1	Wednesday, 21 November 2018	1	A. Revisions of the hypotheses, yes.
2	(10.00 am)	2	Q. Yes. And I think you've update your opinions to take
3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, everybody. Welcome to	3	account of ingress of fire and smoke, taking account of
4	today's hearing. We are going to hear some more expert	4	the evidence from the bereaved, survivors and residents.
5	evidence about fire development and related topics.	5	A. I've added a new section, yes.
6	MS GRANGE: Yes. Good morning, Mr Chairman.	6	Q. Thank you.
7	I'm now going to call Professor Luke Bisby, please.	7	Turning to the scope of your work briefly, if I may,
8	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good, thank you.	8	you're Phase 1 report, as we now have it, sets out your
9	PROFESSOR LUKE BISBY (affirmed)	9	preliminary conclusions on two main things is this
10	Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY	10	right? first of all, the ignition of the facade of
11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, professor. Sit	11	the building.
12	down and make yourself comfortable there.	12	A. Correct.
13	Yes, Mr Millett.	13	Q. And, secondly, fire spread to and on the exterior of the
14	MR MILLETT: Good morning, Professor Bisby.	14	building.
15	A. Good morning.	15	A. That's right.
16	Q. Can I ask you, please, to give the inquiry your full	16	Q. You've also been instructed to provide a further report
17	name.	17	at Phase 2 of this inquiry.
18	A. My name is Luke Alexander Bisby.	18	Just correct me if I'm wrong about this, but
19	Q. Thank you.	19	summarising them, that will cover, first of all, your
20	You have provided to the inquiry a preliminary or	20	final conclusions about fire spread to and over the
21	interim Phase 1 report dated 2 April 2018. I'll just	21	exterior of the building.
22	give the reference to that: that's LBYR0000001, with	22	A. Yes.
23	an accompanying video showing vertical flame spread on	23	Q. Secondly, performance of the materials which formed part
24	the east elevation of the tower at LBYR0000002.	24	of the exterior of the building.
25	You've I think now updated that report in a revised	25	A. Yes.
23	Touve I tillik now updated that report in a revised	23	A. Tes.
	Page 1		Page 3
1	version dated 21 October 2018; is that right?	1	Q. Thirdly, their respective contributions, if any, to the
2	A. That's correct.	2	spread of fire, which would include, I think is this
3		3	right? a review of testing by the BRE and other
	Q. Can that please be shown. That's LBYS0000001, at	4	
5	page 1. Is that the first page of your updated report?	5	relevant testing bodies, and also a review of the standard testing regime.
	A. Yes.	6	A. Yes, that's correct.
6			
7	Q. Is that signature yours?	7	Q. You are going to do that?
8	A. It is.	8	A. To the extent that we can, yes.
9	Q. You summarise the main updates that you've made at	9	Q. To the extent that you can, yes, of course.
10	paragraphs 24 to 28, and I'm just going to summarise	10	Fourthly, I think is this right? you're also
11	them aloud to you and see if you agree that my summary	11	going to look at any issues relating to the mechanical
12	is accurate.	12	response of the reinforced concrete structural frame, if
13	First, an update to your original flame spread	13	relevant.
14	video.	14	A. That's correct.
15	A. Yes.	15	Q. Finally, recommendations about what, if any, changes
16	Q. And four new videos showing horizontal flame spread on	16	could be made or should be made to the regulatory regime
17	the east, north, west and south facades of the tower.	17	and industry practice to prevent a similar incident from
18	A. That's correct.	18	ever happening again in the future.
19	Q. Those are, I think, LBYS0000004, LBYS0000005 and	19	A. Correct.
20	LBYS0000006.	20	Q. Thank you very much.
21	You've also, I think, provided new updates on	21	In your report at section 1.3 this is page 12
22	vertical and horizontal fire spread.	22	you have summarised the structure of your report. If we
23	A. That's correct.	23	can please have that on the screen.
24	Q. Testing of hypotheses based on new evidence that's come	24	You've set out there and we can see it how
25	to light since April this year.	25	you've organised your report, running from paragraph 70,
	Daga 2		Daga 4
	Page 2		Page 4
			1 (Pages 1 to 4)

1 "Section 2: Technical Background", to paragraph 75, 2 "Section 7: Ingress", covering geometry, materials, fire 3 spread and spread over cladding in between. 4 At section 9, first of all you've set out your 5 future work as proposed for Phase 2, and that's 1 Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders in Scot 2 A. Correct. 3 Q. I think you've got a number of awards for your 4 commitment to high quality engineering research 5 education, and your dedication to the broader aca	and
 spread and spread over cladding in between. At section 9, first of all you've set out your Q. I think you've got a number of awards for your commitment to high quality engineering research 	
4 At section 9, first of all you've set out your 4 commitment to high quality engineering research	
5 future work as proposed for Phase 2, and that's 5 education, and your dedication to the broader aca	
	idemic
6 paragraphs 1243 to 1263 at page 264. If we can just 6 and research communities.	
7 have that on the screen, please, just so that that is 7 A. That's correct.	_
8 there. 8 Q. Two general questions, professor: are the factual	
9 You've I think set out also in your report 9 matters that you set out in your report true to the	best
a declaration at paragraph 90, if you can turn back to 10 of your knowledge and belief?	
page 14, and I just want to make sure that you confirm 11 A. They are.	
these here now, paragraphs 88, 89, 90 and, indeed, 91 on 12 Q. Does your report accurately set out your opinion	
pages 14 and 15, under the heading "1.6. Statements". 13 matters in respect of which you have been asked	?
Can you confirm that those are paragraphs which you 14 A. It does.	
15 stand by today? 15 Q. Thank you.	1.0
16 A. Yes. 16 Just to summarise where we've arrived at toda	·
17 Q. Thank you very much. 17 your evidence so far, we've seen already that you	
At section 1.4 of your report at page 13 I'm 18 provided a first report or preliminary report to the	9
19 sorry to ask you to jump around a little bit you've 19 inquiry in April this year.	1
set out your relevant experience and qualifications. 20 On 20 June this year, you gave a presentation	
21 I'm not going to go through all those today everybody 21 inquiry based on that report. You remember that	•
22 can look at those if they want to but can I just pick 22 A. Of course, yes.	
out one or two bullet points from them so that people in 23 Q. People can see that if they want to.	•.
the room and watching us today can hear from you some 24 That presentation focused just to summarise	
25 elements of your experience. 25 in part on the concepts of flammability and fire s	pread
Page 5 Page 7	
1 It's right, isn't it, that you are currently 1 and the different construction materials present or	the
2 professor of fire and structures within the School of 2 facade of the building.	
3 Engineering in the University of Edinburgh? 3 A. That's right.	
4 A. That's correct. 4 Q. This is a continuation of that evidence; is that rig	ht?
5 Q. You were formerly, I think, the head of the Research 5 A. Correct.	,
6 Institute for Infrastructure and Environment and Royal 6 Q. I'm not going to go over the entirety of the detail	that
7 Academy of Engineering Research chair as well. 7 you've covered in your presentations in the past of	
8 A. That's correct. 8 indeed, in this report, but I am going to ask you al	-
9 Q. You are, I think, co-editor-in-chief of the Fire Safety 9 a number of things. First, so you know where we	
10 Journal. 10 going, some questions about the materials installe	d on
11 A. Yes. 11 the facade and their performance in a fire, and als	
12 Q. And you have, I think, extensive experience of 12 your conclusions on fire spread out of the compar	
engineering research and consultancy, of university 13 over the building and back into flats.	,
teaching and promotion of public understanding of 14 A. Okay.	
15 science and engineering. 15 Q. I'm going to ask you to explain some of the aspect	ets in
16 A. That's correct. 16 which you've updated your earlier report.	
Q. You're a chartered structural engineer in the UK. 17 I'm not going to ask you just so that we are	
18 A. Yes. 18 clear about the cause and origin of the fire, because	ause
19 Q. And a licensed professional engineer in Canada. 19 that's been dealt with by Professor Niamh Nic Da	
20 A. Correct. 20 Dr Glover, but your conclusion, if I can just look	
Q. You are, I think, a fellow of the Institute of Fire 21 that with you, is at paragraphs 12.12 to 12.16 of y	
Engineers. 22 report, which is at page 259, if we can please have	
23 A. Yes. 23 on the screen.	
Q. And the Institution of Structural Engineers, the 24 At section 8.1, you have set out your preliminar	y
25 International Institute for FRP in Construction, and 25 conclusions at 12.12 to 12.16 there.	
Page 6	
Page 6 Page 8	

1	You say in 12.12:	1	I went to the tower when there was no scaffolding
2	"There is a high level of evidence to support the	2	external to the tower, so we undertook investigations
3	hypothesis that the fire started somewhere between the	3	internal to the tower and could only see the exterior of
4	edge of the cooker and the kitchen window in Flat 16	4	the tower by leaning or looking out the windows of the
5	(see Figure 83)."	5	tower at that time.
6	You may well know that we now have a report from	6	I subsequently went back on several occasions once
7	Dr Glover, and we'll be hearing from him and	7	the scaffolding was in place and those specific
8	Professor Niamh Nic Daeid, who is also going to come to	8	occasions are noted in the noted table in the
9	give evidence. But in general, do you agree with	9	appendix and walked the scaffolding to the extent
10	Professor Niamh Nic Daeid and Dr Glover's opinions on	10	that we were permitted to, typically based on health and
11	matters of cause and origin?	11	safety considerations on site.
12	A. To the extent that I'm sufficiently expert in cause to	12	So I have on three or four occasions visited the
13	agree, then yes, I do.	13	exterior of the building at the lower levels, so
14	Q. Your report in general again, for clarification	14	levels 3 through 5 or 6. On one occasion, I walked
15	represents your initial conclusions on ignition of the	15	every level of the building on the scaffold from bottom
16	facade and spread up the building based on the evidence	16	to top, full perimeter, up and down, and then I've been
17	that we have to date.	17	back on two separate occasions to inspect the details of
18	A. Correct.	18	the architectural crown at the top of the building.
19	Q. I think it's right that you expect to carry out further	19	Q. On two separate occasions?
20	research and testing later in order to firm up your	20	A. That's correct.
21	conclusions so as to be ready for phase 2.	21	Q. In paragraph 295, as we got there on the screen, you
22	A. Indeed, yes.	22	refer to the work undertaken by Dr Lane.
23	Q. At this stage, are you able to express any firm	23	Have you relied on Dr Lane's survey of the building
24	conclusions about the relative contributions of	24	in any way in your work?
25	different materials on the facade to the rate and the	25	A. I think the only place where I've relied uniquely on
	Page 9		Page 11
1	extent of fire spread?	1	Dr Lane's work would be in the identification of
2	A. I think qualitatively, yes, in some cases.	2	a specific product called purlboard, where during her
3	Quantitatively, it is quite difficult.	3	surveys she was able to identify the specific
4	Q. I'm going to ask you, please, to go to page 74 of your	4	manufacturer of that product via some photographs that
5	report and look at paragraph 290. I'm going to ask you	5	are in her report. So I've relied on that as
6	one or two questions next about the familiarity that you	6	a confirmation of the supplier of those materials. But
7	have with the building after the fire.	7	that I think is probably the only specific location when
8	At paragraph 290 and following, you set out	8	I've done that, yes.
9	a summary of the materials and products presented in	9	Q. We'll come to purlboard later on.
10	this section. You explain those, and at 291 you say	10	I think you were also present when cladding was
11	there were:	11	removed by the police.
12	"291. Six accompanied post-fire inspections of	12	A. That's correct, on two separate occasions, yes.
13	Grenfell Tower that I conducted (the details of which	13	Q. Is it also right that you looked at cladding removal
14	are provided in Appendix A of this report)."	14	photographs which were provided by the police?
15	Then at 295 you say:	15	A. That's correct, yes, some 12,000 photographs.
16	" I have not personally undertaken an exhaustive	16	Q. Are you satisfied in your mind that the sections of
17	physical post-fire survey of the entire exterior, or the	17	cladding that you observed being removed from the
18	interior of all compartments, of Grenfell Tower; such	18	building were properly representative of the materials
19	work has been undertaken in part by Inquiry Expert Dr	19	and the construction of the cladding over the whole
20	Barbara Lane's team, and also by the BRE forensic team	20	building?
21	with and on behalf of the MPS."	21	A. To the extent that it's possible to conclude that, given
22	Just so that we can understand, what investigations	22	that much of the cladding was destroyed in the fire. So
23	of the facade did you undertake at the tower during your	23	it's impossible to know with certainty, but I have no
24	visits?	24	reason to suspect that there was significant variation,
25	A. So I have on several occasions well, initially,	25	yes.
	Page 10		Page 12

1	Q. Breaking that answer down a bit more, were you able	1	after the fire?
2	during your work to consider or calculate the volume of	2	A. Beyond a cursory visual examination, no. Nothing
3	different materials making up the facade that were,	3	systematic.
4	number 1, installed, and actually were installed there?	4	Q. Would such an analysis have helped you in your
5	A. I mean, I've not done those calculations myself. It	5	conclusions that you've arrived at in your report?
6	would be possible based on the geometry of the cladding	6	A. I mean, I think it would be interesting information to
7	system to do that. We have a sense of the respective	7	have. One of the issues with that is the reason that
8	quantities of different materials from purchase orders	8	I, given my scope of work, would be interested in the
9	and materials supplied to the site, but obviously we	9	answer to that question in terms of charring to the
10	couldn't confirm definitively that the materials that	10	amount of insulation remaining, is that one of the
11	were purchased or sent to site were actually installed.	11	questions I'm interested in is the extent to which the
12	Q. Would it follow from that answer that you were also not	12	predominantly PIR insulation within the cavity will have
13	able to calculate or consider the volume of materials	13	contributed to the fire spread mechanisms that we
14	that disintegrated, combusted, melted or fell off during	14	observe on the building.
15	the fire?	15	One of the challenges with using char depth or the
16	A. That's correct, only in an approximate way by surveying	16	amount of material remaining in that context is that we
17	the visual appearance of the building. I have done	17	know that, after the fire front passed a particular
18	that, that was my reason for wanting to do a walk of the	18	location on the building, we had a significant number of
19	full extent of the tower, just to get a sense of the	19	compartment fires burning within the building as
20	extent to which the insulation materials in particular	20	a consequence of the ingress of the fire into the
21	were still present.	21	building. The consequence of those compartment fires is
22	Another means that I've used to try to develop that	22	that you have fires venting from the windows, with
23	information is looking at all of the drone photos that	23	significant external heat fluxes applied to the
24	were taken on various instances by various parties at	24	insulation. That will continue to burn and char the PIR
25	various stages, immediately after the fire and then	25	in the regions around the windows, but that burning and
	Page 13		Page 15
1	during the months following the fire.	1	charring of the PIR is so far behind the fire spread
2	Q. Were you able to analyse, of the material that remained	2	that led to that that it isn't telling me anything
3	on the building at the moment the fire was extinguished,	3	useful about the contribution to the fire spread
4	what was later removed from the building as opposed to	4	mechanisms.
5	what remained on it?	5	So whilst it's interesting, I don't know having
6	A. I mean, that was my rationale for looking at the drone	6	not looked at it yet and thought that detailed about
7	photos and requesting additional drone photos to the	7	what information is available to us, which is a topic
8	extent that I could get my hands on them.	8	we've been leaving for Phase 2, I wouldn't be able to
9	It's very difficult. Immediately after the fire, my	9	say how useful it would be.
10	understanding is that there were some health and safety	10	I think it would be interesting. I don't have
11	concerns about debris continuing to fall off the	11	a huge amount of optimism that it's going to be
12	building, so loose debris, and that some crews were sent	12	particularly constructive as regards fire spread
13	up in a basket and were pulling some of the loose	13	mechanisms.
14	materials off the building, and that we may not have	14	Q. I want to turn to a different topic, namely materials
15	that information recorded in the drone photos that are	15	which were to be found on the facade.
16	available to us.	16	In your report, you have identified a number of
17	So I think, in general, yes, that information is at	17	materials present on or within the facade of
18	least visually available through the drone photos, with	18	Grenfell Tower following the refurbishment. I'm going
19	some caveats about some uncertainties, and that is some	19	to ask you a number of questions about how those
20	work that we do intend to do at Phase 2, to try to get	20	materials behave in a fire, starting, if I can, with the
21	a sense of the amount of insulation consumed in the fire	21	Reynobond 55 PE.
22	in particular.	22	Can we begin, please, by going to page 78 of your
23	Q. Were you able to undertake any kind of analysis or	23	report.
24	investigation into the depth and extent of charring of	24	On that page, we have a table, table 2, which is
25	the insulation which was left behind on the building	25	entitled if we can have that highlighted "ACM

1	product variants used in Grenfell Tower refurbishment	1	A. The nature of the pointing of the penels is not
2	(all at 4mm total thickness)". There are three products	2	A. The nature of the painting of the panels is not something I've looked at specifically.
3	there set out with their different finishes and colours,	3	Q. Again, would that be something you are going to look at
4	as you can see.	4	at Phase 2?
5	In the table, you identify in the last column that	5	A. I mean, I hadn't planned on it because I didn't observe
6	the PE colour, the polyethylene colour, is different	6	any surface effects on the exterior of the aluminium,
7	between column panels and some of the spandrel panels,	7	either during the fire or in any of the testing we've
8	I think.	8	done, for instance cone calorimeter testing, looking at
9	First of all, am I right to identify that	9	how it responds to heat flux.
10	difference?	10	So without any compelling reason to do so,
11	A. That's right. The polyethylene in one case is a clear	11	I wouldn't intend to. If there is a compelling reason,
12	translucent and in the other case is black.	12	I would love to hear it.
13	Q. You say later in your report I'll just give you the	13	Q. That leads me to this questions: in your experience,
14	reference, it's page 77, paragraph 314, there's no need	14	would a powder coating, if there was one, have any
15	to go to it that testing is underway to establish	15	impact on the spread of fire in terms of speed or heat
16	whether there are any significant differences in terms	16	transfer?
17	of the fundamental material and reaction to fire	17	A. I think it's hard to say. I wouldn't expect
18	properties.	18	a significant difference. Powder coatings tend to be
19	At this stage, professor, do you know or can you say	19	very thin, so the mass of material is very small. It
20	with any confidence whether the different core colour	20	could potentially have a minimal impact, but I wouldn't
21	has any bearing on fire performance?	21	expect anything significant.
22	A. We've been doing thermogravimetric analysis and	22	Q. Leaving aside powder coating on the surface, have you
23	differential scanning calorimetry on those two core	23	identified whether these panels had any adhesive between
24	materials, which are essentially tests to characterise	24	the aluminium skin and the polyethylene filler or core?
25	the way these particular core materials respond to	25	A. The product information for the specific product
	Page 17		Page 19
	rage 1/		rage 19
1	heating, and looking for signatures that would indicate	1	indicates that the aluminium skins, if you like, are
2	some differences between the two of them. We've not	2	bonded to the PE filler via a thermal bonding process.
2 3	some differences between the two of them. We've not found anything yet that I would consider significant as	2 3	bonded to the PE filler via a thermal bonding process. I'm not entirely sure how that works or what that is,
2 3 4	some differences between the two of them. We've not found anything yet that I would consider significant as regards the performance of these materials.	2 3 4	bonded to the PE filler via a thermal bonding process. I'm not entirely sure how that works or what that is, but given that it's a thermoplastic material at the
2 3 4 5	some differences between the two of them. We've not found anything yet that I would consider significant as regards the performance of these materials. Q. Are you considering continuing those tests?	2 3 4 5	bonded to the PE filler via a thermal bonding process. I'm not entirely sure how that works or what that is, but given that it's a thermoplastic material at the core, I would expect that would mean that you heat the
2 3 4 5 6	some differences between the two of them. We've not found anything yet that I would consider significant as regards the performance of these materials. Q. Are you considering continuing those tests? A. Of course, yes.	2 3 4 5 6	bonded to the PE filler via a thermal bonding process. I'm not entirely sure how that works or what that is, but given that it's a thermoplastic material at the core, I would expect that would mean that you heat the thermoplastic so that it softens a bit on its surface,
2 3 4 5 6 7	some differences between the two of them. We've not found anything yet that I would consider significant as regards the performance of these materials. Q. Are you considering continuing those tests? A. Of course, yes. Q. Would you be able to report on that at Phase 2?	2 3 4 5 6 7	bonded to the PE filler via a thermal bonding process. I'm not entirely sure how that works or what that is, but given that it's a thermoplastic material at the core, I would expect that would mean that you heat the thermoplastic so that it softens a bit on its surface, and you bond the aluminium to it in that context. Once
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	some differences between the two of them. We've not found anything yet that I would consider significant as regards the performance of these materials. Q. Are you considering continuing those tests? A. Of course, yes. Q. Would you be able to report on that at Phase 2? A. I hope to report on that very early in Phase 2, yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	bonded to the PE filler via a thermal bonding process. I'm not entirely sure how that works or what that is, but given that it's a thermoplastic material at the core, I would expect that would mean that you heat the thermoplastic so that it softens a bit on its surface, and you bond the aluminium to it in that context. Once it cools, you have a bond, but I've not been able to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	some differences between the two of them. We've not found anything yet that I would consider significant as regards the performance of these materials. Q. Are you considering continuing those tests? A. Of course, yes. Q. Would you be able to report on that at Phase 2? A. I hope to report on that very early in Phase 2, yes. Q. Very good.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	bonded to the PE filler via a thermal bonding process. I'm not entirely sure how that works or what that is, but given that it's a thermoplastic material at the core, I would expect that would mean that you heat the thermoplastic so that it softens a bit on its surface, and you bond the aluminium to it in that context. Once it cools, you have a bond, but I've not been able to confirm that.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	some differences between the two of them. We've not found anything yet that I would consider significant as regards the performance of these materials. Q. Are you considering continuing those tests? A. Of course, yes. Q. Would you be able to report on that at Phase 2? A. I hope to report on that very early in Phase 2, yes. Q. Very good. Did the pattern of fire spread that you've observed	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	bonded to the PE filler via a thermal bonding process. I'm not entirely sure how that works or what that is, but given that it's a thermoplastic material at the core, I would expect that would mean that you heat the thermoplastic so that it softens a bit on its surface, and you bond the aluminium to it in that context. Once it cools, you have a bond, but I've not been able to confirm that. Q. Paragraph 431 of your report, if I can please ask you to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	some differences between the two of them. We've not found anything yet that I would consider significant as regards the performance of these materials. Q. Are you considering continuing those tests? A. Of course, yes. Q. Would you be able to report on that at Phase 2? A. I hope to report on that very early in Phase 2, yes. Q. Very good. Did the pattern of fire spread that you've observed from your visits to the tower and from the flame spread	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	bonded to the PE filler via a thermal bonding process. I'm not entirely sure how that works or what that is, but given that it's a thermoplastic material at the core, I would expect that would mean that you heat the thermoplastic so that it softens a bit on its surface, and you bond the aluminium to it in that context. Once it cools, you have a bond, but I've not been able to confirm that. Q. Paragraph 431 of your report, if I can please ask you to go to that. It's at page 100.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	some differences between the two of them. We've not found anything yet that I would consider significant as regards the performance of these materials. Q. Are you considering continuing those tests? A. Of course, yes. Q. Would you be able to report on that at Phase 2? A. I hope to report on that very early in Phase 2, yes. Q. Very good. Did the pattern of fire spread that you've observed from your visits to the tower and from the flame spread videos that you've presented indicate the possibility,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	bonded to the PE filler via a thermal bonding process. I'm not entirely sure how that works or what that is, but given that it's a thermoplastic material at the core, I would expect that would mean that you heat the thermoplastic so that it softens a bit on its surface, and you bond the aluminium to it in that context. Once it cools, you have a bond, but I've not been able to confirm that. Q. Paragraph 431 of your report, if I can please ask you to go to that. It's at page 100. You say there:
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		1	
1	Q. Is that the earliest date at which these issues were	1	instance, surface temperature at ignition will come
2	documented or is there even earlier reliable literature?	2	from.
3	A. There is even earlier commentary in the literature, but	3	One of the issues with polyethylene is with the
4	those are some of the earliest papers we could find	4	orientation of the sample and the way that the fuel
5	specifically dealing with polyethylene. There is	5	responds to heating, and that it does melt and drip. So
6	considerable earlier work looking at thermoplastics in	6	it will depend on the particular configuration.
7	general.	7	Q. Can you give us a sense of time to ignition for low
8	Q. In the next paragraph, paragraph 434, you refer to the	8	density polyethylene?
9	work of Tewarson and Pion.	9	A. I mean, that will depend on the heat flux that you apply
10	Taking those two together, the 1975 and 1976 work,	10	to it. So you see in the table, table 3, critical heat
11	would that work be, in particular, specifically known to	11	flux for polyethylene is listed at 15 kilowatts per
12	competent fire safety professionals?	12	metre squared, so that is the heat flux. If you had
13	A. I would be surprised if most fire safety professionals,	13	a lower heat flux then that and you were to test it
14	competent or otherwise, were specifically aware of those	14	I presume that reference is using testing in what we
15	two papers.	15	call a cone calorimeter a heat flux less than
16	Q. But what about the principles in them?	16	15 kilowatts per square metre will not result in
17	A. I mean, I think that the general principle that	17	ignition of the sample within a defined period, a period
18	a thermoplastic will melt and drip and burn quite	18	of minutes. Higher heat fluxes would cause ignition
19	vigorously is very clearly highlighted in any of the	19	eventually. The higher the heat flux, the faster it
20	reference text that one would expect a competent fire	20	will ignite.
21	safety professional to have at least skimmed, if not	21	Q. Are you able to give us a clue about its thermal
22	know quite well. So, for instance, Dougal Drysdale's	22	inertia?
23	book on fire dynamics or the SFPE handbook would be	23	A. Its thermal inertia is comparatively high in comparison,
24	references where they clearly highlight the risks	24	for instance, to a polymer insulating foam. One of the
25	associated with these materials. I would certainly	25	reasons I presented the data in these tables, it is
23	associated with these materials. I would tertainly	23	reasons 1 presented the data in these tables, it is
	Page 21		Page 23
1	think it reasonable to expect fire safety professionals		
	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	1	probably worth me mentioning, is not because they
2	to have some awareness of those references, yes.	2	necessarily represent definitive values in all cases for
3	to have some awareness of those references, yes. Q. If we can then turn to the next paragraph of your	2 3	necessarily represent definitive values in all cases for materials; if we additives or fillers or fire
3 4	to have some awareness of those references, yes. Q. If we can then turn to the next paragraph of your report, 435, and have that on the screen and identify	2 3 4	necessarily represent definitive values in all cases for materials; if we additives or fillers or fire retardants, we might get slightly different values. So
3	to have some awareness of those references, yes. Q. If we can then turn to the next paragraph of your report, 435, and have that on the screen and identify it, you actually pick up your reference there to the	2 3 4 5	necessarily represent definitive values in all cases for materials; if we additives or fillers or fire retardants, we might get slightly different values. So these are ballpark reference values that I've placed in
3 4 5 6	to have some awareness of those references, yes. Q. If we can then turn to the next paragraph of your report, 435, and have that on the screen and identify it, you actually pick up your reference there to the SFPE handbook of fire protection and engineering.	2 3 4 5 6	necessarily represent definitive values in all cases for materials; if we additives or fillers or fire retardants, we might get slightly different values. So these are ballpark reference values that I've placed in the report to give an overview of the kinds of
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1	which I think is the rate at which energy releases per	1	from the polyethylene?
2	unit time as a material burns, expressed in watts,	2	A. You mean why have I bothered to mention this
3	kilowatts and I think megawatts, you've set out in your	3	temperature?
4	report that the heat release rate can extrapolated to	4	Q. Well, that's another way of putting it.
5	quantify the size of any fire; is that right?	5	A. Yeah. I think because the aluminium for many products
6	A. Yes. I mean, that's typically how we quantify the size	6	that we find at Grenfell Tower, the aluminium is there
7	of the fire.	7	and is providing some protection to the underlying
8	Q. For reference, it's footnote 12 in your report on	8	combustible material. So that's true for the ACM, it's
9	page 23. We don't need to go to it.	9	also true for the Celotex and the Kingspan insulation
10	My question is this: knowing the approximate	10	products, it's true for the window infill panels, all of
11	quantity maybe this is the problem, but tell me of	11	which have aluminium skins of various thicknesses. So
12	polyethylene in panels which were used on floors 4 to 23	12	it's important to understand the extent to which those
13	of the building, are you able to quantify the size of	13	protective layers will have remained in place.
14	the resultant fire?	14	As opposed to, for instance, if we had steel skins
15	A. No, because it will depend on the amount of the material	15	of a similar thickness, the outcome could potentially
16	that's burning at any given instant in time. So the	16	have been quite different, because steel has a much
17	more material that's burning, the more heat release	17	higher melting temperature than aluminium.
18	you'll get; the less material, the less heat release.	18	So I put the value there to simply indicate this
19	So it's going to be dependent on the time at which you	19	particular weakness, if you like, of aluminium, in that
20	ask the question.	20	it melts at temperatures which are comparatively low.
21	So early on, the fire is going to be quite small.	21	Q. It's interesting.
22	At some stage, the fire is a very, very, very large	22	Can I ask you to pick up paragraph 462 on page 105,
23	fire. To quantify that in any way that I would be able	23	where you make this point.
24	to defend scientifically would be very difficult.	24	You say there:
25	Q. At paragraph 461, just moving ahead, if I can, we come	25	"462. It is notable that aluminium also has a
	Page 25		Page 27
			<u> </u>
1	to section 4.12. This is page 104, where you deal with	1	comparatively high coefficient of thermal expansion
2	aluminium and its reaction to fire.	2	(about twice that of steel or concrete) and so under
3	You say:	3	heating (as in a cladding fire), it can be expected to
4	"461. Upon exposure to heat, aluminium will melt at	4	warp and deform under the influence of thermal gradients
5	approximately 660°C."	5	and differential thermal expansion with other materials.
6	First, does the physical evidence that you've seen	6	This may lead to connection failures or to the opening
7	from your surveys of the building suggest that this	7	up of cavities and products formed by aluminium sheets,
8	temperature was reached anywhere on the building?	8	including ACM rainscreen cassettes."
9	A. Yes. I mean, there is considerable evidence of melted	9	Are you able to tell us anything about the speed at
10	aluminium.	10	which this warping or deformation would occur once
11	Q. Where would that have been, from your observations?	11	aluminium had reached 660 degrees?
12	A. I mean, if you were to walk the surface of the	12	A. Well, I mean, that's a difficult question. It's a good
13	scaffolding, as I did, you would see remnants of melted	13	question but a difficult one. The warping of the
14	aluminium in most areas of the building and, to be	14	aluminium will depend on the rate of change of
15	honest, small droplets, small pools, bits of	15	temperature. So the thermal expansion is, you know, the
16	re-solidified aluminium throughout the site. Yes, it's	16	hotter something gets, the longer it gets, right? So
17	quite widespread.	17	that is relevant to an aluminium sheet, both because if
18	Q. Would melting aluminium itself, taken as a single	18	the entire aluminium sheet take a two-dimensional
19	product, have any effect or play any role in the extent	19	sheet of aluminium if its temperature is increased,
20	and rate of fire spread?	20	the entire sheet wants to expand in all directions. If
21	A. I wouldn't expect it to, no. I mean, aluminium is	21	the material that is behind the aluminium sheets has
22	reactive, but typically only in a finally divided powder	22	a different coefficient of thermal expansion, you will
23		23	generate mechanical stresses at the interface between
	form, which is not what we have here.	1	
24	form, which is not what we have here. Q. Does that mean that the temperature at which aluminium	24	the two materials, which could lead to debonding failure
24 25		24 25	the two materials, which could lead to debonding failure between those two materials.
	Q. Does that mean that the temperature at which aluminium	1	

1	Additionally, if you have a temperature gradient	1	occasions, those panels appear to be quite similar to
2	through your aluminium sheets, ie the surface is hot and	2	these panels, yes.
3	the face which is against whatever the core material is	3	Q. Did the Aluglaze panels I call them that as
4	is colder, then that aluminium sheet is going to curve	4	a shorthand which were at Grenfell have exposed edges
5	as a consequence of the thermal gradient. The external	5	of XPS?
6	surface is getting hotter, it wants to get larger; the	6	A. They were mounted within the window frame assemblies, so
7	rear surface is cold, it doesn't want to get larger, and	7	the edges in general were not exposed, no.
8	that induces a curvature in the aluminium, which again	8	Q. Right.
9	can induce mechanical stresses in your panel and could	9	A. I mean, let me just caveat that: one instance where the
10	lead to opening up of the panel or some kind of failure.	10	edges became exposed, which I think is a relevant
11	So the thermal expansion is potentially quite	11	instance, and I'm sure we'll come to this at some stage
12	important for aluminium, in particular.	12	today, is that we know that the extract fans that were
13	I mean, I should point out that both concrete and	13	mounted within these panels in the kitchens of the
14	steel also experience thermal expansion, just less than	14	refurbishment windows tended to fail quite early on when
15	aluminium.	15	exposed to heating. When those fans fell out of the
16	Q. At different temperatures as well?	16	mounting panels that they were sitting within, which are
17	A. The rate of change of length is less significant for	17	these Aluglaze panels so far as we can tell, you then
18	a given change in temperature for steel and concrete.	18	have a hole through an Aluglaze panel, and obviously the
19	Q. I see, okay.	19	inside of that hole has the exposed XPS showing in that
20	Can I turn then to Aluglaze, which is the next	20	location.
21	product I just want to ask you about.	21	Q. I was going to ask you that. In that instance, is it
22	You cover that at page 95 of your report at	22	your opinion that that exposed XPS foam within the
23	paragraph 389 under section 4.9.1. The title of this	23	circle in which the fan was previously mounted
24	part is "Window Infill Panels (Aluminium/Polystyrene	24	facilitated fire spread in any way?
25	Composite Panels)".	25	A. I mean, that's certainly plausible. I think it's
	Page 29		Page 31
1	At a constant 204 and a constant 204 and a	,	immediate manifest that the VDC immediates in a large
1	At paragraph 394, over the page at page 96, and at	1	important to recognise that the XPS insulation is a low
2	paragraph 402 at page 97, you refer to these as	2	density product. So despite the fact that it looks like
3	Aluglaze. You say that the infill panels around the	3	there's quite a lot of it there's 25 millimetres of
4	kitchen extract fans and the window infill panels are	5	that XPS as opposed to 3 millimetres of the PE, for
5	made of the same product, namely Aluglaze.	6	instance, in the ACM panels both the density and the
6	A. That appears to be the case, yes.	7	heat of combustion of polystyrene in this configuration
7	Q. Aluglaze I think is made up of extruded polystyrene, or	1	are considerably less than is the case for the PE.
8	XPS, sandwiched between aluminium sheeting.	8	So the total mass of polystyrene that's available
9	A. Correct.	9	here is actually quite small, so even if we assume that
10	Q. Just for our note, that's figure 56 at page 96. There's	10	all of that mass is consumed to deliver energy to the
11	no need to go to it well, we have it there.	11	fire, we're talking about a comparatively small quantity
12	Is that it?	12	of energy. A few per cent, not a huge amount of the
13	A. That's it, yes.	13	total.
14	Q. Is it right that these panels that we see here are	14	Q. So, in summary, can you quantify the contribution that
15	similar to the panels that were involved in the Lakanal	15	this material as exposed by the falling out of the fans
16	House fire?	16	had to the overall spread of fire?
17	A. Yes, in terms of the type of product. Yes, that's true.	17	A. If I were to assume that it all burns as efficiently as
18	Q. Is there any difference you know about between these	18	possible, I could come up with a back-of-the-envelope
19	panels on Grenfell and the panels on Lakanal House?	19	quantification, yes.
20	A. I've not specifically looked at the details of the	20	Q. No, let's not do that.
21	panels that were installed on Lakanal House.	21	A. But given that under the conditions we would experience,
22	Q. What about the Shepherds Court fire?	22	we don't know how complete the combustion will have
23	A. Yes, I mean, based on the LFB presentation that deals	23	been, it's difficult to do that in any way that would be
24	specifically with the Shepherds Court fire, which has	24	scientifically defensible. We could do a sanity check
25	been discussed here at the inquiry on a number of	25	on it and find it's quite small.
	Page 30		Page 32
	U		U

1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK. It sounds as though you don't think 2 it's bust to have been significants. 3 A. Certainly as regards an escalating fire, once the fire 4 gest bag. When the fire is suitable, think it found 5 potentially have contributed, for instance, to fluming 6 out the window early on. 7 MR MILLETE. Yes, think you. We will come back to that in 8 due course. 8 In minute of the propositions, if you see what I mean. 10 to go to page 97 of your report, prangraph 460. 10 to go to page 97 of your report, prangraph 460. 11 You queez here from the product literature for 12 Alughare, published by brand Systems Limited, 181. 14 "Inher an essevent braise quaries in terms of the 16 designing the panel composition. Takes may include: 16 designing the panel composition. Takes may include: 17 "Inher an essevent braise quaries not terms of the 18 "O', Discos Vto Bradieng Regulations 19 "O', Discos Vto Bradieng Regulations 19 "O', Discos Vto Bradieng Regulations 19 "O', Discos Vto Bradieng Regulations 10 To you know if any of those questions could be 20 answered in relation to this material as you save it 21 answered in relation to this material as you save it 22 installed at Groudfil? 23 A. So that statement has come from Panel Systems Limited. 24 Indicate that was one of the statements that they 24 quoted, it says: 25 "PSLG not on manufacture a panel that has been 26 subjected to any independent fire testing," 28 on not hat basis, I wound day no, there is no 29 evidence that this material would meet any of those 21 guerrene from Panel Systems Limited. 21 guerrene from Panel System Limited. 22 guerrene from Panel System Limited. 23 A. paragraph 40S, just above the section that you've quoted, it says: 24 page 35 1 reference to confirm that; it may be from their position statement. 2 page 35 1 reference to confirm that; it may be from their position statement. 2 page 35 1 reference to confirm that it im any be from their position statement. 3 At paragraph 40S, just above the section that you've quoted, it says: 3 r				
A. Certainly as regards an evoluting fore, once the fire gos big. When the fire's small, I think it could potentially have contributed, for instance, to flushing a potentially have contributed for instance, to flushing a potentially have contributed for instance, to flushing a court for window carly on. MR MILLETT. Yes, thank you. We will come back to that in do ac course. Before I have this material, can I ask you, pleane, Defore I have this material, can I ask you, pleane, Defore I have this material, can I ask you, pleane, Defore I have this material, can I ask you, pleane, Defore I have this material, can I ask you, pleane, Defore I have this material, can I ask you, pleane, Defore I have this material, can I ask you, pleane, Defore I have the intended of the product intenture for Defore I have the intended of the product intenture for Defore I have the intended of the product intenture for Defore I have the intended of the product intenture for Defore I have the intended of the product intenture for Defore I have the intended of the product intenture for Defore I have been been intended. Defore I have the intended of the product intenture for Defore I have the intended of the product intenture for Defore I have the intended of the product intended of				· -
ges big. When the fire is small, I think it round out the vision cuty to, out the vision cuty to, MR MILETT. Yes, thank you. We will come back to that in decourse. Before I lowe this material, can I asky you, please, to go yo geep? of you reroy, pumpagnly 406. You quote her from the product literature for Alagdone, pudiobach by Pand Systems Limited, Place St. Sarker Speed of Plane response of Plane 'b' Class We so Building Regulations 'b' (New Combusthic Core.'' Do you know if any of those questions could be answered in relation to this material would meet any of those subsequently listed requirements, if that answers your quoted, it says: "They are a substituted to the inquiry. I'd have to check the "Place as I and a laws 0. For any where is no evidence that this material would meet any of those subsequently listed requirements, if that answers your quoted, it may be from the receipting product, no. Q I gives rise to the next question, which is are you look a paragraph 405, just above the tests required for class I and class 0. For any where ximilar product, no. Do you know if any of those were present on these produced by or for anybody clse? The produced by or for anybody clse? The second question that arises out of that is if you look a paragraph 405, just above the tests required for class I and class 0. For any where ximilar product, no. The produced production is a production of the control of		it's likely to have been significant.		
problematic, in that without actually performing the regulatory compliance tests, I don't understand the actually performing the regulatory compliance tests, I don't understand the actually performing the regulatory compliance tests, I don't understand the actually performing the regulatory compliance tests, I don't understand the actual to course. 8			3	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
out the window early on. MR MILLETT: Yes, hank you. We will come back to that in decrease the meterial, can I ask you, please, to go be a feel leave the material, can I ask you, please, to go be a feel leave the material, can I ask you, please, to go be a feel leave the material, can I ask you, please, to go be a feel leave the material, can I ask you, please, to go you will be proposed to go you go de that in the I hank it would be very good to put those questions to her tomorrow, if possible. You quote here from the product literature for the proposition of the go you will be very good to put those questions to her tomorrow, if possible. Q. Yes, thank you. There are several basic queries in terms of the designing the panel composition. These may include: 'a 'no Class I Surface Spread of Hame' 'a 'D Class I Surface Spread of Hame' 'a 'D Class I Surface Spread of Hame' 'b' Non-Combushle's Core.' Do you know if any of those questions could be amovered in relation to this material as you saw it and they are selected. Have you calculated the heat release rate of a unit of this NPS? A to that statement has come from Panel Systems Limited. I believe that was one of the statements that they submitted to the inquiry. I'd have to check the Page 33 Terference to confirm that; it may be from their position statement. A to paragraph 405, just above the section that you've quoted, it says: "PSL do not manufacture a panel that has been subjected to any independent fire testing." A to paragraph 405, just above the section that you've quoted. It says: "PSL do not manufacture a panel that has been subjected to any independent fire testing." A to paragraph 407, the product internative asys of any other fire test data for this material you does not the rest of the produced by or for anybody else? "A Not appropriate 405, just above the section that you've quoted. I says: "PSL do not manufacture a panel that has been subjected to any independent fire testing." A to paragraph 407, the product literature says o				
MR MILLETT: Ves, thunk you. We will come back to that in decorate.			5	•
Before I leave this material, can I ask you, please, 10 to go to pay 87 of your report, paragraph 406. 11 Adapter, published by Pour Systems Limited, PSL. At 13 paragraph 406, it says: 12 Again, published by Pour Systems Limited, PSL. At 14 "There are several basic queries in terms of the 15 fire performance of panels that may form part of 16 designing the panel composition. These may include: 18 "9) Class Toric Building Regulations 19 "(Non-Combastible Cose." 19 "Non-Combastible Cose." 19 "Non-Combast		-		
specifically on compliance issues, 1 think it would be very good to put those questions to her tomorrow, if possible. Augukae, published by Panel Systems Limited, PSL. At 12 Augukae, published by Panel Systems Limited, PSL. At 13 panagraph 406, it says: There are several basic queries in terms of the 14 three are several basic queries in terms of the 15 five performance of panels that may form part of 16 designing the panel composition. These may include 17 "a) Class 15 urinee Systead of Flams 19 "O Class 10 to Building Regulations 19 "O Class 10 to Building Regulations 19 "O Class 10 to Building Regulations 20 answered in relation to this material as you asswit 19 "O Class 10 to Building Regulations 20 answered in relation to this material as you asswit 19 "None-Combosible Core." 19 A. Again, it will depend on the nature in which that piece of XTPS is burning. So, you know, the heaf flux it's submitted to the inquiry. 19 days to check the 25 submitted to the inquiry. 19 days to check the 25 submitted to the inquiry. 19 days to check the 25 submitted to the inquiry. 19 days to check the 25 submitted to the inquiry. 19 days to check the 26 subjected to any independent fire testing." 19 A. Paragraph 405, just above the section that you've quoted, it says: 10 and 19 and		•		
to go to page 97 of your report, pangraph 406. You quote her from the product literature for tomorrow, if possible. Alughare, published by Pand Systems Limited, PSL. At pangraph 406, it says: There are several basic queries in terms of the designing the panel composition. These may include the panel of the panel statement in the part of designing the panel composition to the material as you saw it possible. To Non-Combotible Core: To Non-Combotible Core: To Non-Combotible Core: To So on that basis, I would say no, there is no evidence that this material would meet any of these subsequently listed requirements, if that answers your question. Pan of sure that if does: To Q. It gives rise to the next question, which is: are you aware of any other fire test data for this material product, no. Q. It gives rise to the next question, which is: are you aware of any other fire test data for this material polock at pangraph 407, the product literature says: "To achieve (a) [Class I Surface Spread of Flame] we may propose an aluminism skin, to achieve (b) a polysecyanutate foam and for (e) a lamella mineral fibre." Do you know if any of those were present on these 25 panels at Grenfell in either location? To polyse an aluminism skin, to achieve (b) a polysecyanutate foam and for (e) a lamella mineral fibre." Do you know if any of those were present on these 25 panels at Grenfell in either location?				
11 You quote here from the product literature for 12 Alughare, published by Panel Systems Limited, PSL. At 13 prangraph 40f, it says: 14 "There are several basic queries in terms of the 15 fine performance of panels that may form part of 16 designing the panel corrosoition. These may include: 17 "a) Class 1 Surface Spread of Planne 18 "b) Class 1 to Bailding Regulations 19 "c) Non-Combasthle Core." 19 Dyou know if any of those questions could be 20 answered in relation to this naterial as you saw it 21 installed at Granfell? 22 installed at Granfell? 23 A. So that statements a come from Panel Systems Limited. 24 I believe that was one of the statements that they 25 submitted to the inquiry. I'd have to check the 26 Page 33 1 reference to confirm that; it may be from their position 27 statement. 28 A page 35 1 reference to confirm that; it may be from their position 29 statement. 3 At paragraph 405, just above the section that you've quoted, it says: 10 "PSL, do not manufacture a panel that has been 29 subsequently listed requirements, if that answers your question. I'm not sure that it does. 20 Q, t gives rise to the next question, which is: are you aware of any other fire test data for this material produde metal and produced by or for anybody else? 14 A. Not specifically, no. I have never seen either BS 476, part 6 or 7 testing, which would be the tests required for class 1 and class 0. For any other similar product, no. 20 (I gives rise to the next question), which is: are you aware of any other fire test data for this material produde deed by or for anybody else? 21 a produced by or for anybody else? 22 a polysocyanurate form and for (e) a lamella mineral fibre." 23 (Page 4) 24 (Do you know if any of those were present on these 20 polysocyanurate form and for (e) a lamella mineral fibre." 25 (Page 4) 26 (Page 5) 27 (Page 5) 28 (Page 5) 29 (Page 5) 20 (Page 6) 20 (Page 6) 21 (Page 6) 22 (Page 6) 23 (Page 6) 24 (Page 7) 25 (Page 7) 26 (Page 7) 27 (Page 7) 28 (Page 7) 29 (Page 7) 20 (-			
Alaglave, published by Pared Systems Limited, PSI. At paragraph 40s, it says: 13				
Turning over to page 101, please, you've set out there table 4, where you give details of the proporties of YRS. You covered those a little bit just now, and they are selected. There are several basic queries in terms of the designing the panel composition. These may include: The proposition of the set may be a subjected to the statement when the proposition of the proporties of YRS. You covered those a little bit just now, and they are selected. The page 35 the proposition of the proporties of YRS. A gain, it will depend on the nature in which that piece of YRS is burning. So, you know, the heat flux it's subjected to, the manner in which it's burning, et cetera. A So that statement has come from Panel Systems Limited. The page 33 testing a subjected to the inquiry. I'd have to check the page 35 to spoil to liberate from a piece of this material, but that would be the maximum conceivable value. In reality, it would be somewhat less than that. How much somewhat less, I would be somewhat less than that. How much somewhat less, I would be somewhat less than that. How much somewhat less, I would be somewhat less than that. How much somewhat less, I would be somewhat less than that. How much somewhat less that		•		•
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fire performance of panels that may form part of designing the panel composition. These may include: **a) Class II Write Spread of Flame* **b) Class IV to Building Regulations **c) Non-Combatible Core.** **Do you know if any of those questions could be answered in relation to this material as you saw it installed at Grenfell? **Do you know if any of those were present on these panels at Grenfell in either location? **The Class II Write Spread of Flame* **The Class II Write S				
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fibre." 23 People may have experienced you may have 24 Do you know if any of those were present on these 25 panels at Grenfell in either location? 28 People may have experienced you may have 29 experienced this yourself if you hold a match up to 29 a piece of this XPS, it tends to shrivel and shrink away			1	
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panels at Grenfell in either location? 25 a piece of this XPS, it tends to shrivel and shrink away			1	
Page 34 Page 36	25		25	
Page 34 Page 36		D 24		D 04
		Page 34		Page 36

1	from the heat, which makes it difficult to measure its	1	polyisocyanurate foam.
2	properties, if it's running away from you; whereas the	2	Was that present in the building in the form of
3	polyethylene, which is higher density, you can actually	3	Celotex insulation on the columns and in the spandrels?
4	measure a useful value.	4	A. Yes.
5	Q. So the big difference is the density.	5	Q. Is it right that this product, using that word
6	A. Well, the big difference is the way that it responds to	6	advisedly, is made up of PIR foam with a thin layer of
7	the heating. The low density influences that behaviour.	7	aluminium foil?
8	Q. If they're subject to the same heating conditions, does	8	A. Both faces and in some cases with a glass fibre mesh as
9	that mean XPS would maybe this is not the appropriate	9	well within the foam.
10	question take longer to melt and form burning	10	Q. At paragraph 438, you say in the second line:
11	droplets than PE?	11	"The low thermal inertia of PIR means that it tends
12	A. I would expect XPS to melt before PE as a consequence of	12	to have a comparatively low time to ignition and will
13	its thermal inertia, which, despite me not giving	13	support rapid flame spread."
14	a value in this table, its thermal inertia at room	14	Then you give under table 5 the selected typical
15	temperature, so its insulating properties, would be	15	properties of PIR foam insulation, and you can see the
16	better than low density polyethylene and non-foamed	16	thermal inertia from a cone calorimeter of
17	polyethylene, which means I would expect the surface to	17	0.06 kilowatts square per second.
18	heat up more rapidly than PE, all other conditions being	18	Can you describe the process by which this
19	equal.	19	material and I mean the material PIR supports
20	Q. Dr Lane has said that this product made up some	20	rapid flame spread?
21	13 per cent or so of the facade at Grenfell Tower. Just	21	A. So in order for flame spread to occur, you have to have
22	for a reference, that is paragraph 11.17.4 at page 63 of	22	heating of the surface of the material, which leads to
23	her latest report.	23	pyrolysis of the material. That results in the
24	Are you able to agree with her about that?	24	formation of combustible pyrolysis products adjacent to
25	A. I've not actually done a rigorous calculation, but it	25	the material and, if those pyrolysis products mix with
	Page 37		Page 39
1	seems about right, yes.	1	air in the right proportions, and you have either an
2	Q. Is XPS ever, in your professional and academic opinion,	2	ignition source or an appropriate amount of heat in that
3	an appropriate material to use on a high-rise building	3	gas mixture adjacent to the surface, you will have
4	such as Grenfell Tower?	4	flaming. Then you need the next piece of material to be
5	A. I mean, that's a question that I would want to answer in	5	exposed to conditions that are sufficient for that
6	the context of the overall fire safety strategy for the	6	response to sort of snowball, ignition to ignition to
7	building. It's conceivable that it could be used by	7	ignition, with the flame spreading along the surface.
8	someone who takes adequate account of its response to	8	So those are the conditions you need for flame
9	fire.	9	spread to occur.
10	Again, whilst my own remit for Phase 1 is not	10	One of the things it's important to mention about
11	necessarily related specifically to compliance	11	PIR is that you tend to need an external source of heat
12	assessments of various materials, at Grenfell Tower this	12	flux in order for that flame spread to progress along
13	material is used in an insulating capacity, and	13	a PIR material. So a piece of PIR material left to its
14	Grenfell Tower is above 18 metres. My reading of	14	own devices, in the absence of any heat flux being
15	Approved Document B would suggest that materials used in	15	received by it from an external source, will tend to
16	that type of application should be classed as A2, Euro	16	self-extinguish. Professor Torero mentioned this
17	class, which this material would not be.	17	yesterday.
18	So in that respect, no, it's not an appropriate	18	Q. Yes. That is PIR as a material.
19	material to be using, in my view.	19	If one then turns to Celotex as a product, the
20	But, again, I think that would be an excellent	20	question is: does an aluminium foil covering on one or
21	question to put to Dr Lane tomorrow.	21	more faces affect the rate of flame spread or time to
22	Q. Can I then turn to a different product, which is the PIR	22	ignition?
23	insulation. Just some general points, first of all.	23	A. Yes. I mean, it will, I think that's one of the reasons
24	You cover that at paragraph 438 on page 101, so	24	presumably that it's there. So the aluminium skin will
25	we're on the same page, and PIR, as you can see, is	25	prevent the pyrolysis gases, at least initially, from
		I	
	Page 38		Page 40

1	exiting the surface of the PIR, which makes them	1	classification of this product for the purposes of the
2	unavailable for combustion, the surface of the PIR, so	2	Building Regulations?
3	that would prevent surface spread of flame.	3	A. Again, I guess that's partly a compliance question,
4	Additionally, when subjected to a radiant heat flux,	4	isn't it? These materials are tested for classification
5	the aluminium will essentially reflect some of that	5	with respect to the requirements of the Building
6	initial radiant heat flux and will prevent surface	6	Regulations, both under the national classification
7	heating of the PIR to some extent so that it's less	7	system and under the European classification system, in
8	likely that it will pyrolyse early, despite its low	8	a way such that they are protected by their foil face
9	thermal inertia.	9	when those tests are performed, in all of the cases that
10	Q. Would there be a difference of significance between the	10	would matter relevant to those classifications, yes.
11	rate of flame spread across uncovered or unfoiled faces	11	So I guess that's a long-winded answer to the
12	as opposed to the rate of flame spread within the	12	question.
13	material where there is a foil face when exposed to heat	13	Yes, it matters if the aluminium is not there.
14	flux?	14	Q. Is that because when the tests are done, they're tests
15	A. I would expect there to be a significant difference,	15	done on PIR which is fully faced with an aluminium foil?
16	yes, although I wouldn't be able to quantify it at this	16	A. Correct, yes. And based on tests that I have seen,
17	stage.	17	I would say also that any joints are also sort of
18	Q. Professor Torero has said that PIR has the potential to	18	overtaped with aluminium tape when those tests are
19	burn for a longer period of time compared with other	19	performed, yes.
20 21	components of the Grenfell facade system. And, again,	20 21	Q. Second question: is there any relevance in the difference in the thickness of the aluminium foil on the
	a reference there: that's his report at page 64,	22	
22 23	lines 1748 to 1751. There's no need to go to it.	23	PIR insulation compared with the aluminium skin on the rainscreen when you're considering how readily each of
23 24	Do you agree with that?	24	those materials will pyrolyse?
25	A. Yes, in principle, yes.Q. Do you think that that potential to burn for a longer	25	
23	Q. Do you tillik tilat tilat potential to burn for a longer	23	A. That's a tricky one because of the differences in
	Page 41		Page 43
1	period is relevant in any way to the re-entry of fire	1	thermal inertia and density of the underlying materials.
2	back into flats at Grenfell Tower?	2	The aluminium skin on the Celotex is much, much thinner,
3	A. I mean, everything that can burn that is there is	3	so I would expect it to heat up a more quickly and,
4	potentially relevant. I wouldn't consider that to be	4	therefore, be removed more quickly than is the case for
5	dominant by any stretch of the imagination, but the fact	5	the ACM. I think that's a fair statement, yes.
6	that it can pyrolyse and release combustible pyrolysis	6	Q. Have you done any testing to determine the time and
7	products must be relevant in some way, even if a small	7	conditions under which the foil on the PIR would peel
8	one.	8	away or remove itself in comparison with the foil on the
9	Q. Again, another general question, I'm afraid: longer	9	panels?
10	burning time of which Professor Torero speaks and with	10	A. No.
11	which you agree, is that relevant to vertical or	11	Q. Could that be done?
12	horizontal fire spread?	12	A. It could be done. I'd have to think very hard and for
13	A. Potentially to the horizontal, but given the horizontal	13	longer than I have at the moment what we might get out
14	modes of fire spread that, again, I'm sure we'll talk	14	of that in terms of useful information, yes.
15	about in some detail later, I don't think it would play	15	Q. Turning to phenolic foam insulation. That's another
16	a significant role with horizontal.	16	material I want to ask you about.
17	With vertical, I think the timescales of vertical	17	Is it right that phenolic foam insulation was
18	fire spread are too short for the burning of the PIR to	18	present on the building in the form of Kingspan
19	be that important.	19	insulation on some spandrel panels?
20	Q. We've talked about cut edges and faces that are or	20	A. That's correct.
21	aren't exposed in the PIR.	21	Q. That I think was used on upper floors; is that right?
22	Two questions about that.	22	A. I think I've seen it photographed on some of the lower
23	First of all, would the fact that the Celotex as	23	floors, as well as during my walk-around on a few very
24	installed on the building with, in part, cut edges so	24	localised locations on the upper floors, yes.
25	that they're exposed affect the reliability of the	25	Q. Is it fair to say that it has similar properties to PIR
	Page 42		Page 44

1	in terms of its ability to support rapid flame spread?	1	paragraph, is that the aluminium alloys won't directly
2	A. In a general sense, yes.	2	contribute to fire development and can be expecting to
3	Q. Can you comment on how it would have contributed to the	3	have melting temperatures exceeding 660 degrees.
4	fire on the upper floors where it was used, if different	4	The question is: would those aluminium windows
5	from Celotex?	5	deform at a lower temperature?
6	A. No, I mean, in a similar manner to the things	6	A. The loss of stiffness in aluminium prior to melting,
7	I've already said about PIR.	7	yes, there would be some. I would have to reference
8	Q. I think you've also referred to other types of	8	technical literature to know for sure, but I would
9	insulation used in the building around the windows. Can	9	imagine you'd start to see loss of mechanical properties
10	I take you to paragraphs 337 and 338 on pages 81 and 82	10	anywhere above 300 Celsius, something like that.
11	of your report.	11	Q. Yes.
12	At the bottom of page 81, you pick up the fact that	12	A. What proportion of mechanical properties you'd lose at
13	there was:	13	what temperature would be something I'd want to do a bit
14	"337. A 25mm thick foil-faced PIR polymer foam	14	more homework on before answering.
15	insulation board manufactured by Celotex. The specific	15	Q. I suppose the question really is: at what temperature
16	product name is yet to be confirmed.	16	would you expect these windows to deform sufficiently to
17	"338. A 25mm thick foil-faced polymer foam	17	fall out?
18	insulation board manufactured by Kingspan. The specific	18	A. Very difficult question to answer, because it depends on
19	product name is yet to be confirmed"	19	the nature of the fixings, the way they're held in
20	Dr Lane has identified these as respectively	20	there, the loads that they're subjected to, the
21	Celotex TB4000 and Kingspan Thermapitch TP10. Have you	21	restraining forces that the structural frame imposes
22	any reason to disagree with Dr Lane?	22	back on them, given that the window frames are trying to
23	A. No, I have no reason to disagree.	23	expand more than the concrete that they're attached to.
24	Q. Do you know what materials those types of insulation are	24	So that's an extraordinarily difficult question to
25	comprised of?	25	answer.
	Page 45		Page 47
1	A. Those should be PIR materials, I believe, yes.	1	Q. Is it necessary, do you think, to answer it for the
2	Q. Turning next, then, to a new material, PU foam,	2	purposes of your reaching final conclusions at Phase 2?
3	polyurethane foam, page 102 of your report.	3	A. I mean, my remit for Phase 1 is interested in ignition
4	It's table 7 under section 4.10.1.5, if I can just	4	of the cladding and spread over the cladding. By the
5	ask you to look at that, please. Middle of the page.	5	time that aluminium window frames falling out and off of
6	You described PU foam as a synthetic thermoset	6	the building becomes an issue, the fire front is already
7	polymer, flexible or rigid.	7	gone. So I think in terms of timescales, for me it's
8	In the table, you've identified the properties.	8	not a relevant issue.
9	Just in general, professor, is it your opinion that	9	Q. I understand.
10	PU foam has similar properties to PIR and phenolic foam	10	A. There's certainly no evidence that the window frames
11	in terms of its ability to support rapid fire spread?	11	were falling out of the building that I'm aware of as
12	A. In general, yes. Yes, it's sort of ballpark, yes.	12	the fire was spreading.
13	Q. Ballpark?	13	Q. Next item: extract fans, which you've covered on
14	A. Yes.	14	page 98, if we can please turn to those, under
15	Q. It is a big or small ballpark?	15	section 4.9.2, paragraph 416. You cover it at 413 to
16	-	16	417 and I want to pick up what you say at 416.
17	A. Quite a small one, I would say. Q. Next product: aluminium windows. Page 94, if I can ask	17	You say there:
18	you just to skip back to that, please, under	18	"416. Video and photographic evidence collected
19		19	both during the fire and also during Post-fire site
	section 4.9, paragraphs 386 and 387.	20	
20	You've been able to identify now that the windows	20 21	investigations, along with a number of Inquiry witness
21	used in the refurbishment this is paragraph 386	1	statements (see Section 7.4), suggests that the kitchen
22		22	extract fans were in many cases the first components of
22	are assumed, based on the available evidence, to be what	22	Alanamin Alanaman Islam (in aland) Control 1 1 1 12
23	you've set out there, "Metal Technologies 5-20 Hi	23	the window assemblies (including frames, glazing units,
23 24	you've set out there, "Metal Technologies 5-20 Hi Thermally Broken Aluminium Windows", and your	24	infill panels and extract fans) to fail and fall away
23	you've set out there, "Metal Technologies 5-20 Hi	1	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
23 24	you've set out there, "Metal Technologies 5-20 Hi Thermally Broken Aluminium Windows", and your	24	infill panels and extract fans) to fail and fall away

		1	
1	fire exiting the compartment of origin in Flat 16 (see	1	about this this morning, funnily enough, over breakfast,
2	Section 5), and in the case external fire attack due to	2	and if the manufacturer of those fans can tell us, that
3	external fire spread elsewhere on and in the	3	would be very useful, yes.
4	cladding"	4	Q. Would it help you know at what likely temperature these
5	Are you able to identify what these extract fans	5	extract fans would deform and fail?
6	were themselves made of?	6	A. It would be sort of a secondary check on the testing
7	A. They're mechanical extract fans, so obviously they're	7	that we're doing ourselves at Edinburgh. So we are
8	made of a number of different materials, but the key	8	subjecting samples of the materials from these fans to
9	materials that are sort of holding them in place, if you	9	what's called dynamic mechanical analysis at the
10	like, are a polycarbonate ABS blend, as far as I can	10	University of Edinburgh, where we actually measure the
11	tell.	11	mechanical response of the material as it is heated and
12	So I do have a number of these fans at the	12	cooled. So we're actually measuring those reductions of
13	University of Edinburgh and we've been subjecting bits	13	mechanical properties at Edinburgh, and some of those
14	of the fans to testing to try to determine precisely	14	data were presented yesterday during the questioning of
15	what they are.	15	Professor Torero.
16	They are marked as PC-ABS with markings on the	16	Q. So is the answer that knowing those proportions would
17	various components, which is a polycarbonate ABS blend.	17	assist you in your work?
18	Q. At paragraph 417, if we can have that highlighted on the	18	A. I think so, yes. I don't think it's critical, but it
19	screen, you give us some details about that. PC-ABS.	19	would be nice to know.
20	This material itself I think you've analysed in	20	Q. Does that mean you're not able to say as at now the
21	a bit more detail in your report at page 104, if I can	21	likely temperature at which these extract fans would
22	just ask you to go to that.	22	deform and fail?
23	You have at table 9 on that page and table 10 where	23	A. The testing we've done to date and the data that were
24	you've analysed the selected typical properties of neat	24	presented yesterday when Professor Torero was giving
25	ABS plastic and neat PC plastic respectively.	25	evidence so the data that were presented yesterday
	Page 49		Page 51
	1 4gC 17		1 4ge 31
1	First of all, do you know whether the PC-ABS in	1	were data we obtained at the University of Edinburgh
2	these extract fans at Grenfell Tower were neat in the	2	using tests on the specific fans that were used at
3	way you've described them?	3	Grenfell Tower. Those tests indicated essentially
4	A. So the reason that I've presented those two tables for	4	a total loss of mechanical properties before you reach
5	what is effectively one material, if you like, is that	5	a temperature of about 100 degrees Celsius, which is
6	the way PC-ABS works, based on my understanding I'm	6	clearly quite a low temperature in the context of
7	not a polymers chemist is that it's a physical blend.	7	a fire.
8	So you have some polycarbonate thermoplastic and some	8	MR MILLETT: Thank you, professor.
9	ABS thermoplastic, and you just physically mix them into	9	Mr Chairman, I'm going to turn to a different
10	a mixture in some relative proportions to one another	10	material. Is that a convenient moment for a short
11	and you end up with a PC-ABS blend, which is the polymer	11	break?
12	that you end up. So the respective proportions of ABS	12	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think it is, yes.
13	and PC will depend on the particular properties that	13	Professor Bisby, we're going to have a break now.
14	you're interested in for your particular component.	14	THE WITNESS: Okay.
15	So whether you want a shiny surface, a durable	15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I am going to have to ask you,
16	surface or a tough surface or a product that's resistant	16	please, not to talk to anyone about your evidence while
17	to cracking or a bit more amenable to being pushed	17	you're out of the room, and we'll start again at 11.25.
18	around, you can play with the proportions of the two	18	All right?
19	components. The products are marked as BC ABS but I don't brown	19	If you would like to go with the usher, she'll look
20	The products are marked as PC-ABS, but I don't know	20	after you.
21	what proportions those two components are in. O. Would it be relevant to your work to know those	21	Good, 11.25, then, please.
22	Q. Would it be relevant to your work to know those	22	(11.15 am)
23 24	proportions?	23 24	(A short break) (11.25 am)
			U L . 4.2 all D
	A. We're trying to find out via testing at the University	1	
25	A. We're trying to find out via testing at the University of Edinburgh what those proportions are. I was thinking	25	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, ready to carry on,
	• •	1	

1	professor?	1	Q. Let me show you something. Can I ask, please, the
2	THE WITNESS: Yes.	2	witness to be shown CTAR00000018, page 3.
3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.	3	This is a BRE report from 1992 after the Knowsley
4	Mr Millett.	4	Heights fire.
5	MR MILLETT: Professor, I want to turn now, please, to the	5	You can see under the heading "Fire damage", if we
6	uPVC window surrounds.	6	can have that expanded:
7	We know from your report that uPVC was installed	7	"All the cladding on the eleven storeys was
8	around the windows during the refurbishment; correct?	8	destroyed on one vertical face - note that the splayed
9	A. Yes.	9	corners were also damaged, Figure 3.1.3. Fire spread
10	Q. I think you've set out on page 103 of your report if	10	vertically up the cavity behind the cladding, melting
11	we can go to that, please table 8, which shows the	11	the aluminium supports and also attacking the window
12	selected typical properties of PVC rubber membrane,	12	reveals via the strand board and the uPVC frames"
13	which is under the heading which starts the page before	13	Does that tell us anything about the risks of using
14	at paragraph 447, under section 4.10.1.6, "Polyvinyl	14	uPVC surrounds adjacent to combustible materials?
15	Chloride".	15	A. I would query what specifically is meant by uPVC frames
16	The table there shows that uPVC has a low melting	16	in this context. That might mean the actual window
17	point of between 75 and 105 degrees centigrade, and we	17	frames are made from uPVC, as opposed to the boards that
18	can see that there.	18	surround the window opening, which is the case we have
19	We can keep that on the screen, if we can, please,	19	at Grenfell Tower. So I'm not certain we're talking
20	Paul, but can we also have up on the screen the report	20	about necessarily an apples to apples situation in this
21	of Professor Torero at page 41, where there is	21	case.
22	a diagram. It's his figure 9 on page 41. That's	22	But I think it's clear that uPVC is very well known
23	JTOS0000001. We see it on the lower part of the page	23	to soften and lose mechanical properties at temperatures
24	there, professor.	24	that are low. I think I've quoted typical surface
25	He says that that shows:	25	temperature limits in the range of 50 degrees Celsius.
23	The says that that shows.		temperature minus in the range of 30 degrees ceisius.
	Page 53		Page 55
	IDA 1 : 1 C DIVICE CONTROL CONTROL		The second secon
1	"Mechanical properties of uPVC as a function of	1	The manufacturers of uPVC products will quote these
2	temperature [°c]. The modulus (in blue) is related to	2	values in terms of surface temperature limits.
2 3	temperature [°c]. The modulus (in blue) is related to the elastic modulus of the material the plot indicates	2 3	values in terms of surface temperature limits. So if a surface temperature limit for a product is
2 3 4	temperature [°c]. The modulus (in blue) is related to the elastic modulus of the material the plot indicates that the material begins to drastically lose stiffness	2 3 4	values in terms of surface temperature limits. So if a surface temperature limit for a product is limited to 50 degrees Celsius, anyone who has thought
2 3 4 5	temperature [°c]. The modulus (in blue) is related to the elastic modulus of the material the plot indicates that the material begins to drastically lose stiffness at approx. 60°c, losing 80°c by 80°c and 100% by 90°c.	2 3 4 5	values in terms of surface temperature limits. So if a surface temperature limit for a product is limited to 50 degrees Celsius, anyone who has thought about it will recognise that temperatures substantially
2 3 4 5 6	temperature [°c]. The modulus (in blue) is related to the elastic modulus of the material the plot indicates that the material begins to drastically lose stiffness at approx. 60°c, losing 80°c by 80°c and 100% by 90°c. tests were conducted at the University of Edinburgh and	2 3 4 5 6	values in terms of surface temperature limits. So if a surface temperature limit for a product is limited to 50 degrees Celsius, anyone who has thought about it will recognise that temperatures substantially higher than that are going to be problematic. If you're
2 3 4 5 6 7	temperature [°c]. The modulus (in blue) is related to the elastic modulus of the material the plot indicates that the material begins to drastically lose stiffness at approx. 60°c, losing 80°c by 80°c and 100% by 90°c. tests were conducted at the University of Edinburgh and the data was provided by Prof. Bisby."	2 3 4 5 6 7	values in terms of surface temperature limits. So if a surface temperature limit for a product is limited to 50 degrees Celsius, anyone who has thought about it will recognise that temperatures substantially higher than that are going to be problematic. If you're relying on this material to provide any sort of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	temperature [°c]. The modulus (in blue) is related to the elastic modulus of the material the plot indicates that the material begins to drastically lose stiffness at approx. 60°c, losing 80°c by 80°c and 100% by 90°c. tests were conducted at the University of Edinburgh and the data was provided by Prof. Bisby." First of all, can you confirm that you're the source	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	values in terms of surface temperature limits. So if a surface temperature limit for a product is limited to 50 degrees Celsius, anyone who has thought about it will recognise that temperatures substantially higher than that are going to be problematic. If you're relying on this material to provide any sort of performance in a fire, you ought to be, in my opinion,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	temperature [°c]. The modulus (in blue) is related to the elastic modulus of the material the plot indicates that the material begins to drastically lose stiffness at approx. 60°c, losing 80°c by 80°c and 100% by 90°c. tests were conducted at the University of Edinburgh and the data was provided by Prof. Bisby." First of all, can you confirm that you're the source of that data set?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	values in terms of surface temperature limits. So if a surface temperature limit for a product is limited to 50 degrees Celsius, anyone who has thought about it will recognise that temperatures substantially higher than that are going to be problematic. If you're relying on this material to provide any sort of performance in a fire, you ought to be, in my opinion, deeply suspicious of the ability of uPVC to provide it.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	temperature [°c]. The modulus (in blue) is related to the elastic modulus of the material the plot indicates that the material begins to drastically lose stiffness at approx. 60°c, losing 80°c by 80°c and 100% by 90°c. tests were conducted at the University of Edinburgh and the data was provided by Prof. Bisby." First of all, can you confirm that you're the source of that data set? A. That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	values in terms of surface temperature limits. So if a surface temperature limit for a product is limited to 50 degrees Celsius, anyone who has thought about it will recognise that temperatures substantially higher than that are going to be problematic. If you're relying on this material to provide any sort of performance in a fire, you ought to be, in my opinion, deeply suspicious of the ability of uPVC to provide it. I think that would be fair, yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	temperature [°c]. The modulus (in blue) is related to the elastic modulus of the material the plot indicates that the material begins to drastically lose stiffness at approx. 60°c, losing 80°c by 80°c and 100% by 90°c. tests were conducted at the University of Edinburgh and the data was provided by Prof. Bisby." First of all, can you confirm that you're the source of that data set? A. That's correct. Q. Secondly, do you agree with Professor Torero's use of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	values in terms of surface temperature limits. So if a surface temperature limit for a product is limited to 50 degrees Celsius, anyone who has thought about it will recognise that temperatures substantially higher than that are going to be problematic. If you're relying on this material to provide any sort of performance in a fire, you ought to be, in my opinion, deeply suspicious of the ability of uPVC to provide it. I think that would be fair, yes. Q. Before I leave this, can I take you to figure 3.1.4,
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1	is suggesting that when a uPVC window frame is subjected	1	materials would ignite?
2	to heat from an externally escalating fire, the failure	2	A. No, I've not been able to confirm precisely what those
3	of the glazing will happen earlier. But having not read	3	materials are as yet. Again, we're doing testing on
4	the report, I wouldn't be able to say for sure.	4	those materials at Edinburgh and we hope to be able to
5	Q. Fair enough.	5	say so soon.
6	Putting that away and going back to	6	Q. Assuming smoke at 100 degrees centigrade, would that in
7	Professor Torero's report, can I ask you to be shown	7	your opinion, professor, open a direct path for flame
8	page 44 of his report, please, and specifically lines	8	spread into the cladding structure via the uPVC
9	1266 to 1271, where he identifies the lower and upper	9	deformation?
10	bounds of temperature which would affect uPVC's	10	A. That's a difficult question to answer. UPVC, as we've
11	behaviour.	11	discussed, does soften at relatively low temperatures,
12	Can I summarise this: in general terms, do you agree	12	but it doesn't turn into a flowing liquid in the way
13	the heating of uPVC by smoke generated by a 300-kilowatt	13	that, for instance, polyethylene will. I believe
14	fire so 140 and 220 degrees centigrade will result	14	Professor Torero said it turns to sort of gum. I would
15	in a loss of mechanical strength within approximately 5	15	say it goes floppy, to use the technical lingo. So it
16	to 11.5 minutes?	16	doesn't flow, typically, although it can semi-flow in
17	A. I mean, it's certainly plausible, yes. I'd want to do	17	a very viscous way under certain heating conditions. So
18	the calculation myself to verify that, to say	18	the rate at which it's heated matters in terms of what
19	definitively yes, but it's certainly plausible.	19	you get after it's heated.
20	Q. Turning to page 47 of Professor Torero's report, I just	20	UPVC is a very interesting material because in some
21	want to show you five lines in the middle of that page.	21	cases and we have evidence of this on site at
22	That's 1344 to 1349, if you could just look at those.	22	Grenfell Tower under some forms of heating, which we
23	He picks up your report, and then in line 1347 says:	23	don't know, you see the uPVC remains essentially white
24	"None of these components would have ignited with	24	and drips and almost flows like a molasses or something,
25	the temperatures attained by the smoke layer, therefore	25	certainly from the head of the window in cases and in
	Page 57		Page 59
1	the conditions that will lead to direct impingement of	1	many cases on the jamb.
2	flames on these materials need to be analyzed."	2	In other cases, I would imagine cases where it's
3	Do you agree with that?	3	subjected to higher heat fluxes under a shorter duration
4	A. Yes.	4	of time, the uPVC will intermesh which means it chars
5	Q. Do you agree that the dimensions of the kitchen in	5	and bubbles and becomes sort of a black expanded char.
6	flat 16 were sufficiently small that uPVC would've	6	It will also, under some circumstances, in the
7	failed wherever the fire had been in that kitchen?	7	manner I described for XPS, as a consequence of that
8	A. Yes, although I am basing that opinion on the analysis	8	charring and swelling, it will also shrink to some
9	provided by Professor Torero.	9	extent.
10	Q. Absolutely, and thank you for that clarification.	10	So the combination of it going floppy, it
11	Do you also agree that given the low temperature of	11	potentially dripping under some circumstances or
12	smoke, you would need direct flame impingement on	12	potentially swelling and forming a char means it's very
13	combustible elements around the windows below or behind	13	difficult to say definitively what would've happened to
14	the uPVC?	14	that uPVC.
15	A. If we assume that the smoke temperatures are going to be	15	That's quite a caveat, I admit. The short answer is
16	300 Celsius or lower, in accordance with	16	I think it's certainly plausible and potentially likely
17	Professor Torero's analysis, then yes, I would agree	17	that if you had the uPVC heated to temperatures around
18	with that.	18	100 degrees Celsius, that, yes, you would open up a gap
19	Q. I should have qualified the question in that way, but	19	adjacent to the window, yes.
20	thank you for that.	20	Q. I am going to press you a little bit. You say certainly
21	Turning to the related question of adherence, do you	21	plausible and potentially likely.
22	agree that glue and silicon sealants which were used to	22	Doing the best you can sitting here, with what
23	install the uPVC window surrounds are also flammable?	23	degree of confidence would you say that, assuming smoke
24	A. Yes.	24	temperature of 100 degrees centigrade, that would open
25	Q. Do you know from your own work at what temperature those	25	a path into the cladding?
	Control of the contro		- r
	Page 58		Page 60

1	A If	,	CID MADTIN MOODE DICK. And then I don't know
1	A. If you said assuming a temperature of 200 to 300 degrees	1 2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And then, I don't know
2	centigrade, I would be more confident.	3	A. Yes. Again, I think, yes, I agree with you. But the
3	Q. So is it right that your confidence level gets lower the	4	uPVC boards don't weigh that much in comparative terms,
5	lower the temperature? A. Of course. Of course, yes.	5	they're not super-high-density products. So the forces to which those adhesives would be subjected are not
6	Q. But at 100, which is our benchmark	6	•
7		7	immense, and they tend to be quite strong adhesives at
	A. Yeah, I think it's likely that we will have had	8	ambient temperature. So even if they lose virtually all
8	I mean, we know from having looked at post-fire photos	9	of their mechanical properties, they may still have
9	in particular of the building, in apartments or in flats		sufficient properties to hold something in place.
10	that were not subjected to very severe fires but where	10	So it's very difficult for me to say absolutely the
11	the fire was creeping in from the outside in the later	11	uPVC falls away, absolutely we have a hole next to the
12	stages of the fire, we know that the weak point in the	12	window. I think it's likely, but I'm a cautious guy, so
13	window surrounds is that gap to the right or left of the	13	I wouldn't want to say absolutely.
14	window.	14	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I suppose gravity plays its part,
15	Q. Yes.	15	because depending on where they're fixed
16	A. And so, yes, I think that's a likely weak point.	16	A. Of course. Yes, yes, of course.
17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: While we're on this aspect of	17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, thank you very much.
18	things, can you help with the adhesives? You just told	18	Yes, Mr Millett.
19	me that the adhesives are the sort of materials that	19	MR MILLETT: Can I now turn to EPDM rubber, which stands for
20	will deform	20	ethylene propylene diene monomer rubber, which you cover
21	A. They're polymeric materials, yes.	21	on page 103 at paragraph 4.10.1.7.
22	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you contemplate a uPVC board	22	Correct me if I'm wrong, professor, this material
23	fixed by adhesive to something else, and you've got	23	was used as a weatherproof membrane in the window
24	smoke impingement let's take the 100-degree	24	assembly at Grenfell Tower.
25	centigrade figure do you know how that is going to	25	A. That's correct, at the sides of the windows.
	Page 61		Page 63
1	affect the adhesive?	1	O. At paragraph 450 on this page, just under that heading
	affect the adhesive? A. The issue there is that in order to affect the adhesive.	1 2	Q. At paragraph 450 on this page, just under that heading there you say:
1 2 3	A. The issue there is that in order to affect the adhesive,	2	there, you say:
2	A. The issue there is that in order to affect the adhesive, the heat would have to get through the uPVC to the	2 3	there, you say: "No specific details are available regarding the
2	A. The issue there is that in order to affect the adhesive, the heat would have to get through the uPVC to the adhesive. So the adhesive is going to be in a sense	2 3 4	there, you say: "No specific details are available regarding the combustion properties of EPDM, and these will be studied
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2 3 4 5 6	A. The issue there is that in order to affect the adhesive, the heat would have to get through the uPVC to the adhesive. So the adhesive is going to be in a sense insulated by the uPVC. But if we assume that the uPVC manages to get to 100 degrees Celsius and then the adhesive gets to 100 degrees Celsius, I presume the	2 3 4 5 6 7	there, you say: "No specific details are available regarding the combustion properties of EPDM, and these will be studied by laboratory-based testing at Phase 2 for the specific
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1	Again, I couldn't identify it.	1	Is it right just, in general terms, purlboard is
2	Q. From your knowledge of mastic in general, would that	2	a polyurethane foam board covered with a paper covering?
3	also be flammable?	3	A. Correct.
4	A. I would expect so, but I would want to check.	4	Q. It formed part of the original construction of
5	Q. Would you expect so because it's a polymer?	5	Grenfell Tower above the perimeter of the windows in
6	A. I presume it's polymer-based.	6	each flat.
7	Q. Right, okay.	7	A. That's my understanding, yes. It's shown as an existing
8	Next material: spray foam. We can take this,	8	feature on some of the architectural drawings for the
9	I think, quickly, but in your report at page 256, if	9	refurb. It's also present below the windows on the
10	I can jump ahead to that, you set out there at	10	external wall of the building, covered with a layer of
11	paragraphs 1190 to 1194 some evidence that you've	11	plasterboard.
12	summarised from the BSR witness statements and oral	12	Q. On page 85, at paragraph 357, you say that you don't
13	evidence about pre-existing gaps in the window framing,	13	believe that it:
14	and, in particular, some evidence from some residents	14	" played a central role in spread of the fire
15	that additional foam or silicon was used by Rydon to	15	once the external cladding ignited, however it may have
16	fill up the gaps around the windows of which residents	16	played an as yet undetermined role in fire spread and
17	have given evidence that they complained.	17	growth within the compartment of origin."
18	At 1192, you say in the penultimate line:	18	Do you mean flat 16 or do you mean all flats into
19	" additional foam and/or silicone was used to	19	which the fire then entered?
20	(ineffectually in some cases) address this problem."	20	A. In this instance I mean flat 16.
21	Was that use of additional foam and/or silicon	21	Q. Was the presence of purlboard a route or mechanism by
22	potentially significant in terms of the ingress of	22	which fire could break back into flats or propagate
23	either smoke or fire back into flats?	23	within them once it had come back in?
24	A. I mean, it's very hard to say. There's sort of a double	24	A. Given its location in a band I believe 350 millimetres
25	answer on this point, in that if we're talking about	25	in width around the exterior wall of the entirety of
	Page 65		Page 67
1	ingress of smoke, and that smoke is relatively cool,	1	every flat that I'm aware of in the building, then that
2	cool to such an extent that it doesn't affect the	2	
3	coor to such an extent that it doesn't affect the		
	nolymer foam that's been sprayed in place, one can		purlboard on the ceiling would be one of the first combustible materials that a fire coming into the flat
	polymer foam that's been sprayed in place, one can	3	combustible materials that a fire coming into the flat
4	imagine the presence of that foam would be helpful as	3 4	combustible materials that a fire coming into the flat through a window would find as it was coming in,
4 5	imagine the presence of that foam would be helpful as regards ingress of smoke.	3	combustible materials that a fire coming into the flat through a window would find as it was coming in, notwithstanding the materials around the actual window
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1	place.	1	Can I ask you to unpack that a little bit for us and
2	I'm not entirely sure if that's what that question	2	just explain these edges.
3	is getting at. I'm not entirely sure what	3	First of all, can you point out where the bevelled
4	a polyethylene gripper rod is, if I'm being honest. But	4	edges are for us? You can get up if you want to.
5	there are certainly little bits of polymer shim that	5	A. So the bevelled edge I'm referring to is this edge here
6	seem to have been installed in an improvised manner to	6	(Indicates). For instance, comparing to this edge, this
7	get the window exactly where they want it.	7	edge, the cut across the panel is perpendicular. Here
8	Q. Have you been able to form any view about whether those	8	that cut is at an angle. The reason I felt that was
9	shims or pucks as you describe them contributed in any	9	significant to mention is it exposes a larger surface
10	way to the spread of fire or smoke?	10	area of polyethylene at that location.
11	A. These are small shims, so the mass of material that is	11	Q. It's not immediately obvious to the naked eye looking at
12	present is quite low. I wouldn't expect any significant	12	this photograph
13	impact in terms of the available fuel, that sort of	13	A. When you hold it, it's quite obvious.
14	thing. I suppose it's plausible, given the role that	14	Q. Really more for the transcript, the inner edges of the
15	they appear to be performing, that loss of mechanical	15	aluminium that we can see on figure 20 are set back from
16	properties of those shims could lead to loosening of the	16	the outer edges, so the bevel is an angle from the
17	window frames themselves under heat, but that would be	17	bottom to the top.
18	speculative.	18	A. That's correct.
19	Q. Have you seen any evidence that that happened?	19	Q. Similarly with the upright there, from the inner to the
20	A. Not seen any evidence of that happening, no.	20	outer, there's an angle.
21	Q. I'm now going to turn to a different topic altogether,	21	What kind of angle is the bevel, do you know?
22	coming away from materials, and I'm going to turn to the	22	
23	geometry of the building and the presence of cavities	23	A. I haven't measured it, but it is probably somewhere
23			around 45 degrees, I would say, from memory.
25	and channels in the structure, and to see how and where	24	Q. Right.
23	some of those materials we've been discussing this	25	A. I should point out that this is one example of a cut
	Page 69		Page 71
	0		0
1	morning, professor, fit in.	1	edge on one specific piece of spandrel cassette I was
2	morning, professor, fit in. Can I start by going to page 41 of your report and	1 2	edge on one specific piece of spandrel cassette I was given, so I have no way of knowing if that is a uniform
	5.1		
2	Can I start by going to page 41 of your report and	2	given, so I have no way of knowing if that is a uniform detail. Q. From your knowledge, partly following up that last
2 3	Can I start by going to page 41 of your report and showing you section 3.2.4.	2 3	given, so I have no way of knowing if that is a uniform detail.
2 3 4	Can I start by going to page 41 of your report and showing you section 3.2.4. You summarise in that section there we can see it	2 3 4	given, so I have no way of knowing if that is a uniform detail. Q. From your knowledge, partly following up that last
2 3 4 5	Can I start by going to page 41 of your report and showing you section 3.2.4. You summarise in that section there we can see it at paragraphs 232, 233 and 234 the three main sets of	2 3 4 5	given, so I have no way of knowing if that is a uniform detail. Q. From your knowledge, partly following up that last question, would this kind of configuration or this kind
2 3 4 5 6	Can I start by going to page 41 of your report and showing you section 3.2.4. You summarise in that section there we can see it at paragraphs 232, 233 and 234 the three main sets of materials present in the cladding system: the foil-faced polymeric PIR insulation product, the ACM panels and the cavity barriers.	2 3 4 5 6	given, so I have no way of knowing if that is a uniform detail. Q. From your knowledge, partly following up that last question, would this kind of configuration or this kind of feature be present on every ACM cassette on the tower? A. It's hard to say. Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7	Can I start by going to page 41 of your report and showing you section 3.2.4. You summarise in that section there we can see it at paragraphs 232, 233 and 234 the three main sets of materials present in the cladding system: the foil-faced polymeric PIR insulation product, the ACM panels and the	2 3 4 5 6 7	given, so I have no way of knowing if that is a uniform detail. Q. From your knowledge, partly following up that last question, would this kind of configuration or this kind of feature be present on every ACM cassette on the tower?
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1	So I point it out out of interest, but I don't think	1 your report.
2	it's a hugely significant detail, if that's a helpful	While we're on this and I know this is more going
3	thing to say.	3 to be Phase 2 are you able at this stage to identify
4	Q. Yes.	4 any obvious risks in that kind of installation?
5	The other feature you point out in figure 20 is the	5 A. The hanging of the cassettes on the rails in that way?
6	re-entrant internal corners. The word re-entrant might	6 Q. With exposed PE.
7	be confusing because you use it in a different context	7 A. I mean, yes. I mean, those rails as installed at
8	when we come to the panels on the column, but do you	8 Grenfell Tower, they also break through cavity barriers,
9	mean by re-entrant the well, what you point out	9 as I'm sure we'll also discuss later. So you have
		·
10	there, the lower edge?	
11	A. I mean the inside	the cladding and, in doing so, expose those exposed edges of polyethylene to heat. Perhaps as importantly,
12	Q. The inside lower edge.	
13	A. This here (Indicates).	even if the spread up the cladding rail is not what
14	Q. Is that lower edge exposing PE simply because of the way	we're particularly worried about, if the ACM cassette on
15	in which this cassette was folded over and shaped?	the whole is exposed to heat and you have the
16	A. Yes. My understanding of the way these cassettes are	polyethylene becoming liquid within the ACM cassette,
17	shaped is that you take a flat panel of the ACM sheet	what that means is some of that polyethylene is going to
18	and then you route a groove into the back face of it and	exit the ACM cassette within the cladding rail, which
19	then you fold along that line. So you remove the	19 then provides a route for that polyethylene to flow down
20	aluminium skin and you remove a certain volume of the	20 as well.
21	polyethylene, which allows you to get a nice straight	Q. Absolutely. I think we can make this clearer, actually,
22	fold line in your cladding cassette, in the same way you	by reference to figure 16 on page 43.
23	might score a box in order to make a box.	23 A. Okay.
24	Q. At paragraph 241 on page 42 of your report, you explain	Q. If we can go to that. I think that's your drawing,
25	the importance of this folding and exposure of PE. We	isn't it, there?
	Page 73	Page 75
1	can see what you say there.	1 A. That's correct, ves.
1 2	can see what you say there. But in simple terms, does this mean that exposed	1 A. That's correct, yes. 2 O. It's a horizontal section detail, so we're looking at
2	But in simple terms, does this mean that exposed	2 Q. It's a horizontal section detail, so we're looking at
2 3	But in simple terms, does this mean that exposed return edges go into the cladding rails which are then	Q. It's a horizontal section detail, so we're looking at it, as it were, from above, at the join between the
2 3 4	But in simple terms, does this mean that exposed return edges go into the cladding rails which are then voids which run up the length of the spandrel?	 Q. It's a horizontal section detail, so we're looking at it, as it were, from above, at the join between the concrete spandrel beam and the concrete column, so at
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	But in simple terms, does this mean that exposed return edges go into the cladding rails which are then voids which run up the length of the spandrel? A. What it means is that at the edges of ACM panels, you will always have exposed polyethylene, and on the insides of the boxes along every fold line you will also have exposed polyethylene, which means that there are multiple routes to expose that polyethylene directly to heating or flaming and, probably more importantly, there are multiple routes by which melted polyethylene can exit the ACM panel and then flow to other places. Q. Do these return edges which are exposed in the way we've seen, either the bevelled ones or the return edges, fit into the cladding rails? A. I'm not sure I follow. You mean as the cladding cassettes are hung onto the cladding rails? Q. Yes. A. Yes, within the cladding rails you will have exposed edges of ACM, yes.	Q. It's a horizontal section detail, so we're looking at it, as it were, from above, at the join between the concrete spandrel beam and the concrete column, so at the return, if I can call it that, there. You show the ACM rainscreen cassettes spandrel section turning at right angles and fitting into the aluminium cladding rail, and you put "Void" there. Does this mean that the exposed edges of the ACM rainscreen cassettes are sitting within the void? In fact, there are two of them there. A. That's correct. Q. Does that mean that there is therefore exposed PE material sitting in that void? A. Correct. Q. And that if it burns, drips and melts, it will drip down the void, down the rail? A. That would be my expectation, yes. Q. Can I ask you to look at page 50, just picking this up and running with it a bit further. We can see
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1	system have been removed on the left-hand side of that	1	photograph, but the angled PIR foam insulation attached
2	photo.	2	to the column is, albeit from below.
3	Q. Certainly. Can you identify from that photograph the	3	A. Yes, so these two are here and here (Indicates).
4	return element that runs into the cladding rail? Are	4	Q. Oh, I see.
5	you able to do that?	5	A. Just barely visible.
6	A. Yes.	6	Q. Yes, I see.
7	Q. Can you do that for us, please.	7	A. This one is coming in here.
8	A. So I imagine what we're talking about is this line along	8	Q. That one. Yes, I see.
9	the side of the spandrel cassette (Indicates), and	9	A. That's correct.
10	there's this small cover strip of ACM which is sort of	10	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If we look on the photograph,
11	adhered to the side of that, and then there are these	11	there's a label showing what's described as foil face
12	bars here running side to side in the cladding rail, the	12	polymer foam insulation board column section.
13	cassette has sort of hook-shaped cut-outs on the side it	13	It's the second label
14	hangs onto, and that cut-out side is all exposed PE.	14	A. Correct, yes.
15	Q. Is that photograph representative of what you would find	15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That looks as though it's
16	I suppose above and below the kitchen window of flat 16?	16	identifying a cut edge.
17	A. Yes, from level 4 to the top of the building, to the	17	A. That is a cut edge. So this here is a cut edge.
18	extent we can confirm that, given the damage of the	18	However, underneath so what you would have found here
19	upper levels, yes.	19	is a cavity barrier here and then you would've found
20	Q. Sorry, I may have to make you get up again, but can you	20	another piece of the PIR coming down here. So this edge
21	also point out on this photograph where the cut edges of	21	would've been butted up against the cavity barrier, and
22	PIR insulation would be?	22	below the top surface would've been butted up against
23	A. That is a slightly trickier one in this location.	23	the cavity barrier.
24	Q. It may be we can do it in a better	24	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
25	A. Yes, it's more obvious at the location next to the	25	MR MILLETT: I think, just while we're at it, you can
	The rest, is a more of violation for the formation field to the		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
	Page 77		Page 79
1	window as opposed to next to the spandrel, so it's more	1	actually see the voids is this right? created by
2	obvious slightly up here (Indicates).	2	the grooves in the concrete columns?
2 3	obvious slightly up here (Indicates). In this situation, it's probably worth pointing out	2 3	the grooves in the concrete columns? A. That's correct, yes. So, yes, you can see the surface
2 3 4	obvious slightly up here (Indicates). In this situation, it's probably worth pointing out that this construction detail that's shown on this	2 3 4	the grooves in the concrete columns? A. That's correct, yes. So, yes, you can see the surface of the pre-existing concrete columns were not flat. You
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	obvious slightly up here (Indicates). In this situation, it's probably worth pointing out that this construction detail that's shown on this slide, the two layers of the PIR foam on the spandrel section sort of framing into the interesting configuration of cuts in the PIR here where they join, into the 100-millimetre depth on the columns, because of the configuration of the building, it would appear that that's quite a straightforward thing to actually do from a constructability perspective. So given the geometries we're dealing with here, it seems that whoever installed the cladding and insulation was able to cut the insulation to kind of fit in the way that I've shown it here. Adjacent to the window, which I guess is a different figure, I don't know if it's — I won't ruin your plan, Mr Millett — there's more variability next to the window in terms of how that was installed. But having said that, you have essentially foil here and you have foil here, that is a cut edge, PIR, you have foil along this surface and along this surface, that is a cut edge, that is a cut edge (Indicates).	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	the grooves in the concrete columns? A. That's correct, yes. So, yes, you can see the surface of the pre-existing concrete columns were not flat. You have these sort of vertical channels in them. It's worth saying in some locations on the building that I've inspected, there has been an attempt made apparently to close those at the locations of cavity barriers with spray foam. In other locations, not so, as is shown here. Q. With spray foam? A. With spray foam, yes. Q. Returning to the subject of exposed PE edges, can I ask you to be shown, please, figure 10.26 in Barbara Lane's report. That is BLAS0000010, at page 26. This is paragraph 10.4.8 of Dr Lane's report. You can see on the right-hand side of that figure the photograph we were looking at earlier with the bevelled edges. On the left-hand side of that figure there is a location photograph identifying where one would find those gaps on the building. Dr Lane has related the bevelled edge to the edge of the panel, as you can see, under the return at
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			_
1	A. Yes.	1	there.
2	Q. Do you agree with that?	2	Indeed, yesterday, I believe, Professor Torero was
3	A. I do.	3	shown a picture where this piece of board has been cut
4	Q. Does that tell us that, in fact, there were exposed	4	square and it just comes up and it just stops, and there
5	polyethylene edges open to the atmosphere?	5	no piece of insulation here. That's from Dr Lane's
6	A. Yes.	6	report. We see variable configurations of the cuts in
7	Q. Can I ask you next to turn back to your own report at	7	the PIR boards, certainly in the lower levels of the
8	page 44, figure 17.	8	building.
9	That shows the geometry of the cladding system at	9	So it's hard to say with any certainty at a given
10	the junction of a window unit and a column on the east	10	location what the condition was at that location, and
11	face; is that aright?	11	certainly outside flat 16 there's so much damage
12	A. That's correct.	12	I couldn't tell you, outside flat 16, if this piece of
13	Q. There's a photograph I think we can relate to this.	13	foam is there, if the board is cut at this acute angle
14	Paul, if we can keep this on the screen and go,	14	like this or cut at the right angles. I just can't say.
15	please, to page 55 of your report. There's a photograph	15	Q. Just focusing on the exposed edge of the panel exposing
16	there which is figure 27(b). We have a similar	16	the PE, you've identified the elbow joint, but at the
17	photograph as we had before under (a), and under (b) we	17	top, which I think was the first edge you identified of
18	have a different photograph.	18	the yellow hatched aluminium fixing sorry, ACM panel.
19	Can you help us with this: first of all, in the	19	Just exactly which edge is exposed, can you point that
20	photograph, is this representative of what you would	20	out?
21	find adjacent to the kitchen window of flat 16?	21	A. You mean just here (Indicates)?
22	A. Yes.	22	Q. Just there.
23	Q. On this photograph, and using both the photograph and	23	A. It's that little tiny edge (Indicates).
24	the diagram, can you help us, where would the exposed	24	Q. Is that sitting in a void?
25	edges of ACM panel be in that assembly?	25	A. No. It's sitting, as you can see in this picture,
	Daga 91		Daga 92
	Page 81		Page 83
1	A. In this case, the exposed edges of ACM panel are sort of	1	barely the detail alongside the window, it's very
2	just there at the tip, where it comes in here	2	difficult to see, but you can see that you have the
3	(Indicates), and at this corner here internally, you	3	window frame, which is the darker grey, and then you
4	would have an exposed re-entrant corner.	4	have a secondary element here, which is a little metal
5	Q. Just at that little elbow joint I think you're pointing	5	angle which is connected to the window frame, and then
6	at	6	the ACM panel is riveted through or screwed through that
7	A. Correct, just here (Indicates).	7	L-shaped channel. So the exposed edge of polyethylene
8	Q in figure 17.	8	here, alongside the window, is actually external to the
9	A. So you would have that routed joint there to create the	9	L. So it's just there (Indicates), along that line.
10	fold.	10	Q. Does that mean that it would be visible or tangible from
11	Q. Is that like what you call the return edge in the	11	within the flat?
12	photograph me looked at earlier?	12	A. It's quite close to the frame, so it will probably be
13	A. Correct, though obviously a different angle.	13	quite difficult to get a little at it, but in principle,
14	Q. Are any of the voids that you can see in the diagram,	14	yes.
15	figure 17, relevant to fire spread?	15	Q. But it's exposed to the air?
16	A. In this figure I mean, yes. I mean, one issue that	16	A. It appears that way, yes.
17	is a bit of a sticking point is you can see that I have	17	Q. So is this right: there is actually an exposed
18	kind of lightened this piece of polymer foam, of PIR	18	longitudinal edge of some 3 millimetres of PE facing
19	foam insulation, and that is because the condition of	19	into each flat at that location about well, five or
20	the insulation boards in that location adjacent to	20	so centimetres, perhaps less, from the window frame?
21	windows over the building is variable, so we don't	21	A. Provided that this detail as shown here is consistent
22	always find that piece of foam existing. So in some	22	over the building, which is a hard thing to verify.
23	cases, this piece of foam that I have here, which is	23	Q. I understand that.
24	a small piece that's cut to basically fill a very small,	24	A. So that gap may vary. This construction detail I've not
25	awkward bit of cladding next to the window, is just not	25	been able to find on any drawings submitted to the
	D 02		D 0.4
	Page 82		Page 84

1	inquiry by anyone, so it appears to be an improvised	1	Q. If I call it that.
2	detail, in some respects. That could be wrong, and of	2	Again, are any of the voids in this diagram relevant
3	course material might come to light, but I've not seen	3	to fire spread?
4	this shown on any drawings.	4	A. I mean, all voids are relevant to fire spread, but
5	Q. Have you considered the role that that exposed PE in	5	specifically this void here within the channel. So this
6	that precise location would play in the initial ignition	6	
	of the rainscreen on exit of the fire by whatever route		cladding rail which you can see in this photo here is
7	-	7	coming off the tip of the column. It's got this
8	from flat 16?	8	U-shaped feature with the bar going across, and this
9	A. Yes.	9	cladding rail here at the column tip is a continuous
10	Q. We'll come back to it.	10	void which runs all the way from the base of the
11	A. Yes.	11	building, right the way to the roof, along the column
12	Q. Figure 18 is the next one we need to look at, page 45.	12	tip unobstructed, and the cavity barriers are all cut
13	This shows the geometry of the cladding at the column	13	around that rail, as you can see here. Actually, it's
14	tip; is that right?	14	quite a nice picture, the way the cavity barrier has
15	A. That's correct.	15	been cut in this instance. No guarantee that they're
16	Q. Yes. If you go back I'm so sorry to make you jump	16	always cut in exactly this way, but clearly there's no
17	around to the page where we were looking at the	17	way to have a cavity barrier continue through that
18	photographs, page 55, and look at figure 27(a). Just	18	U-shaped channel.
19	flip between them.	19	Q. Thank you.
20	If we could have both of those on the screen,	20	The next one is figure 19 on page 46 of your report.
21	please, Paul, at the same time, figure 27(a) on the	21	I'm not sure we have a correlative photograph to put
22	left-hand side and figure 18 on the right-hand side.	22	with it, but this is a vertical section detailing the
23	Thank you.	23	typical geometry of horizontal joints between the ACM
24	First of all, is this to your knowledge or on your	24	cassettes along the vertical column lines. That's how
25	survey representative of all the columns in the tower?	25	you described it, more or less.
			y
	Page 85		Page 87
1	A. Certainly columns that are on the faces of the tower.	1	Again, is that representative of all the columns in
2	At the corner columns you have a slightly more	2	the tower?
	At the corner columns you have a singlity more		
3		1	
3	complicated detail, because those columns are not	3	A. As far as I can tell, yes.
4	complicated detail, because those columns are not triangular, they're more half squares.	3 4	A. As far as I can tell, yes.Q. Including the corners.
4 5	complicated detail, because those columns are not triangular, they're more half squares. Q. Yes.	3 4 5	A. As far as I can tell, yes.Q. Including the corners.A. Yes. Yes in principle, yes.
4 5 6	complicated detail, because those columns are not triangular, they're more half squares. Q. Yes. A. But in principle, yes, it's essentially the same detail.	3 4 5 6	 A. As far as I can tell, yes. Q. Including the corners. A. Yes. Yes in principle, yes. Q. On that assembly, can you identify for us, please, where
4 5 6 7	complicated detail, because those columns are not triangular, they're more half squares. Q. Yes. A. But in principle, yes, it's essentially the same detail. Q. On that assembly, can you identify for us, please, the	3 4 5 6 7	 A. As far as I can tell, yes. Q. Including the corners. A. Yes. Yes in principle, yes. Q. On that assembly, can you identify for us, please, where the exposed edges of ACM would be?
4 5 6 7 8	complicated detail, because those columns are not triangular, they're more half squares. Q. Yes. A. But in principle, yes, it's essentially the same detail. Q. On that assembly, can you identify for us, please, the location of the exposed edges of ACM?	3 4 5 6 7 8	 A. As far as I can tell, yes. Q. Including the corners. A. Yes. Yes in principle, yes. Q. On that assembly, can you identify for us, please, where the exposed edges of ACM would be? A. This is a vertical section through the cladding panels.
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4 5 6 7 8 9	complicated detail, because those columns are not triangular, they're more half squares. Q. Yes. A. But in principle, yes, it's essentially the same detail. Q. On that assembly, can you identify for us, please, the location of the exposed edges of ACM? A. Yes. So you would have exposed edges of ACM there, at the tip, there, at the tip. This is a little infill	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 A. As far as I can tell, yes. Q. Including the corners. A. Yes. Yes in principle, yes. Q. On that assembly, can you identify for us, please, where the exposed edges of ACM would be? A. This is a vertical section through the cladding panels. So you have exposed edges of polyethylene, I mean certainly right at that location just there, at this
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	complicated detail, because those columns are not triangular, they're more half squares. Q. Yes. A. But in principle, yes, it's essentially the same detail. Q. On that assembly, can you identify for us, please, the location of the exposed edges of ACM? A. Yes. So you would have exposed edges of ACM there, at the tip, there, at the tip. This is a little infill piece of ACM, so there, there, there, there, here and here (Indicates). Q. You say "here and here", at the top in the acute angle A. The inside, the return of that acute angle. Q. Because it's been grooved? A. In order to fold it, yes. You route it to fold it. Q. Can we take it that any fold of ACM panelling which we can see in this and, indeed, other configurations results in exposure of PE? A. That's my understanding of the way these are manufactured, yes. Q. We have, I think, six identified locations of exposed PE in the nose assembly. A. Correct.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. As far as I can tell, yes. Q. Including the corners. A. Yes. Yes in principle, yes. Q. On that assembly, can you identify for us, please, where the exposed edges of ACM would be? A. This is a vertical section through the cladding panels. So you have exposed edges of polyethylene, I mean certainly right at that location just there, at this location just here, at that location, right there, and along these edges (Indicates), although in section that's not necessarily an edge that we're interested in. Q. In the third of those, which is the right angle we can see moving from left to right and bottom to top, just below the wiggly arrow A. Mm-hm. Q is the exposure of PE on the exterior, again, open to the air? A. Yes, yes, it will be. Q. That runs transversely, does it? A. It would run across. Q. It runs across. Q. I'm not sure you pointed this out, but would there also
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	complicated detail, because those columns are not triangular, they're more half squares. Q. Yes. A. But in principle, yes, it's essentially the same detail. Q. On that assembly, can you identify for us, please, the location of the exposed edges of ACM? A. Yes. So you would have exposed edges of ACM there, at the tip, there, at the tip. This is a little infill piece of ACM, so there, there, there, there, here and here (Indicates). Q. You say "here and here", at the top in the acute angle A. The inside, the return of that acute angle. Q. Because it's been grooved? A. In order to fold it, yes. You route it to fold it. Q. Can we take it that any fold of ACM panelling which we can see in this and, indeed, other configurations results in exposure of PE? A. That's my understanding of the way these are manufactured, yes. Q. We have, I think, six identified locations of exposed PE in the nose assembly.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. As far as I can tell, yes. Q. Including the corners. A. Yes. Yes in principle, yes. Q. On that assembly, can you identify for us, please, where the exposed edges of ACM would be? A. This is a vertical section through the cladding panels. So you have exposed edges of polyethylene, I mean certainly right at that location just there, at this location just here, at that location, right there, and along these edges (Indicates), although in section that's not necessarily an edge that we're interested in. Q. In the third of those, which is the right angle we can see moving from left to right and bottom to top, just below the wiggly arrow A. Mm-hm. Q is the exposure of PE on the exterior, again, open to the air? A. Yes, yes, it will be. Q. That runs transversely, does it? A. It would run across. Q. It runs across. A. Yes.

1	be a transverse or running earness expecture of DE in the	1	is lined with an intumescent material (visible as the
2	be a transverse or running across exposure of PE in the	2	is lined with an intumescent material (visible as the black strip in Figure 10.17)"
	inside of the right angle joint in the void, the	3	
3	rainscreen cavity. A. Below?		Which we may need to look at if we need to:
4		4	" which is intended to activate under heat and
5	Q. Below, just there, exactly.	5	expand to close the 25mm gap. Therefore, initially in a
6	A. Here and there (Indicates). Yeah, I mean, I should say	6	fire, the entire column cavity over the entire building
7	at this point that this one here, I'm saying yes on the	7	height was fully connected."
8	basis that every fold I've ever seen in an ACM cassette	8	Do you agree with that conclusion?
9	has a routed cut. Given we don't have a photo and	9	A. Yes.
10	I can't see it in my head right now, that is something	10	Q. Does that mean that there would be a continuous cavity
11	I would want to check to verify, to be certain. But	11	up the column?
12	I can't think of a way they would make that cut without	12	A. With the cavity barriers in an unreacted state, yes.
13	doing it. That's certainly something I'll check.	13	Q. If you look on at figure 10.19, in her report, that's
14	Q. You've identified these pictures and you say, I think,	14	page 20, she explains there:
15	that these are particularly important to vertical fire	15	"Rainscreen cladding panels can distort when heated,
16	spread.	16	either through heating of the panel itself or by failure
17	Dr Lane I'll summarise her opinion, I hope	17	of the supporting fixtures. This can allow further gaps
18	accurately has identified the rainscreen cavity in	18	between the cavity barriers and the rainscreen cladding
19	the column as itself a route for fire spread. Do you	19	panels to form"
20	agree with that?	20	Do you agree with that?
21	A. Potentially, yes.	21	A. Yes.
22	Q. You say potentially; what's the caveat?	22	Q. Will that also provide a route or further route or
23	A. It will depend on the effectiveness of the cavity	23	exacerbated route to fire spread by with of bypassing
24	barriers within that cavity at preventing vertical fire	24	the cavity barriers?
25	spread within the cavity, to the extent that the cavity	25	A. Absolutely, yes. Of course, all of this is predicated
	Page 89		Page 91
1	remains a cavity as the fire grows which wouldn't be for	1	on the assumption that the cavity barriers are installed
1 2	remains a cavity as the fire grows which wouldn't be for	1 2	on the assumption that the cavity barriers are installed
2	very long under a very high heat flux. Quite quickly,	2	as per the recommendations of the cavity barrier
2 3	very long under a very high heat flux. Quite quickly, the rainscreen cassettes are deforming or gone or	2 3	as per the recommendations of the cavity barrier supplier, which may or may not be the case.
2 3 4	very long under a very high heat flux. Quite quickly, the rainscreen cassettes are deforming or gone or burning and you no longer have a cavity, which defeats	2 3 4	as per the recommendations of the cavity barrier supplier, which may or may not be the case. Q. Understood.
2 3 4 5	very long under a very high heat flux. Quite quickly, the rainscreen cassettes are deforming or gone or burning and you no longer have a cavity, which defeats the purpose of having a cavity barrier.	2 3 4 5	as per the recommendations of the cavity barrier supplier, which may or may not be the case. Q. Understood. Can I show you also page 21 of her report at
2 3 4 5 6	very long under a very high heat flux. Quite quickly, the rainscreen cassettes are deforming or gone or burning and you no longer have a cavity, which defeats the purpose of having a cavity barrier. Q. Yes.	2 3 4 5 6	as per the recommendations of the cavity barrier supplier, which may or may not be the case. Q. Understood. Can I show you also page 21 of her report at section 10.3.40, and figure 10.20.
2 3 4 5 6 7	very long under a very high heat flux. Quite quickly, the rainscreen cassettes are deforming or gone or burning and you no longer have a cavity, which defeats the purpose of having a cavity barrier. Q. Yes. A. I'm sure we'll come to that.	2 3 4 5 6 7	as per the recommendations of the cavity barrier supplier, which may or may not be the case. Q. Understood. Can I show you also page 21 of her report at section 10.3.40, and figure 10.20. She says there and there it is this is the
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1	your report at page 68.	1	Q. That gap there that we see, the dark line we were just
2	You'll see that's a photograph from site inspection	2	looking at a moment ago, is that an opening?
3	during cladding deconstruction outside a typical kitchen	3	A. Yes.
4	window on level 4, looking vertically upwards.	4	Q. So any flame
5	Is that, do you think, so far as you've been able to	5	A. That's to provide ventilation to the ventilated
6	ascertain, representative of the assembly outside	6	rainscreen system. It's intended to be an opening.
7	flat 16?	7	Q. Does that mean that any flame emanating from the window
8	A. As regards the cavity barriers?	8	set, wherever it is on the window set, could get up
9	Q. Yes oh, as regards all of the components you can see	9	through that crack and melt or burn the exposed
10	there.	10	polyethylene?
11	A. My experience of having looked at how the cavity	11	A. Absolutely, yes.
12	barriers were fitted into the awkward spaces, this being	12	Q. I'm now going to turn to a different feature of the
13	one example, is that it was improvised on a case-by-case	13	building, professor, which is covered by you at
14	basis. I wouldn't necessarily say that that I mean,	14	paragraph 3.2.4.2 of your report on page 58, which is
15	as I say, I haven't done an exhaustive survey of every	15	the column top and architectural crown details.
16	remaining cavity barrier installation on the building,	16	Can I start by diving into page 61 within that
17	so it would be hard to say, but my gut feeling, having	17	section, and figure 32, which we have there on the
18	looked at a lot of them, is that they vary.	18	screen. This is, I think is this right? a drawing
19	Q. In terms of identification of exposed edges of	19	of the crown detail?
20	polyethylene, would you be able to identify where those	20	A. That's correct. Well, I mean, it's a design drawing of
21	exposed edges would be when looking at this picture?	21	the crown detail.
22	A. So there's going to be exposed edge along here, along	22	Q. I was going to ask you. It looks as if it's come from
23	there, here, not there, and you would've had a column	23	CEL, so it's a design drawing.
24	cassette coming in here and being joined to this, so	24	Can I just have that on the screen at the same time
25	long this line on the outside of the angle (Indicates).	25	as something else I'm going to show you, an image in
	Page 93		Page 95
1	O. Cam Livest cale view to estill stand	1	Dr. Lands report and that is DLAS0000010 at mages 47 to
1	Q. Can I just ask you to still stand	1 2	Dr Lane's report, and that is BLAS0000010 at pages 47 to
2	A. I'm a academic; I'm happier standing! Q. Just help me. Above the extract fan which sits in its	3	49. This i figures 10.46, 10.47 and 10.48. We probably can't get them all on the screen.
4	panel, you can see a gap where the rainscreen panel	4	Starting with figure 10.46 to start with, if we can.
5	returns back on a horizontal plane towards the vertical	5	Can you tell us how that drawing, 10.46, relates to
6	plane of the window set, and we've blown it up there for	6	the original design drawing?
7	you. You can see the dark edge below.	7	A. In terms of how the right-hand drawing relates to the
8	Can you help us with whether there would be any	8	left-hand drawing?
9	exposed polyethylene in that location?	9	O. Yes.
10	A. So this corner that is forming this line with the shadow	10	A. I mean, they're showing essentially the same thing. The
11	behind is not an exposed edge. But the photo that we	11	right-hand drawing is showing a vertical section through
12	have that showed the bevel previously shows you the back	12	the crown detail, whereas the left-hand is showing
13	of this. So you have a slight upturn here, so there's	13	
13		14	a front elevation of the crown detail. O. When we look at the blue part, the profiled cladding
	a fold and it's going sort of that way into the screen, sort of yea big, an inch or so, I would say (Indicates).	15	Q. When we look at the blue part, the profiled cladding panels linking column cladding to top of crown, can you
1.5	sort or yearig, an inch or so, I would say (Indicates).		just help us with the orientation and geometry of that
15 16	And at the ten of that you have expected adds of	1.6	man neur us while the chiefhanon and veomenty of mai
16	And at the top of that, you have exposed edge of	16	
16 17	polyethylene.	17	or those panels?
16 17 18	polyethylene. Q. I see. So underneath this, as it were, moving	17 18	or those panels? A. Right, okay. I should point out that I'm colour blind,
16 17 18 19	polyethylene.Q. I see. So underneath this, as it were, moving horizontally into the building and then coming up	17 18 19	or those panels? A. Right, okay. I should point out that I'm colour blind, so we need to be careful. You're referring to this
16 17 18 19 20	polyethylene. Q. I see. So underneath this, as it were, moving horizontally into the building and then coming up vertically, and then coming back out again, you have	17 18 19 20	or those panels? A. Right, okay. I should point out that I'm colour blind, so we need to be careful. You're referring to this (Indicates)?
16 17 18 19 20 21	polyethylene. Q. I see. So underneath this, as it were, moving horizontally into the building and then coming up vertically, and then coming back out again, you have a flat, exposed, lengthways surface of polyethylene?	17 18 19 20 21	or those panels? A. Right, okay. I should point out that I'm colour blind, so we need to be careful. You're referring to this (Indicates)? Q. Yes.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	polyethylene. Q. I see. So underneath this, as it were, moving horizontally into the building and then coming up vertically, and then coming back out again, you have a flat, exposed, lengthways surface of polyethylene? A. So you have a flat surface of exposed polyethylene which	17 18 19 20 21 22	or those panels? A. Right, okay. I should point out that I'm colour blind, so we need to be careful. You're referring to this (Indicates)? Q. Yes. A. Blues are good for me, so we're generally all right.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	polyethylene. Q. I see. So underneath this, as it were, moving horizontally into the building and then coming up vertically, and then coming back out again, you have a flat, exposed, lengthways surface of polyethylene? A. So you have a flat surface of exposed polyethylene which is horizontally looking up.	17 18 19 20 21 22 23	or those panels? A. Right, okay. I should point out that I'm colour blind, so we need to be careful. You're referring to this (Indicates)? Q. Yes. A. Blues are good for me, so we're generally all right. So this section here would be the top of a column,
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	polyethylene. Q. I see. So underneath this, as it were, moving horizontally into the building and then coming up vertically, and then coming back out again, you have a flat, exposed, lengthways surface of polyethylene? A. So you have a flat surface of exposed polyethylene which is horizontally looking up. Q. Exactly.	17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	or those panels? A. Right, okay. I should point out that I'm colour blind, so we need to be careful. You're referring to this (Indicates)? Q. Yes. A. Blues are good for me, so we're generally all right. So this section here would be the top of a column, and that on this drawing would be this piece here or
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1	Q. Yes, I see.	1	the actual line of the roof there.
2	You can see from the drawing that's been magnified,	2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
3	two lines coming down vertically at an angle. What does	3	A. Yes. But I could be wrong. I'd want to check that.
4	that signify?	4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think we might be able to see it.
5	A. That's just showing the way that the panel is folded in	5	I didn't make a note of the number of the red and blue
6	order to create the architectural detail that we see at	6	drawing, but
7	the roof line. So the original reinforced concrete	7	A. It's certainly indicated on the drawing. Whether it's
8	columns that sit behind these are tapered back, it's	8	present on site is
9	just an architectural detail, and so the cladding panels	9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Another matter.
10	were tapered back in line with the concrete, although	10	A. Yes.
11	it's worth mentioning some distance from the	11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
12	pre-existing concrete. The pre-existing concrete stops	12	MR MILLETT: We may be able to see it in figure 33 on
13	at a lower level.	13	page 62 of your report. That may help, professor.
14	Q. The next figure is 10.47, if we can just look at that,	14	A. 33, no.
15	please. That shows the presence of combustible	15	Q. No.
16	Reynobond cladding panels formed into fins.	16	A. I should point out at this point that the figure that
17	Where would they sit? Can you tell us where they	17	was previously on the right from Dr Lane's report that
18	would sit in relation to the figure at 32?	18	showed essentially the same section as being shown on
19	A. So these panels here (Indicates) yes, the red red	19	the left from my report I don't know what that is, if
20	is not a good colour for me are essentially these	20	it's possible to bring it up. I do think it's important
21	vertical slats.	21	to point this out, actually.
22	Q. Yes.	22 23	Q. Okay.
23	A. I believe Dr Lane refers to them as fins.	23	A. No, so SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It's the coloured version of
24 25	Q. She does, fins.	25	figure 33?
23	A. I call them C channels.	23	nguit 33:
	Page 97		Page 99
1	Q. Ah, that was a question I had, fine. That answers that.	1	A. The coloured version of my figure 33, yes, exactly.
2	10.48 is the next drawing, which is the same drawing	2	MR MILLETT: If you
3	there. Well, first of all, is it the same drawing?	3	A. So, yes, the one you had a second that one, yes.
4	Looks like it.	4	So that figure there, unfortunately I was not aware
5	A. It appears to be, although the one in Dr Lane's report	5	of its existence before seeing Dr Lane's most recent
6	has been marked up by somebody at some stage along the	6	report, so that only became available to me recently.
7	way.	7	The figure that you had put up a moment ago,
8	Q. Is there any significance in that drawing, in that	8	Mr Millett, which was from my figure 33, you can see
9	A. In the marking up? No, I don't think so.	9	that it does not include the details below the coping
10	Q. In general terms, is there any insulation sitting behind	10	that goes over the side of the roof. It's just
11	the details we can see at the top of the columns?	11	important for me to state that.
12	A. At the top of the columns, no. The insulation is	12	Q. That's helpful. So, in fact, using figure 10.47 in
13	terminated above the level of the windows at the top	13	Dr Lane's report at page 48, section 10 is this
14	floor.	14	right? you can actually see where the insulation
15	Q. Is there any insulation at all within the crown detail?	15	stops and, therefore, there's no insulation behind the
16	A. No.	16	fins or any other part of the architectural crown
17	Q. What about cavity barriers?	17	details?
18	A. No.	18	A. That's correct.
19	Q. Is there an aluminium coating	19	Q. I think that answers the chairman's question.
20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Before we go on, is there any	20	But there is also an aluminium flashing that we can
21	insulation behind what looks like the top layer of	21	see, which you may not be able to see this, I think it's
22	spandrel panels? Looking at the previous drawing in	22	in green oh, it's grey, is it? That makes two of us!
23	Dr Lane's report, it looked to me as though there might	23	Did you know about that aluminium flashing over the
24	have been.	24	top of the insulation?
25	A. I believe yes, but that it terminates before reaching	25	A. Yes, I knew about the flashing, but I wasn't aware that
	Page 98		Page 100
		1	0

1	the drawing shows PIR insulation underneath. On the	1	box-shaped, so they have tops and bottoms
2	drawing that I've used, my figure 33, that's denoted in	2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Ah.
3	the design drawing as it's very small print, but it	3	A like cassettes. So they have a bottom that returns,
4	says:	4	and at the a top it comes over the top.
5	"WSP PLY BONDED INSIDE COPING TO REDUCE SAG."	5	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Where they have a return at the
6	So that's indicated as an aluminium sheet with	6	bottom is there a cut edge? It's an open cut edge
7	essentially a moisture-resistant plywood bonded to the	7	A. Yes, imagine a cardboard box that doesn't have the flaps
8	underside to reduce its sag. So we had always assumed	8	on it anymore.
9	that was the detail in that location on the roof.	9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. And at the top, the same?
10	In light of this new drawing, I've asked to go back	10	A. At the top the same, yes.
11	to the site and have a look myself.	11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So every edge is exposed.
12	Q. Subject to that later visit, are you able to identify on	12	A. On the inside face of the crown, yes.
13	figure 10.47 where the exposed edges of polyethylene	13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Thank you.
14	might be within the ACM?	14	MR MILLETT: In fact, I think you get a visual image from
15	A. In the crown detail?	15	figure 35 on the same page.
16	Q. In the crown detail.	16	Perhaps we can have that expanded, Paul, please.
17	A. I mean, they're everywhere. The better drawing is my	17	Does that show us the C channels?
18	figure 34.	18	A. Yes. I mean, the crown elements in this figure are
19	Q. 34, yes, let's go to that, and, indeed, the photograph	19	extremely badly damaged. This is immediately above the
20	at figure 35. This is page 63 of your report.	20	flat 6s, incidentally, this is where the fire will have
21	A. Yes, okay. So – yes.	21	first have come up the building.
22	Q. So can you show us where	22	Q. So it's the north-east corner?
23	A. Yes, so	23	A. Correct. Yes, correct. So here you can see these are
24	Q. You need to go back up to figure 34. There.	24	the aluminium C channels. Those.
25	A. Yes.	25	Then these very badly damaged and warped pieces of
	Page 101		Page 103
	1 age 101	-	1 age 103
1	Q. Have that expanded.	1	aluminium are aluminium skins of the pre-existing ACM
2	A. It's worth saying what you have in this detail is you	2	cassettes. Having gone up there and looked at them the
3	have aluminium C-shaped channels, so these are vertical	3	polyethylene is essentially gone, there's some residue
4	elements, so this is a horizontal section through the	4	but the polyethylene has either burned or melted and
5	crown. So you have essentially C-shaped channels	5	dripped down from those cassettes at the top.
6	running vertically like fence posts. They have bolts	6	Q. The C channels, are those the indentations which move
7	running across them at various heights, and then you	7	away from the camera in vertical grooves that we can see
8	have essentially the inverse shape made out of an ACM	8	there?
9	slotting onto those rails. That just sort of you end	9	A. These, yes, these are the C channels. So the ACM
10	up making essentially a fence of ACM and aluminium C	10	elements have been removed by the fire. The aluminium
11	channels as you go along the crown detail.	11	C channels are quite massive, they're quite thick,
12	So this piece here is the column cassettes, the	12	I think they are 3 millimetres thick aluminium, so they
13	column top cassette, framing in to start the crown	13	are quite beefy elements. So it was harder for the fire
14	detail, and then you just have a repeating sequence of	14	to remove them.
15	these C-shaped channels continuing across until you get	15	Q. Yes, I see.
16	to the next column.	16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And nothing to prevent horizontal
17	You have exposed edges at this corner, at this	17	propagation?
18	edge sorry, this corner, this edge, at this edge, at	18	A. No, no, I mean quite the opposite.
19	this corner, the next corner, that edge, so just	19	MR MILLETT: What do you mean when you use the expression
20	basically (Indicates) and on you go, all the way	20	"architectural crown"?
21	across.	21	A. I mean that the only function of the crown that I can
22	So you have a lot of exposed edges, certainly.	22	ascertain is that it was a visual and aesthetic feature
23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Presumably these are just	23	of the building, and therefore it's an architectural
24	vertical C channels, are they?	24	feature of the building, as opposed to having some
	A. In this view, was in soult the there are the	1 25	
25	A. In this view, yes; in reality these cassettes are	25	specific engineering functionality. It wasn't required,
	A. In this view, yes; in reality these cassettes are Page 102	25	Page 104

1	there was already a parapet beam and a safety grating at	1	respect to these questions of fire spread is
2	roof level. So it served no purpose other than	2	predominantly visual evidence, yes.
3	an aesthetic purpose, as far as I can tell. I mean, if	3	Q. Now, have you had an opportunity to consider Dr Lane's
4	we have evidence otherwise I would like to hear it, but	4	and Professor Torero's analysis of spread out of flat 16
5	as far as I can tell it was purely an aesthetic feature.	5	in their respective reports?
6	Q. We'll come back to the role of the crown in fire spread	6	A. Yes, although not in any very deep way. I've read the
7	later in your evidence, professor.	7	reports, although admittedly under quite short time
8	Can I then turn to the question of windows.	8	constraints.
9	At page 73 of your report, you have summarised the	9	Q. We know that Professor Torero gave evidence yesterday
10	materials that you have identified as used in the window	10	and explained that he's carried out some modelling
11	sets at paragraphs 279 to 284. Then at paragraphs,	11	I think he might describe it as "simple modelling" to
12	specifically 282, 283 and 284 itself, and then into 285	12	assist with analysis of how the fire broke out of
13	you explain what happens if any of those, or all three,	13	flat 16.
14	are penetrated for any reason.	14	Am I right in thinking that you yourself haven't
15	Now, it's Dr Lane's opinion and she's going to	15	carried out a similar analysis?
16	attend to give evidence, so we'll have to wait to see	16	A. That's correct.
17	what she says but it's her opinion that once there	17	Q. Do you agree with Professor Torero that, in order to
18	was a localised fire near the window, the majority of	18	have direct flame impingement onto the ACM panels
19	materials around the window had no potential	19	sitting outside flat 16, you would need a fire of
20	fire-resisting performance. I've summarised her	20	something like 830 kilowatts within the flat?
21	opinion.	21	A. No. If I understand what Professor Torero said
22	Do you agree with that?	22	yesterday, if I were to attempt to summarise what
23	A. I wouldn't use the word "no"; I would say "very little".	23	Professor Torero said yesterday after quite a lengthy
24	Q. So very little potential fire-resisting performance?	24	discussion about these issues, it would be that the
25	A. Correct.	25	gases exiting that his preferred fire is between 60
	Page 105		Page 107
1	O Chalada and this is non-much 0.7 (an	,	J 200 J-1
1	Q. She's also concluded and this is paragraph 9.7.6 on	1	and 300 kilowatts
2	page 48 of section 9 of her report that once there		
2		2	Q. Yes.
3	was a fire in a flat anywhere near a window, there was	3	A based on his analysis of the compartment.
4	was a fire in a flat anywhere near a window, there was a very high likelihood that it would break out of the	3 4	A based on his analysis of the compartment. That the largest of those fires is going to provide
4 5	was a fire in a flat anywhere near a window, there was a very high likelihood that it would break out of the flat into the cladding.	3 4 5	A. — based on his analysis of the compartment. That the largest of those fires is going to provide smoke layer temperatures in a non-post-flashover
4 5 6	was a fire in a flat anywhere near a window, there was a very high likelihood that it would break out of the flat into the cladding. Do you agree with that?	3 4 5 6	A. — based on his analysis of the compartment. That the largest of those fires is going to provide smoke layer temperatures in a non-post-flashover scenario at a maximum of about 300 degrees Celsius, but
4 5 6 7	was a fire in a flat anywhere near a window, there was a very high likelihood that it would break out of the flat into the cladding. Do you agree with that? A. I mean, I guess it depends what one means by "very high	3 4 5 6 7	A. — based on his analysis of the compartment. That the largest of those fires is going to provide smoke layer temperatures in a non-post-flashover scenario at a maximum of about 300 degrees Celsius, but he seems to be leaning to somewhat less than that, say
4 5 6 7 8	was a fire in a flat anywhere near a window, there was a very high likelihood that it would break out of the flat into the cladding. Do you agree with that? A. I mean, I guess it depends what one means by "very high likelihood", but I would say it's likely, yes.	3 4 5 6 7 8	A. — based on his analysis of the compartment. That the largest of those fires is going to provide smoke layer temperatures in a non-post-flashover scenario at a maximum of about 300 degrees Celsius, but he seems to be leaning to somewhat less than that, say 200 degrees Celsius. And so that the gases exiting the
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1	panels above the window, through an open window, so as	1	A. That's correct, yes. I mean, B1 in the first report was
2	to be able to ignite them, you would need a fire of the	2	essentially assigning the extract fan a causal role. So
3	magnitude of 830 kilowatts?	3	I think it probably would be fairer to say that the
4	A. No, I think if you had a fire of 300 kilowatts that was	4	original B1 has just vanished because we have
5	sufficiently close to the window, you could have flames	5	insufficient evidence, I think, to support that
6	going out the window.	6	hypothesis now.
7	Q. In your work and analysis of fire spread, have you taken	7	Q. B2 reflects your original B3, so fire getting through
8	Professor Torero's modelling into account?	8	the materials in the sides of the window frames and
9	A. No. I mean, only to the extent that it was presented in	9	getting into the cladding that way.
10	his initial Phase 1 report, and only as a sort of sanity	10	A. Correct.
11	check on what is possible as opposed to having done any	11	Q. So essentially B1 is now out through a hole in the
12	detailed analysis of it.	12	window, and B2 is out through the materials in the side
13	Q. What about Dr Lane's analysis, same question.	13	or round the surrounds of the windows.
14	A. No, I had not considered that.	14	A. That's correct.
15	Q. I'll ask you questions about those as we go along.	15	Q. In layman's terms.
16	Let's go a little bit further into some detail, if	16	A. Yes.
17	we can.	17	Q. Now, I think you've updated your conclusions. I want to
18	In your first report that you provided in April this	18	show this to you. It's page 147 of your report, please.
19	year, you I think identified three hypotheses for fire	19	If you go to that, you can see at paragraph 712, you
20	egress, exit from flat 16. I'm not going to take you	20	say:
21	through those in detail, but just to summarise them if	21	"712. There is insufficient evidence to accept or
22	I can. For our record, they are at pages 128 to 129,	22	reject Hypothesis B2 at present. On a balance of
23	paragraphs 575, 579 and 582.	23	probabilities, I consider Hypothesis B2 to be equally
24	I think you had three hypotheses: B1, B2 and B3.	24	likely as Hypothesis B1, above."
25	Is this right: B1 is fire spread out of the	25	It looks from that and I may be wrong as if
	Page 109		Page 111
1 1	compartment via the infill candwich panel within which	1	voulve changed your view, because in your original
1 2	compartment via the infill sandwich panel within which	1 2	you've changed your view, because in your original
2	the extract fan was mounted, or the extract fan itself,	2	report you said that what is now B2 or was originally B3
2 3	the extract fan was mounted, or the extract fan itself, igniting the cladding adjacent to the window at flat 16.	2 3	report you said that what is now B2 or was originally B3 was your most likely by a considerable margin. Is that
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the squarder casetters above the window, which would tend to support an idea or a hypothesis that the flames venting the window and heating the spanderd paned directly above the window could have been a mechanism by which the cluthing fire gets going. Q. Right. A. If that makes sense. Q. No. in shert, further video evidence. A. Correct, es. MR MILLETT: Now, we're going to opend a bit of time just analysing that just to understand fully what it is, and line fire spread video. The not going to obend a bit of time just the district of the solowing gous ame just of just and then the tailing the just to understand fully what it is, and fire spread video. The not going to obend a bit of time just the district of the solowing gous ame just of just anextly the district of the solowing gous ame just of just anextly the solowing gous ame just of just anextly understand the time. MC Chairman, what I'll do is I clink to start with, the solid photographs. So we go through it and then perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch to be read. MR MILLETT: Most unabledy. MR MILLETT in constantial control time just the solid photographs. So we go through the solid his to start with. The alternative would be to break a bit entity. MR MILLETT in constantial control to disrupt the flow of the perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch to be more just by preference solely to the video as opposed to the photographs. MR MILLETT: Professor ship, before we stury. The going to the professor in may be able to take it slightly Demonstration. What would you like to does Page 113 more quickly by reference solely to the video as opposed to the photographs. Can a acanally just ask the professor, which would to the photographs, figures 58 and following, in your eport. HE WITNESS: Do you have page numbers for those? MR MILLETT: So is at page 11. MR MILLETT: So is at page 11. MR MILLETT: So hove cheen accustomed and that is kine we are going to be looking at video of				
venting the window and hearing the spanderd panel directly above the window could have been a mechanism by which the cladding fire jets joing. Q. Right. A. If that makes sense. Q. So, in abort, further video evidence. B. Q. So, in abort, further video evidence. A. Correct, vs. MR MILLETT: Now, we're going to spend a bit of time just analysing that just to understand fully what it is, and the theory of the showing you some just of your needy updated the time. MR Chairman, what I'ldo is I think to start with. Mr Chairman, what I'ldo is I think to start with. MR MILLETT: Now, we're going to spend a bit of time just the time. MR Chairman, what I'ldo is I think to start with. MR Chairman, what I'ldo is I think to start with. MR Chairman, what I'ldo is I think to start with. MR Chairman, what I'ldo is I think to start with. MR Chairman, what I'ldo is I think to start with. MR MILLETT: So, we go through it, and then perhaps take the video immediately after the lunch perhaps take the video immediately af	1	the spandrel cassettes above the window, which would	1	front of the live stream at 2 o'clock when we resume.
directly above the window could have been a mechanism by shich the cladding fire gets going. O Right A If that makes sense. A Correct, yes. NEM ILETT: Now, we're going to spend a bit of time just analysing that just to understand fully what it is, and analysing that just to understand fully what it is, and in the time. In the bashowing you some parts of your newly updated if it spread video. In not going to do that yet, green the time. MR MILETT: Now, we're going to spend a bit of time just analysing that just to understand fully what it is, and in the time. MR WILETT: Now, we're going to spend a bit of time just analysing that just to understand fully what it is, and in the time. MR WILETT: Now, we're going to do that yet, green the time. MR WILETT: Now, we're going to do that yet, green the time. MR WILETT: What is the wide or mandated yather the lunch becak. MR WILETT: What what would be to break a bit early. MR WILETT: Now. SIR MARTIM MOORE-BICK: It ink we'll do it anyway. We're going to break now, professor, and we will start again at the time. Dessert of the room, and we will start again at the time. MR WILETT: What was the they door immediately after the lunch becak. MR WILETT: What was the we'll do it anyway. We're going to break now, professor, and we'll start again at the time. MR WILETT: What was the we'll do it anyway. MR WILETT: What was the we'll do it anyway. MR WILETT: Professor Bishy, before we start, Prin going to fine presentation. What would you like to do? MR WILETT: What was sensible, actually, if may say so. Break now. Then I may be able to take it slightly Page 113 Page 113 Page 115 The WITNESS: No you have sensor which would be more illustrative for the purposes of you explaining you for the professor, which would be more illustrative for the purposes of you explaining your professor, which would have been accustomed, and that is sirecting. MR WILETT: Six is at page 1/7. (Pause) The Witness: Nour passes, or we come back, in the usual way to which we've been	2	tend to support an idea or a hypothesis that the flames	2	I'll repeat the warning at that stage.
5 Can we affired to take the extra 5 minutes and come back at 2 o'clock? 7 A. If that makes sense. 8 Q. So, in short, further video evidence. 9 A. Correct, yes. 10 MR MILLETT. Nos, we're going to spend a bit of time just analysing that just to understand fully what it is, and 11 place don't like the own professor, to have some funch and so on. 11 analysing that just to understand fully what it is, and 11 place don't like the own professor, to have some funch and so on. 12 I will be showing you some parts of your newly updated 12 while you're out of the room, and we will start again at 1 place don't like to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room, and we will start again at 2 o'clock. All right? The usher will look after you. 16 doc, 2 o'clock, then, please. 13 Good, 2 o'clock, then, please. 14 Good, 2 o'clock, then, please. 15 MR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, that's something we could do. 16 to me. 17 perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch 17 perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch 18 perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch 19 perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch 19 perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch 19 perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch 19 perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch 19 perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch 19 perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch 19 perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch 19 perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch 19 perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch 19 perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch 19 perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch 19 perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch 19 perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch 19 perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch 19 perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch 19 perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch 19 perhaps take the video into perhaps take the video immediately after the hunch 19 perhaps take	3	venting the window and heating the spandrel panel	3	So is that convenient?
6 Q. Right 7 A. If that makes sense. 9 Q. So, in short, further video evidence. 9 A. Correct, yes. 10 In MR MILLETT. Now, we're going to spend a bit of time just analysing that just to understand fully what it is, and 11 may any one and your evidence while you're out of the room, and we will start again at 12 clocke, then, please. 11 In analysing that just to understand fully what it is, and 11 look of the room, and we will start again at 12 clocke, All right? The usiber will look after you. 12 In will be showing you some parts of your newly updated 12 while you're out of the room, and we will start again at 13 clocked, All right? The usiber will look after you. 14 the time. 14 Cook, 2 clocke, then, please. 15 Mr. Chairman, what I'll do is I think to start with, 16 the still photographs, as we go through it, and then 16 (The short adjournment) 17 perhaps take the video immediately after the bunch 17 (2.00 pm) 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, that's something we could do. 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, that's something we could do. 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: well that's something we could do. 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: well that's something we could do. 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: well that's something we could do. 19 the presentation. What would you like to do? 19 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: well that's something we could do. 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Ready to carry on? 19 THE WITNESS: Do you have bab to take it slightly 20 so. Break now. Then I rawy bab be to take it slightly 21 more quickly by reference solely to the video as opposed to the photographs. Figures S 8 and following, in your report? 22 THE WITNESS: Do you have page numbers for those? 23 MR MILLETT: Sir a page 117. 24 MR MILLETT: Time some to be bear the serve stranger of the cert y stages. 19 popping in give video, with pauses, or the 19 photographs, figures S 8 and following, in your report? 24 MR MILLETT: Sir a page 117. 25 MR MILLETT: Sir a page 117. 26 Page 113 27 THE WITNESS: Do you have page numbers for those? 28 MR MILLETT: Sir a page 117. 28 MR	4	directly above the window could have been a mechanism by	4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It is, certainly.
7 A. If that makes sense. 8 Q. So, in short, further video evidence. 9 A. Correct, yes. 10 MR MILLETT: Now, we're going to spend a bit of time just analysing that just to understand fully what it is, and 11 means that the sense of the presentation. What I'd do it anyway. 11 will be showing you some parts of your newly updated the time. 12 I will be showing you some parts of your newly updated the time. 13 fire spread video. The not going to do that yet, given the time. 14 If the still photographis, as we go through it, and then 16 the still photographis, as we go through it, and then 17 perhaps take the video immediately after the funch 18 break. 15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, thar's something we could do. 20 clock, then, please. 16 (The short adjournment) (12,55 pm) (16 still photographis, as we go through it, and then 16 the still photographis, as sensible, actually, if i may say 25 so. Break now. Then I may be able to take it slightly 25 so. Break now. Then I may be able to take it slightly 26 so and a calculally just ask the professor, which would 4 be more illustrative for the purposes of you explaining 27 your opinion, the video, with pauses, or the photographs, figures 58 and following, in your report? 17 I'HE WITNESS: I mean, I think either would probably 1 either one would work. The videos are perhaps more interesting. 18 MR MILLETT: We should certainly use what is more interesting. 19 In which case, Mr Chairman, I'm going to ask you to interesting. 19 In which case, Mr Chairman, I'm going to ask you to first spread on the exterior of Grenfell Tower in the period just after 20 interesting. 20 In Just want to jick this up with you as a data price stream of the compartment). 21 I just want to pick this up with you as a data price stream of the recompartment). 22 I just want to pick this up with you as a data price of Grenfell Tower in the period just after 20 in the reson does not want to see that, then they 20 in the reson of the feating use and in the carely part of the fire? 21 I Jo am. Some peop	5	which the cladding fire gets going.	5	Can we afford to take the extra 5 minutes and come
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r			
1	are important.	1	it could've done is passed at 01.05. Can you comment on
2	The reason I want you to do that is that we've heard	2	that?
3	earlier that you have changed your opinion between your	3	A. I think the basis on which Professor Torero is making
4	first report and your second report, and what I need you	4	that statement is related to a still image that does
5	do is to explain to me by reference to this video what	5	show some falling debris from the window, which could
6	we see which enables you to come to that conclusion,	6	
		7	potentially be droplets of polyethylene burning and
7	focusing particularly on the timing of the fan failing		falling from the window. But it's very, very limited at
8	and also the timing and place of where we see melting	8	this stage.
9	droplets of polyethylene.	9	Q. Yes.
10	Okay?	10	A. You will have noticed in my report that we've put that
11	A. Okay.	11	time where we would be more comfortable confirming that
12	Q. So you're going to be in control	12	the fire was within the cladding and burning the
13	A. I'll try.	13	polyethylene closer to 01.08/01.09 in my report.
14	Q. If we have to go back to anything, we can do that.	14	Q. His image is at 01.05.57. For reference purposes, it's
15	A. Okay.	15	page 56 of his report.
16	Q. Can we start, please, Paul.	16	Let's continue.
17	(Video Played)	17	A. Okay, yes.
18	A. I mean, I just stopped it here because that's coincident	18	(Video Played)
19	with the figure 58 that you showed me recently, that's	19	Any time here, Paul.
20	about the same time. Again, we do see some flaming.	20	So in this sequence here, around 01.07.51 and some
21	That flaming does appear to be confined to inside the	21	seconds after that, what we see here is that flames are
22	flat still, you don't see a lot of flames coming out the	22	passing underneath the fan mounting unit. It's hard to
23	window. You do see a bit of smoke coming out of the	23	say whether that's through the bottom of the infill
24	window, which equally could be heating the cladding	24	panel or some flames coming out of the inwardly opening
25	above the window or adjacent to the window, admittedly	25	window immediately below the extract fan. It's also
	, ,		•
	Page 117		Page 119
1	4 Vinitad Indust	1	difficult to say definitively whether an not the systemat
1	to a limited extent.	1	difficult to say definitively whether or not the extract
2	Q. Do you know whether the window is open or closed at this	2	fan is still in place here, although it appears to be.
3	point?	3	Q. Right.
4	A. My understanding is that the larger pane, the tilt pane,	4	A. Then I'll get you, Paul, to just continue a little bit
5	is tilted inwards 40/50 millimetres, a couple of inches.	5	more, please.
6	Q. So open?	6	(Video Played)
7	A. Open at the top in an inwardly tilting position, and	7	Pause there. If you can go back a little bit,
8	that the smaller pane between the extract fan is open,	8	apologies.
9	according to the witness statement, approximately	9	So there is a moment there just at the end of that
10	10 inches, I believe is what Mr Kebede says.	10	clip
11	Q. Thank you.	11	(Video Played)
12	A. So go ahead, Paul.	12	There. So in that view there, you can see
13	(Video Played).	13	a circular opening in the location where we would expect
14	Stop it, Paul.	14	the extract fan to be.
15	So that's not a very good frame to stop on there,	15	Q. Does it appear to you that the extract fan is still in
16	unfortunately. But at this stage, again, we can see	16	place?
17	flames inside the flats and, again, it's hard to say the	17	A. No, it would appear to me on the basis of this that the
18	extent to which those flames might be projecting outside	18	extract fan has fallen out.
19	the window, so we still see a similar condition,	19	Q. Right.
20	although the fire is growing a bit in time as we go	20	A. Unfortunately, that could have occurred even before
21	forward.	21	01.05.49, it's possible, we just don't have very good
22	Q. Still contained within the compartment at this stage?	22	views to be able to say definitively when the extract
23	A. It appears to be, yes.	23	fan has fallen out.
	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	24	Q. On this frame, you can see a circular orange disc but
74	() I think by this stage Professor Lorero save that it has		v. on and mane, you can see a circular trange tise but
24	Q. I think by this stage Professor Torero says that it has		
25	Q. I think by this stage Professor Torero says that it has exited the compartment, or the earliest point at which	25	with a black bar across it. Might that tell you that

1	the extract fan was still in place or not?	1	material coming out of the window at that stage, before
2	A. I think what we're seeing there the larger, bright	2	we get to 01.09. If we can just go back to that and
3	spot is I think the opening where the extract fan	3	just play from there.
4	would've sat. So that is a hole through a window infill	4	(Video Played)
5	panel, a circular opening through a window infill panel,	5	There.
6	and the little piece of flame you can see under that	6	A. Yes.
7	I would suggest is either flames coming from the bottom	7	Q. We can see burning material at 01.08.19. What is that?
8	of the infill panel or through the open window	8	A. I couldn't say. It's possible it's polyethylene. It
9	immediately below the extract fan.	9	could also be things that are coming out from inside the
10	Okay, go ahead, Paul	10	flat. We have the purlboard immediately above the
11	(Video Played)	11	window which I would expect to be burned or burning at
12	Here, Paul.	12	this stage, and you have various other things around the
13	So here, this next sequence, you really just see the	13	window that could potentially be burning.
14	fire continuing to grow within the flat. Increasingly,	14	The droplets we just saw falling are not falling
15	we see flames coming through the extract fan and through	15	sort of straight down in a very sort of dedicated
16	that either open or absent window beneath the extract	16	seeming manner, they're a bit floating away from the
17	fan and, indeed, a little bit of flaming coming, it	17	building.
18	would appear, through the inwardly tilting window as	18	Later on, when we see the burning and dripping
19	well.	19	polyethylene, that tends to be sort of a more
20	Q. By this stage, 01.08.16, have we seen any falling	20	vertical the particles are falling with a bit more
21	burning material yet?	21	intent, if you see what I mean.
22	A. Aside from the still photo that Professor Torero has	22	Q. Yes, okay, we can continue.
23	used, no significant we should see it in a few	23	(Video Played)
24	moments.	24	A. Stop there, Paul.
25	Q. The reason I ask is if you go I wonder whether	25	So you did hear someone in the background there say,
	Page 121		Page 123
1	there's a way of having both on the screen at the same	1	"It sounds like it's dropping down", so I would expect
2	time to figure 60 of your report at page 119	2	that they're commenting on things falling to the ground.
3	I don't know if it is possible to have both on the	3	In this photo, you can clearly see that the extract
4	screen at the same time you have it may be we	4	fan is now absent from the panel; there's very clearly
5	haven't arrived at it yet	5	a hole there now. There's quite a lot of flame within
6	A. Yes, we will see that in a moment, if we continue.	6	the compartment and a little bit exiting the compartment
7	Q. Very good.	7	at this stage.
8	A. If everybody watches the lower left-hand side of the	8	Q. We saw at the end of the last sequence the flowing,
9	window, they should see debris dropping down in	9	dripping material. Do you say that's polyethylene?
10	a moment.	10	A. I think it's probable that it's polyethylene, but
11	Q. Before we do that, can you tell from this frame or the	11	I couldn't possibly say with certainty.
12	sequence that leads to it what is combusting?	12	Q. If it were, where would it be coming from?
13	A. No, I couldn't say.	13	A. Given the location it's dripping from, it would be
14	It's also noteworthy here that there does appear to	14	coming either from the column cassette to the left of
15	be flaming sort of more towards the left-hand side of	15	the window, or from the spandrel cassette immediately
16	the window, although given that it's sort of shielded by	16	above and to the left of the window, I would say, or
17	the view angle, it's hard to say for sure.	17	some combination of those two potentially.
18	Q. Right. Can we continue, please.	18	Q. If it were coming from the column cassette to the you
19	(Video Played)	19	say to the left of the window, you mean
20	A. Pause it there, Paul.	20	A. As I'm looking from the outside.
21	Here you can see 01.09.34, and there you can see now	21	Q. As you're looking at it?
22	sort of a semi-continuous stream of lit particles from	22	A. Yes.
23	the lower left-hand side of the window.	23	Q. What is the mechanism by which that polyethylene would
24	Q. Can I just ask you to go back to the end of the last	24	have ignited at this point?
25	sequence. I want you to look for burning, falling	25	A. Well, as we've discussed, we essentially have these two
Ī		1	
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	candidates, my two hypotheses, B1 and B2. One is that the fire and hot gas gets into the cladding via the uPVC window boards, which we will have to assume have been removed in some way, or because flame and hot gas are	1 2 3	swinging window that opens like that and it's open 10 inches, so it's essentially wide open. So you're
3 4 5 6 7	the fire and hot gas gets into the cladding via the uPVC window boards, which we will have to assume have been removed in some way, or because flame and hot gas are	1	
4 5 6 7	window boards, which we will have to assume have been removed in some way, or because flame and hot gas are	3	· · · · ·
5 6 7	removed in some way, or because flame and hot gas are		looking straight into the kitchen here, whereas the
6 7		4	right-hand window is closed from a visual perspective.
6 7	exiting the compartment via the extract fan panel or the	5	It could have some soot deposition on it which is
7	open window and impinging on that column cassette	6	causing it to be slightly frosted at this stage in the
	immediately outside the window or immediately above the	7	fire, which is why it looks a lot darker.
Ü	window. It could be either.	8	Does that make sense?
9	To be honest I do say this at some stage in my	9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It does.
10	report I think the only credible answer to that	10	A. But it does appear to me that there is more flaming to
11	question is that it's going to be some combination of	11	the left of the window. That is certainly something
12	those two, because no matter what, the hot gas and	12	that is true.
13	flames exiting the compartment are going to be heating	13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I ask because I think you suggested
13		14	that the fire might have come out of the kitchen at the
15	the cladding externally, and no matter what, you are	15	_
	going to be getting heat through the window surround,	16	top of the window rather than at the side of the window,
16 17	whether its there or not, and into the cladding. It's	17	to put it in a rather general way.
17	a question of the relative importance of those two modes		A. Yes. SID MADTIN MOODE PICK. If it some out of the top of the
18	of heating the cladding, and I would be very hard	18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If it came out of the top of the
19	pressed to say which one I think is dominant, if that	19	window, it's going to be the top of the small window,
20	makes sense.	20	not the top of the large window.
21	Q. On the basis of the visual inspection of these videos?	21	A. It's going to be the extract fan, the hole in the
22	A. On the basis of any of the evidence that I've seen, yes.	22	extract fan panel would be the primary route that
23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can you help me make sure I've	23	I would suggest, as well as the window immediately
24	understood what I'm seeing in some of these pictures.	24	below.
25	If we look at the one on the screen at the moment	25	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
	Page 125		Page 127
1	A. V.	١,	A. Oliver
1	A. Yes. SID MADTIN MOODE DICK: we take it do we that the ten	1 2	A. Okay. MP MILLETT: Different question: at this store was the YPS
2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: — we take it, do we, that the top	2	MR MILLETT: Different question: at this stage, was the XPS
3	of that brightly illuminated window is where the fan	3	involved?
	was?	4 5	A. It appears to me that some of the flaming that we see
5	A. The sort of circular opening, yes. SID MADTIN MOODE PICK. Would it be right to infer from this	5	around the extract fan infill panel will be associated
6	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would it be right to infer from this	6	with combustion of the XPS. I would consider that
7	and the previous films that the large window which is to	7	highly probable, given that we have flaming and hot
8	the left of the small window with the fan as you stand	8	gases there, yes. Although, as I've noted, there's not
9	in the kitchen, or to the right, is not as heavily	9	a huge mass of material there, so it could burn away
10	involved?	10	quite quickly and then you're left with two aluminium
11	A. Well, it is not open, so —	11	sheets.
12	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well	12	Q. Okay.
13	A. It is - it's hard to see on this screen, but it is here	13	(Video Played)
14	(Indicates).	14	A. There, Paul.
15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It's there, but I mean	15	Okay, so I've stopped the video here because we can
16	A. Yes?	16	now see there is actually some burning debris on the
17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: The impression I get from what I'm	17	ground directly beneath the window. My assumption would
18	seeing here — and it's true for the earlier shots — is	18	be that that would be polyethylene that has dripped
19	that the fire is impinging on the, as we view it from	19	whilst burning, forming a small pool fire on the ground.
20	here, left-hand window where the fan was, but not nearly	20	So at this stage, 01.09.58, we're reasonably certain
21	so much on the right-hand large window, which could be	21	we have polyethylene burning and melting within the
22	relevant for identifying the point at which break-out	22	cladding by some means.
23	occurs.	23	Q. Do you know whether that would be self-sustaining by
24	A. Yes. I mean, the important thing to recognise in this	24	this stage?
25	view is that this smaller window here is an inward	25	A. Within the cladding?
	D 424		D 400
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1	Q. Within the cladding.	1	Q. Right.
2	A. If you have polyethylene burning and dripping out of	2	(Video Played)
3	cladding such as this, and either you have a continued	3	A. Right here. Go back a bit, Paul, if you wouldn't mind.
4	source of external heat flux or you have pooling of that	4	What I'm looking for is 01.13.31. We see a little pulse
5	polyethylene in the location where it's continuing to	5	of flame.
6	burn, then yes, I would say at this stage you would have	6	(Video Played)
7	a fire that we would expect to propagate if left to its	7	There.
8	own devices.	8	Yes. So there we start to see now this pulsing of
9	Q. Yes.	9	flames. Those flames are exiting the vertical gap
10	A. Okay, Paul.	10	between the first and second spandrel panels immediately
11	(Video Played)	11	above the kitchen window of flat 16, which would
12	Can you stop it here, Paul.	12	indicate that you have some pyrolysis or evaporation of
13	It's very difficult to see here through the trees,	13	liquefied polyethylene within the cavity above flat 16.
14	but what we do see in this next sequence is quite a lot	14	Q. That's behind the cassette?
15	of smoke coming out of the compartment and quite a lot	15	A. There's something going on inside that cassette, and the
16	of flame coming out of the compartment is well.	16	gases are coming out, they're hot, they're finding
17	Go ahead, Paul.	17	oxygen and they're flaming.
18	(Video Played)	18	Q. Had you seen any evidence visually of that phenomenon
19	Here, yes.	19	before this point?
20	So here what's interesting is you can see now quite	20	A. At Grenfell Tower or in other fires?
21	a lot of flaming below the spandrel panel. It's	21	Q. Yes, at Grenfell.
22	difficult to say whether those flames are emanating from	22	A. I think this is the first time we see this happening
23	within the compartment itself or whether that is	23	specifically at Grenfell in the footage that we have,
24	an indication that we have polyethylene within that	24	yes.
25	spandrel panel that's actually burning and dripping and	25	Just before you continue, Paul, what you'll see in
	70.440		75
	Page 129		Page 131
1	burning whilst it falls away.	1	a minute, if this continues, in just a couple more
2	The location where you see a bright spot on the	2	seconds, you'll see a similar licking or pulsing of
3	spandrel panel below the kitchen window of flat 16, the	3	flame slightly to the left, which is along the corner or
4	only explanation I could give for that is that that is	4	the re-entrant corner where the column joins the
5	burning polyethylene on the surface of the spandrel	5	spandrel panel above flat 16. You'll see that extend
6	panel. The likely candidate for where that polyethylene	6	I think a little bit further up.
7	would've come from would be the spandrel panel above the	7	Go ahead.
8	kitchen window.	8	(Video Played).
9	Q. What about to the side, to the left of the kitchen	9	Yes, there it is. That's the joint between the
10	window?	10	column and the spandrel panel. Again, it indicates to
11	A. In the location that it is, I think it's unlikely it	11	me that there's something going on within those
12	would come from the side and end up there. Yes.	12	cassettes at that location.
13	Okay, Paul.	13	(Video Played)
14	(Video Played)	14	Stop it there, Paul.
15	Q. If I can ask you to pause there.	15	So at this point, I think it's quite clear that the
16	You can see the fire and flames now impinging upon	16	cladding is involved, the ACM cladding cassettes are
17	the 90-degree return of the aluminium panel above the	17	involved, and that this fire is likely to escalate up
18	kitchen.	18	the building, supported primarily by combustion of the
19	A. Yes.	19	ACM and the polyethylene.
20	Q. Would that tell you anything about ingress of fire into	20	So I think that's as far as we really need to go
21	the dark crack that we looked at earlier this morning,	21	here.
22	behind which is exposed PE?	22	Q. Right.
23	A. Certainly at this stage I would expect flaming inside	23	A. So just to say where does that leave me with respect to
24	the cavity behind the ACM panel, yes. I would expect	24	my two hypotheses — that's probably the next question?
	those flames to travel up through that gap, yes.	25	Q. That was the next question.
25	those names to traver up through that gap, yes.	23	
25		23	(
25	Page 130	23	Page 132

1	A. Yes. So where it leaves me is with a situation that	1 scenario. So I wouldn't want to labour the point too
2	I have Professor Torero's analysis which suggests to me	2 much.
3	that the gas layer in the kitchen is between 200 and	3 Q. No, I understand that.
4	300 degrees Celsius, most likely, and that we have flame	4 Picking up 713 and the purpose of this exercise,
5	impingement on whatever is going on inside the kitchen	5 in a sense, is to see if you can come to an opinion with
6	at that stage.	6 a reasonable degree of confidence about, although
7	If we assume that the uPVC is physically absent, and	7 they're combined, whether B1 or B2 is the more likely.
8	if we assume along with the uPVC goes the 25-millimetre	8 A. Yes. I mean, I think you can tell that I'm not
9	thick PIR which is adhered to the back of the uPVC, then	9 enthusiastic to be drawn on this point, I think, at this
10	we have EPDM weatherproofing membrane, which would	10 stage. If you really push me, I would say that fire
11	provide negligible resistance to flame impingement and	spread through the uPVC is ahead by a nose. Yes.
12	those type of gas temperatures and it would burn through	12 Q. All right. Let me try a different way.
13	quite rapidly, and then we're into the back of the	13 You're obviously looking at it from a visual
14	cladding, and as Professor Torero said yesterday, at	14 perspective and forming your opinions based on what you
15	that point, with flame impingement and those types of	15 see.
16	gas temperatures, it's anyone's guess as to which	16 A. Mm-hm.
17	material is the first ignited material within the	17 Q. You can see burning droplets. They were coming,
18	cavity.	18 I think, from the bottom of the window.
19	Outside the window, I have flames and hot gases	19 A. That's where we see them exiting the window box, yes.
20	exiting. I have impingement of those flames and hot	Q. My question is: is that not more consistent with
21	gases directly above and potentially to the left, if I'm	21 hypothesis B2?
22	outside the building and looking at the building, of the	22 A. B2 being through the uPVC, yes?
23	window, and at some stage we see polyethylene melting	23 Q. Yes.
24	and dripping and falling from that region to the	24 A. I mean, perhaps, but as we discussed earlier, when I was
25	left-hand side of the window as I'm looking at it from	25 pointing out the detail of the cladding cassette
	D 422	D 125
	Page 133	Page 135
1	the outside.	alongside the window, the exposed edge of polyethylene
1 2	the outside. I think where that leaves us is in a situation	alongside the window, the exposed edge of polyethylene in that particular location is external to the cavity.
2	I think where that leaves us is in a situation	2 in that particular location is external to the cavity.
2 3	I think where that leaves us is in a situation where, no matter how you look at this, you have some	2 in that particular location is external to the cavity. 3 So that vertical line of PE immediately to the left of
2 3 4	I think where that leaves us is in a situation where, no matter how you look at this, you have some combination of those two heating mechanisms that are	in that particular location is external to the cavity. So that vertical line of PE immediately to the left of the window, if I'm looking at the window, is actually
2 3 4 5	I think where that leaves us is in a situation where, no matter how you look at this, you have some combination of those two heating mechanisms that are causing eventually the ignition of the cladding and the	in that particular location is external to the cavity. So that vertical line of PE immediately to the left of the window, if I'm looking at the window, is actually external. So if it is coming directly from that
2 3 4 5 6	I think where that leaves us is in a situation where, no matter how you look at this, you have some combination of those two heating mechanisms that are causing eventually the ignition of the cladding and the escalation of the fire spread up the building.	in that particular location is external to the cavity. So that vertical line of PE immediately to the left of the window, if I'm looking at the window, is actually external. So if it is coming directly from that location, then I think we sort of have to hold our hands
2 3 4 5 6 7	I think where that leaves us is in a situation where, no matter how you look at this, you have some combination of those two heating mechanisms that are causing eventually the ignition of the cladding and the escalation of the fire spread up the building. If you look at I was looking at this over the	in that particular location is external to the cavity. So that vertical line of PE immediately to the left of the window, if I'm looking at the window, is actually external. So if it is coming directly from that location, then I think we sort of have to hold our hands in the air and say we don't know.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	I think where that leaves us is in a situation where, no matter how you look at this, you have some combination of those two heating mechanisms that are causing eventually the ignition of the cladding and the escalation of the fire spread up the building. If you look at I was looking at this over the lunch break paragraph 713 in my report, I sort of	in that particular location is external to the cavity. So that vertical line of PE immediately to the left of the window, if I'm looking at the window, is actually external. So if it is coming directly from that location, then I think we sort of have to hold our hands in the air and say we don't know. Q. Right. Again, I think
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	I think where that leaves us is in a situation where, no matter how you look at this, you have some combination of those two heating mechanisms that are causing eventually the ignition of the cladding and the escalation of the fire spread up the building. If you look at — I was looking at this over the lunch break — paragraph 713 in my report, I sort of finish this section on B1 and B2 — it's immediately	in that particular location is external to the cavity. So that vertical line of PE immediately to the left of the window, if I'm looking at the window, is actually external. So if it is coming directly from that location, then I think we sort of have to hold our hands in the air and say we don't know. Q. Right. Again, I think SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That does depend on being able to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	I think where that leaves us is in a situation where, no matter how you look at this, you have some combination of those two heating mechanisms that are causing eventually the ignition of the cladding and the escalation of the fire spread up the building. If you look at — I was looking at this over the lunch break — paragraph 713 in my report, I sort of finish this section on B1 and B2 — it's immediately below the paragraph that you read previously, and I say:	in that particular location is external to the cavity. So that vertical line of PE immediately to the left of the window, if I'm looking at the window, is actually external. So if it is coming directly from that location, then I think we sort of have to hold our hands in the air and say we don't know. Right. Again, I think SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That does depend on being able to see clearly enough where the droplets are coming from.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	I think where that leaves us is in a situation where, no matter how you look at this, you have some combination of those two heating mechanisms that are causing eventually the ignition of the cladding and the escalation of the fire spread up the building. If you look at I was looking at this over the lunch break paragraph 713 in my report, I sort of finish this section on B1 and B2 it's immediately below the paragraph that you read previously, and I say: "713. Indeed, it is probable that some combination	in that particular location is external to the cavity. So that vertical line of PE immediately to the left of the window, if I'm looking at the window, is actually external. So if it is coming directly from that location, then I think we sort of have to hold our hands in the air and say we don't know. Q. Right. Again, I think SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That does depend on being able to see clearly enough where the droplets are coming from. A. Indeed, and we can't because of the angle we're looking
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	I think where that leaves us is in a situation where, no matter how you look at this, you have some combination of those two heating mechanisms that are causing eventually the ignition of the cladding and the escalation of the fire spread up the building. If you look at I was looking at this over the lunch break paragraph 713 in my report, I sort of finish this section on B1 and B2 it's immediately below the paragraph that you read previously, and I say: "713. Indeed, it is probable that some combination of the fire spread routes suggested in hypotheses B1 and	in that particular location is external to the cavity. So that vertical line of PE immediately to the left of the window, if I'm looking at the window, is actually external. So if it is coming directly from that location, then I think we sort of have to hold our hands in the air and say we don't know. Q. Right. Again, I think SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That does depend on being able to see clearly enough where the droplets are coming from. A. Indeed, and we can't because of the angle we're looking at it.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	I think where that leaves us is in a situation where, no matter how you look at this, you have some combination of those two heating mechanisms that are causing eventually the ignition of the cladding and the escalation of the fire spread up the building. If you look at — I was looking at this over the lunch break — paragraph 713 in my report, I sort of finish this section on B1 and B2 — it's immediately below the paragraph that you read previously, and I say: "713. Indeed, it is probable that some combination of the fire spread routes suggested in hypotheses B1 and B2 conspired to cause the initial ignition and sustained	in that particular location is external to the cavity. So that vertical line of PE immediately to the left of the window, if I'm looking at the window, is actually external. So if it is coming directly from that location, then I think we sort of have to hold our hands in the air and say we don't know. Q. Right. Again, I think SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That does depend on being able to see clearly enough where the droplets are coming from. A. Indeed, and we can't because of the angle we're looking at it. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Also the fact that if they were
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	I think where that leaves us is in a situation where, no matter how you look at this, you have some combination of those two heating mechanisms that are causing eventually the ignition of the cladding and the escalation of the fire spread up the building. If you look at — I was looking at this over the lunch break — paragraph 713 in my report, I sort of finish this section on B1 and B2 — it's immediately below the paragraph that you read previously, and I say: "713. Indeed, it is probable that some combination of the fire spread routes suggested in hypotheses B1 and B2 conspired to cause the initial ignition and sustained burning of the external cladding."	in that particular location is external to the cavity. So that vertical line of PE immediately to the left of the window, if I'm looking at the window, is actually external. So if it is coming directly from that location, then I think we sort of have to hold our hands in the air and say we don't know. Q. Right. Again, I think SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That does depend on being able to see clearly enough where the droplets are coming from. A. Indeed, and we can't because of the angle we're looking at it. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Also the fact that if they were coming from above the window, they're falling past the
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	I think where that leaves us is in a situation where, no matter how you look at this, you have some combination of those two heating mechanisms that are causing eventually the ignition of the cladding and the escalation of the fire spread up the building. If you look at — I was looking at this over the lunch break — paragraph 713 in my report, I sort of finish this section on B1 and B2 — it's immediately below the paragraph that you read previously, and I say: "713. Indeed, it is probable that some combination of the fire spread routes suggested in hypotheses B1 and B2 conspired to cause the initial ignition and sustained burning of the external cladding." That's kind of where I end up with it. I guess I would like to say also, with respect to this issue, that for me, it's almost a secondary issue. I can understand why you want to get to knowing more confidently which one it is, but at the end of the day, there's a number of mechanisms by which rainscreen cladding of this nature could be ignited on the outside of the building, and to focus too heavily on the	in that particular location is external to the cavity. So that vertical line of PE immediately to the left of the window, if I'm looking at the window, is actually external. So if it is coming directly from that location, then I think we sort of have to hold our hands in the air and say we don't know. Q. Right. Again, I think SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That does depend on being able to see clearly enough where the droplets are coming from. A. Indeed, and we can't because of the angle we're looking at it. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Also the fact that if they were coming from above the window, they're falling past the window which is itself highly illuminated by the fire. A. Mm-hm. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Does that make it more or less difficult to A. And if they are coming from above the window, given the way that that cassette is configured, essentially it's a box that goes like that (Indicates), you essentially have a trough internal to the cavity at that location
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	I think where that leaves us is in a situation where, no matter how you look at this, you have some combination of those two heating mechanisms that are causing eventually the ignition of the cladding and the escalation of the fire spread up the building. If you look at — I was looking at this over the lunch break — paragraph 713 in my report, I sort of finish this section on B1 and B2 — it's immediately below the paragraph that you read previously, and I say: "713. Indeed, it is probable that some combination of the fire spread routes suggested in hypotheses B1 and B2 conspired to cause the initial ignition and sustained burning of the external cladding." That's kind of where I end up with it. I guess I would like to say also, with respect to this issue, that for me, it's almost a secondary issue. I can understand why you want to get to knowing more confidently which one it is, but at the end of the day, there's a number of mechanisms by which rainscreen cladding of this nature could be ignited on the outside of the building, and to focus too heavily on the specifics of what has happened in this particular fire scenario I think in a way diminishes the importance of	in that particular location is external to the cavity. So that vertical line of PE immediately to the left of the window, if I'm looking at the window, is actually external. So if it is coming directly from that location, then I think we sort of have to hold our hands in the air and say we don't know. Q. Right. Again, I think SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That does depend on being able to see clearly enough where the droplets are coming from. A. Indeed, and we can't because of the angle we're looking at it. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Also the fact that if they were coming from above the window, they're falling past the window which is itself highly illuminated by the fire. A. Mm-hm. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Does that make it more or less difficult to A. And if they are coming from above the window, given the way that that cassette is configured, essentially it's a box that goes like that (Indicates), you essentially have a trough internal to the cavity at that location and your burning polyethylene is going to come out either end of the trough at the vertical cracks. Given

the extract fan, the left-hand side — you know, it's possible, but, again, I don't know that we will ever know the answers to these questions. MR MILLETT: Let me try something on you. We've treated the uPVC as a single entity, but can you help us, with the temperatures that Professor Torero has identified within the compartment, would it be more likely that the uPVC would fail and fall away and open up at the top as opposed to the bottom? A. I think so, yes. Can I take you back into your report at page 12 I want to pick up figure 66, which is actually page I want to pick up figure 66, which is actually page I then the uPVC at the top by the window? A. Indeed, yes. Q. That would also, therefore, support hypothesis B2. A. Indeed, yes. Q. So that in fact, although the flaming droplets might well have been coming from the top end of the window jamb on the right-hand side as you look out, the ingress of fire into the cavity could well have come through the uPVC there? A. The intermittent flaming at the junction betw	rent in all ny . 22. ge 123.
Row the answers to these questions. 3 flame impingement due to a ceiling jet from at the MR MILLETT: Let me try something on you. 4	rent in all ny . 22. ge 123.
MR MILLETT: Let me try something on you. We've treated the uPVC as a single entity, but can you help us, with the temperatures that Professor Torero has identified within the compartment, would it be more likely that the uPVC would fail and fall away and open up at the top as opposed to the bottom? A. I think so, yes. I want to pick up figure 66, which is actually page I the inside of the compartment through the gap created by the uPVC at the top by the window? A. Indeed, yes. Q. So that in fact, although the flaming droplets might well have been coming from the top end of the window giamb on the right-hand side as you look out, the ingress of fire into the cavity could well have come through the gap created by is that more consistent with hypothesis B1 or Early inham to pick up figure 66, which is actually page I that we have to keep in mind. Hence more inability to be more confident, with apologies. O. Thatk we have to keep in mind. Hence more inability to be more confident, with apologies. O. Thatk you. Can I take you back into your report at page 12 I want to pick up figure 66, which is actually page I think it probably spans the two, in fact. You identify in the text at figure 66, at the bott of the page: " Intermittent flaming between the spandrel cassettes above between Level 4 and Level 5." We saw that on the video and you showed us the same that the page of the window in the right-hand side as you look out, the ingress of fire into the cavity could well have come through the I that more consistent with hypothesis B1 or Early in the text at figure 66, which is actually page in the window. A. Ves. I think to pick up figure 66, which is actually page I that we have to keep in mind. Hence more inability to be more confident, with apologies. A. Indeed, yes. I think to pick up figure 66, which is actually page I that we have to keep in mind. Hence more inability to be more confident, with apologies. A. Indeed, yes. I want to pick up figure 66, which is actually page I that we have to kee	rent in all ny · · 22. ge 123.
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you help us, with the temperatures that Professor Torero has identified within the compartment, would it be more likely that the uPVC would fail and fall away and open up at the top as opposed to the bottom? A. I think so, yes. Q. If that is so, would it not also be the case that, therefore, there was a more likely ingress of fire from the inside of the compartment through the gap created by the uPVC at the top by the window? A. Indeed, yes. Q. That would also, therefore, support hypothesis B2. A. Indeed, yes. Q. So that in fact, although the flaming droplets might well have been coming from the top end of the window giamb on the right-hand side as you look out, the ingress of fire into the cavity could well have come through the gap creater of the sinability to be more confident, with apologies. Q. Thank you. Can I take you back into your report at page 12 I want to pick up figure 66, which is actually page. I think it probably spans the two, in fact. You identify in the text at figure 66, at the bott of the page: " Intermittent flaming between the spandrel cassettes above between Level 4 and Level 5." We saw that on the video and you showed us the same than the video and you showed us the same than the video and you showed us the column and the spandrel" I sthat more consistent with hypothesis B1 or E	22. ge 123.
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10 A. I think so, yes. 11 Q. If that is so, would it not also be the case that, 12 therefore, there was a more likely ingress of fire from 13 the inside of the compartment through the gap created by 14 the uPVC at the top by the window? 15 A. Indeed, yes. 16 Q. That would also, therefore, support hypothesis B2. 17 A. Indeed, yes. 18 Q. So that in fact, although the flaming droplets might 19 well have been coming from the top end of the window 20 jamb on the right-hand side as you look out, the ingress 21 of fire into the cavity could well have come through the 20 Is that more consistent with hypothesis B1 or E	ge 123.
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15 A. Indeed, yes. 16 Q. That would also, therefore, support hypothesis B2. 17 A. Indeed, yes. 18 Q. So that in fact, although the flaming droplets might 19 well have been coming from the top end of the window 20 jamb on the right-hand side as you look out, the ingress 21 of fire into the cavity could well have come through the 15 cassettes above between Level 4 and Level 5." We saw that on the video and you showed us the saw that on the video and yo	:hat.
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of fire into the cavity could well have come through the 21 Is that more consistent with hypothesis B1 or E	
31	D20
1 77 IPVC there?	
A. Yes. Indeed, the way that the rail that holds the spandrels I would say is more consistent with	
window framing onto the building terminates at that 24 venting hypothesis. The flaming at the column	in could be
25 location would allow flames and hot gases exiting at the 25 due to either to those hypotheses.	
Page 137 Page 139	
1 top right-hand corner, if you're inside looking out, to 1 Q. Under hypothesis B1, would one expect to see the	the burning
2 access the spandrel panel as well as the column panel 2 of the cladding more directly above the window a	•
3 just above the window. So, yes, it's possible. 3 opposed to on the side, as we do?	
4 Q. Putting into the mix that possibility, how would that 4 A. I would expect that, given the buoyancy of ho	ot gases and
5 then square against the possibility of your hypothesis 5 the tendency for flames to move in that directi	ion, yes.
6 B1, namely flame impingement directly through the gap 6 Q. Would that not, then, tend to support hypothesis	s B2 over
7 left by the extract vent or the open window? 7 B1, or is that just short nose again?	
8 A. I don't think that would necessarily impact my previous 8 A. I think so, yes.	
9 statement that I would say, you know, via the uPVC 9 Q. Right.	
failing is ahead by a nose, but not by a significant 10 Similar question. Look at figure 68(a), please.	
11 margin. 11 This is thermal imaging, page 126 of your report,	, and
12 It's important to say we also have the analysis by 12 you've set out the relevant thermal images at the s	second
Professor Torero, and he clearly has a preference, 13 pulse and a second after the second pulse at 01.14	4-odd.
14 I think, in his report. Dr Lane also, I think, 14 Looking at this, is the picture that these show,	
expresses a clear preference for the uPVC failing mode 15 particularly figure 68(a), the heat still there after	
in her report. 16 the first pulse and the absence of it after the second	nd
17 The only thing I would say and I'm sure 17 pulse, is that consistent with your hypothesis B1,	, that
Professor Torero would agree with me on this is that 18 the fire vented out of the open window or the extra	tract
19 his analysis, as you've pointed out, is a simplified 19 fan?	
analysis, it's quite a straightforward, simple analysis, 20 A. As Professor Torero discussed yesterday, give	en the
21 and it doesn't take account of, for instance, the 21 resolution of these images, it's difficult to say	
purlboard immediately inside the window and the 22 anything too conclusive about them. That hot	
potential for that to burn and flame, or the potential 23 this image does appear to be approximately in	-
for the extract fan infill panel to burn and provide 24 location of the extract fan panel, which could i	n the
25 some flames as well. 25 that this is a time and here we're at about 01	n the indicate
Page 138 Page 140	n the indicate

		Т	
1	Q. Yes.	1	from Professor Torero.
2	A. So it could just simply be the extract fan panel burning	2	Q. Having considered his report and heard him give evidence
3	or it could be I mean, it could be anything burning	3	yesterday, do you disagree with Professor Torero?
4	in that location, but it's in the approximate location	4	A. In what respect? In respect of that statement?
5	of the extract fan panel, I would say.	5	Q. Yes.
6	Q. Does this evidence help us in any way to decide as	6	A. Yes, I think I do. I think I do.
7	between hypothesis B1 and B2?	7	Q. Let me show you what he says so we're clear about what
8	A. Not really, in my opinion, no.	8	I'm asking you to agree with.
9	Q. Moving on to some other evidence.	9	Can you be shown, please, JTOS0000001 at page 46,
10	We have some evidence from Firefighter Daniel Brown	10	lines 1314 to 1315.
11	that after 1.20 am, so a little bit later, he could see	11	He says:
12	within the cavity behind the panels and could see fire	12	"Hypothesis B1, as indicated by Prof. Bisby"
13	travelling up the building. You'll recall he lent out	13	A. Is this his most recent version of his report? Because
14	of the window and aimed his jet into them.	14	I think he's referring to my original B1.
15	He says in his contemporaneous notes just for the	15	Q. He may well be. I can hear mutterings around me, which
16	record, this is MET00005251 at page 3 that the fire	16	rather indicates that I should be not asking you that
17	was travelling in an upwards direction behind the	17	question.
18	cladding. He says:	18	•
19	" it was easy to see the material behind it was	19	A. I think this is referring to the fire starts in the extract fan as the hypothesis, yes.
20	alight and travelling in an upwards direction however	20	
20	the vast majority of the cladding remained in place and	20	Q. Moving forward, then, to talk about direct flame impingement through an open window.
22	any attempts to extinguish simply bounced off."	22	Is it relevant, having considered Professor Torero's
23			_
	And similar evidence later when he gave evidence and	23	report and also your own work based on the visual
24 25	in his statement to the police in a fuller form.	24	inspections of the video, that flames would've come out
23	Does that help you, again, decide between B1 and B2?	25	from a hot compartment into a relatively cool atmosphere
	Page 141		Page 143
		1	
1	A No because I think at that stage we're quite well along	1	outside?
1	A. No, because I think at that stage we're quite well along	1 2	outside?
2	in the vertical progression of the fire up the cladding,	2	A. I mean, certainly one of the consequences of venting
2 3	in the vertical progression of the fire up the cladding, and so regardless of how it started, we have a very	2 3	A. I mean, certainly one of the consequences of venting outside is a cooling effect, both on the gases and on
2 3 4	in the vertical progression of the fire up the cladding, and so regardless of how it started, we have a very well-developed fire in the cladding at that stage.	2 3 4	A. I mean, certainly one of the consequences of venting outside is a cooling effect, both on the gases and on the flames as a consequence of the cold air entrainment
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2 A. Yes. Yes. 3 Q. Is that point in time when smoke and/or flames extend 4 out of the compartment of origin, or is it as soon as 5 any of the combustible components of the facade in the 6 case of Grenfell Tower ignites? 6 A. It's the moment when any secondary fire compartment is 8 compromised by hot smoke or flames. 9 Q. What do you mean by secondary fire compartment? 10 A. So the flat of origin is a fire compartment. 11 Q. Yes. 12 A. It's a fire-rated box. The most likely candidate for 13 next compromised would be the flat directly above, which 14 is also intended to be a fire-rated box. Given fires 15 aren't supposed to move from one fire-rated box to 16 another fire-rated box, I would say that 17 compartmentation is effectively lost when flat 26 is 18 compromised by the vertically spreading fire. 19 Q. So not, then—is this right?—at the moment when the 20 ACM panels ignite outside flat 16? 21 A. I mean, I think that one could argue that, but if the 22 definition of fire compartmentation is that the fire is 23 confined to a single compartment in a building— 24 I mean, let's take the case of a fire in a building that 25 doesn't have a cladding system that spreads flame 2 I fin to actually inevitable, that it would affect other boxes, wasn't it? A. I agree in this case there is an inevitability, but, of course, cladding isn't supposed to do this. So I guess I'm struggling to understand what the point of the question is. MR MILLETT: I think the point of the question is to work out—people speak of compartmentation linked to stay put, and it's part of a bigger design principle, and it's not for me to tell you, but it's really a question of focusing on a point in time which we can all understand as what we mean by compartmentation has been breached or lost. I'm suggesting to you that it's lost when the components of the cladding on the exterior of flat 16 in this particular case are alight. A. I mean, I can go along with that in this case, but as I said, if we had a building that had a different cladding syst	1	terms, is breached?	1	established in the cladding, it was almost inevitable.
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1	as opposed to the potential consequences. It's what	1	showing the professor, or he'll be showing us, his
2	actually happens. So when that flat above flat 26	2	second clip, LBYS0000002, and this also will show
3	becomes involved, you now have lost your fire box, your	3	pictures of the building on fire on the exterior and has
4	fire-rated box in your building.	4	audio attached to it. Some people will find it
5	Q. There's a question I was going to ask you later on, but	5	distressing and may need to leave the room or remove
6	I might as well ask you it now: in your experience, do	6	themselves from the live stream. I'll give people a few
7	you know of a cladding fire which has not resulted in	7	seconds before we show this.
8	flats in a high-rise building other than the flat of	8	Can I ask Paul if we can move to the sequence at
9	origin being breached?	9	01.15.53.
10	A. That has not resulted in?	10	(Video Played)
11	Q. Yes. In other words, a cladding fire which didn't break	11	Now, I've shown you quite a bit of that.
12	back in.	12	In this clip, we can see a covering jet, which we
13	A. Not specifically, because we tend not to hear about them	13	can still see in the part we've frozen on, being started
14	because they don't, so they're not newsworthy in that	14	up and aimed underneath the window.
15	sense.	15	From what you've seen, professor and you've seen
16	My understanding from speaking to colleagues who	16	and analysed all the video clips you've got, and it may
17	work in the fire services internationally would be that	17	not be complete, of course is this the first visual
18	it is reasonably routine to have fires in multi-storey	18	confirmation of the jet being in use?
19	buildings that don't spread to other fire compartments	19	A. Yes.
20	via the exterior. It depends on the characteristics of	20	Q. I don't need to take you to this, but we have a document
21	the cladding system.	21	from the LFB, which is their ORR, their operational
22	Q. Right.	22	response report, which has a time at 01.11, which
23	A. We could think of a number of cases where that has	23	suggests that a jet was being applied at 01.11, and that
24	happened, and you have seen fire spread vertically where	24	it was being applied above the window.
25	you didn't have ACM, maybe you had window infill panels	25	Have you seen anything to support that statement?
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1	or some other type of cladding system that presented	1	A. No, I've not.
2	fire spread risks, but I think we only know about them	2	Q. In your opinion, could earlier external firefighting
3	because that occurred, if that makes sense.	3	in other words, earlier than 01.16 that we've seen
4	Q. I am going to try to get a feel for the inevitability	4	have made a difference?
5	which the chairman has put to you, when we come back to	5	A. That's a very difficult question to answer. I think
6	Grenfell Tower, looking at the geometry and	6	it's hard to say with any certainty. The only evidence
7	configuration of this cladding structure.	7	that I could bring to answering that question is that
8	Was it in your opinion inevitable that, once the	8	I've seen a number of cladding fire tests on
9	cladding had ignited, it would spread in the way you've	9	large-scale, 9-metre high rigs where fires involving
10	identified and, therefore, inevitable that it would	10	combinations of materials similar to this, ie PIR
11	breach other compartments?	11	backing insulation and an ACM PE rainscreen, in a fire
12	A. Yes.	12	that is developed and spreading up the cladding one to
13	Q. So in practical terms, would it be right to say that	13	two storeys, not dissimilar to what we see here,
14	actually compartmentation, to all intents and purposes,	14	although admittedly higher up in the air in this case,
15	was breached once the cladding was alight outside	15	I've seen those fires extinguished with relative ease in
16	flat 16?	16	test lab scenarios.
17	A. Sure, noting my slight disagreement with that	17	Obviously noting that there could be significant
18	definition, I'll go along with you.	18	differences between those systems in those scenarios,
19	MR MILLETT: External firefighting, moving ahead.	19	not knowing the differences in terms of the firefighting
20	Can I ask you, please, to look at a video clip.	20	kit that's used in order to do that, in terms of the
21	Mr Chairman, I'm not sure if I need to keep	21	volumes of water deployed by the hoses and the
22	repeating the trigger warning	22	pressures, et cetera, et cetera, but I have seen fires
23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It's better if you do.	23	visually similar to this involving similar materials
24	MR MILLETT: It probably is better.	24	extinguished in fire test laboratories, yes.
25	I again repeat the trigger warning: I'm going to be	25	So I think it is not impossible in theory.
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			38 (Pages 149 to 152)

1	Q. Knowing what you do about the composition of the	1	know that, and if that isn't the case, it's equally
2	materials in this cladding structure and their geometry,	2	important that we know that. Both in terms of truth in
3	in your opinion, would spraying a jet above the window	3	this event and in terms of the fact that we have a large
4	of flat 16 have made a material difference to fire	4	number of buildings in the UK with non-compliant
5	spread by 1.15 am?	5	cladding systems on them, I would expect firefighting
6	A. That's a very, very difficult and, I recognise, very	6	tactics would be influenced by whether or not an attempt
7	important question.	7	was made and was proven effective or not in this
8	Again, I would say it's possible, but I'm not	8	context.
9	a firefighter. I would not want to say one way or	9	That's why I did it and I think it's important to
10	another for sure.	10	state that.
11	Q. On the basis that the jet is being applied from the	11	Q. That's obviously left a factual question open.
12	ground, would it have been possible for water to reach	12	On the hypothesis that the operational response
13	behind the cladding outside flat 16, whether in the	13	report is correct and that a covering jet was applied
14	column or in the spandrels, or indeed the spandrels	14	above the window at 01.11 it may not have been for
15	above the kitchen, if that is where there was fire?	15	terribly long what conclusions would you draw from
16	A. I mean, it's a ventilated rainscreen facade. It's meant	16	that if that was a fact?
17	to exclude rain, which would be water coming	17	A. That would indicate it is potentially very difficult to
18	predominantly from above.	18	extinguish one of these fires, even if that is done very
19	In terms of water coming from below, one imagines	19	early on. I mean, keep in mind that at 01.11 we
20	that water could get into the cladding via the cracks	20	could look at the video of the fire in that region, and
21	and openings that we've discussed in looking at the	21	it's still quite small and localised. It hasn't
22	configuration of the cladding. Whether the amount of	22	extended anywhere near what it has by 01.15, when we see
23	water that one could get into the cavity, and assuming	23	the covering jet applied.
24	there's burning going on within the cavity, would be	24	So if it is genuinely not possible to relatively
25	sufficient to extinguish a growing fire of this nature,	25	easily extinguish a fire which at that stage at least
	**************************************		····· J. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	Page 153		Page 155
			3
1	again, it's very difficult to say with any certainty.	1	visually is quite a small fire, although admittedly in
2	I think it's possible but not definitive.	2	visually is quite a small fire, although admittedly in the cladding, then that's an important piece of
2 3	I think it's possible but not definitive. Q. Possible but not definitive. There's a range, though,	2 3	visually is quite a small fire, although admittedly in the cladding, then that's an important piece of information as regards the safety of people who are
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2 3 4 5	I think it's possible but not definitive. Q. Possible but not definitive. There's a range, though, in that. Would it be probable or improbable?	2 3 4 5	visually is quite a small fire, although admittedly in the cladding, then that's an important piece of information as regards the safety of people who are potentially living in buildings with non-compliant cladding on them.
2 3 4 5 6	I think it's possible but not definitive. Q. Possible but not definitive. There's a range, though, in that. Would it be probable or improbable? A. I don't know. Genuinely, I couldn't say.	2 3 4 5 6	visually is quite a small fire, although admittedly in the cladding, then that's an important piece of information as regards the safety of people who are potentially living in buildings with non-compliant cladding on them. Q. Approaching it from a different angle, assuming that the
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8	I think it's possible but not definitive. Q. Possible but not definitive. There's a range, though, in that. Would it be probable or improbable? A. I don't know. Genuinely, I couldn't say. Q. All right. Vertical fire spread, if I can turn to that.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	visually is quite a small fire, although admittedly in the cladding, then that's an important piece of information as regards the safety of people who are potentially living in buildings with non-compliant cladding on them. Q. Approaching it from a different angle, assuming that the fact as recorded in the operational response report at 01.11 is not a fact, in other words didn't happen, no
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			A. T
1	you may have colleagues inside for the sake of the	1	A. I mean, the fundamental assertion that I'm making here
2	safety of the colleagues inside.	$\begin{vmatrix} 2\\3 \end{vmatrix}$	is that if a fire is ignited in a cladding system such
3	So that may change a decision about what it is that	4	as this made from these materials under any
4 5	you do first in that fire scenario. Maybe it would be better to put out the external cladding fire first to be	5	circumstances, we have to expect it to spread quickly and catastrophically because of the nature of the
6	sure that you've dealt with that and then attempt to	6	materials involved. On that basis, it is unreasonable
7	fight the fire internally or some combination of	7	to expect compartmentation to be maintained and, on that
8	activities that might be a bit different.	8	basis, it is unreasonable to have a stay-put policy in
9	Q. Which leads, then, just to confirm the question I asked	9	place.
10	before, having done this little circuitous route: if, in	10	Now, of course, that relies on someone recognising
11	fact, it turns out that there was no covering jet placed	11	that they've got this material on their building, which
12	above the window of flat 16 at 01.11, is it right that	12	is clearly not the case, apparently, here. So
13	you can't say whether it's probable or improbable that	13	I recognise it's quite a strong statement but it's in
14	effective external firefighting would've extinguished	14	a sense a philosophical one.
15	this fire?	15	Q. You say philosophical; that's your opinion.
16	A. I couldn't say.	16	A. Yes, but it relies on this assumption that people
17	Q. You say it's possible but not definite, but you can't	17	actually are aware of the cladding that they have on
18	tell me where on the spectrum between those two it is?	18	their building.
19	A. I mean, my view is in the absence of any information,	19	Q. I'm going to ask you some detailed questions about your
20	it's certainly worth a try.	20	analysis of each of the three routes of fire spread:
21	Q. Vertical fire spread. I think I was showing you what's	21	upward first, then downward, then horizontal, if I can.
22	now on the screen, 748 to 750.	22	Before I do that, can I just ask you to look briefly
23	You've got regulation B4 up there, and you say the	23	at Dr Lane's basic hypothesis. This is BLAS0000010 at
24	functional objective of B4 is that:	24	page 5, and this is figures 10.2 and 10.3 of Dr Lane's
25	"The external walls of the building shall adequately	25	report.
	Page 157		Page 159
	1 age 137		1 age 137
1	resist the spread of fire over the walls and from one	1	She has identified six different pathways for fire
2	building to another, having regard to the height, use	2	spread, and you can see those particularly in 10.2 and
3	and position of the building."	3	then you also have F in 10.3.
4	You say the functional objective was clearly not	4	I have questions about A and D, the columns. They
5	achieved at Grenfell Tower.	5	represent the two vertical channels I think that you say
6	I think it's right that you haven't at this stage	6	played an important role in the fire spread on the
7	considered compliance with the guidance in	7	night.
8	Approved Document B, have you?	8	A. That's correct.
9	A. Not significantly, no.	9	Q. That's right, is it?
10	Q. You do, though, go on to say at paragraph 751 and 752,	10	Dr Lane's also identified a third vertical pathway,
11	and particularly in 752, picking it up in the third	11	E, you can see it as yellow in figure 10.2, which
12	line:	12	I think is via the insulating core panels which connect
13	"On the basis that fire compartmentation was not a	13	between the spandrel panels. Would you agree with her?
14	credible component of any fire safety strategy, once the	14	A. I mean, I would agree that those are continuous bands of
15	refurbishment cladding had been installed at Grenfell	15	material that can burn. I'm not sure that I would agree
16	Tower, it follows logically that a 'stay put' policy was	16	that I've seen either evidence or a physical mechanism
17	also not a credible component Safety strategy, once the	17	by which that is a direction of travel of a fire front,
18 19	refurbishment cladding had been installed." There are three reasons, I think, why you say that	18 19	if you see what I mean. Q. I do.
20		20	-
21	in terms of directions of fire spread: upward, downward and horizontal.	20 21	Leaving aside fire front we may come back to that can I ask you to be shown page 39 of Dr Lane's
22	Do those different theories underpin this basic	22	report, figure 10.37 under paragraph 10.7.2, which is
23	thesis that a stay-put policy was not a credible	23	a photograph of the vertical fire spread up insulating
24	component of any fire safety strategy at Grenfell after	24	core panels, estimated time at 01.26, taken off YouTube.
25	the refurbishment?	25	Her view is that this image shows evidence of fire
			·
	Page 158		Page 160
			40 (D 157 to 160)

1	spread up the insulating core panels.	1	Q. You say this is paragraph 847, just under that
2	My first question is: have you considered that as	2	that this is similar to vertical fire spread up a solid
3	a pathway?	3	fuel surface. It's the last sentence of that paragraph.
4	A. I've considered the fact that the insulating core panels	4	A. Yes. I mean, on a solid fuel surface, you would expect
5	will burn.	5	an exponential increase in the rate of spread based on
6	Q. Yes.	6	the available research, yes.
7	A. So this is a photo that shows insulating core panels	7	Q. When you say a solid fuel surface, could you explain
8	burning, yes?	8	what you mean by that?
9	Q. That is what she says.	9	A. So the scientific literature on vertical fire spread
10	A. It's not necessarily a photo that shows vertical fire	10	dating back many decades, people have been running
11	spread because we can't see which way the fire is going	11	experiments on vertically oriented fuels so we can try
12	in a still image.	12	to understand the physics of the upward concurrent fire
13	Q. I follow.	13	spread mechanism. Obviously if you want to understand
14	A. Yes? That might seem a bit pedantic, but I do think	14	something that is actually quite complex in terms of the
15	it's an important point. So I could assert that the	15	physics, even for a vertically oriented fuel that is
16	insulating core panels have been ignited by falling	16	totally homogeneous, is a single material, doesn't melt,
17	burning debris rather than an upward fire spread	17	doesn't drip, doesn't flow, doesn't warp, you know, it's
18	mechanism, and on the basis of this image, I don't think	18	a very well behaved material, even studying upward
19	you'd be able to say that I'm wrong. Does that make	19	concurrent fire spread on that very simple case is
20	sense?	20	extremely complicated in order to reproduce the physics.
21	Q. Thank you. It does. It makes sense to me.	21	I was at a conference two weeks ago where the
22	A. I'm not saying it isn't, I'm just saying it's difficult	22	keynote lecture was by a chap who is still trying to do
23	to assert that. We can discuss in detail my fire spread	23	this for the very simple case. When you bring a second
24	mechanisms. I suspect that we will. Yes.	24	surface in, you have a cavity, and he just sort of put
25	Q. So you say that on the basis of this photograph, you	25	his hands in the air and said, "Forget it." The models
	Page 161		Page 163
1	couldn't confirm to a degree of confidence that the		
		1 1	that we have even the most advanced models can't do
	•	1 2	that we have, even the most advanced models, can't do
2	insulating core panels were a route of vertical fire	2	this at this stage.
2 3	insulating core panels were a route of vertical fire spread?	2 3	this at this stage. So it's important to recognise the complexity of the
2 3 4	insulating core panels were a route of vertical fire spread?A. That's correct. The insulating core panels burn, or the	2 3 4	this at this stage. So it's important to recognise the complexity of the science we're dealing with here.
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1	dripping, melting, falling, we have deformations, we	1	That's one possible explanation of a number that we
2	have window openings, we have all sorts of complexities	2	could come up with.
3	that we would have to account for if we wanted to model	3	But, again, the combination of materials, I don't
4	this in any meaningful way.	4	know what backing insulation was used within the cavity
5	Nonetheless, what we have is a vertical surface with	5	at The Address. PIR, of all the backing cavity
6	distributed fuel on it, and we observe a similar	6	insulations we might choose, is one of the least
7	outcome, which is a growing fire vertically which causes	7	combustible of those materials that we might choose. It
8	this exponential increase in the rate of fire spread.	8	could've had XPS insulation, it could've had Styrofoam
9	So it is just to say that that exponential increase	9	or something. Yes.
10	in fire spread is not unexpected; it is supported by the	10	Q. Moving ahead, you say in your report this is
11	physics that we understand in general terms.	11	page 169, I don't think there's a need to go to it
12	Q. I think you agree is this right? with	12	the flames reached the roof level at 01.27.58 or
13	Professor Torero that the flame spread that was observed	13	thereabouts.
14	at Grenfell Tower was not as rapid as that which was	14	A. Thereabouts, yes.
15	observed at The Address in Dubai?	15	Q. We can see from a picture or diagram at page 170
16	A. The progression of the upward spreading of fire was	16	perhaps we ought to look at that, this is figure 99,
17	significantly faster at The Address fire, yes.	17	it's a photograph captured at 01.27.42 that the crown
18	Q. That was also, wasn't it, a cladding fire involving	18	was involved in the fire by this time. Is this about
19	polyethylene-filled ACM?	19	the earliest moment when the crown was involved or is
20	A. I mean, based only on media reports, yes.	20	it
21	Q. Are you able to identify any reasons why the vertical	21	A. There or thereabouts. I would say give or take
22	fire spread at Grenfell was slower than that observed	22	2/3 minutes.
23	at, for example, the Dubai tower, The Address?	23	Q. Looking at this image, is there anything you can take
24	A. No. I mean, I could postulate some things, but they	24	from it which tells us anything about the mechanism for
25	would be speculative. The one thing that one does	25	fire spread at the top of the building?
23	would be speculative. The one thing that one does	23	me spread at the top of the building?
	Page 165		Page 167
	8		O
1	observe at The Address fire that one doesn't observe at	1	A. Not as yet, I would say. I think we do see it later in
1 2	observe at The Address fire that one doesn't observe at Grenfell is that The Address fire, based on media	1 2	A. Not as yet, I would say. I think we do see it later in some of the videos and some of the photos, but on the
2	Grenfell is that The Address fire, based on media	2	some of the videos and some of the photos, but on the
2 3	Grenfell is that The Address fire, based on media reports, I think started at the 20th floor of a building	2 3	some of the videos and some of the photos, but on the basis of this photo, no.
2 3 4	Grenfell is that The Address fire, based on media reports, I think started at the 20th floor of a building that is much, much taller than Grenfell Tower, it needs	2 3 4	some of the videos and some of the photos, but on the basis of this photo, no.Q. You've got, I think, five hypotheses of vertical fire
2 3 4 5	Grenfell is that The Address fire, based on media reports, I think started at the 20th floor of a building that is much, much taller than Grenfell Tower, it needs to be pointed out	2 3 4 5	some of the videos and some of the photos, but on the basis of this photo, no. Q. You've got, I think, five hypotheses of vertical fire spread which you cover under section 6.1.6 of your
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1	I wouldn't say it's necessarily one distinct mechanism.	1	A. I mean, that's the purpose of it, so, yes, one would
2	I think there are a combination of factors, the	2	hope. Yes.
3	respective contributions of which are difficult to	3	Q. Therefore, would it matter whether or not a covering jet
4	quantify. I mean, that's one of the reasons why I've	4	was applied from above or below?
5	taken a very mechanistic and systematic approach to	5	A. The reason I made a distinction between above and below
6	dealing with this issue via a number of specific	6	is because of the nature of the openings in the
7	hypotheses which look individually at the various	7	rainscreen cladding.
8	factors that we know can influence vertical fire spread.	8	So, I mean, I could demonstrate with a figure, if
9	Q. We know that Siderise open state intumescent cavity	9	that's a useful thing to do very quickly.
10	barriers were installed in the cladding system. Have	10	Q. Always useful.
11	you considered whether a different type of cavity	11	A. If we look at I'll find it now ah, perfect. So if
12	barrier might have made a difference to vertical fire	12	we look at figure 19
13	spread, whether through the columns or the spandrels?	13	Q. That's page 46 of your report.
14	A. In the manner that the cavity barriers assuming the	14	A. Page 46, yes.
15	same insulation was used, ie that the cavity barriers	15	Just as an example, that's showing the joint between
16	are broken at cladding rails, et cetera, et cetera?	16	column cassettes, and the point I was trying to make is
17	Q. Yes, for example.	17	if you're rain and you're coming down like this the
18	A. I wouldn't expect no, I wouldn't think there would be	18	reason this joint is configured in this way is to
19	any significant difference necessarily.	19	prevent the rain from getting inside cladding, to let
20	MR MILLETT: Right.	20	air get in to ventilate it. If you're down here
21	Mr Chairman, I've got an eye on the clock, which	21	spraying up, one imagines you could somehow get some
22	I suppose I should've had earlier. It's 3.20. This	22	water in behind the cladding. That is the reason for
23	might be an appropriate time for a short break.	23	that distinction.
24	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If it suits you, I think it would be	24	Q. Okay. But in general, the fact is that since the very
25	a good time.	25	large majority of this facia is rain-repellent or
	Page 169		Page 171
1	MR MILLETT: It does. I'm going to look at hypothesis C2	1	water-repellent
2	after the break.	2	A. It's going to repel water, yes.
3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Professor, we're going to have	3	Q the actions of the Fire Brigade in external
4	a short break now. Please don't talk to anyone about	4	firefighting are is this right? likely to have
5	your evidence while you're out of the room and we'll	5	little effect?
6	come back at 3.30. All right?	6	A. If the cladding system is still intact, in that it
7	THE WITNESS: Okay.	7	doesn't have holes having opened up in it, then yes,
8	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.	8	I would agree with that.
9	Good, 3.30, please. Thank you.	9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: This may be a completely wild idea
10	(3.20 pm)	10	no doubt you'll tell me if it is, but if you could get
11	(A short break)	11	above the fire and put water down the cavity, would that
12	(3.35 pm)	12	be likely to do any good?
13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Sorry about the delay, technical	13	A. I wouldn't want to hazard a guess at that one. One
14	glitch, I believe.	14	imagines it couldn't make matters worse, but I wouldn't
15	THE WITNESS: No problem.	15	want to say the extent to which it would make matters
16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Anyway, ready to go on now?	16	better.
17	THE WITNESS: Yes.	17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Fair enough, thank you.
18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.	18	MR MILLETT: Right, thank you.
19	MR MILLETT: Professor, I'm sorry about that.	19	Turning to hypothesis C, can I take you back,
20	Can I, before I go back to hypothesis C2, just ask	20	please, to the foot of page 178 and the top of page 179
20	you a question about the application of water to the	21	of your report, where you set out hypothesis C. We can
21	• •	22	see at the top of page 179 what you say there. You say:
22	cladding.	23	"The presence of combustible (PIR) thermal
	Was this cladding I say cladding the	24	insulation within the external cladding system
2425	rainscreen hydrophobic, in the sense that it repels water as a matter of course?	25	significantly contributed to the rate and/or extent of
	us a matter of course:		- 5

1	upward vertical fire spread observed at Grenfell Tower."	1	thermal inertia material would, will contribute to
2	Can you explain the mechanism by which it	2	a higher rate of temperature increase of anything else
3	contributed?	3	in the system, yes.
4	A. Right, well, it's important to say firstly that that is	4	Q. Would it follow from that that if there were no such
5	the hypothesis that I'm testing rather than a statement,	5	insulation, or no such combustible insulation, the
6	if you see what I mean.	6	vertical spread of the fire would've been slower in its
7	Q. It is.	7	initial stages?
8	A. I then come later to a conclusion on that statement	8	A. It's a slightly hypothetical question, but if the cavity
9	later in that section.	9	were not insulated in any way, it would lose heat more
10	Q. You do, and	10	rapidly and, therefore, yes, I would go along with that
11	A. On page 180. But I think it's important to note that	11	statement.
12	those are stated as hypotheses rather than facts or	12	Q. Or if it were insulated by something that was wholly
13	conclusions, if you see what I mean.	13	non-combustible, if there is such a thing?
14	Q. You're right, and I jumped a stage, perhaps in my	14	A. Well, it's important not to mix ideas here. So the
15	eagerness to	15	combustibility is related to the additional heat release
16	A. Okay.	16	resulting from pyrolysis and production of combustible
17	Q move on.	17	pyrolysis products. The low thermal inertia is about
18	A. But the primary physical mechanisms by which I would	18	heat loss to the system.
19	think the PIR could contribute to we're in C	19	So the one situation is about heat production and
20	upward vertical fire spread would be both that PIR is	20	the other situation is about reducing heat loss, and
21	a combustible material, so when exposed to a heat flux	21	they're potentially independent mechanisms, so it's
22	that is sufficient to reach the pyrolysis temperature,	22	important we consider them differently.
23	it will pyrolyse, it will release combustible pyrolysis	23	So we could imagine, if the backing insulation has
24	products. Those combustible pyrolysis products could	24	a higher thermal inertia, it's less thermally efficient
25	contribute to an increase in local heat release rate of	25	as an insulator, that, yes, there would be additional
	75 (75)		75 155
	Page 173		Page 175
		1	
1	a fire.	1	heat losses to that system and the vertical progression
1 2	a fire. So the extent to which that pyrolysis will occur and	1 2	heat losses to that system and the vertical progression of the fire would be slowed.
	So the extent to which that pyrolysis will occur and	1	
2		2	of the fire would be slowed.
2 3	So the extent to which that pyrolysis will occur and contribute is unquantified at this stage, but that's one	3	of the fire would be slowed. My personal view is that in the context of the
2 3 4	So the extent to which that pyrolysis will occur and contribute is unquantified at this stage, but that's one potential mechanism that could exacerbate heat release	2 3 4	of the fire would be slowed. My personal view is that in the context of the presence of the polyethylene, that would be hugely
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1 2 3 4 5	perspective, are far simpler than what we find on Grenfell Tower. Q. That leads in, I think, to a related issue. At paragraphs 877 to 879 on page 180, you refer to a large-scale test carried out by DCLG, as it then was,	1 2 3 4 5	place, and it prevents them from opening up. But I've not tested that theory. Q. Okay. Moving to a slightly different issue, in terms of the state of the building after the fire, when you did
6 7	in the weeks following the Grenfell Tower fire. You say these demonstrated that the use of PIR insulation within	6 7	your surveys, did you see areas where the ACM panelling remained intact even though there was extensive charring
8 9 10	the rainscreen cavity did not obviously exacerbate escalation of vertical fire spread, and you explain why. Then you say at 879:	8 9 10	of the insulation behind it? A. No. No. It's possible; I didn't see it. Q. Did you see any areas on level 3 where there was
11 12	"It should be noted that the PIR used in these tests was, as far as I have understood from the available	11 12	widespread charring to a depth and where the damage to the PE was highly localised and more severe on the inner
13 14	reports, protected from direct flame impingement by foil facings or foil tape (i.e. the joints and cut edges were	13	face than on the outer face? A. The damage to the PIR?
15 16 17	not exposed within the cavity in these tests, as appears to have been the case at Grenfell Tower)." Just expanding on that, first of all, what in your	15 16 17	Q. The ACM panelling was more severe on the inner face.A. I've not observed that, no.Q. Did you see any evidence low down on the corner columns
18 19	opinion was the utility of the DCLG tests in determining whether the PIR as installed at Grenfell Tower	18	where soot deposits at the joint in the panels might suggest that the fire was burning internally rather than
20 21	contributed to the rate and extent of vertical fire spread, given the lack of foil facings we've seen on the	20 21 22	within the panelling? A. I didn't see that. Low down at the column tips, there's
22 23 24	edges at Grenfell? A. What is the utility of the DCLG post-Grenfell tests specifically with respect to the Grenfell Tower fire?	23 24	typically quite a bit of evidence of melted, dripped polyethylene which has solidified in that location. But I didn't see any soot, or at least I didn't notice it.
25	Q. Yes. Page 177	25	Q. Your next hypothesis is hypothesis C3 at page 180. This
	Page 1 / /	1	
	150 177		Page 179
1	A. Simply illustrative, in that what those tests show is	1	is continuous vertical channels and extensive internal
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	A. Simply illustrative, in that what those tests show is that if you have an ACM PE rainscreen, the test, regardless of the backing insulation, escalates vertical fire spread very, very quickly. I mean, that is really the only reason I've presented that information in this report. Other than that, I would think they don't have much utility. Q. Are you able to tell whether it makes a difference that the assembly used in that test did not have cut edges of PIR? A. I couldn't say one way or another. Q. Do you know whether in those tests the department used a riveted ACM panel rather than a cassette panel? A. I believe that those were riveted. Q. Would that make a difference? A. There is some information — again, I'm not dealing with compliance in my Phase 1 work — I believe that we've received to the inquiry which indicates that a riveted system, as regards product classifications under standard testing, I think specifically through the test that we call the single burning item test, that the riveted system performs marginally better than the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	is continuous vertical channels and extensive internal cavities. Your conclusion is at 888, I think, which is, you say this is page 181: "888. At the time of writing I am not aware of any definitive evidence that the continuous vertical channels and extensive cavities, which have been shown to exist within the refurbishment external cladding system of Grenfell Tower played a role in promoting or accelerating upward vertical fire spread." Just taking that a little bit slowly, first of all, when you say "definitive", what do you mean? A. I guess I mean I couldn't say for certain that it plays a role that would significantly accelerate the vertical fire spread. Q. Are you able to say within a range of probabilities whether the continuous vertical cavities and channels on the columns played a role, some role, in the fire spread vertically? A. Yes. I mean, yes, I think it's likely. Q. Likely? A. I think it's likely that they did, yes. I think I do

1	the known importance of vertical channels, I consider it	1	a cavity causes flame extension.
2	likely that these features contributed, although I can't	2	The other effect, of course, is that if you have
3	quantify it at this stage.	3	a flat wall, then the wall looks out and sees the cold
4	Q. So you're not able to say how likely?	4	world. If you have walls at some angle to each other,
5	A. I think it's very likely that they contributed to some	5	then part of what the one wall sees is the other wall,
6	extent. I think it's almost certain that they	6	which is hot, and you get a re-radiation effect, which
7	contributed to some extent. Whether that's, you know,	7	causes the temperature to increase locally, which again
8	1 per cent worse or 50 per cent worse, I wouldn't be	8	will exacerbate vertical fire spread.
9	able to say at this stage.	9	So I think "plausible" is not perhaps as strong as
10	Q. So the difficulty you have is not the likelihood of the	10	I ought to have used. I think it's very likely that
11	contribution, it's the extent of it?	11	there will be some effect, but again quantifying it is
12	A. It's the significance of that contribution to the	12	the challenge.
13	outcome.	13	I'm not aware of any work in the technical
14	Q. Quantitatively?	14	literature that looks at wing walls at angles other than
15	A. Quantitatively, yes.	15	90 degrees. So the extent to which that is important,
16	Q. Hypothesis C4, which is prevailing wind, you can reject,	16	I couldn't say at this stage.
17	and you have.	17	Q. Can further work be done at Phase 2?
18	Hypothesis C5, which is your last one on vertical	18	A. Further work could definitely be done. I have a project
19	fire spread, relates to the specific overall geometry of	19	planned, yes.
20	the building, and you cover that at paragraphs 903 and	20	Q. Okay.
21	following on page 182, and you explain what the geometry	21	Just picking up a couple of points of detail.
22	is.	22	Paragraph 906 within the hypothesis, you refer to:
23	You say at paragraph 911 on page 183 in the	23	"Column lines that offered continuous and unbroken
24	pre-penultimate line:	24	vertical lines of combustible rainscreen cladding, along
25	"It is not possible to definitively determine"	25	with combustible PIR insulation within the rainscreen
	Page 181		Page 183
1	Well, I'm not sure I picked up the complete	1	cavity (i.e. vertical lines of available fuel unbroken
2	conclusion. Perhaps it's 912. You say:	2	by windows). This created a continuous and
3	"912. On the basis of the available evidence it is	3	uninterrupted vertical 'fuel bed' to support upward
4	not possible to accept or reject Hypothesis C5.	4	vertical fire spread and will have influenced (i.e.
5	However, in my opinion it is plausible to suggest that	5	increased the propensity for) upward vertical fire
6	the presence of the protruding column 'wing wall' at 135	6	spread."
7	degrees could have played an as yet unquantified role in	7	You refer at footnote 56 to section 4.9.1.
8	promoting rapid upward vertical fire spread. Additional	8	Can I take you to page 32 of your report, which
9	work would be required at Phase 2 to confirm and	9	I don't think is something we've looked at today. It's
10	quantify this."	10	figure 8. It's within section 3.1 of your report,
11	To what level of confidence are you able to say that	11	professor, and it's a drawing, effectively, from
12	the presence of the protruding column wing wall did play	12	Celotex.
13	a role?	13	Can you identify where the continuous vertical lines
14	A. Well, the physics at play here is two effects. One	14	of combustible cladding in PIR insulation are by
15	effect is that having the fire confined within a corner,	15	reference to that drawing?
16	even if it's not a right-angle corner, does two things.	16	A. Noting my previously stated colour blindness, I think
17	It changes the way that fresh air is entrained into the	17	the pink sections, left and right-hand sides, if they
18	fire, which means essentially you're going to get less	18	were to continue vertically up and down outside that
19	air entrained into the fire at its base because there's	19	image, those would be the continuous bands that I'm
20	restricted access to the fire because of its	20	referring to.
21	confinement. That has an effect of elongating the flame	21	Q. At 907 on page 183 you refer to:
22	as the flame searches for more air in order to continue	22	"Spandrel lines that offered continuous and unbroken
23	burning. So you have flame elongation in a confined	23	horizontal lines of combustible rainscreen cladding,
24	area, which would exacerbate upward vertical fire	24	along with combustible PIR insulation within the
25	spread, in the same way as confining a flame within	25	rainscreen cavity (i.e. horizontal lines unbroken around
	Page 182		Page 184

1	the full perimeter of the building at all levels from	1	downward fire spread at the corner of column A5 and the
2	Level 3 and above). This created a continuous and	2	north face. So that's essentially the north-east
3	uninterrupted horizontal supply of fuel, capable of	3	corner, is it?
4	supporting horizontal fire spread by a number of routes	4	A. Mm-hm.
5	and mechanisms."	5	Q. You identify dripping, burning material there, just
6	Again, coming back to figure 8 on page 32, can you	6	hanging down on the right-hand side from the main
7	identify those very briefly for us?	7	A. Sorry, that's the north-west corner.
8	A. Those are the blue sections. And to be fair, they're	8	Q. North-west corner. It's the north-west corner, is it?
9	continuous and uninterrupted only because the columns	9	A. Yes.
10	also provide a means for them to pass by the column, if	10	Q. Okay.
11	you see what I mean.	11	Then you have is it the same corner in the next
12	Q. Absolutely.	12	photograph, downward fire spread?
13	Finally on upward fire spread, Dr Lane says we	13	Is one a continuation of the other?
14	don't need to go to this unless you want to, it's her	14	A. Yes. In fact, in one of my videos it will be either
15	report at paragraph 10.4.20 at page 28 that the	15	the north face video or the west face video there is
16	cladding rails for spandrel panels provided a route for	16	video footage of this, which is far more instructive, to
17	vertical fire spread because they essentially bypass the	17	be honest, than the images. But the images tell the
18	cavity barriers. Do you agree with her?	18	story, if you like.
19	A. I do.	19	And, yes, the two things I would highlight there is
20	Q. I can now turn to downward fire spread. You cover that	20	that along the right-hand side of that corner column,
21	at section 6.2 of your report, starting on page 184.	21	you see clear downward fire spread. If it was a video,
22	Is it right, professor, that downward spread, in	22	you'd see progression of that fire front down the
23	your opinion, is caused by two things: one, the melting	23	column.
24	and running downwards of the polyethylene and, secondly,	24	You also see the lines of light that are on the
25	opposed-flow flame spread?	25	column. There's sort of one line and then a secondary
	err common err		,
	Page 185		Page 187
1	A. Yes, with the first of those being the dominant one.	1	line slightly further below at storey heights. Those
1 2	A. Yes, with the first of those being the dominant one. O. The melting and running downwards of PE?		line slightly further below at storey heights. Those are the horizontal breaks in the cassettes along the
2	Q. The melting and running downwards of PE?	2	are the horizontal breaks in the cassettes along the
2 3	Q. The melting and running downwards of PE?A. Correct.		are the horizontal breaks in the cassettes along the column. And I believe that what we're seeing there is
2 3 4	Q. The melting and running downwards of PE?A. Correct.Q. You've defined, I think, opposed-flow flame spread in	2 3 4	are the horizontal breaks in the cassettes along the column. And I believe that what we're seeing there is pooling of burning polyethylene on that little shelf
2 3 4 5	 Q. The melting and running downwards of PE? A. Correct. Q. You've defined, I think, opposed-flow flame spread in your report on page 184 in footnote 58. I take it that 	2 3 4 5	are the horizontal breaks in the cassettes along the column. And I believe that what we're seeing there is pooling of burning polyethylene on that little shelf that I showed previously in my diagram as the
2 3 4 5 6	 Q. The melting and running downwards of PE? A. Correct. Q. You've defined, I think, opposed-flow flame spread in your report on page 184 in footnote 58. I take it that that is the definition that you're using. 	2 3 4 5 6	are the horizontal breaks in the cassettes along the column. And I believe that what we're seeing there is pooling of burning polyethylene on that little shelf that I showed previously in my diagram as the polyethylene drips down inside the columns.
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1	there's another bright pinpoint of light, do you see?	1	Q. What enables you from this or the other photographs we
2	A. Just here?	2	have been looking at to form that view?
3	Q. There, yes. What is that?	3	A. It's a combination of the fact that opposed-flow fire
4	A. It might just be falling debris. It's hard to say from	4	spread on the spandrel panels would be quite a difficult
5	a still. We could look at the video, I suppose.	5	thing to have happened, because these are
6	Q. Moving on to the next figures, 112 and 113 on page 191,	6	aluminium-coated polyethylene rainscreen panels, so they
7	again, you could see dripping burning material in both	7	tend not to spread fire laterally unless there's some
8	of those pictures, falling and landing on window	8	other factor at play.
9	details. That's what you say in relation to figure 113.	9	Opposed-flow fire spread in a lateral sense relies
10	Again, can you point anything specific out from	10	on there being fuel ahead of the flame front, and it
11	there about how it is that that burning, dripping	11	relies on there being energy getting to the fuel ahead
12	material is actually spreading fire?	12	of the flame front. If you have a burning ACM PE cored
13	A. Yes. I mean, it's actually, I think, a very important	13	rainscreen panel, there's two questions you have to ask.
14	point. We see this inclined front of the flame here	14	The first question is: where does the energy go? The
15	I mean, it's also interesting to point out that after	15	energy goes mostly up. The second question you have to
16	that very bright line passes, we see much less flaming.	16	ask is: where does the fuel go? And the fuel goes
17	We have compartment fires burning within these fires	17	mostly down. Granted some of the energy goes with it
18	now, but we see dark patches on the cladding, which does	18	because it's burning.
19	go to this question of the extent to which the backing	19	So if your energy goes mostly up your fuel goes
20	insulation is still contributing once the polyethylene	20	mostly down, you're not left with much to cause lateral.
21	has burned out of the rainscreen cladding, and indicates	21	Right?
22	that not so much would be the answer to that question.	22	That combined with the fact that when we observe the
23	But nonetheless, we have this diagonal line here.	23	video, in particular the thermal imaging video from the
24	The bits that we've circled here, again, if this was in	24	helicopters, the NPAS videos that were taken on the
25	a video, what you would see is material falling down,	25	night, when they switch to a thermal imaging filter in
	Page 189		Page 191
	1 agc 107		1 agc 171
1	landing on either the windowsills or, in cases where the	1	those videos hopefully we'll have a chance to see
1 2	landing on either the windowsills or, in cases where the cassettes have disappeared, on top of cavity barriers	1 2	those videos hopefully we'll have a chance to see some of it it is really striking the amount of hot
2	cassettes have disappeared, on top of cavity barriers	2	some of it it is really striking the amount of hot
3	cassettes have disappeared, on top of cavity barriers and forming these localised pool fires, which then cause	2 3	some of it — it is really striking the amount of hot burning debris that is falling down this building which
2 3 4	cassettes have disappeared, on top of cavity barriers and forming these localised pool fires, which then cause generation of energy up and further fuel this diagonal	2 3 4	some of it — it is really striking the amount of hot burning debris that is falling down this building which is not visually obvious when you look at an optical
2 3 4 5	cassettes have disappeared, on top of cavity barriers and forming these localised pool fires, which then cause generation of energy up and further fuel this diagonal line.	2 3 4 5	some of it it is really striking the amount of hot burning debris that is falling down this building which is not visually obvious when you look at an optical view. When you look at thermal imaging, it's like
2 3 4 5 6	cassettes have disappeared, on top of cavity barriers and forming these localised pool fires, which then cause generation of energy up and further fuel this diagonal line. But the key thing I wanted to mention was if we	2 3 4 5 6	some of it — it is really striking the amount of hot burning debris that is falling down this building which is not visually obvious when you look at an optical view. When you look at thermal imaging, it's like a waterfall of molten, burning material falling off the
2 3 4 5 6 7	cassettes have disappeared, on top of cavity barriers and forming these localised pool fires, which then cause generation of energy up and further fuel this diagonal line. But the key thing I wanted to mention was if we imagine that this diagonal line stays a diagonal line,	2 3 4 5 6 7	some of it — it is really striking the amount of hot burning debris that is falling down this building which is not visually obvious when you look at an optical view. When you look at thermal imaging, it's like a waterfall of molten, burning material falling off the side of this building, contributing to heating of the
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1	That's clear enough.	1	We've covered that before.
2	Can I ask you whether you formed a view about	2	Is that the same mechanism
3	whether the Aluglaze panels contained in the infill	3	A. Same idea, yes.
4	panels and the panels supporting the extract fans	4	Q we saw in relation to vertical?
5	contributed as a source of melting and dripping material	5	A. It's keeping heat within the system, which has to do
6	contributing in turn to downward fire spread?	6	something, and that would just accelerate the
7	A. I think it's possible, but I think that the potential	7	downward yes.
8	is, in comparative terms, quite small. I will base that	8	Q. Hypothesis D3 at the top of page 200 is the continuous
9	opinion on two key arguments.	9	vertical channels and extensive internal cavities
10	The first would be that, as I've already discussed,	10	contributing to downward fire spread. You cover that at
11	when XPS is exposed to a heat source, it tends to shrink	11	paragraphs 958 to 962 there on that page.
12	away from the flame and then burn in situ. It is	12	Is your conclusion there that it's likely that
13	capable of forming a pool fire under the right	13	downward fire spread would have been somewhat slower, as
14	conditions, but in small quantities, heated quite	14	you say at 962, had these channels and extensive
15	severely, I would expect it not to necessarily do that.	15	internal cavities not been present, confirmed by your
16	Indeed, the PowerPoint presentation we have from the	16	visual evidence?
17	LFB about the Shepherds Court fire, that shows some	17	A. Yes, it is. Yes. So there is extensive evidence at
18	experiments done by Bureau Veritas in the wake of that	18	Grenfell Tower of solidified polyethylene in the
19	fire to look at panels that have the same at least it	19	locations of those cavities that has dripped down from
20	appears to be the same, it's a blue XPS insulation. In	20	above to the cooler parts of the building near the base,
21	that case, they actually do set alight some panels and	21	and you have large quantities of polyethylene in the
22	they don't see pooling, but they do see shrinking away	22	base of the building in those locations, which is fairly
23	from the flame.	23	compelling evidence.
24	For that reason, I would say probably not that	24	MR MILLETT: I want to turn to horizontal spread and the
25	substantial an effect.	25	crown, if I can.
	Page 193		Page 195
1	The secondary reason is that the XPS is	1	I am going to show you a little bit of video.
2	25 millimetres thick, but it has a density that's almost	2	Again, I should repeat the trigger warning. This is
3	an order of magnitude less than the PE, and it's only	3	very much this building, very much on fire, and a lot of
4	present, as Dr Lane has said, over 13 per cent of the	4	people might find that distressing. There is also audio
5	exterior of the building, as opposed to something more	5	that goes with it. Again, people might find that
6	like 70 per cent for the ACM panels.	6	distressing. So if they don't feel they're up to seeing
7	So the mass of material is a fraction of the mass of	7	it, they should either leave this room or remove
8	PE present, its heat of combustion is less by about	8	themselves from the live stream.
9	10 per cent than PE. So we have less of it, it has less	9	This is video 4, Paul.
10	heat of combustion, and it tends not to form pool fires	10	I'm going to ask you to pause if you think there is
11	when not in large quantities.	11	anything we should be looking at. This is in the
12	So for that basis, I would say I mean, clearly	12	context of horizontal spread and, particularly, the
13	it's going to contribute, but I think it's probably	13	crown contributing to fire spread.
14	small and negligible.	14	We can start at 5.29, or 5.30.
15	Q. Turning to your hypothesis D2, that's on page 199 at	15	Mr Chairman, I think we should start now.
16	paragraphs 952 and following, you say there, and	16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, I think that will be all right.
17	I summarise, that the exposed edges of the PIR	17	(Video Played)
18	insulation may have contributed indirectly to downward	18	A. Stop it there, Paul.
19	fire spread, but you say there's no "compelling	19	Yes, this is just a video showing that still that we
20	evidence" that it played a role. That's paragraph 957.	20	looked at a few minutes ago, where you can clearly see
21	A. Yes.	21	the burning material dropping down the right-hand side
22	Q. If we have that up on the screen, "no compelling	22	of that corner column, this being the north-west corner.
23	evidence".	23	You can see the formation of these bands of light at the
24	I think you go on to say that it may have played	24	junctions between the columns, and hopefully this is one
25	a minor role by insulating or heating within the cavity.	25	part of the video where we actually observe that
			*
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1	progression, but I couldn't say if it is for sure.	1	bit.
2	Go ahead.	2	(Video Played)
3	(Video Played)	3	I think we've probably come to the end of what may
4	Okay, so this	4	be useful for you to comment on, but if there is
5	Q. This is some NPAS video footage.	5	anything else in these sequences that you think assists
6	A. Yes. Thank you for the pre-emptive stop, Paul.	6	illustrating horizontal spread, particularly at the
7	So, yes, this is some of the NPAS image where it	7	crown
8	appears they're using some kind of thermal imaging	8	A. No, I think what I commented on previously says it all,
9	filter here, night vision, and it's just instructive,	9	but the hypothesised mechanism at the crown is probably
10	I think, to look, as this video progresses obviously	10	worth restating, that those crown elements burn and
11	the regions that are burning appear to have saturated	11	spread fire preferentially and create what is
12	the filter because they're so hot, but you can see the	12	essentially a fuse around the top of the building. The
13	amount of hot debris that is falling from the tower,	13	mechanism is they burn, they drip polyethylene onto the
14	which really, I think, supports this idea of the	14	coping directly below them, formation of a localised
15	downward mechanism.	15	
		16	pool fire which progresses laterally, ignites the next
16 17	Q. Right. Do you want him to continue?	17	crown elements and progresses around the building.
	A. Yes, please well, I guess the other comment I would		Q. Yes, thank you.
18	make here it's not so clear here, but you can see	18	The other thing to pick up here is that you say in
19	that the furthest extent of progression of this fire is	19	your report at page 238, moving ahead significantly in
20	along the crown on the west face. So the furthest	20	it to the end well, to the beginning of horizontal
21	horizontal progression as we move around the building as	21	fire spread hypotheses, and you have a number of
22	the fire progresses in all five of the videos that I've	22	hypotheses, under E. At paragraph 1114, you say:
23	produced demonstrates that the fire progression around	23	"1114. It is worth noting that, under normal
24	the building, both clockwise and anticlockwise, if	24	conditions, upward spreading fires and fire plumes tend
25	you're looking from above, is at the crown, and that the	25	to spread outward as they travel upward. This is
	Page 197		Page 199
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1	rate of that spread is actually reasonably consistent	1	because the heat and smoke, which travel upward from a
2	throughout the duration of the fire. So it's almost	2	fire, form an inverted cone that widens as it rises due
3	like a linear fuse moving around the top of the	3	to entrainment of fresh air into the fire plume."
4	building.	4	You say that results in a characteristic V-pattern.
5	Q. Shall we continue and see if we can see more of that.	5	Is the spread at the crown simply an example of that
6	(Video Played)	6	V-pattern or is it different?
7	Don't need that one at all.	7	A. No, I mean, I believe that what is driving the spread at
8	Can we then go to 7.07. Let's move on to the next	8	the crown is the lateral progression of the pool fire
9	sequence, sequence 4.	9	beneath it. Yes.
10	Just tell us if there's anything you want to point	10	Q. Not the inverted cone effect from vertical spread?
11	out here.	11	A. No. If that were the case, then I would've expected the
12	(Video Played)	12	way we observe fire to progress around the building to
13	A. Any time here.	13	be different than it is. I would've expected vertical
14	So, yes, here you get a nice close-up view at the	14	fire spread up the east face to be more of a cone in the
15	level of the crown. It's hard to see, but you see the	15	first place. Yes.
16	sort of vertical lines. These are the vertical elements	16	Q. Turning to your hypotheses I think I can take these
17	of the crown. You can see that the crown itself is	17	quite quickly E1, paragraph 1115, page 328, is it
18	burning, and beneath the crown you have what appears to	18	right that your hypotheses are not as well developed in
19	be, to my eye, a pool of polyethylene which is melting	19	relation to horizontal fire spread as they are in
20	on the coping element that sits directly beneath the	20	relation to horizontal fire spread as they are in relation to upward and downward spread?
21	crown.	21	A. The hypotheses are not as well developed? I think we
22	Q. Is that the leading edge of the flame front on that face	22	
23		23	have more of them because there were more things we
24	at that point? A. It is at that point in time, yes.	23	wanted to just make sure, or rather I was many ideas
25	Q. Shall we continue to see how that progresses a little	25	were popping in as to what could be causing this
23	2. Shan we continue to see now that progresses a fittle	23	lateral.
	Page 198		Page 200
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1	I mean, it's worth noting that, I think as	1	can't quantify the extent of that contribution. Is that
2	Professor Torero said yesterday, the Grenfell Tower fire	2	a fair way of summarising your view of that hypothesis?
3	is quite unusual in the context of lateral or horizontal	3	A. I think it's possible, but I've no evidence to suggest
4	fire spread, in that when we've seen other fires in	4	that it did.
5	buildings that have similar rainscreen materials, we	5	Q. Are you able to express any view now on the extent to
6	tend not to see the entire building engulfed. So the	6	which the presence of PIR contributed to the horizontal
7	question is: why has that happened at Grenfell Tower?	7	spread of fire?
8	The distinguishing feature appears to be the crown,	8	A. Not in any quantified way, no.
9	but I wanted to make sure that I looked at every	9	Q. Dr Lane's view is that, at least at an early stage, the
10	possible option. That's why we have a large number.	10	presence of cut and exposed PIR edges in the cladding
11	I'm not sure I'd agree they're less developed.	11	structure along the spandrel panels may have supported
12	I think it's such an unusual mechanism that I'm	12	horizontal flame spread. Can you agree with that or not
13	proposing, or hypothesising, in that it's not something	13	offer a view?
14	we see every day. Upward fire spread on combustible	14	A. I think it's possible. The thing that is important to
15	material is pretty straightforward. Downward fire	15	recognise about that is that in order for flame to
16	spread by burning dripping thermoplastics is pretty	16	spread in an opposed-flow mode horizontally, even on
17	straightforward. This lateral mechanism is, if you	17	a PIR, Celotex specifically, that isn't protected with
18	like, a unique situation which is a consequence of the	18	a foil facing, ie at a cut edge, you need a significant
19	architectural features of Grenfell Tower.	19	external heat flux that is sustained. So in the absence
20	So it's the fire spread mechanism for which	20	of a significant external heat flux causing it to
21	I certainly want to do a lot more work at Phase 2 to	21	continue progressing, which means you kind of already
22	make sure we interrogate that and test that hypothesis	22	need a fire already there, you're not going to see that.
23	to show whether or not that is the dominant mechanism,	23	The lateral fire spread on PIR in the absence of an
24	as I believe it is.	24	external heat flux will stop, generally.
25	Q. I think your initial assessment, at least at this stage,	25	Q. Hypothesis E3, page 240, paragraph 1135, that hypothesis
	Page 201		Page 203
1	perhaps subject to further work, is that the dominant	1	is that continuous vertical channels and extensive
2	cause your phrase of horizontal spread was	2	internal cavities present in the structure contributed
3	a combination of pooling of melted and dripping	3	to the rate of horizontal fire spread.
4	polyethylene, and also the tendency of fire plumes to	4	Your opinion is I think this is 1135 it was
5	widen as they move upwards.	5	not likely.
6	A. A combination of those two.	6	A. I mean, not directly, although obviously indirectly as
7	Q. Are you able to give us any quantification as to which	7	a consequence of having influenced both the vertical,
8	is the dominant of those two?	8	upward and downward.
9	A. Well, in the absence of the melting, dripping and	9	Q. Is there any evidence that cavity barriers were at all
10	pooling, the upwards wouldn't matter. So, you know, the	10	effective in initially preventing horizontal fire spread
11	upwards spreading is almost a consequence of the	11	prior to the point at which the fire reached the crown?
12	downward spreading.	12	A. Not that I'm aware of, no, and indeed, as I've
13	Q. Dr Lane says that the horizontal spread would also have	13	mentioned, I think there is evidence that after the fire
14	occurred across the exposed edges of polyethylene on the	14	fronts had passed a particular level on the building,
15	spandrel panels. Do you agree with that?	15	whatever polyethylene was remaining tended to form pools
16	A. Again, that would be an opposed-flow fire spread	16	and burn locally on top of the cavity barriers,
17	mechanism on a fuel in a horizontal direction. As	17	potentially making matters a bit worse.
18	I discussed earlier, the important question there	18	Q. We can see hypotheses E4 and E5 and your conclusions
19	is: where does the energy go and where does the fuel go?	19	about that. E4 you reject and E5 is about the
20	And on the basis of my answer, you probably got a sense	20	architectural crown, and you've explained the role
21	that I don't think that's a particularly important	21	already that you say it played in relation to that.
22	mechanism in this case.	22	There's also a hypothesis E6, which is the
23	Q. As to hypothesis E2, which is paragraph 1126 at	23	contribution made, if any, by the aluminium and XPS
24	page 239, I think your conclusion is that, in theory,	24	composite window infill panels, and I think your conclusion there is that they played a role but you
2.5			conclusion there is that they higged a role but you
25	PIR could contribute to the spread of flame, but you	25	conclusion there is that they played a fole out you
25	PIR could contribute to the spread of flame, but you Page 202	23	Page 204

1	can't quantify it. I'm summarising perhaps	1	possible routes for ingress of smoke and fire back into
2	inaccurately, but is that a fair description of your	2	the building.
3	view about that?	3	My question is: are these set out in any order of
4	A. This is with reference to the infill panels?	4	likelihood?
5	Q. Yes.	5	A. The five routes
6	A. Yes, I mean, the infill panels, as we've discussed, they	6	Q. Yes. So it's page 253. 1168, open windows; 1169,
7	have fuel in them that is combustible and can burn. So	7	extract fan units; 1170, pre-existing gaps.
8	in a fire that's progressing laterally, I would expect	8	A. No, they're not set out in any order of likelihood, but
9	that fuel to become involved somehow and contribute.	9	throughout the following section, and in particular on
10	But, yes, quantifying it, I couldn't do that at this	10	the basis of evidence from the bereaved, survivors and
11	stage.	11	residents, the conclusion that I get to on this
12	Q. Dr Lane says for reference purposes, it is page 31 of	12	incidentally, that evidence is very helpful in this
13	part 10 of her report at paragraph 10.5.9, this is her	13	regard — is that it would appear the routes of ingress
14	pathway C that these panels connect to the other	14	depend on the nature of the fire spread that is adjacent
15	combustible materials at the head and the sill of the	15	to the flat.
16	window and, therefore, provided a route above and below	16	So early on in vertical upward fire spread, where
17	for horizontal fire spread.	17	the fire is still quite small, then the ingress routes
18	In reaching your own conclusion on hypothesis E6,	18	are related to the extract fan and the window
19	did you take that view into account?	19	construction, and we have comments in the witness
20	A. Yes. But, again, it seems to me that that would require	20	statements to that effect, in particular associated with
21	what is effectively, again, an opposed-flow lateral fire	21	the extract fans and early failures of the extract fans.
22	spread mechanism, and for the same reasons that I think	22	As the fire grows and becomes large, as
23	it's unlikely on the ACM panel, which is a combustible	23	Professor Torero said yesterday, glazing is actually not
24	material with two aluminium skins, I think it's unlikely	24	that resistant to high heat fluxes, and we have comments
25	to occur on an infill panel.	25	from certainly in the flat 6s as we move up the
23	to occur on an inim panci.	23	from certainly in the flat of as we move up the
	Page 205		Page 207
1	Q. Given the way you've already described XPS behaving,	1	building, as the fire is growing, people refer to their
2	which is in a different way, with a higher ignition	2	windows exploding inwards quite suddenly with very
2 3	which is in a different way, with a higher ignition point, I think, than polyethylene, would that also mean	2 3	windows exploding inwards quite suddenly with very little warning and prior to failure of the extract fan.
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1	afternoon which I should be asking. So if I can do	1	A. I mean, I'm reasonably certain the frame hadn't dropped
2	that, that would be helpful.	2	out.
3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. If you don't mind, we'll keep	3	Q. He says it did.
4	you a little bit longer and have a 5-minute break to let	4	A. I'm reasonably certain that it's still there after the
5	counsel take stock and see if there are any more	5	fire. We should have photos to confirm that.
6	questions. All right?	6	Q. Right.
7	Would you like to go with the usher now and we'll	7	A. I'm reasonably certain that the aluminium window frames
8	keep this as short as we can.	8	of flat 16 are still there. So the entire frame has not
9	(Pause)	9	drop out.
10	I'm going to say 5 minutes Mr Millett or sooner if	10	Q. On hypothesis, let's assume for the moment that the
11	you can do it sooner. Thank you.	11	chairman were to find that it did, as a matter of fact,
12	(4.30 pm)	12	how would that affect your view, if at all?
13	(A short break)	13	A. How would it affect my view?
14	(4.35 pm)	14	Q. Of the means of fire egress from the compartment?
15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, professor, I think there	15	A. Does he say at what time
16	will be a few more questions, but before we continue,	16	Q. This would be after 01.20.
17	can I just remind everybody that there will be a routine	17	A. Then it wouldn't affect my view.
18	fire alarm test at a 4.45. The announcement will tell	18	Q. Right. Then it may not help that I ask this next
19	you not to take any action, and that's quite right.	19	question, but I'll ask it anyway.
20	Just be aware that that is going to happen, but just	20	You say in paragraph 386 I won't take you back to
21	ignore it.	21	it that the windows used in Grenfell are constructed
22	-	22	from an extruded aluminium profile with polyamide
	Yes, Mr Millett.	23	thermal break built into the frames.
23	MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, thank you.		
24	Professor, one or two further questions.	24	Is that material something which melts at a much
25	First, I want to ask you about the failure of the	25	lower temperature than aluminium?
	Page 209		Page 211
1	aluminium window frames.	1	A. I haven't looked recently at the specific properties of
2	When you were doing your work leading to this	2	polyamide, but it tends to be a polymer that has better
3	report, did you consider whether there was any evidence	3	than typical thermal performance. In fact, I believe
4	which showed that aluminium frames had failed?	4	their product sheet states that the reason they use
5	A. Not in the early stages of the fire as would be relevant	5	polyamide is so that they can have a thermal break prior
6	to the fire spread.	6	to coating, which involves elevated temperature
7	Q. Let me show you something. Can I please ask the witness	7	processing. But I think certainly that temperature is
8	to have up MET00010867, which is the witness statement	8	below the 600 and 660 that we would expect for
9	provided to the police by Daniel Brown,	9	aluminium, yes.
10	Firefighter Brown, MET00010867.	10	Q. So if it has a polymer in it, and it melts, do you
11	I'd like you to be shown, please, page 10 of that.	11	consider that the window frame would fail at
12	In the second from last paragraph this is	12	a temperature lower than the normal temperature for
13	Daniel Brown's statement, he was in the first pair into	13	aluminium, which is 660 degrees centigrade or so?
14	flat 16 he says:	14	A. It depends what we mean by fail. So it depends what
15	"I realised that where I had seen the curtain of	15	role the polyamide thermal break is playing from
16	flame was in fact where the window had been. The window	16	a mechanical perspective within the window frame.
17		17	I wouldn't be familiar enough with the system at this
	and frame were no longer there and it had completely		
18		18	stage to say if loss of that thermal break would cause
	dropped out, leaving a hole in the wall. I carried on	18 19	stage to say if loss of that thermal break would cause a mechanical failure of the window frame. It's possible
18			a mechanical failure of the window frame. It's possible
18 19	dropped out, leaving a hole in the wall. I carried on following the line on the ceiling to above the fridge and then noticed in the corner of my eye an orange ember	19	a mechanical failure of the window frame. It's possible but, again, I'm speculating. It's certainly something
18 19 20 21	dropped out, leaving a hole in the wall. I carried on following the line on the ceiling to above the fridge and then noticed in the corner of my eye an orange ember fall outside the window area so I looked out of the	19 20 21	a mechanical failure of the window frame. It's possible but, again, I'm speculating. It's certainly something I'll look at on the basis of that question.
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18 19 20 21 22 23 24	dropped out, leaving a hole in the wall. I carried on following the line on the ceiling to above the fridge and then noticed in the corner of my eye an orange ember fall outside the window area so I looked out of the window to investigate what this was." He gives evidence that the frame had dropped out. Does that tell you anything, does that affect your	19 20 21 22 23 24	a mechanical failure of the window frame. It's possible but, again, I'm speculating. It's certainly something I'll look at on the basis of that question. Q. Can I please ask you to be shown your first clip and go to 01.12. This is a question which I've been asked to ask you
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1	The reason I've been asked to ask you this is in	1 very fully. I, for one, found it very interesting and
2	your evidence in July you said there was evidence of	2 helpful, so thank you very much indeed.
3	water being applied by jet at 01.12. I just want to	3 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
	look at the video just to be precise with you exactly	4 All right. Now you're free to go and the usher will
4	what you were and maybe still are talking about.	5 look after you.
5		6 (The witness withdrew)
6	A. I think at 01.12?	7 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, just before 4.45, that is the
7	Q. At 1.12.	8 business for the day.
8	A. I hope what I said is that there's evidence of water on	9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, thank you very much.
9	the ground at 01.12.	10 10 o'clock tomorrow, then, please
10	Q. Usual trigger warning, possibly seeing fire on the	11 (4.45 pm)
11	building, although this clip isn't supposed to.	12 (The hearing adjourned until Thursday, 22 November 2018
12	Can I just wait 10 seconds and then ask the	13 at 10.00 am)
13	question.	14 INDEX
14	Can we please be shown the clip at 01.12. Start at	15 PROFESSOR LUKE BISBY (affirmed)1
15	01.120.00, please, Paul.	Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY1
16	(Video Played)	16
17	Did you see any evidence there of the application of	17
18	water at 01.12?	18
19	A. No. I mean, I think what you're referring to is there	19
20	does appear to be water on the ground below flat 16 at	20
21	01.12.	21
22	Q. Yes.	22
23	A. There's two in my mind, this is something that I've	23
24	considered at some length in looking at the issues we	24
25	discussed previously with respect to the potential jet	25
	Page 213	Page 215
1	at 01.11.	
2	One explanation is that it's my understanding that	
3	when a hose is charged, it's not uncommon for	
4	a firefighter to just give it a quick spray to test that	
5	everything is fine as it should be before they start	
6	their deployment. So it could be that that is the	
7	reason for that water being on the ground at that time.	
8	The other possibility is that there is, I believe,	
9	evidence of burning debris on the ground prior to 01.12,	
10	and it's conceivable that the firefighters who were on	
11	site there decided to put that burning debris out, as we	
12	no longer see it burning here at 01.12 and that is the	
13	reason for the water on the ground at 01.12.	
14	So, yes, I've considered it at some length and those	
15	are the two explanations I can come up with.	
16	MR MILLETT: Professor, thank you very much. Those are the	
17	extra questions I had for you.	
18	It remains for me to say thank you very much to you	
19	for coming along today to assist us with our	
20	investigations and give your evidence. We're extremely	
21	grateful. Thank you.	
22	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'd add my thanks to those of	
23	Mr Millett. We're really grateful to you for putting	
23		
25	your expertise at our disposal. You've produced some	
23	very substantial reports and you've explained them all	
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