

WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: WAINWRIGHT, ROD

Age if under 18: OVER 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18')

Occupation: FIRE OFFICER

This statement (consisting of 19 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature: R WAINWRIGHT

Date: 15/05/2018

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded ☐ (supply witness details on rear)

This statement is about my role as Station Manager for the London Fire Brigade, for the investigation into the fire at Grenfell Tower that occurred on the 14th of JUNE 2017.

I am [REDACTED] I have been in the fire service since late 1998, September I believe, for the London Fire Brigade (LFB). This will be my 20th year service. My first posting was at Stratford, as a recruit fire fighter. I then moved on to become a fire rescue operative at Bethnal green. After that, I worked as a CBRN operative for the rapid response team at [REDACTED] where I then became a Watch manager. I moved to training at Southwark training centre and I specialised in BA (breathing apparatus) and firefighting. From there I became a Watch manager at Leyton fire station, and Plaistow fire station. I then went to Central operations at union street HQ as a watch manager. There I was temporarily promoted to station manager on the same team. When I was formally made up to station manager, I started working at the establishment performance team, where I am now.

The establishment and performance team sits under central operations as a strategic role. The role is to look after the day-to-day running and staff. My specific role is station managers/group managers and maybe to a lesser amount the deputy assistant commissioners. I take care of all their rotas and rota groups. We have four rota groups, and they are split north and south. I have to make sure we have enough officers on per day and night. In addition, to make sure we have the right skills in the right places, in order to meet the day-to-day service delivery the fire brigade needs to supply to the public. If needed due to training or sickness, we can get additional officers on duty. In situations like Grenfell Tower, we will have working

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parties. I would be working with department heads to say we need more people on here can you please bring them on additionally. This all feeds into our stars system, which is our electronic role board, where everybody can see everybody's availability. Then from that it feeds into our mobilising system, where our mobilising officers can see who is available on that day, and if they are not available, what they are doing. Therefore, it is a strategic role in the view of the whole brigade. Within that, we take care of the fire stations, fire appliances and staff. This includes working out where we are free to release staff for other things, such as training and joint ventures with partnership agencies. I have been in this role since around about April 2015, which coincided with my promotion to station manager.

Before this role, I was acting up as a station manager at central operations, which is like the parent department for where I work now. They have the overview of the brigade in terms of looking at certain processes, working groups, and new ideas that come in. I was working under Deputy Assistant Commissioner Mick Ellis at that time.

The SERT (Special Entry and Recovery Team) role sits under the special operations group of headquarters. It is there to work with SO19 in the police force, and sits in the MTFA (Marauding Terrorist Firearm Attack) arena for anything counter terrorism. It requires a certain amount of training and understanding of procedures that we would use with the police, should anything happen that we are required to work in line with the police. For this to be effective we have officers on recall, to make sure every 24hrs we have enough officers and can put a SERT team together if needed. Generally, my car is full of equipment that we use and uniform that is unbranded. The SERT team is run out of Union Street, and there is continual professional development. That consists of Expectations on fitness, BA procedures and equipment. There is a minimum of 4 weeks training a year, which is about keeping you current. The recall works so that you have a pager that stays with you when you are on recall. If your shift finishes at 5pm when you are on recall, that pager stays on for the rest of that day and night into the next day. Sometimes you can be on recall for your whole days off, and the pager has to be with you, in case we need to contact you. You would need to be within a 2-hour recall area for that.

Training for SERT, [REDACTED]
place in view of anyone else. It has, also taken place [REDACTED] The
training is usually done with a multi-agency approach and we work very
closely with police and their procedures, as they would do with ours. We have a set format of how we
work and how we conduct ourselves there.

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That is where the CPD (continual professional development) comes into it, because procedures and equipment change, so we have to keep our selves current. The training is self-elected. This means I can self-elect to go on some training because a new piece of equipment has come out. We are entrusted to maintain ourselves, and then we will go on top of that other standard courses.

I am a BAI (breathing apparatus instructor) and I am accredited. I did a two-week course for that. That makes me officially able to train fire fighters, as I did in one of my job roles. The tactics are the same, what we teach people is what we teach people, that does not ever change. For me maybe it is experience and proficiency, because I am always doing it. There is no expectation for a group manager or a station manager to maintain their BA skills. Usually it is for officers up to watch manager to wear at incidents, but in our remit it is for officers to wear, so that differs. I am a HAZMAT officer for hazardous materials, Hazardous Materials & Environmental Protection Officer (HMEPO) and there is an expectation for this role I might have to wear BA in a chemical environment. Therefore, I do continue to wear BA, and I do so more than some fire fighters will in a year. Because whether it be, training or operationally I will be wearing it a lot.

Officially, the LFB dissolved our training arm four or five years ago, now it all gets put through BABCOCKS. Therefore, I have become an assessor, which is a role between the London fire brigade and BABCOCK training. This involves me going down to their training centres, to see if they have met the fire brigade standards. We will ask questions and watch a drill of all elements including BA. I am part of a small team that will go down and quality assure that as well, now that they train our recruits.

In relation to training on high-rise buildings, we do regular training on any situation including high-rise fire training that will test resources and skills. It is drilled in during training, when it comes to establish any high-rise protocols, the risk associated with it, what our gold standard is. We look at how we are going to use the firefighting lift, our equipment and breaking it down into sectors. Planeing of windows or anything on the side of the building, which could be a risk or a hazard. Planeing is firefighting term that describes the motion of an object as it falls to the ground through its tumbling motion. It goes right down to looking at the wind conditions of the building and how that is going to affect the fire. We do regular training with that. We take time to sit down with crews afterwards. The way the crews are structured, is that generally the crew manager or watch manager is in charge, when they get there will start setting the foundations for the structure. Unless there will be an attendance there who will monitor or if necessary take over. They would make sure we get all the responses we expect to see from the LFB side, and

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potentially the police as well, because we take full responsibility for safety at a scene. That could include using police to help close roads, to help easy access and egress from any RVPS we have set.

Stations are expected to maintain their own training, which is monitored by the crew manager, watch manager, station manager and then the group manager as the borough commander. They will also have a look at the risks on their ground and have a look into how much training is being done. For example, some stations in London with have a large amount of high-rise buildings, so they will set up days with neighbouring boroughs, where they go and do a run through a building. This involves them familiarising themselves with the building and doing a drill in the building, to understand the dynamics of that building.

Part of that, we have our visits that we do, our 72D's where we have familiarisations and that goes across all four watches so that no one gets missed. They have a look at the inlets and outlets for the high-rise; the access for example is there anything different, any key codes. Does the building have a foyer, if so is it staffed 24hrs, who runs it and if there are break glasses on every floor. We would have a look at how the lifts work, also if there was a fire lift, where it was and if it worked. There is a robust review and training programme for these procedures and policies. The last high rise training I would have done was at [REDACTED] [REDACTED] within the last three months, because this is part of my SERT role. These courses are run regularly.

I will be mentioning the below people:

Paul McCLENAGAN who is a station manager. I know him because we were firefighters together; we joined at the same time. We were similar age, we had the same aspirations in the job and beliefs as far as the jobs we have chosen and why we wanted to do them. Paul has been a Station Manager for the past 10 years as opposed to me the last 3 years. He is currently a Station Manager in the rapid response team; he looks after our CBRN response which is at [REDACTED] They are a bespoke crew with a set of vehicles to deal with anything from terrorism to Hazmat related.

Nick HARDING is a station manager, we first met when I was a fire rescue operative, when I was at Bethnal Green Nick was one of my instructors. He was a watch manager at the time, a very good officer, a safe pair of hands as we say. That was around 2008 and then we didn't see each other for a long time, then we would just bump into each other at events or headquarters.

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Richard WELSH is a Deputy Assistant Commissioner; I have known Richard for about 12 years and worked with him on community fire safety projects such as LIFE (local intervention fire education).

Pat GOULBOURNE is also a Temporary Deputy Assistant Commissioner, I have known him for about the last 7 years through working at various incidents and the Special operations group. Pete WOLFENDEN is a Station Manager in the NW area and have known him for about 2 years through work-based projects.

Nick SAUNDERS is also a Station Manager and have known him for nearly 2 years but our work streams do not cross.

Gareth COOK is a Station Manager in the NW area and I have known him for about 3 years and have been on various training courses with him.

Dave FARR is a Station Manager who has since retired and works for the Brigades Protective Equipment Group in Croydon. I have known Dave for about 8 years, as he was a trainer with myself.

Gary WILSON who is an operational response watch manager. Gary works within the special operations team. He works around SERT but because he is not a station manager rank, he cannot be a SERT officer. He has a good understanding of SERT procedure because it aids his day-to-day role.

On the 14th June 2017, I was at home and I was in a deep sleep. I was not on recall that night. My wife always urges me to keep my phone on silent when I sleep, but it was just luck I had left my phone on vibrate. At around 0100-0130hrs I received a call from Paul McCLENAGAN on my personal phone. It was almost a week prior I was standing at London Bridge dealing with a terrorist attack, so that was immediately what came to my mind, so when I received the call I thought we had another attack. Paul said put the TV on, we have one of the biggest fires in London. I put sky news on and saw what was happening. It was a very quick conversation. We discussed what we had; Paul was clearly busy, so he was quick; he asked me if I could attend. He told me where the event is, what was the RVP, who I was going to be working with and what he wanted me to do. Paul advised me PPV (positive Pressure Ventilation) was needed to re stabilise the core of the building. There is a small team of us on recall, but they needed people there straight away. I got my things, mobilised and 10- 15 minutes later, I had left. I later found out that order had come from DAC Adrian FENTON.

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I quickly put my clothes on, which were my tactical firefighting clothes; these are clothes I wear for any MTFA event. I went downstairs and turned on my airwave. The airwave is my work radio, so I could hear any updated information about the event. I got into my car and made my way. I was given the postcode for Grenfell Tower, and I put it into my sat nav and I think I travelled on the M11 then the M25 and then joined into London, I remember I did not cut through town. I had Nick HARDINGS telephone number so I rung him en route, I had a quick conversation with him on the hands free. We tried to make a quick plan of where we were going to meet and what we were going to do. But I didn't realise it was going to be as hard as it was and any best-made plans were redundant on point of contact. But we looked at our plan of how we were going to respond to deal with it. When I got near the roads were heavily congested. I ended up parking around a quarter of a mile away. The journey took me about 25-30 minutes. I parked, put my equipment on and aligned myself with the building. It took me about 5 minutes on foot. Getting closer I could see how bad it was. I have never experienced anything as bad. I was just thinking of the magnitude of it the whole way there. Listening to messages and hearing how many appliances were there, it was unprecedented. The week before hand, I thought that London Bridge was going to be my career defining moment, but that was forgotten about with the size of this. The car I was driving at the time was a golf 1.6 in black, which is my personal response car. It is fitted with sirens and lights front, rear and top. I drove that car because that is what I am insured to drive on brigade business and it has all my equipment in it. I drove as fast as I could there, safely but it was time critical. The lights and sirens were on the whole way there, nonstop even on clear roads.

The equipment I have in my car is my structural firefighting equipment, which is our normal rig for most incidents. That consists of leather fire boots, leggings tunic, helmet and my respirator. Additionally to that, I carry my ballistic protection equipment, and my certified unmarked pure black kit. I also have a spare helmet, which I use for training, this is because under high temperatures the helmet taints and goes a yellow/brown colour. My other helmet is white and clean and presents the look of an officer at an incident.

When I was en route and I had my airwave on there was an array of messages back and forth from the command unit. It was mainly to try and pick up tactical modes. When I say that I mean if we are going to be offensive or defensive, it defines how we are attacking that fire. Also listening for things such as the dimensions of the building, fire spread and how much was alight. From what I saw on the news, a fair bit of the building was alight. Sometimes you can get a lot of information from listening, but sometimes it can be repetitive, the same messages going out, because it's not just me, every single officer in the

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brigade would have had their airwave on that night, and we all needed to know what we were going to. So there was a lot, I was getting percentages alight, persons reported, any information that would have given me a better view so that when I get their it wasn't going to be such a shock. Also if someone wanted to speak to me, they could be calling me up on the airwave as well as your phone. I can't remember specific messages, as there was so much information. Paul told me to speak to Nick HARDING and Gary WILSON who was bringing in the SAWD (Symmetrical all-wheel drive) vehicle, which carries the positive pressure ventilation equipment. They were quick conversations, we agreed the postcodes we had been given, and where we were travelling from. Who ever got there first was to scan the building and gather information, and then give a tactical plan to the incident commander, or the sector commander to pass up to the incident commander. We carry other equipment, but the PPV was what we were being called on for.

There was no other firefighting equipment we had that would have made an impact on that fire. So first one there was to start making the operational plan, as to what we were going to do, where and how. We work closely with the NILO (duty national Incident liaison officer). Nick was in attendance first.

I have never worked near Grenfell Tower before; it was new to go to that location. I can be sent anywhere whilst at work, but I very rarely went that way unless driving through. I know the area is generally wealthy but other than that very little working knowledge. I must have passed the tower before but I wouldn't have known what it is or what it is called. I have never been to the actual tower before. I don't go to West London a lot of the time, so from looking at the map on my phone I think it was an east to west approach. I believe I came off near Paddington, and came around the back of there. I remember seeing the glow of the tower in the distance about five minutes before I reached it, and thinking Christ. I could make out the smoke plume from the fire, and see how much that was affecting it. Then I could actually see the building and it was almost as if a match had been lit and totally burning down in the distance. The nearer I got it started to become more and more apparent that it was getting worse and worse. I could see the building was a high-rise block of flats, and looked to me at the time like it was entirely alight. When I say entirely alight, I mean the fire was wrapped around it 360 degrees. I couldn't actually see the back of the building, but for me there was enough information for me to believe the fire had wrapped all the way around it. It was unlike anything anyone has ever experienced before. It really did put gravitas on the situation to that everyone was going to be tested that night and this wasn't going to be your run of the mill incident. Even at that time of night, there were a lot of cars on the road, and a lot

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of footfall. On a number of occasions, I would turn into a road and then have to reverse out and then find a different way through. Hence why I wasn't able to get a close to the incident, as I would have liked to. I eventually parked on a housing estate. I don't know the name of it but I could tell you roughly, where it was. It was almost behind a church, and I had to go through an alleyway to get to it. People were just dumping cars, regardless if it was an emergency vehicle or not. The road in front of me was blocked by cars, fire appliances, just all sorts. People from the housing estates were outside watching, when I turned up they were running over to me and asking me what was happening. I couldn't give anything away because I needed to get to the scene, but I asked them to get inside and move their vehicles off the street if they had any. If anything I was a little snappy, which isn't me, but I was trying to get my fire kit on, with people coming over some of whom were drunk, and I really didn't have the time to have a conversation. I just had to say, I'm really sorry I need to get over there, please help us and move any cars. I was rigged within about a minute and I was gone. When I got there, a cordon was already in place, which was staffed by the police, to prevent people getting inside the hazard zone. Press where at the cordon, people filming and taking pictures. Social media would have been going wild. In terms of the people, they were quite respectful. They stood back there was no jostling, some were cuddling each other and crying as it was clearly something terrible. I could over hear some people saying that they had friends there. People were bringing teas and coffees out to officers. The community was really working with us. Members of public took me through a side alley and brought me in front of the tower. There were lots of people watching from behind the cordon and talking. I asked a police officer if he was ok, he obviously wasn't going to be able to talk in front of people. He just shook his head at me, and that was enough to say this is bad. I would say at that point there were around 20 members of the public there, men and women, old and young. As the hours went on the numbers increased, but it was well managed. The community seemed helpful. When I went back to my car to get kit for Gary there was a member of press trying to ask me questions and I elected not to speak to him, it wasn't the right time for that. Some cars must have moved as when I went back other officers parked their cars near me.

My initial thoughts when I got to Grenfell Tower, I thought "fuck me". When I saw the fire and the way it moved up the building I was shocked. Generally, with a high-rise fire, the fire will break through the window and you will see it catch stuff like bird netting and stuff like that. Grenfell Tower was different; when I saw it, I could see it was going to be horrific. You could see how far the fire had moved around the building. It brought 911 to mind. I did not know if people were trapped or if they were evacuating. I looked at it and I thought "how am I going to fucking do anything with that, what am I going to do" what

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impact was I going to have on it, what was I going to bring to the party that was going to have an impact. I knew it was not going to be an easy job. Paul was calm, and clearly under pressure to get people there immediately. As I have worked with him in the past, we have a good understanding of each other's work behaviour. I believe I parked in the area of Verity close; I then walked through some pedestrian walkways and came out onto Lancaster road opposite Notting Hill Methodist church. Once I got through to where the traffic tape was, I had a clear view of where I was going to be working for the remainder of the time. There was a lot of hard standing around there where specialist appliances were, and multi-agency responses in front of me. As I walked through that I could see the building, and it was pretty much as I thought from the pictures I had seen and my drive up to it. I felt like an ant in front of it because it was enormous. It was likened to more of a battlefield than any fire scene I had ever been to before, because of the amount of shedding that had happened at the building, the amount of planning of materials that had fallen around it.

I met with Nick HARDING and discussed tactics. We were waiting for the SAWD vehicle with the PPV and the kit we need. We met on the fire ground in front of the building just off site there. In charge of this sector was Richard WELSH. The others I saw were Pat GOULBOURNE, Pete WOLFEDEN, Nick SAUNDERS Gareth COOK and Dave FARR. They all had different roles at the scene.

PPV has been around for about a year so is fairly new skill within the brigade. I trained at another brigade for two weeks to become qualified. There are 20 officers trained in this in the LFB. With the PPV there are different requirements, the size, positioning and the safety of it. It works by forcing fresh air through the building stabilizing the core. We was not sure if we would have an effect, due to the hazard zone of falling cladding, it was really challenging. We advised Pat of our intentions. We had to assess the state of the building, but it was a very dynamic situation and to know if we would be effective we needed to know if the internal doors were open or closed. We needed an entry and an exit point for the air. But we had no solid information. The whole building had failed, we did not know about the doors or windows and it was very hard to see. We also had to consider the fact it could fuel the fire. But the conditions needed to try and be improved.

There were police officers shuttling fire crews with riot shields, which really made my skin crawl. They had both circular shields and the more traditional long rectangular shields. They were above their heads and above our crews, to protect them coming in and out of the building. Debris was falling the whole time I was there, sometimes It was really loud and sometimes it was smaller bits, but continued at regular

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intervals. That makes the fire brigade go whoa, hold on a minute that is a fire hazard. But it's a game changer at that moment. We know we need to do something about the size of that fire. We were lessening our chances or anything-bad happening with the shields, which we were truly grateful for, It was maybe a ten-meter run, from the natural cover of the overpass to the building. There was no stopping when running across under the shield until you were inside the tower and under cover. Once inside the tower, the shields were taken from them and the next crew than needed to come out would use it. They were all working from the outside safety officer, who would say "go" when there was a gap in the falling debris, if there was debris coming down they wouldn't come out. The building was well alight from top to bottom. Some faces of the building were worse than others. I was trying to understand how the fire had wrapped around the building the way it had. Something had caught and the fire was spreading which was unusual for us. I think I was there around 15 minutes before I met up with Nick who was assessing the building from the outside. He takes lots of things into consideration, for example the size of the building. All this is to see if we can have an effect on the fire, if we can make it better or if it would make it worse. PPV can be great at tool for restabilising, but what you do not want to do is add more air to a fire, which would add to its fuel and ferocity, if the PPV isn't going to work. We have to take a measured response to that, in such an unprecedented situation. We couldn't just put the fans on and see; we had to be sure it was going to work, or at least not make it worse. It took us a while to do this, as it was two fans, it was never going to reach the top of the building, but for us, if it could make conditions better for one person, then it was worth it.

At the bottom of the building, there was a glass cover then the footway where there was a concrete above it, which gave us cover from the falling debris, so this was our chosen point. We have to seal around the door to encapsulate it. This was the main door to the atrium. We had two fans and did not know if from our position we would get a good enough seal, as the round aperture of our fan propels a gust of wind outwards, the further it goes the wider it becomes. We had to get both fans on and positioned towards the door to try and seal it. What we want is nothing coming out and it all pushed in. That's all based on how far away we are from the door, and the surroundings. We had to be further back than we wanted; this was due to the falling debris. We would have had debris falling on us and the fans constantly. So we had to go further back in order to take cover under the walkway. It was the most suitable place at the time. Normally we would try to stagger the fans and get them at different angles. But where we were there was a bike rack with bikes and all twisted metal, it made it impossible to get a gold text book perfect set up. It

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was hard and this was all part of our assessment. Every attempt was made to make a positive impression, by trying to clear the broken glass. I was there about 30-40 minutes until the fans were on.

Gary does not carry fire kit so he did not have any with him, so I gave him my spare fire kit. I spoke to Keely FOSTER and when I booked in, I added him to my role call board, with skills and location. I amended my board with him because he was there and a resource to me. CSS command support system. He was going to make a difference.

Pats crews were inside the building so they had to be told prior that the fans were going to be turned on. We told him we were going to turn the fans on; one of us would be inside assessing. The strategy was that Nick and Gary Wilson would be outside with the fans and I would be inside the building to monitor the reaction. After a clear thirty seconds it was having no affect. That was more to do with the fact that outside there had been a failure. So that never really got off the ground.

I waited inside the atrium of the building; Nick and Gary were positioned on the fans. There was light smoke but it was breathable. The best way I could describe the smoke there was like being in the presence of a BBQ that is around 10-20 meters away. We were working in that. The fans pushed the smoke inside but it was workable. I could see the airflow change very quickly. We had the fans on for 30 seconds tops. More smoke had built up and it had not improved anything, it was not making anything better, and was dragging more smoke inside. I went out under a police shield. There was a large amount of smoke rapidly coming from something about 10-20 foot above the door. The best was I could describe it would be a HVAC (combined heating and ventilation system) but I could not be sure. There seemed to be a failure in the building. It changed the dynamics and immediately we identified fans off. The fans are powered by petrol run generators, so combustion and other fumes are a factor to consider. We did not have anything else to move the fumes so PPV was an option we could not deliver on. Fire fighters had said it had got smokier inside. I do not believe the extra smoke was from our actions. The smoke continued to pour out from there for another hour before it started to peter off which confirmed to me this was not because of the fans but something else.

The debris coming down was what I now understand to be the external parts of the building such as any metal batons that may have been on there to hold on the actual boards. So now not only were the boards falling where they had caught alight, but also any pieces of metal were falling down with, it if they had lost their integrity. Every now and then, you would see some metal studding falling down, just burnt

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twisted metal. This made moving in and out for crews difficult, as there were no clear walkways. It was made very clear to me early on, that there is a leg over there from a gentle man who jumped out of the higher part of the building, and hit the glass canopy and his leg was torn off. A crew recovered him and took him to where the undercover parking area was and he was declared dead by the LAS. All that could be done was to cover him with some tarp. I don't know if it was from an appliance or it was near in the area. The body needed to be covered for respectful reasons, and then the body was removed when the LAS had established themselves there. I believe the leg was probably removed later, but it was there whilst I was there. It started to get covered by debris but we were mindful to landmark in our heads where it was.

Crews were running in and out regularly, usually in twos and possibly threes, depending on if they could fit under the shield. I would guess there were between 16 and 20 fire fighters in the atrium at any one time. I have never experienced the debris falling as it did and the need to use police shields ever before. We do expect some hazards, and that is why we put in our cordons and have safety zones. But to have the whole shell of a building falling on you was completely new. People knew they were safe outside the cordon and that worked. They also knew when going inside that cordon the risks, which we managed. The only safer way to do it, would have been not to be anyone inside at all, which was never going to happen.

From what I understood from speaking to other staff members, there had been a fire inside from white goods. In my experience if a fire breaches the external boundaries, it's not unusual for it to set light to products left on balconies, or items such as pigeon netting and would obviously add to the fire loading. Worst-case scenario it could travel up. But to see a fire wrapping round the building the way it did, I've never seen or even heard of it before. It would be more likely for the fire to spread inside, if a door wasn't closed or something like that. It was highly unusual to see it wrapping around the building, melting the windows and breaching the compartments from the exterior and the forcing its way into other floors. Because there were so many people there crying and clearly scared from the public side, your empathy is through the roof. Seeing people being brought out from the fire burnt or dead. What you imagined they were feeling you had to times it by 1000 to try and understand what they were feeling. Whilst inside the atrium it was very noisy but the helmets can compound the noise. I don't know if I could hear any alarms going off.

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We put the fans away and re grouped between 0300-0400hrs. A decision was made we needed to extend the water supply. There was only one water riser, and there was not enough water pressure on each floor. It was very testing for resources, and could not move forward past some floors. Firefighting was being made difficult. We have a Rosenbauer pump to work water up the stairs. It was myself, Gareth COOK, Nick and Gary. They are also petrol driven so one problem was it also had to be outside away from the falling debris, but it needs to come in at a certain rate for that to be efficient, so there were certain things that worked in our favour. It is pull cord operated. You attach it via a hose to an appliance then another hose goes from the pump into the atrium. It adds pressure to the water as it passes through the pump. It was just to add another string to our bow. They are on certain fire appliances so it only took a couple of minutes to locate one. That pump just provides the water with a little bit more pressure, to get it up the stairs. We put that plan into place and the decision was there was enough staff there to make that work. The brief was, once the pump was in place with a dedicated water supply, we were going to try and move as much water as we can upstairs, so we would know how long it would be before it starts to become ineffective. That was going to be a suck it and see exercise. The plan was to send up crews and extend the water supply to the floors where they needed the water. That was going to be based on the sector commanders understanding of what supplies were like. Pat was dealing with the tactics for that sector, he had the information on where it was bad, and where the supplies were bad, and we just gave them an extra resource. This gave them more water; the crew were going to have to think on their feet about how they are going to use it. It was all about the comms, from getting the water in, to where they were going to send it. I can't tell you what floor the water got up to, because the crews were motivated. I truly believe, if they could have got it to the very top of the building that day, they would have. This went to plan quickly as it's a firefighters bread and butter. So I was only doing this task for around half an hour. The dry riser was working but in my opinion, it was being over worked. I spoke to some of the crews downstairs; everyone was motivated, keen, anxious and scared. As I used to be a breathing apparatus instructor, so from that side, I tried to give a little bit extra advice, for their own safety. Working on the stairway, if they were going to be taking the hose up, we do usually say get the hose tight in the stairs. But this is dependent on what they were seeing; don't forget you get the hose up a little bit further without, as you lose a bit when you wrap it around the stairway. It's great to keep it tucked in, it keeps it out the way and keeps the stairway open, but they had to risk asses it. If they needed to take the hose straight up staircase, it adds a lot of weight on the hose, then thinking do you need a hose bandage, so it was about dealing with it in pragmatic manner to optimise what we had. It was about being safe, but thinking about other options.

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Put the fire out, make sure everything is out, don't get caught behind anything and don't take any unnecessary risks. On that night/day, I tried to speak to some crews and get some feedback. Confirmation of the floors that were clear, but what I was conscious of not doing, was overstepping my boundary, as Pat was taking it all down and scribing. I just wanted to give them a bit more faith and leadership, to say "come on guys, we can do this. We need to get that fire put out". I don't remember smelling any gas, or anyone bringing any issues to my attention.

We couldn't get some of our appliances there, I know there was an Aerial appliance that was offered to us from Surrey and was used to fight one of the sides of the fire. It was just to the right of where I was as I have described on my drawing exhibit RGW/2 I believe it can reach higher than anything we had in London. But that also needed its own water supply.

The smoke there was medium to dark grey and generic, sometimes had a musty colour when certain things burnt. There wasn't a steady colour as it was darker at the top, but the smoke was constant. I don't believe the smoke was any different to any other fire. It smelt like a usual smoky smell. I could hear screaming and crying. Pumps working and crews talking about what they were doing.

At this point, I was outside and I had seen Keeley FOSTER, who is a deputy assistant Commissioner. It had become apparent that all the roads were now blocked, and I told her that I had to a distance away and getting in has been a nightmare. So access and egress was an issue that needed dealing with. At this point, I was acting in an advisory role, just refreshing people with what they already knew. I asked Pat if there was anything else I could do, and he released me. We had more appliances we needed to attend, and other blue light vehicles also needing to attend. But they could get anywhere near the incident. What I offered was, that I would identify what roads were blocked, what was blocking them, and where we could move that into. I took two available firefighters with me, and we had a small brief. We were having trouble with the narrower residential streets. We needed to know what was blocking the roads, who they belonged to and get them moved. We went off in different directions as far as we could down each road. I could tell you road names or directions I am afraid, we just starburst. We then listed appliances, cars, number plates. Both were drivers and I did say to them, if you can safely move those appliances do so. If you can get them off the road, so there was enough room for other appliances to fit through and keep the road open. They were able to do this easily with some appliances. They came back to me and gave me a list of vehicles that needed moving. I passed those back to Keeley FOSTER, I then set out getting in contact with stations about the vehicles and if I was unsuccessful, I wanted to at least get some drivers there to

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help. I handed the list of police vehicle to a police officer, and said these are your vehicles we need moving. I don't believe the ambulances were too bad on the night, it was just the police and fire that had dumped and run. We opened up the area within an hour. We managed to get enough free crews, get them involved in what we were doing. Identify drivers by using radios and loud halers. We were on top of this in around an hour to an hour and forty minutes.

I took up a control point, which was outside the sports centre on the green. We had a lot of crews congregate there, both fresh and old. Some people had been wearing BA all night, and they were exhausted. It was clear this was a major incident; we needed to have some sort of BA main control. One of the functions of our job is to have that at any incident. Once we were happy that the roads were opening up and we could get assets in and out, I then took over BA main control. From my experience as both a station manager and as a BA instructor, I would like to think I have a good handle on what BA main control is about. But it was hard, I had appliances with miss matching crews, I had people that were exhausted from one wear, people that maybe had two wears. There was the need to know who had there sets still, did I have enough BA cylinders. I needed to know who else was working with me, where we were going to have a rest area and a holding area. I spoke to KEELEY and I said leave this with me I can run this. I also had two crew managers and a watch manager underneath me, which I utilised. It was rough, it was ready and it was dirty. It was basically on a loud haler; I took a vocal point and brought every ones attention to that point. I asked all the crew managers and watch managers to attend where I was standing. I needed to separate who had arrived and who had already worn. I had to make sure people fit and fresh to wear; as there was no doubt in my mind people would have stayed all month long if it had an effect on the outcome. But the matter of fact was I needed to keep a rotation of people coming in, and I also had to get some stations away. It was a bit like spinning plates on the biggest level I have ever done. The brief I gave my staff was that I needed a rest area, somewhere to take the exhausted crews, no matter how much they argued they needed to get away from there. I had a clear briefing from KEELEY about what crews had been there the longest. We utilized the leisure centre for the rest area, we had the sports hall downstairs. The salvation Army and other external agencies were there offering aid, food, drink and refreshments. They were roughly 20 meters behind us, so that married nicely for me that people could get refreshments, and really importantly rehydrate. Also, to get some food on board for those that had been there all night. I would receive a request for fresh wearers. I would go next in the que and send them in. We had to make sure we had fresh BA sets and those waiting to go in were resting. Wearers had to leave their BA kits there as we needed to know we had enough and if needed we could get them repaired and

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cleaned in situ. One firefighter was [REDACTED] so we had to keep on top of everything. It was starting to break day and would guess the time was between 0500.

- 0700hrs. As it was starting to get lighter, I had better visibility of what was happening. The sun was coming up and it was a hot day so we had to start to get people in the shade and be mindful of that. We also needed to start getting people away and those arriving in to make best use of our resources. All watch managers and officers who had been there for an over amount of time, were given the brief to collate their crews and drop all their BA sets in the BA holding area. This was where we had the RPE LO - respiratory protection liaison officer, who deal with all the BA logistics. Although we had some crews leaving with potentially no sets, we needed to know we had sets there ready for new crews coming on and off. Then before they left they had to come to me and collect their role call boards, so we had them clearly marked as leaving. They then also had to attend Paddington Fire Station that was for debriefing, make statements and to be assessed by advisory and counselling. There were some challenges were people just wanted to go home. There was some soft skills needed to say "I understand that you are upset, but we just need to make sure that you are alright" and people went there. It was a hard task. We were able to get people away. People were coming to me with other various problems; we were trying to offload these from the command unit. We established a holding area for fresh wearers and wearers that were fit to wear again. A gold standard is when they wear BA once. Then there is a test to see if they are fit and well, then they can go in again. There were lots of things to consider, the Metabolic heat, running so many floors; the kits can keep heat inside, the emotions and the external heat barrier. It was testing every fibre in every ones body that day and I had to make sure they were safe. If they didn't look well enough to go back in, they went down stairs where it was cool and we had crash mats. I was met with group manager Steve NORMAN who attended. He took over from my role as it needed another senior officer. It continued to run with the same principals and I stayed to assist him. Radio was hard that day because the channel was busy, so was useful to have a runner to go backwards and forwards from the command unit when needed. Those that I spoke to said it was overwhelming as there was no space on the channel to call up on the radio. The next morning was a very hot day. The sun had come across, so we had to move people over to where it was cooler and into the shade. I stayed there until around 5pm that day. During that time, I stayed with Steve doing the same job, moving crews in, moving crews out. Checking equipment was where it should be, and when they left making sure they took their role board cards and sending them off for de brief. I was then replaced by Station Manager Dave GEORGE and Steve was replaced by I believe Group manager Jamie JENKINS.

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I got something to eat and drink at that point. Went to the command unit with my role call board. Asked if I could do more and was told to go and have a rest as I had been there for around 18 hours, I didn't take any breaks or leave my post, but people did bring me refreshments. It was exceptional circumstances. I collected my personal effects and let those on my sector I was leaving. I found a purse on my way back and handed it to an officer. It was an orange purse. I got in my car and went to Paddington about a mile away, which took around 10 minutes. It was about 1700hrs. I spoke to my wife to let her know I was ok. Got to Paddington and saw lots of crews there that we had sent back there. I also saw Deputy Assistant Commissioner Sabrina COHEN-HATTON, and Assistant Chief Tim CUTBILL and I spoke to them about it. They were there to help run that assurance process, debriefing and welfare. It was kind of a numbering system of writing thoughts up, any contemporaneous notes and then welfare. I elected not to see them at the time. All I really wanted to do if I'm totally honest is go home. That process took about an hour to an hour and a half. I spoke to Station Manager Paul EASTLAND. He was there helping upstairs, making notes. He is also a close friend, so I spoke to him. I then drove home. I was home within about an hour and a half, and I believe it was 1900hrs. I went home to my wife and kids and then tried to re think about everything, you re live it and think if there was anything else we could have done.

I came back the next day at 0800hrs. We had stood up our BCC (Brigade coordination centre) at Stratford, which is where I am based. I wasn't part of the BCC at that point, but my day-to-day role on the establishment performance team meant I needed to make sure we had a full range of resources. Checking our stars, which is our system to see who is on duty and where everyone is, if they are on training etc. We needed to make sure if there was anything preventing people from being mobilised, what we could do to make them available. Paul TREW was running the BCC, and I let them know we had spare cars if people's cars weren't working, to get them in. I also needed to make sure that the crews were fit mentally and physically. Asking people if they are ok, doing the caring, and wellbeing side of things. It was to ensure our service delivery was at its optimum and nothing was going to be missed. That was that 24 hours for me.

Throughout this incident, I felt people saw things that you would only see during a war, so I had to be mindful of people's welfare. I think we were resourced correctly but Grenfell Tower was a phenomenon.

Exhibit RGW/1 seal number MPSZ13185079 - A copy of my contemporaneous notes made prior to my shift finishing on 15.06.17.

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Exhibit RGW/2 seal number MPSZ13185080 - A map I drew for the police.

Exhibit RGW/3 seal number MPSZ13134129 - Copy of MG11 showing track changes.

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