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GRENFELL TOWER INQUIRY RT

Day 278

May 16, 2022

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Monday, 16 May 2022
(10.00 am)
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to
    today's hearing. Today we're going to begin by hearing
    further evidence from Mr John Hetherington of London
    Resilience.
        So I'm going to ask Mr Hetherington to come back in,
    please.
        MR JOHN HETHERINGTON (continued)
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, Mr Hetherington.
THE WITNESS: Good morning.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you for coming back to answer
    some more questions.
THE WITNESS: You're very welcome.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.
    Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY (continued)
MR MILLETT: Yes, good morning, Mr Chairman. Good morning,
    members of the panel.
            Mr Hetherington, good morning to you.
A. Good morning.
Q. Can we now turn, please, to 15 June 2017, and I want to
        start with communications between London Resilience and
        the DCLG.
            Now, your colleague Hamish Cameron was, I think --
        is this right? -- the strategic adviser on 15 June,
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        until you took over at 14.30 that day.
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. Now, let's go, please, to {CLG00003062}. We can see
    here an email, the second email on the page, please,
    from Lynne Dowdican, at }8.58\mathrm{ in the morning, RED control
    is copied, "For briefing - read out London":
        "Hi Jenny
        "Hamish rang from London - read out below - they are
        emailing Red control as well.
            "44 families have been put in accommodation
        overnight (commercial hotels). }25\mathrm{ other families with
        vulnerable people or children are being housed. The
        council have reasonable confidence that they have now
        accommodated those in need. The council staff have
        stated they can resolve any shortage in accommodation
        and last night all persons requiring accommodation were
        encouraged to attend the Westway Rest Centre.
            "RBKC have put plans in place overnight for recovery
        and the humanitarian assistance aspects."
            It goes on about the recovery and what is going to
        be needed.
            From whom would London Resilience have received
        information of this kind?
A. So that would have been either a read-out from the SCG
    or direct communications with the borough emergency
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control centre, would be my understanding of where this information came from.
Q. I see.

If we go to $\{$ LFB00061311 $\}$, please, second email on
the page, Lynne Dowdican again, 9.24, to Hamish Cameron
and Toby Gould, copied to RED, "Urgent Questions", and she says:
"Dear Hamish and Toby
"I tried to call. We have some further urgent queries to clear if you are able.
"What were the numbers accommodated in rest centres overnight?
"In the 8CG minutes it states -
" 25 other families with vulnerable people or
children are being housed.
"Have they been housed? And in what accommodation.
"What support to families is available? What are
the various things on the ground?
"Rest centre.
"Family support line.
"Casualty bureau.
"Friends and family centre run by Salvation Army.
"What are the phone numbers for these and a one line description of what each of these do."

So those are her questions.

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Then if you look up the page, please, you can see Toby Gould's response back to Lynne Dowdican and Hamish Cameron:
"Lynne,
"Hamish is getting the confirmed answers from RBKC and MPS.
"On your other questions below the following has the answers ..."

And you can see what is suggested there. There is a link to the RBKC newsroom council statements in respect of her questions on facilities and numbers.

Then if you go, please, to \{CLG00003099\}, second email down, here is an email at 10.20 from
Jenny Shellens to Philip James, copied to RED, "Hi Phil", and the subject, "SCG asks", and this is ahead of the 11 o'clock SCG meeting. Philip James is the government liaison officer, and he(sic) says in the second line:
"A couple of areas that it would help us for you to probe on if it is not completely clear:
"The number of residents displaced ..."
Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. She goes on to say in the last paragraph, if you turn the page to the top of page 2 \{CLG00003099/2\}: provided to us. DCLG would have also been members of the SCG meetings and could have asked questions themselves, and I think it was an in-the-round discussion. But from the looks of the information that we were getting and the way in which Hamish posed his
earlier response, he wouldn't have been making comment we were getting and the way in which Hamish posed his
earlier response, he wouldn't have been making comment without clear indication coming from RBKC.
Q. Right. Was the impression that RBKC did have a grip?

What was the answer to the question, "Are we satisfied that RBKC has a grip"?
A. So at that stage, on the Thursday morning, I wasn't there. Throughout the Wednesday afternoon, I think they were providing all the indications of having grip. So everything that they were saying was that they had control on the situation, they were understanding the numbers and putting their assessment in place, working out the -- if you recall from the last session of evidence, we looked at the kind of -- "not just bodies but the right people" was -- or words to that effect, was one of the email chains. They had a logical and
"We've had an update from LRP and also homelessness
team are talking to the RBKC team. But it would be useful to add any intelligence you can along the lines of:
"- Are we satisfied that everyone who wants accommodation has it?
"- When do we think those from surrounding area (who are in the rest centre) will be able to return home?
" - Are we satisfied that RBKC has a grip on this?"
Now, I've shown you all this email chain now, but was it brought to your attention at the handover that DCLG were asking such specific questions on the response?
A. No, not such specific questions. The -- have RBKC got a grip, that's a general term that government will tend of use of local response mechanisms, and that's their litmus test, I think, coming from a COBR/central government-type environment.
Q. Right. What does that mean, "grip"? I mean, "grip" is "grip", but --
A. So do they have an understanding on the numbers, do they have a plan in place to respond to it, are they in control, if you like.
Q. Right.

Did you or do you consider that the information

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provided by the London Resilience here to RED may have created the impression that all was in hand in relation to the response on the ground and the immediate housing needs of those affected by the fire? 6
sensible approach to defining what they needed and how they were going to go about getting it.
Q. Now, moving on to the DCLG's deployment, if we go, please, to $\{C L G 00018936 / 2\}$, this is an email at 10.09 on 15 June from Toby Gould to John Bentham:
"John,
"We don't think it would be particularly effective to deploy to RBKC Borough Emergency Control Centre. Previously it's worked best being located at SOR and/or having a clear line of contact with the CEO/his direct office. That way you can have the overall SCG picture/access to MPS and others, but know you can discuss direct with the LA CEO or his team when required."

Were you made aware yourself, Mr Hetherington, that DCLG's RED had enquired about a government liaison officer, GLO, being deployed to RBKC on that morning but were advised against it by Toby Gould?
A. No, I wasn't made aware of that, and nor have I ever seen them deployed direct to the ground in other incidents either.
Q. Right. Are you able to explain the rationale for the advice being given here?
A. So Toby is looking at precedent there, and it is usual that a DCLG RED officer, so their resilience and

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emergencies division, so a government liaison officer, would come and be either physically present within the special operations room or be a standing member of the SCG, so that they have the information from all of the agencies that they need to speak to there.
Q. Right. But what about going into the BECC? Would there be a precedent for a GLO going into an LA's BECC?
A. I've never seen that before.
Q. Right.

Now, SRO stands for special operations room.
A. That is correct.
Q. And that was at Lambeth.
A. That's correct.
Q. That's the MPS's facility there.
A. That's correct, yes, which serves for all agencies.
Q. Indeed. Yes.

Then let's go, please, next to \{LFB00061313\}. You can see that at 10.01, second email down on the page,
Philip James to Toby Gould, copied to Leanne Grimes at LFB and RED, and there are queries raised here by Nicholas Hurd, who was Minister of State for Policing and the Fire Service. The first point is that:
"... [he] has raised with us the offer the Post Office have made to issue money to residents from the tower [who have no access to cash]."

## And look at point 2 below that:

"We have heard from some of the residents who spent the night in the rest centre saying how there was very little or in some cases no bedding and pillows. Can you confirm that you have organisations such as the Red Cross and the Samaritans involved and that there will be better sleeping facilities tonight?"

The third $\{$ LFB00061313/2 $\}$ :
"... DCLG press office [offer] to support K\&C comms teams ..."

Now, that email, as we can see from the email above it on page 1 \{LFB00061313/1\}, please, is forwarded by Toby Gould to Mark Sawyer and Nicholas Holgate at 10.16, and it says:
"Nicholas, Mark,
"A positive response to DCLG's questions below would be appreciated.
"Nicholas, if you would like to appoint someone to be their main point of contact for you rather than through us please let me know."

Now, first question for you, Mr Hetherington: were you made aware on 15 June that Nicholas Hurd, the Minister of State for Policing and the Fire Service, had relayed concerns about the sleeping facilities for those at the Westway Centre?

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A. No.
Q. Should you have been?
A. If it hadn't been a completed action by the time I came
in at 2.30 or hadn't been raised directly to RBKC to
provide a response, then, yes, I would expect to. But
as you can see here, I think this is -- Toby's making
all efforts to get in touch directly, bearing in mind at
this stage we were expecting Mark Sawyer to be going
into RBKC for the day to support them.
Q. Yes.
A. He's trying two lines of approach to both Mark and
Nicholas to raise this to them.
Q. Were you made aware of DCLG's press office offer to
RBKC?
A. No.
Q. Should you have been?
A. No, not necessarily. I wouldn't have expected that
level of detail to be contained in a handover,
especially if RBKC had either taken up the offer -- it
was made at 10 o'clock in the morning, so I would have
expected, within the subsequent four hours, the
Q. Now, if we go to \{LFB00061319\}, again, we go to an email
at 16.20, top of the chain. That's on 15 June. This is
would have been taken up. 10
from Toby Gould to Stuart Turner, copied to Mark Sawyer and to you, and it says:
"Thanks.
"Mark, from the HASG I wasn't clear about the intentions and numbers of people involved (the line was terrible ), but if the cordons will remain for days to come I don't think it would be appropriate for evacuees to stay in the rest centre overnight for a number of nights. It sounded as though there may be pressure on the rooms they already have people in now if hotels already have those rooms booked for the weekend.
"I appreciate they are working as hard as they can and rightly prioritising the vulnerable, and have possibly already considered this, but if there is a possible option re. the offer from the business sector panel we should explore that route.
"Don Randall said he just needs numbers, duration etc. to put the request to the hotel sector."

And it continues in that vein.
My question for you is: was it clear to you by this point that there was a problem with emergency accommodation?
A. Well, I was copied in to this email, so I would have been aware of this email at the time, but again I think there's options within it -- so there's an identified

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problem with accommodation, but also a route to try and solve it at this point.
Q. Yes, and what were you doing about that? What was your role in relation to dealing with this information?
A. So it wasn't my role at this stage. I was -- by this time, so we were at 4 o'clock, just after 4 o'clock, I would have been in SOR, working to the MPS Gold Commander, who would have still been the SCG chair at this stage.
Q. Right. But you were copied in to this; what did you think your function was in relation to the information being provided here?
A. So a cc generally tends to be for information, to keep you apprised of the situation. So it was copied to Stuart Turner and Tom Brady, who were both working within the London Local Authority Co-ordination Centre at that stage, and would have been in close contact with RBKC BECC. So my understanding is that this is Toby speaking to Stuart and Tom, looking to get information either through RBKC BECC or as a result of the working -- close working with the humanitarian assistance steering group, to finalise those numbers and put an approach to the business sector to seek further hotels.
Q. Let's go to $\{$ LFB00061230 $\}$, please. This is an email
from you to Nicholas Holgate at 17.44, where you say in the second line:
"MPS [Commander], Neil Jerome would like to speak to you, what is the best number and most convenient time for you?"

That's then followed up by an email about half an hour later at $\{$ LFB00061233\}, where you send a message to Hamish Cameron and Toby Gould, copied to Steve Hamm:
"Sorry to be the bearer of bad news. Just had a chat with MPS Gold following his private call with Nicholas. The Mayor was mobbed on scene earlier, there is a community meeting later today which is showing concerns of civil unrest, he is therefore not satisfied any more to be handing over to recovery tomorrow."

Then let's look at the next one in the chain at \{LFB00061227\}. This is from you at 18.33 the previous day, which I think we looked at before, and you say there, in the second sentence in the first paragraph:
"I think by Friday we will be handed over to recovery so that call should go ahead, I think it needs to with the Trooping the colour and other events over the weekend."

Now, you will recall that from evidence last week.
A. Yes. Just to clarify on this chain, this chain -- so every Friday, we have a partnership call at 12.30 , so we
bring together all partners regardless. It will happen this week, next week, every week, and has been happening since the Olympics. That's the call that we're talking about there on Friday.

So Hamish, if you see in the email below, is saying,
"Shall we continue with the 1230 Friday call", and because there are other events going on in London, such as the heatwave, Trooping the Colour, we felt it prudent to carry on and speak to partners.

I think the overarching email there that I'm talking about was, as you'd expect with an operation, once the operation phase has finished, so the site has stabilised somewhat and the fire is out, we would look to hand over to recovery as soon as possible.
Q. Right.
A. So that was all intentions working through the -- from the Wednesday night into Thursday, through the Thursday. If you recall some of the other emails we talked about was RBKC putting their structures in place ready to take over for the recovery. So that's what we were aiming towards on the Friday handover from the SCG to the recovery (inaudible) --
Q. Right. So you were aiming for a transfer to recovery by the Friday?
A. That's correct, yes.

## Q. Right.

Then if we go to $\{$ LFB00061233\}, which we've just been looking at, and you refer there to your discussion with MPS Gold -- that's Neil Jerome.
A. That's correct.
Q. Yes -- after he'd spoken to Nicholas Holgate.

Was there anything in addition to what you call concerns of civil unrest following your conversation with Commander Jerome that had led to the decision to delay the recovery phase?
A. No, it was that -- there's kind of two aspects to the incident: there's the scale and then the complexity.
The scale remained unchanged, we knew the numbers that we were dealing with by now, but what was becoming more and more difficult was the complexity, and this notion of civil unrest which was growing throughout the Thursday afternoon and into the Friday.
Q. So that made it more complex?
A. That made it more complex, yes.
Q. And that led to the delay in the recovery phase starting?
A. Absolutely, yes.
Q. Right, I see.

Then the final topic on the events of 15 June I want to explore with you are the discussions relating to the

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activation of the LLAG arrangements.
Now, just to recap and to clarify, the Gold resolution we looked at on Thursday. Now, we looked at appendix $\mathrm{A}--$ we don't need to go back to it -- and we also looked at the mutual aid memorandum and, I think, the circular from 2011, but there are two more documents I think we need to look at to complete the story.

Can I ask you, please, to go to \{LFB00061167\}. These are proposed clarifications to the Gold resolution and arrangements for mutual aid dated 13 July 2010 by Doug Flight.

If we go to page 5 in that document \{LFB00061167/5\}, under "Major Incidents" at paragraph 8, fourth line down, it refers to section 138 , and the fourth line down it says:
"The current gold resolution authorises Local Authority Gold to discharge functions under section $138(1)$ on behalf of the Councils following the convening of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (Gold Command) called to respond to an incident requiring a 'Level 2' response (defined as a single site or wide-area disruptive challenge which required a co-ordinated response by relevant agencies). This is the trigger mechanism for Local Authority Gold to be able to exercise their 'executive' powers."

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The word "executive" there is in quotation marks.
Do you know what those executive powers are or were to be?
A. I think as we discussed on Thursday, it's the ability to incur expenditure.
Q. Right.
Then if we go, please, to paragraphs 15 and 16 , on page 7 \{LFB00061167/7\}, "Ability to Respond to Emergencies":
"There may be exceptional circumstances where it could become appropriate for Local Authority Gold to be able to respond to incidents and exercise delegated powers where Gold Command has not been convened, for example in the event of extreme and disruptive weather or other events. The point in such 'rising-tide' events at which the full Local Authority Gold arrangements may need to be implemented will not be clear at the outset. Nor would it be triggered by the convening of a police-led Gold Command. To cover this eventuality and any unforeseen events, a process has been developed which permits the full Gold powers to be triggered in the absence of a police-led Gold Command being established, but only where certain procedures are complied with to give the Councils comfort that use of the delegated powers by Local Authority Gold will only
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be operated in exceptional circumstances and where absolutely necessary."

And then it goes on at 16 :
"In these circumstances, before Local Authority Gold can exercise powers under section 138 ... a London
Partnership meeting (which is normally led by the
Government Office for London) will need to have been convened and, additionally, the prior agreement of London Councils, on behalf of the Boroughs, will need to have been obtained. In practice, London Councils will be consulted and its approval will need to be given before Local Authority Gold is able to exercise any delegated powers. Approval is sought for this power to be delegated to the Chief Executive of London Councils in consultation with the Leaders (or their deputies) of each of the three main political parties. The power of Local Authority Gold to incur any expenditure would be subject to further controls as set out below."

And then it goes on about the discretion to incur expenditure.

Now, you say that executive powers were powers to spend money; is that correct in the circumstances of 15 and 16 , which tend to suggest that it might be a little bit wider than that?
A. So my reading of paragraphs 15 and 16 is that they speak
to -- so the Gold resolution came in in 2004, alongside
the Civil Contingencies Act, for a way in which local authorities could work together, given the close proximity in London. In 2010, on the back of the experience from the snow and grit, as I mentioned before, where they had to respond when there wasn't an SCG because it wasn't deemed necessary by the police, and because we had changed from regional government offices, we had lost that level 2 descriptor to an emergency, so they were saying that they could still act in a rising tide emergency without the invocation of an SCG where there was permission from the councils to do so.
Q. Now, on Thursday last week, when you and I were examining this together, we looked at the 17.30 call which took place on 14 June. Was there agreement of all local authorities for the delegation, as these paragraphs suggest here?
A. So the agreement was sought in 2010/2011 that they all signed up to it. It is then for the agreement of the affected local authority to ask for that support.

So my understanding, unless it is a London-wide, I don't think this is saying that all local authorities need to be asked as to whether or not they can convene the LLAG arrangements in an incident. Where it is

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affecting a borough, it is for that borough to ask.
Q. Well, that's not what it suggests, is it? 16 rather suggests that in each and every incident a London Partnership meeting would need to be convened, the prior agreement of London Councils would need to be obtained, and London Councils need to be consulted and approved of before Local Authority Gold is able to exercise any delegated powers.
A. So a partnership meeting is a term that we use in lieu of an SCG. So if -- to give you an example, on the thunderstorms that we had last summer, where no agency was declaring it a major incident and it wasn't
a police-led incident, we hold what we term
a partnership meeting, which we would chair as London
Resilience Group, to pull together organisations for situational awareness. That's where it says -- and bearing in mind when this was written, we still had the government offices for London and other parts of the country as well. So a London Partnership meeting, which is normally led by the government office for London, so that was their role before we took over at London Resilience team and then subsequently London Resilience Group.
Q. Was discussion of the delegation and exercise of delegated powers the basis of the 17.30 call, the
5.30 pm call, on 14 June?
A. On the 14 th, it was what support Nicholas Holgate needed as the lead local authority to the response and the Gold Commander for RBKC.
Q. Right. What happened on that call, to the best of your recollection, constitutionally within these paragraphs or other parts of appendix $B$, as contemplated by these arrangements? Was there any discussion of these arrangements at all?
A. Not in the way that I think you're looking at, but there were questions as to what resources Nicholas Holgate needed, which is where the discussions came around the City of London providing two press officers and London Borough of Southwark providing two officers -- senior officers with experience from Lakanal and the recent London Bridge. It was more the -- what support do you need, as a single borough, from the rest of London, which is part of these arrangements.
Q. These arrangements don't, I don't think -- is this right? -- contemplate that it would be simply left to a chief executive to decide for him or herself to trigger London Gold. There seems to be more to it than that. Or is that wrong?
A. I think that's wrong. The decision around -- the agreement to the London Gold arrangements was made by

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each of the council elected membership, so it had to go
to a meeting of full council or equivalent or however it was determined, but that was in peacetime back in 2010 and 2011 and took a period of a year for all of the boroughs to sign up to it. Once that agreement had been made - - and London Councils, I believe, are the organisation who hold all of those signatures in time -then the London Gold arrangements are binding, which says that boroughs will endeavour to provide mutual aid support to each other where requested, and that there is a power vested in a single local authority chief executive, London Local Authority Gold, to commit expenditure in response to an emergency.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Just help me with this, would you: you identify Mr Holgate's request for support from other boroughs by the provision of manpower, in effect.
A. Yes.

SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That doesn't require anything to be done under section 138 , does it?
A. Not at that time, not unless they're invoking it.

I would imagine RBKC were spending way and above outside of what they had usually budgeted. It would have
been -- they were paying for hotels, et cetera,
et cetera, so that is --
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, that's a matter for RBKC,
isn't it?
A. RBKC, yeah.

SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And they can get mutual support by asking other boroughs to provide manpower in the form of press officers or housing officers or whatever.
A. Yes.

SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So at the moment I don't see how section 138 comes into play, which is the subject of the Gold resolution.
A. But the Gold resolution also is underpinned by the mutual aid agreement as well.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Ah, that's where we look for it, is it?
A. Well, it 's part of the Gold resolution, is that the boroughs have agreed to a memorandum of understanding of mutual aid, and that's their agreement to endeavour to provide support through staffing or services to other local authorities as and when requested. The mutual aid agreement puts that in one of its first paragraphs, I think.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, thank you very much.
MR MILLETT: Let's go to \{LFB00061225\}. This is the email that we saw on Thursday from you at 18.58 , which was the short précis of your call at 15.30 with Nicholas Holgate which you send to him.

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If we go, please, to the section "Immediate and longer term support", in the third chunk, about a third of the way down your screen, and the last paragraph of that says -- well, actually I can pick it up two lines down in it. It says:
" If requested by the Leader of RBKC, London Councils may make an approach to political leaders across London to provide political support to RBKC but it was recognised this is a small network of people able to act in this capacity and a delicate subject."

What did you mean by that?
A. So if I recall, this was something that Chris Naylor had raised on the call around providing support to the way in which councillors were operating on the ground, and provide a peer network to councillors themselves.
Q. Why was political support needed?
A. Well, all manner of support was being provided. I think it was creating a network so that they didn't feel like they were on their own.
Q. Well, you use the word "political". Political leaders to provide political support. What's political support?
A. Well, support to the politicians, either a friendly face or experience of having dealt with something similar themselves, or just a peer support amongst the politicians in London.

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Q. Why was it delicate? Why was it a delicate subject?
A. I don't know. Well, I suspect it was a delicate subject
    at the time. London is a majoritively Labour
    constituent base and this is a Conservative council.
    We'd just been on the back of a general election where
    the MP had changed from a Conservative to Labour
    politician, and sometimes in these networks -- already
    the press had kind of looked to interview a number of
    the political leaders either at the scene, so it was
    just seen as a delicate subject for them.
Q. So party political ?
A. Yes.
Q. Was there already criticism of RBKC out there?
A. I think it was starting to swell by the Wednesday
    afternoon/Wednesday evening when we were coming to get
    there, yes.
Q. Now, let's then go, please, to {LFB00119268}, which
        I think we looked at earlier. We've seen emails about
        the LLACC being stood up on 14 June, and we looked at
        those before, and it was officially opened on the
        morning of the 15th at }8.15\mathrm{ in the morning.
            Is it the case that there was a hybrid situation in
        play on the 14th, LLACC not officially open but stood
        up?
A. Yes, that's correct.
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Q. Yes. Was that because it was anticipated by London Resilience that RBKC would activate the LLAG arrangements; yes?
A. Yes, or there would be requests for mutual aid, yes.
Q. Let's go to \{LFB00061234\}. If you go to these emails, please, these are between the BECC and LLACC.

If we can start, please, on page 2 \{LFB00061234/2\}, 16.34, 15 June, questions for BECC, and there they are. This was sent by LFB LAC1 to the BECC, "OFFICIAL: For Action":

## "Good afternoon

"I am your liaison officer ..."
This comes from Gillian Maxwell; do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. The questions are four-fold, and the fourth one is:
"With regard to assistance from boroughs, please can you be giving some serious thought to what you are likely to be needing over the next $24 / 48$ hrs and over the weekend as the closer we get to the weekend the harder it will be for this to be facilitated."

Was that normal practice in an emergency, namely for the LLACC to be asking the responding authority questions like that? Was that normal?
A. Well, I think we were trying to assist them in getting some foresight. We're getting towards the end of the
working day for most other local authorities in London, so to get some form of request out that they can be thinking about. This is now the Thursday, so we were trying to be pre-emptive in terms of what support they would need over a longer period of time and be on the front foot in terms of what they're requesting.
Q. Yes. But at this point there had been no decision by Nicholas Holgate to invoke the London Gold, and you were still in a hybrid situation. Would it be normal, while the LLACC was stood up but not yet activated, for it to be asking questions of this nature: what are you likely to be needing over the next 24 to 48 hours?
A. Yes, I think we're trying to be supportive, and that's part of our role, to try and help get the boroughs to that position.
Q. Yes. What underlies my question is: was there an indication at that time that RBKC was floundering?
A. Not necessarily floundering, but I think it would be -it would be difficult for a borough to sustain that level of operations over a continued and longer period of time. So we were trying to get on the front foot so that -- push them into thinking: what are you going to need in the future so we can start to ask for it now, so that it can come in good order.
Q. Now, if we then go to page 2 , the top email, the

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response from BECC at 17.03 to question 4:
"Over the next 24/48 hours: availability of:
"a) LALO.
"b) Rest centre managers.
"c) Rest centre teams.
"d) Emergency planning staff."
You see that?
A. Yes.
Q. It gives the official line that there are so many donations that they don't have any more capacity, that may change, and directs enquiries to the RBKC website in respect of monetary donations and other things.

Now, if we go to page 1 \{LFB00061234/1\}, please, last email on page 1, Gillian Maxwell from the LLACC replies at 17.14, confirming that contact will be made -- do you see that? -- to boroughs for staff.

Then if you go to the second email down from the BECC:
"Hi Gillian,
"1. In response to your query below we would require 2 shifts i.e. day and night shift (with stand by and on scene) hence we need 4 of each i.e. LALO, rest centre managers and teams and EP staff. Could you please coordinate this on our behalf?
"2. For tonight have you got 2 BECC officers to work
from 9:00pm to 8:00am tonight?"
You see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, that was then forwarded on to you by
Gillian Maxwell at 17.45 , which is where it comes to
you, "Information just received"; right? At the top.
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. Do you see that?
A. Yeah.
Q. My question, having shown you all of that, is: did you
consider this to be the first request for mutual aid
from the council?
A. Yes.
Q. You did.
In your first statement - - we don't need to go to
it -- page 23 \{LFB00061158/23\}, paragraph 73, you say
that you sought authority from Chris Naylor, who was the
duty LLAG, before a request was then made to all
boroughs. Why was that procedural step necessary?
A. It's to keep LLAG informed, so that they know what
mutual aid is going where, and to provide us as the
co-ordination centre, rather than it being -- as
I mentioned, we're not a decision-maker -- to get
authority so we can go out to all of the boroughs to ask
for that. It was a quick process in this instance;
9:00pm to 8:00am tonight?"
A. Yes.
Q. Now, that was then forwarded on to you by
Gillian Maxwell at 17.45, which is where it comes to
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. Do you see that?
A. Yeah.
Q. My question, having shown you all of that, is: did you
consider this to be the first request for mutual aid
A. Yes.
In your first statement - - we don't need to go to
it -- page $23\{$ LFB00061158/23\}, paragraph 73 , you say
that you sought authority from Chris Naylor, who was the
duty LLAG, before a request was then made to all
oroughs. Why was that procedural step necessary?
mutual aid is going where, and to provide us as the
co-ordination centre, rather than it being -- as
authority so we can go out to all of the boroughs to ask
for that. It was a quick process in this instance;
I think it was 10 minutes from receipt to then being
made -- or 12 minutes -- to all boroughs in London.
Q. Right.
You say in your statement at paragraph 75 at page 23
\{LFB00061158/23\} that it was becoming more apparent
throughout the afternoon and into the evening of 15 June
that LLAG activation was going to take place in order to
provide greater support to RBKC.
A. Yes.
Q. There it is now on the screen in front of you.
In what way was it becoming more apparent, at least
to you?
A. So as I mentioned earlier, the complexity of the
incident was changing. There was -- if we consider it
like a policing model, where you police by consent,
local authorities responding by consent of the
population wasn't necessarily happening. This was
a different type of incident, where those that were
trying to respond were also those that were being held
to account for it, and it was making it increasingly
difficult for them. And the complexity of the incident
and the number of areas of response -- the donations
were continuing to grow, which was an area that they had
to respond to, and the kind of expansion of the walkways
and not getting access back to property that you would
expect normally very quickly. A rest centre open more than a few hours or 12 hours is quite a rarity. So this kind of growing length of issue was -- or kind of problem for them was adding to the complexity.
Q. Right. So it sounds from that answer that there were a number of factors which to your mind meant it -- is this right? -- was increasingly inevitable that LLAG would be triggered in some way. Those are the factors you have just set out.
A. Yes, that RBKC would require greater support in responding to this, yes.
Q. Was there any particular dominant factor in the list you have just given us?
A. No, I think it was an amalgam of all of them.
Q. Right.
\{LFB00061219/12\} next, please, this is your logbook entry for 15 June at 18.39 . You can see there at 18.39 , at the foot of the screen:
"Call from Mark to explain the rationale for the LLAG activation."

I think that says. Am I right?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. Yes.

Now, you say in your statement - we don't need to go to it -- paragraph 76 on page 24 \{LFB00061158/24\},

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that the rationale is documented in your email to Toby Gould and Hamish Cameron at 19.02.

Let's go to that, then, linking the two documents through your statement, \{LFB00061236\}, and you say there:
"Evening all,
"In light of the increasing complexity of the incident, the recent request for mutual aid from RBKC and a number of other factors, the decision has been taken to activate LLAG to own the incident and support directly RBKC.
"Current plan that as of tomorrow morning Paul Martin (Wandsworth) will go into RBKC to support LLAG and three other Chief Executives will be made available to support aspects of the response.
"Hopefully the next email will contain better news!"
Now, first, the number of other factors, are those the factors that you have just described to us?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you.

Who was it who made the decision to activate LLAG?
A. It was a request from Nicholas Holgate, as I understand.
Q. Yes, it was a request, but who made the decision to activate it? You say it's the same thing, do you?
A. Yes. I don't know that answer.

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Q. Would it be inevitable that when a chief executive asked
    for LLAG to be triggered, LLAG would respond?
A. Yes.
Q. Right.
Let's go, then, to your second statement
    {LFB00119130/32}, please, paragraph 101. You say there:
            "Once the scope of the incident and the need for
    wider support to assist with the increase in community
    tensions and the recovery process became more apparent
    it became appropriate for RBKC to officially request the
    support of LLAG in leading the coordination of the
    incident and in establishing a new command structure.
    That process was put in motion on the evening of 15 June
    2017 and LLAG was formally activated in the early
    afternoon of 16 June 2017."
        Was there a particular reason why LLAG could not be
        activated immediately when Nicholas Holgate requested it
        on the evening of 15 June?
A. I don't know. I think it was -- the complexity required
        some level of assessment to go in, so that people
        understood exactly what it was they were taking on in
        that capacity as London Local Authority Gold.
Q. Why is that, given that Mark Sawyer had been at RBKC, at
        the Town Hall, from 8.00 am that morning?
A. I don't know.
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Q. You don't know.

I mean, is that you speculating, when you say,
"I think it was the complexity required"? Do you actually know why there was a delay or are you just giving your view of it now?
A. I'm just giving my view as I understood, that there was that growing complexity and the need to undertake some form of assessment.
Q. What form of assessment was undertaken?
A. I think that the chief executives going in wanted to see for themselves what was in place and make it a managed and orderly assumption of that control, co-ordination.
Q. Pushing then later into the evening of 15 June, \{LFB00061238\}. This is an email from you to Toby Gould, Hamish Cameron and Steve Hamm, to tell them of a conversation you'd had with Emma Strain, who was the assistant director external relations at the GLA, and your email refers to City Hall's concerns regarding grip, again, we can see that.

If you go, please, to the second paragraph, you explain what happened in the call:
"Given the concerns at City Hall regarding the grip on the situation at RBKC she has said that if we have further issues to raise then we can do so through her which will be passed through David Bellamy, anonymously
if needed.
"Obviously this will be sensitive, so not a wish list of gripes but just to make you all aware we have that avenue should it be required."

Had you been told what City Hall's concerns were about RBKC at that time?
A. I think it was the changing media approach to the RBKC situation, and, like I say there, the grip, which is, as we discussed earlier, quite a wide-ranging term, but the control and exertion that RBKC were having on the situation.
Q. Right. And what were those concerns specifically?
A. I can't remember exactly.
Q. Then we go to \{LFB00061240\}. This is an email from you at 22.04 to Toby Gould, Hamish Cameron, Matthew Hogan and Steve Hamm, "Overnight update":
"No significant change to the situation."
And then if you go about halfway down the email, you can see you say this:
"LLAG Activation - This will not take place before 13.00 most likely. John B [John Barradell] will go to RBKC to see what he is signing up to before he officially activates LLAG. Mark is currently in RBKC trying to help they set out their stall.
"My take on this, spoken briefly to Hamish, we can

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use this to show a support to mutual aid through the
LLACC and potentially reduce commitment to Recovery and HA. Mark's requests of us have diminished now that he has spent a day in RBKC and understands the frustrations and the dangers of getting embroiled in sorting out a larger numbers of problems for them."

Why did John Barradell, to your understanding, need to see what he was signing up to before officially activating LLAG?
A. Because he needed to understand what it was. So John wasn't the official LLAG at that time. I think there was almost a potential that this was getting beyond what the London Local Authority Gold arrangements were, where a single chief executive was representing on behalf of local government views.
Q. Right. You told us earlier when I asked you that if a chief executive asked for LLAG to be activated, LLAG would inevitably respond. Was it to your understanding that John Barradell might not, he might say no?
A. No, I don't think he was ever in the position or would have said no, I think he just wanted to understand what the scale and complexity was that he was going into, and what it was that would be needed to be done, how much support was required around that.
Q. But in the meantime, LLAG would not be operating; it
would be RBKC in control; yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Why would it be necessary to have that limbo period
pending John Barradell working out what was needed? Why
not go in straight away after activation and work it out
at that stage?
A. Well, it doesn't make sense just to rush in and then have that paucity of working out what it is you're going to do at that point either.
Q. Does it not, given that RBKC was now being criticised from all sides in its handling, which had partly necessitated the invocation of LLAG in the first place?
A. I think it 's probably six of one and half a dozen of the other. It was trying to get a good start to the LLAG arrangements coming in, and understanding the exact extent to which they're operating in.
Q. Right.

Now, you see you say:
"John B will go to RBKC to see what he is signing up to before he officially activates LLAG."

Is that right? Was it within his power officially to activate LLAG, or was that left simply to the request by Nicholas Holgate as the chief executive?
A. Nicholas. I think this is probably my sloppy use of English at quite a late time in the evening.

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Q. Right. Was there a sense in your mind that LLAG were nervous, reluctant perhaps, to get involved, having been asked?
A. No, I don't think they were nervous or reluctant, and I think that's shown by the level of support that did go in on the Friday.
MR MILLETT: Now, you say in your first statement, paragraph --
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Sorry, before we leave this email, I have to say that the tenor of that paragraph beginning "LLAG Activation" leaves me with the impression that you, and perhaps John Barradell, thought that he was going to go in and take over; in other words, decide what should be done, deploy resources, take it out of the hands of Mr Holgate. Is that how you understood it?
A. This is quite a unique set of circumstances. So this is where the arrangements that we have to respond to any emergency need a degree of flexibility in what we can do, and I think we probably pushed the boundaries, both of the LLAG arrangements and what we were asking individuals to do in terms of come in and support in such a large-scale incident, and almost run the show for Nicholas Holgate in response.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, you've used two interesting words there: one is "support" and the other is "almost"
\{LFB00061219/16\}, please. I'd like to show you this entry in your logbook on page 16 for that day. If you go, please, to 9.11 in the morning, at the top of the screen, it says:
"Call with Mark Sawyer regarding Chris Naylor's political concerns and potential need to ..." Is that "message" or "massage"?
A. Message.
Q. "... message political lead from London Councils." What does that entry mean?
A. I can't remember the details of the call, but that would have been a discussion between Mark Sawyer and myself around Chris Naylor's political concerns and the need for -- I think what we were looking for is something from London Councils to send out a message to all of the political leads.
Q. What were Chris Naylor's political concerns?
A. I think they were still the same concerns that he had the other day around getting support to other politicians. I can't remember the exact details of what any further concerns would have been.
Q. Right. What sort of message from London Councils did you have in mind, when you said "potential need to message political lead from London Councils"? What had you got in mind?
A. I honestly can't remember. I don't know what that would have been.
Q. Let's then turn to the HASG 16 June 2017.

Well, let me just ask you, before I go there: was

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there a sense of reluctance or trepidation, perhaps, of LLAG stepping into what might have been regarded by you at the time as a political minefield, or what had become one?
A. Not that I'm aware of.
Q. Did that account for the delay, nervousness of stepping into what had become politically delicate?
A. I don't know, because I wasn't aware that -- it was a hugely politically charged situation, I think that's quite apparent for everybody to see, but I'm -I certainly have no indication that that was the cause of a delay at the time.
Q. Yes.

Let's go to the HASG, and there's a bit of background to this.

There was a first meeting of the HASG by way of background on 15 June, attended by Mark Sawyer. If you go, please, to $\{$ LFB00061320\}, this is an email to you on 15 June, so the evening before, at 22.24. This is Toby Gould - - I'm sorry, I said Mark Sawyer; I meant Toby Gould -- email to you of that evening, and if you go to the fourth paragraph down, "HASG", he says:
"I assume I'll pick up our lead on this in the morning/midday meeting. I'm turning to the composition now to try to make sure they have all the right
A. Yes, in their emergency response, yes.

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## Q. Yes, of course, in an emergency response.

To your recollection, was the operation of the HASG ever practised during training sessions?
A. Yes, so it had been practised through the Exercise Unified Responder the year before, in 2016.
Q. Right. Were you concerned by what Toby Gould was telling you in this email that evening?
A. Yes, it doesn't look a great start. As we've heard through the previous evidence, I don't think the humanitarian assistance lead officer was expecting to undertake that role or had the necessary support around them to be able to do that.
Q. Did you do anything as a result of being told what we can see you were told by Toby Gould that evening?
A. Not personally, because I knew Toby had -- the reason Toby is saying he's assuming he'll pick up the lead on this and had been involved was because he had supported the London Borough of Southwark 11/12 days previously through the London Bridge attack, so he had the experience and some of the networks into the voluntary sectors to make sure that they were engaged and supported, which is why he talked about trying to make sure that they have the right partnership people involved, because he already had those linkages or some of those linkages previously.

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Q. I see. So is that why he offered to provide the
    secretariat to the HASG?
A. That's correct.
Q. I see.
    Then let's go, please, to {LFB00061327}. This is
    an email. If we go to the foot of page 1, please, you
    can see right at the very foot there's an email at 11.57
    from Donna Wootton at Ealing to a large number of
    recipients and copyees at the top of page 2
    {LFB00061327/2}, if we go to that, please. You are
    emailed, as well as Matthew Hogan and Toby Gould, as you
    can see, and she says:
    "Hi all,
    "Can I put in a request that either more resource or
    seniority is put into the LLACC Link role? I recognise
    priorities should be with RBKC and this is incredibly
    serious and dynamic incident but I personally am
    struggling a little bit here in getting any information
    or response to queries."
    Then she says:
    "The mutual aid requests are messy and complicated -
    and I recognise again it's a dynamic situation - but
    I've had to ask the LLACC 3 times to confirm a request
    and no one is answering emails or calls. I have
    multiple staff who are trained, competent and wish to
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    help but I'd also like assurance that briefings will be
    forthcoming, that a RVP isn't just 'the scene' and
    really just replies to emails. I've put aside today to
    brief and make sure all staff are ready to respond as
    best they can but I currently just have lots on standby
    unaware of their role. We're sending staff into really
    stressful environments and I just want to make sure they
    have all the information and access needed."
    Then the last line:
    "Apologies for this, in a stressful time, but as
    I said just a little extra resource would help us help
    RBKC to the best of our ability."
    Now, there are a couple of other confirmations along
        the same lines.
            If we go, please, to \(\{\) LFB00061327/1\}, this is
        an email from Twm Palmer, who is head of contingency at
        Hounslow, and Twm Palmer agrees with Donna Wootton's
        email. Again, you're copied in to this. It only comes
        about 9 minutes later:
            "AII,
            "I agree.
            "Also, I want to mention the lack of timely
                information every day and lack of COP
                reports/Situational Awareness briefings, which would be
                very helpful here locally.
    "I would also like to see the mutual aid be a little better and more efficiently coordinated, as it 's been quite frustrating locally here too.
"Echoing what Donna states below, and understand that you are doing a great job supporting this in a stressful time and a lot of us are willing to help."

The response to that comes at the top of page 1, if we can just scroll up to that. You are a recipient of an email from Toby Gould:
"Just checking who is responding.
"They could be sent SCG minutes, STAC reports. The response on mutual aid is simply that we're having to process as and when we get them."

Then if you go to $\{$ LFB00067778\} -- and there will be a question after all these documents -- first email down, you respond at 16.04 to Twm Palmer at Hounslow and Donna Wootton at Ealing, and also Toby Gould, Matt Hogan, and copied to others:
"Donna, all
"Thank you for the email.
"Hopefully the latest email from the Llacc provides you with an update you need. I appreciate your sense of a lack of information, rest assured had there been a risk from the plume we would gave circulated that but have had to prioritise in ensuring the right information

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verified and confirmed goes to those responding. We will work to make sure it is made more widely available, when there are significant changes to that released, as you can imagine there are some very difficult issues being dealt with that it would not necessarily appropriate to share on a more open basis."

## Then you say this:

"With regards to mutual aid we are doing everything we can to clarify requests but until last night had not received any formal requests from RBKC."

Just to finish this off, there's an email of 17 June at $\{$ LFB00061252 $\}$. So this is the Saturday now. This is where this ends up. Second paragraph:
"Have there been any comments on our overall level of support? There was criticism of the mutual aid and llacc on Friday, I haven't got into the whole we are supporting other functions at the detriment of the llacc yet but one to be in our minds if it does come."

Now, here is the question, having shown you all of that material: can you explain what you meant there by supporting other functions at the detriment of LLACC? What were the other functions you were supporting?
A. So the humanitarian assistance steering group, the mass fatalities co-ordination group, providing the Secretariat to those, and some of the other wider
response, so trying to pull together information on the communications group, et cetera, and tying in those. So that's not written into either of those frameworks, that we provide that secretariat response, and so -- but because we had the experience, because it wasn't going well, that was where we felt the gap needed to be plugged more urgently. We hadn't had the mutual aid requests up until the night before, but it was becoming more apparent and more aware that there were multiple mutual aid requests going out, or not just channelled through us in the local authority co-ordination centre, but also going direct service to service. So the end-user in each of the 33 boroughs was getting multiple requests at different times of the day, which became difficult for them to organise and agree to what collective, cohesive support they could provide from their authorities as a whole.
Q. Right.

Now, we saw criticisms from the head of emergency management at Ealing and the head of contingency planning and resilience at Hounslow; was their criticism in each case fair, did you think?
A. It was partly fair. It wasn't a straightforward -- it wasn't a - - it wasn't as good as the response we would wish to have. We had a procedure for mutual aid whereby
a borough requesting mutual aid would provide a form which describes the effect they want to have achieved, as much notice as possible, and how it would best be filled, which we could go out to the boroughs with. But, as I just described, it was going across from different services, so housing were going direct amongst the directors of housing group, and so that would have gone to a borough, and for the contingency planning manager in a borough, they would have received all of these from the different forms, so they will have thought that it is becoming extremely messy.

So it wasn't as good as we had wanted. We were trying to get a grip on it at that stage.
Q. Right. So was it the case that the LLACC's resources were being stretched too thinly?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes.

Now, \{LFB00061344\}. Here is an email, now 17 June. If we go to the third paragraph down in this email, it's from Toby Gould to Steve Hamm and you and Hamish Cameron. Third paragraph down:
"Mass Fats and Humanitarian support are a drain. I'm hoping with three other LA EP managers joining the mix [tomorrow] on HA we can position them well and limit our commitment. But the expectation from John B is we
will make it work. It's a little [galling] when we're doing things $K$ and $C$ could do themselves if they had some of the staff in over the weekend who have the weekend off and [whose] jobs we're effectively covering."

Was there a problem with RBKC staffing levels that you had been encountering?
A. Yes. I don't think they had the support staff in place to manage this, and I think that was evident through previous evidence that they've given that they didn't put the training and forethought into it.

If you look at the -- when I talk about scale and complexity, the previous edition of the humanitarian assistance plan, so $4.0--$ and my apologies that we provided the Inquiry with several -- various copies in the lead-up to that -- but 4.0 provides quite a clear statement in the early stages, around page 7 or 8 , of the expectation of scale of response that we would expect either at a borough level or a regional level, and then also, halfway through, what we expected a borough to have trained in terms of those numbers, and I think we've seen through evidence that they just weren't there.
Q. You say you've seen through evidence, but was it your view at the time?

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A. I think this was now becoming clear in the time that there was -- how could I describe it? -- that the response was almost hollow. So I recall somebody, but I can't remember who, pulling levers, and nothing was happening when they tried to pull that lever. So putting in place a humanitarian assistance group, but there just wasn't the -- it's not just a HALO, a lead officer, who's able to do it. They need a composite team behind them to understand the subject matter and are experienced in both secretariat and convening work and then the project management work behind it to pull all of the various bits together. A meeting doesn't just happen and all the actions get magically done; it takes a lot of work behind to pull all of those pieces together.
Q. Let's then go to \{LFB00061257\}. We're now at 18 June at 21.26. Here is an email from Matt Hogan -- you can see that from the foot of the email -- to a large number of recipients, including you:
"Hi All,
"You'll have seen on WhatsApp (hopefully) that the LLACC will be moving to Westminster tomorrow morning.
"It has been agreed that all staff should stop all non-essential work in order to prioritise LLACC (this is subject to change as the week progresses). The only
A. Arguably we could have stopped it earlier, but I think
by this stage we were integrated into so many of those activities that we just had to stop everything else. Q. Right.

Now, going back in time, then, to the evening of 17 June, the Saturday night, \{LFB00061252\}. This is an email from you to Hamish Cameron, Toby Gould and
Steve Hamm, which we looked at before, and in the last an email from you to Hamish Cameron, Toby Gould and
Steve Hamm, which we looked at before, and in the last sentence you say:
"As a question just to gain an understanding of RBKC response have we been working to their local plans for HA and recovery or regional plans." You tell us in your statement, I think, that you
hadn't been able to find a response to that email. You tell us in your statement, I think, that you
hadn't been able to find a response to that email.

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That's right, isn't it?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. Yes, that's your second statement at paragraph 58 at page 18. Let's actually look at that, if we can, please. That's at $\{$ LFB00119130/18\}, paragraph 58. In the middle of the paragraph, you say:
"I have looked over my emails and records from that time and have been unable to locate a response to that question. From memory I believe the RBKC response as to recovery was based on its local plans. I cannot recall the position regarding humanitarian assistance but I think it would likely have been based on the regional plans which is a reference to the Humanitarian Assistance framework exhibited as $\mathrm{JH} / 12$ to my first statement. Both the local and regional 'plans' referenced within the above email will have been framework documents setting out broad principles to be followed rather than detail[ed] situation specific plans."

My question: would you expect to have been informed which plans a local authority was following if LLAG had been activated or was to be activated?
A. I don't think it would have made a huge difference. I think I was just trying to understand whether or not they had contextualised the plans specifically or
supported by Hamish and Steve H."
Should stopping all non-essential work in order to prioritise LLACC have happened earlier than this, which is 18 June?
A. So we've never done it for another incident, where we've stopped all non-essential work. Normally we've carried on and we have the duty team, and then we manage rotas between us to enable enough or other work to carry on in conjunction.
Q. Yes.
whether it was the wider frameworks. A number of boroughs do use the regional frameworks as their overarching plan or their loose framework, it's just sometimes they add more detail and contextualisation as to how they will achieve that within their local plan.
Q. Did it concern you at the time that you didn't know which plan the local authority was following in its response?
A. No, it wouldn't be a huge concern. They would have been based on the same principles and to achieve the same
thing. It's just a question for clarity at the time.
Q. Did it surprise you at the time that RBKC did not have a humanitarian assistance plan, as David Kerry has confirmed?
A. I would have expected them to have something in place that would have contextualised and put it into the reality of RBKC's response that they knew how to discharge the regional framework.
MR MILLETT: Right.
Mr Chairman, I have one short line of questions to cover, which won't take more than about five minutes or so. It would be more convenient to take them now and then take the break.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And would that get to the end of your questions?

## MR MILLETT: Yes.

SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Oh, well, I think that's much
more sensible, I agree. Thank you.
MR MILLETT: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Now, let me take to you, please, to \{GOL00001728\}.
This is a paper published by London Resilience and the LAP, "MSL Peer Review Results 2016", as you can see. The introduction says that:
"This paper provides the complete results of the 2016 MSL peer review. The MSL assessment provides an overview of London's collective local authority capabilities and preparedness for emergencies and also provides boroughs with an assurance of their individual organisational capability. The results are intended to be used at both the London and individual borough level to inform collective and individual improvement needs respectively."

If we go to page 5 , please, in this document $\{$ GOL00001728/5\}, and we look at the last paragraph on page 5 , it says:
"Overall the stabilised trends provide a positive picture. It was never intended or expected that the MSL would be $100 \%$ green in all boroughs. The implementation of a three year planning cycle demonstrates confidence of existing capability amongst boroughs and a step
A. Yes. Purely on numbers, yes.
Q. Purely on numbers.

Was any action taken by London Resilience to improve Newham's performance after these results were filed with

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## LAP?

A. So that's not our role, to improve their performance. As I stated on Thursday, one of the primary purposes of this was for the results to inform the borough's own business planning, and it's their responsibilities and their duties that they're trying to discharge under this.

It 's not London Resilience Group's job to improve individual boroughs. We provide guidance and support to them as a collective in their overall discharge of duties, in ways in which they can achieve efficiencies.
Q. Yes, and see comparatively how they do, but does that tell us that there was no effective peer review or enforcement of standards?
A. To be enforced by who, sorry?
Q. Well, quite, that's the question.

Let's break that up.
First of all, it's self-assessment, not peer assessment; yes?
A. On odd years, yes, but there was a peer review but by equals, rather than independent external peer review.
Q. Right. So no independent peer review in any year.
A. Yes.
Q. And is this right: no enforcement by an independent enforcing body, such as the LAP or London Resilience?
A. The local authorities panel and London Resilience are not enforcing bodies.
Q. Exactly so.
A. Yes.
Q. And there isn't one and wasn't one?
A. No, there isn't one, no.
Q. No. I think it's also correct that there was no minimum threshold, no minimum number of minimum standards for London that each local authority was required to achieve.
A. No.
Q. So does it come to this: these were loose benchmarking measures that it would be up to each local authority to score for themselves and then work out for themselves what to do in response?
A. Yes, that's the framework that we work in, with no auditing or directive powers to any agency.
MR MILLETT: Yes. Yes, thank you very much.
Mr Chairman, we have come to the end of my prepared questions.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, thank you.
MR MILLETT: And I'm going to ask for the usual break, please.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
Well, on this occasion, Mr Hetherington, we can
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combine the usual break which we have when counsel has got to the end of his questions with the break we need to have in the middle of the morning anyway. So we'll stop now, we'll come back at 11.35, and we'll see then whether there are any more questions we have for you.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: As before, please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room. All right?
THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
(Pause)
Thank you. 11.35, please. Thank you.
(11.22 am)
(A short break)
(11.35 am)

SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, Mr Hetherington, we'll see if there are any more questions.

Yes, Mr Millett.
MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman, thank you very much.
Just one question, which is a question we often ask certain witnesses, and it's this: Mr Hetherington, looking back on the experience, looking back on the evidence that we have been through and what you now know, is there anything in your role in the first

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SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And can I add my thanks too, Mr Hetherington, on behalf of all the members of the

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panel. I think we all found it initially rather
daunting to see the pictorial structure of London
Resilience, but we have really benefitted from your
explanation of how it works and your evidence about what happened on the days immediately after the fire. So thank you very much indeed. We're very grateful to you.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And now, of course, you're free to go.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
(The witness withdrew)
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you, Mr Millett. Now, we have another witness waiting.
MR MILLETT: We do.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We are having a change of witness and a change of counsel, I think.
MR MILLETT: We are, yes, that's right. Mr Sawyer is the witness and Mr Keating is the counsel.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right. Well, in those circumstances, I think the best thing is if we rise for a couple of minutes to allow the usual arrangements to be made, and perhaps you'd ask the usher to come and tell us as soon as you're ready.
MR MILLETT: Very well, thank you.

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SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Or Mr Keating can ask the usher to
    come and get us when he is ready.
MR MILLETT: Yes. Thank you very much, Mr Chairman.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
(11.40 am)
    (A short break)
(11.47 am)
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Keating.
MR KEATING: Good morning, Mr Chairman. Good morning,
    members of the panel.
        Could I call Mark Sawyer, please.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
            MR MARK SAWYER (affirmed)
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. Please sit
    down and make yourself comfortable.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, thank you.
            Yes, Mr Keating.
            Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY
MR KEATING: Well, good morning, Mr Sawyer. Thank you very
    much for attending today and assisting the Inquiry with
    its investigations.
            Just a few introductory matters, as we say to all
    witnesses.
            Firstly, if you have any difficulty in understanding
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    any of my questions, please do ask me just to rephrase
    it, I'm sure it will be my fault.
            Secondly, if I can ask you to keep your voice up so
    that the transcriber, sitting to your right, can capture
    your evidence. Also, if I could ask you to avoid
    nodding or shaking your head, because that's something
    which isn't picked up on the transcript.
    A. Yes.
Q. Lastly, if you need a break at any stage, just let us
know. I'm sure that's something we can accommodate.
Is that okay?
A. Very much so.
Q. In terms of a few formalities, I want to just deal with
your statements and identify them, please.
You have provided three statements to the Inquiry
and I'm going to ask you to look at the first one, which
is \{GOL00001349\}, please, and that is dated 1 July 2020.
If we could turn to page 25 , please, we see the date
at the bottom, and we see your name in print.
Can you confirm that that's your signature?
A. That is my signature.
Q. Thank you.
If we could turn to your second statement, which is
\{GOL00001839\}, please. That's your second statement.
In relation to that, if you could turn to page 10 ,
Q. Excellent, thank you.

Lastly, your third witness statement, which is very recent, and that's \{GOL00001847\}, please.

If you could turn to page 3, please, that's dated 12 May 2022, so last Thursday. Again, can you confirm that's your signature?
A. It is, and thank you for accepting it so late.
Q. No difficulty at all.

In relation to those witness statements, can you confirm that you have had the opportunity, first of all, to read them?
A. Yes.
Q. And are they true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you.

Mr Sawyer, to help you and to help the panel, in terms of questions today, they're going to fall into three broad areas.

Firstly, and briefly, your role within the City of London Corporation and the work you have undertaken in the field of civil resilience prior to June 2017.

## A. Yes.

Q. Secondly, your operational involvement, if I could label it that, on 14 and 15 June, including your liaison with RBKC, the London Resilience Group and the duty London Local Authority Gold. We will touch upon your attendance on 15 June at the RBKC Town Hall, where you were supporting Nicholas Holgate and other senior RBKC staff. So that will be the second area.

Finally, we will turn to an examination of some of the reviews and work you have undertaken in the months and years after the fire to review the emergency resilience structures. There's a number of reports that you have had involvement with; isn't that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. So they're the three broad areas, and let's turn to the first and the shortest one: your role, please.

Is it correct, since April 2017, you have been the chief executive liaison officer (resilience) for the City of London Corporation?
A. That is correct, for the City of London Corporation. However, in -- the best way of describing it would be that I was hosted by the City of London Corporation, but working to all 33 London local authorities, who equally funded my position.
Q. Thank you.
A. And I believe in approximately 2018 my job title changed slightly -- however, the role didn't change significantly -- to resilience adviser, as compared to resilience liaison.
Q. So the same role but re-labelled to resilience adviser?
A. Yes.
Q. Hosted by the City of London Corporation, but assists all 33 councils?
A. Correct.
Q. In relation to -- it's touched upon probably by its title, or re-labelled title, what would you say your role involved as of June 2017?
A. My role involved assisting London local authorities and primarily assisting the local authorities panel to -- on resilience -related matters, supporting the setting of agendas and the level of conversation necessary on resilience at a regional level, and with the additional responsibility of monitoring preparedness across London local authorities on behalf of the local authorities panel, and assisting local authorities and the London Local Authority Gold arrangements should the unfortunate situation arise whereby we have an incident to deal with, such as was the tragedy at Grenfell.
Q. So three main roles, drawing out what you said a moment ago: first of all, that sort of advice and support, as

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you described, in relation to preparedness, which may involve policy and development work; secondly, monitoring resilience via the local authority panel; and, thirdly, in relation to the operation or activation of the LLAG; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. It may be captured by your answer already, but your role then as chief executive liaison officer, that also included supporting a chief executive when responding to a localised major incident within their borough; is that correct?
A. As necessary and required.
Q. Yes.

Is it right also, as a result of your role, you are a standing member of the local authorities panel?

## A. Correct.

Q. And you're also a member of its implementation group?
A. Correct.
Q. You have explained in your statement at paragraph 49 \{GOL00001349/10\} that you have extensive experience in responding on behalf of local authorities to large-scale incidents in London.
A. I believe so, yes.
Q. And the incidents you refer to include terror attacks, severe weather events and fatal accidents; is that

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    correct?
A. Correct.
Q. In relation to the London Local Authority Gold, the
    LLAG, we've heard quite a lot of evidence in relation to
    that from Mr Hetherington, and I'm not going to
    hopefully repeat that, but just perhaps draw out a few
    limited points, please.
        It 's fair to say that it 's one of the special
    features of the London Resilience framework, isn't that
    correct, the LLAG?
A. Of the London local authority resilience framework, yes.
Q. And as we heard already, it's a pan-London mechanism
    which can be activated in response to an emergency,
    drawing upon the resources of all 33 London local
    authorities, led by a single chief executive. Is that
    a fair if not simple summary of the process?
A. It's a mechanism for co-ordinating London-wide support
    to an incident, yes.
Q. If you could just try and raise your voice a little bit
    more.
        You just said it 's a mechanism for co-ordinating
    London-wide support to incidents.
        Two points just in relation to that.
        Firstly, in relation to the mechanism, the power, is
    it the case that for it to be activated, it would
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    require a request from a local authority? It would have
    to be invited rather than imposed?
    A. Correct.
Q. In relation to the process or procedure for activation,
is it right that at the time there was no formal
recognised procedure for its activation within the Gold
operating procedure document?
A. The only procedure was the expectation that a local
authority who wished to activate the local authority
arrangements bottom-up would make a personal request.
Q. Exactly. We don't need to turn to the document, but
there is a guide which simply states that LLAG
arrangements are activated when LLAG is contacted in
relation to an emergency which has occurred.
A. Correct, and if I may just add a slight additional
context to that: there is no, as I'm aware, legal basis
upon which Local Authority Gold can intervene in the
affairs of an individual local authority. Therefore, it
had to be a request rather than imposed.
Q. We'll return to certain changes or modifications which
have taken place in relation to guidance in our third
part of the evidence, in the post-fire work.
I want to move on to something which we're going to
touch upon a few times, which is EP2020.
EP, one assumes, stands for "emergency planning"?

## A. It does.

Q. And you have set it out in your statement, but in 2016 you undertook a review of local authority emergency planning in London, and that review was called EP2020.

What l'd like to do is, with your assistance, examine some of the aspects of this, really to provide an insight -- perhaps a short insight -- into the state of civil resilience in London in the period shortly before the fire in June 2017.

You explain in your statement at paragraph 9 \{GOL00001349/2\} - - I'm going to summarise -- that the report, EP2020, was commissioned as there was a recognition by the local authorities panel of heightened pressure on councils and an increase in external and internal risks; is that correct?

## A. Correct.

Q. You touch upon some of those risks, but did those identified risks include a "loss of corporate knowledge and capacity"?
A. Correct.
Q. With your assistance, I would like to explore three specific points from the report, and perhaps if you could turn to the report, it 's dated 3 October 2016, \{GOL00001515\}.

We can see there it's dated 3 October. We see your

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name, and supported by David Kerry. Is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. That's somebody we've heard evidence from and who was the contingency planning manager at RBKC; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. If we could turn to page 3 \{GOL00001515/3\}, please. Thank you. It says in terms of the scope of your EP2020 that, in relation to the Local Authority Gold resolution, that was not considered within the review. The second paragraph says this:
"The two elements excluded [from the review] are; the London Local Authority Gold Resolution and the ... rota. This is due to their proven effectiveness to underpin the collective and coordinated approach of authorities to significant incidents."

## Is that correct?

A. Correct.
Q. So the position is, in this review you were doing of the London civil resilience position, the LLAG at that stage wasn't seen as an area of concern.
A. Correct.
Q. And that's why it wasn't within the scope of your report.
A. Correct.
Q. If we move down to "Overall Assessment", I'm just going to read the first paragraph there:
"There is a developing trend of reduced capacity and capability across London. The ability of our authorities to discharge a leadership role on resilience to the level communities would expect and deserve is under strain. To prevent further degradation of the service and potentially expose ourselves to undesirable levels of risk, this report suggests a number of actions chief executives may wish to consider to bolster the service and enhance resilience."

Is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. I want to deal with capacity, the second point in relation to this EP2020 report, and to do so, could we turn to page $8\{$ GOL00001515/8\}, please, and paragraph 3.1.1. It's the bottom of the page, thank you so much.
"3. Review Findings and Recommendations.
" ...
"3.1.1. Emergency Planning Service."
It says this:
"Emergency Planning staffing levels are at the
lowest point since 2009, with a downward trend established since the 2012 Olympics [we'll turn to the

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figures in a moment] ... This reduction combined with continuing demand for efficiencies across authorities has the potential to significantly affect our ability to satisfy the expectations of our communities and assure them that we possess the appropriate means to prepare and respond, where necessary, to the myriad of resilience challenges that need to be addressed. This includes our ability to deliver effective authority wide support to our communities and develop a culture of community resilience across our localities ."

Is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. So, in effect, this report is sounding a warning that numbers were down in terms of capacity; isn't that correct?
A. Very much so.
Q. If we turn overleaf to page 9 \{GOL00001515/9\}, and we see those pictorial graphs which were referred to in the previous paragraph, figure 3.0 shows a downward graph in relation to staffing levels; isn't that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. We see, in terms of emergency planning staff levels per authority, Kensington and Chelsea being there centre-west, relatively high, actually, with four members, staffing levels; isn't that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. In relation to those staffing numbers, is it the case that they do not show staffing levels in relation to what we've heard of as Council Silvers, BECC staff, LALOs?
A. No, this was solely numbers of designated emergency planning personnel.
Q. Whilst doing your report, and in terms of capacity, this was at very much a high specialist level, what you were dealing with, did you have any information or insight as of 2016 whether that downward trend in capacity was also reflected in those roles such as LALOs, BECC staff, Council Silvers?
A. I -- there was an additional part of this process which did look at that level of detail, which was overseen by London Resilience Group on behalf of LAP, and I have no doubt that some of that data would have been taken into consideration in this report.
Q. And what was your view then in relation to that additional process and additional data?
A. I'd need to remind myself of what that said, but I think it would be fair to say that following the Olympics, you' ll note that downward trend, combined with the financial burdens and strain that local government was experiencing at that time, did lead to a concern

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regarding the numbers of people assigned to deal with resilience and emergency planning across local authorities.
Q. Okay, thank you.

If we could move on, please, the third area I want to touch upon is the minimum standards for London, which the panel have heard evidence about this morning and in the past about, and we've also heard questions being posed to David Kerry in relation to.

With your assistance, could we turn to page 12, please, of this report $\{G O L 00001515 / 12\}$, and we could look, please, at paragraph 3.2.1, which is at the bottom. This is under the heading of "Governance and Planning", and puts just puts into a little bit of context the minimum standards for London:
" ... introduced in 2007, comprising 16 standards designed to ensure all London local authorities had the appropriate policies and procedures in place to support the London Local Authority Gold ... arrangements."

It sets out how:
"In 2009, a second tranche of Standards were published detailing the specific requirements of plans and capabilities each authority should maintain. These plans and capabilities range from generic emergency response functions to humanitarian assistance and excess

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    death plans."
    It goes on in the second paragraph:
    "A review of the Minimum Standards for London
    assessments conducted annually reveals a minimal
    downward trend in immediate operational response
    capabilities."
            Then it says this:
            "Of concern, however, is a significant downward
    trend in meeting standards relating to plans and
    capabilities."
            So the MSLs have been in since 2007, so just
    nine years by this stage. They had been updated, as
    they describe, in 2009, and your report, your words:
            "Of concern, however, is the significant downward
    trend in meeting standards relating to plans and
    capabilities."
        Is that the position?
A. Correct.
Q. Is there anything else you wanted to add in relation to
    that concern at this stage?
A. Nothing that springs to mind immediately.
Q. Well, perhaps we can just explore that a little bit
    more.
            If we see, at the bottom of page 12, figure 3.4:
            "Minimum Standards for London (Plans and

\section*{ownward trend in immediate operational response}
Then it says this:
"Of concern, however, is a significant downward
trend in meeting standards relating to plans and capabilities ."
So the MSLs have been in since 2007, so just nine years by this stage. They had been updated, as they describe, in 2009, and your report, your words:
"Of concern, however, is the significant downward trend in meeting standards relating to plans and capabilities."
Is that the position?
A. Correct.
Q. Is there anything else you wanted to add in relation to that concern at this stage?
A. Nothing that springs to mind immediately.
Q. Well, perhaps we can just explore that a little bit more.
"Minimum Standards for London (Plans and
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            Capabilities) compliance by year."
            We see overleaf at page 13 \{GOL00001515/13\} a table,
            and it says "Assessment", the most recent assessment by
            that stage December 2015, and we see three columns,
    "Green", "Amber" and "Red", green being effectively
    there is no concern, operational; amber, is it right,
    indicates operational but requires development; and red
    indicates not operational.
    A. Correct.
Q. Is that a fair description?
A. Correct.
Q. In very basic terms, there was a percentage increase in
relation to amber and red rows over that year from
December 2014 to December 2015, with just under
a quarter of assessments having amber, which means
operational but requires development; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And there was an increase -- I'm not sure if "a slight
increase" is the right terminology -- to $2.67 \%$ from
$0.67 \%$ in relation to red.
If we could turn to the last MSL peer review
results, which are 2016, and that's at \{GOL00000136\},
please.
So you did your review, you had the 2015 results of
MSLs, and this is a document which we've actually seen

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Capabilities ) compliance by year."
We see overleaf at page 13 \{GOL00001515/13\} a table, and it says "Assessment", the most recent assessment by "Green", "Amber" and "Red", green being effectively there is no concern, operational; amber, is it right, indicates operational but requires development; and red indicates not operational.
A. Correct.
Q. Is that a fair description?
A. Correct.
Q. In very basic terms, there was a percentage increase in relation to amber and red rows over that year from a quarter of assessments having amber, which means operational but requires development; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And there was an increase -- I'm not sure if "a slight increase" is the right terminology -- to $2.67 \%$ from $0.67 \%$ in relation to red.

If we could turn to the last MSL peer review results, which are 2016, and that's at \{GOL00000136\}, please.

So you did your review, you had the 2015 results of 78
already this morning with a different reference -- I'll just give that reference for the note. The previous reference in relation to this document is \{GOL00001728\}. So I believe we've got the same document, two different references.

To identify this document, it's "MSL Peer Review Results 2016", and it says:
"This paper updates [the local authority panel] on the status of Boroughs' assessment following the MSL Peer Review 2016."

If you could turn to page 2 \{GOL00000136/2\}, please, and look at paragraph 5, or section 5, "Trends for capabilities ". If you recall, that was one of the areas that you had expressed a concern about in your EP2020 report. We're here a little bit later in time in 2016 with some more information, and it says this:
"Trends for capabilities
"Overall, 10 capabilities have been identified as having more than a quarter ( 9 or more boroughs) reporting an Amber or Red rating."

I'm just going to mention some of those, we can see it in that table: training provided by boroughs, humanitarian assistance, evacuation and identification of vulnerable persons.

Is that correct?

## A. Correct.

Q. Applying that to RBKC for a moment, the Inquiry's heard and seen evidence that RBKC reported amber in relation to those named capabilities: training, humanitarian assistance, identification of vulnerable persons.

Was it a matter of concern, from your perspective, that over a quarter of boroughs, including RBKC, reported this in their self-assessment, that they were either amber or red in ten capabilities ?
A. It was a concern. It would have been a concern. What I'd just like again -- if I can add a bit more context.
Q. Of course.
A. The MSLs serve two purposes, and I think you may have heard this morning one of those is to inform an individual local authority, who has the statutory duty, where its weaknesses, where its strengths sit, and then inform local business planning in terms of addressing them.

The second purpose of MSLs was to inform LAP, the local authorities panel, with an indication of trends, themes, things which potentially would benefit from some level of regional support. And I use the term "support" because the local authorities panel has no legal basis upon which it can assist - insist that an individual local authority does anything with what is produced.

So LAP generally operates, and continues to operate, on the basis of producing guidance, producing advice, strong argument, and relying to some extent -- and my apologies for this -- on a bit of common sense, in terms of: we've provided you with the tools, it 's now really -- you're encouraged to adopt what's been provided.
Q. So you mentioned that it was of concern, but also within the context that this is to assist the local authority to identify where they have areas to develop, and also to identify trends. That's the context.

But we're dealing with perhaps more than a quarter of local authorities having areas which required development, dealing with humanitarian assistance, identification of vulnerable persons. How much of a concern was it that this seemed to be relatively widespread?
A. In 2016, I was commissioned by the local authorities panel to do the review EP2020, but the secretariat, the management of discussions at LAP, was facilitated through London Resilience Group and not directly by myself, so I wouldn't wish to comment in terms of LAP's view on that. I can give you a personal view, which is that would be of concern.
Q. We have heard already this morning in your evidence as 81
well that the LAP is there to, in terms of standards, encourage compliance --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and meeting and improving, but in terms of enforcement, there's no power in relation to enforce those standards.
A. No power whatsoever.
Q. That's in relation to MSLs, which are the minimum standards for London. This is pre-fire. Later on this afternoon we'll deal with what's replaced the minimum standards for London, the RSLs; isn't that correct?
A. Yeah, and I'm happy to explain some of the rationale for why that change was required.
Q. Yes. We'll cover that. I just wanted to assist with having a context of the landscape in which we explore events in June 2017.

The final point, and it perhaps is covered by your last answer in terms of concern, we have also heard evidence within the individual MSL report for RBKC that they had no capability, in other words it was red, for the appointments of a humanitarian assistance lead officer, a HALO. Was the absence of an operational capability for something such as that, as a HALO, a matter of concern to you back in 2016?
A. It would have been of concern, but I would have expected
Q. So your recommendations in 2016, there was a process where they were going to be implemented. Then we have events in June 2017 and, as we'll hear this afternoon, a number of post-fire reviews, including you refreshing your report.
A. Yes, correct. However, the refresh was based upon primarily a peer challenge conducted and commissioned by London Councils --
Q. Yes.
A. -- that considered not just Grenfell, but the other significant incidents that occurred in 2017.
Q. Yes.
A. So it was a consolidated review, which then led to that report being published, the assurance review being

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published, and therefore the refreshed EP2020 -- the EP2020 consolidated all of that, those recommendations.
Q. We'll deal with those three reports and that consolidation this afternoon.

I'm going to move on now to your involvement on 14 June.

In terms of your notification, you helpfully set out in your statement -- we don't need to turn to it -- at paragraph 27 \{GOL00001349/5\} that you first became aware of the fire by text and email around 4.40 in the morning; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Upon that notification, what was your role upon being notified?
A. My role really was to monitor the local authority initial response, and I think that was demonstrated by identifying that the message to Local Authority Gold had been incorrectly directed, and so that was my initial role, was to monitor the level of response.
Q. We could perhaps touch upon that. We know that there was an on-duty London Local Authority Gold, that being Andrew Blake-Herbert, chief executive of the London Borough of Havering. He was on duty, as it happens, until 9 o'clock. What you're referring to is that the notification had been sent to the next London Local
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Authority Gold on the rota, who was Chris Naylor, who was due on at 9 o'clock; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. What role would the duty London Gold, using the short term, have in those circumstances? So, for instance,
Andrew Blake-Herbert or Chris Naylor, whoever was on duty, what would their role be?
A. Their role at that point would be to monitor the situation, assure themselves that the local authority concerned, RBKC, were fully engaged and were not expressing any immediate issues or concerns.
Q. How would they assure themselves that the local authority were fully engaged?
A. They would have to take it as said on the SCG, had they dialled in to the SCG.
Q. So your answer was they would have to take it, ie the London Gold, on what was reported at the SCG, had they dialled in to the SCG?
A. Correct.
Q. Was there an expectation, in those circumstances, that the duty LLAG would dial in or attend an SCG in those circumstances?
A. It was discretionary. On occasions, London Resilience Group will offer to dial in to an SCG or in to a partnership call or whatever nature of call is held,

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and then report back. But in this situation, the -I believe Local Authority Gold was informed about the call, and then the interaction between them and London Resilience Group occurred, which then resulted in them not dialling in, I believe.
Q. Okay. I don't want to conflate what the expectation would be and what happened actually in the circumstances.
A. Sure.
Q. So in normal circumstances, bearing in mind it's one of your areas, would your expectation be that the duty LLAG would sign in?
A. For that -- for this type of incident, yes.
Q. Yes. But you did say it's discretionary, so there's nothing that says that they must dial in to an SCG?
A. No, particularly in this situation, because it was a single-based borough incident.
Q. In relation to that point about it being a single-based borough incident, what was the significance back then, if any, of that distinction?
A. Could you ask the question --
Q. Of course.

You mentioned that this was a single incident. It was contained within a local authority. Did that have any significance in terms of what a duty LLAG would do?
A. Yes, I think it would, because I would expect London Local Authority Gold or Andrew Blake-Herbert at the time to dial in and just assess as to whether there are wider implications, whether it be the plume could extend into other boroughs, et cetera, as an example.
Q. Yes.
A. And so it's two functions, really: one is to assure that RBKC had everything it needed, and the second one was to assess as to whether there were wider implications.
Q. Okay.

Well, let 's examine what happened, and then we can update those answers if need be.

So the notification email you received at 04.41 informed you that there was an SCG, a strategic co-ordination group meeting, that was to be held at 5 o'clock. Is it the position that you decided to attend that meeting as you believed it would be unlikely that the on-duty London Local Authority Gold would be able to attend because of the short notification ?
A. Correct.
Q. You mention in your statement at paragraph 30 \{GOL00001349/6\} that, by dialling in, this allowed you to hear the briefing on the situation and ensure that you were in a good position to provide advice if required to the duty LLAG, London Resilience Group, or

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John Barradell, chair of the local authority panel.

## A. Correct.

Q. So that's the circumstances in which you dialled in to that first SCG.

As you were listening, what view did you form about the scale of the incident?
A. The view that I formed was that it was big. However, there was still a lot of information not currently available, hence I work on the basis that that's why there was a follow-up SCG pretty soon afterwards. But it was because there was a paucity of information at that point.
Q. In terms of headlines, what did you consider were the areas where there was a paucity of information?
A. In terms of the number -- if I recollect, what I wasn't fully sighted on was as to how many -- had the building been fully evacuated, you know, the numbers of people directly affected and -- yeah, I think, to be honest with you, it was numbers and the data that was lacking, that would then have given me a good -- a better indication of actually the scale of this, the scale of the tragedy.
Q. Okay. So big absence of data in relation to numbers so that you could fully successful the true scale --
A. Yes.

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Q. -- of the incident.
        David Kerry for RBKC, who you have worked with in
    the past, closely one assumes, on EP2020, he
    participated on the call. What view did you form of
    RBKC and their input during that call?
A. Their participation in the call gave me a sense that
        they were engaged, they had deployed LALOs to the scene,
        there was -- so in relation to that, the right
        conversations should have been taking place, the fact
        that David was very experienced, and there was nothing
        raised on the call that said RBKC when challenges or
        difficulties that they were unable to deal with.
Q. To summarise what you say at paragraph 31
        {GOL00001349/6}, which chimes with what you have told us
        a moment ago:
            "Following the SCG ... I concluded that [RBKC] were
        actively engaged in the established multi-agency
        response. As a result, I reverted to monitoring emails,
        sharing information with John BARRADELL ... and liaising
        with London Resilience Group ..."
            Is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Is it fair to say at that stage, did you envisage London
    Local Authority Gold having any active role in the
    response?
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    A. No, not unless requested
    Q. Did you anticipate at that stage that there would be
an imminent request?
A. No.
Q. Does it follow that you formed a view as to whether RBKC
had sufficient resources to deal with the humanitarian
needs of those affected in the fire at that stage?
A. That is something that I didn't consider and was very
much reliant upon the information provided.
Q. So is this a fair summary: you listened in on the call,
what you heard didn't raise any concerns or flashing
alarm bells, but in terms of the humanitarian needs,
that's something which you didn't independently consider
at that stage, whether RBKC had the capacity to deal
with it?
A. The consideration of the humanitarian need would have been considered, but I hadn't considered the possibility that RBKC wouldn't have the staff resource to deal with what was required.
Q. We know that the next SCG was at 06.30, which you didn't attend, nor did you attend any of the subsequent SCG meetings that day on 14 June. Can you explain why that was?
A. For two reasons. One was that I was receiving information around those meetings. I was aware that

London Resilience Group were briefing Local Authority
Gold, I was aware of offers of support coming in to RBKC, so they weren't just being left stranded to deal with this. It was only towards the end of the first day, the 14 th, that then the concerns started to materialise regarding their capacity and ability to deal with the challenge that they faced.

And the other -- sorry, my apologies, the other, for want of a better word, failsafe was that London
Resilience Group provide dedicated support to London local authorities, we have a good professional working relationship with them, and had they themselves expressed any concerns or had concerns, I would have expected them to have raised it with me, and potentially with John Barradell as well.
Q. Were you aware that your colleagues from the London Resilience Group would be on those calls?
A. Yes.
Q. So from the surrounding information, you took the view that you didn't need to be on the call. You were aware LLAG colleagues were on the SCGs.

In relation to the duty LLAGs, so
Andrew Blake-Herbert for those first three SCGs -- we had one at 5.00 , one at 6.30 , one at $8.30--$ he didn't attend; Chris Naylor didn't attend the 14.00 or 19.30 .

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So none of the duty LLAGs attended either.
A. That's correct, and --
Q. Was that something that you were aware of, that there was a non-attendance by the duty LLAGs?
A. At the point whereby it was still being considered a single-borough incident, and until such point that it became clear that RBKC weren't able to effectively deal with their responsibilities, I would suggest that there was no need for Local Authority Gold to be on those calls.
Q. Although you did say earlier on that, in relation to monitoring, the role of the duty LLAG is to monitor the response of RBKC, and that there would be perhaps
a benefit, even in a single local authority incident, of having a duty LLAG on the SCG call; isn't that correct?
A. On the first call.
Q. On the first call?
A. Yes, with them then continuing to receive briefings and updates following every SCG, with the option to say, "Actually, I'm not comfortable with this, perhaps I do need to dial in". But they would be basing that upon the advice and information being provided to them also by London Resilience Group.
Q. Would you accept, bearing in mind the 5 o'clock SCG, where you mention that there was data deficits, gaps, as the next SCG, which we've heard was at 08.30.

Perhaps, with your assistance, we could look at
an email you received just before then. There's a series of emails I'd like your assistance upon.
That's $\{$ GOL00000218\}, please.
If we look at the body of the email there, Toby Gould to you, 8.04:
"To update you on the current situation and local authority gold considerations."

This is pre the next SCG, as we can see in the second paragraph. This, we see at the third paragraph, is where that misunderstanding emerged: "Nicholas Holgate was on the 06.30 SCG via teleconference (K\&C's preferred method rather than teleconference (K\&C's preferred method rather than
attending SOR)."

We have heard that already; is that the special operations room in Lambeth?
A. Correct, yes.
Q. Pausing there for a moment, best practice. Is there any best practice here as to whether a chief executive, in
to assessing the scale of the incident, that there would have been a benefit of having an experienced chief executive calling in and monitoring to see if things were in hand?
A. In hindsight, potentially, yes. However, I believe that the subsequent SCG had the RBKC chief executive. So, you know, they're peers. Local Authority Gold has a specific function, but is an equal in terms of position and role.
Q. It's just really in relation to that word "monitoring", as you mentioned, that it may not have been the practice then of having a duty LLAG calling in, but whether it would have had a benefit if there was somebody who was separate from the immediate response who was able to perhaps give peer support or advise the local authority chief executive of difficulties which were apparent to that person.
A. Again, in hindsight, I guess I could definitely see the value of that. However, RBKC, I believed, understood the way in which it could secure additional support, and where it could secure that additional peer support.
Q. Yes.

Just dealing with one discrete matter, you mentioned your belief -- and it's in your statement as well -that Nicholas Holgate was at the next SCG at 6.30 .

I think the wider evidence is that that, although maybe noted down somewhere, is incorrect; he wasn't at the next SCG, just by way of record.
A. Okay.
"To update you on the current situation and local perations room in Lambeth?
those circumstances, should attend the special operations room at Lambeth or whether they could participate by teleconference?
A. The original thinking was that a chief executive would - - or should I say chief executive Council Gold --
Q. Yes.
A. -- would make their way in to SOR.
Q. So that was the original thinking.
A. Yeah, subsequently -- if we're talking about this particular incident, then, yes, there was -- the thinking was that Council Gold would go in to SOR.
Q. I'm going to use Council Gold rather than chief executive.

What would the benefits of Council Gold in that situation be, from moving from their headquarters or town hall and coming to Lambeth for that meeting? What would the advantage be?
A. One of the advantages is that, rather than dialling in via teleconference, you're establishing strong relationships, understanding across equals around the SCG table, and I think body language is an interesting benefit of sitting there face-to-face with someone, as well as by being in that environment, it fast tracks the conversations outside of the SCGs and issues and problems are more easily addressed, I believe.

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Q. So benefits with face-to-face communication.

In terms of original thinking, to use your
phraseology, is there guidance or was there guidance anywhere which said that, in such an event, Council Gold should attend the SOR?
A. I would need to refresh my memory, but that was, if I may add, one of the reasons why Local Authority Gold at that time was invited to visit SOR, to familiarise themselves and then understand the environment in which they may be asked to operate.

But, sorry, my apologies, I just need to clarify . That was very much predicated on Local Authority Gold response going in to SOR, and very much predicated on the basis that that would often be in a situation where more than one local authority was affected. So I wouldn't like it to be seen that it was set in stone that Council Gold would go in there, but there would have been benefits in that happening.
Q. Thank you.

We see, in the middle of that paragraph:
"Nicholas [Holgate] and Chris Naylor (oncoming
[LLAG] at 09.00) are in agreement that Nicholas will lead [local authority] engagement in the SCG. From the meetings to date I would agree that seems the best approach. Nicholas thinks that aside from housing needs
which may spill over borough boundaries there is no need for LLAG to be stood up."

Were you content at that stage in relation to what Toby Gould said was the best approach, that the SCG would be -- the lead would be taken by the local authority?
A. I had no reason not to believe that was an accurate assessment. I think this is where, again, the clarification around the role of Local Authority Gold and how it interacts with Council Gold is an important one. There is a distinction. And so in terms of using terminology like "lead engagement in the SCG", Local Authority Gold is a co-ordination, communication and representative role; the lead for the response would still have been Council Gold in terms of the local authority contribution.
Q. Yes. In relation to LLAG, what did you understand by the phrase "LLAG to be stood up", where it says that at the bottom of paragraph 3 ?
A. It's just -- my personal impression of that would be that Local Authority Gold would become more actively involved.
Q. And at that stage, when you've heard that there's no need for LLAG to be stood up, we then move on to the next part, which says this:

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"Chris [Naylor] is aware that we may need to seek his approval for mutual aid requests."

The panel have heard this very recently.
"Although not requested by $\mathrm{K} \& C$, we will be staffing the LLACC to offer coordination support if required." Is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. So from your perspective, as chief resilience liaison officer at that stage, what was your view as to progress and the state of matters prior to the 08.30 SCG?
A. My view, based upon this email, was that RBKC were dealing with the incident and, as described, didn't require any wider London-wide support at that time.
Q. We see at the top of that email, if we just scroll up a little bit, please, that you forwarded that email that you received at 08.04 to John Barradell at 08.13.
A. Correct.
Q. Two minutes later at 08.15, he received, John Barradell, a separate email from John Hetherington, which you were copied in to, and perhaps we can deal with that by way of completeness, $\{G O L 00001473\}$. If we could scroll down to the initial email.

So we see at 07.50 the source of this, "LLAG needs to gear up". That's Nicholas Holgate's email to Toby Gould, copying in the duty LLAGs. We see at the
Q. Well, let's think about it. It's a short email. We can see the context, which we spent some time running through, at 08.15, which effectively says RBKC retained the lead at this point. You mentioned earlier on that the view was that London Local Authority Gold doesn't

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appear to be actively involved. Is that what you meant, "Looks like job done"?
A. I would suggest that is likely to be the motivation behind that message, which was that it had been clarified that RBKC were leading the incident, there was no need for Local Authority Gold to actively be involved, and therefore, other than making sure RBKC continued and had continued to be in a position to lead on the response, then there was no need for wider London-wide involvement.
Q. Just to add a slight nuance to that, was it the case that, because it was a self-contained incident in a single local authority, in the circumstances you described, was that the view also, that "Job done"?
A. The fact that it was a single-borough incident being led by the accountable authority -- in terms of the local authority aspect of this, being led by the accountable authority; the fact that they, as I believed, understood the way in which the Gold arrangements worked and were available should the situation change; they had what I believed was experienced emergency planning personnel, who I understood to know how that system works; and therefore, until such point that the situation changed, the incident was being managed by RBKC.
Q. And in relation to that view you formed, did you speak
A. I believe John Barradell was potentially interviewing that day, so I'm not sure - I don't recall direct face-to-face conversation was him until later on in the day, when we started -- when some of the concerns started to materialise, and hence we had the teleconference call at 5.30 that evening.
Q. Which we're going to move on to in just a moment.
A. Yeah.
Q. So your role going forward at this stage on the 14 th, what would your role, if any, be from this email saying "Job done"?
A. It was simply just to continue to monitor. I would have remained copied in to SCG minutes, had they occurred, and other information being shared by London Resilience Group, but it very much was a monitoring role.
Q. You mentioned how concerns emerged in the afternoon. Can you tell us when that was and what were the nature of those concerns?
A. I don't know precise timings.
Q. Yes.
A. But I think there were two areas of concern. One was the rising media coverage, and some of the stories that were starting to be aired didn't quite match with the 101
sort of information that we were -- had received previously in the day. And I think John Barradell may be able to add more to this, but I think he was aware of lots of offers of support and help being declined, or not being taken up. And so really it was just something that needed to happen to just sense-check the situation within the borough, and something that, you know, John Barradell, as chair of the local authorities panel, would inevitably have wanted to do.
Q. Okay.

Well, let's move on to that 17.30 conference which took place with Nicholas Holgate, John Barradell, Chris Naylor, the duty LLAG, John Hetherington, who we have heard already, from London Resilience Group, and John O'Brien of London Councils.

You state this at paragraph 34 of your statement \{GOL00001349/7\}, that:
"... following a conversation with John BARRADELL, I was asked to liaise with the [LRG] London Resilience Group to set up a conference call ..."

Can you help with that discussion and when that discussion was?
A. The discussion with John Hetherington would have been at some point late afternoon, but with sufficient time for the call to then be set up for 5.30 . panel may have seen this already. This is an email by you, 15.46. We can see who it's sent to, including Chris Naylor, John O'Brien, John Hetherington, John Barradell, "Categories: Red Category":
"As discussed on the phone, the two main reasons for our call with Nicholas are:
"1. To gain [a] better understanding of the likely support K\&C will require going forward to support strategic decisions on how this is best delivered. Fundamental to this is resilience at the highest level and ensuring appropriate strategic support is available to Nicholas if required.

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"2. To consider the wider implications for K\&C and London as a whole and determine initial actions to address."

That's your email setting out the purpose for the call.

Were they your words? Was that your idea, or was that what was suggested to you by John Barradell as the purpose for the meeting?
A. I don't recall, but the principle behind establishing the conference call had been set following previous incidents in 2017, where there had been value in Local Authority Gold, if activated, and those chief executives who were from the affected boroughs, London Councils, who obviously support the sort of political perspective and leaders' committee in London, getting together for, for want of a better word, a bit of a scrum down.
Q. Yes.
A. And seeking insight from Nicholas in terms of what his potential needs were going to be over the coming days, so that local authorities weren't (a) in the dark and, secondly, playing catch-up if there was to be something that materialises that needed wider support.
Q. Yes.

In relation to your role during this call, were you there as a watching brief or were you there to provide
advice, bearing in mind your expertise?
A. I very much saw it as a chief exec to chief exec call,
but clearly if I could add value to the call, then
I would have made a comment, I would have contributed.
Q. And do you recall providing any advice during this call
on 14 June at 17.30 ?
A. I don't recall, but if I may add some context.
Q. Yes.
A. John Barradell is vastly experienced in this and,
actually, John and I had a strong working relationship.
So the sorts of things that I would be thinking about,
I have no doubt he would have been thinking about as
well.
Q. And you had that conversation, on your evidence earlier
on, where there was concerns --
A. Yes.
Q. - - developing regarding the response --
A. Correct.
Q. - by RBKC?
Save for a short summary of the call in an email
which the panel have seen and we may touch upon in a few
moments by John Hetherington, there was no formal
minutes or personal notes taken by you of this call ; is
that correct?
A. Correct.

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## Q. Why was no note or minute taken of this call?

A. Well, I think I had probably agreed with

John Hetherington that he would produce a note afterwards, so whether it be in an email, it was still a précis of the conversation.
Q. Okay.
A. And it was, for want of a better word, an informal conversation between Nicholas and the other chief executives, for them to just gauge the situation and see what level of support might be required. So it wasn't a formal part of the structure. It would be classified, I guess, as an opportunity to gauge what level of peer support is required.
Q. During that call, did Nicholas Holgate, from your recollection, state any concern that he had in relation to the council's capacity or ability to continue to lead the humanitarian response?
A. No, and I would suggest that John Hetherington's précis is fairly accurate of the conversation.
Q. Can you recall whether there was any concerns expressed by anyone on that call regarding the ability of RBKC to cope with the immediate aftermath?
A. I can't recall the exact detail of the conversation, but I think, as an indication, that RBKC would have benefitted from support were the decisions to deploy
staff into the borough the next day, and included within that were communications staff, subject matter expertise in terms of recovery from London Bridge, from Southwark, et cetera, and Lakanal, of course, and then immediately after that call, I think John Barradell had a further conversation with Nicholas where it was agreed that I would also go in to provide support, in a similar way as I had provided to other local authorities in
a similar situation -- well, not in a similar situation; provided to other local authorities in response to other types of incident.
Q. So without having a precise recollection of the conversation, if we look at what flowed from the meeting, your view is that there must have been an identified need to support RBKC; is that correct?
A. I would suggest that there was an increased nervousness in terms of what was being stated and actually what was reality.
Q. Well, let's develop that a little bit more.

So there was an increased nervousness by those who were listening on the call by what was being stated, ie by what was being stated by RBKC; is that correct?
A. That would have been my personal take on it, yes.
Q. And as a result of that increased nervousness during this call, was it the case that there were offers to

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support RBKC more?
A. Yes, correct.
Q. And in relation to those offers to provide further support, can you recollect whether there was any resistance to any additional support?
A. No, I don't believe there was.
Q. In terms of your specific role, your evidence a short while ago was that you believed that there was an additional call after this teleconference between Mr Holgate and Mr Barradell, and as a result, then you were asked to deploy the next day.
A. Correct, and I think that's referenced in John Hetherington's précis, where he talks about post-call note.
Q. Absolutely.

You said you have done it before, provided that sort of assistance; would that be unusual, in those circumstances, for you to be deployed to assist at a local authority?
A. The fact that I believe I've done it twice in $15 / 20$ years suggests it is unusual, and in both situations, it was not as quickly as I was required to go in to RBKC, on the sort of $24 / 48$ hours after.

If you'd like the context, the first time I was deployed in to a borough whilst I worked for London Fire
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    and Emergency Planning Authority was in support of
    Westminster City Council's response to the
    Alexander Litvinenko poisoning, and the fact that there
    were multiple locations across London and actually
    across the country where there was potentially
    contamination, and I supported Westminster in terms of
    the recovery programme, but, more importantly, provided
    the conduit and link between the fast-paced police
    investigation and those boroughs that potentially had
    contaminated locations within their borough. So it was
    a facilitation role --
Q. Yes.
A. -- and ensured the wider sort of -- rather than it just
    being Westminster-focused, that there was actually
    a view across London.
            The second incident that I responded to was the
        potential risk of flooding in Croydon, where again it
        was -- there was a sense that they needed some level of
        support, and I provided what I could to them and helped
        in whatever way I could.
Q. So relatively exceptional for you to be deployed --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and to be deployed so quickly.
A. Yes.
Q. We will probably turn to your deployment after the
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    luncheon break, but I just want to deal with a couple
    more emails, if we can, before then.
        Was it the case at that stage, by the
        afternoon/evening of 14 June, did you sense any
        reluctance of London Resilience Group or the LAP to be
        getting drawn in into any long-term support?
    A. I believe -- I don't think there was any reluctance from
the local authorities panel. I believe that there was
some conversations regarding -- within London Resilience
Group and potentially that I had with London Resilience
Group around whether RBKC were providing the right level
of support to the various functions that they needed to
deliver, and the need to ensure that London Resilience
Group didn't get embroiled in areas of which potentially
RBKC should have been taking responsibility for.
Q. So you're referring to the view of the London Resilience
Group and John Hetherington. There's an email which the
panel saw just this morning in relation to that.
What was your view as to that opinion expressed or
viewpoint expressed by the London Resilience Group about
not being embroiled, I think your word was?
A. May I ask what the time and dates when those --
Q. Of course. Let's quickly show it. It's \{LFB00061229\}.
Thank you, Mr Sawyer. It's at 23.04. It's an email you
haven't seen but the panel have seen today.
luncheon break, but I just want to deal with a couple more emails, if we can, before then.

Was it the case at that stage, by the afternoon/evening of 14 June, did you sense any reluctance of London Resilience Group or the LAP to be
A. I believe -- I don't think there was any reluctance from the local authorities panel. I believe that there was some conversations regarding -- within London Resilience Group and potentially that I had with London Resilience of support to the various functions that they needed to deliver, and the need to ensure that London Resilience Group didn't get embroiled in areas of which potentially RBKC should have been taking responsibility for.
Q. So you're referring to the view of the London Resilience Group and John Hetherington. There's an email which the panel saw just this morning in relation to that.

What was your view as to that opinion expressed or viewpoint expressed by the London Resilience Group about not being embroiled, I think your word was?
A. May I ask what the time and dates when those --
Q. Of course. Let's quickly show it. It's \{LFB00061229\}.
Thank you, Mr Sawyer. It's at 23.04. It's an email you haven't seen but the panel have seen today.

You're not on the distribution list, but there's a reference to the discussion between you and Mr Hetherington, and we see in the second paragraph:
"RBKC support - Mark is meeting with RBKC to discuss
their arrangements for [humanitarian assistance] and Recovery. I have made the point this is going to be a very long process ... I have made the point to Mark [that being you, Mr Sawyer] that they should look to consume this in everyday business as far as possible so that we don't get drawn into a long term support, Mark agreed with this, I think we will need to do something but I think if possible some advice early days to bring the right people together then let them get on with it."

Again, we've heard evidence in relation to that. Is that a fair summary of your discussion with John Hetherington?
A. I think that would be fair to say, and I think that we need to take into account that this was still an RBKC-led local authority response. There was -- and I can't - - John Hetherington would probably be better placed to explain this, but I think that there was a concern amongst LRG at the time that they were being asked to deliver functions and, for want of a better word, bail out the local authorities, and therefore local authorities themselves needed to take more direct

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responsibility, particularly for some of the administration, things that there should be no reason why they don't have the capacity within the system to do that, allowing London Resilience Group to then revert to their primary role, which is to some extent subject matter expertise as well.
Q. Sure. I think the word -- you just knocked against the microphone -- was "bail out", was it?
A. Yes.
Q. There was a concern about bailing out the local authority?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you.

Perhaps the final email we can touch upon is one which is sent the following day, \{LFB00061310\}. It's an email you sent to Toby Gould. You were up early working on 15 June, and it says this:

## "Toby,

"... We had a call with Nicholas yesterday evening prior to SCG and made the point that he needs to gap analysis his needs and then support can be more focused. Currently [City of London] are supporting Comms and Southwark are supplying SME advice."

Pausing there, could you help us with SME?
A. Subject matter expertise.
Q. Subject matter expertise, and that's a phrase you have
used already:
"David Kerry has been tasked overnight to produce
the road to recovery, loosely based on an agenda for
Thor SMT this morning."
Perhaps you could assist us with that, what's
"Thor"?
A. I assume it's a typo and it should be "the SMT this
morning".
Q. Okay. I thought it was something special which I wasn't
familiar with. Okay, so that's a typo.
SMT is senior management team?
A. Senior management team.
Q. Okay.
A. And in the context of this, SMT, I would imagine I was
referring to their Council Gold meeting.
Q. Their council, so RBKC Gold, we've heard that they had
meetings twice a day.
A. Yes.
Q. That's what you're referring to, thank you.
If we scroll down just to deal with this email 113
"I know you're joining ..."
So this is what Toby sends you the night before:
"I know you're joining RBKC colleagues in the morning and will be discussing with Hamish. It will be good to get an honest broker appraisal of what we/other Boroughs are likely to need to help them with. I think today they've been too busy to consider a lot of the offers of support. With at least five Boroughs offering support on behalf of their CEOs, I think that should be considered alongside our potential to help if gaps need to be filled."

Was that how you saw your role, getting an honest broker appraisal, when you attend the Town Hall on 15 June?
A. Not necessarily solely an honest appraisal of what needs they wanted, but it was more of an appraisal of their ability to cope with what they were being asked to deliver.
Q. So does it follow that you were down there to provide support, but also underlining that you were there to see whether they were doing what needed to be done?
A. Correct, and if I may add -- we may cover this at the end of all the questioning -- I think if $I$ had this time again, I would certainly have made an earlier assessment that they needed more direct input. But at the time
Q. And it also could suggest a lack of strategic oversight

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as well.
A. Definitely .

MR KEATING: Okay.
Well, we'll move on to 15 June just after the
luncheon break, if that's acceptable, Mr Chairman.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, that's a good point to break, I think.
MR KEATING: Thank you.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, we'll stop now, Mr Sawyer, so
that we can all have a chance to get some lunch. We will resume at 2 o'clock, please.

I have to ask you, as all the other witnesses, while
you're out of the room, please don't talk to anyone
about your evidence or anything relating to it.
All right?
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
(Pause)

Thank you very much. 2 o'clock, then, please.
MR KEATING: Thank you.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
(1.02 pm)
(The short adjournment)
(2.00 pm)

SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, Mr Sawyer, on we go, if
you're ready.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. Yes, Mr Keating.
MR KEATING: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Welcome back, Mr Sawyer.
We were just about to turn to 15 June, and one topic I would like your assistance with is in relation to David Kerry. Is it right that you actually had contact with him on the evening of 14 June?
A. Yeah, it was a phone call.
Q. Yes. You set out at paragraph 36 \{GOL00001349/7\} -perhaps we could open it up, so we have it all in front of us - - that you spoke to him on the phone and:
"During the call David KERRY briefed me and confirmed he was just about to start a night shift. I expressed concern that he needed to be available during the day to support the Council's overall response."

And he acknowledged that concern.
We know that you saw him on 15 June and he was working for a short period of time, but then went on to -- he was still working a night shift, he wasn't working during the day; is that correct?
A. As I understand it, yes.

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Q. Was there any response or update as to why he remained on nights and not worked during the day of 15 June and 16 June?
A. No, no mention of that. Having raised it, also in my statement, with Tony Redpath as well, and that links back to this point about RBKC utilising the right staff in the right roles at the right time to support their decision-making.
Q. So we know that he wasn't there during the day on 15 June. What impact did you think that would have had or did have on the RBKC response on 15 June and then 16 June?
A. The impact was simply that, from what I could see, their overall response required some -- it was very fragmented, and it needed someone somewhere centrally to be advising Nicholas appropriately about the right structures that needed to be in place and the way in which that could best be delivered, the types of frameworks, planning, or sort of the response arrangements that needed to be put into place, and my view was that if David had been around there during the day, it -- in the day on day one, rather than not being there on the 14th, he might have been able to guide and steer the local authority response, and particularly Nicholas Holgate, into greater understanding about what
was required, the scale that was -- of what was required to be put into place, and that may have changed certain decisions RBKC made on the 14 th.
Q. So is it your view that you consider that there was a vacuum in terms of specialist advice that could have been given to the town clerk, Nicholas Holgate, on 15 June, or 14 June?
A. Well, I went in and probably filled that role to some extent on the 15 th.
Q. Yes.
A. Therefore, the question is: why wasn't there someone from RBKC to do that for them?
Q. Yes, and there wouldn't have been somebody doing that on 14 June if David Kerry was not there?
A. Yeah, and I can't obviously comment on what difference that would have made on the 14 th, I can just comment on the fact that there was a vacuum on the 15 th that needed to be filled.
Q. So it's right, isn't it, that you had, on 15 June, a meeting early in the morning with both David Kerry and Nicholas Holgate; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. How did you find, in terms of how he appeared, Mr Kerry when you saw him on 15 June?
A. I think, as described in my statement, he was

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traumatised and emotional and tired.
Q. Whilst he was there, did you consider he was able to actually assist Mr Holgate?
A. No.
Q. But - -
A. Sorry, I did consider that he wasn't fit to support Nicholas, yes.
Q. We will see in due course, but in one of your post-fire reflections $\{G O L 00001301\}$ you say that:
"Briefing by DK [David Kerry], [emergency planning]
manager confirmed he was traumatised ... not in a position to offer strategic direction with influence." Is that a fair summary?
A. Definitely .
Q. And we will see that document in a moment.

Did you raise with Mr Holgate on 15 June that Mr Kerry wasn't around and should be around, or there was an absence of support he required?
A. I had several conversations with Nicholas Holgate, I don't recall the detail of all of them, but I do recall, as I mentioned earlier, referencing David Kerry's -- the vacuum created by him being on night shift to Tony Redpath. But I think as the day progressed, it became more and more clear that RBKC as an organisation needed additional support. So, to be
A. Without quoting the guidance, my general understanding would be that response transitions to recovery at the

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point whereby there's no longer a risk to life and the situation has stabilised, and that at that point, the blue light organisations start to withdraw.
Q. Let me assist you in relation to the non-statutory guidance in relation to this, paragraph 5.1.5 \{CAB00004519/83\}:
"The recovery phase should begin at the earliest opportunity following the onset of an emergency, running in tandem with the response to emergency. It continues until disruption has been rectified, demands on services have returned to normal levels and the needs of those affected (directly and indirectly) have been met."

Is that what you were alluding to when you were asked?
A. Yeah, the final point within that, sorry?
Q. "... and the needs of those affected (directly or indirectly ) have been met."
A. Yeah, obviously that's a moot point in terms of the Grenfell response.
Q. When would you expect normally, from your experience, that transition to occur from emergency response to recovery?
A. Traditionally, it is reasonably quick. It depends on the scale of the incident, you know, and every incident is obviously different, so I wouldn't like to put
a definitive timeframe on that. But it is obviously
a time at which all parties concerned are satisfied that those -- if not all, some of that criteria has been met, and then it transitions to the local authority, who are responsible for supporting the community, leading the community, within that area.
Q. Yes.
A. So therefore it is an agreed point in time.
Q. We saw from earlier emails on the day before that there was an expectation that the response would move to recovery on 15 June; is that correct?
A. No, that's incorrect.
Q. No?
A. That wouldn't be my definitive view. I think there may have been suggestions that it was likely that that would be the point at which it would happen, but I don't recall any conversations that I was party to that suggested that that was definitely going to happen.
Q. Okay.

Let's perhaps look at it from a different perspective. The night before we saw an email where David Kerry had been tasked overnight to produce the road to recovery, and that was loosely based on an agenda for the senior management team this morning. You will recall --

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A. Yes.
Q. -- we dealt with that before lunchtime. So that was
    something which was referred to in correspondence the
    night before.
        When you attended and had your meeting with
        David Kerry, was there any document prepared in relation
        to setting out a route map in relation to going towards
        recovery?
A. No, not that I saw, and just to qualify the previous
        question --
Q. Yes.
A. -- as far as I'm concerned, by defining that route
    towards recovery, that path, wasn't necessarily to me
        an indication that it was definitely going to happen on
        the 15th.
Q. This flows from your answers so far: from what you saw
        and what was being discussed on that morning on }15\mathrm{ June,
        did you consider that RBKC was in a position to
        transition from response to recovery?
A. No.
Q. And why was that?
A. For two reasons: firstly, I don't think that they had robust enough arrangements in place to effectively manage the recovery process; and, secondly, I think there had been a complete loss of trust and confidence
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in RBKC, and, therefore, for them to lead on the recovery, strategies and action would have been required to restore some of that faith and confidence in the local authority.
Q. In relation to the latter matter, that loss of trust, as you described it, when did that become apparent to you, that that was a significant factor?
A. I had no idea whatsoever before the fire, even on the 14th, the level of mistrust there was circulating amongst the community, so this was brand new to me. I think it started to hit home probably on the 15 th, when, again, more news was being shared and the situation became clearer.
Q. When we were looking at your statement at paragraph 69 \{GOL00001349/14\}, you raised the point about RBKC should consider what additional support it required. What support did you consider that they required?
A. At that point, I hadn't really got to grips with exactly what they had in place in the first place, and, to be honest with you, as always in this, I'm not sure RBKC knew what additional support they needed. There wasn't that single point of truth in terms of how they were responding. The BECC wasn't functioning effectively and, therefore, discussions were taking place without the full picture understood.

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Q. Situational awareness is perhaps another term for it.
A. Yes.
Q. Is that fair?
A. Yes.
Q. I think we'll cover that in just a moment.

Let's move on, then. This was your early meeting.
We then know that there was an RBKC Gold Group meeting, senior management team meeting, at 10 o'clock on 15 June.

What was your assessment as an observer of that meeting?
A. I think as detailed in the statement. I think it was very operational, and I think that was because there wasn't this, for want of a better word, consistent understanding of the situation. I think it was too big, and I think there was no -- it was too polite, and I'd need to qualify that. It was $--I$ think it may have been described as a board meeting by other people giving evidence, and it was, for me, very similar to a traditional style of local authority meeting, very polite, very structured. It wasn't dynamic, it wasn't forward-looking, and it -- yeah, I think l've probably said enough about that meeting.
Q. Let's look at paragraph 73 \{GOL00001349/14\}, if you could scroll down. It chimes with what you have just
told us. The last sentence, you say:
"After the meeting, I suggested to Nicholas HOLGATE that the meeting had been very operational and not strategic enough."

And you asked him to consider reducing the membership, if we could see overleaf \{GOL00001349/15\}.

What was his response when you said to him that the meeting was too operational and not strategic enough?
A. I'm not sure I got a response to that.
Q. How receptive was Nicholas Holgate to your input on 15 June?
A. I believe he was receptive. I think $--I$ don't recall a particular comment in terms of that previous statement just made. He was receptive, but I think he was trying to oversee the council response in a traditional local authority way, which meant that if that was his senior management team, then he probably wouldn't have wished to pick and choose who he involved, whereas I would have picked and chose those heads of service, those heads of -- directors in various departments who actually had something to contribute.
Q. So a more streamlined approach?
A. Yeah, and I think that would be the more effective way of having a real strategic - level conversation. And the thing that was missing was not so much, "This is what we

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need to do now"; there wasn't a clear deadline placed on anything, as far as I can remember, and there wasn't a sense of, "This is what we need to do within the next 24, 48, 72 hours", and a forward look to add some sense of direction and purpose to the response.
Q. Is that what you mean when you refer to it not being strategic enough?
A. Yes.
Q. I'm going to move on to the humanitarian assistance steering group, which, again, the panel have heard quite a lot of evidence in relation to. That was something which was being assembled that day, and the first meeting took place at 2 o'clock on 15 June.

At paragraph 75 \{GOL00001349/15\}, which we can see just in front of us, you had contact with Sue Redmond. You say this:
"I spoke to Sue Redmond, the nominated [RBKC] ... (HALO) and I noted the extreme pressure she was under due to the pace in which the response was required and the scale of the situation."

Is that a fair summary?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you have expected a HALO to be appointed before 15 June? Would you have expected one to be appointed on 14 June, for instance?

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A. I would have expected, on 14 June, someone to be
    designated with the responsibility to lead on the
    response to the community. I think within their borough
    emergency management plan it references a Welfare
    Bronze.
Q. Yes.
A. The question is: who does that Welfare Bronze report in
    to? And, yes, I would have expected someone to be
    tasked with leading the humanitarian assistance
    response.
Q. The HALO is something which is a role identified in the
    humanitarian assistance framework, one of the London
    Resilience documents; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Were you aware that she had no training before in that
    role as a HALO?
A. If I didn't, then I would have been informed on that
    morning.
Q. Again, just so that the panel perhaps can assess how
    normal this is, would you expect in that sort of
    situation for the appointed HALO to be somebody with no
    previous experience in that role?
A. No.
Q. You wouldn't expect --
A. Well, if you define experience as appropriately trained,
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having exercised and understand the role and what's required, then I would expect that. In terms of experience, there are so few incidents that have -- of this -- of the scale that would require a full-blown humanitarian assistance response, then direct experience, no.
Q. No. But you would expect, is it right, from your answer, someone who was appointed would have the requisite training --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and exercising that role?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you provide assistance to Ms Redmond in relation to her carrying out her role?
A. I did in the lead-up to the meeting, but not during the meeting, because I wasn't in the room.
Q. Is it the case that you invited and asked Toby Gould to assist - -
A. Yes, I did.
Q. -- Ms Redmond?
A. I did, and that included sending the meeting invites to those people that had been omitted by RBKC in the first $--I$ believe in the first round of invites
Q. There was probably a lot of things going on in relation to your involvement on 15 June, but were you aware that
that invitation for Toby Gould to assist Ms Redmond was around 1.30, that's when that request was made to him? Does that sound about right?
A. That's correct, and after -- that was prompted by me.
Q. It led to Mr Gould doing his best by sending out invites to the voluntary sector and an updated agenda about ten minutes before the meeting.
A. Correct.
Q. Would you agree, far from an ideal set of circumstances, sending out information such as that so close to an important meeting?
A. Without doubt.
Q. I'm going to move on to communications.

At paragraph 72 \{GOL00001349/14\} you refer to speaking to Martin Fitzpatrick, and he was head of the media communications team at RBKC, and you explained that he had failed to dial in to the London Gold communications group conference call at 8.30 in the morning, and it states:
"Martin FITZPATRICK indicated that the request may have been lost in the 200 emails he had not had time to open."

Is that correct?
A. That's what -- that event happened, yes.
Q. Yes. What was the purpose -- again, to assist the

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panel - - of a London Gold communications group conference? What would be that?
A. That's part of the London Resilience Partnership structures and arrangements following a response strategic co-ordination arrangements. It's an opportunity for comms leads, communications leads from all of those key responding agencies to align messaging, share what -- anything relevant in terms of communications, and ensure that there is a coherent approach to messaging both the local community and the rest of London as necessary.
Q. Was it a cause of concern that the head of the media communications team at RBKC had not participated in that call?
A. It was concern enough for, I believe, someone from London Resilience Group to tell me that he hadn't been on that call and, therefore, it was sufficiently important for me to raise it with him.

And can I just add that I'm not sure if you have the minutes from that conference call; if RBKC are on that call, then that was obviously -- I wasn't aware of that, but also I would have expected Martin Fitzpatrick to be aware if they were on the call or not.
Q. Well, we've heard it's a pretty small team, the media communications team, and you've given your advice there
about the difficulties he raised in relation to the volume of material in terms of emails.

What view did you form during 15 June, whilst you were at the Town Hall, of how the communications team were performing at RBKC?
A. That was one of the areas I didn't really delve too deeply with.
Q. Let's have a quick look at $\{$ GOL00001301\}. These are your post-incident reflections, which we will touch upon. But on the fourth line we can see:
"Comms team in denial and overwhelmed. Asked why missed 8.30 !comms call [I'm not sure if that's deliberate or not] - missed amongst two hundred emails."

So it's really the first part of the sentence I'd like your assistance with:
"Comms team were in denial and overwhelmed."
What did you mean by that?
A. The overwhelmed aspect of that was a link to the 200 emails, small team, et cetera, et cetera. The denial piece, I can't recall.
Q. Okay.

I wonder if we could go back to your statement. We will refer to this document again in a short while, but if we go back to your first statement, page 10 $\{G O L 00001349 / 10\}$, paragraph 50, please. Thank you. You

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set out really your approach, third line :
"This involvement included gaining an understanding of methods and structures being applied by the [RBKC] to manage the response across the range of responsibilities, including humanitarian assistance, housing, mass fatalities and generic command and control functions."

So really this draws together what you say in your statement. So you've done a number of things, and it allowed you to gain an understanding of their structures; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. At paragraph 54 \{GOL00001349/11\}, you set out your opinion, and you say this:
"However, in my opinion, I did not believe that Nicholas HOLGATE had complete awareness of the scale and complexity of what [RBKC] were being asked to deal with, with a lack of full situational awareness across the senior management team."

> Is that correct?
A. Yes, it is .
Q. When did you form that view?
A. Around lunchtime, I think, maybe early afternoon.

I can't be specific, because, like I say, this just
evolved. That understanding evolved.

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Q. Yes.
A. And there were a number of specific elements that led me
    to form my overall opinion, which then, as I've said
    earlier, led to a conversation with John Barradell late
    afternoon.
Q. The conversation I think you referred to was the day
    before, on the 14th. So we're on the 15th --
A. This is a new conversation.
Q. We will move on to that conversation.
            But in relation to conversations, did you raise
        these concerns with Mr Holgate, that he had a lack of
        understanding of the complexity of what RBKC were to
        deal with and there was a lack of full situational
        awareness?
A. I don't -- no, I don't recall discussing that with him in that - - in those terms, no, I don't recall that.
Q. Should you have?
A. I think that goes back to my comment earlier about I should have stepped in earlier and made that more clearly known. But I think, as I said, the intention was always to go in there and try and assist. I had several conversations with Tony Redpath, because Nicholas was always very -- you know, appeared very busy, and I raised the issue about situational awareness definitely with him, and so I was hoping, just with the
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intention of trying to help, that by flagging these things as the day progressed, the situation would improve.
Q. Were you trying to encourage, nudge, point towards areas to improve? Is that how, in reality, your approach was?
A. That is a really good way of describing that. And the other way, whether right or wrong, I still felt that I was a guest in RBKC, I'd been allowed in, rather than having the authority to go in and actually instruct and change. So it was working with them to ensure that I remained seen as supportive and trying to help, rather than not.
Q. In retrospect, you have alluded to twice now sort of lessons learned. Is a lesson that you have learned that you should have been more challenging in highlighting the extent of how RBKC were going wrong?
A. Yeah, and -- exactly, and I think, again, testament to the fact that this was the first situation that I'd been involved with which required that level of assertion, you know, that level of assertiveness, and, as I said,
I think there were a number of events which culminated in the earlier -- sorry, mid-afternoon that then led me to say to John Barradell, "This isn't working".
Q. Okay. We'll move to that in a little while.

While we have paragraph 54, let's just continue
reading the last part:
"It was also my opinion that [RBKC] had not been galvanised as an organisation due to witnessing members of staff seemingly continuing to deliver their day jobs whilst a small number of individuals appeared to be dealing with a significant number of issues at the same time."

What did you mean by that?
A. I think, without doubt, there were lots and lots of good people trying to do the best they possibly could. It may have been just -- and, sorry, I acknowledge that there are still critical services that a local authority still needs to deliver, even in the midst of the tragedy at Grenfell, so that acknowledged, but there was just again this sense that I got that there were too few people trying to do too much, and I didn't at any stage hear the terms referenced that all non-critical services had been suspended, as an example. The fact that the humanitarian assistance group meeting had to be relocated because the IT wasn't working, et cetera. What I wasn't seeing is a team of people running around making the whole response work.

So it's not just those people making decisions and dealing directly with the issues; it's the infrastructure around that to enable it to function

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effectively, and I didn't get any sense of that.
And I think it links back, if I may -- this may seem very minor, but I was very concerned when I walked in to the council offices that morning and saw the pile of donations in the courtyard outside, and no sense of anybody being instructed or being tasked with dealing with that. There may well have been, but it was just my observations on the day.
Q. One interpretation or impression from your answers was that there was a lack of urgency that you observed; is that a fair impression?
A. I wouldn't necessarily say that that would be fair, because I'm sure, in certain areas across the organisation, there was urgency in terms of activity. What was lacking was an urgency to define the way in which the council should address these big issues that needed to be addressed, and that was, again, just my observations from the Gold meetings.
Q. Well, let's return back to your post-incident reflections, which is \{GOL00001301\}. We have touched upon some of these already, but I just want to deal with the remainder. You mentioned already this is what you noted down and emailed to yourself about a couple of weeks after the incident.

We see on the first example the one you just touched
upon, the donations which you first observed; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. The fifth line:
"CEO no system to address offers of support ..."
And you give an example where you suggest he should request acknowledgement.

We mentioned before lunch that there were emails internally between you and LRG regarding Nicholas Holgate being too busy to consider offers of support. Did that remain an issue?
A. I can't say. Others will have been more sighted than I was in terms of the actual offers coming in. I'm aware, for example, of the business sector panel making offers available.
Q. Sure.
A. So, yes, there were offers. But once the conversation was had at 5.30, then my focus moved more towards what we were going to do the next day and how we were going to ease into full sort of Local Authority Gold support.
Q. You make an observation here, which is implicitly a criticism, that there was no system in place to address offers of support. Perhaps if I could put it this way: what system would you expect someone in that situation to have in place to deal with offers of support?

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A. I would have expected there to have been a dedicated officer, perhaps within the BECC, borough emergency control centre, where every offer of support would have been channelled through. That's the way I would have done it. And then allow that officer or that role to then disseminate and -- but the key is not just pinging it out -- sorry for the technical term - - of, you know, sending it on to people; it 's about monitoring it, it 's about making sure actually that it is actioned, which is why, again, I was particularly keen to highlight to Nicholas the offer from Borough Market, who had sadly obviously had the terrorist incident only a few days before that, but they were still willing and wanting to provide whatever support they could, which I thought was admirable, and I thought that it was worthy of a response.

But this then also links to this sense that Nicholas didn't have sufficiently robust support around him to take some of the, for want of a better word, administrative burden away from him and allow him to do some of that strategic thinking which was required.
Q. He was too operational rather than strategic?
A. I think he was overwhelmed.
Q. Okay.

I want to deal with one of the other observations
you have made and you have touched upon already, underneath that:
"BECC failing with no situational awareness. No sitrep produced."

Again, when did you form the view that the BECC was failing, with no situational awareness?
A. I think that was after the -- we went straight from -I went straight from observing the Council Gold meeting, I think, at 10.00 into the SCG at 11.00 , and it was after the SCG that I made that point, and I think then overnight they were tasked with a situation report, so it materialised the next morning.
Q. You mentioned raising this with Tony Redpath; is that correct?
A. I believe so.
Q. What was his response when you raised the lack of situational awareness in the BECC?
A. I think he acknowledged that. I believe he acknowledged it, from my recollection.
Q. Whilst we have this document open, it's slightly out of sequence in terms of the timeline, but we see down at the bottom:
"Challenged director of housing over suggestion residents would be spending a further night in rest centre. See minutes to 16 th pm Gold meeting.

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Associated comments from Gold - it is adequate."
Can you assist with the circumstances where you challenged the director of housing over that suggestion?
A. What I can recall is that there was a suggestion that there may still be people, residents, members of the community, having to spend an additional night or the next - - that night in a rest centre, and I questioned whether more could be done. I can't recall the exact words, but I questioned as to whether more should be done to ensure that didn't happen.
Q. The last feature is this:
"Due to continuing concerns on grip, arranged conference call on evening at approx 5.30."

I'm going to ask you again -- we will read it out now:
"Mid call Nick left room to speak to someone outside."

In relation to that part, were you with Mr Holgate at the Town Hall during this teleconference?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. And this is something you noted, that during the teleconference with John Barradell and others, he left the room to speak to somebody outside?
A. That's right.
Q. Okay.

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A. And, sorry, if I may just --
Q. Yes.
A. -- contextualise that. I found it a little bit strange
    that he had the ear of Eleanor Kelly and John Barradell
    on the phone, they were talking to him about how he was
    coping and what additional support was required, and
    then Nicholas decided to leave the room and have
    a conversation with someone else outside, leaving us sat
    on the call. And I just didn't feel that that was
    showing (a) the right -- he wasn't necessarily
        prioritising in the right way, because that call was
        very important in my mind.
Q. Did you know who the person was or what the
        circumstances for -- the need for Mr Holgate to absent
        himself?
A. No, but, to be honest with you, it would have had to
        have been really, really important, as far as I was
        concerned, but there was no indication of what it
        related to.
Q. So you have mentioned this is an important call. Was it
    the case that it was your suggestion that this call
    should take place?
A. It was my suggestion to Nicholas Holgate that he needed
    additional support and that he should set up the call
    with John and Eleanor, John Barradell and Eleanor Kelly.
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    Q. Yes. Before this call, did you have contact with
    John Barradell so he was sighted as to the issues you
    experienced?
    A. Yes. Yes.
Q. What information did you relay to him, in broad form?
A. Just a general assessment, as described in my statement.
Q. A lack of situational awareness, lack of grip?
A. Common term, but yeah, a lack of grip. They just were
        not on top of it in a way which I would have expected
        and therefore needed help.
Q. You used the phrase "concerned" a number of times; what
        sort of gradient of concern had you at this stage, prior
        to the call on 15 June?
    A. Sufficient to suggest that that call was important.
Q. Did you advise Mr Barradell as to any suggested course
        before that call?
A. I can't recall, but I think, as I mentioned earlier,
    John Barradell and I saw things in a similar way and,
    therefore, I would expect him to know what was needed.
Q. This additional support, what did you envisage was going
    to occur or should occur at this stage?
A. Well, I think, prior to the call, the main aim was to
    get Nicholas to realise he needed help, you know, and
    I don't think he didn't appreciate that, but I think he
    needed that extra nudge to make it happen.
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[^0]A. I don't recall the details of that meeting, other than
A. Obviously I remember Nicholas leading. I remember there would have been a conversation around what support Nicholas required. But, like I say, the minutiae of the conversation, I don't recall.
Q. Can you assist with the length of the meeting?
A. I would suggest it was probably about 30 minutes.
Q. How about the mood of the meeting?
A. Supportive.
Q. How would you describe the approach of Mr Holgate at that stage? You're talking about how he needed to consider what help he needed, and he perhaps hadn't arrived at that view, that he needed assistance. Did that change during the meeting?
A. No, I think he was receptive. The fact that he was very happy to set up the meeting said to me that he was receptive to any support that was being made available to him.
Q. Do you recall whether there was any discussion regarding the actual activation of the London Gold resolution?
A. I don't - what I can comment on that is that my understanding as a result of that meeting was that John was - - John Barradell was going to go into RBKC the next morning to provide direct support and advice to

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Nicholas, read himself into the situation, understand the issues, the structures that were in place,
understand what the resourcing needs were likely to be, and then at some point, having been read in, the Local Authority Gold arrangements would be invoked, which would then have allowed John Barradell the ability to spend RBKC's money and commit resources on behalf of RBKC into the borough for RBKC to then manage.
Q. That view of the role of John Barradell, is that something which you recollect emerged after the meeting, or was this something you recollect emerged during the meeting?
A. It would have ... I would suggest it must have been discussed in terms of going in there the next day during the meeting.
Q. Is it fair to say that you can't be sure because of the passage of time and the absence of a note?
A. Very much so.
Q. John Hetherington in his statement recalls -- at paragraph 76 \{LFB00061158/24\}, just for the record -that on 15 June at 18.39, you discussed London Gold being activated the following day. Does that sound correct?
A. I think that matches with what I've just described.
Q. And he states that your discussion was subsequently
reflected in an email, and let's have a look at that email to aid your recollection, \{LFB00061236\}. Again, this may be one that the panel have seen already. 19.02. You're not a recipient of this email, but Mr Hetherington believes that this reflected your discussion:
"In light of the increasing complexity of the incident, the recent request for mutual aid from RBKC and a number of other factors, the decision has been taken to activate LLAG to own the incident and support directly RBKC.
"Current plan that as of tomorrow morning Paul Martin (Wandsworth) will go into RBKC to support LLAG and three other Chief Executives will be made available to support aspects of the response."

Was it the case that at this initial stage, at 7 o'clock on 15 June, John Barradell wasn't the person who was considered to be sent down to the Town Hall, but in fact it was a different chief executive, Paul Martin?
A. No, that's not correct. And if I may just add a comment about some of the language utilised within this email, where it talks about "taken to activate LLAG to own the incident", LLAG supports the incident; it's owned by the category 1 responder, the local authority, RBKC.

And in terms of was it -- I think if you look at the

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wording of John Hetherington's sentence starting
"Current plan that as of tomorrow Paul Martin ... will go in", go in to support LLAG, not to perform the role of LLAG.
Q. Okay, thank you for that clarification. Mr Hetherington has been asked already about this this morning, but I just wanted to see if you had anything to add, bearing in mind this was meant to reflect your conversation. So the evidence, drawing it together, your recollection at that meeting, or soon after, there was discussion regarding activation of London Gold. We see an email shortly after which reflects a discussion you had with John Hetherington. So on the evening of 15 June, it's fair to say that activation had been discussed and agreed; correct?
A. Agreed that it would happen.
Q. Yes.
A. I'm not party to any of the conversations around exactly when that would happen, other than I expected it the next day, hence the email as described. But I was also aware that mutual aid was already being facilitated, so that was an indication to me that support was starting to be generated for the benefit of RBKC. And I think also testament to that is the reference in that email about three other chief executives are being made
available to support. So conversations had already started as a result of that 5.30 call.
Q. Yes. Your answer predicts the next question, really, regarding whether there was a delay and if there was any impact of delay. So we know it was 2 o'clock the following day, Friday, 16 June, when it was formally activated, and do you know why that was, why there was that passage of time, if $I$ could put it neutrally, from the evening of 15 June to 2 o'clock on the Friday, 16 June, before formal activation?
A. No, I don't know as to why they waited until that point. I can comment on the 2 o'clock event, if that would help. But I think I've referenced previously this belief that RBKC hadn't quite worked out what support it required and, therefore, rather than just throw everything at it and it not to be right, it was important to genuinely understand what was required.

So I think the immediate need through the mutual aid request was for BECC staff, and I think additional support was then being sort of considered the next morning.
Q. Yes. Would you accept there's a tension here between forming an understanding of what help they needed and the urgent need to provide humanitarian assistance to those affected?

## A. Without doubt.

Q. And it's right to say that by the Thursday evening, there was extensive coverage in the media about how that was apparently failing; is that correct?
A. I, to be honest with you, didn't look at the media that evening. I was busy doing this. But I would imagine that was the case.
Q. In terms of forming the view of what assistance they may need, they had your expertise there for a day, actually, to identify that there were significant failings in a number of areas; isn't that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. So what benefit would there have been, bearing in mind you were there to assess and identify the need, waiting until the following day to 2 o'clock to formally activate LLAG?
A. As previously stated, I wasn't party to the discussions around exactly when that transfer would happen, and Nicholas Holgate and John Barradell are probably better placed to do so.
Q. Do you consider that that was, as it's been termed, a limbo period from the 15 th over to the 16 th, where the LLAG resources weren't fully utilised?
A. There was a $--I$ would suggest that the time spent between 5.30 and perhaps the Gold meeting the following

[^1]to have a genuine view of what extra resources they did require. I' $m$ not sure that that was delivered.
Q. Do you consider now that the London Gold resolution should have been formally activated at a sooner stage?
A. I think we would all probably have said it should have been invoked on the morning of the 14 th.
Q. Yes. But let's say a decision was made on the 15 th, as you discussed, at this meeting. Do you think it should have waited until the following day or should it have been done sooner?
A. I think it would have been very challenging for John Barradell to have taken a view in terms of what resourcing was required, how -- what level of support RBKC required, without actually going across and seeing it for himself.
Q. Notwithstanding -- and forgive me for probing you on this, but you mentioned a couple of times how you and John Barradell worked closely with each other, know each other, are of similar mind; you would have known, wouldn't you, what was going through his mind and the challenges that he faced? You could assist him, couldn't you?
A. I wouldn't question his decision to wait until the next morning and really read himself in.

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morning in RBKC would have been time well spent for them
Q. From that view close up and assisting John Barradell, how long did you think it took for London Gold to be able to effectively and adequately meet the humanitarian
difficulties in the surrounding households, what was your understanding of the role London Local Authority Gold held in relation to responsibility for, first, Grenfell Tower residents, but also those walkway residents?
A. I think, before I answer that question, it is worth just clarifying, if I may --
Q. Of course.
A. -- London Local Authority Gold is a co-ordination role, providing resources, assets, support to the affected borough for it to then deploy and co-ordinate and manage - - sorry, manage locally, and I think that's played out in terms of how the mutual aid agreement is designed. So an offering local authority places its resources, people, at the disposal of the affected borough.

The role that John Barradell moved into, in terms of being asked to lead the response, was a conversation between him and Nicholas at 2 o'clock on that -- on the 16th. The technical details in terms of under what authority John Barradell undertook that lead role for the response is something that you would need to ask Nicholas and John Barradell about, because, as I say, there is no legal basis upon which Local Authority Gold leads a response within a borough.

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So in terms of just clarifying that point, I think that, for me, was important to share.

In terms of what John did agree, in terms of whether it was the tower, whether it was the footprint, again,
I think that is a conversation that you would need to have with Nicholas and John.

But as far as I'm concerned, John's role was providing an effective response to those people directly affected by the incident.
Q. I' II move on, please --
A. Sorry, my apologies, I've referred to "people"; to the BSRs, the bereaved, survivors, residents affected by the incident, because, you know, that's worthy of remembering.
Q. Okay.

I'm going to move on, if that's okay, to just briefly touch upon an assessment of the humanitarian assistance response once led by London Gold from 16 June.

You were closely supporting, were you not, John Barradell over these coming days?

## needs of those affected by the fire?

A. As to -- my apologies, as to meeting the needs of those people affected, I think you would need to -- as to when that occurred, I think every individual, every BSR, will have their own views in terms of when their needs were actually met. What I would suggest is that by the Sunday, there were structures in place to ensure that there was -- an effective support could be mounted. So the Saturday, the 17th, a lot of time and effort was spent on creating, for want of a better word, an organisation from scratch. So this had never been done before. We needed to bring in the right expertise, the right people, to make sure that we could make the difference that was required. So then, I would suggest, by the Sunday, we were in a much stronger position to try and go out and put into place what was required.
Q. It's been described as a standing start, the sort of Grenfell fire response team had to make a standing start on the Friday and Saturday of that weekend.
A. Correct, and we were very fortunate that there was appropriate accommodation in Westminster, and although, you know, ideally we would have not had to leave the RBKC offices on the Friday evening, but as a result of the demo, et cetera, it was the prudent decision to make, but it did then lead to us locating in a far more

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suitable location, far more conducive to multi-agency collaboration and getting everybody in the one place to mount a concerted co-ordinated response.
Q. So it took time to put in the structures, because this hadn't been done before. The structures were in place by close of play, perhaps, on Sunday.
A. Yeah, I would -- I'd need to check my records, but yeah, around that time. During Sunday was when we started to break through the pressure of setting it up and actually start to really get into the meaningful work.
Q. Yes. And we know that there was a press statement on the evening of the Sunday with Eleanor Kelly and the British Red Cross.
A. Correct.
Q. Which probably symbolised the Grenfell fire response team starting in earnest, and then --
A. Well, it started -- sorry, I hope you don't mind?
Q. No.
A. There was -- we didn't stop and just set up, there were still actions being delivered through that -- through the Saturday and Sunday, but clearly the priority was to create the structure, because without the structure you don't have that co-ordinated, coherent approach.
Q. Does it follow that, for those reasons, it took a number of days to make a material difference to the response?
A. I couldn't say as to whether it was several days, because my focus - others may have a view. I don't have a view on that, because my focus was very much on getting the thing into a fit state to make a difference.
Q. Perhaps another way to express it is this: issues did continue for a number of days, didn't they, in relation to communication with those at hotels, the Westway, and similar issues?
A. Without doubt, and one of the key challenges was the lack of data, and so it was to some extent -- and not that I directly led on any of that work, but there was a significant challenge in terms of gathering the data and making sense of it.
Q. Again, it's probably obvious from your answer, but data is in relation to the identification of those who were affected?
A. Yes, yeah, where they'd been located, which hotels, things like that, things that were essential to mount an effective humanitarian response, and there was a lot of uncertainty in those first few days.
Q. Would you expect that, from your experience, to have that lack of data so many days after an incident?
A. No. I wouldn't - I would expect to have strong data three/four days after the event.
Q. I'm going to move on to the last part of our questions

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to you and your evidence. You remember we had three parts, and this is the post-Grenfell Tower fire reviews which took place. With your assistance, we're going to navigate through some of those and your updated EP2020 review, and perhaps cover some of the matters you have raised in your second and third statements.

So you have set out in your first statement a number of the post-fire reviews which took place in the London civil resilience framework since 2017, supplemented by your second statement in April 2022, and your third most recent statement provides some final thoughts, the one that you provided on Thursday, following a period, as you describe, of reflection --
A. Yes.
Q. - - and preparing to give evidence.

If perhaps we could open \{GOL00001346\}, please.
This is what we mentioned already, EP2020, "Emergency Planning into the 2020s, April 2018 - Refresh". That contains -- we're not going to go through them all --27 recommendations; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Is it right that, in preparing this refresh report, you also reviewed your original EP2020 report, drafted in October 2016?
A. Correct.

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Q. And that had }14\mathrm{ recommendations, and you also considered
    two post-fire reviews which we can see touched upon
    under "Background", and let's look at the first one. It
    says this:
            "On the 7th February the Local Authorities'
    Panel ... endorsed a high-level implementation plan
    designed to address }11\mathrm{ recommendations contained in the
    [I want to emphasise this] Independent Peer Challenge
    review conducted by Tom Riordan and Mary Ney between
    October 2017 and February 2018."
        If we could turn overleaf, please, page 2
    {GOL00001346/2}:
            "Tom and Mary noted that the Recommendations for
        Local Government Emergency Planning and Resilience for
        the 2020s (EP 2020) report contained a range of
        recommendations that are in the process of
        implementation and endorsed this improvement work. It
        then goes on to make further recommendations to build on
        EP2020 ..."
            Let's have a look at this document briefly,
        {GOL00000146}. So this is the independent peer
        challenge review, January 2018, you see at page 1, and
        perhaps we could turn over to page 2 {GOL00000146/2},
        please, and we'll just deal with the introduction:
            "This independent peer challenge was commissioned in
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    October 2017 [as we just heard] by the London Councils
    Leaders' Committee who wanted an independent view about
    the arrangements that underpin London Local Government's
    collaborative resilience work. The peer challenge had
    an agreed scope in light of the unprecedented challenges
    faced between March and September 2017."
            Pausing there, that was your point this morning,
        that it wasn't just the Grenfell Tower fire --
    A. That's right, correct.
Q. -- but there were a number of events in 2017.
A. Yes.
Q. I think we have heard Mr Adamson of the British
Red Cross describe it as a sort of watershed year in
terms of emergency planning. I'm not sure if you agree
with that term.
A. Unprecedented.
Q. Okay. Watershed and unprecedented.
If we look at the second paragraph:
"The focus of the work was fitness of the collective
response, not individual borough arrangements."
Perhaps we could turn over, please, to page 3
\{GOL00000146/3\}, and under "Findings", if we look at
paragraph 7, we can see the Grenfell Tower fire is in
there. I'm just going to deal with four lines from the
bottom:
"The peer review team heard from several
stakeholders that the Grenfell Tower Fire had undermined confidence in vital elements of London Local
Government's collective resilience arrangements. Many of the recommendations are intended to address these issues and help restore confidence."

Is that right? Is that a fair summary?
A. I think it is, yes.
Q. So this was the first of two reports which you considered. Let's turn to the second one, which is called "Assurance framework review", \{GOL00001596\}.
"Providing individual and collective assurance", and that's Sean Ruth, February 2018.

If we could turn to page 2 \{GOLO0001596/2\}, please, and look at the circumstances. Again, executive summary:
"This review was commissioned by the City of London Corporation on behalf of the Local Authorities' Panel in January 2018. The objective of the review is to recommend the means by which London local government ... can individually and collectively assure their organisations' preparedness, particularly their capacity and capability, through a credible, transparent,
efficient and cost-effective approach."
Is that right?

## A. Correct.

Q. If we could have a look at page 3 \{GOL00001596/3\}, please, and the third paragraph, which may chime with something you say in one of your later statements. This was in the 2018 report:
"There was a widespread view that there is limited involvement in Emergency Planning and Resilience ... across most organisations, with most of the responsibility resting with emergency planning teams and Chief Executives. This review looks at the challenge of embedding a culture of emergency planning and resilience across an organisation in a way that reflects the health and safety culture - it becomes everyone's business ..."

So in relation to that, this was mentioned in 2018, do you consider that is still a current issue?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Could we also go to page 14 \{GOL00001596/14\}, please, and paragraph 3.12. It talks about the statutory duties in relation to planning and recovery, and I want to just read out this aspect four lines down:
"On more than one occasion 'Recovery' was described as the Cinderella of emergency planning with a view this was replicated across the country. There is little evidence to suggest the same level of attention is being paid to the 'Recovery' phase of an emergency incident as
Q. That's one of the phrases you use in your third statement \{GOLO0001847/2\}, which is, "Embedding the statement $\{$ GOLO0001847/2\}, which is, "Embedding
philosophy of ' resilience is everybody's business'". You consider that to be a key feature moving forward; is that correct?
A. I do, and a lot of work has been done to engage with various professional networks, directors of comms,
directors of housing, to really embed that philosophy various professional networks, directors of comms,
directors of housing, to really embed that philosophy that they should be taking far more ownership of areas which best sit with them.
MR KEATING: I'm going to move on to a number of areas - five areas, in fact -- which are recommendations and matters of discussion in EP2020: we're going to deal with standards, we have MSLs, minimum standards for London, we'll move on to resilience standards for London
it is to preparedness and response, despite this being
the lead role of local authorities, the long-term impact
this will have on people and businesses in the local community and the potential risk to the credibility and reputation of a local authority."

Again, this was three years ago in 2018, and now four years ago. Do you agree with the description here that recovery is the Cinderella of emergency planning?
A. Recovery is fundamental to local authorities restoring, recovering, allowing the community, the area, to recover following a large-scale emergency, and it is a local authority lead responsibility .
Q. Yes. I think we understand what recovery is, but do you agree with the description which is set out in this report, that it's down as the Cinderella, that it 's not given the same level of attention as paid to the other phases?
A. I would suggest yes, then.
Q. As we have touched upon already, from the consideration of these two reports and your previous reports, EP2020, you considered and consolidated these into your EP2020 refresh; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. So with all this work that you were undertaking in your report, what did you consider the most important area,

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perhaps, that needed to be changed or attention needed to be put on?
A. I think the most important area was linked to the comment about it being everybody's business. It was about moving away from this reliance of the selected few to organisation ownership, and the role -- sorry, and elements of resilience, emergency planning, being overseen and driven by the relevant departments, the experts within those departments, rather than it all resting with emergency planners.
in a moment; the review of the Gold resolution;
community resilience; learnings from previous
humanitarian responses; and training. So we're going to
touch upon those and draw a few threads together.
Before I do so, the first one is resilience
standards for London, and perhaps, Mr Chairman, that may be a moment for a natural break.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, I assume that that's going to take you a little while to deal with those; is that right?
MR KEATING: Yes.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Then I think it would be sensible to
have a break now, wouldn't it?
MR KEATING: Thank you.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, Mr Sawyer, I think it's time
we had a short break. We'll stop now. We'll come back,
please, at 3.30, and then we'll carry on then.
While you're out, please don't talk to anyone about your evidence. All right?
THE WITNESS: No, of course, thank you.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.

## (Pause)

Thank you very much.
MR KEATING: Thank you.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: 3.30, please. Thank you.
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(3.15 pm)
    (A short break)
(3.30 pm)
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, Mr Sawyer, ready to carry on?
THE WITNESS: Very much so.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK:Good, thank you very much.
    Yes, Mr Keating.
MR KEATING: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
            Welcome back, Mr Sawyer.
            We're just going to deal with one of the first areas
    which flowed from your EP2020 refresh report, and we
    have that right in front of us now {GOL00001346/2}, and
    if we can see recommendation 2, which is this:
            "All London Local Authorities adopt the assurance
    framework recommended in the Sean Ruth Review 2018 and
    commit to credible selfassessment locally led by chief
    executives and overseen by Members which focuses on
    capacity and capability and organisational commitment to
    the resilience agenda. This local assurance is
    supported by sub-regional peer challenge and external
    independent peer review."
            So that was one of your core recommendations; isn't
        that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And that's to be overseen by the local authority panel,
```it may not be, it may be a bit difficult to do so - - buthow did the resilience standards for London differ orare an improvement on the minimum standards for London?
A. Both in content and approach. In terms of content, it took 11 key thematic areas, and focused on core areas of resilience which local authorities, organisationally wide, should apply. So it wasn't very much -- it wasn't solely focused on potentially the role of emergency planners. The resilience standards for London now focus on the responsibilities of organisations as a whole.

In terms of approach, we've talked about minimum standards for London having an element of sub-regional peer challenge. That was very light touch, and it was emergency planners peer reviewing emergency planners. It didn't quite work, from my perspective. So this now applies a three-layered approach, with the LGA currently providing that external independent, impartial -- sorry,
same word -- independent peer challenge, which adds a more robust layer of sort of the process.
Q. So three layers. Let's remind everyone, what's layer 1 and layer 2?
A. Layer 1 is the local self-assessment.
Q. Yes.
A. Layer 2 is sub-regional good practice workshops. So that's not necessarily a review of every standard in detail, but what it is, is an opportunity for boroughs to learn from other boroughs, again linking to some of the emphasis behind the original minimum standards for London, which was around identifying common trends, issues that need to be addressed. And, as I say, the third component is that LGA peer challenge part of the process.
Q. LGA being Local Government Association?
A. Yes, my apologies, yes.
Q. I would like us just to explore that theme of peer challenge as a theme.

Perhaps we could look at your third statement \{GOL00001847/2\}, please, paragraph 9. So this is what you've written down in terms of areas.

If you just scroll up for a moment, please, so we see paragraph 6 , we touched upon that already:
"Embedding the philosophy of 'resilience is
everybody's business'."
That was one of the key factors you mentioned, and let 's move to another one of the key factors, which is in bold at paragraph 9:
"Establishing an assurance process that is mandatory and enforceable."

\section*{Let's read paragraph 10, please:}
"I believe the Resilience Standards for London... provide the means by which all London local authorities can effectively assess preparedness across the organisation."

We see there your views as to its being utilised.
"If the approach is adopted by individual local authorities and applied as designed, it will allow:
". senior officers and local politicians to maintain effective oversight;
"...
"... appropriate levels of transparency for communities to be sighted on preparedness ..."

I'm summarising because we have it in front of us.
A. Yes.
Q. Perhaps more selective reading rather than summarising. But this is the part I would like your assistance upon:
"To date, I believe there are varying levels of senior level commitments to RSLs [resilience standards

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for London] and the Local Authority Panel ... which oversaw the development of them does not have the authority to insist that boroughs adopt the full approach. Currently signing up to the [Local Government Association] facilitated peer challenges is optional and [the local authorities panel] does not have the means of establishing a robust rolling programme to ensure all 32 local authorities and the City of London ... undergo external challenge. A solution is required to ensure individual and collective strengths and weaknesses in local authority resilience arrangements are genuinely understood, shared and addressed."

Big paragraph. A lot of information in there.
How many local authorities to date have not signed up to the Local Government Association facilitated peer challenge?
A. I believe currently three have undergone the process as part of the pilot process -- the pilot review, and -- as part of the pilot process. But, to date, I'm not aware of any other local authority asking to be peer reviewed -- peer challenged, I should say.
Q. Three out of 33 have asked and participated in the peer challenge?
A. Yeah. It's worth contextually appreciating that the process was paused during COVID.
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Q. Yes
A. And so it is expected that reinstating the process will
start this year. My point is that whilst it remains
optional, there is a risk that some local authorities
won't necessarily buy into the full process and apply it
as intended.
Q. The first line of this paragraph is your belief, as you
set out in your statement, something which you
volunteered to the Inquiry late last week. You believe
that there are "varying levels of senior level
commitment to RSLs and the Local Authorities Panel"; is
that the position?
A. Some of that view is based on some anecdotal evidence.
Q. Yes.
A. Some evidence to suggest that the standards, the
self -assessments, are being completed by emergency
planning teams as compared to being overseen and worked
on by senior officers. So it's flagging a risk in the
process and system that through -- more effective and
enforceable management of the process would address.
Q. How could that be achieved? You talk about a solution
is required and you mention something which is more
effective and enforceable management of the process. If
you had a magic wand, how would you achieve that?
A. If I knew how to achieve that, I would probably have
included it in the statement. Apologies to be flippant. But it would require some either government-led policy included in some level of legislation, perhaps. What I've done by recording this is just highlighting to me the risk that remains whilst this is an optional process.
Q. So optional process, and the local authorities panel don't have the power to enforce this.
A. Exactly.
Q. So it's dependent, as we heard already, as was in relation to MSLs, on the individual local authority adherence and commitment to resilience; isn't that correct?
A. Yeah, and -- yeah, at the right level.
Q. Let's move on to central government. You have talked about government involvement.
Is it correct that central government do not have a formal role in the assessment or inspection of emergency planning and resilience at a local level?
A. That is -- not of local authorities, no.
Q. No, so they don't participate in any local assurance framework?
A. No.
Q. I wonder if we could go back to the assurance framework review by Sean Ruth, please, $\{$ GOL00001596/16\}, please.
Q. The first line of this paragraph is your belief, as you
A. Some of that view is based on some anecdotal evidence.
Q. Yes.
A. Some evidence to suggest that the standards, the self assessments, a being completed by emergency on by senior officers. So it's flagging a risk in the process and system that through -- more effective and enforceable management of the process would address.
Q. How could that be achieved? You talk about a solution effective and enforceable management of the process. If you had a magic wand, how would you achieve that?
A. If I knew how to achieve that, I would probably have

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\section*{A. No, no.}
Q. I'm going to continue from paragraph 59:
"... a national public sector body such as the Local Government Association [which you touched upon a few moments ago] ... a private sector organisation such as one of the 'big 4' accounting firms and a subject matter expert [SME] commissioned specifically for the work."

Then we've paragraph 60:
"One of the options discussed was the CCS matching peers from across the [LRF] system to a London Borough for peer review purposes. This option was not explored further due to other priorities within CCS."

Do you know why that was, what the other priorities were - -
A. No.
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Q. -- as alluded to here?
Q. -- as alluded to here?
A. No. Again, I wasn't party to those conversations.
Q. Although I'm reading from your statement.
A. Yes.
Q. You're summarising what the position is, but you're not able to assist with what underpins that information?
A. No, and provided in the spirit of sharing as much as I could.
Q. Yes.
"It was also understood that consideration was being given to adopting this process for the national standards too."
So against that background, you then say this, bottom of paragraph 62:
"There is however merit in the Government further considering its role and the value of assembling an independent peer review team as this would connect the emergency planning and resilience work being undertaken at national, regional, and local level."
So this is your second statement. We perhaps may have fast forwarded to your third statement already, and it's a similar topic, but in relation to that last matter, what's your view about what could be done to connect emergency planning at national, regional and local level?

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A. I would suggest that further conversations on the proposal as detailed there in terms of the viability of that, et cetera, I think would be an effective way of linking national through to local.

I think aligning the approach that we apply in London via the LGA, which is a national organisation, to approaches across the rest of the country, because, you know, it's fair to say that London has its unique ways of working, but actually there's lots of learning and lots of sharing to be done across the country as well, so that's another way of addressing that.

But I think what we were keen to do - - sorry, what I was keen to do was get the current approach re-established, get full buy-in from all 33 to that approach, assess the value that that approach applies, the success, for want of a better word, and then determine as to whether there's any further work to be done on aligning it nationally. It's a work in progress.
Q. Currently, do you think that there is this connection between local, regional and national resilience?
A. In terms of assurance?
Q. Yes.
A. Yeah. I think there's the two layers of assurance currently applied, or several layers. One is the layer
in which LRFs and the multi-agency aspect is assessed
via the national approach, and we obviously have our sector-specific local authority approach.
Q. Yes.
A. It 's something that I'm not -- don't have sufficient detail to be able to provide any further sort of comment on that at this point.
Q. Okay.

Well, I'm going to move on to the second area, which is review of the Gold resolution and addendum. That's something which was identified in your EP2020 refresh report under the heading "Governance", recommendation 8. It was recommended that there should be a review and consider options to make triggers and escalation process clearer. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. If we could turn to \(\{G O L 00000146 / 14\}\), please, this is something in the independent peer challenge,
paragraph 20h. Four lines down, it says this:
"... there is also a need for greater clarity about the different roles of the Borough Gold, LLAG and the Chair of LAP in the context of the Gold Resolution, including extending this clarity to handling the communications and the media and to the handover from response to recovery. The peer challenge identified an

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appetite to quickly strengthen the current Gold
Resolution to increase the leverage of LLAG, through the LAP Chair, and to provide a more proactive and speedy response in exceptional circumstances, for example, when a borough needs help but does not request it."

Is that right? That was the sort of context which was highlighted in the independent peer challenge report --
A. Correct.
Q. - - which flowed into the recommendation you made in your report.
A. Yes.
Q. A latter progress report -- which, again, I don't think we need to look at -- what happened was, in relation to your EP2020, there was an implementation report which was completed and a progress report which was provided to London Councils, and one of those was provided in July 2019. In that, there's reference that, after legal advice, it was not possible, in simple terms, to activate the Gold resolution without the consent of the local authority in question; is that correct?
A. Yes, correct.
Q. So in very simple terms, John Barradell couldn't have stepped in of his own volition and took control.
A. Going back to my comment this morning, no legal basis
upon which to intervene.
Q. That all concerns the interpretation of the statutory powers under section 138 of the Local Government Act 1972.
A. Yes.
Q. So, in light of that advice received, is it the position that the local authority panel developed guidance in August 2018 for chief executives - -
A. Correct.
Q. - - in relation to the Gold resolution and its activation?
A. Yes.
Q. It may be obvious, what was the purpose of this guidance?
A. It was to clarify how the Gold arrangements are activated and applied, and the breadth of the responsibility
Q. In your view, do you consider that that guidance addresses the concerns raised in the peer challenge review?
A. I think it strengthens understanding, and if we have stronger understanding, it's more likely that the misunderstandings that potentially occurred in the early stages of the Grenfell response won't occur again.
Q. Let's have a look at your second statement in relation

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to this, \(\{\) GOL00001839/2\}, paragraph 10, please. This really just fleshes out your view that the guidance assists greater understanding. You mention at paragraph 10:
"Instruction on how the guidance should be applied is delivered in three ways ... shared with all chief executives as part of their induction into local authority regional resilience arrangements ..."

\section*{Correct?}
A. Correct.
Q. "... referenced in the more detailed London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) briefing session provided by London Resilience Group ... to chief executives ..."
A. Correct.
Q. "... and finally, incorporated into the pre-on call briefing [s] ..."

So something which is mentioned a lot for chief executives in the role as London Local Authority Gold.
A. Correct.
Q. It's also incorporated into London Local Authority Gold operating procedure, which is shared with all the chief executives.
A. Correct.
Q. Has that been improved in terms of the process as to activation, in your view?
A. The major shift is an increased emphasis on proactivity, and I think we've seen in incidents recently over the last couple of years where that proactivity has led to earlier conversations between Local Authority Gold and the affected borough's Gold, to assess whether additional support is required or not.
Q. You touch upon that in relation to more recent exercises and how it provides:
"... an opportunity to secure understanding about how the affected borough was addressing demands and proactively ensure the availability of wider support was understood by all and coordinated if required."
A. Correct, and by including it in the exercises, we're not only making sure the Local Authority Gold performing that role in the exercise fully understands it, but that knowledge is shared across other Golds from other boroughs.
Q. So more guidance, better understanding, more proactivity.
A. Yes.
Q. I'm going to turn on the Mayor of London, if I may, please.

In relation to the role of the Mayor of London in London Resilience, we've heard that his role is not operational, but it's to act as the voice of London; is

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that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. What is your view as to the suggestion which is made by the Mayor of London in their opening submissions to this module that there may be a need for the formal role of the Mayor of London in a civil emergency to be expanded in carefully defined circumstances to require the invocation of mutual aid and appropriate leadership arrangements? In other words, it seems to have some role in the activation of the Gold resolution.
A. I would suggest that that may well be legally challenging, to find a solution to that. But that said, I believe that by better defining the role of Local Authority Gold, by establishing that proactive approach to ensuring that we don't wait to be asked, we actually ask - the Local Authority Gold asks, "Do you need help, support?", by applying that more proactive approach, we will hopefully have addressed the concerns that arose during Grenfell.
Q. Let's look at your statement, please, second statement, page 6 \{GOL00001839/6\}, and you were asked this question at question 48. The question was:
"As part of the work undertaken in your EP2020 refresh report, what consideration has been given to the role of the Mayor of London?"

\section*{You say at paragraph 49:}
"I am not aware of any consideration being given to the role of the Mayor of London within the work undertaken to deliver the original EP2020 prospectus [that's the 2016] and the EP2020 refresh report, beyond that of delivering the 'Voice of London'."

Is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. If we could turn overleaf, please, to paragraph 50 \{GOL00001839/7\}:
"During the simplification process associated to the LLAG Operating Procedure ... it was determined not to include reference to the role of the Mayor. The Mayor's role is however included in the London Strategic Coordination Framework and incorporated into LLAG arrangements briefings to chief executives and relevant exercises."

Lastly to question 8 in this supplementary statement, you were asked:
"Has there been any requests and/or identified need to expand the Mayor's role from beyond being the 'voice of London' to an operational role?"

Requests in part of your work in the EP2020 refresh considerations of the two other reports, and your answer is at paragraph 52 :

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"I am not aware of any requests and/or identified need to expand the Mayor's role."

Is that the position?
A. Correct.
Q. In relation to an expanded role for the Mayor, is there anything else that you consider is necessary to add to that?
A. Not at this time.
Q. Training.

It was recommended in the EP2020 refresh report that all chief executives and their deputies attend periodical training events and participate in a structured exercise programme to prepare them to undertake LLAG duties. That's something which is, I believe, recommendation 20.

Was that recommendation made because there was an identified gap in training provided hitherto?
A. In relation to performing the role of Local Authority Gold, I think there was an identified need to ensure that training was delivered and that there was appropriate opportunities for exercising of that role, and on occasions exercising opportunities can be few and far between, so the question was: how can we improve that and ensure that all 33 local authorities undertook an appropriate level of training in that role?
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Q. In your view, was there a need to improve training for
chief executives for the LLAG role?
A. Yes, there was.
Q. In his evidence to the Inquiry, Nicholas Holgate stated
this, \{Day273/223:19\}:
"... I think that the ability to deal to the quality
that we would all want, our ability to address the needs
of the survivors, the bereaved and others after
a tragedy of this scale, would require an intensity and
an extent of preparation which to me in all probability
goes well beyond what was then expected even of
a compliant authority."
Do you consider that the training which was
available pre-June 2017 was sufficient to equip a chief
executive or a Council Gold to respond to an incident
such as Grenfell?
A. I think we need to delineate training in terms of the
Local Authority Gold role to training that should be
delivered to anybody performing the role of Gold --
Council Gold.
Q. Yes.
A. And I think, if you don't mind me saying, on the day of
the fire, Nicholas Holgate was performing the role of
Council Gold, not Local Authority Gold.
Q. Right.

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A. So the Local Authority Gold training builds on training that should be delivered locally.
Q. So there's two levels. The local authority is responsible for training its own, effectively.
A. Yes, very much so, and then the Gold -- the Local Authority Gold training places that knowledge, experience into a regional context, and that regional context is a co-ordination role, not a command and control role.
Q. So in your wider work, were you able to identify any deficits in terms of the training which was available at the local level, local authority level, in relation to Council Gold?
A. No. We never delved into that level of detail in terms of what was being delivered locally.
Q. I'm going to move on to community resilience, the fourth of \(-\quad I\) am coming to the end of the questions now, Mr Sawyer.

So in relation to community resilience and community engagement, again these were recommendations in your EP2020 report, 6 and 24, that boroughs, local authorities, recognise the importance of community resilience and have clear communication, engagement and liaison plans in place, with strong relationships across each sector that are well connected to emergency plans,
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and understands the impact of incidents on their & 1 \\
communities. & 2 \\
So I've combined probably two recommendations & 3 \\
together, but, in essence, in terms of community & 4 \\
resilience, was it the case that there was an identified & 5 \\
need for real improvements? & 6 \\
A. Yes. & 7 \\
Q. And that was, in part, as a result of Grenfell Tower, & 8 \\
isn't that correct, the need to improve community & 9 \\
resilience ? & 10 \\
A. Yes. & 11 \\
Q. Is it the case that the London Resilience Partnership & 12 \\
community steering group was set up as a result of the & 13 \\
work you recommended, and that's chaired by the chief & 14 \\
executive of London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham? & 15 \\
A. That's correct, it was chaired by that chief executive. & 16 \\
Q. And this London Resilience Partnership community & 17 \\
steering group was established in 2018 to provide & 18 \\
advice, guidance and support to other local authorities & 19 \\
in relation to this area; is that correct? & 20 \\
A. Correct. & 21 \\
Q. "Developing community resilience: a review", was & 22 \\
\hline a document prepared by that steering group in July 2019, & 23 \\
and that identified a number of principles, including & 24 \\
the "need to maintain deep respect, and value the role & 25
\end{tabular}

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of communities and community organisations"; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Something which you touch upon in your second statement, that the London Resilience Forum funded a community resilience co-ordinator, and you state at paragraph 28 \{GOL00001839/4\} that work is also likely to begin soon to build on community resilience activities and support local authorities and other stakeholders at local level.

So drawing it all together, in relation to that co-ordinator role, is that something which is still pending at this stage?
A. I'm not sighted on the status of that role. That is an LRF funded role that's being hosted by the GLA, Greater London Authority.
Q. At the time of your second statement, which was April 2022, it's classified as ongoing, rather than completed.
A. I haven't had an update on that role.
Q. So in relation to the matters you recommended in relation to community resilience and community engagement, do you consider those two features are sufficient to bring about the recommendations you identified in EP2020 refresh?
A. I think that the -- to genuinely support the community
to be more resilient, takes lots of activity at a very local level to make a difference. So the work of the steering group produced guidance -- it's a bit like we talked about previously, the role of LAP in terms of producing guidance and helping to provide tools for local authorities to implement locally. That was a similar motivation behind that guidance document, to then allow the various agency and allow local authorities to consider that guidance and look at what it meant in terms of applying it locally.

I think we also need to be mindful of the fact that there was the fantastic community effort both in Grenfell but also during COVID, the COVID response, and relationships between community, faith, voluntary sector and the funder sector was really reinforced during that period, and we're currently in a position whereby I believe London Funders, which is an umbrella organisation representing a significant number of community groups, et cetera, are leading on work to further strengthen those relationships, strengthen those networks, and again provide another conduit for supporting the conversation on community resilience via the GLA co-ordinator, all the way through to the local ward level activity within local authorities.

So as to whether those recommendations have been

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actually delivered, it's -- it has to continue to be work in progress, but it's just being discharged through a different route.
Q. In some respects it's an unfair question, because it's just a start, isn't it, in relation to what you've done?
A. Yes. Well, you' ll never complete community resilience in its entirety. It will always be a work in progress. It's just making sure that the right level of support is available to deliver it.
Q. Is it right that there is an interplay between community resilience and the resilience standards of London? That's something which there is a specific standard in relation to community engagement.
A. Yeah, and that documents quite clearly what good looks like.
Q. Finally in relation to this topic is whether you have any views as to the requirements under the CCA, Civil Contingencies Act, regulations, regulation 23, whether a category 1 responder -- where it says "must have regard to the activities of the voluntary organisations when carrying on their activities ", whether you consider that regulation framework is sufficient or whether there needs to be more in relation it that?
A. I think you can never downplay the important role of voluntary sector, faith sector, the community as
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    a whole, and I think there is -- anything that can be
    done to further reinforce the importance of that has to
    be considered. I don't have the answer, but I think it
    has to be reinforced, yes.
    Q. I'm going to move on to the fifth area, which is
learning from previous humanitarian responses.
So one of the recommendations recommended that the
local authorities panel commission a review of current
plans and exercising, so as to build on learnings from
the experience of humanitarian welfare response provided
to victims and survivors in 2017.
Can you assist in relation to progress of that?
What was the scope of this review of current plans and
exercising as part of that recommendation?
A. Is there a way you can put that up on screen, because --
Q. Yes, of course I can.
A. If you don't mind.
Q. If you could bring up, please, {GOL00001346/24}, and
just like magic, there it is. Thank you so much. So
it's recommendation 18.
A. Yeah, okay,
Q. Okay. I'll just give you a moment. It's quite a dense
paragraph:
"Building on learning from the experiences of the
humanitarian and welfare response in 2017 ..."

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A. Okay, fine, I can update you on that.
            As a result of this, the local authorities panel
    established a humanitarian assistance programme, which
    had input at a strategic level from the directors of
    adult social services within London, led by an emergency
    planning manager with experience of recent incidents
    affecting communities, and that programme contained
    a number of workstreams of which over the last two or
    three years work has been progressed, and I believe
    I provided an update to the Inquiry --
Q. Yes.
A. -- of the status of that programme.
Q. I can assist you in relation to that, and we can perhaps
    summarise it. So in relation to that humanitarian
    assistance programme you identified, that also developed
    policies and procedures for local authorities in
    providing wrap-around support to survivors. In relation
    to that wrap-around support, you mention that a draft
    version of guidance, the key worker support to people
    critically affected by emergencies guidance, has been
    approved by the local authority panel this February; is
    that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And you state in your statement, paragraph 5 of your
    second statement, that it will be further developed
through a robust pilot programme.
A. Correct.
Q. And that it stems from lessons learned from the Grenfell Tower.
A. Correct.
Q. So those lessons learned from the Grenfell Tower have been reflected in this draft guidance for wrap-around support for key workers.
A. Yes, and other pieces of work within that programme.
Q. It's nearly five years since events, and we have talked about reviews in 2017, 2018, and this draft guidance in February 2022. Pausing there, we obviously had COVID intervening in that period of time, but are you satisfied with the pace of delivery in relation to this guidance and these improvements?
A. No.
Q. No?
A. No.
Q. Why are you not satisfied with the pace of delivery?
A. I would have preferred them to be delivered much quicker.
Q. What's the barrier to bringing in improvements which are identified as part of your work earlier?
A. I believe local government doesn't often do things quickly, but that's not an excuse. I believe that it's

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an indication that a lot of these pieces of work are being progressed by -- not by people with a dedicated responsibility to that piece of work, so they have other -- they have their day job to deliver as well. So the prioritisation of work or establishing sufficient capacity in the system to enable these pieces of work to be delivered more quickly currently doesn't exist.
Q. And the solution is greater capacity and greater prioritisation?
A. Investment.
Q. In terms of, finally, wider observations, drawing together your work for the EP2020 refresh has resulted, as you have set upon in your statements, and we haven't gone through a lot of it, is various additional guidance documents have been produced to add to the London Resilience suite of documents. There has been a concept of operations, we have had the resilience standards for London, there's a civil resilience handbook, the a humanitarian assistance framework has been updated, the guidance we touched upon in relation to wrap-around support, the guidance we've touched upon in relation to chief executives and the activation of LLAG, and there's more guidance in relation to mutual aid and emergency planning teams which has been referred to in your statement.

Is there a danger that the field of resilience is
becoming saturated with too many plans and guidance documents?
A. Not necessarily saturated, because I can see a purpose for each of those documents. The challenge we have is that those documents are well known probably by -again, my favourite term today -- those selected few, and we need to find a way whereby that level of knowledge of those relevant plans, frameworks, is not just shared but actually maintained. So I think in my third statement I reference the challenge of conflicting priorities and officers dipping in and out of resilience.
Q. Yes.
A. So we need to find a way whereby that level of knowledge isn 't continually -- it's not even refreshed, they're told multiple times, because they hear, forget, come back, hear, forget, come back, so it's a cycle of continually -- repetition, as compared to -- we need to find a way whereby that is maintained.
Q. So for an individual who is not one of the select few but has some involvement or responsibility, they will be greeted, will they not be, with national guidance, in London there will be the regional guidance, and then at their local authority you're going to have the local

\section*{guidance and plans.}

Is there a danger that quite important messages may actually be lost due to the volume and density of the material?
A. Potentially, if you're expecting somebody to know it all, but I think what we need to do -- be is much more precise in terms of what someone needs to know to enable them to perform effectively, and then maintain that level of knowledge.
Q. And in terms of that maintaining the knowledge, you'd also accept that there also needs to be a sufficient number of trained staff in place to ensure that the knowledge and plans which flow from them are acted upon when the time arrives; isn't that correct?
A. Very much, the right people in the right roles with the right knowledge and in the right numbers.
Q. Perhaps we could bring up what you alluded to a moment ago in your last statement, please, paragraph 3, \{GOL00001847/1\}. Am I right that's what you were alluding to, "Professionalising the local authority approach to incident response"? You say this:
"Local authorities need to take their responsibility at being Category 1 responders more seriously and accept that the right people with the appropriate skills need to be identified and installed in the right numbers into
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response roles at every level. To support these
officers, the problem of 'dipping in and out of
interest' in resilience related matters and finding
other priorities which prevent full engagement, has to be formally addressed."

Is that the position?
A. I believe it is. I may have used slightly different terms in reference to finding other priorities. I think other priorities find them.
Q. Okay.

When you say it has to be formally addressed, what do you mean by formally addressed?
A. We need to -- if a solution can be found, then it should be found, and not just continue accepting: this is the way it works.
Q. Is mindset a factor here? Do you think organisationally the mindset has to change towards the importance of civil resilience?
A. Corporate ownership.
Q. Is it your view that local authorities currently still need to take responsibility in relation to being category 1 responders more seriously?
A. There are some local authorities who are better prepared than others.
Q. Can you say why they're better prepared than others?

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\section*{A. Probably greater corporate ownership. \\ MR KEATING: Okay.}

Mr Sawyer, I'm grateful for your patience and the patience of the panel. They're all the questions I have for you this afternoon.

Mr Chairman, with your leave, if we perhaps have a short pause to see if there's any questions.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
Well, Mr Sawyer, when counsel gets to the end of his questions, we have a short break, just to let him take stock, but also to allow an opportunity for other people who are following the proceedings from elsewhere to suggest questions.

So we'll break now. We'll come back at 4.25 , and at that point we'll see if there are any more questions we ought to ask you. All right?
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you go with the usher, please.
Thank you.

\section*{(Pause)}

We'll say 4.25. If you need more time, perhaps you
could just let the usher tell us.
MR KEATING: Thank you.
(4.17 pm)
(A short break)
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(4.25 pm)
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, Mr Sawyer, we'll see if there
are any more questions for you.
Yes, Mr Keating.
MR KEATING: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
One question which has arisen which perhaps you
could assist us with, Mr Sawyer, is this: we were
talking about resilience standards for London and we
were talking about the pilot scheme, the voluntary pilot
scheme, which is operated by the LGA, those independent
peer challenges.
In relation to that, you mentioned that three local
authorities so far have participated or asked to
participate in that. Can you assist whether RBKC was
one of those three local authorities?
A. No, they weren't one of those authorities.
Q. Okay, thank you.
Finally, Mr Sawyer, is this: in relation to your
evidence, is there anything else that you wanted to add
which may assist the Inquiry with its investigations?
A. Nothing extra to what I included in my third statement,
and other than that to say that, given this time again,
which I know we can't get back, I would have made less
of an assumption that Nicholas Holgate genuinely
understood what invoking the Gold arrangement meant, and
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that wouldn't have meant that he would have stepped aside to allow another chief executive to take over. I think, had I known that, even on the 14th, that may have been able to be addressed.
Okay, so that's really in terms of what I would do differently and what I think should happen.
I do have a personal statement, if I would be allowed to make that personal statement.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Is this the statement that I read on your third statement?
A. It is, and if I would be allowed to speak publicly to that and refer to my statement, I would be really grateful.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, all right. Thank you.
A. Thank you.
Just a little bit of context to why I wrote this statement, and I've thought very hard about it, which is why I want to refer to it, because I want to get this right.
In the evening, a warm evening in late July/early August 2017, I attended a meeting with the community in the law centre underneath the finger blocks, and quite innocently, at the end of a long meeting at the -- quite late in the evening, innocently said to the then chair of Grenfell United, "I hope my wife's going to be okay

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\section*{MR KEATING: Thank you, Mr Chairman.}
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could assist us with, Mr Sawyer, is this: we were talking about resilience standards for London and we scheme, which is operated by the LGA, those independent peer challenges.
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A. No, they weren't one of those authorities.
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A. Nothing extra to what I included in my third statement, and other than that to say that, given this time again, of an assumption that Nicholas Holgate genuinely understood what invoking the Gold arrangement meant, and

## SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.

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because I'm going to need her to pick me up from the station because I'm going to get home really late". Without an ounce of malice, he said to me, "Well, at least you have a home to go to". So that places into context for me what Grenfell means.

Now, what I have written here is that in July 2017 I was asked by John Barradell to contact members of Grenfell United and see if I could help them with direct discussions with RBKC and in any way possible. I obviously agreed to this, determined to provide support in any way possible.

Through this process, I met the most amazing people, who conducted themselves during a period of trauma, pain, anguish, sadness and frustration in the most dignified, compassionate and proud way possible. I was humbled by the experience and remain humbled by the experience.

One of the main things from this experience I will carry with me for the rest of my life is the hope that people never again have to endure the pain that these good people had to suffer. In any situation, whether it be day-to-day life or whether it be an emergency, people always must come first.

Thank you.

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MR KEATING: Well, Mr Sawyer, it just remains for me to say
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MR KEATING: Well, Mr Sawyer, it just remains for me to say
on behalf of the counsel team: thank you so much for
on behalf of the counsel team: thank you so much for
attending today and assisting the Inquiry in its
attending today and assisting the Inquiry in its
investigations and providing your evidence. Thank you.
investigations and providing your evidence. Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It's right that I should thank you
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It's right that I should thank you
as well, Mr Sawyer, on behalf of the panel. It's been
as well, Mr Sawyer, on behalf of the panel. It's been
very helpful for us to get your assistance in relation
very helpful for us to get your assistance in relation
to the workings of London Resilience. We have learned
to the workings of London Resilience. We have learned
a lot and we're very grateful to you. So thank you very
a lot and we're very grateful to you. So thank you very
much indeed.
much indeed.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And you're free to go.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And you're free to go.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
(The witness withdrew)
(The witness withdrew)
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, thank you very much,
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, thank you very much,
Mr Keating. That's it for the day.
Mr Keating. That's it for the day.
MR KEATING: Yes, it is, thank you.
MR KEATING: Yes, it is, thank you.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And we shall have another witness
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And we shall have another witness
tomorrow.
tomorrow.
MR KEATING: Yes, Mr Millett's back tomorrow with
MR KEATING: Yes, Mr Millett's back tomorrow with
Mr Barradell.
Mr Barradell.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right. Well, thank you very much.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right. Well, thank you very much.
We break there then. 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
We break there then. 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
MR KEATING: Thank you.

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MR KEATING: Thank you.
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SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
(4.31 pm)
    (The hearing adjourned until 10 am
        on Tuesday, 17 May 2022)
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P4


[^0]:    Q. Okay.

    In relation to this meeting, which took place,
    I think it was 5 o'clock, actually, on 15 June, no minutes or note of the meeting; is that correct?
    A. Correct.
    Q. Again, why was that? Why was there no note of this important meeting, as you described it?
    A. I think, in hindsight, it should have been recorded, but at the time $I$ treated it as a similar level of conversation to the previous day.
    Q. So you considered it a peer-to-peer --
    A. Yes.
    Q. -- informal --
    A. Yes.
    Q. -- conversation?
    A. Yes.
    Q. But actually, on your account, these are quite exceptional circumstances --
    A. Correct.
    Q. -- where you were sufficiently concerned to arrange a meeting, or suggest a meeting was called.
    A. Correct.
    Q. Can you recall whether Nicholas Holgate was given any advice during that meeting?

[^1]:    Q. Okay.

    I'm going to talk about that sort of post-activation period very briefly, if I may.

    What did you consider to be the main challenges post-activation in meeting the needs of those affected by the fire?
    A. Restoring trust and confidence, and making sure that the housing needs of everyone affected was met in the most effective way possible.
    Q. Perhaps we could have a look at paragraph 95 of your statement $\{$ GOL00001349/18\}, just to continue that answer. Thank you. Second line:
    "The challenge faced, however, was the scale in terms of number of residents who sadly lost their lives, the significant rehousing need, complexity such as the loss of the boilers supporting the Lancaster West estate creating a larger impact footprint, the local political dynamic and finally the community reaction which from the outset laid the blame on the [RBKC] and the [TMO]. These challenges will have made the response extremely difficult to coordinate from the outset."

    Does that reflect your evidence as to the challenges?
    A. Yes, it does.
    Q. In relation to the larger impact footprint caused by the

    1

