WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: DAY, TONY

Age if under 18: (if over 18 insert 'over 18') Occupation: NETWORK MANAGER

This statement (consisting of 12 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature: T DAY Date: 30/01/2018

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded ☐ (*supply witness details on rear*)

I, Tony DAY make this statement in relation to the Grenfell Tower Fire which took place on 14 June 2017. Prior to this incident, I had no knowledge of Grenfell Tower and had never attended the site.

Background

1. I am a Band C Network Manager employed by Cadent Gas Ltd that was part of the Emergency Response and Repair team which attended at Grenfell Tower during the tragic events of 14 and 15 June 2017.
2. I have over 41 years of experience working in the gas industry and started working as a Gas Service Apprentice for the North Thames Gas board, as it was then known, in 1976. I have experience of working as part of the Emergency Response team but, for the last 15 years, have predominantly worked for the Repair team, responding to gas escapes and fixing any issues with the gas mains network to maintain supply. I was temporarily appointed to the role of Head of Network in London.
3. As a Repair Manager, I have been trained to deal with major incidents. No training course or policy or procedure could prepare you for an incident like Grenfell Tower. However, I have previously attended a training course that was run by the fire service in approximately 2014/2015 where we were trained on how to respond and support the fire service in a major fire incident. We were presented with a major incident scenario, an explosion in a shopping centre, and were trained how to respond to such an incident.

4. During my career, I have attended at a number of emergency incidents which have included fires and explosions, but I have never, during the 41 years I have worked with the gas industry, had to deal with or experience an incident that compares to the Grenfell Tower tragedy.

5. The Head of Operations for London which covers Emergency Response and Repair work is James HARRISON. He oversees and is responsible for both the Emergency and Repair teams. James HARRISON is a Band B Manager and he reports to the Director of Operations, Ed SYSON.

6. I am a Band C Repair Manager, responsible for the West of London. I report to James HARRISON. I supervise the Level 7 Network Engineers for repair and the Level 6 Network Supervisors for repair report to the Level 7 Managers.

The morning of 14 June 2017

7. On the morning of 14 June 2017, I was the Band C, Manager on standby. Different levels of the organisation are put on a rota to cover out of hours requirements such as attending emergencies. Those on standby are home based and can be contacted when required.

8. At around 4:30am, I received a call from the on-call Level 7 Emergency Manager, Dave EDWARDS. He is a Network Engineer for Emergency and told me that he had been asked to attend an incident and was making his way to the site. I understood from Dave EDWARDS that the engineer on site and had been asked to stand by and was awaiting further instructions from the London Fire Brigade (LFB"). I asked Dave whether he needed me on site. Dave told me that he understood that it wasn't a gas related incident and that my attendance wasn't necessary for the time being. He would keep me abreast of any developments.

9. I also received a call from the Dispatch Team in Hinckley to inform me that Cadent had been asked to attend a fire incident in London to assist the Fire Service. It is not unusual for a Band C Manager on call to be informed of an incident for awareness.

10. At 5:15am, I woke up and turned on the radio. News of the fire at Grenfell Tower was emerging all over the news and I realised the severity of the situation. My Level 7 Network Engineer for repair, Jason ALLDAY and I had intended on attending a meeting in Hinckley that day. However, upon hearing the news, I immediately spoke with Jason and although he was not on-call that morning we both decided to make our way to Grenfell Tower as soon as possible. Jason had worked in the area recently on a medium pressure gas mains repair in a street near to Grenfell Tower on Bramley Road. The work was completely unrelated to Grenfell Tower but the road had been closed whilst our team carried out the work. As far as I am aware, this road ,closure on Bramley Road did not

have any impact on the emergency services' work that day. Emergency services would have been aware of the road closure in advance, as is standard practice.

Arrival on site

11. I arrived on site at approximately 08:00am. The journey from my home to the site took over two hours due to the volume of traffic on the roads, I had to take detours due to the amount of traffic and road closures. I have also worked in the area previously and was therefore familiar with the area.

12. The scene when I arrived can only be described as a war zone. The area was in total chaos. It felt as if there were thousands of people surrounding the site. The emergency services had erected a number of cordons to keep the public away from the site and it was impossible at first to get anywhere near the building.

13. Dave EDWARDS had established a muster point for the Cadent team and I made my way over to this point. I have reviewed a map of the area where I have identified the muster point near to Dover House on Darfield Way. When we first arrived on site, we were not a priority for the LFB. The LFB obviously had other priorities. Both the FCC and Dave EDWARDS had been to the LFB command unit to introduce themselves and explain that they were from Cadent Gas and had asked whether there was anything the LFB wanted us to do. They had been asked to standby and await further instructions. When Jason had arrived on site, he had also gone to the LFB command unit to introduce himself and establish contact with the fire officers.

14. We knew there were live gas services in the building. It was obvious to all of us that the gas had to be turned off and we were planning how this would be achieved. We took direction from the LFB who were in charge of the situation as category 1 responders. Cadent were category 2 responders and our role was to co-operate with and assist the fire services. It was important that we took direction from the LFB and worked closely with them to support their role as the primary responders and could not do anything that could jeopardise their work.

The chain of command

15. I was the most senior Cadent Manager on site for the majority of the day, but Jason was the engineer who took operational control of the incident and assumed responsibility for mobilising and arranging the teams. He was also the main point of contact with the LFB. I was the incident controller and I took responsibility for updating and feeding information to the wider business. I made sure that Jason had enough resources on site and I dealt with the high level communications

to ensure that Jason and the engineers could concentrate on the task at hand. My priority was to safeguard life and property, obviously including my team.

16. I managed the welfare of the team. James HARRISON arranged pastoral support for the team on site and the support remains available. We were conscious that people were working long hours under difficult conditions and I ensured that the team was well fed and watered and was regularly updated and briefed. I instructed the team to ensure that they were always accompanied by another member of the team when walking around the site and to take off their high visibility gear as there was a sense of unease as the day progressed. There were people approaching the team, asking questions and trying to record conversations. Throughout the day, we pulled the team back to the muster point for appropriate breaks. Every single member of the team was committed to finishing the job despite the long hours. Nobody wanted to leave the site, even when their shift came to an end. It was an intense period of time and I think the adrenaline kept us going but the commitment from all the men on site was total.

17. Jason and I worked as a team and agreed all major decisions together in accordance with engineering policies and procedures, so far as possible, and based on our experiences in the industry. No decision was made in isolation. Jason recorded all the key decisions in his diary and I initialled those decisions. After the incident, we completed the necessary paperwork to formally record our decisions.

Initial plan to isolate the gas

18. When Jason returned from speaking with the LFB, he told me that the LFB did want Cadent to turn the gas off to the building. We got to work immediately and considered what options were available. One of the engineers had given Jason his GoBook which displayed all the maps of the mains that were feeding gas to the building.

19. Jason and I considered what would be the most effective and efficient way to isolate the gas based on the information we had available to us from the maps of the mains, our knowledge and experience of working on the network and our knowledge of the evolving situation at Grenfell Tower.

20. Our options were dictated to a large degree by the ongoing emergency situation and we were also very alert to the fact that wherever we carried out our work, we would have to ensure that it did not impact on the work of the emergency services.

21. It is possible to turn off the gas to a building by operating a service isolation valve situated near the building. However, it is not unusual for those valves to have been covered over. To be able to turn off a valve which has been covered, it is necessary to excavate the ground in order to gain access to the valve. We could not get anywhere near the building to inspect whether there was a valve that was easily accessible. The fire was still ablaze and debris was continuing to fall from the tower. Cordons had been erected and pieces of the building that were on fire were falling to the ground. It would have been impossible to deploy our teams to work safely there in order to isolate the supply and had we passed the cordons and approached the building, we would have been disregarding the instructions of the LFB.

22. Under the circumstances, and in light of the fact that it was impossible to get anywhere near the building, our plan was to isolate the gas mains as close to the building as we possibly could, whilst maintaining the safety of our team. We identified three potential points on the map where we could isolate the gas. The process of isolating the gas would involve excavating the three mains at the three separate locations before cutting and capping those mains. The first potential isolation point was on a 12" main situated at the top of Station Walk, the second potential isolation point was on a 4" main situated near a walkway called Testerton Walk and the third potential isolation point was on a 180mm main situated at the top of Grenfell Road.

23. Once we had identified the three likely points of isolation, Jason requested network analysis which would inform us what the impact would be on the network if we proceeded with the proposed plan. The network analysis results confirmed that the impact on customers would be minimal. However, the impact of isolating the gas on our customers was never a consideration that influenced our decision making process. The priority for us was to turn the gas off quickly and safely.

24. Before we implemented the plan, Jason walked around the site to locate the isolation points identified on the maps. He needed to establish firstly whether it would be possible to safely place a team of our engineers at each of the points and, secondly, whether we would be able to gain access to the three points and deploy our plant and machinery there without disturbing or impacting on the work of the emergency services.

25. Jason communicated our proposed plan with his point of contact from the LFB . He liaised with the fire officers who helped him locate the individual sites. It was difficult for Jason to reach some of the locations because of the cordons and the ongoing emergency and he had to rely on the

assistance of the LFB to gain access to the sites and pass through the emergency cordons. At approximately 11:30am, once Jason had identified all three locations and was happy that the teams could work there, the LFB point of contact agreed that our teams could work and excavate at the three points.

26. We anticipated that the gas would be isolated by approximately 19:00 to 20:00 that evening and we communicated this to the LFB. We took into account how long it would take for the teams to excavate the ground and carry out the isolation. An isolation of this nature in normal day time operations would usually take much longer to plan the isolation, gain access to the isolation points, deploy the teams and machinery, excavate the ground, locate the main, prepare the necessary permits, stop the flow of gas and cut the supply of gas. However, we were of course working under exceptional circumstances.

27. Based on my experience and my knowledge of the network, I believed that the proposed plan presented the quickest option to isolate the gas. We were as close to the building as we could be and could deploy our engineers to work in relatively safe areas of work which would not interfere significantly with the work of the emergency services. The decision to isolate the gas was a decision that both Jason and I discussed together and a decision that I ultimately approved as the Band C Network Manager.

28. I have thought about this decision since the events at Grenfell Tower and have considered whether it was the right decision to isolate the gas in the way we did. It was absolutely the right decision. The option of cutting and capping the mains at the three identified points was the only option to isolate the gas quickly under the circumstances. The bottom of the tower had been cordoned off and was covered in debris. We could not get access to even inspect the service installation valve and deploying a team to carry out an excavation here would not have been possible under the circumstances. It would have been unsafe.

29. Gas is transported around the country at high pressure and fed into local distribution zones, where gas is distributed to consumers via a series of pressure tiers. The final stage pressure reduction, for low pressure supply to properties in a local area, is achieved via a governor. A small village may be fed by a single governor, which could be turned off to cut the supply to the village. However, the gas network in London is integrated to ensure security of supply of gas to consumers and turning off one governor results in the neighbouring governors compensating and maintaining supply, all of which would need to be turned off. To guarantee isolation, therefore, will still would

have required excavation and physical isolation of sections of mains, to prevent back-feed of gas from the other sources. The option of turning off the governors was not a quicker option.

30. I knew that the LFB wanted us to turn the gas off and I felt severe pressure to do this and did everything within my power to isolate the gas as quickly as possible. Although we were not told whether there were still survivors in the building, we all felt a moral sense of responsibility to isolate the gas as quickly as possible. That was always our priority.

31. If I was presented with the same situation again, I would implement the same plan to isolate the gas based on my experience and knowledge of the way the network is configured.

Operating the plan

32. A team of approximately 25 personnel, to include emergency engineers, repair engineers and mates, support drivers, JCB operators and supervisors had been mobilised to site and we had also arranged for our flow stopping equipment to be transferred to the site as soon as possible. Our equipment included three 3-12 kits to assist the engineers with the excavations. The engineers were mobilised from all over London and attended the site as soon as possible. The roads were chaotic and the closure of the A40 made it difficult to travel to the site, but when we were ready to start work, we had a full team of engineers available to carry out the excavations.

33. At around 12:30pm, Jason briefed the whole team at the Cadent muster point at Darfield Way. He allocated all of the engineers to particular isolation points. Jason informed the team exactly what was required and expected of them and what the procedures were that they should be following and implementing. The priority was to carry out the excavations as quickly and safely as possible to identify the mains and isolate the supply of gas. Jason knew that the engineers would soon be working under unprecedented conditions and did a fantastic job in ensuring that everyone knew what their role was. Jason made it clear to the team that if any of them had any concerns or felt uneasy about the conditions they were working under that they should speak with Jason. He was in charge of the operation and he was the team's main point of contact. Jason ensured that a supervisor was allocated to each isolation point and he informed the team that he would be moving from one site to another.

34. I was aware that media and public interest in the incident was increasing and that tensions, understandably, were rising. During the briefing, I informed the whole team of the importance of not talking to members of the public or press. I informed the team that we had a PR system in

place to monitor all communication and that all queries should be directed to the PR team. I wanted to ensure that the team could fully focus on the job at hand and were not distracted.

35. It did take time for our plant and machinery to be deployed to the sites. This was an incident like no other and unless you were there on the day, it is difficult to provide a sense of just how horrendous the conditions were. Grenfell Tower looked like the remains of a building that you would expect to see on the news from Syria. It was hard to believe that this was in our area in London. Debris was falling from the building and people were running around in a state of complete distress. No task was without its difficulty or complication. For example, the fire officers had to move one of their fire engines to allow access for our JCB. However, some of the fire officers had been taken back to their base in a minibus to change shifts and one of their officers had accidentally taken the key to the fire engine with him. There was a delay before the keys were returned and the vehicle could finally be moved. There were fire engines parked all along Grenfell Road and ambulances parked all along Bramley Road. We worked around the emergency services and they assisted us so far as possible by providing access to our teams and by ensuring that as many of our machines could be moved to the isolation points. The 180mm main by Grenfell Road had to be hand dug initially whilst the fires services assisted us to transport our machinery to the point. The 4" main at Testerton Walk all had to be hand dug by the team because our JCB could not reach that site.

36. The excavation work on the 12" main started around 13:30. There were delays in accessing the site of the 4" and 180mm mains because they were nearer to the tower and it was harder to gain access. However, we were eventually able to start working on these sites at approximately 14:30.

Entering the building

37. I understand that the LFB were becoming increasingly concerned about the structure of the building and at around 14:00, the LFB approached Jason and asked him if he would be prepared to send some of the engineers into the basement of the building to turn off the valves on the gas risers. This was the first time that the LFB had asked us to enter the building and the first time we were allowed to go anywhere near the building. I was told by Jason that the LFB were concerned that the structure of the building was at risk of collapse. The fire was continuing to burn at a very high temperature and there was no opportunity for the building to cool down. Drones had been used to survey the building and monitor its stability.

38. The LFB confirmed that it was safe for Jason to enter the building and agreed to accompany him into the basement. Jason wanted to risk assess the situation before sending any engineers inside and therefore, for the greater good, went into the basement with the LFB. There was some delay whilst the LFB found a key to the basement, but Jason entered the basement, accompanied by the LFB, at around 15:00. The police shielded him and the LFB from the debris with riot shields as they walked into the building. Almost immediately after, he and the fire crew were instructed via the LFB's radio system to retreat from the building. The LFB had heard popping and cracking from inside the building and their concerns about the condition of the building increased. The police extended the 30m cordon beyond the points where our teams were working on the 4" and 180mm main and we all had to move away from the tower.

39. At this point, we decided to pull all our teams back and we met at the Cadent muster point where the teams were fed, watered and de-briefed by Jason.

40. At around 17:00, Jason and I, with James HARRISON who was now on site, went back to the LFB command unit to speak with the officers there. I was clear in my mind that we had to be able to continue to work within the cordoned area if we wanted to turn off the gas. We communicated this to the LFB who informed Jason that if we wanted to work within the cordon, it would have to be based on our own risk assessment rather than theirs. Debris was continuing to fall from the building. Neither Jason nor I were happy to deploy our teams to work under the tower unless it had been agreed with the LFB and we therefore had a fifteen minute dialogue with the LFB to agree the best way forward. We carried out a joint risk assessment and agreed that our teams would continue to work outside - under the building whilst the LFB spotted the building and surveyed it for any further signs of movement. It was agreed that the LFB would immediately inform our teams if there were any further concerns about the structure of the building. We also identified and agreed three exit routes for the teams should they need to evacuate quickly. This safe system of work was agreed jointly between Cadent and the LFB.

41. We returned to the muster point to update and fully brief the teams. Everyone understood that the priority for us was to turn the gas off. I was confident that everyone appreciated the sense of urgency. The teams recommenced their work at the isolation points at approximately 17:20.

Isolating the gas

42. At around 18:20, Jason received further information from the LFB that the building was unstable. Jason and I discussed our plan of action. I knew that we were not far away from isolating the gas

and, with this in mind, I instructed Jason to tell the teams to continue with their work of isolating the gas.

43. We isolated the 4" and the 180mm mains by around 20:00 on the evening of 14 June. A number of the team had been working long hours under extremely difficult conditions to finish the job and we relieved some of the men after the first two mains had been isolated.

44. The gas supply into the building was still being fed by the 12" main and the team was still working on isolating this main. At around 20:00, someone from the LFB (I do not know their name) asked whether Jason would be prepared to go into the basement again to attempt to isolate the gas. I believe that this request to go into the building was in response to an increased sense of pressure felt by the LFB to isolate the gas because of concerns they had about the structure of the building.

45. I spoke with Jason and we discussed the situation in the basement. He informed me that when he went into the basement that afternoon, the water was up to his knees and the electricity had not been turned off. I was consequently of the view that it would not be safe for Jason to enter the basement and I instructed him not to go in because the electricity had not been isolated, there was therefore a danger of live electricity in water with no adequate protection and the risk of electrocution. I was not willing to expose Jason or any of my team to this risk. The LFB respected our decision not to enter given the danger.

46. Work continued on the 12" main which was situated at Station Walk near where all the ambulances were stationed. This task proved to be more difficult than anticipated. The main was buried deeper than we had expected and the location of a four foot wall made it harder for the team to dig down and locate the main. It is not unusual for mains to be located in slightly different locations to what is displayed on the maps and although the maps provide a relatively accurate picture of where the mains are located, there can be some discrepancies.

47. The main was located around 1.5 metre below ground. If a main is located this deep, it is normal practice for the engineers to shutter and support the excavation to protect the engineers and prevent the ground surrounding the hole from collapsing. Deep excavation equipment is necessary for this task and we requested tRIIO, our gas distribution strategic partners, to send their deep excavation equipment to site as soon as possible. However, Jason and I carried out a risk assessment and decided that as the main was in solid ground conditions, there was no risk of collapse.

48. Once the team had located the main, we discovered that it was a 15" main, rather than a 12" main, as we had anticipated and planned to isolate. Routinely, operational teams are equipped to deal with mains varying in sizes from 3" to 12". This discovery had the potential to impact on the isolation timetable.

49. The equipment necessary to isolate a 15" main is different to a 12" main. The flow stopping bags (which are inserted into the pipes and the inflated to stop the flow of gas) for a 15" main are bigger and Cadent sub-contract this work to Pipelines Maintenance Centre ('PMC"). We were still under pressure to isolate the gas and knew that PMC's service level agreement to attend on site was six hours. This did not take into account the difficulties they would undoubtedly experience in driving to the site. We had to think quickly. Our priority was to isolate the gas.

50. Jason, James HARRISON and I discussed the various options. We agreed that we would try to overinflate a 12" bag to establish whether or not it was an option to use the smaller bags on the 15" main. We overinflated the bag and measured its dimension using a caliper. The bag had inflated to 14.5". Under the circumstances, we made a decision to isolate the 15" main using the 12" equipment. This is contrary to normal operational policies and procedures, but this was not a standard situation. The 15" measurement is taken from the external diameter of the main, it is not necessarily 15" inside the main. There were gauges either side to measure the flow of the gas and to confirm that the gas had been stopped. We had a contingency plan in place and had a reserve 12" bag ready in case there were any issues with the first bag, we also ensured that this site location was manned and managed at all times.

51. This appeared to work and the flow of gas stopped once we inserted the bag into the main. The gas flames within the building appeared to die down and there was a huge sense of relief. The LFB were extremely grateful. One of the officers with whom Jason had been working closely embraced Jason and thanked him for everything he had done.

52. PMC had been called to site to carry out the permanent isolation of the main and we stayed on site to monitor the situation until they arrived.

53. I left the site at 06:15am on the morning of 15 June 2017. The gas had been isolated by this point and Nicola WILKINSON, who is Band C Emergency Network Manager, had arrived on site and Jason and I handed over to her.

Our working relationship with the LFB

54. The LFB were in control of the incident, we were there to assist and support them and took instructions from them to ensure that nothing we did impacted on their work. We worked well with the LFB and Jason built up a very close professional and successful working relationship with their officers. The officers changed shifts and we had to re-introduce ourselves and set up a new working relationship when that happened but Jason had one main point of contact at all times, albeit the availability of the LFB officers was understandably limited.

55. When we arrived, the LFB expected us to be able to turn the gas off relatively easily and quickly. We did therefore have to manage their expectations and explain that it was not as easy as switching one switch off. Isolating the supply of gas is a complex and integrated process. It demands the skill and expertise of experienced engineers who analyse the gas network before carrying out excavations to efficiently and safely locate and isolate the mains.

56. It was clear that the LFB wanted the gas to be isolated as quickly as possible. They absolutely appreciated that we were doing our job as quickly as possible and told us to do the best that we could. We kept them abreast of all developments. They helped us wherever they could and we did the same. I would describe the working relationship between us as professional and constructive.

57. The pressure that the LFB was working under was surreal. We heard horror stories about fire officers having to climb over around 40 bodies in the stairwell to come out of the building. I saw broken men that day. The emergency services were all stretched and fire officers had been deployed from Essex and all over London.

Reflections

58. The conditions the engineers had to work under that day were horrendous. They were the worst conditions that I have ever seen. My team saw survivors and bodies being carried out of the building. They saw mothers and children tragically coming out of the building fused together because of the intense heat. The team working at Grenfell Tower witnessed events that no one should ever have to witness or experience.

59. The 15" main was located right next to the 'sterile area' where the paramedics treated the injured. The team had to work here, next to where the paramedics were treating the causalities as they came out of the building. Another main was located next to the morgue where the bodies were placed in body bags. The scenes were chaotic, emotions were running high and the scenes at the site were understandably quite tense, but I witnessed a very positive side to humanity that day.

Everyone had a job to carry out but everyone worked together and helped each other so far as possible.

60. I have had time to reflect on the course of events that day. I believe that we worked effectively and efficiently and there isn't anything that I would do differently if presented with a similar situation.

61. I felt very proud of our team that day. Jason did a fantastic job. He coordinated the whole operation successfully. We had 100% commitment from all the team on site as they worked in horrendous conditions. The team are trained gas engineers but no one is trained to deal with a situation like this.

I understand that the material I have provided to the Police may be shared with the Public Inquiry investigating the Grenfell Tower Fire. I am willing for any material handed to the criminal investigation to be shared with the Public Inquiry.

Signature: T DAY Signature witnessed by:
2018