1	Tuesday, 13 November 2018	1	an incident, and at that point I was neither in
2	(10.00 am)	2	a position to have good communications, neither had
3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to	3	I been properly briefed as I would be at 04.10 when
4	today's hearing.	4	I came in. And also my location in a vehicle on
5	We are going to begin by hearing the rest of	5	a motorway was difficult as well.
6	Commander Jerome's evidence.	6	Q. You say in paragraph 46:
7	MR MILLETT: Good morning, Mr Chairman. Yes, we are.	7	"He briefed me on the nature of the incident, the
8	Can I please call Commander Jerome back.	8	command structure put in place, the resources being
9	NEIL JEROME (continued)	9	deployed, and the current status of the activations
10	Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY (continued)	10	initiated on my earlier call."
11	MR MILLETT: Commander, good morning.	11	During that briefing, did he give you any further
12	A. Good morning.	12	new information about the incident?
13	Q. Thank you very much for coming back to us this morning.	13	A. Would it be okay to refer to my notes?
14	A. Thank you.	14	Q. Yes, of course.
15	Q. I am going to turn now to your involvement on the night,	15	A. Thank you.
16	or, rather, to turn back to it.	16	Q. Just so we know what those are, I think you're referring
17	Can I ask you, please, to go to page 13 of your	17	to the Jerome log, which is at MET00023289.
18	witness statement and look at paragraph 46.	18	Is that what you're referring to as your notes?
19	You say that you arrived at the special operations	19	A. Yes, it is, yes.
20	room at 4.10 am, and you were briefed by Chief Inspector	20	Q. Okay. And they start, just so we're all keeping up with
21	Barrett.	21	you, on page 14 internally, and, indeed, the Relativity
22	I think it's right, isn't it, that this was your	22	reference.
23	second briefing, having had the first substantive	23	I think the part that you want to refer to is on
24	briefing at 02.30?	24	page 15, a quarter of the way down the page at the
25	A. That's right, yes.	25	A. I'm sorry, so I'm on page 8 of that document.
	Page 1		Page 3
		1	
1	Q. Before you arrived at the incident room, which was at	1	Q. Right.
1 2	Q. Before you arrived at the incident room, which was at Lambeth, were you receiving any updates about the	1 2	
	Q. Before you arrived at the incident room, which was at Lambeth, were you receiving any updates about the incident?		A. That's the one, yes.
2	Lambeth, were you receiving any updates about the incident?	2	A. That's the one, yes. Q. That says:
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Lambeth, were you receiving any updates about the incident?  A. So on my way in I received a phone call from Chief Inspector Barrett just giving me an update in terms of just the extent of the fire. But clearly at that point, travelling at speed in a vehicle, there was no way of making any notes, and certainly no way that I could make any decisions at that point.  Q. Did Inspector Barrett tell you, while you were en route, about the change in stay-put advice?  A. No.  Q. Did he tell you anything about the number of casualties or fatalities that were being experienced?  A. No, no.  Q. What did he tell you?  A. Just that the fire was continuing to spread and that it was a very serious incident.  Q. Did you take any actions or make any decisions en route as a result of what he told you?  A. I did not. I wasn't in the position with a telephone line, which was very difficult to make any decisions at that point. And it wouldn't have been appropriate to do	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	A. That's the one, yes.  Q. That says:  "0420 briefing from"  Is that Duane Barrett?  A. Yes, that's right.  Q. " CAD482."  So what would you like to refer us to?  A. So during the course of that he's telling me that clearly the call came in at 01.16. He's given me the CAD reference, that it was initially a six-pump fire.  The timing of our first units on the scene, the number of MPS units, its location. The Gold commander, which is Paul Warnett at that point. And then talking through the resources that we've got at the scene. Updating me that we believe there to be at least tragically four people that have died, the number of people that we believe had evacuated. The fact that we'd put our callers onto the 999 system so that we didn't have anybody waiting to come through, that was to give support to the London Fire Brigade, the additional resources that we've got going to that.  And then also on some of the activations, so GT
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2 Q. Just a couple of things on that page. First of all, a third of the way down the page, you record:  4 "Everyone onto 999" 5 Then there's, "no" 6 A. " no waiters" 6 A. " no waiters" 6 Q. "No waiters", so that means you have nobody waiting for 8 999 calls? 9 A. That's right. 9 Q. Does that mean a command had been given to the 11 Metropolitan Police control room, MetCC, to take 12 Grenfell calls? 13 A. Yes, that was my understanding, and that we had put 14 members of the control room onto the telephone systems to prioritise the 999 calls. 16 Q. Right. We'll come back to that shortly. 17 It then goes on to say, "SO19". What is that? 18 A. SO19 is our armed response vehicles. So we spoke enhanced training as well as building entry skills. Our armed officers have clearly an advanced training as well, and also means of — method of entry into 22 well, and also means of — method of entry into 23 buildings as well, should they be required in order to 24 gain access.  They weren't there in an armed capacity, I'd like to 25 They weren't there in an armed capacity, I'd like to 26 getting as many resources there as possible in order to 27 getting as many resources there as possible in order to 28 getting as many resources there as possible in order to 29 getting as many resources there as possible in order to 3 into the life-saving phase of an incident. So an incident will have a number of different phases, and clearly we were still in a life-saving phase at that point.  4 clearly we were still in a life-saving phase at that point.  6 D. Did he tell you at that stage that the stay-put advice, as we've come to call it, had been revoked and that the advice to all residents was to self-evacuate if they could?  A. I haven't made a record of that, and so I can't recall that off the top of my head.  9 List for fifte top of my head.  10 List fifte top of my head.  11 List fift to top of my head.  12 List fift to top of my head.  13 List his briefing, over and above what we can see there on that page?  A. No	1	W00W	1	you which led you to write that down there?
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3 have that option available to us should we need to get 3 Q. You did that, did you?	2		2	time I'd actually arrived in the special ops room.
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4 into people's houses and save their lives. 4 A. Yes.	4	into people's houses and save their lives.	4	A. Yes.
5 Q. It says here: 5 Q. You have a clear, independent recollection of it being	5	Q. It says here:	5	Q. You have a clear, independent recollection of it being
6 " SO19 going to go, due to building collapse." 6 04.10?	6	" SO19 going to go, due to building collapse."	6	04.10?
7 How would you deploy those officers in the event of 7 A. Yes.	7	How would you deploy those officers in the event of	7	A. Yes.
the collapse of the building or the imminent threat of 8 Q. You told us yesterday that your phone call with Chief	8	the collapse of the building or the imminent threat of	8	Q. You told us yesterday that your phone call with Chief
9 the building's collapse? 9 Inspector Barrett which he'd had with you while you were	9	the building's collapse?	9	Inspector Barrett which he'd had with you while you were
10 <b>A. So, in making that note clearly they wouldn't go into</b> 10 still at home started at 02.30, and I think you said	10	A. So, in making that note clearly they wouldn't go into	10	still at home started at 02.30, and I think you said
11 <b>a collapsing building, but the danger then to the</b> 11 yesterday ended at 02.40/02.45. That meant it took you	11	a collapsing building, but the danger then to the	11	yesterday ended at 02.40/02.45. That meant it took you
surrounding area if the building comes down, if we can 12 1 hour and 20 minutes to get from your home to the GT	12	surrounding area if the building comes down, if we can	12	1 hour and 20 minutes to get from your home to the GT
get people out to save their lives in the buildings 13 room at Lambeth; is that right?	13	get people out to save their lives in the buildings		room at Lambeth; is that right?
14 around the tower itself. 14 A. That's right.	14	around the tower itself.	14	A. That's right.
15 Q. I follow. So this wasn't a question of sending these 15 Q. Is that time period a function of the distance between	15	Q. I follow. So this wasn't a question of sending these	15	Q. Is that time period a function of the distance between
particular officers into Grenfell Tower itself 16 your home and Lambeth?	16	particular officers into Grenfell Tower itself	16	your home and Lambeth?
17 A. Absolutely not. 17 A. So it will be a combination of the distance and also the		A. Absolutely not.	17	
18 Q it was the surrounding area that needed to be fact of then just getting in a position where I'm ready		Q it was the surrounding area that needed to be	18	fact of then just getting in a position where I'm ready
19 cleared? 19 <b>to go.</b>	19	cleared?	19	to go.
20 A. Absolutely, yes, it was. 20 I did consider so I have a staff officer who				
Q. Just a little bit lower down that page, I don't think lives a reasonable closeness to me, whether I would use	21			lives a reasonable closeness to me, whether I would use
you got there, but four entries up from the bottom,  22 him to convey me in or whether I would divert a resource	22	you got there, but four entries up from the bottom,	22	him to convey me in or whether I would divert a resource
under the same time mark which starts at 0420 at the to come down and pick me up and then convey me back in,				
top, it says, "Still in rescue mode."  24 and certainly my view at that time was to divert				
25 Can you remember what Chief Inspector Barrett told 25 a resource that was sorely needed on the night to save	25	Can you remember what Chief Inspector Barrett told	25	a resource that was sorely needed on the night to save
Page 6 Page 8		Page 6		Page 8

1	people's lives would not be appropriate, and therefore	1	in a consultation and a conversation with the London
2	I made the decision that I would call my staff officer.	2	Fire Brigade, because you wouldn't know the volumes of
3	Q. Were you delayed in any way in getting to the special	3	999 calls and the fact that you had people dialling in
4	operations room following the end of your call with	4	on the 999 system.
5	Chief Inspector Barrett?	5	Q. Do you know whether Chief Inspector Barrett found out
6	A. Only making your way through south London, even at that	6	from his opposite number or from the LFB control room
7	time of the morning, making your way through traffic	7	staff at Stratford what advise the control room staff
8	does impede your progress a little.	8	were giving to 999 callers from Grenfell Tower?
9	Q. Do you think there should've been someone of your rank	9	A. I'm sorry, I don't know.
10	available in the GT room at an earlier stage?	10	Q. Do you know whether he instructed the Met control room
11	A. This is something which I have given a lot of thought to	11	staff himself or whether he delegated that to somebody
12	in terms of those timings. But I was reassured by my	12	else?
13	phone call early on with Chief Inspector Barrett that	13	A. I'm sorry, I would assume that there was a delegation
14	certainly the police command structure was in place, we	14	involved, but I don't know for certain.
15	had a Gold with an experienced superintendent who was	15	Q. You have exhibited as exhibit number 2 to your
16	actually on duty at the time, and the call-out	16	statement and it's MET00023291 a summary, if we
17	procedures for a chief officer to arrive.	17	can just have a look at that. It's a summary of 999
18	Whilst clearly I will be making command decisions	18	calls handled by the MPS control room, or MetCC.
19	that are looking forward and how we would be managing	19	You've put a column in, as we can see, the second
20	the incident going forward, I was confident we'd got	20	column from the right, which says "ADVICE", and then we
21	a command structure in place, Gold and Silver, and that	21	can see it tends to vary: evacuate, stay, evacuate,
22	that was appropriate at that time.	22	stay, evacuate, evacuate, stay, et cetera.
23	Q. Going back to your statement, and going back to what you	23	When you compiled this summary, did you yourself
24	told us a moment ago based on your note we may need	24	study each transcript?
25	to have both open you say in paragraph 49 of your	25	A. No, so that was produced for me. So I didn't go through
	Page 9		Page 11
1	statement on page 14:	1	each and every one, no.
2	"Chief Inspector Barrett further informed me that he	2	Q. Did you go through any of them?
3	had deployed the MPS control room staff onto 999 calls.	3	A. Not each transcript, no, I went through the summary that
4	This meant that there were no callers waiting for their	4	was produced for me.
5	call to be answered."	5	Q. So you didn't cross-check the summary with the
6	We covered that a moment ago very briefly, but	6	underlying transcripts?
7	I want to explore that a bit more with you, commander.	7	A. No, I did not.
8	First of all, was this deployment something that had	8	Q. Who prepared this for you, do you know?
9	been done exceptionally by Chief Inspector Barrett?	9	A. That would have been one of our legal professionals,
10	A. So it doesn't happen as a matter of routine, but it	10	I believe.
11	certainly does happen when there is an exceptional	11	Q. When you were given this summary and looked at it, as
12	volume of calls coming through that we would work with	12	you said you did, did you note that the advice appears
13	the other emergency services in order to assist them.	13	to have varied as between MPS control room staff prior
14	We also do the same with other police forces as well.	14	to 2.00 am?
15	So it's not unusual but it's not common.	15	A. That's right, it does vary.
16	Q. Do you know what time Chief Inspector Barrett had	16	Q. What did you take away from noting that?
17	deployed the MPS control staff to deal with	17	A. So my reflections on that are that clearly our operators
18	Grenfell Tower 999 calls?	18	are listening to individuals on the telephone, and
19	A. No, I do not.	19	clearly they're wanting to save life as well and they're
20	Q. Did he tell you?	20	wanting to save their lives. And I think that each
21	A. No.	21	individual is making an assessment based upon what
22	Q. Do you know whether he had done so in liaison with the	22	they're hearing and the call at the time.
23	London Fire Brigade?	23	So whilst I can see that there is stay-put advice
24	A. So whilst I don't know what the precise procedure is, my	24	that people are following, I can also see that there are
25	assumption is you could only do that once you had been	25	individuals, there are call-takers, that are probably
			, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
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	Page 10		Page 12

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1		,	
1	listening to those people on the other end of the line	1	a decision-making model, and one of those is clearly
2	and making an assessment with them to say, "Look,	2	taking into account policies and procedures, but also
3	I think that you do have a chance to get out."	3	making sure that you apply those to the circumstances
4	So I can see that they're making those flexible	4	that are presented before you. But there is
5	decisions based upon what they're hearing at the time,	5	a consistency in how you arrive at that decision-making
6	and clearly not rigidly adhering to the advice that had	6	process.
7	been given to them.	7	Q. Well, it may be, commander, you can't help me with this,
8	I suspect that in many of those cases they would've	8	but in your experience, in general terms, how
9	actually have saved people's lives as well.	9	experienced is the MetCC as a control room in giving
10	Q. From your knowledge, do you know whether or not MetCC	10	advice to callers from burning buildings?
11	control room staff are trained in how to advise a caller	11	A. That would be, certainly in this instance, quite rare,
12	who is calling from a burning building?	12	albeit that, as I said in my evidence yesterday, it is
13	A. I don't know.	13	not uncommon to receive fire calls about tower blocks.
14	Q. Do you know whether they're trained in or have any	14	But in these circumstances, this is very, very rare.
15	knowledge of any of the London Fire Brigade's policies	15	Q. Normally is this right? when the MetCC receives
16	on that subject?	16	a call from a caller in a burning tower block, that
17	A. I don't know.	17	would be handed over to the LFB and it would be dealt
18	Q. You don't know?	18	with by their control room?
19	A. I don't know.	19	A. So I don't know, but certainly in my experience it
20	Q. On the night itself, did you know or come to learn that	20	wouldn't be quite as cold as that. So the operator
21	the advice that was being given by MetCC control room	21	clearly is going to take some information from the
22	staff tended to vary from operator to operator and	22	caller in order to maximise the chances of saving
23	caller to caller?	23	people's lives, before then, indeed, maybe transferring
24	A. No, it wasn't until subsequently.	24	it over.
25	Q. Would you have expected there to be a consistent	25	Q. Let me be a bit more specific. Is this right: although
	Page 13		Page 15
1	approach adopted by MetCC control room staff?	1	the operator might well take initial details name,
2	A. So our operators are having to make decisions, often	2	address, perhaps the conditions, matters of that
3	life and death I'm not talking with regards to the	3	nature when it came to specific advice to the caller,
4	fire, but life and death decisions when they're talking	4	would the MetCC operator then hand the call to the LFB
5	to distressed members of the public, and are making	5	control room, or would they go further and take upon
6	those decisions in the very best interests of those	6	themselves the giving of the advice as to whether to
7	individuals they're talking to.	7	stay or to get out and to assist the caller in assessing
8	So clearly London has been through a very traumatic	8	whether it was safe to get out?
9	period in the last 18 months, and many of those	9	A. I don't know that level of detail, sorry.
10	operators will have spoken to individuals at the time.	10	Q. Would you expect the London Fire Brigade to be in
11	They will know what the advice is within those	11	contact itself with the Metropolitan Police control
12	circumstances, but they'll also be assessing and using	12	room, MetCC, supervisor so as to ensure that the advice
13	that advice and applying it to the circumstances that	13	that was being given by the MetCC's control room about
14	they hear at the time.	14	whether to stay or to leave was consistent with the
15	So our operators are making very fluid judgement	15	LFB's advice?
16	calls based upon what they're actually hearing at the	16	A. So I would expect those conversations to take place and
17	time and not rigidly following a script or a procedure.	17	I would expect that the LFB supervisor would be in
18	They're making sure that they're giving the very best	18	contact with us. I don't know on the night in terms of
19	advice in the circumstances that they hear because those	19	whether those checks in terms of consistency — but
20	circumstances will vary.	20	clearly I would expect those conversations to be taking
21	Q. Yes, the circumstances will vary, but you wouldn't	21	place.
22	expect, would you, the policy or the basic ground rules	22	Q. Do you remember being told during the night that the
23	of how to give advice to vary, would you?	23	stay-put advice had changed and that the advice was now
24	A. So there would be clearly they make an assessment,	24	to evacuate?
25	and one of the things that we are trained in using is	25	A. I do recall that happening. It was sometime later on,
2.5	and one of the things that we are trained in using is	23	ao recan enac nappening. It was sometime fater on,
	Page 14		Page 16

1	cometime between 04.20 and leter, but I con't recall	1	I'm not going to go through CAD932 because you
1 2	sometime between 04.20 and later, but I can't recall exactly when that took place.	2	didn't, and therefore I'm not going to do it with you
3	Q. Your recollection is that that took place after 04.20,	3	here now, but I note your answer.
4	so after your briefing with Chief Inspector Barrett?	4	Can I turn, then, to the heli-tele downlink and go
5	A. Yes. I can recall, but I haven't made a note of it,	5	back to paragraph 49 of your statement, please,
6	that someone did mention that the stay-put advice had	6	commander.
7	changed during the course of that night.	7	You say, four lines down from the start of that
8	Q. And you put your learning moment at after 04.20?	8	paragraph:
9	A. Yes.	9	"The National Police Air Service were requested by
10	Q. Do you remember whether you were told at that time that	10	the control room to provide assistance. Emergency
11	it had changed earlier or that it had now changed?	11	services are allowed to deploy into such temporary
12	A. No, that it had changed much earlier.	12	flight restriction zones to help assist with dealing
13	Q. Did you discover when that was at the time?	13	with the incident in accordance with the rules laid down
14	A. No.	14	by the Civil Aviation Authority."
15	Q. You didn't?	15	Do you know what specific assistance NPAS, the
16	A. No.	16	National Police Air Service, were asked to provide?
17	Q. Looking at your schedule, if you look at, for example	17	A. So I know that the request was provided to the National
18	it's not really an example, but it's the last of them on	18	Police Air Service to lift earlier on in the evening.
19	the page where it says "stay". 932 is the CAD	19	I don't know precisely what they were told in terms of
20	reference, time of call: 03.05, advice: stay:	20	the assistance that they would be given they would
21	"Caller this is the police. I'm trying to get	21	ask to be given.
22	someone to you but you need to tell me where you are."	22	Q. When you say, I think, in that last answer the request
23	Whoever has read the transcript has interpreted that	23	was provided to "lift" earlier on in the evening
24	as a stay. Assuming that's right, because I don't think	24	that's what the transcriber has taken from your answer.
25	you can help us with that, were you aware that that was	25	Did you say that?
	Page 17		Page 19
	Tage 17		1 490 17
1	some 15 minutes or so at least after the LFB had revoked	1	A. Yes. So that's a technical term
2	the stay-put advice and was now advising all callers to	2	Q. What does that mean?
3	leave?	3	A for the deployment of a helicopter.
4	A. Yes, that's right.	4	Q. Oh, I see, right. So the request
5	Q. Can you account for that? Can you account for why that	5	A. Take off.
6	advise was being given by your control room even at that	6	Q to deploy?
7	stage?	7	A. Yes, the common phrase would be to take off.
8	A. No, I'm sorry, I can't.	8	Q. I follow. Because that might cause confusion. It
9	Q. This is to some extent a hypothetical question, but if	9	caused confusion with me.
10	in fact the MetCC was giving stay-put advice at or	10	A. Sorry.
11	around this time, 03.05, then assuming that that was not	11	Q. Not lift people off a building
12	the same advice as the advice now being given by the	12	A. Absolutely not.
13	LFB, my question is: is that consistent with the	13	Q but to lift off and go to the building?  A. So as I said vectorday containly the police believe to see
14	approach required by the principles of joint working as	14 15	A. So as I said yesterday, certainly the police helicopters
15	set out in the JESIP document, the joint doctrine interoperability framework?	16	do not have a rescue function.
16		17	Q. Was the deployment of an NPAS helicopter an automatic
17 18	A. So, again, if so I think it would be useful to	18	JESIP response by the police to a major incident?  A. So it would be a consideration, and certainly in my
19	actually look at 932, if we do have it available, to go	19	experience, using helicopters does provide you with
20	through that CAD. But if not, then clearly in the interests of JESIP and that joint working and the	20	an additional perspective on an incident, whether you're
21	sharing of information, that clearly should've taken	21	dealing with public order or whether you're dealing with
22	place.	22	a major incident such as this.
23	Q. I'm sorry, I didn't catch that last part.	23	Q. I think I take from your last answer that it's not
24	A. Then that should've taken place.	24	an automatic JESIP response to a major incident. Does
25	Q. It should've taken place. Yes.	25	that mean that somebody would then have to apply their
			•
	Page 18		Page 20

mind and make a specific decisions—   2   A. Yes.   2   2   A. Yes.   3   0   — in the cantest of a major incident whether to deploy   3   3   4   a belicoper   4   5   A. No.   5   a belicoper   5   a belicop			_	
2 A. Vis. 3 Q.— in the context of a major incident whether is deploy 4 a helicopter? 5 A. Vis. 5 But clearly having a helicopter and having the 8 ability to view the downlink would be of great 8 ability to view the downlink of the off to one 8 ability to view the downlink of the off to one 8 ability to view the downlink of the off to one 9 about he helicopter pilot? 9 about he helicopter pilot? 10 about he helicopter pilot? 11 about he helicopter pilot? 12 about he helicopter pilot? 13 a. No. sorry, I do not. 14 a. No. sorry, I do not. 15 a. No. and clearly the other proper unit. 16 about he provided the helicopter pilot? 17 a. No. 1 do not. 18 a. No. sorry, I do not. 19 a. No. 1 do not. 19 a. Do you know, even now, why the community of the lib of one. 11 about he helicopter pilot? 10 a. No. 1 do not. 11 about he helicopter pilot? 12 b. Op you know what the means of the the lIFB 12 b. Op you know what the means of the the lib of one. 14 a. No. 1 do not. 15 a. No. 1 do not. 16 a. Op you know due to the lib to the proving the heli-to downlink in the th	1	mind and make a specific decision	1	A. Clearly we would expect those to work. I wouldn't
3 - m the context of a major mediate whether its olegoby 4 a beloespate? 5 A. Ves. 6 Q. Do you know who that wan? 6 Q. Do you know who that wan? 7 A. Li daw'th. 8 Q. Do you know, even now, why the command units at the LFB 8 Q. Do you know, even now, why the command units at the LFB 9 Q. Do you know, even now, why the command units at the LFB 9 Q. Carl part and your do look at CADR2, I want to sak you 10 Q. Carl part and you do look at CADR2, I want to sak you 11 about the briefed do-words taked. 11 If you go to CADR2, please, and turn in its 12 If you go to CADR2, please, and turn in its 13 made of 102.30 you can rese 14 CADR2, 1-yell cell please, and turn in its 15 "GFASL 1-yell cell please, please, and turn in its 16 CORDAGR AND FROUTER DESER FOR LFB AND POLICE TO VIEW 17 HELTTEL PICTEES* 18 Fact of all thinks 2 in just that an Inspector 19 Tanche vola to year-edy, GT ASU sus the GT control 20 now on it amboth? 21 A. That "right which is "foryour" 22 A. A. So I certainly know what FYI is, which is "foryour" 23 information", but the rest of it, I would presume that's 24 A. So I certainly know what FYI is, which is "foryour" 25 information", but the rest of it, I would presume that's 26 Who would you expect to have resolved that its issue on the injet? 27 O. Right, chay. 30 They have two portable downlinks as we can read there were difficulties in necessing the heli-stele downlink from the one reviewing the heli-stele downlink from the rest of it, I would presume that were being the state were being the minimation and you and go a ware at any point that the IFB were not to Lambeth. 4 A. No. 4 A. No. 5 O. Do you know the formation of that the tree portable downlinks are? 5 A. No. 6 O. Right, chay. So you won't be able to help one writh my next question, then, which is why they weren't taken my formation while enr route to Lambeth. 5 Who would you expect to have been presented and were enrouted to the firm of the command on the presented and were enrouted to the present of the command on the present of the tree i	2	A. Yes.		•
4 abelicoper?  5 A. Yes.  6 Q. Doysu harow sho that was?  7 A. I durkt, an.  7 a. So, I do not.  8 b. Op byou know why the LFR were not put in direct radio contact with the helicopter pilot?  8 a. No.  8 a. No.  8 b. Op byou know why if wasn't used?  8 b. A. No.  9 a. Colling and the build of the pure of a time  8 b. I manked build a systemely, 017 ASU was the GT comed  9 a. No. I do not.  9 a. A. No.  9 a. A. No.  9 a. Collegin, ckay.  9 a. No.  9 a. No.  9 a. A. No.  9 a. No.  9 a. No.  9 a. Op you know what these purtable downlinks are?  9 a. A. No.  10 a. Curtification is an expect to the rest of that to the hard wasn't and the pure of the defect with the non-operating helicited downlink from the force of the defect with the non-operating helicited downlinks are were defected.  9 a. No.  9	3	O in the context of a major incident whether to deploy		•
5 A. Ves. 6 Q. Do you know who that was? 7 A. I down't, no. 8 Q. Do you know, who that was? 8 Q. Do you know, even now, why the command units at the LFB were not be the field downlink beed? 10 Q. Cant just sky not look at CAD 82. I want to ask you about the field downlink beed? 11 Byung you CAD 82, Jenous, and ham in a line you you good to CAD 82. I want to go you can you have been and the field downlink beed? 12 Byung you CAD 82, Jenous, and ham in a line you you can you will be the past a time made of 20.33 key use are set of FASU 1-FI YOLE JUNEAN FOR FARILLE DOWNLINSS 15 "GFASU 1-FI YOLE JUNEATE FOR LEAR BAD FOLLECT O VIEW 16 THE JUNEAU FOR THE JUNEAU FOR FOR THE JUNEAU FOR FOR THE JUNEAU FOR THE JUNEAU FOR THE JUNEAU FOR THE JUNEAU FOR FOR THE JUNEAU FOR THE JUNEAU FOR THE JUNEAU FOR THE JUNEAU FOR FOR THE JUNEAU FOR THE JUNEAU FOR THE JUNEAU FOR THE JUNEAU FOR FOR THE JUNEAU FOR THE JUNEAU FOR THE JUNEAU FOR THE JUNEAU FOR FOR THE JUNEAU FOR THE J	4			•
6 Q. Do you know who that was? 7 A. I don't, no. 9 C. Do you know why it was? 9 A. No. I do not. 9 C. Do Jou know, even now, why the command units at the LFB were not able to receive the heli-tele downlink? 10 C. Do Jou know, even now, why the command units at the LFB were not able to receive the heli-tele downlink? 11 Journal of the December of the page at a time many of 07.2 No. J. do not. 12 Jifyou po to CAMPE, them, and ture int it to page 22, just above the locitom of the page at a time many of 07.2 No. J. Do you know why the LFB were not put in direct radio control with the helicopter pito? 13 page 22, just above the locitom of the page at a time many of 07.2 No. J. Do you know why the LFB were not put in direct radio control with the helicopter pito? 14 mark of 07.2 No. J. Do you know why the LFB were not put in direct radio control many of 07.2 No. J. Do you know why the wasn't used? 14 A. No. SORTO, I do not. 15 ONE OARDO, AND INSOUTE TO SETEN FOR LFB AND POLICE TO VIEW HILLING TURES. 16 ONE OARDO, AND INSOUTE TO SETEN FOR LFB AND POLICE TO VIEW HILLING TURES. 18 First of all, I flank is right tat, as languous to the page at a time detail the LFB ones — there is a facility from ground to the facility from ground to the page at a time of the page at a time of the page at a time detail the LFB ones — there is a facility from ground to the page at a time of	5	•		
7 A. Iden't, no. 8 Q. Do you know why is was? 9 A. No. 1 do not. 10 Q. Can i just ask you to knok at CADB2. I want to ask you 11 about neb kineled adominish intel! 12 If you go to CADB4, please, and turn in it to 13 page 22, just above the bottom of the page at a time 14 mast of 93.23 %, you on see: 15 "GT-3SU-FYDEINHAVE INFO FORTABLE DOWNINKS 16 CORDADA ADDIBIOURITE SOURCE FOR LIBE AND FOLICE TO VEW HEITEL PROTTERS." 18 Fast of all. I think it's right that, as languezed 19 Thanket to tild a posterable, CT-3SU was the GT control 20 room at Lambed? 21 A. That's right. 22 Q. And FYI- we know what that mann—OL2IN = what as that a control intermedian, but the rest of II, I would presume that's the page 21 23 that? 24 A. So I certainly know what FYI is, which is "for your linformation," but the rest of II, I would presume that's 25 Were you made aware at any point that the LFB were and the page 22 26 Q. Right, okay. 27 They have two portable downlinks as we can read there. 28 A. No. 29 Q. So at this point, 03.23, you'd finished your conversation with Chief inspector Barrett, during his first when you arrived at GT I ambeth that the problem had now energed? 30 Q. Do go at now portainly heli-tied downlink? 31 A. No. 32 Q. Do you know why the LEB were not put in direct radio contact with the helicople piplot? 32 A. No. 1 do not. 33 C. Do you know why the believe the helicople piplot? 34 A. No. 1 do not. 35 Q. Do you know why the believe the helicople piplot? 36 A. No. 1 do not. 37 Q. Do you know why the DEB were not put in direct radio contact with the helicople piplot? 38 A. No. 39 They have have what that mann—OL2IN = what as the LEB were not receiving the heli-ded downlinks as we can read there. 40 Del Chief Inspector Barrett, during his first when the problem had now conversation with Chief inspector Barrett and were entry in the first that people were trying to find a workarround in order to work around some of those receiving the heli-ded downlink? 41 A. No. 42 D. Did you get any briefing from Chief Inspector Bar				
8 Q. Do you know, why the command units at the LFB were not able to receive the hell-rick downlink? 9 A. No. I do not. 11 about the behinde downlink? 12 If you go to ADMS, place, and turn in it to page 22, just above the bottom of the page at a time mark 076.23 %, you on see: 13 page 22, just above the bottom of the page at a time mark 076.23 %, you on see: 14 mark 076.23 %, you on see: 15 OKHOARD AND INROCITE TO SCINE FOR LIFE AND POLICE TO VIEW HILLIFECTIES.* 16 OKHOARD AND INROCITE TO SCINE FOR LIFE AND POLICE TO VIEW HILLIFECTIES.* 17 First of all. I think it's right that, as imported portion and the lambour of the page at a time of the page at a t				·
9 A. No. 1 do not. 10 Q. Can I just and you hole of at CADSE2. I want to mak you 11 about the keids devotable devotable and it is 12 If you go to CADSE2, place, and turn in it to 13 jugue 22 just down the form the page at airms 14 mank of 03.23.86, you can see 15 "GT/NSU-FFI (6E21) HAVE TWO PORTABLE DOWNLINSS 16 GORDAD AND INNORITE TO SETNIC FOR I PLA AND POLICE TO VIEW 17 HELTELI PICLITIES* 18 First of all, think it right that, as Imposor 19 Thankfor told in posterably, GT ASU was the GT cound 20 room at Lamberd. 21 A. That's right. 22 Q. And FYI - we know what the mans = -0621N - what to 23 A. So I certainly know what FYI is, which is "for your 24 A. So I certainly know what FYI is, which is "for your 25 information", but the rest of it, I would presume that's 26 Were you made aware at any point that the LFB were 27 or form production of the feet. 28 Were you made aware at any point that the LFB were 29 Q. So at this point, 03.23, you'd finished your 20 Q. So at this point, 03.23, you'd finished your 21 a. No. 10 you get any information while en route that this 22 plockers? 3 They have two portable downlinks as we can read 4 there. 4 there. 5 Were you made aware at any point that the LFB were 6 not receiving the heli-cled downlink from the 7 helicopters? 8 A. No. 9 Q. So at this point, 03.23, you'd finished your 10 conversation with Chief Inspector Barrett and were 11 en route to Lambeth. 12 plot Quest any information while en route that this 13 problem had emerged? 14 A. No. 14 not. 15 A. No. 16 you know why the LFB were not put whit he problem had now energed? 17 A. No. 14 not. 18 you know why the sub-live de downlinks as we. 19 Q. Dod you get any briefing from Chief Inspector Barrett 19 A. No. 14 not and support unit. 19 A. No. 14 not. 20 Q. Right, okay. 21 So you know why the sub-live help me with my 22 not problem had emerged? 23 A. No. 24 A. No. 14 not. 25 Poly you know what the poly were taken 26 poly you get any briefing from Chief Inspector Barrett 27 when you arrived at GT Lambeth that this problem				
10   C cm   pure ask you to look at CADAR2   want to ask you   11   about the lebel developing itself.     12   Hysus to LOMAR2, please, and turn in a to   13   page 22, just above the bottom of the page at a time   14   musk of 2023, 35, you can's be a support of the page at a time   15   "OTFASU-FYI 0721NHAVE TWO PORTABLE DOWNLINSS     16   OSHOARD AND PRACUTETTO SCIPAE FOR LEPA AND POLICE TO VIEW     17   HELTEL PUCTIES*     18   First of all, thinks its right that, as Inspector     19   Thatche told to yesterday, OT ASU was the GT control     10   room at Lambett!     10   A. No, 1 of not.     2   Q. Doy which we whether they should've been?     3   A. No, 5 or my, 1 do not.     4   A. So on our Airwave systems — and clearly I don't know in detail the LEP once—there is a facility from ground to detail the LEP once—there is a facility from ground to detail the LEP once—there is a facility from ground to detail the LEP once—there is a facility from ground to detail the LEP once—there is a facility from ground to detail the LEP once—there is a facility from ground to detail the LEP once—there is a facility from ground to detail the LEP once—there is a facility from ground to detail the LEP once—there is a facility from ground to detail the LEP once—there is a facility from ground to detail the LEP once—there is a facility from ground to detail the LEP once—there is a facility from ground to detail the LEP once—there is a facility from ground to expect the during of the defect with the non-operating held-teld once the fore once once once of the page 21   20   20   20   20   20   20   20				
the believe decominis itself.  If you go to CADASE, please, and turns in it to page 22 page at a contact with the helicopter pilet?  If you go to CADASE, please, and turns in it to page 22 page at a contact with the helicopter pilet?  If you go to CADASE, please, and turns in it to page 22 page at a contact with the helicopter pilet?  A. No., ourny, I do not.  O. Do you know why sets the post-off pilet Act please at a contact with the helicopter pilet?  A. No., ourny, I do not.  O. Do you know why sets the post-off know in detail the LFB ones. — there is a facility from ground to air to patch in and speak to the air support unit.  O. Do you know why it wasn't used?  A. So on our Airwave systems — and clearly I don't know in detail the LFB ones. — there is a facility from ground to air to patch in and speak to the air support unit.  O. Do you know why it wasn't used?  A. So on our Airwave systems — and clearly I don't know in detail the LFB ones. — there is a facility from ground to air to patch in and speak to the air support unit.  O. Do you know why it wasn't used?  A. No. I do not.  O. You said a moment ago in your answer that you would exceed the curing of the defect with the non-operating the lefter left and speak to the air support unit.  O. Do you know why it wasn't used?  A. No. I do not.  O. You said a moment ago in your answer that you would exceed the curing of the defect with the non-operating the heli-tele downlink in four your information", but the rest of it, I would presume that's  Page 21  A. So If there's the ability clearly for individuals who percet the curing of the defect with the non-operating the heli-tele downlinks as we can read there.  A. So If there's the ability clearly for individuals who percet the technical aspects of that to have done so. My reading of that is that people were trying to find a workaround in order to work around some of those technical difficulties that were being experienced.  O. Do you know what these portable downlinks are?  A. No.  O. You donn?  A. No.  O. Do			1	
12   If you go to CAD482, please, and turn in it to   13 page 22, past above the bottom of the page as a time   14 mark of 1023.84, year cares   15 mark 2012   14 mark of 1023.84, year cares   15 mark 2012   15 mark 2012   16 No. No. Sorry, 1 do not.   16 mark 2012   17 mark 2012   18 mark 2012   18 mark 2012   19 mar				
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15 OSHOARD AND ENROUTE TO SCENE FOR LFB AND POLICE TO VIEW 16 HELTEL PICURES: 18 First of all, I think its right that, as lospector 19 Thatcher old us systerdy, CT ASU was the GT control 20 O, And FYI – we know what that means – OE2IN – what is 21 that 21 A. That's right. 22 Q. And FYI – we know what that means – OE2IN – what is 23 that 24 A. So I certainly know what FYI is, which is "for your information", but the rest of it, I would presume that's 25 information", but the rest of it, I would presume that's 26 Q. Right, ckay. 27 A. So if there's the ability clearly for individuals who 28 A. No. 29 Q. So at this point, 03-23, you'd finished your conversation with Chief Inspector Barrett and were on route to Lambeth. 20 Q. Did you get any information while en route that this problem had emerged? 30 A. No. 31 They have two portable downlinks are were difficulties in receiving the heli-tele downlink? 31 A. No. 32 Q. Do you know what these portable downlinks are? 33 A. No. 34 A. No. 45 Q. Did you get any information while en route that this problem had emerged? 46 A. No. 47 A. No. 48 A. No. 49 Q. Did you get any information while en route that this problem had emerged? 40 A. No. 41 C. Did you get any briefing from Chief Inspector Barrett was no operating heli-tele downlink between the helicopter and the LFB and briefly downlink between the helicopter and the LFB and briefly downlink between the helicopter and the LFB and briefly downlink between the was no operating heli-tele downlink? 41 A. So I don't know in and seak to the air support unit. 42 A. No. I do not. 43 A. No. I certainly know what the air support unit. 44 C. Do you know what the air support unit. 45 A. No I do not. 46 LFB and a significant is and peak to the air support unit. 47 A. No I do not. 48 A. No I do not. 49 A. No I do not. 40 A. No I certainly know what these portable downlinks are? 40 A. No I certainly know what these portable downlinks are? 41 A. So i don't know what the LFB wore not the might? 42 A. No I don't know in a stagic live the air				•
MELTEL PICCURES:   15   15   16   17   18   18   19   19   19   19   19   19		•		
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First of all, I think it's right that, as Inspector Thatcher told in spectrally GT ASU was the GT control croom at Lambeth?  A. No. I do not.  Q. You said a moment ago in your answer that you would expect the curing of the defect with the non-operating heli-teled devinlink to be resolved at other levels.  Who would you expect to have resolved that issue on the night?  A. So I certainly know what FYI is, which is "for your information", but the rest of it, I would presume that's  Page 21  Page 23  Lace I a call sign.  Q. Right, okay.  Page 21  Lace I wow how to operate the technical aspects of that to have done so. My reading of that is that people were trying to find a work around some of those technical difficulties that were being experienced.  A. No.  Q. So at this point, 03.23, you'd finished your conversation with Chief Inspector Barrett and were officulties in receiving the heli-cled downlink?  A. No.  Q. Did you get any information while en route that this problem had emerged?  A. No.  Page 22  A. No.  Page 23  Lace I would presume that's  Lace I would you expect to have resolved that issue on the night?  A. So if there's the ability clearly for individuals who have done so. My reading of that is that people were trying to find a workaround in order to work around some of those technical difficulties that were being experienced.  Q. Do you know what these portable downlinks are?  A. No.  Q. Right, okay. So you won't be able to help me with my next question, then, which is why they weren't taken into the command unit and used by the LFB.  A. No. I do not.  LFB?  A. No. I	16	ONBOARD AND ENROUTE TO SCENE FOR LFB AND POLICE TO VIEW		•
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room at Lambeth?  21 A. A. That's right. 22 Q. And FY1—we know what that means — OE2IN — what is 23 that? 24 A. So I certainly know what FY1 is, which is "for your 25 information", but the rest of it, I would presume that's  Page 21  25 Page 23  26 Nere you made aware at any point that the LFB were 27 not receiving the heli-tele downlink from the 28 heli-tele downlink to be resolved that issue on the night?  A. So I certainly know what FY1 is, which is "for your 26 information", but the rest of it, I would presume that's  Page 21  27 Na. So I if there's the ability clearly for individuals who  Page 23  28 know how to operate the technical aspects of that to have done so. My reading of that is that people were trying to find a workaround in order to work around some of those technical difficulties that were being experienced.  A. No.  A. No.  Q. So at this point, 03,23, you'd finished your enswered that you would expect to have resolved that issue on the night?  A. No.  Q. Do you know what these portable downlinks as we can read there.  A. No.  Q. Do you know what these portable downlinks are?  A. No.  Q. Do you know what these portable downlinks are?  A. No.  Q. Do you know what these portable downlinks are?  A. No.  Q. Did you get any information while en route that this problem had emerged?  A. No.  Q. Did you get any briefing from Chief Inspector Barrett when you arrived at GT Lambeth that this problem had now emerged?  A. No.  Page 22  A. No.  20 Do you know if the Airwave channel on which NPAS messages were being communicated was available to the LFB.  A. So I don't know for certain, no. But I do know on our police handsets there is a ground-to-air channel and I would assume that would be the same for the London Fire Brigade as well.  Page 22  A. No.  Page 22  Page 24	18	First of all, I think it's right that, as Inspector		
21 A. That's right. 22 Q. And FYI - we know what that means - OE2IN - what is that? 23 that? 24 A. So I certainly know what FYI is, which is "for your 25 information", but the rest of it, I would presume that's  Page 21  1 a call sign. 2 Q. Right, okay. 3 They have two portable downlinks as we can read 4 there. 5 Were you made aware at any point that the LFB were 6 not receiving the heli-tele downlink from the 7 helicopters? 8 A. No. 9 Q. So at this point, 03.23, you'd finished your 10 conversation with Chief Inspector Barrett and were 11 en route to Lambeth. 12 Did Chief Inspector Barrett, during his first 13 substantive call with you at 02.30, tell you that there 14 were difficulties in receiving the heli-tele downlink? 15 A. No. 16 Q. Did you get any information while en route that this 17 problem had emerged? 18 A. No. 19 Q. Did you get any briefing from Chief Inspector Barrett when you arrived at GT Lambeth that this problem had now 20 emerged? 21 know how to operate the technical aspects of that to have done so. My reading of that is that people were trying to find a workaround in order to work around some of those technical difficulties that were being experienced. 6 Q. Do you know what these portable downlinks are? 7 A. No. 8 Q. You don't? 9 A. No. 10 Q. Right, okay. So you won't be able to help me with my next question, then, which is why they weren't taken into the command unit and used by the LFB. 13 A. No. I do not. 14 Q. Do you know if the Airwave channel on which NPAS messages were being communicated was available to the LFB? 17 A. So I don't know for certain, no. But I do know on our police handsets there is a ground-to-air channel and 1 I would assume that would be the same for the London Fire Brigade as well. 21 Q. Yes. 22 A. But certainly each handset is programmed slightly differently. 23 A. But certainly each handset is programmed slightly differently. 24 Q. Can I ask you to go to your log of the night, which is	19	Thatcher told us yesterday, GT ASU was the GT control		
22 Q. And YI - we know what that means - OE21N - what is that?  23 A. So I certainly know what FVI is, which is "for your life rest of it, I would presume that's  24 A. So I certainly know what FVI is, which is "for your life rest of it, I would presume that's  25 information", but the rest of it, I would presume that's  26 Page 21  27 Page 23  28 A. So if there's the ability clearly for individuals who  29 Page 23  20 Right, okay.  21 Is know how to operate the technical aspects of that to have done so. My reading of that is that people were trying to find a workaround in order to work around some of those technical difficulties that were being experienced.  29 Page 23  20 Right, okay.  30 They have two portable downlinks as we can read there.  40 Were you made aware at any point that the LFB were on to receiving the heli-tele downlink from the helicopters?  41 A. No.  42 A. No.  43 A. No.  44 C. Q. Do you know what these portable downlinks are?  45 A. No.  46 Q. Do you know what these portable downlinks are?  47 A. No.  48 Q. You dont?  49 A. No.  40 Q. Right, okay. So you won't be able to help me with my next question, then, which is why they weren't taken into the command unit and used by the LFB.  40 A. No.  41 In the experienced.  41 In the order to work around some of those technical difficulties that were being experienced.  42 Q. Do you know what these portable downlinks are?  43 A. No.  44 Op Op ou know what these portable downlinks are?  45 A. No.  46 Q. Do you know what these portable downlinks are?  47 A. No.  48 Q. You dont?  49 A. No.  40 Q. Right, okay. So you won't be able to help me with my next question, then, which is why they weren't taken into the command unit and used by the LFB.  40 A. No.  41 Q. Do you know if the Airwave channel on which NPAS messages were being communicated was available to the LFB?  41 A. No.  42 A. No.  43 A. No.  44 C. Do you know on it have the portable downlinks are?  45 A. No.  46 Q. Do you know on it have the portable downlink to the portable downlink to have t	20	room at Lambeth?	20	
23 Who would you expect to have resolved that issue on the night? 25 Information", but the rest of it, I would presume that's  Page 21  26 Page 23  27 Page 23  28 Row how to operate the technical aspects of that to have done so. My reading of that is that people were trying to find a workaround in order to work around some of there.  29 Were you made aware at any point that the LFB were not receiving the heli-tele downlink from the helicopters?  20 A. No.  21 Page 23  22 Row whow to operate the technical aspects of that to have done so. My reading of that is that people were trying to find a workaround in order to work around some of these technical difficulties that were being experienced.  21 Op you know what these portable downlinks are?  22 A. No.  23 Who would you expect to have resolved that issue on the night?  24 A. So if there's the ability clearly for individuals who have done so. My reading of that is that people were trying to find a workaround in order to work around some of these technical aspects of that to have done so. My reading of that is that people were trying to find a workaround in order to work around some of the such days of the standard and were helicopters?  3 They have two portable downlinks as we can read there.  4 Op you know what these portable downlinks are?  4 A. No.  4 Op you know what these portable downlinks are?  4 A. No.  5 Op you know what these portable downlinks are?  4 A. No.  5 Op you know what these portable downlinks are?  4 A. No.  6 Op you know what these portable downlinks are?  4 A. No.  6 Op you know what these portable downlinks are?  5 A. No.  6 Op you know what these portable downlinks are?  6 Op you know what these portable downlinks are?  7 A. No.  8 Op you don?  9 A. No.  10 Op Right, okay, So you won't be able to help me with my next question, then, which is why they weren't taken into the command unit and used by the LFB.  13 A. No. 1 do not.  14 Op Do you know if the Airwave channel on which NPAS messages were being communicated was available to the LFB	21	A. That's right.	21	expect the curing of the defect with the non-operating
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Page 21    a call sign.   1	23	that?	23	Who would you expect to have resolved that issue on
Page 21    Page 23    Page 23    Row how to operate the technical aspects of that to have done so. My reading of that is that people were trying to find a workaround in order to work around some of there.   A. No.   So.   You don't?	24	A. So I certainly know what FYI is, which is "for your	24	the night?
1 a call sign. 2 Q. Right, okay. 3 They have two portable downlinks as we can read 4 there. 4 there. 5 Were you made aware at any point that the LFB were 6 not receiving the heli-tele downlink from the 7 helicopters? 8 A. No. 9 Q. So at this point, 03.23, you'd finished your 10 conversation with Chief Inspector Barrett and were 11 en route to Lambeth. 12 Did Chief Inspector Barrett, during his first 13 substantive call with you at 02.30, tell you that there 14 were difficulties in receiving the heli-tele downlink? 15 A. No. 16 Q. Did you get any information while en route that this 17 problem had emerged? 18 A. No. 19 Q. Did you get any briefing from Chief Inspector Barrett 19 when you arrived at GT Lambeth that this problem had now 20 emerged? 21 Q. Does it come as a surprise to you to find out that there 22 was no operating heli-tele downlink between the 23 height of the sit hat people were 24 trying to find a workaround in order to work around some 25 of those technical difficulties that were being 26 experienced. 27 A. No. 28 Q. You don't? 29 A. No. 20 Q. Right, okay. So you won't be able to help me with my 21 next question, then, which is why they weren't taken 22 in the command unit and used by the LFB. 23 A. No, I do not. 24 C. Do you know if the Airwave channel on which NPAS 25 messages were being communicated was available to the 26 LFB? 27 A. So I don't know for certain, no. But I do know on our 28 police handsets there is a ground-to-air channel and 29 I would assume that would be the same for the London 20 Fire Brigade as well. 21 Q. Yes. 22 A. No. 23 Q. Does it come as a surprise to you to find out that there 24 was no operating heli-tele downlinks between the 25 helicopter and the LFB's command units? 26 Page 22 27 Page 24	25	information", but the rest of it, I would presume that's	25	A. So if there's the ability clearly for individuals who
1 a call sign. 2 Q. Right, okay. 3 They have two portable downlinks as we can read 4 there. 4 there. 5 Were you made aware at any point that the LFB were 6 not receiving the heli-tele downlink from the 7 helicopters? 8 A. No. 9 Q. So at this point, 03.23, you'd finished your 10 conversation with Chief Inspector Barrett and were 11 en route to Lambeth. 12 Did Chief Inspector Barrett, during his first 13 substantive call with you at 02.30, tell you that there 14 were difficulties in receiving the heli-tele downlink? 15 A. No. 16 Q. Did you get any information while en route that this 17 problem had emerged? 18 A. No. 19 Q. Did you get any briefing from Chief Inspector Barrett 19 when you arrived at GT Lambeth that this problem had now 20 emerged? 21 Q. Does it come as a surprise to you to find out that there 22 was no operating heli-tele downlink between the 23 height of the sit hat people were 24 trying to find a workaround in order to work around some 25 of those technical difficulties that were being 26 experienced. 27 A. No. 28 Q. You don't? 29 A. No. 20 Q. Right, okay. So you won't be able to help me with my 21 next question, then, which is why they weren't taken 22 in the command unit and used by the LFB. 23 A. No, I do not. 24 C. Do you know if the Airwave channel on which NPAS 25 messages were being communicated was available to the 26 LFB? 27 A. So I don't know for certain, no. But I do know on our 28 police handsets there is a ground-to-air channel and 29 I would assume that would be the same for the London 20 Fire Brigade as well. 21 Q. Yes. 22 A. No. 23 Q. Does it come as a surprise to you to find out that there 24 was no operating heli-tele downlinks between the 25 helicopter and the LFB's command units? 26 Page 22 27 Page 24		D 24		D 22
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8 A. No. 9 Q. So at this point, 03.23, you'd finished your 10 conversation with Chief Inspector Barrett and were 11 en route to Lambeth. 12 Did Chief Inspector Barrett, during his first 13 substantive call with you at 02.30, tell you that there 14 were difficulties in receiving the heli-tele downlink? 15 A. No. 16 Q. Did you get any information while en route that this 17 problem had emerged? 18 A. No. 19 Q. Did you get any briefing from Chief Inspector Barrett 20 when you arrived at GT Lambeth that this problem had now 21 emerged? 22 A. No. 23 Q. Does it come as a surprise to you to find out that there 24 was no operating heli-tele downlink between the 25 helicopter and the LFB's command units?  Page 22  Page 24  8 Q. You don't?  9 A. No. 10 Q. Right, okay. So you won't be able to help me with my 11 next question, then, which is why they weren't taken 12 into the command unit and used by the LFB. 13 A. No, I do not. 14 Q. Do you know if the Airwave channel on which NPAS 15 messages were being communicated was available to the 16 LFB? 17 A. So I don't know for certain, no. But I do know on our 18 police handsets there is a ground-to-air channel and 19 I would assume that would be the same for the London 20 Fire Brigade as well. 21 Q. Yes. 22 A. But certainly each handset is programmed slightly 23 differently. 24 Q. Can I ask you to go to your log of the night, which is 25 MET00023289, and go to page 8.	6		6	Q. Do you know what these portable downlinks are?
Q. So at this point, 03.23, you'd finished your conversation with Chief Inspector Barrett and were en route to Lambeth.  Did Chief Inspector Barrett, during his first substantive call with you at 02.30, tell you that there were difficulties in receiving the heli-tele downlink?  A. No.  Did you get any information while en route that this problem had emerged?  A. No.  Did you get any briefing from Chief Inspector Barrett when you arrived at GT Lambeth that this problem had now emerged?  A. No.  Did you get any briefing from Chief Inspector Barrett when you arrived at GT Lambeth that this problem had now emerged?  A. No.  Page 22  Page 24  A. No.  Page 24  Page 24  A. No.  Page 24  A. No.  Page 24  A. No.  Q. Right, okay. So you won't be able to help me with my next question, then, which is why they weren't taken into the command unit and used by the LFB.  A. No.  Q. Do you know if the Airwave channel on which NPAS messages were being communicated was available to the LFB?  A. No, I do not.  A. So I don't know for certain, no. But I do know on our police handsets there is a ground-to-air channel and I would assume that would be the same for the London Fire Brigade as well.  Q. Yes.  A. But certainly each handset is programmed slightly differently.  Q. Can I ask you to go to your log of the night, which is MET00023289, and go to page 8.	7	helicopters?	7	A. No.
conversation with Chief Inspector Barrett and were en route to Lambeth.  Did Chief Inspector Barrett, during his first substantive call with you at 02.30, tell you that there were difficulties in receiving the heli-tele downlink?  A. No.  O Did you get any information while en route that this problem had emerged?  A. No.  O Did you get any briefing from Chief Inspector Barrett when you arrived at GT Lambeth that this problem had now emerged?  A. No.  O Does it come as a surprise to you to find out that there was no operating heli-tele downlink between the helicopter and the LFB's command units?  Page 22  Page 24  O Right, okay. So you won't be able to help me with my next question, then, which is why they weren't taken into the command unit and used by the LFB.  A. No, I do not.  It would not he circumand unit and used by the LFB.  A. No, I do not.  It would an intention provide helicopter and the Life downlink?  A. So I don't know for certain, no. But I do know on our police handsets there is a ground-to-air channel and I would assume that would be the same for the London Fire Brigade as well.  Q. Yes.  A. But certainly each handset is programmed slightly differently.  Q. Can I ask you to go to your log of the night, which is MET00023289, and go to page 8.	8	A. No.	8	Q. You don't?
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25 helicopter and the LFB's command units?  Page 22  Page 24  Page 24				·
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	25	nelicopter and the LFB's command units?	25	ME100023289, and go to page 8.
		Page 22.		Page 24
6 (Pages 21 to 24)		1 1100 22		

1	Near the bottom of the page you can see, just above	1	A. Then he would become Silver.
2	0500, it says:	2	Q. He became Silver?
3	"Arranging briefing with Paul Warnett."	3	A. Yes.
4	I think he was the Gold from whom you took over.	4	Q. Does that mean Inspector Thatcher became Bronze or did
5	A. Yes, yes.	5	he come out of the structure?
6	Q. You had taken over from him.	6	A. So because of the Gold, Silver, Bronze structure, what
7	Had you taken over from him prior to 5.00 am?	7	you could have with an inspector such as Nick Thatcher
8	A. Yes, I had.	8	is he could then become effectively working with Silver.
9	Q. So was it that briefing during which you took over from	9	So you would only ever have one Silver, but clearly
		10	
10	him?	11	because of the continuity, because of everything that
11	A. So I took over I received the briefing from Chief		was taking place, because of the complexity, the
12	Inspector Barrett. That was at 04.20. So I then	12	fast-paced nature of the incident, Nick Thatcher could
13	considered that I was within the special operations	13	then assist Mr Warnett with his discharge of his
14	room, that I'd received the briefing, that I was then in	14	functions as Silver.
15	a position to assume command as Gold.	15	Q. Right. I see.
16	Q. I am just going to tie this up, then, with your	16	Once you had assumed Gold Command, what was your
17	statement, paragraph 50 at page 14. Just go back to	17	plan?
18	that.	18	A. So my plan was very simply to preserve and protect life
19	You say there:	19	as much as we could, and I think I detailed in my notes
20	"50. Once I had arrived at GT and received the	20	just very, very briefly what that initial plan was.
21	briefing from Chief Inspector Barrett at 04:10, I was of	21	Q. Is that at page 8 of MET00023289?
22	the view that command could now transfer to me.	22	A. Yes. So the initial plan is very simply, in those very,
23	I undertook the role of gold commander at that point."	23	very early stages, that you would go straight to our
24	Did you do so after having had a briefing from	24	core duty, protect and preserve life, and then provide
25	Superintendent Warnett?	25	assistance to those individuals who were injured, as
	•		,
	Page 25		Page 27
1	A. No. so I assumed command before I had that briefing from	1	well as providing assistance to those individuals who
1 2	A. No, so I assumed command before I had that briefing from	1 2	well as providing assistance to those individuals who
2	Superintendent Warnett.	2	had evacuated.
2 3	Superintendent Warnett.  Q. When you assumed that role, therefore, you were working	2 3	had evacuated.  Q. You say that your role essentially was to attend and
2 3 4	Superintendent Warnett.  Q. When you assumed that role, therefore, you were working on the basis of the briefing given to you by Chief	2 3 4	had evacuated.  Q. You say that your role essentially was to attend and chair the strategic co-ordinating group meetings, and
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1	multi-agency strategy."	1	putting in place this is as you're moving into a stage
2	When you say an initial multi-agency strategy, do we	2	where more and more partners are coming around the
3	take from that that there was, until that point,	3	table, what you need to be absolutely clear of is and
4	5.00 am, no multi-agency strategy?	4	my role as the chair of the strategic co-ordinating
5	A. So my understanding is that there was, but clearly what	5	group is making sure that we're all aligned and we know
6	I would need to do is make sure that that multi-agency	6	what our priorities are. That's the purpose of making
7	strategy was appropriate given the timescale and the	7	sure that we have this in place.
8	information that we were receiving.	8	Q. At this point, 5.00 am, did you know that the council
9	A strategy is not a fixed point; it remains flexible	9	had already triggered their own emergency response in
10	and must change according to the updated information	10	accordance with their own policy?
11	that's coming in.	11	A. Yes, I must have done, because I know that there were
12	Q. Yes. I just wonder why you use the word "initial" there	12	local authority representatives at that meeting.
13	in your statement.	13	Q. At Lambeth at 5.00 am?
14	A. So, for me, because that would be my first strategic	14	A. At 5 o'clock.
15	co-ordinating group, that would be the first	15	Q. Who was there?
16	multi-agency strategy of bringing all of the London	16	A. Can I refer to the
17	Resilience Forum together. That would be the first	17	Q. We can go to your note if you like.
18	opportunity for that to take place.	18	(Pause)
19	Clearly, that does not prevent that earlier on there	19	A. So from the local authority there was a Stuart Priestly,
20	is that joint strategy of working together to save	20	David Kerry and Mark Sawyer.
21	people's lives.	21	Q. Just to be clear, can I ask you to look, please, at
22	Q. So does that mean that before 5.00 am there was a joint	22	MET00023287 and turn in that document to page 3. That's
23	strategy, it just wasn't, as it were, a London	23	the London Resilience SCG minutes, the 5.00 am meeting.
24	Resilience Forum joint strategy?	24	A. That's right.
25	A. Yes.	25	Q. If you go to page 3 of that document, you can see the
	D 20		D 04
	Page 29		Page 31
1	Q. Could you explain the difference?	1	local authority representatives, Stuart Priestly,
2	A. So the London Resilience Forum brings together other	2	David Kerry and Mark Sawyer.
3	responders other than the blue-light emergency services.	3	Were they physically present at Lambeth or were they
4	So clearly before that point, the initial part	4	patched in by telephone?
5	would've been mainly first responders. The London	5	A. I can't remember.
6	Resilience Forum is wider than just the first	6	Q. Right.
7	responders.	7	A. No, I can't remember.
8	Q. Would the METHANE message, which would normally be sent	8	Q. Was this the first time that you'd engaged with those
9	at the point at which a major incident is declared, not	9	individuals or those representatives?
10	engage agencies wider than the blue-light agencies?	10	A. Yes.
11	A. Certainly at that point, not necessarily. It would be	11	Q. Going back to a page in the document, you can see item
12	very much focused on what the primary objectives are and	12	1.1:
13	the resources you've got available. And in	13	"1.1. LFB requested attendance by a structural
14	a fast-moving complex where people's lives are at risk,	14	engineer due to concerns over the structural integrity
15	then I would expect that it would be focused on those	15	of the building. The engineer is now confirmed on
16	arrangements.	16	scene."
17	We're all absolutely clear as emergency responders	17	To your knowledge, was that the first time that the
18	what our first duty is, and that's to save people's	18	LFB had requested attendance or earlier on in the night?
19	lives.	19	A. So that would've come from the London Fire Brigade
20	Q. So do I take it from that that at this point, you didn't	20	representative.
21	have a multi-agency strategy under the umbrella of the	21	Q. Richard Mills?
22	London Resilience Forum; did that mean that up until	22	A. Yes, that's right.
23	that point there was no shared agency strategy outside	23	Q. Right.
24	the blue-light or emergency services?	24	A. So clearly I don't know at what time they made that
25	A. So I believe that there would be. The purpose of	25	call.
	Page 30		Page 32

1	Q. At paragraph 3.1, under the title "Situation brief", you	1	time, and Inspector Thatcher, who was Silver at that
2	can see it says:	2	time and I say "time", it was about 02.40
3	"3.1. At 0:55 LFB was called to the incident in	3	DAC O'Loughlin identifies as the first and biggest thing
4	North Kensington, a block of flats with 24 floors,	4	that the LFB needed from the Metropolitan Police was
5	Grenfell Tower, W1. The building is alight from 2nd to	5	identifying the people and the casualties.
6	24th floor, approximately 100 individuals involved, LFB	6	I can show you a clip of the body-worn video if you
7	has declared a major incident."	7	like, but take it from me that that is what is said.
8	Did anybody say at that meeting that in fact the	8	By the time of your involvement and by the time of
9	Metropolitan Police had also declared a major incident?	9	this first meeting at 5.00 am of the SCG, did you
10	A. Let me just read down through.	10	appreciate the importance of that function,
11	(Pause)	11	identification of people and casualties, to LFB's search
12	No, they did not, but then I was aware that we had,	12	and rescue function?
13	so within my knowledge I was clearly aware that the	13	A. Yes. So yesterday I described the role of a casualty
14	police had also declared it a major incident.	14	bureau and taking information from a number of different
15	Q. And had done so some 35 minutes before the LFB had done?	15	sources that includes the hospital, includes the
16	A. Yes.	16	survivor reception centres so that we have
17	Q. How was this meeting updated with the priorities that	17	an accurate picture of individuals that may or may not
18	were being adopted at that time on the incident ground	18	still be within Grenfell Tower.
19	itself?	19	Q. It took time, I think, for that casualty bureau to be
20	A. So at the end of my note, which I've got as MET00023289,	20	set up, as we heard yesterday.
21	and page 9 of that	21	A. (Nodded assent)
22	Q. Yes.	22	Q. I think some four hours.
23	A. Probably about a third of the way down, it says:	23	A. That's right.
24	"Save life, inform public, welfare of staff."	24	Q. We were told it was instructed to be set up at 02.30 and
25	So there will have been a conversation during that	25	got set up about 06.30.
	Page 33		Page 35
1	0500 meeting that was not recorded in the minutes around	,	A Theete winks
1	0500 meeting that was not recorded in the minutes around	1	A. That's right.
2	the priorities.	3	Q. That period of four hours, let me put it to you, was
3	Q. It also says: " difficulty gaining access, 15th floor above,	4	rather long, was it not, if in fact what was supposed to be happening was that the LFB were trying to know who
4 5		5	had been cleared from particular flats and who had not?
6	awaiting sit update."  Do you know how long after this meeting you had to	6	A. So whilst the casualty bureau is a formal process and
7	wait to get a situational update?	7	a very formal structure in terms of gathering that
8	A. So during the course of that night there were	8	information in, clearly in the meantime of that taking
9	situational updates coming in incredibly regularly.	9	place, officers on the ground and working with the
10		10	
11	Q. Right.  A. So it wasn't as though you have these periodically every	11	London Fire Brigade and also with the London Ambulance Service getting those records of who has come out,
12		12	that's clearly going to be difficult, because there will
13	hour or every hour and a half, they would've been coming in pretty instantly.	13	be individuals who will have self-evacuated and not gone
14	Q. Going back to the role of the RBKC representatives,	14	
15	Priestly, Kerry and Sawyer, do you know what their	15	to a recognised centre.  The community were absolutely outstanding in helping
16	duties entailed, or rather what they were actually	16	one another, and clearly bringing that assistance to
17	doing?	17	other human beings who are in peril is one of the things
18	A. So the role of the local authority are there primarily	18	that really does stand out from this absolute tragedy.
19	to provide the humanitarian assistance. So they would	19	So there isn't a clean and clinical way of gathering
20	be opening up casualty and survivor reception centres.	20	, ,
21	Q. Did anybody at the meeting mention the fact that the	21	all of that information. It's going to be complex, it's going to be multiple sources, multiple places, just
22	London Fire Brigade had asked for plans of the building?	22	
23		23	trying to understand who has come out and who may well
23	A. No.  Q. At an earlier meeting in the command unit between	23	be remaining in there.
24 25	DAC O'Loughlin, who was the incident commander at that	25	Certainly I'm aware that officers on cordons were speaking to people on the cordons to try and get that
23	2.10 0 Longmin, who was the incluent communical at that	23	speaking to people on the cordons to dry and get that
	Page 34		Page 36
	<del>-</del>		9 (Pages 33 to 36)

		.	0.10
1	information through.	1	Q. If we can just go back to it MET00023287:
2	Q. What was your understanding of how survivors from the	2	"3.8. Shelter and care (including access to
3	tower were actually being identified?	3	medication) to be provided for evacuated people. RBKC
4	A. So it would be my understanding that we would be taking	4	adult social care arrangements to be developed, 2 rest
5	names and addresses from people as we would engage with	5	centres open, further 3 premises to be opened to shelter
6	them.	6	people. Likely to consolidate later in the morning."
7	Q. So, what, your officers would speak to evacuees?	7	Then you can see the reference to the casualty
8	A. Yes.	8	bureau under 3.10.
9	Q. And what was the system for doing that? Was there	9	My question is: what involvement did your officers
10	a system for doing that?	10	have in the establishment of those centres?
11	A. So I think it would be, certainly in those	11	A. So specifically, I don't know.
12	circumstances, dealing with it as it happened, as you	12	Q. What involvement did your officers have in going to
13	came across people.	13	those centres and assisting evacuated people with
14	Q. Who was doing that?	14	identifying themselves and those loved ones who were
15	A. So I think that would be a whole host of different	15	still in the tower so as to be able to relay that back
16	officers who were coming in contact with people.	16	to the LFB to assist with their search and rescue?
17	I think the priority at that point, though, was	17	A. So, again, specifically, I don't know precisely the
18	clearly people have come out, but also identifying	18	answer to that, but it would be my understanding that
19	individuals who remain within the tower and seeing what	19	our officers would be going there, albeit recognising
20	we could do to try and save them.	20	that our primary focus is to save life as well.
21	Q. What did your officers actually do together with the LFB	21	Q. Do you know what your officers' role was, if any, in
22	to facilitate that aim?	22	overseeing the documentation of the survivors and
23	A. So I don't know.	23	gathering or providing information in relation to
24	Q. You don't know?	24	residents who may be still in the tower or who were
25	A. In absolute detail.	25	missing?
	D 45		D 40
	Page 37		Page 39
1	Q. Right.	1	A. No, I do not.
2	We know that the LESLP major incident manual	2	MR MILLETT: Commander, thank you very much. I've come to
3	document provides for survivor reception centres and	3	the end of the questions I have for you.
4	friends and relatives reception centres to be set up so	4	I've been going nearly an hour. There may be one or
5	that survivors can be met by police and other services,	5	two more I just want to double check I've covered.
6	and enable survivors to be documented and missing	6	Mr Chairman, it may be appropriate for a break now.
7	persons then to be identified and have information	7	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, I think we'll have the
8	submitted about them.	8	usual mid-morning break of 10 minutes, perhaps slightly
9	Can I ask you, did you appreciate at the time that	9	more, and then when we come back, commander, we'll have
10	the primary responsibility for setting up these centres	10	an idea whether there are more questions that we need to
11	rested with the police, supported by the local	11	ask you.
12	authority?	12	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
	A. So my understanding at that point was because the police	13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? I'm going to ask you to
13		14	go with the usher now, if you would, not to talk to
14	don't have access to buildings that would enable that to		•
15	take place, that would be the role of the local	15	anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room,
16	authority to do.	16	and we'll resume at 11.10.
17	Q. Did you have any discussion with the local authority	17	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
18	about how they were going to be setting up those	18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
19	centres?	19	Good, 11.10, then, please.
20	A. So I didn't, but I was assured from the 0500 meeting	20	(11.00 am)
21	that that was in the process. Clearly it says that two	21	(A short break)
22	rest centres were open and a further three premises to	22	(11.10 am)
23	be opened.	23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, commander? I haven't
24			and the second s
	Q. We pick that up at paragraph 3.8.	24	actually asked Mr Millett, but I suspect he has got some
25	<ul><li>Q. We pick that up at paragraph 3.8.</li><li>A. Yes.</li></ul>	24 25	actually asked Mr Millett, but I suspect he has got some questions for you.

1	MR MILLETT: A few but not very many, commander.	1	A. No, I'm sorry, I don't know.
2	The first is about the call handler handling the	2	Q. Different question. Back to helicopters again.
3	advice on CAD932 at 03.05, and I know you wanted to see	3	Can I ask you, please, to go to RBK00013294, and
4	that. I'm not going to show it to you, but I am going	4	within that, please, to go to page 37. This is the
5	to take you back to your witness statement at	5	LESLP major incident procedure manual, version 9.4,
6	paragraph 35, if I can, please, page 11, where you	6	2015, paragraph 10.1.3.
7	exhibited CAD482.	7	You can see there what helicopters can provide by
8	You say:	8	way of the following support facilities. There's a list
9	"This shows that at 03:08 a message was received by	9	of bullet points there, airborne command and control,
10	the MPS control room from the LFB stating that Fire	10	et cetera.
11	Safety Guidance had changed, and that those inside the	11	Would any of those support facilities in the context
12	building ought to escape by any means possible. My	12	of a fire involving the LFB be available in the absence
13	current understanding that that message was communicated	13	of a functioning heli-tele downlink?
14	across the airways to officers shortly before 03:10."	14	A. Could you rephrase that question again for me, please?
15	So to be fair to you, when I asked you about whether	15	Q. Yes. Looking at that list
16	or not the call that we see in your exhibit NAJ/2, which	16	A. Yes.
17	was timed at	17	Q of support facilities that are available when an NPAS
18	A. 03.05.	18	helicopter is deployed, would any of those be available
19	Q 03.05, was inconsistent with the advice that had then	19	in the absence of a heli-tele downlink
20	changed, putting the two together, is that right?	20	A. So
21	A. That would be my understanding, yes.	21	Q in the context of a fire?
22	Q. So would that mean and your guess is as good as mine,	22	A. Yes, so clearly it would provide that evidential video,
23	but to be fair to you that in fact that particular	23	the capture of the scene clearly from the perspective of
24	control room operator at MetCC had not yet heard or been	24	a helicopter. You wouldn't be able to get that from the
25	given the message that the advice was now to evacuate,	25	ground.
	Page 41		Page 43
1	because the first time that was broadcast from MetCC to	1	The airborne command and control in the immediate
2	all officers was at 03.08?	2	aftermath of an incident, that wouldn't be applicable in
3	A. Yes, that could well be the case, yes.	3	this particular incident.
4	Q. But I think it remains the case that you still can't	4	The overview of the scene, clearly that would give
5	explain why that is so given that the LFB had changed	5	you an additionality from an airborne perspective.
6	the advice at 02.47 latest?	6	The casualty search/assessment of numbers, in my
7	A. That's right, I do not know.	7	evidence yesterday I said in my experience, that's more
8	Q. Just continuing in the same topic, can I take you back,	8	around searching of large, open spaces.
9	please, to your note of the night, MET00023289, at	9	Identification of present or potential hazards,
10	page 8.	10	clearly that would give, again, an airborne view of
11	This is your incident management log, first part.	11	maybe some of those.
12	You say there and we looked at it earlier	12	Transportation of personnel and equipment, that
13	a third of the way down the page:	13	wouldn't be appropriate in these circumstances.
14	"Everyone onto 999, no waiters"	14	Weather conditions and wind direction at scene, that
15	You told us that that confirmed that the MetCC was	15	would clearly be available by other means, but it would
16	taking Grenfell calls.	16	give the degree of drift of the burning material that's
17	A. Yes.	17	falling from the building and whether the emergency
18	Q. Do you know the mechanics of how that would work in	18	services on the scene would need to extend the cordon at
19	terms of BT connecting calls?	19	all.
20	A. I'm sorry, no, that would be a technical question	20	The area containment, including cordon
21	I don't know the answer to.	21	deployment/infringement, you would get that from
22	Q. Do you know whether there are any protocols that the Met	22	officers on the ground as well; however, it does give
23	has with BT as to how they would put calls through to	23	you that wider perspective.
24	the Met or through to another control room which was not	24	The traffic management/route planning, clearly one
25	LFB?	25	of the primary roles for us in supporting the London
1		1	
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1	Fire Brigade is allowing not just them but other	1	as this?
2	emergency vehicles access to and fro of the scene. So	2	A. So if they had that within clearly if it's a council
3	that would give you that perspective that you may not	3	building, or a building to which the council would have
4	necessarily quite get from the ground itself.	4	access, then I would expect that to be the case, yes.
5	And then imagery of the scene, including photographs	5	Q. Would you expect the LALO to be able to provide a list
6	and video, thermal imaging, that would give you	6	of residents?
7	a different perspective of that.	7	A. Yes, I would.
8	Q. Just following up on that in relation to the third,	8	Q. Would you expect the LALO to be able to identify
9	fourth and fifth bullet points so immediate overview	9	vulnerable residents, such as those who were partially
10	of the scene, et cetera, casualty search/assessment of	10	sighted or non-sighted or those with mobility
11	numbers and identification of present or potential	11	difficulties?
12	hazards let me suggest to you that it must be right,	12	A. Certainly vulnerabilities, yes.
13	mustn't it, that in the absence of a heli-tele downlink	13	Q. Commander, thank you very much. I've come to the end of
14	between the NPAS helicopter and the LFB command unit,	14	my oh, apparently not.
15	the support facilities offered by the helicopter in	15	Could you just wait one moment? I'm sorry.
16	relation to those functions would be very severely	16	(Pause)
17	limited?	17	I'm asked to ask you, as you can see from what's
18	A. So the operators within the helicopter are incredibly	18	just happened: could the helicopter have used the public
19	experienced, and what they would be able to do is convey	19	address system? Could a helicopter have used a public
20	that verbally to those on the ground. It wouldn't	20	address system, such as a megaphone or some other kind
21	necessarily rely entirely upon a heli-tele downlink. So	21	of way of communicating with residents?
22	they would be providing their own assessment, clearly.	22	A. So it does have access to that. Whether that would've
23	Q. They would?	23	been heard or not, I don't know. So I don't know
24	A. Yes.	24	specifically the answer to that question.
25	Q. But without the visual I repeat the question the	25	Q. And what is that access? How does it work functionally,
	Page 45		Page 47
1	LFB's ability to gain support from the facility would be	1	do you know?
2	very severely limited, no?	2	A. No, I'm sorry.
3	A. I wouldn't say severely limited. I mean, clearly it	3	MR MILLETT: No.
4	would be of benefit, absolutely it would, but also of	4	Thank you very much, commander, I have no further
5	benefit is the fact that the operators within the	5	questions for you.
6	helicopter would be talking to those on the ground as	6	Can I say thank you very much to you for coming
7	well and describing what they are seeing and the	7	along and assisting the inquiry with our investigations.
8	hazards.	8	We very much appreciate it, so thank you.
9	Q. Can I ask you to then go back in this document	9	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
10	a slightly different topic to page 11.	10	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I would like to add my thanks,
11	So we're still within the LESLP major incident	11	commander. I'm sorry that we've had to call you back
12	procedure manual, and at page 11, where we're dealing	12	for a second day, and thank you for coming back for a
13	with the local authority, you can see that there's	13	second day.
14	reference under 3.8.2 to "Local Authority Gold and the	14	Your evidence is very helpful. It's another piece
15	LLACC".	15	in the jigsaw puzzle which we're trying to put together,
16	Under 3.9, the "Local Authority Liaison Officer	16	so we're very grateful to you for coming along to tell
17	(LALO)":	17	us what you could.
18	"3.9.1. The LALO is a senior representative of the	18	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
19	affected borough who is able to react to requests for	19	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, and now you're
20	local authority assistance and is the on-scene liaison	20	free to go. If you would like to go with the usher,
		1 21	she'll look after you. Thank you.
21	point for the Council."	21	
21 22	And you can see what the LALO is required to do.	22	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
21 22 23	And you can see what the LALO is required to do. Although we don't see reference to it in the LESLP	22 23	THE WITNESS: Thank you. (The witness withdrew)
21 22 23 24	And you can see what the LALO is required to do.  Although we don't see reference to it in the LESLP itself, would you expect the LALO's role to include the	22 23 24	THE WITNESS: Thank you.  (The witness withdrew)  SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.
21 22 23	And you can see what the LALO is required to do. Although we don't see reference to it in the LESLP	22 23	THE WITNESS: Thank you. (The witness withdrew)
21 22 23 24	And you can see what the LALO is required to do.  Although we don't see reference to it in the LESLP itself, would you expect the LALO's role to include the	22 23 24	THE WITNESS: Thank you.  (The witness withdrew)  SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.

		1	
1	Mr Woodrow from the London Ambulance Service.	1	the next witness.
2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.	2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, you in general terms.
3	MR MILLETT: Ms Rose Grogan will be examining him, and we'll	3	MR MILLETT: Me plural, right.
4	probably take a short break in order for him to be	4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
5	brought or to rearrange matters for that.	5	(11.25 am)
6	Before I do that, can I just read into the record	6	(A short break)
7	a number of further pieces of evidence.	7	(11.30 am)
8	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, very well.	8	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Ms Grogan.
9	MR MILLETT: I want to read into the record two schedules of	9	MS GROGAN: Good morning, Mr Chairman.
10	witness statements, exhibits and documents.	10	The next witness for today is Mr Paul Woodrow from
11	The first of those contains a list of witness	11	the London Ambulance Service.
12	statements and exhibits of other police officers who	12	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good, thank you.
13	attended the scene on the night, and also Temporary	13	MS GROGAN: Could we please call Mr Woodrow.
14	Chief Inspector Winch, who describes how the emergency	14	PAUL WOODROW (sworn)
15	calls and the Metropolitan Police command and control	15	Questions by MS GROGAN
16	system operates.	16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Mr Woodrow.
17	The reference to the schedule is INQ00000519. If it	17	Would you like to take a seat and make yourself
18	can please be put up on the screen so people can see	18	comfortable. All right?
19	what I am talking about, that would be helpful.	19	Yes, Ms Grogan.
20	INQ00000519.	20	MS GROGAN: Thank you.
21	All of those references are the references to those	21	Can you please give the inquiry your full name?
22	witness statements which are being read in.	22	A. My full name is Paul Andrew Woodrow.
23	Chief Inspector Winch's statement is METS00020664.	23	Q. Thank you very much for coming to give evidence today
24	There's a second list of documents, which is	24	and to assist the inquiry with its investigations. It's
25	INQ00000515, if that could also please be shown on the	25	very much appreciated.
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1	screen.	1	I'll be asking you the questions today. If you have
2	When it comes up, I'll explain what it is.	2	any difficulty in understanding any questions, please
3	That is a list of helicopter and NPAS witness	3	feel free to ask me to rephrase or to go slower.
4	statements with the name of the witness statement maker,	4	If you feel you need a break at any point, just
5	as in the other schedule, the exhibit numbers, where	5	signal and we'll have a short break.
6	relevant, and the MET references.	6	A. Okay.
7	I should just add this: the material contained in	7	Q. Please keep your voice up and speak into the microphone
8	both schedules that's INQ00000519 and INQ00000515	8	so that the transcribers can hear you as well.
9	does include distressing information about matters on	9	You've made a witness statement for the inquiry.
10	the night. The NPAS material also includes live footage	10	It's in a folder on your desk in front of you, and it
11	from the NPAS helicopter which is distressing and	11	will also appear on the screen. It may be easier to
12	graphic.	12	look at documents on the screen than in the bundle.
13	So if anybody wants to access it, then I would just	13	Can I start by taking you to that statement. It's
14	say that, if they do so, they need to be mindful of any	14	LAS00000009. It's dated June 2018.
15	distress that may be caused by this material either to	15	Have you read your statement recently?
16	themselves or to anybody who is looking at it with them.	16	A. Yes, I have.
17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good. Well, thank you for drawing	17	Q. Can you confirm that the contents are true?
18	attention to that.	18	A. Yes, I can.
19	MR MILLETT: So, Mr Chairman, with that, I would ask for	19	Q. Have you discussed your evidence with anyone?
20	another short break so that the preparations can be made	20	A. No.
21	before the next witness comes.	21	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Woodrow, to save you the trouble
22	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, very well.	22	of getting too close to the microphone, I think you'll
23	Well, I'll rise for 5 minutes or less if you find	23	find you're about the right distance at the moment. If
24	that you are ready sooner.	24	you're not, someone will wave at me and we'll tell you.
25	MR MILLETT: Well, it's Ms Grogan who is going to be taking	25	A. Okay, thank you.
	Page 50		Page 52
	U	1	U

1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right?	1	Q. You also say there that you're responsible for 999
2	MS GROGAN: I'll stop leaning forward as well.	2	emergency operations centres. Does that include 999
3	You've also provided exhibits. A list of those	3	call handlers?
4	exhibits is LAS00000010.	4	A. It does indeed.
5	If we could get at up on the screen, please.	5	Q. So you have ultimate oversight of call handlers at the
6	The references, just for the record, for those	6	LAS?
7	exhibits are LAS00000002 to LAS00000008.	7	A. The emergency operations centres are one of the
8	Going first to your statement then, Mr Woodrow, on	8	functional lines within my directorate, yes.
9	page 3, could you look at paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2.	9	Q. In your role, are you personally required to carry out
10	In 2.2 you say that you've drawn on information and	10	any front-line activities, such as attending a scene of
11	documents generated and held by the LAS in preparing	11	an incident?
12	this statement. Can I just check what those are.	12	A. So within my particular role now, I'm not routinely
13	So did that, at the time you wrote your statement,	13	deployed as part of the command structures. But
14	include witness statements taken by the police and	14	depending on the certain types of incident, there may be
15	subsequently disclosed by the inquiry?	15	a role where I will be deployed as part of that
16	A. No, the information that I used in terms of crafting my	16	structure, as indeed I was on the night in question.
17	statement at the time were obviously the policies and	17	Q. Would you be deployed to scene for all major incidents
18	procedures that we have internally. I reviewed our	18	or would it depend on the incident?
19	computer-aided dispatch logs, the incident logs that	19	A. No, I wouldn't.
20	were completed by operational commanders.	20	Q. When you are deployed as part of a major incident, what
21	I did not actually have access to any of the MPS	21	would your role usually be?
22	witness statements when I crafted the statement that was	22	A. Well, now my role would usually be to be a spokesman for
23	submitted.	23	the service, to work in terms of multi-service media,
24	Q. Have you reviewed those now?	24	that kind of thing.
25	A. I have reviewed those statements now.	25	I wouldn't routinely be deployed to manage
	Page 53		Page 55
1 1	O. Thoule you	1	an incident. We have a structure in place that does
1	Q. Thank you.	1 2	an incident. We have a structure in place that does
2	Again, just for the record, the LAS Gold log	2	that routinely. I wouldn't be routinely required to do
2 3	Again, just for the record, the LAS Gold log reference is MET00023715, the LAS CAD reference is	2 3	that routinely. I wouldn't be routinely required to do that.
2 3 4	Again, just for the record, the LAS Gold log reference is MET00023715, the LAS CAD reference is MET00019931.	2 3 4	that routinely. I wouldn't be routinely required to do that.  Q. So the inquiry has already heard about Gold, Silver and
2 3 4 5	Again, just for the record, the LAS Gold log reference is MET00023715, the LAS CAD reference is MET00019931.  Did you also review the 999 call transcripts?	2 3 4 5	that routinely. I wouldn't be routinely required to do that.  Q. So the inquiry has already heard about Gold, Silver and Bronze Command; do you sit slightly apart from that
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1	Q. Thank you.	1	that we were getting that accurate information because
2	I'll move on now to ask you some questions about	2	our NHS partners would require that.
3	your role on the night of the fire.	3	So it was just ensuring that, essentially, we had
4	When were you first alerted to the fire at	4	the resources.
5	Grenfell Tower?	5	The next thing was around the management of shift
6	A. Well, as I said, I wasn't structured on call that night,	6	changeover. So, you know, were we thinking about the
7	so I wasn't a nominated officer on call. We had a Gold	7	crews that had been on the night shift and the fact that
8	on call.	8	we needed to turn those crews around with days.
9	I, in the nature of my role, like to have my	9	So it was really just a situational report and
10	telephone with me at all times, and I wasn't directly	10	an update in terms of and then I allowed Gold just to
11	contacted, but I woke up and looked at my phone and	11	continue his normal business working through the
12	looked at my inbox and saw that a pager message had gone	12	recognised structures that he had in place.
13	out relating to this incident.	13	Q. You then left to travel to the tower at about 6.45 that
14	I then woke up, contacted the Gold strategic	14	morning.
15	commander that I knew was on duty that night, which was	15	When you arrived at the tower, what was your role?
16	Stuart Chrichton. I asked Stuart Chrichton to give me	16	A. So essentially I'd been nominated by the strategic
17	a verbal update on the telephone, and the verbal update	17	commander, because of the scale of the incident, to be
18	was essentially that we'd got the structures in place,	18	the media spokesman. There was a lot of information
19	our Gold Command suite was open, and that the incident	19	coming back around large amounts of media congregating
20	was being managed in accordance to our policies and	20	at the scene, and it's often the case that when there is
21	procedures.	21	a major incident, we do nominate a senior operational
22	I asked if there was any specific assistance he	22	officer, and, indeed, it's in our incident response plan
23	required at that time and he was confident that the	23	that a senior designated officer is sent to the scene to
24	incident was being managed in accordance to our	24	manage the press briefings.
25	procedures.	25	So that was primarily the role that I undertook when
	D 57		D 50
	Page 57		Page 59
1	Q. So LAS procedures don't require you to be notified or to	1	I went to Grenfell Tower that day.
2	attend, but you decided to phone in to find out	2	Q. Given the time that you arrived at the tower, can we
3	A. Yes. So my role as executive director of operations,	3	take it that you're familiar with the external layout of
4	there's no direct requirement. I can be paged to	4	
5	certain types of incidents and the Gold Commanders can		Grenfell Tower and where the LAS set up sector 1 and
	certain types of including and the Gold Commanders can	5	*
6	choose to contact me as the director of operations if		sector 2?  A. Yes, very much so.
6 7	choose to contact me as the director of operations if	5	sector 2?
	**	5 6	sector 2? A. Yes, very much so.
7	choose to contact me as the director of operations if they feel they need something specific from me. That is normally for me to manage the wider NHS to allow the	5 6 7	sector 2?  A. Yes, very much so.  Q. If we could pull up MET00019059 on the screen.  That's a map produced by the incident response
7	choose to contact me as the director of operations if they feel they need something specific from me. That is	5 6 7 8	sector 2?  A. Yes, very much so.  Q. If we could pull up MET00019059 on the screen.
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7 8 9 10	choose to contact me as the director of operations if they feel they need something specific from me. That is normally for me to manage the wider NHS to allow the Gold Commander to concentrate on the strategic command of the incident.	5 6 7 8 9	sector 2?  A. Yes, very much so.  Q. If we could pull up MET00019059 on the screen.  That's a map produced by the incident response officer Laurence Ioannou, the Bronze medic, as part of his evidence.  Does that map reflect what you understand to be the
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7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	choose to contact me as the director of operations if they feel they need something specific from me. That is normally for me to manage the wider NHS to allow the Gold Commander to concentrate on the strategic command of the incident.  So I'm usually used as trying to manage our executive, our board and the wider NHS in terms of the provision of information.  Q. You did decide to go in that morning to the EOC at Waterloo and you arrived about 6.00 am; is that right?  A. That's correct.  Q. Were you briefed about the incident at that stage?  A. I was.  Q. What was the content of that briefing?  A. That there had obviously been a major fire, with most of the building actually alight, large numbers of patients trapped in the building. There was a difficulty around trying to identify finite numbers. I was given an update on the casualties that we'd treated so far.	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	sector 2?  A. Yes, very much so.  Q. If we could pull up MET00019059 on the screen.  That's a map produced by the incident response officer Laurence Ioannou, the Bronze medic, as part of his evidence.  Does that map reflect what you understand to be the layout of the scene on the night?  A. Absolutely.  Q. Thank you.  I am now going to move on and ask you some questions about the role of the LAS in a major incident and your policies and procedures.  You've exhibited some policies to your witness statement. That's the LESLP major incident procedure manual, the JESIP joint doctrine interoperability framework and LAS's incident response procedures.  Not exhibited but relevant is the strategic co-ordination protocol; is that right?  A. Yes.

1	A. I am.	1	face-to-face, that's 4.1.1; share information with
2	Q. So the starting point is that there's a legal duty under	2	partners promptly; establish a joint emergency Airwave
3	the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 for the LAS to assess	3	channel; and also understand key priorities, activities
4	risk, to plan for emergencies and co-operate and share	4	and issues of partner agencies.
5	information with other responders.	5	Let's go through each of these in turn.
6	A. Correct.	6	First of all, meeting at the scene.
7	Q. You're familiar with that legal obligation?	7	Who would the LAS expect to liaise with at
8	A. I am.	8	an incident like Grenfell Tower when they arrived?
9	Q. Both LESLP, as I call it is that what you call it?	9	A. So we would look for the fire service, London Fire
10	A. LESLP, yes.	10	Brigade, command. So in that type of incident, we would
11	Q. Both LESLP and JESIP deal with co-ordination between	11	look to liaise with the operational commander from the
12	agencies; is that right?	12	London Fire Brigade.
13	A. That's correct.	13	Q. How quickly would you expect the relevant supervising
14	Q. And the strategic co-ordination protocol also deals with	14	officers to meet with one another?
15	joint working.	15	A. Well, in ideal circumstances, the three emergency
16	A. Correct.	16	services should actually have their sort of control
17	Q. Before we look at the policies, could I just check the	17	command units co-located, and very distinguished in
18	agencies that would be working together on the night of	18	terms of there are individual beacons that flash from
19	Grenfell. So that would be the LAS, obviously, the LFB,	19	command units that make it visible.
20	the police and the local authority; is that right?	20	So we would normally expect to see that, in terms of
21	A. Yes, they would be the primary people that would be	21	that is the ideal place, where you get the three
22	working together. There would be supplementary	22	services jointly located.
23	organisations, so utilities can come into that equation	23	Q. So if you have a first responder from the LAS attending
24	on the night. But the primary partners in the incident	24	the scene, would you expect them to go straight to the
25	are the three emergency services and local authority.	25	LFB command unit?
	Page 61		Page 63
1	But that doesn't exclude, depending on the circumstances	1	A. So the first responder on scene, the first thing that we
2	of the incident, other participants.	2	would do is expect them to give us a report back in
3	Q. What expectations would the LAS have of a local	3	terms of what is going on. So we wouldn't expect the
4	authority at a major incident such as Grenfell?		terms or what is going on. So we wouldn't expect the
	authority at a major meldent such as Gremen:	4	first responder to, for example, stop and treat
5	A. So I think each service has different expectations. For	4 5	
5 6			first responder to, for example, stop and treat
	A. So I think each service has different expectations. For	5	first responder to, for example, stop and treat patients. What we want that first responder to do is to
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6 7 8	A. So I think each service has different expectations. For us, our role within a major incident is obviously to deal with the immediacy of treating patients, ensuring that they're triaged, that they are treated and that	5 6 7 8	first responder to, for example, stop and treat patients. What we want that first responder to do is to get eyes onto the incident, try and feed information back to the emergency operations centre or the special operations centre, depending on whether the incident has
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1	are. So that allows people, even if they're unfamiliar	1	our control room on the incident management desk, and in
2	with a certain type of role actually, it's	2	the course of a significant incident or a major incident
3	a checklist that says: these are the duties you need to	3	being declared, we move that incident into a specialist
4	discharge in that role.	4	operations centre. That channel would be critically
5	So we would expect the information back would be	5	monitored during that period.
6	for us it's I think you've seen reference to	6	Q. You mentioned that the LAS has a link with the MPS CAD.
7	something called METHANE, which is essentially the first	7	We've heard evidence about how you can update the
8	report that we would expect someone to give from	8	other's CAD; is that right? How does that work in
9	an incident site. So that is whether it's a major	9	practice?
10	incident, or we have within our operating procedures	10	A. With the Metropolitan Police Service?
11	declaration of a significant incident, which I can talk	11	Q. Yes.
12	about, if required.	12	A. So, yes, we have the ability to electronically transfer
13	So whether it's a significant or a major incident,	13	messages directly into each other's CAD, so without the
14	the exact location, the type of incident that we've got,	14	need for them to physically contact us. They are just
15	potential hazards, access and egress to the incident,	15	typing messages. So it's actually an electronic link.
16	number of casualties, and the other emergency services	16	So they can provide update information electronically to
17	that are on scene.	17	us.
18	So it's a very quick situational report that tries	18	Q. Can you see their CAD or can you only pass messages?
19	to give us a flavour in terms of the emergency	19	A. No, we don't actually see their CAD, it's just the
20	operations centre and the command teams around what type	20	messages that they're sending us, and that goes into our
21	of incident we're facing.	20	
22	Q. I'll come back and ask you questions later about what	22	log as a message received from the MPS with whatever
	· ·		information they're giving us. We don't see their live
23	happened on the night. I'm just trying to establish the	23	CAD.
24	principles here, but thank you.	24	Q. And they don't see yours either?
25	The next thing in LESLP is to share information	25	A. No.
	Page 65		Page 67
1	4	1	
1	promptly.	1	Q. Is it right that command vehicles are equipped with
2	What methods of communication are in place between	2	Airwave radio as well?
3	the LAS and the LFB?	3	A. That is correct.
4	A. So routinely then we will have interactions with the LFB	4	Q. So a command unit on scene you would also expect to be
5	control room.	5	listening in to that joint emergency services channel?
6	Q. How are those effected?	6	A. Yes.
7	A. They are by phone. We have an electronic CAD,	7	Q. Moving on in LESLP, the next heading is to understand
8	computer-aided dispatch link with the Metropolitan	8	key priorities. You would expect this to happen on
9	Police. We don't have that with the London Fire	9	scene, wouldn't you?
10	Brigade, so we use a standard telephone procedure, both	10	A. Yes.
11	ways.	11	Q. Are there other ways of sharing this information, for
12	We have Airwave radios, so both the London Fire	12	example at Silver or Gold Command level?
13	Brigade well, all the emergency services have Airwave	13	A. So in the first stages of an incident, you'd primarily
14	digital radio technology.	14	be getting that information from the scene, from the
15	There is an emergency services tri-agency channel,	15	actual operational commanders on the ground.
16	[redacted] channel, which is always in operation and is	16	As the incident gets more established, if there's
17	monitored, and critical information can be shared across	17	a decision to create a strategic co-ordination group,
18	that channel.	18	then you might get that information being shared at
19	So there's numerous ways.	19	different levels. But certainly at the beginning of
20	Then obviously when we're on scene, face-to-face	20	an incident, that information will be coming from people
21	communication in terms of the information flow coming	21	on the ground.
22	from our control room and vice versa.	22	Q. Is that when you start to have inter-agency Gold
23	Q. The shared radio, is that monitored on scene as well as	23	meetings, for example?
24	in the control room?	24	A. So on scene, you would be having operational command
		25	meetings. So the three services would be meeting
25	A. So, no, for us, the [redacted] channel is monitored in	23	meetings. So the three services would be meeting
25	•	23	
25	A. So, no, for us, the [redacted] channel is monitored in  Page 66	23	Page 68

1	44h 4-11	1	
1	together, talking about the operational challenges, the	1 2	operations centre.
2	latest situation reports, exchanging that information.	3	Each shift, there are nominated roles which are
3	That information would then come back up through to our		allocated to the watch that are on duty, and that will
4	specialist operations centre, where our tactical	4	include critical loggists, watch managers, dispatchers,
5	commander would be based, and that tactical commander	5	and at the beginning of each shift, those people are
6	then would take anything he or she felt was required to	6	nominated. So it would be a member of control room
7	the Gold meetings.	7	staff that would work under the SOC manager, who would
8	Q. What procedures are in place, then, for communicating	8	be a Bronze-level manager.
9	information learned from other agencies at the scene	9	Q. I think you said the trigger for that is a significant
10	back to control and more widely through the LAS? Is	10	incident.
11	that by radio, is that by phone or CAD?	11	A. Significant or major.
12	A. So it would principally go by radio. Yes, if	12	Q. Could we go on to page 11 of the same document, please.
13	information needs to be disseminated, it would go	13	It says there at (b) that one of the things you
14	through Airwave radio.	14	should do is nominate a single point of contact in each
15	Q. Is the same procedure then in place for communicating	15	control room to establish a method of communication
16	information learned at command level back to the scene,	16	between the different agencies, which could involve
17	so would you have the control room radioing LAS officers	17	creating a telecommunications link or a multi-agency
18	at the scene?	18	interoperable talkgroup.
19	A. Yes, so our well, it would be our specialist	19	Do you know if that was done on the night of the
20	operations centre, absolutely has dedicated radio	20	14th?
21	channels, for not only the resources that are being	21	A. So, the multi-agency interoperable talkgroup, which is
22	sent, but also for the commanders. They're on	22	a channel that I refer to as [redacted], was in
23	a separate radio channel. So, yes, we have that two-way	23	operation because detailed in my statement I do note
24	information flow.	24	that there are the special operations centre pick up
25	Q. Could we pull up LAS00000001, please. We're looking for	25	messages that are coming through on [redacted]. So that
	Page 69		Page 71
	1 age 07		1 age / 1
	<del>-</del>		
1	page 6.	1	channel was live, and indeed that is live 24/7.
1 2	page 6. This is JESIP, which also emphasises effective	1 2	channel was live, and indeed that is live 24/7.  Q. Was there a single point of contact? Was there one
			Q. Was there a single point of contact? Was there one
2	This is JESIP, which also emphasises effective	2	Q. Was there a single point of contact? Was there one person in charge?
2 3	This is JESIP, which also emphasises effective communication.	2 3	<ul><li>Q. Was there a single point of contact? Was there one person in charge?</li><li>A. I could not definitively define if there was a single</li></ul>
2 3 4	This is JESIP, which also emphasises effective communication.  If we flip forward onto page 10 of the same	2 3 4	<ul><li>Q. Was there a single point of contact? Was there one person in charge?</li><li>A. I could not definitively define if there was a single point of contact on that night from</li></ul>
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1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you like Mr Woodrow to read	1	sole use of Airwave and we just provide different radio
2	that? Because I think he is having the same problem as	2	channels to split resources depending on what type of
3	I have	3	incident it is.
4	MS GROGAN: We went a little bit too fast there.	4	I suppose, in reality, the actual amount of times
5	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: There we are. That's better.	5	that we work together as two agencies in a year if
6	(Pause)	6	you take the London Ambulance Service takes around
7	A. Yes.	7	1.9 million emergency calls. Less than 1 per cent of
8	MS GROGAN: Thank you.	8	those calls are actually calls to fire-related issues
9	So it's fair to summarise the policies in this way:	9	from the London Fire Brigade.
10	responding agencies should be in regular communication	10	So our interaction on a day-to-day basis is quite
11	with one another; do you agree?	11	small compared to, for example, our working with the
12	A. That's correct.	12	MPS.
13	Q. Both at the scene and then at a tactical and strategic	13	What you would expect at incidents where we are
14	level.	14	required to work together is that we all work together
15	A. Correct.	15	to establish the JESIP. So JESIP was designed to ensure
16	Q. Responding agencies should have access to key	16	that the three emergency services work more cohesively
17	information about the incident.	17	together, so we would expect that to happen.
18	A. When it's available, yes.	18	Now, clearly there are challenges. There are
19	Q. And they should also have an understanding of the	19	challenges with every plan, that when you try to enact
20	others' activities during the incident?	20	that plan, there are always sets of circumstances which
21	A. Correct.	21	create a challenge.
22	Q. During the course of a major fire, what kind of	22	But I wouldn't say from my experience that we've had
23	information would you expect to be shared between the	23	overarching problems with communication with the London
24	LFB, the MPS and the LAS? You can just give us the key	24	Fire Brigade. We work closely with them and, indeed, we
25	headlines.	25	exercise regularly with them.
	D 72		D 75
	Page 73		Page 75
1	A. Okay. So, actually, from the Fire Brigade, we would	1	Q. Going back to your statement and moving on now to
2	expect the Fire Brigade to be the leading agency for	2	talking about the events of the night.
3	this type of incident. So how much of the building is	3	A. Yes.
4	affected. Do we know how many properties are within the	4	Q. If we pull up your statement at page 6. So that's
5	building? Do we have any idea of casualty numbers? Do	5	LAS00000009.
6	we know any idea of patients that have self-evacuated or	6	A. Yes.
7	have been rescued?	7	Q. You've provided a chronology for the inquiry that sets
8	From the police, our initial expectation from the	8	out key events on the night from the LAS's perspective.
9	police would probably be to manage the scene in terms of	9	Starting at 01.29, that's when the first 999 call
10	the co-ordination of cordons, ensuring that the scene	10	was connected to the LAS, and that was actually from the
11	site is safe.	11	LFB, wasn't it?
12	So they would be the principal things that we'd look	12	A. That's correct.
13	for in the first instance on arrival.	13	Q. I think you've explained that it is usual practice for
14	Q. Going back to the LFB, would you expect them to share	14	the LFB to phone you rather than use any other form of
15	details of their tactics and the way in which they were	15	communication to alert you.
16	intending to fight the fire or to evacuate or not	16	A. Correct.
17	evacuate residents?	17	Q. They do that by way of a 999 call, do they?
18	A. Yes, we would.	18	A. They do.
19	Q. What is the LAS's experience of the reliability of LFB	19	Q. This call was placed about 30 minutes after we now know
20	communication equipment prior to the fire?	20	that the LFB attended the scene.
21	A. Well, the LFB use two different types of communication.	21	Is it normal for that amount of time to pass before
22	So the LFB have a UHF radio system which enables LFB	22	the LFB contacts the LAS?
23	commanders and firefighters to exchange information. We	23	A. No, I think we would reasonably expect to be contacted
24	use our Airwave radios for all of so they have	24	sooner than that.
25	different types of radio communication, where we have	25	Q. We can now look at the transcript of that call, which is
	D 74		D 7/
	Page 74		Page 76

1	INQ00000378.	1	contained within it, would you have expected the LAS to
2	That will just be on the screen rather than in your	2	declare a significant incident at this point?
3	bundle.	3	A. So not directly from this one call. I mean, this call
4	If we could have page 2, please.	4	came in at 01.29.06, and from recollection the emergency
5	So that's the start of the call where the operator	5	operations centre so this would've been a call that
6	answers, and the London Fire Brigade identify	6	was coming in to one call handler. Once that was
7	themselves.	7	identified by the watch managers, then very quickly,
8	If we could move on to page 3, you'll see there's	8	just based on the intelligence from this call, it was
9	some explanation of the location of the event, which	9	the emergency operations centre that declared
10	I'll come back to.	10	a significant. So we didn't wait for anyone to arrive
11	Just at the bottom of the page, the caller tells the	11	on scene, EOC declared it a significant incident, and
12	LAS operator that they've got a 20-pump fire.	12	there were a number of actions as a consequence of that
13	A. Yes.	13	taken.
14		14	Q. Your statement says that the call was triaged through
	Q. Then on page 4, you'll see just below the middle of the	15	
15	page, the operator says:	1	protocol 8.
16	"OPERATOR: Yeah. Bear with me, mate, so you've got	16	A. Yes.
17	a 20-pump fire, persons supporting"	17	Q. Those protocols are used to triage individual patients;
18	But I think that's a mistranscription of "persons	18	is that right?
19	reported":	19	A. Yes, so I guess it's important to be clear about how we
20	"CALLER: He said 25-pump fire now.	20	triage. So every ambulance service in England has one
21	"OPERATOR: 25-pump fire."	21	of two triage systems that are licensed to be used in
22	So during the course of this short call, the LFB	22	England: one of those is NHS pathways, and one of those
23	attendance goes up from a 20-pump fire to a 25-pump	23	is a medical priority dispatch system. The London
24	fire.	24	Ambulance Service uses that triage tool.
25	A. Yes.	25	What that triage tool essentially does is our
	Page 77		Page 79
1	Q. Would an LAS call handler understand the significance of	1	call handlers are non-clinical, so they take information
2	a 20-pump fire when answering a call?	2	from the 999 caller and that will guide them, based on
3	A. Not just based on 20-pump fire. So the persons reported	3	that information, into a set of questions that need to
4	is the bit that is important for us.	4	be asked and responded to with yes and no answers, and
5	So I think what's important, I suppose, to point out	5	then there are some specific questions as you get
6	is that the London Fire Brigade do respond to fire	6	through.
7	incidents in London with large amounts of appliances,	7	The idea is to work through what priority of
8	to, you know, industrial units overnight. So it's not	8	response, based on the information that's being taken
9	uncommon for the LFB to call us to say that they're	9	from the caller, do we need to allocate in terms of
10	dispatching a large amount of appliances or it's, you	10	dispatching the resource.
11	know, a large pump fire. The important things for us is	11	Q. Do the protocols assume that the person on the other end
12	around persons involved.	12	of the phone is either a patient or is reporting
13	But although the call handler is taking this call,	13	a patient?
14	I think what we can draw or what I certainly drew	14	A. Yes, or could be a third-party caller that is passing
15	from reviewing is actually this type of message that	15	information, yes. So we have to go on the information
16	we get for the LFB warranted further action before too	16	that we receive from the call.
17		17	Q. So are there any more general protocols where you're
18	long.  Q. When the dispatcher then decides to dispatch LAS	18	being called to an incident rather than where there is
19		19	one individual patient?
	resources to the scene, is it just the information in		•
20	the 999 call that they take into account?	20	A. Well, so what we will get is something that we call
21	A. Yes.	21	a chief complaint. So the chief complaint will be if
22	Q. As you said, the significant thing in that call is that	22	someone is saying difficulty in breathing, then that
23	persons were reported?	23	will take them to the protocol for difficulty in
24	A. Yes.	24	breathing, and within that chief complaint there will be
25	Q. Based on your review of this call and the information	25	a number of questions that get asked. Based on the
		25	a number of questions that get asked. Based on the $\label{eq:page-80} Page~80$

1	answers to those questions, it will lead to different	1	essentially reading them back our reference.
2	questions, and ultimately, at the end of the protocol,	2	Q. Why do they do that when the LFB can't see the LAS's
3	it will deem a response requirement in terms of the	3	CAD?
4	priority of that patient and the length of time that we	4	A. Sorry?
5	have to respond to that.	5	Q. Why do they do that when the LFB does not have access to
6	So it's quite a complex system. It allocates chief	6	the LAS's CAD?
7	complaint, and then once we have the chief complaint,	7	A. Because if they want to pass us any further information
8	based on what the information is being given to the call	8	in subsequent calls, they can then turn around and say,
9	handler, that then, through the computer-aided dispatch,	9	"In relation to the LAS CAD247", which then we could
10	leads them to a set of questions to eliminate some	10	automatically link to the original call. So that's the
11	conditions and ask further questions.	11	reason why we give that reference.
12	Ultimately, when that protocol is concluded, the	12	Q. So going back to your statement and moving on a bit in
13	determinant is reached and the response is allocated.	13	the chronology so that's back to LAS00000009 on
14	Q. Does the protocol tell you how many resources to	14	page 6 we see at 01.33, the first IRO is dispatched
15	dispatch or is there an element of discretion involved	15	to the scene. Then in the next 5 minutes, I've counted
16	there?	16	up that the LAS dispatches two further ambulances, the
17	A. Yes, so there is an element of discretion involved.	17	London Air Ambulance, four HART operatives you can
18	Q. You say that the incident was classed as a category C2	18	just see that at the bottom of the page.
19	call.	19	A. Yes.
20	A. Yes.	20	Q. And one further incident response officer.
21	Q. What is C2?	21	Do you know the basis upon which the dispatcher
22	A. So not immediately life threatening and would require	22	decided to send that level of resources to the tower?
23	response within 30 minutes. That was the initial triage	23	A. So incident response officers we have on duty 24/7 right
24	of that call.	24	across London. It is standardised procedure for us that
25	I think that's in relation to the fact that there	25	when we receive a call from the London Fire Brigade to
	Page 81		Page 83
1	are no patient details received. So at the time, the	1	a fire with persons reported that an incident response
2	information was that there was a fire-related incident	2	officer is sent.
3	where there were people reported as being involved in	3	In terms of the ambulance and the hazardous area
4	that, but there was no direct clinical information	4	response team, again, for an incident of this type, our
5	regarding to patient.	5	hazardous area response team would automatically be
6	Essentially, the triage system, when you get	6	dispatched to what we would call a fire call.
7	patient-specific information, will so if there had	7	Q. Does the reference to four HART mean four teams or four
8	been someone with severe difficulty in breathing that	8	individuals?
9	was confirmed, clearly that call to that patient	9	A. Four resources.
10	would've been a higher priority. But this was a generic	10	Q. Are resources one person or
11	call with persons reported and it generates a subset or	11	A. No, we have two we have four vehicles. They have
12	a standardised priority, which was a C2.	12	different levels. So we sent a HART responder who was
13	Q. Then it goes to the dispatcher and the dispatcher	13	solo in a car and we sent two in another vehicle. So we
14	decides which resources to send to the incident; is that	14	have two teams on duty, HART teams, 24/7 in London, one
15	correct?	15	based in West London, one based in East London. That's
16	A. Correct.	16	a national asset and we have to have those 12 HART, two
17	Q. On page 9 of the transcript so that's the document	17	teams of six, we have to have those on duty 24/7.
18	that's on the screen now but page 9 you'll see at the	18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And they just attend by car, do
19	end the caller so this is actually the LAS calling,	19	they?
20	I think gives a reference of 247, which is to the LAS	20	A. And bigger vehicles. So they are a team so, for
21	CAD.	21	example, in some types of call, we might send a HART
22	Do you know why they would do that with the LFB?	22	operative to go and provide a situational report, which
23	A. Yes, so that is just confirming to the London Fire	23	means we wouldn't send the whole HART team, we'd hold
24	Brigade what we would call our working CAD, which is the	24	some back. So they just have different methods of
25	information that we've just received from the LFB. It's	25	responding. But essentially they work in two teams of
	D 02		D 04
	Page 82		Page 84

1 Six huffreent vehicles. 2 Six MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you. 3 MS GROCAN: Six, we've been taking breaks about very hour 4 over the lack tow days. The vehicle believe that they were deploying. There was a subsequent ealt. And I think it was jest the area controller putting that intelligence together very quickly and saying this is something that in or fortine and detaring that quickly. 3 HT HR WITNESS: The comfortable. 3 MS GROCAN: Six, we've been taking breaks about very hour 4 pumps that they were deploying. There was a subsequent ealt. And I think it was jest the area controller 5 aspatish when they were deploying. There was a subsequent ealt. And I think it was jest the area controller a saying this is something that in or fortine and detaring that quickly. 4 Six MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll peas on. If you get to lite. 5 Six MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll peas on. If you get to lite. 5 being, just make it charm do well stop. 6 If the make it charm do well stop. 6 If the store could below up the down of lite. 6 If the store could below up the down of lite. 7 a significant insident where the charmon. 8 We can see that on the CAD, so that, MITODIP911 at 19 page 3. 9 If about two-thinks of the way down, it says — 10 If about two-thinks of the way down, it says — 21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think we have to have it expanded below the store of the public outside. 22 A. I can. 23 Or CALL MADE A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT DUE TO INTEL				
so with Cart toodays. In very happy myself to path one to handerine if you like.  SR MARTN MOORE-BUCK: Well, lefs see. How are you feeling, but Woodnow?  Hell Wi MUSS. Proceeding the constitution of the time stage when you think you've had enough for the time being, lost make it clear and then well stage there, if we could blow up the last entity on the action of the stage, then on page 7 of your winess statement, all 41, ingh at the hotton there, if we could blow up the last entity on the action there	1	six in different vehicles.	1	LFB?
over the last two days. The very happy myself to push one to lunchine if you like.  SIR MARTIN MORE-INCK: Well, led's see: How are you feeling, M Wondow?  SIR MARTIN MORE-INCK: Well, led's see: How are you feeling, M Wondow?  SIR MARTIN MORE-INCK: Well pess on. If you get to the stage when you think you've ded noongh for the time of sup when you think you've ded noongh for the time the stage when you think you've ded noongh for the time the stage when you think you've ded noongh for the time the stage when CAD247 - so this medican - was declared a significant includen by the last setting to the scene, that is when CAD247 - so this medican - was declared a significant includen by the last setting to the scene, that is when CAD247 - so this medican - was declared a significant includen by the last setting to the scene, that is when CAD247 - so this medican - was declared a significant includen by the last setting to the scene, that is when CAD247 - so this medican - was declared a significant includen by the last setting to the scene, although they weren't from inside the tower.  So the scene and look at it.  A. Ves.  There is a so it is off at search well as you that swe have to have it expanded before were qual look at it.  A. When him.  Significant incident by the scene, the form the scene and look at it.  There is a so it is off at a servant of the scene and the scene and look at it.  There is a so it is off at a servant of the scene and look at it.  There is a so it is off at a servant of the scene and look at it.  The scene as a servant look at it.	2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.	2	A. So I think it was obviously the information that
5 on to lanchtime flyou like 5 SIR MARTIN MORE-BICK. Well, led's see. How are you 5 feeling, M. Wondow? 8 HILL WITNESS: Preconficiable. 9 SIR MARTIN MORE-BICK. Well pies on If you get to the 5 stage when you think you've had exough for the time 10 stage when you think you've had exough for the time 11 being, air make it clear and how well stop. 12 HIL WITNESS: Okay. Thank you, sir. 13 MS GROGAN: Moving on in the chronology, then, on page 7 of 14 your witness statement, and 14, right at the bottom 15 there, if we could blow up the last entry on the screen, 16 that is when CAD247 — so his inciders — was declared 17 a significant incident by the EOC. 18 We can see that on the CAD3, to that's MET00019931 at 19 page 3. 11 Is about two-thirds of the way down, it says — 12 SIR MARTIN MORE-BICK. I think we have to have it requanded 12 before we try and lock at it. 13 A Man-hm. 14 Page 85 15 A Correct. 16 A Man-hm. 17 A monthum of the way down, it says — 18 NS GROGAN. Hink it is says. 19 CALL MADE A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT DUE TO INTEL 20 There is in So it is 01.44 2 by "KRAIINM!" 21 Based on that information, should it not have been 22 A 1 cm. 23 Q. "CALL MADE A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT DUE TO INTEL ON 24 RAPICAL MADE A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT DUE TO INTEL ON 25 La AC DL a person? 26 A Ves. on AC — I do upsolgube because the London 27 Annihum cervice is find a carryoms. AC will be area 28 centroller, and an area controller is — whitin our 29 centroller, and an area controller is — whitin our 29 centroller, and an area controller is — whitin our 29 centroller, and an area controller is — whitin our 29 centroller, and an area controller is — whitin our 29 centroller, and an area controller is — whitin our 29 centroller, and an area controller is — whitin our 29 centroller, on the is is monon in our emergency 20 in question. 20 (The Carrin our of the CAD is an area 21 that are controller is — whitin our centroller is — whitin our 29 centroller, to that is someone in our emergency 20 in question. 21 The feel of the controller is	3	MS GROGAN: Sir, we've been taking breaks about every hour	3	originally came from the LFB in terms of the number of
6 SR MARTIN MOOR-BRICK: Well, lefs see. How are you 8 THE WITNESS. The comfortable. 9 SIR MARTIN MOOR-BRICK. Well press on. If you get to the 10 stage when you think you've denotagh for the time 11 being, just make it clear and then well stop. 11 THE WITNESS. (Day. Thank) you, sir 12 THE WITNESS. (Day. Thank) you, sir 13 MS GROGAN. Moving on in the chromology, then, on page 7 of 14 your witness statement, at 01.41, right at the bottom 15 there, if we could show up the last carry on the screen, 16 that is when CAD217—so this incident—was declared 16 a significant incident by the BRC. 17 a significant incident by the BRC. 18 We can see that on the CAD, so that's MET0019931 at 19 page 3. 11 grades and the CAD, so that's MET0019931 at 19 page 3. 11 SR MARTIN MOOR-BRICK. I think we have to have it equanded 22 before we your allook at at. 23 MS GROGAN: I think it asps: 24 "CALL MADE A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT DUE TO INTEL" 25 There if is, So if is 01 4.42 by "KRAIINMI". 26 Page 85  Page 85  Page 87  1 Can you see that, M Woodow? 2 A I can. 2 NSTRUCTION OF AC DL. 3 SA CA. 1 do appledge because the London 2 A Yes, of C - 1 do appledge because the London 3 Q "CALL MADE A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT DUE TO INTEL. on 4 NSTRUCTION OF AC DL. 4 SA Yes, of C - 1 do appledge because the London 4 A NSTRUCTION OF AC DL. 5 Is AC DL. a pesson? 6 A Yes, of C - 1 do appledge because the London 7 Annibulance Service is full of acronyms. AC will be area 6 controller, and an area controller is - within our 7 certain parts of geography in Londons, we have 8 controller, and an area controller is - within our 9 page 3. 1 Based on that information, should it not have been 17 declared a major incident frather than a significant incident. 18 within those objects promps, there are controllers 19 page 3. 2 NS there is the LSA Selfmition of a significant incident for the page 2. 2 NS there is the LSA Selfmition of a significant incident. 2 NS The EAS Selfmition of a significant incident is in the LAS 2 NS that is the south of the page 2. 2 NS the page	4	over the last two days. I'm very happy myself to push	4	pumps that they were deploying. There was a subsequent
7 seeling, M. Woodrow? 8 THE WTINES. Proceeding the control of the WTINES. Proceeding the control of the WTINES. Proceeding the control of the work of	5	on to lunchtime if you like.	5	call. And I think it was just the area controller
8 HTE WITNESS: Pincomfortable. 9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll press on. If you get to the stage when you faink; you've had arough for the time 10 stage when you faink; you've had arough for the time 11 being, just make it clear and then we'll stop. 12 THE WITNESS Claay. These you, sir. 13 MS GROCAN: Mowing on in the chromology; then, on page 7 of 14 your witness statement, at 01-41, right at the bottom 15 there, if we could blow up the last earny on the screen, 16 that is when CAD27 – so this incident — was declared 17 a significant incident by the POC. 18 We can see that on the CAD, so that's MET00019931 at 19 page 3. 20 If shout two-flinks of the way down, it says — 21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Unink we have to have it expanded before a way and look at at. 22 before we try and look at at. 23 MS GROCAN: think it says: 24 "CALJ MADE A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT DUE TO INTEL" 25 There it is. So it is 014.142 by "REAHNMI". 26 Page 85  1 Can you see that, Mr Woodrow? 2 A. I can. 2 Page 85  1 Can you see that, Mr Woodrow? 3 Q. "CALL MADE A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT DUE TO INTEL" 4 A. No, I don't believe at that time that it should have been declared a major incident rather than a significant incident. Proceeding free. 3 Mithin those dispatch groups, AC will be area of controller, and an area controller is — which in our certain parts of geography in London so, we have one correspond year of the controller, and that are controller power than those storace that are available in those secre, although they weren't from inside the tower. 4 A. Ves.  4 C. They were from members of the public outside. 5 A. Correct. 6 Q. The definition of a significant incident is in the LAS incident manuals of the public outside. 18 A. Mrn-lum. 19 Q. So there is the LAS definition of a significant incident. 18 It says there that: 19 You have been devacuation." 19 Preproms Reported Frie calls 6/10 pumps and above or large scale evacuation." 19 Page 87  10 Language of the that is special and the controller is — which in our declared a major incident	6	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, let's see. How are you	6	putting that intelligence together very quickly and
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll peas on. If you get to the stage when you finkly you've had enough for the time  being, jast make it clear and then we'll stop.  If the WITNISS Okay, Thank you, sir.  MS GROGAN: Moving on in the chronology, then, on page 7 of that is should have weren't from inside there, if we could blow up the last entry on the sereen, the that is when CAD247—so his incident—was declared a significant incident by the BOC.  We can see that on the CAD, so that's METO0019931 at page 3.  If is about two-thirds of the way down, it says—  If is about two-thirds of the way down, it says—  If sa Bout two-thirds of the way down, it says—  If sa Bout two-thirds of the way down, it says—  There it is. So it is 01.41.42 by "KRAHNMI".  Page 85  Can you see that, Mr Woodrow?  A. Yes,  A. Mm-hm.  Page 87  Can you see that, Mr Woodrow?  A. Yes,  Sadd A. I can.  Can you see that, Mr Woodrow?  A. Yes,  A. Whish stage, this was a 25-pump fire. We learnt that firm the 99 call.  Page 87  Can you see that, Mr Woodrow?  A. Yes,  Sadd Can you see that, Mr Woodrow?  A. Yes,  Page 87  Dead of that information, should it not have been declared a major incident trainer than a significant incident.  So A. Can you see that, Mr Woodrow?  A. Yes,  Sadd Can you see that, Mr Woodrow?  A. Yes,  Based on that information, should it not have been declared a major incident rather than a significant incident?  A. No, I don't believe at that time that it should have been.  Centroller, and an area cantroller is - within on the seed of the cantral of a building fire.  This is quite difficult around—in some aspects, this is where the LFB will attend, for example, and narea cantroller is - within the incident or some aspects, this is where the LFB will attend, for example, and narea cantroller is - within the incident or some spects, this is where the rare a persona involved at that are centrolling resources that are available in that are centrolling resources that are available in that are centrolling resources that are available in contro	7	feeling, Mr Woodrow?	7	saying this is something that is not routine and
stage when you think you've had enough for the time  11 being, just make it clear and then well stop.  12 HIB WITNESS: Clast, Thank you, sir.  13 MS GROGAN: Moving on in the chromology, then, on page 7 of  14 your witness statement, at 01.41, right at the bottom  15 there, if we could blow up the last entry on the screen.  16 that is when CAD2AT – so this incident – was declared  17 a significant incident by the IFOC.  18 We can see that on the CAD, so that's MET00019931 at  19 page 3  18 MRTIN MOORE-BICK: I think we have to have it expanded  20 hefers we try and look at in.  21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think we have to have it expanded  22 hefers we try and look at in.  23 MS GROGAN: I think it says:  24 "CALL MADE A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT DUE TO INTEL"  25 There it is. So it is 0.14.42 by "KRAHNMI".  26 A Lean.  3 Q. "CALL MADE A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT DUE TO INTEL"  27 Page 85  28 A Ves.  29 Page 87  20 Based on that information, should it not have been declared an major incident rather than a significant incident.  29 emergency operations centre, we have dispatch groups for certain parts of goography is I andown some the surface controller, and an area controller is – within our emergency operations centre, we have dispatch groups for central parts of goography is I and one was the area controller of controller, so that is someone in our emergency operations centre.  20 In the controller of the way down, it says.  21 Sinch Based on that information, should it not have been declared an major incident rather than a significant incident.  22 Based on that information of a building free.  23 This is quite difficult around – in some aspects, this is why we've created, through learning, the declaration of a significant incident.  24 Can be a read of the controller of the way down, it is an area controller on the central parts would be deemed as a major incident for us.  25 The controller, so that is someone in our emergency operations centre.  26 The part of the controller of the way of the controller of the wa	8	THE WITNESS: I'm comfortable.	8	declaring that quickly.
libering just make it clear and then we'll stop.    He WINNES: Okay: Hunk, you, sir.   MS GROCAN: Moving on in the chronology, then, on page 7 of your witness statement, at 01-14, right at the bottom there, if we could blow up the last curry on the serece, that it when CAD247 - so this incident — was declared a significant incident by the FOC.	9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll press on. If you get to the	9	Q. So we can see in your chronology we don't need to
12 THE WITNESS O Bay. Thank you, sir. 13 MS GROGAN: Moving on in the chronology, then, on page 7 of 14 your writness statement, at 01-41, right at the bottom 15 there, if we could blow up the last earry on the screen, 16 that is when CAD247 - so this incident - was declared 17 a significant incident by the EOC. 18 We can see that on the CAD, so that's MET00019931 at 19 page 3. 20 If's about two-chinds of the way down, it says - 21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think we have to have it expanded 22 before we try and look at it. 23 MS GROGAN: 1 dim it says: 24 "CALL MADE A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT DUE TO INTEL" 25 There it is. So it is 01.41.42 by "KRAIINM".  26 Page 85  1 Can you see that, Mr Woodrow? 2 A. I can. 3 Q. "CALL MADE A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT DUE TO INTEL. On 1 NISTRUCTION OF AC DL." 2 Is AN OR I do a pelogise because the London 3 NISTRUCTION OF AC DL." 4 A. Yes, so AC - I do a pelogise because the London 4 Anthanace Service is full of a croaryms. AC will be area 8 controller, and an area controller is - within our 9 emergency operations centre, we have dispatch groups for 10 certain parts of geography in London so, we have 11 south-teart an north-west London. 12 one-the-curtal, north-west London. 13 Within those dispatch groups, there are centrollers 14 that are controller rs, we have dispatch groups for 15 central parts of geography in London so, we have 16 controller, so that is someone in our emergency 17 operations centre. 18 Lebeve, looking at that document, that that 19 would've been area controller rs - within our 20 controller, so that is someone in our emergency 21 operations centre. 22 A Person Sectors. Over-receing those sectors is an area 23 our you say in your statement that this decision was made 24 because of the nature of 999 calls and information that 25 bloes certors. Over-receing those sectors is an area 26 controller, we have dispatch groups for 27 controller, and an area controller rs - within our 28 controller, and an area controller rs - within our 29 controller, and an area controll	10	stage when you think you've had enough for the time	10	pull it up by that stage you'd had four 999 calls
13 MS GROGAN: Morting on in the chronology, then, on page 7 of 14 your witness statement, at 01 41, right at the bottom 15 there, if we could blow up the lact enry on the screen, 16 that is when CAD247 – so this incident — was declared 17 a significant incident by the EOC. 18 We can see that on the CAD, so that's METO0019931 at 19 page 3. 19 If's about two-thirds of the way down, it sups — 20 If's about two-thirds of the way down, it sups — 21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think we have to have it cepanded 22 before we try and look at it. 22 "CALL MADE A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT DUE TO INTEL" 23 MS GROGAN: I think: I staps: 24 "CALL MADE A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT DUE TO INTEL" 25 There it is. So it so 0.1.1.2 by "KRAHNMI".  26 Page 85  1 Can you see that, Mr Woodrow? 2 A. I can. 2 Q. "CALL MADE A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT DUE TO INTEL ON 3 NSTRUCTION OF AC D.L." 4 A. Yes. 2 A. Yes. 2 Based on that information, should it not have been declared a major incident rather than a significant incident? 3 A. No. I don't believe at that time that it should have been. 3 Controller, and an area controller is — within our controller, and an area controller is — within our semence yo operations certire. 3 Within those dispatch groups, there are controllers that are controller, root and is sentence in our emergency operations centre. 4 Delieve, looking at that document, that that would've been area controller Pavid Laird on the evening in question. 4 Delieve, looking at that document, that that would've been area controller Pavid Laird on the evening in question. 4 Delieve, looking at that document, that that would've been area controller pavid Laird on the evening in question. 5 Delieve, looking at that document, that that would've been area controller pavid Laird on the evening in question. 5 Delieve position, and that this decision was made because of the nature of 999 calls and information that the special operations centre. 5 Decience of the nature of 999 calls and information that we would normally do to, you know, a routine incid	11	being, just make it clear and then we'll stop.	11	relating to the scene, although they weren't from inside
your winces statement, at 01.41, right at the bottom there, if we could blow up the last entry on the screen, there, if we could blow up the last entry on the screen, there, if we could blow up the last entry on the screen, there, if we could blow up the last entry on the screen, there, if we could blow up the last entry on the screen, there, if we could blow up the last entry on the screen, there, if we could blow up the last entry on the screen, there is we will consider the screen, there is we controller. It was a significant tincident to incident manual so that's LAS00000008 at page 21.  A. Mrn-hm.  20 If a shout two-thirds of the way down, it says —  11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think we have to have it expanded 22 before we try and look at it. 23 MS GROGAN: I think it says: 24 "CALI MADE A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT DUE TO INTEL	12	THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you, sir.	12	the tower.
there, if we could blow up the last entry on the screen, that is when CAD247—so this incident — was declared a significant incident by the EOC.  We can see that on the CAD, so that's MET00019931 at page 3.  If sabout two-thirds of the way down, it says — 20 in incident. Moore before we try and look at it.  Page 85  Can you see that, Mr Woodrow?  A Lean.  Can you see that, Mr Woodrow?  A Lean.  InSTRUCTION OF AC DL.  B AC DL a persor?  A No, I don't believe at that time that it should have been declared a major incident fairer than a significant incident. Seen we were receiving information of a building fire. This is why we've created, through learning, the declaration of a significant incident. So in the LAS definition of a significant incident. Is any there that it is a significant incident. Is any there are controller as a significant incident. Seen the LAS definition of a significant incident. Is any there that:  It says there that:  It	13	MS GROGAN: Moving on in the chronology, then, on page 7 of	13	A. Yes.
that is when CAD247 — so this incident — was declared a significant incident by the EOC. If a significant incident by the EOC. If a sout two-thirds of the way down, it says — If a about two-thirds of the way down, it says — If sa about two-thirds of the way down, it says — If sa about two-thirds of the way down, it says — If sa about two-thirds of the way down, it says — If sa about two-thirds of the way down, it says — If sa about two-thirds of the way down, it says — If sa about two-thirds of the way down, it says — If sa about two-thirds of the way down, it says — If says there that: If says ther	14	your witness statement, at 01.41, right at the bottom	14	Q. They were from members of the public outside.
17 a significant incident by the FOC.  18 We can see that on the CAD, so that's MET00019931 at 19 page 3.  20 It's about two-thirds of the way down, it says  21 SIR MARTIN MOOKE-BICK: I think we have to have it expanded 22 before we try and look at it.  22 before we try and look at it.  23 MS GROGAN: I think it says:  24 "CALL MADE A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT DUE TO INTEL"  25 There it is. So it is 01.414 by "KRAHNMI".  Page 85  1 Can you see that, Mr Woodrow?  4 A. I can.  3 Q "CALL MADE A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT DUE TO INTEL.ON  4 INSTRUCTION OF AC DL."  5 Is ACD La person?  6 A. Yes, so AC — I do apologise because the London  7 Ambulance Service is full of acronyms. AC will be area controller; and an area controller is whith nour emergency operations centre, we have dispatch groups for certain parts of geography in London so, we have 101 controller, and an area controller is online at 14 that are controller, and an area courted is a within our emergency operations centre, we have dispatch groups for out-central, north-west London.  3 Within those dispatch groups, there are controllers  4 that are controller as out-these at London, north-west London.  3 Within those dispatch groups, there are controllers  4 that are controller to what is someone in our emergency  5 in question.  2 Q. You say in your statement that that that would not be deemed as a major incident for us.  3 So some of the learning was that in the initial stages, if you think there is potential for an incident, which essentially changes the way that we're dealing with that incident up until the point that we can actually get better intelligened the incident response involved as incident do is, for example, to take that incident of our emergency operations centre. We send more resource than of our emergency operations centre. But that thins decision was made 23 on you statement that this decision was made 2	15	there, if we could blow up the last entry on the screen,	15	A. Correct.
18 We can see that on the CAD, so that's MET00019931 at 19 page 3. 19 page 3. 20 It's about two-thirds of the way down, it says — 20 It's about two-thirds of the way down, it says — 21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK. I think we have to have it expanded 22 before we try and look at it. 21 It says there that: 22 "CALL MADE A SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT DUE TO INTEL" 24 By Tkin stage, this was a 25-pump fire. We learnt that from the 999 call. 25 There it is. So it is 01.41.42 by "KRAHENMI". 25 Based on that information, should it not have been declared a major incident rather than a significant incident. 3 incident? 3 incident? 3 incident? 4 N. Yes, so AC — 1 do apologise because the London 4 Net STRICTION OF AC DL." 4 So CDL a person? 5 been. We were receiving information of a building fire. 4 N. Yes, so AC — 1 do apologise because the London 5 with what London, south-east London, south-ea	16	that is when CAD247 so this incident was declared	16	Q. The definition of a significant incident is in the LAS
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10 certain parts of geography in London so, we have 11 south-west London, south-east, 11 at all and there are a large amount of pumps dispatched 12 north-central, north-west London. 13 Within those dispatch groups, there are controllers 14 that are controlling resources that are available in 15 those sectors. Overseeing those sectors is an area 16 controller, so that is someone in our emergency 17 operations centre. 18 I believe, looking at that document, that that 19 would've been area controller David Laird on the evening 19 in question. 20 G. He's a relatively senior person within the EOC? 21 But the things that a declaration of a significant 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. You say in your statement that this decision was made 24 because of the nature of 999 calls and information that 25 had been reported. Was that the information from the 26 at all and there are a large amount of pumps dispatched 27 to that incident. But that would not be deemed as 28 a major incident for us. 29 So some of the learning was that in the initial 29 stages, if you think there is potential for an incident 20 escalate, we've now created within the incident 21 response plan something called a significant incident, 22 which essentially changes the way that we're dealing 23 with that incident up until the point that we can 24 actually get better intelligence from the scene. 25 But the things that a declaration of a significant 26 incident do is, for example, to take that incident out 27 of our emergency operations centre, put it into the 28 special operations centre. We send more resource than 29 we would normally do to, you know, a routine incident.	9	emergency operations centre, we have dispatch groups for	9	are times where the LFB will attend, for example,
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Page 86 Page 88	25	had been reported. Was that the information from the	25	• •
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So we start to enhance that response at an early 1 1 Q. So that's a 12-minute response time between first 2 2 stage by defining it as a significant incident. dispatch and arrival. 3 3 Q. Was the LAS aware at this time that the police had Is that a reasonable time, in your experience? 4 already declared a major incident at 01.32? 4 5 A. No, we were not. 5 Q. When deciding who to dispatch to the scene, would the 6 Q. Is that the sort of key information that you would 6 LAS look to see who was closest? 7 expect the MPS to have told the LAS when they made their 7 A. So in terms of officers, yes, they're dispatched 8 decision? 8 differently. In terms of the actual ambulance resource, 9 9 A. So we would've expected that information to have been our ambulance resource is tracked, is on electronic 10 conveved to us, ves. 10 tracking, and so the allocators for resource would press 11 Q. Was the shared Airwave channel 3 up and running at this 11 a suggestion button, and what the CAD system does is 12 12 take the GPS co-ordinates of where the call is and then 13 13 A. It would've been. does a scan around and gives the allocator or the 14 Q. So that's a route by which they could've communicated it 14 dispatcher the list of the nearest resources. 15 15 So, yes. 16 16 Q. How would you expect those different LAS personnel A. Yes. 17 Q. Would having that information about the MPS's decision 17 arriving on scene to liaise with one another? have made a difference to the LAS's decision? 18 18 A. So I think obviously the first officer on scene, they 19 A. Depending on the information that the Metropolitan 19 would essentially assume the role of operational 20 20 Police Service would've passed with that message, commander, and they would then look -- well, the first 21 because it is possible for our individual services to 21 thing they would do is report back and give a report 22 22 declare what they deem to be a major incident for their back into our emergency operations centre. They would 23 23 then look to put, depending on what they'd seen, the individual organisation. 24 But for us as, you know, a category 1 responder, 24 relevant structures in place to manage that. So 25 25 allocating primary command roles, they would be looking principally our role within a major incident is the Page 89 Page 91 1 1 in terms of suitable access and egress points for triage and treatment of patients. It's not always the 2 case that if the Metropolitan Police Service declare 2 resources, so setting up a rendezvous point. They would 3 3 do that very quickly in the first few minutes of a major incident, we would deem it to be such 4 4 an incident from a health perspective. 5 It sounds as if I'm not being clear on the question. 5 Then what they would look to do is to find out where 6 I think major incident declaration is certainly 6 the other emergency services are in terms of their 7 7 command and try to get further information. an important -- but what we would've looked for was the 8 reason. So we would've expected -- when a major 8 Q. Would the other LAS personnel, such as paramedics and 9 9 HART officers, know in advance that Laurence Ioannou had incident is declared -- and all of the doctrine refer to 10 this -- what you expect of the person that is declaring 10 assumed the role of Bronze medic? 11 a major incident is to give you that METHANE report, 11 A. So they wouldn't know the name of the individual, but 12 12 they would obviously -- you know, the fact that we've which is very high level but it describes the reasons 13 for the declaration. 13 got Bronze medic, Bronze medic would be giving 14 14 instructions back to EOC in terms of: can you tell I think, based on that information, that could've 15 well influenced the decision, but of course we didn't 15 ambulances where the rendezvous point is? And that 16 16 information -- in our ambulance vehicles, we have mobile receive that information. 17 Q. Moving on again in the chronology, the first LAS 17 data terminals. So there's just a lot of data gets 18 resource on scene arrived at 01.45, and that was Y251. 18 transferred onto a screen. That information would be 19 This is on page 8 of your statement. 19 updated through to crews based on the information that's 20 A. Yes. 20 coming back from the scene and requests for, you know, 21 Q. That was a HART officer, and shortly afterwards 21 rendezvous points and directions and where crews are to 22 an advanced paramedic arrives on scene and then the 22 head to. 23 first incident response officer, Laurence Ioannou, says 23 Q. HART don't have access to MDTs, is that right, in their 24 he arrived at 01.49. 24 vehicles? 25 25 A. So HART on that particular night, so the vehicles that A. Yes.

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1	HART were in, were not MDT vehicles, they had satellite	1	because I was not actually in the specialist operations
2	navigation. But what we have on the Airwave radios is	3	centre when that happened.
3	the ability to pass information in terms of messages	4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, I suppose one could ask: does
4	down on their Airwave radio, in text message as well as	5	it look like a long delay or does it look the sort of
5	voice.	6	time you'd expect?  A. So from my experience in terms of doing what we need to
6	Q. Do people on the scene have remote access to the CAD or		A. So from my experience in terms of doing what we need to
7	is that just something that exists in the control room?	7	do to get — these things do take time, so I wouldn't
8	A. No, the CAD is just the computer-aided dispatch system	8 9	say that that was unreasonable. And to be honest, the
9	that is used within the emergency operations centre.		information that we're passing to the LFB actually
10	Q. We can see from the transcript of that initial 999	10	doesn't essentially impact anything that the LFB were
11	call we don't have to pull it up that there was	11	doing. So this is really more of a courtesy message to
12	some confusion initially over the postcode and you've		say that we have upgraded that incident and to let them
13	mentioned that in your statement.	13 14	know that we're responding accordingly.
14	A. Yes.		MS GROGAN: The declaration of a significant incident
15	Q. Resources were initially sent to SW11 instead of W11.	15	doesn't appear to be recorded on CAD247. If it would
16	In that call, the LAS handler refers to yet another	16	help you, I can pull up the page that deals with that
17	address that doesn't match.	17	time period.
18	Is there a problem with identifying addresses on LAS	18	A. Yes, please.
19	systems?	19	Q. So that's MET00019931, page 4.
20	A. No, this was a user error. The address was incorrectly	20	(Pause)
21	inputted into the CAD, which is why south-west 11 was	21	We'll wait for it to come up on the screen for you.
22	inputted instead of west 11, which is why a different	22	A. Okay.
23	location was coming up on the gazetteer.	23	Q. So if you just take a second to refamiliarise yourself
24	Q. Do you know whether that confusion over the address	24 25	with that page, Mr Woodrow.
25	caused any delay in getting LAS personnel to the tower?	25	A. Yes.
	Page 93		Page 95
1	A. I don't believe it did.	1	Q. Can you see anywhere on that page where the significant
2	Q. Going back to your chronology on page 9 of your	2	incident is logged?
3	statement, at 01.52, you say that the LAS updated the	3	It seems to be earlier, so it may be an error in
4	LFB by phone that the LAS had declared a significant	4	your statement, at 01.47.
5	incident.	5	A. Yes.
6	A. Yes.	6	Q. It says, "SIGNIFICANT PAGING INITIATED". Is that
7	Q. That's 10 minutes after the declaration was made within	7	a significant incident?
8	the LAS.	8	A. Yes. So once the significant incident is declared,
9	A. Correct.	9	that, as I say, then sets off a number of actions. One
10	Q. Do you know why it took 10 minutes to relay this	10	of those actions is then to page out that a significant
11	information?	11	incident has been declared to command groups.
12	A. Well, I wasn't there, so I can't definitively tell you.	12	Q. The update to the LFB is not recorded on the CAD.
13	I think probably from the declaration what we would be	13	A. No, it doesn't appear to be on that page, no.
14	doing is taking the steps that we need to take in terms	14	Q. Would you expect it to be?
15	of the actions that the emergency operations centre	15	A. Yes, I would.
16	could take. So as I've explained previously, the	16	Q. There is an entry at 01.52 that says, "METPOL AWARE NO
17	specialist operations centre would be opened up, people	17	REF PASSED".
18	would be moved into that room. I think that's probably	18	Is that a reference to informing the Met Police
19	just a gap of getting people settled and then obviously	19	about the significant incident?
20	updating the LFB that we'd taken those actions.	20	A. Yes.
21	Q. Should it have been communicated sooner?	21	Q. What does it mean when it says "NO REF PASSED"?
22	A. I think that's impossible for me to say. I think what	22	A. So no reference passed, so no additional CAD, no
23	I would say is that it is imperative that we get that	23	reference, no new CAD, just associated with the
24	information across to partners as soon as is	24	original.
25	practicable. I can't answer that question specifically	25	Q. When the LAS informed the LFB that it had declared
	Page 94		Page 96

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1	a significant incident, do you know if any other	1	and I think that's the reason in terms of the comment
2	information was shared with the LFB at that time?	2	regarding smoke inhalation, in terms of actually the
3	A. No, I don't. I would suggest from previous experience	3	integrity of the internal of the building had not been
4	it would've been just a very quick call to say that we'd	4	penetrated at that time.
5	• • •	5	Q. So in your experience, would that have affected his
	declared a significant incident.	6	decision-making about where, for example, to set up
6	Q. Would the LFB know what that meant?	7	
7	A. Yes.		a triage point or how many people to have dealing with
8	Q. Moving topics to liaison with the LFB on scene.	8	triage and issues such as that?
9	We know that you weren't there on the night until	9	A. No, I don't think so. So I think that comment doesn't
10	later, but please answer these questions in light of	10	influence the incident response officers. So the
11	your general experience. If you don't know the answer	11	incident response officer, by nature of the fact that
12	then please do say.	12	he's declared a significant incident, is already into
13	Laurence Ioannou says that when he arrived at scene,	13	setting up the normal procedures that we would expect
14	he was not sure who was in charge for the LFB.	14	them to do.
15	Would you expect that sort of information to be	15	So that doesn't influence his decision to do
16	available to an IRO, so would they be told in advance	16	anything differently at that time.
17	who to look for?	17	Q. Paul Hammond, who is another member of LAS personnel who
18	A. So an incident response officer would look for officers,	18	attended the scene on the night, says that
19	so officers and officers' tabards. So they would look	19	Laurence Ioannou decided to keep the incident as
20	for the incident commander by the nature of the tabard.	20	a significant incident because the LFB said they thought
21	I think when our incident response officer arrived	21	the fire was superficial.
22	on scene and actually was looking at the east aspect of	22	I can pull up that reference for you. It's
23	the building, saw a number of LFB personnel who were	23	MET00014408 at page 4.
24	officers and officers are denoted by the fact that	24	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Which part would you like to look
25	they wear a different colour helmet and that was	25	at?
	Page 97		Page 99
	1 1 100 00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	,	MC CD CCAN THE ALL THE TELL THE ALL THE
1	where the IRO first went to see whether he could get	1	MS GROGAN: It's the bottom paragraph, I think. Is that
2	information around who was commanding the incident.	2	right?
2 3	information around who was commanding the incident.  Q. If we pull up Mr Ioannou's statement, MET00010862, and	2 3	right? Sorry, that's not the right reference.
2 3 4	information around who was commanding the incident.  Q. If we pull up Mr Ioannou's statement, MET00010862, and page 5 of that statement.	2 3 4	right?  Sorry, that's not the right reference.  Could you zoom out again and I'll just find the
2 3 4 5	information around who was commanding the incident.  Q. If we pull up Mr Ioannou's statement, MET00010862, and page 5 of that statement.  It's just that first paragraph you've mentioned his	2 3 4 5	right?  Sorry, that's not the right reference.  Could you zoom out again and I'll just find the right bit.
2 3 4 5 6	information around who was commanding the incident.  Q. If we pull up Mr Ioannou's statement, MET00010862, and page 5 of that statement.  It's just that first paragraph you've mentioned his description of having seen a group of firefighters near	2 3 4 5 6	right? Sorry, that's not the right reference. Could you zoom out again and I'll just find the right bit. (Pause)
2 3 4 5 6 7	information around who was commanding the incident.  Q. If we pull up Mr Ioannou's statement, MET00010862, and page 5 of that statement.  It's just that first paragraph you've mentioned his description of having seen a group of firefighters near the east face of the building.	2 3 4 5 6 7	right?  Sorry, that's not the right reference.  Could you zoom out again and I'll just find the right bit.  (Pause)  Sorry, I think the reference in my notes are wrong.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	information around who was commanding the incident.  Q. If we pull up Mr Ioannou's statement, MET00010862, and page 5 of that statement.  It's just that first paragraph you've mentioned his description of having seen a group of firefighters near the east face of the building.  He says there:	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	right? Sorry, that's not the right reference. Could you zoom out again and I'll just find the right bit. (Pause) Sorry, I think the reference in my notes are wrong. I'll pull out the correct reference later and perhaps we
2 3 4 5 6 7	information around who was commanding the incident.  Q. If we pull up Mr Ioannou's statement, MET00010862, and page 5 of that statement.  It's just that first paragraph you've mentioned his description of having seen a group of firefighters near the east face of the building.  He says there:  "There were several other fire fighters still	2 3 4 5 6 7	right?  Sorry, that's not the right reference.  Could you zoom out again and I'll just find the right bit.  (Pause)  Sorry, I think the reference in my notes are wrong.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	information around who was commanding the incident.  Q. If we pull up Mr Ioannou's statement, MET00010862, and page 5 of that statement.  It's just that first paragraph you've mentioned his description of having seen a group of firefighters near the east face of the building.  He says there:	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	right? Sorry, that's not the right reference. Could you zoom out again and I'll just find the right bit. (Pause) Sorry, I think the reference in my notes are wrong. I'll pull out the correct reference later and perhaps we can come back to my question so I can let you see the evidence.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	information around who was commanding the incident.  Q. If we pull up Mr Ioannou's statement, MET00010862, and page 5 of that statement.  It's just that first paragraph you've mentioned his description of having seen a group of firefighters near the east face of the building.  He says there:  "There were several other fire fighters still	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	right? Sorry, that's not the right reference. Could you zoom out again and I'll just find the right bit. (Pause) Sorry, I think the reference in my notes are wrong. I'll pull out the correct reference later and perhaps we can come back to my question so I can let you see the evidence. So we'll pause that.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	information around who was commanding the incident.  Q. If we pull up Mr Ioannou's statement, MET00010862, and page 5 of that statement.  It's just that first paragraph you've mentioned his description of having seen a group of firefighters near the east face of the building.  He says there:  "There were several other fire fighters still standing there. I walked over to them. Someone in a white hat and commander tabard then said 'It's not as bad as it looks'. 'We believe it is an external fire	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	right? Sorry, that's not the right reference. Could you zoom out again and I'll just find the right bit. (Pause) Sorry, I think the reference in my notes are wrong. I'll pull out the correct reference later and perhaps we can come back to my question so I can let you see the evidence.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	information around who was commanding the incident.  Q. If we pull up Mr Ioannou's statement, MET00010862, and page 5 of that statement.  It's just that first paragraph you've mentioned his description of having seen a group of firefighters near the east face of the building.  He says there:  "There were several other fire fighters still standing there. I walked over to them. Someone in a white hat and commander tabard then said 'It's not as bad as it looks'. 'We believe it is an external fire and has not penetrated internally'."  Mr Ioannou says in light of that information he was expecting to deal with patients with smoke inhalation only.  You can't answer for him, obviously, but in general, would that sort of information affect the LAS decisions about how to set up on scene and what resources to deploy?  A. So I believe that we would be going to the London Fire Brigade for that specific advice around the type of incident that we were dealing with.  From my experience, that would've played into	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	right?  Sorry, that's not the right reference.  Could you zoom out again and I'll just find the right bit.  (Pause)  Sorry, I think the reference in my notes are wrong.  I'll pull out the correct reference later and perhaps we can come back to my question so I can let you see the evidence.  So we'll pause that.  Mr Ioannou then first meets with AC Roe from the LFB at 02.23, which is over 30 minutes after Mr Ioannou arrived on scene.  Would you expect liaison between on-scene commanders to happen earlier than that?  A. Ideally, yes.  Q. Is the only way of them communicating with one another on scene to go and find each other in person or is there a way of doing it via radio or some other way?  A. The normal way would've been to go and identify that person face-to-face at the command unit.  Q. Other witnesses describe similar issues with being unable to locate LFB staff. For example, Maria Conyers.

1	was virtually nonexistent in her view, that the LAS	1	are currently no patients. Due to the information from
2	could not locate the LFB safety officer early in the	2	the LFB Commander Lawrence has kept it as a significant
3	night and that they would've been assisted by an LFB	3	incident."
4	counterpart in contact and relaying messages that they	4	Just looking at the information that he received
5	received.	5	so he's been told they think it's superficial and that
6	We've been through the policies that emphasise the	6	there are currently no patients do you think at that
7	importance of communication between agencies.	7	stage it was reasonable to keep the incident as
8	Would you expect there to be better communication on	8	a significant incident?
9	site between the LAS and LFB than as described by	9	
10	Ms Conyers?	10	A. So I think the incident response officer weighed up the
11	A. So I think we have to contextualise this incident. It	11	information from the lead agency. He would've taken
12	was unprecedented in terms of its nature and its size.	12	that information as expert advice from the lead agency,
13	•	13	and I believe in terms of his overall decision-making
	It undoubtedly was a very complex incident in terms of	14	and the fact that, actually, there were currently no
14	not just the type, but the other factors that were		patients, and, you know, we had sent a predetermined
15	involved in the management of this incident.	15	attendance, at that time he deemed it reasonable to keep
16	It is clear that communications were one of those	16	it at a significant incident.
17	challenges that night, and there are numerous references	17	Q. Is the fact of there being no patients a major factor in
18	to people trying to attain situational awareness.	18	decision-making?
19	I just think on the actual night, that was just very	19	A. I wouldn't say it was a major factor, but it would've
20	difficult tactically to be able to achieve.	20	been a factor. From recollection, IRO Ioannou also
21	So in a perfect world, yes, you would expect	21	reflects on an incident of a fire previously where it
22	communication to have been much better than it appeared	22	was declared as a major incident and there were three
23	to have been on that night, but that has to be taken	23	patients treated.
24	into the context of the operating environment that	24	So I think in his mind he was trying to put all of
25	people were working in and the dynamic environment of	25	this situational awareness, his experience from previous
	Page 101		Page 103
	1 480 101		1 486 100
1	there were things ever-changing on scene that night, and	1	incidents and come up with that option. And based on
1 2	there were things ever-changing on scene that night, and I think that all contributed to those challenges with		incidents and come up with that option. And based on that information, he took that decision.
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2	I think that all contributed to those challenges with communication.	2	that information, he took that decision.  Q. I have one more topic that I think we can get through
2 3	I think that all contributed to those challenges with communication.  Q. So practically speaking, then, does Maria Conyers's	2 3 4	that information, he took that decision.  Q. I have one more topic that I think we can get through before lunch, which is the LAS's declaration of a major
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1	officers, hospital liaison officers deployed to	1	the Airwave radios, they were retrieved from the vehicle
2	appropriate hospitals, HART and central operations and	2	and they were distributed to other key members of our
3	equipment support vehicles.	3	response.
4	Does that sound about right?	4	So in terms of for the Bronze operational
5	A. That's correct.	5	commander, did he have a vehicle where he could get in
6	Q. I've taken that from the LAS's policies.	6	and sit down and have meetings? No, he didn't. But,
7	Is it right that a command support vehicle was	7	actually, that didn't stop him having meetings, and
8	dispatched but could not get close to the scene? Do you	8	indeed his communication with his command team in the
9	recall that from the evidence?	9	roles, it is very clear that there was good
10	A. Yes. So there was a particular challenge. There was	10	communication between Mr Ioannou and the rest of the
11	a general challenge throughout that incident in terms of	11	command teams.
12	physically being able to access with vehicles close	12	Q. Might it have helped with better communication between
13	enough to the scene. I think part of that issue is that	13	the LFB command units and the LAS or do you think
14	there were a large number of LFB appliances already	14	A. Considerably, yes.
15	arriving on scene before we were notified of the event.	15	Q. By the time the LAS declared a major incident, do you
16	There were large numbers of Metropolitan Police Service	16	know whether the predetermined attendance had in fact
17	that were requested within the first hour from the time	17	already been met on site?
18	of the origin of the call, and that made it a constant	18	A. So from my review, no, not entirely. But I think the
19	challenge.	19	decision was made in the specialist operations centre,
20	There are numerous references around trying to solve	20	once the significant incident had been declared, that
21	RVPs and trying to get this issue of access definitively	21	actually we were starting to deploy more resources.
22	arranged.	22	So from my review, by 3 o'clock the full
23	I think, you know, from my experience, the actual	23	predetermined attendance for a major incident was met.
24	area, the roads were quite narrow, there were lots of	24	Q. 3.00 am. So that's about 35 minutes after the
25	private cars parked, and then with emergency service	25	declaration was made.
	D 405		D 407
	Page 105		Page 107
1	vehicles, there was a real challenge in terms of clear	1	What are the other consequences of declaring a major
2	access and egress.	2	incident?
3	Q. What would you expect a command support vehicle to do at	3	A. So it sets up a number of actions in terms of the wider
4	a major incident?	4	NHS. So in terms of hospitals, once we declare a major
5	A. Well, they would locate themselves near partner command	5	incident and we put those hospitals on standby, or
6	units, and that would be a place for the operational	6	indeed we declare those hospitals as hospitals that will
7	commander to base themselves.	7	receive patients, it triggers those hospitals to take
8	Obviously they would be liaising with partner	8	actions in terms of ensuring they're able to receive
9	agencies, fire and police, but then we would be able to	9	likely patients that we'll send.
10	use that command support vehicle then to hold meetings	10	I think when we're declaring a major incident, we're
11	with teams on the ground, be able to transmit messages	11	also trying to deal with the major incident, but also
12	through that vehicle back through to the specialist	12	trying to think of how we retain core service delivery
13	operations centre.	13	to the rest of London.
14	Q. And that vehicle would have access to that joint radio	14	It triggers issues around our requirement in terms
15	channel that we've already talking about?	15	of deployment of all of our HART resources, so there was
16	A. Yes, so it has Airwave communications on it.	16	consideration then around if there was another incident
17	Q. So they would be able to hear messages coming through on	17	in another part of London that required HART resources,
	that from other agencies as well?	18	how would that be managed?
18	that from other agencies as wen.	1	
18	-	19	So it triggers off a whole host of actions outside
	A. Yes. Q. Do you think the fact that the CSV couldn't get close to	19 20	So it triggers off a whole host of actions outside of the delivery of the predetermined attendance.
19	A. Yes.		
19 20	A. Yes.  Q. Do you think the fact that the CSV couldn't get close to	20	of the delivery of the predetermined attendance.
19 20 21	A. Yes.     Q. Do you think the fact that the CSV couldn't get close to the site had any effect on LAS operations on the night	20 21	of the delivery of the predetermined attendance.  Q. But the SOC itself was already set up when you have
19 20 21 22	<ul><li>A. Yes.</li><li>Q. Do you think the fact that the CSV couldn't get close to the site had any effect on LAS operations on the night of the fire?</li></ul>	20 21 22	of the delivery of the predetermined attendance.  Q. But the SOC itself was already set up when you have a significant incident?
19 20 21 22 23	<ul> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. Do you think the fact that the CSV couldn't get close to the site had any effect on LAS operations on the night of the fire?</li> <li>A. No, I don't believe it did. I think the personnel from</li> </ul>	20 21 22 23	of the delivery of the predetermined attendance.  Q. But the SOC itself was already set up when you have a significant incident?  A. Yes.
19 20 21 22 23 24	<ul> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. Do you think the fact that the CSV couldn't get close to the site had any effect on LAS operations on the night of the fire?</li> <li>A. No, I don't believe it did. I think the personnel from that vehicle made their way to the scene, and the equipment on the command support vehicle, in terms of</li> </ul>	20 21 22 23 24	of the delivery of the predetermined attendance.  Q. But the SOC itself was already set up when you have a significant incident?  A. Yes.  Q. So does it have much of an effect in terms of the resources at command level that you deploy to
19 20 21 22 23 24	<ul> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. Do you think the fact that the CSV couldn't get close to the site had any effect on LAS operations on the night of the fire?</li> <li>A. No, I don't believe it did. I think the personnel from that vehicle made their way to the scene, and the</li> </ul>	20 21 22 23 24	of the delivery of the predetermined attendance.  Q. But the SOC itself was already set up when you have a significant incident?  A. Yes.  Q. So does it have much of an effect in terms of the

1	A. Yes. So once it's a major incident, then there would've	1	Good afternoon, Mr Woodrow.
2	been more staff deployed from the emergency operations	2	I want to pick up by looking at a little bit more in
3	centre to run the incident through the SOC. So more	3	detail of the communications between the LAS, the MPS
4	staff would've been allocated to SOC.	4	and the LFB on the night.
5	Q. Was the LAS's decision to declare a major incident	5	So starting with the MPS.
6	communicated to either the MPS or the LFB?	6	At page 10 of your statement at 02.10 you refer to
7	A. I believe it was, yes.	7	an update via the shared radio channel from the MPS.
8	Q. Do you know how it was communicated?	8	If we look at the CAD of that, which is MET00019931,
9	A. I believe it was through the CAD link to the MPS.	9	page 5, you'll see there about a third of the way down
10	Q. And to the LFB?	10	it says:
11	A. I think that would've been Laurence Ioannou would've	11	"MP ASKING FOR US TO LIAISE WITH MPAS 4 ON"
12	informed	12	Then it's just redacted because that's the radio
13	Q. On site?	13	channel.
14	A the LFB commander on site that he was declaring	14	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I really think it's asking rather
15	a major.	15	a lot of Mr Woodrow to read this as it is.
16	MS GROGAN: That's a convenient moment for me, sir.	16	MS GROGAN: Sorry, shall we zoom in on it?
17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Is it?	17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think we should.
18	MS GROGAN: Yes, if it's convenient for everyone else.	18	(Pause)
19	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, we're going to have a break	19	MS GROGAN: So right at the top you'll see:
20	now, Mr Woodrow, so we can all get some lunch.	20	"MP ASKING FOR US TO LIAISE WITH MPAS 4 ON [blank]."
21	THE WITNESS: Okay.	21	That's the shared radio channel.
22	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm going to ask you, please, not to	22	Then you'll see just below it says:
23	talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of	23	"SOC ADVISED TO MONITOR"
24	the room.	24	Do you know if that was the first time that the SOC
25	THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.	25	would have switched on the shared radio channel or would
	Page 109	_	Page 111
1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll stop now. We'll resume at	1	it have been on earlier in the incident?
2	2.05.	2	A. So that channel would have been on. It would have been
3	If you would like to go with the usher, she'll look	3	on throughout that evening. It's a channel that's
4	after you. All right?	4	monitored as part of routine business.
5	THE WITNESS: Thank you.	5	Q. If we go over the page to page 6, so MPAS 4 is one of
6	(Pause)	6	the police helicopters. If we go on to page 6 and we
7	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Just for my benefit, Ms Grogan, how	7	zoom in and there's an entry there that says:
8	are you getting on?	8	"[Redacted] - SMOKE COMING FROM WESTERN ASPECT OPEN
9	MS GROGAN: I'm over halfway through, sir, so I suspect I'll	9	WINDOW - HALF WAY UP"
10	be maybe 40 minutes after lunch, 45 minutes.	10	You can see two there, one at 02.10, top 6 floors.
11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: There's no rush, I just wanted to	11	A. Yes.
12	see how the afternoon was going to work out.	12	Q. So that's the one you refer to in your statement, and
13	MS GROGAN: I certainly won't take all afternoon.	13	then further down, 02.12, smoke coming from western
14	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.	14	aspect.
15	Very well, 2.05, then, please.	15	So the calls logged on this radio channel in the CAD
16	(1.05 pm)	16	are all coming from the police helicopter?
17	(The short adjournment)	17	A. Yes.
18	(2.05 pm)	18	Q. From my review of the CAD, there aren't any other
19	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Woodrow?	19	messages from the shared radio being recorded in the
20	THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you, sir.	20	CAD.
21	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Ready to carry on?	21	Would you have expected, as a matter of routine,
22	THE WITNESS: Yes.	22	messages coming through that radio channel to be
23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good, thank you.	23	recorded?
24	Ms Grogan.	24	A. Yes, if the messages were being picked up by the loggist
	MS GROGAN: Thank you, sir.	25	then I would expect those messages to have been recorded
25			
25			-

1	in the log.	1	Q. I am summarising there. That is an example of the MPS
2	Q. We also have evidence of phone calls between the MPS and	2	saying and the LAS agreeing that it's more efficient to
3	a watch manager at the LAS. The transcript for that is	3	communicate via the shared radio
4	INQ00000379.	4	A. Yes.
5	If we could pull that up at page 16, please.	5	Q than via phone.
6	This is a call where I'll just summarise it	6	A. Yes.
7	the MPS have phoned in to say that they have a patient	7	Q. Would you agree that it's more efficient to do it that
8	at Latimer Road tube station and they wanted to know how	8	way?
9	best to tell the LAS where to come and pick that patient	9	A. Yes, I do.
10	up, because as you've already referred to, there were	10	Q. You then have a reference in your statement to
11	issues with getting access to the scene because of	11	an incoming call regarding patients on the 25th floor
12	congestion.	12	that was passed on to the LFB, and you cite this as
13	You'll see on that transcript what the MPS is asking	13	an example in your statement of information being passed
14	is how they can best update the LAS about where they	14	to the LFB at 02.21.
15	are.	15	A. Correct.
16	You'll see the caller says there can you read	16	Q. We can see that on page 10 of your statement, you say:
17	that okay or would you like us to zoom in?	17	"DDS desk inform the LFB of CAD 336 and information
18	A. No, I can read that.	18	relating to patients alive on 25th floor."
19	Q. "CALLER: Yeah, relating to it and obviously there's,	19	So that's 02.21.
20	there's been requests gone in from all over the place	20	A. Yes.
21	and we've been making phone calls from CADs that don't	21	Q. It's one reference from the bottom?
22	necessarily have yourself linked into it. We've	22	A. Yes. Yes.
23	literally been, like, help we need for this	23	Q. Do you know how this information was passed on?
24	four-year-old that I just gave your colleague there.	24	A. So I suspect that would've been by phone. So DDS is the
25	So, I'm just wondering if you know what your link is to	25	dispatch deployment sector, and so wouldn't have been
	Page 113		Page 115
1	us, the CAD number we're working from, to work with you,	1	the desk that would've been managing the [redacted]
2	we can send stuff backwards and forwards but the	2	radio channel, that would be the incident management
3	location will be constantly changing. I just don't want	3	desk.
4	to get any confusion. Do you see where I'm coming from?	4	So phone would be obviously I wasn't there, but
5	"WATCH MANAGER: Yeah, okay. So just looking at our	5	from the entry, we don't have a direct CAD link and they
6	working CAD of 247 we haven't sent any messages directly	6	would not have been monitoring that channel. It's
7	to the police (Inaudible) looking at to be fair because	7	a different desk that monitors the [redacted] channel.
8	I think obviously you guys have been dealing with your	8	DDS was actually sitting in the main control room.
9	part but we've not yeah we've not had any	9	So
10	communication with the police.	10	Q. So DDS was sitting in the main control room, not the
11	"CALLER: So no one's monitoring the, the radio?	11	SOC
12	WATCH MANAGER: Yeah, well, I was going to say on the	12	A. Yes. So the DDS is not a functional desk that is
13	radio they are obviously"	13	implemented as part of a major incident; it's a standard
14	There is reference there to two radio channels being	14	desk that is in the main emergency operations centre.
15	monitored, but obviously one of those radio channels	15	Q. And the way that happened was obviously LAS received
16	will be the more relevant one in this scenario.	16	a 999 call from a member of the public saying there were
17	Then we go over the page to page 17, it says:	17	people alive on the top floor
18	"CALLER: Right, okay. Yeah, so that's fine, so what	18	A. Yes.
19	I can tell you is the guys who are working [redacted],	19	Q and then DDS made the decision to pass that on to the
20	if they need to tell you where the unit's required who	20	LFB?
21	are not at the RVP are you happy to go by [redacted]	21	A. Yes.
22	rather than constant phone calls?"	22	Q. You accept in your statement that information from other
23	So that there is the MPS feeding information through	23	999 calls was not passed on by the LAS to the LFB.
24	the radio rather than phoning?	24	A. Yes.
25	A. Sorry, could you ask that question again?	25	Q. Is there a reason why DDS would've decided to pass on
			•
	Page 114		Page 116
			20 (Pages 113 to 116)

1 A. So I think that would ve just used the DDS - the DDS is not that would ve just used the DDS - the DDS is not that would ve just used the DDS - the DDS is not that would ve just used the DDS - the DDS is not DS - the DDS -			١.	A N. 14:11 (* 1 . 14.44 . 91)
that would've just used the DDS – the DDS is not actively engaged in dispatching resources. The DDS desk books at dynamic displayment, it looks at allocation of rest breaks, that kind of thing. So it probably was a decision – I wan't three, but I'm assuming a DDS would've been used as that desk would've had capacity to make a call.  So it wouldn't have been because that is that desk's responsibility. I think it was just a decision that was taken on that night.  So it wouldn't have been because that is that desk's responsibility. I think it was just a decision that was taken on that night.  As of the army protection of policy in place that would require all handers or dispatch to pass information on from fire survival guidence calls to the I-FB?  As So there is no defined policy, but there is an expectation that when those types of calls come through, either the watch manager is contacted or the call-stading supervisor.  And to a certain cestent, common sense needs to prevaled that that is important information and it should be transferred. But at the time in question there was no dedicated policy that stated that had to occur.  Q. And you very fairly accepted in your slatement that that's an ear for improvement.  Page 117  A. A Absolutely.  Q. I'll ask you some more questions about that when we get to the end.  Moving on, then, to communications from the LFB to the LAS.  We know that the LFB did not tell the LAS that if that by phone.  The LFB actually declared its major incident at O. 20.6.  Would you expect the LFB to have updated the LAS that I think there are some additional actions for more to the call. Should the call handler have passed that information action to lead to a major incident would be seen assisted by a single point of contact in each control come?  A A boolattely.  Q. I'll ask you some more questions about that when we get to the end.  Moving on, then, to communications from the LFB to the Lea.  We know that the LFB did not tell the LAS that if had declared a major incident would we material				• •
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make a call.  So it wouldn't have been because that is that desk's responsibility, I think it was just a decision that was taken on that night.  Q. I there any protocol or policy in place that would require call handlers or dispatch to pass information on the form fire survival guidance calls to the LFB?  A. So there any protocol or policy in place that would require call handlers or dispatch to pass information on the form fire survival guidance calls to the LFB?  A. So there is no defined policy, but there is an expectation that when those types of calls come through, either the watch manager is contacted or the call-taking supervisor.  And to a certain extent, common sense needs to prevail that that is important information and it should be transferred. But at the time in question there was no dedicated policy that stated that had to occur.  Page 117  A. A Absolutely.  Q. Pla sk you some more questions about that when we get to the cad.  Moving on, then, to communications from the LFB to the LAS.  We know that the LFB did not tell the LAS that it had declared a major incident until 02.37, and it did that by phone.  The LFB actually declared its major incident at 02.06.  Would you expect the LFB to have updated the LAS carlier than 30 minutes after?  A. Ves.  Would you expect the LFB to have updated the LAS carlier than 30 minutes after?  A. Ves.  Q. In that call, the LAS does not mention that it had declared a major incident shortly before it received the calls should the call handler have passed that information on?  A. No. I don't think that would've materially affected it, the declaration for us was around enabling the additional actions for us to respond to that type. I wouldn't have materially affected the LFB in any way, So—  Q. Does the fact of the LFB declaring a major incident have any knock-on effect for the LASS decision-making or operations?  Head additional actions for us to respond to that type. I wouldn't have materially affected the LFB in any way.  So—  Q. Does the fact of the LFB declaring				5 5
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Q. Is there any protocol or policy in place that would require call handlers or dispatch to pass information on free survival guidance calls to the LFB?  A. So there is no defined policy, but there is an expectation that when those types of calls come through, either the watch manager is contacted or the call-taking supervisor.  And to a certain extent, common sense needs to prevail that that is important information and it should be transferred. But at the time in question there was no dedicated policy that stated that had to occur.  Q. And you very fairly accepted in your statement that that's an area for improvement.  Page 117  A. Absolutely.  Q. I'll ask you some more questions about that when we get to the end.  Moving on, then, to communications from the LFB to the LAS.  We know that the LFB did not tell the LAS that it had declared a major incident until 02.37, and it did that by phone.  The LFB actually declared its major incident at 02.06.  We know that the LFB to have updated the LAS caller than 30 minutes after?  A. Yes.  Q. In that call, the LAS does not mention that it had declared a major incident shortly before it received the call. Should the call handler have passed that information on?  A. No, I don't think that would've materially affected it, the declaration for us was around enabling the additional actions for us was around enabling the additional actio		- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
that a single point of contact between control rooms is set up.  14 by the call handlers or dispatch to pass information on from fire survival guidance calls to the LFB?  15 A. So there is no defined policy, but there is an expectation that when those types of calls come through, either the watch manager is contacted or the call-shiding supervisor.  18 through, either the watch manager is contacted or the call-shiding supervisor.  20 And to a certain extent, common sense needs to prevail that that is important information and it should be transferred. But at the time in question there was no dedicated policy that stated that had to occur.  21 Q. And you very fairly accepted in your statement that that's an area for improvement.  22 Page 117  1 A. Absolutely.  2 Q. I'll ask you some more questions about that when we get to toth e end.  3 Moving on, then, to communications from the LFB to the LAS.  4 Moving on, then, to communications from the LFB to the LAS.  5 We know that the LFB did not tell the LAS that it had declared a major incident until 02.37, and it did that by phone.  5 The LFB actually declared its major incident at 10 02.06.  10 Would you expect the LFB to have updated the LAS earlier than 30 minutes after?  11 A. Yes.  12 Would you expect the LFB to have updated the LAS earlier than 30 minutes after?  13 A. Yes.  14 Q. In that call, the LAS does not mention that it had declared a major incident shortly before it received the call. Should the call handler have passed that information on?  12 Moving on the context of the resource that was constantly escalating, the incident ward information on?  13 A. Yes.  14 Q. In that call, the LAS does not mention that it had declared a major incident shortly before it received the call. Should the call handler have passed that information on?  14 A. Job that the call that the call that the output of the communication issues.  15 But hat has to be taken in the context of the resource that was constantly escalating, the incident ward distressing, so they may wish				•
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16 A. So there is no defined policy, but there is 17 an expectation that when those types of calls come 18 through, either the watch manager is contacted or the 29 call-taking supervisor. 20 And to a certain extent, common sense needs to 21 prevail that that is important information and it should 22 be transferred. But at the time in question there was 23 no dedicated policy that stated that had to occur. 24 Q. And you very fairly accepted in your statement that 25 that's an area for improvement. 26 Page 117  1 A. Absolutely. 2 Q. I'll ask you some more questions about that when we get 3 to the end. 4 Moving on, then, to communications from the LFB to 4 the LAS. 5 the LAS. 6 We know that the LFB did not tell the LAS that it 4 had declared a major incident until 02.37, and it did 5 that by phone. 9 The LFB actually declared its major incident at 10 02.06. 10 Would you expect the LFB to have updated the LAS 11 Would you expect the LFB to have updated the LAS 12 carlier than 30 minutes after? 13 A. Yes. Q. In that call, the LAS does not mention that it had 15 declared a major incident shortly before it received the 16 call. Should the call handler have passed that 17 information on? 18 A. No. I don't think that would've materially affected it, 18 the declaration for us was around enabling the 29 additional actions for us to respond to that type. It 20 Q. Does the fact of the LFB declaring a major incident have 21 any knock-on effect for the LAS's decision-making or 22 op. Does the fact of the LFB declaring a major incident have 23 any knock-on effect for the LAS's decision-making or 24 operations? 25 operations? 26 Does the fact of the LFB declaring a major incident have 27 any knock-on effect for the LAS's decision-making or 28 operations? 29 Operations? 30 Does the fact of the LFB declaring a major incident have 31 any knock-on effect for the LAS's decision-making or 32 operations?			1	that a single point of contact between control rooms is
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1	The LAS has two emergency operations centres, one in	1	Q. So people whose role it is to answer the phone to 999
2	Bow and one in Waterloo; is that right?	2	calls, do they stay in the EOC or do you move some over
3	A. That is correct.	3	to take 999 calls for that incident to the SOC?
4	Q. We have some witness statements from 999 call handlers	4	A. Okay, so there are a number of roles within the
5	that I think you will have seen, one from Ms Woodhouse	5	emergency operations centre. So when you first join the
6	and one from Ms Morris.	6	emergency operations centre, your primary role is to
7	A. Ms Morris, yes.	7	answer 999 calls.
8	Q. Ms Woodhouse describes the layout of the Waterloo EOC in	8	As you develop your career, you can, whilst still
9	her statement, and she says that call handlers are on	9	retaining your licence to answer 999 calls, become
10	one floor but dispatch crews and management are on	10	a dispatcher, you can become an allocator of resources
11	another floor; is that right?	11	or you become an area controller, so there is a career
12	A. So not strictly. So the emergency operations centre at	12	progression. At all times, however, you can be
13	our Waterloo building, there is one single room, but at	13	redeployed into call handling.
14	one end of the room our call handlers sit at one end	14	So when we make the decision to move an incident
15	of the room. There is a partition and there is one step	15	into the specialist operations centre, the watch manager
16	up to the dispatch end of the room. To say it's on	16	in charge in the night will take the requisite skill
17	a different floor the emergency operations centre is	17	level, ensuring that they are protecting normal business
18	located on the ground floor, but there are two ends of	18	in terms of call answering. But they might take
19	the room, and the dispatch end of the room, you step up	19	a number of people that might not just be call handlers.
20	one step to walk into that end of the room. So that's	20	So it is a multi-skilled workforce that are deployed.
21	kind of the set-up of the control room at Waterloo.	21	Q. Can I get at it from a slightly different angle.
22	Q. Is that similar to the layout at Bow, so you have	22	If you have people receiving information from the
23	handlers and dispatchers all in the same room?	23	incident via 999
24	A. So the emergency operations centre at Bow, they are	24	A. Yes.
25	co-located and there isn't even a step up or a partition	25	Q are they likely to be in the SOC room at that point,
	Page 121		Page 123
1	at that control centre.	1	so are calls from the incident all directed to the SOC
1 2		1 2	
	Q. Ms Woodhouse refers to moving into the SOC room upon		room, or does it depend?
2		2	
2 3	Q. Ms Woodhouse refers to moving into the SOC room upon a declaration of significant incident. Does that mean	2 3	room, or does it depend?  A. No, it's quite possible that people just in the
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1	will get information from the fire service. We don't	1	particular incident, but if a call handler is not sure
2	normally, in those circumstances, receive calls from	2	what to do, that's why we have call-taking supervisors
3	victims that are trapped in a building.	3	down where they are based for any queries or questions
4	Q. Could you look at MET00015657 at page 2. It will come	4	or advice to be given.
5	up on the screen for you.	5	Q. Are 999 call handlers aware of the stay-put policy and
6	That is a statement from Ms Woodhouse, where she	6	where this applies?
7	says I'll just get to the right bit sorry, I am	7	A. So they would not be formally aware of that policy
8	just finding the right section for you.	8	through any formal training that we give them.
9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, which section	9	Q. Would the LAS expect to be told if the stay-put policy
10	MS GROGAN: It's right at the very bottom. So if we could	10	was changed to evacuate?
11	zoom in on the very bottom paragraph, please.	11	A. It would be reasonable in the circumstances for us to
12	There she says:	12	have been informed that there was a change of advice.
13	"The Call Handlers had not been given any advice as	13	Q. But as a general matter of policy, it's not written down
14	to what to say to callers from the incident as it had	14	anywhere, is it, that that should happen?
15	been assumed the calls would be to the LONDON FIRE	15	A. No, in terms of the triage tool that we use, it does not
16	BRIGADE rather than to the LAS."	16	give people specific guidance. There is in certain what
17	Is that the working assumption within the LAS, or	17	we call chief complaint areas, where there is a danger,
18	was that just her personal assumption?	18	critical danger, prompt, that if the call handler
19	A. No, that's her personal assumption. So to be absolutely	19	believes that individual for whatever reason is in
20	clear, our call handlers, regardless of whether they're	20	critical danger, there is a scripted message, depending
21	in a specialist operations centre or in the emergency	21	on which chief complaint that call is coming through on,
22	operations centre, have a defined, scripted triage	22	and it is just a scripted message.
23	process, which means that they take information from the	23	So, again, it's the system. We just have to follow
24	call and, based on that information, as I described	24	the system. We don't train our staff to give people
25	previously, they need to take the caller through	25	fire survival guidance or any type of guidance outside
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1	a series of questions to reach a determinant, whatever	1	other than what is actually scripted within the triage
2	that determinant would be.	2	system.
3	So it's scripted. We're not allowed to go off	3	Q. I now want to look at a few calls from the night with
4	script for obvious reasons because they're	4	you.
5	non-clinicians and can't make decisions on triage	5	A. Yes.
6	themselves, which is why they are licensed and they have	6	Q. We have a few to go through. I'll ask questions as we
7	to stay licensed to use that tool.	7	go along.
8	Q. Once the call handler works out that they are receiving	8	A. Yes.
9	a call from a fire, is there any facility for	9	MS GROGAN: And then some more questions at the end.
10	transferring that call to the LFB?	10	This is where I'm going to refer, sir, to the
11	A. So there would be no facility to directly transfer that	11	transcript from the flat 182 999 call.
12	call to the LFB. The procedure would be you take the	12	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Are we coming to that first?
13	call, as you would through the policies and procedures	13	MS GROGAN: Yes.
14	that we have, so you take the caller through the script,	14	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right. Then people should be aware
15	and then we would pass information to the LFB depending	15	that we are going to read a transcript of a call that
16	if that information was relevant. We would be able to	16	some people might find upsetting.
17	transfer that information.	17	MS GROGAN: Yes.
18	Q. Are your call handlers trained or advised to pass that	18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you are concerned about hearing
19	information on? So are they aware that they might need	19	it read and referred to, now is the time to leave the
20	to pass information on to the LFB?	20	room.
21	A. If it's relevant information, yes. If they're not sure	21	(Pause)
22	then we have call-taking supervisors, and whenever	22	No. All right, Ms Grogan.
23	they're not sure, they are guided to ensure that they	23	MS GROGAN: So the first call is a call received by
24	contact further advice if they think they require it.	24	Ms Woodhouse at 02.39.
25	Whatever the issue is, it's not specific to this	25	A. Yes.
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1	Q. She says in her statement that she advised the caller	1	caller was in critical danger, would've been scripted as
2	that the emergency services were there based on what she	2	such: if it's too dangerous to stay where you are and
3	could see on the TV.	3	you think you can leave safely, get away and call us
4	She would, however, have had access to the CAD as	4	from somewhere safe.
5	well, wouldn't she?	5	Q. That's the script for protocol 7?
6	A. (Nodded assent)	6	A. That's the script for protocol 7.
7	Q. Yes. So watching TV was an additional way of keeping	7	So these critical danger messages are not just in
8	her updated as to what was on the ground.	8	protocol 7, they're in a number of those protocols, but
9	A. Yes.	9	obviously the message would change slightly depending on
10	Q. Looking at the transcript, it's INQ00000383, and if we	10	the circumstances.
11	go to page 5.	11	But that would've been the only guidance, scripted
12	So by this point, the caller has called to say that	12	guidance, that the call handler could've given in terms
13	their flat is on fire.	13	of sticking through to the protocols of the triage
14	Ms Woodhouse then breaks off and speaks to another	14	system.
15	operator:	15	Q. She didn't give that advice on the phone as far as the
16	"OPERATOR 2: Hello.	16	transcript shows. She was cut off. And then
17	"OPERATOR 1: All right, mate. Um, 392, do I give	17	Ms Woodhouse says that she didn't call the caller back,
18	instructions? I mean they're obviously already on the	18	even though protocol requires her to.
19	way, they say they're stuck in the Tower."	19	Is there any exception to that protocol about
20	Then operator 2 goes on to ask some further	20	phoning people back? Is there any time when you
21	information and Ms Woodhouse describes the call.	21	wouldn't phone a caller back?
22	Operator 2 then says:	22	A. No.
23	"OPERATOR 2: Um, I don't know whether we should stay	23	Q. Moving on, then, to the next transcript, this is another
24	on the phone to them or not.	24	call that comes through at 3.00 am, and it's
25	"OPERATOR 1: I know, that's what I mean. I mean	25	INQ00000384, page 2.
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1	they're all screaming, you know. Do I you know, do I	1	So here the caller phones and identifies himself as
2	say I mean they're all panicking and screaming.	2	being on the 15th floor in flat 143, although I'll note
3	I don't know what to do."	3	for the record we think that's an error and that's noted
4	So you've said that call handlers aren't trained to	4	in the witness statement.
5	give FSG advice, so that's her there being concerned	5	A. Yes.
6	that she's not able to advise the caller about what to	6	Q. The operator says towards the bottom:
7	do.	7	"OPERATOR: The 15th. Is there smoke on your floor,
8	Is there anything in your protocols that might have	8	sir?
9	helped her with that?	9	"CALLER: I don't I'm not yeah.
10	A. So in the circumstances, the call handler should've	10	"OPERATOR: Okay, sir, can you see any flames?"
11	taken the caller through the protocol. The most	11	Then going over the page, I won't read it all out,
12	suitable protocol to take the caller through would've	12	but if we zoom in a little bit, please, you'll see there
13	been AMPDS protocol 7, fire burns. And actually, that's	13	the operator is asking the caller about the conditions
14	all that our call handlers are trained, is to try to	14	in the flat, how many people there are, and then asking
15	take the advice down in terms of the chief complaint so	15	whether are not there is a window nearby for them to get
16	that the triage system generates the set questions that	16	some fresh air.
17	need to be answered.	17	Is that an example of the call handler going
18	As I say, there is a critical danger element to some	18	off-script?
19	protocols, and if they'd have gone into that particular	19	A. Yes.
20	protocol, they would've given a message, that is	20	Q. So they're not trained to ask about conditions in a flat
21	a scripted message, from the AMPDS triage.	21	if someone phones from a flat on fire or a house on
22	Q. Do you know what that message would have been for this	22	fire?
23	kind of protocol?	23	A. No. And, again, I think, you know, it is important
24	A. Just so that I am absolutely clear, the critical danger	24	I think call handlers were particularly traumatised that
25	message, if the call handler would've identified the	25	they were speaking I think there were some human
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1	factors there around the scripted questions, did they	1	reference to the meeting in your statement, you can find
2	seem appropriate, given the circumstances. So this	2	it
3		3	A. So at page 14.
4	would not be a routine script for the requisite chief complaint, those questions to be asked.	4	A. So at page 14. Q. Yes, 03.30, page 14.
5	Q. There's one more phone call. I don't need to go to it	5	Mr Ioannou says that Helen Wigley fed back from that
6		6	
7	because you've answered all my questions already based on the previous calls, but just for the inquiry record,	7	meeting to the LAS control room.  I think that update is at 03.43 in your chronology,
8	the final call received by the LAS from within the tower	8	so it's page 16, where it says, "bronze Medic update
9	is at 03.18, and the reference is INQ00000385.	9	SOC".
10	By the time the LAS had received those last two	10	A. Yes.
11	calls so 03.00 and 03.18 the LFB had itself	11	Q. That doesn't mention the change in stay put.
12	changed its stay-put policy. I just want to explore	12	Would you expect Ms Wigley to appreciate the
13	with you how that was communicated to the LAS.	13	significance of the change in the stay-put policy and to
14	So the evidence so far is that the LFB changed the	14	communicate that back to control?
15	stay-put policy around 02.35 and 02.47.	15	A. Yes, I would have.
16	That was communicated over police radio to the	16	Q. Do you know if the LAS was ever informed of the change
17	police just before 03.10.	17	in stay put?
18	Do you know whether it was communicated to the LAS	18	A. At the time of my statement, I was unable to find any
19	on scene at the same time?	19	•
20		20	record of us being formally advised.  Q. Moving on in topics now, Mr Woodrow, just to a few
21	A. So there is no record that I could find that we were directly communicated with the change of that advice.	20	topics about decision-making on the night.
22	· ·	22	Again, we know you weren't there, but if you can
23	Q. Was it communicated over the shared Airwave channel as	23	
24	far as you're aware?  A. Not as far as I'm aware.	24	help us with these questions, then please do.  A. Of course.
25		25	Q. So we know that the LAS set up two sectors on the night
23	Q. Would the LAS have been able to hear the MPS radio	23	Q. So we know that the LAS set up two sectors on the night
	Page 133		Page 135
1	messages on the scene?	1	of the fire.
1 2	messages on the scene?  A. Not necessarily. I think that the other thing that's	1 2	of the fire.  A. Yes.
	A. Not necessarily. I think that the other thing that's		
2	A. Not necessarily. I think that the other thing that's important here is the script that we have for that type	2	A. Yes.
2	A. Not necessarily. I think that the other thing that's	2 3	A. Yes. Q. Sector 2 was set up around 3.00 am, just after. LAS
2 3 4	A. Not necessarily. I think that the other thing that's important here is the script that we have for that type of incident includes that critical message that I've	2 3 4	<ul><li>A. Yes.</li><li>Q. Sector 2 was set up around 3.00 am, just after. LAS staff in their witness statements describe initially</li></ul>
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1	the tower, and there was a discussion on why that was.	1	A. Yes.
2	It was deemed to be that there was, you know, some real	2	Q. But you can work adjacent to it?
3	concerns around debris with bringing patients out from	3	A. Yes.
4	the east aspect, and therefore Mr Ioannou set up	4	Q. One of the reasons for that is that the HART uniform is
5	a mirrored sector 2 on the opposite side of the tower.	5	not designed to go into a building that's on fire
6	So that's entirely appropriate and within our response	6	because it doesn't have thermal protection.
7	procedures.	7	A. Doesn't have thermal protection, yes.
8	Q. Did the LAS and HART teams have adequate resources to	8	Q. Okay.
9	fully operate two sectors?	9	Colin Pinnington, who is a HART officer, in his
10	A. So I think at the beginning, when patients were	10	statement
11	exhibiting themselves, it was a bit of a surprise	11	A. Yes.
12	because it had been agreed that patients would be	12	Q says that they could have considered deploying staff
13	extricated to the casualty collection point, the	13	to the bridgehead, and that this has happened in the
14	casualty clearing station that was already set up. But	14	past, including at Lakanal House.
15	very quickly, Mr Ioannou is reported in his log as	15	Are you aware of that?
16	sending reassigning staff, and as more staff were	16	A. I'm not aware of that specific decision.
17	attending as a result of the major incident declaration,	17	Q. But in principle, it was open to HART to consider
18	including HEMS teams, sector 2 were set up, and that's	18	whether or not to go into the bridgehead; is that right?
19	where IRO Maria Conyers was based.	19	A. Yes.
20	Q. Are you aware of whether that initial delay in getting	20	Q. Are you aware of any other fires where HART staff have
21	resources to sector 2 caused any issues with the	21	been deployed into a bridgehead whilst there was an
22	treatment of patients?	22	active fire?
23	A. I don't believe it did.	23	A. I'm not aware, no.
24	Q. Another issue on the night was a request from the LFB	24	Q. With your knowledge of the tower, do you think it
25	for HART teams to go into the building. Are you aware	25	would've been feasible for HART to do that during the
	Page 137		Page 139
1	of that issue?	1	night of the fire?
2	A. Yes, I am.	2	A. So I believe, with the information that was provided to
3	Q. If we note the HART policy on entering into buildings,	3	both the incident commander and the HART team, that we
4	that's LAS00000002 at page 3, if we call that up.	4	deployed HART very close to the tower and used the
5	I'll just summarise that. There it says that the	5	concrete walkway as an area of protection.
6	decision about whether or not to deploy in EDBA so	6	I think it needs to be taken into the context of not
7	extended duration breathing apparatus is made by	1	T time it needs to be taken mito the content of not
8	- **	7	just the sheer scale of the fire within the block, but
	HART, not by anyone else.	7 8	just the sheer scale of the fire within the block, but
9	HART, not by anyone else.  That's right, isn't it?	8	clearly there were other issues that we were concerned
9 10	That's right, isn't it?	8 9	clearly there were other issues that we were concerned around in terms of falling debris, and some of that
10	That's right, isn't it?  A. Yes, it would be a HART team leader in conjunction with	8 9 10	clearly there were other issues that we were concerned around in terms of falling debris, and some of that debris was alight.
10 11	That's right, isn't it?  A. Yes, it would be a HART team leader in conjunction with the operational commander. So there would be	8 9 10 11	clearly there were other issues that we were concerned around in terms of falling debris, and some of that debris was alight.  So I think in the circumstances the right decision
10 11 12	That's right, isn't it?  A. Yes, it would be a HART team leader in conjunction with the operational commander. So there would be a discussion, and clearly there is a process that needs	8 9 10 11 12	clearly there were other issues that we were concerned around in terms of falling debris, and some of that debris was alight.  So I think in the circumstances the right decision was made. We were right within the inner cordon that
10 11 12 13	That's right, isn't it?  A. Yes, it would be a HART team leader in conjunction with the operational commander. So there would be a discussion, and clearly there is a process that needs to be undertaken before you would commit HART resources	8 9 10 11 12 13	clearly there were other issues that we were concerned around in terms of falling debris, and some of that debris was alight.  So I think in the circumstances the right decision was made. We were right within the inner cordon that the LFB had set, so I believe the decision was right not
10 11 12 13 14	That's right, isn't it?  A. Yes, it would be a HART team leader in conjunction with the operational commander. So there would be a discussion, and clearly there is a process that needs to be undertaken before you would commit HART resources in terms of risk assessment.	8 9 10 11 12 13 14	clearly there were other issues that we were concerned around in terms of falling debris, and some of that debris was alight.  So I think in the circumstances the right decision was made. We were right within the inner cordon that the LFB had set, so I believe the decision was right not to commit into the tower.
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1	A. Because there were obstructions like hoses, it was	1	was the appropriate system under the circumstances.
2	a very active area, and triage is a process that needs	2	Q. The next topic I have is about transporting patients to
3	to take place in a safe, you know, essentially confined	3	hospital.
4	environment where you can get on and do your work.	4	A. Yes.
5	So that's why the decision was made to do it outside	5	Q. The Gold log at 06.15 records that's the Silver medics
6	of the tower under the cover of the walkway, where	6	summarise the dispersal of casualties to four hospitals.
7	access was better for HART paramedics to undertake that	7	If we pull that up so you can see it, it's MET00019934
8	initial triage sieve.	8	at page 22.
9	Q. The decision not to go into the tower appears to have	9	(Pause)
10	been taken on site. Was it ever discussed at a higher	10	It doesn't exist? Right. I'm not sure if that's
11	level, so with Silver or Gold Command, do you know?	11	MR FRIEDMAN: It may be that it's in page 22 of this
12	A. So I don't believe it was.	12	witness's summary of the logs.
13	The SOP that you're quoting is a national so	13	MS GROGAN: Possibly. Sorry, yes
14	HART the hazardous area response team, sorry they	14	MR FRIEDMAN: LAS00000009, page 22, might be the reference.
15	are a national asset for ambulance services. So this	15	MS GROGAN: We can get it there as well, yes, thank you.
16	is a national standard operating procedure. It's not	16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you, Mr Friedman.
17	LAS-specific; it applies to HART teams across the	17	MS GROGAN: Right, so if we pull up LAS00000009, page 22,
18	country.	18	please.
19	Based on the page that describes the risk of	19	So here we have the summary of where people were
20	combustion of fire gases cannot be eliminated,	20	being sent. So that's King's College, Chelsea and
21	environments where full structural firefighting apparel	21	Westminster, St Mary's and the Royal Free.
22	was in use, I believe that decision not to commit HART	22	But if we go to the CAD, which is MET00019931 at
23	into the building was the right decision based on that	23	page 35, the entry there at 06.40, about halfway down
24	information.	24	the page
25	Q. From the evidence, we know that HART were also concerned	25	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can we have it expanded, please.
	Page 141		Page 143
1	about the structural integrity of the building. If	1	MS GROGAN: We'll zoom in.
2	they'd been given early reassurance that the building	2	It says:
3	was structurally sound, do you think this would've made	3	"UNDER THE IMPRESSION THERE IS ONLY ONE HOSPITAL
4	any difference to the decision that was made?	4	THAT CASUALTY ARE GOING TO - ENQ WHICH HOSPITALS THE
5	A. So I don't believe, having seen what HART operatives	5	PATIENTS ARE BEING TAKEN TO"
6	and, indeed, our front-line staff did on the night, that	6	It looks there as if there's some confusion about
7	actually the structural integrity of the building was	7	which hospitals are actually accepting patients.
8	a concern, but I don't think that was a primary concern	8	Are you aware of that being an issue on the night?
9	around whether they entered the building or not.	9	A. No.
10	I think it was the appropriateness of the job that HART	10	Q. Is this a message from the LAS internally or is it a
11	needed to undertake and was that being done in the best	11	message from the Met Police?
12	location.	12	A. So I think that message is from the Metropolitan Police
13	So, you know, in my experience, we will set up our	13	Service, and I think that is in relation to the
14	casualty clearing but the rescue operation for	14	discussions around a casualty bureau number being set
15	victims from fire sits with the London Fire Brigade.	15	up.
16	They extricate those patients to an area where we can do	16	What's clear in the evidence that I reviewed, and
17	an initial triage, then we would move them to casualty	17	actually is the right thing to do, is that once the
18	clearing, where we would do a further assessment, and	18	major incident was declared, the hospitals that we put
19	then make sure that those patients receive the	19	on standby were nominated, and they were King's College,
20	appropriate treatment and definitive transport to	20	Chelsea and Westminster, St Mary's and Royal Free.
21	hospital.	21	There's two major trauma centres there, and there
22	Q. Could you have had one or two HART officers deployed to	22	were particular discussions about which trauma centres
23	assist in moving patients from inside the tower to the	23	to send patients to, and also to ensure that there was
24	triage point on the night of the fire?	24	capacity in those trauma centres for the rest of London.
25	A. No, I believe the system that was set up on the night	25	So that was discussed, in the evidence that I read,
	, - senere one system that was set up on the hight		,
ļi.			
	Page 142		Page 144

at joint service meetings. I think that's in relation to the setting up of a casualty bureau.  2 One of the purposes of a casualty bureau is to be able to work out who is still missing us was stay up mill the morning of the 14th 2 A. Correct.  3 Q. One of the purposes of a casualty human is to be able to work out who is still missing us was stay to more the start when a patient is patients who were taken away from site in order to assist that process, so working out who went where?  4 A. So the processes in place is that when a patient is because the process, and the part of the major incident process, we also sent hospital liaison officers to the hospitals. So we recurd when patients were because the process, and the part of the major incident process, we also sent hospital liaison officers to the hospitals. So we recurd when patients were because the process, and what the major incident process, we also sent hospital liaison officers to the hospitals. So we recurd when patients were because the process, and what the major incident process, we also sent hospital liaison officers to the hospitals. So we recurd when patients were leave the process, and what the major incident process, we also sent hospital liaison officers to the hospitals. So we recurd when patients were to the hospitals when the vehicles were to the hospitals when the vehicles were to the hospitals but the process, and what form on patients and get patients for their receiving hospital and those patients then would've been hosbed into the system.  1 That wan't possible to do with all patients, but the receiving hospital and those patients be on with all patients, but the receiving hospital and those patients be on with all patients, but the receiving hospital and those patients be on with all patients, but the receiving hospital and those patients be an or the receiving hospital and those patients be definite patient provided to do with all patients, but the receiving hospital patient provided the patient report form of the patient report form				
3 Q. One of the pupposes of a coasulty buzeau is to be able 4 to work out who is still missing; is that right? 5 A. Correct. 6 Q. What systems were in place to record the details of 5 patients who were taken away from site in order to 8 assist that process, so working out who went where? 9 A. So the processes in place is that when a patient is 10 loaded onto a vehicle, ready to be transported, the 11 destination hospital is agreed, and as part of the major 12 incident process, we also sent hospital islain officers 13 to the hospitals. So we record when patients were 14 leaving the secree, that's be process, and who what 15 officers at hospitals so that when the vehicles were 16 arriving, they were essentially seeing those patients 17 in. 18 Q. Was that information passed on to those who were working 29 out who was still missing? 20 A. So that information passed on to those who were working 21 out who was still missing? 22 to co-ordination group - so those conference calls, where 23 around setting up a casualty bureau, then those 24 information in terms of where we were entous partners and there was discussion 23 around setting up a casualty bureau, then those 24 information in terms of where we were conveying patients 25 became critical. And also we were passing that 26 A. Where we were able to record names, the names were 27 recorded on the patient report forms. Some of the 28 patients, treap of the patients were conveyed weren't in a position to be able to 29 give in their details. 20 Q. We heard evidence this morning about when the casualty 21 collection bureau was set up. 22 Had the sense up calling the casualty 23 collection bureau was set up. 24 A. Nerve we were able to record names, the names were 25 recorded on the patient report forms. Some of the 26 patients we conveyed weren't in a position to be able to 27 give in their details. 28 That's along apacition. 29 Q. That's a long question. 30 Q. We heard evidence this morning that the casualty collection bureau was set up. 31 A. A. Sorty, the point where		•		
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5 A. Correct. 6 Q. What systems were in place to record the details of patients who were taken away from site in order to assist that process, so working out who went where? 7 A. So the processes in place is that when a patient is to fee hospitals. So we record when patients were to the hospitals hospital a signed, and as part of the major incident process, we also sent hospital liaison officers to fee hospitals. So we record when patients were to to fee hospitals. So we record when patients were to the hospitals. So we record when patients were to form on patients and get patients? details, then clearly the hospital has the twe hospital liaison officers in continuing the secree, that's fee process, and we had officers at hospitals so that when the vehicles were arriving the very control who was still missing? 8 Q. Was that information passed on to those who were working out who was still missing? 9 Q. Was that information —so this is where the strategic co-ordination group —so those conference calls, where you had numerous partners and there was discussion and entirely an assistly bureau, then those information in terms of where we were conveying patients became crifical. And also we were expected information to the wider NHS in London. 9 Q. That would be in relation to numbers of patients leaving the scene and arriving at hospitals, but what about a named individuals, was that kind of information on the wider need to record names, the names were recorded on the patient report forms. Some of the patients we conveyed weren't in a position to be able to give as their details. 9 Q. We heard evidence this morning about when the casualty collection bureau was set up. 10 Q. We heard evidence this morning about when the casualty collection bureau was set up. 11 Links what is important is that when decisions were made to try to keep families to position. From the process of the case of the patient requires, where will that be delivered. 11 A. A. Sorry, can you — 12 Q. Sorry, Ive used the wrong word. 13 A. A. Nor the c	3		3	
6 Q. What systems were in place to record the details of 7 patients who were taken away from site in order to 8 assist that process, so working out who went where? 9 A. So the processes in place is that when a patient is 10 loaded not a vehicle, ready to be transported, the 11 destination hospital's lagered, and as part of the major 12 incident process, we also sent hospital liaison officers 13 to the hospitals. So are cred when patients were 14 leaving the scene, that's the process, and we had 15 officers a thospitals on that when the vehicles were 16 arriving, they were essentially seeing those patients 17 in. 18 Q. Was that information passed on to those who were working 19 out who was still missing? 21 A. So that information — so this is where the strategic 22 you had numerous partners and there was discussion 23 around setting up a casually bureau, then those 24 information in terms of where we were conveying patients 25 became critical. And also we were passing that 26 page 145  Page 145  1 information on to the wider NHS in London. 2 Q. That would be in relation to numbers of patients leaving 3 the scene and arriving at hospitals, but what about 4 named individuals, was that kind of information 5 collected and then passed back? 7 recorded on the patient report forms. Some of the 8 patients we conveyed weren't in a position to be able to 2 give us their details. 10 Q. We heard evidence this morning about when the casualty 2 collection bureau was set up. 11 Lad it been set up earlier, would that sort of 12 part of the patient report forms. Some of the 13 information have been available in one place for people 14 to work out who was still unaccounted for? 15 A. Sorry, we use the worting patient to easily collection bureau was set up. 16 Q. Sorry, I've used the wrong word. 17 We heard evidence this morning about when the casualty 28 collection bureau was set up. 29 Q. Sorry, I've used the wrong word. 20 Q. Sorry, I've used the wrong word. 21 A. A sorry are you as pure cassing the decisions were made to try t	4	<u> </u>		
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16 arriving, they were essentially seeing those patients in.  17 in.  18 Q. Was that information passed on to those who were working out who was still missing?  20 A. So that information — so this is where the strategic co-ordination group — so those conference calls, where you had numerous partners and there was discussion around setting up a casualty bureau, then those information in terms of where we reconveying patients became critical. And also we were passing that  Page 145  1 information no to the wider NHS in London.  Q. That would be in relation to numbers of patients leaving the scene and arriving at hospitals, but what about named individuals, was that kind of information or collected and then passed back?  A. Where we were able to record names, the names were recorded on the patient report forms. Some of the patient we conveyed weren't in a position to be able to give us their details.  10 Q. We heard evidence this morning about when the casualty collection bureau was set up.  11 Link what is important is that when decisions are made to transport patients to hospital, the decision in terms of which hospital has the services they require for the best levid or care.  10 Q. Sorry, can you—  11 information have been available in one place for people to work out who was still unaccounted for?  12 A. Sorry, can you—  13 information have been available in one place for people to where is the best care that the patient requires, where will that be decision to convey people is to where is the best care that the patient requires, where will that be decision to not be evidence. This is a page 27.  14 A. Ah, right. Okay, Yes.  15 Q. Our understanding is that that bureau is where  16 Q. Our understanding is that that bureau is where  17 think was table that and be a routine question that we would ask, yes.  28 Q. Think was univous that the inquiry has already beard of being sent to different hospitals from that we would ask, yes.  29 Think we would selve the very do being the fail and then relatives having probl	14	leaving the scene, that's the process, and we had	14	That wasn't possible to do with all patients, but
17   In.   2   Q. Was that information passed on to those who were working out who was still missing?   19   about the flat numbers and floors where residents had come from?   20   A. So that information — so this is where the strategic 21   22   22   23   24   24   25   25   25   25   25   26   27   27   27   28   29   29   245   29   29   245   29   29   245   29   29   245   29   245   29   245   29   245   24   24   24   24   24   24   2	15	officers at hospitals so that when the vehicles were	15	our primary concern is actually to stabilise the
18 Q. Was that information passed on to those who were working out who was still missing? 20 A. So that information — so this is where the strategic co-ordination group — so those conference calls, where you had numerous partners and there was discussion around setting up a casualty bureau, then those information in terms of where we were conveying patients became critical. And also we were passing that  Page 145  1 information on to the wider NHS in London. 2 Q. That would be in relation to numbers of patients leaving 3 the scene and arriving at hospitals, but what about 4 named individuals, was that kind of information collected and then passed back?  A. Where we were able to record names, the names were recorded on the patient report forms. Some of the patient report forms. Some of the give us their details.  Q. We heard evidence this morning about when the casualty collection bureau was set up.  A. So I think — can there be improvements? Yes. In every seenario, it's a continual learning process. So it would be wrong for me to sit here and say that things cannot be improved.  I think what is important is that when decisions are made to transport patients to hospital, the decision in terms of which hospital they're transported to is which hospital has the services they require for the best level of care. Those decisions are made on a clinical basis. And where possible — you know, in review of the evidence, this morning that the casualty collection bureau — 20 Q. Sorry, I've used the wrong word.  A. Is that the casualty collection bureau — 20 Q. Sorry, I've used the wrong word.  A. Is that the casualty collection bureau — 20 Q. Sorry, I've used the wrong word.  A. Is that the casualty collection bureau — 20 Q. Sorry, I've used the wrong word.  A. Is that the casualty collection bureau — 20 Q. Sorry, I've used the wrong word.  A. Is that the casualty collection bureau — 20 Q. Sorry, I've used the wrong word.  A. Is that the casualty collection bureau — 20 Q. Sorry, I've used the wrong word.  A. So I think has a	16	arriving, they were essentially seeing those patients	16	patients, treat them and get them to the definitive
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20 A. So that information — so this is where the strategic co-ordination group — so those conference calls, where you had numerous partners and there was discussion around setting up a casualty bureau, then those information in terms of where we were conveying patients became critical. And also we were passing that  Page 145  Page 145  Page 147  I information on to the wider NHS in London. Q. That would be in relation to numbers of patients leaving the scene and arriving at hospitals, but what about a named individuals, was that kind of information collected and then passed back?  A. Where we were able to record names, the names were recorded on the patient report forms. Some of the patients we conveyed weren't in a position to be able to give us their details.  Q. We heard evidence this morning about when the casualty collection bureau was set up.  Had it been set up earlier, would that sort of information and the patient we conveyed with the patient see conveyed with the work out who was still unaccounted for?  A. Sorry, can you —  Q. That's a long question.  We heard evidence this morning that the casualty collection bureau was set up.  A. When you say the casualty collection bureau —  Q. Sorry, I've used the wrong word.  A. Is that the casualty collection bureau —  Q. Sorry, I've used the wrong word.  A. Is that the casualty collection bureau —  Q. Sorry, Fve used the wrong word.  A. Is that the casualty collection bureau —  Q. Sorry, Fve used the wrong word.  A. Is that the casualty collection bureau —  Q. Sorry, Fve used the wrong word.  A. Is that the casualty collection bureau —  Q. Sorry, Fve used the wrong word.  A. Is that the casualty collection bureau —  Q. Sorry, Fve used the wrong word.  A. Is that the casualty collection bureau —  Q. Sorry, Fve used the wrong word.  A. Is that the casualty collection bureau —  Q. Sorry, Fve used the wrong word.  A. Is that the casualty collection bureau —  Q. Sorry, Fve used the wrong word.  A. Is that the casualty collection bureau —  Q. Sorry, Fve used the wro	18	Q. Was that information passed on to those who were working	18	Q. As part of that process, did the LAS collect information
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already heard of being sent to different hospitals from their families and then relatives having problems being  Page 145  Page 147    Information on to the wider NHS in London. 2	22	you had numerous partners and there was discussion	22	that we would ask, yes.
Page 145  Page 145  Page 147  I information on to the wider NHS in London. Q. That would be in relation to numbers of patients leaving the scene and arriving at hospitals, but what about named individuals, was that kind of information collected and then passed back?  A. Where we were able to record names, the names were recorded on the patient report forms. Some of the patients we conveyed weren't in a position to be able to give us their details.  Q. We heard evidence this morning about when the casualty collection bureau was set up.  Had it been set up earlier, would that sort of information have been available in one place for people to work out who was still unaccounted for?  A. Sorry, can you— Q. That's a long question.  We heard evidence this morning that the casualty collection bureau was set up.  A. When you say the casualty collection bureau— Q. Sorry, I've used the wrong word. Q. Yes, the point where people were working out which flats were cleared and who was still unaccounted for.  A. Ah, right, Okay, Yes. Q. Our understanding is that that bureau is where  the information at the wider NHS in London.  Page 147   able to locate their families.  Could any improvements be made to LAS procedures to ensure that that decate heir families.  Could any improvements be made to LAS procedures to ensure that that doeat that docate their families.  Could any improvements be made to LAS procedures to ensure that that doeat that of an able to LAS procedures to ensure that that doeat that of an able to LAS procedures to ensure that that doeat that doeat the infamilies.  Could any improvements be made to LAS procedures to ensure that that doeat that doeat that doeat that doeat that doeat that doeat that that that the ture?  A. So I think — can there be improved.  I think what is important is that when decisions are made to transport patients to hospital, the decision in terms of which hospital has the services they require for the best level of care. Those decisions were made to try to keep families together.  But pr	23	around setting up a casualty bureau, then those	23	Q. There's evidence from survivors that the inquiry has
page 145  information on to the wider NHS in London.  Q. That would be in relation to numbers of patients leaving the scene and arriving at hospitals, but what about named individuals, was that kind of information collected and then passed back?  A. Where we were able to record names, the names were recorded on the patient report forms. Some of the patients we conveyed weren't in a position to be able to give us their details.  Q. We heard evidence this morning about when the casualty collection bureau was set up.  Had it been set up earlier, would that sort of information have been available in one place for people to work out who was still unaccounted for?  A. Sorry, can you —  Q. That's a long question.  Page 147  able to locate their families.  Could any improvements be made to LAS procedures to ensure that that doesn't happen in the future?  A. So I think — can there be improvements? Yes. In every scenario, it's a continual learning process. So it would be wrong for me to sit here and say that things cannot be improved.  I think what is important is that when decisions are made to transport patients to hospital, the decision in terms of which hospital they're transported to is which hospital has the services they require for the best level of care. Those decisions are made on a clinical basis. And where possible—you know, in review of the evidence, there were occasions where decisions were made to try to keep families together.  But principally the decision to convey people is to where is the best care that the patient requires, where will that be delivered.  Q. Sorry, Fve used the wrong word.  A. Sharthe Casualty collection bureau—  Q. Sorry, Fve used the wrong word.  A. When you say the casualty collection bureau—  Q. Sorry, Fve used the wrong word.  A. Sharthe Casualty collection bureau—  Q. Sorry, Fve used the wrong word.  A. Sharthe Casualty collection bureau—  Q. Yes, the point where people were working out which flats were cleared and who was still unaccounted for.  A. Ah, right. Okay. Yes.  Q. Our	24	information in terms of where we were conveying patients	24	already heard of being sent to different hospitals from
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24 <b>A. Ah, right. Okay. Yes.</b> 25 Q. Our understanding is that that bureau is where 26 Q. 3.10.2. So if we zoom in on it, it's just the second	22	Q. Yes, the point where people were working out which flats		At 3.10.2 in your statement so that's
Q. Our understanding is that that bureau is where 25 Q. 3.10.2. So if we zoom in on it, it's just the second	23	were cleared and who was still unaccounted for.	23	LAS00000009, and that is at page 27.
	24	A. Ah, right. Okay. Yes.	24	A. Sorry, which
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1 age 140		Page 146		Page 148
		1°age 140		rage 140

2 A. Yes. 2 survival	AS implementing training on what kind of fire guidance to give?
2 A. Yes. 2 survival	
	be clear about fire survival guidance, currently
	he AMPDS triage system that we're licensed to
	re not at liberty to provide any fire survival
	ce. We have to use one of two systems. NHS
	ys is the other system. Again, that system does
	vide any fire survival guidance.
9 services could've been improved. 9 <b>What</b>	t we have within our triage system is the
10 We've been through that in detail already in your 10 critical	danger message, and we've reiterated the use
11 evidence. 11 when ca	all handlers believe that someone is in critical
12 Are there any further examples that you want to draw 12 danger,	that that script should be read to the
13 attention to? 13 individu	ual.
14 A. So, I think we have fundamentally reviewed the 14 Q. Have y	ou taken any specific steps to ensure that
15 structures of our emergency operations centres. We're 15 information	tion is passed to other agencies in a timely
16 just in the process now of restructuring those rooms and 16 manner	during other incidents?
17 delivering those. 17 A. Yes, w	e have. So particularly around the use of
18 We are aware that there are some issues around two 18 [redacto	ed], and in terms of some of the information that
19 control rooms. There were people taking some calls from 19 was exc	hanged around the Parsons Green tube incident
	ppened later, September 2017, we saw
	antly better communication between services.
_	as of any other aspects on the scene, you
	ed the issue of parking and congestion being
24 in for call takers. Additional training has been given 24 an issue	
	he LAS implemented any lessons learned from
Page 149	Page 151
	.9
1 around the critical danger messages. 1 that issue	
	terms of trying to assess so I think our
I I	ns on the night is that where we were trying to
	ources closer to the scene, I think there were
	revisions of RVPs and, in actual fact, in terms
,	ales of the vehicles, there's reference to
	vehicles being held at Hammersmith hospital and
	ng drawn in.
	around adaptability and thinking outside
	ually, having vehicles right on top of the
	metimes in large numbers might not be the
	but to have a place where you can hold and bring
j	numbers in to keep routes in terms of access and
	ear, that's general learning.
15 various types of incidents that had very different 15 But, a	gain, circumstances in terms of individual
16 challenges and trying to build those in. 16 incidents	s – you know, we can write that into a plan,
17 So, you know, I regret, as I've said, that there 17 but then	we'll face something else where that plan
18 were some things that we should've done that we didn't 18 doesn't v	work. So it's just around constantly trying to
19 do. You know, that's down to individuals in the context 19 adapt.	
20 of an unprecedented event and on the night. 20 I thinl	k Mr Ioannou throughout that night was
21 But as an organisation, we're absolutely committed 21 constant	ly looking at ways of trying to do things
22 to learn, and I've been driving that forward as we've 22 different	tly and overcoming the challenges which, you
23 continued to develop services. 23 know, w	ere quite unique and on an unprecedented scale
24 Q. You mention training around critical messages. 24 that night	nt.
25 <b>A. Yes.</b> 25 Q. Finally,	can you look at MET00023715, at page 9. So
D 450	D 450
Page 150	Page 152

1	this is the Gold log, I think.	1	First of all, just before you left the room we were
2	Yes, so it's the reference at 0711, could you zoom	2	talking about parking and congestion at the scene.
3	in on that, please, on the left-hand side.	3	Do you know if congestion at the scene had any
4	There's a reference in that log there, you'll see,	4	impact on the speed at which people could be conveyed to
5	to:	5	hospital?
6	"Helicopters coming to evac people from roof."	6	A. I don't believe it had any negative impact on patient
7	We know that helicopters did not evacuate anyone	7	outcome.
8	from Grenfell Tower on the night of the fire.	8	Q. We also discussed the Woodhouse call from flat 182 at
9	Do you know where that impression may have came from	9	Grenfell Tower.
10	that's recorded in this log?	10	In your lessons learned exercise, have you developed
11	A. So I believe there was a discussion with LFB,	11	any specific training around passing on information from
12	a consideration around whether the coastguard could be	12	flats that are on fire back to the LFB?
13	brought in, in terms of their ability to have winches.	13	A. So in terms of the consolidation of the message or the
14	In terms of that message, I didn't read anywhere	14	reiteration of the message, it's the message that when
15	that helicopters were being deployed, but in the	15	you receive a call in a scenario like that, that message
16	evidence that I've reviewed, there was certainly	16	needs to go into the specialist operations centre. That
17	a discussion around whether HM Coastguard could add any	17	message there gets logged and the LFB would be
18	value in terms of being able to evacuate any people that	18	contacted.
19	might be trapped in the high levels of the building.	19	Q. We also discussed the protocol that you should call back
20	Q. But it's not accurate to say that the helicopters were	20	a caller if the call is dropped.
21	coming	21	Have you implemented any additional training or any
22	A. No.	22	lessons learned around ensuring that protocol is
23	Q to evacuate people; we know that didn't happen.	23	complied with?
24	A. No.	24	A. Well, it's just been reiterated that that is something
25	MS GROGAN: Thank you very much. Those are the questions	25	that we should do, and we take 1.9 million calls and we
	Page 153		Page 155
1	I have for you, but it may be that there are some more	1	do get calls that are dropped. That should just be
2	questions that others would like to ask, so I will have	2	routine business.
3	a pause now.		Toutine business.
		3	Of course in the position we found ourselves in on
	•	3	Of course, in the position we found ourselves in on
4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We're going to have a break now,	4	that night, for whatever reason, the individual didn't
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1 Well, now, Ms Grogan, what's next? 2 MS GROGAN: Yes, sir. All I have to do now is read in the 3 schedule of witness statements, exhibits and documents 4 from the LAS to the inquiry— 5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right. 6 MS GROGAN: — which should take about 30 seconds. 7 If I could bring that schedule up on screen, it's 8 INQ00000526. 8 If I could bring that schedule up on screen, it's 9 This schedule contains a list of witness statements 10 and exhibits of LAS personnel who attended the scene on 11 the inglist, together with other key LAS documents. 11 dis schedule includes distressing information about 14 this schedule includes distressing information about 15 matters on the night. 15 matters on the night. 16 I would ask that the schedule material is now 17 formally read into the inquiry record. 18 Rix two pages long, so if we could just seroll down 19 to make sure we've caught everything. 20 There we are. 21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right. So a lot of people have made 22 statements for the use of the inquiry. 23 MS GROGAN: Yes. 31 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right. So a lot of people have made 32 with everything else. 4 MS GROGAN: Thank you, sir. That's it from me. I think 4 Mr Rawat is now planning to read in some statements. 4 MS GROGAN: Thank you, sir. That's it from me. I think 4 Mr Rawat is now planning to read in some statements. 5 MS GROGAN: Thank you, sir. That's it from me. I think 5 Mr RawAT: MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. 6 MS GROGAN: Thank you, sir. That's it from me. I think 6 Mr Rawat is now planning to read in some statements. 7 Sirk MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right. Thank you very much. 9 (Pause)  10 Yes, Mr Rawat. 11 Charles and School afternoon, Mr Chairman. 11 Mr RawAT: Good afternoon, Mr Chairman.	
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Figure 1 Floodid bring that schedule up on screen, it's 1 N000000526.  This schedule contains a list of witness statements 10 and exhibits of LAS personnel who attended the scene on 10 evidence of Hanan Wahabi on Thursday last week. Za 11 the night, together with other key LAS documents.  SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. 12 If I may just read an extract from his statement 13 which relates to the events of the night itself. 14 this schedule includes distressing information about 14 Iron which relates to the events of the night itself. 15 matters on the night. 15 matters on the night. 16 I would ask that the schedule material is now 16 formally read into the inquiry record. 17 the flat, I went to my room and started playing 18 It's two pages long, so if we could just seroll down 19 to make sure we've caught everything. 19 and a few family members. Then I got some food to each statements for the use of the inquiry. 22 statements for the use of the inquiry. 23 MS GROGAN: Yes. 23 smell wasn't particularly strong, but it was constant. 24 we're very grateful to all of them for taking the time 25 widence before the inquiry and will be considered along 3 with everything else. 4 MS GROGAN: Yes. 5 ISR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. 6 MS GROGAN: Thank you, sir. That's it from me. I think MR RAWAT: Good afternoon, Mr Chairman. 10 What I'd like to do now, if I may, is just to use 12 it was from the oven. I could see that it was conding in through the extractor fan in the kitche window. The kitchen and could see that smoke was coming in through the extractor fan in the kitche sometimes, like burning cigaretes that could catch a curtain and start a fire. Once rice was thrown into o flat. 17. My dad's eyesight is bad, so he couldn't see where the smoke was coming if in the oven. I could see that it was consing if the suffer. 17. My dad's eyesight is bad, so he couldn't see where the smoke was coming if in the oven. I could see that it was consider to the smoke was coming if the oven. I could see that it was consing it was f	
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	-
the remaining time this afternoon to continue with the 13 from the extractor fan in the window, and settling on	
work of putting into the record statements from 14 the ceiling, like water. The smoke was black.	
survivors, residents and bereaved individuals who have 15 "18. I wondered if people had lit a bonfire in the	
16 made statements. 16 grassy area downstairs, so I went into the living room	
17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, all right.  17 to have a look. Through the bottom of the living room	1
18 MR RAWAT: Before I do so, can I give the explanation we've 18 window, I could see the top flicker of a flame. There	
given in the past, which is that whilst I may from the 19 was a little bit of black smoke in the living room too,	
statements be reading extracts, they are admitted into  20 though not as much as in the kitchen. I thought maybe	e
the inquiry's record in their entirety and considered 21 the tree under the living room window was on fire, at	
22 accordingly as evidence. 22 wanted to have a look, so I went to open the window.	
23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. 23 It's one of those windows that you can open in different	nt
24 ZAKARIYA CHEBIOUNI (evidence read into the record) 24 ways. If you turn the handle so that it points straight	
25 MR RAWAT: The first statement I wish to put into the record 25 up, it opens like a door, if you turn it another way, it	
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1	hinges open at the top, and if you turn it another way,	1	the lady and the kids she was with stay in front of me.
2	it locks the window closed. The window is behind the	2	Then the little girl with the older lady went back
3	sofa so I had to climb onto the sofa to reach it. I	3	upstairs, I think to get her parents.
4	opened the window like a door. I saw a spark and just	4	"23. When we reached the first floor, we came
5	as I leaned forward to see where the spark had come	5	across two firefighters. They weren't wearing masks. I
6	from, fire shot straight up, in front of my face. I	6	could see their faces: they were both white men with
7	realised that the fire was on the outside of the	7	blue eyes and brown hair. One was holding the door from
8	building. I moved back and my mum said, 'quickly,	8	the stairwell to the landing open. The other told me to
9	quickly, close it!', so I closed back the window.	9	go back upstairs. I thought that was such a dumb thing
10	"19. My dad was saying that we should stay in the	10	to say. There was no way I was going back, but I
11	flat, but I was like no, you lot can stay, but I'm	11	started to back up, like I was obeying him. Then, the
12	taking my sister, I can't leave my little sister here.	12	Eritrean-looking grandmother started speaking with the
13	[redacted] was still in her bed, but she was awake	13	firefighters. She couldn't speak English very well. As
14	because she had heard the commotion. I walked to her	14	she spoke with them, I pushed past and walked out the
15	bedroom, lifted her up and brought her out. Then I set	15	door the firefighter was holding open. He looked
16	her down, maybe near the front door, I can't remember.	16	annoyed with me as I walked by, but I kept going. I
17	I put on my sandals, walked out of our flat, onto the	17	have been shown a CCTV image showing me leaving the
18	landing, and poked my head down the stairs, to check	18	building, carrying [redacted]. The time on the image is
19	there wasn't any fire on the landing or the stairs.	19	1:19am."
20	There wasn't any fire, but I saw some white smoke on the	20	If I jump forward just a little bit in the
21	landing, and in the stairwell.	21	statement, Zak also sets out his recollection of the
22	"20. At this point, I was wearing my tracksuit	22	contact that his family had with his uncle Abdulaziz who
23	bottoms and my abaya, which is traditional clothing that	23	was in flat 182, and that's at paragraph 27, if I may:
24	Muslims wear to the mosque, and sandals on my feet.	24	"27. My mum was talking to Faouzia and Abdulaziz on
25	[redacted] was wearing her pajamas, and no shoes. My	25	her mobile, saying there was a fire. She was speaking
23	[reducted] was wearing her pajamas, and no shoes. Wy	23	net moone, saying there was a rive. She was speaking
	Page 161		Page 163
1	mum was wearing a brown dressing gown and a [redacted]	1	really quickly, because she was panicking. I tried to
2			
_	and my dad was wearing his work clothes, I think. When	2	grab the phone from her so I could speak to them more
3	and my dad was wearing his work clothes, I think. When I got back to the flat my parents asked me whether there	3	grab the phone from her so I could speak to them more calmly, but she didn't let me, so I used my dad's mobile
	I got back to the flat my parents asked me whether there		calmly, but she didn't let me, so I used my dad's mobile
3		3	
3 4	I got back to the flat my parents asked me whether there had been any smoke on the landing and in the stairwell.  I lied and said no, as I knew if I told them about the	3 4	calmly, but she didn't let me, so I used my dad's mobile and called Yasin. I would say this was 5 to 10 minutes after I got of the tower, so around 1:30 a.m. Yasin
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	to listen to them, because they were going to	1	"15. I then looked round to the left of the window
2 get stu	ck. She said they were speaking to the fire	2	facing the walkways when I saw a woman on the balcony of
3 brigado	e, and we hung up.	3	one of the walkway finger blocks waving and shouting to
	A little while later I called Nur Huda again,	4	people in the tower. She was in a dressing gown waving
	at time we didn't speak for very long. She said	5	frantically at me while I was looking out of the kitchen
	ere still speaking with the fire brigade and I	6	window. There were other people standing next to her
	r she needed to get out. The conversation was	7	and they seemed to be signalling to other people in the
	ecause her dad took the phone from her and said	8	tower whilst others appeared to be having intense
	busy', or something like that, as in, they were	9	conversations on their mobile phones.
	beaking with the fire brigade. He sounded like he	10	"16. Rebin was still in the living room at this
	a rush. After that, I didn't speak to them	11	point. I told him what I could see and told him that
_	I called a while later to the house phone but it	12	something wasn't right and he told me to open the
	go through, and I called all of their phones but	13	kitchen window to get a better feel for what was going
	picked up."	14	on outside. The flat is on the corner of the building
	's all I propose to read from that statement.	15	with the kitchen window on one side of the building
	TIN MOORE-BICK: All right, thank you.	16	facing the playground and the living room window around
	O AYOUB KAREEM (evidence read into the record)	17	the corner on the other side of the building facing the
	VAT: The next statement I propose to put into the	18	walkways.
	Mr Chairman, is that of Milad Ayoub Kareem. The	19	"17. I opened the window on the side facing the
	ce for that is IWS00001077.	20	playground and I could immediately smell a strong smell
	e go to page 13, please, there is a statement of	21	of burning. There were fire fighters in the playground
	The statement is signed and dated	22	- about 3 or 4 of them and 1 was trying to communicate
•	tember 2018, and it is not accompanied by any	23	with me.
24 exhibit		24	"18. I knew at that point that something close by
25 Mila	d Kareem did not live in Grenfell Tower, but he	25	was burning but it wasn't until I looked up and right to
	Page 165		Page 167
1 explair	ns in his statement that, on the night of 13 June,	1	my horror I saw a fire raging from outside of the
	s visiting a friend, Rebin Sabir, who lived at	2	building above me in a North West direction.
	er 23 on the 5th floor. He explains that he arrived	3	"19. I could see smoke, lots of thick black smoke
	nfell Tower at around 11.00 pm and they were	4	floating in the air. The fire was red, blazing red with
	together when they began to notice a smell of	5	a hint of yellow, blue and green flames. The flames and
	and burning, which initially did not cause any	6	smoke were all mixed together. I remember seeing fire
	n, particularly to Rebin. But then, as the smoke	7	and pieces of the building falling to the ground. I was
	tronger, Milad became more and more concerned.	8	shocked at how close the fire was to me. I could see
	pick it up at paragraph 12 on page 2, please:	9	everything clearly from the window."
	Rebin told me to check the kitchen to put my	10	The statement continues:
	at ease so I went to the kitchen to make sure	11	"21. Whilst looking up at the flames from the
12 everyt	ning was ok. I checked the cooker but there was	12	kitchen window the smoke appeared to be circulating
	n of fire in the kitchen but the smell became	13	moving in an upwards direction along the side of the
	ably stronger. It was as if I was standing close	14	building. The fire was spreading quickly.
	onfire but I couldn't see it.	15	"22. I said to Rebin we are in deep trouble as the
	Whilst in the kitchen I could hear people	16	building is on fire and Rebin jumped up from the living
	e shouting, not screaming, but I remember a women	17	room sofa where he was sitting and went to the living
	ildren speaking loudly. The windows were double	18	room window. When he saw the smoke he started talking
	so I couldn't hear exactly what was being said	19	in our language saying 'oh my God, fire, what are we
_	was loud enough for me to hear it and become	20	going to do?'
	ious. It was late so I wouldn't have expected	21	"23 I noticed at this point that a fireman was
			on the ground and a fire engine was parked under the
ZZ Cilliai	en to be awake at that time so I went to the	22	on the ground and a fire engine was parked under the
	en to be awake at that time so I went to the w to see what was happening outside.	22 23	bridge which connects the tower to the walkways.
23 windo			
23 windo 24 "14.	w to see what was happening outside.	23	bridge which connects the tower to the walkways.
23 windo 24 "14.	w to see what was happening outside.  I looked out of the kitchen window facing the	23 24	bridge which connects the tower to the walkways.  "24. I shouted at the fireman about 6 or 7 times

Day 72

trapped'; to get his attention as there was so much 1 there is no way out'. I was coughing as the smoke got 2 2 noise around us. The firefighter eventually shouted stuck in my lungs. My eyes started burning so I quickly 3 'what floor are you on, how many people?' I shouted 3 closed the door. 4 back '5th floor, flat 23, 2 people'. 4 "33. I ran back to the kitchen window to speak to 5 "25. The firefighter told us to 'stay where you are 5 the same fireman. I thought about jumping out the and don't panic'. I was shacking and scared but felt 6 window to escape but couldn't as it was too high. Rebin 6 comforted that I had spoken to the firefighter. I 7 7 was still walking between the living room and the 8 8 thought we would be rescued. kitchen on his phone trying to find out what was going 9 9 "26. I left the kitchen window to go to the living 10 room to join Rebin. I think he was on the phone at this 10 "34. I spoke to the fireman and said we couldn't take the stairs as the corridor was filled with thick 11 point or speaking to neighbours from the window. 11 12 "27. We were in absolute shock. Completely 12 black smoke and it was too dangerous. I asked him to 13 petrified. I just kept walking from room to room as I 13 come and get us out of the building. I told him if we was so unsettled. I looked outside the bedroom window 14 14 took the stairs we would die. He told me not to panic 15 and I could see a fire engine parked. 15 and to stay there and they would come and get me. I 16 "28. 10-15 minutes passed and the firefighters had 16 could literally see my whole life passing by my eyes. 17 not come to rescue us so I went back to the kitchen 17 "35. The smell was getting stronger every minute. 18 18 window to speak with the same firefighter on the ground. You could see the smoke was slowly creeping into the 19 I asked if they were coming to get us as the smoke was 19 flat - trying to force its way through the keyhole, 20 getting stronger outside the building. At this point I 20 under the door and through the sides of the front door. 21 was told by the same firefighter that it might be best 21 "36. Rebin suggested that we take the stairs. But 22 22 for us to take the stairs. I thought that was a good having seen the condition in the communal hallway, I 23 23 idea. told him that it wasn't safe. He reassured me that it 24 "29. Rebin was still talking to neighbours but I 24 was ok and went to get his jacket from the bedroom and 25 did not hesitate and went straight to the front door 25 we opened the door the second time. That's when he saw Page 169 Page 171 the smoke for himself and he closed the door straight 1 without a second thought. 1 2 "30. The smell of smoke was now intense. I saw 2 away as the smoke was so thick. 3 3 "37. We were both scared, terrified and feeling smoke coming into the flat from the bottom of the front 4 4 door as I walked towards it so I became anxious. I hopeless as we felt trapped. 5 opened the front door looking straight ahead into the 5 "38. I believe half an hour or so passed when two 6 communal hallway in front of me and to my horror I saw 6 firemen came through Rebin's front door. I do not know 7 the communal hallway was already filled with a wall of 7 how they got in but I remember they were wearing masks 8 intense thick black smoke, so thick I couldn't see 8 carrying red oxygen cylinder on their backs and torches. 9 9 anything clearly except the smoke. It was pitch black. I thought they had arrived to save us but they told us 10 "31. I could just about make out the lifts from the 10 to stay in the flat a little longer because they didn't 11 front door when I strained and squinted my eyes. I 11 have any oxygen masks with them for us and it was too 12 could hear screams from the stairways in different 12 dangerous to go down the stairs without them because the 13 languages, Arabic in particular and firefighters talking 13 smoke was so bad. 14 to people. I could hear men saying 'get out it's not 14 "39. I didn't want them to leave us but the 15 safe'. I could hear somebody call out 'Omar, are you 15 firefighters said 'stay here and we will find another 16 ok?' I couldn't see anybody as the smoke was too thick 16 way to get you out, don't panic we will get you out'. 17 and dark but I could hear what felt like 100 17 Then they left. They were only with us in the flat for 18 conversations at once from different directions. I 18 no more than two minutes. 19 remember hearing little children crying and screaming 19 "40. We closed the door behind them but a lot of 20 from different parts of the building. That sound will 20 smoke had already entered the flat. I could see the 21 21 never leave me. reflection of the smoke in the torch light when they 22 "32. I was at the front door for 5-7 seconds in 22 were in the flat. It wasn't thick smoke and we could

43 (Pages 169 to 172)

still see everything in the flat at this stage, but it

Page 172

"41. The temperature in the flat was increasing.

total shock. I was thinking to myself 'oh my God, what

is happening, how are we going to get out'. The shock

hit me in my knees as it dawned on me that 'this is it,

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was there.

Day 72 Grenfell Tower Public Inquiry "42. By now we were totally panicked and did not 1 far. 2 2 know what to do. It seemed hopeless but we were praying "53. The firefighters moved the ladder to the 3 3 kitchen window. A fireman climbed up and asked if we that somebody would come and get us out. 4 "43. Then about 20-30 minutes later I saw 2 firemen 4 were ok. He looked so hot and was sweating heavily. He 5 on the ground putting a ladder up against the building 5 asked me for a glass of water so I got him one. He towards us but it was not long enough and only reached 6 stayed at the window and drank his water. He only had a 6 7 7 the floor below us. helmet on, no breathing apparatus or mask. I would 8 8 "44. At this point, we thought we were going to die guess he arrived after 2am but I can't say for sure. 9 and there was no way we could be rescued. We were 9 "54. He asked who was going to go down the ladder 10 desperate to get out of the building but didn't have 10 first and Rebin told me to go. Rebin is older than me 11 many options. 11 so I think he wanted to make sure I got out safely 12 "45. We thought about tying bed sheets together to 12 before he went down. I didn't want to leave him but we 13 climb down to lower floors and then jump down to the 13 had to move quickly so I put my coat on and climbed onto 14 ground. We thought we would break some bones but at 14 the window ledge. 15 least we would be alive but Rebin didn't have enough 15 "55. When I looked at the fireman's ladder it was 16 sheets " 16 very slim, seemed flimsy and unsafe. I asked the 17 If I move forward in the statement to paragraph 48, 17 firefighter to tie me to the ladder or do something to 18 18 it continues: make it secure but he said 1 had to go now and move 19 "48. We talked to neighbours and people on the 19 quickly as the fire was approaching. He said the fire 20 20 walkways but we had no communication with the and smoke were escalating and the building was burning 21 firefighters for roughly 20-30 minutes. Then I saw some 21 rapidly. I will never forget him saying to me 'please 22 22 firefighters looking at the bridge (near flat 6) which just get on the ladder so I can save your life'. That 23 connected the tower to the walkway finger blocks. The 23 is when the reality of the situation dawned on me. I 24 bridge was connected to a fenced gate which was locked 24 just had to risk it if not I would die in the fire. 25 25 "56. Whilst sitting on the window ledge, I could with a massive chain. Page 173 Page 175 see heavy flames, black smoke and pieces of the building 1 "49. If the firefighter had put the ladder up by 1 2 the playground the ladder would have been too short to 2 falling from the building. The corner of the building 3 3 on the North East side was burnt completely. reach us so I watched them open the gate to bring the 4 4 "57. I couldn't see the sky as it was covered by ladder up onto the bridge. The firemen had rope in 5 their hands which they attached to the ladder to pull it 5 the flames and smoke. The fire was really bad, it was 6 up onto the bridge before extending the ladder up to the 6 raging. I had never seen anything like this before. 7 7 "58. The firefighter told me what to do and guided living window. 8 "50. Now that the firemen had opened the gate by 8 my every step. He told me to hold onto the window frame 9 9 the bridge, I believed the ladder would be long enough with my left hand and feel for the ladder step with my 10 to reach us. Once the ladder was on the bridge they 10 right foot. 11 extended it up but it was too short. The ladder only 11 "59. It took me about 5 minutes to get myself 12 reached to 3rd or 4th floor. 12 together because I was panicking. I couldn't feel the 13 "51. They collapsed the ladder and didn't say 13 ladder with my foot at first but I eventually managed it 14 anything to us but after about 10 minutes some 14 and I started to work my way down the ladder. The 15 15 fireman was directing me from underneath me saying 'left

firefighters on the bridge put another ladder up against the building towards us but they put it about 3 feet away from the window and it was too difficult and dangerous to reach. "52. I was desperate to get out but thought we would fall from the window whilst reaching for the ladder as it was too far from the wall of the building. My feet were getting hot from the heat inside the flat. I remember shouting out to the firefighters asking them to move the ladder closer to the window so we could reach it without over stretching out of the window too

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Page 176

foot, right foot, left foot, right foot'. We went down

about twenty steps before the top ladder ended and the

lower ladder started which was scary but we carried on

"60. I saw a fireman at the bottom holding the base

of the ladder. When I got down the fireman directed me

to a policeman who was standing near the main entrance.

I spoke to him and he sent me away from the building.

There was what seemed like hundreds of people

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down.

everywhere."

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1	Mr Chairman, that's where I propose to stop reading	1	people were going upstairs. I thought that she had
2	from that statement.	2	instructions to go upstairs. She was not panicking but
3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, thank you.	3	it was as though she had been given an instruction. It
4	FADUMO AHMED (evidence read into the record)	4	was also clear that fire was lower down the Tower and
5	MR RAWAT: The next statement I would want to put into the	5	walking down towards the fire made less sense. I had
6	record is the statement of Fadumo Ahmed. That is	6	known Debbie since I moved in and so I thought I should
7	IWS00000729.	7	do what she said.
8	If we go to page 8, please, the statement carries	8	"8. The door to the stairs was closed and I opened
9	a statement of truth. It's signed and dated	9	the door and went into the stairway. In the stairs
10	11 May 2018. It is not accompanied by any exhibits.	10	there was only a little bit of smoke at that time and it
11	In her statement, Ms Ahmed explains that she moved	11	was light. There was less smoke than in the lobby but
12	into flat 164 on the 19th floor of Grenfell Tower in	12	there was some. There was no fire alarm and there was
13	2008. She lived alone in her flat, and on the night of	13	no one else on the floor at the time. Debbie and I
14	the fire itself she had been at work until 9.00 pm and	14	walked slowly up the stairs.
15	then she went straight home.	15	"9. On the way up the stairs from the 19th floor to
16	If I begin by setting out an extract of her account	16	the 23rd floor I saw no one else. I don't even know if
17	of the fire by going to paragraph 6 on page 2.	17	Debbie was following me at the time. I went upstairs
18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.	18	because Debbie had told me to. I thought that she might
19	MR RAWAT: "6. At the time of the fire it was Ramadan and I	19	have had information about what we should do. I just
20	broke my fast at about 9pm after work. After work I	20	followed what she said.
21	stayed in my flat and I was listening to Islamic	21	"10. I think I went straight to the 23rd floor, but
22	lectures on my phone with headphones on. At about	22	I am a little confused about whether it was the last
23	1:20am I was still awake in my bedroom and listening to	23	floor. I came out into the lobby at the top and the
24	the lectures, when I got a phone call from my cousin,	24	smoke was even worse than on my floor. It was now very
25	Sabah Mohammed, who told me that there was a fire in the	25	dark and thick and very hard to see. It made my eyes
	,		
	Page 177		Page 179
1	building. She lives near Grenfell Tower and could see	1	hurt and, as before, smelt of chemicals.
2	from the outside that it was on fire. She told me that	2	"11. When I got to the top floor there were people
3	I should come out of the Tower and get downstairs. I	3	standing in front of the door to Flat 201. This is the
4	spoke to Sabah after the fire and she remembers checking	4	flat that was opposite the lift in the corner. The flat
		5	was in the same position in the building as Debbie's
5	her phone times and told me that she first called me at 1:20am. I was shocked by her call. There had never	6	flat four floors below.
6	been a fire before in Grenfell Tower that I had seen. I	7	
7		8	"12. We were able to get in to Flat 201 although I had never been in the flat before and did not know whose
8	did not check if there was any fire and at this time did		
9	not see any fire or smoke in my flat.	9	flat it was. Inside the flat there was some smoke but a
10	"7. With Sabah's phone call I sensed it was serious	10	lot less than the lobby and I could also see fire at the
11	and that something was very wrong and so I quickly got	11	windows. I was standing in the corridor and could look
12	ready to leave the flat. I picked up my phone and keys,	12	along the hall and see fire appearing in front of the
13	put my shoes on and quickly came out of the flat. I was	13	living room window.
14	thinking of going downstairs. When I came out of my	14	"13. We stood in the corridor of the flat. I think
15	flat into the lobby it was full of dark smoke. It was	15	there were about 10 people there and we were crowded
16	thick dark grey and steamy and was very hard to see	16	around the entrance door and hallway. I've been shown
17	through. I could not see very far because of the smoke.	17	pictures of people by the police and identified some of
18	It smelt a bit like gas and chemicals and I covered my	18	these. There was Debbie Lamprell and her male friend
19	mouth. It burned my eyes and I just wanted to cover my	19	Gary Maunders. I often saw Debbie and Gary together and
20	eyes because of the pain on my eyes. I could see my	20	she lived on my floor. There was also my other
21	neighbour, Debbie Lamprell, standing opposite the two	21	neighbour, Amal Ahmedin from flat 166, who was also from
22	lifts near the cupboard doors. There is a cupboard	22	my floor. She was with her cousin Amina Mahmud Idris,
23	opposite the two lifts and she was next to this. She	23	and daughter Amaya. There was also an afro-Caribbean
24	lived on the same floor as me and had the corner flat,	24	man who I now know was Raymond Bernard and I think he
25	number 161. She looked frightened and said to me that	25	was the tenant of Flat 201. There was also Berkti
	Page 178		Page 180
	1 450 110	1	1 480 100

Day 72 Grenfell Tower Public Inquiry Haftom with her teenage son, Biruk Haftom. It was hard 1 fire coming from below and thought that there was no 2 2 hope going downstairs. I tried to go up further to get to recognise people and we couldn't talk to each other 3 because of the smoke. By now the smoke was going into 3 away from the fire but I quickly reached a metal door 4 our mouths and we could barely breathe. 4 that was padlocked. I tried to get through the door and 5 "14. The front door of the flat was open a little 5 banged it again and again. I wanted to get out at the and people were standing along the corridor near the 6 top but couldn't. My police statement says I got onto 6 7 7 the roof. This is not correct. I tried to get on the door. People were acting in different ways, some were 8 8 roof and banged on the door to get up there but could calm, some were panicking and trying to cover their 9 9 mouths. We were all hiding in the corridor of the flat not get out. I could hear a helicopter outside and kept 10 to get away from the flames near the window and because 10 banging on the metal door. It was a steel brownish 11 colour door. It was very small but locked. I could 11 the lobby was so thick with smoke. 12 "15. I think people were suffering because they 12 hear the helicopter and kept thinking that there was no 13 way for them to get in. They couldn't see me and I 13 were not able to breathe. The smoke was affecting 14 people's minds and making it impossible to even think. 14 don't know why I was banging or how long I stayed there. 15 I was feeling dizzy. It was like a gas. 15 "19. By now smoke started to come onto the stairs. I was on the phone to my cousin who was telling me 'just 16 "16. Amal and I began to go to the bathroom to try 16 17 and bring water out and throw it onto the fire in the 17 come down, just come down' but I knew how bad the smoke 18 18 was in the lobby and knew that the fire must have been window. We found a washing up bowl and about three 19 times we carried water in the plastic bowl through to 19 stronger downstairs. Even though my cousin was saying 20 'come down' I thought there was just no hope going down. 20 the living room. We threw the water on the window 21 because the top of the window was on fire. The window 21 "20. More smoke was coming the stairs and making it 22 22 hard to face going down. It was as if the smoke was opens in two ways, it can open completely on its hinges 23 23 like a normal window or it can tilt forward at the top. following me up. It very scary. The smoke was dark and 24 It was tilted open at the top and the top had caught 24 had a terrible smell. It was like drinking gas. 25 fire and was burning away. We were trying to throw 25 "21. My cousin was on the phone but I was thinking Page 181 Page 183 1 1 water onto the widow to try and put it out. I was 2 worried because I could see that the television was 2 3 3 close by the window and was worried that it might become 4 4 dangerous because of the fire and water and so we 5 5 stopped. 6 "17. I realised that the water was not helping. I 6 7 7 reality was so different. went back to the area just inside the front door near 8 the boiler. At that time I don't know how many people 8 9 9 were still standing there. There were about 10 people 10 next to the door and some were saying that they could 10 11 not breathe. We felt trapped as the fire had broken 11 12 12

into the flat through the window and was in the living room and thick smoke from the lobby was coming into the flat. We were trapped with fire from one side that was starting to come in and thick smoke on the other side. I realised that I needed to get out and so I came out of the flat into the lobby which was full of thick black smoke. I ran out of flat 201 straight into the stairway. I couldn't see anything in the lobby because it was so full of smoke but the door to the stair was

"18. Around this time my family was calling me again and again telling me to get out and come downstairs. This was not that easy and they did not understand what I was seeing. I was worried about the

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that they couldn't see what was really going on. The smoke was coming up hitting me and what they were saying and what I was doing, were completely different. The smoke was coming up towards me. That is what stopped me from going down stairs. I felt like my cousin just couldn't understand. I appreciated their calls but the

> "22. As I was banging on the door more and more smoke was coming up. The smoke was getting thicker and thicker all the time in the stairwell. It was now so thick that I couldn't even see the stairs underneath my

"23. I remember speaking to my cousin on the phone. I wasn't thinking straight and was breathing chemicals. Whenever the phone rang I wasn't always able to answer. At one stage my sister called me. I heard them both telling me to come down the stairs.

"24. I decided to try and walk down the stairs but could hardly walk. On the way down there was smoke in the stairs. It was very dark and so I couldn't see things properly. As I got further down the smoke got thicker and it became more and more difficult. I could not breathe very well and was coughing. I could not walk properly and had to hold the rails to steady myself.

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46 (Pages 181 to 184)

very close.

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1	"25. The further I went down the worse the smoke	1	had lived at Flat 151 Grenfell Tower for about 12 to 18
2	was. It was making me cough and was making me feel	2	months before the fire."
3	dizzy but I came down two or three flights but finally	3	If I just read an extract of Solmaz's statement.
4	could not do any more and sat down against the wall. I	4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
5	think this was between floor 20 and 21. I remember this	5	MR RAWAT: Particularly in relation to the events of the
6	because it was half-way between floors and I was sitting	6	night itself. I start at paragraph 7 on page 2, please:
7	and leaning with my back against the wall. I don't know	7	"7. On 13th June, Sakeneh, Fatemeh, my mother
8	how long I was sitting there. It may have been half an	8	Shanaz, Fariba and I spent the day together. We had
9	hour, I just don't know.	9	lunch at Sakeneh's flat and stayed there that afternoon.
10	"26. There was so much smoke and breathing was so	10	I left with my mother and Fariba at about 9.30pm.
11	difficult and I felt weak. I just prayed. I wanted the	11	Fatemeh stayed with Sakeneh.
12	smoke to take my soul, but I didn't want to experience	12	"8. A few hours later, after I had got home, I
13	the fire. I knew I was going to die and felt like I was	13	received a phone call from a friend telling me that
14	waiting to die. I was thinking about the good things	14	Grenfell Tower was on fire. I then immediately called
15	that I have done. In Islam we believe that the good	15	Fatemeh. I believe that this call was made before I am.
16	things you have done in your life will protect you at	16	Fatemeh could not speak English fluently and so I would
17	the end. I was wondering whether I had done enough good	17	speak to her in Farsi, which was her first language.
18	in my life and whether I had done the things that I	18	Fatemeh answered the phone. I told her that there was a
19	should have done.	19	fire at Grenfell Tower. She said: 'yes, the building is
20	"27. After about half an hour I saw a light coming	20	on fire, come as soon as possible.' She then asked me to
21	towards me and I heard a fireman's voice. The fire man	21	call the fire brigade. I called my mother and I told
22	had a light on his forehead and I could see it through	22	her about the fire. At first my mother did not believe
23	the smoke. I don't remember speaking to him. He wanted	23	me and she thought that I was exaggerating. She thought
24	to hold my hand to help me down the stairs but I was too	24	that it would be just a small fire. I shouted at her
25	dizzy to walk very far and he began to carry me. I	25	that it was serious.
	analy to main very tal and no organito early me. I	20	till it was serious.
	Page 185		Page 187
1	remember very little from this point. I remember saying	1	"9. I was driven to Grenfell Tower by a friend.
2	thank you. I remember that he said that we needed to go	2	When I arrived I saw that the fire brigade were already
3	downstairs. I could not continue walking and he soon	3	there. There were a lot of firefighters around the
4	had to carry me down because I couldn't walk. He was	4	bottom of the Tower. I am not sure how many. I believe
5	going very fast to get down the stairs but after this I	5	I arrived at the base of the Tower at about 1.10am. I
6	don't really remember what happened.	6	had been on the phone to Fatemeh from the moment I left
7	"28. My next memory is lying down somewhere and the	7	my house. She was telling me what was happening
8	ambulance people were with me. There was an ambulance	8	inside."
9	and paramedics and they were giving me oxygen. They	9	If I continue from paragraph 11:
10	took me to St Mary's hospital and I was there for about	10	"11. My mother came to the Tower around 10 to 20
11	a week."	11	minutes after I had arrived, so at around 1.20am to 1.30
	That's where I propose to end with that statement.		minutes after 1 had arrived, so at around 1.20am to 1.50
1 1/		1 12	am Shahrokh one of Sakeneh's sons, arrived about 45
12		12	am. Shahrokh, one of Sakeneh's sons, arrived about 45
13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.	13	minutes after me.
13 14	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. SOLMAZ SATTAR (evidence read into the record)	13 14	minutes after me. "12. When we first arrived there were only a few
13 14 15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.  SOLMAZ SATTAR (evidence read into the record)  MR RAWAT: Mr Chairman, can I now go to a statement which is	13 14 15	minutes after me.  "12. When we first arrived there were only a few people who were not firefighters, perhaps 10 people, at
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1 now." 1 Fatemeh. I could hear Sakeneh in the background but I 2 2 did not speak to her. I relayed what I was told to my If I move on to paragraph 14: 3 3 "14. On the way to Grenfell Tower I remember asking mother Shahnaz and to Shahrokh. For some of the time I 4 Fatemeh if there was anyone to help her, or if the fire 4 put Fatemeh on speaker phone so that everyone could hear 5 brigade were there. Fatemeh said that she did not know. 5 what she had to say. I also translated what she was 6 At the time Fatemeh said she was too scared to go to the 6 saying to the police and fire officer. 7 7 window to see where the fire was. When I first started "20. I was worried and scared but I believed that 8 8 Fatemeh and Sakeneh would be rescued. We saw more and speaking to her, Fatemeh was in Flat 151 with Sakeneh. 9 9 By the time I had arrived at Grenfell Tower, Fatemeh more firefighters and police officers arriving as time 10 told me that they had left their flat intending to go 10 went on. Later on, there was a helicopter flying around 11 the Tower that I thought was there to rescue people 11 down the stairs and to leave the Tower but when they 12 left their flat, they met other residents in the 12 trapped higher up in the building. I asked Fatemeh if 13 13 she could hear the helicopter but she said she could not corridors (she did not say exactly who or where) and 14 they were told not to go downstairs as there was fire 14 hear it. I said it was probably there to rescue her. 15 further down inside the building. Fatemeh told me that 15 "21. I remember seeing that the fire brigade were 16 she and Sakeneh went up to a neighbour's flat on the 16 spraying water on the outside of the building but the 17 23rd Floor - I believe the neighbour was called Farhad 17 water could only reach part way up the building, perhaps to the 11th or 12th floor. It didn't look like it was 18 ... From then on, Fatemeh and Sakineh stayed in this 18 19 flat on the 23rd floor; I believe that this was Flat 19 reaching higher than this. 20 20 "22. At one point, Fatemeh started coughing down 205. I do not know exactly what time it was that they 21 went up to Flat 205 but if I arrived at the Tower at 21 the phone. I told her to drink some water. She told me 22 22 that there was no water, and that the water supply in around 1.10am, it must have been shortly before then. 23 23 "15. I saw the fire going up the building after I the flat had been cut. 24 arrived. It was so quick it looked like burning paper. 24 "23. Later on in the night I said to Fatemeh that I 25 The smoke got thicker and thicker as the night went on. 25 just wanted to put down the phone to her so that I could Page 189 Page 191 "16. When I arrived, I was standing at the base of 1 tell the firefighters and police officers the 1 2 the Tower next to a police officer and London Fire 2 information that she had told me. The firefighters gave 3 3 me the advice to pass on which was that my aunts should Brigade officer. They both asked me who I was speaking 4 4 stay put and wet towels and put them under doors. When to, and asked me who was up there. I explained that my 5 aunties were on the 23rd floor and that they had to be 5 I tried to call back Fatemeh back, she did not pick up 6 rescued. Fatemeh told me that she and Sakeneh were in 6 the phone. After this I was not able to speak to her 7 7 again. The previous call had been the last time I had Flat 205 with two men and two other women. I passed the 8 8 information on to the police officer and the fire spoken to her. 9 9 officer. At that time Fatemeh was quite calm. She said "24. I keep asking myself why I put the phone down. 10 to me to tell the police officer and the fire officer to 10 Even though I could not get through to Fatemeh, I still 11 bring trucks to rescue them; she asked that they bring a 11 believed at the time that they would be rescued by the 12 12 cherry picker or an extended ladder that could reach firefighters. From where we were standing it looked like 13 them up on the 23rd floor. 13 the other side of the Tower was not yet on fire. I 14 "17. Fatemeh told me that there was no fire in the 14 actually thought that my aunts had been rescued and that 15 flat but there was smoke, and that they could smell the 15 was why Fatemeh was not answering her phone. "25. I could see lights in windows of the Tower, 16 smoke. I passed this on to the police and fire officer. 16 17 17 "18. I was told by the fire officer to tell Sakeneh and I could see people holding lights in the windows and 18 18 waving them, trying to get attention. I could hear and Fatemeh and the others in Flat 205 to stay put, and 19 that they would be rescued. I told my aunt this. The 19 people inside screaming for help. 20 firefighter told me to tell my aunts that they should 20 "26. From a lower floor — I am not sure which - I 21 21 saw a white sheet with knots tied in it being lowered make everything wet, to wet towels and put them under 22 the doors, to wet the carpet, the sofa and to wet 22 down out of a window and then being taken back up. I 23 23 themselves. When I told Fatemeh to do this she said think it was a person inside trying to use the sheets as 24 they had already done all of that. 24 a rope to climb down." 25 25 "19. I continued to be in telephone contact with Mr Chairman, that's all I propose to read from that Page 190 Page 192

1	statement.	1	rescue my loved ones. At one point whilst in the crowd,
2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, thank you very much.	2	I fell down on the ground."
3	SHAHNAZ AFRASIABI (evidence read into the record)	3	Again, if I move now to paragraph 12:
4	MR RAWAT: The next statement I now propose to put in the	4	"12. I stood next to Solmaz who was on the
5	record is that of Shahnaz Afrasiabi, IWS00000767,	5	telephone to Fatemeh. She was speaking in [redacted] to
6	please.	6	Fatemeh as Fatemeh was not fluent in English. Solmaz
7	If we go, please, to page 7 of that statement, it	7	was listening to what Fatemeh had to say and then she
8	has a statement of truth, it's signed and dated 26 June	8	would tell the firefighter and police officer standing
9	2018.	9	next to us what was going on in their flat. The
10	There is also a translator's declaration	10	officers then gave advice on what to do to Solmaz and
11	accompanying the statements.	11	she then passed on their advice to Fatemeh in
12	There are no exhibits to put in.	12	[redacted]. I can't remember what the firefighters were
13	If, again, I can just read some extracts, please,	13	saying Fatemeh and Sakeneh should do. Sometimes Solmaz
14	and take us back to page 1.	14	put her phone on speakerphone so I could also hear what
15	At paragraph 3, Shahnaz explains:	15	Fatemeh was saying and what was going on in the flat. I
16	"My older sisters Sakeneh Afraseyabi and Fatemeh	16	can't remember exactly what she said, as there was so
17	Afraseyabi both died in Grenfell Tower. I was very	17	much going on at the time. I do remember hearing that
18	close to them - particularly to Sakeneh."	18	Fatemeh and Sakeneh had moved from their flat on the
19	If I move now to paragraph 8 and again deal with the	19	18th floor to another flat, on the 23rd floor, where
20	account of the night of the fire:	20	they were with some of Sakeneh's neighbours.
21	"8. I received a phone call from a family member in	21	"13. We watched the fire getting worse. We stood at
22	the early hours of the morning telling me that there was	22	the base of the Tower, helpless. I did not know what to
23	a fire at Grenfell Tower. At first I did not believe	23	do. It was like a movie. I could hear people screaming
24	think that it was very serious. I think that this call	24	from the Tower. People around me were crying because
25	was made at around lam. I then shortly after this call	25	they had loved ones in the Tower. I was just crying and
	Page 193		Page 195
1	received another phone call, this time from my daughter	1	I couldn't breathe."
2	Solmaz. She told me to get to Grenfell Tower straight	2	Again, if I move forward in the statement now to
3	away. She told me that the fire was real, and that it	3	paragraph 17:
4	was serious. I told Fariba that there was a fire at the	4	"17. I saw a helicopter in the sky an hour or two
5	Tower and we left my flat immediately. I stood in the	5	after I had arrived. I remember that we all spoke about
6	street and I put my hand out in front of passing cars	6	how we thought it was there to rescue my sisters. I
7	asking them to stop and take us to Grenfell Tower. A	7	thought it was there to rescue people in the Tower. We
8	car stopped and we were given a lift by a stranger	8	all believed at that point that my sisters would be
9	towards the Tower, who dropped us off at 'Pumpkin Pizza	9	rescued, out of the Tower and out of the fire but that
10	Shop' which was close to the Tower. We then started	10	didn't happen. Days after the fire I found out that the
11	walking towards the Tower. I got there at around	11	helicopter was there to film the fire.
12	1:30am."	12	"18. Solmaz had been on the phone to Fatemeh
13	If I continue at paragraph 10, the statement	13	virtually the whole time since I had been there. Solmaz
14	continues:	14	told Fatemeh that she was going to put the phone down so
15	"10. I tried to get into the Tower. I managed to	15	that she could get an update from firefighters about
16	make my way through a small group of people who were all	16	what they should do, so she could tell Fatemen and give
17	pushing and shoving each other to get towards the Tower.	17	her an update on the rescue. Solmaz put the phone down
18	At the front of the crowd were some police and fire	18	and spoke to some firefighters. However, Fatemeh did
19	officers. I pleaded with them to let me go into the	19	not pick up her calls after this point. She didn't pick
20	Tower but they didn't let me in. I could do nothing	20	up any calls after this. We were no longer able to
20	more but stand there and watch the fire. Much later on,	21	reach her. I think that this was around 3am. At the
22	I saw that my arms and legs were covered in bruises. I	22	time I believed that they must have been rescued by the
23	think these bruises were from me trying to get between	23	firefighters and my sisters were leaving or had left the
24	the crowd to get into the Tower and trying to get past	24	Tower.
25	the police so that I could get to the building and	25	"19. I waited for my sisters to come out of the
23	the police so that I could get to the building and	23	17. I wanted for my sisters to come out of the
	Page 194		Page 196

1	building, but they didn't come. It was incredibly	1	IWS00001036, please. This is the statement of
2	difficult. I was crying and found it difficult to	2	Rebecca Ross, who was a resident of flat 122 in
3	breathe. I was getting more and more worried about my	3	Grenfell Tower.
4	sisters as time went on and I started to question	4	If we go to page 23 in the statement, please, the
5	whether they had in fact been rescued."	5	statement carries a statement of truth, and it is signed
6	If I finally end by just reading a part of	6	and dated 22 August 2018.
7	paragraph 23.	7	There are 10 exhibits accompanying the statement and
8	"23. I also went to a local church to get some	8	I should put those formally into the record. They are
9	water. I believe I did this at around 10am. There were	9	labelled within the statement RSR/1 to RSR/10, and in
10	two registers at the church and I checked them. One	10	terms of their inquiry references, they begin at
11	list was for the people who had been rescued from the	11	$IWS 00001033 \ to \ IWS 00001036, \ IWS 00001039 \ to \ IWS 00001041,$
12	Tower, and another list for those who were missing. I	12	IWS00001043 to IWS00001044, and finally IWS00001046.
13	saw that my sisters had been registered as having been	13	As I've explained, Mr Chairman, the statement sets
14	rescued, so I left and went to check all the churches	14	out a great deal of detail, including Ms Ross's account
15	nearby to try and find them. I went to the Town Hall,	15	of the night.
16	and to all the hospitals where the survivors were being	16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
17	treated at to see if my sisters were there or if there	17	MR RAWAT: I do not propose to read any part of the
18	was a record of them but there wasn't. I do not know	18	statement out loud today, but again would ask that it
19	why my sisters were on a list as having been rescued as	19	simply it be formally admitted into the record.
20	we now know that they lost their lives in that fire,	20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, thank you.
21	whilst we were watching from the ground. I found out	21	MR RAWAT: I think we've got a little longer than I thought,
22	that they died some time on 14 June. The pain I feel is	22	so perhaps could I just do one more statement, if I may?
23	immeasurable."	23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, very well.
24	I propose to stop reading from that statement at	24	MAKREM HARZI (evidence read into the record)
25	that point.	25	MR RAWAT: Thank you.
	Page 197		Page 199
		1	
1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-RICK: Ves thank you very much	1	Could we have please IWS0000052 on the screen
1 2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, thank you very much.  NIDA MANGORA (evidence read into the record)	1 2	Could we have, please, IWS00000952 on the screen,
2	NIDA MANGOBA (evidence read into the record)	2	and if we go, please, to page 15 of the statement.
2 3	NIDA MANGOBA (evidence read into the record)  MR RAWAT: Mr Chairman, if I finish today's reading by just	2 3	and if we go, please, to page 15 of the statement.  This is the statement of Makrem Harzi, and on the
2 3 4	NIDA MANGOBA (evidence read into the record)  MR RAWAT: Mr Chairman, if I finish today's reading by just putting two further statements into the record.	2 3 4	and if we go, please, to page 15 of the statement.  This is the statement of Makrem Harzi, and on the last page, page 15, we see that it is signed with
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2 3 4 5 6	NIDA MANGOBA (evidence read into the record)  MR RAWAT: Mr Chairman, if I finish today's reading by just putting two further statements into the record.  The first statement, if we could just have it up on the screen, is IWS00001145.	2 3 4 5 6	and if we go, please, to page 15 of the statement.  This is the statement of Makrem Harzi, and on the last page, page 15, we see that it is signed with a statement of truth.  The date of the statement appears on the front page
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there was a fire in the building and that we had to get 1 busy. It certainly was not possible to run down the 2 2 out. I confirm that it was just Khalid at our door arid stairwell and it was not possible to walk at a hasty 3 he had not spoken to any fireman as far as I am aware. 3 pace down the stairs. This was because there were quite 4 There were no firemen at this stage that we could see. " 4 a number of people, I cannot recall how many. In front 5 I stop there and move on to paragraph 30, because 5 of and behind me and my family on the stairs. I the statement continues -- sorry, there is a bit of absolutely cannot remember how many people. It was like 6 6 7 7 paragraph 29 I should read. a dream. 8 It continues in relation to the interaction with 8 "33. It felt like being in a dream going down those 9 9 stairs. In the stairwell I do not remember there being Khalid: 10 "I remember that behind him we could already see 10 any smoke or if there was then it was very limited. I 11 smoke in our communal landing, it was not thick smoke 11 could see down the stairs as the smoke (if there was 12 but it was clearly visible. At the time of leaving the 12 any) was not thick. As I have said I cannot remember 13 flat there was smoke, but it was not very thick. The 13 if there was no smoke or if it was just very thin. I 14 smoke was not black but more a grey/white colour and you 14 do not remember if there was any smell of smoke on the 15 could see through it. I realised straightaway that 15 stairwell. There were lights on in the stairwell, but I 16 something was seriously wrong. My wife and I decided to 16 do not know if they were the emergency lights or the 17 leave our flat immediately, with our child. 17 ordinary lights. I could not hear any fire alarms 18 "30. The three of us rushed out of our flat in our 18 either above or below where we were, while we were going 19 nightclothes. We had two smoke alarms in our flat, one 19 down the stairwell. However, when I reached around the 20 in the kitchen and one in the hallway. Neither of these 20 boxing gym on the first floor, or shortly after. I 21 went off. I know that they were both working as they 21 could hear alarms, but I do not know where the sound was 22 would go off when we were cooking. This had happened 22 coming from or what the alarms actually were. However, 23 recently within the last month. No smoke alarms were 23 it must have been close as it sounded quite loud. As 24 going off outside out flat as there were none. I did 24 mentioned above when we were leaving our floor via the 25 25 stairwell, there were no firemen that we could see. not even stop to pick up my mobile phone, nor did my Page 201 Page 203 1 "34. There were people in the stairwell who had 1 wife, we just got out with our son straightway. I did 2 stop briefly to put on my shoes, however my wife only 2 clearly just woken up. They were i n a state of 3 semi-undress and clearly did not have on proper outdoor 3 had flip flops on as we started down the stairs. 4 4 clothes. I remember seeing people topless and people "31. I recall that as we were leaving our flat our 5 neighbour, Khalid, was knocking on our other neighbours' 5 just in their underwear, all going down the stairs. They had obviously left their flats in haste and 6 doors, when an elderly couple who lived in flat 56 6 7 7 urgency, just like me and my family. opened the door in response to his knocking, I recall at 8 8 that point I could now see quite thick smoke come out of "35. We could only go down in single file down the 9 9 stairwell, as very soon we met fire fighters coming up the flat, as the front door opened. The smoke coming 10 out of Flat 56 came out when they opened their door. 10 the stairs. We first met the firefighters either on the 11 The smoke that came out was black and much darker than 11 floor with the boxing gym or shortly after that. I 12 12 think we passed about three or four firemen at this the smoke that was on the landing. I cannot remember 13 what the smoke smelt like as everything was moving so 13 point. I also recall seeing the fire fighters' hoses 14 being run up the stairwell. The fire fighters and their 14 quickly There was lots of smoke coming out of their 15 flat, but I could not see inside their flat properly as 15 hoses restricted the width of the stairwell which could be used by the residents leaving the building. I do not 16 their flat was in the corner. All I could see was the 16 17 know how long it took for my family to get down the 17 smoke leaving through the front door. I could not see 18 18 stairs. But it seemed to be no more than five or ten that they were coughing ... I could clearly see that by 19 19 this stage, the point at which my family and I had minutes. I really am not sure, though. 20 entered the landing to escape (a time I do not know), I 20 "36. I subsequently learned from the police that 21 21 the CCTV camera which was located in our ground floor of could see the smoke coming from inside fiat 56. This 22 22 lent even more urgency to my decision for my family to the Tower area captured me leaving the building at 1:24 23 23 am. From this information, assuming that it took my leave the building soon as possible. 24 "32. At the time I entered the stairwell - we had 24 family five to ten minutes to get down the stairwell 25 25 from the 8th floor. I would have thus seen the smoke to open the door leading into it - the stairs were quite

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coming out of the front door of flat 56, when it was
 2
        opened by the occupants, at between approximately 1:14
 3
        am and 1:19 am."
 4
           That's all I propose to read from that statement,
 5
        Mr Chairman.
 6
      SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, thank you very much.
 7
      MR RAWAT: That is our reading for today.
 8
      SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, well, it's right that I should
 9
        thank all those who made the statements you've read for
10
        taking the time and trouble to produce them for us, and
        just to confirm that they will all be put into the
11
        inquiry's record, they will form part of the evidence
12
13
        and will be taken into consideration with everything
14
15
      MR RAWAT: Thank you very much, Mr Chairman.
      SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
16
17
           So that's it for today, is it?
18
      MR RAWAT: It is.
19
      SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, thank you very much. Well,
20
        we'll break at that point and resume tomorrow morning at
21
         10 o'clock, please. Thank you.
22
           10 o'clock tomorrow, then. Thank you.
23
      (4.30 pm)
24
       (The hearing adjourned until Wednesday, 14 November 2018
25
                   at 10.00 am)
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