

**WITNESS STATEMENT**

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: HAYWARD, SCOTT

Age if under 18: (if over 18 insert 'over 18')

Occupation: FIRE OFFICER

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This statement (consisting of page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature:

Date: 04/10/2017

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded ☐ (supply witness details on rear)

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This statement is my account of the Grenfell Tower fire that took place in London on Wednesday 14th June 2017.

I am employed by the London Fire Brigade and my current role is the Principle Operations Manager (POM). I have been in this role for approximately eleven years after serving with the Royal Navy in a similar background. The London Fire Brigade's Principle Operations Manager role is based around strategic management more than operational involvement. I provide an overview of the control room from a strategic view. This includes liaising with senior fire officers, monitoring staffing levels, reviewing system capability, ensuring that all our systems are fully functional on a 24/7 basis and other areas. My working days are Monday to Friday normally around 5.30am - 3pm.

If there is a serious incident, there is a call out rota between the three senior staff managers. That is myself, Joanne SMITH and Adam CRINION. Joanne is the Senior Operations Manager (SOM) based at our Operations Command Centre and Adam is another Senior Operations Manager but has only been in the role for 4 weeks at the time of the incident, and has been shadowing Joanne. The overnight call out rota between the senior managers is in place should there be a large scale fire incident that requires senior assistance and additional support.

I will describe the control room setup within the London Fire Brigade. Our main Operations Centre is based in Merton, London, SW19. We have a fall back Operations Centre in Stratford, East London which

Signature:  
2017

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is smaller than Merton. Control staff are attached to various Watches or teams as they can be referred too. They work a variable shift pattern, providing more staff on duty at busier times. One watch is made up of 15-16 staff members. Each watch has an Operations Manager (OM) who is supported by three Assistance Operations Managers (AOM). The OM and AOM sit at the back of the room and deal with any incidents within the control room itself. This can include monitoring calls, supervising calls and resource management.

There are eleven control room staff members who are split into parts; three control room officers (CRO), two radio transmission operators, one pager officer and sometimes one resource management officer on a night shift. All of these staff are trained to take any 999 calls and do so if there are a larger number of calls during a shift, or if colleagues are on breaks. Each role may vary as a result of calls and live incidents.

Control room staff are on a six day shift pattern. Day one is referred to as the 'day shift' which is 0800-2000 hours. Day two is referred to as a 'short shift' split to either 0800-1600 hours or 1400-2200 hours. Day three is referred to as 'night shift' 2000-0800 hours. Day's four to six are rest days, however staff are able to do overtime and assist with covering staff on other Watches. Control Room Officers (CRO) pick up and deal with the calls made to the fire service via 999. They generally take the information from the caller and mobilise resources without assistance.

The Operations Manager (OM) will oversee what units are being mobilised to a call alongside assisting with any advice that is sought. With regards to breaks, the control room staff rotate themselves and have rolling breaks. They tend to organise their own if we are not busy and are receiving a low number of calls. The breaks are regular due to the nature of the role.

Throughout this statement I will use terminology that the Fire Brigade use. I will explain various words to assist with understanding. The first is the word 'pump' which simply means a fire engine appliance. For example, when the words '25 pump fire' are used, it means that 25 fire engines are assigned to a fire. To put that into context, an average house fire requires two pumps. A high rise building is normally four or more pumps. Alongside pumps we have specialist vehicles such as fire rescue units and command units.

I will also mention 'Fire Survival Guidance' calls, or 'FSG' in abbreviated terms. I am not a controller coming from a military background and I have never given fire survival guidance myself, but have a lot of understanding on it being in the London Fire Brigade for over ten years. If a person calls 999 and tells

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2017

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us there is a fire in a building our standard advice for a house/flat/dwelling is to tell the caller to get out and stay out. If the caller provides our Control Room Officers (CRO) with information that they are unable to get out due to fire or smoke, the CRO can initiate 'Fire Survival Guidance'.

When a call becomes FSG, the general advice for a fire in a high rise building is to stay put, assuming that the caller is not affected by heat, fire or smoke and await rescue from Fire Fighters. The guidance can be to open a window to get fresh air; put something under the door to prevent smoke coming in; get a wet rag to cover faces, or move to a different location with the flat or building where there is no smoke or fire. This guidance is given whilst awaiting rescue from Fire Fighters on the ground. The Control Room Officers stay on the line, keep the callers calm and give continuous guidance. Each call is judged on its own accord based on the circumstances. This high rise building advice is both government policy and London Fire Brigade policy. It was revised following lessons learnt from the Lakanal fire in 2009, which included guidance around smoke as well as heat and fire.

I will now talk about the night of Tuesday 13th June going into Wednesday 14th June 2017. I was working as normal on the Tuesday day time. Joanne Smith was the on-call senior manager that night. At about 1.30-2am on the Wednesday I was at home. I received a telephone call from Joanne Smith telling me that there was a 25 pump fire with multiple Fire Survival Guidance calls and that she was going into work at our fall back Operations Centre in Stratford, East London. This Operations Centre is smaller than our base at Merton which was non operational that night due to essential maintenance work being undertaken.

My telephone call with Joanne was very brief and I received no more information but that there was a big fire and a large fire brigade response. Due to the size of our response and potential seriousness of the incident, I decided to go into work and support Joanne. I quickly got ready, left my home in [REDACTED] and drove down to Stratford on emergency blue lights. Within thirty minutes the fire brigade response to the fire had gone from 25 pump to 40 pumps, not including additional support such as rescue units, command units and aerial ladders. During my drive to Stratford I did not listen to the radio and was only informed via phone call from Joanne.

I arrived at the Stratford Command Centre at about 2.40am. I had a quick shower, got dressed into my uniform then went into the control room to get an overview as to what was happening. The Stratford Control Centre was very noisy with control room officers on the phones taking calls. The television was

Signature:  
2017

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on in the background and you could see the outside of a high rise Tower was on fire. I was informed that this tower was Grenfell Tower.

I was made aware that by the time I got to Stratford, the Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) policy had changed from the standard national policy 'stay put' to new advice of 'get out' and self-rescue. I believe this was a joint decision between Andy ROWE, who was the Assistant Commissioner (AC) on the ground, the Deputy Assistant Commissioner (DAC) Adrian FENTON and Joanne SMITH. I overheard conversation that crews could not get above the 15th floor of Grenfell Tower and the decision was made because crews may not have got to those people on the upper floors, in addition to all the other facts and resources in the circumstances.

For the next two hours everyone was extremely busy, taking calls, looking at crew resources and co-ordination. I monitored my Control Room staff and liaised with senior officers, providing them with regular updates. This included speaking to the Director of Operations staff officer, Rob DAVIES in order to bring the Commissioners group up to date with resourcing and control room operations.

I had no communications with crews on the ground at the Tower. Nor did I go to the scene itself. I went round the control room asking the control Room officers if they were ok, providing support to them where it was appropriate whilst they were taking phone calls. They were unable to take any breaks due to the high volume of calls that were relentless. It was full on but we just got on with it and I ensured my staff were ok.

The advice of 'get out' was still in place over the next few hours, with Control Room Officers taking/logging calls. By around 4.30am things were starting to calm down in the control room. Resource Management were beginning to rotate crews at the tower, with all crews going to a central location in Paddington for a debrief and to write notes. At that point it was the start of the recovery phase in the control room.

Calls across the whole of London still needed to be considered when mobilising the crews, as we were sending pumps from all areas to the Tower. I was speaking to the Operations Manager, Alex NORMAN, asking her to organise breaks for the control room officers. Adam CRINION went to get some food for them as there was no opportunity of their own accord. Joanne made the decision to arrange for a Counsellor to come and see the Control Room staff prior to them going off duty. The Counselling is a

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2017

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24/7 service. Due to the nature and sheer volume of FSG calls, we believed this was necessary to look after our staff as there were lots of tears and upset. Emotions were beginning to come out.

The Counsellor arrived at 7am and spoke to all the staff on the watch before they finished their shift. I did not want the staff going home without seeing the Councillor, informing the staff that the Councillor was there.

The watch changeover was at 8am when the 'day shift' and 'short shift' staff members come in. When they arrived, they were briefed by the Operations Manager Alexandra NORMAN as to what had taken place overnight, and were informed that it was still a live incident with 999 calls still being received. With it being a live incident at that point, there was no debrief with the night shift staff prior to them finishing and going home.

As the morning went on, I stayed on duty and continued with my normal line of work, whilst assisting with resource management and staff support. I think I finished work that day at about 4pm. After the incident the staff on the watch who were working that night have had a qualified councillor available to them for voluntary help.

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