

**WITNESS STATEMENT**

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: BAYNARD, PETER

Age if under 18: (if over 18 insert 'over 18')

Occupation: ENGINEER

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This statement (consisting of 8 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature: P BAYNARD

Date: 11/12/2017

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded ☐ (supply witness details on rear)

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I, Peter Joseph BAYNARD make this statement in relation to the Grenfell Tower Fire which took place on 14 June 2017.

**Background**

1. I am an employee of Cadent Gas Ltd and I was one of the engineers who attended the incident at Grenfell Tower during the 14 and 15 June 2017.
2. I am a Network Engineer for the Emergency Team working on the London network which is one of the four gas networks operated by Cadent. Grenfell Tower is situated within this network. The Head of Operations, James HARRISON manages the London network Emergency Response and Repair capability. He is a Band B Manager and reports to the Director of Operations Ed SYSON.
3. I have recently been promoted to the position of Level 7 Network Engineer. The Emergency team operate a team of First Call Operatives ('FCOs'). I oversee the work of approximately 100 First Call Operatives (FCO) and four Level 6 Network Supervisors who supervise the team of FCOs who respond to reported gas emergencies. My manager is Nicola WILKINSON and she is a Band C manager.
4. To comply with our regulatory standards, an FCO must respond and attend a reported gas escape within 1 to 2 hours of the incident being reported. The FCO will assess and investigate the situation and either make the situation safe or, if required, request a repair team to attend

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5. The repair team for the West of London is managed by the Band C manager Tony DAY. One of the Level 7 Network Engineers for the repair team is Jason ALLDAY. Both were on site during the Grenfell Tower Incident.
6. For gas escapes and incidents involving the gas network, rather than an incident involving the internal pipework in a property, a repair team will need to make safe and effect a repair. This usually involves excavating the ground to uncover the gas pipes and then employing a suitable repair technique.
7. I attended the incident as a Level 6 Network Supervisors on-call. I have only recently been promoted to Level 7 (April 2016) and was still on the rota for Level 6 Supervisors on the morning of the incident as the call-out rotas are produced in advance and run from September to September each year when the new rotas are published.
8. I have been employed by Cadent Gas Ltd since November 2001. I was a FCO for 12 years before being promoted to a Level 6 Network Engineer in 2014. I spent my time working as a FCO in Goswell Road and Camden Town. I was fortunate to have been placed in these areas as they are recognised as being the best areas for a FCO to learn his trade because they are such busy areas.
9. My qualifications and training include: Cap CR1 — supervisor emergency training and CAP SV4— how to deal with an incident. I completed the Cap CR1 training in July 2016. The scheme started around seven or eight years ago as part of the competency assessment programme. There is a course for FCOs, supervisors, and managers and all essential material was brought together. The Cap courses are completed once every five years. There is also a short annual update course and a one week course (the SV4) which involves assessment of engineering techniques, policies and procedures. All supervisors are required to complete this SV4 course and it involves an assessment involving a mock exercise on an enclosed street with dummy buildings, an explosion and dealing with the aftermath of an incident. The brief is to visit a team which is not following policies and procedures and doing all sorts of things wrong, and checking the FCO response.
10. Prior to this incident, I had attended Grenfell Tower once as a supervisor to assist with isolating a leaking gas riser on Saturday 1 October 2016 with the FCO Jason MCCARTHY. I did enter the basement to try to locate the gas services and identify how many people would be affected if we isolated the supply. I recall that a girder key was needed to get into the basement and we got that from the caretaker. I did not touch or work on any of the boilers or anything else in the basement.

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I solely supervised the work on the gas riser. This was the only time that I ever recall attending Grenfell Tower prior to June 2017.

The first call on the morning of 14 June 2017

11. I had been on-call as a Network Supervisor since 17:00 on the afternoon of 13 June 2017. It had been a normal run of the mill night. I went to bed at around 11pm and was woken at around 03:25am when I heard my mobile ringing. I just missed the call but knew it was from the dispatch centre so immediately returned the call.
12. The dispatch centre informed me that Cadent had been called to assist the fire services at an incident in West London. I was informed that a FCO was already on his way to the site. It is normal for us to attend a fire incident to assist the fire services and I didn't think anything of the call initially as fires can vary from small household fires to fires on industrial estates. I had not appreciated the scale of the incident but at around 03:41 am I received a text from the dispatch centre to inform me that we were dealing with a major incident and that it was being reported all over the news.
13. I switched my television on and saw the scenes from Grenfell Tower. My first reaction was that this could not be happening in our country.
14. The Level 7 Network Engineer for emergency on-call that morning was Dave EDWARDS and I called him to let him know what was going on. I then immediately called my FCO, Jason KNIGHTLEY. He had not yet arrived at the site but was on his way there. I told him how serious the incident was so that he knew what to expect when he arrived on site. I then got into my car and drove to the site.

Arrival at site

15. I left my house at around 04:00am. As I was driving to the site, I listened to the radio, LBC station and heard the horror stories that were being reported from the site that people were jumping from the building and that people were distressed that families were still in the building.
16. On my way to the site, I received a call from Jason KNIGHTLEY who had arrived by then. He told me that he couldn't get anywhere near the building because the whole area had been cordoned off by the police and no one was allowed access. I told him to obtain as much information as he could about the situation and what our role was.
17. Energy Networks Association (ENA) maintain the National Gas Incident website (NGIS) which records all gas incidents. Industry stakeholders are registered with ENA and will receive updates

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and notifications about any incident, for example, if there has been a loss of gas supply to customers in their premises. Whilst on my way to the site, I asked the dispatch team to raise the NGIS notification.

18. I drove along the North Circular and parked under the A40. There were multiple road closures which made it difficult to drive to the site but I arrived at the site at approximately 04:50am. I rang Dave EDWARDS who was already on site and made my way to meet him.
19. Dave EDWARDS had established a muster point for Cadent personnel. Both he and Jason KNIGHTLEY were at that muster point. I attach as my Exhibit PJB1 a map of the local area. I have identified the muster point as point 1 on the map.
20. Dave EDWARDS informed me that Jason KNIGHTLEY had been to speak with the LFB, but we had been asked to standby. It was absolute carnage at the site. I was immediately struck by the enormity of the incident. I had never seen anything like this before. The roads were blocked with emergency services and there were members of public on the streets who were upset, there were also lots of reporters and press. The 27 storey block of flats was up in flames. From where I was standing at our muster point, I had a clear view of the block of flats and would estimate that it was 90% alight on the upper levels. I knew we would need full teams on site to include emergency engineers, repair engineers and their 'mates', supervisors, managers and support works to support the work of the repair team. Jason had already requested more resources and a repair team were on their way. I was also aware that the dispatch team were contacting the repair managers because I was in contact with dispatch and Dave EDWARDS confirmed that he had spoken to Tony DAY.
21. Peter HYATT, the repair team leader and his 'mate' arrived on site at around 05:00am. They were the other side of the road closure and struggled to reach the site but Jason KNIGHTLEY directed them to where we were situated.
22. We did not know at this point what had caused the fire and whether gas was involved. However, we all knew that we would need to disconnect the gas supply to the building. This was based on our experience and knowledge, we normally have a repair team on standby and if at any time we feel that gas is fuelling a fire, the only way to extinguish that fire is to begin by disconnecting the gas supply. From experience, I know that a fire fuelled by gas would normally burn with a blue flame but at that point there was no communication from the London Fire Brigade ("LFB") to say that the gas was fuelling the fire. Dave EDWARDS was liaising with Jason to get an idea of which mains were supplying gas to the building and where those were situated. This was a major fire

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incident. The fire was ablaze and there was a real sense of danger and concern amongst the people at the site that the tower could collapse. It was obvious as soon as we had arrived on site that we would not be able to disconnect the supply of gas at the building and that we would need to disconnect the gas by isolating the supply in the network. This would involve our repair team excavating the ground to uncover the gas pipes to stop the flow of gas and cut the mains.

23. At around 05:30am, Dave EDWARDS went to speak with the LFB to ask whether there was anything they needed us to do at that point in time. The LFB had established a command unit from where they ran their operation. The command unit was established at point 2 on the map at Exhibit PJB1. The command unit was situated behind the cordon. Dave went to the command unit and when he returned he informed us that the LFB had asked us to standby and await further instructions.
24. The repair team managers, Tony DAY and Jason ALLDAY arrived at site at approximately 07:30 to 08:00am. They met us at the Cadent muster point. By this point, we had obtained maps of the mains that supplied gas to the building from the engineers and Tony, Dave and Jason went through those plans together. They wanted to ensure that as soon as we received the green light from the LFB, we would know exactly where to attack on the network.
25. In the meantime, I carried out welfare checks on the engineers and ensured that we had enough resources on site. Jason KNIGHTLEY'S shift had finished and I arranged for him to be relieved by another FCO, Chris CUTHBERT.
26. At around 08:45am, Jason ALLDAY went to speak with the LFB officers at their command unit. When he returned he told us that he had been given permission to go ahead and implement the operational plan to isolate the supply of gas to the building.
27. The aim was to isolate the gas quickly and safely. However, our options were limited to some extent by the fact that it was impossible to get anywhere near the tower. The whole block was on fire, there was debris surrounding the tower and falling to the ground and there were cordons restricting our access. We were restricted from carrying out work near the building and from potentially isolating service isolation valves that served the building. It was unsafe. There was no opportunity to get anywhere near the building.

#### Isolating the gas

28. Jason and Tony had agreed on a proposed operational plan to isolate the supply of gas. We had a group meeting to brief out the plan to isolate the supply to all present. The plan was to carry out

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excavations at three separate locations to locate the gas pipes and cut the supply of gas to the building.

29. The first potential isolation point was on a 12" main situated at the top of Station Walk, the second potential isolation point was on a 4" main situated near a walkway called Testerton Road and the third potential isolation point was on a 180mm main situated at the top of Grenfell Road. The map attached as my Exhibit PJB1 identifies the three mains we proposed to isolate at points 3, 4 and 5.
30. The repair managers wanted to carry out the isolation as near to the building as they possible could. Because of the way the network is configured, if the repair team carried out the isolations further away from the building, it would have been necessary to carry out more excavations to cut off the supply of gas to the building. Gas is fed in a number of directions and the repair team would need to be sure that they were cutting all possible feeds. Naturally, the more excavations that need to be carried out, the more complex the operation is.
31. Given the environment that we were working in, Jason had to check whether it would be feasible to deploy the repair teams to excavate at the proposed sites. We had produced and printed enlarged maps of the area and Jason and I walked around the surrounding area with the maps to locate the potential isolation points. The LFB facilitated this and allowed us to pass through the cordons to assess the isolation locations. We started walking around the site at approximately 09:30am. I could see large pieces of what looked like ash, pieces of metal and other debris falling from the building.
32. It is difficult to describe the scenes we witnessed as we walked around the site. Fire officers were running in and out of the tower to rescue who they could. People were coming out of the tower in a terrible state and casualties were being treated on the ground. We had to walk past all the bodies that had been placed to rest. When I was walking around the site to the excavation areas, there was a garage area situated around 50 metres from the tower itself and I noticed multiple body bags located in the garage area.
33. At one point, we were approached by a structural engineer from the Council who told us to move away because the building was not safe. He did not direct us to a specific area. I have never seen a fire that fierce before. I was really concerned that the building could come down any minute. I personally did not feel that the cordons had been extended far enough from the tower. There was a real sense of danger.

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34. The area was in a state of turmoil and it was difficult to move past the emergency workers and vehicles to locate one of the isolation points. However, with the assistance of the LFB, Jason was able to locate all three isolation points and decided that it would be safe to deploy the repair teams and start on the excavations.
35. At around 12:30pm, Jason pulled all the engineers back to the muster point and briefed everyone on the operation. It was an inspirational talk. He told all the engineers exactly how we were going to isolate the supply of gas, explained where each of the isolation points were, where we would need to carry out the excavations and how the flow of gas would be stopped and the mains capped. He prepared all the engineers for what was ahead of them and explained that if anyone was unhappy or felt uncomfortable that they should speak with him. I had just experienced the worst experience of my life walking around the tower. However, Jason rallied all the team together. I felt inspired by his talk. He instilled confidence in all the engineers and everyone felt motivated and determined to carry out the job to the best of our abilities.
36. Interest in the incident was obviously growing by now and we were being approached by members of the press and public. I was approached by a female member of the press who was asking questions and recording me, I politely told her that I was unable to comment. A number of people had questions and queries but Tony DAY briefed us and explained that all queries should be directed to our PR team. This allowed us all to focus on the job at hand.

The role of the emergency team

37. The repair team was responsible for carrying out the excavations and isolating the supply of gas as is normal practice when Cadent are asked to respond to a fire incident and need to disconnect the supply of gas. The emergency team's role on this day was to assist and support the repair engineers by whatever means possible.
38. We carried equipment and tools to the sites and moved fencing to the isolation points so that the excavations could be secured. We carried out welfare checks on the men. They were working hard in horrendous conditions, carrying out physical work on one of the hottest day of the year and we ensured that they were given appropriate breaks and had enough water and food to continue with the excavations. Jason had implemented a rota to ensure that the engineers working on the excavations did not tire. Due to the severity of the incident, everyone knew that we needed to isolate the gas quickly and everyone felt the pressure to cut the supply of gas as quickly as possible.

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39. It was difficult to deploy our teams and equipment to the isolation points. Obviously, during a situation like that, the work of the emergency services who are rescuing people from the building and treating the casualties is the priority and we had to work around their men and vehicles. The category 1 responders (LFB) are the lead on site. We rely on their instructions and information from them, so if they say that we can work, we can act on that, if they tell us it's unsafe, we would not carry out any work until they authorise it. The streets were so congested with people and vehicles that it took time to manoeuvre our vehicles to the isolation points. We don't have an emergency blue light to facilitate access to the areas and we had to liaise with the emergency services who helped us as much as possible to get the equipment to our men. They moved their vehicles whenever they could and facilitated our access through the cordons. There were multiple cordons and to pass through them we had to show our ID and explain who we were. Some cordons were fine to get through but for others those manning the cordon had to speak to their supervisor before we received the green light to go through.
40. The mood during the first day changed quite dramatically. When we first arrived, everyone was in a state of panic. As the day progressed, the atmosphere was almost carnival like, with hundreds of people in the streets and people trying to help in whatever way they could. Food vans were dotted along some of the streets. By the end of the day, there was understandably a sense of anger and unease and frustration was directed towards those in authority.
41. Throughout the operation, there was a clear chain of command on site. Before Jason and Tony arrived, Dave and I were the most senior managers on site and we co-ordinated the team. Once Jason arrived, he managed the operational side of the incident whilst Tony controlled the incident from a higher level.
42. I was responsible for updating the dispatch centre throughout the day and also provided regular updates to my manager Nicola WILKINSON regarding the situation as it progressed on site, who was present and what was planned. I spoke with Nicola WILKINSON, just before 06:00am, I think she was aware of the incident because of the media situation. I think that David was the first person on site to speak with Nicola.
43. I left the site on the evening of 14 June 2017 at 20:00. Nobody wanted to leave the site before everything had been done. We felt committed to the job and wanted to ensure that we had done everything we could to assist with the incident. Two of the isolations had been completed by the time I left and the team were working on the final isolation point.

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## Working relationship with the LFB

44. We worked well with the emergency services. Jason was the main point of contact with the LFB and he developed a good working relationship with them.
45. The LFB were obviously under severe pressure that day and we couldn't, understandably, speak with someone from the LFB at all points in the day. However, they assisted us as much as possible to deploy our teams and equipment to the sites.

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