

OPUS2

Grenfell Tower Inquiry

Day 299

July 5, 2022

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Tuesday, 5 July 2022

(10.00 am)

SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to today's hearing.

Today we're going to begin hearing presentations by lawyers acting on behalf of the families of those who died in the fire.

Yes, Mr Millett.

MR MILLETT: Good morning, Mr Chairman. Good morning, members of the panel.

I would now invite Mr Danny Friedman QC to come to the podium to make a presentation on behalf of the families of Eslah Elgwahry and Mariem Elgwahry from flat 196 on floor 22 of the tower.

May I repeat, for general purposes, the trigger warning that the statements and the materials that will be discussed and possibly displayed during this presentation may be distressing to some, and those in the room or watching may wish to consider whether to continue to do so or not.

Thank you very much.

SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you.

Yes, Mr Friedman.

Presentation relating to ESLAH ELGWAHRY and MARIEM ELGWAHRY by MR FRIEDMAN

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MR FRIEDMAN: Eslah Elgwahry was born on 1 December 1952 in Alexandria, Egypt. Eslah and her husband, Hanfy, moved into flat 196 of Grenfell Tower in 1983 as tenants of RBKC. The flat was on floor 22, as renumbered following the refurbishment.

Their son, Ahmed — who, sir, you will recall addressed you at the commemoration hearing on Tuesday, 29 May 2018 — had been born the year before his parents moved in. Mariem, Ahmed's sister, was born on 11 April 1990. The tower was her home for all of her 27 years of life. By the time of the fire, Eslah had lived in Grenfell Tower for 34 years. Ahmed grew up and lived in the tower for 20 years. By the time of the fire, he was living with his wife and young son.

To give context to who the deceased were and also how they responded to the events of the night, can I recall some of the core points that you have learnt about them through the commemoration and other hearings.

Eslah Elgwahry was a mother to Ahmed and Mariem, but also a significant figure to many of the younger people born and bred in Grenfell. You will recall, for instance, how fondly Mohammed Rasoul spoke of her during his Module 4 evidence.

Ahmed has chosen to respect a degree of privacy around his mother, to keep her memory special to the

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family, but he has asked that the panel, and indeed Mr Millett, take the opportunity to look privately at a photograph of Mrs Elgwahry, which I think you have had this morning. He has also publicly recalled at the commemoration her strength in raising her children after her husband's death; that it was thanks to what she taught them that they were such a close-knit family who always put each other first. He recalled the unconditional love she showed them and the many other hearts she touched.

As for Mariem Elgwahry, Ahmed spoke of his connection to his baby sister. When their father died of cancer in 1998, he was 16 and she was only 8. He was not just a big brother, but a father figure. Ahmed described a funny, beautiful, strong, confident, sporty, adventurous and ambitious young woman. Also a person who was caring and selfless, a wonderful aunt to his young son and inseparable from their mother. Indeed, while both of them looked after their mother in her ill — health, Mariem was her mother's primary carer, and remained so long after she could have moved out, but very much chose to stay.

Sir, you will recall Ahmed's agonising account of the long final call between him and his sister as he stood below, powerless to help her and his mother above.

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He told you that he believes Mariem, who was young and fit, could have made it out of the tower, but Mariem would never have left their mother, who could not have done so. You will also recall Ahmed's account of the calm and patience that Mariem mustered in a brave and selfless effort to protect her mother and him, putting her family first to the last.

May I say a few words about Eslah Elgwahry's physical health.

Eslah had a complex range of health challenges which resulted in difficulty walking and left her reliant on the lift to get to and from floor 22. Her mobility problems meant that she was unable to evacuate without assistance via the single stairs in the event of a need to do so. These physical matters would be confirmed after her death by anthropology findings, which identified multiple degenerative processes in major parts of her body and features consistent with severe osteoarthritis, as well as diabetes and degenerative ageing.

As early as 2015, Eslah ticked the box in the TMO tenancy information questionnaire to communicate that she had a physical disability. Eslah's completed questionnaire was shown to the panel in Module 3 during the examination of David Noble, and I give the reference

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1 only for the record: {IWS00001778/11}, and transcript
2 {Day119/47:17} to {Day119/48:13}.

3 As with others who provided such information, there
4 was no plan in place for Mrs Elgwahry as to how she
5 would evacuate in the event of a need to do so, such as
6 a personal emergency evacuation plan, nor were there any
7 communications or pre-existing arrangements in place
8 with the LFB to secure her assisted evacuation or
9 rescue.

10 I identify this absence of planning in respect of
11 Eslah Elgwahry, but the same generic situation is
12 relevant to other individual cases which I and my
13 colleagues will address you on in the coming days.

14 As with others, Eslah's vulnerability and the extent
15 of knowledge of it should be noted as a fact important
16 in its own right, but relevant to the recommendation
17 already made in the Phase 1 report and any further
18 recommendations that the Inquiry may consider in due
19 course.

20 As Mr Millett explained yesterday morning, during
21 these Module 8 presentations we will focus on core facts
22 relating to the individual deaths. Any submitted
23 criticism of other state and corporate core participants
24 arising out of those facts has already been the subject
25 of submissions in the closing statements of earlier

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1 modules or may be returned to in the final overarching
2 closing statements which are now planned for the autumn.
3 What you have invited us to ensure at this stage is that
4 the individual facts in relation to each person who died
5 are not lost; that what happened to them can be
6 considered in their own right, so that other findings
7 that the Inquiry may make in due course about causation
8 and responsibility are made with an understanding that
9 these individual lives were what was at stake.

10 May I turn, then, to the evening of the fire .

11 Eslah Elgwahry was last seen on CCTV footage at
12 3.21 pm on 13 June, entering the lift lobby to go up
13 into the building. Mariem was seen entering at
14 10.14 pm. She had been over at Ahmed's home, where they
15 had enjoyed an evening together. They had FaceTimed
16 their mother to make plans for the weekend, as they
17 always did.

18 The fire from the kitchen appliance in flat 16,
19 which started shortly before 1.00 am on floor 4, reached
20 the kitchen window of the Elgwahry home at flat 196 on
21 floor 22 at around 01.26 am.

22 Naomi Li and Lydia Liao, who lived in flat 195 on
23 floor 22, made calls to the control room of the LFB at
24 01.21 to tell them that they could smell smoke on their
25 floor. Then they saw Eslah and Mariem in the communal

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1 lobby. They said — that is Mariem and Eslah said —
2 that there was a fire in their kitchen. This was what
3 Mariem then reported to the control room in her 999 call
4 made shortly after 01.30.

5 This call is an important marker in the timeline of
6 the unfolding fire. It gave notice to the LFB of what
7 was occurring 18 floors above the flat of origin of the
8 fire. It also tells you that Mariem and her mother had
9 moved. On the call she can be heard to say that they
10 are in a neighbour's flat on floor 23, having gone
11 upstairs to the home of Flora Neda and
12 Mohamed Saber Neda, where they were joined by
13 Sakina Afrasehabi and Fatemeh Afrasiabi, the sisters who
14 had come from flat 151 on floor 18. In a further call
15 at 01.37, Mariem described how the kitchen of flat 196
16 had been absolutely fine and then suddenly flames just
17 blew in.

18 As the Phase 1 report recorded, before approximately
19 1.30, and at a time residents could safely still
20 evacuate via the stairs without endangering themselves,
21 many residents tragically went upstairs to the top
22 floor. This is an issue that BSRs might want to
23 understand as best as the available evidence allows.
24 Myself and colleagues will return to the known facts of
25 this upwards migration and the findings made in the

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1 Phase 1 report at various stages in the next days, and
2 in particular in the presentation for Debbie Lamprell
3 tomorrow morning.

4 For now, and for the purposes of this presentation,
5 based on the timing between Naomi Li and Lydia Liao
6 seeing them at about 01.26 and the call to the
7 control room at 01.30, it is clear that Eslah and Mariem
8 had moved from flat 196 on floor 22 to flat 205 on the
9 top floor.

10 Mariem told her brother and sister-in-law in phone
11 calls shortly after, timed at 01.49 and 01.56, that they
12 had tried to go downstairs, but they hadn't been able to
13 descend as the stairwell had been blocked by others
14 going upstairs. These residents were telling them to go
15 back up.

16 This is an experience corroborated by Naomi Li and
17 Lydia Liao, who also turned back from an attempt to
18 descend the stairs due to the number of people coming
19 upstairs. Flora Neda also recalled asking Mariem why
20 they had come up, and her too saying that the stairwell
21 had been blocked with people all making their way up.

22 The source of the communication to go up is unclear.
23 There is evidence from Meron Mekonnen that a male voice
24 was heard to shout a command for residents to go back.
25 That may have been a firefighter, although Mariem did

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1 not mention that she was personally aware of who had
 2 shouted in that way.
 3 The upwards migration also occurred at a time when
 4 the attempted rescue of Joseph Daniels on floor 16 by
 5 firefighters was unfolding below, which would have led
 6 to a release of smoke into the staircase and may have
 7 given rise to a perception of danger below.
 8 Panel, you can return to some of the detail of what
 9 was happening on floor 14 and how it might have affected
 10 others in the building when you hear the presentations
 11 for Sheila and Joseph Daniels later in this module.
 12 While the full circumstances of the upwards
 13 migration will never be known, it is a fact that none of
 14 the firefighters present in the building at the time
 15 ever unequivocally shouted for residents in the
 16 staircase to get out when they had the chance to do so.
 17 Mariem and Eslah were therefore sheltering in the
 18 Neda family home in flat 205. To make sense of the
 19 various movements you will hear about in this and later
 20 presentations, I'm going to ask for an MPS floor plan
 21 diagram to be brought up.
 22 Before I do, can I just add in a trigger warning.
 23 It's, as I say, a diagram and a floor plan, but it does
 24 have the names of people who died and the various flats
 25 they were in when you look at it, and if anyone wants to

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1 not look at it, please bear that in mind.
 2 Can I therefore call up {MET00012529/25}, please.
 3 Now, if you look at 205, you will see it's the home
 4 of Mr and Mrs Neda, and you will also see, as I've
 5 indicated, that Eslah Elgwahry, Mariem Elgwahry,
 6 Sakina Afrasehabi and Fatemeh Afrasiabi have joined them
 7 in the home.
 8 I should add, because it's not clear, I can see,
 9 that of course Farhad Neda is "F Neda", and it should be
 10 Mr Farhad Neda. He is the son of the Nedas, and he is
 11 in the home as well.
 12 We can take that down, please.
 13 When Mariem spoke to the control room at 01.38, she
 14 indicated that there were seven residents in the flat in
 15 conditions at that time free of smoke. Mariem was told
 16 that fire services were on the scene and was assured
 17 that they would be informed that there were occupants on
 18 floor 23.
 19 The Neda family, as you will hear in a presentation
 20 this afternoon, comprised, as I've said, of Saber and
 21 Flora and the son, Farhad. You will also hear that
 22 Flora Neda, like Eslah, had a physical disability.
 23 Also sheltering were the Iranian sisters, Sakina and
 24 Fatemeh, and you will hear when I make the presentation
 25 following this one that Sakina Afrasehabi too had

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1 a physical disability affecting her mobility.
 2 Mariem called 999 again at 01.54 and repeated that
 3 there were seven adults stuck in flat 205, which was now
 4 full of smoke. She explained that the fire was starting
 5 to rise to flat 205. She thought it was going to come
 6 through the window in a second. She was told by the
 7 operator that the LFB were trying to send firefighters
 8 up to them.
 9 At this time, the control room was receiving
 10 a significant number of fire survival guidance calls
 11 from the top floors of the tower reporting the rapidly
 12 deteriorating conditions immediately affecting that part
 13 of the building.
 14 For these purposes, I want to focus on floor 23,
 15 although next week you will hear about multiple calls
 16 that were made from floor 22 at a similar time. Aside
 17 from Mariem Elgwahry's calling from flat 205, other
 18 control room calls just to mention at this juncture took
 19 place between 1.30 and just after 1.40, and included
 20 Jessica Urbano Ramirez and Biruk Haftom, now both in
 21 flat 201, and Hesham Rahman from flat 204.
 22 Debbie Lamprell then began a long call from flat 201 at
 23 01.41. All these calls described deteriorating
 24 conditions on the floor.
 25 Service requests were created to assist the

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1 residents on the top floor and passed to the fire
 2 ground. What we know of them is as follows:
 3 A service request reflecting fire survival guidance
 4 calls from floor 22 with smoke coming into the flat was
 5 relayed to the fire ground by 01.35.36. No flat number
 6 is mentioned, and that can be found in the radio log.
 7 Operations Manager Norman spoke to Watch Manager
 8 Meyrick at the fire ground at 01.35.24 to tell him that
 9 smoke was going into the top floor.
 10 A further service request was created at 01.40.37
 11 that read:
 12 "Seven people in Flat 205 on 23rd floor. Persons
 13 unable to leave property."
 14 That information would have come from
 15 Mariem Elgwahry.
 16 At 01.45.45 a service request referred to "11 people
 17 in bedroom of flat on 23rd floor". That request relates
 18 to the calls that were coming from the occupants in
 19 flat 201, which we will return to tomorrow.
 20 The first known handwritten FSG list at the fire
 21 ground, sometimes referred to in Phase 1 as the
 22 "Sadler list", was made between around 01.40 and 01.50,
 23 and it referred to flat 205 (the Elgwahrys, the Nedas
 24 and the Afrasiabis) and flat 204 (Hesham Rahman). That
 25 can be found at Phase 1 report volume 2, page 209 to

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1 210.
 2 Flats 205 and 204 would be written on the portable
 3 forward information board, or FIB, that was carried to
 4 the bridgehead before it moved from the 3rd to the
 5 2nd floor.
 6 At 01.57.34, a discrete radio transmission to
 7 Command Unit 8 referred to a caller in flat 205
 8 reporting that the fire was coming right up to their
 9 flat. That would again be prompted by Mariem and
 10 probably her 01.54 call.
 11 Messages had therefore been passed to the fire
 12 ground concerning the conditions on floor 23 across
 13 about 01.33 to 01.57. However, no deployments were made
 14 to the floor for the purposes of rescue until after
 15 02.08. The crew deployed at this time was diverted at
 16 floor 10 and did not reach floor 23.
 17 At 01.56, the Paddington crew in extended duration
 18 breathing apparatus, or EDDBA, were deployed to the roof
 19 of the building. This was for firefighting and not
 20 rescue purposes. On this you know that they
 21 fortuitously found and rescued Fadumo Ahmed, who had
 22 evacuated deteriorating conditions in flat 201. She was
 23 in a state of collapse somewhere between the 20th and
 24 the 21st floor. Members of this crew did not reach
 25 above floor 22.

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1 Other deployments were made to floor 23 at 02.24,
 2 02.51 and 03.03, but none reached the top floor.
 3 Can I turn briefly to the ability to escape and the
 4 absence of lifts capable for use for evacuation
 5 purposes.
 6 Professor Purser's evidence has highlighted the
 7 tragic potential for residents to escape via the stairs,
 8 including the top floor, throughout the night. He
 9 estimates that a person of generally good health could
 10 have escaped flat 205 and made it down the stairs
 11 without collapsing until around 02.33.
 12 However, for a resident with significant mobility
 13 issues such as Eslah Elgawhry, unassisted evacuation was
 14 not a realistic option. Walking down 23 floors even
 15 with her daughter's assistance would have been very
 16 difficult, if not impossible, in normal times. It is
 17 a fact that residents with mobility impairment and
 18 family who were not prepared to leave them were trapped.
 19 On this, we draw attention to the Grenfell lifts
 20 which Phase 1 established were not firefighting lifts,
 21 and even in the early stages of the fire could not be
 22 brought under control by the LFB in order that they
 23 could be used for the purposes of assisted evacuation.
 24 The Inquiry will in due course determine submissions
 25 made in other modules about the causes of those various

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1 important issues relating to the lifts.
 2 In the period between 2.00 and 2.30, the sheltering
 3 occupants in flat 205 spoke to family and friends
 4 outside, who in turn relayed their predicament to the
 5 fire ground.
 6 At around 2 o'clock, Lucy Ho, a close friend of
 7 Mariem, called her. She tried to persuade Mariem to
 8 leave the flat, though she knew her friend would never
 9 leave her mother. Mariem told Lucy that the emergency
 10 services knew where they were and that she believed they
 11 would come for them. Lucy Ho spoke to a police officer
 12 to make sure that the LFB were indeed aware of the
 13 presence of the occupants in flat 205.
 14 Shortly again after 2 o'clock, Farhad Neda spoke to
 15 a firefighter via the phone of a friend outside the
 16 tower. He passed on that there were disabled people in
 17 the flat. The firefighter said they were aware of them
 18 and were on their way.
 19 At around this time, Fatemeh Afrasiabi spoke with
 20 her niece, Solmaz Sattar, who was outside the tower.
 21 Ms Sattar also told the police and fire officers at the
 22 fire ground about those in flat 205. The firefighter
 23 advised that the occupants should stay where they were
 24 and that they would be rescued.
 25 At around 2.13, Ahmed Elgawhry called Mariem again.

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1 While on the phone to her, a police officer took him to
 2 a command unit, where a firefighter gave his sister
 3 advice about lying low and breathing via the drain in
 4 the bathroom. The firefighter advised her to call 999.
 5 I read the words from Ahmed's Phase 1 statement, and
 6 I give the reference for the record: {IWS0000988/6},
 7 paragraph 18.
 8 "The fire fighter looked at me and he didn't have
 9 anything to say. He was speechless. He knew that he
 10 couldn't help my mum and sister anymore. He almost
 11 turned away and started ignoring me when I asked further
 12 questions. This was extremely difficult to comprehend
 13 especially when I knew my sister was still on the phone
 14 and felt that when I arrived I was going to help in some
 15 way when the fact of the matter is I couldn't. At this
 16 point I thought about returning into the Tower again to
 17 try and save them. I then remember the policeman's look
 18 at me also aware of the way the firefighter was behaving
 19 and understood there was nothing else that could be said
 20 he looked at me and escorted me out of the vehicle and
 21 we walked to Bomore Road next to the Kensington Leisure
 22 Centre."
 23 At 02.25, while Farhad Neda and his mother were
 24 still in the flat, Mariem dialled 999 and spoke to the
 25 control room again. This was CRO Howson. Mariem told

16

1 her that the seven occupants were now cornered in the
2 kitchen with flames at the kitchen window and the whole
3 flat was in blackness. They were running out of air,
4 and her mother was near to passing out.

5 Mariem also asked:

6 "Can you get a chopper or something, could you get
7 a helicopter or something to get us out?"

8 To which the control room operator responded:

9 "There is, there is one there, OK, all right, the
10 fire brigade are on their way now, they're making their
11 way [up]."

12 When Mariem said that the fire was in the living
13 room, she was offered the "decision" as to whether to
14 leave. Mariem replied that they had tried to leave but
15 it was black and they could not breathe.

16 As a consequence of this call, the control room
17 called Command Unit 8 at 02.28.27 to indicate that fire
18 was getting into flat 205 and it was "getting quite
19 desperate for the occupants". At some point between
20 02.25 and 02.35, Farhad and Flora Neda left flat 205.
21 In the next presentation, you will hear about the
22 details of their desperate bid for escape, including
23 that Mr Neda was unable to follow them.

24 Eslah and Mariem Elgawahy and Sakina and
25 Fatemeh Afrasiabi remained in flat 205.

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1 At 2.33, Mariem called Ahmed a final time, in a call
2 that would last for 1 hour and 53 minutes, stretching
3 back beyond the point in time that he heard his sister
4 and mother lose consciousness. Ahmed repeatedly tried
5 to encourage her to leave, but Mariem told him that she
6 could not get out, having tried to do so, and that the
7 landing was filled with thick black smoke. Ahmed
8 believes that, in fact, Mariem was just not prepared to
9 leave their mother.

10 Members of the panel, I have already recalled
11 Ahmed's moving account of his sister's courage and
12 selflessness during this call. Despite her own anguish,
13 and throughout her gradual deterioration and loss of
14 consciousness, Mariem persisted in letting him know that
15 she was still there.

16 When Mariem was no longer responsive and Ahmed
17 assumed that he had lost both his sister and mother, he
18 heard his mother's voice for the first and only time
19 that night, saying in Arabic that she was struggling for
20 breath. This was around 3.10 to 3.15 in the morning.

21 Approximately five to ten minutes later, he heard
22 the sound of the fire taking over the flat. He remained
23 on the phone long after, only ending the call at 4.27.

24 The subsequent archaeological investigation
25 established that Eslah and Mariem died in close

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1 proximity to one another in the kitchen area of
2 flat 205, where they are known to have sheltered, and
3 close by were the Afrasiabi sisters.

4 Professor Purser charts the spread of the fire,
5 which from around 2.45 came across the corner column on
6 the west side and across the living room and kitchen,
7 and that was the point when it last affected the flat.
8 A large internal compartment fire can be seen at
9 approximately 3.33, which must have been what Ahmed
10 heard. Professor Purser is clear that by this time the
11 occupants of flat 205 were unconscious and had likely
12 died from smoke due to exposure of toxic gases.

13 Sir, the primary medical cause of death for both
14 Eslah and Mariem is properly identified as inhalation of
15 fire fumes or something similar, as opposed to, with
16 respect, the less informative and general "the effects
17 of fire" as found in the early post-mortem reports by
18 forensic pathologists who did not yet have the benefit
19 of Professor Purser's specialist input. We make the
20 point by combining the pathology and toxicity evidence
21 together with the known facts in relation to fire
22 spread, and also what Ahmed Elgawahy heard on the call.

23 It is right to conclude by acknowledging Eslah and
24 Mariem Elgawahy's family, and especially Ahmed. Just as
25 Mariem made the critical call from the tower at 1.30 to

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1 make clear that this was a whole—building fire, so
2 Ahmed, in the terrible days after the fire, helped
3 himself and other bereaved to call out to the wider
4 world about what had occurred during the night and the
5 aftermath. The WhatsApp group of bereaved families that
6 Ahmed started continues to this day.

7 For his lawyers, Ahmed was able to describe to us
8 the details of the night with clarity and precision that
9 helped us first to really comprehend an event which for
10 those who were not there was otherwise incomprehensible.
11 He has since provided the same invaluable accounts to
12 the Inquiry and supported others to do the same. All
13 this he has done so that nothing relevant is lost, and
14 that every feature of the last part of Eslah and
15 Mariem's life and death is made to count.

16 Sir, that completes that presentation.

17 If I may, I'm going to ask for a 30-minute break, if
18 that is convenient.

19 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Yes. Well, thank you very much
20 indeed, Mr Friedman.

21 Yes, well, we'll rise now. There needs to be
22 an opportunity for you, but more importantly for the
23 families, to have a chance to digest that, and we shall
24 rise until — shall I say 11 o'clock? Would that be
25 convenient?

20

1 MR FRIEDMAN: Yes. Thank you.
 2 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Very good. Thank you very much.
 3 We shall rise until 11 o'clock. Thank you all.
 4 (10.35 am)
 5 (A short break)
 6 (11.00 am)
 7 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.
 8 MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman, members of the panel.
 9 I would invite Mr Friedman, please, to come back to the
 10 podium and now to make the presentations on behalf of
 11 Sakina Afrasehabi and Fatemeh Afrasiabi from flat 151 on
 12 floor 18.
 13 Again, I would repeat the trigger warning I gave
 14 earlier: these statements and materials that will be
 15 displayed or discussed during this presentation may be
 16 distressing to some, and they may wish to look away or
 17 to absent themselves from this room while it is in
 18 progress.
 19 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you very much.
 20 Yes, Mr Friedman.
 21 Presentation relating to SAKINA AFRASEHABI and
 22 FATEMEH AFRASIABI by MR FRIEDMAN
 23 MR FRIEDMAN: Sakina Afrasehabi and Fatemeh Afrasiabi died
 24 together in flat 205 on the top floor of Grenfell Tower.
 25 On the night of the fire, Fatemeh was visiting her

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1 sister, who lived in flat 151 on the 18th floor.
 2 Can I begin with the key details in relation to each
 3 of the women.
 4 Sakina Afrasehabi was born on 4 April 1952. She was
 5 65 years old at the time of her death. She was the
 6 tenant at flat 151.
 7 Fatemeh Afrasiabi was born on 15 November 1957. She
 8 was 59. She lived at an address in Edmonton.
 9 Both sisters were born in Abadan, Iran.
 10 Sir, you will recall the commemorations of the
 11 sisters' lives on 29 and 30 May 2018 from their
 12 families. All family members you heard from record how
 13 close the sisters were and how much they enjoyed each
 14 other's company. You saw poignant photos of them
 15 together in life as part of the presentation given by
 16 Nazanin Aghlani and the film played to you by
 17 Mohammad Samimi, Fatemeh's son, who is a filmmaker.
 18 Sakina's children — Sharokh, Shiva, Nazanin, Mona
 19 and Mohammed — remembered their mother's sense of
 20 humour, her great warmth, the unconditional love she
 21 gave her family, and the kindness and generosity she
 22 shared with family, friends and neighbours alike. You
 23 will recall the numerous references to her delicious
 24 cooking, and especially to her famous fish stew. Shiva
 25 told us that she had lost her anchor, her protector, and

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1 her only true friend.
 2 Fatemeh's family remembered her great love and
 3 dedication for her family, her joy and positivity, her
 4 artistic talent and creativity, and especially the dolls
 5 she made, which they still treasure. They also recalled
 6 Fatemeh's beautiful singing voice, and how she would
 7 sing as she sewed or did chores around the house.
 8 On this you heard from her children: Maryam,
 9 Masoumeh, Raheleh, Zahra and Mohammad.
 10 Shahnaz Afraseyabi, the aunt to the children, also came
 11 to the commemoration to pay tribute to the two sisters
 12 she had lost. Fatemeh's husband, Ghorban Ali Samimi,
 13 was unable to attend the commemoration hearing despite
 14 his urgent wish to do so.
 15 Can I turn to the issue of known vulnerability.
 16 Sakina Afrasehabi suffered from longstanding medical
 17 conditions, including diabetes, high blood pressure and
 18 arthritis. She found movement extremely difficult,
 19 especially on stairs, and, at the time of the fire,
 20 walked with the aid of a tri-walker walking frame.
 21 Prior to moving to Grenfell, between 1998 and 2016,
 22 Sakina was housed in an RBKC-owned 2nd-floor flat in
 23 Ladbroke Grove with her daughter, Nazanin, who was her
 24 recognised primary carer. The property had no lift, and
 25 Sakina had great difficulties accessing the property via

23

1 the 42 stairs to the front door, and also with the five
 2 steps inside the flat itself.
 3 From 2003, RBKC assessed that Sakina should be
 4 rehoused in a property with no more than six steps in
 5 total, or a property with a lift, on no higher than the
 6 4th floor. RBKC subsequently assessed in 2014 that she
 7 required a step-free property.
 8 Until 2016, Sakina and her daughter remained in the
 9 Ladbroke Grove flat. However, they had undergone
 10 a prolonged and for them stressful investigation of
 11 their entitlement to a two-bedroom flat, during which
 12 Sakina's health had deteriorated further. Sakina was
 13 also aware that, due to her history of bidding for
 14 properties under the applicable choice-based letting
 15 system, the rules meant that if she refused the 2016
 16 offered tenancy at Grenfell, she faced being suspended
 17 from bidding for further properties for a year. It was
 18 against this background that Sakina reluctantly, and
 19 with a sense of pressure, accepted the tenancy for
 20 flat 151, a one-bedroom flat on floor 18 of
 21 Grenfell Tower.
 22 As a matter of fact, the family were fearful about
 23 their mother moving to Grenfell Tower. As I noted in
 24 the previous presentation, as was the position in the
 25 case of all such disabled residents at Grenfell, there

24

1 was no plan in place as to how Sakina would evacuate in
 2 the event of a need to do so, such as a personal
 3 emergency evacuation plan, nor were there any
 4 communications or pre-existing arrangements in place
 5 with the LFB to secure her assisted evacuation or
 6 rescue.

7 Turning to the fire .

8 By way of immediate background, Fatemeh came to stay
 9 with her sister from 12 June 2017 with the purpose of
 10 helping Sakina prepare for a family dinner to be held
 11 the following night. On 13 June, Sakina and Fatemeh
 12 spent time with members of their family, who joined them
 13 for a large dinner at flat 151 that evening. That
 14 included Mona and Nazanin and their children, and their
 15 other sister , Shahnaz, and their niece, Solmaz.
 16 Solmaz Sattar has given statements to the Inquiry and
 17 the police that I will come back to. The other family
 18 members left before 10.00 pm, but Fatemeh stayed the
 19 night. Nazanin, at the commemoration hearing, recounted
 20 her mother coming to the lift to say goodbye, and
 21 kissing her son goodbye a second time before they left.

22 The terrifyingly quick spread of fire meant that the
 23 external flames reached floor 18 before 01.26 am. The
 24 kitchen window of flat 156, where Shahid and
 25 Sayeda Ahmed lived, exploded inwardly shortly before

25

1 01.27. This can be timestamped by the time of the
 2 999 call Mr Ahmed made. He threw down his mobile phone
 3 as he fled the flat , but the recording of the 999 call
 4 captures voices shouting "Fire" and banging on doors.
 5 Shahid and Sayeda Ahmed record "the lady with the
 6 walking frame" answering the door when they knocked.
 7 This would have been Sakina. They also saw Hamid Kani,
 8 whose presentation you will hear tomorrow. Shahid told
 9 Sakina to get out and remembers her coming out of her
 10 flat . Shahid and Sayeda Ahmed then left the building.

11 When Sakina and Fatemeh came out onto the staircase,
 12 it is likely that they saw others going up the stairs .
 13 Corinne Jones left her flat on floor 17 in order to exit
 14 the building at 01.30. On the stairwell , she saw
 15 a group of "maybe four people" that she described as
 16 "Muslim women, at least one wearing a hijab", standing
 17 on the mezzanine level behind her. The women were
 18 debating whether to go up or down the stairs because
 19 they did not know where the fire was. Sakina and
 20 Fatemeh did not wear a hijab, but this group of four may
 21 have included them. The fact is that while residents of
 22 higher floors such as Corinne Jones and her children
 23 safely descended the staircase at or around 01.30,
 24 Sakina and Fatemeh were among a number of people that
 25 ascended the staircase.

26

1 Can I deal with the known evidence relating to
 2 flat 205 as to why that may have happened.

3 The Phase 1 report at paragraph 10.284 records
 4 Farhad Neda's evidence. He estimated that at least
 5 ten people had come up the stairs, the first four of
 6 whom came into his home. These were Mariem Elgwhary and
 7 her mother, Eslah, and the sisters Sakina Afrasehabi and
 8 Fatemeh Afrasiabi. Mariem told Farhad Neda that the
 9 fire had already reached her flat . Mariem did not say
 10 who had told them to go upstairs, but Farhad did recall
 11 that one of the sisters said that they had been told
 12 that helicopters would rescue them from the roof.

13 Sharokh Aghlani is Sakina's eldest son. While
 14 Sharokh was en route to Grenfell Tower, having been told
 15 by family about the fire , he managed to speak to his
 16 aunt, Fatemeh, on the phone. She told her nephew that
 17 she and Sakina had been told to go up to floor 23, but
 18 did not say by whom. When Fatemeh then spoke to her
 19 niece, Solmaz, she said that residents had told them not
 20 to go down because there was a fire lower in the
 21 building. This is similar to what Mariem Elgwhary told
 22 her brother and sister—in-law in phone calls shortly
 23 after . They had started to go down, but residents
 24 coming up had told them to go back.

25 There is no single reason why people came up. As

27

1 I have touched on in the previous presentation, there is
 2 some evidence from Meron Mekonnen that a male voice was
 3 heard to shout a command for residents to go back. This
 4 may have been a firefighter and, if so, the shout to go
 5 back could have been understood as a command to go up.
 6 The upwards migration also occurred at the time when the
 7 attempted rescue of Joseph Daniels on floor 16 by
 8 firefighters was unfolding, which would have led to
 9 a release of smoke into the staircase and may have given
 10 rise to a perception of danger below.

11 We are going to return to the topic when we present
 12 the known facts in relation to Debbie Lamprell tomorrow
 13 morning. For present purposes, we can say that, again,
 14 while the full circumstances of the upwards migration
 15 will never be known, it is a fact that none of the
 16 firefighters present in the stairwell at the time ever
 17 unequivocally shouted for residents in the staircase to
 18 get out when they had the chance to do so.

19 The sisters therefore sought shelter in flat 205 on
 20 floor 23, the home of the Neda family. We do not know
 21 why they ended up in that flat, but these were two
 22 families who spoke the common language of Farsi, and
 23 they would have been partly familiar faces. You just
 24 heard that they joined Eslah and Mariem Elgwhary, who
 25 came up the stairs effectively in front of them.

28

1 As to timing, Mariem made her two early 999 calls
 2 from flat 205 shortly after arriving there at 01.30 and
 3 01.37. At 01.38, she got put through to the LFB and
 4 indicated that there were seven residents in the flat in
 5 conditions free of smoke. So that is three from the
 6 Neda family, two from the Elgwahry family, and
 7 Sakina and Fatemeh Afrasiabi. Mariem was told that fire
 8 services were on the scene and that the fire services
 9 would be told that the families were on floor 23.

10 When Mariem called 999 at 01.54, she repeated that
 11 there were seven adults stuck in flat 205, which was now
 12 full of smoke. She explained that the fire was starting
 13 to rise to flat 205, and she said it was going to come
 14 through the window in a second. She was told that they
 15 were trying to send firefighters up to them. The
 16 residents were not told to evacuate.

17 Members of the panel, as you know and will hear
 18 again from other presentations, at this time the
 19 control room was receiving a significant number of fire
 20 survival calls from the top floor reporting rapidly
 21 deteriorating conditions, and service requests were
 22 created to assist the residents on the top floor and
 23 passed to the fire ground. In the coming days, you will
 24 hear of similar calls and service requests from other
 25 floors.

1 At that time, Sakina's son, Sharokh Aghlani, and the
 2 niece, Solmaz Sattar, who had now both arrived at
 3 Grenfell Tower, continued to make calls to Sakina and
 4 Fatemeh, and also relayed the location and number of
 5 people in flat 205 to firefighters and police officers
 6 at the scene. They were told to inform the occupants to
 7 stay put and that firefighters would come to their
 8 rescue.

9 As you have heard, no deployments were made to the
 10 floor for the purposes of rescue until after 2.08. The
 11 crew deployed at this time was diverted at floor 10 and
 12 did not reach floor 23. Also, at 01.56, the Paddington
 13 crew were deployed to the roof for firefighting and not
 14 rescue purposes. They did not get there, but rescued
 15 one person, Fadumo Ahmed, somewhere between floors 20
 16 and 21. As we detail next week, one firefighter,
 17 Firefighter Roberts, got to the doorway of floor 22, but
 18 no higher. Other crews were deployed after 02.08 at
 19 02.24, 02.51 and 03.03, but none reached the top floor.

20 Professor Purser's evidence has highlighted the
 21 tragic potential for residents to escape via the stairs,
 22 including the top floor, until, in the case of floor 23,
 23 approximately 2.33 in the morning. However, for
 24 a resident with significant mobility issues such as
 25 Sakina Afrasehabi, unassisted evacuation was not

1 a realistic option. Once the conditions in the
 2 stairwell deteriorated, descending the 23 floors, even
 3 with her sister's assistance, within a timescale that
 4 would have averted collapse due to exposure to
 5 asphyxiant gases was impossible.

6 It is a fact that residents on the higher floors
 7 with mobility impairments, and family or friends who
 8 were not prepared to leave them, were trapped, and this
 9 is another one of those cases.

10 This in turn directs attention to the status of
 11 those Grenfell lifts. Again, this is the subject of
 12 submission on causation and responsibility, but it is
 13 a further fact that, over the preceding years and during
 14 two prior significant lift works, the Grenfell lifts had
 15 never been upgraded to the current technical standard of
 16 firefighting lifts and/or developed for use in emergency
 17 planning in such a way as to be capable of use for the
 18 purpose of evacuation of a mobility impaired person such
 19 as Sakina Afrasehabi.

20 In the period between 2.00 am and 2.30, the
 21 sheltering occupants in flat 205 spoke to family and
 22 friends outside who continued to relay their predicament
 23 to the authorities at the fire ground. I have mentioned
 24 the contact at 2 o'clock that Mariem Elgwahry had with
 25 her friend Lucy Ho. She told the police about them.

1 Shortly after 2.00 am, Farhad Neda spoke to
 2 a firefighter via the phone of his friend at the tower.
 3 He passed on that there were disabled people in the
 4 flat. The firefighter said they were aware of them and
 5 were on their way. Around this time, Fatemeh spoke
 6 again with Solmaz Sattar. Ms Sattar also relayed their
 7 situation to police and fire officers at the
 8 fire ground. The firefighter advised that the occupants
 9 should stay where they were and that they would be
 10 rescued.

11 At 02.25, Mariem Elgwahry dialled 999 and spoke to
 12 the control room again. She said that the seven
 13 occupants were now cornered in the kitchen, with flames
 14 at the kitchen window and the whole flat in blackness.
 15 They were running out of air and her mother was near to
 16 passing out. She also pleaded for assistance from
 17 a helicopter.

18 When she said that the fire was in the living room,
 19 she was offered the "decision" as to whether to leave.
 20 She said they had tried to leave but it was black and
 21 they could not breathe. This was also the call when she
 22 asked CRO Howson on a number of occasions whether
 23 a helicopter could come.

24 As a consequence of this 999 call, the control room
 25 called Command Unit 8 at 02.28.27 to indicate that the

1 fire was getting into flat 205 and "getting quite
2 desperate for the occupants".
3 At some point between 02.25 and 02.35, Farhad and
4 Flora Neda left the flat. Sharokh Aghlani continued to
5 speak to his mother and aunt on their mobile phones.
6 They remained in flat 205. He heard them both
7 struggling to breathe, and there came a point where he
8 heard his aunt Fatemeh say, "Forgive us", and sounds of
9 what he interpreted as her going into shock. The phone
10 subsequently went dead. 50 seconds before the line went
11 dead, he heard an explosion.
12 The final call between Mariem Elgwahry and
13 Ahmed Elgwahry assists with the timing. Ahmed heard his
14 sister and mother lose consciousness between around 3.10
15 and 3.15. Approximately five to ten minutes later, he
16 heard the sound of the fire taking over the flat.
17 The subsequent archaeological investigation
18 established that the sisters died in close proximity to
19 one another in that kitchen area of flat 205, where they
20 were known to have sheltered when Mariem Elgwahry made
21 her 02.25 call. Also close by were Eslah and
22 Mariem Elgwahry.
23 The anthropology evidence in relation to
24 Sakina Afrasehabi confirms what was known in life: that
25 she had suffered from degenerative bone and arthritic

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1 disease.
2 Professor Purser charts the spread of the fire,
3 which came around the building at 02.45, onto the west
4 side and across the living room and kitchen in its last
5 area of effect. A large internal compartment fire can
6 be seen from around 03.33, which coincides with the call
7 that Sharokh would have made.
8 Professor Purser is clear that, by that time, the
9 occupants of flat 205 were unconscious and had likely
10 died from asphyxia due to exposure to toxic gases. The
11 primary medical cause of death of both Sakina and
12 Fatemeh is therefore properly identified as inhalation
13 of fire fumes, or a similar formulation.
14 May I conclude by a few words about the families of
15 Sakina and Fatemeh, who died together in flat 205.
16 As Shiva, Sakina's daughter, put it, the one saving
17 grace is that her mother did not die alone, but with the
18 sister she loved.
19 Sir, you remarked at the commemoration on the moving
20 tributes paid by the families and what a privilege it
21 was for you to hear from them. We all got to know of
22 the passionate commitment that these people had to their
23 mothers.
24 Despite their immense suffering, the family have
25 since assisted the Inquiry with important evidence

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1 regarding the circumstances of Sakina and Fatemeh's
2 death. The family have also been tireless in
3 campaigning for fire safety reform, in particular
4 through their work resisting attempts to depart from
5 your urgent Phase 1 recommendation for personal
6 emergency evacuation plans for those that need them.
7 Sakina is one of the people who needed such a plan.
8 Throughout all of this, the family have shown
9 exceptional strength and dignity, and I would therefore
10 like to conclude by paying tribute to them. All their
11 efforts have been for the mothers they loved.
12 Sir, that completes the presentation.
13 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Thank you very much indeed,
14 Mr Friedman.
15 MR FRIEDMAN: May I ask that we now take a 15–minute break,
16 and Mr Khan QC will follow on with a presentation after
17 that.
18 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Yes, if that's convenient to
19 Mr Khan, then I'm very happy that we should do that.
20 In that case, we will rise at this point and resume
21 at 11.40. Yes? Thank you very much.
22 MR FRIEDMAN: Thank you.
23 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: 11.40, then, please.
24 (11.26 am)
25 (A short break)

35

1 (11.55 am)
2 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.
3 MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman. I would now invite
4 Mr Imran Khan QC to come to the podium, please, to make
5 the presentation on behalf of Mohamed Saber Neda from
6 flat 205 on floor 23.
7 Again, I should just say that the statements and the
8 materials that will be discussed or displayed during
9 this presentation may be distressing to some, and they
10 may wish to absent themselves from the room or look away
11 from the live stream as they wish.
12 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Thank you very much.
13 Mr Khan, yes, please.
14 Presentation relating to MOHAMED AMIED 'SABER' NEDA
15 by MR KHAN
16 MR KHAN: Good morning, sir. Good morning, panel members.
17 As we noted in the break, this is an incredibly
18 difficult and distressing time, and the image that was
19 just displayed was of Mohamed Amied Neda. It was of
20 Mohamed Neda. I hope that what I say today does justice
21 to the memory of Mr Neda, and gives some comfort to his
22 family, who are here today, Farhad and Shakila.
23 Mohamed Amied Neda was affectionately known as
24 Saber. Saber in Persian means patience. It is the same
25 in Urdu and in Arabic. And it described Mr Neda to

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1 a tee; he was the epitome of patience.
 2 He was born on 3 May 1960 in Afghanistan. He was
 3 a loving husband to Shakila, a father to his son,
 4 Farhad. He died aged 57 on 14 June 2017.
 5 He lived with his wife and his son in flat 205, as
 6 we know, on the 23rd floor, their tenancy of the flat
 7 commencing on 17 May 1999.
 8 You will recall, sir, as Mr Friedman Queen's Counsel
 9 mentioned, the commemorations, and you were present, and
 10 I would invite you to remind yourself of those
 11 submissions that were made when Shakila, Farhad and
 12 Saber's brother, Aref, provided a more detailed picture
 13 of Saber than I'm able to do today, and the loving
 14 relationship they had between them. I would invite the
 15 panel members to look at that material and read it with
 16 care. I'm sure you will.
 17 Saber met his wife, Shakila, in 1989, when they were
 18 28 and 26 respectively. At the time, he was
 19 a high-ranking officer in the Afghan army. They married
 20 in the wonderful city of Kabul in 1991, and were husband
 21 and wife for over 27 years. Shakila says it was
 22 "a marriage full of love".
 23 Unfortunately, Saber and his family had to flee
 24 Afghanistan in 1998 because of the risk they faced from
 25 the Taliban. He, Saber, was targeted as an army

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1 officer, and Shakila, who was a primary school teacher,
 2 was no longer able to work, as the Taliban had closed
 3 the school where she was employed. The family, like
 4 many, sought refuge in the UK, and came to London in
 5 March 1998, where they were able to claim asylum.
 6 Saber was a hardworking individual, and took
 7 whatever work he could find to support his family,
 8 including as a minicab driver. That experience led him
 9 to establish his own chauffeur business, where he
 10 continued to work for the last ten years of his life and
 11 which Farhad is continuing to this day.
 12 Farhad described him as the sort of person who would
 13 "never complain about work and would never take a day
 14 off for being sick". His family affectionately remember
 15 a man who took pride in his appearance, and was always
 16 impeccably turned out. He always wore a smart suit and
 17 a range of colourful ties, even when not at work. His
 18 hard work underpinned his dedication to his family.
 19 Farhad says that he grew up in a "safe home full of love
 20 and laughter".
 21 Turning to the events of the night in question.
 22 We know that at 00.54, Mr Kebede made the emergency
 23 call to report a fire in the kitchen of flat 16 on the
 24 4th floor. The spread of fire was sufficiently rapid
 25 that occupants on the higher floors were aware within

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1 minutes of its start, and by 01.26, the fire had reached
 2 the 23rd floor.
 3 Saber and his family had arrived home at 00.52, just
 4 moments before the outbreak of the fire. They had spent
 5 a wonderful evening with Shakila's sister and family in
 6 Heston, having gone there to break their fast, as, sir,
 7 you will recall that it was Ramadan at the time. When
 8 they arrived home, the lifts were working. All three
 9 went up to their flat in the lift. Both Farhad and
 10 Shakila recalled hearing loud noises from the
 11 extractor/ventilator fan immediately upon exiting the
 12 lift on the floor. Shakila recalls telling her husband
 13 that they should report the noise to the TMO as it was
 14 so loud and they would not be able to sleep.
 15 Farhad in fact telephoned the TMO and was told that
 16 an engineer was on his way to fix it. He also recalls
 17 being told that the Fire Brigade were also coming.
 18 Whilst they waited, they noted that one of the lifts was
 19 now not working and had an out of order/out of service
 20 message, whereas both lifts had been working earlier
 21 when they arrived home. So Farhad called the out of
 22 hours service at 01.10 to report the noise from the
 23 extractor fan, and approximately ten minutes later his
 24 mother said she could smell something burning. Farhad
 25 described the burning as an electrical burning smell and

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1 Shakila described it as burning rubber. We understand
 2 that Saber was not aware of the smell as he could not
 3 smell particularly well following earlier surgery on his
 4 nose.
 5 Upon realising that there was a fire, they went onto
 6 their landing to investigate, and saw their neighbours
 7 from flat 206, Fathia Elsanosi and her daughter,
 8 Isra Ibrahim, on the landing in a very distressed state.
 9 They also saw a lot of people from the lower floors
 10 coming up the stairs in a state of panic, and telling
 11 them that there was a fire and they had been told to go
 12 up to the top floor. These people included
 13 Mariem Elgahry and her mother, Eslah Elgahry, and two
 14 sisters, Sakina and Fatemeh Afrasiabi. These four
 15 people came into the Nedas' flat seeking refuge from the
 16 fire. The others went into the adjoining flats on the
 17 23rd floor.
 18 Farhad said that the presence of people coming up
 19 and those who said there was a fire further below,
 20 together with the fact they had been told by the LFB to
 21 go up, influenced his family's decision to go back into
 22 their flat.
 23 We know round this time that there were multiple
 24 calls made from the occupants on the 23rd floor to their
 25 loved ones. Mariem Elgahry made several 999 calls from

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1 the Nedas' flat, and Mr Friedman QC referred to some of
2 these. I'll refer to four.

3 At 1.27.42, she made a call to the Fire Brigade, and
4 she told the controller that there were seven people in
5 the flat, flat 205. She told them she could not see
6 fire or smoke but that she had come up from the floor
7 below and that was fully on fire.

8 At 01.37.25, she made another call to the LFB, where
9 a controller advised her that the fire units were to be
10 notified.

11 At 01.54.10, she again called the LFB, on which
12 occasion she told them the flat was now full of smoke,
13 there were flames at the windows and there was no way
14 out.

15 At 02.24.34, she made a further call to the LFB to
16 say that they were trapped in the flat with the fire.
17 The controller apparently told her they should cover
18 their mouths with wet towels if they were going to
19 leave.

20 The Neda family also made and received several
21 telephone calls from family and friends outside the
22 tower asking what they were doing to try and get out.
23 Farhad Neda confirms in his account that he recalls
24 Mariem Elgawahy making calls to the emergency services.
25 He also states that neither he nor his father or mother

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1 made calls to the emergency services; however, he did
2 speak to friends outside the tower. On one occasion,
3 Farhad is very clear that he spoke to a firefighter, as
4 one of his friends outside the tower passed their phone
5 so he could speak to one of them directly. Farhad says
6 the firefighter's response was -- and I now quote from
7 what he says -- that they were making their way up --
8 that is firefighters -- and had reached a certain level,
9 but he did not know which, and they were on their way
10 up. The firefighter told Farhad, "He told me we should
11 stay in the flat, he told me to stay put".

12 Meanwhile, the Nedas looked out the kitchen window
13 and, in desperation, signalled with the lights and
14 screens on their phones to attract the attention of
15 emergency services on the ground.

16 But by 02.00 hours, the conditions in flat 205 were
17 rapidly deteriorating. The fire had entered the front
18 bedroom, situated at the front door. Saber instructed
19 everyone to stay away from the bedroom and for all of
20 them to gather in the kitchen.

21 Thick smoke filled the flat. They soaked towels and
22 filled water bottles. Quite horrifically, Shakila felt
23 that she had no option but to throw herself out of the
24 window, saying that she did not want to be burnt alive.
25 She believes this to be around 2.00 am. She says she

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1 was pulled back by Saber and Farhad, and it was at this
2 point they agreed they had no option but to try and
3 leave and make their way down.

4 Farhad took his mother and left the flat after
5 placing wet towels over their faces. Saber told his
6 wife and son that he would be right behind them as they
7 left. Saber stayed behind to offer assistance to the
8 Elgawahy and Afrasiabi families. This was, Chair,
9 members of the panel, the last time that Shakila and
10 Farhad saw their husband and father. They believed
11 Saber was behind them with the four women, and their
12 last sight of him alive was seeing him helping the women
13 with the wet towels.

14 Farhad and Shakila made their way out down the
15 stairs through thick, black, choking smoke, Farhad
16 carrying and dragging his mother out, believing Saber
17 was somewhere behind them. Shakila called out to Saber
18 when they reached the stairwell door, but he didn't
19 answer. She attempted to go back to him, but Farhad
20 told her they would not make it out of the tower if they
21 turned back.

22 We know that Saber spoke to his nephew, Lotfrahman
23 Habibrahman Abdulrahman, at 02.37, when Saber asked what
24 was going on and why nobody had come to help them. He
25 said that unless someone came to help them within the

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1 next minute then he and the others in the flat would be
2 dead, as the fire had reached inside the flat. This was
3 the last they heard from him.

4 We also know that upon returning home, Saber's
5 brother-in-law, Habibrahman Abdulrahman, found a voice
6 message on his phone from Saber, in which he said this:

7 "Goodbye, I am leaving this world, goodbye. I hope
8 you won't be in pain. Goodbye, everyone."

9 This was the last message he left before he died.
10 We're told that his voice was calm and he didn't show
11 any fear.

12 At this point, Chair, it's worth noting that,
13 amongst the very many serious health issues that Shakila
14 had endured and was enduring by the time of the fire, in
15 December 2009 she was formally diagnosed with
16 a condition called myasthenia gravis. This is a rare
17 condition that caused her to suffer with muscle
18 weakness. The condition most commonly affected her
19 muscles such that she got cramps in her limbs and
20 suffered with breathing difficulties. In 2017, her
21 mobility was seriously affected.

22 After the diagnosis, Shakila generally went out of
23 the house with Saber, and when she did so she didn't
24 need to use her walker or her wheelchair, because Saber
25 patiently, like his name, held on to her hand and walked

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1 slowly with her. On bad days she used a walking stick,
2 as she couldn't walk more than 50 to 100 metres. Her
3 condition was such that, following her diagnosis,
4 Shakila only used the lifts at the tower and could not
5 use the stairs on her own. If the lifts were not
6 working, she could not leave the house. If she arrived
7 home to find they were not working, either Saber or
8 Farhad helped her up the stairs to the 23rd floor.
9 Chair, this mammoth task, this mammoth effort, took
10 an hour or so.

11 This was the Shakila that left her flat on the night
12 of the fire, without her husband, who had until then
13 been her support, her carer, her love. She left with
14 her son, Farhad, and both had to undertake the task of
15 getting out of the tower. Because of her mobility
16 issues, Farhad had to carry his mother by clasping her
17 around the waist with one arm and around his shoulders,
18 so she could lean on him to carry her weight.

19 Farhad had told his mother that there were 12 steps
20 on each staircase and 24 steps for each floor. She has
21 said that she could feel something beneath her feet as
22 they were going down the stairs. When she asked Farhad
23 what it was, he told her not to worry, it's just the
24 fire hoses. The firefighters were still coming, coming
25 up. He told his mother to be careful and he hugged her

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1 close to him. He put his hand on her shoulder and told
2 her that he was with her. Farhad said to his mother,
3 "Just stay with me".

4 Shakila recalls that around the 18th floor she
5 stumbled and Farhad turned on the light of his mobile
6 telephone. He only kept it on for a few minutes because
7 he didn't want to drain the battery. The light wasn't
8 particularly helpful because it was pitch black smoke,
9 but what it did show, in shocking, graphic detail, was
10 the sight of people lying motionless on the stairs.
11 Farhad kept the light on for a few minutes so they could
12 see where they were placing their feet to avoid stepping
13 on people. Shakila says, perhaps thankfully, they
14 didn't see the faces or any identifying features of
15 those who were on the stairs. It was very difficult to
16 see through the thick black smoke. She did however say
17 this to her son, as it dawned on her that they were not
18 walking over hose pipes, they were walking over dead and
19 dying people.

20 At that point, Farhad had no choice now but to carry
21 his severely disabled mother down the stairs on his
22 back. She could no longer walk.

23 Shakila says this of their walk down the stairs that
24 night:

25 "I would never have had any chance at all of getting

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1 out of the tower if it were not for the incredible
2 strength and love of my son."

3 I move on, sir.

4 Whilst it is claimed that the Paddington crew of the
5 LFB had been deployed to the roof to tackle the fire
6 from that aspect, we know that no firefighter managed to
7 reach the 23rd floor, and despite the repeated advice of
8 the emergency services to multiple occupants on this
9 floor that firefighters were making their way to them,
10 no dedicated BA crew was deployed to the 23rd floor
11 until after 02.08, and none reached the floor.

12 CM Evans and FF Bloxham were briefed to go to
13 flat 205, and they tallied out at 02.24.24 and 02.24.33
14 respectively. But between floors 18 and 20, they claim
15 that they came across a male and female casualty who
16 were purportedly Shakila and Farhad Neda. Shakila
17 vehemently disputes this, and it is stated in her
18 Inquiry witness statement that they did not come across
19 any firefighters until much lower down the tower,
20 saying, "Maybe it was the 6th, 5th or 4th floor".

21 Detective Superintendent Paul Warnett has provided
22 an account in which he states that at 02.40 hours
23 approximately he was made aware that a male had been
24 seen to fall from the mid to upper floors, landing
25 within the children's play area to the west of the

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1 tower. With the assistance of a colleague and
2 firefighters, this individual was moved to a place of
3 safety, where paramedics could attend to him.
4 Detective Warnett recalled that the male they had
5 recovered clearly had serious injuries. He was moved to
6 the MPS tent outside the Kensington Leisure Centre where
7 a paramedic quickly confirmed there were no signs of
8 life. We now know, sir, that this was Saber.

9 Saber's life was pronounced extinct at 02.50. The
10 post-mortem report concludes that Saber died from
11 "multiple injuries consistent with fall from height".
12 A sample of his blood showed that it was oily and had
13 begun to separate. It showed a concentration of 20%
14 carboxyhaemoglobin. In addition, there were reported to
15 be slight soot deposits on his face, clothes and in his
16 nostrils. There were no burns.

17 In relation to the blood analysis and the events
18 prior to his death Professor Purser, in his evidence to
19 the Inquiry a few days ago, in fact -- I think it was on
20 29 June {Day296/123:12-20} -- said this:

21 "Mr Neda fell from the tower with 20%
22 [carboxyhaemoglobin] in his blood at the time he fell.
23 If he waited until that point and then decided to walk
24 down, following his son and his wife, there was a good
25 chance he would have not been able to walk all the way

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1 down, he would have collapsed on the way down, because
 2 he's preloaded 20. By the time he was halfway down the
 3 stair , he probably would have reached the point of
 4 collapse."

5 Farhad has said this about the last time he saw his
 6 father as he escaped with his mother {IWS00000886/13}:
 7 "It is the last time my eyes set eyes on my best
 8 friend in the world.
 9 "Dad was a hero ..."
 10 He was, Farhad. He was a hero.
 11 "Dad was a hero, to my mind. He could have come
 12 with us, at that moment. However, he did not leave those
 13 women who were distressed and needed help in our flat.
 14 He died trying to save their lives , he gave them hope
 15 and encouragement. He was calm and he did not panic.
 16 He certainly did not put himself first and just rush out
 17 with us. He was being composed and caring towards the
 18 four women who had looked to him for help. He knew full
 19 well, as did mum and I, and those ladies, that we were
 20 all in mortal danger. He knew full well that time was
 21 running out and his instinct must have been to go
 22 immediately, but being the sort of man he was he delayed
 23 for those moments whilst he helped others prepare for
 24 the thick and toxic smoke outside our flat.
 25 "For me and my mother it took a super human and

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1 enormous physical effort to survive. We were just lucky
 2 that part of the way down we found a pocket of better
 3 air that allowed me to push on.
 4 "No words can convey the sadness knowing that all
 5 five died in the fire . No words can convey the loss of
 6 my dear dad. However, I am extremely proud of him. He
 7 gave those ladies comfort and encouragement when all
 8 hope looked lost at the top of Grenfell Tower."
 9 The last word goes to Shakila, Saber's wife, who
 10 says this:
 11 "Our hopes and our dreams have been shattered. The
 12 chance to enjoy special moments as a close loving family
 13 has been taken away from us, and there is a heavy sense
 14 of loss within our hearts which will never go away.
 15 Saber had always been there for all of us. He never
 16 complained and he always did everything with a smile.
 17 He was my husband, and he was my best friend. I miss
 18 him so much."
 19 Chair, it 's often said in Farsi when somebody dies,
 20 "Ruheshan shad". Rest in peace.
 21 Thank you very much.
 22 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Well, thank you very much, Mr Khan.
 23 Well, at that point we're going to rise because the
 24 next presentation is due to be made at 2 o'clock, when
 25 the families of the deceased will be able to be here to

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1 hear it .
 2 So we stop now and we resume at 2 o'clock, please.
 3 Thank you very much.
 4 (12.20 pm)
 5 (The short adjournment)
 6 (2.00 pm)
 7 (Proceedings delayed)
 8 (2.10 pm)
 9 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.
 10 MR MILLETT: Yes, thank you, Mr Chairman.
 11 I would now invite Danny Friedman, please, to come
 12 back to the podium to present on behalf of
 13 Rania Ibrahim, Fethia Hassan, and Hania Hassan, from
 14 flat 203 on floor 23.
 15 Again, I would repeat the trigger warning: that
 16 statements and materials that will be discussed or
 17 displayed during this presentation may be distressing to
 18 some, and those who wish to absent themselves from this
 19 room or from watching the live stream should do so now.
 20 Thank you.
 21 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Yes, Mr Friedman.
 22 Presentation relating to RANIA IBRAHIM, FETHIA HASSAN and
 23 HANIA HASSAN by MR FRIEDMAN
 24 MR FRIEDMAN: Rania Ibrahim was born in Aswan in Egypt on
 25 3 March 1986. She was 31 years old when she died. She

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1 was married to Hassan Awadh Hassan. The couple moved
 2 into flat 203 in Grenfell Tower in 2016. They had two
 3 daughters, Fethia Hassan, born 5 October 2012, and
 4 Hania Hassan, born 4 June 2014, both of whom died with
 5 their mother in flat 203. They were 4 and 3 years old.
 6 On the night of the fire , Hassan Awadh Hassan was in
 7 Egypt attending to his brother, who was gravely ill . He
 8 returned to the UK on the following day, to discover
 9 that none of his family had survived.
 10 Sir, you will recall the commemoration hearings for
 11 Rania, Fethia and Hania were on three separate days,
 12 during which family members provided statements and
 13 films. As you heard, Rania came from a large and close
 14 family of which she was one of seven siblings. They are
 15 Sayeda, Hanan, Randa, Rasha, Rania, Mohammad and
 16 Mahmoud, as well as a half–brother, Mustafa.
 17 Rania came to London in 2009 to assist her sister,
 18 Sayeda Ibrahim, who was suffering from cancer. Rania
 19 met Hassan in 2010, and they married in 2011. In
 20 June 2015, after both of their children had been born,
 21 they obtained the tenancy to flat 203. Hassan spent
 22 several months renovating the flat before they moved in.
 23 He wanted his family to have a beautiful home.
 24 On 22 May 2018, sir, Rasha Ibrahim shared memories
 25 with you of her sister . She described her as

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1 a beautiful soul. No one could sit with Rania and not
2 smile.

3 On 23 May 2018, Sayeda Ibrahim showed a film
4 narrated by her daughter, Aiasha, testifying to Rania's
5 great kindness and commitment to justice. She spoke of
6 the support Rania provided to Sayeda and Sayeda's
7 children — her, Aiasha, Mustafa, Mawada and
8 Abdulrahman — during her illness.

9 On 29 May 2018, Hassan Awadh Hassan spoke of the
10 unbearable loss of his wife and children. The Inquiry
11 also heard from Munira Mahmud, who you know lived with
12 her family in flat 25 on floor 5 of Grenfell Tower, who
13 spoke to the loss of her very close friend. Munira is
14 the wife of Mohammed Rasoul, who gave evidence in
15 Module 4, when all of the panel heard from him.

16 These commemorative portraits highlighted that as
17 a wife, mother, sister and friend, Rania Ibrahim was
18 an exceptionally loving and generous person with a deep
19 Muslim faith, who put herself before others, caring for
20 those more in need than herself.

21 As to the children, Fethia was a confident child
22 with a strong and vibrant personality. Hania was
23 quieter, but showed a wisdom beyond her years. She
24 adored her sister, and always tried to be like her.
25 Both girls were raised by their parents to be lively and

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1 kind. The many surviving photographs show the children
2 to be full of joy.

3 May I turn to 13 June.

4 CCTV footage shows Hania Hassan entering the
5 lift lobby of Grenfell Tower at 5.27 in the company of
6 Munira Mahmud, Rania's close friend. She was looking
7 after Hania while Rania took Fethia swimming. As close
8 families, they were helping each other while Hassan had
9 to be in Egypt to care for his brother.

10 At 18.09, Rania and Fethia can be seen re-entering
11 the tower. They joined with Munira in flat 25 to feed
12 their children together. Rania then returned to her own
13 flat with her children. Munira last saw her friend at
14 21.30, when she went up to flat 203 to give Rania her
15 iftar meal to break the fast.

16 Analysis of the footage of external fire spread on
17 the flat 6 column shows that the fire reached floor 23
18 soon after 01.26. Indeed, its spread was sufficiently
19 rapid for its effects to be noticed by the occupants of
20 the top floor much earlier. Farhad Neda of flat 205, as
21 you heard this morning, called the TMO out-of-hours
22 engineer at 1.10 and referred to an "electric burning
23 smell".

24 Shortly after the call, with the smell getting
25 stronger, the Neda family went on to the landing and saw

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1 Fathia Ahmed Elsanousi and her daughter, Isra Ibrahim,
2 who had exited from flat 206 in a state of panic. Isra
3 started to run down the stairs, with her mother walking
4 after.

5 As you heard and will hear about further in other
6 presentations, soon after, at around 1.30, residents of
7 the lower floors came up to the top floor. With them
8 were Fathia Ahmed and Isra Ibrahim returning back up,
9 who then sought refuge in Rania's home.

10 To make sense of the various movements, I'm going to
11 again ask to bring up the MPS floor diagram. Before
12 I do, may I give a trigger warning. You will see plans
13 and names, but no images of people or fire. It is
14 {MET00012529/25}.

15 You can see at the bottom left-hand corner Rania's
16 flat 203, where she and Hania and Fethia were. This
17 also shows flat 206, at the top right-hand side, where
18 the Elsanousi family would come from, we presume because
19 their kitchen was soon compromised by fire.

20 If we can take that plan down, please.

21 At 01.38, Rania Ibrahim began to live stream events
22 in her flat in a Facebook recording that lasted until
23 01.44.33. As a piece of evidence, that recording is
24 extremely helpful in explaining conditions on the top
25 floor and who came into the flat. The video is also

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1 distressing to show, and I hope everyone will understand
2 we do not ask to show it now, especially as the Inquiry
3 has already described the important parts of the video
4 in its Phase 1 report, and generally been assisted by
5 Rania's own efforts in this regard in real time.

6 By 01.38, Isra Ibrahim and her mother, Fathia Ahmed,
7 had already come into the flat. Isra's brother,
8 Abufras Ibrahim, who was visiting that night, can also
9 be seen in the video.

10 Rania is captured opening the door to check whether
11 anyone in the corridor needs help. At 55 seconds into
12 the video, Rania opens the front door and calls out to
13 people to come to her apartment. At 1 minute 14 seconds
14 into the recording, Rania says she is going out of the
15 flat. She then appears to step into the lobby,
16 returning at 1 minute 32 seconds. She can be heard
17 calling out while in the lobby.

18 A man who has since been identified as Gary Maunders
19 by both his niece and his previous partner enters the
20 flat, obviously in need of sanctuary from the smoke.

21 At around 5 minutes and 21 seconds into the video,
22 Rania is heard to say words that, "The whole building is
23 burning and we're on the top floor". She then queries
24 how they could possibly get out in these circumstances.
25 Professor Purser's Phase 2 evidence has underscored

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1 how occupants of the flats on the top floor were
2 inhibited from escaping by the dense smoke in the actual
3 lobby of the floor that had accumulated as early as
4 01.29.

5 The available version of the video which translates
6 Rania Ibrahim's Arabic into English subtitles shows at
7 this point that she is making religious recitations for
8 what continues for the large part of the remaining
9 footage.

10 Members of the panel, as you have heard in other
11 presentations today, at this time the control room was
12 receiving a significant number of fire survival guidance
13 calls from the top-floor flats reporting rapidly
14 deteriorating conditions.

15 Can I mention three points about this.

16 First, there were calls between 01.30 and 01.41,
17 especially from Jessica Urbano Ramirez, Mariem Elgwahry,
18 Biruk Haftom, and the beginning of a long call by
19 Debbie Lamprell. Some of these calls will be dealt with
20 in further detail tomorrow. Cumulatively, they called
21 for the LFB to go to the top floor to assist, but that
22 could not occur.

23 Second, we know now that the highest deployment was
24 the Paddington crew after 01.56 for firefighting and not
25 rescue purposes. They saved Fadumo Ahmed, but only one

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1 of their number reached the exit door of floor 22. None
2 reached floor 23.

3 Third, other crews were deployed at 2.08, and then
4 at 2.24, 2.51 and 3.03, but none reached the highest
5 floor.

6 Relatives of Rania Ibrahim became aware that Rania
7 and her children were trapped in her flat due to the
8 fire. Rania's sister, Sayeda, received a FaceTime call
9 from Rania to say that there was a fire in the block and
10 that she didn't think she would be able to leave.

11 Just before 2.00 am, Sayeda's daughter, Aiasha,
12 called the emergency services to tell them that there
13 was a woman with two children stuck in flat 203 on
14 floor 23.

15 Rania did not speak English as a first language, and
16 it appears that she provided her mobile phone to her
17 neighbour, Isra Ibrahim, who spoke fluent English with
18 a London accent. Isra Ibrahim made repeated calls to
19 the LFB over the following 45 minutes. I'm going to
20 deal with those calls in this presentation and return to
21 them when we make a presentation for the Elsanousi
22 family on the last days of these hearings.

23 At 02.05.25, Isra Ibrahim told CRO Howson at the
24 control room that she was part of a group of five adults
25 and two children in flat 203. Isra Ibrahim expressly

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1 asked for "the status of the situation at the moment".
2 She was assured that the fire was on the 4th floor, but
3 it was creating a lot of smoke. She was expressly
4 advised that it was not safe to go outside because
5 there's a lot of smoke in the communal areas. She was
6 told to stay calm for the children, and that
7 firefighters would go to them as soon as possible.

8 Isra Ibrahim called the LFB back at 02.21.32, by
9 which time she told CRO Gotts that the next-door flat
10 was on fire. She pressed the operator as to whether
11 there was actually enough firefighters to rescue them
12 and was again told that firefighters were coming up.
13 When she asked whether the helicopters could assist, she
14 was told, "They are sending up a helicopter so that they
15 can see it from the air but, erm, I'll let them know".

16 Isra Ibrahim spoke to the control room for a final
17 time at 02.42.06. She told CRO Howson that smoke from
18 the fire next door was coming in. She emphasised that
19 they were five adults with two children under 5. When
20 Isra was told by the operator to call back if there were
21 any changes, she made it plain that a further call might
22 not be possible, effectively because they would be dead.
23 CRO Howson again assured Isra Ibrahim that the
24 firefighters were making their way up the building, but
25 would not be drawn on what floor the firefighters were

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1 on at the moment.

2 As the panel will be aware, this was a point in time
3 after the stay-put advice had been revised by those in
4 command in the control room, which occurred at around
5 02.35, albeit that there would have been a period of
6 time when this change was being communicated to the
7 individual operators. The chair will recall
8 SOM Joanne Smith walking around the control room to
9 inform each colleague of the change. The message had
10 not yet got through to CRO Howson at the time of this
11 call, because the occupants of flat 203 were told that,
12 "The safest place for you at the moment is in the flat
13 ... because you don't know what's going on outside".

14 A further call was made to the control room at
15 02.58.42 to say that, in the previous few minutes, they
16 had spoken to their neighbour, who was stuck in flat 203
17 with her two children, both under the age of 5. The LFB
18 operator on this call was again CRO Howson. The caller
19 told the operator that they had tried to get into the
20 building but had been stopped by the police.

21 For the first time, CRO Howson communicated that if
22 the resident was to phone back then, "We're advising
23 people ... now [that] they need to get out of the
24 building". The caller queried, "But how will they get
25 out of the building? No one's shown them the way". The

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1 operator emphasised that they needed to attempt to get
 2 out of the building, and she also said she would let the
 3 crews know that Rania was still in the flat .
 4 At around 3 o'clock, Rania spoke to Munira Mahmud.
 5 By this time it was dark, the flat was filled with
 6 smoke, and Rania was finding it difficult to breathe and
 7 coughing. The children could be heard in the background
 8 coughing quite a lot and asking for their father .
 9 Munira repeatedly tried to convince her friend to leave,
 10 telling her she would die if she stayed. However, Rania
 11 clearly remained under the impression that she was
 12 required to stay put and that someone was coming to
 13 rescue her based on what the control room had told her.
 14 She also referred to seeing a helicopter . This was the
 15 last time the friends spoke.
 16 Rania also spoke to her sister , Sayeda Ibrahim, at
 17 around 3 o'clock, and to her brother, Mohammad Ibrahim,
 18 after that. There was no further contact.
 19 When Munira Mahmud's friend, Samir, tried to call
 20 Rania's number at about 03.15, she did not answer.
 21 As you will hear further in the Elsanousi
 22 presentation later in these hearings, it is known from
 23 CCTV footage that Abufiras Ibrahim fell from the tower at
 24 3.50.
 25 The remains of Rania Ibrahim and her two daughters

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1 were found in close proximity and, indeed, commingled in
 2 the bathroom area of flat 203. They were also in close
 3 proximity to Fathia Ahmed and Isra Ibrahim. The adult
 4 women had made a cordon round the children. The remains
 5 of Gary Maunders were discovered in the adjacent
 6 separate toilet area.
 7 Professor Purser describes how there would have been
 8 relatively slow smoke infiltration into the flat over
 9 a long period between 1.30 until around 3.11 to 3.20,
 10 when there would have been increased smoke and toxic gas
 11 penetration from the external fire outside the bedrooms.
 12 Professor Purser explains how the toxicology sample
 13 from Abufiras Ibrahim, which showed a sub-incapacitating
 14 20% carboxyhaemoglobin level at the time he fell at
 15 3.50, is an important factor to estimate the time of
 16 death for other occupants. Charting the likely
 17 accumulation using this point of reference, he
 18 calculates a time of death for the adults who remained
 19 in the flat , sheltering in the bathroom and toilet area,
 20 at approximately 4.20. However, due to the more rapid
 21 uptake of gases by young children, he indicates that
 22 Hania and Fethia Hassan would have lost consciousness
 23 and died before their mother by approximately 3.55.
 24 Professor Purser's evidence therefore establishes
 25 that the medical cause of death can be given as the more

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1 specific and informative cause of inhalation of
 2 toxic fumes, rather than the generic conclusion of
 3 consistent with the effects of fire , as found in the
 4 current post-mortem reports.
 5 Panel, can I conclude that if you watch the Facebook
 6 video in your own time, you will see that Rania Ibrahim
 7 was a special woman, motivated by her faith, and she
 8 conducted herself in a powerful and impressive manner at
 9 a point when she increasingly knew that she and her
 10 daughters were going to die.
 11 It is right to conclude by paying tribute to Rania,
 12 Fethia and Hania's family and friends, including Rania's
 13 siblings , and most especially to Hassan, who lost
 14 everything that night.
 15 This husband and father has experienced an enormous
 16 trauma, but he is also a special person, who works in
 17 the Al Manaar Mosque and is known to a lot of people in
 18 the area. If you want to understand something about
 19 him, and indeed the other parts of this community, you
 20 can recall what Mohammed Rasoul said of him during the
 21 Module 4 evidence. It's transcript {Day265/149:11}:
 22 " ... Hassan was out of the country. He'd been
 23 looking after his brother for six months ... his brother
 24 had his legs amputated in Egypt because of extreme
 25 diabetes, and he was looking after him. He hadn't seen

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1 his kids, his wife and kids, for a long time. He
 2 arrived the next morning, and the first place I happened
 3 to make contact with him was the Al Manaar Mosque, and
 4 I just remember ... I was there trying to make sense of
 5 things, trying to find some peace in the mosque, and the
 6 moment I saw him and he came over to me ... And as soon
 7 as I saw him ... I got up, embraced him. I was trying
 8 to keep it together ... I'm the one who broke out
 9 crying. And he told me, he just — his words were,
 10 'Alhamdulillah, Alhamdulillah' ... 'All thanks and
 11 praise be to God, whatever we go through'. And I think
 12 just that kind of reflection of our Islamic tradition ,
 13 where whatever you go through in life, you deal with it ,
 14 you have your struggles, you apply the means outwardly,
 15 but inwardly ... we should strive for that inner peace,
 16 where we accept ... God's divine decree in things that
 17 happen. And for me, I was just — I was blown away just
 18 about how he reacted and how he kept it together. That
 19 was inspirational ."
 20 Panel, inwardly, Hassan and this community of family
 21 and friends strives for peace as part of their faith .
 22 But I know it is important to them for me to end the
 23 presentation by saying to you that through their faith ,
 24 they also strive for justice .
 25 That concludes the presentation.

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1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much indeed,
2 Mr Friedman.

3 Well, that concludes the last of the presentations
4 that we're going to hear today. So the Inquiry will
5 cease at that point, and we shall resume at 10 o'clock
6 tomorrow morning, when we shall hear presentations in
7 relation to others who lost their lives in the fire.

8 Thank you all very much. 10 o'clock tomorrow
9 morning, please. Thank you.

10 (2.35 pm)

11 (The hearing adjourned until 10 am
12 on Wednesday, 6 July 2022)

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