1	Friday, 23 November 2018	1	Q. Have you had an opportunity to read it recently?
2	(10.00 am)	2	A. Yes.
3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to	3	Q. Can you confirm that its contents are true?
4	today's hearing.	4	A. Yes.
5	Now, by way of a change, today we are going to hear	5	Q. Thank you.
6	from three of the control room officers, whose names we	6	I'm going to begin my questions by asking you
7	have seen used quite a lot in the documents but from	7	something about your role and experience in the LFB.
8	whom we haven't yet heard.	8	You are currently a control room officer
9	Is that right, Mr Millett?	9	A. Yes.
10	MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, it is. Good morning.	10	Q. — employed by the LFB?
11	I'm going to start by calling Control Room Officer	11	A. Yes.
12	Yvonne Adams, please.	12	Q. I think it's right that you've been in that position for
13	YVONNE ADAMS (affirmed)	13	over 45 years.
14	Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY	14	A. Yes.
15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Very good. Thank you very much. Do	15	Q. So you started in 1972?
16	sit down and make yourself comfortable.	16	A. That's it, yes.
17	THE WITNESS: Thank you.	17	Q. Following your initial employment in 1972, Ms Adams, and
18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.	18	over that 45-year period, did you receive regular
19	MR MILLETT: Good morning, Ms Adams.	19	training on call management?
20	A. Good morning.	20	A. Not regular, but I've received training, yes.
21	Q. Can I ask you, please, to give the chairman your full	21	Q. When was the last training that you received prior to
22	name.	22	the night of the fire in June 2017?
23	A. Yvonne Patricia Adams.	23	A. Do you mean on just general call management or FSG?
24	Q. I'm going to start by thanking you very much for coming	24	Q. Let's start with general call management.
25	today and assisting the inquiry with its investigations.	25	A. I can't remember.
	Page 1		Page 3
1	We're extremely grateful to you for coming.	1	Q. What about FSG?
2	My questions are intended to be short and simple,	2	A. My training was 2016, and there was two sessions in
3	but if they don't work out that way, please tell me and	3	2012. And I did some workshops with the command unit.
4	I will ask the question either again or put it in	4	But that was for their training, not us.
5	a different way.	5	Q. That was for their training?
6	A. Okay.	6	A. We participated, yes.
7	Q. We're going to be covering the events of the night in	7	Q. Focusing on the 2016 training, can you just tell us what
8	some detail this morning. If at any time you need	8	that involved, please?
9	a break, then we can take a break. All you have to do	9	A. To be honest, I can't really remember. I think it was
10	is just indicate and we can stop.	10	just generally going over the FSG guidance and just our
11	The aim is to sit and take evidence for no more than	11	general procedures on it.
12	an hour, but if that's too long, again, tell me and we	12	Q. Were you shown and given help understanding policy 539,
13	can take it in shorter pieces.	13	emergency call management?
14	A. Okay, thank you.	14	A. Yes, we would've just gone over general FSG guidance.
15	Q. Can I start by asking you, please, to look at your	15	I can't remember it specifically.
16	witness statement that you gave to the Metropolitan	16	Q. Was it based on documents or was there any role play
17	Police last year.	17	involved?
18	What I'm going to show you will appear on the screen	18 19	A. I know we did do role play, but I can't remember which
19	on the desk in front of you, or if you want to use the	20	one that was. It might have been in the 2012, but
20	screen at the back of the room, you can do that as well.	20 21	I honestly can't remember.
21	Can the witness first be shown MET00007762.		Q. Did you get training on policy 790? Do you know
22	That is a witness statement with your name on it,	22	something called policy 790?
23	dated 11 October 2017, given to the Metropolitan Police. Is that your statement?	23 24	A. Yes.
2/	IS THAT YOUR STATEMENT?	₁ 24	Q. FSG, fire survival guidance.
24		25	A Voc
24 25	A. Yes.	25	A. Yes.
		25	A. Yes. Page 4

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1	Q. We'll come to look at that policy shortly.	1	an actor or somebody like that of a fire survival
2	A. Okay.	2	guidance caller?
3	Q. Before the Grenfell Tower fire, did you get any training	3	A. I was doing the radio. I don't think anyone was
4	or other kind of education on matters arising or lessons	4	I think we was just passing the calls in, writing it
5	learnt from the Lakanal House fire which happened in	5	down and then passing it to the command unit.
6	2009?	6	Q. Just to focus a bit more, was this training on
7	A. We changed our procedure slightly in the questions we	7	communications between the control room and the command
8	asked. So I remember that FSG guidance lesson. And we		
	<u> </u>	8	unit rather than handling the call coming from the
9	changed our attendance to FSG calls.	9	caller?
10	Q. You changed your attendance to FSG calls? Can you just	10	A. It was specifically for the command unit's benefit, and
11	explain what you mean?	11	we was just participating in the workshop. So for them
12	A. Yes. Well, prior to that, we didn't send specific	12	to learn what to do at their end more than us.
13	appliances to deal with FSG calls, and now we do.	13	Q. Do you remember and maybe, because it wasn't directed
14	Q. Oh, I see.	14	at you, you can't, but see if you can help me what
15	A. So we send a command unit, station manager and pumping	15	the lesson that the command unit was supposed to learn
16	appliance for support	16	from that training was?
17	Q. Right, this is about resourcing?	17	A. You'd have to ask them.
18	A. Yes, it's about resourcing and who we're going to	18	Q. Okay. I think I have. All right.
19	contact on arrival, when they get there, passing the	19	Have you ever had any specific training on fires in
20	calls to.	20	high-rise residential buildings?
21	Q. Did you get training in 2016 or in 2012 on how to handle	21	A. I don't think specific, no.
22	multiple FSG calls; in other words, what happens when	22	Q. Would it follow that you've also not had training in how
23	the control room starts to receive more than one?	23	to go about advising lots of callers to evacuate
24	A. Not in our training that I remember, just when I did the	24	a high-rise residential building?
25	workshops with the command unit.	25	A. No.
	Page 5		Page 7
1	Q. When did you do the workshops with the command unit?	1	Q. No?
1 2	Q. When did you do the workshops with the command unit?A. Sorry, I can't remember those dates, sorry. I've done	1 2	Q. No? A. No.
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1	A. Not many, but there has been occasions.	1	statement. If you go there, you'll see on the screen
2	Q. Right. Not many. I mean, I know it's difficult	2	the third paragraph, and you describe FSG at the start
3	A. I know	3	of that paragraph. We'll come up back to that.
4	Q counting back over 45 years I'm sorry to keep	4	Halfway through the paragraph, or just a bit below
5	saying 45 years, but it's an impressive period of time!	5	it, you say:
6	Can you count the number of FSG calls from any	6	"National advice for FSG calls in high rise
7	building that you've had to handle?	7	buildings is to 'stay put' and await rescue, blocking
8	A. Maybe I don't know maybe up to 10, maybe.	8	any smoke with towels, alongside reassurance. A CRO
9	Q. Really? Mm.	9	would usually stay on the phone to the caller until
10	Have you ever experienced being in the control room	10	rescued."
11	where there were multiple FSG calls coming from a single	11	A. Yes.
12	incident?	12	Q. You also say earlier in the paragraph I just want to
13	A. Yes, I do remember one occasion when we was taking	13	show this to you:
14	multiple calls	14	"A call becomes FSG when a caller is unable to get
15	Q. Which was that?	15	out of a building/house due to a fire or smoke."
16	A in a high-rise. It was Fred Wigg Tower in Leyton.	16	I just want to see if I can pin this down a bit
17	O. Frederick?	17	more.
18	A. Fred Wigg Tower. I was radio operator at the time, but	18	Are you saying that you would give stay-put advice
19	calls were going on around the room.	19	to someone who is trapped and wouldn't leave, or
20	O. When was that?	20	couldn't leave?
21	A. Oh, goodness, I can't remember. Sorry, I can't remember	20	
22	the date. It was oh, sorry, I don't know.	22	A. Depends on the call. I mean, if they can't get out,
23	Q. Let's try and get the decade.	23	then you'd do everything to try and make them safe. Yes, it would just depend on the call.
24		24	
25	A. Mm Well, it was in the 20s, but I honestly can't	25	Q. Let me ask the question this way: would there be any
23	remember. I would just be guessing. Maybe five or	25	point in giving what you understand as stay-put advice
	Page 9		Page 11
1	div vicens age	1	to compledly who is trapped and can't do anything other
1	six years ago.	2	to somebody who is trapped and can't do anything other
2	Q. I'm just trying to work out, was it before or after		than stay put?
3	A. It was after Lakanal. Q. After Lakanal?	3 4	A. Sorry, say that again, sorry? Q. Would you ever give stay-put advice, as you understand
4		5	it, to someone who tells you that they're trapped?
5	A. Yeah, after Lakanal.	6	
6	Q. To the best of your recollection, did the lessons that		A. Well, they'd have to stay there, wouldn't they, if
7	you'd learnt from Lakanal help the control room handle	7	they're trapped?
8	the Fred Wigg Tower fire?	8	Q. Exactly.
9	A. I don't know. I wasn't on duty for Lakanal, so but	9	A. I mean, what else can they do? Then you just hope you
10	I couldn't say.	10	can keep them safe.
11	Q. I want to turn to explore briefly with you your	11	Q. Moving on, then, when you receive a call from somebody
12	understanding and application of what we've come to call		who says they're trapped or they can't leave, or they've
13	the stay-put policy. I'm using that as a shorthand,	13	tried to leave and they can't, in your experience, or
14	perhaps for a number of different ideas.	14	your understanding of the policy, would you immediately
15	A. Yes.	15	proceed to give them FSG advice or would you first try
16	Q. First, can you just tell us what you understood as	16	to establish to your satisfaction whether there may be
17	at June 2017 by the stay-put policy?	17	some way of leaving the building?
18	A. Well, if they're not being affected by the fire, smoke	18	A. I think you'd maybe go down that route generally, if it
19	or heat, that they would stay where they were and we	19	was a house fire, because there may be other
20	would make a note of where they are calling from, flat	20	alternatives or ways of getting out that they've not
21	number if we're talking about high-rise their	21	thought of, maybe through a window, you know, a flat
22	floors, how many people, and we would relay that	22	roof, there could be some other way of escaping that
23	information to the fire ground, and the crew would go	23	they've not thought of. But in a high-rise building,
24	and get them or talk to them, if they're safe.	24	they don't have many alternatives, do they?
25	Q. Can I ask you, then, to turn to page 2 of your witness	25	Q. So do I take it from that that when the caller says,
	Page 10		Page 12
<u> </u>	υ		3 (Pages 9 to 12)

1	"I'm trapped" or, "I'm stuck, I can't leave", do you	1	"Brigade Control advise callers to 'Get out and Stay
2	take them at face value and proceed straight to FSG or	2	out', however if a call is received from a High rise
3	do you	3	building where Fire, Heat and Smoke are not affecting
4	A. You would ask them why they can't leave generally. That	4	the caller, LFB would advise that:
5	would be the first question, normally. Yes.	5	"You are usually safest to remain in your premises
6	Q. How hard would you push them in giving you detailed	6	unless affected by fire, heat or smoke. If the situation
7	information about why they can't leave so as to be able	7	changes, you should leave your premises and dial 999, if
8	to continue to advise them?	8	you need further assistance."
9	A. That would be so dependent on the caller, whether	9	Just pausing there, does that sentence accord with
10	they're listening to you, whether there's a language	10	your understanding of the stay-put policy, as we've
11	problem, all sorts of things. It's not a black and	11	called it?
12	white it's a grey area. You just do your best to try	12	A. Yes.
13	and make yourself clear.	13	Q. So would it be right to say it's "stay put, unless"?
14	Q. When you're making an assessment of whether they can or	14	A. Yes.
15	can't leave, do you rely only on the information that	15	
	the caller is giving you or might you also rely on	16	Q. Just focusing on the word "affecting" in the first of those paragraphs we looked at, and then "affected" in
16 17	information that you were getting back from the fire		
18	ground, if you had any?	17	the second, "affected by fire, heat or smoke", what
		18	information would you, as a control room officer, use to
19	A. Probably mainly the caller. I mean, the only	19	make your assessment as to whether premises are affected
20	information we get back from the fire ground normally is	20	by fire, heat or smoke?
21	informative messages. We don't specifically get many	21	A. Just information from the caller, what they're telling
22	messages back telling us what's happening at the	22	you.
23	incident.	23	Q. What kind of information would that be?
24	Q. How helpful would informative messages be, in the case	24	A. Where the smoke is, if it's coming from outside their
25	of a high-rise fire, in assisting you in assessing	25	front door.
	Page 13		Page 15
1	whether or not the caller can safely leave?	1	Q. So is this affected inside the flat or more generally?
2	A. It's so difficult to say. It probably would help. But,	2	A. All of it, really. I mean, it's just all dependent on
	A. It's so difficult to say. It probably would help. But, I mean, you'd still be asking the same questions,	2 3	A. All of it, really. I mean, it's just all dependent on what they're telling you.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	A. It's so difficult to say. It probably would help. But, I mean, you'd still be asking the same questions, because until you get told otherwise, all you can do is try and keep them safe. If the smoke's coming under their front door, you know there's smoke on the other side, or a fire, so you can't send people out into those conditions. Q. Let's look at the policy. I'm going to start with policy 539. A. Okay. Q. If we can please have that. That's tab 3 of our policies bundle, and this is the policy called "Emergency call management". It's there on the screen, Ms Adams, for you, current as at March 2014 and issued in November 2007 originally. Can I ask you, please, to go to appendix 3 on page 16. I ought to start by asking you: are you familiar with this policy generally? A. Yes. Q. Are you familiar in general terms with appendix 3, which is entitled "Fire survival guidance"?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. All of it, really. I mean, it's just all dependent on what they're telling you. Q. Would somebody be affected by fire, heat or smoke if they could smell smoke but couldn't see it or weren't coughing? A. Not necessarily, no, if you could just smell it. No, not necessarily. Q. Would somebody be affected by fire, heat or smoke if their flat wasn't on fire but they could see the fire approaching? A. I suppose you could say they were being affected by it, but where would the fire be coming? Through their windows, do you mean, or just outside their window? Just — Q. Either way. A. Yes, I mean, then they are being affected by the fire. Q. Again — it's a question I asked before — when you make your assessment of whether a caller is affected by fire, heat or smoke, would you rely solely on what the caller was telling you or would you also look to rely on information coming to you from the incident ground? A. Well, it would be both if you've got information coming back.

1	calls, but in that experience that you can recall, would	1	a difference between being unable and the caller
2	you find the information coming from informative	2	believing that they're unable.
3	messages useful?	3	The question is: on your understanding of when
4	A. If it's just a normal FSG call, and someone's trapped in	4	a call becomes an FSG call, is it when the caller
5	their house, you normally hear the firefighters anyway.	5	believes that they're unable to leave, or is it when
6	You just hear them coming and then you hear them talking	6	you've assessed they can't leave and in your judgement
7	to the person, and then the person they just put the	7	they can't leave?
8	phone down, they don't even say goodbye to you normally	8	A. It would all be down to the caller. So if they believe
9	because they've been rescued, so you know they're safe.	9	they can't leave, then I have to believe them that they
10	Q. Coming back to a question we looked at earlier, which	10	can't leave.
11	I don't think I completely covered with you, in your	11	Q. I follow. So does that mean that you take them at face
12	experience you've given us a rough number of the FSG	12	value and you don't say to them, "Well, actually,
13	calls you've covered during your experience.	13	although you say you can't leave, let's test that a bit.
14	A. Yes.	14	Have you looked outside your front door? Have you tried
15	Q. How many of those were from residential high-rise	15	an open window?"
16	blocks?	16	A. Yes, you would do that.
17	A. I can't actually remember any being in high-rise.	17	Q. You would do that?
18	Q. Can I turn to your witness statement again. We'll come	18	A. You would, as I say, on a normal not a high-rise
19	back to the policy shortly.	19	call, you would pursue other avenues of why they can't
20	If you go back to page 2 of your witness statement,	20	leave.
21	Ms Adams, you say paragraph 3 on that page, which starts	21	Q. But I think, because you'd never handled an FSG call
22	"A call may sometimes become" so it's the third	22	from a high-rise, perhaps your experience doesn't help
23	paragraph down or the second substantive paragraph:	23	us.
24	"A call may sometimes become a 'Fire Survival	24	A. Yes, maybe.
25	Guidance' call or FSG in short. A call becomes FSG when	25	Q. While we're on the same page of the policy, page 2, can
			10 1 3/10 /
	Page 17		Page 19
1	a caller is unable to get out of a building/house due to	1	I ask you, please, to look at paragraph 4, "Prioritising
2	a fire or smoke."	2	calls".
3	We looked at that a minute ago.	3	Paragraph 4.1 if we can have that expanded,
4	Can I just clarify something with you.	4	please, that would be helpful it says:
5	Keep that on the screen it will be kept on the	5	"4.1. Occasionally control receives multiple FSGs
6	screen for you and I'm going to ask you now to look	6	at an incident. All FSGs received by control are
7	at policy 790. That's LFB00001257, which we have in our	7	treated with the same level of urgency, however, in
8	policies bundle at tab 5. That's the first page of it,	8	certain circumstances, the officer in charge of control
9	issued as at February 2012 and reviewed as	9	may direct call handlers to terminate a call to answer
10	current April 2014.	10	another."
11	First, Ms Adams, are you familiar with this policy?	11	Before the night of Grenfell Tower, Ms Adams, is
12	A. Yes.	12	that something you'd ever experienced?
13	Q. If we turn in that policy, first of all, to page 2 and	13	A. Never. Never.
14	look at paragraph 2.1, under the title "Fire survival	14	Q. Have you ever in your career been directed to terminate
15	guidance call definition", it says and we can expand	15	an FSG call in order to answer another?
16	that for you, there it is:	16	A. No.
17	"2.1. A FSG call is a call received into control	17	Q. I think the next question I can predict the answer to,
18	where the caller believes that they are unable to leave	18	but do you know what the circumstances would be where
19	their premises due to the effects of fire, and [in bold]	19	the officer in charge may tell you to stop an FSG call
20	where the control officer remains on the line providing	20	to handle another?
21	appropriate advice."	21	A. Just an overwhelming amount of calls coming into the
22	Just pausing there in that paragraph, and comparing	22	control.
23	that with what you say in your statement, which we can	23	Q. But you've never had the experience before Grenfell of
24	also highlight, a call becomes FSG when the caller is	24	that?
25	unable to get out, I'm interested in whether there is	25	A. Never, no.
	Page 18		Page 20
	1 450 10	1	1 480 20

1	Q. Can I ask you to turn the page, please, within the	1	transfer to the incident". You can see at the foot of
2	policy, to paragraph 5.5. If we can please have that	2	that page of the policy, paragraph 5.1 says:
3	highlighted, there.	3	"5.1. As soon as control has confirmed that a FSG
4	This says:	4	call is in progress they will contact the incident
5	"5.5. Control will attempt to gather all the	5	ground and start to pass over the initial details. At
6	information on the Control Information Form (see	6	this stage it is likely to be basic information relating
7	Appendix 2) and relay this information to the incident	7	to the number of persons involved and their location
8	as and when it becomes available."	8	within the property."
9	Then, Ms Adams, we can see a long list of bullet	9	Looking at that, in your experience, what would the
10	points understand that which are details of information:	10	usual method of passing that information over to the
11	number of flat/house, number of persons involved,	11	incident ground be?
12	et cetera.	12	A. It could be a service request, or you could because
13	Appendix 2, just so you know what it is, if we could	13	you normally have someone if you was taking the call,
14	move on to that. I think it's page 8 of this exhibit.	14	maybe your supervisor or a colleague will come and
15	"Appendix 2 - Control information form."	15	listen to the call with you. So if they was close to
16	Is that form something you're familiar with?	16	the radio operator, they could even just go over to the
17	A. I think I've seen it, but we don't use it.	17	radio operator and say to them, "Tell them they're in
18	Q. You don't use it?	18	the back room." They get it there as quick as possible,
19	A. No.	19	the information to the ground, and you would probably
20	Q. Have you ever used this form in the control room in your	20	back it up with a service request.
21	experience?	21	Q. So would that be you making the service request or you
22	A. No, no.	22	telling the radio operator?
23	Q. Going back to the detailed information at paragraph 5.5	23	A. It could be me or it could be a colleague. It would all
24	we were just on, looking at that list of bullet point	24	depend on your staffing levels and what the manning was
25	details, would you normally expect to gather this	25	at the time, how many people were free to assist you
	Page 21		Page 23
1	information during an FSG call?	1	with that call.
2	A. Yes.	2	Q. So I think what you're telling us is that it would
3	Q. You would?	3	depend.
4	A. Yes.	4	A. It would very much depend on your staffing levels.
5	Q. In your experience of FSG calls, is it normally possible	5	Q. So would there be two methods of communicating that:
6	to get all of this information from the caller?	6	first of all, the radio operator and, secondly, the
7	A. Again, it's all dependent on the caller. You just don't	7	service request?
8	know until you're taking that call, even if they're	8	A. It could be, because to me it's always the quickest way
9	listening to you, you know, if they're in a panic or	9	to get the information to the ground. It may be if you
10	they're talking to other people with them. So you would	10	could speak to the radio officer, just say, "Quickly
11	try your best to get that information.	11	tell them that they're in such and such a room", and
12	Q. Again, it's difficult, because I know your experience of	12	then you could do the niceties of the log afterwards.
13	these is limited, even though you've had 45 years of	13	Q. If you were to do a service request
14	control room experience, but have you ever known a time	14	A. Yes.
15	where you took an FSG call in which you got all of this	15	Q what would happen to it? It would come up on the
16	information?	16	screen in the control room.
17	A. I can't remember. Hopefully I've got most of it, but	17	A. Yes.
18	I can't say I've got all of it.	18	Q. Would it also come up on a screen somewhere on the
19	Q. Perhaps the clue is in the word "attempt" at the	19	incident ground?
20	beginning. So you've attempted but never perhaps always	20	A. No, no, it just goes on our log in control.
21	succeeded; is that right?	21	Q. It goes into your log?
22	A. Yes, and what's relevant at the time. It's just yes,	22	A. Yes.
23	you would hopefully get all that.	23	Q. So it would have to be actioned by somebody in the
24	Q. Turning back in the policy, please, to the bottom of the	24	control room
25	previous page, page 2, paragraph 5, "Information	25	A. Yes, it would have to go to the radio operator.
	Page 22		Page 24

1	Q. So the method of communication under 5.1 is the radio	1	the screen, that's Christine Howson's chair, is it?
2	operator?	2	A. Yes, I think she was sitting either that chair or the
3	A. Yes, initially, yes.	3	other chair, and then the supervisor's at the bank. And
4	Q. Yes, thank you.	4	I think Debbie Real was closest to me, I think. I can't
5	I'm going to turn, Ms Adams, to the events of the	5	swear to that, but I think it was Debbie.
6	night of the fire itself, if I can.	6	Q. So you were in very close proximity to Christine Howson
7	A. Okay.	7	and Pam Jones?
8	Q. If I can ask you to go to your witness statement and	8	A. Pam Jones I was very close to, yes, she was next to me.
9	look at page 3, second paragraph down from the top of	9	Q. But Christine Howson looks like she was just opposite.
10	the page.	10	A. Yes, just opposite. Yes, that's it.
11	You say:	11	Q. It's quite difficult for us there's a reason for me
12	"I was assigned as the Pager Officer for the night,	12	asking this which we'll come to later to get a clear
13	working alongside the other Control Room Officers. I	14	idea of the distance between Christine Howson's chair
14	started work at 8pm and it was all very normal for the	15	and your chair. Comparing it with where you are sitting
15	first few hours. Sharon DARBY and I had a rest period	16	and the chairman is sitting, are you further or nearer?
16 17	at around midnight. The CRO staff rotate rest periods	17	A. Probably to where the chairman is sitting, about there. Q. About there, all right.
	throughout the shift."	18	In his witness statement, Pete Duddy says that he
18 19	Picking up a point about pager officer to start with.	19	was working notifications, such as when incidents were
20	Does that mean that you at the start of the	20	to go from a six to an eight-pump fire and notifying the
21	shift, at least were responsible for ensuring that	21	senior officers and the press officer. That's what he
22	there were enough correct senior officers present at the	22	says.
23	incident?	23	Do you remember him doing that role on the night
24	A. Yes, that would be my job normally.	24	initially?
25	Q. I'd like to get an idea of where it was that you were	25	A. No, he was over in the corner, but
23	Q. To like to get all face of where it was that you were		The root in the corner, but in
	Page 25		Page 27
1	sitting in the control room on the night.	1	Q. How would your two roles work together?
2	If I can ask you, please, to be shown the LFB	2	A. My role is the operational officers that go onto the
3	control room report, which is LFB00004790, and turn	3	incident. So when the incidents are upgraded with the
4	please to page 175.	4	make-ups, they respond to the paging operator, and then
5	This is a photograph of the Stratford facility and	5	it would be my responsibility to book them onto that
6	the layout.	6	incident, to book them status 2, going on.
7	Can you point out to us where you were sitting,	7	Q. I see.
8	please?	8	A. And give them information that they required.
9	A. So I'm to the right of the supervisor's desks, just in	9	Then we have a sheet that we work to to ensure that
10	that corner in the bank you can't see. So it's that one	10	you've got the right amount of officers.
11	on the right-hand corner, that little bank of	11	Also, if they've not responded, you would be chasing
12	Q. Would it be possible for you to get up and	12	them up, paging them again or phoning them and saying,
13	A. Yes, do you want me to point?	13	"Have you got the order in?" So you'd just that's
14	Q. I'm sorry, I think that would be helpful, to point it	14	for the attendance.
15	out.	15	Then Peter's role is more the senior officers above
16	A. I'm here (Indicates).	16	that, and notification on that level.
17	Q. You're there?	17	Q. I follow.
18	A. Yes.	18	A. It's not what the paging operator does.
19	Q. Where the red dot is hovering?	19	Q. Okay. So he was on the senior officers and you were on
20	A. Yes, that's it.	20	the
21	Q. Okay. Who was to your left and right?	21	A. Yeah, yeah, I was on the
22	A. To the right was Pam Jones. So it's a bank of two	22	Q other resourcing?
23	positions, and Pam was next to me. In this bank there	23	A. That's it.
24	was Christine, right at the front of the screen.	24	Q. I follow.
25	Q. So the chair we see there on the right at the bottom of	25	In the position you were operating on the night,
	Page 26		Page 28

1	would you be able to or usually take 999 calls as well	1	control room for handing information over to the
2	as being the pager officer?	2	incident ground?
3	A. Yes.	3	A. I think still at that time it would be service requests,
4	Q. I think, as you say in your statement, you started to	4	if you had any further information.
5	take 999 calls from Grenfell and then moved away from	5	Q. So you would make a service
6	your role as pager officer. That's right?	6	A. By radio yes, and it would go to the radio operator.
7	A. Yes, yes.	7	Q. I see. So you weren't is this right? using pieces
8	Q. Is that just because of the volume that started to mount	8	of paper at that stage?
9	up?	9	A. Not at that point, no.
10	A. Absolutely. I think I spoke to a few officers when they	10	Q. We've got something called a short incident log which
11	responded, but I didn't get to complete my sheet and	11	you may be familiar with.
12	check that there was enough officers for the attendance	12	A. Yes.
13	or anything, it just it just went mad.	13	Q. We'll come to look at it in due course.
14	Q. I think we might be able to put a time on that.	14	A. Okay.
15	If I can take you back in the same document, which	15	Q. But we don't actually see your initials on the short
16	is the control room report, to page 12, with a time mark	16	incident log creating service requests to pass over FSG
17	of 01.21.24.	17	messages.
18	We believe this is the first call you take, and it's	18	A. No, I don't think I created any, actually.
19	from a female caller reporting the smell of smoke from	19	Q. Right. You didn't?
20	inside Grenfell Tower. She states that she is from	20	A. I think that one was like just a duplicate call because
21	flat 195 on the 22nd floor.	21	she was just saying there was smoke, could smell smoke,
22	To the best of your recollection, was that the first	22	and I think I told her that we had a fire on the
23	call you took from this incident?	23	4th floor. And because she was ringing from the
24	A. Yes, I believe it was.	24	22nd floor, I mean, I just couldn't comprehend that
25	Q. We'll come back to that call later.	25	that's where the fire was.
	Q. We have considered that the minutes.		
	Page 29		Page 31
1	Did you stop your role as pager officer at that	1	O No We'll come back to look at that in due course, but
1 2	Did you stop your role as pager officer at that	1 2	Q. No. We'll come back to look at that in due course, but
2	point or before that?	2	do you know whether you passed this information to the
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1	A. No, I didn't.	1	A. No.
2	Q is that because you thought it already had been	2	Q. The next thing we see in the report if we can please
3	passed to the incident ground?	3	turn to page 22 is at 01.29.38, you take a call from
4	A. No, it's because I thought there was just another call	4	a female requesting Fire Brigade attendance at Ladbroke
5	to the incident, and it just didn't warrant further	5	Grove, Latimer Road.
6	information being sent to the ground.	6	The summary goes on:
7	Q. What was it about the call that you thought warranted	7	"CRO Adams confirms that this is to Grenfell Tower
8	not sending information to the incident ground, just	8	and explains that the Brigade is already in attendance.
9	looking at the summary?	9	The caller asks CRO Adams to send more fire engines and
10	A. Just the fact that there was just a smell of smoke and	10	states that the whole of left side of building is on
11	that we were in attendance and we were dealing with the	11	fire. The caller then corrects herself by stating that
12	fire on the 4th floor.	12	the whole of the right side is on fire. CRO Adams
13	Q. Right. I see.	13	advises that 20 fire engines are coming and the fire
14	A. I don't know whether the make-ups had started coming in	14	service are already in attendance."
15	by then, but I just believed that we were dealing with	15	At that point, it looks as if you were aware that
16	the fire and it was just the remnants of the smoke going	16	the make-up had reached 20.
17	up the building in some way.	17	A. Yes, it does, yes.
18	Because we've had calls to dust chutes in the past	18	Q. You also, I think as you told us before, were aware that
19	where it goes up on all floors and people are reporting	19	the fire was on the 4th floor; yes?
20	all the smoke, but it's actually just the dust chute	20	A. Yes.
21	chamber that's on fire.	21	Q. To be clear, is that because you had an informative
22	Q. Do I take it from that that you didn't think it would be	22	message earlier?
23	helpful for the incident ground to know	23	A. Well, because the original call was on the 4th floor.
24	A. Yes.	24	Q. I see, okay.
25	Q about a report of the smell of smoke?	25	So you know that there had been a make-up to 20
	Page 33		Page 35
1	A. Yes.	1	pumps, and the message at 01.28 that you had also got of
2	Q. Even though it was right at the top of the building?	2	persons reported, you knew that as well, I think, did
3		3	you?
4	A. Well, they was there. They could see what was	4	A. Probably, but I can't remember specifically.
5	happening. So providing they're in attendance maybe if they wasn't in attendance, then I might have	5	Q. Okay. Well, let's just see if I can prompt your memory.
6	considered sending them a message, you know, saying	6	If you go, please, to the short incident log
7	we've received a further call to a smell of smoke. But	7	we'll come back to this. Perhaps keep this on the
8	as they was there and dealing with the fire, it didn't	8	screen and go, please, to the short incident log,
9	seem relevant on that one.	9	MET00013830, and turn to page 18, at the very top of the
10	Q. So you thought this was just residual smoke from the	10	page.
11	fire on the 4th floor?	11	Ms Adams, if I can just ask you to look at the very
12	A. Yes, yes. And I also say there, "Ring us back if things	12	top of the page, you can see at 01.28.40, Sharon Darby
13	change."	13	has created a service request, "PERSONS REPORTED". And
14	Q. At this point, 01.21, had you heard the make-ups of the	14	then at 01.28.47, there's a make-up, "PERSONS REPORTED".
15	pumps to that point?	15	So you can see that. Then at 01.29.15 a service request
16	A. I can't remember. I remember some of them coming in,	16	updated, "PERSONS REPORTED".
17	but I can't remember all the sequence or the times.	17	And so it goes on.
18	Q. It's a matter of recollection and impression, I think.	18	By this time, you'd heard the makes-ups and you'd
19	A. Yes.	19	had a call from the public. Do you think you'd also
20	Q. But does that tell us that you don't remember having any	20	seen that there was now an official persons reported
21	particular impression about how the fire was already	21	message coming from the incident ground?
22	progressing at this point, 01.21?	22	A. I honestly can't remember.
23	A. No, I can't recall. Not at that particular time.	23	Q. Looking at all that information in the round, was it
24	Q. So you don't remember that pumps had been made eight by	24	clear to you by this point, 01.29.38, when you got this
25	that point?	25	call from the member of the public that the whole of the
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1	right side of the building is on fire, that this was	1	to pick up one or two very particular points from it, if
2	a very seriously spreading fire, no longer confined to	2	I can. Is that okay?
3	the 4th floor?	3	A. Yes.
4	A. It does seem that way, yes. Yes.	4	Q. Are you all right with that? The transcript is
5	Q. You say it seems that way; do you recall it that way?	5	LFB00000321.
6	A. Well, yes, I mean and sometimes people exaggerate,	6	You can see that it starts at 01.38.18 by looking at
7	you know, when they give calls, so I still had nothing	7	the second group of numbers in the blue line, second
8	confirmed, and you're still it's someone's vision of	8	from the right, "013818". That's where we get the time
9	a fire.	9	from of 01.38.18, Ms Adams.
10	Q. Do you remember whether you communicated this	10	If we can go, please, in the call to page 2, first
11	information that you got from this female caller about	11	of all. We can see there that the caller is in the
12	the whole of the building being on fire to anybody in	12	middle of the page saying:
13	the control room?	13	"CALLER: 14, 14. How can I get out of here?"
14	A. No, because I think there was a lot of calls coming in,	14	And:
15	so I think everyone who was taking calls might have been	15	"CALLER: I'm on the 14th floor!
16	aware, but I don't specifically no, I didn't pass it	16	"OPERATOR: Tell me what flat you are.
17	on to anyone in particular.	17	"CALLER: 14, 14, 14!
18	Q. Ms Adams, we have been going for 50 minutes. Are you	18	"OPERATOR: Are you sorry, 14 or 13.
19	happy to continue for another 10 minutes or would you	19	"CALLER: Yes, 14, 14."
20	like a break now?	20	It goes on like that.
21	A. No, 10 minutes is fine.	21	Then at page 5 we can see that she tells you, just
22	Q. Moving from that call we've just been looking at to	22	below halfway down the page:
23	a call which you took where somebody was saying they	23	"CALLER: I have a child, I have a child, I
24	were actually trapped.	24	have a child! Help me!"
25	Can I ask you to look, please, at the Brigade	25	Do you see that?
	Page 37		Page 39
1	control report, LFB00004790, that we've been looking at,	1	Then at pages 6 and 7, the bottom of page 6 she
2	and turn, please, to page 37.	2	tells you there's fire coming, and the top of page 7, if
3	This is a call at 01.38.18, towards the bottom of	3	you go to page 7, the caller says:
4	that page. We've expanded it there for you. I'll just	4	"CALLER: there is fire! There is fire coming
5	show you the summary:	5	from the door (Inaudible) I feel like jumping. I feel
6	"CRO Adams takes a call from a female who is	6	like jumping. Can anybody come?"
7	shouting loudly and repeatedly stating that she is on	7	I've shown you a lot of that.
8	the 14th floor in flat 115. She shouts that the fire is	8	Do you remember taking down these details, or
9	coming into the building and asks how she can get	9	recording them in some way, while you were hearing them
10	downstairs. CRO Adams confirms that the caller is in	10	from the caller?
11	Grenfell Tower and frequently asks what flat the caller	11	A. Only on the format that we have come up to record the
12	is in to which the caller responds 14. The caller	12	initial call on. Yes, just on there. I don't think
13	shouts that she is going to die and CRO Adams informs	13	I recorded it anywhere else.
14	her that she will get crews to her. CRO Adams then	14	Q. Can you just explain for us what that format is that
15	manages to confirm that smoke is coming in under the	15	comes up?
16	door and windows and advises the caller to block the	16	A. So when a call comes in, it automatically generates
17	door and shut the windows. The caller is very	17	a call collection form, and you type the address in and
18	distressed and says there is fire coming through the	18	the details of the call on there. So, yes, I would've
19	door and states that she feels like jumping. A smoke	19	taken it on that form.
20	alarm is audible in the background."	20	Q. So you type in details, would you?
21	It's a 4-minute and 20-second call.	21	A. Yes. Well, flat 14, Grenfell Tower.
22	First, do you have an independent recollection of	22	Q. That's the flat number you understood, is it?
23	this call?	23	A. Yes, but I think I got that wrong. I think she was
24	A. I do remember it, yes.	24	saying something different at the beginning of the call.
25	Q. I'm going to show you the transcript of this call just	25	But I remember she was really screaming. It was very
	D		75
	Page 38		Page 40
			10 (D 27 t- 40)

1	hard to understand what she was telling me.	1	Is there a reason why you didn't pass on the
2	Q. Yes.	2	information that you were getting from this call, what
3	A. And I think she misunderstood me when I'm asking her	3	you think was floor 14, or flat 14?
4	her flat number, because she's saying 14, but I think	4	A. I just got the impression that we had it already and it
5	that was the floor she was on.	5	had already been passed, but I just I can't remember,
6	Q. Yes. We can see you pressing for the detail.	6	specifically.
7	A. Yes.	7	Q. Right. Well, one more question before the break, if
8	Q. In terms of recording the details she was giving you	8	I can, to see if I can follow that up.
9	so fire in the flat, or coming through the door, the	9	Go back two pages in this same document to page 50.
10	fact that she had a child were those details details	10	At 01.47.44, you can see that Alex Norman, OM Norman,
11	that you recorded?	11	rings command unit 8 and passes over a request for the
12	A. I don't remember, I don't know what I typed on the call,	12	flats below to be checked. We can see that in that box
13	the original call.	13	there that there is a third item down, floor number 14.
14	Q. If you did record them, how would you go about recording	14	A. Mm.
15	them?	15	Q. But no flat number, and the remarks:
16	A. I would've done it on the original call, and maybe	16	"In the call OM Norman says she doesn't know the
17	I've I can't remember what stage we were at, whether	17	flat number because the caller disappeared."
18	we was writing stuff down, because it was just going	18	Does that help with your recollection?
19	mental. So I can't honestly remember whether I wrote	19	A. I don't know if that's my call or not. I don't
20	that one down or not.	20	Q. You don't know?
21	Q. If you typed it into your system on the call collection	21	A. I don't know.
22	form, what would then happen to that information?	22	MR MILLETT: Okay.
23	A. It would just get logged on a duplicate call, like	23	Right, Mr Chairman, that's a convenient moment in
24	a repeat call, on the system.	24	the questions for a break.
25	Q. Would the radio operator then see that?	25	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
	Page 41		Page 43
			NO MILETER A decision of the decision of
1	A. No, they wouldn't see that. I'd have to do a service	1	MR MILLETT: Is that convenient to you and to the witness?
2	request, which I know I didn't do, because I don't think	2	THE WITNESS: Yes, that's fine.
3	I did any. But I'm not sure I think I tried to	3	MR MILLETT: It is.
4	establish somewhere if we had flat 14, because I got the	4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll have a short break now,
5	impression she may have called already, for some reason,	5	Ms Adams. Please don't talk to anyone about your
6	but I don't know why.	6	evidence while you're out of the room, and we'll resume
7	Q. You say you didn't do a service request; do you know why	7	at 11.10.
8	you didn't do a service request?	8	If you would like to go with the usher, she'll look
9	A. No, not at that point, I don't. I think I was just	9	after you.
10	trying to establish what was going on in the room	10	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
11	because it was just – there was so much happening and	11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: 11.10, please. Thank you.
12	it was just horrendous. So, no, I don't know.	12	(11.00 am)
13	Q. Do you remember whether you passed these specific	13	(A short break)
14	details about this caller to Alex Norman or somebody	14	(11.10 am) SIR MARTIN MOORE PICK. All right readule commune?
15	else in the control room?	15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, ready to carry on?
16	A. I can't remember. I think I might have said, "Have we	16	THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you.
17	got flat 14?" But I honestly can't remember.	17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Very good, thank you.
18	Q. If you look on in the control room report, to page 52	18	Yes, Mr Millett.
19	that's LFB00004790, page 52 you can see that at	19	MR MILLETT: Ms Adams, thank you very much for coming back
20	01.50.49, you make a call on a landline to the mobile	20	to us.
21	phone allocated to command unit 8 in order to pass on	21	Can I just go back to a call we looked at earlier
22	FSG calls.	22	this morning which you'd taken from a member of the
23	A. Yes.	23	public outside the building, who told you that the whole
24	Q. I'll just show you the two you pass on: flat 133 and	24	of the left side and then, in fact, the whole of the
			right aids at the highling was on fire
25	flat 182.	25	right side of the building was on fire.
25	flat 182. Page 42	25	Page 44

1	Just to refocus the document, it's the control room	1	and provides advice about blocking doors and closing
2	report, LFB00004790, page 22. This is at 01.29.38.	2	windows. She asks what flat the caller is in and he
3	There it is on the screen, three entries up from the	3	replies that he is in flat 133. CRO Adams tells the
4	bottom.	4	caller to call back if it gets worse and the MPS take
5	My question about that is: when the caller said to	5	the call back, releasing CRO Adams from the call."
6	you that the whole of the left side and then the whole	6	2 minutes, 31 seconds.
7	of the right side is on fire, did you actually think	7	Just focusing on some points of detail there.
8	that she was exaggerating or did you think she was being	8	You are asked in the call to set up a conference
9	serious?	9	call. Is that something that you had done before?
10	A. It's hard to say now what I thought at the time. And it	10	A. Never, no.
11	could be I mean, we've had scaffolding up buildings	11	Q. Did you know what they wanted you to do?
12	before and it's going up the whole of the side of the	12	A. Well, just presumably to talk to the caller. But, yeah,
13	building, so it could be all sorts of reasons.	13	I was surprised.
14	I didn't imagine that it really was the whole	14	Q. Is that what you expected the police control room to do
15	building that was alight, I think, at that time, but	15	if they received a call from people trapped in the
16	I can't say what I was thinking at that time.	16	building?
17	Q. I'm getting the impression from what you said that,	17	A. No, no, never seen it before or had dealings with that
18	actually, you treated what you were being told with	18	before.
19	a dose of scepticism; you didn't really believe what she	19	Q. Right.
20	was saying.	20	A. I didn't even know it was possible, so
21	A. Maybe. And also there were so many calls probably	21	Q. But you did manage to speak to the caller?
22	coming in, started coming in, and we're on the scene	22	A. Yes, I did, yes.
23	dealing with it, so, you know, there wasn't much I could	23	Q. I'm going to show you the transcript and ask you one or
24	do with that information that I thought would assist in	24	two questions about it which we don't get from this
25	any way, sort of telling them on the ground, because	25	summary. LFB00000326.
	D 45		D 47
	Page 45		Page 47
1	they're there.	1	We can see the time of call, second group of numbers
2	Q. What I'm really trying to get at is when you get this	2	from the right in blue, "014618", 01.46.18. It starts
3	call and are told the whole side of the building left	3	on page 2:
4	or right, it doesn't matter is on fire, combined with	4	"OPERATOR: Hello, Fire Brigade.
5	the number of calls you've seen coming in, my question	5	"CALLER 1: Hi, the Fire Brigade. It's the Met
6	really is: why did you treat that with scepticism or	6	Police here, regarding your fire that you've got on the
7	some degree of scepticism? Why didn't you take it at	7	Grenfell Tower at the moment. I've got someone stuck on
8	face value?	8	the kitchen floor, we've got nothing on your camp(?) as
9	A. It's hard to say now but yes. By that time you're	9	to what advice to give people. Is there anything that
10	thinking: what the hell is going on there? You know, we	10	you're giving because (inaudible) stressing out like mad
11	were all sort of thinking: what's happening? You know,	11	(inaudible)."
12	we're all sitting there bewildered at all these calls	12	Then you talk about being on the phone and mediating
13	coming in.	13	a conference call, and you say:
14	Q. Bewildered. Okay.	14	"OPERATOR: Yeah, no problem."
15	Moving forward, then, in the timeline, can I ask you	15	So clearly it wasn't a problem, even if you hadn't
16	to move forward, also in this document, to page 48 to	16	come across it before.
17	49, the bottom of 48, top of page 49.	17	I'm just interested in what's being said to you by
18	This is a call at 01.46.18 you take from the MPS	18	the caller at the beginning of the call, the
19	control room about a caller in flat 133 on the	19	Metropolitan Police caller, in that part I just read
20	16th floor. You can just see what is said there:	20	out.
21	"The MPS CRO asks if there is any advice they can	21	When he or she said "we've got nothing on your camp
22	give callers and explains that she has a caller that is	22	as to what advice to give people", did you know what
23	stuck on the 16th floor who is very distressed. The MPS	23	they meant?
	Operator asks if she can set up a conference call	24	A. No, but I presume they don't have fire survival guidance
24			
24 25	between the individual and CRO Adams. CRO Adams agrees	25	information. I don't know what "camp" is.
		25	information. I don't know what "camp" is. Page 48

1	Q. I didn't quite hear and I can't see on the transcript	1	A. No, I think that was the lady that called. I think that
2	what you just said. Could you repeat your answer,	2	was the original call that I was referring to and
3	please?	3	I obviously couldn't remember it correctly.
4	A. I don't know what "camp" means. I presume it's they've	4	Q. Ah, you think that was the original call?
5	got no guidance on FSG calls. Because	5	A. I think so.
6	Q. Right.	6	Q. I see. Okay. Because I was going to ask you whether it
7	Did you expect the Metropolitan Police to know what	7	might be this call where you give him advice to try and
8	to advise callers who say they're trapped?	8	block up the smoke and stay where he is, and tell him
9	A. No.	9	that you're dealing with a fire on the 4th floor. But
10	Q. Right.	10	that's not this call, you don't think; is that right?
11	A. Why would they? They're a different service.	11	A. I really can't remember. It was so long ago I did the
12	Q. Did you tell any of your supervisors that you had taken	12	statement, I can't remember what call I was referring
13	a call from the Metropolitan Police?	13	to.
14	A. No. I think everyone was too busy to pass individual	14	Q. All right.
15	call information.	15	A. It may possibly have been that first call and I got the
16	Q. Did it occur to you as important at the time that the	16	sex wrong.
17	Metropolitan Police were taking 999 calls from people	17	Q. Okay. Staying with this call and if we can go back
18	trapped in the building, but didn't know what advice to	18	to the transcript, please, LFB00000326 at the bottom
19	give them?	19	of the second page, page 2, you are speaking to the
20	A. No, not at the time, because I didn't know where our	20	operator, and "Operator" is you, and "Caller 1" is the
21	calls were going to, so this may have been a one-off.	21	Met control room.
22	But I presume they was pinging everywhere because we	22	Three-quarters of the way down the page, caller 1
23	couldn't cope with them all.	23	that's the Met control room says:
24	Q. Did you have any thoughts about whether it would've	24	"CALLER 1: All right. Lovely, bear with me two
25	helped Alex Norman or Debbie Real to know that other	25	seconds. I'm just going to pop (inaudible) now. I know
	Page 49		Page 51
1	emergency services were taking calls from people stuck	1	your phone's probably crazy (inaudible).
2	in the building and didn't have the right advice to hand	2	"OPERATOR: Oh, it's manic. There's so many people
3	to give them or didn't know what advice to give them?	3	stuck in their flats."
4	A. They may have already been aware of that. I mean,	4	Then you get put on to the caller at the top of
5	I don't know.	5	page 3 and you give advice.
6	Q. Just to close this off, this call, if you go to your	6	Then at the top of page 4 if you can just be
7	statement, you see at the top of page 4, if we can go to	7	shown to that, please you say:
8	that, you say:	8	"OPERATOR: Okay. If it gets worse, ring us back.
9	"I remember taking a call from a man on the 20th	9	But just try and stop the smoke coming in and just stay
10	floor who was saying there was smoke coming into his	10	where you are for now, but we are dealing with a fire on
11	flat. This was shortly after the initial call and I	11	the 4th floor.
12	don't think it was a 'Fire Survival Guidance' call. I	12	"CALLER 2 [the caller in the flat]: On the 4th
13	told him that he would be ok because the fire was on the	13	floor. Okay.
14	4th floor at that point. I hadn't received any new	14	"OPERATOR: Yeah. On the 4th floor. So, just try
15	information or update so assumed that was still the case	15	and keep your windows closed and put something against
16	and thought how he could be affected on the 20th floor.	16	the bottom of the door to stop the smoke coming in. And
17	I gave him advice to put towels under the doors and try	17	then if it gets worse, dial 999 and ask for the Fire
18	to get some fresh air to help prevent the smoke from	18	Brigade."
19	coming in before the call ended. The 'Fire Survival	19	I just want to ask you about why you were saying
20	Guidance' calls then began to come in, which all us CROs	20	that the fire is on the 4th floor.
21	were dealing with."	21	At this stage, just summarising the information
22	I want to see if we can pin down that call and link	22	when I say "at this stage", I mean at the time of this
23	the points of information.	23	call, which was at 01.46 you'd already been told the
24	I don't think you did actually take a call from	24	building was on fire all the way up one side by a caller
25	a man on the 20th floor at any point in the night.	25	outside, and you'd had the woman on the 14th floor at
	Page 50		Page 52
		_	

1	01.38 saying that she had fire through her front door.	1	"CALLER 2: Under the door. The, the front door"
2	At this point, did you realise that the fire had	2	At that stage, to your way of thinking, was the
3	climbed above the 4th floor?	3	caller affected by smoke?
4	A. Well, by this point I think we knew it was not contained	4	A. Only that it's coming under the door, so he wants to
5	on the 4th floor, so that's probably the wrong	5	protect himself from that smoke and try and stop it
6	information to give this caller, but I'm just probably	6	coming in. So, yes. But without hearing all the call
7	saying where the original fire started. But without	7	and everything, it's hard to say from this transcript
8	having any other information as to where the fire was,	8	what I was thinking.
9	other than what you've just said, it was just yeah.	9	Q. Is there a reason why, having been told that smoke was
10	And also, at that time, we still was anticipating	10	coming into the flat under the front door, you didn't
11	that the firefighters was going to get to them, you	11	then explore with him whether he could get out, which
12	know, we're just advising people to stay where they are	12	was the next thing that happens? If you're affected by
13	and we'll go to them.	13	fire or smoke, you
14	Q. We can see what you say, that you're telling the caller	14	A. Maybe because he's in a high-rise, I'm thinking there's
15	that the fire was on the 4th floor.	15	only going to be one door.
16	A. Mm-hm.	16	Q. Is that an assumption that you made?
17	Q. My question really is: why were you giving the caller	17	A. Probably, yes.
18	that information when you had other information which	18	Q. So you didn't think there was a point in exploring the
19	would suggest that the fire had spread significantly	19	exit route because it was a high-rise?
20	above the 4th floor?	20	A. Maybe. I can't really say at this point, but that may
21	A. I can't say why I said that at the time.	21	have been a reason.
22	Q. Right.	22	Q. Well, I don't want to put ideas in your head or words in
23	A. Just maybe that's what I definitely knew at that time.	23	your mouth, but I'm just trying to get a feel for why
24	Q. Right.	24	you didn't explore with caller why there wasn't a safe
25	A. And we had no clarification at that point as to where	25	exit route.
	•		
	Page 53		Page 55
1	the actual fine was enreading to other than what was	1	A Vech Well I coult imaging thould have a healt door on
1	the actual fire was spreading to, other than what was	1	A. Yeah. Well, I can't imagine they'd have a back door on
2	coming in from the callers. But nothing specific from	2	the 13th floor. It would only be a front door that he
2 3	coming in from the callers. But nothing specific from the ground itself.	2 3	the 13th floor. It would only be a front door that he could gain access to. So, yes, I was probably thinking
2 3 4	coming in from the callers. But nothing specific from the ground itself. Q. We can see from this transcript that you didn't explore	2 3 4	the 13th floor. It would only be a front door that he could gain access to. So, yes, I was probably thinking along those lines.
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1	A. I think I remember Alex being on the phone to them, and	1	A. Mm.
2	I think she was passing fire survival guidance calls and	2	Q. "Cannot stop smoke coming through front door so have
3	I called across and at that point she put the phone	3	gone into the living room."
4	down. I said to her, "Alex, I've got a couple more",	4	A. Mm.
5	and she put the phone down and I said, "Oh, don't worry,	5	Q. If one can do this and look back at the report and we
6	I'll ring them back", and so I phoned them. I think it	6	don't necessarily need to that's at page 38, it's
7	was Michael and Pam who was next to me, who I think was	7	a call Pam Jones starts at 01.38.38, and she's sitting
8	on a really long call at that time, and I just spoke to	8	next to you.
9	them.	9	A. Yes.
10	Q. Yes.	10	Q. Did she give you this information to pass over to CU8
11	A. It seemed the quickest way of getting information to the	11	about flat 182?
12	fire ground because the radio was obviously really busy	12	A. I asked her when I phoned them. Because she was sitting
13	and I believe we was passing FSG calls by landline by	13	next to me, and I asked. I said, "Pam, what's your
14	that time.	14	details?" and she give me the information to pass. And
15	Q. Yes. So is the answer to my question that you	15	she was obviously on a long call. It was obviously
16	volunteered to do this because you knew	16	a difficult call, because she was on there so long,
17	A. Yes, I just used my initiative, yes.	17	so
18	Q. Okay.	18	Q. Do you know whether Alex Norman, in making earlier admin
19	In your statement, if we can just look quickly at	19	line calls to speak to the command unit, had asked
20	that, back to page 4, you say, in the third paragraph,	20	control room officers for details?
21	three lines up from the bottom:	21	A. Sorry, if she'd asked?
22	"I did ring the Command Unit at the scene to pass on	22	Q. Control room officers for details.
23	details of the flats in trouble, based on the calls that	23	A. I don't remember.
24	I had taken. Normally they are informed by message, but	24	Q. Right.
25	a call was easier and quicker in these circumstances."	25	A. No.
	Page 57		Page 59
1	At that stage, did you have any concern about radio	1	Q. You don't know where she was getting details to pass to
2	messages that Sharon Darby was sending not getting	2	the command unit from like you're doing here?
3	through to the command unit?	3	A. She probably did, but I didn't hear her. I mean, she
4	A. Not a concern, but I know in the past it's not always	4	probably did, got information.
5	easy to contact the fire ground and pass information to	5	Q. At the moment when you passed this message about
6	them, and it's easier to do it via a phone conversation	6	flat 182 to CU8, do you remember whether Pam Jones was
7	than on the radio. And obviously Sharon was so busy.	7	still on the phone?
8	And I just remember Alex was passing them anyway by	8	A. Yes, she was.
9	phone, so it just seemed a quicker way of doing it.	9	Q. She was.
10	Q. Was Alex using the admin landline?	10	A. I think it was a long call, that one.
11	A. I believe so, yes. She was yes.	11	Q. When you made this call, did you know perhaps you
12			
	O. Going back, if we can, to the control report at that	12	
	Q. Going back, if we can, to the control report at that page, we can see that you pass a message about floor 16,	12 13	don't that Alex Norman had also been on the phone to
13	page, we can see that you pass a message about floor 16,	13	don't that Alex Norman had also been on the phone to CU8 a few minutes earlier, 01.47.44, to be precise?
13 14	page, we can see that you pass a message about floor 16, flat 133, smoke coming in I'm so sorry, if we go back	13 14	don't that Alex Norman had also been on the phone to CU8 a few minutes earlier, 01.47.44, to be precise? A. Well, I believe that was the call that she was when
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1	Is that the call you're talking about?	1	"CU8: Right, so is that your priority at the moment,
2	A. I think so.	2	21st?"
3	Q. Right.	3	I just want to ask you what you understood by that.
4	A. Yes, I think it was.	4	What did you think CU8 meant by "is that your priority"?
5	Q. I see.	5	A. Presumably they're prioritising the calls on the ground.
6	I want to go back to the call that you do at	6	Q. You say "presumably"; did you think at the time that
7	01.50.49, so page 52 of this report, just to come back	7	that is what they were doing on the ground?
8	to it. I'd like to show you the transcript for that	8	A. Maybe. I can't say what I remember, but from that
9	call as well, please. It's INQ00000203.	9	there, it looks like they're asking to prioritise calls.
10	You see on the first page of that that the time of	10	Q. Did you take from that that CU8 was expecting the
11	this call is 01.50.49. We can get that from the second	11	control room to prioritise incoming FSG calls and tell
12	group of numbers from the left this time. We can see	12	them what the priority was?
13	that there. So we've got a time mark for that of	13	A. No, I think it's probably their decision on the ground
14	01.50.49.	14	as to the information we pass them as to how they
15	If you go to page 2, the first page of the actual	15	prioritise the calls.
16	script:	16	Q. Going on:
17	"OPERATOR: I'm ringing the command unit. 182? Do	17	"OPERATOR: To be honest, my caller wasn't too bad in
18	you know what floor's that on?	18	133 but I think the one in 182 sounds a bit panicked.
19	"CU8: Charlie Uniform 8?	19	She's still on the phone to them."
20	"OPERATOR: Hi. It's Control again."	20	I think the "she" we've established is Pam Jones.
21	Just picking up that very first line in that	21	A. Pam, yes.
22	transcript, you say:	22	Q. "CU8: Right, but the smoke seems heaviest on Flat on
23	"OPERATOR: I'm ringing the command unit. 182? Do	23	Floor 21?
24	you know what floor's that on?"	24	"OPERATOR: That's the caller we've got at the
25	Who are you speaking to, do you think?	25	moment."
	Page 61		Page 63
	1 age 01		1 ugc 03
1	A. Probably Pam.	1	Just a couple of points from that.
2	Q. Then Charlie Uniform 8 comes on:	2	You're giving him a comparison between flat 133 and
3	"OPERATOR: Hi. It's Control again.	3	flat 182. Was your understanding that CU8 wanted
4	"CU8: Hello.	4	a prioritisation only as between those two flats or more
5	"OPERATOR: Okay, we've got a couple more.	5	generally?
6	"CU8: Go again.	6	A. I think more generally, but I can't say
7	"OPERATOR: It's Flat 133.	7	Q. Okay.
8	"CU8: Flat 133.	8	A exactly.
9	"OPERATOR: On the 16th Floor.	9	Q. Continuing at the bottom of page 3, CU8 says:
10	"CU8: On the 16th Floor?	10	"CU8: Okay, all right, thank you very much."
11	"OPERATOR: Yeah, and 182 on the 21st."	11	Then you say at the top of page 4:
12	So you cover that information there.	12	"OPERATOR: They're just coming on every floor, so
13	A. Mm-hm.	13	what's she saying? What do you need us to do?"
14	Q. Then if I can ask you to go to page 3 of the transcript,	14	It looks like you're talking to two people in that
15	the next page, you say a third of the way down the page:	15	sentence. "They're just coming on every floor" is
16	"OPERATOR: Sorry, I'm just listening to my	16	intended for CU8, and "so what's she saying?", are you
17	colleague. The one on the 21st Floor, they can't stop	17	asking that question of Pam Jones?
18	the smoke coming in the front door so they've gone into	18	A. I can't remember.
19	the living room now."	19	Q. Okay. And then CU8 says:
20	Pausing there, is that also information coming from	20	"CU8: We need to know the area or priority so
21	Pam Jones, who is sitting next to you?	21	because we've got so many, it'd be nice to have an idea
22	A. Yes.	22	of priority.
	O. D. L. A. L.L. CHIO	23	"OPERATOR: Maybe prioritise it a little bit?
23	Q. Right. And then CU8 says:		
23 24	Q. Right. And then CU8 says: "CU8: Is that the 21st or 23rd?	24	"CU8: Yeah.
		24 25	"CU8: Yeah. "OPERATOR: Yeah.
24	"CU8: Is that the 21st or 23rd? "OPERATOR: The 21st Floor.	1	"OPERATOR: Yeah.
24	"CU8: Is that the 21st or 23rd?	1	

1	"CU8: So ask them what smoke logging is like, how	1	Q. Moving ahead, the next call we see is from you at
2	heavy the smoke is."	2	02.00.34.
3	Did you understand at that stage that you were being	3	Can we move in the control room report, please,
4	asked to prioritise callers on the basis of smoke	4	Ralph, to page 61.
5	density?	5	This is a quarter of the way down that page:
6	A. He asked me that question, but then I'm thinking that	6	"02:00:34 CRO Adams phones Command Unit 8 on the
7	they are all a priority. There's just so many coming in	7	team leader mobile number to pass information about
8	and I thought: what do you do? How do you deal with all	8	calls that have been received which are summarised in
9	of this? So And we were taking information.	9	the table below. The Command Unit Operator summarises
10	I mean, the operators all had you know, if you looked	10	by suggesting that floors 21 to 23 are the most affected
11	at our whiteboard, you can see we was taking in number	11	and CRO Adams agrees that they seem to be the most
12	of people, disabled, children, so we were taking in	12	worrying."
13	information anyway. So, yeah. And I can remember	13	A. Mm.
14	thinking: oh my God, they're all a priority. There's	14	Q. We'll look at the transcript in a moment.
15	just so many of them.	15	A. Okay.
16	Q. So	16	Q. Just to pick up the precise floor numbers that we can
17	A. What do you do?	17	see there.
18	Q. Yes. I mean, just looking at this call, he in CU8 is	18	A. Yes.
19	asking you to attempt some kind of prioritisation based	19	Q. 182, 201, 92, 165, and 194, and some details next to
20	on smoke density.	20	those.
21	A. Yes.	21	If I can ask you, please, to go to the transcript,
22	Q. Is that what you understood him to be asking you?	22	it's INQ00000195.
23	A. I did, yes, and I can remember looking around the room	23	Again, just to pick up the time mark of it, page 1,
24	and thinking I'll try and tell people, but it was	24	second group of numbers from the left you can see
25	just to impart that information with all what was	25	"020034", so 34 seconds past the hour.
	Page 65		Page 67
1	going on was so difficult	1	If you go places first to page 2 you can see
2	going on was so difficult. Q. I see.	2	If you go, please, first, to page 2, you can see that the conversation starts:
3	A. So I just got back to call-taking.	3	"CU8: Charlie Uniform 8.
4	Q. Having been asked to prioritise on the basis of smoke	4	"OPERATOR: Hi, it's Control again.
5	density, did you tell any of the supervising officers in	7	
_	density, and you ten any of the supervising officers in	5	_
6		5	"CU8: Go ahead.
6 7	the control room that that is what CU8 had asked for?	6	"CU8: Go ahead. "OPERATOR: Yeah, the one we reported in Flat 182?
7	the control room that that is what CU8 had asked for? A. I don't think so. I think they was all on the phone,	6 7	"CU8: Go ahead. "OPERATOR: Yeah, the one we reported in Flat 182? "CU8: Sorry, can you repeat that?
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7 8 9	the control room that that is what CU8 had asked for? A. I don't think so. I think they was all on the phone, they was all doing stuff, it was just Q. Did you think to tell CU8 that his request to prioritise	6 7 8 9	"CU8: Go ahead. "OPERATOR: Yeah, the one we reported in Flat 182? "CU8: Sorry, can you repeat that? "OPERATOR: Yeah, Flat 182 on the 21st? "CU8: On the 21st, Flat 182?
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1	Then at the bottom of page 3, you say:	1	page 58 of the control room report that's
2	"OPERATOR: Flat 92 on the 12th floor."	2	LFB00004790 you can see there that, under the time
3	Then it continues onto the next page, at the bottom:	3	mark of 01.59.05:
4	"OPERATOR: 22nd floor, Flat 194."	4	"Command Unit 8 reply to the Radio Operator at
5	You can see that there.	5	Brigade Control.
6	We can pause there for the purposes of my question.	6	"'Go ahead, over'.
7	Were these calls that you were telling CU8 about	7	"The Radio Operator [Sharon Darby] at Brigade
8	95, 194 calls that you had taken?	8	Control then send information about flat 201. 'Charlie
9	A. No.	9	Uniform 8, a further call. We have 11 persons and a
10	Q. Did you have a list in front of you or some other basis	10	baby, er, who are trapped in Flat 201. That's Flat 207.
11	of information?	11	That's 11 persons and a baby, over'."
12	A. Because I'd already rung them on the previous one about	12	So it looks as if the information that you were
13	the two calls that me and Pam were taking, and all the	13	sending at just after 2.00 am, by admin line call to
14	supervisors were so busy, I thought it might be an idea	14	CU8, duplicated this radio message.
15	for me to go around the room and take the flat numbers.	15	A. Yes, it does, yes.
16	So, again, I just used my initiative. So I went around	16	Q. Did you know that Sharon Darby had already passed this
17	to each operator, asked them their flat number and the	17	message over by radio to
18	details they could pass, and then I just rung the	18	A. No.
19	command unit again.	19	Q. Does it follow, then, that you didn't say to Sharon
20	Q. I see. So, in short, you went round the room	20	"I've done it again" or "I've duplicated it"?
21	A. Yes.	21	A. No.
22	Q they told you, you wrote it down, went back to your	22	Q. Were these calls you were sending I haven't shown you
23	desk and made the call?	23	the whole of the transcript, there were others, but we
24	A. And phoned the command unit.	24	can see the numbers of flats from the control room
25	Q. You said it was off your own initiative.	25	report that you did pass over were you sending them
	Page 69		Page 71
	A W.	١,	i i como de llatico di
1	A. It was, yes.	1	as a priority to CU8 or were these all the information
2	Q. Was Alex Norman or Debbie Real aware that you were	2	that you had at that point?
2 3	Q. Was Alex Norman or Debbie Real aware that you were passing messages in that way?	2 3	that you had at that point? A. That was just the information I had at the time. It was
2 3 4	Q. Was Alex Norman or Debbie Real aware that you were passing messages in that way?A. Probably not, no. They were so bogged down with stuff	2 3 4	that you had at that point? A. That was just the information I had at the time. It was prior to Jason Oliff, the station manager, arriving in
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1	Q. Is there a reason why you didn't ask that control room	1	Q. Is there a reason why not?
2	officer giving you the information about flat 201 what	2	A. I think it was just more concentrating on passing the
3	the smoke conditions were like in the flat?	3	flats and leaving it up to them as to what their
4	A. No, it was just literally them trying to speak to me and	4	prioritisation was at their end.
5	I'm quickly writing it down as they're on the call, and	5	Q. Did you think to ask CU8, "Well, what's happening at the
6	just again to get the information over to the ground as	6	building so that we can work out what advice to give
7	quick as possible.	7	callers in those high floors"?
8	Q. If you look at the information on page 60 of the control	8	A. Not at that time. It was pass it as quick as possible
9	room report for flat 165 that you pass over perhaps	9	and then answer calls, because I was still call-taking
10	it's better to do this off the transcript at the same	10	as well.
11	time.	11	Q. You then go on at the end of the call at page 5, if we
12	You say on page 4 of the transcript, if we can just	12	can look at the transcript, we cover 194, which is Tony
13	flip forward one page in it 165 is something you pick	13	Disson, "pensioner with heavy smoke there", floor 22.
14	up a third of the way down:	14	Then two-thirds of the way down the page, you say:
15	"OPERATOR: Yeah, I think that they're the most	15	"OPERATOR: Yeah. I think I'll be ringing you again
16	worrying and Flat 165 on the 19th.	16	in a minute but I think we're up to date at the moment.
17	"CU8: I'm sorry, can you repeat that?	17	"CU8: Yeah, no problem. All right, cheers.
18	"OPERATOR: Yeah, Flat 165 on the 19th Floor and	18	"OPERATOR: But it's not sounding good."
19	we've got two adult.	19	Did you think you were up to date at that moment?
20	"CU8: Flat 165?	20	A. At that moment in time, I thought I passed all there was
21	"OPERATOR: Yeah, 165 and two adults and a baby but	21	to pass.
22	they're not too bad at the moment."	22	Q. What made you think that?
23	That information goes across. It's also summarised	23	A. I don't know. Just I'd gone around the room and that's
24	in the control room report.	24	what I assumed at the time. No one was telling me
25	When you say there to CU8 "they're not too bad at	25	anything different.
	Page 73		Page 75
1	the moment", was that your own assessment of the	1	Q. By telling him, "I think I'll be ringing you again in
2	situation or is that something that you were told by the	2	a minute", was that because you were expecting to gather
3	control room officer you got this information from?	3	more information from the control room and pass it on?
4	A. It must have been from the control operator, because	4	A. Yes, just more flats, more people trapped.
5	I wouldn't have said that if I didn't have that	5	Q. Did you intend after this call to get up and go around
6	information.	6	again and gather it?
7	Q. Just a little bit further up the page, CU8 says:	7	A. I probably would've done because, as I say, the
8	"CU8: I'm getting the impression it's Floors 21 and	8	supervisors were inundated, and I'd already started
9	23 between 21 and 23 are the most severe?"	9	doing this, so I thought I'd carry on. But then I think
10	And you agree with him, you say:	10	the station manager come in and he took over that role.
11	"OPERATOR: Yeah, I think that they're the most	11	So I probably would've gone around again, depending on
12	worrying"	12	the work I was doing at the time.
13	Just on that, at that point, given what you had	13	Q. You said a moment ago that you thought the station
14	learnt about smoke and fire affecting the floors at the	14	manager came in and took over that role.
15	top of the building, did you think about the stay-put	15	A. Mm.
16	advice that you were giving to other callers?	16	Q. At this point, this is just after 2.00 am, had the
17	A. No, not really. I was still just passing the	17	person you're referring to, who you call the station
18	information, and again, at that point, we probably	18	manager, come and started?
19	hadn't had the information to tell them to get out,	19	A. I can't remember the timescale.
20	so	20	Q. Are you talking about Jason Oliff?
21	Q. Given the clear difficulties with those high floors, did	21	A. Yes.
	you think to have a discussion with CU8 about whether	22	Q. And his whiteboard?
17	, or think to have a discussion with CO0 about whether	23	A. And his whiteboard, yes.
22 23	crews could actually get up to those floors at that		
23	crews could actually get up to those floors at that		
23 24	point, 2 o'clock?	24 25	Q. Had he started that at this point, do you think?
23		24	

1	Adrian Fenton and the others, and I just remember them	1	to that message via your Vision log?
2	going over in the corner, because they had to wheel it	2	A. If I'd looked in the log, but the log is really
3	from one end to the other and it collapsed as they	3	difficult to read and I didn't look at the log at all
4	wheeled it out, because it was broken. So I don't think	4	that night.
5	it was him. I think it was when the others come in,	5	Q. Why is the log difficult to read?
6	they pulled the boards out.	6	A. It's just so much information on there. It's pages and
7	Q. So at this point, had you essentially taken over as the	7	pages of it.
8	point of communication of FSG information from the	8	Q. Is it coming up
9	control room to the command unit?	9	A. You have to keep scrolling through each individual page.
10	A. Not in an official way, but just unofficially that it	10	It's not easy.
11	just seemed I was doing it at this particular moment in	11	Q. As it comes onto the screen, is it coming onto your
12	time.	12	screen
13	Q. After this admin line call, we see one more admin line	13	A. No.
14	call that you make at 02.28.27. Can I ask you, please,	14	Q in live time?
15	to be shown two things: first of all, page 83 of the	15	A. No, you'd have to interrogate the log.
16	control room report LFB00004790, page 83 and also	16	Q. So there's a mechanical question: is it not therefore
17	have up at the same time, please, the transcript for	17	possible to be on a call and watch the information going
18	this call at INQ00000204.	18	onto the Vision log as it comes on?
19	I'll just show you the start of the transcript on	19	A. No. Not if you're taking a call.
20	page 2:	20	Q. So if you wanted to know what messages had gone through
21	"748: 748.	21	the Vision log or come onto the system as a result of
22	"CONTROL: Hello, it's Control again."	22	Sharon Darby inputting a message like that, you would
23	Could you help us with what 748 is? Is that	23	have to interrogate the Vision log?
24	a number of designation of CU8?	24	A. You would.
25	A. I don't know.	25	Q. How easy is it to do that?
	Dage 77		Daga 70
	Page 77		Page 79
		1	
1	Q. Okay. Then you say:	1	A. Not easy at all.
1 2	Q. Okay. Then you say: "CONTROL: Hello, it's Control again."	1 2	A. Not easy at all. Q. What do you have to do?
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2 3 4 5	"CONTROL: Hello, it's Control again." So you're ringing it. A. Mm. Q. "748: Hello. "CONTROL: Hi. We've got Flat 205."	2 3 4 5	 Q. What do you have to do? A. You go in, you've a page this big, and then you're just scrolling page after page after page after page. Some of it is colour-coded to try and make it stand out a bit. So if it's an informative message, we
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1	You can see in the transcript at the top of page 2	1	a whiteboard, so you could see that they were taking
2	it says:	2	the number of people, disabled, children, so you were
3	"748: 748.	3	taking this information anyway. This is a point of
4	"CONTROL: Hello, it's Control again."	4	clarification.
5	Were you intending to call CU8?	5	To the best of your recollection, at 01.50.49, so
6	A. Yes, because I believed he was still dealing with the	6	just afterwards, was the whiteboard already established
7	FSG calls. And as I say, he didn't tell me otherwise,	7	in the control room or did that come later?
8	otherwise I'd have instantly dialled CU7.	8	A. I can't remember what time it was.
9	Q. By this point, was Jason Oliff in the control room?	9	Q. Next question by way of clarification.
10	A. Yes, he was.	10	When you went round the control room officers before
11	Q. Did he have his whiteboards up?	11	making your call to CU8 at 02.00.34, did you ask those
12	A. Yes. And the reason I called them myself is because	12	callers about smoke density as CU8 had asked for?
13	I wasn't on a call at the time and Christine was	13	A. I can't remember, sorry.
14	opposite me, and it was an extremely difficult call, and	14	Q. Is there a reason why you didn't say to them, "I need
15	I could just hear her and I said and I looked in the	15	information about smoke density"?
16	corner and they was all busy, and I thought: oh my God,	16	A. I don't think I did. I don't think I did. I think
17	this is so bad. I said to Christine, "Shall I phone the	17	I was just taking the information they was passing me.
18	command unit and tell them?" And so I phoned them	18	Q. What I'm trying to get at is: is there a reason why,
19	myself. I just thought it was quicker, because I was	19	having been told by CU8 that they wanted you to
20	listening to the call she was taking, and passed the	20	prioritise on the basis of smoke density, you didn't ask
21	information to them, because it sounded so serious.	21	the other CROs to tell you?
22	MR MILLETT: Yes.	22	A. I think it was just the difficulty of them still being
23	Ms Adams, it may be a convenient moment for you to	23	on the line, I thought the main priority was the flat
24	take another short break. Perhaps we should.	24	numbers and the people in there.
25	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Does that suit you?	25	Q. Were they all still on the line when you spoke to them?
	Page 81		Page 83
1	MP MILLETT: Vas a short one if that is convenient to you	1	A I think so was I think it was literally "What's your
1	MR MILLETT: Yes, a short one, if that is convenient to you.	1	A. I think so, yes. I think it was literally "What's your
2	THE WITNESS: Okay, yes.	2	flat number? How many people?" Just very brief
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1	"CONTROL: Okay. Hold on, I'll just see if there's	1	floor. This is Nicholas Burton and his wife, Pily.
2	any more for you. Any more for the command unit?	2	We can pick this up in summary form at page 72 of
3	They're getting out, are they? Yeah, we're trying to	3	the control report. That's LFB00004790, page 72.
4	persuade them to leave so I'll leave you with that one	4	That's the summary.
5	and I'll ring you back if there's any more."	5	02.13.03:
6	When you say "Any more for the command unit?", who	6	"CRO Adams takes a call from a male caller, who says
7	are you talking to?	7	he is Nick Burton, reporting that his whole tower block
8	A. I presume I just did a general broadcast to the room, as	8	is on fire and that he is in flat 165 on the 19th
9	I was on the phone to them, if they had any more.	9	floor."
10	But yes, it wasn't anybody specific.	10	
11	Q. Did you get a response from anybody?	11	I want to show you the transcript for this, please. This is LFB00000344.
12		12	
	A. I can't remember. Probably not.		At page 1 of that transcript, we can see the time,
13	Q. When you say "They're getting out, are they?", is that	13	second group of numbers from the right, "021303", so
14	a question to Christine?	14	02.13.03.
15	A. It was, yes.	15	On page 2 of the transcript, you can see that the
16	Q. Then you say:	16	call starts and the caller says:
17	"Yeah, we're trying to persuade them to leave so	17	"OPERATOR: Fire brigade.
18	I'll leave you with that one and I'll ring you back if	18	"CALLER: Oh, hi, this (Inaudible) from 165 Grenfell
19	there's any more."	19	Tower. I know you
20	Are you then talking to the command unit?	20	"OPERATOR: 165?
21	A. Yes.	21	"CALLER: Yeah, Grenfell Tower. Our tower block is on
22	Q. And when you say:	22	fire
23	"Yeah, we're trying to persuade them to leave"	23	"OPERATOR: Yeah.
24	Was that because you had been told now to tell all	24	"CALLER: and we're trapped in the 19th floor, but
25	people to leave, come what may, or was this a decision	25	nobody's coming and the flames next-door's getting very
	Page 85		Page 87
1	made by Christine based on what she was being told?	1	close to our windows now, and the smoke's in the houses
2	A. I can't remember. Well, I don't know whether she knew	2	
3		1	(Overspeaking)"
3	at that time, but I think it and I didn't hear her		
4	call Livet heard har and of that call and I presume	3	Just at that point, when he says "we're trapped in
4	call, I just heard her end of that call, and I presume	4	the 19th floor", did the use of the word "trapped" by
5	that the fire was in their flat and that they needed to	4 5	the 19th floor", did the use of the word "trapped" by the caller alert you to the fact that this was now
5 6	that the fire was in their flat and that they needed to leave.	4 5 6	the 19th floor", did the use of the word "trapped" by the caller alert you to the fact that this was now an FSG call?
5 6 7	that the fire was in their flat and that they needed to leave. Q. Did you tell Sharon Darby or Jason Oliff that you had	4 5 6 7	the 19th floor", did the use of the word "trapped" by the caller alert you to the fact that this was now an FSG call? A. Possibly. But without seeing the rest of it, I'm not
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5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	that the fire was in their flat and that they needed to leave. Q. Did you tell Sharon Darby or Jason Oliff that you had made this communication with CU8? A. I didn't, no. Q. Is there a reason why not? A. Sharon didn't really need to know because she wasn't passing any calls anyway at that time, because it was all Jason Oliff, and, no, it was just — they was all busy in the corner. It just seemed irrelevant that I'd done that, so Q. At this stage, did you get a sense that the officer in CU8 was at the same time talking to Jason Oliff? A. I thought Jason was not on the phone at that time because I think I would've maybe said to him Christine's got a very bad call, but I can't remember. Q. I want just to pick up a particular call at around about this time — A. Mm-hm. Q. — before coming to the change in stay-put advice.	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	the 19th floor", did the use of the word "trapped" by the caller alert you to the fact that this was now an FSG call? A. Possibly. But without seeing the rest of it, I'm not sure. Q. Okay. A. I mean, he's saying he's trapped, so I assume that he just needed some guidance. Q. Well, we can see the rest of the call, and it runs over 5 pages or so. You go on to say: "OPERATOR: Yeah, and what floor are you on? "CALLER: Nineteen. "OPERATOR: Nineteen? How many of you in there? "CALLER: There's two me and my wife (Inaudible) dog. "OPERATOR: Two adults and a dog? Okay. "CALLER: Yeah. "OPERATOR: And so are you blocking the smoke from coming in?" It goes on in that vein over page 3, and you say at

1	"OPERATOR: Yeah, we are trying to get to you, but	1	A. No, probably more calls were waiting and it was
2	we've got	2	literally so many calls coming in that you just was down
3	"CALLER: Yeah.	3	to taking as brief details as you could to answer
4	"OPERATOR: numerous people trapped in the flats.	4	another call.
5	So	5	Q. Right.
6	"CALLER: Yeah, I understand.	6	A. He was saying he was safe so and hopefully at that
7	"OPERATOR: we just want to sort of try and	7	time, I think we all believed, all the call-takers, that
8	assess how bad it is, but do you are you okay? Is	8	the crews were still going up to them and will get to
9	the smoke okay at the moment?	9	them all. So I don't think what's the time of the
10	"CALLER: (Overspeaking) smoke in the whole house.	10	call? I don't think we had the information to tell them
11	"OPERATOR: Okay.	11	to leave at that point.
12	"CALLER: Not bad smoke; we've got (Overspeaking)	12	Q. 02.13 or so.
13	"OPERATOR: But you're okay?	13	A. Yeah. At that point, we were still anticipating that
14	"CALLER: We've got the windows	14	the crews would be with them.
15	"OPERATOR: Just	15	Q. Did you have any solid information that crews were
16	"CALLER: closed.	16	getting up there or was that just an assumption you were
17	"OPERATOR: Yeah, and the door you've blocked the	17	making or an expectation?
18	smoke coming from coming in, yeah?	18	A. It was an assumption because we'd had no information to
19	"CALLER: Yeah.	19	state otherwise.
20	"OPERATOR: You've put something against the door?	20	Q. Is there a reason why because we can see on this call
21	Okay. If it gets	21	what you do say you don't ask him whether either he
22	"CALLER: Yeah.	22	or his wife had any mobility problems? Is there any
23	"OPERATOR: any worse, ring us back, but we are	23	reason why you didn't ask that question?
24	trying to get to you."	24	A. I don't think that's a general question we ask. If you
25	That's most of it.	25	was saying to someone, "Can you leave?", they'd tell you
	Page 89		Page 91
1	A. Yes.	1	anyway. They'd say, "Well, I'm disabled" or whatever.
2	Q. We can see from page 4, if we just go back to it, that	2	They'd offer that information themselves.
3	he says a quarter of the way down that page:	3	Q. But you didn't ask him whether he could leave.
4	"CALLER: (Overspeaking) smoke in the whole house."	4	A. No, I didn't ask.
5	We can see how the call ends. You check he's okay	5	Q. So you didn't even get to that point.
6	and you say that you're trying to get to them	6	
			A. No.
7	A. Mm-hm.		A. No. O. So you've got a trapped caller and you don't know
7 8		7	Q. So you've got a trapped caller and you don't know
8	Q and he should ring back if it gets any worse.	7 8	Q. So you've got a trapped caller and you don't know whether they've been able to leave or can leave, and if
8	Q and he should ring back if it gets any worse.A number of questions.	7 8 9	Q. So you've got a trapped caller and you don't know whether they've been able to leave or can leave, and if not, why not?
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8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q and he should ring back if it gets any worse. A number of questions. First of all, you don't ask the caller to explain why they think they're trapped. Is there a reason for that? A. No. But I think he's explained as the conversation goes on that there's smoke in the house and there's smoke coming from underneath the door, so presumably he's not going to go out in the smoke. Q. You say "presumably". Was that an assumption that you made A. Probably. Q that he was trapped? A. Yes. Q. Because we can see you don't explore with him whether he'd actually already tried to get out, or what the 	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q. So you've got a trapped caller and you don't know whether they've been able to leave or can leave, and if not, why not? A. The caller said it was "Not bad smoke; we've got", I believe there. So I'm just assuming it's not that bad at the moment. Q. Right. A. Other calls may have been more serious. So all I could tell him was we were going to get to him as soon as we could. Q. Right. A. Ring us back if it gets worse. Q. Did you form a view about how safe it was for this caller to stay in their flat? A. No. Also, they're there; they need to make their own choices as well as to what they feel safe or not safe. So
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A. I can't remember. I thought I wrote all my calls down 1 with those calls, that particular night. If it was 2 2 and passed them, but I can't -- I hope I did. a different occasion, you'd give that person all the 3 3 time in the world, you'd have someone listening to you Q. At this stage, how were you recording the calls and 4 passing them? 4 while you're dealing with it, we'd be passing 5 5 information to the ground, but not on that night. A. I was writing them on a piece of paper. 6 Q. How did that piece of paper get to Jason Oliff at the 6 Q. You say not on that night; because ...? 7 7 A. Because it was overwhelming. There was only seven whiteboard? 8 call-takers dealing with all those calls coming in, and 8 A. You walked up to him and gave it to him. 9 9 Q. Given the policy we've looked at before, is there we just did our best for them. 10 a reason why you didn't at least explore the possibility 10 Q. We now turn to a different topic, which is the change in 11 the advice. 11 with this caller of whether he and his wife could leave? 12 A. I can't remember. I can't say. 12 A. Mm-hm. 13 13 Q. I'm pressing you a bit on this, I'm afraid, but is there Q. You cover this on page 4 of your witness statement, if 14 a reason why you didn't? 14 we can go back and look at that. At the bottom of 15 15 A. I can only assume the volume of calls that were coming page 4 and over to the top of page 5, you say: "At around 2.30-2.45am I remember being told in 16 in, and when they're saying that it's not too bad, the 16 17 17 person by our Operations Manager Alexandra NORMAN that smoke, they're safer than some of the other callers that 18 18 the advice to callers had changed and was now to 'get were -- you know the calls waiting to be answered. 19 O. Right. 19 people out' and self-rescue. She told all us CROs, 20 going round the desks. This is not normal policy and is 20 A. I think the thing we didn't have on the Grenfell night 21 was the luxury of time to give to callers. And we've 21 really alien to me as it has never happened before. All 22 22 of a sudden I was telling people to get out of the all got to live with that. We was having to not spend 23 as much time as we normally would, and we was just 23 building giving them advice to find the nearest 24 adjusting it to the conditions of the room. 24 staircase, asking them if they can get out. I didn't 25 25 know how many staircases there were in that building, Q. Mm. Page 93 Page 95 1 1 but could only advise and reassure any callers." A. It was just horrendous, so we was just trying to get 2 through as many calls as possible, to pass those flat 2 A. Mm-hm. 3 3 Q. First of all, the time frame you've given as 2.30 to numbers to the crews on the scene for them to go and 4 4 2.45 am. rescue them. And in some cases, that didn't work out. 5 5 Q. We looked at it earlier, but you'll remember that the When you made this statement, how did you come to 6 definition of a fire survival guidance call is where the 6 recall that as the time frame, 2.30 to 2.45 am? 7 operator stays on the line until the call is cleared or 7 A. I can't recall. It just seemed around that sort of 8 8 the caller is rescued. timescale. 9 9 Q. Do you remember how Alex Norman relayed that information A. Mm-hm. 10 Q. You can see that doesn't happen with this call even 10 to you? You say it was in person. though the caller says he is trapped. 11 11 A. Yes, she stood in front of me. She had a piece of paper 12 12 with the instructions written down. She just said "Wet 13 Q. Can you explain why you didn't stay on the line with 13 towels and wet sheets and tell them to leave." And 14 14 I can recall distinctly saying to her "All floors?" And this caller? 15 A. You're just having to make decisions as to whether you 15 she just said "All floors." 16 16 let people go, and you just judge it, I think, on the Q. Right. 17 17 A. Then you was just trying to get your head round that one person, how vulnerable they were -- I don't know. 18 18 minute you were telling people, "Stay, we're going to Decisions I hope I'll never have to make again, but we 19 19 did on that night. come to you", and the next minute, "You've got to get 20 Q. This is a point to ask the question as good as any, as 20 out and leave." 21 points go, but looking at this particular example, did 21 Q. So just breaking that down a bit, she showed you some 22 you feel at that time that your many years of experience 22 written instructions, did she? 23 and the training that you had had equipped you properly 23 A. It was on a piece of paper, but she verbally said it. 24 to deal with this call? 24 It was the verbal thing that I remember. 25 25 Q. You then asked her "All floors?" A. I don't think you could ever be fully equipped to deal

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1			
	A. I did, yes.	1	"OPERATOR: What flat number are you?
2	Q. Is there a reason why you asked that question?	2	"CALLER 1: 193, on the 22nd floor.
3	A. Because it was incomprehensible that we was telling	3	"OPERATOR: The 22nd sorry, that flat number
4	everyone on every floor to suddenly get out, we weren't	4	again?
5	going to make it. It was just yeah, unprecedented.	5	"CALLER 1: It's the 22nd floor; 193
6	Q. You say you didn't know how many staircases there were	6	"OPERATOR: 193?
7	in the building.	7	"CALLER 1: on the 22nd floor."
8	A. No.	8	Pausing there, is there a reason why you keep having
9	Q. Would that have helped you?	9	to ask?
10	A. Well, I was only giving that advice because I thought:	10	A. Just to confirm I got the right number and the right
11	will they know which way to turn? But I learnt	11	floor.
12	afterwards there was only one, one staircase, so	12	Q. Right.
13	because if you're going out into a smoke-filled	13	A. Because sometimes you can easily mishear.
14	corridor, you know, it's just: which way are you going	14	Q. Towards the bottom of the page, you say:
15	to go? Where is your nearest exit? But obviously that	15	"OPERATOR: Okay, and what is happening now? Is
16	wasn't relevant because they only had one.	16	there smoke coming in or a fire?
17	Q. When Alex Norman gave you these instructions, did she	17	"CALLER 1: There's smoke coming in, a lot.
18	give you a clear impression of how to give that advice;	18	"OPERATOR: Okay. And have you tried blocking it
19	in other words, what terms or tone to use with callers?	19	off? Have you put towels against the door?"
20	A. No. No. She couldn't do that.	20	At that stage, did you understand that these callers
21	Q. Did she leave you with the impression that you were	21	were trapped?
22	still able to give the caller some kind of choice, or	22	A. From that, it sounds like they can't get out, yes.
23	did she make it clear to you that this was essentially	23	Q. Then it continues onto page 3 and you go through the
24	a live or die instruction?	24	numbers in the flat, eight adults, and then the caller
25	A. Yes, yes, a live or die.	25	says:
	12 100, 500, 11 110 01 010		ou, o.
	Page 97		Page 99
1	Q. The latter?	1	"CALLER 1: Can the helicopter take us, please?
2	A. That's the impression I got from the advice she gave me.	2	"OPERATOR: So, is it eight adults?
3	Q. After you had that instruction and in those terms from	3	"CALLER 1: No two, three, four, five six
4	Alex Norman, did you start applying that advice straight	4	"OPERATOR: okay.
5	away?	5	"CALLER 1: adults and three children.
6	A. I believe so, yes.		
		6	"OPERATOR: Three children?
7	Q. I'm going to look at one or two calls with you to see if	6 7	"OPERATOR: Three children?" "CALLER 1: Yeah."
			"CALLER 1: Yeah.
7	Q. I'm going to look at one or two calls with you to see if we can pin this down a bit more.The first one is page 91 to 92 of the control	7	"CALLER 1: Yeah. "OPERATOR: How many adults?
7 8	we can pin this down a bit more.	7 8	"CALLER 1: Yeah. "OPERATOR: How many adults? "CALLER 1: I've got asthma; very bad asthma.
7 8 9	we can pin this down a bit more. The first one is page 91 to 92 of the control report. This is at 02.37, exactly, the bottom of that	7 8 9	"CALLER 1: Yeah. "OPERATOR: How many adults? "CALLER 1: I've got asthma; very bad asthma. "OPERATOR: Okay. We are trying to get to you.
7 8 9 10	we can pin this down a bit more. The first one is page 91 to 92 of the control	7 8 9 10	"CALLER 1: Yeah. "OPERATOR: How many adults? "CALLER 1: I've got asthma; very bad asthma. "OPERATOR: Okay. We are trying to get to you. What's happening in your house?"
7 8 9 10 11	we can pin this down a bit more. The first one is page 91 to 92 of the control report. This is at 02.37, exactly, the bottom of that page.	7 8 9 10 11	"CALLER 1: Yeah. "OPERATOR: How many adults? "CALLER 1: I've got asthma; very bad asthma. "OPERATOR: Okay. We are trying to get to you. What's happening in your house?" I'm just going to run through the rest of the call,
7 8 9 10 11 12	we can pin this down a bit more. The first one is page 91 to 92 of the control report. This is at 02.37, exactly, the bottom of that page. "CRO Adams takes a call from a female caller in flat	7 8 9 10 11 12	"CALLER 1: Yeah. "OPERATOR: How many adults? "CALLER 1: I've got asthma; very bad asthma. "OPERATOR: Okay. We are trying to get to you. What's happening in your house?"
7 8 9 10 11 12 13	we can pin this down a bit more. The first one is page 91 to 92 of the control report. This is at 02.37, exactly, the bottom of that page. "CRO Adams takes a call from a female caller in flat 193 on the 22nd floor who is reporting that a lot of	7 8 9 10 11 12 13	"CALLER 1: Yeah. "OPERATOR: How many adults? "CALLER 1: I've got asthma; very bad asthma. "OPERATOR: Okay. We are trying to get to you. What's happening in your house?" I'm just going to run through the rest of the call, picking up some parts of it.
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7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	we can pin this down a bit more. The first one is page 91 to 92 of the control report. This is at 02.37, exactly, the bottom of that page. "CRO Adams takes a call from a female caller in flat 193 on the 22nd floor who is reporting that a lot of smoke is coming into the flat and that she has blocked up the door." We'll look at the transcript of that. It's probably easier to do it. It's LFB00000366. Again, you can see the time in the second group of	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	"CALLER 1: Yeah. "OPERATOR: How many adults? "CALLER 1: I've got asthma; very bad asthma. "OPERATOR: Okay. We are trying to get to you. What's happening in your house?" I'm just going to run through the rest of the call, picking up some parts of it. At page 5, you say at the top: "OPERATOR: Yeah, I understand that, and we are trying to get to you as soon as possible, and we're going to tell the firemen where you are." Looking at that, do you think that this was at
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	we can pin this down a bit more. The first one is page 91 to 92 of the control report. This is at 02.37, exactly, the bottom of that page. "CRO Adams takes a call from a female caller in flat 193 on the 22nd floor who is reporting that a lot of smoke is coming into the flat and that she has blocked up the door." We'll look at the transcript of that. It's probably easier to do it. It's LFB00000366.	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	"CALLER 1: Yeah. "OPERATOR: How many adults? "CALLER 1: I've got asthma; very bad asthma. "OPERATOR: Okay. We are trying to get to you. What's happening in your house?" I'm just going to run through the rest of the call, picking up some parts of it. At page 5, you say at the top: "OPERATOR: Yeah, I understand that, and we are trying to get to you as soon as possible, and we're going to tell the firemen where you are."
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7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	we can pin this down a bit more. The first one is page 91 to 92 of the control report. This is at 02.37, exactly, the bottom of that page. "CRO Adams takes a call from a female caller in flat 193 on the 22nd floor who is reporting that a lot of smoke is coming into the flat and that she has blocked up the door." We'll look at the transcript of that. It's probably easier to do it. It's LFB00000366. Again, you can see the time in the second group of numbers from the right at "023700", so 02.37 exactly. At the top of page 2, it says:	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	"CALLER 1: Yeah. "OPERATOR: How many adults? "CALLER 1: I've got asthma; very bad asthma. "OPERATOR: Okay. We are trying to get to you. What's happening in your house?" I'm just going to run through the rest of the call, picking up some parts of it. At page 5, you say at the top: "OPERATOR: Yeah, I understand that, and we are trying to get to you as soon as possible, and we're going to tell the firemen where you are." Looking at that, do you think that this was at a time before or after you had had the instructions from
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7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	we can pin this down a bit more. The first one is page 91 to 92 of the control report. This is at 02.37, exactly, the bottom of that page. "CRO Adams takes a call from a female caller in flat 193 on the 22nd floor who is reporting that a lot of smoke is coming into the flat and that she has blocked up the door." We'll look at the transcript of that. It's probably easier to do it. It's LFB00000366. Again, you can see the time in the second group of numbers from the right at "023700", so 02.37 exactly. At the top of page 2, it says: "OPERATOR: Fire brigade. "CALLER 1: Yes (Inaudible) 22nd floor in 193	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	"CALLER 1: Yeah. "OPERATOR: How many adults? "CALLER 1: I've got asthma; very bad asthma. "OPERATOR: Okay. We are trying to get to you. What's happening in your house?" I'm just going to run through the rest of the call, picking up some parts of it. At page 5, you say at the top: "OPERATOR: Yeah, I understand that, and we are trying to get to you as soon as possible, and we're going to tell the firemen where you are." Looking at that, do you think that this was at a time before or after you had had the instructions from Alex Norman to tell callers on all floors to leave? A. I think that would be before. That may have been my last call I took before I got the instruction. Because
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	we can pin this down a bit more. The first one is page 91 to 92 of the control report. This is at 02.37, exactly, the bottom of that page. "CRO Adams takes a call from a female caller in flat 193 on the 22nd floor who is reporting that a lot of smoke is coming into the flat and that she has blocked up the door." We'll look at the transcript of that. It's probably easier to do it. It's LFB00000366. Again, you can see the time in the second group of numbers from the right at "023700", so 02.37 exactly. At the top of page 2, it says: "OPERATOR: Fire brigade. "CALLER 1: Yes (Inaudible) 22nd floor in 193 Grenfell Tower. We can	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	"CALLER 1: Yeah. "OPERATOR: How many adults? "CALLER 1: I've got asthma; very bad asthma. "OPERATOR: Okay. We are trying to get to you. What's happening in your house?" I'm just going to run through the rest of the call, picking up some parts of it. At page 5, you say at the top: "OPERATOR: Yeah, I understand that, and we are trying to get to you as soon as possible, and we're going to tell the firemen where you are." Looking at that, do you think that this was at a time before or after you had had the instructions from Alex Norman to tell callers on all floors to leave? A. I think that would be before. That may have been my last call I took before I got the instruction. Because I think I would've said, "You've got to leave or attempt
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	we can pin this down a bit more. The first one is page 91 to 92 of the control report. This is at 02.37, exactly, the bottom of that page. "CRO Adams takes a call from a female caller in flat 193 on the 22nd floor who is reporting that a lot of smoke is coming into the flat and that she has blocked up the door." We'll look at the transcript of that. It's probably easier to do it. It's LFB00000366. Again, you can see the time in the second group of numbers from the right at "023700", so 02.37 exactly. At the top of page 2, it says: "OPERATOR: Fire brigade. "CALLER 1: Yes (Inaudible) 22nd floor in 193 Grenfell Tower. We can "OPERATOR: Yeah?	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	"CALLER 1: Yeah. "OPERATOR: How many adults? "CALLER 1: I've got asthma; very bad asthma. "OPERATOR: Okay. We are trying to get to you. What's happening in your house?" I'm just going to run through the rest of the call, picking up some parts of it. At page 5, you say at the top: "OPERATOR: Yeah, I understand that, and we are trying to get to you as soon as possible, and we're going to tell the firemen where you are." Looking at that, do you think that this was at a time before or after you had had the instructions from Alex Norman to tell callers on all floors to leave? A. I think that would be before. That may have been my last call I took before I got the instruction. Because I think I would've said, "You've got to leave or attempt to leave."

1	page 5 "we are trying to get to you as soon as	1	Q. Now
2	possible", was that based on any information that you	2	A. That wasn't to be.
3	had had from the incident ground or was that, again, the	3	Q. At 02.43
4	assumption or expectation that you had?	4	A. Yes.
5	A. My expectation we would.	5	Q. I'm sorry.
6	Q. Listening to what was going on in the control room at	6	A. I'm all right, it's okay.
7	that stage, could you hear colleagues now giving get-out	7	Q. Are you okay?
8	advice?	8	A. Yes, I'm fine.
9	A. No.	9	Q. At 02.43.55, so not very long after this call and
10	Q. You're told by this caller that there are children in	10	this call is at 02.37, so this is a few minutes after
11	the flat and that the caller herself has got very bad	11	this call you take another call from the same flat,
12	asthma. Is that information that you passed over to	12	and this is LFB00000376.
13	Jason Oliff?	13	Just for the note, it's page 98 of the control
14	A. I don't think so, probably just the number of people.	14	report, but we don't need to see it. We'll look at the
15	Q. Going on with the call to the end we can take this	15	transcript.
16	quite quickly, it's quite clear what is happening you	16	Again, you can see the time of this from the second
17	say at page 5, a quarter of the way down, just after the	17	group of numbers on the right at the top, "024355".
18	part I showed you:	18	It starts on page 2 of the transcript:
19	"OPERATOR: Okay. Look, I'm going to go now, because	19	"OPERATOR: Fire brigade.
20	we've got lots of calls coming in. I'm going to tell	20	"CALLER: Hello?
21	them where you are, and you just try and keep yourself	21	"OPERATOR: Hello? Fire brigade."
22	safe, try and stop the smoke coming in, go to a room	22	A third of the way down:
23	that's the least smoky and all stay together. We'll get	23	"OPERATOR: Yeah. And what flat number are you?
24	to you as soon as we can, okay?	24	"CALLER: 22nd floor.
25	"CALLER 1: Okay.	25	"OPERATOR: 22nd floor. What flat number?
	•		
	Page 101		Page 103
1	"OPERATOR: All right? Ring us back if it starts	1	"CALLER: 193 "
1 2	"OPERATOR: All right? Ring us back if it starts	1 2	"CALLER: 193." So this is the same flat same floor as the call
2	catching fire in your house"	2	So this is the same flat, same floor, as the call
	catching fire in your house" A. Mm.	2 3	So this is the same flat, same floor, as the call you've just taken, which we've just looked at.
2 3	catching fire in your house" A. Mm. Q. Is there a reason why you said "I'm going to go now,	2	So this is the same flat, same floor, as the call you've just taken, which we've just looked at. You say:
2 3 4	catching fire in your house" A. Mm. Q. Is there a reason why you said "I'm going to go now, because we've got lots of calls coming in", and didn't	2 3 4	So this is the same flat, same floor, as the call you've just taken, which we've just looked at. You say: "OPERATOR: 193. Okay, and what is happening now?
2 3 4 5	catching fire in your house" A. Mm. Q. Is there a reason why you said "I'm going to go now, because we've got lots of calls coming in", and didn't stay on the line helping them?	2 3 4 5	So this is the same flat, same floor, as the call you've just taken, which we've just looked at. You say:
2 3 4 5 6	catching fire in your house" A. Mm. Q. Is there a reason why you said "I'm going to go now, because we've got lots of calls coming in", and didn't stay on the line helping them? A. Again, the volume of calls. It's just the sheer amount	2 3 4 5 6	So this is the same flat, same floor, as the call you've just taken, which we've just looked at. You say: "OPERATOR: 193. Okay, and what is happening now? Is the fire coming in your flat? "CALLER: Who?
2 3 4 5 6 7	catching fire in your house" A. Mm. Q. Is there a reason why you said "I'm going to go now, because we've got lots of calls coming in", and didn't stay on the line helping them? A. Again, the volume of calls. It's just the sheer amount of calls that were waiting to be answered.	2 3 4 5 6 7	So this is the same flat, same floor, as the call you've just taken, which we've just looked at. You say: "OPERATOR: 193. Okay, and what is happening now? Is the fire coming in your flat?
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1	Q. No.	1	My question is: is that what you understood from the
2	A. Maybe because things were intensifying and just the	2	instruction that Alex Norman had given you?
3	volume of calls we was having, I don't know. It's hard	3	A. No, I think it was to tell them to leave. Maybe
4	to say.	4	I wasn't very clear on that one, but I can't remember.
5	Q. We can see you're asked about a helicopter, and you say:	5	So, yeah, I mean — and it's always their choice.
6	"OPERATOR: I'm sorry, we don't have any helicopters,	6	I mean, they're there, they're seeing it, they know
7		7	
	I'm sorry. So it's flat 193, 22nd floor, you've got	8	what's on the other side of the door, they know what's
8	eight people?"		in their flat, so I'm just on the end of the phone,
9	Then you ask can you get out at all and you're told:	9	just trying to help them.
10	"OPERATOR: Can you get out at all?	10	Q. I mean, did you understand Alex Norman's instructions
11	"CALLER: It's full of smoke, the fire from other	11	A. Yes, I did understand.
12	side is over our building.	12	Q. Well, did you understand them to mean that you could
13	"OPERATOR: Okay. But is the fire in the corridor?"	13	leave the caller with a sense of choice, or did you
14	It continues in that vein. You do explore exit	14	understand the instruction that, come what may, these
15	routes, as we can see.	15	callers needed to understand that they had no choice and
16	On page 4, you say two-thirds of the way down:	16	had to leave?
17	"OPERATOR: Okay. Well we are trying to get to you	17	A. Yes, I believe I did understand that, but I don't know
18	but it's very difficult. So all I'm saying to you is if	18	if it come across on that call very well.
19	it gets very, very bad you need to get yourself out of	19	Q. Can you explain why you didn't give them the advice in
20	those flats, get all your eight people out, cover	20	uncompromising terms?
21	yourself with wet towels, wet sheets, anything and try	21	A. No, I can't.
22	and get out, okay? All right?	22	Q. Okay.
23	"CALLER: Mmm.	23	A. Hopefully I did better on the others.
24	"OPERATOR: Okay. I'm going to leave you now. You	24	Q. All right.
25	make the decision whether you think you need to leave or	25	Flat 182, 21st floor, at 02.46. This is transcript
	Page 105		Page 107
	- 182 - 10		- 1180 - 01
1	not, all right?"	1	LFB00000379.
		1	Li B00000379.
2	Looking at what you're telling them at that stage,	2	We can do it on the transcript, but for our
2 3			
	Looking at what you're telling them at that stage,	2	We can do it on the transcript, but for our
3	Looking at what you're telling them at that stage, do you think that was before or after Alex Norman had	2 3	We can do it on the transcript, but for our reference again, this is page 100 of the control room
3 4	Looking at what you're telling them at that stage, do you think that was before or after Alex Norman had given you the instruction?	2 3 4	We can do it on the transcript, but for our reference again, this is page 100 of the control room report.
3 4 5	Looking at what you're telling them at that stage, do you think that was before or after Alex Norman had given you the instruction? A. I can't honestly remember.	2 3 4 5	We can do it on the transcript, but for our reference again, this is page 100 of the control room report. 02.46.42. We can see that from the top of that
3 4 5 6	Looking at what you're telling them at that stage, do you think that was before or after Alex Norman had given you the instruction? A. I can't honestly remember. Q. Do you think	2 3 4 5 6	We can do it on the transcript, but for our reference again, this is page 100 of the control room report. 02.46.42. We can see that from the top of that page.
3 4 5 6 7	Looking at what you're telling them at that stage, do you think that was before or after Alex Norman had given you the instruction? A. I can't honestly remember. Q. Do you think A. I would think maybe after, but I can't remember.	2 3 4 5 6 7	We can do it on the transcript, but for our reference again, this is page 100 of the control room report. 02.46.42. We can see that from the top of that page. If we go to the start of the call, page 2: "OPERATOR: Hello? Fire brigade. Hello? Fire
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1	need —	1	(Pause)
2	"CALLER: We can't, we can't. (inaudible).	2	Q. Just one or two further questions.
3	"OPERATOR: Okay. We're advising people now to try	3	Can I ask you to go back to your statement at
4	and leave the building, okay?"	4	page 5, please.
5	So at that point this is 02.46, so only a minute	5	On page 5 in the second paragraph, you describe how
6	or two after the end of the last call you're now	6	the television wasn't put on because the supervisors
7	telling 182 in very clear terms, it seems from this,	7	didn't want to upset you. I'm summarising.
8	that they have to leave.	8	General questions.
9	Did anything change between the last call and this	9	When you're working at the Merton control room, are
10	call?	10	you used to having the television on?
11		11	A. Yes, it's on 24/7.
12	A. I don't know. I don't know whether that was the first	12	Q. Would you have a downlink from an NPAS helicopter if one
	call I took following that instruction or the last call,	13	•
13	I honestly can't remember.		was there?
14	Q. Okay.	14	A. We should have, but it's not been working for years.
15	A. But that one is very clearly I'm saying to them, "You've	15	Q. It's not been working for years?
16	got to leave." So that seems more likely that it's the	16	A. Mm.
17	first call to tell them to leave, but	17	Q. What, in Merton?
18	Q. Well, we have the timings. The one we looked at was	18	A. Yes.
19	02.43 and this is 02.46, but you recall it differently?	19	Q. What about Stratford?
20	A. Yes, maybe this was the first call, then. I honestly	20	A. I think it used to work there. Well, not at Stratford,
21	can't remember, I'm sorry.	21	it doesn't work. I think in our previous control room
22	Q. Going to the end of the call, we can see that you say in	22	at GVP, I think we had a link, but it's never worked at
23	the third from the end part:	23	the lock, not in our control anyway, or at Stratford.
24	"OPERATOR: Try and get yourself out the building.	24	Q. Have you ever used it, when it did work, to help you?
25	Get wet towels, wet sheets, anything, try and get out of	25	A. Not me specifically, but I believe it's helpful for the
	D 100		D 111
	Page 109		Page 111
1	the building. As you leave your flat think where the	1	fire ground, like when you've a major fire, but not for
1 2	the building. As you leave your flat think where the nearest staircase is and head for it and run, all right?	1 2	fire ground, like when you've a major fire, but not for us in control, we've not particularly used it.
	nearest staircase is and head for it and run, all right?		
2	nearest staircase is and head for it and run, all right? Okay, I'm going to have to leave you. Sorry, we've got	2	us in control, we've not particularly used it. Q. Would you in the past have been able to use what was on
2 3	nearest staircase is and head for it and run, all right? Okay, I'm going to have to leave you. Sorry, we've got so many calls coming in. Just try and get out of the	2 3	us in control, we've not particularly used it.
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1	mean it's on the top floors. And knowledge is always	1	A. Possibly. It's a very hard to say as an afterthought,
2	good. The more knowledge you have, it's always helpful.	2	yes.
3	MR MILLETT: Ms Adams, I've come to the end of my questions	3	Q. I know it's difficult, but would it have assisted you in
4	I have to ask you. What I normally do is to ask the	4	pressing CU8 for them to tell you what the conditions
5	chairman to rise for a few minutes to make sure that	5	were like inside the stairs or inside the building?
6	I've covered everything I need to cover with you.	6	A. Again, possibly, but it's so difficult to say. I mean,
7	THE WITNESS: Okay.	7	I assumed we was getting that information because
8	MR MILLETT: I'm going to ask him to do that.	8	Jason Oliff had an open line to them, so I sort of
9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We are going to have a short break	9	assumed they would be updating Jason, but
10	where counsel checks whether he has any other questions	10	Q. Did there come a time we've covered the night up to
11	he needs to ask.	11	about 02.50 now when you became aware that
12	Again, please don't speak to anyone about your	12	firefighters were not able to get to upper floors of the
13	evidence while you're out of the room.	13	building?
14	We'll come back in 5 minutes or as soon as you're	14	A. Only when Alex told us, just stood in front of us, and
15	ready.	15	then when the policy changed, then I was thinking, you
16	MR MILLETT: Thank you Mr, Chairman.	16	know and she said all floors, so I assumed that we
17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you would like to go with the	17	wasn't going to get to anybody.
18	ushers, please.	18	Q. Anybody at all?
19	Mr Millett, if I say 1 o'clock or as soon as	19	A. Yes.
20	possible, all right?	20	Q. Not just the upper floors?
21	MR MILLETT: Yes.	21	A. All floors. Well, yeah, all floors.
22	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.	22	But I think later on and I don't know what the
23	(12.55 pm)	23	timescale was I believe there was a mention of them
24	(A short break)	24	not getting above either the 11th or 15th floor, but
25	(1.00 pm)	25	I couldn't give you any timescale on that and it was
	Page 113		Page 115
1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Ms Adams, I suspect one	1	just something I heard in the room.
2	or two questions.	2	Q. I see, thank you.
3	MR MILLETT: Yes, without being specific about number.	3	Just one or two further questions about specific
4	First of all, Ms Adams, can I just go back to the	4	calls.
5	TV/heli-tele we were discussing just before we finished.	5	We looked at the call at 02.46.42, 182, where you
6	A. Yes.	6	give very unequivocal advice "You need to get out".
7	Q. Would having the television on in the control room at	7	A. Mm-hm.
8	Stratford that night, or having the heli-tele downlink	8	Q. We looked at the call at 02.43, where you say, "You need
9	working, not have at least given you a visual expression	9	to make the decision whether you need to leave or not."
10	of the speed and extent of external fire and smoke	10	A. Yes.
11	spread around this building?	11	Q. Is there a reason why you weren't able to call that
12	A. Possibly.	12	caller back, the one that called at 02.43, and say, "You
13	Q. Would that not have assisted you in being able to judge	13	need to leave"?
14	what kind of advice you were giving to individual	14	A. Just the amount of calls coming in. And you'd have to
15	callers?	15	find that call amongst the hundreds of calls that was
16	A. We would still have to go by the guidelines of stay put,	16	coming in. So it was impossible, really. And all the
17	unless advised otherwise. We couldn't just say off our	17	calls that were waiting to answered, to tell them to get
18	own backs, sort of thing, "Get out now."	18	out.
19	Q. Assuming that stay put hadn't been changed, to use	19	Q. Finally, can I just ask you to look at something we
20	an overall expression	20	haven't looked at before, which is a call at 02.49.20,
	A. Yes.	21	LFB00000381. It's a short call.
21			77 d .:
22	Q so that you were still in, as it were, stay put	22	You can see the timing of that call at the top
22 23	Q so that you were still in, as it were, stay put territory, would it not have assisted you to be able to	23	again, "024920".
22 23 24	Q so that you were still in, as it were, stay put territory, would it not have assisted you to be able to advise callers on whether they should be assessing the	23 24	again, "024920". It starts:
22 23	Q so that you were still in, as it were, stay put territory, would it not have assisted you to be able to	23	again, "024920".
22 23 24	Q so that you were still in, as it were, stay put territory, would it not have assisted you to be able to advise callers on whether they should be assessing the	23 24	again, "024920". It starts:

1	"CALLER: There's flames coming out of the top of the	1	You say before the end of the call, "We are trying
2	roof, darlin', come and get me. I've (inaudible).	2	to get to you". Again, was there any solid basis for
3	"OPERATOR: I know, I know, can you get yourself.	3	that or was that your expectation?
4	"CALLER: I can see the flames coming down my flat,	4	A. No, I was just thinking of something to say to someone
5	darlin'.	5	who is telling you they can't leave, just to give them
6	"OPERATOR: Right, can you get out of the building?	6	a little bit of hope. But I think I was trying to
7	"CALLER: No, I can't see a thing.	7	stress that he needs to go.
8	"OPERATOR: Why can't you leave?	8	Q. Because by this stage you had it very clear in your mind
9	"CALLER: Because it's too dark, I don't (several	9	that there were no firefighters that could get into the
10	inaudible words). Darlin', I'm 67 years of age, I can't	10	building at all.
11	be running —	11	So the question is: given that knowledge at this
12	"OPERATOR: Are you on your own?	12	point, why did you say to him, "We're trying to get to
13	"CALLER: Yes, I'm on my own.	13	you"?
14	"OPERATOR: Okay. We're advising — what floor are	14	A. Just, again, because he's saying he can't leave, so what
15	you on?	15	do you say to someone who can't leave?
16	"CALLER: Oh my, the times I've told everyone, 22nd!	16	Q. When the call ended, did you think that this caller had
17	Please, love.	17	understood that his only chance of surviving was to try
18	"OPERATOR: Right, we're advising people — listen to	18	to leave?
19	me, we're advising people to leave the building.	19	A. I don't know, because he's obviously cleared the line,
20	"CALLER: It don't take an hour (several inaudible	20	so I don't know what he thought.
21	words)	21	Q. Do you remember what you did with this information after
22	"OPERATOR: Okay.	22	this call?
23	"CALLER: (Several inaudible words). I can see the	23	A. No, I think possibly we wasn't still passing information
24	flames, come and get me!	24	to Jason to pass because it seemed that it was just
25	"OPERATOR: Can you —	25	that was our remit, to tell everyone to leave the
	Page 117		Page 119
1	"CALLED: Come and get mal	1	huilding So, and if they could get to them they
1	"CALLER: Come and get me!	1	building. So and if they could get to them, they
2	"OPERATOR: We are trying to get to you but it's very	2	would. So
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1 (1.0 pm) 2 (2.10 pm) 3 (2.10 pm) 4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Milett. 5 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, I now call Control Room Officer 6 Christine Howson, please. 7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good, thank you very much. 8 CHRISTINE HOWSON (affirmed) 9 Questions by COUNSELT OT HE INQUIRY 10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. 11 Yes, Mr Millett. 12 MR MILLETT: Good afternoon, Ms Howson. 13 Can Lask you, please, to give the chairman your 14 full name. 15 A. Christine Anne Howson. 16 Q. Im going to start by thanking you very much for coming today and giving evidence to the inquiry and assisting to use with our investigations. We very much appreciate it. 19 If sometimes difficult for witnesses to come and 21 room of the test and the very and the analysin and so if a training and the very and the analysin and so if a training and the very and the analysin and so if a training and the very and the analysin and so if a training and the very and the monitor of the desk to your right or on the screen behind you. 16 Q. You've given a witness statement to the Metropolitan Police dated 27 October 2017, and that is at 7 METO007763. 28 It should appear on the monitor on the desk to your right or on the screen behind you. 29 Listin kit's right you've writes statement to the Metropolitan police dated 27 October 2017, and that is at 1 polyce and the police dated 27 October 2017, and that is at 1 polyce and the police last year? 21 Do you recognise that us your witness statement you gave to the police last year? 21 A. Yes, I day, yes. 22 C. any ou confirm that it is contents are true? 23 A. That to turn to your role in the LFB and your training. 24 A. Yes, I day yes. 25 Q. Have you read if recently? 26 A. Have, year and it recently? 27 Q. Can you confirm that it is contents are true? 28 A. That to turn to your role in the LFB and your training introduced on the form after Lakanal, House fire in 2009? 29 List in this first private were changes. There was introduction of the form after Lakanal.			I	
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4 A. Since the initial training? 5 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, Inow call Control Room Officer 6 Christine Howson, please. 7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good, thank you very much. 8 CHRISTINE HOWSON (affirmed) 9 Questions by COUNSEL TO THE NOURRY 10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. 11 Yes, Mr Millett. 12 MR MILLETT: Good afternoon, Ms Howson. 13 Can I ask you, please, to give the chairman your 14 full name. 15 A. Christine Anne Howson. 16 Q. Imaging to start by thanking you very much appreciate it. 17 today and giving evidence to the inquiry and assisting 18 us with our investigations. We very much appreciate it. 19 If sometimes office it in the poor of the sometimes office in the same training session, did your training or firm that training session, did your training of the same training session, did your training of the same training session, as Younne. 20 can use a break. We wont sit and ask questions for root at the a break. We wont sit and ask questions for more than an hour, but if you need a break before that, we can take a break settlifer. 25 Sometimes my questions are not as short and simple 26 The page 121 1 as they are supposed to be, so if you want me to ask the question in a different way or to repeat it, I'm very happy to do so. 28 It should appear on the monitor on the desk to your right or on the screen behind you. 29 If you wish to use that. It's a matter for you. 20 If you wish to use that. It's a matter for you. 21 Do you recognise that as your witness statement you gave to the police last year? 29 Q. Have you read it recently? 30 A. It would have been in January 2017. 41 A. Yes, I was not the same training involved? 42 A. Others are training with the training involved? 43 A. Others are training with the training involved? 44 A. Others are training with the training involved? 45 A. Others are training with the training involved? 46 A. Others are training a price to the fire affective with the same training session, and the training session, and the training resisting a price to the fire a	2	(The short adjournment)	2	receive any refresher or additional training after that
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10 SBR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. 11 Yes, Mr Millett. 12 MR MILLETT: Good afternoon, Ms Howson. 13 Can I ask you, please, to give the chairman your full I amre. 14 full name. 15 A. Christine Anne Howson. 16 Q. I'm going to start by thanking you very much for coming today and giving evidence to the inquiry and assisting today and giving evidence to the inquiry and assisting today and giving evidence to the inquiry and assisting to the place of the place of the same training session as Yvonne. 17 Less of that night, and so if at any time of the place of the same training session as Yvonne. 18 Less one the same training session as Yvonne. 19 It's sometimes difficult for witnesses to come and relive the events of that night, and so if at any time of the place of the			1	
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Do you recognise that as your witness statement you gave to the police last year? A. Yes, I do, yes. Q. Have you read it recently? A. I have, yes. Q. Can you confirm that its contents are true? A. I can, yes. Q. I want to turn to your role in the LFB and your training. A. Not specifically multiple FSGs, it always really just assumed there would be one or a few, not multiple ones. A. Not specifically multiple FSGs, it always really just assumed there would be one or a few, not multiple ones. A. Maybe two or three. Q. Was any of your training 2014 or 2016, taking that time frame focused on matters arising or lessons learnt from the Lakanal House fire in 2009? A. Not specifically. I think there were changes. There was introduction of the form after Lakanal.			1	
13 assumed there would be one or a few, not multiple ones. 14 A. Yes, I do, yes. 15 Q. Have you read it recently? 16 A. I have, yes. 17 Q. Can you confirm that its contents are true? 18 A. I can, yes. 19 Q. I want to turn to your role in the LFB and your 20 training. 10 You say a few; how many? 11 A. Maybe two or three. 12 Q. Was any of your training 2014 or 2016, taking that time frame focused on matters arising or lessons 18 learnt from the Lakanal House fire in 2009? 19 A. Not specifically. I think there were changes. There 20 was introduction of the form after Lakanal.			1	
14 A. Yes, I do, yes. 15 Q. Have you read it recently? 16 A. I have, yes. 17 Q. Can you confirm that its contents are true? 18 A. I can, yes. 19 Q. I want to turn to your role in the LFB and your 20 training. 19 Q. You say a few; how many? 19 A. Maybe two or three. 10 Q. Was any of your training 2014 or 2016, taking that time frame focused on matters arising or lessons learnt from the Lakanal House fire in 2009? 19 A. Not specifically. I think there were changes. There was introduction of the form after Lakanal.				
15 Q. Have you read it recently? 16 A. I have, yes. 16 Q. Was any of your training 2014 or 2016, taking that 17 Q. Can you confirm that its contents are true? 18 A. I can, yes. 19 Q. I want to turn to your role in the LFB and your 20 training. 15 A. Maybe two or three. 16 Q. Was any of your training 2014 or 2016, taking that 17 time frame focused on matters arising or lessons 18 learnt from the Lakanal House fire in 2009? 19 A. Not specifically. I think there were changes. There 20 was introduction of the form after Lakanal.				
16 A. I have, yes. 17 Q. Can you confirm that its contents are true? 18 A. I can, yes. 19 Q. I want to turn to your role in the LFB and your 20 training. 20 Was any of your training 2014 or 2016, taking that 17 time frame focused on matters arising or lessons 18 learnt from the Lakanal House fire in 2009? 19 A. Not specifically. I think there were changes. There 20 was introduction of the form after Lakanal.		-	1	
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18 A. I can, yes. 19 Q. I want to turn to your role in the LFB and your 20 training. 18 learnt from the Lakanal House fire in 2009? 19 A. Not specifically. I think there were changes. There 20 was introduction of the form after Lakanal.			1	
19 Q. I want to turn to your role in the LFB and your 20 training. 19 A. Not specifically. I think there were changes. There 20 was introduction of the form after Lakanal.		· · · · · ·	1	_
20 training. 20 was introduction of the form after Lakanal.			1	
		Q. I want to turn to your role in the LFB and your	1	
21 I think it's right you've worked for the LFB since 21 Q. When you say the form, is that the control information		training.		
1	21	I think it's right you've worked for the LFB since	1	Q. When you say the form, is that the control information
22 2004; is that right? 22 form?	22	2004; is that right?	1	form?
23 A. That's correct, yes. 23 A. Yes, yes, for FSG calls.	23	A. That's correct, yes.	23	A. Yes, yes, for FSG calls.
24 Q. In your role as a control room operator; yes? 24 Q. Right.	24	Q. In your role as a control room operator; yes?	24	Q. Right.
25 A. Yes. 25 A. And the use of those.	25	A. Yes.	25	A. And the use of those.
Page 122		Dago 122		Page 124
Page 122 Page 124		rage 122		rage 124

Deligy ou use those in the control room? A. Ne. 1 re not used them, no. Q. Did you use those them being used in the control room in response to an FSG call? A. Ne. Q. So they were introduced, but never used? A. I personally have not used them. Q. In your statement at page 3, if I can ask you to turn to that, please, in the second paragraph, you say four lines down from the star of that paragraph: "Thave dealt with quife a few of these calls over the they are quite rare." 13 And you're referring to FSG calls. A. Ves. 14 A. Ves. 15 Q. " but they are quite rare." 16 I want to get a feel for the experience that you had of those calls. A. Not calls. First of all, were any of the FSG calls that you handled over the years high-rise calls? Doing the best you can to recall, how many FSG calls, prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you 10 Q. Daing and you flows incidents involved multiple ISG calls? A. Not. A. Not. A. A. Wes. Page 125 Then it goes on to tell you what should happen if the caller should be unable to escape. Jasta fooding at that paragraph that we've just to onced at above that, "You are usually safest to remain in your premises unless affected by fire, heat or smoke." You are usually safest to remain in your premises and whether a caller's premises are affected by fire, heat or or smoke." A. Yes. 15 Q. " but they are quite rare." 16 Live and to get a feel for the experience that you had of those calls. 17 A. Not. 18 Pirst of all, twe any of the FSG calls that you. 19 In the fall. If it was in their Inst, theal would give them advice on extend or or smoke." 20 Q. Doing the best you can to recall, how many FSG calls, prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you. 21 A. Maybe 20. 22 Q. 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20				
2 A. I've not used them, no. 3 Q. Did you ever observe them being used in the control room in response to an FSG call? 4 in response to an FSG call? 5 A. No. 6 Q. So they were introduced, but never used? 6 Q. So they were introduced, but never used? 7 A. I personally have not used them. 9 Un I your statement at page 3, if I can sak you to hum to that, please, in the second paragraph, you say four lilius down from the start of that paragraph: 10 lilius down from the start of that paragraph: 11 "I have dealt with quite a few of these calls over the years" 12 they are 3. 13 And you're referring to FSG calls. 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. " but they are quite rate." 16 Q. " but they are quite rate." 17 A. Yes. 18 First of all, were any of the FSG calls that you bandled over the years high-rise calls? 19 bandled over the years high-rise calls? 20 A. No that I can remember. No. 21 Q. Did any of those incidents involved multiple FSG calls. 22 A. No. 23 Q. Doing the best you can to recall, how many FSG calls, prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you a handled? 24 A. Wes. 25 bandled? 26 A. Wes. 27 A. Yes. 28 Q. Or sight the sample of the page of the first page — well, this will do. 29 A. Yes. 30 Q. Doing the best you can to recall, how many FSG calls, prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you a properties bundle, please, and turn in that to appendix 3 on page 16. 31 A. Yes. 4 Q. Right. 4 A. Yes. 4 Q. Right. 5 Can I sak you to look at policy 539, that's tab 3 of our policies bundle, please, and turn in that to appendix 3 on page 16. 4 A. Yes, I am familiar with this, with what we see on the first page — well, this will do. 4 A. Yes, I am familiar with this, with what we see on the first page — well, this will do. 4 A. Yes, I am familiar with this, with what we see on the subset of the prior to all if you look on this page at the third. 5 Pirst of all, if you look on this page at the third. 6 Pirsgade Control advise callers to Vict out and Stuy out. 6 Pirsgade Control advise callers to Vict out and Stuy out. 7	1	O Did you use those in the control room?	1	Then it goes on to tell you what should hannen if
Just looking at that prangraph that we've just looked at above that, "You are usually safest to remain in your premises", does that accord with your understanding of the stay-put policy? A. Ve. O. In your statement at page 3, if I can ask you to turn to that, plesse, in the second paragraph, you say four they are dealt with quite a few of these calls over the start of that paragraph? In which they are quite rare." A. A yets. A. A yets. O. " but rhey are quite rare." Is a And you're referring to TSG calls. A. A yet. I a A. Yet. I a A. Yet, a yet quite rare." I a A. Yet, a yet quite rare." I b andided over the years high-rise calls? A. No. A. Not that I can remember. No. O. Doing the best you can to recall, how many FSG calls, prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you b andided? A. A yet. A. A waybe 20. Q. Doing the best you can to recall, how many FSG calls, prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you A. Yes. Q. Right. A. A waybe 20. Just to be clear if you could please be shown the first page — well, this will do "Appendix 3 on page 16. Just to be clear if you could please be shown the first page — well, this will do "Appendix 3 on page 16. A. Yes, a management" A. Yes, a manuface will do "Appendix 3 on page 16. A. Yes, a manuface will do "Appendix 3 on page 16. A. Yes, a manuface will do "Appendix 3 on page 16. A. Yes, a manuface will do "Appendix 3 on page 16. A. Yes, a manuface will do "Appendix 3 on page 16. A. Yes, a manuface will do "Appendix 3 on page 16. A. Yes, a manuface will do "Appendix 3 on page 16. A. Yes, a manuface will do "Argue and so will a wil				
4 looked at above that, "You are usually safest to remain in your premises", does that accord with your understanding of the stay-put policy? 7 A. 1 personally have not used them. 9 C. In your statement at page 3, if I can ask you to turn to that, please, in the second pangarph), you say four 1 lines down from the start of that pangarph: 11 "There dealt with quite a few of these calls over 1 the years." 12 A. Ves. 13 And you're referring to FSG calls. 14 A. Ves. 15 Page 125 16 Twant to get a feel for the experience that you had of those calls. 17 First of all, were any of the FSG calls that you handled? 18 First of all, were any of the FSG calls that you handled? 19 Daily of those incidents involved multiple FSG calls; prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you 25 handled? 10 A. Not that I can remember. No. 21 Q. Doing the best you can to recall, how many FSG calls, prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you 25 handled? 10 A. Maybe 20. 11 A. Maybe 20. 12 A. Nes. 4 Q. Right. 13 An yes. 4 O. Is smoke was coming into a caller's flat, would you tell their flat. If was in their flat, may advice would be— 14 A. Yes. 15 Can I ask you to look at policy 539, that's tab 3 of our policies bundle, please, and turn in that to appendix 3 on page 16. 16 Just to be clear if you could please be shown the first page—well, this will do. 17 A. Yes. 18 Just to be clear if you could please be shown the first page—well, this will do. 18 Just to be clear if you could please be shown the first page—well, this will do. 19 "Appendix 3 - firs exrived guidance." 10 Q. Right. Tyou flow of the prior to flat principles and the prior to flat prior				
5 A. No. 6 Q. So they were introduced, but never used? 7 A. I personally have and suced them. 8 Q. In your statement at page 3, if I can ask you to turn to that, please, in the second paragraph; you says four lines down from the start of that paragraph; in the death with quite a few of these calls over the years				
6 Q. So they were introduced, but never used? 7 A. I personally have not used them. 8 Q. In your statement at page 3, if I can ask you to hum to that, please, in the second paragraph, you say four that, please, in the second paragraph, you say four I lines down from the start of that paragraph. 11 "I have dealt with quite a few of these calls over I have dealt and the premises and dialy 99, if you are usually safest to remain in your premises and cannot do not prove that they were safest to remain in your premises unless affected by fire, heat or smoke? 11 A. Ves. 12 Q. Did my of these affel for the experience that you had of these calls over I have the years high-rise calls? 23 Q. Doing the best you can to recall, how many FSG calls, prior to the right of Grentfell, do you think you had have the years high-rise calls? 24 A. Maybe 20. 25 Page 125 1 A. Maybe 20. 2 Q. Tist fire. What about smoke? 2 Q. Right. 3 Q. Right. 3 Q. Right. 4 A. Yes. 4 Q. Right. 5 Can I ask you to look at policy 539, that's tab 3 of our policies bundle, please, and turn in that to a story the f		_		•
7 A. J personally have not used them. 8 Q. In your statement at page 3, if I can ask you to turn to the properties of the pears				
8 Q. In your statement at page 3, if I can ask you to turn to that, please, in the second paragraph, you say four 10 lines down from the start of that paragraph: 11 "Thave dealt with quite a few of these calls over 12 the years" 12 and you're referring to FSG calls. 13 And you're referring to FSG calls. 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. " but they are quite rare." 15 Q. " but they are quite rare." 16 I want to get a feel for the experience that you had of off those calls. 18 First of all, were any of the FSG calls that you bandled over the years high-rise calls? 19 bandled? 19 ba				
that, please, in the second paragraph, you say four lines down from the start of that paragraph: "Thave dealt with quite a few of these calls over the years" A yes, and you've referring to FSG calls. A Yes, and they are quite rare." I but they are quite rare." First of all, were any of the FSG calls that you handled over the years high-rise calls? A. Not that I can remember. No. Q. Doing the best you can to recall, how many FSG calls? A. No. Page 125 A. Maybe 20. A. Maybe 20. Q. Right. Can Jask you to look at policy 539, that's tab 3 of our policies bundle, please, and turn in that to approxin's 3 on page 16. Jampendix 3 on page 15. Jampendix 3 to policy 539, "Emergency call management"? A. Yes, I am familiar with fire survival guidance." A. Yes, I am familiar with fire survival guidance. First of all, if you look on this page at the third: "You are usually safest to remain in your premises unless affected by fire, heat or smoke." You are usually safest to remain in your premises and dial 999, if you need further assistance." You are usually safest to remain in your premises unless affected by fire, heat or smoke." Lan you can the first deal, were a actually in their rank it fire was actually in their and which information you would use as a control como officer to make the assessment as to whether a caller's premises are affected by fire, heat or smoke." A. Well, I would vity to ascertain if the fire was actually into the first twas in their flat, ther I would give them advice on getting out of the flat, they're rescued. Q. I flat, to keep them safe until they're rescued. 21 I would give them advice to stop the smoke coming into their flat, to keep them safe until they're rescued. 22 I would give them advice to stop the smoke coming into their flat. Hard they are affected by fire, heat or smoke? A. If it was				
lines down from the start of that paragraph: "I have deaft with quite a few of these calls over the years" And you're referring to FSG calls. A. Ves. I want to get a feel for the experience that you had of those calls. First of all, were any of the FSG calls that you handled over the years high-rise calls? Q. Did any of those incidents involved multiple FSG calls? A. No. Q. Doing the best you can to recall, how many FSG calls, prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you handled? A. Maybe 20. Q. Ozo? A. A. Wash. A. Wash. A. Wash. I would work on the premise that they were safer where they were. Yes ept them advice on getting out of fall. If it's not, I would work on the premise that they were safer where they were. A. Sinoke—well, we work to keep the smoke out of their flat, to keep them safe until they're rescued. Q. If smoke was coming into a caller's flat, would you tell them to stay in their premises? A. If it was coming into the flat, my advice would be— Page 125 A. Maybe 20. Q. 20? A. A. Yes. I would give them advice to stop the smoke coming into their flat. You are usually safest to remain in your premises unless affected by fire, heat or smoke." Can you explain what information you would use as a control room offect or make the assessment as to whether a caller's premises are affected by fire, heat or smoke? A. Well, I would work on the premise that they were safer where they were. A. Sinoke—well, the work to keep the smoke out of their flat, to keep them safe until they're rescued. Q. If smoke was coming into a caller's flat, would you tell them to stay in their premises? A. If it was coming into a caller's flat, would you tell them to stay in their premises? A. If it was coming into the flat, my advice would be— Page 127 I would give them advice to stop the smoke coming into their flat. Q. So at the point at which—let me be clear about this—a caller tells you than the premises and their flat. A. Yes, I am familiar with this, with what we see on the screen, appe				
11 they dealt with quite a few of these calls over the years" 12 the years" 13 And you're referring to FSG calls. 14 A. Yes. 15 Can you explain what information you would use as a control room officer to make the assessment as to whether a caller's premises are affected by fire, heat or smoke? 16 I want to get a feel for the experience that you had of those calls. 17 I want to get a feel for the experience that you had of those calls. 18 First of all, were any of the FSG calls that you handled over the years high-rise calls? 20 A. Not that I can remember. No. 21 Q. Did any of those incidents involved multiple FSG calls? 22 A. No. 23 Q. Doing the best you can to recall, how many FSG calls, prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you handled? 24 prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you handled? 25 handled? 26 A. Yes. 27 Q. Right. 28 Q. Right. 29 Q. 20? 20 Q. 20? 20 Q. 20? 21 A. Maybe 20. 22 Q. 20? 23 Q. Bound the years high-rise calls? 24 prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you handled? 25 handled? 26 A. Yes. 27 A. Yes. 28 Q. Right. 29 Q. Right. 29 C. and ask you to look at policy 539, that's tab 3 of our policies bundle, please, and turn in that to appendix 3 on page 16. 29 G. Right. Flow you familiar with this, with what we see on the screen, appendix 3 to policy 539, "Emergency call management?" 29 Q. Right. I just want to ask you one or two questions about this. 20 Page 125 21 I would give them advice to stop the smoke coming in. 21 I would give them advice to stop the smoke coming in to their flat. 22 Page 127 23 L vould give them advice to stop the smoke coming into their flat. 24 L vould give them advice to stop the smoke coming into their flat. 25 Q. Right. I just want to ask you one or two questions about this. 26 Page 127 27 L vould give them advice to stop the smoke coming in. 28 Q. Yes, either through the door of their flat or through the d	9			
the years" A A Yes. A Yes. C " but they are quite rare." I want to get a feel for the experience that you had for those calls. First of all, were any of the FSG calls that you had for those calls. A Not that I can remember. No. Q Did any of those incidents involved multiple FSG calls? A Not. A Not. A Not. A Wes. Daing the best you can to recall, how many FSG calls, prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you handled? A No. Page 125 A Maybe 20. Q Right. C an I ask you to look at policy 539, that's tab 3 of our policies bundle, please, and turn in that to appendix 3 on page 16. Just to be clear if you could please be shown the first page - well, this will do. A Yes, I am familiar with firs survival guidance." A Yes, I am familiar with firs survival guidance." A Yes, I am familiar with firs survival guidance." A Yes, I am familiar with firs survival guidance." A Yes, I am familiar with firs survival guidance. Q Pigilt. I just want to ask you one or two questions about this. First of all, if you look on this page at the third: "First of all, if you look on this page at the third: "First of all, if you look on this page at the third: "First of all, if you look on this page at the third: "First of all, if you look on this page at the third: "First of all, if you look on this page at the third: "First of all, if you look on this page at the third: "First of all, if you look on this page at the third: "First of all, if you look on this page at the third: "First of all, if you look on this page at the third: "First of all, if you look on this page at the third: "First of all, if you look on this page at the third: "First of all, if you look on this page at the third: "First of all, if you look on this page at the third: "First of all, if you look on this page at the third: "First of all, if you look on this page at the third: "First of all, if you look on this page at the third: "First of all, if you look on this page at the third: "First of all, if you look on this	10	lines down from the start of that paragraph:	10	
A. Yes. 13 whether a caller's premises are affected by fire, heat or smoke? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. " but they are quite rare." 16 I want to get a feel for the experience that you had of chose calls. 17 First of all, were any of the FSG calls that you handled over the years high-rise calls? 28 A. Not that I can remember. No. 29 Q. Doil any of those incidents involved multiple FSG calls? 20 A. Not that I can remember. No. 21 Q. Doil any of those incidents involved multiple FSG calls? 22 A. No. 23 Q. Doing the best you can to recall, how many FSG calls, prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you handled? 29 Page 125 10 A. Maybe 20. 20 Q. 20? 21 A. Yes. 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Right. 24 Can I ask you to look at policy 539, that's tab 3 of our policies bundle, please, and turm in that to appendix 3 on page 16. 25 Gan I ask you to look at policy 539, that's tab 3 of our policies bundle, please, and turm in that to appendix 3 on page 16. 26 Just to be clear if you could please be shown the first page — well, this will do. 27 A. Yes, I am familiar with this, with what we see on the screen, appendix 3 to policy 539, "Emergency call management"? 28 A. Yes, I am familiar with fire survival guidance." 29 Right. I just want to ask you one or two questions about this. 20 Page 127 21 I would give them advice to stop the smoke coming into their flat. 22 Q. 20? 23 Q. 20? 24 A. Maybe 20. 25 I would you say that they are affected by fire, heat or smoke? 26 So at the point at which — let me be clear about this — a caller tells you that smoke is coming in form outside? 27 A. If smoke was coming into the flat, my advice would be— 28 Page 127 29 Li would give them advice to stop the smoke coming into thicir flat. 30 Q. So at the point at which — let me be clear about this — a caller tells you that smoke is coming in form outside? 31 A. Yes, I am familiar with fire survival guidance. 32 Q. Would you still think they were safest to remain in your premises unless affected by fire, heat or smoke. 31 A. Ye	11	"I have dealt with quite a few of these calls over	11	Can you explain what information you would use as
14 A. Yes. 15 Q. " but they are quite rare." 16 I awant to get a feel for the experience that you had of those calls. 18 First of all, were any of the FSG calls that you handled over the years high-rise calls? 20 A. Not that I can remember. No. 21 Q. Did any of those incidents involved multiple FSG calls? 22 A. No. 23 Q. Doing the best you can to recall, how many FSG calls, prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you handled? 24 prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you handled? 25 handled? 26 A. Well, I was in their flat, then I would give them advice on getting out of the flat. If it's not, I would work on the premise that they were safer where they were. 29 Q. Doing the best you can to recall, how many FSG calls, prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you handled? 29 A. No. 20 Q. Doing the best you can to recall, how many FSG calls, prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you handled? 20 A. No. 21 Q. 20? 22 A. No. 23 Q. 20? 24 L. I would work on the premise that they were safer where they were. 25 A. Smoke – well, we work to keep the smoke out of their flat, to keep them advice to stop the smoke out of their flat, to keep them advice on getting out of the flat. If it's not, I would work on the premise that they were safer where they were. 26 Q. That's fire. What about such they were safer where they were. 27 A. Min the premises of their flat to keep the smoke out of their flat, to keep the smoke only of their flat. 28 Q. Right. 29 A. Maybe 20. 20 Q. 20? 31 A. Yes. 32 Q. So and the point at which – let me be clear about their flat. 40 Q. Right. 41 A. Maybe 20. 41 I would give them advice to stop the smoke coming into their flat. 42 Yes, at many and they were safer where they were were. 43 A. If it was only in the flat, I fit was in their flat, then I would work on the premise that they were safer. 44 A. Maybe 20. 45 A. Maybe 20. 46 Q. Right. 47 A. If would give them advice to stop the smoke coming into their flat or through the door of their flat or through the door of their flat or	12	the years"	12	a control room officer to make the assessment as to
15 Q. " but they are quite rare." 16 I want to get a feel for the experience that you had of the form of these calls. 17 of those calls. 18 First of all, were any of the FSG calls that you handled over the years high-rise calls? 20 A. Nor that I can remember. No. 21 Q. Did any of those incidents involved multiple FSG calls? 22 A. No. 23 Q. Doing the best you can to recall, how many FSG calls, prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you handled? 24 prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you handled? 25 handled? 26 A. Yes. 27 A. Waybe 20. 28 Q. Right. 29 G. Right. 20 G. Right. 20 G. Right. 21 I would give them advice on stop the smoke out of their flat, the fire was actually in their flat, the fire was device on getting out of the flat. If it was divise on their flat is not, I would work on the premise that they were safer where they were. 20 D. That's fire. What about smoke? 21 A. No. 22 D. Doing the best you can to recall, how many FSG calls, prior to the night of Grenfell, do you think you them advice on their flat, then they were safer. 21 A. No. 22 D. That's fire. What about smoke? 23 A. Yes. 24 A. No. 25 A. Washe 20. 26 Q. Right. 27 I would give them advice to stop the smoke coming into their flat. 28 The window of their flat. 29 The window of their flat them to stay in their premises? 20 A. It as work and a premise that they were safeted by fire, heat or smoke. 21 I would give them advice to stop the smoke coming into their flat them to stay in their premises? 22 I would give them advice to stop the smoke of their flat them to stay in their premises? 23 A.	13	And you're referring to FSG calls.	13	whether a caller's premises are affected by fire, heat
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Page 126 Page 128	25	you need further assistance."	25	Q. Would you not start, though, to explore with the caller
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2 smoke that was coming into their flat? 3 A. Initially, no. I wouldn't. I would 4 Q. You wouldn't? 5 A. No, if the fire wasn't in their flat. 6 It depended. If it was obviously the first call, then yes, I would. But if we are dealing with a call already in the building, then, no, I would try to keep them safe in their flat, awaiting rescue. 9 Q. Right. 10 Q. Right. 11 A. That is what I would wo. 12 Q. So is this right: for you, the big difference is fire? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Is this right your understanding is that it's at that population to their fer fire, that you start to explore means of exit? 16 Q. Is which in the fire survival guidance as set out in this appendix, in your statement — If can take you beks to that—you say on port as in the second panagraph, which we're still on: 16 that—you say on port as you and in the second panagraph, which we're still on: 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Mowing on to fire survival guidance as set out in this appendix, in your statement — If can take you beks to that—you say on port as you shall are an an approach there is a fire and a person cannot leave a property because of that treft, the procedure is to make 19 Page 129 10 It as Fire Survival Guidance call. This creates a new procedure from a control room officer's perspective." 23 They uge on to say what that is. You say: 24 "would raise my hand and inform a Supervisor who may come to me or histen in on the call. I would lake the dealts from the caller, saking if they can get out and other questions to establishin the circumstances and whereabouts." 1 A Fire Survival Guidance call. I would lake the dealts from the caller, saking if they can get out and other questions to establishin the circumstances and whereabouts." 1 A Fire Survival Guidance call. I would lake the dealts from the caller, saking if they can get out and other questions to establishing whether a person cannot leave a property mobility to the caller of t	1	whether they could safely leave to get away from the	1	A. No. I mean, you know, I would no, the caller's
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5 A. No, if the fire wasn't in their flat. 6 It depended. If if was obviously the first call, 7 then yes, I would. But if we are dealing with a call 8 already in the building, then, no, I would try to keep 9 them safe in their flat, awaiting rescue. 10 Q. Right. 11 A. That is what I would so. 12 Q. So is this right: for you, the big difference is fire? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Is this right: for you, the big difference is fire? 15 A. Yes. 16 C. So is this right: for you, the big difference is fire? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Moving on to fire survival guidance as set out in this appenda, in your statement—if I can take you back to that—you say on page 3 in the second paragraph, which we're still or: 18 a pependa, in your statement—if I can take you back to that—you say on page 3 in the second paragraph, which we're still or: 20 acls, which I will now that about in more depth. In summary, if there is a fire and a person cannot leave a property because of that fire, the procedure is to make Page 129 1 it a Fire Survival Guidance call. This creates a new property because of that fire, the procedure is to make Page 129 1 it a Fire Survival Guidance call. This creates a new property because of that fire, it's may come to me or listen in on the call. I would take the details from the caller, asking if they can get out and other questions to stabilish the circumstances and whereabouts." 1 you say there in you or statement "if there is a fire and a person cannot leave because of that fire", it's and person cannot leave a property once there is a fire? 2 You say there in you statement "if there is a fire? 3 You say there in you statement "if there is a fire? 4 A. Well, but have deen do where a person cannot leave a property once there is a fire? 5 You say there in you statement "if there is a fire? 6 Do you take it at fice value." 7 You say there if they can leave or not. 8 You say there in you will eave if the earlier will eave. 9 You say there in you or statement "if there is a fire? 16 Do you take it at fice value." 17 A. No, I w		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	4	
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A. No, I would ask them why they can't leave. Q. How far do you push it? A. No, you know, I would just accept that they can't leave. Q. So who is the judge of whether or not they can leave? Do you leave it to the caller or do you bring your judgement and experience to bear on that question? 20 like that prior to Grenfell. Q. Was it prior to Lakanal House, do you think, 2009? A. Yes, I think it probably would've been. Q. Was it a high-rise residential block? A. I can't remember. Q. Okay.	18	what's happening outside your flat"? Do you do that or	18	Q. A long time ago?
Q. How far do you push it? A. No, you know, I would just accept that they can't leave. Q. So who is the judge of whether or not they can leave? Q. Do you leave it to the caller or do you bring your judgement and experience to bear on that question? Q. Was it prior to Lakanal House, do you think, 2009? A. Yes, I think it probably would've been. Q. Was it a high-rise residential block? A. I can't remember. Q. Okay.	19	take it at face value?	19	A. It's the only time I can really remember, an incident
A. No, you know, I would just accept that they can't leave. Q. So who is the judge of whether or not they can leave? Do you leave it to the caller or do you bring your judgement and experience to bear on that question? 22 A. Yes, I think it probably would've been. 23 Q. Was it a high-rise residential block? A. I can't remember. 25 Q. Okay.	20	A. No, I would ask them why they can't leave.	20	like that prior to Grenfell.
Q. So who is the judge of whether or not they can leave? 24 Do you leave it to the caller or do you bring your 25 judgement and experience to bear on that question? 26 Q. Was it a high-rise residential block? 27 A. I can't remember. 28 Q. Was it a high-rise residential block? 29 Q. Was it a high-rise residential block? 20 Q. Was it a high-rise residential block?	21	Q. How far do you push it?	21	Q. Was it prior to Lakanal House, do you think, 2009?
Q. So who is the judge of whether or not they can leave? Do you leave it to the caller or do you bring your judgement and experience to bear on that question? Q. Was it a high-rise residential block? A. I can't remember. Q. Okay.	22		22	
Do you leave it to the caller or do you bring your 24 A. I can't remember. 25 judgement and experience to bear on that question? 26 Q. Okay.	23		23	Q. Was it a high-rise residential block?
judgement and experience to bear on that question? 25 Q. Okay.	24	Do you leave it to the caller or do you bring your	24	A. I can't remember.
Page 130 Page 132	25		25	Q. Okay.
		Page 130		Page 132

1	A Dut I only remember it because it was unusual for	1	Q. Right.
1 2	A. But I only remember it because it was unusual for someone to be told to end a call.	2	
3		3	A. But, yeah, fire survival, you would be looking to get most of that information, or as much information as you
4	Q. Looking at the same page, paragraph 5.1, "Information transfer to the incident", what would be the usual	4	could, really, anything that's going to help.
5	method you would adopt for passing information from	5	Q. Looking at "number of flat/house", was that information
6	a fire survival guidance call to the incident ground?	6	that you would ask for only on a fire survival guidance
7	A. In a normal course of events, it would be a service	7	call or for any call?
8	request form via the radio.	8	A. Any call.
9	Q. So you would make that on Vision so the radio officer	9	Q. What about the next one, "number of persons", fire
10	could then radio it over?	10	survival guidance or any call?
11	A. Radio operator could send it, yes.	11	A. Not number of persons. I mean, if there was a fire, you
12	Q. So it would radioed by the radio officer?	12	would ask if anyone's inside the building or if they
13	A. Yes.	13	believe anyone's inside or might be inside.
14	Q. You wouldn't call the incident ground yourself?	14	Q. So just looking at this list, what information wouldn't
15	A. Me, no.	15	you ask for if the call was not or not yet a fire
16	Q. Unless you were on the radio.	16	survival guidance call?
17	A. Yes, just the radio operator.	17	(Pause)
18	Q. Can I ask you to turn the page, please, to paragraph 5.5	18	A. Well, location of the caller within premises and access
19	in this policy. It says:	19	point. If it wasn't a fire survival, we wouldn't need
20	"5.5. Control will attempt to gather all the	20	that.
21	information on the Control Information Form (see	21	Q. Right.
22	Appendix 2) and relay this information to the incident	22	A. Condition of their location, you would be looking for
23	as and when it becomes available."	23	that information on any call.
24	Then you see underneath that a list of bullet points	24	Proximity to fire, if known. Presumably that's the
25	which are the subject of that information.	25	person you're speaking to. If it's not fire survival,
	Page 133		Page 135
1	In your experience, is it possible to obtain all of	1	you may or may not be looking for that information.
2	that information from callers?	2	Yes, that would be it really.
3	A. Yes. Yes.	3	Q. So is this right: in a call that has not yet in your
4	Q. I mean, is it something you would usually do, go through	4	mind become a fire survival guidance call, you would
5	each and every head of information, asking for that	5	only ask for the number of flat or the house, and is
6	detail?	6	this right? sometimes the condition of their
7	A. Yes, you would attempt to get all of that information.	7	location?
8	Q. You would?	8	A. Yes. I mean, if it's not a fire survival, if it's
9	A. You know, not every situation you would be able to get	9	a fire call
10	all of it, but, you know, you would attempt to get that.	10	Q. Yes.
11	Q. This information is in a paragraph in a policy the title	11	A we're basically looking for an address, and, you
12	of which is "Fire survival guidance".	12	know, the type of incident it is
13	My question is: do you as a control room officer	13	Q. Right.
14	normally try and get all that information for all calls	14	A in order to mobilise.
15	where a person is calling from a high-rise building, or	15	Q. Does that mean that where the caller is calling from
16	only those which are fire survival guidance, in other	16	a flat that has smoke coming in, but is not in your mind
17	words where they are trapped and can't get out, and, in	17	a fire survival guidance call, you wouldn't seek to
18	your way of thinking, there is a fire?	18	establish things like, for example, proximity to fire,
19	A. No. I think all of that information would only be	19	if known, latest advice, number of persons involved?
20	pertinent, really, to a fire survival call.	20	A. Well, if they've got smoke coming in are you speaking
21	Q. So is this right: it's not until it becomes a fire	21	specifically about a high-rise or just generally?
22	survival guidance call in your mind that you start	22	Q. Yes, I am.
23	asking for this specific information?	23	A. So if they've got smoke coming in, no, I would collect
24	A. Yes. I mean, there's information there that you would	24	more information to pass to the crews on scene.
25	ask for, for any type of call.	25	Q. Right.
	Page 134		Page 136

A. Let them know that there are people there so that they 1 1 I would take more information. 2 2 can then go and make sure that they're okay in the flat. O. I mean --3 3 Q. If it was a smoke call, if I can put it that way, no A. Just try and gauge it on what information we had and 4 fire yet, smoke coming into the flat, what information 4 what was going on. 5 would you, in that list, think it was important to 5 Q. To take an example which we may or may not come to, but 6 gather? 6 supposing you had a caller complaining about smoke 7 7 coming in, it wasn't an FSG call in your mind, you A. Yes, well, I think probably -- yes, most of it, really. 8 Q. I'm just trying to get a feel for where the line is 8 wouldn't know unless you asked them whether, for 9 9 drawn when it's not an FSG call, what information you example, they had some kind of bronchial or respiratory 10 would ask for. 10 problem like asthma or some other difficulty. 11 11 A. No, I wouldn't know unless I asked them. A. When it comes to high-rise, it is different, because of 12 the stay-put policy. We do -- well, I do, I do deal 12 Q. Would you ask them for that information? 13 13 with it differently, because if they're not directly A. No, not initially, no. 14 affected by the fire -- they're within the building and 14 Q. Why is that? 15 not affected by the fire -- my experience and the 15 A. If they were coughing, I would ask them why they were training that I've had, I am working on the assumption 16 16 coughing, what was causing them to cough, things like 17 17 that. But if they were just talking normally -- it just that they are in a safe place. 18 18 Q. Right. depends on how they're reacting, really. 19 A. I mean, obviously Grenfell's changed that, but the 19 Q. What about mobility difficulties? Was that the sort of 20 20 information you would seek to get from them if this call assumption would always be and, in my experience, has 21 always turned out to be that they are safe if they're 21 wasn't a full-blown fire survival guidance call? 22 22 not directly affected by the fire. A. Not if it wasn't an FSG call, no. 23 23 Q. I see. Q. What about where it had become a full-blown fire 24 A. So I would take the information, make the crews aware 24 survival guidance call? So in your mind, fire affecting 25 that someone is in that flat, they're concerned about 25 the flat, they need to leave. Would you ask in that Page 137 Page 139 1 the situation and they need to be visited and reassured, 1 situation? 2 but my assumption would be that they are in a safe 2 A. Yes, start questioning about, "Are you able to leave?" 3 3 "No." "If not, why?" You know, if people have got place. 4 Q. Is that so even if there is smoke coming into their 4 mobility issues, they do tend to tell you. 5 5 Q. Turning to the night of the fire, we know you were based 6 A. Yes. I mean, it does happen. I mean, you know, we get 6 in the Stratford control room. 7 7 fires and they'll be sort of in the chute or something You say in your statement -- we don't need to go to 8 and someone leaves the chute open, and it creates a lot 8 it -- it's a small room, probably better because you 9 9 of smoke in a communal area. Obviously that's not what could hear and know what's going on, but you also say it 10 happened in this instance, but that's what can happen 10 gets very noisy. 11 and it can create a lot of smoke. 11 A. Yes. 12 O. Which can make it difficult to hear callers. There's no immediate danger. We might know that it 12 13 is actually the chute that's alight, which is protected, 13 First of all, can you tell us, by reference to 14 14 a photograph, where you were sitting? Can the witness the chute is protected, and so we just need to make sure 15 that they keep themselves safe, keep the smoke out, and 15 please be shown LFB00004790, page 175. 16 that it will be dealt with and they are in a safe place. 16 Ms Howson, can you identify where you were sitting. 17 Q. Does that mean that in that kind of call, you wouldn't 17 There. 18 take, for example, details like the number of persons in 18 A. (Indicates) Yes. 19 the flat, any disabilities or the age of the occupants? 19 Q. So you were sitting on the left-hand chair? 20 A. It would depend. I mean, it depends how much 20 A. Yes. 21 21 Q. Just remind me, if nobody else, who was sitting in the information we've already got. You know, if I knew that 22 was the situation that I've just explained, I wouldn't 22 right-hand chair on that screen? 23 23 necessarily take any more information than that, other A. No one. 24 24 Q. That was empty, was it? than that there was someone there who was concerned. 25 If I wasn't sure what was going on, then obviously 25 A. That was empty. Page 138 Page 140

1	Q. Did you have a clear line of sight to your right to	1	was moving, spreading?
2	Yvonne Adams and Pam Jones?	2	A. No. No, not really. I didn't know how it was
3	A. I did.	3	progressing. But it's unusual. 20 pumps is unusual.
4	Q. Just to remind me again, who was immediately opposite	4	For it to go 20, you know you're dealing with something
5	you sitting in the CRO chairs?	5	quite extraordinary, really.
6	A. Sarah Russell.	6	Q. By that stage, had it occurred to you or did you think
7	Q. Anybody else?	7	that the fire was moving up the building at speed,
8	A. I think it was Sarah, I think it was Angie, and then	8	affecting the floors higher up than the initial floor?
9	Sharon.	9	A. Well, I mean, prior to that, I'd taken a couple of calls
10	Q. When you say in your statement that Stratford is better	10	from people on the upper floors, saying that there was
11	because you can hear each other, does that mean you can	11	smoke outside their windows
12	hear the advice being given by other CROs?	12	Q. Yes.
13	A. Yeah, you've got more of an awareness of the type of	13	A which I just couldn't get my head round, really,
14	calls that are coming in.	14	because we knew the fire was on the lower levels, and
15	Q. Could you hear in detail what the CROs were saying to	15	for the smoke to still be outside people's windows on
16	callers? Would you listen out for that?	16	that floor I couldn't understand what was happening
17	A. I could hear the address, so I knew we were getting	17	to the fire, really.
18	multiple calls to the same address.	18	Q. Can we go, then, to the control room report, please, at
19	Q. You speak of the noise in the control room which can	19	page 25. That's LFB00004790.
20	make it difficult to hear callers. Did you find during	20	At page 25, the top of the page, you can see that
21	the incident that you did have difficulty hearing the	21	that you take a call from a male caller who is on his
22	callers because of the noise in the control room?	22	balcony in W2:
23	A. As things escalated, yes, it did get very noisy.	23	" and he can see a whole block of flats on fire
24	Q. Did you find it obscured your hearing of what the	24	near Westfield. CRO Howson checks the individual's
25	callers were telling you?	25	postcode and is satisfied that the caller is in close
	Page 141		Page 143
1	A. It became more difficult to hear. I mean, I was this	1	enough proximity to Grenfell for it to be the same
2	is like the corner of the room (Indicates).	2	incident."
3	Q. Yes.	3	At that stage you're told, and you verify, it's the
4	A. So if I was struggling, I stood up and I walked back	4	whole block of flats on fire, and this is 01.30.
5	into the corner of the room, just to give myself, you	5	Did that give you information from which you could
6	know, a bit of space between me and the room, really.	6	now tell that the fire had moved substantially beyond
7	Q. With your headset on?	7	the compartment of origin?
8	A. With a headset on, yes, yes.	8	A. Yes, it did. But I never really until I actually saw
9	Q. In your witness statement, page 4, the second paragraph,	9	a picture of the building, I had no understanding of
10	you refer to the make-ups there. You say on the fifth	10	what was going on there.
11	line down, "8, 10, 12, then 20 pumps."	11	Q. Right.
12	We have time marks for each of these, and	12	A. I just couldn't envisage what was actually happening
13	particularly for make pumps 20 of 01.29.46 I can show	13	there until
14	you that if we need to and 25 pumps at 01.31.48, so	14	Q. Would it have helped to have the television or heli-tele
15	about 2 minutes later.	15	downlink in front of you so you could see what was going
16	Bringing you forward to that point in the night, did	16	on?
17	the speed of these make-ups give you any information	17	A. I don't know whether it would've helped or not, really.
18	about the way the fire was behaving?	18	I mean, it was a shock to see it.
19	A. Yes.	19	Q. That was later in the night?
20	Q. What did you think?	20	A. Yes.
21	A. Well, I said there, you know, I knew it was a massive	21	Q. Yes.
22	fire.	22	A. Yes, yes.
23	Q. Yes.	23	Q. When this caller tells you the whole block of flats was
24	A. It was like a major fire.	24	on fire, did you believe him or did you treat it with
25	Q. Did you get any impression of where in the building it	25	scepticism?
	Page 142		Page 144
			36 (Pages 141 to 144)

1	A. I think at that point, I didn't disbelieve him.	1	"013210", so 01.32.10.
2	I thought that we was dealing with something	2	The call starts on that first page underneath that.
3	obviously I thought we was dealing with a very	3	"CALLER: Erm, hello? Erm, there's a big fire at
4	serious fire.	4	Grenfell Tower."
5	Q. Yes.	5	On page 1, you can see that the person says, towards
6	A. But, as I say, until I got the visual, I didn't realise	6	the bottom of the page, in answer to your question what
7	quite how bad it was.	7	flat are you in, caller:
8	Q. There's a call at 01.37.09, a third of the way down the	8	"OPERATOR: What fl, what flat are you in?
9	page [35]:	9	"CALLER: We're, we're at the top floor.
10	"CRO Howson takes a call from a female caller who	10	"OPERATOR: Top, right. What number? What is your
11	states that she can see a massive fire in a tower and	11	door number?
12	that people may jump out. Caller states they are not in	12	"CALLER: My, my actual door number's 155 but I'm at
13	the building but can hear people screaming for help.	13	someone else's house."
14	CRO Howson states there are ten fire engines there and	14	You know that they're at the top.
15	more en-route."	15	Then on page 3, if you turn to that, you can see
16	In fact, by that stage, the make-up was 25. Had you	16	that the caller tells you there's a lot of smoke coming
17	not heard or seen that message in the room or on the	17	in. In the middle of the page there, you ask:
18	Vision log?	18	"OPERATOR: Okay, well what I want you to do, right?
19	A. Ten fire engines there and more en route, yes.	19	The fire's not in your flat, is it?
20	Q. Oh, I see, more en route. So you had heard it was 25 by	20	"CALLER: Er, no but I can see it and the window's
21	this stage?	21	already burning up."
22	A. Yes.	22	So you're told the window is burning up.
23	Q. Fine.	23	You say:
24	At that point, you'd had the call earlier at	24	"OPERATOR: Okay, all right. Listen, I want you to
25	01.30.14, whole block of flats on fire. Now you're	25	try and stop that smoke coming into the flat for me."
			u) and one and an and an an an an
	Page 145		Page 147
1	hearing a call that there's a massive fire and people	1	At that stage, given you were told that the window
2	may jump out.	2	was burning, was it not a fire survival guidance call,
3	A. Yes.	3	and this person was affected by fire?
4	Q. By this stage, had you realised that people weren't, as	4	A. Yes, it was.
5	it were, exaggerating; this was a serious whole-block	5	Q. We don't see you then saying, "You need to leave, can we
6	fire?	6	assess the means of exit." Is there a reason why that
7	A. Yes, absolutely. On the other hand, I think up until	7	is?
8	that night, I truly believed that 20 appliances could	8	A. Well, I still believed at that point that if I could
9	deal with anything.	9	keep them safe where they were, we would rescue them.
10	Q. Right.	10	Q. If you turn to page 4, two-thirds of the way down that
11	A. I really did. So, you know, I was confident that once	11	page, after the discussion about speaking to an adult,
12	we had 20 machines there, 100 firefighters, in my mind	12	caller says:
13	I'm thinking: whatever it is, we can deal with it.	13	"CALLER: Hello?
14	Q. I'm going to ask you about certain calls that you took	14	"OPERATOR: Hello there, hi, I've just been speaking
15	prior to the change in stay-put advice.	15	to, erm, I don't know if that's, er, one of your
16	First of all, a call from the 23rd floor, flat 201.	16	children.
17	We can picture this up at the control room report,	17	"CALLER: Oh my God, the fire is coming through.
18	page 27. If we can just go back.	18	"OPERATOR: I know. Listen, erm, I'm just trying to
19	This is at 01.32.10. Top of the page:	19	explain to em, you're on the top floor are you?
20	"CRO Howson takes a call from what sounds like a	20	"CALLER: No, hang on, hang on (inaudible)
21	child who says they are in a top floor flat."	21	the smoke's coming through the window.
22	I just want to show you the transcript of that if	22	"OPERATOR: The smoke's coming through the window?
23	I can, this is LFB00000667.	23	"CALLER: Yeah, yeah.
	We can see the time of this call from the top line,	24	"OPERATOR: Don't let the smoke in, so shut the
24	The cam see the time of this can from the top line;		
24 25	next to "Event", second group of numbers from the right,	25	windows, all right? The, erm, the fire's below you, I
	next to "Event", second group of numbers from the right,	25	
		25	windows, all right? The, erm, the fire's below you, I Page 148

1	take it, is it? Yeah"	1	She wasn't really sort of saying too much, I just nodded
2	Then there's no more answer and the call finishes.	2	and said to her
3	By the end of this call, were you completely	3	Q. You didn't
4	confident that the fire had not actually come into the	4	A. No. I mean, I was on calls at the time.
5	flame spread and it was just smoke I say "just", but	5	Q. You didn't put two and two together with each other and
6	as opposed to fire?	6	work out that you were on different calls to callers
7	A. Yes.	7	from the same flat?
8	Q. Given that you were told that the fire was coming in the	8	A. No, I didn't know that.
9	window, by the caller, or coming through, why were you	9	Q. Different flat, different floor, if I can: flat 194,
10	so confident it was only smoke and not fire?	10	22nd floor, which is Tony Disson.
11	A. I don't know. I mean, it was inconceivable that they're	11	Control room report, page 59. I don't think there's
12	on the top floor and it would be on fire.	12	a need to see the transcript because we get everything
13	Q. We know from earlier calls that you had been told on two	13	we need from the control report summary.
14	occasions, before this call, 01.27 and 01.30 sorry,	14	Page 59. This call is at 02.00.33.
15	one occasion, to be fair to you, one occasion, 01.30	15	I'll read it all to you:
16	that the whole block of flats was on fire and you'd	16	"CRO Howson takes a call from a male caller who says
17	heard the makes-ups. Why was it inconceivable that	17	he has been waiting 15 minutes and that his flat is
18	a flat on the top floor was on fire?	18	getting worse. The caller explains that it is black in
19	A. I don't know, I just couldn't get my head around it.	19	the flat and that he cannot see anything. He then
20	I just couldn't. I still felt at that time we were	20	advises CRO Howson that he is a pensioner and she checks
21	doing rescues. I still felt at that time, if I could	21	that he is preventing smoke from getting into the flat,
22	keep them safe where they were and get the firefighters	22	which the caller states that he is. CRO Howson asks if
23	to them, that that was their best option.	23	there is another room in the flat which is less smoky
24	I think there was a point where the thought of	24	and the caller suggests that the front room is probably
25	getting them out of their flats into I don't know what,	25	the best one. CRO Howson tells him to sit on the floor
	D 140		D 151
	Page 149		Page 151
1	just seemed, I don't know, too dangerous.	1	as the air will be cleaner and asks for the flat number
1 2	just seemed, I don't know, too dangerous. Q. Were you in a position to assess at that stage whether	1 2	as the air will be cleaner and asks for the flat number which the caller gives this as 194 on 22nd floor. A
2	Q. Were you in a position to assess at that stage whether	2	which the caller gives this as 194 on 22nd floor. A
2 3	Q. Were you in a position to assess at that stage whether the exits really were so dangerous that you couldn't	2 3	which the caller gives this as 194 on 22nd floor. A smoke alarm is audible in the background. CRO Howson confirms the Brigade will be there as soon as they can. The caller sounds very similar to an earlier call taken
2 3 4	 Q. Were you in a position to assess at that stage whether the exits really were so dangerous that you couldn't encourage or advise them to leave? A. Well, I mean, looking at that, I don't think I even asked. 	2 3 4 5 6	which the caller gives this as 194 on 22nd floor. A smoke alarm is audible in the background. CRO Howson confirms the Brigade will be there as soon as they can. The caller sounds very similar to an earlier call taken by CRO Fox at 01:30:08."
2 3 4 5 6 7	 Q. Were you in a position to assess at that stage whether the exits really were so dangerous that you couldn't encourage or advise them to leave? A. Well, I mean, looking at that, I don't think I even asked. Q. Is there a reason why not? 	2 3 4 5 6 7	which the caller gives this as 194 on 22nd floor. A smoke alarm is audible in the background. CRO Howson confirms the Brigade will be there as soon as they can. The caller sounds very similar to an earlier call taken by CRO Fox at 01:30:08." He told you, as we can see, that his flat was worse
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 Q. Were you in a position to assess at that stage whether the exits really were so dangerous that you couldn't encourage or advise them to leave? A. Well, I mean, looking at that, I don't think I even asked. Q. Is there a reason why not? A. No, there's no reason. I just we was in the process 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	which the caller gives this as 194 on 22nd floor. A smoke alarm is audible in the background. CRO Howson confirms the Brigade will be there as soon as they can. The caller sounds very similar to an earlier call taken by CRO Fox at 01:30:08." He told you, as we can see, that his flat was worse and is black.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q. Were you in a position to assess at that stage whether the exits really were so dangerous that you couldn't encourage or advise them to leave? A. Well, I mean, looking at that, I don't think I even asked. Q. Is there a reason why not? A. No, there's no reason. I just we was in the process of doing rescues. I was just trying to keep them away, 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	which the caller gives this as 194 on 22nd floor. A smoke alarm is audible in the background. CRO Howson confirms the Brigade will be there as soon as they can. The caller sounds very similar to an earlier call taken by CRO Fox at 01:30:08." He told you, as we can see, that his flat was worse and is black. Having regard to the policy we looked at, 539, did
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q. Were you in a position to assess at that stage whether the exits really were so dangerous that you couldn't encourage or advise them to leave? A. Well, I mean, looking at that, I don't think I even asked. Q. Is there a reason why not? A. No, there's no reason. I just we was in the process of doing rescues. I was just trying to keep them away, safe in their flat, until they were rescued. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	which the caller gives this as 194 on 22nd floor. A smoke alarm is audible in the background. CRO Howson confirms the Brigade will be there as soon as they can. The caller sounds very similar to an earlier call taken by CRO Fox at 01:30:08." He told you, as we can see, that his flat was worse and is black. Having regard to the policy we looked at, 539, did you think that this caller was now affected by fire or
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1	A. No, no, for sure, yes.	1	Q. We've seen a call earlier, the one at 01.32, just
2	Q. The next one is flat 192, 22nd floor. There are	2	a moment ago, the one from flat 201, top floor, that the
3	a number of calls. I'll take these as quickly as I can	3	window was burning, and you've been told that the whole
4	with you.	4	building was on fire. I just want to know, really, why
5	The first one as 02.10.31. This is control room	5	you were still thinking that the fire was on the
6	report 69, and the transcript is LFB00000345. I'd like	6	4th floor.
7	to look at that transcript with you if I can.	7	A. Because that's where the original fire was, you know,
8	We can see the first page of it, timed at 02.10.31,	8	and everything the fire, it just it didn't do
9	you can see that from the column with the right-hand	9	what other fires do. It just it shouldn't have
10	bunch of numbers, first from the right.	10	happened, you know, the fire shouldn't have been there.
11	If you look at the start of the call:	11	And I think I still couldn't get my head round what was
12	"OPERATOR 1: Fire brigade.	12	happening on the building, within the building, and
13	"CALLER: (Inaudible) yeah, hi.	13	I was still working, trying to keep people safe, to be
14	"OPERATOR 1: Hello, fire brigade?	14	rescued, and I still felt at that point that was the
15	"CALLER: Yeah, there is fire (Several inaudible	15	safest place for them. I was just trying to keep them
16	words).	16	away from the worse of it and keep them safe in their
17	"OPERATOR 1: Hello?	17	flats.
18	"CALLER: Yeah, there is fire in our kitchen."	18	Q. We've seen what is said at page 4, cooker, fire, fire in
19	Do you see that?	19	the kitchen.
20	Then you go on to get the flat number and floor from	20	If we look at page 5, a third of the the way down,
21	them over the bottom of the second page and to the top	21	you now say:
22	of the third page.	22	"OPERATOR 1: Flat 192; so, there's a fire in the
23	On the fourth page, page 4, a third of the way down,	23	kitchen."
24	you say:	24	We then see on to page 9, if we look forward at
25	"OPERATOR 1: Right. So, when you say a fire, what,	25	page 8 we can see, as we pass it, it's confirmed there's
			, , ,
	Page 153		Page 155
1	yyaa it tha aaalsan an gamathina?	,	a fire in the kitchen.
1 2	was it the cooker or something? "CALLER: (Several inaudible words) there is already	1 2	
3	fire (Several inaudible words) get down here (Several	3	At page 9, you say at the top of the page: "OPERATOR 1: All right. Well, listen, I mean, at
4	inaudible words) get down, get down!"	4	the moment we're advising people to stay in their flats,
5	Then towards the bottom of the page you say:	5	but if you've got a fire in your flat, it's your
_	"OPERATOR 1: Listen, we're dealing with a fire on	6	
6	the fourth floor, okay? Is it the smoke	7	decision; you may have to try and get out, okay? How near are you to the stairwell?
7 8		8	"CALLER: (No reply)
_	"CALLER: (Overspeaking) there is fire on the 22nd	l .	
9	floor.	9	"OPERATOR 1: How near are you to the stairs?"
10	"OPERATOR 1: On the 22nd floor, in your	10	Then there's discussion about that.
11	"CALLER: (Overspeaking)	11	Towards the bottom of the page:
12	"OPERATOR 1: kitchen, yeah?	12	"CALLER: Yeah, we are trapped (Overspeaking)"
13	"CALLER: Yes. Yeah.	13	And you talk about children.
14	"OPERATOR 1: Okay. All right, just The 22nd	14	The call essentially ends there at page 10 without
15	floor, yeah?	15	much further information.
16	"CALLER: Yeah.	16	My question is: you know now there's a fire in the
17	"OPERATOR 1: Flat 192; so, there's a fire in the	17	flat. You've suggested to them that they should
18	kitchen."	18	leave the advice on page 9 but you say to them,
19	So you've established at this point in the call that	19	"it's your decision; you may have to try and get out,
20	the flat is on fire.	20	okay?"
21	Do you know why you told the caller that the fire	21	Can I just ask you, why didn't you tell them, "Given
22	was only on the 4th floor at that stage?	22	that you've got a fire in your flat, you need to leave",
23	A. I don't know. I think I still didn't appreciate that	23	and make it very clear they had to leave? Can you help
24	the fire was affecting flats that high up in the	24	me with why you didn't do that?
25	building.	25	A. No.
	Page 154		Page 156
	1		1 1100

1	Q. We also see you don't explore with them how safe it is	1	had you had any positive information in the control room
2	for them to leave, how smoke-logged the lobbies or stair	2	to lead you to think that crews were going to be able to
3	is. Is there a reason why you didn't do that?	3	get to the 22nd floor?
4	A. No. I mean, at the time, we were still following the	4	A. No.
5	stay-put policy.	5	Q. So why were you thinking or expecting that crews were
6	Q. As you understood it.	6	going to be able to reach them?
7	A. Yes, as I understood it.	7	A. Because we do.
8	Q. There's a second call, and this is transcript	8	Q. It's an assumption, is it?
9	LFB00000351, a few minutes later. This is 02.18.06, the	9	A. We do, yeah, we do get to people and we do rescue them.
10	second page of which establishes same flat, 192,	10	Q. There's a third call from this flat a few minutes later
11	22nd floor.	11	at 02.34.16, and that's LFB00000363.
12	Then on page 3, very much the same thing, smoke and	12	Just picking a point or two up from that call, you
13	fire. Fire in the kitchen again, as you can see in the	13	say on page 3 it's the same flat in the middle of
14	middle of the page.	14	the page:
15	Then top of page 4, again:	15	"OPERATOR: Two adults and three kids, yeah? All
16	"OPERATOR: You'll have to try and make	16	right. So is - just stay (inaudible)
17	yourselves make your way to somewhere safe if that	17	"CALLER: Sorry?
18	fire is in your flat."	18	"FEMALE SPEAKER: (inaudible) is being affected by
19	Then you give them some advice in the middle of that	19	the fire and flames and smoke they've gotta get out.
20	page. You say:	20	Damp towel, (overspeaking) together.
21	"OPERATOR: to the stairwell so, wherever the	21	"OPERATOR: Up or down? Where to go?
22	smoke is less heavy, if you can take some blankets and	22	"FEMALE SPEAKER: Down."
23	towels and put them round your mouth so you're not	23	Could you tell me what is happening on that? Are
24	breathing in the smoke, okay, and get to the place	24	you speaking to someone in the control room or someone
25	try and head to where there is the least smoke, okay?"	25	on the end of the phone?
	ay and need to where there is the least smoke, okay.	20	on the one of the phone.
	Page 157		Page 159
1	And the advice continues, as you can see.	1	A. Sorry, which part was it?
2	Then you go on to page 5. They tell you:	2	Q. Page 3, just below halfway down, where you see:
2 3	Then you go on to page 5. They tell you: "CALLER: We have opened one side of the windows"	2 3	Q. Page 3, just below halfway down, where you see: "FEMALE SPEAKER: (inaudible) is being affected by
2 3 4	Then you go on to page 5. They tell you: "CALLER: We have opened one side of the windows" Then just after halfway down, you say:	2 3 4	Q. Page 3, just below halfway down, where you see: "FEMALE SPEAKER: (inaudible) is being affected by the fire and flames and smoke, they've gotta get out.
2 3 4 5	Then you go on to page 5. They tell you: "CALLER: We have opened one side of the windows" Then just after halfway down, you say: "OPERATOR: Have you left the flat?	2 3 4 5	Q. Page 3, just below halfway down, where you see: "FEMALE SPEAKER: (inaudible) is being affected by the fire and flames and smoke, they've gotta get out. Damp towel, (overspeaking) together."
2 3 4 5 6	Then you go on to page 5. They tell you: "CALLER: We have opened one side of the windows" Then just after halfway down, you say: "OPERATOR: Have you left the flat? "CALLER: (No reply)	2 3 4 5 6	Q. Page 3, just below halfway down, where you see: "FEMALE SPEAKER: (inaudible) is being affected by the fire and flames and smoke, they've gotta get out. Damp towel, (overspeaking) together." Can you help me with whether you're speaking to
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Then you go on to page 5. They tell you: "CALLER: We have opened one side of the windows" Then just after halfway down, you say: "OPERATOR: Have you left the flat? "CALLER: (No reply) "OPERATOR: Hello? Have you left the flat? "CALLER: (No reply) "OPERATOR: Hello? Where are you now? "CALLER: (Overspeaking) 192." At that stage, what were you trying to do? A. Well, just trying to keep them safe, trying to get them away from the fire. Q. We can see from this call that you were trying to assist them to leave. My question really is: why were you doing that on this call, when they called back, and not on the earlier call? A. I don't know, it was just things that should have been happening, weren't happening. You know, we should've been — you know, these people should've been rescued and we weren't able to get to them. Q. Right. A. The policies we had that have always worked in the past, they weren't working.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. Page 3, just below halfway down, where you see: "FEMALE SPEAKER: (inaudible) is being affected by the fire and flames and smoke, they've gotta get out. Damp towel, (overspeaking) together." Can you help me with whether you're speaking to someone on the end of the phone or somebody in the control room? A. I don't know. I mean, there was a lot of times on calls where I was speaking to people in the room as well. I don't know in that particular call. Q. Do you think this was you taking guidance from a supervisor? Is that possible? A. Possibly. Q. But you can't remember? A. Possibly. I mean, I did have conversations where I was on calls and speaking to supervisors. Q. Do you remember any language or communication difficulties with these callers from this particular flat? A. I don't know about this particular flat. I mean, there were some calls where it was difficult because of language or noise or the sheer panic. But I wouldn't be able to say which ones in particular.

1	02.25.38, control room report, page 80 and LFB00000670.	1	A. No.
2	Now, this is, as you can see from the top of the	2	Q. I can understand that. But are you trained, when giving
3	page, at 02.25.38, as I've said, and it's a connection,	3	reassurance to callers, to make sure that whatever
4	it looks like, from BT, which starts:	4	reassurance you give them, you don't raise expectations
5	"CALLER 1: there's a female on the line she says	5	falsely in their minds about rescue?
6	she's in flat 205, er, 23rd floor of the building, er,	6	A. Not specifically. I mean, I think maybe my expectation
7	they can't get out and they're running out of oxygen."	7	was raised about what we could and couldn't do
8	Then the call is essentially put through.	8	Q. Right.
9	I just want to look at the bottom of page 2 with	9	A possibly. Well, it was, definitely.
10	you.	10	Q. Did you think that a helicopter
11	The caller says at the bottom:	11	A. Not in the case of the helicopter.
12	"CALLER 2: But my mother she's diabetic, got asthma	12	Q. Right.
13	"OPERATOR: Okay, all right, listen, I'm just gonna	13	A. I mean, I knew the helicopter wasn't the Brigade
14	speak to the crews.	14	helicopter. I mean, we haven't got one, we don't use
15	"CALLER 2: Could you get a chopper or something,	15	them. So, you know, that would've been like the police
16	could you get a helicopter or something to get us out?	16	sort of heli-tele or but, no, I think it was probably
17	"OPERATOR: There is, there is one there, okay, all	17	
18	right, the fire brigade are on their way now, they're	18	my expectation on the night of what we could do, really, that I was giving to the callers, right up until the
19	making their way."	19	point where we was told to get them out.
		20	•
20	First of all, did you consider whether you needed to	20 21	Q. Right.
21	ask the caller whether the mother has any difficulties	1	A. Because we weren't going to be able to get to them.
22	moving, any mobility issues? She told you about	22	So up until that point, any hope I was giving to the
23	diabetes and asthma, did you think to ask about mobility	23	callers, was, I think, my hope. I did genuinely think
24	issues as well?	24	we was still going to get there to help these people.
25	A. No.	25	Q. One more question, then I'm going to ask the chairman
	Page 161		Page 163
1	Q. Is there a reason why you didn't do that?	1	for a short break
1 2	A. No. I mean, I think by that stage, it was the	2	A. Okay.
		1	
2	A. No. I mean, I think by that stage, it was the	2	A. Okay.
2 3	 A. No. I mean, I think by that stage, it was — the conditions, everybody was going to have difficulties dealing with the situation. Q. You can see, as I've just read to you, the bottom of 	2 3	A. Okay.Q if I can, because I don't want to leave this call hanging.A. No.
2 3 4	A. No. I mean, I think by that stage, it was — the conditions, everybody was going to have difficulties dealing with the situation.	2 3 4	A. Okay.Q if I can, because I don't want to leave this call hanging.
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1	MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, I think that's a convenient	1	been different?
2	moment. I'm going to turn to a different topic.	2	A. I honestly don't know.
3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Is that all right?	3	Q. Would you have been able to say to him, "Well, you must
4	MR MILLETT: Yes.	4	get out" or seek to explore the safety of the exit
5	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, Ms Howson, we're going to have	5	routes with him at that stage?
6	a short break now. Please don't talk to anyone while	6	A. As I say, I honestly don't know. I've always been
7	you're out of the room, at least about your evidence and	7	confident in the stay-put policy, and it's always had
8	so on, and if you go with the usher, we'll resume at	8	good results. That's what I believed was going to
9	3.25, if that's all right.	9	happen.
10	Thank very much.	10	Q. Right.
11	Right. 3.25, then, please. Thank you.	11	A. And I believed that I was keeping them safe to be
12	(3.15 pm)	12	rescued.
13	(A short break)	13	I don't know whether having a heli-tele there
14	(3.25 pm)	14	would've made any difference to that, seeing the outside
15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Ms Howson, ready to carry	15	of the building, still not knowing really what's going
16	on? Thank you.	16	own inside the building, what the state of the
17	MR MILLETT: Ms Howson, thank you for coming back to us.	17	stairwells, the communal areas was like.
18	I want to take you back to a call to show you the	18	So I don't know. I don't know whether it would've
19	transcript, because the summary I showed you of the call	19	made any difference. I was following a procedure that
20	was not completely complete. This is a call at 02.00.33	20	I've followed many times and has always saved people's
21	from Tony Disson, flat 194.	21	lives, and that's what I did that night.
22	Can I ask you, please, to be shown LFB00000337.	22	Q. I want to ask you about the change in stay put. Can
23	We have the time of the call at the top of the page,	23	I take you back to your statement.
24	02.00.33.	24	A. Yes.
25	Can I ask you, please, to go to page 2.	25	Q. You say on page 6 of your statement in the third
	Page 165		Page 167
1	You see there that you're told:	1	nergaranh that you can't remember an exact time but you
2	"CALLER: Yes. I'm a pensioner, darling, I can't get	2	paragraph that you can't remember an exact time, but you
3	about.	3	say: " I received instructions from my Assistant
4	"OPERATOR: Okay. Listen, you can't go anywhere	4	Operations Manager Debbie REAL that we needed to get
5	anyway, you're in the safest place there, all right?	5	these people out, and that the advice had changed. I now
6	Overspeaking)	6	needed to tell people to get out of the building."
7	"CALLER: Darling, it's black.	7	Do you remember even roughly what time that was?
8	"OPERATOR: Listen, the fire is on the 4th floor,	8	A. No.
9	okay? Are you doing everything you can to get the smoke	9	Q. Do you remember exactly what she said?
10	coming in?	10	A. She stood in front of me, and she said something to the
11	"CALLER: Yes, yes.	11	effect of, "Right, get them all out now."
12	"OPERATOR: You are. Okay.	12	Q. Right.
13	"CALLER: My, my, my letterbox won't close so it's	13	A. She said, "Tell them wet towels, blankets, cover their
14	coming through the letterbox.	14	faces and get them out of their flats, we can't get to
15	"OPERATOR: All right. Well, put a towel in.	15	them."
16	"CALLER: (inaudible) put something in it. All	16	Q. Was that the first time that you realised that the
17	right. Thanks. All right."	17	firefighters won't be able to rescue people in the
18	One or two questions about that.	18	building?
19	First of all, by this time, was it clear to you that	19	A. Yes.
20	the fire had spread to the top floor? This is	20	Q. Did you get an impression of which floors couldn't be
21	2 o'clock, more or less.	21	accessed or was it all of them?
22	A. Yes, it would've been, yes.	22	A. All of them.
23	Q. If you had had the images from the heli-tele downlink or	23	Q. Did she hold a piece of paper up in front of you with
24	the television showing the external fire spread or smoke	24	some writing on it?
25	spread, do you think your advice to this caller would've	25	A. No, but she was very clear in her instructions.
	Page 166		Page 168
1	1 agc 100		1 age 100

1	Q. Was she very clear in the terms and tone of what you	1	A. That's the call you just spoke to me about, isn't it?
2	were supposed to say?	2	Q. No, it's a different flat.
3	A. Yes.	3	(Pause)
4	Q. How clearly did you understand that the advice you were	4	A. I don't know, that one I'm telling them to stay?
		5	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you like to put the question
5	to give to callers was, "You must get out at all costs, it's a live or die choice"?	6	
6		7	again, Mr Millett? MR MILLETT: Well, yes, I suppose I'll have to now.
7	A. Very clear.	8	There's a call earlier which we looked at before at
8	Q. I just want to look at just one call around the time of	9	02.34, which is LFB00000363. I don't want to have to go
9	the change in the advice. Can I ask you, please, to	10	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
10	look at LFB00000375.		back over it again, but this is the call at the end of
11	This is a call summarised in the control room report	11	which you gave advice about damp towel essentially it
12	at page 95. It's flat 203 on the 23rd floor, timed at	12	was a get-out call.
13	02.46.02, as you can see from the number in the column	13	A. Yes.
14	at the top.	14	Q. That was at 02.34.
15	If I can ask you, please, to go to the first page of	15	A. Yes, I think there was one call where I told people to
16	the call, you see you're given the flat number:	16	get out prior to the instruction because the flat was on
17	"CALLER: Hi, I'm in flat 203.	17	fire.
18	"OPERATOR: Flat 203. What floor are you on?	18	Q. Right, I see. Okay. So is that the difference, that
19	"CALLER: 21st floor."	19	that flat was on fire, so you were telling them to
20	Then if you go to page 2, you record the fact that	20	leave
21	you are told the flat next door is on fire, and you say:	21	A. Yes.
22	"OPERATOR: put some stuff around the windows as	22	Q but now you've been given the general instruction?
23	well just to try to keep as much smoke —	23	A. The general one, yes. Once we had the instruction, that
24	"CALLER: Put things around the windows.	24	was to tell all occupants, all the residents, to leave.
25	"OPERATOR: as much you can just to keep smoke	25	Q. I see. But in this call, flat 203 at 02.42, you don't
	Page 169		Page 171
	1 age 107		1 agc 1/1
1	out. Keep low, okay, obviously we're letting the fire	1	think you've been given the instruction by Debbie Real
1 2	out. Keep low, okay, obviously we're letting the fire crews know that you're there. How many of you in	1 2	think you've been given the instruction by Debbie Real at this stage?
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1	one's shown them the way.	1	Once I had the visual of what we were dealing with,
2	"OPERATOR: Well, they, they need to attempt to get	2	everything made sense I was still giving advice of
3	out the building. If, if they can't stay in the flat	3	'stay put' to people who were calling, because we had
4	anymore - have you spoken to her or you calling on -"	4	not been instructed any further. I was sticking to the
5	Then there's a continuation of a discussion about	5	policy. Half of me was thinking 'how will we get them
6	smoke.	6	out?", and the other half was thinking 'what do we do'."
7	Let's just go to the next page, please, where the	7	Is it your recollection that you'd seen
8	call ends, then you say at the top:	8	Jason Oliff's or the officer of the day's phone and the
9	"OPERATOR: Well, listen, what I'm gonna do I'm	9	picture on it before Debbie Real came to you with the
10	gonna let the crews know that she's still in there"	10	instructions that you should now tell everybody to get
11	And you get more details. Then you say:	11	out?
12	"OPERATOR: I'll let the crews know -"	12	A. Yes, I think it was before.
13	This is just before 3.00 am, after the time,	13	Q. You say half of you was thinking, "How will we get them
14	I think, as we've established, you were told to give	14	out?" and a half "What do we do?" Did you discuss that
15	get-out-at-all-costs advice.	15	dilemma with anybody in the control room?
16	Why did you tell this caller that you'll let the	16	A. No. I mean, a couple of times I just shouted out in the
17	crews know, given that had already by now been told by	17	room, you know, "How long is it going to take to get to
18	Debbie Real that the crews weren't going to rescue	18	these people?" But we didn't have the answers. We
19	anybody?	19	didn't know.
20	A. Well, no, I mean, we're still letting the crews know	20	Q. Do you remember how long after seeing that image you
21	that we would I mean, I'd told him to tell the	21	continued to give stay-put advice for?
22	occupants to leave.	22	A. I don't, I'm afraid. I really don't.
23	Q. We saw that, you did.	23	Q. Was it long or short?
24	A. Yes, but we didn't stop telling the crews that we'd	24	A. I don't know. I don't think it was it wasn't very
25	advised people in flats to leave. I mean, not all of	25	long.
	Page 173		Page 175
1			
	the well, I don't know for sure, but I'm working on	1	Q. Do you think if you'd seen that image earlier on, it
2	the premise that not all of the people that we spoke to	2	would've assisted you, having the whole picture, in the
2 3	the premise that not all of the people that we spoke to called back after we got the instruction to leave the	2 3	would've assisted you, having the whole picture, in the advice you were giving to callers? It's a question
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1	long ago.	1	Ms Howson. I'm sorry if this has been a slightly
2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We have, haven't we?	2	disagreeable exercise, having to go back through the
3	Normally we have a little break at this stage to	3	events of that night in some detail, I can well
4	give counsel a chance to check he's asked all the	4	understand it might have been, but it is very important
5	questions he should've asked. Very often we go out and	5	for us to understand in as much detail as we can what
6	I rise for a bit, but I think today, you can sit down	6	was going on that night, and so we're very grateful to
7	for a bit, you and I can sit here and ignore what goes	7	you for coming to tell us what you know about it.
8	on and anyone who wants to speak to Mr Millett can do	8	Thank you very much indeed.
9	that now. You get a breather. All right?	9	THE WITNESS: I hope anything I've said helps.
10	THE WITNESS: Yes.	10	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Of course, it does help, yes, very
11	MR MILLETT: Thank you, Mr Chairman.	11	much so. Thank you very much.
12	(Pause)	12	If you would like to go with the usher, she'll look
13	Well, Mr Chairman, rather than risking further open	13	after you. Thank you.
14	outcry, treating it like an auction, I shall ask my	14	(The witness withdrew)
15	final questions.	15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.
16	Ms Howson, I do have one or two more, if that's all	16	MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, we can now call our final witness
17	right.	17	of the day, Control Room Officer Heidi Fox.
18	First of all, did there come a time in the night	18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, thank you.
19	when you knew that no more firefighters were being sent	19	HEIDI FOX (affirmed)
20	to carry out rescues in upper floors?	20	Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY
21	A. No.	21	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Ms Fox.
22	Q. Just being specific, at 3 o'clock, what was the state of	22	Now, sit down and make yourself comfortable. We can
23	your knowledge about the extent to which firefighters	23	take this at your pace, and if at any point you feel
24	were getting up to the upper floors of the building?	24	you'd like to have a break, you just make that clear to
25	A. No idea, no idea.	25	me. All right?
	,		
	Page 177		Page 179
1	0.01.	١,	THE WITNESS OF
1	Q. Okay.	1	THE WITNESS: Okay.
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1	the police?	1	Q. Have you ever had any training on or experience of
2	A. Yes, I do.	2	a situation remember whether the control room is
3	Q. Have you read it recently?	3	receiving multiple FSG calls
4	A. Yes, I have.	4	A. No, no.
5	Q. Can you confirm that its contents are true?	5	Q until the night of Grenfell?
6	A. Yes, it is.	6	A. Yes. Lakanal there wasn't as many as Grenfell, but we
7	Q. I want to start by asking some questions about your role	7	had a few, but not as many.
8	and training.	8	Q. You were, I think, one of the control room officers at
9	I think it's right that you've worked for the LFB	9	Lakanal, weren't you?
10	is this right? for 32 years or so prior to the date	10	A. Yes.
11	of this statement?	11	Q. I think you spoke to one of the callers and handled
12	A. Yes.	12	an FSG call at that fire.
13	Q. So since about 1986, I think.	13	A. I did.
14	A. That's correct.	14	Q. Can I ask you this: when Grenfell happened and unfolded,
15	Q. Has that always been in the position of a control room	15	did your experience of being a control room operator at
16	officer?	16	the Lakanal fire help you in any way?
17	A. Yes.	17	A. Yes, it did help. But every fire survival guidance call
18	Q. After your initial training, were you given any	18	is different.
19	refresher training or additional training?	19	Q. In what way did it help?
20	A. Yes, I have been.	20	A. It helped from some of the knowledge and some of the
21	Q. When was the last training you received before the	21	harrowing calls that we received at Lakanal. Obviously
22	Grenfell Tower fire in June 2017?	22	we had a lot of harrowing calls at Grenfell that night.
23	A. 2011, 2012, 2016.	23	Q. I just want to ask some questions about your
24	Q. In 2016, can you tell us what training that was?	24	understanding of what we've come to call the stay-put
25	A. That was with the command unit.	25	policy.
	Page 181		Page 183
1	O 2012 what was that training?	,	La come et et ement en more 2 com en in the
1	Q. 2012, what was that training?	1	In your statement on page 2, you say in the
2	A. That was fire survival guidance refresher training.	2	paragraph second from bottom: "In my experience, instinct takes over and the
3	Q. Were you trained on emergency call management,	3	in my experience, instinct takes over and the
4		1	
	policy 539, do you think?	4 5	advice to stay or leave the property is given. I try to
5	A. Yes.	5	advice to stay or leave the property is given. I try to remain on the phone line for as long as possible to
5 6	A. Yes.Q. What about fire survival guidance policy 790?	5 6	advice to stay or leave the property is given. I try to remain on the phone line for as long as possible to reassure the person calling. Ordinarily, we are trained
5 6 7	A. Yes.Q. What about fire survival guidance policy 790?A. Yes.	5 6 7	advice to stay or leave the property is given. I try to remain on the phone line for as long as possible to reassure the person calling. Ordinarily, we are trained to advise someone to remain within their property,
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5 6 7 8 9	 A. Yes. Q. What about fire survival guidance policy 790? A. Yes. Q. Were you ever trained on the lessons learnt from Lakanal House, if I can put it that way? 	5 6 7 8 9	advice to stay or leave the property is given. I try to remain on the phone line for as long as possible to reassure the person calling. Ordinarily, we are trained to advise someone to remain within their property, unless they are able to leave." Just breaking that down, when you say you are
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		1	
1	A. We advise them to maybe move into another room, open	1	telling you, "I've got smoke in my flat in a high-rise
2	a window, put the towels down, things like that.	2	building", does that mean that the caller is not safe to
3	Q. If they're affected by smoke, do you advise them to	3	remain in their premises and should be looking to
4	leave or do you	4	escape?
5	A. In a high-rise we're talking about?	5	A. It depends if the smoke is inside their property or if
6	Q. Yes, we're talking about high-rise buildings.	6	the smoke is on the stairwell.
7	A. We advise them to put the towels down.	7	Q. I see. If it was inside their property
8	Q. At what point in a call like that would it become a fire	8	A. Sorry, in the corridor.
9	survival guidance call in your mind?	9	Q. If it was inside their flat, would that mean that they
10	A. If they're unable to get out of the property.	10	were no longer safe and, therefore, should look to
11	Q. At what point in a call would you make an assessment of	11	escape?
12	whether it was safe for the caller to leave?	12	A. Well, you could ask them where the actual if there is
13	A. Well, you would ask the caller the questions: are they	13	a fire inside the flat or where the smoke is coming
14	able to get out? You would assess the situation.	14	from. It may be the smoke has come from outside in the
15	Q. What information would you have to have in front of you	15	corridor, just under their doors into the actual
16	before you would start on that assessment?	16	property itself, in which case you could ask them to go
17	A. Well, the four principles of the fire survival guide is	17	to a window and close the door, ventilate the property.
18	to escape, assess and protect.	18	Q. I just note, because you referred to it, on that same
19	Q. Well, let's look at that in a bit more detail.	19	page, if we look further down, we can see that you have
20	Can I first of all ask you to look at policy 539.	20	the four principles. I'll just ask you about that
21	That's LFB00000737, tab 3 of the policies bundle.	21	before we leave this page.
22	If we go to appendix 3 on page 16, it's called "Fire	22	Those four principles, when do they first kick in?
23	survival guidance".	23	A. When you take the call.
24	Just scanning your eye, Ms Fox, down this page, if	24	Q. Right. Because the first of those is to assist the
25	you would, are you familiar with this guidance in this	25	caller to identify a safe alternative escape route.
	Page 185		Page 187
1	policy?	1	I'm just going
2	A. Yes.	2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Shall we have the bottom part
3	Q. Looking at the third paragraph down, it says:	3	enlarged? I think it's very difficult for Ms Fox to
4	"Brigade Control advise callers to 'Get out and Stay	4	read it on the screen.
5	out', however if a call is received from a High rise	5	MR MILLETT: Well, there's a reason why I wanted the whole
6	building where Fire, Heat and Smoke are not affecting	6	thing, because it links back to something at the top of
7	the caller, LFB would advise that:	7	the page.
8	"You are usually safest to remain in your premises	8	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right.
9	unless affected by fire, heat or smoke. If the situation	9	MR MILLETT: Just look at the whole thing to start with.
10	changes, you should leave your premises and dial 999, if	10	You can see at the bottom of the page I think it
11	you need further assistance."	11	starts I'm not quite clear it says:
12	Then it goes on to tell you what should happen if	12	"The control room officer will ascertain through
13	the caller is unable to escape.	13	initial questioning, the type of premises the caller is
14	Just looking at that appendix, first of all, what	14	in and use the link on the Reference Information
15	I've just read to you, does that accord with your	15	File"
16	understanding of the stay-put policy?	16	And then:
17	A. Yes.	17	"Control room officers will always use the four
18	Q. Can you explain what information you would use in your	18	principles of Escape, Assess, Protect and Rescue to
19	experience to make the assessment as to whether	19	provide guidance to these callers."
20	a caller's premises are affected you can see the word	20	My question is: "these callers", to your way of
21	"affected" by fire, heat or smoke? What information	21	understanding are the four principles of escape,
22	would you need for that?	22	assess, protect and rescue applicable to FSG callers or
23	A. We would need to know where the smoke's coming from, if	23	is it any caller who calls from within a flat in
24	it's got inside the property.	24	a high-rise building who says that they're affected?
25	Q. If there was smoke inside the property, the caller was	25	A. Any caller.
23	2. If there was smoke inside the property, the earler was	23	23. Any Canci.
	Page 186		Page 188
	Page 186		Page 188

2 the fire was inside their flat, you would ask them: 4 four principles by identifying the first one, a safe 5 alternative escape route? 6 A. You would ask them if they could get out. 7 Q. Then you would go on, if it wasn't possible, to assess the situation by asking the caller direct questions. Is 8 the situation by asking the caller direct questions. Is 9 that your understanding of how you should proceed? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Just pausing there, before we look at 790. Does it work 12 like this, so I understand your understanding: if 13 a caller is in a high-rise residential block and isn't 14 affected by smoke, heat or fire, you'd tell them to stay 15 where they are. If there's smoke coming into the flat, 16 is the next thing you do, to your way of understanding, 17 you start by assessing whether there's a safe 18 alternative escape route for them to leave? 19 A. If the smoke's coming inside the flat from outside, then 20 you ask them to block the doors, 21 Q. Right. 22 A. Yes, you would ask them to block the doors. 23 Q. I'they were affected in any way by smoke'? 24 A. Yes, you would ask them to block the doors. 25 Q. So where you have a caller who says, "There is smoke in 26 Page 189 27 Page 191 28 A. But most people that tive in the flats in high-rises do 29 kaow where their escape route is, but this policy says that 19 you cold assess on bly them if they can get out of the property. 19 Q. Hey know where their escape route is because there's 19 Looking at the first line of that: 29 They know where their escape route is, but this policy says that 29 You can see from the first page of that that this was reviewed as current as of April 2014. 29 Were you familiar with this policy as at the night 20 They know where their escape route is, but this policy says that 29 They know where their escape route is, but this policy says that 29 You can see from the first page of that that this 29 Were you familiar with this policy as the night 20 They know where their escape route is because there's 21 A. Yes, 10 You would q				
Ms Fox, does that mean that you would then start the four principles by identifying the first one, a safe A four would ask them if they could get out. A. You would ask them if they could get out. A. You would ask them if they could get out. A. You would ask them if they could get out. By that your understanding of how you should proceed? A. You would ask them of before we look at 790. Does it work like like his, so I understand your understanding: if a caller is in a high-rise residential block and isn't affected by smoke, heat or fire, you'd tell them to stay the stream that you would go through it process of helping them, first of all, identify a safe alternative escape route for them to leave? A. If the smoke's coming inside the flat from outside, then you sak them to block the doors, and — Q. Right. A. Yes, Q. Right. A. Yes, Q. Now and ask them to block the doors, and — Q. Right. A. Yes, you would ask them to block the doors, and — Q. Right. A. Yes, you would ask them to block the doors, and a safe alternative escape route? A. A. Yes, you would ask them to block the doors. A. A. Hi high-rise's hit within — Page 189 A. A. Is it high-rise's hit within — Page 189 A. Wet, you would question them, and you would ask them if they know where their escape route is because there's normally — they just go through their front door to their nearest stairwell. A. But most people that live in the flats in high-rises do know where their escape route is because there's normally — they just go through their front door to their nearest stairwell. A. Yes, C. Right. A. But most people that live in the flats in high-rises do know where their escape route is because there's normally — they just go through their front door to their nearest stairwell. A. Yes, C. Page 2, if you would, under section 2 "Fire survival guidance call definition": "2.1. A FSG call is a call received into control where the caller shale, you read they are unable to leave their premises. " To you tranderstanding, so is it a f	1	Q. So a person who calls and says, "I'm affected by smoke,	1	A. No, you would ask them if it was safe to get out. If
four principles by identifying the first one, a safe alternative escape route? 7 Q. Then you would go if, it wasn't possible, to assess 8 the instantion by asting the caller direct questions. Is 9 that your understanding of how you should proceed? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Just pausing there, before we look at 790. Does it work 12 like this, so I understand your understanding: if 13 a caller is in a high-rise residential block and isn't 14 affected by smoke, heat or fire, you'd tell them to stay 15 where they are. If there's smoke coming into the flat, 16 is the next thing you do, to your way of understanding, 17 you start by assessing whether there's a safe 18 alternative escape route for them to leave? 19 A. If the smoke's coming inside the flat from outside, then 20 you ask them to block the doors, 21 Q. Right. 22 A. Did you say it was coming from outside, 22 A. Yes, you would ask them to block the doors. 23 Q. If they were affected in any way by smoke? 24 A. Yes, you would ask them to block the doors. 25 Q. So where you have a caller who says, "There is smoke in Page 189 1 my flat", at what point would you begin to identify a safe alternative escape route is because there's normally – they just go through their front door to their nearest stairwell. 26 Q. They know where their escape route is because there's normally – they just go through their front door to their nearest stairwell. 27 Q. They know where their escape route. 28 A. You would ask them if they can get out of the property. 29 Q. A. Van that point would you ask them that a question? 30 Q. They know where the route is, but this policy says that you need to assess or help them identify a safe alternative escape route: 31 A. Sorry, I don't understand the question. 32 Page 191 32 C. Right. 33 A. Is thigh-rise? 34 A. Well, you would question them, and you would ask them if they exall performance in the property of the property. 34 A. Yes, and the provide in the property. 35 A. Yes, and the provide in the property. 36 A. Yes, and the provide in the propert	2	I've got smoke in my flat", to your way of thinking,	2	the fire was inside their flat, you would ask them if it
saltemative escape route? A. You would ask them if they could get out. Q. Then you would go on, if it wasn't possible, to assess the situation by asking the caller direct questions. Is that your understanding of how you should proceed? A. Yes. Q. Just pausing there, before we look at 790. Does it work like this, so I understand your understanding: if a caller is in a high-rise residential block and isn't directed by smoke, heat or fire, you'd tell them to stay where they are. If there's smoke coming into the flat, is the next thing you do, to your way of understanding. You start by assessing whether there's a safe alternative escape route for them to leave? A. If the smoke's coming inside the flat from outside, then you was them to block the doors, and— Q. Right. A. But was coming from outside? Q. So where you have a caller who says, "There is smoke in 19 as afe alternative escape route? A. Yes, you would ask them to block the doors. Q. So where you have a caller who says, "There is smoke in 19 they know where their escape route? A. Yes, you would ask them to block the doors. Q. Right. A. But most people that five in the flats in high-rises do show where their escape route is. A. But most people that five in the flats in high-rises do show where their escape route. B. A. Wound ask them to block the doors of they was affected in any way by smoke? A. But most people that five in the flats in high-rises do show where their escape route. B. A. Wound ask them of block the doors. Q. Right. A. But most people that five in the flats in high-rises do show where their escape route. There are a number of questions. There are a number	3	Ms Fox, does that mean that you would then start the	3	was safe to get out of their property.
6 A. You would go on, if it wasn't possible, to assess the situation by asking the caller direct questions. Is that your understanding of how you should proceed? A. Yes. 11 Q. Just pausing there, before we look at 790. Does it work like this, so I understand your understanding: if a caller is in a high-rise residential block and sin't affected by smoke, heat or fire, you'd tell them to stay where they are. If there's smoke coming into the flat, it is the next thing you do, to your way of understanding, you start by assessing whether there's a safe alternative escape route of them to leave? 19 A. If the smoke's coming inside the flat from outside, then you ask them to block the doors, and — you ask them to block the doors. 20 Q. If they were affected in any way by smoke? 21 Q. Right. 22 A. Yes, you would ask them to block the doors. 23 Q. If why were affected in any way by smoke? 24 A. Yes, you would ask them to block the doors. 25 Q. So where you have a caller who says, "There is smoke in the flat firm of the flat form outside, then you ask them to block the doors. 24 A. Yes, you would ask them to block the doors. 25 Q. So where you have a caller who says, "There is smoke in the flat in the flat in high-rises do know where their scape route? 1 my flat," at what point twould you begin to identify a safe alternative escape route? 2 a safe alternative escape route is because there's normally – they just go through their front door to the know where their escape route is because there's normally – they just go through their front door to the know where their escape route is because there's normally – they just go through their front door to the first question is: at what point in a call would you safe that exercise? 2 A. Yes, look in the flat in high-rises do know where their escape route is because there's normally – they just go through their front door to the first question is: at what point in a call would you safe that exercise? 3 A. Is thigh-rise; Is it within – is the flat in high-rises do kno	4	four principles by identifying the first one, a safe	4	Q. You say if there's fire inside their flat, I understand
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21 Q. Okay. So you got a caller who says, "I've got smoke in 21 A. When the caller tells you they can't get out, beca 22 my flat." My question to you is: would that then prompt 23 they're the ones that have got the visual and they			1	
my flat." My question to you is: would that then prompt 22 they're the ones that have got the visual and they	21		1	A. When the caller tells you they can't get out, because
	22		1	they're the ones that have got the visual and they are
	23		1	
24 out", or would you not assess the safe alternative 24 Q. So you are relying solely on the information given to	24		1	Q. So you are relying solely on the information given to
25 escape route? 25 you by the caller about whether they can get out?	25	escape route?	1	
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		_	
1	A. Yes.	1	details, would you collect I'm talking about FSG
2	Q. Does that mean you don't go through a process of saying,	2	calls specifically, so a call where a caller believes
3	"Well, come on, let's see how genuine this is. What's	3	they cannot escape details about the age or
4	the smoke like outside your flat? Can you actually see	4	disability, if any, of the caller?
5	the other side of the corridor?" Do you go through that	5	A. You can ask the caller. Normally, if they've got
6	kind of process or not?	6	a disability, the caller would normally give that
7	A. You rely on the information that the caller gives you.	7	information themselves.
8	Q. Would you normally get or expect to get updates from the	8	Q. So the answer is no, you wouldn't ask for it, you would
9	incident ground to help you make that assessment?	9	expect them to volunteer it?
10	A. We get informative messages from the incident ground.	10	A. Not always. You ask them how many people are inside the
11	Q. Nothing else?	11	property, you ask if there's any children. If
12	A. Not from each individual caller. We get informatives	12	a person's got a disability, they normally give that
13	from the incident ground.	13	information themselves.
14	Q. Looking at paragraph 4, "Prioritising calls", same page:	14	Q. If you turn the next page, please, in the policy, to
15	"4.1. Occasionally control receives multiple FSGs	15	paragraph 5.5. We can have that blown up:
16	at an incident. All FSGs received by control are	16	"5.5. Control will attempt to gather all the
17	treated with the same level of urgency, however, in	17	information on the Control Information Form (see
18	certain circumstances, the officer in charge of control	18	Appendix 2) and relay this information to the incident
19	may direct call handlers to terminate a call to answer	19	as and when it becomes available."
20	another."	20	I've asked lots of control room officers about the
21	First, have you ever had experience of being in the	21	control information form.
22	control room where the officer in charge of control	22	Have you ever used a control information form in the
23	directed call handlers to terminate a call to answer	23	control room?
24	another?	24	A. No.
25	A. Not previously to Grenfell, no.	25	Q. Do you know why it's never used, or you haven't used it?
	Page 193		Page 195
1	O. You're right. Previous to Grenfell, no.	1	A. I don't know the reason, but normally when you get
1 2	Q. You're right. Previous to Grenfell, no. Then same page, bottom of the page, paragraph 5,	1 2	A. I don't know the reason, but normally when you get a fire survival call, the last thing you want to do is
	Q. You're right. Previous to Grenfell, no.Then same page, bottom of the page, paragraph 5,"Information transfer to the incident":	2	a fire survival call, the last thing you want to do is
2	Then same page, bottom of the page, paragraph 5,		a fire survival call, the last thing you want to do is start looking for a form and start filling that in.
2 3	Then same page, bottom of the page, paragraph 5, "Information transfer to the incident": "5.1. As soon as control has confirmed that a FSG	2 3	a fire survival call, the last thing you want to do is start looking for a form and start filling that in.Q. You can see a list of bullet points of details: number
2 3 4	Then same page, bottom of the page, paragraph 5, "Information transfer to the incident": "5.1. As soon as control has confirmed that a FSG call is in progress they will contact the incident	2 3 4	a fire survival call, the last thing you want to do is start looking for a form and start filling that in. Q. You can see a list of bullet points of details: number of flat/house, number of persons involved, location of
2 3 4 5	Then same page, bottom of the page, paragraph 5, "Information transfer to the incident": "5.1. As soon as control has confirmed that a FSG call is in progress they will contact the incident ground and start to pass over the initial details. At	2 3 4 5	a fire survival call, the last thing you want to do is start looking for a form and start filling that in. Q. You can see a list of bullet points of details: number of flat/house, number of persons involved, location of caller, et cetera.
2 3 4 5 6	Then same page, bottom of the page, paragraph 5, "Information transfer to the incident": "5.1. As soon as control has confirmed that a FSG call is in progress they will contact the incident	2 3 4 5 6	a fire survival call, the last thing you want to do is start looking for a form and start filling that in. Q. You can see a list of bullet points of details: number of flat/house, number of persons involved, location of caller, et cetera. We're dealing with FSG calls, so the caller is
2 3 4 5 6 7	Then same page, bottom of the page, paragraph 5, "Information transfer to the incident": "5.1. As soon as control has confirmed that a FSG call is in progress they will contact the incident ground and start to pass over the initial details. At this stage it is likely to be basic information relating	2 3 4 5 6 7	a fire survival call, the last thing you want to do is start looking for a form and start filling that in. Q. You can see a list of bullet points of details: number of flat/house, number of persons involved, location of caller, et cetera. We're dealing with FSG calls, so the caller is trapped or believes they can't get out.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Then same page, bottom of the page, paragraph 5, "Information transfer to the incident": "5.1. As soon as control has confirmed that a FSG call is in progress they will contact the incident ground and start to pass over the initial details. At this stage it is likely to be basic information relating to the number of persons involved and their location	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	a fire survival call, the last thing you want to do is start looking for a form and start filling that in. Q. You can see a list of bullet points of details: number of flat/house, number of persons involved, location of caller, et cetera. We're dealing with FSG calls, so the caller is trapped or believes they can't get out. In your experience, would you expect to be able to
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	Then same page, bottom of the page, paragraph 5, "Information transfer to the incident": "5.1. As soon as control has confirmed that a FSG call is in progress they will contact the incident ground and start to pass over the initial details. At this stage it is likely to be basic information relating to the number of persons involved and their location within the property." That's what that says. In your experience, what would be the usual method that the control room would adopt for passing over	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	a fire survival call, the last thing you want to do is start looking for a form and start filling that in. Q. You can see a list of bullet points of details: number of flat/house, number of persons involved, location of caller, et cetera. We're dealing with FSG calls, so the caller is trapped or believes they can't get out. In your experience, would you expect to be able to get all of that information from the caller? A. Yes, you would try and hope that you would. Q. Then you'd pass that over to the incident ground, would
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Then same page, bottom of the page, paragraph 5, "Information transfer to the incident": "5.1. As soon as control has confirmed that a FSG call is in progress they will contact the incident ground and start to pass over the initial details. At this stage it is likely to be basic information relating to the number of persons involved and their location within the property." That's what that says. In your experience, what would be the usual method that the control room would adopt for passing over information to the incident ground? A. We would pass the information over via service request to the appliance on scene or the command unit on scene, and give the information to the fire ground. Q. You say service request; that's on the Vision log, is	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	a fire survival call, the last thing you want to do is start looking for a form and start filling that in. Q. You can see a list of bullet points of details: number of flat/house, number of persons involved, location of caller, et cetera. We're dealing with FSG calls, so the caller is trapped or believes they can't get out. In your experience, would you expect to be able to get all of that information from the caller? A. Yes, you would try and hope that you would. Q. Then you'd pass that over to the incident ground, would you? A. That's right. Q. And that'd be, what, through a service request through the Vision log? A. Service request, yes.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Then same page, bottom of the page, paragraph 5, "Information transfer to the incident": "5.1. As soon as control has confirmed that a FSG call is in progress they will contact the incident ground and start to pass over the initial details. At this stage it is likely to be basic information relating to the number of persons involved and their location within the property." That's what that says. In your experience, what would be the usual method that the control room would adopt for passing over information to the incident ground? A. We would pass the information over via service request to the appliance on scene or the command unit on scene, and give the information to the fire ground. Q. You say service request; that's on the Vision log, is it? A. On the Vision. Q. You say to the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	a fire survival call, the last thing you want to do is start looking for a form and start filling that in. Q. You can see a list of bullet points of details: number of flat/house, number of persons involved, location of caller, et cetera. We're dealing with FSG calls, so the caller is trapped or believes they can't get out. In your experience, would you expect to be able to get all of that information from the caller? A. Yes, you would try and hope that you would. Q. Then you'd pass that over to the incident ground, would you? A. That's right. Q. And that'd be, what, through a service request through the Vision log? A. Service request, yes. Q. Can I now turn to the night of the fire. We know you were based in the Stratford control room.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Then same page, bottom of the page, paragraph 5, "Information transfer to the incident": "5.1. As soon as control has confirmed that a FSG call is in progress they will contact the incident ground and start to pass over the initial details. At this stage it is likely to be basic information relating to the number of persons involved and their location within the property." That's what that says. In your experience, what would be the usual method that the control room would adopt for passing over information to the incident ground? A. We would pass the information over via service request to the appliance on scene or the command unit on scene, and give the information to the fire ground. Q. You say service request; that's on the Vision log, is it? A. On the Vision. Q. You say to the A. To the radio operator. The service request will go to the radio operator and the radio operator will pass the information to the fire ground. Q. I see, thank you. At that early stage when you're collecting initial	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	a fire survival call, the last thing you want to do is start looking for a form and start filling that in. Q. You can see a list of bullet points of details: number of flat/house, number of persons involved, location of caller, et cetera. We're dealing with FSG calls, so the caller is trapped or believes they can't get out. In your experience, would you expect to be able to get all of that information from the caller? A. Yes, you would try and hope that you would. Q. Then you'd pass that over to the incident ground, would you? A. That's right. Q. And that'd be, what, through a service request through the Vision log? A. Service request, yes. Q. Can I now turn to the night of the fire. We know you were based in the Stratford control room. You were seated well, let's see if we can do this by a picture. Can I ask for the witness, please, to be shown LFB00004790, page 175. That is a photograph of the Stratford control room, Ms Fox. Can you just help us, where were you sitting on
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Then same page, bottom of the page, paragraph 5, "Information transfer to the incident": "5.1. As soon as control has confirmed that a FSG call is in progress they will contact the incident ground and start to pass over the initial details. At this stage it is likely to be basic information relating to the number of persons involved and their location within the property." That's what that says. In your experience, what would be the usual method that the control room would adopt for passing over information to the incident ground? A. We would pass the information over via service request to the appliance on scene or the command unit on scene, and give the information to the fire ground. Q. You say service request; that's on the Vision log, is it? A. On the Vision. Q. You say to the A. To the radio operator. The service request will go to the radio operator and the radio operator will pass the information to the fire ground. Q. I see, thank you.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	a fire survival call, the last thing you want to do is start looking for a form and start filling that in. Q. You can see a list of bullet points of details: number of flat/house, number of persons involved, location of caller, et cetera. We're dealing with FSG calls, so the caller is trapped or believes they can't get out. In your experience, would you expect to be able to get all of that information from the caller? A. Yes, you would try and hope that you would. Q. Then you'd pass that over to the incident ground, would you? A. That's right. Q. And that'd be, what, through a service request through the Vision log? A. Service request, yes. Q. Can I now turn to the night of the fire. We know you were based in the Stratford control room. You were seated well, let's see if we can do this by a picture. Can I ask for the witness, please, to be shown LFB00004790, page 175. That is a photograph of the Stratford control room,

1	the night of the Grenfell Tower fire?	1 2	a break with Angie Gotts at about 1 o'clock, and within	
2	A. I was sitting in the far corner.		20 minutes you were told by Peter May to come back into	
3	Q. You're pointing at your monitor	3 4	the room. I'm summarising what you say there.	
4	A. Oh, sorry, do you want me to stand up?		The first record of a call taken by you was at	
5			01.25.12. That's page 15 of the control room report,	
6	, and the second		LFB00004790. If we can just have that up on the screen,	
7	A. Sorry, I was sitting over here (Indicates).	7	page 15.	
8	Q. So the little red dot is hovering over a screen right in	8	Do you see, 01.25.12?	
9	the far corner. Okay. So you're the other side of the	9	A. Mm-hm.	
10	OM and AOM?	10	Q. It's a simple question, I think: does that sound about	
11	A. Yes, the OM and AOMs are there and I was there	11	right to you as the time at which you took your first	
12	(Indicates).	12	call?	
13	Q. Who was sitting next to you?	13	A. Yes.	
14	A. Nobody.	14	Q. I am going to ask one or two specific questions about	
15	Q. You were on your own?	15	some calls.	
16	A. Yes.	16	Before I do that, can I just ask you, when you	
17	Q. Who was the nearest other control room operator?	17	started to take calls, how did you go about recording	
18	A. I believe Pete Duddy was sitting I think he was	18	the information that you were getting?	
19	sitting here (Indicates).	19	A. On the Vision system.	
20	Q. The witness is pointing to the left-hand arrow in the	20	Q. Does that mean that that then went to Sharon Darby on	
21	pair of arrows on the left of the photograph.	21	the radio and she passed it to the incident ground?	
22	A. There (Indicates).	22	A. To take the call, we took the call on the Vision system.	
23	Q. There, right.	23	If we gave a message to Sharon, it would've been via the	
24	A. And the whiteboard went here.	24	service request on the Vision system.	
25	Q. The whiteboard was behind him.	25	Q. Do you remember that at one point there was an officer	
	Page 197		Page 199	
1	So there was a bank of screens there at the back of	1	who came into the control room and set up a whiteboard?	
2	the room. Was there nobody but you sitting there?	2	A. Yes, that was officer of the day, Jason Oliff.	
3	A. No, just me.	3	Q. How long roughly after you started taking calls do you	
4	Q. So a lonely pitch. Okay, right.	4	think he did that?	
5	We've been told where the television was. I think	5	A. I don't know.	
6	it was on the back wall is this right? behind the	6	Q. When he did that, what did you understand the purpose of	
7	OM and AOM. I think you say that you couldn't see if it	7	the whiteboard system to be?	
8	was on and off.	8	A. He was putting the flat numbers up, the people inside	
9	A. No, I couldn't see where I was sitting.	9	the flats.	
10	Q. Was there any point during the night when you thought it	10	Q. Was that replacing the usual system of radio operators	
11	would be useful to see the images that might have been	11	passing information to the incident ground or was it	
12	on the news, on the television?	12	an additional method of communication?	
13	A. I think we were all too busy to look and see the images.	13	A. It was an additional method, but it's also a visual	
14	Q. Are you aware or were you aware that there should have	14	method so we could see it in the control room.	
15	been images available to the control room from the	15	Q. You come back into the control room, you take your first	
16	heli-tele downlink?	16	call.	
17	A. It doesn't work.	17	What information at that point did you have about	
18	Q. It didn't work?	18	what was happening?	
19	A. No.	19	A. Well, when Peter May knocked on the door at Angie and I,	
20	Q. Would it have been helpful to have that working?	20	he said it's a 10-pump fire, so we walked into the room	
21	A. Again, we were so busy, I don't think we would've had	21	and and a 10-pump fire.	
22	time to actually have looked at it and seen it.	22	Q. After you'd sat down, do you remember hearing the	
23	Q. You say in your statement this is page 4, third	23	make-ups: 10 and then 15 and then 20?	
24	paragraph, second line that you and I'll	24	A. I think I remember the 20, but after that, the only one	
25	summarise on the night of the incident, you went on	25	I remember was the 40.	
			B 40:	
	Page 198		Page 200	
			50 (Pages 197 to 200)	

1	Q. So you don't remember it going 25 at 01.31?	1	A. I can't remember what I was thinking at the time.
2	A. No.	2	Q. Did you tell anyone in the control room that there were
3	Q. Was this increase in make-ups that you'd come into	3	reports of smoke and fire on the 12th floor at this
4	something you'd ever experienced before?		point?
5	5 A. Not at that fast pace.		A. Everybody in the control room was inundated with fire
6	6 Q. What did that fast pace tell you about the way this fire		calls. I believe I wrote the number down on a piece of
7	was behaving?	7	paper.
8	A. I didn't know how the fire was behaving, but it told me	8	Q. Is there a reason why, given the information you had,
9	that it was going to be a big job.	9	you didn't advise the caller to leave or check whether
10	Q. A big job in what sense?	10	it was safe for them to leave and help them with that?
11	A. Well, a major fire.	11	A. Again, I can't remember. I took so many calls that
12	Q. I just want to ask you about two or three calls before	12	night, I cannot remember that one.
13	the stay-put advice changed.	13	Q. Do you remember making some kind of assessment as to
14	First of all, can I ask you, please, to look at the	14	whether this caller was actually trapped in their flat
15	control room report, page 17. This is 01.26.58.	15	or whether, in fact, they could leave?
16	This a call from flat 95, towards the bottom of the	16	A. I don't know. I'd have to listen to the tape again.
17	page:	17	Q. Would you classify this call as an FSG call?
18	"01:26:58. CRO Fox takes a call from a female	18	I appreciate I've only shown you a summary, but on this
19	reporting a fire in Grenfell Tower. The caller explains	19	information, would you call this an FSG call, to your
20	that she is on the 12th floor and asks for some advice	20	way of understanding?
21	on what to do. CRO Fox clarifies the address and the	21	A. Possibly.
22	caller explains that she can see the fire through the	22	Q. What makes you unsure?
23	window and reports that her neighbour says that the fire	23	A. Again, I would have to listen to the tape or listen to
24	is in her kitchen already. The caller says that smoke	24	the caller and clarify exactly what was happening. And
25	is coming from the main door and CRO Fox advises her to	25	maybe I didn't ask her enough questions at that time.
23	is coming from the main door and CRO Fox advises her to	23	maybe I thun t ask her chough questions at that time.
	Page 201		Page 203
1	put wet towels down to stop the smoke. There is some	1	Q. We can look at the transcript, if it helps you. This is
2	audible confusion regarding whether the towels should be	2	LFB00000309. Let's do that. Let's go to page 2.
3	wet or dry and CRO Fox then confirms the location and	3	It starts:
4	flat number as flat 95. CRO Fox states that she will	4	"CALLER: Yes, hi, good evening. I'm calling from the
5	pass on the information to the crews."	5	Grenfell Tower
6	The call lasts 2 minutes and 10 seconds.	6	"OPERATOR: Yeah.
7	We can see that the call is from the 12th floor, and	7	"CALLER: We do having the fire in the building,
8	you're told that there is fire coming through the	8	we're living on the 12th floor."
9	window, she can see fire through the window, and that	9	You establish the address.
10	there is a fire in her neighbour's kitchen, that is what	10	At the foot of the page, you're told:
11	is said here in the summary, and also smoke coming	11	"CALLER: Yes, but I need to know — I've got a
12	through the caller's main door.	12	(inaudible) because I heard that it's the floors below
13	With all of that information, what did that tell you	13	(inaudible) next door. My neighbour she's saying the
14	about where the fire was and how can it was behaving, at	14	fire in her kitchen already. I have two kids, we really
15	this point, 01.26?	15	don't know what to do.
16	A. Well, I believed the fire was still on the 4th floor,	16	"OPERATOR: Yeah. Have you got any smoke coming into
17	but obviously she's saying that there is smoke on the	17	your property?
18	12th floor.	18	"CALLER: Yes, it's coming through the floor — from
19	Q. But she's also saying that her neighbour is saying that	19	our main door because it's outside."
20	the fire is in her kitchen already. So why did you	20	Then you explore putting sheets or towels down to
21	think that the fire was or was still on the 4th floor?	21	stop the smoke coming in.
22	A. I don't know, I can't remember.	22	Then there's more discussion about which flat number
23	Q. Did it occur to you that this fire had obviously started	23	and floor number it is, and then you say, two-thirds of
24	on the 4th floor but had spread enormously and was now	24	the way down:
25	on the 12th. Was that a thought you had at the time?	25	"OPERATOR: Okay then, I'll tell them on the radio.
	D 202		P 204
	Page 202		Page 204

1	And you're flat 95 on the 12th floor.	1	"OPERATOR: Just — yeah, just —		
2	"CALLER: Okay, thank you.	2	2 "CALLER: You can't see a hand in front of ya.		
3	"OPERATOR: Okay.	3	"OPERATOR: Listen. Just make sure that you put some,		
4	4 "CALLER: It's it[sic] the normal the towels or the		erm, towels and things down to stop the smoke coming in,		
5			okay?		
6	6 "OPERATOR: Sorry I can't, sorry I can't hear you.		"CALLER: All right then, darling. Thank you.		
7	"CALLER: Is it the normal towels or the wet towels?	7	"OPERATOR: All right then. Thank you for your call.		
8			"CALLER: I'll tell all the rest, all right.		
9	Grenfell Towers.	9	"OPERATOR: Okay then, all right.		
10	"CALLER: No, no, no, we're on the floor 12th, 12th.	10	"CALLER: Thank you. Bye.		
11	"OPERATOR: Yeah, but I'm telling you — listen, I'm	11	"OPERATOR: (overspeaking)		
12	just telling you where the actual fire is, okay, so it's	12	"CALLER: 22nd, yeah. Thank you, bye.		
13	flat 16.	13	"OPERATOR: 22nd. Thank you."		
14	"CALLER: It's (inaudible) 16 but it already came to	14	It's a short call.		
15	12th. She's saying that — she's telling that she was	15	What I want to focus on is he says the conditions		
16	shouting that she's having the fire in the kitchen —	16	are terrible and you can't see your hand in front of		
17	"OPERATOR: Yeah, that's right and the fire brigade	17	you.		
18	are on the scene, okay?	18	You don't ask him whether there's fire in his flat.		
19	"CALLER: Okay.	19	Why is that?		
20	"OPERATOR: Okay, all right then."	20	A. Because normally the caller would turn around and tell		
21	And the call then ends.	21	me that there is a fire inside his flat.		
22	So that's the totality of the call I've shown you,	22	Q. Again, was there a reason why you didn't go through the		
23	admittedly at some speed, Ms Fox.	23	assessment with him to see whether he could safely		
24	But my question is: would you classify this as	24	leave?		
25	an FSG call, a fire survival guidance call?	25	A. Probably the amount of calls that we're receiving on the		
	Page 205		Page 207		
1	A. It would've been an FSG call, yes.	1	night. We had to be aware that there was numerous calls		
2	· •	1	ingit. We had to be aware that there was numerous cans		
	O My question is: what do you got from that information to	2	coming in and we had to deal with everybody and try and		
	Q. My question is: what do you get from that information to	2 3	coming in, and we had to deal with everybody and try and		
3	lead you to think that the caller was trapped and	3	speak to everybody. But also we were looking after the		
3 4	lead you to think that the caller was trapped and couldn't leave their flat?	3 4	speak to everybody. But also we were looking after the rest of London, and there could've been a major fire or		
3 4 5	lead you to think that the caller was trapped and couldn't leave their flat? A. Because she was saying that she's having a fire in the	3 4 5	speak to everybody. But also we were looking after the rest of London, and there could've been a major fire or a house fire somewhere in the south of London again that		
3 4 5 6	lead you to think that the caller was trapped and couldn't leave their flat?A. Because she was saying that she's having a fire in the kitchen.	3 4 5 6	speak to everybody. But also we were looking after the rest of London, and there could've been a major fire or a house fire somewhere in the south of London again that we didn't know that was within them calls.		
3 4 5 6 7	lead you to think that the caller was trapped and couldn't leave their flat? A. Because she was saying that she's having a fire in the kitchen. Q. That's next door.	3 4 5 6 7	speak to everybody. But also we were looking after the rest of London, and there could've been a major fire or a house fire somewhere in the south of London again that we didn't know that was within them calls. Q. Another call, this is flat 205, 23rd floor, 01.38.16.		
3 4 5 6 7 8	lead you to think that the caller was trapped and couldn't leave their flat? A. Because she was saying that she's having a fire in the kitchen. Q. That's next door. A. Sorry, I've misunderstood it. She's getting smoke	3 4 5 6 7 8	speak to everybody. But also we were looking after the rest of London, and there could've been a major fire or a house fire somewhere in the south of London again that we didn't know that was within them calls. Q. Another call, this is flat 205, 23rd floor, 01.38.16. LFB00000317.		
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	lead you to think that the caller was trapped and couldn't leave their flat? A. Because she was saying that she's having a fire in the kitchen. Q. That's next door. A. Sorry, I've misunderstood it. She's getting smoke inside the property, so I would've told her to put the	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	speak to everybody. But also we were looking after the rest of London, and there could've been a major fire or a house fire somewhere in the south of London again that we didn't know that was within them calls. Q. Another call, this is flat 205, 23rd floor, 01.38.16. LFB00000317. We believe this is Mariem Elgwahry, who had		
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 lead you to think that the caller was trapped and couldn't leave their flat? A. Because she was saying that she's having a fire in the kitchen. Q. That's next door. A. Sorry, I've misunderstood it. She's getting smoke inside the property, so I would've told her to put the wet towels down. There's a couple of points on there 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	speak to everybody. But also we were looking after the rest of London, and there could've been a major fire or a house fire somewhere in the south of London again that we didn't know that was within them calls. Q. Another call, this is flat 205, 23rd floor, 01.38.16. LFB00000317. We believe this is Mariem Elgwahry, who had originated from flat 196 but was now in flat 205 on the		
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 lead you to think that the caller was trapped and couldn't leave their flat? A. Because she was saying that she's having a fire in the kitchen. Q. That's next door. A. Sorry, I've misunderstood it. She's getting smoke inside the property, so I would've told her to put the wet towels down. There's a couple of points on there where it says it's inaudible. 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	speak to everybody. But also we were looking after the rest of London, and there could've been a major fire or a house fire somewhere in the south of London again that we didn't know that was within them calls. Q. Another call, this is flat 205, 23rd floor, 01.38.16. LFB00000317. We believe this is Mariem Elgwahry, who had		
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1	Next page, please:	1	MR MILLETT: I'm grateful to everybody. Thank you.
2	"OPERATOR: There's no smoke or anything coming into	2	Can I ask you to look at your witness statement,
3	the property (Overspeaking)	3	page 4, bottom paragraph, please.
4	4 "CALLER: There's nothing yet, there's nothing yet		You say there:
5	5 "OPERATOR: Right. Okay (Overspeaking)		"Initially, the advice was given to remain inside
6			the building until my OM, Alex NORMAN, informed me that
7	there was no smoke in there. It was absolutely fine,	7	the advice had changed and she said to me 'tell them to
8	but then all of a sudden the flames just blew into our	8	get out'. I remember hearing about there being problems
9	kitchen"	9	with the stairwell and I remember one operational staff
10	Just on what she's telling you there, did that tell	10	member saying to me, 'we aren't going to get to them'."
11	you that at this point this is 01.38 the fire had	11	Do you remember, first of all, even roughly, what
12	by now spread from the 4th floor to the 22nd floor,	12	time this was?
13	which is where she'd come up from?	13	A. No, I had no idea of time. It was a complete blur.
14	A. She was telling me there was smoke on the 22nd floor.	14	Q. Do you remember exactly what she said to you by way of
15	Q. Well, she's	15	advice?
16	A. Then sorry, I'm just reading.	16	A. As my statement said, to tell them to get out.
17	Q. I'm so sorry.	17	Q. "Tell them to get out", that's your clearest memory of
18	(Pause)	18	her exact words, is it?
19	A. Yes, but the crews are on scene and I believed that they	19	A. Yes.
20	were going up and checking every floor at that time.	20	Q. Did she give you any indication as to how to get that
21	Q. Did this information tell you that whatever else had	21	across to callers, what terms to use, what tone to use?
22	happened before that, by now the fire had definitely	22	A. No, she just advised us to tell them to get out.
23	spread from the 4th floor and was attacking the	23	Q. Was it your understanding that that advice, "Tell them
24	22nd floor?	24	to get out", had to be absolutely clear, this was a life
25	A. From reading that information, yes.	25	and death choice?
	The Front Fedding that information, yes	20	and death onese.
	Page 209		Page 211
1	O Did you tell anybody in the control room, such as	1	A She didn't say it was a life and death ahaige but to
1	Q. Did you tell anybody in the control room, such as	1	A. She didn't say it was a life and death choice, but to
2	Debbie Real, at that point, that the fire had now	2	tell them to get out, obviously it was.
2 3	Debbie Real, at that point, that the fire had now definitely spread to the topmost part of the building?	2 3	tell them to get out, obviously it was. Q. Was that your understanding, that it was?
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		Т		
1	Q. I just want to look at one or two of the calls that you	1	get yourself out of your property safely?	
2	received or took around this time.	2	"CALLER: No we can't, we opened it and (inaudible),	
3	First of all, flat 182, 21st floor.	3	we can't.	
4	There's a transcript reference LFB00000374.	4	"OPERATOR: You can't.	
5	We can see the time of the call is 02.43.54, and if		"CALLER: I tried but we can't, we are trapped in the	
	you go to the first page, you can see you establish	5 6		
6	the flat number and the floor number and the number of		bedroom.	
7		7	"OPERATOR: They're in the bedroom?	
8	people in the flat:	8	"CALLER: Yeah. What are you waiting for? We are	
9	"CALLER: There's five of us. Hurry up!	9	dying."	
10	"	10	Then there's an off-call conversation.	
11	"CALLER: Two adults, three children."	11	Do you remember who you might have been talking to	
12	Then the next page, you say:	12	in the control room during that call?	
13	"OPERATOR: Okay, are you able to — listen, are you	13	A. No. No, I don't remember.	
14	able to get yourself out of the property safely?	14	Q. Do you remember having assistance from Debbie Real or	
15	"CALLER: No.	15	Jo Smith at this stage?	
16	"OPERATOR: No, okay. Right, what you need to do is	16	A. I don't remember.	
17	you need to get some damp towels or damp sheets and put	17	Q. This is about 02.45.	
18	them over yourself as well. Hello? Hello?"	18	A. I don't remember.	
19	I think the call ends at that point.	19	Q. Do you remember getting any assistance during the night	
20	It's not a very long call, and perhaps we can't do	20	with calls from senior operations managers within the	
21	it off this, but you're asking: can you get out safely?	21	control room?	
22	Do you think this call was before or after you had been	22	A. No, because they were too busy dealing with other	
23	told by Debbie Real to tell callers to get out, looking	23	Q. Right. So if you didn't get assistance from operations	
24	at the terms of the advice you're giving here?	24	managers, who would you have been talking to?	
25	A. I can't remember, to be precise. But if Alex Norman	25	A. I don't know, I can't remember.	
	Page 213		Page 215	

1	came round and told us to tell them to get out, then it	1	Q. Okay.	
2	would've been afterwards.	2	It goes on to say:	
3	Q. Is there a reason why you didn't say to these callers,	3	"OPERATOR: Yeah, I've been telling them.	
4	"You have to leave, come what may, get yourself out	4	"CALLER: (inaudible).	
5	now"?	5	"OPERATOR: Right, hello?	
6	A. Well, I think the line cleared, by looking at that.	6	"CALLER: Yeah?	
7	Q. Right.	7	"OPERATOR: Yeah, what you need to do is you need to	
8	A. Because I'm asking them, "Hello? Hello?" and then the	8	get out of the property now, you need to get out.	
9	line is cleared before I can ask them any further	9	"CALLER: We can't!	
10	information.	10	"OPERATOR: You have to try and get out, you have to	
11	Q. There's another call I'll show you, flat 192,	11	try and you need to get some towels around your head and	
12	22nd floor, at 02.42.22. So this is the next call that	12	faces and your body and you need to try and leave the	
13	you take, or shortly after.	13	property because the firemen are there, okay. So you	
14	This is LFB00000378, if we can just look at that.	14	need to try and leave —"	
15	It starts on page 2, if we can just have that,	15	Just pick this up at the next page:	
16	please:	16	"CALLER: Where are they?	
10			ž	
17	"OPERATOR: Fire brigade. Hello? Fire brigade.	17	"OPERATOR: They're on different floors so you need	
	•		"OPERATOR: They're on different floors so you need to try and make out safely."	
17	"OPERATOR: Fire brigade. Hello? Fire brigade.	17	to try and make out safely."	
17 18	"OPERATOR: Fire brigade. Hello? Fire brigade. "CALLER: We are on the 22nd floor, we are dying	17 18	to try and make out safely." Looking at that, do you think this call was after	
17 18 19 20	"OPERATOR: Fire brigade. Hello? Fire brigade. "CALLER: We are on the 22nd floor, we are dying (inaudible). "OPERATOR: 22nd? Yeah, what floor are you on?	17 18 19 20	to try and make out safely." Looking at that, do you think this call was after Debbie Real had told you the new advice, looking at the	
17 18 19 20 21	"OPERATOR: Fire brigade. Hello? Fire brigade. "CALLER: We are on the 22nd floor, we are dying (inaudible). "OPERATOR: 22nd? Yeah, what floor are you on? "CALLER: 22nd floor."	17 18 19 20 21	to try and make out safely." Looking at that, do you think this call was after Debbie Real had told you the new advice, looking at the terms of the advice you're giving?	
17 18 19 20 21 22	"OPERATOR: Fire brigade. Hello? Fire brigade. "CALLER: We are on the 22nd floor, we are dying (inaudible). "OPERATOR: 22nd? Yeah, what floor are you on? "CALLER: 22nd floor." It carries on.	17 18 19 20 21 22	to try and make out safely." Looking at that, do you think this call was after Debbie Real had told you the new advice, looking at the terms of the advice you're giving? A. Yes, because I'm telling them to get out.	
17 18 19 20 21 22 23	"OPERATOR: Fire brigade. Hello? Fire brigade. "CALLER: We are on the 22nd floor, we are dying (inaudible). "OPERATOR: 22nd? Yeah, what floor are you on? "CALLER: 22nd floor." It carries on. At the foot of the page, after going through who is	17 18 19 20 21 22 23	to try and make out safely." Looking at that, do you think this call was after Debbie Real had told you the new advice, looking at the terms of the advice you're giving? A. Yes, because I'm telling them to get out. Q. If you go to the next page, you're told the only place	
17 18 19 20 21 22	"OPERATOR: Fire brigade. Hello? Fire brigade. "CALLER: We are on the 22nd floor, we are dying (inaudible). "OPERATOR: 22nd? Yeah, what floor are you on? "CALLER: 22nd floor." It carries on. At the foot of the page, after going through who is in the flat, you say:	17 18 19 20 21 22	to try and make out safely." Looking at that, do you think this call was after Debbie Real had told you the new advice, looking at the terms of the advice you're giving? A. Yes, because I'm telling them to get out. Q. If you go to the next page, you're told the only place that they can go is the window because the corridor is	
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	"OPERATOR: Fire brigade. Hello? Fire brigade. "CALLER: We are on the 22nd floor, we are dying (inaudible). "OPERATOR: 22nd? Yeah, what floor are you on? "CALLER: 22nd floor." It carries on. At the foot of the page, after going through who is in the flat, you say: "OPERATOR: Okay. Now, listen to me, are you able to	17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	to try and make out safely." Looking at that, do you think this call was after Debbie Real had told you the new advice, looking at the terms of the advice you're giving? A. Yes, because I'm telling them to get out. Q. If you go to the next page, you're told the only place that they can go is the window because the corridor is already full of smoke.	
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	"OPERATOR: Fire brigade. Hello? Fire brigade. "CALLER: We are on the 22nd floor, we are dying (inaudible). "OPERATOR: 22nd? Yeah, what floor are you on? "CALLER: 22nd floor." It carries on. At the foot of the page, after going through who is in the flat, you say:	17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	to try and make out safely." Looking at that, do you think this call was after Debbie Real had told you the new advice, looking at the terms of the advice you're giving? A. Yes, because I'm telling them to get out. Q. If you go to the next page, you're told the only place that they can go is the window because the corridor is	

1	It continues in that vein. Essentially you're	1	were giving?
2	telling them to leave and they say they can't.	2	A. I don't think so because we were giving everybody the
3	If we just go to the next page, I think we can see	3	advice that was appropriate at the time.
4	that more clearly perhaps we can't and the call	4	Q. Different question, different topic.
5	then ends.	5	If you had known on the night that many callers were
6	My question is: is there a reason why you didn't	6	calling from flats or about flats which had front doors
7	stay on the call and try and guide them out?	7	with no functioning automatic door-closers, would that
8	A. There's no reason, but maybe at the time I couldn't stay	8	have affected the advice that you were giving?
9	on every call, or maybe they weren't listening to me.	9	A. No, we would have given the same advice.
10	Not all the callers were listening to us. We can only	10	MR MILLETT: Okay.
11	give a guidance and we can only advise the caller.	11	Ms Fox, thank you very much for your patience. I've
12	They're the ones there on scene. We can only do our	12	come to the end for the time being of the questions that
13	best to guide the caller and give them advice to get out	13	I have for you.
14	of the property. But not all callers were listening to	14	Normally what we do is take a short break and
15	us.	15	I check my notes and see if there are any further
16	Q. No, I understand that.	16	questions that we have.
17	Were you conscious during this call, or perhaps	17	So, Mr Chairman, might we be able to do that?
18	other calls, that the callers you were speaking to were	18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. We'll have a 5-minute break so
19	individuals for whom English was not their first	19	that counsel can do any sweeping-up that needs to be
20	language?	20	done.
21	A. There was a lot of callers I spoke to that English	21	Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence
22	wasn't their first language. Some of them may have had	22	while you're out of the room, and if you would like to
23	problems understanding what we were saying.	23	go with the usher she'll look after you, all right?
24	Q. Did you take any kind of steps to try to help them	24	We'll come back at 4.45.
25	understand what you were saying?	25	Thank you very much.
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	1 agc 217	-	1 agc 217
1	A. You always take steps for you to help them. That's what	1	Mr Millett, I'll say 4.45, but if you are ready
2	we do: we save life. We always try and help everybody.	2	sooner, I'll get the usher to bring me back.
3	It doesn't matter what language they are or nationality.	3	MR MILLETT: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
4	Q. Can you help me identify what those steps are. If you	4	(4.40 pm)
5	are talking to someone for whom English isn't their	5	(A short break)
6	first language, how would you go about helping them to	6	(4.45 pm)
7	understand you?	7	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Ms Fox, I think one or
8	A. You would maybe speak to them a bit slower, you would	8	two more questions. Not, I hope, too many.
9	maybe try and emphasise your words a bit more. Again,	9	THE WITNESS: Okay, thank you.
10	every call is different, but you try and help every	10	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.
11	caller.	11	MR MILLETT: Ms Fox, there are a few further questions, but
12	Q. Do you think you did that?	12	I hope not to detain you for very much longer.
13	A. On the night, I believe we all done that. We all tried	13	Thank you very much for coming back for this last
14	our best.	14	innings.
15	Q. Going back to your statement on page 5, the fifth	15	The first is a call at 02.54.21. I'm going to ask
16	paragraph from the top, the middle of the page, you say:	16	you short questions about very specific calls for
17	"At around 05.00 hours, was the first I saw Grenfell	17	certain families.
18	Tower was on Sky news."	18	This is LFB00000549, but the best place to pick it
19	What did you see?	19	up is page 108 of the control room report, if we can.
20	A. It was a bit of a shock; it was a high-rise building	20	Oh, well, we have this transcript now. It probably
21	that was literally on fire.	21	takes longer to go through it. Perhaps it doesn't
22	Q. Do you remember who showed you that image?	22	matter, we'll use the transcript:
23	A. No, I can't remember.	23	"OPERATOR: Navigator, hello.
24	Q. Do you think if you'd seen that image earlier on it	24	"NAVIGATOR: What's the name of the block?
25	would've assisted you in terms of the advice that you	25	"OPERATOR: Navigator, hello, can I help -"
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1	First of all, what's "Navigator"? That wasn't	1	A. I can't remember that call, and as I said to you before,	
2	a question I prepared to ask you, but I'm curious.		the time was a complete blur. I don't know what time	
3	A. I haven't got a clue.	3	they told us to get them out. All I know is Alex was in	
4	Q. All right:		front of me and she told them to get out. I can't tell	
5	5 "NAVIGATOR: Yeah, it's regarding a fire at Grenfell		you what time it was.	
6	House. I'm handing you over to someone who knows	6	Q. When you were told that this caller was in flat 194 on	
7	someone that trapped inside."	7	the 22nd floor, did you refer to the whiteboard during	
8	Does that help us identify "Navigator"?	8	this call for someone matching that flat number and	
9	A. I'm sorry, I'm not familiar with that. My mind has gone	9	floor?	
10	blank, I'm sorry.	10	A. No, I didn't refer to the whiteboard because it would've	
11	Q. Don't worry. Let's pick it up.	11	been too busy. I know Yvonne was taking our slips of	
12	You say:	12	paper and giving it to Jason Oliff, who was updating the	
13	"OPERATOR: Navigator, can I help you please?	13	whiteboard.	
14	"CALLER: Yeah, my friend's stuck on the 22nd floor	14	Q. Did you write down the details of this on a piece of	
15	of the building that's on fire.	15	paper and give it to Jason Oliff at that point, do you	
16	"OPERATOR: 22nd floor, okay -	16	think?	
17	"CALLER: Yeah, 194.	17	A. I could've done, but I took so many calls that night,	
18	"OPERATOR: - what's her number?	18	I can't remember that particular one.	
19	"CALLER: 194. I can watch him looking out the	19	Q. Okay.	
20	window and the fire's all around him.	20	Can I ask you to be shown LFB00000419, which is	
21	"OPERATOR: Yeah, I, I know. And how many people are	21	a call from flat 142.	
22	stuck inside there (Inaudible)?	22	You can see the time of this, 03.18. If we just go	
23	"CALLER: It is just there just him, him there.	23	back to the first page so that it's clear, please,	
24	"OPERATOR: Right, what we're doing is we're - well,	24	Ralph. 03.18.45. So this is long after, I think we've	
25	(Inaudible) - why isn't he ringing - he needs to ring	25	established, the stay-put advice had changed.	
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1	999, that's what he needs to do -	1	Can I go to the first page of that transcript,	
2	"CALLER: I ca Er, cos -	2	please.	
3	"OPERATOR: - speak to (Inaudible).	3	You're told the address, 142, and you say a third of	
4	"CALLER: - my battery's died. I can't get through	4	the way down:	
5	to him. My battery's died. I don't know his number.	5	"OPERATOR: You need to try and get yourself out of	
6	"OPERATOR: Right, okay. Well, we're asking people	6	the property.	
7	to leave their properties but I tell them -"	7	"CALLER: (inaudible) but it's too (inaudible) it's	
8	Then it goes on like that.	8	too hot, like, outside that door. Please."	
9	If you just turn the page, I think we'll see the	9	Five people inside.	
10	call end:	10	Then if you turn the page, there's some discussion,	
11	"OPERATOR: All right. I'm gonna -	11	and then in the middle of the page, you say:	
12	"CALLER: - thank you.	12	"OPERATOR: So you've got five adults and you're not	
13	"OPERATOR: - tell them on the radio though -	13	able to get yourself outside?	
14	"CALLER: All right.	14	"CALLER: No, there's two elderly people.	
15	"OPERATOR: - don't worry. I'm gonna -	15	"OPERATOR: And you're at flat 143, 17th floor.	
16	"CALLER: Okay.	16	"CALLER: 142, 142, 142.	
17	"OPERATOR: - I'm gonna tell them on the radio -"	17	"OPERATOR: 142.	
18	This is at 02.54.21.	18	"CALLER: 2, 2, 2.	
19	I think you were saying earlier in that call that	19	"OPERATOR: Okay. I'm, I'm going to tell them on the	
20	you were telling people to leave, so can we be clear	20	radio, okay?	
21	that this was after Debbie Real had told you to change	21	"CALLER: Please, come, there's elderly people here,	
22	the advice to get out?	22	please.	
23	A. It wasn't Debbie Real; it was Alex that came round to	23	"OPERATOR: All right, thank you. Bye bye."	
24	change the advice.	24	And the call ends.	
25	Q. But in timing terms	25	To be fair to you, you are told there are elderly	
	D 222			
	Page 222		Page 224	
			56 (Pages 221 to 224)	

		Т	
1	people, but given now that you have been told clearly by	1	When a caller tells you they are affected by smoke,
2	this time that the advice has to be that they must get	2	was it your understanding that at that point you would
3	out, is there any reason why you didn't tell this caller	3	start to assess the safety of means of escape, or would
4	that they must leave, come what may?	4	you leave that until later?
5	A. I can't remember that call, but I'm sure I would've told	5	A. No, we would assess the means of escape, and ask them to
6	them to get out. Maybe they weren't listening to me.	6	block the doors and stop the smoke coming in.
7	I can't remember that call.	7	Q. Right.
8	Q. There is a call earlier in the evening we can do	8	A. And then I would pass that information onto the radio or
9	this, I think, by reference to the control room	9	the command unit.
10	report different flat, and this is page 39 and 40 of	10	Q. So the question is: given that you were told on this
11	the control room report.	11	call that there was smoke coming in, why didn't you
12	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Do you have the number, Mr Millett?	12	start with the caller to assess the safety of the means
13	MR MILLETT: It's 02.08.48. It's page 67.	13	of escape?
14	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Have you got the document reference?	14	A. Maybe because of the number of calls coming in. I can't
15	MR MILLETT: LFB00004790, yes, the control room report.	15	answer that question. I can't remember the night.
16	"02:08:48. CRO Fox takes a call from a female	16	Q. There's another call along the same lines, 02.11.42,
17	caller who explains that she is in Grenfell Tower and	17	which I won't ask you about and I can't actually find on
18	there is a fire on the floor below them, the caller is	18	the control report.
19	in Flat 175 on the 20th floor. CRO Fox asks how many	19	We have a call, as we know, which you handled for
20	people there are in the flat and the caller replies that	20	some 33 minutes with Marcio Gomes on the 21st floor,
21	there is her, her husband and three kids, one baby. CRO	21	which started at 03.25, and we've been through that with
22	Fox confirms this and states that she is passing all the	22	Mr Gomes. I'm certainly not going to ask you any
23	details on to our command unit that is on scene. The	23	details about that call, Ms Fox. I just want to ask you
24	caller says [this is the important part] there is smoke	24	one question.
25	coming into the flat and CRO Fox provides FSG about	25	Can you tell us why you stayed on the call with
	Page 225		Page 227
	1 age 223	-	1 age 227
1	blocking the doors to keep the smoke out and the caller	1	Mr Gomes from 03.25 but didn't stay on any FSG calls
2	advises she has already done that. CRO Fox confirms	2	with any other callers prior to that time to assist them
3	that she has passed on the information to the crews to	3	out of the building?
4	come and get them and tells the caller to call back if	4	A. Again, I cannot answer that. It was very alien to all
5	she needs to."	5	of us in the control room that night. We never, ever
6	My question is: given that you're told there that	6	put the phone down with people when it's with regards to
7	the caller says there's smoke coming into the flat,	7	fire safety guidance calls. We always try and help
8	Ms Fox, why did you make no attempt to assess with the	8	people. The fire crews always get there in my 32 years.
9	caller whether there was a safe means of escape?	9	Mr Gomes and his family I don't know, maybe
10	A. Because I actually told her to put the towels down and	10	instinct took over and I don't know. I think it was
11	the sheets down, and I think at that time we were still	11	because he started off calm and then he said the fire
12	using the stay-put policy.	12	was in his flat. I'd asked him how many children he
13	Q. Yes. I think you said to us earlier on that once there	13	got, he said his wife was pregnant with a baby,
14	was smoke coming into the flat, you would start to	14	asthmatic, and I just stayed on the line with him and
15	assess the means of escape from a flat.	15	helped guide him down the stairs and did the best
16	My question really is: why didn't you do that, given	16	I could that night, the same as we all did. We just
17	that that was how you would normally go about assisting	17	worked so hard.
18	a caller?	18	Again, looking at the transcripts and listening to
19	A. I think I may have got confused before with your	19	the calls are completely different.
20	questioning.	20	Q. Finally, just a couple more calls.
21	Q. With my questioning?	21	At 01.26.58, there's a call in relation to flat 95,
22	A. Possibly.	22	which I think we looked at, on the 12th floor, that you
23	Q. Right. So let me go back over it because I don't want	23	took.
24	there to be any confusion. Just to roll back a little	24	It is at page 17 of the control room report. So
25	bit.	25	this is LFB00004790.
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1	Bottom of the page, we looked at this before:	1	A. I can't remember.
2	"01:26:58. CRO Fox takes a call from a female	2	Q. Okay.
3	reporting a fire in Grenfell Tower."	3	If in fact it wasn't you passing this information to
4	4 Do you remember we discussed that earlier in your		the incident ground but Angie Gotts in response to
5	evidence?	5	another call, can you explain why you didn't pass the
6	A. We did.	6	information you had about this flat to the incident
7	Q. And was asked for advice. We can see the summary of	7	ground?
8	that call here.	8	A. I can't explain it because I can't remember the call.
9	At the end, it says:	9	MR MILLETT: Right.
10	"CRO Fox states that she will pass on the	10	Ms Fox, thank you very much. I have now come to the
11	information to the crews."	11	end of my questions.
12	That is information that there was smoke and fire in	12	It remains for me only to thank you very much indeed
13	the neighbour's kitchen.	13	for coming to the inquiry and assisting us with our
14	Did you consider passing this information to the	14	investigations. I know it's not been easy for you to
15	fire ground?	15	recall the events of that night and I am extremely
16	A. Yes, I	16	grateful to you for coming, so thank you very much.
17	Q. Detailed information.	17	Can I also add my thanks to the transcribers and the
18	A. I would've passed the information on to the fire ground.	18	trial director for their patience, all of their
19	Q. Do you know how you would've done that?	19	patience, in sitting far later than I would've liked on
20	A. I can't remember exactly. Again, it would've been	20	a Friday evening, and to Stephen Walsh.
21	a service request, or it would've been a piece of paper	21	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
22	and we would've passed it to the command unit. But	22	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I should thank you very much on
23	either way, we were passing as much information on to	23	behalf of the inquiry as a whole. I would imagine
24	the fire ground as we possibly could that night.	24	you've been sitting around for quite a long time waiting
25	Q. I'm not sure at the moment we can see a record of that	25	to give your evidence, which is a disagreeable thing in
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1	in the short incident log, but if there isn't, can you	1	itself, so I'm very sorry about that.
2	explain that?	2	THE WITNESS: Thank you. It's no problem.
3	A. If there was no record in the short incident log, it	3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: very helpful to hear your account
4	would've been done by paper. The incident log is so	4	of these matters. It all goes to enable us to piece
5	long to look through	5	together the bigger picture. We're very grateful to you
6	Q. Let me be certain that I'm not putting a false point to	6	for coming along.
7	you. If you go to the short incident log, which is	7	THE WITNESS: You're welcome.
8	MET00013830, and go, please, to page 19. Look, please,	8	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm sorry if it's been
9	at the time mark of 01.40.40.	9	a disagreeable exercise.
10	We can see a service request made by AG, in fact,	10	THE WITNESS: No problem at all. No problem. Thank you.
11	Angie Gotts:	11	Bye bye.
12	" PERSONS TRAPPED IN FLAT ON 12TH FLOOR - UNABLE	12	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you. If you would like to go
13	TO LEAVE."	13	with the usher.
14	That's obviously not you, but can you explain why it	14	(The witness withdrew)
15	was that Angie Gotts was passing that message, or	15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That must be it for today,
16	perhaps this was a duplicate call?	16	Mr Millett.
17	A. Angie could've had a duplicate call. But I wouldn't	17	MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, it is, and I want to say
18	there was no reason why I wouldn't have passed the	18	a personal thank you to you and the transcribers and to
19	message.	19	the trial director for their patience.
20	Q. Are you able to relate this call at 01.26 to this	20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Not to me, but it's been a very long
21	service request message at 01.40.40, do you think?	21	day for everyone, so I'm grateful to all of you for your
22	A. No, I cannot remember that call in particular.	22	patience and the way you've listened so quietly to the
23	Q. It looks as if this was not necessarily a response to	23	evidence.
24	your call but a call that Angie Gotts took. Is that	24	And of course I am very grateful to the document
25	right, do you know?	25	manager, or trial director, and the stenographers, who
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1	always work on late without any complaints, and we're	
2	very grateful to them.	
3	MR MILLETT: This is not a competition for thanks, but	
4	I want to express my thanks to the LFB when I said	
5	Stephen Walsh, I really meant him in his corporate	
6	capacity for making these witnesses available to us,	
7	and I apologise for the rescheduling we've had to have,	
8	but it's important we heard from them.	
9 10	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, I absolutely endorse that, thank you very much.	
11	Thank you very much. Well, we'll break now. We'll	
12	resume on Monday at 10 o'clock and we shall get back to	
13	the evidence of Dr Lane.	
14	MR MILLETT: Yes, thank you.	
15	(5.05 pm)	
16	(The hearing adjourned until Monday, 26 November 2018	
17	at 10.00 am)	
18		
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