

OPUS2

Grenfell Tower Inquiry

Day 271

May 3, 2022

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Tuesday, 3 May 2022

1
2 (10.00 am)
3 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to
4 today’s hearing. Today we’re going to hear from another
5 witness from the Royal Borough of Kensington and
6 Chelsea.
7 Yes, Mr Millett.
8 MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman, good morning. Good morning,
9 members of the panel.
10 I now call Ms Sue Redmond, please.
11 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Thank you.
12 MS SUE REDMOND (affirmed)
13 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Thank you very much. Please sit
14 down, make yourself comfortable.
15 (Pause)
16 All right?
17 THE WITNESS: Yes.
18 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Thank you.
19 Yes, Mr Millett.
20 Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY
21 MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman, thank you.
22 Ms Redmond, good morning.
23 Can I start by thanking you very much for coming to
24 the Inquiry and assisting us with our investigations .
25 We are extremely grateful to you.

1

1 We are going to take breaks during the course of
2 your evidence, in the morning and in the afternoon, but
3 if you need a break at any other time, please just let
4 us know and we can do that.
5 If you have any difficulty understanding any of my
6 questions, just say and I can put the question again or
7 put it in a different way so that we can get your best
8 evidence.
9 One other thing: if you could please keep your voice
10 up so that it’s clear to the person sitting to your
11 right, who is typing away, she can get down everything
12 you say on a nice clean transcript. Also, please don’t
13 nod or shake your head; you have to say “Yes” or “No” as
14 the case may be. All right?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. All right.
17 Now, you have provided two witness statements to
18 the Inquiry. I’m going to just show them to you and put
19 them in formally.
20 First, {RBK00035676}, please. That should be the
21 first page of your first statement to the Inquiry of
22 28 January 2019.
23 If we go to page 15 in it, please, there is
24 a signature under the statement of truth and above the
25 date. Is that your signature?

2

1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 Your second statement is at {RBK00058120}. Is that
4 the first page of your second statement?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 If we go, please, to the foot of page 9 you can see,
8 under the statement of truth there, a signature above
9 the date of 9 April 2020. Is that your signature?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Have you read both of these statements recently?
12 A. I have.
13 Q. Thank you. Can you confirm that their contents are
14 true?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 Now, I’m going to start with questions about your
18 background.
19 Is it right that, at the time of the Grenfell Tower
20 fire on 14 June 2017, you held the role of interim
21 executive director for adult social care, or ASC, and
22 public health?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And you took that role on, I think, in April 2017, and
25 you held it until October 2017; yes?

3

1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Why was that an interim role?
3 A. Because the previous director had left and they didn’t
4 have time to bring someone in straight away, so often
5 interims come in just to hold the fort until they
6 recruit another director.
7 Q. I think you were part of the tri –borough agreement; yes?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. You had returned to the tri –borough agreement to
10 complete the project, which included dissolving the
11 tri –borough initiative which involved LBHF, London
12 Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, because it wanted to
13 get out of it; is that right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Can you tell us, in brief, what the tri –borough
16 agreement was?
17 A. Yes. In certain services, like children’s services,
18 adult services in particular, and public health, the
19 three London boroughs of Hammersmith and Fulham,
20 Westminster and Kensington and Chelsea, they combined
21 those services together. So they had one director over
22 the three — well, they had one executive director over
23 the three councils for adult social care, for instance,
24 instead of one in each, and each of those councils then
25 had their own individual director who reported to the

4

1 exec director , the idea being they could share staff ,
 2 they would save money on sharing staff, but also they
 3 could combine how they worked and share good practice.
 4 Q. Yes. Can you confirm for us that adult social care
 5 moved from being a single-borough service to
 6 a tri-borough service in 2012?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. Yes, and I think it's right that you were employed by
 9 Hammersmith and Fulham, LBHF, but your responsibility --
 10 is this right? -- was for adult social care for all
 11 three councils.
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. Yes.
 14 Now, in your first statement at paragraph 9
 15 {RBK00035676/2} you tell us that you had three
 16 directors , one from each council, who reported directly
 17 to you; is that right?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Is it right that they each had an operational lead role,
 20 and Stella Baillie was the director with responsibility
 21 for RBKC; yes?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. And she was, I think -- is this right? -- employed by
 24 RBKC.
 25 A. She was.

5

1 Q. Yes. I think within RBKC -- is this right? -- she was
 2 the director for integrated care, but for all three
 3 boroughs.
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. And I think that's from 2015, as you tell us; yes? Or
 6 Baillie tells us that in her statement, but does that
 7 accord with your recollection?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Adult social care -- is this right? -- provided
 10 residential and community-based care for the elderly,
 11 ill , disabled and vulnerable persons; yes?
 12 A. That's right.
 13 Q. And in relation to those residents coming under its
 14 remit -- is this right? -- that would be, ordinarily,
 15 any resident with mental health problems or learning
 16 disabilities or challenges, the elderly , and people with
 17 dementia or other vulnerable adult difficulties ?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Yes.
 20 How many people worked in the ASC department when
 21 you were there?
 22 A. I'm not sure exactly, but there was probably about
 23 a thousand people, I think.
 24 Q. Yes. I think you say that it was a thousand RBKC staff;
 25 is that right?

6

1 A. Oh, no, I think I probably meant tri-borough.
 2 Q. Tri-borough.
 3 In 2017, to whom did you report in your role as
 4 interim executive director?
 5 A. Initially I -- well, I reported to the Hammersmith and
 6 Fulham chief exec.
 7 Q. That was Nigel Pallace, I think.
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Yes, and he was the lead CEO for the tri-borough, was
 10 he?
 11 A. For adult social care -- well, he was -- they appointed
 12 the director , so he was the one I reported to.
 13 Q. Very well.
 14 Did you also report to Charlie Parker, who was the
 15 CEO at Westminster?
 16 A. Yes, I had to go and see -- report to both, and also
 17 Nicholas as well.
 18 Q. And Nicholas Holgate --
 19 A. Nicholas Holgate.
 20 Q. -- at RBKC, yes.
 21 Now, before the fire on the night of 14 June 2017,
 22 how much contact did you yourself have in that role with
 23 Nicholas Holgate at RBKC?
 24 A. I really think I just was introduced. I don't think I'd
 25 been to a management meeting, because I wasn't going to

7

1 the management meetings, so I hadn't had contact with
 2 hardly anyone in RBKC management team or Nicholas much,
 3 just to say hello, I think.
 4 Q. Right.
 5 Now, I want to ask you some questions next about
 6 your experience of dealing with civil emergency
 7 responses and crisis management.
 8 In your first statement, if we can turn to that,
 9 please, at page 2 {RBK00035676/2}, paragraph 6, you tell
 10 us that your background qualification was as a social
 11 worker and -- and I'm summarising here -- that you had
 12 worked in senior positions in local government for
 13 a number of years. Is that right?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. I think that included working as an assistant director
 16 of adult social care at Wandsworth Council, before
 17 working at Wiltshire County Council as corporate
 18 director for some six years before you retired from
 19 there in 2015; is that right?
 20 A. 2013.
 21 Q. 2013, but that's right? Yes.
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. Now, did those roles at Wandsworth and Wiltshire provide
 24 you with civil emergency or crisis management training?
 25 A. They both provided me with management training, desktop

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1 exercises in the command structure, basically.
 2 Q. Yes.
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. And did you learn about a leadership role which involved
 5 training in multiple agency responses involving the
 6 Gold, Silver and Bronze levels?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. I think you participated, as you tell us, in
 9 a simulation exercise while you were at Wiltshire, not
 10 on the scale of Grenfell, but basically a desk exercise.
 11 A. Yes, it was a half a day exercise with multi -- with
 12 partners.
 13 Q. I see.
 14 When you retired from Wiltshire in 2013, you tell us
 15 in your first statement that you undertook temporary
 16 director roles, including six months in 2013 as interim
 17 director of adult social care, employed by LBHF, in the
 18 same tri-borough position we've already discussed; is
 19 that correct?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. Just help me here, between the end of your first stint
 22 at LBHF in October 2013 and your return there in
 23 April 2017, did you undertake any similar interim
 24 director roles?
 25 A. I did. I was -- a similar role in Kingston for

1 two years, and then a similar role in Cheshire.
 2 Q. Kingston and Cheshire.
 3 When you returned to the tri-borough in April 2017
 4 as interim executive director for adult social care and
 5 public health, did you receive any guidance or any
 6 information on the contingency management plan from LBHF
 7 or RBKC?
 8 A. No.
 9 Q. None. So you didn't see -- is this right? -- RBKC's
 10 contingency management plan at that stage?
 11 A. I didn't.
 12 Q. Were you aware that it existed?
 13 A. Only insofar as I knew councils had to have
 14 a contingency plan, and in each of my other interims,
 15 I was never inducted or given any information about them
 16 either.
 17 Q. Right.
 18 Were you aware, when you came back in April 2017,
 19 that the contingency management plan was a joint plan
 20 between RBKC and LBHF?
 21 A. No.
 22 Q. You weren't, right. So was that the same as your
 23 experience at your previous roles at Wandsworth and
 24 Wiltshire?
 25 A. Well, they all had their own plans.

1 Q. Right. When you were at Wandsworth and then Wiltshire,
 2 did you see those plans?
 3 A. I would have -- because I was corporate director,
 4 I would have probably seen them at management meetings,
 5 and certainly on the training we would have gone through
 6 the structures.
 7 Q. What was your understanding in June 2017 of the role of
 8 adult social care in the event of an emergency which
 9 engaged either LBHF's or RBKC's contingency management
 10 plans?
 11 A. Well, my understanding at the time, from all my other
 12 roles, was the role of adult social care is to look
 13 after the people that are known to them, so first of all
 14 you make sure you look at your databases and you make
 15 sure people who have got care needs are being looked
 16 after. You also support hospitals, so you often maybe
 17 try to help people be discharged home quicker than they
 18 might have been so you can free up a hospital. You also
 19 look at the surrounding areas and make sure home care
 20 and all the services are going to be able to be
 21 delivered. It was -- it's specifically around those
 22 vulnerable adults that are in your service, and also you
 23 have a rota already set up to staff rest centres with
 24 social workers.
 25 Q. In your role as interim executive director of adult

1 social care, did anybody at RBKC or indeed LBHF provide
 2 emergency response training to you?
 3 A. No.
 4 Q. Did they discuss emergency response training with you at
 5 any induction when you came back to the tri-borough in
 6 April 2017?
 7 A. No.
 8 Q. Had you received any training during your first time in
 9 the role back in 2013?
 10 A. No.
 11 Q. Before the Grenfell Tower fire in June 2017, had you
 12 ever had an operational role as a director of adult
 13 social care during an emergency response?
 14 A. No.
 15 Q. Now, we know that during the response to the
 16 Grenfell Tower fire, you were given the role of
 17 humanitarian assistance lead officer, also known as the
 18 HALO; that's correct, isn't it?
 19 A. Yes, I did have that role.
 20 Q. Yes. What was your knowledge at that time of what that
 21 role involved? I say at that time; at the moment you
 22 took it on.
 23 A. I actually took the role on later on, on the day of the
 24 14th, I think.
 25 Q. Yes.

1 A. And by that time I had advice from Tony Andrews, from
 2 Westminster, about what the role was, and I actually
 3 took it on, I actually then wrote to Nicholas Holgate
 4 and said, "I've got advice, I can do this role". Before
 5 that, I didn't have any idea what the role was, and
 6 I think that both Stella, who had had the role
 7 initially, and myself just thought it was -- I meant
 8 just -- it was about rotas for rest centres, doing the
 9 normal things that adult social care directors do.
 10 Q. Right.
 11 Now, we'll come to the humanitarian assistance
 12 framework later in your evidence, but in relation to the
 13 role of HALO, were you aware when you took it on of what
 14 it meant or how it was defined?
 15 A. I knew, because I'd read the guidance that night, that
 16 it was to co-ordinate multi-agency responses, a few --
 17 not in terms of the emergency, but in terms of
 18 longer-term support.
 19 Q. Let's look at the framework for the moment briefly,
 20 {RBK00011313}, please. I'll show you page 1 and then we
 21 can look at page 2. There's the first page. This is
 22 version 5.0 as at April 2017.
 23 If we go to page 2 {RBK00011313/2}, please, you can
 24 see the second entry down:
 25 "Humanitarian Assistance Lead Officer (HALO).

1 "The HALO will be appointed by Local Authority Gold,
 2 and will typically be a director with responsibility for
 3 Adult Social Care.
 4 "The HALO will bring together partners including
 5 Health, the police, and voluntary and faith sectors to
 6 oversee the Humanitarian Assistance effort. They form
 7 the Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group (HASG)."
 8 So did you understand at the time that it was a role
 9 where you, as the holder being appointed, required
 10 knowledge of the specific council emergency plans for
 11 each borough, as well as the wider London Resilience
 12 humanitarian assistance framework?
 13 A. No, I didn't understand that.
 14 Q. You didn't? Right.
 15 Were you familiar with this definition when you took
 16 the role on?
 17 A. Well, this definition was sent to me. I read it in the
 18 evening of the 14th.
 19 Q. Right, okay.
 20 A. And I read that to be, from where I was sitting at the
 21 time, by myself, without anyone supporting me, to be
 22 a co-ordination role, so I thought I could co-ordinate
 23 a meeting, basically.
 24 Q. Did you consider whether your previous training or your
 25 experience prepared you in any way for this role?

1 A. I considered -- well, mostly I considered the fact that
 2 I didn't know anyone in RBKC, I wouldn't be the right
 3 person for this role.
 4 Q. Right. Did you make that clear to RBKC or Tony Andrews?
 5 A. Tony didn't work for RBKC, Tony was --
 6 Q. He was at Westminster.
 7 A. -- a Westminster -- and he was sending me -- the first
 8 time I got something from him it was to say, "Just to
 9 let you know, this is the framework in case you need
 10 it".
 11 Q. Right.
 12 A. And I didn't really take cognisance of how serious -- to
 13 read this huge document at whenever I got it, 3 o'clock
 14 in that afternoon.
 15 Q. Did it surprise you at the time that there was no person
 16 more readily available who was familiar with this
 17 document already and had had some training on it?
 18 A. It surprised me -- not particularly maybe that, because
 19 I didn't know no one had had any training on it, but it
 20 surprised me that no one else stepped up to do this
 21 role.
 22 Q. So you had -- is this right? -- to be colloquial about
 23 it, a "Why me?" moment?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Let's turn to the events of 14 June, then.

1 Can you recall when you first became aware of the
 2 fire at Grenfell Tower?
 3 A. I think it was very early in the morning. Ann Stuart
 4 rang me.
 5 Q. Right.
 6 A. Gish, I think.
 7 Q. Were you aware at that time that the RBKC contingency
 8 management plan had been activated?
 9 A. No.
 10 Q. What did you consider at that stage that you, and
 11 particularly the adult social care department, was
 12 required to do?
 13 A. Ann Stuart worked for Hammersmith and Fulham, and so
 14 first of all I was surprised she was ringing me, but she
 15 was the emergency duty person on duty that night, so
 16 I knew that we had to -- I didn't know -- she said there
 17 was a fire and, "You need to come in" -- well, she said,
 18 "I'm going through the database". So I knew, as I said
 19 before, the sort of things adult social care had to do
 20 in terms of looking after our own people who might have
 21 been affected.
 22 Q. She told you she was going through the database; which
 23 database was that? Was that your tri-borough ASC
 24 database?
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. I see. Did that have details of those people who
2 received those services and where they lived?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. I see.
5 In relation to that database, how up to date was it
6 or should it have been in accordance with the usual
7 processes adopted?
8 A. I can only think it was very up to date. They're
9 usually very up to date in terms of people we know.
10 Q. Right.
11 We may come back to this later in your evidence, but
12 since we're on it now, let me just ask you: who was it
13 in RBKC upon whom you relied to keep that database up to
14 date?
15 A. Well, Stella was the director of RBKC, so --
16 Q. Stella Baillie?
17 A. Stella Baillie.
18 Q. Do you know what steps Stella Baillie took vis--à-vis the
19 TMO, RBKC's TMO, to keep her information about
20 vulnerable persons in RBKC up to date?
21 A. I don't know. I'm struggling with the connection
22 between the TMO.
23 Q. Right.
24 A. She would have known who -- we would have had addresses
25 of everyone known to adult social care. They would have

17

1 been in the adult social care database.
2 Q. Right.
3 A. I don't know whether -- I don't know what contact she
4 had with the TMO about their -- how to support them at
5 times of emergencies.
6 Q. Right.
7 Let me ask it slightly differently, then: to what
8 extent was there any communication or a conduit for
9 information between the tri-borough ASC database on the
10 one hand and RBKC's housing department on the other?
11 A. I have no knowledge.
12 Q. You don't know, all right.
13 Now, if we go to your first statement, please,
14 page 4 {RBK00035676/4}, paragraphs 17 and 18, you say at
15 the end of paragraph 17, having been called at about
16 6 am, that you made your way to the BECC at the
17 Town Hall to offer any assistance and find out what was
18 required.
19 Do you remember what time you arrived at the BECC?
20 A. I don't, but it was very early. I can't remember what
21 exact time.
22 Q. Right. How would you describe what you observed when
23 you arrived?
24 A. Well, it was a small room with no windows. It had three
25 televisions on, and that's the first time I saw

18

1 Grenfell Tower, and there were quite a few people in
2 there.
3 Q. Right.
4 A. Yeah.
5 Q. Okay. And were you aware at that time or did you learn
6 who was Council Silver and in charge of the BECC?
7 A. No, I didn't know who was in charge of the BECC.
8 Q. Did you speak to anybody to find out what was required
9 of you?
10 A. Yes. Well, I knew straight -- there was myself there as
11 adult social care and there was children's services and
12 there was Ann Stuart, and between children's and adults,
13 we were looking at our own staff, we were making plans
14 about hospital discharges, we were making plans about
15 rotas of social workers, that's what we were doing at
16 that time, and we were both -- it was quite siloed. We
17 were just getting on with that in terms of adult social
18 care.
19 Q. Was Ann Stuart there --
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. -- or working remote? She was in the BECC?
22 A. She was there.
23 Q. Right. Do you know what time she arrived? Do you know?
24 A. Well, she was the emergency duty officer. I think she
25 must have got there about 6.00 or before then.

19

1 Q. Right.
2 Now, when you were going through the ASC database,
3 did the search parameters that you were using, do you
4 know, include those residents in the surrounding areas,
5 in other words not just Grenfell Tower but those in the
6 surrounding blocks, the walkways?
7 A. As far as I can remember, I think just at that time it
8 was Grenfell Tower. I think later on people started
9 looking at surrounding areas, but at that time I think
10 it was just Grenfell.
11 Q. Can you recall when ASC became aware of the need to
12 consider those in the surrounding areas, the walkways?
13 A. I can't remember when.
14 Q. Or Treadgold House. No?
15 A. They would -- I can't remember when.
16 Q. Do you know what was done in relation to those who were
17 identified on the ASC database?
18 A. Yes. Their social workers were contacted. All these
19 people were known to the council, so they had social
20 workers or they had some support worker, and all those
21 support workers or social workers were contacted and
22 asked to see if they could contact either people or
23 their next of kin and to see if they could see if they
24 were located, that they were safe, and to ring back.
25 Q. Was there any specific action in relation to identifying

20

1 those who may have been sent to hospital?
 2 A. Social workers were sent to hospitals as well, both to
 3 be there to support people when they got there, but
 4 also, as I said before, to help hospitals discharge
 5 existing patients. So we did send social workers to
 6 hospital.
 7 Q. Now, the earliest record we have in the Inquiry's
 8 documents is that a social worker went to a hospital at
 9 8.30 am, and we get that from -- this is for our
 10 records -- a spreadsheet at {RBK00028713}, row 19,
 11 column E. Don't worry about me showing it to you. Does
 12 that accord with your recollection?
 13 A. It would probably be the right timing, because --
 14 Q. Right.
 15 A. Yeah.
 16 Q. Right.
 17 In your statement, if we go to paragraph 22, please,
 18 on page 5 {RBK00035676/5}, you say there:
 19 "Around 09.30hrs on 14 June, I tasked Stella Baillie
 20 with setting up a rest centre rota for social workers to
 21 ensure that there were social workers providing support
 22 at the rest centres. Stella was the Director of the ASC
 23 team at RBKC and had been in post for many years and was
 24 hugely experienced. A request for volunteers was made
 25 so that we could provide the required number of Social

21

1 Workers at each of the 3 main rest centres, on a rota
 2 basis, and ensure they were staffed properly on a
 3 continuous basis."
 4 To whom was that support to be directed?
 5 A. At that time it was to -- well, there was a generic call
 6 for support to go to rest centres. It wasn't specific
 7 about which rest centres. After that, though, they were
 8 allocated to different rest centres.
 9 Q. What I really mean is: was the support to be given or
 10 directed to those who had escaped from the tower or was
 11 it family members seeking information?
 12 A. It was -- that support was for the rest centres
 13 specifically, whoever was there.
 14 Q. I see.
 15 Do you know why it took until 9.30 am to set that
 16 rota up, or to request that that rota be set up?
 17 A. I think 9.30 was -- before that, as I was saying,
 18 Ann Stuart was -- she did have a rota of people who were
 19 ready to go, and there were some people already ready to
 20 go. I think we were waiting to be told when to send
 21 them.
 22 Q. Right, I see. And can you say when social workers from
 23 the ASC were actually deployed to rest centres?
 24 A. I think it must have been around -- I think 9.30 must
 25 have been the time we knew what rest centres to go to

22

1 and there was a decision made that we should send people
 2 out. We couldn't just send them without some
 3 instructions and some co-ordination, so I think it was
 4 about that time. It might have been 10 o'clock.
 5 Q. Right.
 6 A. 10 o'clock.
 7 Q. So are you saying that you didn't know which
 8 rest centres were operating to which social workers
 9 should be sent until about 9.30?
 10 A. No, people did know rest centres, but -- and there was
 11 a rota of -- we already had the rota, but I'm trying to
 12 remember that -- I think officially we said, "Go to --
 13 we need someone to go to this, this and this specific
 14 rest centres" at that time.
 15 Q. Right, I see. So you already had the rest centres --
 16 you already knew which they were, you just hadn't worked
 17 the rota out until 9.30?
 18 A. Well, there was a list of a lot of places that people
 19 were going to, so in terms of which specific
 20 rest centres to send people to, I think we needed to
 21 know from someone in the BECC or somewhere where they
 22 would best be sent.
 23 Q. Right.
 24 To the best of your recollection, was the BECC clear
 25 with you at all times about which rest centres were

23

1 operating?
 2 A. It's only in retrospect that I really understood what
 3 the BECC was supposed to be doing, because at that time
 4 and that day, I didn't get any sense of any -- anyone
 5 co-ordinating what was happening, certainly from my
 6 perspective in there. So I think we -- someone told us
 7 around 9.30 which rest centres to go to.
 8 Q. Right. But before that, was there any discussion that
 9 you were either involved with or heard about which
 10 rest centres were operating?
 11 A. I heard that there were -- there was lots going on, and
 12 I just heard lots of names mentioned.
 13 Q. Right, I see. But -- right.
 14 A. Lots of rest centre names mentioned, or lots of
 15 accommodation names mentioned.
 16 Q. Yes.
 17 You said a moment ago in one of your answers that
 18 you weren't sure what the BECC was or what it was
 19 supposed to do. Can we take it from that that you had
 20 never had any training about what a BECC was, who was
 21 supposed to be running it and what your role as a HALO
 22 would be and how it would fit?
 23 A. No.
 24 Q. Right. So you were essentially, what, learning on the
 25 job, were you?

24

1 A. Yes. I knew -- in terms of the training I'd had before
 2 on Gold, Silver and Bronze, they were talking about
 3 first responders and second responders. I can't
 4 remember anything about a BECC. My training was like
 5 2010.
 6 Q. Was there sufficient capacity available to you to
 7 provide social workers on the rota to the three main
 8 rest centres that you refer to?
 9 A. Well, I think initially, of course -- I think initially
 10 we did have enough social workers that we thought would
 11 be enough, and obviously very quickly it was realised
 12 there was going to have to be a rota throughout the day
 13 and the next day, and I think then we were really
 14 looking for volunteers.
 15 Q. And where were you looking for those volunteers?
 16 A. Only -- at that time, it was across RBKC and Westminster
 17 and Hammersmith and Fulham. It was asking any social
 18 workers to join a rota.
 19 Q. Right.
 20 I would like then to turn next to the RBKC
 21 management board meeting at 11 am on 14 June, which has
 22 been referred to as RBKC Gold and meetings of RBKC Gold.
 23 If we go, please, to paragraph 23, just a little bit
 24 lower down your screen {RBK00035676/5}, you deal with
 25 that board meeting in paragraph 23 there, and you say:

25

1 "My predecessor did not attend the Management Board
 2 meetings at RBKC -- she would attend the Westminster City
 3 Council ones only -- so I was not scheduled to attend
 4 that meeting and Stella would attend. However, I was
 5 copied into an email from Nicholas Holgate (Chief
 6 Executive at RBKC) informing us that in light of the
 7 tragic events at Grenfell Tower, the scheduled meeting
 8 would take place as a 'Gold' meeting. Stella Baillie
 9 said she was happy to continue to attend the meeting as
 10 normal on the basis that she knew the Management that
 11 would be attending. This made complete sense to me;
 12 this was a crisis and the presence of a stranger, albeit
 13 the Interim Executive Director was not in my opinion
 14 going to assist."
 15 Now, is it right that the meeting was a scheduled
 16 meeting, but it was then converted into an RBKC Gold
 17 meeting in light of the events unfolding that morning?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Yes.
 20 Bearing in mind that you're already in the
 21 Town Hall, did you consider at the time that you should
 22 have attended, in light of the seriousness of the
 23 incident?
 24 A. I was with -- in the BECC with Ann, and Stella was
 25 a very experienced director, and I just said, "Well, you

26

1 go to" -- well, she said, "I'm going to the first one".
 2 I didn't consider that I should go. I wasn't invited to
 3 the management -- I wasn't part of the management --
 4 I didn't think at that moment I should go.
 5 Q. Right.
 6 Was there, even in retrospect, any skillset or set
 7 of experiences that you could have brought to that
 8 meeting which she didn't?
 9 A. I can't think of any.
 10 Q. No.
 11 Let's then look at the minutes of that meeting,
 12 {RBK00001095}, page 1 to start with, to show you the
 13 first page of it and the attendees. There it is: 11 am
 14 at Kensington Town Hall, action sheet, and you can see
 15 who was present and in attendance, and we can see:
 16 "Apologies for absence: Sue Redmond ..."
 17 It's not a matter for you to apologise or explain
 18 the apology, but I think, is it right, you weren't
 19 scheduled to be there anyway?
 20 A. No. Yes, sorry, it's right, yes.
 21 Q. Yes.
 22 Now, if we go to page 2 {RBK00001095/2}, we can see
 23 the "Update from CC and SB", the latter of which is
 24 Stella Baillie, SB, and that includes the fact that ASC
 25 have, as it says, third bullet point down:

27

1 "Pulled together a list of known residents accessing
 2 a number of Council Services, but do not know where they
 3 all are currently."
 4 Then it goes on in the next bullet point:
 5 "The Crisis Centre are on standby to offer help to
 6 Mental Health Service users. There are a number of over
 7 65s and the Enabling Team are on site."
 8 What was the crisis centre?
 9 A. This is a specific service to RBKC which I don't know
 10 about, but I think it's the joint service with health --
 11 with the health service and the social workers, who were
 12 mental health service, and I don't actually know who
 13 they are.
 14 Q. Right.
 15 Can you help us, what was the enabling team, do you
 16 know?
 17 A. I don't know who the enabling team are.
 18 Q. You weren't at this meeting, to be fair, so there may be
 19 a limit to how much you can help with it, but if we go
 20 to page 4 {RBK00001095/4}, in the fourth bullet point
 21 down there, it says:
 22 "Looking to set up a Humanitarian Assistance Group
 23 which will continue to look at the welfare of the
 24 residents once the immediate crisis is over. TR to seek
 25 advice from an expert in Harrow Council on this. SB

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1 said she was happy to lead on this until Friday and
 2 would find a deputy to take over."
 3 Did you know at that time what a humanitarian
 4 assistance steering group entailed?
 5 A. No.
 6 Q. Now, you mention in your statement at paragraph 25
 7 {RBK00035676/6}, as we've seen, over the page, that it
 8 had been said that Stella would take the lead on that,
 9 but because she was due to go on leave, you were given
 10 the role.
 11 Do you remember when it was decided that you would
 12 become what is known as a HALO, a humanitarian
 13 assistance lead officer?
 14 A. No, not specifically, because it was sort of organic in
 15 a way, and I actually at the end said, "I'll do it". So
 16 when Stella said this, when I read it again, I was
 17 really surprised, because I think -- this wasn't
 18 mentioned throughout the day, that a humanitarian
 19 assistance group would be looked at again.
 20 Q. Right.
 21 A. That was the only reference I've seen to it. Stella
 22 didn't come back to me and say she was going to lead,
 23 she was going to be a HALO. I think her response was
 24 the same as mine, what we knew adult social care could
 25 do. I can't --

1 Q. Yes.
 2 A. I can't say any more. But no one came back -- no one
 3 spoke about a humanitarian assistance group for the rest
 4 of the day.
 5 Q. Right.
 6 I think, as you told us earlier, you had a "Why me?"
 7 moment. Just to pick that up in your statement, if we
 8 can go, please, to your second statement
 9 {RBK00058120/3}, paragraph 3.3, you say there in the
 10 second sentence:
 11 "When I was designated the role of HALO on
 12 14 June 2017, I did question whether I was the right
 13 person for the role as I was relatively new to the
 14 Borough and did not know too many people, nor have all
 15 the contact details, of those (both internally within
 16 RBKC and external agencies) that could provide
 17 assistance. I accepted the role, explaining that
 18 I would need further support and I did receive a lot of
 19 support from Tony Andrews, Westminster City Council."
 20 When you accepted the role, as you say you did, you
 21 say you questioned whether you were the right person for
 22 the role; did you articulate that question to
 23 Tony Andrews or anybody else?
 24 A. Yes, I know I had conversations and I've seen emails
 25 that I've sent to say some expert is coming in after me

1 raising this, so I must -- I spoke to quite a few
 2 people.
 3 Q. But you nonetheless took on the role?
 4 A. Well, if I could just explain a little bit then. That
 5 afternoon, Stella said she was going on leave, so I said
 6 I would step in, in terms of her role, not knowing what
 7 that role was at that time.
 8 Q. Right.
 9 A. And then Tony Andrews from Westminster City Council sent
 10 me the framework, and then in the evening he sent me
 11 specifics about what the role is and what they do.
 12 After that, no one actually said to me, "You are the
 13 HALO". At that evening -- I mean, I'm probably going
 14 too far, I can come back to you. So no one actually
 15 said to me, "Will you be the HALO?" It wasn't actually
 16 agreed formally until the next day.
 17 Q. I see.
 18 Now, then, let's just stick with 14 June for the
 19 moment.
 20 If we go back to your first statement, please, at
 21 {RBK00035676/6}, paragraph 27 at the foot of the page,
 22 you say:
 23 "An ASC heads of service meeting was held at around
 24 14:00hrs on 14 June."
 25 You see that. Then if we go to your second

1 statement, please, page 4 {RBK00058120/4},
 2 paragraph 5.2, you tell us a little bit more about that
 3 meeting, and you say it was:
 4 "... led by Stella Baillie to update, coordinate and
 5 ensure all people known to social care were receiving
 6 care still and that hospitals could be supported and
 7 people moved out to free up capacity. The meeting also
 8 discussed rotas and the provision of cover. The meeting
 9 was attended by the ASC managers from all three councils
 10 in order to support RBKC's small management team.
 11 I attended the meeting, but arrived later and am not
 12 shown on the list of attendees."
 13 Now, let's look, then, against that background in
 14 your statement, at the draft minutes of that meeting.
 15 It's at {RBK00058106}. I think you tell us that you
 16 don't believe that formal minutes were taken. These are
 17 drafts.
 18 If you look at the email, if you go to the bottom of
 19 the email on page 1, where the note begins, you can see
 20 it says "Discussion", and the first bullet point or dash
 21 there says:
 22 "Needs a comms pulled together to advise staff what
 23 to say to clients."
 24 Was such a plan pulled together, do you remember?
 25 A. I can't remember a specific plan being pulled together,

1 but certainly our social care staff hopefully were told
 2 what to say to clients .
 3 Q. Right.
 4 A. They were told — basically they were saying — they
 5 were contacting their own clients who they'd known and
 6 they were asking them did they know where their next of
 7 kin was or did they know things, and — it wasn't a
 8 comms plan in terms of the disaster or anything.
 9 Q. I see. So there wasn't one? There wasn't a comms plan
 10 per se?
 11 A. No.
 12 Q. I see.
 13 What was the advice given to staff about what they
 14 should say to their own clients?
 15 A. Well, basically we were asking them to see if, first of
 16 all, they could locate them, or if not they could locate
 17 the next of kin, and then they found out that they were
 18 safe, and then they could tell them where the
 19 rest centres were.
 20 Q. Now, if you look at the last point on page 1, it says:
 21 "One of the ASC's focus is the humanitarian needs of
 22 those affected — will need to pull together a regular
 23 board, but in the meantime we need to create a rota for
 24 cover at the three rest centres — someone will need to
 25 be awake and alert (and not alone — ideally we want 3

1 people per rest centre per shift)."
 2 Now, in relation to pulling together a regular board
 3 there, what was that a reference to, do you know?
 4 A. I don't know, and I think everyone was just
 5 concentrating on the rota for the rest centres.
 6 Q. Right. Was that board related to the humanitarian
 7 assistance steering group, or HASG, that then came to be
 8 set up?
 9 A. I can only assume it must be.
 10 Q. Right. Or there was a possibility that I suppose
 11 a board might have been suggested and then superseded by
 12 the creation of a humanitarian assistance steering
 13 group; can you help us?
 14 A. I think this is indicative that people didn't really
 15 know what was what.
 16 Q. Right.
 17 Was there any discussion at this meeting, 2 o'clock
 18 on the 14th, of the humanitarian assistance framework
 19 document or the need for a steering group?
 20 A. No.
 21 Q. No.
 22 As you can see here, there's a reference to a need
 23 to create a rota for cover at the three rest centres,
 24 three people per rest centre per shift .
 25 Again, if you look at the same page {RBK00058106/2},

1 lower down, there's a bullet point seven bullet points
 2 down, about two-thirds of the way down your screen,
 3 which says, "Need people" — do you see it, "Need people
 4 to volunteer"?
 5 A. Yeah.
 6 Q. "Need people to volunteer for tonight's rest centre
 7 shifts — Ann to look into this. The 'volunteer'
 8 rest centres haven't taken a list of who's there so we
 9 can't cross reference, so it's chaotic and confusing.
 10 We need the people at our rest centres to stay at our
 11 rest centres."
 12 Now, two things about that.
 13 First, was staffing the rest centres and filling
 14 the rota a problem at the start of this response?
 15 A. I think at the start, because they already had a rota of
 16 some people, those people were called straight away, but
 17 I think as it unfolded there was a real need to get
 18 volunteers, and there was a concern about how many
 19 volunteers they needed.
 20 Q. Now, there is a reference here also to the taking of
 21 lists at rest centres; can you explain, as you say, in
 22 what way it was chaotic and confusing?
 23 A. I didn't say that. I think that was Ann Stuart.
 24 Q. Well, okay. The email says it.
 25 A. All right.

1 Q. Going back to that seventh bullet point in the middle of
 2 your screen, or two-thirds of the way down your screen,
 3 it says, "we can't cross reference, so it's chaotic and
 4 confusing". Was that not a view you shared at the time?
 5 A. I don't know whether I was there for the whole of that
 6 meeting, but it wasn't — obviously that's what Ann
 7 said, and I don't know whether I shared it or not,
 8 because I was in this — I wasn't really connected into
 9 what was happening at the rest centres.
 10 Q. Right.
 11 Do you know how it was known that the volunteer
 12 rest centres were not taking a list of those who were
 13 there?
 14 A. No.
 15 Q. Was that being reported? You don't know?
 16 A. I don't know how that was known.
 17 Q. Now, we know that a number of locations opened up
 18 spontaneously on the night of the fire as places of
 19 shelter, and RBKC then designated the locations that
 20 they would support: first the Harrow Club, and then the
 21 Rugby Portobello Trust, and then a decision later to
 22 concentrate efforts on the Westway Centre.
 23 Is that your recollection of the official
 24 rest centres on the night?
 25 A. Is the Harrow Club the same as the Clement James?

1 Q. No.
 2 A. Okay, well --
 3 Q. Then no.
 4 A. No.
 5 Q. Do you remember what the process was of registering
 6 those who had attended an official rest centre so
 7 designated?
 8 A. No.
 9 Q. Do you know whether the information of those or about
 10 those who did register was collated from the three
 11 rest centres that are mentioned here in the minutes?
 12 A. Well, I only know in retrospect, having heard --
 13 Q. I see. All right. Even in retrospect, were they?
 14 A. Sorry, were they --
 15 Q. Were they collated?
 16 A. Well, sorry, I only know what I've heard in these
 17 hearings, and I know they weren't collated.
 18 Q. I see. All right.
 19 Was it the case that a number of those displaced by
 20 the fire would move from rest centre to rest centre,
 21 looking for information regarding missing loved ones?
 22 A. That's what I believe.
 23 Q. You believe so. Do you know how someone who would
 24 attend more than one rest centre would be recorded?
 25 A. No.

1 Q. No, and presumably you don't know how the numbers of
 2 those attending rest centres would be collated?
 3 A. No.
 4 Q. Let's then turn to the next meeting, which was at 3 pm,
 5 1500 hours, on 14 June, and that was an RBKC Gold
 6 meeting, and you cover that at paragraph 26 of your
 7 first statement on page 6 {RBK00035676/6}, if we can go
 8 to that, please. Page 6, paragraph 26. It's up on the
 9 screen. You say:
 10 "Stella Baillie and I both attended the 15:00hrs
 11 Gold meeting. I think this was on the basis that
 12 I became aware that Stella was due to go on annual leave
 13 on the Friday after work, therefore it was sensible that
 14 I was involved for continuity and to understand the
 15 issues at the time."
 16 Attending the meeting, what was your impression of
 17 what was happening? What was your impression of the
 18 meeting?
 19 (Pause)
 20 A. On one hand, there were lots -- they were reporting
 21 people saying -- I'm trying to think of specifics. They
 22 were saying some things hadn't worked, like senior
 23 managers at rest centres, but they were there now, so on
 24 the one hand there was a sense that people were doing
 25 things that should be right. On the other hand, I just

1 got a sense of people being shocked, and it wasn't
 2 a tactical meeting as such.
 3 Q. Right.
 4 A. It was a meeting that was different for people -- they
 5 were updating things and it -- and there was lots going
 6 on. There was lots of information there, and very hard
 7 to then work out who was accountable and responsible for
 8 what.
 9 Q. Did you form any view about whether RBKC had a clear
 10 strategy and sufficient resources to deal with the
 11 aftermath of this fire?
 12 A. At that time, as I say, I was -- there was sort of -- it
 13 felt like a reassurance from people, "Senior managers
 14 are there now, we've got the rotas, we've got this",
 15 everyone was saying their individual things, so in that
 16 respect it seemed as though people were doing things.
 17 Obviously I know that wasn't the case at all. But
 18 I didn't get the sense that there was real -- there was
 19 urgency on some things, but there wasn't a real sense
 20 of -- and there was lots of managers in the room, and
 21 I didn't know why some of them weren't out there or doing
 22 other things. There was lots of us in the room.
 23 Q. I don't want to paraphrase that answer, but would it be
 24 right to say -- and correct me if this is wrong -- that
 25 your impression was that although there was plenty of

1 activity, it wasn't co-ordinated or structured and
 2 following a particular plan?
 3 A. I didn't get a sense it was following a plan.
 4 Q. Did you get a feeling or did you form a view about
 5 whether RBKC had sufficient resources to do what they
 6 were trying to do?
 7 A. I hadn't -- I didn't have any idea then because as --
 8 for me, because I didn't know those people, I was
 9 hearing, "Senior managers are there, we're doing this,
 10 we've got this". I knew we were struggling with some
 11 social workers, but we had a rota for the next day.
 12 Q. Let's go to the minutes, {RBK00002282}. You can see
 13 there 3 pm, Kensington Town Hall, action sheet, and you
 14 can see who was in attendance. Stella Baillie is
 15 identified there, as are you. Also in attendance
 16 Robert Black, as you can see, he was from the TMO.
 17 If you look under the heading "Grenfell Tower fire",
 18 fourth bullet point down, it says:
 19 "TR [Tony Redpath] reported the BECC were finding
 20 out about the numbers of people in the rest centres and
 21 what practical assistance they needed. Consideration to
 22 be given on how the donations can be transported to the
 23 rest centres once a sense of demand was ascertained."
 24 Was there clarity -- any clarity -- about the amount
 25 of people affected at that stage?

1 A. I don't think there was.
 2 Q. Was there any mention, any discussion, of any problem
 3 about obtaining an accurate understanding of the numbers
 4 affected adversely and what practical assistance they
 5 needed?
 6 A. I can't remember that there was any discussion.
 7 Q. There was, and what was the upshot of that discussion?
 8 A. Sorry, I can't remember that there was --
 9 Q. You can't remember that there was?
 10 A. No.
 11 Q. I'm sorry, I misheard you. Yes, I see.
 12 If we go, then, to the final entry on page 2 of the
 13 minutes {RBK00002282/2}, above "Agreed to reconvene", it
 14 says in that last bullet point:
 15 "TR to communicate with SR on which rest centres to
 16 keep open overnight."
 17 Did Tony Redpath communicate with you on that issue?
 18 A. I can't specifically remember, but I think we agreed it
 19 was -- would be the Westway that would open that night.
 20 And the reason he was communicating with me is to make
 21 sure that the social workers were there and supporting
 22 them.
 23 Q. Yes.
 24 Was it the case that you yourself wanted to go out
 25 to the rest centres, but were being asked to remain

1 because leadership was needed in the office?
 2 A. I wanted to do something, yeah, and I did suggest I go,
 3 on two separate occasions.
 4 Q. Who asked you to stay in the office?
 5 A. I can't remember, but I said, "Look, I can -- can I go
 6 out and do something", and they said, "Oh, no, we
 7 need -- you're the adult social care, you need to stay
 8 here". I also asked on the Friday with Gold London as
 9 well, and I was told no.
 10 Q. Right.
 11 Let's then turn back to the time you took on the
 12 role of HALO, and as we've seen already, you took it on
 13 expressly, it seems -- is this right? -- on the basis
 14 that you needed further support; yes?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Yes.
 17 Now, the support you received -- again, is this
 18 correct -- was in the form of Tony Andrews, who was
 19 I think at that stage the emergency planning manager,
 20 humanitarian assistance, at Westminster City Council.
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. You say in your first statement that he told you that,
 23 as the interim executive director, it was your role,
 24 according to national protocol, to lead on humanitarian
 25 assistance; yes? That's what you say in your statement

1 at paragraph 29 {RBK00035676/7}. We can see it if you
 2 like.
 3 A. No, it's -- I think at some point he told me that, but
 4 what he did initially was send us all in the adult
 5 social care a framework document, that framework
 6 document, to say, "You might want to have a read of
 7 this".
 8 Q. Right.
 9 A. He was being very helpful.
 10 Q. Do you remember when he sent that document to you?
 11 A. I know from records that he sent that email to us all at
 12 about 2 o'clock on the 14th.
 13 Q. Right. And did you have the conversation with him when
 14 he told you it was your role to lead on national
 15 protocol?
 16 A. Well, he sent me a document at 2 o'clock. I don't know
 17 when I opened it.
 18 Q. Right.
 19 A. And it was a framework, it was that -- a huge framework
 20 document, and it was only later, when I think I'd come
 21 out of a Gold meeting or something, that I think
 22 I rang -- we actually had a conversation about that role
 23 and what it is and who's supposed to do it, and that's
 24 when I then went to people in RBKC and said, "Could
 25 someone else -- do you want me to do" -- you know,

1 I wanted to do something, but I actually didn't think
 2 maybe I was the right person to do it.
 3 Q. Who did you tell at RBKC?
 4 A. I think -- I can't remember, but I think it might have
 5 been Tony Redpath. I can't remember. I spoke to a few
 6 other -- I might have also spoken to Nicholas, because
 7 after that then came a discussion about some expert
 8 would be coming tomorrow to take on the HALO role.
 9 Q. You say, "I might have spoken to Nicholas"; is that
 10 Nicholas Holgate?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. Was he in the BECC? Sorry, let me try it like this:
 13 where were you when you had that conversation with him?
 14 A. I've no idea.
 15 Q. Right. Was it face-to-face or was it on the telephone?
 16 A. It would have been face-to-face.
 17 Q. Right. Somewhere in Kensington Town Hall?
 18 A. Yeah.
 19 Q. Right.
 20 Now, let's go to {RBK00019928}. This is an email
 21 from Tony Andrews on 14 June 2017 timed at 20.24 in the
 22 evening to you:
 23 "Subject: Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group
 24 suggestion.
 25 "Attachments: Grenfell Tower HASG suggestion ...

1 "Sue
 2 "Here are some thoughts for your first meeting. For
 3 what it's worth your role according to the London
 4 Humanitarian Assistance Framework is 'Humanitarian
 5 Assistance Lead Officer' (HALO).
 6 "You may like to put my 24/7 contact numbers below
 7 on your phone."
 8 Now, before that point, had you heard of HALO?
 9 A. If I had, it had only been --- when I read --- I read the
 10 document.
 11 Q. Right. Had you already received the document, the
 12 framework ---
 13 A. He'd sent ---
 14 Q. --- from Tony Andrews before this point?
 15 A. Yes, he'd sent the framework about 2 o'clock on the
 16 Friday.
 17 Q. Yes.
 18 A. This was more specifics. He was actually giving me some
 19 specifics and a bit more detail.
 20 Q. Yes. It's attached to this email that we see a document
 21 called the "Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group".
 22 Let's just look at that, because we can see what's
 23 attached. {RBK00019929}. It has that very title, and
 24 it says in the first paragraph:
 25 "The HASG SITS under the Local Authority Recovery

1 Group which is typically chaired by the Chief Exec to
 2 coordinate all recovery issues (community reassurance,
 3 built environment issues, community cohesion, Business
 4 Continuity issues etc). You may get the HASG started
 5 before the Recovery Group starts.
 6 "The HASG is a multi agency group typically chaired
 7 by the Director of Adult Social Care who has lead
 8 responsibility for Humanitarian Assistance under the
 9 Civil Contingency Act 2004.
 10 "The purpose is to lead, oversee and coordinate all
 11 aspects of the Humanitarian response. In this incident
 12 that is likely to include ..."
 13 And then you can see a long, long list of numbered
 14 roles and functions. Do you see that?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Now, just pausing there, when you got this document, did
 17 you look at the framework document that you had been
 18 sent earlier in the day to see how your role fitted into
 19 this?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. You did.
 22 If we look at the third paragraph on page 1 and then
 23 all the numbers, you would agree, I think, that these
 24 are a significant number of areas for you to oversee as
 25 HALO; yes?

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. Yes, and one of those, if we go to the second item down,
 3 point 2 says:
 4 "Rest Centres and other Immediate Needs. The HASG
 5 probably only needs brief assurance from the person
 6 coordinating rest centres that the following are being
 7 taken care of and may only need a more detailed
 8 discussion if there are problems needing higher level
 9 resolution (e.g. more substantial mutual aid from other
 10 local authorities and partners)."
 11 On the 14th and into the 15th, who did you consider
 12 was the person co-ordinating the rest centres?
 13 A. Well, I actually had one person's name, but I don't
 14 think she was. I know Gold were co-ordinating, they
 15 were doing discussions at Gold. There was a woman
 16 called Sue Harris who I found was out there reporting
 17 back. I thought she was managing the rest centres.
 18 I think I'm mistaken about that now, but at the time
 19 I thought it might have been her.
 20 Q. Why do you think you're mistaken about that now?
 21 A. Because --- well, I don't know, actually.
 22 Q. Right. So is the answer you don't know?
 23 A. Yes, I don't know who was co-ordinating.
 24 Q. Right.
 25 Did you have any idea about what the BRC, the

1 British Red Cross, were doing and what their role was at
 2 that time?
 3 A. I don't think I had any detailed idea what they were
 4 doing at that time. I very soon did, but no, I didn't.
 5 Q. You say you very soon did; when? When did you very soon
 6 do?
 7 A. Well, the next morning.
 8 Q. Right. And what, when you did come to understand it,
 9 did you understand their role to be?
 10 A. Well, the council were --- I think I did ask some
 11 questions. The council said the British Red Cross go in
 12 first, they co-ordinate our rest centres for us, and
 13 they communicate with people.
 14 Q. Right.
 15 A. When I spoke to the British Red Cross, their view wasn't
 16 quite the same.
 17 Q. Right. We may come back to that later in your evidence,
 18 but just while we're on it, who was it at the council
 19 who told you that the British Red Cross go in first,
 20 they co-ordinate our rest centres and communicate with
 21 people?
 22 A. So many people --- it was some --- it might have been
 23 Stuart Priestley or Tony Redpath.
 24 Q. Right.
 25 Now, can we go back to the email chain in the

1 evening of 14 June between you and Tony Andrews.
 2 You responded to his email, and we can see that at
 3 {RBK00058103}. This captures what you've just told us
 4 about your conversation with Nicholas Holgate. It's
 5 from you to Tony Andrews at 21.15 on 14 June:
 6 "Thanks so much Tony."
 7 And then you give your number, and then in the next
 8 line it says:
 9 "Nicholas just told me that some expert is going to
 10 come to help on this front from London Councils so
 11 I will find out tomorrow if I am the halo or not.
 12 "But in the meantime I have read some of your
 13 framework thanks and will read this.
 14 "And I will catch up with you even on phone tomorrow
 15 when I know."
 16 Now, I take it that Nicholas there is
 17 Nicholas Holgate; yes?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Now, do you remember who the expert from London Councils
 20 or perhaps London Resilience was to be at that stage?
 21 A. No. I mean, I don't know, rather than I don't remember.
 22 I don't know who --
 23 Q. Right, you don't know.
 24 Given that you felt that, as you say, somebody else
 25 could or perhaps should have occupied the role of HALO

1 the following day, did the lack of information delay the
 2 setting up of the humanitarian assistance steering group
 3 on 14 June?
 4 A. Well, on 14 June I'd only -- this is 8 o'clock at night
 5 when I'm getting the information about what a HALO is,
 6 and I didn't -- it didn't stop me setting it up first
 7 thing in the morning, because I went in at 8 o'clock and
 8 did all the business for it, even before I knew whether
 9 I was doing it or not, so I didn't know what else
 10 I could do then.
 11 Q. Right.
 12 Now, I think you had email contact with
 13 Nicholas Holgate that same evening, around about the
 14 same time, in fact the next thing you did, because if we
 15 look at {RBK00019951}, we can see that you sent him
 16 an email six minutes after sending this back to
 17 Tony Andrews. This is at 21.21.21, and you say to him:
 18 "Nicholas
 19 "I hope you are ok.
 20 "Just to let you know I have good support and advice
 21 about setting up the humanitarian assistance board asap.
 22 "I am happy to start this tomorrow but will await
 23 our meeting with you in the morning.
 24 "And of course if we have the expert from London
 25 Councils we can agree who does what and take it from

1 there.
 2 "Just wanted to give you some reassurance."
 3 Why did you think he needed reassurance?
 4 A. I think -- and I remember this -- I think it wasn't
 5 really that. I had by that time, that afternoon, seen
 6 lack of co-ordination, and I'd spoken to Tony Redpath
 7 and Stuart Priestley about that.
 8 Q. Right.
 9 A. And I said, "You need to get the structures, you need to
 10 get sorted", and then when I read this, I knew, I felt,
 11 that if I just came in as someone people didn't know,
 12 setting up this humanitarian assistance steering group,
 13 that there's no way it would have been in any structure.
 14 I thought we were in danger of setting something up to
 15 duplicate everything else and everyone running around
 16 doing the same thing, which had been happening. So this
 17 email was actually -- I sent -- I think I also sent the
 18 actual advice I'd got from Tony to actually say what it
 19 was. I was actually saying, "This is what this is, it's
 20 a serious group, I'm happy to start it, just so you
 21 know", and it was really saying, "I need this to be part
 22 of a structure". I should have been more explicit, but
 23 that's what I was actually saying.
 24 Q. Right.
 25 A. And this is me saying I'll do it, because I wasn't

1 actually -- no one's in the meantime told me to do it or
 2 set it up.
 3 Q. Right.
 4 Now, I think you do say in your statement, at
 5 paragraph 7.7 of your second statement {RBK00058120/6},
 6 that you got a response from Mr Holgate to your email
 7 a few minutes later. Let's go to that, {RBK00058107}.
 8 This is an email sent by him back to you, four minutes
 9 later, 21.25, and he says:
 10 "Sue
 11 "Thanks. If you want to take some steps before
 12 10 am, please do. Up to you."
 13 What did you make of that response?
 14 A. With everything I know and at that time, I just thought
 15 it's up to me to do whatever I wanted.
 16 Q. Right. So you didn't -- I see. Did you take that email
 17 as essentially the go-ahead to take on the role of HALO
 18 and set up the HASG?
 19 A. Oh, no, what I took that as is: it's up to you to do
 20 what you want. So I actually did meet at 8 o'clock and
 21 start doing everything.
 22 Q. Right.
 23 Do you consider that the HASG could have been set up
 24 on the 14th, rather than on the morning of the 15th?
 25 A. I -- in -- I do. I do.

1 Q. You do. And looking back on it now, do you think or do
 2 you agree that an HASG should have been set up on the
 3 14th as opposed to the 15th?
 4 A. Oh, yes, I do. And when I read the document, it was
 5 massive in terms of what that group does, but it did say
 6 it was light touch on rest centres, but of course,
 7 because of what was happening in rest centres, that
 8 group became basically sorting out the issues in the
 9 rest centres.
 10 Q. Right.
 11 Who did you consider was leading on humanitarian
 12 issues on 14 June before the establishment of the HASG
 13 on the 15th, and indeed the confirmation of you as HALO?
 14 A. Again, it was siloed. Adults were leading on adults,
 15 children were leading on children, so their humanitarian
 16 issues. Tony Redpath, I thought, was looking at
 17 humanitarian assistance board. I thought he was the one
 18 who was dealing with that. Of course, in my ignorance
 19 of not knowing what the huge task of it was, I didn't
 20 realise he was doing all that.
 21 Q. Now, if we go to your first statement, please, page 7
 22 {RBK00035676/7}, paragraph 28, you say there:
 23 "I stayed at the RBKC Town Hall the whole day and
 24 did not leave until after 22:00hrs that evening."
 25 And that's 14 June, if we look at this paragraph in

1 the context of your wider statement. Then you go on:
 2 "I remained in BECC throughout the day and supported
 3 any actions which needed doing and asking Tony Redpath
 4 if he needed help co-ordinating anything."
 5 So was Tony Redpath your principal point of contact
 6 within the BECC during 14 June?
 7 A. No, but he was a senior manager, a director who was
 8 managing all of them. He wasn't in the BECC very often.
 9 But I had by that time -- rightly or wrongly, I had
 10 started answering some phones in the BECC, and I could
 11 see that there was very little leadership. There was
 12 an amazing woman in there, Rebecca Blackburn, doing
 13 an amazing job, but I could sense that -- there were
 14 a lot of people, a lot of phones going, and there was
 15 a lot of people running around, and it didn't seem --
 16 I didn't know who was leading or what, so I went and
 17 I remember asking Tony Redpath and Stuart Priestley to
 18 sit in a room with me, and I think I took -- I asked the
 19 director of children's to come with me.
 20 Q. Did you have a meeting?
 21 A. Well, it wasn't a meeting, but it was like a ten-minute
 22 conversation.
 23 Q. Right, and --
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. -- during that conversation, did it become clear to you

1 what the principal problems of the response were?
 2 A. Well, I just said to both of them, "You need to stop,
 3 you need to pause, you need to slow down, you need to
 4 get some structure everyone's running round like rabbits
 5 in the headlights", that's what I said. "Please use us,
 6 we need to co-ordinate things", that's what I said.
 7 Q. What was it that appeared to you to be lacking in
 8 co-ordination at that point?
 9 A. Leadership.
 10 Q. In what areas specifically?
 11 A. Well, particularly in the BECC, and I've heard people
 12 say it was a loud environment, phones were going. It
 13 needs to be like that. Maybe people who are not used to
 14 it could be shocked. But I saw people duplicating,
 15 you know, they were asking questions about, "What's the
 16 phone number for this?", "What's the address for this?",
 17 and it was 101 things going on, and adult social care
 18 and children's were separate, housing was separate.
 19 I just didn't get the sense that we were fitting into
 20 any sort of plan. And when I -- and at the Gold
 21 meeting, you know, people were saying things are okay,
 22 then in the BECC it just felt -- so many questions were
 23 coming in about rest centres, and I just didn't get
 24 a sense of any plan at all or any structure, and so
 25 I was asking him, "Could we have -- could you pause,

1 and" -- and they were running in -- people were running
 2 in and out and running around, and people were talking
 3 together in groups and then running off. So it
 4 wasn't -- didn't feel co-ordinated.
 5 Q. Right.
 6 Now, if we go to paragraph 30 of this statement,
 7 a little bit lower down {RBK00035676/7}, you say this:
 8 "In addition to the crisis response, I had to ensure
 9 that our resources were not being depleted to the point
 10 which would prevent the execution of ASC's 'day to day
 11 business' elsewhere in the Borough. Grenfell was
 12 absolutely a priority to be properly resourced in
 13 addition to maintaining routine care."
 14 Looking ahead to 15 June, did you consider at that
 15 point that there were sufficient resources available to
 16 RBKC for it to meet the humanitarian needs of those
 17 affected as well as its routine care commitments?
 18 A. No.
 19 Q. What gave you that impression?
 20 A. Because every -- they didn't have very many staff, they
 21 didn't have very many managers in adult social care in
 22 RBKC, and the main one they had went to their local
 23 office and was dealing with Grenfell. So there was
 24 hardly any other managers around.
 25 Q. Right.

1 A. And the purpose of that point was saying we had managers
 2 in Westminster and in Hammersmith and Fulham, and it was
 3 about that whole adult social care team trying to
 4 support.
 5 Q. Yes.
 6 Let's then turn to 15 June, and you refer in your
 7 statement to a meeting with Tony Andrews at 8 am that
 8 morning. That's at paragraph 32, if we just turn the
 9 page, please, to page 8 {RBK00035676/8}, where you set
 10 that out. You say in the last sentence there:
 11 "We were waiting for the go ahead from
 12 Nicholas Holgate."
 13 So I take it that you still hadn't heard back from
 14 him by 8 am on the morning of the 15th?
 15 A. No, and I don't think I actually ever heard anything, it
 16 was just then in the Gold meeting at, whenever it was,
 17 10.00, that it was announced.
 18 Q. We will come to that.
 19 Do you remember having a conversation at any time
 20 that morning, or indeed later in the day on the 15th,
 21 with somebody called Mark Sawyer?
 22 A. I definitely remember talking to Mark Sawyer, yes, it
 23 must have been on the -- well, I met him -- I think he
 24 was there on the 15th, yeah.
 25 Q. Did he provide any advice to you or share any thoughts

1 with you at that time?
 2 A. Oh, I can't remember. I know I said, "I don't know
 3 anyone" -- I think I might have said to him, "I don't
 4 know people in RBKC and I need some support", and
 5 I think he, for the next day, got in someone to take
 6 notes and something.
 7 Q. Right.
 8 A. I forget whether he actually spoke to me that day.
 9 Q. Right. You recall having a conversation with him on
 10 that day; do you recall relaying to him your
 11 observations about what was happening in the BECC and
 12 the rabbit--in--headlights nature of the response that you
 13 had observed the previous day?
 14 A. Actually, I suppose it's coming to me. I think I spoke
 15 to Mark, sorry, after a Gold meeting, maybe in the
 16 afternoon. I think that's maybe when I spoke to him,
 17 because he was then introduced as someone who was from
 18 London Gold.
 19 Q. Right. Right, well, we'll come to that --
 20 A. Yeah.
 21 MR MILLETT: -- in due course.
 22 Can we start the day, then, or the day's Golds,
 23 15 June, 10 am, and let's go to the meeting note,
 24 {RBK00028807}.
 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE--BICK: Before we go there, could I just

1 ask: you say in your statement in the morning you had
 2 a meeting about 8 o'clock and started putting together
 3 the HASG, and then you say you were waiting for the
 4 go--ahead from Mr Holgate; hadn't you had that in that
 5 previous email?
 6 A. Possibly. So I was doing it. When I say I was waiting
 7 for the go--ahead, officially.
 8 SIR MARTIN MOORE--BICK: But hadn't he told you in the email
 9 to get on and do what you thought was appropriate?
 10 A. He had. I suppose I was waiting to know if this person
 11 was coming in to do that role. It's about the role.
 12 I was getting on and doing the things that were needed
 13 to do.
 14 SIR MARTIN MOORE--BICK: Right. Thank you.
 15 MR MILLETT: In the light of that, let's just go back to see
 16 how you understood the email.
 17 Can we go to {RBK00058107}. This is
 18 Nicholas Holgate's email to you at 21.25, and you say to
 19 him in the third line in your email to him a few minutes
 20 before that:
 21 "I am happy to start this tomorrow but will await
 22 our meeting with you in the morning."
 23 His response is:
 24 "Thanks. If you want to take some steps before
 25 10 am, please do. Up to you."

1 So did you understand his email to you as saying,
 2 "Here is formal confirmation of the setting up of the
 3 humanitarian assistance steering group in the morning",
 4 or did you read him as telling you that you could
 5 essentially take preparatory steps off your own bat, but
 6 that nonetheless formal confirmation would have to await
 7 the meeting?
 8 A. I think I thought, yeah, get on, set up the meeting, but
 9 whether I was a HALO or not, I think that's the thing
 10 that was still in doubt.
 11 MR MILLETT: Right, I follow.
 12 Mr Chairman, is that a convenient moment?
 13 SIR MARTIN MOORE--BICK: Yes, I think it is.
 14 MR MILLETT: We can then get into the meeting at 10 o'clock
 15 a bit more thoroughly.
 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE--BICK: Well, Ms Redmond, as you were told,
 17 we have a break during the morning, and this seems like
 18 a good time to have it, so we will stop there. We'll
 19 resume, please, at 11.30. And on this and other
 20 occasions when there are breaks in your evidence, please
 21 don't talk to anyone about your evidence while you're
 22 out of the room. All right?
 23 THE WITNESS: Yes. Thanks.
 24 SIR MARTIN MOORE--BICK: Thank you very much. Would you go
 25 with the usher, please.

1 (Pause)
 2 Thank you. 11.30, then, please. Thank you.
 3 (11.15 am)
 4 (A short break)
 5 (11.30 am)
 6 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Right, Ms Redmond, ready to carry
 7 on?
 8 THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you.
 9 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Thank you very much.
 10 Yes, Mr Millett.
 11 MR MILLETT: Yes, thank you, Mr Chairman.
 12 Let's turn, then, to the RBKC Gold Group meeting at
 13 10 am on 15 June 2017. The notes or minutes of that are
 14 at {RBK00028807}. We can see who attended, you included
 15 there, as you can see in the first chunk of names.
 16 Was it then that you were formally appointed as
 17 the council's HALO?
 18 A. I think in my understanding it was.
 19 Q. Right. I think the first meeting of that group was at
 20 2 pm, 1400 hours; yes?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. Yes.
 23 Now, in your first statement — I don't think we
 24 don't need to go to it — page 8 {RBK00035676/8},
 25 paragraph 32, you say you had to wait for the go-ahead

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1 from Nicholas Holgate. We saw that already before the
 2 break.
 3 Did you get the go-ahead formally? Did he say to
 4 you, "You are now the HALO"?
 5 A. I can't remember that because I just — I think I just
 6 said, "I've set up the meeting". Is there anything in
 7 these minutes? Does it say?
 8 Q. Yes, and let's turn to page 2 {RBK00028807/2}. If you
 9 look at page 2 under "Other Updates", bullet point 2:
 10 "SR to act as the Council's HALO and lead on the
 11 Humanitarian response i.e. continuing to support
 12 residents evacuated from Grenfell and other households."
 13 Was that the go-ahead?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. Right. And did Mr Holgate himself say that or was that
 16 a —
 17 A. My recollection was he did, and when you say was it the
 18 go-ahead, I was already doing the prep. This was
 19 actually telling everyone else that that was my role.
 20 Q. Now, staying with the minutes of the Gold Group meeting
 21 at 10 am, can we turn to page 3 {RBK00028807/3}, and you
 22 can see at the foot of page 3 there, which is under the
 23 major heading of "Key Issues & Actions", there is
 24 a headline or wording in bold, "Reputational damage"; do
 25 you see that?

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1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. Underneath the first paragraph, there is a line that
 3 says:
 4 "SR and MF to nominate a key voluntary sector
 5 liaison officer."
 6 Do you see that?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. What role was envisaged for that individual?
 9 A. My recollection from this — I think I was given that
 10 task because I was going to set up the humanitarian
 11 assistance group, so it was to go there and talk about
 12 it. I'm guessing that was the voluntary — well, I'm
 13 trying to remember. One of the roles of the
 14 humanitarian assistance group is to make sure the
 15 voluntary sector are part of that, and we needed someone
 16 who could actually go and talk to the voluntary sector,
 17 and I think, having tried to remember who that was then,
 18 the only person in the council who took any role in that
 19 was Tony Redpath, and he became that person.
 20 Q. And MF is Martin Fitzpatrick, I think; yes?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. Yes, and he was in RBKC's media communications team,
 23 I think, wasn't he? Do you remember that?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Yes.

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1 Now, you say in your second statement at
 2 paragraph 13 on page 9 {RBK00058120/9} — and, again, no
 3 need to see it unless we want to — that it was
 4 Tony Redpath who was appointed RBKC's voluntary sector
 5 lead shortly after this meeting. Do you remember that?
 6 A. Yes. When we say appointed, I had to ask around who
 7 would be — who leads the voluntary sector, and he was,
 8 so I said, "Tony, you'll have to come".
 9 Q. Did you have conversations with him at that stage about
 10 that role?
 11 A. No.
 12 Q. You didn't.
 13 What was the nature of your discussions of any kind
 14 with Tony Redpath about engaging with the voluntary
 15 sector and the support that it was able to provide?
 16 A. When — I don't know whether I had any conversations
 17 with him then about it, but I did have a conversation
 18 with him about who was — which voluntary organisations
 19 were out there, was he going — did he have contacts
 20 with him, who were the people we should invite to the
 21 humanitarian assistance group, and he said he'd go and
 22 sort out the reps to come to the group. My role was to
 23 get the reps to the group to have that discussion with
 24 them, so they can be part of that response going
 25 forward.

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1 Q. You say reps; who were the reps?
 2 A. The representatives from the voluntary sector --
 3 Q. Right, I see.
 4 A. -- who he knew who could join the humanitarian
 5 assistance group.
 6 Q. I follow.
 7 Now, within the voluntary sector, there's
 8 the Red Cross. I just want to go back to the Red Cross
 9 with you.
 10 If we go to your first statement, please, page 8
 11 {RBK00035676/8}, paragraph 33, you say there:
 12 "I liaised with the Red Cross [this is after your
 13 arrival at the BECC on 15 June] to make sure that they
 14 and the Council were working together efficiently."
 15 Was it on 15 June that this liaison between you
 16 and the BRC occurred?
 17 A. I think it was later in the day, it wasn't that early,
 18 but yes.
 19 Q. Right. What did you actually do?
 20 A. Well, I actually -- the Red Cross -- I think it might
 21 have been after the humanitarian assistance group first
 22 meeting, and I spoke after with the Red Cross to get
 23 their view on what was happening.
 24 Q. And what did they tell you?
 25 A. They had a lot of concerns about many things. They did

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1 raise some at the humanitarian assistance group, but
 2 they had concerns about how the council weren't visible
 3 and they -- managers weren't there.
 4 Q. Right. Who did you speak to, do you remember?
 5 A. I think it was Emma.
 6 Q. Emma Spragg? Right.
 7 At that point, 15 June, what did you understand the
 8 British Red Cross was doing?
 9 A. Operationally they were doing an awful lot of things on
 10 the ground in terms of supporting rest centres. They
 11 had volunteers out looking at donations. They were
 12 offering to be involved with everything.
 13 Strategically, Emma was trying to -- I think Emma
 14 was wanting to get more strategic overview of the whole
 15 picture, including the impact, the numbers of people who
 16 were involved, and that whole impact assessment.
 17 Q. What links did you understand they were having with
 18 council staff?
 19 A. I didn't know what formal links they were having.
 20 I didn't know what formal links they were having. On
 21 the ground they were speaking with people in the
 22 centres, but I don't know whether operationally,
 23 managerially, they had any links in with the council.
 24 Q. You say, in your last answer but one, that Emma Spragg
 25 was wanting to get more strategic overview of the whole

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1 picture; did she tell you that?
 2 A. Well, in terms of anyone coming to that humanitarian
 3 assistance steering group meeting with any experience
 4 and understanding all the things one had to do,
 5 including the impact assessment, the Red Cross and she
 6 were really helpful in helping me look at that overview.
 7 So I got a sense that they were following some sort of
 8 plan and an understanding of what should happen in
 9 crises, and I was wanting them to work with the council
 10 closely in helping them.
 11 Q. Did you think that it was the council's plan they were
 12 following or their own?
 13 A. No, their own -- I think it was their own plan.
 14 Q. What impression did you form, even if it was only
 15 an impression, about how well the BRC was integrating
 16 with RBKC staff and whether or not that was part of
 17 a holistic and organised strategy?
 18 A. I think the Red Cross were desperate for that, but
 19 I don't think that was actually happening.
 20 Q. Did she tell you that or say anything to give you that
 21 impression?
 22 A. I know I got the impression from things that were said.
 23 I can't exactly remember the conversations. And those
 24 conversations continued for a while after.
 25 Q. Right. And I think in general you found the BRC,

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1 British Red Cross, helpful during the whole of your time
 2 as a HALO?
 3 A. Really, really helpful.
 4 Q. Yes.
 5 Now, if we go to your second statement, please,
 6 page 7 {RBK00058120/7}, paragraph 10.3, you say:
 7 "At 11:42hrs on 15 June 2017, I received a copy of
 8 the BRC's impact assessment. This had been sent into
 9 the BECC from Matt Hogan, London Resilience Manager."
 10 And you exhibit it.
 11 Did you read it at the time?
 12 A. I can't actually remember whether I read it at the time.
 13 We certainly had it at the group meeting.
 14 Q. Right.
 15 Now, you had said in the previous paragraph,
 16 paragraph 10.2, that BRC provided information from staff
 17 working in the rest centres and with residents. Is that
 18 correct?
 19 A. Sorry, what paragraph am I on?
 20 Q. 10.2 --
 21 A. 10.2.
 22 Q. -- in the middle of your screen. Let me show you what
 23 you say. You say:
 24 "I had regular telephone and face to face contact
 25 with the BRC and they brought a lot of experience in

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1 a very calm manner, providing information from staff
 2 working in the rest centres and with residents,
 3 assisting with managing the Rest Centres and always
 4 providing suggestions and new ideas."
 5 On the basis that that's correct, do you remember,
 6 were any key messages being fed back from the
 7 rest centres to you via the BRC?
 8 A. Yeah, they were saying that there was -- people were
 9 very upset, council staff weren't very visible, there
 10 didn't seem to be any -- I can't remember. They were
 11 saying things like that. This was in the afternoon of
 12 the 15th.
 13 Q. Right. Did you pass any of the messages that you were
 14 getting from the BRC on to anybody else at RBKC?
 15 A. Yes, I know I -- it was really concerning, what they
 16 were saying, and they didn't have any liaison in. Of
 17 course, I'm -- there's an assumption here that this role
 18 is in charge of everything, but I was co-ordinating it,
 19 and when I heard those things, I went straight to
 20 Tony Redpath and said, "You need to talk to the
 21 British Red Cross, they've got really" -- and then you'd
 22 go to a Gold meeting and you get told senior managers
 23 are going out and things are happening. So, yeah,
 24 I raised it with Tony Redpath.
 25 Q. After the time you took on the HALO role, to whom did

1 you report at RBKC, or to whom did you think you were
 2 supposed to report at RBKC, in respect of the HALO role?
 3 A. Into the Gold meeting, I guess, but not --
 4 Q. Right. But not to any particular individual?
 5 A. No. I didn't have anyone in RBKC working with me.
 6 I had to ask for some support.
 7 Q. Turning to the operation of the Westway particularly,
 8 were you aware of the BRC operating a wristband system
 9 for residents and the bereaved so that they could come
 10 in?
 11 A. Not specifically. I have heard about it, but at that
 12 time.
 13 Q. Were you aware at the time on that day of any problems
 14 that that gave rise to?
 15 A. Not on that day.
 16 Q. Later?
 17 A. Only insofar as I've heard some things in these
 18 hearings.
 19 Q. Were you aware of any problems about people from the
 20 walkway properties gaining access to the Westway?
 21 A. Not at the time.
 22 Q. Can we then turn to the HASG meeting on 15 June which
 23 you said would take place at 2 pm and indeed did.
 24 I think you chaired that group meeting, didn't you?
 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Do you know why it didn't take place until 2 pm that
 2 day?
 3 A. I think, because I was trying to think about that,
 4 I think it was partly because there were so many other
 5 meetings, and I think there was a 10 o'clock Gold and
 6 then there was some other meeting with health
 7 colleagues, I think, and so I left the meeting to be
 8 arranged, and the earliest time I was told was
 9 2 o'clock.
 10 Q. If we go to your first statement, please, at page 8
 11 {RBK00035676/8} -- this is your second statement, we
 12 need to go back to your first statement -- paragraph 37,
 13 I summarise what you say there: you say that the group
 14 was a multi-agency group which included representatives
 15 from mental health, the BRC, bereavement counsellors,
 16 hospitals and faith groups, among others. That's
 17 correct, is it?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. Have I summarised that correctly?
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. Now, we know that just before the meeting -- indeed, at
 22 13.56 -- Tony Andrews circulated the agenda and the
 23 terms of reference. Can we look at those. It's
 24 {RBK00020255}. There's the first page, "Grenfell Tower
 25 Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group, Terms of

1 Reference", and the agenda is there beneath it. Page 2
 2 {RBK00020255/2} is the terms of reference.
 3 Do you know who drafted that? Tony Andrews
 4 circulated it, but do you know who drafted it?
 5 A. I think this must be from the framework document.
 6 Q. Right. It is, it's drawn from annex 1, but do you know
 7 whether -- or did you have any input into it at all, or
 8 were you just given it?
 9 A. This was a suggestion -- no, he just gave me the terms
 10 of reference, yeah.
 11 Q. Right.
 12 Now, if we go then to page 2, we see it there, and
 13 you can see that the key responsibilities are set out in
 14 paragraphs 1 through to 7 there. I won't read them all
 15 to you. But one of them, the first one, is:
 16 "Ensuring that the needs of affected people are
 17 understood and met."
 18 And then particularly 4:
 19 "Initiating consultation with communities and
 20 individual to ensure the response is effective."
 21 And 5:
 22 "Ensuring effective promotion of services to
 23 affected people, and ensuring that effective pathways
 24 exist to enable people to find the support they
 25 require."

1 6 is about sharing information, and 7 financial
 2 control.
 3 I haven't read it all out to you, but it's obviously
 4 all there for people to see.
 5 If we look, then, at Tony Andrews' email under cover
 6 of which this document was sent to you, among others,
 7 this is at {RBK00020254}. As you can see, it's from him
 8 at 13.56, copied to a large number of people, including
 9 you as in fact the last copyee:
 10 "Dear All
 11 "For those of you dialling in today the agenda and
 12 terms of Reference are here."
 13 Is this the first time you'd seen the terms of
 14 reference for the HASG?
 15 A. No, I think Tony and I met quite a lot that morning,
 16 I must have seen them before. I read the framework, so
 17 they would have been in there, and we agreed the agenda
 18 together.
 19 Q. Right, I see. How prepared did you feel to chair that
 20 meeting?
 21 A. I felt that agenda was massive. I felt I could
 22 co-ordinate a meeting. I could chair a meeting, I could
 23 co-ordinate a meeting. What was obvious to me was that
 24 there was so much there and there was so much happening
 25 that that group had -- it was just a massive agenda.

1 Q. Right.
 2 Let's go back, then, to the agenda, which is page 1,
 3 I think, of this document {RBK00020255/1}. There it is.
 4 We can see the extent of the agenda there that you
 5 describe as massive. It has things in it, so that
 6 everybody can see: "Overview of Welfare Needs", "Support
 7 to be provided", "Community Assistance Centre",
 8 "Helpline", "Management of Donations", and then
 9 underneath that, "Requirements for mutual aid from
 10 neighbouring local authorities and other agencies".
 11 Had you discussed that specifically during the
 12 course of the morning with Tony Andrews?
 13 A. No.
 14 Q. Right. What was the process whereby this agenda was put
 15 together between you and Tony Andrews?
 16 A. This is the agenda he said -- this is, again,
 17 a framework document agenda.
 18 Q. I see. So you just read the framework document, noted
 19 the existence of a pro forma agenda like this, and so
 20 you were ready for it when it came?
 21 A. Yeah. Tony said, "This is the agenda, it might be
 22 massive, you might not get on to all those things".
 23 Q. I see.
 24 A. We did have -- sorry. I'll wait.
 25 Q. Did you understand that, in order to achieve the first

1 of the key roles -- so if we go to page 2
 2 {RBK00020255/2}, we can see the terms of reference,
 3 item 1, "Ensuring that the needs of affected people are
 4 understood and met" -- did you understand that
 5 humanitarian impact assessments were required to be
 6 completed by agencies in attendance at the HASG?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. You did. Were there any problems in receiving those
 9 impact assessments promptly?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. And what were those problems?
 12 A. I can't remember in detail, but I do remember we had to
 13 go out to several people there about filling them in.
 14 I don't think anyone had seen them. I think the
 15 thing -- the problem was, the same people that were at
 16 that group were doing all these other things, and in
 17 terms of this group, the status, the authority of it,
 18 the actual importance of it wasn't understood by
 19 everyone.
 20 Q. Well, when did you get the impact assessments?
 21 A. Well, they came in -- they had to be changed daily, so
 22 I can't remember when -- they were updated very
 23 regularly, but I do know Tony had to actually ask lots
 24 of people lots of times.
 25 Q. Right, I see. When they did come, were they helpful in

1 aiding you in the discharge of your responsibilities as
 2 HALO, to understand the needs of those affected?
 3 A. Well, I had -- did I have two meetings as a HALO? And
 4 it was -- the one from British Red Cross gave numbers
 5 and issues that were going on, but we didn't get the
 6 rest until the next day, and there were just updates of
 7 how many people had housing and stuff. It was just
 8 quite overwhelming.
 9 Q. Now, can I show you something from Mike Robinson, who
 10 was the director of public health at Westminster City
 11 Council. He gave us a statement at {RBK00035336}, if we
 12 can go to that, please. There is the first page.
 13 Can we turn in it, please, to page 6
 14 {RBK00035336/6}, paragraph 29. This is what he says.
 15 He says:
 16 "The PHIT sought to collate information about the
 17 survivors. We requested lists from different actors
 18 involved in the recovery effort, such as Housing
 19 officers, rest centre managers, and the police. This
 20 was planned to be part of the HIA. We wanted the
 21 HASG/HRG to possess the most accurate information
 22 possible. Eva Hrobonova drafted the report. The
 23 following week, I reviewed it and signed it off.
 24 However, before it was circulated, we required the RBKC
 25 Gold permission. This led to some delay, I presume

1 because the Gold Group had concerns about releasing
 2 information. The Summary HIA was released the following
 3 week (w/c 19 June 2017)."
 4 Was it the case that there was a delay in the
 5 circulation of these impact assessments, as he
 6 identifies there?
 7 A. I have no knowledge of that, because I wasn't -- we
 8 tasked the public health and Eva to actually bring
 9 together all those impact assessments I was asking for.
 10 This is a week later and I wasn't leading it. I have no
 11 idea what -- they came to the --
 12 Q. Right.
 13 A. The ones that were done came to the humanitarian
 14 assistance group, so they weren't delayed.
 15 Q. I see.
 16 A. She was collating them to get a better assessment of
 17 what the needs were going forward. That's the report
 18 she was collating for the following week, and I don't
 19 know where that went.
 20 Q. So is this right: these were for a more medium-term
 21 humanitarian response, rather than the immediate
 22 short-term response?
 23 A. The -- well, the -- yes, more -- because people were
 24 filling these in, and then she was looking -- she was
 25 collating them, and it took her a long time in terms of

1 getting them back from people, but also she was
 2 collating them to give us: what do we need going
 3 forward?
 4 Q. What did you at the time -- this is early afternoon on
 5 15 June -- consider to be the most pressing issue for
 6 the HASG?
 7 A. Well, when I went into the meeting in terms of advice
 8 and discussions, it was to set up -- it was to look at
 9 whether we needed a humanitarian assistance centre, and
 10 that was something that would be set up the next day or
 11 the day after, a bit longer term, where you would have
 12 all the services that people might need in one place.
 13 That was the ambition for -- and that was -- I thought
 14 that was the main consideration of that --
 15 Q. Right.
 16 A. -- action.
 17 Q. So is that how you saw your role as HALO as well, or did
 18 you see your role as HALO as involving more immediate
 19 and pressing humanitarian concerns?
 20 A. I didn't when I originally read it, but because all
 21 sorts of things weren't happening -- we were talking
 22 about setting up -- I did see my role as doing that
 23 longer-term -- that humanitarian assistance centre.
 24 That was what I was told had to come out of that
 25 meeting, you know, that's what we had to get on and do.

1 It's not medium; it's like two days later or something.
 2 Q. Let's look at the minutes again, please, and I just want
 3 to ask you one or two questions about locations and
 4 rest centres again.
 5 Can we go, please, back to the HASG minute at
 6 {RBK00001920}. I say back to the minutes; we haven't
 7 actually seen these yet, but certainly back to the
 8 meeting.
 9 Here is a set of the minutes:
 10 "Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group (HASG).
 11 15th June 2017 at 2pm.
 12 "SR welcomed everyone and asked TA to summarise the
 13 purpose of the Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group."
 14 First, do you remember or do you know who took these
 15 minutes?
 16 A. Yes, it was my PA.
 17 Q. Your PA. Did you circulate the minutes to everybody who
 18 had come to the meeting?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. If we look at page 1, and we look at the third paragraph
 21 from the bottom of the page, scrolling down to that,
 22 please, it says:
 23 "The Council's efforts are at Westway as a council
 24 run rest centre. Other informal rest centres may
 25 continue but they will not be resourced with Council

1 services."
 2 Why was a decision made not to support the other
 3 rest centres in the local community?
 4 A. I don't know when that decision was made. I think there
 5 was discussion about how everyone needed to consolidate
 6 into one rest centre, and --
 7 Q. When was that decision made?
 8 A. Well, I don't know when it was made. By the time we had
 9 this meeting, I think Tony Redpath said this was what
 10 was happening.
 11 Q. Right.
 12 Were you aware at this time that places such as the
 13 Rugby Portobello Trust and the Clement James Centre were
 14 being accessed and used by many of the bereaved and
 15 survivors?
 16 A. Yes, I -- yeah.
 17 Q. Did you receive any feedback that those affected by the
 18 fire were not in fact accessing the services available
 19 at the Westway?
 20 A. I think I remember there was a discussion about not
 21 many -- people were going to be directed to Westway,
 22 there weren't very many people there, but the figures
 23 were getting higher and so people were going to Westway.
 24 Q. Yes. Let's go to page 3 {RBK00001920/3}, and we pick
 25 that up. Page 3, second paragraph from the bottom, you

1 are recorded as saying:
 2 "SR explained that the Westway rest centre has not
 3 had huge numbers of residents but the numbers are
 4 increasing there."
 5 Is that what you're referring to?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. Yes.
 8 If you also look at page 4 of the minute
 9 {RBK00001920/4}, there is an issue raised, it seems, by
 10 Emma Spragg. It says in the second paragraph:
 11 "TG explained that there might be others at this
 12 venue such as neighbours, extended families, and those
 13 will be displaced for some time and those who want
 14 support. More work is needed to clarify how all needs
 15 can be accommodated.
 16 "Next steps will involve TA [Tony Andrews] helping
 17 to find a venue and co-ordinate accordingly. Sub Groups
 18 will be formed and TA is leading, along with the
 19 Council, Red Cross, Health Partners, and the Services.
 20 Community cohesion and faith groups are doing great
 21 things and should be involved. The Red Cross to contact
 22 faith groups."
 23 What was the source of the information that the
 24 Westway, as you put it on the previous page, had not had
 25 a huge number of residents but numbers were increasing?

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1 A. It must have been someone from the meeting who was
 2 feeding that back to us.
 3 Q. Given what we've seen in the terms of reference for the
 4 HASG, which included initiating consultation with
 5 communities and individuals, do you remember, was there
 6 any action taken to determine the cause of the lower
 7 than expected numbers at the Westway?
 8 A. At that time, I think people were -- because it had only
 9 just been allocated as the main rest centre. So that's
 10 what people thought: once people knew about it, they
 11 would go there.
 12 Q. Yes. Although the need for one centralised official
 13 rest centre appears to be recognised here, do you
 14 remember whether people discussed the need for support
 15 to the other locations?
 16 A. I think in this conversation, and these minutes,
 17 because -- and this is why I said it's my PA rather than
 18 someone who is an expert at recording these minutes --
 19 this conversation, and certainly about TA, Tony Andrews,
 20 was about forming that one centre where council services
 21 and other services would be in. So I think this --
 22 these emails are conflating maybe a rest centre with
 23 a humanitarian assistance centre, and using the same
 24 vocabulary, because what we were talking about there was
 25 a need for something very soon where council services

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1 and other services could be to give support to people.
 2 Q. I see.
 3 A. This is talking about the community -- the humanitarian
 4 assistance centre.
 5 Q. Not rest centres per se?
 6 A. That's my understanding of this discussion.
 7 Q. Right. Was that an understanding you had at the time?
 8 (Pause)
 9 Let me try this differently. You're pausing because
 10 it may be a difficult question.
 11 At the time, on 15 June, did you understand there to
 12 be a distinction drawn in the London Resilience
 13 arrangements between a rest centre and a humanitarian
 14 assistance centre?
 15 A. I did.
 16 Q. You did, and what was that distinction?
 17 A. The rest centres were the immediate ones set up by the
 18 BECC and staffed by rest centre managers and managed
 19 through Gold, and that's what was happening, in my view.
 20 This one was the one -- the role that the humanitarian
 21 assistance group, which I was -- I was told and
 22 supported that we weren't dealing with the issues, the
 23 immediate issues; this was about setting something up
 24 for a day or two, once a suitable venue had been found,
 25 where people could come for all the advice and emotional

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1 support they needed in the one place.
 2 Q. I follow.
 3 Is it your evidence -- and just assist us to clarify
 4 it -- that at the time, on the 15th, you observed that
 5 there was some confusion in the minds of those at RBKC
 6 between the rest centre on the one hand and what you
 7 were intending to do by way of establishment of
 8 a humanitarian assistance centre on the other?
 9 A. I think there probably was. Language was used for
 10 different things, and certainly my PA didn't understand
 11 it when she was writing this as well.
 12 Q. Right, I see.
 13 Let's then examine together the numbers displaced.
 14 Can we go to page 1 of these minutes
 15 {RBK00001920/1}, please, and look at the fourth
 16 paragraph down. Now, there you can see it says:
 17 "TR [Tony Redpath], BECC Representative explained
 18 that the council efforts are with the residents who have
 19 been displaced to ensure that they are comfortable and
 20 have accommodation moving forward. There are 77 people
 21 in hotels with 25 people in the Westway Sports Centre
 22 which is the only remaining Council rest centre.
 23 Council resources and police presence are at Westway.
 24 If Council assistance is needed, then Westway is where
 25 residents are to go. There have been mountain of

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1 donations, transit lorries arriving from across the
 2 country. This is a major logistical effort to get all
 3 sorted and distributed."
 4 If we go over the page, please, to page 2
 5 {RBK00001920/2}, the third paragraph down, in the
 6 context of numbers, it says:
 7 "AG [that could be Amanda Gill], Housing explained
 8 that there are 79 households in commercial local hotels.
 9 There are under 30 households in temporary accommodation
 10 and some are in hospitals as delayed discharges because
 11 of the accommodation problem."
 12 Can you explain the differences in the information
 13 being provided, the BECC here saying that 77 people were
 14 in hotels and the housing department saying that there
 15 were 79 households in hotels, plus 30 more households in
 16 temporary accommodation, that's 109 households in all?
 17 Can you explain the discrepancy in the numbers?
 18 A. I can't.
 19 Q. No?
 20 A. I can't.
 21 Q. You can't. Would you agree, not just in relation to the
 22 ordinary use of language, but at the time there was
 23 a difference between persons and households, households
 24 being more than one person, usually?
 25 A. I don't know. That's how housing saw it. They might

1 have seen — one individual could have been a household,
 2 because they'd had a house.
 3 Q. Was there a problem with terminology when the
 4 information was circulated about the number of those
 5 adversely affected by the fire?
 6 A. I think there was quite a lot of problem with
 7 terminology generally, yeah.
 8 Q. Right.
 9 Going back, please, to page 2 {RBK00001920/2}, third
 10 paragraph down again, which starts "AG", as we've seen,
 11 it goes on in the third line:
 12 "People temporarily evacuated from neighbouring
 13 properties are not a priority for temporary
 14 accommodation unless they are vulnerable. This is due
 15 to the shortage of temporary accommodation and the need
 16 to prioritise the residents of Grenfell Tower.
 17 Residents placed in hotels are visited to check their
 18 immediate practical needs. People have lost their IDs
 19 so we are ensuring that they have money and other needs
 20 met."
 21 First of all, was it the case that those evacuated
 22 from neighbouring properties, so the walkways, were not
 23 a priority for temporary accommodation unless they were
 24 vulnerable? Is that right?
 25 A. Well, I only know that because it's written here.

1 Q. Right. But you don't remember a separate discussion
 2 about it?
 3 A. No, I wouldn't have been party to a separate discussion
 4 about the housing issues.
 5 Q. Right.
 6 What was the information that you received about the
 7 number of evacuated persons from neighbouring properties
 8 who were affected by the fire? What kind of numbers are
 9 we dealing with, do you remember?
 10 A. Only from these notes. I can't remember.
 11 Q. Right. On the notes, if you go three paragraphs on, if
 12 we scroll down, please, it says:
 13 "The plan is to accommodate residents as locally as
 14 possible ..."
 15 Then it goes on:
 16 "There are 450 people in cordoned off area who are
 17 still awaiting details of when they are allowed back
 18 their homes. A lot of utilities to supply heating and
 19 water are under Grenfell which have been affected. It
 20 will take two weeks or longer for housing is sorted
 21 [sic]. The Red Cross explained that the Air Hotel have
 22 offered free accommodation."
 23 Now, do you remember the cordoned off area included
 24 homes on Grenfell Walk, Hurstway Walk, Testerton Walk,
 25 Barandon Walk and Treadgold House? Do you remember

1 that?
 2 A. Well, I know those names.
 3 Q. Would you agree that that was a substantial number of
 4 people evacuated who were not placed in hotel or
 5 temporary accommodation at that stage?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. Yes, and it looks as if, from this minute, at that stage
 8 it was well known that there were problems with the loss
 9 of utilities such as heating and water supply.
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. Yes.
 12 What was the expectation, in the light of those
 13 facts, about what was going to happen to those evacuees
 14 from the cordoned off area in the forthcoming days?
 15 A. Well, this was the first meeting, and this is an update
 16 from every aspect of people who came to that meeting.
 17 This is an update. After this, as a consequence of this
 18 meeting, we set up subgroups, and one of which was
 19 housing, and each of those subgroups — it's not really
 20 reflected in here what was said. Each of those
 21 subgroups was to take these issues and to deal with them
 22 and come back and report back on what they were doing on
 23 everything, and the housing group were taking forward
 24 these things.
 25 Q. Right. But what was the expectation? I just want to

1 make sure I have an answer to my question.
 2 A. Oh.
 3 Q. What did you expect would happen to the evacuees from
 4 the cordoned off area, particularly given the numbers
 5 that are being discussed?
 6 A. Well, at that time, I didn't have an expectation.
 7 I was -- the housing subgroup were going to have to have
 8 a look at that, and Gold Command were looking at that as
 9 well.
 10 Q. I see. So did you think that lay outside your role as
 11 HALO?
 12 A. In terms of me doing anything about that immediately,
 13 what we were showing is this is a huge issue that's
 14 happening, and we need to set up a task group now, so
 15 that task group was set up then to take forward these
 16 things.
 17 Q. Right.
 18 A. And to report back.
 19 Q. Now, the minute continues. We've seen it. If you go
 20 back up the screen, you can see, in the last two lines
 21 of the paragraph that starts "AG, Housing", that
 22 residents were placed in hotels and had lost their IDs.
 23 Were you satisfied at that stage that the humanitarian
 24 needs of those in hotels were being met?
 25 A. Well, no, they weren't, because they still needed --

1 they needed so much more.
 2 Q. And did there come a time when that changed?
 3 A. You mean -- are we just talking about the first three --
 4 you mean in the first three days?
 5 Q. Yes. Well, you start on 15 June --
 6 A. Yeah.
 7 Q. -- with the observation that there are residents in
 8 hotels who needed money and other needs met, because
 9 they've not least lost their IDs; did that improve in
 10 the coming days?
 11 A. Well -- and I think the action from this was housing
 12 staff were -- again, this was a huge issue for the
 13 housing subgroup. The housing staff were going to visit
 14 people and making sure they had the money and their
 15 needs met. That was the action. Obviously that was too
 16 overwhelming, so by the Saturday or Sunday, we asked --
 17 when other resources kicked in, we got key workers.
 18 Q. Right.
 19 A. And I don't know how much improved after that, because
 20 there's been mixed views of that, but ...
 21 Q. You say it was too overwhelming; just help me a little
 22 bit more, what was overwhelming about it?
 23 A. What was -- when I said that, was ...
 24 Q. Yes. You said in the last answer:
 25 "The housing staff were going to visit people and

1 making sure they had the money and their needs met.
 2 That was the action. Obviously that was too
 3 overwhelming ..."
 4 What was the problem?
 5 A. Well, the -- I don't know how many housing staff --
 6 where they -- whether they knew were people were, what
 7 hotels they were in. They did have lists of that, but
 8 they said they had problems finding people in the hotels
 9 and they said people weren't there. I don't know how
 10 they managed that process. But after that -- and there
 11 might not have been enough of them.
 12 This sounds -- you know, it's like everyone's got
 13 a certain task to do, and it wasn't like that. People
 14 were just running around and trying their best.
 15 I'm sure -- you've got the housing lead talking
 16 tomorrow. I don't know exactly what they did.
 17 Q. If we go on to page 3 again {RBK00001920/3} and look at
 18 the sixth paragraph this time in this minute, it's about
 19 two-thirds of the way down your screen, it says:
 20 "There is a need agree [sic] ways of sharing
 21 information so that residents can be tracked and their
 22 needs met. There is a Governmental Group looking at
 23 this."
 24 Who was the governmental group referred to here who
 25 was looking at this?

1 A. Well, this would have been said by either Tony Redpath
 2 or someone we had at that meeting from central
 3 government, and my PA hasn't put the detail down, so
 4 I can't remember what the --
 5 Q. Right.
 6 A. This is indicative of why you need loggists and people
 7 taking notes that understand the process.
 8 Q. Right.
 9 Did you expect or had you expected that a procedure
 10 for sharing information should have been put in place
 11 before the fire so that this discussion wouldn't have to
 12 happen after the fire?
 13 A. Sorry, sharing information between -- before the fire?
 14 Sorry, I'm --
 15 Q. Well, it says:
 16 "There is a need [to] agree ways of sharing
 17 information so that residents can be tracked and their
 18 needs met."
 19 Let me try it slightly differently : did you expect
 20 that there would be an already established mechanism for
 21 sharing information such as that for that purpose?
 22 A. I know we shared information. So in terms of my own
 23 area, adult social care shared information with health,
 24 so we had combined records, and we would have known
 25 people who had been in -- hopefully, who had been in

1 housing need, but other than that, I don't know.
 2 Q. You don't know.
 3 Do you know what steps were taken after this meeting
 4 to agree on a way of sharing information as identified
 5 there in the minute?
 6 A. No.
 7 Q. Now, the minutes touch on the topic of donations from
 8 the public, and we've seen reference here to the
 9 mountain of donations, with transit lorries arriving
 10 from across the country. We saw that on page 1.
 11 What impact do you recall the volume of donations
 12 had, if any, on RBKC's activities and the response?
 13 A. Well, they hardly had anyone to deal with them, so again
 14 it was -- there were so many of them, and we did --
 15 Debbie Morris became the person again in this subgroup
 16 who was to take that forward. But there were very few
 17 staff to be able to deal with it. You know, there was
 18 not enough staff to deal with it. There were so many
 19 donations outside.
 20 Q. Does that tell us that there was no pre-existing plan to
 21 deal with donations and their distribution?
 22 A. Well, there probably was something in the plan but, in
 23 reality, it didn't materialise.
 24 Q. Right. You say in the plan, but there was -- right. So
 25 is this right: whatever there was, it didn't

1 materialise?
 2 A. It didn't materialise, both because I -- there was so
 3 many, but also I don't know whether there was
 4 a designated lead to do that, or they had a preparedness
 5 for that.
 6 Q. Right.
 7 Now, if we stick with the minutes and go to page 4
 8 {RBK00001920/4}, please, third paragraph from the
 9 bottom, we can see it says:
 10 "MR to lead the health and wellbeing sub group which
 11 will include ASC, children's services, and mental
 12 health. MR to feedback to HAB. LP and JW to co-chair
 13 the sub group with MR."
 14 Now, MR is Michael Robinson; yes?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. And he was the director of public health at Westminster
 17 City Council; yes?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. If we look at his statement at {RBK0035336/5}, please,
 20 paragraph 25 at the foot of that page, four lines up
 21 from the bottom of page 5, he says -- you need to go to
 22 page 6 {RBK0035336/6}, actually, for the bit I want:
 23 "We concluded that there was little point of
 24 duplicating efforts and resources. We agreed that the
 25 HRG would take the lead and we would convene our own

1 subgroup, if necessary, later on. I cannot recall how
 2 many HASG meetings I attended, but I was present at the
 3 initial meetings on 15 June and 16 June ..."
 4 You see that. Then he goes on to say in the next
 5 paragraph he attended the first meeting on 15 June:
 6 "Thereafter, Cynthia Folarin took the lead and
 7 reported to me. Discussions ... were fed back ..."
 8 Then he says at paragraph 27:
 9 "The DPH did not have power to mobilise any further
 10 resources on the ground. We, ourselves, did not deliver
 11 any services to the community. Instead, RBKC entered
 12 into contracts with the local NHS trusts, such as the
 13 CLCH, to deliver services. Throughout the first-week,
 14 we were in contact with the CLCH to ensure that those
 15 services were provided properly. For instance, we knew
 16 that there would be many traumatised children and so we
 17 ensured that our health visitors and school nurses would
 18 prioritise work in the vicinity."
 19 Is that correct? Does that correspond with your own
 20 recollection?
 21 A. Yes. When he says entered into contracts, if he's
 22 talking about this response, they were part of that
 23 response partners anyway, so they would have done it
 24 without a contract, but yes.
 25 Q. Yes.

1 If we go back to the minutes, then, at page 2
 2 {RBK00001920/2}, there is a reference there, in the last
 3 paragraph on page 2, to the Manchester Step Pathway, as
 4 you can see there from the second line; yes?
 5 A. Yeah.
 6 Q. Could you explain what that was?
 7 A. I can't in detail, but basically this is about saying:
 8 what is the route for people who had been traumatised or
 9 through something like this? And it was saying the
 10 first two days or three weeks, this happens;
 11 five weeks -- six weeks later, this happens; then you do
 12 an assessment, and it goes through different stages of
 13 what sort of response in terms of mental health support
 14 you should give survivors.
 15 Q. Right.
 16 Now, in relation to publicising those services, at
 17 the bottom of page 2, just a little lower down, you can
 18 see it says:
 19 "NHS have a general leaflet, and a consistent
 20 message is needed from health and other partners that
 21 can be used. This will be very helpful so this can be
 22 advertised."
 23 Can you help us with what was envisaged with the
 24 entry? If you go to the top of page 3 {RBK00001920/3},
 25 you can see there:

1 "MR, Director of Public Health to promote
 2 communications and work with the Council communications
 3 with the leaflets etc. Psychology Services are aware of
 4 this so will link into those they are working with."
 5 What was envisaged?
 6 A. This was about letting people know, wherever they were,
 7 that there was a range of help they could access and the
 8 details of it and the phone numbers.
 9 Q. Right.
 10 Now, did you know that the following day, 16 June,
 11 the NHS partners were asking for the council's website
 12 to be updated so that people affected by Grenfell,
 13 either directly or indirectly, and in need of mental
 14 health support or psychological therapy could call
 15 a dedicated NHS response line?
 16 A. I don't recall.
 17 Q. You don't recall. Do you know anything about that?
 18 A. No, but this would have been part of this, to make sure
 19 it was on the website. They would have been doing that
 20 as part of this — these actions.
 21 Q. Right. Do you know who was co-ordinating that effort
 22 with RBKC?
 23 A. Within RBKC?
 24 Q. Well, either within or with.
 25 A. It would have been someone — it would have been maybe

1 Louise Proctor or someone from CCG.
 2 Q. Right. Did you know anything about that at this time?
 3 It's discussed here at the meeting, but did you know
 4 anything about it beyond the proposal set out here in
 5 the minutes?
 6 A. I can't remember, no.
 7 Q. Right.
 8 Sticking then with the topic of communications,
 9 we've seen that one of the matters set out in the terms
 10 of reference for the HASG was to ensure effective
 11 promotion of services to affected people, and ensuring
 12 that effective pathways exist to enable people to find
 13 the support they require. We saw that as one of the
 14 terms of reference.
 15 Were communications to those affected by the fire
 16 identified as a problem at this meeting, do you
 17 remember?
 18 A. I can't remember, but I do know communications were
 19 a problem.
 20 Q. Right. What aspect of communications do you remember
 21 being a problem?
 22 A. Things like staff on the front — on the ground maybe
 23 not always knowing how to access cash or where to refer
 24 people, where people should go to for advice about loved
 25 ones. There were those sorts of things, a range of

1 those.
 2 Q. Who was reporting that back to you?
 3 A. I don't know whether anyone said it at this meeting, but
 4 certainly I must have got it from Gold or from other
 5 places.
 6 Q. Right. Let's see if we can pin this down a bit more
 7 closely.
 8 Can we go to page 5 of this minute {RBK00001920/5},
 9 please. Top of the page, top of your screen:
 10 "A communications sub group will be needed.
 11 [Criticism] and questions have been asked around the
 12 communications. SR is going to gold meeting now so
 13 communications will be an integral part of the
 14 discussions."
 15 Just looking at that, does it provoke
 16 a recollection? What were the criticisms and questions
 17 asked around communications?
 18 A. Well, what I've said, and just that people didn't know
 19 where to go and people weren't being told what was
 20 happening generally, and people on the ground, the staff
 21 on the ground weren't informed.
 22 Q. Now, do you remember taking that to RBKC Gold at the
 23 next Gold meeting?
 24 A. I don't remember going to Gold, but I do remember going
 25 to Tony Redpath and — because he managed all the

1 internal services — asking him what was going on about
 2 comms, and we needed to get a message out, and I think
 3 I did mention it at Gold — I don't think it's in the
 4 minutes, but I did mention it — and he told me that the
 5 media and comms were doing something. I don't know
 6 whether that's in the Gold meeting.
 7 Q. We'll come to the Gold meeting minutes in a moment and
 8 look at it.
 9 Before we do, let's look at some other people's
 10 evidence about the impressions they got about this
 11 meeting, the first HASG meeting.
 12 First, Emma Spragg, who attended, I think.
 13 {BRC00000050/15} is her statement, and if we go, please,
 14 in it to paragraph 63, she says in the fourth line down
 15 there:
 16 "My impression of this meeting was that it could
 17 perhaps have been better organised, though I understood
 18 the extremely stressful and distressing situation
 19 everyone was involved in, especially the council staff.
 20 The meeting room was quite small; there were substantial
 21 numbers of individuals packed in. London Resilience
 22 Group supported the meeting."
 23 Now, first of all, her impressions of the meeting.
 24 What do you say about that? Do you agree?
 25 A. Yeah, I agree with her.

1 Q. She says at paragraph 65:
 2 "There was discussion about the provision of support
 3 and the roles different organisations at the site were
 4 performing, in an attempt to identify gaps in the
 5 services being provided. Topics raised included numbers
 6 of households affected, accommodation and welfare needs.
 7 At this stage there was still no confirmation of numbers
 8 affected nor confirmation of where all the survivors
 9 were located, whether in temporary accommodation or
 10 rest centres."
 11 Do you agree with that?
 12 A. Yes.
 13 Q. You do.
 14 Would you have been assisted by representatives from
 15 the voluntary organisations providing support at the
 16 unofficial rest centres being in attendance at this
 17 meeting?
 18 A. I don't think they were in attendance. I don't think we
 19 had a representative. We might have had someone from
 20 the churches who was at the ...
 21 Q. Right. Were any efforts made, do you remember, to try
 22 to identify those organisations and invite them to this
 23 meeting?
 24 A. Well, that was -- I actually asked Tony Redpath to do
 25 that.

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1 Q. Yes, and indeed it's I think in the framework document.
 2 Is that where you got the idea from?
 3 A. Yes, and that came from the conversation I had with him
 4 about being the voluntary sector lead.
 5 Q. Yes.
 6 Let's then turn to the RBKC Gold meeting in the
 7 afternoon of 15 June 2017 at 15.30. The minutes are at
 8 {RBK00001874}, please.
 9 First, attendees. We can see that you were in
 10 attendance there; yes?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. As was Tony Redpath and others.
 13 If we stick with page 1 and look at the fourth
 14 bullet point down, which says:
 15 "If the cordon is not lifted, then have over 800
 16 people to find places. Will need to seek help from
 17 Government."
 18 Do you remember where the number of 800 came from?
 19 A. No.
 20 Q. Now, those numbers were, as is obvious, much greater
 21 than the 450 people that had been noted in your meeting
 22 of the HASG some 90 minutes earlier. Are you able to
 23 explain the difference?
 24 A. I'm not.
 25 Q. Did you query the numbers at the time?

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1 A. No, I didn't. I didn't.
 2 Q. Was it not of interest to you to know even roughly how
 3 many people were adversely affected by the fire who
 4 would be requiring humanitarian assistance or some kind
 5 of help from RBKC?
 6 A. I would probably have asked after. I didn't ask at the
 7 time at this Gold meeting.
 8 Q. Right. Why is that?
 9 A. I -- the Gold -- I'd just been from -- we had just had
 10 our meeting, yeah, we'd just had the housing -- the
 11 humanitarian assistance steering group meeting, and I'd
 12 just come into this, and I just felt ... there wasn't --
 13 every meeting was doing the same thing, every meeting
 14 was just hearing these same things, and I didn't know
 15 where the role I had fitted in with this and how I could
 16 possibly take all those things forward and understand
 17 everything at that time, and I didn't even, you know,
 18 think to ask about those two figures, no, because I was
 19 really concentrating on a centre and getting some things
 20 moving specifically. So I didn't ask about the
 21 difference.
 22 Q. Right, you didn't.
 23 Did you have confidence in the accuracy of the
 24 information being provided given the discrepancy in the
 25 numbers --

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1 A. No.
 2 Q. -- that are being thrown around? You didn't have any
 3 confidence?
 4 A. No.
 5 Q. What did you understand by the reference to the need to
 6 seek help from the government?
 7 A. I don't know what that's referring to.
 8 Q. Was there any discussion at that point -- 3.30 in the
 9 afternoon of 15 June -- regarding the activation of the
 10 Gold protocol for London Local Authority Gold, LLAG?
 11 A. I wasn't -- I didn't hear anything.
 12 Q. Right. Were you aware of the structure and the ability
 13 to invoke London Gold resolution?
 14 A. I'm not sure whether I was specifically, but I was --
 15 I didn't know the council had to ask. I didn't know the
 16 specifics of that.
 17 Q. Right.
 18 If we go to page 3 of this document {RBK00001874/3},
 19 these minutes of this meeting, second bullet point down,
 20 or first bullet point on the page:
 21 "CC feedback that Coms was not seen to be working
 22 and that the Council was not visible enough. Schools
 23 are not able to get in touch with the press office and
 24 need help to manage Coms.
 25 " ■ Coms team can draft an internal memo for staff

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1 from the Leader."
 2 Do you know who raised that at the meeting?
 3 A. Yeah, that's Claire Chamberlain.
 4 Q. Claire Chamberlain. And what was done about that, do
 5 you know?
 6 A. I think at that time as well some of us said there were
 7 issues — there were real issues with comms, and there
 8 was a comms person there —
 9 Q. So —
 10 A. — who was supposed to take that forward.
 11 Q. Right.
 12 If we stick with this page and look at the next item
 13 down, the second item down, "Humanitarian Assistance
 14 Steering Group Update", you give the report there; yes?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. And in the second bullet point you report that you had:
 17 " ... made a request to BECC for a full time
 18 administer [sic] support officer and a key person who
 19 knows networks and contacts in Council."
 20 Did you receive that support?
 21 A. This is where I think Mark Sawyer comes in for a bit of
 22 that — this question, because he came up to me
 23 afterwards and asked me what the issues were.
 24 The next morning, there was someone that he sent
 25 along to start taking the notes and being

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1 an administrative support who understood all the
 2 processes. I didn't get a key person who knows contacts
 3 in council, so I had to just go and ask anyone who
 4 I could what to do about this and what to do about that.
 5 Q. Right. We may come to that, but let me just show you
 6 the email just to see if we can put this in its context.
 7 {RBK00027850}. This is an email almost exactly
 8 a day later, 16 June, since you refer to it, and it's
 9 an email from Toby Gould at London Fire to
 10 Deborah Collins and you:
 11 "Deborah, Sue,
 12 "I took a decision to seek mutual aid from other
 13 local authorities to provide secretariat support around
 14 the HASG meetings over the weekend. We needed to put
 15 the request out ASAP to have a better chance of a
 16 positive response. I didn't think you'd object but
 17 please shout if any problems.
 18 "I'll be here and will lead that function but we are
 19 running short on our own staff or our volunteers to
 20 support. If RBKC can assist it would be very useful to
 21 have someone around who can also provide contact details
 22 etc."
 23 Is that what you were referring to?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. Yes, thank you.

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1 Then going back, if we can, to the minute, please,
 2 {RBK00001874/3}, under the heading of "Forward look",
 3 after your report from the HASG and the mass fat
 4 steering group:
 5 "FORWARD LOOK
 6 "Internal staffing.
 7 "
 8 " ■ NA [Nick Austin] said that the WSC [Westway
 9 support centre] need a Senior Manager and a Rest Centre
 10 Manager at WSC. BECC working on rota for Rest Centre
 11 Manager. Senior officers thin on ground but will think
 12 about this."
 13 Two things.
 14 First, was that a matter of concern to you or others
 15 at the meeting? When I say "that", what I mean is the
 16 staffing problem identified there.
 17 A. Well, I think it was raised as a concern and then
 18 someone was going to action it. I don't know whether it
 19 was then I said I'll — not in that meeting, but I said
 20 I'll go. I was told not to, but yeah.
 21 Q. Right. Now, this is obviously in the context — I say
 22 "obviously"; do you remember whether this was in the
 23 context of the Westway Centre being a rest centre or
 24 whether it was in its context of being a humanitarian
 25 assistance centre?

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1 A. It was as a rest centre.
 2 Q. What was the WSC at this point? Was it a rest centre?
 3 A. It was a rest centre, and it wasn't going to be — at
 4 that time, no one envisaged it would be the longer term.
 5 It turned out to become the longer term.
 6 Q. I follow.
 7 When did discussions about WSC becoming the
 8 longer-term humanitarian assistance centre start?
 9 A. Well, I think there was an action that — we needed one,
 10 so it was — that was obvious, and then someone from
 11 RBKC, I forget who it was, in charge of buildings, he
 12 was tasked with finding — well, with me, he was tasked
 13 with finding a suitable premises that could be
 14 a longer term, medium term. And that was started on the
 15 Friday — the Thursday or Friday. Maybe Thursday.
 16 Q. Yes, and I think we come back to that in due course in
 17 your evidence, so we'll park that for the moment.
 18 I just want to ask you a question or two about
 19 helplines for residents.
 20 If we go back a page, please, in these minutes to
 21 page 2 {RBK00001874/2}, you can see on page 2, under the
 22 second bullet point, it says:
 23 "Red cross can help set up a helpline. KB and SR to
 24 take forward."
 25 Now, in your second statement, you say —

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1 paragraph 11.1 on page 8 {RBK00058120/8} -- that you
 2 wanted to see whether it was possible to run a dedicated
 3 joint helpline with the BRC.
 4 Why did you consider a joint helpline in particular
 5 was needed?
 6 A. I don't think that was my advice, and I think --
 7 Red Cross I think wanted the council, I think, to do
 8 a helpline. Red Cross had one up and running, and
 9 I think they advised that they could join them both
 10 together. So I tried to find someone in the council who
 11 would be able to do that.
 12 Q. Was the problem that at this point, in the absence of
 13 a dedicated response helpline, the RBKC's housing line
 14 was what was being publicised as the number to call?
 15 A. I think it might have been. I can't ...
 16 Q. Well, let's just put this in --
 17 A. I can't remember.
 18 Q. -- context if we can.
 19 {MOL00000014}. This is the SCG 08.30 meeting on
 20 14 June, so this is the day before.
 21 Picking it up at page 3 {MOL00000014/3},
 22 paragraph 6, if you look at the heading "Local
 23 Authorities provided an update", third bullet point:
 24 "RBKC Housing Line ... is available for displaced
 25 people."

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1 Was that what you understood was the position going
 2 into 15 June and remaining the position as at 15.30 on
 3 15 June?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. Yes.
 6 Now, you I think then liaised with RBKC customer
 7 services during the evening of 15 June about setting up
 8 a helpline with the support of the Red Cross; is that
 9 right?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. And you raised that again, I think, the next day,
 12 16 June, at the second HASG meeting. We can see that at
 13 {RBK00002040/1}.
 14 We've jumped ahead to the next day, but just
 15 pursuing this helpline question, under 3, "Chair", it
 16 says:
 17 "Clarify with RBKC Gold whether the helpline
 18 (emotional support, access to funds, links to other
 19 services available) for this incident should be run by
 20 RBKC or the BRC. BRC helpline is up and running
 21 8am-8pm.
 22 "BRC/RBKC (Mr Westbrook/Call Centre) to consider
 23 linking helpline to a hunt group also staffed by RBKC."
 24 First, what was a hunt group, do you know?
 25 A. I think where you chase -- a call goes to someone else

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1 directly and you chase --
 2 Q. Right. What was the outcome of those enquiries that are
 3 identified in that box there?
 4 A. I think the issue here was British Red Cross were
 5 taking -- were -- had a call -- a helpline up and
 6 running, but the council weren't providing them with the
 7 information, you know, they didn't feel it was all their
 8 responsibility to have the helpline, so they wanted us
 9 to talk with RBKC about it, and the outcome of this,
 10 I think, was that there were some problems doing the
 11 join-up, and so I think RBKC said they could set one up,
 12 but they took a while to do it, and I didn't think --
 13 I wanted to ask the British Red Cross what they thought
 14 about it, so I went back to them.
 15 Q. Right.
 16 Now, I think you say in your second statement -- and
 17 it's paragraph 11.1 {RBK00058120/8} -- that, on
 18 reflection, you don't think you ever managed to
 19 co-ordinate the two helplines before London Gold stepped
 20 in.
 21 A. No, because this was Friday lunchtime and they stepped
 22 in Friday afternoon.
 23 Q. Yes. Would it have helped to have had a dedicated
 24 helpline --
 25 A. Oh, I'm sure it would.

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1 Q. -- as quickly as possible?
 2 A. I'm sure it would.
 3 Q. Was it the position, so far as you recall it, that there
 4 were these two helplines operating separately and
 5 independently: RBKC's housing line on the one hand and
 6 the British Red Cross helpline on the other?
 7 A. Yes, I think so.
 8 Q. Right.
 9 Now, I think it's right that the helpline that was
 10 eventually used was the phone number that had been set
 11 up by the British Red Cross in response to the
 12 Manchester Arena incident which had occurred on
 13 22 May 2017. Is that your recollection?
 14 A. Immediately it was. I don't know whether that stayed
 15 that way, but yeah.
 16 Q. Yes.
 17 Do you remember that on 17 June -- that's the
 18 Saturday -- there was a brief meeting of the community
 19 assistance centre, the CAC, subgroup at 1 o'clock, and
 20 Tony Andrews circulated an action, which was that
 21 a helpline number needs to be published immediately? Is
 22 that something you recall?
 23 A. I wasn't there.
 24 Q. You weren't there, but do you recall the event, do you
 25 recall the fact?

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1 A. Yeah.
 2 Q. You do.
 3 After that was set up, were there problems still
 4 relating to the number not being published or did those
 5 disappear?
 6 A. There were so many things in the days after in -- when
 7 we were in Westminster that we had to deal with, and I'm
 8 sure the helpline would have been -- the publication --
 9 the publicity around the helpline would have been one of
 10 them. I'm sure we were dealing with that.
 11 Q. In fact, the records show that the BRC,
 12 British Red Cross, helpline was eventually set up on
 13 16 June, the Friday. Did any problems arise while it
 14 was active, do you remember?
 15 A. I think there were some questions about the information
 16 that the staff had to hand and what they knew.
 17 Q. Let's then turn to 16 June and start with the RBKC Gold
 18 meeting on that day at 10 o'clock. You say that you
 19 attended that meeting. That's paragraph 41 of your
 20 first statement at page 9 {RBK00035676/9}. We don't
 21 need to see that. But that's right, is it, you
 22 attended?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. Yes.
 25 Now, you mention in your statement that

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1 John Barradell was present at that meeting. You say
 2 that at paragraph 41. He was the town clerk at the City
 3 of London and also the chair of the local authorities
 4 panel.
 5 What did you understand his role to be in this
 6 incident?
 7 A. I didn't know at that time, I just knew we had some
 8 people who hadn't been to previous meetings. I had
 9 hoped they were there to help.
 10 Q. Right.
 11 Now, let's go to your first statement, then, at
 12 page 9 {RBK00035676/9}, paragraph 41. You say there in
 13 the middle:
 14 "I think Nicholas Holgate chaired the meeting. The
 15 next meeting was at 15:00hrs and at the end of the
 16 meeting, John Barradell said that the next meeting was
 17 'by invitation only'. Although it was never expressly
 18 said, from this I took it to mean that London Resilience
 19 were now taking over control. London Resilience is
 20 there to provide support and mutual aid in a crisis
 21 situation."
 22 First, is what you remember John Barradell saying,
 23 that the next meeting was by invitation, something that
 24 he said at the 10 o'clock meeting or at the end of the
 25 1500 hours meeting?

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1 A. In my recollection, it was the end of the 1500 hours
 2 meeting.
 3 Q. I see, right. And I think you say you took it to mean
 4 that London Resilience was now taking over control, as
 5 you say.
 6 Was there a discussion about London Local Authority
 7 Gold taking over during the 10 o'clock meeting?
 8 A. In my recollection, I don't remember anything like that.
 9 I just thought we had some people sitting there.
 10 Q. What do you mean, some people sitting there?
 11 A. Well, people I didn't know who were in this meeting and
 12 they didn't say anything about -- they may have been
 13 introduced as London Gold, but I had no recollection
 14 there was any talk about them taking over.
 15 Q. Right.
 16 Let's go to {RBK00020703}. These are the minutes of
 17 the 10 o'clock meeting on 16 June 2017. You can see who
 18 was present; you were present, as was Nicholas Holgate
 19 and a list of others. But you can also see also in
 20 attendance John Barradell. Do you see that?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. And also Alex Woodman, LLACC, and Mark Sawyer too.
 23 Now, if we go, please, in that, to page 4
 24 {RBK00020703/4}, you will see a heading, "London Local
 25 Authority Gold", about a third of the way down your

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1 screen, and it says:
 2 "JB outlined what he and his team would be doing.
 3 Which is primarily to compliment what we are doing and
 4 give us some respite. He praised the Council for
 5 managing on their own for so long but now was the time
 6 to get in help and support."
 7 Do you remember that?
 8 A. I can't remember it as such, but I didn't read that as
 9 taking over or anything like that.
 10 Q. Right. Well, we may come back to that in a moment. But
 11 you can see, sticking with the minute on page 3
 12 {RBK00020703/3}, if we go back, please, under item 5,
 13 "Key Issues and Strategic Decisions", it says:
 14 "Humanitarian Assistance (including Emergency
 15 Rest Centre, Community Assistance Centre, offers of
 16 accommodation)."
 17 It says there:
 18 "TR assisting in identifying properties for a
 19 Community Assistance Centre. Need space with furniture,
 20 barriers and private rooms with provision for people to
 21 speak to Liaison officers."
 22 Do you see that?
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. What did you understand to be a community assistance
 25 centre?

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1 A. This is -- I think he's doing this because we sent --
 2 he's the voluntary sector person and he is reporting
 3 back. This is what I'm calling the humanitarian
 4 assistance centre. It's the same thing. It was the
 5 longer-term thing that the group I was dealing with was
 6 looking at.
 7 Q. Right. So you read this or -- is this right? -- you
 8 understood community assistance centre to be the same
 9 thing as a humanitarian assistance centre?
 10 A. Yes.
 11 Q. Right.
 12 Can I just show you, then, {RBK00013294}. Now, this
 13 is the major incident procedure manual published by
 14 LESLP.
 15 Are you familiar or were you familiar with this
 16 document at the time?
 17 A. No.
 18 Q. You weren't.
 19 Let's go to page 36 {RBK00013294/36},
 20 paragraph 9.11. This is under the heading "Community
 21 Assistance Centre", and it says:
 22 "The Local Authority may decide to establish
 23 a Community Assistance Centre (CAC) to undertake a
 24 detailed Community Impact Assessment, to provide advice
 25 and support to affected people and to support the

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1 recovery of the community in a local setting. Community
 2 Assistance Centres may be considered particularly where
 3 a Humanitarian Assistance Centre has not been
 4 activated."
 5 So did you know that a community assistance centre
 6 was not the same as a humanitarian assistance centre, in
 7 fact was what would happen where you didn't have
 8 a humanitarian assistance centre?
 9 A. I know that in terms of the work that was happening in
 10 RBKC, those two phrases were interchangeable, but for me
 11 reading this, they're actually -- they're the same
 12 thing. We were calling it -- at one point even in our
 13 humanitarian assistance group it was called the CAC
 14 meeting, and then it changed, the HAC meeting. But in
 15 terms of what they were doing and what they were going
 16 to provide and what they needed in there, it was exactly
 17 the same thing.
 18 Q. Right.
 19 Now, at this point -- 10 am, 16 June 2017 -- what
 20 was the Westway Sports Centre classified as?
 21 A. Sorry, what was the day? The Friday?
 22 Q. Yes, we're on the Friday and we're at 10 o'clock.
 23 A. I still think that was a rest centre.
 24 Q. Right.
 25 How advanced were efforts to locate a suitable

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1 location for a community assistance centre or, if you
 2 like, a humanitarian assistance centre?
 3 A. There were people in the council tasked with looking at
 4 all their accommodation, and I know that -- I forget his
 5 name, but the person who was in charge of it came back
 6 to us, to Tony Andrews who was looking at this with him,
 7 to say he couldn't find any -- he found one place, which
 8 was discounted by everyone because it wasn't in the
 9 area, and then we put together some sort of spec about
 10 what it should be, and British Red Cross put together
 11 a list of things they needed, and then he had a better
 12 specification to go and apparently look for
 13 accommodation. He said he couldn't find any.
 14 So I just remember the conversations about the
 15 Westway were: "look, we've got the Westway" -- and
 16 apparently, I can't recall, but the Westway wanted to
 17 open as a leisure centre again on the Monday, so the
 18 conversations were: you can't close the Westway, it
 19 needs to become -- it needs to stay open and it needs to
 20 become this centre, even initially for the first few
 21 days or weeks until we find some proper place.
 22 Q. I see.
 23 Now, we can see in this minute, if we go back to the
 24 minute at page 3 -- this is {RBK00020703/3} -- which was
 25 where we were before, the next bullet point says this:

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1 "NH [it's highlighted in yellow on your screen] said
 2 we should continue to use WSC and asked RE and SR to
 3 identify a place by 12noon today."
 4 This is to identify a place -- is this right? -- for
 5 use as a community assistance centre?
 6 A. Yes.
 7 Q. Yes. Was that a realistic request, to identify
 8 a location for a CAC by 12 noon that day, within
 9 two hours?
 10 A. No.
 11 Q. Did you tell him it wasn't a realistic request?
 12 A. Well, at the time -- my name's next to it, but it was --
 13 RE -- I forget his name -- he had already looked at
 14 a list of places, so I didn't know whether he knew that
 15 he had somewhere. I mean, most councils would know, or
 16 you would hope you would know, if there was
 17 accommodation in your area which you could commandeer
 18 for that, or there's organisations you could speak to,
 19 so I thought he might have something in mind. When
 20 I see "by 12noon today", and then what he came back with
 21 to say he couldn't find anything, that -- I just thought
 22 the Westway seemed to be the place.
 23 Q. Was the position that a suitable alternative location
 24 wasn't identified and that, by 17 June, Westway had
 25 transitioned into a CAC, or was it still a rest centre?

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1 A. In my thoughts, it was transitioning, yeah, into a CAC.
 2 Q. Right.
 3 Let's see if we can just pin this down a little bit
 4 more accurately. {RBK00020788}. This is a little bit
 5 later in the day. This is an email from Tony Andrews to
 6 Emma Spragg at the Red Cross, Rebecca Blackburn in the
 7 BECC, and also a number of others, including you:
 8 "Dear All
 9 "Many thanks for your contributions this afternoon."
 10 This postdates the Gold meeting that afternoon and
 11 the next HASG meeting. But underneath the words "To
 12 confirm the actions agreed", it says:
 13 "Westway will be used as a temporary Community
 14 Assistance Centre over the weekend: (9am to 6pm)."
 15 So is it the case that at some point during the
 16 16th, the decision was taken that the Westway would
 17 transition, at least temporarily, into a CAC?
 18 A. Yes, it was. Someone had spoken to the Westway. We had
 19 already set up the group that was looking at what needed
 20 to be done, and it was definitely agreed by the end of
 21 that day, and the services were going to be in place the
 22 next day.
 23 Q. Now, if we then stick with the topic, Westway, and stick
 24 with the date, 16 June 2017, a little bit later in that
 25 day from this email, let's go to {RBK00020821}. This is

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1 an email on 16 June 2017 at 19.14, if we go to the
 2 bottom of page 1 of the email run there. It's from
 3 Toby Gould to Emma Spragg and you and Mark Sawyer,
 4 copied to Tony Andrews:
 5 "RE: humanitarian Assistance Centre –
 6 comms/information requirement and shopping list."
 7 You see that?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. Then if you turn the page to page 2 {RBK00020821/2}, top
 10 of page 2, he says this:
 11 "I know you are well aware of the community tensions
 12 and the urgent need for information for those affected.
 13 From what we're [hearing] there are confused messages
 14 being given out on the ground with, for example, police
 15 and other (RBKC?) staff turning friends and family away
 16 from the Westway centre and telling those with missing
 17 loved ones to call the casualty bureau instead. There
 18 is a concern this is fuelling community tension, and
 19 that turning people away is preventing them from getting
 20 the support they so need. I know work is ongoing to
 21 improve the communications but as an interim measure, if
 22 clear messages could be given to the front line staff
 23 across all responding agencies about what is available
 24 and where, that would be a good step forward."
 25 My question is: were you aware that this was

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1 a problem before you received this email, confused
 2 messages being given out?
 3 A. I don't recall knowing that.
 4 Q. You don't recall knowing that. So when you received
 5 this email, did what Toby Gould is saying here in the
 6 passage I've read to you come to you as a surprise?
 7 A. I think I read this later than he sent it, but it
 8 probably wasn't a surprise because it was transitioning
 9 and it wasn't — no one has said this will be
 10 a community assistance centre, I don't think. Comms
 11 hadn't gone out, I don't think, to people. People were
 12 still working on it. That's what I think.
 13 Q. Now, if we scroll to the top of page 1 in this email run
 14 {RBK00020821/1}, we can see that Tony Andrews then sent
 15 an email to the BECC email address, as you can see,
 16 copied to you and others, including Emma Spragg, and it
 17 says, "To Comms". This is timed now at 20.17 on the
 18 evening of 16 June:
 19 "Please [see] the message below About current
 20 confusion on the purpose of the centre at Westway and
 21 about the location of the Police Friends and Family
 22 centre resulting in distressed people being wrongly sent
 23 away.
 24 "From tomorrow morning Westway will be a temporary
 25 Community Assistance Centre until we can set up a proper

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1 longer term facility. There will be welfare, housing,
 2 health and psychological support available for anyone
 3 affected by the incident between 9am and 6pm on Saturday
 4 and Sunday and onwards.
 5 "Please ask the BECC to check with the police for
 6 the definite location of the Friends and families
 7 reception centre so that can be included with in [sic]
 8 the comms on all websites, including the new .gov
 9 website.
 10 "Please also ask the BECC to clarify Westway's
 11 possible use as a rest centre so this can also be clear
 12 in the same message.
 13 "Please ensure that the managers of the centre are
 14 clear so that reception and security staff don't send
 15 people away wrongly."
 16 Now, focusing there on the request to ask the BECC
 17 to check with the police for the definite location of
 18 the friends and family reception centre, what did you
 19 understand that to be, that centre? What was that
 20 about?
 21 A. That's where bereaved — people who have been bereaved
 22 would go to find out from the police what was happening.
 23 Q. Right. So not Westway?
 24 A. No.
 25 Q. And to your recollection, was the communication clear

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1 that if bereaved friends and family wanted information
 2 about their loved ones, then the Westway was not the
 3 place to go?
 4 A. At that time it wasn't clear where people would go.
 5 Q. What, to your recollection, was the place where friends
 6 and family could go for news about their loved ones?
 7 A. Well, over this time, I think there was a bit of
 8 confusion about this. One of the -- there was another
 9 centre, I forget the name, where it was called at that
 10 time a family -- friends and family reception -- in the
 11 locality, I forget what it was, but obviously people
 12 were coming anywhere for -- so they might be coming to
 13 the Westway as well.
 14 Q. Why was there an apparent lack of clarity about where
 15 the location of the friends and family reception centre
 16 was or was to be?
 17 A. I can't answer that, but I do know that the work I did
 18 the next few days was all about looking at a friends and
 19 families reception centre somewhere else and setting it
 20 up properly. I don't know -- I think the police set
 21 this up. I don't know where they set it up.
 22 Q. Did you know or had anybody told you that the friends
 23 and family reception centre had been moved on the
 24 evening or by the evening of 14 June to the Westway?
 25 A. I didn't know that was a formal -- I can't recall that

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1 at all.
 2 Q. Right. Do you agree that it was a matter for some
 3 concern that, even two and a half days after the fire,
 4 there was still uncertainty about the location of
 5 support for those seeking support and information about
 6 their loved ones?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. Were you concerned about that at the time?
 9 A. Because I didn't know everything, I didn't know there
 10 was this -- I knew people didn't -- were not knowing
 11 where to go properly. We were trying to get -- well,
 12 I was trying to get some comms messages out through the
 13 comms team. Yeah, absolutely concerned. And when
 14 I went home in the night and saw what was happening to
 15 people, it was horrendous, so that's why I just -- it
 16 was horrendous and I was concerned.
 17 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, it's a little bit before
 18 1 o'clock, but this would be a convenient moment. The
 19 next topic will take us well beyond 1 o'clock and there
 20 is no immediate stopping point in it which would be
 21 convenient. So is now a convenient moment?
 22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, in that case we had better
 23 stop now, hadn't we?
 24 MR MILLETT: Yes, thank you.
 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We are going to stop now,

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1 Ms Redmond, so we can all get some lunch. We will
 2 resume, please, at 2 o'clock, and as I've asked you
 3 before, please don't talk to anyone about your evidence
 4 or anything relating to it while you're out of the room.
 5 All right?
 6 THE WITNESS: Okay.
 7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
 8 (Pause)
 9 Thank you, Mr Millett. 2 o'clock, then, please.
 10 MR MILLETT: Thank you.
 11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
 12 (12.58 pm)
 13 (The short adjournment)
 14 (2.00 pm)
 15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Ms Redmond, ready to
 16 carry on?
 17 THE WITNESS: Yes.
 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
 19 Yes, Mr Millett.
 20 MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman.
 21 Ms Redmond, before we go back to where we were
 22 going, which was 16 June, can I just take a slightly
 23 sideways look at your evidence and look back at your
 24 training.
 25 Can you clarify for us, please, whether your lack of

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1 contingency management training during your interim role
 2 was to do with where you were placed or your agency
 3 statement, or whether you found that other permanent
 4 senior staff you were working with during your first
 5 week were equally untrained in contingency management?
 6 A. My lack of training was because I guess I was
 7 an interim. I hadn't been trained in any other of my
 8 interim posts either.
 9 Q. Did you ever establish whether colleagues at RBKC --
 10 I say colleagues; those occupying similar positions to
 11 you in adult services in RBKC, for example
 12 Stella Baillie, or in CSS, children's social services --
 13 had more training than you on contingency management?
 14 A. I didn't know that.
 15 Q. You didn't know that.
 16 From your experience in other councils, does the
 17 lack of your own training and, so far as you could see,
 18 possibly the lack of others' training for permanent
 19 senior staff surprise you?
 20 A. I think it's one of the lessons I would like to put
 21 down, that -- there isn't lack of training, there is
 22 training, different authorities have different levels of
 23 training, but I've been in quite a lot of authorities at
 24 a senior level, and the training one gets, if you just
 25 see Gold, Bronze and Silver, it does not -- there wasn't

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1 any training on a HALO, there wasn't any training on the
 2 depth and breadth of the humanitarian assistance group,
 3 it does not give people the experience to deal with what
 4 happened here.
 5 Q. Right.
 6 A. Or --- and certainly in terms of the director of adult
 7 social services being in that HALO role, I'm not quite
 8 sure why, but also, if you're doing that, you need to be
 9 absolutely really trained in that, and I never had that.
 10 Q. Right.
 11 Let's turn, then, to 16 June 2017, and the Gold
 12 meeting on that morning at 10 am, which you tell us in
 13 your statement you attended, and we've covered that.
 14 Let's move on, then, to the next meeting
 15 chronologically, two hours later at noon, which was the
 16 second humanitarian assistance steering group on that
 17 date.
 18 Now, let's go to {RBK00002040}, please. You can see
 19 the document we looked at earlier, and we studied item 3
 20 here, "Clarify with RBKC Gold".
 21 Just looking down at page 7 {RBK00002040/7}, we can
 22 see the attendees, and looking down the list, do you
 23 agree that it remained the position at this point, noon
 24 on the 16th, that the only voluntary and community
 25 organisation present was Cruse, Cruse bereavement care?

1 A. Well, I'm looking at the list and there is victim
 2 support there and British Red Cross.
 3 Q. Okay.
 4 A. And the Archdeacon was representing the faith sectors ---
 5 well, part of the faith sectors.
 6 Q. Thank you.
 7 So British Red Cross --- just picking those out ---
 8 was there because there was a pre-existing protocol, or
 9 at least one that had expired but was still being acted
 10 upon, between RBKC and the BRC. Did you know that?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. Yes. So then the Archdeacon of Middlesex, do you know
 13 how he came to be at this meeting?
 14 A. Yes. We asked --- I asked Tony Redpath to identify
 15 voluntary sector people, plus faith group sector ---
 16 someone who could represent and join the meetings from
 17 the faith groups, and I think the Archdeacon was
 18 mentioned as possibly representing a portion of the
 19 faith groups to come to this meeting at that short
 20 notice.
 21 Q. And which portion was that?
 22 A. Well, he wasn't representing the whole --- well, I think
 23 he was representing --- he was --- I was told he was
 24 representing the faith sector.
 25 Q. Right. But apart from them, it looks as if it's right

1 that other than those perhaps three, at its most
 2 generous, entities or people, voluntary and community
 3 organisations remained uninvited or overlooked; is that
 4 the case?
 5 A. I think the purpose of inviting voluntary sector
 6 representatives, rather than a lot of voluntary
 7 sector --- because this meeting was huge. But I do think
 8 someone who was representing the voluntary sector or
 9 Tony should have spoken --- should have come, knowing
 10 what was happening in the voluntary sector communities
 11 out there then.
 12 Q. Right.
 13 Do you know what had happened by way of attempts
 14 made by RBKC to get voluntary and faith sectors to
 15 attend?
 16 A. No, I just left it to them.
 17 Q. If we go to page 2 of this document {RBK00002040/2}, we
 18 can see that the topic of communication is raised here
 19 at page 2, and if you look at item 11 there, you can see
 20 that there are some suggestions, and it says:
 21 "Collate all information on helplines, services,
 22 rest centres, etc. and publish to the public via comms
 23 channels and GOV.UK/RBKC website. To produce leaflet
 24 versions and provide to all front line services dealing
 25 with those affected by the incident. To consider

1 language barriers/alternative languages/distribution via
 2 community/faith networks."
 3 Now, at that stage, how advanced were the
 4 communications from RBKC to those affected, perhaps
 5 through these channels, do you know?
 6 A. Well, I know they weren't very effective because I saw
 7 what was happening on the television. They weren't
 8 effective. But this was now taking --- getting all that
 9 information and saying, "This needs to be done now" and
 10 getting someone to take that action.
 11 Q. Right. Were you disappointed that it hadn't been done
 12 before or was it your expectation that it should have
 13 been done before this time? This is now more than
 14 48 hours after the fire.
 15 A. I think a lot of the things that came to this group
 16 should have been done before.
 17 Q. Right. Does that include improving comms or getting
 18 communication conduits like this in place?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. Yes.
 21 Now, if we turn, please, to page 6 of this same set
 22 of minutes {RBK00002040/6}, we can see there, there is,
 23 under the heading "Health and Wellbeing Sub Group",
 24 item 7. Look at 7.2. It says:
 25 "The Group discussed the need to look at making

1 information available in different languages,
 2 signposting people looking for their loved ones away
 3 from hospitals, safeguarding for stranded children and
 4 the coordination of volunteers.”
 5 Whose suggestion was that? Or at whose prompting
 6 did that discussion take place? Was it yours?
 7 A. Yes, we were asking — we wanted people to raise the
 8 issues that they were — they had found from their first
 9 subgroup, and the things that they were raising from
 10 their subgroup were these issues.
 11 Q. What provision had been made at that stage for providing
 12 information to those for whom English was not their
 13 first language?
 14 A. I don't personally know.
 15 Q. Do you know what support was provided at the Westway for
 16 that category of people, including the provision of
 17 interpreters?
 18 A. I don't know.
 19 Q. Was there an awareness that this part of RBKC was
 20 ethnically diverse and that English wasn't a first
 21 language for potentially very many numbers of people?
 22 A. I would have thought there was an awareness.
 23 Q. Right, you would have thought there was, but were you
 24 aware that this was something in people's minds?
 25 A. I can't recall whether something was mentioned earlier

1 on about interpreters, but certainly I wasn't — I don't
 2 know. This was just raised at my meeting.
 3 Q. Do you know what had prompted the suggestion for
 4 signposting people looking for loved ones away from
 5 hospitals? What had prompted that?
 6 A. I think that's because people were looking for
 7 information, to see if their loved ones were in hospital
 8 or they weren't, I think that's what that relates to.
 9 Q. Right. What would that involve, signposting them away
 10 from hospitals?
 11 A. This is — these were — they were raising the things
 12 they needed to do next, and I guess we didn't have
 13 a long — this was a much more tactical meeting, so we
 14 were — they were saying these were things they'd
 15 discussed in their subgroup and these were things they
 16 were going to address. I'm hoping what — and I think
 17 some of the conversations were putting social workers in
 18 there, getting people to go and meet people at hospitals
 19 so they could actually talk to them.
 20 Q. What was the root of this concern, do you know?
 21 A. I can't recall, but I think it was people were very
 22 distressed looking for their loved ones, and maybe the
 23 hospital wasn't the right place, and they should go to
 24 the family and friends centre or they should go
 25 somewhere else.

1 Q. Why was that still happening more than 48 hours after
 2 the incident?
 3 A. I'm speculating that those were the — places weren't
 4 giving them the information they needed.
 5 Q. But why were they still going to hospitals looking for
 6 loved ones —
 7 A. I can't answer that.
 8 Q. — more than 48 hours after the incident? You can't
 9 help us with that.
 10 Was that a question mark? Was that a topic examined
 11 at this meeting?
 12 A. This was the feedback from the chair of the subgroup
 13 that had met the day before saying the things they were
 14 looking at, and that was one of the things they were
 15 looking at, and they were going to try and address that.
 16 We didn't — the group then — the whole group then
 17 didn't go into a lot of discussion about all these
 18 things. It was feedback from them about the things they
 19 were looking at and what they were dealing with next.
 20 Q. I see. So there was no examination of the reasons why
 21 it was that, 48 hours after the incident, families were
 22 still drifting round London hospitals trying to find
 23 news of their loved ones?
 24 A. There might have been, I don't recall it, but there
 25 certainly would have been at that subgroup meeting.

1 They would have looked at why.
 2 Q. Right.
 3 Now, let's then go to the meeting on 20 June,
 4 four days later. {RBK00001014}. Now, as I say, this is
 5 20 June, so we're now on the Tuesday, I think, in fact,
 6 after the fire.
 7 Item 46:
 8 "Sue Redmond (Housing & Temp Accommodation Subgroup)
 9 "Sue Redmond to work with Comms on a resource
 10 directory and a simple message and FAQs document to give
 11 to all affected individuals. Deadline to get this out
 12 to those workers on the front line by 15.00 today
 13 (20th June)."
 14 Was it the case that by Tuesday, 20 June, a leaflet
 15 or FAQ document had still not yet been produced for
 16 those affected by the fire?
 17 A. I can't remember whether anything did happen, but
 18 obviously I needed to do something better there —
 19 produce something better. So I can't remember.
 20 Q. This was of course after the LLAG had been activated on
 21 the Friday, 16 June in the afternoon. Did you get any
 22 help or any oversight or any input from LLAG in relation
 23 to working on comms to improve it in the manner
 24 identified here?
 25 A. Before this time or after this action?

1 Q. Before this time, between the 16th and the 20th.
 2 A. I didn't have this as an action point on the -- for me
 3 personally. After the 16th, LLAG took over, and it was
 4 a totally different structure that was created.
 5 Q. Can you explain why there was a delay in producing
 6 a leaflet?
 7 A. Well, certainly it was on our agenda when we had our
 8 16th HASG meeting in RBKC, it was one of the actions
 9 that the subgroups were going to take forward. After
 10 that, there was a different structure kicked in and
 11 I don't know why that action didn't take place. Maybe
 12 the structure had been changed or it had been lost in
 13 the transitions. I can't answer.
 14 Q. You can't answer.
 15 Let's try this. Let's go to {RBK00014835}. What
 16 I'm showing you here is a document circulated on
 17 20 June 2017 by the Grenfell Tower Victims Unit, which
 18 was prepared by central government, MHCLG, and we know
 19 from that {GOL0000611}, which I don't need to show you.
 20 It is a Grenfell Tower Victims Unit guidance document,
 21 and it says in the second paragraph:
 22 "The Unit will act as a single point of access into
 23 Government for those affected by the Grenfell Tower
 24 fire, and will co-ordinate Government support services
 25 on issues such as benefits, immigration, transport,

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1 education and health.
 2 "This is in addition to the support services
 3 available at the Community Assistance Centre.
 4 "We are not an advice line for victims which is
 5 provided by the British Red Cross on [then there is
 6 a number] ... However, we can help to resolve any
 7 questions and problems that support workers (social
 8 workers, Family Liaison Officers, housing officers etc)
 9 are encountering on behalf of victims."
 10 Is this a document you saw at the time?
 11 A. I probably did.
 12 Q. You probably did.
 13 Did RBKC produce any document for victims in this
 14 same way after 20 June?
 15 A. This work comes out of the LLAG group that was then
 16 assembled, so we were all doing tasks to feed into this.
 17 Not RBKC, they weren't involved really. It was the rest
 18 of us now who were in this -- the next phase. I don't
 19 think RBKC did anything, but I can't remember.
 20 Q. Right.
 21 A. This organisation -- these were -- this document was
 22 published with all the input that we were all doing over
 23 those days to gather all this information, put it all
 24 together. When I say "we", I mean the people who'd been
 25 moved to Westminster to carry on with the longer-term

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1 planning.
 2 Q. Right. Did RBKC, though, produce anything of their own,
 3 independently of this document, for victims?
 4 A. I don't know.
 5 Q. Right.
 6 Now, in your first statement at page 13
 7 {RBK00035676/13}, if we can go to that, please,
 8 paragraph 61, you say:
 9 "I wrote a number of emails before my visit to No10.
 10 I was a lead person with the Members and reported to
 11 them and had to provide them with support. Councillor
 12 Mary Weale was distraught on the Friday at the lack of
 13 communications coming out of RBKC, with Members not
 14 being told what was going on and the whole situation
 15 becoming increasing negative towards RBKC. I produce
 16 a copy of an email that I sent her as exhibit SR/29 in
 17 which I mention the need for support. What I meant by
 18 this is that she was not being supported by RBKC Comms.
 19 I mention that this could have serious implications and
 20 by that I meant that I thought the Council would be
 21 taken over."
 22 Now, what we need from that, then, is the email,
 23 {RBK00020903}. Here is an email from you to
 24 Councillor Weale on 17 June 2017, so this is now the
 25 Saturday, very early in the morning, I think 12 minutes

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1 past midnight; do you see that?
 2 A. Yes.
 3 Q. "Subject: Hello.
 4 "Dear Cllr Weale
 5 "Apologies for not ringing earlier ..."
 6 Then you say:
 7 "I so know you ..."
 8 I'm not quite sure how to read that:
 9 "I ... know you and other [councillors] want to have
 10 clear actions etc and want to talk to people as you are
 11 real community leaders. To be very honest you need a
 12 lot more support in that area that hasn't been
 13 happening."
 14 What was that a reference to?
 15 A. I saw Councillor Weale in RBKC before we all had to move
 16 out, and I met her. She was very upset and she said her
 17 and some of the councillors, they had met people, they
 18 wanted to call a community meeting, could I speak to
 19 someone because they're not hearing anything that's
 20 happening, could I speak to people in RBKC and perhaps
 21 arrange something for them so they could meet with
 22 people in the community.
 23 Q. Right.
 24 At the foot of the email, you say:
 25 "There are serious implications in all this

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1 not that any other council could have done better as
 2 it 's so huge but because I fear there will be the need
 3 to make a statement .. if you understand?"
 4 Now, in your statement you say that there you meant
 5 you thought the council would be taken over, but in
 6 relation to that, when did you first fear or think that
 7 the council would be taken over?
 8 A. I suppose what I meant, the council would be taken over,
 9 is not so much that Gold would come in and take over the
 10 operations and the support, because I thought that was
 11 quite right; I meant that some people in the council
 12 would go.
 13 Q. I see. Were your serious implications that you were
 14 adverting to here in this email something that was
 15 discussed among RBKC senior leadership, so far as you
 16 knew?
 17 A. Oh, no, not at all. It was other people talking about
 18 RBKC.
 19 Q. Right, I see.
 20 Now, going back in time to 16 June 2017, if we can
 21 look back at the minutes of the noon HASG meeting on
 22 that day, those are at {RBK00002040/2}. Let's look at
 23 page 2, please, action 14 at the foot of page 2,
 24 "Chair". Do you see it says:
 25 "Chair. Clarify with RBKC Gold responsibility for

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1 coordination of volunteers. Noted should not be
 2 a responsibility of BRC due to other priority work they
 3 are leading/supporting."
 4 Why did that need to be clarified?
 5 A. Again, I think this comes from British Red Cross. They
 6 felt they were doing things they shouldn't be doing and
 7 it was the council's responsibility .
 8 Q. Who had fed that back to this meeting?
 9 A. Unless it's later on, I'm assuming it's someone from
 10 British Red Cross.
 11 Q. Right. Did the meeting agree with those concerns, that
 12 the BRC was overreaching itself?
 13 A. No, it wasn't that sort of meeting. It was just -- they
 14 were feeding back that they didn't think they should be
 15 doing that. No one at the meeting argued with that. It
 16 was just a sense that they should not be doing this and
 17 the council should be dealing with volunteers.
 18 Q. Right. Do we take it from that that it was the BRC who
 19 had been co-ordinating volunteers up to that point?
 20 A. I know -- I don't know whether it came after this or
 21 before this -- that the BECC was given responsibility
 22 for co-ordinating volunteers, but I don't know whether
 23 they were doing it appropriately or they were doing it
 24 properly.
 25 Q. Right.

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1 A. And I think BRC, British Red Cross, were getting lots of
 2 phone calls and offers of support, I think.
 3 Q. I want then to turn to the activation of the LLAG and
 4 the handover of the HALO role.
 5 If we go back to your first statement, please,
 6 page 10 {RBK00035676/10}, paragraph 47, you say there --
 7 and I'm summarising -- that, on the afternoon of
 8 16 June, you left the Town Hall and you went to the
 9 Westminster City Council offices because of the protest
 10 at the Town Hall. I think it's right, isn't it, that by
 11 this stage London Local Authority Gold had been
 12 activated, in the sense that the handover had been
 13 completed; is that right?
 14 A. I found out that when I got to Westminster, yeah. Yeah.
 15 Q. Right.
 16 Then at paragraph 48, you say:
 17 "I remember when I got to Westminster, a number of
 18 rooms had been set up and sub- groups were already up
 19 and running. There were numerous other Chief Executives
 20 in attendance and a lot of tasks were being carried out.
 21 I did ask why London Gold did not help from day one and
 22 was told that they had to be invited in to help by the
 23 Council. I thought that in these circumstances this
 24 protocol needed to be changed."
 25 To whom did you speak about that on that day?

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1 A. I think I asked -- I don't know who -- I may have asked
 2 Mark Sawyer why they didn't come in, and he said they
 3 had to be invited.
 4 Q. Right.
 5 A. And then I had the thought that these circumstances
 6 needed to be changed, and I then followed up that
 7 thought with an email.
 8 Q. Yes. What was it about this incident that led you to
 9 think that the protocol needed to be changed?
 10 A. I couldn't believe that something this big, and people
 11 were watching it for days, and there were experts in
 12 community planning, absolute experts in London who could
 13 come in and support, and that they had to be asked to
 14 come in, and if they weren't asked, I just thought there
 15 should be some protocol that said you have -- there has
 16 to be a different way of working this.
 17 Q. Let's go to page 14 of your statement {RBK00035676/14},
 18 paragraph 69, just to round that off. You say:
 19 "It was clear that the scale of the disaster and the
 20 immediate need for leadership and direction and
 21 coordination was much greater than RBKC could respond to
 22 as expected by people. I think members and some staff
 23 were on the scene very quickly but did not take the
 24 lead. In my view at the very earliest of stages a Gold
 25 London wide team should have been set up, experts sent

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1 in and coordination, advice and support given to
 2 the Council."
 3 Can you clarify for us whether those are your views
 4 now in hindsight or whether those were views you held at
 5 the time in the midst of the response?
 6 A. I still hold them now.
 7 Q. Yes, but did you hold them then?
 8 A. Oh, I did.
 9 Q. You did, right.
 10 Can you help us, what difference would it have made
 11 to the response had a Gold London-wide team been set up
 12 at the outset at, say, 6 am on 14 June?
 13 A. Well, not only would you have had more people, but you
 14 would have had experts who were trained, and
 15 communications would have been --- and also, my view of
 16 what happened when I got to Westminster was --- or even
 17 just my very short meeting with Mark Sawyer, I asked him
 18 for something and the next minute it was there. They
 19 had resources at their fingertips like this. They were
 20 command and control, they were doing things.
 21 Q. Things that --- is this right --- you didn't observe
 22 happening at the BECC?
 23 A. It wasn't just the BECC, it was a whole range of things
 24 they were doing. The BECC was one small --- there was
 25 lots of groups doing things and acting on them and

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1 experts saying, "This is what we need, we need to get
 2 this person in, bring that person in, do this". It was
 3 very co-ordinated.
 4 Q. Right.
 5 Now, when you attended Westminster City Council
 6 offices on the evening of the 16th, because that's where
 7 we are now, the Friday evening, what happened to your
 8 role as HALO?
 9 A. I don't know exactly how it happened, but I think there
 10 were a number of chief execs already there who had
 11 experience of being HALOs and they took on that role and
 12 then I became support to them. I think that's how it
 13 happened.
 14 Q. Right.
 15 What was the status of the response at this point of
 16 handover to London Gold? Where had it got up to?
 17 A. Sorry ...
 18 Q. Well, let me see if I can get at it more specifically .
 19 Can we go to an email at {GOL00001303}. This is
 20 an email that you sent to Mark Sawyer on the morning of
 21 18 June, that's the Sunday, at 11.05, if you go down,
 22 please, to the foot of page 1 and over to page 2. To be
 23 clear, you're sending this email to John Barradell and
 24 Julia Corkey, as well as Charlie Parker at WCC. You
 25 misspell John Barradell's name, so he doesn't get it,

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1 but it doesn't matter. What then happens is Mark Sawyer
 2 corrects it and sends it on to him.
 3 But looking at the text of your email at the bottom
 4 of page 1, you say:
 5 "Dear John and co ..."
 6 Then on to page 2 {GOL00001303/2}:
 7 "I have no idea of the protocol or if you will even
 8 read this from me. Because the amazing support and
 9 structure is kicking in and we are now in a different
 10 world. And believe me I appreciate that and am learning
 11 so much.
 12 "However I have to share with you some thinking if I
 13 am to be able to hold my head up after all this .
 14 "I can absolutely appreciate the political issues .
 15 "However there are lots of learning from previous
 16 incidents .. not least the issues of scapegoats ..
 17 whether individuals or organisations .
 18 "There are hundreds of staff still going to work
 19 tomorrow in RBKC and they may be feeling demoralised
 20 following the impact of political attacks. They need to
 21 know they aren't crap, are valued and continue to have
 22 something significant to contribute and they need to
 23 feel the organisation is still ok.
 24 "And so without beating about the bush .. RBKC will
 25 need to continue and do their job with residents and

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1 whatever people feel about that we have a responsibility
 2 to make sure the council is working well and have a good
 3 team leading it who have the explicit confidence of
 4 everyone and are not undermined. So deal with what you
 5 need to and let the rest of RBKC get on with the vital
 6 work they do. And let's agree who can do that and help
 7 them do that rather than watching them fail and then
 8 going in.
 9 "It's not going to help residents if the whole
 10 organisation folds .
 11 "So there needs to be a plan for that, instead of a
 12 whole scale attack.
 13 "And for the future maybe a lesson learned is that
 14 you don't wait .. London gold .. for a council to ask
 15 you ... but in a major incident like this ... where the
 16 council itself may be traumatised .. you just step in !!!
 17 "So we are all responsible aren't we.
 18 "Sue."
 19 Now, can you just tell us why you felt you needed to
 20 write this email to John Barradell on the morning of the
 21 Sunday, 18 June?
 22 A. From the Friday, just some of us went to Westminster,
 23 one of them was Nicholas Holgate and one of them was me
 24 and I think Tony Redpath out of RBKC. I don't know why
 25 it was just the few of us. And from then through to the

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1 Sunday, I saw how — I don't know what the word is —
 2 how marginalised he was, they were, in this whole new
 3 structure.
 4 I had had emails from managers in RBKC saying their
 5 staff were feeling terrible about the way the evacuation
 6 of the building had gone. They were feeling frightened
 7 about going to work. They felt the whole council,
 8 because of the press — they felt that the whole council
 9 was rubbish and they were feeling awful.
 10 I also picked up lots of stuff on the Friday night
 11 and the Saturday and some of the Sunday from people
 12 across — professionals across London who were working
 13 about how they thought RBKC had not handled this and how
 14 bad they were, and I had some experience in adult social
 15 care and in social care of organisations that have had
 16 deaths and, as a consequence, learnt — some people had
 17 been scapegoated, and it's taken years for the
 18 organisation to recruit staff again and to get staff
 19 moving, and in that moment, in that immediate time, they
 20 were feeling terrible, the services weren't operating,
 21 it was falling apart.
 22 So I just — I felt a sense — a bit of sense of
 23 injustice about every single criticism that was —
 24 I wasn't — I didn't know RBKC, really. Every — a
 25 sense of injustice that was put in their direction.

1 I felt angry that people had watched it for two days,
 2 and I didn't understand why, and I just wanted him to
 3 actually make a decision about: are you going to support
 4 these leaders in RBKC to get on with their job or are
 5 you not, and you can't let it gradually go on.
 6 Q. When you say, in the last sentence of the fourth
 7 paragraph from the end there, "let's agree who can do
 8 that and help them do that rather than watching them
 9 fail and then going in", did you think the council had
 10 failed before London Gold was activated?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. You did.
 13 Now, your observation at the end was or included
 14 that the council itself may be traumatised. What led
 15 you to think that that might be the case?
 16 A. I saw some people who patently weren't functioning
 17 properly. It was ... people weren't operating the way
 18 they should have been. People were very upset.
 19 Leadership people were very upset and not functioning.
 20 Q. Let's then turn to 17 June 2017, which I know
 21 chronologically is day before this email, but in the
 22 events this is what comes next.
 23 We know — and correct me if we're wrong about
 24 this — the role of HALO was passed over to
 25 Mary Harpley; is that right?

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. And she at the time was the chief executive of Hounslow
 3 Council; yes?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. You say you were instructed to support Mary Harpley.
 6 Did you see any difference in the response while
 7 supporting Mary Harpley?
 8 A. Everything was very different. We were in this huge
 9 floor of Westminster Council. There was a central hub.
 10 There were different offices for every single area that
 11 were operating in it. In those offices, there were
 12 people to take notes, there were people who were
 13 information officers, there would be people who would be
 14 runners. There were lots of staff working to them.
 15 There was a huge co-ordination where — in terms of the
 16 HALO. She had a short meeting with John Barradell and
 17 a few people. She came out with a few actions she had
 18 to do. She came in to us, gave us our instructions. It
 19 was very organised and very smooth, and very resourced.
 20 Q. Right.
 21 Did you get the impression that Mary Harpley had
 22 knowledge and expertise of how to run a major incident
 23 as a council leader under the pan-London arrangements?
 24 A. Yes, I think I did.
 25 Q. Did you ask yourself at the time the question — well,

1 let me try it this way: did you make a comparison in
 2 your own mind between Mary Harpley and her activities
 3 and approach and that of Nicholas Holgate?
 4 A. No, I didn't make that comparison, and there was a huge
 5 infrastructure there, absolutely huge infrastructure
 6 around her.
 7 Q. I see, right. So just to be clear, you don't — is this
 8 right? — attribute Mary Harpley's response to perhaps
 9 better expertise and training in the matter of civil
 10 contingencies than that which Nicholas Holgate had?
 11 A. I didn't really have ... I can't really — I don't feel
 12 comfortable — I can't really say that. She was doing
 13 a humanitarian assistance liaison role, which is one
 14 aspect of the civil contingency, and she was doing that
 15 in this whole infrastructure. I'm sure she was very
 16 well trained.
 17 Q. Right. Do you know what training she had to adopt the
 18 HALO role?
 19 A. No.
 20 Q. You don't.
 21 Let's look at her statement, {GOL00001114/2}. This
 22 is her second witness statement to the Inquiry. If we
 23 go in that, please, to page 2, paragraph 3, she says:
 24 "My initial assessment on arriving was that the RBKC
 25 team, working with partners, had tried to cover all the

1 key strands of humanitarian assistance, but that they
 2 had not managed to demonstrate enough progress in any of
 3 these areas on the ground to provide confidence to
 4 survivors and observers that the right work was being
 5 done."
 6 Now, pausing there, I think, do you agree that RBKC
 7 had not made enough progress yet in covering all the key
 8 strands of humanitarian assistance before 17 June?
 9 A. Yes.
 10 Q. Yes.
 11 She continues:
 12 "Coming in to the team, it was clear that some of
 13 the things which really needed to be in place were not.
 14 These included: a single, definitive list of the hotels
 15 into which surviving families and individuals had been
 16 placed, with basic contact information; a process for
 17 communicating regularly with these families and
 18 individuals which should have been underway already;
 19 a clear understanding of which families and individuals
 20 had the greatest needs, notwithstanding the terrible
 21 situation everyone was in; and a list of key community,
 22 faith and other leaders with whom I would have expected
 23 the RBKC team to have been engaging already. I have
 24 said in my original Witness Statement that there was
 25 little to no handover from the RBKC team which made it

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1 difficult to know at the start whether these things did
 2 already exist or not. We could not find them, so had to
 3 assume they did not."
 4 Now, I've read that all to you.
 5 In relation to her list of things that were missing,
 6 do you consider that her list is a fair summary?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. If we go back to her first statement, {GOL00000441/4},
 9 if I can show you paragraph 13, she says this:
 10 "By the time help was accepted, the RBKC team were
 11 exhausted and not in a position to provide any
 12 meaningful handover to the LLAG team coming into support
 13 them. Consequently, the LLAG team had to spend quite
 14 a lot of time assessing the situation and trying to
 15 establish, for example, contact information for families
 16 dispersed in hotels or who were the key leaders and
 17 contacts in the local community with whom we should
 18 engage."
 19 Do you agree with that observation?
 20 A. Yes, I do, and she's not counting me as the RBKC team at
 21 this point, but yes.
 22 Q. You do.
 23 Let's then turn to the meeting at Downing Street on
 24 17 June.
 25 In your first statement, if we go to that, please,

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1 page 11 {RBK00035676/11}, you cover this at
 2 paragraph 53, and you say:
 3 "In the midst of all that was happening during the
 4 day, I was informed by Westminster Comms that I was
 5 required to attend at No10 Downing Street on the 17th
 6 for a meeting with some of the residents and the Prime
 7 Minister, to provide an update on behalf of RBKC."
 8 Now, in your contact with Lorna Gratton, who was
 9 an aide to the Prime Minister, she sent an email, and
 10 let's look at that. That's at {RBK00020896}. I think
 11 you actually spoke to her to understand what it was that
 12 you needed to do at the meeting; yes?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. She follows that up with this email on the Friday, the
 15 16th, before the Saturday the 17th meeting, and this is
 16 timed at 11.12 in the morning, as you can see, and she
 17 says to you:
 18 "Sue,
 19 "Thanks for speaking to me earlier for agreeing [to]
 20 attend the meeting at Downing Street tomorrow."
 21 Then if you go to the fourth paragraph down, she
 22 says this:
 23 "As discussed the PM will mostly be listening to the
 24 concerns of the residents and volunteers. She may turn
 25 to you to for help with some of the questions they ask.

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1 You certainly won't be expected to know all of the
 2 answers, but listening to concerns (and hopefully acting
 3 on them subsequently) will go along [sic] way. As
 4 discussed, many of the residents were frustrated by a
 5 perceived lack of information and coordination from the
 6 council, however they very polite in the meeting today,
 7 and I would expect the tone tomorrow to be similar
 8 (though they maybe even better prepared with questions
 9 and examples)."
 10 Now, in relation to what she says there about the
 11 residents being frustrated by a perceived lack of
 12 information and co-ordination from the council, did you
 13 agree at the time from what you had observed up to that
 14 point that that was a justified complaint?
 15 A. Yes.
 16 Q. Now, ahead of the meeting in Downing Street, you I think
 17 forwarded this email to Nicholas Holgate.
 18 Let's look at that: {RBK00049583}. This is at the
 19 foot of page 1 and over to page 2. You email him:
 20 "Subject: Meeting tomorrow at Downing Street on
 21 grenfell towers.
 22 "Dear Nicholas ..."
 23 And then over to the top of page 2 {RBK00049583/2}:
 24 "I hope you are ok."
 25 Pausing there, that's a self-explanatory sentiment;

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1 was it prompted by any observation on your part that he
2 was very far from okay?
3 A. I don't know how very far from okay, but it was -- we
4 left -- when we left RBKC and went to -- we all made our
5 own way to Westminster, I just observed that he was just
6 left there basically, sitting there, and it was -- yeah.
7 Q. Then you go on:
8 "I thought I would share with you what I have just
9 had from No 10.
10 "I have also shared with Tony and Cllr Weale as she
11 was wanting to meet groups tomorrow and me be there so
12 wanted to let her know why I couldn't.
13 "I'm not sure this is the time to talk about how
14 I feel .. and I am not even sure I should go to
15 tomorrow's meeting but if there is anything you want to
16 advise or you want to steer I would be very grateful."
17 What did you mean by, "I'm not sure this is the time
18 to talk about how I feel"?
19 A. Well, I absolutely did not think I was the person to go
20 to that meeting.
21 Q. Right. You say in your statement, I think, in this
22 regard, that you were not totally familiar with the way
23 RBKC operated or the key personnel involved. Do you
24 consider or did you consider at the time that that lack
25 of familiarity hindered your ability as HALO to

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1 co-ordinate the response in any way?
2 A. I do think it did. I also think by the time the HALO
3 role was there, there was so much coming at that HALO,
4 no one person could have done it. I do think that.
5 Q. Was it your view at the time that a HALO would have been
6 better appointed from within RBKC, as opposed to under
7 the tri-borough arrangements, which could have involved
8 anyone from Hammersmith and Fulham or Westminster?
9 A. Well, I was in -- I was there as a tri-borough person,
10 so there could have been anyone, but it could have been
11 another director either in RBKC or another tri-borough
12 director, absolutely.
13 Q. Yes, but trying it a different way, were you concerned
14 at the time that you were being sent in to bat for RBKC
15 when it wasn't your borough, and its shortcomings,
16 whatever they were, or whatever you saw of them, were
17 not your responsibility?
18 A. It was -- well, it was maybe a bit of that, in that
19 I didn't know RBKC, it wasn't my borough, but neither --
20 I mean, I wasn't -- I'd only been there two months for
21 the three of them, so I wasn't any more or less
22 involved -- well, I was less involved with RBKC than the
23 rest, but it was that if you're going to meet people
24 after what they'd been through, to have someone who
25 could say, "I've only been there" -- I mean, I wouldn't

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1 have said it, but, "This person's only been there
2 two months", who didn't know the voluntary sector
3 colleagues, who didn't know all the people in the
4 room -- I don't mean the individuals necessarily, but
5 didn't know Grenfell, didn't know -- that wasn't going
6 to, to me, be an empathetic and the right response, the
7 right person.
8 I mean, obviously they said to me, "You can show
9 empathy, you can talk to people", that's why they asked
10 me to do it, but I didn't know the area, I didn't know
11 the community. I would have wanted someone who knew
12 those people to go there and really, really listen and
13 really take something back. I mean, I could do that on
14 one level, but not really. I didn't think I was the
15 right person.
16 Q. Did you make clear to Nicholas Holgate what you have
17 just made clear to us?
18 A. No, at the -- this is like 12 o'clock at night, isn't
19 it? And I was going there the next morning.
20 Q. Yes.
21 A. So I've just said -- that's why I said, "I'm not sure
22 this is the time to talk about how I feel". I couldn't
23 write all that in an email. I was going, you know,
24 I was doing what I was being requested to do, and that's
25 why I said, "I'm not sure I'm the right person to go".

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1 I made those feelings known to Westminster comms, who
2 were asking me to go.
3 Q. Now, the meeting with the Prime Minister took place at
4 13.30 on Saturday, 17 June, but I think, in the event,
5 you were not asked to attend, or you didn't attend in
6 the end.
7 A. No. No, I did -- I was sat in the room outside.
8 Q. Yes, but you didn't go into the meeting.
9 A. And I didn't go into the meeting.
10 Q. No, and in the end I think returned back to cover the
11 response at Westminster Council's offices.
12 A. And someone came out of the meeting who was the person
13 who was representing -- I don't know, the Archdeacon or
14 someone, and said, "Why are you here? Why isn't
15 Nicholas or Tony here?"
16 Q. Right. Well, why weren't they?
17 A. I can't answer that, only that I was asked by that
18 Gold Command team on the Friday night to go.
19 Q. Right. Did you ask anybody involved in organising the
20 meeting at Downing Street why it was that you had been
21 asked but why Nicholas Holgate or Tony Redpath hadn't?
22 A. Well, it wasn't the Downing Street people, it was the
23 people in Gold who were saying I should go and not the
24 others.
25 Q. I follow. Did you ask them the same question?

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1 A. I did. I did.
 2 Q. And what did they tell you?
 3 A. I was the best person to go in the time because I could
 4 sit and talk to people and listen and they were — they
 5 just said they didn't want those people — other people
 6 to go. They didn't think that it was right for them to
 7 go.
 8 Q. Why not?
 9 A. Well, I had those conversations, but I didn't really —
 10 I just thought they didn't think they would come across
 11 very well or — I don't know.
 12 Q. Now, I think you received some notes of that meeting.
 13 They are at {RBK00021098}. They're not minutes, they're
 14 notes. As you can see, they come in the form of
 15 an email from Lorna Gratton, second email down, to you
 16 on 17 June at 6.03 pm. If you look at the substance:
 17 "Hi Sue,
 18 "In the interests of speed, below is a slightly
 19 rough and ready cut of my notes from the meeting the PM
 20 had with local residents and volunteers."
 21 Then she says:
 22 "I've split it into 5 sections."
 23 And those sections are split out.
 24 If we go to page 2 {RBK00021098/2}, seven points
 25 down from the top, you can see the first few words

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1 start:
 2 "People from council or coordination team ..."
 3 Can you see that? It's about two-thirds of the way
 4 down the first block of text, seventh bullet point down,
 5 "People from council". Do you see that?
 6 A. Oh, yes, "People from council", yes.
 7 Q. It says:
 8 "People from council or coordination team to meet
 9 people as they are discharged from hospital to provide
 10 support — this is apparently not currently happening."
 11 Was that a problem that you were aware of during
 12 your time as HALO?
 13 A. No. I don't think I was specifically aware of that
 14 specifically, no.
 15 Q. Right. Whose responsibility was it to know that?
 16 (Pause)
 17 A. People at that time, I think — again, it goes back to
 18 that original conversation, doesn't it? People didn't
 19 know where people were. So I guess some people were
 20 going to hospital and being discharged before people had
 21 even known where they were. I think that's — so that
 22 list of where people were or what had happened to them,
 23 maybe it hadn't been co-ordinated by then.
 24 Q. Pursuing this theme, then, of helping people discharged
 25 from hospital, can we just go back, then, to 14 June,

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1 the Wednesday. {RBK00001026}, please. This is an email
 2 from Laura Johnson of RBKC housing, second email down,
 3 14 June at 7.41 am, so early on in the incident, or
 4 early on in the day, to Robert Shaw at housing at RBKC,
 5 copied to Amanda Gill:
 6 "Rob,
 7 "We shall be organising a team to send to the two
 8 rest centre to assess the displaced peoples housing need
 9 and arrange alternative accommodation for them.
 10 "Amanda phoning around commercial hotels now to find
 11 vacancies.
 12 "We are also setting up a protocol for those people
 13 in hospital who will be discharged and need to be
 14 rehoused.
 15 "We are in Holland Room if you want to drop by to
 16 see what needs doing."
 17 Were you aware yourself that there was a protocol
 18 being developed on 14 June in relation to residents
 19 being discharged from hospital?
 20 A. No, I wasn't, and I think this is again an indication of
 21 how siloed some of the responses — some of the work
 22 was, because that would have been a really good example
 23 of working with social care on doing those things and
 24 helping and supporting.
 25 Q. Right. So your criticism there is that this was, you

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1 say, siloed; so this was left to housing, but they
 2 hadn't joined up the dots with social care so that
 3 social care staff could offer their assistance?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. Yes.
 6 A. It would have been more helpful to have more people who
 7 are used to hospital discharge processes there.
 8 Q. Were you told about this protocol when you took over the
 9 HALO role?
 10 A. No.
 11 Q. Or even before that?
 12 A. No.
 13 Q. No. Do you happen to know whether it was a pre-existing
 14 protocol or whether it was drafted in the wake of the
 15 incident or whether it existed at all?
 16 A. I have no idea.
 17 Q. You don't.
 18 Let's look at Laura Johnson's first statement,
 19 {RBK00035592}. There is the first page of it. Let's go
 20 to page 9 {RBK00035592/9}, please, paragraph 37. She
 21 says:
 22 "The protocol for people being discharged from
 23 hospital was organised through Adult Social Care ('ASC')
 24 and Families' and Childrens' [sic] Services ('FCS').
 25 They had social workers at hospitals to liaise with the

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1 hospital and families on what housing and/or support
 2 they needed when they were due to be discharged. ASC
 3 would then make this information available to Housing.
 4 We would then arrange for them to be placed in hotels.
 5 Sue Redmond, Director of ASC for tri—borough, took
 6 charge of this aspect, with Clare[sic] Chamberlain,
 7 Tri—Borough Director of Children’s Services.”
 8 Is that correct, that you took charge of this?
 9 A. Not quite. I think there’s two different aspects of
 10 a discharge from hospital. The first thing that we were
 11 doing was going into hospitals and helping existing
 12 people, not to do with the fire, who were in hospital
 13 and could actually be discharged home. So that’s what
 14 social workers do, and they were helping to see if any
 15 people could be discharged early from hospital,
 16 therefore freeing up some beds in case the people needed
 17 them who were coming in. So that’s what adult social
 18 care did in that respect.
 19 Q. I see.
 20 A. I think the bit about then people going to hospital from
 21 the fire and then being discharged home, I — we sent
 22 social workers there to actually help people do that,
 23 but I don’t know how that fits in with Laura’s earlier
 24 email about a protocol. If she’s meaning adult social
 25 care protocol, well, ours was about existing people in

1 hospitals being able to be discharged home.
 2 Q. I follow.
 3 Were there problems relating to the operation of the
 4 protocol between adult social care and housing?
 5 A. Again, there weren’t problems about the discharging
 6 existing people, but in terms of new people coming in,
 7 we did send social workers to the hospital, just to be
 8 there to support, but I wasn’t aware of a protocol in
 9 that respect. Hopefully they were liaising with each
 10 other, but they were doing things very differently. But
 11 the social worker was sent there to work with the
 12 housing people on trying to help people.
 13 Q. Right.
 14 From your perspective, was there a system eventually
 15 put in place whereby housing and ASC liaised about what
 16 should happen to those people being discharged from
 17 hospital?
 18 A. I actually don’t know.
 19 Q. You don’t know.
 20 If we go to {RBK00011588}, please, this is an email
 21 on 17 June 2017 at 14.23 from Michelle Scaife at adult
 22 social care services RBKC to Paul Hargreaves, and she
 23 says:
 24 “My understanding from a brief discussion with
 25 Amanda Johnson (housing) this morning is that anyone who

1 will require accommodation at time of discharge needs to
 2 be flagged with them as soon as possible. Any
 3 information pertaining to family members that will need
 4 housing with person for discharge will also be of
 5 benefit to housing. Apparently hospital teams are
 6 directly [sic] this information to housing or via RBKC
 7 ASC Community Liaisons (myself/Ann Stuart).
 8 “I think it would be helpful for us to all have one
 9 directive on this because at the moment there are
 10 a number of lists flying around and assumptions about
 11 who is doing what — Are hospital sending information
 12 direct to housing or is all information coming to us
 13 here at ASC and we pass it on to housing? Rob/Paul are
 14 you able to clarify what the message is that housing has
 15 given hospitals in terms of this or how hospital teams
 16 are currently working in term[s] of this matter?”
 17 Now, clearly you don’t get this email at this time,
 18 but what was the answer to that? Was it the case that
 19 within RBKC, from what you could see, there was
 20 confusion about how the information was to be treated?
 21 A. Yes.
 22 Q. Yes. So this would chime with you, would it?
 23 A. I think it would chime with my observation that teams —
 24 different departments weren’t — didn’t really work
 25 together as one response. They were doing things

1 differently.
 2 Q. Let’s go to {GOL00001155}, then, please. Now, this is
 3 a long document run, but if we go to page 7
 4 {GOL00001155/7}, please, and look at item 40 ...
 5 I apologise, can I go back to page 1 {GOL00001155/1}
 6 just to show you what this document is. This is the
 7 HASG meeting on 17 June 2017 at 11 o’clock at Kensington
 8 Town Hall. So this is the Saturday. It says:
 9 “Meeting today at 13.30 with Mary Harpley (Chair),
 10 Andrew Meek (HA lead), Laura Johnson/Amanda Johnson
 11 (housing) ...”
 12 And, of course, at this time you’re down at
 13 Downing Street, waiting to be let into the room but not
 14 being let in, so you weren’t there, I assume; is that
 15 right?
 16 A. Yes.
 17 Q. Right. Let’s see how far you can help us then.
 18 If you go to page 7 {GOL00001155/7}, please, you can
 19 see item 40. It says:
 20 “Sue Redmond (LA).
 21 “Sue Redmond to update the group at the next meeting
 22 to confirm whether the families within the hospitals are
 23 receiving the appropriate social care.”
 24 Now, the first thing is when you got back to
 25 Westminster from Downing Street at some point on

1 Saturday, 17 June, were you given this note or told that
 2 you had to update the group at the next meeting on this
 3 topic?
 4 A. I can't remember, but I probably was. I got back in the
 5 afternoon sometime, so I probably ---
 6 Q. Right.
 7 A. I must have been given it.
 8 Q. Now, you can see what's recorded. Do you remember this
 9 item?
 10 A. I don't.
 11 Q. You don't.
 12 If we go, then, to {RBK00021637}, this is now
 13 18 June, so this is the Sunday, the next day. Here is
 14 an email from Sarah Binner --- it's the second email
 15 down --- to Stella Baillie, and also to Michelle Scaife
 16 copied in there, as you can see, and the subject is "RE:
 17 HASG - Meeting cancellation Monday 19th June 2017".
 18 Sarah Binner, I think, just to be clear, she was
 19 LBHF's provider to provider project lead, wasn't she,
 20 for the tri-borough?
 21 A. I've no idea.
 22 Q. Right, okay.
 23 She provides this briefing, and if you look a little
 24 bit lower down the text of it, she says:
 25 "In brief,

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1 "All cases will require long term involvement of SW.
 2 "The hospital will allocate a SW [social worker]
 3 from hospital or the complex care teams.
 4 "ALL communication on allocations will be sent to
 5 Natasha Bishopp - leading on coordination of SW.
 6 "With regards to Hospitals we will continue to
 7 discharge patients with an allocated worker, or to
 8 allocate from complex care and liaise with housing."
 9 Is that right? Is that what happened?
 10 A. This was the Monday, and by the Monday we'd started to
 11 get help from elsewhere, and we'd asked for social
 12 workers from across London, and Natasha Bishopp had been
 13 given the role of co-ordinating that support of social
 14 workers. So these things were put in action.
 15 Q. Right.
 16 Now, if we go to the last paragraph in this update,
 17 she says there:
 18 "We need clarification from housing if patient
 19 should be sent directly to the town hall, this was the
 20 instruction on Thursday and Friday last week."
 21 Do you know why discharged patients were advised to
 22 go to the Town Hall rather than the Westway Sports
 23 Centre?
 24 A. I've no idea. I saw that in another email and I had no
 25 idea why that would be.

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1 Q. Right.
 2 Was this, like the failure to be notified of
 3 a discharge, another breakdown in communication?
 4 A. Yes.
 5 Q. Now, I'm sorry to dot around in terms of timing, but
 6 just seeing if we can pursue the themes. Going back to
 7 {RBK00021098/2}, this is the post-Number 10 meeting note
 8 that we saw earlier, and if we can go to page 2, please,
 9 look at the third entry from the bottom of the large
 10 chunk of text, above the heading "Specific requests from
 11 residents", the third from bottom says:
 12 "Council to get in touch ..."
 13 Do you see that?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 Q. "Council to get in touch with resident associations and
 16 other groups with local leaders - and have better comms
 17 (e.g. large screen as at football matches)."
 18 Now, we know that community groups and organisations
 19 weren't invited to HASG meetings, but the question is:
 20 what efforts, if any, had been made to engage community
 21 groups in a co-ordinated response?
 22 A. In the two days?
 23 Q. Yes.
 24 A. I know council elected members had gone out. I don't
 25 know anyone else had gone out to talk to --- and I know

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1 people had gone to some of the rest centres, but I don't
 2 know what they'd done in terms of ---
 3 Q. We know that the terms of reference for the HASG, which
 4 we looked at before, included initiating consultation
 5 with communities and individuals to ensure the response
 6 is effective. Did you think at the time that more could
 7 and should have been done to engage with communities?
 8 A. Well, in terms of me and the HASG, that was --- the plan
 9 was going forward, and it was as it happened in terms of
 10 the next few weeks, to really engage with communities to
 11 make this --- whatever happened in the future something
 12 that they wanted, but that wasn't what I was doing at
 13 that time.
 14 Q. Right. No. But you could observe what was happening,
 15 and did you observe at the time that, despite the terms
 16 of reference, including this obligation, more could have
 17 and should have been done?
 18 A. I'm going --- I don't know whether I'm being pedantic,
 19 but in terms of the HASG, that wasn't set up for two ---
 20 the day after, was it? So it should have been set up
 21 the day before and someone should have done something
 22 about that, absolutely. But I also think before that,
 23 the HASG is supposed to do that in terms of the ongoing
 24 involvement and inclusion of people to make it really
 25 meaningful for them. There should have been something

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1 much more happening on the first morning, the first
 2 afternoon, the first day, to talk to voluntary sector
 3 anyway.
 4 Q. And then looking a little bit lower down the screen,
 5 under the heading "Specific requests from residents", it
 6 says:
 7 "Council should proactively contact Clement James
 8 Centre representatives (To note: PM requested the
 9 council leader to make contact with all mosques,
 10 churches and temples by end of day Friday when she spoke
 11 to him on Friday evening – this doesn't appear to have
 12 been done)."
 13 Were you aware of this request by the Prime Minister
 14 before you received this email?
 15 A. No.
 16 Q. Do you know whether any contact had been made before
 17 this?
 18 A. I don't know.
 19 Q. And on being told of this, as you can see you were
 20 indirectly, by -- well, directly by Lorna Gratton, if
 21 you go back to page 1, did you contact Nicholas Holgate
 22 about it or about any of the concerns in it?
 23 A. No, this is, as you can see, a huge list. What I did
 24 then, because I was not leading even the humanitarian --
 25 so I sent this huge list to Westminster, who were

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1 dealing with it, for them and BECC, who were then going
 2 to co-ordinate every single aspect with people to get it
 3 done. I was in a specific team looking at certain
 4 things from then on.
 5 Q. Yes.
 6 A. This is to me because I was the representative at the
 7 meeting, so I had to pass it on to other people to do
 8 those things.
 9 Q. Right.
 10 Looking at the top of the email string, then,
 11 following up on that answer, you forward the email that
 12 you'd got from Lorna Gratton to Robin Campbell and
 13 Julia Corkey, both at WCC, but not to anybody at RBKC.
 14 Do you think you also sent it to RBKC?
 15 A. At that time, I had been -- I was sending everything to
 16 them. All communications, things like this, were going
 17 to the Westminster comms.
 18 Q. I see. Is that why we have no record, I think, of you
 19 sending this to Nicholas Holgate?
 20 A. No, I just sent it straight to -- as Westminster comms,
 21 who then dealt with everything.
 22 Q. Right.
 23 Once London Local Authority Gold led the response,
 24 as they did from the 16th, did you notice any difference
 25 or improvement in the level of community engagement?

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1 A. I know there was a specific group set up, community
 2 engagement group, and there were conversations about
 3 community meetings, but I wasn't involved in them, but
 4 I know things were being discussed and taken forward.
 5 Q. Right. Were there any problems with community
 6 engagement after LLAG started to lead the response?
 7 A. I think there were still problems with community
 8 engagement, yeah.
 9 Q. What sort of problems?
 10 A. Just in terms of really knowing -- going out and
 11 speaking to people. I know some chief executives went
 12 out, I know, and I wasn't involved in it, but I know
 13 people went out.
 14 Q. Can we go to {RBK00022720}. This is an email, if we go
 15 to the foot of page 1, from you on 20 June 2017 to
 16 Carolyn Downs at Brent, copied to Andrew Meek at
 17 Haringey and Emma Spragg at the Red Cross, subject, "RE:
 18 urgent support for premier inn Hammersmith".
 19 Now, the timing is six days after the fire and
 20 four days after London Gold took over the response, and
 21 if you look at the first paragraph, you say:
 22 "Carolyn the community engagement has been missing
 23 from everything and we have been saying that from the
 24 start. And yes everything in the support strand has got
 25 to be about what the community want and recognising what

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1 the community are already doing.
 2 "I have been wanting from the start to have these
 3 conversations in the round, but we are continuing to
 4 have separate workstreams that are rushing off, briefing
 5 separately ... and we need now to get some coordination
 6 and principles about the community ..
 7 "I know why, but we have the chance as we move on
 8 now to bring some structure, some project management and
 9 some thinking to our work .. and put the person and the
 10 community at the heart.
 11 "We can't do this from a bunker in Westminster.
 12 "I know you know that but it would be good to have
 13 a conversation with someone and with us that is more
 14 than 5 minutes long ... and where we listen to each
 15 other without rushing to a solution to the wrong
 16 question.
 17 "Not a criticism just a plea. I have cc in
 18 Emma from red x as we have had this conversation a lot.
 19 "Let me know if you want us to join you or see you
 20 sometime tomorrow to talk maybe after???"
 21 "Sue."
 22 Now, when you say there, "we have been saying [this]
 23 from the start", if you go back to the first page of
 24 this email run, what did you mean?
 25 A. I'm just remembering this. Everyone was in a -- working

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1 separately, so when we went to Westminster, it was -- as
 2 I said at the beginning, it was very structured, it was
 3 very tactical, it was very command and control, and that
 4 was needed initially, and so I was in a group looking
 5 at -- I forget what it was, but it was looking at
 6 humanitarian response, some of it, and in another room
 7 and another group there were a group of people looking
 8 at community engagement separately strategically, and
 9 I didn't think how we could actually -- you know, we
 10 couldn't really effectively do humanitarian responses
 11 that would meet people's needs if we didn't have -- if
 12 we weren't engaged in listening to the community and
 13 understanding, and so even those requests, for instance,
 14 tiny, lots of requests about key workers or what does
 15 someone help, need -- we couldn't do that without
 16 actually talking to people. And I'd been in a room by
 17 that time for a week, and I just thought -- and also the
 18 way -- I do understand these structures, but at some
 19 point you actually do need to stop and have
 20 a conversation about a bit to develop a theme, rather
 21 than running -- people were running with responses.
 22 That's how we were doing things. And, as a consequence,
 23 we were missing key aspects of how you could really talk
 24 to communities about what would work for them better.
 25 Q. Did you feel at this point, 20 June 2017, that within

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1 the London Gold-led response, co-ordination about how to
 2 engage and work with the community was lacking?
 3 A. I don't know whether it was lacking, I just didn't know
 4 whether it was -- I didn't know much about it, and it
 5 wasn't being fed into the workstream I was doing, so
 6 therefore it was seen as a very separate -- we've got to
 7 engage sort of -- I don't mean politically, I mean with
 8 a small p. We've got to engage with groups on a -- just
 9 talking to groups, getting groups together. What I was
 10 talking about here was really listening to people and
 11 understanding what was happening and spending more time
 12 with them. It was a bit more different, and no one was
 13 doing that, in my view.
 14 Q. And your role at this point was what, exactly, as you
 15 understood it?
 16 A. I can't remember the exact role. I was in a team that
 17 was looking at -- so anything that came from -- I think
 18 Carolyn Downs must have been the HALO at that time, so
 19 I was in a room with several people, and anything that
 20 came to her, come to us. Like for instance when
 21 Number 10 said everyone needed a key worker, I was in
 22 a room and I had to arrange a meeting to get key
 23 workers. I then had to do a briefing, the key workers.
 24 I then had to do -- we were just responding to actions
 25 individually and constantly. So that's why I was

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1 saying, "Can we have a pause and just take stock
 2 now?" -- was that a week later? I don't know -- "Just
 3 take stock now just for a little bit, not in this
 4 structure of Gold, but to talk properly about what we
 5 can do". That's what I was asking for there.
 6 Q. Yes.
 7 I just want to ask you one or two questions about
 8 social workers.
 9 In relation to those affected by the fire who
 10 already had a social worker, would it follow that they
 11 would still have had support from their pre-existing
 12 social worker throughout this disaster?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. Yes.
 15 Now, we've heard a number of references to the term
 16 "key workers". Was that, just help, something that the
 17 government had declared should be given to victims, that
 18 everybody should have a key worker?
 19 A. That was my understanding, yeah.
 20 Q. Right. I think it's right, isn't it, that all
 21 key workers, as such, had to be social workers?
 22 A. That was what was instructed, yeah.
 23 Q. Right, I see. So only a social worker could be
 24 a key worker as designated?
 25 A. At that time.

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1 Q. Did that change?
 2 A. I don't know whether it changed, but I'm just saying
 3 that was the instruction. Whether or not you needed
 4 social workers to do that is another point.
 5 Q. I think it's right that -- is this right, correct me if
 6 this is wrong -- the allocated case worker would offer
 7 a wide range of practical and emotional support and, if
 8 necessary, access to specialist services.
 9 A. That was the brief.
 10 Q. That was the brief. Was the brief followed through?
 11 A. I think -- I don't know whether it was -- was it the
 12 Saturday or the Sunday we asked for key workers?
 13 Q. Well, it was declared on the Friday, 16 June.
 14 A. Right. Well, we probably had a meeting on the Saturday
 15 with all directors across London and we asked for them
 16 to give us names of social workers. Between that and
 17 then Sunday, in that room with some people, we then had
 18 to say what the key worker might be doing -- might be
 19 able to do.
 20 Again, in my view, this was just a very, very quick
 21 response. People did need to be spoken to by people,
 22 people did need help, but it could have been the housing
 23 worker who had already supported them. So we had
 24 a whole lot of people who were offering their support
 25 who came from outside -- I mean, it doesn't matter where

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1 they came from, but they were coming and we didn't have
 2 a load of structure in place, we didn't have a place
 3 where they could go, we didn't have someone to manage
 4 them, we didn't have — so it was beginning. So it was
 5 a process that took time.
 6 Q. It sounds as if the process at its initiation caused
 7 quite a few problems; is that fair?
 8 A. Well, it needed a lot of work.
 9 Q. Right.
 10 Now, there is some evidence we've heard from those
 11 who had key workers that some key workers were helpful
 12 and supportive whereas others were not. Was there
 13 a lack of clarity about the nature and scope of the
 14 key worker role?
 15 A. I think at first there was, because again, because there
 16 wasn't the management in place, there wasn't a place
 17 they could go, we hadn't got a whole lot of — over the
 18 days and the weeks that followed, there was a lot of
 19 information for them, lots, but some key workers — some
 20 social workers — some people just wanted to go and say
 21 hello to people, "Are you okay?" They didn't know they
 22 had to do all these other things. And some people
 23 didn't need them. But some people might have needed
 24 them, and those social workers who'd come from a totally
 25 different council hadn't been briefed properly by then.

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1 I think things like that were happening. It was all
 2 very, very quick. There may have been a different way
 3 of doing it.
 4 MR MILLETT: Right.
 5 Mr Chairman, is now a convenient moment? We're
 6 going to stick with social workers for a bit, but it's
 7 probably a convenient moment to take a pause.
 8 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: If that suits you, yes, we can have
 9 a break at that point.
 10 MR MILLETT: Yes.
 11 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Well, it sounds as though it's
 12 a good time to take the afternoon break, Ms Redmond, so
 13 we will break there. We'll return at 3.30, please, and
 14 again, please don't talk to anyone about your evidence
 15 while you're out of the room. All right? Thank you
 16 very much.
 17 (Pause)
 18 Thank you very much, Mr Millett. 3.30, then,
 19 please. Thank you.
 20 (3.13 pm)
 21 (A short break)
 22 (3.30 pm)
 23 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Good. All right, Ms Redmond?
 24 THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you.
 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you.

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1 Yes, Mr Millett.
 2 MR MILLETT: Yes, thank you, Mr Chairman.
 3 Could we turn, please, to {CLG00005594}. This is
 4 an email from Steve Mulrooney, dated 19 June 2017, sent
 5 at 14.27. Now, you're not a recipient of it, but I just
 6 want to ask you something about it.
 7 Steve Mulrooney is in housing strategy at MHCLG, or
 8 was at the time.
 9 He says here:
 10 "Katy
 11 "As of 14.00 [that's on 19 June], 65 keyworkers have
 12 been allocated.
 13 "A further 25–30 (TBC) social workers are currently
 14 at a briefing on the key worker roll for the incident.
 15 This means they are approaching the key figure of 96 key
 16 workers for cat 1s."
 17 Could you just help, what were cat 1s, or the key
 18 figure of 96 key workers for cat 1s?
 19 A. I don't know.
 20 Q. You don't know, you can't help with that.
 21 Was it the case that on Monday, 19 June 2017 there
 22 were cat 1 families that had not been allocated
 23 a key worker?
 24 A. I see. It was — I think it was a categorisation of
 25 people, whether they'd been bereaved, survived or —

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1 I think that's what categories were.
 2 I don't know these figures. He must have got these
 3 figures from the centre I was working in. I don't know
 4 whether — I don't recognise the figures, but I do know
 5 that this was the day after we'd asked, or we'd asked
 6 for people, and not everyone had a key worker straight
 7 away.
 8 Q. Now, if you look on further, it says, third paragraph
 9 down:
 10 "Key worker allocation is waiting for and bound by
 11 process of the Family Liaison Officers (FLOs) being
 12 allocated to families. Once FLOs allocated they are
 13 referring through to the key worker coordinator, who is
 14 then allocating key workers."
 15 Did the process where a family liaison officer had
 16 to be allocated for those residents who were bereaved
 17 place an additional delay in the allocation of
 18 a key worker?
 19 A. Well, it possibly did, but it sounds like — these
 20 key workers were individual social workers from every
 21 other council, and I think when we say allocated,
 22 I think they were given a name of someone who was on the
 23 list and they were given their allocation, they were
 24 said, "This is the person you need to go and see, here's
 25 a bit of a briefing", and they might have gone. We

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1 didn't have -- I don't think there were family liaison
 2 officers for everybody, and I think the protocol was
 3 that those families that were bereaved needed a family
 4 liaison officer before they had a key worker.
 5 Q. Yes, exactly. So if you didn't have a pre-existing
 6 social worker, is it right that you couldn't get
 7 a key worker who was a social worker unless and until
 8 you had an FLO allocated to you?
 9 A. Yeah, from the police.
 10 Q. From the police, yes.
 11 A. Yeah.
 12 Q. Yes.
 13 Now, if you go to {RBK00022845}, this is an email to
 14 you on 21 June 2017, that's the Wednesday now, a week
 15 on, and it comes from Natasha Bishopp at the top of the
 16 email run, and she is in family services at RBKC, and
 17 this comes to you, and she says:
 18 "Hi Sue
 19 "To confirm 106 (Tower and walk) residents
 20 allocated.
 21 "Two thirds of these have been made contact with, we
 22 will confirm exact numbers on those who have actually
 23 been seen in person later today.
 24 "A further 10 people were identified as needing
 25 allocating via the Operation DWP/Post office Theresa May

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1 Monies -- these will be allocated today.
 2 "Those in neighbouring streets that were displaced
 3 at present number 23 and these are being allocated --
 4 further residents in this category being identified so
 5 exact this number to rise during the day will update you
 6 later today."
 7 Does it follow or can we take from this document
 8 that as of 21 June 2017, seven days after the fire, of
 9 106 residents of Grenfell Tower and the walkways,
 10 two-thirds had been contacted, but it appeared unknown
 11 how many of those were contacted face-to-face?
 12 A. Yes, because this was -- we had to get reports regularly
 13 every -- twice a day from the people who were
 14 co-ordinating the key workers, so that would have been
 15 her report.
 16 Q. Yes, I see.
 17 Do you know why the remaining third had still not
 18 been contacted?
 19 A. Yes, it's because -- I'll try and -- it might not have
 20 been the best process to say everyone will have
 21 a key worker within two days. It might not have been
 22 possible to do exactly what people thought would be
 23 happening. Originally it was just people in the tower,
 24 and then it was everyone who was affected, so the list
 25 got longer, and the key workers were coming from

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1 everywhere, and it was very hard to get many very
 2 quickly in there who could actually do something real.
 3 Q. Right. Was there a process whereby people wouldn't be
 4 allocated a key worker until everybody in the tower had
 5 one?
 6 A. I don't know whether that was the formal process, but we
 7 actually said people in the tower maybe -- they may have
 8 been the category 1 ones, I'm not quite sure.
 9 Q. Right.
 10 A. But I think that would make sense.
 11 Q. Right. And why did those who had been displaced in
 12 neighbouring areas but still needing support have to
 13 await the allocation of a key worker?
 14 A. Originally -- this might not have been the process
 15 anyone would have advocated to do this work, by the way,
 16 I just need to put that down. Originally, we actually
 17 went out to ask for X number of social workers to cover
 18 the families that were affected in the tower, that's
 19 what the -- was said. But then lots of people came
 20 forward who were affected, who had relatives, and so
 21 more and more people needed support, whether or not
 22 everyone, I mean, needed an allocation of a key worker
 23 or not, but then the numbers got bigger, and so we had
 24 to look at other social workers and we had to start
 25 saying who needed them first, and it was those people

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1 who were affected mostly first. There had to be some
 2 sort of categorisation in some ways --
 3 Q. Right.
 4 A. -- which came from the Gold.
 5 Q. Once key workers were allocated to families, can you
 6 tell us how long it took in general for face-to-face
 7 contact to take place with the relevant families or
 8 person?
 9 A. I forget in terms of the briefing because, of course,
 10 this is being done -- the briefings are being done on --
 11 very quickly, and protocols are being drawn up very
 12 quickly, and I think the process was: please get in
 13 touch with your person straight away by phone or
 14 face-to-face.
 15 In retrospect -- and some people didn't want to
 16 see -- they actually didn't want to see a key worker at
 17 that stage. Some people were seeing housing workers, so
 18 they didn't know what a key worker was. Some people
 19 weren't at the addresses that the key worker had. There
 20 were lots of operational reasons why some people might
 21 not have seen face-to-face in that day.
 22 Q. Let's go to {RBK00015243}. This is an email from
 23 Mona Hayat on Thursday, 22 June 2017, so we're outside
 24 the seven-day period after the fire, but it looks back,
 25 and the subject is, as you can see, the third entry

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1 down, "Suicidal Ideation Amongst Grenfell residents":
 2 "Dear Debbie, Tim & Natasha."
 3 That's Natasha Bishopp, and if you look down,
 4 please, at page 2 of this document {RBK00015243/2}, you
 5 can see that it follows on from an email the previous
 6 day, on 21 June, from Mona Hayat, the same title:
 7 "Dear Craig
 8 "A situation happened at the Westway site this
 9 afternoon; a patient was restrained until 999 service
 10 arrived.
 11 "Our Community Champions are reporting patients who
 12 are threatening to kill themselves and there are reports
 13 of suicide attempts. The disquiet is due to people
 14 calling the helplines or speaking to social workers who
 15 are arranging appointments for a weeks' time.
 16 "I completely appreciate the real stretch on
 17 services at the moment. However, it's apparent people
 18 need to be seen a lot sooner. I am aware that this is
 19 building within the local community and I think it would
 20 be helpful for us to support you by distributing comms
 21 amongst community leaders that provides some assurance
 22 that people will be given appointments as a matter of
 23 urgency."
 24 She signs herself off:
 25 "Mona Hayat

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1 "Director of Programmes
 2 "NHS West London Clinical Commissioning Group."
 3 Was this problem adverted to here by Mona Hayat
 4 something you were aware of at the time? And I say at
 5 the time; on or around 21 June 2017.
 6 A. I can't remember this example, but I do know not
 7 everyone was getting a key worker ringing them.
 8 Q. Right.
 9 Let's go then on to {RBK00016140}. This is an email
 10 from RBKC, Rachael Dalton, on 23 June 2017, to the BECC,
 11 copied to RBKC housing staff, regarding feedback from
 12 residents who had been placed at the Holiday Inn in
 13 Kensington, and in the fourth paragraph down on your
 14 screen she says this, and this is about Jennie, who had
 15 been co-ordinating the Holiday Inn Kensington forum.
 16 She says:
 17 "She has advised that residents have reported, and
 18 are angry, that they have yet to see anyone at all from
 19 the Council — despite my understanding that all Grenfell
 20 residents had been allocated an SW [social worker] and
 21 had completed suitability assessments — perhaps these
 22 are households from the cordoned area? She stated that
 23 because the staff that have been drafted in from
 24 elsewhere, the impression is that residents feel they
 25 have been abandoned by RBKC despite them being present

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1 since last Wednesday at the rest centres and making
 2 contact with clients etc.
 3 "It is our officer's observations that the majority
 4 of residents have been satisfied with the response and
 5 assistance of RBKC, but that a number of volunteers,
 6 about whom safeguarding concerns were raised this week,
 7 were present at the hotel and antagonising/escalating
 8 the feeling of residents, calling the media and calling
 9 lawyers etc."
 10 First, were you aware that residents felt abandoned
 11 by RBKC by virtue of the fact that they were having to
 12 deal with workers from outside the borough?
 13 A. I'm sure people might have done, yeah.
 14 Q. Was that a problem that was brought to your attention at
 15 the time?
 16 A. It might have been, but Theresa May had said everyone
 17 had to have a key worker, and there weren't enough key
 18 work — and that key worker had to be a social worker.
 19 My view was I don't think they needed to be a social
 20 worker, and they could have been anyone from RBKC who
 21 had empathy and could understand and talk to people.
 22 Had that happened or — Westminster or Hammersmith and
 23 Fulham, they would have had local people who would have
 24 seen them and they would have been co-ordinated better,
 25 that is my impression. This was because lots of people

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1 were coming from different places, they were just
 2 visiting from outside and they didn't know the area, and
 3 people didn't feel they were from RBKC, and they
 4 weren't.
 5 Q. Right.
 6 Looking at the officer's observations in the last
 7 paragraph that a number of volunteers had been attending
 8 the Holiday Inn in Kensington and antagonising or
 9 escalating the feeling of residents, et cetera, was that
 10 something you were aware of at the time or knew anything
 11 about?
 12 A. Yes, that had come through the group, the team I was in,
 13 in terms of safeguarding concerns about some people who
 14 were trying to ... trying to — yeah, not quite
 15 escalate, but they had different views of whether those
 16 residents should speak to a key worker at all, "Don't
 17 speak to them", some people were saying that. That was
 18 some of the reports we got.
 19 Q. Right. Where were those volunteers from? Were they
 20 from organisations or were they just people who —
 21 A. I think they were individuals.
 22 Q. Right, I see.
 23 Now, I want to ask you about walkway residents.
 24 Do you remember, what was London Local Authority
 25 Gold's process for allocating key workers to the

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1 families of the walkways, by which I mean the buildings
 2 within the Grenfell area but were not the tower?
 3 A. I can't remember it in detail, but I do know there were
 4 conversations. It might have been that that's when the
 5 numbers of people needing key workers increased.
 6 I can't remember in detail.
 7 Q. Were families from the walkways prioritised in the same
 8 way that Grenfell Tower residents were?
 9 A. I think originally in all these things there was
 10 a categorisation done of who people might have had to
 11 have key workers, and in the first instance it was those
 12 in the tower. It wasn't meaning they wouldn't — other
 13 people wouldn't get support or help, but in terms of the
 14 key worker specifically .
 15 Q. Yes, and when did that change so that everybody was
 16 treated equally, or did it?
 17 A. I can't even remember, (a) whether it did change, but
 18 I do know more people got — were allocated key workers,
 19 and I can't remember when.
 20 Q. Right.
 21 Then let's go back to {GOL00001742}. I say back;
 22 I think this is the first time we've seen this document.
 23 This is a minute, or a note, perhaps, of the HAC
 24 subgroup, community assistance centre and helpline
 25 subgroup, Andrew Meek, Beverley Tarka, and we know that

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1 it 's dated 19 June.
 2 If we go to page 2 {GOL00001742/2}, penultimate
 3 entry, we can see there that Beverley Tarka, who was
 4 Haringey I think, and Gold Command key worker subgroup
 5 leader, she suggests here to Andrew Meek that:
 6 "... she heads up core (tower) and Sue to look at
 7 the support for other locally affected."
 8 Were there separate workstreams for Grenfell Tower
 9 residents and the walkway residents?
 10 A. No, not separate workstreams, but in terms of
 11 humanitarian assistance, there are categories of people
 12 who might be affected. It's in the framework, I think.
 13 Q. Right.
 14 A. And those people who are survivors or bereaved or
 15 involved immediately, they are — there's
 16 a categorisation, then people who are affected because
 17 they were in — locally or they saw. There is
 18 a categorisation in terms of responses.
 19 Q. Did that categorisation lead to different provisions of
 20 support for Grenfell Tower residents and the walkway
 21 residents respectively?
 22 A. In relation to this, I can't remember what happened —
 23 I think this is why we had to get a lot more key
 24 workers, because there were a lot more people who needed
 25 support. They might not have all wanted key workers,

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1 but because there was a decree that everyone would have
 2 a key worker, everyone who was affected wanted one.
 3 Absolutely, if they wanted one, they should have had
 4 one. And I think that's why we had to get more
 5 key workers in. I can't remember the workstream from
 6 here.
 7 Q. Right.
 8 Let's see if we can pick this up earlier on in this
 9 note.
 10 If we go to the foot of page 1 {GOL00001742/1},
 11 please, you see there underneath the phrase "Identified
 12 5 strands", and then it says in the second bullet point:
 13 "For those different cohorts what's the level of
 14 support we are providing/offer to them."
 15 Is that a reference to different levels of support
 16 being given to different groups of people depending on
 17 whether they were in the tower or from the walkways?
 18 A. Yes, and I think this is absolutely part of a framework.
 19 Q. Right.
 20 A. A national framework that do that.
 21 Q. And if you look back at page 2 {GOL00001742/2} again,
 22 you can see, under the red reference to "Nick Pendry —
 23 Clinical Lead", it says:
 24 "Government Offer is only for people in the tower —
 25 96 families (86 from Grenfell Tower and 10 from

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1 Grenfell Walk)."
 2 What was that about, do you know?
 3 A. I think that's saying that that's all that maybe they
 4 meant at the time when people should have key workers.
 5 Q. Right. Was it the case that there was a lack of
 6 available key workers which left certain displaced
 7 residents without one?
 8 A. I'm sure that — we did have lots of key workers. I'm
 9 sure some people either didn't see them because they
 10 didn't do or they didn't do what they wanted. I don't
 11 know —
 12 Q. Who — sorry.
 13 A. I'm not quite sure how many didn't actually have one
 14 allocated in this cohort.
 15 Q. Right.
 16 Who was in charge of the allocation system?
 17 A. There was a group which Beverley and myself and a few
 18 people sat on in Westminster — I guess it was the HALO
 19 at the time, but we managed the group that were getting
 20 the allocations, the system together, and then we set
 21 up — I think it was — Natasha Bishopp's name was
 22 mentioned. She was the social worker leader who was
 23 then managing how they were operated and what happened
 24 to them. But Beverley and I and a few other people
 25 there were actually getting the names and some of the

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1 people were allocating them to people who needed them.
 2 Q. Were you liaising with housing, RBKC housing?
 3 A. Yes, we were. I definitely — we definitely felt,
 4 because some people already — in terms of allocating
 5 key workers to people who already had a housing person
 6 supporting them, there was a question: should we do
 7 that? They're already seeing housing people, they're
 8 providing support, they've got to know them. But we had
 9 to give them a key worker as well. That's what we were
 10 told.
 11 Q. Right, I see.
 12 During your time working on the response, first as
 13 HALO and then after the pan-London response was
 14 activated, did you have any experience of support being
 15 provided from central government?
 16 A. I don't think I did.
 17 Q. Right.
 18 Now, we've had the benefit of your comments and
 19 opinions on the London Gold activation and a number of
 20 specific elements of the response. I just want to ask
 21 you about the adequacy of that response and the
 22 feedback.
 23 If we go to {RBK00044673}, what I'm showing you is
 24 a document entitled "Adult Social Care, Staff De-Brief
 25 Sessions Feedback report". Now, this was produced by

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1 Geoff Sherlock on 14 July 2017.
 2 Did you see this document at the time?
 3 A. I think I did, because we asked someone to come in and
 4 talk to our — we wanted a debrief, so we got someone
 5 independent in to do it, in adult social care. It was
 6 just us doing it.
 7 Q. Right. Did you have any input into this document?
 8 A. No, it was just asking all the staff, I wasn't —
 9 I don't think I was asked. I don't think so. I can't
 10 remember.
 11 Q. Okay. Let's see if this prompts a recollection.
 12 Can we go to page 2 {RBK00044673/2}, please, and
 13 look at the second bullet point down on page 2,
 14 "Co-ordination". I'll show it to you. It says:
 15 "Co-ordination between Police, voluntary agencies
 16 etc. was said to be poor and the flow of information and
 17 understanding of each other's roles was felt to be
 18 fragmented.
 19 "One group described how they had been managing the
 20 Westway Centre when a group from a different Borough
 21 arrived and 'took over' making it clear that they were
 22 now 'in charge'.
 23 "A consistent comment was that the lack of
 24 co-ordination led to people having to repeat their
 25 information several times."

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1 Now, what I've read to you there, were these
 2 observations that you shared, that you agreed with?
 3 A. These were observations of the people on the ground and
 4 I understand what they mean by one — they were taken
 5 over, I understand what happened there, but they might
 6 not have been aware of what was happening there.
 7 Q. Right.
 8 A. And obviously the co-ordination wasn't good, we've
 9 discussed that most of the day.
 10 Q. Can we go to page 3 {RBK00044673/3}, then, and look at
 11 the third paragraph. That's "Emergency/Contingency
 12 Plans" there, next to the bullet point, and it says:
 13 "Emergency/Contingency Plans and the lack of them
 14 was raised by all groups spoken to. It was generally
 15 felt that there was no clear plan in place which led to
 16 much of the confusion and lack of co-ordination. This
 17 was particularly referred to as being the major issue in
 18 the initial stages. It was, however, the view that as
 19 time passed this improved and there now seemed to be
 20 more consistency."
 21 Was it the case that there were plans, but very
 22 limited knowledge of their existence among the staff who
 23 were meant to apply them, from what you observed?
 24 A. Yes. I subsequently know that some of the plans weren't
 25 complete, but yes, there were plans.

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1 Q. And immediately underneath that it says:
 2 "The Keyworker Role was the subject of a great deal
 3 of discussion and the lack of clarity of the purpose of
 4 the role was a major topic. People felt that the
 5 expectations placed on them were unrealistic in that
 6 they were expected to deal with everything and find
 7 a solution to every issue raised."
 8 Is that an observation with which you would agree?
 9 A. It is.
 10 MR MILLETT: Yes. Yes, thank you very much.
 11 Well, Ms Redmond, I should tell you I've come to the
 12 end of my prepared questions. I'm going to ask
 13 the Chairman to do what we normally do, which is to take
 14 a short pause at this stage to see whether there's
 15 anything I've overlooked or other questions that others
 16 would wish me to ask.
 17 So if we could take the normal break that we
 18 normally do now, that would be very helpful,
 19 Mr Chairman.
 20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, thank you, Mr Millett.
 21 Well, as you probably know, Ms Redmond, at this
 22 stage in the proceedings we have a short break to enable
 23 Mr Millett to check that he has not left anything out,
 24 and also to allow others who are following the
 25 proceedings from elsewhere to suggest questions that

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1 perhaps we ought to have asked you. So we'll stop now.
 2 Do you think ten minutes is long enough, Mr Millett?
 3 MR MILLETT: I'm just looking at my emails.
 4 Yes, I think so. I think ten minutes, and if I need
 5 longer, I can come and ask.
 6 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. I think we will say 4.05, and
 7 if it goes a bit longer, well, someone can tell you.
 8 THE WITNESS: Okay.
 9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Again, please don't talk to anyone
 10 about your evidence while you're out of the room.
 11 All right?
 12 THE WITNESS: Okay.
 13 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
 14 (Pause)
 15 Well, we'll say 4.05, Mr Millett. If you need
 16 longer, just ask the usher to come and tell us.
 17 MR MILLETT: Thank you.
 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
 19 (3.55 pm)
 20 (A short break)
 21 (4.05 pm)
 22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, Ms Redmond. Well, we'll see
 23 if there are any more questions for you. All right?
 24 Thank you.
 25 Yes, Mr Millett.

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1 MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman, just one or two.
 2 First, could you please be shown {GOL00001742}
 3 again, please. Now, we looked at this before. This is
 4 the note of an HAC subgroup, community assistance centre
 5 and helpline subgroup, and if you look at the five
 6 strands at the foot of page 1 and go over to the top of
 7 page 2 {GOL00001742/2}, you can see the third bullet
 8 point down refers to an equalities impact assessment,
 9 and it says:
 10 "Equalities impact assessment needs to be done on
 11 this but not desperately urgent."
 12 Do you recall whether an equalities impact
 13 assessment was ever done?
 14 A. I can't remember.
 15 Q. Right.
 16 Do you remember, from what you saw, whether those
 17 involved in the humanitarian side of the response to the
 18 Grenfell Tower fire were consciously aware, from what
 19 they said or what they did, so far as you could tell, of
 20 the obligations of RBKC under the public sector equality
 21 duty under the Equality Act?
 22 A. I'm finding that difficult to answer. I know that
 23 people expressed issues around interpreters and food and
 24 times of prayers and opportunities for people for that,
 25 so they were taking those things into account in some of

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1 the responses.
 2 Q. Yes, yes. Could I reformulate my question slightly more
 3 pointedly, perhaps: was there any discussion at the time
 4 about the discharge of that duty from what you saw?
 5 A. No.
 6 Q. No.
 7 Now, we talked about key workers and allocation.
 8 Where key workers were allocated to families with
 9 children, did those key workers have ready access to the
 10 CCS, the children's services?
 11 A. My recollection was in the main, RBKC children's
 12 services tried to be the key workers for those families
 13 with children. So most of them hopefully did have local
 14 RBKC social workers.
 15 Q. Right. Were you aware of any instances where
 16 key workers were allocated to families who did not have
 17 ready access to child support services?
 18 A. I'm not aware individually. There may have been.
 19 Q. Right.
 20 Now, finally, Ms Redmond, is there anything else
 21 that you would like to add to your evidence by way of
 22 observations or anything you would like to say in
 23 addition to what you have told us today?
 24 A. Well, I suppose the thing for me is just about lessons
 25 learned, and I know you've got hundreds of lessons that

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1 are learned, but in councils, one of the main things you
 2 hear, and I've been to lots of councils in senior
 3 levels, and it's always said children and adult services
 4 are the most important, because that's people, and
 5 people can need support and can die.
 6 After this experience, I just think the status and
 7 the awareness of the emergency planning system in
 8 councils is not as it should be, and it needs to be
 9 absolutely up there. They need to be inspected, they
 10 need to be a person who's really accountable at
 11 a senior -- a really senior -- and the corporate team
 12 have to get training that -- I've never experienced
 13 training that you need to do anything like this, and
 14 I think that needs to be changed totally. I think if
 15 you're always going to have the director of adult social
 16 care as a HALO, they need to be trained specifically in
 17 what that is, in the breadth of it, rather than just --
 18 and I would question why you need that person to do it.
 19 I think Gold should go in immediately. Whatever you
 20 mean by Gold, I think experts should go in immediately
 21 something happens and not sit there and wait, and
 22 support a council from the start.
 23 MR MILLETT: Thank you very much.
 24 Well, Ms Redmond, it only remains for me to thank
 25 you very much for coming here today to the Inquiry and

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1 assisting us with our investigations . We are extremely
 2 grateful to you.
 3 That's all I have for you, so thank you very much.
 4 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
 5 SIR MARTIN MOORE--BICK: Ms Redmond, it's right that I should
 6 add my thanks on behalf of all of us on the panel to you
 7 for coming along today to give your evidence. It's been
 8 very interesting to hear what you have to tell us and
 9 very helpful, so we're grateful to you for coming. And
 10 now you're free to go.
 11 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE--BICK: Thank you very much.
 13 (The witness withdrew)
 14 SIR MARTIN MOORE--BICK: Well, Mr Millett, that, I think,
 15 must be it for today.
 16 MR MILLETT: Yes.
 17 SIR MARTIN MOORE--BICK: But we have another witness
 18 tomorrow.
 19 MR MILLETT: We have another witness tomorrow,
 20 Laura Johnson, with whom I think you will be familiar,
 21 and Mr Keating is going to adduce her evidence.
 22 SIR MARTIN MOORE--BICK: Good. Thank you very much.
 23 Well, then, we'll break at that point and we'll
 24 resume at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, please.
 25 MR MILLETT: Thank you.

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1 SIR MARTIN MOORE--BICK: Thank you very much.
 2 (4.11 pm)
 3 (The hearing adjourned until 10 am
 4 on Wednesday, 4 May 2022)
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