



GRENFELL TOWER INQUIRY RT

Day 210

November 25, 2021

Opus 2 - Official Court Reporters

Phone: 020 4515 2252

Email: transcripts@opus2.com

Website: <https://www.opus2.com>

1 Thursday, 25 November 2021
2 (10.00 am)
3 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to
4 today's hearing. Today we're going to continue hearing
5 evidence from Ms Dany Cotton, formerly the commissioner
6 of the London Fire Brigade.
7 So would you ask Ms Cotton to come back in, please.
8 MS DANIELLE COTTON (continued)
9 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Good morning, Ms Cotton.
10 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
11 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: All ready to carry on?
12 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
13 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Good, thank you very much.
14 Yes, Mr Millett.
15 Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY (continued)
16 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, good morning to you. Good
17 morning, members of the panel.
18 Good morning to you, Ms Cotton.
19 A. Good morning.
20 Q. Now, yesterday, when we broke, we were looking at
21 an article at {INQ00014890}. Can we please have that
22 up. There it is. Just to remind everybody of its
23 title:
24 "Fatalities Will Happen 'Sooner or Later' Warns
25 Fire Safety Expert After Dubai Blaze Resurrects Fears

1

1 Over Flammable Cladding."
2 If I can just remind you of the last paragraph on
3 page 1. I'll repeat it to you, because we looked at it
4 yesterday:
5 "Tall British buildings have been required to comply
6 with British safety standard BS476, which meets the
7 Class '0' standard stipulating 'no surface spread of
8 flames', since regulations were changed in the aftermath
9 of the 1973 Summerland holiday park fire on the Isle of
10 Man, which killed 50 people and injured eight
11 seriously."
12 Now, you got this article, as we know, from the
13 emails that we saw yesterday afternoon.
14 We've heard from other witnesses, particularly
15 Rita Dexter and AC Dan Daly, that even notwithstanding
16 the UK regulatory regime, the LFB had by this time
17 encountered a great deal of compartmentation breaches,
18 and a great deal of enforcement activity as a result
19 focused around compartmentation problems, or focused on
20 those problems. Were you aware of that at this time?
21 A. I became aware — I wasn't — I'd never worked in the
22 fire safety part of London Fire Brigade, but later on in
23 my career I became aware of some of those.
24 Q. When was that?
25 A. I'm not sure. I would have been familiar with

2

1 operational incidents where there had been
2 compartmentation breaches as an operational officer, but
3 not so much the enforcement side of things, probably
4 until I was the director and then the commissioner.
5 Q. So 2016 or so?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Do you accept that the LFB as a body knew that the
8 assumption that, in the case of any given building, the
9 Building Regulations had been complied with was
10 an unsafe assumption?
11 A. I think as — from my knowledge at the time, I was not
12 aware that — I don't think that would have been made as
13 an assumption. I think that there was still the belief
14 that the regulatory environment in the United Kingdom
15 was designed to prevent such breaches happening, but
16 I know that, you know, we were aware there were
17 exceptions to that where breaches did occur.
18 Q. Indeed, and you must have been aware that the LFB, as
19 the enforcement body for responsible persons in London,
20 came across — perhaps came across with great
21 frequency — failures of compartmentation in the
22 building, quite apart from any fires.
23 A. No, I was not aware that they came across the regularly,
24 no.
25 Q. You weren't aware, right.

3

1 Were you aware that from 2009, after Lakanal, there
2 were concerns within the LFB about potential weaknesses
3 in the regulatory system, specifically the
4 Building Regulations and the RRO?
5 A. No, I was not aware of that.
6 Q. Did you ever discover that fact?
7 A. No, I don't think so. It was — as I say, the area and
8 the directorates that I worked in were not connected
9 with fire safety.
10 Q. You say "not connected with fire safety"; it sounds —
11 would this be right? — that you were completely
12 disconnected from fire safety.
13 A. I would say that — and definitely whilst doing the work
14 that I have to prepare to come here, that it's become
15 quite evident that the fire safety department in London
16 Fire Brigade was not as well connected to the rest of
17 the organisation as it could or should have been.
18 Q. Is that an understatement?
19 A. I think it was not as well connected. I think
20 information was not shared, and I think that it was
21 probably not given the prominence it should have been.
22 Q. Now, the risk that a building may fail to comply with
23 the regulatory regime is one thing; what about the risk
24 that highly insulated materials themselves may fail?
25 Was that a risk known to you in your capacities from

4

1 2012 to 2017?
 2 A. No, it wasn't.
 3 Q. Do you accept that it was the job of operational
 4 assurance to put these two pieces of the puzzle
 5 together, namely the risk that a building may not comply
 6 with the regulatory regime and the risk that materials
 7 on a building may fail and assist fire spread was a very
 8 real risk?
 9 A. That would not have come into the operational assurance
 10 arena under any circumstance. We didn't have dealings
 11 with the fire safety aspects. It might have come to our
 12 attention through ODCB; you will have seen the
 13 membership of ODCB contained the assistant commissioner
 14 for fire safety, and also obviously Dave Brown, who was
 15 in charge of fire safety. But, no, that wouldn't have
 16 been something that operational assurance would have
 17 been dealing with.
 18 Q. I'd like to know why that is, given what operational
 19 assurance did, as you've told us, namely to ensure the
 20 safety and safe operations and effective operations of
 21 firefighters on the incident ground and members of the
 22 public. So the question is: why wasn't it something to
 23 do with operational assurance, given that firefighters
 24 may come to a fire in a building which has either failed
 25 or is about to fail and is not compliant with the

5

1 Building Regulations?
 2 A. Because I think there was a problem in the realisation
 3 and understanding that there could be such a significant
 4 failure of Building Regulations. That was never brought
 5 to my attention, so therefore we would not have known
 6 that, and I think, therefore, it would have been very
 7 difficult to have drawn that as a conclusion that
 8 I would have known and therefore could have shared with
 9 firefighters.
 10 Obviously, firefighter safety was one of my main
 11 focuses and priorities, so had that been something that
 12 had been brought to my attention, it would have been
 13 something we would have addressed, but it was not.
 14 Q. But we saw yesterday that it was within the operational
 15 assurance department that the highly insulated buildings
 16 CBT package originated.
 17 A. Yes, and, as I explained yesterday, that was as a result
 18 of a firefighter fatality fire, which is why it was of
 19 such great interest to the operational assurance
 20 department, and, as I explained yesterday, it was under
 21 a very different circumstance of highly insulated
 22 buildings, that that was the attention we were bringing
 23 to firefighters, because it clearly was a risk because
 24 it had translated into fatalities.
 25 Q. Yes, but surely the operational assurance department

6

1 wasn't interested only in firefighter fatalities and
 2 only interested in incidents that had happened. Is it
 3 not the case that the operational assurance department
 4 should have, because it was part of its role, been
 5 interested in examining all the risks presented by
 6 highly insulated buildings on the incident ground?
 7 A. I think the problem here, and I think that it wasn't one
 8 that just London Fire Brigade suffered from, I think the
 9 UK fire service as a whole still did not have the
 10 knowledge contained in one place to identify the
 11 specific risk and the potential for the hazard that
 12 could cause. I think there was nowhere that was sharing
 13 that information, and I think that should have been
 14 something that a central body should have been able to
 15 identify, all the pieces of information that I have now
 16 seen as part of my preparing to come here, and made that
 17 something that was shared through the UK fire service.
 18 But it wasn't something that we had shared with us in
 19 operational assurance.
 20 Q. Now, you got the link to this article through the email
 21 we've seen. We saw it yesterday afternoon. Looking at
 22 the first page, it's quite a striking image, isn't it?
 23 A. Yes, it is.
 24 Q. Did you read this article in full, do you think?
 25 A. Yes, I did.

7

1 Q. Yes.
 2 Let's turn to page 4 {INQ00014890/4}. On page 4,
 3 after the article, there are some comments left by
 4 individuals, starting with Alan Brinson at the top of
 5 your screen. He highlights the fact that fatalities had
 6 previously occurred at a similar fire in Roubaix in
 7 2012, and also, as it seems, in Dijon in France in 2010.
 8 Then there are two comments below that, and if you
 9 scroll down, please, you can see the one left by
 10 Dane Owen, who is at Omega Fire. He says this:
 11 "This article seems to lack a grasp of Regulations
 12 and the fundamental Issue here. It is this nothing to
 13 do with Class 0 Surface Spread of Flame, typically these
 14 facades achieve that requirement as the outer skin is
 15 aluminium (or other non-combustible material) and
 16 therefore the fire will not spread on the surface of the
 17 cladding. This is often confused by architects and
 18 specifiers as the products often have a Class 0 rating
 19 and is then misunderstood as being compliant for use in
 20 high-rise schemes.
 21 "The issue is the flammable core of insulation
 22 inside the cladding, this is covered in the UK by clause
 23 12.7 of the Approved Document which states the [sic] 'in
 24 buildings with a storey 18m or more above ground level
 25 any insulation product, filler material etc used in the

8

1 external wall construction should be of limited
 2 combustibility' the permitted products or method of
 3 testing to pass the required standards are then
 4 reference in the Appendix.
 5 "Although this issue is prevalent in the Middle East
 6 and has been highlighted by recent fires there are also
 7 large scheme still being incorrectly specified and
 8 constructed in the UK due to this fundamental
 9 misunderstanding of the regulations."
 10 Now, reading that — well, did you read that at the
 11 time?
 12 A. No, I read the article, I didn't read the comments
 13 underneath.
 14 Q. You read the article but you didn't read the comments
 15 underneath.
 16 We saw the message that came from Tony Biles, who
 17 specifically picked up clause 12.7, yesterday. We saw
 18 that. If we want, we can go back to the email.
 19 A. No, it's fine, thank you.
 20 Q. And we saw your response to it. That is what, would you
 21 accept, he is responding to; not the article, where we
 22 see no reference to 12.7, but the comment which has been
 23 left by Dane Owen? Did you not go back to the article
 24 and have a look at it and see what it was that
 25 Tony Biles was talking about?

9

1 A. No, because I understood that Tony Biles' comment was,
 2 as I explained yesterday, not one that he was making
 3 a reference to understanding that, because I knew he
 4 wasn't understanding fire safety. So, no, I didn't, and
 5 I didn't read the comments underneath at the time.
 6 Q. If we go back to the email, then, let me show you the
 7 reference, at {LFB00024217}, I just want to see if I can
 8 pursue this a little more.
 9 In your email of 7 January 2016 at 15.09, you say,
 10 in response to Tony Biles, who says "Always knew
 11 Clause 12.7 would be used somewhere by someone":
 12 "I'm surprised it's taken them so long to reference
 13 such a key piece of information!"
 14 We looked at that yesterday together.
 15 Now I've shown you the comment which contains
 16 specific reference to 12.7, are you able to explain what
 17 you meant by, "I'm surprised it's taken them so long to
 18 reference such a key piece of information"?
 19 A. Yes. As I explained yesterday, I was responding to
 20 Tony Biles' flippant comment. There was no response to
 21 the comment he's making about 12.7. That's what
 22 I explained yesterday. That's —
 23 Q. You did.
 24 A. — the sum of it.
 25 Q. And now I've shown you the full document and the

10

1 article, or rather the comment in which 12.7 appears
 2 specifically, you still stand by that answer, do you?
 3 A. Yes, that's the truth. That was the answer, that was
 4 the response at the time, that's all there was to it.
 5 Q. Nonetheless, having read that comment now, as I've shown
 6 you, do you accept that you and other members of your
 7 directorate were on notice of the fact that developers
 8 in the UK were routinely misunderstanding the Building
 9 Regulations and Approved Document B and 12.7
 10 specifically, and conflating surface spread of flame
 11 with the requirements that the products needed to be of
 12 limited combustibility?
 13 A. Other colleagues in fire safety may have had that
 14 knowledge but, as I said, the people referenced in that
 15 email are not fire safety officers and had not worked in
 16 the fire safety arena.
 17 Q. Right. Why didn't you read the comments?
 18 A. I have no idea. I just read the article. The article
 19 was of the interest to me. I quite often find, with
 20 many articles, that people write many, many comments
 21 underneath that aren't relevant, and I also am not
 22 a qualified fire safety officer. So lots of those would
 23 have been technical architectural details. The interest
 24 to me was around the actual article itself and the
 25 spread of the fire, and the fact that it was made

11

1 reference to: it shouldn't happen in the United Kingdom
 2 because of the Building Regulations we have here.
 3 Q. Right. Did you seek to explore that question with the
 4 fire safety department?
 5 A. No. I knew the fire safety department were aware of the
 6 fire, because any notable fire is something of interest
 7 to operational officers, and the fire safety department
 8 contains a number of senior operational officers.
 9 Q. The senior officer in the fire safety department at this
 10 time was, I think, Dan Daly.
 11 A. I think it would have —
 12 Q. Or was it Neil Orbell at this point, January 2016?
 13 A. Potentially Neil Orbell, I think, but I couldn't recall.
 14 It was either Neil Orbell or Dan Daly.
 15 Q. Either way, was there anything stopping you simply
 16 pinging this on to them and asking them whether or not
 17 this could happen here, in the light of their specific
 18 knowledge?
 19 A. I think, as I said previously, that I had had
 20 conversations at ODCB and other places where we had
 21 talked about fires overseas where there had been
 22 examples like this, and we had had the conversation
 23 about Building Regulations and standards being very
 24 different in the United Kingdom.
 25 Q. I mean, did you regard this simply as a fire safety

12

1 matter and something for them and really nothing to do
 2 with your department?
 3 A. No, not at all. That's why we had a professional
 4 conversation, because any fire is of interest to the
 5 fire service. So it wouldn't simply be a matter for
 6 fire safety.
 7 Q. Yes. You say a specific conversation; did that
 8 conversation not inform you that there were not
 9 infrequent breaches of Building Regulations by
 10 developers or by owners of buildings regularly enforced
 11 by the LFB, which involved failure of compartmentation
 12 and fires such as this, so that thinking that it
 13 couldn't happen here was an unsafe assumption?
 14 A. As I said, I was not aware of the amount of fire safety
 15 breaches and prosecutions that London Fire Brigade had
 16 experienced.
 17 Q. Did you actually have a conversation or discussion with
 18 anybody in the fire safety department about this fire
 19 based on this article?
 20 A. No, I didn't.
 21 Q. Why is that?
 22 A. Because I knew that colleagues were aware of these fires
 23 because of conversations I'd had at ODCB.
 24 Q. Which colleagues?
 25 A. Fire safety and other senior colleagues in operational

13

1 policy, because all the members of ODCB would have been
 2 part of those conversations.
 3 Q. Right.
 4 Having seen the article, did you do anything about
 5 it?
 6 A. As I explained, I had a conversation with professional
 7 colleagues where we discussed the fact that Building
 8 Regulations were very different overseas to the
 9 United Kingdom.
 10 Q. Who told you that the Building Regulations overseas were
 11 very different to those in the United Kingdom?
 12 A. It said so at the bottom of the article.
 13 Q. Well, it did, and you've just said you had
 14 a conversation with professional colleagues where you
 15 discussed that. Who were the professional colleagues
 16 that you had that discussion with?
 17 A. Other senior officers. I can't remember the exact list.
 18 Graham Ellis was definitely one, as was Lee Drawbridge,
 19 but colleagues from other departments as well, I think
 20 operational policy.
 21 Q. Right.
 22 Did you have a discussion with any professional
 23 colleagues on this article from the fire service
 24 department?
 25 A. I'm sorry, could you repeat? The fire service

14

1 department?
 2 Q. The fire safety department.
 3 A. No, you've asked that. No, I didn't.
 4 Q. Why is that?
 5 A. Because, as I said, we'd had conversations at ODCB about
 6 it.
 7 Q. Yes, but ODCB hasn't got people on it from the
 8 fire safety department.
 9 A. The assistant commissioner for fire safety was
 10 a standing member of ODCB.
 11 Q. Ah. Well, that's interesting, because we've not seen
 12 any discussion at ODCB level involving that officer on
 13 this topic.
 14 A. No, so it wouldn't have been a discussion that was
 15 necessarily minuted, it would have been a professional
 16 discussion amongst colleagues around fires in other
 17 countries. But the standing members of ODCB contained
 18 all of the assistant commissioners from the relevant
 19 departments — policy, fire safety, resilience,
 20 operational assurance — and that's the basis of where
 21 we would have conversations. Not the whole subject of
 22 that meeting was always minuted.
 23 Q. To the best of your recollection, did any officer from
 24 the fire safety department at any time give you
 25 an assurance that the fire that happened in Dubai, the

15

1 subject of this article, couldn't happen here because of
 2 our regulatory regime?
 3 A. No.
 4 Q. No. And given that, were you not interested yourself to
 5 find out the answer to that question, rather than simply
 6 taking it as a quotation from the article?
 7 A. At that time, it was something that wasn't brought to my
 8 attention, so no.
 9 Q. It wasn't brought to your attention, as you say, but was
 10 it not something you were interested in getting to the
 11 bottom of so that you could be sure that this was not
 12 a risk that your firefighters were going to be facing?
 13 A. I knew that we had a very professional fire safety
 14 department containing not only operational officers but
 15 fire engineers, and I would have expected, if they had
 16 that knowledge, that they would have raised that and
 17 brought that to the attention of all operational
 18 colleagues.
 19 Q. Right. So, in a nutshell, does it come to this: you got
 20 the article, you read it, you didn't read the comments,
 21 and you waited to see if the fire safety department said
 22 anything to you about it, and if they didn't, then all
 23 was well?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Now, let's look in a little bit more detail at the

16

institutional knowledge of the Brigade on widespread compartmentation failure.

We heard some evidence about this at Module 5, and Dan Daly told us that much of the LFB's RRO enforcement activity was, as he said, "predicated on compartmentation, because it is a significant risk, where we find it's been breached". That's what he said.

He told us about a report which I'd like to show you at {LFB00120301}. It's entitled, "Fire Resisting Compartmentation — Flats", and it was written by the head of regulatory enforcement in fire safety, Andy Jack. Indeed, I should just tell you this document is an exhibit to Andy Jack's witness statement to the Inquiry. He has told us in writing in that statement that this was written in August 2016, and for a bit more background, AC Daly told us that the report may have gone to the directorate management board, the DMB, and possibly the CMB or the commissioner's group. That's what he told us at Day — well, he told us that, I'm not sure exactly when, we can find that out.

My question is: did you see a subsequent version of this report?

- A. Not that I recall. I would not have attended the directorate management or performance management board.
Q. Right.

17

Let's look at the document, page 2 {LFB00120301/2}. At page 2, you can see that, at the bottom paragraph, there is a headline, "The Compartmentation Issue", and a text underneath that which says this:

"The compartmentation between flats is of vital importance to prevent the spread of fire through a building containing multiple dwellings and is essential if an evacuation strategy based on 'defend in place' is to be utilised in the building. In the absence of adequate fire resisting compartmentation, fire and/or the products of combustion are liable to spread into other dwellings in the block and/or the means of escape. In the absence of an early warning of fire, persons in those premises may be overcome or prevented from making a safe escape. This assumes an even greater significance in premises occupied by vulnerable persons who may need assistance to make an escape or otherwise be slow to do so due to infirmity or lack of awareness of danger (e.g. in sheltered housing blocks)."

If you go to page 3 {LFB00120301/3}, it says this:

"The ongoing experience of the Authority's inspectors is that fire risk assessments rarely consider compartmentation in areas of the building away from the means of escape and rarely consider services that run

18

through flats (e.g. soil pipes and ventilation).

Consequently scant factual basis is available to justify or validate use of a 'stay put' emergency plan."

Now, AC Daly told us — and it's {Day184/70:10} to {Day184/71:19} for the reference — that the point being made by this report was that stay put as an evacuation strategy should only be relied on where it can be established that a building's compartmentation is effective, and that the LFB had concerns at the time that fire risk assessors were not able to assess the compartmentation of the building as a whole. That was his evidence.

Now, would I be right in thinking that, when you became commissioner in 2017, you became aware of that problem?

A. No, I was not made aware of that problem.

Q. You were not?

A. No, I wasn't.

Q. Had you been made aware of it previously?

A. No, I hadn't been.

Q. Had you ever been made aware of that problem?

A. No, I hadn't been.

Q. Can you explain why that is?

A. I don't know, because nobody shared that information with me.

19

Q. You were the commissioner, come January 2017.

A. I was.

Q. And nobody told you that stay put as an evacuation strategy should only be relied on where it could be established that the building's compartmentation was effective?

A. No, nobody told me.

Q. Do you find that surprising?

A. I do now, knowing — seeing that, but nobody told me that at the time.

Q. The report then goes on to cite examples of fire safety breaches that have compromised compartmentation, and I'll just show you one or two.

If we stick with page 3, Ms Cotton, you can see lower down, in the second paragraph, first bullet point, a number of examples. The first one is:

"The communal ventilation system at Lakanal which allowed products of combustion to percolate from flat to flat."

Then if you go to page 8 {LFB00120301/8} — I'll show you these together and then ask the question — if you look at the top of page 8, the report goes on to record, in the "Conclusions" part which starts on page 7, as follows:

"There are significant examples of compartmentation

20

1 issues posing high levels of risk to the public, more
 2 examples are very likely to be discovered, and so
 3 rectified, as a result of fire risk assessment before
 4 fires occur. Pushing the boundaries of the RRFSO to
 5 ensure that this happens is in the interests of public
 6 safety.”
 7 Now, during your tenure as commissioner, what was
 8 the LFB’s strategy for resolving that widespread
 9 concern, do you know?
 10 A. No, I don’t.
 11 Q. You don’t?
 12 A. No, I don’t.
 13 Q. Do you know whether there was a strategy?
 14 A. I am unaware.
 15 Q. Right.
 16 Against that background, and given the LFB’s
 17 knowledge as I’ve shown you, namely significant examples
 18 of compartmentation issues posing high levels of risk,
 19 as this report says, can you explain why no action was
 20 taken to inform local crews that compartmentation issues
 21 were abundant, they might impact their operations and
 22 posed a high risk for crews and members of the public
 23 alike?
 24 A. I don’t know why that information wasn’t shared.
 25 Q. Again, do you find that surprising?

21

1 A. I do find surprising that a part of London Fire Brigade
 2 had information that could impact on operational crews’
 3 ability to deal with an operational incident and that
 4 wasn’t shared, yes.
 5 Q. I mean, can you shed some light on what it was about
 6 this organisation, the LFB, that meant that that
 7 information was so tightly held and not disseminated to
 8 the people who mattered?
 9 A. I don’t know. It’s become evident in my reading papers
 10 to prepare for this that I think sometimes the work of
 11 the fire safety team was in almost a silo situation and
 12 was not as well connected to the operational colleagues
 13 as it should have been. But I can’t answer as to why.
 14 As I say, I didn’t work in that directorate.
 15 Q. Do I take it from that answer that that is also the
 16 reason why no action was taken to expand LFB’s
 17 operational training on compartmentation issues?
 18 A. I would imagine so, but, as I say, I’m unaware.
 19 Q. Given your last two answers, one suspects I know what
 20 you’ll say, but let’s give you an opportunity to answer
 21 it: why did the LFB not send a very clear message to
 22 crews telling them of the LFB’s growing concern, at
 23 latest by 2016, that a stay—put evacuation strategy may
 24 be undermined or inappropriate in any number of
 25 buildings in front of them, and that they may be

22

1 required to evacuate residents in challenging
 2 environments?
 3 A. I don’t know the answer to that.
 4 Q. Let’s go to {CLG10009016}. This is a letter dated
 5 3 April 2017 to Gavin Barwell, as he then was, MP, who
 6 was the Minister of State for Housing, Planning and
 7 Minister for London within the DCLG, as it then was.
 8 If you look at page 2 {CLG10009016/2}, we can see
 9 that the letter came from you; yes?
 10 A. It did, yes.
 11 Q. It’s copied to Brandon Lewis, who was Minister for
 12 Policing and the Fire Service.
 13 Let’s just see what you say.
 14 You say in the third paragraph down:
 15 “While there has been a focus on the quality of
 16 construction in schools and hospitals due to some high
 17 profile building failures, we have mounting evidence of
 18 issues of concern within residential buildings and, in
 19 particular, blocks of flats. In a purpose built block
 20 of flats each flat should be separated by a minimum of
 21 60 minutes fire resisting construction from the rest of
 22 the building. Compartmentation should also be provided
 23 between flats to the escape routes around communal rooms
 24 and facilities, concealed voids, common service risers
 25 and from other occupancy types.

23

1 “Residential buildings are designed to have a ‘stay
 2 put’ policy whereby only the residents within the flat
 3 of fire origin evacuate in the event of fire. All other
 4 residents can safely remain within the building unless
 5 directly affected by heat or smoke or directed to leave
 6 by the attending firefighters. The standard of
 7 compartmentation is therefore critical as it limits fire
 8 spread within the building to protect other residents
 9 from the effects of fire. It also assists in protecting
 10 firefighters by preventing unseen or unusual fire
 11 spread.
 12 “When compartmentation is missing, or incorrectly
 13 installed, it can potentially place residents at
 14 significant risk. With the Lakanal House fire in 2009
 15 in which six people died, there were compartmentation
 16 breaches which allowed fire and smoke to spread through
 17 the building contrary to the functional requirements of
 18 the Building Regulations and in direct conflict with the
 19 evacuation strategy for the building. We are deeply
 20 concerned that since the beginning of 2017, LFB has
 21 identified, on average, at least one residential
 22 property (or development) in London with significant
 23 compartmentation deficiencies per month. These usually
 24 come to our attention after a fire, or by a person
 25 responsible for the property seeking our advice. It is

24

safe to assume that there are many other cases that do not come to our attention, yet are placing the residents of those properties in significant risk from fire spread within the building."

Then, if you turn to the last page {CLG1009016/2}, please, you see there's a paragraph about wider issues, which I don't think I need to read to you. The last sentence I should. It says this:

"We are also concerned about contractor competency, and how this influences compartmentation deficiencies and therefore occupants' safety in respect of fire."

"Whilst raised in the context of flats, the issues above also occur in a variety of building types and occupancies such as schools and hospitals."

"I very much hope that we can meet to discuss how we can work together to make London a safer place to live and I look forward to hearing from you."

Now, first, do you agree, this letter doesn't actually convey what the LFB wanted from the department; what was it?

- A. I believe that — and this letter was put together by Dan Daly and his team in fire safety — the concern was around the approved inspectors, as it says, and around building standards, and that the — to put pressure on the responsible people for building and regulation and

25

inspection of buildings to ensure this couldn't happen.

Q. Did you meet Gavin Barwell?

A. Sorry, could you remind me of the date of the letter, please?

Q. Yes, it was 3 April 2017.

A. I think we did. I'm sorry, I had many, many meetings with external people, and I can't remember specifically, but I'm pretty sure that Dan Daly and I and someone else from his fire safety team, maybe Andy Jack, did meet with him.

Q. Right.

At all events, it looks as if — would this be right? — certainly by 3 April 2017, you, as the signatory of this letter, were well aware of the problems discussed in it.

A. Yes, at that point the fire safety — well, Dan Daly had brought this to my attention as an issue, yes.

Q. Yes. But by this time, of course, you were commissioner and not in charge of operational assurance.

A. I was, yes.

Q. When this came to your attention, and before signing the letter, you read it, did you think to direct or investigate, I should say, what training was being given to frontline responders about the risks posed by compartmentation failure and the consequent knock-on

26

effect to the validity of a stay-put policy in any given building?

- A. So I was aware from my previous membership of ODCB that, following any operational incident, our fire investigation team would complete a report that would contain details of the fire, the cause of the fire, and any issues that had come about. That would be fed into the DIOT process, and then any areas or trends, as we've said before, would have been identified. So if there had been increasing risks which would have been identified by fire investigation reports, that would have been fed in, and I would have assumed that that would have then been taken forward into a training programme. But, no, at that time, I did not check that personally.

Q. You told us earlier this morning that you had never been made aware of the problem, namely that stay put as an evacuation strategy should only be relied on where it could be established that a building's compartmentation was effective, and that LFB had concerns from 2016. I mean, looking at this letter, that can't be right, can it? You did know that, at least by early April 2017.

A. What I said was that I wasn't aware that London Fire Brigade had so many issues with prosecution around breaches. I was clearly aware from this letter that

27

there had been issues in the built environment, because that's why the assistant commissioner for fire safety wanted us to meet with Gavin Barwell. I wasn't aware of the detail of that or the volume of that.

Q. Right. Well, let's then go back over things a little bit.

Looking at the topics covered by this letter, to which you put your signature, when did you first become aware of the problems identified in it?

A. I think shortly before this letter, Dan Daly would have met with me and had a conversation with me about it.

Q. Right. So you knew nothing about any of this until, what, early April, late March?

A. I don't recall when I would have had other knowledge, but I definitely — I mean, I can only say that I would definitely know it then because I can see that I'd read and signed a letter, so I can't remember.

Q. Right.

When this was first brought to your attention, do you remember what your reaction was?

A. No, not specifically. At that time I had only been in post for a very short time. There were, as you can imagine, a huge number of things that came to my attention, and a huge variety in roles and responsibilities that the London Fire Commissioner had,

28

1 and this was one of those, so it was an exceptionally
 2 busy time. We were also, as you're aware, dealing with
 3 large-scale terrorist incidents that have taken place in
 4 London. So I — it was an exceptionally busy time and
 5 I can't recall the specifics of each piece of
 6 information, I'm sorry.
 7 Q. When it was first brought to your attention, did you not
 8 think to yourself or did you not ask yourself why it
 9 hadn't been brought to your attention at any earlier
 10 time, 2015, particularly 2016, when you were director of
 11 operational assurance?
 12 A. I would have assumed that this had been brought to the
 13 attention of the director of operations and the deputy
 14 commissioner at that time, so no, I wouldn't have
 15 thought why it hadn't been brought to my attention.
 16 Q. Well, you make an assumption. You say, "I would have
 17 assumed that this had been brought to the attention of
 18 the director of operations". Did you not ask why you
 19 didn't know about it until April or late March, perhaps,
 20 2017?
 21 A. No, I didn't.
 22 Q. I mean, why is that? This is a major challenge, isn't
 23 it, to the efficacy and fire safety of high-rise
 24 residential buildings in London? You had occupied
 25 a senior position in operational assurance and then

29

1 safety until you were appointed commissioner. Did you
 2 not want to know why it was that you didn't know
 3 anything about this, if that's the case?
 4 A. No, because, as I say, we had professional operational
 5 colleagues in that directorate who would have been aware
 6 of that information, so I don't know why they didn't
 7 share that information.
 8 Q. Right.
 9 Can I just ask you, then, given that you knew of
 10 these problems in April 2017, what steps did you take,
 11 or did you take any steps, to instigate any training,
 12 any refresher training, to make sure that frontline
 13 responders knew that when they went to a fire in
 14 a high-rise building, these were the risks they had to
 15 be aware of?
 16 A. I didn't take any steps personally. At that point, this
 17 information would have been shared through both the
 18 directorate management board and with ODCB, and that's
 19 where those steps would have been taken. As
 20 the commissioner, no, I didn't take any steps
 21 personally.
 22 Q. Why is that?
 23 A. As I explained, it was an exceptionally busy time.
 24 I was new to the role. I was trying to get —
 25 effectively get my head around the huge numbers and

30

1 areas of responsibility that I had. So I was very busy
 2 with dealing with a large number of key issues.
 3 Q. Yes, but this issue was sufficiently important, wasn't
 4 it, for you to write to the minister, and copied to the
 5 other relevant minister? This was a big issue,
 6 otherwise you wouldn't have sought to trouble central
 7 government with it. So why wasn't this top of your
 8 agenda, or close to it?
 9 A. Because, as I said, there were a number of other
 10 risk—critical things, such as terrorist attacks taking
 11 place in London, that were also competing priorities.
 12 Q. This isn't the only letter you wrote at the time, is it?
 13 Let's go to {LFB00089064}. Now, this is a letter that
 14 is addressed to Ben Gummer MP, House of Commons, and if
 15 you go, please, to the third page {LFB00089064/3}, you
 16 can see that it isn't signed. It looks as if it's
 17 a draft.
 18 Do you remember this document?
 19 A. No, I don't.
 20 Q. You don't.
 21 Let's just look, then, at the third paragraph down,
 22 if we go back to page 1 {LFB00089064/1}, please,
 23 "Housing". The title is, "Conservative party
 24 manifesto", and it opens:
 25 "I am writing to you regarding the Conservative

31

1 party manifesto for the 2017 General Election."
 2 This, I think we can take it, was ahead of the
 3 general election on, to the best of my recollection,
 4 8 June that year:
 5 "I know that this will be published very soon but
 6 hoped there may still be an opportunity for you to
 7 consider three proposals from the London Fire Brigade
 8 (LFB) for inclusion in the manifesto that will improve
 9 fire safety in our homes, schools and places of work.
 10 "Below I set out three key measures that I would
 11 urge you to include in the manifesto and would, of
 12 course, be happy to provide further information on any
 13 of these issues.
 14 "Housing.
 15 "We have mounting evidence of issues of concern over
 16 the quality of construction of some residential
 17 buildings and, in particular, blocks of flats. In
 18 a purpose built block of flats each flat should be
 19 separated by a minimum of 60 minutes fire resisting
 20 construction from the rest of the building. Residential
 21 buildings are designed to have a 'stay put' policy
 22 whereby only the residents within the flat of fire
 23 origin evacuate in the event of fire. All other
 24 residents can safely remain within the building unless
 25 directly affected by heat or smoke or directed to leave

32

by the attending firefighters . The standard of compartmentation is therefore critical as it limits fire spread within the building to protect other residents from the effects of fire . It also assists in protecting firefighters by preventing unseen or unusual fire spread."

Then there is the paragraph which is identical to the paragraph in the letter you signed on 3 April 2017, and then below that, in bold in the box, it says this:

"What we are calling for: We are keen to ensure the quality of housing and a key safeguard are building regulations. Building regulations ensure that plans are approved by Local Authority Building Control (LABC) or private Approved Inspectors. We are concerned that LABC power to take enforcement action expires after 12 months of a building being completed, and power to prosecute expires after 2 years. These deadlines limit LABC powers and can leave a legacy of problems which can massively impact the safety of residents in a fire. We want the deadlines to be extended to a more appropriate period — to be decided through consultation with key stakeholders."

Do you remember seeing this letter in draft form?

A. No, I don't recall seeing it.

Q. Have you ever seen this document before?

33

A. No, I don't think I have, I don't recall seeing it.

Q. Right. Do you remember having any discussion about writing to Ben Gummer on these issues?

A. No, this would have been a conversation between Dan Daly and probably Helen Newton.

Q. Right. Do you remember any discussion about a problem with enforcement of Building Regulations and time limits available to the LABC for prosecution?

A. No, I don't remember that.

Q. Right.

Can I then turn to a different topic, which is the 2016 review of Brigade control by AC Tom George, who has given evidence.

He produced, as you may know, a report on 22 July 2016, which contained a number of observations and recommendations, and he explains in his statement that steps were being taken by other senior officers in control to implement the recommendations in his report.

Now, he also told us that he presented an updated report to the LFB's corporate management board in February 2017, not long after you were appointed interim commissioner.

Do you remember that report?

A. I do, yes.

Q. You remember it being presented to the CMB?

34

A. I do, yes.

Q. Yes.

Do you know why the report had not been presented to the CMB in July 2016?

A. No, I'm unaware. The report had been commissioned by and obviously presented to director Dave Brown in his directorate. Why that wasn't then taken to the commissioner's board, I don't know. It was something that I was quite keen to see the outcome of.

Q. Right. You say you were quite keen to see the outcome of it; how did you learn about it?

A. Dave Brown had told us at commissioner's board that AC Tom George was being commissioned to do that piece of work.

Q. And you asked him for it, did you?

A. I spoke to Dave Brown and asked if we were going to see the outcome of the report, and he said we were, and then by the time I became commissioner, I asked again about it, and it was then presented to the commissioner's board.

Q. Did you specifically ask him to present it formally to the commissioner's board?

A. I asked Dave Brown if he would be bringing it, yes.

Q. Right. When did you first read it?

A. Probably prior to that meeting.

35

Q. I see. When you did read it, did you have any particular concerns about its findings or about control more generally?

A. I had concerns about control. I had become aware of the fact that control were — I'd say not — you know, they were feeling that they were isolated from the mainstream part of London Fire Brigade. I had actually visited control on a number of occasions, as part of the programme they were doing of staff engagement, to hear some of their concerns, so I was aware that there were issues. So that's why I was pleased that a report had been commissioned to look deeper into the issues in control.

Q. Did you ask Dave Brown why he hadn't presented it to the CMB before February 2017?

A. No, that would have been a decision between himself and the then commissioner, Ron Dobson.

Q. Yes, maybe, but were you not interested to know what the reason was?

A. I knew the report had been through a number of different sort of evaluations of it, I suppose, so no, I didn't know why it hadn't been presented.

Q. I think it's right that you asked that a further update be provided to the CMB six months thence?

A. I did, yes.

36

1 Q. Why did you want an update in such a short space of
2 time?
3 A. Because I wanted to ensure that the areas that had been
4 identified were being addressed.
5 Q. Did you have any particular concerns arising out of your
6 review of that report or from discussing its findings at
7 the CMB?
8 A. I was concerned, I thought there were a number of areas
9 that needed focus and work on, and I wanted to ensure
10 that the action plan was being implemented.
11 Q. Can I just go back, then, to the letter to Ben Gummer,
12 the draft document we looked at earlier. You said you
13 hadn't seen it before. Let's have it on the screen,
14 {LFB00089064}.
15 A. I said I didn't recall seeing it. I'm not sure whether
16 I had. I don't recall having seen it.
17 Q. You don't recall having seen it?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Let's just get to the bottom of that, if we can. Can we
20 have that on the screen.
21 Can we also have on the screen at the same time,
22 please, {LFB00089063}. This is an email from
23 Helen Newton to you. Do you see?
24 A. I do, yes.
25 Q. Subject, "FOR CLEARANCE/TO SIGN: Letters re party

37

1 manifestos":
2 "Hi Dany,
3 "Despite the unexpected nature of the General
4 Election, we have identified an opportunity to urge the
5 three main political parties represented in London to
6 include some of our key asks in the party manifestos.
7 We understand that the parties are still seeking policy
8 ideas although time is of the essence!"
9 It goes on, "I have heard from several Labour MPs
10 this week", et cetera, and in the middle of the middle
11 paragraph, it says:
12 "... the key asks are on building regs, sprinklers
13 in schools and the single recall register — and are all
14 issues on which we have been campaigning."
15 It's signed off by Helen Newton, who is the public
16 affairs manager for the LFB, as you can just about see
17 on your screen.
18 You don't doubt, do you, that this draft did at
19 least come across your desk?
20 A. Quite possibly. As I said, at the time it was
21 exceptionally busy. It was quite common that I would
22 have in the region of 20 to 30 letters a week —
23 Q. Right.
24 A. — that would require my signing, so, yes, as I said,
25 I don't recall, but the issue around the total recalls

38

1 campaign was something we'd been doing a lot of
2 significant work on, and the fire safety team and
3 Helen Newton had been particularly focused, so I was
4 very aware of that.
5 Q. In the next paragraph it says:
6 "Please find attached three letters which are the
7 same wording but addressed to each party lead."
8 Then in bold, underlined:
9 "Could you let me know as soon as possible if you
10 are happy to approve and sign these as I'll need to get
11 them out very quickly."
12 Do you remember whether you did sign them and send
13 them out?
14 A. I don't know. As I say, my inbox would have been
15 managed and dealt with by my staff officer and my PA
16 team, so I would imagine they would have —
17 Q. Right.
18 A. — printed them for me to sign.
19 Q. At all events, you don't remember a specific problem
20 with a letter like that, such that you would call
21 Helen Newton in and say, "I'm sorry, I'm not prepared to
22 sign that" or have a further discussion about it? You
23 don't remember —
24 A. No, I wouldn't imagine so. Helen Newton would have done
25 a lot of background work with Dan Daly on these issues

39

1 and they were both being very proactive in these
2 matters.
3 Q. So can we proceed on the assumption that although you
4 may not be able to remember it now, at the time you saw
5 the letter, you would have read it and signed it off as
6 asked by Helen Newton?
7 A. I would imagine so. As I say, I can't recall, but
8 I would imagine so.
9 Q. Right. And when you say "I would imagine so", is that
10 because you don't remember taking one of these letters
11 out of the pile you had and saying, "I'm sorry, I can't
12 sign that, I need to have a discussion about it"?
13 A. I think I probably would have had a discussion about it
14 anyway, but I don't recall specifically any issue with
15 this letter.
16 Q. Right.
17 Now, I just have one or two final questions for you,
18 Ms Cotton.
19 On 14 June 2017, you attended the Grenfell Tower
20 fire as commissioner of the London Fire Brigade, and
21 indeed as monitoring officer.
22 A. I did, yes.
23 Q. In September 2018, you attended Phase 1 of this Inquiry
24 to give evidence about the night in question.
25 Over three years later, having had the time to

40

1 reflect not only on the events of that night but on the
 2 years that preceded it, is it your view that the
 3 Grenfell Tower fire was a one-off fire, completely
 4 unpredicted, completely unpredictable, for which the LFB
 5 could never reasonably be prepared?
 6 A. I think that, having had the time to reflect and the
 7 understanding of the knowledge London Fire Brigade had,
 8 my view is that we had a lot of organisational
 9 knowledge. I still think that, even now, the knowledge
 10 held by London and the UK fire service would not have
 11 anticipated such a catastrophic failure of any building
 12 with so many breaches. But, yes, we did have knowledge
 13 of various aspects of that, and I think that that has
 14 become evident by the documents that I've read.
 15 Q. Reflecting on the evidence that you have given to
 16 the Inquiry over the last two and a bit days, are you
 17 able now to identify anything that you could or should
 18 have done during your time at the LFB which would have
 19 better equipped the incident commanders at the fire on
 20 14 June at Grenfell Tower?
 21 A. I think that, organisationally, there was information
 22 that we could have shared that could have been
 23 translated into training for all members of London Fire
 24 Brigade that may well have assisted them.
 25 MR MILLETT: Yes, thank you.

41

1 I have now come, Ms Cotton, to the end of my
 2 prepared questions. There may be some further questions
 3 that I have skipped over or haven't asked you which
 4 I may need to go back to, and there may be further
 5 questions that others may wish me to ask. So I'm going
 6 to ask the Chairman for a little bit of time for that in
 7 the usual way, as we do.
 8 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
 9 Well, as I think you know, Ms Cotton, when counsel
 10 gets to the end of his prepared questions, we always
 11 have a break to give him a chance to check that he
 12 hasn't left something out, and to give other people who
 13 are following the proceedings, but not from this room,
 14 a chance to suggest questions that perhaps we should
 15 have put to you.
 16 So we'll have a break now. I think we'll come back
 17 at 11.15, and at that point we'll see whether there are
 18 any more questions that we need to ask you.
 19 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, thank you.
 20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: As before, when you're out of the
 21 room, please don't discuss your evidence or anything to
 22 do with it with anyone. All right?
 23 THE WITNESS: No, sir. Thank you.
 24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
 25 (Pause)

42

1 Right, Mr Millett. Well, I thought we could be
 2 a little bit more generous on the timing of the break
 3 this time.
 4 MR MILLETT: Yes.
 5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And that will give you plenty of
 6 time to deal with anything that crops up.
 7 MR MILLETT: It should, given the overnight break we've had,
 8 but if I need a little bit longer —
 9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, of course, you only have to
 10 tell the usher to come and warn us.
 11 MR MILLETT: Very good. Thank you very much, Mr Chairman.
 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: 11.15, please.
 13 (10.55 am)
 14 (A short break)
 15 (11.15 am)
 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, Ms Cotton. Well, we'll see
 17 now if there are any more questions for you. All right?
 18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
 19 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
 20 Yes, Mr Millett.
 21 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, thank you. One or two.
 22 Can I ask you, please, to be shown {LFB00118237}.
 23 This is a HSE document, Health and Safety Executive,
 24 entitled, "Striking the balance between operational and
 25 health and safety duties in the Fire and Rescue

43

1 Service". You will see it has two authors, one of whom
 2 was the chair, Judith Hackitt. Now, the date of this
 3 was in fact March 2010.
 4 If you go to page 2 {LFB00118237/2}, please, you can
 5 see that there was some guidance here, and some
 6 principles. If you look at page 2, you can see the
 7 principles set out there under "Principles":
 8 "Particular challenges for Fire and Rescue
 9 Authorities as employers."
 10 First, I should ask you, have you ever seen this
 11 document before?
 12 A. Yes, I have.
 13 Q. When did you first see this document, do you think?
 14 A. I'm not sure, but I remember having conversations,
 15 high-level ones, with Dr Adrian Bevan, who was the head
 16 of health and safety, and he had also worked for the
 17 Health and Safety Executive.
 18 Q. Were you commissioner at that stage or were you in one
 19 of your former roles?
 20 A. No, in my former role.
 21 Q. Which role?
 22 A. Assistant commissioner operational assurance.
 23 Q. I see, AC/OA. So you saw that before 2016, then?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Yes, I see.

44

1 If you look at the guidance under "Principles", you
 2 can see:
 3 "The application of health and safety law is
 4 challenging for Fire and Rescue ..."
 5 And it sets out some reasons why that is. It then
 6 sets out the health and safety duties.
 7 If you go to page 4 {LFB00118237/4}, you can see
 8 some guidance behind the principles, and this is what
 9 the HSE inspectors would consider. You see those.
 10 Were you aware of the primary duties which it is
 11 said in this document HSE inspectors would consider?
 12 Page 4.
 13 A. Sorry, I can't --
 14 Q. No. Page 4. We have to wait for it to come up.
 15 (Pause)
 16 Thank you.
 17 So you can see at the top of your screen it says:
 18 "The primary duties under health and safety law are
 19 on employers. HSE inspectors, when inspecting or
 20 investigating an individual Fire and Rescue Authority
 21 using HSE's own procedures, including the Work Related
 22 Death Protocols, will consider ..."
 23 Then there is a list of bullet points. Do you see
 24 that?
 25 A. I can, yes.

45

1 Q. Were you familiar with those at the time?
 2 A. Not familiar with them. I think I'd seen them, but
 3 I wasn't familiar with the detail because, as I said,
 4 Dr Adrian Bevan was my professional expert in health and
 5 safety.
 6 Q. Right. So just explain to me, when you got this
 7 document and you saw it, did you ingest the detail and
 8 make sure you were well aware of these principles and
 9 these things that would be considered?
 10 A. I didn't receive -- formally receive the document.
 11 I was aware of the document.
 12 Q. Right. Did you ever have cause to refer to it?
 13 A. No, I didn't.
 14 Q. Right.
 15 Can I ask you, please, to be shown {CWJ00000022}.
 16 This is another HSE document, "The management of health
 17 and safety in the GB fire and rescue service", of
 18 October 2010. Have you ever seen this before?
 19 A. I don't recall having seen this, no.
 20 Q. Right. It's a 24--page document.
 21 If we can go to page 23 {CWJ00000022/23}, please, we
 22 can see that there are some key recommendations set out
 23 in summary in part 5 of this document, and you can see
 24 that in paragraph 1:
 25 "All Fire and Rescue Services should ..."

46

1 And there is a list of things they should do,
 2 including:
 3 "Have effective processes to assess competence."
 4 The third bullet point down. Much of this is about
 5 training and maintenance of accurate records of
 6 training, et cetera.
 7 2 is about the production of national guidance on
 8 common minimum standards, and 3:
 9 "Fire and rescue services should:
 10 " ■ ensure the training framework for the maintenance
 11 of core skills is able to equip firefighters to
 12 competently deal with all reasonably foreseeable risks
 13 at incidents.
 14 " ■ quality assure the delivery and effectiveness of
 15 core skills training across all duty systems and roles;
 16 and
 17 " ■ ensure training records are complete and
 18 effective ."
 19 It continues under 4 and 5 on training, and 5, good
 20 practice on incident command training.
 21 6 is about risk--critical information being provided
 22 to an incident commander being accurate, timely and
 23 suitable.
 24 It goes on, over the page to page 24
 25 {CWJ00000022/24} in similar vein. 7, all services

47

1 should ensure that, the first bullet point:
 2 " ■ they provide adequate training for staff
 3 gathering and assessing risk critical information;
 4 " ■ there is a system in place to actively collect
 5 relevant risk critical information;
 6 " ■ they monitor the effectiveness of these
 7 arrangements;
 8 " ■ risk critical information is kept up to date and
 9 is in a suitable format; and
 10 " ■ incident commanders are able to access the
 11 information to inform their command decisions."
 12 Were you aware of those recommendations that I've
 13 shown you?
 14 A. No, I wasn't.
 15 Q. You weren't. At any stage, even as commissioner?
 16 A. I don't believe so, no.
 17 Q. Can you explain why that is, given your role originally
 18 as AC/OA?
 19 A. I would imagine it would be something that
 20 Dr Adrian Bevan, as the professional lead for health and
 21 safety and, prior to that, Brenda Weir, who led on
 22 health and safety, would have been informed of, but
 23 I was not made aware of them.
 24 Q. It's odd, isn't it, that you weren't made aware of it,
 25 given your role as AC/OA? Surely this kind of document

48

1 would be exactly the kind of thing that you would expect
 2 to have on your desk, or is that wrong?
 3 A. I wasn't made aware, so no, I don't believe so.
 4 Q. Well, that reasons from the outcome. Do you accept that
 5 you should have been aware of this document, it should
 6 have been imprinted on your heart?
 7 A. I think that I had a health and safety professional, as
 8 I said, who had worked for the HSE working for me, so
 9 therefore I would be, as not a health and safety
 10 professional myself, dependent on having that
 11 professional expertise.
 12 Q. During your time as AC/OA, do you remember whether there
 13 was an audit or quality assurance conducted
 14 independently to ensure that the LFB was actually
 15 compliant with the expectation contained in this
 16 document and, indeed, the first one I showed you?
 17 A. I don't recall if there was.
 18 Q. You don't recall if there was?
 19 A. I don't recall if there was.
 20 Q. Do you mean by that you have no recollection of there
 21 ever being one, or you don't remember one way or the
 22 other?
 23 A. I don't remember one way or the other.
 24 Q. Right.
 25 As AC/OA, it would be unusual, wouldn't it, not to

49

1 know about a third party, independent audit of
 2 compliance?
 3 A. We had external MOPAC who provided audit facilities for
 4 London Fire Brigade. They may well have undertaken
 5 that. The MOPAC recommendations were discussed at
 6 commissioner's board. Whether that took place prior to
 7 me being there, I'm not aware.
 8 MR MILLETT: Yes, thank you very much.
 9 Ms Cotton, I have no further questions for you. It
 10 only remains for me to thank you very much for coming to
 11 the Inquiry in Phase 2 and assisting us with our
 12 investigations, we're extremely grateful to you.
 13 Thank you.
 14 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Ms Cotton, and I would like to
 15 add my thanks on behalf of not just myself, but
 16 obviously the other members of the panel. You have
 17 given evidence for quite a long time. It's very helpful
 18 to us to hear directly from those involved in these
 19 sort of matters, so we really are very grateful to you
 20 for coming along and telling us what you know.
 21 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
 22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So thank you very much indeed, and
 23 you're now free to go.
 24 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, sir. Thank you.
 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you. Would you like to go

50

1 with the usher, then, please.
 2 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
 3 (The witness withdrew)
 4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, Mr Millett. Now, we have
 5 another witness, I think, but not quite yet.
 6 MR MILLETT: We do, not quite yet. Former
 7 Commissioner Ron Dobson, who will be examined by
 8 Andrew Kinnier Queen's Counsel. I am told that he will
 9 be ready or at least here in about an hour.
 10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, we will start him at
 11 2 o'clock --
 12 MR MILLETT: Probably best.
 13 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: -- would probably be the most
 14 convenient course, wouldn't it?
 15 MR MILLETT: Very well.
 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Very well.
 17 Well, we'll break at that point. We'll resume,
 18 then, at 2 o'clock, when we shall look forward to
 19 hearing evidence from former Commissioner Dobson.
 20 Good, thank you very much. 2 o'clock, please.
 21 (11.26 am)
 22 (The short adjournment)
 23 (2.00 pm)
 24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Kinnier.
 25 MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir. May I call Ron Dobson.

51

1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
 2 MR RONALD DOBSON (affirmed)
 3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much indeed. Now, do
 4 sit down, make yourself comfortable.
 5 Mr Kinnier, I've come in without my notebook, but
 6 the usher is going to sort that out for me, so I suggest
 7 you just carry on.
 8 Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY
 9 MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.
 10 Would you please confirm your name for the record?
 11 A. Ronald James Dobson.
 12 Q. Mr Dobson, good afternoon. Thank you very much for
 13 coming to attend to give evidence today.
 14 Before we start, there's three bits of advice,
 15 really, I should give at the outset.
 16 My questions are intended to be short and clear;
 17 sometimes it doesn't quite work out that way. If I am
 18 unduly long or unclear or both, please say so and I'll
 19 rephrase the question.
 20 Secondly, we will have a break roughly halfway
 21 through the course of this afternoon's session. If,
 22 however, you need a break at any other time, please
 23 don't hesitate to say so.
 24 A. Thank you.
 25 Q. Finally, there is a temptation, in answer to questions

52

1 "yes" or "no", to nod alone. Could you please say "yes"
 2 or "no" as the case may be, otherwise the transcriber
 3 will not be able to pick up your answer accurately.
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. Now, am I right that you have provided three witness
 6 statements to this Inquiry?
 7 A. That's correct.
 8 Q. The first is dated 28 January 2019, which can be found
 9 at {LFB00032157}. Is that it?
 10 A. It is.
 11 Q. The second is dated 18 April 2019, and that can be found
 12 at {LFB00055138}. Is that it?
 13 A. It is.
 14 Q. Finally, the third statement was dated 30 April 2020,
 15 and can be found at {LFB00110652}. Is that your third
 16 statement?
 17 A. It is.
 18 Q. Thank you. Have you read each of those statements
 19 recently?
 20 A. I have.
 21 Q. Now, I understand that you would like to make one
 22 correction to your first statement, I think it is.
 23 A. Yes, please, yes.
 24 Q. It's paragraph 42 of your first witness statement, which
 25 is at {LFB00032157/11}. We see there the start of that

53

1 paragraph refers to action 13. It should refer to
 2 action 14; is that right?
 3 A. That's correct.
 4 Q. Thank you.
 5 Subject to that correction, can you confirm that the
 6 contents of each of your three statements are true?
 7 A. Yes, thank you.
 8 Q. Thank you.
 9 Are you happy for those statements to be taken as
 10 your evidence to this Inquiry?
 11 A. I am.
 12 Q. Each of those three statements has exhibited
 13 a significant number of documents. Have you read those
 14 documents in advance of today?
 15 A. I have.
 16 Q. And have you discussed your evidence with anyone before
 17 coming today?
 18 A. Only my legal representatives.
 19 Q. Thank you.
 20 Now, Mr Dobson, I would like to start with your
 21 roles and responsibilities at the London Fire Brigade.
 22 Now, just to give you an idea of the structure of
 23 the questions I'm going to ask you, I'm going to ask you
 24 initially some questions about the LFB and its
 25 structure, including some about the temporary bodies

54

1 that were established in the aftermath of the
 2 Lakanal House fire in July 2009. I will then ask you
 3 questions about fire safety activities within the LFB,
 4 before coming on to ask you questions about the actions
 5 taken by the LFB in response to recommendations and
 6 other actions following Lakanal.
 7 Now, before we get to all of that, can I start with
 8 questions about your career.
 9 Am I right in understanding that you joined the LFB
 10 in 1979?
 11 A. That's correct.
 12 Q. And over the next 30 years or so, you advanced through
 13 the ranks, so that you went from being an operational
 14 firefighter to being a senior officer; is that right?
 15 A. That's correct.
 16 Q. If we could go to your first witness statement, which is
 17 at {LFB00032157/2}, and if we look at paragraph 5, in
 18 the penultimate line, you explain there that in 2000 you
 19 were promoted to the position of assistant chief
 20 officer, in which role you were "responsible for LFB
 21 wide operational planning and policy".
 22 Now, is that assistant chief officer role similar to
 23 the assistant commissioner role?
 24 A. Yes, it is. The name "assistant chief officer" was
 25 changed to "assistant commissioner" following

55

1 a re-organisation in the early 2000s.
 2 Q. Now, in which directorate or department did you sit as
 3 the assistant chief officer?
 4 A. I worked for the deputy commissioner and that was in the
 5 operations department.
 6 Q. Thank you.
 7 Now, in 2003, you became the assistant commissioner
 8 for service delivery; is that right?
 9 A. That's correct.
 10 Q. And as the AC for service delivery, were you also the
 11 third officer?
 12 A. After a while I was, yes.
 13 Q. Was that position created for the first time for you or
 14 was it a historic role?
 15 A. No, it's a role that had existed historically, but it
 16 hadn't been used by the Brigade for a number of years,
 17 and it was reintroduced for me in order to provide
 18 operational cover.
 19 Q. In relation to your role as AC for service delivery, did
 20 you report to the deputy commissioner?
 21 A. I did.
 22 Q. Can you help us, in brief, what were your
 23 responsibilities as the AC for service delivery?
 24 A. I was responsible for the operational and fire safety
 25 performance of all fire stations in the London Fire

56

1 Brigade. That covers their attendance at incidents and
 2 all the community safety work they did in terms of
 3 preventing fires in people's homes. I was also
 4 responsible for the London Fire Brigade's national
 5 resilience project, which was the response to the
 6 terrorist attacks that took place in New York in 2001.
 7 I was responsible for the London Fire Brigade's
 8 performance in that area too.
 9 Q. Thank you.
 10 You were appointed the commissioner of the London
 11 Fire Brigade in October 2007; is that right?
 12 A. That's correct.
 13 Q. And you held that position until your retirement in
 14 December 2016.
 15 A. Yes, that's correct.
 16 Q. So before 2015, is it right that the officers who
 17 directly reported to you were the deputy commissioner,
 18 Rita Dexter —
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. — the director of operational resilience and training,
 21 Gary Reason —
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. — and Sue Budden, who was the director of finance and
 24 contractual services?
 25 A. Yes.

57

1 Q. We understand that there was a restructuring of the
 2 organisation in 2015; is that right?
 3 A. That's correct.
 4 Q. What was the reasoning for that restructure?
 5 A. It was a restructure to reflect the changing
 6 responsibilities of the Brigade. These things would
 7 take place from time to time, depending on how the
 8 organisation progressed, what the duties and
 9 responsibilities were, and in conjunction with the
 10 elected members of the fire authority, it was agreed
 11 that we would review the structure.
 12 Q. Thank you.
 13 As part of that restructure, am I right in
 14 understanding that the post of deputy commissioner no
 15 longer existed?
 16 A. That's correct.
 17 Q. Why was it discontinued?
 18 A. Because experience had found that the role of deputy
 19 commissioner was not really needed because, actually,
 20 most of the things that the deputy commissioner
 21 deputised for me on were carried out by the directors.
 22 So it wasn't always the deputy commissioner who directly
 23 deputised for me, we would use the directors within
 24 their areas of responsibility to deputise, and therefore
 25 the actual role of deputy commissioner was no longer

58

1 needed.
 2 Q. Now, following that restructure, you explain that some
 3 of the posts that had historically reported to
 4 Rita Dexter as deputy commissioner then reported to you;
 5 is that right?
 6 A. That's correct.
 7 Q. One of those directors who now reported to you directly
 8 was the director of operations, namely Dave Brown; is
 9 that right?
 10 A. That's correct.
 11 Q. Thank you.
 12 Now, the next topic I'd like to come on to is the
 13 oversight that you exercised as commissioner of the
 14 various bodies and committees that existed within the
 15 LFB.
 16 A. Okay.
 17 Q. Now, as a general starting question, what organisational
 18 arrangements were in place to allow the three directors
 19 to report to you, as commissioner?
 20 A. The most formal arrangement was through the corporate
 21 management board, a body that comprised the three
 22 directors and other heads of service as well, so that we
 23 could have a forum whereby we could discuss operational
 24 and managerial and strategic issues relating to London
 25 Fire Brigade. We had a process called the

59

1 commissioner's group, which was introduced after
 2 a review of the way we communicated as an organisation
 3 internally some years before. This was an informal
 4 arrangement. We met once a week, and the idea of this
 5 was to enable the directors to speak to me directly and
 6 without all the other heads of service there, where we
 7 would just discuss concerns and worries and any other
 8 issues that we might have coming along. And also I held
 9 a regular series of one-to-one meetings with the
 10 directors.
 11 Q. Thank you.
 12 Now, if we can stay with your first witness
 13 statement, and if we could go to paragraph 15 on page 5
 14 {LFB00032157/5}, and it's really to follow on what
 15 you've just said about one-to-ones.
 16 Now, in the third line down, you refer to having
 17 regular one-to-one meetings with the directors —
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. — in the context of the Lakanal House board and
 20 the Brigade's consequential action plan.
 21 Now, putting Lakanal to one side for the moment, did
 22 you have regular one-to-one meetings with your
 23 directors? It seems as if you did.
 24 A. Yes, I did.
 25 Q. How often would those one-to-ones be held?

60

1 A. They would vary, but certainly I would see — I would
 2 expect to see each of the directors on an almost daily
 3 basis, but the formal one—to—ones would take place once
 4 a month.
 5 Q. And those formal monthly one—to—ones, can you give the
 6 panel a flavour of the range of issues that would fall
 7 to be discussed?
 8 A. Yes, we would talk about — I would feed back to them on
 9 issues arising from my discussions with elected members
 10 and the Mayor upon issues relating to their
 11 directorates; we would talk about their performance
 12 plans, their actions within the plan overall, in terms
 13 of the London Safety Plan; we'd talk about staffing
 14 matters; we'd talk about any issues that were of concern
 15 to them; and we'd particularly talk about issues that
 16 were due to go to the fire authority that they were
 17 producing reports and papers on, and we'd talk about the
 18 progress and the content of those.
 19 Q. And those would be supplemented by daily informal
 20 discussions —
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. — with your directors?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. Now, you referred in an earlier answer to the
 25 commissioner's group, and other witnesses have referred

61

1 to the commissioner's group meetings. As you said, they
 2 involved you and the three directors and the
 3 third officer, Dave Brown; is that right?
 4 A. That's correct.
 5 Q. Were those meetings minuted or not?
 6 A. No, they weren't.
 7 Q. Can you help us as to why they were not minuted?
 8 A. Yeah, they were designed to be informal meetings to
 9 improve the communications between the commissioner and
 10 directors. Now, this pre-dated my appointment. It was
 11 following a review of communications between the top
 12 management team that was carried out under the previous
 13 commissioner, Sir Ken Knight, and one of the
 14 recommendations was one of the findings was that the
 15 directors and the commissioner didn't have sufficient
 16 opportunity outside of formal meetings to actually
 17 discuss issues within the authority.
 18 Q. In your experience as commissioner, did you find them
 19 useful as an efficient and effective means of allowing
 20 directors to update you and for you to communicate your
 21 views to them?
 22 A. Yes, I found them very efficient.
 23 Q. You referred in an earlier answer to the corporate
 24 management board, the CMB.
 25 A. Yeah.

62

1 Q. And you would have gathered from watching proceedings
 2 that there have been a number of discussions about what
 3 was considered by CMB.
 4 Am I right in understanding that that board was
 5 attended by a broader pool of senior officers and wasn't
 6 confined to yourself and your three directors?
 7 A. That's correct.
 8 Q. Would the membership of that board develop over time and
 9 reflect the demands of particular issues that the CMB
 10 was concerned with?
 11 A. Yes, it did. We had a range of standing advisers to the
 12 board, who would reflect the nature of their role, but
 13 we'd also invite other members of the heads of service
 14 and the group below those as well to talk to us about
 15 specific issues or specific papers that we were
 16 considering.
 17 Q. Did you find that a useful mechanism to allow those who
 18 were closest to the coalface to raise specific matters
 19 with you and the board more generally?
 20 A. I found it invaluable.
 21 Q. Now, it appears from the minutes that the CMB reviewed
 22 various reports, important documents, that would be in
 23 course submitted to the London Fire and Emergency
 24 Planning Authority, LFEPA; is that right?
 25 A. That's correct.

63

1 Q. Now, the impression from the documents — and I use
 2 those words advisedly — is that a lot of CMB's work was
 3 cyclical. Is that a fair or complete impression to
 4 take?
 5 A. Not complete, but I would say fair.
 6 Q. In the sense of incomplete, were there ad hoc matters
 7 that would fall to be considered but, on the whole, the
 8 business tended to be cyclical?
 9 A. Yeah, the CMB would consider matters that were going to
 10 go — matters that were going to be taken by elected
 11 members at their various committees at LFEPA. So there
 12 was the main LFEPA committee and there were subsidiary
 13 committees that worked for LFEPA as well, and all of
 14 those would have a programme of meetings and
 15 a requirement for papers to be updated and sent to them
 16 within their areas of responsibility.
 17 Q. Now —
 18 A. CMB would be — sorry, CMB would be programmed in order
 19 to take those in good time for those documents to be
 20 presented properly to the authority.
 21 Q. Now, was the commissioner's group the day-to-day
 22 effective means by which you exercised oversight over
 23 the activities of your three directors and their
 24 directorates?
 25 A. Not really, no. The commissioner's group was really

64

1 about sharing information between the three directors
 2 and I. We would discuss issues in relation to
 3 particular directorates on occasion, but it was really
 4 the information—sharing process between the three
 5 directors and myself so we could talk about the
 6 day—to-day ongoing activity of the Brigade.
 7 Q. So what was forum in which you exercised day—to-day
 8 management of your directors?
 9 A. Well, it was that, it was the corporate management
 10 board, and through the, you know, individual ongoing
 11 meetings I had with them on an almost daily basis.
 12 Q. Now, the LFB had an almost military—like use of
 13 acronyms, and one of the acronyms we've become familiar
 14 with is ODCB. Now, that stands for the operational
 15 directorates co—ordination board, whose membership
 16 consisted of directors and heads of service from, it
 17 seems to be, the two operations—focused departments.
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Is that right?
 20 A. It is.
 21 Q. Again, ODCB appeared to be primarily concerned with the
 22 LFB's operational performance. Again, is that a fair
 23 view to take?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Am I right in understanding that you yourself were not

65

1 a member of ODCB?
 2 A. That's correct.
 3 Q. Why were you not a member of ODCB?
 4 A. ODCB was established after a restructure around —
 5 I think it was around 2010, where we established — we
 6 had three directorates, two of which were operational
 7 and one of which was mainly administrative, directorate
 8 of finance and contractual services, and we soon
 9 recognised that there was a need for the operational
 10 directorates to co—ordinate their work much more closely
 11 than perhaps they had been doing in order to actually
 12 reduce or to co—ordinate the burden on fire stations,
 13 the training, et cetera, they needed to do. So that
 14 board was brought in to enable that function to take
 15 place. It was dealing with issues of delivery rather
 16 than policy, and therefore it was a matter that could
 17 be — I devolved to the deputy commissioner.
 18 Q. Thank you.
 19 We have considered some boards and committees. Were
 20 there any other boards and committees you were a member
 21 of internal to the LFB?
 22 A. I chaired — after the retirement of one of our
 23 officers, I chaired the contracts oversight board.
 24 I was concerned that the — I was — I had concerns
 25 about the way we were managing our ongoing external

66

1 contracts generally. There was quite a lot of them, and
 2 I was worried that we were extending too many contracts
 3 without actually re—tendering at the point when we
 4 should have done, so I took control of that personally.
 5 Q. Can you remember when you did that?
 6 A. I think that was ... I really can't remember the exact
 7 date, but I think it was around 2012.
 8 Q. Would that have been around the same time — just trying
 9 to pinpoint it — that responsibility for provision of
 10 training was outsourced to Babcock?
 11 A. It would have been, although it wouldn't have been
 12 related to that.
 13 Q. Thank you.
 14 Now, if we could go to an exhibit that you helpfully
 15 provided, which is RJD/1, which can be found at
 16 {LFB00032151}. Now, we find here a role profile or job
 17 description, I think, for the role of the London Fire
 18 Commissioner. Under the structural organogram, we see
 19 a second box there entitled "Main purpose of the job".
 20 That is described in the following way:
 21 "To provide strong effective corporate leadership
 22 and strategic direction for the London Fire Brigade to
 23 ensure the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority
 24 achieves its vision, aims and objectives."
 25 There is an element of management speak about these

67

1 definitions. It's an inescapable reality, I think. But
 2 in straightforward, plain English, what was the essence
 3 of your job as commissioner?
 4 A. I was responsible for all aspects of the performance of
 5 London Fire Brigade, and I was responsible to the London
 6 Fire and Emergency Planning Committee and the Mayor for
 7 the performance of those duties.
 8 I was also responsible as the main adviser to London
 9 Fire and Emergency Planning Authority in terms of the
 10 fulfilment of its statutory functions, and also
 11 responsible as a chief adviser to the Mayor in terms of
 12 fire and rescue service in London.
 13 Q. Are you able to give the panel an idea of how involved
 14 you were on a day—to-day practical basis with the
 15 operations and activities of your directorates?
 16 A. I would say very involved. I had a keen interest in the
 17 work of each of the directorates. I was very keen that
 18 the work of the directorates was co—ordinated properly.
 19 We had some very onerous responsibilities, and a very
 20 high workload as well throughout most of the time that
 21 I was the commissioner, and I was really keen to
 22 understand what was going on, to understand the pressure
 23 on the directorates, in order to be able to provide them
 24 with whatever support, help, assistance and resources
 25 that I could.

68

1 Q. Putting the question slightly differently : how did you
 2 ensure that your directorates were working in accordance
 3 with and towards the aims that you had set for them?
 4 A. That was carried out through the one-to-one meetings
 5 with the directors , informally through the
 6 commissioner's group as well, we would have informal
 7 discussions where there were points of conflict or
 8 points of disagreement or points of — or any problems,
 9 and also through the corporate management board, where
 10 I would study each of the papers and things that were
 11 coming to the corporate management board and exercise my
 12 overview in terms of making sure that they were in line
 13 with the authority's corporate objectives and with
 14 the Mayor's strategies as well.
 15 Q. Thank you.
 16 Now, Mr Dobson, I want to move on to a slightly
 17 separate but linked topic, and that's the responsibility
 18 and role of LFEPA.
 19 Now, we have on the screen your job description, and
 20 we see, immediately below the box which says "Main
 21 purpose of the job", the heading "Core
 22 responsibilities ", and under the subheading of
 23 "Leadership", we see a number of bullet points.
 24 Now, the second bullet point says this:
 25 "To provide strategic leadership of LFEPA, its

69

1 resources, plans and activities to ensure the highest
 2 standards of governance."
 3 Now, in broad terms, am I right in understanding
 4 that LFEPA was charged with the political oversight of
 5 the London Fire Brigade?
 6 A. Yes, LFEPA was the fire authority for London as
 7 described within the Greater London Authority Act.
 8 Q. LFEPA discharged that function through various
 9 procedural mechanisms, primarily various boards and
 10 committees such as the strategy committee; is that
 11 right?
 12 A. It is , but just to add some detail to that —
 13 Q. Please do.
 14 A. — which might help the panel, is that the committee was
 15 made up of a number — the authority was made up of
 16 a number of elected members. Some of those, about just
 17 over half , came from the Greater London Authority, and
 18 just over half of those came from the London boroughs,
 19 nominated through London Councils. There was also two
 20 independent mayoral appointees who were not politicians,
 21 necessarily , but appointed to the authority because of
 22 their expertise or perceived expertise in fire and
 23 rescue-related matters.
 24 The Mayor chose and appointed the chair of the
 25 authority each year, and that would actually —

70

1 exclusively , actually , be a member — someone from the
 2 members of the assembly that were on the authority.
 3 Q. Thank you.
 4 Although you were not a member of the authority, am
 5 I right in understanding that, as commissioner, you were
 6 required or expected to attend LFEPA meetings?
 7 A. Absolutely.
 8 Q. We see there in the second bullet point that you were
 9 required to provide "strategic leadership of LFEPA".
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. Again, in plain English, non-management speak terms,
 12 what did that involve?
 13 A. The members of LFEPA were non-fire and rescue service —
 14 didn't have fire and rescue service experience, apart
 15 from in some cases the Mayoral appointees. So my job
 16 was to translate into layperson's language, on many
 17 occasions, the roles and responsibilities of the fire
 18 and rescue service as described by the fire and rescue
 19 service framework and by the Fire and Rescue Services
 20 Act, and also to make sure that the authority achieved
 21 best practice in all of its policies , not only in
 22 relation to fire and rescue service, but also in
 23 relation to things like human resources, management and
 24 management of staff.
 25 Q. Is it right, therefore, that the authority relied upon

71

1 you for expert guidance on matters pertaining to the
 2 exercise of fire and rescue functions and duties?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. Staying with this element of the job description and
 5 looking at the third bullet point on that page, it says
 6 this:
 7 "To ensure that Authority policy is converted into
 8 strategy and actions through effective relations with
 9 Authority Members and to be accountable to the Authority
 10 for its overall performance."
 11 In a nutshell, that appears to be saying that you
 12 were the point man as between the LFB and LFEPA. It's
 13 a crude way of putting it, but does it capture the
 14 essence?
 15 A. I think it does, yes.
 16 Q. Thank you.
 17 Having dealt with roles, responsibilities ,
 18 et cetera, what I'd now like to turn to is an overview
 19 of the Lakanal House fire and the actions that were
 20 taken in its aftermath.
 21 Now, the starting point for this is your first
 22 witness statement, and if we could go to
 23 {LFB00032157/4}, and if we look at paragraph 11, we see
 24 there, in the third line , that you describe the Lakanal
 25 fire as "a very significant incident" for the Brigade.

72

1 Now, could I go through the apparent reasons why it
 2 was a very significant incident for the Brigade, so that
 3 I can see whether you agree or disagree or something in
 4 between with the various factors I outline for you.
 5 A. Okay.
 6 Q. First of all, the fire involved the rapid and widespread
 7 failure of compartmentation.
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Secondly, there was extensive fire and smoke spread.
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. And, in particular, there was rapid external fire spread
 12 in multiple directions.
 13 A. No.
 14 Q. Why do you disagree with that?
 15 A. Because the fire spread in relation to Lakanal House was
 16 not extraordinary, except that the fire spread downwards
 17 due to flaming droplets from the panels above, windows
 18 above, going into flats below. But in terms of — if
 19 that fire spread downwards hadn't taken place, then the
 20 fire spread, I don't believe, would have been
 21 extraordinary, but would be something we would expect to
 22 find in buildings.
 23 Q. I think we can go to it if needs be, but in your
 24 evidence to the inquest you said that {CWJ0000010/33}:
 25 "I think the rate at which it spread upwards at this

73

1 fire was a factor in the handling of the incident
 2 subsequently."
 3 And then you later said {CWJ0000010/27}:
 4 " ... on no occasion before has about been [sic]
 5 experience of this phenomenon where fires start below
 6 the fire floor."
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. And that was really the reason why I suggested to you
 9 one of the reasons why the Brigade thought this was
 10 a very significant incident was because of that
 11 phenomenon of external fire spread.
 12 A. Well, the external fire spread — apart from the
 13 downward spread, which obviously affected operations
 14 quite significantly, that was the most significant part
 15 of the fire spread as far as I was concerned. The
 16 external fire spread was not usual because we'd seen
 17 that in other instances in high-rise buildings and also
 18 in low-rise buildings, where the fire comes out of the
 19 window on one floor and transfers to the window above.
 20 So that was not unusual. There were factors affecting
 21 that that obviously were the subject of letters to the
 22 government subsequently.
 23 MR KINNIER: Don't worry, we will come on to those, but —
 24 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Sorry to interrupt you, Mr Kinnier.
 25 Mr Dobson, as you know, all your evidence is being

74

1 taken down, and I think it would probably make life
 2 a little easier for the transcriber if you could
 3 possibly slow down a little.
 4 A. Apologies.
 5 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: I know it's very difficult, but if
 6 you can. Thank you.
 7 A. Apologies, sir.
 8 MR KINNIER: Mr Dobson, one of the features of the Lakanal
 9 fire — I don't think you disagree with this, bearing in
 10 mind what you've just said — was that the rapid
 11 external fire spread was facilitated by, amongst other
 12 factors, external wall panels that weren't compliant or
 13 not wholly compliant with Building Regulations. Would
 14 you agree with that?
 15 A. Well, they were window panels, not wall panels. So they
 16 were actually panels in the lower portions of the
 17 windows, rather than panels on the wall.
 18 Q. Panels that weren't compliant with the Building
 19 Regulations?
 20 A. Indeed. Indeed.
 21 Q. The number of FSG calls received was comparatively high,
 22 particularly compared to the Brigade's historic
 23 experience; is that right?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. There were poor communications between the control room

75

1 and the incident ground.
 2 A. That came about subsequently. So it certainly was
 3 a factor that made me see Lakanal House as a significant
 4 fire, but I wasn't sure that was completely apparent to
 5 me at the point where I made the decision to implement
 6 the board.
 7 Q. Crews and incident commanders had limited knowledge
 8 about the layout of the building and there was a degree
 9 of confusion about the location of the flats, I think.
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. Seventhly, many firefighters reported issues with the
 12 radio communications on the night.
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. Thank you.
 15 Now, we'll explore some of those factors in due
 16 course as we go through it, but I wanted to see what you
 17 identified as being the reasons for the significance of
 18 Lakanal.
 19 Now, can I turn to the mechanisms which the LFB
 20 established in order to investigate Lakanal, to learn
 21 lessons and make consequential recommendations.
 22 Now, the first one of those I'd like to look at is
 23 the Lakanal House board.
 24 A. Okay.
 25 Q. Now, in the immediate aftermath of the fire, is it right

76

1 that the LFB, alongside the Metropolitan Police, were
 2 investigating the cause of the fire?
 3 A. Mr Kinnier, would it be — could you return to the
 4 previous question, because there's one element that made
 5 the Lakanal House fire particularly significant for me,
 6 and that was the nature of the six people that died, and
 7 actually the nature of the way those deaths occurred at
 8 the fire, that was something which was, I would say,
 9 outside of my experience and outside many people's
 10 experience, and it made it a very significant fire for
 11 that reason. I apologise for that.
 12 Q. No, it's helpful to have that, and thank you.
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. Going back to the Lakanal House board —
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. — am I right in understanding that both the LFB and the
 17 Metropolitan Police were investigating the cause of that
 18 fire?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. Now, if we can stay on the page we're looking at on the
 21 screen, conveniently, and look at paragraph 11 of your
 22 first witness statement {LFB00032157/4}, you explain
 23 there, in broad terms, that in October 2009, so roughly
 24 three months after the fire, you set up the
 25 Lakanal House board, and in the second line of that

77

1 paragraph, you go on to say this:
 2 "I recognised that the Lakanal House fire was a very
 3 significant incident and that it would need a clear
 4 point of focus due to the range and scope of the actions
 5 likely to be required of the LFB. I also wanted to make
 6 a clear statement, both to the public and to the LFB,
 7 about how important this matter was and that we would be
 8 devoting considerable attention, time and resources to
 9 it. This was because I considered it to be essential
 10 for the London Fire Brigade to identify and address any
 11 learning points that might arise from the debriefs and
 12 investigations into the Lakanal House fire and also from
 13 the inquests touching the deaths of the six people who
 14 died in the fire."
 15 Now, in the next paragraph, you go on to say this:
 16 "On 1 October 2009 the Board met for the first time.
 17 At this meeting the 'Terms of Reference' were first
 18 considered. On 5 November 2009, at the second meeting
 19 of the Board the Terms of Reference were agreed ... As
 20 can be seen from the Terms of Reference, the Board would
 21 oversee all aspects of the Lakanal investigation and
 22 related issues. This was in order to better understand
 23 the LFB's response to the Lakanal House fire on 3 July
 24 2009, as well as the associated issues that emerged
 25 subsequent to the fire and to ensure that appropriate

78

1 action was taken in a timely manner to deal with those
 2 issues."
 3 Now, it appears to be plain from that, at least,
 4 that the intention was that the board would identify the
 5 lessons to be learned, and then consequential amendments
 6 that were identified as being necessary would be made to
 7 the LFB's policies and procedures; in broad terms, was
 8 that the intention?
 9 A. That was one of the intentions.
 10 Q. And —
 11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, that's a slightly tantalising
 12 answer, if I may say. You follow it up.
 13 MR KINNIER: Can you help us with what the other intentions
 14 were that aren't immediately apparent from the —
 15 A. Well, the other intentions were — it had become clear
 16 to me, in the period between when the fire occurred and
 17 1 October, that there were increasingly a significant
 18 number of interested parties in this fire and this
 19 investigation. As you mentioned, Mr Kinnier, the police
 20 were carrying out an investigation. There were
 21 questions about whether or not the HSE were going to
 22 carry out their own investigation. There was
 23 significant media interest in the fire itself and what
 24 the — how London Fire Brigade had dealt with it.
 25 I could see that there was going to be a coroner's

79

1 inquest at some point in the future. So there were
 2 many, many strands to this fire that made me believe it
 3 needed a separate board of its own, at least for a time,
 4 in order to actually consider all those things and make
 5 sure they were dealt with appropriately and in
 6 a co-ordinated way, because otherwise they would have
 7 been dealt with piecemeal by the various departments who
 8 were responsible for various aspects of it, and I wanted
 9 to deal with it all in one place so we were well
 10 co-ordinated as a Brigade.
 11 Q. And the lessons that would be identified would be
 12 lessons that the LFB itself had identified and that
 13 would be addressed via various recommendations; is that
 14 right?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Now, we've heard from other witnesses about a range of
 17 other procedures which the LFB has: DIOT, the dynamic
 18 and intelligent operational training process, and the
 19 SAI, the serious accident investigation process.
 20 Really this goes back to the answer you have just
 21 given: why did you not use either or both of those
 22 processes, but rather set up a bespoke process under the
 23 aegis of the Lakanal House board?
 24 A. Well, we did use those processes, it was just that they
 25 were not the only processes that were needed to be used

80

1 as part of the investigation and the subsequent issues
 2 arising at the Lakanal board, and the Lakanal board was
 3 a place whereby we pulled all those things together into
 4 one place so the Brigade could then respond in
 5 a co-ordinated way.
 6 So the SAI process was most certainly used in order
 7 to investigate the accidents, we used that process
 8 extensively, and the DIOT process was very important in
 9 terms of identifying operational matters that needed to
 10 be addressed, but there was many others as well, and
 11 I was very keen to get those all in one place so they
 12 could be corralled properly and dealt with in
 13 a co-ordinated way.
 14 Q. How did you ensure that the results of the SAI
 15 investigation were fed into the Lakanal House board's
 16 deliberations?
 17 A. That was part of the agendas with — there was various
 18 items on the agenda. I had an officer, which we may
 19 talk about in a moment, who was actually effectively my
 20 chief of staff in relation to the Lakanal investigation
 21 and all aspects of it, Mr Tim Cutbill, and we were — we
 22 received the results of the SAI as the SAI was
 23 progressing at the board at its various stages.
 24 Q. Thank you.
 25 Does the same answer apply to how the deliberations

81

1 of the DIOT process fed into the board's deliberations?
 2 A. Yes, it did.
 3 Q. Now, the Lakanal House board identified 34 action points
 4 for the organisation's improvement or development, and
 5 those actions later came to be known as the Lakanal
 6 pre-actions because they were identified before the
 7 inquest.
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Is that right?
 10 A. That's correct.
 11 Q. Now, the first record that we have of the 34 pre-actions
 12 is in the minutes of the Lakanal House board meeting on
 13 15 September 2010, and we can find those minutes at
 14 {LFB00084031}. Just briefly, we can see that you are
 15 a member of the board and you attended this meeting.
 16 Could we go to page 7 {LFB00084031/7}, and here we
 17 have appendix 1, headed "Action plan". We've gone to
 18 this document with a number of witnesses now, but
 19 essentially this is a table which identifies the 34
 20 pre-actions; that's right?
 21 A. That's correct.
 22 Q. It also provides the assigned officer who was
 23 responsible for implementing the consequential action.
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Now, if we could turn back to the first page of these

82

1 minutes {LFB00084031/1}, it appears that reports were
 2 presented by three departments, namely control,
 3 operations and fire safety; is that right?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. If we could look at paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2, for example,
 6 on this page, we see that "SH/JS" — so that's
 7 Scott Hayward and Joanne Stibbards, as was, we now know
 8 as Jo Smith — "presented an overview of the draft
 9 Control report/analysis and post actions", and we see
 10 further detail provided in paragraph 5.2.
 11 We then see below that paragraph an emboldened
 12 heading which reads "Post actions", and that details
 13 some of the work that had been done by the control room,
 14 I think I'm right in saying.
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Then if we turn over the page to page 2 {LFB00084031/2},
 17 and in particular paragraph 5.9, we see a quintet of
 18 proposed actions set out there, all of which came to be
 19 subsumed in the 34 pre-actions; is that right?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. I've only glossed over this, but the three reports
 22 submitted by the individual departments, did they
 23 provide the foundation of the 34 pre-actions?
 24 A. They certainly provided the foundation, yes.
 25 Q. Thank you.

83

1 Could we stay with control room for the moment, and
 2 if we look at paragraph 5.10. "RD", that's you.
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. Various comments are recorded here, most notably you say
 5 this:
 6 "[You] commented that there are potentially 2/3
 7 areas to consider in relation to Control:
 8 "1. The information transfer from control to
 9 fire ground.
 10 "2. The question of where LFB stand in relation to
 11 training/guidance compared to national guidance. It is
 12 evident that national guidance is in need of
 13 improvement.
 14 "3. To ensure that refresher training is maintained
 15 for fire survival calls and recorded on STEP."
 16 Now, did you decide which of the proposed actions
 17 would constitute the LFB's pre-actions?
 18 A. This was issues that arose from the paper and the
 19 presentation we received from Scott Hayward and
 20 Joanne Stibbards, and what is listed here is basically
 21 my sort of summary of the issues in there. But I was —
 22 I signed off that these were actions that needed to be
 23 added to the plan, yes.
 24 Q. I suppose, put differently, was this a directional
 25 summary, Mr Dobson, in the sense that you were saying,

84

1 "These are the matters that you shall consider"? Were
 2 you giving them some form of intellectual steer and
 3 guidance as to what you were expecting to see covered in
 4 the pre-actions?
 5 A. Yes, I was trying to be very clear in terms of the
 6 actions I expected to be progressed as a result of the
 7 report that we'd received.
 8 Q. Thank you.
 9 Apologies for jumping around the documents, could we
 10 go back to your first witness statement,
 11 {LFB00032157/5}, and it's paragraph 15. Thank you.
 12 What you say there is this:
 13 "As can be seen from the various iterations of the
 14 action plan, individuals were appointed to the role of
 15 Lead Officer for each action. I did not have personal
 16 responsibility for the individual actions in the action
 17 plan but I had oversight through the Lakanal House Board
 18 meetings, my regular one to one meetings with the
 19 Directors and frequent meetings with DAC Tim Cutbill."
 20 Now, you touched upon this in an earlier answer.
 21 Can you help us as to the gist of the role that
 22 DAC Cutbill performed in relation to the Lakanal House
 23 board?
 24 A. As I said earlier, I think probably the easiest way to
 25 describe it, he was almost my chief of staff in relation

85

1 to Lakanal. So he was seconded to the Lakanal board,
 2 effectively, for a period of I think it was two/two and
 3 a half years during the height of the investigations and
 4 the main work London Fire Brigade was doing. His role
 5 was to ensure that the issues contained in the action
 6 plan were being dealt with by heads of service, he would
 7 have informal relations with them about that, and to
 8 keep me updated informally. His role was also to act as
 9 the main point of contact with external bodies, such as
 10 the Metropolitan Police Service, the HSE, and to some
 11 extent the government as well, in relation to the
 12 ongoing investigations to make sure that LFB was
 13 presenting an appropriate, comprehensive and
 14 co-ordinated front.
 15 Q. Now, the impression from the documents -- and I should
 16 be more specific, the minutes of the board meetings --
 17 A. Yeah.
 18 Q. -- is that it was a forum in which progress could be
 19 reported, rather than being a decision-making forum. Is
 20 that a fair distinction to make?
 21 A. I would describe the board as an opportunity to discuss
 22 the issues that were arising from the investigation in
 23 all of its various forms, to seek agreement in terms of
 24 the actions that needed to be taken by the various
 25 departments of the Brigade, to allocate those

86

1 responsibilities to individual officers that had the
 2 functional responsibilities for those areas, and a place
 3 where progress against those actions would be monitored.
 4 Q. So I think you agree, in broad terms, with the
 5 proposition I put to you, then.
 6 A. I do, I just think it's slightly broader than as
 7 explained.
 8 Q. Thank you.
 9 To what extent did you contribute to the
 10 directorates' efforts to implement the pre-actions that
 11 had been set for them?
 12 A. Well, my role was to chair the board, to agree the
 13 actions, and people were aware that their actions were
 14 going -- they were going to be held accountable for
 15 their actions at the board, which I chaired. I think
 16 during the period of time the board was in existence,
 17 I chaired all but two meetings of the board, so I saw it
 18 as that important that I dedicated a significant amount
 19 of my time to that, and I also dealt with the --
 20 you know, supported, through my work with the directors
 21 through one-to-one meetings and through the
 22 commissioner's group. If there were issues of resource
 23 that were causing a problem in delivery of some of these
 24 actions, then I would seek to help the directorate with
 25 those, or if there were other matters that were beyond

87

1 their control that I could help with, I was trying to do
 2 that.
 3 Q. Looking at the discussions that took place in your
 4 one-to-ones, would they be the forum in which it was
 5 determined that a particular pre-action had been
 6 completed or would that be decided elsewhere?
 7 A. No, that would be decided at the board.
 8 Q. Now, I think I'm right in saying that the board sat
 9 until September 2013, so it was sitting throughout the
 10 course of the inquest; is that right?
 11 A. That's correct.
 12 Q. Was the board finally stood down in September 2013
 13 because a view had been taken that the pre-actions had
 14 been completed?
 15 A. No. The board was stood down in September 2013 for
 16 a number of reasons. One was that the -- it had been
 17 agreed -- I had decided and agreed it with the
 18 fire authority that the responsibility for the oversight
 19 of the remaining actions -- and there were remaining
 20 actions -- would be taken over by the ODCB, and the
 21 reason I decided that was that whilst I feel that my
 22 leadership and involvement in the board on a day-to-day
 23 basis for that first period was entirely appropriate,
 24 there was a time at which the board -- the work of the
 25 board needed to become much more day-to-day work of the

88

1 directorates, including their normal business plans,
 2 rather than something which was specific.
 3 Q. So ODCB took up the remaining balance of the work; is
 4 that right?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. And that's a body on which you didn't sit?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. But you would have seen the minutes?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. So was the mechanism by which you ensured that the
 11 remaining actions were completed your review of the
 12 minutes, coupled with your discussions with —
 13 A. And with —
 14 Q. With the one—to—ones and all the rest of it.
 15 A. With the directors, and also by discussions with
 16 Tim Cutbill.
 17 Q. Did Tim Cutbill's role remain unchanged throughout the
 18 course of this, so until the last action was completed?
 19 A. No, Tim Cutbill was dedicated to working on
 20 Lakanal House for the first couple of years, I think it
 21 was, and sometime around 2011/2012 he took up a normal
 22 management role as well, but maintained an oversight of
 23 the Lakanal House work.
 24 Q. Did Mr Cutbill stay within the LFB until you retired
 25 or —

89

1 A. He did.
 2 Q. Did anyone succeed him in his Lakanal role?
 3 A. No.
 4 Q. Thank you.
 5 Can we now turn to the Rule 43 recommendations and
 6 the LFEPA working group.
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. Now, following the Lakanal House inquest, the coroner
 9 sent the LFB a Rule 43 letter, which set out a number of
 10 recommendations for the prevention of future deaths that
 11 she considered were necessary and desirable.
 12 Now, we can see that letter, which you have
 13 helpfully exhibited to your statement, and we can find
 14 it at {LFB00032158}.
 15 Now, we can see it's dated 28 March 2013. We can
 16 also see that the first page sets out the purpose of the
 17 letter, and the final paragraph on this first page reads
 18 as follows:
 19 "Before I set out my recommendations, I acknowledge
 20 that London Fire Brigade have already undertaken
 21 extensive work to learn from their experience with the
 22 fire at Lakanal House, have introduced new policies and
 23 have reviewed existing policies in respect of a number
 24 of matters of significance, including ..."
 25 If we go over the page {LFB00032158/2}, she sets out

90

1 on page 2 a list of the bullet points, which include,
 2 amongst other matters we can see, 7(2)(d) visits,
 3 awareness of fire spread, communication between control
 4 and the incident ground, and the handling of FSG calls.
 5 Now, can you help us, what submissions or what other
 6 material was put before the coroner at the inquest to
 7 allow her to identify the work that the LFB had already
 8 carried out in relation to these subject areas?
 9 A. I can't recall exactly which documents were provided to
 10 the coroner. Certainly in relation to statements by
 11 myself, I referred to the work that London Fire Brigade
 12 had done, and it's my recollection, although I can't be
 13 absolutely sure, that the coroner was made aware of the
 14 minutes, et cetera, of the Lakanal board and the action
 15 plan that we had in place there.
 16 Q. Were those minutes simply provided to her or were they
 17 exhibited to a statement from a witness who spoke to
 18 their contents?
 19 A. I honestly can't remember.
 20 Q. Now, if we can go back to page 2 of the coroner's letter
 21 {LFB00032158/2}, she went on to identify five
 22 recommendations, which we can see identified in
 23 italicised subheadings.
 24 A. Yeah.
 25 Q. First of all, "Public awareness of fire safety";

91

1 secondly, "Visits made pursuant to section 7(2)(d) Fire
 2 and Rescue Services Act 2004, general familiarisation
 3 visits and home fire safety visits"; thirdly, "Incident
 4 Commanders"; if we turn over to page 3 {LFB00032158/3},
 5 we see "Brigade Control"; fifthly, "Communications";
 6 before concluding with a subheading entitled "Response",
 7 which set out the timeframe in which the coroner was
 8 inviting the LFB to respond.
 9 Now, Mr Dobson, we'll go through the detail of these
 10 recommendations in due course, but at this stage I'd
 11 like to ask you this: is it right that you nominated
 12 Gary Reason to lead the LFB's work on implementing these
 13 recommendations?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. Can you help us, why did you think that Mr Reason was
 16 the man for the job?
 17 A. Well, a number of reasons. Most importantly, many of
 18 these, or most of these, fell within his area of
 19 responsibility, as I recall, so I think that's
 20 appropriate. And, secondly, Gary Reason was an officer
 21 that I knew was willing and able to undertake
 22 a significant level of detail in terms of his monitoring
 23 of the work of his reports and the monitoring of the
 24 work that he was responsible for.
 25 Q. Just picking up on that answer, our understanding was

92

1 that Mr Reason, his directorate, were only directly
 2 concerned with matters relating to incident command and
 3 communications, whereas the balance fell within the
 4 remit of Rita Dexter, that's to say public awareness of
 5 fire safety, 7(2)(d) visits and control. Are we wrong
 6 in that understanding?
 7 A. No, you're correct, but Gary Reason was responsible
 8 for — mainly for the oversight and producing the
 9 reports of progress. He wasn't actually responsible for
 10 those areas of work that actually sat within
 11 Rita Dexter's directorate. So things like the public
 12 communication messaging, that was very — sat very
 13 firmly with Rita and she was responsible for that.
 14 Q. Can we go back to your first witness statement,
 15 {LFB00032157/6}. If we could look at paragraph 22 at
 16 the bottom of that page, you say this:
 17 "On 20 June 2013 at a meeting of the LFEPA
 18 I presented a report 'Coroner's Inquests following the
 19 fire at Lakanal House on 3 July 2009 (FEP2072)' ..."
 20 You helpfully exhibit that report and the meeting
 21 minutes before going on to say this in the fourth line
 22 of that paragraph:
 23 "As set out within the report, it was proposed that
 24 implementation of the proposed actions in response to
 25 the rule 43 recommendations, was to be monitored by the

93

1 ODCB."
 2 You've probably highlighted the answer to this
 3 question: why had you identified ODCB as being the
 4 responsible monitoring body here?
 5 A. Because it was the body that was — had the membership
 6 of all the main people that needed to be responsible for
 7 dealing with and progressing the actions described by
 8 the coroner.
 9 Q. I was anticipating that you may say that you were
 10 anticipating ODCB taking up the slack from the
 11 Lakanal House board in due course. Was that something
 12 that became a reason later on?
 13 A. Well, that is true, and it was part of the reasoning,
 14 but mainly it was because the Lakanal — the ODCB had
 15 all the officers on there that were responsible for the
 16 areas where the actions recommended by the coroner were
 17 made.
 18 Q. Am I again right in assuming that your previous answer
 19 applies to this question: that you monitored ODCB's
 20 progress by a review of their minutes and discussions
 21 with the relevant directors and personnel?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. Could we go back to your witness statement but turn over
 24 the page to page 7 {LFB00032157/7} and look at
 25 paragraph 23. That says this:

94

1 "As can be seen from the minutes of the meeting, in
 2 addition, it was agreed that a task group would be
 3 established, consisting of three Elected Members of
 4 LFEPA, drawn one from each political group, to undertake
 5 a review of the LFB's response to the fire at Lakanal
 6 House and to provide their recommendations into the
 7 Strategy Committee."
 8 Now, take it from me that the task group is not
 9 mentioned in your report. Was it instigated by LFEPA
 10 members?
 11 A. It was.
 12 Q. Now, as you explain in paragraph 24, which we can see on
 13 the screen, the task group became known as the
 14 Lakanal House working group, and that working group
 15 consisted only of LFEPA members, although you and other
 16 senior officers from the LFB attended meetings; is that
 17 right?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Now, Rita Dexter explained in her evidence that one of
 20 the LFEPA members, Valerie Shawcross, was particularly
 21 interested in the Brigade's response because her seat
 22 caught Southwark; is that right?
 23 A. I believe her seat had caught Southwark at some time.
 24 I'm not sure it actually did at the time of the Lakanal
 25 fire.

95

1 Q. Was that one of the prompts why the working group was
 2 set up?
 3 A. Yes, it was.
 4 Q. Presumably also why Valerie Shawcross assumed the chair
 5 of the working group; is that right?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. Ms Dexter also told the panel that the working group was
 8 to provide political oversight, scrutiny and
 9 accountability of the LFB and their responses to the
 10 coroner's Rule 43 recommendations. Do you agree?
 11 A. I do agree, except that I think their work was wider
 12 than that, and if you were to examine the terms of
 13 reference for the group and also the work programme they
 14 set themselves as well as set out in their first
 15 meeting, I think it demonstrates the work of this
 16 working group was wider than just monitoring the
 17 progress of the LFB in terms of the coroner's action
 18 points.
 19 Q. Really flowing on from that answer, the working group
 20 appears to have intended to scrutinise what are
 21 described as longer term themes; is that right?
 22 A. It is, yes.
 23 Q. Can you give us a flavour of what those longer term
 24 themes were?
 25 A. Well, the working group were very keen to meet with

96

1 a range of different parties, obviously, and I think
 2 that — I hope the Inquiry has seen the list of
 3 attendees that they invited to their meeting subsequent
 4 to them being established. The things that they were
 5 particularly interested in were things like the
 6 communication that took place between the fire and
 7 rescue service and residents of high-rise buildings in
 8 terms of their escape routes and how to stay safe. They
 9 were particularly interested in the responsibilities of
 10 local authority elected members in relation to housing,
 11 particularly in relation to when high-rise buildings
 12 were being refurbished or repaired, and the
 13 responsibilities they held there. They were also very
 14 interested in the work to support victims of fires and
 15 other emergencies and where London Fire Brigade could
 16 play a role in that and what arrangements already
 17 existed within local authorities. And they were also
 18 very interested in the responses and the role of
 19 government in terms of the findings from Lakanal House
 20 investigation that we'd identified that were the
 21 responsibility of government.
 22 Q. They had a lot on their plate.
 23 A. They did.
 24 Q. What was left over for the LFEPA scrutiny committee?
 25 A. Well, they reported to the scrutiny committee, so the

97

1 reason — because there was a lot of work on their
 2 plate, as you put it, that's why it was decided it
 3 wasn't appropriate for the scrutiny committee to carry
 4 that work out directly and they appointed the working
 5 group, members that had an interest — a real interest
 6 in the outcome of the fire and said they were willing to
 7 commit the time to actually take on this workload.
 8 Q. We know from the minutes of the Lakanal House working
 9 group that it met on six occasions between July 2013 and
 10 March 2014. The LFEPA's strategy committee was updated
 11 on the LFB's progress in relation to Rule 43 on only two
 12 occasions: first, in November 2013, when work on the
 13 actions was continuing —
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. — and, secondly, when the Lakanal House working group
 16 was finally wound up in July 2014. That's what we have
 17 discerned from the minutes. Does that accord with your
 18 recollection?
 19 A. It does.
 20 Q. Thank you.
 21 Can we turn to the minutes of an ODCB meeting from,
 22 I think, 4 July 2013.
 23 A. Before we do that, Mr Kinnier, would it just be
 24 appropriate for me to make a comment? I know
 25 the Inquiry has previously been told by other witnesses

98

1 that the Lakanal House working group was an unusual
 2 thing for members to do. That's not an observation with
 3 which I would concur.
 4 Q. Was that an observation made by Ms Dexter?
 5 A. I think it was also Mr Reason agreed with it, actually,
 6 so — but it's certainly something not which I would
 7 concur, because I can think of other examples of where
 8 members put together working groups of this nature to
 9 assist officers in developing particular areas of
 10 strategy in other areas, so the budget would certainly
 11 be one, the London Safety Plan would be one, and others.
 12 Q. That's useful, thank you very much.
 13 Can we turn to these ODCB minutes of the meeting on
 14 4 July 2013, which can be found at {LFB00032729/3}. We
 15 see there the substantive text there deals with item 6,
 16 which is the coroner's Rule 43 letter's action plan, and
 17 if we could look at the second paragraph, it says,
 18 "DoORT", which is the acronym for director of
 19 operations, resilience and training, Gary Reason; is
 20 that correct?
 21 A. That's correct.
 22 Q. The minutes record as follows:
 23 "DoORT advised that the HSE would be interested in
 24 outcomes and that the Commissioner had met with
 25 Val Shawcross to discuss the Members Group agreed at the

99

1 last Authority meeting to consider the Lakanal fire and
 2 lessons to be learned. Terms of Reference for this
 3 group are being discussed and it is likely that
 4 Cllr Maurice Heaster and Cllr Peter Truesdale will be
 5 members of the group. It is anticipated that regular
 6 progress reports will be submitted to the Strategy
 7 Committee."
 8 Were regular progress reports submitted to the
 9 committee?
 10 A. The regular reports were the two reports you identified
 11 earlier.
 12 Q. And that's it?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. You say in your witness statement — and we don't need
 15 to go to it, but the reference is {LFB00032157/7},
 16 paragraph 24 — "I had overall oversight of the
 17 implementation of the Coroner's recommendations".
 18 Now, other than attending meetings where updates
 19 were given to LFEPA members, reviewing the minutes of
 20 ODCB, how else did you monitor progress of
 21 implementation of the work required to meet the Rule 43
 22 recommendations?
 23 A. Certainly via my one-to-one meetings with the directors,
 24 we would occasionally discuss it at the commissioner's
 25 group, and I would have additional ad hoc meetings with

100

1 the directors in relation to the parts of the coroner's
 2 recommendation action plan that they were responsible
 3 for .
 4 Q. Did you feel that you had the requisite detail provided
 5 to you from these various sources to have an informed,
 6 effective understanding of the state of progress?
 7 A. Yes, I did.
 8 Q. Did you feel that the sources of information that you
 9 used were giving you full , complete and accurate
 10 information about progress?
 11 A. I did.
 12 Q. And you never had cause to doubt that?
 13 A. I can't recall any times when I had cause to doubt that,
 14 no, although maybe there were times when I questioned it
 15 more — the reports more than others, I would say, would
 16 be the way I'd describe it .
 17 Q. We may come on to it, and you've given a general answer.
 18 Could I pin you down to something more particular: are
 19 there any subject areas or reports in relation to which
 20 you felt the need to question more closely than in
 21 relation to others, and if so, what were they?
 22 (Pause)
 23 A. There certainly were, but I can't actually recall
 24 exactly which ones they were at the moment.
 25 Q. So nothing stood out for you as being, to be blunt,

101

1 particularly —
 2 A. Well, I think probably at certain times the issues
 3 relating to control stood out to me, but other than
 4 that, I can't think of things that were particularly of
 5 concern to me from the reports that I was receiving.
 6 Q. Thank you.
 7 Can we turn on to a separate topic now, and that's
 8 the LFB's knowledge of poor compartmentation in
 9 buildings in London, external fire spread and their
 10 consideration after the Lakanal fire in light of what
 11 had been learnt at Lakanal.
 12 Now, it's probably useful to start that examination
 13 by looking at the Lakanal House fire from the
 14 perspective of fire safety. If we could start that by
 15 examining the previous fires of which you were
 16 personally aware that involved, if I can call it
 17 generically , cladding and fire spread, external fire
 18 spread.
 19 First of all , were you aware of the Knowsley Heights
 20 fire in Liverpool in April 1991?
 21 A. I was.
 22 Q. Were you also aware of the Garnock Court fire in Irvine
 23 in Ayrshire on 11 June 1999?
 24 A. No.
 25 Q. Can I take it from that that you were not aware of the

102

1 report prepared by the environment, transport and
 2 regional affairs select committee in 1999 on the
 3 potential risk of fire spread by external cladding
 4 systems?
 5 A. No.
 6 Q. Were you aware of the Harrow Court fire in Stevenage on
 7 2 February 2005?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Do you agree with Ms Dexter that the information about
 10 these fires provided a useful learning point for the
 11 LFB?
 12 A. Yes, I do.
 13 Q. Can you help us as to why you think that is so and why
 14 you agree with Ms Dexter?
 15 A. Because I think fires — significant fires of this
 16 nature are fortunately quite rare within the
 17 United Kingdom, actually, let alone England, so
 18 therefore when these fires do occur, we should take —
 19 the best we can, we should take any learning points from
 20 those fires as best we can.
 21 Q. Can you help us as to why those fires were not obviously
 22 taken as learning points, given that answer, for the
 23 LFB?
 24 A. My recollection is that, having looked at those fires ,
 25 the conclusion that we came to was that whilst they were

103

1 significant fires , issues — we either already dealt
 2 with the issues arising from those via changes to our
 3 operational procedures, or the items — the issues that
 4 arose from them were not necessarily relevant for London
 5 Fire Brigade in the context of our operations and,
 6 you know, the nature and size of our Brigade.
 7 Q. Now, you say "we". The three fires we're discussing
 8 pre-dated your appointment as commissioner.
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. Who were the officers who considered the facts of
 11 certainly the two fires you were aware of, so
 12 Harrow Court and Knowsley Heights?
 13 A. Well, I didn't actually determine the officers to do
 14 that, but my understanding is they were considered by
 15 the operations department and also by the fire safety
 16 department.
 17 Q. Thank you.
 18 Now, Assistant Commissioner Daly gave evidence,
 19 really in the context of the Madingley fire in 2010 that
 20 was in Kingston upon Thames, that the LFB as
 21 an organisation did not always take "every opportunity
 22 to learn as an organisation" and "that protection wasn't
 23 always as high up the agenda as it needed to be and so
 24 the opportunities to learn from protection haven't
 25 always been as well addressed".

104

1 From your vantage point, having been at the LFB for
 2 a considerable period of your life and ended up as
 3 commissioner, do you agree with that observation?
 4 A. I do.
 5 Q. Can you help us understand why the LFB did not seize
 6 every opportunity to learn from incidents and other
 7 fires?
 8 A. It's very difficult to account for. I think my main
 9 explanation of that is that these were things that
 10 happened in other brigades and we didn't necessarily see
 11 them — or the Brigade at the time didn't necessarily
 12 see them as relevant, where there was potentially
 13 a culture in the London Fire Brigade that, actually,
 14 things that happened outside of London didn't really
 15 relate to London. I wouldn't agree with that, but
 16 I think it was the culture at the time.
 17 Q. Can I stop you there.
 18 A. Of course.
 19 Q. It's an interesting point.
 20 How had this London-centric perception come about,
 21 and what did you do to try and cure it during your
 22 relatively long time in post as commissioner?
 23 A. I think it came about because it was — because London
 24 Fire Brigade had been for many, many years the largest
 25 and busiest operational fire and rescue service in the

105

1 country, largest in terms of numbers of staff, numbers
 2 of fire engines, number of fire stations, but also
 3 largest in terms of number of personnel, and also
 4 because I think many disasters or large fires or other
 5 incidents, for that matter, had occurred in London, so
 6 there was a cultural, I think — without being
 7 completely conscious about it, there was a culture of:
 8 if it didn't happen in London, then it's not really
 9 relevant to us.
 10 Q. And there was nothing, therefore, to learn from other
 11 fires outside London?
 12 A. To some extent. I wouldn't say that was completely the
 13 case on all occasions, because there were fires from
 14 outside London that London did learn from, but I think,
 15 generally speaking, we could have learnt more from other
 16 fires outside of London had that culture not existed.
 17 Q. What did you do in your time, as I said, to try and cure
 18 that perception?
 19 A. Well, I tried to engage with the national fire and
 20 rescue service perhaps more than I might have done
 21 previously. So I was a member of the Chief Fire
 22 Officers Association board for — well, for most of my
 23 tenure. I instigated — we might come to talk about
 24 this later, but I instigated a process where London Fire
 25 Brigade actually funded the production of national

106

1 operational guidance for the service when that was —
 2 when that sort of leadership was sorely needed, and the
 3 reasons for doing that were not only because the fire
 4 and rescue service in this country needed some
 5 leadership to actually progress the issues that were
 6 being debated but not resolved, but it was also
 7 important that London Fire Brigade officers
 8 increasingly, with the changes in the service,
 9 recognised that they were employed by London Fire
 10 Brigade, but they were still part of the English fire
 11 and rescue service.
 12 Q. The second element of the quote I asked you about
 13 related to AC Daly's view "that protection wasn't always
 14 as high up the agenda as it needed to be". You agreed
 15 with that. Why was protection not always or
 16 consistently given the priority it deserved?
 17 A. When I — I agree with that, I do agree with that, in
 18 the context of operations. So it's my view that the
 19 fire regulation and fire safety department were not
 20 always as closely linked to operations as they should
 21 have been or could have been. I think fire safety was
 22 certainly high up the agenda in terms of London Fire
 23 Brigade's role in relation to their statutory duties
 24 around the Fire Precautions Act, the Workplace
 25 Regulations and later the Fire Safety Order, so

107

1 certainly very high up the agenda in relation to those,
 2 but specifically in relation to operations, I think for
 3 the same reasons as explained earlier, there was
 4 a cultural maybe blind spot, in fact, that actually
 5 fire safety regulation had an important part to play in
 6 the delivery of operations.
 7 Q. Was operations the big beast — I put this really
 8 crudely, Mr Dobson, really to tease out more nuanced
 9 views from you, but was operations the big beast and
 10 therefore consumed the greater part of resources and
 11 focus of attention? Is that at least a crude way of
 12 looking at the problem?
 13 A. I would agree, for many years.
 14 Q. Do you agree that it's crude or —
 15 A. It is crude —
 16 Q. — is it accurate?
 17 A. — but I think it's accurate as well.
 18 Q. Now, going back slightly, you referred to there being
 19 a blind spot in relation to protection. Can you help us
 20 as to why that blind spot came about?
 21 A. Well, I think I refer to my previous answer, really.
 22 I think it was because operations was generally — the
 23 culture of the organisation was that operations was the
 24 most important part of the service. That was the part
 25 of the service that the public most focused on, the

108

1 public who speak to — the public in London, and we did
2 on many occasions ask them their views in the fire and
3 rescue service. The only thing the public are really
4 interested in is a fire engine arriving quickly if they
5 call the Fire Brigade. They wasn't particularly
6 interested in the work of the fire and rescue service in
7 relation to fire prevention.

8 So I think all of that came together to lead to,
9 you know, the development of the culture where
10 operations was the most important thing we did.

11 Q. Had you identified this cluster of cultural issues
12 before you started your tenure as commissioner or is it
13 a perception that has developed with the benefit of
14 retirement and further reflection?

15 A. No, I think I'd formed that view before I was
16 the commissioner.

17 Q. What did you do in order to give protection a greater
18 priority and to give it a bigger voice compared to
19 operations?

20 A. First of all, I think it was important that
21 I demonstrated that fire protection was important, and
22 therefore, in the communication messages and things when
23 I was talking to staff, I would very often — well,
24 almost exclusively — lay out the important role that
25 fire protection plays. I based that upon the need to

109

1 protect the public, as well as firefighters,
2 particularly around preventing fire deaths and fire
3 injuries and the number of fires in London, reducing
4 those.

5 I made a very big point during my tenure that it was
6 very important — our protection role was very important
7 in terms of reducing the number of fires in London and,
8 therefore, the risk of fire — of injury or death to
9 members of the public.

10 Practical things that I did were we had a very
11 detailed suite of performance indicators for the whole
12 of the service, and we implemented a thing called
13 a performance management CMB, where all the directors
14 and all the heads of service would come along and we
15 would analyse their performance against their
16 indicators, and fire safety played a very high part in
17 terms of their performance against their performance
18 indicators.

19 Q. A difficult question to answer, I suspect, but how
20 successful do you think your efforts were to cure those
21 cultural problems and to alleviate the effects of the
22 blind spot on protection?

23 A. I think in terms of the outcomes we achieved in relation
24 to the numbers of fires in London decreasing
25 significantly during my time as commissioner, the

110

1 numbers of fire deaths, the number of fire injuries also
2 decreasing significantly during my time as commissioner,
3 I would like to think that I was successful. But in
4 terms of the overall culture of the Brigade in relation
5 to operations being the big beast, in your words,
6 I wasn't as successful as I would have liked to have
7 been. I think we did make some progress, but I don't
8 think I was as successful as I would hope to have been.

9 Q. Do you remember the Atherstone—on—Stour fire?

10 A. I do.

11 Q. Which was in 2007. In broad terms, a fire in
12 a vegetable packing warehouse, I think, constructed from
13 sandwich panels, and the fire had spread beyond the
14 compartment of origin and, ultimately and tragically,
15 four firefighters from Warwickshire Fire and Rescue
16 Service lost their lives fighting it. Is that a fair
17 summary of the essentials of the fire?

18 A. Yes, it is.

19 Q. Now, following that incident, a CLG fire and rescue
20 service circular was issued by the then chief fire and
21 rescue adviser, Sir Ken Knight, who had been your
22 predecessor at the LFB —

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. — on 23 March 2009. Can we go to that circular, which
25 is at {HOM00023213}. We can see, just above halfway

111

1 down the page, it was addressed to you as
2 the commissioner of LFEPA, amongst other recipients.
3 I can take it from your answer that you remember
4 receiving this?

5 A. I do.

6 Q. Now, if we can turn to page 4 {HOM00023213/4},
7 paragraph 4.1, what we have here, under the emboldened
8 heading "Knowledge of Building Construction", it says
9 this:

10 "In January 2008, the Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser
11 (CFRA) wrote to all CFOs [chief fire officers] to remind
12 Fire and Rescue Services of the need to ensure that
13 operational risk information was available to
14 firefighters in relation to high risk buildings. In
15 particular, the danger when fighting fires in Thermo
16 Clad Panel (sandwich panel) buildings was highlighted.
17 Dear Chief Officer Letters (DCOL) 3/96, 4/94, 15/99 in
18 conjunction with the Fire Research and Development Group
19 report 'Firefighting Options for Fires Involving
20 Sandwich Panels' described the hazards and appropriate
21 actions that need to be taken to maintain firefighter
22 safety whilst fighting fires in buildings of sandwich
23 panel construction."

24 Then if we go over the page to paragraph 4.2,
25 the circular went on to say this:

112

1 "Fire and Rescue Services are reminded that
 2 firefighters and, in particular, Incident Commanders
 3 will only be able to make a suitable and sufficient
 4 assessment of the risks at operational incidents,
 5 including being alerted to critical safety issues, if
 6 they are able to recognise building construction types
 7 and the impact that these buildings have on fire
 8 behaviour. FRAs are therefore reminded of their
 9 responsibility to ensure that safety critical
 10 information is available to Incident Commanders and all
 11 personnel in respect of risks within their area.
 12 Arrangements should also be in place to ensure personnel
 13 can recognise types of building construction."
 14 Now, just to make the point, FRAs in this context is
 15 fire and rescue authorities; is that right?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Now, upon reading and receiving this circular, what
 18 direction did you give to your senior officers as to how
 19 best the LFB could respond to the requirements it sets
 20 out?
 21 A. My recollection was that I asked the relevant officers
 22 to consider this in relation to the training that was
 23 already provided to firefighters to identify if there
 24 were gaps that we needed to address and then to design
 25 methods, training, to actually address those gaps.

113

1 MR KINNIER: Thank you.
 2 Sir, it is just 3.15.
 3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
 4 MR KINNIER: That is an appropriate place.
 5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It suits you to stop there, does it?
 6 MR KINNIER: Yes.
 7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right.
 8 Well, as you were told, Mr Dobson, we were going to
 9 have a break during the afternoon and this is a good
 10 time to take it. So we'll stop now. We'll resume, if
 11 we may, please, at 3.30.
 12 As I have said to all the other witnesses, please
 13 don't discuss your evidence or anything relating to it
 14 with anyone while you're out of the room.
 15 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Thank you.
 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. Would you like
 17 to go with the usher, please.
 18 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
 19 (Pause)
 20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you, Mr Kinnier. 3.30, then,
 21 please.
 22 MR KINNIER: Thank you.
 23 (3.15 pm)
 24 (A short break)
 25 (3.30 pm)

114

1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, Mr Dobson, all ready to carry
 2 on, I hope?
 3 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir, yes.
 4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
 5 Yes, Mr Kinnier.
 6 MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.
 7 Mr Dobson, before the break, we were discussing
 8 the circular that Sir Ken sent round in March 2009.
 9 Now, on the very same day that circular was
 10 despatched to chief fire officers, a letter was sent by
 11 Steve Turek, who at that stage was one of your assistant
 12 commissioners, to London boroughs and social housing
 13 landlords. Can we go to that letter, which is at
 14 {LFB00001805}.
 15 Now, as you can see, that letter opens thus:
 16 "In the light of a number of recent fires in
 17 social housing blocks I am seeking your help in bringing
 18 fire safety issues to the attention of your tenants and
 19 staff and as an enforcing authority we thought it would
 20 be helpful to draw your attention, as a social housing
 21 provider, to a number of significant issues relating to
 22 your responsibilities under the Regulatory Reform (Fire
 23 Safety) Order 2005."
 24 Now, first of all, do you remember this letter?
 25 A. I do.

115

1 Q. Can we turn to page 2 {LFB00001805/2}, and you can see
 2 the third heading on that page is emboldened,
 3 "Replacement windows", and the letter says this:
 4 "We have noted cases where replacement windows,
 5 particularly uPVC window units, are of a shorter depth
 6 to the original units/window sets. This has resulted in
 7 the gaps being covered with non-fire resisting materials
 8 which, in the event of fire, distort and allow fire into
 9 the wall cavity. Although the latest amendments to the
 10 Building Regulations require fire stopping around the
 11 window, the problem may exist in many properties with
 12 windows that were replaced before April 2007.
 13 "We have also noted that panels on the exterior of
 14 flats have been replaced with non-fire resisting uPVC
 15 panels as part of replacement of window units. This may
 16 have contributed to total failure of the windows during
 17 a fire and consequently contributed to fire being able
 18 to pass upwards across the exterior wall to the windows
 19 of flats above, causing them to fail and fire to spread
 20 to those flats."
 21 If we go to the section below that one, which is
 22 under the heading "Lack of fire stopping barriers in
 23 wall cavities", the letter continues thus:
 24 "Lack of fire stopping in wall cavities has been
 25 noted in a number of fires, particular those involving

116

1 older timber frame construction. Although such
 2 structures are safe if correctly constructed, the lack
 3 of fire stopping in some 1960s and 1970s structures is
 4 a cause for concern as it has allowed unrestricted rapid
 5 fire spread through the building. In more than one case
 6 this has resulted in total loss of the building.
 7 Although required by Building Regulations the same
 8 problem has been found in some more modern properties.”
 9 Now, can you help us, what had prompted AC Turek to
 10 send this letter?
 11 A. This would have been a result of fire investigation
 12 reports following fires at premises where these
 13 circumstances had actually been noticed, and also by
 14 inspections carried out predominantly by fire safety
 15 regulation officers when they liaised with local
 16 authorities and inspect buildings in their care.
 17 Q. Now, the introduction read, and I took you to it, “In
 18 light of a number of recent fires in social housing
 19 blocks”. Can you recall now, did those fires involve
 20 non—fire—resisting external panels?
 21 A. I can't recall.
 22 Q. Thank you.
 23 Can I now turn to a separate topic, which is the
 24 immediate aftermath of the Lakanal House fire and the
 25 correspondence you had with DCLG.

117

1 Now, three months after Mr Turek's letter on
 2 3 July 2009, a fire started in a television on the
 3 ninth floor of Lakanal House in Southwark. Am I right
 4 in saying that the fire spread rapidly both up and down
 5 the building through false ceiling voids and via the
 6 building's composite external façade panels, which were
 7 constructed, I think, of uPVC?
 8 A. That's correct.
 9 Q. Now, can we go to {LFB00001232}. This is a letter that
 10 you sent, Mr Dobson, to local authorities and
 11 social housing providers on 9 July, so six days after
 12 the fire, and it's entitled “Social housing — fire
 13 safety risk assessment and maintenance of means of
 14 escape provisions”.
 15 Now, you open this letter in the first two
 16 paragraphs by making reference back to Mr Turek's letter
 17 of 23 March, which we looked at just now, and say that
 18 you are writing following the Lakanal fire to remind
 19 recipients of their responsibilities under the RRO.
 20 Now, if we look at the third and fourth paragraphs
 21 of the letter, they read as follows:
 22 “Firstly, a requirement of the Order [the RRO] is
 23 that a suitable and sufficient fire safety risk
 24 assessment is undertaken for all premises to which the
 25 Order applies. In this regard I would emphasise that

118

1 any risk assessment should include, amongst other
 2 things, consideration of the compartmentation within the
 3 premises, particularly where it protects means of escape
 4 routes, and that there are systems in place to ensure
 5 that these elements of compartmentation are maintained.
 6 It is also a requirement of the Order that the risk
 7 assessment should be reviewed if any material change
 8 takes place within the premises. This will include
 9 changes to the compartmentation arrangements, as well as
 10 potentially any refurbishment work.
 11 “The findings of the fire risk assessment must be
 12 implemented to remove or reduce fire risks and to ensure
 13 adequate general fire precautions are provided. In
 14 particular this includes an evacuation strategy that is
 15 appropriate to the circumstances of the individual
 16 premises.”
 17 Now, at this time, bearing in mind what's set out in
 18 that letter, was it the Brigade's working assumption
 19 that poor compartmentation was one of the root causes or
 20 principal features of the Lakanal fire?
 21 A. I think the early indications from the fire
 22 investigation was that was the case, yes.
 23 Q. Was there a concern within the LFB at that time that
 24 many other buildings in London might suffer from the
 25 same incidence of poor compartmentation?

119

1 A. Yes, it was, and hence the letter.
 2 Q. And presumably the hope was, in sending this letter,
 3 that defects in compartmentation could be identified by
 4 local authorities, RSLs, and remedied?
 5 A. Correct, yes.
 6 Q. Can we go back and look at the final sentence of the
 7 fourth paragraph on this first page, where it says this:
 8 “In particular this includes an evacuation strategy
 9 that is appropriate to the circumstances of the
 10 individual premises.”
 11 Was that a suggestion that the stay—put strategy may
 12 not be appropriate in high—rise buildings which do not
 13 have adequate compartmentation?
 14 A. No, I don't think that was the intention of this letter,
 15 that statement there. This was once again a reflection
 16 of the emerging findings from the fire investigation
 17 into Lakanal House where we knew from those initial
 18 investigations that there were escape balconies on the
 19 second floor in each of the flats, but we also started
 20 to identify that the residents weren't aware of the
 21 purpose of those balconies, and also that in some cases
 22 those balconies had been used for inappropriate storage
 23 and things like that, making their use as an escape
 24 route — undermining their use as an escape route.
 25 I don't think we had anything more than that in mind at

120

1 the time of this letter .
 2 Q. Can we now go to a separate piece of correspondence,
 3 which can be found at {LFB00104291}. This is a letter
 4 that you sent to Sir Ken Knight, so your predecessor
 5 from the LFB, who was now the chief fire and rescue
 6 adviser .

7 In that letter , you say this :

8 "Dear Sir Ken,

9 "I am writing to inform you that as part of our
 10 investigation into the fire at Lakanal House ... on
 11 3 July 2009 we have had tests carried out on the
 12 exterior wall panels of the building and that those
 13 tests have given rise to concerns which may well be
 14 relevant to other high rise premises. Although our
 15 investigations are continuing and the matter has still
 16 to come before the Coroner, I feel that it is in the
 17 public interest to draw the issue to your attention so
 18 that the matter can be discussed within the Department
 19 and any necessary advice can be given to owners and
 20 landlords of high rise buildings."

21 Now, in the paragraphs following, you summarise the
 22 functional requirement B4 of the Building Regulations,
 23 ie that a building's external walls should adequately
 24 resist fire spread, and you also set out the relevant
 25 provisions of Approved Document B.

121

1 Could we turn to the second page of this letter
 2 {LFB00104291/2}, however, and look at the third
 3 paragraph in particular . There you say this:
 4 "Based on the tests conducted by the Building
 5 Research Establishment, it appears that there are
 6 external wall panels at Lakanal House, that do not have
 7 the necessary reaction to fire properties required for
 8 the location in which they have been used.

9 "We have also become aware that this type of panel
 10 has been supplied by more than one company.

11 "In the circumstances, we believe it may be
 12 appropriate for a warning to be given to housing
 13 providers that it would be advisable to check the
 14 specification for external wall panels in their high
 15 rise housing stock and check that what has been
 16 installed meets the correct specification (i.e. that
 17 fire safety requirements of the Building Regulations
 18 were taken into account); and to include this in fire
 19 risk assessments for relevant properties."

20 Now, taking a step back and looking at this letter
 21 with a cold eye, it appears that you were primarily
 22 concerned that a similar fire — that's one involving
 23 external fire spread — could occur at any number of
 24 buildings if similar non-compliant panels had been
 25 fitted .

122

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Is that a fair summary?

3 A. Yes, it is .

4 Q. There is no suggestion in your letter that this was
 5 a London-specific problem. Again, is that a fair
 6 reading of what you set out here?

7 A. Yes, it is .

8 Q. So presumably you were inviting Sir Ken Knight to write
 9 to all local authorities , housing providers, et cetera ,
 10 across the United Kingdom?

11 A. I was.

12 Q. Ms Dexter told the Inquiry that, despite being deputy
 13 commissioner with responsibility for the fire safety
 14 department at the time this letter was sent, she had no
 15 involvement in its drafting , nor had she been made aware
 16 of the issues that were set out in this letter , nor the
 17 decision to write to Sir Ken in these terms.

18 First of all , do you agree with that?

19 A. Could you remind me of the date of the letter again,
 20 please, Mr Kinnier?

21 Q. Yes. If you go to the front page, it is
 22 14 December 2009.

23 A. Okay.

24 My recollection is that at that time Ms Dexter
 25 wasn't the deputy commissioner, because the previous

123

1 deputy commissioner, Roy Bishop, had retired on
 2 30 September 2009, and Ms Dexter wasn't actually
 3 appointed to the role of deputy commissioner until later
 4 in 2010.

5 Q. Had her predecessor stood down in November 2009?

6 A. Her predecessor, Roy Bishop, retired on
 7 30 September 2009.

8 Q. The reason I am slightly surprised by your answer here
 9 is that the information we have is that the start date
 10 of her role as deputy commissioner was 10 November 2009,
 11 ie a month or so before this letter was sent.

12 A. Erm ... I don't believe so. I may be wrong, but my
 13 recollection was that there was an interim period
 14 whereby — before an appointment was made, and the
 15 authority didn't actually appoint Ms Dexter as the
 16 deputy commissioner until later in 2010.

17 Q. So she would appear to be right, therefore, on the
 18 substance, that she wasn't consulted on its contents,
 19 was unaware that it was going to be sent and certainly
 20 unaware that it was to be sent to Sir Ken in these
 21 terms; is that a fair summary?

22 A. I think so, yes.

23 Q. Do you know whether anyone in the fire safety department
 24 was involved in the consideration of the substance of
 25 this letter ?

124

1 A. Yes, the letter would have been drafted on my behalf by
2 members of the fire safety regulation department,
3 principally Assistant Commissioner Turek.
4 Q. I think Mr Turek is the principal draftsman of it; is
5 that fair?
6 A. Yes, it is, yeah.
7 Q. Just going back one point. It's probably a very minor
8 point in the scheme of things, but we have Ms Dexter's
9 start date of 10 November from paragraph 4 of her
10 witness statement, in which she confirmed that as her
11 start date. Your recollection is different?
12 A. My recollection is different, yeah.
13 Q. Now, we have Sir Ken Knight's response to you, and that
14 can be found at {HOM00046018}. We see it's dated
15 22 December 2009, so some eight days after the initial
16 letter. He refers there to having attended a meeting of
17 the MPS strategic investigation oversight group, or the
18 inelegantly acronymed SIOG, for the Lakanal House fire.
19 If we go to the fourth paragraph on this page,
20 Sir Ken said this:
21 "Members of SIOG did recognise that the information
22 arising from the BRE report has potential implications
23 for meeting the expectations of certain aspects of
24 Approved Document B of Schedule 1 to the
25 Building Regulations 2000 (as amended), but it was felt

125

1 that at this time there is insufficient information to
2 warrant alerting housing authorities and/or property
3 owners to the specific matters raised not least as:
4 "(i) the investigation has not yet determined if the
5 surface spread of flame properties of the panels fitted
6 in Lakanal House were specified by the Housing
7 Authority.
8 "(ii) the investigation has not yet determined if
9 the surface spread of flame properties of the panels
10 fitted in Lakanal House were differently specified to
11 those subsequently fitted."
12 Then if we can look at the second page of this
13 letter {HOM00046018/2}, Mr Dobson, in the second
14 paragraph onwards, Sir Ken said this:
15 "... MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] investigators
16 are actively pursuing the information required to
17 clarify the public interest issues.
18 "The above matters have been discussed with
19 colleagues within Communities and Local Government. The
20 clarification being sought by the investigators will, in
21 turn, assist further discussion on the disclosure of the
22 relevant information.
23 "In the meantime CLG Housing Policy colleagues are
24 including a generic statement in a letter to Housing
25 Authorities a copy of which I will forward to you.

126

1 "I look forward to keeping in touch on the above
2 issues."
3 Now, having set that out — apologies, it's a very
4 long run-up, but it's probably helpful to take you back
5 through the documents — we've got a copy of the letter
6 which seems to be the generic statement that Sir Ken was
7 referring to. We can find that at {LFB00041215}.
8 Now, you will see from the top left it's also dated
9 22 December 2009, so the same day as his response to
10 you. It's addressed to the CEOs, local housing
11 authorities in England — so, apologies, not
12 United Kingdom, it's England — and it's entitled
13 "Fire safety in high rise social rented housing blocks".
14 On the first page, under the heading
15 "Building Regulations and Building Control", the letter
16 said this:
17 "One point of interest coming to our attention has
18 been concerns raised regarding the specification of
19 window and cladding systems used on high rise blocks.
20 Guidance on the appropriate specification of external
21 walls and cladding systems, to satisfy the fire safety
22 aspects of building regulations, is given in Approved
23 Document B (Fire Safety), section 12. Whilst the
24 specification of window frames would not normally be
25 affected by this guidance, in—fills, spandrels and

127

1 overcladding could be.
2 "Where any work which is subject to the building
3 regulations is carried out then this should be checked
4 by a Building Control Body ... in accordance with those
5 regulations. If there is any doubt over the application
6 of, or compliance with, these regulations then advice
7 should be sought from the relevant [building control
8 body]."
9 Taking a step back, this letter appears to put the
10 onus squarely on housing authorities who may have any
11 doubt about compliance with the Building Regulations,
12 and the onus is on them to report the matter to the
13 relevant building control body.
14 Was that how you read this generic statement when
15 you received it in December 2009?
16 A. It was.
17 Q. That contrasts markedly with the contents of your
18 letter. In your letter, you were suggesting writing to
19 housing providers specifically to invite them
20 proactively to check the specifications of their
21 high-rise external wall panels for compliance with the
22 Building Regulations. Again, is that a fair reading of
23 what you were asking Sir Ken to do?
24 A. It is.
25 Q. Did you have the view at the time that Sir Ken's generic

128

1 letter did not satisfy the request that you had put in
 2 your letter of 14 December 2009?
 3 A. I think my feeling was that it partially satisfied it
 4 but didn't go as far as I was hoping the government
 5 might go.
 6 Q. Can you help us, where did it fall short, in your view?
 7 A. Well, I think, actually, it could have been more widely
 8 circulated, rather than just the building — the people
 9 this is addressed to, it should have been addressed to
 10 maybe owners of social housing or — I can't remember
 11 exactly the names of all the bodies that you would write
 12 to, but actually certainly a wider audience than just
 13 was here, and I actually — I think it may — at this
 14 point might have been worthy of a note to fire and
 15 rescue services as well.
 16 Q. Did you make those points to Sir Ken at the time?
 17 A. I think my letter — I didn't — not specifically
 18 verbally, but I think the letter — my letter was clear
 19 that I expected probably more action than was undertaken
 20 as a result of this letter.
 21 Q. You presumably would have known him from your time
 22 together at the LFB. Did you contact him to say,
 23 "Listen, Ken, this doesn't really meet what is
 24 required", or words to that effect?
 25 A. No, no, I didn't. I didn't.

129

1 Q. Can you help us as to why not?
 2 A. Because at the time there was still — the police
 3 investigation was taking place into Lakanal House.
 4 Sir Ken, on behalf of the government, was involved in
 5 that, and there was — whether it was real or perceived,
 6 it certainly existed — there was a barrier between
 7 London Fire Brigade and Sir Ken's department in relation
 8 to things relating to Lakanal House. So I didn't feel
 9 in the position to be able to undertake that sort of
 10 informal approach.
 11 Q. Can we go to {LFB00089549}.
 12 Now, we can see from the bottom half of this page
 13 that this was the email by which the generic letter was
 14 sent to you.
 15 A. Yeah.
 16 Q. If we go up the page, we can see that you forward it to
 17 Rita Dexter, Steve Turek, DAC Cutbill and John Bradbury,
 18 commenting, "This is interesting".
 19 First of all, can we assume from the fact that
 20 you've sent it to Rita Dexter that she was effectively
 21 the deputy commissioner by this stage, or would she
 22 normally have been included in circulation of this type?
 23 A. I would normally try to circulate to as many of the
 24 directors in possible. That's always a problem in terms
 25 of sending everyone everything, because that was

130

1 overload, but because Rita Dexter had some
 2 responsibility for fire safety regulation and
 3 Steve Turek in particular, it was appropriate to send it
 4 to her.
 5 Q. Why did you consider it to be "interesting"?
 6 A. I think it was interesting because of the discussions
 7 we'd had previously about what the government reaction
 8 might be to the letter and how much action might be
 9 taken.
 10 Q. Now, mindful of the answer you gave to an earlier
 11 question, as the police investigation into Lakanal
 12 progressed, as the causes became clearer as well, did
 13 you consider pressing Sir Ken again on adopting your
 14 suggestion of a more proactive approach to housing
 15 providers in respect of external wall cladding?
 16 A. I did consider it, but I decided against it for the
 17 reasons I mentioned earlier.
 18 Q. Can you remember whether you or anyone else at your
 19 behest in December 2009 or shortly thereafter took any
 20 steps to warn operational crews that, given the presence
 21 of exterior panels, they may encounter the type of rapid
 22 external fire spread that was encountered at Lakanal?
 23 A. Not that I recall, no.
 24 Q. Why not?
 25 A. Because I think the speed at which the fire spread

131

1 externally was an issue which was brought about by the
 2 failure of the panel in the windows, but it was my
 3 belief that actually that was not an unusual type of
 4 fire spread, that firefighters would not be surprised
 5 about. So actually firefighters, particularly,
 6 you know, working with high-rise buildings, would not be
 7 surprised to see a fire exit the window and spread the
 8 way that it did; they might just be more surprised at
 9 the speed of it.
 10 Q. Mr Dobson, if I can make a plea on behalf of the
 11 transcriber.
 12 A. Sorry.
 13 Q. It's very difficult. The moment someone suggests to you
 14 to speak slowly, it may not always achieve that aim.
 15 A. I'm sorry.
 16 Q. But I would be grateful for your help there.
 17 Was any consideration given to informing crews about
 18 what to do when confronted with widespread
 19 compartmentation failure, which was one of the features
 20 we discussed at Lakanal?
 21 A. No, because the issues at Lakanal, the operational
 22 issues at Lakanal, were brought about more by the need
 23 to move the bridgehead down the building because the
 24 fire was spreading downwards, rather than in the way
 25 they would traditionally expect it to be, which was

132

1 upwards. So in terms of actually firefighting on the
2 floors where the fire existed, apart from it being
3 a severe fire, I didn't think there was anything
4 particularly that was unusual that fire crews needed to
5 be notified of.
6 Q. Can we go to {LFB00025654/13}. Now, this is an appendix
7 that was included within a 2015 report that we'll come
8 to later in your evidence, but the substance of the
9 appendix is a note from 2010, you will see 15 April
10 2010, prepared by Mr Turek for you.

11 In that note, it says this, under the heading,
12 "Building regulations compliance issues for stakeholder
13 meeting ... on 21 April 2010 ... [at] Union Street".
14 It said this:

15 "You are due to meet with representatives from the
16 construction and building control sectors on 21 April to
17 discuss our concerns about the quality of construction
18 and checking of new build and refurbished residential
19 premises."

20 Now, we can see the list of attendees included
21 senior individuals from the Construction Industry
22 Council, which is the CIC, the NHBC, LABC, and
23 representatives from CLG, including Mr Brian Martin. Is
24 that right?

25 A. That's correct, yeah.

133

1 Q. Can we go to page 14 {LFB00025654/14}, so over the page,
2 and we see there the heading "Background to issues". If
3 I could go through the six bullet points as set out
4 there, and apologies for having to listen to me read
5 them out:

6 "■ A significant number of recent fires (over last
7 2 years or so) have exhibited unusual fire spread and/or
8 smoke spread. Investigations have often found this to
9 be due to failures to comply with the Building
10 Regulations either during construction or during
11 refurbishment. The fires concerned have resulted in
12 persons becoming trapped and requiring rescue by
13 the Brigade; Building collapse and other unnecessary
14 damage to buildings; fire fighters being placed at
15 unnecessary risk.

16 "■ Similar failures to comply with the Building
17 Regulations have been found as a result of standard
18 audits and follow up to alleged fire risks.

19 "■ Around 50 significant cases in the London area
20 have come to our attention over the last 2 years or so.
21 In each case, the building defects arose at the time of
22 construction or refurbishment. Most cases involve large
23 and major construction companies.

24 "■ In each case the building defects appear to
25 either have not been identified by the Building Control

134

1 Body or to have been noted but not followed up on to
2 ensure the defects were remedied before the premises
3 come into use.

4 "■ It is now a matter of significant concern whether
5 the construction and approval process is being enforced
6 with sufficient vigour to reasonably ensure new
7 residential buildings in London are fit for purpose.

8 "■ A further issue is that the buildings involved
9 (so far) can have been built at any time over the last
10 10 or 15 years. Consequently we are concerned about how
11 many residential premises with significant Building
12 Regulation defects may be in use in London."

13 Now, we can take it from that — and I want to see
14 whether you agree — that certainly in April 2010,
15 non-compliance with Building Regulations was not
16 an abstract issue for the LFB, but it was a risk that
17 had already been identified and realised in
18 a significant number of fires in the capital; is that
19 a fair summary?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And in particular, the distinctive features of those
22 fires had been unusual fire and/or smoke spread; is that
23 right?

24 A. In most, yes, but not in all. I would say the fire
25 spread — once — the fire spread was not unusual in

135

1 terms of its predictability, given the defects of the
2 buildings, but yes, I would agree.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 Now, Ms Dexter gave evidence that fire spread beyond
5 the compartment of origin was not a one-off at Lakanal
6 and was in fact — the word she used was "common".
7 Would you agree that is what this memorandum is alluding
8 to?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Do you remember the meeting on 21 April —

11 A. I remember this briefing note, but I don't — I'm trying
12 very hard to remember the actual meeting, and I am
13 afraid I can't at the moment.

14 Q. If we can turn over the page again to page 15
15 {LFB00025654/15}, this sets out a list of what are
16 called key issues for discussion with stakeholders. If
17 we could look at some of those in slightly more detail,
18 the first of which is (c). That said this:

19 "The role of other key players (CIC, LABC, ACAI ..."
20 Can you help us with that?

21 A. I'm afraid not.

22 Q. "... CLG, LFEPA) in ensuring the construction industry
23 complies with the Building Regulations and that
24 appropriate checks are made to verify compliance."

25 Helped with that reminder, does that prompt any

136

1 recollection of the gist of the discussion of that
 2 topic?
 3 A. It does. I remember a meeting held at Union Street
 4 where there was representatives from these bodies, but
 5 I have that as a recollection as a meeting also attended
 6 by some local authorities in London as well, so I'm not
 7 sure I'm remembering exactly the right meeting,
 8 unfortunately.
 9 Q. Can you help us, then, with a slightly more practical
 10 question: what was LFEPA's role in ensuring the
 11 construction industry complied with the Building
 12 Regulations and that appropriate checks were made?
 13 A. Well, our role was to make the building construction
 14 industry and the government aware of defects that were
 15 being identified by us either by inspection or by fire
 16 investigation following incidents that occurred within
 17 London.
 18 Q. Could we look at item (e), and that provides this:
 19 "Identifying and remedying historic hidden failures
 20 that would not be identified through normal fire risk
 21 assessment."
 22 What type of issues did the LFB have in mind here?
 23 A. We had in mind there that the Fire Safety Order required
 24 responsible persons to carry out a fire risk assessment
 25 of their building, but at that point it didn't require

137

1 them to carry out an intrusive survey and, therefore,
 2 some of the defects that have caused the fire spread
 3 within these buildings, ie failure or absence of
 4 firestopping within cavities, wouldn't necessarily be
 5 identified by the fire risk assessment carried out.
 6 Q. Can you remember whether one of the issues that the LFB
 7 had in mind there was a widespread breakdown in
 8 compartmentation?
 9 A. I don't recall that being discussed, no.
 10 Q. Can you remember whether there was much discussion or
 11 the concerns the LFB had were non-compliant panels as
 12 had been encountered at Lakanal?
 13 A. Not in relation to this particular meeting, no.
 14 Q. Was there any conclusion as to how these historic hidden
 15 failures might be identified and remedied?
 16 A. Not that I recall.
 17 Q. Can we look at item (g), which asked:
 18 "What can be done to improve compliance with the
 19 Building Regulations and to identify significant
 20 historic failures so that they can be rectified."
 21 Can you recall what, if any, conclusion was reached
 22 on that point?
 23 A. I think this was — I do remember this, and I think this
 24 was an issue that all the bodies that attended the
 25 meeting raised lack of resources as their main concern.

138

1 So I think there was some concern amongst all the bodies
 2 that attended this, and also, whether it was this
 3 meeting or another one, raised with me by local
 4 authorities that the resources available to them to
 5 carry out their building control function had been
 6 reduced in time, I couldn't put a timescale on that, and
 7 that was impairing their ability to carry out their role
 8 in relation to what we're talking about here.
 9 Q. Bearing in mind that, did you raise with them at this
 10 stage your suggestion for more proactive action to be
 11 taken in relation to writing to housing providers,
 12 et cetera, that you'd set out in your 14 December
 13 letter?
 14 A. I believe so, but I can't be absolutely certain.
 15 Q. Now, we took Mr Daly through the substance of this note,
 16 and I think I'm right in saying he was the head of
 17 fire safety at the time.
 18 A. What, at the time of this meeting?
 19 Q. Yes. Or was it Mr Turek?
 20 A. It would have been Mr Turek, yeah.
 21 Q. Was he a member of the fire safety team at this stage?
 22 A. I believe — actually, I think he was a station manager
 23 at the time. I'm not entirely sure, but I think he was.
 24 I don't think he was in the fire safety regulation team
 25 at this time.

139

1 Q. He is certainly there as the head of fire safety at the
 2 time of the Grenfell fire.
 3 A. Yeah.
 4 Q. Now, he agreed these issues have a direct impact on
 5 operational firefighting and the appropriate operational
 6 response. Bearing that in mind, was there a reason why
 7 you couldn't share the issues that you discussed at this
 8 meeting with operational crews?
 9 A. There was not a reason why we couldn't. I think in
 10 terms of communication with the operational workforce
 11 generally, at the back of my mind in all these issues
 12 when we're talking about making operational stations
 13 aware of things is the judgment given by the judge in
 14 the case against the four firefighters from
 15 Atherstone—on—Stour, who were charged with corporate —
 16 gross negligence, corporate manslaughter — gross
 17 negligence and manslaughter, and I believe the Inquiry
 18 has seen the outcome from that trial, where the judge in
 19 there made it very, very clear that he believed that one
 20 of the causes of the fire, one of the contributing
 21 factors to the deaths, were that — was the
 22 proliferation, I think was his word that he used, of
 23 guidance and information given to operational crews,
 24 much of which conflicted with each other, others of
 25 which duplicated each other.

140

1 Now, in relation to this particular issue — I hope
 2 I'm speaking slowly enough — in relation to this
 3 particular issue, the fire spread within the buildings
 4 where these fires occurred was unusual because the
 5 fire — because of the reason it was caused because the
 6 firestopping was absent, but as an operational
 7 firefighter, wouldn't have been things that I believe
 8 operational crews would not have expected to see and
 9 weren't ready to deal with. Certainly they were the
 10 types of things that I as an operational officer
 11 wouldn't have been completely surprised by.
 12 Q. Could I suggest, though, that, notwithstanding the
 13 warning against a proliferation of advice notes, policy
 14 changes and the rest of it, there was something to be
 15 said for warning operational crews about the emerging,
 16 indeed significant trend of non-compliant buildings, and
 17 the significant number of unusual incidences of fire and
 18 smoke spread; there was nothing to stop that, was there?
 19 A. No, there wasn't, no, but I would suggest that they
 20 weren't as unusual, and I would also suggest that they
 21 wouldn't be a surprise to operational firefighters
 22 generally when attending incidents.
 23 Q. Can we turn on to a separate topic now, and that's
 24 correspondence you had with central government in
 25 respect of the functional requirement B4 of the Building

141

1 Regulations.
 2 Now, the note we've just looked at focused primarily
 3 on Building Regulation non-compliances in a general
 4 sense. I think what I'd like to do now is to focus on
 5 a particular aspect of the Building Regulations, which
 6 is B4, and again, that, in summary, is the requirement
 7 that a building's external walls should be capable of
 8 resisting fire spread, in broad terms.
 9 Now, we know that the report, which we can find at
 10 {LFB00039545}, was produced for the Brigade by
 11 Adrian Prest, a former head of building control at
 12 East Hertfordshire, and we can see it is dated at the
 13 very top October 2010. Now, we'll come to this in
 14 a moment. The report advises the LFB on the correct
 15 interpretation of functional requirement B4.
 16 Now, do you recall seeing this report?
 17 A. I do.
 18 Q. Did you see this report in or about October 2010, do you
 19 remember?
 20 A. It was probably slightly later than that, but yes, it
 21 was about that time.
 22 Q. Why was Mr Prest engaged to advise the LFB on the proper
 23 understanding of functional requirement B4?
 24 A. Because we — because it was a cause of discussion
 25 amongst fire safety officers. It was also something

142

1 we'd written to the government about in terms of
 2 interpretation, and we were seeking an independent
 3 interpretation of that regulation.
 4 Q. When you say it was a source of discussion —
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. — is that a euphemism for: they couldn't agree what it
 7 meant?
 8 A. Not entirely, yes.
 9 Q. Thank you.
 10 If we could turn to page 5 of his report
 11 {LFB00039545/5}, we see there, under the heading
 12 "Question 4 and 15 October discussions — B4 External
 13 Walls: Fire Spread", a question that Mr Prest was asked
 14 to answer, and that question is this:
 15 "Do the requirements for external walls bear
 16 directly upon their ability to resist fire spreading
 17 from inside a building and up the outside of the wall,
 18 ie, when ignited other than by radiation from another
 19 building?"
 20 Mr Prest sets out his understanding of B4, and we
 21 can see in the third paragraph of that page he says:
 22 "AD—B4, as amended March 2010 ... states that B4
 23 will be met if the external walls restrict 'the risk of
 24 ignition from an external source and the spread of fire
 25 over their surfaces' ..."

143

1 Then if we go to the penultimate paragraph on that
 2 page, Mr Prest's ultimate conclusion was this:
 3 "Although there are requirements relating to
 4 fire spread, including in cavities of external walls,
 5 AD B [Approved Document B] does not clearly indicate
 6 that resistance or prevention of fire —spread over
 7 external walls, from an internal fire, is an objective
 8 in its own right."
 9 Now, having seen that conclusion, can you remember
 10 what your response was to it?
 11 A. Firstly, I think it's right to say that I never served
 12 in a specialist fire safety department in London Fire
 13 Brigade. That's possibly for the cultural reasons we
 14 discussed earlier, Mr Kinnier.
 15 Q. You were on the ops side?
 16 A. I was on the ops side, unfortunately, yes. I wish
 17 I hadn't been. I wish I had had fire safety experience,
 18 because it would certainly have been helpful to me in
 19 the role as commissioner. But my reading of this, and
 20 I think the advice I got from colleagues in the fire
 21 safety department who raised it with me, was that they
 22 found this — they found it quite perverse, really, and
 23 not intuitive, that it could be read in that way.
 24 Q. I think we can put it this way: that it was, put
 25 politely, at odds with the Brigade's understanding,

144

1 which was that the fire resistance of the external face
 2 was a requirement in its own right?
 3 A. I think that's correct.
 4 Q. Now, if we can go to {LFB00049525}. These are the
 5 minutes of the fire safety regulation department
 6 Lakanal House meeting on 18 January 2011. You didn't
 7 attend that meeting. I don't think you were required to
 8 attend that meeting.
 9 If we turn to page 2 {LFB00049525/2}, paragraph 3.8,
 10 the minutes record the following:
 11 "Dave Kennett advised that he and GM Paul Jenkins
 12 would be meeting Brian Martin to discuss B4 fire spread
 13 issues and Adrian Prest's view that the external part of
 14 the Lakanal building complies with the Building
 15 Regulations. If there is ultimately any concern over
 16 the interpretation of AdB then this would be a national
 17 learning issue and it would be for the Commissioner to
 18 raise with the Secretary of State."
 19 Now, were you aware of that proposed meeting with
 20 Mr Martin from CLG?
 21 A. I knew there were a range of meetings taking place with
 22 the government department about this and other issues,
 23 but not this specific meeting.
 24 Q. Were you aware that they were minded to ask you to raise
 25 the matter with the Secretary of State?

145

1 A. I'm not surprised, yes.
 2 Q. What did the Brigade hope to achieve from the meeting
 3 with Mr Martin?
 4 A. We hoped to — I think they hoped to achieve
 5 a clarification into the government's precise
 6 interpretation of the regulation.
 7 Q. Now, Andy Jack touches on this issue in his third
 8 statement to the Inquiry, which we can find at
 9 {LFB00120308/6}, paragraph 19. Mr Jack explains
 10 matters thus:
 11 "The LFB sought guidance from the Government as to
 12 the scope of Requirement B4(1) and the guidance in
 13 Approved Document B following Adrian Prest's report on
 14 the fire at Lakanal House in 2010. On 14 February 2011,
 15 the LFB wrote to Brian Martin of the CLG 'to ensure that
 16 we have correctly understood requirement B4 of the
 17 Building Regulations, particularly with regards to
 18 vertical fire spread'.
 19 Now, Mr Jack exhibited that letter, which we can
 20 find at {LFB00120305}. That letter, addressed to
 21 Mr Martin, said this:
 22 "You will be aware that we are currently carrying
 23 out an investigation into the fire that occurred at
 24 Lakanal, Camberwell in July 2009. As part of the
 25 investigation we need to ensure that we have correctly

146

1 understood requirement B4 of the Building Regulations,
 2 particularly with regards to vertical fire spread.
 3 Therefore, we seek your assistance and would be grateful
 4 if you would answer the questions set out below.
 5 "Requirement B4(1) contains two objectives: firstly,
 6 to restrict the spread of fire over the external
 7 envelope of the building and secondly, to restrict the
 8 spread of fire from one building to another.
 9 "1. Please confirm whether or not the first
 10 objective is an objective in its own right regardless of
 11 distance from any boundary.
 12 "2. Please confirm whether or not Building
 13 Regulations and Approved Document B recognises that
 14 rapid fire spread over the external envelope of
 15 a building may make fire service intervention more
 16 difficult and, therefore, the combustibility of the
 17 external envelope should be controlled."
 18 The letter then goes on to pose three more
 19 questions, which I won't read out for you.
 20 But looking at that letter, would it be fair to say
 21 that this piece of correspondence, taken with the other
 22 evidence we've discussed this afternoon, shows that
 23 certainly by February 2011, your fire safety department
 24 had developed a detailed and technical understanding of
 25 external wall panels and the fact that those materials

147

1 were being used contrary to the Building Regulations?
 2 A. I'm not sure I could go quite that far. Certainly the
 3 evidence from Lakanal House in terms of the spandrel
 4 panels in those windows was the thing that precipitated
 5 this, and I think — I don't necessarily think that the
 6 content of this letter would mean that they had
 7 a general concern about it. Certainly it was an issue
 8 they wanted clarified, and they would have wanted it
 9 clarified for a number of reasons, not least the
 10 potential prosecution of Southwark Borough Council as
 11 a result of the Lakanal fire.
 12 Q. How usual was it for the LFB to write to officials at
 13 CLG asking for clarification of detailed questions
 14 arising under the Building Regulations?
 15 A. I can't answer that question, I'm afraid.
 16 Q. Did you see this letter before it was sent to Mr Martin?
 17 A. No.
 18 Q. Were you aware that the intention was to send it?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. Were you aware of the gist of the contents of this
 21 letter?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. Were you aware of the specific detailed questions, the
 24 five, that it was proposed that Mr Martin should answer?
 25 A. Insofar as they were issues that had been discussed with

148

1 me previously, yes.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 Now, Mr Martin's reply was on 23 February 2011, and
4 we can find that at {LFB00113254}. If we could look at
5 the foot of page 1, he repeats or rehearses
6 the Brigade's first question, and responds in the final
7 paragraph of that page, and he says this:

8 "The two objectives that form the requirements in
9 paragraph B4(1) of Schedule 1 of the Building
10 Regulations are closely linked, but are independent of
11 each other, both need to be considered having regard to
12 the height, use and position of the building."

13 Now, to my eye, at least, he appears to have
14 confirmed that the LFB's view was to be preferred and
15 that Mr Prest's view was not to be preferred. Was that
16 how you read Mr Martin's response back in February 2011?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Was there a view at the LFB that Mr Prest's erroneous
19 reading of B4 was confined to him or was there a fear
20 that it was more widespread?

21 A. Well, I think the reason for writing to the government
22 department for clarification was that we believed it was
23 actually not just his personal view, and in fact that
24 debate had been taking place within the London Fire
25 Brigade at all, actually confirming it might be a view

149

1 that was held elsewhere.

2 Q. Now, on the documents we have, discussions appear to
3 have gone silent until December 2012, so nearly
4 two years after this initial exchange. The resurgent
5 activity was a letter you wrote to Brandon Lewis, and it
6 dealt with this and other Lakanal related issues. We
7 can find that letter at {LFB00032154}, and it was dated
8 11 December 2012. You said this:

9 "Dear Minister,

10 "You will be aware that the London Fire Brigade has
11 been carrying out an investigation into the fire that
12 occurred at Lakanal, Camberwell, on the 3rd July 2009.
13 In the course of that investigation a number of issues
14 have come to light that may warrant consideration by
15 your Department. The issues have been set out below as
16 a number of recommendations. Appendix One, which is
17 attached to this letter, provides background information
18 for each recommendation."

19 Now, the letter sets out seven recommendations. Can
20 you help us as to how those recommendations were
21 identified?

22 A. They were issues that were arising from the
23 investigations into the Lakanal House fire, as
24 I remember.

25 Q. And why did you consider it necessary to write to the

150

1 minister at this stage about these matters?

2 A. Because I was really keen that they were actually
3 considered properly by government, and I thought the
4 appropriate way to do that would be to write to the
5 minister to ensure that action was taken by officials.

6 Q. Did you have an apprehension at this time that the
7 government wouldn't take full and effective action in
8 response to these matters?

9 A. I suppose I did, yes.

10 Q. Can you help us as to why you had formed that
11 apprehension?

12 A. I think probably previous experience of engagement with
13 the government over these issues, particularly around
14 fire safety and building control, et cetera, where to
15 some extent I could understand, but this government
16 seemed to be reluctant to take any what I would call
17 decisive action in terms of making some -- trying to
18 make -- facilitate some change or indeed making people
19 aware of the problems.

20 Q. When you refer to government --

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. -- are you referring to the particular administration
23 that was in power in December 2012 or are you talking
24 more broadly about central government over a course of
25 administrations?

151

1 A. I think I'm talking about the latter, but in particular
2 with relation to the Department of Communities and Local
3 Government with which we were sat at the time.

4 Q. Would your concerns be directed towards ministers or
5 would it be concerned more with the acts and omissions
6 of relevant officials, or both?

7 A. Both, I think.

8 Q. On the basis that ministers would be advised by
9 officials?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Can we look at three of the seven recommendations that
12 were identified in your letter to the minister, and the
13 first of which is recommendation 1, which we find set
14 out in the text here, and that said this:

15 "That Government provide further guidance regarding
16 (a) which parts and areas of buildings containing
17 multiple domestic premises can be described as 'parts
18 used in common' (common parts) and (b) how the fire
19 safety order is intended to operate in relation to these
20 premises where the responsible person does not
21 necessarily have control over features affecting common
22 parts and/or common fire precautions."

23 Now, what aspect of the Lakanal House fire had
24 prompted the LFB to identify this as an issue requiring
25 additional guidance from government?

152

1 A. Mainly the breakdown of the compartmentation in relation
 2 to the ventilation, et cetera, on the corridors outside
 3 the flats, and the fact that the fire had spread from
 4 the flat of origin out into the corridor much more
 5 quickly than we would've expected it to.
 6 Q. So it's that vital issue of compartmentation?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. Can we next look at recommendation 5, which is in the
 9 final paragraph on this first page, and that said this:
 10 "That Government provide further guidance in
 11 relation to Requirement B4 of the Building Regulations,
 12 particularly with regards to the spread of fire over the
 13 external envelope of the building."
 14 Again, was your concern at this stage — and we are
 15 now three and a half years after the Lakanal fire — not
 16 just that similar non-compliant external panels were on
 17 buildings in London, but that similar fires could occur
 18 and in fact had occurred and they were the ones you had
 19 referred to in your 2010 note?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. Was it your hope, looking specifically at what relief
 22 you were looking for from the government, that the
 23 government would either revise Approved Document B or
 24 would provide supplemental additional advice on the
 25 scope and meaning of functional requirement B4?

153

1 A. I was hoping for the latter, although I would have been
 2 very pleased to see the former.
 3 Q. Were you hoping for the latter in that that was the more
 4 precise, focused concern you had at the time and that
 5 was the priority that needed dealing with?
 6 A. For me, the priority that needed dealing with was
 7 clarity about what the regulation actually meant in
 8 relation to the circumstances we're talking about,
 9 because that would then provide further guidance to
 10 building control and to fire and rescue services in
 11 terms of their ability to carry out their actions as
 12 a result of the Fire Safety Order, as resulting from
 13 their inspections.
 14 Q. Could we go to page 2 {LFB00032154/2}, which is
 15 recommendation 7. It says this:
 16 "That Government provide guidance for the
 17 responsible person as to how they might assess that the
 18 risk assessor has sufficient training, experience and
 19 knowledge to carry out a suitable assessment of the risk
 20 in complex and high risk premises."
 21 What was it about the Lakanal fire or the LFB's
 22 subsequent investigations that had prompted this
 23 particular recommendation?
 24 A. The Lakanal fire — as it turns out, we later found out
 25 that there wasn't a risk assessment for Lakanal, and

154

1 that was the result of the prosecution, as I recall, in
 2 terms of Southwark Borough Council. However, it was
 3 still our concern that the guidance in relation to the
 4 responsible person was not as clear as it should be in
 5 terms of the type of people they — in terms of their
 6 qualifications required for them to carry out the risk
 7 assessment or, indeed, the people or persons which they
 8 would employ to carry out that on their behalf. Because
 9 these risk assessments could take various stages, they
 10 may be intrusive or not, and in a high-rise building,
 11 they're much more complex than carrying them out in
 12 a low-rise building. So we were concerned that people
 13 of — with inappropriate or insufficient qualifications
 14 were being engaged to carry out these risk assessments.
 15 Q. Was there a more particular concern, namely that fire
 16 risk assessors were failing to identify widespread
 17 failures in compartmentation?
 18 A. That was part of the concern, yes.
 19 MR KINNIER: Thank you.
 20 Sir, we are, I think, at 4.26. The next section of
 21 questions I will not finish in 4 minutes, and, sir,
 22 I think that, in those circumstances, this may be
 23 an appropriate time to end today.
 24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, very well. Thank you very
 25 much.

155

1 Well, it sounds as though that's a sensible point at
 2 which to close for the day, Mr Dobson. I'm afraid we
 3 are going to have to ask you to come back on Monday to
 4 answer some more questions, but not unexpected, I hope.
 5 THE WITNESS: No.
 6 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So we will stop there. We will
 7 resume, please, at 10 o'clock next Monday. As before,
 8 I have to ask you not to discuss your evidence or
 9 anything relating to it over the break.
 10 THE WITNESS: Okay.
 11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right?
 12 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Thank you.
 13 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much indeed.
 14 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.
 15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, well, if you go with the
 16 usher, we will see you on Monday.
 17 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
 19 (Pause)
 20 Thank you very much, Mr Kinnier.
 21 Well, we'll resume on Monday morning. I would just
 22 like to say a quick word of thanks to our transcriber.
 23 And at that point we shall break for the day.
 24 MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.
 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. 10 o'clock on

156

1 Monday, please.
2 (4.27 pm)
3 (The hearing adjourned until 10 am
4 on Monday, 29 November 2021)
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

157

1	INDEX	
2	MS DANIELLE COTTON (continued)	1
3	Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY	1
	(continued)	
4		
	MR RONALD DOBSON (affirmed)	52
5		
	Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY	52
6		
7		
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

158

159

A					
	153:24	almost (6)	22:11 61:2	apprehension (2)	151:6,11
ability (4)	22:3 139:7 143:16	65:11,12 85:25 109:24		approach (2)	130:10 131:14
154:11		alone (2)	53:1 103:17	appropriate (20)	33:20 78:25
able (15)	7:14 10:16 19:10	along (3)	50:20 60:8 110:14	86:13 88:23 92:20 98:3,24	
40:4 41:17 47:11 48:10		alongside (1)	77:1	112:20 114:4 119:15	
53:3 68:13,23 92:21		already (6)	90:20 91:7 97:16	120:9,12 122:12 127:20	
113:3,6 116:17 130:9		104:1 113:23 135:17		131:3 136:24 137:12 140:5	
above (9)	8:24 25:13	also (58)	5:14 8:7 9:6 11:21	151:4 155:23	
73:17,18 74:19 111:25		22:15 23:22 24:9 25:9,13		appropriately (1)	80:5
116:19 126:18 127:1		29:2 31:11 33:4 34:19		approval (1)	135:5
absence (3)	18:10,13 138:3	37:21 44:16 56:10 57:3		approve (1)	39:10
absent (1)	141:6	60:8 63:13 68:8,10 69:9		approved (12)	8:23 11:9
absolutely (3)	71:7 91:13	70:19 71:20,22 74:17		25:23 33:13,14 121:25	
139:14		78:5,12 82:22 86:8 87:19		125:24 127:22 144:5	
abstract (1)	135:16	89:15 90:16 96:4,7,13		146:13 147:13 153:23	
abundant (1)	21:21	97:13,17 99:5 102:22		april (17)	23:5 26:5,13 27:22
ac (10)	2:15 17:16 19:4	104:15 106:2,3 107:6		28:13 29:19 30:10 33:8	
34:12 35:13 56:10,19,23		111:1 113:12 116:13		53:11,14 102:20 116:12	
107:13 117:9		117:13 119:6 120:19,21		133:9,13,16 135:14 136:10	
acai (1)	136:19	121:24 122:9 127:8 137:5		architects (1)	8:17
accept (5)	3:7 5:3 9:21 11:6	123:19 128:6 141:13		architectural (1)	11:23
49:4		144:20 153:24		area (5)	4:7 57:8 92:18
access (1)	48:10	advisable (1)	122:13	113:11 134:19	
accident (1)	80:19	advice (1)	142:22	areas (16)	18:24 27:8 31:1
accidents (1)	81:7	advised (3)	99:23 145:11	37:3,8 58:24 64:16 84:7	
accord (1)	98:17	152:8		87:2 91:8 93:10 94:16	
accordance (2)	69:2 128:4	advisedly (1)	64:2	99:9,10 101:19 152:16	
account (2)	105:8 122:18	adviser (5)	68:8,11 111:21	arena (2)	5:10 11:16
accountability (1)	96:9	112:10 121:6		arent (2)	11:21 79:14
accountable (2)	72:9 87:14	advisers (1)	63:11	arise (1)	78:11
accurate (5)	47:5,22 101:9	advises (1)	142:14	arising (8)	37:5 61:9 81:2
108:16,17		aegis (1)	80:23	86:22 104:2 125:22 148:14	
accurately (1)	53:3	affairs (2)	38:16 103:2	150:22	
achieve (4)	8:14 132:14	affected (4)	24:5 32:25	arose (3)	84:18 104:4 134:21
146:2,4		74:13 127:25		around (20)	2:19 11:24 15:16
achieved (2)	71:20 110:23	affecting (2)	74:20 152:21	23:23 25:23,23 27:24	
achievements (1)	67:24	affirmed (2)	52:2 158:4	30:25 38:25 66:4,5 67:7,8	
acknowledge (1)	90:19	afraid (4)	136:13,21 148:15	85:9 89:21 107:24 110:2	
acoa (5)	44:23 48:18,25	156:2		116:10 134:19 151:13	
49:12,25		after (18)	1:25 4:1 8:3 24:24	arrangement (2)	59:20 60:4
acronym (1)	99:18	33:15,17 34:21 56:12 60:1		arrangements (5)	48:7 59:18
acronymed (1)	125:18	66:4,22 77:24 102:10		97:16 113:12 119:9	
acronyms (2)	65:13,13	118:1,11 125:15 150:4		arriving (1)	109:4
across (7)	3:20,20,23 38:19	153:15		article (21)	1:21 2:12 7:20,24
47:15 116:18 123:10		aftermath (5)	2:8 55:1 72:20	8:3,11 9:12,14,21,23	
action (26)	21:19 22:16	76:25 117:24		11:1,18,18,24 13:19	
33:15 37:10 54:1,2 60:20		afternoon (5)	2:13 7:21	14:4,12,23 16:1,6,20	
79:1 82:3,17,23		94:2,18 96:19 101:17		14:12 15:13 16:1,20	
85:14,15,16 86:5 89:18		103:22 108:21 110:19		articles (1)	11:20
91:14 96:17 99:16 101:2		112:3 124:8 131:10 143:14		ask (22)	1:7 20:21 29:8,18
129:19 131:8 139:10		147:4 148:15,24 156:4		30:9 35:21 36:14 42:5,6,18	
151:5,7,17		120:15 123:5,19 128:22		43:22 44:10 46:15	
actions (29)	55:4,6 61:12	131:13 136:14 142:6		54:23,23 55:2,4 92:11	
72:8,19 78:4 82:5		153:14		109:2 145:24 156:3,8	
83:9,12,18 84:16,22		against (7)	21:16 87:3	asked (12)	15:3
85:6,16 86:24		110:15,17 131:16 140:14		35:15,16,18,23 36:23 40:6	
87:3,13,13,15,24 88:19,20		141:13		42:3 107:12 113:21 138:17	
89:11 93:24 94:7,16 98:13		agenda (6)	31:8 81:18	143:13	
112:21 154:11		104:23 107:14,22 108:1		asking (3)	12:16 128:23
actively (2)	48:4 126:16	agendas (1)	81:17	148:13	
activities (4)	55:3 64:23	agree (20)	25:18 73:3 75:14	asks (2)	38:6,12
68:15 70:1		87:4,12 96:10,11 103:9,14		aspect (2)	142:5 152:23
activity (4)	2:18 17:5 65:6	105:3,15 107:17,17		aspects (8)	5:11 41:13 68:4
150:5		108:13,14 123:18 135:14		78:21 80:8 81:21 125:23	
acts (1)	152:5	136:2,7 143:6		127:22	
actual (3)	11:24 58:25	127:3,11 134:4		assembly (1)	71:2
136:12		agreed (9)	58:10 78:19	assess (3)	19:10 47:3 154:17
actually (41)	13:17 25:19	88:17,17 95:2 99:5,25		assessing (1)	48:3
36:7 49:14 58:19 62:16		107:14 140:4		assessment (13)	21:3 113:4
66:11 67:3 70:25 71:1		agreement (1)	86:23	118:13,24 119:1,7,11	
75:16 77:7 80:4 81:19		ah (1)	15:11	137:21,24 138:5 154:19,25	
93:9,10 95:24 98:7 99:5		ahead (1)	32:2	155:7	
101:23 103:17 104:13		aim (1)	132:14	assessments (4)	18:23
105:13 106:25 107:5 108:4		aims (2)	67:24 69:3	assessor (1)	154:18
113:25 117:13 124:2,15		alan (1)	8:4	assessors (2)	19:10 155:16
129:7,12,13 132:3,5 133:1		alerted (1)	113:5	assigned (1)	82:22
139:22 149:23,25 151:2		alerting (1)	126:2	assist (3)	5:7 99:9 126:21
157:7		alike (1)	21:23	assistance (3)	18:17 68:24
ad (3)	64:6 100:25 144:5	alleged (1)	134:18	147:3	
adb (1)	145:16	alleviate (1)	110:21	assistant (15)	5:13 15:9,18
adb4 (1)	143:22	allocate (1)	86:25	28:2 44:22	
add (2)	50:15 70:12	allow (4)	59:18 63:17 91:7	55:19,22,23,24,25 56:3,7	
added (1)	84:23	116:8		104:18 115:11 125:3	
addition (1)	95:2	allowed (3)	20:18 24:16	assisted (1)	41:24
additional (3)	100:25 152:25	117:4		assisting (1)	50:11
		allowing (1)	62:19	assists (2)	24:9 33:4
		alluding (1)	136:7		

B	
b (10)	11:9 121:25 125:24
127:23 144:5,5 146:13	
147:13 152:18 153:23	
b4 (14)	121:22 141:25
142:6,15,23 143:12,20,22	
145:12 146:16 147:1	
149:19 153:11,25	
b41 (3)	146:12 147:5 149:9
babcock (1)	67:10
back (27)	1:7 9:18,23 10:6
28:5 31:22 37:11 42:4,16	
61:8 77:14 80:20 82:25	
85:10 91:20 93:14 94:23	

108:18 118:16 120:6	
122:20 125:7 127:4 128:9	
140:11 149:16 156:3	
background (5)	17:16 21:16
39:25 134:2 150:17	
balance (3)	43:24 89:3 93:3
balconies (3)	120:18,21,22
barrier (1)	130:6
barriers (1)	116:22
barwell (3)	23:5 26:2 28:3
based (4)	13:19 18:8 109:25
122:4	
basically (1)	84:20
basis (7)	15:20 19:2 61:3
65:11 68:14 88:23 152:8	
bear (1)	143:15
bearing (4)	75:9 119:17
139:9 140:6	
beast (3)	108:7,9 111:5
became (9)	2:21,23 19:14,14
35:18 56:7 94:12 95:13	
131:12	
become (9)	4:14 22:9 28:8
36:4 41:14 65:13 79:15	
88:25 122:9	
becoming (1)	134:12
before (34)	21:3 26:21 27:9
28:10 33:25 36:15 37:13	
42:20 44:11,23 46:18	
52:14 54:16 55:4,7 57:16	
60:3 74:4 82:6 90:19 91:6	
92:6 93:21 98:23	
109:12,15 115:7 116:12	
121:16 124:11,14 135:2	
148:16 156:7	
beginning (1)	24:20
behalf (5)	50:15 125:1 130:4
132:10 155:8	
behaviour (1)	113:8
behest (1)	131:19
behind (1)	45:8
being (44)	8:19 9:7 12:23
19:5 26:23 33:16 34:17,25	
35:13 37:4,10 40:1	
47:21,22 49:21 50:7	
55:13,14 74:25 76:17 79:6	
86:6,19 94:3 97:4,12 100:3	
101:25 106:6 107:6 108:18	
111:5 113:5 116:7,17	
123:12 126:20 133:2	
134:14 135:5 137:15 138:9	
148:1 155:14	
belief (2)	3:13 132:3
believe (12)	25:21 48:16
49:3 73:20 80:2 95:23	
122:11 124:12 139:14,22	
140:17 141:7	
believed (2)	140:19 149:22
below (11)	8:8 32:10 33:9
63:14 69:20 123:18 74:5	
83:11 116:21 147:4 150:15	
ben (3)	31:14 34:3 37:11
benefit (1)	109:13
bespoke (1)	80:22
best (7)	15:23 32:3 51:12
71:21 103:19,20 113:19	
better (2)	41:19 78:22
between (17)	18:5 23:23
34:4 36:16 43:24 62:9,11	
65:1,4 72:12 73:4 75:25	
79:16 91:3 97:6 98:9 130:6	
bevan (3)	44:15 46:4 48:20
beyond (3)	87:25 111:13
136:4	
big (5)	31:5 108:7,9 110:5
111:5	
bigger (1)	109:18
biles (5)	9:16,25 10:1,10,20
bishop (2)	124:1,6
bit (7)	16:25 17:16 28:6
41:16 42:6 43:2,8	
bits (1)	52:14
blaze (1)	1:25
blind (4)	108:4,19,20 110:22
block (3)	18:12 23:19 32:18
blocks (7)	18:20 23:19 32:17

115:17 117:19 127:13,19	
blunt (1)	101:25
board (57)	17:17,24 30:18
34:20 35:8,12,20,22 50:6	
59:21 60:19 62:24	
63:4,8,12,19 65:10,15	
66:14,23 69:9,11 76:6,23	
77:14,25 78:16,19,20 79:4	
80:3,23 81:2,2,2,3	
82:3,12,15 85:17,23	
86:1,16,21 87:12,15,16,17	
88:7,8,12,15,22,24,25	
91:14 94:11 106:22	
boards (5)	66:19,20 70:9
81:15 82:1	
bodies (7)	54:25 59:14 86:9
129:11 137:4 138:24 139:1	
body (11)	3:7,19 7:14 59:21
89:6 94:4,5 128:4,8,13	
135:1	
bold (2)	33:9 39:8
borough (2)	148:10 155:2
boroughs (2)	70:18 115:12
both (10)	30:17 40:1 52:18
77:16 78:6 80:21 118:4	
149:11 152:6,7	
bottom (6)	14:12 16:11 18:2
37:19 93:16 130:12	
boundaries (1)	21:4
boundary (1)	147:11
box (3)	33:9 67:19 69:20
bradbury (1)	130:17
brandon (2)	23:11 150:5
bre (1)	125:22
breached (1)	17:7
breaches (10)	2:17 3:2,15,17
13:9,15 20:12 24:16 27:25	
41:12	
break (13)	42:11,16
43:2,7,14 51:17 52:20,22	
114:9,24 115:7 156:9,23	
breakdown (2)	138:7 153:1
brenda (1)	48:21
brian (3)	133:23 145:12
146:15	
bridgehead (1)	132:23
brief (1)	56:22
briefing (1)	136:11
briefly (1)	82:14
brigade (55)	1:6 2:22 4:16
7:8 13:15 17:1 22:1 27:24	
32:7 34:12 36:7 40:20	
41:7,24 50:4 54:21 56:16	
57:1,11 58:6 59:25 65:6	
67:22 68:5 70:5 72:25 73:2	
74:9 78:10 79:24 80:10	
81:4 86:4,25 90:20 91:11	
92:5 97:15 104:5,6	
105:11,13,124 106:25	
107:7,10 109:5 111:4	
130:7 134:13 142:10	
144:13 146:2 149:25	
150:10	
brigades (10)	57:4,7 60:20
75:22 95:21 105:10 107:23	
119:18 144:25 149:6	
bringing (3)	6:22 35:23
115:17	
brinson (1)	8:4
british (2)	2:5,6
broad (6)	70:3 77:23 79:7
87:4 111:11 142:8	
broaden (2)	63:5 87:6
broadly (1)	151:24
brought (15)	6:4,12
16:7,9,17 26:17 28:19	
29:7,9,12,15,17 66:14	
132:1,22	
brown (8)	5:14 35:6,12,16,23

4:4,22 5:5,7,24 6:1,4 11:8 12:2,23 13:9 14:7,10 18:7,9,24 19:11 23:17,22 24:4,8,17,18,19 25:4,13,24,25 27:2 30:14 32:20,24 33:3,12,12,13,16 34:7 38:12 41:11 75:13,18 76:8 112:8 113:6,13 116:10 117:5,6,7 118:5 121:12,22 122:4,17 125:25 127:15,15,22 128:2,4,7,11,13,22 129:8 132:23 133:12,16 134:9,13,16,21,24,25 135:11,15 136:23 137:11,13,25 138:19 139:5 141:25 142:3,5,11 143:17 145:14,14,14 146:17 147:1,7,8,12,15 148:1,14 149:9,12 151:14 153:11,13 154:10 155:10,12	cause (9) 7:12 27:6 46:12 77:2,17 101:12,13 117:4 142:24 caused (2) 138:2 141:5 causes (3) 119:19 131:12 140:20 causing (2) 87:23 116:19 cavities (4) 116:23,24 138:4 144:4 cavity (1) 116:9 cbt (1) 6:16 ceiling (1) 118:5 central (4) 7:14 31:6 141:24 151:24 ceos (1) 127:10 certain (3) 102:2 125:23 139:14 cetera (9) 38:10 47:6 66:13 72:18 91:14 123:9 139:12 151:14 153:2 cfos (1) 112:11 cfra (1) 112:11 chair (4) 44:2 70:24 87:12 96:4 chaired (4) 66:22,23 87:15,17 chairman (4) 1:16 42:6 43:11,21 challenge (1) 29:22 challenges (1) 44:8 challenging (2) 23:1 45:4 chance (2) 42:11,14 change (2) 119:7 151:18 changed (2) 2:8 55:25 changes (4) 104:2 107:8 119:9 141:14 changing (1) 58:5 charge (2) 5:15 26:19 charged (2) 70:4 140:15 check (5) 27:14 42:11 122:13,15 128:20 checked (1) 128:3 checking (1) 133:18 checks (2) 136:24 137:12 chief (14) 55:19,22,24 56:3 68:11 81:20 85:25 106:21 111:20 112:10,11,17 115:10 121:5 chose (1) 70:24 cic (2) 133:22 136:19 circular (6) 111:20,24 112:25 113:17 115:8,9 circulate (1) 130:23 circulated (1) 129:8 circulation (1) 130:22 circumstance (2) 5:10 6:21 circumstances (6) 117:13 119:15 120:9 122:11 154:8 155:22 cite (1) 20:11 clad (1) 112:16 cladding (8) 2:1 8:17,22 102:17 103:3 127:19,21 131:15 clarification (4) 126:20 146:5 148:13 149:22 clarified (2) 148:8,9 clarify (1) 126:17 clarity (1) 154:7 class (3) 2:7 8:13,18 clause (3) 8:22 9:17 10:11 clear (9) 22:21 52:16 78:3,6 79:15 85:5 129:18 140:19 155:4 clearanceto (1) 37:25 clearer (1) 131:12 clearly (3) 6:23 27:25 144:5 clg (7) 111:19 126:23 133:23 136:22 145:20 146:15 148:13 clg10009016 (1) 23:4 clg100090162 (1) 23:8 clg10090162 (1) 25:5 cllr (2) 100:4,4 close (2) 31:8 156:2 closely (4) 66:10 101:20	107:20 149:10 closest (1) 63:18 cluster (1) 109:11 cmb (14) 17:18 34:25 35:4 36:15,24 37:7 62:24 63:3,9,21 64:9,18,18 110:13 cmbs (1) 64:2 coalface (1) 63:18 cold (1) 122:21 collapse (1) 134:13 colleagues (16) 11:13 13:22,24,25 14:7,14,15,19,23 15:16 16:18 22:12 30:5 126:19,23 144:20 collect (1) 48:4 combustibility (3) 9:2 11:12 147:16 combustion (2) 18:11 20:18 come (30) 1:7 4:14 5:9,11,24 7:16 16:19 20:1 24:24 25:2 27:7 38:19 42:1,16 43:10 45:14 52:5 59:12 74:23 101:17 105:20 106:23 110:14 121:16 133:7 134:20 135:3 142:13 150:14 156:3 comes (1) 74:18 comfortable (1) 52:4 coming (8) 50:10,20 52:13 54:17 55:4 60:8 69:11 127:17 command (3) 47:20 48:11 93:2 commander (1) 47:22 commanders (6) 41:19 48:10 76:7 92:4 113:2,10 comment (8) 9:22 10:1,15,20,21 11:1,5 98:24 commented (1) 84:6 commenting (1) 130:18 comments (9) 8:3,8 9:12,14 10:5 11:17,20 16:20 84:4 commissioned (3) 35:5,13 36:12 commissioner (66) 1:5 3:4 5:13 15:9 19:14 20:1 21:7 26:18 28:2,25 29:14 30:1,20 34:22 35:18 36:17 40:20 44:18,22 48:15 51:7,19 55:23,25 56:4,7,20 57:10,17 58:14,19,20,22,25 59:4,13,19 62:9,13,15,18 66:17 67:18 68:3,21 71:5 99:24 104:8,18 105:3,22 109:12,16 110:25 111:2 112:2 123:13,25 124:1,3,10,16 125:3 130:21 144:19 145:17 commissioners (16) 15:18 17:18 35:8,12,19,22 50:6 60:1 61:25 62:1 64:21,25 69:6 87:22 100:24 115:12 commit (1) 98:7 committee (12) 64:12 68:6 70:10,14 95:7 97:24,25 98:3,10 100:7,9 103:2 committees (6) 59:14 64:11,13 66:19,20 70:10 common (8) 23:24 38:21 47:8 136:6 152:18,18,21,22 commons (1) 31:14 communal (2) 20:17 23:23 communicate (1) 62:20 communicated (1) 60:2 communication (5) 91:3 93:12 97:6 109:22 140:10 communications (6) 62:9,11 75:25 76:12 92:5 93:3 communities (2) 126:19 152:2 community (1) 57:2 companies (1) 134:23	company (1) 122:10 comparatively (1) 75:21 compared (3) 75:22 84:11 109:18 compartment (2) 111:14 136:5 compartmentation (43) 2:17,19 3:2,21 13:11 17:2,6,10 18:3,5,10,24 19:8,11 20:5,12,25 21:18,20 22:17 23:22 24:7,12,15,23 25:10 26:25 27:19 33:2 73:7 102:8 119:2,5,9,19,25 120:3,13 132:19 138:8 153:1,6 155:17 competence (1) 47:3 competency (1) 25:9 competently (1) 47:12 competing (1) 31:11 complete (5) 27:5 47:17 64:3,5 101:9 completed (5) 33:16 88:6,14 89:11,18 completely (7) 4:11 41:3,4 76:4 106:7,12 141:11 complex (2) 154:20 155:11 compliance (7) 50:2 128:6,11,21 133:12 136:24 138:18 compliant (6) 5:25 8:19 49:15 75:12,13,18 complied (2) 3:9 137:11 complies (2) 136:23 145:14 comply (5) 2:5 4:22 5:5 134:9,16 composite (1) 118:6 comprehensive (1) 86:13 comprised (1) 59:21 compromised (1) 20:12 concealed (1) 23:24 concern (19) 21:9 22:22 23:18 25:22 32:15 61:14 102:5 117:4 119:23 135:4 138:25 139:1 145:15 148:7 153:14 154:4 155:3,15,18 concerned (14) 24:20 25:9 33:14 37:8 63:10 65:21 66:24 74:15 93:2 122:22 134:11 135:10 152:5 155:12 concerns (14) 4:2 19:9 27:20 36:2,4,10 37:5 60:7 66:24 121:13 127:18 133:17 138:11 152:4 concluding (1) 92:6 conclusion (6) 6:7 103:25 138:14,21 144:2,9 conclusions (1) 20:23 concur (2) 99:3,7 conducted (2) 49:13 122:4 confined (2) 63:6 149:19 confirm (4) 52:10 54:5 147:9,12 confirmed (2) 125:10 149:14 confirming (1) 149:25 conflating (1) 11:10 conflict (2) 24:18 69:7 conflicted (1) 140:24 confronted (1) 132:18 confused (1) 8:17 confusion (1) 76:9 conjunction (2) 58:9 112:18 connected (5) 4:8,10,16,19 22:12 conscious (1) 106:7 consequent (1) 26:25 consequential (4) 60:20 76:21 79:5 82:23 consequently (3) 19:2 116:17 135:10 conservative (2) 31:23,25 consider (16) 18:23,25 32:7 45:9,11,22 64:9 80:4 84:7 85:1 100:1 113:22 131:5,13,16 150:25	considerable (2) 78:8 105:2 consideration (5) 102:10 119:2 124:24 132:17 150:14 considered (11) 46:9 63:3 64:7 66:19 78:9,18 90:11 104:10,14 149:11 151:3 considering (1) 63:16 consisted (2) 65:16 95:15 consistently (1) 107:16 consisting (1) 95:3 constitute (1) 84:17 constructed (4) 9:8 111:12 117:2 118:7 construction (20) 9:1 23:16,21 32:16,20 112:8,23 113:6,13 117:1 133:16,17,21 134:10,22,23 135:5 136:22 137:11,13 consultation (1) 33:21 consulted (1) 124:18 consumed (1) 108:10 contact (2) 86:9 129:22 contain (1) 27:6 contained (6) 5:13 7:10 15:17 34:15 49:15 86:5 containing (3) 16:14 18:7 152:16 contains (3) 10:15 12:8 147:5 content (2) 61:18 148:6 contents (5) 54:6 91:18 124:18 128:17 148:20 context (6) 25:12 60:19 104:5,19 107:18 113:14 continue (1) 1:4 continued (4) 1:8,15 158:2,3 continues (2) 47:19 116:23 continuing (2) 98:13 121:15 contractor (1) 25:9 contracts (3) 66:23 67:1,2 contractual (2) 57:24 66:8 contrary (2) 24:17 148:1 contrasts (1) 128:17 contribute (1) 87:9 contributed (2) 116:16,17 contributing (1) 140:20 control (32) 33:13 34:12,18 36:2,4,5,8,13 67:4 75:25 83:2,9,13 84:1,7,8 88:1 91:3 92:5 93:5 102:3 127:15 128:4,7,13 133:16 134:25 139:5 142:11 151:14 152:21 154:10 controlled (1) 147:17 convenient (1) 51:14 conveniently (1) 77:21 conversation (9) 12:22 13:4,7,8,17 14:6,14 28:11 34:4 conversations (6) 12:20 13:23 14:2 15:5,21 44:14 converted (1) 72:7 139:15 convey (1) 25:19 coordinate (2) 66:10,12 coordinated (6) 68:18 80:6,10 81:5,13 86:14 coordination (1) 65:15 copied (2) 23:11 31:4 copy (2) 126:25 127:5 core (4) 8:21 47:11,15 69:21 coroner (8) 90:8 91:6,10,13 92:7 94:8,16 121:16 coroners (8) 79:25 91:20 93:18 96:10,17 99:16 100:17 101:1 corporate (10) 34:20 59:20 62:23 65:9 67:21 69:9,11,13 140:15,16 corralled (1) 81:12 correct (27) 53:7 54:3 55:11,15 56:9 57:12,15 58:3,16 59:6,10 62:4 63:7,25 66:2 82:10,21 88:11 93:7 99:20,21 118:8 120:5 122:16 133:25	142:14 145:3 correction (2) 53:22 54:5 correctly (3) 117:2 146:16,25 correspondence (4) 117:25 121:2 141:24 147:21 corridor (1) 153:4 corridors (1) 153:2 cotton (13) 1:5,7,8,9,18 20:14 40:18 42:1,9 43:16 50:9,14 158:2 couldnt (8) 12:13 13:13 16:1 26:1 139:6 140:7,9 143:6 council (3) 133:22 148:10 155:2 councils (1) 70:19 counsel (6) 1:15 42:9 51:8 52:8 158:3,5 countries (1) 15:17 country (2) 106:1 107:4 couple (1) 89:20 coupled (1) 89:12 course (14) 26:18 32:12 43:9 51:14 52:21 63:23 76:16 88:10 89:18 92:10 94:11 105:18 150:13 151:24 cover (1) 56:18 covered (4) 8:22 28:7 85:3 116:7 covers (1) 57:1 created (1) 56:13 crews (12) 21:20,22 22:2,22 76:7 131:20 132:17 133:4 140:8,23 141:8,15 critical (7) 24:7 33:2 48:3,5,8 113:5,9 crops (1) 43:6 crude (4) 72:13 108:11,14,15 crudely (1) 108:8 cultural (5) 106:6 108:4 109:11 110:21 144:13 culture (7) 105:13,16 106:7,16 108:23 109:9 111:4 cure (3) 105:21 106:17 110:20 currently (1) 146:22 cutbill (7) 81:21 85:19,22 89:16,19,24 130:17 cutbills (1) 89:17 cwj0000001027 (1) 74:3 cwj000000022 (1) 46:15 cwj0000000223 (1) 46:21 cwj00000002224 (1) 47:25 cwj000001033 (1) 73:24 cyclical (2) 64:3,8	dclg (2) 23:7 117:25 dcol (1) 112:17 deadlines (2) 33:17,20 deal (8) 2:17,18 22:3 43:6 47:12 79:1 80:9 141:9 dealing (7) 5:17 29:2 31:2 66:15 94:7 154:5,6 dealings (1) 5:10 deals (1) 99:15 dealt (10) 39:15 72:17 79:24 80:5,7 81:12 86:6 87:19 104:1 150:6 decisions (1) 84:16 decided (7) 33:21 88:6,7,17,21 98:2 131:16 decision (3) 36:16 76:5 123:17 decisionmaking (1) 86:19 decisions (1) 48:11 decisive (1) 151:17 decreasing (2) 110:24 111:2 dedicated (2) 87:18 89:19 deeper (1) 36:12 deeply (1) 24:19 defects (8) 120:3 134:21,24 135:2,12 136:1 137:14 138:2 defend (1) 18:8 deficiencies (2) 24:23 25:10 definitely (4) 4:13 14:18 28:15,16 definitions (1) 68:1 degree (1) 76:8 deliberations (3) 81:16,25 82:1 delivery (8) 47:14 56:8,10,19,23 66:15 87:23 108:6 demands (1) 63:9 demonstrated (1) 109:21 demonstrates (1) 96:15 department (7) 4:15 6:15,20,25 7:3 12:4,5,7,9 13:2,18 14:24 15:1,2,8,24 16:14,21 25:19 56:2,5 104:15,16 107:19 121:18 123:14 124:23 125:2 130:7 144:12,21 145:5,22 147:23 149:22 150:15 152:2 departments (7) 14:19 15:19 65:17 80:7 83:2,22 86:25 dependent (1) 49:10 depending (1) 58:7 depth (1) 116:5 deputise (1) 58:24 deputised (2) 58:21,23 deputy (18) 29:13 56:4,20 57:17 58:14,18,20,22,25 59:4 66:17 123:12,25 124:1,3,10,16 130:21 describe (4) 72:24 85:25 86:21 101:16 described (7) 67:20 70:7 71:18 94:7 96:21 112:20 152:17 description (3) 67:17 69:19 72:4 deserved (1) 107:16 design (1) 113:24 designed (4) 3:15 24:1 32:21 62:8 desirable (1) 90:11 desk (2) 38:19 49:2 despatched (1) 115:10 despite (2) 38:3 123:12			
C					D				
c (1) 136:18 call (5) 39:20 51:25 102:16 109:5 151:16 called (3) 59:25 110:12 136:16 calling (1) 33:10 calls (3) 75:21 84:15 91:4 cambewell (2) 146:24 150:12 came (16) 3:20,20,23 9:16 23:9 26:21 28:23 70:17,18 76:2 82:5 83:18 103:25 105:23 108:20 109:8 campaign (1) 39:1 campaigning (1) 38:14 cant (21) 14:17 22:13 26:7 27:21 28:17 29:5 40:7,11 45:13 67:6 91:9,12,19 101:13,23 102:4 117:21 129:10 136:13 139:14 148:15 capable (1) 142:7 capacities (1) 4:25 capital (1) 135:18 capture (1) 72:13 care (1) 117:16 career (2) 2:23 55:8 carried (8) 58:21 62:12 69:4 91:8 117:14 121:11 128:3 138:5 carry (14) 1:11 52:7 79:22 98:3 115:1 137:24 138:1 139:5,7 154:11,19 155:6,8,14 carrying (4) 79:20 146:22 150:11 155:11 cases (6) 25:1 71:15 116:4 120:21 134:19,22 catastrophic (1) 41:11 caught (2) 95:22,23					dac (3) 85:19,22 130:17 daily (3) 61:2,19 65:11 daly (4) 2:15 12:10,14 17:4,16 19:4 25:22 26:8,16 28:10 34:4 39:25 104:18 139:15 dalys (1) 107:13 damage (1) 134:14 dan (10) 2:15 12:10,14 17:4 25:22 26:8,16 28:10 34:4 39:25 dane (2) 8:10 9:23 danger (2) 18:19 112:15 danielle (2) 1:8 158:2 dany (2) 1:5 38:2 date (8) 26:3 44:2 48:8 67:7 123:19 124:9 125:9,11 dated (9) 23:4 53:8,11,14 90:15 125:14 127:8 142:12 150:7 dave (9) 5:14 35:6,12,16,23 36:14 59:8 62:3				

detail (10) 16:25 28:4 46:3,7 70:12 83:10 92:9,22 101:4 136:17 detailed (4) 110:11 147:24 148:13,23 details (3) 11:23 27:6 83:12 determine (1) 104:13 determined (3) 88:5 126:4,8 develop (1) 63:8 developed (2) 109:13 147:24 developers (2) 11:7 13:10 developing (1) 99:9 development (4) 24:22 82:4 109:9 112:18 devolved (1) 66:17 devoting (1) 78:8 dexter (17) 2:15 57:18 59:4 93:4 95:19 96:7 99:4 103:9,14 123:12,24 124:2,15 130:17,20 131:1 136:4 dexters (2) 93:11 125:8 didn't (38) 5:10 9:12,14 10:4,5 11:17 13:20 15:3 16:20,22 22:14 29:19,21 30:2,6,16,20 36:21 37:15 46:10,13 62:15 71:14 89:6 104:13 105:10,11,14 106:8 124:15 129:4,17,25,25 130:8 133:3 137:25 145:6 died (3) 24:15 77:6 78:14 different (9) 6:21 12:24 14:8,11 34:11 36:20 97:1 125:11,12 differently (3) 69:1 84:24 126:10 difficult (6) 6:7 75:5 105:8 110:19 132:13 147:16 dijon (1) 8:7 diot (4) 27:8 80:17 81:8 82:1 direct (3) 24:18 26:22 140:4 directed (3) 24:5 32:25 152:4 direction (2) 67:22 113:18 directional (1) 84:24 directions (1) 73:12 directly (10) 24:5 32:25 50:18 57:17 58:22 59:7 60:5 93:1 98:4 143:16 director (9) 3:4 29:10,13,18 35:6 57:20,23 59:8 99:18 directorate (12) 11:7 17:17,24 22:14 30:5,18 35:7 56:2 66:7 87:4 93:1,11 directorates (14) 4:8 61:11 64:24 65:3,15 66:6,10 68:15,17,18,23 69:2 87:10 89:1 directors (30) 58:21,23 59:7,18,22 60:5,10,17,23 61:2,22 62:2,10,15,20 63:6 64:23 65:1,5,8,16 69:5 85:19 87:20 89:15 94:21 100:23 101:1 110:13 130:24 disagree (3) 73:3,14 75:9 disagreement (1) 69:8 disasters (1) 106:4 discerned (1) 98:17 discharged (1) 70:8 disclosure (1) 126:21 disconnected (1) 4:12 discontinued (1) 58:17 discover (1) 4:6 discovered (1) 21:2 discuss (13) 25:15 42:21 59:23 60:7 62:17 65:2 86:21 99:25 100:24 114:13 133:17 145:12 156:8 discussed (15) 14:7,15 26:15 50:5 54:16 61:7 100:3 121:18 126:18 132:20 138:9 140:7 144:14 147:22 148:25 discussing (3) 37:6 104:7	115:7 discussion (17) 13:17 14:16,22 15:12,14,16 34:2,6 39:22 40:12,13 126:21 136:16 137:1 138:10 142:24 143:4 discussions (11) 61:9,20 63:2 69:7 88:3 89:12,15 94:20 131:6 143:12 150:2 disseminated (1) 22:7 distance (1) 147:11 distinction (1) 86:20 distinctive (1) 135:21 distort (1) 116:8 dmb (1) 17:18 dobson (22) 36:17 51:7,19,25 52:2,11,12 54:20 69:16 74:25 75:8 84:25 92:9 108:8 114:8 115:1,7 118:10 126:13 132:10 156:2 158:4 document (29) 8:23 10:25 11:9 17:12 18:1 31:18 33:25 37:12 43:23 44:11,13 45:11 46:7,10,11,16,20,23 48:25 49:5,16 82:18 121:25 125:24 127:23 144:5 146:13 147:13 153:23 documents (11) 41:14 54:13,14 63:22 64:1,19 85:9 86:15 91:9 127:5 150:2 does (11) 16:19 72:13,15 81:25 98:17,19 114:5 136:25 137:3 144:5 152:20 doesnt (3) 25:18 52:17 129:23 doing (6) 4:13 36:9 39:1 66:11 86:4 107:3 domestic (1) 152:17 done (7) 39:24 41:18 67:4 83:13 91:12 106:20 138:18 dont (52) 3:12 4:7 19:24 21:10,11,12,24 22:9 23:3 25:7 28:14 30:6 31:19,20 33:24 34:1,1,9 35:8 37:16,17 38:18,25 39:14,19,23 40:10,14 42:21 46:19 48:16 49:3,17,18,19,21,23 52:23 73:20 74:23 75:9 100:14 111:7 114:13 120:14,25 124:12 136:11 138:9 139:24 145:7 148:5 doort (2) 99:18,23 doubt (5) 38:18 101:12,13 128:5,11 down (16) 8:9 20:15 23:14 31:21 47:4 52:4 60:16 75:1,3 88:12,15 101:18 112:1 118:4 124:5 132:23 downward (1) 74:13 downwards (3) 73:16,19 132:24 dr (3) 44:15 46:4 48:20 draft (5) 31:17 33:23 37:12 38:18 83:8 drafted (1) 125:1 drafting (1) 123:15 draftsman (1) 125:4 draw (2) 115:20 121:17 drawbridge (1) 14:18 drawn (2) 6:7 95:4 droplets (1) 73:17 dubai (2) 1:25 15:25 due (11) 9:8 18:18 23:16 61:16 73:17 76:15 78:4 92:10 94:11 133:15 134:9 duplicated (1) 140:25 during (13) 21:7 41:18 49:12 86:3 87:16 105:21 110:5,25 111:2 114:9 116:16 134:10,10 duties (8) 43:25 45:6,10,18 58:8 68:7 72:2 107:23	duty (1) 47:15 dwellings (2) 18:7,12 dynamic (1) 80:17 <div>E</div> e (1) 137:18 earlier (12) 27:16 29:9 37:12 61:24 62:23 85:20,24 100:11 108:3 131:10,17 144:14 early (5) 18:13 27:22 28:13 56:1 119:21 easier (1) 75:2 easiest (1) 85:24 east (2) 9:5 142:12 effect (2) 27:1 129:24 effective (12) 5:20 19:9 20:6 27:20 47:3,18 62:19 64:22 67:21 72:8 101:6 151:7 effectively (4) 30:25 81:19 86:2 130:20 effectiveness (2) 47:14 48:6 effects (3) 24:9 33:4 110:21 efficacy (1) 29:23 efficient (2) 62:19,22 efforts (2) 87:10 110:20 eg (2) 18:19 19:1 eight (2) 2:10 125:15 either (9) 5:24 12:14,15 80:21 104:1 134:10,25 137:15 153:23 electd (6) 58:10 61:9 64:10 70:16 95:3 97:10 election (3) 32:1,3 38:4 element (4) 67:25 72:4 77:4 107:12 elements (1) 119:5 ellis (1) 14:18 else (3) 26:8 100:20 131:18 elsewhere (2) 88:6 150:1 email (7) 7:20 9:18 10:6,9 11:15 37:22 130:13 emails (1) 2:13 emboldened (3) 83:11 112:7 116:2 emerged (1) 78:24 emergencies (1) 97:15 emergency (5) 19:3 63:23 67:23 68:6,9 emerging (2) 120:16 141:15 emphasise (1) 118:25 employ (1) 155:8 employed (1) 107:9 employers (2) 44:9 45:19 enable (2) 60:5 66:14 encounter (1) 131:21 encountered (3) 2:17 131:22 138:12 end (3) 42:1,10 155:23 ended (1) 105:2 enforced (2) 13:10 135:5 enforcement (7) 2:18 3:3,19 17:4,11 33:15 34:7 enforcing (1) 115:19 engage (1) 106:19 engaged (2) 142:22 155:14 engagement (2) 36:9 151:12 engine (1) 109:4 engineers (1) 16:15 engines (1) 106:2 england (3) 103:17 127:11,12 english (3) 68:2 71:11 107:10 enough (1) 141:2 ensure (29) 5:19 21:5 26:1 33:10,12 37:3,9 47:10,17 48:1 49:14 67:23 69:2 70:1 72:7 78:25 81:14 84:14 86:5 112:12 113:9,12 119:4,12 135:2,6 146:15,25 151:5 ensured (1) 89:10 ensuring (2) 136:22 137:10 entirely (3) 88:23 139:23 143:8	entitled (6) 17:9 43:24 67:19 92:6 118:12 127:12 envelope (4) 147:7,14,17 153:13 environment (3) 3:14 28:1 103:1 environments (1) 23:2 equip (1) 47:11 equipped (1) 41:19 erm (1) 124:12 erroneous (1) 149:18 escape (11) 18:13,15,18,25 23:23 97:8 118:14 119:3 120:18,23,24 essence (3) 38:8 68:2 72:14 essential (2) 18:8 78:9 essentially (1) 82:19 essentials (1) 111:17 established (9) 19:8 20:5 27:19 55:1 66:4,5 76:20 95:3 97:4 establishment (1) 122:5 et (9) 38:10 47:6 66:13 72:18 91:14 123:9 139:12 151:14 153:2 etc (1) 8:25 euphemism (1) 143:6 evacuate (3) 23:1 24:3 32:23 evacuation (8) 18:8 19:6 20:3 22:23 24:19 27:18 119:14 120:8 evaluations (1) 36:21 even (4) 2:15 18:16 41:9 48:15 event (3) 24:3 32:23 116:8 events (3) 26:12 39:19 41:1 ever (7) 4:6 19:21 33:25 44:10 46:12,18 49:21 every (2) 104:21 105:6 everybody (1) 1:22 everyone (2) 1:3 130:25 everything (1) 130:25 evidence (24) 1:5 17:3 19:12 23:17 32:15 34:13 40:24 41:15 42:21 50:17 51:19 52:13 54:10,16 73:24 74:25 95:19 104:18 114:13 133:8 136:4 147:22 148:3 156:8 evident (4) 4:15 22:9 41:14 84:12 exact (2) 14:17 67:6 exactly (6) 17:20 49:1 91:9 101:24 129:11 130:25 examination (1) 102:12 examine (1) 96:12 examined (1) 51:7 examining (2) 7:5 102:15 example (1) 83:5 examples (7) 12:22 20:11,16,25 21:2,17 99:7 except (2) 73:16 96:11 exceptionally (4) 29:1,4 30:23 38:21 exceptions (1) 3:17 exchange (1) 150:4 exclusively (2) 71:1 109:24 executive (2) 43:23 44:17 exercise (2) 69:11 72:2 exercised (3) 59:13 64:22 65:7 exhibit (3) 17:13 67:14 93:20 exhibited (5) 54:12 90:13 91:17 134:7 146:19 exist (1) 116:11 existed (7) 56:15 58:15 59:14 97:17 106:16 130:6 133:2 existence (1) 87:16 existing (1) 90:23 exit (1) 132:7 expand (1) 22:16 expect (4) 49:1 61:2 73:21 132:25 expectation (1) 49:15 expectations (1) 125:23	expected (6) 16:15 71:6 85:6 129:19 141:8 153:5 expecting (1) 85:3 experience (12) 18:22 58:18 62:18 71:14 74:5 75:23 77:9,10 90:21 144:17 151:12 154:18 experienced (1) 13:16 expert (3) 1:25 46:4 72:1 expertise (3) 49:11 70:22,22 expires (2) 33:15,17 explain (9) 10:16 19:23 21:19 46:6 48:17 55:18 59:2 77:22 95:12 explained (10) 6:17,20 10:2,19,22 14:6 30:23 87:7 95:19 108:3 explains (2) 34:16 146:9 explanation (1) 105:9 explore (2) 12:3 76:15 extended (1) 33:20 extending (1) 67:2 extensive (2) 73:9 90:21 extensively (1) 81:8 extent (4) 86:11 87:9 106:12 151:15 external (9) 11:19 16:5 17:7,20 20:8 21:25 22:1 39:6 62:18 63:17 67:16 73:22 82:13 90:13 127:7 142:9 146:8,20 149:4 150:7 152:13 findings (6) 36:2 37:6 62:14 97:19 119:11 120:16 fine (1) 9:19 finish (1) 155:21 fire (379) 1:6,25 2:9,22,22 4:9,10,12,15,16 5:7,11,14,15,24 6:18 7:8,9,17 8:6,10,16 10:4 11:13,15,16,22,25 12:4,5,6,6,7,9,25 13:4,5,6,14,15,18,18,25 14:23,25 15:2,8,9,19,24,25 16:13,15,21 17:9,11 18:6,10,11,14,23 19:10 20:11 21:3 22:1,11 23:12,21 24:3,3,7,9,10,14,16,24 25:3,11,22 26:9,16 27:4,6,6,11,23 28:2,25 29:23 30:13 32:7,9,19,22,23 33:2,4,5,19 36:7 39:2 40:20,20 41:3,3,7,10,19,23 43:25 44:8 45:4,20 46:17,25 47:9 50:4 54:21 55:2,3 56:24,25,25 57:4,7,11 58:10 59:25 61:16 63:23 66:12 67:17,22,23 68:5,6,9,12 70:5,6,22 71:14,17,18,19,22 72:2,19,25 factual (1) 19:2 fail (5) 4:22,24 5:7,25 116:19 failed (1) 5:24 failing (1) 155:16 failure (10) 6:4 13:11 17:2 26:25 41:11 73:7 116:16 132:2,19 138:3 failures (8) 3:21 23:17 134:9,16 137:19 138:15,20 155:17 fair (12) 64:3,5 65:22 86:20 111:16 123:2,5 124:21 125:5 128:22 135:19 147:20 fall (3) 61:6 64:7 129:6 false (1) 118:5 familiar (5) 2:25 46:1,2,3 65:13 familiarisation (1) 92:2 far (4) 74:15 129:4 135:9 148:2 fatalities (4) 1:24 6:24 7:1 8:5 fatality (1) 6:18 fears (1) 1:25 features (5) 75:8 119:20 132:19 135:21 152:21 february (7) 34:21 36:15 103:7 146:14 147:23 149:3,16 fed (4) 27:7,12 81:15 82:1 feed (1) 61:8	feel (5) 88:21 101:4,8 121:16 130:8 feeling (2) 36:6 129:3 fell (2) 92:18 93:3 felt (2) 101:20 125:25 fep2072 (1) 93:19 fifthly (1) 92:5 fighters (1) 134:14 fighting (3) 111:16 112:15,22 filler (1) 8:25 final (5) 40:17 90:17 120:6 149:6 153:9 finally (4) 52:25 53:14 88:12 98:16 finance (2) 57:23 66:8 find (21) 11:19 16:5 17:7,20 20:8 21:25 22:1 39:6 62:18 63:17 67:16 73:22 82:13 90:13 127:7 142:9 146:8,20 149:4 150:7 152:13 findings (6) 36:2 37:6 62:14 97:19 119:11 120:16 fine (1) 9:19 finish (1) 155:21 fire (379) 1:6,25 2:9,22,22 4:9,10,12,15,16 5:7,11,14,15,24 6:18 7:8,9,17 8:6,10,16 10:4 11:13,15,16,22,25 12:4,5,6,6,7,9,25 13:4,5,6,14,15,18,18,25 14:23,25 15:2,8,9,19,24,25 16:13,15,21 17:9,11 18:6,10,11,14,23 19:10 20:11 21:3 22:1,11 23:12,21 24:3,3,7,9,10,14,16,24 25:3,11,22 26:9,16 27:4,6,6,11,23 28:2,25 29:23 30:13 32:7,9,19,22,23 33:2,4,5,19 36:7 39:2 40:20,20 41:3,3,7,10,19,23 43:25 44:8 45:4,20 46:17,25 47:9 50:4 54:21 55:2,3 56:24,25,25 57:4,7,11 58:10 59:25 61:16 63:23 66:12 67:17,22,23 68:5,6,9,12 70:5,6,22 71:14,17,18,19,22 72:2,19,25 73:6,9,11,15,16,19,20 74:1,6,11,12,15,16,18 75:9,11 76:4,25 77:2,5,8,10,18,24 78:2,10,12,14,23,25 79:16,18,23,24 80:2 83:3 84:9,15 86:4 88:18 90:20,22 91:3,11,25 92:1,3 93:5,19 95:5,25 97:6,15 98:6 100:1 102:9,10,13,14,17,17,20,22 103:3,6 104:5,15,19 105:13,24,25 106:2,2,19,21,24 107:3,7,9,10,19,19,21,22,24,25 108:5 109:2,4,5,6,7,21,25 110:2,2,8,16 111:1,9,11,13,15,17,19,20 112:10,11,12,18 113:1,7,15 115:10,18,22 116:8,8,10,17,17,19,22,24 117:3,5,11,14,24 118:2,4,12,12,18,23 119:11,12,13,20,21 120:16 121:5,10,24 122:7,17,18,22,23 123:13 124:23 125:18 127:13,21,23 129:14 130:7 131:2,22,25 132:4,7,24 133:2,3,4 134:7,14,18 135:22,24,25 136:4 137:15,20,23,24 138:2,5	139:17,21,24 140:1,2,20 141:3,5,17 142:8,25 143:13,16,24 144:4,7,12,12,17,20 145:1,5,12 146:14,18,23 147:2,6,8,14,15,23 148:11 149:24 150:10,11,23 151:14 152:18,22,23 153:3,12,15 154:10,12,21,24 155:15 firefighter (6) 6:10,18 7:1 55:14 112:21 141:7 firefighters (20) 5:21,23 6:9,23 16:12 24:6,10 33:1,5 47:11 76:11 110:1 111:15 112:14 113:2,23 132:4,5 140:14 141:21 firefighting (3) 112:19 133:1 140:5 fires (43) 3:22 9:6 12:21 13:12,22 15:16 21:4 57:3 74:5 97:14 102:15 103:10,15,15,18,20,21,24 104:1,7,11 105:7 106:4,11,13,16 110:3,7,24 112:15,19,22 115:16 116:25 117:12,18,19 134:6,11 135:18,22 141:4 153:17 firespread (1) 144:6 firestopping (2) 138:4 141:6 firmly (1) 93:13 first (48) 7:22 20:15,16 25:18 28:8,19 29:7 35:24 44:10,13 48:1 49:16 53:8,22,24 55:16 56:13 60:12 72:21 73:6 76:22 77:22 78:16,17 82:11,25 85:10 88:23 89:20 90:16,17 91:25 93:14 96:14 98:12 102:19 109:20 115:24 118:15 120:7 123:18 127:14 130:19 136:18 147:9 149:6 152:13 153:9 firstly (3) 118:22 144:11 147:5 fit (1) 135:7 fitted (4) 122:25 126:5,10,11 five (2) 91:21 148:24 flame (4) 8:13 11:10 126:5,9 flames (1) 2:8 flaming (1) 73:17 flammable (2) 2:1 8:21 flat (7) 20:18,19 23:20 24:2 32:18,22 153:4 flats (16) 17:10 18:5 19:1 23:19,20,23 25:12 32:17,18 73:18 76:9 116:14,19 120:19 153:3 flavour (2) 61:6 96:23 flippant (1) 10:20 floor (4) 74:6,19 118:3 120:19 floors (1) 133:2 flowing (1) 96:19 focus (5) 23:15 37:9 78:4 108:11 142:4 focused (6) 2:19,19 39:3 108:25 142:2 154:4 focuses (1) 6:11 follow (3) 60:14 79:12 134:18 followed (1) 135:1 following (16) 27:4 42:
---	--	---	---	--	--	--

formally (2) 35:21 46:10	127:22 131:20 132:17	head (6) 17:11 30:25 44:15	60:19 72:19 73:15 76:3,23	impression (3) 64:1,3 86:15	inspection (2) 26:1 137:15	31:2 32:13,15 34:3
format (1) 48:9	136:1 140:13,23	139:16 140:1 142:11	77:5,14,25 78:2,12,23	imprinted (1) 49:6	inspections (2) 117:14	36:11,12 38:14 39:25
formed (2) 109:15 151:10	giving (2) 85:2 101:9	headed (1) 82:17	80:23 81:15 82:3,12	improve (3) 32:8 62:9 138:18	154:13	59:24 60:8 61:6,9,10,14,15
former (6) 44:19,20 51:6,19	glossed (1) 83:21	heading (9) 69:21 83:12	85:17,22 89:20,23 90:8,22	improvement (2) 82:4 84:13	inspectors (6) 18:23 25:23	62:17 63:9,15 65:2 66:15
142:11 154:2	gm (1) 145:11	112:8 116:2,22 127:14	93:19 94:11 95:6,14 97:19	inappropriate (3) 22:24	33:14 45:9,11,19	76:11 78:22,24 79:2 81:1
formerly (1) 1:5	goes (6) 20:11,22 38:9 47:24	133:11 134:2 143:11	98:8,15 99:1 102:13	120:22 155:13	installed (2) 24:13 122:16	84:18,21 86:5,22 87:22
forms (1) 86:23	80:20 147:18	headline (1) 18:3	117:24 118:3 120:17	inbox (1) 39:14	instances (1) 74:17	102:2 104:1,2,3 107:5
fortunately (1) 103:16	going (22) 1:4 16:12 35:16	heads (6) 59:22 60:6 63:13	121:10 122:6 125:18	incidence (1) 119:25	instigate (1) 30:11	109:11 113:5 115:18,21
forum (5) 59:23 65:7	42:5 52:6 54:23,23 64:9,10	65:16 86:6 110:14	126:6,10 130:3,8 145:6	incidences (1) 141:17	instigated (3) 95:9 106:23,24	123:16 126:17 127:2
86:18,19 88:4	68:22 73:18 77:14	health (13) 43:23,25	146:14 148:3 150:23	incident (21) 5:21 7:6 22:3	institutional (1) 17:1	132:21,22 133:12 134:2
forward (6) 25:17 27:13	79:21,25 87:14,14 93:21	44:16,17 45:3,6,18 46:4,16	152:23	27:4 41:19 47:20,22 48:10	insufficient (2) 126:1 155:13	136:16 137:22 138:6
51:18 126:25 127:1 130:16	108:18 114:8 124:19 125:7	48:20,22 49:7,9	housing (26) 18:19 23:6	72:25 73:2 74:1,10 76:1,7	insulated (4) 4:24 6:15,21	140:4,7,11 145:13,22
found (12) 63:8,11,15 58:18	156:3	hear (2) 36:9 50:18	31:23 32:14 33:11 97:10	78:3 91:4 92:3 93:2 111:19	7:6	148:25 150:6,13,15,22
62:22 63:20 67:15 99:14	gone (3) 17:17 82:17 150:3	heard (4) 2:14 17:3 38:9	115:12,17,20 117:18	113:2,10	insulation (2) 8:21,25	151:13
117:8 121:3 125:14	good (14)	80:16	118:11,12 122:12,15 123:9	incidents (10) 3:1 7:2 29:3	intellectual (1) 85:2	italicised (1) 91:23
134:8,17 144:22,22 154:24	1:3,9,10,13,16,16,18,19	hearing (5) 1:4,4 25:17	126:2,6,23,24 127:10,13	47:13 57:1 105:6 106:5	intelligent (1) 80:18	item (3) 99:15 137:18 138:17
foundation (2) 83:23,24	43:11 47:19 51:20 52:12	51:19 157:3	128:10,19 129:10 131:14	113:4 137:16 141:22	intended (3) 52:16 96:20	items (2) 81:18 104:3
four (2) 111:15 140:14	64:19 114:9	heart (1) 49:6	139:11	include (6) 32:11 38:6 91:1	152:19	iterations (1) 85:13
fourth (4) 93:21 118:20	governance (1) 70:2	heaster (1) 100:4	however (3) 52:22 122:2	119:1,8 122:18	intention (4) 79:4,8 120:14	its (67) 1:22 4:14 7:4,22 9:19
120:7 125:19	government (28) 31:7 74:22	heat (2) 24:5 32:25	155:2	included (3) 130:22 133:7,20	148:18	10:12,17 17:7,9 19:4 22:9
frame (1) 117:1	86:11 97:19,21 126:19	height (2) 86:3 149:12	hse (9) 43:23 45:9,11,19	includes (2) 119:14 120:8	intentions (3) 79:9,13,15	23:11 31:16 36:2,23 37:6
frames (1) 127:24	129:4 130:4 131:7 137:14	heights (2) 102:19 104:12	46:16 49:8 79:21 86:10	including (9) 45:21 47:2	interest (12) 6:19 11:19,23	38:15 46:20 48:24 50:17
framework (2) 47:10 71:19	141:24 143:1 145:22	held (9) 22:7 41:10 57:13	99:23	54:25 89:1 90:24 113:5	12:6 13:4 68:16 79:23	53:24 54:24 56:15 60:14
france (1) 8:7	146:11 149:21	60:8,25 87:14 97:13 137:3	hses (1) 45:21	126:24 133:23 144:4	98:5,5 121:17 126:17	67:24 68:1,10 69:25 71:21
fras (2) 113:8,14	151:3,7,13,15,20,24	150:1	huge (3) 28:23,24 30:25	inclusion (1) 32:8	127:17	72:10,12,20 75:5 77:12
free (1) 50:23	152:3,15,25 153:10,22,23	helen (7) 34:5 37:23 38:15	human (1) 71:23	incomplete (1) 64:6	interested (15) 7:1,2,5	80:3 81:23 85:11 86:23
frequency (1) 3:21	154:16	39:3,21,24 40:6		incorrectly (2) 9:7 24:12	16:4,10 36:18 79:18 95:21	87:6 90:15 91:12 99:6
frequent (1) 85:19	governments (1) 146:5	help (23) 56:22 62:7 68:24	I	increasing (1) 27:10	97:5,9,14,18 99:23 109:4,6	102:12 105:8,19 106:8
front (3) 22:25 86:14 123:21	graham (1) 14:18	70:14 79:13 85:21 87:24	id (14) 2:21 5:18 13:23 17:8	increasingly (2) 79:17 107:8	interesting (5) 15:11 105:19	107:18 108:14,17 118:12
frontline (2) 26:24 30:12	grasp (1) 8:11	88:1 91:5 92:15 103:13,21	28:16 36:5 46:2 59:12	independent (4) 50:1 70:20	130:18 131:5,6	123:15 124:18 125:7,14
fsq (2) 75:21 91:4	grateful (4) 50:12,19 132:16	105:5 108:19 115:17 117:9	72:18 76:22 92:10 101:16	143:2 149:10	interests (1) 21:5	127:3,4,8,10,12,12 132:13
fulfilment (1) 68:10	147:3	129:6 130:1 132:16 136:20	109:15 142:4	independently (1) 49:14	interim (2) 34:21 124:13	136:1 144:8,11 145:2
full (4) 7:24 10:25 101:9	great (4) 2:17,18 3:20 6:19	137:9 150:20 151:10	idea (4) 11:18 54:22 60:4	index (1) 158:1	internal (2) 66:21 144:7	147:10 153:6
151:7	greater (5) 18:16 70:7,17	helped (1) 136:25	68:13	indicate (1) 144:5	internally (1) 60:3	itself (3) 11:24 79:23 80:12
function (3) 66:14 70:8	108:10 109:17	helpful (5) 50:17 77:12	ideas (1) 38:8	indications (1) 119:21	interpretation (5) 142:15	ive (8) 10:15,25 11:5 21:17
139:5	grenfell (4) 40:19 41:3,20	115:20 127:4 144:18	identical (1) 33:7	indicators (3) 110:11,16,18	143:2,3 145:16 146:6	41:14 48:12 52:5 83:21
functional (7) 24:17 87:2	140:2	helpfully (3) 67:14 90:13	identified (26) 24:21 27:9,11	individual (7) 45:20 65:10	interrupt (1) 74:24	
121:22 141:25 142:15,23	gross (2) 140:16,16	93:20	28:9 37:4 38:4 76:17 79:6	83:22 85:16 87:1 119:15	intervention (1) 147:15	J
153:25	ground (6) 5:21 7:6 8:24	hence (1) 120:1	80:11,12 82:3,6 91:22 94:3	120:10	into (27) 5:9 6:24 18:12	
functions (2) 68:10 72:2	76:1 84:9 91:4	here (22) 4:14 7:7,16 8:12	97:20 100:10 109:11 120:3	individuals (3) 8:4 85:14	27:7,13 36:12 41:23 71:16	jack (5) 17:12 26:9
fundamental (2) 8:12 9:8	group (33) 17:18 60:1 61:25	12:2,17 13:13 16:1 44:5	134:25 135:17 137:15,20	133:21	72:7 73:18 78:12 81:3,15	146:7,9,19
funded (1) 106:25	62:1 63:14 64:21,25 69:6	51:9 67:16 82:16 84:4,20	138:5,15 150:21 152:12	industry (4) 133:21 136:22	82:1 95:6 116:8 120:17	jacks (1) 17:13
further (13) 13:12 36:23	87:22 90:6	94:4 112:7 123:6 124:8	identifies (1) 82:19	137:11,14	121:10 122:18 130:3	james (1) 52:11
39:22 42:2,4 50:9 83:10	95:2,4,8,13,14,14	129:13 137:22 139:8	identify (12) 7:10,15 41:17	inelegantly (1) 125:18	131:11 135:3 146:5,23	january (6) 10:9 12:12 20:1
109:14 126:21 135:8	96:1,5,7,13,16,19,25	152:14	78:10 79:4 91:7,21 113:23	inescapable (1) 68:1	150:11,23 153:4	53:8 112:10 145:6
152:15 153:10 154:9	98:5,9,15 99:1,25	hertfordshire (1) 142:12	120:20 138:19 152:24	infills (1) 127:25	introduced (2) 60:1 90:22	jenkins (1) 145:11
future (2) 80:1 90:10	100:3,5,25 112:18 125:17	hes (1) 10:21	155:16	infirmary (1) 18:18	introduction (1) 117:17	jo (1) 83:8
	groups (1) 99:8	hesitate (1) 52:23	identifying (2) 81:9 137:19	influences (1) 25:10	intrusive (2) 138:1 155:10	joanne (2) 83:7 84:20
	growing (1) 22:22	hi (1) 38:2	ie (5) 121:23 122:16 124:11	inform (4) 13:8 21:20 48:11	intuitive (1) 144:23	job (9) 5:3 67:16,19 68:3
	guidance (20) 44:5 45:1,8	hidden (2) 137:19 138:14	138:3 143:18	121:9	invaluable (1) 63:20	69:19,21 71:15 72:4 92:16
	47:7 72:1 84:11,12 85:3	high (18) 21:1,18,22 23:16	ignited (1) 143:18	informal (6) 60:3 61:19 62:8	investigate (3) 26:23 76:20	john (1) 130:17
	107:1 127:20,25 140:23	68:20 75:21 104:23	ignition (1) 143:24	69:6 86:7 130:10	81:7	joined (1) 55:9
	146:11,12 152:15,25	107:14,22 108:1 110:16	ii (1) 126:8	informally (2) 69:5 86:8	investigating (3) 45:20	judgment (1) 140:13
	153:10 154:9,16 155:3	112:14 121:14,20 122:14	ill (5) 2:3 20:13,20 39:10	information (34) 4:20	77:2,17	judith (1) 44:2
	gummer (3) 31:14 34:3	127:13,19 154:20	52:18	7:13,15 10:13,18 19:24	investigation (26) 27:5,11	july (14) 34:15 35:4 55:2
	37:11	highest (1) 70:1	52:18	21:24 22:2,7 29:6	78:21 79:19,20,22 80:19	78:23 93:19 98:9,16,22
		highlevel (1) 44:15	17:20 22:18 26:6,8 29:6	30:6,7,17 32:12 41:21	81:1,15,20 86:22 97:20	99:14 118:2,11 121:11
		highlighted (3) 9:6 94:2	35:5 37:15 39:21,21 40:11	47:21 48:3,5,8,11 65:1	117:11 119:22 120:16	146:24 150:12
		112:16	42:5 44:14 50:7 54:23,23	84:8 101:8,10 103:9	121:10 125:17 126:4,8	jumping (1) 85:9
	hackitt (1) 44:2	highlights (1) 8:5	112:13 113:10 124:9	112:13 113:10 124:9	130:3 131:11 137:16	june (5) 32:4 40:19 41:20
	hadnt (10) 19:20,22 29:9,15	highly (4) 4:24 6:15,21 7:6	83:14 88:8 95:24 132:15	125:21 126:1,16,22 140:23	146:23,25 150:11,13	93:17 102:23
	36:14,22 37:13 56:16	highrise (10) 8:20 29:23	136:11,21 137:6	150:17	investigations (9) 50:12	justify (1) 19:2
	37:19 144:17	30:14 74:17 97:7,11	139:16,23 141:2 146:1	informationsharing (1) 65:4	78:12 86:3,12 120:18	
	half (5) 70:17,18 86:3 130:12	120:12 128:21 132:6	148:2,15 152:1 156:2	informed (2) 48:22 101:5	121:15 134:8 150:23	K
	153:15	155:10	image (1) 7:22	informing (1) 132:17	154:22	
	halfway (2) 52:20 111:25	himself (1) 36:16	image (8) 22:18 28:23	infrequent (1) 13:9	investigators (2) 126:15,20	keen (9) 33:10 35:9,10
	handling (2) 74:1 91:4	historic (5) 56:14 75:22	39:16,24 40:7,8,9 48:19	ingest (1) 46:7	invite (2) 63:13 128:19	68:16,17,21 81:11 96:25
	happen (7) 1:24 12:1,17	137:19 138:14,20	immediate (2) 76:25 117:24	initial (3) 120:17 125:15	invited (1) 97:3	151:2
	13:13 16:1 26:1 106:8	historically (2) 56:15 59:3	immediately (2) 69:20 79:14	150:4	inviting (2) 92:8 123:8	keep (1) 86:8
	happened (4) 7:2 15:25	hoc (2) 64:6 100:25	impact (5) 21:21 22:2 33:19	initially (1) 54:24	involve (3) 71:12 117:19	keeping (1) 127:1
	105:10,14	113:7 140:4	113:7 140:4	injured (1) 2:10	134:22	ken (17) 62:13 111:21 115:8
	happening (1) 3:15	holiday (1) 2:9	impairing (1) 139:7	injuries (2) 110:3 111:1	involved (10) 13:11 50:18	121:4,8 123:8,17 124:20
	happens (1) 21:5	hom00023213 (1) 111:25	implement (3) 34:18 76:5	injury (1) 110:8	62:2 68:13,16 73:6 102:16	125:13,20 126:14 127:6
	happy (3) 32:12 39:10 54:9	hom000232134 (1) 112:6	87:10	inq00014890 (1) 1:21	124:24 130:4 135:8	128:23 129:16,23 130:4
	hard (1) 136:12	hom00046018 (1) 125:14	implementation (3) 93:24	inq000148904 (1) 8:2	involvement (2) 88:22	131:13
	harrow (2) 103:6 104:12	hom000460182 (1) 126:13	100:17,21	inquest (6) 73:24 80:1 82:7	123:15	kennett (1) 145:11
	hasnt (2) 15:7 42:12	home (1) 92:3	implemented (3) 37:10	88:10 90:8 91:6	involving (4) 15:12 112:19	kens (2) 128:25 130:7
	havent (4) 42:3 104:24	homes (2) 32:9 57:3	110:12 119:12	inquests (2) 78:13 93:18	irvine (1) 102:22	kept (1) 48:8
	having (19) 11:5 14:4 34:2	honestly (1) 91:19	implementing (2) 82:23	inquiry (15) 1:15 17:14 40:23	isle (1) 2:9	key (11) 10:13,18 31:2 32:10
	37:16,17 40:25 41:6 44:14	hope (9) 25:15 97:2 111:8	92:12	41:16 50:11 52:8 53:6	isnt (5) 7:22 29:22 31:12,16	33:11,21 38:6,12 46:22
	46:19 49:10 60:16 72:17	115:2 120:2 141:1 146:2	implications (1) 125:22	54:10 97:2 98:25 123:12	48:24	136:16,19
	103:24 105:1 125:16 127:3	153:21 156:4	importance (1) 18:6	140:17 146:8 158:3,5	isolated (1) 36:6	killed (1) 2:10
	134:4 144:9 149:11	hoped (3) 32:6 146:4,4	important (14) 31:3 63:22	inside (2) 8:22 143:17	issued (1) 111:20	kind (2) 48:25 49:1
	hayward (2) 83:7 84:19	hoping (3) 129:4 154:1,3	78:7 81:8 87:18 107:7	insofar (1) 148:25	issues (70) 21:1,18,20 22:17	kingdom (8) 3:14 12:1,24
	100:19 101:17 103:22	hospitals (2) 23:16 25:14	108:5,24 109:10,20,21,24	inspect (1) 117:16	23:18 25:6,12	

kingston (1) 104:20 kinnier (24) 51:8,24,25 52:5,9 74:23,24 75:8 77:3 79:13,19 98:23 114:1,4,6,20,22 115:5,6 123:20 144:14 155:19 156:20,24 knew (13) 3:7 10:3,10 12:5 13:22 16:13 28:12 30:9,13 36:20 92:21 120:17 145:21 knight (4) 62:13 111:21 121:4 123:8 knights (1) 125:13 knockon (1) 26:25 know (41) 2:12 3:16,16 5:18 19:24 21:9,13,24 22:9,19 23:3 27:22 28:16 29:19 30:2,2,6 32:5 34:14 35:3,8 36:5,18,22 39:9,14 42:9 50:1,20 65:10 74:25 75:5 83:7 87:20 98:8,24 104:6 109:9 124:23 132:6 142:9 knowing (1) 20:9 knowledge (16) 3:11 7:10 11:14 12:18 16:16 17:1 21:17 28:14 41:7,9,12 76:7 102:8 112:8 154:19 known (6) 4:25 6:5,8 82:5 95:13 129:21 knowsley (2) 102:19 104:12	least (10) 24:21 27:22 38:19 51:9 79:3 80:3 108:11 126:3 148:9 149:13 leave (3) 24:5 32:25 33:18 led (1) 48:21 lee (1) 14:18 left (6) 8:3,9 9:23 42:12 97:24 127:8 legacy (1) 33:18 legal (1) 54:18 lessons (5) 76:21 79:5 80:11,12 100:2 let (3) 10:6 39:9 103:17 lets (11) 8:2 16:25 18:1 22:20 23:4,13 28:5 31:13,21 37:13,19 letter (81) 23:4,9 25:18,21 26:3,14,22 27:21,25 28:7,10,17 31:12,13 33:8,23 37:11 39:20 40:5,15 90:9,12,17 91:20 115:10,13,15,24 116:3,23 117:10 118:1,9,15,16,21 119:18 120:1,2,14 121:1,3,7 122:1,20 123:4,14,16,19 124:11,25 125:1,16 126:13,24 127:5,15 128:9,18,18 129:1,2,17,18,18,20 130:13 131:8 139:13 146:19,20 147:18,20 148:6,16,21 150:5,7,17,19 152:12 letters (7) 37:25 38:22 39:6 40:10 74:21 99:16 112:17 level (3) 8:24 15:12 92:22 levels (2) 21:1,18 lewis (2) 23:11 150:5 lfb (62) 2:16 3:7,18 4:2 13:11 19:9 22:6,21 24:20 25:19 27:20 32:8 38:16 41:4,18 49:14 54:24 55:3,5,9,20 59:15 65:12 66:21 72:12 76:19 77:1,16 78:5,6 80:12,17 84:10 86:12 89:24 90:9 91:7 92:8 95:16 96:9,17 103:11,23 104:20 105:1,5 111:22 113:19 119:23 121:5 129:22 135:16 137:22 138:6,11 142:14,22 146:11,15 148:12 149:18 152:24 lfb00001232 (1) 118:9 lfb00001805 (1) 115:14 lfb000018052 (1) 116:1 lfb00024217 (1) 10:7 lfb0002565413 (1) 133:6 lfb0002565414 (1) 134:1 lfb0002565415 (1) 136:15 lfb00032151 (1) 67:16 lfb00032154 (1) 150:7 lfb000321542 (1) 154:14 lfb00032157 (1) 53:9 lfb0003215711 (1) 53:25 lfb000321572 (1) 55:17 lfb000321574 (2) 72:23 77:22 lfb000321575 (2) 60:14 85:11 lfb000321576 (1) 93:15 lfb000321577 (2) 94:24 100:15 lfb00032158 (1) 90:14 lfb000321582 (2) 90:25 91:21 lfb000321583 (1) 92:4 lfb000327293 (1) 99:14 lfb00039545 (1) 142:10 lfb000395455 (1) 143:11 lfb00041215 (1) 127:7 lfb00049525 (1) 145:4 lfb000495252 (1) 145:9 lfb00055138 (1) 53:12 lfb00084031 (1) 82:14 lfb000840311 (1) 83:1	lfb000840312 (1) 83:16 lfb000840317 (1) 82:16 lfb00089063 (1) 37:22 lfb00089064 (2) 31:13 37:14 lfb000890641 (1) 31:22 lfb000890643 (1) 31:15 lfb00089549 (1) 130:11 lfb00104291 (1) 121:3 lfb001042912 (1) 122:2 lfb00110652 (1) 53:15 lfb00113254 (1) 149:4 lfb00118237 (1) 43:22 lfb001182372 (1) 44:4 lfb001182374 (1) 45:7 lfb00120301 (1) 17:9 lfb001203012 (1) 18:1 lfb001203013 (1) 18:21 lfb001203018 (1) 20:20 lfb00120305 (1) 146:20 lfb001203086 (1) 146:9 lfb5 (16) 17:4 21:8,16 22:16,22 34:20 65:22 78:23 79:7 84:17 92:12 95:5 98:11 102:8 149:14 154:21 lfepa (23) 63:24 64:11,12,13 69:18,25 70:4,6,8 71:6,9,13 72:12 90:6 93:17 95:4,9,15,20 97:24 100:19 112:2 136:22 lfepas (2) 98:10 137:10 liable (1) 18:11 liaised (1) 117:15 life (2) 75:1 105:2 light (6) 12:17 22:5 102:10 115:16 117:18 150:14 like (20) 5:18 12:22 17:8 39:20 50:14,25 53:21 54:20 59:12 71:23 72:18 76:22 92:11 93:11 97:5 111:3 114:16 120:23 142:4 156:22 liked (1) 111:6 likely (3) 21:2 78:5 100:3 limit (1) 33:17 limited (3) 9:1 11:12 76:7 limits (3) 24:7 33:2 34:7 line (6) 55:18 60:16 69:12 72:24 77:25 93:21 link (1) 7:20 linked (3) 69:17 107:20 149:10 list (7) 14:17 45:23 47:1 91:1 97:2 133:20 136:15 listed (1) 84:20 listen (2) 129:23 134:4 litten (8) 10:8 16:25 28:5 42:6 43:2,8 75:2,3 live (1) 25:16 liverpool (1) 102:20 lives (1) 111:16 local (13) 21:20 33:13 97:10,17 117:15 118:10 120:4 123:9 126:19 127:10 137:6 139:3 152:2 location (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 29:4,24 31:11 32:7 36:7 38:5 40:20 41:7,10,23 50:4 54:21 56:25 57:4,7,10 59:24 61:13 63:23 67:17,22,23 68:5,8,12 137:6 139:3 152:2 london (2) 76:9 122:8 london (83) 1:6 2:22 3:19 4:15 7:8 13:15 22:1 23:7 24:22 25:16 27:23 28:25 2
--	---	---

<p>objectives (4) 67:24 69:13 147:5 149:8</p> <p>observation (3) 99:2,4 105:3</p> <p>observations (1) 34:15</p> <p>obviously (8) 5:14 6:10 35:6 50:16 74:13,21 97:1 103:21</p> <p>occasion (2) 65:3 74:4</p> <p>occasionally (1) 100:24</p> <p>occasions (6) 36:8 71:17 98:9,12 106:13 109:2</p> <p>occupancies (1) 25:14</p> <p>occupancy (1) 23:25</p> <p>occupants (1) 25:11</p> <p>occupied (2) 18:16 29:24</p> <p>occur (6) 3:17 21:4 25:13 103:18 123:24 153:17</p> <p>occurred (9) 8:6 77:7 79:16 106:5 137:16 141:4 146:23 150:12 153:18</p> <p>ocklock (5) 5:11,11,18,20 156:7,25</p> <p>october (8) 46:18 57:11 77:23 78:16 79:17 142:13,18 143:12</p> <p>odcb (26) 5:12,13 12:20 13:23 14:1 15:5,7,10,12,17 27:3 30:18 65:14,21 66:1,3,4 88:20 89:3 94:1,3,10,14 98:21 99:13 100:20</p> <p>odcbs (1) 94:19</p> <p>odd (1) 48:24</p> <p>odds (1) 144:25</p> <p>officer (20) 3:2 11:22 12:9 15:12,23 39:15 40:21 55:14,20,22,24 56:3,11 62:3 81:18 82:22 85:15 92:20 112:17 141:10</p> <p>officers (23) 11:15 12:7,8 14:17 16:14 34:17 57:16 63:5 66:23 87:1 94:15 95:16 99:9 104:10,13 106:22 107:7 112:11 113:18,21 115:10 117:15 142:25</p> <p>officials (4) 148:12 151:5 152:6,9</p> <p>often (6) 8:17,18 11:19 60:25 109:23 134:8</p> <p>okay (5) 59:16 73:5 76:24 123:23 156:10</p> <p>older (1) 117:1</p> <p>omega (1) 8:10</p> <p>omissions (1) 152:5</p> <p>once (4) 60:4 61:3 120:15 135:25</p> <p>oneoff (2) 41:3 136:5</p> <p>onerous (1) 68:19</p> <p>ones (3) 44:15 101:24 153:18</p> <p>onetoone (6) 60:9,17,22 69:4 87:21 100:23</p> <p>onetwoones (6) 60:15,25 61:3,5 88:4 89:14</p> <p>ongoing (5) 18:22 65:6,10 66:25 86:12</p> <p>onus (2) 128:10,12</p> <p>onwards (1) 126:14</p> <p>open (1) 118:15</p> <p>opens (2) 31:24 115:15</p> <p>operate (1) 152:19</p> <p>operational (60) 3:1,2 5:3,9,16,18,23 6:14,19,25 7:3,19 12:7,8 13:25 14:20 15:20 16:14,17 22:2,3,12,17 26:19 27:4 29:11,25 30:4 43:24 44:22 55:13,21 56:18,24 57:20 59:23 65:14,22 66:6,9 80:18 81:9 104:3 105:25 107:1 112:13 113:4 131:20 132:21 140:5,8,10,12,23 141:6,8,10,15,21</p> <p>operations (24) 5:20,20 21:21 29:13,18 56:5 59:8 68:15 74:13 83:3 99:19</p>	<p>104:5,15 107:18,20 108:2,6,7,9,22,23 109:10,19 111:5</p> <p>operationsfocused (1) 65:17</p> <p>opportunities (1) 104:24</p> <p>opportunity (7) 22:20 32:6 38:4 62:16 86:21 104:21 105:6</p> <p>ops (2) 144:15,16</p> <p>options (1) 112:19</p> <p>orbell (3) 12:12,13,14</p> <p>order (17) 56:17 64:18 66:11 68:23 76:20 78:22 80:4 81:6 107:25 109:17 115:23 118:22,25 119:6 137:23 152:19 154:12</p> <p>organisation (8) 4:17 22:6 58:2,8 60:2 104:21,22 108:23</p> <p>organisational (2) 41:8 59:17</p> <p>organisationally (1) 41:21</p> <p>organisations (1) 82:4</p> <p>organogram (1) 67:18</p> <p>origin (5) 24:3 32:6 111:14 136:5 153:4</p> <p>original (1) 116:6</p> <p>originally (1) 48:17</p> <p>originated (1) 6:16</p> <p>others (6) 42:5 81:10 99:11 101:15,21 140:24</p> <p>otherwise (4) 18:18 31:6 53:2 80:6</p> <p>outcome (6) 35:9,10,17 49:4 98:6 140:18</p> <p>outcomes (2) 99:24 110:23</p> <p>outer (1) 8:14</p> <p>outline (1) 73:4</p> <p>outset (1) 52:15</p> <p>outside (9) 62:16 77:9,9 105:14 106:11,14,16 143:17 153:2</p> <p>outsourced (1) 67:10</p> <p>over (36) 2:1 28:5 32:15 40:25 41:16 42:3 47:24 55:12 63:8 64:22 70:17,18 83:16,21 88:20 90:25 92:4 94:23 97:24 112:24 128:5 134:1,6,20 135:9 136:14 143:25 144:6 145:15 147:6,14 151:13,24 152:21 153:12 156:9</p> <p>overall (4) 61:12 72:10 100:16 111:4</p> <p>overcladding (1) 128:1</p> <p>overcome (1) 18:14</p> <p>overload (1) 131:1</p> <p>overnight (1) 43:7</p> <p>overseas (3) 12:21 14:8,10</p> <p>oversee (1) 78:21</p> <p>oversight (11) 59:13 64:22 66:23 70:4 85:17 88:18 89:22 93:8 96:8 100:16 125:17</p> <p>overview (3) 69:12 72:18 83:8</p> <p>owen (2) 8:10 9:23</p> <p>own (6) 45:21 79:22 80:3 144:8 145:2 147:10</p> <p>owners (4) 13:10 121:19 126:3 129:10</p> <p>P</p> <p>pa (1) 39:15</p> <p>package (1) 6:16</p> <p>packing (1) 111:12</p> <p>panel (11) 1:17 50:16 61:6 68:13 70:14 96:7 112:16,16,23 122:9 132:2</p> <p>panels (25) 73:17 75:12,15,15,16,17,18 111:13 112:20 116:13,15 117:20 118:6 121:12 122:6,14,24 126:5,9 128:21 131:21 138:11 147:25 148:4 153:16</p> <p>paper (1) 84:18</p>	<p>papers (5) 22:9 61:17 63:15 64:15 69:10</p> <p>paragraph (45) 2:2 18:2 20:15 23:14 25:6 31:21 33:7,8 38:11 39:5 46:24 53:24 54:1 55:17 60:13 72:23 77:21 78:1,15 83:10,11,17 84:2 85:11 90:17 93:15,22 94:25 95:12 99:17 100:16 112:7,24 120:7 122:3 125:9,19 126:14 143:21 144:1 145:9 146:9 149:7,9 153:9</p> <p>paragraphs (4) 83:5 118:16,20 121:21</p> <p>park (1) 2:9</p> <p>part (25) 2:22 7:4,16 14:2 20:23 22:1 36:7,8 46:23 58:13 74:14 81:1,17 94:13 107:10 108:5,10,24,24 110:16 116:15 121:9 145:13 146:24 155:18</p> <p>partially (1) 129:3</p> <p>particular (28) 23:19 32:17 36:2 37:5 44:8 63:9 65:3 73:11 83:17 88:5 99:9 101:18 112:15 113:2 116:25 119:14 120:8 122:3 131:3 135:21 138:13 141:1,3 142:5 151:22 152:1 154:23 155:15</p> <p>particularly (22) 2:14 29:10 39:3 61:15 75:22 77:5 95:20 97:5,9,11 102:1,4 109:5 110:2 116:5 119:3 132:5 133:4 146:17 147:2 151:13 153:12</p> <p>parties (4) 38:5,7 79:18 97:1</p> <p>parts (5) 101:1 152:16,17,18,22</p> <p>party (6) 31:23 32:1 37:25 38:6 39:7 50:1</p> <p>pass (2) 9:3 116:18</p> <p>paul (1) 145:11</p> <p>pause (5) 42:25 45:15 101:22 114:19 156:19</p> <p>penultimate (2) 55:18 144:1</p> <p>people (18) 2:10 11:14,20 15:7 22:8 24:15 25:25 26:7 42:12 77:6 78:13 87:13 94:6 129:8 151:18 155:5,7,12</p> <p>peoples (2) 57:3 77:9</p> <p>per (1) 24:23</p> <p>perceived (2) 70:22 130:5</p> <p>perception (3) 105:20 106:18 109:13</p> <p>percolate (1) 20:18</p> <p>performance (13) 17:24 56:25 57:8 61:11 65:22 68:4,7 72:10 110:11,13,15,17,17</p> <p>performed (1) 85:22</p> <p>perhaps (5) 3:20 29:19 42:14 66:11 106:20</p> <p>period (7) 33:21 79:16 86:2 87:16 88:23 105:2 124:13</p> <p>permitted (1) 9:2</p> <p>person (4) 24:24 152:20 154:17 155:4</p> <p>personal (2) 85:15 149:23</p> <p>personally (5) 27:15 30:16,21 67:4 102:16</p> <p>personnel (4) 94:21 106:3 113:11,12</p> <p>persons (6) 3:19 18:14,17 134:12 137:24 155:7</p> <p>perspective (1) 102:14</p> <p>pertaining (1) 72:1</p> <p>perverse (1) 144:22</p> <p>peter (1) 100:4</p> <p>phase (2) 40:23 50:11</p> <p>phenomenon (2) 74:5,11</p> <p>pick (1) 53:3</p> <p>picked (1) 9:17</p>	<p>picking (1) 92:25</p> <p>piece (6) 10:13,18 29:5 35:13 121:2 147:21</p> <p>piecemeal (1) 80:7</p> <p>pieces (2) 5:4 7:15</p> <p>pile (1) 40:11</p> <p>pin (1) 101:18</p> <p>pinging (1) 12:16</p> <p>pinpoint (1) 67:9</p> <p>pipes (1) 19:1</p> <p>place (29) 7:10 18:9 24:13 25:16 29:3 31:11 48:4 50:6 57:6 58:7 59:18 61:3 66:15 73:19 80:9 81:3,4,11 87:2 88:3 91:15 97:6 113:12 114:4 119:4,8 130:3 145:21 149:24</p> <p>placed (1) 134:14</p> <p>places (2) 12:20 32:9</p> <p>placing (1) 25:2</p> <p>plain (3) 68:2 71:11 79:3</p> <p>plan (14) 19:3 37:10 60:20 61:12,13 82:17 84:23 85:14,17 86:6 91:15 99:11,16 101:2</p> <p>planning (6) 23:6 55:21 63:24 67:23 68:6,9</p> <p>plans (4) 33:13 61:12 70:1 89:1</p> <p>plate (2) 97:22 98:2</p> <p>play (2) 97:16 108:5</p> <p>played (1) 110:16</p> <p>players (1) 136:19</p> <p>plays (1) 109:25</p> <p>plea (1) 132:10</p> <p>please (32) 1:7,21 8:9 25:6 26:4 31:15,22 37:22 39:6 42:21 43:12,22 44:4 46:15,21 51:1,20 52:10,18,22 53:1,23 70:13 114:11,12,17,21 123:20 147:9,12 156:7 157:1</p> <p>pleased (2) 36:11 154:2</p> <p>plenty (1) 43:5</p> <p>pm (4) 51:23 114:23,25 157:2</p> <p>points (13) 45:23 69:7,8,8,23 78:11 82:3 91:1 96:18 103:19,22 129:16 134:3</p> <p>police (7) 77:1,17 79:19 86:10 126:15 130:2 131:11</p> <p>policies (4) 71:21 79:7 90:22,23</p> <p>policing (1) 23:12</p> <p>policy (12) 14:1,20 15:19 24:2 27:1 32:21 38:7 55:21 66:16 72:7 126:23 141:13</p> <p>politely (1) 144:25</p> <p>political (4) 38:5 70:4 95:4 96:8</p> <p>politicians (1) 70:20</p> <p>pool (1) 63:5</p> <p>poor (4) 75:25 102:8 119:19,25</p> <p>portions (1) 75:16</p> <p>pose (1) 147:18</p> <p>posed (2) 21:22 26:24</p> <p>posing (2) 21:1,18</p> <p>position (6) 29:25 55:19 56:13 57:13 130:9 149:12</p> <p>possible (2) 39:9 130:24</p> <p>possibly (4) 17:18 38:20 75:3 144:13</p> <p>post (5) 28:22 58:14 83:9,12 105:22</p> <p>posts (1) 59:3</p> <p>potential (5) 4:2 7:11 103:3 125:22 148:10</p> <p>potentially (5) 12:13 24:13 84:6 105:12 119:10</p> <p>power (3) 33:15,16 151:23</p> <p>powers (1) 33:18</p> <p>practical (3) 68:14 110:10 137:9</p> <p>practice (2) 47:20 71:21</p> <p>preaction (1) 88:5</p>	<p>preactions (9) 82:6,11,20 83:19,23 84:17 85:4 87:10 88:13</p> <p>precautions (3) 107:24 119:13 152:22</p> <p>preceded (1) 41:2</p> <p>precipitated (1) 148:4</p> <p>precise (2) 146:5 154:4</p> <p>predated (2) 62:10 104:8</p> <p>predecessor (4) 111:22 121:4 124:5,6</p> <p>predicated (1) 17:5</p> <p>predictability (1) 136:1</p> <p>predominantly (1) 117:14</p> <p>preferred (2) 149:14,15</p> <p>premises (15) 18:14,16 117:12 118:24 119:3,8,16 120:10 121:14 133:19 135:2,11 152:17,20 154:20</p> <p>prepare (2) 4:14 22:10</p> <p>prepared (6) 39:21 41:5 42:2,10 103:1 133:10</p> <p>preparing (1) 7:16</p> <p>presence (1) 131:20</p> <p>present (1) 35:21</p> <p>presentation (1) 84:19</p> <p>presented (12) 7:5 34:19,25 35:3,6,19 36:14,22 64:20 83:2,8 93:18</p> <p>presenting (1) 86:13</p> <p>pressing (1) 131:13</p> <p>pressure (2) 25:24 68:22</p> <p>prest (4) 142:11,22 143:13,20</p> <p>prests (5) 144:2 145:13 146:13 149:15,18</p> <p>presumably (4) 96:4 120:2 123:8 129:21</p> <p>pretty (1) 26:8</p> <p>prevalent (1) 9:5</p> <p>prevent (2) 3:15 18:6</p> <p>prevented (1) 18:15</p> <p>preventing (4) 24:10 33:5 57:3 110:2</p> <p>previous (8) 27:3 62:12 77:4 94:18 102:15 108:21 123:25 151:12</p> <p>previously (7) 8:6 12:19 19:19 98:25 106:21 131:7 149:1</p> <p>primarily (4) 65:21 70:9 122:21 142:2</p> <p>primary (2) 45:10,18</p> <p>principal (2) 119:20 125:4</p> <p>principally (1) 125:3</p> <p>principles (6) 44:6,7,7 45:1,8 46:8</p> <p>printed (1) 39:18</p> <p>prior (3) 35:25 48:21 50:6</p> <p>priorities (2) 6:11 31:11</p> <p>priority (4) 107:16 109:18 154:5,6</p> <p>private (1) 33:14</p> <p>proactive (3) 40:1 131:14 139:10</p> <p>proactively (1) 128:20</p> <p>probably (17) 3:3 4:21 34:5 35:25 40:13 51:12,13 75:1 85:24 94:2 102:2,12 125:7 127:4 129:19 142:20 151:12</p> <p>problem (14) 6:2 7:7 19:15,16,21 27:17 34:6 39:19 87:23 108:12 116:11 117:8 123:5 130:24</p> <p>problems (9) 2:19,20 26:15 28:9 30:10 33:18 69:8 110:21 151:19</p> <p>procedural (1) 70:9</p> <p>procedures (4) 45:21 79:7 80:17 104:3</p> <p>proceed (1) 40:3</p> <p>proceedings (2) 42:13 63:1</p> <p>process (12) 27:8 59:25 65:4</p>	<p>80:18,19,22 81:6,7,8 82:1 106:24 135:5</p> <p>processes (4) 47:3 80:22,24,25</p> <p>produced (2) 34:14 142:10</p> <p>producing (2) 61:17 93:8</p> <p>product (1) 8:25</p> <p>production (2) 47:7 106:25</p> <p>products (5) 8:18 9:2 11:11 18:11 20:18</p> <p>professional (13) 13:3 14:6,14,15,22 15:15 16:13 30:4 46:4 48:20 49:7,10,11 107:5 111:7</p> <p>profile (2) 23:17 67:16</p> <p>programme (4) 27:14 36:9 64:14 96:13</p> <p>programmed (1) 64:18</p> <p>progress (14) 61:18 86:18 87:3 93:9 94:20 96:17 98:11 100:6,8,20 101:6,10 107:5 111:7</p> <p>progressed (3) 58:8 85:6 131:12</p> <p>progressing (2) 81:23 94:7</p> <p>project (1) 57:5</p> <p>proliferation (2) 140:22 141:13</p> <p>prominence (1) 4:21</p> <p>promoted (1) 55:19</p> <p>prompt (1) 136:25</p> <p>prompted (3) 117:9 152:24 154:22</p> <p>prompts (1) 96:1</p> <p>proper (1) 142:22</p> <p>properly (4) 64:20 68:18 81:12 151:3</p> <p>properties (7) 25:3 116:11 117:8 122:7,19 126:5,9</p> <p>property (3) 24:22,25 126:2</p> <p>proposals (1) 32:7</p> <p>proposed (6) 83:18 84:16 93:23,24 145:19 148:24</p> <p>proposition (1) 87:5</p> <p>prosecute (1) 33:17</p> <p>prosecution (4) 27:24 34:8 148:10 155:1</p> <p>prosecutions (1) 13:15</p> <p>protect (3) 24:8 33:3 110:1</p> <p>protecting (2) 24:9 33:4</p> <p>protection (10) 104:22,24 107:13,15 108:19 109:17,21,25 110:6,22 101:4,8,12,17,25</p> <p>protects (1) 119:3</p> <p>protocols (1) 45:22</p> <p>provide (15) 32:12 48:2 56:17 67:21 68:23 69:25 71:9 83:23 95:6 96:8 152:15 153:10,24 154:9,16</p> <p>provided (14) 23:22 36:24 47:21 50:3 53:5 67:15 83:10,24 91:9,16 101:4 103:10 113:23 119:13</p> <p>provider (1) 115:21</p> <p>providers (6) 118:11 122:13 123:9 128:19 131:15 139:11</p> <p>provides (3) 82:22 137:18 150:17</p> <p>provision (1) 67:9</p> <p>provisions (2) 118:14 121:25</p> <p>public (17) 5:22 21:1,5,22 38:15 78:6 91:25 93:4,11 108:25 109:1,1,3 110:1,9 121:17 126:17</p> <p>published (1) 32:5</p> <p>pulled (1) 81:3</p> <p>purpose (7) 23:19 32:18 67:19 69:21 90:16 120:21 135:7</p> <p>pursuant (1) 92:1</p> <p>pursue (1) 10:8</p> <p>pursuing (1) 126:16</p> <p>pushing (1) 21:4</p> <p>putting (3) 60:21 69:1 72:13</p> <p>puzzle (1) 5:4</p>	<p>Q</p> <p>q (404) 1:20 2:24 3:5,7,18,25 4:6,10,18,22 5:3,18 6:14,25 7:20,24 8:1 9:14,20 10:6,23,25 11:5,17 12:3,9,12,15,25 13:7,17,21,24 14:3,10,13,21 15:2,4,7,11,23 16:4,9,19,25 17:25 19:17,19,21,23 20:1,3,8,11 21:11,13,15,25 22:5,15,19 23:4,11 26:2,5,11,18,21 27:16 28:5,12,18 29:7,16,22 30:8,22 31:3,12,20 33:25 34:2,6,10,25 35:2,10,15,21,24 36:1,14,18,23 37:1,5,11,17,19,25 38:23 39:5,17,19 40:3,9,16,23 41:15 44:13,18,21,23,25 45:14 46:1,6,12,14,20 48:15,17,24 49:4,12,18,20,24 52:12,25 53:5,8,11,14,18,21,24 54:4,8,12,16,19 55:12,16 56:2,6,10,13,19,22 57:9,13,16,20,23 58:1,4,12,17 59:2,7,11,17 60:11,19,25 61:5,19,22,24 62:5,7,18,23 63:1,8,17,21 64:1,6,17,21 65:7,12,19,21,25 66:3,18 67:5,8,13 68:13 69:1,15 70:8,13 71:3,8,11,25 72:4,16 73:6,9,11,14,23 74:8 75:18,21,25 76:7,11,14,25 77:12,14,16,20 79:10 80:11,16 81:14,24 82:3,9,11,22,25 83:5,16,21,25 84:4,24 85:8 86:15,18 87:4,8 88:3,8,12 89:3,6,8,10,14,17,24 90:2,4,8 91:16,20,25 92:15,25 93:14 94:9,18,23 95:12,19 96:1,4,7,19,23 97:22,24 98:8,15,20 99:4,12,22 100:12,14 101:4,8,12,17,25</p>
--	---	--	--	--	---	--

131:11 137:10	91:9 92:19 101:13,23	121:22 122:17 125:25	102:5 117:12	resulted (3) 116:6 117:6	43:23,25 44:16,17	140:18 144:9
143:12,13,14 148:15 149:6	117:19,21 131:23	127:15,22 128:3,5,6,11,22	representatives (4) 54:18	134:11	45:3,6,18 46:5,17 48:21,22	seize (1) 105:5
questioned (1) 101:14	138:9,16,21 142:16 155:1	133:12 134:10,17 135:15	133:15,23 137:4	resulting (1) 154:12	49:7,9 55:3 56:24 57:2	select (1) 103:2
questions (27) 1:15 40:17	recalls (1) 38:25	136:23 137:12 138:19	represented (1) 38:5	results (2) 81:14,22	61:13 83:3 91:25 92:3 93:5	send (5) 22:21 39:12 117:10
42:2,5,10,14,18 43:17	receive (2) 46:10,10	142:1,5 145:15 146:17	request (1) 129:1	resume (4) 51:17 114:10	99:11 102:14 104:15	131:3 148:18
50:9 52:8,16,25 54:23,24	received (5) 75:21 81:22	147:1,13 148:1,14 149:10	require (3) 38:24 116:10	156:7,21	107:19,21,25 108:5 110:16	sending (2) 120:2 130:25
55:3,4,8 79:21 147:4,19	84:19 85:7 128:15	153:11	137:25	resurgent (1) 150:4	112:22 113:5,9 115:18,23	senior (11) 12:8,9 13:25
148:13,23 155:21 156:4	receiving (3) 102:5 112:4	regulatory (8) 2:16 3:14	required (14) 2:5 9:3 23:1	resurrects (1) 1:25	117:14 118:13,23 122:17	14:17 29:25 34:17 55:14
158:3,5	113:17	4:3,23 5:6 16:2 17:11	71:6,9 78:5 100:21 117:7	retendering (1) 67:3	123:13 124:23 125:2	63:5 95:16 113:18 133:21
quick (1) 156:22	recent (4) 9:6 115:16 117:18	115:22	122:7 126:16 129:24	retired (3) 89:24 124:1,6	127:13,21,23 131:2 137:23	sense (3) 64:6 84:25 142:4
quickly (3) 39:11 109:4	134:6	rehearses (1) 149:5	137:23 145:7 155:6	retirement (3) 57:13 66:22	139:17,21,24 140:1 142:25	sensible (1) 156:1
153:5	recently (1) 53:19	reinforcement (1) 56:17	requirement (16) 8:14 64:15	109:14	144:12,17,21 145:5 147:23	sent (13) 64:15 90:9
quintet (1) 83:17	recipients (2) 112:2 118:19	relate (1) 105:15	118:22 119:6 121:22	return (1) 77:3	151:14 152:19 154:12	115:8,10 118:10 121:4
quite (17) 3:22 4:15 7:22	recognise (3) 113:6,13	related (5) 45:21 67:12	141:25 142:6,15,23 145:2	review (8) 34:12 37:6 58:11	sai (5) 80:19 81:6,14,22,22	123:14 124:11,19,20
11:19 35:9,10 38:20,21	125:21	78:22 107:13 150:6	146:12,16 147:1,5	60:2 62:11 89:11 94:20	same (9) 37:21 39:7 67:8	130:14,20 148:16
50:17 51:5,6 52:17 67:1	recognised (3) 66:9 78:2	relating (9) 59:24 61:10 93:2	153:11,25	95:5	81:25 108:3 115:9 117:7	sentence (2) 25:8 120:6
74:14 103:16 144:22 148:2	107:9	102:3 114:13 115:21 130:8	requirements (7) 11:11	reviewed (3) 63:21 90:23	119:25 127:9	separate (6) 69:17 80:3
quotation (1) 16:6	recognises (1) 147:13	144:3 156:9	24:17 113:19 122:17	119:7	sandwich (4) 111:13	102:7 117:23 121:2 141:23
quote (1) 107:12	recollection (13) 15:23 32:3	relation (40) 56:19 65:2	143:15 144:3 149:8	reviewing (1) 100:19	112:16,20,22	separated (2) 23:20 32:19
	49:20 91:12 98:18 103:24	71:22,23 73:15 81:20	requiring (2) 134:12 152:24	revise (1) 153:23	sat (4) 88:8 93:10,12 152:3	september (7) 40:23 82:13
	113:21 123:24 124:13	84:7,10 85:22,25 86:11	requisite (1) 101:4	rise (6) 121:13,14,20 122:15	satisfied (1) 129:3	124:2,7
	125:11,12 137:1,5	91:8,10 97:10,11 98:11	rescue (34) 43:25 44:8	127:13,19	satisfy (2) 127:21 129:1	series (1) 60:9
	recommendation (6) 101:2	101:1,19,21 107:23	45:4,20 46:17,25 47:9	risers (1) 23:24	saw (10) 2:13 6:14 7:21	serious (1) 80:19
	150:18 152:13 153:8	108:1,2,19 109:7 110:23	68:12	risk (45) 4:22,23,25 5:5,6,8	9:16,17,20 40:4 44:23 46:7	seriously (1) 2:11
	154:15,23	111:4 112:14 113:22 130:7	71:13,14,18,18,19,22 72:2	6:23 7:11 16:12 17:6 18:23	87:17	served (1) 144:11
	recommendations (24)	138:13 139:8,11 141:1,2	92:2 97:7 105:25 106:20	19:10 21:1,3,18,22 24:14	saying (7) 40:11 72:11 83:14	service (43) 7:9,17 13:5
raised (7) 16:16 25:12 126:3	34:16,18 46:22 48:12 50:5	152:2,19 153:1,11 154:8	107:4,11 109:3,6	25:3 48:3,5,8 103:3 110:8	84:25 88:8 118:4 139:16	14:23,25 23:12,24 41:10
127:18 138:25 139:3	55:5 62:14 76:21 80:13	155:3	111:15,19,21 112:10,12	112:13,14 118:13,23	scant (1) 19:2	44:1 46:17 56:8,10,19,23
144:21	90:5,10,19 91:22 92:10,13	relations (2) 72:8 86:7	113:1,15 121:5 129:15	119:1,6,11 122:19 134:15	schedule (2) 125:24 149:9	59:22 60:6 63:13 65:16
range (6) 61:6 63:11 78:4	93:25 95:6 96:10	relatively (1) 105:22	134:12 154:10	135:16 137:20,24 138:5	scheme (2) 9:7 125:8	68:12 71:13,14,18,19,22
80:16 97:1 145:21	100:17,22 150:16,19,20	relevant (16) 11:21 15:18	rescuerelated (1) 70:23	143:23 154:18,19,20,25	schemes (1) 8:20	86:6,10 97:7 105:25
ranks (1) 55:13	152:11	31:5 48:5 94:21 104:4	research (2) 112:18 122:5	155:6,9,14,16	schools (4) 23:16 25:14 32:9	106:20 107:1,4,8,11
rapid (6) 73:6,11 75:10	recommended (1) 94:16	105:12 106:9 113:21	residential (9) 23:18 24:1,21	riskcritical (2) 31:10 47:21	38:13	108:24,25 109:3:6
117:4 131:21 147:14	record (5) 20:23 52:10 82:11	121:14,24 122:19 126:22	29:24 32:16,20 133:18	risks (9) 7:5 26:24 27:10	scope (3) 78:4 146:12 153:25	110:12,14 111:16,20
rapidly (1) 118:4	99:22 145:10	128:7,13 152:6	135:7,11	30:14 47:12 113:4,11	scott (2) 83:7 84:19	126:15 147:15
rare (1) 103:16	recorded (2) 84:4,15	relied (4) 19:7 20:4 27:18	residents (12) 23:1	119:12 134:18	screen (9) 8:5 37:13,20,21	services (12) 18:25 46:25
rarely (2) 18:23,25	records (2) 47:5,17	71:25	24:2,4,8,13 25:2 32:22,24	rita (10) 2:15 57:18 59:4	38:17 45:17 69:19 77:21	47:9,25 57:24 66:8 71:19
rate (1) 73:25	rectified (2) 21:3 138:20	relief (1) 153:21	33:3,19 97:7 120:20	93:4,11,13 95:19	95:13	92:2 112:12 113:1 129:15
rather (9) 11:1 16:5 66:15	reduce (2) 66:12 119:12	reluctant (1) 151:16	resilience (4) 15:19 57:5,20	130:17,20 131:1	scroll (1) 8:9	154:10
75:17 80:22 86:19 89:2	reduced (1) 139:6	remain (3) 24:4 32:24 89:17	99:19	ridl (1) 67:15	scrutinise (1) 96:20	session (1) 52:21
129:8 132:24	reducing (2) 110:3,7	remaining (4) 88:19,19	resist (2) 121:24 143:16	ride (38) 7:4 30:24 44:20,21	scrutiny (4) 96:8 97:24,25	set (25) 32:10 44:7 46:22
rating (1) 8:18	refer (5) 46:12 54:1 60:16	89:3,11	resistance (2) 144:6 145:1	48:17,25 55:20,22,23	98:3	69:3 77:24 80:22 83:18
rd (1) 84:2	108:21 151:20	remains (1) 50:10	resisting (7) 17:9 18:10	56:14,15,19 58:18,25	seat (2) 95:21,23	87:11 90:9,19 92:7 93:23
re (1) 37:25	reference (16) 9:4,22	remedied (3) 120:4 135:2	23:21 32:19 116:7,14	63:12 67:16,17 69:18	second (13) 20:15 53:11	96:2,14,14 119:17 121:24
reached (1) 138:21	10:3,7,12,16,18 12:1 19:5	138:15	142:8	85:14,21 86:4,8 87:12	67:19 69:24 71:8 77:25	123:6,16 127:3 134:3
reaction (3) 28:20 122:7	78:17,19,20 96:13	remedying (1) 137:19	resolved (1) 107:6	89:17,22 90:2 97:16,18	78:18 99:17 107:12 120:19	139:12 147:4 150:15
131:7	100:2,15 118:16	remember (38) 14:17 26:7	resolving (1) 21:8	107:23 109:24 110:6	122:1 126:12,13	152:13
read (28) 7:24	referenced (1) 11:14	28:17,20 31:18 33:23	resource (1) 87:22	124:3,10 136:19 137:10,13	seconded (1) 86:1	sets (9) 45:5,6 90:16,25
9:10,12,12,14,14 10:5	referred (6) 61:24,25 62:23	34:2,6,9,23,25 39:12,19,23	resources (7) 68:24 70:1	139:7 144:19	secondly (6) 52:20 73:9	113:19 116:6 136:15
11:5,17,18 16:20,20 25:7	91:11 108:18 153:19	40:4,10 44:14 49:12,21,23	71:23 78:8 108:10 138:25	roles (6) 28:24 44:19 47:15	92:1,20 98:15 147:7	143:20 150:19
26:22 28:16 35:24 36:1	referring (2) 127:7 151:22	67:5,6 91:19 111:9 112:3	139:4	54:21 71:17 72:17	secretary (2) 145:18,25	seven (2) 150:19 152:11
40:5 41:14 53:18 54:13	refers (2) 54:1 125:16	115:24 129:10 131:18	respect (5) 25:11 90:23	ron (3) 36:17 51:7,25	section (4) 92:1 116:21	seventhly (1) 76:11
117:17 118:21 128:14	reflect (5) 41:1,6 58:5	136:10,11,12 137:3	113:11 131:15 141:25	ronald (3) 52:2,11 158:4	127:23 155:20	several (1) 38:9
134:4 144:23 147:19	63:9,12	138:6,10,23 142:19 144:9	respond (3) 81:4 92:8 113:19	room (6) 42:13,21 75:25	sectors (1) 133:16	severe (1) 133:3
149:16	reflecting (1) 41:15	150:24	responders (2) 26:24 30:13	83:13 84:1 114:14	see (82) 8:9 9:22,24 10:7	shall (3) 51:18 85:1 156:23
reading (7) 9:10 22:9 113:17	reflection (2) 109:14 120:15	remembering (1) 137:7	responding (2) 9:21 10:19	rooms (1) 23:23	16:21 17:21 18:2 20:14	share (2) 30:7 140:7
123:6 128:22 144:19	reform (1) 115:22	remind (6) 1:22 2:2 26:3	responds (1) 149:6	root (1) 119:19	23:8,13 25:6 28:16 31:16	shared (9) 4:20 6:8 7:17,18
149:19	refresher (2) 30:12 84:14	112:11 118:18 123:19	response (17) 9:20 10:10,20	roubaix (1) 8:6	35:9,10,16 36:1 37:23	19:24 21:24 22:4 30:17
reads (2) 83:12 90:17	refurbished (2) 97:12 133:18	reminded (2) 113:1,8	11:4 55:5 57:5 78:23 92:6	roughly (2) 52:20 77:23	38:16 42:17 43:16	41:22
ready (4) 1:11 51:9 115:1	refurbishment (3) 119:10	remind (1) 136:25	93:24 95:5,21 125:13	round (1) 115:8	44:1,5,6,13,23,25	sharing (2) 7:12 65:1
141:9	134:11,22	remit (1) 93:4	127:9 140:6 144:10 149:16	route (2) 120:24,24	45:2,7,9,17,23 46:22,23	shawcross (3) 95:20 96:4
real (3) 5:8 98:5 130:5	regard (3) 12:25 118:25	remove (1) 119:12	151:8	routes (3) 23:23 97:8 119:4	53:25 61:1,2 67:18	99:25
realisation (1) 6:2	149:11	rented (1) 127:13	responses (2) 96:9 97:18	69:20,23 71:8 72:23 73:3	69:23 71:8 72:23 73:3	shed (1) 22:5
realised (1) 135:17	regarding (3) 31:25 127:18	reorganisation (1) 56:1	responsibilities (15) 28:25	83:13 84:1 114:14	76:3,16 79:25 82:14	sheltered (1) 18:19
reality (1) 68:1	152:15	repaired (1) 97:12	54:21 56:23 58:6,9 68:19	roy (2) 124:1,6	83:6,9,11,17 85:3	shjs (1) 83:6
really (23) 13:1 50:19 52:15	regardless (1) 147:10	repeat (2) 2:3 14:25	69:22 71:17 72:17 87:1,2	rro (4) 4:4 17:4 118:19,22	90:12,15,16 91:2,22 92:5	short (7) 28:22 37:1 43:14
58:19 60:14 64:25,25 65:3	regards (3) 146:17 147:2	repeats (1) 149:5	97:9,13 115:22 118:19	rls (1) 120:4	95:12 99:15 105:10,12	51:22 52:16 114:24 129:6
67:6 68:21 74:8 80:20	153:12	rephrase (1) 52:19	responsibility (12) 31:1	nun (1) 18:25	111:25 115:15 116:1	shorter (1) 116:5
96:19 104:19 105:14 106:8	regime (4) 2:16 4:23 5:6	replaced (2) 116:12,14	58:24 64:16 67:9 69:17	runup (1) 127:4	125:14 127:8 130:12,16	shortly (2) 28:10 131:19
108:7,8,21 109:3 129:23	16:2	replacement (3) 116:3,4,15	85:16 88:18 92:19 97:21		132:7 133:9,20 134:2	should (44) 4:17,21
144:22 151:2	region (1) 38:22	reply (1) 149:3	113:9 123:13 131:2		135:13 141:8 142:12,18	7:4,13,14 9:1 17:12 19:7
reason (20) 22:16 36:19	regional (1) 103:2	report (36) 17:8,16,22 19:6	responsible (25) 3:19 24:25		143:11,21 148:16 154:2	20:4 22:13 23:20,22 25:8
57:21 74:8 77:11 88:21	register (1) 38:13	20:11,22 21:19 27:5	25:25 55:20 56:24 57:4,7	safe (5) 5:20 18:15 25:1 97:8	156:16	26:23 27:18 32:18 41:17
92:12,15,20 93:1,7 94:12	regs (1) 38:12	34:14,18,20,23 35:3,5,17	68:4,5,8,11 80:8 82:23	117:2	seeing (6) 20:9 33:23,24	42:14 43:7 44:10 46:25
98:1 99:5,19 124:8 140:6,9	regular (7) 60:9,17,22 85:18	36:11,20 37:6 56:20 59:19	92:24 93:7,9,13 94:6,15	safeguard (1) 33:11	34:1 37:15 142:16	47:1,9 48:1 49:5,5 52:15
141:5 149:21	100:5,8,10	85:7 93:18,20,23 95:9	101:2 137:24 152:20	safety (2) 24:4 32:24	seek (4) 12:3 86:23 87:24	54:1 67:4 86:15 103:18,19
reasonably (3) 41:5 47:12	regularly (2) 3:23 13:10	103:1 112:19 125:22	154:17 155:4	safer (1) 25:16	147:3	107:20 113:12 119:1,7
135:6	regulation (13) 25:25 107:19	128:12 133:7	rest (5) 4:16 23:21 32:20	safety (106) 1:25 2:6,22	seeking (4) 24:25 38:7	121:23 128:3,7 129:9
reasoning (2) 58:4 94:13	108:5 117:15 125:2 131:2	142:9,14,16,18 143:10	89:14 141:14	4:9,10,12,15 5:11,14,15,20	115:17 143:2	142:7 147:17 148:24 155:4
reasons (12) 45:5 49:4 73:1	135:12 139:24 142:3 143:3	146:13				

side (4) 3:3 60:21 144:15,16
sign (6) 37:25
39:10,12,18,22 40:12
signatory (1) 26:14
signature (1) 28:8
signed (6) 28:17 31:16 33:8
38:15 40:5 84:22
significance (3) 18:16 76:17
90:24
significant (31) 6:3 17:6
20:25 21:17 24:14,22 25:3
39:2 54:13 72:25 73:2
74:10,14 76:3 77:5,10 78:3
79:17,23 87:18 92:22
103:15 104:1 115:21
134:6,19 135:4,11,18
138:19 141:16,17
significantly (3) 74:14
110:25 111:2
signing (2) 26:21 38:24
silent (1) 150:3
silo (1) 22:11
similar (8) 8:6 47:25 55:22
122:22,24 134:16
153:16,17
since (2) 2:8 24:20
single (1) 38:13
slog (2) 125:18,21
sir (75) 1:3,9,10,11,12,13
43:5,9,12,16,18,19
50:14,21,22,24,25
51:4,10,13,16,24,25
52:1,3,9 62:13 74:24
75:5,7 79:11 111:21
114:2,3,5,7,15,16,20
115:1,3,4,6,8 121:4,8
123:8,17 124:20 125:13,20
126:14 127:6 128:23,25
129:16 130:4,7 131:13
155:20,21,24
156:6,11,12,13,15,18,24,25
sit (3) 52:4 56:2 89:6
sitting (1) 88:9
situation (1) 22:11
six (7) 24:15 36:24 77:6
78:13 98:9 118:11 134:3
size (1) 104:6
skills (2) 47:11,15
skin (1) 8:14
skipped (1) 42:3
slack (1) 94:10
slightly (9) 69:1,16 79:11
87:6 108:18 124:8 136:17
137:9 142:20
slow (2) 18:18 75:3
slowly (2) 132:14 141:2
smith (1) 83:8
smoke (7) 24:5,16 32:25
73:9 134:8 135:22 141:18
social (8) 115:12,17,20
117:18 118:11,12 127:13
129:10
soil (1) 19:1
someone (4) 10:11 26:8 71:1
132:13
something (24) 5:16,22
6:11,13 7:14,17,18 12:6
13:1 16:7,10 35:8 39:1
42:12 48:19 73:3,21 77:8
89:2 94:11 99:6 101:18
141:14 142:25
sometime (1) 89:21
sometimes (2) 22:10 52:17
somewhere (1) 10:11
soon (3) 32:5 39:9 66:8
sooner (1) 1:24
sorely (1) 107:2
sort (6) 36:21 50:19 52:6
84:21 107:2 130:9
sought (4) 31:6 126:20
128:7 146:11
sounds (2) 4:10 156:1
source (2) 143:4,24
sources (2) 101:5,8
southwark (5) 95:22,23

118:3 148:10 155:2
space (1) 37:1
spandrel (1) 148:3
spandrels (1) 127:25
speak (5) 60:5 67:25 71:11
109:1 132:14
speaking (2) 106:15 141:2
specialist (1) 144:12
specific (13) 7:11 10:16
12:17 13:7 39:19
63:15,15,18 86:16 89:2
126:3 145:23 148:23
specifically (12) 4:3 9:17
11:2,10 26:7 28:21 35:21
40:14 108:2 128:19 129:17
153:21
specification (5) 122:14,16
127:18,20,24
specifications (1) 128:20
specifics (1) 29:5
specified (3) 9:7 126:6,10
specifiers (1) 8:18
speed (2) 131:25 132:9
spoke (2) 35:16 91:17
spot (4) 108:4,19,20 110:22
spread (65) 2:7 5:7 8:13,16
11:10,25 18:6,12
24:8,11,16 25:3 33:3,6
73:9,11,15,16,19,20,25
74:11,12,13,15,16 75:11
91:3 102:9,17,18 103:3
111:13 116:19 117:5 118:4
121:24 122:23 126:5,9
131:22,25 132:4,7 134:7,8
135:22,25,25 136:4 138:2
141:3,18 142:8 143:13,24
144:4 145:12 146:18
147:2,6,8,14 153:3,12
spreading (2) 132:24 143:16
sprinklers (1) 38:12
squarely (1) 128:10
staff (9) 36:9 39:15 48:2
71:24 81:20 85:25 106:1
109:23 115:19
staffing (1) 61:13
stage (9) 44:18 48:15 92:10
115:11 130:21 139:10,21
151:1 153:14
stages (2) 81:23 155:9
stakeholder (1) 133:12
stakeholders (2) 33:22
136:16
stand (2) 11:2 84:10
standard (5) 2:6,7 24:6 33:1
134:17
standards (5) 9:3 12:23
25:24 47:8 70:2
standing (3) 15:10,17 63:11
stands (1) 65:14
start (11) 51:10 52:14 53:25
54:20 55:7 74:5 102:12,14
124:9 125:9,11
started (3) 109:12 118:2
120:19
starting (3) 8:4 59:17 72:21
starts (1) 20:23
statement (24) 17:13,15
34:16 53:14,16 22:24
55:16 60:13 72:22 77:22
78:6 85:10 90:13 91:17
93:14 94:23 100:14 120:15
125:10 126:24 127:6
128:14 146:8
statements (6) 53:6,18
54:6,9,12 91:10
states (2) 8:23 143:22
station (1) 139:22
stations (4) 56:25 66:12
106:2 140:12
statutory (2) 68:10 107:23
stay (11) 19:3,6 20:3 24:1
27:17 32:21 60:12 77:20
84:1 89:24 97:8
staying (1) 72:4
stayput (3) 22:23 27:1
120:11

steer (1) 85:2
step (3) 84:15 122:20 128:9
steps (7) 30:10,11,16,19,20
34:17 131:20
steve (3) 115:11 130:17
131:3
stevenage (1) 103:6
stibbards (2) 83:7 84:20
stick (1) 20:14
still (11) 3:13 7:9 9:7 11:2
32:6 38:7 41:9 107:10
121:15 130:2 155:3
stipulating (1) 2:7
stock (1) 122:15
stood (5) 88:12,15 101:25
102:3 124:5
stop (5) 105:17 114:5,10
141:18 156:6
stopping (5) 12:15
116:10,22,24 117:3
storage (1) 120:22
storey (1) 8:24
straightforward (1) 68:2
strands (1) 80:2
strategic (5) 59:24 67:22
69:25 71:9 125:17
strategies (1) 69:14
strategy (17) 18:8 19:7 20:4
21:8,13 22:23 24:19 27:18
70:10 72:8 95:7 98:10
99:10 100:6 119:14
120:8,11
street (2) 133:13 137:3
striking (2) 7:22 43:24
strong (1) 67:21
structural (1) 67:18
structure (3) 54:22,25 58:11
structures (2) 117:2,3
study (1) 69:10
subheading (2) 69:22 92:6
subheadings (1) 91:23
subject (8) 15:21 16:1 37:25
54:5 74:21 91:8 101:19
128:2
submitted (4) 63:23 83:22
100:6,8
subsequent (5) 17:21 78:25
81:1 97:3 154:22
subsequently (4) 74:2,22
76:2 126:11
subsidiary (1) 64:12
substance (4) 124:18,24
133:8 139:15
substantive (1) 99:15
subsumed (1) 83:19
succeed (1) 90:2
successful (4) 110:20
111:3,6,8
sue (1) 57:23
suffer (1) 119:24
suffered (1) 7:8
sufficient (5) 62:15 113:3
118:23 135:6 154:18
sufficiently (1) 31:3
suggest (5) 42:14 52:6
141:12,19,20
suggested (1) 74:8
suggesting (1) 128:18
suggestion (4) 120:11 123:4
131:14 139:10
suggestions (1) 132:13
suitable (5) 47:23 48:9 113:3
118:23 154:19
suite (1) 110:11
suits (1) 114:5
sum (1) 10:24
summarise (1) 121:21
summary (8) 46:23 84:21,25
111:17 123:2 124:21
135:19 142:6
summerland (1) 2:9
supplemental (1) 153:24
supplemented (1) 61:19
supplied (1) 122:10
support (2) 68:24 97:14
supported (1) 87:20

suppose (3) 36:21 84:24
151:9
sure (18) 2:25 16:11 17:20
26:8 30:12 37:15 44:14
46:8 69:12 71:20 76:4 80:5
86:12 91:13 95:24 137:7
139:23 148:2
surely (2) 6:25 48:25
surface (6) 2:7 8:13,16 11:10
126:5,9
surfaces (1) 143:25
surprise (1) 141:21
surprised (8) 10:12,17 124:8
132:4,7,8 141:11 146:1
surprising (3) 20:8 21:25
22:1
survey (1) 138:1
survival (1) 84:15
suspect (1) 110:19
suspects (1) 22:19
system (3) 4:3 20:17 48:4
systems (5) 47:15 103:4
119:4 127:19,21
T
table (1) 82:19
taken (26) 10:12,17 21:20
22:16 27:13 29:3 30:19
34:17 35:7 54:9 55:5 64:10
72:20 73:19 75:1 79:1
86:24 88:13,20 103:22
112:21 122:18 131:9
139:11 147:21 151:5
takes (1) 119:8
taking (9) 16:6 31:10 40:10
94:10 122:20 128:9 130:3
145:21 149:24
talk (10) 61:8,11,13,14,15,17
63:14 65:5 81:19 106:23
talked (1) 12:21
talking (7) 9:25 109:23 139:8
140:12 151:23 152:1 154:8
tall (1) 2:5
tantalising (1) 79:11
task (3) 95:2,8,13
team (9) 22:11 25:22 26:9
27:5 39:2,16 62:12
139:21,24
tease (1) 108:8
technical (2) 11:23 147:24
television (1) 118:2
telling (2) 22:22 50:20
temporary (1) 54:25
temptation (1) 52:25
tenants (1) 115:18
tended (1) 64:8
tenure (4) 21:7 106:23
109:12 110:5
term (2) 96:21,23
terms (45) 57:2 61:12
68:9,11 69:12 70:3 71:11
73:18 77:23 78:17,19,20
79:7 81:9 85:5 86:23 87:4
92:22 96:12,17 97:8,19
100:2 106:1,3 107:22
110:7,17,23 111:4,11
123:17 124:21 130:24
133:1 136:1 140:10 142:8
143:1 148:3 151:17 154:11
155:2,5,5
terrorist (3) 29:3 31:10 57:6
testing (1) 9:3
tests (3) 121:11,13 122:4
text (3) 18:4 99:15 152:14
thames (1) 104:20
thank (77) 1:13 9:19 41:25
42:19,23,24
43:11,18,19,21 45:16
50:8,10,13,21,22,24,24,25
51:2,20,25 52:3,9,12,24
53:18 54:4,7,8,19 56:6
57:9 58:12 59:11 60:11
66:18 67:13 69:15 71:3
72:16 75:6 76:14 77:12
81:24 83:25 85:8,11 87:8
90:4 98:20 99:12 102:6

104:17
114:1,15,16,18,20,22
115:3,4,6 117:22 136:3
143:9 149:2 155:19,24
156:12,13,14,17,18,20,24,25
thanks (2) 50:15 156:22
thats (54) 10:21,22 11:3,4
13:3 15:11,20 17:7,19 28:2
30:3,18 36:11 53:7 54:3
55:11,15 56:9 57:12,15
58:3,16 59:6,10 62:4
63:7,25 66:2 69:17 79:11
82:10,20,21 83:6 84:2
88:11 89:6 92:19 93:4
98:2,16 99:2,12,21 100:12
102:7 118:8 122:22 130:24
133:25 141:23 144:13
145:3 156:1
themes (2) 96:21,24
themselves (2) 4:24 96:14
thence (1) 36:24
thereafter (1) 131:19
therefore (21) 6:5,6,8 8:16
24:7 25:11 33:2 49:9 58:24
66:16 71:25 103:18 106:10
108:10 109:22 110:8 113:8
124:17 138:1 147:3,16
theres (3) 25:6 52:14 77:4
thermo (1) 112:15
theyre (1) 155:11
thing (7) 4:23 49:1 99:2
109:3,10 110:12 148:4
thinking (2) 13:12 19:13
third (17) 23:14 31:15,21
47:4 50:1 53:14,15 56:11
47:5,6,10,15,17,19,20 48:2
118:20 122:2 143:21 146:7
thirdly (1) 92:3
though (2) 141:12 156:1
thought (6) 29:15 37:8 43:1
74:9 115:19 151:3
three (26) 32:7,10 38:5 39:6
40:25 52:14 53:5 54:6,12
59:18,21 62:2 63:6 64:23
65:1,4 66:6 77:24 83:2,21
95:3 104:7 118:1 147:18
152:11 153:15
through (32) 5:12 7:17,20
18:6 19:1 24:16 30:17
33:21 36:20 52:21 55:12
59:20 65:10 69:4,5,9
70:8,19 72:8 73:1 76:16
85:17 87:20,21,21 92:9
117:5 118:5 127:5 134:3
137:20 139:15
throughout (3) 68:20 88:9
89:17
thursday (1) 1:1
thus (3) 115:15 116:23
146:10
tightly (1) 22:7
tim (5) 81:21 85:19
89:16,17,19
timber (1) 117:1
time (84) 2:16,20 3:11 9:11
10:5 11:4 12:10 15:24 16:7
19:9 20:10 26:18 27:14
28:21,22 29:2,4,10,14
30:23 31:12 34:7 35:18
37:2,21 38:8,20 40:4,25
41:6,18 42:6 43:3,6 46:1
49:12 50:17 52:22 56:13
58:7,7 63:8 64:19 67:8
68:20 78:8,16 80:3
87:16,19 88:24 95:23,24
98:7 105:11,16,22 106:17
110:25 111:2 114:10
119:17,23 121:1 123:14,24
126:1 128:25 129:16,21
130:2 134:21 135:9
139:6,17,18,23,25 140:2
142:21 151:6 152:3 154:4
155:23
timeframe (1) 92:7
timely (2) 47:22 79:1
times (3) 101:13,14 102:2

timescale (1) 139:6
timing (1) 43:2
title (2) 1:23 31:23
today (5) 1:4 52:13 54:14,17
155:23
todays (1) 1:4
together (9) 5:5 10:14 20:21
25:16,21 81:3 99:8 109:8
129:22
told (20) 5:19 14:10
17:4,8,14,16,19,19 19:4
20:3,7,9 27:16 34:19 35:12
51:8 96:7 98:25 114:8
123:12
tom (2) 34:12 35:13
tony (5) 9:16,25 10:1,10,20
too (2) 57:8 67:2
took (10) 50:6 57:6 67:4
88:3 89:3,21 97:6 117:17
131:19 139:15
topic (8) 15:13 34:11 59:12
69:17 102:7 117:23 137:2
141:23
topics (1) 28:7
total (3) 38:25 116:16 117:6
touch (1) 127:1
touched (1) 85:20
touches (1) 146:7
touching (1) 78:13
towards (2) 69:3 152:4
tower (3) 40:19 41:3,20
traditionally (1) 132:25
tragically (1) 111:14
training (23) 22:17 26:23
27:13 30:11,12 41:23
47:5,6,10,15,17,19,20 48:2
57:20 66:13 67:10 80:18
84:14 99:19 113:22,25
154:18
trainingguidance (1) 84:11
transcriber (4) 53:2 75:2
132:11 156:22
transfer (1) 84:8
transfers (1) 74:19
translates (1) 71:16
translated (2) 6:24 41:23
transport (1) 103:1
trapped (1) 134:12
trend (1) 141:16
trends (1) 27:8
trial (1) 140:18
tried (1) 106:19
trouble (1) 31:6
true (2) 54:6 94:13
truesdale (1) 100:4
truth (1) 11:3
try (3) 105:21 106:17 130:23
trying (6) 30:24 67:8 85:5
88:1 136:11 151:17
tured (9) 115:11 117:9
125:3,4 130:17 131:3
133:10 139:19,20
tureds (2) 118:1,16
turn (22) 8:2 25:5 34:11
72:18 76:19 82:25 83:16
90:5 92:4 94:23 98:21
99:13 102:7 112:6 116:1
117:23 122:1 126:21
136:14 141:23 143:10
145:9
turns (1) 154:24
two (1) 86:2
type (6) 122:9 130:22 131:21
132:3 137:22 155:5
types (5) 23:25 25:13
113:6,13 141:10
typically (1) 8:13
U
uk (7) 2:16 7:9,17 8:22 9:8
11:8 41:10
ultimate (1) 144:2
ultimately (2) 111:14 145:15
unaware (5) 21:14 22:18
35:5 124:19,20
unchanged (1) 89:17

unclear (1) 52:18
underlined (1) 39:8
undermined (1) 22:24
undermining (1) 120:24
underneath (5) 9:13,15 10:5
11:21 18:4
understand (8) 38:7 53:21
58:1 68:22,22 78:22 105:5
151:15
understanding (19) 6:3
10:3,4 41:7 55:9 58:14
63:4 65:25 70:3 71:5 77:16
92:25 93:6 101:6 104:14
142:23 143:20 144:25
147:24
understatement (1) 4:18
understood (3) 10:1 146:16
147:1
undertake (3) 92:21 95:4
130:9
undertaken (4) 50:4 90:20
118:24 129:19
unduly (1) 52:18
unexpected (2) 38:3 156:4
unfortunately (2) 137:8
144:16
union (2) 133:13 137:3
united (8) 3:14 12:1,24
14:9,11 103:17 123:10
127:12
units (2) 116:5,15
unit>window (1) 116:6
unless (2) 24:4 32:24
unnecessary (2) 134:13,15
unpredictable (1) 41:4
unpredicted (1) 41:4
unrestricted (1) 117:4
unsafe (2) 3:10 13:13
unseen (2) 24:10 33:5
until (12) 3:4 28:12 29:19
30:1 57:13 88:9 89:18,24
124:3,16 150:3 157:3
unusual (13) 24:10 33:5
49:25 74:20 99:1 132:3
133:4 134:7 135:22,25
141:4,17,20
update (3) 36:23 37:1 62:20
updated (4) 34:19 64:15
86:8 98:10
updates (1) 100:18
upon (7) 61:10 71:25 85:20
104:20 109:25 113:17
143:16
upvc (3) 116:5,14 118:7
upwards (3) 73:25 116:18
133:1
urge (2) 32:11 38:4
used (14) 8:25 10:11 56:16
80:25 81:6,7 101:9 120:22
122:8 127:19 136:6 140:22
148:1 152:18
useful (5) 62:19 63:17 99:12
102:12 103:10
usher (5) 43:10 51:1 52:6
114:17 156:16
using (1) 45:21
usual (3) 42:7 74:16 148:12
usually (1) 24:23
utilised (1) 18:9
V
val (1) 99:25
valerie (2) 95:20 96:4
validate (1) 19:3
validity (1) 27:1
vantage (1) 105:1
variety (2) 25:13 28:24
various (18) 41:13 59:14
63:22 64:11 70:8,9 73:4
80:7,8,13 81:17,23 84:4
85:13 86:23,24 101:5
155:9
vary (1) 61:1
vegetable (1) 111:12
vein (1) 47:25

ventilation (3) 19:1 20:17
153:2
verbally (1) 129:18
verify (1) 136:24
version (1) 17:21
vertical (2) 146:18 147:2
via (4) 80:13 100:23 104:2
118:5
victims (1) 97:14
views (3) 62:21 108:9 109:2
vigour (1) 135:6
vision (1) 67:24
visited (1) 36:7
visits (5) 91:2 92:1,3,3 93:5
vital (2) 18:5 153:6
voice (1) 109:18
voids (2) 23:24 118:5
volume (1) 28:4
vulnerable (1) 18:17

W

wait (1) 45:14
waited (1) 16:21
wall (15) 9:1 75:12,15,17
116:9,18,23,24 121:12
122:6,14 128:21 131:15
143:17 147:25
walls (8) 121:23 127:21
142:7 143:13,15,23
144:4,7
warehouse (1) 111:12
warn (2) 43:10 131:20
warning (4) 18:13 122:12
141:13,15
warns (1) 1:24
warrant (2) 126:2 150:14
warwickshire (1) 111:15
wasnt (34) 2:21 5:2,22
7:1,7,18 10:4 16:7,9 19:18
21:24 22:4 27:23 28:3
31:3,7 35:7 46:3 48:14
49:3 58:22 63:5 76:4 93:9
98:3 104:22 107:13 109:5
111:6 123:25 124:2,18
141:19 154:25
watching (1) 63:1
way (21) 12:15 42:7 49:21,23
52:17 60:2 66:25 67:20
72:13 77:7 80:6 81:5,13
85:24 101:16 108:11
132:8,24 144:23,24 151:4
weaknesses (1) 4:2
wed (12) 15:5 39:1
61:13,14,15,17 63:13
74:16 85:7 97:20 131:7
143:1
week (3) 38:10,22 60:4
weir (1) 48:21
welcome (1) 1:3
went (4) 30:13 55:13 91:21
112:25
werent (9) 3:25 48:15,24
62:6 75:12,18 120:20
141:9,20
weve (11) 2:14 7:21 15:11
27:8 43:7 65:13 80:16
82:17 127:5 142:2 147:22
whatever (1) 68:24
whats (1) 119:17
whereas (1) 93:3
whereby (5) 24:2 32:22
59:23 81:3 124:14
whilst (6) 4:13 25:12 88:21
103:25 112:22 127:23
whole (5) 7:9 15:21 19:11
64:7 110:11
wholly (1) 75:13
whom (1) 44:1
whose (1) 65:15
wide (1) 55:21
widely (1) 129:7
wider (4) 25:6 96:11,16
129:12
widespread (7) 17:1 21:8
73:6 132:18 138:7 149:20
155:16

willing (2) 92:21 98:6
window (9) 74:19,19 75:15
116:5,11,15 127:19,24
132:7
windows (9) 73:17 75:17
116:3,4,12,16,18 132:2
148:4
wish (3) 42:5 144:16,17
withdrew (1) 51:3
witness (31) 1:10,12 17:13
42:19,23 43:18 50:21,24
51:2,3,5 53:5,24 55:16
60:12 72:22 77:22 85:10
91:17 93:14 94:23 100:14
114:15,18 115:3 125:10
156:5,10,12,14,17
witnesses (6) 2:14 61:25
80:16 82:18 98:25 114:12
wont (1) 147:19
wording (1) 39:7
work (41) 4:13 22:10,14
25:16 32:9 35:14 37:9
39:2,25 45:21 52:17 57:2
64:2 66:10 68:17,18 83:13
86:4 87:20 88:24,25
89:3,23 90:21 91:7,11
92:12,23,24 93:10
96:11,13,15 97:14
98:1,4,12 100:21 109:6
119:10 128:2
worked (7) 2:21 4:8 11:15
44:16 49:8 56:4 64:13
workforce (1) 140:10
working (19) 49:8 69:2 89:19
90:6 95:14,14
96:1,5,7,16,19,25
98:4,8,15 99:1,8 119:18
132:6
workload (2) 68:20 98:7
workplace (1) 107:24
worried (1) 67:2
worries (1) 60:7
worry (1) 74:23
worthy (1) 129:14
wouldnt (16) 5:15 13:5 15:14
29:14 31:6 39:24 49:25
51:14 67:11 105:15 106:12
138:4 141:7,11,21 151:7
wouldve (1) 153:5
wound (1) 98:16
write (8) 11:20 31:4
123:8,17 129:11 148:12
150:25 151:4
writing (8) 17:14 31:25 34:3
118:18 121:9 128:18
139:11 149:21
written (3) 17:10,15 143:1
wrong (3) 49:2 93:5 124:12
wrote (4) 31:12 112:11
146:15 150:5

Y

yeah (12) 62:8,25 64:9 86:17
91:24 125:6,12 130:15
133:25 139:20 140:3
151:21
year (2) 32:4 70:25
years (15) 33:17 40:25 41:2
55:12 56:16 60:3 86:3
89:20 105:24 108:13
134:7,20 135:10 150:4
153:15
yesterday (12) 1:20 2:4,13
6:14,17,20 7:21 9:17
10:2,14,19,22
yet (5) 25:2 51:5,6 126:4,8
york (1) 57:6
youd (1) 139:12
youll (1) 22:20
youre (5) 29:2 42:20 50:23
93:7 114:14
yourself (6) 16:4 29:8,8 52:4
63:6 65:25
youve (8) 5:19 14:13 15:3
60:15 75:10 94:2 101:17
130:20

0

0 (3) 2:7 8:13,18

1

1 (15) 2:3 31:22 40:23 46:24
78:16 79:17 82:17 84:8
125:24 147:9 149:5,9
152:13 158:2,3
10 (6) 124:10 125:9 135:10
156:7,25 157:3
1000 (1) 1:2
1055 (1) 43:13
11 (4) 72:23 77:21 102:23
150:8
1115 (3) 42:17 43:12,15
1126 (1) 51:21
12 (2) 33:16 127:23
127 (8) 8:23 9:17,22
10:11,16,21 11:1,9
13 (1) 54:1
14 (8) 40:19 41:20 54:2
123:22 129:2 134:1 139:12
146:14
15 (7) 60:13 82:13 85:11
133:9 135:10 136:14
143:12
1509 (1) 10:9
1599 (1) 112:17
18 (2) 53:11 145:6
18m (1) 8:24
19 (1) 146:9
1960s (1) 117:3
1970s (1) 117:3
1973 (1) 2:9
1979 (1) 55:10
1991 (1) 102:20
1999 (2) 102:23 103:2

2

2 (22) 18:1,2 23:8 33:17
44:4,6 47:7 50:11
51:11,18,20 83:16 84:10
91:1,20 103:7 116:1
134:7,20 145:9 147:12
154:14
20 (2) 38:22 93:17
200 (1) 51:23
2000 (2) 55:18 125:25
2000s (1) 56:1
2001 (1) 57:6
2003 (1) 56:7
2004 (1) 92:2
2005 (2) 103:7 115:23
2007 (3) 57:11 111:11
116:12
2008 (1) 112:10
2009 (24) 4:1 24:14 55:2
77:23 78:16,18,24 93:19
111:24 115:8 118:2 121:11
123:22 124:2,5,7,10
125:15 127:9 128:15 129:2
131:19 146:24 150:12
2010 (17) 8:7 44:3 46:18
66:5 82:13 104:19
124:4,16 133:9,10,13
135:14 142:13,18 143:22
146:14 153:19
2011 (5) 145:6 146:14
147:23 149:3,16
20112012 (1) 89:21
2012 (6) 5:1 8:7 67:7
150:3,8 151:23
2013 (9) 88:9,12,15 90:15
93:17 98:9,12,22 99:14
2014 (2) 98:10,16
2015 (4) 29:10 57:16 58:2
133:7
2016 (12) 3:5 10:9 12:12
17:15 22:23 27:20 29:10
34:12,15 35:4 44:23 57:14
2017 (15) 5:1 19:14 20:1
23:5 24:20 26:5,13 27:22
29:20 30:10 32:1 33:8
34:21 36:15 40:19

2018 (1) 40:23
2019 (2) 53:8,11
2020 (1) 53:14
2021 (2) 1:1 157:4
21 (3) 133:13,16 136:10
22 (4) 34:15 93:15 125:15
127:9
23 (6) 46:21 84:6 94:25
111:24 118:17 149:3
24 (3) 47:24 95:12 100:16
24page (1) 46:20
25 (1) 1:1
28 (2) 53:8 90:15
29 (1) 157:4

3

3 (13) 18:21 20:14 23:5
26:5,13 33:8 47:8 78:23
84:14 92:4 93:19 118:2
121:11
30 (5) 38:22 53:14 55:12
124:2,7
315 (2) 114:2,23
330 (3) 114:11,20,25
34 (5) 82:3,11,19 83:19,23
38 (1) 145:9
396 (1) 112:17
3rd (1) 150:12

4

4 (12) 8:2,2 45:7,12,14
47:19 98:22 99:14 112:6
125:9 143:12 155:21
41 (1) 112:7
42 (2) 53:24 112:24
426 (1) 155:20
427 (1) 157:2
43 (7) 90:5,9 93:25 96:10
98:11 99:16 100:21
494 (1) 112:17

5

5 (9) 17:3 46:23 47:19,19
55:17 60:13 78:18 143:10
153:8
50 (2) 2:10 134:19
51 (1) 83:5
510 (1) 84:2
52 (4) 83:5,10 158:4,5
59 (1) 83:17

6

6 (2) 47:21 99:15
60 (2) 23:21 32:19

7

7 (6) 10:9 20:24 47:25 82:16
94:24 154:15
72d (3) 91:2 92:1 93:5

8

8 (3) 20:20,22 32:4

9

9 (1) 118:11