

# OPUS2

Grenfell Tower Inquiry

Day 152

June 29, 2021

Opus 2 - Official Court Reporters

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1 Tuesday, 29 June 2021  
 2 (10.00 am)  
 3 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to  
 4 today’s hearing. Today we’re going to hear evidence  
 5 from Mr Graham Webb, who was the managing director of  
 6 Repairs Direct, which carried out responsive repairs for  
 7 the TMO.  
 8 Yes, Mr Kinnier.  
 9 MR KINNIER: Sir, may I call Mr Webb.  
 10 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Thank you.  
 11 MR GRAHAM WEBB (sworn)  
 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Thank you very much. Do sit down  
 13 and make yourself comfortable.  
 14 THE WITNESS: Thank you.  
 15 (Pause)  
 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Good, thank you.  
 17 When you’re ready, Mr Kinnier.  
 18 Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY  
 19 MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.  
 20 Would you mind confirming your name for the record.  
 21 A. Graham Webb.  
 22 Q. Thank you. Good morning, Mr Webb. Thank you for  
 23 attending today to give evidence.  
 24 Before we start questioning, there are three things  
 25 I should perhaps set out before we start.

1

1 First of all, if at any time you feel you need  
 2 a break, please say so, that’s not a problem.  
 3 Secondly, if you could keep your voice up  
 4 throughout, that enables the shorthand writer to capture  
 5 everything you say and capture it accurately.  
 6 Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, my questions  
 7 are hopefully clear; sometimes they’re not. If they’re  
 8 not clear to you, please don’t hesitate to say so and  
 9 I’ll rephrase it so it’s comprehensible.  
 10 A. Thank you.  
 11 Q. Now, you have provided five statements to the Inquiry.  
 12 The first statement is dated 23 August 2018, which is  
 13 found at {TMO10048963}. Is that it?  
 14 A. Yes, it is.  
 15 Q. Your second statement is dated 14 February 2019, and can  
 16 be found at {TMO00840366}. Is that it?  
 17 A. Yes, it is.  
 18 Q. Third statement dated 17 April 2019, which is at  
 19 {TMO00840368}. Is that it?  
 20 A. Yes, it is.  
 21 Q. Fourth statement dated 20 August 2019, which is at  
 22 {TMO10049986}. Is that it?  
 23 A. Yes, it is.  
 24 Q. Thank you.  
 25 Fifthly and finally, the statement dated

2

1 25 September 2019, {TMO00842379}. Is that it?  
 2 A. Yes, it is.  
 3 Q. Thank you.  
 4 Have you read each of those statements recently?  
 5 A. I have, yes.  
 6 Q. Can you confirm their contents are true?  
 7 A. They are indeed.  
 8 Q. And you’re content for those statements to stand as your  
 9 evidence to this Inquiry?  
 10 A. I am, yes, thank you.  
 11 Q. Now, the first topic I would like to discuss with you  
 12 today is your personal experience and training.  
 13 If we turn to paragraph 3 of your second statement,  
 14 which can be found at {TMO00840366/1}, in the first line  
 15 there you say:  
 16 "My career background is in high volume operational  
 17 team management."  
 18 What do you mean by "high volume operational team  
 19 management"?  
 20 A. So in my background I’ve led large teams of security  
 21 staff at Heathrow Airport, where I led a team of 1,200  
 22 people. I’ve also led large teams of repairs staff, so  
 23 electricians, plumbers, plasterers. I’ve led  
 24 manufacturing teams. So very much blue collar, dynamic,  
 25 quick turnaround workforces.

3

1 Q. Thank you.  
 2 Staying in the same paragraph, at the end of the  
 3 second line, you say that:  
 4 "Early in my career I spent a year in social housing  
 5 repairs and maintenance ..."  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. For whom did you work during that year?  
 8 A. I worked for Morrison.  
 9 Q. And when was that year?  
 10 A. From my recollection it was around 2012.  
 11 Q. What was your role at that organisation?  
 12 A. I was a regional director and I looked after the  
 13 responsive repairs and voids contracts across  
 14 approximately six different clients, which included the  
 15 London Borough of Southwark, Kensington and Chelsea TMO,  
 16 London Borough of Ealing and a number of others.  
 17 Q. So can we take it from that that you had experience,  
 18 before you started at Repairs Direct, in maintenance of  
 19 properties?  
 20 A. Yes, I did.  
 21 Q. Thank you.  
 22 What experience did you have in relation to the  
 23 maintenance of fire safety systems?  
 24 A. I do not.  
 25 Q. Any specific experience of maintenance as it affected

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1 fire doors?  
 2 A. Yes. So in social housing or repairs and maintenance,  
 3 of course, then there was a responsibility for normally  
 4 the front doors for flats, and in smoke alarms and smoke  
 5 sensors, that sort of thing, within property, and also  
 6 occasionally on the repair of communal fire doors.

7 Q. And what experience did you have of the management of  
 8 health and safety generally?

9 A. As a manager of large operational teams, I was used to  
 10 managing teams and putting health and safety at the  
 11 front of the agenda, making sure we had a culture of  
 12 safety leadership, and encouraged our staff to report  
 13 not only accidents but near-misses, so that we could  
 14 learn from those and eradicate the opportunities for  
 15 those to occur again.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 Could we turn to {TMO00853077/14}. We see there, in  
 18 the top right-hand corner, this is the spring 2016  
 19 edition of The Link, which is the TMO's newsletter, and  
 20 it's the announcement of your appointment as managing  
 21 director of Repairs Direct.

22 Now, it says in that paragraph that you had at the  
 23 time senior management and operational leadership  
 24 experience in social housing repairs and maintenance.

25 A. Yes.

5

1 Q. Was that your one year at Morrisons that's been referred  
 2 to there?

3 A. Yes, it would be, yes.

4 Q. And nothing else beyond that?

5 A. No, though it does refer to my time at Rok Group Plc.  
 6 Rok, which is a company which no longer exists, dealt  
 7 with domestic insurance repairs, so similar kinds of  
 8 activities in generally privately owned homes as  
 9 a result of a leaky boiler or something of that sort.

10 Q. And what was your experience as operations director for  
 11 Safetykleen UK in relation to the maintenance of  
 12 properties?

13 A. So at Safetykleen UK I had a wide brief. I was  
 14 responsible for their manufacturing operation, but I was  
 15 also responsible for all of their facilities in the UK.  
 16 So the maintenance management, (inaudible) cleaning,  
 17 reception desks, and also all the usual safety systems,  
 18 legionella, et cetera.

19 Q. During your time with Morrisons, what experience did you  
 20 have of dealing with the TMO?

21 A. So the TMO was one of I believe six contracts that  
 22 I looked after. So I had a local manager embedded  
 23 within the TMO who ran the day-to-day operation of the  
 24 contract, and that was one of a cluster of contracts  
 25 that I looked after for Morrisons.

6

1 Q. Were there any issues that you encountered during that  
 2 time about problems with maintenance at Repairs Direct?

3 A. Erm --

4 Q. And responsiveness and turnaround of --

5 A. There was a backlog of repairs that we were  
 6 struggling -- that Morrison was struggling to clear, and  
 7 we were involved in conversations with the TMO around  
 8 how we could provide more resource to try and clear the  
 9 backlog.

10 Q. And that was your experience in 2012?

11 A. Yeah, and, you know, in short, it was agreed that we  
 12 were unable to provide the service that they required  
 13 within the funding -- the price point that had been  
 14 agreed, so Morrisons served notice on the contract.

15 Q. Mr Webb, thank you.

16 Before we go on to the next topic, it may well be  
 17 that the shorthand writer is having some difficulties  
 18 keeping up with you.

19 A. I'm sorry.

20 Q. If you can maybe adopt a slower pace.

21 A. I will, yes.

22 Q. Thank you very much.

23 Can we turn to {TMO10048963/1}.

24 Now, this is paragraph 2 of your first statement to  
 25 the Inquiry, and you explain there that Repairs Direct

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1 was a wholly-owned subsidiary of RBKCTMO, and its role  
 2 was to deal with reactive repairs in residential housing  
 3 managed by TMO; is that a fair summary?

4 A. Yes, it is.

5 Q. Can you help the panel and explain briefly your role and  
 6 responsibilities as managing director of Repairs Direct?

7 A. So Repairs Direct handled all of the responsive repairs  
 8 within the homes that were owned by the Royal Borough,  
 9 so that would mean everything from a leaky tap to  
 10 perhaps a -- repairing a light switch or repairing  
 11 a door, and also dealt with what was known as voids. So  
 12 void properties are homes which have been vacated for  
 13 one or other reason, and my team would visit that  
 14 property and do whatever work was necessary to bring it  
 15 back up to a defined lettable standard.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 Now, Sacha Jevans, who was the TMO's director of  
 18 operations, says in her statement -- we don't need to go  
 19 to it, but the reference is {TMO00000893/6},  
 20 paragraph 29, third line:

21 "Graham was directly accountable to the  
 22 Repairs Direct Board, however I had a dotted line  
 23 management function over him."

24 Would you agree that Sacha Jevans had a dotted line  
 25 management function above you?

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1 A. I would, yes.  
 2 Q. What did that dotted line mean in practice?  
 3 A. In essence, as Repairs Direct was a separate limited  
 4 company, I was answerable to the board of  
 5 Repairs Direct, but for day-to-day issues such as  
 6 approving periods of annual leave, then I would defer to  
 7 Sacha for approval.  
 8 Q. Thank you.  
 9 Now, the next topic I would like to turn to is the  
 10 information that was provided to you about the issues  
 11 that were confronting Repairs Direct when you joined the  
 12 company.  
 13 If we can turn to {RBK00060576/1}.  
 14 This document, as its front page shows, was an audit  
 15 report concerning Repairs Direct and it's dated  
 16 May 2014.  
 17 First of all, were you briefed on its contents when  
 18 you arrived at Repairs Direct?  
 19 A. I don't recall being briefed on its contents, no.  
 20 Q. Have you seen this document before?  
 21 A. I don't believe so.  
 22 Q. Do you recall any reference to an audit report of  
 23 Repairs Direct in May 2014 during your time at  
 24 Repairs Direct?  
 25 A. I recall that I was told that RBKC would from time to

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1 time audit Repairs Direct, but I don't recall a specific  
 2 reference to a report from May 2014.  
 3 Q. And you don't recall asking whether RBKC had previously  
 4 carried out any audits?  
 5 A. No.  
 6 Q. Could we stay in this document and turn to page 12  
 7 {RBK00060576/12}.  
 8 We see in the top left-hand corner it refers there  
 9 to "Repairs Quality Monitoring", and the audit  
 10 identified a number of areas for concern, set out in the  
 11 bottom left-hand corner, which included there in the  
 12 first bullet point:  
 13 "General level of poor quality workmanship."  
 14 If we go over the page {RBK00060576/13}, we see at  
 15 the very top left-hand corner:  
 16 "Work claimed as completed but where no work as  
 17 actually undertaken."  
 18 If we skip one, we see:  
 19 "Failure by some operatives to adhere to basic  
 20 Health and Safety processes."  
 21 If we go to the very bottom of the list, we see:  
 22 "Quality of work produced by subcontractors is not  
 23 included in surveys."  
 24 If we could turn to page 14 {RBK00060576/14}, and  
 25 look at the bottom paragraph and the third and fourth

10

1 bullet points there:  
 2 " ■ Greater focus on the quality of workmanship  
 3 during the post inspection process.  
 4 " ■ Further H&S training with random spot checks on  
 5 both employees and subcontractors."  
 6 Now, in relation to those identified failings in the  
 7 audit and the steps taken to resolve them, Sacha Jevans  
 8 said in her evidence — and we don't need to go to it,  
 9 but the reference is {Day127/117:2-7} — this:  
 10 "... I know Graham was doing a lot of work in terms  
 11 of these particular items, focus groups. So,  
 12 for example, we had a lot of work in the contact centre  
 13 on our processes, a lot of work on improving the IT  
 14 systems, we did health and safety gap analysis, more  
 15 training."  
 16 Now, first of all, do you agree with Sacha Jevans?  
 17 Did she give a comprehensive summary there of the steps  
 18 you were taking to make good the deficiencies identified  
 19 in this plan?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. Can you briefly summarise, in your own words, what steps  
 22 you took to meet those deficiencies set out in the audit  
 23 plan?  
 24 A. Firstly, I made clear the daily service level targets  
 25 that were expected of the team and made sure that the

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1 team were fully briefed of those. So they had  
 2 an expectation over how old a repair job should be  
 3 before it was completed, so the time taken between it  
 4 being notified to us and the job being completed. We  
 5 also made very clear our expectations on the quality of  
 6 repairs, and our aspirations that a repair should be  
 7 completed on the first time of visit rather than  
 8 requiring subsequent visits, and we did that through  
 9 a number of different processes.  
 10 But what was clear to me when I joined the  
 11 organisation was that the staff lacked an understanding  
 12 of that vision, and lacked guidance, and lacked  
 13 motivation to achieve those targets.  
 14 Q. Now, given that you hadn't seen RBKC's audit of  
 15 May 2014, how did you yourself identify the failings  
 16 that you set about addressing?  
 17 A. So in the time before I started work there, there had  
 18 been an interim managing director called Paul Gevaux,  
 19 who had been responsible for managing Repairs Direct  
 20 since my predecessor had left. He produced a report  
 21 which picked up on many similar points, and when I first  
 22 arrived I took the time to spend time on the road with  
 23 our operatives, to talk to residents, to talk to council  
 24 members, to talk to our customer service team who took  
 25 telephone calls, and really get first-hand experience of

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1 how people felt about the service we were delivering.  
 2 Q. When you succeeded Paul Gevaux, did you have a handover  
 3 discussion of any sort?  
 4 A. Yes, we did.  
 5 Q. Can you recall the gist of the conversation you had with  
 6 Mr Gevaux on that occasion?  
 7 A. It mirrored many of the points that are made here.  
 8 Q. Was there an individual called Chris Davis, who is the  
 9 interim health and safety manager at Repairs Direct?  
 10 A. I don't recall that name.  
 11 Q. Do you recall Mr Gevaux telling you or advising you  
 12 about the importance of ensuring jobs are "made good to  
 13 fire—resisting standard"?  
 14 A. I don't recall him making that point specifically. We  
 15 talked about the quality of repair and the need to  
 16 improve that, but we didn't talk specifically around the  
 17 point that you mentioned.  
 18 Q. Okay.  
 19 Could we go to {TMO10007720}, which is a health and  
 20 safety action plan prepared for the TMO's health and  
 21 safety committee in January 2016.  
 22 If we can go to row 13, and reference A5, column B,  
 23 it says:  
 24 "Continue to work with A&R [which is assets and  
 25 regeneration] and [Repairs Direct] to ensure fire safety

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1 firmly embedded in all work ..."  
 2 If we look at column E, going rightwards, it says  
 3 that Janice Wray:  
 4 "Met with RD [Repairs Direct] H&S and impressed on  
 5 him the importance of ensuring jobs are 'made good to  
 6 fire—resisting standard'."  
 7 Now, having seen that plan prepared in January 2016,  
 8 and having had your memory refreshed, do you recall  
 9 anything about Mr Gevaux making the point that jobs are  
 10 made good to a fire resisting standard?  
 11 A. No, I don't recall him making a statement to that  
 12 effect.  
 13 Q. Did Janice Wray impress upon you the importance of  
 14 making jobs good to a fire resisting standard at any  
 15 time?  
 16 A. Janice Wray and I had a number of meetings as part of my  
 17 induction to the role and to the organisation. I don't  
 18 recall her particularly flagging that as a concern, but  
 19 we had a far—ranging conversation around health and  
 20 safety performance generally.  
 21 Q. Thank you.  
 22 Now, when you joined Repairs Direct, did you receive  
 23 any information regarding the company's role in reducing  
 24 fire risk and ensuring the TMO complied with its  
 25 fire safety obligations?

14

1 A. Sorry, can I ask you to repeat the question?  
 2 Q. Of course.  
 3 When you joined the company, did you receive any  
 4 information about Repairs Direct's role in reducing fire  
 5 risk and assisting the TMO to comply with performance of  
 6 its fire safety obligations?  
 7 A. I don't recall specific conversations on that topic.  
 8 I do recall broader conversations around health and  
 9 safety obligations and requirements.  
 10 Q. Did fire safety have any particular prominence in those  
 11 discussions?  
 12 A. No, I mean, if I'm to be honest, it is inherent in the  
 13 nature of responsive repairs to have an awareness of  
 14 fire safety precautions in the work that you do and in  
 15 how you leave a repair when completed.  
 16 Q. Following on from that answer, how did you see  
 17 Repairs Direct's role in assisting the TMO perform its  
 18 fire safety obligations?  
 19 A. So it's important that the operatives have a clear  
 20 understanding of the risk relating to work that they do,  
 21 and that's fulfilled by a standard risk assessment for  
 22 certain tasks. So, for example, there will be  
 23 a standard generic risk assessment about how you change  
 24 a washer on a tap. They then perform a dynamic risk  
 25 assessment when they reach the site, because you have to

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1 look at the environment you're working in and consider  
 2 any additional risks as a result of that. And there are  
 3 certain activities that responsive repairs operatives  
 4 undertake which require what we would call hot works, so  
 5 welding or something that would generate heat, for which  
 6 there is a permit process to ensure that it's properly  
 7 controlled and there is proper planning around it.  
 8 So a lot of steps are in place to make sure that  
 9 they are there and the work that they undertake is done  
 10 in a way that prevents any risk of fire.  
 11 And then at the completion of the work, depending on  
 12 the nature of it, there may be a need to reinstate  
 13 firestopping. So that's, you know, if you have had to  
 14 drill through a wall or a floor plate, to make sure that  
 15 the material that plugs that gap is fire preventative  
 16 material.  
 17 Q. Put slightly differently, were you aware of the specific  
 18 duties that the TMO was under as a result of the  
 19 Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order of 2005?  
 20 A. I'm not aware of the detail of that document.  
 21 Q. Was there any document that you recall that either you  
 22 received as you joined or you required to be created  
 23 during your time as managing director which set out how  
 24 specifically Repairs Direct would assist the TMO to  
 25 discharge its fire safety obligations?

16

1 A. There was a TMO health and safety document, and  
 2 Repairs Direct had its own health and safety documents  
 3 as well. As a principle, Repairs Direct adopted the  
 4 TMO's policies and practices —  
 5 Q. We'll come on to this later, Mr Webb.  
 6 A. Okay, fine.  
 7 Q. But beyond what you have already identified, nothing  
 8 else?  
 9 A. No.  
 10 Q. Thank you.  
 11 Were you provided with any advice, whether from  
 12 Janice Wray or anyone else at the TMO, about how to  
 13 ensure that repairs carried out by Repairs Direct  
 14 operatives did not compromise fire safety?  
 15 A. I don't recall being given any advice by Janice Wray on  
 16 that subject, no.  
 17 Q. Or anyone else from the TMO?  
 18 A. Not from the TMO, no. But the staff within  
 19 Repairs Direct were technically qualified, and we were  
 20 working to specifications that were set by other aspects  
 21 of the TMO. So maybe a better answer is that,  
 22 for example, in replacing a door, a flat entrance door,  
 23 we would work to a specification set by the TMO for  
 24 a standard fire resistance door known as an FD30.  
 25 Q. When you arrived at Repairs Direct, was there any

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1 guidance, policy, procedure or process already in place  
 2 that governed fire safety matters?  
 3 A. Not that I can recall.  
 4 Q. Did you yourself receive any training on maintenance of  
 5 fire safety systems in residential properties,  
 6 for example fire doors and the like?  
 7 A. I didn't receive any specific training myself. However,  
 8 the staff that we would use to do any work on  
 9 fire safety doors or smoke alarms would be technically  
 10 qualified, and we refreshed the training to ensure that  
 11 we maintained integrity of things like fire doors.  
 12 Q. Did you receive any general fire safety training during  
 13 your time as MD of Repairs Direct?  
 14 A. Only inasmuch as it would be for fire evacuation  
 15 procedures in the office areas, et cetera.  
 16 Q. But nothing beyond that in terms of what your operatives  
 17 were doing and the repairs they were carrying out?  
 18 A. Not that I recall, no.  
 19 Q. Now, can we turn to the health and safety regime that  
 20 was in place at Repairs Direct and, in particular,  
 21 a health and safety audit carried out by Rob Anderson of  
 22 RHSS, which was carried out in December 2014.  
 23 Before I ask you any questions, if we can go to that  
 24 document, which is at {TMO00863642/1}.  
 25 Now, first of all, have you seen that document

18

1 before?  
 2 A. I don't recall seeing it before.  
 3 Q. Do you remember Mr Gevaux or anyone else making any  
 4 reference to a health and safety audit by RHSS in  
 5 handover discussions or any other discussions?  
 6 A. No, I think Mr Gevaux made reference to his  
 7 organisation's own review of health and safety. I don't  
 8 recall a reference to this.  
 9 Q. Now, if we can turn to the executive summary, which is  
 10 at page 3 {TMO00863642/3}, we see there in the bottom  
 11 part of the page four key findings and areas for  
 12 attention, and you will see: full review of the health  
 13 and safety policy by a competent person; secondly,  
 14 training needs to be planned and organised; thirdly,  
 15 risk assessments must be suitable and sufficient; and,  
 16 fourthly, inspection and monitoring systems need to be  
 17 defined and adhered to.  
 18 Were you aware of any of those specific failings  
 19 that had been identified in this report when you started  
 20 work at Repairs Direct?  
 21 A. If I can just take a moment to read through.  
 22 Q. Of course.  
 23 (Pause)  
 24 A. I was aware that we were not at the standard that we  
 25 would need to be, not as a result of this report but

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1 from the comments from Mr Gevaux and from my own  
 2 assessments.  
 3 Q. Now, if we can go further into this document, and if we  
 4 could first of all go to page 10 {TMO00863642/10}, and  
 5 if we see there in the first item at the top of the  
 6 page, under the heading "Board Level Commitment":  
 7 "No details were available that spelt out Board  
 8 Level commitment relevant to Repairs Direct. It's not  
 9 clear what role the board play in terms of Health and  
 10 Safety leadership and if Health and Safety is minuted at  
 11 Board meetings for Repairs Direct specifically. With  
 12 the set-up of the company with KCTMO being hazy in some  
 13 respects this should be clearly documented."  
 14 Now, if you hadn't seen this audit report until  
 15 today, did that criticism resonate with your experience  
 16 at Repairs Direct?  
 17 A. No, it wouldn't.  
 18 Q. Could we turn to page 19 {TMO00863642/19}, and the  
 19 second paragraph there, which said:  
 20 "An active training matrix was not located or  
 21 acknowledged to confirm to the auditor who has or has  
 22 not been trained in what and when. This is major area  
 23 of concern in the event of civil or criminal proceedings  
 24 and for demonstrating competence through training."  
 25 Again, if you hadn't seen this audit report, did the

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1 criticism set out there resonate with your experience  
 2 when you were at Repairs Direct?  
 3 A. No, there was a regular training regime in place.  
 4 Q. And if we could finally turn to page 27  
 5 {TMO00863642/27}, under the heading "Section 9 –  
 6 Fire Protection and Prevention", the first observation  
 7 is this:  
 8 "Fire awareness training has not been provided to  
 9 operatives."  
 10 Was that still the case when you joined  
 11 Repairs Direct?  
 12 A. I couldn't say how recently they had had fire awareness  
 13 training, but fire awareness would be part of their  
 14 training on an ongoing basis.  
 15 Q. Now, even if you weren't aware of this audit report, on  
 16 the basis of the answers you're giving, it sounds — and  
 17 please shout if this is unfair or insufficiently  
 18 nuanced — that the deficiencies identified in this  
 19 report had been remedied by the time you joined.  
 20 A. Some of them had been remedied. They were not perhaps  
 21 as robust as they could have been in documentation,  
 22 for example, but it was certainly stronger than this  
 23 report had indicated.  
 24 Q. Were you satisfied with the clarity of the health and  
 25 safety leadership provided by the board during your time

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1 at Repairs Direct?  
 2 A. I was, yes.  
 3 Q. Could we now turn to minutes of an executive team  
 4 meeting on 23 March 2016, and if we could go to  
 5 {TMO00852911/4}.  
 6 If we could look at item 13 at the bottom of the  
 7 page, it's recorded there that you presented your vision  
 8 for Repairs Direct.  
 9 Over the page {TMO00852911/5}, in the third bullet  
 10 point, you noted a gap for a health and safety manager  
 11 for quality and environment needed.  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. What were your expectations of a health and safety  
 14 manager at that time, so March 2016?  
 15 A. My expectation was to bring somebody in who would  
 16 provide governance, assurance and continue training for  
 17 health and safety practices for the team, that provided  
 18 protection for the staff, residents and those in the  
 19 proximity of work that we were doing, but somebody who  
 20 would also help us to achieve ISO level accreditation  
 21 for health, safety, environment and quality.  
 22 Q. When you joined Repairs Direct, who was fulfilling those  
 23 responsibilities?  
 24 A. There was nobody appointed in post.  
 25 Q. And how long had that been the case?

22

1 A. It had been around a year, I believe, if not more.  
 2 Q. Can we now turn to the minutes of a Repairs Direct board  
 3 meeting on 10 March 2016, so 13 days before this  
 4 executive team meeting. Those minutes can be found at  
 5 {RBK00059213/3}, and if we can turn to item 8.1. You  
 6 will see it says there this:  
 7 "Graham Webb informed the Board that the Health and  
 8 Safety ... Manager position was still vacant. He  
 9 explained that the delay to recruit for the H&S manager  
 10 had been the need to fully ascertain the business needs  
 11 and also build plan for accreditation on various ISO  
 12 schemes before recruiting for a suitable candidate. He  
 13 assured the Board that he intends to recruit by  
 14 June 2016."  
 15 What business needs did you have to ascertain before  
 16 recruiting?  
 17 A. The business had lacked vision in terms of its direction  
 18 of travel, in that we wanted to be a responsive repair  
 19 business, we wanted — but the staff did not understand  
 20 whether we wanted to improve that service to residents  
 21 or any other aspiration for the business.  
 22 So we needed to establish a strategy for the  
 23 business, to have that strategy approved by the  
 24 management board, the Repairs Direct board and the TMO  
 25 board, and then I wanted to be able to recruit a health

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1 and safety professional who could be part of that  
 2 strategy, so they needed to understand it and to  
 3 complement that. And by that I mean somebody who has  
 4 the experience to lead us towards the ISO accreditation,  
 5 but also who can make health and safety training  
 6 engaging and resonating with blue collar workforces.  
 7 For want of a better phrase, it can be a dry topic. You  
 8 have to make it engaging, you have to make it land, and  
 9 to find somebody who can do that is worth taking the  
 10 extra time to find them.  
 11 Q. Just to spell it out, why did you need to build a plan  
 12 for accreditation on ISO schemes before recruiting?  
 13 A. (a) it's an endorsement that you're working to best  
 14 practice, which is clearly a good thing, and gave the  
 15 board reassurance as well as the residents of the  
 16 borough.  
 17 (b) we had an aspiration, once we were fully  
 18 delivering a service that was acceptable to the  
 19 residents and the tenants of the borough, that we'd like  
 20 to offer a comparable service to leaseholders on  
 21 a paid-for basis, who were living in often the same  
 22 buildings. Having ISO accreditation was, in my view,  
 23 a base requirement to be able to offer a commercial  
 24 paid-for service.  
 25 Q. Thank you.

24

1 Could we look at the final sentence in item 8.1,  
 2 which says this:  
 3 "The Board was assured that the risk [presumably  
 4 from not having a health and safety manager in position]  
 5 had mitigated by ensuring that all the workforce are  
 6 fully trained on [health and safety] issues on the  
 7 role."  
 8 First of all, what do you mean by health and safety  
 9 issues there?  
 10 A. So regular health and safety matters such as manual  
 11 handling, slips, trips, falls, the need for hot works  
 12 permits, those kind of issues, even for office staff  
 13 around health and safety matters around the office, but  
 14 to make sure that that training was delivered again in  
 15 an engaging way. So, for example, we engaged  
 16 a contractor who didn't do a manual handling course on  
 17 a projector in a classroom, but took the people out to  
 18 a van and loaded baths and doors in and out of vans,  
 19 which is far more relevant and engaging for that kind of  
 20 workforce.  
 21 Q. Now, it's notable that the list of issues you identified  
 22 there did not include fire safety. Can we assume,  
 23 therefore, that fire safety was not caught in the  
 24 mitigation measures that were trained to --  
 25 A. I did make reference to hot works and permits, so

25

1 welding and roofing works and associated works like  
 2 that, which would have a fire safety element to them,  
 3 were included in that training.  
 4 Q. So those specific elements of fire safety?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. Now, could I ask you to go to {TMO10016680/19}.  
 7 Now, you will not have seen this document before.  
 8 It's Janice Wray's mid-year performance review for  
 9 2016/2017.  
 10 A. Right.  
 11 Q. If you look at the third paragraph, it says this:  
 12 "Further work to embed fire safety ..."  
 13 Then looking at the final line:  
 14 "Discussions with RD [Repairs Direct] who include in  
 15 toolbox talks and further discussion with Sam and  
 16 Derrick about the work of sub-contractors."  
 17 Now, for the uninitiated, what is a Toolbox Talk?  
 18 A. A Toolbox Talk is a team meeting, most normally for the  
 19 blue collar workforce. Normally they're held weekly,  
 20 and you may cover some business updates, but what you  
 21 will always do is use the opportunity to do at least one  
 22 element of training at each event, and you will pick  
 23 a topic of the week and staff will be trained on that,  
 24 and then they'll sign to confirm that they've received  
 25 that training.

26

1 Q. Who provided that training?  
 2 A. So it was often provided by their team leaders or the  
 3 line managers, and sometimes by an external agency if  
 4 that were appropriate to the subject we were delivering.  
 5 Q. Did the talks include training on fire safety issues, to  
 6 the best of your --  
 7 A. Inasmuch as we would touch on things like hot works and  
 8 issues like that, yes, it would.  
 9 Q. Were you involved in or indeed aware of any discussions  
 10 between Janice Wray, Sam Hart and Derrick Singleton  
 11 about ensuring subcontractor work did not compromise  
 12 fire safety?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. Can you give the panel the gist of those discussions?  
 15 A. We re -- whilst I was there, we re--contracted our  
 16 subcontractor framework. So the nature of responsive  
 17 repairs is that the volume is always higher in the  
 18 winter than it is in the summer, and also there are  
 19 certain activities where there is simply not enough  
 20 demand for you to employ a full-time resource on that  
 21 task, so you have to have a number of subcontractors on  
 22 your books to do that.  
 23 When we re--contracted our subcontractors, we not  
 24 only were looking for obviously advantageous commercial  
 25 terms, but they were required to demonstrate that they

27

1 had appropriate health and safety training,  
 2 documentation, insurances in place.  
 3 I know that was discussed between Janice and Sam and  
 4 Derrick, and also with Shannon MacInnes, who was the  
 5 health and safety manager that I appointed in the  
 6 business.  
 7 Q. I should have asked this as a preliminary question: am  
 8 I right in thinking that Sam Hart was your commercial  
 9 manager from August 2016 onwards?  
 10 A. He was indeed, yes.  
 11 Q. And that Derrick Singleton was your operations manager  
 12 from roughly the same time, August 2016?  
 13 A. That's correct, yes.  
 14 Q. Now, you referred there to Sharon(sic) MacInnes, and she  
 15 started her employment as Repairs Direct health and  
 16 safety, environment and quality manager on  
 17 21 November 2016.  
 18 A. Shannon MacInnes, yes.  
 19 Q. Yes. And so she started work some five or six months  
 20 after the deadline of June that you had set yourself.  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. While you were recruiting for that role, who was  
 23 responsible for ensuring that Repairs Direct complied  
 24 with its health and safety obligations?  
 25 A. As the managing director, that would fall to me.

28



1 Q. Now, could we go to {TMO00863652/1}.

2 This is a document, as you can see, entitled on its

3 front page "Health & Safety Policy, Repairs Direct".

4 You will see in the bottom left "Version 01".

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Bottom right, the date, February 2015.

7 If we can turn over the page to page 2

8 {TMO00863652/2}, looking there, it looks as if this

9 document is a draft. It is or seems to be a draft.

10 First of all, can you remember whether this was

11 adopted and approved at any time?

12 A. I don't recall it being published, no.

13 Q. Are you familiar with it? Have you seen this document

14 before?

15 A. I saw this document in — as part of the preparation for

16 today, but I don't recall seeing it at the time I was

17 there.

18 Q. So you can't help us as to who drafted it?

19 A. No, I'm afraid I can't.

20 Q. Can we assume, therefore, it wasn't distributed to

21 Repairs Direct operatives?

22 A. I couldn't say. It pre-dates my time, so I couldn't say

23 whether it was distributed in 2015. I didn't join until

24 2016.

25 Q. Now, if we can, notwithstanding what you've said, just

29

1 go to page 5 in this document {TMO00863652/5} and

2 paragraph 1.4, it says there:

3 "The Managing Director is ultimately responsible for

4 compliance with Health and Safety throughout the

5 organisation."

6 Bearing in mind your most recent answer, I assume

7 you'd agree with that?

8 A. Absolutely.

9 Q. Now, could we go to a separate document now, which is

10 {TMO10016214/1}.

11 This is a report, as you can see from its front

12 page, entitled "Repairs Direct Health and Safety

13 Management System, Gap Analysis", dated February 2017.

14 First of all, have you seen that report before?

15 A. Yes, I have.

16 Q. Shannon MacInnes says that she wrote the report, and she

17 says also in her witness statement — I'll give the

18 reference, we don't need to go to it: paragraph 60,

19 which is at {TMO00899676/4} — that when she first

20 joined Repairs Direct, so that's November 2016, she

21 wanted to have a clear understanding of what policies

22 and procedures had been implemented in the past and how

23 these were operating in practice. The gap analysis

24 report was therefore produced to help her formulate

25 a health and safety strategy going forward.

30

1 Now, was there a health and safety strategy at this

2 point, ie February 2017?

3 A. We would have fallen under the umbrella of the TMO's

4 health and safety strategy, though I recognised that we

5 needed to have one for Repairs Direct because the nature

6 of the work that the staff did fundamentally differed

7 from those in primarily administrative roles.

8 When Shannon first started, I asked her to complete

9 a gap analysis so I could understand the fundamental

10 differences between where we were and where we needed to

11 be.

12 Q. And so it's as a result of your direction that this gap

13 analysis was prepared?

14 A. It was, yes.

15 Q. Now, was there a formal decision, either in your time

16 or, to the extent to which you know, before your time,

17 that Repairs Direct would adopt the TMO's health and

18 safety practices, or was it simply an informal practice,

19 absent any specific health and safety strategy for

20 Repairs Direct itself?

21 A. There was a formal agreement that we would adopt all TMO

22 policies and procedures unless there was a fundamental

23 reason why the activities of Repairs Direct required

24 a standalone document.

25 Q. And was that agreement reached before you joined or

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1 after you joined?

2 A. I don't recall if it was in place before I joined, but

3 it was made very clear — I was part of that

4 conversation when I got there, and I was very clear that

5 that was the right position to be.

6 Q. So it happened fairly soon after you joined; is that —

7 A. I believe so, yes.

8 Q. So the first quarter 2016 or thereabouts?

9 A. Of that order.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 Now, if we could turn to page 3 in this document

12 {TMO10016214/3} and item 4.3, and it's the first

13 paragraph really that deals with training. It sets out

14 there this:

15 "Health and Safety training is a legal requirement

16 and [Repairs Direct] is falling short of its

17 obligations."

18 If we go down to the fourth paragraph under this

19 section on this page:

20 "There is limited evidence of training certificates

21 for Operatives and contractors, and no evidence of

22 certificates for temporary workers. Mandatory training

23 requirements have not been established, or frequencies

24 for renewal defined or monitored."

25 Now, in light of your assurance to the

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1 Repairs Direct board on 10 March 2016 that risk of not  
 2 having a health and safety manager had been  
 3 appropriately mitigated by ensuring that the workforce  
 4 had been trained on health and safety matters, can you  
 5 explain this unambiguous finding?  
 6 A. I felt, and I recall having this conversation with  
 7 Shannon, that she'd taken a particularly negative view,  
 8 that often the training was occurring but what was not  
 9 occurring was the paperwork to evidence it.  
 10 However, I did agree that for temporary staff who we  
 11 may bring on, plumbing staff at short notice to cover  
 12 absence, for example, we were not robust enough in  
 13 providing training before they went out and performed  
 14 live jobs.  
 15 Q. Now, what steps were taken to remedy the deficiency that  
 16 Ms MacInnes had identified here?  
 17 A. I can't recall the exact action. As a result of this  
 18 gap analysis, Shannon worked with Derrick Singleton, the  
 19 operations manager, to establish an action plan, and  
 20 her, I, he and Sam would review that in our weekly  
 21 operations meetings to make sure we were making progress  
 22 on closing the gaps in the plan.  
 23 Q. Can you remember specifically what was done to ensure  
 24 that all training was appropriately recorded?  
 25 A. I can't recall, sorry.

33

1 Q. Now, if we can turn over the page {TMO10016214/4} to  
 2 paragraph 4.4, and the second paragraph under that  
 3 heading which relates to contractor management, it says  
 4 this:  
 5 "Currently there is a procedure for vetting  
 6 contractors but no formal monitoring or inspection of  
 7 health and safety management or work practices  
 8 thereafter."  
 9 Did you accept at the time that there were no formal  
 10 arrangements for monitoring and inspection?  
 11 A. No, I didn't.  
 12 Q. You disagreed with that?  
 13 A. I disagree with that statement, yes.  
 14 Q. On what basis did you disagree with that statement?  
 15 A. So our contractors, (a) when we were signing them up to  
 16 work for us, we would review their health and safety  
 17 policies and documents and training records. We would  
 18 also inspect their work on an ad hoc basis, so  
 19 unannounced visits by supervisors or by our surveyors to  
 20 look at the work in practice, and then post-completion  
 21 of the work, we would also inspect to make sure that the  
 22 work had been done to a satisfactory standard and  
 23 discuss the work with the resident.  
 24 Q. Again, mindful of your previous answer, was the issue  
 25 here that those processes weren't formally recorded and

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1 that was Shannon MacInnes' gripe?  
 2 A. The post-inspections were recorded. The ad hoc  
 3 inspections weren't, so that may have been the issue.  
 4 Q. Now, in respect of this report, Shannon MacInnes said in  
 5 paragraph 16 of her statement -- and the reference, we  
 6 don't need to go to it, is {TMO00899676/4} -- this:  
 7 "I cannot recall the specific actions taken  
 8 following the production of my Report. I did not feel  
 9 health and safety was a priority at Repairs Direct.  
 10 This was one of the reasons why I eventually left,  
 11 health and safety concerns were more 'talk than  
 12 action'."  
 13 Do you agree with that assessment?  
 14 A. No, and I'm disappointed to hear that that's the  
 15 statement that she's made.  
 16 Q. On what basis would you disagree with her?  
 17 A. I appointed a health and safety manager into a role that  
 18 had been vacant for some time because health and safety  
 19 was a fundamental concern for me, and I wanted to be  
 20 sure that, whilst there was health and safety support  
 21 from the TMO, from Janice Wray and her team, we had  
 22 somebody within my own team who looked at the very  
 23 specific circumstances in which my team worked and the  
 24 risks that that presented to them, to other residents,  
 25 and to the general public. So I think that

35

1 I fundamentally disagree with her suggestion that it was  
 2 all talk and no action.  
 3 Q. Could we turn to {TMO00842228}.  
 4 Now, as you see from the torrential addressee list,  
 5 Janice Wray distributed papers for the TMO health and  
 6 safety committee meeting on 13 June 2017, so a day  
 7 before the fire. You're not named as one of the  
 8 recipients, but Shannon MacInnes and Derrick Singleton  
 9 are.  
 10 Now, this email attached a report entitled "Health  
 11 and safety progress report -- Repairs Direct", and that  
 12 can be found at {TMO00845378}.  
 13 Do you recall seeing that document in June 2017?  
 14 Please shout if you would like to scroll through it  
 15 to refresh your memory, if need be.  
 16 A. I don't particularly recall seeing it, but it was some  
 17 time ago, so I may have done but I don't recall it.  
 18 Q. Would you be able to assist the panel as to who would  
 19 have written a health and safety progress report for  
 20 Repairs Direct? Would it have been Ms MacInnes?  
 21 A. Shannon would have written that, absolutely,  
 22 Shannon MacInnes.  
 23 Q. Were these types of report regularly produced?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. If so, is it therefore likely that you would have read

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1 it at the time?  
 2 A. It's possible, yes. Shannon would have produced  
 3 a regular update and I would have read that.  
 4 Q. Is it slightly more than possible? You have  
 5 re-emphasised to the panel your commitment to health and  
 6 safety. Given this deals with health and safety  
 7 progress, is it more likely than possible that you would  
 8 have read it?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Could we turn to a separate document, which is  
 11 {TMO00845378/1}.
 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think that's the one we have on  
 13 the screen, isn't it?  
 14 MR KINNIER: Apologies, yes.  
 15 We can see at paragraph 1 it lists various health  
 16 and safety procedures at the bottom of the page, and  
 17 then it goes on to say in the final paragraph:  
 18 "Additional operational procedures that are needed  
 19 to ensure proper health and safety compliance will be  
 20 required."  
 21 We see at paragraph 1.2 it records that:  
 22 "A general health and safety policy, specific to  
 23 [Repairs Direct] ... has ... been drafted."  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. Then we have at paragraph 1.3:

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1 "Two operational procedures have been adapted from  
 2 ... TMO documents."  
 3 Now, are you able to assist the panel as to why at  
 4 this stage a new health and safety policy had been  
 5 drafted?  
 6 A. I can't specifically say why at this stage. I do  
 7 believe — I do recall that we — of all the policies  
 8 that the TMO had, we did believe that Repairs Direct  
 9 required a health and safety policy of its own.  
 10 Q. Looking at paragraph 1.3, do the two procedures set out  
 11 there represent the sum total of the health and safety  
 12 policies and procedures that were in place just before  
 13 the fire, in addition to the health and safety policy?  
 14 A. I believe that the Repairs Direct health and safety  
 15 policy, there had been one before this. I believe I'd  
 16 signed one early in my time there. I can understand why  
 17 we would want operational procedures and guidance on  
 18 risk assessment and accident reporting, but I couldn't  
 19 answer any more specifically to what you're asking.  
 20 Q. To the extent you can, is it therefore correct to  
 21 surmise that there was no operational procedure that  
 22 specifically governed repairs to fire safety systems,  
 23 including fire doors and the like?  
 24 A. No, that's not correct.  
 25 Q. Are you saying there was a written document which

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1 governed those matters, or are you saying there are  
 2 informal arrangements that govern those matters?  
 3 A. So it was standard practice and I believe it was  
 4 documented, for example, that if my staff who would have  
 5 been carpenters, for example, were looking at a flat  
 6 front entrance door, which would have been an FD30 rated  
 7 fire door, they were expected to only repair like for  
 8 like. So they wouldn't drill new holes that would  
 9 impact the integrity of the fire resistance, they would  
 10 only replace like for like, so door furniture,  
 11 letterboxes, hinges, whatever. And if it were not  
 12 possible to do so, they would be required to replace the  
 13 door with another fire door, and our systems only  
 14 allowed them to purchase an FD30 door to replace that.  
 15 So those documentations were in existence, and were  
 16 a specification from the TMO.  
 17 Q. Thank you.  
 18 If we turn over the page {TMO00845378/2} to  
 19 paragraph 2.2, it says there, under the heading "Health  
 20 and Safety Management":  
 21 "ARMADA Training provided a two-day course to the  
 22 [Repairs Direct] Management Team, Supervisors and  
 23 Quantity Surveyors. The objective of this training was  
 24 to provide managers with training on fundamentals of  
 25 [health and safety]."

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1 Did you attend that training?  
 2 A. I don't believe so.  
 3 Q. Even if you didn't attend, are you aware or not whether  
 4 it covered fire safety?  
 5 A. I'm afraid I don't recall.  
 6 Q. Could we turn to {TMO00870929}.
 7 Now, this is an untitled document dated 2017, the  
 8 date appears from the file name, which appears to refer  
 9 to Repairs Direct's health and safety duties.  
 10 Shannon MacInnes says in her statement at  
 11 paragraphs 20 to 21 {TMO00899676/7} — we don't need to  
 12 go to it — that she was the author, and it was  
 13 an unfinished draft which was neither published nor  
 14 adopted.  
 15 Now, looking at that, is your position still that  
 16 there was a health and safety policy in place before the  
 17 fire?  
 18 A. I believe there was, yes.  
 19 Q. Can we now turn to a separate topic, which is  
 20 co-ordination with the TMO on matters of health and  
 21 safety, including fire safety.  
 22 Could we go to {TMO00844151/5}.
 23 Now, these are minutes of a TMO health and safety  
 24 committee meeting on 31 July 2015, so before you  
 25 started.

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1 It's recorded at item 11, we see there, under the  
 2 heading "Repairs Direct", in the second line, that:  
 3 "Barbara Matthews advised that we should have common  
 4 policies and procedures for both KCTMO ... and that  
 5 Janice Wray should have audit rights over  
 6 [Repairs Direct's] Health & Safety systems."  
 7 When you started in January 2016, your understanding  
 8 is that there were common health and safety policies and  
 9 procedures in place --  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. -- is that fair?  
 12 A. That's correct.  
 13 Q. Now, do you recall whether Janice Wray in fact had audit  
 14 rights over Repairs Direct's health and safety  
 15 obligations and their performance?  
 16 A. I don't recall that that was a stated right, but should  
 17 Janice have asked to have reviewed any of our activity  
 18 then I would not have had an objection to that.  
 19 Q. Do you remember Janice Wray seeking to exercise her  
 20 audit rights?  
 21 A. I don't recall, no.  
 22 Q. What was your understanding of Janice Wray's role in  
 23 relation to Repairs Direct's health and safety duties  
 24 and their performance?  
 25 A. Janice Wray provided the TMO view. We sought to adhere

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1 to that as close as we could. And she was also a very  
 2 useful point of conversation if there were some debate  
 3 over a technical requirement. So if, for example, the  
 4 assets and regeneration team were looking to change  
 5 specification, there was often a conversation between  
 6 them, our operational team and Janice in terms of the  
 7 nature of that, the nature of the change, the  
 8 operational impact of it, our ability to maintain it,  
 9 for example.  
 10 Q. Do you remember Janice Wray's advice and guidance ever  
 11 being sought in relation to a fire safety matter, to the  
 12 best of your knowledge?  
 13 A. Not to the best of my knowledge. I mean, we spoke with  
 14 Janice on a regular basis on a range of issues.  
 15 Q. Now, on 19 January 2016, so a week or so after you  
 16 started work at Repairs Direct, you attended a meeting  
 17 of the TMO's health and safety committee.  
 18 Now, is it right that you were a regular attendee of  
 19 that meeting?  
 20 A. Yes. Not every meeting, but I did attend it on  
 21 a regular basis.  
 22 Q. Why did you attend the TMO's health and safety committee  
 23 meeting?  
 24 A. Because it allowed us to share Repairs Direct's health  
 25 and safety performance with them, and if there were any

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1 learning available from them, we could adopt that within  
 2 Repairs Direct.  
 3 Q. If you weren't able to attend, who would attend on your  
 4 behalf, as it were?  
 5 A. Shannon MacInnes and/or Derrick Singleton, my operations  
 6 manager.  
 7 Q. If we could go to the minutes of that meeting, which are  
 8 at {TMO10012670/2}, item 1.11, you will see there it's  
 9 minuted, "MB" -- I think that's Martin Barr; is that  
 10 right?  
 11 A. Possible.  
 12 Q. " ... had agreed to look at procedures for reviewing  
 13 Insight reports, clarifying what is outstanding and what  
 14 priority these have and acknowledged the need to ensure  
 15 there is an effective escalation procedure for ESAs  
 16 reporting health & safety issues. MB had confirmed that  
 17 he would be meeting with Olivia Hutchison on the  
 18 20th January and with GW [presumably you] the following  
 19 week to discuss this. He will then produce a draft  
 20 escalation procedure. SJ [presumably Sacha Jevans]  
 21 asked for clarification on time scale. JW to request MB  
 22 aims to bring draft to next meeting."  
 23 Can you remember now whether you met Martin Barr to  
 24 discuss this particular issue?  
 25 A. I can't recall whether I met him to discuss the

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1 particular issue. In my first few weeks I met with many  
 2 internal managers on a range of topics, so ...  
 3 Q. So you can't remember whether there was any particular  
 4 outcome?  
 5 A. I can't remember this meeting in particular, no.  
 6 Q. Was there an equivalent procedure for Repairs Direct  
 7 operatives and supervisors who identified health and  
 8 safety issues during jobs to escalate or report those  
 9 issues?  
 10 A. Yes, there was.  
 11 Q. And what was that procedure?  
 12 A. So depending on the nature of the issue, at its -- that  
 13 it was most risk, the highest risk, if you like, if they  
 14 encountered a dangerous or aggressive resident where  
 15 they felt they were in danger, they were empowered to  
 16 walk away. If they were asked -- if they encountered  
 17 a piece of work where they felt that doing that piece of  
 18 work created a risk to them or others, they were  
 19 empowered to walk away.  
 20 Q. Thank you.  
 21 A. If they discovered an issue that needed to be notified,  
 22 they would either call the planner, so one of the people  
 23 in the office and notify them of that, or they'd talk to  
 24 their supervisor, and then depending on the nature or  
 25 the severity of the matter, someone might immediately

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1 attend or it would be arranged for a follow-up to  
 2 happen.  
 3 Q. Thank you.  
 4 On 10 March 2016, you attended a meeting of the  
 5 Repairs Direct board, and the minute can be found at  
 6 {RBK00059213/1}. There we go, we can see you as second  
 7 on the list of attendees.  
 8 If we could turn over to page 2 {RBK00059213/2} and  
 9 item 5.4, and the second paragraph, it says there:  
 10 "The Board then discussed the policy needs of the  
 11 Company [Repairs Direct]. Graham Webb suggested that  
 12 the Company could adopt the parent Company's policies as  
 13 a way to strive to attain the same standards."  
 14 Now, is that really the thinking that underpinned  
 15 the agreement to adopt other standards that you referred  
 16 to earlier on in your evidence?  
 17 A. Yes, so these were broader, well thought through  
 18 standards. It made entire sense to adopt those, unless  
 19 there was a material difference in the work that we were  
 20 undertaking.  
 21 Q. Do you remember, on analysis, whether there were any  
 22 material differences that prevented you adopting a TMO  
 23 policy?  
 24 A. The only one that I can recall is the health and safety  
 25 policy.

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1 Q. As part of those discussions, was fire safety ever  
 2 discussed as being one of those material differences  
 3 that required a bespoke Repairs Direct solution?  
 4 A. I don't recall that being discussed, no.  
 5 Q. Now, on 8 April 2016, Janice Wray emailed you a number  
 6 of documents, but included her fire safety strategy  
 7 review, and that was sent in advance of the TMO's health  
 8 and safety committee meeting on 12 April 2016. The  
 9 review included a current version of the TMO's fire  
 10 safety strategy, which was dated November 2013.  
 11 Now, can you remember whether you read the review  
 12 and the fire safety strategy?  
 13 A. Sorry, this was a document bundle in advance of a health  
 14 and safety meeting?  
 15 Q. Yes, in April 2016.  
 16 A. Yes, as a matter of routine I would have read all of the  
 17 documents in advance of the meeting.  
 18 Q. Did you understand the fire safety strategy to be one of  
 19 those common policies shared by TMO and Repairs Direct?  
 20 A. I don't recall particularly, but I would imagine it  
 21 would be so, yes.  
 22 Q. You don't recall, though, any specific discussion as to  
 23 whether that strategy applied or would be adopted by  
 24 Repairs Direct?  
 25 A. I don't recall any discussion as to whether there was

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1 a need for Repairs Direct to have a different policy.  
 2 Q. Now, on 17 January 2017 you were sent a report by  
 3 Guy Sharma, a senior auditor for RBKC, which was  
 4 entitled "Final report Repairs Direct Systems Review".  
 5 That email can be found at {RBK00060148}, so just to  
 6 remind you of what was sent and when.  
 7 Now, can you remember, why was that review carried  
 8 out?  
 9 A. So Guy Sharma was part of the internal audit team, as  
 10 I recall, from RBKC. They had a rolling programme of  
 11 auditing different aspects of the TMO's performance, and  
 12 Repairs Direct featured on that at a regular interval,  
 13 and he would come and review — and therefore from time  
 14 to time he would come and review our systems of work,  
 15 and to ensure that data that we were reporting was  
 16 independent and accurate and accurately reflected the  
 17 service that was being delivered.  
 18 Q. Thank you.  
 19 If we can go to {RBK00060149/18}, and item 7, we see  
 20 there the management action plan governs repair quality  
 21 monitoring.  
 22 The review recommended, we see there in the far  
 23 right-hand column, that the selection of jobs for  
 24 post-inspection should be random and automated, and in  
 25 the management response it records that the

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1 post-inspections were completed by RD supervisors and  
 2 repairs team surveyors.  
 3 Can you remember now what percentage of repairs were  
 4 inspected after the work had been done?  
 5 A. I believe it was between 10 and 15%.  
 6 Q. Was that a sort of prescribed sample amount or was —  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. Yes.  
 9 Was the approach to post-inspecting fire safety  
 10 repairs any different to other repairs?  
 11 A. No.  
 12 Q. Was consideration ever given to post-inspecting a higher  
 13 percentage of fire safety repairs or targeting them  
 14 specifically for post-inspection?  
 15 A. No.  
 16 Q. Now, can we now look at the process for carrying out  
 17 responsive fire safety repairs, and in particular the  
 18 process for actioning fire safety repairs raised by  
 19 residents or estate staff.  
 20 Now, for repairs raised by residents and TMO estate  
 21 staff, was any training or guidance provided to  
 22 Repairs Direct staff on how to identify a repair that  
 23 might affect fire safety?  
 24 A. So any fire-related repair which was identified through  
 25 the regular estate inspections or identified to

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1 Janice Wray's health and safety team, the repair request  
 2 on our computer system was raised by Janice's team and  
 3 the job would have a prefix "FRA", meaning it was  
 4 fire-related works.  
 5 We then had — Shannon MacInnes, in fact, as health  
 6 and safety manager, would have oversight of all of those  
 7 repairs to make sure they were completed in a timely  
 8 way, and to make sure that she liaised with Janice on  
 9 any reason for any delay in that process.  
 10 Q. So, in short, there was a process by which the TMO's  
 11 health and safety team was notified of a fire safety  
 12 repair?  
 13 A. Absolutely.  
 14 Q. Thank you.  
 15 Now, if we can go to {TMO10012668/4}, this is the  
 16 TMO's fire safety strategy of November 2013.  
 17 We see there at paragraph 5, at the bottom of the  
 18 page, it sets out the management arrangements for  
 19 fire safety.  
 20 Paragraph 5.1, and if we go over the page  
 21 {TMO10012668/5}, it's the first paragraph, penultimate  
 22 sentence, says that:  
 23 "Repairs [raised] to fire doors, self-closers etc.  
 24 are given priority."  
 25 Sorry, the text is somewhat dense, but it's in that

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1 top paragraph at the top of the page.  
 2 Did Repairs Direct give priority to repairs to fire  
 3 doors and self-closers?  
 4 A. So every repair, whether it was — was given a degree of  
 5 priority as to whether it was routine, urgent or  
 6 emergency, and that priority for the — when the health  
 7 and safety team raised that repair, they would set the  
 8 priority to it, and that would dictate the timescale  
 9 that we had to complete the repair.  
 10 Q. I suppose, asking the question again, just emphasising  
 11 it was specifically directed towards fire doors and  
 12 self-closers, were those routinely given, for example,  
 13 an urgent rating, or were they treated as routine or,  
 14 indeed, were they treated as emergency?  
 15 A. So from my recollection they would certainly not have  
 16 been treated as routine, but the priority would have  
 17 been set by Janice Wray and her team when they raised  
 18 the task, not by my team.  
 19 Q. Are you able to give the panel a gist from your  
 20 experience of whether such works were rated as urgent,  
 21 for example, or emergency?  
 22 A. It would depend on the nature of the deficiency. If  
 23 a fire door was missing then I would absolutely expect  
 24 that to be an emergency and a same-day response.  
 25 Q. Thank you.

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1 A. If it was easing and adjusting because it was banging as  
 2 it closed, it may have been regarded as an urgent  
 3 response, which I think from memory was a three or  
 4 five-day fix.  
 5 Q. Following on, that was going to be my next question: in  
 6 terms of emergency, what was the time requirement for  
 7 completion of those?  
 8 A. 24 hours.  
 9 Q. Now can I ask you about the process for actioning  
 10 repairs arising out of fire risk assessments or LFB  
 11 inspections.  
 12 Now, if we go to {TMO00860824/1}, we have here email  
 13 correspondence on 5 September 2016 between  
 14 Derrick Singleton, so your ops manager —  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. — Chelsea McRickus, a Repairs Direct service  
 17 administrator, and Sam Hart, who was the commercial  
 18 manager who we have discussed before. It is primarily  
 19 concerned with the allocation of fire risk assessment  
 20 repairs to Goni.  
 21 First of all, who or what is Goni?  
 22 A. Goni were a subcontractor that we used for certain  
 23 works.  
 24 Q. Now, within Repairs Direct, who would usually decide  
 25 whether a fire safety repair should be carried out

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1 in-house or should be subcontracted?  
 2 A. If there was a request for any work of any nature to be  
 3 subcontracted, the commercial team had to give approval  
 4 for that because there was obviously expenditure related  
 5 to that.  
 6 Q. What criteria, in broad terms, were applied by the  
 7 commercial team before subcontracting happened?  
 8 A. It would be a balance of looking at the urgency of the  
 9 work, whether the skillsets existed within our team, the  
 10 current workload on our team if the skillset existed, or  
 11 whether it would simply be more effective to outsource  
 12 that work to a competent supplier.  
 13 Q. So it would be someone in the commercial team,  
 14 for example, who decided whether a Repairs Direct  
 15 operative had the requisite fire safety skills to repair  
 16 a fire door?  
 17 A. So the Repairs Direct operatives had — were trained in  
 18 whatever skillsets. Their skills were noted in our  
 19 system, we knew what their skillsets were. The planning  
 20 team would be able to advise if somebody had the  
 21 necessary skillset. So a carpenter can re-hang a door,  
 22 be it a fire door or any other kind of door. If we have  
 23 a large package of doors to be fixed in the same  
 24 location, it can be easier and more efficient to give  
 25 that to a subcontractor who can dedicate a team just to

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1 walk through the entire area and clear all the tasks at  
2 the same time.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 Now, just looking at the email from  
5 Derrick Singleton, which is the top of this page --  
6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- and looking in particular at the second paragraph, he  
8 says -- it's obviously entitled "FRA works" -- in the  
9 final sentence:

10 "The only thing I'm not sure they [Goni] would be  
11 able to do is the fire stopping as we may need this to  
12 be certificated."

13 So looking at it really from a different end of the  
14 prism --

15 A. Yes, different skillsets.

16 Q. -- how would Repairs Direct satisfy itself that  
17 subcontractors were capable of doing fire safety-related  
18 work such as firestopping?

19 A. So when a subcontractor was being signed up to work for  
20 us, we would look at the skillsets that they had, we  
21 would take references from previous employers and we  
22 would look at the qualifications of their team.

23 There are certain activities which are obviously  
24 more prescribed. Firestopping work is a heavily  
25 prescribed piece of activity, as you would imagine, and

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1 therefore it tends to be much more specialist suppliers  
2 that you use for firestopping work.

3 Q. Was anyone within Repairs Direct specifically  
4 responsible for monitoring the progress of repairs  
5 arising out of FRA actions?

6 A. Yes, Shannon MacInnes.

7 Q. Now, could I go to {CST00002174}.

8 We see roughly halfway down that page Peter Maddison  
9 emailed Alex Bosman and yourself and Teresa Brown,  
10 copying in Janice Wray, on 21 October 2016, and the  
11 subject matter was Carl Stokes' inspections before LFB  
12 audits of Grenfell Tower, Barandon Walk and  
13 9 Colville Square.

14 The email says this:

15 "Attached are the results of Carl Stokes'  
16 pre-inspections of Grenfell, [Barandon] and Colville.  
17 "I have asked Alex to co-ordinate action within  
18 Assets and Regeneration that needs to be progressed in  
19 the next couple of days.  
20 "I have also asked him to check in with Graham to  
21 ensure that responsive repair issues are in hand.  
22 "Going forward, I have agreed with Janice that  
23 representatives from A&R/RD/Housing Management will be  
24 invited to attend inspections with Carl Stokes and  
25 Adrian.

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1 "This will help ensure that there is a clear and  
2 shared understanding of standards and actions required --  
3 using Carl and Adrian's expertise to raise awareness  
4 with our staff.

5 "It will also be a good way of ensuring that the  
6 ownership of actions is pushed down to the right level.  
7 I also hope that it will help develop a better  
8 understanding of the responsibilities for each team and  
9 improve the communication when matters need escalation."

10 Now, what was your role generally in relation to  
11 monitoring responsive repairs arising from Carl Stokes'  
12 inspections and in particular his FRAs?

13 A. We would have handled those in the same way as we would  
14 with FRA-related work, but I do recall that as a result  
15 of this we used to send one of our supervisors to  
16 accompany these tours so that we had a very clear  
17 understanding of the exact location, the exact issue,  
18 and how we needed to resolve it.

19 Q. And that was routinely done, was it?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Did you find that it achieved the aim that Mr Maddison  
22 set out for this exercise, ie better understanding of  
23 the responsibilities of each time and an improvement in  
24 communication?

25 A. I believe so, yes.

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1 Q. Was there a concern at this time that FRA actions and  
2 the standards required to close them out satisfactorily  
3 were not clearly understood by those carrying out the  
4 repairs?

5 A. I don't believe so, no.

6 Q. Now can I turn to the topic of the backlog of responsive  
7 repairs, and in particular the FRA responsive repairs.

8 For this purpose, can we now go back to the minutes  
9 of the TMO health and safety committee, which is the  
10 first one you attended on 19 January 2016, and they can  
11 be found at {TMO10012670/4}.

12 We see at the top of the page item 3.1. In respect  
13 of FRA actions it's recorded that:

14 "JW and BM [Janice Wray and Barbara Matthews]  
15 highlighted the main points of the FRA summaries. In  
16 particular, it was emphasised that significant progress  
17 had been made with completing the backlog of outstanding  
18 actions by Contract Management and by RD  
19 [Repairs Direct]."

20 Now, holding that there, if we can go to a separate  
21 document, which is {TMO10011910}.

22 This is the summary of FRAs that was submitted for  
23 the purposes of this meeting on 19 January 2016. We can  
24 see that there were 172, looking at responsive repairs,  
25 outstanding. It's in the penultimate box from the

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1 bottom. Reading across, there are 18 partially  
 2 completed responsive repair actions.  
 3 If we go over the page {TMO10011910/2}, we see that  
 4 the outstanding actions are broken down in relation to  
 5 their age, and we see 54 responsive repairs that are  
 6 four to six months old, 57 over seven months, and 55 in  
 7 excess of 12 months.  
 8 Now, this was your first health and safety meeting;  
 9 were you concerned by the number and the age of the  
 10 outstanding actions that are summarised here in this  
 11 document?  
 12 A. Of course, yes.  
 13 Q. And what was your particular concern, looking at the  
 14 numbers?  
 15 A. The age profile concerned me. There are legitimate  
 16 reasons why some work can take a prolonged period to  
 17 resolve, but there seemed to be a problem in closing  
 18 out — there seemed to be a problem in closing out older  
 19 repairs.  
 20 Q. In her evidence, Barbara Matthews cited as an optimum  
 21 number something between 10 and 20.  
 22 Given your experience, mindful of the extent of the  
 23 TMO stock, was there an optimum number of outstanding  
 24 actions that you considered to be reasonable or  
 25 tolerable?

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1 A. Well, I mean, your optimum number is zero, of course.  
 2 I wouldn't want to put a target on it, because any  
 3 target that's set other than zero is almost  
 4 an acceptance of something being substandard, but  
 5 certainly I wasn't happy with the volume and the age of  
 6 some of these.  
 7 Q. Were you told why there was such a backlog, particularly  
 8 backlog of old actions?  
 9 A. I did — I do recall doing some investigation into that.  
 10 Many of the properties on the RBKC portfolio were of  
 11 some age. Almost every fire door is bespoke, so  
 12 everything has to be made from scratch, which obviously  
 13 prolongs the period of time it takes to do it. There  
 14 were also a number where perhaps the fire doors were  
 15 being warped from a leak, to give you an example, and  
 16 a leak in a high-storey block can take some time to  
 17 track. It can leak through many, many floors before it  
 18 actually reaches the point where you find it and it  
 19 causes the problem, and they are very, very difficult to  
 20 track back.  
 21 Q. Did your investigations allay the concerns you  
 22 originally held when you saw the raw data as summarised  
 23 for the purposes of the health and safety committee?  
 24 A. No, we still needed to do better.  
 25 Q. Can you remember when you joined the TMO whether there

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1 was a plan in place for ensuring that the number, and  
 2 particularly the number of old actions, was  
 3 substantially reduced?  
 4 A. No, there was no one — at the time I joined  
 5 Repairs Direct, no one within Repairs Direct was owning  
 6 the FRA actions. So that's one of the first things  
 7 I put in place as a result of this meeting, was to have  
 8 somebody who could own them and fight to make sure they  
 9 were being pursued and not —  
 10 Q. And who became the owner?  
 11 A. So initially I used a gentleman who was the customer  
 12 service manager, whose name escapes me, forgive me, and  
 13 then when Shannon MacInnes joined us, I transferred that  
 14 responsibility to her.  
 15 Q. So as of November 2016 —  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. — it was Shannon MacInnes?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. If we can go back to the minutes themselves, which is at  
 20 {TMO10012670/4}, if we can go to item 3.2, it's recorded  
 21 there that:  
 22 "PM [Peter Maddison] asked for a copy of the detail  
 23 behind this report."  
 24 So the one we've just been looking at:  
 25 "[Peter Maddison] noted that the system should be

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1 more robust to ensure actions are escalated if they are  
 2 out of time or allocated to staff who are no longer with  
 3 the organisation. GW [Graham Webb] advised the process  
 4 will be reviewed to avoid outstanding historic actions."  
 5 So the review, is that the investigation that you've  
 6 just given the detail of?  
 7 A. Exactly. So I went away to look into this list, and  
 8 create — and put in place that process where we had  
 9 an owner within the business.  
 10 Q. Thank you.  
 11 Could we now turn to a separate document, which is  
 12 {TMO00843644}.  
 13 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Are we going to a new —  
 14 MR KINNIER: We're not. There are four further questions on  
 15 this topic which, just for the sake of cleanliness, I'd  
 16 like to get finished.  
 17 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: I just thought I would ask.  
 18 MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir. It shouldn't take us beyond  
 19 11.30.  
 20 So this is a health, safety and facilities team  
 21 update from 4 February 2016, prepared by Janice Wray,  
 22 I think.  
 23 Now, she reported, you will see at item 3:  
 24 "FRA & H&S Actions — significant progress made with  
 25 volume of actions outstanding for [Repairs Direct] and

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1 Contract Management. Barbara and I have met with Sacha,  
2 Pete, Alex and Graham Webb to look at the detail of the  
3 actions being raised and how each are to be progressed.  
4 Accepted that there is no need to continue with these  
5 meetings but just to identify key trends. Have now  
6 agreed an improved procedure with [Repairs Direct] which  
7 should enable works to be progressed in a timely manner  
8 once backlog cleared."

9 Now, do you remember agreeing an improved procedure  
10 with Janice Wray?

11 A. I don't remember the specifics of it. I'm not surprised  
12 by the comment, but I don't remember the specifics.

13 Q. So you won't be able to help the panel as to what the  
14 particular arrangements were --

15 A. I'm sorry, I can't.

16 Q. Now, it recorded here that, in effect, the procedure  
17 would only be effective once the backlog was cleared.

18 What did you do to ensure the backlog was cleared  
19 from the Repairs Direct angle?

20 A. When I joined Repairs Direct -- and forgive me, I cannot  
21 remember the volume of FRA actions at the point  
22 I started -- it was on an improving trend, but wasn't  
23 within what we would have regarded as being  
24 an acceptable parameter. So we were reducing the  
25 number, we were reducing the age profile, but we weren't

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1 yet where we wanted to be.  
2 Q. Would you monitor the backlog routinely?  
3 A. Yes, so it would come up in my monthly management teams,  
4 and it would also be discussed at the health and safety  
5 committee chaired by Barbara Matthews.  
6 Q. Am I right in understanding that timely completion of  
7 FRA actions was not the subject of a key performance  
8 indicator?  
9 A. It was not on our headline key performance indicators,  
10 no.  
11 Q. Can you help, given that the FRA backlog had clearly  
12 been a long-running issue, are you able to assist the  
13 panel as to why the reduction of that backlog wasn't the  
14 subject of a KPI?  
15 A. So our headline KPIs, and my experience in managing  
16 large operational businesses, if you have more than  
17 eight headline KPIs, it's very difficult to actually  
18 absorb the content. They will give you the general  
19 sense of direction for the business. If something is  
20 causing a problem, it will generally cause one of those  
21 KPIs, if you choose the right ones, to indicate there is  
22 a problem behind it. So a prolonged period of time to  
23 close out an FRA action would have extended the average  
24 number of days to complete repairs, which was one of our  
25 key performance indicators. So if that KPI had started

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1 to become adverse, that would prompt us to look into the  
2 background beneath it, but it wasn't part of the core  
3 eight KPIs that we would report on responsive repairs.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 Why was it accepted that there was no need to  
6 continue meetings about outstanding FRA actions?

7 A. From my recollection, we were making good progress and  
8 the direction of travel was good.

9 Q. Now, can we turn to the FRA action statistics that were  
10 produced for the TMO's health and safety committee in  
11 January 2017, so a year after you joined, and if we go  
12 to {TMO10015963}.

13 If we look at "Responsive Repair", again,  
14 penultimate row at the bottom, we see there are 11  
15 outstanding and five partially complete responsive  
16 repair actions.

17 How had Repairs Direct achieved such a reduction in  
18 the outstanding repairs?

19 A. Through those actions that I've described, having real  
20 ownership and somebody championing each of those repairs  
21 and ensuring that it was completed on time and to the  
22 right quality.

23 Q. Can you remember whether most of the reduction had been  
24 achieved before Shannon MacInnes joined?

25 A. We were making good progress before she joined in

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1 November, and then obviously this was, I think,  
2 two months later.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 Could we turn to {TMO10021548}, which are the  
5 minutes of the TMO's health and safety committee meeting  
6 on 13 June 2017.

7 Now, you're not recorded as attending, but if we  
8 turn to page 3 {TMO10021548/3} and item 3.3, we see  
9 there it's recorded:

10 "[Janice Wray] advised that she had collated all the  
11 responsive repair items that were currently not complete  
12 and had provided Derrick Singleton with a spreadsheet  
13 identifying the details of each and the repair stage it  
14 had stopped at. Derrick had agreed to investigate,  
15 advise and progress these works. SM [Shannon MacInnes]  
16 agreed to raise with Derrick and report back to JW by  
17 the 23rd June."

18 Can we take it from that that the reduction of FRA  
19 responsive repair actions achieved in January 2017 had  
20 not been sustained in the first half of 2017?

21 A. I couldn't say from that minute.

22 Q. Now, if we stay in this document and go back to 3.3, we  
23 see at the bottom:

24 "HC raised concern that he had witnessed a number of  
25 missed appointments lately and other delays in

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1 completing responsive works and that he had raised this  
 2 with PJ Phillip. BM asked SM to take this back and  
 3 raise with her colleagues.”  
 4 HC I think is Hash Chamchoun; is that right?  
 5 A. Yes, I would imagine so.  
 6 Q. Did Shannon MacInnes communicate this information to  
 7 you?  
 8 A. I don't recall her raising this to me particularly, no.  
 9 Q. Are you able to help with why appointments were being  
 10 missed and other delays in completing responsive repair  
 11 works?  
 12 A. Responsive repairs are largely predictable, but  
 13 sometimes when you go to fix what you believe is  
 14 a dripping tap, it turns out to be a burst pipe behind  
 15 a wall, and so what you think is a 30-minute appointment  
 16 turns into a two-hour appointment.  
 17 It was standard practice to do what we called  
 18 dynamic rescheduling, so our system allowed us to change  
 19 appointments, so who — which staff went to which  
 20 appointment during the day. But some days the world  
 21 plots against you and you just can't get to every  
 22 appointment on time, sadly.  
 23 MR KINNIER: Thank you.  
 24 Sir, I have come to the end of that particular  
 25 topic.

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1 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Right. Well, that is a convenient  
 2 point at which to have a break, then, isn't it?  
 3 Mr Webb, we will have a short break now. We'll come  
 4 back, please, at 11.40, and we'll resume then.  
 5 I have to ask you, please, not to talk to anyone  
 6 about your evidence or anything relating to it while  
 7 you're out of the room.  
 8 THE WITNESS: Of course, sir.  
 9 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you. Would you like to go  
 10 with the usher, please.  
 11 THE WITNESS: Thank you.  
 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you.  
 13 (Pause)  
 14 Thank you, 11.40.  
 15 MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.  
 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you.  
 17 (11.25 am)  
 18 (A short break)  
 19 (11.40 am)  
 20 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Right, Mr Webb, are you ready to  
 21 carry on?  
 22 THE WITNESS: Thank you.  
 23 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Good, thank you.  
 24 Yes, when you're ready, Mr Kinnier.  
 25 MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.

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1 Mr Webb, can we now turn to the backlog of  
 2 responsive repairs and reporting performance.  
 3 Could we first turn to {TMO00840516/3}, which are  
 4 the minutes of an executive team meeting on  
 5 24 February 2016.  
 6 You didn't attend this meeting, but we see, roughly  
 7 a third of the way down the page, under the heading  
 8 "Repairs Direct", in the fourth line, it says this:  
 9 "Graph — work in progress £4000 jobs overall  
 10 £1m 45k.  
 11 "[Barbara Matthews] these are not necessarily whole  
 12 jobs. Some jobs need to be closed. [Barbara Matthews]  
 13 thinks this is about process. Graham is getting staff  
 14 in to try and clear backlog. Disquiet about the level  
 15 of the whip."  
 16 I think that's works in progress, isn't it?  
 17 A. Yes, it should be "WIP", work in progress, yes.  
 18 Q. "Graham is working towards £1/2m by year end. We need  
 19 an explanation of why.  
 20 "Surplus?  
 21 "Payroll costs lower.  
 22 "How do we maintain getting the whip down. Paul the  
 23 new Chair of the Board will be challenging."  
 24 Was that backlog all in relation to responsive  
 25 repairs, can you remember?

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1 A. Yes, if I can clarify, sorry, where it says £4,000,  
 2 that's 4,000 jobs, as account of jobs rather than value,  
 3 and when you raise a job — the nature of responsive  
 4 repairs, when you raise a job, you use a system which  
 5 effectively diagnoses the job and allows you to  
 6 attribute a cost to that job, hence you can say that the  
 7 WIP was valued at around £1 million to that point.  
 8 Q. In answer to my question, was that backlog all in  
 9 relation to responsive repairs?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. Would it have included FRA-related repairs?  
 12 A. Yes, it would.  
 13 Q. Barbara Matthews thought the backlog was about process.  
 14 Did you agree with that assessment at the time?  
 15 A. Process was certainly a contributory factor.  
 16 Q. What were the problems afflicting process?  
 17 A. Some of the issues were that jobs were not being closed  
 18 down sufficiently. So we may have completed the work  
 19 on site, but if the operative had a problem with his  
 20 handset, he may not have been able to close the job  
 21 down, and therefore there was an open job in WIP, rather  
 22 than a completed repair, for example.  
 23 Q. What was the basis for the disquiet about level of the  
 24 WIP?  
 25 A. 4,000 jobs is 4,000 residents who have something broken

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1 in their home and that's not acceptable.  
 2 Q. What steps did you take to clear the backlog at this  
 3 stage?  
 4 A. Okay, so again it was around structure, around giving  
 5 staff some very clear objectives, and also to put some  
 6 more — some greater focus on to our planning. So in  
 7 the office we had, from memory, four staff who — whilst  
 8 we had a computer system which did most of the planning,  
 9 we had four staff who could manipulate that to get the  
 10 most out of the day. If you want to clear the work,  
 11 then the more jobs you can get completed by the  
 12 operatives in a day, the quicker you'll chew through  
 13 a backlog.  
 14 Q. Now, can I turn to the matters arising action log, which  
 15 can be found at {TMO00862547/11}.  
 16 If we could look at item 2, which is "Review of  
 17 KPIs", that was an action allocated to you and  
 18 Sacha Jevans to complete arising from the Repairs Direct  
 19 board meeting on 10 March 2016, and we see in the update  
 20 column, which is at the far right — hand side, it's  
 21 recorded:  
 22 "Completed and revised suite of KPI agreed with TMO  
 23 Board and reported monthly/quarterly."  
 24 Did you review and revise Repairs Direct KPIs with  
 25 Sacha Jevans after the board meeting on 10 March 2016?

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1 A. I proposed a number of changes to the KPIs that I felt  
 2 would more accurately reflect the customer experience  
 3 and also reflect changes in the responsive repairs  
 4 market about how to compare one service with another.  
 5 Q. Now, a TMO board meeting was held on 31 March 2016. If  
 6 we go to {TMO10044882}, we find the agenda.  
 7 If we can go to page 17 {TMO10044882/17}, which is  
 8 described at the top as appendix 2, it's also described  
 9 as appendix B, which is the performance update referred  
 10 at to item 14 of the agenda, it sets out the proposed  
 11 KPIs for Repairs Direct.  
 12 Now, were those the KPIs that you had proposed to  
 13 Sacha Jevans or had they been altered before it had  
 14 reached this final stage?  
 15 A. No, the 2016/17 targets were those that I proposed to  
 16 the Repairs Direct board, which included Sacha Jevans,  
 17 and they — and once the Repairs Direct board supported  
 18 my proposals, they were taken to the TMO board for  
 19 approval.  
 20 Q. Thank you.  
 21 Now, if we look on the far left — hand side, the  
 22 second entry under the heading "Responsive Repairs:  
 23 Repairs Direct" says, "Average days to complete  
 24 a responsive repair". Now, that was added, and  
 25 "[Percentage] of non-emergency repairs completed in

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1 target" removed.  
 2 Can you explain the rationale for the addition and  
 3 the removal?  
 4 A. So average days to complete a responsive repair is  
 5 a very effective way of understanding the impact to  
 6 a resident of having something broken in their home, and  
 7 that tracked the moment from which they recorded a fault  
 8 with us to the moment at which that repair was  
 9 completed. As we can all imagine, sitting in your home  
 10 with a leaking tap for ten days is something you have to  
 11 find quite uncomfortable. Therefore tracking our  
 12 performance and shortening the number of days it took to  
 13 complete a repair was a very good measure of the service  
 14 we were providing to our customers.  
 15 Q. Now, volume of outstanding repairs broken down by age  
 16 was not specifically proposed. Can you explain why?  
 17 A. Because the other metrics in that list would expose  
 18 an ageing profile. So if, for example, you had a large  
 19 number of repairs that you were completing that were  
 20 three or perhaps four months old, then your score on the  
 21 average days to complete a responsive repair would go up  
 22 and would prompt a further investigation.  
 23 Q. Given you were mindful of ensuring KPIs reflected what  
 24 was going on, what we know was going on was that there  
 25 was a continuing problem with the backlog of FRA

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1 actions. Now, mindful of that history, mindful that the  
 2 previous month there had been 4,000 jobs outstanding,  
 3 wouldn't volume of outstanding jobs broken down by age  
 4 have been a useful practical KPI, bearing in mind the  
 5 particular experience of Repairs Direct?  
 6 A. It could have been a consideration, I would agree.  
 7 However, the value of WIP or work in progress was  
 8 included in our financial consideration, and the other  
 9 metrics on here would have flagged growths in backlogs.  
 10 Q. Can we turn now to a meeting of the Repairs Direct board  
 11 on 15 December 2016, which is at {RBK00059125}. We see  
 12 you're listed third on the rota of attendees.  
 13 If we can go to page 2 {RBK00059125/2}, item 5.3, it  
 14 says this:  
 15 "Work in progress was within target. An aged  
 16 analysis of WIP by job profile was AGREED to be brought  
 17 to the next meeting. It was confirmed that all jobs  
 18 outstanding since before June 2016 would be cleared by  
 19 the end of 2016."  
 20 Why was an aged analysis of work in progress  
 21 requested at that meeting?  
 22 A. Having — from recollection, having brought the overall  
 23 volume and value of work in progress to within the  
 24 target we set ourselves, the board were keen to  
 25 understand whether there were some particularly old jobs

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1 that were hanging around that we would miss by just  
 2 looking at the headline values. Some — the nature of  
 3 some repairs, like leaks as I described earlier, can  
 4 take some time to route through, and that's why the  
 5 board would have asked to see that.

6 Q. Looking at the record that WIP was within target, now,  
 7 admittedly this was a meeting in December 2016, but we  
 8 know certainly in February 2016 there were 4,000  
 9 outstanding jobs, can you help us as to what target was  
 10 applied for the purposes of making this statement to the  
 11 board?

12 A. From my recollection, I can't recall the volume of WIP,  
 13 I can recall that we set ourselves a target that the  
 14 value of WIP should be below £500,000. You do need  
 15 a degree of work in progress to keep your workforce busy  
 16 and to have some predictability about the need to  
 17 subcontract work over coming periods.

18 Q. Now, the next Repairs Direct board meeting was on  
 19 8 March 2017, and we can find the board papers at  
 20 {TMO00862574/10}.

21 We find here the analysis of aged works in progress,  
 22 just following on from the December meeting.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. If we could just look at the bottom of this page, you  
 25 will see at the very bottom there a file name, "gwebb"

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1 et cetera. Had you generated these statistics?

2 A. It's possible. I don't recall, but it is possible.

3 Q. Who else would have done if it weren't you?

4 A. One of the financial support team, but it would have  
 5 passed to me to — I generally collated the board pack,  
 6 so it would have been requested by me and then reviewed  
 7 by me as I put the board pack together.

8 Q. So you would have scrutinised the accuracy of the data  
 9 being put forward?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Now, can we look at the top graph, entitled "Aged WIP  
 12 (Volume)". To the lay eye, it appears to show at least  
 13 1,000 repairs were outstanding from October 2016 through  
 14 to January 2017.

15 First of all, have I read that bar chart correctly?

16 A. It's around 100 jobs from October 2000 ... not 1,000.

17 Q. So you don't add them all up?

18 A. No, so that's — so in this example there are 100 jobs  
 19 that were raised in October that, as of the time of  
 20 collecting that report, were still open and not  
 21 completed.

22 Q. Understood.

23 Now, can we look at the minutes of this particular  
 24 meeting, which can be found at {TMO00894303/2},  
 25 item 3.4. You see at the top of the page there it says:

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1 "An aged analysis of WIP was distributed. It was  
 2 noted that 50% of works pre-dated 2016. There were  
 3 a number of complex leak repairs. In view of the MD it  
 4 was not an unusual profile for a business like RD. The  
 5 Committee discussed the target WIP and the number of  
 6 jobs this equated to and value. It was noted that the  
 7 automated system would assist, however this was not  
 8 fully complete as there was a coding issue IT were, as  
 9 yet, unable to resolve. It was agreed that this issue  
 10 would be reported back through the MD's report."

11 First of all, why was it not an unusual profile in  
 12 your considered view?

13 A. So responsive repairs tend to have a very seasonal  
 14 profile, you have less works raised in the summer, more  
 15 works raised in the winter, and also a lot of those  
 16 works that are raised in the winter can be problematic.  
 17 Leak detection, particularly in high-rise accommodation,  
 18 can take some time to resolve, and the volume of work  
 19 will generally prolong the time it takes to clear your  
 20 work in progress. So your average days, the metric that  
 21 we referred to earlier, would tend to be slightly longer  
 22 during the winter months than it would be during the  
 23 summer months.

24 Q. What was the target WIP at this stage?

25 A. Again, I can't remember the volume target we set, but

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1 from a value perspective it was £500,000.

2 Q. Was greater emphasis put on the value for the reasons  
 3 you've given, as opposed to volume at this —

4 A. We looked at both. From a business financial management  
 5 perspective, obviously, value is incredibly important.  
 6 We've often spent money on parts and not yet finished  
 7 a repair and haven't therefore been able to be paid for  
 8 it. Operationally, volume is a key driver in terms of  
 9 scheduling your workforce and planning resource.

10 Q. Now, Paul Gevaux, your predecessor, had reported at  
 11 a Repairs Direct board meeting on 28 May 2015 — we  
 12 don't need to go to it, but the reference is at  
 13 item 5.2, {RBK00059052/2} — that an acceptable level of  
 14 aged WIP was 40 to 50 jobs at any one time, and there  
 15 should be a report explaining any exceptional WIP over  
 16 two months old.

17 Would you agree with that as a metric?

18 A. 40 to 50 jobs in WIP would sound incredibly low, given  
 19 that we were dealing with, I believe, from memory,  
 20 something north of 30,000 repairs a year. 40 to 50 jobs  
 21 is basically a day's work.

22 Q. Now, can we look at a TMO board meeting which took place  
 23 at 30 March 2017, and if we could go to  
 24 {TMO10046960/21}.

25 Here we have a board KPI report, and we see that

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1 "Responsive repairs" are there at the top of the page,  
 2 and "Average days to complete a responsive repair",  
 3 I think the key indicator you have identified in your  
 4 evidence today, is green.  
 5 Given the backlog that we've just been looking at as  
 6 set out in your bar chart, did you agree that this  
 7 performance indicator didn't give a full and therefore  
 8 accurate picture of the volume and age of the  
 9 outstanding FRA actions?  
 10 A. In terms of meeting the standard HouseMark definition of  
 11 that KPI, it was an accurate reflection of the position  
 12 of the business. Of course, there were jobs that were  
 13 completed that had taken more than 10.2 days, but there  
 14 were many jobs that we were completing within 24 or  
 15 48 hours. So it was an accurate reflection of the  
 16 business performance, yes.  
 17 And, sorry, just to clarify that point, HouseMark is  
 18 an industry body in social housing who set the  
 19 definitions of how you calculate these measures. This  
 20 is not something that we subjectively came up with.  
 21 Q. That was the criteria you consistently used during your  
 22 time when measuring performance of —  
 23 A. I used it consistently because I felt it was a very  
 24 strong measure of the actual customer experience, yes.  
 25 Q. Now, can I turn to a separate topic, which is

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1 Repairs Direct's involvement in the maintenance of flat  
 2 entrance doors.  
 3 Now, can I ask you to go to your fifth witness  
 4 statement, which is at {TMO00842379/6}, and  
 5 paragraph 23. You say there this:  
 6 "I have been asked to detail any involvement  
 7 Repairs Direct had in work on flat entrance doors at  
 8 Grenfell Tower, including in relation to self-closing  
 9 mechanisms. The work carried out by Repairs Direct on  
 10 flats at Grenfell Tower would have been in relation to  
 11 requests made by residents individually or via the Fire  
 12 Risk Assessment programme. Repairs Direct had no  
 13 involvement in any planned preventative maintenance  
 14 programme of work in relation to the flat entrance doors  
 15 at Grenfell Tower, in so far as I can recall."  
 16 Now, do you recall any involvement that  
 17 Repairs Direct had in the TMO's inspection and planned  
 18 maintenance regime for flat entrance doors beyond  
 19 Grenfell Tower?  
 20 A. I recall that I was asked to provide a quotation for  
 21 an installation programme of door-closers, self-closing  
 22 mechanisms, across the borough, and to propose what  
 23 an inspection regime could possibly cost and the  
 24 problems associated with trying to deliver that.  
 25 Q. And that's the sum total of your recollection on that

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1 issue?  
 2 A. As I recall, yes.  
 3 Q. Could we go to {LFB00003534/1}.  
 4 Now, this is 2013, so well before you joined  
 5 Repairs Direct, but Janice Wray emailed Matthew Ramsey,  
 6 who is a fire safety inspection officer at the LFB, and  
 7 she set out at point 1 of this email the TMO's approach  
 8 to self-closing devices on tenants' flat entrance doors.  
 9 She says in the second bullet point that:  
 10 " ■ When properties become void self-closers will be  
 11 reinstated/ installed as necessary.  
 12 " ■ At other times when major work is being  
 13 undertaken in a dwelling the self-closer will be  
 14 reinstated if it has been disconnected."  
 15 Now, it's correct, isn't it, that Repairs Direct  
 16 carried out repairs and maintenance in void properties?  
 17 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 18 Q. When you joined Repairs Direct, was TMO's policy on  
 19 inspection and maintenance of self-closing devices as  
 20 set out in this email, and was it communicated to you?  
 21 A. If I can just take the time to read the email.  
 22 Q. Of course.  
 23 (Pause)  
 24 A. Yes, that's how I understood the policy to be.  
 25 Q. Who communicated that policy to you, can you remember

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1 now?  
 2 A. It would have been part of our standard — lettable  
 3 standard — sorry, documented lettable standard for void  
 4 properties.  
 5 Q. So that was something the TMO directed —  
 6 A. Yes, the TMO had agreed a lettable standard with the  
 7 Royal Borough. That was documented and that was the  
 8 standard to which we were to reinstate void properties.  
 9 And it was also part of this — in terms of just general  
 10 flat entrance doors, it was part of the specification  
 11 for installing a new door.  
 12 Q. And it was your understanding that the policy, the  
 13 approach to self-closers, was to be implemented by  
 14 Repairs Direct staff?  
 15 A. If we were doing the work, then yes, absolutely. As we  
 16 did not do the work as part of a planned preventative  
 17 maintenance programme, it was generally part of  
 18 responsive repairs or in void works.  
 19 Q. Thank you.  
 20 Now, on 9 September 2016, Janice Wray circulated  
 21 papers for the TMO health and safety committee meeting  
 22 which was due to be held on 13 September.  
 23 Now, those papers included paper 6, a review of  
 24 fire safety policy and strategy. That can be found at  
 25 {TMO00840660/2}.

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1 We can see the third bullet point, the first line,  
 2 says:  
 3 "Flat Entrance doors — now have a flat door  
 4 assessment checklist & fire door specification that  
 5 [Repairs Direct] use — should be included or referred to  
 6 and reproduced elsewhere."  
 7 Were you aware that Repairs Direct were using  
 8 a flat door assessment checklist and fire door  
 9 specification?  
 10 A. I was aware that we had a specification that we were  
 11 complying to, yes.  
 12 Q. Did you ever have cause to read the checklist or the  
 13 assessment itself?  
 14 A. I can't recall, I may have done.  
 15 Q. Can you remember why each document was produced now?  
 16 A. No. It was standard practice for most major pieces of  
 17 work to have a specification, so we understood the  
 18 requirement of the work we were to do. So in installing  
 19 anything — most of our repairs were to repair and  
 20 repair like for like. In the event that we had to  
 21 install new, there was a specification that was  
 22 documented by the TMO for us to adhere to.  
 23 Q. Can we go to {TMO00873603}.  
 24 Now, in relation to the specification, we understand  
 25 that it refers to a specification provided by

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1 Paul Brunning to Janice Wray, and we see that here, on  
 2 14 September 2015, and it says, "for all FC30 door we  
 3 are replacing".  
 4 Now, the attachment can be found at {TMO00873605}.  
 5 This document needs to be downloaded, for which  
 6 I apologise to the document manager.  
 7 (Pause)  
 8 If it's possible to look at the "Tick List" sheet,  
 9 it sets out there the specification for flat entrance  
 10 doors, including self-closing devices. Do you have  
 11 that?  
 12 A. Yes, I can see.  
 13 Q. Now, is that the specification that was referred to in  
 14 the fire safety strategy review, can you help us with  
 15 that?  
 16 A. I couldn't say for certain. I understood the strategy  
 17 to be around a door called an FD30 rather than an FC30.  
 18 Whether that was a later iteration of this, I couldn't  
 19 say.  
 20 Q. Is it correct that Repairs Direct operatives only  
 21 carried out fire door repairs and subcontractors would  
 22 have carried out any replacements to this specification?  
 23 A. So certainly we would have used subcontractors for any  
 24 uPVC-based doors. If they are wooden — if they were  
 25 wooden doors, then an FD30 wooden door could have been

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1 installed by our own staff who were qualified to do so.  
 2 Q. Thank you.  
 3 Now, just in relation to the checklist, can I take  
 4 you to a separate email document, which can be found at  
 5 {CST00030151/3}, which hopefully should be an email from  
 6 Alex Bosman to Janice Wray on 2 February 2016.  
 7 We see in the second paragraph Alex Bosman asks  
 8 Janice Wray whether she was able to provide a checklist  
 9 for operatives to confirm doors can be considered  
 10 nominally fire rated when attending prior to installing  
 11 a Perko and renewal of hinges.  
 12 Now, Janice Wray forwarded that email to  
 13 Alan Brooks, and if we go to page 1 of this chain  
 14 {CST00030151/1}, and the first paragraph, she says in  
 15 the second sentence:  
 16 "As per Alex request the Fire Risk Assessor and  
 17 I have come up with the following checklist for your  
 18 operatives ..."  
 19 She then set out a ten-point checklist to determine  
 20 whether a door is a notional fire door.  
 21 Again, can you help us, is that the checklist that  
 22 was referred to in the fire safety strategy review?  
 23 A. Again, I don't know if that's the exact checklist.  
 24 Certainly there are elements of it I would have expected  
 25 to have seen on the checklist. Alex Bosman would have

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1 been qualified to specify the requirements of the doors  
 2 that we were to fit.  
 3 Q. Can I ask you, between the two possible candidates that  
 4 we've identified for the checklist that was referred to,  
 5 is this the more likely one compared to the document in  
 6 the tick-list sheet we looked at earlier that referred  
 7 to FC30 doors?  
 8 A. I really couldn't say, I would be speculating.  
 9 Q. Can I now turn to a separate document, which is  
 10 {TMO00840660/2}.  
 11 This is again going back to the fire safety strategy  
 12 review, and if we look at the particular section that  
 13 dealt with self-closers, which is the fifth bullet  
 14 point, it said this:  
 15 "Self-closers — inspection & maintenance of fitted  
 16 self-closers — LFB advise that the RRO [the 2005 order]  
 17 requires regular inspection/maintenance of these devices  
 18 to ensure that are still operating effectively and have  
 19 not been disconnected/disabled. The LFB have advised  
 20 that landlords MUST NOT rely exclusively on void checks  
 21 to undertake these inspections. How can this be  
 22 progressed? Is this something that ESAs can assist  
 23 with? Are there any ppm [planned preventative  
 24 maintenance] contractors such as gas servicing  
 25 contractor who could assist? Could it be included in

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1 tenancy checks? Could RD be asked to feedback after  
2 visiting a property?"

3 If we go on to page 3 {TMO00840660/3}, and roughly  
4 two-thirds of the way down, we see your comments there  
5 on this document. Now, you don't comment on the  
6 inspection and maintenance of self-closers.

7 My question is this: do you recall what was  
8 discussed about these options for inspecting  
9 self-closing devices at the health and safety committee  
10 meeting on 13 September 2016?

11 A. I do recall that there were lots of conversations around  
12 how to effectively deliver an inspection programme on  
13 door-closers. I don't recall if it was specifically at  
14 that meeting, but there were a lot of conversations  
15 about it.

16 Q. Do you remember giving your view at that meeting as to  
17 whether Repairs Direct staff could check self-closers  
18 when carrying out any other work at TMO properties?

19 A. I don't recall specifically giving my advice, no.

20 Q. Now, can I turn to another document, which is,  
21 I'm afraid, another email chain, at {TMO00863767/3}.

22 We see there, at the very bottom of the page, the  
23 start of an email from Janice Wray to Derrick Singleton  
24 on 8 December 2016.

25 The full email is over the page on page 4

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1 {TMO00863767/4}, and she asks Derrick Singleton, who was  
2 your ops manager, about actions arising from the FRA for  
3 Frinstead House.

4 If we could look at the bottom paragraph on page 4,  
5 asking if he could assist with checking whether the flat  
6 entrance doors were self-closing FD30s. There we go.

7 If we go to page 3 {TMO00863767/3}, and the first  
8 paragraph in the second line, Mr Singleton says this in  
9 his reply. He queries why Carl Stokes had not checked  
10 them and suggested it would be better for Carl Stokes to  
11 assess "what is required that we [ie Repairs Direct] can  
12 work to".

13 Then if we can go up to page 2 {TMO00863767/2}, we  
14 have Janice Wray's response, and in the first paragraph  
15 she says this, amongst other matters:

16 "Do we not have someone who can assess the doors he  
17 highlights and hasn't been able to access — as per the  
18 nominal checklist that we used for Adair? Goni?"

19 Then it goes on to the second paragraph:

20 "Also shouldn't we have another resource we can call  
21 on for these assessments?"

22 In the final sentence.

23 If we go up to page 1 {TMO00863767/1}, and the  
24 bottom, Mr Singleton replies:

25 "... can you send me through the checklist used for

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1 Adair and I'll get one of the supervisors to check  
2 these."

3 Then Janice Wray replied, we see further up the  
4 page, on 30 December 2016:

5 "Here is the info that I provided Alan Brooks in  
6 relation to a 'nominally fire-rated door'. Clearly all  
7 flat entrance doors now need to be fitted with  
8 self-closing devices and so the checklist needs amending  
9 to include the present and effective operation of  
10 a self-closing device. However, where the door  
11 inspections are recommended because the door has clearly  
12 been replaced in relatively recent timeframe this door  
13 must meet the current standard and be a self-closing  
14 FD30s fitted with all intumescent and cold seals etc."

15 Now, did Repairs Direct supervisors carry out flat  
16 entrance door inspections more widely than at  
17 Frinstead House after this exchange of correspondence?

18 A. No, they didn't.

19 Q. Can you help us as to why not?

20 A. Inspecting — to inspect for a self-closing device being  
21 on a door, a Perko self-closing device is a chain that's  
22 fitted between the inside of the door into the inside of  
23 the frame and it's only therefore visible by going into  
24 the property and looking at the door. Residents are  
25 reluctant to take time from work for appointments for

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1 you to come and look at something that isn't broken and  
2 therefore it's very difficult to get access, and that  
3 was the subject of much discussion when we were being  
4 asked to look at a borough-wide inspection process.

5 So I think, from memory, our supervisors pursued,  
6 with the help of resident liaison staff, an inspection  
7 at Frinstead House, but we never resolved the issue of  
8 how you could look at internally-contained Perko  
9 self-closers on doors across the borough.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 Now, I think earlier in your evidence, but certainly  
12 in your statements, you referred to the fact that after  
13 completing a programme of flat entrance door works for  
14 Adair and Hazlewood Towers —

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. — Repairs Direct were asked to quote for a three-year  
17 programme to install self-closers on flat entrance doors  
18 across the borough.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Is that right?

21 A. Correct, yes.

22 Q. Can we look at a paper that Janice Wray drafted for the  
23 joint management team meeting between RBKC and the TMO  
24 on 1 March 2017, and it's entitled "Installation of  
25 self-closing devices on flat entrance doors, for

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1 discussion". That can be found at {RBK00000988/1}. So  
2 there we go, there is the document.

3 If we can turn to page 3 {RBK00000988/3}, we see  
4 there, at the bottom half of the page, a table setting  
5 out the estimated costs of both the proposed self-closer  
6 installation programme as well as the proposed  
7 self-closer inspection and maintenance programme.

8 Now, Janice Wray said in her evidence that you  
9 provided the information which went into that table. Is  
10 that correct?

11 A. Yes, I worked on this with Sam Hart, who was my  
12 commercial manager.

13 Q. Now, given that, is it right that the assumptions and  
14 estimated costs set out in the table covered all flat  
15 entrance doors in TMO properties, including those which  
16 had been replaced as part of the door replacement  
17 programme between 2011 and 2013?

18 A. It looked at all front entrance doors except those that  
19 were properties with a street entrance. So in other  
20 words flats that were part of a block, not those with  
21 a front door that opens directly onto the street.

22 Q. So, subject to that caveat, the table did cover all flat  
23 entrance doors, including those that had been part of  
24 the flat entrance door replacement programme in 2011 and  
25 2013?

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1 A. To the best of my recollection, yes.

2 Q. Under the heading "Installation Programme for total  
3 stock", that's the first item, the assumption is 75%  
4 installation.

5 Now, that appears to suggest that 75% of flat  
6 entrance doors would need to have self-closing devices  
7 installed. Is that a correct reading of that table?

8 A. Yes, and that's an assumption that we made at the time,  
9 correct, yes.

10 Q. Can you help the panel as to what the basis was for that  
11 assumption?

12 A. I'm afraid I can't recall.

13 Q. Now, under the second heading, "Inspection/Maintenance  
14 Programme", what was the basis for the assumption that  
15 20% of flat entrance doors required their closers  
16 repaired or adjusted?

17 A. It was fairly common to find that when you visited  
18 a property, the door-closer had been disabled or  
19 removed. Residents struggled with it. It made the door  
20 quite heavy if you were trying to go through with  
21 a buggy, perhaps, or some shopping, or perhaps if you  
22 were an elderly resident, and also some residents liked  
23 to be able to leave their front door open if their  
24 children were playing on the balcony outside the flat,  
25 which of course the door-closer prevented. So it was

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1 very common to find that they'd been removed.

2 Q. Would the same factors have informed the assumption that  
3 20% of doors required closers to be replaced?

4 A. Yes, because some were simply disabled, others were  
5 removed entirely.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 Now, can I turn to repairs carried out to flat  
8 entrance doors at Grenfell, and can we look at some  
9 specific examples, and first of all flat 26.

10 Now, the resident of flat 26 says at paragraph 4(b)  
11 of his statement to the Inquiry: {IWS0001742/4}

12 "There was an incident after the front door to my  
13 flat was replaced when I was trapped inside my flat ...  
14 I contacted the TMO and informed them that I was stuck  
15 inside my flat and could not get the door to open ...  
16 The TMO sent somebody over and he managed to open the  
17 door from the outside and carried out repair works to  
18 the door. I had no further problems with the new door  
19 after these repair works were carried out."

20 The resident then went on to state:

21 "Further, the contractor who was sent to fix the  
22 door offered to take off the self-closing mechanism on  
23 the door; and did not mention anything about the risk  
24 that this would cause. I chose not to have the  
25 self-closing mechanism removed."

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1 The reference is {IWS00001742/4}.

2 Now, the repair records that the Inquiry has been  
3 provided, which were extracted from the Repairs Direct  
4 open contractor system, suggests that a Repairs Direct  
5 operative, Franklin Griffiths, completed this repair on  
6 18 May 2016.

7 Are you able to explain why a Repairs Direct  
8 operative appears to have offered to remove  
9 a self-closing device?

10 A. No, I'm not able to explain that, and I'm disappointed  
11 if that were the case.

12 Q. Were Repairs Direct operatives made aware of the purpose  
13 and requirement of self-closing devices on flat entrance  
14 doors?

15 A. Yes, they were.

16 Q. And is that something you can speak personally to,  
17 having witnessed instructions being given to your staff?

18 A. The subject of door-closers was a very large discussion  
19 point around the TMO for some months, and it was  
20 certainly discussed in Toolbox Talks that I attended  
21 with those staff.

22 Q. Can I now turn to flat 153 at the tower, and if we can  
23 turn to {TMO10023348}.

24 Now, this is a display job screenshot for a repair  
25 to flat 153 raised on 29 July 2016, "fgriff", who

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1 I think refers to Franklin Griffiths :  
 2 "Nothing much wrong with door apart from door closer  
 3 missing."  
 4 Now, we found no record of a repair following this  
 5 self—closer issue.  
 6 Now, where an operative identified an issue with  
 7 a flat entrance door and the need for a further repair  
 8 or indeed a replacement to that door during a job, was  
 9 there a process in place for progressing the further  
 10 repair?  
 11 A. Yes, indeed. He -- the operative would be expected  
 12 to -- if he didn't have the materials on his van there  
 13 and then, he would be expected to arrange for a second  
 14 job to be raised with a detailed description of exactly  
 15 what work had to be completed.  
 16 Q. Now, were operatives required to notify anyone if a door  
 17 was left insecure or the fire resistance was adversely  
 18 impacted, for example if the self—closer had been  
 19 removed pending a further repair?  
 20 A. If a door was insecure then there was an established  
 21 procedure for putting a temporary secure door in place.  
 22 If a door—closer was detached then they're instructed to  
 23 re—attach it.  
 24 Q. Again, can you testify that that instruction was given  
 25 to your staff?

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1 A. Absolutely, yes.  
 2 Q. Can I now turn to flat 135.  
 3 If we go to {IWS00002065/3}, Samuel Daniels was the  
 4 resident of flat 135, and he says at paragraph 14, which  
 5 is just below the halfway mark of that page, this:  
 6 "One evening this fault was raised with the TMO by  
 7 phone on an emergency line as it was at night and the  
 8 front door was not closing. According to my housing  
 9 file, this happened on 4 April 2017. I remember  
 10 a caretaker came out and took out the middle hinge in  
 11 the door. This made the door close once you pulled it  
 12 close; but there was still an issue with the lock  
 13 system. The caretaker said that they would come back  
 14 and replace the entire door, but they never did."  
 15 Now, the repair records show an out—of—hours repair  
 16 request for flat 135 on 4 April -- we don't need to go  
 17 to it, but the reference is row 82, {RBK00053297} -- and  
 18 that request was described as a front door not closing,  
 19 which is recorded as having been completed by  
 20 a Repairs Direct operative, Piotr Klimkiewicz, on the  
 21 same day, rather than a caretaker.  
 22 Now, the records also show a follow—on repair  
 23 request on 5 April 2017, and the reference is row 84,  
 24 {RBK00053297}. Again, we don't need to go to it. That  
 25 was described as an "overhaul complete uPVC front door".

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1 The target date was set as 8 May, and a subcontractor,  
 2 Doorway Maintenance, was allocated the repair. The  
 3 repair, however, was recorded as abandoned and nothing  
 4 further is recorded.  
 5 Now, that's a very long run—up to hopefully  
 6 a shorter question, which is this: when a repair was  
 7 abandoned, was there a system in place for checking why  
 8 it had been abandoned and that the repair was  
 9 subsequently carried out?  
 10 A. If a repair was abandoned, on the majority of occasions  
 11 that would have been because the staff were unable to  
 12 access the property. When the staff were unable to  
 13 access the property, they would -- so firstly they would  
 14 ring the doorbell and knock on the door. If there was  
 15 no answer, they would ring the resident's telephone  
 16 number, which they had on their PDA. They would then  
 17 call the office, who would also try and call the  
 18 resident, and if we were still unable to get any contact  
 19 with them, we would leave a postcard notifying them that  
 20 we'd tried to attend, and the operative would take  
 21 a photograph of the front door, which would be uploaded  
 22 from his PDA to evidence that we had attended at that  
 23 point. The postcard that we left in the letterbox would  
 24 instruct the resident to re—contact us to make a further  
 25 appointment for the repair to be completed.

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1 Q. Thank you.  
 2 Can I now turn to a separate and distinct topic,  
 3 which is that of complaints, and if we can go to  
 4 {TMO10026082/3}.  
 5 This is an email from Andrea Newton from the  
 6 Lancaster West Residents' Association, and it's an email  
 7 sent to Sacha Jevans and others.  
 8 If we look at the third paragraph, she says this in  
 9 the second sentence:  
 10 "I feel there is a huge lack of coordination within  
 11 TMO and [Repairs Direct]."  
 12 She then goes on to explain in detail her concern  
 13 about the management of repairs, and if we go down to  
 14 the sixth paragraph:  
 15 "But despite management at TMO literally  
 16 'micro—managing' specific repairs that are then passed  
 17 onto the [relevant] people within the repairs depts,  
 18 staff are seeming to completely ignore procedure or are  
 19 incapable of getting bookings finalised and contractors  
 20 to arrive to the jobs on the right day if at all.  
 21 "Also there are conflicting stories coming from  
 22 various staff all working on the same repair.  
 23 "This simply does not reflect the customer  
 24 satisfaction data that you have gathered."  
 25 Now, Sacha Jevans forwarded that to you and various

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1 others later that day.  
 2 My question is this: did you agree with  
 3 Andrea Newton's assessment that there was a lack of  
 4 co-ordination between the TMO and Repairs Direct?  
 5 A. No, I wouldn't have agreed with that. However, what  
 6 I would accept is that Andrea Newton was a resident on  
 7 the Lancaster West Estate, and she certainly was getting  
 8 a perception that things were not running as smoothly as  
 9 they should, and certainly we did need — I was  
 10 certainly not being complacent, and I do believe that  
 11 our service could improve, but not to the degree that  
 12 she describes there.  
 13 Q. Did you have any cause to consider that Andrea Newton  
 14 was exaggerating the scale of the concerns regarding  
 15 Repairs Direct's responsiveness to sorting out repairs?  
 16 A. I can't speak for Andrea Newton's perceptions. She's  
 17 documented something here.  
 18 Q. To the best of your knowledge, put differently, were the  
 19 concerns she has raised here in this email  
 20 representative of broader concerns expressed by  
 21 residents in TMO properties about Repairs Direct's  
 22 service?  
 23 A. It was not unusual if I went to resident meetings and  
 24 residents' associations, as I did from time to time, for  
 25 residents to complain about the time it took to complete

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1 repairs, particularly difficult repairs, so I'm not  
 2 surprised by that comment.  
 3 Q. Do you accept that her views were representative,  
 4 therefore?  
 5 A. Her views represented her perception, clearly, from that  
 6 note. It's not for me to interpret what she meant  
 7 beyond that, I don't think.  
 8 Q. Can we turn to page 2 within this email chain  
 9 {TMO10026082/2}, and it's point 4 of Sacha Jevans' email  
 10 to you and others, including Mr Black, and it says this:  
 11 "Graham please start thinking about when we can  
 12 start the Lanc West pilot (if not already)."  
 13 What was the Lanc West pilot?  
 14 A. Sorry, I'm just trying to find that on this ...  
 15 Q. I'm terribly sorry. It's her email to you, so if you go  
 16 slightly further up the page. You see at the very top?  
 17 A. Right.  
 18 Q. Sorry. Can you remember what that pilot was?  
 19 A. I'm starting to remember. I believe that we were  
 20 considering allocating a number of operatives to work  
 21 specifically and exclusively on the Lancaster West  
 22 Estate and to see how that improved our service delivery  
 23 for those residents.  
 24 Q. So given the purpose underlying the pilot, is it fair to  
 25 say that there were genuine substance to the concerns

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1 expressed by Andrea Newton?  
 2 A. It would suggest that there was more than one person  
 3 saying such a thing, you're right. I'm always open to  
 4 trying new operational models to see if it's going to  
 5 help deliver a better service to the customer.  
 6 Q. Did you meet Sacha Jevans to discuss the concerns  
 7 identified by Andrea Newton and which the Lanc West  
 8 pilot appears to have been designed to remedy?  
 9 A. I don't recall, sorry.  
 10 Q. How regular would your meetings be with Sacha Jevans?  
 11 A. Sacha and I would certainly have met at the monthly  
 12 Repairs Direct management group, and probably once  
 13 a month in between that.  
 14 Q. How efficient was Sacha Jevans about chasing you to  
 15 answer requests, emails, or to see whether tasks had  
 16 been completed?  
 17 A. Very much so. Her PA also supported her in doing that.  
 18 Q. So can we take it that it is likely, if not probable,  
 19 that you did subsequently discuss the concerns expressed  
 20 by Andrea Newton with Sacha Jevans?  
 21 A. I may have done. I don't recall having a specific  
 22 conversation on that point.  
 23 Q. Can you remember whether the Lanc West pilot was  
 24 implemented?  
 25 A. No, I don't.

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1 Q. Do you remember there being any pressure from executives  
 2 at the TMO to ensure that the Lanc West pilot was  
 3 implemented?  
 4 A. No, I don't recall that.  
 5 Q. Did you receive any correspondence from councillors  
 6 expressing concerns about the efficiency and  
 7 effectiveness of the service provided by Repairs Direct,  
 8 at least in relation to Lancaster West?  
 9 A. I received correspondence from councillors on behalf of  
 10 their — of residents in their constituencies from time  
 11 to time, and generally they would be about problems. So  
 12 I can't say if it was specifically about Lancaster West,  
 13 but certainly I did receive correspondence from  
 14 councillors.  
 15 Q. Can I ask you to turn to {TMO00899676/3}.  
 16 This is the witness statement of Shannon MacInnes,  
 17 and if we could look at paragraph 12, and in particular  
 18 the third line, she says this:  
 19 "A lot of residents were unhappy with the quality of  
 20 repairs works, the time it was taking to handle the  
 21 repairs and also the level of priority allocated to the  
 22 repair."  
 23 Were you aware of a lot of resident dissatisfaction  
 24 with the quality of repairs being carried out?  
 25 A. I would disagree with the phrase that it was a lot. We

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1 did track resident satisfaction . There were a volume  
 2 of — as a standard routine, there were — a proportion  
 3 of all completed repairs received a follow-up call to  
 4 assess customer satisfaction with the service delivered,  
 5 and of course we also kept records of the volume of  
 6 complaints received. The volume of complaints received,  
 7 as I recall , was in low percentage figures compared to  
 8 the number of repair works we completed.

9 Q. Were you aware of a reputation held by Repairs Direct  
 10 for poor management of repairs and indeed disdain for  
 11 residents?

12 A. No, I was not aware of that.

13 Q. Now, are you familiar with the name Samantha Burrell?

14 A. I am.

15 Q. What was her role?

16 A. Samantha Burrell worked in the call centre for the TMO  
 17 for a period of time, and latterly , towards the end of  
 18 my time at Repairs Direct, she moved into working in  
 19 a customer service role for me handling complaints.

20 Q. Could I ask us to go to {TMO00894344/10}.

21 If we go to paragraph 44, and it's really the first  
 22 line , Samantha Burrell explained that Repairs Direct  
 23 carried out customer satisfaction surveys, and in  
 24 relation to those surveys, she says at paragraph 45,  
 25 just below:

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1 "Residents were called and asked to give marks out  
 2 of 10. We had to maintain over a 90%—95% satisfaction  
 3 rate, so if I was to make 10 calls who gave marks under  
 4 6, I would have to call another 10 residents to make  
 5 sure percentage went higher."

6 If we go over the page {TMO00894344/11} to  
 7 paragraph 46, she said this:

8 "However, in my view these statistics did not  
 9 provide a true picture of the repairs carried out. When  
 10 I commenced employment with Repairs Direct, the ethos  
 11 was to select specific jobs which was almost a guarantee  
 12 positive reaction to the works for example, a tap  
 13 repair, to bolster the percentage."

14 Were you aware of the efforts to bolster  
 15 satisfaction rates of repairs as set out here by  
 16 Samantha Burrell?

17 A. Absolutely not, and my firm belief was that the calls  
 18 were selected at random.

19 Q. Was there any doubt at any time about resident  
 20 satisfaction with the quality of repairs?

21 A. I was very clear about residents' perception of the  
 22 quality of repairs. We had our customer satisfaction  
 23 surveys, as you see here, we had our complaints data and  
 24 we had feedback from resident meetings.

25 Q. Thank you.

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1 Can I now turn to a separate topic, which is that of  
 2 vulnerable persons, and if I could ask you to turn to  
 3 {TMO00866011}.

4 Now, this is, as you see, a TMO senior management  
 5 team meeting on 18 February 2016, and if we go to page 4  
 6 {TMO00866011/4}, item 8.1, it's under the heading  
 7 "Supporting People Policy", it's recorded that:

8 "TB [Teresa Brown] advised there was not a mechanism  
 9 for staff to feedback information on resident  
 10 vulnerabilities which led to the development of this  
 11 policy. A CRM process is being [developed] around this.

12 "TB and GW [you] will [discuss] the most suitable  
 13 mechanism for RD staff to feedback any concerns.

14 "The form and policy will undergo some further  
 15 amendments and

16 "HC [Hash Chamchoun] added that CAS ..."

17 Do you know what that is?

18 A. It was the assisted living areas. Forgive me, I can't  
 19 remember the exact interpretation of the letters , but it  
 20 was the assisted living areas.

21 Q. "...needs to be included in the document. TB to ask  
 22 David Noble to discuss amendments with HC."

23 Do you recall discussion about the supporting people  
 24 policy and how Repairs Direct staff would report back  
 25 identified vulnerabilities of residents?

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1 A. Yes, I do.

2 Q. What was the substance of that discussion?

3 A. Effectively , the reality — what we all understood was  
 4 that, due to the nature of Repairs Direct's work, we  
 5 possibly entered more of the properties than any other  
 6 part of the TMO and encountered more of the residents on  
 7 a daily basis than other people. The PDAs that the  
 8 operatives held and on which they received their work  
 9 would flag any known appropriate vulnerability, and that  
 10 could be that it was, perhaps, a mother with very young  
 11 children or a fragile elderly person, or it could flag  
 12 an alert for a potential violent resident, for example.

13 If they encountered something that differed to that,  
 14 they could — (a) they were empowered to walk away if  
 15 they felt any way in danger to themselves, but if they  
 16 felt that the resident was in another way vulnerable  
 17 that hadn't been notified, then they would flag that to  
 18 their planner by calling our office , and they would  
 19 notify it to the customer service centre and  
 20 Teresa Brown's team would follow up it.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 Can we go to {TMO00866013/1}.

23 Now, this is the TMO's supporting residents  
 24 procedure which seems to have come into practical effect  
 25 in or about April 2016.

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1 First of all, are you familiar with that document?  
 2 A. I don't recall reading it particularly.  
 3 Q. Can you help as to whether your staff were trained on  
 4 the requirements of this procedure?  
 5 A. Yes, my staff were trained on what to look for in terms  
 6 of resident vulnerability and how to handle that, should  
 7 they encounter it.  
 8 Q. So you hadn't seen the document, but your staff were  
 9 trained on its requirements?  
 10 A. Yes, I believe so. I was certainly aware that the  
 11 training was going to take place in support of that and  
 12 that was a requirement.  
 13 Q. Can you now remember when that training took place and  
 14 who was responsible for providing it?  
 15 A. I don't remember when. I believe it was delivered by a  
 16 member of Teresa Brown's team during one of our  
 17 Toolbox Talks with the operatives.  
 18 Q. Can we turn to {TMO00901356}, and this should be  
 19 a Repairs Direct operative summary form.  
 20 There is a list here of the types of issues that may  
 21 affect a resident and a box for comments.  
 22 Now, have you seen this form before?  
 23 A. It's not familiar to me particularly, no.  
 24 Q. Can you help us as to whether that was used by  
 25 Repairs Direct operatives?

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1 A. It may have been. I would have been surprised. I would  
 2 have expected them to have rung the office and delivered  
 3 the information first — hand having left the property,  
 4 rather than fill out — try and find a form in the van  
 5 to fill out and hand in.  
 6 Q. Would there or should there have been as part of that  
 7 process some form of document to record what  
 8 a Repairs Direct operative had found, particularly if it  
 9 concerned a vulnerability or a disability of  
 10 a particular resident?  
 11 A. So my expectation and my understanding of the process  
 12 they followed was, having called the planner in the  
 13 office, that the planner would have immediately  
 14 completed an email to record the nature of the concern  
 15 being flagged by the operative and that would have been  
 16 sent to the housing team to follow up.  
 17 Q. Thank you.  
 18 Can I now turn to the issue of the health check  
 19 audit review after the fire at Grenfell.  
 20 Could I ask you to go to {TMO00862541/5}.  
 21 Now, this is a report entitled "Repairs Direct —  
 22 The Way Forward", prepared by the interim managing  
 23 director for Repairs Direct, Chris Furlong, for a TMO  
 24 board meeting held on 18 January 2018, so that's after  
 25 you'd left the company in November 2017.

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1 Can we go to page 11 {TMO00862541/11}, which ought  
 2 to be appendix 1 of the report. This sets out the  
 3 findings of a health check on the Repairs Direct  
 4 service, and if we go about a third of the way down, we  
 5 see in the far left — hand column "Op05", and it's  
 6 recorded:  
 7 "Backlog of repairs dates to January 2017 — total  
 8 number 5,400 jobs."  
 9 Now, given the concerns raised about the backlog  
 10 which had been a consistent feature during your time at  
 11 Repairs Direct, can you account for how this backlog  
 12 amassed from January 2017 onwards?  
 13 A. Sadly, in the immediate aftermath of the fire,  
 14 I dedicated a number of my team to work on the  
 15 Lancaster West Estate on the other homes which had been  
 16 evacuated in the immediate footprint of Grenfell Tower,  
 17 so we were replacing doors that had been — that the  
 18 police had opened forcibly, we were reassuring residents  
 19 of the safety of the properties and helping to encourage  
 20 people to move back in.  
 21 I'd also devoted a number of my staff to increase  
 22 the speed with which we turned around void properties to  
 23 create more opportunities to re-home people who were in  
 24 temporary accommodation following the fire.  
 25 At the same time, productivity of the teams reduced

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1 significantly, for a couple of reasons. Obviously they  
 2 felt, as everyone did, the gravity of the huge horror  
 3 that had occurred.  
 4 Excuse me ...  
 5 And they were struggling to conduct their day-to-day  
 6 work. And residents across the borough were also  
 7 frankly scared of the risk of fire in their own  
 8 property.  
 9 I'm sorry, can I have a moment?  
 10 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Would you like to stop for a minute?  
 11 THE WITNESS: Could I, please?  
 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Yes. The usher will take you out  
 13 for a minute, if you would like to go out.  
 14 (Pause)  
 15 I think the best thing is if we rise just for a few  
 16 moments, and as soon as Mr Webb feels able to carry on,  
 17 then of course we will resume.  
 18 MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.  
 19 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you.  
 20 (12.38 pm)  
 21 (A short break)  
 22 (12.46 pm)  
 23 THE WITNESS: Thank you for that.  
 24 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: All right now, Mr Webb?  
 25 THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you.

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1 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Thank you.  
 2 Yes, Mr Kinnier.  
 3 MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.  
 4 Can we go back, just briefly — only a few more  
 5 questions, Mr Webb —  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. — to the document we were at {TMO00862541/11} and go to  
 8 the bottom of this page, "Op11":  
 9 "There is no structured approach to categorising  
 10 repairs into types of repairs (e.g. FRA Actions,  
 11 complaints actions, standard repairs etc.) and as such  
 12 are difficult to manage, monitor or prioritise."  
 13 Now, given the emphasis that had been put on  
 14 prioritising FRA actions since at least January 2016,  
 15 can you explain that particular finding?  
 16 A. No, I can't, and, I mean, obviously it postdates my time  
 17 there. I can only assume that some of the processes  
 18 I had put in place had unravelled in the time since.  
 19 Q. Can we turn over the page {TMO00862541/12}, roughly  
 20 two-thirds of the way down, and look at "Op19", where it  
 21 says that:  
 22 "Repairs Processes are inefficient and not working.  
 23 "A lack of consistent working is causing jobs to  
 24 fail ..."  
 25 Are you able to explain this particular finding?

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1 A. No, I'm sorry, I can't.  
 2 Q. If we can turn to page 16 {TMO00862541/16}, the fourth  
 3 row, we see there "Hs08" on the far left, which says:  
 4 "There is a Health and Safety Training Matrix for  
 5 workforce but is not up-to-date.  
 6 "Staff are not up-to-date with ... training."  
 7 Given the concerns that had previously been raised  
 8 about training which we discussed earlier on this  
 9 morning, are you able to explain this conclusion here?  
 10 A. No. I mean, what I can say is that in the immediate  
 11 aftermath of the fire, as I explained earlier, the staff  
 12 productivity had dipped considerably. They were  
 13 struggling with the aftermath of the fire, as much of  
 14 us, and we had diverted a number of resource to work on  
 15 particular issues on the Lancaster West Estate to make  
 16 those homes fit for rehabilitation, and also to turn  
 17 around void properties as quickly as we could to provide  
 18 alternative living for those who had been made homeless,  
 19 and therefore the available staff for day-to-day tasks  
 20 had slowed down, which I think also speaks to your  
 21 earlier comment about the amount of work that had built  
 22 up in a backlog.  
 23 Certainly, even between the date of the fire and the  
 24 date of my departure, some of our regular processes  
 25 slipped because we were very much in a reactive

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1 environment and trying to do the best we could for  
 2 everyone around us.  
 3 MR KINNIER: Mr Webb, thank you very much.  
 4 Sir, that is the end of my questions as it stands.  
 5 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Yes.  
 6 MR KINNIER: May I have the usual opportunity?  
 7 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Yes.  
 8 MR KINNIER: Might I ask for ten minutes to see if there are  
 9 any further questions I have missed out —  
 10 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: No, of course.  
 11 MR KINNIER: — or indeed whether there are any further  
 12 questions others may have.  
 13 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Yes, of course.  
 14 Well, Mr Webb, you may know that when counsel gets  
 15 to the end of his questions, or thinks he has, we have  
 16 a short break to enable him to take stock, and to enable  
 17 others who aren't present in the room to suggest  
 18 questions that perhaps ought to be asked.  
 19 THE WITNESS: Of course.  
 20 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: So we'll break now until 1 o'clock.  
 21 At 1 o'clock we will get you back in and see if there  
 22 are any more questions for you, but I hope we will quite  
 23 soon get to the end of the whole business. All right?  
 24 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.  
 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: So if you go with the usher, we'll

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1 see you at 1 o'clock.  
 2 THE WITNESS: Thank you.  
 3 (Pause)  
 4 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Right, Mr Kinnier, we will come back  
 5 in at 1 o'clock. If you find you need more time, then  
 6 just let the usher know and she will tell us.  
 7 MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.  
 8 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: All right.  
 9 (12.50 pm)  
 10 (A short break)  
 11 (1.07 pm)  
 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Right, Mr Webb, I'm sorry we kept  
 13 you waiting longer than I indicated, but sometimes that  
 14 happens.  
 15 THE WITNESS: I'm sure, thank you.  
 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Anyway, we'll now see if there are  
 17 any more questions for you.  
 18 Yes, Mr Kinnier.  
 19 MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.  
 20 Just a few more questions, if you'd bear with me,  
 21 Mr Webb.  
 22 Now, we touched on and we discussed Ms Burrell's  
 23 views earlier in examination. In her witness statement  
 24 she'd suggested that there'd been a lack of oversight  
 25 and technical competency on the part of Repairs Direct

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1 operatives, and in particular she mentioned that RD  
 2 operatives had the minimum relevant skill  
 3 accreditations, which were not monitored, and training  
 4 was not readily available, and Repairs Direct was not  
 5 part of any accreditation training or monitoring health  
 6 and safety schemes.  
 7 First of all, would you accept those criticisms that  
 8 she makes?  
 9 A. No, that's certainly not my recollection and my  
 10 impression of that.  
 11 Q. Is it right to say that Repairs Direct operatives were  
 12 only required to have minimal relevant skill  
 13 accreditations?  
 14 A. No, they would have been required to have had a core  
 15 apprenticeship, which we would have confirmed with  
 16 City & Guilds or the appropriate accrediting body, and  
 17 then we often upskilled them so they could conduct more  
 18 than one task. So, for example, rather than having to  
 19 send both an electrician and a plumber to do some work  
 20 on a boiler, we would train the plumber on how to  
 21 isolate the electrics and make him more of a -- what  
 22 we'd call a multiskilled technician.  
 23 Q. She charged Repairs Direct with having no monitoring of  
 24 training of Repairs Direct operatives. What would you  
 25 say to that allegation?

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1 A. Again, I wouldn't agree with that. We sponsored  
 2 a number of operatives who were going through, in their  
 3 own time, evening classes to further their skills, and  
 4 when they achieved those further qualifications, we  
 5 expanded the range of work that they were allocated to,  
 6 to put those skills to use.  
 7 MR KINNIER: Thank you.  
 8 Sir, I have no further questions arising. The final  
 9 thing for me to say is to thank you, Mr Webb, for  
 10 attending to give evidence today.  
 11 THE WITNESS: Thank you.  
 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Webb, I'd like to thank you  
 13 very much on behalf of all the members of the panel. It  
 14 is very helpful to us to hear directly from those people  
 15 who were involved in these matters, and in your case  
 16 it's the second time round.  
 17 THE WITNESS: It is, yes.  
 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I remember seeing you on the  
 19 previous occasion.  
 20 THE WITNESS: Yes.  
 21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So thank you very much for giving us  
 22 more of your time to come and tell us what you know.  
 23 THE WITNESS: I'm happy to help, sir.  
 24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much indeed. Well,  
 25 now it's all over and you're free to go.

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1 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.  
 2 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you would like to go with the  
 3 usher, she will look after you.  
 4 THE WITNESS: Thank you.  
 5 (The witness withdrew)  
 6 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Kinnier, that's obviously  
 7 a convenient point at which to break. I think I'm right  
 8 in saying we don't have any further witnesses for today.  
 9 Is that right?  
 10 MR KINNIER: That's right, sir, and you have the opening  
 11 statements in relation to the issue of smoke control  
 12 tomorrow morning.  
 13 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, and we shall start that at the  
 14 slightly earlier time of 9.30.  
 15 So we will break now until 9.30 tomorrow morning,  
 16 please.  
 17 MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.  
 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.  
 19 (1.10 pm)  
 20 (The hearing adjourned until 9.30 am  
 21 on Wednesday, 30 June 2021)  
 22  
 23  
 24  
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