



GRENFELL TOWER INQUIRY RT

Day 282

May 23, 2022

Opus 2 - Official Court Reporters

Phone: 020 4515 2252

Email: transcripts@opus2.com

Website: <https://www.opus2.com>

Monday, 23 May 2022

1
2 (10.00 am)
3 (Proceedings delayed)
4 (10.08 am)
5 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to
6 today's hearing. We're going to begin today by hearing
7 evidence from a representative of the office of the
8 Mayor of London.
9 Yes, Ms Malhotra.
10 MS MALHOTRA: Good morning, Mr Chairman. Good morning,
11 members of the panel.
12 Could I please call Mr David Bellamy.
13 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you.
14 MR DAVID BELLAMY (affirmed)
15 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you very much. Now, please
16 sit down and make yourself comfortable.
17 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
18 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you.
19 Yes, Ms Malhotra, when you're ready, thank you.
20 Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY
21 MS MALHOTRA: Good morning, Mr Bellamy.
22 A. Good morning.
23 Q. Can I start by thanking you for attending today to give
24 your evidence to the Inquiry and for your assistance.
25 Just a few words by way of introduction, if I may.

1

1 Could I invite you, please, to keep your voice up so
2 that we can hear you clearly. It also helps not to nod
3 or shake but to say "Yes" or "No", because nods and
4 shakes don't get picked up on the transcript.
5 If any of my questions are unclear, please say so
6 and I will happily rephrase the question.
7 Lastly, if you feel you need a break at any time,
8 please do let us know. Is that all right?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. I'm going to turn to your statements next.
11 You made three statements to the Inquiry. They will
12 appear on the screen in front of you. Could I please
13 take you to them now.
14 Your first witness statement, {MOL00000025}. We can
15 see on the right—hand side it is dated 28 September
16 2018.
17 If we go to page 26 of your first statement, we can
18 see a signature there at the bottom; is that yours?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Could I take you to your second statement. That's
21 {MOL00000166}. On the right—hand side we can see it is
22 dated 28 June 2019.
23 Now, on page 2, we can see a signature there; is
24 that your signature?
25 A. Yes.

2

1 Q. Could I take you to your third statement. That's
2 {MOL00000180}. Again, on the right—hand side we can see
3 it is dated 19 February 2021.
4 There's a signature on page 10. Again, can you
5 confirm that that is yours?
6 A. It is.
7 Q. Have you had an opportunity to read each of your
8 statements recently?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Can you confirm that the contents are true to the best
11 of your knowledge?
12 A. There are two things that I wanted to mention.
13 One was that the exhibit to the first statement of
14 the strategic co—ordination protocol, the incorrect
15 version was submitted. I believe it was 6.5 when it
16 should have been 7.3, which was in force at the time.
17 The second thing was in the first statement at
18 para 62 and the third statement at para 24, I think the
19 implication could have been made that the K+C Foundation
20 was in some way part of the Royal Borough of Kensington
21 and Chelsea, and I don't believe that to be the case.
22 Q. Thank you for those clarifications.
23 Mr Bellamy, the focus of my questions today will be
24 the following four topics: firstly, your background,
25 role and responsibilities; secondly, the Greater London

3

1 Authority and its roles and responsibility; thirdly, the
2 role of the Mayor of London in civil emergency; and,
3 fourthly, your response and that of the Mayor of London
4 and the GLA in the immediate aftermath of the fire.
5 So turning first to your background, if I may.
6 You were at the time of the fire and still are
7 employed by the Greater London Authority; is that right?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. You have been employed by the Greater London Authority
10 since May 2016; is that correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Your role at the Greater London Authority is the Mayor
13 of London's chief of staff; is that correct?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. The Mayor of London was at the time of the fire and
16 remains today Sadiq Khan; is that so?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Your role as chief of staff means you are directly
19 responsible to the Mayor for the leadership of his
20 office, advisers and the co—ordination of his
21 administration; is that right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Would you agree, Mr Bellamy, that that puts you at the
24 heart of his administration?
25 A. Yes.

4

1 Q. You have served as the Mayor of London's chief of staff
 2 since he was elected the Mayor of London in May 2016; is
 3 that so?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. Before being appointed as chief of staff to the Mayor of
 6 London in 2016, did you have any experience in civil
 7 contingencies and emergency planning?
 8 A. So I would have had a very small amount of knowledge
 9 from some of the preparatory work which took place for
 10 the event of the Mayor being elected, but substantively,
 11 no.
 12 Q. Once you became the Mayor's chief of staff, did you
 13 receive trainings or briefings about civil
 14 contingencies?
 15 A. So there was the — there was a briefing book prepared
 16 for the incoming Mayor which had a couple of pages in it
 17 on resilience, and, as I just indicated, I saw a draft
 18 of that during the election campaign, and I had
 19 a session in the first week, I believe on the first
 20 Thursday, with the GLA's city operations lead, who
 21 served as our duty officer most of the time then, to
 22 take me through arrangements.
 23 Q. Thank you.
 24 I'd like to ask you next about the Greater London
 25 Authority and where it sits within the civil resilience

5

1 framework for London.
 2 Is it right the Greater London Authority is a body
 3 corporate that is established by statute, that's the
 4 Greater London Authority Act of 1999? Is that correct?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. The Greater London Authority is made up of the Mayor of
 7 London and the London Assembly; is that right?
 8 A. It is.
 9 Q. Is it the case that the Greater London Authority, the
 10 GLA as I'll refer to it, is the overarching body, and
 11 the role of the Mayor of London sits within it?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Is it right that the functions given to the Greater
 14 London Authority are exercised in one of three ways:
 15 first, by the Mayor of London on behalf of the GLA;
 16 secondly, by the London Assembly on behalf of the GLA;
 17 or by the Mayor and Assembly on behalf of the GLA?
 18 A. Yes, and there are schemes of delegation pertaining to
 19 the first two of those.
 20 Q. The Inquiry has heard evidence from Mr Hetherington, who
 21 is now the head of London Resilience, regarding
 22 category 1 and 2 responders. You also deal with this —
 23 we don't need to go to it — at paragraph 16 of your
 24 first statement {MOL00000025/5}.
 25 Category 1 responders, if I can just summarise it in

6

1 this way, are, for example, the emergency services and
 2 local authorities; category 2 responders include
 3 transport and utility companies, for example.
 4 Can you confirm if the Mayor of London is
 5 a category 1 responder?
 6 A. I think the Authority is, yes.
 7 Q. The Greater London Authority is a category 1 responder,
 8 and became a category 1 responder in 2011; is that
 9 right?
 10 A. I believe so.
 11 Q. For us to better understand how the Greater London
 12 Authority fits into the civil resilience framework, it
 13 might assist us if you can help us with the historical
 14 context.
 15 Is it the case that in 2002, following the 9/11
 16 attacks, the London Resilience team was formed?
 17 A. I believe so.
 18 Q. At that time, did it form part of the Government Office
 19 for London?
 20 A. Yes, that's my understanding.
 21 Q. The Government Office for London closed in 2010; is that
 22 right?
 23 A. I believe so.
 24 Q. This is when responsibility for resilience in London was
 25 devolved from the Government Office for London to the

7

1 Greater London Authority; is that right?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. In your first statement — I'd like to take you to it,
 4 that's {MOL00000025/6}, paragraph 24, and the final
 5 sentence there — you say:
 6 "The functions of LRT and responsibility for the LRF
 7 were then transferred to the GLA."
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Does it follow the GLA had oversight of these aspects of
 10 resilience in London?
 11 A. I think it follows that the GLA had its responsibilities
 12 as a category 1 responder, plus those set out in the
 13 statutory guidance.
 14 Q. Well, we'll come to what those functions were shortly.
 15 On 1 February 2015, the functions undertaken by the
 16 LRT, the London Resilience team, on behalf of the
 17 Greater London Authority were transferred, and they were
 18 transferred to the London Fire and Emergency Planning
 19 Authority, known as LFEPA; is that right?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. The London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority was
 22 also a category 1 responder; is that right?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. Employees of the London Resilience team were transferred
 25 from the GLA to LFEPA; is that the case?

8

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. And these employees merged with the LFB's own planning
 3 department, which, according to Hamish Cameron, who was
 4 one of the three heads of London Resilience at the time
 5 of the fire, was completed in 2016; is that your
 6 understanding?
 7 A. I think he was one of the deputy heads, but yes, I think
 8 there was a merger some time following the transfer.
 9 Q. Upon completion of the merge, the London Resilience
 10 Group, which we have heard about from Mr Hetherington,
 11 was formed; is that right?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Now, in your first statement — we have it in front of
 14 us — page 6 {MOL00000025/6}, paragraph 25, you say
 15 this:
 16 "Regulation 7(1) of the CCA [Civil Contingencies
 17 Act] Regulations provides that in order to facilitate
 18 cooperation under regulation 4, responders may enter
 19 into a protocol with each other. Regulation 8 provides
 20 that each general Category 1 responder may: (a) perform
 21 a duty under s.2(1) of CCA jointly with another
 22 responder, (b) make arrangements with another responder
 23 for that responder to perform such a duty on behalf of
 24 the general Category 1 responder."
 25 Is it your understanding that these regulations

9

1 provide the basis for the GLA's working arrangements?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. I'd like to look at those arrangements now, if I may.
 4 As it was at the time of the fire — I appreciate it
 5 has somewhat changed since — is it correct that the
 6 arrangement between the GLA and LFEPA was governed by
 7 a protocol?
 8 A. I'm not — I believe there was something in place. I'm
 9 struggling to remember whether it was a protocol or
 10 a memorandum of understanding. Obviously it was put
 11 into effect before my time.
 12 Q. Yes.
 13 A. But I know there's some document that governs it, yes.
 14 Q. Perhaps I could help you, Mr Bellamy.
 15 If we could go to {MOL00000042}, it is dated
 16 28 January 2015, and it is a protocol relating to the
 17 discharge of statutory resilience functions by the
 18 London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority on behalf
 19 of the Greater London Authority. We can see that.
 20 Could we go to page 4 {MOL00000042/4}, please. At
 21 (H) we can see the purpose of the protocol is set out,
 22 and it says this:
 23 "The purpose of this Protocol is to reflect the
 24 agreement reached by the Parties that the functions
 25 currently undertaken by the [London Resilience team] on

10

1 behalf of the GLA, comprising the LRF Secretariat role
 2 and other resilience functions set out in Schedule 1
 3 (the 'Specified Functions'), shall be carried out by the
 4 Fire Authority on the GLA's behalf. This is permitted
 5 by the CCR [Civil Contingencies Regulations] 4(5), 7 and
 6 8 as set out above. As a Category 1 responder itself,
 7 the Fire Authority has the necessary statutory powers to
 8 carry out the functions in question."
 9 Moving to schedule 1 on page 28 {MOL00000042/28},
 10 then, we can see the responsibilities that were
 11 transferred to LFEPA are listed here. I'm not going to
 12 go through all of them, or in fact any of them, but we
 13 can see at the bottom of the page there it says which of
 14 those functions remained with the GLA.
 15 If we can turn over the page {MOL00000042/29}, we
 16 can see there that these are the responsibilities that
 17 were retained by the Greater London Authority:
 18 "▪ Strategic oversight for resilience.
 19 "▪ Continuance as the home of London Resilience
 20 through the facilitation of key meetings on site at the
 21 GLA's City Hall, such as the London Resilience Forum and
 22 maintaining and improving as necessary the London
 23 Prepared website."
 24 Mr Bellamy, can you assist us, please, what is your
 25 understanding of strategic oversight for resilience

11

1 here?
 2 A. So, as I say, obviously this was before my time. What
 3 I interpret that as meaning was that although London
 4 Resilience team at LFEPA were carrying out these
 5 responsibilities for the GLA, it wasn't transferring the
 6 GLA's ultimate responsibility, as set out, you know, as
 7 a category 1 responder and as set out in the statutory
 8 guidance.
 9 Q. Can you assist us with whether the Greater London
 10 Authority have oversight of the London Resilience Group,
 11 the London Resilience Forum and the London Resilience
 12 Partnership that we have heard about?
 13 A. So the Authority is a member of the partnership, and
 14 thus a member of the forum. It obviously — the Mayor
 15 obviously appoints the chair of the resilience forum and
 16 so there's, you know, a potential relationship there.
 17 In terms of the London Resilience Group as now is,
 18 clearly they're carrying out responsibilities for LFEPA
 19 as was, the local authorities and the GLA, and,
 20 you know, there's certainly a relationship there between
 21 the GLA and London Resilience Group, given all those
 22 things.
 23 Q. So could I just clarify, then, by virtue of the
 24 responsibilities that we've seen, the strategic
 25 oversight role for resilience that the Greater London

12

1 Authority has, does that mean that the Greater London
 2 Authority has oversight of the London Resilience Forum?
 3 A. No, I don't think there's anything in statute that sets
 4 out — that gives us any greater responsibility than any
 5 other category 1 responder. You know, the guidance does
 6 say — it says for the time being that the Mayor is or
 7 appoints the chair of the forum, but I don't think
 8 there's actually anything in statute or guidance that
 9 gives the GLA some form of strategic oversight for all
 10 of resilience in London. It's very much a partnership
 11 matter.
 12 Q. So would it be wrong in that case, then, to suggest that
 13 the chair of the London Resilience Forum is the person
 14 who would have oversight of the work of the London
 15 Resilience Forum?
 16 A. So I think you would say they were probably the ultimate
 17 person. They have the programme board, I think it's
 18 called, where key members of the partnership would come
 19 together and agree and oversee the work programme, so
 20 having more focus, so I think I would possibly look to
 21 that programme board, but clearly the role of the
 22 chair's important.
 23 Q. Are you aware of any mechanism or ability of the Mayor
 24 of London or the GLA to scrutinise the work of the
 25 London Resilience Forum?

13

1 A. So I don't — at the time that this was introduced and,
 2 you know, 2016 when we came into office, I don't think
 3 there was any such mechanism. There is one now.
 4 Q. Can you tell us what that mechanism is, please?
 5 A. So as part of the changes we introduced at the GLA,
 6 I chair a corporate investment board which, you know,
 7 considers all the key decisions before the GLA before
 8 they're submitted to the Mayor, and we have formed
 9 a number of subcommittees of that board. One of those
 10 is a resilience committee, which is very much focused
 11 on, you know, the GLA's responsibilities under the CCA,
 12 associated guidance, et cetera, and as part of that, we
 13 work with John Hetherington, and the chair of the
 14 resilience forum, of course, now is the deputy mayor for
 15 fire and resilience, and so we have somebody in the GLA
 16 in a way we didn't back then who very clearly has a lead
 17 responsibility around resilience.
 18 Q. So just so I've understood it correctly, the way that
 19 the Mayor of London and the Greater London Authority
 20 have oversight of the work of the London Resilience
 21 Forum is through a board that has, since the fire, been
 22 created; is that right?
 23 A. Yes, and through, you know, the works of the
 24 deputy mayor.
 25 Q. Before moving on, then, Mr Bellamy, and for

14

1 completeness, we should point out that on 1 April 2018,
 2 after the fire, LFEPA was abolished and replaced by the
 3 London Fire Commissioner; is that right?
 4 A. That's correct.
 5 Q. Is it the case that the responsibilities of LFEPA then
 6 transferred to the London Fire Commissioner?
 7 A. It is.
 8 Q. Can we take it that, as a result of that change and
 9 replacement, it didn't result in any responsibility
 10 change on behalf of the Greater London Authority?
 11 A. Not as with regard to resilience. There were clearly
 12 other things for the Authority that changed as a result
 13 of that governance change.
 14 Q. Now, the Inquiry has heard evidence from Mr Hetherington
 15 regarding the structure of the London Resilience
 16 arrangements, the London Resilience Partnership, the
 17 Group and the London Resilience Forum and its subset
 18 structures, including sector panels. Would you agree
 19 that the structural arrangements are complex?
 20 A. I'm not sure I would, no.
 21 Q. Can you assist the Inquiry with who has responsibility
 22 for creating the structures that sit within the broad
 23 term "London Resilience", and by that I mean the London
 24 Resilience Group, the LRP, the London Resilience
 25 Partnership, and the London Resilience Forum?

15

1 A. It would be the London Resilience Forum, because the
 2 structures are there to — you know, their duty to
 3 co-operate and carry out their respective
 4 responsibilities under the Act and guidance.
 5 Q. Now, I would like to move on to the role of the Mayor of
 6 London and the Greater London Authority, and that is
 7 addressed in chapter 9 of the statutory guidance,
 8 Emergency Preparedness, which is dated March 2012.
 9 If we could go to {LFB00061171}, this is chapter 9
 10 of the statutory guidance, Emergency Preparedness.
 11 If we could go to page 11 {LFB00061171/11},
 12 paragraph 9.22, we can see here it gives us some
 13 indication as to what the role of the Mayor of London
 14 and the Greater London Authority is. It says:
 15 "As the elected leader of London's regional
 16 government, the Mayor of London plays a full part in
 17 supporting the effective implementation of the Act and
 18 improving the preparedness of the capital.
 19 "In particular, the Mayor/GLA:
 20 "■ is closely engaged in high-level discussions and
 21 decisions relating to the management of emergencies in
 22 London;
 23 "■ (or an appointed deputy) is currently Chair of
 24 the LRF;
 25 "■ contributes as necessary to the pre-informing of

16

1 Londoners about the content of emergency plans, the
 2 correct behaviour in an emergency and good practice in
 3 terms of preparedness in the home, as part of
 4 initiatives organised both locally and at the UK level;
 5 "■ prepares to play a key role in warning and
 6 informing the public during an emergency in London; and
 7 "■ takes responsibility for civil protection issues
 8 in connection with the management of Parliament and
 9 Trafalgar Squares."
 10 If we can go to the next page {LFB00061171/12}:
 11 "The GLA is a Category 1 responder under the Act and
 12 as such has the same responsibilities as other
 13 Category 1 responders. However, there are a number of
 14 duties that the GLA currently takes on in relation to
 15 London that are additional to other Category 1
 16 responders."
 17 Just pausing there for a moment before we go on to
 18 the next part. The statutory guidance doesn't list the
 19 Mayor of London as a category 1 responder, does it?
 20 A. It didn't — well, it says that the GLA is, and, as
 21 we've discussed, the Mayor of London is a part of the
 22 GLA and has essentially the executive responsibility
 23 there. So, for my purposes, the two would be
 24 synonymous.
 25 Q. It goes on at 9.25:

17

1 "In particular, the GLA:
 2 "■ is responsible for the secretariat of the LRF
 3 [London Resilience Forum];
 4 "■ is responsible for producing and maintaining
 5 a pan-London risk assessment; and publishing all or part
 6 of it in line with regulations; and
 7 "■ is responsible for the planning and exercising of
 8 pan-London emergency plans."
 9 I would like to move on to a document that you make
 10 reference to in your statement and you corrected this
 11 morning, it's the strategic co-ordination protocol.
 12 You mentioned this morning that in your statement
 13 you referred to version 6.5, but in fact there was
 14 a more up-to-date version that was in place at the time
 15 of the fire, and I'd like to take you to that. It's
 16 {RBK00036718}.
 17 This is version 7.3, we can see, and it's dated
 18 February 2017. Can you see that?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. I'd like to take you to page 25 {RBK00036718/25},
 21 please. If we could look at paragraph 2.8.9 first, it
 22 says there:
 23 "The Mayor of London and the Greater London
 24 Authority
 25 "2.8.9. In the event of any disruptive incident it

18

1 is likely that the Mayor's Office will require initial
 2 and regular information about the situation. This
 3 function will usually be carried out by the London
 4 Resilience Group in conjunction with the relevant lead
 5 response organisation(s), and by the Mayor's Press
 6 Office. In addition, the Mayor may obtain specific
 7 advice at a senior level through the Mayor's Advisory
 8 Group ..."
 9 It then goes on to say:
 10 "The Mayor will collaborate closely with the
 11 Strategic Coordinating Group, and where appropriate,
 12 central government. The Mayor may also be invited to
 13 attend meetings of COBR."
 14 Just pausing there for one moment, if I may, is the
 15 Mayor of London's attendance at a COBR meeting
 16 automatic?
 17 A. No, it's at the ultimate discretion of the Prime
 18 Minister, although I think the guidelines now in
 19 place — not necessarily at the time, but now in
 20 place — are — you know, recommend to the
 21 Prime Minister that that be the case.
 22 Q. What about ministerial meetings, as the type that
 23 occurred in response to the Grenfell Tower fire? Was it
 24 automatic that the Mayor of London would attend
 25 a meeting of that nature?

19

1 A. No, I mean, it's entirely a matter for the ministers
 2 convening the meeting.
 3 Q. Going back to 2.8.11:
 4 "The Mayor of London has a key response role as the
 5 'voice of London'. The role of the Mayor is to support
 6 the operational response to an emergency in London by
 7 providing a unified statement — a 'voice' for London.
 8 It will be the Mayor's role to provide regional
 9 information and reassurance throughout the duration of
 10 the response and into the initial stages of the recovery
 11 phase — this role is complementary to, and in support
 12 of, local responders and operational spokespeople."
 13 It then goes on to talk about how that occurs.
 14 Mr Bellamy, would you agree with me, firstly, that
 15 this term, the term "Mayor(sic) of London", didn't occur
 16 in the statutory guidance, Emergency Preparedness, that
 17 we looked at a moment earlier?
 18 A. I mean, as I say, it comes back to what we talked about
 19 earlier: the GLA is the corporate body, and then the
 20 Mayor of London is essentially the executive arm of the
 21 GLA, and so, you know, it's a clarification, this
 22 document, for people, that, you know, within the GLA, it
 23 would be the Mayor of London who is taking on these
 24 responsibilities, not the London Assembly.
 25 Q. Thank you. The question I was asking — I'll try it

20

1 again: the term "voice of London" that is used here in
 2 this strategic co-ordination protocol, it doesn't appear
 3 in the Emergency Preparedness document that we looked
 4 at, does it?
 5 A. Not directly, but I think there are, you know,
 6 responsibilities that the GLA has set out in that
 7 guidance that speak to it. But the term doesn't appear.
 8 Q. Can you help us with what your understanding of the term
 9 "voice of London" means?
 10 A. I think it's very much what it said there. It's —
 11 you know, it's speaking to Londoners and on behalf of
 12 London — of course, it ranges much more widely,
 13 national and international interest in these things —
 14 really to contextualise what is happening and give
 15 Londoners the information that they need to understand
 16 what has happened and how it might impact on them. You
 17 know, I should say, it is clearly distinct, as is said
 18 there, from communications from other responders that
 19 may be more tightly focused on the scene and those more
 20 directly impacted by the incident.
 21 Q. Does the Mayor of London or the GLA have an operational
 22 role in an emergency? What's your understanding?
 23 A. No, with the possible exception of if there were a major
 24 incident on GLA land. So obviously you saw in the
 25 statutory guidance the mentions of Trafalgar Square and

21

1 Parliament Square, which the GLA's responsible for. But
 2 in the general case, I would say no.
 3 Q. I'd like to move on, then, to events on 14 June, if
 4 I may.
 5 Your colleague Jon—Paul Graham was the duty officer
 6 that night; is that correct?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. At the time of the fire, he was the city operations and
 9 major — mayor events lead at the Greater London
 10 Authority; is that right?
 11 A. Major events lead.
 12 Q. Major events.
 13 In his statement — I'll take you to it, it's
 14 {GLA00000004} — we can see there at paragraph 4, he
 15 says this, at the end of the second line:
 16 "In this role I supported the Mayor, Chief of Staff
 17 and Mayoral Directors by providing high-level support
 18 and advice in relation to major incidents and rising
 19 tide/ civil contingency type scenarios. I also led the
 20 GLA's involvement in the strategic oversight and
 21 delivery of major and high impact events across London."
 22 Is that right?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. How experienced would you consider he was in relation to
 25 dealing with serious incidents and attending strategic

22

1 co-ordination group meetings at the time of the fire?
 2 A. It's hard for me to comment on his — on the level of
 3 experience he had as of May 2016 because, of course,
 4 I wasn't privy to it. I would say that, you know, he
 5 was experienced in attending strategic co-ordinating
 6 groups that occurred since then, and, you know, had good
 7 contacts around, you know, category 1 and category 2
 8 responders, particularly the GLA group, to support him
 9 carrying out that role.
 10 Q. He was first made aware of the fire at 3.09 by the then
 11 London Fire Commissioner; is that right?
 12 A. I believe so.
 13 Q. Both you and the Mayor of London were contacted by
 14 Ali Picton, head of the Mayor's private office, and you
 15 say in your statement that the Mayor was notified
 16 between 3.20 to 3.30.
 17 Can you recall what time you were notified?
 18 A. I believe it was 3.26.
 19 Q. That's very precise.
 20 A. It's a moment one doesn't forget.
 21 Q. Yes, I'm sure.
 22 Could I ask you next about the strategic
 23 co-ordination group protocol — well, I've asked you
 24 about the strategic co-ordination protocol; I'd like to
 25 ask you about the SCG meetings.

23

1 We can see here, if I could take you to
 2 {LFB00123769/7}, please, looking at this diagram at the
 3 top of the page — I'm not sure if we can zoom in,
 4 thank you. We can see here that the Greater London
 5 Authority, at about 10 o'clock on this diagram, is shown
 6 as part of the composition of an SCG; is that right?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. Now, the Greater London Authority had its own civil
 9 contingencies response plan at the time of the fire,
 10 didn't it?
 11 A. It did.
 12 Q. And I'm going to take you to that document now. It's
 13 {MOL000000040}. We can see there the full title is
 14 "Major incident and civil contingencies response
 15 protocol, Mayor of London's Gold Cell", and it's dated
 16 November 2016. I'm going to refer to it as the civil
 17 contingencies plan.
 18 If we can go to page 16 {MOL000000040/16}, please, it
 19 sets out there the role of the duty officer. It says:
 20 "The GLA duty GLA Gold Officer needs to be
 21 contactable at all times whilst on call."
 22 It then goes on to say that they need to:
 23 "Write down the information known at the time and
 24 establishing the reason that they are invoking the
 25 [Mayor's Gold Cell]."

24

1 Is that what that "MGC" stands for?
 2 A. I believe so.
 3 Q. Record the date and time of the notification, start
 4 recording details and actions taken and transfer of the
 5 MGC incident log, once available. It then goes on to
 6 give practical advice as to where meetings should take
 7 place.
 8 Is it also the role of the GLA duty officer to
 9 attend an SCG?
 10 A. That — yes, they normally would do that.
 11 Q. Is it right that Mr Graham attended the first three
 12 meetings on 14 June, followed by Emma Strain, who was
 13 the assistant director of external relations at the
 14 Greater London Authority. She attended all other SCGs
 15 during 14 to 20 June, save for the 18th, which you
 16 yourself attended; is that right?
 17 A. That's right, yes.
 18 Q. I'd like to ask you next about the Mayor's Gold Group,
 19 if I may.
 20 If we can go to page 12 on this document
 21 {MOL00000040/12}, we can see here at paragraph 4, I'd
 22 like to take you to the second paragraph of that,
 23 because it tells us what the MGC is. It says it's:
 24 "... designed to ensure that the Mayor is well
 25 informed about any major incident or rising—tide

25

1 situation in London and so allow him to effectively
 2 carry out his role until acting as the spokesperson for
 3 the capital as well as providing civic leadership and
 4 reassurance. It will also support them in fulfilling
 5 the other responsibilities of the Office of
 6 Mayor of London during a crisis, e.g. establishing
 7 a Disaster Appeal Fund."
 8 And then goes on to set out at appendix A who the
 9 members of the Gold Cell are.
 10 If we could go over the next page to page 13
 11 {MOL00000040/13} and look at paragraph 4.2, it tell us
 12 when the Mayor's Gold Cell will be activated. It would:
 13 "... normally be invoked once a major incident has
 14 been declared by an emergency service in London.
 15 Alternatively, there may be occasions where the MGC is
 16 activated in response to a rising—tide event such as
 17 a flu pandemic, severe weather warning, impending
 18 widespread industrial action or anticipated public
 19 disorder."
 20 Finally, if we can go to page 19, please, of this
 21 document {MOL00000040/19}, we can see here who the
 22 permanent members of the Mayor's Gold Cell are. We can
 23 see that you are listed as chair, Mr Graham is listed,
 24 as is Ms Strain. Is that right?
 25 A. Yes.

26

1 Q. The Mayor's Gold Cell was activated in the early hours
 2 of the morning by Mr Graham; is that correct?
 3 A. It is.
 4 Q. Now, there are a number of passages, next, of
 5 Mr Graham's witness statement I would like to take you
 6 to, starting with page 7. So that's {GLA00000004/7},
 7 paragraph 35, please.
 8 He says the following about the 14 June 6.30 SCG:
 9 "I recall the Royal Borough of Kensington and
 10 Chelsea ('RBKC') provided an update during the meeting
 11 stating they were in the process of consolidating
 12 rest centres into one centre. RBKC also said that their
 13 Gold group would be meeting at 11:00. I was very
 14 shocked to hear that RBKC had not already held
 15 a Gold Group and were not planning to do so for another
 16 four and a half hours. RBKC were the responsible local
 17 authority dealing with a very serious incident which
 18 clearly required a strategic response from its senior
 19 management."
 20 He goes on in the next paragraph, paragraph 36, to
 21 say this:
 22 "The fact that the RBKC Gold Group was not scheduled
 23 until 11:00 made me consider they were not necessarily
 24 coping with the demands of the incident even at this
 25 early stage. I felt that on one hand RBKC were giving

27

1 the impression that they were in control of the
 2 situation e.g. referring to arrangements for rest
 3 centres, but on the other hand the timing of their first
 4 Gold group meeting suggested a lack of any strategic
 5 direction at RBKC."
 6 Now, Mr Bellamy, was this information relayed to
 7 you?
 8 A. I don't recall whether it was included in the update
 9 from the SCG meeting. I never had the chance, really,
 10 to have much more discussion with Mr Graham beyond that
 11 point because, as you know, he found out his mother died
 12 and so obviously came off duty.
 13 Q. He went off duty at 10 o'clock that morning; is that
 14 right?
 15 A. Around then, yes.
 16 Q. If these concerns had been relayed to you, do you think
 17 there was something that you might have done in response
 18 to it?
 19 A. It's hard to say. You know, would I definitely have
 20 done something? I don't think I can say I definitely
 21 would have. It certainly would be, you know, a piece of
 22 intelligence that — you know, and situational awareness
 23 that would help me to understand the picture and that
 24 perhaps not everything was going as it should be.
 25 Q. Well, let's see if we can help at all.

28

1 At paragraph 39 of Mr Graham's statement
 2 {GLA00000004/8} that we have in front of us still, we
 3 can see at the end of the second line:
 4 "I do not recall raising my concerns with RBKC's
 5 timings for its first Gold Cell meeting as I was focused
 6 on relaying updates from the SCG meeting and organising
 7 what the Mayor needed to do that morning."
 8 So we know that's what Mr Graham's position is, that
 9 he can't recall at the time he provided this statement
 10 whether he relayed that information or not, and I'd just
 11 like to explore this with you, Mr Bellamy, if I may.
 12 We know, because you say so in your statement and
 13 you've provided us with documentation to support that,
 14 that the Mayor's Gold Cell meeting was held at 8 o'clock
 15 on 14 June; is that right?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. I'd like to take you to {MOL00000009}, please. We can
 18 see here that these are actions from the Gold Cell
 19 meeting. At the top of the page, it tells us who was
 20 present, and we can see that you chaired that meeting,
 21 and that Mr Graham also attended that meeting; is that
 22 right?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. Was the meeting convened especially for the
 25 Grenfell Tower fire?

29

1 A. It was.
 2 Q. Were any concerns about the local authority expressed at
 3 this meeting by anyone?
 4 A. I don't recall that — that meeting.
 5 Q. Do you consider that if anyone present had formed
 6 concerns about the local authority at this early stage,
 7 this would have been an appropriate forum for raising
 8 it?
 9 A. I would, with the qualification that, given the scale of
 10 the incident, and we're at a very early stage, one
 11 wouldn't necessarily expect, you know, everything about
 12 the local authority's performance to be perfect, and so,
 13 again, you know, colleagues would be trying to form,
 14 you know, overall situational awareness, and I guess see
 15 whether there was anything in that context that gave
 16 them concern.
 17 Q. On one interpretation, Mr Bellamy, this could be
 18 a missed opportunity; would you agree with that?
 19 A. It would be a missed opportunity if — yes, if —
 20 you know, if you took the RBKC decision not to have
 21 a Gold Group until 11.00 as a major indicator of their
 22 problems.
 23 Q. It's also a fact, isn't it, that these concerns of
 24 Mr Graham that he expresses in his statement are not
 25 recorded contemporaneously in a meeting or a note, are

30

1 they?
 2 A. So there's — I mean, he would have taken a note of the
 3 SCG and I believe that would have been circulated by
 4 email. You know, you've got in front of us the only
 5 record we have of the Gold Cell meeting.
 6 Q. Just going back to the civil contingencies protocol for
 7 one moment, if we may, that's {MOL00000040/16}. We have
 8 looked at it already. We can see here the
 9 responsibilities of the GLA Gold officer. It's the
 10 first bullet point. We can see:
 11 "Write down the information known at the time and
 12 establishing the reason that they are invoking the MGC.
 13 Record the date and time of the notification."
 14 And the second bullet point:
 15 "Start recording details and actions taken and
 16 transfer to the MGC Incident Log once available."
 17 Mr Graham compiled a note between 4.30 and 10.00 am
 18 which we can see here. That's {MOL00000039}. This is
 19 the note that he prepared setting out the information
 20 that he was receiving.
 21 If we can scroll through it, I hope you can accept
 22 from me, Mr Bellamy, that it doesn't refer to any
 23 concerns in this document, does it?
 24 A. It's very much a factual record of, you know, what was
 25 happening.

31

1 Q. It doesn't record his concerns, does it?
 2 A. It does not.
 3 Q. Whilst we are on the topic of notes, could I invite you
 4 to go back to the civil contingencies protocol, please,
 5 {MOL00000040/15}. We can see here, in your own
 6 protocol, at paragraph 4.4 it refers to record-keeping,
 7 and it says this, it's just the first paragraph I'm
 8 going to read to you:
 9 "Maintaining an accurate record of key events,
 10 actions and decisions together with their reasons is
 11 paramount and the MGC Operations Director will appoint
 12 a dedicated log keeper."
 13 Now, this didn't occur in response to the
 14 Grenfell Tower fire. No incident log was kept for the
 15 Gold Cell. Is that right?
 16 A. That's correct.
 17 Q. There are no informal or formal minutes of the MGC
 18 meetings either, are there?
 19 A. Not beyond the action list that you've seen.
 20 Q. The actions we've already looked at and we can see that
 21 there is no record there of any concerns held by
 22 Mr Graham, or anyone else for that matter. In fact, the
 23 first time that any concerns or any actions arising from
 24 concerns about the response are seen on 16 June. Would
 25 you agree with that?

32

1 A. Well, I would need to read through them all but —
 2 Q. Let me take you to that.
 3 A. Well, you know, I'm sure there will be on 16 June, I'm
 4 sure what you say is right. I haven't, you know, got
 5 all of those actions in front of me to check, but I've
 6 no reason to disagree. I'm sure you're right.
 7 Q. Can you assist us, then, why no incident log or minutes
 8 were kept?
 9 A. Yeah, I need to give you a bit of context around this
 10 protocol.
 11 So when we came into office and you asked me about
 12 training and so forth earlier, none of this procedure
 13 existed, and so, you know, through my initial training
 14 I would, you know — I would, you know — had some
 15 feeling that there needed to be a bit more here than
 16 there was and, indeed, there was an incident response
 17 framework put together in July 2016 as a response to my
 18 concerns.
 19 We then had, in the autumn, a couple of major
 20 incidents, so there was the attempted bombing on the
 21 Jubilee Line and there was the tram crash in Croydon,
 22 and really out of that experience it became clear to us
 23 that we needed, you know, for the way — for the Mayor
 24 to carry out his responsibility as the voice of London,
 25 we needed kind of clearer processes in place, and so the

33

1 purpose of writing this protocol was to set those out.
 2 At the start, aspects of it were necessarily
 3 somewhat aspirational, because the resource wasn't there
 4 to do it. As we discussed earlier, for instance,
 5 Mr Graham, this was — you know, this side of things was
 6 only part of his job, he had other significant
 7 responsibilities as well, and that's the resourcing
 8 level we had. And so at the time of the fire, we were
 9 implementing various points of it, you see that in him
 10 keeping the initial record, but we hadn't got to the
 11 arrangements where there was anybody trained and in
 12 place to act as a log-keeper, so that didn't happen.
 13 Q. Would it be fair to say, then, that you were not
 14 familiar with your own civil contingencies procedures at
 15 the time?
 16 A. No, I would say — prefer to say that we weren't in full
 17 compliance with them.
 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Was this a case of knowing what the
 19 book said, so to speak, but not having resources to
 20 implement it at that stage, or do you think people just
 21 overlooked the book?
 22 A. I think it's a case primarily — I think that, you know,
 23 there was possibly more to do in terms of training and
 24 embedding some of the protocol. I think it's also
 25 a factor, as I say, you know, of some very constrained

34

1 resources, and a period where we'd had the terror attack
 2 at Westminster, we'd had the Manchester Arena attack and
 3 the consequent move to critical threat level, which has
 4 an impact on London, and the London Bridge
 5 Borough Market terror attack, and so there was an awful
 6 lot that was — you know, we were dealing with
 7 responding, and that obviously took away what limited
 8 capacity we had from: right, how do we get to the full
 9 implementation of our protocol?
 10 You know, we now do have 24/7 members of staff who
 11 are trained to keep incident logs and, indeed, we're
 12 currently implementing specialist software to enable
 13 them to do so.
 14 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you.
 15 MS MALHOTRA: You have answered my next question.
 16 Could I move on to the 8.30 SCG, and I'd like to
 17 take you to Mr Graham's statement again. That's
 18 {GLA00000004/8}, paragraph 41. He says the following
 19 from the SCG meeting at 8.30:
 20 "I recall explaining at the meeting that the Mayor
 21 intended to visit the site given his responsibilities to
 22 act as the voice of London. Mr Holgate seemed very
 23 interested in my proposal and insisted that RBKC be
 24 involved in any such arrangements. I was very surprised
 25 at this and it seemed, again, to reinforce RBKC's skewed

35

1 priorities in the aftermath of the fire. Mr Holgate
 2 seemed to be more preoccupied on this call with minor
 3 issues such as the Mayor's proposed visit to the scene
 4 and the possible attendance of Nicholas Paget—Brown
 5 (Leader of RBKC), rather than more important strategic
 6 issues regarding the handling of this crisis.
 7 Mr Holgate was insistent that Mr Paget—Brown should be
 8 present for any visit by the Mayor. This was an issue
 9 I would need to discuss further with colleagues at the
 10 GLA."
 11 He then says in the next paragraph:
 12 "As noted in the minutes, the update provided by
 13 RBKC focused on rest centres and the provision of
 14 referral numbers for displaced people. These are issues
 15 which will be relevant for many major incidents e.g. the
 16 evacuation of residences due to a WW2 bomb. However,
 17 there did not seem to be any acknowledgment by RBKC of
 18 the apparent scale of this incident. RBKC certainly did
 19 not ask for any assistance from other partner agencies
 20 during this call."
 21 The final paragraph that I'd like to take you to
 22 from his statement is at paragraph 44 on this page
 23 {GLA00000004/9}:
 24 "I remained concerned that RBKC was still lacking
 25 any strategic direction for this crisis, particularly

36

1 given its first Gold group meeting was not due to start
2 for another two and a half hours. The next SCG was
3 arranged for 14:00."

4 Can you recall, Mr Bellamy, if this information was
5 relayed to you?

6 A. No, I don't believe it was.

7 Q. Would you have expected concerns of this nature to have
8 been brought to your attention?

9 A. I would. I think the explanation for why follows in
10 Mr Graham's statement.

11 Q. We can come on to that. We don't need to turn to it
12 now, but he deals with it in his witness statement and
13 you do too, but for personal reasons Mr Graham handed
14 over his GLA duty officer role to Emma Strain at, he
15 says, around 10.00/10.30 on 14 June.

16 I would like to focus on the events before he handed
17 over his role, if I may.

18 Mr Graham set up a WhatsApp group, and he deals with
19 this at paragraph 26 of his witness statement
20 {GLA00000004/5}. I don't think we don't need to go to
21 it now, but is it right that there was a WhatsApp group
22 for the Mayor's Gold Group Cell?

23 A. For the Mayor's Gold Cell, yes, it pre-dated the fire.

24 Q. We can see, if I can take you to, please, {GLA00000854},
25 this is a typed transcript of these messages, and it

37

1 runs to some 68 pages. I'm not going to go through all
2 of those, but could I just highlight some of those
3 messages.

4 So on page 1 we can see 14 June, 3.19:

5 "Jon—paul Graham: MAJOR INCIDENT: Fire at
6 Grenfell Tower W11. 40 pump incident. 60 people
7 missing. There will be mass fatalities."

8 If we can then go to page 5 {GLA00000854/5}, please,
9 we can see a message here at 5.52. Jon—Paul Graham
10 says:

11 "Strategic Coordinating Group Gold Call and update
12 from LFB Commissioner updated circulated by email."

13 Can you see that?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Next could I take you to page 7 {GLA00000854/7}, please.

16 We can see there, towards the bottom of the page, at
17 8.32, a message from Mr Jon—Paul Graham:

18 "RBK&C are having their first gold meeting will be
19 at 11:00."

20 Can you see that?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Finally to page 9 {GLA00000854/9}, please. At 10.05
23 Mr Graham sends this message:

24 "They are doing a systematic search of the building
25 for survivors and have reached the 13th floor. This

38

1 search is for survivors only."

2 So we can see his last message was at 10.05.

3 Without going through every single one of them,

4 would you accept that there is no reference to concerns
5 on the morning of 14 June?

6 A. I would, yes.

7 Q. Do you accept that this would have been an appropriate
8 channel to express any concerns?

9 A. It was a possible channel, or, yes, it could have been
10 done in a meeting or he could have come to see me
11 directly.

12 Q. Have you, since the Grenfell Tower fire, considered your
13 own civil contingencies response procedures in terms of
14 raising concerns about a category 1 responder if there
15 were any?

16 A. So we are currently engaged in a process of completely
17 rewriting the protocol as, you know, part of
18 a fundamental review, taking on board learnings not only
19 from 2017, but also work on — you know, relating to
20 no-deal Brexit and COVID—19, which obviously are major
21 incidents, have been preoccupying us for the last
22 two years. So, you know, we're engaged in a very major
23 overhaul of those at the moment.

24 Q. I would like to ask you next about Ms Katharine Hammond
25 from the civil contingencies secretariat.

39

1 Could I take you to {CAB00003021}, please. Let's go
2 to the top of the page. 14 June, it's an email at 8.05.
3 We can see it was addressed to you from
4 Katharine Hammond.

5 If you can look further down, on 14 June at 7.45, we
6 can see that you sent an email to Ms Hammond saying:

7 "Here's the latest update we have. Casualty
8 information is confidential."

9 Below that we can see that this was the read-out or
10 the overview of the SCG from Mr Graham. Is that right?

11 A. Yes. I think some of that will be information he had
12 before the first SCG, but yes, that's the view he had at
13 that time.

14 Q. If we can go to the transcript of Ms Hammond's evidence,
15 please, it's {Day281/37:3}, please. So this is
16 Ms Hammond's evidence to the Inquiry last week, and at
17 line 3, she's asked about going to her statement, and
18 she goes on to say — forgive me.

19 (Pause)

20 Bear with me one moment. It should be Day 281,
21 page 37.

22 A. Yes, I can see that.

23 (Pause)

24 Q. Forgive me, we may have to come back to that.

25 In her evidence — I hope you'll accept it from

40

1 me — Ms Hammond says that she was in regular contact
 2 with you during the response to the Grenfell Tower fire.
 3 Would you agree with that?
 4 A. So I would agree that she stated it; indeed, I can see
 5 it on my screen, her evidence there. We've seen
 6 an email between us, so definitely we were in touch.
 7 I have a recollection of being in a meeting room at the
 8 then City Hall on the phone to Ms Hammond. I'm not —
 9 I believe that was during the Grenfell incident, but I'm
 10 not certain. It could have been another one. And
 11 I would have seen her on — in the margins of the
 12 ministerial meetings as well.
 13 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, she says that she recalls
 14 being in touch with you periodically over a number of
 15 days. It doesn't sound to me as though you would
 16 disagree with that.
 17 A. I wouldn't disagree. It's certainly possible.
 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
 19 MS MALHOTRA: Was it part of your role and responsibility to
 20 update the civil contingencies secretariat?
 21 A. No.
 22 Q. Was this out of convention or was there a duty on you?
 23 A. No, this was entirely kind of, you know, good
 24 partnership working. The formal updates, of course,
 25 should have come from the government representative on

41

1 the SCG, who then would have fed back into the civil
 2 contingencies secretariat.
 3 Q. Why is it that you felt the need to update Ms Hammond?
 4 A. Well, clearly it's a very major incident, and we always
 5 strive to work closely with the centre of government in
 6 such circumstances, and, you know, it's always possible
 7 that, you know, (a) different parties have different
 8 additional sources of information, and/or different —
 9 you know, things can get conveyed sometimes perhaps
 10 slightly differently and not fully from an SCG, and
 11 just, you know, then in terms of what parties may be
 12 doing about that, it's just good to be in touch.
 13 Q. Did you and the GLA and the Mayor of London's Office
 14 have a good working relationship with the CCS?
 15 A. I think it was — would be a very limited relationship.
 16 I think we, you know, probably only would deal there in
 17 context of incidents, but, you know, they would
 18 certainly reach out to us if we could help with
 19 something. But obviously normally they would go through
 20 DCLG and through them to the resilience forum.
 21 Q. I would like to move on to the first ministerial
 22 meeting. So we're moving on in time, then, please, on
 23 14 June, to 4 o'clock in the afternoon, which is when
 24 the first ministerial meeting took place.
 25 The Mayor of London dialled into that first meeting,

42

1 it was chaired by Mr Nicholas Hurd, and you attended in
 2 person; is that right?
 3 A. Correct.
 4 Q. I would like to take you to your statement, please, at
 5 page 16 {MOL00000025/16}, and paragraph 75, please. You
 6 say here:
 7 "A ministerial meeting was convened by central
 8 Government at 16.00 on 14 June 2017. This was not a
 9 COBR meeting. The meeting was chaired by Nick Hurd
 10 (Minister of State at the Home Office). The Mayor
 11 dialled in to the meeting and I attended the meeting on
 12 his behalf, in case there were any problems with the
 13 conference call system. The Chief Executive of Royal
 14 Borough of Kensington and Chelsea ('RBKC') also dialled
 15 in to the meeting. The meeting was attended by several
 16 ministers."
 17 Now, Mr Bellamy, the panel have heard evidence that
 18 in fact Mr Holgate — well, directly from Mr Holgate
 19 himself that he did not attend this meeting. You say in
 20 your statement that he did dial in. Do you think you
 21 may be wrong about this?
 22 A. I think I may be wrong, yes. Yeah. Yeah, I've seen
 23 other evidence, yes, that suggests that he didn't.
 24 Q. Would you have expected him to attend this meeting?
 25 A. Yes.

43

1 Q. Do you recall anyone mentioning his absence?
 2 A. I don't. I have very limited recall of that meeting.
 3 Q. Can we take it, therefore, that you didn't raise his
 4 absence with anybody?
 5 A. Not that I recall.
 6 Q. The Inquiry has heard evidence from Ms Hammond of the
 7 CCS, who we've referred to before, that there are two
 8 versions of the ministerial minutes of this meeting. In
 9 one version, which I'll take you to now at
 10 {CAB00013811}, if you can look at the bottom of this
 11 page, these are the minutes from 14 June, at
 12 subsection (b), under the heading "Immediate shelter and
 13 medium term rehousing", at the bottom of that paragraph
 14 it says:
 15 "The MAYOR OF LONDON pressed for further reassurance
 16 and requested that contact was made with the local
 17 Council to ensure that affected individuals are not left
 18 without accommodation."
 19 Can you see that?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. If I can take you to another version of those minutes at
 22 {CAB00002714}, under that same section, subsection (b)
 23 of the minutes, we can see that that does not appear.
 24 Can you see that?
 25 A. Yeah, I can see it's not there.

44

1 Q. Now, the Mayor of London in his statement — I'd like to
 2 take you to it. It's {MOL00000189/8}, please, at
 3 paragraph 30, where he says this:
 4 "I remember that at the meeting I repeatedly
 5 emphasised the need to consider as an urgent priority
 6 the implications of the fire for other people living in
 7 high rise buildings across London and the whole of the
 8 country. It was clear that people living in those
 9 buildings would be feeling very anxious and distressed
 10 and an urgent investigation was needed so that some
 11 reassurance could be provided. A swift assessment of
 12 how many similar blocks there were across the country
 13 needed to be made, given that many had been refurbished
 14 or re-cladded. I urged the importance of this being
 15 co-ordinated from central Government, given that it was
 16 a national issue, and stated that a clear message from
 17 Government that this was underway was vital."
 18 He then goes on to say in the next paragraph of his
 19 statement at paragraph 31:
 20 "I have seen a note of the meeting of 14 June which
 21 has been exhibited to the witness statement of
 22 Katharine Hammond of the Cabinet Office ... and has been
 23 disclosed to the Inquiry [he then gives the URN] ... As
 24 far as I can remember this note accurately reflects the
 25 discussion at the meeting."

45

1 I'd like to see if we can explore this a little bit
 2 further, because in his statement, it's not clear
 3 whether the Mayor of London has seen the minute where
 4 comment is attributed to him, but I would like to take
 5 you to a handwritten note now that we have been
 6 provided, and this is a note that the Mayor of London,
 7 his head of private office, Ali Picton, produced
 8 following a debrief of this meeting, and we can see that
 9 at {MOL00000181}.
 10 This is the handwritten note, and we can see there
 11 in the middle of the page:
 12 "SK and Nick Hurd.
 13 "Concern about other buildings and residents in tall
 14 blocks.
 15 "Rescue and recovery on the ground and ..."
 16 You might have to assist us with what that says.
 17 A. "Close contact LFB". I imagine that was the Mayor
 18 saying he was in close contact with the Fire Brigade.
 19 Q. Then:
 20 "This is priority — but need to know cause to
 21 reassure people in other blocks."
 22 Is that right?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. Now, whilst we can see "rescue and recovery" and "this
 25 is a priority", there doesn't appear to be, in this note

46

1 at least, any mention of concerns regarding the
 2 response; would you agree with that?
 3 A. Not in that note, no, although it does talk about,
 4 you know, rescue and recovery on the ground as being
 5 a priority, but it doesn't, yeah, give any specific
 6 concerns.
 7 Q. Now, the Inquiry has heard about the GLA oversight
 8 committee meetings, and we will come to those again in
 9 due course. But for now, in your evidence to the
 10 oversight committee on 23 November 2017 — I can take
 11 you to the transcript for that. It's {MOL00000017}. We
 12 can see here this is a transcript of that meeting, where
 13 you gave evidence as well as Mr Barradell and others.
 14 If I could take you, please, to page 7 of this
 15 transcript {MOL00000017/7}, at the bottom of page 7 we
 16 have a record of what you were saying. Towards the
 17 bottom of it, you say this — if we can go over to the
 18 next page {MOL00000017/8}, please. At the top of that
 19 page you say:
 20 "It is fair to say that on the Wednesday, there were
 21 a lot of people getting their heads around things.
 22 The Mayor at the meeting on the Wednesday asked a lot of
 23 questions and was pushing for a lot of action."
 24 Are you referring here to the ministerial meeting at
 25 4 o'clock on 14 June?

47

1 A. I was, yes.
 2 Q. Before I actually ask you a question about that meeting
 3 and what the Mayor of London may or may not have said,
 4 could I take you to your note of that meeting. It's at
 5 {MOL00000151}. Such as it is, is this your note of that
 6 ministerial meeting?
 7 A. It is, very brief, because the Mayor and colleagues were
 8 on the call, so I didn't need to note much down.
 9 Q. Can you assist with what questions and actions the Mayor
 10 of London raised at that meeting at 4 o'clock on
 11 14 June?
 12 A. So, at this distance, my recollection is very much what
 13 I said to the oversight committee, that the Mayor,
 14 you know, was really, you know, raising a number of
 15 points and pressing, you know, for things to be done
 16 repeatedly. I note that there were, you know, two
 17 things in the draft minutes. I'm sure he did raise
 18 those. I've no doubt he raised other things. I can't,
 19 I'm afraid, remember the specifics, and I'm afraid
 20 I never saw those minutes, either the draft version or
 21 the final version, until I was preparing to give
 22 evidence to the Inquiry. I believe they weren't
 23 circulated at the time.
 24 MS MALHOTRA: Sir, I'm about to move on. Perhaps now is
 25 a convenient moment for a break.

48

1 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Does it suit you?
 2 MS MALHOTRA: Yes, it does.
 3 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: All right.
 4 Well, Mr Bellamy, we do have a break during the
 5 morning and this is a good time to take it. So we'll
 6 stop there. We'll resume at 11.35, please. I have to
 7 ask you, please, not to talk to anyone about your
 8 evidence or anything relating to it while you're out of
 9 the room.
 10 THE WITNESS: Of course.
 11 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: All right? Thank you very much.
 12 Would you go with the usher, please.
 13 (Pause)
 14 Thank you very much. 11.35.
 15 MS MALHOTRA: Thank you.
 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you.
 17 (11.20 am)
 18 (A short break)
 19 (11.35 am)
 20 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: All right, Mr Bellamy, all ready to
 21 carry on?
 22 THE WITNESS: I am, thank you.
 23 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you very much.
 24 Yes, Ms Malhotra.
 25 MS MALHOTRA: Well, Mr Bellamy, we talked about events in

49

1 the afternoon of 14 June. I would like now to turn to
 2 the evening of 14 June.
 3 At 6.15, the Mayor spoke with the Secretary of State
 4 for DCLG, and we can see a read—out of this call which
 5 was circulated at 6.56. I'll take you to that read—out.
 6 It's at {CLG00003011}.
 7 We can see here the section I want to take you to:
 8 "Hi all,
 9 "Please find a quick readout of the
 10 [Secretary of State]'s call with the Mayor of London
 11 below:
 12 "■ Sadiq Khan dialled in to the [first] ministerial
 13 meeting chaired by Nick Hurd this afternoon ..."
 14 And it goes on to say that he was "impressed with
 15 the Government's response so far".
 16 There is then a discussion about rehousing and the
 17 Fire Brigade, where the Mayor of London flagged whether
 18 there was enough counselling facilities for the
 19 firefighters.
 20 Were you on this call?
 21 A. No.
 22 Q. It doesn't appear as though you were copied in to this
 23 read—out either; is that right?
 24 A. That's a government read—out, so no.
 25 Q. This was an internal DCLG email; is that correct?

50

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. Are you able to say what impressed the Mayor of London
 3 about the central government response at that stage?
 4 Was there any discussion that he had with you?
 5 A. No.
 6 Q. I'd like to take you to the Mayor of London's statement,
 7 please. That's {MOL00000189/8}. If we can look at
 8 paragraph 32, the Mayor of London says this:
 9 "I remember that I spoke to Sajid Javid at 18.15 on
 10 14 June 2017. As I had visited the Grenfell Tower area
 11 earlier that day, our discussion first reflected my
 12 experiences during that visit and my deep concern about
 13 the situation faced by the bereaved, survivors and
 14 others in the local community. Having seen the chaos on
 15 the ground I recall I expressed the need for a single
 16 point of contact and advice for the local community, and
 17 for visible support from local and national Government.
 18 I recall suggesting that a 'one stop shop' for advice
 19 and support be put in place to help those who were
 20 desperately seeking support."
 21 Could I next take you to a note. That's
 22 {MOL00000182}, please. This is a note by Ali Picton,
 23 and we can see, towards the bottom of the page, it says:
 24 "SJ [I think that is]
 25 "Single point access. Phone line established? One

51

1 stop shop. Visible support on ground.
 2 "Follow—up on list of cladding buildings in London.
 3 London Councils can help ..."
 4 Is that MH — can you decipher —
 5 A. That will be "MHCLG", yes.
 6 Q. Although at the time I believe they weren't called
 7 MHCLG, they were DCLG at the time of the fire.
 8 It says:
 9 "Legal support and assistance and need for
 10 public inquiry."
 11 Bearing in mind the Mayor of London's observations
 12 in his statement there, can you assist us with what your
 13 assessment of the response was at that stage?
 14 A. Sorry, the response in general?
 15 Q. The response in general.
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. The local authority response.
 18 A. Well, I think the important thing to say is — and you
 19 see it through the SCG minutes, you see it through the
 20 ministerial meeting minutes — is the wide range of
 21 issues that were being dealt with. Obviously we saw
 22 just before the break, you know, references, you know —
 23 Underground, the safety of the Underground, the
 24 stability of the tower, the A40, the local schools. The
 25 list went on, didn't it? So there was a, you know, very

52

1 wide range of issues being dealt with. I don't think —
 2 the Mayor may have picked up some specifics from his
 3 visit that day, although that visit was largely focused
 4 on emergency services. I do believe he popped in
 5 briefly to a community centre. But, you know, I think
 6 really we didn't have enough visibility on the local
 7 authority response for us to have, you know, really been
 8 able to say, "Yes, you know, it's good" or "It's not
 9 good". We only really had the assurances that RBKC
 10 provided at the SCG meetings.
 11 Q. Could I ask you this, then, Mr Bellamy: given the Mayor
 12 of London's role, as you accept, as a category 1
 13 responder and the Greater London Authority's role as
 14 a category 1 responder, should you have had better
 15 visibility of what was happening on the ground?
 16 A. So I think the point about category 1 responders is
 17 around, you know, the duty to co-operate. It doesn't
 18 give the, you know, right to get into the internal
 19 workings of any one partner. I — you know, whilst
 20 accepting that, that it's a strategic co-ordinating
 21 group, it clearly would have been helpful if, you know,
 22 any partner there had had the ability, whilst
 23 recognising the wide range of issues the SCG was dealing
 24 with, to, you know, question a bit more RBKC about what
 25 they said.

53

1 Q. Your statement sets out the contact that you or the
 2 Mayor of London had with senior central figures in
 3 central government. What contact did you have with the
 4 local authority on 14 June?
 5 A. Personally, I didn't have any.
 6 Q. Can you assist us with what contact the Mayor of London
 7 had with the local authority on 14 June?
 8 A. So, as I think he says in his statement, he spoke to the
 9 then leader of the council when he was on the way there.
 10 There was an offer for the leader to join the Mayor in
 11 person on the Mayor's visit, but the leader, I believe,
 12 wasn't able to take that up.
 13 Q. Did you have any contact with the duty LLAG, or
 14 John Barradell, the chair of the LAP, on 14 June?
 15 A. No.
 16 Q. In retrospect, do you consider that you or the Mayor of
 17 London should have?
 18 A. I think had we had awareness of the issues that there
 19 were, then clearly we would have taken action of that
 20 sort, as indeed I did the following day.
 21 Q. I would like to ask you about that visit that you've
 22 referred to on 15 June.
 23 At 2.00 pm, the Mayor visited the site; is that
 24 right?
 25 A. So I referred to the visit on the 14th. There was

54

1 also —
 2 Q. Forgive me, there was a visit on the 14th. I would like
 3 to ask you about the one on 15 June.
 4 A. Okay.
 5 Q. Is it right that the Mayor visited the site at 2.00 pm
 6 on the 15th?
 7 A. I couldn't comment on the exact time. I wasn't there.
 8 Q. So you didn't attend with the Mayor of London?
 9 A. No.
 10 Q. We can see here an email at {LFB00061233}. This is
 11 an email from John Hetherington, deputy head of London
 12 Resilience at the time, on 15 June at 6.11 in the
 13 evening. He says:
 14 "Sorry to be the bearer of bad news. Just had
 15 a chat with MPS Gold following his private call with
 16 Nicholas. The Mayor was mobbed on scene earlier, there
 17 is a community meeting later today which is showing
 18 concerns of civil unrest, he is therefore not satisfied
 19 any more to be handing over to recovery tomorrow."
 20 I'd like to take you to the Mayor of London's
 21 statement again, please. That's {MOL00000189/11}. We
 22 can see there at the bottom of the page on paragraph 46
 23 he says this of his visit:
 24 "46. During this visit the full scale of the tragedy
 25 was starting to become clear and some members of the

55

1 community were clearly very upset. Completely
 2 understandably, people were angry and wanted answers
 3 from someone in a position of authority so my visit drew
 4 a large crowd. I remember someone threw a bottle of
 5 water at me as I passed by.
 6 "47. I had not made plans to visit the Notting Hill
 7 Methodist Church. Following my visit to the Centre, as
 8 I spent time speaking with those affected ..."
 9 He then goes on to say at paragraph 48:
 10 "During my visit to the church, a large crowd
 11 congregated outside the front entrance. Like the
 12 Prime Minister and several other senior politicians, I
 13 have a police protection team. I was advised by my
 14 security team to exit the church via the back
 15 entrance but I felt very strongly that it was my duty as
 16 Mayor to listen to the communities' concerns first hand
 17 so I left via the front door and the visit was extended
 18 for around another hour so that I could listen to those
 19 affected."
 20 Are you able to assist us with whether in fact the
 21 Mayor of London was mobbed on his visit on the afternoon
 22 of 15 June?
 23 A. I don't care for the word "mobbed". Here was
 24 a community in grief that had clearly been let down
 25 before, during and after the fire, and I think it's

56

1 entirely right that they would want to, you know, speak
 2 to somebody in a position of responsibility and
 3 authority about what happened.
 4 Q. I'd like to try and follow matters as chronologically as
 5 possible. Could I invite you to look at this:
 6 {MOL00000183}. We can see here this is a transcript of
 7 media interviews that were given by the Mayor of London
 8 on 14 and 15 June.
 9 At page 14 {MOL00000183/14}, the very bottom of the
 10 page, it says this:
 11 "Important the council provides housing to those who
 12 have lost it, and guidance to all those who want to help
 13 who are turning up with vanloads of goods. I sensed the
 14 frustration from volunteers at ..."
 15 A. Sorry, can I just pause you, I'm not seeing that on
 16 screen.
 17 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Right. Can we go back a bit,
 18 please.
 19 A. Yeah, can we just get it on screen and then ... Right,
 20 so we're — sorry, I think we may be starting in the
 21 middle of the paragraph, so that's why I lost you.
 22 MS MALHOTRA: It's page 14, can you see that?
 23 A. So what's the first few words of where you're starting
 24 and then I can follow you?
 25 Q. At the very bottom of that page, three lines up from the

57

1 bottom, right at the very end:
 2 "Important the council provides housing ..."
 3 Can you see that there?
 4 A. Yeah, okay. I'm with you now. Let's run from there.
 5 Q. "Important the council provides housing to those who
 6 have lost it, and guidance to all those who want to help
 7 who are turning up with vanloads of goods. I sensed the
 8 frustration from volunteers at Westway at things not
 9 being properly co-ordinated — so important — we will
 10 signpost people at City Hall to where they need to go."
 11 We can see here in what the Mayor is saying that
 12 there were concerns with the response; would you agree
 13 with that?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. When did you first become aware of concerns with the
 16 local authority response?
 17 A. So I think I became aware — you know, I did ask
 18 before — so I went to the ministerial meeting that I'm
 19 sure we'll come on to, which was at I think 3.30, and
 20 I did ask before I went to that that, you know, was
 21 there any information yet from the Mayor's visit, but at
 22 that point there wasn't. It's possible before I went
 23 I saw some of the scenes of the Mayor's visit on the
 24 television. But I think, you know, I really formed
 25 concerns about RBKC's response at the ministerial

58

1 meeting and then, you know, when I returned to City Hall
 2 after it.
 3 Q. So are you able to say when you had concerns? Was it
 4 before the ministerial meeting, if I've understood you
 5 correctly?
 6 A. No, I don't believe I had any significant concerns
 7 before the ministerial meeting, but if I'd seen the TV
 8 footage or colleagues had made me aware of what had gone
 9 on on the Mayor's visit, then clearly I would have seen
 10 that, you know, things were not as they should be.
 11 Q. Well, you've mentioned that second ministerial meeting
 12 at 3.30 on 15 June. I'd like to turn to that now.
 13 You attended that meeting on behalf of the Mayor of
 14 London; is that right?
 15 A. Correct.
 16 Q. And that meeting was attended by Nicholas Holgate, then
 17 the chief executive to the Royal Borough of Kensington
 18 and Chelsea; is that right?
 19 A. I believe so, yes.
 20 Q. Can you tell us what impression you formed of Mr Holgate
 21 at that meeting?
 22 A. I'll be honest, I don't really have much direct
 23 recollection of that meeting and not of Mr Holgate.
 24 I just remember coming away with a real sense of
 25 unhappiness and concern about the response, and that

59

1 there was something that was really not right.
 2 Q. Was this your first interaction with Mr Holgate? Was
 3 this the first time you'd seen him?
 4 A. Since the beginning of — well, I think he dialled in,
 5 so I didn't see him. I think it's the first interaction
 6 that I would have had with him since the fire. I had
 7 met him previously before the fire.
 8 Q. I would like to take you to paragraph 79 of your first
 9 witness statement {MOL00000025/16}, please.
 10 Paragraph 79, you say this:
 11 "A second ministerial meeting took place ..."
 12 You then go on to say in the second line:
 13 "Following the meeting, I was sufficiently concerned
 14 at the lack of progress being made with the recovery
 15 operation that on my return to City Hall, I telephoned
 16 John Barradell, Chief Executive of the City of London
 17 Corporation and Chair of the Local Authority Panel
 18 ('LAP') to enquire about the progress of the recovery
 19 operation from his standpoint and discuss what action
 20 could most helpfully be taken."
 21 Are you able to assist us with what specifically
 22 concerned you at this point in time, so during that
 23 ministerial meeting which started at 3.30 on 15 June?
 24 A. So, firstly, I think my concern was about — you know,
 25 probably described as response and recovery. As we

60

1 know, the kind of boundary between the two isn't a clear
 2 one at all times.
 3 I don't think it was really specifics. It was,
 4 you know, what, you know, came out of the meeting, and
 5 I've seen some of the evidence from other people who
 6 were at that meeting. It was also when I — as
 7 I returned to City Hall, I — before I could get to my
 8 desk, I was met by colleagues who said, you know, "Look,
 9 David, you know, RBKC are really just — it's failing,
 10 it's just not working", which I think they judged both
 11 from the Mayor's visit and also contact they had
 12 received from other, you know, probably political
 13 figures in the — in that area of London, who would have
 14 passed on information and — you know, so I think we
 15 just — you know, we weren't really clear on precisely
 16 what the failings were. We could just see that things
 17 were really not working and something needed to be done
 18 about it.
 19 Q. Well, I'd like to next try and piece together as best we
 20 can the sequence of events that then followed this
 21 meeting.
 22 Could I take you to {GLA00000854}, please. We've
 23 looked at it before. This is the transcript of the
 24 WhatsApp messages —
 25 A. Yes.

61

1 Q. — between the Mayor's Gold Group.
 2 Could I take you to page 26 {GLA00000854/26}. I'd
 3 just like to look and read through some of these
 4 exchanges that we can see here, starting at the top of
 5 the page. It's 15 June, and 17.22, Ms Strain says:
 6 "I've reached out through a number of routes re RBKC
 7 messaging re donations/volunteers/support including
 8 contacting chief execs office. Will keep on it but no
 9 response so far."
 10 We can then see, a little later at 5.31, one of your
 11 colleagues says:
 12 "Is there a way we can get across that rbkc are
 13 totally out of their depth? Jeff — should we speak with
 14 London councils resilience lead? They need a lot of
 15 help."
 16 Then it goes on, "DB" — is that you?
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. "... going to talk to John Barradell."
 19 Then it says at 5.39:
 20 "John on line to nick holgate CEO RBKC right now.
 21 Aware of problems. Will call back shortly."
 22 Just pausing there, this may help us with the
 23 sequence of events and timing, but is it right that you
 24 were talking to Mr Holgate at this stage?
 25 A. No. I asked my executive assistant to get me

62

1 John Barradell on the phone and — you know, so I walked
 2 back in the office. As I said, colleagues relayed
 3 concerns in general terms, which chimed with what I felt
 4 coming out of the ministerial meeting. So, as I say,
 5 I asked my assistant to get John Barradell on the phone.
 6 John came to the phone and said essentially he was on
 7 the other line with Nicholas Holgate and, you know, was
 8 aware there were some problems and that he would call me
 9 back.
 10 Q. So is it the case that you didn't speak directly with
 11 Mr Holgate?
 12 A. Correct.
 13 Q. John Barradell, as we've seen in the passage that
 14 I referred you to in your statement before, was the
 15 chief executive of the City of London Corporation and
 16 chair of the local authority panel, which the Inquiry
 17 has heard about, what that is. He had not been involved
 18 in any strategic co-ordination group meetings at this
 19 point, had he?
 20 A. No.
 21 Q. He had not been involved in the ministerial meetings,
 22 had he?
 23 A. No.
 24 Q. At this stage, the response was being led by the Royal
 25 Borough of Kensington and Chelsea; is that correct?

63

1 A. The local authority duties, yes.
 2 Q. When giving evidence to the GLA oversight committee —
 3 and I'll take you to that transcript now, it's
 4 {MOL00000017/37} — you say this:
 5 "When I came out of the ministerial meeting on the
 6 Thursday afternoon it was abundantly clear — accepting
 7 things are always going to be difficult on the first day
 8 after the incident for obvious reasons — that the
 9 response and the beginnings of the recovery operation
 10 were not what they needed to be. Immediately when
 11 I came back to City Hall I rang John and said, 'What is
 12 going on? What are you [doing] ... about it?'
 13 Discussions were ... underway, as had been earlier
 14 outlined, which led to the invocation of mutual aid."
 15 A. I'm sorry, the transcript says, "What are you going to
 16 do about it?", not, "What are you doing about it?"
 17 Q. Forgive me.
 18 I would like to ask you about this passage,
 19 "discussions were ... underway". Can you explain what
 20 you meant by that?
 21 A. Okay. "Discussions were ..."
 22 I think — whether that's an error in the transcript
 23 or whether I misspoke at the time, that should say
 24 "Discussions were already underway", and, as I say,
 25 Mr Barradell was on the phone with Mr Holgate and others

64

1 when I called him.
 2 Q. So it's not the case that there had been discussions
 3 ongoing prior to your call to Mr Barradell?
 4 A. Not involving me.
 5 Q. Were you aware that London Resilience had had a call
 6 with Mr Holgate the day before, on 14 June?
 7 A. No.
 8 Q. Do you consider your responsibility and that of the
 9 Mayor of London that that is information that maybe you
 10 ought to have been aware of?
 11 A. I'm not sure I do. Clearly, you know, it was
 12 an internal local authority matter in terms of their
 13 response, and it comes back to, you know, the Civil
 14 Contingencies Act concept of this being a partnership
 15 and each partner conducting their own legal
 16 responsibilities. As I say, you know, nobody thought to
 17 say, "Okay, yes, we have got some, you know, concerns
 18 perhaps at this point and we should talk to the Mayor or
 19 his chief of staff about it", you know, it's very much
 20 I think, you know, local authorities saying, "Well, what
 21 concerns have we got, what can we do about it?", which
 22 of course is the point of the mutual aid system that
 23 they have.
 24 Q. What was your purpose in speaking to Mr Barradell?
 25 A. My purpose in speaking to him was that it had become

65

1 clear to us that the response was, you know, very far
 2 from what it needed to be, and something needed to be
 3 done, but it wasn't, you know, immediately apparent to
 4 me what, you know, the options available — indeed,
 5 whether there were any options available to address the
 6 matter.
 7 Q. I'd like to take you to an email, please. It's at
 8 {GOL00001473}, please. It's the second email at 7.50,
 9 which is towards the bottom of the page. It's an email
 10 from Mr Holgate to the London Resilience Group and the
 11 LLAG oncoming and off-going duty officers, where
 12 Mr Holgate says this:
 13 " ... I do not (yet) think LLAG needs to gear up."
 14 Can you see that?
 15 A. I can.
 16 Q. It then goes up, the next email at 8.15:
 17 "Just for information we have been in touch with
 18 both Nicholas Holgate, Chris Naylor as oncoming LLAG and
 19 Andrew Blake—Herbert as Offgoing LLAG. All are content
 20 at the moment that RBKC retain [the] lead at [this]
 21 point."
 22 Then the top of that email chain, we can see
 23 Mark Sawyer responds at 8.18 on 14 June:
 24 "Looks like job done. Cheers."
 25 Do you see that?

66

1 A. I can see it.
 2 Q. Can you assist us with what your understanding of LLAG
 3 arrangements were at the time of the fire?
 4 A. At the time of the fire, I'm — you know, so it's hard
 5 for me. So as we touched on earlier, at the beginning
 6 of January 2016 I started with no knowledge about
 7 resilience. Today I have the knowledge I have, and
 8 clearly I have gone through a process. It's very hard
 9 to look back and say: well, right, exactly what did
 10 I know at that time?
 11 Clearly, I didn't at that time know enough about
 12 LLAG as an internal local authorities process for me to
 13 kind of look at exploring that. Instead, as we've
 14 discussed, I went to Mr Barradell when I realised there
 15 were problems.
 16 Q. So can you assist us with what your understanding of
 17 LLAG arrangements were?
 18 A. So I think that's just what I answered previously.
 19 Q. Did you understand the activation of LLAG to mean that
 20 one local authority would take over a response?
 21 A. As I say, I'm not clear on what I understood, if I knew
 22 of it at all, about LLAG. At the time, I don't think
 23 I had a comprehensive understanding, as clearly
 24 the Inquiry itself has had some debate about the finer
 25 points of this.

67

1 Q. Do you consider that you ought to have had?
 2 A. No, because it was — it's an internal matter to the
 3 local authority response.
 4 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: The fact that you contacted
 5 John Barradell might suggest that you thought that he
 6 had some active role to play; was that the case?
 7 A. No, I contacted him because I knew him, I knew he was
 8 the deputy chair of the resilience forum, and clearly
 9 was the kind of local authority leader on resilience.
 10 We'd got a problem, I didn't know whether he knew about
 11 the problem or not, but it's very clear there was
 12 a problem, that something needed to be done, so I wished
 13 to discuss with him what we could do about matters.
 14 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Yes. Thank you.
 15 MS MALHOTRA: As I say, dealing with things as
 16 chronologically as best we can, can you tell us what was
 17 discussed in your call with Mr Barradell?
 18 A. So that first call was very brief, because he was on the
 19 other line to Nicholas Holgate, and he basically — so
 20 I said, "Look, John, we've got a" — you know,
 21 paraphrasing, "We've got a problem here". You know, he
 22 acknowledged that, said he was on, you know, a call at
 23 the moment with Nicholas Holgate, and that he'd ring me
 24 back when that — you know, after that call.
 25 Q. I would like to take you to your handwritten note of

68

1 your conversation with Mr Barradell. That's
2 {MOL00000175}.

3 You say that you were on the phone to him, he was on
4 the line to Mr Holgate. Was there an occasion when you
5 spoke to him again?

6 A. Yes. So, firstly, apologising for getting his surname
7 wrong in that note. What the WhatsApps show is that
8 that call must have concluded just before 18.49, because
9 then I informed colleagues at that time via WhatsApp of
10 the outcome of the conversation, so it clearly would
11 have been about 6.45.

12 Q. We'll come to those —

13 A. Indeed.

14 Q. — WhatsApp conversations in a moment.
15 Just looking at this note, it says, "With
16 Eleanor Kelly". Was Ms Kelly in the room with
17 Mr Barradell when you were having a conversation with
18 him?

19 A. That's my understanding, yes.

20 Q. Are you able to assist with why she was there?

21 A. So I now know that Ms Kelly was the deputy chair of the
22 local authorities panel and so worked closely with
23 Mr Barradell, and clearly they then — you know, that's
24 been demonstrated both in the subsequent Grenfell
25 response, you know, further to this, also in terms of

69

1 the no—deal Brexit response and the COVID—19 response,
2 where they worked, you know, very closely together in
3 the SCG arrangements we established.

4 Q. Let me ask you this: at the time of your call with
5 Mr Barradell, when Eleanor Kelly was present, can you
6 tell us whether you had expressed a view to him about
7 what you thought should be happening in the response?

8 A. No, I don't believe I did. As I say, I didn't feel —
9 I don't think I was sighted on the specifics of what the
10 issues were, just that there were issues and, you know,
11 the question really was: what could be done so that they
12 were properly gripped and addressed?

13 Q. It may be obvious and you may have answered this, but
14 what was it that you were asking him to do?

15 A. So, as I say, when I rang him just after 5.30 was, as
16 I said, because I could see that we had, you know,
17 a real issue. I didn't — you know, I did not know at
18 all what our options were to address that issue, and so
19 clearly as, you know, an experienced person who would
20 understand all that, I wanted to discuss that with him
21 in order that hopefully we could agree on the most
22 appropriate course of action.

23 Q. Did he suggest a course of action to you?

24 A. So, as I say, the first call he just said, "I'm talking
25 to Nicholas Holgate, I'll call you back". The second

70

1 call, as you can see here, he just informs me of what
2 course of action they were taking.

3 Q. Is that the note where it says "K&C involved" — you
4 might have to assist me with your handwriting, I'm
5 afraid.

6 A. Apologies, it's not great at the best of times:
7 "■ K&C invoked for Chief Exec cover & other support.
8 "— Another [chief exec] as [Local Authority] Gold —
9 [and it says] formally start."

10 I assume I just didn't manage to keep up.
11 Presumably I was saying "formally start tomorrow at some
12 point".

13 And then:
14 "JB & [I think that's supposed to be] EK to support
15 them plus Mary (Hounslow) ..."

16 So that's Mary Harpley, who was at the time the
17 chief executive of London Borough of Hounslow, and
18 "Doug", who is Patterson, I think, who at the time was
19 the chief executive for the London Borough of Bromley.

20 And then it says:
21 "K&C will do community resilience & cohesion,
22 housing & displaced."

23 Presumably a reference to those in the walks.
24 There's a reference — I think that is "London",
25 reference to "mortuary", and then the last note's rather

71

1 incomplete:
2 "External [chief executive] oversight with K&C
3 director on ..."

4 And then it stops.

5 Q. So what was your understanding, now your memory's been
6 refreshed by this note, of what was going to happen
7 after that call?

8 A. So my understanding was that another chief executive was
9 going in to K&C alongside Mr Holgate to help with the
10 co—ordination of matters.

11 Q. So to work alongside, was that your understanding?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. When was your understanding that that would take place?

14 A. I can't remember if there was anything in the WhatsApp
15 history that, as you say, we might come to that helps
16 with that. You know, as you can see, I say "formally
17 start" and I didn't note down, so I think — I don't
18 really have a strong memory. It's probably been too
19 polluted by everything that we've read subsequently.

20 Q. We can come to those WhatsApp exchanges in a moment.
21 I just want to ask you this about Ms Hammond. We
22 know that you were in contact with her. Did you express
23 to Mr Barradell or had you had expressed to you at that
24 point that there was pressure from central government
25 for action on the response to take place?

72

1 A. Not that I recall. I imagine at that point that the
 2 government would still have been digesting the
 3 ministerial meeting in the same way that we were.
 4 Q. So can you recall if you had received any pressure from
 5 central government yourself at that stage to do
 6 something about the response?
 7 A. I've absolutely no recollection of receiving any
 8 pressure from central government. I'm confident
 9 I didn't.
 10 Q. Did you have any role or play any part in Mr Barradell
 11 stepping in, or was it that matters were already in
 12 train before you spoke to him?
 13 A. So do you mean in terms of stepping in in terms of his
 14 intervention with Mr Holgate, or do you mean in terms of
 15 stepping in in terms of actually kind of being there in
 16 K&C?
 17 Q. Stepping in to assist Mr Holgate, as we can see in this
 18 note.
 19 A. So as we can see in this note, the note says, "Another
 20 [chief executive] as [Local Authority] Gold", with
 21 John Barradell and Eleanor Kelly supporting that other
 22 chief executive. So at that stage I did not know —
 23 and, indeed, I think that shows when we'll come on to
 24 Friday morning — I didn't know that it was Mr Barradell
 25 who was going to take on that role.

73

1 Q. I'd like to take you to Katharine Hammond's evidence,
 2 please. That's {Day281/74:17}. Let's hope I can see it
 3 this time.
 4 A. Yeah.
 5 Q. We can see here Ms Hammond is asked about what she says
 6 in her witness statement, and I'll just take you to the
 7 start of the question that she's asked to give it some
 8 context:
 9 "Question: In the light of what you say there
 10 [referring back to her witness statement], was it your
 11 understanding of the LLAG arrangements that LLAG would
 12 assume the same executive authority and powers vested in
 13 the relevant chief executive, ie Nick Holgate?
 14 "Answer: Yes, I assumed that Mr Barradell was
 15 acting on behalf of Mr Holgate in respect of this area
 16 of his responsibilities. That was my understanding at
 17 the time.
 18 "Question: What was the basis of that
 19 understanding?
 20 "Answer: I think the way I learned about this was
 21 through conversation with Mr Bellamy, so that would be
 22 the basis.
 23 "Question: Can you remember what he said to you?
 24 "Answer: Not in precise words, I'm afraid."
 25 Do you agree with Ms Hammond in her recollection of

74

1 a conversation with you.
 2 A. So I don't have — I think this is — just being — just
 3 so I'm clear, going back to line 1 and 2, this is Friday
 4 morning, is it? Just so we're clear. I don't have
 5 a recollection of that conversation. I'm quite prepared
 6 to believe that it happened.
 7 I think what we see from the — and you may be
 8 coming to this, so apologies — note of the Gold Cell
 9 meeting, you know, it's still — was it 8.30 in the
 10 morning, 9.00 in the morning, whenever the Gold Cell
 11 meeting was, it still wasn't clear at that point who was
 12 taking on the LA Gold responsibilities, but that was
 13 reported to the 11.00 am SCG, and so that was — our
 14 then duty officer reported that via the WhatsApp
 15 conversation at, I believe, 11.25.
 16 Q. I believe Ms Hammond is speaking about a conversation
 17 with you on 15 June. Can you assist us with whether you
 18 had a conversation with her on the 15th?
 19 A. Well, I may or may not have done, but that clearly was
 20 before there was any suggestion of John Barradell
 21 getting involved. I think what you're showing me on the
 22 screen at the moment is about the morning of the 16th.
 23 Q. So you don't recall having a conversation with
 24 Ms Hammond on 15 June where you said to her that
 25 Mr Bellamy(sic) would be acting on behalf of Mr Holgate

75

1 in respect of those responsibilities?
 2 A. So, firstly, I'm Mr Bellamy, so no. Secondly, as I say,
 3 that only happened on Friday the 16th. Thirdly, as
 4 I said earlier, I may well have had a conversation or
 5 conversations with Katharine Hammond, you know,
 6 throughout this matter, I'm perfectly prepared to
 7 believe I did, I just don't have any specific
 8 recollection of them, I'm afraid.
 9 Q. You say in your witness statement {MOL00000025/16} — we
 10 don't need to turn to it now — that you were reassured
 11 by your conversation with Mr Barradell, who told you
 12 RBKC were planning to invoke mutual aid that evening.
 13 That's the evening of 15 June.
 14 When you spoke with Mr Barradell, what did you
 15 understand "invoke mutual aid" to mean?
 16 A. I understood it to mean that appropriate colleagues from
 17 wider London local government would be getting involved
 18 in assisting with the response and providing perhaps the
 19 capacity and experience that, you know, it appeared from
 20 the failings RBKC were lacking.
 21 Q. I would like to take you to those WhatsApp messages, the
 22 transcript of them. That's {GLA00000854/26}, please.
 23 We had got up to the stage of the message at 5.39:
 24 "John on line to nick holgate CEO RBKC right now.
 25 Aware of problems. Will call back shortly."

76

1 Can you assist — and I appreciate this message was
 2 not written by you — what were those problems that are
 3 suggested here?
 4 A. So Dr Bowes sat in the same office as me and was
 5 essentially , you know, listening to my conversation or
 6 heard my immediate summary as I put the phone down, and
 7 what he's saying there is that John Barradell was on the
 8 phone to Nicholas Holgate at that time, as I spoke to
 9 John Barradell, that John was aware that there were
 10 problems and that John would call me back shortly.
 11 Q. We can move forward in time to the message at 6.49 that
 12 you've already referred to. You write here:
 13 "Spoke to John Barrowdale [we know that you mean
 14 Mr Barradell]. A LA chief exec is being assigned to
 15 share the load."
 16 Was that your understanding at the time?
 17 A. Yes, that's my shorthand for the note of the meeting
 18 that you've already seen.
 19 Q. And your evidence was that you didn't know who that
 20 chief executive was going to be?
 21 A. Correct.
 22 Q. "Please can people tell me what K&C issues we are seeing
 23 and I will feedback to John [as] they can be picked up."
 24 A. "... so they can be picked up."
 25 Q. And then your colleague then responds back at 6.52:

77

1 "That's really helpful. I know emma was aware of
 2 some issues. Tony devenish's pa came upstairs and said
 3 H&F were struggling to make contact and help."
 4 Is that Hammersmith and Fulham?
 5 A. Yeah, Hammersmith and Fulham Council, yes. It would
 6 have been. So Mr Devenish, for your information, is
 7 the — was and is the London Assembly member for central
 8 and west London, which includes both Hammersmith and
 9 Fulham and Kensington and Chelsea.
 10 Q. Were there issues with getting hold of RBKC, as we can
 11 see is suggested here?
 12 A. I believe there were. I think that's shown throughout
 13 the evidence, including evidence from my GLA colleagues.
 14 Q. We can then see that Ms Strain sends a message about
 15 some of the concerns of the team, and we can see, and
 16 I can take you to that in due course, the email that she
 17 then sends.
 18 I just want to ask you this before we move away from
 19 this topic of the conversation with Mr Barradell.
 20 Given that the Mayor of London — you have been
 21 referred to his witness statement and what he says about
 22 his observations on the second visit that he had on
 23 15 June, the concerns that you had on 15 June following
 24 the ministerial meeting, were you satisfied, Mr Bellamy,
 25 to wait for information about what chief executive would

78

1 be in a supporting role? Were you satisfied with the
 2 response that you received?
 3 A. So I was satisfied that, you know, local authorities in
 4 London were taking what they considered to be
 5 appropriate action. I considered that Mr Barradell, as
 6 clearly a local authority chief executive of some
 7 experience, particularly with regard to resilience ,
 8 would have a far better understanding than me of, you
 9 know, what was required to be done, and doubtless, from
 10 his discussions with Mr Holgate, what some of the issues
 11 may be. And so, you know, I was, you know, satisfied
 12 that, you know, action was being taken that Mr Barradell
 13 considered to be appropriate.
 14 Q. I asked you about an email earlier sent by Mr Sawyer,
 15 where he says "job done". I would just like to take you
 16 to one more email exchange. That's {LFB00061229},
 17 please.
 18 Now, this is an email again from Mr Hetherington,
 19 sent to his London Resilience Group colleagues.
 20 I appreciate you weren't on this email. It's not one
 21 that was copied to you. But what he says in that second
 22 paragraph towards the bottom, three lines up from the
 23 bottom of the second paragraph:
 24 "... I have made the point to Mark that they should
 25 look to consume this in everyday business as far as

79

1 possible so that we don't get drawn into a long term
 2 support, Mark agreed with this, I think we will need to
 3 do something but I think if possible some advice early
 4 days to bring the right people together then let them
 5 get on with it."
 6 Was there an impression or did you form the
 7 impression that there was reluctance on the part of the
 8 LLAG and Mr Mark Sawyer and London Resilience to get
 9 involved in helping RBKC?
 10 A. So, I mean, I had no knowledge of this at the time.
 11 That's not how I interpret this email at all.
 12 I interpret this email as being from London Resilience
 13 Group and, you know, London Resilience Group were,
 14 you know, saying, "So that we don't get drawn into
 15 a long-term support" — and that, you know, would
 16 reflect that, you know, London Resilience have,
 17 you know, always got to be ready for, as events sadly
 18 showed, the next incident that will happen. They still
 19 would be — clearly would have some involvement here,
 20 they still had some involvement in matters related to
 21 the London Bridge and Borough Market terror attacks,
 22 which were, what, 11 days, I think, prior to Grenfell
 23 fire , and so I think what I see there is, you know,
 24 London Resilience Group saying, "Well, we need,
 25 you know, RBKC to set themselves up to handle what is

80

1 clearly going to be an ongoing situation".
 2 Q. Could I invite you to look at your first witness
 3 statement at paragraph 79 {MOL00000025/16}, please.
 4 It's the very bottom of paragraph 79. You say:
 5 "I was reassured by this."
 6 By that it means — let me read out the first few
 7 lines:
 8 "I was informed by Mr Barradell that he was
 9 currently on a separate call with RBKC who had informed
 10 him that they were planning to invoke mutual aid that
 11 evening. I was reassured by this. However this did not
 12 in fact take place until the following day."
 13 A. So I think what that is doing is, you know, there's —
 14 so I'm aware of the Inquiry's, you know, debates and
 15 looking into this. I have to say I find it surprising
 16 that — you know, I don't pretend to understand the
 17 legalities of the Gold resolution between local
 18 authorities. I find it surprising that a situation in
 19 which a chief executive can incur expenditure on behalf
 20 of another authority is able to occur without some
 21 sort of written statement, although I suppose one can
 22 imagine circumstances where it's just not possible to
 23 obtain that. And I think, you know, what we see there
 24 is, as I think the Inquiry's teased out, the kind of
 25 difference between, you know, the start of mutual aid

81

1 and then John Barradell himself taking a more leading
 2 role in terms of, you know, directing the response and
 3 recovery operation.
 4 Q. Would you say that you were surprised that it took place
 5 the following day?
 6 A. So, yeah, I think I would. I think I would have
 7 expected that that — you know, following, you know,
 8 that conversation, the agreement of Mr Holgate —
 9 obviously, I wasn't sighted on — it sounds like there
 10 were various conversations to get him to the point of
 11 agreeing, but, you know, I would have thought that
 12 fairly quickly at that stage, you know, a decision would
 13 be taken on whether that would be the current primary
 14 London Local Authority Gold or whether somebody else
 15 would take that responsibility.
 16 Q. So we know that LLAG was not in fact activated until the
 17 following day, the afternoon of the following day. Did
 18 you take any steps to question what was happening?
 19 A. So I'm not sure I know that. I know that John Barradell
 20 went there on the Friday morning, and I'm not clear —
 21 you know, what I know is that — so on the Friday
 22 morning, at the 8.30 Gold Cell, we reflected that we
 23 didn't know who was taking on that responsibility.
 24 I had — I was given an action to find out. I don't
 25 remember anything specific subsequent to that action,

82

1 but then what we see from the Gold Cell WhatsApp group
 2 is that it was reported to the SCG, and so I was
 3 informed at 11.25 that John Barradell was the person
 4 taking that LLAG role.
 5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, and I imagine at that stage you
 6 understood that he was going to take on the role of
 7 LLAG, London Gold, under the Gold resolution?
 8 A. I wouldn't be certain about that. As I say, I wouldn't
 9 have had — not being from a local authority, I wouldn't
 10 have necessarily had knowledge of the Gold resolution or
 11 the scope of it or so forth, which of course is —
 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right.
 13 A. If I'd had that knowledge, my conversation with
 14 Mr Barradell on the Thursday might have been slightly
 15 different, might have been, "Why isn't ..." rather than
 16 "What should we do?"
 17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, thank you.
 18 MS MALHOTRA: I'd just like to show you this email,
 19 {GOL00000196}. It's the email that you sent to
 20 Mr Barradell at 7.48 that evening. In the last sentence
 21 of that first paragraph. You say:
 22 "... it's worth flagging that building a list of
 23 people known to live in the tower as something they have
 24 apparently so far failed to do."
 25 Are you referring to RBKC here?

83

1 A. I am, yes.
 2 Q. Would you agree that the issues on the ground, as they
 3 have been referred to, were acute?
 4 A. I think the evidence before the Inquiry shows that they
 5 were, yes.
 6 Q. I'd like to next turn your attention to some other
 7 emails from your colleague Ms Strain, and again
 8 I appreciate you were not on these emails. You're not
 9 copied in to them, but I'd like to see if you could help
 10 us with the topics that they do cover.
 11 The first is {LFB00067777}. This is an email from
 12 John Hetherington — forgive me. This is an email from
 13 Mr Hetherington to his internal LRG colleagues talking
 14 about a conversation with Ms Strain, your colleague at
 15 the GLA. It says this:
 16 "Had a call with Emma Strain at the GLA. Given the
 17 concerns at City Hall regarding the grip on the
 18 situation at RBKC she has said that if we have further
 19 issues to raise then we can do so through her which will
 20 be passed through David Bellamy, anonymously if needed.
 21 "Obviously this will be sensitive, so not a wish
 22 list of gripes but just to make you all aware we have
 23 that avenue should it be required."
 24 Can you assist us with what the sensitivity was
 25 here?

84

1 A. So, you know, I think you could almost regard this as
2 Emma saying — so obviously I'd asked Emma to pull
3 together a list of issues so that, you know, I could
4 inform John Barradell for whoever London Local Authority
5 Gold would be, so that they were informed and could
6 address these points, and clearly she's spoken to
7 John Hetherington to try and, you know, see: are there
8 any other things that we should be aware of?

9 I think the point about sensitive, I think the
10 analogy might be with a whistleblowing situation, so
11 that if for any reason anybody in London Resilience
12 Group saw things related to their responsibilities
13 towards local authorities and, you know, the work they
14 were doing with RBKC, they had an avenue in which those
15 could be raised without, you know, them being kind of
16 accused of, you know, telling tales or whatever it might
17 be. You know, just really a desire that we needed to
18 know the facts in order that they could be addressed.

19 Q. I'd like to take you to another email exchange. That's
20 {LFB00061241}. It's the email in the middle of the page
21 from Ms Strain, 15 June at 22.31, and she says this:

22 "Just worth noting that there are reports from
23 people locally that firefighters have told them it's
24 over 100 fatalities. It's not sustainable to continue
25 the announcements how they've been going. Will be a big

85

1 risk that our (us/HMG [Her Majesty's Government]/K&C
2 [Kensington and Chelsea]) response is not commensurate
3 with the scale of the tragedy."

4 Did the uncertainty in confirmed fatalities affect
5 or impact on the Mayor of London's voice of London role?
6 A. So I think this reflects, you know, a situation in which
7 clearly there are proper processes that must be followed
8 in terms of identifying fatalities, and so, you know, we
9 started with a very low number of fatalities, which
10 anybody looking at it could see was very, very low.

11 Because there wasn't, you know, a definitive figure
12 coming from that source, and it was very slow, and
13 because, you know, the Casualty Bureau and RBKC
14 operations hadn't said, "Oh, look, right, there are this
15 many people in the tower, right, we know about this many
16 people, we've got a certain number in hospitals, so this
17 gives us a number presumed missing", which might then
18 give you an approximation for the potential range of
19 potential fatalities, because that wasn't there, we're
20 in a situation where the communications were very much
21 about the official position, which of course is all we
22 can communicate, but quite rightly people in the
23 community would look at that and say, "Well, that's
24 self-evidently not right, and, you know, we have been
25 failed, you know, so completely by authorities, is this

86

1 another attempt to downplay the severity of what we
2 saw?" And I think that was Ms Strain's point.

3 Q. I'd like to turn to the investigations by the Greater
4 London Authority oversight committee that we have seen
5 the transcript of your contributions to. It's right to
6 say that there were three sessions in respect of that
7 response to Grenfell Tower fire: one on 4 September,
8 23 November and 31 January 2018; is that right?

9 A. I know they had three sessions. I don't recall the
10 precise dates.

11 Q. On, as we have already established, 23 November 2017,
12 the committee looked in more detail at the Mayor's role
13 in the response and recovery phases; is that right?

14 A. That would be the session that I and borough chief
15 executives attended, yes.

16 Q. Going back to that transcript, then, on 23 November
17 2017, that's {MOL00000017/37}, you say in the second
18 paragraph:

19 "For me, there are three lessons at a high level to
20 be learnt from Grenfell. The first is that the mutual
21 aid processes were not invoked early enough. They
22 should have been invoked immediately. Clearly, we have,
23 as discussed, the peer review underway to try to stop
24 that issue ever happening again."

25 Just pausing there, dealing with the first issue

87

1 that you identified there, what do you mean by saying
2 that the mutual aid ought to have been invoked earlier?

3 A. So I think there's what I meant at the time, and then
4 I would put an additional comment on it now. What
5 I meant at the time was that the scale of the incident
6 and RBKC's, you know, preparedness to respond to it,
7 clearly the incident was, you know, beyond their
8 capability, and they really needed to get help in
9 a structured way to put a proper operation in place.

10 The thing I would add to that now is that, reading
11 the version of the humanitarian assistance framework,
12 5.0, that was draft — that was in use at that time, is,
13 you know, I think actually that makes fairly clear that
14 mutual aid should have been invoked, and also,
15 of course, that, you know, a humanitarian assistance
16 liaison officer should have been appointed immediately.

17 Q. You then say:

18 "The second issue — which the Chair rightly referred
19 to — is that, with the best response in the world,
20 pre-existing conditions in the community and the
21 relationship between the community and its council can
22 create a challenge that the theory of a response and
23 recovery operation may not anticipate. We could have
24 a perfect response recovery operation ready to go but it
25 deals with real people and real situations and so we

88

1 have to deal with that. The third high-level area of
2 learning is about the resources that were available to
3 LLAG to deploy and whether we have the right
4 capabilities available to us. We have talked about one
5 example in terms of liaison with affected families.
6 There is a lesson to be learnt that that was not quite
7 right."

8 You have already alluded to one additional comment
9 that you would make as to what you saw the concerns
10 being. With the passage of time, have you since
11 reflected on any other?

12 A. I mean, I think that stands up well in terms of the,
13 you know, key issues. I think clearly there were,
14 you know, some issues about preparedness of boroughs,
15 particularly K&C, and all the processes that should have
16 been there to ensure that boroughs were prepared. But
17 equally I can understand the challenges in achieving
18 that. But that's, I think, another real area of focus
19 that's needed.

20 Q. Have you since reflected that maybe there was more that
21 you could have done to ensure that the response in those
22 early days was well managed?

23 A. So I think in terms of the specific incident, you know,
24 the GLA as a partner didn't receive the information
25 about what was going on on the ground and the failings

89

1 that there were in order for us as a partner to raise
2 concerns and try and see to them, that they were
3 addressed, and that was for us the fundamental
4 challenge, is the lack of visibility into what was going
5 on.

6 Q. Having had that reflection, what have you or the GLA
7 done since to rectify that?

8 A. So on that specific point, we now have a team, the
9 London situational awareness team, which is a 24/7
10 function which monitors information about what is going
11 on in London, so both information from resilience
12 partners but also open-source information on the
13 internet, social media and so forth, and maintains
14 relationships with the relevant government machinery in
15 order that, you know, we get, first, early notification
16 of incidents and, secondly, regular reporting on them.
17 So we have that capacity, and then, you know, they're
18 also there when a major incident is declared in support
19 of our involvement in the SCG in terms of creating
20 an incident log and other such things.

21 Q. I'd like to move on to another topic, please.

22 In your first witness statement — and we'll have it
23 up in front of us — page 25 {MOL00000025/25},
24 paragraph 118, you refer to the role of the Mayor of
25 London, and I'd like to ask you about that.

90

1 Paragraph 118, the end of the second line:

2 "There are clear limits to the Mayor's role in
3 an incident of this nature. Given the Mayor does not
4 have any direct operational responsibility to respond to
5 such an incident, he could not have pursued a more
6 active role in terms of the resilience arrangements
7 post-Grenfell without both breaching agreed protocols
8 and taking responsibility from RBKC (itself
9 a democratically-elected public authority) without any
10 legal basis for doing so. Instead he offered and
11 provided active support to those who had those powers."

12 At paragraph 119 you go on to say:

13 "I stated in my evidence before the Oversight
14 Committee [you give the reference for it] ... that
15 the Mayor had 'a role in terms of communication in
16 amplifying the messages from those with operational
17 command'. This emphasises the fact that the Mayor's
18 primary role is to communicate and provide reassurance
19 to Londoners with regard to an incident of this nature.
20 The existing resilience arrangements do not envisage, or
21 permit, the Mayor to intervene in terms of coordinating
22 any operational response. Whether that is a
23 satisfactory state of affairs is a matter the Mayor
24 urges the Inquiry to consider."

25 In his statement, the Mayor of London — if we can

91

1 go to that statement, it's {MOL00000189/24}. He says at
2 paragraph 102 at the bottom of the page:

3 "... the key point is that under the relevant
4 arrangements it is entirely for the borough in which
5 a civil emergency occurs to decide when to request
6 mutual aid. There was and still is no process which
7 allows a third party to step in and insist that mutual
8 aid is invoked. This means that if a borough is not
9 dealing with an emergency effectively but for some
10 reason does not ask for help, there is nothing that
11 London Resilience or anyone else can do to take control
12 of the situation."

13 At paragraph 113 {MOL00000189/27}, he goes on to
14 say, in the middle of the paragraph:

15 "... for the Mayor to have the ability to determine
16 whether aspects of the response and recovery from
17 a civil emergency should be left with the local borough
18 or assigned at a [local] level."

19 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: "... a London level."

20 MS MALHOTRA: "... London [local] level."

21 I would like to explore this a little further with
22 you, if I may, please.

23 A representative of the Greater London Authority was
24 present at all the SCG meetings between 14 and 20 June,
25 weren't they?

92

1 A. They were.
 2 Q. The three of you that attended, we've already
 3 established, were members of the Mayor of London's
 4 Gold Group in response to the Grenfell Tower; that's
 5 right, isn't it?
 6 A. The Gold Cell, yes.
 7 Q. The Mayor's Gold Cell would meet often multiple times
 8 a day, would it?
 9 A. As we felt necessary, yes.
 10 Q. There were also two ministerial meetings, one on the
 11 14th and another on 15 June. You attended both of those
 12 meetings and the Mayor of London dialled in to the
 13 meeting on the 15th; is that correct?
 14 A. No, he dialled in to the meeting on the 14th. He didn't
 15 attend in any way the meeting on the 15th.
 16 Q. Thank you. You attended both of those meetings; is that
 17 right?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Would you agree that these meetings were attended by key
 20 ministers involved in the response to the Grenfell Tower
 21 fire?
 22 A. I would agree that they were attended by relevant
 23 ministers, you know, from the government department —
 24 the key government departments related to the incident.
 25 Q. And from 16 June, those meetings morphed into the

93

1 Grenfell Tower recovery taskforce meetings, which took
 2 place once a day, the majority of which were chaired by
 3 the then Prime Minister; is that right?
 4 A. Yes, that's right.
 5 Q. You attended four out of five of those meetings between
 6 16 to 20 June; is that right?
 7 A. So I think in that total you're also including
 8 official —level meetings, which weren't chaired by the
 9 Prime Minister but by the Deputy National Security
 10 Adviser, but yes. Other than the meeting on the
 11 Saturday, I attended all the others, yes.
 12 Q. And the Mayor of London attended two out of five of
 13 those meetings between 16 to 20 June; is that right?
 14 A. Yes, I believe — or was it three? He attended on the
 15 Saturday, the Monday, and then possibly we've just
 16 slipped outside your time period, the Wednesday.
 17 Q. It was open to you or the Mayor of London to raise any
 18 issues in those meetings, wasn't it?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. You spoke with Katharine Hammond, as we have heard, and
 21 you had an opportunity to raise any concerns with her
 22 privately if needed; is that right?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. Would you accept that the Mayor of London and his office
 25 had access at a very high level to those who could

94

1 influence the trajectory of the response?
 2 A. If you — well, as we say, the response, obviously, is
 3 across the partnership, responding to a range of aspects
 4 of it. Clearly, you know, we had — you know, certainly
 5 the Mayor spoke to the leader of RBKC. We spent a lot
 6 of time trying different officers to speak to RBKC, as,
 7 the evidence showed, did others, and failed to do so.
 8 So we certainly, you know, as partners, had the
 9 theoretical ability, but it clearly proved challenging
 10 to do so.
 11 Q. Would you accept, by virtue of the Mayor of London's
 12 presence at key meetings, that there was opportunity to
 13 influence?
 14 A. So opportunity to influence what?
 15 Q. Opportunity to influence what was happening on the
 16 ground.
 17 A. So there was the opportunity to contribute to the
 18 co—ordination — through the SCG, there was opportunity
 19 to be involved in the co—ordination of what was going on
 20 on the ground. Clearly what the SCG wasn't seeing from
 21 RBKC is any detail about what was or was not happening
 22 in order that, you know, we could say, "Well, hang on
 23 a minute, that's a problem, isn't it?"
 24 Q. Do you consider the Greater London Authority and the
 25 Mayor's role as having oversight responsibility for

95

1 London Resilience that they would have had influence and
 2 authority in what occurred in the aftermath of the
 3 Grenfell Tower fire?
 4 A. So we touched on this earlier. Our responsibilities for
 5 London Resilience are as a category 1 responder, which,
 6 as we said, is a slightly unusual situation, because
 7 we're not an operational responder, we're a strategic
 8 authority, but clearly that was the mechanism that was
 9 taken to get us involved in the LRF so that we could
 10 take on those responsibilities.
 11 From there, you know, as a responder, we have our
 12 duties under the Act to co—operate, and they're
 13 overwhelmingly referring to the preparedness. It didn't
 14 give us any powers to involve ourselves in the response
 15 activities of any individual responder.
 16 Q. Do you consider, Mr Bellamy, that if the existing
 17 procedures — and by that I mean the LLAG and mutual aid
 18 agreements — had been effectively deployed, there would
 19 still remain a need to strengthen the role of the Mayor
 20 of London as you suggest?
 21 A. So I consider that if the frameworks and protocols in
 22 place had been followed perfectly, ie at, let's say,
 23 4.00 am on Wednesday the 14th RBKC had said —
 24 you know, looked at the humanitarian assistance
 25 framework, you know, activated that, appointed

96

1 a suitably experienced and qualified humanitarian
2 assistance liaison officer, and recognised in accordance
3 with the framework that they needed mutual aid, and if,
4 through that and discussions with London Local Authority
5 Gold, the appropriate structure for that local authority
6 partnership effort could have been established, then
7 there would have been, you know, no need for the Mayor
8 to have any further power. Because, to be clear, what
9 we absolutely see is, you know, what we saw belatedly
10 happen after Grenfell, was local authority colleagues
11 stepping in to, you know, help and contribute, because
12 they're emphatically the people with the skillset to do
13 this. The GLA, as a strategic policy authority, in
14 general wouldn't have the people with the right skills
15 to carry out the responsibilities of a local authority,
16 nor would we seek to do so, as the Mayor said in his
17 statement.

18 Q. Would you accept that there were a number of reviews
19 that have been undertaken into London Resilience since
20 the Grenfell Tower fire, culminating with the EP2020
21 refresh report written by Mark Sawyer? None of those
22 reports suggest a greater role of the Mayor of London,
23 do they?

24 A. So in terms of reviews of London Resilience, yeah,
25 you're talking about the Riordan and Ney review related

97

1 to local authority arrangements, not London Resilience
2 generally, and no, they — yeah, that review doesn't
3 suggest a change, no.

4 Q. Mark Sawyer, when giving his evidence to the Inquiry,
5 was asked about the role of the Mayor of London, and we
6 can go to his transcript. It's {Day278/184:3}. He was
7 asked the question:

8 "Question: What is your view as to the suggestion
9 which is made by the Mayor of London in their opening
10 submissions to this module that there may be a need for
11 the formal role of the Mayor of London in a civil
12 emergency to be expanded in carefully defined
13 circumstances to require the invocation of mutual aid
14 and appropriate leadership arrangements? In other
15 words, it seems to have some role in the activation of
16 the Gold resolution.

17 "Answer: I would suggest that that may well be
18 legally challenging, to find a solution to that. But
19 that said, I believe that by better defining the role of
20 Local Authority Gold, by establishing that proactive
21 approach to ensuring that we don't wait to be asked, we
22 actually ask — the Local Authority Gold asks, 'Do you
23 need help, support?', by applying that more proactive
24 approach, we will hopefully have addressed the concerns
25 that arose during Grenfell."

98

1 A. Could I respond to that? Is that ...?

2 So, respectfully, I disagree with him. I think what
3 the evidence shows from Grenfell is that there were lots
4 of people offering aid and assistance to RBKC, but they
5 were fine, thank you, and didn't wish to avail
6 themselves of it. I think — and that is the challenge.

7 Where I think Mr Sawyer is right is that legally
8 there is no power and no ability for the Mayor currently
9 to step in. Boroughs are sovereign, as we know, and —
10 but, of course, you know, the law can be changed.

11 The question I put is that if you look at what
12 happened, and we've had the discussion about the evening
13 of the 15th and then obviously matters went on into the
14 16th, you know, we were reliant on the chief executive
15 of RBKC accepting mutual aid, and if a decision needs to
16 be made in a case where a chief executive is not —
17 you know, through shock or whatever reason, not
18 understanding the scale of what's before them, who is to
19 make that decision?

20 So with Grenfell, it could have been the chief
21 executive of the City of London Corporation, as chair of
22 the London Council, but I fail to see what democratic
23 accountability there is in a chief executive from one
24 area taking, you know, a decision that ultimately, as we
25 saw on the Friday, was taking away — you know, it took

99

1 away powers from a borough chief executive. It could be
2 the chair of London Councils, who at the time was the
3 leader of Haringey, but, again, what's Haringey got to
4 do with Kensington and Chelsea?

5 And that's where I come back to the Mayor of London
6 as somebody elected by the people of all of London,
7 including K&C.

8 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, but this is a political
9 question, isn't it? Because what's being suggested is
10 the Mayor should have powers to intervene, overriding
11 the role of the boroughs, or a particular borough, and
12 whether that's desirable or not would seem to me to be
13 a political question.

14 A. Well, I'm not sure. I think sometimes, with respect,
15 people describe things as political questions when
16 I wouldn't, I think they're questions. I think,
17 you know, the question is: who takes the decision?
18 You know? For really important matters, such as
19 matters, you know, like you say, potentially taking the
20 responsibility away from a borough for a period of time
21 and assigning it to somebody else, I'd rather those
22 decisions were taken by somebody democratically elected
23 and accountable.

24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, all right, thank you.

25 MS MALHOTRA: You may have already answered this, but

100

1 considering all of these matters, do you still share the
 2 Mayor's view that the role of the Mayor in civil
 3 emergencies should be expanded, as he says in his
 4 statement at paragraph 113 {MOL00000189/27}?

5 A. Yes, with appropriate safeguards about the role,
 6 thinking about -- you know, it could be that, you know,
 7 it's about receiving, perhaps, a report or assurance
 8 from the strategic co-ordination group that the Mayor
 9 could then consider if need be. You know, I'm not here
 10 suggesting a kind of unilateral thing, that the Mayor
 11 can just, you know, decide whatever the Mayor of the day
 12 wishes.

13 MS MALHOTRA: Thank you, Mr Bellamy. Those are the
 14 questions I have for you.

15 Thank you.

16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, thank you.

17 Well, Mr Bellamy, when we get to this point, we have
 18 to have a short break, first to let counsel check that
 19 she has asked all the questions she should have asked,
 20 and also to allow other people who are following the
 21 proceedings from elsewhere to suggest questions that
 22 we haven't thought of but they think perhaps we should
 23 put to you.

24 So we're going to take a short break. I'm going to
 25 say that we'll come back at 1 o'clock, and at that point

101

1 we'll see if there are any more questions for you --

2 THE WITNESS: Okay.

3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: -- and how we go from there.

4 All right?

5 While you're out of the room, I have to ask you,
 6 please, not to talk to anyone about your evidence, as
 7 before.

8 THE WITNESS: Of course.

9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right?

10 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. Would you go
 12 with the usher, please.

13 (Pause)

14 Ms Malhotra, I said 1 o'clock. I know that's
 15 a short time. If you find that you need more time, will
 16 you ask the usher to come and tell us?

17 MS MALHOTRA: I'm very grateful.

18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.

19 (12.54 pm)

20 (A short break)

21 (1.02 pm)

22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, Mr Bellamy. Well, we'll see
 23 if there are any more questions for you.

24 Yes, Ms Malhotra.

25 MS MALHOTRA: Just one question, Mr Bellamy.

102

1 Is there anything you would wish to add to your
 2 evidence that is relevant to the Inquiry's
 3 investigations that I have not covered with you?

4 A. I think I'd just like the opportunity to say that
 5 obviously mine is an internal-facing role, and I just
 6 wanted to take this opportunity publicly to say,
 7 you know, to the survivors, the bereaved, local
 8 residents, how very sorry I am for what happened.
 9 I consider that they were failed not just here and
 10 there, but I think the evidence of this Inquiry has
 11 shown that, you know, they were failed by us as
 12 a society, and I think it's incumbent on all of us to,
 13 you know, do whatever we can to ensure that nothing like
 14 that ever happens again.

15 I think I've kind of outlined in evidence some of
 16 the things that we at the GLA have done since then, and
 17 that's very important that we all do that, and that
 18 everybody looks critically at that.

19 I also want to, in that spirit, acknowledge those
 20 people who, when RBKC failed, came to help. They didn't
 21 have to do so. The only reason that they did was
 22 a desire for public service, and I think that's the
 23 spirit that all of us need to keep in our minds as we,
 24 you know, move forward and do all we can to ensure that
 25 nothing like this ever happens again.

103

1 MS MALHOTRA: Well, thank you, Mr Bellamy. All that's left
 2 is for me to thank you for coming today to give your
 3 evidence.

4 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'd like to add my thanks,
 6 Mr Bellamy, on behalf of the panel as a whole. It's
 7 been very interesting to hear what you have to tell us,
 8 and very helpful to us as well. So thank you very much
 9 for giving us your time to come and give evidence.

10 Thank you.

11 THE WITNESS: Thank you, I'm grateful for the opportunity.

12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Now, of course, you're free to go.

13 Thank you.

14 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

15 (The witness withdrew)

16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Ms Malhotra.

17 Well, we have another witness, but not until after
 18 the break. So we'll stop now for lunch and we'll
 19 resume, please, at 2.05. All right?

20 2.05, please. Thank you.

21 (1.05 pm)

22 (The short adjournment)

23 (2.05 pm)

24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.

25 MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman, good afternoon. Good

104

1 afternoon, members of the panel.
 2 I now call Mr Nicholas Hurd, please.
 3 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you.
 4 MR NICHOLAS HURD (affirmed)
 5 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you very much. Please sit
 6 down, make yourself comfortable.
 7 (Pause)
 8 All right?
 9 Yes, Mr Millett.
 10 Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY
 11 MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman, thank you.
 12 Mr Hurd, good afternoon. Can I start by thanking
 13 you very much for coming to the Inquiry and assisting us
 14 with our investigations. We are extremely grateful to
 15 you.
 16 As with all witnesses before you, can I give you one
 17 or two coaching tips, please.
 18 First, keep your voice up, so that the person who
 19 sits to your right can get down everything you say nice
 20 and clearly.
 21 Secondly, please don't nod or shake your head —
 22 you've just nodded — you need to say "Yes" or "No",
 23 thank you very much.
 24 We will have breaks in the normal way. I'm hoping
 25 to finish you this afternoon. You can help with that.

105

1 We will break at 3.15 or so in order to give everybody a
 2 breather.
 3 If any of my questions are unclear, please say so
 4 and I will happily rephrase the question or put it in
 5 a different way.
 6 Now, you have made two statements to the Inquiry.
 7 Everything we're going to look at together will appear
 8 on the screen. The first one is at {HOM00046080}.
 9 Is that your first witness statement to the Inquiry?
 10 A. It is.
 11 Q. Thank you.
 12 Can we go, please, to page 21, where there is
 13 a signature. Is that your signature above the date?
 14 A. It is.
 15 Q. Thank you.
 16 Can we please go to {HOM00050072}. Is that your
 17 second or supplementary witness statement to
 18 the Inquiry?
 19 A. It is.
 20 Q. Thank you.
 21 If we go, please, to page 9, you will see
 22 a signature above the date of 2 April 2020. Is that
 23 your signature?
 24 A. It is.
 25 Q. Have you read each of these statements recently?

106

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. Now, apart from one correction, which I think you have
 3 acknowledged through your solicitors, which we'll come
 4 to, can we confirm that the contents are true?
 5 A. Apart from that material correction, yes.
 6 Q. Yes.
 7 Now, I'm going to look at three areas with you:
 8 firstly, and briefly, your background and role at the
 9 time of the fire in June 2017; secondly, the role of the
 10 Home Office more broadly; and, thirdly, your own
 11 involvement in the response in the first seven days.
 12 Can I then turn to your political background.
 13 I am right, I think, that you are a member of the
 14 Conservative party; yes?
 15 A. I am.
 16 Q. And previously the Member of Parliament for Ruislip,
 17 Northwood and Pinner; yes?
 18 A. That's right.
 19 Q. In relation to your ministerial career, I think you were
 20 Parliamentary Secretary, Minister for Civil Society,
 21 between May 2010 and July 2014; is that right?
 22 A. That's correct.
 23 Q. And Parliamentary Under—Secretary of State at the
 24 Department for International Development between 2015
 25 and 2016.

107

1 A. That's correct.
 2 Q. And Minister of State for Climate Change and Industry at
 3 the BEIS, the Department for Business, Energy and
 4 Industrial Strategy, between July 2016 and June 2017.
 5 A. That's correct.
 6 Q. Yes, thank you.
 7 Now, at the time of the Grenfell Tower fire, I think
 8 you had just been appointed Minister of State for
 9 Policing and the Fire Service.
 10 A. That's correct.
 11 Q. You had been in post, I think, for something like
 12 two days before the fire.
 13 A. I think I was appointed on the Monday evening.
 14 Q. Right, so two days.
 15 Now, the ministerial role fell, I think, within the
 16 ambit of the Home Office's responsibility; is that
 17 right?
 18 A. That's correct.
 19 Q. Yes. On 26 June 2017, I think you were appointed
 20 Minister for the Victims of the Grenfell Tower Fire; is
 21 that right?
 22 A. That's correct.
 23 Q. Yes, and whose decision, do you know, was it to create
 24 that role?
 25 A. I can't be sure. I've always assumed it came from

108

1 Number 10.

2 Q. What did your role and responsibilities as Minister for
3 the Victims of the Grenfell Tower Fire involve?

4 A. I think they were three-fold.

5 The first was to support the victims unit in trying
6 to give direct assistance where we could to victims, and
7 I know the word "victims" is sensitive, but I will use
8 it because that was the name of the unit.

9 The second was to try and act as some sort of bridge
10 between the community and central government at a time
11 when it was clearly needed, because the context was one
12 of zero trust and engagement.

13 And I think there was a third, longer-term
14 dimension, which was a recognition that the road to
15 recovery was going to be long, and the experience from
16 precedents such as Hillsborough suggested that there
17 might be value in having a minister in the system that
18 would effectively act as some sort of advocate for the
19 community within the system, because life and politics
20 and the media, always a risk that they might move on and
21 that the critical issues that the community still
22 required might lose some sense of focus inside
23 government. I think there was a risk around that.

24 So those were the three dimensions of the role as
25 I understood it.

109

1 Q. That ministerial role, am I right, sat within the
2 Department for Communities and Local Government, DCLG?

3 A. That's right.

4 Q. Right. Did that overlap with your Home Office role?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Right.

7 Is it right that you held that role, the Minister
8 for the Victims of the Grenfell Tower Fire, until the
9 2019 general election?

10 A. Yes, when I stood down.

11 Q. When you stood down. Did anybody take that ministership
12 up, that ministerial post up, on from you?

13 A. No, the arrangement with the Prime Minister was that
14 I would continue to perform a role on a voluntary basis
15 as an independent adviser to him, supported by
16 Elizabeth Sanderson.

17 Q. Right.

18 Now, I think it's right, isn't it, that on
19 26 March 2020, you were appointed the Prime Minister's
20 independent adviser on Grenfell? Is that right?

21 A. Could you repeat the date?

22 Q. March 2020.

23 A. That sounds about right.

24 Q. Are you still in that position?

25 A. Yes.

110

1 Q. So does that involve advising the Prime Minister and
2 ministers and public bodies on Grenfell-related issues?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And you occupy that role today, do you?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. What type of Grenfell-related issues would you or will
7 you be addressing?

8 A. A very live one in recent months has been the process of
9 decision-making and engagement on the highly sensitive
10 issue of the future of the tower.

11 Q. Right.

12 Would your role involve examining and advising on
13 the effect of the report and the recommendations of this
14 panel?

15 A. One of the — my memory is that one of the first things
16 that we did in the new role was to encourage new
17 processes inside government and mechanisms of
18 accountability to make it clearer to the community what
19 progress was being made against the recommendations of
20 your first report, Chair.

21 Q. And that fell, and falls even today, within your remit,
22 does it?

23 A. There's no official remit. I think the role that
24 Elizabeth Sanderson and I play is to pick up — is to
25 stay engaged with the community, pick up problems, raise

111

1 them with government, and where there are issues and
2 difficulties and sensitivities, try and make sure that
3 the government fully understands the community's
4 position.

5 Q. Right. But does that involve, or might it involve,
6 examining and advising on the effect of the report and
7 the recommendations of this panel?

8 A. So, again, one of the feedback we got from the community
9 in the early days was, "We don't know what the
10 government is doing in relation to the recommendations
11 of the first report". In my experience, not
12 untypically, actually there was a huge amount going on,
13 but the government was absolutely lousy in communicating
14 it, and there wasn't a system inside the government to
15 really drive accountability for it, including the London
16 Fire Brigade. So our recommendation, which was
17 accepted, was there would be a ministerial group to
18 drive that forward, and within that a process was
19 developed to deliver a dashboard that the community
20 could access which would allow them to get to the
21 information they wanted, specifically on the progress
22 made against the recommendations made by this Inquiry.
23 So that would be one example of something where we'd
24 heard some feedback from the community, took it into
25 government, and through, you know, our advice to the

112

1 Prime Minister and Number 10, tried to engineer
 2 something that we thought was helpful.
 3 Q. Right. I mean, is it right that your role, as described
 4 just now, will examine the effect of the report and the
 5 recommendations of the panel based, as it might be, in
 6 part, on the evidence you're giving today?
 7 A. As I said, the remit is very broad. Where we feel the
 8 Prime Minister needs advice, we will give it. Normally,
 9 I would say, in practice, we are heavily led and
 10 influenced by what we hear from our relationship and our
 11 engagement with the community.
 12 Q. Have you or, to your own knowledge, the Prime Minister
 13 considered the risk and extent of any conflicts inherent
 14 in your accepting that role or continuing to occupy that
 15 role, the independent adviser to the Prime Minister, at
 16 the same time as being a witness?
 17 A. I don't remember any material conversation around that.
 18 The system, if I can use that shorthand, was well aware
 19 that I was a core participant. No issues were raised in
 20 that respect.
 21 Q. Was any consideration given, to your knowledge, within
 22 central government, by you or anybody else, to how it
 23 could be that you could at one and the same time be
 24 a factual witness to the Inquiry, but at the same time
 25 be the Prime Minister's independent adviser in respect

113

1 of it?
 2 A. Well, I think — with the current Prime Minister,
 3 I think the basis of the ongoing relationship was rooted
 4 in a desire to see some continuity, because there was
 5 a recognition that Secretaries of State have come and
 6 gone, ministers have come and gone, and that there was
 7 value in having some people helping to advise who had
 8 been involved in the process since the immediate
 9 aftermath of the terrible disaster. I think that was
 10 the primary driver of the current arrangement.
 11 As I say, I don't recall any conversations about
 12 potential conflicts of interest, and there was, as far
 13 as I understand it, awareness that, you know, I might be
 14 called here as a witness at some point in the process.
 15 Q. Now, let's turn to your knowledge of the CCA, the Civil
 16 Contingencies Act 2004.
 17 Can I take it that you have heard of that piece of
 18 legislation?
 19 A. I have.
 20 Q. Yes. At the time of the fire, June 2017, were you aware
 21 of the regulations promulgated under that Act?
 22 A. No.
 23 Q. You weren't? Were you aware of the statutory guidance,
 24 Emergency Preparedness?
 25 A. No.

114

1 Q. And I think we can take it that you were not aware,
 2 therefore, of the non-statutory guidance, Emergency
 3 Response and Recovery.
 4 A. No.
 5 Q. Or what's been called ConOps, which has the rather
 6 longer title of, "Responding to Emergencies: The UK
 7 Central Government Response, Concept of Operations".
 8 A. No.
 9 Q. No. Had you ever read any of that material?
 10 A. No, there was no reason for me to do so.
 11 Q. During your ministerial career, have you ever or had you
 12 ever received any training on civil resilience?
 13 A. None.
 14 Q. I want to ask you about your time as Minister for
 15 Policing and the Fire Service at the Home Office, but
 16 before I do, can I just ask you: is it the case that
 17 since January 2016, the Home Office was responsible for
 18 fire funding and policy framework in which the fire and
 19 rescue authorities operated?
 20 A. I believe that's the date. It certainly was my — one
 21 of my responsibilities as a new minister.
 22 Q. Yes.
 23 Now, turning to June 2017, was it your understanding
 24 at the time that the Home Office was the lead government
 25 department, or LGD, at least in respect of the immediate

115

1 response?
 2 A. It was made clear to me.
 3 Q. By whom?
 4 A. I can't recall exactly, but my expectation is it would
 5 be David Lamberti, from whom I think you have received
 6 evidence.
 7 Q. Yes. David Lamberti?
 8 A. Lamberti. Forgive the mispronunciation.
 9 Q. Yes. I think he was one of the Home Office — he was
 10 a Home Office official?
 11 A. He was one of my senior officials at the Home Office.
 12 Q. Yes, and we'll come to see his name when we see the list
 13 of attendees —
 14 A. Exactly.
 15 Q. — at the 16.00 14 June meeting, perhaps.
 16 Can you help us, when did the Home Office relinquish
 17 the role of lead government department in respect of the
 18 Grenfell Tower response or recovery?
 19 A. I'm not entirely sure there was a moment, or certainly
 20 I wasn't part of the moment. My sense is that during
 21 the course of, if I can shorthand, Thursday, there was
 22 a sort of growing recognition that CLG at the time was
 23 effectively becoming the lead ministry in terms of the
 24 evolution into the recovery phase.
 25 Q. Right. Was it your understanding that the CLG had some

116

1 responsibility as lead government department for some
 2 part of the response?
 3 A. My understanding was always that in — particularly in
 4 relation to the performance of the local government
 5 level 1 responder, I would naturally expect that the
 6 department with overall responsibility for local
 7 authorities would, in effect, take the lead in terms of
 8 the relationship and decision-makers in that specific
 9 context. For the blue lights, my expectation,
 10 of course, would be that the Home Office would lead on
 11 that.
 12 Q. Right.
 13 What was your understanding generally of the role of
 14 a lead government department in the response, the
 15 immediate response to an incident such as this?
 16 A. My basic understanding was that the principal role was
 17 of leading the co-ordination of the kind of support of
 18 the national government to the response, in line with
 19 the, you know, processes the legislation envisaged.
 20 Q. Right. Did you have a clear understanding of the
 21 responsibilities of a government department?
 22 A. I wouldn't describe it as very clear, Mr Millett. As
 23 you said at the top, I'd been in post for a day.
 24 Q. Yes.
 25 Did you understand — and I'm quoting from ConOps,

117

1 chapter 2, 2.8, but let me put it to you without going
 2 to the document — that the lead government department
 3 usually takes overall responsibility for assessing the
 4 situation, ensuring that its ministers and other
 5 relevant ministers are briefed, handling media and
 6 parliamentary interest, and providing co-ordinated
 7 policy and other support as necessary to local
 8 responders?
 9 A. Yes, I think that was broadly what was explained to me,
 10 and I was aware that the Home Office had led in the
 11 production of the sitreps, and the fact that I was asked
 12 to chair the first meeting I think was evidence of
 13 clarity around the role of the Home Office in that
 14 specific immediate context.
 15 Q. Now, you say, "it was explained to me"; was that by
 16 David Lamberti or other officials?
 17 A. It wasn't explained in great depth. As we'll come on to
 18 see, the circumstances of that first day meant that
 19 there wasn't a lot of time for detailed explanation of
 20 the mechanics and detailed roles and responsibilities.
 21 I was asked to chair a meeting and was pitched pretty
 22 quickly into that.
 23 Q. Yes. Well, let's turn to that. That's the 14 June
 24 16.00 meeting.
 25 A. Correct.

118

1 Q. Now, it was called a cross-Whitehall ministerial
 2 meeting. That was a meeting, am I right, convened by
 3 the CCS, the civil contingencies secretariat, sitting
 4 within the Cabinet Office?
 5 A. That's my understanding.
 6 Q. Who was the person in that who asked you to chair the
 7 meeting?
 8 A. The person I think I first met and who briefed me was
 9 Katharine Hammond. The communication — the decision
 10 about the meeting was communicated to me I think at some
 11 point in my visit to the tower around the middle of the
 12 day.
 13 Q. Right. In general, can you help us —
 14 A. And that was relayed — sorry, that was relayed to me
 15 through the private office. I didn't speak to anyone
 16 directly.
 17 Q. Right.
 18 Let's go to {CAB00000118}, please. If we can go to
 19 the bottom of the page, page 1, we can see it's an email
 20 from Alastair Whitehead on 14 June 2017 at 10.04, and he
 21 is sending an email to the civil contingencies
 22 secretariat. Do you see that?
 23 A. I do.
 24 Q. If you turn to the top of page 2 {CAB00000118/2},
 25 Alastair Whitehead says:

119

1 "Thanks, I've discussed with Stuart, and the
 2 Prime Minister has asked for a cross-Whitehall
 3 coordination meeting this afternoon — given Home
 4 Secretary availability, I suggest we do this at Minister
 5 of State level, so chaired by Minister Policing & Fire,
 6 with Ministers from Health, Transport, Housing, London,
 7 etc. attending with the Mayor of London and operational
 8 commanders. We'll need to cover, among other
 9 things ..."
 10 Then there are four bullet points, and the third of
 11 which you will see:
 12 "Affected persons — immediate and medium-term
 13 rehousing, potential financial support if appropriate."
 14 Now, the Home Secretary at the time, I think, was
 15 Amber Rudd; is that right?
 16 A. That's correct.
 17 Q. Clearly there was an availability problem. What was
 18 that, do you know?
 19 A. I'm not aware of it.
 20 Q. Right. Was there anything unusual about you personally
 21 being asked to chair this meeting as opposed to her,
 22 given that she was Secretary of State?
 23 A. I wouldn't have known at the time because I wasn't aware
 24 of precedent. I had never been in that situation
 25 before. I'll be honest and say I felt it was strange at

120

1 the time, but when you're given that instruction, you
2 take it .
3 Q. You were given the instruction. You call it an
4 instruction . Who instructed you? I mean, you say —
5 A. As I said before, I received a message, I think, if my
6 memory is correct, on my — either on my way down to the
7 tower or back from it saying, "There's a meeting in
8 Whitehall, you're being asked to chair it and we need to
9 get back".
10 Q. I mean, I ask the question in view of the document on
11 the screen. Was it your understanding at the time that
12 the instruction , or perhaps I should say suggestion, had
13 come from Number 10? You can see it comes from —
14 A. No, I don't think I was clearly aware of that.
15 Q. Right.
16 Now, can you help with whether the chairing of that
17 meeting by you as opposed to the Home Secretary made any
18 difference to the official status of the meeting in your
19 understanding at the time?
20 A. Could you clarify what you mean by official status?
21 Because I'm aware that —
22 Q. Yes.
23 A. — you were trying to tease out of Katharine Hammond
24 some of the definitions around COBR.
25 Q. Well —

121

1 A. I'm here to be helpful, so perhaps direct me to what
2 you're particularly interested in.
3 Q. Yes, absolutely. Second line of the email at the top of
4 the page:
5 " ... given Home Secretary availability, I suggest we
6 do this at Minister of State level ..."
7 Now, was the lack of availability by the Home
8 Secretary a reason why this was done at a different
9 Minister of State level , in other words a more junior
10 Minister of State level?
11 A. I honestly can't answer that question. This is the
12 first time I've seen that email. I was just simply
13 told, "There's a meeting and you have been asked to
14 chair it".
15 Q. Was it your understanding at the time that the meeting,
16 being at Minister of State level , had a different status
17 from the same meeting had it been chaired by the
18 Home Secretary?
19 A. I think I was aware that that is a different type of
20 meeting, and I subsequently went on to participate in
21 the meetings chaired by the Prime Minister, and that was
22 clearly a different level of meeting. So, yes, that ...
23 Q. Right. But just focusing on the very first part of that
24 answer, when you say that that is a different type of
25 meeting, are you telling us that had Amber Rudd been

122

1 available for the meeting and chaired it, it would have
2 had a different status, a more exalted status?
3 A. I'm not — with respect to Amber Rudd, I'm not sure. My
4 personal — if I'm allowed to express a personal view,
5 my personal view is that those first two meetings should
6 have been chaired and populated at a more senior level,
7 and I'm happy to give my reasons why. Part of those
8 reasons why I think are about signalling , and we can —
9 I can expand on that if you want. I do, however,
10 perhaps register some sympathy with the position that
11 Katharine Hammond was trying to articulate with you,
12 that I'm not entirely sure that that would have resulted
13 in a different meeting.
14 Q. Right.
15 Then let's turn to the question of COBR.
16 Can we go, please, to Melanie Dawes' witness
17 statement for this part of the Inquiry. This is at
18 {CLG00030653/36}, paragraph 119. We can see there she
19 says in the second line, second sentence:
20 "When the Prime Minister chaired COBR on the Friday
21 this was very effective . It sent greater focus through
22 the system and had a positive impact on the wider
23 Government response."
24 Then she says this:
25 "Had the initial COBR meeting on the day of the fire

123

1 been chaired at Cabinet level , or by the Prime Minister,
2 it might have provided an additional layer of
3 questioning and challenge about the local response to
4 that being provided by MHCLG and the Home Office."
5 First , was it your understanding on the day that
6 that initial meeting was a COBR meeting, as she seems to
7 suggest there?
8 A. No, it was called something else.
9 Q. Well, we will see the minute and the other documents
10 around it, but I think it was a cross-ministerial —
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. — meeting. But was it your understanding — I think
13 you've said no, but to repeat the question, is this
14 right: your understanding was that this was not a COBR
15 meeting?
16 A. That was my understanding, yeah.
17 Q. And where did that understanding come from?
18 A. Perhaps not rooted in a deep understanding of, you know,
19 the COBR system, but my understanding of the COBR — of
20 a COBR meeting is that it's peopled by Secretaries of
21 State and often the Prime Minister in the chair. That
22 may have been my uninformed view, but that was my
23 definition of what a COBR meeting is, full fat.
24 Q. Right. Okay.
25 What was your understanding at the time of the

124

1 circumstances in which a COBR meeting full fat, as you
 2 describe it, would have been necessary or appropriate?
 3 A. Again, I come back to the point that at that moment on
 4 that day, I didn't have any profound personal experience
 5 of this to be making judgements, but, you know, I refer
 6 you to Katharine Hammond's evidence that, you know,
 7 a full —fat COBR, if you like, is called where it's very,
 8 very clear that national government has a major role to
 9 play and decisions are required by senior ministers, and
 10 I think you heard from her that wasn't necessarily the
 11 judgement on the first day.
 12 Q. Well, we'll work out in due course —
 13 A. Of course, sorry.
 14 Q. — what we did and didn't hear from her, but I want your
 15 understanding.
 16 Was it your understanding at the time that, whatever
 17 it was — and we are on 14 June, when the meeting is
 18 called — the Grenfell Tower fire at that point was not
 19 the kind of emergency which justified a full —fat COBR
 20 meeting?
 21 A. No, what I was told was that there was a cross—Whitehall
 22 ministerial meeting that, as the Minister for Policing
 23 and the Fire Service, two of the blue lights most
 24 directly involved in the response phase, I had been
 25 asked to chair the meeting. It wasn't until I got to

125

1 the meeting, had the briefing, that I had a full
 2 understanding of the purpose meeting (sic) and went
 3 straight into it.
 4 Q. By the time of the meeting, at 4 o'clock on that day,
 5 were you surprised in your own mind that a COBR meeting
 6 properly so called, as you understood it to have been,
 7 had not been convened?
 8 A. I think I have already expressed my personal view that
 9 it would have been appropriate to call a meeting at
 10 a more senior level from the start.
 11 Q. Now, looking at what Melanie Dawes says there on the
 12 screen, she says that if the meetings had been COBR or
 13 chaired by the Prime Minister, they might have provided
 14 an additional layer of questioning and challenge about
 15 the local response. Do you agree with that?
 16 A. No. I agree with the first part of her statement. As
 17 I said, I think that meeting should have been at the
 18 most senior level from the start. But that is largely
 19 because of the sheer weight of the moment and, you know,
 20 we are talking about a situation in which the country
 21 had woken up to one of the worst disasters in our
 22 memory. We all remember how we felt that day. I just
 23 felt that response was not proportionate to the anxiety
 24 and trauma in the community and the country, and that
 25 people expected to see a more senior level of leadership

126

1 from the start. That remains my private view.
 2 However — and I'm sorry if this is nuanced — I do
 3 think the fundamental problem in those two meetings from
 4 the point of view of central government was the lack of
 5 ground truth and the lack of reliable, good information
 6 about what was actually happening on the ground, which
 7 was completely unacceptable, and therefore my concern is
 8 that even if attendance had been at a more senior level,
 9 the brief would have been the same, the information to
 10 the meeting would have been the same, and that's why
 11 I caution against Melanie's extrapolation that somehow
 12 that would have resulted in a different level of
 13 challenge. I think the basic problem was the lack of
 14 ground truth in those meetings.
 15 Q. Now, just in that last answer, just picking out the
 16 thread of it, you say you felt that the response was not
 17 proportionate to the anxiety and trauma in the community
 18 and the country, and that people expected to see a more
 19 senior level of leadership from the start.
 20 Was that your view at the time, on the day, or is
 21 that your view as a result of later events?
 22 A. Well, thank you for allowing me to clarify that.
 23 I was — I think I've already said I was surprised on
 24 the day, but when you're asked to do things, you do it.
 25 So it is a judgement that has formed over time. But

127

1 I do register again my caveat to that judgement: I don't
 2 think people should extrapolate that necessarily as
 3 a result of that upgrading of the meeting to a more
 4 senior level, that necessarily the experience of the
 5 bereaved, survivors and residents would have changed
 6 materially in that first day.
 7 Q. Now, in paragraph 10 of your first statement
 8 {HOM00046080/3} — I don't think we don't need to go to
 9 them — you set out the objectives for the meeting in
 10 the chair's brief, which I think you were provided with
 11 by the Cabinet Office.
 12 A. Correct.
 13 Q. Let's go to that. It's at {HOM00046083}. The panel
 14 have seen it a number of times with earlier witnesses.
 15 Paragraph 1:
 16 "You are chairing a Ministerial meeting at 16:00 on
 17 the Grenfell Tower fire. The objectives for the meeting
 18 are to ensure a shared understanding of the latest
 19 situation and outlook, determine any national support
 20 that is needed for the immediate response and to discuss
 21 emerging key policy issues."
 22 Who prepared this document, do you know?
 23 A. I don't believe I ever asked. I think my assumption is
 24 it was produced by CCS with inputs from other people.
 25 Q. Right. So not from the Home Office officials directly,

128

1 or is that wrong?
2 A. I can't be sure. I was aware that the Home Office had
3 played a role in line with their responsibility in
4 assembling the sitreps and the information into that
5 meeting. In terms of who actually produced this chair's
6 briefing, I'm not sure I ever asked.
7 Q. Now, in both of your witness statements you have
8 referred to the fact, as you say, that Nicholas Holgate
9 dialled in to that meeting. I think you would wish to
10 correct that.
11 A. No, that was a mistake.
12 Q. Can you explain how that mistake arose?
13 A. Some muddle in my mind in terms of perhaps conflation of
14 meetings. I know that I wasn't alone in that muddle,
15 but I apologise for that muddle. I think, if I'm
16 honest, it probably also reflects an assumption that he
17 would have been there.
18 Q. Right. So can we take it that you had not read
19 Katharine Hammond's witness statement before you
20 provided your evidence or hadn't seen —
21 A. No, no, I hadn't read her witness statement at the time
22 in 2019 when I produced mine.
23 Q. No, and there may be a chronological reason for that.
24 Just to be very clear, in the light of the answer
25 you have just given, we have to correct, do we,

129

1 paragraph 9 of your first statement and paragraph 5 of
2 your second statement, where you refer to the fact that
3 Nicholas Holgate was on the call, or had dialled in to
4 the call?
5 A. Yes, and I apologise again if I've misled the Inquiry in
6 any way.
7 Q. Now, Nicholas Holgate was chief executive of Royal
8 Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, wasn't he?
9 A. Correct.
10 Q. And do you accept that his attendance at this meeting,
11 given that RBKC was the local authority category 1
12 responder, was extremely important?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Did you expect him to attend?
15 A. Yes, I believe so.
16 Q. And therefore his absence — is this right? — from the
17 meeting or from dialling in to the meeting by
18 teleconference would have been an obvious omission,
19 an obvious gap.
20 A. There's always a danger of looking at these things
21 through the lens of hindsight. Again, I'd ask
22 the Inquiry to understand the circumstances. I'd just
23 come from the tower, I'd walked into the Cabinet Office
24 building, into a briefing, you know, I'm engaged with
25 the need to chair a highly pressured and important

130

1 meeting, I'm going straight into a briefing, and I'm
2 being talked through the brief. There's a time
3 pressure. I don't think there was a lot of time for
4 debate around attendees, and I imagine I received some
5 assurances that the information that the meeting
6 required from the local authority was going to be
7 supplied in different ways.
8 You'll also see, Mr Millett, from the chairman's
9 brief that the questions that you might reasonably
10 expect to be directed at the council, I'm encouraged to
11 direct them to the Minister at the Communities and Local
12 Government.
13 Q. What was the source, as far as you can recall, of the
14 information about what was happening on the ground and
15 what RBKC was doing, if not Nicholas Holgate?
16 A. My understanding was that the information was going to
17 be provided through the Department of Communities and
18 Local Government, which is why the chair directed me to
19 ask those questions at Marcus Jones, I think was the
20 minister at the time, and we also, as you know, had the
21 Lord Mayor, I believe, on the phone at that meeting as
22 well.
23 Q. Well, yes. Now, let's look, then, in the light of that,
24 at the documents.
25 Can we go to the meeting minutes, please, and I want

131

1 to show you two versions of this and see if you can
2 assist.
3 Can we have up first, please, {CAB00002714}, and I'm
4 going to have at the same time, please, to save time,
5 a second or different version of the minutes at
6 {CAB00013811}.
7 First of all, we can see the first page, and they
8 look reasonably similar, but I want to direct your
9 attention, please, on the left-hand side, to, under the
10 "Key issues" section, (b), with the title "Immediate
11 shelter and medium term rehousing". Can you see that?
12 A. I can.
13 Q. Yes, and that says {CAB00002714}:
14 "The local Council were presently identifying
15 temporary accommodation for those residents of Grenfell
16 Tower. Longer-term re-housing would also be the
17 responsibility of the Council. The Council were not
18 currently asking for additional support."
19 Now, if you look at the right-hand side
20 {CAB00013811}, this is a different version of the
21 minutes, for the same meeting, and under the same
22 heading, under (b), "Immediate shelter and medium term
23 rehousing", it says this:
24 "THE MINISTER FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT stated that
25 the local Council were presently identifying temporary

132

1 accommodation for those residents of Grenfell Tower.
 2 Longer-term re-housing would also be the responsibility
 3 of the Council. The MAYOR OF LONDON pressed for further
 4 reassurance and requested that contact was made with the
 5 local Council to ensure that affected individuals are
 6 not left without accommodation."
 7 Now, first, are you able to help us understand why
 8 there are two versions of this minute with different
 9 texts under that heading?
 10 A. I can't. As I think the Inquiry are aware, these
 11 minutes were not circulated and the first time I've seen
 12 them is in preparing for this session.
 13 Q. So that answers my next question.
 14 Then doing the best you can with your recollection,
 15 can you assist us with whether what we see on the
 16 right-hand side of the screen, which is longer and more
 17 detailed, was what was said?
 18 A. I can't be sure. Where I'm guided to is the actions
 19 from the meeting, which explicitly require the
 20 department to liaise with the council in terms of
 21 support for housing. So — and accommodation. So
 22 that — my understanding of that, there would be
 23 a discussion in the meeting, there may have been the
 24 position on the left stated, which the council were not
 25 currently asking for additional support, and there may

133

1 well have been a debate that resulted in that action.
 2 The level to which the Mayor of London participated in
 3 that debate, I can't quite remember.
 4 Q. No.
 5 Do you recall, first of all, the Minister for Local
 6 Government — who I think was Marcus Jones, wasn't it?
 7 A. That's my recollection.
 8 Q. Yes. Does that help you with who was providing the
 9 update in respect of the local council?
 10 A. I think, with respect, I'd already answered that. It
 11 was the department and he was the minister, and he was
 12 the one I was directed to ask the questions to in the
 13 chairman's brief.
 14 Q. Yes, and therefore — I'm sorry to press.
 15 A. No.
 16 Q. Therefore, is it your recollection that it was the
 17 Minister for Local Government, Marcus Jones, who said
 18 the local council are presently identifying temporary
 19 accommodation?
 20 A. I can't be sure because I don't have a very accurate
 21 reflection of the flow of the conversation, but the
 22 minute states that position was stated and my
 23 extrapolation of this and the actions is that there was
 24 a debate around that point and an action for the
 25 department to liaise with the council, and that may or

134

1 may not have reflected a level of uncertainty and lack
 2 of confidence in the statement that they didn't need
 3 support.
 4 Q. Do you recall the Mayor or the Mayor's representative
 5 there pressing for the further reassurances identified
 6 in the second part of that paragraph on the right?
 7 A. I can't recollect it clearly, but that's not to say it
 8 didn't happen.
 9 Q. Looking at the left-hand side and the last sentence, it
 10 says:
 11 "The Council were not currently asking for
 12 additional support."
 13 Do you recall that being said?
 14 A. I can't remember it being said explicitly, but if it's
 15 minuted this explicitly then I think it's reasonable to
 16 assume that it was stated as such.
 17 Q. Yes.
 18 Now, just picking up on the chair's brief you
 19 referred to — and you're right to say that you were
 20 directed to ask Marcus Jones the question. Let's look
 21 at that. That's at {HOM00046083/2}, paragraph 5d. It's
 22 at the top of page 2. There it is, and if you look at
 23 5d:
 24 "ASK DCLG (Marcus Jones MP) what other support has
 25 been put in place to assist those affected (in

135

1 particular whether sufficient rest centres have been
 2 established and if support being provided to victims'
 3 families)."
 4 Did you ask that question, do you think?
 5 A. I can't recall explicitly asking it, but I do note that
 6 in the minutes of the meeting, if they're accurately
 7 reported, it makes clear that the chair gave every
 8 department the opportunity to raise problems, and what
 9 I can see clearly is that no problem was raised in that
 10 respect, or otherwise it would have been recorded in the
 11 minutes and I would have hoped some actions would have
 12 flowed from it.
 13 So I'm sorry not to be more clear on that, but
 14 that's the best that my memory can assist with at the
 15 moment.
 16 Q. We can see, if we look back at it — but take this from
 17 me because it's gone from the screen — there is no
 18 record in either version of the minutes of any
 19 discussion of that nature?
 20 A. No, and I accept that, where — what I do see is that
 21 that section of the conversation in the meeting threw up
 22 an action in relation to liaison with the council about
 23 provision of accommodation, which suggests that there
 24 was a debate around the position that had been stated by
 25 the department and a requirement of the department to

136

1 liaise more closely with the council to see whether they
2 could help with something that was clearly an urgent
3 problem.
4 Q. There was no discussion about rest centres or their —
5 A. I think if there had been a discussion on the
6 rest centres, it would — likely to have been recorded.
7 You will know that in the CRIP or the sitrep there are
8 some basic facts about the establishment of the
9 rest centres. It may be that the department recorded
10 that. In the absence of anyone — and, of course, this
11 is unforgivable in hindsight, but in the absence of
12 anyone raising a problem, the conversation moves on.
13 And I know that's very difficult for people to
14 understand now we know the reality that was being
15 endured by families at that time. But no problem was
16 raised — I believe that no problem was raised in that
17 meeting as it should have been.
18 Q. Allied to that, let's go back, then, to the version of
19 the minutes, the slightly longer version,
20 {CAB00013811/2}. If we can go to the top of page 2,
21 please, we can see a section headed, "Support for those
22 affected and families", and it says:
23 "There was discussion around offering Trauma
24 Counselling to firefighters and ambulance workers
25 involved in the incident. THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR

137

1 HEALTH said that NHS England provided Bereavement and
2 Trauma Counselling services and that these could be made
3 available to those who needed it."
4 There is no record there of any discussion about
5 actual support for the families affected, the bereaved
6 or potentially bereaved, is there?
7 A. No, and I think there is a problem with this minute, if
8 I might explain, because I have some personal
9 responsibility for this particular focus on trauma
10 counselling for firefighters. So there was a discussion
11 around it. I'm as clear as I can be it did not take
12 place within the context of conversation around support
13 for those affected and families. Why would it? And I'm
14 happy to explain why prominence was given to that issue,
15 if it's of interest to the Inquiry.
16 Q. Well, it might be, but first, factual question number 1:
17 was there a discussion about this kind of counselling
18 being offered to the families at this meeting?
19 A. Well, if I can just explain why emphasis was given on
20 counselling to the firefighters, I can explain that
21 because I have personal responsibility for it.
22 Q. Yes.
23 A. So I had come to this meeting straight from a visit to
24 the tower. As you might expect, I'd been very affected
25 by the horror of that spectacle. I had met Dany Cotton,

138

1 the Fire Commissioner. I had asked her whether she
2 had — and this is all set out in my witness statement,
3 and she had made one ask, and that was this specific ask
4 for support for her firefighters. And so I had come
5 from that meeting with her at the tower into the
6 meeting, and I had kind of not wanted to lose sight of
7 that point and, therefore, I registered — my memory,
8 which may be faulty, which is that I registered it at
9 the top of the meeting, and there is a logical place to
10 do that, where the first section talks about the needs
11 of the blue lights, and I believe that I would have
12 registered that at the top of the meeting. The fact
13 that in the action list it is registered as the first
14 action I think bears that out, because the action list
15 follows the flow of the conversation.

16 So I completely understand, Mr Millett, why it would
17 seem very strange that the meeting should give emphasis
18 to blue light counselling in this context, however
19 important that issue is, but I think the minutes play
20 the right notes but in the wrong order.

21 Q. Right. But are you saying that there was a different
22 discussion at a different part of the meeting about
23 offering counselling to the bereaved and the families?
24 A. I think the basic point I would want to try and
25 emphasise here, that as it says at the top, this was

139

1 a meeting designed to flush out problems, and so there
2 may or may not have been a discussion about it. It
3 would have been incumbent on the NHS to brief the
4 meeting and to bring to the table any problems or any
5 requests for additional support. If they didn't, it
6 wouldn't have been registered, and I think that's what
7 happened.
8 Q. Was there any discussion about what support was to be
9 put in place for those affected, other than housing, as
10 we've seen?
11 A. Not that I can directly recall, but, again, the meeting
12 was a problem-flushing meeting, and if people didn't
13 recognise or didn't know there were problems at that
14 time, they didn't bring it to the meeting and,
15 therefore, the meeting focused on the wide range of
16 problems that we did know about, and as you can see from
17 the chairman's brief, there were about 18 different
18 lines of questioning to different departments, each of
19 those covering highly sensitive and difficult issues,
20 and I was very conscious that one of my main challenges
21 as the chair was to get across all those issues and make
22 sure that nothing was left out, and I feel I did that.
23 But, again, I make my central point: that was
24 a meeting to flush out problems. If problems weren't
25 flushed out, there wasn't a debate or discussion.

140

1 Q. Let's go back to the brief, then, in light of that.
 2 That's at {HOM00046083/2}. You can see there that under
 3 paragraph 6, under "Requests for additional support", it
 4 says:
 5 "ASK DCLG (Marcus Jones MP) if there have been any
 6 requests for mutual aid from the Strategic Coordination
 7 Group. ASK if any offers of additional support have
 8 been made by neighbouring Boroughs."
 9 Was there any discussion on those topics?
 10 A. Not that I can remember specifically. I have noted in
 11 the CRIP that by the time of this meeting it's recorded
 12 there was an offer of assistance from Hammersmith and
 13 Fulham, so I — participants who had read the CRIP would
 14 have been aware of that.
 15 Q. Right.
 16 A. But I don't recall any debate, and of course the absence
 17 of Nicholas Holgate or anyone from the council would
 18 have rather undermined the opportunity to have any
 19 debate about that.
 20 Q. Right. Can you explain why there wasn't a debate about
 21 those matters, requests for additional assistance?
 22 A. I can't — you know, I can't explain why there wasn't
 23 any debate. I think part of the explanation may lie in
 24 the absence of the council, because obviously, you know,
 25 the question people would want to ask is, "Why have you

141

1 not taken up this offer of support?", and only he or his
 2 colleagues could have answered that.
 3 Q. Yes.
 4 Now, let's go, then, to what happened next after the
 5 meeting.
 6 Can we go, please, to {HOM00046089}. Now, this is
 7 a very long email collection, I think is the right word.
 8 We can go to page 14 within it {HOM00046089/14}. At
 9 page 14 we can see an official sitrep number 4,
 10 14 June 2017, received at 17.29. Do you see that?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. Yes. It's exhibit number 7 to your first witness
 13 statement.
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. It says:
 16 "Please find below SitRep 4 for the ongoing fire
 17 related incident at Grenfell Tower in Latimer Road,
 18 London. Please direct any queries to the HO Fire Duty
 19 Officer at ..."
 20 Then there is an email address.
 21 If we go, please, to "Media and communications",
 22 which I think we need on page 16 {HOM00046089/16}, you
 23 can see that there is a question from the press about
 24 the cross-ministerial meeting earlier that day.
 25 A. Yes.

142

1 Q. 16, "Media and communications":
 2 "There is significant coverage on Sky News and BBC
 3 news, with video coverage of the fire submitted from
 4 members of the public.
 5 "For earlier media coverage please refer to previous
 6 SitReps.
 7 "Nick Hurd took questions from the Press around
 8 1700hrs."
 9 Do you see that?
 10 A. I do.
 11 Q. It's reported that you say, in answer to the question
 12 "Tell us what was discussed", in the third square bullet
 13 point it says:
 14 "It was a meeting of senior ministers and senior
 15 officials from cross [sic] the systems and I leave it
 16 feeling reassured that the resources are in place and
 17 the capacity is in place to support people through this
 18 immediate emergency response."
 19 What was it that reassured you that resources were
 20 in place and that there was capacity in place to support
 21 people?
 22 A. Well, in part because that's what the meeting was told.
 23 In large part because that's what the meeting was told.
 24 Again, it's a meeting to flush out problems and,
 25 you know, I come back to my central point: that meeting

143

1 was not adequately informed by the ground truth of what
 2 was happening in the area. And to my eyes now, in
 3 hindsight, clear failures of intelligence in terms of
 4 bringing the right information to that meeting and,
 5 therefore, you know, unacceptable, as it looks today,
 6 because it reads terribly complacently. I could only
 7 report what the feeling of that meeting was, which was
 8 at that point in time, on day one, there was —
 9 you know, the message was, you know, "We can cope, we
 10 have the resources, we have the capacity".
 11 Q. But the "we" there is RBKC, isn't it?
 12 A. To some degree and most importantly, but, you know, this
 13 is a cross-Whitehall meeting where every department —
 14 and the minute is very clear that I left space for every
 15 department to signal any problems, and, you know, the
 16 actions show where the debate focused, which was
 17 immediately recognition of the challenge that
 18 the council were going to have in relation to temporary
 19 accommodation and an action that the department needed
 20 to engage urgently with them, notwithstanding their
 21 statement that they didn't need any support. So there
 22 clearly was some active debate around that.
 23 As you will see from the rest of the interview, the
 24 media were very quick on to the national issue, which
 25 was the fact that people were going to bed that night

144

1 alarmed about the safety of the buildings they were in,
 2 and so that, as you would expect, did occupy some space
 3 of the meeting in terms of a ministerial response to
 4 that.
 5 Q. Yes, indeed, and you cover that next in the Q&A.
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. By this point, were you aware that there were others,
 8 not from Grenfell Tower but from the surrounding
 9 buildings, particularly the walkways, who had been
 10 evacuated and were going to be needing emergency
 11 temporary accommodation?
 12 A. My honest answer to that is I don't think that meeting
 13 was sufficiently aware of that point, and I'm not sure
 14 if I — my memory of the CRIP sheets or the sitreps,
 15 which is what the — kind of the information feed at
 16 that meeting, I don't think they capture that truth
 17 adequately either, is my honest recollection.
 18 Q. Now, you mentioned earlier in your evidence today that
 19 you had come to the 4 o'clock meeting from, if I can
 20 call it this, the incident ground, from the building;
 21 yes?
 22 A. Correct.
 23 Q. And you had visited that, I think, in your capacity as
 24 Minister for Policing and the Fire Service at about
 25 1 o'clock that day, 1300 hours.

145

1 A. Around that time, yeah.
 2 Q. Just to be clear, is it right that you didn't, at that
 3 stage, visit any of the surrounding areas, including
 4 rest centres?
 5 A. No, I wish I had and I can explain why not.
 6 Q. Why not?
 7 A. The most practical issues that I had been informed — my
 8 recollection is I had been informed about the meeting on
 9 the way down or at some point during the visit, and the
 10 advice was, quite rightly, I needed to get back to
 11 prepare for what was a critical meeting. In practical
 12 terms, that's the most direct reason.
 13 In hindsight, I wish I'd have gone down earlier and
 14 seen more. There were frustrating delays in getting
 15 authorisation to make a visit, so, in effect, my visit
 16 was unauthorised.
 17 Q. Now, you went down there. Presumably you went to the
 18 cordon.
 19 A. Correct.
 20 Q. Did you go through the cordon?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. How close did you get to the tower?
 23 A. My recollection is I stood at the foot of the tower with
 24 the deputy fire commissioner, Steve Apter, and the fire
 25 commissioner. There were police officers there and

146

1 there were ambulance services there. The fire was still
 2 active, there was a fire engine still being deployed and
 3 there were firefighters resting on the grass, from
 4 memory.
 5 Q. Now, before you went through the cordon, did you have
 6 a chance to observe what was happening in the streets?
 7 A. I — my recollection was that it was very difficult to
 8 get to the site, and my hazy recollection is that it was
 9 a confused landscape in terms of manoeuvring around
 10 and, as you might expect, an atmosphere that it's very
 11 hard to describe.
 12 Q. Can you describe it?
 13 A. Well, I think part of the, you know ... not adequately,
 14 if I'm honest, Mr Millett. I was in the cordon — it
 15 took a bit of time to get there, but I was in the cordon
 16 where, obviously, by definition, there was a sort of
 17 insulated feeling, but the horror of the building was,
 18 you know, very powerful.
 19 Q. Now, at any part of your visit, first of all, were you
 20 accompanied by anybody from RBKC?
 21 A. No.
 22 Q. Did that strike you as strange?
 23 A. No, because I come back to the genesis of the visit,
 24 which was, rightly or wrongly, I looked — I had been
 25 sitting frustrated in the Home Office, wanting to go

147

1 down. I was a newly appointed fire and police service
 2 minister. I felt I was in the wrong place sitting in
 3 the Home Office. I wanted to go. As my witness
 4 statement says, I'd had a conversation earlier that
 5 morning with Deputy Commissioner Steve Apter. He had
 6 made it clear that I was welcome to go down there and
 7 I was keen to do so, had suffered frustrations in terms
 8 of getting authorisation to do so.
 9 So my lens was very much as a Minister for Police
 10 and the Fire Service who didn't at that stage recognise
 11 that I was about to be pitched into a sort of wider
 12 responsibility in terms of chairing that meeting.
 13 In hindsight, of course, I wish it would have been
 14 different, because I might have gone into that meeting
 15 with some ground truth that meeting didn't have.
 16 Q. Right.
 17 Did you feel that, although the Home Office being
 18 responsible for fire meant that it was lead government
 19 department in respect of the response to this civil
 20 emergency, you were adequately briefed and trained in
 21 that aspect of your portfolio?
 22 A. I don't see how I could have been, given that this was
 23 day two.
 24 Q. And finally on this, did you observe at any time during
 25 that visit anybody from RBKC or, so far as you might

148

1 have been able to tell, KCTMO?

2 A. No. To be honest, though, I'm not sure I would have

3 expected to — I don't know what the rules around the

4 cordon were, but that was a space in which the blue

5 lights were working.

6 Q. Now, let's turn to 15 June.

7 Can we go, please, to {HOM00046090}. If we could

8 pick up the second email, please, at the foot of the

9 page, it's an email from your private secretary,

10 I think, to the office of Sajid Javid, "FAO James —

11 Access to Cash and sleeping materials", and it's timed

12 at 8.45. The email confirms that both offices have

13 spoken and there were concerns raised by you.

14 If you look at the second and third bullet points.

15 The second bullet point is right at the foot of page 1:

16 "The Minister has been told that there is an urgent

17 issue with access to cash for former residents of

18 Grenfell Tower. He's also been told via Margot James MP

19 (BEIS Minister) that the Post Office — there is local

20 one just around the corner from the tower, have offered

21 to facilitate access to money for residents. He would

22 be really grateful if your teams were able to facilitate

23 a link between the Post Office and the local Council so

24 that they can make people aware."

25 Then the third bullet point {HOM00046090/2}:

149

1 "There have also been a couple of concerns raised

2 with him about the quality of the sleeping materials

3 that were available for people last night and asked if

4 there was anything HMG could do to help the Council

5 upgrade?"

6 Now, just looking at that, Mr Hurd, would it be

7 right to say that, based on this email, concerns about

8 residents getting access to cash and about the quality

9 of sleeping materials at the rest centre were raised

10 with you either late on 14 June or early morning on

11 Thursday, the 15th?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Can you recall which it was? Was it late on the 14th or

14 was this the first — was it just before you sent this

15 message?

16 A. No, I can't be sure, but my instinct is that these would

17 have been concerns raised towards the end of the day

18 previously, which were recorded and sort of despatched

19 into the system first thing in the morning. But I may

20 be wrong on that.

21 Q. Let's then turn to your first contact with RBKC.

22 Can we go, please, to the first email on page 1 in

23 this same email string {HOM00046090/1}. This is the

24 continuation of that discussion, and this is an email

25 back from Sajid Javid at 9.44 that morning, which

150

1 confirms that both offices had indeed met since the

2 earlier email at 8.45 that I've just shown you. "James,

3 it was good to meet you earlier" is how it starts, and

4 then it confirms in the third paragraph:

5 "The Minister is keen that i) someone from HMG

6 speaks to the CEO of the PO and ii) link is made to the

7 Council and that residents are able to access money as

8 soon as possible unless there are already alternative

9 arrangements in place?"

10 We can see in the second paragraph reference is made

11 to the leader of RBKC council, and specifically

12 a suggestion that Nicholas Holgate be the right person

13 for the Post Office to connect with. Do you see that?

14 A. I do.

15 Q. Yes, in the second paragraph there.

16 Now, the leader of the council was

17 Nicholas Paget—Brown, wasn't it?

18 A. He was.

19 Q. Yes. Did you speak to him?

20 A. I did at some point during these proceedings, as I set

21 out in my witness statement. I do not recall

22 a conversation with him about this specific subject.

23 Q. Do you think you spoke to the leader before 9.44, or

24 perhaps before 8.45 that morning?

25 A. I don't recall explicitly having a conversation with him

151

1 about this urgent issue about access to cash. It may

2 well be that it was processed by other people.

3 Q. Right. It's a timing point really.

4 A. I understand, yeah.

5 Q. Can we narrow down the timing of your call to

6 Nicholas Paget—Brown to a point, some point, before

7 9.44 on that morning, looking at the second paragraph?

8 A. I can see why you might lead to that. I am — and I'm

9 frustrated by this, I am struggling to recall exactly

10 when I had that call with Nicholas Paget—Brown, because

11 I may have confused myself with my error about the

12 attendance of Mr Holgate in the first meeting. My best

13 estimate at this moment is that I had the conversation

14 with Mr Paget—Brown at some point on the Thursday

15 morning, is my best recollection, and it may well have

16 been in line with your line of questioning.

17 Q. Right. Okay.

18 Now, in your second statement {HOM00050072/4},

19 paragraph 7 — and we don't need to go to it — you

20 refer to speaking first with Nicholas Holgate, the chief

21 executive of RBKC, your first conversation with him.

22 Can you remember when you first spoke to

23 Nicholas Holgate?

24 A. So correct me if I'm wrong, but are you assuming that

25 I had these conversations? Because I'm not necessarily

152

1 assuming that from reading this email.
 2 Q. No, let's go to the statement then.
 3 A. Yeah.
 4 Q. I'm not using the email to base my question, I'm
 5 using —
 6 A. The first time I heard Mr Holgate's voice was in the
 7 meeting of 15 June, in the cross—ministerial meeting.
 8 Q. You are clear about that, are you?
 9 A. I'm as clear as I can be, yeah.
 10 Q. Let's see if we can be clearer even more.
 11 If we go, please, to {HOM00050072/4}, your second
 12 statement, paragraph 7, you say in the middle of the
 13 paragraph:
 14 "My first interaction with the leadership of RBKC
 15 had been with Nicholas Holgate, the Chief Executive ...
 16 of RBKC."
 17 Now, that suggests that your first conversation with
 18 Nicholas Holgate was before your first conversation with
 19 Nicholas Paget—Brown; yes?
 20 A. Yes, but I think this plays into my misunderstanding and
 21 my muddle around which meetings Mr Holgate attended. So
 22 my first recollection was that the call with
 23 Mr Paget—Brown followed that meeting.
 24 Q. I see.
 25 A. I'm now in doubt about the sequence.

153

1 Q. I see. I understand. I follow. I understand that.
 2 A. Thank you.
 3 Q. So in fact it's possible, looking at the email I showed
 4 you, that you spoke to Nicholas Paget—Brown first and at
 5 some point before 9.44 on the morning of the 15th, but
 6 didn't speak to the chief executive, Nicholas Holgate,
 7 until the meeting that afternoon?
 8 A. That's possible.
 9 Q. Yes, it's possible. What's your recollection so far as
 10 you have —
 11 A. Probable.
 12 Q. Right.
 13 Now, when you did speak to Nicholas Holgate, can you
 14 remember what you spoke to him about?
 15 A. Mr Holgate or Mr Paget—Brown, sorry?
 16 Q. Mr Holgate.
 17 A. So my recollection is the — my first conversation with
 18 Mr Holgate was as chair of the inter—ministerial meeting
 19 and he was an attendee attending by phone, so I never
 20 saw him, I never had a — I don't believe I had a prior
 21 conversation with him.
 22 Q. Right. So essentially we have to read paragraph 7 of
 23 your second statement in the light of what you have told
 24 us?
 25 A. In the light — exactly.

154

1 Q. I follow.
 2 Now, sticking with 15 June, on that day and indeed
 3 around that time, I think it's right, isn't it, that
 4 parliament wasn't sitting?
 5 A. Because of the election, yes.
 6 Q. Because of the election. But, nonetheless, it's right
 7 that an extraordinary meeting was convened on 15 June;
 8 yes?
 9 A. Correct.
 10 Q. Yes. Do you know who called that meeting?
 11 A. No. I mean, I think it's what's described as the usual
 12 channels, so it would have been an agreement somehow
 13 between the parties at the Leader of the House level or
 14 at the whips level. I'm guessing, I've never asked, but
 15 I assume that is how these occasions are agreed.
 16 Q. Right. And what was the purpose of the meeting, so far
 17 as you understood it?
 18 A. Oh, I'm very clear on that. As I alluded to earlier,
 19 you know, this was, you know, one of the worst national
 20 disasters to have affected this country in peacetime.
 21 It would be absolutely right for our democracy to debate
 22 and discuss it. You know, obviously the primary issue
 23 was, you know, the local condition and issues that arise
 24 around support for the community affected, but it was
 25 a national issue as well in which, you know, MPs were

155

1 having to cope, having to deal with enquiries from their
 2 constituents, who were either very concerned about the
 3 event and the response then, or very concerned about
 4 their own personal safety in the tower blocks they're
 5 in. So it's a long answer, but it was entirely
 6 appropriate that, you know, our democracy should not
 7 ignore the moment.
 8 Q. Now, did you attend a briefing session before that
 9 meeting?
 10 A. I believe so.
 11 Q. And that, I think, was with Alok Sharma MP, who was then
 12 the Minister of State for Housing and Planning.
 13 A. Yes, and possibly other attendees as well.
 14 Q. I think Andrea Leadsom as well; yes?
 15 A. That would make some sense.
 16 Q. Well, she was Leader of the House.
 17 A. She was.
 18 Q. That meeting started, according to the record, at 13.30.
 19 Would that —
 20 A. That sounds right.
 21 Q. — accord with your recollection?
 22 Is this right: you led that meeting, together with
 23 Alok Sharma?
 24 A. Yes, which was very unusual. It was an exceptional
 25 meeting in every sense, and I can explain why.

156

1 Q. Could you, please?

2 A. Because if parliament had been sitting normally, the

3 meeting would have been chaired effectively by the

4 speaker, and the ministers responsible would have been

5 held to account at the despatch box. This was a wholly

6 unusual meeting where, in effect, I was chairing the

7 meeting as well as answering questions to the

8 government, alongside Alok Sharma. It was extraordinary

9 in the sense it was held in a different room. It was

10 a highly emotionally charged meeting. So it was

11 exceptional in every circumstance.

12 Q. Now, you say in your statement that you fielded a large

13 number of questions from MPs who, amongst other things,

14 were concerned about the residents. Was there

15 a discussion on that topic?

16 A. Yes, and in large part it resulted in the — effectively

17 the guarantee that Alok Sharma made about offering

18 housing within the local area, which I think, in my

19 recollection, flowed in part from the debate in that

20 meeting, which obviously had a large number of London

21 MPs in it, as well as representatives from all over the

22 country.

23 Q. So discussion about housing. Was there any discussion

24 about any other aspect of the impact of the fire on

25 residents or, more broadly, families, bereaved or

157

1 potential bereaved, and surrounding residents?

2 A. Not that I can recall directly. That doesn't mean it

3 didn't happen. One of the exceptional features of this

4 meeting is that there is no recording of it, as

5 I understand it, there's no filming of it, as

6 I understand it, which is frustrating.

7 However, to be fair to my parliamentary colleagues,

8 I recall that there was, you know, a great deal of

9 concern expressed in that meeting about the welfare of

10 the — of, if I may say, the living victims of the fire.

11 Q. Now, according to Alok Sharma's witness statement — we

12 don't need to go to it, but it's at {CLG10009731/7},

13 paragraph 23 — the meeting finished at 3.15, 15.15 pm.

14 Would that accord with your recollection?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So it was quite a long meeting.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And you yourself I think that very morning had raised

19 concerns about the support being provided to those

20 affected, as we've seen from the emails.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Yes. Did your concerns in your mind on the morning of

23 that day occupy any time of the meeting?

24 A. I remember ... I remember speaking to the need for the

25 state to effectively put its arms round the community,

158

1 and I remember talking about the need to avoid plodding

2 bureaucracy in that process, and I think that was the

3 sort of general sense of the meeting as well. So — and

4 obviously that meeting then flowed into the second

5 meeting, where, as you can see, at the top of that

6 meeting, from the minutes of the meeting, that I'd made

7 it very clear that I wanted that meeting to focus on

8 individuals.

9 Q. Yes, and we're going to come to that in just a moment.

10 Before we do, can I ask you, please, to look at your

11 first statement, page 9 {HOM00046080/9}, and go, please,

12 to paragraph 27. In the middle of the paragraph, you

13 pick up the meeting with Alok Sharma, and then just

14 after halfway down you say:

15 "I gave a statement and the meeting was also used as

16 an opportunity for parliamentarians to ask questions of

17 the Government. It was held in Westminster Hall and we

18 fielded a large number of questions from MPs who,

19 amongst other things, were concerned about the residents

20 being rehoused and the safety of other buildings across

21 the country. The special meeting reflected the deep

22 shock felt up and down the country."

23 Now, the only two topics you mention specifically

24 there are rehousing and the safety of other buildings

25 across the country. Was there any discussion, to the

159

1 best of your recollection, on any other topic?

2 A. I'm sure there was, because I think Members of

3 Parliament wanted to register their deep shock at how

4 something like this could happen in Britain. I'm sure

5 that there was a discussion or position—taking on why

6 this had happened. I'm sure that a range of other

7 issues were debated and discussed. I say debated, but

8 it was more of a series of Members of Parliament giving

9 statements and positions. I may have just chosen those

10 two issues because they fed into the meeting that I went

11 on to chair.

12 Q. Well, let's go to that, then.

13 That meeting started, I think, at 15.30. This is

14 the second cross—Whitehall ministerial meeting.

15 A. Yes, Alok and I went straight from parliament to that

16 meeting.

17 Q. Right. And, as you told us before, Nicholas Holgate did

18 dial in to that meeting.

19 A. He did.

20 Q. Yes.

21 Then there is a chair's brief again. Let's look at

22 that: {HOM00046131}, which is your exhibit 4 to your

23 first statement, and as you say, at the top of the

24 briefing note, in the third line:

25 "In particular, you will want to probe on progress

160

1 on the provision of support to victims and the emergency
 2 services and the provision of fire safety advice to the
 3 public."
 4 So that had become — is this right? — something at
 5 the top of your agenda, progress on the provision of
 6 support to victims and the emergency services?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. Yes.
 9 Now, if we go, please, to {CAB00002720}, let's pick
 10 up the minutes of the meeting. We can see who was there
 11 from the first page. You can see there you're in
 12 the chair, list of names. Bottom of the screen,
 13 Nicholas Holgate dialling in.
 14 Top of page 2 {CAB00002720/2}, please:
 15 "THE CHAIR opened by emphasising the need for
 16 rigorous understanding of the situation affecting
 17 individuals to inform the response."
 18 Was that as a result of the concerns raised with
 19 you, as well as the direction in the brief?
 20 A. I think it reflects a growing understanding that there
 21 was a problem which arguably should — almost certainly
 22 should have been there the day before, so I just wanted
 23 to make it very clear that I wanted to focus that
 24 meeting on support for individuals and understanding
 25 what was needed and what was going on.

161

1 Q. And what was the precise problem that you were
 2 increasingly understanding?
 3 A. Oh, you know, I think there was a growing sense that we
 4 had not been sufficiently informed about the ground
 5 truth. The Inquiry will be very well aware that, in
 6 parallel, there's a kind of very sustained and intensive
 7 sort of media story building, which, from my
 8 recollection — I think this is borne out by the CRIPs
 9 on the first day — was very much around: how could this
 10 have happened? But then, I think quite rightly, soon
 11 evolved into exploring some of the failings on the
 12 ground in support for the community.
 13 So my recollection may be hazy on that, but I sense
 14 that this was part of an overdue shift on the part of
 15 central government to really focus on actually what was
 16 happening on the ground to support bereaved, survivors
 17 and residents.
 18 MR MILLETT: Yes.
 19 Mr Chairman, I have a number of questions still on
 20 this minute, but I think I probably won't finish before
 21 3.20, so I'm happy to make a start —
 22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you rather break at this point
 23 or do you want to finish the questions?
 24 MR MILLETT: Let me get to exactly 3.20, and I may have come
 25 to —

162

1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, the time doesn't have to be
 2 exactly 3.20. We can allow you a certain amount of
 3 indulgence. I don't think the witness will mind if we
 4 go on for a few more minutes.
 5 A. I don't mind at all.
 6 MR MILLETT: Let's —
 7 A. Nor do I need a break if you need the time.
 8 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, there are others who would
 9 welcome one.
 10 A. Others may, yes.
 11 MR MILLETT: Let's take this in stages. I'm never one to
 12 refuse an indulgence from the Chairman.
 13 Right, let's go, please, to page 3 {CAB00002720/3},
 14 then, item 2(a):
 15 "2. Key issues.
 16 "a) Immediate shelter and medium term rehousing
 17 "Those affected were being placed into hotels for
 18 immediate shelter, with 77 from Grenfell Tower and 25
 19 people from the surrounding area in hotels. A large
 20 number of people are assumed to have gone to stay with
 21 friends and family, though the Westway centre had
 22 capacity for 300 to stay and only 30 were there the
 23 previous night."
 24 Did you have clarity at that meeting about whether
 25 those figures of those housed in emergency accommodation

163

1 related to individuals or households? What were those
 2 numbers?
 3 A. I can't recall exactly, but I think you'll be aware from
 4 the action list, from memory the two first actions from
 5 this meeting were related to clear uncertainty and
 6 concern about the quality of data and information
 7 available. From memory. I haven't got the action
 8 points in front of me. But by now we were very
 9 concerned about the quality of information and data we
 10 had about some very basic things, like how many people
 11 were in the tower and how many people actually needed
 12 support, and when we come on to Mr Holgate's testimony,
 13 that was at the crux of his lack of credibility.
 14 Q. Right. But this, I think, was something that you had
 15 been aware of from earlier that morning, isn't it, this
 16 problem about numbers and consistency?
 17 A. Yes, it had definitely grown through the day as a very
 18 clear concern that we — our knowledge of how many
 19 people were in the tower and how many people needed
 20 support was not fit for purpose.
 21 Q. Let's just leave that document on the screen, and can we
 22 then go at the same time, please, to {HOM00046089/21}.
 23 This is within the bundle of situational reports, or
 24 sitreps, which you exhibit at LH/7, and this one is at
 25 9.00 am on 15 June, as you can see; yes?

164

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. At the top of the screen.
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. And it's sitrep 5.
 5 If you go, please, down to page 22 {HOM00046089/22},
 6 you can see in the fourth bullet from the bottom, that's
 7 about two-thirds of the way down your screen, it says:
 8 "Vulnerable people and families have been given
 9 accommodation overnight as a priority, including 44
 10 families from the tower and 25 from the surrounding
 11 area. There remains a shortfall of accommodation."
 12 Now, that's what you were told earlier in the day,
 13 at 9 o'clock that day, but come the afternoon, the
 14 meeting discusses 77 from Grenfell Tower as opposed to
 15 44 families. Did you think those figures were
 16 inconsistent?
 17 A. I think that reinforces the point I'm making, which is
 18 the system I was part of was getting increasingly
 19 concerned that we couldn't rely on the numbers being
 20 provided, which is why the two actions at the top of
 21 the — that flowed from this meeting are focused on data
 22 and information. As I'm sure you're aware, I believe
 23 the previous evening my colleague Alok Sharma had spoken
 24 to Nicholas Paget-Brown and had got some numbers from
 25 him about the gap between what they had and what they

165

1 felt they needed.
 2 Q. Yes, and you'll have seen, I think, from the earlier
 3 situation report, that confirmed 200 people had been
 4 evacuated, and yet only 25 had spent the night in
 5 accommodation. Did that inconsistency concern you?
 6 A. I think that just merely reinforces my central point.
 7 There was too much inconsistency around numbers, which
 8 is why that meeting focused very much on trying to put
 9 in place processes to improve our understanding of the
 10 numbers.
 11 Q. Yes. Yes, thank you. We may come back to this —
 12 A. Of course.
 13 MR MILLETT: — minute in due course but, Mr Chairman, is
 14 that a convenient moment for the afternoon break?
 15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think it is, yes, thank you.
 16 Well, as you know, Mr Hurd, we have a break during
 17 the afternoon for the benefit of all sorts of people, so
 18 we're going to take it now. We will resume, please, at
 19 3.40, and while you're out of the room, I have to ask
 20 you, please, not to discuss your evidence with anyone.
 21 All right?
 22 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
 23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. Would you go
 24 with the usher, please.
 25 (Pause)

166

1 Thank you, Mr Millett. 3.40, then, please.
 2 Thank you.
 3 (3.23 pm)
 4 (A short break)
 5 (3.40 pm)
 6 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Hurd, ready to carry
 7 on, I hope?
 8 THE WITNESS: Yes.
 9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
 10 Yes, Mr Millett.
 11 MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman, thank you.
 12 Mr Hurd, can I ask you, please, to go back to the
 13 document we were on, which is the sitrep
 14 {HOM00046089/22}, on the right-hand part of the screen,
 15 and look at the penultimate bullet point, where it says:
 16 "Rest Centres: Some heated flare-ups between
 17 individuals especially regarding media intrusion. The
 18 West Way rest centre stayed open overnight for those who
 19 had not been provided with alternative accommodation.
 20 Further humanitarian assistance centres will open
 21 today."
 22 Now, first, were any flare-ups discussed during the
 23 meeting, do you think?
 24 A. Not that I can recall.
 25 Q. Was it clear to you how many humanitarian centres would

167

1 be opened?
 2 A. I can't recall.
 3 Q. Was it clear to you who was responsible for opening them
 4 up?
 5 A. My assumption would be the local authority.
 6 Q. Right. Did you leave this meeting feeling reassured
 7 that the resources and capacity were in place to support
 8 those affected by the fire?
 9 A. The overall and most powerful recollection from this
 10 meeting was the complete collapse in the credibility of
 11 Nicholas Holgate when under questioning. That is the
 12 overriding impression of this meeting.
 13 Q. Right. I think that might answer the next question, but
 14 let's pinpoint it exactly in your first statement. Can
 15 we go to that, please, at page 5 {HOM00046080/5},
 16 paragraph 17. You say, about three-quarters of the way
 17 down the block of text that you began to lose faith in
 18 RBKC's ability to deal with the situation.
 19 At what point on the 15th, I think it is, of June
 20 did you begin to lose faith in RBKC?
 21 A. Well, I think this meeting was a defining meeting, and
 22 I think you've heard that from other sources. It was —
 23 because of his failure to attend the previous day, this
 24 was the first time, effectively, the council was kind of
 25 open to questions, and as we discussed before the break,

168

1 there was a growing concern about data, the reliability
 2 of data, and numbers, and he really wasn't able to
 3 answer some questions that anyone might reasonably ask
 4 him — expect him to answer, and you've seen the
 5 reactions to the meeting. I think it was instrumental
 6 in the dropping of the penny across the system.
 7 Q. Can you give us a concrete example of a question which
 8 he wasn't able to answer which you had been expecting
 9 him to be able to answer?
 10 A. So my recollection, the focus of the discussion was
 11 around housing need. You'll be aware that the housing
 12 minister, Alok Sharma, had come to that meeting from
 13 parliament, where he had made effectively a guarantee
 14 about rehousing in the local area. You'll know that
 15 he'd been pressing the council leader, I think, the
 16 night before for numbers, numbers, numbers, and it
 17 became quite clear from the questioning and the
 18 investigation in that meeting that the council weren't
 19 on top of the numbers, both in terms of numbers of
 20 people in the tower and the broader housing requirement,
 21 and I can still see the faces round the room of
 22 incredulity.
 23 Q. Right.
 24 Can I just ask you, though, the Alok Sharma
 25 guarantee you just referred to, was that to rehouse

169

1 everybody affected by the fire within three weeks?
 2 A. No, that was the — it was a guarantee to rehouse within
 3 the local area those who wanted to be rehoused in the
 4 local area. There wasn't a timeframe put on it on the
 5 Thursday, when the procedure got escalated to what I've
 6 called full — fat COBR. It was effectively the
 7 Prime Minister that drove the decision to put
 8 a timeframe on it.
 9 Q. I see, thank you.
 10 Now, what did you do as a result of this loss of
 11 faith?
 12 A. Well, I think as you can see from the evidence around
 13 the system, it was a defining moment, so it was the
 14 moment that the penny dropped with Number 10, who were
 15 there at the meeting. I think you've seen the evidence
 16 from Helen MacNamara and other people from the
 17 department who were at the meeting. I think you've seen
 18 the reaction of Katharine Hammond at CCS. It was the
 19 moment when I think the system belatedly recognised that
 20 the council were failing and were not on it and that
 21 something needed to change, and I think it's from that
 22 moment on that the wheels started to turn.
 23 Q. I see.
 24 Do you agree with Katherine Richardson's assessment
 25 of Mr Holgate in that meeting that he was quite

170

1 defensive and tried to assure ministers that no
 2 additional help was required?
 3 A. I think he was still on that page, and I think that was,
 4 again, where the incredulity and the lack of credibility
 5 started to build. We couldn't have had a clearer
 6 picture.
 7 Q. What measures were in place to monitor or oversee that
 8 RBKC had the necessary resources from central government
 9 effectively to be able to carry out their
 10 responsibilities from the start?
 11 A. I think those are questions best directed at the
 12 Department for Communities and Local Government. My
 13 short answer is they were inadequate.
 14 Q. Right. And that appeared to you at the time, did it?
 15 A. Well, by now — and this may be part hindsight
 16 judgement — I think I, as chair, and the rest of the
 17 system were getting very frustrated about the lack of
 18 ground truth and the lack of our understanding of what
 19 was really happening on the ground, and that suggested
 20 a major information failure.
 21 Q. Did you have another conversation with
 22 Nicholas Paget—Brown after this meeting?
 23 A. My recollection is I had only one conversation with
 24 Nicholas Paget—Brown, because obviously he is the
 25 political leader, rather than the chief executive, so

171

1 I wanted to get a different perspective. It turns out
 2 the contents of that meeting were exactly the same as
 3 the conversation he had with Alok Sharma.
 4 Q. Did you speak to Nicholas Holgate after this meeting
 5 and, indeed, at any time in the ensuing few days?
 6 A. No, I don't believe so, because from this meeting, the
 7 wheels were turning that would eventually lead to regime
 8 change.
 9 Q. Sticking with paragraph 17 {HOM00046080/5}, in the last
 10 sentence there you say:
 11 "Further, I appreciate that, given the scale of the
 12 disaster, it is likely that RBKC was quite simply
 13 overwhelmed."
 14 Now, is that a hindsight observation on your part or
 15 was that your impression or observation at the time?
 16 A. I think it was fast becoming the impression at the
 17 moment. After this meeting, I was taking calls from
 18 friends and acquaintances who were involved in the area,
 19 and I had — was introduced to Alan Everett, who was the
 20 vicar at the time at St Clement St James's, and he took
 21 me through dispassionately, and the picture was emerging
 22 very clearly of totally unacceptable co—ordination and
 23 support for the community.
 24 Q. Right. So to be clear, given everything that you had
 25 done up until that point, including chairing these two

172

1 meetings, visiting the site, talking to
2 Nicholas Paget—Brown and at this meeting, that was your
3 impression at the time?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. I see.

6 Now, did your impression of the situation on the
7 ground and the reports that you were receiving
8 personally accord with the information coming through up
9 to that point that the council did not need support?

10 A. No, I think that's my point. There was a kind of ground
11 truth lag. You know, I think, as is now well
12 documented, Mr Holgate was trying to maintain a line
13 that the council could cope on its own, and the evidence
14 was beginning to weigh very heavily that they couldn't.

15 Q. Let's go, then, to the Friday, 16 June.

16 Can we start on that date, please, with
17 {CLG00018939}. Now, this is an email from
18 Katherine Richardson timed at 8.02 am on that day,
19 Friday, 16 June, to Helen MacNamara at the DCLG.

20 Katherine Richardson was the deputy director within
21 the DCLG's resilience and emergencies division, RED, and
22 it also goes to the office of the principal private
23 secretary at the DCLG, as you can see.

24 She says that she has just taken a call from the
25 housing minister's office. If you go to the subject,

173

1 "CLG support to RBKC", and if you look at the first
2 paragraph, it says:

3 "Thanks Helen — yes, Jo and I discussed. Ideally we
4 can encourage Nick H to ask us for the specific help
5 we're offering. Copying Alex P who should be kept
6 sighted on this.

7 "I've also just taken a call from the housing
8 minister's office. Nick Hurd is continuing to raise
9 concerns about how the response on the ground is working
10 eg getting information to people affected. Some of this
11 is for the police rather than K+C but we should consider
12 a stronger offer of support."

13 Were you continuing to raise concerns that morning
14 about how the response on the ground was working?

15 A. Yes, and I think it's recorded through my private
16 office's — as I've just said, I had a series of calls
17 the night before directly from community people working
18 as volunteers, ie sort of non—official calls that were
19 really trying to impress on me how bad things were and
20 the need for the government to get its act together.
21 That included a conversation with someone I didn't know,
22 who was the vicar of St Clement St James's.

23 Q. Right. So just filling in the blanks for us there: the
24 meeting happens on the afternoon of the 15th, but
25 between the meeting ending and early morning on the

174

1 16th, I think you're telling us that you had had
2 discussions with people from the community —

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. — about what was actually happening on the street?

5 A. Yeah. In the meantime, of course, as you've got
6 evidence, wheels were beginning to turn in the system
7 that had belatedly recognised that there was a major
8 problem that required a change in position. I was
9 simply having those calls and those conversations and,
10 as you have evidence, I fed those in on the Friday
11 morning first thing.

12 Q. Were those calls coming to you or were you soliciting
13 them, as it were, finding out —

14 A. No, they were all coming to me — coming in to me from
15 people I knew or vaguely knew or perhaps knew I was
16 involved and found ways of getting hold of me, and
17 someone, I can't remember who, offered to introduce me
18 to Alan Everett, the vicar of St Clement St James, and
19 his — because obviously they were absolutely at the
20 epicentre of this and had a very clear view on the
21 failings, his very kind of dispassionate account of the
22 failings left a deep impression on me.

23 Q. Right. Did anybody from the Muslim community, from the
24 Al Manaar Mosque, for example, get in touch with you or
25 try to get in touch with you directly?

175

1 A. I can't remember, but one of my first visits was there
2 and I heard directly from them their experience as well.

3 I can't put an exact date on that visit, but it's in my
4 witness statement.

5 Q. Now, if you look a little bit lower down the chain,
6 earlier on the morning of 16 June, you can see at 07.57
7 there's an email from — I apologise, if we go to page 2
8 {CLG00018939/2}, we can see it more clearly. Middle of
9 page 2, there is an email at 7.41 from Lorna Gratton at
10 Number 10 to the office of Sajid Javid, copied to
11 Alastair Whitehead, who was the Prime Minister's private
12 secretary, subject "CLG support to RBKC". It says:

13 "Hello,

14 "I spoke to Helen Mac yesterday after the cross
15 government meeting. There are still concerns here about
16 how well organised the response effort is for those in
17 receipt of it on the ground. Would it be helpful for
18 them to have more support from CLG (e.g a small team of
19 people seconded similar to the victim support unit?)?
20 Could you let me know what you think.

21 "Thanks,

22 "Lorna."

23 So would it be right to take from that that there
24 were concerns within Number 10 about the effectiveness
25 of the response at this stage?

176

1 A. Before this email, I think you've got evidence that
 2 immediately after the meeting that I chaired before,
 3 Lorna Gratton had a direct conversation with senior
 4 officials at the department to express her view in
 5 response to what she'd heard from Nicholas Holgate, and
 6 I think, as I said, wheels were beginning to turn the
 7 night before. This is just a building of the drumbeat.
 8 Q. Right.
 9 Now, just to put one more piece of the puzzle in
 10 place, could you go, please, to {CLG00008234}. If we go
 11 to page 1 in this email run, third email down, this is
 12 an email from your office — Deborah Morrison,
 13 I think — to the office of Sajid Javid, 16 June. This
 14 is at 8.56, a little bit later than we've been looking
 15 at, copied to Katharine Hammond:
 16 "Hi James, Tom,
 17 "With many thanks (Tom) for your time on the phone —
 18 the Minister is receiving direct feedback this morning
 19 that the coordination on the ground in terms of i)
 20 connecting families and ii) coordinating the volunteer
 21 effort is not quite there yet and is perceived as
 22 'chaotic'.
 23 "He feels it would be helpful for us collectively to
 24 identify who is actually responsible for coordinating
 25 both efforts (as in a person) and what, if any, more

177

1 support they may need."
 2 Now, that direct feedback, was that the feedback
 3 you've just been explaining to us, in other words direct
 4 conversations you were personally having with people on
 5 the ground —
 6 A. I believe so. That's my reaction to your question, yes.
 7 Q. What did you do as a result of that feedback?
 8 A. What I've just described, which is I fed it into the
 9 system, and I think that this is just one of the proof
 10 points of that, yeah.
 11 Q. I see. So this is you essentially feeding it in to
 12 Sajid Javid's office?
 13 A. Yes, because by that time, clearly, his department was
 14 leading.
 15 Q. Right.
 16 Now, following those issues being raised by your
 17 office with DCLG, what did your office continue to do
 18 better to support the local council with the problems
 19 they were facing locally?
 20 A. Are you asking what we — what I did?
 21 Q. Yes, what you did. What you and your office did.
 22 A. We registered this concern. We asked that question.
 23 I think that reflects the feedback that you've had from
 24 evidence, that one of the fundamental frustrations and
 25 causes of distress was the inability to identify any

178

1 leadership or reliable sources of information or any
 2 visible co-ordination of the humanitarian support, if
 3 I can use that language, and there had been a delay in
 4 setting up the co-ordination mechanism for that. So at
 5 this point I am registering concerns and asking
 6 questions.
 7 You'll be aware that around about this time or very
 8 shortly after, a decision had been quite rightly taken
 9 to go to full —fat COBR with the Prime Minister in
 10 the chair, as I think a result of the drumbeat
 11 I described earlier, in terms of growing awareness that
 12 there needed to be change.
 13 Q. Then let's move on — inch on, I think — by a few
 14 minutes later into the morning of 16 June.
 15 {CAB00001152}, please. This is an email from your
 16 office to Katharine Hammond at the civil contingencies
 17 secretariat at 9.33, if we go, please, to the second
 18 email on the page. Can you see that?
 19 A. I can.
 20 Q. It comes again from your private secretary,
 21 Deborah Morrison, and it says:
 22 "Katherine,
 23 "Thank you so much for your time on the phone
 24 earlier this morning."
 25 So was this you speaking to her or was this your

179

1 private secretary speaking to Katharine Hammond?
 2 A. This is my private secretary.
 3 Q. Yes.
 4 She says:
 5 "As we discussed, in advance of the meeting this
 6 afternoon the Minister would be really grateful if the
 7 Secretariat could pull together a written summary of
 8 what we are doing across the system to:
 9 "i. support victims;
 10 "ii. provide support for emergency services
 11 personnel;
 12 "iii. action taken so far to [sic] identify and
 13 check similar buildings;
 14 "iv. action taken so far to re-house people and what
 15 is our common understanding (DLG/RBKC) of the commitment
 16 to re-house people locally;
 17 "v. action taken so far to reassure people about
 18 their fire safety; and
 19 "vi. an update on access to cash (and how it's
 20 working on the ground/any updates from local Banks?)
 21 "We've touched on all these questions over the last
 22 two meetings but the Minister thinks it would be helpful
 23 to have a summary that we can work through point by
 24 point. He feels it is important that we use this
 25 meeting to really stress test the reality on the ground,

180

1 given the conflicting reporting and as this is likely to
 2 be the 'handover' meeting before we switch into recovery
 3 mode.
 4 "Would that be possible?"
 5 Now, why did you consider it necessary to convey
 6 that detail or those questions to the Cabinet Office,
 7 the CCS?
 8 A. Because I think the assumption — the context here is
 9 that we are preparing and expecting for a third in the
 10 series of the meetings that I chaired, and I wanted to
 11 be sure that that meeting kind of drilled down into the
 12 issues that we'd raised and some of the challenges we
 13 raised. So I think this is to the Cabinet Office asking
 14 them to prepare something specific for me in the
 15 anticipation, as I think you can see from the email at
 16 the bottom of the page, that I would be chairing the
 17 next meeting. As we now know, the decision was taken
 18 that the Prime Minister would, quite rightly, chair the
 19 next meeting.
 20 Q. Now, going back to the bottom of page 1 {CAB00001152/1},
 21 you can see that I read to you that you are recorded as
 22 feeling it important to use the meeting to really stress
 23 test the reality on the ground. Why was that necessary?
 24 What had led to that need?
 25 A. Because of the cumulative picture that I've tried to

181

1 convey to you that this process of cross—Whitehall
 2 co—ordination was terribly undermined by poor
 3 information, lack of ground truth, and data that wasn't
 4 keeping up with reality, which made a difficult
 5 decision—making environment even harder. So I think
 6 this is partly an exercise of a chair wanting to make
 7 sure that there was momentum and continuity from the
 8 last meeting and that we really drilled down into what
 9 we said we would look into — what felt most important
 10 at the time.
 11 Q. And what was the conflicting reporting? You need to go
 12 to the top of page 2 {CAB00001152/2}, I'm afraid, but if
 13 we go to the top of page 2 —
 14 A. I think — let me please just check the ...
 15 Q. "... given the conflicting reporting ..."
 16 A. So I think this, in part, relates to the point that you
 17 were trying to tease out of me, which is around the
 18 confusion around data and numbers, which was causing
 19 real frustration.
 20 Q. So inconsistent reporting from RBKC, rather than
 21 conflicting reporting from different parts of
 22 government? Is that —
 23 A. I think it's the former, to the best of my recollection.
 24 Q. Now, I think you have just made the point, but confirm
 25 for us, that you at that stage still expected that you

182

1 would be chairing the further cross—Whitehall meeting
 2 that afternoon.
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. Yes.
 5 If we go, please, to {CLG00008289}, if we move
 6 further forward into the morning, 16 June. Page 1,
 7 second email in chain, please, towards the bottom of
 8 page 1. Here's an email from Alastair Whitehead at
 9 10.50 confirming that the Prime Minister had decided to
 10 chair the meeting that afternoon herself.
 11 If we go to the top of page 2 {CLG00008289/2},
 12 please, you can see what he says:
 13 "All,
 14 "The Prime Minister has decided that this
 15 afternoon's CCS Ministerial meeting will now be the
 16 first meeting of the Prime Minister—chaired Grenfell
 17 Towers Recovery Taskforce at 1330 in 70 Whitehall (CCS
 18 will confirm with a Calling Notice), with SoSs from
 19 DCLG, HO, DfE, DWP, MoJ, HMT, DH attending, along with
 20 the Policing and Fire Minister, Minister for London,
 21 operational partners and the Mayor of London and
 22 RB Kensington and Chelsea.
 23 "The CRIP should be circulated by 1200 ..."
 24 Then there is a list of bullet points which are the
 25 topics.

183

1 It's clear that those topics, those six topics, have
 2 been either cut and pasted or very closely copied or
 3 mirror those set out in the topic list that
 4 Deborah Morrison had sent at your instruction earlier
 5 that morning to Katharine Hammond; yes?
 6 A. It looks very similar. This is the first time I've seen
 7 this email, so ...
 8 Q. Right. Right.
 9 Do you know what it was that changed to take this
 10 from a ministerial meeting number 3 to a Prime
 11 Minister—chaired taskforce meeting?
 12 A. I think the Prime Minister's personal visit, if I recall
 13 the timing correctly, the day before will have had
 14 a powerful effect upon herself. She was by then — and
 15 I'm simply deducing this from the evidence that you've
 16 received — receiving advice that, you know, the council
 17 was failing and there were major problems about the
 18 support for the community. She'll have been advised
 19 that it was time to escalate the process, because it was
 20 likely that the central government was likely to play
 21 a bigger role than perhaps had been imagined at the
 22 start.
 23 Q. Now, I think you continue to attend the meetings —
 24 A. I did.
 25 Q. — which had become known as the taskforce meetings.

184

1 A. I do.
2 Q. Yes.
3 Just pick this up. At {CAB00011967}, here is
4 an email from Alastair Whitehead late on the day of the
5 16th, at 18.25, to Katharine Hammond, where he says:
6 " ... we are going to have another PM—chaired meeting
7 tomorrow (sorry), given the seeming chaos on the ground
8 due to RBKC not gripping this. We will then maybe do
9 a call on Sunday, but hopefully not a full physical
10 meeting."
11 Was it still the case on the Saturday, 17 June,
12 notwithstanding that the Prime Minister was now chairing
13 what was called a taskforce, that RBKC was still not
14 gripping this, or rather that there was still chaos on
15 the ground due to RBKC not gripping this, as it's said?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Given that, by that stage, RBKC had ceded control to
18 John Barradell as London Local Authority Gold by that
19 stage, was there an expectation that RBKC would grip it
20 or continue to do so?
21 A. No, this may be — I can't speak for Alastair in that
22 context. This email is obviously going out around the
23 point of the transition. I don't think it changes the
24 fact that there was chaos or there was perceived to be
25 chaos on the ground and the need for a clearer sense of

185

1 grip which a PM—chaired meeting would bring.
2 Q. Then sticking with the 16th, I think Andrea Leadsom
3 visited RPT, didn't she, Rugby Portobello, where she met
4 a volunteer called Sof McVeigh and Eddie Daffarn. Do
5 you remember that?
6 A. I wasn't with her. I remember that she visited the
7 area.
8 Q. And do you recall — well, let me show you a document,
9 {IWS00002250}. Here is an email from Sof McVeigh, and
10 you can see that it's timed at 9.22 on 26 October, so
11 it's a long time afterwards. But if you go then down to
12 the foot of page 1, you can see another email much
13 earlier in the string on 22 June 2017, and then if you
14 turn to page 2 {IWS00002250/2}, you can see that this is
15 a response to Andrea Leadsom from Sof McVeigh, and here
16 you see, underneath that, Sof McVeigh's email to
17 Andrea Leadsom on 17 June at 16.50:
18 "Thank you for coming to visit RPT yesterday, we
19 were together meeting with Eddie, a Grenfell Tower
20 resident first thing.
21 "In the meeting you gave the impression that your
22 priority would be to get someone in charge in place as
23 a matter of priority, and act in a co—ordinating
24 capacity.
25 "As it stands, there are a number of local groups

186

1 mainly staffed by volunteers working 24/7 trying to deal
2 with this disaster, there is no central co—ordinated
3 point of contact for information or residents needs.
4 "The government needs to appoint a
5 minister/department & team in charge immediately to
6 co—ordinate all the different relief efforts.
7 "Most of the people on the ground are volunteers, or
8 community based operations, and most of us do not have
9 disaster experience or training, there has been no lead
10 on this.
11 "Very urgently — no one has been visiting the hotels
12 to check the residents — some are elderly, all are very
13 disorientated and most do not have English as a first
14 language. For example just now a RPT volunteer had to
15 drive a doctor from the Westway to one of the hotels.
16 Grief counsellors and medics need to be at the hotels on
17 a daily basis."
18 Now, we don't see that Andrea Leadsom responded to
19 the email, but my question for you is: did she discuss
20 these topics with you at that point?
21 A. Not that I recall.
22 Q. Would you have expected someone in her office to have
23 raised these matters with you?
24 A. I was only aware of a visit, I wasn't aware of this
25 conversation or what the substance of her visit was.

187

1 Q. So she raised — is this right? — no concerns with you
2 about the need for a single central government point of
3 contact for bereaved, survivors and residents?
4 A. Not that I recall, but that doesn't mean that she didn't
5 raise it with others.
6 Q. Now, you've already touched on the creation of the role
7 of Minister for Grenfell Victims. Do you recall whether
8 the need for such a role arose either wholly or in part
9 from the concerns raised by Sof McVeigh and
10 Edward Daffarn with Andrea Leadsom on 16 June as
11 recorded in this email?
12 A. I don't believe so directly, although obviously this
13 very powerful email talks to a lot of the entirely
14 unacceptable reality of experience of people who had
15 every reason to demand better. So I think it —
16 although I've never seen this email, it is absolutely
17 consistent with the picture that was beginning to form
18 in the government's mind, which is why, on the Friday,
19 you can see very clear evidence of the central
20 government mobilising in a way that it hadn't done so on
21 the Wednesday.
22 Q. I mean, did the government give thought to appointing
23 a minister or department and team in charge to
24 co—ordinate all the different relief efforts at this
25 time or later?

188

1 A. So the two meetings I chaired were designed to
 2 co-ordinate the support of central government to support
 3 the response and recovery process, as per the blueprint
 4 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and the presumption
 5 of sovereignty and everything that you've explored. So
 6 there was a co-ordination function up and running from
 7 the start, as I've — the point I've laboured is that
 8 I think that process was terribly undermined by the
 9 quality of information that went into that system.
 10 Q. You say terribly undermined; I mean, was this
 11 an enduring flaw or had it been — was there a time when
 12 it came to be cured by the fact that John Barradell was
 13 now in charge and pan-London arrangements were in place?
 14 A. It certainly — and you've got independent advice on
 15 that, it improved quickly.
 16 Q. Now, let's turn to 17 June.
 17 It's right, I think, that you and Amber Rudd, the
 18 then Home Secretary, visited the Westway Centre that
 19 day.
 20 A. Correct.
 21 Q. Whom did you meet there?
 22 A. We met a range of people. The meeting that sticks most
 23 closely in my mind is a meeting I'd organised with
 24 a representative group of volunteers, who, as you well
 25 know, were by then a very, very important part of the

189

1 landscape in terms of support for the community, and
 2 I felt it was important for Amber Rudd to hear directly
 3 from them some of the issues that they faced.
 4 Q. And one of the issues that they faced was the issue of
 5 money being distributed to affected families, wasn't it?
 6 A. Yes, one of a number of issues, yeah.
 7 Q. A number of issues, also including support for people in
 8 hotels and communications.
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. So those problems were persisting; yes?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. Notwithstanding the appointment and entry into action of
 13 John Barradell the day before.
 14 A. Although to — yes, to be fair, he'd only been in the
 15 seat for a day and he was inheriting a chaotic
 16 landscape. So, to be fair to him, I think it would be
 17 reasonable to expect him to have a little bit more time
 18 to impose improvement.
 19 Q. Yes. I think you observed a number of problems with the
 20 response which you wanted to raise with John Barradell;
 21 yes? We have a letter to that effect.
 22 A. Yes, a joint letter with Amber Rudd, yeah.
 23 Q. A joint letter, and that is at — to put it up in front
 24 of you — {HOM00046091}. That's the letter, isn't it?
 25 A. That's the letter.

190

1 Q. Yes, and it goes to Robert and John. John is
 2 John Barradell. Who is Robert?
 3 A. I'm not entirely clear who Robert is.
 4 Q. Right.
 5 A. I apologise for that.
 6 Q. It is going to David Gauke MP's PPS, and it may be him.
 7 Now, it's a long letter and there's a list of
 8 problems in it, but were all those problems persisting
 9 at the time of your visit?
 10 A. I assume so, because they were relayed directly to us on
 11 that day, yes.
 12 Q. Yes.
 13 Now, if we look, please, at the last paragraph, you
 14 can see that the letter was also sent to Number 10, if
 15 you go to page 2 {HOM00046091/2}, please. Yes? It goes
 16 to Gavin Barwell, Alastair Whitehead —
 17 A. Yes.
 18 Q. — and others at Number 10.
 19 You say in your first statement that you were
 20 subsequently given to understand that the £500 cash
 21 payment would be distributed to the affected families on
 22 18 June, and then they would get a chit to enable him to
 23 receive the £5,000 payment.
 24 What was the source of that information?
 25 A. The source of the information of the problem?

191

1 Q. The source of the information of the process to be run
 2 by RBKC.
 3 A. I can't recall, but I think through the CRIPs and the
 4 sitreps, there's a reasonable account of how that — the
 5 mechanisms for payment were set up.
 6 Q. Right.
 7 Do you remember that the confusion about
 8 distribution of money was one which was first grasped
 9 on — I think we've seen this from your own email early
 10 in the morning on 15 June, but was still uncured as at
 11 the 17th?
 12 A. Yes. I think — I may be wrong on this — the earlier
 13 conversation with the Post Office was about making it
 14 easier for people to access their cash. This is
 15 a conversation in part about the ability of people to
 16 access the cash that was promised by the Prime Minister
 17 on, I believe, the day before.
 18 Q. Yes. In fact, I think the record shows — and correct
 19 me if I'm wrong about this — that this was still
 20 a problem come 19 June, the Monday.
 21 A. I believe so.
 22 Q. Yes. Do you know why? Why was it a problem that
 23 endured through the weekend?
 24 A. I don't think I'm the person best placed to give you
 25 a reliable answer on that.

192

1 Q. Well, can you give us a clue?
 2 A. Not one that you can rely on.
 3 Q. All right.
 4 Would you accept, though, overall, that the policy
 5 governing how payments would be made was still being
 6 devised within government as late as the —
 7 A. Yes. I mean, I don't think that's completely
 8 surprising. The policy — I mean, obviously the
 9 Prime Minister wouldn't have announced it if there
 10 hadn't been some pre-cooking, as it were, but it wouldn't
 11 be completely abnormal for some of the detail to be
 12 worked out subsequently and some things probably not
 13 thought through fully that needed to be ironed out.
 14 I don't think that in itself would be completely
 15 surprising.
 16 Q. Let me show you what Sadiq Khan has said about this.
 17 Can I show you his statement, please.
 18 A. Of course.
 19 Q. This is {MOL00000189/14}, paragraph 60, I'll read it to
 20 you, he says:
 21 "One thing from that meeting that stuck out in my
 22 mind ..."
 23 And this was the meeting on the Saturday, and you
 24 can — take this from me — pick that up at
 25 paragraph 57.

193

1 A. Yes, I remember.
 2 Q. He says:
 3 "One thing from that meeting that stuck out in my
 4 mind, was a fairly lengthy discussion that took place
 5 about how much financial support should be given to
 6 families displaced from their homes, either in the tower
 7 or close by, and whether this should be paid as a lump
 8 sum, or in instalments. There appeared to be a
 9 reluctance by some to give those who needed support this
 10 payment in a lump sum. A figure of £500 was discussed,
 11 to be given to families who had lost everything in the
 12 fire as an 'instalment' rather than a lump sum of £5000,
 13 which I believe was based on relief given to those
 14 forced to leave their homes in areas across the country
 15 hit by floods. I recall I intervened to ask why it was
 16 an issue here in the Grenfell community to make one lump
 17 sum payment rather than instalments when it hadn't been
 18 the case after a flood. I couldn't understand why the
 19 residents of Grenfell Tower would be treated any
 20 differently and said so. It was eventually agreed that
 21 this would be paid as one lump sum of £5000. Looking
 22 back, I consider this was symptomatic of the prejudice
 23 and institutional indifference towards the bereaved,
 24 survivors and residents we were to see in the months and
 25 years that followed."

194

1 Now, first, did Sadiq Khan, to your knowledge, raise
 2 the point about difference in treatment between the
 3 victims of floods on the one hand, who got a lump sum,
 4 and the victims or the residents of Grenfell Tower on
 5 the other?
 6 A. I recall there was a discussion about the right
 7 structure. I don't recall it in the terms that
 8 Sadiq Khan relates, and I can't, to be honest, recollect
 9 him having a direct intervention into that conversation.
 10 That, of course, doesn't mean it didn't happen. There
 11 was a discussion for sure.
 12 Q. Right. Were you party to the discussions leading to the
 13 eventual agreement that it would be paid as a lump sum
 14 of £5,000?
 15 A. No, because at this point this was being driven,
 16 I presume, by DWP and the Treasury, and, from memory, it
 17 was £500 cash and the balance in a bank account. I may
 18 be wrong on that.
 19 There was definitely a discussion around what was
 20 the right balance and structure, but I don't — but
 21 I think it was entirely being driven by what's the most
 22 sensible and appropriate thing to do, rather than some
 23 of the assertions that are made —
 24 Q. Can you enlighten us, what was the reason for the
 25 difference in treatment?

195

1 A. To be honest, I'm not aware — I wasn't involved in the
 2 flood, in the flood process, so I'm not aware that there
 3 was a difference in treatment or why, if there was,
 4 there should be.
 5 Q. Right.
 6 Now, the Mayor's retrospective or hindsight opinion
 7 is that it was symptomatic of the prejudice and
 8 institutional indifference towards the bereaved,
 9 survivors and residents that he says we were to see in
 10 the months and years that followed. Do you share that
 11 view?
 12 A. No, I don't. But you might expect me to see that. What
 13 I do absolutely accept is that the response in the
 14 immediate aftermath of the fire was wholly inadequate
 15 and might have led some people to believe there was
 16 institutional indifference.
 17 Q. Can we —
 18 A. I know there wasn't, but I understand why some people
 19 might have felt that.
 20 Q. Can we then turn to {HOM00046091}, which is the letter
 21 again, and if we go, please, to the foot of the screen,
 22 "Support for people in hotels", it says:
 23 "It was clear that many of the families that were
 24 being housed in hotels were not receiving sufficient
 25 care and attention. For example, some had been housed

196

1 on the top floor of buildings. There were complaints of
 2 hotels not providing food at times suitable for those
 3 fasting, which given the make-up of the area was
 4 a significant number of people. There was also the
 5 feeling that people in hotels were 'out of sight and out
 6 of mind'. (John — do Kensington and Chelsea Housing
 7 have the resource they need to engage these families one
 8 on one to ensure they are ok? Do you need any support
 9 from HMG?)"

10 The John is John Barradell there.

11 A. I presume so.

12 Q. Did you receive a response to that question?

13 A. I didn't personally. I don't know if Amber Rudd got
 14 a formal response to this or not.

15 Q. Looking further down, "Communications":

16 "It was clear that the communications work that had
 17 happened to date was not filtering down to the ground.
 18 This is not necessarily a surprise when people do not
 19 have phones."

20 Then it goes on:

21 "As such the Home Secretary has commissioned her
 22 Director of Communications, Simon Wren, to produce
 23 a leaflet, on behalf of the government, clearly setting
 24 out government advice in multiple languages. This will
 25 then be distributed to the community."

197

1 Now, this is the 17th, this is the Saturday.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Why was that not considered sooner? Why were leaflets
 4 not considered sooner?

5 A. I can't necessarily answer that. What I am very clear
 6 about is that was one of the clearest takeaways from
 7 that visit. I remember Amber Rudd being particularly
 8 exercised by this, and it's consistent with all the
 9 evidence you've received that one of the most common and
 10 utterly reasonable complaints was, you know, "No one was
 11 telling us anything, we simply didn't have the
 12 information that we needed at a time when we desperately
 13 needed", and that message, you know, Amber and
 14 I received loud and clear, and she was determined to
 15 take an immediate action on it.

16 The context of that trip was it was — we were
 17 effectively on a fact-finding visit. It was about
 18 trying to build our understanding of what was actually
 19 happening on the ground that reflected our lack of
 20 confidence of what we'd been told up to that point. So
 21 by this point, another department was in the lead, but
 22 we wanted to sort of play our part in trying to find
 23 out.

24 Q. Do you know when a leaflet did eventually get —

25 A. I think it was very quick, within days.

198

1 Q. Would you accept that that could have been and should
 2 have been done faster?

3 A. Yes, like many things.

4 Q. Let's then go, please, to {HOM00046081}. This is your
 5 exhibit 14. It's a letter from the local MP, then
 6 Emma Dent Coad, to Amber Rudd, the then Home Secretary,
 7 and if you can see at paragraph 2 on that page, towards
 8 the foot of the screen — I should have shown you the
 9 date: it's 17 June 2017.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Paragraph 2, under the heading "Immediate support for
 12 those affected":

13 "There must be officials from all relevant
 14 government departments and agencies on site to deal with
 15 benefit claims, identity documents, any issues related
 16 to immigration status and all other key administrative
 17 and bureaucratic issues."

18 Did officials from the Home Office first arrive at
 19 the Westway Centre only on the Sunday, 18 June, and not
 20 earlier?

21 A. I believe it was Sunday. I believe there were three
 22 departments there on the Sunday, and the Home Office was
 23 one of them, yeah.

24 Q. But not before?

25 A. I believe not.

199

1 Q. And why was that?

2 A. I can't be sure. It may well be that, as part of our
 3 visit, it was clear to us that the government needed
 4 more visible representation on the ground, and it may
 5 well be that Amber accelerated that as a result of our
 6 visit, but I think it was also part of a broader process
 7 of central government weighing in more heavily, being
 8 more visible, being more aware of the need to provide
 9 support. In the case of the Home Office, a clear need
 10 to help with the replacement of documents, for example.

11 Q. Immigration documents?

12 A. All manner of documents, but including immigration
 13 documents.

14 Q. Right. I think it's right that the Home Office set up
 15 a 24-hour telephone line to assist with immigration and
 16 passport issues.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. But only four days —

19 A. And I think that may have front-run the physical
 20 presence, but I may be wrong on that.

21 Q. Right. But that, I think, was some four days after the
 22 fire, in the end. It wasn't until the Saturday or the
 23 Sunday.

24 A. That may well be the case.

25 Q. Right. And do you know why it took so long?

200

1 A. Because I think it feeds into the bigger, wider problem,
2 which is central government was too slow.
3 Q. I think there was some — can you help with this —
4 confusion around the automated menu which was
5 established, which didn't make it clear that there was
6 a specific line for Grenfell-related enquiries. Did you
7 come to know that?
8 A. If I did, I don't recall it today.
9 Q. You can't help with that?
10 A. I'm afraid I can't.
11 Q. You also visited the scene and surrounding areas on
12 a number of occasions after the 14th. I think one was
13 with Alok Sharma on 19 June; is that right?
14 A. That wasn't a visit, it was a public meeting.
15 Q. A residents' meeting, I think it was, wasn't it?
16 A. In truth — and I think this is confirmed from other
17 evidence — it was a meeting predominantly but not
18 exclusively with the bereaved, as it turns out.
19 Q. At all events, was it at the Harrow Club?
20 A. It was.
21 Q. Right.
22 If you go, please, to {HOM00046086}, you can see
23 a letter dated 24 June, which starts:
24 "Dear all,
25 "Thank you for inviting us to join the Community

201

1 Safety Partnership meeting on Monday evening."
2 The Monday evening was the 19th, I think. Yes.
3 It covers a large number of topics, and we can
4 scroll down. We can see "Practical support at the
5 Westway Centre", "Financial support".
6 Then if we scroll to page 2 {HOM00046086/2}, we can
7 see "Rehousing for people whose homes were destroyed",
8 and there in the first bullet point is the
9 Prime Minister's commitment to rehouse everybody within
10 three weeks.
11 Then to page 3 {HOM00046086/3}, "Support for people
12 whose homes are not fit for habitation", "Immigration",
13 and then "Public Inquiry".
14 Can you help us, why was that letter only sent some
15 five days after the meeting on the 19th? Why was it
16 only sent on 24 June?
17 A. I can't be sure. It would have been a letter that would
18 have to be cleared through the system. Sometimes that
19 could be unacceptably slow. In this context, it clearly
20 was unacceptably slow.
21 Q. Can we go to {CLG00004304}. This takes us outside the
22 seven-day period, but it's an email of 29 June 2017 from
23 Helen MacNamara to a number of people in DCLG, including
24 the office of Melanie Dawes, subject, "Reflections on
25 today's meetings", and it says:

202

1 "This afternoon Suzanne and I accompanied Nick Hurd
2 and Liz Sanderson (from No 10) to a series of community
3 meetings at St Clements Church in North Kensington."
4 Then cast your eye down a little bit further. There
5 is a title, "General reflections", and it says:
6 "We are still letting these people down. They do
7 not feel as if government is responsive and we must fix
8 that. Clearer lines of communication will help but we
9 have to be much more active and present in person at
10 every level if we want people to believe that the
11 Government cares and will keep its promises. They
12 consistently said they wanted things written down (our
13 housing letter is a very good idea and we need to think
14 about doing more of that)."
15 Then the second bullet point is about:
16 "The hardest question ... why it wasn't possible to
17 be clearer about the numbers who were in the tower."
18 Third bullet:
19 "All of the groups were critical about the lack of
20 any visible authority on the ground in the immediate
21 response and still now."
22 Focusing on the first bullet point, and the
23 criticism, perhaps, in the third bullet point, did you
24 share Helen MacNamara's views that are reflected in her
25 reflections as a result of the meeting that you had with

203

1 her that day?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Can you explain why it was that, even as late as
4 29 June, you were of the view that government was still
5 letting the local community down?
6 A. By then, I had taken on the new role that you asked me
7 about on the start, and as I've said in my witness
8 statement I'd taken a decision to try and have personal
9 meetings with families or individuals that wanted to see
10 me, and through those meetings, as well as trying to
11 help them with their personal issues, you know,
12 a picture was forming quite clearly about how — some of
13 the failings that were still in the system and the way
14 that people, you know, continued to feel let down.
15 I would also say that because of the failure to grip
16 it in the early days, the situation that John Barradell
17 and others inherited was made even more difficult, and
18 as I think others have said, if you don't get a grip on
19 these things early, then it becomes very hard to
20 reassert any sense that, you know, the system's got the
21 situation under control. I think the perceptions were
22 set very early and were very difficult to shift and, as
23 I think Helen points out too, there was a huge problem
24 in terms of trust.
25 Q. Can we look at your first witness statement, please, at

204

1 page 7 {HOM00046080/7}, paragraph 22. You say in the
2 second sentence, top of the page:

3 "It was not evident to me that a blueprint existed
4 for managing the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower
5 disaster."

6 What do you mean by that? What point are you
7 making?

8 A. I'm in part making a perception that I was walking into
9 a system that was in shock because it had not
10 anticipated an event like this in terms of some of the
11 worst-case planning, and so I think that was reflected
12 in some of the early processes. I think, with the
13 benefit of hindsight, that statement also takes on board
14 the reality that the system struggled to adapt to the
15 reality of the Grenfell disaster and a situation in
16 which one of the first-level responders clearly couldn't
17 cope but wouldn't admit it.

18 Q. So you're making a point about —

19 A. There was — it's a bit of a hindsight point, but the
20 system struggled to cope with a — what I think was
21 a first-time situation, where one of the first-line
22 responders was not asking for help in a system that was
23 built on the premise that if people needed help, they
24 asked for it.

25 MR MILLETT: Thank you very much.

205

1 Mr Hurd, those are the prepared questions I've got
2 for you, although there may be one or two others I have
3 inadvertently missed.

4 I'm going to ask the Chairman now to take the normal
5 break. It's a little bit later than I would have liked
6 him to do that, but I'm going to do that.

7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.

8 Well, I think you may have been here when
9 I explained to the last witness why we have to have
10 a break at this point, so I won't go all through that
11 again, but we do need to have a break.

12 I should think ten minutes is enough, isn't it,

13 Mr Millett? Well, if I said 4.40?

14 MR MILLETT: Yes, 4.40.

15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And if you need more time, you can
16 always tell me.

17 We will break until 4.40, and then we'll see if
18 there are any more questions at that point. All right?

19 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. Would you go
21 with the usher, please.

22 (Pause)

23 Well, there you are, Mr Millett, if you find you
24 need more time, just let us know. All right?

25 MR MILLETT: Yes, thank you, Mr Chairman.

206

1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.

2 (4.32 pm)

3 (A short break)

4 (4.40 pm)

5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Hurd. Well, we'll see
6 if there are any more questions.

7 Yes, Mr Millett.

8 MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman.

9 Just one question, Mr Hurd, and it's this: looking
10 back on it, looking back on the visits you had at the
11 time, your interactions at the time, and reflecting on
12 it now, is there anything that you would have done
13 differently in the role you occupied at the time?

14 A. Well, I'm ashamed, you know, of the failure of the
15 system I was part of to provide, you know, fellow
16 citizens with the most basic support and comfort that
17 they had every reason to feel totally entitled to in
18 arguably their darkest hour.

19 I've thought hard about this. I genuinely feel that
20 I did the best I could with the information and
21 experience available to me, but if the Inquiry feels
22 that best wasn't good enough, I, like others, will be
23 held to account for it.

24 I have very briefly two reflections.

25 I was part of a system that failed to be alive early

207

1 enough to the possibility/probability that the
2 Kensington and Chelsea Council would not be able to
3 cope. And this isn't a judgement around preparation or
4 even competence; I think it should have been evident to
5 us earlier that the scale and complexity of the seismic
6 impact of this disaster was always going to be too much
7 for one council to cope with. Add to that the very
8 clear impression that was forming quickly on the first
9 day that the council was going to struggle to have the
10 moral authority to lead, I think that we collectively
11 should have been quicker to put in place risk monitoring
12 that gave us more direct observation of what was
13 happening on the ground that in turn might have
14 empowered us to be more effective in our challenge of
15 the council. And I think of my chairing of the first
16 meeting and wishing that we'd had better information
17 about the reality of life in the rest centres. I think
18 of my first conversation with Nick Paget-Brown and how
19 I would have played that differently if I'd known what
20 I know now. So I regret that.

21 I have a second reflection which I don't think has
22 perhaps come through in other evidence.

23 Part of what upsets me most about the evidence that
24 you have been presented with from bereaved, survivors
25 and residents in that period was the way people were

208

1 made to feel, and you've had language like this:
 2 impersonal, second-class citizens, the specific
 3 instances of — totally unacceptable. And I have — was
 4 concerned then and am still concerned now about the
 5 degree to which those involved in the human contact in
 6 the emergency response are trauma informed. I know
 7 I wasn't sufficiently trauma — but we are talking about
 8 a community in deep trauma and those helping them, or
 9 trying to help them, need to be, in my view, better
 10 informed about what that actually means, and I don't
 11 feel that's been picked up elsewhere, but it's very
 12 clear to me.

13 Those would be my two reflections, and then I have
 14 just one closing comment with your permission, Chair.

15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Of course.

16 A. So you have, for reasons that I completely understand,
 17 decided to draw a line on the seventh day, and I totally
 18 respect and understand that, but you will be as aware as
 19 anyone that, you know, the road to recovery and what
 20 some people call a new normal is still work in progress,
 21 as I think some statements have put it, and continue to
 22 be very difficult for many people.

23 One observation I make, having been involved in this
 24 process, is where any progress has been made, it has
 25 been where the state has realised that it needed to

209

1 think and act differently, the critical distinction
 2 between doing things with people rather than doing
 3 things to people. And where we have had any progress is
 4 where the NHS or even the council under new leadership
 5 have recognised that.

6 To make that work, you need people to work with, and
 7 I know that I would be supported by many people who have
 8 worked in the public service over these years to want to
 9 acknowledge that, you know, individuals, families,
 10 committees, representative groups who took in many ways
 11 a very brave decision to engage with us despite
 12 everything that was going on in their lives, despite
 13 every reason not to trust the state, took a decision
 14 that they wanted to work with us to try and help us make
 15 better decisions on behalf of their representatives or
 16 their neighbours, and I know many people would just want
 17 to register our thanks and gratitude for that. It's
 18 an extraordinary community that deserved a lot better.

19 Thank you.

20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.

21 MR MILLETT: Well, Mr Hurd, it only remains for me to thank
 22 you very much for coming here and assisting us with our
 23 investigations. We are extremely grateful to you, so
 24 thank you very much.

25 THE WITNESS: Thank you. Thank you.

210

1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Hurd, I must add my own thanks
 2 but also the thanks of my fellow members of the panel to
 3 you for coming to give your evidence. I think you have
 4 been able to give us a very unusual and I might even say
 5 unique perspective on some of the aspects that we're
 6 examining in this module, and it's been very helpful to
 7 us, and I think I can say with some confidence that
 8 we've learned a lot.

9 So thank you very much indeed for giving up the time
 10 to come and give evidence to us.

11 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Chair, and I know how important
 12 your process of delivering truth and accountability is
 13 to the community, and I wish you every strength in that.
 14 Thank you.

15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, and now,
 16 of course, you're free to go.

17 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.

19 (The witness withdrew)

20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Mr Millett.

21 MR MILLETT: Yes.

22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Now, that must be it for the day.

23 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, thank you, and again, thank you to
 24 everybody, including our transcriber, for sitting
 25 a little bit later to accommodate me and the witness.

211

1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, of course.

2 And tomorrow we'll have another witness.

3 MR MILLETT: Yes, Ms McManus, who will be examined by
 4 Ms Malhotra of counsel.

5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you. So we break there and we
 6 resume at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, please.

7 MR MILLETT: Thank you.

8 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
 9 (4.46 pm)

10 (The hearing adjourned until 10 am
 11 on Tuesday, 24 May 2022)

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

212

1	INDEX	
2		PAGE
3	MR DAVID BELLAMY (affirmed)	1
4		
5	Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY	1
6		
7	MR NICHOLAS HURD (affirmed)	105
8		
9	Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY	105
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
	213	
	214	

A					
	177:24 198:18 209:10	aid (17) 64:14 65:22	anticipate (1) 88:23	64:18 70:4 72:21 78:18	65:20 67:12 69:22 79:3
	acute (1) 84:3	76:12,15 81:10,25 87:21	anticipated (2) 26:18 205:10	90:25 92:10 98:22	81:18 85:13 86:25 115:19
	adapt (1) 205:14	88:2,14 92:6,8 96:17 97:3	anticipation (1) 181:15	102:5,16 115:14,16 121:10	117:7
ability (7) 13:23 53:22 92:15	add (5) 88:10 103:1 104:5	98:13 99:4,15 141:6	anxiety (2) 126:23 127:17	130:21 131:19 134:12	authority (81) 4:1,7,9,12
95:9 99:8 168:18 192:15	208:7 211:1	al (1) 175:24	anxious (1) 45:9	135:20,24 136:4 139:3,3	5:25 6:2,4,6,9,14 7:6,7,12
able (18) 51:2 53:8 54:12	addition (1) 19:6	alan (2) 172:19 175:18	anybody (9) 34:11 44:4	141:5,7,25 159:10,16	8:1,17,19,21 10:18,19
56:20 59:3 60:21 69:20	additional (14) 17:15 42:8	alarmed (1) 145:1	85:11 86:10 110:11 113:22	166:19 167:12 169:3,24	11:4,7,17 12:10,13 13:1,2
81:20 133:7 149:1,22	88:4 89:8 124:2 126:14	alastair (7) 119:20,25 176:11	147:20 148:25 175:23	174:4 194:15 206:4	14:19 15:10,12 16:6,14
151:7 169:2,8,9 171:9	132:18 133:25 135:12	183:8 185:4,21 191:16	anyone (14) 30:3,5 32:22	asked (32) 23:23 33:11 40:17	18:24 22:10 24:5,8 25:14
208:2 211:4	140:5 141:3,7,21 171:2	alex (1) 174:5	44:1 49:7 92:11 102:6	47:22 62:25 63:5 74:5,7	27:17 30:2,6 52:17 53:7
abnormal (1) 193:11	address (4) 66:5 70:18 85:6	ali (3) 23:14 46:7 51:22	119:15 137:10,12 141:17	79:14 85:2 98:5,7,21	54:4,7 56:3 57:3 58:16
abolished (1) 15:2	142:20	alive (1) 207:25	166:20 169:3 209:19	101:19,19 118:11,21 119:6	60:17 63:16 64:1 65:12
above (3) 11:6 106:13,22	addressed (6) 16:7 40:3	allied (1) 137:18	anything (11) 13:3,8 30:15	120:2,21 121:8 122:13	67:20 68:3,9 71:8 73:20
absence (7) 44:1,4 130:16	70:12 85:18 90:3 98:24	allow (4) 26:1 101:20 112:20	49:8 72:14 82:25 103:1	125:25 127:24 128:23	74:12 79:6 81:20 82:14
137:10,11 141:16,24	addressing (1) 111:7	163:2	120:20 150:4 198:11	129:6 139:1 150:3 155:14	83:9 85:4 87:4 91:9 92:23
absolutely (8) 73:7 97:9	adequately (4) 144:1 145:17	allowed (1) 123:4	207:12	178:22 204:6 205:24	95:24 96:2,8
112:13 122:3 155:21	147:13 148:20	allowing (1) 127:22	apart (2) 107:2,5	asking (10) 20:25 70:14	97:4,5,10,13,15 98:1,20,22
175:19 188:16 196:13	adjusted (1) 212:10	allows (1) 92:7	apologies (2) 71:6 75:8	132:18 133:25 135:11	130:11 131:6 168:5 185:18
abundantly (1) 64:6	adjournment (1) 104:22	alluded (2) 89:8 155:18	apologise (4) 129:15 130:5	136:5 178:20 179:5 181:13	203:20 208:10
accelerated (1) 200:5	administration (2) 4:21,24	almost (2) 85:1 161:21	176:7 191:5	205:22	authorities (2) 30:12 53:13
accept (13) 31:21 39:4,7	administrative (1) 199:16	alok (12) 156:11,23 157:8,17	apologising (1) 69:6	asks (1) 98:22	automated (1) 201:4
40:25 53:12 94:24 95:11	admit (1) 205:17	158:11 159:13 160:15	apparent (2) 36:18 66:3	aspect (2) 148:21 157:24	automatic (2) 19:16,24
97:18 130:10 136:20 193:4	advance (1) 180:5	165:23 169:12,24 172:3	apparently (1) 83:24	aspects (5) 8:9 34:2 92:16	autumn (1) 33:19
196:13 199:1	advice (13) 19:7 22:18 25:6	201:13	appeal (1) 26:7	95:3 211:5	avail (1) 99:5
accepted (1) 112:17	51:16,18 80:3 112:25	alone (1) 129:14	appear (7) 2:12 21:2,7 44:23	aspirational (1) 34:3	availability (4) 120:4,17
accepting (4) 53:20 64:6	113:8 146:10 161:2 184:16	along (1) 183:19	46:25 50:22 106:7	assembling (1) 129:4	122:5,7
99:15 113:14	189:14 197:24	alongside (3) 72:9,11 157:8	appeared (3) 76:19 171:14	assembly (5) 6:7,16,17 20:24	available (11) 25:5 31:16
access (12) 51:25 94:25	advise (1) 114:7	already (16) 27:14 31:8	194:8	78:7	66:4,5 89:2,4 123:1 138:3
112:20 149:11,17,21 150:8	advised (2) 56:13 184:18	32:20 64:24 73:11	appendix (1) 26:8	assertions (1) 195:23	150:3 164:7 207:21
151:7 152:1 180:19	adviser (5) 94:10 110:15,20	77:12,18 87:11 89:8 93:2	applying (1) 98:23	assessing (1) 118:3	avenue (2) 84:23 85:14
192:14,16	113:15,25	100:25 126:8 127:23	appoint (2) 32:11 187:4	assessment (4) 18:5 45:11	avoid (1) 159:1
accommodate (1) 211:25	advisers (1) 4:20	134:10 151:8 188:6	appointed (9) 5:5 16:23	52:13 170:24	aware (43) 13:23 23:10
accommodation (14) 44:18	advising (3) 111:1,12 112:6	also (42) 2:2 6:22 8:22 19:12	88:16 96:25 108:8,13,19	assigned (2) 77:14 92:18	58:15,17 59:8 62:21 63:8
132:15 133:1,6,21 134:19	advisory (1) 19:7	22:19 25:8 26:4 27:12	110:19 148:1	assigning (1) 100:21	65:5,10 76:25 77:9 78:1
136:23 144:19 145:11	advocate (1) 109:18	29:21 30:23 34:24 39:19	appointing (1) 188:22	assist (24) 7:13 11:24 12:9	81:14 84:22 85:8 113:18
163:25 165:9,11 166:5	affairs (1) 91:23	43:14 55:1 61:6,11 69:25	appointment (1) 190:12	15:21 33:7 46:16 48:9	114:20,23 115:1 118:10
167:19	affect (1) 86:4	88:14 90:12,18 93:10 94:7	appoints (2) 12:15 13:7	52:12 54:6 56:20 60:21	120:19,23 121:14,21
accompanied (2) 147:20	affected (22) 44:17 56:8,19	101:20 103:19 129:16	appreciate (5) 10:4 77:1	67:2,16 69:20 71:4 73:17	122:19 129:2 133:10
203:1	89:5 120:12 133:5 135:25	131:8,20 132:16 133:2	79:20 84:8 172:11	75:17 77:1 84:24 132:2	141:14 145:7,13 149:24
accord (3) 156:21 158:14	137:22 138:5,13,24 140:9	149:18 150:1 159:15	approach (2) 98:21,24	133:15 135:25 136:14	162:5 164:3,15 165:22
173:8	155:20,24 158:20 163:17	173:22 174:7 190:7 191:14	appropriate (15) 19:11 30:7	200:15	169:11 179:7 187:24,24
accordance (1) 97:2	168:8 170:1 174:10 190:5	197:4 200:6 201:11 204:15	39:7 70:22 76:16 79:5,13	assistance (12) 1:24 36:19	196:1,2 200:8 209:18
according (3) 9:3 156:18	191:21 199:12	205:13 211:2	97:5 98:14 101:5 120:13	52:9 88:11,15 96:24 97:2	awareness (6) 28:22 30:14
158:11	affecting (1) 161:16	alternative (2) 151:8 167:19	125:2 126:9 156:6 195:22	94:4 109:6 141:12,21	54:18 90:9 114:13 179:11
account (5) 157:5 175:21	affirmed (4) 1:14 105:4	alternatively (1) 26:15	approximation (1) 86:18	167:20	away (6) 35:7 59:24 78:18
192:4 195:17 207:23	213:3,7	although (11) 12:3 19:18	april (2) 15:1 106:22	assistant (3) 25:13 62:25	99:25 100:1,20
accountability (4) 99:23	afraid (7) 48:19,19 71:5	47:3 52:6 53:3 81:21	apter (2) 146:24 148:5	63:5	awful (1) 35:5
111:18 112:15 211:12	74:24 76:8 182:12 201:10	148:17 188:12,16 190:14	area (16) 51:10 61:13 74:15	63:18	
accountable (1) 100:23	after (21) 15:2 56:25 59:2	206:2	89:1,18 99:24 144:2	assisting (3) 76:18 105:13	B
accurate (2) 32:9 134:20	64:8 68:24 70:15 72:7	always (10) 42:4,6 64:7	157:18 163:19 165:11	210:22	b (5) 9:22 44:12,22
accurately (2) 45:24 136:6	97:10 104:17 142:4 159:14	80:17 108:25 109:20 117:3	169:14 170:3,4 172:18	associated (1) 14:12	132:10,22
accused (1) 85:16	171:22 172:4,17 176:14	130:20 206:16 208:6	186:7 197:3	assume (5) 71:10 74:12	
achieving (1) 89:17	177:2 179:8 194:18 200:21	amber (11) 120:15 122:25	areas (4) 107:7 146:3 194:14	135:16 155:15 191:10	back (41) 14:16 20:3,18 31:6
acknowledge (2) 103:19	201:12 202:15	123:3 189:17 190:2,22	201:11	assumed (3) 74:14 108:25	32:4 40:24 42:1 56:14
210:9	aftermath (6) 4:4 36:1 96:2	197:13 198:7,13 199:6	arena (1) 35:2	163:20	57:17 62:21 63:2,9 64:11
acknowledged (2) 68:22	114:9 196:14 205:4	200:5	arguably (2) 161:21 207:18	assuming (2) 152:24 153:1	65:13 67:9 68:24 70:25
107:3	afternoon (20) 42:23 50:1,13	ambit (1) 108:16	arise (1) 155:23	assumption (4) 128:23	74:10 75:3 76:25 77:10,25
acknowledgment (1) 36:17	56:21 64:6 82:17 104:25	ambulance (2) 137:24 147:1	arising (1) 32:23	129:16 168:5 181:8	87:16 100:5 101:25
acquaintances (1) 172:18	105:1,12,25 120:3 154:7	among (1) 120:8	arm (1) 20:20	assurance (1) 101:7	121:7,9 125:3 136:16
across (11) 22:21 45:7,12	165:13 166:14,17 174:24	amongst (2) 157:13 159:19	arms (1) 158:25	assurances (2) 53:9 131:5	137:18 141:1 143:25
62:12 95:3 140:21	180:6 183:2,10 203:1	amount (3) 5:8 112:12 163:2	arose (3) 98:25 129:12 188:8	assure (1) 171:1	146:10 147:23 150:25
159:20,25 169:6 180:8	afternoons (1) 183:15	amplifying (1) 91:16	around (40) 14:17 23:7	atmosphere (1) 147:10	166:11 167:12 181:20
194:14	afterwards (1) 186:11	analogy (1) 85:10	28:15 33:9 37:15 47:21	attack (3) 35:1,2,5	194:22 207:10,10
acting (3) 26:2 74:15 75:25	again (29) 3:2,4 21:1 30:13	andor (1) 42:8	53:17 56:18 109:23 113:17	attacks (2) 7:16 80:21	background (4) 3:24 4:5
action (27) 26:18 32:19	35:17,25 47:8 55:21 69:5	andrea (6) 156:14	118:13 119:11 121:24	attempt (1) 87:1	107:8,12
47:23 54:19 60:19	79:18 84:7 87:24 100:3	186:2,15,17 187:18 188:10	124:10 131:4 134:24	attempted (1) 33:20	bad (2) 55:14 174:19
70:22,23 71:2 72:25	103:14,25 112:8 125:3	andrew (1) 66:19	136:24 137:23 138:11,12	attend (11) 19:13,24 25:9	balance (2) 195:17,20
79:5,12 82:24,25 134:1,24	128:1 130:5,21 140:11,23	angry (1) 56:2	143:7 144:22 146:1 147:9	43:19,24 55:8 93:15	bank (1) 195:17
136:22 139:13,14,14	143:24 160:21 171:4	announced (1) 193:9	149:3,20 153:21 155:3,24	130:14 156:8 168:23	banks (1) 180:20
144:19 164:4,7	179:20 196:21 206:11	announcements (1) 85:25	162:9 166:7 169:11 170:12	184:23	barradell (45) 47:13 54:14
180:12,14,17 190:12	211:23	anonymously (1) 84:20	179:7 182:17,18 185:22	attendance (5) 19:15 36:4	60:16 62:18 63:1,5,13
198:15	against (3) 111:19 112:22	another (22) 9:21,22 27:15	195:19 201:4 208:3	127:8 130:10 152:12	64:25 65:3,24 67:14
actions (14) 25:4 29:18	127:11	37:2 41:10 44:21 56:18	arranged (1) 37:3	attended (20) 25:11,14,16	68:5,17 69:1,17,23 70:5
31:15 32:10,20,23 33:5	agencies (2) 36:19 199:14	71:8 72:8 73:19 81:20	arrangement (3) 10:6 110:13	29:21 43:1,11,15 59:13,16	72:23 73:10,21,24 74:14
44:9 133:18 134:23 136:11	agenda (1) 161:5	85:19 87:1 89:18 90:21	114:10	87:15 93:2,11,16,19,22	75:20 76:11,14 77:7,9,14
148:16 164:4 165:20	agree (18) 4:23 13:19 15:18	93:11 104:17 171:21 185:6	arrangements (20) 5:22 9:22	94:5,11,12,14 153:21	78:19 79:5,12 81:8 82:1,19
activated (5) 26:12,16 27:1	20:14 30:18 32:25 41:3,4	186:12 198:21 212:2	10:1,3 15:16,19 28:2 34:11	attendee (1) 154:19	83:3,14,20 85:4 185:18
82:16 96:25	47:2 58:12 70:21 74:25	answer (19) 74:14,20,24	35:24 67:3,17 70:3 74:11	attendees (3) 116:13 131:4	189:12 190:13,20 191:2
activation (2) 67:19 98:15	84:2 93:19,22 126:15,16	98:17 122:11,24 127:15	91:6,20 92:4 98:1,14 151:9	156:13	197:10 204:16
active (6) 68:6 91:6,11	170:24	129:24 143:11 145:12	189:13	attending (6) 1:23 22:25	barrowdale (1) 77:13
144:22 147:2 203:9	agreed (4) 80:2 91:7 155:15	156:5 168:13 169:3,4,8,9	arrive (1) 199:18	23:5 120:7 154:19 183:19	barwell (1) 191:16
activities (1) 96:15	194:20	171:13 192:25 198:5	articulate (1) 123:11	37:8 84:6	base (1) 153:4
actual (1) 138:5	agreeing (1) 82:11	answered (6) 35:15 67:18	ashamed (1) 207:14	132:9 196:25	based (4) 113:5 150:7 187:8
actually (14) 13:8 48:2 73:15	agreement (4) 10:24 82:8	70:13 100:25 134:10 142:2	ask (45) 5:24 23:22,25 25:18	attributed (1) 46:4	194:13
88:13 98:22 112:12 127:6	155:12 195:13	answering (1) 157:7	36:19 39:24 48:2 49:7	authorisation (2) 146:15	basic (6) 117:16 127:13
129:5 162:15 164:11 175:4	agreements (1) 96:18	answers (2) 56:2 133:13	53:11 54:21 55:3 58:17,20	148:8	137:8 139:24 164:10
				authorities (11) 7:2 12:19	207:16

best (15) 3:10 61:19 68:16 71:6 88:19 133:14 136:14 152:12,15 160:1 171:11 182:23 192:24 207:20,22	broad (2) 15:22 113:7 broader (2) 169:20 200:6 broadly (3) 107:10 118:9 157:25 bromley (1) 71:19 brought (1) 37:8 build (2) 171:5 198:18 building (7) 38:24 83:22 130:24 145:20 147:17 162:7 177:7 buildings (10) 45:7,9 46:13 52:2 145:1,9 159:20,24 180:13 197:1 built (1) 205:23 bullet (15) 31:10,14 120:10 143:12 149:14,15,25 165:6 167:15 183:24 202:8 203:15,18,22,23 bundle (1) 164:23 bureau (1) 86:13 bureaucracy (1) 159:2 bureaucratic (1) 199:17 business (2) 79:25 108:3	carry (8) 11:8 16:3 26:2 33:24 49:21 97:15 167:6 171:9 carrying (3) 12:4,18 23:9 cash (9) 149:11,17 150:8 152:1 180:19 191:20 192:14,16 195:17 cast (1) 203:4 casualty (2) 40:7 86:13 category (25) 6:22,25 7:2,5,7,8 8:12,22 9:20,24 11:6 12:7 13:5 17:11,13,15,19 23:7,7 39:14 53:12,14,16 96:5 130:11 cause (1) 46:20 causes (1) 178:25 causing (1) 182:18 caution (1) 127:11 caveat (1) 128:1 cca (4) 9:16,21 14:11 114:15 ccr (1) 11:5 ccs (8) 42:14 44:7 119:3 128:24 170:18 181:7 183:15,17 ceded (1) 185:17 cell (19) 24:15,25 26:9,12,22 27:1 29:5,14,18 31:5 32:15 37:22,23 75:8,10 82:22 83:1 93:6,7 central (26) 19:12 43:7 45:15 51:3 54:2,3 72:24 73:5,8 78:7 109:10 113:22 115:7 127:4 140:23 143:25 162:15 166:6 171:8 184:20 187:2 188:2,19 189:2 200:7 201:2 centre (10) 27:12 42:5 53:5 56:7 150:9 163:21 167:18 189:18 199:19 202:5 centres (12) 27:12 28:3 36:13 136:1 137:4,6,9 146:4 167:16,20,25 208:17 ceo (3) 62:20 76:24 151:6 certain (4) 41:10 83:8 86:16 163:2 cetera (1) 14:12 chain (3) 66:22 176:5 183:7 chair (39) 12:15 13:7,13 14:6,13 16:23 26:23 54:14 60:17 63:16 68:8 69:21 88:18 99:21 100:2 111:20 118:12,21 119:6 120:21 121:8 122:14 124:21 125:25 130:25 131:18 136:7 140:21 154:18 160:11 161:12,15 171:16 179:10 181:18 182:6 183:10 209:14 211:11 chaired (18) 29:20 43:1,9 50:13 94:2,8 120:5 122:17,21 123:1,6,20 124:1 126:13 157:3 177:2 181:10 189:1 chairing (9) 121:16 128:16 148:12 157:6 172:25 181:16 183:1 185:12 208:15 chairman (11) 1:10 104:25 105:11 162:19 163:12 166:13 167:11 206:4,25 207:8 211:23 chairmans (3) 131:8 134:13 140:17 chairs (5) 13:22 128:10 129:5 135:18 160:21 challenge (8) 88:22 90:4 99:6 124:3 126:14 127:13 144:17 208:14 challenges (3) 89:17 140:20 181:12 challenging (2) 95:9 98:18 chance (2) 28:9 147:6 change (9) 15:8 13:13 98:3 108:2 170:21 172:8 175:8 179:12	changed (5) 10:5 15:12 99:10 128:5 184:9 changes (2) 14:5 185:23 channel (2) 39:8,9 channels (1) 155:12 chaos (5) 51:14 185:7,14,24,25 chaotic (2) 177:22 190:15 chapter (3) 16:7,9 118:1 charge (4) 186:22 187:5 188:23 189:13 charged (1) 157:10 chat (1) 55:15 check (5) 33:5 101:18 180:13 182:14 187:12 cheers (1) 66:24 chelsea (12) 3:21 27:10 43:14 59:18 63:25 78:9 86:2 100:4 130:8 183:22 197:6 208:2 chief (37) 4:13,18 5:1,5,12 22:16 43:13 59:17 60:16 62:8 63:15 65:19 71:7,8,17,19 72:2,8 73:20,22 74:13 77:14,20 78:25 79:6 81:19 87:14 99:14,16,20,23 100:1 130:7 152:20 153:15 154:6 171:25 chimed (1) 63:3 chit (1) 191:22 chosen (1) 160:9 chris (1) 66:18 chronological (1) 129:23 chronologically (2) 57:4 68:16 church (4) 56:7,10,14 203:3 circulated (6) 31:3 38:12 48:23 50:5 133:11 183:23 circumstance (1) 157:11 circumstances (6) 42:6 81:22 98:13 118:18 125:1 130:22 citizens (2) 207:16 209:2 city (13) 5:20 11:21 22:8 41:8 58:10 59:1 60:15,16 61:7 63:15 64:11 84:17 99:21 civic (1) 26:3 civil (32) 4:2 5:6,13,25 7:12 9:16 11:5 17:7 24:8,14,16 31:6 32:4 34:14 39:13,25 41:20 42:1 55:18 65:13 92:5,17 98:11 101:2 107:20 114:15 115:12 119:3,21 148:19 179:16 189:4 cladding (1) 52:2 claims (1) 199:15 clarification (1) 20:21 clarifications (1) 3:22 clarify (3) 12:23 121:20 127:22 clarity (2) 118:13 163:24 clear (54) 33:22 45:8,16 46:2 55:25 61:1,15 64:6 66:1 67:21 68:11 75:3,4,11 82:20 88:13 91:2 97:8 116:2 117:20,22 125:8 129:24 136:7,13 138:11 144:3,14 146:2 148:6 153:8,9 155:18 159:7 161:23 164:5,18 167:25 168:3 169:17 172:24 175:20 184:1 188:19 191:3 196:23 197:16 198:5,14 200:3,9 201:5 208:8 209:12 cleared (1) 202:18 clearer (7) 33:25 111:18 153:10 171:5 185:25 203:8,17 clearest (1) 198:6 clearly (50) 2:2 12:18 13:21 14:16 15:11 21:17 27:18 42:4 53:21 54:19 56:1,24 59:9 65:11 67:8,11,23 68:8	69:10,23 70:19 75:19 79:6 80:19 81:1 85:6 86:7 87:22 88:7 89:13 95:4,9,20 96:8 105:20 109:11 120:17 121:14 122:22 135:7 136:9 137:2 144:22 172:22 176:8 178:13 197:23 202:19 204:12 205:16 clement (3) 172:20 174:22 175:18 clements (1) 203:3 clg (5) 116:22,25 174:1 176:12,18 clg00003011 (1) 50:6 clg00004304 (1) 202:21 clg00008234 (1) 177:10 clg00008289 (1) 183:5 clg000082892 (1) 183:11 clg00018939 (1) 173:17 clg000189392 (1) 176:8 clg0003065336 (1) 123:18 clg100097317 (1) 158:12 climate (1) 108:2 close (4) 46:17,18 146:22 194:7 closed (1) 7:21 closely (8) 16:20 19:10 42:5 69:22 70:2 137:1 184:2 189:23 closing (1) 209:14 club (1) 201:19 clue (1) 193:1 coaching (1) 105:17 coad (1) 199:6 cobr (20) 19:13,15 43:9 121:24 123:15,20,25 124:6,14,19,19,20,23 125:1,7,19 126:5,12 170:6 179:9 cohesion (1) 71:21 collaborate (1) 19:10 collapse (1) 168:10 colleague (5) 22:5 77:25 84:7,14 165:23 colleagues (15) 30:13 36:9 48:7 59:8 61:8 62:11 63:2 69:9 76:16 78:13 79:19 83:13 97:10 142:2 158:7 collection (1) 142:7 collectively (2) 177:23 208:10 come (40) 8:14 13:18 37:11 39:10 40:24 41:25 47:8 58:19 69:12 72:15,20 73:23 100:5 101:25 102:16 104:9 107:3 114:5,6 116:12 118:17 121:13 124:17 125:3 130:23 138:23 139:4 143:25 145:19 147:23 159:9 162:24 164:12 165:13 166:11 169:12 192:20 86:12 104:2 105:13 173:8 175:12,14,14 186:18 210:22 211:3 command (1) 91:17 commanders (1) 120:8 commensurate (1) 86:2 comment (6) 23:2 46:4 55:7 88:4 89:8 209:14 commissioned (1) 197:21 commissioner (8) 15:3,6 23:11 38:12 139:1 146:24,25 148:5 commitment (2) 180:15 202:9 committee (8) 14:10 47:8,10 48:13 64:2 87:4,12 91:14 committees (1) 210:10 common (2) 180:15 198:9	communicate (2) 86:22 91:18 communicated (1) 119:10 communicating (1) 112:13 communication (3) 91:15 119:9 203:8 communications (8) 21:18 86:20 142:21 143:1 190:8 197:15,16,22 communities (5) 56:16 110:2 131:11,17 171:12 community (39) 51:14,16 53:5 55:17 56:1,24 71:21 86:23 88:20,21 109:10,19,21 111:18,25 112:8,19,24 113:11 126:24 127:17 155:24 158:25 162:12 172:23 174:17 175:2,23 184:18 187:8 190:1 194:16 197:25 201:25 203:2 204:5 209:8 210:18 211:13 communitys (1) 112:3 companies (1) 7:3 competence (1) 208:4 compiled (1) 31:17 compacently (1) 144:6 complaints (2) 197:1 198:10 complementary (1) 20:11 complete (1) 168:10 completed (1) 9:5 completely (9) 39:16 56:1 86:25 127:7 139:16 193:7,11,14 209:16 completeness (1) 15:1 completion (1) 9:9 complex (1) 15:19 complexity (1) 208:5 compliance (1) 34:17 composition (1) 24:6 comprehensive (1) 67:23 comprising (1) 11:1 concept (2) 65:14 115:7 concern (12) 30:16 46:13 51:12 59:25 60:24 127:7 158:9 164:6,18 166:5 169:1 178:22 concerned (11) 36:24 60:13,22 156:2,3 157:14 159:19 164:9 165:19 209:4,9 concerns (48) 28:16 29:4 30:2,6,23 31:23 32:1,21,23,24 33:18 37:7 39:4,8,14 47:1,6 55:18 56:16 58:12,15,25 59:3,6 63:3 65:17,21 78:15,23 84:17 89:9 90:2 94:21 98:24 149:13 150:1,7,17 158:19,22 161:18 174:9,13 176:15,24 179:5 188:1,9 concluded (1) 69:8 concrete (1) 169:7 condition (1) 155:23 conditions (1) 88:20 conducting (1) 65:15 conference (1) 43:13 confidence (3) 135:2 198:20 211:7 confident (1) 73:8 confidential (1) 40:8 confirm (6) 3:5,10 7:4 107:4 182:24 183:18 confirmed (3) 86:4 166:3 201:16 confirming (1) 183:9 confirms (3) 149:12 151:1,4 conflation (1) 129:13 conflicting (4) 181:1 182:11,15,21 conflicts (2) 113:13 114:12 confused (2) 147:9 152:11 confusion (3) 182:18 192:7 201:4 congregated (1) 56:11 conjunction (1) 19:4	connect (1) 151:13 connecting (1) 177:20 connection (1) 17:8 conops (2) 115:5 117:25 conscious (1) 140:20 consequent (1) 35:3 conservative (1) 107:14 consider (16) 22:24 27:23 30:5 45:5 54:16 65:8 68:1 91:24 95:24 96:16,21 101:9 103:9 174:11 181:5 194:22 consideration (1) 113:21 considered (7) 39:12 79:4,5,13 113:13 198:3,4 considering (1) 101:1 considers (1) 14:7 consistency (1) 164:16 consistent (2) 188:17 198:8 consistently (1) 203:12 consolidating (1) 27:11 constituents (1) 156:2 constrained (1) 34:25 consume (1) 79:25 contact (17) 41:1 44:16 46:17,18 51:16 54:1,3,6,13 61:11 72:22 78:3 133:4 150:21 187:3 188:3 209:5 contactable (1) 24:21 contacted (3) 23:13 68:4,7 contacting (1) 62:8 contacts (1) 23:7 contemporaneously (1) 30:25 content (2) 17:1 66:19 contents (3) 3:10 107:4 172:2 context (14) 7:14 30:15 33:9 42:17 74:8 109:11 117:9 118:14 138:12 139:18 181:8 185:22 198:16 202:19 contextualise (1) 21:14 contingencies (20) 5:7,14 9:16 11:5 24:9,14,17 31:6 32:4 34:14 39:13,25 41:20 42:2 65:14 114:16 119:3,21 179:16 189:4 contingency (1) 22:19 continuance (1) 11:19 continuation (1) 150:24 continue (6) 85:24 110:14 178:17 184:23 185:20 209:21 continued (1) 204:14 continuing (3) 113:14 174:8,13 continuity (2) 114:4 182:7 contribute (2) 95:17 97:11 contributes (1) 16:25 contributions (1) 87:5 control (4) 28:1 92:11 185:17 204:21 convened (5) 29:24 43:7 119:2 126:7 155:7 convenient (2) 48:25 166:14 convening (1) 20:2 convention (1) 41:22 conversation (42) 69:1,10,17 74:21 75:1,5,15,16,18,23 76:4,11 77:5 78:19 82:8 83:13 84:14 113:17 134:21 136:21 137:12 138:12 139:15 148:4 151:22,25 152:13,21 153:17,18 154:17,21 171:21,23 172:3 174:21 177:3 187:25 192:13,15 195:9 208:18 conversations (7) 69:14 76:5 82:10 114:11 152:25 175:9 178:4 convey (2) 181:5 182:1 conveyed (1) 42:9 cooperate (3) 16:3 53:17 96:12 cooperation (1) 9:18
---	---	--	--	---	---	--

coordinate (3) 187:6 188:24 189:2	credibility (3) 164:13 168:10 171:4	141:16,19,20,23 144:16,22 155:21 157:19	details (2) 25:4 31:15	138:4,10,17 139:22	draft (4) 5:17 48:17,20 88:12	151:2 153:1,4 154:3
coordinated (4) 45:15 58:9 118:6 187:2	crip (5) 137:7 141:11,13 145:14 183:23	debated (2) 160:7,7	determine (2) 92:15 128:19	140:2,8,25 141:9 150:24	draw (1) 209:17	173:17 176:7,9
coordinating (8) 19:11 23:5 38:11 53:20 91:21 177:20,24 186:23	crips (2) 162:8 192:3	debates (1) 81:14	determined (1) 198:14	157:15,23,23 159:25 160:5	drawn (2) 80:1,14	177:1,11,11,12 179:15,18
coordination (21) 3:14 4:20 18:11 21:2 23:1,23,24 63:18 72:10 95:18,19 101:8 117:17 120:3 141:6 172:22 177:19 179:2,4 182:2 189:6	crisis (3) 26:6 36:6,25	deborah (3) 177:12 179:21 184:4	developed (1) 112:19	169:10 194:4 195:6,11,19	drew (1) 56:3	181:15 183:7,8 184:7
cope (7) 144:9 156:1 173:13 205:17,20 208:3,7	critical (5) 35:3 109:21 146:11 203:19 210:1	debrief (1) 46:8	development (1) 107:24	discussions (10) 16:20 64:13,19,21,24 65:2 79:10 97:4 175:2 195:12	drilled (2) 181:11 182:8	185:4,22 186:9,12,16
copied (6) 50:22 79:21 84:9 176:10 177:15 184:2	criticism (1) 103:18	decide (2) 92:5 101:11	devenish (1) 78:6	disorder (1) 26:19	drive (3) 112:15,18 187:15	187:19 188:11,13,16 192:9
copying (1) 174:5	critically (1) 103:18	decided (3) 183:9,14 209:17	devenishs (1) 78:2	disorientated (1) 187:13	driven (2) 195:15,21	202:22
cordon (6) 146:18,20 147:5,14,15 149:4	cross (2) 143:15 176:14	decipher (1) 52:4	dfe (1) 183:19	dispassionate (1) 175:21	driver (1) 114:10	emails (3) 84:7,8 158:20
core (1) 113:19	crossministerial (3) 124:10 142:24 153:7	decision (14) 30:20 82:12 99:15,19,24 100:17 108:23 119:9 170:7 179:8 181:17 204:8 210:11,13	dh (1) 183:19	dispassionately (1) 172:21	dropped (1) 170:14	embedding (1) 34:24
corner (1) 149:20	crosswhitehall (7) 119:1 120:2 125:21 144:13 160:14 182:1 183:1	decisionmakers (1) 117:8	diagram (2) 24:2,5	displaced (3) 36:14 71:22 194:6	dropping (1) 169:6	emergencies (4) 16:21 101:3
corporate (3) 6:3 14:6 20:19	crowd (2) 56:4,10	decisionmaking (2) 111:9 182:5	dial (2) 43:20 160:18	disruptive (1) 18:25	drove (1) 170:7	115:6 173:21
corporation (3) 60:17 63:15 99:21	croymdon (1) 33:21	defined (1) 171:1	dialled (9) 42:25 43:11,14 50:12 60:4 93:12,14 129:9 130:3	distance (1) 48:12	drumbeat (2) 177:7 179:10	emergency (33) 4:2 5:7 7:1 8:18,21 10:18 16:8,10 17:1,2,6 18:8 20:6,16 21:3,22 26:14 53:4 92:5,9,17 98:12 114:24 115:2 125:19 143:18 145:10 148:20 161:1,6 163:25 180:10 209:6
correct (35) 4:10,13 6:4 10:5 15:4 17:2 22:6 27:2 32:16 43:3 50:25 59:15 63:12,25 77:21 93:13 107:22 108:1,5,10,18,22 118:25 120:16 121:6 128:12 129:10,25 130:9 145:22 146:19 152:24 155:9 189:20 192:18	culminating (1) 97:20	defined (1) 98:12	dialling (2) 130:17 161:13	distinct (1) 21:17	due (8) 36:16 37:1 47:9 78:16 125:12 166:13 185:8,15	152:2 153:1,4 154:3 173:17 176:7,9 177:1,11,11,12 179:15,18 181:15 183:7,8 184:7 185:4,22 186:9,12,16 187:19 188:11,13,16 192:9 202:22
corrected (1) 18:10	culmulative (1) 181:25	defining (3) 98:19 168:21 170:13	didnt (53) 14:16 15:9 17:20 20:15 24:10 32:13 34:12 43:23 44:3 48:8 52:25 53:6 54:5 55:8 60:5 63:10 67:11 68:10 70:8,17 71:10 72:17 73:9,24 77:19 82:23 89:24 93:14 96:13 99:5 103:20 119:15 125:4,14 135:2,8 140:5,12,13,14 144:21 146:2 148:10,15 154:6 158:3 174:21 186:3 188:4 195:10 197:13 198:11 201:5	distinction (1) 210:1	duration (1) 20:9	4:2 5:7 7:1 8:18,21 10:18 16:8,10 17:1,2,6 18:8 20:6,16 21:3,22 26:14 53:4 92:5,9,17 98:12 114:24 115:2 125:19 143:18 145:10 148:20 161:1,6 163:25 180:10 209:6
correction (2) 107:2,5	cured (1) 189:12	definitely (5) 28:19,20 41:6 164:17 195:19	different (28) 42:7,7,8 83:15 95:6 106:5 122:8,16,19,22,24 123:2,13 127:12 131:7 132:5,20 133:8 139:21,22 140:17,18 148:14 157:9 172:1 182:21 187:6 188:24 207:13 208:19 210:1	distress (1) 178:25	during (22) 5:18 17:6 25:15 26:6 27:10 36:20 41:2,9 49:4 51:12 55:24 56:10,25 60:22 98:25 115:11 116:20 146:9 148:24 151:20 166:16 167:22	emerging (2) 128:21 172:21
correctly (3) 14:18 59:5 184:13	current (3) 82:13 114:2,10	defensive (1) 171:1	difficult (8) 64:7 137:13 140:19 147:7 182:4 204:17,22 209:22	distributed (3) 190:5 191:21 197:25	duties (3) 17:14 64:1 96:12	emma (7) 25:12 37:14 78:1 84:16 85:2,2 199:6
cotton (1) 138:25	currently (10) 10:25 16:23 17:14 35:12 39:16 81:9 99:8 132:18 133:25 135:11	defined (1) 98:12	difficulties (1) 112:2	division (1) 173:21	duty (18) 5:21 9:21,23 16:2 22:5 24:19,20 25:8 28:12,13 37:14 41:22 53:17 54:13 56:15 66:11 75:14 142:18	emotionally (1) 157:10
couldnt (6) 55:7 165:19 171:5 173:14 194:18 205:16	cut (1) 184:2	defining (3) 98:19 168:21 170:13	digesting (1) 73:2	document (14) 10:13 18:9 20:22 21:3 24:12 25:20 26:21 31:23 118:2 121:10 128:22 164:21 167:13 186:8	dwp (2) 183:19 195:16	emphasised (1) 45:5
council (44) 44:17 54:9 57:11 58:2,5 78:5 88:21 99:22 131:10 132:14,17,17,25 133:3,5,20,24 134:9,18,25 135:11 136:22 137:1 141:17,24 144:18 149:23 150:4 151:7,11,16 168:24 169:15,18 170:20 173:9,13 178:18 184:16 208:2,7,9,15 210:4	data (7) 164:6,9 165:21 169:1,2 182:3,18	demand (1) 188:15	dimension (1) 109:14	documentation (1) 29:13	dwps (2) 183:19 195:16	emphasises (1) 91:17
councils (3) 52:3 62:14 100:2	date (10) 25:3 31:13 106:13,22 110:21 115:20 173:16 176:3 197:17 199:9	demand (1) 188:15	dimensions (1) 109:24	documented (1) 173:12	earlier (32) 20:17,19 33:12 34:4 51:11 55:16 64:13 67:5 76:4 79:14 88:2 96:4 128:14 142:24 143:5 145:18 146:13 148:4 151:2,3 155:18 164:15 165:12 166:2 176:6 179:11,24 184:4 186:13 192:12 199:20 208:5	emphasising (1) 161:15
counsel (6) 1:20 101:18 105:10 212:4 213:5,9	dated (8) 2:15,22 3:3 10:15 16:8 18:17 24:15 201:23	demand (1) 188:15	direct (14) 59:22 91:4 109:6 122:1 131:11 132:8 142:18 146:12 177:3,18 178:2,3 195:9 208:12	documents (7) 124:9 131:24 199:15 200:10,11,12,13	early (17) 27:1,25 30:6,10 80:3 87:21 89:22 90:15 112:9 150:10 174:25 192:9 204:16,19,22 205:12 207:25	emphatically (1) 97:12
counselling (8) 50:18 137:24 138:2,10,17,20 139:18,23	dates (1) 87:10	demand (1) 188:15	directed (5) 131:10,18 134:12 135:20 171:11	does (19) 8:9 13:1,5 17:19 21:4,21 31:23 32:1,2 44:2,3 47:3 49:1,2 91:3 92:10 111:1,22 112:5 134:8	engage (3) 144:20 197:7 210:11	employed (2) 4:7,9
counsellors (1) 187:16	data (7) 164:6,9 165:21 169:1,2 182:3,18	demand (1) 188:15	directing (1) 82:2	doesn't (16) 17:18 21:2,7 23:20 31:22 32:1 41:15 46:25 47:5 50:22 53:17 98:2 158:2 163:1 188:4 195:10	engaged (5) 16:20 39:16,22 111:25 130:24	employees (2) 8:24 9:2
country (11) 45:8,12 126:20,24 127:18 155:20 157:22 159:21,22,25 194:14	date (10) 25:3 31:13 106:13,22 110:21 115:20 173:16 176:3 197:17 199:9	demand (1) 188:15	direction (3) 28:5 36:25 161:19	doing (14) 38:24 42:12 64:12,16 81:13 85:14 91:10 112:10 131:15 133:14 180:8 203:14 210:2,2	engagement (3) 109:12 111:9 113:11	empowered (1) 208:14
couple (3) 5:16 33:19 150:1	date (10) 25:3 31:13 106:13,22 110:21 115:20 173:16 176:3 197:17 199:9	demand (1) 188:15	direction (3) 28:5 36:25 161:19	donationsvolunteerssupport (1) 62:7	engaged (5) 16:20 39:16,22 111:25 130:24	enable (2) 35:12 191:22
course (32) 14:14 21:12 23:3 41:24 47:9 49:10 65:22 70:22,23 71:2 78:16 83:11 86:21 88:15 99:10 102:8 104:12 116:21 117:10 125:12,13 137:10 141:16 148:13 166:12,13 175:5 193:18 195:10 209:15 211:16 212:1	date (10) 25:3 31:13 106:13,22 110:21 115:20 173:16 176:3 197:17 199:9	demand (1) 188:15	direction (3) 28:5 36:25 161:19	done (20) 28:17,20 39:10 48:15 61:17 66:3,24 68:12 70:11 75:19 79:9,15 89:21 90:7 103:16 122:8 172:25 188:20 199:2 207:12	engaged (5) 16:20 39:16,22 111:25 130:24	encourage (2) 111:16 174:4
cover (4) 71:7 84:10 120:8 145:5	date (10) 25:3 31:13 106:13,22 110:21 115:20 173:16 176:3 197:17 199:9	demand (1) 188:15	direction (3) 28:5 36:25 161:19	done (20) 28:17,20 39:10 48:15 61:17 66:3,24 68:12 70:11 75:19 79:9,15 89:21 90:7 103:16 122:8 172:25 188:20 199:2 207:12	engage (3) 144:20 197:7 210:11	encouraged (1) 131:10
coverage (3) 143:2,3,5	date (10) 25:3 31:13 106:13,22 110:21 115:20 173:16 176:3 197:17 199:9	demand (1) 188:15	direction (3) 28:5 36:25 161:19	done (20) 28:17,20 39:10 48:15 61:17 66:3,24 68:12 70:11 75:19 79:9,15 89:21 90:7 103:16 122:8 172:25 188:20 199:2 207:12	energy (1) 108:3	end (6) 22:15 29:3 58:1 91:1 150:17 200:22
covered (1) 103:3	date (10) 25:3 31:13 106:13,22 110:21 115:20 173:16 176:3 197:17 199:9	demand (1) 188:15	direction (3) 28:5 36:25 161:19	done (20) 28:17,20 39:10 48:15 61:17 66:3,24 68:12 70:11 75:19 79:9,15 89:21 90:7 103:16 122:8 172:25 188:20 199:2 207:12	engage (3) 144:20 197:7 210:11	ending (1) 174:25
covering (1) 140:19	date (10) 25:3 31:13 106:13,22 110:21 115:20 173:16 176:3 197:17 199:9	demand (1) 188:15	direction (3) 28:5 36:25 161:19	done (20) 28:17,20 39:10 48:15 61:17 66:3,24 68:12 70:11 75:19 79:9,15 89:21 90:7 103:16 122:8 172:25 188:20 199:2 207:12	engaged (5) 16:20 39:16,22 111:25 130:24	endured (2) 137:15 192:23
covers (1) 202:3	date (10) 25:3 31:13 106:13,22 110:21 115:20 173:16 176:3 197:17 199:9	demand (1) 188:15	direction (3) 28:5 36:25 161:19	done (20) 28:17,20 39:10 48:15 61:17 66:3,24 68:12 70:11 75:19 79:9,15 89:21 90:7 103:16 122:8 172:25 188:20 199:2 207:12	engagement (3) 109:12 111:9 113:11	enduring (1) 189:11
covid19 (2) 39:20 70:1	date (10) 25:3 31:13 106:13,22 110:21 115:20 173:16 176:3 197:17 199:9	demand (1) 188:15	direction (3) 28:5 36:25 161:19	done (20) 28:17,20 39:10 48:15 61:17 66:3,24 68:12 70:11 75:19 79:9,15 89:21 90:7 103:16 122:8 172:25 188:20 199:2 207:12	engaged (5) 16:20 39:16,22 111:25 130:24	energy (1) 108:3
crash (1) 33:21	date (10) 25:3 31:13 106:13,22 110:21 115:20 173:16 176:3 197:17 199:9	demand (1) 188:15	direction (3) 28:5 36:25 161:19	done (20) 28:17,20 39:10 48:15 61:17 66:3,24 68:12 70:11 75:19 79:9,15 89:21 90:7 103:16 122:8 172:25 188:20 199:2 207:12	engage (3) 144:20 197:7 210:11	enquire (1) 60:18
create (2) 88:22 108:23	date (10) 25:3 31:13 106:13,22 110:21 115:20 173:16 176:3 197:17 199:9	demand (1) 188:15	direction (3) 28:5 36:25 161:19	done (20) 28:17,20 39:10 48:15 61:17 66:3,24 68:12 70:11 75:19 79:9,15 89:21 90:7 103:16 122:8 172:25 188:20 199:2 207:12	engaged (5) 16:20 39:16,22 111:25 130:24	enquiries (2) 156:1 201:6
created (1) 14:22	date (10) 25:3 31:13 106:13,22 110:21 115:20 173:16 176:3 197:17 199:9	demand (1) 188:15	direction (3) 28:5 36:25 161:19	done (20) 28:17,20 39:10 48:15 61:17 66:3,24 68:12 70:11 75:19 79:9,15 89:21 90:7 103:16 122:8 172:25 188:20 199:2 207:12	engage (3) 144:20 197:7 210:11	ensuring (1) 172:5
creating (2) 15:22 90:19	date (10) 25:3 31:13 106:13,22 110:21 115:20 173:16 176:3 197:17 199:9	demand (1) 188:15	direction (3) 28:5 36:25 161:19	done (20) 28:17,20 39:10 48:15 61:17 66:3,24 68:12 70:11 75:19 79:9,15 89:21 90:7 103:16 122:8 172:25 188:20 199:2 207:12	engaged (5) 16:20 39:16,22 111:25 130:24	ensure (9) 25:24 44:17 89:16,21 103:13,24 128:18 133:5 197:8
creation (1) 188:6	date (10) 25:3 31:13 106:13,22 110:21 115:20 173:16 176:3 197:17 199:9	demand (1) 188:15	direction (3) 28:5 36:25 161:19	done (20) 28:17,20 39:10 48:15 61:17 66:3,24 68:12 70:11 75:19 79:9,15 89:21 90:7 103:16 122:8 172:25 188:20 199:2 207:12	engage (3) 144:20 197:7 210:11	ensuring (2) 98:21 118:4
	date (10) 25:3 31:13 106:13,22 110:21 115:20 173:16 176:3 197:17 199:9	demand (1) 188:15	direction (3) 28:5 36:25 161:19	done (20) 28:17,20 39:10 48:15 61:17 66:3,24 68:12 70:11 75:19 79:9,15 89:21 90:7 103:16 122:8 172:25 188:20 199:2 207:12	engaged (5) 16:20 39:16,22 111:25 130:24	enter (1) 9:18
	date (10) 25:3 31:13 106:13,22 110:21 115:20 173:16 176:3 197:17 199:9	demand (1) 188:15	direction (3) 28:5 36:25 161:19	done (20) 28:17,20 39:10 48:15 61:17 66:3,24 68:12 70:11 75:19 79:9,15 89:21 90:7 103:16 122:8 172:25 188:20 199:2 207:12	engage (3) 144:20 197:7 210:11	entirely (10) 20:1 41:23 57:1 92:4 116:19 123:12 156:5 1

estimate (1) 152:13 et (1) 14:12 etc (1) 120:7 evacuated (2) 145:10 166:4 evacuation (1) 36:16 even (10) 27:24 111:21 127:8 153:10 182:5 204:3,17 208:4 210:4 211:4 evening (11) 50:2 55:13 76:12,13 81:11 83:20 99:12 108:13 165:23 202:1,2 event (5) 5:10 18:25 26:16 156:3 205:10 events (13) 22:3,9,11,12,21 32:9 37:16 49:25 61:20 62:23 80:17 127:21 201:19 eventual (1) 195:13 eventually (3) 172:7 194:20 198:24 ever (8) 87:24 103:14,25 115:9,11,12 128:23 129:6 everett (2) 172:19 175:18 every (11) 39:3 136:7 144:13,14 156:25 157:11 188:15 203:10 207:17 210:13 211:13 everybody (5) 103:18 106:1 170:1 202:9 211:24 everyday (1) 79:25 everyone (1) 1:5 everything (9) 28:4 30:11 72:19 105:19 106:7 172:24 189:5 194:11 210:12 evidence (54) 1:7,24 6:20 15:14 40:14,16,25 41:5 43:17,23 44:6 47:9,13 48:22 49:8 61:5 64:2 74:1 77:19 78:13,13 84:4 91:13 95:7 98:4 99:3 102:6 103:2,10,15 104:3,9 113:6 116:6 118:12 125:6 129:20 145:18 166:20 170:12,15 173:13 175:6,10 177:1 178:24 184:15 188:19 198:9 201:17 208:22,23 211:3,10 evident (2) 205:3 208:4 evolution (1) 116:24 evolved (1) 162:11 exact (2) 55:7 176:3 exactly (10) 67:9 116:4,14 152:9 154:25 162:24 163:2 164:3 168:14 172:2 exalted (1) 123:2 examine (1) 113:4 examined (1) 212:3 examining (3) 111:12 112:6 211:6 example (9) 7:1,3 89:5 112:23 169:7 175:24 187:14 196:25 200:10 exception (1) 21:23 exceptional (3) 156:24 157:11 158:3 exchange (2) 79:16 85:19 exchanges (2) 62:4 72:20 exclusively (1) 201:18 exec (3) 71:7,8 77:14 execs (1) 62:8 executive (29) 17:22 20:20 43:13 59:17 60:16 62:25 63:15 71:17,19 72:2,8 73:20,22 74:12,13 77:20 78:25 79:6 81:19 99:14,16,21,23 100:1 130:7 152:21 153:15 154:6 171:25 executives (1) 87:15 exercise (1) 182:6 exercised (2) 6:14 198:8 exercising (1) 18:7 exhibit (5) 3:13 142:12 160:22 164:24 199:5 exhibited (1) 45:21	existed (2) 33:13 205:3 existing (2) 91:20 96:16 exit (1) 56:14 expand (1) 123:9 expanded (2) 98:12 101:3 expect (10) 30:11 117:5 130:14 131:10 138:24 145:2 147:10 169:4 190:17 196:12 expectation (3) 116:4 117:9 185:19 expected (8) 37:7 43:24 82:7 126:25 127:18 149:3 182:25 187:22 expecting (2) 169:8 181:9 expenditure (1) 81:19 experience (13) 5:6 23:3 33:22 76:19 79:7 109:15 112:11 125:4 128:4 176:2 187:9 188:14 207:21 experienced (4) 22:24 23:5 70:19 97:1 experiences (1) 51:12 explain (11) 64:19 129:12 138:8,14,19,20 141:20,22 146:5 156:25 204:3 explained (4) 118:9,15,17 206:9 explaining (2) 35:20 178:3 explanation (3) 37:9 118:19 141:23 explicitly (5) 133:19 135:14,15 136:5 151:25 explore (3) 29:11 46:1 92:21 explored (1) 189:5 exploring (2) 67:13 162:11 express (4) 39:8 72:22 123:4 177:4 expressed (6) 30:2 51:15 70:6 72:23 126:8 158:9 expresses (1) 30:24 extended (1) 56:17 extent (1) 113:13 external (2) 25:13 72:2 extraordinary (3) 155:7 157:8 210:18 extrapolate (1) 128:2 extrapolation (2) 127:11 134:23 extremely (3) 105:14 130:12 210:23 eye (1) 203:4 eyes (1) 144:2	194:6,11 196:23 197:7 204:9 210:9 family (1) 163:21 fao (1) 149:10 far (15) 45:24 50:15 62:9 66:1 79:8,25 83:24 114:12 131:13 148:25 154:9 155:16 180:12,14,17 fast (1) 172:16 faster (1) 199:2 fasting (1) 197:3 fat (2) 124:23 125:1 fatalities (6) 38:7 85:24 86:4,8,9,19 faulty (1) 139:8 features (1) 158:3 february (3) 3:3 8:15 18:18 fed (4) 42:1 160:10 175:10 178:8 feed (1) 145:15 feedback (8) 77:23 112:8,24 177:18 178:2,2,7,23 feeding (1) 178:11 feeds (1) 201:1 feel (11) 2:7 70:8 113:7 140:22 148:17 203:7 204:14 207:17,19 209:1,11 feeling (8) 33:15 45:9 143:16 144:7 147:17 168:6 181:22 197:5 feels (3) 177:23 180:24 207:21 fell (2) 108:15 111:21 fellow (2) 207:15 211:2 felt (15) 27:25 42:3 56:15 63:3 93:9 120:25 126:22,23 127:16 148:2 159:22 166:1 182:9 190:2 196:19 few (6) 1:25 57:23 81:6 163:4 172:5 179:13 fielded (2) 157:12 159:18 figure (2) 86:11 194:10 figures (4) 54:2 61:13 163:25 165:15 filling (1) 174:23 filming (1) 158:5 filtering (1) 197:17 final (3) 8:4 36:21 48:21 finally (3) 26:20 38:22 148:24 financial (3) 120:13 194:5 202:5 find (9) 50:9 81:15,18 82:24 98:18 102:15 142:16 198:22 206:23 finding (1) 175:13 fine (1) 99:5 finer (1) 67:24 finish (3) 105:25 162:20,23 finished (1) 158:13 fire (83) 4:4,6,15 8:18,21 9:5 10:4,18 11:4,7 14:15,21 15:2,3,6 18:15 19:23 22:8 23:1,10,11 24:9 29:25 32:14 34:8 36:1 37:23 38:5 39:12 41:2 45:6 46:18 50:17 52:7 56:25 60:6,7 67:3,4 80:23 87:7 93:21 96:3 97:20 107:9 108:7,9,12,20 109:3 110:8 112:16 114:20 115:15,18,18 120:5 123:25 125:18,23 128:17 139:1 142:16,18 143:3 145:24 146:24,24 147:1,2 148:1,10,18 157:24 158:10 161:2 168:8 170:1 180:18 183:20 194:12 196:14 200:22 firefighters (7) 50:19 85:23 137:24 138:10,20 139:4 147:3 first (118) 2:14,17 3:13,17 4:5 5:19,19 6:15,19,24 8:3 9:13 18:21 23:10 25:11	28:3 29:5 31:10 32:7,23 37:1 38:18 40:12 42:21,24,25 50:12 51:11 56:16 57:23 58:15 60:2,3,5,8 64:7 68:18 70:24 81:2,6 83:21 84:11 87:20,25 90:15,22 101:18 105:18 106:8,9 107:11 109:5 111:15,20 112:11 118:12,18 119:8 122:12,23 123:5 124:5 125:11 126:16 128:6,7 130:1 132:3,7,7 133:7,11 134:5 138:16 139:10,13 142:12 147:19 150:14,19,21,22 152:12,20,21,22 153:6,14,17,18,22 154:4,17 159:11 160:23 161:11 162:9 164:4 167:22 168:14,24 174:1 175:11 176:1 183:16 184:6 186:20 187:13 191:19 192:8 195:1 199:18 202:8 203:22 204:25 208:8,15,18 firstlevel (1) 205:16 firstline (1) 205:21 firstly (6) 3:24 20:14 60:24 69:6 76:2 107:8 firsttime (1) 205:21 fit (2) 164:20 202:12 fits (1) 7:12 five (3) 94:5,12 202:15 fix (1) 203:7 flagged (1) 50:17 flagging (1) 83:22 flameups (2) 167:16,22 flaw (1) 189:11 flood (3) 194:18 196:2,2 floods (2) 194:15 195:3 floor (2) 38:25 197:1 flow (2) 134:21 139:15 flowed (4) 136:12 157:19 159:4 165:21 flu (1) 26:17 flush (3) 140:1,24 143:24 flushed (1) 140:25 focus (11) 3:23 13:20 37:16 89:18 109:22 123:21 138:9 159:7 161:23 162:15 169:10 focused (9) 14:10 21:19 29:5 36:13 53:3 140:15 144:16 165:21 166:8 focusing (2) 122:23 203:22 follow (5) 8:9 57:4,24 154:1 155:1 followed (7) 25:12 61:20 86:7 96:22 153:23 194:25 196:10 following (18) 3:24 7:15 9:8 27:8 35:18 46:8 54:20 55:15 56:7 60:13 78:23 81:12 82:5,7,17,17 101:20 178:16 follows (3) 8:11 37:9 139:15 followup (1) 52:2 food (1) 197:2 foot (6) 146:23 149:8,15 186:12 196:21 199:8 footage (1) 59:8 force (1) 3:16 forced (1) 194:14 forget (1) 23:20 forgive (6) 40:18,24 55:2 64:17 84:12 116:8 form (5) 7:18 13:9 30:13 80:6 188:17 formal (4) 32:17 41:24 98:11 197:14 formally (3) 71:9,11 72:16 formed (7) 7:16 9:11 14:8 30:5 58:24 59:20 127:25 former (2) 149:17 182:23 forming (2) 204:12 208:8 forth (3) 33:12 83:11 90:13 forum (18) 11:21	12:11,14,15 13:2,7,13,15,25 14:14,21 15:17,25 16:1 18:3 30:7 42:20 68:8 forward (4) 77:11 103:24 112:18 183:6 found (2) 28:11 175:16 foundation (1) 3:19 four (6) 3:24 27:16 94:5 120:10 200:18,21 fourth (1) 165:6 fourthly (1) 4:3 framework (7) 6:1 7:12 33:17 88:11 96:25 97:3 115:18 frameworks (1) 96:21 free (2) 104:12 211:16 friday (11) 73:24 75:3 76:3 82:20,21 99:25 123:20 173:15,19 175:10 188:18 friends (2) 163:21 172:18 front (10) 2:12 9:13 29:2 31:4 33:5 56:11,17 90:23 164:8 190:23 frontrun (1) 200:19 frustrated (3) 147:25 152:9 171:17 frustrating (2) 146:14 158:6 frustration (3) 57:14 58:8 182:19 frustrations (2) 148:7 178:24 fulfilling (1) 26:4 fulham (4) 78:4,5,9 141:13 full (9) 16:16 24:13 34:16 35:8 55:24 124:23 125:1 126:1 185:9 fullfat (4) 125:7,19 170:6 179:9 fully (3) 42:10 112:3 193:13 function (3) 19:3 90:10 189:6 functions (10) 6:13 8:6,14,15 10:17,24 11:2,3,8,14 fund (1) 26:7 fundamental (4) 39:18 90:3 127:3 178:24 funding (1) 115:18 further (16) 36:9 40:5 44:15 46:2 69:25 84:18 92:21 97:8 133:3 135:5 167:20 172:11 183:1,6 197:15 203:4 future (1) 111:10	192:24 193:1 194:9 211:3,4,10 given (36) 6:13 12:21 30:9 35:21 37:1 45:13,15 53:11 57:7 78:20 82:24 84:16 91:3 113:21 120:3,22 121:1,3 122:5 129:25 130:11 138:14,19 148:22 165:8 172:11,24 181:1 182:15 185:7,17 191:20 194:5,11,13 197:3 gives (5) 13:4,9 16:12 45:23 86:17 giving (7) 27:25 64:2 98:4 104:9 113:6 160:8 211:9 gla (48) 4:4 6:10,15,16,17 8:7,9,11,25 10:6 11:1,14 12:5,19,21 13:9,24 14:5,7,15 17:11,14,20,22 18:1 20:19,21,22 21:6,21,24 23:8 24:20,20 25:8 31:9 36:10 37:14 42:13 47:7 64:2 78:13 84:15,16 89:24 90:6 97:13 103:16 gla000000004 (1) 22:14 gla0000000045 (1) 37:20 gla0000000047 (1) 27:6 gla0000000048 (2) 29:2 35:18 gla0000000049 (1) 36:23 gla000000854 (2) 37:24 61:22 gla00000085426 (2) 62:2 76:22 gla0000008545 (1) 38:8 gla0000008547 (1) 38:15 gla0000008549 (1) 38:22 glas (8) 5:20 10:1 11:4,21 12:6 14:11 22:1,20 goes (18) 17:25 19:9 20:13 24:22 25:5 26:8 27:20 40:18 45:18 50:14 56:9 62:16 66:16 92:13 173:22 191:1,15 197:20 going (55) 1:6 2:10 11:11 20:3 24:12,16 28:24 31:6 32:8 38:1 39:3 40:17 62:18 64:7,12,15 72:6,9 73:25 75:3 77:20 81:1 83:6 85:25 87:16 89:25 90:4,10 95:19 101:24,24 106:7 107:7 109:15 112:12 118:1 131:1,6,16 132:4 144:18,25 145:10 159:9 161:25 166:18 181:20 185:6,22 191:6 206:4,6 208:6,9 210:12 gol000000196 (1) 83:19 gol000001473 (1) 66:8 gold (47) 24:15,20,25 25:18 26:9,12,22 27:1,13,15,22 28:4 29:5,14,18 30:21 31:5,9 32:15 37:1,22,23 38:11,18 55:15 62:1 71:8 73:20 75:8,10,12 81:17 82:14,22 83:1,7,7,10 85:5 93:4,6,7 97:5 98:16,20,22 185:18 gone (8) 59:8 67:8 114:6,6 136:17 146:13 148:14 163:20 good (20) 1:5,10,10,21,22 17:2 23:6 41:23 42:12,14 49:5 53:8,9 104:25,25 105:12 127:5 151:3 203:13 207:22 goods (2) 57:13 58:7 governance (1) 15:13 governed (1) 10:6 governing (1) 193:5 government (75) 7:18,21,25 16:16 19:12 41:25 42:5 43:8 45:15,17 50:24 51:3,17 54:3 72:24 73:2,5,8 76:17 90:14 93:23,24 109:10,23 110:2 111:17	112:1,3,10,13,14,25 113:22 115:7,24 116:17 117:1,4,14,18,21 118:2 123:23 125:8 127:4 131:12,18 132:24 134:6,17 148:18 157:8 159:17 162:15 171:8,12 174:20 176:15 182:22 184:20 187:4 188:2,20,22 189:2 193:6 197:23,24 199:14 200:3,7 201:2 203:7,11 204:4 governmentkc (1) 86:1 governments (2) 50:15 188:18 governs (1) 10:13 graham (17) 22:5 25:11 26:23 27:2 28:10 29:21 30:24 31:17 32:22 34:5 37:13,18 38:5,9,17,23 40:10 grahams (5) 27:5 29:1,8 35:17 37:10 grasped (1) 192:8 grass (1) 147:3 grateful (6) 102:17 104:11 105:14 149:22 180:6 210:23 gratitude (1) 210:17 gratton (2) 176:9 177:3 great (3) 71:6 118:17 158:8 greater (35) 3:25 4:7,9,12 5:24 6:2,4,6,9,13 7:7,11 8:1,17 10:19 11:17 12:9,25 13:1,4 14:19 15:10 16:6,14 18:23 22:9 24:4,8 25:14 53:13 87:3 92:23 95:24 97:22 123:21 grenfell (44) 19:23 29:25 32:14 38:6 39:12 41:2,9 51:10 69:24 80:22 87:7,20 93:4,20 94:1 96:3 97:10,20 98:25 99:3,20 108:7,20 109:3 110:8,20 116:18 125:18 128:17 132:15 133:1 142:17 145:8 149:18 163:18 165:14 183:16 186:19 188:7 194:16,19 195:4 205:4,15 grenfellrelated (3) 111:2,6 201:6 grief (2) 56:24 187:16 grip (5) 84:17 185:19 186:1 204:15,18 gripes (1) 84:22 gripped (1) 70:12 gripping (3) 185:8,14,15 ground (40) 46:15 47:4 51:15 52:1 53:15 84:2 89:25 95:16,20 127:5,6,14 131:14 144:1 145:20 148:15 162:4,12,16 171:18,19 173:7,10 174:9,14 176:17 177:19 178:5 180:25 181:23 182:3 185:7,15,25 187:7 197:17 198:19 200:4 203:20 208:13 groundany (1) 180:20 group (38) 9:10 12:10,17,21 15:17,24 19:4,8,11 23:1,8,23 25:18 27:13,15,22 28:4 30:21 37:1,18,21,22 38:11 53:21 62:1 63:18 66:10 79:19 80:13,13,24 83:1 85:12 93:4 101:8 112:17 141:7 189:24 groups (4) 23:6 186:25 203:19 210:10 growing (5) 116:22 161:20 162:3 169:1 179:11 grown (1) 164:17 guarantee (4) 157:17 169:13,25
---	--	---	--	---	--	--

Opus 2
Official Court Reporters

transcripts@opus2.com
020 4515 2252

july (3) 33:17 107:21 108:4 june (84) 2:22 22:3 25:12 15 27:8 29:15 32:24 33:3 37:15 38:4 39:5 40:2,5 42:23 43:8 44:11 45:20 47:25 48:11 50:1,2 51:10 54:4,7,14,22 55:3,12 56:22 57:8 59:12 60:23 62:5 65:6 66:23 75:17,24 76:13 78:23 23 85:21 92:24 93:11,25 94:6,13 107:9 108:4,19 114:20 115:23 116:15 118:23 119:20 125:17 142:10 149:6 150:10 153:7 155:2,7 164:25 168:19 173:15,19 176:6 177:13 179:14 183:6 185:11 186:13,17 188:10 189:16 191:22 192:10,20 199:9,19 201:13,23 202:16,22 204:4 junior (1) 122:9 justified (1) 125:19	76:5,19 77:5,13,19 78:1 79:3,9,11,11,12 80:13,14,15,16,17,23,25 81:13,14,16,23,25 82:2,7,7,11,12,16,19,19,21,23 85:1,3,7,13,15,16,17,18 86:6,8,11,13,15,24,25 87:9 88:6,7,13,15 89:13,14,23 90:15,17 93:23 95:4,4,8,22 96:11,24,25 97:9,11 99:9,10,14,17,24,25 100:17,18,19 101:6,6,9,11 102:14 103:7,11,13,24 108:23 109:7 112:9,25 114:13 117:19 120:18 124:18 125:5,6 126:19 128:22 129:14 130:24 131:20 137:7,13,14 140:13,16 141:22,24 143:25 144:5,9,9,12,15 147:13,18 149:3 155:10,19,19,22,23,25 156:6 158:8 162:3 166:16 169:14 173:11 174:21 176:20 181:17 184:9,16 189:25 192:22 196:18 197:13 198:10,13,24 200:25 201:7 204:11,14,20 206:24 207:14,15 208:20 209:6,19 210:7,9,16 211:11	153:14 179:1 210:4 leading (4) 82:1 117:17 178:14 195:12 leadsom (6) 156:14 186:2,15,17 187:18 188:10 leaflet (2) 197:23 198:24 leaflets (1) 198:3 learned (2) 74:20 211:8 learning (1) 89:2 learnings (1) 39:18 learnt (2) 87:20 89:6 least (2) 47:1 115:25 leave (4) 143:15 164:21 168:6 194:14 led (8) 22:19 63:24 64:14 113:9 118:10 156:22 181:24 196:15 left (9) 44:17 56:17 92:17 104:1 133:6,24 140:22 144:14 175:22 lefthand (2) 132:9 135:9 legal (3) 52:9 65:15 91:10 legalities (1) 81:17 legally (2) 98:18 99:7 legislation (2) 114:18 117:19 lengthy (1) 194:4 lens (2) 130:21 148:9 lesson (1) 89:6 lessons (1) 87:19 let (15) 2:8 33:2 56:24 70:4 80:4 81:6 101:18 118:1 162:24 176:20 182:14 186:8 193:16 204:14 206:24 lets (31) 28:25 40:1 58:4 74:2 96:22 114:15 118:23 119:18 123:15 128:13 131:23 135:20 137:18 141:1 142:4 149:6 150:21 153:2,10 160:12,21 161:9 163:6,11,13 164:21 168:14 173:15 179:13 189:16 199:4 letter (13) 190:21,22,23,24,25 191:7,14 196:20 199:5 201:23 202:14,17 203:13 letting (2) 203:6 204:5 level (31) 17:4 19:7 23:2 34:8 35:3 87:19 92:18,19,20 94:25 117:5 120:5 122:6,9,10,16,22 123:6 124:1 126:10,18,25 127:8,12,19 128:4 134:2 135:1 155:13,14 203:10 lfb (2) 38:12 46:17 lfb00061171 (1) 16:9 lfb0006117111 (1) 16:11 lfb0006117112 (1) 17:10 lfb00061229 (1) 79:16 lfb00061233 (1) 55:10 lfb00061241 (1) 85:20 lfb00067777 (1) 84:11 lfb001237697 (1) 24:2 lfbs (1) 9:2 lfepa (8) 8:19,25 10:6 11:11 12:4,18 15:2,5 lfd (1) 115:25 lft7 (1) 164:24 liaise (3) 133:20 134:25 137:1 liaison (4) 88:16 89:5 97:2 136:22 lie (1) 141:23 life (2) 109:19 208:17 light (7) 74:9 129:24 131:23 139:18 141:1 154:23,25 lights (4) 117:9 125:23 139:11 149:5 like (63) 5:4 8:2 8:3 10:3 16:5 18:9,15,20 22:3 23:24 25:18,22 27:5 29:11,17 35:16 36:21 37:16 39:24 42:21 43:4 45:1 46:1,4 50:1 51:6 54:21 55:2,20 56:11 57:4 59:12 60:8	61:19 62:3 64:18 66:7,24 68:25 74:1 76:21 79:15 82:9 83:18 84:6,9 85:19 87:3 90:21,25 92:21 100:19 103:4,13,25 104:5 108:11 125:7 160:4 164:10 199:3 205:10 207:22 209:1 liked (1) 206:5 likely (6) 19:1 137:6 172:12 181:1 184:20,20 limited (3) 35:7 42:15 44:2 limits (1) 91:2 line (25) 18:6 22:15 29:3 33:21 40:17 51:25 60:12 62:20 63:7 68:19 69:4 75:3 76:24 91:1 117:18 122:3 123:19 129:3 152:16,16 160:24 173:12 200:15 201:6 209:17 lines (5) 57:25 79:22 81:7 140:18 203:8 link (2) 149:23 151:6 list (15) 17:18 32:19 52:2,25 83:22 84:22 85:3 116:12 139:13,14 161:12 164:4 183:24 184:3 191:7 listed (3) 11:11 26:23,23 listen (2) 56:16,18 listening (1) 77:5 little (9) 46:1 62:10 92:21 176:5 177:14 190:17 203:4 206:5 211:25 live (2) 83:23 111:8 lives (1) 210:12 living (3) 45:6,8 158:10 liz (1) 203:2 llag (18) 54:13 66:11,13,18,19 67:2,12,17,19,22 74:11,11 80:8 82:16 83:4,7 89:3 96:17 load (1) 77:15 local (81) 7:2 12:19 20:12 27:16 30:2,6,12 44:16 51:14,16,17 52:17,24 53:6 54:4,7 58:16 60:17 63:16 64:1 65:12,20 67:12,20 68:3,9 69:22 71:8 73:23 76:17 79:3,6 81:17 82:14 83:9 85:4,13 92:17,18,20 97:4,5,10,15 98:1,20,22 103:7 110:2 117:4,6 118:7 124:3 126:15 130:11 131:6,11,18 132:14,24,25 133:5 134:5,9,17,18 149:19,23 155:23 157:18 168:5 169:14 170:3,4 171:12 178:18 180:20 185:18 186:25 199:5 204:5 locally (4) 17:4 85:23 178:19 180:16 log (6) 25:5 31:16 32:12,14 33:7 90:20 logical (1) 139:9 logkeeper (1) 34:12 logs (1) 35:11 london (207) 1:8 3:25 4:2,3,7,9,12,15 5:2,6,24 6:1,2,4,6,7,7,9,11,14,15,16,21 7:4,7,11,16,19,21,24,25 8:1,10,16,17,18,21,24 9:4,9 10:18,19,25 11:17,19,21,22 12:3,9,10,11,11,17,21,25 13:1,2,10,13,14,24,25 14:19,19,20 15:3,6,10,15,16,17,23,24,25 16:1,6,6,13,14,16,22 17:6,15,19,21 18:3,23,23 19:3,24 20:4,5,6,7,15,20,23,24 21:1,9,12,21 22:9,21 23:11,13 24:4,8 25:14 26:1,6,14 33:24 35:4,4,22 42:25 44:15 45:1,7 46:3,6 48:3,10 50:10,17 51:2,8	52:2,3 53:13 54:2,6,17 55:8,11 56:21 57:7 59:14 60:16 61:13 62:14 63:15 65:5,9 66:10 71:17,19,24 76:17 78:7,8,20 79:4,19 80:8,12,13,16,21,24 82:14 83:7 85:4,11 86:5 87:4 90:9,11,25 91:25 92:11,19,20,23 93:12 94:12,17,24 95:24 96:1,5,20 97:4,19,22,24 98:1,5,9,11 99:21,22 100:2,5,6 112:15 120:6,7 133:3 134:2 142:18 157:20 183:20,21 185:18 londoners (4) 17:1 21:11,15 91:19 londons (13) 4:13 5:1 16:15 19:15 24:15 42:13 51:6 52:11 53:12 55:20 86:5 93:3 95:11 long (8) 80:1 109:15 142:7 156:5 158:16 186:11 191:7 200:25 longer (3) 115:6 133:16 137:19 longerterm (3) 109:13 132:16 133:2 longterm (1) 80:15 look (35) 10:3 13:20 18:21 26:11 40:5 44:10 51:7 57:5 61:8 62:3 67:9,13 68:20 79:25 81:2 86:14,23 99:11 106:7 107:7 131:23 132:8,19 135:20,22 136:16 149:14 159:10 160:21 167:15 174:1 176:5 182:9 191:13 204:25 looked (8) 20:17 21:3 31:8 32:20 61:23 87:12 96:24 147:24 looking (15) 24:2 69:15 81:15 86:10 126:11 130:20 135:9 150:6 152:7 154:3 177:14 194:21 197:15 207:9,10 looks (4) 66:24 103:18 144:5 184:6 loma (3) 176:9,22 177:3 lose (4) 109:22 139:6 168:17,20 loss (1) 170:10 lost (4) 57:12,21 58:6 194:11 lot (11) 35:6 47:21,22,23 62:14 95:5 118:19 131:3 188:13 210:18 211:8 lots (1) 99:3 loud (1) 198:14 lousy (1) 112:13 low (2) 86:9,10 lower (1) 176:5 lrf (5) 8:6 11:1 16:24 18:2 96:9 lrg (1) 84:13 lrp (1) 15:24 lrt (2) 8:6,16 lump (7) 194:7,10,12,16,21 195:3,13 lunch (1) 104:18	36:15 38:5 39:20,22 42:4 90:18 125:8 171:20 175:7 184:17 majority (1) 94:2 makes (2) 88:13 136:7 makeup (1) 197:3 making (6) 125:5 165:17 192:13 205:7,8,18 malhotra (24) 1:9,10,19,21 35:15 41:19 48:24 49:2,15,24,25 57:22 68:15 83:18 92:20 100:25 101:13 102:14,17,24,25 104:1,16 212:4 manaar (1) 175:24 manage (1) 71:10 managed (1) 89:22 management (3) 16:21 17:8 27:19 managing (1) 205:4 manchester (1) 35:2 manner (1) 200:12 manoeuvring (1) 147:9 many (17) 36:15 45:12,13 86:15,15 164:10,11,18,19 167:25 177:17 196:23 199:3 209:22 210:7,10,16 march (3) 16:8 110:19,22 marcus (6) 131:19 134:6,17 135:20,24 141:5 margins (1) 41:11 margot (1) 149:18 mark (6) 68:23 79:24 80:2,8 97:21 98:4 market (2) 35:5 80:21 martin (57) 1:5,13,15,18 34:18 35:14 41:13,18 49:1,3,11,16,20,23 57:17 68:4,14 83:5,12,17 92:19 100:8,24 101:16 102:3,9,11,18,22 104:5,12,16,24 105:3,5 162:22 163:1,8 166:15,23 167:6,9 206:7,15,20 207:1,5 209:15 210:20 211:1,15,18,20,22 212:1,5,8 mary (2) 71:15,16 mass (1) 38:7 material (3) 107:5 113:17 115:9 materially (1) 128:6 materials (3) 149:11 150:2,9 29:7 33:23 35:20 32:22 65:12 66:6 68:2 76:6 91:23 186:23 matters (11) 57:4 68:13 72:10 73:11 80:20 99:13 100:18,19 101:1 141:21 187:23 maybe (3) 65:9 89:20 185:8 mayor (124) 1:8 4:2,3,12,15,19 5:1,2,5,10,16 6:6,11,15,17 7:4 12:14 13:6,23 14:8,14,19,24 16:5,13,16 17:19,21 18:23 19:6,10,12,15,24 20:4,5,20,23 21:21 22:9,16 23:13,15 24:15 25:24 26:6 29:7 33:23 35:20 36:8 42:13,25 43:10 44:15 45:1 46:3,6,17 47:22 48:3,7,9,13 50:3,10,17 51:2,6,8 52:11 53:2,11 54:2,6,10,16,23 55:5,8,16,20 56:16,21 57:7 58:11 59:13 65:9,18 78:20 86:5 90:24 91:3,15,21,23,25 92:15 93:12 94:12,17,24 95:5,11 96:19 97:7,16,22 98:5,9,11 99:8 100:5,10 100:11,12,18,21 24:14 131:21 133:3 134:2 135:4 183:21	mayoral (1) 22:17 mayorgla (1) 16:19 mayors (29) 5:12 19:1,5,7 20:8 23:14 24:25 25:18 26:12,22 27:1 29:14 36:3 37:22,23 54:11 58:21,23 59:9 61:11 62:1 87:12 91:2,17 93:7 95:25 101:2 135:4 196:6 mayorsic (1) 20:15 mcmanus (1) 212:3 mcveigh (4) 186:4,9,15 188:9 mcveighs (1) 186:16 mean (28) 13:1 15:23 20:1,18 31:2 67:19 73:13,14 76:15,16 77:13 80:10 88:1 89:12 96:17 113:3 121:4,10,20 155:11 158:2 188:4,22 189:10 193:7,8 195:10 205:6 meaning (1) 12:3 means (5) 4:18 21:9 81:6 92:8 209:10 meant (5) 64:20 88:3,5 118:18 148:18 meantime (1) 175:5 measures (1) 171:7 mechanics (1) 118:20 mechanism (5) 13:23 14:3,4 96:8 179:4 mechanisms (2) 111:17 192:5 media (10) 57:7 90:13 109:20 118:5 142:21 143:1,5 144:24 162:7 167:17 medics (1) 187:16 medium (4) 44:13 132:11,22 163:16 mediumterm (1) 120:12 meet (3) 93:7 151:3 189:21 meeting (269) 19:15,25 20:2 27:10,13 28:4,9 52:5,6,14,19,20,21,24 30:3,4,25 31:5 35:19,20 37:1 38:18 39:10 41:7 78:24 93:13,14,15 94:10 116:15 118:12,21,24 119:2,2,7,10 120:3,21 121:7,17,18 122:13,15,17,20,22,25 123:1,13,25 124:6,6,12,15,20,23 125:1,18 22:25 126:1,2,4,5,9,17 127:10 128:3,9,16,17 129:5,9 130:17,17,17 131:1,5,21,25 132:21 133:19,23 136:6,21 137:17 138:18,23 139:5,6,9,12,17,22 140:1,4,11,12,14,15,24 141:11 142:5,24 143:14,22,23,24,25 144:4,7,13 145:3,12,16,19 146:8,11 148:12,14,15 152:12 153:7,7,23 154:7,18 155:7,10,16 156:9,18 22:25 157:3,6,7,10,20 158:4,9,13,16,23 159:3,4,5,6,6,7,13,15,21 160:10,13,14,16,18 161:10,24 163:24 164:5 165:14,21 166:8 167:23 168:6,10,12,21,21 169:5,12,18 170:15,17,25
--	---	---	--	--	---	--

Opus 2
Official Court Reporters

transcripts@opus2.com
020 4515 2252

172:9 174:2 191:13 193:19,25 199:7,11 205:1 parallel (1) 162:6 paramount (1) 32:11 paraphrasing (1) 68:21 parliament (9) 17:8 22:1 107:16 155:4 157:2 160:3,8,15 169:13 parliamentarians (1) 159:16 parliamentary (4) 107:20,23 118:6 158:7 part (48) 3:20 7:18 14:5,12 16:16 17:3,18,21 18:5 24:6 34:6 39:17 41:19 73:10 80:7 113:6 116:20 117:2 122:23 123:7,17 126:16 135:6 139:22 141:23 143:22,23 147:13,19 157:16,19 162:14,14 165:18 167:14 171:15 172:14 182:16 188:8 189:25 192:15 198:22 200:2,6 205:8 207:15,25 208:23 participant (1) 113:19 participants (1) 141:13 participate (1) 122:20 participated (1) 134:2 particular (6) 16:19 18:1 100:11 136:1 138:9 160:25 particularly (8) 23:8 36:25 79:7 89:15 117:3 122:2 145:9 198:7 parties (4) 10:24 42:7,11 155:13 partly (1) 182:6 partner (6) 36:19 53:19,22 65:15 89:24 90:1 partners (3) 90:12 95:8 183:21 partnership (11) 12:12,13 13:10,18 15:16,25 41:24 65:14 95:3 97:6 202:1 parts (1) 182:21 party (3) 92:7 107:14 195:12 passage (3) 63:13 64:18 89:10 passages (1) 27:4 passed (3) 56:5 61:14 84:20 passport (1) 200:16 pasted (1) 184:2 patterson (1) 71:18 pause (8) 40:19,23 49:13 57:15 102:13 105:7 166:25 206:22 pausing (4) 17:17 19:14 62:22 87:25 payment (5) 191:21,23 192:5 194:10,17 payments (1) 193:5 peacetime (1) 155:20 peer (1) 87:23 penny (2) 169:6 170:14 penultimate (1) 167:15 people (87) 20:22 34:20 36:14 38:6 45:6,8 46:1 47:21 56:2 58:10 61:5 77:22 80:4 83:23 85:23 86:15,16,22 88:25 97:12,14 99:4 100:6,15 101:20 103:20 114:7 126:25 127:18 128:2,24 137:13 140:12 141:25 143:17,21 144:25 149:24 150:3 152:2 163:19,20 164:10,11,19,19 165:8 166:3,17 169:20 170:16 174:10,17 175:2,15 176:19 178:4 180:14,16,17 187:7 188:14 189:22 190:7 192:14,15 196:15,18,22 197:4,5,18 202:7,11,23 203:6,10 204:14 205:23 208:25 209:20,22 210:2,3,6,7,16 peopled (1) 124:20	per (1) 189:3 perceived (2) 177:21 185:24 perception (1) 205:8 perceptions (1) 204:21 perfect (2) 30:12 88:24 perfectly (2) 76:6 96:22 perform (3) 9:20,23 110:14 performance (2) 30:12 117:4 perhaps (19) 10:14 28:24 42:9 48:24 65:18 76:18 101:7,22 116:15 121:12 122:1 123:10 124:18 129:13 151:24 175:15 184:21 203:23 208:22 period (5) 35:1 94:16 100:20 202:22 208:25 periodically (1) 41:14 permanent (1) 26:22 permission (1) 209:14 permit (1) 91:21 permitted (1) 11:4 persisting (2) 190:10 191:8 person (13) 13:13,17 43:2 54:11 70:19 83:3 105:18 119:6,8 151:12 177:25 192:24 203:9 personal (12) 37:13 123:4,4,5 125:4 126:8 138:8,21 156:4 184:12 204:8,11 personally (5) 54:5 120:20 173:8 178:4 197:13 personnel (1) 180:11 persons (1) 120:12 perspective (2) 172:1 211:5 pertaining (1) 6:18 phase (3) 20:11 116:24 125:24 phases (1) 87:13 phone (13) 41:8 51:25 63:1,5,6 64:25 69:3 77:6,8 131:21 154:19 177:17 179:23 phones (1) 197:19 physical (2) 185:9 200:19 pick (7) 111:24,25 149:8 159:13 161:9 185:3 193:24 picked (5) 2:4 53:2 77:23,24 209:11 picking (2) 127:15 135:18 picton (3) 23:14 46:7 51:22 picture (6) 28:23 171:6 172:21 181:25 188:17 204:12 piece (4) 28:21 61:19 114:17 177:9 pinner (1) 107:17 pinpoint (1) 168:14 pitched (2) 118:21 148:11 place (36) 5:9 10:8 18:14 19:19,20 25:7 33:25 34:12 42:24 51:19 60:11 72:13,25 81:12 82:4 88:9 94:2 96:22 135:25 138:12 139:9 140:9 143:16,17,20,20 148:2 151:9 166:9 168:7 171:7 177:10 186:22 189:13 194:4 208:11 placed (2) 163:17 192:24 plan (2) 24:9,17 planning (11) 5:7 8:18,21 9:2 10:18 18:7 27:15 76:12 81:10 156:12 205:11 plans (3) 17:1 18:8 56:6 play (8) 17:5 68:6 73:10 111:24 125:9 139:19 184:20 198:22 played (2) 129:3 208:19 plays (2) 16:16 153:20 please (107) 1:12,15 2:1,5,8,12 10:20 11:24 14:4 18:21 24:2,18 26:20 27:7 29:17 32:4 37:24 38:8,15,22 40:1,15,15 42:22 43:4,5 45:2 47:14,18	49:6,7,12 50:9 51:7,22 55:21 57:18 60:9 61:22 66:7,8 74:2 76:22 77:22 79:17 81:3 90:21 92:22 102:6,12 104:19,20 105:2,5,17,21 106:3,12,16,21 119:18 123:16 131:25 132:3,4,9 137:21 142:6,16,18,21 143:5 149:7,8 150:22 153:11 157:1 159:10,11 161:9,14 163:13 164:22 165:5 166:18,20,24 167:1,12 168:15 173:16 177:10 179:15,17 182:14 183:5,7,12 191:13,15 193:17 196:21 199:4 201:22 204:25 206:21 212:6 plodding (1) 159:1 plus (2) 8:12 71:15 pm (12) 54:23 55:5 102:19,21 104:21,23 158:13 167:3,5 207:2,4 212:9 pmchaired (2) 185:6 186:1 po (1) 151:6 points (10) 34:9 48:15 67:25 85:6 120:10 149:14 164:8 178:10 183:24 204:23 police (5) 56:13 146:25 148:1,9 174:11 policing (6) 108:9 115:15 120:5 125:22 145:24 183:20 policy (6) 97:13 115:18 118:7 128:21 193:4,8 political (6) 61:12 100:8,13,15 107:12 171:25 politicians (1) 56:12 politics (1) 109:19 polluted (1) 72:19 poor (1) 182:2 popped (1) 53:4 populated (1) 123:6 portfolio (1) 148:21 portobello (1) 186:3 position (11) 29:8 56:3 57:2 86:21 110:24 112:4 123:10 133:24 134:22 136:24 175:8 positions (1) 160:9 positiontaking (1) 160:5 positive (1) 123:22 possibilityprobability (1) 208:1 possible (16) 21:23 36:4 39:9 41:17 42:6 57:5 58:22 80:1,3 81:22 151:8 154:3,8,9 181:4 203:16 possibly (4) 13:20 34:23 94:15 156:13 post (7) 108:11 110:12 117:23 149:19,23 151:13 192:13 postgrenfell (1) 91:7 potential (6) 12:16 86:18,19 114:12 120:13 158:1 potentially (2) 100:19 138:6 power (2) 97:8 99:8 powerful (4) 147:18 168:9 184:14 188:13 powers (6) 11:7 74:12 91:11 96:14 100:1,10 pps (1) 191:6 practical (4) 25:6 146:7,11 202:4 practice (2) 17:2 113:9 precedent (1) 120:24 precedents (1) 109:16 precise (4) 23:19 74:24 87:10 162:1 precisely (1) 61:15 precooking (1) 193:10 predated (1) 37:23 predominantly (1) 201:17	preexisting (1) 88:20 prefer (1) 34:16 preinforming (1) 16:25 prejudice (2) 194:22 196:7 premise (1) 205:23 preoccupied (1) 36:2 preoccupying (1) 39:21 preparation (1) 208:3 preparatory (1) 5:9 prepare (2) 146:11 181:14 prepared (8) 5:15 11:23 31:19 75:5 76:6 89:16 128:22 206:1 preparedness (10) 16:8,10,18 17:3 20:16 21:3 88:6 89:14 96:13 114:24 prepares (1) 17:5 preparing (3) 48:21 133:12 181:9 presence (2) 95:12 200:20 present (6) 29:20 30:5 36:8 70:5 92:24 203:9 presented (1) 208:24 presently (3) 132:14,25 134:18 press (4) 19:5 134:14 142:23 143:7 pressed (2) 44:15 133:3 pressing (3) 48:15 135:5 169:15 pressure (4) 72:24 73:4,8 131:3 pressured (1) 130:25 presumably (3) 71:11,23 146:17 presume (2) 195:16 197:11 presumed (1) 86:17 presumption (1) 189:4 pretend (1) 81:16 pretty (1) 118:21 previous (4) 143:5 163:23 165:23 168:23 previously (4) 60:7 67:18 107:16 150:18 primarily (1) 34:22 primary (4) 82:13 91:18 114:10 155:22 prime (33) 19:17,21 56:12 94:3,9 110:13,19 111:1 113:1,8,12,15,25 114:2 120:2 122:21 123:20 124:1,21 126:13 170:7 176:11 179:9 181:18 183:9,14,16 184:10,12 185:12 192:16 193:9 202:9 principal (2) 117:16 173:22 prior (3) 65:3 80:22 154:20 priorities (1) 36:1 priority (7) 45:5 46:20,25 47:5 165:9 186:22,23 private (12) 23:14 46:7 55:15 119:15 127:1 149:9 173:22 174:15 176:11 179:20 180:1,2 privately (1) 94:22 privy (1) 23:4 proactive (2) 98:20,23 probable (1) 154:11 probably (8) 13:16 42:16 60:25 61:12 72:18 129:16 162:20 193:12 probe (1) 160:25 problem (23) 68:10,11,12,21 95:23 120:17 127:13,3 136:9 137:3,12,15,16 138:7 161:21 162:1 164:16 175:8 191:25 192:20,22 201:1 204:23 problemflushing (1) 140:12 problems (24) 30:22 43:12 62:21 63:8 67:15 76:25 77:2,10 111:25 136:8 140:1,4,13,16,24,24 143:24 144:15 178:18 184:17 190:10,19 191:8,8 procedure (2) 33:12 170:5	procedures (3) 34:14 39:13 96:17 proceedings (3) 1:3 101:21 151:20 process (19) 27:11 39:16 67:8,12 92:6 111:8 112:18 114:8,14 159:2 182:1 184:19 189:3,8 192:1 196:2 200:6 209:24 211:12 processed (1) 152:2 processes (8) 33:25 86:7 87:21 89:15 111:17 117:19 166:9 205:12 produce (1) 197:22 produced (4) 46:7 128:24 129:5,22 producing (1) 18:4 production (1) 118:11 profound (1) 125:4 programme (3) 13:17,19,21 progress (9) 60:14,18 111:19 112:21 160:25 161:5 209:20,24 210:3 prominence (1) 138:14 promised (1) 192:16 promises (1) 203:11 promulgated (1) 114:21 proof (1) 178:9 proper (2) 86:7 88:9 properly (3) 58:9 70:12 126:6 proportionate (2) 126:23 127:17 proposal (1) 35:23 proposed (1) 36:3 protection (2) 17:7 56:13 protocol (20) 3:14 9:19 10:7,9,16,21,23 18:11 21:2 23:23,24 24:15 31:6 32:4,6 33:10 34:1,24 35:9 39:17 protocols (2) 91:7 96:21 proved (1) 95:9 provide (6) 10:1 20:8 91:18 180:10 200:8 207:15 provided (19) 27:10 29:9,13 36:12 45:11 46:6 53:10 91:11 124:2,4 126:13 128:10 129:20 131:17 136:2 138:1 158:19 165:20 167:19 provides (5) 9:17,19 57:11 58:2,5 providing (7) 20:7 22:17 26:3 76:18 118:6 134:8 197:2 149:6 150:13,21 provision (5) 36:13 136:23 161:1,2,5 public (11) 17:6 26:18 52:10 91:9 103:22 111:2 143:4 161:3 201:14 202:13 210:8 publicly (1) 103:6 publishing (1) 18:5 pull (2) 85:2 180:7 pump (1) 38:6 purpose (8) 10:21,23 34:1 65:24,25 126:2 155:16 164:20 purposes (1) 17:23 pursued (1) 91:5 pushing (1) 47:23 puts (1) 4:23 puzzle (1) 177:9	25:3,11,18 27:1,4 28:13,16,25 29:17,24 30:2,5,17,23 31:6 32:1,3,17,20 33:2,7 34:13 37:7,11,24 38:15,22 39:7,12,24 40:14,24 41:22 42:3,13,21 43:4,24 44:1,3,6,21 45:1 46:19,24 47:7 48:2,9 50:22,25 51:2,6 52:6,15,17 53:11 54:1,6,13,16,21 55:2,5,8,10 57:4,25 58:5,15 59:3,11,16,20 60:2,8 61:19 62:1,18 63:10,13,21,24 64:2,17 65:2,5,8,24 66:7,16 67:2,16,19 68:1,25 69:12,14,20 70:4,13,23 71:3 72:5,11,13,20 73:4,10,17 74:1,5 75:16,23 76:9,21 77:11,19,22,25 78:10,14 79:14 81:2 82:4,16 84:2,6 85:19 87:3,11,16 88:17 89:20 90:6,21 93:2,7,10,16,19,25 94:5,12,17,20,24 95:11,15,24 96:16 97:18 98:4 106:11,15,20,25 107:2,6,16,19,23 108:2,6,11,14,19,23 109:2 110:1,4,6,11,17,22,24 111:1,4,6,11,21 112:5 113:3,12,21 114:15,20,23 115:1,5,9,11,14,22 116:3,7,9,12,15,25 117:12,20,24 118:15,23 119:1,6,13,17,24 120:17,20 121:3,10,15,22,25 122:3,15,23 123:14 124:9,12,17,24 125:12,14 126:4,11 127:15 128:7,13,25 129:7,12,18,23 130:7,10,14,16 131:13,23 132:13 133:13 134:4,8,14,16 135:4,9,17 136:16 137:4,18 138:16,22 139:21 140:8 141:1,15,20 142:3,12,15 143:1,11 144:11 145:5,7,18,23 146:2,6,17,20,22 147:5,12,19,22 148:16,24 149:6 150:13,21 151:15,19,23 152:3,5,17 153:2,4,8,10,24 154:1,3,9,12,16,22 155:1,6,10,16 156:8,11,14,16,18,21 157:1,12,23 158:11,16,18,22 159:9 160:12,17,20 161:8 162:1 164:14,21 165:2,4 166:2,11 167:25 168:3,6,13 169:7,23 170
--	---	---	---	--	--

<p>read (14) 3:7 32:8 33:1 62:3 72:19 81:6 106:25 115:9 129:18,21 141:13 154:22 181:21 193:19</p> <p>reading (2) 88:10 153:1</p> <p>readout (6) 40:9 50:4,5,9,23,24</p> <p>reads (1) 144:6</p> <p>ready (5) 1:19 49:20 80:17 88:24 167:6</p> <p>real (6) 59:24 70:17 88:25,25 89:18 182:19</p> <p>realised (2) 67:14 209:25</p> <p>reality (8) 137:14 180:25 181:23 182:4 188:14 205:14,15 208:17</p> <p>really (31) 21:14 28:9 33:22 48:14 53:6,7,9 58:24 59:22 60:1 61:3,9,15,17 70:11 72:18 78:1 85:17 88:8 100:18 112:15 149:22 152:3 162:15 169:2 171:19 174:19 180:6,25 181:22 182:8</p> <p>reason (15) 24:24 31:12 33:6 85:11 92:10 99:17 103:21 115:10 122:8 129:23 146:12 188:15 195:24 207:17 210:13</p> <p>reasonable (4) 135:15 190:17 192:4 198:10</p> <p>reasonably (3) 131:9 132:8 169:3</p> <p>reasons (6) 32:10 37:13 64:8 123:7,8 209:16</p> <p>reassess (1) 204:20</p> <p>reassurance (6) 20:9 26:4 44:15 45:11 91:18 133:4</p> <p>reassurances (1) 135:5</p> <p>reassure (2) 46:21 180:17</p> <p>reassured (6) 76:10 81:5,11 143:16,19 168:6</p> <p>recall (45) 23:17 27:9 28:8 29:4,9 30:4 35:20 37:4 44:1,2,5 51:15,18 73:1,4 75:23 87:9 114:11 116:4 131:13 134:5 135:4,13 136:5 140:11 141:16 150:13 151:21,25 152:9 158:8,2 164:3 167:24 168:2 184:12 186:8 187:21 188:4,7 192:3 194:15 195:6,7 201:8</p> <p>recalls (1) 41:13</p> <p>receipt (1) 176:17</p> <p>receive (4) 5:13 89:24 191:23 197:12</p> <p>received (11) 61:12 73:4 79:2 115:12 116:5 121:5 131:4 142:10 184:16 198:9,14</p> <p>receiving (7) 31:20 73:7 101:7 173:7 177:18 184:16 196:24</p> <p>recent (1) 111:8</p> <p>recently (2) 3:8 106:25</p> <p>recladded (1) 45:14</p> <p>recognise (2) 140:13 148:10</p> <p>recognised (4) 97:2 170:19 175:7 210:5</p> <p>recognising (1) 53:23</p> <p>recognition (4) 109:14 114:5 116:22 144:17</p> <p>recollect (2) 135:7 195:8</p> <p>recollection (29) 41:7 48:12 59:23 73:7 74:25 75:5 76:8 133:14 134:7,16 145:17 146:8,23 147:7,8 152:15 153:22 154:9,17 156:21 157:19 158:14 160:1 162:8,13 168:9 169:10 171:23 182:23</p> <p>recommend (1) 19:20</p> <p>recommendation (1) 112:16</p> <p>recommendations (6) 111:13,19 112:7,10,22</p>	<p>113:5</p> <p>record (13) 25:3 31:5,13,24 32:1,9,21 34:10 47:16 136:18 138:4 156:18 192:18</p> <p>recorded (9) 30:25 136:10 137:6,9 141:11 150:18 174:15 181:21 188:11</p> <p>recording (3) 25:4 31:15 158:4</p> <p>recordkeeping (1) 32:6</p> <p>recovery (23) 20:10 46:15,24 47:4 55:19 60:14,18,25 64:9 82:3 87:13 88:23,24 92:16 94:1 109:15 115:3 116:18,24 181:2 183:17 189:3 209:19</p> <p>rectify (1) 90:7</p> <p>red (1) 173:21</p> <p>refer (8) 6:10 24:16 31:22 90:24 125:5 130:2 143:5 152:20</p> <p>reference (7) 18:10 39:4 71:23,24,25 91:14 151:10</p> <p>references (1) 52:22</p> <p>referral (1) 36:14</p> <p>referred (12) 18:13 44:7 54:22,25 63:14 77:12 78:21 84:3 88:18 129:8 135:19 169:25</p> <p>referring (5) 28:2 47:24 74:10 83:25 96:13</p> <p>refers (1) 32:6</p> <p>reflect (2) 10:23 80:16</p> <p>reflected (9) 51:11 82:22 89:11,20 135:1 159:21 198:19 203:24 205:11</p> <p>reflecting (1) 207:11</p> <p>reflection (3) 90:6 134:21 208:21</p> <p>reflections (5) 202:24 203:5,25 207:24 209:13</p> <p>reflects (5) 45:24 86:6 129:16 161:20 178:23</p> <p>refresh (1) 97:21</p> <p>refreshed (1) 72:6</p> <p>refurbished (1) 45:13</p> <p>refuse (1) 163:12</p> <p>regard (4) 15:11 79:7 85:1 91:19</p> <p>regarding (6) 6:21 15:15 36:6 47:1 84:17 167:17</p> <p>regime (1) 172:7</p> <p>regional (2) 16:15 20:8</p> <p>register (4) 123:10 128:1 160:3 210:17</p> <p>registered (6) 139:7,8,12,13 140:6 178:22</p> <p>registering (1) 179:5</p> <p>regret (1) 208:20</p> <p>regular (3) 19:2 41:1 90:16</p> <p>regulation (3) 9:16,18,19</p> <p>regulations (5) 9:17,25 11:5 18:6 114:21</p> <p>rehouse (5) 169:25 170:2 180:14,16 202:9</p> <p>rehoused (2) 159:20 170:3</p> <p>rehousing (11) 44:13 50:16 120:13 132:11,16,23 133:2 159:24 163:16 169:14 202:7</p> <p>reinforce (1) 35:25</p> <p>reinforces (2) 165:17 166:6</p> <p>related (8) 80:20 85:12 93:24 97:25 142:17 164:1,5 199:15</p> <p>relates (2) 182:16 195:8</p> <p>relating (4) 10:16 16:21 39:19 49:8</p> <p>relation (8) 17:14 22:18,24 107:19 112:10 117:4 136:22 144:18</p> <p>relations (1) 25:13</p> <p>relationship (8) 12:16,20 42:14,15 88:21 113:10 114:3 117:8</p>	<p>relationships (1) 90:14</p> <p>relayed (8) 28:6,16 29:10 37:5 63:2 119:14,14 191:10</p> <p>relaying (1) 29:6</p> <p>relevant (9) 19:4 36:15 74:13 90:14 92:3 93:22 103:2 118:5 199:13</p> <p>reliability (1) 169:1</p> <p>reliable (3) 127:5 179:1 192:25</p> <p>reliant (1) 99:14</p> <p>relief (3) 187:6 188:24 194:13</p> <p>relinquish (1) 116:16</p> <p>reluctance (2) 80:7 194:9</p> <p>rely (2) 165:19 193:2</p> <p>remain (1) 96:19</p> <p>remained (2) 11:14 36:24</p> <p>remains (4) 4:16 127:1 165:11 210:21</p> <p>remember (27) 10:9 45:4,24 48:19 51:9 56:4 59:24 72:14 74:23 82:25 113:17 126:22 134:3 135:14 141:10 152:22 154:14 158:24,24 159:1 175:17 176:1 186:5,6 192:7 194:1 198:7</p> <p>remit (3) 111:21,23 113:7</p> <p>repeat (2) 110:21 124:13</p> <p>repeatedly (2) 45:4 48:16</p> <p>rephrase (2) 2:6 106:4</p> <p>replaced (1) 15:2</p> <p>replacement (2) 15:9 200:10</p> <p>report (9) 97:21 101:7 111:13,20 112:6,11 113:4 144:7 166:3</p> <p>reporting (6) 90:16 181:1 182:11,15,20,21</p> <p>reports (4) 85:22 97:22 164:23 173:7</p> <p>representation (1) 200:4</p> <p>representative (6) 1:7 41:25 92:23 135:4 189:24 210:10</p> <p>representatives (2) 157:21 210:15</p> <p>request (1) 92:5</p> <p>requested (2) 44:16 133:4</p> <p>requests (4) 140:5 141:3,6,21</p> <p>require (3) 19:1 98:13 133:19</p> <p>required (8) 27:18 79:9 84:23 109:22 125:9 131:6 171:2 175:8</p> <p>requirement (2) 136:25 169:20</p> <p>rescue (4) 46:15,24 47:4 115:19</p> <p>residences (1) 36:16</p> <p>resident (1) 186:20</p> <p>residents (23) 46:13 103:8 128:5 132:15 133:1 149:17,21 150:8 151:7 157:14,25 158:1 159:19 162:17 187:3,12 188:3 194:19,24 195:4 196:9 201:15 208:25</p> <p>resilience (75) 5:17,25 6:21 7:12,16,24 8:10,16,24 9:4,9 10:17,25 11:2,18,19,21,25 12:4,10,11,11,15,17,21,25 13:2,10,13,15,25 14:10,14,15,17,20 15:11,15,16,17,23,24,24,25 16:1 18:3 19:4 42:20 55:12 62:14 65:5 66:10 67:7 68:8,9 71:21 79:7,19 80:8,12,13,16,24 85:11 90:11 91:6,20 92:1 96:1,5 97:19,24 98:1 115:12 173:21</p>	<p>resolution (4) 81:17 83:7,10 98:16</p> <p>resource (2) 34:3 197:7</p> <p>resources (8) 34:19 35:1 89:2 143:16,19 144:10 168:7 171:8</p> <p>resourcing (1) 34:7</p> <p>respect (14) 74:15 76:1 87:6 100:14 113:20,25 115:25 116:17 123:3 134:9,10 136:10 148:19 209:18</p> <p>respectfully (1) 99:2</p> <p>respective (1) 16:3</p> <p>respond (3) 88:6 91:4 99:1</p> <p>responded (1) 187:18</p> <p>responder (24) 7:5,7,8 8:12,22 9:20,22,22,23,24 11:6 12:7 13:5 17:11,19 39:14 53:13,14 96:5,7,11,15 117:5 130:12 165:11 210:21</p> <p>responders (13) 6:22,25 7:2 9:18 17:13,16 20:12 21:18 23:8 53:16 118:8 205:16,22</p> <p>responding (3) 35:7 95:3 115:6</p> <p>responses (2) 66:23 77:25</p> <p>response (94) 4:3 19:5,23 20:4,6,10 24:9,14 26:16 27:18 28:17 32:13,24 33:16,17 39:13 41:2 47:2 50:15 51:3 52:13,14,15,17 53:7 58:12,16,25 59:25 60:25 62:9 63:24 64:9 65:13 66:1 67:20 68:3 69:25 70:1,1,7 72:25 73:6 76:18 79:2 82:2 86:2 87:7,13 88:19,22,24 89:21 91:22 92:16 93:4,20 95:1,2 96:14 107:11 115:3,7 116:1,18 117:2,14,15,18 123:23 124:3 125:24 126:15,23 127:16 128:20 143:18 145:3 148:19 156:3 161:17 174:9,14 176:16,25 177:5 186:15 189:3 190:20 196:13 197:12,14 203:21 209:6</p> <p>responsibilities (30) 3:25 8:11 11:10,16 12:5,18,24 14:11 15:5 16:4 17:12 20:24 21:6 26:5 31:9 34:7 35:21 65:16 74:16 75:12 76:1 85:12 96:4,10 97:15 109:2 115:21 117:21 118:20 171:10</p> <p>responsibility (30) 4:1 7:24 8:6 12:6 13:4 14:17 15:9,21 17:7,22 33:24 41:19 57:2 65:8 82:15,23 91:4,8 95:25 100:20 108:16 117:1,6 118:3 129:3 132:17 133:2 138:9,21 148:12</p> <p>responsible (11) 4:19 18:2,4,7 22:1 27:16 115:17 148:18 157:4 168:3 177:24</p> <p>responsive (1) 203:7</p> <p>rest (14) 27:12 28:2 36:13 136:1 137:4,6,9 144:23 146:4 150:9 167:16,18 171:16 208:17</p> <p>resting (1) 147:3</p> <p>result (11) 15:8,9,12 127:21 128:3 161:18 170:10 178:7 179:10 200:5 203:25</p> <p>resulted (4) 123:12 127:12 134:1 157:16</p> <p>resume (4) 49:6 104:19 166:18 212:6</p> <p>retain (1) 66:20</p> <p>retained (1) 11:17</p> <p>retrospect (1) 54:16</p> <p>retrospective (1) 196:6</p> <p>return (1) 60:15</p> <p>returned (2) 59:1 61:7</p>	<p>review (4) 39:18 87:23 97:25 98:2</p> <p>reviews (2) 97:18,24</p> <p>rewriting (1) 39:17</p> <p>richardson (2) 173:18,20</p> <p>richardsons (1) 170:24</p> <p>righthand (6) 2:15,21 3:2 132:19 133:16 167:14</p> <p>rightly (7) 86:22 88:18 146:10 147:24 162:10 179:8 181:18</p> <p>rigorous (1) 161:16</p> <p>ring (1) 68:23</p> <p>riordan (1) 97:25</p> <p>rise (1) 45:7</p> <p>rising (1) 22:18</p> <p>risingtide (2) 25:25 26:16</p> <p>risk (6) 18:5 86:1 109:20,23 113:13 208:11</p> <p>road (3) 109:14 142:17 209:19</p> <p>robert (3) 191:1,2,3</p> <p>role (79) 3:25 4:2,12,18 6:11 11:1 12:25 13:21 16:5,13 17:5 20:4,5,8,11 21:22 22:16 23:9 24:19 25:8 26:2 37:14,17 41:19 53:12,13 68:6 73:10,25 79:1 82:2 83:4,6 86:5 87:12 90:24 91:2,6,15,18 95:25 96:19 97:22 98:5,11,15,19 100:11 101:2,5 103:5 107:8,9 108:15,24 109:2,24 110:1,4,7,14 111:4,12,16,23 113:3,14,15 116:17 117:13,16 118:13 125:8 129:3 184:21 188:6,8 204:6 207:13</p> <p>roles (2) 4:1 118:20</p> <p>room (7) 41:7 49:9 69:16 102:5 157:9 166:19 169:21</p> <p>rooted (2) 114:3 124:18</p> <p>rules (2) 158:25 169:21</p> <p>routes (1) 62:6</p> <p>royal (6) 3:20 27:9 43:13 59:17 63:24 130:7</p> <p>rpt (3) 186:3,18 187:14</p> <p>rudd (9) 120:15 122:25 123:3 189:17 190:2,22 197:13 198:7 199:6</p> <p>rugby (1) 186:3</p> <p>ruislip (1) 107:16</p> <p>rules (1) 149:3</p> <p>run (3) 58:4 177:11 192:1</p> <p>running (1) 189:6</p> <p>runs (1) 38:1</p> <p>S</p> <p>s21 (1) 9:21</p> <p>sadiq (5) 4:16 50:12 193:16 195:1,8</p> <p>sadly (1) 80:17</p> <p>safeguards (1) 101:5</p> <p>safety (8) 52:23 145:1 156:4 159:20,24 161:2 180:18 202:1</p> <p>sajid (6) 51:9 149:10 150:25 176:10 177:13 178:12</p> <p>same (17) 17:12 44:22 73:3 74:12 77:4 113:16,23,24 122:17 127:9,10 132:4,21,21 150:23 164:22 172:2</p> <p>sanderson (3) 110:16 111:24 203:2</p> <p>sat (2) 77:4 110:1</p> <p>satisfactory (1) 91:23</p> <p>satisfied (5) 55:18 78:24 79:1,3,11</p> <p>saturday (6) 94:11,15 185:11 193:23 198:1 200:22</p> <p>save (2) 25:15 132:4</p> <p>saw (11) 5:17 21:24 48:20 52:21 58:23 85:12 87:2 89:9 97:9 99:25 154:20</p>	<p>sawyer (6) 66:23 79:14 80:8 97:21 98:4 99:7</p> <p>saying (13) 40:6 46:18 47:16 58:11 65:20 71:11 77:7 80:14,24 85:2 88:1 121:7 139:21</p> <p>scale (8) 30:9 36:18 55:24 86:3 88:5 99:18 172:11 208:5</p> <p>scenarios (1) 22:19</p> <p>scene (4) 21:19 36:3 55:16 201:11</p> <p>scenes (1) 58:23</p> <p>scg (24) 23:25 24:6 25:9 27:8 28:9 29:6 31:3 35:16,19 37:2 40:10,12 42:1,10 52:19 53:10,23 70:3 75:13 83:2 90:19 92:24 95:18,20</p> <p>scgs (1) 25:14</p> <p>schedule (2) 11:2,9</p> <p>scheduled (1) 27:22</p> <p>schemes (1) 6:18</p> <p>schools (1) 52:24</p> <p>scope (1) 83:11</p> <p>screen (17) 2:12 41:5 57:16,19 75:22 106:8 121:11 126:12 133:16 136:17 161:12 164:21 165:2,7 167:14 196:21 199:8</p> <p>scroll (3) 31:21 202:4,6</p> <p>scrutinise (1) 13:24</p> <p>search (2) 38:24 39:1</p> <p>seat (1) 190:15</p> <p>second (41) 2:20 3:17 22:15 25:22 29:3 31:14 59:11 60:11,12 66:8 70:25 78:22 79:21,23 87:17 88:18 91:1 106:17 109:9 122:3 123:19,19 130:2 132:5 135:6 149:8,14,15 151:10,15 152:7,18 153:11 154:23 159:4 160:14 179:17 183:7 203:15 205:2 208:21</p> <p>secondclass (1) 209:2</p> <p>seconded (1) 176:19</p> <p>secondly (6) 3:25 6:16 76:2 90:16 105:21 107:9</p> <p>secretariat (9) 11:1 18:2 39:25 41:20 42:2 119:3,22 179:17 180:7</p> <p>secretaries (2) 114:5 124:20</p> <p>secretary (19) 50:3,10 107:20 120:4,14,22 121:17 122:5,8,18 149:9 173:23 176:12 179:20 180:1,2 189:18 197:21 199:6</p> <p>section (6) 44:22 50:7 132:10 136:21 137:21 139:10</p> <p>sector (1) 15:18</p> <p>security (2) 56:14 94:9</p> <p>see (166) 2:15,18,21,23 3:2 10:19,21 11:10,13,16 16:12 18:17,18 22:14 24:1,4,13 25:21 26:21,23 28:25 29:3,18,20 30:14 31:8,10,18 32:5,20 34:9 37:24 38:4,9,13,16,20 39:2,10 40:3,6,9,22 41:4 44:19,23,24,25 46:1,8,10,24 47:12 50:4,7 51:23 52:19,19 55:10,22 57:6,22 58:3,11 60:5 61:16 62:4,10 66:14,22,25 67:1 70:16 71:1 72:16 73:17,19 74:2,5 75:7 78:11,14,15 80:23 81:23 83:1 84:9 85:7 86:10 90:2 97:9 99:22 102:1,22 106:21 114:4 116:12,12 118:18 119:19,22 120:11 121:13 123:18 124:9 126:25 127:18 131:8 132:1,7,11</p>	<p>133:15 136:9,16,20 137:1,21 140:16 141:2 142:9,10,23 143:9 144:23 148:22 151:10,13 152:8 153:10,24 154:1 159:5 161:10,11 164:25 165:6 169:21 170:9,12,23 173:5,23 176:6,8 178:11 179:18 181:15,21 183:12 186:10,12,14,16 187:18 188:19 191:14 194:24 196:9,12 199:7 201:22 202:4,7 204:9 206:17 207:5</p> <p>seeing (3) 57:15 77:22 95:20</p> <p>seek (1) 97:16</p> <p>seeking (1) 51:20</p> <p>seem (3) 36:17 100:12 139:17</p> <p>seemed (3) 35:22,25 36:2</p> <p>seeming (1) 185:7</p> <p>seems (2) 98:15 124:6</p> <p>seen (30) 12:24 32:19,24 41:5,11 43:22 45:20 46:3 51:14 59:7,9 60:3 61:5 63:13 77:18 87:4 122:12 128:14 129:20 133:11 140:10 146:14 158:20 166:2 169:4 170:15,17 184:6 188:16 192:9</p> <p>seismic (1) 208:5</p> <p>selfevidently (1) 86:24</p> <p>sending (1) 119:21</p> <p>sends (3) 38:23 78:14,17</p> <p>senior (16) 19:7 27:18 54:2 126:10,18,25 127:8,19 128:4 143:14,14 177:3 159:3 162:3,13 185:25 204:20</p> <p>sensed (2) 57:13 58:7</p> <p>sensible (1) 195:22</p> <p>sensitive (5) 84:21 85:9 109:7 111:9 140:19</p> <p>sensitivities (1) 112:2</p> <p>sensitivity (1) 84:24</p> <p>sent (10) 40:6 79:14,19 83:19 123:21 150:14 184:4 191:14 202:14,16</p> <p>sentence (6) 8:5 83:20 123:19 135:9 172:10 205:2</p> <p>separate (1) 81:9</p> <p>september (2) 2:15 87:7</p> <p>sequence (3) 61:20 62:23 153:25</p> <p>series (4) 160:8 174:16 181:10 203:2</p> <p>serious (2) 22:25 27:17</p> <p>served (2) 5:1,21</p> <p>services (9) 26:14 103:22 108:9 115:15 125:23 145:24 148:1,10 210:8</p> <p>services (7) 7:1 53:4 138:2 147:1 161:2,6 180:10</p> <p>session (4) 5:19 87:14 133:12 156:8</p> <p>sessions (2) 87:6,9</p> <p>set (18) 8:12 10:21 11:2,6 12:6,7 21:6 26:8 34:1 37:18 80:25 128:9 139:2 151:20 184:3 192:5 200:14 204:22</p> <p>sets (3) 13:3 24:19 54:1</p> <p>setting (3) 31:19 179:4 197:23</p> <p>seven (1) 107:11</p> <p>sevenday (1) 202:22</p> <p>seventh (1) 209:17</p> <p>several (2) 43:15 56:12</p> <p>severe (1) 26:17</p> <p>severity (1) 87:1</p> <p>shake (2) 2:3 105:21</p> <p>shakes (1) 2:4</p> <p>shall (1) 11:3</p>
--	--	---	--	--	---	---

share (4) 77:15 101:1 196:10 203:24	143:6 145:14 164:24 192:4	specified (1) 11:3	171:3 176:15 182:25	80:2,15 90:18 91:11 98:23	team (13) 7:16 8:16,24	81:13 88:3 111:23 121:7
shared (1) 128:18	sits (3) 5:25 6:11 105:19	spectacle (1) 138:25	185:11,13,14 192:10,19	109:5 117:17 118:7 120:13	10:25 12:4 56:13,14 78:15	122:13 130:20 131:2 158:5
sharma (10) 156:11,23	sitting (6) 119:3 147:25	spent (3) 56:8 95:5 166:4	193:5 203:6,21 204:4,13	128:19 132:18 133:21,25	90:8,9 176:18 187:5	162:6 176:7 191:7 192:4
157:8,17 159:13 165:23	148:2 155:4 157:2 211:24	spirit (2) 103:19,23	209:4,20	135:3,12,24 136:2 137:21	188:23	theyre (8) 12:18 14:8 90:17
169:12,24 172:3 201:13	situation (24) 19:2 26:1 28:2	spoke (15) 50:3 51:9 54:8	stood (3) 110:10,11 146:23	138:5,12 139:4 140:5,8	10:25 12:4 56:13,14 78:15	96:12 97:12 100:16 136:6
sharmas (1) 158:11	51:13 81:1,18 84:18 85:10	69:5 73:12 76:14 77:8,13	stop (5) 49:6 51:18 52:1	141:3,7 142:1 143:17,20	tease (2) 121:23 182:17	156:4
shed (1) 177:5	86:6,20 92:12 96:6 118:4	94:20 95:5 151:23 152:22	87:23 104:18	144:21 155:24 158:19	teased (1) 81:24	theyve (1) 85:25
sheer (1) 126:19	120:24 126:20 128:19	154:4,14 176:14	stops (1) 72:4	161:1,6,24 162:12,16	teleconference (1) 130:18	thing (10) 3:17 52:18 88:10
sheets (1) 145:14	161:16 166:3 168:18 173:6	spoken (3) 85:6 149:13	story (1) 162:7	164:12,20 168:7 172:23	telephone (1) 200:15	101:10 150:19 175:11
shell (1) 184:18	204:16,21 205:15,21	165:23	straight (4) 126:3 131:1	173:9 174:1,12	telephoned (1) 60:15	186:20 193:21 194:3
shelter (5) 44:12 132:11,22	situational (4) 28:22 30:14	spokespeople (1) 20:12	138:23 160:15	176:12,18,19 178:1,18	television (1) 58:24	195:22
163:16,18	90:9 164:23	spokesperson (1) 26:2	strain (9) 25:12 26:24 37:14	179:2 180:9,10 184:18	telling (4) 85:16 122:25	thinking (1) 101:6
shes (3) 40:17 74:7 85:6	situations (1) 88:25	square (3) 21:25 22:1 143:12	62:5 78:14 84:7,14,16	189:2,2 190:1,7 194:5,9	175:1 198:11	thinks (1) 180:22
shift (2) 162:14 204:22	six (1) 184:1	squares (1) 17:9	85:21	196:22 197:8 199:11 200:9	tells (2) 25:23 29:19	third (15) 3:1,18 89:1 92:7
shock (4) 99:17 159:22	sj (1) 51:24	st (7) 172:20,20 174:22,22	strains (1) 87:2	192:4,5,11 207:16	temporary (5) 132:15,25	109:13 120:10 143:12
160:3 205:9	sk (1) 46:12	175:18,18 203:3	strange (3) 120:25 139:17	supported (3) 22:16 110:15	134:18 144:18 145:11	149:14,25 151:4 160:24
shocked (1) 27:14	skewed (1) 35:25	stability (1) 52:24	147:22	210:7	ten (1) 206:12	177:11 181:9 203:18,23
shop (2) 51:18 52:1	staff (1) 97:14	staff (8) 4:13,18 5:1,5,12	strategic (24) 3:14 11:18,25	supporting (3) 16:17 73:21	term (11) 15:23 20:15,15	thirdly (3) 4:1 76:3 107:10
short (9) 49:18 101:18,24	skillet (1) 97:12	22:16 35:10 65:19	12:24 13:9 18:11 19:11	79:1	21:1,7,8 44:13 80:1	though (6) 41:15 50:22
102:15,20 104:22 167:4	sky (1) 143:2	staffed (1) 187:1	21:2 22:20,25 23:5,22,24	suppose (1) 81:21	132:11,22 163:16	149:2 163:21 169:24 193:4
171:13 207:3	sleeping (3) 149:11 150:2,9	stage (19) 27:25 30:6,10	27:18 28:4 36:5,25 38:11	supposed (1) 71:14	terms (40) 12:17 17:3 34:23	thought (9) 65:16 68:5 70:7
shortfall (1) 165:11	slightly (4) 42:10 83:14 96:6	34:20 51:3 52:13 62:24	53:20 63:18 96:7 97:13	sure (33) 15:20 23:21 24:3	39:13 42:11 63:3 65:12	82:11 101:22 113:2 188:22
shorthand (3) 77:17 113:18	137:19	63:24 73:5,22 76:23 82:12	101:8 141:6	33:3,4,6 48:17 58:19 65:11	69:25 73:13,13,14,15 82:2	193:13 207:19
116:21	slipped (1) 94:16	83:5 146:3 148:10 176:25	strategy (1) 108:4	82:6 100:14 108:25 90:19	86:8 89:5,12,23 90:19	thread (1) 127:16
shortly (5) 8:14 62:21 76:25	slow (4) 86:12 201:2	182:25 185:17,19	street (1) 175:4	116:19 123:3,12 129:2,6	91:6,15,21 97:24 116:23	threat (1) 35:3
77:10 179:8	202:19,20	stages (2) 20:10 163:11	streets (1) 147:6	133:18 134:20 140:22	117:7 129:5,13 133:20	three (16) 2:11 6:14 9:4
should (48) 3:16 15:1 21:17	small (2) 5:8 176:18	standpoint (1) 60:19	strength (1) 211:13	145:13 149:2 150:16	144:3 145:3 146:12 147:9	25:11 57:25 79:22
25:6 28:24 36:7 40:20	social (1) 90:13	stands (3) 25:1 89:12 186:25	strengthen (1) 96:19	160:2,4,6 165:22 181:11	148:7,12 169:19 177:19	87:6,9,19 93:2 94:14 107:7
41:25 53:14 54:17 59:10	society (2) 103:12 107:20	start (21) 1:23 25:3 31:15	stress (2) 180:25 181:22	182:7 195:11 200:2 202:17	179:11 190:1 195:7 204:24	109:24 170:1 199:21
62:13 64:23 65:18 70:7	sof (5) 186:4,9,15,16 188:9	34:2 37:1 71:9,11 72:17	strike (1) 147:22	surmise (1) 69:6	205:10	202:10
79:24 83:16 84:23 85:8	software (1) 35:12	74:7 81:25 105:12	string (2) 150:23 186:13	surprise (1) 197:18	terrible (1) 114:9	threefold (1) 109:4
87:22 88:14,16 89:15	soliciting (1) 175:12	126:10,18 127:1,19 162:21	strive (1) 42:5	surprised (4) 35:24 82:4	terribly (4) 144:6 182:2	threequarters (1) 168:16
92:17 100:10 101:3,19,22	solicitors (1) 107:3	171:10 173:16 184:22	strong (1) 72:18	126:5 127:23	189:8,10	threw (2) 56:4 136:21
121:12 123:5 126:17 128:2	solution (1) 98:18	189:7 204:7	stronger (1) 174:12	surprising (4) 81:15,18	terror (3) 35:1,5 80:21	through (46) 5:22 11:12,20
137:17 139:17 156:6	somebody (6) 14:15 57:2	started (7) 60:23 67:6 86:9	strongly (1) 56:15	193:8,15	test (2) 180:25 181:23	14:21,23 19:7 31:21
161:21,22 174:5,11 183:23	82:14 100:6,21,22	156:18 160:13 170:22	structural (1) 15:19	surrounding (6) 145:8 146:3	testimony (1) 164:12	107:3 112:25 119:15
194:5,7 196:4 199:1,8	somehow (2) 127:11 155:12	171:5	structure (4) 15:15 97:5	158:1 163:19 165:10	text (1) 168:17	52:19,19 62:3,6 67:8 74:21
206:12 208:4,11	someone (7) 56:3,4 151:5	starting (5) 27:6 55:25	195:7,20	201:11	texts (1) 133:9	84:19,20 95:18 97:4 99:17
show (7) 69:7 83:18 132:1	174:21 175:17 186:22	57:20,23 62:4	structured (1) 88:9	survivors (10) 38:25 39:1	thank (82) 1:13,15,17,18,19	107:3 112:25 119:15
144:16 186:8 193:16,17	187:22	starts (2) 151:3 201:23	structures (3) 15:18,22 16:2	51:13 103:7 128:5 162:16	3:22 5:23 20:25 24:4 35:14	123:21 130:21 131:2,17
showed (3) 80:18 95:7 154:3	something (21) 10:8	stated (8) 41:4 45:16 91:13	struggle (1) 208:9	188:3 194:24 196:9 208:24	49:11,14,15,16,22,23	143:17 146:20 147:5
showing (2) 55:17 75:21	28:17,20 42:19 60:1 61:17	132:24 133:24 134:22	struggled (2) 205:14,20	sustainable (1) 85:24	68:14 83:17 93:16 99:5	164:17 172:21 173:8
shown (5) 24:5 78:12 103:11	66:2 68:12 73:6 80:3 83:23	135:16 136:24	struggling (3) 10:9 78:3	sustained (1) 162:6	100:24 101:13,15,16	174:15 180:23 192:3,23
151:2 199:8	108:11 112:23 113:2 124:8	statement (81) 2:14,17,20	152:9	suzanne (1) 203:1	102:10,11,18	193:13 202:18 204:10
shows (4) 73:23 84:4 99:3	137:2 160:4 161:4 164:14	3:1,13,17,18 6:24 8:3 9:13	stuart (1) 120:1	swift (1) 45:11	104:1,2,4,8,10,11,13,14,16,20	206:10 208:22
192:18	170:21 181:14	18:10,12 20:7 22:13 23:15	stuck (2) 193:21 194:3	switch (1) 181:2	105:3,5,11,23	84:19,20 95:18 97:4 99:17
sic (3) 126:2 143:15 180:12	sometimes (3) 42:9 100:14	27:5 29:1,9,12 30:24 35:17	subcommittees (1) 14:9	sympathy (1) 123:10	106:11,15,20 108:6 127:22	78:12
side (8) 2:15,21 3:2 34:5	202:18	36:22 37:10,12,19 40:17	subject (4) 151:22 173:25	sympomatic (2) 194:22	154:2 166:11,15,22,23	thursday (7) 5:20 64:6 83:14
132:9,19 133:16 135:9	somewhat (2) 10:5 34:3	43:4,20 45:1,19,21 46:2	176:12 202:24	196:7	167:1,2,9,11 170:9 179:23	116:21 150:11 152:14
sight (2) 139:6 197:5	soon (2) 151:8 162:10	51:6 52:12 54:1,8 55:21	submitted (3) 3:15 14:8	synonymous (1) 17:24	186:18 201:25 205:25	170:5
sighted (3) 70:9 82:9 174:6	sooner (2) 198:3,4	60:9 63:14 74:6,10 76:9	143:3	system (26) 43:13 65:22	206:19,20,25 207:1	thus (1) 12:14
signal (1) 144:15	sort (12) 54:20 81:21	78:21 81:3,21 90:22 91:25	subsection (2) 44:12,22	109:17,19 112:14 113:18	210:19,20,21,24,25,25	tidecivil (1) 22:19
signalling (1) 123:8	109:9,18 116:22 147:16	92:1 97:17 101:4 106:9,17	subsequent (2) 69:24 82:25	123:22 124:19 150:19	211:9,11,14,15,17,18,20,23,23	tightly (1) 21:19
signature (8) 2:18,23,24 3:4	148:11 150:18 159:3 162:7	123:17 126:16 128:7	subsequently (4) 72:19	165:18 169:6 170:13,19	212:5,7,8	time (133) 2:7 3:16 4:6,15
106:13,13,22,23	174:18 198:22	129:19,21 130:1,2 135:2	122:20 191:20 193:12	171:17 175:6 178:9 180:8	thanking (2) 1:23 105:12	5:21 7:18 9:4,8 10:4,11
significant (4) 34:6 59:6	sorts (1) 166:17	139:2 142:13 144:21 148:4	subset (1) 15:17	189:9 202:18 204:13	thanks (8) 104:5 120:1 174:3	12:2 13:6 14:1 18:14 19:19
143:2 197:4	soff (1) 183:18	151:21 152:18 153:2,12	substance (1) 187:25	205:9,14,20,22 207:15,25	176:21 177:17 210:17	22:8 23:1,17 24:9,23 25:3
signpost (1) 58:10	sound (1) 41:15	154:23 157:12 158:11	substantively (1) 5:10	systematic (1) 38:24	211:1,2	29:9 31:11,13 32:23
similar (5) 45:12 132:8	sounds (3) 82:9 110:23	159:11,15 160:23 168:14	suffered (1) 148:7	systems (2) 143:15 204:20	thats (82) 2:20 3:1 6:3 7:20	34:8,15 40:13 42:22 48:23
176:19 180:13 184:6	156:20	176:4 191:19 193:17	sufficient (2) 136:1 196:24	_____	8:4 15:4 23:19 25:17 27:6	49:5 52:6,7 55:7,12 56:8
simon (1) 197:22	source (5) 86:12 131:13	204:8,25 205:13	sufficiently (4) 60:13 145:13	T	29:8 31:7,18 32:16 34:7	60:3,22 64:23
since (16) 4:10 5:2 10:5	191:24,25 192:1	statements (8) 2:10,11 3:8	162:4 209:7	table (1) 140:4	35:17 40:12 50:24 51:7,21	67:3,4,10,11,22 69:9 70:4
14:21 23:6 39:12 60:4,6	sources (3) 42:8 168:22	106:6,25 129:7 160:9	suggest (11) 13:12 68:5	takeaways (1) 198:6	55:21 57:21 64:22 67:18	71:16,18 74:3,17
89:10,20 90:7 97:19	179:1	209:21	70:23 96:20 97:22 98:3,17	taken (19) 25:4 31:2,15	69:1,19,23 71:14,16 74:2	77:8,11,16 80:10 88:3,5,12
103:16 114:8 115:17 151:1	sovereign (1) 99:9	stated (2) 50:10 134:22	101:21 120:4 122:5 124:7	54:19 60:20 79:12 82:13	76:13,22 77:17 78:1,12	89:10 94:16 95:6 100:2,20
single (4) 39:3 51:15,25	sovereignty (1) 189:5	stating (1) 27:11	suggested (6) 28:4 77:3	96:9 100:22 142:1 173:24	79:16 80:11 85:19 86:23	102:15,15 104:9 107:9
188:2	space (3) 144:14 145:2 149:4	status (6) 121:18,20 122:16	78:11 100:9 109:16 171:19	174:7 179:8 180:12,14,17	87:17 89:18,19 93:4 94:4	108:7 109:10 113:16,23,24
sir (58) 1:5,13,15,18 34:18	speak (12) 21:7 34:19 57:1	123:2,2 199:16	suggesting (2) 51:18 101:10	181:17 204:6,8	95:23 100:5,12 102:14	114:20 115:14,24 116:22
35:14 41:13,18 48:24	62:13 63:10 95:6 119:15	statute (3) 6:3 13:3,8	suggestion (4) 75:20 98:8	103:17,22 104:1 107:18,22	103:17,22 104:1 107:18,22	118:19 120:14,23
49:1,3,11,16,20,23 57:17	151:19 154:6,13 172:4	statutory (10) 8:13 10:17	121:12 151:12	108:1,5,10,18,22 110:3	108:1,5,10,18,22 110:3	121:1,11,19 122:12,15
68:4,14 83:5,12,17 92:19	185:21	11:7 12:7 16:7,10 17:18	suggests (3) 43:23 136:23	115:20 118:23 119:5	120:16 127:10 134:7	124:25 125:16 126:4
100:8,24 101:16	speaker (1) 157:4	20:16 21:25 114:23	153:17	75:12 79:4 82:1,23 83:4	135:7,21 136:14 137:13	127:20,25 129:21
102:9,31,11,18,22	speaking (9) 21:11 56:8	stay (3) 111:25 163:20,22	suit (1) 49:1	91:8 99:24,25 100:19	140:6 141:2 143:22,23	131:2,3,20 132:4,4 133:11
104:5,12,16,24 105:3,5	65:24,25 75:16 152:20	stayed (1) 167:18	suitable (1) 197:2	172:17	146:12 147:14 141:11	137:15 140:14 141:11
162:22 163:1,8 166:15,23	158:24 179:25 180:1	step (2) 92:7 99:9	suitably (1) 97:1	tales (1) 85:16	146:12 154:8 165:6,12	144:8 146:1 147:15 148:24
167:6,9 206:7,15,20	speaks (1) 151:6	stepping (5) 73:11,13,15,17	sum (7) 194:8,10,12,17,21	talk (6) 20:13 47:3 49:7	173:10 178:6 190:24,25	153:6 155:3 158:23
207:1,5 209:15 210:20	special (1) 159:21	97:11	195:3,13	62:18 65:18 102:6	193:7 209:11	163:1,7 164:22

<p>times (6) 24:21 61:2 71:6 93:7 128:14 197:2 timing (5) 28:3 62:23 152:3,5 184:13 timings (1) 29:5 tips (1) 105:17 title (4) 24:13 115:6 132:10 203:5 today (14) 1:6,23 3:23 4:16 55:17 67:7 104:2 111:4,21 113:6 144:5 145:18 167:21 201:8 todays (2) 1:6 202:25 together (12) 13:19 32:10 33:17 61:19 70:2 80:4 85:3 106:7 156:22 174:20 180:7 186:19 told (12) 76:11 85:23 122:13 125:21 143:22,23 149:16,18 154:23 160:17 165:12 198:20 tom (2) 177:16,17 tomorrow (5) 55:19 71:11 185:7 212:2,6 tony (1) 78:2 too (6) 37:13 72:18 166:7 201:2 204:23 208:6 took (16) 5:9 30:20 35:7 42:24 60:11 82:4 94:1 99:25 112:24 143:7 147:15 172:20 194:4 200:25 210:10,13 topic (6) 32:3 78:19 90:21 157:15 160:1 184:3 topics (9) 3:24 84:10 141:9 159:23 183:25 184:1,1 187:20 202:3 total (1) 94:7 totally (5) 62:13 172:22 207:17 209:3,17 touch (6) 41:6,14 42:12 66:17 175:24,25 touched (4) 67:5 96:4 180:21 188:6 towards (11) 38:16 47:16 51:23 66:9 79:22 85:13 150:17 183:7 194:23 196:8 199:7 tower (50) 19:23 29:25 32:14 38:6 39:12 41:2 51:10 52:24 83:23 86:15 87:7 93:4,20 94:1 96:3 97:20 108:7,20 109:3 110:8 111:10 116:18 119:11 121:7 125:18 128:17 130:23 132:16 133:1 138:24 139:5 142:17 145:8 146:22,23 149:18,20 156:4 163:18 164:11,19 165:10,14 169:20 186:19 194:6,19 195:4 203:17 205:4 towers (1) 183:17 trafalgar (2) 17:9 21:25 tragedy (2) 55:24 86:3 train (1) 73:12 trained (3) 34:11 35:11 148:20 training (5) 33:12,13 34:23 115:12 187:9 trainings (1) 5:13 trajectory (1) 95:1 tram (1) 33:21 transcriber (1) 211:24 transcript (15) 2:4 37:25 40:14 47:11,12,15 57:6 61:23 64:3,15,22 76:22 87:5,16 98:6 transfer (3) 9:8 25:4 31:16 transferred (6) 8:7,17,18,24 11:11 15:6 transferring (1) 12:5 transition (1) 185:23 transport (2) 7:3 120:6 trauma (8) 126:24 127:17 137:23 138:2,9 209:6,7,8</p>	<p>treasury (1) 195:16 treated (1) 194:19 treatment (3) 195:2,25 196:3 tried (3) 113:1 171:1 181:25 trip (1) 198:16 true (2) 3:10 107:4 trust (3) 109:12 204:24 210:13 truth (11) 127:5,14 144:1 145:16 148:15 162:5 171:18 173:11 182:3 201:16 211:12 try (12) 20:25 57:4 61:19 85:7 87:23 90:2 109:9 112:2 139:24 175:25 204:8 210:14 trying (14) 30:13 95:6 109:5 121:23 123:11 166:8 173:12 174:19 182:17 187:1 198:18,22 204:10 209:9 tuesday (1) 212:11 turn (22) 2:10 11:15 37:11 50:1 59:12 76:10 84:6 87:3 107:12 114:15 118:23 119:24 123:15 149:6 150:21 170:22 175:6 177:6 186:14 189:16 196:20 208:13 turning (5) 4:5 57:13 58:7 115:23 172:7 turns (2) 172:1 201:18 tv (1) 59:7 twothirds (1) 165:7 type (5) 19:22 22:19 111:6 122:19,24 typed (1) 37:25</p> <hr/> <p>uk (2) 17:4 115:6 ultimate (3) 12:6 13:16 19:17 ultimately (1) 99:24 unacceptable (5) 127:7 144:5 172:22 188:14 209:3 unacceptably (2) 202:19,20 unauthorised (1) 146:16 uncertainty (3) 86:4 135:1 164:5 unclear (2) 2:5 106:3 uncured (1) 192:10 underground (2) 52:23,23 undermined (4) 141:18 182:2 189:8,10 underneath (1) 186:16 undersecretary (1) 107:23 understand (24) 7:11 21:15 28:23 67:19 70:20 76:15 81:16 89:17 114:13 117:25 130:22 133:7 137:14 139:16 152:4 154:1,1 158:5,6 191:20 194:18 196:18 209:16,18 understandably (1) 56:2 understanding (53) 7:20 9:6,25 10:10 11:25 21:8,22 67:2,16,23 69:19 72:5,8,11,13 74:11,16,19 77:16 79:8 99:18 115:23 116:25 117:3,13,16,20 119:5 121:11,19 122:15 124:5,12,14,16,17,18,19,25 125:15,16 126:2 128:18 131:16 133:22 161:16,20,24 162:2 166:9 171:18 180:15 198:18 understands (1) 112:3 understood (8) 14:18 59:4 67:21 76:16 83:6 109:25 126:6 155:17 undertaken (3) 8:15 10:25 97:19 underway (5) 45:17 64:13,19,24 87:23 unforgivable (1) 137:11</p>	<p>unhappiness (1) 59:25 unified (1) 20:7 unilateral (1) 101:10 uninformed (1) 124:22 unique (1) 211:5 unit (3) 109:5,8 176:19 unless (1) 151:8 unrest (1) 55:18 until (14) 26:2 27:23 30:21 48:21 81:12 82:16 104:17 110:8 125:25 154:7 172:25 200:22 206:17 212:10 untypically (1) 112:12 unusual (5) 96:6 120:20 156:24 157:6 211:4 update (9) 27:10 28:8 36:12 38:11 40:7 41:20 42:3 134:9 180:19 updated (1) 38:12 updates (3) 29:6 41:24 180:20 upgrade (1) 150:5 upgrading (1) 128:3 upon (22) 9:9 84:14 upset (1) 56:1 upsets (1) 208:23 upstairs (1) 78:2 uptodate (1) 18:14 urged (1) 45:14 urgent (5) 45:5,10 137:2 149:16 152:1 urgently (2) 144:20 187:11 urges (1) 91:24 urn (1) 45:23 used (2) 21:1 159:15 usher (5) 49:12 102:12,16 166:24 206:21 ushmg (1) 86:1 using (2) 153:4,5 usual (1) 155:11 usually (2) 19:3 118:3 utility (1) 7:3 utterly (1) 198:10</p> <hr/> <p>v (1) 180:17 vaguely (1) 175:15 value (2) 109:17 114:7 vanloads (2) 57:13 58:7 various (2) 34:9 82:10 version (14) 3:15 18:13,14,17 44:9,21 48:20,21 88:11 132:5,20 136:18 137:18,19 versions (3) 44:8 132:1 133:8 vested (1) 74:12 vi (1) 180:19 via (5) 56:14,17 69:9 75:14 149:18 vicar (3) 172:20 174:22 175:18 victim (1) 176:19 victims (14) 108:20 109:3,5,6,7 110:8 136:2 158:10 161:1,6 180:9 188:7 195:3,4 video (2) 56:14 143:3 views (1) 203:24 virtue (2) 12:23 95:11 visibility (3) 53:6,15 90:4 visible (6) 51:17 52:1 179:2 200:4,8 203:20 visit (43) 35:21 36:3,8 51:12 53:3,3 54:11,21,25 55:2,23,24 56:3,6,7,10,17,21 58:21,23 59:9 61:11 78:22 119:11 138:23 146:3,9,15,15 147:19,23 148:25 176:3 184:12 186:18 187:24,25 191:9 198:17,17 200:3,6 201:14 visited (8) 51:10 54:23 55:5 145:23 186:3,6 189:18 201:11 visiting (2) 173:1 187:11</p>	<p>visits (2) 176:1 207:10 vital (1) 45:17 voice (10) 2:1 20:5,7 21:1,9 33:24 35:22 86:5 105:18 153:6 voluntary (1) 110:14 volunteer (3) 177:20 186:4 187:14 volunteers (6) 57:14 58:8 174:18 187:1,7 189:24 vulnerable (1) 165:8</p> <hr/> <p>w (1) 11:38,6 wait (2) 78:25 98:21 walked (2) 63:1 130:23 walking (1) 205:8 walks (1) 71:23 walkways (1) 145:9 wanting (2) 147:25 182:6 warning (2) 17:5 26:17 wasnt (43) 12:5 23:4 34:3 54:12 55:7 58:22 66:3 75:11 82:9 86:11,19 94:18 95:20 112:14 116:20 118:17,19 120:23 125:10,25 129:14 130:8 134:6 140:25 141:20,22 151:17 155:4 169:2,8 170:4 182:3 186:6 187:24 190:5 196:1,18 200:22 201:14,15 203:16 207:22 209:7 water (1) 56:5 way (23) 1:25 3:20 7:1 14:16,18 33:23 54:9 62:12 73:3 74:20 88:9 93:15 105:24 106:5 121:6 130:6 146:9 165:7 167:18 168:16 188:20 204:13 208:25 ways (4) 6:14 131:7 175:16 210:10 weather (1) 26:17 website (1) 11:23 wed (7) 35:1,2 68:10 112:23 181:12 198:20 208:16 wednesday (5) 47:20,22 94:16 96:23 188:21 week (2) 5:19 40:16 weekend (1) 192:23 weeks (2) 170:1 202:10 weigh (1) 173:14 weighing (1) 200:7 weight (1) 126:19 welcome (3) 1:5 148:6 163:9 welfare (1) 158:9 went (16) 28:13 52:25 58:18,20,22 67:14 82:20 99:13 122:20 126:2 146:17,17 147:5 160:10,15 189:9 werent (10) 34:16 48:22 52:6 61:15 79:20 92:25 94:8 114:23 140:24 169:18 west (2) 78:8 167:18 westminster (2) 35:2 159:17 westway (6) 58:8 163:21 187:15 189:18 199:19 202:5 weve (21) 12:24 17:21 32:20 41:5 44:7 61:22 63:13 67:13 68:20,21 72:19 86:16 93:2 94:15 99:12 140:10 158:20 177:14 180:21 192:9 211:8 whatever (5) 85:16 99:17 101:11 103:13 125:16 whats (9) 21:22 57:23 99:18 100:3,9 115:5 154:9 155:11 195:21 whatsapp (10) 37:18,21 61:24 69:9,14 72:14,20 75:14 76:21 83:1 whatsapps (1) 69:7 wheels (4) 170:22 172:7 175:6 177:6</p>	<p>whenever (1) 75:10 whist (5) 24:21 32:3 46:24 53:19,22 whips (1) 155:14 whistleblowing (1) 85:10 whitehall (2) 121:8 183:17 whitehead (6) 119:20,25 176:11 183:8 185:4 191:16 whoever (1) 85:4 whole (2) 45:7 104:6 wholly (3) 157:5 188:8 196:14 whom (3) 116:3,5 189:21 whose (3) 108:23 202:7,12 wide (4) 52:20 53:1,23 140:15 widely (1) 21:12 wider (4) 76:17 123:22 148:11 201:1 widespread (1) 26:18 wish (8) 84:21 99:5 103:1 129:9 146:5,13 148:13 211:13 wished (1) 68:12 wishes (1) 101:12 wishing (1) 208:16 withdrew (2) 104:15 211:19 witness (51) 1:17 2:14 27:5 37:12,19 45:21 49:10,22 60:9 74:6,10 76:9 78:21 81:2 90:22 102:2,8,10 104:4,11,14,15,17 106:9,17 113:16,24 114:14 123:16 129:7,19,21 139:2 142:12 148:3 151:21 158:11 163:3 166:22 167:8 176:4 204:7,25 206:9,19 210:25 211:11,17,19,25 212:2 witnesses (2) 105:16 128:14 woken (1) 126:21 wont (2) 162:20 206:10 work (17) 5:9 13:14,19,24 14:13,20 39:19 42:5 72:11 85:13 125:12 180:23 197:16 209:20 210:6,6,14 worked (4) 69:22 70:2 193:12 210:8 workers (1) 137:24 working (11) 10:1 41:24 42:14 61:10,17 149:5 174:9,14,17 180:20 187:1 workings (1) 53:19 works (1) 14:23 world (1) 88:19 worst (2) 126:21 155:19 worstcase (1) 205:11 worth (2) 83:22 85:22 wouldnt (13) 30:11 41:17 83:8,8,9 97:14 100:16 117:22 120:23 140:6 193:9,10 205:17 wren (1) 197:22 write (3) 24:23 31:11 77:12 writing (1) 34:1 written (5) 77:2 81:21 97:21 180:7 203:12 wrong (13) 13:12 43:21,22 69:7 129:1 139:20 148:2 150:20 152:24 192:12,19 195:18 200:20 wrongly (1) 147:24 ww2 (1) 36:16</p> <hr/> <p>yeah (22) 33:9 43:22,22 44:25 47:5 57:19 58:4 74:4 78:5 82:6 97:24 98:2 124:16 146:1 152:4 153:3,9 175:5 178:10 190:6,22 199:23 years (4) 39:22 194:25 196:10 210:8 yesterday (2) 176:14 186:18 yet (4) 58:21 66:13 166:4 177:21</p>	<p>youd (1) 60:3 youll (7) 40:25 131:8 164:3 166:2 169:11,14 179:7 youre (22) 1:19 33:6 49:8 57:23 75:21 84:8 94:7 97:25 102:5 104:12 113:6 121:1,8 122:2 127:24 135:19 161:11 165:22 166:19 175:1 205:18 211:16 yours (2) 2:18 3:5 yourself (5) 1:16 25:16 73:5 105:6 158:18 youve (23) 29:13 31:4 32:19 54:21 59:11 77:12,18 105:22 124:13 168:22 169:4 170:15,17 175:5 177:1 178:3,23 184:15 188:6 189:5,14 198:9 209:1</p> <hr/> <p>zero (1) 109:12 zoom (1) 24:3</p> <hr/> <p>0</p> <hr/> <p>0757 (1) 176:6</p> <hr/> <p>1</p> <hr/> <p>1 (45) 6:22,25 7:5,7,8 8:12,15,22 9:20,24 11:2,6,9 12:7 13:5 15:1 17:11,13,15,19 23:7 38:4 39:14 53:12,14,16 75:3 96:5 101:25 102:14 117:5 119:19 128:15 130:11 138:16 145:25 149:15 150:22 177:11 181:20 183:6,8 186:12 213:3,5 10 (15) 3:4 24:5 28:13 109:1 113:1 121:13 128:7 170:14 176:10,24 191:14,18 203:2 212:6,10 100 (1) 85:24 1000 (2) 1:2 31:17 10001030 (1) 37:15 1004 (1) 119:20 1005 (2) 38:22 39:2 1008 (1) 1:4 102 (2) 92:2 102:21 105 (3) 104:21 213:7,9 1050 (1) 183:9 11 (2) 16:11 80:22 1100 (5) 27:13,23 30:21 38:19 75:13 1120 (1) 49:17 1125 (2) 75:15 83:3 113 (2) 92:13 101:4 1135 (3) 49:6,14,19 118 (2) 90:24 91:1 119 (2) 91:12 123:18 12 (1) 25:20 1200 (1) 183:23 1254 (1) 102:19 13 (1) 26:10 1300 (1) 145:25 1330 (2) 156:18 183:17 13th (1) 38:25 14 (37) 22:3 25:12,15 27:8 29:15 37:15 38:4 39:5 40:2,5 42:23 43:8 44:11 45:20 47:25 48:11 50:1,2 51:10 54:4,7,14 57:8,9,22 65:6 66:23 92:24 116:15 118:23 119:20 125:17 142:8,9,10 150:10 199:5 1400 (1) 37:3 14th (7) 54:25 55:2 93:11,14 96:23 150:13 201:12 15 (21) 54:22 55:3,12 56:22 57:8 59:12 60:23 62:5 75:17,24 76:13 78:23,23 85:21 93:11 149:6 153:7 155:2,7 164:25 192:10</p>	<p>1515 (1) 158:13 1530 (1) 160:13 15th (9) 55:6 75:18 93:13,15 99:13 150:11 154:5 168:19 174:24 16 (17) 6:23 24:18 32:24 33:3 43:5 93:25 94:6,13 142:22 143:1 173:15,19 176:6 177:13 179:14 183:6 188:10 1600 (4) 43:8 116:15 118:24 128:16 1650 (1) 186:17 16th (6) 75:22 76:3 99:14 175:1 185:5 186:2 17 (6) 168:16 172:9 185:11 186:17 189:16 199:9 1700hrs (1) 143:8 1722 (1) 62:5 1729 (1) 142:10 17th (2) 192:11 198:1 18 (3) 140:17 191:22 199:19 1815 (1) 51:9 1825 (1) 185:5 1849 (1) 69:8 18th (1) 25:15 19 (4) 3:3 26:20 192:20 201:13 1999 (1) 6:4 19th (2) 202:2,15</p> <hr/> <p>2</p> <hr/> <p>2 (22) 2:23 6:22 7:2 23:7 75:3 106:22 118:1 119:24 135:22 137:20 161:14 163:15 176:7,9 182:12,13 183:11 186:14 191:15 199:7,11 202:6 20 (4) 25:15 92:24 94:6,13 200 (3) 54:23 55:5 166:3 2002 (1) 7:15 2004 (2) 114:16 189:4 2010 (2) 7:21 107:21 2011 (1) 7:8 2012 (1) 16:8 2014 (1) 107:21 2015 (3) 8:15 10:16 107:24 2016 (12) 4:10 5:2,6 9:5 14:2 23:3 24:16 33:17 67:6 107:25 108:4 115:17 2017 (17) 18:18 39:19 43:8 47:10 51:10 87:11,17 107:9 108:4,19 114:20 115:23 119:20 142:10 186:13 199:9 202:22 2018 (3) 2:16 15:1 87:8 2019 (3) 2:22 110:9 129:22 2020 (3) 106:22 110:19,22 2021 (1) 3:3 2022 (2) 1:1 212:11 205 (3) 104:19,20,23 21 (1) 106:12 22 (3) 165:5 186:13 205:1 2231 (1) 85:21 23 (6) 1:1 47:10 87:8,11,16 158:13 24 (5) 3:18 8:4 201:23 202:16 212:11 247 (3) 35:10 90:9 187:1 24hour (1) 200:15 25 (6) 9:14 18:20 90:23 163:18 165:10 166:4 26 (6) 2:17 37:19 62:2 108:19 110:19 186:10 27 (1) 159:12 28 (5) 2:15,22 10:16 11:9 118:1 281 (1) 40:20 2811 (1) 20:3 289 (2) 18:21,25 29 (2) 202:22 204:4 2a (1) 163:14</p> <hr/> <p>3</p> <hr/> <p>3 (4) 40:17 163:13 184:10 202:11</p>
---	---	---	---	--	--	---

30 (2) 45:3 163:22	8 (3) 9:19 11:6 29:14					
300 (1) 163:22	802 (1) 173:18					
309 (1) 23:10	805 (1) 40:2					
31 (2) 45:19 87:8	815 (1) 66:16					
315 (2) 106:1 158:13	818 (1) 66:23					
319 (1) 38:4	830 (4) 35:16,19 75:9 82:22					
32 (1) 51:8	832 (1) 38:17					
320 (4) 23:16 162:21,24 163:2	845 (3) 149:12 151:2,24					
323 (1) 167:3	856 (1) 177:14					
326 (1) 23:18						
330 (4) 23:16 58:19 59:12 60:23	9					
340 (3) 166:19 167:1,5	9 (7) 16:7,9 38:22 106:21 130:1 159:11 165:13					
35 (1) 27:7	900 (2) 75:10 164:25					
36 (1) 27:20	911 (1) 7:15					
37 (1) 40:21	922 (2) 16:12 186:10					
39 (1) 29:1	925 (1) 17:25					
	933 (1) 179:17					
4	944 (4) 150:25 151:23 152:7 154:5					
4 (13) 9:18 10:20 22:14 25:21 42:23 47:25 48:10 87:7 126:4 142:9,16 145:19 160:22						
40 (1) 38:6						
400 (1) 96:23						
41 (1) 35:18						
42 (1) 26:11						
430 (1) 31:17						
432 (1) 207:2						
44 (4) 32:6 36:22 165:9,15						
440 (4) 206:13,14,17 207:4						
446 (1) 212:9						
45 (1) 11:5						
46 (2) 55:22,24						
47 (1) 56:6						
48 (1) 56:9						
5						
5 (4) 38:8 130:1 165:4 168:15						
50 (1) 88:12						
500 (3) 191:20 194:10 195:17						
5000 (4) 191:23 194:12,21 195:14						
530 (1) 70:15						
531 (1) 62:10						
539 (2) 62:19 76:23						
552 (1) 38:9						
57 (1) 193:25						
5d (2) 135:21,23						
6						
6 (2) 9:14 141:3						
60 (2) 38:6 193:19						
611 (1) 55:12						
615 (1) 50:3						
62 (1) 3:18						
630 (1) 27:8						
645 (1) 69:11						
649 (1) 77:11						
65 (2) 3:15 18:13						
652 (1) 77:25						
656 (1) 50:5						
68 (1) 38:1						
7						
7 (10) 11:5 27:6 38:15 47:14,15 142:12 152:19 153:12 154:22 205:1						
70 (1) 183:17						
71 (1) 9:16						
73 (2) 3:16 18:17						
741 (1) 176:9						
745 (1) 40:5						
748 (1) 83:20						
75 (1) 43:5						
750 (1) 66:8						
77 (2) 163:18 165:14						
79 (4) 60:8,10 81:3,4						
8						