		_	
1	Monday, 19 November 2018	1	witness statement?
2	(10.00 am)	2	A. Yes. Yes, it is.
3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to	3	Q. Have you read it recently?
4	today's hearing.	4	A. Yes.
5	Today we are going to hear further evidence from	5	Q. Can you confirm for us that the contents are true?
6	various control room officers.	6	A. Yes.
7	MR MILLETT: Good morning, Mr Chairman.	7	
8	Yes, that's right, and our next witness is a London	1	Q. Thank you.
9	Fire Brigade control room officer, Sarah Russell.	8	You had been, at the date of your statement,
10	Can I please call Sarah Russell.	9	I think, in the position of a control room officer at
	•	10	the LFB for about nine months.
11 12	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.	11	A. Nine months in total, with training as well.
	SARAH RUSSELL (affirmed)	12	Q. And you started your training when?
13	Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY SIR MARTIN MOORE PICK. Thenk you very much indeed. Sit	13	A. September 2016.
14	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much indeed. Sit	14	Q. In terms of your training, do you remember getting any
15	down and make yourself comfortable.	15	training on policy number 790, which is about fire
16	Yes, Mr Millett.	16	survival guidance?
17	MR MILLETT: Ms Russell, good morning.	17	A. Yes, there was a day of training for fire survival
18	A. Good morning.	18	guidance.
19	Q. Can I start, please, by asking you to give the chairman	19	Q. Can you tell us briefly what that training involved?
20	your full name.	20	A. It was outlining practices. We had some example calls
21	A. Sarah Jane Russell.	21	played to us, how to handle it, that sort of content.
22	Q. I'm going to begin by thanking you very much for coming	22	Q. Do you remember receiving training on emergency call
23	to the inquiry and assisting us with our investigations.	23	management, policy 539?
24	It is enormously helpful for us to be able to hear from	24	A. In regards to FSG as well?
25	you, so we are extremely grateful. So thank you.	25	Q. Yes.
	Page 1		Page 3
	1 age 1		1 age 3
		1	
1	If at any time you need a break during my questions,	1	A. Yes, when they played the samples, they talked through
2		1 2	A. Yes, when they played the samples, they talked through how it was handled and just how to handle the caller.
	If at any time you need a break during my questions, then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help		
2	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take	2	how it was handled and just how to handle the caller.
2 3	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help	2 3	how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive
2 3 4	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well.	2 3 4	how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons
2 3 4 5	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than	2 3 4 5	how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called
2 3 4 5 6	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need to	2 3 4 5 6	how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lakanal House?
2 3 4 5 6 7	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need to break before that, we can do that. Can I also say that sometimes my questions, which	2 3 4 5 6 7	how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lakanal House? A. I remember Lakanal being mentioned in training. It was
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need to break before that, we can do that. Can I also say that sometimes my questions, which are supposed to be short and simple, sometimes don't	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lakanal House? A. I remember Lakanal being mentioned in training. It was referred to as a hard example of FSG, but nothing since
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need to break before that, we can do that. Can I also say that sometimes my questions, which	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lakanal House? A. I remember Lakanal being mentioned in training. It was referred to as a hard example of FSG, but nothing since then.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need to break before that, we can do that. Can I also say that sometimes my questions, which are supposed to be short and simple, sometimes don't turn out that way, so if you want me to repeat the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lakanal House? A. I remember Lakanal being mentioned in training. It was referred to as a hard example of FSG, but nothing since then. Q. It was mentioned, was it? Was any other training given
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need to break before that, we can do that. Can I also say that sometimes my questions, which are supposed to be short and simple, sometimes don't turn out that way, so if you want me to repeat the question or put it in a different way, I'm very happy to do that.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lakanal House? A. I remember Lakanal being mentioned in training. It was referred to as a hard example of FSG, but nothing since then. Q. It was mentioned, was it? Was any other training given to you about what to do as a result of lessons learnt at
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need to break before that, we can do that. Can I also say that sometimes my questions, which are supposed to be short and simple, sometimes don't turn out that way, so if you want me to repeat the question or put it in a different way, I'm very happy to do that. Thank you very much.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lakanal House? A. I remember Lakanal being mentioned in training. It was referred to as a hard example of FSG, but nothing since then. Q. It was mentioned, was it? Was any other training given to you about what to do as a result of lessons learnt at Lakanal?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need to break before that, we can do that. Can I also say that sometimes my questions, which are supposed to be short and simple, sometimes don't turn out that way, so if you want me to repeat the question or put it in a different way, I'm very happy to do that.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lakanal House? A. I remember Lakanal being mentioned in training. It was referred to as a hard example of FSG, but nothing since then. Q. It was mentioned, was it? Was any other training given to you about what to do as a result of lessons learnt at Lakanal? A. I don't remember any specific training based off of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need to break before that, we can do that. Can I also say that sometimes my questions, which are supposed to be short and simple, sometimes don't turn out that way, so if you want me to repeat the question or put it in a different way, I'm very happy to do that. Thank you very much. I'm going to begin by asking you some questions about your experience and training.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lakanal House? A. I remember Lakanal being mentioned in training. It was referred to as a hard example of FSG, but nothing since then. Q. It was mentioned, was it? Was any other training given to you about what to do as a result of lessons learnt at Lakanal? A. I don't remember any specific training based off of that, I just remember it being mentioned. Q. You refer to it in your last answer but one as "a hard
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need to break before that, we can do that. Can I also say that sometimes my questions, which are supposed to be short and simple, sometimes don't turn out that way, so if you want me to repeat the question or put it in a different way, I'm very happy to do that. Thank you very much. I'm going to begin by asking you some questions about your experience and training. First, it's right, I think, that you're a control	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lakanal House? A. I remember Lakanal being mentioned in training. It was referred to as a hard example of FSG, but nothing since then. Q. It was mentioned, was it? Was any other training given to you about what to do as a result of lessons learnt at Lakanal? A. I don't remember any specific training based off of that, I just remember it being mentioned. Q. You refer to it in your last answer but one as "a hard example of FSG". Why do you say that?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need to break before that, we can do that. Can I also say that sometimes my questions, which are supposed to be short and simple, sometimes don't turn out that way, so if you want me to repeat the question or put it in a different way, I'm very happy to do that. Thank you very much. I'm going to begin by asking you some questions about your experience and training. First, it's right, I think, that you're a control room officer as at today with the London Fire Brigade.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lakanal House? A. I remember Lakanal being mentioned in training. It was referred to as a hard example of FSG, but nothing since then. Q. It was mentioned, was it? Was any other training given to you about what to do as a result of lessons learnt at Lakanal? A. I don't remember any specific training based off of that, I just remember it being mentioned. Q. You refer to it in your last answer but one as "a hard
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need to break before that, we can do that. Can I also say that sometimes my questions, which are supposed to be short and simple, sometimes don't turn out that way, so if you want me to repeat the question or put it in a different way, I'm very happy to do that. Thank you very much. I'm going to begin by asking you some questions about your experience and training. First, it's right, I think, that you're a control room officer as at today with the London Fire Brigade. A. Yes, yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lakanal House? A. I remember Lakanal being mentioned in training. It was referred to as a hard example of FSG, but nothing since then. Q. It was mentioned, was it? Was any other training given to you about what to do as a result of lessons learnt at Lakanal? A. I don't remember any specific training based off of that, I just remember it being mentioned. Q. You refer to it in your last answer but one as "a hard example of FSG". Why do you say that? A. Just that all FSGs aren't — they don't have happy endings, that that incident didn't.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need to break before that, we can do that. Can I also say that sometimes my questions, which are supposed to be short and simple, sometimes don't turn out that way, so if you want me to repeat the question or put it in a different way, I'm very happy to do that. Thank you very much. I'm going to begin by asking you some questions about your experience and training. First, it's right, I think, that you're a control room officer as at today with the London Fire Brigade. A. Yes, yes. Q. As at the date of your statement, which I'll show you,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lakanal House? A. I remember Lakanal being mentioned in training. It was referred to as a hard example of FSG, but nothing since then. Q. It was mentioned, was it? Was any other training given to you about what to do as a result of lessons learnt at Lakanal? A. I don't remember any specific training based off of that, I just remember it being mentioned. Q. You refer to it in your last answer but one as "a hard example of FSG". Why do you say that? A. Just that all FSGs aren't — they don't have happy
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need to break before that, we can do that. Can I also say that sometimes my questions, which are supposed to be short and simple, sometimes don't turn out that way, so if you want me to repeat the question or put it in a different way, I'm very happy to do that. Thank you very much. I'm going to begin by asking you some questions about your experience and training. First, it's right, I think, that you're a control room officer as at today with the London Fire Brigade. A. Yes, yes. Q. As at the date of your statement, which I'll show you, you'd had that role for some nine months?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lakanal House? A. I remember Lakanal being mentioned in training. It was referred to as a hard example of FSG, but nothing since then. Q. It was mentioned, was it? Was any other training given to you about what to do as a result of lessons learnt at Lakanal? A. I don't remember any specific training based off of that, I just remember it being mentioned. Q. You refer to it in your last answer but one as "a hard example of FSG". Why do you say that? A. Just that all FSGs aren't — they don't have happy endings, that that incident didn't. Q. During your training, did you get specific training on
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need to break before that, we can do that. Can I also say that sometimes my questions, which are supposed to be short and simple, sometimes don't turn out that way, so if you want me to repeat the question or put it in a different way, I'm very happy to do that. Thank you very much. I'm going to begin by asking you some questions about your experience and training. First, it's right, I think, that you're a control room officer as at today with the London Fire Brigade. A. Yes, yes. Q. As at the date of your statement, which I'll show you, you'd had that role for some nine months? A. Yes, roughly nine months at the time.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lakanal House? A. I remember Lakanal being mentioned in training. It was referred to as a hard example of FSG, but nothing since then. Q. It was mentioned, was it? Was any other training given to you about what to do as a result of lessons learnt at Lakanal? A. I don't remember any specific training based off of that, I just remember it being mentioned. Q. You refer to it in your last answer but one as "a hard example of FSG". Why do you say that? A. Just that all FSGs aren't they don't have happy endings, that that incident didn't. Q. During your training, did you get specific training on how to handle calls coming from high-rise residential
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need to break before that, we can do that. Can I also say that sometimes my questions, which are supposed to be short and simple, sometimes don't turn out that way, so if you want me to repeat the question or put it in a different way, I'm very happy to do that. Thank you very much. I'm going to begin by asking you some questions about your experience and training. First, it's right, I think, that you're a control room officer as at today with the London Fire Brigade. A. Yes, yes. Q. As at the date of your statement, which I'll show you, you'd had that role for some nine months? A. Yes, roughly nine months at the time. Q. You've given us a witness statement, which was I think	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lakanal House? A. I remember Lakanal being mentioned in training. It was referred to as a hard example of FSG, but nothing since then. Q. It was mentioned, was it? Was any other training given to you about what to do as a result of lessons learnt at Lakanal? A. I don't remember any specific training based off of that, I just remember it being mentioned. Q. You refer to it in your last answer but one as "a hard example of FSG". Why do you say that? A. Just that all FSGs aren't they don't have happy endings, that that incident didn't. Q. During your training, did you get specific training on how to handle calls coming from high-rise residential buildings? A. We had training about mobilisation, what questions to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need to break before that, we can do that. Can I also say that sometimes my questions, which are supposed to be short and simple, sometimes don't turn out that way, so if you want me to repeat the question or put it in a different way, I'm very happy to do that. Thank you very much. I'm going to begin by asking you some questions about your experience and training. First, it's right, I think, that you're a control room officer as at today with the London Fire Brigade. A. Yes, yes. Q. As at the date of your statement, which I'll show you, you'd had that role for some nine months? A. Yes, roughly nine months at the time.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lakanal House? A. I remember Lakanal being mentioned in training. It was referred to as a hard example of FSG, but nothing since then. Q. It was mentioned, was it? Was any other training given to you about what to do as a result of lessons learnt at Lakanal? A. I don't remember any specific training based off of that, I just remember it being mentioned. Q. You refer to it in your last answer but one as "a hard example of FSG". Why do you say that? A. Just that all FSGs aren't they don't have happy endings, that that incident didn't. Q. During your training, did you get specific training on how to handle calls coming from high-rise residential buildings? A. We had training about mobilisation, what questions to ask, how many floors categorise the high-rise, but
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need to break before that, we can do that. Can I also say that sometimes my questions, which are supposed to be short and simple, sometimes don't turn out that way, so if you want me to repeat the question or put it in a different way, I'm very happy to do that. Thank you very much. I'm going to begin by asking you some questions about your experience and training. First, it's right, I think, that you're a control room officer as at today with the London Fire Brigade. A. Yes, yes. Q. As at the date of your statement, which I'll show you, you'd had that role for some nine months? A. Yes, roughly nine months at the time. Q. You've given us a witness statement, which was I think done for the Metropolitan Police, dated 10 October 2017.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lakanal House? A. I remember Lakanal being mentioned in training. It was referred to as a hard example of FSG, but nothing since then. Q. It was mentioned, was it? Was any other training given to you about what to do as a result of lessons learnt at Lakanal? A. I don't remember any specific training based off of that, I just remember it being mentioned. Q. You refer to it in your last answer but one as "a hard example of FSG". Why do you say that? A. Just that all FSGs aren't they don't have happy endings, that that incident didn't. Q. During your training, did you get specific training on how to handle calls coming from high-rise residential buildings? A. We had training about mobilisation, what questions to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need to break before that, we can do that. Can I also say that sometimes my questions, which are supposed to be short and simple, sometimes don't turn out that way, so if you want me to repeat the question or put it in a different way, I'm very happy to do that. Thank you very much. I'm going to begin by asking you some questions about your experience and training. First, it's right, I think, that you're a control room officer as at today with the London Fire Brigade. A. Yes, yes. Q. As at the date of your statement, which I'll show you, you'd had that role for some nine months? A. Yes, roughly nine months at the time. Q. You've given us a witness statement, which was I think done for the Metropolitan Police, dated 10 October 2017. That is MET00007698. First of all, is that the first page of your police	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lakanal House? A. I remember Lakanal being mentioned in training. It was referred to as a hard example of FSG, but nothing since then. Q. It was mentioned, was it? Was any other training given to you about what to do as a result of lessons learnt at Lakanal? A. I don't remember any specific training based off of that, I just remember it being mentioned. Q. You refer to it in your last answer but one as "a hard example of FSG". Why do you say that? A. Just that all FSGs aren't — they don't have happy endings, that that incident didn't. Q. During your training, did you get specific training on how to handle calls coming from high-rise residential buildings? A. We had training about mobilisation, what questions to ask, how many floors categorise the high-rise, but nothing in particular for FSGs. Q. Did you get any training on how to help a resident of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	then all you have to do is just signal and we can take a break, and there are others in the room who will help with that as well. I'm not planning to ask you questions for more than 45 minutes at a go, so that's the aim, but if we need to break before that, we can do that. Can I also say that sometimes my questions, which are supposed to be short and simple, sometimes don't turn out that way, so if you want me to repeat the question or put it in a different way, I'm very happy to do that. Thank you very much. I'm going to begin by asking you some questions about your experience and training. First, it's right, I think, that you're a control room officer as at today with the London Fire Brigade. A. Yes, yes. Q. As at the date of your statement, which I'll show you, you'd had that role for some nine months? A. Yes, roughly nine months at the time. Q. You've given us a witness statement, which was I think done for the Metropolitan Police, dated 10 October 2017. That is MET00007698.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	how it was handled and just how to handle the caller. Q. Before Grenfell, which was June 2017, did you receive any kind of training of any kind focused on lessons learnt from an earlier fire in London at a place called Lakanal House? A. I remember Lakanal being mentioned in training. It was referred to as a hard example of FSG, but nothing since then. Q. It was mentioned, was it? Was any other training given to you about what to do as a result of lessons learnt at Lakanal? A. I don't remember any specific training based off of that, I just remember it being mentioned. Q. You refer to it in your last answer but one as "a hard example of FSG". Why do you say that? A. Just that all FSGs aren't — they don't have happy endings, that that incident didn't. Q. During your training, did you get specific training on how to handle calls coming from high-rise residential buildings? A. We had training about mobilisation, what questions to ask, how many floors categorise the high-rise, but nothing in particular for FSGs.

1 a high-rise residential building assess the safety of 1	it says:
2 an escape route? 2	"The London Fire Brigade define a Fire Survival
3 A. Not in specific to high-rise, just in the general 3	Guidance call as being a call to Brigade Control where
4 assessing the situation, is it safe to stay or to leave 4	the caller believes that they are unable to leave their
5 in the general sense, but not in specific to high-rise 5	premises due to the effects of fire, and where the
6 buildings. 6	Control Room Officer remains on the line providing
7 Q. In the general sense, what was the training which you 7	appropriate advice until either the caller is able to
8 had about how to go about assisting a caller to assess 8	leave by their own means, is rescued by the Fire brigade
9 the safety of an escape route?	or the line is cleared."
10 A. Just ask questions, find out if there's smoke, little 10	That's the context.
11 hints that there might be a fire outside the door, like 11	Then it says in the third paragraph down:
12 heat, popping noises, just little things that you 12	"Brigade Control advise callers to 'Get out and Stay
13 know, if they say there's popping noises at the door, 13	out', however if a call is received from a High rise
14 don't tell them to go outside, there could be a fire 14	building where Fire, Heat and Smoke are not affecting
15 outside. Things like that.	the caller, LFB would advise that:
16 Q. Did you have any experience prior to the night of the	"You are usually safest to remain in your premises
17 fire of any FSG?	unless affected by fire, heat or smoke. If the
18 A. No, that was my first FSG.	situation changes, you should leave your premises and
19 Q. What about 999 calls from high-rise buildings, did you 19	dial 999, if you need further assistance."
20 ever have any experience of taking those? 20	My first question, Ms Russell, is: does that accord
21 A. Yes, I would've had probably quite a few. It's quite 21	with your understanding of the stay-put policy?
	A. Yes.
	Q. Looking at the text, it says in that last paragraph
24 A. No. 24	I read out to you:
25 Q. Did you get any training about how a control room would 25	"You are usually safest to remain in your premises
Page 5	Page 7
1 go about handling multiple FSG calls if it was faced 1	unless affected by fire, heat or smoke."
2 with that situation?	I just want to concentrate with you on the word
3 A. Well, to my understanding, not on that scale. I don't	"affected".
4 remember anything being mentioned. It wasn't expected 4	As at the night of Grenfell, what did you understand
5 as it was completely different from what you normally 5	by the word "affected"?
	A. That there is smoke in their property or heat from the
7 Q. Did you have any training on multiple FSG calls to 7	fire, so they would have to be directly affected by the
8 a lesser extent than you experienced at Grenfell?	fire to make them leave.
	Q. In your training or in your experience as you had to
but nothing about, you know, when there's multiple calls 10	that date, what information did you expect to use to
coming in and they're all FSGs, nothing like that.	make your assessment of whether or not those premises
12 Q. I want to move to explore your understanding and 12	were affected in the way you've described?
	A. Smoke is normally the biggest indicator. If there's
policy. Whether that's the accurate expression or not,	smoke coming into their property, that means the fire
15 we'll find out.	will be close normally close by. A heat source would
16 First of all, can I ask you, are you familiar with 16	mean it's obviously very close.
17 policy 539? 17	Just general cues. The callers are normally quite
18 A. Yes, yes. 18	forthcoming with any information that would give away
19 Q. So let's look at that, . It's LFB00000737. For those	that the fire is affecting them.
	Q. When making that assessment about whether premises are
21 tab 3 of the LFB policy bundle. 21	affected, were you trained to or did you have experience
We have it there on the screen.	of relying on messages from the incident ground or were
23 Can I ask you, please, to turn to appendix 3 in 23	you completely reliant on information given to you by
24 that, which is on page 16.	the caller?
	A. On that night?
Page 6	Page 8

1	Q. In general, prior to that night, what would be your	1	what a caller was telling you meant that they were
2	expectation?	2	trapped?
3	A. In general, you would expect someone to be sat with you.	3	A. Just their inability to leave the building. If they
4	When you're on an FS call, it's quite it's all your	4	tell you they can't leave is the big indicator.
5	focused on, really, you're very into that, and when	5	Most of the time if you say to someone, "Can you get
6	you're on an FSG, normally you'd have someone sat next	6	out?", my experience of calls since and before, they say
7	to you, still keeping you involved in the room,	7	yes and they start leaving. There's obviously a reason
8	reminding you of things. So you would expect to have	8	for them to say, "No, I can't leave."
9	some kind of input as to what was going on in the	9	Q. Do you explore that reason with them or do you take them
10	building.	10	at face value?
11	In terms of whether they're out, you would normally	11	A. Yes, you would ask what is the situation like, try and
12	expect a message back saying, "All persons accounted	12	get them to confirm a bit of what they're seeing.
13	for", some acknowledgement that you knew what was going	13	Q. Can I ask you in light of that last answer you gave me
14	on.	14	to look at policy 790. That is at tab 5 of our policies
15	Q. You've answered that question as if the call was already	15	bundle, and it's LFB00001257.
16	an FSG call.	16	I'd like to show you paragraph 2.1 on page 2. It's
17	Is it right that in fact and we'll come to this	17	on the screen there, Ms Russell, for you to see, and it
18	in a minute before a call becomes an FSG call, there	18	says:
19	are some stages you've got to go through?	19	"2.1. A FSG call is a call received into control
20	A. Yes.	20	where the caller believes that they are unable to leave
21	Q. So if a caller is affected by fire or smoke but can	21	their premises due to the effects of fire, and [in bold]
22	leave, then it's not yet an FSG call.	22	where the control officer remains on the line providing
23	A. No.	23	appropriate advice."
24	Q. Have I got that right?	24	You said in your statement, as we've just looked at,
25	A. Yes, if the caller can leave in any way, it's not FSG.	25	that it's where they're affected by smoke.
	• •		, , ,
	Page 9		Page 11
1	Q. So at the time when you're making the assessment as to	1	Is there a reason why you categorise the calls as
2	whether the caller is affected, by fire, heat or	2	FSG if they are trapped by smoke?
3	smoke	3	A. Well, fire survival guidance sorry, you mean smoke in
4	A. Yes.	4	relation to just generally a fire where they can't
5	Q to what extent would you expect to rely solely on the	5	leave?
6	information from the caller, or would you rely also on	6	Q. So looking at the policy where it says, "due to the
7	information from the incident ground?	7	effects of fire", were you trained to understand that as
8	A. From my understanding, normally at that time the crews	8	the effects of fire, including heat and smoke?
9	would be very early on the scene. If not already on	9	A. Yes, yes, so signs of fire, yes.
10	if not, they might not be there yet, they might still be	10	Q. In general terms, did you ever get any training on how
11	on the way. So you wouldn't have anything coming back	11	to prioritise FSG calls among themselves? So if you got
12	from the crews anyway, it would be just what the caller	12	three FSG calls, for example, you would assign
13	is telling you. That's what we go by on calls because	13	a priority, 1, 2, 3, to each of them?
14	we can't see what they're seeing.	14	A. No, I don't remember any specific training like that.
15	Q. Can I ask you to look at your witness statement, which	15	Q. Did you receive any training on giving particular
16	we have up on the screen in front of you, and go,	16	priority or treatment to callers from flats where they
17	please, to page 3.	17	were affected by fire, heat or smoke, where the caller
18	You say on page 3 it's the third paragraph down:	18	was in some way a child or disabled or an elderly
19	"A FSG becomes active at the point the caller says	19	person?
20	that they cannot get out of their property and they are	20	A. No, same again, I don't remember any training about
21	affected by smoke."	21	prioritising, just that the information is passed over
22	In your training or experience I think we're	22	and I assume the crews would then decide what to
23	looking at training rather than experience because you	23	prioritise.
24	say you hadn't experienced an FSG call as at the night	24	Q. Sticking with policy 790, can I ask you, please, to go
25	of Grenfell how would you go about assessing whether	25	to paragraph 5.1, which is at the bottom of the same
	2		
	Page 10		Page 12

1	page of the policy we're on.	1	in that day.
2	The heading there, Ms Russell, is "Information	2	Q. Did that training involve assessment of the length,
3	transfer to the incident". It says:	3	nature and shape of the escape route?
4	"5.1. As soon as control has confirmed that a FSG	4	A. I don't remember that in particular.
5	call is in progress they will contact the incident	5	Q. What about assessment of smoke density or fire in the
6	ground and start to pass over the initial details at	6	escape route or routes?
7	this stage it is likely to be basic information relating	7	A. I have a recollection about, you know, asking how bad
8	to the number of persons involved and their location	8	the smoke is.
9	within the property."	9	Q. Then the second item down on that page is assessing the
10	Is that your understanding of what information would	10	situation by asking the caller direct questions, and you
11	be transferred?	11	can see examples of those direct questions: do you know
12	A. Yes, as well as possibly why they can't leave, the	12	where the fire is? What room are you in? Is anyone
13	conditions, if there's smoke or heat.	13	with you?
14	Q. What sort of details would you try to get out of the	14	Did you get specific training on how to go about
15	caller to pass on to the incident ground?	15	making that assessment?
16	A. The location, what floor, the flat number, what room	16 17	A. Just asking the questions of the caller and getting
17	they're in, how they're being affected. It's just	1	their response was all the training I remember, really.
18	information like that.	18	Q. In your understanding, would it be you leaving it to the
19	Q. I'm sorry to make you jump from policy to policy, but	19	caller to assess the situation, or would you then make
20	can I ask you to go back to policy 539, "Emergency call	20	the assessment, as it were, for them and then give clear
21	management", LFB00000737. It's back to tab 3 of our	21	advice based on your assessment?
22	policies bundle for those who have it. Please turn in	22 23	A. I think I would rely on both. The caller would be
23 24	that to page 16, again, appendix 3. From the middle of the page down to the bottom of	23	telling you things, assessing the situation they are in,
25	the page, it says:	25	but we have a bit more training on how to deal with those situations, so we can give input as, you know,
23	the page, it says.	23	those situations, so we can give input as, you know,
	Page 13		Page 15
1	"The control room officer will ascertain through	1	what I think would be best in the situation. But it's
2	initial questioning, the type of premises the caller is	2	only guidance because we can't see; we're basing it on
3	in and use the link on the Reference Information File	3	what they're telling us.
4	'Fire Survival Guidance' to take them to the appropriate	4	
5			Q. In that training, doing that assessment, was any part of
5	area of information to use, to assist the caller."	5	Q. In that training, doing that assessment, was any part of that training designed to direct you to information
6	area of information to use, to assist the caller." The first of those, if you can see it, two	1	
		5	that training designed to direct you to information
6	The first of those, if you can see it, two	5 6	that training designed to direct you to information coming not from the caller but from the incident ground,
6 7	The first of those, if you can see it, two paragraphs on, is:	5 6 7	that training designed to direct you to information coming not from the caller but from the incident ground, the incident commander, the command unit?
6 7 8	The first of those, if you can see it, two paragraphs on, is: "Firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a	5 6 7 8	that training designed to direct you to information coming not from the caller but from the incident ground, the incident commander, the command unit? A. No, I don't remember any training like that.
6 7 8 9	The first of those, if you can see it, two paragraphs on, is: "Firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a safe, alternative ESCAPE route for them to leave their	5 6 7 8 9	that training designed to direct you to information coming not from the caller but from the incident ground, the incident commander, the command unit? A. No, I don't remember any training like that. Q. Right, okay.
6 7 8 9 10	The first of those, if you can see it, two paragraphs on, is: "Firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a safe, alternative ESCAPE route for them to leave their premises."	5 6 7 8 9 10	that training designed to direct you to information coming not from the caller but from the incident ground, the incident commander, the command unit? A. No, I don't remember any training like that. Q. Right, okay. I want to turn to the night of the fire.
6 7 8 9 10 11	The first of those, if you can see it, two paragraphs on, is: "Firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a safe, alternative ESCAPE route for them to leave their premises." You see the word "ESCAPE" in bold capital letters	5 6 7 8 9 10 11	that training designed to direct you to information coming not from the caller but from the incident ground, the incident commander, the command unit? A. No, I don't remember any training like that. Q. Right, okay. I want to turn to the night of the fire. You say on page 5 of your witness statement if
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	The first of those, if you can see it, two paragraphs on, is: "Firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a safe, alternative ESCAPE route for them to leave their premises." You see the word "ESCAPE" in bold capital letters there.	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	that training designed to direct you to information coming not from the caller but from the incident ground, the incident commander, the command unit? A. No, I don't remember any training like that. Q. Right, okay. I want to turn to the night of the fire. You say on page 5 of your witness statement if I can take you to that, please in the last paragraph
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	The first of those, if you can see it, two paragraphs on, is: "Firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a safe, alternative ESCAPE route for them to leave their premises." You see the word "ESCAPE" in bold capital letters there. Did your training assist you in how to go about	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	that training designed to direct you to information coming not from the caller but from the incident ground, the incident commander, the command unit? A. No, I don't remember any training like that. Q. Right, okay. I want to turn to the night of the fire. You say on page 5 of your witness statement if I can take you to that, please in the last paragraph on that page, the third line from the start of that paragraph: "I was posted as radio operator, monitoring
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	The first of those, if you can see it, two paragraphs on, is: "Firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a safe, alternative ESCAPE route for them to leave their premises." You see the word "ESCAPE" in bold capital letters there. Did your training assist you in how to go about helping the caller identify a safe alternative escape route? A. I remember brief training about asking if they were low	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	that training designed to direct you to information coming not from the caller but from the incident ground, the incident commander, the command unit? A. No, I don't remember any training like that. Q. Right, okay. I want to turn to the night of the fire. You say on page 5 of your witness statement if I can take you to that, please in the last paragraph on that page, the third line from the start of that paragraph: "I was posted as radio operator, monitoring channel 2 (south London), with Sharon DERBY[sic] who was
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	The first of those, if you can see it, two paragraphs on, is: "Firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a safe, alternative ESCAPE route for them to leave their premises." You see the word "ESCAPE" in bold capital letters there. Did your training assist you in how to go about helping the caller identify a safe alternative escape route? A. I remember brief training about asking if they were low enough, was there a balcony or another roof they can get	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	that training designed to direct you to information coming not from the caller but from the incident ground, the incident commander, the command unit? A. No, I don't remember any training like that. Q. Right, okay. I want to turn to the night of the fire. You say on page 5 of your witness statement if I can take you to that, please in the last paragraph on that page, the third line from the start of that paragraph: "I was posted as radio operator, monitoring channel 2 (south London), with Sharon DERBY[sic] who was operating channel 4 (North London)."
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	The first of those, if you can see it, two paragraphs on, is: "Firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a safe, alternative ESCAPE route for them to leave their premises." You see the word "ESCAPE" in bold capital letters there. Did your training assist you in how to go about helping the caller identify a safe alternative escape route? A. I remember brief training about asking if they were low enough, was there a balcony or another roof they can get to, was there an alternative staircase, just	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	that training designed to direct you to information coming not from the caller but from the incident ground, the incident commander, the command unit? A. No, I don't remember any training like that. Q. Right, okay. I want to turn to the night of the fire. You say on page 5 of your witness statement if I can take you to that, please in the last paragraph on that page, the third line from the start of that paragraph: "I was posted as radio operator, monitoring channel 2 (south London), with Sharon DERBY[sic] who was operating channel 4 (North London)." I want to just get a feel for where it was you were
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	The first of those, if you can see it, two paragraphs on, is: "Firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a safe, alternative ESCAPE route for them to leave their premises." You see the word "ESCAPE" in bold capital letters there. Did your training assist you in how to go about helping the caller identify a safe alternative escape route? A. I remember brief training about asking if they were low enough, was there a balcony or another roof they can get to, was there an alternative staircase, just an alternate route out if one was blocked by smoke or	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	that training designed to direct you to information coming not from the caller but from the incident ground, the incident commander, the command unit? A. No, I don't remember any training like that. Q. Right, okay. I want to turn to the night of the fire. You say on page 5 of your witness statement if I can take you to that, please in the last paragraph on that page, the third line from the start of that paragraph: "I was posted as radio operator, monitoring channel 2 (south London), with Sharon DERBY[sic] who was operating channel 4 (North London)." I want to just get a feel for where it was you were sitting in the control room on the night.
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	The first of those, if you can see it, two paragraphs on, is: "Firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a safe, alternative ESCAPE route for them to leave their premises." You see the word "ESCAPE" in bold capital letters there. Did your training assist you in how to go about helping the caller identify a safe alternative escape route? A. I remember brief training about asking if they were low enough, was there a balcony or another roof they can get to, was there an alternative staircase, just an alternate route out if one was blocked by smoke or fire.	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	that training designed to direct you to information coming not from the caller but from the incident ground, the incident commander, the command unit? A. No, I don't remember any training like that. Q. Right, okay. I want to turn to the night of the fire. You say on page 5 of your witness statement if I can take you to that, please in the last paragraph on that page, the third line from the start of that paragraph: "I was posted as radio operator, monitoring channel 2 (south London), with Sharon DERBY[sic] who was operating channel 4 (North London)." I want to just get a feel for where it was you were sitting in the control room on the night. Can I ask you, please, to be shown the LFB's control
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	The first of those, if you can see it, two paragraphs on, is: "Firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a safe, alternative ESCAPE route for them to leave their premises." You see the word "ESCAPE" in bold capital letters there. Did your training assist you in how to go about helping the caller identify a safe alternative escape route? A. I remember brief training about asking if they were low enough, was there a balcony or another roof they can get to, was there an alternative staircase, just an alternate route out if one was blocked by smoke or fire. Q. You say brief training; what did that training involve?	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	that training designed to direct you to information coming not from the caller but from the incident ground, the incident commander, the command unit? A. No, I don't remember any training like that. Q. Right, okay. I want to turn to the night of the fire. You say on page 5 of your witness statement if I can take you to that, please in the last paragraph on that page, the third line from the start of that paragraph: "I was posted as radio operator, monitoring channel 2 (south London), with Sharon DERBY[sic] who was operating channel 4 (North London)." I want to just get a feel for where it was you were sitting in the control room on the night. Can I ask you, please, to be shown the LFB's control report, and this is LFB00004790 at page 175.
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	The first of those, if you can see it, two paragraphs on, is: "Firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a safe, alternative ESCAPE route for them to leave their premises." You see the word "ESCAPE" in bold capital letters there. Did your training assist you in how to go about helping the caller identify a safe alternative escape route? A. I remember brief training about asking if they were low enough, was there a balcony or another roof they can get to, was there an alternative staircase, just an alternate route out if one was blocked by smoke or fire. Q. You say brief training; what did that training involve? A. I just remember one day in particular for FSG training	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	that training designed to direct you to information coming not from the caller but from the incident ground, the incident commander, the command unit? A. No, I don't remember any training like that. Q. Right, okay. I want to turn to the night of the fire. You say on page 5 of your witness statement if I can take you to that, please in the last paragraph on that page, the third line from the start of that paragraph: "I was posted as radio operator, monitoring channel 2 (south London), with Sharon DERBY[sic] who was operating channel 4 (North London)." I want to just get a feel for where it was you were sitting in the control room on the night. Can I ask you, please, to be shown the LFB's control report, and this is LFB00004790 at page 175. If we can have that photograph expanded, please.
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	The first of those, if you can see it, two paragraphs on, is: "Firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a safe, alternative ESCAPE route for them to leave their premises." You see the word "ESCAPE" in bold capital letters there. Did your training assist you in how to go about helping the caller identify a safe alternative escape route? A. I remember brief training about asking if they were low enough, was there a balcony or another roof they can get to, was there an alternative staircase, just an alternate route out if one was blocked by smoke or fire. Q. You say brief training; what did that training involve? A. I just remember one day in particular for FSG training and it covered a few different things on that one day,	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	that training designed to direct you to information coming not from the caller but from the incident ground, the incident commander, the command unit? A. No, I don't remember any training like that. Q. Right, okay. I want to turn to the night of the fire. You say on page 5 of your witness statement — if I can take you to that, please — in the last paragraph on that page, the third line from the start of that paragraph: "I was posted as radio operator, monitoring channel 2 (south London), with Sharon DERBY[sic] who was operating channel 4 (North London)." I want to just get a feel for where it was you were sitting in the control room on the night. Can I ask you, please, to be shown the LFB's control report, and this is LFB00004790 at page 175. If we can have that photograph expanded, please. Thank you.
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	The first of those, if you can see it, two paragraphs on, is: "Firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a safe, alternative ESCAPE route for them to leave their premises." You see the word "ESCAPE" in bold capital letters there. Did your training assist you in how to go about helping the caller identify a safe alternative escape route? A. I remember brief training about asking if they were low enough, was there a balcony or another roof they can get to, was there an alternative staircase, just an alternate route out if one was blocked by smoke or fire. Q. You say brief training; what did that training involve? A. I just remember one day in particular for FSG training and it covered a few different things on that one day, so the management of the call, the questions to ask,	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	that training designed to direct you to information coming not from the caller but from the incident ground, the incident commander, the command unit? A. No, I don't remember any training like that. Q. Right, okay. I want to turn to the night of the fire. You say on page 5 of your witness statement if I can take you to that, please in the last paragraph on that page, the third line from the start of that paragraph: "I was posted as radio operator, monitoring channel 2 (south London), with Sharon DERBY[sic] who was operating channel 4 (North London)." I want to just get a feel for where it was you were sitting in the control room on the night. Can I ask you, please, to be shown the LFB's control report, and this is LFB00004790 at page 175. If we can have that photograph expanded, please. Thank you. First of all, is that a photograph of the control
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	The first of those, if you can see it, two paragraphs on, is: "Firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a safe, alternative ESCAPE route for them to leave their premises." You see the word "ESCAPE" in bold capital letters there. Did your training assist you in how to go about helping the caller identify a safe alternative escape route? A. I remember brief training about asking if they were low enough, was there a balcony or another roof they can get to, was there an alternative staircase, just an alternate route out if one was blocked by smoke or fire. Q. You say brief training; what did that training involve? A. I just remember one day in particular for FSG training and it covered a few different things on that one day,	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	that training designed to direct you to information coming not from the caller but from the incident ground, the incident commander, the command unit? A. No, I don't remember any training like that. Q. Right, okay. I want to turn to the night of the fire. You say on page 5 of your witness statement — if I can take you to that, please — in the last paragraph on that page, the third line from the start of that paragraph: "I was posted as radio operator, monitoring channel 2 (south London), with Sharon DERBY[sic] who was operating channel 4 (North London)." I want to just get a feel for where it was you were sitting in the control room on the night. Can I ask you, please, to be shown the LFB's control report, and this is LFB00004790 at page 175. If we can have that photograph expanded, please. Thank you.
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	The first of those, if you can see it, two paragraphs on, is: "Firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a safe, alternative ESCAPE route for them to leave their premises." You see the word "ESCAPE" in bold capital letters there. Did your training assist you in how to go about helping the caller identify a safe alternative escape route? A. I remember brief training about asking if they were low enough, was there a balcony or another roof they can get to, was there an alternative staircase, just an alternate route out if one was blocked by smoke or fire. Q. You say brief training; what did that training involve? A. I just remember one day in particular for FSG training and it covered a few different things on that one day, so the management of the call, the questions to ask,	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	that training designed to direct you to information coming not from the caller but from the incident ground, the incident commander, the command unit? A. No, I don't remember any training like that. Q. Right, okay. I want to turn to the night of the fire. You say on page 5 of your witness statement if I can take you to that, please in the last paragraph on that page, the third line from the start of that paragraph: "I was posted as radio operator, monitoring channel 2 (south London), with Sharon DERBY[sic] who was operating channel 4 (North London)." I want to just get a feel for where it was you were sitting in the control room on the night. Can I ask you, please, to be shown the LFB's control report, and this is LFB00004790 at page 175. If we can have that photograph expanded, please. Thank you. First of all, is that a photograph of the control

1	was organised on the night of the fire?	1	period has finished?
2	A. Yes.	2	A. Yes.
3	Q. Can you tell us, where were you sitting?	3	Q. Going to your witness statement, can I ask you, please,
4	A. So if that was the supervisor position on the far right,	4	to look at page 6. At the top of that page, you say:
5	I was sitting opposite on this position on the left-hand	5	"The number of calls began stacking up and up. I
6	side, just behind the first computer you can see	6	asked Sharon if she would mind combining both channel 2
7	(Indicates).	7	and channel 4 on the radio. My channel was silent so I
8	Q. It might help if you would be able to get up and point	8	thought I could help better by answering calls. I did
9	to that. We have got a ready dot system, but it's	9	not want to sit doing nothing when everyone else was
10	probably slower than	10	busy. Sharon agreed so I de-monitored my channel and
11	A. This position here (Indicates).	11	moved back to call handling."
12	Q. The witness is pointing we have the red dot there	12	We'll come on to the first call that you took in
13	to the black computer just second from the left-hand	13	a moment, but before we do, at the point when the
14	side of the picture, facing towards the camera.	14	control room started to take 999 calls from
15	A. Yes.	15	Grenfell Tower on the night of the fire, do you remember
16	Q. Who was sitting to your immediate left?	16	what the system in general was for passing information
17	A. That would've been Angie Gotts.	17	to the incident ground?
18	Q. Was anybody sitting to your immediate right or were you	18	A. So once someone takes a call that has information from
19	on the end?	19	it, you would generate a service request, head it to the
20	A. No, I was the end of that position. The desk in front	20	radio channel that that incident was on, complete it.
21	may have been Christine Howson, but I'm not 100 per cent	21	It then goes out so everyone can see it. The radio
22	sure.	22	operator would then pick that up, call up the call sign
23	Q. Was that a position from which you operated the radio,	23	that is relevant and pass that information over.
24	or did you have to move positions because we know you	24	Q. You would generate that service request from your
25	stopped operating the radio.	25	computer monitor at your desk?
	Page 17		Page 19
1	A. No, that was where I was all night.	1	A. Yes.
2	Q. All night?	2	Q. Would you speak to the radio operator or would you rely
3	A. Yes.	3	entirely on the messaging system within the computer
4	Q. Okay.	4	system in the control room?
5	Would your position in the control room vary	5	•
5	• •	"	
6	depending on incident or shift or was it random?	6	A. You would make the radio operator aware that you'd sent
6 7	depending on incident or shift, or was it random? A. It would very on shift. At the start of a tour you're	6 7	a message out. You would shout out "Message on
7	A. It would vary on shift. At the start of a tour you're	7	a message out. You would shout out "Message on channel 2" or "4".
7 8	A. It would vary on shift. At the start of a tour you're allocated to a position, and that position would	7 8	a message out. You would shout out "Message on channel 2" or "4". Q. When you say the number of calls began stacking up and
7 8 9	A. It would vary on shift. At the start of a tour you're allocated to a position, and that position would normally have a certain role, and that changes tour to	7 8 9	a message out. You would shout out "Message on channel 2" or "4". Q. When you say the number of calls began stacking up and up, is that something you heard or something you saw on
7 8 9 10	A. It would vary on shift. At the start of a tour you're allocated to a position, and that position would normally have a certain role, and that changes tour to tour, every time you're in.	7 8 9 10	a message out. You would shout out "Message on channel 2" or "4". Q. When you say the number of calls began stacking up and up, is that something you heard or something you saw on your monitor?
7 8 9 10 11	A. It would vary on shift. At the start of a tour you're allocated to a position, and that position would normally have a certain role, and that changes tour to tour, every time you're in. Q. Do you know how the allocation of positions would be	7 8 9 10 11	a message out. You would shout out "Message on channel 2" or "4".Q. When you say the number of calls began stacking up and up, is that something you heard or something you saw on your monitor?A. Both. We have a buzzer that sounds when calls are
7 8 9 10 11 12	 A. It would vary on shift. At the start of a tour you're allocated to a position, and that position would normally have a certain role, and that changes tour to tour, every time you're in. Q. Do you know how the allocation of positions would be done? 	7 8 9 10 11 12	 a message out. You would shout out "Message on channel 2" or "4". Q. When you say the number of calls began stacking up and up, is that something you heard or something you saw on your monitor? A. Both. We have a buzzer that sounds when calls are coming in. I don't recall whether it was buzzing,
7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 A. It would vary on shift. At the start of a tour you're allocated to a position, and that position would normally have a certain role, and that changes tour to tour, every time you're in. Q. Do you know how the allocation of positions would be done? A. It's done by the supervisors. I think it's supposed to 	7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 a message out. You would shout out "Message on channel 2" or "4". Q. When you say the number of calls began stacking up and up, is that something you heard or something you saw on your monitor? A. Both. We have a buzzer that sounds when calls are coming in. I don't recall whether it was buzzing, actually, in Stratford now I think of it, because it was
7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 A. It would vary on shift. At the start of a tour you're allocated to a position, and that position would normally have a certain role, and that changes tour to tour, every time you're in. Q. Do you know how the allocation of positions would be done? A. It's done by the supervisors. I think it's supposed to be done so everyone gets a fair share of different roles 	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 a message out. You would shout out "Message on channel 2" or "4". Q. When you say the number of calls began stacking up and up, is that something you heard or something you saw on your monitor? A. Both. We have a buzzer that sounds when calls are coming in. I don't recall whether it was buzzing, actually, in Stratford now I think of it, because it was the backup, but normally we would. But it's visible on
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 A. It would vary on shift. At the start of a tour you're allocated to a position, and that position would normally have a certain role, and that changes tour to tour, every time you're in. Q. Do you know how the allocation of positions would be done? A. It's done by the supervisors. I think it's supposed to be done so everyone gets a fair share of different roles and gets to experience the roles as often as everyone 	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	a message out. You would shout out "Message on channel 2" or "4". Q. When you say the number of calls began stacking up and up, is that something you heard or something you saw on your monitor? A. Both. We have a buzzer that sounds when calls are coming in. I don't recall whether it was buzzing, actually, in Stratford now I think of it, because it was the backup, but normally we would. But it's visible on the ICS screen that there are calls waiting with
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 A. It would vary on shift. At the start of a tour you're allocated to a position, and that position would normally have a certain role, and that changes tour to tour, every time you're in. Q. Do you know how the allocation of positions would be done? A. It's done by the supervisors. I think it's supposed to be done so everyone gets a fair share of different roles and gets to experience the roles as often as everyone else. 	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	a message out. You would shout out "Message on channel 2" or "4". Q. When you say the number of calls began stacking up and up, is that something you heard or something you saw on your monitor? A. Both. We have a buzzer that sounds when calls are coming in. I don't recall whether it was buzzing, actually, in Stratford now I think of it, because it was the backup, but normally we would. But it's visible on the ICS screen that there are calls waiting with a number underneath of how many as well.
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 A. It would vary on shift. At the start of a tour you're allocated to a position, and that position would normally have a certain role, and that changes tour to tour, every time you're in. Q. Do you know how the allocation of positions would be done? A. It's done by the supervisors. I think it's supposed to be done so everyone gets a fair share of different roles and gets to experience the roles as often as everyone else. Q. Was there a system whereby the most junior was sat next 	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	a message out. You would shout out "Message on channel 2" or "4". Q. When you say the number of calls began stacking up and up, is that something you heard or something you saw on your monitor? A. Both. We have a buzzer that sounds when calls are coming in. I don't recall whether it was buzzing, actually, in Stratford now I think of it, because it was the backup, but normally we would. But it's visible on the ICS screen that there are calls waiting with a number underneath of how many as well. Q. So south London was quiet, so you moved to calls?
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 A. It would vary on shift. At the start of a tour you're allocated to a position, and that position would normally have a certain role, and that changes tour to tour, every time you're in. Q. Do you know how the allocation of positions would be done? A. It's done by the supervisors. I think it's supposed to be done so everyone gets a fair share of different roles and gets to experience the roles as often as everyone else. Q. Was there a system whereby the most junior was sat next to one of the more experienced control room officers? 	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	a message out. You would shout out "Message on channel 2" or "4". Q. When you say the number of calls began stacking up and up, is that something you heard or something you saw on your monitor? A. Both. We have a buzzer that sounds when calls are coming in. I don't recall whether it was buzzing, actually, in Stratford now I think of it, because it was the backup, but normally we would. But it's visible on the ICS screen that there are calls waiting with a number underneath of how many as well. Q. So south London was quiet, so you moved to calls? A. Yes.
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 A. It would vary on shift. At the start of a tour you're allocated to a position, and that position would normally have a certain role, and that changes tour to tour, every time you're in. Q. Do you know how the allocation of positions would be done? A. It's done by the supervisors. I think it's supposed to be done so everyone gets a fair share of different roles and gets to experience the roles as often as everyone else. Q. Was there a system whereby the most junior was sat next to one of the more experienced control room officers? A. To begin with, you're sat with someone, but once you're 	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	a message out. You would shout out "Message on channel 2" or "4". Q. When you say the number of calls began stacking up and up, is that something you heard or something you saw on your monitor? A. Both. We have a buzzer that sounds when calls are coming in. I don't recall whether it was buzzing, actually, in Stratford now I think of it, because it was the backup, but normally we would. But it's visible on the ICS screen that there are calls waiting with a number underneath of how many as well. Q. So south London was quiet, so you moved to calls? A. Yes. Q. On page 6, in the second main paragraph, you say:
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 A. It would vary on shift. At the start of a tour you're allocated to a position, and that position would normally have a certain role, and that changes tour to tour, every time you're in. Q. Do you know how the allocation of positions would be done? A. It's done by the supervisors. I think it's supposed to be done so everyone gets a fair share of different roles and gets to experience the roles as often as everyone else. Q. Was there a system whereby the most junior was sat next to one of the more experienced control room officers? A. To begin with, you're sat with someone, but once you're on your own, as far as I know there's no system like 	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	a message out. You would shout out "Message on channel 2" or "4". Q. When you say the number of calls began stacking up and up, is that something you heard or something you saw on your monitor? A. Both. We have a buzzer that sounds when calls are coming in. I don't recall whether it was buzzing, actually, in Stratford now I think of it, because it was the backup, but normally we would. But it's visible on the ICS screen that there are calls waiting with a number underneath of how many as well. Q. So south London was quiet, so you moved to calls? A. Yes. Q. On page 6, in the second main paragraph, you say: "The first call I took was about an hour long."
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 A. It would vary on shift. At the start of a tour you're allocated to a position, and that position would normally have a certain role, and that changes tour to tour, every time you're in. Q. Do you know how the allocation of positions would be done? A. It's done by the supervisors. I think it's supposed to be done so everyone gets a fair share of different roles and gets to experience the roles as often as everyone else. Q. Was there a system whereby the most junior was sat next to one of the more experienced control room officers? A. To begin with, you're sat with someone, but once you're on your own, as far as I know there's no system like that. 	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	a message out. You would shout out "Message on channel 2" or "4". Q. When you say the number of calls began stacking up and up, is that something you heard or something you saw on your monitor? A. Both. We have a buzzer that sounds when calls are coming in. I don't recall whether it was buzzing, actually, in Stratford now I think of it, because it was the backup, but normally we would. But it's visible on the ICS screen that there are calls waiting with a number underneath of how many as well. Q. So south London was quiet, so you moved to calls? A. Yes. Q. On page 6, in the second main paragraph, you say: "The first call I took was about an hour long." For the rest of that page, you describe a long call
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 A. It would vary on shift. At the start of a tour you're allocated to a position, and that position would normally have a certain role, and that changes tour to tour, every time you're in. Q. Do you know how the allocation of positions would be done? A. It's done by the supervisors. I think it's supposed to be done so everyone gets a fair share of different roles and gets to experience the roles as often as everyone else. Q. Was there a system whereby the most junior was sat next to one of the more experienced control room officers? A. To begin with, you're sat with someone, but once you're on your own, as far as I know there's no system like that. Q. When you say "to begin with", do you mean during your 	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	a message out. You would shout out "Message on channel 2" or "4". Q. When you say the number of calls began stacking up and up, is that something you heard or something you saw on your monitor? A. Both. We have a buzzer that sounds when calls are coming in. I don't recall whether it was buzzing, actually, in Stratford now I think of it, because it was the backup, but normally we would. But it's visible on the ICS screen that there are calls waiting with a number underneath of how many as well. Q. So south London was quiet, so you moved to calls? A. Yes. Q. On page 6, in the second main paragraph, you say: "The first call I took was about an hour long." For the rest of that page, you describe a long call that started at 01.29.48, and we have a record of that
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 A. It would vary on shift. At the start of a tour you're allocated to a position, and that position would normally have a certain role, and that changes tour to tour, every time you're in. Q. Do you know how the allocation of positions would be done? A. It's done by the supervisors. I think it's supposed to be done so everyone gets a fair share of different roles and gets to experience the roles as often as everyone else. Q. Was there a system whereby the most junior was sat next to one of the more experienced control room officers? A. To begin with, you're sat with someone, but once you're on your own, as far as I know there's no system like that. Q. When you say "to begin with", do you mean during your probationary period? 	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	a message out. You would shout out "Message on channel 2" or "4". Q. When you say the number of calls began stacking up and up, is that something you heard or something you saw on your monitor? A. Both. We have a buzzer that sounds when calls are coming in. I don't recall whether it was buzzing, actually, in Stratford now I think of it, because it was the backup, but normally we would. But it's visible on the ICS screen that there are calls waiting with a number underneath of how many as well. Q. So south London was quiet, so you moved to calls? A. Yes. Q. On page 6, in the second main paragraph, you say: "The first call I took was about an hour long." For the rest of that page, you describe a long call that started at 01.29.48, and we have a record of that call and we'll come to it.
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. It would vary on shift. At the start of a tour you're allocated to a position, and that position would normally have a certain role, and that changes tour to tour, every time you're in. Q. Do you know how the allocation of positions would be done? A. It's done by the supervisors. I think it's supposed to be done so everyone gets a fair share of different roles and gets to experience the roles as often as everyone else. Q. Was there a system whereby the most junior was sat next to one of the more experienced control room officers? A. To begin with, you're sat with someone, but once you're on your own, as far as I know there's no system like that. Q. When you say "to begin with", do you mean during your probationary period? A. Yes. 	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	a message out. You would shout out "Message on channel 2" or "4". Q. When you say the number of calls began stacking up and up, is that something you heard or something you saw on your monitor? A. Both. We have a buzzer that sounds when calls are coming in. I don't recall whether it was buzzing, actually, in Stratford now I think of it, because it was the backup, but normally we would. But it's visible on the ICS screen that there are calls waiting with a number underneath of how many as well. Q. So south London was quiet, so you moved to calls? A. Yes. Q. On page 6, in the second main paragraph, you say: "The first call I took was about an hour long." For the rest of that page, you describe a long call that started at 01.29.48, and we have a record of that call and we'll come to it. Just to identify it, is that the call which starts
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 A. It would vary on shift. At the start of a tour you're allocated to a position, and that position would normally have a certain role, and that changes tour to tour, every time you're in. Q. Do you know how the allocation of positions would be done? A. It's done by the supervisors. I think it's supposed to be done so everyone gets a fair share of different roles and gets to experience the roles as often as everyone else. Q. Was there a system whereby the most junior was sat next to one of the more experienced control room officers? A. To begin with, you're sat with someone, but once you're on your own, as far as I know there's no system like that. Q. When you say "to begin with", do you mean during your probationary period? 	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	a message out. You would shout out "Message on channel 2" or "4". Q. When you say the number of calls began stacking up and up, is that something you heard or something you saw on your monitor? A. Both. We have a buzzer that sounds when calls are coming in. I don't recall whether it was buzzing, actually, in Stratford now I think of it, because it was the backup, but normally we would. But it's visible on the ICS screen that there are calls waiting with a number underneath of how many as well. Q. So south London was quiet, so you moved to calls? A. Yes. Q. On page 6, in the second main paragraph, you say: "The first call I took was about an hour long." For the rest of that page, you describe a long call that started at 01.29.48, and we have a record of that call and we'll come to it.
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. It would vary on shift. At the start of a tour you're allocated to a position, and that position would normally have a certain role, and that changes tour to tour, every time you're in. Q. Do you know how the allocation of positions would be done? A. It's done by the supervisors. I think it's supposed to be done so everyone gets a fair share of different roles and gets to experience the roles as often as everyone else. Q. Was there a system whereby the most junior was sat next to one of the more experienced control room officers? A. To begin with, you're sat with someone, but once you're on your own, as far as I know there's no system like that. Q. When you say "to begin with", do you mean during your probationary period? A. Yes. 	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	a message out. You would shout out "Message on channel 2" or "4". Q. When you say the number of calls began stacking up and up, is that something you heard or something you saw on your monitor? A. Both. We have a buzzer that sounds when calls are coming in. I don't recall whether it was buzzing, actually, in Stratford now I think of it, because it was the backup, but normally we would. But it's visible on the ICS screen that there are calls waiting with a number underneath of how many as well. Q. So south London was quiet, so you moved to calls? A. Yes. Q. On page 6, in the second main paragraph, you say: "The first call I took was about an hour long." For the rest of that page, you describe a long call that started at 01.29.48, and we have a record of that call and we'll come to it. Just to identify it, is that the call which starts

1	A. Yes. I've since found out that wasn't my first call.	1	in a service request, "MAKE PUMPS 25".
2	I didn't remember that I had a call from someone outside	2	Did you see or hear the make pumps 25 message before
3	of the building. But the hour-long call was a dead line	3	you started the long call, do you think?
4	from BT; there was no one on the line.	4	A. I remember being on the call and trying to reassure the
5	Q. I think you called the number back	5	caller saying there were 25 pumps below, and I remember
6	A. Yes.	6	it went up to a 40 at some point, but I'm not too sure
7	Q that BT had given you.	7	of the timeline along it.
8	We have the transcript for that, we're going to look	8	Q. At that point, the beginning of your call, the long
9	at it in a moment, but just so that it's primed and	9	call, did you have any thoughts about this fire and how
10	ready to go, it's LFB00000507 and it's 70 pages long.	10	it was developing, having heard or been aware of that
11	Before I ask you some questions about that, first,	11	escalation?
12	when you took that call, were you aware of the messages	12	A. Around the 15/25 mark, 25 was an indication that this is
13	that were starting to come in about the incident?	13	a big fire. When it went to 40, I had never had any
14	A. I was aware of the make-up messages coming in of the	14	experience of that. I didn't really know what we were
15	incident.	15	dealing with. We hadn't seen it.
16	Q. Let me see if I can pin those down.	16	Q. At that stage, had you heard or seen any messages about
17	Can I ask you, please, to be shown the short	17	which floor it was on?
18	incident log, which is MET00013830, and turn, please, to	18	A. The fire started on the 4th floor, in my memory.
19	page 17.	19	Q. Yes.
20	On that page at 01.16, you can see an informative	20	A. But
21	message, first of all: fire on 4th floor, 75 per cent	21	Q. I'm sorry, I should've reminded you, of course, we've
22	alight, block of flats of 20 floors.	22	seen on page 17 the informative message saying it was on
23	Do you remember seeing that or being aware of it?	23	the 4th floor.
24	A. Yes, I remember being aware of it.	24	A. Yes.
25	Q. Then at 01.19 we can skip out six it goes to make	25	Q. So my question should've been: having seen it was on the
	6 m om 1.8 1. 8 1		(, q
	Page 21		Page 23
1	pumps eight. Were you aware of that?	1	4th floor at 01.16, did you see or hear any further
2	A. Yes.	2	information to lead you to think that it was still on
3	Q. Then it goes to 10 pumps at 01.26. Were you aware of	3	the 4th floor or whether it had started to move from the
4	that?	4	4th floor?
5	A. Yes, yes.	5	A. I don't recall being made specifically aware that it had
6	Q. 01.26.41. And then at 01.27.59, you see it goes to 15	6	spread the way it had.
7	pumps. Were you aware of that?	7	Q. At that point, when it was made up to 25 pumps, did you
8	A. There was a point where the make-ups were very quick and	8	have any reason to think, or did you think, that it was
9	I just remember seeing it had escalated quite quickly	9	still on the 4th floor?
10	while I was on the phone.	10	A. I would've thought that it had maybe spread to flats
11	Q. Then at 01.28, page 18, if I can just take you to that,	11	around it, but definitely not that it had travelled up
12	the top of the page, 01.28.40, there's a service request	12	the building and spread to more floors.
13	from Sharon Darby, "PERSONS REPORTED".	13	Q. Prior to the start of this call, did you hear or see
14	What did that mean to you?	14	Sharon Darby passing messages over the radio to the
15	A. That there are persons inside the building that can't	15	command unit then on scene?
16	leave.	16	A. I did hear messages going on, but it is quite noisy in
17	Q. That can't leave. Right.	17	the room and I would've been dealing with calls, so
18	So does that mean that at that point you became	18	you're not always 100 per cent aware of what people are
19	aware that fire survival guidance calls either were in	19	saying, but you do have a general idea of what's going
20	progress or were about to be in progress?	20	on.
21	A. Yes.	21	Q. More specifically, if I can just ask you to look at
22	Q. Then at 01.29.41, page 18 again, you can see that	22	page 18 in the middle there, against the time mark of
23	there's a message, PM, which I think is Peter May, "TEN	23	01.31.38, you can see a service request, and this is
24	PUMP FIRE".	24	just above the make-up request for 25, so this is still
25	Then at 01.31.48, SAD, halfway down the page, puts	25	at the time when pumps are 20:
-	, ,	1 -	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

The FLOOR ALSO - PEOPLE TRAPPED 1				
FILORA AISO - PEOPLE TRAPPED* Were you aware of that message at the time it was sent, do you think? A. I have we had calls coming in from all over the building, but at the time I believed that people were affected by smoke, I didn't have an indication the fire was a bad as what if was 9. Os would it be right to finish that at the time that long 11 call started, you'd heard that message or seen that 12 a. A. I may have done but I cannot remember. 13 Q. Okaly 14 MR RILLETT. MR Russell, thank you for coming back to us. 15 m now going to ask you fo look at the transcript 16 of hat call frame, you go the statement and so had, it was 17 we can ear at the top of that first page, in the 28 group of numbers sext of the word! "Event," there's 19 a group of numbers sext of the word! "Event," there's 19 a group of numbers sext of the word! "Event," there's 10 a group of numbers sext of the word! "Event," there's 11 that, please - you say in the second time of the second 12 min paragraph: 13 Title to find on back information from her, 14 I the first page of that 15 min paragraph: 16 Do you see that? 17 Line to find on back information from her, 18 Q. So that's the time at which this call started. 19 Title to find on back information from her, 20 such as that number, be higher to the 22nd." 21 group of numbers sext of the word! "Event," there's 22 on the 26th floor that dog one higher to the 22nd." 23 statement to the policie to feedback 2017, and you go you 24 statement to the policie to feedback 2017, and you go 25 your account of that call? 26 A. No, that was all based off of memory. 27 your account of that call? 28 A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my 29 memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. 29 MR MILTET. Right (Nay.) 20 memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. 21 sign Agrith MOORE-RICK. 22 you can be a beak, shall it say 2d fill floor. 23 yell a start gain at 10.55. 24 min yell a single propograte to have a break from time to time for 24 everyon's been gl	1	" RT4 - G271 - FURTHER CALL TO SAY FIRE ON 20TH	1	(10.45 am)
were you aware of that message at the time it was sent, do you think? A. Isseew we had culls coming in from all over the building, but at the time I helieved that people were affected by smoke, I didn't have an indication the free was as bad as what it was. Q. So would be regist to think that at the time that long call started, you'd heard that message or seen that message? Q. O shay. A. I any have done but I cannot remember. Q. O kay. MR Russell, I have one or two questions before we have a hreak. O have a hreak. O have a hreak. O have a for fish first page of that. We can see at the top of that first page, in the group of numbers across of that first page, in the group of numbers across of that first page, in the group of numbers across of that first page, in the group of numbers across of that first page, in the group of numbers across of that first page, in the group of numbers across of that first page, in the group of numbers across of that first page, in the group of numbers across of that first page, in the group of numbers across of that first page, in the group of numbers across of that first page, in the group of numbers across of that first page, in the group of numbers across of that first page, in the group of numbers across of that first page, in the group of numbers across of that first page, in the group of numbers across of that first page, in the group of numbers across of that first page, in the group of numbers across of that first page, in the group of that first page of that. We can see at the top of that first page, in the group of that first page of that. A. Yes, So by so see that? A. Yes, The page of Gyour statement — if you can go back to that, please — you say in the second time, 01,2948. Do you see that? A. Yes, So by so so that should be a group and the during if you feel could be a group and the during if you feel could be a group and the during if you feel could be a group and the during if you feel could be a group and the during if you feel could be a group an	2		2	
4 Sir MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Ms Russell? 5 A. I knew we had calls coming in from all over the building, but at the time in believed that people were affected by smole, I didn't have an indication the fire was a bat as what it was. 9 Q. So would it he right to think that at the time that long call standard, you'd heard that message or seen that in message? 11 A. I may have done but I cannot remember. 12 Q. Olay. 13 Q. Olay. 14 Ms Russell, I have one or two questions before we in the fire page of that. 15 All may have done but I cannot remember. 16 On page 6 of your statement – if you can go back to the fire page of that first page, in the group of numbers sect to the word "Fever", there's a group of numbers sect to the word "fever", there's a group of numbers sect to the word "fever", there's a group of numbers sect to the word "fever", there's a group of numbers sect to the word "fever", there's a group of numbers sect to the word "fever", there's a group of numbers sect to the word "fever", there's a group of numbers sect to the word "fever", there's a group of numbers sect to the word "fever", there's a group of numbers sect to the word "fever", there's a group of numbers sect to the word "fever", there's a group of numbers sect to the word "fever", there's a group of numbers sect to the word "fever", there's a group of numbers sect to the word "fever", there's a group of numbers sect to the word "fever", there's a group of numbers sect to the word "fever", there's a group of numbers sect to the word "fever", there's a group of numbers sect to the word "fever", there's a group of numbers sect to the word "fever", there's a group of numbers sect to the word "fever", there's a group of numbers sect to the follow the fever in the product of the second in	3	Were you aware of that message at the time it was	3	
5 huilding, but at the time I believed that people were affected by smoke, I didn't have an indication the fire was as bad as what it was. 9. Q. So would the right to think that at the time that long call started, yord heard that message or seen that message? 12 A. I may have doue but I cannot remember. 13 Q. Olay. 14 Ms Eussell, I have one or two questions before we have a break. 15 have a break. 16 Ongoe 6 of your statement – if you can go back to that, please – you say in the second line of the second that, please – you say in the second line of the second on the 20th floor but had gone higher to the 22nd.' 22 First, can Just as day units when you made this 24 statement to the police in October 2017, and you gare 25 your account of hat call, had you seen the transcript 26 what you mean when you wrote your statement and and 22nd? 24 A. No, that was all based off of memory. 25 What tall? 26 A. No, that was all based off of memory. 37 Q. Well see, as we will in a moment, probably alter the break, that it says 22nd floor. Do you think that's what you meant when you wrote your statement and and 22nd? 36 MK MILLETT. Right. Okay 37 A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. 38 MK MILLETT. Right Cokay 39 MK MILLETT. Right Cokay 40 MK MILLETT. Right Cokay 41 Teach and the proprietie to brave a break. 42 Sit MARTIN MOORE-BICK. All right? If you'd like to go with the bave coverage sheer. II think this is a good moment to review while work on the form time to time for reveryone's hearf. It hink this is a good moment to review while you're out of the room, please, and we'll safety have come. So we'll sop for just over 10 minutes. 45 THE WITNESS. Oday 45 MR MILLETT. When the time that long and the first page of the time to time for revery and the time to time for reveryone's heart. The first to the time that long and the first page of the transcript of this long call. I think this is a good moment to revidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll safety hav	4	,	4	
building, but at the time I believed that people were affected by snoke, I didn't have an indication the fire was abe day what it was a bat bat common form her, and the first page of that. We can see at the top of that first page of that. We can see at the top of that first page of that. We can see at the top of that first page, in the group of numbers sectod the word "Feven", there's a group of numbers sectod from the right which is the time that people of the town when you are and the word "Feven", there's a group of numbers sectod from the right which is the time that people of the pown and the word "Feven", there's a group of numbers and the word the word "Feven", there's a group of numbers and the word the word "Feven", there's a group of numbers and the word the word "Fe	5		5	
affected by smoke, I didn't have an indication the fire was as bod as what it was. 9 Q. So wedal its engit to think that at the time that long call started, you'd heard that message or seen that message? 10 Call started, you'd heard that message or seen that message? 11 A. I may have done but I cannot remember. 12 We can see at the top of that first page, in the group of numbers next to the word "Event", there's a group of numbers next to the word "Event", there's a group of numbers next to the word "Event", there's a group of numbers next to the word "Event", there's a group of numbers next to the word "Event", there's a group of numbers seed from the right which is the time. 01.29.48. 10 On page 6 of your statement - if you can go back to that, please - you say in the second line of the second main prangraph: 11 Tried to find out besic information from her, such as the flat morber, floor number and how many yell people were master with the. She told me data the level 20 on the 20th floor but had gone higher to the 22nd." 12 people were masted with the. She told me data the level 21 your account of that call, had you seen the transcript 22 statement to the police in October 2017, and you save 23 your account of that call, had you seen the transcript 23 startent to the police in October 2017, and you save 24 file can sky you to look at page 2, you can see that shortly into the call, in the middle of the page, she 22 your account of that call; had you seen the transcript 23 says to you, in answer to your question: 12 O, Wells eas, we will in a moment, probably after the 4 break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's 4 break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's 4 break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's 4 minutes. 4 break that the was a bit fluzzy. 5 minutes. 4 finances. 4 finan		<u> </u>		
8 MR MILLETT: Ms Russell, thank you for coming back to us. 9 Q. So would it be right to think that at the time that long call started, you'd beard that message or seen that message? 11 now going to sak you to look at the transcript message? 12 A. I may have done but I cannot remember. 13 Q. Olay. 14 Ms Russell, have one or two questions before we have a break. 16 On page 6 of your statement — if you can go back to that peace—you say in the second inne of the second main paragraph: 18 Tirried to find out basic information from her, and the first peace of the second main paragraph: 19 Tirried to find out basic information from her, and the first peace of the second main paragraph: 20 and a she that number, floor number and how many people were inside with her. She told me that she lived on the 20th floor but had gone higher to the 22nd." 21 Tirried, can I juin task you this: when you made this statement to the polote in October 2017, and you gave your account of that call, had you seen the transcript. 22 Your account of that call, had you seen the transcript. 23 Q. Well see, as we will in a moment, probably after the break, that it says 22rd floor. Do you think that's hord you meant when you wrote your statement and said 22rd? 24 A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. 25 MR MRILLETT: Right. (Name). 26 Well see, as we will in a moment, probably after the break, that it says 22rd floor. Do you think that's what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 22rd? 26 MR MILLETT: Right. (Name). 27 Well see, as well in a moment, probably after the break that it says 22rd floor. Do you think that's hord you mean when you wrote your statement and said 22rd? 28 MR MRILETT: Right. (Name). 29 Well see, as well in a moment, probably after the break that it is a specific to that we have a seal of the page. The probably after the break that it is a specific to the page of the second in the second in the said for the page. The probably after the second in the page and	7		1	_
9 Q. So would it be right to think that at the time that long call started, you'd heard that message or seen that message? 11 message? 12 A. I may have done but I cannot remember. 13 Q. Okay. 14 Ms Russell, I have one or two questions before we have a break. 15 have a break. 16 On page for fyour statement – if you can go back to that, please – you say in the second in fair plant paragraph: 19 "I tried to find out basic information from her, such as the flat number, floor number and how many 20 people were inside with her. She tolim the that she lived 21 people were inside with her. She tolim the that she lived 22 on the 20th floor but had gone higher to the 22nd." 22 First, can I just ask you this: when you made this 23 statement to the police in October 2017, and you gave 24 statement to the police in October 2017, and you gave 25 your account of that call, had you seen the transcript 25 what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 6 22nd?" 2 A. No, that was all based off of memory. 2 Q. Wells e., saw will in a moment, probably after the break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 6 22nd?" 2 Mr Mill, EFT. Right Cokay. 3 MR MILLETT. Right Cokay. 4 Mr Chairman, we've been going for just under 14 45 minutes. 5 If MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. 5 MR ARRILETT. We've about to turn to that long call. I think it it might be appropriate to have a break. 5 If MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. 6 MR ARRILETT. We've about to turn to that long call. I think it it might be appropriate to have a break. 5 If MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. 6 Mark Martin MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the tester, please. 7 OVERATOR: The top floor, 23. We've already there." It we can be found to turn to that long call. I think it is a good moment to that the tester, please. 7 OVERATOR: The top floor, 23. We've already there." It was a lot of commotion in the backeground, there was something going on, she was quite distressed	8	•	1	
ord started, you'd heard that message or seen that message? 11			1	
message? 12 A. I may have done but I cannot remember. 13 Q. Okay. 14 Ms Russell, I have one or two questions before we have a break. 15 have a break. 16 On page 6 of your statement – if you can go back to that, please – you say in the second line of the second managraph: 17 Tirtled to find our basic information from her, have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good mornant to has long call. I think is have an a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good mornant to the police on the Colk Brown's break it in might be appropriate to have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good mornant to the police on the talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of that to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the tone, please, and we'll status and at 10.55. Please. Thank you. 10 A. Na Russell, have one or two questions before we time. I wave the statement, the second into of the second to the time. Old proper thank that's shortly into the call, in the middle of the page, she shortly into the call, in the middle of the page, she Page 27 1 of that call? 2 A. No, that was all based off of memory. 2 Q. Well see, as we will in a moment, probably after the break, that it snays 23rd floor. Do you think that's where you meant when you wrote your statement and said to break, that it snays 23rd floor. Do you think that's when I gave the statement, I did say that my memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. 10 Mr. AlliLETT: Right. Okay. 21 Mr. Mill.ETT: Right. Okay. 22 Mr. Martin MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. 23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. 24 Sir MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. 26 Sir MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a				
A. I may have done but I cannot remember. Q. Okay. Ms Russell, I have one or two questions before we have a break. Do page 6 of your statement — if you can go back to that that please — you say in the second line of the second main paragraph: Tited to find out basic information from her, such as the flust number, floor number and how many 20 such as the flust number, floor number and how many 21 people were inside with her. She told me that she lived 22 on the 20th floor but had gone higher to the 22nd." First, can I just ask you this: when you made this 22 your account of that call, had you seen the transcript 22 your account of that call, had you seen the transcript 23 statement to the police in October 2017, and you gave 24 statement to the police in October 2017, and you gave 25 your account of that call, had you seen the transcript 25 shortly into the call, in the middle of the page, she Page 25 Page 25 Page 27 1 of that call? A. No. that was all based off of memory. Q. Well see, as we will in a moment, probably after the break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's 4 what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 6 22nd? Mr MILLETT. Right. Okay. Mr Chairman, we've been going far just under 45 minutes. Mr MilleTT. We're about to turn to that long call. I think if it night be appropriate to have a break. SIR MARITIN MOORE-BICK. Yes. Mr MRIMILETT. We're about to turn to that long call. I think if it might be appropriate to have a break. SIR MARITIN MOORE-BICK. A good point to have a break, yes. Mr MR MILLETT. We're about to turn to that long call. I think if it might be appropriate to have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to evidence while you're out of the room, please, and well 21 start again at 10.55. SIR MARITIN MOORE-BICK. A good point to have a break, yes. Mr MilleTT. We're about to turn to that long call. I think if it might be appropriate to have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good mom	11	2	11	
13 group of numbers next to the word "Event", there's a group of numbers next to the word "Event", there's in the sease heak. 15 have break. 16 On page 6 of your statement – if you can go back to that, please – you say in the second line of the second in that, please – you say in the second line of the second in that, please – you say in the second line of the second in that, please – you say in the second line of the second in that, please – you say in the second line of the second in that, please – you say in the second line of the second in that, please – you say in the second line of the second in that, please – you say in the second line of the second in that, please – you say in the second line of the second in that, please – you say in the second line of the second in that, please – you say in the second line of the second in that, please – you say in the second line of the second in that, please – you say in the second line of the second in that, please – you say in the second line of the second in that, please – you say in the second line of the second in that, please – you say in the second line of the second in that, please – you say in the second line of the second in that, please – you say in the second line of the second in the second in the say in the second line of the second in the second line of the second in the second line of the second		-		. •
Ms Russell, I have one or two questions before we have a break. In have a break or please. In have one. So well stop for just over 10 minutes. In have one. So well stop for just o		•		
time: 01.29.48. On page 6 of your statement – if you can go back to that, please – you say in the second line of the second main paragraph: "I tried to find out basic information from her, such as the flat number, floor number and how many people were inside with her. She told me that she lived on the 20th floor but had gone higher to the 22nd." First, can I just ask you this: when you made this statement to the police in October 2017, and you gave your account of that call, had you seen the transcript Page 25 Page 25 Page 27 1 of that call? A. No, that was all based off of memory. Q. Well see, as we will in a moment, probably after the break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's what you meant when you wrote your statement and said break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 22ad? A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that fone call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that fone call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to the have can. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. Right, 10.55, please. Thank you.				
16 On page 6 of your statement – if you can go back to 17 that, please – you say in the second line of the second 18 main paragraph: 19 "I tried to find out basic information from her, 20 such as the flat number, floor number and how many 21 people were inside with her. She told me that she lived 22 on the 20th floor but had gone higher to the 22nd." 23 First, can I just ask you this: when you made this 24 statement to the police in October 2017, and you gave 25 your account of that call, had you seen the transcript 26 A. No, that was all based off of memory. 27 A. No, that was all based off of memory. 28 Page 25 29 Page 27 20 of that call? 29 A. No, that was all based off of memory. 30 Q. We'll see, as we will in a moment, probably after the 31 break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's 32 what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 33 22nd? 34 A. Yes. 35 When I gave the statement, I did say that my 36 memory of floors and time was a bif fuzzy. 39 MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. 30 MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. 31 MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think 31 it might be appropriate to have a break. 32 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK. Yes. 33 MARTIN MOORE-BICK. All right? If you'd like to go with 34 the usher, please. 35 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK. All right? If you'd like to go with 36 the usher, please. 36 Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 37 POERATOR: The top floor, 23. We're already there." 38 the assembly and the background, there was a loid or young person? 39 A. Yes. 40 Page 27 41 a start was a lot of common to time for 41 timight be appropriate to have a break. 42 timight was a lot of common to in the background, there was a loid or young person? 41 A. I remember the start of the call being quite – there 42 was a lot of common to in the background, there was a loid or young person? 43 A. Yes. 44 break that is any our to laik to anyone about your 45 common to the background there was a loid or young person? 46 policy and the background there was a loid or young person? 47 A. Yes relatively, her v	15	•	15	
that, please - you say in the second line of the second main paragraph: "It ride to find out basic information from her, such as the flat number, floor number and how many 20 on the 20th floor but had gone higher to the 22nd." 21 people were inside with her. She told me that she lived 22 on the 20th floor but had gone higher to the 22nd." 23 First, can I just ask you this: when you made this 24 statement to the police in October 2017, and you gave 25 your account of that call, had you seen the transcript Page 25 1 of that call? 2 A. No, that was all based off of memory. 3 Q. We'll see, as we will in a moment, probably after the 4 break, that it says 22rd floor. Do you think that's 5 what you ment when you wrote your statement and said 6 22nd? 7 A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my 8 memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. 9 MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. 10 Mr Chairman, we've been going for just under 11 4s minutes. 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. 16 Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for 17 everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to 18 have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. 19 I must ask you not to talk to anyone abount your 20 to the day that my 22 to the floor place, and we'll 23 tat again at 10.55. 24 THE WITNESS. Okay. 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with 26 the usher, please. 27 The young person? 28 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with 29 the usher, please. 29 Right, 10.55, please. Thank you.	16	On page 6 of your statement if you can go back to	16	
main paragraph: "I tried to find out basic information from her, such as the flat number, floor number and how many people were inside with her. She told me that she lived on the 20th floor but had gone higher to the 22nd." First, can I just ask you this: when you made this statement to the police in October 2017, and you gave your account of that cail, had you seen the transcript Page 25 Page 25 Page 27 1 of that call? A. No, that was all based off of memory. Q. We'll see, as we will in a moment, probabhy after the break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 22nd? A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break. Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for veveyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. In must ask you to look at page 2, you can see that shortly into the call, in the middle of the page, she Page 27 1 says to you, in answer to your question: "DERATOR: What floor are you on in Grenfell Tower? "JESSICA: 7a. "DERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? "OPERATOR: The top floor, 23. We're already there." It doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this transcript, the Suesci of at any time during it short all the wind of that call, had you one of a break for the dealt, in the middle of the page, she Page 27 1 says to you, in answer to your question: "OPERATOR: Sorry? "JESSICA: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? "OPERATOR: The top floor, 23. We're already there." It doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point. Is there any reason why not, have a look of the page. It doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point. Is there any reason why not, have a look of the page. The transcript of the page and the page, she says at the top of the page: "JESSICA: The top	17		17	
The going to ask you quite a few questions about this transcript, Ms Russell, so if at any time during it you feel you need a break you guist want a breather to stop and collect your feel you need a break place in Just ask you this when you made this statement to the police in October 2017, and you gave 25 your account of that call? A. No, that was all based off of memory. Q. We'll see, as we will in a moment, probably after the break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's whan you meant when you wrote your statement and said 22nd? A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. MR MRILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it it might be appropriate to have a break. MS Russell, so if at any time during it you toel you need a break you just want a breather to stop and collect your flood path to Page 2. If I goan and collect your flood plat it bit is transcript, Ms Russell, so if at any time during it you feel you need a break it stop and collect you med a break, please just tell me and we can do that. If I can ask you to look at page 2, you can see that shortly into the call, in the middle of the page, she way to you, in answer to your question: "OPERATOR: What floor are you on in Grenfell Tower? "JESSICA: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? "OPERATOR: The top floor, 23. We're already there." If doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point. Is there any reason why not? A. I remember the start of the call being quite — there was a lof of commotion in the background, there was something going on, she was quite distressed, and 1 didn't feel that I could get information clearly if she was panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. If was all of the page, she says at the top of the page. The was all of commotion in the background, there was something going on, she was quite distressed, and 1 didn't feel that I could get infor				
such as the flat number, floor number and how many popole were inside with her. She told me that she lived on the 20th floor but had gone higher to the 22nd." 23 First, can I just ask you this: when you made this statement to the police in October 2017, and you gave your account of that call, had you seen the transcript 25 shortly into the call, in the middle of the page, she Page 25 1 of that call? 2 A. No, that was all based off of memory. 3 Q. We'll see, as we will in a moment, probably after the break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's 4 break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's 5 what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 6 22nd? 4 A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. 9 MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. 10 Mr Chairman, we've been going for just under 45 minutes. 11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, that the usher, please. 13 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break. 14 If I can ask you to look at page 2, you can see that shortly into the call, in the middle of the page, she Page 27 1 of that call? 2 asys to you, in answer to your question: 2 "OPERATOR: What floor are you on in Grenfell Tower? 3 "JESSICA: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? 3 "JESSICA: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? 4 "OPERATOR: The top floor, 23. We're already there." 4 It doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point. Is there any reason why not? 4 It doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point. Is there are reason why not? 4 It doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point. Is there are a reason why not? 4 It doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point. Is there are yreason why not? 5 was a lot of commotion in the background, there was something going on, she was quite distressed, and I didn't feet that I could get information clearly if she was panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. 5 I was a loud of the			1	
people were inside with her. She told me that she lived on the 20th floor but had gone higher to the 22nd." First, can I just ask you this: when you made this statement to the police in October 2017, and you gave your account of that call, had you seen the transcript Page 25 Page 27 1 of that call? A. No, that was all based off of memory. Q. We'll see, as we will in a moment, probably after the break, that it susys 23rd floor. Do you think that's what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 22nd? A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. MR MRISSEII, we have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. The WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. Page 27 1 says to you, in answer to your question: 2 "OPERATOR: What floor are you on in Grenfell Tower? "JESSICA: 23. "OPERATOR: Sorry? 3 "JESSICA: 23. "OPERATOR: Sorry? 4 up? OPERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? OPERATOR: The top floor, 23. We're already there." 11 to doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point. Is there any reason why not? A. I remember the start of the call being quite — there was a lot of commontion in the background, there was a lot doesn't look as if you took the flat number at the spring on one show a quite distressed, and 1 didn't feel that I could get information clearly if she was panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. 10 Could you tell straight away that she was a child or young person? 11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. 12 THE WITNESS: Okay. 13 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go		,		
22 on the 20th floor but had gone higher to the 22nd." 23 First, can I just ask you this: when you made this 24 statement to the police in October 2017, and you gave 25 your account of that call, had you seen the transcript 26 Page 25 27 Page 27 1 of that call? 2 A. No, that was all based off of memory. 3 Q. We'll see, as we will in a moment, probably after the 4 break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's 5 what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 6 22nd? 6 A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my 8 memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. 9 MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. 10 Mr Chairman, we've been going for just under 11 45 minutes. 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. 13 MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. 15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. 16 Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. 19 I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll start again at 10.55. 17 THE WTINESS: Okay. 28 Sir MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. 29 Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 20 Explored that I could get information clearly if the usher, please. 20 Could you tell straight away that she was a child or young person? 21 Sir MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. 22 Right, 10.55, please. Thank you.	21	·	21	
23 First, can I just ask you this; when you made this 24 statement to the police in October 2017, and you gave 25 your account of that call, had you seen the transcript 26 Page 25 Page 27 1 of that call? 2 A. No, that was all based off of memory. 3 Q. We'll see, as we will in a moment, probably after the 4 break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's 5 what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 6 22nd? 7 A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my 8 memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. 9 MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. 10 Mr Chairman, we've been going for just under 11 45 miuntes. 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. 13 MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think 14 it might be appropriate to have a break, yes. 15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. 16 Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for 17 everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to 18 have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. 19 I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your 20 evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll 21 start again at 10.55. 22 THE WITNESS: Ckay. 23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with 24 the usher, please. 25 Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 26 Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 27 The Witness: One 28 We can do that. 16 I' can ask you to look at page 2, you can see that shortly into the call, in the middle of the page; she 24 If I can ask you to look at page 2, you can see that shortly into the call, in the middle of the page; she 25 says to you, in answer to your question: 28 "OPERATOR: What floor are you on in Grenfell Tower? 29 "JESSICA: 23. 29 "JESSICA: 23. 20 "OPERATOR: The top floor, 23. We're already there." 29 It doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point. Is there any reason why not? 20 Lidden't feel that I could get information clearly if she was panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. 21 Sir Martin Moore-Bick: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. 22 Sir Mart	22		22	
statement to the police in October 2017, and you gave your account of that call, had you seen the transcript Page 25 Page 27 1 of that call? 2 A. No, that was all based off of memory. 3 Q. We'll see, as we will in a moment, probably after the break, that it is says 23rd floor. Do you think that's what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 2 22nd? A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, was panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. MR MRUSESSICA: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 12 start again at 10.55. Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 24 If I can ask you to look at page 2, you can see that shortly into the call, in the middle of the page, she Page 27 Page 27 24 If I can ask you to look at page 2, you can see that shortly into the call, in the middle of the page, she Page 27 25 shortly into the call, in the middle of the page, she Page 27 26 PERATOR: What floor are you on in Grenfell Tower? "JESSICA: 23. "OPERATOR: Sorry? "JESSICA: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? "OPERATOR: The top floor, 23. We're already there." It doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point. Is there any reason why not? A. I remember the start of the call being quite — there was a lot of commotion in the background, there was something going on, she was quite distressed, and I didn't feel that I could get information clearly if the swas panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. Q. Could you tell straight away that she was a child or young person? A. Yes, relatively, her voice sounded quite young. By calling "Mum" as well. Q. Turning to page 3 of the transcript, to start with, picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: "JES				
Page 25 Page 27 1 of that call? A. No, that was all based off of memory. 3 Q. Well see, as we will in a moment, probably after the break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's 4 break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's 5 what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 6 22nd? 7 A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. 9 MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. 10 Mr Chairman, we've been going for just under 11 45 minutes. 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. 13 MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it it might be appropriate to have a break. 15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. 16 Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. 16 Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to early in the middle of the page, she Page 27 1 says to you, in answer to your question: 2 "OPERATOR: What floor are you on in Grenfell Tower? 3 "JESSICA: 23. 4 "OPERATOR: The top floor, 23. We're already there." 4 this point. Is there any reason why not? A. I remember the start of the call being quite — there was a lot of commotion in the background, there was something going on, she was quite distressed, and I didn't feel that I could get information clearly if she was panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. Q. Could you tell straight away that she was a child or young person? A. Yes, relatively, her voice sounded quite young. By calling "Mum" as well. 21 gibr. Martin MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 22 divented the transcript, to start with, picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? "OPERATOR: The fire's on the fourth floor. They're there at the moment fighting it, okay?"				
Page 25 1 of that call? 2 A. No, that was all based off of memory. 3 Q. We'll see, as we will in a moment, probably after the 4 break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's 5 what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 6 22nd? 6 22nd? 7 A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my 8 memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. 9 MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. 10 Mr Chairman, we've been going for just under 11 45 minutes. 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. 13 MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think 14 it might be appropriate to have a break. 15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Agood point to have a break, yes. 16 Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for 17 everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to 18 have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. 19 I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your 20 evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll 21 start again at 10.55. 22 THE WITNESS: Okay. 23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with 24 the usher, please. 25 Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 10 Says to you, in answer to your question: 26 "JERSICA: The toy floor, 23. Please can you nur operators? 27 "JERSICA: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 28 "JESSICA: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 29 properators? 3 Up? 4 DPERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 29 properators? 4 It doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point. Is there any reason why not? 4 It doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point. Is there any reason why not? 4 It doesn't look as if you took the flat number at the spont on the background, there was a lot of commotion in the background, there was something going on, she was quite distressed, and I didn't feel that I could get information clearly if she was panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. 9 I didn't feel that I could get information clearly if she was panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. 9 Q. Could you tell straight away that she w				
1 of that call? 2 A. No, that was all based off of memory. 3 Q. We'll see, as we will in a moment, probably after the 4 break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's 5 what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 6 22nd? 6 up? 7 A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my 8 memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. 9 MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. 10 Mr Chairman, we've been going for just under 11 45 minutes. 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. 13 MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think 14 it might be appropriate to have a break. 15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. 16 Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for 17 everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to 18 have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. 19 I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your 20 evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll 21 start again at 10.55. 22 THE WITNESS: Okay. 23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with 24 the usher, please. 25 Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 26 Pope RATOR: What floor are you on in Grenfell Tower? 3 "JESSICA: 23. 4 "OPERATOR: Sorry? 4 "POPERATOR: Sorry? 4 "OPERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 4 "OPERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 4 "POPERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 4 "POPERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 4 "POPERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 4 "POPERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 4 "POPERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 4 "POPERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 4 "POPERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 4 "POPERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 4 "POPERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 4 "POPERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 4 "POPERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 4 "POPERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 4 "POPERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 4 "POPERATOR: The floor and you hurry 5 "JESSICA: Are t		5 F.		,,
2 A. No, that was all based off of memory. 3 Q. We'll see, as we will in a moment, probably after the 4 break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's 5 what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 6 22nd? 7 A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my 8 memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. 9 MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. 10 Mr Chairman, we've been going for just under 11 45 minutes. 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. 13 MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think 14 it might be appropriate to have a break. 15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. 16 Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for 17 everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to 18 have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. 19 I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your 20 evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll 21 start again at 10.55. 22 THE WITNESS: Okay. 23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with 24 the usher, please. 25 Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 2 "DEFRATOR: What floor are you on in Grenfell Tower? 3 "JESSICA: 23. 4 "OPERATOR: Sorry? **JESSICA: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? **OPERATOR: Ho top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? **OPERATOR: Sorry? **JESSICA: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? **OPERATOR: Sorry? **It doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point. Is there any reason why not? **A. I remember the start of the call being quite — there was a lot of commotion in the background, there was something going on, she was quite distressed, and 14 I didn't feel that I could get information clearly if she was a panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. 9 Could you tell straight away that she was a child or young person? 18 A. Yes, relatively, her voice sounded quite young. By calling "Mum" as well. 20 Q. Turning to page 3 of the transcript, to start with, picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: 10 Q. Turning to page 3 of the transcript, t		Page 25		Page 27
2 A. No, that was all based off of memory. 3 Q. We'll see, as we will in a moment, probably after the 4 break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's 5 what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 6 22nd? 7 A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my 8 memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. 9 MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. 10 Mr Chairman, we've been going for just under 11 45 minutes. 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. 13 MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think 14 it might be appropriate to have a break. 15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. 16 Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for 17 everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to 18 have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. 19 I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your 20 evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll 21 start again at 10.55. 22 THE WITNESS: Okay. 23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with 24 the usher, please. 25 Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 2 "JESSICA: What floor are you on in Grenfell Tower? 3 "JESSICA: 23. 4 "OPERATOR: Sorry? * "JESSICA: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? * "OPERATOR: What floor are you on in Grenfell Tower? * "JESSICA: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? * "OPERATOR: Sorry? * "JESSICA: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? * "OPERATOR: Sorry? * "JESSICA: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? * "OPERATOR: Sorry? * "JESSICA: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? * "OPERATOR: Sorry? * "JESSICA: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? * "OPERATOR: Sorry? * "JESSICA: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? * "OPERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? * "OPERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? * "OPERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? * "JESSICA: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? * "JESSICA: The top floor, 25. Please can you hurry up? * "OPERATOR: What floor are you on in Grenfell Tower? * "JES	1	of that call?	1	says to you. in answer to your question:
3 Q. We'll see, as we will in a moment, probably after the 4 break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's 5 what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 6 22nd? 6 Up? 7 A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my 8 memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. 9 MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. 10 Mr Chairman, we've been going for just under 11 45 minutes. 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. 13 MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think 14 it might be appropriate to have a break. 15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. 16 Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for 17 everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to 18 have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. 19 I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your 20 evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll 21 start again at 10.55. 22 THE WITNESS: Okay. 23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with 25 Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 28 The was panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. 29 JESSICA: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 29 up? 20 PERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 29 up? 20 PERATOR: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry 20 up? 21 It doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point. Is there any reason why not? 20 A. I remember the start of the call being quite – there was a lot of commotion in the background, there was something going on, she was quite distressed, and 11 I didn't feel that I could get information clearly if she was panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. 30 Q. Could you tell straight away that she was a child or young person? 41 A. Yes, relatively, her voice sounded quite young. By 42 calling "Mum" as well. 43 Q. Turning to page 3 of the transcript, to start with, 44 picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: 45 "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? 46 "OPERATOR: The fire's on the fourth floor. They're there at the moment fighting it, okay?"	2	A. No, that was all based off of memory.		
break, that it says 23rd floor. Do you think that's what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 22nd? A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. Mr Chairman, we've been going for just under 45 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. MR MSSell, we have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to start again at 10.55. I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll start again at 10.55. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. Right, 10.55, please. Thank you.	3		3	
what you meant when you wrote your statement and said 22nd? A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. MR MILLETT: Right, Okay. Mr Chairman, we've been going for just under SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that lone as break, yes. MR MRLETT: We're about to turn to that lone as break, yes. MR Russell, we have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll start again at 10.55. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. "JESSICA: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry up? "OPERATOR: The top floor, 23. We're already there." It doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point. Is there any reason why not? A. I remember the start of the call being quite – there was a lot of commotion in the background, there was something going on, she was quite distressed, and I didn't feel that I could get information clearly if she was a panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. Q. Could you tell straight away that she was a child or young person? A. Yes, relatively, her voice sounded quite young. By calling "Mum" as well. Q. Turning to page 3 of the transcript, to start with, picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? "JESSICA: The top floor, 23. We're already there." It doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point, is doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point, is doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point, is doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point, is doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point, is d	4		4	
6 22nd? 7 A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my 8 memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. 9 MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. 10 Mr Chairman, we've been going for just under 11 45 minutes. 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. 13 MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think 14 it might be appropriate to have a break. 15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. 16 Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for 17 everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to 18 have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. 19 I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your 20 evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll 21 start again at 10.55. 22 THE WITNESS: Okay. 23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with 24 the usher, please. 25 Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 26 PRATOR: The top floor, 23. We're already there." 27 "OPERATOR: The top floor, 23. We're already there." 28 It doesn't look as if you took the flat number at this point. Is there any reason why not? 29 A. I remember the start of the call being quite — there was a lot of commotion in the background, there was something going on, she was quite distressed, and 29 I didn't feel that I could get information clearly if she was a panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. 20 Could you tell straight away that she was a child or young person? 21 A. Yes, relatively, her voice sounded quite young. By calling "Mum" as well. 22 Q. Turning to page 3 of the transcript, to start with, picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: 23 "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? 24 "OPERATOR: The fire's on the fourth floor. They're there at the moment fighting it, okay?"	5		5	"JESSICA: The top floor, 23. Please can you hurry
memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. Mr Chairman, we've been going for just under 45 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. MR MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that of the call being quite — there was a lot of commotion in the background, there was something going on, she was quite distressed, and I didn't feel that I could get information clearly if she was panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. MR MISLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. MR MISLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break, yes. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it his is a good moment to it might be appropriate to have a break, yes. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it his is a good moment to it might be appropriate to have a break, yes. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it his is a good moment of the was a lot of commotion in the background, there was something going on, she was quite distressed, and I didn't feel that I could get information clearly if she was panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. A. Yes, relatively, her voice sounded quite young. By calling "Mum" as well. Q. Turning to page 3 of the transcript, to start with, picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? "OPERATOR: T	6	22nd?	6	up?
memory of floors and time was a bit fuzzy. MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. Mr Chairman, we've been going for just under 45 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. MR MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that of the call being quite — there was a lot of commotion in the background, there was something going on, she was quite distressed, and I didn't feel that I could get information clearly if she was panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. MR MISLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. MR MISLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break, yes. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it his is a good moment to it might be appropriate to have a break, yes. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it his is a good moment to it might be appropriate to have a break, yes. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it his is a good moment of the was a lot of commotion in the background, there was something going on, she was quite distressed, and I didn't feel that I could get information clearly if she was panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. A. Yes, relatively, her voice sounded quite young. By calling "Mum" as well. Q. Turning to page 3 of the transcript, to start with, picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? "OPERATOR: T	7	A. Yes. When I gave the statement, I did say that my	7	"OPERATOR: The top floor, 23. We're already there."
MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. Mr Chairman, we've been going for just under 45 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. MR Mussell, we have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll start again at 10.55. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. His point. Is there any reason why not? A. I remember the start of the call being quite — there was a lot of commotion in the background, there was something going on, she was quite distressed, and I didn't feel that I could get information clearly if she was panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. Q. Could you tell straight away that she was a child or young person? A. Yes, relatively, her voice sounded quite young. By calling "Mum" as well. Q. Turning to page 3 of the transcript, to start with, picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? "OPERATOR: The fire's on the fourth floor. They're there at the moment fighting it, okay?"	8		8	
Mr Chairman, we've been going for just under 45 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll start again at 10.55. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. A. I remember the start of the call being quite — there was a lot of commotion in the background, there was something going on, she was quite distressed, and I didn't feel that I could get information clearly if she was panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. Q. Could you tell straight away that she was a child or young person? A. Yes, relatively, her voice sounded quite young. By calling "Mum" as well. Q. Turning to page 3 of the transcript, to start with, picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? "OPERATOR: The fire's on the fourth floor. They're there at the moment fighting it, okay?"	9	MR MILLETT: Right. Okay.	9	
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll start again at 10.55. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. I didn't feel that I could get information clearly if she was panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. Q. Could you tell straight away that she was a child or young person? A. Yes, relatively, her voice sounded quite young. By calling "Mum" as well. Q. Turning to page 3 of the transcript, to start with, picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? "OPERATOR: The fire's on the fourth floor. They're there at the moment fighting it, okay?"	10		10	A. I remember the start of the call being quite there
MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll start again at 10.55. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. I didn't feel that I could get information clearly if she was panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. Q. Could you tell straight away that she was a child or young person? A. Yes, relatively, her voice sounded quite young. By calling "Mum" as well. Q. Turning to page 3 of the transcript, to start with, picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? "OPERATOR: The fire's on the fourth floor. They're there at the moment fighting it, okay?"	11	45 minutes.	11	was a lot of commotion in the background, there was
MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think it might be appropriate to have a break. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll start again at 10.55. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. I didn't feel that I could get information clearly if she was panicking, so I wanted to try and calm her down first. Q. Could you tell straight away that she was a child or young person? A. Yes, relatively, her voice sounded quite young. By calling "Mum" as well. Q. Turning to page 3 of the transcript, to start with, picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? "OPERATOR: The fire's on the fourth floor. They're there at the moment fighting it, okay?"	12	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.	12	something going on, she was quite distressed, and
it might be appropriate to have a break. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll start again at 10.55. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to pound person? A. Yes, relatively, her voice sounded quite young. By calling "Mum" as well. Q. Turning to page 3 of the transcript, to start with, picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? "OPERATOR: The fire's on the fourth floor. They're there at the moment fighting it, okay?"	13	MR MILLETT: We're about to turn to that long call. I think	13	1
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A good point to have a break, yes. Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll start again at 10.55. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for Q. Could you tell straight away that she was a child or young person? A. Yes, relatively, her voice sounded quite young. By calling "Mum" as well. Q. Turning to page 3 of the transcript, to start with, picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? "OPERATOR: The fire's on the fourth floor. They're there at the moment fighting it, okay?"	14	_	14	•
Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll start again at 10.55. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. Ms Russell, we have a break from time to time for young person? A. Yes, relatively, her voice sounded quite young. By calling "Mum" as well. Q. Turning to page 3 of the transcript, to start with, picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? "OPERATOR: The fire's on the fourth floor. They're there at the moment fighting it, okay?"	15		15	
everyone's benefit. I think this is a good moment to have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll start again at 10.55. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 17 young person? A. Yes, relatively, her voice sounded quite young. By calling "Mum" as well. Q. Turning to page 3 of the transcript, to start with, picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? "OPERATOR: The fire's on the fourth floor. They're there at the moment fighting it, okay?"				
have one. So we'll stop for just over 10 minutes. I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll start again at 10.55. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 18 A. Yes, relatively, her voice sounded quite young. By calling "Mum" as well. Q. Turning to page 3 of the transcript, to start with, picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? "OPERATOR: The fire's on the fourth floor. They're there at the moment fighting it, okay?"				
I must ask you not to talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll start again at 10.55. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 19 calling "Mum" as well. 20 Q. Turning to page 3 of the transcript, to start with, picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? "OPERATOR: The fire's on the fourth floor. They're there at the moment fighting it, okay?"		•	1	
evidence while you're out of the room, please, and we'll start again at 10.55. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 20 Q. Turning to page 3 of the transcript, to start with, picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? "OPERATOR: The fire's on the fourth floor. They're there at the moment fighting it, okay?"		* *	1	
start again at 10.55. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 21 picking up something on that page, she says at the top of the page: 22 "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? "OPERATOR: The fire's on the fourth floor. They're there at the moment fighting it, okay?"	20		1	_
THE WITNESS: Okay. 22 of the page: 23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with 24 the usher, please. 25 Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 22 of the page: 23 "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? 24 "OPERATOR: The fire's on the fourth floor. They're 25 there at the moment fighting it, okay?"	21	start again at 10.55.	21	
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with the usher, please. Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 23 "JESSICA: Are they downstairs? "OPERATOR: The fire's on the fourth floor. They're there at the moment fighting it, okay?"	22	-	1	
the usher, please. 24 "OPERATOR: The fire's on the fourth floor. They're 25 Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 26 there at the moment fighting it, okay?"	23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you'd like to go with	23	
25 Right, 10.55, please. Thank you. 25 there at the moment fighting it, okay?"	24	the usher, please.	24	•
Page 26 Page 28	25	Right, 10.55, please. Thank you.	25	
Page 26 Page 28				
		Page 26		Page 28

		Т	
1	Just at that stage, very early on in the call, so	1	in there with you or -
2	about 01.30, did you think the fire was still on the	2	"JESSICA: No, it's not in my property."
3	4th floor or did you think the fire might have moved?	3	Just pausing there.
4	A. I would've thought it may have moved, but I wouldn't	4	A. Yes.
5	have thought it would've been anywhere near where she	5	Q. She's given you the information about the smoke, but the
6	was.	6	fire wasn't in her property.
7	Q. On page 4, if we can now go to that, she says at the top	7	A. Yes.
8	of page 4:	8	Q. At that stage, why did you not move to the first phase
9	"JESSICA: There's fire in the house. Please hurry	9	of FSG guidance?
10	up!"	10	A. What do you mean by
11	On the same page, she says, just a little bit lower	11	Q. So you know that she's affected by smoke.
12	down:	12	A. Yes.
13	"JESSICA: Yes, there's a fire in the house.	13	Q. So at that stage, is there a reason why you didn't then
14	"OPERATOR: Okay. Is there any smoke coming in?"	14	move to exploring a safe exit with her?
15	"JESSICA: Yes, there's a lot of everything(?)"	15	A. Well, at the time, I still didn't know all the
16	Then moving to page 5, a quarter of the way down,	16	information, who she was with, what flat number she was
17	she says:	17	in. As I said, it was quite panicky at the start of the
18	"JESSICA: I can't, my whole house is on fire."	18	call. So as we moved on, I gradually got more
19	Do you see that there?	19	information from her. So I did find it quite difficult
20	You say:	20	to start with, with getting the information that
21	"OPERATOR: Can, can you block the door? Are there	21	I needed.
22	any clothes you can put underneath it?	22	Q. At this stage in the call, you know she's affected by
23	"JESSICA: (Inaudible) close the door."	23	smoke, the fire isn't in the property, but did you think
24	At that point and it's still quite early on in	24	she was trapped and couldn't get out at that stage?
25	the call did you understand that she was being	25	A. Yes, she told me during that call that someone had tried
	Page 29	_	Page 31
1	affected by smoke and possibly fire?	1	to leave and they had come back inside the building, and
2	A. The smoke, because she said there was smoke coming in,	2	I did want to talk to that person because they were
3	but when she was talking about fire, my understanding	3	an adult. At some point in the call, I tried to get
4	that there was a fire in that room, because of where	4	I think a couple of times I tried to get her to pass the
5	I thought the fire was I wanted to investigate that	5	phone over. I was mindful that I was talking to
6	more. But	6	a 12-year-old and I wanted to speak to the adult who had
7	Q. I'll come back to smoke in a minute, but as we can see,	7	been out in the corridor, that could tell me what it was
8	you then say towards the bottom of the page:	8	like out there, but I never managed to get her to give
9	"OPERATOR: They can't come up to you yet, the fire's	9	the phone over.
10	below you. It's on the fourth floor, okay?	10	Q. Just going back a page to page 5, you say, three lines
11	"JESSICA: Already? That's too far."	11	up from the bottom of the page:
12	What did you get from that answer?	12	"OPERATOR: They can't come up to you yet, the fire's
13	A. I thought she meant they're far away, they're too far	13	below you. It's on the fourth floor, okay?"
14	below her.	14	When you said "They can't come up to you yet", were
15	Q. The Fire Brigade was too far away?	15	you referring to the Fire Brigade?
16	A. Yes.	16	A. Yes.
17	Q. Over the page at page 6, you ask her, just below the top	17	Q. What made you think that the Fire Brigade weren't able
18	of the page:	18	to come up to the top floor?
19	"OPERATOR: Have you stopped the smoke coming in?	19	A. That they weren't already there. I mean, at this
20	"JESSICA: No, there's too much smoke.	20	moment, they wouldn't have been able to come up to her.
21	"OPERATOR: Whereabouts are you? What room are you	21	They weren't there because they were fighting their way
22	in?	22	through that fire.
23	"JESSICA: We're in the front doors but there's a	23	Q. Did you have any information from the incident ground to
24	fire at the back. There's a fire!	24	lead you to say that the Fire Brigade couldn't come up
25	"OPERATOR: Is it actually in your property? Is it	25	to you yet, or was it just your
	D 42		D 46
Ī	Daga 30	1	Page 32
	Page 30		1 age 32

1	A. No specific information. It was based off of what	1	why you didn't do that?
2	I would expect to happen and trying to reassure her that	2	A. It was probably an overlooked comment that I didn't
3	they are there, they are coming, but they're not there	3	at the time, didn't see any I thought it meant
4	yet.	4	something different.
5	Q. Going back to page 6, Ms Russell, if I can just ask you	5	Q. If I can ask you to move forward or be shown page 11 in
6	to look at that, two-thirds of the way down, you've	6	the transcript.
7	established that the smoke is there, the fire isn't.	7	You say to her and the run-up to this is you're
8	Then you ask her there again:	8	giving her advice to stop the smoke coming in and you're
9	"OPERATOR: And whereabouts are you in the building	9	asking her about shutting the window then at the top
10	then? Are you still on the top floor?	10	of the page at page 11, you say:
11	"JESSICA: Yeah, we're on the top floor, around the	11	"OPERATOR: They are, they're coming for you but you
12	back, in someone's house."	12	need to keep yourself safe until they get there.
13	Why did you ask her that question again, given what	13	Hello?"
14	she'd already told you about where they were?	14	At this stage, had this become a full-blown fire
15	A. I was coming back to the flat number, trying to get more	15	survival guidance call?
16	information about where she was, any additional	16	A. Yes, I'd say it was at that point.
17	information that I hadn't already got at the start of	17	Q. At this stage, what had you done in your own mind to
18	the call.	18	help her assess whether or not she could leave safely?
19	Q. Could you tell by this point in the call that she was	19	A. At that point, I had the information that they'd tried
20	a child or a young person?	20	to move away from the smoke, that they were trying to
21	A. I had an idea that she was young, but I didn't know how	21	keep the smoke out. From that point on, I then started
22	young.	22	to try to talk to the person that had left to then
23	Q. Was there a reason why you didn't ask her to pass the	23	establish were there any other you know, could they
24	phone to an adult, if there was one, at this point?	24	get out, or how bad it was outside.
25	A. At that point, I was still talking to her, still trying	25	Q. When you said "They're coming for you", do you recall
	Page 33		Page 35
1	to get the information from her. I think it was shortly	1	receiving or having received any information from the
2	after or some point after that I did start saying, "Can	2	incident ground that crews were coming up or going to be
3	I speak to someone else?" Part of the role is also to	3	able to get up to the 23rd floor to carry out rescues?
4	try and calm people down, keep them calm, and I felt	4	A. No, we had no specific information that crews were on
5	that I still needed to talk to her for that little bit	5	any floors, who they were attempting to rescue; it was
6	of time.	6	just based off of you'd expect it, that's what always
7	Q. At the foot of the page, just below the question and	7	happens, they're always going to get there.
8	answer we have just looked at, she says:	8	Q. So do we take it from that, Ms Russell, that you didn't
9	"JESSICA: There's four fires downstairs."	9	have any positive information that crews were actually
10	You at the top of page 7 say:	10	coming; this was your expectation that they would come?
11	"OPERATOR: Listen -	11	A. Yes, it was expectation, yes.
12	"JESSICA: They're coming up. Please tell them to	12	Q. I see.
13	hurry up."	13	Did it occur to you that telling her that crews were
14	When she said "There's four fires downstairs", what	14	coming might then discourage her and those in the flat
15	did you make of that?	15	who she was speaking to from making an effort to escape?
16	A. Really I heard from that that there was fire downstairs.	16	A. It may well have, but at the time that was what
17	I thought it was a 12-year-old panicking. I did wonder	17	I believed was happening, that was what the firefighters
18	what she was basing the four fires off of because she	18	were trying to do. I had nothing to suggest otherwise
19	wasn't downstairs, what was she seeing, because she said	19	to that.
20	the fire wasn't in her house? So I just inferred that	20	Q. At page 13 of the transcript it's the same again
21	the fire is downstairs.	21	in the middle of that page:
22	Q. Right. But not how far down it was?	22	"OPERATOR: Hello. You need to explain to me what's
23	A. No.	23 24	going on.
24 25	Q. It does look as though you didn't explore this question about four fires downstairs with her. Is there a reason	24 25	"JESSICA: There's - the door on the room is gonna
23	about four fires downstalls with fier. Is there a reason	23	explode soon. Please can you hurry up?"
	Page 34		Page 36
		-	0 (Pages 33 to 36)

Ī			
1	Then you go back to the question of numbers.	1	person who had been outside, someone that was older. It
2	When she said "the door on the room is gonna explode	2	did sound like she was panicking, and that was one of
3	soon", did that tell you anything about whether or not	3	the reasons, other than her age, why I wanted to talk to
4	she could now safely leave?	4	someone else.
5	A. It would possibly have said that there may have been	5	Q. Did it occur to you, given that you hadn't yet assessed
6	heat on the other side. I was still trying to gain	6	the security of the escape route, that telling her that
7	information about numbers in the room. The call did go	7	the crews were coming up without having solid
8	back and forth between the situation in the room and me	8	information to back that up meant that you might be
9	trying to get information from her as well.	9	lulling her into a false sense of security?
10	Q. Then at page 14, just above halfway down, you say:	10	A. At the time, no, because, as I've said, it was based on
11	"OPERATOR: They are hurrying up. They're, they're	11	what I would expect to happen, what should happen. As
12	trying to get to you, okay? Is there another room that	12	I say, it was more about it was comforting her and
13	you can go into?	13	trying to get her through that situation and to get the
14	"JESSICA: No. Can you hurry up, please? I'm begging	14	information.
15	you.	15	Q. Going back to your training, looking back on it, was it
16	"OPERATOR: They are. They're right below you but	16	clear to you from the training that this reassurance
17	you need to keep yourself safe.	17	advice should be given at any particular point, either
18	"JESSICA: What floor are you on? What floor are you	18	before or after you had thoroughly exhausted the
19	on?"	19	assessment of the safety of the exit route?
20	At that point, do you remember whether she was	20	A. I remember from the training saying that every call is
21	speaking to someone else in the room?	21	different, every caller is different, how you handle
22	A. My memory of it is it was quite hard to tell who she was	22	them. Some people need more reassurance than others.
23	talking to at points, whether she'd gone off for another	23	Some people will give you the information and you can
24	conversation or whether she was talking to me, and	24	get straight down to the facts. Other people need a bit
25	I think a few times, something was going on in the	25	more persuasion and comfort. So it varies.
			•
	Page 37		Page 39
1	background that I wasn't aware of, but she wasn't very	1	The training was just saying that it varies caller
2	forthcoming with what was going on.	2	to caller, that you have to assess that and get the
3	Q. Just below that, you say:	3	information, but working with the caller that you have.
4	"OPERATOR: They're down below you. They're fighting	4	Q. Just to focus a little bit more closely on that.
5	the fire from below you, okay? They're making their way	5	Did your training tell you that you should exhaust
6	up."	6	the possibilities of assessment of safety of the exit
7	Again, we've seen on that page that you are	7	routes before moving to the reassurance phase?
8	essentially telling her three times that they're coming	8	A. I don't remember it in that specific order. My memory
9	up or trying to get to you.	9	of it, it's a fluid process of you reassure when needed,
10	It's the same question I asked you before: did you	10	and that could be before or after.
11	have any information from the incident ground that	11	Q. Were you ever trained to understand that there was
12	enabled you to tell her that crews were making their way	12	a possibility that, if you move too quickly to the
13	up?	13	reassurance phase and gave the caller the kinds of
14	A. No. At that point, it was more about reassuring her,	14	advice to say, "They're coming to get you" before
15	trying to get her, you know, to keep going rather than	15	exhausting the assessment about the safety of exit, you
16	panicking. So it was just acknowledging that we were	16	might unwittingly lull a caller into a false sense of
17	there, we were below them, they were trying. It was	17	security, so that they might stay where otherwise they
18	a reassurance that because she was at that point	18	might be able to leave safely?
19	talking to someone else again, I think, just trying to	19	A. No, I don't remember anything like that in training.
20	keep her calm.	20	Q. Thank you.
21	Q. At this point in the call I know it's difficult to	21	Is there a reason at this stage, given that we can
22	remember exactly because it was a long call had you,	22	tell she's panicking and that there is smoke in the
23	do you think, formed the view that you had adequately	23	flat, why you didn't say to her, "You must leave"?
24	assessed with the caller the safety of the escape route?	24	A. At that point I mean, we don't tell people to go out
25	A. Not yet, no. No. That's why I wanted to talk to the	25	into smoke when you don't know what's there. If she was
	Page 38		Page 40
	1 420 50		

1	contained in that flat, then there was smoke, but	1	really soon, okay? Okay, so tell me how everyone else
2	I didn't know how bad it was outside, whether it was	2	is doing in there."
3	worse sending her into more smoke or a fire. I hadn't	3	Same question as I asked you before, Ms Russell, I'm
4	established that yet.	4	afraid, but at this point in the call we're about
5	Q. Is there a reason why you didn't push for that	5	a third of the way through it, so about 20 minutes or so
6	information so you could make that assessment?	6	into the call, roughly do you think you had any solid
7	A. I felt that I couldn't push her too much because of the	7	information on the basis of which to tell her that the
8	way she was panicking. For some of it, I felt she	8	fire engines are there and they're fighting the fire
9	wasn't necessarily listening, so it took a while to -	9	from below?
10	I felt that I had to calm her down to be able to get	10	A. Again, same reasons as before. No messages back, just
11 12	more information out of her. So I think I was quite	12	the same as before. O. Moving on to page 24, you say at the top of the page.
13	reassuring and soft rather than hard and, "Give me the answers."	13	Q. Moving on to page 24, you say at the top of the page there:
14	Q. Moving on in the transcript to page 16, at the bottom of	14	"OPERATOR: Okay, I'm, just sending a message to the
15	the page, after the automated voice saying "You've been	15	crews now so they know where you are. So there's 11 of
16	placed on hold", she comes back and she says:	16	you on the 23rd floor. Do you know which side of the
17	"JESSICA: Yeah, we're inside another room."	17	building you're on, the front or the back?"
18	You ask her whether it's a bedroom or a bathroom.	18	Can I ask you to keep that on the screen there and
19	At that stage, did you think that they'd moved	19	to go to the document we looked at before, which is the
20	rooms?	20	short incident log, which is MET00013830, and please
21	A. Yes.	21	turn in it to page 19.
22	Q. What did that tell you about the conditions inside the	22	I'd like you to look at the time stamp of 01.45.45
23	flat?	23	at the very bottom of that page. We can see, if we can
24	A. I hadn't really established much at that point, but	24	just have that highlighted, at the very bottom the block
25	I would've thought that the room that they were in, it	25	that is on the monitor 01.45.45, SR that's you, take
			·
	Page 41		Page 43
1	was possibly too smoky to stay in.	1	it from me that that's you there.
2	Q. So do we take it at this stage there can be no question	2	A. Yes.
3	that you understood that this was a flat affected by	3	Q. You create a service request:
4	smoke at the very least?	4	" RT4 G271 11 PEOPLE IN BEDROOM OF FLAT ON 23RD
5	A. Yes.	5	FLOOR."
6	Q. Again, it looks as if you're not assessing with her the	6	My first question is a formal one: can you confirm
7	ability to escape. Is that because, again, for the	7	that's your message?
8	reasons you gave us before, you felt you couldn't push	8	A. Yes.
9	her too hard or is there another reason?	9	Q. Again, does this accord with your recollection of the
10	A. Yes, yes, I hadn't yet got to the point of asking to	10	time that you created that service request?
11	speak to the other person.	11	A. I don't really remember the times of anything. It was
12	Q. Moving on to page 23 of the transcript, at the top of	12	all very fuzzy.
13	the page and the context for this is you're asking	13	Q. Before this moment so this is about 15 minutes into
14	who is in the flat, the numbers and ages, and she tells	14	the call did you pass any other information on about
15	you she's the youngest person, apart from a baby.	15	the call to anyone in the control room or on the
16	At the bottom the previous page, she says:	16	incident ground?
17	"JESSICA: Can you hurry up?"	17	A. In the control room, a few times people came over and
18	Top of page 23, which is what we're on, you say:	18	were asking questions about what call you were on. So
19	"OPERATOR: Er, we are hurrying, they're right below	19	I don't remember who it was, but I remember a couple of
20	you, the fire engines. They're, they're fi listen	20	people coming over and me saying the information that
21	to me, they're fighting the fire from below you so it's	21	I'd got from the call.
22	gonna take them a little while to get to you. There are	22	Q. That was before this point, was it? Before 01.45?
23	23 floors on the building. The fire was on the 4111	23	A. I believe it was.
24	floor and it's spreading up but they're on their way up	24	Q. So before 15 minutes into the call?
25	to you. They'll fight the fire. They'll get to you	25	A. Yes.
	Page 42		Page 44

1	Q. Do you remember who came over to you?	1	ground to know that a caller had fled a flat on the
2	A. No, I don't remember. I remember Peter May coming over.	2	20th floor and had moved up three floors?
3	I don't think it was him I told the information to.	3	A. Not to my knowledge or understanding. From my point of
4	I remember him being more concerned about if we	4	view, they would need to know where a caller is. They
5	needed to, we could stay with a caller, but him saying	5	don't have numbers of where people are prior to any
6	we need to keep taking calls because of the number that	6	information passed to them.
7	was coming in.	7	Q. Does that tell us that, in fact, in your training, you
8	Q. Was he trying to, as it were, get you off the call and	8	weren't trained to look out for patterns of fire spread
9	onto another one?	9	in a building and be able to pass that information to
10	A. He was making us aware that if everyone had stayed on	10	the ground?
11	the call they were on, there would've potentially been	11	A. No. No.
12	a large number of people in that building that we would	12	Q. At this point, would you have said that this was, by
13	never have spoke to.	13	now, a full-blown fire survival guidance call?
14	Q. Did you pay attention to what he was saying?	14	A. Yes, yes.
15	A. Yes.	15	Q. Did you try to ask for help at this stage from
16	Q. But we can see you stayed on the call for another	16	Alex Norman or Debbie Real?
17	45 minutes or so.	17	A. I looked up for help right at the start of the call
18	A. Yes, I did say to him, "Are we staying or do I have to	18	because I'd never taken an FSG, and you should have
19	leave?", words to that sense, and he said, "If you need	19	people sitting with you, it's a lot for one person to
20	to, stay."	20	do, but everyone was busy, everyone was on calls. I was
21	Q. So he left it to your judgement to stay on the call?	21	looking around the room but there was no one free.
22	A. Yes.	22	Q. At page 26, if I can just take you forward to that, you
23	Q. Given what you had found out in the 15 or so minutes,	23	say at the bottom of that page:
24	perhaps 16 minutes, before this point in the call, is	24	"OPERATOR: They are coming. They're coming up to
25	there a reason why you made this service request only at	25	you, okay? I know it's, it's scary but they are coming
	Page 45		Page 47
1	this point?	1	for you, okay, and it'll seem like forever. Minutes
	•	2	• • •
2	A. I don't remember the specifics. It could be that		seem like hours, I know, but they're right below you,
3	I passed it verbally and that that was a message with	3 4	okay? They are making their way up, I promise."
4	additional information. But it would've gone out	5	This is over the page.
5	verbally anyway to the people that were coming around.		Just pausing there.
6	Q. Is it fair to say that this was around about the time	6	Again, is that the same sort of reassurance not
7	representing the first point in the call when you knew	7	backed up by information as before?
8	reliably that there were 11 people in that flat and the	8	A. Yes, just based on what I expect to happen, what
9	floor number?	9	normally happens.
10	A. Yes. I'd say it took me a long time to be able to get	10	Q. Then you ask her her name, as we can see at the top of
11	enough information to pass over.	11	page 27, and she says Jessica. Is there a reason why
12	Q. You say in your statement and, indeed, it's clear	12	you asked for her name?
13	from the transcript that the caller lived on the	13	A. The length of the call, and I thought that having a name
14	20th floor but had moved to the top of the building, the	14	would help get her back to the call when she wandered
15	23rd floor.	15	off talking to people.
16	Did you think of putting that information into the	16	Q. It looks as if you then talk about her age.
17	service request?	17	If you can just go to page 28, there's some
18	A. No. I think at the time I didn't think that was	18	discussion at the foot of the page about flat number.
19	relevant. It didn't matter to me where she came from,	19	You ask her:
20	it was where she was, because no message had been sent	20	"OPERATOR: Is there anyone there at the moment
21	prior to that. It hadn't been a movement that they had	21	that might know what flat number you're in? Anyone -
22	been they hadn't been informed where she was	22	"JESSICA: Which is the flat number?
23	originally, so I didn't need to update them where she	23	"CALLER 2: We're(?) on(?) 201."
24	had moved to.	24	At that point, do you remember whether somebody else
25	Q. Might it have been helpful for the crews at the incident	25	came on the phone?
		1	

1	A. I remember hearing a voice in the background, but	1	To the best of your recollection, does that reflect
2	I heard voices in the background quite a few times.	2	a message that you passed to Mr Oliff on the night?
3	I think that was the clearest one I'd heard, but it	3	A. I don't remember the unconscious part, but the 11
4	didn't make me aware that I was talking to someone else.	4	people I don't know whether that was based off of my
5	I thought they may have just said it out loud.	5	message or what someone else had given in.
6	Q. Then she says:	6	Q. Do you have any recollection of specifically passing
7	"JESSICA: 2121?"	7	a message to Jason Oliff at around this point?
8	Then it's clarified during the course of the next	8	A. We were writing down flat numbers, floors, additional
9	page, 201.	9	information, and that was then taken off by a collection
10	Is there a reason why you didn't get the flat number	10	of different people.
11	from her at an earlier stage?	11	Q. You're writing them down on a piece of paper and then
12	A. I thought that she didn't know the flat number to begin	12	giving them to other control room staff or somebody
13	with because she had gone up. I got it later on by	13	else?
14	going back to it and asking and she got it from the	14	A. I remember a few times. I think the officer of the day
15	person who she was with.	15	himself may have come over and taken them. I think
16	Q. Should you have got that information from her earlier in	16	Joanne took a few. I think Yvonne Adams may have taken
17	the call?	17	a few as well. So it was a few different people.
18	A. The earlier it came would've been better, but as I said,	18	Q. At this point and we have the time here on this page,
19	I found it quite hard to gauge her and get all the	19	01.58.48, so very near 2 o'clock in the morning do
20	information that I needed.	20	you remember whether you were getting any information
21	Q. At page 31 of the transcript, just moving to that, you	21	back from the incident ground?
22	say, two-thirds of the way down the page, having	22	A. No, I don't really remember any information coming back
23	established the flat number:	23	in.
24	"OPERATOR: Okay. I'll send them that message so	24	Q. Did that cause you any difficulties in being able to
25	they know where exactly where you are, yeah? Is	25	give clear advice to this caller?
	Page 49		Page 51
1	there anyone else in there that's someone older?"	1	A. Yes. I wasn't really aware of what was going on inside
2	There's some discussion after that about whether you	2	that building.
3	can speak to them.	3	Q. Is there a reason why you didn't ask your senior
4	I just want to see if we can pin this down to	4	officers in the control room to push the command unit to
5	a time.	5	give you a clear picture of what was going on?
6	If you can look back again, please, at the short	6	A. I would believe that they would've been doing that
7	incident log at MET00013830 at page 21, and go, please,	7	themselves. They would want a clear picture of what was
8	to the time mark of 01.58.48, SR do you see that?	8	going on as well.
9	A. Yes.	9	Q. I have come to the end of the transcript I want to show
10	Q. "Service Request Created: RT4 G271 11 PERSONS AND A BABY	10	you, Ms Russell. I just want to ask you a general
11	IN FLAT 201."	11	question.
12	That's next to your initial.	12	It's clear that during this call you were dealing
13	Is that when you sent that service request?	13	with a young person. Looking back on it, is there
14	A. Yes. If that's on the log, that's what it would have	14	anything in your training that you would have liked to
15	been.	15	have had which would've prepared you to handle this
16	Q. So we can put a time on that.	16	call?
17	If we can just look at a picture, this is	17	A. More experience with dealing with it, with FSG calls.
18	MET00016912.	18	I hadn't had any training since that one day in
19	We've had some evidence, Ms Russell, about what this	19	training, and that was eight to nine months later.
20	is, and this is one of two whiteboards in the control	20	Training with high-rise and multiple calls as well.
21	room maintained by the officer Jason Oliff.	21	When that volume of calls comes in, what do you
22	We can see on this one that it says, the third item	22	prioritise, the caller you're with or taking more calls?
23	down from the top:	23	Just a set procedure to follow.
24	"201. 23rd flr 2 yr old. 11 people now	24	Q. Just going back to the training, opening up the
25	unconscious."	25	questions we looked at earlier this morning, when you
			-
	Page 50		Page 52
		_	12 (D 10 t- F2)

1	did FSG training, was there any role play	1	way in which this caller could leave?
2	A. No.	2	A. No. I think that I was pressing on through calls then,
3	Q where callers were actors pretending to be trapped?	3	aware of just getting information, wanting to get to as
4	A. No. I have heard of that happening, but on that course,	4	many callers as possible. She told me it was smoky,
5	we didn't do that. We had examples played, but there	5	very smoky outside the flat. I didn't want to send her
6	was no role play.	6	into possibly a worse situation than she was already in.
7	Q. You say you've heard of that happening; is that in the	7	Q. Did you think to yourself: "Well, she says it's smoky,
8	LFB or other fire and rescue services?	8	but I need to know how smoky; she might be assessing it
9	A. In the LFB there are FSG training days where command	9	is actually more dangerous than it was", or did you just
10	units come in and they act it out that way, but I hadn't	10	take her at face value?
11	been a part of one of those.	11	A. I took it at face value.
12	Q. Were those training days before Grenfell or after?	12	Q. Do you remember whether you relayed the details of this
13	A. I'm not sure. I no.	13	call to the incident ground?
14	Q. I'm going to ask you about one or two other calls very	14	A. That I believe was put on paper. I'm not 100 per cent
15	briefly.	15	sure, but I think that was put on a note that was then
16	First of all, flat 173, and this is a call at	16	taken off and put up on the board.
17	02.26.48.	17	Q. Looking back on the night, was that your practice, that
18	I'll do this by reference to the control report, if	18	about this time, 02.30
19	I can, please, at page 81. That's LFB00004790.	19	A. That was the standard thing, that we were writing down
20	There's a related transcript which I don't think	20	the information, it was all being relayed to the boards,
21	I need to take you to, which is LFB00000355.	21	and then passed over from one person on the command
22	I'll take you to this on this page as it's	22	unit.
23	a summary.	23	Q. Do you have any particular recollection of any call that
24	It's a call from a female caller this is the	24	you took where you didn't record the details of the call
25	bottom of the page, 02.26.48:	25	on a piece of paper and then hand it up to the people
	Page 53		Page 55
	1 uge 33		1 4ge 33
1	" reporting that she is inside Grenfell Tower in	1	running the whiteboards?
2	flat 173 on the 20th floor in her living room with her		
	That 1/3 off the 20th floor in her fiving footh with her	2	A. I don't have any recollection of not passing it over.
3	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat	3	A. I don't have any recollection of not passing it over. I know towards the end I took calls that were already up
3 4		1	
	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat	3	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up
4	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell	3 4	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked
4 5	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell advises they have two choices, if it is safe to do so	3 4 5	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over, and they were ticked off, but
4 5 6	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell advises they have two choices, if it is safe to do so they can leave but if not they should stay and the	3 4 5 6	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over, and they were ticked off, but there would've been any updates. If someone was
4 5 6 7	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell advises they have two choices, if it is safe to do so they can leave but if not they should stay and the caller responds to say that she is too high to leave.	3 4 5 6 7	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over, and they were ticked off, but there would've been any updates. If someone was unconscious, you'd write "unconscious" next to it.
4 5 6 7 8	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell advises they have two choices, if it is safe to do so they can leave but if not they should stay and the caller responds to say that she is too high to leave. The caller explains that she has opened the front door	3 4 5 6 7 8	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over, and they were ticked off, but there would've been any updates. If someone was unconscious, you'd write "unconscious" next to it. Q. Next, I'd like just to ask you about another call. It's
4 5 6 7 8 9	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell advises they have two choices, if it is safe to do so they can leave but if not they should stay and the caller responds to say that she is too high to leave. The caller explains that she has opened the front door and it is very smoky outside. CRO Russell provides FSG	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over, and they were ticked off, but there would've been any updates. If someone was unconscious, you'd write "unconscious" next to it. Q. Next, I'd like just to ask you about another call. It's a call from flat 82 on the 11th floor and it's timed at
4 5 6 7 8 9	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell advises they have two choices, if it is safe to do so they can leave but if not they should stay and the caller responds to say that she is too high to leave. The caller explains that she has opened the front door and it is very smoky outside. CRO Russell provides FSG including blocking the smoke and keeping away from the	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over, and they were ticked off, but there would've been any updates. If someone was unconscious, you'd write "unconscious" next to it. Q. Next, I'd like just to ask you about another call. It's a call from flat 82 on the 11th floor and it's timed at 02.32.41.
4 5 6 7 8 9 10	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell advises they have two choices, if it is safe to do so they can leave but if not they should stay and the caller responds to say that she is too high to leave. The caller explains that she has opened the front door and it is very smoky outside. CRO Russell provides FSG including blocking the smoke and keeping away from the doors, shutting any windows that are letting in smoke	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over, and they were ticked off, but there would've been any updates. If someone was unconscious, you'd write "unconscious" next to it. Q. Next, I'd like just to ask you about another call. It's a call from flat 82 on the 11th floor and it's timed at 02.32.41. I am going to ask you to look at the transcript of
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell advises they have two choices, if it is safe to do so they can leave but if not they should stay and the caller responds to say that she is too high to leave. The caller explains that she has opened the front door and it is very smoky outside. CRO Russell provides FSG including blocking the smoke and keeping away from the doors, shutting any windows that are letting in smoke and advises moving to other rooms as required, keeping	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over, and they were ticked off, but there would've been any updates. If someone was unconscious, you'd write "unconscious" next to it. Q. Next, I'd like just to ask you about another call. It's a call from flat 82 on the 11th floor and it's timed at 02.32.41. I am going to ask you to look at the transcript of this, which is LFB00000360.
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell advises they have two choices, if it is safe to do so they can leave but if not they should stay and the caller responds to say that she is too high to leave. The caller explains that she has opened the front door and it is very smoky outside. CRO Russell provides FSG including blocking the smoke and keeping away from the doors, shutting any windows that are letting in smoke and advises moving to other rooms as required, keeping low and covering their faces. CRO Russell confirms the	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over, and they were ticked off, but there would've been any updates. If someone was unconscious, you'd write "unconscious" next to it. Q. Next, I'd like just to ask you about another call. It's a call from flat 82 on the 11th floor and it's timed at 02.32.41. I am going to ask you to look at the transcript of this, which is LFB00000360. THE WITNESS: Sorry, is it okay if we have a quick toilet
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell advises they have two choices, if it is safe to do so they can leave but if not they should stay and the caller responds to say that she is too high to leave. The caller explains that she has opened the front door and it is very smoky outside. CRO Russell provides FSG including blocking the smoke and keeping away from the doors, shutting any windows that are letting in smoke and advises moving to other rooms as required, keeping low and covering their faces. CRO Russell confirms the floor number and explains that the Brigade is in	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over, and they were ticked off, but there would've been any updates. If someone was unconscious, you'd write "unconscious" next to it. Q. Next, I'd like just to ask you about another call. It's a call from flat 82 on the 11th floor and it's timed at 02.32.41. I am going to ask you to look at the transcript of this, which is LFB00000360. THE WITNESS: Sorry, is it okay if we have a quick toilet break?
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell advises they have two choices, if it is safe to do so they can leave but if not they should stay and the caller responds to say that she is too high to leave. The caller explains that she has opened the front door and it is very smoky outside. CRO Russell provides FSG including blocking the smoke and keeping away from the doors, shutting any windows that are letting in smoke and advises moving to other rooms as required, keeping low and covering their faces. CRO Russell confirms the floor number and explains that the Brigade is in attendance and she will pass the information onto the	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over, and they were ticked off, but there would've been any updates. If someone was unconscious, you'd write "unconscious" next to it. Q. Next, I'd like just to ask you about another call. It's a call from flat 82 on the 11th floor and it's timed at 02.32.41. I am going to ask you to look at the transcript of this, which is LFB00000360. THE WITNESS: Sorry, is it okay if we have a quick toilet break? SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, of course.
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell advises they have two choices, if it is safe to do so they can leave but if not they should stay and the caller responds to say that she is too high to leave. The caller explains that she has opened the front door and it is very smoky outside. CRO Russell provides FSG including blocking the smoke and keeping away from the doors, shutting any windows that are letting in smoke and advises moving to other rooms as required, keeping low and covering their faces. CRO Russell confirms the floor number and explains that the Brigade is in attendance and she will pass the information onto the crews. She ends the call by saying if anything changes	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over, and they were ticked off, but there would've been any updates. If someone was unconscious, you'd write "unconscious" next to it. Q. Next, I'd like just to ask you about another call. It's a call from flat 82 on the 11th floor and it's timed at 02.32.41. I am going to ask you to look at the transcript of this, which is LFB00000360. THE WITNESS: Sorry, is it okay if we have a quick toilet break? SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, of course. THE WITNESS: Thank you.
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell advises they have two choices, if it is safe to do so they can leave but if not they should stay and the caller responds to say that she is too high to leave. The caller explains that she has opened the front door and it is very smoky outside. CRO Russell provides FSG including blocking the smoke and keeping away from the doors, shutting any windows that are letting in smoke and advises moving to other rooms as required, keeping low and covering their faces. CRO Russell confirms the floor number and explains that the Brigade is in attendance and she will pass the information onto the crews. She ends the call by saying if anything changes they should call back."	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over, and they were ticked off, but there would've been any updates. If someone was unconscious, you'd write "unconscious" next to it. Q. Next, I'd like just to ask you about another call. It's a call from flat 82 on the 11th floor and it's timed at 02.32.41. I am going to ask you to look at the transcript of this, which is LFB00000360. THE WITNESS: Sorry, is it okay if we have a quick toilet break? SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, of course. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Probably due for a break anyway,
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell advises they have two choices, if it is safe to do so they can leave but if not they should stay and the caller responds to say that she is too high to leave. The caller explains that she has opened the front door and it is very smoky outside. CRO Russell provides FSG including blocking the smoke and keeping away from the doors, shutting any windows that are letting in smoke and advises moving to other rooms as required, keeping low and covering their faces. CRO Russell confirms the floor number and explains that the Brigade is in attendance and she will pass the information onto the crews. She ends the call by saying if anything changes they should call back."	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over, and they were ticked off, but there would've been any updates. If someone was unconscious, you'd write "unconscious" next to it. Q. Next, I'd like just to ask you about another call. It's a call from flat 82 on the 11th floor and it's timed at 02.32.41. I am going to ask you to look at the transcript of this, which is LFB00000360. THE WITNESS: Sorry, is it okay if we have a quick toilet break? SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, of course. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Probably due for a break anyway, aren't we?
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell advises they have two choices, if it is safe to do so they can leave but if not they should stay and the caller responds to say that she is too high to leave. The caller explains that she has opened the front door and it is very smoky outside. CRO Russell provides FSG including blocking the smoke and keeping away from the doors, shutting any windows that are letting in smoke and advises moving to other rooms as required, keeping low and covering their faces. CRO Russell confirms the floor number and explains that the Brigade is in attendance and she will pass the information onto the crews. She ends the call by saying if anything changes they should call back." First of all, do you recall receiving this call, taking it?	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over, and they were ticked off, but there would've been any updates. If someone was unconscious, you'd write "unconscious" next to it. Q. Next, I'd like just to ask you about another call. It's a call from flat 82 on the 11th floor and it's timed at 02.32.41. I am going to ask you to look at the transcript of this, which is LFB00000360. THE WITNESS: Sorry, is it okay if we have a quick toilet break? SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, of course. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Probably due for a break anyway, aren't we? MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman. We are doing quite well.
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell advises they have two choices, if it is safe to do so they can leave but if not they should stay and the caller responds to say that she is too high to leave. The caller explains that she has opened the front door and it is very smoky outside. CRO Russell provides FSG including blocking the smoke and keeping away from the doors, shutting any windows that are letting in smoke and advises moving to other rooms as required, keeping low and covering their faces. CRO Russell confirms the floor number and explains that the Brigade is in attendance and she will pass the information onto the crews. She ends the call by saying if anything changes they should call back." First of all, do you recall receiving this call, taking it? A. Yes, I think I remember that one.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over, and they were ticked off, but there would've been any updates. If someone was unconscious, you'd write "unconscious" next to it. Q. Next, I'd like just to ask you about another call. It's a call from flat 82 on the 11th floor and it's timed at 02.32.41. I am going to ask you to look at the transcript of this, which is LFB00000360. THE WITNESS: Sorry, is it okay if we have a quick toilet break? SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, of course. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Probably due for a break anyway, aren't we? MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman. We are doing quite well. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you go with the usher, we'll come
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell advises they have two choices, if it is safe to do so they can leave but if not they should stay and the caller responds to say that she is too high to leave. The caller explains that she has opened the front door and it is very smoky outside. CRO Russell provides FSG including blocking the smoke and keeping away from the doors, shutting any windows that are letting in smoke and advises moving to other rooms as required, keeping low and covering their faces. CRO Russell confirms the floor number and explains that the Brigade is in attendance and she will pass the information onto the crews. She ends the call by saying if anything changes they should call back." First of all, do you recall receiving this call, taking it? A. Yes, I think I remember that one. Q. You can see from the text of the summary I've shown you	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over, and they were ticked off, but there would've been any updates. If someone was unconscious, you'd write "unconscious" next to it. Q. Next, I'd like just to ask you about another call. It's a call from flat 82 on the 11th floor and it's timed at 02.32.41. I am going to ask you to look at the transcript of this, which is LFB00000360. THE WITNESS: Sorry, is it okay if we have a quick toilet break? SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, of course. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Probably due for a break anyway, aren't we? MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman. We are doing quite well. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you go with the usher, we'll come back in 10 minutes. 11.50. Thank you.
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell advises they have two choices, if it is safe to do so they can leave but if not they should stay and the caller responds to say that she is too high to leave. The caller explains that she has opened the front door and it is very smoky outside. CRO Russell provides FSG including blocking the smoke and keeping away from the doors, shutting any windows that are letting in smoke and advises moving to other rooms as required, keeping low and covering their faces. CRO Russell confirms the floor number and explains that the Brigade is in attendance and she will pass the information onto the crews. She ends the call by saying if anything changes they should call back." First of all, do you recall receiving this call, taking it? A. Yes, I think I remember that one. Q. You can see from the text of the summary I've shown you that the caller told you that it was very smoky outside	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over, and they were ticked off, but there would've been any updates. If someone was unconscious, you'd write "unconscious" next to it. Q. Next, I'd like just to ask you about another call. It's a call from flat 82 on the 11th floor and it's timed at 02.32.41. I am going to ask you to look at the transcript of this, which is LFB00000360. THE WITNESS: Sorry, is it okay if we have a quick toilet break? SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, of course. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Probably due for a break anyway, aren't we? MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman. We are doing quite well. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you go with the usher, we'll come back in 10 minutes. 11.50. Thank you. Yes, 11.50, please.
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell advises they have two choices, if it is safe to do so they can leave but if not they should stay and the caller responds to say that she is too high to leave. The caller explains that she has opened the front door and it is very smoky outside. CRO Russell provides FSG including blocking the smoke and keeping away from the doors, shutting any windows that are letting in smoke and advises moving to other rooms as required, keeping low and covering their faces. CRO Russell confirms the floor number and explains that the Brigade is in attendance and she will pass the information onto the crews. She ends the call by saying if anything changes they should call back." First of all, do you recall receiving this call, taking it? A. Yes, I think I remember that one. Q. You can see from the text of the summary I've shown you that the caller told you that it was very smoky outside the front door.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over, and they were ticked off, but there would've been any updates. If someone was unconscious, you'd write "unconscious" next to it. Q. Next, I'd like just to ask you about another call. It's a call from flat 82 on the 11th floor and it's timed at 02.32.41. I am going to ask you to look at the transcript of this, which is LFB00000360. THE WITNESS: Sorry, is it okay if we have a quick toilet break? SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, of course. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Probably due for a break anyway, aren't we? MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman. We are doing quite well. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you go with the usher, we'll come back in 10 minutes. 11.50. Thank you. Yes, 11.50, please. (11.40 am)
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	mum. CRO Russell checks if there is smoke in the flat and the caller says there is some smoke. CRO Russell advises they have two choices, if it is safe to do so they can leave but if not they should stay and the caller responds to say that she is too high to leave. The caller explains that she has opened the front door and it is very smoky outside. CRO Russell provides FSG including blocking the smoke and keeping away from the doors, shutting any windows that are letting in smoke and advises moving to other rooms as required, keeping low and covering their faces. CRO Russell confirms the floor number and explains that the Brigade is in attendance and she will pass the information onto the crews. She ends the call by saying if anything changes they should call back." First of all, do you recall receiving this call, taking it? A. Yes, I think I remember that one. Q. You can see from the text of the summary I've shown you that the caller told you that it was very smoky outside the front door. A. Yes.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	I know towards the end I took calls that were already up on the board and I'd wrote them down, went and checked myself, passed them over, and they were ticked off, but there would've been any updates. If someone was unconscious, you'd write "unconscious" next to it. Q. Next, I'd like just to ask you about another call. It's a call from flat 82 on the 11th floor and it's timed at 02.32.41. I am going to ask you to look at the transcript of this, which is LFB00000360. THE WITNESS: Sorry, is it okay if we have a quick toilet break? SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, of course. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Probably due for a break anyway, aren't we? MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman. We are doing quite well. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you go with the usher, we'll come back in 10 minutes. 11.50. Thank you. Yes, 11.50, please. (11.40 am) (A short break)

		_	
1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Ms Russell?	1	themselves with the towels and blankets, to get down,
2	THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you.	2	and that they needed to try and leave.
3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Happy to carry on?	3	Q. Right.
4	THE WITNESS: Yes.	4	A. But I didn't feel you could force people to do that.
5	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.	5	Q. Does that mean that what you learnt on the call with
6	MR MILLETT: Ms Russell, thank you for coming back to us.	6	Jessica didn't then feed into the advice you were giving
7	I'm going to ask you about a call I'll do it	7	to this caller?
8	direct from the transcript as I think it's quicker	8	A. Not necessarily because they were on a different floor
9	this comes from flat 82 and it's 02.32.41, LFB00000360.	9	in a different flat. It was a different situation.
10	You can see the time from the blue strap of numbers	10	Q. But you had learnt from the Jessica call that the smoke
11	on the top of the page, and it's the second from the	11	at least
12	right which tells us this is 02.32.41, and we know it's	12	A. Yes.
13	flat 82 from page 2.	13	Q had travelled, in the end fatally, as we know, to the
14	I just want to take you straight to page 3 of this	14	top floor.
15	call. At the top of that page the caller says:	15	A. Yes.
16	"CALLER: It, it's - the fire - it's okay at the	16	Q. Is there a reason why learning that didn't prompt you to
17	moment but the fire seems to be spreading and it's	17	tell this caller from flat 82 on the 11th floor to get
18	blocking past the windows.	18	out, come what may?
19	"OPERATOR: Spreading. Okay. So do you think it's	19	A. Just again that I didn't know how bad it was in the
20	safer for you (overspeaking)	20	stairwell, I didn't know what I was sending them into,
21	"CALLER: I can't see it because obviously I'm	20	so to force someone to leave could've been worse than
22	inside. Huh?	22	them staying.
23	"OPERATOR: Do you think it's safer for you to stay	23	Q. Just going back to the Jessica call, do you think you
24	or to try and leave?"	24	would've been assisted on that call by having a more
25	Why did you ask her that question?	25	senior or experienced control room officer sitting next
23	wify did you ask her that question:	23	schiol of experienced control room officer staining flext
	Page 57		Page 59
		١.	
1	A. I was trying to gauge what he thought of the situation,	1	to you and monitoring you?
2	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put	2	A. Yes. Yes.
2 3	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in.	2 3	A. Yes. Yes.Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was
2 3 4	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to	2 3 4	A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance
2 3 4 5	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment?	2 3 4 5	A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat?
2 3 4 5 6	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is	2 3 4 5 6	 A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out
2 3 4 5 6 7	 if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is guidance. We rely heavily on their decisions, what 	2 3 4 5 6 7	 A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another Brigade, I think.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is guidance. We rely heavily on their decisions, what they're seeing and doing. So I would say that I was not 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another Brigade, I think. Q. But nobody is this right? in the control room came
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is guidance. We rely heavily on their decisions, what they're seeing and doing. So I would say that I was not leaving it to them entirely, but leaving it for them to 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another Brigade, I think. Q. But nobody is this right? in the control room came up to you during that period and said, "You should know
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is guidance. We rely heavily on their decisions, what they're seeing and doing. So I would say that I was not leaving it to them entirely, but leaving it for them to decide, you know, what is safer for them to do. They	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another Brigade, I think. Q. But nobody is this right? in the control room came up to you during that period and said, "You should know there's another call in progress"?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is guidance. We rely heavily on their decisions, what they're seeing and doing. So I would say that I was not leaving it to them entirely, but leaving it for them to decide, you know, what is safer for them to do. They were there, they could see it. I couldn't.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another Brigade, I think. Q. But nobody is this right? in the control room came up to you during that period and said, "You should know there's another call in progress"? A. No, I wasn't aware at the time.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is guidance. We rely heavily on their decisions, what they're seeing and doing. So I would say that I was not leaving it to them entirely, but leaving it for them to decide, you know, what is safer for them to do. They were there, they could see it. I couldn't. Q. Is there a reason why you didn't move on to assist the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another Brigade, I think. Q. But nobody is this right? in the control room came up to you during that period and said, "You should know there's another call in progress"? A. No, I wasn't aware at the time. Q. You touched on just a moment ago the change in the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is guidance. We rely heavily on their decisions, what they're seeing and doing. So I would say that I was not leaving it to them entirely, but leaving it for them to decide, you know, what is safer for them to do. They were there, they could see it. I couldn't. Q. Is there a reason why you didn't move on to assist the caller to make that assessment jointly with you?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another Brigade, I think. Q. But nobody is this right? in the control room came up to you during that period and said, "You should know there's another call in progress"? A. No, I wasn't aware at the time. Q. You touched on just a moment ago the change in the stay-put advice.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is guidance. We rely heavily on their decisions, what they're seeing and doing. So I would say that I was not leaving it to them entirely, but leaving it for them to decide, you know, what is safer for them to do. They were there, they could see it. I couldn't. Q. Is there a reason why you didn't move on to assist the caller to make that assessment jointly with you? A. I would just say the volume of calls coming in, again,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another Brigade, I think. Q. But nobody is this right? in the control room came up to you during that period and said, "You should know there's another call in progress"? A. No, I wasn't aware at the time. Q. You touched on just a moment ago the change in the stay-put advice. Can I take you back to your witness statement at
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is guidance. We rely heavily on their decisions, what they're seeing and doing. So I would say that I was not leaving it to them entirely, but leaving it for them to decide, you know, what is safer for them to do. They were there, they could see it. I couldn't. Q. Is there a reason why you didn't move on to assist the caller to make that assessment jointly with you? A. I would just say the volume of calls coming in, again, that at that point, we needed to get all the flat	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another Brigade, I think. Q. But nobody is this right? in the control room came up to you during that period and said, "You should know there's another call in progress"? A. No, I wasn't aware at the time. Q. You touched on just a moment ago the change in the stay-put advice. Can I take you back to your witness statement at page 7.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is guidance. We rely heavily on their decisions, what they're seeing and doing. So I would say that I was not leaving it to them entirely, but leaving it for them to decide, you know, what is safer for them to do. They were there, they could see it. I couldn't. Q. Is there a reason why you didn't move on to assist the caller to make that assessment jointly with you? A. I would just say the volume of calls coming in, again, that at that point, we needed to get all the flat numbers, all the information. There were so many calls,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another Brigade, I think. Q. But nobody is this right? in the control room came up to you during that period and said, "You should know there's another call in progress"? A. No, I wasn't aware at the time. Q. You touched on just a moment ago the change in the stay-put advice. Can I take you back to your witness statement at page 7. You say in the second paragraph on that page:
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is guidance. We rely heavily on their decisions, what they're seeing and doing. So I would say that I was not leaving it to them entirely, but leaving it for them to decide, you know, what is safer for them to do. They were there, they could see it. I couldn't. Q. Is there a reason why you didn't move on to assist the caller to make that assessment jointly with you? A. I would just say the volume of calls coming in, again, that at that point, we needed to get all the flat numbers, all the information. There were so many calls, and for the lack of people we had in the room, making	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another Brigade, I think. Q. But nobody is this right? in the control room came up to you during that period and said, "You should know there's another call in progress"? A. No, I wasn't aware at the time. Q. You touched on just a moment ago the change in the stay-put advice. Can I take you back to your witness statement at page 7. You say in the second paragraph on that page: "Not long after the call finished I became aware
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is guidance. We rely heavily on their decisions, what they're seeing and doing. So I would say that I was not leaving it to them entirely, but leaving it for them to decide, you know, what is safer for them to do. They were there, they could see it. I couldn't. Q. Is there a reason why you didn't move on to assist the caller to make that assessment jointly with you? A. I would just say the volume of calls coming in, again, that at that point, we needed to get all the flat numbers, all the information. There were so many calls, and for the lack of people we had in the room, making sure we did have all the people that were in there.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another Brigade, I think. Q. But nobody is this right? in the control room came up to you during that period and said, "You should know there's another call in progress"? A. No, I wasn't aware at the time. Q. You touched on just a moment ago the change in the stay-put advice. Can I take you back to your witness statement at page 7. You say in the second paragraph on that page: "Not long after the call finished I became aware that the advice we were giving callers to stay where
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is guidance. We rely heavily on their decisions, what they're seeing and doing. So I would say that I was not leaving it to them entirely, but leaving it for them to decide, you know, what is safer for them to do. They were there, they could see it. I couldn't. Q. Is there a reason why you didn't move on to assist the caller to make that assessment jointly with you? A. I would just say the volume of calls coming in, again, that at that point, we needed to get all the flat numbers, all the information. There were so many calls, and for the lack of people we had in the room, making sure we did have all the people that were in there. Q. At this point in time — this is just after 02.30 — we	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another Brigade, I think. Q. But nobody is this right? in the control room came up to you during that period and said, "You should know there's another call in progress"? A. No, I wasn't aware at the time. Q. You touched on just a moment ago the change in the stay-put advice. Can I take you back to your witness statement at page 7. You say in the second paragraph on that page: "Not long after the call finished I became aware that the advice we were giving callers to stay where they were had changed to try and make attempts to leave
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is guidance. We rely heavily on their decisions, what they're seeing and doing. So I would say that I was not leaving it to them entirely, but leaving it for them to decide, you know, what is safer for them to do. They were there, they could see it. I couldn't. Q. Is there a reason why you didn't move on to assist the caller to make that assessment jointly with you? A. I would just say the volume of calls coming in, again, that at that point, we needed to get all the flat numbers, all the information. There were so many calls, and for the lack of people we had in the room, making sure we did have all the people that were in there. Q. At this point in time — this is just after 02.30 — we know that your call with Jessica had ended.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another Brigade, I think. Q. But nobody is this right? in the control room came up to you during that period and said, "You should know there's another call in progress"? A. No, I wasn't aware at the time. Q. You touched on just a moment ago the change in the stay-put advice. Can I take you back to your witness statement at page 7. You say in the second paragraph on that page: "Not long after the call finished I became aware that the advice we were giving callers to stay where they were had changed to try and make attempts to leave via the stairwell. I think this was about an hour or
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is guidance. We rely heavily on their decisions, what they're seeing and doing. So I would say that I was not leaving it to them entirely, but leaving it for them to decide, you know, what is safer for them to do. They were there, they could see it. I couldn't. Q. Is there a reason why you didn't move on to assist the caller to make that assessment jointly with you? A. I would just say the volume of calls coming in, again, that at that point, we needed to get all the flat numbers, all the information. There were so many calls, and for the lack of people we had in the room, making sure we did have all the people that were in there. Q. At this point in time this is just after 02.30 we know that your call with Jessica had ended. Is there a reason why the information that you got	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another Brigade, I think. Q. But nobody is this right? in the control room came up to you during that period and said, "You should know there's another call in progress"? A. No, I wasn't aware at the time. Q. You touched on just a moment ago the change in the stay-put advice. Can I take you back to your witness statement at page 7. You say in the second paragraph on that page: "Not long after the call finished I became aware that the advice we were giving callers to stay where they were had changed to try and make attempts to leave via the stairwell. I think this was about an hour or two into the incident. I was told by Joanne, the Senior
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is guidance. We rely heavily on their decisions, what they're seeing and doing. So I would say that I was not leaving it to them entirely, but leaving it for them to decide, you know, what is safer for them to do. They were there, they could see it. I couldn't. Q. Is there a reason why you didn't move on to assist the caller to make that assessment jointly with you? A. I would just say the volume of calls coming in, again, that at that point, we needed to get all the flat numbers, all the information. There were so many calls, and for the lack of people we had in the room, making sure we did have all the people that were in there. Q. At this point in time — this is just after 02.30 — we know that your call with Jessica had ended. Is there a reason why the information that you got on that call didn't tell you to tell this caller to get	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another Brigade, I think. Q. But nobody is this right? in the control room came up to you during that period and said, "You should know there's another call in progress"? A. No, I wasn't aware at the time. Q. You touched on just a moment ago the change in the stay-put advice. Can I take you back to your witness statement at page 7. You say in the second paragraph on that page: "Not long after the call finished I became aware that the advice we were giving callers to stay where they were had changed to try and make attempts to leave via the stairwell. I think this was about an hour or two into the incident. I was told by Joanne, the Senior Operations Manager, and I think someone else too."
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is guidance. We rely heavily on their decisions, what they're seeing and doing. So I would say that I was not leaving it to them entirely, but leaving it for them to decide, you know, what is safer for them to do. They were there, they could see it. I couldn't. Q. Is there a reason why you didn't move on to assist the caller to make that assessment jointly with you? A. I would just say the volume of calls coming in, again, that at that point, we needed to get all the flat numbers, all the information. There were so many calls, and for the lack of people we had in the room, making sure we did have all the people that were in there. Q. At this point in time this is just after 02.30 we know that your call with Jessica had ended. Is there a reason why the information that you got on that call didn't tell you to tell this caller to get out, come what may?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another Brigade, I think. Q. But nobody is this right? in the control room came up to you during that period and said, "You should know there's another call in progress"? A. No, I wasn't aware at the time. Q. You touched on just a moment ago the change in the stay-put advice. Can I take you back to your witness statement at page 7. You say in the second paragraph on that page: "Not long after the call finished I became aware that the advice we were giving callers to stay where they were had changed to try and make attempts to leave via the stairwell. I think this was about an hour or two into the incident. I was told by Joanne, the Senior Operations Manager, and I think someone else too." First of all, you say "Not long after the call
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is guidance. We rely heavily on their decisions, what they're seeing and doing. So I would say that I was not leaving it to them entirely, but leaving it for them to decide, you know, what is safer for them to do. They were there, they could see it. I couldn't. Q. Is there a reason why you didn't move on to assist the caller to make that assessment jointly with you? A. I would just say the volume of calls coming in, again, that at that point, we needed to get all the flat numbers, all the information. There were so many calls, and for the lack of people we had in the room, making sure we did have all the people that were in there. Q. At this point in time this is just after 02.30 we know that your call with Jessica had ended. Is there a reason why the information that you got on that call didn't tell you to tell this caller to get out, come what may? A. I hadn't been told when I was told to tell people to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another Brigade, I think. Q. But nobody is this right? in the control room came up to you during that period and said, "You should know there's another call in progress"? A. No, I wasn't aware at the time. Q. You touched on just a moment ago the change in the stay-put advice. Can I take you back to your witness statement at page 7. You say in the second paragraph on that page: "Not long after the call finished I became aware that the advice we were giving callers to stay where they were had changed to try and make attempts to leave via the stairwell. I think this was about an hour or two into the incident. I was told by Joanne, the Senior Operations Manager, and I think someone else too." First of all, you say "Not long after the call finished"; can we be a bit more specific about that?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is guidance. We rely heavily on their decisions, what they're seeing and doing. So I would say that I was not leaving it to them entirely, but leaving it for them to decide, you know, what is safer for them to do. They were there, they could see it. I couldn't. Q. Is there a reason why you didn't move on to assist the caller to make that assessment jointly with you? A. I would just say the volume of calls coming in, again, that at that point, we needed to get all the flat numbers, all the information. There were so many calls, and for the lack of people we had in the room, making sure we did have all the people that were in there. Q. At this point in time this is just after 02.30 we know that your call with Jessica had ended. Is there a reason why the information that you got on that call didn't tell you to tell this caller to get out, come what may?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another Brigade, I think. Q. But nobody is this right? in the control room came up to you during that period and said, "You should know there's another call in progress"? A. No, I wasn't aware at the time. Q. You touched on just a moment ago the change in the stay-put advice. Can I take you back to your witness statement at page 7. You say in the second paragraph on that page: "Not long after the call finished I became aware that the advice we were giving callers to stay where they were had changed to try and make attempts to leave via the stairwell. I think this was about an hour or two into the incident. I was told by Joanne, the Senior Operations Manager, and I think someone else too." First of all, you say "Not long after the call
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	if he could leave, if he thought that leaving would put him in more danger than what he was already in. Q. Does this show us that you were actually leaving it to the caller to make that assessment? A. Well, as I said before, we're not there, what we give is guidance. We rely heavily on their decisions, what they're seeing and doing. So I would say that I was not leaving it to them entirely, but leaving it for them to decide, you know, what is safer for them to do. They were there, they could see it. I couldn't. Q. Is there a reason why you didn't move on to assist the caller to make that assessment jointly with you? A. I would just say the volume of calls coming in, again, that at that point, we needed to get all the flat numbers, all the information. There were so many calls, and for the lack of people we had in the room, making sure we did have all the people that were in there. Q. At this point in time this is just after 02.30 we know that your call with Jessica had ended. Is there a reason why the information that you got on that call didn't tell you to tell this caller to get out, come what may? A. I hadn't been told when I was told to tell people to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	A. Yes. Yes. Q. Were you aware that during that call I know it was an hour long there was another fire survival guidance call in progress from the same flat? A. No, not at the time, I wasn't. I think I found that out quite recently. It was from another Brigade, I think. Q. But nobody is this right? in the control room came up to you during that period and said, "You should know there's another call in progress"? A. No, I wasn't aware at the time. Q. You touched on just a moment ago the change in the stay-put advice. Can I take you back to your witness statement at page 7. You say in the second paragraph on that page: "Not long after the call finished I became aware that the advice we were giving callers to stay where they were had changed to try and make attempts to leave via the stairwell. I think this was about an hour or two into the incident. I was told by Joanne, the Senior Operations Manager, and I think someone else too." First of all, you say "Not long after the call finished"; can we be a bit more specific about that?

1	recollection of not long after may have been quite some	1	A. Yes, yes, but saying the best option would be to leave.
2	time after.	2	Q. Can I ask you to look at another call, which is
3	Q. At any rate, not by 02.32, which is the flat 82 call	3	02.51.09. It's LFB00000386, and this is flat 193.
4	we've just looked at, you think?	4	Again, we can see from the numbers second from the
5	A. Possibly, I'm not sure.	5	right that this is at 02.51.09, so, again, after the
6	Q. Looking at your statement and what you say there, first	6	time at which you have been given that instruction.
7	of all, how did Joanne relay this information to you?	7	This is a call from, as I say, flat 193.
8	A. She came around and verbally passed it on.	8	At page 3 of the transcript, you say:
9	Q. Did she tell you about what you should now be saying to	9	"OPERATOR: Okay, listen. You can do one of two
10	callers?	10	things. You can either make your way into a room and
11	A. To cover themselves, to not breathe in the smoke and to	11	shut the door, keep the smoke out, and stay low, or you
12	make their way down the stairs.	12	can try and make your way out of the building. You have
13	Q. At that stage, did you think that the Fire Brigade would	13	to decide which is safer. Okay? If you're going to
14	no longer be able to rescue people or did you think	14	make your way out the building -"
15	there was still a possibility they might?	15	Then it turns into a discussion about not going
16	A. I didn't think there wasn't a chance, but I had never	16	downstairs.
17	heard of the advice changing to that, so it was	17	It looks from the transcript, Ms Russell, that in
18	something entirely different from what had ever happened	18	this call you were giving the caller a choice as to
19	before.	19	whether to leave or not; is that fair?
20	Q. Did Joanne Joanne Smith, I'm assuming tell you in	20	A. Yes, yes.
21	what terms or with what tone to give this new advice to	21	Q. Why was that, at this point?
22	callers?	22	A. Again, I was making them aware that they needed to leave
23	A. No, I don't recall that.	23	and how. But, again, if you send them out into fire and
24	Q. Having had that instruction from her, did you then start	24	smoke, I could be potentially sending them out to
25	applying the new advice straight away to the next call	25	a death where, if they waited, they may have been
	D (4		D (2
	Page 61		Page 63
1	vou got?	1	rescued.
1 2	you got? A. I don't recall. Lam guessing I would have, but I don't	1 2	rescued. O Does that tell us that in your understanding what
2	A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't	2	Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what
2 3	A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall.	2 3	Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still
2 3 4	A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall?	2 3 4	Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit?
2 3	A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes.	2 3	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was — at that point, I think it was more about
2 3 4 5	 A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. 	2 3 4 5	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were
2 3 4 5 6	 A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. Transcript LFB00000368. 	2 3 4 5 6	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was — at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were now saying that, you know, making your way out may be
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. Transcript LFB00000368. This is a call from the 23rd floor, flat 204. We 	2 3 4 5 6 7	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was — at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were now saying that, you know, making your way out may be the best option, but sending people out could've been
2 3 4 5 6 7	 A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. Transcript LFB00000368. This is a call from the 23rd floor, flat 204. We can see from the group of numbers second from the right 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was — at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were now saying that, you know, making your way out may be
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. Transcript LFB00000368. This is a call from the 23rd floor, flat 204. We can see from the group of numbers second from the right that this is at 02.36.07. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were now saying that, you know, making your way out may be the best option, but sending people out could've been worse than staying in. So, for me, I think I gave them the option, made them aware that they can leave, but if
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. Transcript LFB00000368. This is a call from the 23rd floor, flat 204. We can see from the group of numbers second from the right that this is at 02.36.07. Can I just ask you to look at page 4 of the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was — at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were now saying that, you know, making your way out may be the best option, but sending people out could've been worse than staying in. So, for me, I think I gave them
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. Transcript LFB00000368. This is a call from the 23rd floor, flat 204. We can see from the group of numbers second from the right that this is at 02.36.07. Can I just ask you to look at page 4 of the transcript. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was — at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were now saying that, you know, making your way out may be the best option, but sending people out could've been worse than staying in. So, for me, I think I gave them the option, made them aware that they can leave, but if they're choosing to stay, it depended on the situation outside.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. Transcript LFB00000368. This is a call from the 23rd floor, flat 204. We can see from the group of numbers second from the right that this is at 02.36.07. Can I just ask you to look at page 4 of the transcript. You say a quarter of the way down the page: 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was — at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were now saying that, you know, making your way out may be the best option, but sending people out could've been worse than staying in. So, for me, I think I gave them the option, made them aware that they can leave, but if they're choosing to stay, it depended on the situation outside. Q. To your understanding, did Jo Smith say, "You've got to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. Transcript LFB00000368. This is a call from the 23rd floor, flat 204. We can see from the group of numbers second from the right that this is at 02.36.07. Can I just ask you to look at page 4 of the transcript. You say a quarter of the way down the page: "OPERATOR: Okay. Listen, the fire is getting quite	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was — at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were now saying that, you know, making your way out may be the best option, but sending people out could've been worse than staying in. So, for me, I think I gave them the option, made them aware that they can leave, but if they're choosing to stay, it depended on the situation outside.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. Transcript LFB00000368. This is a call from the 23rd floor, flat 204. We can see from the group of numbers second from the right that this is at 02.36.07. Can I just ask you to look at page 4 of the transcript. You say a quarter of the way down the page: 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was — at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were now saying that, you know, making your way out may be the best option, but sending people out could've been worse than staying in. So, for me, I think I gave them the option, made them aware that they can leave, but if they're choosing to stay, it depended on the situation outside. Q. To your understanding, did Jo Smith say, "You've got to advise callers now that they must get out at all costs"?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. Transcript LFB00000368. This is a call from the 23rd floor, flat 204. We can see from the group of numbers second from the right that this is at 02.36.07. Can I just ask you to look at page 4 of the transcript. You say a quarter of the way down the page: "OPERATOR: Okay. Listen, the fire is getting quite bad. Do you think it would be better if you covered	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was — at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were now saying that, you know, making your way out may be the best option, but sending people out could've been worse than staying in. So, for me, I think I gave them the option, made them aware that they can leave, but if they're choosing to stay, it depended on the situation outside. Q. To your understanding, did Jo Smith say, "You've got to advise callers now that they must get out at all costs"? A. I don't remember the wording of it.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. Transcript LFB00000368. This is a call from the 23rd floor, flat 204. We can see from the group of numbers second from the right that this is at 02.36.07. Can I just ask you to look at page 4 of the transcript. You say a quarter of the way down the page: "OPERATOR: Okay. Listen, the fire is getting quite bad. Do you think it would be better if you covered yourself with a wet towel and tried to make your way down out of the building?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was — at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were now saying that, you know, making your way out may be the best option, but sending people out could've been worse than staying in. So, for me, I think I gave them the option, made them aware that they can leave, but if they're choosing to stay, it depended on the situation outside. Q. To your understanding, did Jo Smith say, "You've got to advise callers now that they must get out at all costs"? A. I don't remember the wording of it. Q. Did you — sorry.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. Transcript LFB00000368. This is a call from the 23rd floor, flat 204. We can see from the group of numbers second from the right that this is at 02.36.07. Can I just ask you to look at page 4 of the transcript. You say a quarter of the way down the page: "OPERATOR: Okay. Listen, the fire is getting quite bad. Do you think it would be better if you covered yourself with a wet towel and tried to make your way	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were now saying that, you know, making your way out may be the best option, but sending people out could've been worse than staying in. So, for me, I think I gave them the option, made them aware that they can leave, but if they're choosing to stay, it depended on the situation outside. Q. To your understanding, did Jo Smith say, "You've got to advise callers now that they must get out at all costs"? A. I don't remember the wording of it. Q. Did you sorry. A. No, just saying that I don't remember the wording of it,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. Transcript LFB00000368. This is a call from the 23rd floor, flat 204. We can see from the group of numbers second from the right that this is at 02.36.07. Can I just ask you to look at page 4 of the transcript. You say a quarter of the way down the page: "OPERATOR: Okay. Listen, the fire is getting quite bad. Do you think it would be better if you covered yourself with a wet towel and tried to make your way down out of the building? "CALLER: I can't see outside my door." He says that a number of times.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was — at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were now saying that, you know, making your way out may be the best option, but sending people out could've been worse than staying in. So, for me, I think I gave them the option, made them aware that they can leave, but if they're choosing to stay, it depended on the situation outside. Q. To your understanding, did Jo Smith say, "You've got to advise callers now that they must get out at all costs"? A. I don't remember the wording of it. Q. Did you — sorry. A. No, just saying that I don't remember the wording of it, the specific wording of it, I just remember saying that,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. Transcript LFB00000368. This is a call from the 23rd floor, flat 204. We can see from the group of numbers second from the right that this is at 02.36.07. Can I just ask you to look at page 4 of the transcript. You say a quarter of the way down the page: "OPERATOR: Okay. Listen, the fire is getting quite bad. Do you think it would be better if you covered yourself with a wet towel and tried to make your way down out of the building? "CALLER: I can't see outside my door." He says that a number of times. Given that was the advice you were giving at that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was — at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were now saying that, you know, making your way out may be the best option, but sending people out could've been worse than staying in. So, for me, I think I gave them the option, made them aware that they can leave, but if they're choosing to stay, it depended on the situation outside. Q. To your understanding, did Jo Smith say, "You've got to advise callers now that they must get out at all costs"? A. I don't remember the wording of it. Q. Did you — sorry. A. No, just saying that I don't remember the wording of it, the specific wording of it, I just remember saying that, you know — getting out and the towels and making their way out.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. Transcript LFB00000368. This is a call from the 23rd floor, flat 204. We can see from the group of numbers second from the right that this is at 02.36.07. Can I just ask you to look at page 4 of the transcript. You say a quarter of the way down the page: "OPERATOR: Okay. Listen, the fire is getting quite bad. Do you think it would be better if you covered yourself with a wet towel and tried to make your way down out of the building? "CALLER: I can't see outside my door." He says that a number of times. Given that was the advice you were giving at that point in the call, do you think you had had the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was — at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were now saying that, you know, making your way out may be the best option, but sending people out could've been worse than staying in. So, for me, I think I gave them the option, made them aware that they can leave, but if they're choosing to stay, it depended on the situation outside. Q. To your understanding, did Jo Smith say, "You've got to advise callers now that they must get out at all costs"? A. I don't remember the wording of it. Q. Did you — sorry. A. No, just saying that I don't remember the wording of it, the specific wording of it, I just remember saying that, you know — getting out and the towels and making their
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. Transcript LFB00000368. This is a call from the 23rd floor, flat 204. We can see from the group of numbers second from the right that this is at 02.36.07. Can I just ask you to look at page 4 of the transcript. You say a quarter of the way down the page: "OPERATOR: Okay. Listen, the fire is getting quite bad. Do you think it would be better if you covered yourself with a wet towel and tried to make your way down out of the building? "CALLER: I can't see outside my door." He says that a number of times. Given that was the advice you were giving at that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was — at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were now saying that, you know, making your way out may be the best option, but sending people out could've been worse than staying in. So, for me, I think I gave them the option, made them aware that they can leave, but if they're choosing to stay, it depended on the situation outside. Q. To your understanding, did Jo Smith say, "You've got to advise callers now that they must get out at all costs"? A. I don't remember the wording of it. Q. Did you — sorry. A. No, just saying that I don't remember the wording of it, the specific wording of it, I just remember saying that, you know — getting out and the towels and making their way out. Q. I'm just trying to get a feel for how clear and firm and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. Transcript LFB00000368. This is a call from the 23rd floor, flat 204. We can see from the group of numbers second from the right that this is at 02.36.07. Can I just ask you to look at page 4 of the transcript. You say a quarter of the way down the page: "OPERATOR: Okay. Listen, the fire is getting quite bad. Do you think it would be better if you covered yourself with a wet towel and tried to make your way down out of the building? "CALLER: I can't see outside my door." He says that a number of times. Given that was the advice you were giving at that point in the call, do you think you had had the instruction from Jo Smith at this point? A. Yes, I would say so.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were now saying that, you know, making your way out may be the best option, but sending people out could've been worse than staying in. So, for me, I think I gave them the option, made them aware that they can leave, but if they're choosing to stay, it depended on the situation outside. Q. To your understanding, did Jo Smith say, "You've got to advise callers now that they must get out at all costs"? A. I don't remember the wording of it. Q. Did you sorry. A. No, just saying that I don't remember the wording of it, the specific wording of it, I just remember saying that, you know getting out and the towels and making their way out. Q. I'm just trying to get a feel for how clear and firm and black and white the advice you understood you had to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. Transcript LFB00000368. This is a call from the 23rd floor, flat 204. We can see from the group of numbers second from the right that this is at 02.36.07. Can I just ask you to look at page 4 of the transcript. You say a quarter of the way down the page: "OPERATOR: Okay. Listen, the fire is getting quite bad. Do you think it would be better if you covered yourself with a wet towel and tried to make your way down out of the building? "CALLER: I can't see outside my door." He says that a number of times. Given that was the advice you were giving at that point in the call, do you think you had had the instruction from Jo Smith at this point?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was — at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were now saying that, you know, making your way out may be the best option, but sending people out could've been worse than staying in. So, for me, I think I gave them the option, made them aware that they can leave, but if they're choosing to stay, it depended on the situation outside. Q. To your understanding, did Jo Smith say, "You've got to advise callers now that they must get out at all costs"? A. I don't remember the wording of it. Q. Did you — sorry. A. No, just saying that I don't remember the wording of it, the specific wording of it, I just remember saying that, you know — getting out and the towels and making their way out. Q. I'm just trying to get a feel for how clear and firm and black and white the advice you understood you had to give was to be.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. Transcript LFB00000368. This is a call from the 23rd floor, flat 204. We can see from the group of numbers second from the right that this is at 02.36.07. Can I just ask you to look at page 4 of the transcript. You say a quarter of the way down the page: "OPERATOR: Okay. Listen, the fire is getting quite bad. Do you think it would be better if you covered yourself with a wet towel and tried to make your way down out of the building? "CALLER: I can't see outside my door." He says that a number of times. Given that was the advice you were giving at that point in the call, do you think you had had the instruction from Jo Smith at this point? A. Yes, I would say so. Q. So was it your understanding that the advice you were giving there was get out as opposed to stay put?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was — at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were now saying that, you know, making your way out may be the best option, but sending people out could've been worse than staying in. So, for me, I think I gave them the option, made them aware that they can leave, but if they're choosing to stay, it depended on the situation outside. Q. To your understanding, did Jo Smith say, "You've got to advise callers now that they must get out at all costs"? A. I don't remember the wording of it. Q. Did you — sorry. A. No, just saying that I don't remember the wording of it, the specific wording of it, I just remember saying that, you know — getting out and the towels and making their way out. Q. I'm just trying to get a feel for how clear and firm and black and white the advice you understood you had to give was to be. So the question really is: when Joanne Smith came round and gave you the change in advice, did you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	A. I don't recall. I am guessing I would have, but I don't recall. Q. You don't recall? A. Yes. Q. Let's see if we can pin this down. Transcript LFB00000368. This is a call from the 23rd floor, flat 204. We can see from the group of numbers second from the right that this is at 02.36.07. Can I just ask you to look at page 4 of the transcript. You say a quarter of the way down the page: "OPERATOR: Okay. Listen, the fire is getting quite bad. Do you think it would be better if you covered yourself with a wet towel and tried to make your way down out of the building? "CALLER: I can't see outside my door." He says that a number of times. Given that was the advice you were giving at that point in the call, do you think you had had the instruction from Jo Smith at this point? A. Yes, I would say so. Q. So was it your understanding that the advice you were	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. Does that tell us that in your understanding, what Jo Smith had told you meant that you were still assessing security of exit? A. No. I was — at that point, I think it was more about what the caller was saying. I was aware that we were now saying that, you know, making your way out may be the best option, but sending people out could've been worse than staying in. So, for me, I think I gave them the option, made them aware that they can leave, but if they're choosing to stay, it depended on the situation outside. Q. To your understanding, did Jo Smith say, "You've got to advise callers now that they must get out at all costs"? A. I don't remember the wording of it. Q. Did you — sorry. A. No, just saying that I don't remember the wording of it, the specific wording of it, I just remember saying that, you know — getting out and the towels and making their way out. Q. I'm just trying to get a feel for how clear and firm and black and white the advice you understood you had to give was to be. So the question really is: when Joanne Smith came

1	understand her to be telling you, "You've got to get	1	were able to tell on our screens, from the numbers, if
2	these callers to get out, come what may", or did you	2	the caller had called previously. There were quite a
3	still think there was an element of assessment,	3	few that I spoke to on more than one occasion. It was
4	judgement, decision, about it?	4	relentless call after call after call. I do not
5	A. I think there would always be an element of assessing	5	remember ringing anyone back or even having the chance,
6	and judgement. Some people stayed with callers down the	6	just updating the callers with the new advice. We kept
7	stairs. At that point, they would've still been	7	asking them that if their situation changed, to keep
8	assessing as well.	8	calling us back which a number of them did."
9	Q. Turning to page 8 of the transcript, you say there,	9	Did you understand whether there were facilities to
10	a third of the way down, having given some advice about	10	be able to call people back in the Stratford control
11	what people should put over them and cover themselves,	11	room?
12	you say:	12	A. We can always call people back, but on that night there
13	"OPERATOR: There's a lot of people inside and	13	were so many calls and so few people, we were struggling
14	the firefighters are struggling to get to everyone,	14	just to answer the calls coming in, let alone call
15	okay, so your best bet is to try and make your way out	15	anyone back.
16	the building."	16	Q. Did you know whether there was a policy on not calling
17	Then in the next section where you're speaking, you	17	people back?
18	say:	18	A. We don't call back landlines. It's viewed that if you
19	"OPERATOR: 22nd floor, I know, I know. But your	19	call back a landline, you're encouraging someone to go
20	best bet is to try and get out"	20	back into the fire.
21	Then you say that again, you use that expression	21	Q. Were most of the calls that you could see on your system
22	a third time:	22	from landlines or from mobiles?
23	"OPERATOR: Okay. Your, your best bet is to try and	23	A. I remember seeing a large number of mobile numbers but
24	leave, get outside."	24	I wouldn't know the make-up of them.
25	When you were using the expression "your best bet",	25	Q. Given that there were a large number of mobile numbers,
			,
	Page 65		Page 67
1	what were you trying to tell the caller?	1	does that mean that the policy of not calling them back
2	A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice I'm	2	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back
3	A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to	2 3	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance?
3 4	A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that	2 3 4	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile
3 4 5	A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering.	2 3 4 5	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than
3 4 5 6	A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been	2 3 4 5 6	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in.
3 4 5 6 7	A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith?	2 3 4 5 6 7	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that,
3 4 5 6 7 8	 A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith? A. I think that it did make callers aware that the best 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph:
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith? A. I think that it did make callers aware that the best thing was to leave. I had a caller that I said that to 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph: "The Control Room uses computers as strategic
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith? A. I think that it did make callers aware that the best thing was to leave. I had a caller that I said that to and he then started panicking. He became clear that the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph: "The Control Room uses computers as strategic resource. Often a TV is on, usually showing the news,
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith? A. I think that it did make callers aware that the best thing was to leave. I had a caller that I said that to and he then started panicking. He became clear that the advice had now changed and this was serious. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph: "The Control Room uses computers as strategic resource. Often a TV is on, usually showing the news, so that we know what is going on. We are allowed to
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith? A. I think that it did make callers aware that the best thing was to leave. I had a caller that I said that to and he then started panicking. He became clear that the advice had now changed and this was serious. Q. Did you think that your job was now to tell people that 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph: "The Control Room uses computers as strategic resource. Often a TV is on, usually showing the news, so that we know what is going on. We are allowed to have our mobile phones with us whilst we work but a lot
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith? A. I think that it did make callers aware that the best thing was to leave. I had a caller that I said that to and he then started panicking. He became clear that the advice had now changed and this was serious. Q. Did you think that your job was now to tell people that this was a live or die choice? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph: "The Control Room uses computers as strategic resource. Often a TV is on, usually showing the news, so that we know what is going on. We are allowed to have our mobile phones with us whilst we work but a lot of the time we do not have the time to look at them."
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice — I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith? A. I think that it did make callers aware that the best thing was to leave. I had a caller that I said that to and he then started panicking. He became clear that the advice had now changed and this was serious. Q. Did you think that your job was now to tell people that this was a live or die choice? A. Possibly. I don't really remember at the time what 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph: "The Control Room uses computers as strategic resource. Often a TV is on, usually showing the news, so that we know what is going on. We are allowed to have our mobile phones with us whilst we work but a lot of the time we do not have the time to look at them." Do you normally find having a TV on helpful when
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith? A. I think that it did make callers aware that the best thing was to leave. I had a caller that I said that to and he then started panicking. He became clear that the advice had now changed and this was serious. Q. Did you think that your job was now to tell people that this was a live or die choice? A. Possibly. I don't really remember at the time what I thought from that. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph: "The Control Room uses computers as strategic resource. Often a TV is on, usually showing the news, so that we know what is going on. We are allowed to have our mobile phones with us whilst we work but a lot of the time we do not have the time to look at them." Do you normally find having a TV on helpful when taking a call?
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith? A. I think that it did make callers aware that the best thing was to leave. I had a caller that I said that to and he then started panicking. He became clear that the advice had now changed and this was serious. Q. Did you think that your job was now to tell people that this was a live or die choice? A. Possibly. I don't really remember at the time what I thought from that. Q. It looks as if, by using the expression "best bet", 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph: "The Control Room uses computers as strategic resource. Often a TV is on, usually showing the news, so that we know what is going on. We are allowed to have our mobile phones with us whilst we work but a lot of the time we do not have the time to look at them." Do you normally find having a TV on helpful when taking a call? A. I have never really found it that helpful because, other
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith? A. I think that it did make callers aware that the best thing was to leave. I had a caller that I said that to and he then started panicking. He became clear that the advice had now changed and this was serious. Q. Did you think that your job was now to tell people that this was a live or die choice? A. Possibly. I don't really remember at the time what I thought from that. Q. It looks as if, by using the expression "best bet", actually you were still giving the caller an element of 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph: "The Control Room uses computers as strategic resource. Often a TV is on, usually showing the news, so that we know what is going on. We are allowed to have our mobile phones with us whilst we work but a lot of the time we do not have the time to look at them." Do you normally find having a TV on helpful when taking a call?
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith? A. I think that it did make callers aware that the best thing was to leave. I had a caller that I said that to and he then started panicking. He became clear that the advice had now changed and this was serious. Q. Did you think that your job was now to tell people that this was a live or die choice? A. Possibly. I don't really remember at the time what I thought from that. Q. It looks as if, by using the expression "best bet", actually you were still giving the caller an element of choice about it. Is that how you understood your role 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph: "The Control Room uses computers as strategic resource. Often a TV is on, usually showing the news, so that we know what is going on. We are allowed to have our mobile phones with us whilst we work but a lot of the time we do not have the time to look at them." Do you normally find having a TV on helpful when taking a call? A. I have never really found it that helpful because, other than Grenfell, I haven't been involved in a major incident that has been filmed on the news while you're
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith? A. I think that it did make callers aware that the best thing was to leave. I had a caller that I said that to and he then started panicking. He became clear that the advice had now changed and this was serious. Q. Did you think that your job was now to tell people that this was a live or die choice? A. Possibly. I don't really remember at the time what I thought from that. Q. It looks as if, by using the expression "best bet", actually you were still giving the caller an element of choice about it. Is that how you understood your role at this point? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph: "The Control Room uses computers as strategic resource. Often a TV is on, usually showing the news, so that we know what is going on. We are allowed to have our mobile phones with us whilst we work but a lot of the time we do not have the time to look at them." Do you normally find having a TV on helpful when taking a call? A. I have never really found it that helpful because, other than Grenfell, I haven't been involved in a major incident that has been filmed on the news while you're on the phone to callers.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith? A. I think that it did make callers aware that the best thing was to leave. I had a caller that I said that to and he then started panicking. He became clear that the advice had now changed and this was serious. Q. Did you think that your job was now to tell people that this was a live or die choice? A. Possibly. I don't really remember at the time what I thought from that. Q. It looks as if, by using the expression "best bet", actually you were still giving the caller an element of choice about it. Is that how you understood your role at this point? A. I don't really remember. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph: "The Control Room uses computers as strategic resource. Often a TV is on, usually showing the news, so that we know what is going on. We are allowed to have our mobile phones with us whilst we work but a lot of the time we do not have the time to look at them." Do you normally find having a TV on helpful when taking a call? A. I have never really found it that helpful because, other than Grenfell, I haven't been involved in a major incident that has been filmed on the news while you're on the phone to callers. Q. So prior to the night of the fire, you had no experience
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice — I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith? A. I think that it did make callers aware that the best thing was to leave. I had a caller that I said that to and he then started panicking. He became clear that the advice had now changed and this was serious. Q. Did you think that your job was now to tell people that this was a live or die choice? A. Possibly. I don't really remember at the time what I thought from that. Q. It looks as if, by using the expression "best bet", actually you were still giving the caller an element of choice about it. Is that how you understood your role at this point? A. I don't really remember. Q. I just want to ask you about callbacks. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph: "The Control Room uses computers as strategic resource. Often a TV is on, usually showing the news, so that we know what is going on. We are allowed to have our mobile phones with us whilst we work but a lot of the time we do not have the time to look at them." Do you normally find having a TV on helpful when taking a call? A. I have never really found it that helpful because, other than Grenfell, I haven't been involved in a major incident that has been filmed on the news while you're on the phone to callers. Q. So prior to the night of the fire, you had no experience of whether or not having the TV on would've assisted you
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith? A. I think that it did make callers aware that the best thing was to leave. I had a caller that I said that to and he then started panicking. He became clear that the advice had now changed and this was serious. Q. Did you think that your job was now to tell people that this was a live or die choice? A. Possibly. I don't really remember at the time what I thought from that. Q. It looks as if, by using the expression "best bet", actually you were still giving the caller an element of choice about it. Is that how you understood your role at this point? A. I don't really remember. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph: "The Control Room uses computers as strategic resource. Often a TV is on, usually showing the news, so that we know what is going on. We are allowed to have our mobile phones with us whilst we work but a lot of the time we do not have the time to look at them." Do you normally find having a TV on helpful when taking a call? A. I have never really found it that helpful because, other than Grenfell, I haven't been involved in a major incident that has been filmed on the news while you're on the phone to callers. Q. So prior to the night of the fire, you had no experience
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice — I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith? A. I think that it did make callers aware that the best thing was to leave. I had a caller that I said that to and he then started panicking. He became clear that the advice had now changed and this was serious. Q. Did you think that your job was now to tell people that this was a live or die choice? A. Possibly. I don't really remember at the time what I thought from that. Q. It looks as if, by using the expression "best bet", actually you were still giving the caller an element of choice about it. Is that how you understood your role at this point? A. I don't really remember. Q. I just want to ask you about callbacks. You say in your statement on page 7, halfway down the page: 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph: "The Control Room uses computers as strategic resource. Often a TV is on, usually showing the news, so that we know what is going on. We are allowed to have our mobile phones with us whilst we work but a lot of the time we do not have the time to look at them." Do you normally find having a TV on helpful when taking a call? A. I have never really found it that helpful because, other than Grenfell, I haven't been involved in a major incident that has been filmed on the news while you're on the phone to callers. Q. So prior to the night of the fire, you had no experience of whether or not having the TV on would've assisted you
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith? A. I think that it did make callers aware that the best thing was to leave. I had a caller that I said that to and he then started panicking. He became clear that the advice had now changed and this was serious. Q. Did you think that your job was now to tell people that this was a live or die choice? A. Possibly. I don't really remember at the time what I thought from that. Q. It looks as if, by using the expression "best bet", actually you were still giving the caller an element of choice about it. Is that how you understood your role at this point? A. I don't really remember. Q. I just want to ask you about callbacks. You say in your statement on page 7, halfway down 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph: "The Control Room uses computers as strategic resource. Often a TV is on, usually showing the news, so that we know what is going on. We are allowed to have our mobile phones with us whilst we work but a lot of the time we do not have the time to look at them." Do you normally find having a TV on helpful when taking a call? A. I have never really found it that helpful because, other than Grenfell, I haven't been involved in a major incident that has been filmed on the news while you're on the phone to callers. Q. So prior to the night of the fire, you had no experience of whether or not having the TV on would've assisted you or not? A. No. I don't recall being in a situation where seeing it would've been relevant.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice — I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith? A. I think that it did make callers aware that the best thing was to leave. I had a caller that I said that to and he then started panicking. He became clear that the advice had now changed and this was serious. Q. Did you think that your job was now to tell people that this was a live or die choice? A. Possibly. I don't really remember at the time what I thought from that. Q. It looks as if, by using the expression "best bet", actually you were still giving the caller an element of choice about it. Is that how you understood your role at this point? A. I don't really remember. Q. I just want to ask you about callbacks. You say in your statement on page 7, halfway down the page: 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph: "The Control Room uses computers as strategic resource. Often a TV is on, usually showing the news, so that we know what is going on. We are allowed to have our mobile phones with us whilst we work but a lot of the time we do not have the time to look at them." Do you normally find having a TV on helpful when taking a call? A. I have never really found it that helpful because, other than Grenfell, I haven't been involved in a major incident that has been filmed on the news while you're on the phone to callers. Q. So prior to the night of the fire, you had no experience of whether or not having the TV on would've assisted you or not? A. No. I don't recall being in a situation where seeing it
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice — I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith? A. I think that it did make callers aware that the best thing was to leave. I had a caller that I said that to and he then started panicking. He became clear that the advice had now changed and this was serious. Q. Did you think that your job was now to tell people that this was a live or die choice? A. Possibly. I don't really remember at the time what I thought from that. Q. It looks as if, by using the expression "best bet", actually you were still giving the caller an element of choice about it. Is that how you understood your role at this point? A. I don't really remember. Q. I just want to ask you about callbacks. You say in your statement on page 7, halfway down the page: "There was still a stack of calls that needed to be answered and we began telling them the new advice. We 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph: "The Control Room uses computers as strategic resource. Often a TV is on, usually showing the news, so that we know what is going on. We are allowed to have our mobile phones with us whilst we work but a lot of the time we do not have the time to look at them." Do you normally find having a TV on helpful when taking a call? A. I have never really found it that helpful because, other than Grenfell, I haven't been involved in a major incident that has been filmed on the news while you're on the phone to callers. Q. So prior to the night of the fire, you had no experience of whether or not having the TV on would've assisted you or not? A. No. I don't recall being in a situation where seeing it would've been relevant. Q. On page 8 of your witness statement, you say at the
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. That what I give is guidance. That the choice — I'm advising on the choice to make, that the best bet was to leave. That no choice was 100 per cent safe, but that was the best one that I was offering. Q. Do you think that reflected the instruction you'd been given by Jo Smith? A. I think that it did make callers aware that the best thing was to leave. I had a caller that I said that to and he then started panicking. He became clear that the advice had now changed and this was serious. Q. Did you think that your job was now to tell people that this was a live or die choice? A. Possibly. I don't really remember at the time what I thought from that. Q. It looks as if, by using the expression "best bet", actually you were still giving the caller an element of choice about it. Is that how you understood your role at this point? A. I don't really remember. Q. I just want to ask you about callbacks. You say in your statement on page 7, halfway down the page: "There was still a stack of calls that needed to be 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	wouldn't apply to them, so you could've called them back had you had the chance? A. No, the policy would not have applied to the mobile numbers, so there was nothing stopping us, other than the volume of calls coming in. Q. On page 5 of your statement, if I can go back to that, you say in the second from last paragraph: "The Control Room uses computers as strategic resource. Often a TV is on, usually showing the news, so that we know what is going on. We are allowed to have our mobile phones with us whilst we work but a lot of the time we do not have the time to look at them." Do you normally find having a TV on helpful when taking a call? A. I have never really found it that helpful because, other than Grenfell, I haven't been involved in a major incident that has been filmed on the news while you're on the phone to callers. Q. So prior to the night of the fire, you had no experience of whether or not having the TV on would've assisted you or not? A. No. I don't recall being in a situation where seeing it would've been relevant.

1	second paragraph, three lines up from the end:	1	MR MILLETT: Ms Russell, thank you very much. I've come to
2	"We had no TV on the Control Room so I had a look on	2	the end of the questions I have for you. I'm extremely
3	the phone and then saw the extent of the blaze. I	3	grateful to you.
4	remember someone saying, 'Oh my God! How is anyone	4	I normally ask the chairman to rise for
5	still calling us?!' the whole building was on fire."	5	a few minutes just to see whether there are any further
6	I know it's difficult to estimate time during the	6	questions I need to ask you, so I'm going to ask him to
7	night, but roughly what time of the night do you think	7	do that, if I may.
8	that was?	8	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, there may be a few
9	A. It would've been quite late on into the incident, when	9	questions that counsel has forgotten about, so I'm going
10	it had quietened down enough to be able to look at	10	to rise for 5 minutes just to let him take stock.
11	social media and the internet, news.	11	So don't talk to anyone about your evidence while
12	I can't guess a time, but it would've been quite	12	you're out of the room.
13	late on.	13	If you go with the usher, we'll resume in about
14	Q. Do you remember whether you took any further 999 calls	14	5 minutes.
15	from anybody in the building after that time?	15	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
16	A. I don't recall. I know I went back onto channel 2 when	16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, Mr Millett, I'm going to say
17	it had quietened down enough for me to take the channel	17	12.20. It's a slightly generous 5 minutes, but you
18	back again.	18	never know.
19	Q. Did seeing for the first time the image of this building	19	MR MILLETT: If I can get you back in any earlier than that,
20	on fire affect or change the advice that you had been	20	Mr Chairman, I will do that.
21	giving to callers up to that point?	21	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, very well. Thank you.
22	A. It's hard to say. It may have, because before that	22	(12.14 pm)
23	I didn't know what I was dealing with. So it may have,	23	(A short break)
24	but I can't say that for sure.	24	(12.20 pm)
25	Q. Slightly different subject.	25	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.
	D (0		
	Page 69		Page 71
		1	
1	Are you aware of the facility in the control room	1	MR MILLETT: Very few Mr Chairman but one or two
1 2	Are you aware of the facility in the control room called the heli-tele downlink?	1 2	MR MILLETT: Very few, Mr Chairman, but one or two
2	called the heli-tele downlink?	2	nonetheless.
	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training	2 3	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to
2 3	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember.	2	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you.
2 3 4	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me	2 3 4	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report,
2 3 4 5	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would've helped you if you'd had it operating	2 3 4 5	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report, LFB00004790 at page 95.
2 3 4 5 6	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me	2 3 4 5 6	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report,
2 3 4 5 6 7	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would've helped you if you'd had it operating on the night?	2 3 4 5 6 7	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report, LFB00004790 at page 95. I'd like you, please, to look at the time mark of 02.41.46.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would've helped you if you'd had it operating on the night? A. I wouldn't know, I've never had any experience with it.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report, LFB00004790 at page 95. I'd like you, please, to look at the time mark of 02.41.46. I'll just read it to you Ms Russell:
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would've helped you if you'd had it operating on the night? A. I wouldn't know, I've never had any experience with it. Q. Turning to a different subject.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report, LFB00004790 at page 95. I'd like you, please, to look at the time mark of 02.41.46.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would've helped you if you'd had it operating on the night? A. I wouldn't know, I've never had any experience with it. Q. Turning to a different subject. If you had known that many callers or a number of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report, LFB00004790 at page 95. I'd like you, please, to look at the time mark of 02.41.46. I'll just read it to you Ms Russell: "CRO Russell takes a call from a MPS CRO who gives
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would've helped you if you'd had it operating on the night? A. I wouldn't know, I've never had any experience with it. Q. Turning to a different subject. If you had known that many callers or a number of callers, at least were calling from flats which had	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report, LFB00004790 at page 95. I'd like you, please, to look at the time mark of 02.41.46. I'll just read it to you Ms Russell: "CRO Russell takes a call from a MPS CRO who gives details of a call they have taken from Flat 192 in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would've helped you if you'd had it operating on the night? A. I wouldn't know, I've never had any experience with it. Q. Turning to a different subject. If you had known that many callers or a number of callers, at least were calling from flats which had front doors which had no functioning automatic	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report, LFB00004790 at page 95. I'd like you, please, to look at the time mark of 02.41.46. I'll just read it to you Ms Russell: "CRO Russell takes a call from a MPS CRO who gives details of a call they have taken from Flat 192 in Grenfell Tower where there are two adults and three
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would've helped you if you'd had it operating on the night? A. I wouldn't know, I've never had any experience with it. Q. Turning to a different subject. If you had known that many callers or a number of callers, at least were calling from flats which had front doors which had no functioning automatic door-closers, would that have affected the advice that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report, LFB00004790 at page 95. I'd like you, please, to look at the time mark of 02.41.46. I'll just read it to you Ms Russell: "CRO Russell takes a call from a MPS CRO who gives details of a call they have taken from Flat 192 in Grenfell Tower where there are two adults and three children. The MPS CRO states that they are in the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would've helped you if you'd had it operating on the night? A. I wouldn't know, I've never had any experience with it. Q. Turning to a different subject. If you had known that many callers or a number of callers, at least were calling from flats which had front doors which had no functioning automatic door-closers, would that have affected the advice that you were giving in any way?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report, LFB00004790 at page 95. I'd like you, please, to look at the time mark of 02.41.46. I'll just read it to you Ms Russell: "CRO Russell takes a call from a MPS CRO who gives details of a call they have taken from Flat 192 in Grenfell Tower where there are two adults and three children. The MPS CRO states that they are in the bedroom and the fire is in the living room. CRO Russell
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would've helped you if you'd had it operating on the night? A. I wouldn't know, I've never had any experience with it. Q. Turning to a different subject. If you had known that many callers or a number of callers, at least were calling from flats which had front doors which had no functioning automatic door-closers, would that have affected the advice that you were giving in any way? A. Yes, because that would've meant that the units weren't	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report, LFB00004790 at page 95. I'd like you, please, to look at the time mark of 02.41.46. I'll just read it to you Ms Russell: "CRO Russell takes a call from a MPS CRO who gives details of a call they have taken from Flat 192 in Grenfell Tower where there are two adults and three children. The MPS CRO states that they are in the bedroom and the fire is in the living room. CRO Russell confirms this information and asks if the MPS CRO knows
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would've helped you if you'd had it operating on the night? A. I wouldn't know, I've never had any experience with it. Q. Turning to a different subject. If you had known that many callers or a number of callers, at least were calling from flats which had front doors which had no functioning automatic door-closers, would that have affected the advice that you were giving in any way? A. Yes, because that would've meant that the units weren't contained, they weren't fireproof for the amount of time	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report, LFB00004790 at page 95. I'd like you, please, to look at the time mark of 02.41.46. I'll just read it to you Ms Russell: "CRO Russell takes a call from a MPS CRO who gives details of a call they have taken from Flat 192 in Grenfell Tower where there are two adults and three children. The MPS CRO states that they are in the bedroom and the fire is in the living room. CRO Russell confirms this information and asks if the MPS CRO knows the floor number which he does not. CRO Russell states
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would've helped you if you'd had it operating on the night? A. I wouldn't know, I've never had any experience with it. Q. Turning to a different subject. If you had known that many callers — or a number of callers, at least — were calling from flats which had front doors which had no functioning automatic door-closers, would that have affected the advice that you were giving in any way? A. Yes, because that would've meant that the units weren't contained, they weren't fireproof for the amount of time that they should have been, or may have not been	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report, LFB00004790 at page 95. I'd like you, please, to look at the time mark of 02.41.46. I'll just read it to you Ms Russell: "CRO Russell takes a call from a MPS CRO who gives details of a call they have taken from Flat 192 in Grenfell Tower where there are two adults and three children. The MPS CRO states that they are in the bedroom and the fire is in the living room. CRO Russell confirms this information and asks if the MPS CRO knows the floor number which he does not. CRO Russell states that she will pass it on to the crews."
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would've helped you if you'd had it operating on the night? A. I wouldn't know, I've never had any experience with it. Q. Turning to a different subject. If you had known that many callers or a number of callers, at least were calling from flats which had front doors which had no functioning automatic door-closers, would that have affected the advice that you were giving in any way? A. Yes, because that would've meant that the units weren't contained, they weren't fireproof for the amount of time that they should have been, or may have not been contained.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report, LFB00004790 at page 95. I'd like you, please, to look at the time mark of 02.41.46. I'll just read it to you Ms Russell: "CRO Russell takes a call from a MPS CRO who gives details of a call they have taken from Flat 192 in Grenfell Tower where there are two adults and three children. The MPS CRO states that they are in the bedroom and the fire is in the living room. CRO Russell confirms this information and asks if the MPS CRO knows the floor number which he does not. CRO Russell states that she will pass it on to the crews." My question is: as a matter of practice or so far as
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would've helped you if you'd had it operating on the night? A. I wouldn't know, I've never had any experience with it. Q. Turning to a different subject. If you had known that many callers or a number of callers, at least were calling from flats which had front doors which had no functioning automatic door-closers, would that have affected the advice that you were giving in any way? A. Yes, because that would've meant that the units weren't contained, they weren't fireproof for the amount of time that they should have been, or may have not been contained. Q. Knowing that information, what advice would you then	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report, LFB00004790 at page 95. I'd like you, please, to look at the time mark of 02.41.46. I'll just read it to you Ms Russell: "CRO Russell takes a call from a MPS CRO who gives details of a call they have taken from Flat 192 in Grenfell Tower where there are two adults and three children. The MPS CRO states that they are in the bedroom and the fire is in the living room. CRO Russell confirms this information and asks if the MPS CRO knows the floor number which he does not. CRO Russell states that she will pass it on to the crews." My question is: as a matter of practice or so far as you recollected, would the phone number of the caller be
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would've helped you if you'd had it operating on the night? A. I wouldn't know, I've never had any experience with it. Q. Turning to a different subject. If you had known that many callers or a number of callers, at least were calling from flats which had front doors which had no functioning automatic door-closers, would that have affected the advice that you were giving in any way? A. Yes, because that would've meant that the units weren't contained, they weren't fireproof for the amount of time that they should have been, or may have not been contained. Q. Knowing that information, what advice would you then have given?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report, LFB00004790 at page 95. I'd like you, please, to look at the time mark of 02.41.46. I'll just read it to you Ms Russell: "CRO Russell takes a call from a MPS CRO who gives details of a call they have taken from Flat 192 in Grenfell Tower where there are two adults and three children. The MPS CRO states that they are in the bedroom and the fire is in the living room. CRO Russell confirms this information and asks if the MPS CRO knows the floor number which he does not. CRO Russell states that she will pass it on to the crews." My question is: as a matter of practice or so far as you recollected, would the phone number of the caller be available to the MPS CRO?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would've helped you if you'd had it operating on the night? A. I wouldn't know, I've never had any experience with it. Q. Turning to a different subject. If you had known that many callers or a number of callers, at least were calling from flats which had front doors which had no functioning automatic door-closers, would that have affected the advice that you were giving in any way? A. Yes, because that would've meant that the units weren't contained, they weren't fireproof for the amount of time that they should have been, or may have not been contained. Q. Knowing that information, what advice would you then have given? A. I would've known that there would've been a lot less	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report, LFB00004790 at page 95. I'd like you, please, to look at the time mark of 02.41.46. I'll just read it to you Ms Russell: "CRO Russell takes a call from a MPS CRO who gives details of a call they have taken from Flat 192 in Grenfell Tower where there are two adults and three children. The MPS CRO states that they are in the bedroom and the fire is in the living room. CRO Russell confirms this information and asks if the MPS CRO knows the floor number which he does not. CRO Russell states that she will pass it on to the crews." My question is: as a matter of practice or so far as you recollected, would the phone number of the caller be available to the MPS CRO? A. Yes, it should have been.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would've helped you if you'd had it operating on the night? A. I wouldn't know, I've never had any experience with it. Q. Turning to a different subject. If you had known that many callers or a number of callers, at least were calling from flats which had front doors which had no functioning automatic door-closers, would that have affected the advice that you were giving in any way? A. Yes, because that would've meant that the units weren't contained, they weren't fireproof for the amount of time that they should have been, or may have not been contained. Q. Knowing that information, what advice would you then have given? A. I would've known that there would've been a lot less time they had in where they were. So I probably	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report, LFB00004790 at page 95. I'd like you, please, to look at the time mark of 02.41.46. I'll just read it to you Ms Russell: "CRO Russell takes a call from a MPS CRO who gives details of a call they have taken from Flat 192 in Grenfell Tower where there are two adults and three children. The MPS CRO states that they are in the bedroom and the fire is in the living room. CRO Russell confirms this information and asks if the MPS CRO knows the floor number which he does not. CRO Russell states that she will pass it on to the crews." My question is: as a matter of practice or so far as you recollected, would the phone number of the caller be available to the MPS CRO? A. Yes, it should have been. Q. We can see from this summary that he did not pass that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would've helped you if you'd had it operating on the night? A. I wouldn't know, I've never had any experience with it. Q. Turning to a different subject. If you had known that many callers or a number of callers, at least were calling from flats which had front doors which had no functioning automatic door-closers, would that have affected the advice that you were giving in any way? A. Yes, because that would've meant that the units weren't contained, they weren't fireproof for the amount of time that they should have been, or may have not been contained. Q. Knowing that information, what advice would you then have given? A. I would've known that there would've been a lot less time they had in where they were. So I probably would've emphasised more at the start, knowing that they	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report, LFB00004790 at page 95. I'd like you, please, to look at the time mark of 02.41.46. I'll just read it to you Ms Russell: "CRO Russell takes a call from a MPS CRO who gives details of a call they have taken from Flat 192 in Grenfell Tower where there are two adults and three children. The MPS CRO states that they are in the bedroom and the fire is in the living room. CRO Russell confirms this information and asks if the MPS CRO knows the floor number which he does not. CRO Russell states that she will pass it on to the crews." My question is: as a matter of practice or so far as you recollected, would the phone number of the caller be available to the MPS CRO? A. Yes, it should have been. Q. We can see from this summary that he did not pass that on to you.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would've helped you if you'd had it operating on the night? A. I wouldn't know, I've never had any experience with it. Q. Turning to a different subject. If you had known that many callers — or a number of callers, at least — were calling from flats which had front doors which had no functioning automatic door-closers, would that have affected the advice that you were giving in any way? A. Yes, because that would've meant that the units weren't contained, they weren't fireproof for the amount of time that they should have been, or may have not been contained. Q. Knowing that information, what advice would you then have given? A. I would've known that there would've been a lot less time they had in where they were. So I probably would've emphasised more at the start, knowing that they didn't have as much time as what you'd think they would, to leave rather than to wait for rescue.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report, LFB00004790 at page 95. I'd like you, please, to look at the time mark of 02.41.46. I'll just read it to you Ms Russell: "CRO Russell takes a call from a MPS CRO who gives details of a call they have taken from Flat 192 in Grenfell Tower where there are two adults and three children. The MPS CRO states that they are in the bedroom and the fire is in the living room. CRO Russell confirms this information and asks if the MPS CRO knows the floor number which he does not. CRO Russell states that she will pass it on to the crews." My question is: as a matter of practice or so far as you recollected, would the phone number of the caller be available to the MPS CRO? A. Yes, it should have been. Q. We can see from this summary that he did not pass that on to you. Is there a reason why you didn't ask him for it? A. Same as the others. We were taking call after call.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	called the heli-tele downlink? A. I'm aware of it, but I've never had any use or training on it that I remember. Q. Does that mean that you wouldn't be able to tell me whether it would've helped you if you'd had it operating on the night? A. I wouldn't know, I've never had any experience with it. Q. Turning to a different subject. If you had known that many callers or a number of callers, at least were calling from flats which had front doors which had no functioning automatic door-closers, would that have affected the advice that you were giving in any way? A. Yes, because that would've meant that the units weren't contained, they weren't fireproof for the amount of time that they should have been, or may have not been contained. Q. Knowing that information, what advice would you then have given? A. I would've known that there would've been a lot less time they had in where they were. So I probably would've emphasised more at the start, knowing that they didn't have as much time as what you'd think they would,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	nonetheless. Ms Russell, thank you very much for coming back to us. I don't have very many questions for you. Can the witness be shown the LFB control report, LFB00004790 at page 95. I'd like you, please, to look at the time mark of 02.41.46. I'll just read it to you Ms Russell: "CRO Russell takes a call from a MPS CRO who gives details of a call they have taken from Flat 192 in Grenfell Tower where there are two adults and three children. The MPS CRO states that they are in the bedroom and the fire is in the living room. CRO Russell confirms this information and asks if the MPS CRO knows the floor number which he does not. CRO Russell states that she will pass it on to the crews." My question is: as a matter of practice or so far as you recollected, would the phone number of the caller be available to the MPS CRO? A. Yes, it should have been. Q. We can see from this summary that he did not pass that on to you. Is there a reason why you didn't ask him for it?

1	That would've meant not taking any more calls to call	1	guessing.
2	back a caller. It was very likely that we already had	2	MR MILLETT: Okay. Thank you very much.
3	that flat number, and therefore would've known what	3	Ms Russell, you'll be glad to know that I've come to
4	floor that flat was on, up on the board. So that	4	the very end of my questions. It remains for me simply
5	would've been passed over and added to the list.	5	to thank you very much for your patience in answering
6	Q. I see.	6	them and for coming to the inquiry today and assisting
7	If you had had that number to hand, would you have	7	us with our investigations. We are very grateful to
8	used it to call that number back, if it was a mobile, to	8	you, so thank you.
9	tell the caller of a change in stay-put advice?	9	THE WITNESS: Thanks.
10	A. If it was a silent call, I may have re-called it just to	10	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'd add my thanks to those of
11	make sure that they were in Grenfell Tower, that it	11	Mr Millett. It's very helpful to hear what was going on
12	wasn't a different incident, that it wasn't a new caller	12	in different places at different times during that
13	with a flat number that we didn't already have.	13	night. It helps us to fill in the bigger picture. So
14	Q. Right.	14	it's really helpful, and thank you very much indeed for
15	A. But the Met Police Service would, I'm guessing, have	15	coming to tell us about your part in it.
16	given some form of advice themselves as well.	16	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
17	Q. You say you're guessing; does that tell us you didn't	17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right. You are now free to go.
18	know what advice they were giving?	18	If you would like to go with the usher, she'll look
19	A. Yes, sorry, that's a guess, yes.	19	after you. Thank you.
20	Q. Different question.	20	(The witness withdrew)
21	Can I ask you, please, to be shown a transcript	21	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.
22	LFB00000357, which is a call at, as you can see,	22	MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, thank you.
23	02.30.45 seconds. This comes from flat 194 on the	23	The next witness is going to be taken by Mr Andrew
24	22nd floor.	24	Kinnier, and that is Zoe Martin from Kent Fire and
25	Just to summarise it, you took a call from Surrey	25	Rescue Services. There may be a need for a very short
	,,,		· · · · · ·
	Page 73		Page 75
1	Fire and Rescue services, who were passing details on	1	break to change the furniture, but I'm in your hands.
2	from a relative.	2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Do you know whether we need to
3	If you look at the second page of the call, you get	3	change the furniture or not?
4	the details. It's a call from a woman who is concerned	4	MR MILLETT: No, we don't.
5	about someone in flat 194 on the 22nd floor.	5	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, then
6	If we look at the bottom of the page I think we	6	MR MILLETT: We don't.
7	probably get enough from this page you say at the	7	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: The witness is ready? I'm told the
8	bottom:	8	witness is ready as soon as Mr Kinnier is ready to call
9	"OPERATOR: Just the one. Okay. Thank you. We've,	9	her.
10	we've got a lot of calls coming in through to that,	10	MR MILLETT: The witness is readier than counsel. So I'll
11	we'll pass it on to our command unit, but they're,	11	quickly move out of the way and let Mr Kinnier take
12	they're fighting their way up for a lot of people."	12	over.
13	It's the same question I asked you before: at this	13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Just take your time.
14	point, do you think you had received any information	14	(Pause)
15	about crews being able to get to the 22nd floor?	15	MR KINNIER: Sir, good afternoon.
16	A. No, no information back about where they were, where	16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Kinnier.
17	they would be able to get and where they wouldn't be	17	MR KINNIER: May I call Ms Martin.
18	able to get.	18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
19	Q. So, again, was this the kind of advice that you were	19	ZOE MARTIN (sworn)
20	giving which was essentially reassurance but without any	20	Questions by MR KINNIER
21	factual information?	21	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Ms Martin.
22	A. Yes, based on that we'd heard nothing otherwise.	22	Sit down and make yourself comfortable there.
23	Q. Do you remember whether you passed this message back to	23	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
24	the command unit?	24	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right.
25	A. That would've gone on paper and then passed over, I'm	25	Yes, Mr Kinnier.
	70 - 51		~
	Page 74		Page 76
			10 (Danas 72 to 76)

1	MR KINNIER: First of all, would you please confirm your	1	Q. Did the training cover stay put?
2	name for the record.	2	A. In your fire survival guidance, it does cover that.
3	A. Yes, it's Zoe Louise Martin.	3	Q. You say it flows probably from your answer the
4	Q. Thank you.	4	training included special training regarding fire
5	If you open the blue folder in front of you, you	5	survival guidance; is that right?
6	should find there your witness statement [MET00012678]	6	A. Yes.
7	dated 19 February of this year; is that right?	7	Q. Can you just give us a summary of what training you
8	A. Yes.	8	received in relation to FSGs?
9	Q. Have you read that statement recently?	9	A. Yes. So you listen to previous fire survival guidance
10	A. This morning I got to read over it.	10	calls that other operators have taken, and we also do
11	Q. Do you confirm that its contents are true?	11	some mock calls. So trainers or other operators will be
12	A. Yes.	12	in a separate room, you'll take a call from them, and it
13	Q. And you're content for that statement to stand as your	13	will be a mock fire survival guidance call.
14	evidence to this inquiry?	14	Q. Just the one?
15	A. Yes.	15	A. No, it could be one or two. Yes.
16	Q. Thank you.	16	Q. But no more than that?
17	First of all, as I understand it, you are a crew	17	A. Just whatever, you know how much time you have on the
18	manager in the control room at Kent Fire and Rescue	18	day to do it, yes.
19	Service.	19	Q. You also say in your statement we don't need to go to
20	A. Yes, that's right.	20	it training is continually written into your shift
21	Q. As at the date of your witness statement, you had been	21	pattern and often takes place monthly. You go on to say
22	working for Kent for 6 and a half years; is that right?	22	that it covers FSG calls.
23	A. Yes.	23	Can you remember before the fire when your most
24	Q. Throughout that time, have you been based in the control	24	recent training on FSGs had been?
25	room?	25	A. I can't remember.
	Daga 77		Dage 70
	Page 77	-	Page 79
1	A. Yes.	1	Q. Can you remember what the training consisted of?
2	Q. As I understand it, the nature of your role as crew	2	A. It is going over previous calls that have been taken
3	manager you summarise thus:	3	within the control room, listening to the calls, looking
4	" to supervise all calls that our operators deal	4	at the call handling, what you may ask, what extra,
5	with to ensure that the right advice is given at all	5	stuff like that.
6	times."	6	Q. Did that training cover anything about stay put?
7	Will you take calls during the course of your shift	7	A. We always cover stay put, yes.
8	or is that left solely to control room operators?	8	Q. Had you had any specific training since your initial
9	A. No. If the operators are busy, then we do take calls.	9	training on high-rise fires?
10	Q. Will you supervise what message, what advice, the	10	A. No.
11	control room operators are giving whilst you're on	11	Q. Are you given any training on how to gather information
12	A. Yes, we monitor the calls at all times.	12	from callers to specifically establish things such as
13	Q. The first substantive topic I'd like to discuss with you	13	whether they're disabled or might have mobility issues?
14	is training and experience.	14	A. You do you know, if they are in a property fire, you
15	A. Mm-hm.	15	ask if they can get out, but normally if a caller has
16	Q. I want to ask you, first of all, about what you say at	16	a disability or can't get out, they normally do inform
17	page 1 of your witness statement. You don't need to go	17	you quite early on in the call.
18	to it. You say that your training consisted of	18	Q. Presumably Kent has written policies on how to handle
10		l	999 calls and FSG calls; is that right?
19	a six-week programme containing a number of modules.	19	8
	a six-week programme containing a number of modules. Is this the initial training you received when you	19 20	A. Yes.
19		1	
19 20	Is this the initial training you received when you	20	A. Yes.
19 20 21	Is this the initial training you received when you joined?	20 21	A. Yes.Q. Is there a specific policy for the handling of FSG
19 20 21 22	Is this the initial training you received when you joined? A. Yes, yes.	20 21 22	A. Yes.Q. Is there a specific policy for the handling of FSG calls?
19 20 21 22 23	Is this the initial training you received when you joined? A. Yes, yes. Q. Can you remember, did that initial training cover fires	20 21 22 23	A. Yes.Q. Is there a specific policy for the handling of FSG calls?A. I don't know. I can't remember.
19 20 21 22 23 24	Is this the initial training you received when you joined? A. Yes, yes. Q. Can you remember, did that initial training cover fires in high-rise buildings? A. Not in high-rise, just fires in domestic premises.	20 21 22 23 24	 A. Yes. Q. Is there a specific policy for the handling of FSG calls? A. I don't know. I can't remember. Q. Could I turn to the topic of stay put. A. Mm-hm.
19 20 21 22 23 24	Is this the initial training you received when you joined? A. Yes, yes. Q. Can you remember, did that initial training cover fires in high-rise buildings?	20 21 22 23 24	 A. Yes. Q. Is there a specific policy for the handling of FSG calls? A. I don't know. I can't remember. Q. Could I turn to the topic of stay put.

1	Q. Again, it's in your statement, we don't need to go to	1	"Fire Survival Guidance calls relate to calls in
2	it.	2	which the caller tells us they are stuck within a
3	You say there at page 2, the last paragraph:	3	premises and are unable to get out."
4	"My understanding of the stay put policy within	4	How do you go about finding out that the resident is
5	buildings is that every building is different and have	5	in fact stuck?
6	different policies. Some have stay put policies which	6	A. If smoke is coming through the door of the bedroom or
7	are put in place by the building management team; and	7	the room that they're in, and, you know, it's too
8	others do not. Personally I would ask each caller what	8	dangerous for them to exit that door and it's safer for
9	the policy is for their building and then be guided by	9	them to stay in the room they're in, that's when you
10	them. If a stay put policy is in place and the	10	would give fire survival.
11	individual is unable to get out, we would enact the Fire	11	Q. You also say in your statement that you stay on the
12	Survival Guidance."	12	phone to those callers to make sure they're rescued.
13	When you say that you would ask the caller whether	13	A. Mm-hm.
14	there is a stay-put policy in place, does that mean you	14	Q. Would you also expect to receive updates from the
15	wouldn't usually have that information in front of you?	15	incident ground as to how a particular rescue is
16	A. No, we don't have information.	16	progressing?
17	Q. What happens if a caller doesn't know whether there's	17	A. Yes. So when the crews get there, they'll put back
18	a stay-put policy in place?	18	messages via the radio. You know, normally if they know
19	A. If no other calls had come in from the same building, we	19	someone's in, it's, you know, maybe a swift rescue. So
20	would then start fire survival guidance, yes.	20	I just normally stay on the phone to the caller and see
21	Q. Immediately?	21	if they can hear anybody shouting, or if they can see
22	A. Yes.	22	the fire service outside.
23	Q. Okay.	23	Q. Would you get any specific updates from the incident
24	A. If they couldn't get out, yes.	24	ground saying, "We've deployed a crew, crew have located
25	Q. What other information would you try to be gathering	25	the flat, crew have rescued the residents, mission
	Page 81	-	Page 83
1	from a caller who is calling from a building that has	1	completed", something along those lines?
2	a stay-put policy? Could you take us through the type	2	A. Yes. They would always update us with radio messages,
3	of information you'd be after?	3	yes, throughout the incident.
4	A. Obviously you would get their address. So normally	4	Q. Can I now talk to calls from other brigades.
5	a stay-put policy is in a block of flats, for example,	5	A. Mm-hm.
6	so you would get the flat number, what floor they were	6	Q. At page 3 of your witness statement again, we don't
7	on, determine what room they were in. I always try and	7	need to go to it unless you want to, but it's the first
8	get the route so if we were to enter via the front	8	big paragraph on that page you say this:
9	door, would our firefighters turn left or right, you	9	"In the event that we take calls from other Brigades
10	know, the route in to find them in that specific room.	10	the protocol would be to keep the caller on the line and
11	Q. Would you ask them about the extent to which their flat	11	call the other Brigade simultaneously and introduce the
12	had been affected by heat or smoke?	12	caller to that Brigade having told them what was being
13	A. Yes. If smoke was coming in, we'd ask them to put stuff	13	reported. For a Brigade like London, we have them on
14	at the bottom of the door, yes.	14	speed dial. If we do not receive any answer, we would
15	Q. Can you explain in what circumstances you would advise	15	take ownership of the call and continue to take all
16	a person within a building that is governed by	16	relevant information whilst continuing to try and
17	a stay-put policy to leave?	17	contact the necessary Brigade."
18	A. Well, unless we've been told that that stay-put isn't	18	You refer there to protocol.
19	relevant but I've never been in a situation to have	19	Is that protocol contained within a formalised
20	to do that, so I can't answer that.	20	document or not?
21	Q. Can I turn next to fire survival guidance itself.	21	A. I'm unsure.
22	A. Mm-hm.	22	Q. Have you received any training on what the arrangements
23	Q. Again, at page 2 of your witness statement it's the	23	are when you take calls in relation to incidents covered
24	second paragraph from the bottom for reference you	24	by other brigades?
25	explain that:	25	A. Yes.
	•		
	Page 82		Page 84

1	Q. Can you give us help, what type of training have you	1	incident?
2	been given in respect of that?	2	A. Can you?
3	A. Its just how to handle the call, what information we	3	Q. When you accept calls from another Brigade's area
4	should take. We then ask the caller to stay on the	4	A. Mm-hm.
5	line. We then do the short dial to whichever brigade,	5	Q is there a means by which you can contact that
6	introduce the caller, pass over a mobile number in case	6	brigade to get more details about the particular
7	we lose them, and then we just transfer the caller	7	incident that you're about to start receiving 999 calls
8	through.	8	in respect of?
9	Q. Do you have phone lines which are dedicated for that	9	A. To be honest, it doesn't happen often that we get
10	purpose?	10	overflow of calls from another brigade. That's the
11	A. Well, we have short dials. We don't have a particular	11	first time that I've experienced it.
12	phone that is, you know, for London Fire, but we have	12	Q. In the event that you do need more detail than you're
13	short dials on our telephone.	13	getting from the 999 call itself, has your training
14	Q. In your previous experience of dealing with London, do	14	given you any number that you can contact to get more
15	those calls go straight through to a CRO or do they go	15	detail about an incident from, if I can call it, the
16	through to a supervisor within the Brigade control in	16	home brigade?
17	London?	17	A. It will be just the short dial number, yes.
18	A. It goes through to an operator.	18	Q. Again, that could go through to the operator?
19	Q. Apart from London, do you know which other brigade Kent	19	A. Yes.
20	is able to take calls for?	20	Q. Is there a way of passing on relevant information that
21	A. Essex we take calls for, and East Sussex and Surrey.	21	the caller gives you directly to the incident ground?
22	Q. And they're your buddy fire and rescue services?	22	A. From another brigade?
23	A. We don't have a buddy fire and rescue; they're our	23	Q. Yes.
24	neighbouring services.	24	A. No. So we would tell the relevant control room and they
25	Q. On the night of 14 June, we know it was a BT operator	25	will speak to their ground. We don't have contact with
	D 05		D 07
	Page 85		Page 87
1	who called and asked if Kent was able to take calls on	1	other brigades on the incident ground.
1 2	who called and asked if Kent was able to take calls on behalf of the LFB.	1 2	other brigades on the incident ground. O. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous
1 2 3	behalf of the LFB.	1 2 3	Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous
2		2	Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous experience people using an Airwave radio as a means
2 3	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get	2 3	Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous
2 3 4	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first?	2 3 4	Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous experience people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered
2 3 4 5	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first? A. For example, if we take a call on somebody else's	2 3 4 5	Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous experience people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered by another brigade?
2 3 4 5 6	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first? A. For example, if we take a call on somebody else's ground, that's because a telephone master has picked it	2 3 4 5 6	Q. Have you heard — you told us you haven't had previous experience — people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered by another brigade?A. We would never contact an incident ground of another
2 3 4 5 6 7	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first? A. For example, if we take a call on somebody else's ground, that's because a telephone master has picked it up, so it comes through to us. If, for example, for	2 3 4 5 6 7	 Q. Have you heard — you told us you haven't had previous experience — people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered by another brigade? A. We would never contact an incident ground of another brigade.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first? A. For example, if we take a call on somebody else's ground, that's because a telephone master has picked it up, so it comes through to us. If, for example, for this night, because of the number of calls they were	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous experience people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered by another brigade? A. We would never contact an incident ground of another brigade. Q. Could I now turn to the night of the fire itself,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first? A. For example, if we take a call on somebody else's ground, that's because a telephone master has picked it up, so it comes through to us. If, for example, for this night, because of the number of calls they were taking, that's when the BT operator will contact us to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous experience people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered by another brigade? A. We would never contact an incident ground of another brigade. Q. Could I now turn to the night of the fire itself, Ms Martin.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first? A. For example, if we take a call on somebody else's ground, that's because a telephone master has picked it up, so it comes through to us. If, for example, for this night, because of the number of calls they were taking, that's when the BT operator will contact us to see if we can help for overflow of calls.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous experience people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered by another brigade? A. We would never contact an incident ground of another brigade. Q. Could I now turn to the night of the fire itself, Ms Martin. A. Mm-hm.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first? A. For example, if we take a call on somebody else's ground, that's because a telephone master has picked it up, so it comes through to us. If, for example, for this night, because of the number of calls they were taking, that's when the BT operator will contact us to see if we can help for overflow of calls. Q. In your experience, is it usually the BT operator who	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous experience people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered by another brigade? A. We would never contact an incident ground of another brigade. Q. Could I now turn to the night of the fire itself, Ms Martin. A. Mm-hm. Q. Just to get this right, as I understand it, you're in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first? A. For example, if we take a call on somebody else's ground, that's because a telephone master has picked it up, so it comes through to us. If, for example, for this night, because of the number of calls they were taking, that's when the BT operator will contact us to see if we can help for overflow of calls. Q. In your experience, is it usually the BT operator who decides to divert calls from London to other areas?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous experience people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered by another brigade? A. We would never contact an incident ground of another brigade. Q. Could I now turn to the night of the fire itself, Ms Martin. A. Mm-hm. Q. Just to get this right, as I understand it, you're in overall charge of the control room; is that right?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first? A. For example, if we take a call on somebody else's ground, that's because a telephone master has picked it up, so it comes through to us. If, for example, for this night, because of the number of calls they were taking, that's when the BT operator will contact us to see if we can help for overflow of calls. Q. In your experience, is it usually the BT operator who decides to divert calls from London to other areas? A. The BT operator will call us, ask if we are able to. We	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous experience people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered by another brigade? A. We would never contact an incident ground of another brigade. Q. Could I now turn to the night of the fire itself, Ms Martin. A. Mm-hm. Q. Just to get this right, as I understand it, you're in overall charge of the control room; is that right? A. Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first? A. For example, if we take a call on somebody else's ground, that's because a telephone master has picked it up, so it comes through to us. If, for example, for this night, because of the number of calls they were taking, that's when the BT operator will contact us to see if we can help for overflow of calls. Q. In your experience, is it usually the BT operator who decides to divert calls from London to other areas? A. The BT operator will call us, ask if we are able to. We would then double-check with our senior management and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous experience people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered by another brigade? A. We would never contact an incident ground of another brigade. Q. Could I now turn to the night of the fire itself, Ms Martin. A. Mm-hm. Q. Just to get this right, as I understand it, you're in overall charge of the control room; is that right? A. Yes. Q. With you was Mitch Samson, who is a crew manager
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first? A. For example, if we take a call on somebody else's ground, that's because a telephone master has picked it up, so it comes through to us. If, for example, for this night, because of the number of calls they were taking, that's when the BT operator will contact us to see if we can help for overflow of calls. Q. In your experience, is it usually the BT operator who decides to divert calls from London to other areas? A. The BT operator will call us, ask if we are able to. We would then double-check with our senior management and then we would call BT back and say yes or no, you know,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous experience people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered by another brigade? A. We would never contact an incident ground of another brigade. Q. Could I now turn to the night of the fire itself, Ms Martin. A. Mm-hm. Q. Just to get this right, as I understand it, you're in overall charge of the control room; is that right? A. Yes. Q. With you was Mitch Samson, who is a crew manager A. Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first? A. For example, if we take a call on somebody else's ground, that's because a telephone master has picked it up, so it comes through to us. If, for example, for this night, because of the number of calls they were taking, that's when the BT operator will contact us to see if we can help for overflow of calls. Q. In your experience, is it usually the BT operator who decides to divert calls from London to other areas? A. The BT operator will call us, ask if we are able to. We would then double-check with our senior management and then we would call BT back and say yes or no, you know, we're able to assist.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous experience people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered by another brigade? A. We would never contact an incident ground of another brigade. Q. Could I now turn to the night of the fire itself, Ms Martin. A. Mm-hm. Q. Just to get this right, as I understand it, you're in overall charge of the control room; is that right? A. Yes. Q. With you was Mitch Samson, who is a crew manager A. Yes. Q Paul Stables, who is a radio operator
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first? A. For example, if we take a call on somebody else's ground, that's because a telephone master has picked it up, so it comes through to us. If, for example, for this night, because of the number of calls they were taking, that's when the BT operator will contact us to see if we can help for overflow of calls. Q. In your experience, is it usually the BT operator who decides to divert calls from London to other areas? A. The BT operator will call us, ask if we are able to. We would then double-check with our senior management and then we would call BT back and say yes or no, you know, we're able to assist. Q. When you say you checked with senior management, what	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous experience people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered by another brigade? A. We would never contact an incident ground of another brigade. Q. Could I now turn to the night of the fire itself, Ms Martin. A. Mm-hm. Q. Just to get this right, as I understand it, you're in overall charge of the control room; is that right? A. Yes. Q. With you was Mitch Samson, who is a crew manager A. Yes. Q Paul Stables, who is a radio operator A. Mm-hm.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first? A. For example, if we take a call on somebody else's ground, that's because a telephone master has picked it up, so it comes through to us. If, for example, for this night, because of the number of calls they were taking, that's when the BT operator will contact us to see if we can help for overflow of calls. Q. In your experience, is it usually the BT operator who decides to divert calls from London to other areas? A. The BT operator will call us, ask if we are able to. We would then double-check with our senior management and then we would call BT back and say yes or no, you know, we're able to assist. Q. When you say you checked with senior management, what rank are we talking about that you'd contact?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous experience people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered by another brigade? A. We would never contact an incident ground of another brigade. Q. Could I now turn to the night of the fire itself, Ms Martin. A. Mm-hm. Q. Just to get this right, as I understand it, you're in overall charge of the control room; is that right? A. Yes. Q. With you was Mitch Samson, who is a crew manager A. Yes. Q Paul Stables, who is a radio operator A. Mm-hm. Q and Jade Millsom was a phone operator.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first? A. For example, if we take a call on somebody else's ground, that's because a telephone master has picked it up, so it comes through to us. If, for example, for this night, because of the number of calls they were taking, that's when the BT operator will contact us to see if we can help for overflow of calls. Q. In your experience, is it usually the BT operator who decides to divert calls from London to other areas? A. The BT operator will call us, ask if we are able to. We would then double-check with our senior management and then we would call BT back and say yes or no, you know, we're able to assist. Q. When you say you checked with senior management, what rank are we talking about that you'd contact? A. It will be our duty control manager.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous experience people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered by another brigade? A. We would never contact an incident ground of another brigade. Q. Could I now turn to the night of the fire itself, Ms Martin. A. Mm-hm. Q. Just to get this right, as I understand it, you're in overall charge of the control room; is that right? A. Yes. Q. With you was Mitch Samson, who is a crew manager A. Yes. Q Paul Stables, who is a radio operator A. Mm-hm. Q and Jade Millsom was a phone operator. A. Yes. Q. In your statement, you refer to Chris Else as the senior manager. Can you help us, where does he lie in your
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first? A. For example, if we take a call on somebody else's ground, that's because a telephone master has picked it up, so it comes through to us. If, for example, for this night, because of the number of calls they were taking, that's when the BT operator will contact us to see if we can help for overflow of calls. Q. In your experience, is it usually the BT operator who decides to divert calls from London to other areas? A. The BT operator will call us, ask if we are able to. We would then double-check with our senior management and then we would call BT back and say yes or no, you know, we're able to assist. Q. When you say you checked with senior management, what rank are we talking about that you'd contact? A. It will be our duty control manager. Q. On 14 June, can you remember who your duty control	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous experience people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered by another brigade? A. We would never contact an incident ground of another brigade. Q. Could I now turn to the night of the fire itself, Ms Martin. A. Mm-hm. Q. Just to get this right, as I understand it, you're in overall charge of the control room; is that right? A. Yes. Q. With you was Mitch Samson, who is a crew manager A. Yes. Q Paul Stables, who is a radio operator A. Mm-hm. Q and Jade Millsom was a phone operator. A. Yes. Q. In your statement, you refer to Chris Else as the senior manager. Can you help us, where does he lie in your chain of command?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first? A. For example, if we take a call on somebody else's ground, that's because a telephone master has picked it up, so it comes through to us. If, for example, for this night, because of the number of calls they were taking, that's when the BT operator will contact us to see if we can help for overflow of calls. Q. In your experience, is it usually the BT operator who decides to divert calls from London to other areas? A. The BT operator will call us, ask if we are able to. We would then double-check with our senior management and then we would call BT back and say yes or no, you know, we're able to assist. Q. When you say you checked with senior management, what rank are we talking about that you'd contact? A. It will be our duty control manager. Q. On 14 June, can you remember who your duty control manager was on that night? A. It was Station Manager Gill. Q. Thank you.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous experience people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered by another brigade? A. We would never contact an incident ground of another brigade. Q. Could I now turn to the night of the fire itself, Ms Martin. A. Mm-hm. Q. Just to get this right, as I understand it, you're in overall charge of the control room; is that right? A. Yes. Q. With you was Mitch Samson, who is a crew manager A. Yes. Q Paul Stables, who is a radio operator A. Mm-hm. Q and Jade Millsom was a phone operator. A. Yes. Q. In your statement, you refer to Chris Else as the senior manager. Can you help us, where does he lie in your chain of command? A. He would've been our duty group manager for that night.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first? A. For example, if we take a call on somebody else's ground, that's because a telephone master has picked it up, so it comes through to us. If, for example, for this night, because of the number of calls they were taking, that's when the BT operator will contact us to see if we can help for overflow of calls. Q. In your experience, is it usually the BT operator who decides to divert calls from London to other areas? A. The BT operator will call us, ask if we are able to. We would then double-check with our senior management and then we would call BT back and say yes or no, you know, we're able to assist. Q. When you say you checked with senior management, what rank are we talking about that you'd contact? A. It will be our duty control manager. Q. On 14 June, can you remember who your duty control manager was on that night? A. It was Station Manager Gill. Q. Thank you. When you've taken ownership of a call, is there	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous experience people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered by another brigade? A. We would never contact an incident ground of another brigade. Q. Could I now turn to the night of the fire itself, Ms Martin. A. Mm-hm. Q. Just to get this right, as I understand it, you're in overall charge of the control room; is that right? A. Yes. Q. With you was Mitch Samson, who is a crew manager A. Yes. Q Paul Stables, who is a radio operator A. Mm-hm. Q and Jade Millsom was a phone operator. A. Yes. Q. In your statement, you refer to Chris Else as the senior manager. Can you help us, where does he lie in your chain of command? A. He would've been our duty group manager for that night. Q. So he would be above Linda Gill?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first? A. For example, if we take a call on somebody else's ground, that's because a telephone master has picked it up, so it comes through to us. If, for example, for this night, because of the number of calls they were taking, that's when the BT operator will contact us to see if we can help for overflow of calls. Q. In your experience, is it usually the BT operator who decides to divert calls from London to other areas? A. The BT operator will call us, ask if we are able to. We would then double-check with our senior management and then we would call BT back and say yes or no, you know, we're able to assist. Q. When you say you checked with senior management, what rank are we talking about that you'd contact? A. It will be our duty control manager. Q. On 14 June, can you remember who your duty control manager was on that night? A. It was Station Manager Gill. Q. Thank you.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous experience people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered by another brigade? A. We would never contact an incident ground of another brigade. Q. Could I now turn to the night of the fire itself, Ms Martin. A. Mm-hm. Q. Just to get this right, as I understand it, you're in overall charge of the control room; is that right? A. Yes. Q. With you was Mitch Samson, who is a crew manager A. Yes. Q Paul Stables, who is a radio operator A. Mm-hm. Q and Jade Millsom was a phone operator. A. Yes. Q. In your statement, you refer to Chris Else as the senior manager. Can you help us, where does he lie in your chain of command? A. He would've been our duty group manager for that night.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	behalf of the LFB. Is that how usually the system works, you get contacted by BT first? A. For example, if we take a call on somebody else's ground, that's because a telephone master has picked it up, so it comes through to us. If, for example, for this night, because of the number of calls they were taking, that's when the BT operator will contact us to see if we can help for overflow of calls. Q. In your experience, is it usually the BT operator who decides to divert calls from London to other areas? A. The BT operator will call us, ask if we are able to. We would then double-check with our senior management and then we would call BT back and say yes or no, you know, we're able to assist. Q. When you say you checked with senior management, what rank are we talking about that you'd contact? A. It will be our duty control manager. Q. On 14 June, can you remember who your duty control manager was on that night? A. It was Station Manager Gill. Q. Thank you. When you've taken ownership of a call, is there	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. Have you heard you told us you haven't had previous experience people using an Airwave radio as a means of contacting the incident ground in an incident covered by another brigade? A. We would never contact an incident ground of another brigade. Q. Could I now turn to the night of the fire itself, Ms Martin. A. Mm-hm. Q. Just to get this right, as I understand it, you're in overall charge of the control room; is that right? A. Yes. Q. With you was Mitch Samson, who is a crew manager A. Yes. Q Paul Stables, who is a radio operator A. Mm-hm. Q and Jade Millsom was a phone operator. A. Yes. Q. In your statement, you refer to Chris Else as the senior manager. Can you help us, where does he lie in your chain of command? A. He would've been our duty group manager for that night. Q. So he would be above Linda Gill?

1	Q. Again, you've set out that your duty control manager was	1	A. I can't remember.
2	Linda Gill.	2	Q. At that stage, did you know what advice in relation to
3	A. Mm-hm.	3	stay put was being given to residents?
4	Q. Was she within the control chain of command or does she	4	A. I knew that it was a stay-put policy.
5	have any operational experience?	5	Q. Can you remember whether you were told that at 01.47 or
6	A. She used to work in the control room. She's now	6	later on in the evening?
7	a station manager.	7	A. What, that it was a stay-put policy?
8	Q. Do you need access in the control room to someone who	8	Q. Yes.
9	has operational experience?	9	A. Well, we were told we knew that.
10	A. Normally all of our senior managers have operational	10	Q. You knew that anyway?
11	experience.	11	A. Yes, we were told that, yes.
12	Q. Do you have operational experience?	12	Q. Did you discuss at this initial stage what advice your
13	A. No.	13	team should be giving to residents phoning from the
14	Q. So are you an exception to the rule?	14	tower?
15	A. Most people in the control room do not. There's some	15	A. When we found out we were taking calls for London,
16	part-time firefighters, but normally us in the control	16	I looked on the news, saw the incident and I told my
17	room we don't have operational experience.	17	team that we may be receiving very difficult calls.
18	Q. If I could ask you to turn to page 3 of your witness	18	Yes.
19	statement, and if you look at the fourth paragraph on	19	Q. That flows into my next question.
20	that page, five lines down, you say this:	20	You say, same page, the fourth paragraph on page 3,
21	"At some point in the night, I cannot be sure of any	21	four lines from the bottom, that you were prompted to
22	times, we received a phone call form BT asking whether	22	look at the news, which you just said.
23	we would be prepared to take calls on behalf of the	23	Do you remember how soon after the initial call from
24	London Fire Brigade"	24	BT that was?
25	We can go to it if you want to, but we have an entry	25	A. Quite
	Page 89		Page 91
1	in the Brigade control report at 01.47, that's at	1	Q. Moments?
1 2	in the Brigade control report at 01.47, that's at page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from	1 2	Q. Moments? A. Yes.
2	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from	2	A. Yes.
2 3	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking	2 3	A. Yes.Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether
2 3 4	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the	2 3 4	A. Yes.Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not?
2 3 4 5	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it	2 3 4 5	A. Yes.Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not?A. I don't understand the question.
2 3 4 5 6	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it is a 25-pump fire with persons reported.	2 3 4 5 6	 A. Yes. Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not? A. I don't understand the question. Q. You're aware of the principle of compartmentation?
2 3 4 5 6 7	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it is a 25-pump fire with persons reported. Does 01.47 sound about right for the time when you	2 3 4 5 6 7	 A. Yes. Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not? A. I don't understand the question. Q. You're aware of the principle of compartmentation? A. No. Q. That buildings are designed so that a fire is contained
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it is a 25-pump fire with persons reported. Does 01.47 sound about right for the time when you were first contacted by BT?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 A. Yes. Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not? A. I don't understand the question. Q. You're aware of the principle of compartmentation? A. No.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it is a 25-pump fire with persons reported. Does 01.47 sound about right for the time when you were first contacted by BT? A. It sounds correct, yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 A. Yes. Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not? A. I don't understand the question. Q. You're aware of the principle of compartmentation? A. No. Q. That buildings are designed so that a fire is contained within a particular compartment.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it is a 25-pump fire with persons reported. Does 01.47 sound about right for the time when you were first contacted by BT? A. It sounds correct, yes. Q. Do you know who it was who then called LFB control from	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 A. Yes. Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not? A. I don't understand the question. Q. You're aware of the principle of compartmentation? A. No. Q. That buildings are designed so that a fire is contained within a particular compartment. A. Okay, yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it is a 25-pump fire with persons reported. Does 01.47 sound about right for the time when you were first contacted by BT? A. It sounds correct, yes. Q. Do you know who it was who then called LFB control from Kent?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 A. Yes. Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not? A. I don't understand the question. Q. You're aware of the principle of compartmentation? A. No. Q. That buildings are designed so that a fire is contained within a particular compartment. A. Okay, yes. Q. Did you have any thoughts about whether that principle
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it is a 25-pump fire with persons reported. Does 01.47 sound about right for the time when you were first contacted by BT? A. It sounds correct, yes. Q. Do you know who it was who then called LFB control from Kent? A. I believe it would've been Paul, who was on the radio.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 A. Yes. Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not? A. I don't understand the question. Q. You're aware of the principle of compartmentation? A. No. Q. That buildings are designed so that a fire is contained within a particular compartment. A. Okay, yes. Q. Did you have any thoughts about whether that principle held good?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it is a 25-pump fire with persons reported. Does 01.47 sound about right for the time when you were first contacted by BT? A. It sounds correct, yes. Q. Do you know who it was who then called LFB control from Kent? A. I believe it would've been Paul, who was on the radio. I asked him to be my go-to. As he was on the radio and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 A. Yes. Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not? A. I don't understand the question. Q. You're aware of the principle of compartmentation? A. No. Q. That buildings are designed so that a fire is contained within a particular compartment. A. Okay, yes. Q. Did you have any thoughts about whether that principle held good? A. No.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it is a 25-pump fire with persons reported. Does 01.47 sound about right for the time when you were first contacted by BT? A. It sounds correct, yes. Q. Do you know who it was who then called LFB control from Kent? A. I believe it would've been Paul, who was on the radio. I asked him to be my go-to. As he was on the radio and we were quiet that night, there was no radio traffic at	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 A. Yes. Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not? A. I don't understand the question. Q. You're aware of the principle of compartmentation? A. No. Q. That buildings are designed so that a fire is contained within a particular compartment. A. Okay, yes. Q. Did you have any thoughts about whether that principle held good? A. No. Q. No?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it is a 25-pump fire with persons reported. Does 01.47 sound about right for the time when you were first contacted by BT? A. It sounds correct, yes. Q. Do you know who it was who then called LFB control from Kent? A. I believe it would've been Paul, who was on the radio. I asked him to be my go-to. As he was on the radio and we were quiet that night, there was no radio traffic at that time, so I asked him to be our liaison.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 A. Yes. Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not? A. I don't understand the question. Q. You're aware of the principle of compartmentation? A. No. Q. That buildings are designed so that a fire is contained within a particular compartment. A. Okay, yes. Q. Did you have any thoughts about whether that principle held good? A. No. Q. No? A. No.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it is a 25-pump fire with persons reported. Does 01.47 sound about right for the time when you were first contacted by BT? A. It sounds correct, yes. Q. Do you know who it was who then called LFB control from Kent? A. I believe it would've been Paul, who was on the radio. I asked him to be my go-to. As he was on the radio and we were quiet that night, there was no radio traffic at that time, so I asked him to be our liaison. Q. That's Paul Stables	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 A. Yes. Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not? A. I don't understand the question. Q. You're aware of the principle of compartmentation? A. No. Q. That buildings are designed so that a fire is contained within a particular compartment. A. Okay, yes. Q. Did you have any thoughts about whether that principle held good? A. No. Q. No? A. No. Q. When you looked at the footage that was being broadcast on the television, what crossed your mind as to the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it is a 25-pump fire with persons reported. Does 01.47 sound about right for the time when you were first contacted by BT? A. It sounds correct, yes. Q. Do you know who it was who then called LFB control from Kent? A. I believe it would've been Paul, who was on the radio. I asked him to be my go-to. As he was on the radio and we were quiet that night, there was no radio traffic at that time, so I asked him to be our liaison. Q. That's Paul Stables A. Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 A. Yes. Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not? A. I don't understand the question. Q. You're aware of the principle of compartmentation? A. No. Q. That buildings are designed so that a fire is contained within a particular compartment. A. Okay, yes. Q. Did you have any thoughts about whether that principle held good? A. No. Q. No? A. No. Q. When you looked at the footage that was being broadcast on the television, what crossed your mind as to the particular advice that would require to be given to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it is a 25-pump fire with persons reported. Does 01.47 sound about right for the time when you were first contacted by BT? A. It sounds correct, yes. Q. Do you know who it was who then called LFB control from Kent? A. I believe it would've been Paul, who was on the radio. I asked him to be my go-to. As he was on the radio and we were quiet that night, there was no radio traffic at that time, so I asked him to be our liaison. Q. That's Paul Stables A. Yes. Q who we referred to earlier?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 A. Yes. Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not? A. I don't understand the question. Q. You're aware of the principle of compartmentation? A. No. Q. That buildings are designed so that a fire is contained within a particular compartment. A. Okay, yes. Q. Did you have any thoughts about whether that principle held good? A. No. Q. No? A. No. Q. When you looked at the footage that was being broadcast on the television, what crossed your mind as to the particular advice that would require to be given to those calling in relation to the fire?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it is a 25-pump fire with persons reported. Does 01.47 sound about right for the time when you were first contacted by BT? A. It sounds correct, yes. Q. Do you know who it was who then called LFB control from Kent? A. I believe it would've been Paul, who was on the radio. I asked him to be my go-to. As he was on the radio and we were quiet that night, there was no radio traffic at that time, so I asked him to be our liaison. Q. That's Paul Stables A. Yes. Q who we referred to earlier? A. Yes, yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 A. Yes. Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not? A. I don't understand the question. Q. You're aware of the principle of compartmentation? A. No. Q. That buildings are designed so that a fire is contained within a particular compartment. A. Okay, yes. Q. Did you have any thoughts about whether that principle held good? A. No. Q. No? A. No. Q. When you looked at the footage that was being broadcast on the television, what crossed your mind as to the particular advice that would require to be given to those calling in relation to the fire? A. I just informed the team that fire survival guidance,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it is a 25-pump fire with persons reported. Does 01.47 sound about right for the time when you were first contacted by BT? A. It sounds correct, yes. Q. Do you know who it was who then called LFB control from Kent? A. I believe it would've been Paul, who was on the radio. I asked him to be my go-to. As he was on the radio and we were quiet that night, there was no radio traffic at that time, so I asked him to be our liaison. Q. That's Paul Stables A. Yes. Q who we referred to earlier? A. Yes, yes. Q. At that time, were you made aware that it was a 25-pump	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 A. Yes. Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not? A. I don't understand the question. Q. You're aware of the principle of compartmentation? A. No. Q. That buildings are designed so that a fire is contained within a particular compartment. A. Okay, yes. Q. Did you have any thoughts about whether that principle held good? A. No. Q. No? A. No. Q. When you looked at the footage that was being broadcast on the television, what crossed your mind as to the particular advice that would require to be given to those calling in relation to the fire? A. I just informed the team that fire survival guidance, you know, will be the advice that will be given out,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it is a 25-pump fire with persons reported. Does 01.47 sound about right for the time when you were first contacted by BT? A. It sounds correct, yes. Q. Do you know who it was who then called LFB control from Kent? A. I believe it would've been Paul, who was on the radio. I asked him to be my go-to. As he was on the radio and we were quiet that night, there was no radio traffic at that time, so I asked him to be our liaison. Q. That's Paul Stables A. Yes. Q who we referred to earlier? A. Yes, yes. Q. At that time, were you made aware that it was a 25-pump fire?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 A. Yes. Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not? A. I don't understand the question. Q. You're aware of the principle of compartmentation? A. No. Q. That buildings are designed so that a fire is contained within a particular compartment. A. Okay, yes. Q. Did you have any thoughts about whether that principle held good? A. No. Q. No? A. No. Q. When you looked at the footage that was being broadcast on the television, what crossed your mind as to the particular advice that would require to be given to those calling in relation to the fire? A. I just informed the team that fire survival guidance,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it is a 25-pump fire with persons reported. Does 01.47 sound about right for the time when you were first contacted by BT? A. It sounds correct, yes. Q. Do you know who it was who then called LFB control from Kent? A. I believe it would've been Paul, who was on the radio. I asked him to be my go-to. As he was on the radio and we were quiet that night, there was no radio traffic at that time, so I asked him to be our liaison. Q. That's Paul Stables A. Yes. Q who we referred to earlier? A. Yes, yes. Q. At that time, were you made aware that it was a 25-pump fire? A. I can't remember. Q. Can you remember whether you were informed as to the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 A. Yes. Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not? A. I don't understand the question. Q. You're aware of the principle of compartmentation? A. No. Q. That buildings are designed so that a fire is contained within a particular compartment. A. Okay, yes. Q. Did you have any thoughts about whether that principle held good? A. No. Q. No? A. No. Q. When you looked at the footage that was being broadcast on the television, what crossed your mind as to the particular advice that would require to be given to those calling in relation to the fire? A. I just informed the team that fire survival guidance, you know, will be the advice that will be given out, yes. Q. We know from your statement that Kent had access to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it is a 25-pump fire with persons reported. Does 01.47 sound about right for the time when you were first contacted by BT? A. It sounds correct, yes. Q. Do you know who it was who then called LFB control from Kent? A. I believe it would've been Paul, who was on the radio. I asked him to be my go-to. As he was on the radio and we were quiet that night, there was no radio traffic at that time, so I asked him to be our liaison. Q. That's Paul Stables A. Yes. Q who we referred to earlier? A. Yes, yes. Q. At that time, were you made aware that it was a 25-pump fire? A. I can't remember.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 A. Yes. Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not? A. I don't understand the question. Q. You're aware of the principle of compartmentation? A. No. Q. That buildings are designed so that a fire is contained within a particular compartment. A. Okay, yes. Q. Did you have any thoughts about whether that principle held good? A. No. Q. No? A. No. Q. When you looked at the footage that was being broadcast on the television, what crossed your mind as to the particular advice that would require to be given to those calling in relation to the fire? A. I just informed the team that fire survival guidance, you know, will be the advice that will be given out, yes. Q. We know from your statement that Kent had access to images from the helicam. Was the helicam footage
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it is a 25-pump fire with persons reported. Does 01.47 sound about right for the time when you were first contacted by BT? A. It sounds correct, yes. Q. Do you know who it was who then called LFB control from Kent? A. I believe it would've been Paul, who was on the radio. I asked him to be my go-to. As he was on the radio and we were quiet that night, there was no radio traffic at that time, so I asked him to be our liaison. Q. That's Paul Stables A. Yes. Q who we referred to earlier? A. Yes, yes. Q. At that time, were you made aware that it was a 25-pump fire? A. I can't remember. Q. Can you remember whether you were informed as to the number of pumps being escalated during the course of the night?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. Yes. Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not? A. I don't understand the question. Q. You're aware of the principle of compartmentation? A. No. Q. That buildings are designed so that a fire is contained within a particular compartment. A. Okay, yes. Q. Did you have any thoughts about whether that principle held good? A. No. Q. No? A. No. Q. When you looked at the footage that was being broadcast on the television, what crossed your mind as to the particular advice that would require to be given to those calling in relation to the fire? A. I just informed the team that fire survival guidance, you know, will be the advice that will be given out, yes. Q. We know from your statement that Kent had access to images from the helicam. Was the helicam footage available as soon as you were notified of the incident?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	page 50, recording Christine Howson taking a call from Kent explaining that BT have been in contact and asking Control Room Officer Howson for the details of the incident, including the address. CRO Howson explains it is a 25-pump fire with persons reported. Does 01.47 sound about right for the time when you were first contacted by BT? A. It sounds correct, yes. Q. Do you know who it was who then called LFB control from Kent? A. I believe it would've been Paul, who was on the radio. I asked him to be my go-to. As he was on the radio and we were quiet that night, there was no radio traffic at that time, so I asked him to be our liaison. Q. That's Paul Stables A. Yes. Q who we referred to earlier? A. Yes, yes. Q. At that time, were you made aware that it was a 25-pump fire? A. I can't remember. Q. Can you remember whether you were informed as to the number of pumps being escalated during the course of the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. Yes. Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartmentation had been breached or not? A. I don't understand the question. Q. You're aware of the principle of compartmentation? A. No. Q. That buildings are designed so that a fire is contained within a particular compartment. A. Okay, yes. Q. Did you have any thoughts about whether that principle held good? A. No. Q. No? A. No. Q. When you looked at the footage that was being broadcast on the television, what crossed your mind as to the particular advice that would require to be given to those calling in relation to the fire? A. I just informed the team that fire survival guidance, you know, will be the advice that will be given out, yes. Q. We know from your statement that Kent had access to images from the helicam. Was the helicam footage

1 A	A. Automatically on our screen you can open up the CCTV.	1	Q. Again, we can go to the Brigade control report if it
2	I always do it when I start a shift as a manager in the	2	helps, but I'll give you some background before I ask
3	control room. That covers the whole of Kent and there	3	you some questions, if that's all right, Ms Martin.
4	is a screen that is a helicam.	4	A. Yes.
5	I don't think it was on at the beginning, but that	5	Q. There was a call taken by a Kent CRO at 02.57 from
6	is something that the police helicopter turn on.	6	a caller in flat 73 on the 10th floor.
7	It's	7	Then we see at 02.59 so roughly 2 minutes
8 (Q. You're dependent upon them?	8	later a record of CRO Gotts at LFB control taking
9 A	A. Yes, they have to switch the switch to turn it on, yes.	9	a call from someone in Kent explaining that they have
10	Q. Does it help having footage from the helicam when giving	10	a caller from flat 73 on the line. CRO Gotts confirms
11	advice and thinking what the appropriate advice is to	11	that the current advice is to leave the building.
12	give to those calling?	12	A. Mm-hm.
13 A	A. Not that night, no.	13	Q. I can take you to that summary if it helps from the
	Q. Why do you say that?	14	Brigade control report, but are you content to rely on
15 A	A. It was on the heat camera, as it were, so the whole	15	the information I've given you?
16	building was obviously glowing, so you couldn't really	16	A. Yes, yes.
17	determine floors and stuff. So it would've made no	17	Q. Okay.
18	difference to the advice we gave.	18	If I can ask you to go to page 4 of your witness
	Q. Does the same drawback apply to the footage you saw	19	statement, and it's really the bottom paragraph, at the
20	being broadcast on the telly?	20	end of the first line. You say this:
	A. Yes.	21	"I had been in touch with London regarding the 'stay
22 (Q. You also say in that paragraph on page 3 that for a few	22	put' policy and we were advised that the policy had been
23	hours you received nothing.	23	withdrawn"
	A. Mm-hm.	24	Do you think this call recorded with CRO Gotts at
25 (Q. Did that surprise you?	25	02.59 was you?
	Page 93		Page 95
	1 49€ 75	 	1 486 73
1 4	A. Yes.	1	A. No.
2 (Q. Did you try and make contact with LFB control to find	2	Q. Who do you think it could've been from Kent making that
3	out what was happening?	3	call?
4	A. No, because I knew that they would be extremely busy.	4	A. It would've been Paul Stables, I believe.
5 (Q. So you just waited	5	Q. Okay.
6 A	A. Yes.	6	Apologies, it's always difficult asking questions
7 (Q and prepared for any calls that may come your way?	7	about timing.
8 A	A. Yes, yes.	8	A. Mm-hm.
9 (Q. Okay.	9	Q. Do you think the timing that we have, 02.57, is about
10	We don't need to go to it unless it would help you,	10	right?
11	but we have a record in the Brigade control report of	11	A. I can't remember.
12	a call from a Kent CRO at 02.18 in which the Kent CRO	12	Q. Roughly an hour after the first notification from BT?
13	asked LFB control for the reference of the incident.	13	A. About that, I can't remember, sorry.
14	Could you help us, why would the incident number be	14	Q. Can you remember Paul feeding back this information to
15	required by Kent?	15	you?
16 A	A. Because we will make an incident our end, if we took any	16	A. Yes.
17	calls, and it's just for reference, cross-referencing.	17	Q. Yes?
18	If we needed to ring London at a later date, we have	18	A. Yes.
19	their incident number.	19	Q. Was that the first time you had been made aware that LFB
20	Q. The next topic I'd like to discuss with you is the	20	control were telling people to leave rather than stay
21	change in stay-put advice that happened on the night.	21	put?
	A. Mm-hm.	22	A. Yes. I asked Paul to contact LFB to see if the stay-put
22 A		23	policy was still in place and what information they were
23 (Q. I think probably by the time you took your first call at	1	Parties, was seen as Provention where the provention and the provention are provention are provention and the provention are provention are provention are provention and the provention are provention are provention are provention are provention and the provention are provention are provention are provention and the provention are pro
23 24	03.22, the advice had already changed.	24	giving their callers so that we, you know, carried on
23 24		1	
23 (24	03.22, the advice had already changed.	24	giving their callers so that we, you know, carried on

1	Q. What prompted you to make that call? Was it looking at	1	A. I could hear what he was saying. We don't monitor him
2	the TV footage?	2	as a crew manager, so I couldn't hear what she was
3	A. No, just the other call that was coming into our control	3	saying back, but I could hear the conversation he was
4	room was a lengthy call, so I asked Paul just to double	4	having.
5	check with London if they had changed any of their	5	Q. Can you remember what advice he gave, if any, about
6	policies, just so that it was consistent between all	6	staying put or leaving?
7	control rooms.	7	A. I can't remember.
8	Q. Once the information had come back from CRO Gotts,	8	Q. Okay.
9	presumably you notified the rest of the Kent team of the	9	Obviously the call with CRO Gotts was at 02.59, and
10	change in advice?	10	that would be 2 minutes after Mr Samson gets on the line
11	A. Yes. It was just the four of us in there and I did let	11	to flat 73.
12	them know, yes.	12	Can you remember whether, after you'd received the
13	Q. Can you remember again, apologies, it's difficult	13	call from CRO Gotts, you told Mr Samson to phone flat 73
14	with this passing of time the words you used or the	14	back?
15	gist of the words you used in communicating the change	15	A. He was already on the phone to them, I believe.
16	of advice to your team?	16	Q. So did you hear him change the advice he gave to the
17	A. There's only four of us in the room, it's not a large	17	caller?
18	room, so I just said to them all: "Just to let you know,	18	A. I heard him say to them if they can get out, and I know
19	you know, the stay-put policy is no more." So	19	they did try a few times to get out, but they couldn't.
20	Q. They were to get out?	20	Q. Would it be possible to bring up the control report
21	A. Well, I said, "If you do receive any calls, you know,	21	itself, which is LFB00004790, at page 110.
22	see if they can get out", yes.	22	You'll see there in respect of the call at 02.57.32
23	Q. Okay.	23	there's a chunk of text.
24	Can you remember any later discussions with LFB	24	A. Mm-hm.
25	control about what advice to give to callers?	25	Q. Might I ask you just to briefly read that to yourself
23	control about what advice to give to cancis:	23	Q. Might Lask you just to offerly fedd that to yourself
	Page 97		Page 99
		1	
1	A I can't remember	1	just so that you're familiar with what it says and then
1 2	A. I can't remember. O. Did you have any information at this stage regarding.	1 2	just so that you're familiar with what it says and then
2	Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding	2	I'll ask you a few questions about it.
2 3	Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the	2 3	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause)
2 3 4	Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies?	2 3 4	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says:
2 3 4 5	Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies?A. No.	2 3 4 5	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent
2 3 4 5 6	Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies?A. No.Q. No?	2 3 4 5 6	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they
2 3 4 5 6 7	 Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies? A. No. Q. No? A. Not that I can remember. 	2 3 4 5 6 7	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they are being told to evacuate. The CRO says that if it
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies? A. No. Q. No? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Ms Martin, I'd now like to turn to certain calls that 	2 3 4 5 6	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they are being told to evacuate. The CRO says that if it safe to evacuate then they should but the caller says it
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies? A. No. Q. No? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Ms Martin, I'd now like to turn to certain calls that were received by Kent on the night, if that's okay. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they are being told to evacuate. The CRO says that if it safe to evacuate then they should but the caller says it isn't safe."
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies? A. No. Q. No? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Ms Martin, I'd now like to turn to certain calls that were received by Kent on the night, if that's okay. A. Yes. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they are being told to evacuate. The CRO says that if it safe to evacuate then they should but the caller says it isn't safe." By that stage, how do you assess whether you should
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies? A. No. Q. No? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Ms Martin, I'd now like to turn to certain calls that were received by Kent on the night, if that's okay. A. Yes. Q. Again, if at any stage you want a break, please just say 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they are being told to evacuate. The CRO says that if it safe to evacuate then they should but the caller says it isn't safe." By that stage, how do you assess whether you should just say directly to the caller "You need to get out"?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies? A. No. Q. No? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Ms Martin, I'd now like to turn to certain calls that were received by Kent on the night, if that's okay. A. Yes. Q. Again, if at any stage you want a break, please just say so. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they are being told to evacuate. The CRO says that if it safe to evacuate then they should but the caller says it isn't safe." By that stage, how do you assess whether you should just say directly to the caller "You need to get out"? How do you assess whether to make that decision or not?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies? A. No. Q. No? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Ms Martin, I'd now like to turn to certain calls that were received by Kent on the night, if that's okay. A. Yes. Q. Again, if at any stage you want a break, please just say so. A. Yes, that's fine. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they are being told to evacuate. The CRO says that if it safe to evacuate then they should but the caller says it isn't safe." By that stage, how do you assess whether you should just say directly to the caller "You need to get out"? How do you assess whether to make that decision or not? A. It all depends, you know, what's happening outside their
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies? A. No. Q. No? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Ms Martin, I'd now like to turn to certain calls that were received by Kent on the night, if that's okay. A. Yes. Q. Again, if at any stage you want a break, please just say so. A. Yes, that's fine. Q. The first call I'd like to discuss with you is in 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they are being told to evacuate. The CRO says that if it safe to evacuate then they should but the caller says it isn't safe." By that stage, how do you assess whether you should just say directly to the caller "You need to get out"? How do you assess whether to make that decision or not? A. It all depends, you know, what's happening outside their door. If smoke is coming in, if the back of the door
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies? A. No. Q. No? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Ms Martin, I'd now like to turn to certain calls that were received by Kent on the night, if that's okay. A. Yes. Q. Again, if at any stage you want a break, please just say so. A. Yes, that's fine. Q. The first call I'd like to discuss with you is in respect of flat 73. That was a flat on the 10th floor 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they are being told to evacuate. The CRO says that if it safe to evacuate then they should but the caller says it isn't safe." By that stage, how do you assess whether you should just say directly to the caller "You need to get out"? How do you assess whether to make that decision or not? A. It all depends, you know, what's happening outside their door. If smoke is coming in, if the back of the door feels hot you're determined by what the caller tells
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies? A. No. Q. No? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Ms Martin, I'd now like to turn to certain calls that were received by Kent on the night, if that's okay. A. Yes. Q. Again, if at any stage you want a break, please just say so. A. Yes, that's fine. Q. The first call I'd like to discuss with you is in respect of flat 73. That was a flat on the 10th floor and the caller was a lady called Ann Chance. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they are being told to evacuate. The CRO says that if it safe to evacuate then they should but the caller says it isn't safe." By that stage, how do you assess whether you should just say directly to the caller "You need to get out"? How do you assess whether to make that decision or not? A. It all depends, you know, what's happening outside their door. If smoke is coming in, if the back of the door feels hot you're determined by what the caller tells you, so
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies? A. No. Q. No? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Ms Martin, I'd now like to turn to certain calls that were received by Kent on the night, if that's okay. A. Yes. Q. Again, if at any stage you want a break, please just say so. A. Yes, that's fine. Q. The first call I'd like to discuss with you is in respect of flat 73. That was a flat on the 10th floor and the caller was a lady called Ann Chance. A. Mm-hm. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they are being told to evacuate. The CRO says that if it safe to evacuate then they should but the caller says it isn't safe." By that stage, how do you assess whether you should just say directly to the caller "You need to get out"? How do you assess whether to make that decision or not? A. It all depends, you know, what's happening outside their door. If smoke is coming in, if the back of the door feels hot you're determined by what the caller tells you, so Q. Can you remember whether you pressed Mr Samson to give
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies? A. No. Q. No? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Ms Martin, I'd now like to turn to certain calls that were received by Kent on the night, if that's okay. A. Yes. Q. Again, if at any stage you want a break, please just say so. A. Yes, that's fine. Q. The first call I'd like to discuss with you is in respect of flat 73. That was a flat on the 10th floor and the caller was a lady called Ann Chance. A. Mm-hm. Q. Going back to the call from the Kent CRO at 02.57, which 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they are being told to evacuate. The CRO says that if it safe to evacuate then they should but the caller says it isn't safe." By that stage, how do you assess whether you should just say directly to the caller "You need to get out"? How do you assess whether to make that decision or not? A. It all depends, you know, what's happening outside their door. If smoke is coming in, if the back of the door feels hot you're determined by what the caller tells you, so Q. Can you remember whether you pressed Mr Samson to give advice to the caller to get out, to be more explicit?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies? A. No. Q. No? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Ms Martin, I'd now like to turn to certain calls that were received by Kent on the night, if that's okay. A. Yes. Q. Again, if at any stage you want a break, please just say so. A. Yes, that's fine. Q. The first call I'd like to discuss with you is in respect of flat 73. That was a flat on the 10th floor and the caller was a lady called Ann Chance. A. Mm-hm. Q. Going back to the call from the Kent CRO at 02.57, which I think we think is Paul Stables, Mitch Samson in his 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they are being told to evacuate. The CRO says that if it safe to evacuate then they should but the caller says it isn't safe." By that stage, how do you assess whether you should just say directly to the caller "You need to get out"? How do you assess whether to make that decision or not? A. It all depends, you know, what's happening outside their door. If smoke is coming in, if the back of the door feels hot you're determined by what the caller tells you, so Q. Can you remember whether you pressed Mr Samson to give advice to the caller to get out, to be more explicit? A. I informed him the policy had changed for London Fire
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies? A. No. Q. No? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Ms Martin, I'd now like to turn to certain calls that were received by Kent on the night, if that's okay. A. Yes. Q. Again, if at any stage you want a break, please just say so. A. Yes, that's fine. Q. The first call I'd like to discuss with you is in respect of flat 73. That was a flat on the 10th floor and the caller was a lady called Ann Chance. A. Mm-hm. Q. Going back to the call from the Kent CRO at 02.57, which I think we think is Paul Stables, Mitch Samson in his witness statement says he took a call in relation to 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they are being told to evacuate. The CRO says that if it safe to evacuate then they should but the caller says it isn't safe." By that stage, how do you assess whether you should just say directly to the caller "You need to get out"? How do you assess whether to make that decision or not? A. It all depends, you know, what's happening outside their door. If smoke is coming in, if the back of the door feels hot you're determined by what the caller tells you, so Q. Can you remember whether you pressed Mr Samson to give advice to the caller to get out, to be more explicit? A. I informed him the policy had changed for London Fire Brigade and I left him to deal with the call.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies? A. No. Q. No? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Ms Martin, I'd now like to turn to certain calls that were received by Kent on the night, if that's okay. A. Yes. Q. Again, if at any stage you want a break, please just say so. A. Yes, that's fine. Q. The first call I'd like to discuss with you is in respect of flat 73. That was a flat on the 10th floor and the caller was a lady called Ann Chance. A. Mm-hm. Q. Going back to the call from the Kent CRO at 02.57, which I think we think is Paul Stables, Mitch Samson in his witness statement says he took a call in relation to flat 73. Do you remember Mitch taking that call? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they are being told to evacuate. The CRO says that if it safe to evacuate then they should but the caller says it isn't safe." By that stage, how do you assess whether you should just say directly to the caller "You need to get out"? How do you assess whether to make that decision or not? A. It all depends, you know, what's happening outside their door. If smoke is coming in, if the back of the door feels hot you're determined by what the caller tells you, so Q. Can you remember whether you pressed Mr Samson to give advice to the caller to get out, to be more explicit? A. I informed him the policy had changed for London Fire Brigade and I left him to deal with the call. Q. Do you know what feedback Mr Samson gave to London about
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies? A. No. Q. No? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Ms Martin, I'd now like to turn to certain calls that were received by Kent on the night, if that's okay. A. Yes. Q. Again, if at any stage you want a break, please just say so. A. Yes, that's fine. Q. The first call I'd like to discuss with you is in respect of flat 73. That was a flat on the 10th floor and the caller was a lady called Ann Chance. A. Mm-hm. Q. Going back to the call from the Kent CRO at 02.57, which I think we think is Paul Stables, Mitch Samson in his witness statement says he took a call in relation to flat 73. Do you remember Mitch taking that call? A. Yes. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they are being told to evacuate. The CRO says that if it safe to evacuate then they should but the caller says it isn't safe." By that stage, how do you assess whether you should just say directly to the caller "You need to get out"? How do you assess whether to make that decision or not? A. It all depends, you know, what's happening outside their door. If smoke is coming in, if the back of the door feels hot you're determined by what the caller tells you, so Q. Can you remember whether you pressed Mr Samson to give advice to the caller to get out, to be more explicit? A. I informed him the policy had changed for London Fire Brigade and I left him to deal with the call. Q. Do you know what feedback Mr Samson gave to London about what had been reported to him by the caller?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies? A. No. Q. No? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Ms Martin, I'd now like to turn to certain calls that were received by Kent on the night, if that's okay. A. Yes. Q. Again, if at any stage you want a break, please just say so. A. Yes, that's fine. Q. The first call I'd like to discuss with you is in respect of flat 73. That was a flat on the 10th floor and the caller was a lady called Ann Chance. A. Mm-hm. Q. Going back to the call from the Kent CRO at 02.57, which I think we think is Paul Stables, Mitch Samson in his witness statement says he took a call in relation to flat 73. Do you remember Mitch taking that call? A. Yes. Q. How close to Mitch were you when he took that call? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they are being told to evacuate. The CRO says that if it safe to evacuate then they should but the caller says it isn't safe." By that stage, how do you assess whether you should just say directly to the caller "You need to get out"? How do you assess whether to make that decision or not? A. It all depends, you know, what's happening outside their door. If smoke is coming in, if the back of the door feels hot you're determined by what the caller tells you, so Q. Can you remember whether you pressed Mr Samson to give advice to the caller to get out, to be more explicit? A. I informed him the policy had changed for London Fire Brigade and I left him to deal with the call. Q. Do you know what feedback Mr Samson gave to London about what had been reported to him by the caller? A. All of the information was put on an incident log. That
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies? A. No. Q. No? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Ms Martin, I'd now like to turn to certain calls that were received by Kent on the night, if that's okay. A. Yes. Q. Again, if at any stage you want a break, please just say so. A. Yes, that's fine. Q. The first call I'd like to discuss with you is in respect of flat 73. That was a flat on the 10th floor and the caller was a lady called Ann Chance. A. Mm-hm. Q. Going back to the call from the Kent CRO at 02.57, which I think we think is Paul Stables, Mitch Samson in his witness statement says he took a call in relation to flat 73. Do you remember Mitch taking that call? A. Yes. Q. How close to Mitch were you when he took that call? A. He sits next to me. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they are being told to evacuate. The CRO says that if it safe to evacuate then they should but the caller says it isn't safe." By that stage, how do you assess whether you should just say directly to the caller "You need to get out"? How do you assess whether to make that decision or not? A. It all depends, you know, what's happening outside their door. If smoke is coming in, if the back of the door feels hot you're determined by what the caller tells you, so Q. Can you remember whether you pressed Mr Samson to give advice to the caller to get out, to be more explicit? A. I informed him the policy had changed for London Fire Brigade and I left him to deal with the call. Q. Do you know what feedback Mr Samson gave to London about what had been reported to him by the caller? A. All of the information was put on an incident log. That incident log was then Paul Stables, as I asked him to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies? A. No. Q. No? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Ms Martin, I'd now like to turn to certain calls that were received by Kent on the night, if that's okay. A. Yes. Q. Again, if at any stage you want a break, please just say so. A. Yes, that's fine. Q. The first call I'd like to discuss with you is in respect of flat 73. That was a flat on the 10th floor and the caller was a lady called Ann Chance. A. Mm-hm. Q. Going back to the call from the Kent CRO at 02.57, which I think we think is Paul Stables, Mitch Samson in his witness statement says he took a call in relation to flat 73. Do you remember Mitch taking that call? A. Yes. Q. How close to Mitch were you when he took that call? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they are being told to evacuate. The CRO says that if it safe to evacuate then they should but the caller says it isn't safe." By that stage, how do you assess whether you should just say directly to the caller "You need to get out"? How do you assess whether to make that decision or not? A. It all depends, you know, what's happening outside their door. If smoke is coming in, if the back of the door feels hot you're determined by what the caller tells you, so Q. Can you remember whether you pressed Mr Samson to give advice to the caller to get out, to be more explicit? A. I informed him the policy had changed for London Fire Brigade and I left him to deal with the call. Q. Do you know what feedback Mr Samson gave to London about what had been reported to him by the caller? A. All of the information was put on an incident log. That
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. Did you have any information at this stage regarding conditions within the tower, particularly on the stairwells and on lobbies? A. No. Q. No? A. Not that I can remember. Q. Ms Martin, I'd now like to turn to certain calls that were received by Kent on the night, if that's okay. A. Yes. Q. Again, if at any stage you want a break, please just say so. A. Yes, that's fine. Q. The first call I'd like to discuss with you is in respect of flat 73. That was a flat on the 10th floor and the caller was a lady called Ann Chance. A. Mm-hm. Q. Going back to the call from the Kent CRO at 02.57, which I think we think is Paul Stables, Mitch Samson in his witness statement says he took a call in relation to flat 73. Do you remember Mitch taking that call? A. Yes. Q. How close to Mitch were you when he took that call? A. He sits next to me. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	I'll ask you a few questions about it. (Pause) You'll see roughly 11 lines down, the text says: "The caller says that she is confused because Kent FRS is telling them to stay and on the other line they are being told to evacuate. The CRO says that if it safe to evacuate then they should but the caller says it isn't safe." By that stage, how do you assess whether you should just say directly to the caller "You need to get out"? How do you assess whether to make that decision or not? A. It all depends, you know, what's happening outside their door. If smoke is coming in, if the back of the door feels hot you're determined by what the caller tells you, so Q. Can you remember whether you pressed Mr Samson to give advice to the caller to get out, to be more explicit? A. I informed him the policy had changed for London Fire Brigade and I left him to deal with the call. Q. Do you know what feedback Mr Samson gave to London about what had been reported to him by the caller? A. All of the information was put on an incident log. That incident log was then Paul Stables, as I asked him to

			_
1	London to update them on the information.	1	"OPERATOR: Okay, we're gonna give him the best
2	Q. I suppose my question was more directed to the substance	2	advice that we can that we've been given from London
3	of what Mr Samson may have told London. Can you	3	Fire, okay, so I'll give him a call."
4	remember what he said? Were you next to him when he	4	In your witness statement on page 4 we can go to
5	updated London?	5	it if we need to you say:
6	A. I can't remember	6	"I advised what I normally would for Fire Survival
7	Q. Okay.	7	Guidance but also assured her that I would personally
8	A what he said.	8	phone him as well."
9	Q. The next call I'd like to discuss with you is in	9	At that stage, was there a reason why you didn't
10	relation to flat 194, which is on the 22nd floor, and	10	tell her that the advice had changed to get out
11	the resident was a man called Mr Anthony Disson.	11	effectively?
12	A. Yes.	12	A. No.
13	Q. As I understand it, you took the call in relation to	13	Q. Can you give us a reason why you wouldn't have said that
14	Mr Disson from his daughter-in-law; is that right?	14	to her?
15	A. Yes, it was his wife.	15	A. Obviously she's going to be in shock, so I just didn't
16	Q. His wife?	16	want to share that advice with her. That's why I said
17	A. Yes.	17	I would call him myself and give the advice.
18	Q. The first of these calls is at 03.22.51.	18	Q. Would there be something to be said you've got to
19	A. Mm-hm.	19	balance a number of considerations. On the one hand,
20	Q. If I could ask for us to go to page 129 in the control	20	you don't want to cause unnecessary distress to the
21	report.	21	caller.
22	If I could just ask you to refresh your memory	22	A. Mm-hm.
23	before I ask you questions.	23	Q. But equally you know that the resident is calling his
24	(Pause)	24	wife, who is calling you.
25	And if you can go on to the next page, please.	25	Is there something to be said for telling her that
	Page 101		Page 103
1	(Pause)	1	the advice has changed in case the resident contacts his
2	We have the wife of the resident calling you from	2	wife again, so he knows the advice that is being given
3	Kent, where she was on holiday. The call was put	3	by the LFB to get out?
4	through to you via an operator in Dundee.	4	A. I didn't think about it, to be honest.
5	Do you know why the call came via Dundee, of all	5	Q. Could I now turn to the second call you received in
6	places? It just did?	6	relation to this flat.
7	A. Yeah, it's just where the BT operators are based.	7	If I could ask Ralph to go back to the control
8	Q. If Ralph could put down the control report and put up	8	report, so LFB00004790, and if I could ask you to go to
9	the transcript of the call, which can be found at	9	page 136 within that document.
10	LFB00000659, and if I could ask you to turn to page 2.	10	We see it's 03.31.23, at the top of that page.
11	If I could ask you just to have a quick read of that	11	It says:
12	page before I ask you questions.	12	"Kent FRS make a call to a resident believed to be
13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can you see it clearly enough?	13	Anthony Disson who explains that he say is[sic] on the
14	A. Yes, thank you.	14	stairs. The Kent CRO asks if he knows what floor he is
15	(Pause)	15	on and the line goes dead."
16	MR KINNIER: If we could turn over the page to page 3, just	16	If I could ask you, Ralph let's go to the
17	so you can familiarise yourself with it.	17	transcript. That's at LFB00000660.
18	(Pause)	18	If I could ask you just to read to yourself the
19	As we've seen, at the bottom third of page 2 of the	19	first page of that.
20	transcript the caller says:	20	(Pause)
21	"CALLER: First of all the fire brigade kept	21	You'll see roughly the third entry from the bottom:
22	saying to him, 'Stay put, stay put' now no one ain't	22	"OPERATOR: are your doors closed?"
23	going to him. He's been in trapped in there for over an	23	A. Mm-hm.
24	hour."	24	Q. At that stage in the conversation, you appear to have
25	On page 3, you say:	25	thought he was still within the flat.
		1	
	Page 102		Page 104

1	Was that simply you assumed he was still in the flat	1	I'll just let you refresh your memory, Ms Martin.
2	because he hadn't told you otherwise at that stage?	2	(Pause)
3	A. Yeah.	3	A. Yes.
4	Q. Do you remember why you were asking whether the doors	4	Q. Looking at page 2, it seems that you explained to her
5	were closed or not?	5	that you tried to call Mr Disson back; is that a fair
6	A. As fire survival, you know, you always make sure the	6	summary?
7	door is closed to the fire. Yes.	7	A. Yes.
8	Q. Do you remember once you'd finished the call with the	8	Q. Is it standard practice in Kent control to try to call
9	gentleman calling back London to give them an update as	9	someone back where the line goes dead?
10	to what his position was?	10	A. In that case, yes.
11	A. I wouldn't have called back but	11	Q. In your view, would it be practicable to call someone
12	Q. Paul would've done?	12	back if things had changed since you last spoke to them,
13	-	13	for example if advice as to whether to leave
13	A Paul would've done, yes.	14	
	Q. So we get an understanding of the information that's	15	A. It depends on the number of calls you were getting, you
15	being reported back, can you remember the best you can		know, if you could start to call people back.
16	what you told Paul to report back to London?	16	Q. Okay.
17	A. No, I can't remember. It would've been confirming the	17	The penultimate topic I'd like to discuss with you,
18	flat number and the floor, definitely, and maybe where	18	and that's the question of door-closers.
19	his location was, but I can't fully remember.	19	Were you ever made aware during the course of the
20	Q. The fact that he was on the stairs was obviously quite	20	night that there was an issue in the building concerning
21	a vital bit of information. Can you remember don't	21	malfunctioning of self-closing front flat entrance
22	speculate if you can't	22	doors?
23	A. No, I can't remember.	23	A. No.
24	Q whether you identified the stairs or not?	24	Q. If you had been aware of any issue regarding
25	A. I can't remember.	25	door-closers to the flat entrance doors, would that have
	Page 105		Page 107
	1 480 103		Tage 107
1	MR KINNIER: Sir, there's one third and final call that it	1	affected the advice you gave to callers coming through
2	MR KINNIER: Sir, there's one third and final call that it may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's	2	affected the advice you gave to callers coming through to Kent?
2	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's	2	to Kent?
2 3	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the	2 3	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors?
2 3 4	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness.	2 3 4	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance.
2 3 4 5	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes.	2 3 4 5	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in
2 3 4 5 6	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, how long do you	2 3 4 5 6	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door, you know.
2 3 4 5 6 7	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, how long do you think you may need to be with Ms Martin?	2 3 4 5 6 7	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door, you know. Q. The final question I'd like to ask it may be that you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, how long do you think you may need to be with Ms Martin? MR KINNIER: To finish my questions, no more than	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door, you know. Q. The final question I'd like to ask — it may be that you can't assist us on this, but you're here, so we take the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, how long do you think you may need to be with Ms Martin? MR KINNIER: To finish my questions, no more than 10 minutes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door, you know. Q. The final question I'd like to ask it may be that you can't assist us on this, but you're here, so we take the advantage.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, how long do you think you may need to be with Ms Martin? MR KINNIER: To finish my questions, no more than 10 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I imagine you would prefer to finish	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door, you know. Q. The final question I'd like to ask it may be that you can't assist us on this, but you're here, so we take the advantage. A. Okay.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, how long do you think you may need to be with Ms Martin? MR KINNIER: To finish my questions, no more than 10 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I imagine you would prefer to finish your evidence before lunch if we can manage it.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door, you know. Q. The final question I'd like to ask it may be that you can't assist us on this, but you're here, so we take the advantage. A. Okay. Q. Would it have been part of your job to have considered
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, how long do you think you may need to be with Ms Martin? MR KINNIER: To finish my questions, no more than 10 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I imagine you would prefer to finish your evidence before lunch if we can manage it. THE WITNESS: If possible, yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door, you know. Q. The final question I'd like to ask — it may be that you can't assist us on this, but you're here, so we take the advantage. A. Okay. Q. Would it have been part of your job to have considered what resources Kent Fire and Rescue Services could've
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, how long do you think you may need to be with Ms Martin? MR KINNIER: To finish my questions, no more than 10 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I imagine you would prefer to finish your evidence before lunch if we can manage it. THE WITNESS: If possible, yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: On you go, Mr Kinnier.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door, you know. Q. The final question I'd like to ask — it may be that you can't assist us on this, but you're here, so we take the advantage. A. Okay. Q. Would it have been part of your job to have considered what resources Kent Fire and Rescue Services could've offered to London to assist?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, how long do you think you may need to be with Ms Martin? MR KINNIER: To finish my questions, no more than 10 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I imagine you would prefer to finish your evidence before lunch if we can manage it. THE WITNESS: If possible, yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: On you go, Mr Kinnier. MR KINNIER: Again, if you want a break, please shout.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door, you know. Q. The final question I'd like to ask it may be that you can't assist us on this, but you're here, so we take the advantage. A. Okay. Q. Would it have been part of your job to have considered what resources Kent Fire and Rescue Services could've offered to London to assist? A. No to offer? They were obviously extremely busy, so
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, how long do you think you may need to be with Ms Martin? MR KINNIER: To finish my questions, no more than 10 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I imagine you would prefer to finish your evidence before lunch if we can manage it. THE WITNESS: If possible, yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: On you go, Mr Kinnier. MR KINNIER: Again, if you want a break, please shout. A. No, that's fine, thank you.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door, you know. Q. The final question I'd like to ask it may be that you can't assist us on this, but you're here, so we take the advantage. A. Okay. Q. Would it have been part of your job to have considered what resources Kent Fire and Rescue Services could've offered to London to assist? A. No to offer? They were obviously extremely busy, so that's not a conversation we would have had. If they
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, how long do you think you may need to be with Ms Martin? MR KINNIER: To finish my questions, no more than 10 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I imagine you would prefer to finish your evidence before lunch if we can manage it. THE WITNESS: If possible, yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: On you go, Mr Kinnier. MR KINNIER: Again, if you want a break, please shout. A. No, that's fine, thank you. Q. If we can go to the third call, which I think is with	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door, you know. Q. The final question I'd like to ask it may be that you can't assist us on this, but you're here, so we take the advantage. A. Okay. Q. Would it have been part of your job to have considered what resources Kent Fire and Rescue Services could've offered to London to assist? A. No to offer? They were obviously extremely busy, so that's not a conversation we would have had. If they called us for assistance with appliances, then yes, we
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, how long do you think you may need to be with Ms Martin? MR KINNIER: To finish my questions, no more than 10 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I imagine you would prefer to finish your evidence before lunch if we can manage it. THE WITNESS: If possible, yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: On you go, Mr Kinnier. MR KINNIER: Again, if you want a break, please shout. A. No, that's fine, thank you. Q. If we can go to the third call, which I think is with Mr Disson's wife, that was at 03.46.42.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door, you know. Q. The final question I'd like to ask it may be that you can't assist us on this, but you're here, so we take the advantage. A. Okay. Q. Would it have been part of your job to have considered what resources Kent Fire and Rescue Services could've offered to London to assist? A. No to offer? They were obviously extremely busy, so that's not a conversation we would have had. If they called us for assistance with appliances, then yes, we would've offered them to them. But as it stands, the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, how long do you think you may need to be with Ms Martin? MR KINNIER: To finish my questions, no more than 10 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I imagine you would prefer to finish your evidence before lunch if we can manage it. THE WITNESS: If possible, yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: On you go, Mr Kinnier. MR KINNIER: Again, if you want a break, please shout. A. No, that's fine, thank you. Q. If we can go to the third call, which I think is with Mr Disson's wife, that was at 03.46.42. Ralph, would you mind putting up on the screen the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door, you know. Q. The final question I'd like to ask — it may be that you can't assist us on this, but you're here, so we take the advantage. A. Okay. Q. Would it have been part of your job to have considered what resources Kent Fire and Rescue Services could've offered to London to assist? A. No — to offer? They were obviously extremely busy, so that's not a conversation we would have had. If they called us for assistance with appliances, then yes, we would've offered them to them. But as it stands, the people in charge of their control room know that we have
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, how long do you think you may need to be with Ms Martin? MR KINNIER: To finish my questions, no more than 10 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I imagine you would prefer to finish your evidence before lunch if we can manage it. THE WITNESS: If possible, yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: On you go, Mr Kinnier. MR KINNIER: Again, if you want a break, please shout. A. No, that's fine, thank you. Q. If we can go to the third call, which I think is with Mr Disson's wife, that was at 03.46.42. Ralph, would you mind putting up on the screen the control report, LFB00004790 at page 139.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door, you know. Q. The final question I'd like to ask — it may be that you can't assist us on this, but you're here, so we take the advantage. A. Okay. Q. Would it have been part of your job to have considered what resources Kent Fire and Rescue Services could've offered to London to assist? A. No — to offer? They were obviously extremely busy, so that's not a conversation we would have had. If they called us for assistance with appliances, then yes, we would've offered them to them. But as it stands, the people in charge of their control room know that we have resources they can use if they need to, so we'll just
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, how long do you think you may need to be with Ms Martin? MR KINNIER: To finish my questions, no more than 10 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I imagine you would prefer to finish your evidence before lunch if we can manage it. THE WITNESS: If possible, yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: On you go, Mr Kinnier. MR KINNIER: Again, if you want a break, please shout. A. No, that's fine, thank you. Q. If we can go to the third call, which I think is with Mr Disson's wife, that was at 03.46.42. Ralph, would you mind putting up on the screen the control report, LFB00004790 at page 139. We see 03.46.42, so roughly the middle of the way	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door, you know. Q. The final question I'd like to ask it may be that you can't assist us on this, but you're here, so we take the advantage. A. Okay. Q. Would it have been part of your job to have considered what resources Kent Fire and Rescue Services could've offered to London to assist? A. No to offer? They were obviously extremely busy, so that's not a conversation we would have had. If they called us for assistance with appliances, then yes, we would've offered them to them. But as it stands, the people in charge of their control room know that we have resources they can use if they need to, so we'll just wait until
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, how long do you think you may need to be with Ms Martin? MR KINNIER: To finish my questions, no more than 10 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I imagine you would prefer to finish your evidence before lunch if we can manage it. THE WITNESS: If possible, yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: On you go, Mr Kinnier. MR KINNIER: Again, if you want a break, please shout. A. No, that's fine, thank you. Q. If we can go to the third call, which I think is with Mr Disson's wife, that was at 03.46.42. Ralph, would you mind putting up on the screen the control report, LFB00004790 at page 139. We see 03.46.42, so roughly the middle of the way down the page. I'll just let you refresh your memory of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door, you know. Q. The final question I'd like to ask it may be that you can't assist us on this, but you're here, so we take the advantage. A. Okay. Q. Would it have been part of your job to have considered what resources Kent Fire and Rescue Services could've offered to London to assist? A. No to offer? They were obviously extremely busy, so that's not a conversation we would have had. If they called us for assistance with appliances, then yes, we would've offered them to them. But as it stands, the people in charge of their control room know that we have resources they can use if they need to, so we'll just wait until Q. If a request had come from London, would you then
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, how long do you think you may need to be with Ms Martin? MR KINNIER: To finish my questions, no more than 10 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I imagine you would prefer to finish your evidence before lunch if we can manage it. THE WITNESS: If possible, yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: On you go, Mr Kinnier. MR KINNIER: Again, if you want a break, please shout. A. No, that's fine, thank you. Q. If we can go to the third call, which I think is with Mr Disson's wife, that was at 03.46.42. Ralph, would you mind putting up on the screen the control report, LFB00004790 at page 139. We see 03.46.42, so roughly the middle of the way down the page. I'll just let you refresh your memory of that.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door, you know. Q. The final question I'd like to ask it may be that you can't assist us on this, but you're here, so we take the advantage. A. Okay. Q. Would it have been part of your job to have considered what resources Kent Fire and Rescue Services could've offered to London to assist? A. No to offer? They were obviously extremely busy, so that's not a conversation we would have had. If they called us for assistance with appliances, then yes, we would've offered them to them. But as it stands, the people in charge of their control room know that we have resources they can use if they need to, so we'll just wait until Q. If a request had come from London, would you then communicate that request, say, to your duty manager
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, how long do you think you may need to be with Ms Martin? MR KINNIER: To finish my questions, no more than 10 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I imagine you would prefer to finish your evidence before lunch if we can manage it. THE WITNESS: If possible, yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: On you go, Mr Kinnier. MR KINNIER: Again, if you want a break, please shout. A. No, that's fine, thank you. Q. If we can go to the third call, which I think is with Mr Disson's wife, that was at 03.46.42. Ralph, would you mind putting up on the screen the control report, LFB00004790 at page 139. We see 03.46.42, so roughly the middle of the way down the page. I'll just let you refresh your memory of that. (Pause)	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door, you know. Q. The final question I'd like to ask it may be that you can't assist us on this, but you're here, so we take the advantage. A. Okay. Q. Would it have been part of your job to have considered what resources Kent Fire and Rescue Services could've offered to London to assist? A. No to offer? They were obviously extremely busy, so that's not a conversation we would have had. If they called us for assistance with appliances, then yes, we would've offered them to them. But as it stands, the people in charge of their control room know that we have resources they can use if they need to, so we'll just wait until Q. If a request had come from London, would you then communicate that request, say, to your duty manager
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, how long do you think you may need to be with Ms Martin? MR KINNIER: To finish my questions, no more than 10 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I imagine you would prefer to finish your evidence before lunch if we can manage it. THE WITNESS: If possible, yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: On you go, Mr Kinnier. MR KINNIER: Again, if you want a break, please shout. A. No, that's fine, thank you. Q. If we can go to the third call, which I think is with Mr Disson's wife, that was at 03.46.42. Ralph, would you mind putting up on the screen the control report, LFB00004790 at page 139. We see 03.46.42, so roughly the middle of the way down the page. I'll just let you refresh your memory of that. (Pause) If we can go to the transcript, which is, LFB00000661, and page 2 of that transcript.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door, you know. Q. The final question I'd like to ask it may be that you can't assist us on this, but you're here, so we take the advantage. A. Okay. Q. Would it have been part of your job to have considered what resources Kent Fire and Rescue Services could've offered to London to assist? A. No to offer? They were obviously extremely busy, so that's not a conversation we would have had. If they called us for assistance with appliances, then yes, we would've offered them to them. But as it stands, the people in charge of their control room know that we have resources they can use if they need to, so we'll just wait until Q. If a request had come from London, would you then communicate that request, say, to your duty manager A. Yes. Q who would then refer it up to senior management? A. Yes. Well, if they requested our appliances, we do send
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	may be best to deal with before we adjourn, if that's all right for you, and obviously convenient for the witness. THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, how long do you think you may need to be with Ms Martin? MR KINNIER: To finish my questions, no more than 10 minutes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I imagine you would prefer to finish your evidence before lunch if we can manage it. THE WITNESS: If possible, yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: On you go, Mr Kinnier. MR KINNIER: Again, if you want a break, please shout. A. No, that's fine, thank you. Q. If we can go to the third call, which I think is with Mr Disson's wife, that was at 03.46.42. Ralph, would you mind putting up on the screen the control report, LFB00004790 at page 139. We see 03.46.42, so roughly the middle of the way down the page. I'll just let you refresh your memory of that. (Pause) If we can go to the transcript, which is,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	to Kent? A. In regards to their own domestic front doors? Q. Yes. The flat front entrance. A. It depends what room they're in. If they're in a bedroom, then they can still shut that door, you know. Q. The final question I'd like to ask it may be that you can't assist us on this, but you're here, so we take the advantage. A. Okay. Q. Would it have been part of your job to have considered what resources Kent Fire and Rescue Services could've offered to London to assist? A. No to offer? They were obviously extremely busy, so that's not a conversation we would have had. If they called us for assistance with appliances, then yes, we would've offered them to them. But as it stands, the people in charge of their control room know that we have resources they can use if they need to, so we'll just wait until Q. If a request had come from London, would you then communicate that request, say, to your duty manager A. Yes. Q who would then refer it up to senior management?

1	them straight away.	1	His wife recalls that she was informed by a CRO
2	Q. You have that authority, do you?	2	she can't remember whether Kent or London to stay off
3	A. Yes, yes.	3	the line whilst they were trying to get through.
4	Q. Can you help us finally with this question: what number	4	Can you remember, would you have said that to her?
5	of appliances would you usually deploy to a high-rise	5	A. I can't remember. But if I was trying to call the
6	fire within Kent on your predetermined deployment?	6	husband, I'd have asked her to try not to call him just
7	A. Every building has its own predetermined attendance. So	7	so that we could give the best advice we could.
8	it could change depending on the number of floors.	8	Q. Is that standard practice or is it something you decided
9	Q. But for high-rise buildings, is there a base minimum of	9	was appropriate because of the particular
10	appliances that would be	10	circumstances
11	A. I believe it's four pumps and a height vehicle.	11	A. Because of the circumstances.
12	MR KINNIER: Okay.	12	Q. Okay.
13	Ms Martin, those are all the questions that I have.	13	A. Yes.
14	The custom is that the chairman allows me a break to	14	Q. The final topic is the footage from the helicam.
15	check that I've covered everything.	15	A. Yes.
16	Sir, if you wouldn't mind allowing me 5 minutes.	16	Q. Were you aware that you could see images of individuals
17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It doesn't take very long.	17	and where they were located?
18	If I say 1.10 or sooner if you're ready sooner.	18	A. No.
19	MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.	19	Q. No.
20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We're going to have a break for	20	A. You could just see an outline of the building, because
21	5 minutes. I have to ask you, please, not to talk to	21	it was on the heat camera, so the outline of the
22	anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room.	22	building and you just saw that it was hot, for example.
23	THE WITNESS: Yes, yes. Thank very much.	23	You couldn't see anything else.
24	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you go with the usher, she'll	24	Q. Presumably you would've found it helpful to have had
25	look after you. Thank very much.	25	imagery which identified, first of all, where
	Page 109		Page 111
1	Right, 1.10 or sooner if you're ready sooner.	1	individuals were, or individuals within the building and
2	MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.	2	their location?
3	(1.06 pm)	3	A. Not necessarily. I don't think it would've changed the
4	(A short break)	4	advice or anything that we would've done in Kent, no.
5	(1.10 pm)	5	Q. Were you aware that you could hear the commentary of the
6	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think there are one or two	6	helicopter pilots who
7	questions.	7	A. We don't have any. You can't hear anything from the
8	THE WITNESS: Yes, okay.	8	CCTV.
9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I hope not too many.	9	MR KINNIER: Okay.
10	MR KINNIER: Ms Martin, thanks very much for your time.	10	Ms Martin, those are all my questions. Thank you
11	Just a few more questions.	11	very much for coming along to give evidence today.
12	First of all a question about resourcing of the	12	We're very grateful.
13	control room at Kent.	13	THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.
14	If asked, could you have supplied more operator	14	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I would add my thanks to those of
15	services on the night, for example by calling in	15	Mr Kinnier.
16	off-duty operators?	16	I'm sorry, by the way, if we've kept you waiting all
17	A. We do have that facility, but we didn't have that many	17	morning to give your evidence.
18	calls, so we didn't need to do that.	18	THE WITNESS: No, that's fine.
19	Q. What's the maximum number of people you can call in	19	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm afraid that's how it works,
20	should the need arise?	20	sometimes.
21	A. Well, we have six desks	21	Anyway, it's very helpful to us to hear what was
22	Q. And that defines the number of	22	going on and your contribution to taking calls. Thank
23	A in our control room, yes.	23	you very much for coming to tell us about it, and now
24	Q. Next question is in relation to your calls with	24	you're fee to go.
25	Mr Disson.	25	THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.
		1	
	Page 110		Page 112

		I	
1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.	1	A. Yes, I am.
2	(The witness withdrew)	2	Q. You've worked for Surrey for over 14 years?
3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, that, as they say, Mr Kinnier,	3	A. 13 years and 9 months at the time, I think it was.
4	is probably a convenient point.	4	Q. But now obviously 14 years.
5	MR KINNIER: It is, and when we come back, we'll have Crew	5	A. Oh, 15 years now, yes.
6	Commander Rob Brown.	6	Q. You've been a crew commander since March 2017; is that
7	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Very good.	7	correct?
8	All right, we'll resume at 2.15, please.	8	A. I'm classed as competent crew commander as
9	MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.	9	of March 2017.
10	(1.15 pm)	10	Q. On the night, you were on duty with officer in charge
11	(The short adjournment)	11	Claire Stanbridge; is that right?
12	(2.15 pm)	12	A. Yes.
13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Kinnier.	13	Q. Is she senior to you?
14	MR KINNIER: Sir, may I call Crew Commander Rob Brown.	14	A. Yes.
15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.	15	Q. Just looking at who else was on duty that night,
16	ROB BROWN (affirmed)	16	Caili Anderson?
17	Questions by MR KINNIER	17	A. Yes.
18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Mr Brown.	18	Q. Is it right she's also known as Caili Beckham?
19	Sit down and make yourself comfortable. All right?	19	A. Now she is, yes.
20	Yes, Mr Kinnier.	20	Q. She was a call taker.
21	MR KINNIER: Good afternoon.	21	A. Yes.
22	Would you first confirm your name for the record.	22	Q. There was also Laura Waters, who was also a call taker;
23	A. Robert Edward Brown.	23	is that right?
24	Q. In front of you, you should have a blue folder. Behind	24	A. Yes.
25	the first tab or directly in front of you should be two	25	Q. Was anyone else involved in taking calls from the tower
	Page 113		Page 115
	1 age 113		rage 113
1	witness statements, both dated 29 January [MET00010868	1	on the night?
2	and MET00010786].	2	A. No.
3	A. Yes, there is.	3	Q. You say in your witness statement we don't need to go
4	Q. Behind the blue tab, you should find an exhibit, which	4	to it that part of your role as the crew commander is
5	is notes you made on the night [MET00018263].	5	to be one of the supervisors; is that right?
6	A. Yes.	6	A. That's correct.
7	Q. Have you read those documents recently?	7	Q. On page 3 of your witness statement, it's the second
8	A. Yes, I have.	8	line from the top, you provide further detail of your
9	Q. Do you confirm their contents are true?	9	job, and it's described as:
10	A. Yes.	10	" to monitor and supervise, where necessary, the
11	Q. And you're content for those documents to stand as your	11	calls that come in and ensure that they are handled
12	evidence to this inquiry?	12	appropriately by the call handlers."
13	A. Yes.	13	Can you give us a bit more flavour, how do you
14	Q. Thank you.	14	monitor and supervise the call takers?
15	Mr Brown, thank you very much for attending today.	15	A. So there's a function within the so when a call taker
16	If at any time you want a break, please say so,	16	is taking a call, I have the ability to monitor them
17	that's not a problem.	17	and, where needs be, prompt them if they need assistance
18	If at any time any of my questions are unclear,	18	in gaining the correct address or inputting it correctly
19	please say so and I'll try and make them clear for you.	19	into the system.
20	A. Thank you.	20	Also, that can be to offer guidance on anything,
21	Q. If I can just deal with some background points first of	21	really.
22	all.	22	Q. In relation to the training you yourself received, as
23	You are currently a crew commander at Surrey Fire	23	part of your initial training, which I think was another
24	and Rescue Service based in the control room; is that	24	six-week module training course
25	right?	25	A. Yes.
	D 444		D 447
	Page 114		Page 116

1 Q. -- what training did you have in relation to fires in 1 A. Some buildings within our mobilising system have 2 2 high-rise buildings? associated notes with it. They would say on that note 3 3 that it had a stay-put policy. That doesn't necessarily A. Well, nothing specific with regard to high-rise 4 buildings, but an awareness of the different factors in 4 cover each and every building because that's -- yeah. 5 5 Q. What do you do if you have no notes and the caller comparison to a domestic house or a factory or 6 6 doesn't know whether there is a stay-put policy in a warehouse, those kind of things. 7 7 Q. Did that initial training deal with stay put and the place? How do you advise them? 8 advice you're to give --8 A. So I think it goes back to that original concept, that 9 9 A. The initial six-week training? if the fire, smoke or fumes or whatever, are not 10 Q. Yes. 10 directly affecting the person involved, the person 11 11 A. No. calling the fire service, then the advice would be to 12 Q. In the subsequent professional training you've received 12 not move towards it or move away from it -- well, not to 13 during your time with Surrey, have you received any 13 move -- not to change anything. Yeah. 14 specific training on stay put and the circumstances in 14 So stay put is a policy or kind of theory which 15 which it's appropriate to change the advice? 15 relies on two things: it's the premise that buildings 16 16 can be and should be designed to prevent fire or inhibit 17 Q. Before the fire itself, when was the most recent time 17 the spread of fire, and secondly to stop the person 18 18 you'd received training? involved from potentially leaving a place of relative 19 A. It was very recently before that, because I think it was 19 safety and putting them into a much more dangerous 20 20 from the lessons learned I think from Lakanal House. place. 21 Yeah, so very recently before it. 21 Q. Could you help us: say if someone called you. They live 22 22 Q. Are you able to remember what training you were given on in a high-rise building and there's a fire affecting 23 23 the circumstances in which it's appropriate to change that building. What information do you try and get from 24 advice from stay put to leave? 24 the caller to assist you to decide how best to respond 25 25 and what advice to give? A. Okay, so it would be to stay put unless a fire or smoke Page 117 Page 119 1 or other fumes are directly affecting the person trapped A. So if --1 2 or -- not even trapped, directly affecting the person, 2 Q. Will you ask for their name, first of all? 3 in which case it would be safer, relatively, to attempt 3 A. Not necessarily. 4 4 Q. Will you ask for their address? 5 Q. As part of your ongoing professional training, has that 5 A. Yes. 6 covered fire survival guidance? Q. Will you ask for where their flat is, for example what 6 7 A. Sorry, could you repeat the question? 7 floor it's on of the high-rise building? 8 Q. As part of your continuing professional training, have 8 A. Yes. 9 you received any specific training on fire survival 9 Q. Will you ask them to what extent their flat is affected guidance? 10 10 by fire or heat? 11 A. Yes, that happens on quite a regular basis. 11 12 Q. Could I ask you, how regular is regular? 12 Q. Are there any other details you try and extract from 13 A. Well, we have monthly watch training within our control 13 them during the course of the call? 14 14 room, and that can encompass a whole manner of different A. If they were able to get out. If they've already stated that they're trapped, then to offer some form of fire 15 things, but fire survival guidance is one of them. 15 16 Q. Could we come on to discuss the first substantive topic 16 survival advice. 17 17 with you, which is stay put and FSG. O. I don't know whether you heard Ms Martin's evidence 18 On page 2 of your statement, you discuss the 18 before, but she said in her experience callers tended to 19 stay-put policy. 19 offer up the information that they were trapped. Does 20 Presumably you're familiar with advising callers on 20 that reflect your professional experience as well? 21 stay put. Is that a fair assumption, I should ask? 21 A. Yes, because it would be probably the most pressing 22 A. Yes. Yes, I understand the concept of stay put and how 22 thing in their mind to say. it would relate to a caller. 23 23 Q. When you have a caller who says they're trapped, is it 24 Q. How do you know if a caller's building has a stay-put 24 your practice in Surrey to stay on the phone until the 25 25 policy or not? individual caller is rescued by the Fire Brigade? Page 118 Page 120

1	A. Yes, because it's a constantly changing environment, the	1	Surrey to communicate directly with London in the event
2	person could be potentially getting in increasingly	2	of receiving London calls?
3	dangerous situations with the fire approaching or smoke	3	A. So if we receive their calls, we would attempt to pass
4	or you know, there's a number of different factors	4	these calls back to them. We have no facility at
5	which could change. So, yes, we stay on the phone.	5	present to mobilise any of their appliances or assets.
6	Also to gain more information for the crews	6	Q. In terms of contacting London, Ms Martin talked about
7	proceeding. So, you know, ascertain whereabouts in the	7	having a short dial system with London. Is that
8	property they are. So if it's a house, are they at the	8	something that Surrey has with London?
9	back of the house or the front of the house, which	9	A. A direct line straight through yes, yes.
10	floor, that kind of thing.	10	Q. Yes.
11	Q. Is there a policy requirement at Surrey to ask callers	11	A. Yes.
12	whether they have mobility issues or anything of that	12	Q. Okay.
13	nature which may affect the extent to which the Brigade	13	Do you have the technology to pass a call directly
14	are able to rescue them?	14	to London or would you take the information, then pass
15	A. No. But, again, that's something which would be most	15	that information on to London?
16	probably offered, in the way that they would say,	16	A. We have to take the information and pass it on. I'm
17	"I can't get out because I'm wheelchair-bound" or	17	unsure of whether we could essentially transfer the
18	bedridden or so on or so forth.	18	call. I think it would be bad practice to do that, but
19	Q. Similarly, if they were elderly or there were a number	19	yeah.
20	of children in the property, is that a detail that is	20	Q. Can you explain why it would be bad practice?
21	offered up rather than it being a requirement of policy	21	A. Yes. We take the details and then we pass those details
22	to ask?	22	on to London.
23	A. Yes.	23	Q. Okay.
24	Q. Can I ask next about overflow call arrangements.	24	Could I ask you about one point which Caili Beckham
25	In the fourth paragraph on page 2 of your statement,	25	raised in her witness statement. We can go to it if
	Page 121		Page 123
1	you say:	1	necessary.
2	"In the event of large scale incidents, we have a	2	At page 3, she recalls receiving the first call
3	procedure in place for the overflow of calls to be	3	about a lady calling about her father-in-law trapped in
4	diverted to a different Brigade. This happens	4	Grenfell Tower, and Caili Beckham says this:
5	nationally amongst Brigades and is known as a 'buddy'	5	"I checked BBC News and Twitter and then saw the
6	system."	6	scale they were talking about - 200 firefighters. It
7	You then say that Surrey's buddy is Merseyside, and	7	was horrifying. I had never seen anything quite like it
8	in relation to Grenfell Tower you were:	8	and was actually quite surprised that we had not been
9	" not acting on behalf of London and were not	9	made aware by London of the scale and that we may
10	taking their overflow, the caller was calling from	10	receive overflow calls."
11	within our area hence why we took the calls."	11	Would you have expected the fire and rescue service
12	We'll come on to the specific calls later, but can	12	which has responsibility for that incident to phone
13	you please help us first with whether it's a common	13	around neighbouring fire and rescue services to alert
14	occurrence for you to receive calls in Surrey that	14	them to the incident?
15	relate to London?	15	A. No, they would be tied up with the actual incident
16	A. It's not a current say again?	16	itself.
17	Q. Is it common?	17	Q. In relation to previous major incidents, have you ever
18	A. Is it common?	18	received a call by way of early notice that you may be
19	Q. Yes.	19	asked to take overflow?
20	A. Not normally. I think the last instance that I had	20	A. Possibly within spate conditions, spate conditions being
21	personally of that was the August riots and whatnot.	21	heavy rainfall, storm-like conditions, which again
22	Q. In 2011 or whenever?	22	happened to London a few years ago, actually. They were
23	A. Yes. In which case we did take a few overflow calls for	23	taking quite a few flooding calls and we I think
24	that. Yes.	24	received a couple of calls for that as well.
25	Q. Do you know what arrangements are in place to allow	25	Q. Would you have expected, say, in this case, London to
-			
	Page 122		Page 124
			31 (Pages 121 to 124)

a whether to leave, excerced you as briefing as so what a whether to leave, excerced youngers are subjusted as whether to leave, excerced youngers are subjusted to have received that type of call? A Well, we wouldn't have capected to have received that type of call? A Well, we wouldn't have capected to have received that type of call? Therefore, they wouldn't excessarily give use information or guidance to pass on 10 – yeah, so they wouldn't have contacted us in the first place. O, Is there any means vanishile to Surney CROs to receive updates in real time, say from incidents in London, from a cited round highed control of the fire grand as to either of moth highed control of the fire grand as to either of moth highed control of the fire grand as to either? 15 A. At the moment, there's nothing utilised to that effect. O Qo key. Thank you, Mr Brown. The first issue If like to discuss is the call you had with Mr Dosost I think daughter-is-law. We can now turn to the events on the night inself. The first issue If like to discuss is the call you had with Mr Dosost I think daughter-is-law. Page 125 A. Correct. Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could be bring this up. LTB00003629. A. Ves. I didn't take the call, but yes, yes, call. A DERSON answered the call and I monitored from the Supervisors desk." 1 A. Correct. Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up. LTB00003629. A. Ves. Q. On you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could be bring this up. LTB00003629. A. Ves. I don't those who the wish and price and out more detail about the incident a Grentell Tower and the time and the prevail of the time and the cert on the night inself. The first issue I filk the to discuss is the call you had with the Doson from the disressed female, Call ADERSON answered the call and I monitored from the Supervisors desk." 1 A. Correct. Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up. LTB000003629. A. Ves. I don't those who the time a			Т	
whether to leave, et ceiters? Would you have expected to have received that type of call? A. Well, we wouldn't have expected to—they wouldn't have known necessarily that we were receiving calls. Therefore, they wouldn't necessarily give us information or guidance to pass on to—yeth, so they wouldn't have contacted as in the first place. Q. Is there any means available to Surrey CROs to receive updates in real time, say from incidents in London, from the ceither London Bragade control of the fire ground as to what is happening, and to inform what advice they gave to callea? A. At the moment, there's nothing utilised to that effect. Q. Clay. Thank you, Mr Brown. The first issue I'd like to discuss is the call you had with Mr Dissort I think daughter-is-law. Page: 125 A. Ves. I didn't take the call, but yes, yes. Q. Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LFB00003629. A. Yes. The first am middle to grow our vision mobilising system. A. Yes. To dish't take the call cannel through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? A. Yes. To dish't star be any our evidence? A. Yes. I dish't star be any our evidence? A. Yes. I dish't take the call, but yes, yes. Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LFB00003629. A. Yes. It's an incident leg from our Vision mobilising system. A. Yes. Q. Do shis is the Surrey log. A. Yes. Q. The first entry, just below halfivary, is 0.228.13. Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? We know from looking at the LFB's control report that of 2.03, Control Room Officer Rassell thas a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the 22d floor. Sopped monitoring Call's call and immediately called London Fire Brigade Control to the call that was made by you to London? Des that to 2.03, Control Room Officer Rassell that a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the 22d floor. De	1	have contacted you to give you a briefing as to what	1	A. Yes.
A Well, we wouldn't have expected to -they wouldn't have loom necessarily that we were receiving calls. Therefore, they wouldn't necessarily give us information or guidance to pass on to -yeah, so they wouldn't have contacted us in the first place. O, is there any menus available to Survey CROs to receive updates in real time, say from incidents in London, from the cell that is happening, and to inform what advice they gave to calles? A Are moment, there's nothing utilised to that effect. O, O Kay Thank you, Mr Brown We can now turn to the centro on the night itself. The first issue I'd like to discuss is the call you had with Mr Discons't lithia daughter-in-dury. A Yes, I din't take the call, but yes, yes. O You say on page 3 of your winess statement: The first seur I'd like to discuss is the call you had with Mr Discons't lithia daughter-in-dury. A Yes, I din't take the call, but yes, yes. O You say on page 3 of your winess statement: The first seur I'd like to discuss is the call you had with Mr Discons't lithia daughter-in-dury. A Yes, I din't take the call, but yes, yes. O You say on page 3 of your winess statement: The first seur I'd like to discuss is the call you had with Mr Discons't lithia daughter-in-dury. A Yes, I din't take the call, but yes, yes. O You say on page 3 of your winess statement: The first seur I'd like to discuss is the call you had with Mr Discons't lithia daughter-in-dury. The district search of the first page of the call you had with Mr Discons't lithia daughter-in-dury. The first seur I'd like to discuss is the call you had with Mr Discons't lithia daughter-in-dury. The first seur I'd like to discuss is the call you had with Mr Discons't lithia daughter-in-dury. The first seur I'd like to discuss is the call you had with Mr Discons't lithia daughter-in-dury. The first seur I'd like to discuss is the call you had with Mr Discons't lithia daughter-in-dury. The first seur I'd like to discuss is the call you had with Mr Discons't lithia daughter-in-dury. The f	2	advice they were giving to callers as to stay put,	2	Q. When you contacted the LFB, did you know a specific
5 A. Well, we wouldn't have expected to —they wouldn't have known necessarily that we were receiving calls. 6 Interceptors, they wouldn't necessarily give us information or guidance to pass on to —yeah, so they wouldn't have contacted us in the first place. 9 On the contacted us in the first place. 10 Q. Is there any means available to Surrey/CROs to receive other to a college. 11 updates in trad time, say form incidents in London, from 12 cirther London Brigade control or the fire ground as to to callers? 12 cirther London Brigade control or the fire ground as to to callers? 13 what is happening, and to inform what advice they gave to callers? 14 A. At the moment, there's nothing utilised to that effect. 15 A. At the moment, there's nothing utilised to that effect. 16 Q. Okay, Thanky you, Mr. Brown. 17 We can now turn to the events on the right istelf. 18 The first issue I'd like to discuss is the call you had with Mr. Disson's I think daughter-in-law. 19 A. Yes. I didn't take the call, but yes, yes. 20 Q. You so yon page 3 of your witness statement: 21 — "At O2:30 hours our control received a pleane call and I monitored from the Supervisors desk." 22 — I hat a fair summany of your evidence? 23 — A. Correct. 24 — Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up L 1PH00003629. 25 — A. Yes, I's an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. 26 — Week you seen this before? 27 — C. So this is the Surrey log. 28 — A. Yes. 29 — The first entry, just below halfway, is 02 28.13. 29 — Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed fermale that you were referred to carrier. 29 — We know from looking at the LTPS control report the when't would come in. 29 — We know from looking at the LTPS control report the information as it was turne critical." 20 — We know from looking at the LTPS control report the information as it was turne critical." 20 — We know from looking at the LTPS control report the information as it was turne critical." 20 — We know from looking a	3	whether to leave, et cetera? Would you have expected to	3	person to contact or did you just call through and
6 known necessarily that we were receiving calls. 7 Therefore, they wouldn't necessarily give us information or guidance to pass on to—yeah, so they wouldn't have contacted us in the first place. 9 contacted us in the first place. 10 Q. Is there any means available os Surrey CROs to receive updates in real time, say from incidents in London, from the cities and to rife any means available os Surrey CROs to receive updates in real time, say from incidents in London, from the cities can be called. 11 what is happening, and to inform what advice they gave to called? 12 A. Yes, Hon't know how their system looks at their end, but that's what I presume to be the case. 13 what is happening, and to inform what advice they gave to called? 14 The first issue I falke to discuss is the call you had with Mr Disson's United to discuss is the call you had with Mr Disson's United to discuss is the call you had with Mr Disson's United to discuss is the call you had with Mr Disson's United to discuss is the call you had with Mr Disson's United to discuss is the call you had with Mr Disson's United to discuss is the call you had with Mr Disson's United to discuss it the call you had with Mr Disson's United to discuss it the call you had the they are aware of it and it was Gernale Call ANDERSON answered the call and I monitored from the Supervisors desk." 12 Q. You say on page 3 of your witness statement: 23 A. Yes, if an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. 24 Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could by bring this up. LTB00003629. 25 A. Yes, if an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. 26 Q. So this is the Surrey log. 3 A. Yes, if an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. 3 Q. So this is the Surrey log. 4 A. Yes, if an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. 4 Have you seen this before? 5 A. Yes, if an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. 5 Q. The first cnry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 6 Q. The first cnry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 7 Q. So this	4	have received that type of call?	4	simply
Therefore, they wouldn't necessarity give us information or guidance to pass on to —yeah, so they wouldn't have contacted us in the first place. Qolary Indiana and Indiana a	5	A. Well, we wouldn't have expected to they wouldn't have	5	A. Oh, no, so there's a direct line number, so we just
or guidance to pass on to — yeah, so they wouldn't have contracted us in the first place. O. Sit from a line specific to a supervisor; it's a line which goes into the control room and may be picked up by updates in real time, say from incidents in London, from electromy of the operations in the Brigade control or the fire ground as to what is happening, and to inform what advice they gave what is happening, and to inform what advice they gave to callers? A. Atte moment, there's nothing utilised to that effect. A. Atte moment, there's nothing utilised to that effect. A. We are now turn to the events on the night itself. The first issue B like to discuss is the call you had with Mr. Disson's I think daughter-in-law. A. Yes. I didn't take the call, but yes, yes. Q. You say on pags 3 of your witness statement. A. Correct. Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up. LFB00003629. A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising when you good the pags 3 of your witness statement, you say at the when it would come in. A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising when you good the page 3 of your witness statement and you were referring to earlier? A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising when you good the page 3 of your witness statement and you were referring to earlier? A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising when you good your witness statement and you were referring to earlier? A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising when your witness statement and you were referring to earlier? A. Yes, that's time and which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? A. I can't remember. Q. Going back to your witness statement that you: " stopped monitoring Califs call and immediately called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pags a of your wit	6	known necessarily that we were receiving calls.	6	press that and it goes through to London, and presumably
voluted us in the first place. Q. Is there any means available to Surrey CROs to receive either London Brigade control? Learning of the operators in the Brigade control? A the moment, there's nothing utilised to that effect. Q. Okary, Thankyou, Mr Brown. We can now turn to the events on the night itself. The first issue fall kits of issues is the call, but yes, yes, A Yes, I didn't know how their system looks at their end, but that's what I presume to be the case. 4. At the moment, there's nothing utilised to that effect. Q. Okary, Thankyou, Mr Brown. We can now turn to the events on the night itself. The first issue fall kits olicisus is the call you had with Mr Disson's I think daughter-in-law. We and now turn to the events on the night itself. With Mr Disson's I think daughter-in-law. A Yes, I didn't take the call, but yes, yes. Water and the summary of your winness statement. "At 0.230 hours our control received a phone call of from a distressed female. Calls ANDERSON answered the call. "At 0.230 hours our control received a phone call or an interest of the property of the distribution of the call with the first call came of the call with the first call came of the property of the call with the first call came of the first call came of the call with the first call came of the call with the first call came of the first call came of the call with the first call came of the call with the first call came of the call came of the call with the first call came of the call came of the call with the first call came of the call came	7	Therefore, they wouldn't necessarily give us information	7	one of their operators picks it up.
any of the operators in the Brigade control? 4 Yes, I don't know how their system looks at their end, but that's what I presume to be the case. 9 When you phoned through to the LFB, did you try and find out more detail about the incident at Grenfell Tower isself? 15 A. At the moment, there's nothing utilised to that effect. 16 Q. Okay. Thank you, Mr Brown. 17 We can now turn to the events on the night itself. 18 The first issue follow to discuss is the call you had with Mr Disson's I think daughter-in-law. 19 with Mr Disson's I think daughter-in-law. 20 A. Yes. I didn't take the call, but yes, yes. 21 Q. You say on page 3 of your witness statement. 22 "Mr O230 hours our control received a phone call eall and I monitored from the Supervisors desk." 23 Is that a fair summary of your evidence? Page 125 1 A. Correct. 2 Q. Car you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LFB00003629. 4 Have you seen this before? 5 A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. 9 Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 10 Would hat be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? 2 A. Yes. 9 Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 10 Would hat be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? 2 A. Defines only yes the down witness statement that you: 2 " stopped monitoring Callis's call and immediately called London Fire Figage Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." 3 A. Delieve so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time when it would come in. 4 We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the called London Fire Figage Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." 3 A. Description of the call that was made by you to London? 4 A. Yes. 9 Q. The first	8	or guidance to pass on to yeah, so they wouldn't have	8	Q. So it's not a line specific to a supervisor; it's a line
time Landon Brigade control or the fire ground as to cither Landon Brigade control or the fire ground as to deliver in the Landon Brigade control or the fire ground as to callers? to callers? A. the moment, there's nothing utilised to that effect. A. When the moment, there's nothing utilised to that effect. B. A. Atte moment, there's nothing utilised to that effect. C. O. Kay, Thank you, Mr Brown. We can now turn to the events on the night itself. The first sissue I'd like to dissuss is the call you had with Mr Dissors! I think daughter-in-law. A. Yes. I din't take the call, but yes, yes. C. O. You say on page 3 of your witness statement: "At 02:30 hours our control received a phone call ground and additional distressel female. Call at MDATENON answered the call and I manitored from the Supervisors desk." Bath a fair summary of your evidence? A. Correct. Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LFB00003629. A. A. Correct. Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LFB00003629. A. Yes, I alon't know how their system looks at their end, but the state of call you had out more detail about the incident at Grenfell Tower is statement: 22 "At Carl' tremember. Page 125 Page 127 Page 127 Page 127 Page 127 Page 127 A. Correct. Q. Were you given any details such as number of pumps, the type of building, resident numbers, number of FSGs, any of that type of information? A. I can't remember. Q. Were you given any details such as number of pumps, the type of building, resident numbers, number of FSGs, any of that type of information? A. I can't remember. Q. Or you say on spee 3 of your witness that the call can be through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? A. I can't remember. Q. Or you say on spee 1 or your page 2 of that tops of the state of the	9	contacted us in the first place.	9	which goes into the control room and may be picked up by
cither London Brigade control or the fire ground as to what is happening, and to inform what advice they gave to teless? A. At the moment, there's nothing utilised to that effect. Q. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Brown. The first issue fd like to discuss is the call you had with Dissorts I think daughter-in-law. Ye can now turn to the events on the night itself. The first issue fd like to discuss is the call you had with Dissorts I think daughter-in-law. Ye was you page 3 of your witness statement: Ye you say on page 3 of your witness statement: Ye and I monitored from the Supervisors desk." A. Correct. Yage 125 A. Correct. Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LTB00003629. A. Yes. it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? Would come in. A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time when it would come in. Q. Ging back to your witness statement that you: " stopped monitoring Galifs call and immediately earlier through from looking at the LFIPs control report We know from looking at the LFIPs control report We know from looking at the LFIPs control report Me know form looking at the LFIPs control report The first individual come in. Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? The first individual find the call that was made by you to London? Light of the LFB, did you try and find out more detail that first. A. Well, the address which we had originally was "Renfield", so obviously we got clarification on that, that it was Grenfell. I'm y memory serves me right, they said it was a large incident, they were aware of it was a large incident, they were aware of it was a large incident, they was a large incident, they were aware of it was a large incident, they was	10	Q. Is there any means available to Surrey CROs to receive	10	any of the operators in the Brigade control?
what is happening, and to inform what advice they gave to callers? A. the moment, there's nothing utilised to that effect. Q. Okay, Thank you, Mr Brown. We can now turn to the events on the night itself. The first issue I'd like to discusse is the call you had with Mr Dissori's I think daughter-in-law. 19 with Mr Dissori's I think daughter-in-law. 10 A. Yes. I didn't take the call, but yes, yes. 11 Q. You say on page 3 of your witness statement: 12 Q. You say on page 3 of your witness statement: 13 A. The first entry, just below halfway, is 0.2.28.13. 14 A. Ocrrect. 15 D. A. The first entry, just below halfway, is 0.2.28.13. 16 A. Well, the address which we had originally was that it was Grentfell. If my memory serves me right, they said it was a large incident, they were aware of it and dealing with it. 16 A. Well, the address which we had originally was that it was Grentfell. If my memory serves me right, they said it was a large incident, they were aware of it and dealing with it. Q. Did they give you any steer on what advice was being given by LPB Brigade control to callers? A. I can't remember. Page 125 Page 127 1 A. Correct. Q. Can you help and dealing with it. Q. Did they give you any steer on what advice was being given by LPB Brigade control to callers? A. I can't remember. Page 127 1 Q. Were you given any details such as number of pumps, the type of building, resident numbers, number of FSGs, any of that type of information? A. I can't remember. Q. Can you remember asking for that type of information, just by way of background, to brief your own control room? A. I can't remember. Q. Can you remember asking for that type of information, just by way of background, to brief your own control room? A. I can't remember. Q. Can you remember asking for that type of information, just by way of background, to brief your own control room? A. I can't remember. Q. Can you remember asking for that type of information, just by way of background, to brief your own control room? Q. Can	11	updates in real time, say from incidents in London, from	11	A. Yes, I don't know how their system looks at their end,
14 to callers? A. At the moment, there's nothing utilised to that effect. Q. Okay, Thank you, Mr Brown. We can now turn to the events on the night itself The first issue I'd like to discuss is the call you had with Mr Dissor's I think daughter-in-law. A. Yes. I didn't take the call, but yes, yes. "A 102-30 hours our control received a phone call from a distressed female Calii ANDERSON answered the call. and I monitored from the Supervisors desk." Is that a fair summary of your evidence? Page 125 A. Correct. Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LFB00003629, A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. A. Yes, Q. So this is the Surrey log. A. Yes, Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were refring to earlier? " stopped monitoring Calil's call and immediately called London Fire Bigade Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." We know from looking at the LFB's control report 20 that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the 25 that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? In a beginning the control to callers which the first call can be a called and that they were aware of it. Yes, and the work of the call can be through from the supervised and that they were aware of it. Yes, and the incident at Grenfell Tower and that they were aware of it. Yes, and and detail about the be time at disconsistency and the first call came through from the Supervised seed. A. Lean't remember. Q. Were you given any details such as number of pumps, the type of building, resident numbers, number of FSGs, any of that type of information? Q. So this is the Surrey log. A. Lean't remember. Q. Were you given any details such as number of pumps, the type of building, resident numbers, number of FSGs, any of that type of information? Q. Can y	12	either London Brigade control or the fire ground as to	12	but that's what I presume to be the case.
15 A. At the moment, there's nothing utilised to that effect. 16 Q. Okay. Thank you, Mr Brown. 17 We can now turn to the events on the night itself. 18 The first issue I'd like to discuss is the call you had 19 with Mr Dissorb's I think daughter-in-faw. 19 Q. Ay Yes. I didn't take the call, but yes, yes. 20 A. Yes. I didn't take the call, but yes, yes. 21 Q. You say on page 3 of your witness statement: 22 "At 02:30 hours our control received a phone call 22 from a distressed female. Call ANDERSON answered the call and I monitored from the Supervisors desk." 22 Is that a fair summary of your evidence? 23 For a distressed female. Call ANDERSON answered the call and I monitored from the Supervisors desk." 24 Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LFB00003629. 25 A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. 26 Q. So this is the Surrey log. 27 A. Yes. 28 A. Yes. 29 Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 29 Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 20 Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? 29 Q. Going back to your witness statement that you: 21	13	what is happening, and to inform what advice they gave	13	Q. When you phoned through to the LFB, did you try and find
16 Q. Okay. Thank you, Mr Brown. We can now turn to the events on the night itself. The first issue Pd like to discuss is the call you had with Mr Disson's I think daughter-in-law. A. Yes. I didn't take the call, but yes, yes. 21 Q. You say on page 3 of your witness statement: 22 "At 02:30 hours our control received a phone call from a distressed female. Call ANDERSON answered the call. and I monitored from the Supervisors desk." 23 Is that a fair summary of your evidence? 24 Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LFB00003629. 3 Have you seen this before? 4 A. Correct. 2 Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LFB00003629. 4 Have you seen this before? 4 A. Correct. 2 Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LFB00003629. 4 Have you seen this before? 4 A. Correct. 9 Q. So this is the Surrey log. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 10 Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the disressed female that you were referring to earlier? 11 through from the disressed female that you were referring to earlier? 12 n. So ped monitoring Callis's call and immediately called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." 18 called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." 29 We know from looking at the LFBs control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the call being from flat 194, the Condon? 20 We know from looking at the LFBs control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the Condon? 21 the Zand floor. 22 the Zand floor. 23 Lard floor. 24 Lond to remark the tower was called the sea turn over to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before Lask you questions.	14	to callers?	14	out more detail about the incident at Grenfell Tower
We can now turn to the events on the night itself. 17	15	A. At the moment, there's nothing utilised to that effect.	15	itself?
The first issue I'd like to discuss is the call you had with Mr Disson's I think daughter-in-law. 2	16	Q. Okay. Thank you, Mr Brown.	16	A. Well, the address which we had originally was
with Mr Disson's I think daughter-in-law. A. Yes. I didn't take the call, but yes, yes. 20 You say on page 3 of your witness statement: 21 "At 02:30 hours our control received a phone call from a distressed female Call in ANDERSON answered the call and I monitored from the Supervisors desk." 22 "At 02:30 hours our control received a phone call from a distressed female Call in ANDERSON answered the call and I monitored from the Supervisors desk." 23 Is that a fair summary of your evidence? 24 Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LFB00003629. 25 A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. 26 So this is the Surrey log. 27 A. Yes. 28 A. Yes. 29 Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 29 Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 20 Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? 20 A. I lollive so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time when it would come in. 21 Q. Going back to your witness statement that you: 22 In they said it was a large incident, they were aware of it and dealing with it. 23 Did they give you any ster on what advice was being given by LFB Brigade control to callers? A. I can't remember. 24 Q. Did you ask, can you remember that? 25 A. I can't remember. 26 Q. Were you given any details such as number of pumps, the type of building, resident numbers, number of FSGs, any of that type of information? 30 A. Yes. 31 A. I can't remember. 42 Q. Were you given any details such as number of pumps, the type of building, resident numbers, number of FSGs, any of that type of information? 43 A. I can't remember. 44 C. Can't remember. 45 Q. Can you remember that? 45 A. I can't remember. 46 Q. Can you given any details such as number of pumps, the type of building, resident numbers, number of pumps, the type of building, resident numbers, number of prome of the type of information? 46 A. Yes. 47 A. Yes. 48 A.	17	We can now turn to the events on the night itself.	17	"Renfield", so obviously we got clarification on that,
20 A. Ves. I didn't take the call, but yes, yes. 21 Q. You say on page 3 of your witness statement: 22 "m't 0.230 hours our control received a phone call 23 from a distressed female Caili ANDERSON answered the 24 call and I monitored from the Supervisors desk." 25 Is that a fair summary of your evidence? 26	18	The first issue I'd like to discuss is the call you had	18	that it was Grenfell. If my memory serves me right,
21 Q. You say on page 3 of your witness statement: 22 "At 02:30 hours our control received a phone call 23 from a distressed female Calii ANDERSON answered the 24 call and I monitored from the Supervisors desk." 25 Is that a fair summary of your evidence? Page 125 1 A. Correct. 2 Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could 3 bring this up: LFB00003629. 4 Have you seem this before? 5 A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising 6 system. 7 Q. So this is the Surrey log. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 10 Would that be the time at which the first call came 11 through from the distressed female that you were 12 referring to earlier? 13 A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time 14 when it would come in. 15 Q. Going back to your witness statement, you say at the 16 bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: 17 " stopped monitoring Cail's call and immediately 18 called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the 19 information as it was time critical." 20 Were you given any details such as number of pumps, the 21 type of building, resident numbers, number of FSGs, any 22 of that type of information, 23 just gove us the – from my statement, they 24 confirmed that the tower was called Grenfell Tower and 25 that a fair summary of your eviness statement, you say at the 26 bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: 27 " stopped monitoring Cail's call and immediately 28 called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the 29 information as it was time critical." 29 We know from looking at the LFB's control report 20 that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call 21 from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, 22 the 22 difloor. 24 Does that correspond to the call that was made by 25 you to London? 26 Isak you questions.	19	with Mr Disson's I think daughter-in-law.	19	they said it was a large incident, they were aware of it
22 "At 02:30 hours our control received a phone call from a distressed female Calil ANDERSON answered the call and I monitored from the Supervisors desk." 24 call and I monitored from the Supervisors desk." 25 Is that a fair summary of your evidence? 26 Page 125 27 A. I can't remember. 28 Page 127 1 A. Correct. 2 Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LFB00003629. 4 Have you seen this before? 5 A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. 6 yes, the Surrey log. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 10 Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? 11 through from the distressed female that you were when it would come in. 12 Q. Going back to your witness statement that you: 13 A. I can't remember. 24 Q. Were you given any details such as number of pumps, the type of building, resident numbers, number of FSGs, any of that type of information. 25 Just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 26 Just so you given any details such as number of pumps, the type of building, resident numbers, number of FSGs, any of that type of information. 27 Just so way of background, to brief your own control romo? 28 A. Yes. 29 Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 10 Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? 29 A. No. So they just gave us the – from my statement, they confirmed that the tower was called Grenfell Tower and that they were aware of it. Yes, that's all we got. 11 Q. Conveniently, the Surrey log is still on the screen. 12 Ralph, could i ask you to turn to page 2 of that log, and if you could identify the entry at 02.34.15. 13 A. Yes. 14 Mr Brown, are you able to help as to whether that log is in relation to the conversation between Caili Anderson and the female caller? 29 A. Yes. 20 Yes. Thank you. 20 For Surrey FRS to report the call being f	20	A. Yes. I didn't take the call, but yes, yes.	20	and dealing with it.
from a distressed female Caili ANDERSON answered the call and I monitored from the Supervisors desk." Is that a fair summary of your evidence? Page 125 Page 125 A. Correct. Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LFB00003629. Have you seen this before? A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. Q. So this is the Surrey log. A. Yes. Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? A. I can't remember. Q. Were you given any details such as number of pumps, the type of building, resident numbers, number of FSGs, any of that type of information, just by way of background, to brief your own control room? A. No. So they just gave us the — from my statement, they confirmed that the tower was called Grenfell Tower and that they were aware of it. Yes, that's all we got. Q. Conveniently, the Surrey log is sith on the screen. referring to earlier? A. I can't remember. 24 Q. Were you given any details such as number of pumps, the type of building, resident numbers, number of FSGs, any of that type of information, just by way of background, to brief your own control room? A. No. So they just gave us the — from my statement, they confirmed that the tower was called Grenfell Tower and that they were aware of it. Yes, that's all we got. Q. Conveniently, the Surrey log is sith on the screen. Ralph, could I ask you to turn to page 2 of that log, and if you could identify the entry at 02.34.15. Mr Brown, are you able to help as to whether that log is in relation to the conversation between Caili Anderson and the female caller? A. Yes. A. Yes. Page 127 A. I can't remember. Q. Were you given any details such as number of pumps, the type of information, just by way of background, to brief your own control room? Q. Con you remember asking for that type of information, just by way of background, to brief your own control	21	Q. You say on page 3 of your witness statement:	21	Q. Did they give you any steer on what advice was being
24 call and I monitored from the Supervisors desk." 25 Is that a fair summary of your evidence? Page 125 Page 127 1 A. Correct. 2 Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LFB00003629. 4 Have you seen this before? 5 A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. 7 Q. So this is the Surrey log. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 10 Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? 11 through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? 12 A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time when it would come in. 15 Q. Going back to your witness statement, you say at the bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: 16 bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: 17 " stopped monitoring Cailif's call and immediately called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." 20 We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the 22nd floor. 24 Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? 24 Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? 25 Did you ask, can you remember that? 26 A. I can't remember. Page 127 2 Q. Were you given any details such as number of pumps, the type of building, resident numbers, number of FSGs, any of that type of information? A. I can't remember. Q. Can you remember asking for that type of information? A. I can't remember. Q. Can you remember asking for that type of information? A. I can't remember. A. A. Correct. Q. Can you remember asking for that type of information? A. I can't remember. A. I can't remember. A. I can't re	22	"At 02:30 hours our control received a phone call	22	given by LFB Brigade control to callers?
Page 125 A. Correct. Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LFB00003629. Have you seen this before? A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. Q. So this is the Surrey log. A. Yes. Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time when it would come in. Q. Going back to your witness statement, you say at the bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: " stopped monitoring Cail's call and immediately called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the 22nd floor. Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? A. I can't remember. Page 127 Q. Were you given any details such as number of pumps, the type of building, resident numbers, number of FSGs, any of that type of information? A. I can't remember. Q. Were you given any details such as number of pumps, the type of building, resident numbers, number of FSGs, any of that type of information? A. I can't remember. Q. Can you remember asking for that type of information, just by way of background, to brief your own control room? A. No. So they just gave us the — from my statement, they confirmed that the tower was called Grenfell Tower and that they were aware of it. Yes, that's all we got. Q. Conveniently, the Surrey log is still on the screen. Ralph, could I ask you to turn to page 2 of that log, and if you could identify the entry at 02.34.15. Mr Brown, are you able to help as to whether that log is in relation to the conversation between Caili Anderson and the female caller? A. Yes. Q. Yes. Thank you. Ralph, if you could put that down and bring up another document, which is	23	from a distressed female Caili ANDERSON answered the	23	A. I can't remember.
Page 125 A. Correct. Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LFB00003629. Have you seen this before? A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. Q. So this is the Surrey log. A. Yes, Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time when it would come in. Q. Going back to your witness statement, you say at the bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: " stopped monitoring Calif's call and immediately called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the 22nd floor. Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? Page 127 Q. Were you given any details such as number of pumps, the type of information? A. Len't remember. Q. Can you remember asking for that type of information, just by way of background, to brief your own control room? A. No. So they just gave us the – from my statement, they confirmed that the tower was called Grenfell Tower and that they were aware of it. Yes, that's all we got. Q. Conveniently, the Surrey log is still on the screen. Ralph, could I ask you to turn to page 2 of that log, and if you could identify the entry at 02.34 1.5. Mr Brown, are you able to help as to whether that log is in relation to the conversation between Calil Anderson and the female caller? A. Yes. Q. Yes. Thank you. Ralph, if you could put that down and bring up another document, which is a transcript, which is LFB00000650. If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before I ask you questions.	24	call and I monitored from the Supervisors desk."	24	Q. Did you ask, can you remember that?
1 A. Correct. 2 Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LFB00003629. 4 Have you seen this before? 5 A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. 6 System. 7 Q. So this is the Surrey log. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 10 Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? 11 through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? 13 A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time when it would come in. 15 Q. Going back to your witness statement, you say at the bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: 16 bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: 17 " stopped monitoring Caili's call and immediately information as it was time critical." 18 We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the 22d floor. 24 Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? 1 Q. Were you given any details such as number of pumps, the type of building, resident numbers, number of FSGs, any of that type of information? A. I can't remember. A. No. So they just gave us the – from my statement, they confirmed that the tower was called Grenfell Tower and that they were aware of it. Yes, that's all we got. Q. Conveniently, the Surrey log is still on the screen. Ralph, could lask you to turn to page 2 of that log, and if you could identify the entry at	25	Is that a fair summary of your evidence?	25	A. I can't remember.
1 A. Correct. 2 Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LFB00003629. 4 Have you seen this before? 5 A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. 6 System. 7 Q. So this is the Surrey log. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 10 Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? 11 through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? 13 A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time when it would come in. 15 Q. Going back to your witness statement, you say at the bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: 16 bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: 17 " stopped monitoring Caili's call and immediately information as it was time critical." 18 We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the 22d floor. 24 Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? 1 Q. Were you given any details such as number of pumps, the type of building, resident numbers, number of FSGs, any of that type of information? A. I can't remember. A. No. So they just gave us the – from my statement, they confirmed that the tower was called Grenfell Tower and that they were aware of it. Yes, that's all we got. Q. Conveniently, the Surrey log is still on the screen. Ralph, could lask you to turn to page 2 of that log, and if you could identify the entry at				
2 Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LFB00003629. 4 Have you seen this before? 5 A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. 6 System. 7 Q. So this is the Surrey log. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 10 Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? 11 through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? 12 referring to earlier? 13 A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time when it would come in. 14 when it would come in. 15 Q. Going back to your witness statement that you: " stopped monitoring Caili's call and immediately called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." 16 We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the 22nd floor. 20 Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? 21 Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? 22 type of building, resident numbers, number of FSGs, any of that type of information? 4 A. I can't remember. A. No. So they just gave us the from my statement, they confirmed that the tower was called Grenfell Tower and that they were aware of it. Yes, that's all we got. Q. Conveniently, the Surrey log is still on the screen. Ralph, could I ask you to turn to page 2 of that log, and if you could identify the entry at 02.34.15. Mr Brown, are you able to help as to whether that log is in relation to the conversation between Caili Anderson and the female caller? A. Yes. Q. Yes. Thank you. Ralph, if you could put that down and bring up another d		Page 125	-	Page 12/
2 Q. Can you help us with one document. Ralph, if you could bring this up: LFB00003629. 4 Have you seen this before? 5 A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. 6 System. 7 Q. So this is the Surrey log. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 10 Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? 11 through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? 12 referring to earlier? 13 A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time when it would come in. 14 when it would come in. 15 Q. Going back to your witness statement that you: " stopped monitoring Caili's call and immediately called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." 16 We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the 22nd floor. 20 Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? 21 Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? 22 type of building, resident numbers, number of FSGs, any of that type of information? 4 A. I can't remember. A. No. So they just gave us the from my statement, they confirmed that the tower was called Grenfell Tower and that they were aware of it. Yes, that's all we got. Q. Conveniently, the Surrey log is still on the screen. Ralph, could I ask you to turn to page 2 of that log, and if you could identify the entry at 02.34.15. Mr Brown, are you able to help as to whether that log is in relation to the conversation between Caili Anderson and the female caller? A. Yes. Q. Yes. Thank you. Ralph, if you could put that down and bring up another d	1	A. Correct.	1	O. Were you given any details such as number of pumps, the
bring this up: LFB00003629. Have you seen this before? A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. Q. So this is the Surrey log. A. Yes. Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time when it would come in. Q. Going back to your witness statement, you say at the bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: " stopped monitoring Caili's call and immediately called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, bose that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? Jose that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? Jose that topy or information? A. I can't remember. Q. Can you remember asking for that type of information, just by way of background, to brief your own control room? A. No. So they just gave us the — from my statement, they confirmed that the tower was called Grenfell Tower and that they were aware of it. Yes, that's all we got. Q. Conveniently, the Surrey log is still on the screen. Ralph, could I ask you to trum to page 2 of that log, and if you could identify the entry at 02.34.15. Mr Brown, are you able to help as to whether that log is in relation to the conversation between Caili Anderson and the female caller? A. Yes. Q. Yes. Thank you. If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before I ask you questions.				
Have you seen this before? A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising system. O. So this is the Surrey log. A. Yes. O. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time when it would come in. O. Going back to your witness statement, you say at the bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: " stopped monitoring Caili's call and immediately called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, bose that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? A. I can't remember. O. Can you remember asking for that type of information, just by way of background, to brief your own control room? A. No. So they just gave us the — from my statement, they confirmed that the tower was called Grenfell Tower and that they were aware of it. Yes, that's all we got. O. Conveniently, the Surrey log is still on the screen. Ralph, could I ask you to turn to page 2 of that log, and if you could identify the entry at 02.34.15. Mr Brown, are you able to help as to whether that log is in relation to the conversation between Caili Anderson and the female caller? A. Yes. Q. Yes. Ralph, if you could put that down and bring up another document, which is a transcript, which is LFB00000650. If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before 1 ask you questions.			1	
5 A. Yes, it's an incident log from our Vision mobilising 6 system. 7 Q. So this is the Surrey log. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 10 Would that be the time at which the first call came 11 through from the distressed female that you were 12 referring to earlier? 13 A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time 14 when it would come in. 15 Q. Going back to your witness statement, you say at the 16 bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: 17 " stopped monitoring Caili's call and immediately 18 called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the 19 information as it was time critical." 19 We know from looking at the LFB's control report 20 We know from looking at the LFB's control report 21 that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call 22 from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, 23 the 22nd floor. 24 Does that correspond to the call that was made by 25 you to London? 26 Can you remember asking for that type of information, just by way of background, to briet your own control room? A. No. So they just gave us the — from my statement, they confirmed that the tower was called Grenfell Tower and that they were aware of it. Yes, that's all we got. 10 C. Conveniently, the Surrey log is still on the screen. Ralph, could I ask you to turn to page 2 of that log, and if you could identify the entry at 02.34.15. Mr Brown, are you able to help as to whether that log is in relation to the conversation between Caili Anderson and the female caller? A. Yes. Q. Yes. Thank you. Ralph, if you could put that down and bring up another document, which is a transcript, which is LFB00000650. If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before 1 ask you questions.				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
6 system. 7 Q. So this is the Surrey log. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 10 Would that be the time at which the first call came 11 through from the distressed female that you were 12 referring to earlier? 13 A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time 14 when it would come in. 15 Q. Going back to your witness statement, you say at the 16 bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: 17 " stopped monitoring Caili's call and immediately 18 called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the 19 information as it was time critical." 10 Gos has been been been been bottom of page 3 of your witness expected been been been called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the 19 information as it was time critical." 20 We know from looking at the LFB's control report 21 that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call 22 from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, 23 the 22nd floor. 24 Does that correspond to the call that was made by 25 you to London? 6 just by way of background, to brief your own control room? 7 room? 8 A. No. So they just gave us the — from my statement, they confirmed that the tower was called Grenfell Tower and that they over aware of it. Yes, that's all we got. 10 that they were aware of it. Yes, that's all we got. 11 Q. Conveniently, the Surrey log is still on the screen. 12 Ralph, could I ask you to turn to page 2 of that log, and if you could identify the entry at 02.34.15. 13 Mr Brown, are you able to help as to whether that log is in relation to the conversation between 14 Caili Anderson and the female caller? 15 A. Yes. 18 Q. Yes. Thank you. 19 Ralph, if you could put that down and bring up another document, which is a transcript, which is 19 LFB00000650. 10 If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before 10 I ask you questions.			1	
7 room? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. 10 Would that be the time at which the first call came 11 through from the distressed female that you were 12 referring to earlier? 13 A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time 14 when it would come in. 15 Q. Going back to your witness statement, you say at the 16 bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: 17 " stopped monitoring Caili's call and immediately 18 called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the 19 information as it was time critical." 20 We know from looking at the LFB's control report 21 that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call 22 from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, 23 the 22nd floor. 24 Does that correspond to the call that was made by 25 you to London? 27 room? 8 A. No. So they just gave us the – from my statement, they confirmed that the tower was called Grenfell Tower and that they were aware of it. Yes, that's all we got. 10 that they were aware of it. Yes, that's all we got. 11 Q. Conveniently, the Surrey log is still on the screen. 12 Ralph, could I ask you to turn to page 2 of that log, and if you could identify the entry at 02.34.15. 13 Mr Brown, are you able to help as to whether that log is in relation to the conversation between 15 Log is in relation to the conversation between 16 Caili Anderson and the female caller? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Yes. Thank you. 19 Ralph, if you could put that down and bring up another document, which is a transcript, which is 20 LFB00000650. 21 If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before 20 I ask you questions.				
A. Yes. Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time when it would come in. Q. Going back to your witness statement, you say at the bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: " stopped monitoring Caill's call and immediately called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? A. No. So they just gave us the — from my statement, they confirmed that the tower was called Grenfell Tower and that they were aware of it. Yes, that's all we got. Q. Conveniently, the Surrey log is still on the screen. Ralph, could I ask you to turn to page 2 of that log, and if you could identify the entry at 02.34.15. Mr Brown, are you able to help as to whether that log is in relation to the conversation between Caili Anderson and the female caller? A. Yes. Q. Yes. Thank you. Ralph, if you could put that down and bring up another document, which is a transcript, which is LFB00000650. If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before I ask you questions.		•		
Q. The first entry, just below halfway, is 02.28.13. Would that be the time at which the first call came through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time when it would come in. Q. Going back to your witness statement, you say at the bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: " stopped monitoring Caili's call and immediately called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call be 22nd floor. Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? Q. Conveniently, the Surrey log is still on the screen. Ralph, could I ask you to turn to page 2 of that log, and if you could identify the entry at 02.34.15. Mr Brown, are you able to help as to whether that log is in relation to the conversation between Caili Anderson and the female caller? A. Yes. Q. Yes. Thank you. Ralph, if you could put that down and bring up another document, which is a transcript, which is LFB00000650. If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before I ask you questions.			1	
through from the distressed female that you were through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time when it would come in. Q. Going back to your witness statement, you say at the bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: " stopped monitoring Caili's call and immediately information as it was time critical." We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call that at 02.30, Control Room to the call that was made by you to London? that they were aware of it. Yes, that's all we got. Q. Conveniently, the Surrey log is still on the screen. Ralph, could I ask you to turn to page 2 of that log, and if you could identify the entry at 02.34.15. Mr Brown, are you able to help as to whether that log is in relation to the conversation between Caili Anderson and the female caller? A. Yes. Q. Yes. Thank you. Ralph, if you could put that down and bring up another document, which is a transcript, which is LFB00000650. If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before I ask you questions.				
through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time when it would come in. Q. Going back to your witness statement, you say at the bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: " stopped monitoring Caili's call and immediately called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? Through from the distressed female that you were referring to earlier? Ralph, could I ask you to turn to page 2 of that log, and if you could identify the entry at 02.34.15. Mr Brown, are you able to help as to whether that log is in relation to the conversation between Caili Anderson and the female caller? A. Yes. Q. Yes. Thank you. Ralph, if you could put that down and bring up another document, which is a transcript, which is LFB00000650. If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before I ask you questions.			1	
referring to earlier? A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time when it would come in. Q. Going back to your witness statement, you say at the bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: " stopped monitoring Caili's call and immediately called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? Ralph, could I ask you to turn to page 2 of that log, and if you could identify the entry at 02.34.15. Mr Brown, are you able to help as to whether that log is in relation to the conversation between Caili Anderson and the female caller? A. Yes. Q. Yes. Thank you. Ralph, if you could put that down and bring up another document, which is a transcript, which is LFB00000650. If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before I ask you questions.			1	•
A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time when it would come in. Q. Going back to your witness statement, you say at the bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: " stopped monitoring Caili's call and immediately called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the 22nd floor. Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? A. I believe so, yes. Yes, that's time stamped as the time and if you could identify the entry at 02.34.15. Mr Brown, are you able to help as to whether that log is in relation to the conversation between Caili Anderson and the female caller? A. Yes. Ralph, if you could put that down and bring up another document, which is a transcript, which is LFB00000650. If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before I ask you questions.		-	1	
when it would come in. Q. Going back to your witness statement, you say at the bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: " stopped monitoring Caili's call and immediately called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? Mr Brown, are you able to help as to whether that log is in relation to the conversation between A. Yes. Q. Yes. Thank you. Ralph, if you could put that down and bring up another document, which is a transcript, which is LFB00000650. If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before I ask you questions.		_	1	
O. Going back to your witness statement, you say at the bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: " stopped monitoring Caili's call and immediately called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the 22nd floor. Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? O Going back to your witness statement, you say at the Caili Anderson and the female caller? A. Yes. O Yes. Thank you. Ralph, if you could put that down and bring up another document, which is a transcript, which is LFB00000650. If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before I ask you questions.			1	
bottom of page 3 of your witness statement that you: " stopped monitoring Caili's call and immediately called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the 22nd floor. Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? 16 Caili Anderson and the female caller? A. Yes. 18 Q. Yes. Thank you. 19 Ralph, if you could put that down and bring up another document, which is a transcript, which is LFB00000650. 21 If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then 23 shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over 24 to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before 25 I ask you questions.			1	
17 " stopped monitoring Caili's call and immediately 18 called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the 19 information as it was time critical." 19 We know from looking at the LFB's control report 20 We know from looking at the LFB's control report 21 that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call 22 from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, 23 the 22nd floor. 24 Does that correspond to the call that was made by 25 you to London? 26 Yes. Thank you. 27 another document, which is a transcript, which is 28 LFB00000650. 29 If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then 20 shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over 21 to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before 22 I ask you questions.			1	
called London Fire Brigade Control Room to pass on the information as it was time critical." We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the 22nd floor. Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? 18 Q. Yes. Thank you. 19 Ralph, if you could put that down and bring up another document, which is a transcript, which is LFB00000650. 21 LFB00000650. 22 If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before I ask you questions.			1	
19 information as it was time critical." 20 We know from looking at the LFB's control report 21 that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call 22 from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, 23 the 22nd floor. 24 Does that correspond to the call that was made by 25 you to London? 26 Ye know from looking at the LFB's control report 27 another document, which is a transcript, which is 28 LFB00000650. 29 If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then 20 shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over 21 to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before 22 I ask you questions.			1	
We know from looking at the LFB's control report that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the 22nd floor. Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? 20 another document, which is a transcript, which is LFB00000650. 21 LFB00000650. 22 If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then 23 shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over 24 to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before 25 I ask you questions.			1	
that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the 22nd floor. Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? that at 02.30, Control Room Officer Russell takes a call 21 LFB00000650. 22 If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then 23 shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over 24 to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before 25 I ask you questions.			1	
from Surrey FRS to report the call being from flat 194, the 22nd floor. Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? If I could just ask you to read page 1 and then to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before I ask you questions.			1	
the 22nd floor. Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? 23 shout when you've finished page 1 and we can turn over to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before 25 I ask you questions.			1	
Does that correspond to the call that was made by you to London? 24 to page 2, just so you can refresh your memory before I ask you questions.			1	
25 you to London? 25 I ask you questions.			1	
			1	
Page 126 Page 128		·		
		Page 126		Page 128

	(n)	
1	(Pause)	that floor, and when taking the mobile number, she says:
2	A. Yes.	2 "OPERATOR 2: I've got lots of calls waiting."
3	Q. Turn over to page 2, please, Ralph.	3 Looking at that answer, do you think at that stage
4	(Pause)	4 it was essential to ascertain from the LFB that someone
5	A. Okay, yes.	5 was going to call back Mr Disson to tell him to 6 evacuate, whether Surrey or London?
6 7	Q. This is the transcript of a second call from the same caller.	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
8	A. Yes.	•
9	Q. It's at 02.45.45. You'll see at the bottom of page 2,	8 Q. Why do you say that? 9 A. Because on the initial call we knew that he was trapped.
10	which is the page on the screen, the CRO has taken the	10 So at that stage we were asking them to contact him to
11	number and then said:	aid in a rescue operation.
12	"OPERATOR: No problem, we will pass that through	12 Q. Do you think at that stage, they would've given
13	to London and see if someone's able to give him a call	that's what you knew. Was there any benefit in Surrey
14	from there, okay? To reassure him, all right?"	14 contacting Mr Disson directly?
15	I know it's not you who was taking the call at	15 A. No.
16	Surrey, but did you know this was something that London	16 Q. Why do you say that?
17	would do, ie call the individual back to provide	17 A. Because that would've possibly impinged on any rescue
18	reassurance?	operation going ahead with London, as it being their
19	A. I didn't know that that was something that they were	19 ground and their resources and attendance.
20	going to do, but I was going to pass that number through	20 Q. Could that risk have been mitigated if you'd asked
21	to London so that they could contact them with regards	21 London for an update as to the attempts to rescue
22	to rescue.	22 Mr Disson?
23	Q. Okay.	23 A. Could it be sorry, could you repeat the question
24	At 02.48.49, Caili Anderson contacts the LFB to ask	24 again?
25	them to do this. She speaks to CRO Gotts to pass on the	25 Q. Could you have dealt with that problem by asking London:
	Page 129	Page 131
1	details. For everyone's reference, that is page 102 of	1 "What's the state of play in terms of rescuing this
1 2	details. For everyone's reference, that is page 102 of the control report. We don't need to go to that unless	1 "What's the state of play in terms of rescuing this 2 gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide
2	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless	2 gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide
	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to.	2 gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide 3 him with an update, provide him with information as to
2 3	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness	2 gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide 3 him with an update, provide him with information as to
2 3 4	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness statement, she says when she tried to pass on details	2 gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide 3 him with an update, provide him with information as to 4 someone's on their way?" something along those lines?
2 3 4 5	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness	2 gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide 3 him with an update, provide him with information as to 4 someone's on their way?" something along those lines? 5 A. Possibly.
2 3 4 5 6	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness statement, she says when she tried to pass on details about the trapped resident to the LFB CRO she said:	 gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide him with an update, provide him with information as to someone's on their way?" something along those lines? A. Possibly. Q. Did it cross your mind at the time, can you remember?
2 3 4 5 6 7	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness statement, she says when she tried to pass on details about the trapped resident to the LFB CRO she said: " London sounded really busy and I had to try and	2 gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide 3 him with an update, provide him with information as to 4 someone's on their way?" something along those lines? 5 A. Possibly. 6 Q. Did it cross your mind at the time, can you remember? 7 A. Possibly.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness statement, she says when she tried to pass on details about the trapped resident to the LFB CRO she said: " London sounded really busy and I had to try and force her to take the details down."	gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide him with an update, provide him with information as to someone's on their way?" something along those lines? A. Possibly. Q. Did it cross your mind at the time, can you remember? A. Possibly. Q. You
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness statement, she says when she tried to pass on details about the trapped resident to the LFB CRO she said: " London sounded really busy and I had to try and force her to take the details down." Was that your experience when you tried to contact	gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide him with an update, provide him with information as to someone's on their way?" something along those lines? A. Possibly. Q. Did it cross your mind at the time, can you remember? A. Possibly. Q. You 9 A. I can't remember. I can't remember.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness statement, she says when she tried to pass on details about the trapped resident to the LFB CRO she said: " London sounded really busy and I had to try and force her to take the details down." Was that your experience when you tried to contact London?	gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide him with an update, provide him with information as to someone's on their way?" something along those lines? A. Possibly. Q. Did it cross your mind at the time, can you remember? A. Possibly. Q. You A. I can't remember. I can't remember. Q. The next topic I'd like to come to is the change in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness statement, she says when she tried to pass on details about the trapped resident to the LFB CRO she said: " London sounded really busy and I had to try and force her to take the details down." Was that your experience when you tried to contact London? A. Not that I can I can't remember, to be honest.	gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide him with an update, provide him with information as to someone's on their way?" something along those lines? A. Possibly. Did it cross your mind at the time, can you remember? A. Possibly. Q. You A. I can't remember. I can't remember. Q. The next topic I'd like to come to is the change in stay-put advice A. Okay. A. Okay. Q on the evening.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness statement, she says when she tried to pass on details about the trapped resident to the LFB CRO she said: " London sounded really busy and I had to try and force her to take the details down." Was that your experience when you tried to contact London? A. Not that I can I can't remember, to be honest. Q. Do you have any recollection of how the CRO on the receiving end at London dealt with your call? Did they sound stressed, were they rushed, did you have to, as	2 gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide 3 him with an update, provide him with information as to 4 someone's on their way?" something along those lines? 5 A. Possibly. 6 Q. Did it cross your mind at the time, can you remember? 7 A. Possibly. 8 Q. You 9 A. I can't remember. I can't remember. 10 Q. The next topic I'd like to come to is the change in 11 stay-put advice 12 A. Okay. 13 Q on the evening. 14 If we could stay with this transcript but go to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness statement, she says when she tried to pass on details about the trapped resident to the LFB CRO she said: " London sounded really busy and I had to try and force her to take the details down." Was that your experience when you tried to contact London? A. Not that I can — I can't remember, to be honest. Q. Do you have any recollection of how the CRO on the receiving end at London dealt with your call? Did they sound stressed, were they rushed, did you have to, as Ms Anderson said, force them to take the details down?	gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide him with an update, provide him with information as to someone's on their way?" something along those lines? A. Possibly. Q. Did it cross your mind at the time, can you remember? A. Possibly. Q. You A. I can't remember. I can't remember. Q. The next topic I'd like to come to is the change in stay-put advice A. Okay. Q on the evening. If we could stay with this transcript but go to page 2, operator 2 says:
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness statement, she says when she tried to pass on details about the trapped resident to the LFB CRO she said: " London sounded really busy and I had to try and force her to take the details down." Was that your experience when you tried to contact London? A. Not that I can I can't remember, to be honest. Q. Do you have any recollection of how the CRO on the receiving end at London dealt with your call? Did they sound stressed, were they rushed, did you have to, as Ms Anderson said, force them to take the details down? A. Okay, yes, they sounded busy.	gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide him with an update, provide him with information as to someone's on their way?" something along those lines? A. Possibly. Q. Did it cross your mind at the time, can you remember? A. Possibly. Q. You A. I can't remember. I can't remember. Q. The next topic I'd like to come to is the change in stay-put advice A. Okay. Q on the evening. If we could stay with this transcript but go to page 2, operator 2 says: "OPERATOR 2: No. Well, we've just been told to tell
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness statement, she says when she tried to pass on details about the trapped resident to the LFB CRO she said: " London sounded really busy and I had to try and force her to take the details down." Was that your experience when you tried to contact London? A. Not that I can I can't remember, to be honest. Q. Do you have any recollection of how the CRO on the receiving end at London dealt with your call? Did they sound stressed, were they rushed, did you have to, as Ms Anderson said, force them to take the details down? A. Okay, yes, they sounded busy. Q. But receptive?	gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide him with an update, provide him with information as to someone's on their way?" something along those lines? A. Possibly. Q. Did it cross your mind at the time, can you remember? A. Possibly. Q. You 9 A. I can't remember. I can't remember. 10 Q. The next topic I'd like to come to is the change in stay-put advice 12 A. Okay. Q on the evening. If we could stay with this transcript but go to page 2, operator 2 says: "OPERATOR 2: No. Well, we've just been told to tell people to put a wet towel over their heads and try and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness statement, she says when she tried to pass on details about the trapped resident to the LFB CRO she said: " London sounded really busy and I had to try and force her to take the details down." Was that your experience when you tried to contact London? A. Not that I can I can't remember, to be honest. Q. Do you have any recollection of how the CRO on the receiving end at London dealt with your call? Did they sound stressed, were they rushed, did you have to, as Ms Anderson said, force them to take the details down? A. Okay, yes, they sounded busy. Q. But receptive? A. They sounded busy, yes.	gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide him with an update, provide him with information as to someone's on their way?" something along those lines? A. Possibly. Q. Did it cross your mind at the time, can you remember? A. Possibly. Q. You A. I can't remember. I can't remember. Q. The next topic I'd like to come to is the change in stay-put advice A. Okay. Q on the evening. If we could stay with this transcript but go to page 2, operator 2 says: "OPERATOR 2: No. Well, we've just been told to tell people to put a wet towel over their heads and try and get out."
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness statement, she says when she tried to pass on details about the trapped resident to the LFB CRO she said: " London sounded really busy and I had to try and force her to take the details down." Was that your experience when you tried to contact London? A. Not that I can — I can't remember, to be honest. Q. Do you have any recollection of how the CRO on the receiving end at London dealt with your call? Did they sound stressed, were they rushed, did you have to, as Ms Anderson said, force them to take the details down? A. Okay, yes, they sounded busy. Q. But receptive? A. They sounded busy, yes. Q. Okay.	gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide him with an update, provide him with information as to someone's on their way?" something along those lines? A. Possibly. Q. Did it cross your mind at the time, can you remember? A. Possibly. Q. You A. I can't remember. I can't remember. Q. The next topic I'd like to come to is the change in stay-put advice A. Okay. Q on the evening. If we could stay with this transcript but go to page 2, operator 2 says: "OPERATOR 2: No. Well, we've just been told to tell people to put a wet towel over their heads and try and get out." At the time, did you take that to mean that stay put
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness statement, she says when she tried to pass on details about the trapped resident to the LFB CRO she said: " London sounded really busy and I had to try and force her to take the details down." Was that your experience when you tried to contact London? A. Not that I can — I can't remember, to be honest. Q. Do you have any recollection of how the CRO on the receiving end at London dealt with your call? Did they sound stressed, were they rushed, did you have to, as Ms Anderson said, force them to take the details down? A. Okay, yes, they sounded busy. Q. But receptive? A. They sounded busy, yes. Q. Okay. If I could ask Ralph to put up another transcript,	gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide him with an update, provide him with information as to someone's on their way?" something along those lines? A. Possibly. Q. Did it cross your mind at the time, can you remember? A. Possibly. Q. You A. I can't remember. I can't remember. Q. The next topic I'd like to come to is the change in stay-put advice A. Okay. Q on the evening. If we could stay with this transcript but go to page 2, operator 2 says: "OPERATOR 2: No. Well, we've just been told to tell people to put a wet towel over their heads and try and get out." At the time, did you take that to mean that stay put had been withdrawn?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness statement, she says when she tried to pass on details about the trapped resident to the LFB CRO she said: " London sounded really busy and I had to try and force her to take the details down." Was that your experience when you tried to contact London? A. Not that I can — I can't remember, to be honest. Q. Do you have any recollection of how the CRO on the receiving end at London dealt with your call? Did they sound stressed, were they rushed, did you have to, as Ms Anderson said, force them to take the details down? A. Okay, yes, they sounded busy. Q. But receptive? A. They sounded busy, yes. Q. Okay. If I could ask Ralph to put up another transcript, and it's of that particular call made by Caili Anderson,	gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide him with an update, provide him with information as to someone's on their way?" something along those lines? A. Possibly. Q. Did it cross your mind at the time, can you remember? A. Possibly. Q. You A. I can't remember. I can't remember. Q. The next topic I'd like to come to is the change in stay-put advice A. Okay. Q on the evening. If we could stay with this transcript but go to page 2, operator 2 says: "OPERATOR 2: No. Well, we've just been told to tell people to put a wet towel over their heads and try and get out." At the time, did you take that to mean that stay put had been withdrawn? A. At no point did we know that we had no idea or
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness statement, she says when she tried to pass on details about the trapped resident to the LFB CRO she said: " London sounded really busy and I had to try and force her to take the details down." Was that your experience when you tried to contact London? A. Not that I can I can't remember, to be honest. Q. Do you have any recollection of how the CRO on the receiving end at London dealt with your call? Did they sound stressed, were they rushed, did you have to, as Ms Anderson said, force them to take the details down? A. Okay, yes, they sounded busy. Q. But receptive? A. They sounded busy, yes. Q. Okay. If I could ask Ralph to put up another transcript, and it's of that particular call made by Caili Anderson, at LFB00000544.	gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide him with an update, provide him with information as to someone's on their way?" something along those lines? A. Possibly. Q. Did it cross your mind at the time, can you remember? A. Possibly. Q. You A. I can't remember. I can't remember. Q. The next topic I'd like to come to is the change in stay-put advice A. Okay. Q on the evening. If we could stay with this transcript but go to page 2, operator 2 says: "OPERATOR 2: No. Well, we've just been told to tell people to put a wet towel over their heads and try and get out." At the time, did you take that to mean that stay put had been withdrawn? A. At no point did we know that we had no idea or inkling if there was stay put in place at that property.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness statement, she says when she tried to pass on details about the trapped resident to the LFB CRO she said: " London sounded really busy and I had to try and force her to take the details down." Was that your experience when you tried to contact London? A. Not that I can I can't remember, to be honest. Q. Do you have any recollection of how the CRO on the receiving end at London dealt with your call? Did they sound stressed, were they rushed, did you have to, as Ms Anderson said, force them to take the details down? A. Okay, yes, they sounded busy. Q. But receptive? A. They sounded busy, yes. Q. Okay. If I could ask Ralph to put up another transcript, and it's of that particular call made by Caili Anderson, at LFB00000544. If we can go to page 3 of that transcript and the	gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide him with an update, provide him with information as to someone's on their way?" something along those lines? A. Possibly. Q. Did it cross your mind at the time, can you remember? A. Possibly. Q. You A. I can't remember. I can't remember. Q. The next topic I'd like to come to is the change in stay-put advice A. Okay. Q on the evening. If we could stay with this transcript but go to page 2, operator 2 says: "OPERATOR 2: No. Well, we've just been told to tell people to put a wet towel over their heads and try and get out." At the time, did you take that to mean that stay put had been withdrawn? A. At no point did we know that we had no idea or inkling if there was stay put in place at that property. So this is the first advice that we've had from London
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness statement, she says when she tried to pass on details about the trapped resident to the LFB CRO she said: " London sounded really busy and I had to try and force her to take the details down." Was that your experience when you tried to contact London? A. Not that I can — I can't remember, to be honest. Q. Do you have any recollection of how the CRO on the receiving end at London dealt with your call? Did they sound stressed, were they rushed, did you have to, as Ms Anderson said, force them to take the details down? A. Okay, yes, they sounded busy. Q. But receptive? A. They sounded busy, yes. Q. Okay. If I could ask Ralph to put up another transcript, and it's of that particular call made by Caili Anderson, at LFB00000544. If we can go to page 3 of that transcript and the second entry from operator 2.	gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide him with an update, provide him with information as to someone's on their way?" something along those lines? A. Possibly. Q. Did it cross your mind at the time, can you remember? A. Possibly. Q. You A. I can't remember. I can't remember. Q. The next topic I'd like to come to is the change in stay-put advice A. Okay. Q on the evening. If we could stay with this transcript but go to page 2, operator 2 says: "OPERATOR 2: No. Well, we've just been told to tell people to put a wet towel over their heads and try and get out." At the time, did you take that to mean that stay put had been withdrawn? A. At no point did we know that we had no idea or inkling if there was stay put in place at that property. So this is the first advice that we've had from London Fire stating that this is what their guidance is, to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness statement, she says when she tried to pass on details about the trapped resident to the LFB CRO she said: " London sounded really busy and I had to try and force her to take the details down." Was that your experience when you tried to contact London? A. Not that I can I can't remember, to be honest. Q. Do you have any recollection of how the CRO on the receiving end at London dealt with your call? Did they sound stressed, were they rushed, did you have to, as Ms Anderson said, force them to take the details down? A. Okay, yes, they sounded busy. Q. But receptive? A. They sounded busy, yes. Q. Okay. If I could ask Ralph to put up another transcript, and it's of that particular call made by Caili Anderson, at LFB00000544. If we can go to page 3 of that transcript and the	gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide him with an update, provide him with information as to someone's on their way?" something along those lines? A. Possibly. Q. Did it cross your mind at the time, can you remember? A. Possibly. Q. You A. I can't remember. I can't remember. Q. The next topic I'd like to come to is the change in stay-put advice A. Okay. Q on the evening. If we could stay with this transcript but go to page 2, operator 2 says: "OPERATOR 2: No. Well, we've just been told to tell people to put a wet towel over their heads and try and get out." At the time, did you take that to mean that stay put had been withdrawn? A. At no point did we know that we had no idea or inkling if there was stay put in place at that property. So this is the first advice that we've had from London
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	the control report. We don't need to go to that unless you want to. My question is this: in Caili Anderson's witness statement, she says when she tried to pass on details about the trapped resident to the LFB CRO she said: " London sounded really busy and I had to try and force her to take the details down." Was that your experience when you tried to contact London? A. Not that I can — I can't remember, to be honest. Q. Do you have any recollection of how the CRO on the receiving end at London dealt with your call? Did they sound stressed, were they rushed, did you have to, as Ms Anderson said, force them to take the details down? A. Okay, yes, they sounded busy. Q. But receptive? A. They sounded busy, yes. Q. Okay. If I could ask Ralph to put up another transcript, and it's of that particular call made by Caili Anderson, at LFB00000544. If we can go to page 3 of that transcript and the second entry from operator 2.	gentleman? Would it help if we phoned him to provide him with an update, provide him with information as to someone's on their way?" something along those lines? A. Possibly. Q. Did it cross your mind at the time, can you remember? A. Possibly. Q. You A. I can't remember. I can't remember. Q. The next topic I'd like to come to is the change in stay-put advice A. Okay. Q on the evening. If we could stay with this transcript but go to page 2, operator 2 says: "OPERATOR 2: No. Well, we've just been told to tell people to put a wet towel over their heads and try and get out." At the time, did you take that to mean that stay put had been withdrawn? A. At no point did we know that we had no idea or inkling if there was stay put in place at that property. So this is the first advice that we've had from London Fire stating that this is what their guidance is, to

1	Q. Did you understand that at the time to mean that stay	1	"OPERATOR: And stay low to the floor and
2	put ie people had been told to evacuate, to leave?	2	(overspeaking) flat and we'll pass it through to London
3	A. The gentleman was initially trapped in his property. We	3	again"
4	had no idea of any kind of stay-put policy in place. It	4	Looking at that transcript, it doesn't look as if
5	being London's ground, we were reliant on them providing	5	Caili Anderson is giving express advice to get out; is
6	guidance as to what they were going to do, bearing in	6	that a fair summary of the advice that was given during
7	mind it was assumed to be a rescue operation. We	7	the course of that call?
8	weren't told otherwise that it wasn't.	8	A. No. Is that yeah, no.
9	Q. Once you'd received that information from London, did	9	Q. Are you able to give us, from your perspective, an
10	you try to call Mr Disson's daughter-in-law to give	10	explanation as to why that advice wasn't given? Was it
11	her advice?	11	because you knew he was trapped and you were relying
12	A. Yes, we contacted the yes.	12	upon the previous information he had given you?
13	Q. If I could ask you to turn back to your witness	13	A. What's the next page of this, sorry?
14	statement at page 5, the very top of that page, you say	14	Q. Ralph, could you turn over the page, please.
15	you received another call at 03.07, and this was from	15	(Pause)
16	the same lady who had called previously. As before,	16	A. Okay, sorry, can you repeat the question?
17	Caili Anderson took the call and you monitored it; is	17	Q. Looking at the transcript, it doesn't look as if
18	that right?	18	Caili Anderson gave express advice to get out.
19	A. Yes.	19	Are you able to help us as to why that advice wasn't
20	Q. Is your recollection that it was during the course of	20	given?
21	that call that you provided the caller with an update as	21	A. I don't know why that advice wasn't given.
22	to the advice from London?	22	Q. From your perspective, were you sat next to Caili whilst
23	A. Okay, so, yeah, it must have been on that call rather	23	she was on the call
24	than us contacting her back.	24	A. I
25	Q. You also say in your witness statement at page 5, third	25	Q to the lady?
23	Q. Tou diso say in your witness statement at page 3, time	23	Q. — to the lady:
	Page 133		Page 135
1	line down:	1	3
1	line down:	1 2	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control
2	"The female sounded more distressed during this	2	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position.
2 3	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames	2 3	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice
2 3 4	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I	2 3 4	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the
2 3 4 5	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first	2 3 4 5	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had?
2 3 4 5 6	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there."	2 3 4 5 6	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had? A. I would've passed exactly the same advice which London
2 3 4 5 6 7	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there." At that time, when that thought crystallised, was	2 3 4 5 6 7	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had? A. I would've passed exactly the same advice which London had passed us to pass on.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there." At that time, when that thought crystallised, was your expectation still that Mr Disson would be rescued?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had? A. I would've passed exactly the same advice which London had passed us to pass on. Q. Okay. That's useful.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there." At that time, when that thought crystallised, was your expectation still that Mr Disson would be rescued? A. No.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had? A. I would've passed exactly the same advice which London had passed us to pass on. Q. Okay. That's useful. Ralph, can you put that down and put up another
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there." At that time, when that thought crystallised, was your expectation still that Mr Disson would be rescued? A. No. Q. So in those circumstances, what advice did you give to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had? A. I would've passed exactly the same advice which London had passed us to pass on. Q. Okay. That's useful. Ralph, can you put that down and put up another transcript which is LFB00000685.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there." At that time, when that thought crystallised, was your expectation still that Mr Disson would be rescued? A. No. Q. So in those circumstances, what advice did you give to the caller? What did you say to the caller?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had? A. I would've passed exactly the same advice which London had passed us to pass on. Q. Okay. That's useful. Ralph, can you put that down and put up another transcript which is LFB00000685. This is a call at 03.06 and is a call made by Surrey
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there." At that time, when that thought crystallised, was your expectation still that Mr Disson would be rescued? A. No. Q. So in those circumstances, what advice did you give to the caller? What did you say to the caller? A. I'm just referring to my statement.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had? A. I would've passed exactly the same advice which London had passed us to pass on. Q. Okay. That's useful. Ralph, can you put that down and put up another transcript which is LFB00000685. This is a call at 03.06 and is a call made by Surrey to the LFB to pass the information following that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there." At that time, when that thought crystallised, was your expectation still that Mr Disson would be rescued? A. No. Q. So in those circumstances, what advice did you give to the caller? What did you say to the caller? A. I'm just referring to my statement. (Pause)	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had? A. I would've passed exactly the same advice which London had passed us to pass on. Q. Okay. That's useful. Ralph, can you put that down and put up another transcript which is LFB00000685. This is a call at 03.06 and is a call made by Surrey to the LFB to pass the information following that earlier call.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there." At that time, when that thought crystallised, was your expectation still that Mr Disson would be rescued? A. No. Q. So in those circumstances, what advice did you give to the caller? What did you say to the caller? A. I'm just referring to my statement. (Pause) Q. Would it help if we went to the transcript?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had? A. I would've passed exactly the same advice which London had passed us to pass on. Q. Okay. That's useful. Ralph, can you put that down and put up another transcript which is LFB00000685. This is a call at 03.06 and is a call made by Surrey to the LFB to pass the information following that earlier call. If I could ask Ralph to take you to page 2 of the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there." At that time, when that thought crystallised, was your expectation still that Mr Disson would be rescued? A. No. Q. So in those circumstances, what advice did you give to the caller? What did you say to the caller? A. I'm just referring to my statement. (Pause) Q. Would it help if we went to the transcript? A. Of course, yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had? A. I would've passed exactly the same advice which London had passed us to pass on. Q. Okay. That's useful. Ralph, can you put that down and put up another transcript which is LFB00000685. This is a call at 03.06 and is a call made by Surrey to the LFB to pass the information following that earlier call. If I could ask Ralph to take you to page 2 of the transcript, you'll see from the fifth line down,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there." At that time, when that thought crystallised, was your expectation still that Mr Disson would be rescued? A. No. Q. So in those circumstances, what advice did you give to the caller? What did you say to the caller? A. I'm just referring to my statement. (Pause) Q. Would it help if we went to the transcript? A. Of course, yes. Q. Ralph, could you put up LFB00000651, and particularly go	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had? A. I would've passed exactly the same advice which London had passed us to pass on. Q. Okay. That's useful. Ralph, can you put that down and put up another transcript which is LFB00000685. This is a call at 03.06 and is a call made by Surrey to the LFB to pass the information following that earlier call. If I could ask Ralph to take you to page 2 of the transcript, you'll see from the fifth line down, operator 1 says:
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there." At that time, when that thought crystallised, was your expectation still that Mr Disson would be rescued? A. No. Q. So in those circumstances, what advice did you give to the caller? What did you say to the caller? A. I'm just referring to my statement. (Pause) Q. Would it help if we went to the transcript? A. Of course, yes. Q. Ralph, could you put up LFB00000651, and particularly go to page 2 of the transcript.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had? A. I would've passed exactly the same advice which London had passed us to pass on. Q. Okay. That's useful. Ralph, can you put that down and put up another transcript which is LFB00000685. This is a call at 03.06 and is a call made by Surrey to the LFB to pass the information following that earlier call. If I could ask Ralph to take you to page 2 of the transcript, you'll see from the fifth line down, operator 1 says: "OPERATOR 1: Yeah. So, flat 194, we're getting a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there." At that time, when that thought crystallised, was your expectation still that Mr Disson would be rescued? A. No. Q. So in those circumstances, what advice did you give to the caller? What did you say to the caller? A. I'm just referring to my statement. (Pause) Q. Would it help if we went to the transcript? A. Of course, yes. Q. Ralph, could you put up LFB00000651, and particularly go to page 2 of the transcript. I'll just let you refresh your memory.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had? A. I would've passed exactly the same advice which London had passed us to pass on. Q. Okay. That's useful. Ralph, can you put that down and put up another transcript which is LFB00000685. This is a call at 03.06 and is a call made by Surrey to the LFB to pass the information following that earlier call. If I could ask Ralph to take you to page 2 of the transcript, you'll see from the fifth line down, operator 1 says: "OPERATOR 1: Yeah. So, flat 194, we're getting a further call saying that the gentleman says there's fire
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there." At that time, when that thought crystallised, was your expectation still that Mr Disson would be rescued? A. No. Q. So in those circumstances, what advice did you give to the caller? What did you say to the caller? A. I'm just referring to my statement. (Pause) Q. Would it help if we went to the transcript? A. Of course, yes. Q. Ralph, could you put up LFB00000651, and particularly go to page 2 of the transcript. I'll just let you refresh your memory. (Pause)	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had? A. I would've passed exactly the same advice which London had passed us to pass on. Q. Okay. That's useful. Ralph, can you put that down and put up another transcript which is LFB00000685. This is a call at 03.06 and is a call made by Surrey to the LFB to pass the information following that earlier call. If I could ask Ralph to take you to page 2 of the transcript, you'll see from the fifth line down, operator 1 says: "OPERATOR 1: Yeah. So, flat 194, we're getting a further call saying that the gentleman says there's fire in his flat now.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there." At that time, when that thought crystallised, was your expectation still that Mr Disson would be rescued? A. No. Q. So in those circumstances, what advice did you give to the caller? What did you say to the caller? A. I'm just referring to my statement. (Pause) Q. Would it help if we went to the transcript? A. Of course, yes. Q. Ralph, could you put up LFB00000651, and particularly go to page 2 of the transcript. I'll just let you refresh your memory. (Pause) I think it's that middle section on page 2 which	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had? A. I would've passed exactly the same advice which London had passed us to pass on. Q. Okay. That's useful. Ralph, can you put that down and put up another transcript which is LFB00000685. This is a call at 03.06 and is a call made by Surrey to the LFB to pass the information following that earlier call. If I could ask Ralph to take you to page 2 of the transcript, you'll see from the fifth line down, operator 1 says: "OPERATOR 1: Yeah. So, flat 194, we're getting a further call saying that the gentleman says there's fire in his flat now. "OPERATOR 2: Right. Now, we're doing now, we've
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there." At that time, when that thought crystallised, was your expectation still that Mr Disson would be rescued? A. No. Q. So in those circumstances, what advice did you give to the caller? What did you say to the caller? A. I'm just referring to my statement. (Pause) Q. Would it help if we went to the transcript? A. Of course, yes. Q. Ralph, could you put up LFB00000651, and particularly go to page 2 of the transcript. I'll just let you refresh your memory. (Pause) I think it's that middle section on page 2 which I think is your recollection	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had? A. I would've passed exactly the same advice which London had passed us to pass on. Q. Okay. That's useful. Ralph, can you put that down and put up another transcript which is LFB00000685. This is a call at 03.06 and is a call made by Surrey to the LFB to pass the information following that earlier call. If I could ask Ralph to take you to page 2 of the transcript, you'll see from the fifth line down, operator 1 says: "OPERATOR 1: Yeah. So, flat 194, we're getting a further call saying that the gentleman says there's fire in his flat now. "OPERATOR 2: Right. Now, we're doing now, we've changed our advice, were going to ring you. So, you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there." At that time, when that thought crystallised, was your expectation still that Mr Disson would be rescued? A. No. Q. So in those circumstances, what advice did you give to the caller? What did you say to the caller? A. I'm just referring to my statement. (Pause) Q. Would it help if we went to the transcript? A. Of course, yes. Q. Ralph, could you put up LFB00000651, and particularly go to page 2 of the transcript. I'll just let you refresh your memory. (Pause) I think it's that middle section on page 2 which I think is your recollection A. Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had? A. I would've passed exactly the same advice which London had passed us to pass on. Q. Okay. That's useful. Ralph, can you put that down and put up another transcript which is LFB00000685. This is a call at 03.06 and is a call made by Surrey to the LFB to pass the information following that earlier call. If I could ask Ralph to take you to page 2 of the transcript, you'll see from the fifth line down, operator 1 says: "OPERATOR 1: Yeah. So, flat 194, we're getting a further call saying that the gentleman says there's fire in his flat now. "OPERATOR 2: Right. Now, we're doing now, we've changed our advice, were going to ring you. So, you need to just tell them, whatever they can, get something
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there." At that time, when that thought crystallised, was your expectation still that Mr Disson would be rescued? A. No. Q. So in those circumstances, what advice did you give to the caller? What did you say to the caller? A. I'm just referring to my statement. (Pause) Q. Would it help if we went to the transcript? A. Of course, yes. Q. Ralph, could you put up LFB00000651, and particularly go to page 2 of the transcript. I'll just let you refresh your memory. (Pause) I think it's that middle section on page 2 which I think is your recollection A. Yes. Q of the advice you gave.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had? A. I would've passed exactly the same advice which London had passed us to pass on. Q. Okay. That's useful. Ralph, can you put that down and put up another transcript which is LFB00000685. This is a call at 03.06 and is a call made by Surrey to the LFB to pass the information following that earlier call. If I could ask Ralph to take you to page 2 of the transcript, you'll see from the fifth line down, operator 1 says: "OPERATOR 1: Yeah. So, flat 194, we're getting a further call saying that the gentleman says there's fire in his flat now. "OPERATOR 2: Right. Now, we're doing now, we've changed our advice, were going to ring you. So, you need to just tell them, whatever they can, get something damp, cover it over them and leave the building.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there." At that time, when that thought crystallised, was your expectation still that Mr Disson would be rescued? A. No. Q. So in those circumstances, what advice did you give to the caller? What did you say to the caller? A. I'm just referring to my statement. (Pause) Q. Would it help if we went to the transcript? A. Of course, yes. Q. Ralph, could you put up LFB00000651, and particularly go to page 2 of the transcript. I'll just let you refresh your memory. (Pause) I think it's that middle section on page 2 which I think is your recollection A. Yes. Q of the advice you gave. Then at the bottom of that page, the caller says:	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had? A. I would've passed exactly the same advice which London had passed us to pass on. Q. Okay. That's useful. Ralph, can you put that down and put up another transcript which is LFB00000685. This is a call at 03.06 and is a call made by Surrey to the LFB to pass the information following that earlier call. If I could ask Ralph to take you to page 2 of the transcript, you'll see from the fifth line down, operator 1 says: "OPERATOR 1: Yeah. So, flat 194, we're getting a further call saying that the gentleman says there's fire in his flat now. "OPERATOR 2: Right. Now, we're doing now, we've changed our advice, were going to ring you. So, you need to just tell them, whatever they can, get something damp, cover it over them and leave the building. "OPERATOR 1: Right, okay. So, we're telling them to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	"The female sounded more distressed during this call. She said that her father-in-law could see flames and a lot of smoke inside the flat. On hearing this I was worried that it was now half an hour since the first call and nobody had got there." At that time, when that thought crystallised, was your expectation still that Mr Disson would be rescued? A. No. Q. So in those circumstances, what advice did you give to the caller? What did you say to the caller? A. I'm just referring to my statement. (Pause) Q. Would it help if we went to the transcript? A. Of course, yes. Q. Ralph, could you put up LFB00000651, and particularly go to page 2 of the transcript. I'll just let you refresh your memory. (Pause) I think it's that middle section on page 2 which I think is your recollection A. Yes. Q of the advice you gave.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	A. I wouldn't be sat next to Caili. I was in the control room, but I was at a different position. Q. Given the transcript, are you able to say what advice you would've given in the circumstances, given the information that Caili had? A. I would've passed exactly the same advice which London had passed us to pass on. Q. Okay. That's useful. Ralph, can you put that down and put up another transcript which is LFB00000685. This is a call at 03.06 and is a call made by Surrey to the LFB to pass the information following that earlier call. If I could ask Ralph to take you to page 2 of the transcript, you'll see from the fifth line down, operator 1 says: "OPERATOR 1: Yeah. So, flat 194, we're getting a further call saying that the gentleman says there's fire in his flat now. "OPERATOR 2: Right. Now, we're doing now, we've changed our advice, were going to ring you. So, you need to just tell them, whatever they can, get something damp, cover it over them and leave the building.

1	can?	1	Q. Was?
2	"OPERATOR 2: Yeah, yeah. Do it now. Put something	2	A. Sorry, could you repeat the question?
3	over your body, put something over your mouth and leave.	3	Q. Sorry, I was waiting for you to finish your sentence,
4	"OPERATOR 1: And just go. Okay. Brilliant, okay.	4	Mr Brown.
5	Thank you very much."	5	You've got the advice there in the call of 03.06.
6	Is that the first time you've had clear, express	6	What more, if anything, would you have expected to
7	advice from London that the advice is to evacuate?	7	have been told by the LFB?
8	A. Yes.	8	A. I don't know.
9	Q. If I could turn back to page 5 of your witness	9	Q. At the time, did you consider that sufficient to enable
10	statement we don't need to turn it up unless you	10	you to provide advice to any subsequent callers?
11	would like to see it you say, and I quote:	11	A. We were working under the belief that they were
12	"At 03:11 hours, Caili ANDERSON called the female	12	attempting to be rescued.
13	caller back and relayed the information that London had	13	Q. Can I ask you, what was the basis of that belief?
14	passed on to me"	14	A. Because it's a fire persons reported and we hadn't been
15	We have a record of that and subsequent calls at	15	told otherwise. That's a standard procedure.
16	03.09 and 03.10.26 in the control report.	16	Q. Can I turn to a separate topic, which is calling other
17	At this time, bearing in mind those additional calls	17	fire and rescue services. On page 5 of your witness
18	that were made, can you help us as to why Caili is not	18	statement, you say you spoke to Kent Fire and Rescue
19	calling Mr Disson directly instead of going via	19	Service, and I quote:
20	a relative?	20	" passing on the information from London that
21	A. The gentleman was in contact he was speaking to the	21	people were to wrap themselves in something wet and try
22	family and we were and as Caili had spoken to the	22	to get out."
23	female caller already, she contacted her back.	23	Then you spoke to Essex to tell them the same thing.
24	We did have the telephone number for Mr Disson, but	24	Was this as a result of a specific request from
25	we didn't use it.	25	London to update surrounding fire and rescue services?
	D 127		D 120
	Page 137		Page 139
1	Q. Can you explain why in more detail? Just looking at it	1	A. Yes, they said to contact Kent and Essex specifically
2	objectively, it seems easier to phone him.	2	because they were taking overflow calls.
3	A. Because possibly, if London were attempting any rescue	3	Q. Did it cross your mind whether other fire and rescue
4	operations, they possibly would be contacting that	4	service control rooms might be dealing with the incident
5	number back. However, at that point, now, where they're	5	other than Kent and Essex and they should be contacted
6	saying that that's the advice they're giving, to just	6	as well?
7	leave the property yes.	7	A. Yes, it did potentially, but there's 49 control rooms
8	Q. But there doesn't appear to be a practical reason to	8	within the UK. I mean, yeah, so
9	stop Surrey phoning Mr Disson directly; is that a fair	9	Q. You called the ones you were specifically told to?
10	comment?	10	A. Yes.
11	A. Yes.	11	Q. Fine.
12	Q. At the end of page 5 of your witness statement, you say	12	If I can turn to a separate topic, and that's other
13	this, and I quote:	13	available sources of information.
14	"We didn't have that much control over the calls we	14	You refer in your witness statement and it's
15	received, especially around giving advice to the caller	15	page 4, the last paragraph, we don't need to go to it
16	as it was not our incident and London didn't pass on any	16	you mention that you had Sky News on in the control
17	advice until we received the third call."	17	room; is that right?
18	What would you have expected to have been told by	18	A. Correct.
19	the LFB above and beyond what is set out in the	19	Q. You describe having access to the television footage as
20	transcript of that call at 03.06?	20	a tool to assist you "build a picture of an incident".
21	A. The expectation up until the point where they said that	21	Again, is that a fair summary of your evidence?
22	the person should self-rescue was that rescue operations	22	A. Correct.
23	were in place, as they should be with a fire persons	23	Q. When you are faced with a major fire, would you
24	reported. So anything other than that, was yeah,	24	ordinarily turn to see whether there was footage on the
25	anything other than that wasn't the case.	25	TV news to assist the advice you'd give to callers?
	Page 138		Page 140

A. I would. There is also, you know, access to other kind of ranges of information which you can get, highways a cancers, electers. But, each, you want to attempt to get as much information as possible. Q. And presumably you'd have access in Survey to Survey's CCTV; is that right? A. No to the Survey CCTV. Q. Right. A. No to the Survey CCTV. Q. Right. A. No. Q. Right. A. No. Q. Ves. 11 A. No. Q. Is there any mechanism to do that? 12 Q. O kay. 13 A. Possibly. Q. But shere any mechanism to do that? 14 Q. But you're not aware of it? A. Yeal. We haven't got if at the moment, but there possibly could be a way of doing it. 15 A. Yeal. We haven't got if at the moment, but there possibly could be a way of doing it. 16 possibly. 17 Q. My dustic camera mode. Doy have the technology to access that? 18 have access to police helicopters, MPASIS, I think if it's called. I don't know what the extent — I don't have whether it's got a thermal imaging camers on it. 24 Q. Did you use it on the might, access to the MPS belicopter footage? 3 A. No. Q. My question was: do you have the extent— I don't have whether it's got a thermal imaging camers on it. You have access to police helicopters, MPASIS, I think if it's called. I don't know what the extent — I don't have ween present the conditional resources from 1 access that? Q. Did you use it on the might, access to the MPS belicopter footage? 3 A. No. Page 141 Q. Wy question was: do you have the extent— I don't think — in would depend on a mumber of different and in accision to deploy Survey's ALP, the element of the possibly came in the might, access to the MPS belicopter footage? 3 A. No. Page 142 Page 145 Page 145 A. No. Page 145 Page 144 Page 144 Page 144 Page 144 Page 144				
2 of ranges of information which you can get, highways can get, highways can get, etcelers. May, yeah, you want to attempt to get as much information as possible. 3 Q. And presumably you'd have access in Surrey to Surrey's CCTV; that righty of the control room as to whether you would be able to contact back however many callers. Hif's one or two callers – If could be 10:00. Yeah, it really doe depend on a number of different factors. 4 Q. Right. 9 A. You're talking about like town centre CCTV? 10 Q. Yea. 11 A. No. 12 Q. Is there any mechanism to do that? 13 A. Possibly. 14 Q. But you're not aware of a? 15 A. Yeah. We haven't go if at the moment, but there possibly could be a way of doing it. 16 Q. Martin said in her evidence this menting that Kent lass access to the MPS's heli-tele live link, including the heat camera mode. Do you have the technology to access that? 15 Q. Dat sharin said in her evidence this menting that Kent lass access to the MPS's heli-tele live link, including the heat camera mode. Do you have the technology to access that? 16 Q. Did you use it on the night, access to that footage? 27 A. It's a Surrey Fist automatically record all phone unabers from Fist Scallers of the Sturrey's practice. 28 Just Surrey Fist automatically record all phone unbers from Fist Scallers from 1 and the questions. 19 Q. Is a the post of the sturrey in practice. 29 Just Surrey Fist automatically record all phone unbers from Fist Scallers from 1 and the questions. 29 A. No. 20 Q. In a that circumstances are they recorded? 31 A. No. 42 Q. Did you task to the the international phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made only only one of the cubers. Please doubt the company of the preventing of the time to check they's all right and to pain an undeat and you've had to call people back who	1	A. I would. There is also, you know, access to other kind	1	if so, to what extent?
4 as to whether you would be able to contact back however many callers. If it's one or two callers—it could be CCTV: is that right? 5 Q. And presumably you'd have access in Surrey to Surrey's 6 1020. Veah, it really does depend on a number of different factors. 9 A. Not to the Surrey CCTV. 9 C. Right. 9 A. You're talking about like town centre CCTV? 10 Q. Vs. 11 A. No. 12 Q. Is there any mechanism to do that? 13 A. Possibly. 14 Q. But you're not aware of it? 15 A. Yeah. We haven't got it at the moment, but there possibly could be a way of doing it. 16 Q. Madmit asaid in her evidence this morning that Kent has access to the MPS heli-tele live link, including the heat camera mode. Do you have the technology to access that? 16 Q. Did you use it on the night, access to that footage? 17 Q. Did you use it on the night, access to that footage? 18 A. We have access to police helicopters, MPAS15, I think it footage? 19 A. Who we have the certen—I don't know whether et'rs got a thermal imaging camera on it. Q. Did you use it on the night, access to that footage? 20 A. It's a Surrey Police— Page 141 1 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS helicopter footage? 2 A. No. 4 Q. Did you use it on the night, access to that footage? 2 A. No. 4 Q. No? 2 A. No. 6 Q. Okay. 1 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS helicopter footage? 2 A. No. 6 Q. Okay. 1 Q. My duestion was: do you have access to the MPS helicopter footage? 2 A. No. 6 Q. Okay. 1 Q. My duestion was: do you have access to the MPS helicopter footage? 2 A. No. 3 A. No. 4 Q. Did you use if on the night, access to that footage? 2 A. No. 5 A. No. 6 Q. Okay. 1 Q. My duestion was: do you have access to the MPS helicopter footage? 2 A. No. 5 A. No. 6 Q. Okay. 1 Q. My duestion was: do you have access to the MPS helicopter footage? 2 A. No. 6 Q. Okay. 1 Q. My duestion was: do you have access to the MPS helicopter footage? 2 A. No. 3 A. No. 6 Q. Okay. 1 Q. My duestion was: do you have access to the MPS helicop	2		2	A. The real world practicality, I don't think it would
5 Q. And presumably you'd have access in Surrey to Surrey's 6 CCTV; is that right? 7 A. No for the Surrey CCTV. 8 Q. Right. 9 A. You're talking about like town centre CCTV? 10 Q. Yes. 11 A. No. 12 Q. Is there any mechanism to do that? 13 A. Possibly. 14 Q. But you're not aware of it? 15 A. Yeah. We haven't got it at the moment, but there possibly could be a way of doing it. 16 possibly could be a way of doing it. 17 Q. Ms Martin said in her evidence this moming that Kent has access to the MPS's heli-sele live link, including the heat camera mode. Do you have the technology to access that? 2 A. We have access to plice helicopters, MPASIS, I think it's called. I don't know what the extent — I don't know whether it's got at hermal imaging camera on it. 24 Q. Did you use it on the night, access to that flootage? 25 A. It's a Surrey Folice — Page: 141 1 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS helicopter frontage? 3 A. No. 4 Q. No? 4 Q. No? 5 A. No. 6 Q. Okay. 1 Q. Way question was: do you have access to the MPS helicopter frontage? 1 A. No. 2 A. No. 3 A. No. 4 Q. No? 5 A. No. 6 Q. Okay. 6 Q. Okay. 7 Can I next talk about the call back system, and really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. 9 Just Surrey Rs alonematically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? 11 A. No automatically. 2 Q. In what creumstenses are they recorded? 3 A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 99 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from told to leave and you've had to call people back who have call back between the check they's beaut or call people back who have one which was and people have been put of you when the situation has deteriorated or not and, 25 Sir MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. 18 You've going to go with one of the usbress. Please and what's you stay on the line to get the number from told to leave and you've had to call people back who have call back steems to	3	cameras, et cetera. But, yeah, you want to attempt to	3	depend on operational business within the control room
6 CCTV; is that right? 7 A. Not to the Surrey CCTV. 8 Q. Right. 9 A. You're talking about like town centre CCTV? 10 Q. Yes. 11 A. No. 12 Q. Is there any mechanism to do that? 13 A. Possibly. 14 Q. But you're not aware of it? 15 A. Yeah. We harven't got it at the moment, but there possibly could be a way of doing it. 16 Q. Ms Martin said in her evidence this moming that Kent has access to the MPS heli-telle live link, including the heat camera mode. Do you have the technology to access that? 16 A. We have access to police helicopters, MPASIS, think it's called. I don't know what the extent — I don't a know whether it's got a thermal imaging camera on it. 16 Q. Did you use it on the night, access to the MPS heli-telper link; including the heat camera mode. Do you have the technology to access that? 17 Like John of the work that the extent — I don't a know whether it's got a thermal imaging camera on it. 18 Q. Did you use it on the night, access to the MPS heli-cepter footage? 19 A. It's a Surrey Police — Page 141 10 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS heli-cepter footage? 21 A. No. 22 A. It's a Surrey Folice — Page 141 11 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS heli-cepter footage? 23 A. No. 44 Q. No? 25 A. No. 45 A. No. 46 Q. Okay. 47 Cam I next talk about the call back system, and really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice, and the content is a synthesia of the content is the content is the content is the content in the content in the content is the content in the content is the content in	4	get as much information as possible.	4	as to whether you would be able to contact back however
7 A. Not to the Surrey CCTV. 8 Q. Right. 9 A. You're talking about like town centre CCTV? 10 Q. Yes. 11 A. No. 12 Q. Is there any mechanism to do that? 13 A. Possibly. 14 Q. But you're not aware of it? 15 A. Yeah. We haven't got it at the moment, but there possibly could be a way of doing it. 16 possibly could be a way of doing it. 17 Q. Ms Martin said in her evidence this morning that Kent has access to the MPS's heli-tiel live link, including the heat camera mode. Do you have the technology to access that? 18 has access to no boy on have the technology to access that? 19 A. Yeah. We have access to police helicopters, MPASIS, I think it's called. I don't know what the extent — I don't know whether it's got a thermal imaging camera on it. 19 Q. Didyous use it on the night, access to that flootage? 20 A. It's a Surrey Police— Page 141 10 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS heli-copter footage? 21 A. We have access to the MPS heli-copter footage? 22 A. No. Page 141 11 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS heli-copter footage? 23 A. No. Page 141 11 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS heli-copter footage? 24 A. No. Page 141 12 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS heli-copter footage? 25 A. It's a Surrey Police— Page 141 12 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS heli-copter footage? 26 A. No. Page 141 1 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS heli-copter footage? 3 A. No. Page 141 1 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS heli-copter footage? 3 A. No. Page 141 1 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS heli-copter footage? 3 A. No. Page 141 1 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS heli-copter footage? 3 A. No. Page 141 1 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS heli-copter footage? 4 A. No. 15 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS heli-copter footage? 5 A. No. 16 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS heli-copter footage? 17 Q. Wou question was: do you have ac	5	Q. And presumably you'd have access in Surrey to Surrey's	5	many callers. If it's one or two callers it could be
8 Q. On the night, did you discuss calling back Mr Disson, for example, or Mr Disson's dangitar-in-law, after the call yes described in evidence today? 11 A. No. 12 Q. Is there any mechanism to do that? 13 A. Possibly. 14 Q. Dat you're not aware of it? 15 A. Yeah. We haven't got it at the moment, but there possibly could be a way of doing it. 16 Q. Madritin said in her evidence this morning that Kent has access to the MPS's heli-tele live link, including the heat camera mode. Do you have the technology to access that? 19 the heat camera mode. Do you have the technology to access that? 21 A. We have access to police helicopters, MPASIS, I think it's know whether it's got a thermal imaging camera on it. 22 Q. Did you use it on the night, access to the MPS 2 A. It's a Surrey Police - 2 Page 141 1 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS 2 helicopter footage? 2 helicopter footage? 3 A. No. 4 Q. No? 5 A. No. 6 Q. Okay. 7 Can I next talk about the call back system, and really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. 9 Just Surrey Railore. 10 A. No automatically. 11 Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? 12 Life does not be eighning of a phone call from a 999 emergency. 13 A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency the full thanks of the call back system and people have been util do leave and you've had to call people back who have a special people back who hav	6	CCTV; is that right?	6	10/20. Yeah, it really does depend on a number of
9 A. Vou're tabling about like town centre CCTV? 10 Q. Yes. 11 A. No. 12 Q. Is there any mechanism to do that? 13 A. Possibly. 14 Q. But you're not aware of it? 15 A. Yesh. We haven't got it at the moment, but there possibly could be a way of doing it. 16 possibly could be a way of doing it. 17 Q. Ms Martin said in her evidence this morning that Kent has access to the MPS's heli-tele live link, including 19 the heat camera mode. Do you have the technology to access that? 19 the heat camera mode. Do you have the technology to access that? 20 access that? 21 A. We have access to police helicopters, MPASIS, I think it's called. I don't know what the extent - I don't know whether it's got a thermal imaging camera on it. Q. Did you use it on the might, access to the MPS helicopter footage? 25 A. It's a Surrey Police - Page 141 1 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS helicopter footage? 26 A. No. 27 Page 141 1 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS helicopter footage? 28 A. No. 4 Q. No? 4 Q. No? 4 Q. No? 5 A. No. 6 Q. Okay. 7 Can I next talk about the call back system, and really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. 9 Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? 10 A. No tautomatically. 11 A. No tautomatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? 12 Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? 13 A. No the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. 19 Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which struy-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been part of your job to contact the resources, and please say if you're not able to assist us with this. 16 Would it have been part of your job to contact the resources, and please say if you're not able to assist us with this. 16 Would it have been part of your job to contact the call be in the final tent of the t	7	A. Not to the Surrey CCTV.	7	different factors.
10 Q. Yes. 10 Calls we've discussed in evidence today? 1 A. No. 11 A. No. 12 Q. Is there any mechanism to do that? 12 Q. Okay. 13 Could I ask you one final topic, and it's about resources, and please say if you're not able to assist us with this. 16 Possibly, could be a way of doing it. 17 I.Flb to ask whether they required more resources from Surrey? 18 Surrey? 19 A. Typically any requests for additional requests from London on the might, access to the MPS 19 A. It's a Surrey? 19 A. No. 19 A.	8	Q. Right.	8	Q. On the night, did you discuss calling back Mr Disson,
11 A. No. 12 Q. Is there any mechanism to do that? 13 A. Possibly. 14 Q. But you're not aware of it? 15 A. Yeah. We haven't got if at the moment, but there is possibly could be a way of doing it. 16 possibly could be a way of doing it. 17 Q. Martin said in her evidence this morning that Kent has access to the MPS beli-ted level this, including the heat camera mode. Do you have the technology to access that? 21 A. We have access to police helicopters, MPASIS, I think it's called. I don't know what the extent — I don't know whether it's got a thermal imaging camera on it. 22 know whether it's got at the remaining camera on it. 23 know whether it's got at the remaining camera on it. 24 Q. Did you use it on the night, access to that footage? 25 A. It's a Surrey Police — Page 141 1 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS helicopter footage? 26 A. No. 27 Q. No? 3 A. No. 4 Q. No? 4 Q. No? 4 Can I next talk about the call back system, and really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. 9 Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? 11 A. No tautomatically. 12 Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? 13 A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number P0 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from told to leave and you've had to call poople back who have access to the whole they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from told to leave and you've had to call poople back who had to all poople back who had to sell poople back who had to sellers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, Sir MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or sonere, possibly.	9	A. You're talking about like town centre CCTV?	9	for example, or Mr Disson's daughter-in-law, after the
12 Q. Is there any mechanism to do that? 13 A. Possibly. 14 Q. But you're not aware of it? 14 15 A. Yeah. We haven't got it at the moment, but there 15 possibly could be a way of doing it. 16 Would it have been part of your job to contact the 17 Would it have been part of your job to contact the 18 bas access to the MPSs heli-tele live link, including 18 the heat camera mode. Do you have the technology to access that? 18 A. We have access to police helicopters, MPAS15, I think 18 its catled. I don't know what the extent — I don't 18 its catled. I don't know what the extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what the extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what the extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what he extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what he extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what he extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what he extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what the extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what he extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what he extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what he extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what he extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what he extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what he extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what he extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what he extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what he extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what he extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what he extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what he extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what he extent — I don't 19 its catled. I don't know what he extent — I don't know what he extent — I don't know what he extent — I don't know hat he extent — I don't k	10	Q. Yes.	10	calls we've discussed in evidence today?
13 A. Possibly. 14 Q. But you're not aware of it? 15 A. Yeal. We haven't got it at the moment, but there possibly could be a way of doing it. 16 possibly could be a way of doing it. 17 Q. Ms Martin said in her evidence this morning that Kent has access to the MPSs heli-tele live link, including the heat camera mode. Do you have the technology to access that? 20 access that? 21 A. We have access to police helicopters, MPAS15, I think it's called. I don't know what the extent — I don't know whether it's got a thermal imaging camer on it. 22 J. A. We have access to police helicopters, MPAS15, I think it's called. I don't know whether it's got a thermal imaging camer on it. 22 J. A. We have access to the flight, access to that footage? 23 A. It's a Surrey Police — Page 141 1 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS helicopter footage? 3 A. No. Page 141 1 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS helicopter footage? 3 A. No. Page 145 1 Q. Mo? A. No. A. No. A. No. 6 Q. Okay. Can I next talk about the call back system, and really whafs the system and whafs Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. No tautomatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the (fine. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the year of the perator. 18 Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people back who have made 990 calls? 20 Q. Would you use the call back system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, 25 SiR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or sooner, 25 SiR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier	11	A. No.	11	A. No.
14 Resources, and please say if you're not able to assist 15 A. Yeah. We haven't got it at the moment, but there 16 possibly could be a way of doing it. 16 17 Q. Ms Martin said in her evidence this morning that Kent 18 has access to the MPS's heli-tele live link, including 18 19 the heat camera mode. Do you have the technology to access that? 19 A. We have access to police helicopters, MPAS15, I think 12 it's called. I don't know what the extent — I don't 19 20 A. It's a Surrey Police — 22 A. It's a Surrey Police — 23 A. It's a Surrey Police — 24 A. No. 24 A. No. 25 A. No. 26 A. No. 27 A. No. 27 A. No. 28 A. No. 29 A. No. 29 A. No. 29 A. No. 29 A. No. 20 A. No. 21 A. No. 22 A. No. 24 A. No. 26 A. No. 27 A. No. 27 A. No. 28 A. No. 29 A. No. 20 A.	12	Q. Is there any mechanism to do that?	12	Q. Okay.
15 A. Yeah. We haven't got it at the moment, but there possibly could be a way of doing it. 16 Q. Ms Martin said in the revidence this moming that Kent has access to the MPS's heli-tele live link, including the heat camera mode. Do you have the technology to access that? 20 access that? 21 A. We have access to police helicopters, MPASIS, I think it's called. I don't know what the extent – I don't know what the extent – I don't know what the certent – I don't know what for a derivation in the certent in the control of the certent of the ce	13	A. Possibly.	13	Could I ask you one final topic, and it's about
16 possibly could be a way of doing it. 16 Would it have been part of your job to contact the 17 LFB to ask whether they required more resources from 18 bas access to the MPS the lete live link, including 19 the heat camera mode. Do you have the technology to access that? 19 A. We have access to police helicopters, MPASIS, I think 20 it's called. I don't know what the extent – I don't 22 know whether it's got a thermal imaging camera on it. 23 Q. Didy ou use it on the night, access to that footage? 25 A. It's a Surrey Police – 25 A. No. 26 Page 141 Page 143 Page 143 1	14	Q. But you're not aware of it?	14	resources, and please say if you're not able to assist
17 Q. Ms Martin said in her evidence this morning that Kent has access to the MPS's heli-tele live link, including to access that? 21 A. We have access to police helicopters, MPAS15, I think it is called. I don't know what the extent—I don't too't know what the extent—I don't know what the extent—I don't too't know what the extent—I don't too't know what the extent—I don't know what the extent—I don'	15	A. Yeah. We haven't got it at the moment, but there	15	us with this.
has access to the MPS's heli-tele live link, including the heat camera mode. Do you have the technology to access that? A. We have access to police helicopters, MPAS15, I think it's called. I don't know what the extent – I don't as called. I don't know what the extent – I don't as called. I don't know what the extent – I don't as called. I don't know what the extent – I don't as called as a so whether the side of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the coperator. A. No. Page 141 1 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS helicopter footage? 3 A. No. Page 143 1 Q. Were you involved in a decision to deploy Surrey's ALP, the 42-metre ALP, to London? 3 A. No. 4 Q. No? 3 A. No. 6 Q. Okay. 6 Q. Okay. 6 Q. Okay. 7 Can I next talk about the call back system, and really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. 9 Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? 11 A. Not automatically. 12 Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? 13 A. Not automatically. 14 coll from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. 15 the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. 16 do leave and you've had to call people back who at large the precentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. 16 do leave and you've had to call people back who callers to check hes covered all the presonally encountered that. 20 Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, 25 Kir MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or sooner, possibly.	16	possibly could be a way of doing it.	16	Would it have been part of your job to contact the
the heat camera mode. Do you have the technology to access that? A. We have access to police helicopters, MPASIS, I think it's called. I don't know what the extent – I don't know what the extent – I don't that. A. We have access to police helicopters, MPASIS, I think it's called. I don't know what the extent – I don't that. Q. Did you use it on the night, access to that footage? A. It's a Surrey Police – Page 141 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS helicopter footage? A. No. Page 143 Q. Were you involved in a decision to deploy Surrey's ALP, the alternative for now. MR KINNIER: Mr Brown, thank you very much. Those are all the questions I have for now. MR KINNIER: Mr Brown, thank you very much. Those are all the questions I have for now. What we tend to do is the chairman grants me a short piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that really what's the system and vhaft's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. No automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. No tautomatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. No to do the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, as the writer is a deficiency and there is a deficiency and th	17	Q. Ms Martin said in her evidence this morning that Kent	17	LFB to ask whether they required more resources from
20 access that? 21 A. We have access to police helicopters, MPASIS, I think 22 it's called. I don't know what the extent – I don't 23 know whether it's got a thermal imaging camera on it. 24 Q. Did you use it on the night, access to that footage? 25 A. It's a Surrey Police – 25 A. It's a Surrey Police – 25 A. It's a Surrey Police – 26 A. No. 26 Page 141 Page 143 1 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS 26 helicopter footage? 27 A. No. 28 Page 141 1 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS 27 helicopter footage? 28 A. No. 29 Page 143 2 the 42-metre ALP, to London? 3 A. No. 4 Q. No? 4 MR KINNIER: Mr Brown, thank you very much. Those are all the questions I have for now. 4 Mat we tend to do is the chairman grants me a short piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. 9 Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone 10 numbers from FSG callers? 10 numbers from FSG callers? 11 A. Not automatically. 11 A. Not automatically. 12 Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? 13 A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency 14 call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. 15 have made 999 calls? 15 A. I haven't personally encountered that. 29 Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous 24 callers to check they're all right and to gain an update 25 as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or 26 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or 27 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or 28 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or 28 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or 29 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or 20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or 20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or 20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All ri	18	has access to the MPS's heli-tele live link, including	18	Surrey?
A. We have access to police helicopters, MPAS15, I think it's called. I don't know what the extent – I don't know whether it's got a thermal imaging camera on it. 24 Q. Did you use it on the night, access to that footage? 25 A. It's a Surrey Police – 25 A. No. 26 Page 141 Page 143 1 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS helicopter footage? 26 helicopter footage? 27 helicopter footage? 28 A. No. 29 No? 29 helicopter footage? 29 helicopter footage? 30 A. No. 30	19	the heat camera mode. Do you have the technology to	19	A. Typically any requests for additional resources would
22 it's called. I don't know what the extent — I don't 23 know whether it's got a thermal imaging camera on it. 24 Q. Did you use it on the night, access to that footage? 25 A. It's a Surrey Police — Page 141 1 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS 2 helicopter footage? 3 A. No. 4 Q. No? 4 Q. No? 5 A. No. 6 Q. Okay. 6 Q. Okay. 6 Q. Okay. 7 Can I next talk about the call back system, and really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. 9 Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? 11 A. Not automatically. 12 Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? 13 A. Not automatically. 14 call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. 12 Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? 2 A. I haven't personally encountered that. 2 Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, 2 Sir MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. 3 Fix Haven't personally encountered to root and, 4 Sir MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or	20	access that?	20	come from the host brigade. They would identify that
23 Rinow whether it's got a thermal imaging camera on it. Q. Did you handle any additional requests from London on the night, access to that footage? 25 A. No. 24 Day ou have access to that footage? 25 A. No. 26 A. No. 27 A. No. 28 A. No. 29 A. No. 20 A. No.	21	A. We have access to police helicopters, MPAS15, I think	21	there is a deficiency and therefore look to resolve
24 Q. Did you use it on the night, access to that footage? 25 A. It's a Surrey Police — Page 141 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS helicopter footage? 3 A. No. 4 Q. No? 5 A. No. 6 Q. Okay. 7 Can I next talk about the call back system, and really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. 9 Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? 11 A. Not automatically. 12 Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? 13 A. Not the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number from the operator. 14 Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? 2 A. I haven't personally encountered that. 2 Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, 2 Use you involved in a decision to deploy Surrey's ALP, the eleginatory of the 42-metre ALP, to London? 3 A. No. 4 Q. Were you involved in a decision to deploy Surrey's ALP, the 42-metre ALP, to London? 4 A. No. 5 MR KINNIER: Mr Brown, thank you very much. Those are all the questions I have for now. 6 What we tend to do is the chairman grants me a short piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. 7 Ver covered everything off. 8 I've covered everything off. 9 Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. 11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. 12 Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. 13 So we've going to have a short break now of no more than 5 minutes or so. 14 So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 5 minutes or so. 15 THE WITNESS: Okay. 16 What we tend to do is the chairman grants me a short piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. 17 Well, you've heard, Mr Br	22	it's called. I don't know what the extent I don't	22	that.
Page 141 Page 143 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS helicopter footage? A. No. Q. No? A. No. G. Okay. Can I next talk about the call back system, and really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. Not automatically. A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as sto whether the situation has deteriorated or not and,	23	know whether it's got a thermal imaging camera on it.	23	Q. Did you handle any additional requests from London on
Page 141 Q. My question was: do you have access to the MPS helicopter footage? A. No. Q. No? A. No. Q. No? A. No. G. Okay. Can I next talk about the call back system, and really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator. Call ray you've heard, Mr Brown, thank you very much. Those are all the questions I have for now. What we tend to do is the chairman grants me a short piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that recovered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than the operator. The WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. You're going to pow with one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. THE WITNESS: Of course not. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or	24	Q. Did you use it on the night, access to that footage?	24	the night for additional resources?
1 Q. My question was; do you have access to the MPS 2 helicopter footage? 3 A. No. 4 Q. No? 5 A. No. 6 Q. Okay. 7 Can I next talk about the call back system, and 8 really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. 9 Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone 10 numbers from FSG callers? 11 A. Not automatically. 12 Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? 13 A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency 14 call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of 15 the time. In any other percentage of the time which 16 they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from 17 the operator. 18 Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which 19 stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been 20 told to leave and you've had to call people back who 21 have made 999 calls? 22 A. I haven't personally encountered that. 23 Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous 24 callers to check they're all right and to gain an update 25 as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, 26 Q. Were you involved in a decision to deploy Surrey's ALP, 27 the 42-metre ALP, to London? 3 A. No. 4 MR KINNIER: Mr Brown, thank you very much. Those are all the questions I have for now. 4 What we tend to do is the chairman grants me a short piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that 1 I've covered everything off. 2 Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that 2 Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes 2 needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. 3 So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 4 You're going to have a short break now of no more than 5 minutes or so. 4 THE WITNESS: Okay. 5 I'm Well you've evidence while you're 5 don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're 5 don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're 5 don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're 6 don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're 7 Out of the room. 8 I'm ARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or 8 I'm ARTIN MOORE	25	A. It's a Surrey Police	25	A. No.
1 Q. My question was; do you have access to the MPS 2 helicopter footage? 3 A. No. 4 Q. No? 5 A. No. 6 Q. Okay. 7 Can I next talk about the call back system, and 8 really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. 9 Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone 10 numbers from FSG callers? 11 A. Not automatically. 12 Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? 13 A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency 14 call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of 15 the time. In any other percentage of the time which 16 they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from 17 the operator. 18 Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which 19 stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been 20 told to leave and you've had to call people back who 21 have made 999 calls? 22 A. I haven't personally encountered that. 23 Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous 24 callers to check they're all right and to gain an update 25 as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, 26 Q. Were you involved in a decision to deploy Surrey's ALP, 27 the 42-metre ALP, to London? 3 A. No. 4 MR KINNIER: Mr Brown, thank you very much. Those are all the questions I have for now. 4 What we tend to do is the chairman grants me a short piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that 1 I've covered everything off. 2 Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that 2 Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes 2 needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. 3 So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 4 You're going to have a short break now of no more than 5 minutes or so. 4 THE WITNESS: Okay. 5 I'm Well you've evidence while you're 5 don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're 5 don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're 5 don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're 6 don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're 7 Out of the room. 8 I'm ARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or 8 I'm ARTIN MOORE		7		D
helicopter footage? A. No. A. No. 4 Q. No? A. No. 4 Q. No? A. No. 6 Q. Okay. Can I next talk about the call back system, and really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system, and reall back system, and really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. B. What we tend to do is the chairman grants me a short piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 5 minutes or so. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. THE WITNESS: Of course not. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or		Page 141		Page 143
helicopter footage? A. No. A. No. 4 Q. No? A. No. 4 Q. No? A. No. 6 Q. Okay. Can I next talk about the call back system, and really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system, and reall back system, and really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. B. What we tend to do is the chairman grants me a short piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 5 minutes or so. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. THE WITNESS: Of course not. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or	1	O My question was: do you have access to the MPS	1	O Were you involved in a decision to deploy Surrey's ALP
A. No. 4 Q. No? 5 A. No. 6 Q. Okay. 7 Can I next talk about the call back system, and really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. 9 Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? 10 In what circumstances are they recorded? 11 A. Not automatically. 12 Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? 13 A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. 13 Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? 10 A. No. 4 MR KINNIER: Mr Brown, thank you very much. Those are all the questions I have for now. What we tend to do is the chairman grants me a short precorded that end of the evidence to check that 7 piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that 1 Pre covered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes 1 seeds a moment to check he's covered all the questions. 5 minutes or so. 1 THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. You're going to have a short break now of no more than 1 You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please 4 don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're 2 out of the room. 2 THE WITNESS: Of course not. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. 2 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or 3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or				
4 Q. No? 5 A. No. 6 Q. Okay. 7 Can I next talk about the call back system, and 8 really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. 9 Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone 10 numbers from FSG callers? 11 A. Not automatically. 12 Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? 13 A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency 14 call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of 15 the time. In any other percentage of the time which 16 they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from 17 the operator. 18 Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which 19 stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been 20 told to leave and you've had to call people back who 21 have made 999 calls? 22 A. I haven't personally encountered that. 23 Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous 24 callers to check they're all right and to gain an update 25 as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and,				•
5 A. No. 6 Q. Okay. 7 Can I next talk about the call back system, and 8 really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. 9 Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone 10 numbers from FSG callers? 11 A. Not automatically. 12 Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? 13 A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency 14 call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of 15 the fume. In any other percentage of the time which 16 the operator. 17 Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which 18 stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been 19 told to leave and you've had to call people back who 20 have made 999 calls? 21 A. I haven't personally encountered that. 22 Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous 23 callers to check they're all right and to gain an update 25 as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, 26 the questions I have for now. 6 What we tend to do is the chairman grants me a short 27 piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that 28 Tve covered everything off. 8 Vive covered everything off. 9 Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. 10 Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes 11 seeds a moment to check he's covered all the questions. 12 Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes 13 needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. 14 So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 15 fminutes or so. 16 THE WITNESS: Okay. 17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. 18 You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please 19 don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're 19 out of the room. 20 Would you use the callback system to check on previous 21 THE WITNESS: Of course not. 22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, 23 possibly. 24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or				
Go. Okay. Can I next talk about the call back system, and really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the other, they are told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system, and really system to check on previous as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, 6 What we tend to do is the chairman grants me a short piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that 7 piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that 8 I've covered everything off. 9 Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. 12 Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 5 minutes or so. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. 21 THE WITNESS: Of course not. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. 22 A. I haven't personally encountered that. 23 Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or		~		
Can I next talk about the call back system, and really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, Teally what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than So mirutes or so. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. THE WITNESS: Of course not. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or				•
really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, Time Will be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 5 minutes or so. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please don't alk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. THE WITNESS: Of course not. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or			6	What we tend to do is the chairman grants me a short
Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check ne's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 5 minutes or so. THE WITNESS: Okay. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. THE WITNESS: Of course not. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or		Can I next talk about the call back system and		~
numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, In indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than to find the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than the questions. Sir MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. The WITNESS: Of course not. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. THE WITNESS: Thank you.		•	7	piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that
A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, In what circumstances are they recorded? Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than the unit of the will be a meds a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than the unit of the will be a mount of the unit of the will be a mount of the unit of the will be a mount of the unit of the will be a mount of the unit of the un	8	really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice.	7 8	piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off.
Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, 12 Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. 13 needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. 14 So we're going to have a short break now of no more than to the time. The WITNESS: Okay. 15 THE WITNESS: Okay. 16 THE WITNESS: Okay. 17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. 18 You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. 20 Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, 20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. 21 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or	8 9	really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone	7 8 9	piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that
13 A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. 14 So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 15 5 minutes or so. 16 THE WITNESS: Okay. 17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. 18 You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please 19 don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're 20 told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? 21 THE WITNESS: Of course not. 22 A. I haven't personally encountered that. 23 Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or	8 9 10	really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers?	7 8 9 10	piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now.
call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, The WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. THE WITNESS: Of course not. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or	8 9 10 11	really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically.	7 8 9 10 11	piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the WITNESS: Okay. THE WITNESS: Okay. You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. THE WITNESS: Of course not. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or	8 9 10 11 12	really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded?	7 8 9 10 11 12	piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes
they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. THE WITNESS: Of course not. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or	8 9 10 11 12 13	really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency	7 8 9 10 11 12 13	piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions.
the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. THE WITNESS: Of course not. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or	8 9 10 11 12 13 14	really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than
Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, 18 You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. 21 THE WITNESS: Of course not. 22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. 23 possibly. 24 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 5 minutes or so.
stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, 19 don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. 21 THE WITNESS: Of course not. 22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. 23 possibly. 24 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 5 minutes or so. THE WITNESS: Okay.
told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, 20 out of the room. THE WITNESS: Of course not. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator.	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 5 minutes or so. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that.
have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, THE WITNESS: Of course not. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 5 minutes or so. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please
22 A. I haven't personally encountered that. 23 Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous 24 callers to check they're all right and to gain an update 25 as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, 26 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, 27 possibly. 28 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 29 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 5 minutes or so. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're
Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 5 minutes or so. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room.
callers to check they're all right and to gain an update 24 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 25 as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, 26 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls?	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 5 minutes or so. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. THE WITNESS: Of course not.
25 as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and, 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that.	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 5 minutes or so. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. THE WITNESS: Of course not. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner,
	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 5 minutes or so. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. THE WITNESS: Of course not. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly.
Page 142 Page 144	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 5 minutes or so. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. THE WITNESS: Of course not. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. THE WITNESS: Thank you.
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	really what's the system and what's Surrey's practice. Just Surrey FRS automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers? A. Not automatically. Q. In what circumstances are they recorded? A. So the beginning of a phone call from a 999 emergency call, the operator will pass the number 90 per cent of the time. In any other percentage of the time which they don't, you stay on the line to get the number from the operator. Q. Have you previously encountered circumstances in which stay-put advice has been withdrawn and people have been told to leave and you've had to call people back who have made 999 calls? A. I haven't personally encountered that. Q. Would you use the callback system to check on previous callers to check they're all right and to gain an update as to whether the situation has deteriorated or not and,	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	piece of time at the end of the evidence to check that I've covered everything off. Sir, I would be grateful if you could extend that indulgence to me now. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, you've heard, Mr Brown, counsel sometimes needs a moment to check he's covered all the questions. So we're going to have a short break now of no more than 5 minutes or so. THE WITNESS: Okay. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let him do that. You're going to go with one of the ushers. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. THE WITNESS: Of course not. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll get back at 3.05, or sooner, possibly. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier, 3.05 or

1	before then, if you're ready.	1	go. Thank you.
2	MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.	2	(The witness withdrew)
3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right.	3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Kinnier.
4	(3.00 pm)	4	MR KINNIER: Sir, the next witness is Group Manager
5	(A short break)	5	Nigel Dilley from Essex County Fire and Rescue. There
6	(3.05 pm)	6	are no changes needed in the furniture, just the folder.
7	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Brown, I think	7	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right. I'll sit here for a couple
8	a couple of questions, probably.	8	of minutes while you get organised.
9	THE WITNESS: Okay.	9	MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.
10	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Kinnier.	10	(Pause)
11	MR KINNIER: Mr Brown, thank you for your patience. Just	11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Kinnier. Now
12	two questions.	12	MR KINNIER: I think Mr Dilley is about to be retrieved.
13	First of all, if asked, how many operators could	13	NIGEL DILLEY (sworn)
14	Surrey have mustered on the night to help with any	14	Questions by MR KINNIER
15	London overflow?	15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. If you would
16	A. We have four on duty.	16	like to sit down and make yourself comfortable.
17	Q. How many were off duty that you could have called in	17	THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
18	should the need have arisen?	18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Kinnier.
19	A. I don't know the exact number, but probably it would be	19	MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.
20	20 of the off duty.	20	First of all, would you please confirm your name for
21	Q. How many desks do you have in the control room at which	21	the record.
22	individuals could be sat?	22	A. Nigel Dilley.
23	A. Sorry	23	Q. Thank you very much for coming along today. It's much
24	Q. How many positions in the control room do you have at	24	appreciated.
25	which	25	In front of you there is a blue folder and
	Page 145		Page 147
1	A. Ten positions.	1	hopefully, if you open it, you'll find a copy of your
2	Q. Thank you.	2	statement of 19 October 2018 [LFB00024396]; is that
3	Finally, were you involved at all in the decision to	3	right?
4	acquire the 42-metre aerial ladder platform by Surrey	4	A. Yes, that's correct.
5	FRS?	5	Q. Have you read that document recently?
6	A. To acquire it?	6	A. Yes, I have.
7	Q. To buy it.	7	Q. Are its contents true?
8	A. No.	8	A. Yes, apart from 3b, where there's an extract from the
9	Q. Good, thank you.	9	National Incident Command System. In the third line it
10	A. No.	10	says:
11	MR KINNIER: That concludes that question.	11	" to reduce risk and safety resolve"
12	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It would have been a surprise.	12	It should be "safely resolve".
13	MR KINNIER: It wasn't a trick question.	13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
14	THE WITNESS: Okay.	14	MR KINNIER: Thank you.
15	MR KINNIER: Mr Brown, thank you very much for coming along	15	Save for that typographical error, the contents are
16	to assist today. It's very welcome.	16	true?
17	THE WITNESS: Thank you.	17	A. They are.
18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'll add my thanks, Mr Brown. It's	18	Q. You are content for the statement to stand as your
19	very helpful to us to hear the different parts of the	19	evidence to the inquiry?
20	story, and as Surrey was involved, albeit in a fairly	20	A. Yes.
21	peripheral respect, it's useful to know what was going	21	Q. Just to deal with some background information, first of
22	on. So thank you very much for coming to give your	22	all, at the time of the fire, what was your position?
23	evidence.	23	A. My position was the duty NILO, national inter-agency
24	THE WITNESS: That's all right. Thank you.	24	liaison officer, for Essex Fire and Rescue Service.
25	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, and now you're free to	25	Q. You say in your witness statement you are a group
	Page 146		Page 148
	Page 140	1	1'48' 148

1	manager for operational policy for Essex County Fire and	1	As a major incident is unfolding, who usually
2	Rescue Service. How long have you been in that role?	2	contacts you, as the duty NILO, to seek your advice?
3	A. I've been in that role since September 2017.	3	Would it be the incident commander himself if the
4	Q. What does that particular job involve, group manager for	4	incident is within Essex?
5	operational policy?	5	A. No, it would be control.
6	A. So I'm involved in really organising anything to do with	6	Q. Could you help us, when you're the duty NILO in Essex,
7	operational policies, procedures, mobilising of	7	how do you assist with an incident that is in London?
8	appliances, new equipment on appliances. A little bit	8	A. This is the first time that I've been asked for advice.
9	with control to do with the flexi rota system, risk	9	In this particular case, it was the passage of
10	information. A whole raft of areas for my job.	10	information from Essex control to LFB control.
11	Q. Thank you.	11	Q. Right.
12	In page 1 of your statement you say that on the	12	A. So this was the first time this has happened.
13	night you were:	13	Q. Bearing in mind that answer, what's been your experience
14	" one of two Level 3 Incident Commanders on duty	14	of the knowledge of other agencies about the nature and
15	for Essex"	15	extent of the NILO's functions and responsibilities?
16	And you were also carrying at the role of duty NILO	16	A. Within Essex?
17	which you adverted to earlier on.	17	Q. Within Essex.
18	Dealing with each of those jobs that you had on the	18	A. We train on a regular basis with police and ambulance.
19	night, what is a level 3 incident commander?	19	For some of my other roles within the NILO cadre,
20	A. So a level 3 incident commander, in line with the	20	for example our marauding terrorist firearm-type
21	National Incident Command System, I would be called on	21	incidents, we work closely with police and ambulance.
22	to deal with incidents of nine pumps and over. We have	22	So we've got a very good working relationship within the
23	three levels in Essex: level 1 for crew and watch	23	county boundary and also within partner agencies in
24	manager, level 2 for station managers, and then over	24	Suffolk and Norfolk.
25	nine pumps for myself as a level 3 incident commander.	25	Q. Will you have counterpart NILOs in Essex Police and
	Page 149		Page 151
	0.00		
1	Q. What are the functions and responsibilities of a level 3	1	Essex Ambulance, for example, and in Suffolk and
2	incident commander?	2	elsewhere that you have arrangements with?
3	A. So I would take over command at the incident ground, for	3	A. Yes, definitely very close relationships with ambulance.
4	any large-scale incidents. So it's an operational role	4	With police, my contact is mainly through force
5	within the structure of the incident command system.	5	control room.
6	Q. You've already helpfully taken our attention to the	6	Q. Have you had any dealings as NILO, whether training or
7	definition of the role of a NILO on page 1 of your	7	otherwise, with the LFB?
8	witness statement.	8	A. No.
	Can you help us with some form of background here.	′	Q. Okay.
10	What types of incident would usually engage the interest	10	In terms of your NILO experience, have you
11	of a duty NILO?	11	identified any difference between the regions with which
12	A. So I would deal with anything supporting the incident	12	you have dealings in relation to the knowledge of and
13	command structure. So where anything is outside of	13	approach to the effective deployment of NILOs to respond
14	policy and procedure, where there are any questions, any	14	to major incidents?
15	queries, for example with control, I can give advice.	15	A. We've had CPD, continuous professional development, days
16	I also work with partner agencies, such as police	16	with NILOs in Manchester following the Kerslake
17	and ambulance, for any incidents they are dealing with	17	incident, and regionally I've worked with NILOs.
18	to offer support from fire and for those types of	18	My understanding of the London NILOs is we were very
19	incidents.	19	similar a very similar way.
20	Q. Is the advice and support for incident command given to	20	Q. Sorry, I cut across you, I apologise. Was that
21	incident command within Essex or, as here, would it be	21	understanding gathered as a result of practical
22	advice and support to the incident commander at the fire	22	experience or just as a result of discussions at
23	ground itself, even though it's outside your area?	23	training and continuing professional development.
24	A. So it would be just for Essex.	24	A. Just practically within the region, just through CPD
25	Q. Okay.	25	with London.
	Page 150		Page 152
	U		U

1	Q. In relation to the responsibilities you have about	1	the volume of calls, then that's passed on to a second
2	dealing with control, have you had any training as to	2	control, which I understand is North West Fire Control
3	how to liaise with other brigades when Essex is	3	for LFB. Should they be in a position where they can't
4	receiving overflow calls via the BT system?	4	take the calls, then BT will pass a call to surrounding
5	A. No.	5	brigades.
6	Q. Are you familiar in your role, whether as level 3	6	Q. So the decision is made by the home fire brigade
7	incident commander or as NILO, with stay-put guidance	7	control, rather than BT; is that a fair summary of your
8	and fire survival guidance?	8	understanding?
9	A. Yes.	9	
			A. I understand it's BT, because BT initially take those
10	Q. What's your understanding of, first of all, stay put?	10	calls and pass them to the host brigade.
11	A. So stay put, predominantly for high-rise, is something	11 12	Q. Do you know who at BT will take that decision to
12	which we have in Essex for high-rise properties. So we		activate the overflow arrangements?
13	would advise in fact, we do give advice for residents	13	A. No.
14	to stay put.	14	Q. At paragraph 6 on page 2 of your statement, you say that
15	Operationally, with dealing with fires in high-rise,	15	Essex would obtain information by phone or e-mail from
16	that has proved to be the policy we've had for some time	16	the LFB about an incident.
17	as the best policy, and we continue to adopt that	17	Is that an arrangement you've had previous
18	policy.	18	experience of?
19	However, it can be changed.	19	A. No, I haven't.
20	Q. In relation to that, in your practical experience, have	20	Q. Have you had any training on these overflow
21	you ever had to withdraw stay put and advise callers to	21	arrangements, their practice?
22	evacuate a high-rise building, for example?	22	A. No, I haven't.
23	A. No, I haven't.	23	Q. This limits the extent to which you'll probably be able
24	Q. Could I next turn to the topic of overflow arrangements.	24	to give answers to these questions, but would you expect
25	At the bottom of page 1 of your statement and the	25	LFB control to make a pre-emptive phone call to you to
	Page 153		Page 155
1	top of page 2, you deal with overflow arrangements.	1	warn you that overflow calls may be directed towards
2	You've quoted there a Mr Peter Suarez, who is the group	2	Essex?
3	fire control officer at Essex.	3	A. Probably a difficult question to answer, but my
4	First of all, what's his role and how does it fit in	4	understanding is that if LFB were in a situation where
5	with yours?	5	they couldn't handle the incoming calls, it would be
6	A. So Peter is really in charge of control in Essex, and	6	quite difficult to pass that information on to
7	those questions I felt were more related to Peter's	7	surrounding brigades.
8	sphere of operations, so I felt it was important to get	8	Q. Okay.
9	the stock answer from Peter. I did understand the	9	
10	procedure myself, but I just wanted, from a professional	10	At paragraph 7 on page 2, you explain that Essex would communicate information to the LFB by phone or, if
11		11	
12	point of view, the correct wording. Q. Thank you.	12	necessary, by e-mail.
			Looking at how this could possibly work in practice,
13	At the top of page 2 of your witness statement, you	13	do you have a point person at the LFB that Essex can
14	say, quoting Mr Suarez:	14	contact with the information?
15	"There was no specific arrangement between ECFRS &	15	A. My understanding is there is a direct line in fact,
16	LFB. There is a National arrangement between BT and all	16	there are two lines: a direct line and an admin line
17	Fire services"	17	direct to LFB. So no one in particular.
18	First of all, can you help us, are these	18	Q. You made reference in your witness statement to contact
19	arrangements contained and formalised in a document?	19	by e-mail.
20	A. I'm not aware.	20	Is there an e-mail address, for example, that you're
21	Q. When you say you're not aware, have you ever seen one?	21	given that you know to use in these circumstances?
22	A. No.	22	A. Not personally, but my colleague I referred to has
23	Q. Do you know what criteria are applied by BT, for	23	stated that there is an e-mail, although phone is
2.4	example, that trigger the overflow arrangements?	24	preferred.
24	A Communication discrete if the heart have a second of	25	() For obvious reasons massimals.
24 25	A. So my understanding is if the host brigade cannot take	25	Q. For obvious reasons, presumably.

the evening as the incident unfolded, ie at them to that the overflow arrangements were activated? An on to London in the event that overflow arrangements are activated? A. In control or? A. In control or? A. Yes. My understanding is they pass on the details which they would ordinarily take from a call if it was in Essex. D. Looking at the Essex-specific context, if an Essex CRO is taking an FSG call, would the CRO be expected to stay on the line with the caller, or just pass the details and/or the call over to the LFF3 A. So my understanding is they would pass the information over, but I'm not 100 per cent sure in this case what actually happened, so— actually happened, so— A. We don't; they will take the information and then call LFF8 control. A. We don't; they will take the information and then call LFF8 control. A. We don't; they will take the information and then call LFF8 control. A. We don't; they will take the information and then call LFF8 control. A. We don't; they will take the information and then call LFF8 control. A. We don't; they will take the information and then call LFF8 control. A. That's correct. A. That's correct. A. That's correct. A. A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address for the rest of the period. A. No We were you based when you were on dury? Were you based at Essex headquarters? A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters? A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters? A. No We were you based when you were on dury? Were you based at Essex headquarters? A. We've gou that the read solutions you can us get through to LFB if the phone lines arent giving the working aday from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address for the rest of the period. A. Via pager. A. Via pager. A. Via pager, thank you. A. Leger of your winess statement, at paragraph 10, you say that you were: A. Department of the	
level of detailed information they're required to pass on to London in the event that overflow arrangements are on to London in the event that overflow arrangements are on to London in the event that overflow arrangements are on to London in the event that overflow arrangements are on to London in the event that overflow arrangements are on to London in the event that overflow arrangements are on to London in the event that overflow arrangements are on the detail on to London in the event that overflow arrangements are on the detail on the London in the event that one that in the low with the caller of puts pass on the details which they would ordinarily take from a call if it was in look in the Essex. A. Yes. My understanding is they pass on the details which they would ordinarily take from a call if it was in look in the essex. Bessex. Description of the Essex especific context, if an Essex CRO is taking an FSG call, would the CRO be expected to stay on the line with the caller, or just pass the details and or the call over to the LFB? A. So my understanding is they would pass the information over, but I'm not 100 per cent sure in this case what arise? Description over, but I'm not 100 per cent sure in this case what arise? A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. Description over, but I'm not 100 per cent sure in this case what arise? A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. Description over, but I'm not 100 per cent sure in this case what arise? A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. Description over, but I'm not 100 per cent sure in this case what arise? A. They were just having problems getting the information through. The were just having problems getting the information through. A. They were just having problems getting the information through. The were just having problems getting the information throug	moment
on to London in the event that overflow arrangements are activated? A. I. control or? Q. Yes. A. Yes. My understanding is they pass on the details which they would ordinarily take from a call if it was in Essex. Q. Looking at the Essex-specific context, if an Essex CRO is taking an FSG call, would the CRO be expected to stay on the line with the caller, or just pass the details and/or the call over to the LFB? A. So my understanding is they push grade ontrol should the record of the LFB? A. So my understanding is they push grade ontrol should the record of the LFB? A. So my understanding is they would pass the information over, but I'm not 100 per cent sure in this case what actually happened, so— call LFB control. Q. Mor Dilley, thank you. I am now turning on to events of the ting. A. There was a large fire in a tower block in we having problems passing that informatic control. Q. Mr Dilley, thank you. I am now turning on to events of the line gibt. A. They were just having problems getting threinformation through. A. They were just having problems getting threinformation through. A. That's correct. Q. You say on page I at paragraph 3a that you were the duty NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on page I at paragraph 3a that you were the duty NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower? A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters? A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address for the rest of the period. Q. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via mobile? A. Via pager. Q. Pager, thank you. A tage 2 of your witness statement, at mobile? A. A page 2 of your witness statement, at mobile? A. A page 2 of your witness statement, at paragraph 10, you say that you were: 15 A paged just before 0200hrs and informed that The paged just before 0200hrs and informed that A paged just before 0200hrs and informed that A paged just before 0200hrs and informed that A p	?
5 activated? 6 A. In control or? 7 Q. Yes. 8 A. Yes. My understanding is they pass on the details which 9 they would ordinarily take from a call if it was in 10 Essex. 11 Q. Looking at the Essex-specific context, if an Essex CRO 12 is taking an FSG call, would the CRO be expected to stay 13 on the line with the caller, or just pass the details 14 and/or the call over to the LFB? 15 A. So my understanding is they would pass the information 16 over, but I'm not 100 per cent sure in this case what 17 actually happened, so — 18 Q. Dose Essex have the technology to patch through calls 19 from Essex to the LFB Brigade control should the need 20 arise? 21 A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then 22 call LFB control. 23 Q. Mr Dilley, thank you. I am now turning on to events of 24 the night. 25 Is it safe to assume that, before 14 June, you had Page 157 1 no previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower? 2 A. That's correct. 3 Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty 4 NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on 5 13 June. 6 Where were you based when you were on duty? Were you based at Essex headquarters? 8 A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters? 9 A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters? 10 Q. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via mobile? 1 Q. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via mobile? 1 A. I page? Of your witness statement, at paragraph 10, you say that you were: 10 Page 1150 the tail detail diming, but the paging message to contact Sesex control, so — 2 C. Our contact Essex control, so — 2 C. Our contact Essex control, and what did the about the incident? 2 A. There was a large fire in a tower block in w. 3 and that we'd received a call from a resident were having problems passing that information through. 2 D. Did it surprise you that there were difficulties at the page of the full the meet of the page of the full the were countered, it you that there were difficulties at the full the meet of the page of the full the were not the M25 on the fu	arily
6 A. In control or? 7 Q. Yes. 8 A. Yes. My understanding is they pass on the details which 9 they would ordinarily take from a call if it was in 10 Essex. 11 Q. Looking at the Essex-specific context, if an Essex CRO 12 is taking an FSG call, would the CRO be expected to stay 13 on the line with the caller, or just pass the details 14 and/or the call over to the LFB? 15 A. So my understanding is they would pass the information 16 over, but I'm not 100 per cent sure in this case what 17 actually happened, so — 18 Q. Does Essex have the technology to patch through calls 19 from Essex to the LFB Brigade control should the need 20 arise? 21 A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then 22 call LFB control. 23 Q. Mr Dilley, thank you. I am now turning on to events of 24 the night. 25 Is it safe to assume that, before 14 June, you had Page 157 1 no previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower? 2 A. That's correct. 3 Q. You contacted Essex control, and what did they about the nicident? 4 N. No, they don't they will take the information and then 26 call LFB control. 27 call LFB control. 28 Q. Mr Dilley, thank you. I am now turning on to events of 29 the night. 29 the night. 29 that's correct. 3 Q. You contacted Essex control, and what did they about the nicident? 4 N. They were just having problems passing that information ocurton. 4 It's the line kept on being cut? Were you given an further detail? 4 A. They were just having problems getting three information and then information through. 4 It's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on Page 159 1 no previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower? 4 N. That's correct. 5 Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty 4 NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on 5 13 June. 6 Where were you based when you were on duty? Were 7 you based at Essex headquarters during the working day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address 10 for the rest of the period. 11 Q. Weney our eat home, how are you cont	
7 Q. Yes. 8 A. Yes. My understanding is they pass on the details which 9 they would ordinarily take from a call if it was in 10 Essex. 11 Q. Looking at the Essex-specific context, if an Essex CRO 12 is taking an FSG call, would the CRO be expected to stay 13 on the line with the caller, or just pass the details 14 and/or the call over to the LFB? 15 A. So my understanding is they would pass the information 16 over, but I'm not 100 per cent sure in this case what 17 actually happened, so – 18 Q. Does Essex have the technology to patch through calls 19 from Essex to the LFB Brigade control should the need 20 arise? 21 A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then 22 call LFB control. 23 Q. Mr Dilley, thank you. I am now turning on to events of 24 the night. 25 Is it safe to assume that, before 14 June, you had 26 Page 157 27 Page 159 28 A. That's correct. 3 Q. You contacted Essex control, and what did they and that we'd received a call from a resident were having problems passing that information to rot he line kept on being cut? Were you given any sort of detail on the difficit on the lift of that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the orthory that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the orthory that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the orthory that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the orthory that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the orthory that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the orthory that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the orthory that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the orthory that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the orthory that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the orthory that is a further detail? 20 A. They were just having problems getting that further detail? 21 Information through. 22 A. It's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on the might, fire whave a car fire on the M25 on the might in formation through. 21 A. So I'm based at Essex hea	s about
8 A. Yes. My understanding is they pass on the details which 9 they would ordinarily take from a call if it was in 10 Essex. 11 Q. Looking at the Essex-specific context, if an Essex CRO 12 is taking an FSG call, would the CRO be expected to stay 13 on the line with the caller, or just pass the details 14 and/or the call over to the LFB? 15 A. So my understanding is they would pass the information 16 over, but I'm not 100 per cent sure in this case what 17 actually happened, so — 18 Q. Does Essex have the technology to patch through calls 19 from Essex to the LFB Brigade control should the need 20 arise? 21 A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then 22 call LFB control. 23 Q. Mr Dilley, thank you. I am now turning on to events of 24 the night. 25 Is it safe to assume that, before 14 June, you had 26 Page 157 1 no previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower? 2 A. That's correct. 3 Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty 4 NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on 5 I 3 June. 6 Where were you based when you were on duty? Were 7 you based at Essex headquarters during the working 9 day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address 10 for the rest of the period. 11 Q. Well come on to those particular contents of 12 Page 1.50 13 A. Via pager. 14 A page 2 of your witness statement, at 15 paragraph 10, you say that you were: 16 Page 1.51 you say on page 1 at paragraph 3 made informed that 17 " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that 18 A. We don't have a specific message. The page content of the specific message. 19 Q. You contacted Essex headquarters during the working and procedures. 10 Q. Were you distinct paragraph 10, you say that you were: 11 A. No, they don't there were all right and the difficut or the line dent? 12 Police to try to pass the information on inght, first of all, just so you can orientate yours and paragraph 10, you say that you were: 11 and the firm and the details and the detail of timings on right, first of all, just so you can orientate yours	paged,
they would ordinarily take from a call if it was in Essex. O, Looking at the Essex-specific context, if an Essex CRO is taking an FSG call, would the CRO be expected to stay on the line with the caller, or just pass the details and/or the call over to the LFB? A. So my understanding is they would pass the information over, but I'm not 100 per cent sure in this case what actually happened, so- Q. Does Essex have the technology to patch through calls from Essex to the LFB Brigade control should the need arise? A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then information through. Call LFB control. A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then information through. Call LFB control. Page 157 Page 159 They were just having problems passing that information through. Call LFB control. A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. Page 157 Page 159 They were just having problems petting three information and then call LFB control. A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. They were just having problems passing that information through. Call LFB control. A. They were just having problems passing that information through. Call LFB control. A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. Page 157 Page 159 They were just having problems passing that information on the was and the detail? A. They were just having problems passing that information on the information on the indicate that were encountered, is you given any sort of detail on the diffict that were encountered, is you given any sort of detail on the diffict that were encountered, is you given any sort of detail on the diffict that were encountered, is you given any sort of detail on the diffict	old you?
10 Essex. 10 Q. You contacted Essex control, and what did the about the incident? 2 A. There was a large fire in a tower block in was and that we'd received a call from a resident were having problems passing that information control. 3 A. No. they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. 2 A. No. they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. 2 A. No. they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. 2 A. No. they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. 2 A. No. they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. 2 A. No. they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. 3 A. No. they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. 3 A. Via pager. 4 A. No. they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. 4 A. It's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on the night. 4 A. It's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on this control. 5 A. No. they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. 2 A. They were just having problems getting three information through. 2 A. They were just having problems getting three information through. 2 A. It's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on the night. 2 A. They were just having problems passing that information through. 2 A. It's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on the night. 3 A. It's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on the night. 3 A. It's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on the night. 4 A. It's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on the night. 5 A. It's the fir	ge is to
11 Q. Looking at the Essex-specific context, if an Essex CRO 12 is taking an FSG call, would the CRO be expected to stay 13 on the line with the caller, or just pass the details 14 and/or the call over to the LFB? 15 A. So my understanding is they would pass the information 16 over, but I'm not 100 per cent sure in this case what 17 actually happened, so — 18 Q. Does Essex have the technology to patch through calls 19 from Essex to the LFB Brigade control should the need 20 arise? 21 A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then 22 call LFB control. 23 Q. Mr Dilley, thank you. I am now turning on to events of 24 the night. 25 Is it safe to assume that, before 14 June, you had 26 Page 157 27 In porevious knowledge of Grenfell Tower? 28 A. That's correct. 39 Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty 30 NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on 31 June. 31 A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working 32 day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address 33 for the rest of the period. 31 A. Via pager. 32 Q. Pager, thank you. 33 A. Via pager. 34 A. Page 2 of your witness statement, at 35 Page 1, just so you can orientate your and have a fixed point for when your involveme are fixed point for when your involveme are can fixed point for when your involveme are are fixed at fixed point for when your involveme are are fixed at fixed point for when your involveme are are fixed and have a fixed point for when your involveme are are fixed point for when your involveme are are fixed at fixed point for when your involveme are are fixed po	
is taking an FSG call, would the CRO be expected to stay on the line with the caller, or just pass the details and/or the call over to the LFB? A. So my understanding is they would pass the information over, but I'm not 100 per cent sure in this case what actually happened, so — Q. Does Essex have the technology to patch through calls from Essex to the LFB Brigade control should the need arise? A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. Q. Mr Dilley, thank you. I am now turning on to events of the night. Is it safe to assume that, before 14 June, you had Page 157 no previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower? A. That's correct. Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on 13 June. Mere were you based when you were on duty? Were you based at Essex headquarters? A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address for the rest of the period. Q. Were you given any sort of detail on the diffict that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the or the line kept on being cut? Were you given any sort of detail on the diffict that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the or the line kept on being cut? Were you given any sort of detail on the diffict that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the or the line kept on being cut? Were you given any sort of detail on the diffict that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the or the line kept on being cut? Were you given any sort of detail on the diffict that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the or the line kept on being cut? Were you given any sort of detail on the diffict that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the or the line kept on being cut? Were you given any sort of detail on the diffict that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the or the line kept on being cut? Were you fine frem the Mala and that we'd receive du net fifting the or the line from the Mala and tha	ney tell you
on the line with the caller, or just pass the details and/or the call over to the LFB? A. So my understanding is they would pass the information over, but I'm not 100 per cent sure in this case what actually happened, so — B. Q. Does Essex have the technology to patch through calls from Essex to the LFB Brigade control should the need arise? A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. Q. Mr Dilley, thank you. I am now turning on to events of the night. Is it safe to assume that, before 14 June, you had Page 157 Page 159 no previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower? A. That's correct. Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on SILUM Discovery of the were you based when you were on duty? Were you based at Essex headquarters? A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address for the rest of the period. A. Via pager. A. Via pager. A. Lya page Just before 0200hrs and informed that A. Via pager just having problems passing that information control. Q. Werl you given any sort of detail on the diffice that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the or the line kept on being cut? Were you given any sort of detail on the diffice that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the or the line kept on being cut? Were you just couldn't get the or the line kept on being cut? Were you given any sort of detail on the diffice that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the or the line kept on being cut? Were you bard through the need 20. Are there any workaround solutions you can use that one particular incident. 3 So, no, it didn't trigger any concerns, espec knowing what the final outcome was and the this. Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty A. No we've got nothing in policy and procedures this. Q. We'll come on to those particular contacts later of the period. Q. We'll come on to those particular contacts later on have a	
and/or the call over to the LFB? A. So my understanding is they would pass the information over, but I'm not 100 per cent sure in this case what actually happened, so— 17 that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the or the line kept on being cut? Were you given any sort of detail on the diffict that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the or the line kept on being cut? Were you given a further detail? A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. 22 call LFB control. 23 Q. Mr Dilley, thank you. I am now turning on to events of the night. 25 Is it safe to assume that, before 14 June, you had Page 157 Page 159 1 no previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower? A. That's correct. 3 Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on 13 June. 5 Universe you based at Essex headquarters? A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters? A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working day, from 9,00 to 5,00, and then from my home address for the rest of the period. 4 Nie can now look at the detail of timings on 13 A. Via pager. 14 Q. Pager, thank you. 15 At page 2 of your witness statement, at 16 paragraph 10, you say that you were: 17 " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that 17 were having problems gassing that information 16 Q. Were having problems detail on the diffict on the line kept on being cut? Were you given any sort of detail on the diffict on the line kept on being cut? Were you given any sort of detail on the diffict on the line kept on being cut? Were you given any sort of detail on the diffict on the line kept on being cut? Were you given any sort of detail on the diffict on the line kept on being cut? Were you given any sort of detail on the diffict on the line kept on being cut? Were you given any sort of detail on the diffict on the line kept on being cut? Were you given any sort of detail on the diffict on the line kept on being cut? Were you given any sort of detail on the diffict on the line	west London,
A. So my understanding is they would pass the information over, but I'm not 100 per cent sure in this case what actually happened, so — Q. Does Essex have the technology to patch through calls from Essex to the LFB Brigade control should the need arise? A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. Q. Mr Dilley, thank you. I am now turning on to events of the night. In oprevious knowledge of Grenfell Tower? A. That's correct. Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on 13 June. Where were you based when you were on duty? Were you based at Essex headquarters? A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address for the rest of the period. Q. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via mobile? A. Via pager. Q. Pager, thank you. Is a fixed point for when you innovemental to paragraph 10, you say that you were: In paged just before 0200hrs and informed that Is control. Q. Were you given any sort of detail on the diffict that where encountered, ie you just couldn't get the that where encountered, ie you just couldn't get the that where encountered, ie you just couldn't get the that where encountered, ie you just couldn't get the that where encountered, ie you just couldn't get the firm the their state that where encountered, ie you just couldn't get the further detail? A. They were just having problems getting the information through. In formation through. In firmation through. A. It's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on through it receive up to 50 to 60 car that one particular incident. So, no, it didn't trigger any concerns, espec knowing what the final outcome was and the this. O. Are there any workaround solutions you can us get through to LFB if the phone lines aren't givin any direct contact? O. We'll come on to those particular contacts later though to proceed the contact?	it and they
16 over, but I'm not 100 per cent sure in this case what actually happened, so — 17 that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the or the line kept on being cut? Were you given any sort of detail on the difficut that were encountered, ie you just couldn't get the or the line kept on being cut? Were you given a further detail? 20 arise? 20 A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. 21 A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. 22 Q. Did it surprise you that there were difficulties get through? A. It's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on Page 157 Page 159 25 afternoon, we might receive up to 50 to 60 call that one particular incident. 3 So, no, it didn't trigger any concerns, espect that one particular incident. 3 So, no, it didn't trigger any concerns, espect this. Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on 13 June. 5 Mileon of the rest of the period. Q. Are there any workaround solutions you can use you based at Essex headquarters? A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address for the rest of the period. Q. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via mobile? 12 Mileon on to those particular contacts later If we can now look at the detail of timings on 13 M. Via pager. Q. Pager, thank you. 14 A page 2 of your witness statement, at 15 If we can now look at the detail of timings on 16 paragraph 10, you say that you were: 16 and have a fixed point for when your involveme 17 If we can now look at the detail of timings on 17 If we can now look at the detail of timings on 18 Mileon 19	ition on to LFB
actually happened, so — Q. Does Essex have the technology to patch through calls from Essex to the LFB Brigade control should the need arise? A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. Q. Mr Dilley, thank you. I am now turning on to events of the night. Is it safe to assume that, before 14 June, you had Page 157 Page 159 1 no previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower? A. That's correct. Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on 13 June. Where were you based when you were on duty? Were you based at Essex headquarters? A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address for the rest of the period. Q. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via mobile? A. Via pager. Q. Pager, thank you. A. Tage 2 of your witness statement, at paragraph 10, you say that you were: " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that 17 that were encountered, ic you just couldn't get the or the line kept on being cut? Were you furthe detail? A. They were just having problems getting thre information through. A. They were just having problems getting thre information through. A. They were just having problems getting thre information through. A. Tit's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on Page 159 A. It's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on that one particular incident. So, no, it didn't trigger any concerns, espec that one particular incident. So, no, it didn't trigger any concerns, espec though the final outcome was and the this. G. Are there any workaround solutions you can us get through to LFB if the phone lines aren't giving any direct contact? A. We've got nothing in policy and procedures thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get through the paragraph 10, you say that you were: If we can now look at the	
18 Q. Does Essex have the technology to patch through calls 19 from Essex to the LFB Brigade control should the need 20 arise? 21 A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then 22 call LFB control. 23 Q. Mr Dilley, thank you. I am now turning on to events of 24 the night. 25 Is it safe to assume that, before 14 June, you had 26 Page 157 1 no previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower? 27 A. That's correct. 3 Q. You say on page I at paragraph 3a that you were the duty 4 NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on 26 Where were you based when you were on duty? Were 27 you based at Essex headquarters during the working 28 A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working 3 day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address 4 No I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working 4 Q. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via 28 mobile? 4 Ni Via pager. 4 Ni Via pager. 5 A. Via pager. 6 Q. Pager, thank you. 7 Paged just before 0200hrs and informed that 8 or the line kept on being cut? Were further detail? 9 da. They were just having problems getting thre information through. 9 day information through? 9 day information on. 9 dependence on the M25 on that there were difficulties garting through? 9 day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address for the rest of the period. 10 If the phone lines aren't giving any direct contact? 11 Q. We've got nothing in policy and procedures thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get through in the detail of timings on night, first of all, just so you can orientate yours and have a fixed point for when your involveme and have a fixed point for when your involveme started.	culties
from Essex to the LFB Brigade control should the need arise? A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. Q. Mr Dilley, thank you. I am now turning on to events of the night. Is it safe to assume that, before 14 June, you had Page 157 Page 159 1 no previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower? A. That's correct. Q. You say on page I at paragraph 3a that you were the duty NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on 13 June. Where were you based when you were on duty? Were you based at Essex headquarters? A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address for the rest of the period. A. Via pager. Q. Well come on to those particular conteats later mobile? A. Via pager. A. Via pager of your witness statement, at paragraph 10, you say that you were: " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that Page 159 A. They were just having problems getting thre information through. A. They were just having problems getting the information through. A. They were just having problems getting the information through. A. They were just having problems getting thre information through. A. They were just having problems getting the information through. A. It's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on the unique to 50 to 60 car that one particular incident. So, no, it didn't trigger any concerns, espect knowing what the final outcome was and the this. Q. Are there any workaround solutions you can use any direct contact? A. We've got nothing in policy and procedures. thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get through in the process was either through airwave police, which I eventually managed to get through the police to try to pass the information on. Q. We'll come on to those particular contacts later policy and procedures. If we can now look at the detail of timings on night, first of all, just so you can orientate yours and h	through
arise? A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. Q. Mr Dilley, thank you. I am now turning on to events of the night. Dage 157 Page 159 I no previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower? A. That's correct. Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on 13 June. Where were you based when you were on duty? Were you based at Essex headquarters? A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters? A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address for the rest of the period. A. Via pager. A. Via pager. A. Via pager. A. Via pager. A. Via paged just before 0200hrs and informed that A. La That's to or information through. A. That's currect. A. It's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on Page 159 A. It's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on Page 159 1 afternoon, we might receive up to 50 to 60 car that one particular incident. So, no, it din't trigger any concerns, espect knowing what the final outcome was and the finis. C. Are there any workaround solutions you can us get through to LFB if the phone lines aren't giving any direct contact? A. We've got nothing in policy and procedures thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get through in the police, which I eventually managed to get through in the police, which I eventually managed to get through in paragraph 10, you say that you were: If we can now look at the detail of timings on night, first of all, just so you can orientate yours and have a fixed point for when your involveme started.	any
A. No, they don't; they will take the information and then call LFB control. Q. Mr Dilley, thank you. I am now turning on to events of the night. Is it safe to assume that, before 14 June, you had Page 157 Page 159 I no previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower? A. That's correct. Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on 13 June. Where were you based when you were on duty? Were you based at Essex headquarters? A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters? A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address for the rest of the period. Q. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via mobile? A. Via pager. A. Via pager. A. Via pager. A. Via pager. A. Via pager 10, you say that there were difficulties at through. 22 through to Erist time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on the M25 on Page 159 afternoon, we might receive up to 50 to 60 car that one particular incident. So, no, it didn't trigger any concerns, espect knowing what the final outcome was and the final outcome was and the final outcome was and the subject through to LFB if the phone lines aren't giving any direct contact? A. We've got nothing in policy and procedures thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get through it was a contact of the period. A. Via pager. A. Via pager. A. Via pager. A. Via pager. A. Via page 2 of your witness statement, at paragraph 10, you say that you were: " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that To define the sactually happened example, if we can now look at the detail of timings on night, first of all, just so you can orientate yours and have a fixed point for when your involvements and have a fixed point for when your involvements and have a fixed point for when your involvements and have a fixed point for when your involvements attents.	
22 call LFB control. 23 Q. Mr Dilley, thank you. I am now turning on to events of 24 the night. 25 Is it safe to assume that, before 14 June, you had 26 Page 157 27 Page 159 28 A. That's correct. 29 A. That's correct. 30 Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty 4 NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on 5 13 June. 6 Where were you based when you were on duty? Were 7 you based at Essex headquarters? 8 A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working 9 day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address 10 G. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via 11 mobile? 12 mobile? 13 A. Via pager. 14 Q. Pager, thank you. 15 At page 2 of your witness statement, at paragraph 10, you say that there were difficulties at through? 20 A. It's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on 21 afternoon, we might receive up to 50 to 60 call that one particular incident. 22 that one particular incident. 3 So, no, it didn't trigger any concerns, espect knowing what the final outcome was and the this. 4 New were you based when you were on duty? Were you based at Essex headquarters? 5 day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address for the rest of the period. 6 When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via mobile? 7 Delice to try to pass the information on. 10 A. Via pager. 11 Q. Pager, thank you. 12 Police to try to pass the information on. 13 A. Via pager. 14 Q. Pager, thank you. 15 At page 2 of your witness statement, at paragraph 10, you say that you were: 16 paragraph 10, you say that you were: 17 " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that 17 started.	rough, getting
23 Q. Mr Dilley, thank you. I am now turning on to events of 24 the night. 25 Is it safe to assume that, before 14 June, you had 26 Page 157 Page 159 1 no previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower? 2 A. That's correct. 3 Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty 4 NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on 5 13 June. 6 Where were you based when you were on duty? Were 7 you based at Essex headquarters? 8 A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working 9 day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address 10 Go When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via 11 mobile? 12 mobile? 13 A. Via pager. 14 Q. Pager, thank you. 15 At page 2 of your witness statement, at 16 paragraph 10, you say that you were: 17 " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that 18 through? 24 A. It's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on 25 example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on 26 example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on 27 afternoon, we might receive up to 50 to 60 cat that one particular incident. 28 So, no, it didn't trigger any concerns, espec knowing what the final outcome was and the this. 29 A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters? 20 Q. Are there any workaround solutions you can us get through to LFB if the phone lines aren't giving any direct contact? 29 A. We've got nothing in policy and procedures. 20 We've got nothing in policy and procedures. 20 We've got nothing in policy and procedures. 21 thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get the police, which I eventually managed to get t	
the night. Is it safe to assume that, before 14 June, you had Page 157 Page 159 1 no previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower? A. That's correct. Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on 13 June. Where were you based when you were on duty? Were you based at Essex headquarters? A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address for the rest of the period. Q. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via mobile? A. Via pager. Q. Pager, thank you. At page 2 of your witness statement, at paragraph 10, you say that you were: " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that A. It's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on Page 159 A. It's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on Page 159 A. It's the first time this has actually happened example, if we have a car fire on the M25 on Page 159 1 afternoon, we might receive up to 50 to 60 cal that one particular incident. So, no, it didn't trigger any concerns, espec than we may concerns, espec thins. Q. Are there any workaround solutions you can us get through to LFB if the phone lines aren't giving any direct contact? A. We've got nothing in policy and procedures, thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get the police, which I eventually mana	s getting
Page 157 Page 159 1 no previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower? 2 A. That's correct. 3 Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty 4 NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on 5 13 June. 6 Where were you based when you were on duty? Were 7 you based at Essex headquarters? 8 A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working 9 day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address 10 G. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via 11 Q. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via 12 mobile? 13 A. Via pager. 14 Q. Pager, thank you. 15 At page 2 of your witness statement, at paragraph 10, you say that you were: 16 paragraph 10, you say that you were: 17 " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that 18 dafternoon, we might receive up to 50 to 60 cat that one particular incident. 2 that one particular incident. 3 So, no, it didn't trigger any concerns, espect knowing what the final outcome was and the this. 4 C. Are there any workaround solutions you can us get through to LFB if the phone lines aren't giving any direct contact? A. We've got nothing in policy and procedures. thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get the police, which I eventually managed	
Page 157 Page 159 1 no previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower? 2 A. That's correct. 3 Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty 4 NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on 5 13 June. 6 Where were you based when you were on duty? Were 7 you based at Essex headquarters? 8 A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working 9 day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address 10 for the rest of the period. 11 Q. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via 12 mobile? 13 A. Via pager. 14 Q. Pager, thank you. 15 At page 2 of your witness statement, at 16 paragraph 10, you say that you were: 17 " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that 18 afternoon, we might receive up to 50 to 60 cat that one particular incident. 2 that one particular incident. 3 So, no, it didn't trigger any concerns, espect knowing what the final outcome was and the this. 6 Q. Are there any workaround solutions you can us get through to LFB if the phone lines aren't giving any direct contact? 8 A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working any direct contact? 9 A. We've got nothing in policy and procedures thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get through in the police, which I eventually managed to get through in the police, which I eventually managed to get through in the police, which I eventually managed to get through in the police, which I eventually managed to get through in the police, which I eventually managed to get through in the police, which I eventually managed to get through in the police, which I eventually managed to get through in the police, which I eventually managed to get through in the police, which I eventually managed to get through in the police, which I eventually managed to get through in the police, which I eventually managed to get through in the police, which I eventually managed to get through in the police, which I eventually managed to get through in the police, which I eventually manage	ed, but, for
no previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower? A. That's correct. Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on Nillo for the final outcome was and the this. No. A. Via page at the start on LFB if the phone lines aren't giving any direct contact? No. We've got nothing in policy and procedures. Thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get the police, which I	n a Saturday
no previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower? A. That's correct. Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on Nillo for the final outcome was and the this. No. A. Via page at the start on LFB if the phone lines aren't giving any direct contact? No. We've got nothing in policy and procedures. Thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get the police, which I	
A. That's correct. Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on this. Q. Are there any workaround solutions you can us get through to LFB if the phone lines aren't giving any direct contact? A. We've got nothing in policy and procedures. thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get three police, which I eventually managed to get three police to try to pass the information on. A. Via pager. A. Via pager. NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on duty? Were knowing what the final outcome was and the this. A. We've got nothing in policy and procedures. thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get three police, which I eventually managed to get three police, which I eventually managed to get three police to try to pass the information on. N. Via pager. N. We'll come on to those particular contacts later and have a night, first of all, just so you can orientate yours and have a fixed point for when your involveme started.	
Q. You say on page 1 at paragraph 3a that you were the duty NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on 13 June. Where were you based when you were on duty? Were you based at Essex headquarters? A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address for the rest of the period. Q. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via mobile? A. Via pager. A. Via pager. Q. Pager, thank you. At page 2 of your witness statement, at paragraph 10, you say that you were: " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that So, no, it didn't trigger any concerns, espect knowing what the final outcome was and the this. Co, no, it didn't trigger any concerns, espect knowing what the final outcome was and the this. Q. Are there any workaround solutions you can us get through to LFB if the phone lines aren't giving any direct contact? A. We've got nothing in policy and procedures. thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get through the contact in figure and police, which I eventually managed to get the police to try to pass the information on. Q. We'll come on to those particular contacts later if we can now look at the detail of timings on night, first of all, just so you can orientate yours and have a fixed point for when your involveme started.	calls for
NILO for a 24-hour period starting at 0900 hours on 13 June. 5 this. 6 Where were you based when you were on duty? Were 7 you based at Essex headquarters? 7 get through to LFB if the phone lines aren't givin 8 A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working 9 day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address 10 for the rest of the period. 11 Q. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via 12 mobile? 13 A. Via pager. 14 Q. Pager, thank you. 15 At page 2 of your witness statement, at 16 paragraph 10, you say that you were: 17 " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that 18 knowing what the final outcome was and the this. 6 knowing what the final outcome was and the this. 6 Q. Are there any workaround solutions you can us get through to LFB if the phone lines aren't givin any direct contact? 8 A. We've got nothing in policy and procedures, thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get thr Police to try to pass the information on. 16 If we can now look at the detail of timings on 17 night, first of all, just so you can orientate yours 18 and have a fixed point for when your involveme 19 this. 10 this. 11 Q. Are there any workaround solutions you can us get through to LFB if the phone lines aren't givin any direct contact? A. We've got nothing in policy and procedures, thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get thr police to try to pass the information on. 12 Police to try to pass the information on. 13 A. Via pager. 14 If we can now look at the detail of timings on 15 night, first of all, just so you can orientate yours and have a fixed point for when your involveme 16 started.	
5 this. 6 Where were you based when you were on duty? Were 7 you based at Essex headquarters? 7 get through to LFB if the phone lines aren't giving any direct contact? 8 A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working 9 day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address 10 for the rest of the period. 11 Q. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via 12 mobile? 13 A. Via pager. 14 Q. Pager, thank you. 15 At page 2 of your witness statement, at paragraph 10, you say that you were: 16 paragraph 10, you say that you were: 17 " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that 5 this. Q. Are there any workaround solutions you can us get through to LFB if the phone lines aren't giving any direct contact? A. We've got nothing in policy and procedures. thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get through 2. 10 thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get through 2. 11 Police to try to pass the information on. 12 Police to try to pass the information on. 13 If we can now look at the detail of timings on night, first of all, just so you can orientate yours and have a fixed point for when your involvement started.	ecially
Where were you based when you were on duty? Were you based at Essex headquarters? A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address for the rest of the period. Q. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via mobile? A. Via pager. Q. Pager, thank you. At page 2 of your witness statement, at paragraph 10, you say that you were: " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that Q. Are there any workaround solutions you can us get through to LFB if the phone lines aren't givin any direct contact? A. We've got nothing in policy and procedures. thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get thr Police to try to pass the information on. If we can now look at the detail of timings on night, first of all, just so you can orientate yours and have a fixed point for when your involveme started.	ie enormity of
you based at Essex headquarters? A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address for the rest of the period. Q. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via mobile? A. Via pager. Q. Pager, thank you. At page 2 of your witness statement, at paragraph 10, you say that you were: " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that 7 get through to LFB if the phone lines aren't givin any direct contact? 8 A. We've got nothing in policy and procedures. thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get thr Police to try to pass the information on. Q. We'll come on to those particular contacts later If we can now look at the detail of timings on night, first of all, just so you can orientate yourse and have a fixed point for when your involveme started.	
A. So I'm based at Essex headquarters during the working day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address for the rest of the period. Q. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via mobile? A. Via pager. Q. Pager, thank you. At page 2 of your witness statement, at paragraph 10, you say that you were: " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that any direct contact? A. We've got nothing in policy and procedures. thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get thr Police to try to pass the information on. Q. We'll come on to those particular contacts later If we can now look at the detail of timings on night, first of all, just so you can orientate yourse and have a fixed point for when your involveme started.	use to try to
day, from 9.00 to 5.00, and then from my home address for the rest of the period. Q. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via mobile? A. Via pager. Q. Pager, thank you. At page 2 of your witness statement, at paragraph 10, you say that you were: " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that A. We've got nothing in policy and procedures, thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get thr Police to try to pass the information on. Q. We'll come on to those particular contacts later if we can now look at the detail of timings on night, first of all, just so you can orientate yours and have a fixed point for when your involveme started.	ving you
for the rest of the period. Q. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via mobile? A. Via pager. Q. Pager, thank you. At page 2 of your witness statement, at paragraph 10, you say that you were: " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that 10 thought process was either through Airwave police, which I eventually managed to get thr police, which I eventually managed to get thr police to try to pass the information on. Q. We'll come on to those particular contacts later If we can now look at the detail of timings on night, first of all, just so you can orientate yours and have a fixed point for when your involveme started.	
Q. When you're at home, how are you contacted? Is it via mobile? 12 mobile? 13 A. Via pager. 14 Q. Pager, thank you. 15 At page 2 of your witness statement, at paragraph 10, you say that you were: 16 paragraph 10, you say that you were: 17 " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that 18 police, which I eventually managed to get thr Police to try to pass the information on. 19 Q. We'll come on to those particular contacts later on the detail of timings on night, first of all, just so you can orientate yours and have a fixed point for when your involvements of the paragraph of the police, which I eventually managed to get thr Police to try to pass the information on. 10 We'll come on to those particular contacts later on the paragraph of timings on night, first of all, just so you can orientate yours and have a fixed point for when your involvements of the paragraph of the police, which I eventually managed to get thr Police to try to pass the information on. 11 If we can now look at the detail of timings on night, first of all, just so you can orientate yours and have a fixed point for when your involvements of the paragraph of the	es, but my
mobile? 12 Police to try to pass the information on. 13 A. Via pager. 14 Q. Pager, thank you. 15 At page 2 of your witness statement, at paragraph 10, you say that you were: 16 paragraph 10, you say that you were: 17 " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that 18 Police to try to pass the information on. 19 Q. We'll come on to those particular contacts later 11 If we can now look at the detail of timings on night, first of all, just so you can orientate yours and have a fixed point for when your involvement started.	e or through
13 A. Via pager. 14 Q. Pager, thank you. 15 At page 2 of your witness statement, at 16 paragraph 10, you say that you were: 17 " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that 18 Q. We'll come on to those particular contacts later 19 If we can now look at the detail of timings on night, first of all, just so you can orientate yours and have a fixed point for when your involvement started.	nrough to Met
Q. Pager, thank you. 14 If we can now look at the detail of timings on 15 At page 2 of your witness statement, at 16 paragraph 10, you say that you were: 17 " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that 18 If we can now look at the detail of timings on 19 night, first of all, just so you can orientate yours 10 and have a fixed point for when your involvement started.	
15 At page 2 of your witness statement, at 16 paragraph 10, you say that you were: 17 " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that 18 night, first of all, just so you can orientate yourse and have a fixed point for when your involvement started.	er.
paragraph 10, you say that you were: 16 and have a fixed point for when your involveme 17 " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that 17 started.	on the
17 " paged just before 0200hrs and informed that 17 started.	rself
	nent
18 ECFRS Control had received a number of calls from 18 Ralph, if I could ask you to put up LFB00003	
)3625.
residents about a fire in a tower block in West London 19 Mr Dilley, have you seen this document before	ore?
and ECFRS Control were having difficulties in passing 20 A. Yes, I have, yes.	
these calls through to London Fire Brigade." 21 Q. Is that the Essex incident log of their involvements	ment on
First of all, had you heard anything about the 22 the night?	
23 incident at Grenfell Tower before you were paged? 23 A. Yes, it is.	
24 A. No, nothing. 24 Q. At page 4 and this is slightly difficult to mak	ake
Q. Would you have expected to have been paged earlier in 25 out at 01.58, which is just below the halfway pages of the page	y point
D 450	
Page 158 Page 160	

1	on that page, it appears to say, "DO DILLEY NILO PAGED	1	the incident and what was happening.
2	TO INFORM".	2	So ordinarily we would give stay-put policy unless
3	A. Mm.	3	we had information from the fire ground that it would be
4	Q. Have tried ringing LFB direct line put there is no	4	changed. In this case, we had no further information.
5	answer.	5	Q. It would help us, I think, at this stage, to understand,
6	"HAVE TRIED RINGING LFB DIRECT LINE BUT THERE IS NO	6	at this very outset of your involvement with the
7	ANSWER	7	response to the incident, what precisely you knew about
8	"WE ARE AWARE THAT THEY HAVE A MAJOR HIGH RISE FIRE	8	the scale of the fire itself. Not very much, from the
9	AS BT GLASGOW ASKED IF WE COULD TAKE SOME OF THE	9	sound of it.
10	OVERFLOW CALLS AS THERE WERE TOO MANY FOR THEIR FALL	10	A. That's correct.
11	BACK SERVICE	11	Q. Did you have any idea of the extent of the floors that
12	"BT STATED IF THIS BECAME A PROBLEM FOR ECFRS THEN	12	were affected by fire or that level of detail?
13	TO RING THEM BACK ON THE SECURE NUMBER AND THEY WOULD	13	A. No. The information we had was there was a caller on
14	STOP THE CALLS."	14	the 22nd floor. So to all intents and purposes, the
15	Doing the best you can now, is it likely that you	15	fire could've been on that floor, the floor below,
16	were paged at or about 01.58?	16	obviously not knowing the enormity of it at the time.
17	A. Yes, that's correct.	17	Q. Thank you.
18	Q. If I could ask Ralph to zoom out and then to zoom back	18	Looking at the top of page 3 of your witness
19	in on 02.04, where you're recorded as saying:	19	statement, you say:
20	"DO DILLEY INFORMED AND SITUATION EXPLAINED	20	"My normal course of action would be to contact the
21	"HE WILL TRY AND MAKE CONTACT	21	LFB Duty NILO via LFB Control"
22	"HE SUGGESTS THAT IF WE GET FURTHER CALLS FROM	22 23	First of all, how do you get in contact with the LFB duty NILO? What's the means of communication?
23	RESIDENTS TO USE THE STAY PUT POLICY UNTIL WE CAN	23	
24	CLARIFY WHAT ADVICE SHOULD BE GIVEN	25	A. So I would normally do that via control, for them to contact LFB control, to ask their duty NILO to be paged,
25	"HE ALSO ASKED THAT WE CONTINUE TO TRY TO CONTACT	23	contact LFB control, to ask their duty NILO to be paged,
	Page 161		Page 163
1	LFB REGARDING CALLER ON 22ND FLOOR	1	to contact me direct, or to get the number of the duty
2	"NO ANSWER FROM LFB VIA DIRECT LINE."	2	NILO. But clearly on the night, knowing that Essex Fire
3	Would this be the first time where you spoke to	3	control couldn't get through to LFB control, I realised
4	someone at Essex regarding the advice that Essex control	4	that this probably wasn't going to happen.
5	ought to be given to callers directed to them?	5	Q. That's why you tried as the first next option Airwave;
6	A. Yes, it was, although the timing when that information	6	is that right?
7	was inputted on the system, looking back at my own call	7	A. Yes, that's correct.
8	log, I actually started the call at 01.58, I think it	8	Q. Why did you think Airwave was a sensible means of trying
9	lasted for about 3/3.5 minutes, so that would be the	9	to contact the duty NILO?
10	time when we'd finished the conversation and that	10	A. It would've been a very how can I say? quick and
11	information was actually recorded.	11	easy way to talk to the duty NILO.
12	Q. Could you help us: you obviously gave an instruction	12	Q. Is there a dedicated duty NILO channel?
13	that stay-put advice was to be given until clarified.	13	A. We have dedicated NILO channels, but, likewise, if LFB
14	Can you help us, why did you give that instruction?	14	had tried to contact myself as duty NILO in the middle
15	What was your reason?	15	of the night, there would've been no response. So that
16	A. So this was following a conversation with the control	16	was an option which I decided to try first before
17	operator from Essex, where we had information from the	17	attempting the longer route via police.
18	caller, but we didn't have any information from London	18	Q. When you tried it, what contact did you make, if any?
19	Fire Brigade.	19	A. None at all. There was no response.
20	As such, it was agreed that we should continue to	20	Q. Was the line operative?
21	give the advice we would normally give until we heard	21	A. That I don't know, because I just dialled into the
22	differently from LFB.	22	channel and then tried to call up the London NILO. It
23	I think one of the worst situations would be if we	23	was of no surprise that there was no response, but it
24	gave advice which was contrary to LFB to tell people to	24	was something I could do very quickly, and just trying
25	get out when, you know, we didn't have any awareness of	25	to get that information through.
	Page 162		Page 164
-	1 450 102	1	1450 101

1	Q. Did you hear any other activity on the channel or could	1	dial into that national talkgroup in order to
2	you hear anything?	2	communicate with colleagues in police, fire and
3	A. No.	3	ambulance.
4	Q. If I could ask to go back to the Essex incident log,	4	Q. Thank you.
5	LFB00003625, and page 3.	5	Staying with the Essex incident log and looking at
6	Looking at the entry for 02.16, I'll just let you	6	the time stamp 02.21, which is six or seven lines down
7	read that Mr Dilley. It says:	7	from the top, it says:
8	"DO DILLEY HAS TRIED ALL THE TALK GROUPS AND HAS NOT	8	"HAVE SPOKEN TO LFB
9	GOT A RESPONSE."	9	"THEY WANT TO KNOW
10	First of all, does that time stamp of 02.16 record	10	"HOW MANY PEOPLE
11	your attempt to contact your LFB counterpart duty NILO?	11	"FLAT NUMBER
12	A. So, it was probably before that, it was probably 02.10,	12	"FLOOR NUMBER
13	round about that time. So having tried to contact the	13	"AND IF FIRE IS AFFECTING THEIR FLAT."
14	duty NILO, then I spoke to Essex Fire control again to	14	Were you aware that Essex appear to have spoken to
15	say I've had no luck getting through, just to get	15	the LFB at this stage?
16	an update as well just to see that information had been	16	A. No, not at this stage.
17	passed through.	17	Q. Are you able to clarify any background information to
18	Q. Can you help us, it says "DO Dilley HAS TRIED ALL THE	18	that call that's recorded there?
19	TALK GROUPS". What's a talkgroup?	19	A. No.
20	A. That's a channel, basically.	20	Q. Mr Dilley, I'm going to ask to see whether you can help
21	Q. So when you say you tried all the talkgroups, you've	21	us with this call. First of all, I'm going to ask
22	obviously explained to us that you used the duty NILO	22	a transcript to be put up on the screen. It is
23	channel.	23	LFB00004790_0076 apologies, it's not the transcript,
24	A. Yes.	24	first of all, it's the Brigade report entry.
25	Q. What other talkgroups did you try that you're referring	25	Thank you.
	Page 165		Page 167
1	to here at the time stamp of 02.16?	1	It's the call at 02.18.55, so the second entry.
2	A. There are a couple of NILO dedicated channels which	2	I'll just let you read that.
3	I tried, but no other channels. So that was for LFB.	3	(Pause)
4	Q. You would've tried those between 02.10, when you made	4	A. Okay.
5	your initial attempt on the Airwave, and 02.16 when	5	Q. If I could ask Ralph to put that document down and put
6	A. Probably 2 or 3 minutes maximum.	6	up LFB00000325.
7	Q. Are there any other systems that are available to you to	7	If we can turn over the page, this is a call at
8	allow instant communication between duty NILOs across	8	01.48 in respect of a flat on the 22nd floor.
9	the country?	9	You'll see roughly halfway down the page, the caller
10	A. We have the national talkgroup. This would be set up	10	says:
11	prior to major exercises, or set up for a major	11	"CALLER: And it's getting very smoky inside the
12	incident, but that would be set up by the host brigade,	12	house."
13	so we'd be invited into that talkgroup.	13	Bearing that in mind, if we put that document down,
14	Q. Can you remember such a talkgroup being set up at	14	and, Ralph, if we can go back to LFB00004790_0076 and go
15	Grenfell?	15	back to 02.18.55, on the fourth line:
16	A. No, no.	16	"CRO Adams then asks about conditions like smoke in
17	Q. Is it that you don't remember it or one wasn't set up?	17	her flat and the Essex CRO says that the caller seems
18	A. I wasn't informed that this talkgroup had been set up.	18	okay."
19	Q. You adverted to it earlier on, and maybe I should have	19	Then it goes on to say two lines down:
20	asked you a question about it earlier on, but how do	20	"The caller has reported that it has started to get
21	talkgroups function at night? Are the duty officers	21	smoky."
22	expected to have all the means of communication	22	What seemed striking was that the caller, as
23	available to them?	23	recorded in the transcript at 01.48, was saying it was
24	A. So I would be paged to be informed of the incident, that	24	very smoky, and looking at how it's been summarised
25	a national talkgroup had been set up, so then I could	25	there, would you agree that the full import of the smoke
	Page 166		Page 168
	1 agc 100	I	1 age 100

1	description given by the caller hasn't been fully	1	you just read that and then ask you to confirm that that
2	conveyed here by the Essex CRO phoning through to	2	is indeed a transcript of that call.
3	London?	3	A. Yes, it is.
4	A. It's the first time I've seen this, this documentation.	4	Q. We see in relation to that call the first complete box
5	It was something that I wasn't involved in, very much of	5	at the top of page 2 so, Ralph, if you could turn the
6	an opinionated so I'm really not too sure I can	6	page over and amplify the first complete box at the
7	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: No. You're being asked to tell us	7	top Mr Dilley, you're recorded there as saying:
8	what you think the document means, aren't you? Which	8	"Nigel DILLEY: Yeah, have you, unless you've got
9	isn't a very fair question.	9	anybody on the scene that can pass that message to the
10	MR KINNIER: Yes. If you can't help us any further, I won't	10	erm erm Silver Silver on scene to get that message to
11	push my luck.	11	London Fire Brigade."
12	Do you remember any stage during the communications	12	The Silver you're referring to there, is that the
13	between the LFB and Essex whether there was any concern	13	Met or the LFB?
14	expressed by Essex regarding stay put and whether it	14	A. So that would be the LFB, through the incident command
15	should be pulled or not? Do you remember being involved	15	structure.
16	in any discussions along those lines?	16	So it was terminology which I felt that the LFB
17	A. No, the conversations I had with Essex originally was	17	the Met Police would be familiar with through the
18	regarding a query over the stay-put policy.	18	command structure on the incident ground.
19	Further on, as we'll probably come on to, is my	19	Q. Thank you.
20	information from Met Police with regards to advice given	20	We don't need to go through it, but you pass on the
21	for people to exit.	21	information that had come through in relation to flats
22	But for that first half hour, I wasn't aware of	22	193 and 82.
23	well, originally we couldn't get through to LFB control.	23	How did you get the information in respect of those
24	Q. That's helpful. It's that contact with the Met Police	24	two flats?
25	I want to ask you about now.	25	A. So that was from control. So the first call I had was
	Page 169		Page 171
1	Going back to page 3 of your witness statement, it's	1	for the 22nd floor, a flat on the 22nd floor, which
2	really five lines down from the top, you say this, and	2	I believe was 193, and then on my conversation with
3	I quote:	3	control around about 02.15, they gave me information
4	" I decided the next best option was to contact Met Police Control with a view of getting them to pass	4 5	about a second caller, which I believe was on the
5	the caller details I had, via Police, directly to the	6	11th floor.
6 7	LFB Command team at the incident."	7	So that information I passed to Met Police. Q. Thank you.
8	Summarising your evidence, is it fair to say that	8	About halfway down page 2, you're recorded as saying
	all other options having failed, the last practicable		
9 10	option was contacting the police?	10	this: "Nigel DILLEY: no I haven't got any further
11		11	details but I can get them."
12	A. I had spoken to control about them trying to get in	12	Did you follow that up and try and obtain further
13	touch with North West Fire Control. So then, for me, it	13	details from Essex control?
13	was looking at other options, other ways of getting that information. And with my close working relationships	14	A. So following on from that conversation, I actually got
15	, and a second s	15	the CAD number and then spoke to Essex control and gave
16	with Essex Police and the information which we share,	16	•
10	I felt, through police, that might be a very good way of	17	them the information, believing actually it would be
17	getting information		better for them to contact Met Police directly rather
17	getting information.		than make a third narty. So I had made those contacts
18	Knowing the type of incident it was, I would've	18	than me as a third party. So I had made those contacts,
18 19	Knowing the type of incident it was, I would've thought police would be present on the incident ground,	18 19	so I passed that number back to Essex control.
18 19 20	Knowing the type of incident it was, I would've thought police would be present on the incident ground, so that information could be passed to the command unit	18 19 20	so I passed that number back to Essex control. Q. When you ended the call, what did you expect would be
18 19 20 21	Knowing the type of incident it was, I would've thought police would be present on the incident ground, so that information could be passed to the command unit directly via police.	18 19 20 21	so I passed that number back to Essex control. Q. When you ended the call, what did you expect would be done with the information you'd conveyed in respect of
18 19 20 21 22	Knowing the type of incident it was, I would've thought police would be present on the incident ground, so that information could be passed to the command unit directly via police. Q. Thank you.	18 19 20 21 22	so I passed that number back to Essex control. Q. When you ended the call, what did you expect would be done with the information you'd conveyed in respect of flats 193 and 82?
18 19 20 21 22 23	Knowing the type of incident it was, I would've thought police would be present on the incident ground, so that information could be passed to the command unit directly via police. Q. Thank you. Now, Ralph, if you could put up on the screen	18 19 20 21 22 23	 so I passed that number back to Essex control. Q. When you ended the call, what did you expect would be done with the information you'd conveyed in respect of flats 193 and 82? A. So two things I'd requested: the first was for the
18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Knowing the type of incident it was, I would've thought police would be present on the incident ground, so that information could be passed to the command unit directly via police. Q. Thank you. Now, Ralph, if you could put up on the screen document INQ00000284, which hopefully is a transcript of	18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 so I passed that number back to Essex control. Q. When you ended the call, what did you expect would be done with the information you'd conveyed in respect of flats 193 and 82? A. So two things I'd requested: the first was for the information to be passed on to the fire ground, and
18 19 20 21 22 23	Knowing the type of incident it was, I would've thought police would be present on the incident ground, so that information could be passed to the command unit directly via police. Q. Thank you. Now, Ralph, if you could put up on the screen	18 19 20 21 22 23	so I passed that number back to Essex control. Q. When you ended the call, what did you expect would be done with the information you'd conveyed in respect of flats 193 and 82? A. So two things I'd requested: the first was for the
18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Knowing the type of incident it was, I would've thought police would be present on the incident ground, so that information could be passed to the command unit directly via police. Q. Thank you. Now, Ralph, if you could put up on the screen document INQ00000284, which hopefully is a transcript of	18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 so I passed that number back to Essex control. Q. When you ended the call, what did you expect would be done with the information you'd conveyed in respect of flats 193 and 82? A. So two things I'd requested: the first was for the information to be passed on to the fire ground, and

	to get in touch with LFB control which we could use. So looking at almost like a third option, a third line of	1 2	A. No, I think my last conversation with control was about
3 4 (looking at almost like a third option, a third line of		
4 (l .	03.15.
	communication.	3	Q. Thank you very much for that, Mr Dilley.
5 £	Q. In relation to the latter, did you ever get that number?	4	Let's move topic and to change of the stay-put
	A. Not that I'm aware of, I wasn't given that number, but	5	advice which you adverted to in your answer.
6	I gave the information to Essex Fire control. But	6	Just to give you some context, at paragraph 14 on
7	having spoken, then, to Essex fire control with that	7	page 3 of your statement, you say that you did become
8	information, I was told we had finally got through to	8	aware that the LFB had changed the stay-put policy
9	LFB control, so the information had been passed.	9	during the night:
10	So I was trying to triangulate the communications,	10	" when talking to the Met Police Control
11	but knowing the information had been passed direct from	11	Operator."
12	Essex Fire control to LFB control, then for me, the	12	Is that a fair summary of your evidence?
13	information had got through, so it wasn't something	13	A. It was, but that was my understanding when I submitted
14	I needed to chase up.	14	my evidence in October this year. However, it wasn't
15 (Q. Thank you.	15	when I was talking to the Met Police operator, it was
16	If we can go back and look at the Essex incident	16	actually I received a text message
17	log, which is LFB00003625 and look at time stamp 02.36.	17	Q. Okay.
18	Go on to page 3. 02.36 we're looking for, Ralph.	18	A to say that they were advising residents to evacuate.
19	Page 2?	19	Q. Okay.
20	All right. You'll see at the very last entry at the	20	Could I just bottom out this point. If I could ask
21	bottom of that page, 02.36:	21	Ralph to put up INQ00000284, and if we can go to page 2.
22	"DO DILLEY HAS SPOKEN TO THE POLICE."	22	That's the transcript of the call we were looking at
23	And now could we go to page 3, and the top, if you	23	earlier, but if you go to the end, and amplify the box
24	can highlight that:	24	at the bottom of page 3.
25	"CONTROL IN HENDON THEY ARE TRYING TO GET A NUMBER	25	You mentioned a text message earlier on. This
23	CONTROL IN ILLIADON THET ARE TRYING TO GET A NOMBER		C
	Page 173		Page 175
1	FOR US	1	appears to be a voicemail message left for you at
2	"THEIR NUMBER IS [redacted] CAD 0801 14/06	2	02.32.31.
3	INCASE[sic] WE NEED IT	3	Is that the message you're referring to there?
4	"CONTROL INFD[sic] DO DILLEY THAT WE HAVE SPOKEN TO	4	A. Yes, sorry, yes.
5	LFB CONTROL NOW."	5	Q. So it's a voicemail as opposed to a text?
6	Does that give us a sort of relatively accurate time	6	A. A voicemail, yes. And the reason they couldn't get
7	point of the conversation you had	7	through is because at the time I was talking to Essex
8 4	A. Yes, it does. When I	8	Fire control. So that would equate to the timings.
9 (Q and fed back to Essex, I should say?	9	Q. Thank you.
10	A. Yes. When I was in conversation with Met Police at	10	If we could tie this document chain together,
11	Hendon, I was paged again by Essex Fire control. As	11	LFB00003625 and page 2, Ralph.
12	soon as I'd finished the conversation, then I spoke to	12	If you go time stamp 02.40, so second entry up from
13	Essex Fire control, and that would equate to the	13	the bottom of the page:
14	timelines there.	14	"DO DILLEY HAS CALLED THE CONTACT NUMBER FOR MET
	Q. After this particular call that's recorded, you updating	15	POLICE AND THE MESSAGE THEY ARE GIVING TO RESIDENTS FROM
16	Essex control at 02.36, were you aware of any later 999	16	LFB IS THAT THEY ARE TO MAKE THEIR WAY TO A FIRE EXIT IF
17	calls that were directed towards Essex?	17	SAFE TO DO SO."
	A. I was aware I think I well, in fact I spoke to	18	A. Yes.
19	Essex Fire control just after that with regards to	19	Q. I think that's the phone message you were referring to
20	a message which I'd got from Hendon regarding asking	20	earlier on as to how you communicated the contents of
21	residents to evacuate the building, and then I think	21	the voicemail message back to Essex control; is that
22	I was paged after that just after 3 o'clock. But by	22	right?
23	that time, Essex were talking to LFB control.	23	A. That's why there were two calls Essex Fire control
	Q. Were you aware of any further communication difficulties	24	within 3 or 4 minutes. My first message was to pass the
25	between Essex and the LFB that night?	25	information on regarding Hendon, and the second with
	Page 174		Page 176

1	this change, which had been communicated via Met Police.	1	incident log, which is LFB00003625 and the time entry at
2	Q. Do you know the identity of the person to whom you spoke	2	03.03, which is on page 1 of that log, second from the
3	at the Essex control room when you communicated this	3	bottom.
4	information?	4	I'll just let you read that to yourself, Mr Dilley.
5	A. I believe it was Russ, Russ White.	5	(Pause)
6	Q. Yes, okay.	6	A. Okay.
7	Mr White, in his witness statement and I can	7	
8	bring up the reference, but I don't think it's	8	Q. That essentially records a caller being recontacted and advised to leave.
9		9	
10	necessary, but please shout if you'd like to see it		Is this the practice that would normally be adopted
	he says in his witness statement and I quote:	10	in relation to calling back residents who are trapped
11	"At 02:36 hours, I spoke to Nigel DILLEY. Message	11	within the flat, and advising them of change of advice?
12	from London Fire Brigade via the Metropolitan Police	12 13	A. Not normally. We wouldn't call back definitely
13	control room is to advise all residents to make their		a landline, on the basis that the caller may be outside
14	way to the fire escape/exit. I informed Nigel DILLEY	14	and then return to pick up the call.
15	that London had confirmed when speaking with the last	15	My understanding is from this, with the change to
16	that the advice was to 'stay put', although this may	16	advice given, and Russ having the time to be able to do
17	have changed depending on how the incident was dealt	17	this, I understand that he decided to recontact the
18	with. Nigel DILLEY again passed me the Metropolitan	18	caller.
19	Police number to get an update."	19	Q. Okay. Thank you very much.
20	Does that recollection of the content of your phone	20	Could you remove the amplification, please, Ralph,
21	conversation with Mr White coincide with your	21	and go to time stamp 03.10.
22	recollection of that conversation?	22	It says there:
23	A. Yes, it does. And just to clarify, I needed Russ to	23	"DO DILLEY INFORMED AS DUTY NILO."
24	speak to Hendon just to clarify the information which	24	Does that confirm the advice that was given in
25	I'd been given via the voicemail was correct, because	25	relation to the call we looked at at 03.03?
	Dago 177		Dage 170
	Page 177		Page 179
1	obviously a change to the stay-put policy is something	1	A. Yes, that would be correct, although the conversation at
1 2	obviously a change to the stay-put policy is something we needed to clarify.	1 2	A. Yes, that would be correct, although the conversation at that time, my understanding was that they had received
	we needed to clarify.		that time, my understanding was that they had received
2		2	
2 3	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you	2 3	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was
2 3 4	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because	2 3 4	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed.
2 3 4 5	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you	2 3 4 5	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was
2 3 4 5 6	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us.	2 3 4 5 6	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed. Q. Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined and classified the incident as
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us. There's a call in relation to flat 153, which is on	2 3 4 5 6 7	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed. Q. Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined and classified the incident as a major incident?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us. There's a call in relation to flat 153, which is on the 18th floor.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed. Q. Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined and classified the incident as a major incident? A. That was, I believe, at that time.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us. There's a call in relation to flat 153, which is on the 18th floor. If I could ask Ralph to bring up the control report,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed. Q. Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined and classified the incident as a major incident?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us. There's a call in relation to flat 153, which is on the 18th floor. If I could ask Ralph to bring up the control report, which is LFB00004790 at page 105.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed. Q. Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined and classified the incident as a major incident? A. That was, I believe, at that time. Q. So around 03.10? A. 03.10, yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us. There's a call in relation to flat 153, which is on the 18th floor. If I could ask Ralph to bring up the control report, which is LFB00004790 at page 105. If I could ask Ralph to amplify 02.51, the first	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed. Q. Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined and classified the incident as a major incident? A. That was, I believe, at that time. Q. So around 03.10?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us. There's a call in relation to flat 153, which is on the 18th floor. If I could ask Ralph to bring up the control report, which is LFB00004790 at page 105. If I could ask Ralph to amplify 02.51, the first entry at that time there.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed. Q. Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined and classified the incident as a major incident? A. That was, I believe, at that time. Q. So around 03.10? A. 03.10, yes. Q. What's the effect of that declaration on your role and responsibilities as the duty NILO at Essex?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us. There's a call in relation to flat 153, which is on the 18th floor. If I could ask Ralph to bring up the control report, which is LFB00004790 at page 105. If I could ask Ralph to amplify 02.51, the first entry at that time there. I'll just let you read that, Mr Dilley, to yourself.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed. Q. Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined and classified the incident as a major incident? A. That was, I believe, at that time. Q. So around 03.10? A. 03.10, yes. Q. What's the effect of that declaration on your role and responsibilities as the duty NILO at Essex? A. So a major incident within London Fire Brigade, unless
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us. There's a call in relation to flat 153, which is on the 18th floor. If I could ask Ralph to bring up the control report, which is LFB00004790 at page 105. If I could ask Ralph to amplify 02.51, the first entry at that time there. I'll just let you read that, Mr Dilley, to yourself. (Pause)	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed. Q. Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined and classified the incident as a major incident? A. That was, I believe, at that time. Q. So around 03.10? A. 03.10, yes. Q. What's the effect of that declaration on your role and responsibilities as the duty NILO at Essex? A. So a major incident within London Fire Brigade, unless it was close to the Essex border, wouldn't normally
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us. There's a call in relation to flat 153, which is on the 18th floor. If I could ask Ralph to bring up the control report, which is LFB00004790 at page 105. If I could ask Ralph to amplify 02.51, the first entry at that time there. I'll just let you read that, Mr Dilley, to yourself. (Pause) A. Okay.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed. Q. Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined and classified the incident as a major incident? A. That was, I believe, at that time. Q. So around 03.10? A. 03.10, yes. Q. What's the effect of that declaration on your role and responsibilities as the duty NILO at Essex? A. So a major incident within London Fire Brigade, unless it was close to the Essex border, wouldn't normally trigger the duty NILO being informed. As you can
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us. There's a call in relation to flat 153, which is on the 18th floor. If I could ask Ralph to bring up the control report, which is LFB00004790 at page 105. If I could ask Ralph to amplify 02.51, the first entry at that time there. I'll just let you read that, Mr Dilley, to yourself. (Pause) A. Okay. Q. Were you familiar with that call or were you aware of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed. Q. Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined and classified the incident as a major incident? A. That was, I believe, at that time. Q. So around 03.10? A. 03.10, yes. Q. What's the effect of that declaration on your role and responsibilities as the duty NILO at Essex? A. So a major incident within London Fire Brigade, unless it was close to the Essex border, wouldn't normally trigger the duty NILO being informed. As you can appreciate, London have resources to deal with,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us. There's a call in relation to flat 153, which is on the 18th floor. If I could ask Ralph to bring up the control report, which is LFB00004790 at page 105. If I could ask Ralph to amplify 02.51, the first entry at that time there. I'll just let you read that, Mr Dilley, to yourself. (Pause) A. Okay. Q. Were you familiar with that call or were you aware of that call on the night?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed. Q. Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined and classified the incident as a major incident? A. That was, I believe, at that time. Q. So around 03.10? A. 03.10, yes. Q. What's the effect of that declaration on your role and responsibilities as the duty NILO at Essex? A. So a major incident within London Fire Brigade, unless it was close to the Essex border, wouldn't normally trigger the duty NILO being informed. As you can appreciate, London have resources to deal with, ordinarily, incidents themselves without requesting
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us. There's a call in relation to flat 153, which is on the 18th floor. If I could ask Ralph to bring up the control report, which is LFB00004790 at page 105. If I could ask Ralph to amplify 02.51, the first entry at that time there. I'll just let you read that, Mr Dilley, to yourself. (Pause) A. Okay. Q. Were you familiar with that call or were you aware of that call on the night? A. No, I wasn't, no.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed. Q. Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined and classified the incident as a major incident? A. That was, I believe, at that time. Q. So around 03.10? A. 03.10, yes. Q. What's the effect of that declaration on your role and responsibilities as the duty NILO at Essex? A. So a major incident within London Fire Brigade, unless it was close to the Essex border, wouldn't normally trigger the duty NILO being informed. As you can appreciate, London have resources to deal with, ordinarily, incidents themselves without requesting advice or assistance from Essex.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us. There's a call in relation to flat 153, which is on the 18th floor. If I could ask Ralph to bring up the control report, which is LFB00004790 at page 105. If I could ask Ralph to amplify 02.51, the first entry at that time there. I'll just let you read that, Mr Dilley, to yourself. (Pause) A. Okay. Q. Were you familiar with that call or were you aware of that call on the night? A. No, I wasn't, no. Q. I won't ask you to comment on the contents of the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed. Q. Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined and classified the incident as a major incident? A. That was, I believe, at that time. Q. So around 03.10? A. 03.10, yes. Q. What's the effect of that declaration on your role and responsibilities as the duty NILO at Essex? A. So a major incident within London Fire Brigade, unless it was close to the Essex border, wouldn't normally trigger the duty NILO being informed. As you can appreciate, London have resources to deal with, ordinarily, incidents themselves without requesting advice or assistance from Essex. Q. The penultimate question I'd like to ask you is going
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us. There's a call in relation to flat 153, which is on the 18th floor. If I could ask Ralph to bring up the control report, which is LFB00004790 at page 105. If I could ask Ralph to amplify 02.51, the first entry at that time there. I'll just let you read that, Mr Dilley, to yourself. (Pause) A. Okay. Q. Were you familiar with that call or were you aware of that call on the night? A. No, I wasn't, no. Q. I won't ask you to comment on the contents of the transcript then. That probably won't assist us any	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed. Q. Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined and classified the incident as a major incident? A. That was, I believe, at that time. Q. So around 03.10? A. 03.10, yes. Q. What's the effect of that declaration on your role and responsibilities as the duty NILO at Essex? A. So a major incident within London Fire Brigade, unless it was close to the Essex border, wouldn't normally trigger the duty NILO being informed. As you can appreciate, London have resources to deal with, ordinarily, incidents themselves without requesting advice or assistance from Essex. Q. The penultimate question I'd like to ask you is going back to the NILO system itself, having gone through the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us. There's a call in relation to flat 153, which is on the 18th floor. If I could ask Ralph to bring up the control report, which is LFB00004790 at page 105. If I could ask Ralph to amplify 02.51, the first entry at that time there. I'll just let you read that, Mr Dilley, to yourself. (Pause) A. Okay. Q. Were you familiar with that call or were you aware of that call on the night? A. No, I wasn't, no. Q. I won't ask you to comment on the contents of the transcript then. That probably won't assist us any further.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed. Q. Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined and classified the incident as a major incident? A. That was, I believe, at that time. Q. So around 03.10? A. 03.10, yes. Q. What's the effect of that declaration on your role and responsibilities as the duty NILO at Essex? A. So a major incident within London Fire Brigade, unless it was close to the Essex border, wouldn't normally trigger the duty NILO being informed. As you can appreciate, London have resources to deal with, ordinarily, incidents themselves without requesting advice or assistance from Essex. Q. The penultimate question I'd like to ask you is going back to the NILO system itself, having gone through the nature of your involvement over the night with the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us. There's a call in relation to flat 153, which is on the 18th floor. If I could ask Ralph to bring up the control report, which is LFB00004790 at page 105. If I could ask Ralph to amplify 02.51, the first entry at that time there. I'll just let you read that, Mr Dilley, to yourself. (Pause) A. Okay. Q. Were you familiar with that call or were you aware of that call on the night? A. No, I wasn't, no. Q. I won't ask you to comment on the contents of the transcript then. That probably won't assist us any further. Can I move to a separate topic, which is the topic	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed. Q. Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined and classified the incident as a major incident? A. That was, I believe, at that time. Q. So around 03.10? A. 03.10, yes. Q. What's the effect of that declaration on your role and responsibilities as the duty NILO at Essex? A. So a major incident within London Fire Brigade, unless it was close to the Essex border, wouldn't normally trigger the duty NILO being informed. As you can appreciate, London have resources to deal with, ordinarily, incidents themselves without requesting advice or assistance from Essex. Q. The penultimate question I'd like to ask you is going back to the NILO system itself, having gone through the nature of your involvement over the night with the incident.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us. There's a call in relation to flat 153, which is on the 18th floor. If I could ask Ralph to bring up the control report, which is LFB00004790 at page 105. If I could ask Ralph to amplify 02.51, the first entry at that time there. I'll just let you read that, Mr Dilley, to yourself. (Pause) A. Okay. Q. Were you familiar with that call or were you aware of that call on the night? A. No, I wasn't, no. Q. I won't ask you to comment on the contents of the transcript then. That probably won't assist us any further. Can I move to a separate topic, which is the topic of callbacks.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed. Q. Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined and classified the incident as a major incident? A. That was, I believe, at that time. Q. So around 03.10? A. 03.10, yes. Q. What's the effect of that declaration on your role and responsibilities as the duty NILO at Essex? A. So a major incident within London Fire Brigade, unless it was close to the Essex border, wouldn't normally trigger the duty NILO being informed. As you can appreciate, London have resources to deal with, ordinarily, incidents themselves without requesting advice or assistance from Essex. Q. The penultimate question I'd like to ask you is going back to the NILO system itself, having gone through the nature of your involvement over the night with the incident. Looking at what happened on the night, do you think
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us. There's a call in relation to flat 153, which is on the 18th floor. If I could ask Ralph to bring up the control report, which is LFB00004790 at page 105. If I could ask Ralph to amplify 02.51, the first entry at that time there. I'll just let you read that, Mr Dilley, to yourself. (Pause) A. Okay. Q. Were you familiar with that call or were you aware of that call on the night? A. No, I wasn't, no. Q. I won't ask you to comment on the contents of the transcript then. That probably won't assist us any further. Can I move to a separate topic, which is the topic	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed. Q. Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined and classified the incident as a major incident? A. That was, I believe, at that time. Q. So around 03.10? A. 03.10, yes. Q. What's the effect of that declaration on your role and responsibilities as the duty NILO at Essex? A. So a major incident within London Fire Brigade, unless it was close to the Essex border, wouldn't normally trigger the duty NILO being informed. As you can appreciate, London have resources to deal with, ordinarily, incidents themselves without requesting advice or assistance from Essex. Q. The penultimate question I'd like to ask you is going back to the NILO system itself, having gone through the nature of your involvement over the night with the incident.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	we needed to clarify. Q. Okay. If I can deal with some individual calls, and if you don't know anything about them, please say so because I don't want to ask you questions in which you can't assist us. There's a call in relation to flat 153, which is on the 18th floor. If I could ask Ralph to bring up the control report, which is LFB00004790 at page 105. If I could ask Ralph to amplify 02.51, the first entry at that time there. I'll just let you read that, Mr Dilley, to yourself. (Pause) A. Okay. Q. Were you familiar with that call or were you aware of that call on the night? A. No, I wasn't, no. Q. I won't ask you to comment on the contents of the transcript then. That probably won't assist us any further. Can I move to a separate topic, which is the topic of callbacks.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	that time, my understanding was that they had received further calls but they were talking to LFB at the time. I also understand at that time the executive officer was also paged to be informed. Q. Do you remember being informed at any stage in the night that the LFB had defined and classified the incident as a major incident? A. That was, I believe, at that time. Q. So around 03.10? A. 03.10, yes. Q. What's the effect of that declaration on your role and responsibilities as the duty NILO at Essex? A. So a major incident within London Fire Brigade, unless it was close to the Essex border, wouldn't normally trigger the duty NILO being informed. As you can appreciate, London have resources to deal with, ordinarily, incidents themselves without requesting advice or assistance from Essex. Q. The penultimate question I'd like to ask you is going back to the NILO system itself, having gone through the nature of your involvement over the night with the incident. Looking at what happened on the night, do you think

1	communication difficulties you encountered?	1	When you made your efforts to contact the LFB's duty
2	A. The NILO function is an option that could be used.	2	NILO, was that as a result of a policy process set out
3	I think with the type of incident, it just wasn't put	3	in this document or another policy document, or was it
4	into action at the time.	4	basically an example of initiative to try and get
5	Q. My final question is one of resources.	5	through to the LFB?
6	Would it have formed part of your job to have	6	A. It's not in the policy, it was part of the original
7	contacted London to see whether they needed more	7	conversation with my first call with Essex Fire control.
8	resources from Essex?	8	In fact, a suggestion from control to see if I could get
9	A. No, that's the host brigade contacting Essex to request	9	in touch with the LFB NILO.
10	additional resources.	10	Q. So initiative reacting to circumstances on the night as
11	MR KINNIER: Thank you.	11	opposed to policy?
12	Mr Dilley, I have no further questions at the	12	A. Yes.
13	moment.	13	Q. Is that likewise for trying to make use of Airwave,
14	As we've said to other witnesses, the chairman	14	contacting the Met and using those alternative means of
15	allows me 5 minutes to review my notes to see if there	15	communication?
16	are any further matters.	16	A. Yes, and I think my involvement was because things
17	Sir, I'd be grateful for that indulgence now, but	17	weren't working out as they should've done for that
18	you may feel slightly longer may be permissible.	18	short period of time, probably for 20/25 minutes before
19	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think maybe seven.	19	the information got through to LFB control.
20	MR KINNIER: Yes.	20	Q. Thank you.
21	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Dilley, we're going to have	21	Going back to the topic of callbacks, did you ever
22	a short break now so counsel can check there aren't any	22	in your capacity as NILO, or indeed as level 3 incident
23	questions which should've been asked but haven't been,	23	commander, specifically raise with Russ White or anyone
24	so we're going to rise for just over 5 minutes. I'm	24	else in Essex control the need for all CROs to call back
25	going to ask you, please, not to talk to anyone about	25	callers where possible to provide an update, such as
	Page 181		Page 183
1	your evidence while you're out of the room.	1	Essex could?
2	If you would like to go with the usher, she'll look	2	A. That's not a conversation that I've had.
3	after you. Thank you.	3	Q. Can you help us why not? Why wouldn't you have had
4	(Pause)	4	that
5	I'll say 4.05.	5	A. My understanding was Russ made that call on the night
6	MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.	6	because he had the capacity to do so. Things had
7	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? Thank you.	7	changed, so Russ used, I'd say, his initiative to do
8	(4.00 pm)	8	that, but he had the capacity to do it as well.
9	(A short break)	9	Q. Final question.
10	(4.05 pm)	10	The LFB has a policy, number 539, which establishes
11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, Mr Dilley, I think Mr Kinnier	11	the principles escape, assess, protect and rescue to
12	has found a couple of questions he would like to ask.	12	deal with FSGs.
13	MR KINNIER: Mr Dilley, thank you very much for your	13	Some of the questions that are recommended in that
14	patience. Just a few more questions that we'd be	14	LFB policy to ask are: do you know where the fire is?
15	grateful for your help in relation to.	15	Which room are you in? Is there anyone there with you?
16	On the first page of your witness statement	16	Has the smoke stopped coming in? Let me know if it's
17	indeed, you made reference to it in correcting	17	thicker? What is happening now?
18	a typographical error at the outset you refer to the	18	Does Essex have a comparable policy?
19	fire and rescue service incident command system.	19	A. Yes, they do. I believe it's advance call handling.
20	Is that a national or an Essex-specific policy?	20	Q. Is that something which you could provide to the
21	A. So that's a national system.	21	inquiry?
22	Q. Would you be able to provide a copy of that policy	22	A. Yes, that can be provided.
23	document to the inquiry?	23	MR KINNIER: Thank you. I'm very grateful.
24	A. Yes, yes.	24	Mr Dilley, thank you very much for your time this
25	Q. Thank you.	25	afternoon, and apologies that you've had a longer wait
	Page 182		Page 184

nce, but we're very grateful.	1	Now, you're going to stand, I think, to give your
	2	evidence.
ir.	3	THE WITNESS: Yes.
I'd add my thanks as well,	4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right. That's fine.
t you waiting for a long	5	Yes, Ms Jones.
evidence, but it's worth the	6	MS JONES: Thank you. Thank you very much.
you for coming and your	7	First of all, please could you give your full name
to us, so thank you very	8	for the record.
to us, so thank you very	9	A. Sharon Elizabeth Lancaster.
ery much.	10	Q. Thank you.
And now you're free to go. The	11	First of all, can I say thank you very much for
And now you're free to go. The	12	
		coming to the inquiry today to help us with our
ir.	13	investigations, and also thank you very much for waiting
rew)	14	so patiently all day. We appreciate you being here
Yes, Mr Kinnier.	15	since this morning.
nd final witness for today is	16	It may be that my questions run over 4.30. If
s to be some minor	17	that's the case, I'll check to see if you're still happy
re just to put a lectern on	18	to continue.
r this to be done in your	19	A. Okay.
sher doesn't seem to mind,	20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I ask you now, you'd like to get
	21	your evidence over and done with today, I imagine?
Let them carry on. I'm going to ask	22	A. Yes.
v long Ms Lancaster might	23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, it may be that it will
	24	run a bit past 4.30. Are you happy to do that?
is going to be examined by	25	A. Yes, that's fine.
185		Page 187
ation will last between 30 to	1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Shall we crack on?
oriefer end of the spectrum	2	MS JONES: Thank you very much, sir.
that range.	3	First of all, Ms Lancaster, can I take you to your
We'll see how that goes. I think as	4	witness statement, which will come up on the screen in
e of 4.30, it's quite nice	5	front of you, but it's also in that folder in front of
has been waiting I think	6	you as well.
evidence.	7	The reference number for our records is MET00018755
	8	and it's dated 29 May and should be on the screen now.
Out of courtesy to her, and in order	9	A. Yes.
rendance, it would be good	10	Q. Can I first of all ask you, is that your witness
his evening.	11	statement?
s Manager and the ladies who	12	A. It is.
they mind running over yet	13	Q. It runs for three pages. Have you had a chance to read
e?	14	it recently?
much.	15	A. I have, yes.
while I've been	16	Q. Do you confirm that the contents of it are true?
e at all.	17	A. Yes.
	18	Q. And you're happy for it to stand as your evidence to
	19	this inquiry?
f I may call Ms Sharon	20	A. I am, yes.
. I may can 1915 Sharon		
Thank you	21	Q. Thank you very much.
Thank you.	22	Ms Lancaster, I have a number of questions about
STER (sworn)	23	your witness statement and some other evidence that we
ONES	24	have already been taken to and I'll take you to in due
Thank you very much.	25	course. But let me say at the outset that my questions
186		Page 188
Thank you 186	very much.	very much. 25

1	are intended to be short and simple, but if they're not,	1	Q. That's very helpful, thank you.
2	please just say, I'll be happy to repeat or rephrase	2	During your training, did you have any training
3	them.	3	about fires in high-rise flats and about fire spread and
4	If you do want a break at any point in time, again,	4	breach of compartmentation?
5	please do just say?	5	A. No.
6	A. Okay.	6	Q. By the time of the Grenfell Tower fire, had you had any
7	Q. All right.	7	experience working in a control room where there had
8	First of all, you say in your witness statement that	8	been a large-scale fire or major incident?
9	at the time of the Grenfell Tower incident, you were	9	A. Not to that degree, no.
10	a control room operator at Essex County Fire and Rescue	10	Q. To any degree, any kind of major incident had you been
11	Service; is that right?	11	involved in?
12	A. It is.	12	A. Not personally, no.
13	Q. You'd been working in the control room since 2012.	13	Q. Did you have any training on how the overflow call
14	A. Yes.	14	arrangements worked with other control rooms?
15	Q. In 2017 August, I think it is you left the	15	A. Yes.
16	employment of Essex?	16	Q. Can you briefly tell us what that training how it was
17	A. I did, yes.	17	delivered and what it was, if you can remember?
18	Q. All right, thank you.	18	A. From what I can remember, I think we tried it with
19	I want to ask you a bit more about your training and	19	Bedfordshire a few times, where our call would divert to
20	your experience as a control room operator whilst at	20	them or their calls would divert to us. On a few
21	Essex.	21	occasions, Bedfordshire's 999 system did fail, so their
22	First of all, when you joined the control room, did	22	calls automatically came through to us, and that
23	you have training on the stay-put policy?	23	highlighted that we did need further training, because
24	A. In our training, we covered lots of different policies.	24	it wasn't something that we did on a regular basis.
25	I can't remember literally one by one, I'm afraid, but	25	Q. When did that take place?
	Page 189		Page 191
		1	
1	11.1 (1 1 11.1	1	A TALLA A C A ALL C
1	we did go through numerous policies.	1	A. I think that was trying to think now it was
2	Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance?	2	definitely 2017.
2 3	Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance?A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy.	2 3	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember?
2 3 4	Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance?A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy.Q. Were you given any training on something that we	2 3 4	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before.
2 3 4 5	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? 	2 3 4 5	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before?
2 3 4 5 6	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to 	2 3 4 5 6	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to training school. 	2 3 4 5 6 7	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Did you have further training on how those overflow
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to training school. Q. Were you given any training after your initial training 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Did you have further training on how those overflow arrangements were to work?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to training school. Q. Were you given any training after your initial training school session? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Did you have further training on how those overflow arrangements were to work? A. Yes, we had prompt cards of what we would do, who we'd
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to training school. Q. Were you given any training after your initial training school session? A. Not on fire survival, no. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Did you have further training on how those overflow arrangements were to work? A. Yes, we had prompt cards of what we would do, who we'd call, how to divert the lines. We'd have a designated
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to training school. Q. Were you given any training after your initial training school session? A. Not on fire survival, no. Q. The initial training you say, was that in 2012 when you 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Did you have further training on how those overflow arrangements were to work? A. Yes, we had prompt cards of what we would do, who we'd call, how to divert the lines. We'd have a designated console that would be purely for that brigade to take
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to training school. Q. Were you given any training after your initial training school session? A. Not on fire survival, no. Q. The initial training you say, was that in 2012 when you joined the control room, or was that earlier when you 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Did you have further training on how those overflow arrangements were to work? A. Yes, we had prompt cards of what we would do, who we'd call, how to divert the lines. We'd have a designated console that would be purely for that brigade to take calls and receive calls.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to training school. Q. Were you given any training after your initial training school session? A. Not on fire survival, no. Q. The initial training you say, was that in 2012 when you joined the control room, or was that earlier when you joined Essex County Fire and Rescue Service? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Did you have further training on how those overflow arrangements were to work? A. Yes, we had prompt cards of what we would do, who we'd call, how to divert the lines. We'd have a designated console that would be purely for that brigade to take calls and receive calls. Q. Am I right in saying that Bedfordshire is your buddy
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to training school. Q. Were you given any training after your initial training school session? A. Not on fire survival, no. Q. The initial training you say, was that in 2012 when you joined the control room, or was that earlier when you joined Essex County Fire and Rescue Service? A. In 2012, when I joined control. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Did you have further training on how those overflow arrangements were to work? A. Yes, we had prompt cards of what we would do, who we'd call, how to divert the lines. We'd have a designated console that would be purely for that brigade to take calls and receive calls. Q. Am I right in saying that Bedfordshire is your buddy service?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to training school. Q. Were you given any training after your initial training school session? A. Not on fire survival, no. Q. The initial training you say, was that in 2012 when you joined the control room, or was that earlier when you joined Essex County Fire and Rescue Service? A. In 2012, when I joined control. Q. I appreciate it's a while ago, but are you briefly able 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Did you have further training on how those overflow arrangements were to work? A. Yes, we had prompt cards of what we would do, who we'd call, how to divert the lines. We'd have a designated console that would be purely for that brigade to take calls and receive calls. Q. Am I right in saying that Bedfordshire is your buddy service? A. Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to training school. Q. Were you given any training after your initial training school session? A. Not on fire survival, no. Q. The initial training you say, was that in 2012 when you joined the control room, or was that earlier when you joined Essex County Fire and Rescue Service? A. In 2012, when I joined control. Q. I appreciate it's a while ago, but are you briefly able to give us an outline of what that training was? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Did you have further training on how those overflow arrangements were to work? A. Yes, we had prompt cards of what we would do, who we'd call, how to divert the lines. We'd have a designated console that would be purely for that brigade to take calls and receive calls. Q. Am I right in saying that Bedfordshire is your buddy service? A. Yes. Q. So was your training specifically only about how to pass
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to training school. Q. Were you given any training after your initial training school session? A. Not on fire survival, no. Q. The initial training you say, was that in 2012 when you joined the control room, or was that earlier when you joined Essex County Fire and Rescue Service? A. In 2012, when I joined control. Q. I appreciate it's a while ago, but are you briefly able to give us an outline of what that training was? A. You go to training school for six weeks, where you learn 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Did you have further training on how those overflow arrangements were to work? A. Yes, we had prompt cards of what we would do, who we'd call, how to divert the lines. We'd have a designated console that would be purely for that brigade to take calls and receive calls. Q. Am I right in saying that Bedfordshire is your buddy service? A. Yes. Q. So was your training specifically only about how to pass calls to Bedfordshire and take their calls, or was it
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to training school. Q. Were you given any training after your initial training school session? A. Not on fire survival, no. Q. The initial training you say, was that in 2012 when you joined the control room, or was that earlier when you joined Essex County Fire and Rescue Service? A. In 2012, when I joined control. Q. I appreciate it's a while ago, but are you briefly able to give us an outline of what that training was? A. You go to training school for six weeks, where you learn all the stations, station numbers, lots of different 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Did you have further training on how those overflow arrangements were to work? A. Yes, we had prompt cards of what we would do, who we'd call, how to divert the lines. We'd have a designated console that would be purely for that brigade to take calls and receive calls. Q. Am I right in saying that Bedfordshire is your buddy service? A. Yes. Q. So was your training specifically only about how to pass calls to Bedfordshire and take their calls, or was it also about passing calls to other brigades where you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to training school. Q. Were you given any training after your initial training school session? A. Not on fire survival, no. Q. The initial training you say, was that in 2012 when you joined the control room, or was that earlier when you joined Essex County Fire and Rescue Service? A. In 2012, when I joined control. Q. I appreciate it's a while ago, but are you briefly able to give us an outline of what that training was? A. You go to training school for six weeks, where you learn all the stations, station numbers, lots of different things about the fire service. The different machines 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Did you have further training on how those overflow arrangements were to work? A. Yes, we had prompt cards of what we would do, who we'd call, how to divert the lines. We'd have a designated console that would be purely for that brigade to take calls and receive calls. Q. Am I right in saying that Bedfordshire is your buddy service? A. Yes. Q. So was your training specifically only about how to pass calls to Bedfordshire and take their calls, or was it also about passing calls to other brigades where you don't have this formal buddy arrangement?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to training school. Q. Were you given any training after your initial training school session? A. Not on fire survival, no. Q. The initial training you say, was that in 2012 when you joined the control room, or was that earlier when you joined Essex County Fire and Rescue Service? A. In 2012, when I joined control. Q. I appreciate it's a while ago, but are you briefly able to give us an outline of what that training was? A. You go to training school for six weeks, where you learn all the stations, station numbers, lots of different things about the fire service. The different machines that we use, different sort of scenarios, attendances. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Did you have further training on how those overflow arrangements were to work? A. Yes, we had prompt cards of what we would do, who we'd call, how to divert the lines. We'd have a designated console that would be purely for that brigade to take calls and receive calls. Q. Am I right in saying that Bedfordshire is your buddy service? A. Yes. Q. So was your training specifically only about how to pass calls to Bedfordshire and take their calls, or was it also about passing calls to other brigades where you don't have this formal buddy arrangement? A. No, it would be to pass calls to other brigades as well.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to training school. Q. Were you given any training after your initial training school session? A. Not on fire survival, no. Q. The initial training you say, was that in 2012 when you joined the control room, or was that earlier when you joined Essex County Fire and Rescue Service? A. In 2012, when I joined control. Q. I appreciate it's a while ago, but are you briefly able to give us an outline of what that training was? A. You go to training school for six weeks, where you learn all the stations, station numbers, lots of different things about the fire service. The different machines that we use, different sort of scenarios, attendances. Q. In particular, with fire survival guidance, what kind of 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Did you have further training on how those overflow arrangements were to work? A. Yes, we had prompt cards of what we would do, who we'd call, how to divert the lines. We'd have a designated console that would be purely for that brigade to take calls and receive calls. Q. Am I right in saying that Bedfordshire is your buddy service? A. Yes. Q. So was your training specifically only about how to pass calls to Bedfordshire and take their calls, or was it also about passing calls to other brigades where you don't have this formal buddy arrangement? A. No, it would be to pass calls to other brigades as well. Q. I'll come back to that in a bit more detail in a moment.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to training school. Q. Were you given any training after your initial training school session? A. Not on fire survival, no. Q. The initial training you say, was that in 2012 when you joined the control room, or was that earlier when you joined Essex County Fire and Rescue Service? A. In 2012, when I joined control. Q. I appreciate it's a while ago, but are you briefly able to give us an outline of what that training was? A. You go to training school for six weeks, where you learn all the stations, station numbers, lots of different things about the fire service. The different machines that we use, different sort of scenarios, attendances. Q. In particular, with fire survival guidance, what kind of training were you given? Was it just a lecture or was 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Did you have further training on how those overflow arrangements were to work? A. Yes, we had prompt cards of what we would do, who we'd call, how to divert the lines. We'd have a designated console that would be purely for that brigade to take calls and receive calls. Q. Am I right in saying that Bedfordshire is your buddy service? A. Yes. Q. So was your training specifically only about how to pass calls to Bedfordshire and take their calls, or was it also about passing calls to other brigades where you don't have this formal buddy arrangement? A. No, it would be to pass calls to other brigades as well. Q. I'll come back to that in a bit more detail in a moment. What I want to do is go to page 2 of your witness
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to training school. Q. Were you given any training after your initial training school session? A. Not on fire survival, no. Q. The initial training you say, was that in 2012 when you joined the control room, or was that earlier when you joined Essex County Fire and Rescue Service? A. In 2012, when I joined control. Q. I appreciate it's a while ago, but are you briefly able to give us an outline of what that training was? A. You go to training school for six weeks, where you learn all the stations, station numbers, lots of different things about the fire service. The different machines that we use, different sort of scenarios, attendances. Q. In particular, with fire survival guidance, what kind of training were you given? Was it just a lecture or was it role play? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Did you have further training on how those overflow arrangements were to work? A. Yes, we had prompt cards of what we would do, who we'd call, how to divert the lines. We'd have a designated console that would be purely for that brigade to take calls and receive calls. Q. Am I right in saying that Bedfordshire is your buddy service? A. Yes. Q. So was your training specifically only about how to pass calls to Bedfordshire and take their calls, or was it also about passing calls to other brigades where you don't have this formal buddy arrangement? A. No, it would be to pass calls to other brigades as well. Q. I'll come back to that in a bit more detail in a moment. What I want to do is go to page 2 of your witness statement, where you speak about the stay-put policy.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to training school. Q. Were you given any training after your initial training school session? A. Not on fire survival, no. Q. The initial training you say, was that in 2012 when you joined the control room, or was that earlier when you joined Essex County Fire and Rescue Service? A. In 2012, when I joined control. Q. I appreciate it's a while ago, but are you briefly able to give us an outline of what that training was? A. You go to training school for six weeks, where you learn all the stations, station numbers, lots of different things about the fire service. The different machines that we use, different sort of scenarios, attendances. Q. In particular, with fire survival guidance, what kind of training were you given? Was it just a lecture or was it role play? A. Role play, mainly, and then sometimes we would've used 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Did you have further training on how those overflow arrangements were to work? A. Yes, we had prompt cards of what we would do, who we'd call, how to divert the lines. We'd have a designated console that would be purely for that brigade to take calls and receive calls. Q. Am I right in saying that Bedfordshire is your buddy service? A. Yes. Q. So was your training specifically only about how to pass calls to Bedfordshire and take their calls, or was it also about passing calls to other brigades where you don't have this formal buddy arrangement? A. No, it would be to pass calls to other brigades as well. Q. I'll come back to that in a bit more detail in a moment. What I want to do is go to page 2 of your witness statement, where you speak about the stay-put policy. If we could look at the top of the witness statement
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to training school. Q. Were you given any training after your initial training school session? A. Not on fire survival, no. Q. The initial training you say, was that in 2012 when you joined the control room, or was that earlier when you joined Essex County Fire and Rescue Service? A. In 2012, when I joined control. Q. I appreciate it's a while ago, but are you briefly able to give us an outline of what that training was? A. You go to training school for six weeks, where you learn all the stations, station numbers, lots of different things about the fire service. The different machines that we use, different sort of scenarios, attendances. Q. In particular, with fire survival guidance, what kind of training were you given? Was it just a lecture or was it role play? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Did you have further training on how those overflow arrangements were to work? A. Yes, we had prompt cards of what we would do, who we'd call, how to divert the lines. We'd have a designated console that would be purely for that brigade to take calls and receive calls. Q. Am I right in saying that Bedfordshire is your buddy service? A. Yes. Q. So was your training specifically only about how to pass calls to Bedfordshire and take their calls, or was it also about passing calls to other brigades where you don't have this formal buddy arrangement? A. No, it would be to pass calls to other brigades as well. Q. I'll come back to that in a bit more detail in a moment. What I want to do is go to page 2 of your witness statement, where you speak about the stay-put policy.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. You're aware of the national sort of stay-put guidance? A. I wasn't aware it was a national stay-put policy. Q. Were you given any training on something that we understand to be called fire survival guidance calls? A. We were given fire survival training when we first go to training school. Q. Were you given any training after your initial training school session? A. Not on fire survival, no. Q. The initial training you say, was that in 2012 when you joined the control room, or was that earlier when you joined Essex County Fire and Rescue Service? A. In 2012, when I joined control. Q. I appreciate it's a while ago, but are you briefly able to give us an outline of what that training was? A. You go to training school for six weeks, where you learn all the stations, station numbers, lots of different things about the fire service. The different machines that we use, different sort of scenarios, attendances. Q. In particular, with fire survival guidance, what kind of training were you given? Was it just a lecture or was it role play? A. Role play, mainly, and then sometimes we would've used 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	definitely 2017. Q. Before or after the fire, do you remember? A. Before. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Did you have further training on how those overflow arrangements were to work? A. Yes, we had prompt cards of what we would do, who we'd call, how to divert the lines. We'd have a designated console that would be purely for that brigade to take calls and receive calls. Q. Am I right in saying that Bedfordshire is your buddy service? A. Yes. Q. So was your training specifically only about how to pass calls to Bedfordshire and take their calls, or was it also about passing calls to other brigades where you don't have this formal buddy arrangement? A. No, it would be to pass calls to other brigades as well. Q. I'll come back to that in a bit more detail in a moment. What I want to do is go to page 2 of your witness statement, where you speak about the stay-put policy. If we could look at the top of the witness statement

1	You say:	1	can open a window, get as low as you can, and we would
2	"With regards to the stay put policy, we will tell	2	stay with the caller.
3	the caller that if it is safe to do so, start to make	3	Q. You say you would stay with the caller; would you stay
4	their way out. If it isn't safe to leave, then we would	4	with them for the entire duration of the call until
5	take information from the caller to help our crews	5	they're rescued or until the line drops out?
6	locate them when they arrive on scene. This information	6	A. Yes.
7	included things such as where the caller was, how many	7	Q. Turning, then, to overflow call arrangements, which we
8	people there are."	8	touched upon earlier, can you just explain for us the
9	Was it your understanding that the stay-put policy	9	system that you said has developed in Essex Fire and
10	only applied to certain buildings?	10	Rescue Service? How would it come to be that you would
11	A. No, that's the training that's on our watch, that's	11	take overflow call from another brigade?
12	what we would go with, because we weren't there, that's	12	A. If calls were coming in to us?
13	what we would tell our caller.	13	Q. Yes.
14	Q. So you would elicit this information, would you, from	14	A. Bedfordshire would call us to say that they were having
15	the caller, working out with them if it was safe to	15	a problem, or if they had too many calls, that their
16	leave or not?	16	calls would automatically divert to Essex. We then had
17	A. Yes.	17	a designated console that we would have to log out, log
18	Q. Would there be any specific circumstances which would	18	back in with a different username and password which was
19	indicate to you that it wasn't safe for them to leave?	19	purely for Bedfordshire. That would then bring up all
20	A. Only if they were to tell us that it's not safe to	20	Bedfordshire's stations, they're ground. So any calls
21	leave, then we would take further information and pass	21	that came in on that console, you'd start to put the
22	that to the crew.	22	address in and that would automatically match for
23	Q. So are you familiar with the stay-put policy being in	23	Bedfordshire. We could then mobilise their machines
24	place for high-rise buildings, so essentially that it's	24	straight from that console.
25	a policy that unless they're affected by fire, heat or	25	Q. So when Bedfordshire would call you, would they tell you
	Page 193		Page 195
1	smoke, they should remain within their flat unless that	1	a bit about the incident that they were experiencing?
2	situation changes?	2	A. Yes.
3	A. From what I can recall, the training that I received on	3	Q. What kind of information would they tell you about that
4	our watch was that we wouldn't say either way. We	4	incident?
5	wouldn't tell them to leave, we wouldn't tell them to	5	A. They would just tell us what they knew, really, what the
6	stay, we would tell them, you know, "If you feel it's	6	incident was, why they needed our assistance. But
7	safe to do so, then you start to make your way out."	7	I think the last couple of times, it was purely because
8	Q. But in terms of your watch, your training, nothing	8	their mobilising system was down. They couldn't take or
9	specific to say	9	receive any emergency calls.
10	A. No.	10	Q. This facility of being able to log in to Bedfordshire's
11	Q just high-rises, this is the policy that always	11	system, was that available for other fire brigade's? So
12	applies?	12	were you able to, for example, log in to, say, London's
13	A. No.	13	
		1	system? A No, it was only for Bedfordshire, because we used the
14	Q. No set policy. All right.	14	A. No, it was only for Bedfordshire, because we used the
14 15	Q. No set policy. All right. The advice that you would give them in terms of when	14 15	A. No, it was only for Bedfordshire, because we used the same mobilising system.
14 15 16	Q. No set policy. All right. The advice that you would give them in terms of when it becomes a fire survival guidance call, are you able	14 15 16	A. No, it was only for Bedfordshire, because we used the same mobilising system. Q. I see, okay.
14 15 16 17	Q. No set policy. All right. The advice that you would give them in terms of when it becomes a fire survival guidance call, are you able just to help us with that, what was your training on	14 15 16 17	A. No, it was only for Bedfordshire, because we used the same mobilising system.Q. I see, okay.So then turning on to when you receive calls from
14 15 16 17 18	Q. No set policy. All right. The advice that you would give them in terms of when it becomes a fire survival guidance call, are you able just to help us with that, what was your training on what to do when you received a call where they're saying	14 15 16 17 18	 A. No, it was only for Bedfordshire, because we used the same mobilising system. Q. I see, okay. So then turning on to when you receive calls from other fire brigade's, so not Bedfordshire.
14 15 16 17 18 19	Q. No set policy. All right. The advice that you would give them in terms of when it becomes a fire survival guidance call, are you able just to help us with that, what was your training on what to do when you received a call where they're saying that they're trapped and you need to give fire survival	14 15 16 17 18 19	 A. No, it was only for Bedfordshire, because we used the same mobilising system. Q. I see, okay. So then turning on to when you receive calls from other fire brigade's, so not Bedfordshire. A. Yes.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Q. No set policy. All right. The advice that you would give them in terms of when it becomes a fire survival guidance call, are you able just to help us with that, what was your training on what to do when you received a call where they're saying that they're trapped and you need to give fire survival guidance?	14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 A. No, it was only for Bedfordshire, because we used the same mobilising system. Q. I see, okay. So then turning on to when you receive calls from other fire brigade's, so not Bedfordshire. A. Yes. Q. Have you any experience of that?
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 Q. No set policy. All right. The advice that you would give them in terms of when it becomes a fire survival guidance call, are you able just to help us with that, what was your training on what to do when you received a call where they're saying that they're trapped and you need to give fire survival guidance? A. It was quite a while ago in 2012. From what I can 	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 A. No, it was only for Bedfordshire, because we used the same mobilising system. Q. I see, okay. So then turning on to when you receive calls from other fire brigade's, so not Bedfordshire. A. Yes. Q. Have you any experience of that? A. We took calls for London quite a few times, or if
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 Q. No set policy. All right. The advice that you would give them in terms of when it becomes a fire survival guidance call, are you able just to help us with that, what was your training on what to do when you received a call where they're saying that they're trapped and you need to give fire survival guidance? A. It was quite a while ago in 2012. From what I can remember, the prompt cards — we would still have prompt 	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 A. No, it was only for Bedfordshire, because we used the same mobilising system. Q. I see, okay. So then turning on to when you receive calls from other fire brigade's, so not Bedfordshire. A. Yes. Q. Have you any experience of that? A. We took calls for London quite a few times, or if a caller was on our ground but the incident was actually
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q. No set policy. All right. The advice that you would give them in terms of when it becomes a fire survival guidance call, are you able just to help us with that, what was your training on what to do when you received a call where they're saying that they're trapped and you need to give fire survival guidance? A. It was quite a while ago in 2012. From what I can remember, the prompt cards — we would still have prompt cards at each console, and the prompt cards would be — 	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 A. No, it was only for Bedfordshire, because we used the same mobilising system. Q. I see, okay. So then turning on to when you receive calls from other fire brigade's, so not Bedfordshire. A. Yes. Q. Have you any experience of that? A. We took calls for London quite a few times, or if a caller was on our ground but the incident was actually in London, it would automatically come through to us
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. No set policy. All right. The advice that you would give them in terms of when it becomes a fire survival guidance call, are you able just to help us with that, what was your training on what to do when you received a call where they're saying that they're trapped and you need to give fire survival guidance? A. It was quite a while ago in 2012. From what I can remember, the prompt cards — we would still have prompt cards at each console, and the prompt cards would be — I'm trying to think — you know, shut the door, if 	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. No, it was only for Bedfordshire, because we used the same mobilising system. Q. I see, okay. So then turning on to when you receive calls from other fire brigade's, so not Bedfordshire. A. Yes. Q. Have you any experience of that? A. We took calls for London quite a few times, or if a caller was on our ground but the incident was actually in London, it would automatically come through to us because they were on Essex's ground. Then we would just
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q. No set policy. All right. The advice that you would give them in terms of when it becomes a fire survival guidance call, are you able just to help us with that, what was your training on what to do when you received a call where they're saying that they're trapped and you need to give fire survival guidance? A. It was quite a while ago in 2012. From what I can remember, the prompt cards — we would still have prompt cards at each console, and the prompt cards would be — 	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 A. No, it was only for Bedfordshire, because we used the same mobilising system. Q. I see, okay. So then turning on to when you receive calls from other fire brigade's, so not Bedfordshire. A. Yes. Q. Have you any experience of that? A. We took calls for London quite a few times, or if a caller was on our ground but the incident was actually in London, it would automatically come through to us
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. No set policy. All right. The advice that you would give them in terms of when it becomes a fire survival guidance call, are you able just to help us with that, what was your training on what to do when you received a call where they're saying that they're trapped and you need to give fire survival guidance? A. It was quite a while ago in 2012. From what I can remember, the prompt cards — we would still have prompt cards at each console, and the prompt cards would be — I'm trying to think — you know, shut the door, if 	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. No, it was only for Bedfordshire, because we used the same mobilising system. Q. I see, okay. So then turning on to when you receive calls from other fire brigade's, so not Bedfordshire. A. Yes. Q. Have you any experience of that? A. We took calls for London quite a few times, or if a caller was on our ground but the incident was actually in London, it would automatically come through to us because they were on Essex's ground. Then we would just

-			
1	sometimes we had it for Kent Fire, sometimes we'd have	1	that it was really smoky, so I passed that across.
2	it for London Fire.	2	Q. All right. We'll come on to that in a moment.
3	Q. When you were dealing with an incident going on in	3	In terms of the information you've got, would you
4	London, how would you first be contacted? Would it be	4	log that on your system?
5	by London or would it be by BT or someone else?	5	A. We would make an incident of it every time, yes.
6	A. Normally London what, if a call came in for London?	6	Q. How would you pass that information to London?
7	Q. Yes.	7	A. We have two numbers: we have an admin line, which would
8	A. Sometimes it came through the BT operator. Sometimes it	8	be just for information, or an emergency line. So if
9	might have been mispatched, so it would come to us by	9	it's a call that we've taken, we would automatically go
10	error. So we would just take the details and then pass	10	through on the emergency line.
11	it across.	11	Q. Is that going to a specific person in the London Fire
12	Q. Have you had any experience of overflow calls coming to	12	Brigade control room, as far as you're aware, or is it
13	you and London notifying you of the fact that you may be	13	just someone ready to pick up that line?
14	receiving overflow calls before you first start to get	14	A. It would just go through on a 999 line, but in Essex we
15	them?	15	would have a designated console that would always be
16	A. Not that I can recall, no.	16	first call take. I don't know if London operate the
17	Q. When you had experience of these calls coming in to you	17	same, but it's so that call would get answered as
18	before, would you have information about the incident	18	quickly as possible.
19	going on in London at the time of receiving the call or	19	Q. Turning then to the night of 14 June, and looking again
20	is that something you'd have to find out after?	20	at page 2 of your witness statement, the third paragraph
21	A. It's something we'd normally have to find out after.	21	down. You say:
22	I've not experienced an incident before like Grenfell.	22	"On Tuesday June 2017 [sic], I was working with
23	It would literally be just a one-off call that would	23	White Watch"
24	come through in error.	24	You say you were working with Russ White, who was
25	Q. What's your usual practice when you take these calls?	25	a supervisor, Katrina Clarke does she also go by the
23	2. What's your usual practice when you take these cans:	23	a supervisor, Radina Clarke does she also go by the
	Page 197		Page 199
1	Is it to just take the information from the caller or is	1	name of Katrina Marshall at some point?
2	it to take the call and patch it over to London? How	2	A. Yes, she's now married, so she's Katrina Marshall.
3	would it usually work?	3	Q. She was a control room operator; is that right?
4	A. We don't have the facility to patch, so we would take	4	A. Yes.
5	the caller's name, contact number and what the incident	5	Q. Vanessa Osborne, was she a control room operator?
6	was. We would then go through to London, pass as much	6	A. Yes.
7	information as we could get to London.	7	Q. The Jayde Palmer, was she a control room operator?
8	Q. Would that information be, if it was, say, in	8	A. Yes.
9	a high-rise building, the floor, the flat number?	9	Q. We know you were also working with a new recruit,
10	A. Yes.	10	Claire Bannister, who was shadowing the control room
11	Q. Would it be about if they had any kind of disability or	11	operators; is that right?
12	mobility issues or	12	A. Yes.
13	A. No, we wouldn't have asked that. We would literally	13	Q. You go on to say when the first call came in from
14	just get as much information as quickly as we could to	14	Grenfell Tower, it was just you and Katrina in the
15	then pass across. So it would just be the standard,	15	control room; is that right?
16	name, address, and the type of incident.	16	A. Yes.
17	Q. So you would usually find out their name, would you?	17	Q. We have a record at 1.43 am that your control room was
18	A. Sometimes they would automatically tell you. It's not	18	first contacted by BT about the incident at
19	something probably, no, we wouldn't normally ask	19	Grenfell Tower. Are you aware of that, that first
20	their name, it would just be number and incident, not	20	contact?
21	their name, no, sorry.	21	A. Yes. I didn't take that though. I was aware of it
22	Q. That's all right.	22	though, yes.
23	What about conditions in the flat? Is that	23	Q. I don't need to show it to you, but what
24	something you would elicit from the caller?	24	Katrina Marshall says in her witness statement is
25	A. I think the call that I took, she automatically said	25	Glasgow exchange contacted your control room via the
			2
	Page 198		Page 200
	1 age 170		- 1 age 200

1	link phone to ask if Essex Fire control could help	1	If we go over to page 6, the time mark of 01.46, at
2	London Fire Brigade as they had a large incident going	2	the very bottom thank you, Ralph it says:
3	and there were too many calls for them and their	3	"Incident type added FIRE - HIGH RISE RESIDENTIAL
4	fallback brigade to answer.	4	BUILDING."
5	Were you aware of those details, did Katrina tell	5	Then to go one line above at 01.47, if you could,
6	you that?	6	Ralph, so if you could zoom out of that and go to one
7	A. Yes, she did call out after saying that London had	7	line above to 01.47:
8	called, they had an incident and we would be taking	8	"Additional info changed W11 AREA A40, BLOCK OF
9	overflow calls.	9	FLATS - LADBROOK[sic] ROAD AREA LONDON."
10	Q. Was it her decision to accept or kind of offer the	10	Are you familiar with this incident log before I go
11	assistance?	11	any further with it?
12	A. You would automatically	12	A. Not too much.
13	Q. You wouldn't need to seek approval from someone senior?	13	Q. Is this something you would've seen on the night as
14	A. No.	14	calls were coming in?
15	Q. Were you or Katrina given any more details about the	15	A. Yes, yes.
16	incident at that point in time?	16	Q. Do you remember at all if you saw that entry going into
17	A. Not at that time, no.	17	the log in front of you?
18	Q. Did you have a discussion between you about trying to	18	A. No, I don't, no, sorry.
19	obtain any more information at that time about the	19	Q. Does this in any way summarise the type of information
20	incident that was taking place?	20	that you had about the incident, the extent of it, being
21	A. I don't think we realised the scale of it at the time	21	in a block of flats in the Ladbroke Grove area?
22	because we wasn't as soon as she'd taken that call,	22	A. Yes, we didn't realise the full address at the
23	we didn't really change, you know, we didn't accept many	23	beginning.
24	calls at all at that time, so we wasn't aware.	24	Q. Sure.
25	Q. Do you have any other ways of obtaining information in	25	I want to come on to the call that you took, which
	Page 201		Page 203
1	your control room, such as having Sky News on or having	1	you discuss at the second half of page 2 of your witness
2	a heli-tele downlink? Is any of that available to you?	2	statement and, as I understand, is the only call you
3	A. Yes, we have a video wall where we would have BBC News	3	took on the night to do with Grenfell.
4	on.	4	A. Yes.
5	Q. BBC News?	5	Q. We know it was from the 22nd floor at flat 193.
6	A. Yes.	6	Ralph, if I can just ask you to go back to
7	Q. Was anything showing at that point in time, do you	7	Ms Lancaster's statement.
8	remember?	8	It's halfway down there, Ms Lancaster, second last
9	A. It did come on. I don't think it was on at that	9	paragraph on that page:
10	particular moment, but it wasn't long after.	10	"My first call was from a woman, who was on the 22nd
11	Q. Just to follow up on something, I'll just ask you, did	11	floor. The lady said it was getting smoky and there was
12	you have this heli-tele downlink facility that we've	12	lots of smoke on her floor. I took her address as Flat
13	heard in other control rooms?	13	193, Grenfell Tower in London. I advised her that I
14	A. No, we don't have that facility.	14	would pass her call onto London Fire Brigade, as we
15	Q. We know that at around 01.45/01.47, depending on which	15	would with any call we take on behalf of London. I
16	document you look at, there was a call that was received	16	recall Katrina contacting London to pass on the details
17	from someone on the A40 just reporting the incident. Do	17	of this call, whilst I remained available to take any
18	you remember that call coming in?	18	other calls."
19	A. I don't, no.	19	In terms of Katrina taking that information and
20	Q. No, all right.	20	calling London, is that something that would be normal
21	If I can just perhaps just show the log for Essex	21	practice?
22	control room just so we can put a bit of a time marker	22	A. Yes. On a night shift, we would split into two halves
23	on it. LFB00003625, please, Ralph, page 7.	23	and we would take it in turns to one would be on the
24	So page 7 is actually where our incident log starts	24	back on the supervisor console while the other one would
25	and it runs backwards.	25	sit out the front.
	Page 202		Page 204

1	Q. Yes.	1	this incident log?
2	A. It just worked out this night that Katrina was sitting	2	A. Yes.
3	on the back and I was sitting out the front.	3	Q. Okay.
4	Q. Do you remember in this call we can go to the	4	Is there any reason why you weren't inputting that
5	transcript if we need to asking how many persons were	5	information when you took the call?
6	in the flat at that time?	6	A. I can't remember, sorry.
7	A. No.	7	Q. No, that's all right.
8	Q. Is there any reason why you didn't take that	8	Was Claire Bannister listening into your call or did
9	information? Would it be normal for you to do so?	9	you tell her information about it such that she was able
10	A. I think she was panicking from what I can remember,	10	to input it into the system?
11	I think she was panicking on the phone, so I just took	11	A. Yes. From what I recall, I think she was sitting at my
12	what I could, but I didn't ask how many people were in	12	console, with me, plugged into a headset so that she
13	the flat.	13	could listen.
14	Q. Would it be usual when you're taking this kind of call	14	Q. We know from your own summary in your witness statement
15	to start advising the caller as to whether they should	15	about the call that you took the flat number, which was
16	stay or go, whether it's safe or not to do so?	16	193
17	A. Yes. But because it was in London, I just took the	17	A. Yes.
18	details just to pass it across to London as soon as	18	Q and you obtained the conditions from the caller
19	possible.	19	because she volunteered the information that it was very
20	Q. So am I right in saying that your evidence is that	20	smoky.
21	because it's a call from London and not your own	21	A. Yes.
22	incident ground, you wouldn't go through that usual	22	Q. Would you expect that kind of information also to be
23	assessment process to give them the advice to work out	23	inputted on this log?
24	whether it's safe to leave or not?	24	A. Yes.
25	A. No, you wouldn't, no.	25	Q. Again, do you have any idea why it wasn't?
	Page 205		Page 207
1	O So you would just take the details, end the call and	1	A No
1	Q. So you would just take the details, end the call and	1 2	A. No. O In terms of then passing the information over to London
2	pass it to London?	2	Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London,
2 3	pass it to London? A. Yes.	2 3	Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the
2 3 4	pass it to London?A. Yes.Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back	2 3 4	Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get
2 3 4 5	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please,	2 3 4 5	Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all.
2 3 4 5 6	pass it to London?A. Yes.Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph.	2 3 4 5 6	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm.
2 3 4 5 6 7	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph. If we could look at the time mark 01.48, it's about	2 3 4 5 6 7	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm. Q. You say in the same paragraph we looked at earlier that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph. If we could look at the time mark 01.48, it's about five lines up from the bottom, and there's a number of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm. Q. You say in the same paragraph we looked at earlier that they were not answering the phones.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph. If we could look at the time mark 01.48, it's about five lines up from the bottom, and there's a number of stars, and then it says:	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm. Q. You say in the same paragraph we looked at earlier that they were not answering the phones. Can you tell us a little bit more what happened
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph. If we could look at the time mark 01.48, it's about five lines up from the bottom, and there's a number of stars, and then it says: "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****"	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm. Q. You say in the same paragraph we looked at earlier that they were not answering the phones. Can you tell us a little bit more what happened there? How many times did Ms Marshall try to contact
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph. If we could look at the time mark 01.48, it's about five lines up from the bottom, and there's a number of stars, and then it says: "***CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" It's quite difficult to make out, but if you look at	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm. Q. You say in the same paragraph we looked at earlier that they were not answering the phones. Can you tell us a little bit more what happened there? How many times did Ms Marshall try to contact London, what kind of process
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph. If we could look at the time mark 01.48, it's about five lines up from the bottom, and there's a number of stars, and then it says: "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" It's quite difficult to make out, but if you look at 01.48 up from the bottom:	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm. Q. You say in the same paragraph we looked at earlier that they were not answering the phones. Can you tell us a little bit more what happened there? How many times did Ms Marshall try to contact London, what kind of process A. Continuously. We have a system that you literally just
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph. If we could look at the time mark 01.48, it's about five lines up from the bottom, and there's a number of stars, and then it says: "***CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" It's quite difficult to make out, but if you look at	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm. Q. You say in the same paragraph we looked at earlier that they were not answering the phones. Can you tell us a little bit more what happened there? How many times did Ms Marshall try to contact London, what kind of process A. Continuously. We have a system that you literally just press the button that will dial through. We were just
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph. If we could look at the time mark 01.48, it's about five lines up from the bottom, and there's a number of stars, and then it says: "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" It's quite difficult to make out, but if you look at 01.48 up from the bottom: " 01:48 Duplicate Additional info changed "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****"	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm. Q. You say in the same paragraph we looked at earlier that they were not answering the phones. Can you tell us a little bit more what happened there? How many times did Ms Marshall try to contact London, what kind of process A. Continuously. We have a system that you literally just press the button that will dial through. We were just continuously pressing both, just trying to get through.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph. If we could look at the time mark 01.48, it's about five lines up from the bottom, and there's a number of stars, and then it says: "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" It's quite difficult to make out, but if you look at 01.48 up from the bottom: " 01:48 Duplicate Additional info changed	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm. Q. You say in the same paragraph we looked at earlier that they were not answering the phones. Can you tell us a little bit more what happened there? How many times did Ms Marshall try to contact London, what kind of process A. Continuously. We have a system that you literally just press the button that will dial through. We were just
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph. If we could look at the time mark 01.48, it's about five lines up from the bottom, and there's a number of stars, and then it says: "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" It's quite difficult to make out, but if you look at 01.48 up from the bottom: " 01:48 Duplicate Additional info changed "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" Can you see that? A. Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm. Q. You say in the same paragraph we looked at earlier that they were not answering the phones. Can you tell us a little bit more what happened there? How many times did Ms Marshall try to contact London, what kind of process A. Continuously. We have a system that you literally just press the button that will dial through. We were just continuously pressing both, just trying to get through. Q. So that was both of you trying to contact London? A. Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph. If we could look at the time mark 01.48, it's about five lines up from the bottom, and there's a number of stars, and then it says: "***CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" It's quite difficult to make out, but if you look at 01.48 up from the bottom: " 01:48 Duplicate Additional info changed "***CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" Can you see that? A. Yes. Q. Is that information you inputted into the system on	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm. Q. You say in the same paragraph we looked at earlier that they were not answering the phones. Can you tell us a little bit more what happened there? How many times did Ms Marshall try to contact London, what kind of process A. Continuously. We have a system that you literally just press the button that will dial through. We were just continuously pressing both, just trying to get through. Q. So that was both of you trying to contact London? A. Yes. Q. Then we know that because you couldn't get hold of them,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph. If we could look at the time mark 01.48, it's about five lines up from the bottom, and there's a number of stars, and then it says: "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" It's quite difficult to make out, but if you look at 01.48 up from the bottom: " 01:48 Duplicate Additional info changed "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" Can you see that? A. Yes. Q. Is that information you inputted into the system on taking this call?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm. Q. You say in the same paragraph we looked at earlier that they were not answering the phones. Can you tell us a little bit more what happened there? How many times did Ms Marshall try to contact London, what kind of process A. Continuously. We have a system that you literally just press the button that will dial through. We were just continuously pressing both, just trying to get through. Q. So that was both of you trying to contact London? A. Yes. Q. Then we know that because you couldn't get hold of them, you paged Nigel Dilley, who has just given evidence to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph. If we could look at the time mark 01.48, it's about five lines up from the bottom, and there's a number of stars, and then it says: "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" It's quite difficult to make out, but if you look at 01.48 up from the bottom: " 01:48 Duplicate Additional info changed "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" Can you see that? A. Yes. Q. Is that information you inputted into the system on taking this call? A. No.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm. Q. You say in the same paragraph we looked at earlier that they were not answering the phones. Can you tell us a little bit more what happened there? How many times did Ms Marshall try to contact London, what kind of process A. Continuously. We have a system that you literally just press the button that will dial through. We were just continuously pressing both, just trying to get through. Q. So that was both of you trying to contact London? A. Yes. Q. Then we know that because you couldn't get hold of them,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph. If we could look at the time mark 01.48, it's about five lines up from the bottom, and there's a number of stars, and then it says: "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" It's quite difficult to make out, but if you look at 01.48 up from the bottom: " 01:48 Duplicate Additional info changed "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" Can you see that? A. Yes. Q. Is that information you inputted into the system on taking this call? A. No. Q. Is it somebody else, and possibly Claire Bannister, who	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm. Q. You say in the same paragraph we looked at earlier that they were not answering the phones. Can you tell us a little bit more what happened there? How many times did Ms Marshall try to contact London, what kind of process A. Continuously. We have a system that you literally just press the button that will dial through. We were just continuously pressing both, just trying to get through. Q. So that was both of you trying to contact London? A. Yes. Q. Then we know that because you couldn't get hold of them, you paged Nigel Dilley, who has just given evidence to assist us with that part of the night.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph. If we could look at the time mark 01.48, it's about five lines up from the bottom, and there's a number of stars, and then it says: "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" It's quite difficult to make out, but if you look at 01.48 up from the bottom: " 01:48 Duplicate Additional info changed "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" Can you see that? A. Yes. Q. Is that information you inputted into the system on taking this call? A. No.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm. Q. You say in the same paragraph we looked at earlier that they were not answering the phones. Can you tell us a little bit more what happened there? How many times did Ms Marshall try to contact London, what kind of process A. Continuously. We have a system that you literally just press the button that will dial through. We were just continuously pressing both, just trying to get through. Q. So that was both of you trying to contact London? A. Yes. Q. Then we know that because you couldn't get hold of them, you paged Nigel Dilley, who has just given evidence to assist us with that part of the night. A. Yes. Q. After you contacted Nigel Dilley, did you then continue
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph. If we could look at the time mark 01.48, it's about five lines up from the bottom, and there's a number of stars, and then it says: "***CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" It's quite difficult to make out, but if you look at 01.48 up from the bottom: " 01:48 Duplicate Additional info changed "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" Can you see that? A. Yes. Q. Is that information you inputted into the system on taking this call? A. No. Q. Is it somebody else, and possibly Claire Bannister, who has inputted it in? A. Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm. Q. You say in the same paragraph we looked at earlier that they were not answering the phones. Can you tell us a little bit more what happened there? How many times did Ms Marshall try to contact London, what kind of process A. Continuously. We have a system that you literally just press the button that will dial through. We were just continuously pressing both, just trying to get through. Q. So that was both of you trying to contact London? A. Yes. Q. Then we know that because you couldn't get hold of them, you paged Nigel Dilley, who has just given evidence to assist us with that part of the night. A. Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph. If we could look at the time mark 01.48, it's about five lines up from the bottom, and there's a number of stars, and then it says: "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" It's quite difficult to make out, but if you look at 01.48 up from the bottom: " 01:48 Duplicate Additional info changed "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" Can you see that? A. Yes. Q. Is that information you inputted into the system on taking this call? A. No. Q. Is it somebody else, and possibly Claire Bannister, who has inputted it in? A. Yes. Q. By CB1, we can see there.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm. Q. You say in the same paragraph we looked at earlier that they were not answering the phones. Can you tell us a little bit more what happened there? How many times did Ms Marshall try to contact London, what kind of process A. Continuously. We have a system that you literally just press the button that will dial through. We were just continuously pressing both, just trying to get through. Q. So that was both of you trying to contact London? A. Yes. Q. Then we know that because you couldn't get hold of them, you paged Nigel Dilley, who has just given evidence to assist us with that part of the night. A. Yes. Q. After you contacted Nigel Dilley, did you then continue to try and get hold of London? A. Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph. If we could look at the time mark 01.48, it's about five lines up from the bottom, and there's a number of stars, and then it says: "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" It's quite difficult to make out, but if you look at 01.48 up from the bottom: " 01:48 Duplicate Additional info changed "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" Can you see that? A. Yes. Q. Is that information you inputted into the system on taking this call? A. No. Q. Is it somebody else, and possibly Claire Bannister, who has inputted it in? A. Yes. Q. By CB1, we can see there. Would it be usual for you to input information about	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm. Q. You say in the same paragraph we looked at earlier that they were not answering the phones. Can you tell us a little bit more what happened there? How many times did Ms Marshall try to contact London, what kind of process A. Continuously. We have a system that you literally just press the button that will dial through. We were just continuously pressing both, just trying to get through. Q. So that was both of you trying to contact London? A. Yes. Q. Then we know that because you couldn't get hold of them, you paged Nigel Dilley, who has just given evidence to assist us with that part of the night. A. Yes. Q. After you contacted Nigel Dilley, did you then continue to try and get hold of London?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph. If we could look at the time mark 01.48, it's about five lines up from the bottom, and there's a number of stars, and then it says: "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" It's quite difficult to make out, but if you look at 01.48 up from the bottom: " 01:48 Duplicate Additional info changed "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" Can you see that? A. Yes. Q. Is that information you inputted into the system on taking this call? A. No. Q. Is it somebody else, and possibly Claire Bannister, who has inputted it in? A. Yes. Q. By CB1, we can see there. Would it be usual for you to input information about the call you're taking into this system to appear on	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm. Q. You say in the same paragraph we looked at earlier that they were not answering the phones. Can you tell us a little bit more what happened there? How many times did Ms Marshall try to contact London, what kind of process A. Continuously. We have a system that you literally just press the button that will dial through. We were just continuously pressing both, just trying to get through. Q. So that was both of you trying to contact London? A. Yes. Q. Then we know that because you couldn't get hold of them, you paged Nigel Dilley, who has just given evidence to assist us with that part of the night. A. Yes. Q. After you contacted Nigel Dilley, did you then continue to try and get hold of London? A. Yes. Q. Again, just through trying these two lines that you mention in your witness statement?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	pass it to London? A. Yes. Q. Can I just ask you to look at the incident log, so back to LFB00003625, and if we can go to page 5, please, Ralph. If we could look at the time mark 01.48, it's about five lines up from the bottom, and there's a number of stars, and then it says: "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" It's quite difficult to make out, but if you look at 01.48 up from the bottom: " 01:48 Duplicate Additional info changed "****CALLER IS AT THE 22 FLOOR*****" Can you see that? A. Yes. Q. Is that information you inputted into the system on taking this call? A. No. Q. Is it somebody else, and possibly Claire Bannister, who has inputted it in? A. Yes. Q. By CB1, we can see there. Would it be usual for you to input information about	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. In terms of then passing the information over to London, we know of course from your witness statement and the evidence of others that Katrina wasn't able to get through to London at all. A. Mm-hm. Q. You say in the same paragraph we looked at earlier that they were not answering the phones. Can you tell us a little bit more what happened there? How many times did Ms Marshall try to contact London, what kind of process A. Continuously. We have a system that you literally just press the button that will dial through. We were just continuously pressing both, just trying to get through. Q. So that was both of you trying to contact London? A. Yes. Q. Then we know that because you couldn't get hold of them, you paged Nigel Dilley, who has just given evidence to assist us with that part of the night. A. Yes. Q. After you contacted Nigel Dilley, did you then continue to try and get hold of London? A. Yes. Q. Again, just through trying these two lines that you

		_	
1	A. Yes.	1	this conversation
2	Q. The emergency line and the admin line.	2	A. No.
3	Is this something you'd experienced before when you	3	Q with this control room operator?
4	had taken overflow calls from London	4	
5	A. No.	5	So just one more question: you're not able to tell
			us why Ms Marshall didn't pass over the details that you
6	Q you had experienced communication difficulties like	6	had actually taken from the call, which was the flat
7	this?	7	number and that it was getting very smoky inside the
8	A. Not at all, no.	8	flat?
9	Q. We know from Mr Dilley's evidence that he passed the	9	A. I could've been taking other calls at that time, so
10	details of this call that you took and another call from	10	I wasn't I can't remember Katrina having that
11	flat 82 at 02.26.30, but we also know that at 02.18,	11	conversation, I'm afraid.
12	someone from Essex and I believe it's Ms Marshall	12	Q. Yes. That's absolutely understandable.
13	did actually get hold of someone in the LFB control room	13	So just then finally on this, we obviously now have
14	to be able to pass the details over.	14	elicited that the call was taken at 01.48 from flat 193,
15	A. Yes.	15	that you took yourself, and the information was passed
16	Q. Are you aware of that information being passed over at	16	to the LFB at the earliest point seems to be 02.18 in
17	that time?	17	the evening. So that appears to be about a 30-minute
18	A. I remember her calling out saying that she'd managed to	18	delay.
19	get through to London.	19	Is that something you would agree with
20	Q. If I can just ask you to go to the transcript and if	20	A. Yes.
21	you can't help us with this call any more, do just	21	Q from what we've looked?
22	say it's LFB00000347, please, Ralph.	22	Again, in your experience, having dealt with
23	So on page 1 there, you can see the last set of	23	overflow calls to London, is that something that you
24	numbers says, "021855", so we know the call took place	24	have experienced?
25	at 02.18.55.	25	A. Not that it's taken that long before, no.
			,
	Page 209		Page 211
1	If we go to page 2 of that transcript, please, we	1	Q. All right.
2	can see the conversation going on between the operators	2	Final set of questions, Ms Lancaster.
3	there. We have operator 1, which I believe is the LFB	3	On page 3 of your witness statement if we could
4	control room operator, and operator 2 is Ms Marshall.)	On page 3 of your witness statement If we could
		1	places as to it Polph top personal you say that
•		4	please go to it, Ralph top paragraph, you say that
5	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat	5	you checked the internet for any information on
5	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor.	5 6	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You
5 6 7	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph.	5 6 7	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire
5 6 7 8	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph. If you look halfway down, Ms Lancaster, you can see	5 6 7 8	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire arrangement and their policy was to stay put unless
5 6 7 8 9	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph. If you look halfway down, Ms Lancaster, you can see that she says:	5 6 7 8 9	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire arrangement and their policy was to stay put unless otherwise advised.
5 6 7 8 9	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph. If you look halfway down, Ms Lancaster, you can see that she says: "OPERATOR 2: And there's another one, on the 22nd	5 6 7 8 9 10	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire arrangement and their policy was to stay put unless otherwise advised. You go on there to say:
5 6 7 8 9 10 11	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph. If you look halfway down, Ms Lancaster, you can see that she says: "OPERATOR 2: And there's another one, on the 22nd floor, as well.	5 6 7 8 9 10 11	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire arrangement and their policy was to stay put unless otherwise advised. You go on there to say: "Grenfell was designed to rigorous fire safety
5 6 7 8 9 10 11	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph. If you look halfway down, Ms Lancaster, you can see that she says: "OPERATOR 2: And there's another one, on the 22nd floor, as well. "OPERATOR 1: Have you got a flat	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire arrangement and their policy was to stay put unless otherwise advised. You go on there to say: "Grenfell was designed to rigorous fire safety standards and each front door for the flats can
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph. If you look halfway down, Ms Lancaster, you can see that she says: "OPERATOR 2: And there's another one, on the 22nd floor, as well. "OPERATOR 1: Have you got a flat "OPERATOR 2: She said she sorry.	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire arrangement and their policy was to stay put unless otherwise advised. You go on there to say: "Grenfell was designed to rigorous fire safety standards and each front door for the flats can withstand fire for up to 30 minutes."
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph. If you look halfway down, Ms Lancaster, you can see that she says: "OPERATOR 2: And there's another one, on the 22nd floor, as well. "OPERATOR 1: Have you got a flat "OPERATOR 2: She said she sorry. "OPERATOR 1: Sorry.	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire arrangement and their policy was to stay put unless otherwise advised. You go on there to say: "Grenfell was designed to rigorous fire safety standards and each front door for the flats can withstand fire for up to 30 minutes." So, first of all, what prompted you to go onto the
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph. If you look halfway down, Ms Lancaster, you can see that she says: "OPERATOR 2: And there's another one, on the 22nd floor, as well. "OPERATOR 1: Have you got a flat "OPERATOR 2: She said she sorry. "OPERATOR 1: Sorry. "OPERATOR 2: Yeah, sorry, flat let me just find	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire arrangement and their policy was to stay put unless otherwise advised. You go on there to say: "Grenfell was designed to rigorous fire safety standards and each front door for the flats can withstand fire for up to 30 minutes." So, first of all, what prompted you to go onto the internet to find this information?
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph. If you look halfway down, Ms Lancaster, you can see that she says: "OPERATOR 2: And there's another one, on the 22nd floor, as well. "OPERATOR 1: Have you got a flat "OPERATOR 2: She said she sorry. "OPERATOR 1: Sorry. "OPERATOR 2: Yeah, sorry, flat let me just find it. He just (Several inaudible words) flat number? Oh,	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire arrangement and their policy was to stay put unless otherwise advised. You go on there to say: "Grenfell was designed to rigorous fire safety standards and each front door for the flats can withstand fire for up to 30 minutes." So, first of all, what prompted you to go onto the internet to find this information? A. Only because it's not on our ground and I didn't know
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph. If you look halfway down, Ms Lancaster, you can see that she says: "OPERATOR 2: And there's another one, on the 22nd floor, as well. "OPERATOR 1: Have you got a flat "OPERATOR 2: She said she sorry. "OPERATOR 1: Sorry. "OPERATOR 2: Yeah, sorry, flat let me just find	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire arrangement and their policy was to stay put unless otherwise advised. You go on there to say: "Grenfell was designed to rigorous fire safety standards and each front door for the flats can withstand fire for up to 30 minutes." So, first of all, what prompted you to go onto the internet to find this information?
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph. If you look halfway down, Ms Lancaster, you can see that she says: "OPERATOR 2: And there's another one, on the 22nd floor, as well. "OPERATOR 1: Have you got a flat "OPERATOR 2: She said she sorry. "OPERATOR 1: Sorry. "OPERATOR 2: Yeah, sorry, flat let me just find it. He just (Several inaudible words) flat number? Oh,	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire arrangement and their policy was to stay put unless otherwise advised. You go on there to say: "Grenfell was designed to rigorous fire safety standards and each front door for the flats can withstand fire for up to 30 minutes." So, first of all, what prompted you to go onto the internet to find this information? A. Only because it's not on our ground and I didn't know
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph. If you look halfway down, Ms Lancaster, you can see that she says: "OPERATOR 2: And there's another one, on the 22nd floor, as well. "OPERATOR 1: Have you got a flat "OPERATOR 2: She said she sorry. "OPERATOR 1: Sorry. "OPERATOR 2: Yeah, sorry, flat let me just find it. He just (Several inaudible words) flat number? Oh, we didn't get the flat number on that one. She said	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire arrangement and their policy was to stay put unless otherwise advised. You go on there to say: "Grenfell was designed to rigorous fire safety standards and each front door for the flats can withstand fire for up to 30 minutes." So, first of all, what prompted you to go onto the internet to find this information? A. Only because it's not on our ground and I didn't know anything about Grenfell Tower. We couldn't get through
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph. If you look halfway down, Ms Lancaster, you can see that she says: "OPERATOR 2: And there's another one, on the 22nd floor, as well. "OPERATOR 1: Have you got a flat "OPERATOR 2: She said she sorry. "OPERATOR 1: Sorry. "OPERATOR 2: Yeah, sorry, flat let me just find it. He just (Several inaudible words) flat number? Oh, we didn't get the flat number on that one. She said there was smoke was starting to get smoky.	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire arrangement and their policy was to stay put unless otherwise advised. You go on there to say: "Grenfell was designed to rigorous fire safety standards and each front door for the flats can withstand fire for up to 30 minutes." So, first of all, what prompted you to go onto the internet to find this information? A. Only because it's not on our ground and I didn't know anything about Grenfell Tower. We couldn't get through to London. So I thought any information, whether it big
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph. If you look halfway down, Ms Lancaster, you can see that she says: "OPERATOR 2: And there's another one, on the 22nd floor, as well. "OPERATOR 1: Have you got a flat "OPERATOR 2: She said she sorry. "OPERATOR 1: Sorry. "OPERATOR 2: Yeah, sorry, flat let me just find it. He just (Several inaudible words) flat number? Oh, we didn't get the flat number on that one. She said there was smoke was starting to get smoky. "OPERATOR 1: Okay, but she's they're okay?	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire arrangement and their policy was to stay put unless otherwise advised. You go on there to say: "Grenfell was designed to rigorous fire safety standards and each front door for the flats can withstand fire for up to 30 minutes." So, first of all, what prompted you to go onto the internet to find this information? A. Only because it's not on our ground and I didn't know anything about Grenfell Tower. We couldn't get through to London. So I thought any information, whether it big or small, would be useful to either us or if we could
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph. If you look halfway down, Ms Lancaster, you can see that she says: "OPERATOR 2: And there's another one, on the 22nd floor, as well. "OPERATOR 1: Have you got a flat "OPERATOR 2: She said she sorry. "OPERATOR 1: Sorry. "OPERATOR 2: Yeah, sorry, flat let me just find it. He just (Several inaudible words) flat number? Oh, we didn't get the flat number on that one. She said there was smoke was starting to get smoky. "OPERATOR 1: Okay, but she's they're okay? "OPERATOR 2: Yeah, they're okay, and we've advised	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire arrangement and their policy was to stay put unless otherwise advised. You go on there to say: "Grenfell was designed to rigorous fire safety standards and each front door for the flats can withstand fire for up to 30 minutes." So, first of all, what prompted you to go onto the internet to find this information? A. Only because it's not on our ground and I didn't know anything about Grenfell Tower. We couldn't get through to London. So I thought any information, whether it big or small, would be useful to either us or if we could find something and pass it back to London to help.
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph. If you look halfway down, Ms Lancaster, you can see that she says: "OPERATOR 2: And there's another one, on the 22nd floor, as well. "OPERATOR 1: Have you got a flat "OPERATOR 2: She said she sorry. "OPERATOR 1: Sorry. "OPERATOR 2: Yeah, sorry, flat let me just find it. He just (Several inaudible words) flat number? Oh, we didn't get the flat number on that one. She said there was smoke was starting to get smoky. "OPERATOR 1: Okay, but she's they're okay? "OPERATOR 2: Yeah, they're okay, and we've advised them to stay put until they hear otherwise.	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire arrangement and their policy was to stay put unless otherwise advised. You go on there to say: "Grenfell was designed to rigorous fire safety standards and each front door for the flats can withstand fire for up to 30 minutes." So, first of all, what prompted you to go onto the internet to find this information? A. Only because it's not on our ground and I didn't know anything about Grenfell Tower. We couldn't get through to London. So I thought any information, whether it big or small, would be useful to either us or if we could find something and pass it back to London to help. Q. Do you remember which website you found this information
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph. If you look halfway down, Ms Lancaster, you can see that she says: "OPERATOR 2: And there's another one, on the 22nd floor, as well. "OPERATOR 1: Have you got a flat "OPERATOR 2: She said she sorry. "OPERATOR 1: Sorry. "OPERATOR 2: Yeah, sorry, flat let me just find it. He just (Several inaudible words) flat number? Oh, we didn't get the flat number on that one. She said there was smoke was starting to get smoky. "OPERATOR 1: Okay, but she's they're okay? "OPERATOR 2: Yeah, they're okay, and we've advised them to stay put until they hear otherwise. "OPERATOR 1: Yeah. Yeah, it sounds a terrible	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire arrangement and their policy was to stay put unless otherwise advised. You go on there to say: "Grenfell was designed to rigorous fire safety standards and each front door for the flats can withstand fire for up to 30 minutes." So, first of all, what prompted you to go onto the internet to find this information? A. Only because it's not on our ground and I didn't know anything about Grenfell Tower. We couldn't get through to London. So I thought any information, whether it big or small, would be useful to either us or if we could find something and pass it back to London to help. Q. Do you remember which website you found this information on?
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph. If you look halfway down, Ms Lancaster, you can see that she says: "OPERATOR 2: And there's another one, on the 22nd floor, as well. "OPERATOR 1: Have you got a flat "OPERATOR 2: She said she sorry. "OPERATOR 1: Sorry. "OPERATOR 2: Yeah, sorry, flat let me just find it. He just (Several inaudible words) flat number? Oh, we didn't get the flat number on that one. She said there was smoke was starting to get smoky. "OPERATOR 1: Okay, but she's they're okay? "OPERATOR 2: Yeah, they're okay, and we've advised them to stay put until they hear otherwise. "OPERATOR 1: Yeah. Yeah, it sounds a terrible fire."	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire arrangement and their policy was to stay put unless otherwise advised. You go on there to say: "Grenfell was designed to rigorous fire safety standards and each front door for the flats can withstand fire for up to 30 minutes." So, first of all, what prompted you to go onto the internet to find this information? A. Only because it's not on our ground and I didn't know anything about Grenfell Tower. We couldn't get through to London. So I thought any information, whether it big or small, would be useful to either us or if we could find something and pass it back to London to help. Q. Do you remember which website you found this information on? A. Google.
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph. If you look halfway down, Ms Lancaster, you can see that she says: "OPERATOR 2: And there's another one, on the 22nd floor, as well. "OPERATOR 1: Have you got a flat "OPERATOR 2: She said she sorry. "OPERATOR 1: Sorry. "OPERATOR 2: Yeah, sorry, flat let me just find it. He just (Several inaudible words) flat number? Oh, we didn't get the flat number on that one. She said there was smoke was starting to get smoky. "OPERATOR 1: Okay, but she's they're okay? "OPERATOR 2: Yeah, they're okay, and we've advised them to stay put until they hear otherwise. "OPERATOR 1: Yeah. Yeah, it sounds a terrible fire." Then they pretty much end the call. First of all, are you aware of Ms Marshall having	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire arrangement and their policy was to stay put unless otherwise advised. You go on there to say: "Grenfell was designed to rigorous fire safety standards and each front door for the flats can withstand fire for up to 30 minutes." So, first of all, what prompted you to go onto the internet to find this information? A. Only because it's not on our ground and I didn't know anything about Grenfell Tower. We couldn't get through to London. So I thought any information, whether it big or small, would be useful to either us or if we could find something and pass it back to London to help. Q. Do you remember which website you found this information on? A. Google. Q. Just Google A. I just googled Grenfell Tower and then it came up lots
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	There on page 1 she passes over the details about flat number 82 on the 11th floor. Then if we can go to the next page, please, Ralph. If you look halfway down, Ms Lancaster, you can see that she says: "OPERATOR 2: And there's another one, on the 22nd floor, as well. "OPERATOR 1: Have you got a flat "OPERATOR 2: She said she sorry. "OPERATOR 1: Sorry. "OPERATOR 2: Yeah, sorry, flat let me just find it. He just (Several inaudible words) flat number? Oh, we didn't get the flat number on that one. She said there was smoke was starting to get smoky. "OPERATOR 1: Okay, but she's they're okay? "OPERATOR 2: Yeah, they're okay, and we've advised them to stay put until they hear otherwise. "OPERATOR 1: Yeah. Yeah, it sounds a terrible fire." Then they pretty much end the call.	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	you checked the internet for any information on Grenfell Tower, googling Grenfell Tower itself. You found a paragraph on a website stating there is a fire arrangement and their policy was to stay put unless otherwise advised. You go on there to say: "Grenfell was designed to rigorous fire safety standards and each front door for the flats can withstand fire for up to 30 minutes." So, first of all, what prompted you to go onto the internet to find this information? A. Only because it's not on our ground and I didn't know anything about Grenfell Tower. We couldn't get through to London. So I thought any information, whether it big or small, would be useful to either us or if we could find something and pass it back to London to help. Q. Do you remember which website you found this information on? A. Google. Q. Just Google

of different subheadings. I think I went onto the first one and I just started reading about it, when it was a built in the 1976, how many stairvells it had. Q. Do you remember — again, I appreciate this might be difficult — if it was the Tenant Management of Grenfell Tower or a number of flats in it, or the companies website, so the company that ran of Grenfell Tower or an umber of flats in it, or the companies website. A. I can't — it was the top one in Google. As soon as you typed it in, it was the five no underneath. I can't in remember what that one was though, I'm afraid. Q. You've just been telling us that there was more in the control in the companies on there than I think you've input into your winness statement with the proof of the companies of th	
built in the 1970s, how many stairwells it had. 4 Q. Do you remember – again, Lapreciate this might be 5 difficult – if it was the Tree man Management 6 Organisation's website, so the company that ran 6 Grenfell Tower or a number of flats in it, or the 8 council's website? 9 A. I can't – it was the top one in Google. As soon as you typed it in, it was the first one underneath. I can't 1 11 remember what that one was though, I'm afraid. 12 Q. Yov've just been telling us that there was more 12 asked everything we need to. 13 information on there than I think you've input into your 13 so fif lean just ask the chairman if he wouldn't witness statement – 14 mind. 14 A. Yes. 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. – about the type of building and the number of 16 stairwells, et cetera. 17 everything we need to. 18 A. Yes. 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. In terms of picking out what was relevant to you, was 19 die information you've set out in your witness statement 4 the information you've set out in your witness statement 4 the information you've set out in your witness statement 4 the information you've set out in your witness statement 4 the information you've set out in your witness statement 4 the information you've set out in your witness statement 4 the information you've set out in your witness statement 4 the information you've set out in your witness statement 4 the information you've set out in your witness statement 4 the information you've set out in your witness statement 4 the information you've set out in your witness statement 4 the information you've set out in your witness statement 4 the information you've set out in your witness statement 4 the information you've set out in your witness statement 4 the information you've set out in your witness statement 4 the information you've set out in your witness statement 4 the information you've set out in your witness statement 4 the information you've set out in your witness statement 4 the information you've set out in your witness statement 4 the information in the learn the control out	
4 Q. Do you remember — again, Lappreciate this might be 5 difficult — if it was the Tenant Management 6 Organisation's website, so the company that ran 7 Grenfell Tower or a number of flats in it, or the 8 council's website? 8 A. Lean't — it was the top one in Google. As soon as you 10 typed it in, it was the first one underreath. Lean't 11 remember what that one was though, I'm afraid. 12 Q. You've just been telling us that there was more 13 information on there than I think you've input into your 14 witness statement — 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. — about the type of building and the number of 17 stairwells, et cetern. 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. In terms of picking out what was relevant to you, was 20 the information you've set out in your witness statement 21 what you thought was relevant — 22 what you thought was relevant to you, was 23 put and the 30 minutes for the doors. I thought that 24 was the most important, you know. We had something to 25 go on. 26 At that time, we couldn't get through to London. We 27 were not aware of their policies and procedures, do you 28 tell them to sky, do you tell them to gs. So a soon 3 tell them to sky, do you tell them to gs. So a soon 4 as I found that information, I called out to Katrina, 5 you know, "This what I've found", I put it on there. 5 So that's why we greed, such soon, day, we're found 7 this. We didn't have anything che to go on at the 8 time. 9 Q. If can turn back to that incident log we're now 10 familiar with, so I EBBOORS 25 at page 3, if we can look 11 at the time mank 02.14, about three or now 12 down, there it says: 13 "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 14 EMERGENCY FIEL ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THER POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL MAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 15 STANABEDS. 18 "EACHFRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHISTAND A FIRE 18 CEACHFRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHISTAND A FIRE 19 C. Do you know the name of it? 20 Do you know the name of it? 21 ADVISED, GRENFELL TOWER SEGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRES SAFETY 22 STANABEDS. 23	
4 Q. Do you remember — again, I appreciate this might be 5 difficult — if it was the Tenant Management 6 Organisation's website, so the company that ran 7 Grenfell Tower or a number of flats in it, or the 8 council's website? 9 A. I can't — it was the top one in Google. As soon as you 10 typed it in, it was the first one underneath. I can't 11 remember what that one was though, I'm afraid. 12 Q. Vou've just been telling us that there was more 13 information on there than I think you've input into your 14 witness statement — 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. — about the type of building and the number of 17 stairwells, et cetera. 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. In terms of picking out what was relevant to you, was 20 the information you've set out in your witness statement 21 what you thought was relevant — 22 put and the 30 minutes for the doors. I thought that 23 put and the 30 minutes for the doors. I thought that 24 was the most important, you know. We had something to 25 go on. 26 Yes in the type of point of the through to London. We 27 were not aware of their poicles and procedures, do you 28 as I found that information, I called out to Katrina, 29 you know, "This is what I've found", I put it on there. 20 So that's why we agreed, was how, obey, we've found 21 dish, We didn't have anything che to go on at the 28 time. 29 Q. I'll can turn back to that incident log we're now 30 I tell them to sky, do you tild them to go. So a soon 31 tell them to sky, do you tild them to go. So a soon 32 tell them to sky, do you tild them to go. So a soon 33 tell them to sky, do you tild them to go. So a soon 4 as I found that information, I called out to Katrina, 4 this. We didn't have anything che to go on at the 5 time. 9 Q. I'll can turn back to that incident log we're now 4 the time mank 02 14, about three or four time marks 4 the time mank 02 14, about three or four time marks 4 the time mank 02 14, about three or four time marks 5 The REPROTICE STATE TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 6 ADVISED, GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 7 I THER POLICY STAT	
6 Organisation's website, so the company that ran 7 Grenfell Tower or a number of flats in it, or the 8 council's website, 9 A. I can't — it was the top one in Google. As soon as you 10 typed it in, it was the first one underneath. I can't 11 remember what that one was though, I'm afraid. 12 Q. You've just been telling us that there was more 13 information on there than I think you've input into your 14 witness statement — 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. — about the type of building and the number of 17 stairwells, et cetera. 17 deveraged in the information of you've set out in your witness statement 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. In terms of picking out what was relevant to you, was 20 the information you've set out in your witness statement 21 what you thought was relevant — 22 A. That's what I thought was the most important, the stay 23 put and the 30 minutes for the doors. I thought that 24 was the most important, you know. We had something to 25 go on. Page 213 At that time, we couldn't get through to London. We 2 were not aware of their policies and procedures, do you 3 tell them to stay, do you tell them to go. So as soon 4 as I found that information, I called on to Katrina. 5 you know, "This is what I've found". I put it on there. 5 So that's why we agreed, you know, obay, we've found 6 So that's why we agreed, you know, obay, we've found 7 this. We didn't have anytting che to go on at the 8 time. 9 Q. IT can turn back to that incident log we're now 10 familiar with, so I EB0003625 at page 3, if we can look 11 at the time nate 02 14, about three or four time marks 12 down, there it says: 12 ADVISED, GRENFELL TOWER REGERERATION THERE IS A 13 THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 14 ADVISED, GRENFELL TOWER REGERERATION THERE IS A 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL TOWER PLANGER STATETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 CALCHERONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHISTAND A FIRE 18 CALCHERONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHISTAND A FIRE	
Grenfell Tower or a number of flats in it, or the council's versite? A. I can't it was the top one in Google. As soon as you typed it in, it was the first one underneath. I can't remember what that one was though, I'm afraid. Q. You've just bene felling us that there was more information on there than I think you've input into your witness statement witness statement witness statement at the council of	
8 council's website? 9 A. I can't - it was the top one in Google. As soon as you 10 typed it in, it was the first one underneath. I can't 11 remember what that one was though, I'm afraid. 12 Q. You've just been telling us that there was more 13 information on there than I think you've input into your 14 witness statement: 15 A. Yes. 16 Q about the type of building and the number of 17 stainwells, et cetera. 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. In terms of picking out what was relevant to you, was 20 the information you've set out in your witness statement 21 what you thought was relevant — 22 A. That's what I thought was the most important, the stay 23 put and the 30 minutes for the doors. I thought that 24 was the most important, you know. We had something to 25 go on. 26 Well, Ms Jones, I'll say 5 minutes unless you're 27 ready sooner. 28 MS JONES: Thank you very much, sir. 29 Q. Ift can turn back to that incident log we're now 29 time time to stay, do you tell them to, so, so as soon 30 tell them to stay, do you tell them to, so, so as soon 31 tell them to stay, do you tell them to, so, so as soon 32 tell them to stay, do you tell them to go. So as soon 33 tell them to stay, do you tell them to, so, so as soon 34 as I found that information, Lealed out to Katrina, 35 you know, 'This is what I've found''. I put it on there. 46 So that's why we agreed, you know, day, we've found 47 this. We didn't have anything the to go on at the 48 time. 49 Q. Ift can turn back to that incident log we're now 40 G. Ift can turn back to that incident log we're now 41 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 42 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 43 THER POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 44 ADYSED, GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 45 THER POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 46 CALFRONT DOOR FOR EACHFLAT CAN WITHISTAND A FIRE 47 ADYSED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS PIRE SAFETY 48 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS PIRE SAFETY 49 C. The survival?	
4. I can't — it was the top one in Google. As soon as you typed it in, it was the first one underneath. I can't remember what that one was though, I'm afraid. 12 Q. You've just been telling us that there was more information on there than I think you've input into your witness statement witness statement— 13 witness statement— 14 witness statement— 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. — about the type of building and the number of statinvells, et cetera. 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. In terms of picking out what was relevant to you, was the information you've set out in your witness statement what you thought was relevant— 21 what you thought was relevant— 22 A. That's what I thought was the most important, the stay put and the 30 minutes for the doors. I thought that was the most important, you know. We had something to go on. Page 213 Page 213 At that time, we couldn't get through to London. We were not aware of their policies and procedures, do you as I found that information, I called out to Katrina, you know, who, we know own, we've found familiar with, so I-PBOOGOSE's tapage 3, if we can look it ince. 9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now go. 10 familiar with, so I-PBOOGOSE's tapage 3, if we can look it ince. 11 at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks down, there it says: 12 down, there it says: 13 "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A down, there it says: 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH is might for the page 2. The page 2. The page 2. The properties of the policy within Essex is control to policy within Essex is control to policy within Essex is control to policy within Essex is control that is called advanced call management? 15 "THER POLECY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 5 STANABES. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHISTAND A FIRE 19 (A. Driy when I did my initial training back in 2012 A control that is called advanced who needs fire survisal. 19 (A. Chriy when I did my initial training back in 2012	
typed it in, it was the first one underneath. I can't remember what that one was though, I'm afraid. Q. You've just been telling us that there was more information on there than I think you've input into your witness statement. A. Yes. Q. about the type of building and the number of stairwells, et cetera. A. Yes. Q. In terms of picking out what was relevant to you, was the information you've set out in your witness statement what you thought was relevant to you, was the information you've set out in your witness statement what you thought was relevant to you, was the most important, the stay as the most important, the stay as the most important, you know. We had something to go on. Page 213 At that time, we couldn't get through to London. We were not aware of their policies and procedures, do you as the flow of their too. So as soon at 16 flowing with the firm. Page 213 At that time, we couldn't get through to London. We were not aware of their policies and procedures, do you as the was the most important, you know, "This is what I've found". I put it on there. So that's why we agreed, you know, day, we've found firmiliar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look down, there it says: O If I can turn back to that incident log we're now you ware of apolicy within Essex Fire control room? O If I can turn back to that incident log we're now you have one of the policy of the deals with how you advance? I make anything we now ho need fire survey guidance? ADVISED, GRENFELL NAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY of STANABADS. What is usual practice to us asked everything we need to asked everything we need to. So if I can just ask the chairman if he wouldn't mind. What is usual practice to us asked everything we need to. So if I can just ask the chairman if he wouldn't mind. What is usual practice to a saked everything we need to. So if I can just ask the chairman if he wouldn't mind. It will define chair the chair the was relevant to you, was deverything. So I'm going to ask you to go with the	
11 remember what that one was though, I'm afraid. 12 Q. You've just been telling us that there was more 13 information on there than I think you've input into your 14 witness statement -	
12 Q. You've just been telling us that there was more information on there than I think you've input into your information on there than I think you've input into your information on there than I think you've input into your information on there than I think you've input into your information on there than I think you've input into your information on there than I think you've input into your information on there than I think you've input into your information on there than I think you've input into your information you've set out in your winess statement information you've set out in your witness statement your evidence. Thank you gou've information you've set out in your witness statement your evidence. Thank you. 20 In terms of picking out what was relevant to you, was the information you've set out in your witness statement your evidence. Thank you. 21 Well, Ms Jones, I'll say 5 minutes unless you're ready sooner. 22 Teady sooner. 23 MS JONES: Thank you very much, sir. 24 (4.50 pm) 25 (A.5 pm) 26 (A.5 pm) 27 (A.5 pm) 28 (A.5 pm) 29 (A.5 pm) 20 (A.5 pm) 20 (A.5 pm) 20 (A.5 pm) 21 (A.5 pm) 22 (A.5 pm) 23 (A.5 pm) 24 (A.5 pm) 25 (A.5 pm) 26 (A.5 pm) 27 (A.5 pm) 28 (A.5 pm) 29 (A.5 pm) 20 (A.5 pm) 20 (A.5 pm) 20 (A.5 pm) 20 (A.5 pm) 21 (A.5 pm) 22 (A.5 pm) 23 (A.5 pm) 24 (A.5 pm) 25 (A.5 pm) 26 (A.5 pm) 27 (A.5 pm) 28 (A.5 pm) 29 (A.5 pm) 20 (A.5 pm) 20 (A.5 pm) 20 (A.5 pm) 21 (A.5 pm) 22 (A.5 pm) 23 (A.5 pm) 24 (A.5 pm) 25 (A.5 pm) 26 (A.5 pm) 27 (A.5 pm) 28 (A.5 pm) 29 (A.5 pm) 20 (A.5 pm) 20 (A.5 pm) 21 (A.5 pm) 22 (A.5 pm) 23 (A.5 pm) 24 (A.5 pm) 25 (A.5 pm) 26 (A.5 pm) 27 (A.5 pm) 28 (A.5 pm) 29 (A.5 pm) 20 (A.5 pm) 20 (A.5 pm) 21 (A.5 pm) 22 (A.5 pm) 23 (A.5 pm) 24 (A.5 pm) 25 (A.5	
information on there than I think you've input into your witness statement	
witness statement — 14 mind. A. Yes. 15 Q. — about the type of building and the number of 16 point to enable counsel to check she's covered 17 stairwells, et cetera. 17 everything. B. A. Yes. 18 So I'm going to ask you to go with the usher for 20 a few minutes, and please don't talk to anyone about 20 your evidence. Thank you. 21 what you thought was relevant — 22 A. That's what I thought was the most important, the stay 23 put and the 30 minutes for the doors. I thought that 24 was the most important, you know. We had something to 25 go on. 25 (A short break) Page 213 Page 215 At that time, we couldn't get through to London. We were not aware of their policies and procedures, do you 18 tell them to stay, do you tell them to go. So as soon 3 at I found that information, I called out to Katrina, 5 you know, "This is what I've found". I put if on there. 6 So that's why we agreed, you know, okay, we've found 16 familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look 17 this. We didn't have anything else to go on at the 18 time. 19 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now 20 ADVISED, GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THERR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 15 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHISTAND A FIRE 18 Q. Fire survival.	
15 A. Yes. 16 Q. — about the type of building and the number of 17 stairwells, et cetera. 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. In terms of picking out what was relevant to you, was 20 the information you've set out in your witness statement 21 what you thought was relevant	
16 Q. – about the type of building and the number of stairwells, et cetera. 17 everything. 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. In terms of picking out what was relevant to you, was 20 the information you've set out in your witness statement 21 what you thought was relevant — 22 A. That's what I thought was the most important, the stay 23 put and the 30 minutes for the doors. I thought that 24 was the most important, you know. We had something to 25 go on. Page 213 1 At that time, we couldn't get through to London. We 2 were not aware of their policies and procedures, do you 3 tell them to stay, do you tell them to go. So as soon 4 as I found that information, I called out to Katrina, 5 you know, "This is what I've found", I put it on there. 6 So that's why we agreed, you know, okay, we've found 7 this. We didn't have anything else to go on at the 8 time. 9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now 10 familiar with, so I-F800003625 at page 3, if we can look 11 at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks 12 down, there it says: 13 "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 18 Fire survival. 18 point to enable counsel to check she's covered everything. 18 So I'm going to ask you to go with the usher for a few minutes, and please don't talk to anyone about taking a call from someone who needs fire survival. 19 everything. 20 If I can turn back to that incident log we're now 21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think there are just on questions. Let's see how we go. 22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think there are just on questions. Let's see how we go. 33 questions. Let's see how we go. 4 A. I can't remember, sorry. 5 First of all, can you tell us, was there a debrief after this incident in the Essex Fire control room? 7 A. I can't remember, sorry. 8 Q. That's all right. 9 Q. If I can turn back to tha	
17 stairwells, et cetera. 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. In terms of picking out what was relevant to you, was 20 the information you've set out in your witness statement 21 what you thought was relevant 22 A. That's what I thought was the most important, the stay 23 put and the 30 minutes for the doors. I thought that 24 was the most important, you know. We had something to 25 go on. Page 213 1 At that time, we couldn't get through to London. We 2 were not aware of their policies and procedures, do you 3 tell them to stay, do you tell them to go. So as soon 4 as I found that information, I called out to Katrina, 5 you know, "This is what I've found", I put it on there. 6 So that's why we agreed, you know, okay, we've found 7 this. We didn't have anything else tog on at the 8 time. 9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now 10 familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look 11 at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks 12 down, there it says: 13 "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THER POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 17 EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 18 O P. Fire survival. 18 So m going to ask you to go with the usher for a few minutes, and please don't talk to anyone a few minutes, and please don't talk to anyone a few minutes, and please don't talk to anyone a few minutes, and please don't talk to anyone a few minutes, and please don't talk to anyone a few minutes, and please don't talk to anyone a few minutes, and please don't talk to anyone a few minutes, and please don't talk to anyone a few minutes, and please don't talk to anyone a few minutes, and please don't talk to anyone evidence. Thank you well, so fill a few minutes, and please don't talk to anyone evidence. Thank you well, so fill a few fill, so fill a few fill, so fill a few fill and so fill a few fill and sone	ak at this
18 A. Yes. 19 Q. In terms of picking out what was relevant to you, was 20 the information you've set out in your witness statement 21 what you thought was relevant 22 A. That's what I thought was the most important, the stay 23 put and the 30 minutes for the doors. I thought that 24 was the most important, you know. We had something to 25 go on. 26 Page 213 Page 215 1 At that time, we couldn't get through to London. We 2 were not aware of their policies and procedures, do you 3 tell them to stay, do you tell them to go. So as soon 4 as I found that information, I called out to Katrina, 5 you know, "This is what I've found", I put it on there. 6 So that's why we agreed, you know, okay, we've found 7 this. We didn't have anything else to go on at the 8 time. 9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now 10 familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look 11 at the ime mark 02.14, about three or four time marks 12 down, there it says: 13 "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHISTAND A FIRE 18 So I'm going to ask you to go with talk to anyone about taking a call from someone who needs fire survey guidance? A. It was just fire survival. 19 Q. Fire survival?	
the information you've set out in your witness statement what you thought was relevant 22 A. That's what I thought was the most important, the stay put and the 30 minutes for the doors. I thought that was the most important, you know. We had something to go on. Page 213 At that time, we couldn't get through to London. We were not aware of their policies and procedures, do you tell them to stay, do you tell them to go. So as soon tell them to stay, do you fell them to go. So as soon as I found that information, I called out to Katrina, you know, "This is what I've found" I put it on there. So that's why we agreed, you know, okay, we've found this. We didn't have anything else to go on at the time. 9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look town, there it says: 10 Gown, there it says: 11 at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks down, there it says: 12 down, there it says: 13 "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH to Many I was proceed and the search of the policies and procedures and the search of the policies and procedures and the search of the policies and procedures, do you land that incident log we're now to shark why we agreed, you know, okay, we've found for the policies and procedures, do you have anything else to go on at the time. 9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now for it is called advanced call management? 10 A. No. 11 at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks to work the mark of the policies and procedures and the policy within Essex control that is called advanced call management? 11 A. No. 12 Q. Are you aware of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire survey guidance? 13 A. Only when I did my initial training back in 2012 (Q. Do you know the name of it? 14 A. I tawas just fire survival. 15 Q. Do you know the name of it? 16 A. Only when I did my initial training back in 2012 (Q. F	
the information you've set out in your witness statement what you thought was relevant 22	
21 what you thought was relevant 22 A. That's what I thought was the most important, the stay 23 put and the 30 minutes for the doors. I thought that 24 was the most important, you know. We had something to 25 go on. 26 Page 213 Page 215 1 At that time, we couldn't get through to London. We 2 were not aware of their policies and procedures, do you 3 tell them to stay, do you tell them to go. So as soon 4 as I found that information, I called out to Katrina, 5 you know, "This is what I've found", I put it on there. 6 So that's why we agreed, you know, okay, we've found 7 this. We didn't have anything else to go on at the 8 time. 9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now 10 familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look 11 at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks 12 down, there it says: 13 "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 21 Well, Ms Jones, I'll say 5 minutes unless you're ready sooner. 22 ready sooner. 23 MS JONES: Thank you very much, sir. 24 (4.45 pm) 25 (A short break) 26 (4.45 pm) 27 (4.50 pm) 28 IR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think there are just on questions. Let's see how we go. 3 questions. Let's see how we go. 4 MS JONES: Yes, thank you. 5 First of all, can you tell us, was there a debrief after this incident in the Essex Fire control room? 7 A. I can't remember, sorry. 8 Q. That's all right. 9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now 10 control that is called advanced call management? 11 A. No. 12 Q. Are you aware of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surv guidance? 15 A. Only when I did my initial training back in 2012 Q. Do you know the name of it? 16 Q. Do you know the name of it? 17 A. It was just fire survival. 18 Q. Fire survival?	
22 A. That's what I thought was the most important, the stay 23 put and the 30 minutes for the doors. I thought that 24 was the most important, you know. We had something to 25 go on. 26 Page 213 Page 215 1 At that time, we couldn't get through to London. We 2 were not aware of their policies and procedures, do you 3 tell them to stay, do you tell them to go. So as soon 4 as I found that information, I called out to Katrina, 5 you know, "This is what I've found", I put it on there. 6 So that's why we agreed, you know, okay, we've found 7 this. We didn't have anything else to go on at the 8 time. 9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now 10 familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look 11 at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks 12 down, there it says: 13 "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 22 ready sooner. 23 MS JONES: Thank you very much, sir. 24 (4.45 pm) 25 (A short break) 24 (4.45 pm) 26 (4.45 pm) 27 (4.45 pm) 28 ISIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think there are just on questions. Let's see how we go. 4 MS JONES: Yes, thank you. 4 MS JONES: Yes, thank you. 5 First of all, can you tell us, was there a debrief after this incident in the Essex Fire control room? 6 after this incident in the Essex Fire control room? 7 A. I can't remember, sorry. 8 Q. That's all right. 9 Secondly, are you aware of a policy within Essex control that is called advanced call management? 11 A. No. 12 Q. Are you aware of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surv guidance? 15 A. Only when I did my initial training back in 2012 Q. Do you know the name of it? 16 Q. Do you know the name of it? 17 A. It was just fire survival. 18 Q. Fire survival?	
put and the 30 minutes for the doors. I thought that was the most important, you know. We had something to go on. Page 213 At that time, we couldn't get through to London. We were not aware of their policies and procedures, do you tell them to stay, do you tell them to go. So as soon tell them to stay, do you tell them to go. So as soon for this we didn't have anything else to go on at the time. Q. Iff can turn back to that incident log we're now familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look familiar at large part y	
24 was the most important, you know. We had something to 25 go on. Page 213 Page 215 1 At that time, we couldn't get through to London. We 2 were not aware of their policies and procedures, do you 3 tell them to stay, do you tell them to go. So as soon 4 as I found that information, I called out to Katrina, 5 you know, "This is what I've found", I put it on there. 6 So that's why we agreed, you know, okay, we've found 7 this. We didn't have anything else to go on at the 8 time. 9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now 10 familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look 11 at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks 12 down, there it says: 13 "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 24 (4.45 pm) 25 (A short break) Page 215 (4.50 pm) 26 (4.50 pm) 27 (4.50 pm) 28 (4.50 pm) 29 (4.50 pm) 30 (A short break) (4.45 pm) 26 (4.45 pm) 26 (A short break) (4.45 pm) 26 (4.45 pm) 26 (4.45 pm) 26 (A short break) 1 (4.50 pm) 2 (4.50 pm) 2 (4.50 pm) 3 questions. Let's see how we go. 4 MS JONES: Yes, thank you. 4 MS JONES: Yes, thank you. 5 First of all, can you tell us, was there a debrief after this incident in the Essex Fire control room? 7 A. I can't remember, sorry. 8 Q. That's all right. 9 Secondly, are you aware of a policy within Essex control that is called advanced call management? 11 A. No. 12 Q. Are you aware of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire survival about taking a call from someone who needs fire survival about taking a call from someone who needs fire survival. 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 18 Q. Do you know the nam	
Page 213 Page 215 At that time, we couldn't get through to London. We 2 were not aware of their policies and procedures, do you 3 questions. Let's see how we go. 4 as I found that information, I called out to Katrina, 5 you know, "This is what I've found", I put it on there. 5 First of all, can you tell us, was there a debrief 6 So that's why we agreed, you know, okay, we've found 6 after this incident in the Essex Fire control room? 7 this. We didn't have anything else to go on at the 8 time. 8 Q. That's all right. 9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now 9 Secondly, are you aware of a policy within Essex control that is called advanced call management? 11 at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks 11 A. No. 12 down, there it says: 12 Q. Are you aware of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surves a device of the policy of th	
Page 213 1 At that time, we couldn't get through to London. We 2 were not aware of their policies and procedures, do you 3 tell them to stay, do you tell them to go. So as soon 4 as I found that information, I called out to Katrina, 5 you know, "This is what I've found", I put it on there. 6 So that's why we agreed, you know, okay, we've found 7 this. We didn't have anything else to go on at the 8 time. 9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now 9 Secondly, are you aware of a policy within Essex 10 familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look 11 at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks 12 down, there it says: 13 "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 18 (4.50 pm) 1 (2 policies and procedures, do you aware of a policy. It hink there are just on questions. Let's see how we go. 4 MS JONES: Yes, thank you. 1 5 PSI MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think there are just on questions. Let's see how we go. 4 MS JONES: Yes, thank you. 1 6 Jone Web God Relief Control of Control of Call	
1 At that time, we couldn't get through to London. We 2 were not aware of their policies and procedures, do you 3 tell them to stay, do you tell them to go. So as soon 4 as I found that information, I called out to Katrina, 5 you know, "This is what I've found", I put it on there. 6 So that's why we agreed, you know, okay, we've found 7 this. We didn't have anything else to go on at the 8 time. 9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now 10 familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look 11 at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks 12 down, there it says: 13 "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 18 (4.50 pm) 1 (4.	
1 At that time, we couldn't get through to London. We 2 were not aware of their policies and procedures, do you 3 tell them to stay, do you tell them to go. So as soon 4 as I found that information, I called out to Katrina, 5 you know, "This is what I've found", I put it on there. 6 So that's why we agreed, you know, okay, we've found 7 this. We didn't have anything else to go on at the 8 time. 9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now 10 familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look 11 at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks 12 down, there it says: 13 "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 18 (4.50 pm) 1 (4.	
2 were not aware of their policies and procedures, do you 3 tell them to stay, do you tell them to go. So as soon 4 as I found that information, I called out to Katrina, 5 you know, "This is what I've found", I put it on there. 6 So that's why we agreed, you know, okay, we've found 7 this. We didn't have anything else to go on at the 8 time. 9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now 10 familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look 11 at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks 12 down, there it says: 13 "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think there are just on questions. Let's see how we go. 3 questions. Let's see how we go. 4 MS JONES: Yes, thank you. 5 First of all, can you tell us, was there a debrief after this incident in the Essex Fire control room? 7 A. I can't remember, sorry. 8 Q. That's all right. 9 Secondly, are you aware of a policy within Essex control that is called advanced call management? 11 A. No. 12 Q. Are you aware of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surviguidance? 15 A. Only when I did my initial training back in 2012 Q. Do you know the name of it? 16 A. It was just fire survival. 17 A. It was just fire survival?	
2 were not aware of their policies and procedures, do you 3 tell them to stay, do you tell them to go. So as soon 4 as I found that information, I called out to Katrina, 5 you know, "This is what I've found", I put it on there. 6 So that's why we agreed, you know, okay, we've found 7 this. We didn't have anything else to go on at the 8 time. 9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now 10 familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look 11 at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks 12 down, there it says: 13 "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think there are just on questions. Let's see how we go. 3 questions. Let's see how we go. 4 MS JONES: Yes, thank you. 5 First of all, can you tell us, was there a debrief after this incident in the Essex Fire control room? 4 A. I can't remember, sorry. 8 Q. That's all right. 9 Secondly, are you aware of a policy within Essex control that is called advanced call management? 11 A. No. 12 Q. Are you aware of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surviguidance? 15 A. Only when I did my initial training back in 2012 Q. Do you know the name of it? 16 A. It was just fire survival. 17 Q. Fire survival?	
tell them to stay, do you tell them to go. So as soon as I found that information, I called out to Katrina, you know, "This is what I've found", I put it on there. So that's why we agreed, you know, okay, we've found this. We didn't have anything else to go on at the time. Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks down, there it says: "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY TO STANDARDS. "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE "Standards. "A MS JONES: Yes, thank you. First of all, can you tell us, was there a debrief after this incident in the Essex Fire control room? A. I can't remember, sorry. Q. That's all right. Secondly, are you aware of a policy within Essex control that is called advanced call management? A. No. 10	ne or two
as I found that information, I called out to Katrina, you know, "This is what I've found", I put it on there. So that's why we agreed, you know, okay, we've found this. We didn't have anything else to go on at the time. Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks down, there it says: 'ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH EMERGENCY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY A. It was just fire survival. EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE MS JONES: Yes, thank you. First of all, can you tell us, was there a debrief after this incident in the Essex Fire control room? A. I can't remember, sorry. Q. That's all right. Secondly, are you aware of a policy within Essex control that is called advanced call management? A. No. Q. Are you aware of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire survival guidance? A. Only when I did my initial training back in 2012 Q. Do you know the name of it? A. It was just fire survival. Q. Fire survival?	10 01 1110
5 you know, "This is what I've found", I put it on there. 6 So that's why we agreed, you know, okay, we've found 7 this. We didn't have anything else to go on at the 8 time. 9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now 10 familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look 11 at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks 12 down, there it says: 13 "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 18 First of all, can you tell us, was there a debrief after this incident in the Essex Fire control room? A. I can't remember, sorry. A. Only what of a policy within Essex control that is called advanced call management? A. No. B. Can't remember, sorry. A. No. C. Ther's all right. A. No. C. A. Only what of a policy within Essex control that is called advanced call management? A. No. C. D. On you aware of a policy within Essex control that is called advanced call management? A. No. C. D. On you aware of a policy within Essex control that is call	
6 So that's why we agreed, you know, okay, we've found 7 this. We didn't have anything else to go on at the 8 time. 9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now 10 familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look 11 at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks 12 down, there it says: 13 "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 18 after this incident in the Essex Fire control room? 7 A. I can't remember, sorry. 8 Q. That's all right. 9 Secondly, are you aware of a policy within Essex control that is called advanced call management? 10 A. No. 11 A. No. 12 Q. Are you aware of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surviguidance? 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 A. Only when I did my initial training back in 2012 17 A. It was just fire survival. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 18 Q. Fire survival?	
this. We didn't have anything else to go on at the time. 7 A. I can't remember, sorry. 8 Q. That's all right. 9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now 10 familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look 11 at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks 12 down, there it says: 13 "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 18 Q. Fire survival?	
time. 8 Q. That's all right. 9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now 10 familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look 11 at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks 12 down, there it says: 13 "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 18 Q. That's all right. 9 Secondly, are you aware of a policy within Essex control that is called advanced call management? 10 control that is called advanced call management? 11 A. No. 12 Q. Are you aware of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surviguidance? 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 18 Q. Fire survival?	
9 Q. If I can turn back to that incident log we're now 10 familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look 11 at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks 12 down, there it says: 13 "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 19 Secondly, are you aware of a policy within Essex control that is called advanced call management? 10 Control that is called advanced call management? 11 A. No. 12 Q. Are you aware of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surviguidance? 15 THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 Q. Do you know the name of it? 17 A. It was just fire survival. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 18 Q. Fire survival?	
familiar with, so LFB00003625 at page 3, if we can look 10 control that is called advanced call management? 11 at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks 12 down, there it says: 13 "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 10 control that is called advanced call management? 11 A. No. 12 Q. Are you aware of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surviguidance? 13 about taking a call from someone who needs fire surviguidance? 14 Design of the control of that is called advanced call management? 15 A. No. 16 A. No. 17 A. No. 18 Design of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surviguidance? 18 Design of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surviguidance? 18 Design of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surviguidance? 19 Design of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surviguidance? 10 Design of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surviguidance? 11 A. No. 12 Q. Do you know the name of it? 13 A. It was just fire survival. 14 Design of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surviguidance? 15 A. Only when I did my initial training back in 2012 16 Design of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surviguidance? 16 Design of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surviguidance? 16 Design of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surviguidance? 18 Design of any policy taking a call from someone who needs fire surviguida	
at the time mark 02.14, about three or four time marks down, there it says: "ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE IS A EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY STANDARDS. "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE A. No. 2	
down, there it says: 12 Q. Are you aware of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surv guidance? 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 19 Q. Are you aware of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surviguidance? 10 A. Only when I did my initial training back in 2012 11 Q. Do you know the name of it? 12 Q. Are you aware of any policy that deals with how you about taking a call from someone who needs fire surviguidance? 13 about taking a call from someone who needs fire surviguidance? 15 A. Only when I did my initial training back in 2012 16 Q. Do you know the name of it? 17 A. It was just fire survival. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE IS A STANDARDS. It was just fire survival. 18 Q. Fire survival?	
13 about taking a call from someone who needs fire survival. 14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 19 About taking a call from someone who needs fire survival guidance? 10 Quidance? 11 A. Only when I did my initial training back in 2012 12 Q. Do you know the name of it? 13 A. It was just fire survival. 14 Q. Fire survival?	u 20
14 EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH 15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 19 guidance? 10 A. Only when I did my initial training back in 2012 11 Q. Do you know the name of it? 12 A. It was just fire survival. 13 Q. Fire survival?	-
15 "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE 15 A. Only when I did my initial training back in 2012 16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 16 Q. Do you know the name of it? 17 STANDARDS. 17 A. It was just fire survival. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 18 Q. Fire survival?	
16 ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY 17 STANDARDS. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 18 Q. Fire survival. 18 Q. Fire survival. 19 Q. Fire survival.	2.
17 STANDARDS. 17 A. It was just fire survival. 18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 18 Q. Fire survival?	•
18 "EACH FRONT DOOR FOR EACH FLAT CAN WITHSTAND A FIRE 18 Q. Fire survival?	
1 -> 110 100	
Was that something that you inputted onto the 20 Q. Just asking you about that and, again, if you don't	:
21 system? 21 remember, please do just say in terms of the fire	
22 A. I asked Claire. 22 survival guidance that you were given training on, do	ð
23 Q. As far as you can recollect for us, is that about the 23 you know if it had four principles set out in it which	
time when you googled this 24 is essentially you have to work through with the	
25 A. Yes. 25 caller first of all, help them to find out if there's	
Page 214 Page 216	

1	an alternative escape route; secondly, to assess the	1	patience.
2	situation they're in; thirdly, then, to begin by	2 3	You'll all understand that when a witness has been waiting all day to give her evidence, it's very
3	protecting them, so going through fire survival guidance	4	disappointing if I simply say, "Please come again
4	with them; and then, fourthly, reassessing the	5	tomorrow". So I'm sorry to keep you all, but I think
5	situation?	6	that was necessary.
6	A. Yes, we would have they were prompt cards, from what	7	I'm grateful to the support team over on that side
7	I can recall. But I didn't ever have to use them, I'm	8	of the room. Again, I've kept them late, but thank you
8	afraid, so I can't remember what's actually written on	9	for your patience as well.
9	them, but I know they were literally step-by-step cards.	10	Right, that's it.
10	Q. Okay, thank you very much.	11	10 o'clock tomorrow?
11	Looking at the incident log, if we could please go	12	MS JONES: Yes.
12	to that again, Ralph, so LFB00003625 on page 6, if we	14	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, 10 o'clock, please. Thank you.
13	could, and four lines up from the bottom on the	15	(5.00 pm)
14	right-hand side, it says:	16	(The hearing adjourned until Tuesday, 20 November 2018
15	"Smart text changed EMERGENCY Call Change."	17	at 10.00 am)
16	There's a few references throughout this log to	18	INDEX
17	something called "smart text".	19	SARAH RUSSELL (affirmed)1
18	Are you able to tell us what that is?		Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY1
	A. If we mobilised into it to change details or if we had	20	70F MARTN () 70
19	S	21	ZOE MARTIN (sworn)76 Questions by MR KINNIER76
20	further information on what kind the call was, it would	22	ROB BROWN (affirmed)
21	automatically come up saying that it had been changed.		Questions by MR KINNIER113
22	Q. So that's the smart text saying it has automatically	23	(400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
23	been changed?		NIGEL DILLEY (sworn)147
24	A. Yes.	24	Questions by MR KINNIER147
25	Q. All right.	25	SHARON LANCASTER (sworn)186
	Page 217		Page 219
	- 18, - 11		1 4ge 217
1	Then a different question: were you aware that night		1 11/20 217
1 2	Then a different question: were you aware that night		1 mgc 217
	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB?		1 11.50 217
2	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No.		1 11.50 217
2 3 4	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay.		Tuge 217
2 3 4 5	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for		Tuge 217
2 3 4 5 6	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for coming to assist us. It's been very helpful to have		Tuge 217
2 3 4 5 6 7	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for coming to assist us. It's been very helpful to have your evidence to assist us with our inquiries.		1 11.50 217
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for coming to assist us. It's been very helpful to have your evidence to assist us with our inquiries. THE WITNESS: Thank you.		1 11.50 217
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for coming to assist us. It's been very helpful to have your evidence to assist us with our inquiries. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'd add my thanks as well,		Tuge 217
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for coming to assist us. It's been very helpful to have your evidence to assist us with our inquiries. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'd add my thanks as well, Ms Lancaster.		Tuge 217
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for coming to assist us. It's been very helpful to have your evidence to assist us with our inquiries. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'd add my thanks as well, Ms Lancaster. Tell me, have you been waiting all day to give your		Tuge 217
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for coming to assist us. It's been very helpful to have your evidence to assist us with our inquiries. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'd add my thanks as well, Ms Lancaster. Tell me, have you been waiting all day to give your evidence?		Tuge 217
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for coming to assist us. It's been very helpful to have your evidence to assist us with our inquiries. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'd add my thanks as well, Ms Lancaster. Tell me, have you been waiting all day to give your evidence? THE WITNESS: Yes.		Tuge 217
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for coming to assist us. It's been very helpful to have your evidence to assist us with our inquiries. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'd add my thanks as well, Ms Lancaster. Tell me, have you been waiting all day to give your evidence? THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm very sorry for that, because		Tuge 217
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for coming to assist us. It's been very helpful to have your evidence to assist us with our inquiries. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'd add my thanks as well, Ms Lancaster. Tell me, have you been waiting all day to give your evidence? THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm very sorry for that, because it's very disagreeable to be kept hanging around for so		Tage 217
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for coming to assist us. It's been very helpful to have your evidence to assist us with our inquiries. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'd add my thanks as well, Ms Lancaster. Tell me, have you been waiting all day to give your evidence? THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm very sorry for that, because it's very disagreeable to be kept hanging around for so long. But thank you for your patience and coming to		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for coming to assist us. It's been very helpful to have your evidence to assist us with our inquiries. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'd add my thanks as well, Ms Lancaster. Tell me, have you been waiting all day to give your evidence? THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm very sorry for that, because it's very disagreeable to be kept hanging around for so long. But thank you for your patience and coming to give evidence. It's very helpful to us, and you are		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for coming to assist us. It's been very helpful to have your evidence to assist us with our inquiries. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'd add my thanks as well, Ms Lancaster. Tell me, have you been waiting all day to give your evidence? THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm very sorry for that, because it's very disagreeable to be kept hanging around for so long. But thank you for your patience and coming to give evidence. It's very helpful to us, and you are free to go. Thank you.		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for coming to assist us. It's been very helpful to have your evidence to assist us with our inquiries. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'd add my thanks as well, Ms Lancaster. Tell me, have you been waiting all day to give your evidence? THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm very sorry for that, because it's very disagreeable to be kept hanging around for so long. But thank you for your patience and coming to give evidence. It's very helpful to us, and you are free to go. Thank you. THE WITNESS: Thank you.		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for coming to assist us. It's been very helpful to have your evidence to assist us with our inquiries. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'd add my thanks as well, Ms Lancaster. Tell me, have you been waiting all day to give your evidence? THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm very sorry for that, because it's very disagreeable to be kept hanging around for so long. But thank you for your patience and coming to give evidence. It's very helpful to us, and you are free to go. Thank you.		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for coming to assist us. It's been very helpful to have your evidence to assist us with our inquiries. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'd add my thanks as well, Ms Lancaster. Tell me, have you been waiting all day to give your evidence? THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm very sorry for that, because it's very disagreeable to be kept hanging around for so long. But thank you for your patience and coming to give evidence. It's very helpful to us, and you are free to go. Thank you. THE WITNESS: Thank you.		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for coming to assist us. It's been very helpful to have your evidence to assist us with our inquiries. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'd add my thanks as well, Ms Lancaster. Tell me, have you been waiting all day to give your evidence? THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm very sorry for that, because it's very disagreeable to be kept hanging around for so long. But thank you for your patience and coming to give evidence. It's very helpful to us, and you are free to go. Thank you. THE WITNESS: Thank you. (The witness withdrew)		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for coming to assist us. It's been very helpful to have your evidence to assist us with our inquiries. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'd add my thanks as well, Ms Lancaster. Tell me, have you been waiting all day to give your evidence? THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm very sorry for that, because it's very disagreeable to be kept hanging around for so long. But thank you for your patience and coming to give evidence. It's very helpful to us, and you are free to go. Thank you. THE WITNESS: Thank you. (The witness withdrew) SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Ms Jones, and		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for coming to assist us. It's been very helpful to have your evidence to assist us with our inquiries. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'd add my thanks as well, Ms Lancaster. Tell me, have you been waiting all day to give your evidence? THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm very sorry for that, because it's very disagreeable to be kept hanging around for so long. But thank you for your patience and coming to give evidence. It's very helpful to us, and you are free to go. Thank you. (The witness withdrew) SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Ms Jones, and that's it for the day.		
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Then a different question: were you aware that night of the stay-put advice being changed by the LFB? A. No. MS JONES: Okay. Well, Ms Lancaster, thank you ever so much for coming to assist us. It's been very helpful to have your evidence to assist us with our inquiries. THE WITNESS: Thank you. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'd add my thanks as well, Ms Lancaster. Tell me, have you been waiting all day to give your evidence? THE WITNESS: Yes. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm very sorry for that, because it's very disagreeable to be kept hanging around for so long. But thank you for your patience and coming to give evidence. It's very helpful to us, and you are free to go. Thank you. (The WITNESS: Thank you. (The witness withdrew) SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Ms Jones, and that's it for the day. MS JONES: That's it for the day. Thank you for sitting		

	Ī	Ī	Ī	ı
	active 10:19	73:9,16,18 74:19	afternoon 76:15	Anderson 115:16
A40 202:17 203:8	activity 165:1	78:5,10 91:2,12	113:21 160:1	125:23 128:16
ability 42:7 116:16	actors 53:3	92:18,21 93:11,11	184:25	129:24 130:15,21
able 1:24 7:7 17:8	actual 124:15	93:18 94:21,24	age 39:3 48:16	133:17 135:5,18
32:17,20 36:3	Adams 51:16	95:11 97:10,16,25	agencies 150:16	137:12
40:18 41:10 46:10	168:16	99:5,16 100:18	151:14,23	Anderson's 130:4
47:9 51:24 61:14	add 75:10 112:14	103:2,10,16,17	ages 42:14	Andrew 75:23
67:1,10 69:10	146:18 185:4	104:1,2 107:13	ago 60:12 124:22	Angie 17:17
70:5 74:15,17,18	218:9	108:1 111:7 112:4	190:15 194:21	Ann 98:16
85:20 86:1,13,16	added 73:5 203:3	117:8,15,24	agree 168:25	answer 4:15 11:13
98:25 117:22	additional 33:16	119:11,25 120:16	211:19	28:1 30:12 34:8
120:14 121:14	46:4 51:8 137:17	125:2,13 127:21	agreed 19:10	67:14 79:3 82:20
128:14 129:13	143:19,23,24	132:11,23 133:11	162:20 214:6	84:14 131:3
135:9,19 136:3	181:10 203:8	133:22 134:10,23	ahead 131:18	151:13 154:9
143:4,14 155:23	206:13	135:5,6,10,18,19	aid 131:11	156:3 161:5,7
167:17 179:16	address 82:4 90:5	135:21 136:3,6,21	aim 2:6	162:2 175:5 201:4
182:22 190:15	116:18 120:4	137:7,7 138:6,15	ain't 102:22	answered 9:15
194:16 196:10,12	127:16 156:20	138:17 139:5,10	Airwave 88:3	66:25 125:23
207:9 208:4	158:9 195:22	140:25 142:19	160:10 164:5,8	199:17
209:14 211:4	198:16 203:22	150:15,20,22	166:5 183:13	answering 19:8
217:18	204:12	151:2,8 153:13	albeit 146:20	75:5 159:5 208:8
absence 185:20	adequately 38:23	161:24 162:4,13	alert 124:13	answers 41:13
absolutely 211:12	adjourn 106:2	162:21,24 169:20	Alex 47:16	155:24
accept 87:3 201:10	adjourned 219:16	175:5 177:16	alight 21:22	Anthony 101:11
201:23	adjournment	179:11,16,24	allocated 18:8	104:13
access 89:8 92:23	113:11	180:19 194:15	allocation 18:11	anybody 17:18
140:19 141:1,5,18	admin 156:16	205:23 218:2	allow 122:25 166:8	69:15 83:21 171:9
141:20,21,24	199:7 209:2	advise 7:12,15	allowed 68:11	anyway 10:12 46:5
141.20,21,24	adopt 153:17	64:14 82:15 119:7	allowing 109:16	56:17 91:10
accord 7:20 44:9	adopted 179:9	153:13,21 177:13	allows 109:14	112:21
account 25:25	adult 32:3,6 33:24	advised 95:22	181:15	apart 42:15 85:19
accounted 9:12	adults 72:12	103:6 179:8	ALP 144:1,2	148:8
accurate 6:14	advance 184:19	204:13 210:20	alternate 14:19	apologies 96:6
174:6	advanced 216:10	212:9 214:16	alternative 14:9,14	97:13 167:23
acknowledgement	advantage 108:9	advises 54:5,12	14:18 183:14	184:25
9:13	adverted 149:17	advising 66:3	217:1	apologise 152:20
acknowledging	166:19 175:5	118:20 175:18	ambulance 150:17	appear 104:24
38:16	advice 7:7 11:23	179:11 205:15	151:18,21 152:1,3	138:8 167:14
acquire 146:4,6	15:21 35:8 39:17	aerial 146:4	167:3	206:25
acquire 140.4,0 act 53:10	40:14 51:25 59:6	affect 69:20 121:13	amount 70:16	appears 161:1
acting 122:9	60:13,18 61:17,21	affirmed 1:12	amplification	176:1 211:17
acting 122.9 action 163:20 181:4	61:25 62:20,24	113:16 219:19,22	179:20	appendix 6:23
activate 155:12	64:22,25 65:10	afraid 43:4 112:19	amplify 171:6	13:23
activated 157:5	66:11,25 67:6	189:25 211:11	175:23 178:12	appliances 108:16
159:2	69:20 70:13,19	213:11 217:8	and/or 157:14	108:25 109:5,10
139.4	37.20 , 3.13,17			100.20 100.0,10
		l	l	I

123:5 149:8,8	94:13 96:22 97:4	assisting 1:23 5:8	45:10 49:4 52:1	123:4 126:15
application 6:13	100:24 110:14	14:8 75:6	55:3 60:3,11,17	129:17 131:5
applied 68:4	111:6 124:19	associated 119:2	63:22 64:6,10	133:13,24 137:9
154:23 193:10	131:20 145:13	assume 12:22	66:8 70:1,3 90:20	137:13,23 138:5
applies 194:12	151:8 161:9,25	157:25	92:6 96:19 107:19	142:7,20 143:4,8
apply 68:2 93:19	166:20 169:7	assumed 105:1	107:24 111:16	144:22 161:11,13
applying 61:25	181:23 198:13	133:7	112:5 124:9	161:18 162:7
appreciate 180:17	214:22 215:12	assuming 5:23	127:19 128:10	165:4 168:14,15
187:14 190:15	asking 1:19 2:14	61:20	141:14 154:20,21	170:1 172:19
213:4	14:16 15:7,10,16	assumption 118:21	161:8 167:14	173:16 174:9
appreciated 147:24	35:9 42:10,13	assured 103:7	169:22 173:5	176:21 178:25
approach 152:13	44:18 49:14 67:7	attempt 118:3	174:16,18,24	179:10,12 180:21
approaching 121:3	89:22 90:3 96:6	123:3 141:3	175:8 178:17	183:21,24 192:21
appropriate 7:7	105:4 128:5	165:11 166:5	190:2,3 199:12	195:18 204:6,24
11:23 14:4 26:14	131:10,25 174:20	attempting 36:5	200:19,21 201:5	205:3 206:4
93:11 111:9	205:5 216:20	138:3 139:12	201:24 209:16	212:20 214:9
117:15,23	asks 72:15 104:14	164:17	210:25 214:2	216:15
appropriately	168:16	attempts 60:19	216:9,12 218:1	backed 48:7
116:12	assess 5:1,8 15:19	131:21	awareness 117:4	background 28:11
approval 201:13	35:18 40:2 100:10	attendance 54:15	162:25	38:1 49:1,2 95:2
approximately	100:12 184:11	109:7 131:19		114:21 128:6
215:3	217:1	186:10	<u>B</u>	148:21 150:9
area 14:5 87:3	assessed 38:24 39:5	attendances 190:20	baby 42:15 50:10	167:17
122:11 150:23	assessing 5:4 10:25	attending 114:15	back 9:12 10:11	backup 20:14
203:8,9,21	15:9,23 42:6 55:8	attention 45:14	13:20,21 19:11	backwards 202:25
areas 86:12 149:10	64:4 65:5,8	150:6	21:5 25:16 27:8	bad 15:7 25:8
arisen 145:18	assessment 8:11,20	August 122:21	30:7,24 32:1,10	35:24 41:2 59:19
arrangement	10:1 15:2,5,15,20	189:15	33:5,12,15 37:1,8	62:15 123:18,20
154:15,16 155:17	15:21 16:4 39:19	authority 109:2	39:8,15,15 41:16	balance 103:19
192:19 212:8	40:6,15 41:6 58:5	automated 41:15	43:10,17 48:14	balcony 14:17
214:14	58:13 65:3 205:23	automatic 70:12	49:14 50:6 51:21	Bannister 200:10
arrangements	assets 123:5	automatically 93:1	51:22 52:13,24	206:20 207:8
84:22 121:24	assign 12:12	142:9,11 191:22	54:17 55:17 56:21	base 109:9
122:25 152:2	assist 14:5,13 58:12	195:16,22 196:23	57:6 59:23 60:14	based 4:13 15:21
153:24 154:1,19	86:16 108:8,13	198:18,25 199:9	67:5,8,10,12,15	26:2 33:1 36:6
154:24 155:12,21	119:24 140:20,25	201:12 217:21,22	67:17,18,19,20	39:10 48:8 51:4
157:4 159:2	143:14 146:16	available 72:20	68:1,2,7 69:16,18	74:22 77:24 102:7
191:14 192:8	151:7 178:7,21	92:25 125:10	71:19 72:3 73:2,8	114:24 158:6,7,8
195:7	208:19 218:6,7	140:13 166:7,23	74:16,23 83:17	basic 13:7 25:19
arrive 193:6	assistance 108:16	196:11 202:2	86:15 96:14 97:8	basically 165:20
ascertain 14:1	116:17 180:19	204:17	98:18 99:3,14	183:4
121:7 131:4	196:6 201:11	aware 20:5 21:12	100:14 104:7	basing 16:2 34:18
asked 19:6 38:10	assistance.' 7:19	21:14,23,24 22:1	105:9,11,15,16	basis 43:7 118:11
43:3 48:12 74:13	assisted 59:24	22:3,7,19 23:10	107:5,9,12,15	139:13 151:18
86:1 90:13,15	68:21	24:5,18 25:3 38:1	113:5 119:8 121:9	179:13 191:24

bathroom 41:18	111:7 119:24	126:16 129:9	167:24 171:11	93:16 95:11
BBC 124:5 202:3,5	153:17 161:15	134:24 153:25	177:12 180:14	107:20 109:7
bearing 133:6	170:4	173:21 175:20,24	181:9 192:11	111:20,22 112:1
137:17 151:13	bet 65:15,20,23,25	176:13 179:3	195:11 199:12	118:24 119:4,22
168:13	66:3,16	203:2 206:8,12	201:2,4 204:14	119:23 120:7
Beckham 115:18	better 19:8 49:18	217:13	brigade's 87:3	128:2 136:23
123:24 124:4	62:15 172:17	boundary 151:23	196:11,18	153:22 174:21
Bedfordshire	beyond 138:19	box 171:4,6 175:23	brigades 84:4,9,24	198:9 203:4
191:19 192:13,17	big 11:4 23:13 84:8	breach 191:4	88:1 122:5 153:3	213:16
195:14,19,23,25	212:18	breached 92:4	155:5 156:7	buildings 4:21 5:6
196:14,18	bigger 75:13	break 2:1,3,7 25:15	192:18,20	5:19 78:24 81:5
Bedfordshire's	biggest 8:13	26:4,14,15,16	Brilliant 137:4	92:8 109:9 117:2
191:21 195:20	bit 11:12 15:24	27:2,21 56:14,17	bring 99:20 126:3	117:4 119:1,15
196:10	26:8 29:11 34:5	56:24 71:23 76:1	128:19 177:8	193:10,24
bedridden 121:18	39:24 40:4 60:24	98:11 106:14	178:10 195:19	built 213:3
bedroom 41:18	105:21 116:13	109:14,20 110:4	broadcast 92:16	bundle 6:21 11:15
44:4 72:14 83:6	149:8 187:24	114:16 144:14	93:20	13:22
108:6	189:19 192:21	145:5 181:22	Brown 113:6,14,16	bundles 6:20
began 19:5 20:8	196:1 202:22	182:9 189:4	113:18,23 114:15	business 143:3
66:25	208:9	215:11,15,25	125:16 128:14	busy 19:10 47:20
begging 37:14	black 17:13 64:22	breathe 61:11	139:4 144:4,12	78:9 94:4 108:14
beginning 23:8	blankets 59:1	breather 27:21	145:7,11 146:15	130:7,16,18
93:5 142:13	blaze 69:3	brief 14:16,21,25	146:18 219:22	button 208:13
203:23	block 21:22 29:21	128:6	BT 20:25 21:4,7	buy 146:7
behalf 86:2 89:23	43:24 82:5 158:19	briefer 186:2	85:25 86:4,9,11	buzzer 20:11
122:9 204:15	159:12 203:8,21	briefing 125:1	86:13,15 89:22	buzzing 20:12
belief 139:11,13	blocked 14:19	briefly 3:19 53:15	90:3,8 91:24	
believe 44:23 52:6	blocking 54:10	99:25 190:15	96:12 102:7 153:4	CAD 172:15 174:2
55:14 90:12 96:4	57:18	191:16	154:16,23 155:4,7	cadre 151:19
99:15 100:25	blue 57:10 77:5	brigade 1:9 2:17	155:9,9,11 161:9	Caili 115:16,18
109:11 126:13	113:24 114:4	7:2,3,8,12 30:15	161:12 197:5,8	123:24 124:4
172:2,4 177:5	147:25	32:15,17,24 54:14	200:18	125:23 128:16
180:9 184:19	board 55:16 56:4	60:7 61:13 84:11	buddy 85:22,23	129:24 130:4,21
209:12 210:3	73:4	84:12,13,17 85:5	122:7 192:13,19	133:17 135:5,18
believed 25:6 36:17	boards 55:20	85:16,19 87:6,10	buddy' 122:5	135:17 135.3,18
104:12 believes 7:4 11:20	body 137:3 bold 11:21 14:11	87:16,22 88:5,7 89:24 90:1 94:11	build 140:20	137:12,18,22
believing 172:16	border 180:15	95:1,14 100:20	building 5:1 7:14 9:10 11:3 21:3	Caili's 126:17
benefit 26:17	bottom 12:25 13:24	102:21 120:25	22:15 24:12 25:6	call 1:10 3:22 5:23
131:13	30:8 32:11 41:14	102.21 120.23	32:1 33:9 42:23	6:9,13 7:3,3,13
best 16:1,25 51:1	42:16 43:23,24	121.13 122.4 125:12 126:18	43:17 45:12 46:14	9:4,15,16,18,18
63:1 64:8 65:15	47:23 53:25 74:6	127:10,22 143:20	47:9 52:2 62:17	9:22 10:24 11:19
65:20,23,25 66:3	74:8 82:14,24	154:25 155:6,10	63:12,14 65:16	11:19 13:5,20
66:5,8,16 103:1	91:21 95:19	157:19 158:21	69:5,15,19 81:5,7	14:24 19:11,12,18
105:15 106:2	102:19 104:21	162:19 166:12	81:9,19 82:1,16	19:22,22 20:20,21
100.10 100.2	102.17 10 1,21	102.17 100.12	01.7,17 02.1,10	
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

20:23,24,25 21:1	123:13,18 124:2	108:16 119:21	198:1,24 205:15	84:9,23 85:15,20
21:2,3,12 23:3,4,8	124:18 125:4,18	126:18 128:9	206:10,14 207:18	85:21 86:1,8,10
23:9 24:13 25:1	125:20,22,24	133:16 137:12	216:25	86:12 87:3,7,10
25:10,25 26:1,13	126:10,17,21,22	140:9 141:22	caller's 118:24	89:23 91:15,17
27:10,18,25 28:10	126:24 127:3	145:17 149:21	198:5	94:7,17 97:21
29:1,25 31:18,22	129:6,13,15,17	176:14 190:5	callers 7:12 8:17	98:8 101:18
31:25 32:3 33:18	130:13,21 131:5,9	201:8 214:4	12:16 53:3 55:4	107:14 110:18,24
33:19 35:15 37:7	133:10,15,17,21	216:10 217:17	60:18 61:10,22	112:22 115:25
38:21,22 39:20	133:23 134:3,6	caller 4:2 5:8 7:4,7	64:14 65:2,6 66:8	116:11 122:3,11
43:4,6 44:14,15	135:7,23 136:11	7:15 8:24 9:21,25	67:6 68:19 69:21	122:12,14,23
44:18,21,24 45:8	136:11,13,18	10:2,6,12,19 11:1	70:10,11 80:12	123:2,3,4 124:10
45:11,16,21,24	138:17,20 139:5	11:20 12:17 13:15	83:12 96:24 97:25	124:23,24 125:6
46:7 47:13,17	142:7,13,14,20	14:2,5,8,14 15:10	108:1 118:20	130:25 131:2
48:13,14 49:17	155:4,25 157:9,12	15:16,19,22 16:6	120:18 121:11	137:15,17 138:14
52:12,16 53:16,24	157:14,22 159:13	23:5 38:24 39:21	125:2,14 127:22	140:2 142:21
54:16,17,18 55:13	162:7,8 164:22	40:1,2,3,13,16	139:10 140:25	140.2 142.21
55:23,24 56:8,9	167:18,21 168:1,7	45:5 46:13 47:1,4	142:10,24 143:5,5	155:1,4,10 156:1
57:7,15 58:20,22	170:25 171:2,4,25	48:23 51:25 52:22	153:21 162:5	156:5 157:18
59:5,10,23,24	170:23 171:2,4,23	53:24 54:4,7,8,22	183:25 215:5	158:18,21 160:1
60:3,5,10,17,23	175:22 178:8,17	54:25 55:1 57:15	calling 28:19 67:8	161:10,14,22
61:3,25 62:8,21	178:18 179:12,14	57:16,21 58:5,13	67:16 68:1 69:5	174:17 176:23
63:2,7,18 67:4,4,4	179:25 183:7,24	58:22 59:7,17	70:11 82:1 92:19	178:4 180:3 190:5
67:10,12,14,18,19	184:5,19 186:20	62:18 63:18 64:6	93:12 102:2	190:25 191:20,22
68:15 72:10,11,25	191:13,19 192:10	66:1,9,17 67:2	103:23,24 105:9	190:23 191:20,22
72:25 73:1,8,10	194:16,18 195:4,7	72:19 73:2,9,12	110:15 119:11	192:12,12,17,17
73:22,25 74:3,4	195:11,14,25	80:15 81:8,13,17	122:10 124:3	195:15,16,20
76:8,17 79:12,13	196:25 197:6,19	82:1 83:2,20	137:19 139:16	196:9,17,21
80:4,17 84:11,15	197:23 198:2,25	84:10,12 85:4,6,7	143:8 179:10	197:12,14,17,25
85:3 86:5,13,15	199:9,16,17	87:21 95:6,10	204:20 209:18	201:3,9,24 203:14
86:24 87:13,15	200:13 201:7,22	98:16 99:17 100:5	calls 3:20 4:20 5:19	204:18 209:4
89:22 90:2 91:23	202:16,18 203:25	100:8,11,15,18,22	5:22 6:1,6,7,10	211:9,23
94:12,23 95:5,9	204:2,10,14,15,17	102:20,21 103:21	10:13 11:6 12:1	calm 28:14 34:4,4
95:24 96:3 97:1,3	205:4,14,21 206:1	118:23 119:5,24	12:11,12 14:25	38:20 41:10
97:4 98:14,18,20	206:18,25 207:5,8	120:23,25 122:10	19:5,8,14 20:8,11	camera 17:14
98:21,23 99:9,13	207:15 209:10,10	128:16 129:7	20:15,17 22:19	93:15 111:21
99:22 100:20	209:21,24 210:24	133:21 134:11,11	24:17 25:5 45:6	141:19,23
101:9,13 102:3,5	211:6,14 216:10	134:24,25 137:13	47:20 52:17,20,21	cameras 141:3
102:9 103:3,17	216:13 217:15,20	137:23 138:15	52:22 53:14 55:2	capacity 183:22
104:5,12 105:8	callback 142:23	157:13 162:1,18	56:3 58:14,16	184:6,8
106:1,16 107:5,8	callbacks 66:21	163:13 168:9,11	66:24 67:13,14,21	capital 14:11
107:11,15 110:19	178:24 183:21	168:17,20,22	68:6 69:14 73:1	car 159:25
111:5,6 113:14	called 4:5 21:5 67:2	169:1 170:6 172:4	74:10 78:4,7,9,12	cards 192:9 194:22
115:20,22 116:12	68:2 70:2 86:1	179:7,13,18 193:3	79:10,11,22 80:2	194:23,23 217:6,9
116:14,15,16	90:10 98:16	193:5,7,13,15	80:3,19,19,22	carried 96:24
120:13 121:24	101:11 105:11	195:2,3 196:22	81:19 83:1,1 84:4	carry 36:3 57:3
		,- · · · · -	,	
		l	l	ı

				raye 224
185:22	136:21 153:19	193:18	116:11 118:16	commander 16:7
carrying 149:16	163:4 175:8	Claire 115:11	122:12 126:14	113:6,14 114:23
case 85:6 104:1	177:17 184:7	200:10 206:20	132:10 143:20	115:6,8 116:4
107:10 118:3	203:8 206:13	207:8 214:22	160:13 169:19	149:19,20,25
122:23 124:25	217:15,21,23	clarification	171:21 185:6	150:2,22 151:3
127:12 138:25	218:2	127:17	188:4 192:21	153:7 183:23
151:9 157:16	changes 7:18 18:9	clarified 49:8	195:10 196:23	Commanders
163:4 187:17	54:16 147:6 194:2	162:13	197:9,24 199:2	149:14
categorise 4:23	changing 61:17	clarify 161:24	202:9 203:25	comment 35:2
12:1	121:1	167:17 177:23,24	217:21 219:4	138:10 178:20
cause 51:24 103:20	channel 16:16,17	178:2	comes 41:16 52:21	commentary 112:5
CB1 206:23	19:6,7,7,10,20	Clarke 199:25	57:9 73:23 86:7	commentary 112.5
CCTV 93:1 112:8	20:7 69:16,17	classed 115:8	comfort 39:25	122:13,17,18
141:6,7,9	164:12,22 165:1	classified 180:7	comfortable 1:15	commotion 28:11
cent 17:21 21:21	165:20,23	clear 15:20 39:16	76:22 113:19	communicate
24:18 55:14 66:4	channels 164:13	46:12 51:25 52:5	147:16	108:22 123:1
142:14 157:16		52:7,12 64:21		156:10 167:2
centre 141:9	166:2,3 charge 88:12	66:10 114:19	comforting 39:12 coming 1:22 4:20	communicated
certain 18:9 98:8	108:18 115:10	137:6	6:11 8:14 10:11	
193:10	154:6	cleared 7:9	16:6 20:12 21:14	176:20 177:1,3
cetera 125:3 141:3			25:5 27:8 29:14	communicating 97:15
213:17	chase 173:14	clearest 49:3		
	check 97:5 109:15	clearly 28:13	30:2,19 33:3,15	communication
chain 88:22 89:4	142:23,24 144:7	102:13 164:2	34:12 35:8,11,25	163:23 166:8,22
176:10	144:13 181:22	close 8:15,15,16	36:2,10,14 38:8	173:3 174:24
chairman 1:7,19	187:17 215:11,16	29:23 98:23 152:3	39:7 40:14 44:20	181:1 183:15
26:10 56:19 71:4	checked 56:4 86:17	170:14 180:15	45:2,7 46:5 47:24	209:6
71:20 72:1 75:22	124:5 212:5	closed 104:22 105:5	47:24,25 51:22 57:6 58:14 67:14	communications
109:14 144:6	checks 54:3	105:7		169:12 173:10
181:14 215:10,13	child 12:18 28:16	closely 40:4 151:21	68:6 72:3 74:10	company 213:6
chance 61:16 67:5	33:20	clothes 29:22	75:6,15 82:13	comparable 184:18
68:3 98:16 188:13	children 72:13	coincide 177:21	83:6 97:3 100:14	comparison 117:5
change 60:12 64:25	121:20	colleague 156:22	108:1 112:11,23	compartment 92:9
69:20 73:9 76:1,3	choice 63:18 66:2,3	colleagues 167:2	146:15,22 147:23	compartmentation
94:21 97:10,15	66:4,13,18	collect 27:22	184:16 185:1,7	92:4,6 191:4
99:16 109:8	choices 54:5	collection 51:9	187:12 195:12	competent 115:8
117:15,23 119:13	choosing 64:11	combining 19:6	197:12,17 202:18	complete 19:20
121:5 132:10	Chris 88:20	come 6:13 9:17	203:14 218:6,16	171:4,6
175:4 177:1 178:1	Christine 17:21	19:12 20:23 21:13	command 16:7	completed 84:1
179:11,15 201:23	90:2	30:7,9 32:1,12,14	24:15 52:4 53:9	completely 6:5 8:23
217:15,19	chunk 99:23	32:18,20,24 36:10	55:21 74:11,24	computer 17:6,13
changed 60:19	circumstances	51:15 52:9 53:10	88:22 89:4 148:9	19:25 20:3
66:11 67:7 94:24	82:15 111:10,11	56:20 58:23 59:18	149:21 150:3,5,13	computers 68:9
97:5 100:19	117:14,23 134:10	65:2 71:1 75:3	150:20,21 170:7	concentrate 8:2
103:10 104:1	136:4 142:12,18	81:19 94:7 97:8	170:20 171:14,18	concept 118:22
107:12 112:3	156:21 183:10	108:21 113:5	182:19	119:8

				raye 223
concern 169:13	164:14,18 165:11	contrary 162:24	173:7,9,12,12,25	could've 59:21 64:8
concerned 45:4	165:13 169:24	contribution	174:4,5,11,13,16	68:2 96:2 108:12
74:4	170:4 172:17,25	112:22	174.4,5,11,15,10	163:15 211:9
	176:14 183:1		174.19,23 173.1	
concerning 107:20		control 1:6,9 2:16	,	council's 213:8
concerns 160:3	198:5 200:20	3:9 5:25 7:3,6,12	176:23 177:3,13	counsel 1:13 71:9
concludes 146:11	208:10,15	11:19,22 13:4	178:10 183:7,8,19	76:10 144:12
conditions 13:13	contacted 86:4 90:8	14:1 16:19,20,24	183:24 189:10,13	181:22 215:16
41:22 98:3 124:20	125:1,9 127:2	18:5,18 19:14	189:20,22 190:12	219:19
124:20,21 168:16	133:12 137:23	20:4 44:15,17	190:14 191:7,14	counterpart 151:25
198:23 207:18	140:5 158:11	50:20 51:12 52:4	199:12 200:3,5,7	165:11
confirm 3:5 11:12	159:10 181:7	53:18 59:25 60:8	200:10,15,17,25	country 166:9
44:6 77:1,11	197:4 200:18,25	67:10 68:9 69:2	201:1 202:1,13,22	county 147:5 149:1
113:22 114:9	208:21	70:1 72:5 77:18	209:13 210:4	151:23 189:10
147:20 171:1	contacting 88:4	77:24 78:8,11	211:3 215:4 216:6	190:13
179:24 188:16	123:6 131:14	80:3 85:16 86:19	216:10	couple 32:4 44:19
confirmed 13:4	133:24 138:4	86:20 87:24 88:12	convenient 106:3	124:24 145:8
128:9 177:15	170:10 181:9	89:1,4,6,8,15,16	113:4	147:7 166:2
confirming 105:17	183:14 204:16	90:1,4,10 93:3	Conveniently	182:12 196:7
confirms 54:13	contacts 104:1	94:2,11,13 95:1,8	128:11	course 23:21 49:8
72:15 95:10	129:24 151:2	95:14 96:20 97:3	conversation 37:24	53:4 56:15 78:7
confused 100:5	160:13 172:18	97:7,25 99:20	98:25 99:3 104:24	90:24 107:19
consider 139:9	contained 41:1	101:20 102:8	108:15 128:15	116:24 120:13
considerations	70:16,18 84:19	104:7 106:19	162:10,16 172:2	133:20 134:15
103:19	92:8 154:19	107:8 108:18	172:14 174:7,10	135:7 144:21
considered 108:11	containing 78:19	110:13,23 114:24	174:12 175:1	163:20 188:25
consisted 78:18	content 3:21 77:13	118:13 125:12,22	177:21,22 180:1	208:3
80:1	95:14 114:11	126:18,20,21	183:7 184:2 210:2	courtesy 186:9
consistent 96:25	148:18 177:20	127:9,10,22 128:6	211:1,11	cover 58:25 61:11
97:6	contents 3:5 77:11	130:2 136:1	conversations	65:11 78:23 79:1
console 192:11	114:9 148:7,15	137:16 138:14	169:17	79:2 80:6,7 119:4
194:23 195:17,21	176:20 178:20	140:4,7,16 143:3	conveyed 169:2	136:23
195:24 199:15	188:16	145:21,24 149:9	172:21	covered 14:23
204:24 207:12	context 6:25 7:10	150:15 151:5,10	copy 148:1 182:22	62:15 84:23 88:4
constantly 121:1	42:13 157:11	151:10 152:5	correct 90:9 115:7	109:15 118:6
contact 13:5 84:17	175:6	153:2 154:3,6	116:6,18 126:1	144:8,13 189:24
86:9,18 87:5,14	continually 79:20	155:2,2,7,25	140:18,22 148:4	215:16
87:25 88:6 90:3	continue 84:15	157:6,19,22	154:11 158:2	covering 54:13
94:2 96:22 127:3	153:17 161:25	157:0,19,22	161:17 163:10	covers 79:22 93:3
129:21 130:9	162:20 187:18	158:18,20 159.9	164:7 177:25	CPD 152:15,24
131:10 137:21	208:21	162:16 163:21,24	180:1	crack 188:1
		162.16 163.21,24	correcting 182:17	create 44:3
140:1 143:4,16	continuing 84:16 118:8 152:23	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
152:4 156:14,18		165:14 169:23	correctly 116:18	created 44:10
159:9 160:8	continuous 152:15	170:5,11,12	correspond 126:24	50:10
161:21,25 163:20	continuously	171:25 172:3,13	corridor 32:7	crew 77:17 78:2
163:22,25 164:1,9	208:12,14	172:15,19 173:1,6	costs 64:14	83:24,24,25 88:14

		_	_	_
99:2 113:5,14	77:21 94:18	100:12 144:1	145:21	118:14 121:4
114:23 115:6,8	dated 2:23 77:7	146:3 155:6,11	detail 87:12,15	122:4 136:2 143:7
116:4 149:23	114:1 188:8	201:10	116:8 121:20	146:19 189:24
193:22	daughter-in-law	decisions 58:7	127:14 138:1	190:18,19,20
crews 10:8,12	101:14 125:19	declaration 180:12	159:6,16,19	195:18 213:1
12:22 36:2,4,9,13	133:10 143:9	dedicated 85:9	160:14 163:12	218:1
38:12 39:7 43:15	day 3:17 14:22,23	164:12,13 166:2	192:21	differently 162:22
46:25 54:16 72:17	15:1 51:14 52:18	deficiency 143:21	detailed 157:3	difficult 31:19
74:15 83:17 121:6	79:18 158:9 186:7	define 7:2	details 13:6,14	38:21 69:6 91:17
193:5	187:14 218:11,22	defined 180:7	55:12,24 72:11	96:6 97:13 156:3
criteria 154:23	218:23 219:3	defines 110:22	74:1,4 86:25 87:6	156:6 159:5
critical 126:19	days 53:9,12	definitely 24:11	90:4 120:12	160:24 206:11
CRO 54:3,4,9,13	152:15	105:18 152:3	123:21,21 128:1	213:5
72:10,10,13,14,15	de-monitored	179:12 192:2	130:1,5,8,15	difficulties 51:24
72:16,20 85:15	19:10	definition 150:7	157:8,13 170:6	158:20 159:16,22
90:5 94:12,12	dead 21:3 104:15	degree 191:9,10	172:11,13 196:25	174:24 181:1
95:5,8,10,24 97:8	107:9	delay 211:18	197:10 201:5,15	209:6
98:18 99:9,13	deadline 186:5	delivered 191:17	204:16 205:18	Dilley 147:5,12,13
100:7 104:14	deal 15:24 78:4	density 15:5	206:1 209:10,14	147:22 157:23
111:1 129:10,25	100:20 106:2	depend 143:3,6	210:5 211:5	160:19 161:1,20
130:6,12,25	114:21 117:7	depended 64:11	217:19	165:7,8,18 167:20
157:11,12 168:16	148:21 149:22	dependent 93:8	deteriorated	171:7,8 172:10
168:17 169:2	150:12 154:1	depending 18:6	142:25	173:22 174:4
CROs 125:10	178:4 180:17	109:8 177:17	determine 82:7	175:3 176:14
183:24	184:12	202:15	93:17	177:11,14,18
cross 132:6 140:3	dealing 23:15 24:17	depends 100:13	determined 100:15	178:14 179:4,23
cross-referencing	52:12,17 69:23	107:14 108:5	developed 195:9	181:12,21 182:11
94:17	85:14 127:20	deploy 109:5 144:1	developing 23:10	182:13 184:24
crossed 92:17	140:4 149:18	deployed 83:24	development	185:5 208:18,21
crystallised 134:7	150:17 153:2,15	deployment 109:6	152:15,23	219:23
cues 8:17	197:3	152:13	dial 7:19 84:14	Dilley's 209:9
current 95:11	dealings 152:6,12	DERBY[sic 16:16	85:5 87:17 123:7	direct 15:10,11
122:16	deals 216:12	describe 20:21	167:1 208:13	16:5 57:8 123:9
currently 114:23	dealt 130:13 131:25	140:19	dialled 164:21	127:5 156:15,16
custom 109:14	177:17 211:22	described 8:12	dials 85:11,13	156:17 160:8
cut 152:20 159:18	death 63:25	116:9	die 66:13	161:4,6 162:2
<u>n</u>	Debbie 47:16	description 169:1	difference 93:18	164:1 173:11
D 210.19	debrief 216:5	designated 192:10	152:11	directed 101:2
D 219:18	decide 12:22 58:10	195:17 199:15	different 2:11 6:5	156:1 162:5
damp 136:23	63:13 119:24	designed 16:5 92:8	14:23 18:14 35:4	174:17
danger 58:3	decided 111:8	119:16 212:11	39:21,21 51:10,17	directly 8:7 87:21
dangerous 55:9	164:16 170:4	214:16	59:8,9,9 61:18	100:11 113:25
83:8 119:19 121:3	179:17	desk 17:20 19:25	69:25 70:9 73:12	118:1,2 119:10
Darby 22:13 24:14	decides 86:12	125:24 185:19	73:20 75:12,12	123:1,13 131:14
date 2:19 3:8 8:10	decision 65:4	desks 110:21	81:5,6 117:4	137:19 138:9

				Ī
170:6,21 172:17	documentation	151:2,6 158:3,6	elicit 193:14 198:24	equate 174:13
disability 80:16	169:4	163:21,23,25	elicited 211:14	176:8
198:11	documents 114:7	164:1,9,11,12,14	Elizabeth 187:9	equipment 149:8
disabled 12:18	114:11 186:12	165:11,14,22	else's 86:5	Er 42:19
80:13	doing 16:4 19:9	166:8,21 179:23	emergency 3:22	erm 171:10,10
disagreeable	43:2 52:6 56:19	180:13,16 183:1	13:20 142:13	error 148:15
218:15	58:8 136:20		196:9 199:8,10	182:18 197:10,24
disappointing	141:16 161:15	<u>E</u>	209:2 214:14	escalated 22:9
219:4	domestic 78:25	E 219:18	217:15	90:24
discourage 36:14	108:3 117:5	e-mail 155:15	emphasised 70:23	escalation 23:11
discuss 78:13 91:12	door 5:11,13 29:21	156:11,19,20,23	employment	escape 5:2,9 14:9
94:20 98:14 101:9	29:23 36:24 37:2	earlier 4:5 49:11,16	189:16	14:11,14 15:3,6
107:17 118:16,18	54:8,23 62:18	49:18 52:25 71:19	enable 139:9	36:15 38:24 39:6
125:18 143:8	63:11 82:9,14	90:18 126:12	186:10 215:16	42:7 118:4 184:11
204:1	83:6,8 100:14,14	136:13 149:17	enabled 38:12	217:1
discussed 143:10	105:7 108:6	158:25 166:19,20	enact 81:11	escape/exit 177:14
discussion 48:18	194:24 212:12	175:23,25 176:20	encompass 118:14	especially 138:15
50:2 63:15 201:18	214:18	190:12 195:8 208:7	encountered	160:3
discussions 97:24	door-closers 70:13	earliest 211:16	142:18,22 159:17	essential 131:4
152:22 169:16	107:18,25		181:1	essentially 38:8
Disson 101:11,14	doors 30:23 54:11	early 10:9 29:1,24 80:17 124:18	encouraging 67:19	74:20 123:17
104:13 107:5	70:12 104:22	easier 138:2 185:19	ended 58:20 172:20	179:7 193:24
110:25 131:5,14	105:4 107:22,25	East 85:21	endings 4:18	216:24
131:22 134:8	108:3 213:23	easy 164:11	ends 54:16	Essex 85:21 139:23
137:19,24 138:9	dot 17:9,12	ECFRS 154:15	engage 150:10	140:1,5 147:5
143:8	double 97:4	158:18,20 161:12	engines 42:20 43:8	148:24 149:1,15
Disson's 106:17	double-check	Edward 113:23	enormity 160:4	149:23 150:21,24
125:19 133:10	86:14	effect 125:15	163:16	151:4,6,10,16,17
143:9	downlink 70:2	180:12	enormously 1:24	151:25 152:1
distress 103:20	202:2,12	effective 152:13	ensure 78:5 116:11	153:3,12 154:3,6
distressed 28:12 125:23 126:11	downstairs 28:23	effectively 103:11	enter 82:8 entire 98:25 195:4	155:15 156:2,9,13
134:2	34:9,14,16,19,21	effects 7:5 11:21		157:2,10,11,18,19
divert 86:12 191:19	34:25 63:16	12:7,8	entirely 20:3 58:9 61:18	158:7,8 159:9,10
191:20 192:10	drawback 93:19 drops 195:5	effort 36:15	entrance 107:21,25	160:21 162:4,4,17 164:2 165:4,14
191.20 192.10	drops 193.3 due 7:5 11:21 12:6	efforts 183:1	108:4	164.2 163.4,14
diverted 122:4	56:17 188:24	eight 22:1 52:19	entry 89:25 104:21	167.3,14 168.17
document 43:19	Dundee 102:4,5	either 7:7 22:19	126:9 128:13	170:15 172:13,15
84:20 104:9 126:2	Dunitee 102.4,3 Duplicate 206:13	39:17 63:10	130:24 165:6	170.13 172.13,13
128:20 148:5	duration 195:4	125:12 160:10	167:24 168:1	172.19 173.0,7,12
154:19 160:19	duty 86:19,20	194:4 212:19	173:20 176:12	173.16 174.9,11
168:5,13 169:8	88:23 89:1 108:22	elderly 12:18	178:13 179:1	174:13,16,17,17
170:24 176:10	115:10,15 145:16	121:19	203:16	174.23,23 176.7
182:23 183:3,3	145:17,20 148:23	element 65:3,5	environment 121:1	178:25 180:13,15
202:16	149:14,16 150:11	66:17	equally 103:23	180:19 181:8,9
	1.7.1,10 100.11		- 1	100.17 101.0,7
			l	<u> </u>

	_			_
183:7,24 184:1,18	215:20 218:7,12	experience 2:15	155:23 163:11	family 137:22
189:10,16,21	218:17 219:3	5:16,20 8:9,21	203:20	far 17:4 18:20
190:13 195:9,16	exact 145:19	10:22,23 11:6	extra 80:4	30:11,13,13,15
199:14 201:1	exactly 38:22 49:25	18:15 23:14 52:17	extract 120:12	34:22 72:18
202:21 209:12	136:6	68:20 70:8 78:14	148:8	199:12 214:23
216:6,9	examination 186:1	85:14 86:11 88:3	extremely 1:25	fatally 59:13
Essex's 196:24	examined 185:25	89:5,9,11,12,17	71:2 94:4 108:14	father-in-law 124:3
Essex-specific	example 3:20 4:8	120:18,20 130:9		134:3
157:11 182:20	4:16 12:12 82:5	151:13 152:10,22	F	February 77:7
establish 35:23	86:5,7 107:13	153:20 155:18	face 11:10 55:10,11	fed 174:9
80:12	110:15 111:22	189:20 191:7	faced 6:1 140:23	fee 112:24
established 33:7	120:6 143:9	196:20 197:12,17	faces 54:13	feed 59:6
41:4,24 49:23	150:15 151:20	211:22	facilities 67:9	feedback 100:21
establishes 184:10	152:1 153:22	experienced 6:8	facility 70:1 110:17	feeding 96:14
estimate 69:6	154:24 156:20	10:24 18:18 59:25	123:4 196:10	feel 16:18 27:21
et 125:3 141:3	159:25 183:4	87:11 197:22	198:4 202:12,14	28:13 59:4 64:21
213:17	196:12	209:3,6 211:24	facing 17:14	181:18 194:6
evacuate 100:7,8	examples 15:11	experiencing 196:1	fact 9:17 47:7 83:5	feels 100:15
131:6,7 133:2	53:5	explain 36:22 82:15	105:20 153:13	felt 34:4 41:7,8,10
137:7 153:22	exception 89:14	82:25 123:20	156:15 174:18	42:8 154:7,8
174:21 175:18	exchange 200:25	138:1 156:9 186:6	183:8 197:13	170:16 171:16
evening 91:6	executive 180:4	195:8	factors 117:4 121:4	female 53:24
132:13 159:1	exercises 166:11	explained 107:4	143:7	125:23 126:11
186:11 211:17	exhaust 40:5	161:20 165:22	factory 117:5	128:16 134:2
event 27:13 84:9	exhausted 39:18	explaining 90:3	facts 39:24	137:12,23
87:12 122:2 123:1	exhausting 40:15	95:9	factual 74:21	fi 42:20
157:4	exhibit 114:4	explains 54:8,14	fail 191:21	fifth 136:15
events 125:17	exit 31:14 39:19	90:5 104:13	failed 170:9	fight 42:25
157:23	40:6,15 64:4 83:8	explanation 135:10	fair 18:14 46:6	fighting 28:25
eventually 160:11	132:25 169:21	explicit 100:18	63:19 107:5	32:21 38:4 42:21
everyone's 26:17	176:16	explode 36:25 37:2	118:21 125:25	43:8 74:12
130:1	expanded 16:22	explore 6:12 11:9	135:6 138:9	File 14:3
evidence 1:5 26:20	expect 6:6 8:10 9:3	34:24 54:25	140:21 155:7	fill 75:13
50:19 71:11 77:14	9:8,12 10:5 33:2	exploring 31:14	169:9 170:8	filmed 68:18
106:11 109:22	36:6 39:11 48:8	express 135:5,18	175:12	final 106:1 108:7
112:11,17 114:12	83:14 155:24	137:6	fairly 146:20	111:14 143:13
120:17 125:25	172:20 207:22	expressed 169:14	FALL 161:10	160:4 181:5 184:9
140:21 141:17	expectation 9:2	expression 6:14	fallback 201:4	185:16 212:2
143:10 144:7,19	36:10,11 134:8	65:21,25 66:16	false 39:9 40:16	finally 109:4 146:3
146:23 148:19	138:21	extend 144:9	familiar 6:16 100:1	173:8 211:13
170:8 175:12,14	expected 6:4	215:10	118:20 153:6	find 5:10 6:15
182:1 185:1,6,8	124:11,25 125:3,5	extent 6:8 10:5	171:17 178:17	25:19 31:19 68:14
186:7,11 187:2,21	138:18 139:6	69:3 82:11 120:9	193:23 203:10	77:6 82:10 94:2
188:18,23 205:20	157:12 158:25	121:13 141:22	214:10	114:4 127:13
208:4,18 209:9	166:22	143:1 151:15	familiarise 102:17	148:1 197:20,21

				raye 229
198:17 210:15	118:15 119:9,11	78:23,25 80:9	five 89:20 170:2	24:3,4,9 25:2,20
212:15,20 216:25	119:16,17,22	117:1 153:15	206:8	25:22 26:4 28:2,5
finding 83:4	120:10,15,25	191:3	fixed 160:16	28:7,24 29:3
fine 98:13 106:15	121:3 124:11,13	firm 64:21	flames 134:3	30:10 32:13,18
112:18 140:11	125:12 126:18	first 2:16,25,25	flat 13:16 25:20	33:10,11 36:3
187:4,25	132:24 136:18	5:18 6:16,25 7:20	28:8 31:16 33:15	37:18,18 42:24
finish 106:8,10	138:23 139:14,17	14:6 16:24 17:6	36:14 40:23 41:1	43:16 44:5 46:9
139:3 186:10	139:18,25 140:3	19:12 20:20 21:1	41:23 42:3,14	46:14,15 47:2
finished 19:1 60:17	140:23 147:5	21:11,21 25:23	44:4 46:8 47:1	54:2,14 56:9 59:8
60:24 105:8	148:22,24 149:1	27:11,12 28:15	48:18,21,22 49:10	59:14,17 62:8
128:23 162:10	150:18,22 153:8	31:8 44:6 46:7	49:12,23 50:11	65:19 72:16 73:4
174:12	154:3,17 155:2,6	53:16 54:18 60:23	51:8 53:16 54:2,3	73:24 74:5,15
fire 1:9 2:17 3:15	158:19,21 159:12	61:6 69:19 77:1	55:5 56:9 57:9,13	82:6 95:6 98:15
3:17 4:5 5:11,14	159:25 161:8	77:17 78:13,16	58:15 59:9,17	101:10 104:14
5:17 7:2,2,5,8,14	162:19 163:3,8,12	84:7 86:4 87:11	60:5 61:3 62:8	105:18 120:7
7:17 8:1,7,8,14,19	163:15 164:2	90:8 94:23 95:20	63:3,7 72:11 73:3	121:10 126:23
9:21 10:2 11:21	165:14 167:2,13	96:12,19 98:14	73:4,13,23 74:5	131:1 135:1 162:1
12:3,4,7,8,9,17	170:12 171:11	101:18 102:21	82:6,11 83:25	163:14,15,15
14:4,20 15:5,12	172:24 173:6,7,12	104:19 110:12	95:6,10 98:15,15	167:12 168:8
16:10 17:1 19:15	174:11,13,19	111:25 113:22,25	98:21 99:11,13	172:1,1,5 178:9
21:21 22:19,24	176:8,16,23	114:21 118:16	101:10 104:6,25	194:25 198:9
23:9,13,18 25:1,7	177:12,14 180:14	120:2 122:13	105:1,18 107:21	204:5,11,12
29:2,3,9,13,18	182:19 183:7	124:2 125:9,18	107:25 108:4	206:10,14 210:6
30:1,3,4,5,15,24	184:14 189:10	126:9,10 132:23	120:6,9 126:22	210:11
30:24 31:6,23	190:5,6,10,13,19	134:5 137:6	134:4 135:2	floors 4:23 21:22
32:15,17,22,24	190:21,25 191:3,6	145:13 147:20	136:17,19 167:11	24:12 26:8 36:5
33:7 34:16,20,21	191:8 192:3	148:21 151:8,12	167:13 168:8,17	42:23 47:2 51:8
35:14 38:5 41:3	193:25 194:16,19	153:10 154:4,18	172:1 178:8	93:17 109:8
42:20,21,23,25	195:9 196:11,18	158:22 159:24	179:11 194:1	163:11
43:8,8 47:8,13	197:1,2 199:11	160:15 162:3	198:9,23 204:5,12	flows 79:3 91:19
53:8 57:16,17	201:1,2 203:3	163:22 164:5,16	205:6,13 207:15	flr 50:24
60:4 61:13 62:14	204:14 210:23	165:10 167:21,24	209:11 210:5,12	fluid 40:9
63:23 67:20 68:20	212:7,11,13	169:4,22 171:4,6	210:15,16,17	focus 40:4
69:5,20 72:14	214:14,16,18	171:25 172:23	211:6,8,14 214:18	focused 4:4 9:5
74:1 75:24 77:18	216:6,13,17,18,21	176:24 178:12	flats 12:16 21:22	folder 77:5 113:24
79:2,4,9,13,23	217:3	182:16 183:7	24:10 70:11 82:5	147:6,25 188:5
80:14 81:11,20	fire's 28:24 30:9	187:7,11 188:3,10	171:21,24 172:22	follow 52:23
82:21 83:1,10,22	32:12	189:8,22 190:6	191:3 203:9,21	172:12 202:11
85:12,22,23 88:8	firearm-type	192:25 197:4,14	212:12 213:7	following 136:12
89:24 90:6,21	151:20	199:16 200:13,18	flavour 116:13	152:16 162:16
92:8,19,20 100:19	firefighters 36:17	200:19 204:10	fled 47:1	172:14
102:21 103:3,6	65:14 82:9 89:16	210:25 212:14	flexi 149:9	foot 34:7 48:18
105:6,7 108:12	124:6	213:1,10 216:5,25	flooding 124:23	footage 92:16,24
109:6 114:23	fireproof 70:16	Firstly 14:8	floor 13:16 21:21	93:10,19 97:2
117:17,25 118:6,9	fires 34:9,14,18,25	fit 154:4	23:17,18,23 24:1	111:14 140:19,24
11,.11,,20 110.0,,				, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
	l	l	l	l

141:24 142:2		1			
Forest 69-4,21 130-8 Toronto 15-12-1 Toronto 15-12-12-13-13-13-13-13-13-13-13-13-13-13-13-13-	141:24 142:2	FS 9:4	gaining 116:18	185:6 186:7 187:1	37:13 40:24 43:19
forewer 48:1 forgotten 71:9 formotten 71:19 form	force 59:4,21 130:8	FSG 3:24 4:8,16		187:7 190:16	48:17 50:7 56:20
forgotten 71:9 form 73:16 89:22 170:15 150:9 formal 44:6 192:19 formal 44:6 192:19 formal 44:6 192:19 formal 44:6 192:19 53:9 54:9 79:22 generally 12:4 generate 19:19.24 forth 37:8 121:8 forthcoming 8:18 38:2 formal 43:5 54:22 found 21:1 45:23 formal 45:5 47:22 found 21:1 45:23 found 21:1 45:23 49:19 60:6 68:16 91:15 102:9 fund 21:1 45:23 49:19 60:6 68:16 91:15 102:9 fund 21:1 45:23 111:2 fund 16:15 102:9 fund 21:1 45:23 49:19 60:6 68:16 91:15 102:9 fund 21:1 45:23 111:2 fund 16:15 fund 21:15 102:9 fund 21:1 45:23 12:12 21:4:18 21:2 21:7:2 114:45 51:15 fund 21:16 23:15 fund 21:17 fund 16:15 fund 38:19 91:20 11:17 fund 18:25 fund 21:17 fund 18:16 fund 38:24 38:17 54:8 fund 18:18 fund 18:25 fund 18:18 fund 18:18 fund 18:25 fund 18:18 fund 18:18 fund 18:25 fund	130:15 152:4	5:17,18,23 6:1,6,7	gathered 152:21	194:15,19 205:23	67:19 68:7 71:13
form 73:16 89:22 11:19 12:2,11,12 general 5:3,5,7 8:23 21:7 31:5 83:4 84:7 85:15 83:18 89:15 87:18 89:25 formal 44:6 192:19 47:18 52:17 53:1 59:16 24:19 52:10 40:21 45:23 51:5 83:18 89:15 87:18 89:25 94:10 95:1,18 formed 38:23 181:6 forthcoming 8:18 53:9 54:9 79:22 generally 12:4 66:7 67:25 70:20 40:21 45:23 51:5 83:18 89:18 99:25 94:10 95:1,18 formod 38:23 181:6 forthcoming 8:18 79:8,24 128:2 132:2 133:3 31:20 10:22 112:24 116:3 112:24 116:3 found 21:1 45:23 18:12 18:12 106:16,24 109:24 66:7 67:25 70:20 106:16,24 109:24 found 21:1 45:23 18:12 132:2 133:3 31:20 10:42 132:113:12 112:24 116:3 49:19 60:6 68:16 91:15 102:9 111:124 18:12 121:25 10:8:15 16:21 16:44:19 86:25 177:22 17:22 135:10:42 132:11 13:12 144:18 147:1 91:12 19:11,17 109:11 145:16 16:21 18:12 16:21 18:12 16:21 18:12 16:31 18:12 170:51,3,17 173:5 177:25 182:2 18:51 19:21 19:21 19:21 19:21 19:21 19:22	forever 48:1	6:9 9:6,16,18,22	gathering 81:25	218:11,17 219:3	75:17,18 78:17
120:15 150:9 13:4 14:22 31:9 7:17 10:16 24:19 52:10 13:13 39:5,17 40:21 45:23 51:5 40:21 45:24 51:1 51:15 40:21 45:23 51:5 40:21 45:24 51:1 51:15 40:21 45:24 51:1 51:15 5 40:21 45:24 51:1 51:1 51:15 5 40:21 45:24 51:1 51:15 5 40:21 45:24 51:1 51:15 5 40:21 45:24 51:1 51:15 5 40:21 45:24 51:1 51:15 5 40:21 45:24 51:1 51:15 5 40:21 45:24 51:1 51:15 5 40:21 45:24 51:1 51:15 5 40:21 45:24 51:1 51:15 5 40:21 45:24 51:1 51:15 5 40:21 45:24 51:1 51:15 5 40:21 45:24 51:1 51:15 5 40:21 45:24 51:1 51:15 5 40:21 45:24 51:1 51:15 5 40:21 45:24 51:1 51:15 5 40:21 45:24 51:1 51:15 51:1 51:1 51:1 51:1 51:1 51	forgotten 71:9	9:25 10:19,24	gauge 49:19 58:1	given 2:22 4:10	79:19,21 81:1
formal 44:6 192:19 formalised 84:19 153:9 54:9 79:22 154:19 47:18 52:17 53:1 53:9 54:9 79:22 generally 12:4 generate 19:19,24 66:7 67:25 70:20 104:7,816 106:13 103:2 104:2 104:2 104:2 103:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 103:2 104:2 103:2 10	form 73:16 89:22	11:19 12:2,11,12	general 5:3,5,7	8:23 21:7 31:5	83:4 84:7 85:15
Sample	120:15 150:9	13:4 14:22 31:9	8:17 9:1,3 12:10	33:13 39:5,17	85:15 87:18 89:25
154:19	formal 44:6 192:19	47:18 52:17 53:1		40:21 45:23 51:5	
formed 38:23 181:6 forth 37:8 121:18 forthcoming 8:18 as:2 forthal 78:8 121:18 forthcoming 8:18 as:2 formed 35:5 47:22 found 21:1 45:23 as:2 found 21:1 45:23 found 21:1 45:16 four 34:9,14,18,25 gi2:1 97:11,17 four 11:1 2:16 2:2 found 21:1 2:15:15 four 34:9,14,18,25 gi2:1 97:11,17 found 180:25 found 21:2 13:12 10:15:15 found 21:1 45:16 found 21:2 13:15:15 found 21:1 45:16 found 21:2 13:15:15 found 21:1 45:16 found 21:2 13:15:15 found 21:1 45:16 found 21:1			·		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
forth 37:8 121:18 forthcoming 8:18 38:2 FSGs 4:17,24 6:11 79:8,24 128:2 133:3 85:2 87:14 91:3 92:18,21 95:15 132:25 130:2,23 112:24 116:3 92:18,21 95:15 132:2 132:2 133:3 112:24 116:3 92:18,21 95:15 132:2 132:2 132:2 133:3 112:24 116:3 92:18,21 95:15 132:2 132:2 132:2 132:3 132:14 134:16 132:2 132:2 133:3 112:24 118:16 132:2 132:2 132:3 132:14 134:16 132:2 132:2 132:3 132:14 134:16 132:16 132:14 134:16 132:16 132:14 134:16 132:16 132:14 134:16 132:16 132:14 134:16 132:16 132:14 134:16 132:16 132:14 134:16 132:16 132		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	,		
forthcoming 8:18 38:2 79:8,24 128:2 184:12 132:2 133:3 136:18 137:21 92:18,21 95:15 103:2 104:2 132:14 134:16 123:25 130:2,23 132:14 134:16 forward 35:5 47:22 found 21:1 45:23 49:19 60:6 68:16 91:15 102:9 full 1:20 168:25 187:7 203:22 47:13 47:14 47:13 47:13 47:13 47:13 47:14 47:13 47:13 47:14 47:15 160:21 18:1 119:9 function 116:15 166:21 181:2 159:20,20,22 159:16,18 161:24 176:12 179:21 179:21 145:16 166:21 181:2 170:5,13,17 173:5 177:25 173:23 175:21,23 175:2					
38:2 forward 35:5 47:22 full 1:20 168:25 found 21:1 45:23 49:19 60:6 68:16 49:19 60:6 68:16 49:15 102:9 111:24 182:12 212:7,21 214:4,5 214:6 215:1 full 510:9 111:24 182:12 212:7,21 214:4,5 214:6 215:1 four 34:9,14,18,25 91:21 97:11,17 109:11 145:16 function 116:15 166:21 181:2 functioned 180:25 quarter 151:18 115:15 functioning 70:12 Gill 86:22 88:24 17:13 32:13 89:19 91:20 17:13 151:15 furniture 76:1,3 121:25 168:15 furniture 76:1,3 14:25 168:16 further 1:5 7:19 24:1 25:1 69:14 71:5 116:8 136:18 163:24 87:13 107:14 17:5 109:14 14:18 147:1 165:4 168:14,14 121:2 136:17 17:5 17:25 17:25 190:1,6,17 192:22 18:18 further 1:5 7:19 24:1 25:1 69:14 71:5 116:8 136:18 15:20,25 32:8 18:15 82:8 107:21 17:20 17:20 173:16,18 16:24 176:12 179:21 179:16,24 180:25 193:12 198:6 199:9,14,25 190:1,6,17 192:22 203:10 204:6 121 22 18:18 fourthly 217:4 71:5 116:8 136:18 159:19 161:22 18:18 159:19 161:22 18:18 159:19 161:22 18:18 159:19 161:22 18:18 159:19 161:22 163:4 169:10,19 170:10 171:10 173:16,18 103:2 104:2 170:20 173:10 83:13 107:14 150:15 115:15 116:8 136:18 169:120 170:14 170:20 173:16,18 103:2 104:2 170:20 170:14 170:20 173:16,18 105:2 110:20 170:14 170:20 173:16,18 105:2 110:20 170:14 170:20 173:16,18 105:2 110:20 170:14 170:20 173:16,18 105:2 110:20 170:14 170:20 173:16,18 105:2 110:20 170:14 170:20 173:16,18 105:2 110:20 170:14 170:20 173:16,18 105:2 110:20 170:14 170:20 173:16,18 105:2 110:20 170:14 170:20 173:16,18 105:2 110:20 170:14 170:20 173:16,18 105:2 110:20 170:14 170:20 173:16,18 110:20 170:14 170:20 173:16,18 110:20 170:14 170:20 173:16,18 110:20 170:14 170:20 173:16,18 105:20 170:20 170:14 120:20 170:14 170:20 173:16,18 110:20 170:14 170:20 173:16,18 110:20 170:14 170:20 173:16,18 120:20 170:14 170:20 173:16,18 120:20 170:14 170:20 173:16,18 120:20 170:14 170:20 173:10,18 100:20 170:14 170:20 173:10,18 100:20 170:14 170:20 170:14 170:20 170:14 170:20 170:14 170:20 170:14 170:20 170:14 170:20 170:14 170:20 170:14 170:20 170:14 170:20 170:14 170:20 170:14 170:20 170:14 170:20 170:14 170:20 170:14 170:20 170:14		,	0		
forward 35:5 47:22 found 21:1 45:23 full 1:20 168:25 187:7 203:22 getting 3:14 15:16 31:20 55:3 117:22 127:22 127:22 144:15 144:18 147:1 137:4 140:15 144:18 147:1 144:18 147:1 165:4 168:14,14 144:18 147:1 165:4 168:14,14 144:18 147:1 165:4 168:14,14 144:18 147:1 165:4 168:14,14 144:18 147:1 165:4 168:14,14 145:16 5:4 168:14,14 145:16 5:4 168:14,14 145:16 5:4 168:14,14 145:16 5:4 168:14,14 145:16 5:4 168:14,14 145:16 5:4 168:14,14 145:16 5:4 168:14,14 145:16 5:4 168:14,14 146:25 185:11 146:25 181:2 151:15 5 functioned 180:25 functioning 70:12 functions 150:1 51:15 151:15 5 functions 150:1 51:15 204:11 211:2 170:5,13,17 179:16,24 180:25 179:16,24 180:25 199:14,25 199:14,25 200:13 203:1,5,6 200:10,202 200:15 208:18 200:13 203:1,5,6 199:14,25 200:13 203:1,5,6 200:10,202 200:10,7 199:14,25 200:13 203:1,5,6 200:10,202 200:10,7 200:10,202 200:10,7 200:10,202 200:10,7 200:10,202 200:10,7 200:10,202 200:10,7 200:11,7 200:10,202 200:10,7 200:13,203:1,5,6 200:10,202 200:10,7 199:14,25 200:13 203:1,5,6 200:10,202 200:10,7 199:14,25 200:13 203:1,5,6 200:10,202 200:10,7 200:10,202 200:10,7 200:10,202 200:10,7 200:10,202 200:10,7 200:10,202 200:10,7 200:10,202 200:10,7 200:10,202 200:10,7 <	_	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Table Tabl					
49:19 60:6 68:16 91:15 102:9 47:13 87:13 107:14 136:3,4,4 150:20 173:23 175:21,23 173:23 175:23 173:23 175:23 173:23 175:23 173:23 175:23 173:23 175:23 173:23 175:23 173:23 175:23 173:23 175:23 173:23 175:23 173:23 175:23 173:23 175:23 173:23					
91:15 102:9 111:24 182:12 212:7,21 214:4,5 214:6 215:1 fully 105:19 169:1 function 116:15 166:21 181:2 175:20,20,22 177:13 109:11 145:16 214:11 216:23 217:13 217:13 151:15 151:15 151:15 151:15 151:15 151:15 166:21 181:2 170:5,13,17 109:11 145:16 214:11 216:23 217:13 32:13 89:19 91:20 121:25 168:15 121:25 168:18 121:15 18:28 121:25 168:18 121:15 18:28 121:25 168:18 121:15 18:28 121:25 168:18 121:15 18:28 121:25 168:18 121:15 18:28 121:25					
111:24 182:12					· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
212:7,21 214:4,5				, ,	
214:6 215:1 four 34:9,14,18,25 91:21 97:11,17 functioned 180:25 91:21 97:11,17 functioned 180:25 functioning 70:12 functioning 70:12		·			/
four 34:9,14,18,25 166:21 181:2 170:5,13,17 173:5 177:25 190:16,17 192:22 91:21 97:11,17 functioned 180:25 functioning 70:12 Gill 86:22 88:24 190:4,6,8,22 193:12 198:6 214:11 216:23 functions 150:1 151:15 gist 97:15 201:15 208:18 200:13 203:1,5,6 32:13 89:19 91:20 147:6 185:18 further 1:5 7:19 39:23 41:12 51:25 gives 72:10 87:21 205:4,16,22 206:5 121:25 168:15 further 1:5 7:19 24:1 25:1 69:14 52:5 58:6 61:21 62:20,25 63:18 209:20 210:1,7 128:18 further 1:5 7:19 39:23 41:12 51:25 55:55 58:6 61:21 62:20,25 63:18 212:4,10,14 128:18 163:4 169:10,19 95:2 97:25 100:17 73:18 74:20 78:11 215:18 216:3,12 30:23 43:17 54:8 178:22 180:3 178:22 180:3 105:9 111:7 125:2 135:5 138:6 126:20 126:36 85:18 106:49 90:13 126:49 90:13 126:49 90:13 126:49 90:13 127:11 218:18 126:24 16:19 126:22 135:5 138:6 126:22 135:5 138:6 126:20,25 63:18 126:24 16:19 127:11 218:18 126:24 16:19 127:11 218:18	1			* · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
91:21 97:11,17 functioned 180:25 204:11 211:7 179:16,24 180:25 193:12 198:6 109:11 145:16 214:11 216:23 217:13 151:15 89:2 201:15 208:18 200:13 203:1,5,6 217:13 151:15 gist 97:15 216:22 200:13 203:1,5,6 32:13 89:19 91:20 147:6 185:18 147:6 185:18 15:20,25 32:8 210:25 168:15 203:10 204:6 6urthly 217:4 24:1 25:1 69:14 52:5 58:6 61:21 52:5 58:6 61:21 62:20,25 63:18 200:20 210:1,7 146:25 185:11 24:1 25:1 69:14 52:5 58:6 61:21 66:17 69:21 70:14 212:4,10,14 218:18 159:19 161:22 83:10 85:1 93:12 73:18 74:20 78:11 217:11 218:18 160:14 17:20 172:10,12 174:24 103:1,3,13,17 125:2 135:5 138:6 125:2 135:5 138:6 121:9 147:25 181:12,16 191:23 117:8 119:25 125:1,7 127:21 126:18 104:15 107:9 188:5,5 203:17 203:11 217:20 125:1,7 127:21 129:13 133:10 104:15 107:9 188:5,5 203:17 204:25 205:3 200:12 129:13 133:10 104:15 107:9 <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·</td> <td></td>				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
The control of the			, , , ,		, ,
214:11 216:23 functions 50:1 89:2 201:15 208:18 200:13 203:1,5,6 217:13 fourth 28:24 30:10 sep:15:15 give 1:19 6:25 8:18 216:22 203:10 204:6 32:13 89:19 91:20 furniture 76:1,3 147:6 185:18 15:20,25 32:8 39:23 41:12 51:25 gives 72:10 87:21 205:4,16,22 206:5 fourthly 217:4 further 1:5 7:19 24:1 25:1 69:14 52:5 58:6 61:21 66:27 66:17 69:21 70:14 212:4,10,14 free 47:21 75:17 71:5 116:8 136:18 64:23 66:2 79:7 66:17 69:21 70:14 215:18 216:3,12 218:18 163:4 169:10,19 95:2 97:25 100:17 91:13 93:10 96:24 20-to 90:13 front 10:16 17:20 172:10,12 174:24 103:1,3,13,17 125:2 135:5 138:6 60d 69:4 30:23 43:17 54:8 181:12,16 191:23 111:7 178:119:25 106:16 176:15 203:11 217:25 81:15 82:8 107:21 192:7 193:21 172:17,12 17:20 172:17,12 17:20 172:17,12 17:20 172:17,12 17:20 172:17,12 17:20 134:10 135:9 140:25 146:22 153:13 104:15 107:9 168:19 186:4 9:9,13 19:3 21:8	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
217:13 fourth 28:24 30:10 32:13 89:19 91:20 121:25 168:15 fourthly 217:4 fourthly 217:4 ffee 47:21 75:17 146:25 185:11 218:18 159:19 161:22 188:18 163:4 169:10,19 172:10,12 174:24 30:23 43:17 54:8 178:22 180:3 1178:12 59:19 161:23 181:15 82:8 107:21 108:3,4 113:24,25 121:9 147:25 121:9 147:25 121:12 214:18 FRS 100:6 104:12 126:22 142:9 216:22 give 7:10 87:21 given 1:19 6:25 8:18 15:20,25 32:8 39:23 41:12 51:25 51:12 59:6 60:18 51:12 59:6 60:18 62:20,25 63:18 62:21 70:14 73:18 74:20 78:11 215:18 216:3,12 217:11 218:18 go-to 90:13 God 69:4 goes 19:21 21:25 22:3,6 85:18 104:15 107:9 108:3,4 113:24,25 129:13 133:10 129:13 133:10 134:10 135:9 140:25 146:22 150:15 153:13 155:24 162:14,21 162:21 163:2 15:14 21:10 25:16 32:10 33:5 36:2,7		- C		, , ,	· / /
fourth 28:24 30:10 furniture 76:1,3 give 1:19 6:25 8:18 gives 72:10 87:21 205:4,16,22 206:5 32:13 89:19 91:20 147:6 185:18 15:20,25 32:8 39:23 41:12 51:25 39:23 41:12 51:25 209:20 210:1,7 fourthly 217:4 24:1 25:1 69:14 52:5 58:6 61:21 62:20,25 63:18 212:4,10,14 free 47:21 75:17 71:5 116:8 136:18 64:23 66:2 79:7 66:17 69:21 70:14 215:18 216:3,12 18:18 163:4 169:10,19 95:2 97:25 100:17 91:13 93:10 96:24 207:09:13 front 10:16 17:20 172:10,12 174:24 103:1,3,13,17 125:2 135:5 138:6 60d 69:4 30:23 43:17 54:8 18:12,16 191:23 112:11,17 116:13 176:15 goes 19:21 21:25 81:15 82:8 107:21 192:7 193:21 117:8 119:25 glad 75:3 104:15 107:9 121:9 147:25 122:14:18 134:10 135:9 140:25 146:22 134:10 135:9 168:19 186:4 121:2 214:18 50:10 155:24 162:14,21 9:19 10:13,16,25 24:16,19 26:10 126:22 142:9 121:6 162:21 163:2 15:14 21:10 25:16 32:10 33:5 36:2,7					
32:13 89:19 91:20 147:6 185:18 15:20,25 32:8 giving 12:15 35:8 209:20 210:1,7 121:25 168:15 further 1:5 7:19 39:23 41:12 51:25 51:12 59:6 60:18 212:4,10,14 fourthly 217:4 71:5 116:8 136:18 64:23 66:2 79:7 66:17 69:21 70:14 215:18 216:3,12 146:25 185:11 159:19 161:22 83:10 85:1 93:12 73:18 74:20 78:11 215:18 216:3,12 218:18 163:4 169:10,19 172:10,12 174:24 103:1,3,13,17 95:2 97:25 100:17 95:2 97:25 100:17 73:18 74:20 78:11 go-to 90:13 God 69:4 30:23 43:17 54:8 178:22 180:3 105:9 111:7 176:15 125:2 135:5 138:6 God 69:4 81:15 82:8 107:21 192:7 193:21 117:8 119:25 126:21 16:15 129:13 133:10 104:15 107:9 188:5,5 203:17 204:25 205:3 212:12 214:18 6271 25:1 44:4 150:15 153:13 9:19 10:13,16,25 9:9,13 19:3 21:8 126:22 142:9 126:22 142:9 126:22 163:2 15:22 163:2 15:14 21:10 25:16 27:9,19 28:12			<u> </u>		
121:25 168:15 further 1:5 7:19 39:23 41:12 51:25 51:12 59:6 60:18 212:4,10,14 fourthly 217:4 fee 47:21 75:17 71:5 116:8 136:18 52:5 58:6 61:21 62:20,25 63:18 213:25 214:3,7 free 47:21 75:17 71:5 116:8 136:18 64:23 66:2 79:7 66:17 69:21 70:14 215:18 216:3,12 121:18 159:19 161:22 83:10 85:1 93:12 73:18 74:20 78:11 215:18 216:3,12 121:18 163:4 169:10,19 95:2 97:25 100:17 91:13 93:10 96:24 90:13 93:10 96:24 front 10:16 17:20 172:10,12 174:24 103:1,3,13,17 125:2 135:5 138:6 God 69:4 30:23 43:17 54:8 178:22 180:3 105:9 111:7 176:15 22:3,6 85:18 81:15 82:8 107:21 192:7 193:21 112:11,17 116:13 176:15 22:3,6 85:18 108:3,4 113:24,25 129:17 133:21 125:1,7 127:21 Glasgow 161:9 19:8 127:6,9 121:19 147:25 6221 14:8 140:25 146:22 150:15 153:13 15:14 21:10 25:16 24:16,19 26:10 126:22 142:9 126:22 14:29 126:21 163:2 15:14 21:10 25:16 32:10 33:5 36:2,7		-		C	
fourthly 217:4 24:1 25:1 69:14 52:5 58:6 61:21 62:20,25 63:18 213:25 214:3,7 free 47:21 75:17 71:5 116:8 136:18 64:23 66:2 79:7 66:17 69:21 70:14 215:18 216:3,12 218:18 159:19 161:22 83:10 85:1 93:12 73:18 74:20 78:11 217:11 218:18 front 10:16 17:20 172:10,12 174:24 103:1,3,13,17 125:2 135:5 138:6 66:17 69:21 70:14 30:23 43:10 96:24 30:23 43:17 54:8 178:22 180:3 105:9 111:7 125:2 135:5 138:6 60d 69:4 81:15 82:8 107:21 181:12,16 191:23 111:7 116:13 176:15 22:3,6 85:18 108:3,4 113:24,25 129:7 193:21 125:1,7 127:21 Glasgow 161:9 19:8 127:6,9 121:9 147:25 188:5,5 203:17 G 134:10 135:9 glowing 93:16 going 1:5,22 2:14 122:12 214:18 50:10 155:24 162:14,21 9:19 10:13,16,25 24:16,19 26:10 FRS 100:6 104:12 gain 37:6 121:6 162:21 163:2 15:14 21:10 25:16 32:10 33:5 36:2,7			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
free 47:21 75:17 71:5 116:8 136:18 64:23 66:2 79:7 66:17 69:21 70:14 215:18 216:3,12 146:25 185:11 159:19 161:22 83:10 85:1 93:12 73:18 74:20 78:11 217:11 218:18 218:18 163:4 169:10,19 95:2 97:25 100:17 91:13 93:10 96:24 go-to 90:13 30:23 43:17 54:8 178:22 180:3 105:9 111:7 138:15 160:7 176:15 goes 19:21 21:25 81:15 82:8 107:21 192:7 193:21 117:8 119:25 glad 75:3 104:15 107:9 121:9 147:25 188:5,5 203:17 204:25 205:3 203:11 217:20 129:13 133:10 Glasgow 161:9 19:8 127:6,9 140:25 146:22 134:10 135:9 glowing 93:16 going 1:5,22 2:14 9:9,13 19:3 21:8 212:12 214:18 50:10 155:24 162:14,21 9:19 10:13,16,25 24:16,19 26:10 126:22 142:9 gain 37:6 121:6 162:21 163:2 15:14 21:10 25:16 32:10 33:5 36:2,7					
146:25 185:11 159:19 161:22 83:10 85:1 93:12 73:18 74:20 78:11 217:11 218:18 218:18 163:4 169:10,19 95:2 97:25 100:17 91:13 93:10 96:24 go-to 90:13 30:23 43:17 54:8 178:22 180:3 105:9 111:7 125:2 135:5 138:6 138:15 160:7 goes 19:21 21:25 81:15 82:8 107:21 192:7 193:21 117:8 119:25 glad 75:3 22:3,6 85:18 119:19 147:25 129:13 133:10 134:10 135:9 168:19 186:4 188:5,5 203:17 204:25 205:3 134:10 135:9 140:25 146:22 glowing 93:16 go 2:6 5:8,14 6:1 9:9,13 19:3 21:8 150:15 153:13 155:24 162:14,21 9:19 10:13,16,25 24:16,19 26:10 27:9,19 28:12 126:22 142:9 gain 37:6 121:6 162:21 163:2 15:14 21:10 25:16 32:10 33:5 36:2,7	· ·			•	*
218:18 163:4 169:10,19 95:2 97:25 100:17 91:13 93:10 96:24 go-to 90:13 6ront 10:16 17:20 172:10,12 174:24 103:1,3,13,17 125:2 135:5 138:6 God 69:4 30:23 43:17 54:8 178:22 180:3 105:9 111:7 138:15 160:7 goes 19:21 21:25 54:23 70:12 77:5 181:12,16 191:23 192:7 193:21 112:11,17 116:13 176:15 goes 19:21 21:25 81:15 82:8 107:21 192:7 193:21 117:8 119:25 glad 75:3 Glasgow 161:9 119:8 127:6,9 121:9 147:25 188:5,5 203:17 134:10 135:9 glowing 93:16 going 1:5,22 2:14 122:12 214:18 6271 25:1 44:4 150:15 153:13 9:19 10:13,16,25 24:16,19 26:10 126:22 142:9 126:22 142:9 162:21 163:2 15:14 21:10 25:16 32:10 33:5 36:2,7					· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
front 10:16 17:20 172:10,12 174:24 103:1,3,13,17 125:2 135:5 138:6 God 69:4 30:23 43:17 54:8 178:22 180:3 105:9 111:7 138:15 160:7 138:15 160:7 172:10,12 174:24 105:9 111:7 138:15 160:7 176:15 176:15 22:3,6 85:18 104:15 107:9 108:3,4 113:24,25 108:3,4 113:24,25 121:9 147:25 121:9 147:25 122:13 133:10 125:1,7 127:21 123:13 133:10				, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	
30:23 43:17 54:8 178:22 180:3 105:9 111:7 138:15 160:7 goes 19:21 21:25 54:23 70:12 77:5 181:12,16 191:23 112:11,17 116:13 176:15 22:3,6 85:18 81:15 82:8 107:21 192:7 193:21 117:8 119:25 glad 75:3 104:15 107:9 108:3,4 113:24,25 129:13 133:10 129:13 133:10 108:31 10:19 119:8 127:6,9 121:9 147:25 129:13 133:10 134:10 135:9 134:10 135:9 134:10 135:9 134:10 135:9 134:10 135:9 134:10 135:9 140:25 146:22 150:15 153:13 150:15 153:13 9:19 10:13,16,25 24:16,19 26:10 27:9,19 28:12 FRS 100:6 104:12 126:22 142:9 136:21 163:2 15:14 21:10 25:16 32:10 33:5 36:2,7		·			O
54:23 70:12 77:5 181:12,16 191:23 112:11,17 116:13 176:15 22:3,6 85:18 81:15 82:8 107:21 192:7 193:21 117:8 119:25 125:1,7 127:21		*	5 5 5		
81:15 82:8 107:21 192:7 193:21 117:8 119:25 glad 75:3 104:15 107:9 108:3,4 113:24,25 203:11 217:20 125:1,7 127:21 Glasgow 161:9 119:8 127:6,9 121:9 147:25 188:5,5 203:17 204:25 205:3 200:25 168:19 186:4 204:25 205:3 212:12 214:18 30:10 150:15 153:13 9:19 10:13,16,25 9:9,13 19:3 21:8 126:22 142:9 126:22 142:9 126:21 163:2 121:6 15:14 21:10 25:16 32:10 33:5 36:2,7					U
108:3,4 113:24,25 203:11 217:20 125:1,7 127:21 Glasgow 161:9 119:8 127:6,9 121:9 147:25 188:5,5 203:17 204:25 205:3 204:25 205:3 134:10 135:9 glowing 93:16 going 1:5,22 2:14 212:12 214:18 6271 25:1 44:4 150:15 153:13 9:19 10:13,16,25 24:16,19 26:10 126:22 142:9 126:22 142:9 126:21 163:2 15:14 21:10 25:16 32:10 33:5 36:2,7		-	· ·		· ·
121:9 147:25 fuzzy 26:8 44:12 129:13 133:10 200:25 168:19 186:4 188:5,5 203:17 G 134:10 135:9 glowing 93:16 going 1:5,22 2:14 204:25 205:3 6 140:25 146:22 9:9,13 19:3 21:8 212:12 214:18 50:10 155:24 162:14,21 9:19 10:13,16,25 24:16,19 26:10 120:22 142:9 162:21 163:2 15:14 21:10 25:16 32:10 33:5 36:2,7				_	
188:5,5 203:17 G 134:10 135:9 glowing 93:16 going 1:5,22 2:14 204:25 205:3 212:12 214:18 140:25 146:22 9:9,13 19:3 21:8 FRS 100:6 104:12 50:10 155:24 162:14,21 9:19 10:13,16,25 24:16,19 26:10 126:22 142:9 140:25 146:22 155:24 162:14,21 12:24 13:20 14:13 27:9,19 28:12 150:15 153:13 15:14 21:10 25:16 32:10 33:5 36:2,7			*		,
204:25 205:3 212:12 214:18 FRS 100:6 104:12 126:22 142:9					
212:12 214:18	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	G			0 0
FRS 100:6 104:12 50:10 155:24 162:14,21 12:24 13:20 14:13 27:9,19 28:12 126:22 142:9 gain 37:6 121:6 162:21 163:2 15:14 21:10 25:16 32:10 33:5 36:2,7		G271 25:1 44:4		,	· /
126:22 142:9 gain 37:6 121:6 162:21 163:2 15:14 21:10 25:16 32:10 33:5 36:2,7		50:10			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
120.22 1.23		gain 37:6 121:6	· ·		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
					•
		I	l	l ————————————————————————————————————	l ————————————————————————————————————

				1490 231
38:15 39:15 49:14	Grenfell 4:3 6:8 8:4	190:21 194:16,20	head 19:19	128:14 132:2
52:1,5,8,24 53:14	10:25 19:15 28:2	216:14,22 217:3	heading 13:2	134:14 135:19
56:11 57:7 59:23	53:12 54:1 68:17	Guidance' 14:4	headquarters	137:18 145:14
63:13,15 68:11	72:12 73:11 122:8	guided 81:9	158:7,8	150:9 151:6
71:6,9,16 75:11	124:4 127:14,18		heads 132:17	154:18 162:12,14
75:23 80:2 98:18	128:9 158:1,23	H	headset 207:12	163:5 165:18
102:23 103:15	166:15 189:9	half 77:22 134:5	hear 1:5,24 23:2	167:20 169:10
109:20 112:22	191:6 197:22	169:22 204:1	24:1,13,16 75:11	182:15 184:3
126:15 129:20,20	200:14,19 204:3	halfway 22:25	83:21 99:1,2,3,16	187:12 193:5
131:5,18 133:6	204:13 212:6,6,11	37:10 66:22 126:9	112:5,7,21 146:19	194:17 201:1
136:21 137:19	212:17,25 213:7	160:25 168:9	165:1,2 210:21	209:21 212:20
144:14,18 146:21	214:13,16 215:5	172:8 204:8 210:8	heard 20:9 23:10	216:25
164:4 167:20,21	ground 8:22 10:7	halves 204:22	23:16 25:10 34:16	helped 70:6
170:1 180:20	13:6,15 16:6	hand 55:25 73:7	49:2,3 53:4,7	helpful 1:24 46:25
181:21,24,25	19:17 32:23 36:2	103:19	61:17 74:22 88:2	68:14,16 75:11,14
183:21 185:22,25	38:11 44:16 47:1	handle 3:21 4:2,20	99:18 120:17	111:24 112:21
187:1 197:3,19	47:10 51:21 55:13	39:21 52:15 80:18	144:12 158:22	146:19 169:24
199:11 201:2	83:15,24 86:6	85:3 143:23 156:5	162:21 202:13	185:8 191:1 218:6
203:16 210:2	87:21,25 88:1,4,6	handled 4:2 116:11	hearing 1:4 49:1	218:17
215:18 217:3	125:12 131:19	handlers 116:12	134:4 219:16	helpfully 150:6
gonna 36:24 37:2	133:5 150:3,23	handling 6:1 19:11	heat 5:12 7:14,17	helping 14:14
42:22 103:1	163:3 170:19	80:4,21 184:19	8:1,6,15 10:2 12:8	helps 75:13 95:2,13
good 1:3,7,17,18	171:18 172:24	hands 76:1 185:21	12:17 13:13 37:6	Hendon 173:25
26:15,17 60:25	195:20 196:22,24	hanging 218:15	82:12 93:15	174:11,20 176:25
76:15 92:12 113:7	205:22 212:16	happen 33:2 39:11	111:21 120:10	177:24
113:21 146:9	group 27:13,14	39:11 48:8 87:9	141:19 193:25	high 7:13 54:7
151:22 170:16	62:9 88:23 147:4	164:4	heavily 58:7	161:8 203:3
186:10	148:25 149:4	happened 61:18	heavy 124:21	high-rise 4:20,23
Google 212:23,24	154:2	94:21 124:22	height 109:11	5:1,3,5,19 52:20
213:9	GROUPS 165:8,19	151:12 157:17	held 6:20 92:12	78:24,25 80:9
googled 212:25	Grove 203:21	159:24 180:24	heli-tele 70:2	109:5,9 117:2,3
214:24	guess 69:12 73:19	186:16 208:9	141:18 202:2,12	119:22 120:7
googling 212:6	guessing 62:2 73:15	happening 36:17	helicam 92:24,24	153:11,12,15,22
Gotts 17:17 95:8,10	73:17 75:1	53:4,7 94:3	93:4,10 111:14	191:3 193:24
95:24 97:8 99:9	guidance 3:16,18	100:13 125:13	helicopter 93:6	198:9
99:13 129:25	7:3 12:3 16:2	163:1 184:17	112:6 142:2	high-rises 5:22
130:25	22:19 31:9 35:15	happens 36:7 48:9	helicopters 141:21	194:11
governed 82:16	47:13 58:7 60:4	81:17 118:11	Hello 35:13 36:22	higher 25:22
gradually 31:18	66:2 79:2,5,9,13	122:4	help 2:3 4:25 14:8	highlight 173:24
grants 144:6	81:12,20 82:21	happy 2:11 4:17	17:8 19:8 35:18	highlighted 43:24
grateful 1:25 71:3	83:1 92:20 103:7	57:3 187:17,24	47:15,17 48:14	191:23
75:7 112:12 144:9	116:20 118:6,10	188:18 189:2	85:1 86:10 88:21	highways 141:2
181:17 182:15	118:15 125:8	hard 4:8,15 37:22	93:10 94:10,14	hints 5:11
184:23 185:1,7	132:24 133:6	41:12 42:9 49:19	109:4 119:21	hold 41:16 208:17
219:7	153:7,8 190:2,5	69:22	122:13 126:2	208:22 209:13
	I			ı

				1
holiday 102:3	identity 177:2	165:4 166:12,24	125:13 161:2	172:21,24 173:6,8
home 87:16 155:6	image 69:19	167:5 170:7,18,19	information 8:10	173:9,11,13
158:9,11	imagery 111:25	171:14,18 173:16	8:18,23 10:6,7	176:25 177:4,24
honest 87:9 104:4	images 92:24	177:17 179:1	12:21 13:2,7,10	183:19 193:5,6,14
130:11	111:16	180:7,8,14,23	13:18 14:3,5 16:5	193:21 196:3
hope 110:9 186:14	imagine 106:10	181:3 182:19	19:16,18,23 24:2	197:18 198:1,7,8
hopefully 148:1	187:21	183:22 189:9	25:19 28:13 31:5	198:14 199:3,6,8
170:24	imaging 141:23	191:8,10 196:1,4	31:16,19,20 32:23	201:19,25 203:19
horrifying 124:7	immediate 17:16	196:6,22 197:3,18	33:1,16,17 34:1	204:19 205:9
host 143:20 154:25	17:18	197:22 198:5,16	35:19 36:1,4,9	206:17,24 207:5,9
155:10 166:12	immediately 81:21	198:20 199:5	37:7,9 38:11 39:8	207:19,22 208:2
181:9	126:17	200:18 201:2,8,16	39:14,23 40:3	209:16 211:15
hot 100:15 111:22	impinged 131:17	201:20 202:17,24	41:6,11 43:7	212:5,15,18,21
hour 20:20 60:4,20	import 168:25	203:3,10,20	44:14,20 45:3	213:13,20 214:4
96:12 102:24	important 154:8	205:22 206:4	46:4,11,16 47:6,9	215:1 217:20
134:5 169:22	213:22,24	207:1 214:9 216:6	48:7 49:16,20	informative 21:20
hour-long 21:3	inability 11:3	217:11	51:9,20,22 54:15	23:22
hours 48:2 93:23	inaudible 29:23	incidents 84:23	55:3,20 58:16,21	informed 46:22
125:22 137:12	210:16	122:2 124:17	61:7 70:19 72:15	90:23 92:20
158:4 177:11	INCASE[sic 174:3	125:11 149:22	74:14,16,21 80:11	100:19 111:1
house 4:6 29:9,13	incident 4:18 8:22	150:4,17,19	81:15,16,25 82:3	158:17 161:20
29:18 33:12 34:20	10:7 13:3,5,15	151:21 152:14	84:16 85:3 86:25	166:18,24 177:14
117:5,20 121:8,9	16:6,7 18:6 19:17	180:18	87:20 95:15 96:14	179:23 180:5,6,16
121:9 168:12	19:20 21:13,15,18	included 79:4	96:23 97:8 98:2	inhibit 119:16
Howson 17:21 90:2	32:23 36:2 38:11	193:7	100:23 101:1	initial 13:6 14:2
90:4,5	43:20 44:16 46:25	including 12:8	105:14,21 119:23	50:12 78:20,23
Huh 57:22	50:7 51:21 55:13	54:10 90:5 141:18	120:19 121:6	80:8 91:12,23
hurry 28:5 29:9	60:21 68:18 69:9	incoming 156:5	123:14,15,16	116:23 117:7,9
34:13 36:25 37:14	73:12 83:15,23	increasingly 121:2	125:7 126:19	131:9 166:5 190:8
42:17	84:3 87:1,7,15,21	indicate 193:19	128:3,5 132:3	190:11 216:15
hurrying 37:11	88:1,4,4,6 90:5	Indicates 17:7,11	133:9 135:12	initially 133:3
42:19	91:16 92:25 94:13		136:5,12 137:13	155:9 159:6
husband 111:6	94:14,16,19	25:7	139:20 140:13	initiative 183:4,10
	100:23,24 124:12	indicator 8:13 11:4	141:2,4 148:21	184:7
ICS 20:15	124:14,15 126:5	individual 81:11	149:10 151:10	inkling 132:22
	127:14,19 138:16	120:25 129:17	155:15 156:6,10	input 9:9 15:25
idea 24:19 33:21 132:21 133:4	140:4,20 148:9	178:4	156:14 157:3,15	206:24 207:10
	149:14,19,20,21	individuals 111:16	157:21 159:14,21	213:13
163:11 185:23 207:25	149:25 150:2,3,5	112:1,1 145:22	160:12 162:6,11	inputted 162:7
identified 105:24	150:10,12,20,21	indulgence 144:10	162:17,18 163:3,4	206:17,21 207:23
111:25 152:11	150:22 151:1,3,4	181:17 215:11	163:13 164:25	214:20
identify 14:8,14	151:7 152:17	INFD[sic 174:4	165:16 167:17	inputting 116:18
20:24 128:13	153:7 155:16	inferred 34:20	169:20 170:14,15	207:4
143:20	158:23 159:1,3,11	info 203:8 206:13	170:17,20 171:21	INQ00000284
175.20	160:2,21 163:1,7	inform 80:16	171:23 172:3,6,16	170:24 175:21
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

inquiries 218:7	it'll 48:1	204:19 205:2	144:4,25 145:2,10	132:21 135:21
inquiry 1:13,23	item 15:9 50:22	208:4 211:10	145:11 146:11,13	139:8 141:1,22,23
75:6 77:14 114:12		214:4	146:15 147:3,4,9	145:19 146:21
148:19 182:23	J	keep 34:4 35:12,21	147:11,12,14,18	154:23 155:11
184:21 187:12	Jade 88:18	37:17 38:15,20	147:19 148:14	156:21 162:25
188:19 219:19	Jane 1:21	43:18 45:6 63:11	169:10 181:11,20	164:21 167:9
inside 22:15 25:21	January 114:1	67:7 84:10 219:5	182:6,11,13	177:2 178:5
32:1 41:17,22	Jason 50:21 51:7	keeping 9:7 54:10	184:23 185:15,16	184:14,16 194:6
52:1 54:1 57:22	Jayde 200:7	54:12	185:25 186:8	194:24 199:16
65:13 134:4	Jessica 28:3,5,23	Kent 75:24 77:18	219:21,22,24	200:9 201:23
168:11 211:7	29:9,13,15,18,23	77:22 80:18 85:19	knew 9:13 25:5	202:15 204:5
instance 122:20	30:11,20,23 31:2	86:1 90:3,11	46:7 91:4,9,10	207:14 208:3,17
instant 166:8	33:11 34:9,12	92:23 93:3 94:12	94:4 131:9,13	209:9,11,24
instruction 61:24	36:24 37:14,18	94:12,15 95:5,9	135:11 163:7	212:16 213:24
62:22 63:6 66:6	41:17 42:17 48:11	96:2 97:9 98:9,18	196:5	214:5,6 216:16,23
162:12,14	48:22 49:7 58:20	100:5 102:3	know 5:13 6:10	217:9
intended 180:25	59:6,10,23	104:12,14 107:8	15:7,11,25 17:24	knowing 70:19,23
189:1	Jo 62:22 64:3,13	108:2,12 109:6	18:11,20 23:14	160:4 163:16
intents 163:14	66:7	110:13 111:2	31:11,15,22 33:21	164:2 170:18
inter-agency	Joanne 51:16 60:21	112:4 139:18	35:23 38:15,21	173:11
148:23	61:7,20,20 64:24	140:1,5 141:17	40:25 41:2 43:15	knowledge 47:3
interest 150:10	job 66:12 108:11	197:1	43:16 47:1,4,25	151:14 152:12
internet 69:11	116:9 143:16	kept 67:6 102:21	48:2,21 49:12,25	158:1 215:4
212:5,15	149:4,10 181:6	112:16 159:18	51:4 55:8 56:3	known 70:10,21
introduce 84:11	jobs 149:18	185:5 218:15	57:12 58:10,20	73:3 115:18 122:5
85:6	joined 78:21	219:8	59:13,19,20 60:3	125:6
investigate 30:5	189:22 190:12,13	Kerslake 152:16	60:9 64:7,19	knows 72:15 104:2
investigations 1:23	190:14	kind 4:4,4 9:9	65:19,19 67:16,24	104:14 134:25
75:7 187:13	jointly 58:13	74:19 117:6	68:11 69:6,16,23	т
invited 166:13	Jones 186:1,19,20	119:14 121:10	70:8 71:18 73:18	<u>L</u>
involve 14:21 15:2	186:24 187:5,6	133:4 141:1	75:3 76:2 79:17	lack 58:17
149:4	188:2 215:21,23	190:21 191:10	80:14,23 81:17	Ladbroke 203:21
involved 3:19 9:7	216:4 218:4,21,23	196:3 198:11	82:10 83:7,18,18	LADBROOK[sic
13:8 68:17 115:25	219:12	201:10 205:14	83:19 85:12,19,25	203:9
119:10,18 144:1	judgement 45:21	207:22 208:11	86:15 90:10 91:2	ladder 146:4
146:3,20 149:6	65:4,6	217:20	92:21,23 96:24	ladies 186:12
169:5,15 191:11	jump 13:19	kinds 40:13	97:12,18,19,21	lady 98:16 124:3
involvement	June 4:3 85:25	Kinnier 75:24 76:8	99:18 100:13,21	133:16 135:25
160:16,21 163:6	86:20 157:25	76:11,15,16,17,20	102:5 103:23	204:11
180:22 183:16	158:5 199:19,22	76:25 77:1 102:16	105:6 107:15	Lakanal 4:6,7,12
is[sic 104:13	junior 18:17	106:1,8,13,14	108:6,18 118:24	117:20 Langustor 185:17
issue 107:20,24	K	109:12,19 110:2	119:6 120:17	Lancaster 185:17
125:18	Katrina 199:25	110:10 112:9,15	121:4,7 122:25	185:23,25 186:6
issues 80:13 121:12	200:1,2,14,24	113:3,5,9,13,14	126:20 127:2,11	186:21,23 187:9
198:12	201:5,15 204:16	113:17,20,21	129:15,16,19	188:3,22 204:8
	201.5,15 201.10			

				rage 234
210:8 212:2 215:9	lectern 185:18	176:16 180:3,7	LFB00003629	link 14:3 141:18
218:5,10 219:25	lecture 190:22	183:5,9,19 184:10	126:3	201:1
Lancaster's 204:7	left 17:16 35:22	184:14 209:13	LFB00004790	list 73:5
landline 67:19	45:21 78:8 82:9	210:3 211:16	16:21 53:19 72:6	listen 34:11 42:20
179:13	100:20 176:1	218:2	99:21 104:8	62:14 63:9 79:9
landlines 67:18,22	189:15	LFB's 16:20 126:20	106:19 178:11	207:13
large 45:12 67:23	left-hand 17:5,13	183:1	LFB00004790 0	listening 14:25 41:9
67:25 97:17 122:2	length 15:2 48:13	LFB00000325	167:23 168:14	80:3 207:8
127:19 159:12	lengthy 97:4	168:6	LFB00024396	literally 189:25
201:2	lesser 6:8	LFB00000347	148:2	197:23 198:13
large-scale 150:4	lessons 4:4,11	209:22	liaise 153:3	208:12 217:9
191:8	117:20	LFB00000355	liaison 90:15	little 5:10,12 29:11
lasted 162:9	let's 6:19 62:6	53:21	148:24	34:5 40:4 42:22
late 69:9,13 218:24	104:16 175:4	LFB00000357	lie 88:21	149:8 208:9
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				
219:8	216:3	73:22	light 11:13	live 66:13 119:21
Laura 115:22	letters 14:11	LFB00000360	liked 52:14	141:18
lay 194:25	letting 54:11	56:12 57:9	likewise 164:13	lived 25:21 46:13
lead 24:2 32:24	level 149:14,19,20	LFB00000368 62:7	183:13	living 54:2 72:14
learn 190:17	149:23,24,25	LFB00000386 63:3	limits 155:23	lobbies 98:4
learned 117:20	150:1 153:6 157:3	LFB00000507	Linda 88:24 89:2	locate 193:6
learning 59:16	163:12 183:22	21:10 27:10	line 7:6,9 11:22	located 83:24
learnt 4:5,11 59:5	levels 149:23	LFB00000544	16:13 21:3,4	111:17
59:10	LFB 3:10 6:21 7:15	130:22	25:17 84:10 85:5	location 13:8,16
leave 5:4 7:4,8,18	53:8,9 72:5 86:2	LFB00000650	95:10,20 99:10	105:19 112:2
8:8 9:22,25 11:3,4	90:10 94:2,13	128:21	100:6 104:15	log 21:18 43:20
11:8,20 12:5	95:8 96:19,22	LFB00000651	107:9 111:3 116:8	50:7,14 100:23,24
13:12 14:9 22:16	97:24 104:3 127:2	134:16	123:9 127:5,8,8	126:5,7 128:11,12
22:17 32:1 35:18	127:13,22 129:24	LFB00000659	134:1 136:15	128:15 160:21
37:4 40:18,23	130:6 131:4	102:10	142:16 148:9	162:8 165:4 167:5
45:19 54:6,7 55:1	136:12 138:19	LFB00000660	149:20 156:15,16	173:17 179:1,2
57:24 58:2 59:2	139:7 143:17	104:17	156:16 157:13	195:17,17 196:10
59:21 60:19 63:1	151:10 152:7	LFB00000661	159:18 161:4,6	196:12 199:4
63:19,22 64:10	154:16 155:3,16	106:25	162:2 164:20	202:21,24 203:10
65:24 66:4,9	155:25 156:4,10	LFB00000685	168:15 173:2	203:17 206:4
70:25 82:17 95:11	156:13,17 157:14	136:10	195:5 199:7,8,10	207:1,23 214:9
96:20 107:13	157:19,22 159:14	LFB00000737 6:19	199:13,14 203:5,7	217:11,16
117:24 125:3	160:7 161:4,6	13:21	209:2,2	London 1:8 2:17
133:2 136:23	162:1,2,22,24	LFB00001257	lines 32:10 69:1	4:5 5:22 7:2
137:3 138:7	163:21,21,22,25	11:15	84:1 85:9 89:20	16:16,17 20:17
142:20 179:8	164:3,13 165:11	LFB00003625	91:21 100:4 132:4	84:13 85:12,14,17
193:4,16,19,21	166:3 167:8,15	160:18 165:5	156:16 160:7	85:19 86:12 89:24
194:5 205:24	169:13,23 170:7	173:17 176:11	167:6 168:19	91:15 94:18 95:21
leaving 11:7 15:18	171:13,14,16	179:1 202:23	169:16 170:2	97:5 100:19,21,25
58:2,4,9,9 99:6	173:1,9,12 174:5	206:5 214:10	192:10 206:8	101:1,3,5 103:2
119:18	174:23,25 175:8	217:12	208:24 217:13	105:9,16 108:13
				<u> </u>
L	I	I	I	I

	1	1	1		
108:21 111:2	look 6:19 10:15	Louise 77:3	149:24	master 86:6	
122:9,15 123:1,2	11:14 19:4 21:8	low 14:16 54:13	Manchester 152:16	match 195:22	
123:6,7,8,14,15	24:21 27:9,24	63:11 135:1 195:1	manner 118:14	matter 46:19 72:18	
123:22 124:9,22	28:8 33:6 34:24	lower 29:11	marauding 151:20	matters 181:16	
124:25 125:11,12	43:22 47:8 50:6	luck 165:15 169:11	March 115:6,9	maximum 110:19	
126:18,25 127:6	50:17 56:11 62:11	lull 40:16	mark 23:12 24:22	166:6	
129:13,16,21	63:2 68:13 69:2	lulling 39:9	50:8 72:7 203:1	mean 8:16 12:3	
130:7,10,13 131:6	69:10 72:7 74:3,6	lunch 106:11	206:7 214:11	18:22 22:14,18	
131:18,21,25	75:18 89:19 91:22		marker 202:22	31:10 32:19 40:24	
132:23 133:9,22	109:25 135:4,17	<u>M</u>	marks 214:11	59:5 68:1 70:5	
135:2 136:6 137:7	143:21 160:14	M25 159:25	married 200:2	81:14 132:19	
137:13 138:3,16	173:16,17 182:2	machines 190:19	Marshall 200:1,2	133:1 140:8	
139:20,25 143:23	185:12 192:24	195:23	200:24 208:10	means 7:8 8:14	
144:2 145:15	202:16 206:4,7,11	main 20:19 25:18	209:12 210:4,25	18:25 86:25 87:5	
151:7 152:18,25	210:8 214:10	maintained 50:21	211:5	88:3 125:10	
157:4 158:19,21	looked 11:24 34:8	major 68:17 124:17	Martin 1:3,11,14	163:23 164:8	
159:3,12 162:18	43:19 47:17 52:25	140:23 151:1	26:12,15,23 27:4	166:22 169:8	
164:22 169:3	61:4 91:16 92:16	152:14 161:8	27:6 56:15,17,20	183:14	
171:11 177:12,15	179:25 208:7	166:11,11 180:8	57:1,3,5 71:8,16	meant 11:1 26:5	
180:14,17 181:7	211:21	180:14 191:8,10	71:21,25 75:10,17	30:13 35:3 39:8	
196:21,23 197:2,4	looking 7:23 10:23	make-up 21:14	75:21,24 76:2,5,7	64:3 70:15 73:1	
197:5,6,6,13,19	12:6 39:15 47:21	24:24 67:24	76:13,16,17,18,19	mechanism 141:12	
198:2,6,7 199:6	52:13 55:17 61:6	make-ups 22:8	76:21,21,24 77:3	media 69:11	
199:11,16 201:2,7	80:3 97:1 107:4	making 8:20 10:1	88:9 95:3 98:8	memory 23:18 26:2	
203:9 204:13,14	115:15 126:20	15:15 36:15 38:5	102:13 106:6,7,10	26:8 37:22 40:8	
204:15,16,20	131:3 135:4,17	38:12 45:10 48:3	106:13 107:1	60:25 101:22	
205:17,18,21	138:1 156:12	58:17 63:22 64:7	109:13,17,20,24	106:21 107:1	
206:2 208:2,5,11	157:11 162:7	64:19 96:2	110:6,9,10 112:10	127:18 128:24	
208:15,22 209:4	163:18 165:6	malfunctioning	112:14,19 113:1,3	134:18	
209:19 211:23	167:5 168:24	107:21	113:7,13,15,18	mention 140:16	
212:18,20 214:1	170:13 173:2,18	man 101:11	123:6 141:17	208:25	
215:5	175:22 180:24	manage 106:11	144:11,17,22,25	mentioned 4:7,10	
London's 133:5	199:19 217:11	managed 32:8	145:3,7,10 146:12	4:14 6:4 175:25	
196:12	looks 42:6 48:16	160:11 209:18	146:18,25 147:3,7	Merseyside 122:7	
long 20:20,21 21:10	63:17 66:16	management 3:23	147:11,15,18	message 9:12 20:6	
23:3,8 25:9 26:13	127:11	13:21 14:24 81:7	148:13 169:7	20:6 21:21 22:23	
27:10 38:22 46:10	lose 85:7	86:14,17 108:24	181:19,21 182:7	23:2,22 25:3,10	
60:4,17,23 61:1	lot 28:11 29:15	213:5 216:10	182:11 185:4,11	25:11 43:14 44:7	
106:6 109:17	47:19 65:13 68:12	manager 60:22	185:15,22 186:4,9	46:3,20 49:24	
149:2 185:5,23	70:21 74:10,12	77:18 78:3 86:19	186:22,25 187:4	51:2,5,7 74:23	
202:10 211:25	134:4	86:21,22 88:14,21	187:20,23 188:1	78:10 159:7,8	
218:16	lots 131:2 189:24	88:23 89:1,7 93:2	215:15 216:2	171:9,10 174:20	
longer 61:14	190:18 204:12	99:2 108:22 147:4	218:9,14,21,25	175:16,25 176:1,3	
164:17 181:18	212:25	149:1,4,24 186:12	219:13,20	176:15,19,21,24	
184:25 186:3	loud 49:5	managers 89:10	Martin's 120:17	177:11	

				
messages 8:22	137:17 140:3	mobility 80:13	169:7 181:19,21	149:21 154:16
21:12,14 23:16	151:13 168:13	121:12 198:12	182:7,11 185:4,11	166:10,25 167:1
24:14,16 43:10	185:20 186:13	mock 79:11,13	185:15,22 186:4,9	182:20,21 190:2,3
83:18 84:2	215:14	mode 141:19	186:22,25 187:4	nationally 122:5
messaging 20:3	mindful 32:5	module 116:24	187:20,23 188:1	nature 15:3 78:2
Met 73:15 160:11	minimum 109:9	modules 78:19	215:15 216:2	121:13 151:14
169:20,24 170:5	minor 185:17	moment 19:13 21:9	218:9,14,21,25	180:22
170:25 171:13,17	minute 9:18 30:7	26:3,17 28:25	219:13	near 29:5 51:19
172:6,17,25	minutes 2:6 26:11	32:20 44:13 48:20	morning 1:3,7,17	necessarily 41:9
174:10 175:10,15	26:18 43:5 44:13	57:17 60:12	1:18 51:19 52:25	59:8 112:3 119:3
176:14 177:1	44:24 45:17,23,24	125:15 141:15	77:10 112:17	120:3 125:6,7
183:14	48:1 56:21 71:5	144:13 159:1	141:17 187:15	131:7
MET00007698	71:10,14,17 95:7	181:13 192:21	mouth 137:3	necessary 84:17
2:24	99:10 106:9	199:2 202:10	move 6:12 17:24	116:10 124:1
MET00010786	109:16,21 144:15	Moments 92:1	24:3 31:8,14 35:5	156:11 177:9
114:2	147:8 162:9 166:6	Monday 1:1	35:20 40:12 58:12	219:6
MET00010868	176:24 181:15,24	monitor 19:25	76:11 119:12,12	need 2:1,6 7:19
114:1	183:18 186:2	20:10 43:25 78:12	119:13 175:4	27:21 35:12 36:22
MET00012678	212:13 213:23	99:1 116:10,14,16	178:23	37:17 39:22,24
77:6	214:19 215:19,21	monitored 125:24	moved 19:11 20:17	45:6,19 46:23
MET00013830	mispatched 197:9	133:17	29:3,4 31:18	47:4 53:21 55:8
21:18 43:20 50:7	mission 83:25	monitoring 16:15	41:19 46:14,24	71:6 75:25 76:2
MET00016912	Mitch 88:14 98:19	60:1 126:17	47:2	78:17 79:19 81:1
50:18	98:21,23	monthly 79:21	movement 46:21	84:7 87:12 89:8
MET00018263	mitigated 131:20	118:13	moving 29:16 40:7	94:10 100:11
114:5	Mm 161:3	months 2:20,21	41:14 42:12 43:12	103:5 106:7
MET00018755	Mm-hm 78:15	3:10,11 52:19	49:21 54:12	108:19 110:18,20
188:7	80:25 82:22 83:13	115:3 MOORE-BICK	MPAS15 141:21	116:3,17 130:2 136:22 137:10
Metropolitan 2:23 177:12,18	84:5 87:4 88:10 88:17 89:3 93:24	1:3,11,14 26:12	MPS 72:10,13,15 72:20 142:1	140:15 145:18
middle 13:24 24:22	94:22 95:12 96:8	26:15,23 27:4,6	MPS's 141:18	157:19 171:20
27:25 36:21	98:17 99:24	56:15,17,20 57:1	multiple 6:1,7,9,10	174:3 183:24
106:20 134:20	101:19 103:22	57:3,5 71:8,16,21	52:20	185:24 186:17
164:14	104:23 208:6	71:25 75:10,17,21	mum 28:19 54:3	191:23 194:19
Millett 1:7,16,17	mobile 67:23,25	76:2,5,7,13,16,18	mustered 145:14	200:23 201:13
26:9,13 27:7,8	68:4,12 73:8 85:6	76:21,24 102:13		205:5 215:12
56:19 57:6 71:1	131:1 158:12	106:6,10,13	N	needed 31:21 34:5
71:16,19,25 72:1	mobiles 67:22	109:17,20,24	N 219:18	40:9 45:5 49:20
75:2,11,21,22	mobilisation 4:22	110:6,9 112:14,19	name 1:20 48:10,12	58:15 59:2 63:22
76:4,6,10	mobilise 123:5	113:1,3,7,13,15	48:13 77:2 113:22	66:24 94:18 147:6
Millsom 88:18	195:23	113:18 144:11,17	120:2 147:20	173:14 177:23
mind 19:6 35:17	mobilised 217:19	144:22,25 145:3,7	187:7 198:5,16,17	178:2 181:7 196:6
92:17 106:18	mobilising 119:1	145:10 146:12,18	198:20,21 200:1	needs 116:17
109:16 120:22	126:5 149:7 196:8	146:25 147:3,7,11	216:16	144:13 216:13
132:6 133:7	196:15	147:15,18 148:13	national 148:9,23	neighbouring
	.	-	.	.

, . ,				Transfer y
151:2,6,19 152:6	13:16 19:5 20:8	obtained 207:18	97:23 98:9 99:8	Operationally
149:16 150:7,11	number 3:15 13:8	172:12 201:19	94:9 95:17 96:5	149:1,5,7 150:4
NILO 148:23	219:16	obtain 155:15	75:2 81:23 92:10	89:10,12,17 143:3
218:1	November 1:1	objectively 138:2	65:15,23 74:9	operational 89:5,9
205:13 204.3,22	notifying 197:13	174:22 219:11,13	62:14 63:9,13	131:18 133:7
203:13 204:3,22	notified 92:25 97:9	o'clock 51:19	56:13 57:16,19	operation 131:11
184:5 199:19	notification 96:12	0	48:1,3 49:24	17:25 70:6
180:24 183:10	notice 124:18	numerous 190.1	43:1,1,14 47:25	operated 17:23 operating 16:17
174:25 175:9 178:18 180:6,22	notes 114:5 119:2,5 181:15	199:7 209:24 numerous 190:1	28:25 29:14 30:10 32:13 37:12 38:5	operate 199:16
164:15 166:21	note 55:15 119:2	142:10 190:18	25:13 26:9,22	opening 52:24
160:15,22 164:2	170:12	67:25 68:5 128:2	okay 16:9 18:4	opened 54:8
149:13,19 157:24	North 16:17 155:2	62:9 63:4 67:1,23	127:5 210:16	148:1 195:1
143:8,24 145:14	Norman 47:16	51:8 57:10 58:16	Oh 69:4 115:5	open 77:5 93:1
125:17 141:24	197:6,21 198:19	37:1,7 42:14 47:5	52:4 157:2 166:21	onwards 215:3
115:10,15 116:1	179:9,12 180:15	numbers 27:13,14	officers 1:6 18:18	ongoing 118:5
110:15 114:5	162:21 163:24	213:7,16	154:3 180:4	ones 140:9
94:21 98:9 107:20	103:6 122:20	210:17 211:7	126:21 148:24	one-off 197:23
90:14,25 93:13	83:18,20 89:10,16	207:15 210:6,16	90:4 115:10	133:9
88:8,23 89:21	80:15,16 82:4	198:5,9,20 206:8	50:21 51:14 59:25	19:18 97:8 105:8
85:25 86:8,21	48:9 68:14 71:4	184:10 188:7,22	7:6 11:22 14:1	once 18:19,25
69:7 70:7 75:13	10:8 18:9 20:14	176:14 177:19	officer 1:9 2:17 3:9	Oliff 50:21 51:2,7
67:12 68:20 69:7	8:15,17 9:6,11	173:4,5,25 174:2	offering 66:5	older 39:1 50:1
19:15 51:2 55:17	normally 6:5 8:13	172:15,19,25	121:16,21	old 50:24 190:25
16:19 17:1 18:1,2	204:20 205:9	164:1 167:11,12	offered 108:13,17	217:10 218:4
9:1 10:24 16:10	normal 163:20	158:18 161:13	201:10	214:6 215:8
night 5:16 8:4,25	Norfolk 151:24	143:6 145:19	120:15,19 150:18	210:19,19,20
208:18,21 219:23	noisy 24:16	138:5 142:14,16	offer 108:14 116:20	196:16 207:3
177:11,14,18	noises 5:12,13	131:1 137:24	off-duty 110:16	187:19 189:6
171:8 172:10	149:25	128:1,2 129:11,20	148:2 175:14	178:3,16 179:6,19
Nigel 147:5,13,22	3:11 52:19 149:22	121:4,19 127:5	October 2:23 25:24	175:17,19 177:6
nice 186:5	nine 2:20,21 3:10	109:4,8 110:19,22	occurrence 122:14	156:8 168:4,18
202:1,3,5	166:8	105:18 107:14	occur 36:13 39:5	150:25 152:9
124:5 140:16,25	152:13,16,17,18	94:19 103:19	occasions 191:21	145:9 146:14
69:11 91:16,22	NILOs 151:15	87:17 90:24 94:14	occasion 67:3	143:12 144:16
news 68:10,18	NILO's 151:15	85:6 86:8 87:14	178:1 211:13	137:4,4 142:6
200:9	183:2,9,22	73:13 78:19 82:6	163:16 165:22	135:16 136:8,24
67:6 73:12 149:8	180:21,25 181:2	72:16,19 73:3,7,8	127:17 162:12	132:12 133:23
new 61:21,25 66:25	165:14,22 166:2 179:23 180:13,16	49:23 54:14 62:19 67:8,23,25 70:10	105:20 106:3 108:14 115:4	125:16 129:5,14 129:23 130:16,19
71:18 82:19 88:6 124:7	164:14,22 165:11	48:21,22 49:10,12	99:9 103:15	117:25 123:12,23
68:16 70:3,8	164:2,9,11,12,13	45:12 46:9 48:18	57:21 82:4 93:16	111:12 112:9
45:13 47:18 61:16	163:21,23,25	31:16 33:15 45:6	obviously 8:16 11:7	109:12 110:8
never 23:13 32:8	158:4 161:1	25:20,20 28:8	obvious 156:25	107:16 108:10
85:24 124:13	152:10 153:7	20:16,25 21:5	obtaining 201:25	101:7 103:1,3
85:24 124:13	152:10 153:7	20:16:25:21:5	obtaining 201:25	101.7 103.1 3

				_
operations 60:22	157:9 159:3 163:2	ownership 84:15	129:10 130:1,23	60:16 68:8 69:1
138:4,22 154:8	180:18	86:24	132:15 133:14,14	81:3 82:24 84:8
operative 164:20	Organisation's	00.24	133:25 134:17,20	89:19 91:20 93:22
operator 16:15	213:6	<u> </u>	134:24 135:13,14	95:19 121:25
19:22 20:2,5 28:2	organised 17:1	page 2:25 6:24	136:14 137:9	140:15 155:14
28:4,7,24 29:14	147:8	10:17,18 11:16	138:12 139:17	156:9 158:3,16
29:21 30:9,19,21	organising 149:6	13:1,23,24,25	140:15 149:12	175:6 192:25
30:25 32:12 33:9	orientate 160:15	15:1,25,21,25	150:7 153:25	199:20 204:9
34:11 35:11 36:22		19:4,4 20:19,21	150.7 153.25	208:7 212:4,7
37:11,16 38:4	original 119:8 183:6	21:19,20 22:11,12	154.1,15 155.14	214:14
42:19 43:14 47:24		22:22,25 23:22	159:8 160:24	
	originally 46:23	24:22 25:16 27:11		paragraphs 14:7
48:20 49:24 57:19	127:16 169:17,23	27:12,24,25 28:20	161:1 163:18	part 16:4 34:3 51:3
57:23 62:14 63:9	Osborne 200:5	28:21,22 29:7,8	165:5 168:7,9	53:11 75:15
65:13,19,23 74:9	ought 162:5	29:11,16 30:8,17	170:1 171:5,6	108:11 116:4,23
85:18,25 86:9,11	out' 7:13	30:17,18 32:10,10	172:8 173:18,19	118:5,8 143:16
86:13 87:18 88:16	outcome 160:4	32:11 33:5 34:7	173:21,23 175:7	181:6 183:6
88:18 102:4 103:1	outline 111:20,21	34:10 35:5,10,10	175:21,24 176:11	208:19
104:22 110:14	190:16	36:20,21 37:10	176:13 178:11	part-time 89:16
129:12 130:24	outlining 3:20	38:7 41:14,15	179:2 182:16	particular 4:24
131:2 132:15,16	outset 163:6 182:18	42:12,13,16,18	192:22,25 199:20	12:15 14:22 15:4
135:1 136:16,17	188:25		202:23,24 203:1	39:17 55:23 83:15
136:20,24 137:2,4	outside 5:11,14,15	43:12,12,21,23	204:1,9 206:5	85:11 87:6 92:9
142:14,17 162:17	21:2 35:24 39:1	47:22,23 48:4,11	209:23 210:1,5,7	92:18 111:9
175:11,15 189:10	41:2 54:9,22 55:5	48:17,18 49:9,21	212:3 214:10	130:21 149:4
189:20 197:8	62:18 64:12 65:24	49:22 50:7 51:18	217:12	151:9 156:17
200:3,5,7 210:3,4	83:22 100:13	53:19,22,25 57:11	paged 158:17,23,25	160:2,13 174:15
210:4,10,12,13,14	150:13,23 179:13	57:13,14,15 60:15	159:4,6 161:1,16	190:21 202:10
210:15,19,20,22	overall 88:12	60:16 62:11,13	163:25 166:24	particularly 98:3
211:3	overflow 86:10	63:8 65:9 66:22	174:11,22 180:5	134:16
operators 78:4,8,9	87:10 121:24	66:23 68:7,25	208:18	partner 150:16
78:11 79:10,11	122:3,10,23	72:6 74:3,6,7	pager 158:13,14	151:23
102:7 110:16	124:10,19 140:2	78:17 81:3 82:23	pages 21:10 188:13	parts 146:19
127:7,10 145:13	145:15 153:4,24	84:6,8 89:18,20	paging 159:7	party 172:18
200:11 210:2	154:1,24 155:12	90:2 91:20,20	Palmer 200:7	pass 13:6,15 19:23
opinionated 169:6	155:20 156:1	93:22 95:18 99:21	panicking 28:14	32:4 33:23 44:14
opposed 62:25	157:4 159:2	101:20,25 102:10	34:17 38:16 39:2	46:11 47:9 54:15
176:5 183:11	161:10 191:13	102:12,16,16,19	40:22 41:8 66:10	72:17,22 74:11
opposite 17:5	192:7 195:7,11	102:25 103:4	205:10,11	85:6 123:3,13,14
option 63:1 64:8,10	197:12,14 201:9	104:9,10,19	panicky 31:17	123:16,21 125:8
164:5,16 170:4,10	209:4 211:23	106:19,21,25	paper 51:11 55:14	126:18 129:12,20
173:2 181:2	overhear 98:25	107:4 116:7	55:25 74:25	129:25 130:5
options 170:9,13	overlooked 35:2	118:18 121:25	paragraph 6:25	135:2 136:7,12
order 40:8 167:1	overrun 186:5	124:2 125:21	7:11,23 10:18	138:16 142:14
186:9	overspeaking	126:16 128:12,22	11:16 12:25 16:12	155:4,10 156:6
ordinarily 140:24	57:20 135:2	128:23,24 129:3,9	16:14 20:19 25:18	157:3,8,13,15
	•		•	•

160:12 170:5	135:15 147:10	142:22 156:22	pilots 112:6	215:24 216:1
171:9,20 176:24	168:3 178:15	191:12	pin 21:16 50:4 62:6	219:15
192:16,20 193:21	179:5 182:4	persons 9:12 13:8	place 4:5 79:21	point 10:19 17:8
196:25 197:10	186:18	22:13,15 50:10	81:7,10,14,18	19:13 22:8,18
198:6,15 199:6	pausing 31:3 48:5	90:6 138:23	96:23 119:7,18,20	23:6,8 24:7 26:15
204:14,16 205:18	pausing 51.5 48.5 pay 45:14	139:14 205:5	122:3,25 125:9	28:9 29:24 32:3
206:2 209:14	penultimate 107:17	perspective 135:9	132:22 133:4	33:19,24,25 34:2
	180:20	135:22	138:23 191:25	35:16,19,21 37:20
211:5 212:20				, ,
passage 151:9	people 24:18 25:2,6 25:21 34:4 39:22	persuasion 39:25 Peter 22:23 45:2	193:24 201:20 209:24	38:14,18,21 39:17
passed 12:21 46:3				40:24 41:24 42:10
47:6 51:2 55:21	39:23,24 40:24	154:2,6,9	placed 41:16	43:4 44:22 45:24
56:5 61:8 73:5	44:4,17,20 45:12	Peter's 154:7	places 75:12 102:6	46:1,7 47:3,12
74:23,25 136:6,7	46:5,8 47:5,19	phase 31:8 40:7,13	planning 2:5	48:24 51:7,18
137:14 155:1	48:15 50:24 51:4	phone 20:25 22:10	platform 146:4	58:15,19 62:21,22
165:17 170:20	51:10,17 55:25	32:5,9 33:24	play 53:1,6 132:1	63:21 64:5 65:7
172:6,19,24 173:9	58:17,18,24 59:4	48:25 68:19 69:3	190:23,24	66:19 69:21 74:14
173:11 177:18	61:14 64:8 65:6	72:19 83:12,20	played 3:21 4:1	89:21 113:4
199:1 209:9,16	65:11,13 66:12	85:9,12 88:18	53:5	123:24 132:21
211:15	67:10,12,13,17	89:22 99:13,15	please 1:10,19 6:23	138:5,21 154:11
passes 210:5	74:12 88:3 89:15	103:8 120:24	10:17 12:24 13:22	156:13 160:16,25
passing 19:16	96:20 107:15	121:5 124:12	16:12,20,22 19:3	174:7 175:20
24:14 51:6 56:2	108:18 110:19	125:22 138:2	21:17,18 25:17	189:4 200:1
74:1 87:20 97:14	132:17 133:2	142:9,13 155:15	26:20,24,25 27:10	201:16 202:7
139:20 158:20	139:21 142:19,20	155:25 156:10,23	27:22 28:5 29:9	211:16 215:3,16
159:14 192:18	162:24 167:10	160:7 176:19	34:12 36:25 37:14	pointing 17:12
208:2	169:21 193:8	177:20 201:1	43:20 50:6,7	points 37:23 114:21
password 195:18	205:12	205:11	53:19 56:22 72:7	police 2:23,25
patch 157:18 198:2	percentage 142:15	phoned 127:13	73:21 77:1 98:11	25:24 73:15 93:6
198:4	period 18:23 19:1	132:2	101:25 106:14	141:21,25 150:16
patience 75:5	60:9 158:4,10	phones 68:12 208:8	109:21 113:8	151:18,21,25
145:11 182:14	183:18	phoning 91:13	114:16,19 122:13	152:4 160:11,12
218:16 219:1,9	peripheral 146:21	138:9 169:2	129:3 135:14	164:17 167:2 [°]
patiently 187:14	permissible 181:18	photograph 16:22	143:14 144:18	169:20,24 170:5,6
pattern 79:21	person 12:19 28:17	16:24	147:20 177:9	170:10,15,16,19
patterns 47:8	32:2 33:20 35:22	pick 19:22 179:14	178:5 179:20	170:21 171:17
Paul 88:16 90:12	39:1 42:11,15	199:13	181:25 187:7	172:6,17,25
90:16 96:4,14,22	47:19 49:15 52:13	picked 86:6 127:9	189:2,5 202:23	173:22 174:10
97:4 98:19 100:24	55:21 82:16 118:1	picking 28:21	206:5 209:22	175:10,15 176:15
100:25 105:12,13	118:2 119:10,10	213:19	210:1,7 212:4	177:1,12,19
105:16	119:17 121:2	picks 127:7	215:19 216:21	policies 11:14
Pause 76:14 100:3	127:3 138:22	picture 17:14 50:17	217:11 219:4,13	13:22 80:18 81:6
101:24 102:1,15	156:13 177:2	52:5,7 75:13	plugged 207:12	81:6 97:6 149:7
102:18 104:20	199:11	140:20	pm 22:23 71:22,24	189:24 190:1
106:23 107:2	personally 81:8	piece 51:11 55:25	110:3,5 113:10,12	214:2
129:1,4 134:13,19	103:7 122:21	144:7	145:4,6 182:8,10	policy 3:15,23 6:14
127.1,1131.13,17	100.7 122.21	* 1 1.7	110.1,0102.0,10	Policy 5.15,25 0.14
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	

				raye 240
6:17,20,21 7:21	138:3,4 141:13,16	141:5 156:25	160:9 214:2	90:24 109:11
11:14 12:6,24	144:23 156:12	presume 127:12	proceeding 121:7	128:1 149:22,25
13:1,19,19,20	206:20	pretending 53:3	process 40:9	purely 192:11
67:16 68:1,4	posted 16:15	pretty 210:24	160:10 183:2	195:19 196:7
80:21 81:4,9,10	potentially 45:11	prevent 119:16	205:23 208:11	purpose 85:10
81:14,18 82:2,5	63:24 119:18	previous 42:16	professional	purposes 163:14
82:17 91:4,7	121:2 140:7	79:9 80:2 85:14	117:12 118:5,8	push 41:5,7 42:8
,			,	1 -
95:22,22 96:23	practicable 107:11 170:9	88:2 124:17	120:20 152:15,23	52:4 169:11
97:19 100:19		135:12 142:23	154:10	put 2:11 29:22
118:19,25 119:3,6	practical 138:8	155:17 158:1	programme 78:19	50:16 55:14,15,16
119:14 121:11,21	152:21 153:20	previously 67:2	progress 13:5	58:2 62:25 65:11
133:4 149:1,5	practicality 143:2	133:16 142:18	22:20,20 60:5,10	79:1 80:6,7,24
150:14 153:16,17	practically 152:24	primed 21:9	progressing 83:16	81:4,6,7,10 82:13
153:18 160:9	practice 55:17	principle 92:6,11	promise 48:3	83:17 91:3 96:21
161:23 163:2	72:18 107:8 111:8	principles 184:11	prompt 59:16	99:6 100:23 102:3
169:18 175:8	120:24 123:18,20	216:23	116:17 192:9	102:8,8,22 117:7
178:1 182:20,22	142:8 155:21	prior 5:16 9:1	194:22,22,23	117:14,24,25
183:2,3,6,11	156:12 179:9	24:13 46:21 47:5	217:6	118:17,21,22
184:10,14,18	197:25 204:21	68:20 166:11	prompted 91:21	119:14 125:2
189:23 190:3	215:10	prioritise 12:11,23	97:1 212:14	128:19 130:20
192:23 193:2,9,23	practices 3:20	52:22	properties 153:12	132:17,19,22
193:25 194:11,14	pre-emptive 155:25	prioritising 12:21	property 8:6,14	133:2 134:16
212:8 214:15	precisely 163:7	priority 12:13,16	10:20 13:9 30:25	136:9,9 137:2,3
216:9,12	predetermined	probably 5:21	31:2,6,23 80:14	153:10,11,14,21
popping 5:12,13	109:6,7	17:10 26:3 35:2	121:8,20 132:22	160:18 161:4,23
position 3:9 17:4,5	predominantly	56:17 70:22 74:7	132:25 133:3	167:22 168:5,5,13
17:11,20,23 18:5	153:11	79:3 94:23 113:4	138:7	169:14 170:23
18:8,8 105:10	prefer 106:10	120:21 121:16	protect 184:11	175:21 181:3
136:2 148:22,23	preferred 156:24	145:8,19 155:23	protecting 217:3	185:18 193:2
155:3	premise 119:15	156:3 164:4	protocol 84:10,18	195:21 202:22
positions 17:24	premises 7:5,16,18	165:12,12 166:6	84:19	210:21 212:8
18:11 145:24	7:25 8:11,20	169:19 178:21	proved 153:16	213:23 214:5,15
146:1	11:21 14:2,10	183:18 186:7	provide 116:8	215:6,7
positive 36:9	78:25 83:3	198:19	129:17 132:2,3	put' 95:22 102:22
possibilities 40:6	prepared 52:15	probationary	139:10 182:22	177:16
possibility 40:12	89:23 94:7	18:23,25	183:25 184:20	puts 22:25
61:15	present 123:5	problem 114:17	provided 133:21	putting 46:16
possible 55:4 99:20	170:19	129:12 131:25	184:22	106:18 119:19
106:12 141:4	press 127:6 208:13	161:12 195:15	provides 54:9	100.10 117.17
183:25 199:18	pressed 100:17	problems 159:14	*	0
205:19	pressing 55:2	159:20	providing 7:6 11:22 133:5	quarter 29:16
	120:21 208:14		pulled 169:15	62:13
possibly 13:12 30:1 37:5 42:1 55:6		procedure 52:23 122:3 139:15	PUMP 22:24	queries 150:15
	presumably 80:18			query 169:18
61:5 66:14 124:20	97:9 111:24	150:14 154:10	pumps 22:1,3,7	question 2:11 7:20
131:17 132:5,7	118:20 127:6	procedures 149:7	23:1,2,5 24:7,25	question 2.11 /.20
			1	

				1490 211
9:15 23:25 28:1	199:18	209:22 210:7	41:5 42:9 45:25	130:13 153:4
33:13 34:7,24	quiet 20:17 90:14	212:4 217:12	48:11 49:10 52:3	197:14,19
37:1 38:10 42:2	quietened 69:10,17	ran 213:6	54:25 58:12,21	receptive 130:17
43:3 44:6 52:11	quite 5:21,21 8:17	random 18:6	59:16 72:24 103:9	recollect 214:23
57:25 64:24 72:18	9:4 22:9 24:16	rang 100:25	103:13 138:8	recollected 72:19
73:20 74:13 91:19	27:19 28:10,12,18	range 186:3	162:15 176:6	recollection 15:7
92:5 101:2 107:18	29:24 31:17,19	ranges 141:2	205:8 207:4	16:25 44:9 51:1,6
108:7 109:4	37:22 41:11 49:2	rank 86:18	reasons 39:3 42:8	55:23 56:2 61:1
110:12,24 118:7	49:19 56:19 60:7	rate 61:3	43:10 156:25	130:12 133:20
130:4 131:23	61:1 62:14 67:2	re-called 73:10	reassessing 217:4	134:21 177:20,22
135:16 139:2	69:9,12 80:17	reacting 183:10	reassurance 38:18	recommended
142:1 146:11,13	91:25 105:20	read 3:3 7:24 72:9	39:16,22 40:7,13	184:13
156:3 166:20	118:11 124:7,8,23	77:9,10 99:25	48:6 74:20 129:18	recontact 179:17
169:9 180:20	156:6 186:5	102:11 104:18	reassure 23:4 33:2	recontacted 179:7
181:5 184:9 211:4	194:21 196:21	114:7 128:22	40:9 129:14	record 20:22 55:24
218:1	206:11	148:5 165:7 168:2	reassuring 38:14	77:2 94:11 95:8
questioning 14:2	quote 137:11	171:1 178:14	41:12	113:22 137:15
questions 1:13 2:1	138:13 139:19	179:4 188:13	recall 20:12 24:5	142:9 147:21
2:5,8,14 4:22 5:10	170:3 177:10	readier 76:10	35:25 54:18 61:23	165:10 187:8
14:24 15:10,11,16	quoted 154:2	reading 213:2	62:2,3,4 68:23	200:17
21:11 25:14 27:19	quoting 154:14	ready 17:9 21:10	69:16 194:3	recorded 95:24
44:18 52:25 71:2		76:7,8,8 109:18	197:16 204:16	142:12 161:19
71:6,9 72:4 75:4	R	110:1 145:1	207:11 217:7	162:11 167:18
76:20 95:3 96:6	radio 16:15 17:23	199:13 215:22	recalls 111:1 124:2	168:23 171:7
100:2 101:23	17:25 19:7,20,21	real 47:16 125:11	receive 4:3 12:15	172:8 174:15
102:12 106:8	20:2,5 24:14	143:2	83:14 84:14 97:21	recording 90:2
109:13 110:7,11	83:18 84:2 88:3	realise 203:22	122:14 123:3	records 179:7
112:10 113:17	88:16 90:12,13,14	realised 164:3	124:10 125:10	188:7
114:18 128:25	raft 149:10	201:21	160:1 192:12	recruit 200:9
144:5,13 145:8,12	rainfall 124:21	really 9:5 15:17	196:9,17	red 17:12
147:14 150:14	raise 183:23	23:14 34:16 41:24	received 7:13 11:19	redacted 174:2
154:7 155:24	raised 123:25	43:1 44:11 51:22	36:1 74:14 78:20	reduce 148:11
159:5 178:6	Ralph 102:8 104:7	52:1 64:24 66:14	79:8 84:22 89:22	refer 4:15 84:18
181:12,23 182:12	104:16 106:18	66:20 68:16 75:14	93:23 98:9 99:12	88:20 108:24
182:14 184:13	126:2 128:12,19	93:16 95:19	104:5 116:22	140:14 182:18
186:24 187:16	129:3 130:20	116:21 130:7	117:12,13,18	reference 14:3
188:22,25 212:2	134:16 135:14	142:8 143:6 149:6	118:9 124:18,24	53:18 82:24 94:13
215:9 216:3	136:9,14 160:18	154:6 169:6 170:2	125:4,22 133:9,15	94:17 130:1
219:19,21,22,24	161:18 168:5,14	196:5 199:1	138:15,17 158:18	156:18 177:8
quick 22:8 56:13	170:23 171:5	201:23	159:13 175:16	182:17 188:7
102:11 164:10	173:18 175:21	rearrangement	180:2 194:3,18	references 217:16
quicker 57:8	176:11 178:10,12	185:18	202:16	referred 4:8 90:18
quickly 22:9 40:12	178:25 179:20	reason 11:7,9 12:1	receiving 3:22 36:1	156:22
76:11 136:25	202:23 203:2,6	24:8 28:9 31:13	54:18 87:7 91:17	referring 32:15
164:24 198:14	204:6 206:6	33:23 34:25 40:21	123:2 124:2 125:6	126:12 134:12
	I			I

				raye 242
165:25 171:12	relayed 55:12,20	128:4,5 130:11	required 54:12	180:17 181:5,8,10
176:3,19	137:13	132:6,9,9 159:7	94:15 143:17	resourcing 110:12
reflect 51:1 120:20	relentless 67:4	166:14,17 169:12	157:3	respect 85:2 87:8
reflected 66:6	relevant 19:23	169:15 180:6	requirement	98:15 99:22
refresh 101:22	46:19 68:24 82:19	189:25 191:17,18	121:11,21	146:21 168:8
106:21 107:1	84:16 87:20,24	192:3 194:22	rescue 36:5 53:8	171:23 172:21
128:24 134:18	213:19,21	202:8,18 203:16	61:14 70:25 74:1	respond 119:24
regard 117:3	reliably 46:8	205:4,10 207:6	75:25 77:18 83:15	152:13
regarding 79:4	reliant 8:23 133:5	209:18 211:10	83:19 85:22,23	responds 54:7
95:21 98:2 107:24	relies 119:15	212:21 213:4,11	108:12 114:24	response 15:17
162:1,4 169:14,18	rely 10:5,6 15:22	216:7,21 217:8	121:14 124:11,13	163:7 164:15,19
174:20 176:25	20:2 58:7 95:14	reminded 23:21	129:22 131:11,17	164:23 165:9
			131:21 133:7	
regards 3:24 108:3 129:21 169:20	relying 8:22 135:11	reminding 9:8	136:25 138:3,22	responsibilities
	remain 7:16,25	remove 179:20	· /	150:1 151:15
174:19 193:2	194:1	Renfield 127:17	139:17,18,25	153:1 180:13
REGENERATI	remained 204:17	repeat 2:10 118:7	140:3 147:5	responsibility
214:13	remains 7:6 11:22	131:23 135:16	148:24 149:2	124:12
region 152:24	75:4	139:2 189:2	182:19 184:11	rest 20:21 97:9
regionally 152:17	remember 3:14,22	rephrase 189:2	189:10 190:13	158:10
regions 152:11	4:7,13,14 6:4	report 16:21 53:18	195:10	result 4:11 139:24
regular 118:11,12	12:14,20 14:16,22	72:5 90:1 94:11	rescued 7:8 64:1	152:21,22 183:2
118:12 151:18	15:4,17 16:8	95:1,14 99:20	83:12,25 120:25	resume 71:13 113:8
191:24	19:15 21:2,23,24	101:21 102:8	134:8 139:12	retrieved 147:12
relate 83:1 118:23	22:9 23:4,5 25:12	104:8 105:16	195:5	return 179:14
122:15	28:10 37:20 38:22	106:19 126:20,22	rescues 36:3	review 181:15
related 53:20 154:7	39:20 40:8,19	130:2 137:16	rescuing 132:1	right 1:8 2:16 9:17
relating 13:7	44:11,19,19 45:1	167:24 178:10	resident 4:25 83:4	9:24 16:9 17:4,18
relation 12:4 79:8	45:2,2,4 46:2	reported 22:13	101:11 102:2	22:17 25:9 26:9
84:23 91:2 92:19	48:24 49:1 51:3	84:13 90:6 100:22	103:23 104:1,12	26:23,25 27:4,6
98:20 101:10,13	51:14,20,22 54:20	105:15 138:24	128:2 130:6	27:14 34:22 37:16
104:6 110:24	55:12 64:15,17,18	139:14 168:20	159:13	42:19 47:17 48:2
116:22 117:1	66:14,20 67:5,23	reporting 54:1	residential 4:20 5:1	57:1,12 59:3 60:8
122:8 124:17	69:4,14 70:4	202:17	203:3	62:9 63:5 71:16
128:15 152:12	74:23 78:23 79:23	representing 46:7	residents 83:25	73:14 75:17 76:24
153:1,20 171:4,21	79:25 80:1,23	request 19:19,24	91:3,13 153:13	77:7,20,22 78:5
173:4 178:8	86:20 90:22,23	22:12 23:1 24:23	158:19 161:23	79:5 80:19 82:9
179:10,25 182:15	91:1,5,23 92:3	24:24 44:3,10	174:21 175:18	88:11,12 90:7
relationship 151:22	96:11,13,14 97:13	45:25 46:17 50:10	176:15 177:13	95:3 96:10 101:14
relationships 152:3	97:24 98:1,7,21	50:13 108:21,22	179:10	106:3 110:1 113:8
170:14	99:5,7,12 100:17	139:24 181:9	resolve 143:21	113:19 114:25
relative 74:2	101:4,6 105:4,8	requested 108:25	148:11,12	115:11,18,23
119:18 137:20	105:15,17,19,21	172:23	resource 68:10	116:5 127:18
relatively 28:18	105:23,25 111:2,4	requesting 180:18	resources 108:12	129:14 133:18
118:3 174:6	111:5 117:22	requests 143:19,23	108:19 131:19	136:20,24 140:17
relay 61:7	127:23,24,25	require 92:18	143:14,17,19,24	141:6,8 142:24
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
	<u> </u>	!	I	I

144:25 145:3,7 26:20 30:4,21 36:24 37:2,7,8,12 50:10 7ule 89:14 135:22 136:1 7un 187:16,24 7un 187:18,24 7un 187:16,24 7un 187:18,24 7un 187:18,24 7un 187:18,24 7un 187:18,24 7un 187:18,24 7un 187:18,24 7un 187					raye 243
146:24,25 147:7 36:24 37:2,78,12 37:21 41:17,25 7:0189:14	144.25 145.3 7	26:20 30:4 21	RT4 25·1 44·4	Sarah 1:9 10 12 21	scale 6:3 122:2
148.3 151:11 37.21 41:17,25 run l89:14 sat 9:3,6 18:17,19 201:21 164:6 173:20 44:15,17 47:21 run l87:16,24 135:22 136:1 scary 47:25 186:15 187:4 54:2 58:17 59:25 608:63:10 67:11 run l87:16,24 runing 56:1 sat 9:3,6 18:17,19 scenarios 190:20 198:22 199:2 71:12 72:14 77:18 runing 56:1 sww 20:9 69:3 school 190:7,9,17 200:3,11,15 79:22 88:32 79:12 80:3 82:7 runs 188:13 202:25 prushed 130:14 Russ 177:5,5,23 111:2 21:4:5 savy 20:9 69:3 school 190:7,9,17 screen 6:22 10:16 school 190:7,9,17 screen 6:22 10:16 111:72:17:20 prushed 130:14 Russ 177:5,5,23 111:2 21:4:5 203:16 saying 9:12 23:5,22 203:16 saying 9:12 23:5,22 23:16 93:1,4 106:18 111:72:17:20 111:72:17:20 40:1 4:15 44:20 112:20:15 112:20:15 112:20:15 112:21 17:20 40:1 4:15 44:20 188:48 screen 6:22 10:16 16:22 17:23 16:16 27:48,20 45:5,14 54:16 62:9 63:4 68:3 45:25 19:17 17:17 20:11 22:25 17 27:10,14,14 75:1 10:22:21 36:18		,			
164:6173:20					*
176:22 182:7 50:21 51:12 52:4 run-up 35:7 running 56:1 189:7,11,18 68:9 69:2 70:1 71:12 72:14 77:18 72:13 194:14 68:9 69:2 70:1 71:12 72:14 77:18 72:12 77:25 78:8,11 77:25 78:8,11 77:25 78:8,11 77:25 78:8,11 77:25 78:8,11 77:25 78:21 79:12 80:3 82:7 79:12 80:3 82:7 79:12 80:3 82:7 79:12 80:3 82:7 79:12 80:3 82:7 184:5,7 199:24 111:22 124:5 189:31,37:4,17,18 93:3 97:4,17,18 180:5,18 199:22 21:12 11:12 11:12 10:13,23 114:24 10:13,23 114:24 10:16 11:13 17:19 10:13,23 114:24 10:16 11:13 17:19 10:13,23 114:24 10:16 11:13 17:19 10:13,23 114:24 10:16 11:13 181:14 126:18,21 161:13 181:14 126:18,21 181		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		·	
186:15 187:4 54:2 58:17 59:25 running 56:1 Saturday 159:25 scene 10:9 24:15 189:7,11,18 60:8 63:10 67:11 188:13 202:25 save 148:15 171:9,10 193:6 198:22 199:2 71:12 72:14 77:18 77:25 78:8,11 77:25 78:8,11 77:25 78:8,11 77:25 78:8,11 77:25 78:8,11 77:25 78:8,11 77:25 78:8,11 79:12 80:3 82:7 79:12 80:3 82:7 79:12 80:3 82:7 79:12 80:3 82:7 179:16 183:23 91:16 93:19 school 1907:9,17 screen 6:22 10:16 11:17 20:15 43:18 93:1,4 106:18 8ay:8,15,17 90:4 11:72,17:20 11:12 2124:5 11:12 2124:5 93:1,4 106:18 8ay:92:00 146:18 8ay:18 199:22 22:19 34:2 39:20 12:19:10 188:48 19:29:0 140:14 115 40:20 </td <td></td> <td>· ·</td> <td>-</td> <td></td> <td>· ·</td>		· ·	-		· ·
189:7,11,18			_		
192:13 194:14 198:22 199:2					
198:22 199:2					· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
200:3,11,15 202:20 205:20 79:12 80:3 82:7 207:7 212:1 215:8 219:10 87:24 88:12 89:6 189:8,15,17 90:4 right-hand 217:14 rigorous 212:11 214:16 ring 94:18 136:21 161:13 217:9 128:7 136:2 ringing 67:5 161:4 161:6 ring 54:18 1420 145:21,24 161:6 161:8 181:24 188:11 4126:18,21 188:11 4126 188:11 510,13,20,22 186:17 203:3 rise 7:13 71:4,10 161:8 181:24 188:11 84:15 161:8 181:24 188:11 84:15 161:8 181:24 189:10,13,20,22 186:17 203:3 rise 7:13 71:4,10 161:8 181:24 189:10,13,20,22 186:17 203:3 182:1 188:15 189:10,13,20,22 186:17 203:3 182:1 188:15 189:10,13,20,22 186:17 203:3 182:1 188:15 189:10,13,20,22 186:17 203:3 180:14 126:18 11:17 20:15 43:18 203:16 163:43:18 203:16 161:15 exorem 67:1 recem 61:19 167:22 170:23 188:4,8 20:10 22:13:2 168:43:3 120:11 129:10 167:22 170:23 188:4,8 20:10 22:13:1 100:13,23 114:24 181:14 126:18,21 11:17 17:22 25:14 45:5,14 54:16 58:23 61:9 63:1 38:24 99:13 38:24					, ,
202:20 205:20					
207:7 212:1 215:8 216:8 217:25 216:8 217:25 219:10 87:48:12 89:6 219:10 89:8.15,17 90:4 219:10 89:8.15,17 90:4 219:10 89:8.15,17 90:4 219:10 89:8.15,17 90:4 219:10 89:8.15,17 90:4 214:16 214:16 108:5,18 109:22 214:16 113:23 214:16 113:14 126:18,21 161:6 114:20 145:21,24 152:5 177:3,13 218:14 120:12,21 218:11 129:10 214:16 113:14 126:18,21 161:13 183:14 126:18,21 161:6 114:20 145:21,24 152:5 177:3,13 218:21 184:15 161:8 181:24 189:10,13,20,22 186:17 203:3 216:6 219:8 22 22 20:12,22 09:13 216:6 219:8 216:6	· · ·		' '		
216:8 217:25					· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
219:10 right-hand 217:14 rigorous 212:11 214:16 ring 94:18 136:21 161:13 118:14 126:18,21 161:13 161:6 ringing 67:5 161:4 161:6 17:9 128:7 136:2 17:9 128:7 136:2 17:9 128:7 136:2 17:9 128:7 136:2 18:14 136:21 18:14 126:18,21 18:14 135:12 12:11 12:22 18:22 12 12:11 190:22 100:4,18 18:14 14:16 18:14 12:1 18:14 12:1 12:1 12:1 12:1 12:1			-	• 0	
right-hand 217:14 93:3 97:4,17,18 11:17 13:2 25:14 45:5,14 54:16 screens 67:1 screens 67:1 rigorous 212:11 110:13,23 114:24 13:14 126:18,21 26:16 27:4,8,20 45:5,14 54:16 58:25 61:9 63:1 20:19 25:17,17 ring 94:18 136:21 118:14 126:18,21 50:19 52:10 54:3 33:5 36:8 43:3 54:4,9,13 57:1,6 64:6,7,17,18 69:4 62:19 22:137:17 27:14 57:11 60:16 62:9 63:4 68:8 62:9 63:4 68:8 69:1 74:3 82:24 69:1 74:3 82:24 69:1 74:3 82:24 69:1 74:3 82:24 69:1 74:3 82:24 69:1 74:3 82:24 69:1 74:3 82:24 10:45 116:119 10:45 116:119 10:45 116:7129:6 62:9 63:4 68:8 69:1 74:3 82:24 69:1 74:3 82:24 69:1 74:3 82:24 69:1 74:3 82:24 69:1 74:3 82:24 69:1 74:3 82:24 10:45 116:719:6 10:45 116:719:6 62:9 63:4 68:8 69:1 74:3 82:24 69:1 74:3 82:24 69:1 74:3 82:24 10:45 116:719:6 10:45 116:719:10 10:45 116:719:10 10:45 116:719:10 10:45 116:719:10 10:45 116:719:10 10:45 116:719:10 10:45 116:719:10 10:45 116:719:10 10:45 116:719:10 10:45 116:719:10 10:51 117:10 10:22 119:11 10:22					
rigorous 212:11 214:16 ring 94:18 136:21 118:14 126:18,21 161:13 ringing 67:5 161:4 140:17 143:3 161:6 riots 122:21 rise 7:13 71:4,10 161:8 181:24 161:8 181:24 161:8 181:24 189:10,13,20,22 186:17 203:3 risk 131:20 148:11 149:9 ROAD 203:9 ROAD 203:9 ROBD 13:6,14,16 219:22 Robert 113:23 role 2:20 18:9 34:3 S3:1,6 66:18 78:2 116:4 149:9 roue 2:20 18:9 34:3 S3:1,6 66:18 78:2 116:4 149:9 roue 18:14,15 150:4,7 153:6 154:4 180:12 190:23,24 roles 18:14,15 151:19 roue 18:14,15 151:19 roum 16:9,2:3,17 3:9 5:25 7:6 9:7 38:24 39:6,19 route 5:2,9 14:9,15 roum 16:9,2:3,17 3:9 5:25 7:6 9:7 38:24 39:6,19 33:5 36:8 43:3 33:5 36:8 43:3 38:24 99:1,3 64:6,7,17,18 69:4 83:24 99:1,3 62:9 63:1 64:6,7,17,18 69:4 83:24 99:1,3 182:1 184:15 118:14 126:18,21 120:14,16 75:3 138:16 161:19 102:22 136:18 62:9 63:4 68:8 69:1 74:3 82:24 1104:16 75:3 118:14:16 7:3 126:21 219:19 SAD 22:25 safe 5:4 14:9,14 31:14 35:12 37:17 54:5 96:4 100:8,9 13:14 49:9 rous 41:20 54:12 safest 7:16,25 safety 5:1,9 38:24 100:4 104:21 safest 7:16,25 safety 5:1,9 38:24 100:4 104:21 safest 7:16,25 safety 5:1,9 38:24 130:13 4:4 151:11 120:23 124:4 see 10:14 11:17 14:6,11 15:11 16:2 17:6 19:21 21:11 214:16 16:14:1 15:12 82:8,10 16:17 17:28 192:13 104:5 16:19 199:12 200:3,5,7 176:12,25 179:2 204:1,8 second 15:9 17:13 20:19 25:17,17 27:14 57:11 60:16 62:9 63:4 68:8 69:7 71:4 07:1 172:8 192:13 1104:18 201:7 172:8 192:13 1104:18 201:7 172:8 192:13 1104:18 201:7 172:8 192:13 1104:18 201:7 172:8 192:13 1104:18:11 112:28 20:7 170:18 20:11 118:18 12:6 18:19 17:3 205:12 020:18 217:12 22 204:1,8 second 15:9 17:13 20:19 52:10 54:3 33:5 36:8 43:3 38:24 99:1,3 168:23 171:7 104:5 116:71 104:5 116:71 104:5 116:71 104:5 116:71 104:5 116:71 104:5 116:71 104:5 116:71 104:5 116:71 104:5 116:71 104:5 116:71 104:5 116:71 104:5 116:71 104:5 116:71 104:5 116:71 104:5 116:71 104:5 116:19 104:5 116:19 104:5 116:19 104:5 116:19 104:5 116:19 104:5 116:19 104:5 116:19 104:5 116:19 104:5 116:19 104:5 116:19 104:5 116:19 104:5 116:19 104:5 116:19 104:5 116:19 104:5 116:19 104:18 201:7 104:5 116:19		f - f	,		,
214:16	C .	, ,		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
ring 94:18 136:21 118:14 126:18,21 50:19 52:10 54:3 83:24 99:1,3 27:14 57:11 60:16 ringing 67:5 161:4 140:17 143:3 54:4,9,13 57:1,6 35:44,9,13 57:1,6 35:25 1,6 62:9 63:4 68:8 riots 122:21 152:5 177:3,13 152:5 177:3,13 126:21 219:19 168:23 171:7 104:5 116:7 129:6 riots 122:21 188:14 184:15 189:10,13,20,22 190:12 191:7 S SAD 22:25 5afe 5:4 14:9,14 31:14 35:12 37:17 168:23 171:7 168:1 172:4 168:1 172:4 168:1 172:4 168:1 172:4 205:20 209:18 205:20 209:18 205:20 209:18 207:24 155:1 176:12,25 179:2 204:18 176:12,25 179:2 204:18 176:12,25 179:2 204:18 176:12,25 179:2 204:18 205:20 209:18 205:20 209:18 205:20 209:18 207:24 155:1 176:12,25 179:2 204:18 207:24 157:11 60:16 69:17 4:3 82:24 ROAD 203:9 Robert 113:23 rooms 41:20 54:12 200:13,25 200:13,25 20:18:9 34:3 20:19 11:18 157:25 176:17 193:3,4,15,19,20 194:8 201:7 28:21 19:19 172:25 216:9 205:20 209:18 217:1	C .	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
161:13 127:9 128:7 136:2 54:4,9,13 57:1,6 102:22 136:18 62:9 63:4 68:8 ringing 67:5 161:4 140:17 143:3 144:20 145:21,24 138:6 161:19 104:5 116:7 129:6 riots 122:21 152:5 177:3,13 126:21 219:19 168:23 171:7 104:5 116:7 129:6 rise 7:13 71:4,10 182:1 184:15 182:1 184:15 182:1 184:15 126:21 219:19 172:8 192:13 130:24 155:1 130:24 155:1 161:8 181:24 189:10,13,20,22 SAD 22:25 5afe 5:4 14:9,14 199:12 200:3,5,7 200:10,15,17,25 202:1,22 209:13 202:1,22 209:13 202:1,22 200:13,27 200:10,15,17,25 202:1,22 209:13 202:1,22 209:13 157:25 176:17 101:9 11:18 2:6 176:12,25 179:2 204:1,8 secondly 119:17 176:12,25 179:2 204:1,8 secondly 119:17 177:25 25 26:4 28:1 217:1 101:9 11:18 12:6 172:25 26:4 28:1 217:1 172:25 26:4 28:1 217:1 172:25 26:5 26:4 28:1 217:1 secondly 119:17 172:25 216:9 217:1 172:25 26:4 28:1 217:1 172:25 26:4 28:1 217:1 172:25 26:4 28:1 217:1 262:19 98:20 100:1 182:14 4:16 42:16 <td>· -</td> <td>-</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>	· -	-			
ringing 67:5 161:4 140:17 143:3 63:17 71:1 72:3,9 138:6 161:19 69:1 74:3 82:24 riots 122:21 152:5 177:3,13 126:21 219:19 168:23 171:7 104:5 116:7 129:6 rise 7:13 71:4,10 182:1 184:15 189:10,13,20,22 5 5 194:18 201:7 168:23 171:7 104:5 116:7 129:6 161:8 181:24 189:10,13,20,22 5 SAD 22:25 safe 5:4 14:9,14 199:12 200:3,5,7 200:10,15,17,25 safe 5:4 14:9,14 205:20 209:18 204:1,8 secondly 119:17 172:25 216:9 217:1 172:25 216:9 217:1 172:25 216:9 217:1 172:25 216:9 217:1 172:25 216:9 217:1 172:25 216:9 217:1 172:25 216:9 217:1 172:25 216:9 217:1 172:25 216:9 217:1 172:25 216:9 217:1 28:21 297:1,11,7	_	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		· /	
161:6 144:20 145:21,24 72:10,14,16 75:3 168:23 171:7 104:5 116:7 129:6 riots 122:21 152:5 177:3,13 126:21 219:19 172:8 192:13 130:24 155:1 130:24 155:1 rise 7:13 71:4,10 182:1 184:15 189:10,13,20,22 S 194:18 201:7 162:8 181:24 199:12 200:35,7 200:10,15,17,25 SAD 22:25 Safe 5:4 14:9,14 200:20 209:18 202:1,22 209:13 210:4 211:3 215:4 31:14 35:12 37:17 10:19 11:18 12:6 172:25 216:9 204:1,8 secondly 119:17 172:25 216:9 204:1,8 secondly 119:17 166:21 279:1 168:23 171:7 104:5 116:7 129:6 130:24 155:1 168:1 172:4 172:4 152:1 168:1 172:4 176:12,25 179:2 204:1,8 secondly 119:17 205:20 209:18 217:21,22 says 7:1,11,23 10:19 11:18 12:6 172:25 216:9 204:1,8 secondly 119:17 172:25 216:9 204:1,8 secondly 119:17 31:43 45:12 25 172:25 216:9 204:1,8 seconds 73:23 section 65:17 134:20 172:25 216:9 217:1 172:25 216:9 217:1 134:20 134:20 134:20 134:20 134			, , , , ,		
riots 122:21 152:5 177:3,13 126:21 219:19 172:8 192:13 130:24 155:1 rise 7:13 71:4,10 182:1 184:15 189:10,13,20,22 SAD 22:25 SAD 22:25 205:20 209:18 176:12,25 179:2 204:1,8 risk 131:20 148:11 199:12 200:3,5,7 afe 5:4 14:9,14 217:21,22 204:1,8 secondly 119:17 172:5 216:9 200:10,15,17,25 31:14 35:12 37:17 54:5 66:4 100:8,9 157:25 176:17 10:19 11:18 12:6 172:25 216:9 217:1 secondly 119:17 172:25 216:9 217:1 seconds 73:23 section 65:17 172:25 216:9 217:1 seconds 73:23 section 65:17 172:25 216:9 217:1 134:4 16 42:16 48:11 49:6 50:22 134:20 SECURE 161:13 seconds 73:23 section 65:17 134:20 SECURE 161:13 security 39:6,9 40:17 64:4			,		
rise 7:13 71:4,10 182:1 184:15 189:10,13,20,22 5 194:18 201:7 168:1 172:4 176:12,25 179:2 204:18 176:12,25 179:2 204:18 176:12,25 179:2 204:18 176:12,25 179:2 204:18 176:12,25 179:2 204:18 201:19:17 168:1 172:4 176:12,25 179:2 204:18 201:19:17 205:20 209:18 217:21,22 204:18 secondly 119:17 172:25 216:9 204:18 201:19:17 172:25 216:9 204:18 201:19:17 172:25 216:9 204:18 201:19:17 172:25 216:9 204:18 201:19:17 172:25 216:9 204:18 201:19:17 172:25 216:9 204:18 201:19 119:18 12:6 201:18 201:19 119:18 12:6 202:13 172:25 216:9 204:18 202:17:1 205:20 20:18:9 201:19 119:17 172:25 216:9 204:18 202:17:1 202:20 10:19 100:49:21 202:17:1 202:20 10:19 202:20 10:19 202:20 10:19 202:20 10:19 202:20 10:19 202:20 10:19 202:20 10:19 202:20 10:19 202:20 10:19 202:20 10:19 202:20 10:19 202:20		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	, ,		
161:8 181:24 189:10,13,20,22 190:12 191:7 199:12 200:3,5,7 200:10,15,17,25 3afe 5:4 14:9,14 31:14 35:12 37:17 54:5 66:4 100:8,9 157:25 176:17 219:22 216:6 219:8 70 cm 1:6,9 2:3,17 3:9 5:25 7:6 9:7 13:14 15:12 16:19,25 18:5,18 217:1 200:24 210:9 217:1 200:24 210:9 200:10,15,17,25 200:10,15,17,25 3afe 5:4 14:9,14 31:14 35:12 37:17 54:5 66:4 100:8,9 157:25 176:17 193:3,415,19,20 194:7 205:16,24 34:11 49:6 50:22 194:7 205:16,24 34:11 49:6 50:22 54:4 55:7 57:15 52:16 62:19 98:20 100:1 13:20 52:14 3:6 13:3,25 26:4 28:1 217:1 3econds 73:23 3ection 65:17 34:20 54:12 194:7 205:16,24 35:18 37:4 40:18 148:12 54:4 180:12 69:7 95:7 96:12 118:3 58:10 63:13 83:8 102:20 104:11 120:23 124:4 100:4 104:21 106:20 168:9 70 cm 1:6,9 2:3,17 3:9 5:25 7:6 9:7 38:24 39:6,19 39:525 7:6 9:7 13:16 14:1 15:12 16:19,25 18:5,18 217:1 82:8,10 164:17 98:19 99:10,13 209:24 210:9 54:21 57:10,21		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	126:21 219:19		
186:17 203:3	-				
risk 131:20 148:11 199:12 200:3,5,7 safe 5:4 14:9,14 says 7:1,11,23 secondly 119:17 ROAD 203:9 200:10,15,17,25 54:5 66:4 100:8,9 13:3,25 26:4 28:1 172:25 216:9 Rob 113:6,14,16 210:4 211:3 215:4 216:6 219:8 157:25 176:17 28:21 29:7,11,17 seconds 73:23 section 65:17 Robert 113:23 rooms 41:20 54:12 97:7 140:4,7 193:3,4,15,19,20 34:8 41:16 42:16 section 65:17 16:4 149:2,3,16 150:4,7 153:6 rota 149:9 58:10 63:13 83:8 102:20 104:11 security 39:6,9 15:19 round 64:25 165:13 route 5:2,9 14:9,15 16:20 168:9 roud 64:25 165:13 route 5:2,9 14:9,15 19:19 148:11 16:7,18 167:7 16:10,17 177:10 20:22 20:24 20:22 20:24 20:22 20:24 20:22 20:24 20:22 20:24 36:12 43:23 45:16 15:19 round 64:25 165:13 route 5:2,9 14:9,15 14:19 15:3,6 samples 4:1 16:17,17:10 20:22 20:24 20:22 20:24 20:22 20:24 20:22 20:24 20:22 20:24 20:22 20:24 20:22 20:24 20:22 20:24 20:24 210:9 20:24 210:9 20:24 210:9					
149:9 200:10,15,17,25 31:14 35:12 37:17 10:19 11:18 12:6 172:25 216:9 Rob 113:6,14,16 219:22 216:6 219:8 210:4 211:3 215:4 216:6 219:8 157:25 176:17 28:21 29:7,11,17 seconds 73:23 Robert 113:23 roms 41:20 54:12 97:7 140:4,7 193:3,4,15,19,20 48:11 49:6 50:22 54:4 55:7 57:15 56:49 98:20 100:1 56:10 65:17 150:4,7 153:6 150:4,7 153:6 155:4,4 180:12 69:7 95:7 96:12 40:18 148:12 62:19 98:20 100:1 56:10:14 11:17 190:23,24 100:4 104:21 106:20 168:9 58:10 63:13 83:8 102:20 104:11 16:21 7:6 19:21 151:19 round 64:25 165:13 route 5:2,9 14:9,15 19:19 148:11 21:16,20 22:6,22 13:16 14:1 15:12 38:24 39:6,19 38:24 39:6,19 38:24 39:6,19 19:19 148:11 20:3:2 206:9 20:22 200:24 20:23 206:9 20:24 210:9 20:24 210:9 20:24 210:9 54:21 57:10,21				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	,
ROAD 203:9 200:1,22 209:13 202:1,22 209:13 210:4 211:3 215:4 219:22 54:5 66:4 100:8,9 157:25 176:17 193:3,4,15,19,20 194:7 205:16,24 safely 35:18 37:4 40:18 148:12 156:4,7 153:6 150:4,7 153:6 150:23,24 13:3,25 26:4 28:1 28:21 29:7,11,17 34:8 41:16 42:16 48:11 49:6 50:22 54:4 55:7 57:15 58:10 63:13 83:8 100:20 104:11 18:3 58:10 63:13 83:8 100:20 104:11 18:3 186ett 7:16,25 118:3 119:19 148:11 106:20 168:9 13:3,25 26:4 28:1 217:1 217:1 seconds 73:23 section 65:17 134:20 SECURE 161:13 security 39:6,9 40:17 64:4 see 10:14 11:17 120:23 124:4 16:21 7:6 19:21 16:2 17:6 19:21 16:2 17:6 19:21 16:2 17:6 19:21 16:2 17:6 19:21 16:3 27:12,16,24 21:11 214:16 samples 4:1 13:16 14:1 15:12 16:19,25 18:5,18 ROb 113:6,14,16 219:22 200:1,22 200:24 200:1,22 200:24 217:1 13:3,25 26:4 28:1 217:1 217:1 seconds 73:23 section 65:17 134:20 SECURE 161:13 security 39:6,9 40:17 64:4 see 10:14 11:17 security 39:6,9 40:17 64:4 see 10:14 11:17 18:3 120:23 124:4 130:5,25 131:1 16:2 17:6 19:21 136:16,18 148:10 23:2 24:1,13,23 26:3 27:12,16,24 21:16,20 22:6,22 20:24 21:19 20:19 98:20 100:1 18:3 16:2 17:6 19:21 13:6 20:20 104:11 16:2 17:6 19:21 16:2 17:1 20:19 20:24 20:24 18:40 20:25 18:5 20	risk 131:20 148:11				
Rob 113:6,14,16 219:22 210:4 211:3 215:4 216:6 219:8 rooms 41:20 54:12 97:7 140:4,7 193:3,4,15,19,20 16:4 149:2,3,16 150:4,7 153:6 154:4 180:12 190:23,24 roles 18:14,15 151:19 room 1:6,9 2:3,17 3:9 5:25 7:6 9:7 13:16 14:1 15:12 16:19,25 18:5,18 157:25 176:17 193:3,4,15,19,20 194:7 205:16,24 section 65:17 194:7 205:16,24 safely 35:18 37:4 40:18 148:12 safer 57:20,23 58:10 63:13 83:8 102:20 100:1 100:4,5,7,8 100:4,5,7,8 100:20 104:11 120:23 124:4 see 10:14 11:17 16:2 17:6 19:21 120:23 124:4 130:5,25 131:1 16:2 17:6 19:21 120:23 124:4 130:5,25 131:1 16:2 17:6 19:21 120:23 124:4 130:5,25 131:1 16:2 17:6 19:21 120:23 124:4 130:5,25 131:1 16:2 17:6 19:21 120:23 124:4 130:5,25 131:1 16:2 17:6 19:21 120:23 124:4 130:5,25 131:1 16:2 17:6 19:21 120:23 124:4 130:5,25 131:1 16:2 17:6 19:21 120:23 124:4 130:5,25 131:1 16:2 17:6 19:21 120:23 124:4 130:5,25 131:1 16:2 17:6 19:21 120:23 124:4 130:5,25 131:1 16:2 17:6 19:21 120:23 124:4 130:15 134:24 130:1	149:9	200:10,15,17,25		10:19 11:18 12:6	172:25 216:9
Robert 113:23 216:6 219:8 193:3,4,15,19,20 34:8 41:16 42:16 section 65:17 Robert 113:23 rooms 41:20 54:12 97:7 140:4,7 safely 35:18 37:4 48:11 49:6 50:22 section 65:17 53:1,6 66:18 78:2 191:14 202:13 40:18 148:12 62:19 98:20 100:1 section 65:17 150:4,7 153:6 150:4,7 153:6 rota 149:9 safer 57:20,23 58:10 63:13 83:8 102:20 104:11 security 39:6,9 40:17 64:4 150:23,24 roughly 2:21 43:6 69:7 95:7 96:12 118:3 120:23 124:4 120:20 104:11 120:23 124:4 120:23 124:4 120:23 124:4 120:23 124:4 120:23 124:4 120:23 124:4<	ROAD 203:9	202:1,22 209:13	,	13:3,25 26:4 28:1	217:1
Robert 113:23 rooms 41:20 54:12 194:7 205:16,24 48:11 49:6 50:22 134:20 role 2:20 18:9 34:3 97:7 140:4,7 40:18 148:12 54:4 55:7 57:15 52:19 98:20 100:1 54:4 55:7 57:15 52:19 98:20 100:1 52:1	Rob 113:6,14,16	210:4 211:3 215:4		28:21 29:7,11,17	seconds 73:23
role 2:20 18:9 34:3 97:7 140:4,7 safely 35:18 37:4 54:4 55:7 57:15 SECURE 161:13 53:1,6 66:18 78:2 191:14 202:13 40:18 148:12 54:4 55:7 57:15 security 39:6,9 150:4,7 153:6 rota 149:9 58:10 63:13 83:8 102:20 104:11 security 39:6,9 150:4,7 153:6 69:7 95:7 96:12 18:3 18:3 102:20 104:11 security 39:6,9 150:4,7 153:6 69:7 95:7 96:12 18:3 18:3 102:20 104:11 security 39:6,9 150:4,7 153:6 69:7 95:7 96:12 18:3 18:3 102:20 104:11 security 39:6,9 151:19 100:4 104:21 safest 7:16,25 130:5,25 131:1 16:2 17:6 19:21 16:2 17:6 19:21 151:19 151:19 100:4 25 165:13 19:19 148:11 13:16 14:18:10 23:2 24:1,13,23 150:14 15:3,6 38:24 39:6,19 38:24 39:6,19 168:10,17 177:10 29:19 30:7 35:3 151:19 82:8,10 164:17 82:8,10 164:17 98:19 99:10,13 209:24 210:9 48:10 50:4,8,22 151:19 151:10 151:10 151:10 151:10	219:22	216:6 219:8		34:8 41:16 42:16	section 65:17
53:1,6 66:18 78:2 116:4 149:2,3,16 150:4,7 153:6 150:4,7 153:6 191:14 202:13 rota 149:9 safer 57:20,23 58:10 63:13 83:8 154:4 180:12 100:4 104:21 100:4 104:21 151:19 round 64:25 165:13 round 64:2	Robert 113:23	rooms 41:20 54:12	-	48:11 49:6 50:22	134:20
116:4 149:2,3,16 rota 149:9 safer 57:20,23 100:4,5,7,8 40:17 64:4 150:4,7 153:6 69:7 95:7 96:12 118:3 120:23 124:4 14:6,11 15:11 190:23,24 100:4 104:21 safest 7:16,25 130:5,25 131:1 16:2 17:6 19:21 151:19 round 64:25 165:13 safety 5:1,9 38:24 132:15 134:24 21:16,20 22:6,22 151:19 round 64:25 165:13 39:19 40:6,15 136:16,18 148:10 23:2 24:1,13,23 19:19 148:11 19:19 148:11 20:3 27:12,16,24 13:16 14:1 15:12 38:24 39:6,19 samples 4:1 179:22 200:24 36:12 43:23 45:16 16:19,25 18:5,18 217:1 98:19 99:10,13 209:24 210:9 54:21 57:10,21	role 2:20 18:9 34:3	97:7 140:4,7	•	54:4 55:7 57:15	SECURE 161:13
116:4 149:2,3,16 rota 149:9 safer 57:20,23 100:4,5,7,8 40:17 64:4 150:4,7 153:6 69:7 95:7 96:12 118:3 102:20 104:11 see 10:14 11:17 154:4 180:12 190:23,24 100:4 104:21 safest 7:16,25 130:5,25 131:1 16:2 17:6 19:21 roles 18:14,15 106:20 168:9 round 64:25 165:13 safety 5:1,9 38:24 132:15 134:24 21:16,20 22:6,22 151:19 round 64:25 165:13 39:19 40:6,15 136:16,18 148:10 23:2 24:1,13,23 room 1:6,9 2:3,17 14:19 15:3,6 38:24 39:6,19 samples 4:1 179:22 200:24 29:19 30:7 35:3 3:9 5:25 7:6 9:7 38:24 39:6,19 82:8,10 164:17 98:19 99:10,13 209:24 210:9 48:10 50:4,8,22 16:19,25 18:5,18 217:1 98:19 99:10,13 209:24 210:9 54:21 57:10,21	53:1,6 66:18 78:2	191:14 202:13		62:19 98:20 100:1	security 39:6,9
150:4,7 153:6 roughly 2:21 43:6 58:10 63:13 83:8 102:20 104:11 see 10:14 11:17 154:4 180:12 69:7 95:7 96:12 118:3 120:23 124:4 14:6,11 15:11 190:23,24 100:4 104:21 safest 7:16,25 130:5,25 131:1 16:2 17:6 19:21 151:19 round 64:25 165:13 39:19 40:6,15 136:16,18 148:10 23:2 24:1,13,23 165:7,18 167:7 14:19 15:3,6 212:11 214:16 22:211 214:16 29:19 30:7 35:3 3:9 5:25 7:6 9:7 38:24 39:6,19 82:8,10 164:17 Samson 88:14 203:2 206:9 48:10 50:4,8,22 16:19,25 18:5,18 217:1 98:19 99:10,13 209:24 210:9 54:21 57:10,21	116:4 149:2,3,16	rota 149:9		100:4,5,7,8	40:17 64:4
154:4 180:12 69:7 95:7 96:12 118:3 120:23 124:4 14:6,11 15:11 190:23,24 100:4 104:21 safest 7:16,25 130:5,25 131:1 16:2 17:6 19:21 roles 18:14,15 106:20 168:9 round 64:25 165:13 39:19 40:6,15 132:15 134:24 21:16,20 22:6,22 151:19 route 5:2,9 14:9,15 119:19 148:11 165:7,18 167:7 26:3 27:12,16,24 room 1:6,9 2:3,17 14:19 15:3,6 212:11 214:16 168:10,17 177:10 29:19 30:7 35:3 3:9 5:25 7:6 9:7 38:24 39:6,19 samples 4:1 179:22 200:24 36:12 43:23 45:16 13:16 14:1 15:12 82:8,10 164:17 Samson 88:14 203:2 206:9 48:10 50:4,8,22 16:19,25 18:5,18 217:1 98:19 99:10,13 209:24 210:9 54:21 57:10,21		roughly 2:21 43:6			see 10:14 11:17
190:23,24 100:4 104:21 safest 7:16,25 130:5,25 131:1 16:2 17:6 19:21 roles 18:14,15 106:20 168:9 safety 5:1,9 38:24 132:15 134:24 21:16,20 22:6,22 151:19 round 64:25 165:13 39:19 40:6,15 136:16,18 148:10 23:2 24:1,13,23 room 1:6,9 2:3,17 14:19 15:3,6 212:11 214:16 22:211 214:16 29:19 30:7 35:3 3:9 5:25 7:6 9:7 38:24 39:6,19 samples 4:1 179:22 200:24 36:12 43:23 45:16 13:16 14:1 15:12 82:8,10 164:17 98:19 99:10,13 209:24 210:9 54:21 57:10,21	*			120:23 124:4	14:6,11 15:11
roles 18:14,15 106:20 168:9 safety 5:1,9 38:24 132:15 134:24 21:16,20 22:6,22 151:19 106:20 168:9 39:19 40:6,15 136:16,18 148:10 23:2 24:1,13,23 106:20 168:9 106:20 168:9 39:19 40:6,15 136:16,18 148:10 23:2 24:1,13,23 106:20 168:9 106:20 168:9 106:20 168:9 130:15 134:24 23:2 24:1,13,23 106:20 168:9 106:20 168:9 139:19 40:6,15 136:16,18 148:10 23:2 24:1,13,23 106:20 168:9 119:19 148:11 165:7,18 167:7 26:3 27:12,16,24 29:19 30:7 35:3 106:20 168:9 119:19 148:11 165:7,18 167:7 29:19 30:7 35:3 29:19 30:7 35:3 106:20 168:9 119:19 148:11 168:10,17 177:10 29:19 30:7 35:3 29:19 30:7 35:3 106:20 169:0 179:22 200:24 36:12 43:23 45:16 48:10 50:4,8,22 106:19,25 18:5,18 217:1 98:19 99:10,13 209:24 210:9 54:21 57:10,21		100:4 104:21	safest 7:16,25		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
151:19 round 64:25 165:13 39:19 40:6,15 136:16,18 148:10 23:2 24:1,13,23 roof 14:17 route 5:2,9 14:9,15 119:19 148:11 165:7,18 167:7 26:3 27:12,16,24 3:9 5:25 7:6 9:7 38:24 39:6,19 samples 4:1 29:19 30:7 35:3 13:16 14:1 15:12 82:8,10 164:17 Samson 88:14 203:2 206:9 48:10 50:4,8,22 16:19,25 18:5,18 217:1 98:19 99:10,13 209:24 210:9 54:21 57:10,21			safety 5:1,9 38:24	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
roof 14:17 route 5:2,9 14:9,15 119:19 148:11 165:7,18 167:7 26:3 27:12,16,24 room 1:6,9 2:3,17 14:19 15:3,6 212:11 214:16 168:10,17 177:10 29:19 30:7 35:3 3:9 5:25 7:6 9:7 38:24 39:6,19 samples 4:1 179:22 200:24 36:12 43:23 45:16 13:16 14:1 15:12 82:8,10 164:17 Samson 88:14 203:2 206:9 48:10 50:4,8,22 16:19,25 18:5,18 217:1 98:19 99:10,13 209:24 210:9 54:21 57:10,21			39:19 40:6,15		-
room 1:6,9 2:3,17 14:19 15:3,6 212:11 214:16 168:10,17 177:10 29:19 30:7 35:3 3:9 5:25 7:6 9:7 38:24 39:6,19 samples 4:1 179:22 200:24 36:12 43:23 45:16 13:16 14:1 15:12 82:8,10 164:17 Samson 88:14 203:2 206:9 48:10 50:4,8,22 16:19,25 18:5,18 217:1 98:19 99:10,13 209:24 210:9 54:21 57:10,21			119:19 148:11	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	, ,
3:9 5:25 7:6 9:7 38:24 39:6,19 samples 4:1 179:22 200:24 36:12 43:23 45:16 13:16 14:1 15:12 82:8,10 164:17 Samson 88:14 203:2 206:9 48:10 50:4,8,22 16:19,25 18:5,18 217:1 98:19 99:10,13 209:24 210:9 54:21 57:10,21			212:11 214:16	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
13:16 14:1 15:12 82:8,10 164:17 Samson 88:14 203:2 206:9 48:10 50:4,8,22 16:19,25 18:5,18 217:1 98:19 99:10,13 209:24 210:9 54:21 57:10,21		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	samples 4:1	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
16:19,25 18:5,18 217:1 98:19 99:10,13 209:24 210:9 54:21 57:10,21		,	_		
		· ·	98:19 99:10,13		′ ′
			100:17,21 101:3		
		<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

				raye 244
63:4 67:21 71:5	46:20 50:13	she'll 75:18 109:24	127:4 219:4	142:25 156:4
72:22 73:6,22	sentence 139:3	182:2		161:20 194:2
83:20,21 86:10			simultaneously 84:11	217:2,5
1	separate 79:12 139:16 140:12	shift 18:6,7 78:7 79:20 93:2 204:22		situations 15:25
95:7 96:22 97:22			sir 1:3,11,14 26:12	
99:22 100:4	178:23	shock 103:15	26:15,23 27:4,6	121:3 162:23
102:13 104:10,21	September 3:13	short 2:9 21:17	56:15,17,20 57:1	six 21:25 110:21
106:20 111:16,20	149:3	27:2 43:20 50:6	57:3,5 71:8,16,21	167:6 190:17
111:23 129:9,13	serious 66:11	56:24 71:23 75:25	71:25 75:10,17,21	six-week 78:19
134:3 136:15	serves 127:18	85:5,11,13 87:17	76:2,5,7,13,15,16	116:24 117:9
137:11 140:24	service 19:19,24	110:4 113:11	76:18,21,24	skip 21:25
165:16 167:20	22:12 23:1 24:23	123:7 144:6,14	102:13 106:1,6,10	Sky 140:16 202:1
168:9 171:4	44:3,10 45:25	145:5 181:22	106:13 109:16,17	slightly 69:25 71:17
172:25 173:20	46:17 50:10,13	182:9 183:18	109:19,20,24	160:24 181:18
177:9 181:7,15	73:15 77:19 83:22	186:14 189:1	110:2,6,9 112:14	slower 17:10
183:8 186:4	114:24 119:11	215:15,25	112:19 113:1,3,7	small 212:19
187:17 196:16	124:11 139:19	shortly 27:25 34:1	113:9,13,14,15,18	smart 217:15,17,22
206:15,23 209:23	140:4 148:24	should've 23:21,25	144:9,11,17,22,25	Smith 61:20 62:22
210:2,8 216:3	149:2 161:11	181:23 183:17	145:2,3,7,10	64:3,13,24 66:7
seeing 10:14 11:12	182:19 189:11	shout 20:6 106:14	146:12,18,25	smoke 5:10 7:14,17
21:23 22:9 34:19	190:13,19 192:14	128:23 177:9	147:3,4,7,9,11,15	8:1,6,13,14 9:21
58:8 67:23 68:23	195:10	shouting 83:21	147:17,18,19	10:3,21 11:25
69:19	services 53:8 74:1	show 2:19 11:16	148:13 169:7	12:2,3,8,17 13:13
seek 151:2 201:13	75:25 85:22,24	52:9 58:4 200:23	181:17,19,21	14:19 15:5,8 25:7
seen 23:15,16,22,25	108:12 110:15	202:21	182:6,7,11 185:3	29:14 30:1,2,2,7
25:10,25 38:7	124:13 139:17,25	showing 68:10	185:4,11,13,15,16	30:19,20 31:5,11
102:19 124:7	154:17	202:7	185:22 186:4,9,20	31:23 33:7 35:8
126:4 154:21	session 190:9	shown 16:20 21:17	186:22,25 187:4	35:20,21 40:22,25
160:19 169:4	set 52:23 89:1	35:5 54:21 72:5	187:20,23 188:1,2	41:1,3 42:4 54:3,4
203:13	138:19 166:10,11	73:21	215:15,23 216:2	54:10,11 59:10
self 136:25	166:12,14,17,18	shut 63:11 108:6	218:9,14,21,25	61:11 63:11,24
self-closing 107:21	166:25 183:2	194:24	219:13	82:12,13 83:6
self-rescue 138:22	194:14 209:23	shutting 35:9 54:11	sit 1:14 19:9 76:22	100:14 117:25
send 49:24 55:5	212:2 213:20	sic 199:22	113:19 147:7,16	119:9 121:3 134:4
63:23 108:25	216:23	side 17:6,14 37:6	204:25	168:16,25 184:16
sending 41:3 43:14	seven 167:6 181:19	43:16 217:14	sits 98:24	194:1 204:12
59:20 63:24 64:8	shadowing 200:10	219:7	sitting 16:19 17:3,5	210:18
senior 52:3 59:25	shape 15:3	sign 19:22	17:16,18 47:19	smoky 42:1 54:9,22
60:21 86:14,17	share 18:14 103:16	signal 2:2	59:25 205:2,3	55:4,5,7,8 168:11
88:20 89:10	170:15	signs 12:9	207:11 218:23	168:21,24 199:1
108:24 115:13	Sharon 16:16 19:6	silent 19:7 73:10	situation 5:4 6:2	204:11 207:20
201:13	19:10 22:13 24:14	Silver 171:10,10,12	7:18 11:11 15:10	210:18 211:7
sense 5:5,7 39:9	185:17 186:20,23	similar 152:19,19	15:19,23 16:1	social 69:11
40:16 45:19	187:9 219:25	Similarly 121:19	37:8 39:13 55:6	soft 41:12
sensible 164:8	she'd 33:14 37:23	simple 2:9 189:1	58:1 59:9 64:11	solely 10:5 78:8
sent 20:5 25:4	201:22 209:18	simply 75:4 105:1	67:7 68:23 82:19	solid 39:7 43:6
		r J		
	l	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

				1490 240
solutions 160:6	37:21 65:17	31:24 35:14,17	35:21 58:25 66:10	149:24 190:18
somebody 48:24	137:21 177:15	40:21 41:19 42:2	160:17 162:8	stations 190:18
51:12 86:5 206:20	186:17	47:15 49:11 61:13	168:20 213:2	195:20
someone's 33:12	speaks 129:25	91:2,12 98:2,11	starting 21:13	stay 5:4 7:12 40:17
83:19 129:13	special 79:4	100:10 103:9	158:4 210:18	42:1 45:5,20,21
132:4	specific 4:13,19 5:3	104:24 105:2	starts 20:24 202:24	54:6 57:23 60:18
soon 13:4 36:25	5:5 12:14 15:14	131:3,10,12 163:5	state 132:1	62:25 63:11 64:11
37:3 43:1 76:8	33:1 36:4 40:8	167:15,16 169:12	stated 120:14	79:1 80:6,7,24
91:23 92:25	60:24 64:18 80:8	180:6	156:23 161:12	81:4,6,10 83:9,11
174:12 201:22	80:21 82:10 83:23	stages 9:19	statement 2:19,22	83:20 85:4 91:3
205:18 213:9	117:3,14 118:9	staircase 14:18	3:1,8 10:15 11:24	95:21 96:20 100:6
214:3	122:12 127:2,8	stairs 61:12 65:7	16:11 19:3 25:16	102:22,22 111:2
sooner 109:18,18	139:24 154:15	104:14 105:20,24	25:24 26:5,7	117:7,14,24,25
110:1,1 144:22	159:8 193:18	stairwell 59:20	46:12 60:14 61:6	118:17,21,22
215:22	194:9 199:11	60:20	66:22 68:7,25	119:14 120:24
sorry 12:3 13:19	specifically 24:5,21	stairwells 98:4	77:6,9,13,21	121:5 125:2
23:21 28:4 56:13	51:6 80:12 140:1	213:3,17	78:17 79:19 81:1	132:14,19,22
64:16 73:19 96:13	140:9 183:23	stamp 43:22 165:10	82:23 83:11 84:6	133:1 135:1
112:16 118:7	192:16	166:1 167:6	88:20 89:19 92:23	142:16 153:10,11
131:23 135:13,16	specifics 46:2	173:17 176:12	95:19 98:20 103:4	153:14,21 157:12
139:2,3 145:23	spectrum 186:2	179:21	116:3,7 118:18	161:23 169:14
152:20 176:4	speculate 105:22	stamped 126:13	121:25 123:25	177:16 193:2
185:5 198:21	speed 84:14	Stanbridge 115:11	125:21 126:15,16	194:6 195:2,3,3
203:18 207:6	sphere 154:8	stand 77:13 114:11	128:8 130:5	205:16 210:21
210:13,14,15	split 204:22	148:18 187:1	133:14,25 134:12	212:8 213:22
216:7 218:14	spoke 45:13 67:3	188:18	137:10 138:12	214:3,15 215:6,7
219:5	107:12 139:18,23	standard 6:9 55:19	139:18 140:14	stay-put 6:13 7:21
sort 3:21 13:14	162:3 165:14	107:8 111:8	148:2,18,25	60:13 73:9 81:14
48:6 159:16 174:6	172:15 174:12,18	139:15 198:15	149:12 150:8	81:18 82:2,5,17
190:2,20	177:2,11	standards 212:12	153:25 154:13	82:18 91:4,7
sound 39:2 90:7	spoken 137:22	214:17	155:14 156:18	94:21 96:22 97:19
130:14 163:9	167:8,14 170:11	stands 108:17	158:15 163:19	118:19,24 119:3,6
sounded 28:18	173:7,22 174:4	stars 206:9	170:1 175:7 177:7	132:11 133:4
130:7,16,18 134:2	spread 24:6,10,12	start 1:19 11:7 13:6	177:10 182:16	142:19 153:7
sounds 20:11 90:9	47:8 119:17 191:3	16:13 18:7 24:13	188:4,11,23 189:8	162:13 163:2
210:22	spreading 42:24	26:21 28:10,20	192:23,24 199:20	169:18 175:4,8
source 8:15	57:17,19	31:17,20 33:17	200:24 204:2,7	178:1 189:23
sources 140:13	SR 43:25 50:8	34:2 47:17 61:24	207:14 208:3,25	190:2,3 192:23
south 16:16 20:17	Stables 88:16 90:16	70:23 81:20 87:7	212:3 213:14,20	193:9,23 218:2
spate 124:20,20	96:4 98:19 100:24	93:2 107:15 193:3	statements 114:1	stayed 45:10,16
speak 20:2 32:6	stack 66:24	194:7 195:21	states 72:13,16	65:6
34:3 42:11 50:3	stacking 19:5 20:8	197:14 205:15	214:15	staying 45:18 59:22
87:25 100:25	staff 51:12	started 3:12 19:14	stating 132:24	64:9 99:6 167:5
177:24 192:23	stage 13:7 23:16	20:22 23:3,18	212:7	steer 127:21
speaking 36:15	29:1 31:8,13,22	24:3 25:10 27:18	station 86:22 89:7	stenography

				raye 240
186:13	161:22	143:18 145:14	114:4	144:19 164:11
step-by-step 217:9	summarise 73:25	146:4,20	take 2:2 11:9 14:4	165:8,19 181:25
Sticking 12:24	78:3 203:19	Surrey's 122:7	16:12 19:14 22:11	215:19
stock 71:10 154:9	summarised	141:5 142:8 144:1	36:8 42:2,22	talked 4:1 123:6
stop 26:18 27:22	168:24	surrounding	43:25 47:22 53:21	talkgroup 165:19
35:8 119:17 138:9	Summarising	139:25 155:4	53:22 55:10 57:14	166:10,13,14,18
161:14	170:8	156:7	60:14 69:17 71:10	166:25 167:1
stopped 17:25	summary 53:23	survival 3:16,17	76:11,13 78:7,9	talkgroups 165:21
30:19 126:17	54:21 72:22 79:7	7:2 12:3 14:4	79:12 82:2 84:9	165:25 166:21
184:16	95:13 107:6	22:19 35:15 47:13	84:15,15,23 85:4	talking 30:3 32:5
stopping 68:5	125:25 135:6	60:4 79:2,5,9,13	85:20,21 86:1,5	33:25 37:23,24
storm-like 124:21	140:21 155:7	81:12,20 82:21	89:23 95:13 108:8	38:19 48:15 49:4
storm-fixe 124.21 story 146:20	175:12 207:14	83:1,10 92:20	109:17 122:23	86:18 124:6 141:9
straight 28:16	supervise 78:4,10	103:6 105:6 118:6	123:14,16,21	174:23 175:10,15
39:24 57:14 61:25	116:10,14	118:9,15 120:16	123.14,10,21	174.23 173.10,13
85:15 109:1 123:9	supervisor 17:4	153:8 190:5,6,10	130:8,15 132:19	tapes 190:25
195:24	85:16 127:8	190:21,25 194:16	130:8,13 132:19	-
strap 57:10	199:25 204:24	190:21,25 194:16	154:25 155:4,9,11	team 81:7 91:13,17 92:20 97:9,16
_		,	, ,	170:7 219:7
strategic 68:9	supervisors 18:13 116:5 125:24	216:18,22 217:3 suspect 185:20	157:9,21 161:9 178:25 186:11	
Stratford 16:25		-		technology 123:13
20:13 67:10	supplied 110:14	Sussex 85:21 swift 83:19	188:3,24 191:25	141:19 157:18
stressed 130:14	support 150:18,20		192:11,17 193:5	telephone 85:13
striking 168:22	150:22 219:7	switch 93:9,9	193:21 195:11	86:6 137:24
structure 150:5,13	supporting 150:12	sworn 76:19 147:13	196:8,25 197:10	television 92:17
171:15,18	suppose 101:2	186:23 219:20,23	197:25 198:1,2,4	140:19
struggling 65:14	supposed 2:9 18:13	219:25	199:16 200:21	tell 3:19 5:14 11:4
67:13	sure 17:22 23:6	system 17:9 18:17	204:15,17,23	17:3 27:22 28:16
stuck 83:2,5	53:13 55:15 58:18	18:20 19:16 20:3	205:8 206:1	32:7 33:19 34:12
stuff 80:5 82:13	61:5 69:24 73:11	20:4 67:21 86:3	taken 47:18 51:9	37:3,22 38:12
93:17	83:12 89:21 105:6	116:19 119:1	51:15,16 55:16	40:5,22,24 41:22
Suarez 154:2,14	157:16 169:6	122:6 123:7 126:6	72:11 75:23 79:10	43:1,7 47:7 58:22
subheadings 213:1	203:24	127:11 142:7,8,23	80:2 86:24 95:5	58:22,24 59:17
subject 69:25 70:9	surprise 93:25	148:9 149:9,21	129:10 150:6	61:9,20 64:2 66:1
submitted 175:13	146:12 159:22	150:5 153:4 162:7	188:24 199:9	66:12 67:1 70:5
subsequent 117:12	164:23	180:21,25 182:19	201:22 209:4	73:9,17 75:15
137:15 139:10	surprised 124:8	182:21 191:21	211:6,14,25	87:24 103:10
substance 101:2	Surrey 73:25 85:21	195:9 196:8,11,13	taker 115:20,22	112:23 131:5,7
substantive 78:13	114:23 115:2	196:15 199:4	116:15	132:16 136:22
118:16	117:13 120:24	206:17,25 207:10	takers 116:14	139:23 159:10
sufficient 139:9	121:11 122:14	208:12 214:21	takes 19:18 72:10	162:24 169:7
Suffolk 151:24	123:1,8 125:10	systems 166:7	79:21 126:21	191:16 193:2,13
152:1	126:7,22 128:11		talk 26:19 32:2	193:20 194:5,5,6
suggest 36:18	129:16 131:6,13		34:5 35:22 38:25	195:25 196:3,5
suggestion 183:8	136:11 138:9	tab 6:21 11:14	39:3 48:16 71:11	198:18 201:5
SUGGESTS	141:5,7,25 142:9	13:21 113:25	84:4 109:21 142:7	207:9 208:9 211:4

				Tage 217
214:3,3 216:5	146:15,17,22,24	26:13,17 29:2,3	148:9 172:18	134:7 137:6,17
217:18 218:11	147:1,9,15,19,23	31:23 32:4,17	173:2,2 199:20	139:9 142:15,15
telling 10:13 11:1	148:14 149:11	34:1 37:25 38:19	thirdly 217:2	144:7 148:22
15:23 16:3 36:13	154:12 157:23	38:23 41:11,19	thoroughly 39:18	151:8,12 153:16
38:8 39:6 65:1	158:14 163:17	43:6 45:3 46:16	thought 19:8 24:10	159:24 162:3,10
66:25 96:20 100:6	167:4,25 170:22	46:18,18 49:3	29:4,5 30:5,13	163:16 165:10,13
103:25 136:24	171:19 172:7	51:14,15,16 53:20	34:17 35:3 41:25	166:1 167:6 169:4
213:12 215:5	173:15 175:3	54:20 55:2,7,15	48:13 49:5,12	173:17 174:6,23
tells 42:14 57:12	176:9 179:19	57:8,19,23 59:23	58:1,2 66:15	176:7,12 178:13
83:2 100:15	181:11 182:3,6,7	60:6,7,20,22 61:4	104:25 134:7	179:1,16,21 180:2
telly 93:20	182:13,25 183:20	61:13,14,16 62:15	160:10 170:19	180:3,4,9 181:4
Ten 22:23 146:1	184:23,24 185:2,3	62:21 64:5,9 65:3	212:18 213:21,22	183:18 184:24
Tenant 213:5	185:8,10,13	65:5 66:6,8,12	213:23	185:6 186:14
tend 144:6	186:15,20,22,25	69:7 70:24 74:6	thoughts 23:9	189:4,9 191:6
tended 120:18	187:6,6,10,11,13	74:14 93:5 94:23	27:22 92:3,11	197:19 199:5
terminology 171:16	188:2,21 189:18	95:24 96:2,9	three 12:12 32:10	201:16,17,19,21
terms 3:14 9:11	191:1 203:2	98:19,19 104:4	38:8 47:2 69:1	201:24 202:7,22
12:10 61:21 123:6	215:20,23 216:4	106:7,16 110:6	72:12 149:23	203:1 205:6 206:7
132:1 152:10	217:10 218:5,8,16	112:3 115:3	188:13 214:11	209:17 211:9
194:8,15 199:3	218:18,19,21,23	116:23 117:19,20	ticked 56:5	214:1,8,11,11,24
204:19 208:2	218:25 219:8,14	119:8 122:20	tie 176:10	timed 56:9
213:19 216:21	thanking 1:22	123:18 124:23	tied 124:15	timeline 23:7
terrible 210:22	thanks 75:9,10	125:19 131:3,12	time 2:1,21 10:1,8	timelines 174:14
terrorist 151:20	110:10 112:14	134:20,21 141:21	11:5 14:25 18:10	times 32:4 37:25
text 7:23 54:21	146:18 185:4	143:2 145:7	24:22,25 25:3,6,9	38:8 44:11,17
99:23 100:4	218:9	147:12 162:8,23	26:8,16,16 27:15	49:2 51:14 60:25
175:16,25 176:5	theory 119:14	163:5 164:8 169:8	27:18,20 31:15	62:19 75:12 78:6
217:15,17,22	thermal 141:23	174:18,21 175:1	34:6 35:3 36:16	78:12 89:22 99:19
thank 1:11,14,25	they'd 35:19 41:19	176:19 177:8	39:10 43:22 44:10	191:19 196:7,21
2:13 3:7 16:23	thicker 184:17	180:24 181:3,19	46:6,10,18 50:5,8	208:10
26:25 27:8 40:20	thing 55:19 66:9	182:11 183:16	50:16 51:18 55:18	timing 96:7,9 162:6
56:16,21 57:2,5,6	120:22 121:10	186:4,6,16 187:1	57:10 58:19 60:6	timings 159:6
71:1,15,21 72:3	139:23	189:15 191:18	60:11 61:2 63:6	160:14 176:8
74:9 75:2,5,8,14	things 5:12,15 9:8	192:1,1 194:24	65:22 66:14 68:13	today 1:5 2:17 75:6
75:16,19,22 76:18	14:23 15:23 63:10	196:7 198:25	68:13 69:6,7,12	112:11 114:15
76:21,23 77:4,16	80:12 107:12	201:21 202:9	69:15,19 70:16,22	143:10 146:16
86:23 102:14	117:6 118:15	205:10,11 207:11	70:24 72:7 76:13	147:23 185:16
106:15 109:19,23	119:15 172:23	213:1,13 216:2	77:24 79:17 87:11	187:12,21
109:25 110:2	183:16 184:6	219:5	90:7,15,20 94:23	today's 1:4
112:10,13,22,25	190:19 193:7	thinking 93:11	96:19 97:14	toilet 56:13
113:1,9,15,18	think 2:16,22 3:9	third 7:11 10:18	110:10 114:16,18	told 25:21 31:25
114:14,15,20	10:22 15:22 16:1	16:13 43:5 50:22	115:3 117:13,17	33:14 45:3 54:22
125:16 128:18	18:13 20:13 21:5	65:10,22 102:19	125:11 126:10,13	55:4 58:24,24
137:5 144:4,24	22:23 23:3 24:2,8	104:21 106:1,16	126:13,19 132:6	60:21 64:3 76:7
145:2,11 146:2,9	24:8 25:4,9 26:4	133:25 138:17	132:19 133:1	82:18 84:12 88:2
,				

				1 age 2 10
91:5,9,11,16	158:1,19,23	28:20 35:6 36:20	28:14 34:4 35:22	69:2 97:2 140:25
99:13 100:7 101:3	159:12 189:9	41:14 42:12 46:13	47:15 57:24 59:2	Twitter 124:5
105:2,16 132:16	191:6 200:14,19	49:21 52:9 53:20	60:19 63:12 65:15	two 14:6 25:14
133:2,8 138:18	204:13 212:6,6,17	56:11 57:8 62:7	65:20,23 81:25	50:20 53:14 54:5
139:7,15 140:9	212:25 213:7	62:12 63:8,17	82:7 84:16 94:2	60:21 63:9 72:1
142:20 159:7	214:13 215:5	65:9 73:21 102:9	99:19 107:8 111:6	72:12 79:15 110:6
173:8 186:1	town 141:9	102:20 104:17	114:19 119:23	113:25 119:15
tomorrow 219:5,11	traffic 90:14	106:24,25 128:20	120:12 127:13	143:5 145:12
tone 61:21	train 151:18	129:6 130:20,23	130:7 132:17	149:14 156:16
tool 140:20	trained 8:21 12:7	132:14 134:14,17	133:10 139:21	168:19 171:24
top 19:4 22:12	40:11 47:8	135:4,17 136:3,10	160:6,12 161:21	172:23 176:23
27:12 28:5,7,21	trainers 79:11	136:15 138:20	161:25 164:16	199:7 204:22
29:7 30:17 32:18	training 2:15 3:11	167:22,23 168:23	165:25 172:12	208:24 216:2
33:10,11 34:10	3:12,14,15,17,19	170:24 171:2	183:4 208:10,22	two-thirds 33:6
35:9 42:12,18	3:22 4:4,7,10,13	175:22 178:21	trying 23:4 33:2,15	49:22
43:12 46:14 48:10	4:19,19,22,25 5:7	205:5 209:20	33:25 35:20 36:18	type 14:2 82:2 85:1
50:23 57:11,15	5:25 6:7 8:9	210:1	37:6,9,12 38:9,15	125:4 128:2,3,5
59:14 104:10	10:22,23 12:10,14	transfer 13:3 85:7	38:17,19 39:13	123.4 128.2,3,3
116:8 133:14	12:15,20 14:13,16	123:17	45:8 58:1 64:21	181:3 198:16
154:1,13 163:18	14:21,21,22 15:2	transferred 13:11	66:1 111:3,5	203:3,19 213:16
167:7 170:2 171:5	15:14,17,24 16:4	trapped 11:2 12:2	164:8,24 170:11	typed 213:10
171:7 173:23	16:5,8 39:15,16	25:2 31:24 53:3	173:10,25 183:13	types 150:10,18
192:24 212:4	39:20 40:1,5,19	102:23 118:1,2	192:1 194:24	Typically 143:19
213:9	47:7 52:14,18,19	120:15,19,23	201:18 208:14,15	typographical
topic 78:13 80:24	52:20,24 53:1,9	120:13,19,23	208:24	148:15 182:18
94:20 107:17	53:12 70:3 78:14	133:3 135:11	Tuesday 199:22	140.13 102.10
111:14 118:16	78:18,20,23 79:1	179:10 194:19	219:16	U
132:10 139:16	79:4,4,7,20,24	travelled 24:11	turn 2:10 6:23	UK 140:8
140:12 143:13	80:1,6,8,9,11	59:13	13:22 16:10 21:18	unable 7:4 11:20
153:24 175:4	84:22 85:1 87:13	treatment 12:16	26:13 43:21 80:24	81:11 83:3
178:23,23 183:21	116:22,23,24	triangulate 173:10	82:9,21 88:8	unclear 114:18
total 3:11	117:1,7,9,12,14	trick 146:13	89:18 93:6,9 98:8	unconscious 50:25
touch 95:21 170:12	117:18,22 118:5,8	tried 25:19 31:25	102:10,16 104:5	51:3 56:7,7
173:1 183:9	118:9,13 152:6,23	32:3,4 35:19	125:17 128:12,23	underneath 20:16
touched 60:12	153:2 155:20	62:16 107:5 130:5	129:3 133:13	29:22 213:10
195:8	157:2 189:19,23	130:9 161:4,6	135:14 137:9,10	understand 8:4
tour 18:7,9,10	189:24 190:4,6,7	164:5,14,18,22	139:16 140:12,24	12:7 29:25 40:11
towel 62:16 132:17	190:8,8,11,16,17	165:8,13,18,21	153:24 168:7	65:1 67:9 77:17
132:25	190.8,8,11,10,17	166:3,4 191:18	171:5 214:9	78:2 88:11 92:5
towels 59:1 64:19	190.22 191.2,2,13	trigger 154:24	turned 5:23	101:13 118:22
tower 19:15 28:2	191.10,23 192.7	160:3 180:16	turning 28:20 65:9	133:1 154:9 155:2
54:1 72:12 73:11	192.10 193.11	true 3:5 77:11	70:9 157:23 195:7	155:9 163:5
91:14 98:3 115:25	216:22	114:9 148:7,16	196:17 199:19	179:17 180:4
122:8 124:4	transcript 21:8	188:16	turns 63:15 204:23	190:5 204:2 219:2
127:14 128:9,9	25:25 27:9,20	try 11:11 13:14	TV 68:10,14,21	understandable
141.14 140.7,7	45.45 41.7,40	uy 11.11 13.14	1 * 00.10,14,21	
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

211:12	uses 68:9	184:25 185:7	194:4,8 199:23	102:19 103:2
understanding 6:3	usher 26:24 56:20	waited 63:25 94:5	Waters 115:22	112:16 132:16,23
6:12 7:21 10:8	71:13 75:18	waiting 20:15	way 2:10,11 6:25	136:20 143:10
13:10 15:18 30:3	109:24 182:2	112:16 131:2	8:12 9:25 10:11	151:22 152:15
47:3 62:24 64:2	185:12,20 215:18	139:3 185:5 186:6	12:18 24:6 29:16	153:16 160:9
64:13 81:4 105:14	ushers 144:18	187:13 218:11	32:21 33:6 38:5	181:14 199:9
152:18,21 153:10	usual 186:5 197:25	219:3	38:12 41:8 42:24	202:12 210:20
154:25 155:8	205:14,22 206:24	wall 202:3	43:5 48:3 49:22	211:21 214:6
156:4,15 157:8,15	215:10	wandered 48:14	53:10 55:1 61:12	215:11
175:13 179:15	usually 7:16,25	want 2:10 6:12 8:2	62:13,16 63:10,12	website 212:7,21
180:2 184:5 193:9	68:10 81:15 86:3	16:10,18 19:9	63:14 64:7,20	213:6,8
understood 42:3	86:11 109:5	27:21 32:2 50:4	65:10,15 70:14	weeks 190:17
64:22 66:18	150:10 151:1	52:7,9,10 55:5	74:12 76:11 87:20	welcome 1:3
unfolded 159:1	198:3,17	57:14 66:21 78:16	94:7 106:20	146:16
unfolding 151:1	utilised 125:15	84:7 89:25 98:11	112:16 121:16	went 23:6,13 56:4
unit 16:7 24:15	T 7	103:16,20 106:14	124:18 128:6	69:16 134:14
52:4 55:22 74:11	<u>V</u>	114:16 130:3	132:4 141:16	213:1
74:24 170:20	value 11:10 55:10	141:3 167:9	152:19 164:11	weren't 32:17,19
units 53:10 70:15	55:11	169:25 178:6	170:16 176:16	32:21 47:8 60:25
unnecessary	Vanessa 200:5	189:4,19 192:22	177:14 193:4	70:15,16 133:8
103:20	varies 39:25 40:1	203:25	194:4,7 203:19	183:17 193:12
unsure 84:21	various 1:6	wanted 28:14 30:5	ways 170:13 201:25	207:4
123:17	vary 18:5,7	32:6 38:25 39:3	we'll 6:15 9:17	west 155:2 158:19
unwittingly 40:16	vehicle 109:11	154:10	19:12 20:23 26:3	159:12 170:12
update 46:23 84:2	verbally 46:3,5	wanting 55:3	26:18,20 56:20	wet 62:16 132:17
101:1 105:9	61:8	warehouse 117:6	71:13 74:11	132:25 139:21
131:21 132:3	video 202:3	warn 156:1	108:19 113:5,8	whatnot 122:21
133:21 139:25	view 38:23 47:4	wasn't 6:4 21:1	122:12 135:2	wheelchair-bound
142:24 165:16	107:11 154:11	31:6 34:19,20	144:22 160:13	121:17
177:19 183:25	170:5	38:1,1 41:9 52:1	169:19 186:4	whereabouts 30:21
updated 101:5	viewed 67:18	60:6,11 61:16	199:2	33:9 121:7
updates 56:6 83:14	visible 20:14	73:12,12 131:7	we're 10:22 13:1	whichever 85:5
83:23 125:11	Vision 126:5	133:8 135:10,19	16:2 21:8 26:13	whilst 68:12 78:11
updating 67:6	vital 105:21	135:21 138:25	28:7 30:23 33:11	84:16 111:3
174:15	voice 28:18 41:15	146:13 164:4	41:17 42:18 43:4	135:22 189:20
use 8:10 14:3,5	49:1	166:17,18 169:5	48:23 58:6 86:16	204:17
65:21 70:3 108:19	voicemail 176:1,5,6	169:22 173:5,13	103:1 109:20	white 64:22 177:5,7
137:25 141:24	176:21 177:25	175:14 178:19	112:12 136:17,20	177:21 183:23
142:23 156:21	voices 49:2 volume 52:21 58:14	181:3 190:3	136:24 144:14	199:23,24
160:6 161:23		191:24 193:19	173:18 181:21,24	whiteboards 50:20
173:1 183:13	68:6 155:1	201:22,24 202:10	185:1,7,21 214:9	56:1
190:20 217:7	volunteered 207:19	207:25 208:4	we've 6:13 11:24	wife 101:15,16
useful 136:8 146:21	\mathbf{W}	211:10	23:21 26:10 38:7	102:2 103:24
212:19	W11 203:8	watch 118:13	50:19 61:4 74:9	104:2 106:17
username 195:18	wait 70:25 108:20	149:23 193:11	74:10 82:18 83:24	111:1

	Ī		İ	İ
windows 54:11	219:2	136:4,6 164:10,15	Zoe 75:24 76:19	02.28.13 126:9
57:18	witnesses 181:14	166:4 170:18	77:3 219:20	02.30 55:18 58:19
withdraw 153:21	woman 74:4 204:10	190:24 203:13	zoom 161:18,18	126:21
withdrawn 95:23	wonder 34:17	wouldn't 10:11	203:6	02.30.45 73:23
132:20 142:19	word 8:2,5 14:11	29:4 32:20 67:24		02.32 61:3
withdrew 75:20	27:13	68:2 70:5,8 74:17	0	02.32.31 176:2
113:2 147:2	wording 64:15,17	81:15 103:13	01.16 21:20 24:1	02.32.41 56:10 57:9
185:14 218:20	64:18 154:11	105:11 109:16	01.19 21:25	57:12
withstand 212:13	words 45:19 97:14	125:5,5,7,8 136:1	01.26 22:3	02.34.15 128:13
214:18	97:15 210:16	159:4 179:12	01.26.41 22:6	02.36 173:17,18,21
witness 1:8 2:22	work 68:12 89:6	180:15 184:3	01.27.59 22:6	174:16
3:1 10:15 16:11	150:16 151:21	194:4,5,5 198:13	01.28 22:11	02.36.07 62:10
17:12 19:3 26:22	156:12 192:8	198:19 201:13	01.28.40 22:12	02.40 176:12
27:5 56:13,16	198:3 205:23	205:22,25 215:13	01.29.41 22:22	02.41.46 72:8
57:2,4 60:14	216:24	wrap 139:21	01.29.48 20:22	02.45.45 129:9
68:25 71:15 72:5	workaround 160:6	write 56:7	27:15	02.48.49 129:24
75:9,16,20,23	worked 115:2	writing 51:8,11	01.30 29:2	02.51 178:12
76:7,8,10,23 77:6	152:17 191:14	55:19	01.31.38 24:23	02.51.09 63:3,5
77:21 78:17 82:23	205:2	written 79:20 80:18	01.31.48 22:25 01.45 44:22	02.57 95:5 96:9
84:6 89:18 95:18	working 40:3 77:22	217:8	01.45 44:22 01.45.45 43:22,25	98:18
98:20 103:4 106:4	139:11 151:22	wrote 26:5 56:4	01.45.45 45.22,25 01.45/01.47 202:15	02.57.32 99:22
106:5,12 109:23	158:8 170:14	X	01.46 203:1	02.59 95:7,25 99:9
110:8 112:13,18	183:17 189:13	$\frac{\mathbf{X}}{\mathbf{X}}$ 219:18	01.40 203.1 01.47 90:1,7 91:5	02:30 125:22
112:25 113:2	191:7 193:15	A 219.10	203:5,7	02:36 177:11
114:1 116:3,7	199:22,24 200:9	Y	01.48 168:8,23	0200hrs 158:17
123:25 125:21	works 86:3 112:19	yeah 33:11 41:17	206:7,12 211:14	021855 209:24
126:15,16 130:4	world 143:2	49:25 102:7 105:3	01.58 160:25	03.03 179:2,25
133:13,25 137:9	worried 134:5	117:21 119:4,13	161:16 162:8	03.06 136:11
138:12 139:17 140:14 144:16,21	worse 41:3 55:6 59:21 64:9	123:19 125:8	01.58.48 50:8 51:19	138:20 139:5 03.07 133:15
144:24 145:9	worst 162:23	133:23 134:25	01:48 206:13	03.07 133.13 03.09 137:16
144.24 143.9	worst 102.23 worth 185:6	135:8 136:17	02.04 161:19	03.10 179:21
147:2,4,17 148:25	worth 183.0 would've 5:21	137:2,2 138:24	02.10 165:12 166:4	180:10,11
150:8 154:13	17:17 24:10,17	140:8 141:3,15	02.14 214:11	03.10.26 137:16
156:18 158:15	29:4,5 41:25	143:6 171:8	02.15 172:3	03.15 175:2
163:18 170:1	45:11 46:4 49:18	210:15,20,22,22	02.16 165:6,10	03.22 94:24
177:7,10 182:16	52:6,15 56:6	year 77:7 175:14	166:1,5	03.22.51 101:18
185:3,10,13,14,16	59:24 65:7 68:21	years 77:22 115:2,3	02.18 94:12 209:11	03.31.23 104:10
187:3 188:4,10,23	68:24 69:9,12	115:4,5 124:22	211:16	03.46.42 106:17,20
189:8 192:22,24	70:6,15,21,21,23	young 28:17,18	02.18.55 168:1,15	03:11 137:12
199:20 200:24	73:1,3,5 74:25	33:20,21,22 52:13	209:25	0801 174:2
204:1 207:14	88:23 90:12 93:17	youngest 42:15	02.21 167:6	0900 158:4
208:3,25 212:3	96:4 105:12,13,17	yr 50:24	02.26.30 209:11	
213:14,20 218:8	108:17 111:24	Yvonne 51:16	02.26.40 170:25	1
218:13,19,20	112:3,4 131:12,17	$\overline{\mathbf{z}}$	02.26.48 53:17,25	1 12:13 78:17
. ,				
	•			

	1			
128:22,23 136:16	14/06 174:2	210:1,4,10,13,15	27 48:11	146:4
136:17,24 137:4	147 219:23,24	210:20	28 48:17	45 2:6 26:11 45:17
149:12,23 150:7	15 22:6 44:13,24	2.1 11:16,19	29 114:1 188:8	186:2
153:25 158:3	45:23 115:5	2.15 113:8,12		49 140:7
179:2 209:23	15/25 23:12	20 21:22 24:25 43:5	3	4th 21:21 23:18,23
210:3,5,12,14,19	153 178:8	145:20 219:16	3 6:21,23 10:17,18	24:1,3,4,9 29:3
210:22 219:19,19	16 6:24 13:23 41:14	20/25 183:18	12:13 13:21,23	
1.06 110:3	45:24	200 124:6	28:20 57:14 63:8	5
1.10 109:18 110:1,5	17 21:19 23:22	201 48:23 49:9	84:6 89:18 91:20	5 11:14 16:11 29:16
1.15 113:10	173 53:16 54:2	50:11,24	93:22 102:16,25	32:10 68:7 71:10
1.43 200:17	175 16:21	2011 122:22	116:7 124:2	71:14,17 109:16
10 2:23 22:3 26:18	18 22:11,22 24:22	2012 189:13 190:11	125:21 126:16	109:21 133:14,25
56:21 106:9	186 219:25	190:14 194:21	130:23 149:14,19	137:9 138:12
158:16 219:11,13	18th 178:9	216:15	149:20,25 150:1	139:17 144:15
10.00 1:2 219:17	19 1:1 43:21 77:7	2016 3:13	153:6 163:18	181:15,24 206:5
10.45 27:1	148:2	2017 2:23 4:3 25:24	165:5 166:6 170:1	215:21
10.55 26:21,25 27:3	192 72:11	115:6,9 149:3	173:18,23 174:22	5-minute 215:11
10/20 143:6	193 63:3,7 171:22	189:15 192:2	175:7,24 176:24	5.00 158:9 219:15
100 17:21 24:18	172:2,22 204:5,13	199:22	183:22 212:3	5.1 12:25 13:4
55:14 66:4 157:16	207:16 211:14	2018 1:1 148:2	214:10	50 90:2 160:1
102 130:1	194 73:23 74:5	219:16	3.00 145:4	539 3:23 6:17 13:20
105 178:11	101:10 126:22	204 62:8	3.05 144:22,25	184:10
10th 95:6 98:15	136:17	20th 25:1,22 46:14	145:6	6
11 35:5,10 43:15	1970s 213:3	47:2 54:2	3/3.5 162:9	
44:4 46:8 50:10		21 50:7	30 186:1 212:13	6 19:4 20:19 25:16
50:24 51:3 100:4	2	2121 49:7	213:23 214:19	30:17 33:5 77:22
11.40 56:23	2 11:16 12:13 16:16	22 206:10,14	30-minute 211:17	155:14 203:1 217:12
11.50 56:21,22,25	19:6 20:7 27:24	22nd 25:22 26:6	31 49:21	60 160:1
110 99:21	48:23 50:24 51:19	65:19 73:24 74:5	3a 158:3	00 100.1
113 219:22,22	57:13 69:16 81:3	74:15 101:10	3b 148:8	7
11th 56:9 59:17	82:23 95:7 99:10	126:23 162:1	4	734:10 60:15 66:22
172:5 210:6	102:10,19 106:25	163:14 168:8	4 16:17 19:7 20:7	156:9 202:23,24
12-year-old 32:6	107:4 118:18	172:1,1 204:5,10	29:7,8 62:11	70 21:10
34:17	121:25 128:12,24	210:10	95:18 103:4	73 95:6,10 98:15,21
12.14 71:22	129:3,9 130:24	23 28:3,5,7 42:12	140:15 160:24	99:11,13
12.20 71:17,24	131:2 132:15,15	42:18,23	176:24	75 21:21
129 101:20	132:16 134:17,20	23rd 26:4 36:3	4.00 182:8	76 219:20,21
13 36:20 115:3	136:14,20 137:2	43:16 44:4 46:15	4.05 182:5,10	790 3:15 11:14
158:5	149:24 154:1,13	50:24 62:8	4.30 186:5 187:16	12:24
136 104:9	155:14 156:9	24 43:12	187:24	
139 106:19	158:15 166:6	24-hour 158:4	4.45 215:24	8
14 37:10 85:25	171:5 172:8	25 23:1,2,5,12 24:7	4.50 216:1	8 65:9 68:25
86:20 115:2,4	173:19 175:21	24:24	40 23:6,13	81 53:19
157:25 175:6	176:11 192:22,25	25-pump 90:6,20	4111 42:23	82 56:9 57:9,13
199:19	199:20 204:1	26 47:22	42-metre 144:2	59:17 61:3 171:22
			12-metre 177.2	