

**WITNESS STATEMENT**

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: BOULTON, STEVEN

Age if under 18: OVER 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18') Occupation: FIRE OFFICER

This statement (consisting of 14 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature: S BOULTON

Date: 05/01/2018

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded  (supply witness details on rear)

I am the above named person and my details are known to Police. This statement is in relation to the Grenfell Tower Fire that occurred on WEDNESDAY 14 JUNE 2017.

My name is Steven BOULTON and I am a Firefighter. I have been a Firefighter for nineteen (19) years, my Pay Number is [REDACTED]2A. I am currently based at EDMONTON FIRE STATION and am posted to Red Watch. I have been at Edmonton for nine (9) years and before that I was based at FINCHLEY, ESSEX and LINCOLNSHIRE. The night of the fire at Grenfell Tower I was on night duty at Edmonton Fire Station. I was on Red Watch, my call sign was A346 and I was posted to the Fire Rescue Unit (FRU). I did not know of Grenfell Tower before the night of the fire and I am not familiar with the area.

I will make reference to the following exhibit in this statement:

- I did a contemporaneous statement after the incident I exhibit as SBO/01 — notes of Grenfell Tower Fire incident 14/06/2017.

I am a competent Firefighter in terms of my training and I have additional qualifications and skills, completed during my career. We do lots of courses and training, including refresher training, throughout the course of the role as a Firefighter. The additional qualifications I have include Fire Rescue Unit (FRU), Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) and Swift Water Rescue Training, LACE — Line Access Casualty Extrication, Line Rescue, Road Traffic Accident (RTA). In the FRU you have Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus (EDBA). I am trained to use EDBA, everyone on an FRU is. Part of your

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initial Firefighting training would be to use Standard Duration Breathing Apparatus (SDBA). I am also a driver, I am qualified to drive all appliances.

We periodically train and our training is recorded on the computer system, we check emails, to keep track of when and where our training is. It all blurs into one as there is so much training we do. Training covers all firefighting policies. During our night shifts we have lectures and during day shifts we may do practical training. Practical training includes use of our kits when we are training. Examples of refresher training we do is swift water rescue training being completed yearly, line training every six (6) months. There are lots of courses for USAR and in various locations, including in Harrow, Park Royal, Beckton, Croydon, and outside London for some, including residential training. Due to my skills and qualifications I will be on call for some of my days off and have a pager to let me know when I am needed.

Swift water rescue includes rescues in floods, lines are a method of rescue, USAR includes use of a mini digger, advanced surveys for buildings in case of risk of collapse. Training includes in confined space, training with heavy equipment, heavy lifting kits, and rail kits. On duty we have completed practical training in empty unused buildings. To make training more realistic during training we will put smoke into buildings, blacken our masks to limit our visibility, and we will have our gear on.

I have completed training for high rise buildings. We have had lectures on this and we do visits for familiarisation, this is called a section 7(2)d. On the Mobile Data Terminal (MDT) we can look at information on the buildings we are going too, including hazards. I cannot recall the last time I did training for high rise buildings. The practical side of training for tower blocks can be restricted. We have a tower in our yard in Edmonton and we use this for practical training. This is not that realistic for a high rise but we can use it for lots of aspects of training. The stairs inside the tower is a Jacob ladder, so steps that go straight up and not like stairs you get in a tower block. We use this tower for line training and casualty rescue, it is realistic for some aspects of training.

I have dealt with calls for high rise buildings throughout career but nothing to the extent of the Grenfell Tower fire. There are three (3) or four (4) tower blocks near the station. With previous incidents we would turn up and what we do is dependent on the situation you are faced with. Generally you get your kit, and spilt into sectors to deal with the situation you have. The Officer In Charge (OIC) stays downstairs, and the Crew Manager goes up to assess the situation.

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You take every incident as it comes as every incident is different. I cannot specify any incidents as I have been to quite a few over the years, incidents can merge into one.

Compartmentation is all part of legislation, for example having fire doors and other fire safety measures. A fire will predominately stay within the flat. I do not recall anything I have been to that have spread that much out of a flat. If the fire is going from floor to floor you would have different working areas. You get more units and you sector the incidents.

The night of the fire at GRENFELL TOWER I started my night duty on TUESDAY 13 JUNE 2017 at 8pm. I am not sure what time I actually got into work, usually we get in a bit early to let the day shift people get away early but I cannot recall what time I got in on that particular night. At the start of the shift we do a roll call when we report for duty. I was posted to the FRU, and was the driver of the FRU that night. At the beginning of the shift I carried out all the checks. This includes on the appliance, on the kits and equipment, BA checks. As I was on the FRU I was an EDDBA wearer that night, all of us posted on the FRU would be EDDBA wearers. At the station we have the FRU, Pump, and Pump Ladder. I do not think anything was off the run that night. Off the run means it would not be in use. I believe all the appliances were in use that shift.

It is a few months since that night, I cannot remember what else happened that night, whether we had any previous calls. During nights after a certain time you are allowed to relax, go to the gym, and to bed. Sometimes I go to the gym, I do not recall what time we were able to relax. I was in bed, asleep and it was between 3-4am that we, the FRU, got the call. The exact time would be on the tip sheet. The bells go down, and it woke me up. When the bells go down this tells you what appliances are called to the incident. As I was asleep I did not know of the incident prior to the bells doing down. The lights went on and the speakers calls out 'mobilise, mobilise' and tells you what appliance is requested, it would have said A346, which is the FRU.

I got out of bed and made my way to the Watch Room to get the tip sheet. The Watch Room is east of the appliance bay at the station. Someone will be in the Watch Room all night, I cannot remember who was in there that night. There is a computer in there, a screen on the wall, and details of the call gets printed out on a tip sheet. This tip sheet has details of the call and an idea of where it is on the map by giving you a grid reference. The details include relevant information about the appliances going to the call, and where the incident is. I cannot remember exactly what was on the tip sheet. I remember it being a forty

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(40) pump fire. I thought 'okay, we have got something serious here'. The tip sheet would have said it was a high rise building. I do not recall if the tip sheet stated the number of floors on the high rise. I saw that the location was not on our map, so on route to the incident someone else checked the route. We have a big map on the wall in the Watch Room and there is also maps on the MDT in the appliance. In addition we carry maps on the appliance and we use google maps on our mobile phones. The incident was requesting ten (10) FRU's and it was a forty (40) pump, this is a big incident. It is very rare to get called to a thirty (30) or forty (40) pump fire. It is the biggest fire I have ever dealt with.

In the FRU was Crew Manager Tim CUTBILL, Firefighter Andy VAN GOUGH and Firefighter Andy WRIGHT. We make sure we all have our kit, that the lockers on the FRU are checked. I asked if everyone had everything, was everyone on, seatbelts on and we left, I had a rough idea of the direction I needed to travel in. Sometimes when the alarms go off it will call one (1) or two (2) appliances. I am not sure what time the Pump or Pump Ladder from Edmonton went to the call, I think they were both still at Edmonton when we went to the call. But I cannot be sure of this, I am concentrating on what I am doing. When we leave the station the Crew Manager presses a button on the MDT which will show that we are on route. Tim was sat in the front passenger seat, Andy and Andy in the back. The MDT is positioned in the front of the appliance in the middle. This usually faces the Officer In Charge (OIC), which on that night was the Crew Manager. I am concentrating on driving, and I am driving under blue light conditions so I am not aware of what is on the MDT. On route things were said but I do not recall what was being said in the appliance. I was concentrating and switched on to the task, in my head I am aware this is a forty (40) pump fire we are going to. It would have taken us around two (2) to three (3) minutes to leave the fire station from when the bells went down.

In the appliance is a Main Scheme radio, this is connected to Control. Some officers also have a mobile radio which connects to the main scheme/control, this is used for radio messages. I do not recall what was being said on the main scheme radio whilst on route to the incident.

The Firefighters on the FRU have handheld radios, we all have these. These have limited range and once in range you can hear what is going on at the incident.

I was driving, we drove on the A10, and then A406 towards Wembley. Someone else was giving directions, I am pretty sure Tim CUTBILL was using google maps to direct me to the incident. We saw smoke from A406 near Wembley, this is quite a distance from Grenfell Tower. I am thinking this is a big

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job, something serious. The smoke was billowing up in the air. This was near a large roundabout on the A406. I am not familiar with the area so cannot be sure of the exact location. We turned off at the Park Royal junction, I do not know the road name. I do not know what the others on the appliance are talking about. We were then on a road via Ladbroke Grove, turning right there was a gap in the street where I saw the tower was alight. The fire was on the outside of the building and it was going up in an angle, lower on one side and higher on the other. I do not recall much about the surrounding area at this stage. We were making our way to the RVP, this location would have been on the tip sheet and MDT. If this changes we should get a message via the radio. I drove to the RVP but there was no one there, apart from a police unit who pointed us in the direction that everyone was going. I cannot say where I drove from Ladbroke Grove, I was going where I was being directed too. I parked the appliance, I cannot recall where. I remember there being lots of other appliances about, I cannot tell you how many. I saw a few members of the public about, some on their phones. I was not concentrating on what they were doing, we had a job to do.

I rigged myself in full firefighter kit, and EDBA. The Crew Manager, Tim CUTBILL, went to find out our task at the Command Unit. Everyone else on the appliance is already rigged in their kit but as I am driving I drive in my uniform. Which means when we arrive at the incident and the others are getting their BA sets out I am spending the time getting rigged, so need about thirty (30) seconds longer to get ready. I am putting on boots, leggings, tunic, flash hood, gloves, helmet — this is personal protective equipment (PPE). The BA sets are on the off-side front of the appliance, in lockers on the outside of the cab.

I think we got to the incident around 4am, I think it took us around fifteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes to drive there. The Crew Manager would hand in our nominal role board to the Command Unit. This a piece of plastic with our details, and then Command Unit will know we are at the incident. Where we parked the appliance was a housing estate type place with a few little alley ways, I cannot tell you where on a map this was. A member of public directed us towards the tower, I cannot remember the route we took to get to the tower from where we parked. We walked there as a crew, with our BA kits. I could see the building from where we were and were walking in the direction of the burning tower. I do not remember much about looking up or focusing on the tower as I was concentrating on getting there.

There were Firefighters pretty much everywhere outside and around the tower, and there were Police officers too. I cannot remember at this stage where the ambulance service were. It took us a few minutes

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to walk there. I cannot remember exactly where around the tower we went too, the Crew Manager told us where we had to wait. We got sent to a BA holding area outside the tower, we were not there that long, we waiting around five (5) to ten (10) minutes. Here there was a walkway with a garage or parking type area above. There were lots of Firefighters here waiting with BA. After waiting here we moved to the base of the building by cutting across a playground, this was a second (2nd) BA holding area. Here were Police Officers with riot shields assisting by taking Firefighters into the building. A BA holding area is usually an area where there is space and clean air. I am not sure on the decision makers for where the holding areas where for this incident. I am not sure of the exact time now, I was not wearing a watch; it was probably between 4-5am.

An officer was moving people forward as more crews were needed. Whilst waiting I could see the right hand side of the tower was pretty much all a light from the sixth (6<sup>th</sup>) floor upwards. I could see smoke and flames and bits of installation falling. It was like black candy floss. I am thinking 'crikey', I am not trying to focus too much on the tower but my processes and training, doing a mental check on having all my kit and BA ready. A lot is running through my mind about the tasks we may need to do, it was a big incident. I was speaking to other Firefighters around but I cannot remember specifically what we talked about.

We were pushing ourselves forward as a crew to get tasked, I cannot tell you how long we were waiting outside. I was thinking the quicker we get in, the quicker we can help people. I saw around twenty (20) to thirty (30) Firefighters waiting at the bottom of the building. The police with shields assisted with getting us into the tower with shield runs, and then we went through a glass door. I do not remember seeing anything falling.

The lobby area was busy and loud, there was quite a few people in there. There was a room to the left with a number of Firefighters waiting. This room had a door you could open and close. There was also some stairs that led to a mezzanine area and here there is a stairwell and then another door with the main stairwell. It was warm in the lobby area, but I do not recall it being that smoky in there. There was water on the floor in the lobby area, around six (6) to eight (8) inches of water. I cannot remember how long we were in the room waiting. I remember inside the generator was moved due to the fumes from that. I do not know who Tim spoke to the in lobby. Entry Control was in the lobby area. An officer said they needed crews with EBDA, we were next in line.

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We got an initial tasking as the emergency crew to a Bethnal Green crew who were in the tower and could not be raised on the radio. We are now joined by Firefighter Suzie PERRY I think who had been separated from her crew, so we are a crew of five (5). All five (5) of us go into Entry Control and listen to the brief, we were told where the Bethnal Green crew were last heard from. Very quickly after our tasking the Bethnal Green crew came down, we did not need to go in to try and find them.

We waited again and then got tasked another job. We got tasked to go to eleventh (11<sup>th</sup>) floor for search and rescue, and go higher dependent on the condition. I cannot remember who in Entry Control gave us the briefing, there were two (2) people on Entry Control. We were not given flat numbers to search, but were told floors. We were told about a casualty on the stairwell, but cannot remember more information provided on that. We were told make our way to the eleventh (11<sup>th</sup>) floor and search as much as we could. At Entry Control we hand our tallies in and after the briefing we go under air, which means EDBA is now on.

We started making our way up the tower. The stairway on the mezzanine is clear, fine and has good visibility. The area is concrete and there is a metal bannister on the stairs. You go up these and then to the main stairwell. We did not have any firefighting media with us, if we needed this we would use whatever we find on the way up in the tower. I do not recall much water being on the stairs, some water running down. The stairwell was warmer but not too hot, the area was concrete and the width of the stairs was around three (3) foot. We would count the floors as we went up. The walls were blackened out, I used my arm or hand rub off the black from the walls to check what floor we were on, it was marked on the walls what floor number it was. The further we went up the warmer it got, but it was fine going up the stairs. Visibility was decreasing but was reasonable. I do not recall coming across any other crews at this stage.

On the tenth (10<sup>th</sup>) floor a casualty was blocking the doorway. The decision was made to move the casualty, there were no signs of life from the casualty. I did not check this myself, I believe it was someone else from the crew but I cannot recall who. We moved her to stop smoke coming into the stairwell from the tenth (10<sup>th</sup>) floor lobby, to keep this area as clear and protected as possible. The casualty was a black lady, she was very large. I cannot remember what she was wearing. She was half in the doorway of the stairwell and half in the lobby area of that floor, this was keeping the door ajar. I did not see anything in the hallway of the tenth (10<sup>th</sup>) floor, it was too smoky in there. I cannot remember what her body position was exactly and I cannot remember the exact body position we put her in. One of the crew members went past the door and I took hold of her by the leg. It took the five (5) of us to move

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her and took us a few minutes, it was quite awkward to move her due to her size. I remember there being lots of hose about as well. I do not know if this information about moving the casualty was updated on the radio. The radio communication was really bad that night, with there being no signal and radio communication being very busy. After moving the lady we carried on to the eleventh (11<sup>th</sup>) floor.

The conditions on the stairwell are similar as we are going up. On the eleventh (11<sup>th</sup>) floor someone from the crew checked the door handle to the lobby area to check the heat. We went through the door in the stairwell to access this floor. The crew gained access to one flat on the left and one flat on the right. We were not able to get that far into the flats, I cannot remember the layout. It was very hot on the floor and so the Crew Manager called us back. He may have had the TIC, he was monitoring the conditions. We work at a team so do not spilt off from each other. We are meant to stay within physical contact of each other, and we were a few feet apart. One of the flats we gained access to the door had to be forced, I cannot remember who forced it and how. The second flat we went into I remember that flat was all burnt out. The flats were smoky and hot, there were no more flames from what I remember. We were shouting 'Fire Brigade', 'can you hear me?' We did not get a response. We usually check our gage readings as a crew and individually on a regular basis. It is the Crew Managers/OICs call on whether we stay or leave, and this is dependent on the conditions. As a Firefighter I want to do as much as I can, I wanted to carry on. I think I had over 200bar in my cylinder so had enough air to carry on. The lobby area was smoky but you could see your colleagues. Generally you stay reasonably low when moving about in smoky areas.

We left the eleventh (11<sup>th</sup>) floor and it was decided that we would continue up and try the twelfth (12<sup>th</sup>) floor. We went back to the stairwell and walked up to the next floor. The stairwell was manageable and we gained access to the twelfth (12<sup>th</sup>), the lobby door was closed. This was hot too and the Crew Manager called us back. I believe he had the Thermal Imaging Camera (TIC). We did not go into any flats on the twelfth (12<sup>th</sup>) floor. After we came out of the twelfth (12<sup>th</sup>) floor we again made the decision to go up further. We did not see any members of public or casualties on the two (2) floors we went into.

We saw another casualty on our way up to the thirteenth (13<sup>th</sup>) floor. There were no signs of life, I did not check myself, I cannot recall who in our crew checked this. This casualty was a black lady, she was a large lady, she was on her back, I remember she had her mobile phone in her left hand, her left arm was out stretched, her head was down towards the stairs. She was in in the landing area of the stairs in-between the floors. We had enough room to walk around this lady.

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We tried to gain access to the thirteenth (13<sup>th</sup>) floor lobby and again we were called back. We had no firefighting media with us. It was too hot in there, I remember the door being closed, I do not remember looking into the floor myself. On Andy WRIGHT'S kit the 'running man' signal was activated. This would be activated by the Entry Control Board. It means he was being called back, it was possible he was low on air. He pressed a button to confirm acknowledgement and we went down to Entry Control. This signal comes up on the Automatic Distress Signal Unit (ADSU), we leave to go back down the tower as a crew. We went back down the stairs, I cannot remember our order down the stairs, it was smoky but we could see each other. I do not remember going past any other crews. We went past the casualty on the tenth (10<sup>th</sup>) floor, I think her position was as we had left her. We were able to step over her to get past.

Back down as Entry Control we collect our tallies and Andy WRIGHT has closed his set down. We have updated Entry Control with our findings. I do not recall the lobby area being any different to before. Myself, Tim, Andy VANGO and Suzie still have air and so have made the decision to split and make a crew of four (4). It would be the Crew Manager that makes the decision, he asked if we could go back into the tower and we were happy to. We went back to Entry Control and made our way up the stairway again. The brief was to carry on to the eleventh (11<sup>th</sup>) and twelfth (12<sup>th</sup>) floors for search and rescue. I do not remember the mezzanine area conditions being any different. We went into the stairwell from the mezzanine area and started up the stairs. I do not remember any difference in smoke in the stairwell. At the seventh (7<sup>th</sup>) floor the decision was made to withdraw, we had no firefighting media. Someone in the crew may also have been low on air. There was lots of hose on the stairs but other crews were using it. There was no firefighting media available for us to use. We made our way back down to Entry Control and updated them, collected our tallies, and have now closed down. This means we turn our cylinders off and face masks are off. I cannot remember if the Entry Control officers are the same as earlier.

That was our first (1<sup>st</sup>) BA wear. We were told to service our breathing sets. The lobby area is okay to breath, there are other Firefighters waiting there. We went outside of the tower, rehydrated, had something to eat and serviced our sets. The salvation army were there with refreshments. Physically I felt okay, I was tired but okay, I drank lots of water. Then we went back out to the BA holding area which was outside and then forward to the next holding area. I have lost track of time, and not sure what time it was, I remember it being daylight out. It was starting to be daylight when we had arrived on scene but by now it is properly daylight. There are lots of Firefighters outside waiting, resting. The BA servicing area was on a grass bank, I cannot remember how far away from the tower we are but we are not too far away

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as I can see the tower. I am not really focusing on it, I am getting myself prepared to go back in. I wiped my mask and wring my t-shirt out. I changed the cylinders of the set, and got it ready in case we need to wear it again. I have completed a fire ground 'A' test, this is done on the ground and takes about ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes. This is the same test we do at the start of the shift but it done on the ground at the incident. Suzie has now gone to her crew who she has seen whilst we were outside. I cannot remember how long we were waiting outside, we were near the leisure centre where 'BA Main Control' was.

If you are happy to you can go back in for a second wear, it is not forced on people. It was via word of mouth we were told about this, I was not directly told by an officer myself. We were probably waiting outside for around two (2) hours. I cannot really say what people were doing, there was lots of movement outside. The Crew Manager, Tim, asked if everyone was happy to go back in, and we said yes. He said lets go back to see if they need people, we went to the second (2<sup>nd</sup>) BA holding area which was outside the tower, It was the four (4) of us from our FRU together. We went back in the tower and into the lobby area, Entry Control had now moved to a flat higher up than the lobby area. I cannot remember what floor this flat was on or the flat number. I remember going up some stairs to get to Entry Control but I cannot tell you if this flat was off the main stairwell in the tower or the stairwell which is wider on the lower floors. I remember it was definitely a flat as I was sat on a bed waiting to be called. The sets we wear weigh around twenty five (25) kilograms, they are heavy. The smoke must have started to clear, that it why Entry Control would have moved up. I was not under air here whilst waiting. Someone had the Entry Control Board outside of the flat, I cannot remember who this was. This person was calling crews when they were needed. There were around eight (8) Firefighters waiting in the flat, all in different parts of the flat. Our crew of four (4) was now split into two (2) crews of two (2) by Entry Control. Myself and Andy VANGO was a crew of two (2) together. The minimum number a crew can be is two (2).

Myself and Andy VANGO were tasked to the leaky feeder. This boosts the signal to the Entry Control Board from our kits. There is a plug into the Entry Control Board, and a long cable and a big box with a feed. It is basically like a massive aerial. We picked up the cable from the Entry Control area, I am not sure who brought it there. We were told to go to the twelfth (12<sup>th</sup>) floor with this long cable, so went back to the stairwell and we went under air again. There was some flooding, water everywhere on the stairwell. We must have gone past the casualty on the tenth (10<sup>th</sup>) floor but I cannot recall this now. I was told afterwards that others crews that moved this lady in the area. We past another crew but did not have a conversation with them and I do not know what they were doing, we are concentrating on our task. I do

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not recall seeing other casualties on the way up. I do not remember if the conditions were worse, better or the same on the stairwell. I do not recall the smoke being that bad.

We found a hose on the tenth (10<sup>th</sup>) floor with the branch out, this was causing the water to go everywhere. We tried to update via radio but the communication was bad so could not. We carried on to the twelfth (12<sup>th</sup>) floor for our task. We knew it was the twelfth (12<sup>th</sup>) floor when we got there as it was written on the wall. The cable for the leaky feeder went into the twelfth (12<sup>th</sup>) floor landing. We checked that it was in range by a green light on our kit flashing when we are in range with the board. On the way down we tried to shut off the hose as this water was going everywhere. We were unable to shut this water off, we looked for where the hose was plugged into. We made our way back down to Entry Control and updated them on completing the task and also what we found with the hose on the tenth (10<sup>th</sup>) floor.

At Entry Control they asked us if we had enough air to go back up to shut the hose off. We had a look at our air levels and told them yes we did. Andy VANGO and I went up again from the stairwell to the tenth (10<sup>th</sup>) floor. There was lots of hose everywhere. There was another crew around the tenth (10<sup>th</sup>) floor where we were trying to follow the hose. We had a brief discussion with them about the hose but they were doing something else. We tried for around ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes to shut this hose off but we could not shut off this water, so we moved this hose to a flat to put the hose as far out of the building as we could to prevent the water from going all over the stairwell. We were soaked with the water gushing out of the hose. I do not remember seeing the casualty on the tenth (10<sup>th</sup>) floor, again we must have passed her but I cannot recall this now.

On the way down we assisted another crew with firefighting, we took over for them. We took out a couple of seats of fire that were in a couple of rooms. I cannot tell you which flats these were, it was two (2) different flats. We took the branches that the crew had to use the hose and water to firefight. That crew went and we spent some time firefighting before Entry Control contacted me with the running man signal. They were telling me I was low on air and to make our way down. I acknowledged this signal, told Andy and then we made our way back down. Back down at Entry Control we updated them on what we did, the hose, assisting the other crew. Entry Control was still outside the flat and there were still Firefighters waiting inside the flat. I cannot tell you names of anyone there.

We went back down and out of the tower back to the grassy area. I remember Blue Watch being on scene now. At some stage during that night I had turned my ankle, I am not sure when but I carried on working.

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I think it was during the second (2<sup>nd</sup>) wear. I took my boot off to look at my ankle, I was examined by the ambulance service that were on scene and was told to go to hospital as it may be a fracture. The LAS were next to the leisure centre, about ten (10) to fifteen (15) metres away. I left my BA set on scene and told my crew I was going to hospital, I also told a Command Unit officer, I am not sure of his name. I was taken to hospital in an ambulance, according to my notes it was around 1400hrs I left the scene. I was at hospital for a couple hours, I do not know what hospital it was; it was local to Grenfell Tower. I was told it was soft tissue injury and that the ankle should be monitored for a few days. As I did not leave the scene in our appliance I cannot tell you where it was parked when I left the scene. I was told that it had been moved from where I had parked it when we arrived on scene.

The FRU, A346, picked me up from the hospital and we were taken to Paddington Fire Station. Here I completed my notes which I have exhibited in this statement and referred to whilst making this statement to Police. We were told to do the notes and also that counselling services was there if we needed it.

We got back to Edmonton Fire Station at around 530-6pm. I went home, spent about half an hour at home, had a shower and then went back to work for another night shift. It was a busy night shift. I did not go back to Grenfell Tower that night. We went to some calls, including a motorbike accident.

I do not remember any alarms or sprinklers in the tower. I did not use the fire lift or know of it being in use so cannot give you any information on this. I did not have any involvement with the dry riser apart from when trying to follow the hose. I cannot give you any information about the smoke management or gas. I did not notice if any of the doors were self-closing, fire doors. When I left at 2pm I was not sure if the tower was still ablaze. I was not wearing a body worn camera. I did not speak to any occupiers and the only member of public that spoke to the crew was the person that directed us to the tower when we arrived on scene. I only saw the one stairwell in the tower and I only saw the one door for entry and exit to the tower. I was not aware of the fire risks around cladding. I have no information on the incident commander that night or the decision making or command structure. The 'stay put' policy is a brief given to people, they stay and we would come and get them. I was not involved and have no information on the decisions around 'stay put' the night of the fire at Grenfell. The size of this incident is something I have never experienced before.

I was then off the next day, I was on a rest period for 24hours after that night duty and then was on call for USAR. My pager went off on my rest days and I was informed I was going back on duty. On

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SATURDAY 17th JUNE 2017 I went to EDMONTON FIRE STATION and then back to GRENFELL TOWER to build a safe walk way, to build a structure so everyone could get in and out of the tower safely. Watch Manager Paul COURTNEY was on scene, as was Andy VANGO, and Firefighter Mick PRICE. We planned what we needed to do to protect the scene. There was a risk of debris falling and the area needed to be safe. It took a couple of hours to plan and we left the scene around 8pm after working there all day.

On SUNDAY 18 JUNE 2017 I went back again to GRENFELL TOWER, I started work at 8am. Andy VANGO and Don FURNLEY were also at Grenfell on this day. We took photographs of inside the tower, using a standard camera. I do not know what was done with these photographs or camera. I was provided with the camera that day to take the photographs and I gave this back when I finished. The photographs were of the concrete pillars in the rooms, this was needed for structural surveyors for a Gold meeting. This was required to assess the safety of the building. Also during this shift I was acting as a safety person for the Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) team that were going into the tower. For this I was watching for their safety on the outskirts of the rooms. I do not know what they were doing in the flats, I do not recall any casualties being brought out at this time.

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