

OPUS2

GRENFELL TOWER INQUIRY RT

Day 301

July 7, 2022

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Thursday, 7 July 2022

(10.00 am)
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to today's hearing. Today we're going to hear presentations in relation to more of those who died in the fire.

Yes, Mr Millett.
MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, good morning. Members of the panel, good morning to you.

I would now invite Mr Danny Friedman QC to come back to the podium, please, to make a presentation on behalf of the family of Abdeslam Sebbar, who was a resident in flat 81 on floor 11 of Grenfell Tower.

I should just give a general trigger warning now: the statements and the materials that will be discussed or displayed during this module may be distressing to some and they may wish to consider whether to leave this room if they are here or to look away from the live stream if they are watching remotely.

Mr Friedman, thank you very much.
SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Friedman, when you're ready. Presentation relating to ABDESLAM SEBBAR by MR FRIEDMAN

MR FRIEDMAN: Abdeslam Sebbar was born in Larache, Morocco, on 11 September 1939. He became a British citizen after emigrating to the United Kingdom in 1967, and was

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a local coffee shop owner until his retirement, having also worked as a chef.

He had lived in Grenfell Tower since 1978, making him one of the longest standing residents of the tower. At the time of the fire, he lived alone in flat 81 on what became floor 11 after the refurbishment. He is survived, amongst other family, by his son, Mohamed Sebbar, and his grandson, Youness, both of whom came to Grenfell on the night of the fire to try to assist him.

It remains too traumatic for the family to speak publicly about Mr Sebbar. Sir, it is for this reason that the family did not address you in the public commemoration in 2018, and that there is no photo of Mr Sebbar on the screen today, although he has provided one for the panel and for Mr Millett Queen's Counsel to see.

I'm also asked by the family to tell you today a little of Mr Sebbar's longstanding commitment to the local community and public service: a lay visitor to local police stations and prisons; a branch leader of the GMB in Paddington Hospital; and, importantly, one of the founders of the Al Manaar Mosque, which the panel has heard played such an important role in serving the community in the aftermath of the fire. Al Manaar was

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where Mr Sebbar had been hours before his death.

The trauma of the night prevented Mohamed Sebbar, until as recently as May 2022, from working with his solicitor to complete a witness statement that fully explains the calls that he made with his father on the night. This is important evidence, and is now available to you to understand what happened, and we are grateful that this has been considered.

Can I turn to Abdeslam Sebbar's physical health at the time of the fire.

In June 2017, he was 77 years old and living alone in flat 81, as we've said. Over the preceding years, Mr Sebbar suffered worsening ill-health and was increasingly vulnerable. He had a diagnosis of high blood pressure and had significant mobility issues. Mr Sebbar identified his medical condition to the TMO on several occasions, including in 2015, when he objected to the repositioning of the boiler in his flat because of his difficulties in moving around. He described himself in correspondence as old and a sick person.

His medical condition and mobility impairment had also come to the attention of RBKC in the context of an application made for temporary accommodation in 2016. The council assessed him as requiring a ground floor flat or a flat with a lift due to his difficulties with

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the stairs. Yet, as with other residents with known vulnerabilities impacting their ability to evacuate, there was no plan in place as to how he would evacuate in the event of a need to do so, nor was there any communication or pre-arrangement in place to secure his assisted evacuation or rescue by the LFB. We therefore recognise this case as falling in a category of cases that the Chair's Phase 1 recommendation on personal emergency evacuation plans would apply to.

Mr Sebbar was last seen on CCTV in the lift lobby of Grenfell Tower at 00.23, waiting to go up into the building having come from evening prayers at Al Manaar. I'm not going to ask for the picture to be put on the screen, but if you look at it in your own time, panel, you will see an elderly gentleman in traditional clothing carrying a stick to assist his walking.

Youssef Khalloud, who lived in flat 85, recalls seeing his neighbour in the lift lobby at the time.

As the panel know, the kitchen appliance fire which started on the 4th floor spread on to the exterior and upwards of the building so quickly that it directly threatened the 11th floor from as early as 01.20.

Flat 86 on floor 11 was the home of the Jafari family. Mr Ali Yawar Jafari would die on floor 10 as a result of taking the lift, which stopped on that

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1 floor , exposing the occupants to the dangerous
2 conditions of the densely smoke-filled lobby. We will
3 return to his presentation next week.

4 Sir, you will recall in the Phase 1 hearing
5 Nadia Jafari's dramatic evidence of the flat 86 kitchen
6 window becoming engulfed in fire and collapsing inwards.
7 The flat 6 kitchen is located immediately adjacent to
8 and shares a common wall with the living room area of
9 flat 81. We will come back to how Nadia Jafari and her
10 father, Ali Yawar Jafari, left flat 86 and, up until
11 they entered the lift , the communal lobby on floor 11
12 was still almost entirely free of smoke. However, as
13 the Phase 1 report has already found at volume 3,
14 paragraph 22.31, the front door of flat 86 was not
15 self-closing and, therefore, remained partially open
16 when Nadia and her father fled what was now a kitchen on
17 fire .

18 Thick black smoke from the external and internal
19 fires affecting flat 86 flowed out of the front door and
20 filled the communal lobby within minutes. When
21 Branislav Lukic and Miran Lovsin came to make their
22 first attempt to evacuate from flat 84 on floor 11, they
23 found the lobby "entirely black" due to being engulfed
24 in thick, black, acrid smoke. Mr Lukic described the
25 situation as "terrifying". They pulled back into their

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1 flat .

2 Mr Sebbar made an emergency call at 01.25.36. In
3 the call, he referred to, "a fire at Grenfell Tower ...
4 91". As is clear from a later call with his son,
5 Mr Sebbar perceived the location of the fire to be in
6 the flat above. This was a flat from which his home had
7 been flooded previously, which had been a significant
8 event for him. The call could not have come from
9 flat 91 at the time; both of its residents had already
10 exited the flat .

11 During the call, the operator asked Mr Sebbar
12 whether there was smoke or fire in his home, but the
13 call cut off before he responded. The operator did not
14 call him back.

15 In a second 999 call, at 01.33.12, Mr Sebbar said
16 that the fire was now inside his flat . The call then
17 cut off in circumstances giving the impression of
18 Mr Sebbar having deliberately ended the call. The
19 transcript records the BT exchange operator informing
20 the 999 call handler that the caller had said he was on
21 floor 11. During this short call, the location of the
22 flat was not clarified .

23 Again, no one tried to call Mr Sebbar back.

24 This was around the point in time when flat 81
25 became exposed to the exterior fire by virtue of

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1 directly adjoining the kitchen window of flat 86, but as
2 Professor Purser explains, this was a transient exterior
3 flaming and likely only affected flat 81 for a short
4 period. According to his analysis, more extensive
5 external flaming occurred only much later at around
6 02.48.

7 On the night of the fire, Mohamed Sebbar,
8 Abdeslam Sebbar's son, was in his home in
9 South Kensington. At about 1.15, he received a call
10 from his sister telling him that Grenfell Tower was on
11 fire. He immediately drove to the tower with his son,
12 Youness.

13 On the way, at around 1.20 am -- so either before or
14 between the two initial 999 calls placed by Mr Sebbar
15 from the flat -- Mohamed received a first call from his
16 father on his mobile phone. Mohamed recalls that
17 Mr Sebbar told him that the tower was on fire and that
18 he was at home waiting for the Fire Brigade to help him
19 out. This was the first of three calls that Mohamed had
20 with his father that night.

21 Mohamed and his son, Youness, arrived at the tower
22 at approximately 1.45 am. They attempted to gain entry
23 to the building to assist their father, but they were
24 stopped from doing so and instructed that the
25 fire service would help him.

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1 A second call between Mohamed and his father began
2 shortly after they arrived at 1.45 and continued until
3 2.30 am. This call was on Mr Sebbar's landline. In the
4 period up to this time, flaming can be seen outside
5 flat 101, higher up the building, with debris falling
6 onto the outside of flat 81. It appears that also
7 around this time, smoke was increasingly entering
8 flat 81, which eventually caused Mr Sebbar to retreat
9 into the enclosed bathroom area.

10 The grandson, Youness, made a 999 call at 02.46.42.
11 The call was put through to Merseyside Fire Services via
12 the 999 overflow arrangements that first routed the
13 caller through Nottingham. Like other control rooms,
14 Merseyside did not know anything about the fire.
15 Youness had to be told that he was through to Liverpool,
16 and they spent time establishing how to spell
17 "Grenfell". Youness told the operator that Mr Sebbar
18 was in flat 81 on floor 11 or 14. He said his
19 grandfather was stuck in the toilet and needed
20 evacuating. The call ended with Youness saying that his
21 grandfather had "just stopped talking on the phone so
22 it's very critical that somebody gets there". By this,
23 Youness meant that they had been cut off and Mr Sebbar's
24 landline had stopped working.

25 After the call with Youness terminated, Merseyside

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1 Fire Services called the LFB control room to tell them
 2 of a grandfather stuck in the toilet in flat 81. They
 3 were informed by an emotional CRO Jones that, "They're
 4 not going to get to people". The LFB operator took
 5 Youness's mobile number to call him back in order to
 6 advise that Mr Sebbar should "get out and go for it".
 7 At 2.50, CRO Jones called Youness's number, which rang
 8 for 18 seconds. She ended the call and did not try
 9 again.

10 However, the advice to get out at this stage, even
 11 if actually given, was not a realistic possibility for
 12 Mr Sebbar. He would not have been able to independently
 13 evacuate via the stairs due to his mobility impairment.

14 Despite all the efforts of Mr Sebbar and his family
 15 to inform the LFB of his situation, the need to evacuate
 16 an occupant from flat 81 was never successfully
 17 registered with the FSG process at the fire ground.

18 We recall the various places and methods where the
 19 flat number might have been listed, but was not: in the
 20 LFB control room, there were no references to flat 81 in
 21 DAC Fenton's notes or on his whiteboard; there was no
 22 reference to flat 81 on the original forward information
 23 board or the walls on floor 3 or 2 of Grenfell Tower;
 24 neither was anything written on the ground floor wall
 25 filled in by Watch Manager Williams after 3.15 am; none

1 of the paperwork found in the command unit vehicles
 2 refers to this particular fact.

3 We have found two references to flat 81: first,
 4 a later version of the whiteboard in Command Unit 7
 5 identifies flat 81 on the left-hand side of the board as
 6 a priority, but the timing of the photograph is unclear;
 7 second, there are pieces of paper that Watch
 8 Manager O'Keeffe discovered in his clothing after the
 9 fire that refer to "Flat 81 [floor] 11" as of 4.05 am.
 10 In any event, there is no evidence of any BA crews ever
 11 being deployed to flat 81. Indeed, no BA teams were
 12 successfully deployed to floors 10 or 11 during much of
 13 the first two hours of the fire. This was despite
 14 multiple FSG calls also from Mr Sebbar's neighbour,
 15 Natasha Elcock, and her partner at flat 82, reporting
 16 that they and their child were stuck on floor 11. As
 17 the Chair has reported, a BA team did save
 18 Natasha Elcock and her family later in the night, but by
 19 that time it was too late for Abdeslam Sebbar.

20 Mohamed was able to call his father again for
 21 a final and third time after Youness's 02.46 999 call.
 22 This is the telephone contact that Mohamed has detailed
 23 in his further statement of 20 May 2022, made as part of
 24 preparing for this final stage of the Inquiry, and it is
 25 important to do justice to it. Its reference, for the

1 record, is {IWS00002375}.

2 At the time, Abdeslam was in the toilet and was
 3 struggling to breathe. Mohamed recalled his father
 4 coughing, choking and experiencing obvious respiratory
 5 problems. He told his son that he thought he was dying.
 6 Mohamed, still outside the building watching, listened,
 7 helpless and unable to do anything. At the end of that
 8 call, the line went dead, and when Mohamed tried to call
 9 back, the phone rang with no answer.

10 Mohamed is clear in his recollection that this call
 11 continued to around 3.30 am. After the call ended,
 12 Mohamed sat on a bench in a state of shock. At 3.50 am,
 13 his nephew rushed up to him saying that his father had
 14 been seen in hospital. Mohamed knew this was not
 15 correct because he had been speaking with his father
 16 minutes earlier. He recalls how he was short with his
 17 nephew and shouted, "My father is dead". Mohamed can
 18 time this interaction minutes after the call ended
 19 because he remembers looking at his watch and seeing
 20 3.30 am.

21 As Professor Purser explains in his report, there
 22 was extensive flaming around 02.48, but this was
 23 concentrated on the side of the exterior wall by flat 82
 24 and then subsided. Prior to and after 2.48, there is
 25 evidence of firefighters applying water to the east

1 elevation on floor 11. This is recorded in 999 calls at
 2 2.37 and 2.47 made by Natasha Elcock from flat 82, who
 3 could see the water in contact with the building.
 4 Dr Stoianov identifies the water jet being applied to
 5 the eastern elevation of the tower from around 2.45.

6 After 2.48, flaming on the exterior of flat 81 is
 7 intermittent until a large interior fire can be seen
 8 after around 3.45 am.

9 At 4.39, Youness called the LFB control room to make
 10 further enquiries about his grandfather. He was told to
 11 watch the news.

12 The archaeology analysis established that Mr Sebbar
 13 died in the protected area of the bathroom, where the
 14 telephone calls also confirm he had sought shelter. He
 15 went to the place in his home that would maximise his
 16 chance of survival for as long as possible.

17 It follows from Mohamed Sebbar's evidence regarding
 18 his final call with his father that the likely time of
 19 unconsciousness is around 3.30, somewhat later than the
 20 initial estimate in Professor Purser's report. The
 21 further witness statement of Mohamed Sebbar was not
 22 available when Professor Purser drafted his report.
 23 Having been taken through the evidence of flame spread
 24 and firefighting activities last Thursday in oral
 25 evidence, Professor Purser's opinion was that this was

1 consistent with Mr Sebbar losing consciousness at around
2 3.30, as recalled by Mohamed. He estimated that
3 Mr Sebbar would have died at around 3.50 to 4.00, or
4 perhaps even a few minutes later, and the reference for
5 that is {Day297/147:19–20}.

6 A post-mortem toxicology test revealed that
7 Mr Sebbar had accumulated an extremely high lethal
8 carboxyhaemoglobin level of 90%. This establishes that
9 the medical cause of Mr Sebbar's death is correctly
10 recorded as "1a inhalation of fire fumes", as found in
11 the final post-mortem report.

12 May I conclude by acknowledging the efforts of the
13 family on the night in doing absolutely everything they
14 possibly could to try to save their loved one. Mohamed
15 also stayed with his father on the phone during that
16 agonising final period in the flat. You have heard it
17 in other cases, but the son on the phone to his dying
18 father, watching the fire and smoke that would kill him,
19 with no power to do anything about it, is rightly
20 described as a torturing experience.

21 Right back in the opening statement for Phase 1 on
22 5 June 2018, I mentioned to the Chair Abdeslam Sebbar's
23 family as being private, but nevertheless very engaged
24 in the process, which they have been in both phases. It
25 is particularly important that Mohamed has found the

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1 strength to detail the final call. It provides clarity
2 as to how long his father kept himself alive and in
3 contact with the ones he loved. It also helps to
4 explain why this family feels such pain from losing him
5 in these awful circumstances.

6 May I conclude by paying tribute to them.

7 Sir, thank you.

8 May I ask for a 20-minute break?

9 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Thank you very much indeed,

10 Mr Friedman. Yes, of course. Shall we say 10.45?

11 Thank you.

12 We will rise now, then, and break until 10.45,
13 please. Thank you.

14 (10.23 am)

(A short break)

16 (10.45 am)

17 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.

18 MR MILLETT: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

19 I now invite Mr Danny Friedman QC back to the
20 podium, please, to make the presentation on behalf of
21 the family of Hesham Rahman from flat 204 on floor 23,
22 who was recovered from flat 204 on floor 23.

23 I should also, as before, give a general trigger
24 warning: the statements and the materials that you're
25 about to hear discussed or displayed may be distressing

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1 to some, and those who are here or watching the live
2 stream may wish to absent themselves or look away as the
3 case may be.

4 Mr Friedman, thank you very much.

5 SIR MARTIN MOORE–BICK: Thank you.

6 Yes, Mr Friedman, when you're ready.

7 Presentation relating to HESHAM RAHMAN by MR FRIEDMAN

8 MR FRIEDMAN: Hesham Rahman lived in flat 204 on the top
9 floor, which became floor 23 after the refurbishment.

10 Hesham was born on 30 January 1960 in Cairo, Egypt. He
11 was 57 years old at the time of his death.

12 Sir, you will recall that, at a commemoration
13 hearing on 22 May 2018, a video tribute to Hesham was
14 prepared by Noha El Baghdady and her young son that was
15 played at the hearing.

16 Hesham lost his mother at a young age and was
17 welcomed by his aunt, Shafika Ragab, into her family.

18 She treated him like her son and he called her his
19 mother. Shafika's daughter, Noha, and Hesham were
20 incredibly close. Noha thought of him as her big
21 brother. He was a loved and cherished member of the
22 family.

23 Mohamed Ragab, Shafika's brother, did not marry or
24 have children of his own, but he always treated Hesham
25 as his son, and Hesham, like other members of the

15

1 family, always referred to him as "uncle".

2 Also at the commemoration hearing, a moving and
3 powerful statement was delivered by Shafika's grandson,
4 Karim Mussilhy, who the Inquiry has also heard from in
5 Module 4. Karim described the important impact Hesham
6 had on his life as a father figure, who he too
7 affectionately called "uncle".

8 The various statements that have come to
9 the Inquiry, including from other family and friends,
10 make it so very clear that Hesham Rahman was loved. He
11 was someone of great kindness and who would always make
12 time for people. He was a talented hairdresser who
13 expressed himself through poetry and had a love of
14 music.

15 The devotion to him played out in the terrible days
16 after the fire, when so many of his family and friends
17 walked the streets and visited the hospitals trying
18 desperately to find him. Karim Mussilhy expressed in
19 his evidence to you that "our families are broken", but,
20 more specifically, Hesham's family would say that his
21 loss of someone so treasured has broken part of them.

22 At the commemoration hearing, a poem that Hesham
23 composed in February 2016 was read aloud. In it, he
24 said that he wished to be remembered in death not with
25 tears and sadness, but with a prayer and a smile. It

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1 was typically him, and so his family hold on to his
 2 memory still with a prayer and a smile.
 3 May I turn to Hesham's known vulnerability.
 4 Hesham had a longstanding diagnosis of diabetes and
 5 associated serious mobility problems which pre-dated his
 6 move to flat 204 of Grenfell Tower in 2012. His health
 7 and mobility further deteriorated in the years after he
 8 moved into flat 204. He began to use a stick, such that
 9 his impairment was plain to see for anyone who met him.
 10 He was reliant on the lifts, and when they were out of
 11 operation, he was unable to leave the flat. When
 12 required to descend stairs, he did so only very slowly
 13 and he would visibly shake.
 14 His vulnerabilities were known to RBKC and the TMO.
 15 On 19 December 2006, he completed an RBKC health and
 16 disability assessment form, identifying his diagnosis of
 17 diabetes and associated difficulties, including
 18 neuropathy, causing significant pain in his feet. He
 19 identified a risk of falling as a side effect of
 20 prescribed medication. He explained he could not manage
 21 even a single flight of stairs and requested a ground
 22 floor flat. He reiterated his mobility-related
 23 difficulties to RBKC on various subsequent occasions.
 24 On 29 January 2007, Hesham's GP responded to
 25 a request from RBKC for information. The GP confirmed

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1 Hesham Rahman's diagnosis and his associated mobility
 2 difficulties. From the records, it appears that an RBKC
 3 housing suitability recommendation was subsequently made
 4 for either an upper lower ground floor property with no
 5 more than six steps, or up to floor 4 with lift access.
 6 Hesham's allocation was to flat 204 on the
 7 23rd floor of Grenfell Tower. Hesham received a new
 8 tenant visit from the TMO on 9 October 2012 and,
 9 subsequently, an introductory tenant review visit on
 10 28 June 2013. The associated forms record that he
 11 disclosed his mobility problems.
 12 It is clear that Hesham was not able to use the
 13 single stairs to evacuate the tower in the event of
 14 a need to do so. His family have made that clear in the
 15 evidence they have given to the Inquiry, and Hesham
 16 himself referred to the fact of his disability several
 17 times during the calls that he made from Grenfell Tower
 18 on the night of the fire.
 19 As with others that we have already referred to,
 20 these were documented disabilities, and it has been
 21 accepted during the evidence before the Inquiry that
 22 there were no arrangements in place, such as a personal
 23 emergency evacuation plan, to assist Hesham to evacuate
 24 in the event of a need to do so, nor were there any
 25 prior arrangements to facilitate firefighters to rescue

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1 him.
 2 May I turn to the night of the fire.
 3 CCTV footage shows Hesham Rahman in the lift lobby
 4 of Grenfell Tower at 8.54 pm on 13 June waiting to go up
 5 into the building.
 6 Shortly after 1.00 am, Hesham was alerted to the
 7 fire by his close family friend, Anna Krivsov, who
 8 lived close by and had seen the fire. Anna told Hesham
 9 to get out, and recalls him agreeing and telling her
 10 that he would get dressed.
 11 A brief word on Anna. She had known Hesham for
 12 17 years, since she was 14, and he and her mother had
 13 been in a relationship. This explains why, as you will
 14 hear, she identified Hesham as her father during
 15 a number of 999 calls.
 16 Analysis of the footage of external fire spread on
 17 the flat 6 column shows that the fire reached floor 23
 18 as early as 1.26. As you have heard, the upwards spread
 19 was sufficiently rapid for its effects to be noticed by
 20 the occupants of the top floor much earlier.
 21 Farhad Neda of flat 205 called the TMO out-of-hours
 22 engineer at 1.10 and referred to an electric burning
 23 smell. You have heard that the Neda family went out
 24 into the landing in response to the smell getting
 25 stronger and saw Fathia Ahmed Elsanousi and her

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1 daughter, Isra Ibrahim, exit flat 206 in a state of
 2 panic, and then saw residents come up and congregate on
 3 the top floor from the lower floors. At about this
 4 time, Farhad Neda recalls seeing Hesham Rahman open his
 5 front door to the flat and then close it again.
 6 Members of the panel, as you have heard in other
 7 presentations, at this time the control room was
 8 receiving a significant number of fire survival guidance
 9 calls from the top floor reporting rapidly deteriorating
 10 conditions. This included the important calls regarding
 11 the conditions in flat 201. As you heard yesterday,
 12 Jessica Urbano Ramirez began her lengthy call with
 13 CRO Russell at 01.29.48; Biruk Haftom spoke to
 14 CRO Howson in the LFB control room at 01.32.10, during
 15 this call he said the window was already burning up;
 16 and, after initial attempts to get through and
 17 conversations with BT call operators, Debbie Lamprell
 18 began a 40-minute call with CRO Jabin of North West Fire
 19 Service at 1.41. All these calls relayed details about
 20 the development of smoke and fire affecting the
 21 23rd floor.
 22 It is against that context that Hesham made his
 23 first call at 01.39.15 from flat 204. Operations
 24 Manager Norman in the LFB control room took the call.
 25 He reported that a little smoke was coming into his

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1 home, which appeared to have set the smoke alarm off.
 2 OM Norman told him that the fire was on floor 4 and that
 3 the safest place for him was to stay in his flat .
 4 OM Norman called Hesham back at 01.46.02, mistakenly,
 5 having selected the wrong number from the screen.
 6 During this call , he told her that he now thought that
 7 the fire was next door. She told him again to stay
 8 where he was and reassured him that crews knew where he
 9 was and would be with him as soon as they could be.

10 It was after these calls that Hesham informed his
 11 family friend Anna that he had been told to stay in the
 12 flat by the Fire Brigade and, on that basis, he intended
 13 to do so.

14 We know that a number of service requests from the
 15 control room were created to assist the residents on the
 16 top floor and passed to the fire ground. Can I refer to
 17 what was said on Monday during the presentation of Eslah
 18 and Mariem Elgwahry.

19 For present purposes, may I remind you of the
 20 following:

21 A service request for floor 22 with smoke coming
 22 into that floor with an unspecified flat number was
 23 relayed to the fire ground at 01.35.

24 OM Norman spoke to Watch Manager Meyrick at the
 25 fire ground at 01.35.24 to tell him that smoke was going

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1 into the top floor . That was four minutes before she
 2 would speak on the phone to Hesham.

3 There were service requests relating to flats 205
 4 and 201 at 1.40 and 1.45.

5 The first known handwritten FSG list at the
 6 fire ground, sometimes referred to as the "Sadler list ",
 7 referred to flat 205, but also flat 204.

8 Flat 204 and 205 would be written on the portable
 9 forward information board that was carried to the
 10 bridgehead, but before it moved from the 3rd to the
 11 2nd floor.

12 Despite this awareness at the fire ground of
 13 conditions on floor 23, may I remind you that no
 14 deployments were made to the floor for the purposes of
 15 rescue until 2.08, and then 02.24, 02.51 and 03.03, but
 16 none were able to reach the floor . The crew that got
 17 the highest in the building was the Paddington crew that
 18 found and rescued Fadumo Ahmed at around the 21st floor,
 19 with only one of their number briefly reaching the lobby
 20 door on floor 22.

21 That is the context for what Karim Mussilhy told you
 22 in Module 4. In the days after the fire , he saw
 23 a London Fire Brigade T-shirt hung on some rails where
 24 people were leaving posters, cards and flowers. The
 25 T-shirt bore the caption, "To all those on the

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1 21st floor and above – we are sorry we couldn't get to
 2 you".

3 Anna Krivsoun recalls speaking to Hesham at around
 4 2.00 am. He told her that he had tried to leave his
 5 flat , but that the smoke was very thick and he couldn't
 6 see anything.

7 Professor Purser's Phase 2 evidence has underscored
 8 how occupants of flats on the top floor were inhibited
 9 from escaping by the dense smoke in the floor lobby from
 10 as early as 01.29. Rania Ibrahim's Facebook video shows
 11 you how dense the lobby smoke was from the period up to
 12 01.44.

13 There were further calls to and from flat 204.
 14 Hesham made an emergency call at 02.36.07. The smoke
 15 alarm was still sounding in his flat and CRO Russell had
 16 difficulty hearing him. He told her that smoke was
 17 coming into the flat , but not flames. He said he was
 18 having difficulty breathing. The operator replied that
 19 the fire was getting quite bad and asked him if it might
 20 be better for him to leave. He responded by saying he
 21 could not see anything outside the door. He also said
 22 that he had a disability and problems walking and so
 23 would need help on the stairs. CRO Russell confirmed
 24 that she would pass on the information. This was the
 25 first time that Hesham Rahman's vulnerability was

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1 identified to the control room. The information was
 2 given by him, not sought. Once Hesham informed them,
 3 the left-hand whiteboard in the control room was duly
 4 updated with the details to read, "1 disabled male".

5 CRO Russell thought that by the time she took this
 6 particular call , she had received the instruction from
 7 SOM Smith to change the stay-put advice. The Phase 1
 8 report concluded at 15.169 that she may have thought
 9 there was still a chance of firefighters reaching
 10 residents to rescue them.

11 At 02.36.12, a female caller who identified herself
 12 as Hesham's daughter, and was therefore Anna, spoke to
 13 CRO Gotts. She relayed that Hesham had told her that
 14 there was already a lot of smoke in the flat and that
 15 the fire was now travelling towards him. CRO Gotts told
 16 Anna that firemen were coming up to him. The caller
 17 asked if a helicopter could be used to rescue Hesham and
 18 CRO Gotts replied that the experts were dealing with it.

19 Shafika Ragab, who lived close to the tower, called
 20 Hesham at 02.59. She told him to leave. He said he had
 21 to wait. He told her that he had told the police , by
 22 which he must have meant the LFB control room, that he
 23 had problems with his feet and could not walk, and that
 24 they had told him that they were coming to get him.
 25 Shafika pleaded with her son to leave and he said he

24

1 would try his best.
 2 At 03.10.34, Hesham called 999 and spoke to
 3 CRO Russell again. He told her that there were no
 4 flames in the flat yet, but there was a lot of smoke
 5 coming into the flat, despite having blocked the front
 6 door. He was now lying on the living room floor with
 7 a wet cloth over his nose and the window shut.
 8 CRO Russell advised him to leave and told him that the
 9 firefighters were having trouble reaching everyone.
 10 Hesham repeated that he could not leave because he could
 11 not see due to the level of smoke and because he could
 12 not walk properly as he was disabled. CRO Russell then
 13 told him that she would tell the crews, promising him
 14 that the crews were coming for him as quickly as they
 15 could.
 16 Shafika Ragab spoke to Hesham again at 03.15. He
 17 told her that he was still waiting for the Fire Brigade
 18 to come and get him. He said the smoke had started to
 19 get to him, and he didn't know what to do. He sounded
 20 scared. This was the last time she spoke to him.
 21 A female caller, likely again Anna Krivsoun, spoke
 22 to CRO Adams at 03.16.12. When told to call him back
 23 and tell him that he needed to leave, Anna explained
 24 again that he could not leave because of his disability
 25 and emphasised he could hardly walk.

25

1 A number of telephone calls timed between 03.20 and
 2 4.01 cast light on the fatal conditions in flat 204 as
 3 the fire reached the exterior of the flat.
 4 Hesham made a final 999 call at 3.20. He spoke to
 5 CRO Adams in a call that lasted 2 minutes and
 6 38 seconds. He told her that the flat was now full of
 7 black smoke and that he could not see anything. During
 8 the call, he informed her that the fire was coming into
 9 his flat. CRO Adams told Hesham that he needed to make
 10 his way out, but he told her what he had told
 11 CRO Russell: that he could not see anything, and he
 12 could not walk properly because he was disabled. He
 13 confirmed that he was alone, with no one to assist him.
 14 CRO Adams said that she would give the information to
 15 the fire crews and that they would try to reach him.
 16 Anna Krivsoun spoke to Hesham at around 3.30. He
 17 told her that the corridor was full of smoke and that he
 18 was in the living room. Anna made 999 calls at 03.38
 19 and 4.01. The transcripts of the calls record Anna
 20 telling the control room what Hesham had told her. As
 21 at 3.38, Anna said that Hesham had not been able to
 22 leave the flat and was now struggling to breathe. She
 23 reiterated to CRO Gotts that the resident was disabled.
 24 Anna could time her final call with Hesham quite
 25 accurately to 3.43.

26

1 At 4.01, she then told CRO Russell that when she
 2 last spoke to him, he was still struggling to breathe.
 3 She tried to talk to him, but she was not sure he could
 4 hear her and didn't respond. The call to her friend
 5 then disconnected.

6 The archaeological investigations recovered Hesham's
 7 remains on the eastern side of the living room, close to
 8 the internal wall farthest from the windows in what
 9 would have been a partitioned area. Professor Purser
 10 explains how Hesham Rahman was able to limit his
 11 exposure by sheltering in the enclosed living room,
 12 lying on the floor and using a wet towel, but was
 13 subject to a long, slow increase in smoke and asphyxiant
 14 gases from around 1.29. There was then a more rapid
 15 increase after the exterior fire spread outside the flat
 16 bedroom at around 3.20. The conditions would have
 17 deteriorated rapidly at around 3.34, as the exterior
 18 fire spread outside the living room area.

19 Due to the asphyxiant gases he had already been
 20 exposed to and his somewhat protected location in the
 21 enclosed area at the rear of the living room, one of the
 22 last places to be affected by smoke and heat,
 23 Professor Purser concludes that it is likely that Hesham
 24 would have been unconscious or already dead before there
 25 was a large interior fire in the flat some time after

27

1 4.00 am. Professor Purser estimates Hesham's time of
 2 death as between 3.45 and 4.00 am.

3 It follows from Professor Purser's evidence that
 4 Hesham Rahman's medical cause of death is more
 5 informatively given as the more specific "inhalation of
 6 fire fumes" or similar wording, rather than the generic
 7 "consistent with the effects of fire" as recorded in the
 8 final post-mortem report. You can conclude that with
 9 the benefit of Professor Purser's analysis, but also the
 10 considerable detail provided from the calls and, in
 11 particular, Anna Krivsoun's contribution.

12 I said at the beginning how painfully missed
 13 Hesham Rahman is as a son, a brother, an uncle and
 14 a friend to so many people. This is an extended family,
 15 including those connected to it through marriage and
 16 friendship, that were critical to responding to the fire
 17 on the night, in the coming days, and still are to this
 18 date. They helped to fill the void of government when
 19 people in Lancaster West were left without it.
 20 Everything they have done, even when it has caused them
 21 pain and suffering, is undoubtedly done with a great
 22 deal of love for the man they have lost.

23 Thank you, sir.
 24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Mr Friedman.
 25 Now we should have another break, I think.

28

1 MR FRIEDMAN: May I ask for half an hour, please?
 2 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Yes, of course. We will rise now,
 3 then, and we will resume at 11.40, please.
 4 Thank you very much. 11.40, please.
 5 (11.08 am)
 6 (A short break)
 7 (11.40 am)
 8 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.
 9 MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman.
 10 I would now invite Mr Sam Stein Queen's Counsel,
 11 please, to come to the podium and make the presentation
 12 on behalf of the family of Husna Begum, Kamru Miah,
 13 Mohammed Hamid, Mohammed Hanif and Rabeya Begum, all
 14 from flat 142 on floor 17, and recovered from there and
 15 from the lobby of floor 17.
 16 Thank you, Mr Stein.
 17 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you.
 18 Yes, Mr Stein.
 19 MR MILLETT: I should give a trigger warning as well: the
 20 statements and the materials that will be discussed or
 21 displayed during this module may be difficult for some,
 22 and those who are in the room and find it difficult are
 23 of course free to leave the room at any time, and those
 24 watching on the live stream are free also to do the
 25 same.

29

1 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Of course.
 2 MR MILLETT: Thank you.
 3 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you very much.
 4 Yes, Mr Stein, when you're ready.
 5 Presentation relating to HUSNA BEGUM, KAMRU MIAH,
 6 MOHAMMED HAMID, MOHAMMED HANIF and RABEYA BEGUM
 7 by MR STEIN
 8 MR STEIN: Sir, I'm going to pause whilst the portraits of
 9 the family are on the screen.
 10 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Yes.
 11 (Pause)
 12 MR STEIN: Kamru Miah lived with his wife, Rabeya Begum, and
 13 their two sons, Mohammed Hamid and Mohammed Hanif, and
 14 their daughter, Husna Begum, in flat 142 of the
 15 Grenfell Tower on the 17th floor.
 16 The couple's oldest son, Mohammed Hakim, who sits
 17 with his solicitor in sight of you, sir, and the panel,
 18 lived in North London, but his wife lived with his
 19 family in flat 142. She was not present on the night of
 20 the fire.
 21 Kamru Miah was born in Sylhet, Bangladesh, and was
 22 79 years of age at the time of the fire. He moved to
 23 the United Kingdom in 1963 and was a retired baker and
 24 tandoori chef. Hakim tells me that he could cook
 25 anything. Mr Miah was someone with a heart of gold, who

30

1 made everyone his friend. He had a gentle and sweet
 2 nature, was well respected by his family and in his
 3 community, and he would always help anyone in need. He
 4 especially loved both nature programmes and action
 5 movies. James Bond films were a particular favourite,
 6 especially those featuring Sean Connery or Roger Moore.
 7 His elder son, Hakim, recalled how his father was
 8 not only good to his children, but also to his wife,
 9 Mrs Begum, who in turn was loyal and loving to Mr Miah.
 10 Mr Miah was a supportive man that was close with both
 11 his family in London and his family in Bangladesh,
 12 comprising his wife there, Joleka Khatun, and their
 13 three children, Sujon Miah, Rusna Begum and Mina Begum,
 14 whom he visited in Bangladesh.
 15 Rabeya Begum was born on 15 November 1952 in
 16 Bangladesh. Approximately ten years after their
 17 marriage, Mrs Begum and Mr Miah moved to London.
 18 Mrs Begum is described as the most beautiful, generous,
 19 caring and loving mother anyone could ever ask for. She
 20 was someone that her children always felt safe with.
 21 Even as adults, they would go to her if they were
 22 worried or they were scared. An excellent cook herself,
 23 Mrs Begum's dishes are much missed. Hakim's favourite
 24 dish was lamb curry, and he states that his mum made it
 25 best. She wouldn't leave her husband's side throughout

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1 his illness and was very much a loving wife. Equally,
 2 she was the type of mother who protected her children
 3 from all harm and gave them all attention and care.
 4 Hakim says she was deeply loved, adored by all her
 5 family and anyone that knew her.
 6 Mohammed Hamid was born on 19 January 1989, the
 7 younger brother to Mr Mohammed Hakim, an older brother
 8 to Mohammed Hanif and Ms Husna Begum. Despite suffering
 9 from Crohn's disease since childhood, he was
 10 an incredible person, a fun-loving personality, always
 11 cracking jokes. Hakim described his brother Hamid as
 12 his father's guardian angel, that was always around
 13 after Mr Miah had multiple strokes. That was because he
 14 never wanted him to feel lonely, always taking care to
 15 bring him treats he enjoyed eating. Hamid was a good
 16 friend to his mother, looking after her too.
 17 In the May 2018 commemoration hearings, Hakim had
 18 this to say of Mohammed Hamid:
 19 "He was a trooper, a lion heart, brave and loyal ...
 20 Sometimes he would make me feel like he was my older
 21 brother even though he was younger than me, due to the
 22 advice he would give to me when I was in need of advice
 23 about daily life struggles. He was very mature for his
 24 age and wise. How quickly he was taken away."
 25 Mohammed Hanif was the younger brother, born on

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1 20 February 1991. He’s remembered by his bright,
 2 warming smile, his uniquely gentle, kind approach, and
 3 his ability to make all those around him feel
 4 comfortable and at ease. Mohammed Hanif’s generosity
 5 always shone through. He was passionate about his
 6 faith, as well as helping others in need. He was
 7 brilliantly creative, with brilliant talents in drawing
 8 and design. Hakim recalls he would often create his own
 9 animations or create beautiful pictures for the whole
 10 family. Hanif loved watching movies, especially Marvel,
 11 and enjoyed playing on his PlayStation with his
 12 siblings. Despite his short time here, Mohammed Hanif
 13 touched many hearts and is remembered with love.

14 Husna Begum, the youngest of the family.
 15 Ms Husna Begum was born on 4 February 1995. She was
 16 described as the epitome of adventure and spirit,
 17 marvelling at the universe with a burning desire to
 18 travel and experience as much of the world as possible.
 19 Husna was an intellectual, who indulged in creative
 20 writing and studying of history. She displayed talent
 21 in the kitchen as well, able to make any dish or
 22 dessert, getting it perfectly right on the first try.
 23 Husna valued her friends and family and would never
 24 forget anniversaries or birthdays.

25 Hakim recalls during the 2018 commemoration hearings

1 bringing her home from hospital when she was born, and
 2 recounted the joy he finally felt in having a little
 3 sister. He remembers her as the family’s perfect little
 4 star that is greatly missed.

5 Hakim said in his witness statement, sir, in Phase 1
 6 of the Inquiry {IWS00000019}:

7 "The fire took away everything. My sister was
 8 supposed to get married on 29 July 2017. The hall was
 9 paid for, the caterer was paid for, everything was
 10 ready. It was a happy time for us. I knew how happy
 11 I was on my wedding day, and that my sister looked
 12 forward to hers. She was very excited for her wedding,
 13 and we used to talk about it a lot. She was
 14 22 years old."

15 Kamru Miah, Rabeya Begum and their four children,
 16 Mohammed Hakim, Mohammed Hanif, Mohammed Hamid and
 17 Husna Begum, lived in a two-bedroom Notting Hill Housing
 18 Trust property between 2005 and 2009. Mr Miah applied
 19 for larger accommodation and they registered as homeless
 20 with the RBKC and went onto the RBKC’s housing register.
 21 The family gave up the Notting Hill property in exchange
 22 for entering the LetStart scheme. Through that scheme,
 23 they were housed in a range of temporary privately
 24 rented properties, first in Ashburnham Mansions between
 25 January of 2010 and March of 2011, and then in

1 Stanley Road in Ilford, 2011 to 2013. An offer was made
 2 in 2013, but withdrawn on medical grounds. In 2013,
 3 later on, the family moved to Scott House in Edmonton.

4 Prior to moving to the Grenfell Tower, Mr Miah had
 5 a number of debilitating and serious health problems
 6 which severely restricted his mobility. He suffered
 7 with bad arthritis, which meant that he walked with
 8 a shuffle and a limp and used a walking stick. He
 9 couldn’t walk very far and had particular difficulties
 10 with steps. He also suffered a heart attack and two
 11 strokes. Following this, his health began to slowly
 12 deteriorate even more and he became less mobile and
 13 stayed indoors more often. He became fearful of going
 14 out and was practically housebound. He lacked energy
 15 and suffered with shortness of breath.

16 After his second stroke, he was admitted to
 17 intensive care and placed on a life support machine, and
 18 he spent three weeks in hospital at that time.
 19 Following discharge he returned home, but struggled with
 20 and required assistance in completing everyday tasks,
 21 the basics of life, dressing and eating. He also began
 22 to suffer with short-term memory loss, started to forget
 23 names, and sometimes repeated his actions. His mobility
 24 further deteriorated and was very poor.

25 RBKC and, it is believed, the TMO were aware of

1 Mr Miah’s health issues and mobility impairment. Prior
 2 to being rehoused, he filled out an assessment form with
 3 the help from his niece, Rohema Khanom, identifying his
 4 health conditions and inability to use stairs.

5 One of his sons, Mohammed Hamid, also suffered with
 6 the condition Crohn’s since childhood. Sir, as you are
 7 probably aware, Crohn’s leads to real difficulties in
 8 taking nutrition and digestion of food. Because of
 9 that, he had problems with weakness and lethargy, rapid
 10 weight loss, severe abdominal cramps, chest pains and
 11 frequent vomiting, and was taking a range of medication
 12 for his condition. Speaking to Hakim this morning, he
 13 described how he, Mohammed Hamid, would also have to
 14 take special drinks to try and get nutrition into his
 15 body. It is not known whether the condition was
 16 reported to the RBKC.

17 Rabeya Begum attended a meeting with an RBKC housing
 18 officer in August 2016. She attended with Mr Hanif.
 19 Her niece, Rohema Khanom, went along to interpret for
 20 her. At the meeting, she was presented with the tenancy
 21 for 142 Grenfell Tower. Mrs Begum and Ms Khanom
 22 disputed the intended housing for Mr Miah in a high-rise
 23 tower block, but assurances were provided that the
 24 accommodation was temporary. The housing officer told
 25 them that this was the only property of the required

1 size available and, if the family refused it, they'd be
2 making themselves intentionally homeless. The housing
3 officer agreed to give Mrs Begum 24 hours to speak to
4 her husband before accepting. The family were not
5 permitted to view the property before making a decision.

6 Mr Miah and Mrs Begum signed the tenancy at
7 142 Grenfell Tower and moved into the property on and
8 around the August Bank Holiday weekend. They only
9 discovered that the property was in fact on the
10 17th floor when they collected the keys. They accepted
11 the flat, as obviously they wanted to keep the family
12 living together.

13 On the night of the fire, there were no relevant
14 arrangements in place, PEEPs or otherwise, to enable
15 Mr Miah to self-evacuate or to facilitate his rescue by
16 the London Fire Brigade or through any other means.

17 I turn now to the night of the fire.

18 CCTV footage has shown the last time Mr Kamru Miah
19 and Mrs Rabeya Begum entered Grenfell Tower at 13.50.19
20 on 12 June. Mr Miah can be seen with his walking stick.
21 Mr Hamid was last sighted on the same day at 9.21 in the
22 evening, and Husna Begum was later sighted on 13 June at
23 14.58.

24 On the night of 13 June, Ms Husna Begum was in her
25 bedroom in flat 142 when her brother, Mr Hakim, came to

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1 visit their parents at approximately 7 o'clock in the
2 evening. Rabeya Begum prepared food for Ramadan, whilst
3 Kamru Miah spent the evening watching television. They
4 broke fast at 9 o'clock, and Mohammed Hakim left at
5 about 10 o'clock.

6 After arriving home at his flat at 11.02 Mr Hakim
7 then contacted his mother, Mrs Begum, to say goodnight.
8 She was glad her son was home. She said that she was
9 tired, she had a bit of a headache and was going to go
10 to sleep. That was the last time Hakim spoke directly
11 to his mother.

12 The final sighting of Mr Mohammed Hanif was at
13 11.15, when CCTV from the lift lobby of Grenfell Tower
14 shows him approaching the lift.

15 Virgilio Castro, one of the occupants of flat 146 on
16 floor 17, describes being woken at about 1.15 am by
17 smoke alarms and shouts of "Fire". He describes going
18 to the hallway and seeing the fire already outside the
19 kitchen window, and then seeing the flames coming
20 through the ventilation gap. Genaro Batoon fled the
21 flat first, followed by Virgilio Castro and his
22 girlfriend shortly after, in panic.

23 Analysis of the footage of the fire spread on the
24 flat 6 column of the tower confirms that the fire had
25 reached the top of floor 17 by 1.24.

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1 The Phase 1 report has already concluded that the
2 front door of flat 146 was defective and could not close
3 behind the occupants as they fled, exiting the building
4 shortly after 1.30.

5 Corinne Jones, one of the occupants of flat 145,
6 describes seeing Virgilio Castro standing outside his
7 front door with thick, black smoke emerging from the top
8 of the door and moving along the ceiling. After briefly
9 going back to her flat for a period of seconds, she
10 recalls coming back out to find a massive deterioration
11 in the conditions in the lobby. She and her children
12 exited the building at 1.30.

13 After 1.28 am, the remaining persons on the floor
14 were Vincent Chiejina in flat 143 and residents of
15 flat 142, Mr Miah, Mrs Begum, Mr Hamid, Mr Hanif and
16 Ms Husna Begum.

17 Sir, there is no evidence of any deployments made to
18 flat 142. FSG information received from and about
19 flat 142 was transmitted from the control room to the
20 command units, but got lost in the morass of
21 communications at the incident ground.

22 The first 999 call was made by Ms Husna Begum and
23 was connected to the Metropolitan Police Service at
24 1.29. It lasted 8 minutes and 51 seconds. Husna stated
25 that the fire was right next door, and they saw flames

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1 from their window. She asked what they should do. The
2 call operator checked with the London Fire Brigade and
3 stated that, "There's someone coming up to help you".
4 The line appeared to be cut off. The transcript notes
5 "Possible speaking in another language" heard in the
6 background. It appears the family stayed where they
7 were, waiting on that advice.

8 Following this, at 1.38, CRO Howson took a call from
9 the Metropolitan Police Service regarding a call from
10 a family in flat 142 on the 17th floor. That call
11 informed her that there were five people present, with
12 smoke entering the flat. CRO Howson confirmed that the
13 information was to be passed on to the crews on scene.

14 At 1.43, the information was passed from control to
15 CU8, the radio operator there stating that:

16 "On the 17th floor in flat 142 we've got five people
17 ... in the flat with smoke coming into the flat."

18 At 1.44, the message was received CU8, stating:

19 "The only flat numbers you've given me [on] the
20 17th floor is 142 and that's five people and the
21 12th floor is Flat 95, no further information than that
22 apart from heavy smoke ..."

23 Separately, at around 1.50 am, Ms Khanom describes
24 noticing an incoming call from Ms Husna Begum. Husna
25 told Ms Khanom about the fire in her building.

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1 Ms Khanom told her to stuff things under the doors to
2 try to stop the smoke getting in. She said she'd come
3 to the tower.

4 Following on, at about 1.57, Ms Khanom called
5 Mr Hakim to tell him that the Grenfell Tower was alight.
6 She told him that the family flat was pitch black, they
7 can't see anything. Hakim also received a call from his
8 cousin's daughter, Jessie, informing him that his
9 cousin, Abdul, had been on site for ten minutes, and was
10 sent, at 1.38, a video showing the tower on fire. Hakim
11 received a further call from Abdul asking where he was.
12 He made preparations to leave.

13 Sir, as noted in the Phase 1 report, between 2.15
14 and 2.20, the information from the first 999 call made
15 at 1.29 does not appear amongst the early information
16 recorded on the white ground floor lobby wall after 2.15
17 either.

18 The words "17th [floor], 142 FSC" do appear on the
19 wall on what is likely to be the 2nd floor mezzanine,
20 where the bridgehead was sited before it moved up to
21 floor 3 at 2.20. Sir, the Phase 1 report also notes
22 that a deployment between 2.20 offered the best chance
23 for the family to have been rescued. No deployment was
24 made.

25 Some time between 2.20 and 2.50, Ms Khanom called

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1 Husna Begum, who said her mother was panicked and asked
2 Ms Khanom to calm her down. She could hear Mr Miah
3 reciting from the Qur'an in the background. Ms Khanom
4 then spoke to Mrs Begum, who said that the fire was in
5 the flat and had taken hold. She said that they had
6 retreated to Hamid and Hanif's room. Ms Khanom spoke to
7 Husna Begum again, who said that it was pitch black, and
8 hung up.

9 The family's second 999 call was connected to the
10 London Fire Brigade at 2.27. CRO Fox took the call from
11 Husna. She said that they had been waiting for an hour
12 and no one had come to help them. Husna said, "We're
13 going to die, basically, in here".

14 She confirmed the fire was right next to the window
15 and confirmed once again the presence of five adults,
16 repeatedly emphasising that two were elderly. CRO Fox
17 said, much like the first call, "I'm going to tell the
18 command unit on scene".

19 At 2.29, CRO Fox created a service request on the
20 Vision system, asking for a radio message to be sent to
21 CU8 relating to flat 142. The message was, "five adults
22 including two elderly persons inside flats".

23 The radio operator at Brigade control sends the
24 message to CU7:

25 "Charlie Uniform 7, erm, Flat 142, 142 on the

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1 17th --- 1-7 --- 17th floor ..."

2 Trying to get the message across.

3 "Five adults including two elderly persons are
4 trapped inside. Over."

5 At 2.30, the call and the message was acknowledged.

6 Watch Manager Peckham then notes on the CIF at
7 2.32 --- that's the control information form --- that
8 seven persons were trapped, five adults, two elderly
9 persons. As, sir, in the Phase 1 report, the finding
10 was made, beyond this point it is not possible to know
11 what was done with that information. There is no
12 evidence about whether Watch Manager Peckham transmitted
13 it and, if so, to whom.

14 By 2.32, flat 142 appears on the laminated list on
15 the wall of CU7. The Phase 1 report concludes that this
16 was likely placed there as a result of Ms Husna Begum's
17 second 999 call. However, it does not feature on
18 De Silvo's list of FSG information at the bridgehead on
19 floor 3.

20 As further noted in the Phase 1 report, the last
21 deployment of crews who were able to reach floor 17 or
22 above included Firefighters Mitchell, Cheesman and Pole,
23 who were deployed to floor 23 between 2.51 and 2.53.
24 They stopped at floor 18 and helped evacuate occupants
25 in flat 153 when they realised they did not have

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1 sufficient air to reach floor 23.

2 The last chance of rescue of the family in flat 142
3 lay in the timely communication to the bridgehead of the
4 information provided in Husna's second call at 2.27 and
5 its being acted upon swiftly. The information, the
6 report concluded, did eventually arrive, but there is no
7 evidence that it was acted upon.

8 At around 3.00 in the morning, Ms Khanom spoke to
9 Mr Hanif, who asked for forgiveness and said goodbye.
10 Ms Khanom notes in her witness statement that she could
11 hear her aunt, Mrs Begum, and her uncle, Mr Miah, in the
12 background, reciting from the Qur'an. She could also
13 hear Husna crying.

14 At 3.08, as Hakim was getting into a cab to travel
15 to the tower, he received a call from his sister,
16 Husna Begum. She said, "There's a fire, we're all
17 trapped in our flat. You're my older brother. Please
18 forgive me if I've ever hurt you, but I don't think
19 we're going to make it". Ms Begum then ended the call.
20 Mr Hakim attempted to call back and call his mother,
21 father and brothers, but could not get through.

22 At 3.09, the third 999 call is made by Husna Begum
23 and her brother, Mr Hamid, from his phone number. The
24 LFB transcript reports that this is flat 143, but it was
25 found to be flat 142 in the Phase 1 report. They said

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1 there were five people in the flat .
 2 The two are recorded to have said:
 3 "There's fire in our building! There is fire in our
 4 flat! It's in the kitchen and the hallway."
 5 CRO Adams advised the family to get wet towels, wet
 6 sheets and make a run for it. The line then appears to
 7 cut off.
 8 Again, as noted in the Phase 1 report, there is no
 9 record of this call being passed on to CU7.
 10 After 3.15, flat 142 also appears on the whiteboard
 11 grid on CU7, showing five persons and a P for priority,
 12 which might indicate the presence of elderly persons.
 13 Following that, at 3.23, a CIF was made noting the
 14 presence of five people in the flat , flat 142, again
 15 marked priority.
 16 At 3.18, the fourth and final 999 call is made by
 17 Husna Begum, begging for help or a helicopter. She
 18 spoke with CRO Fox, who advised them to leave. Husna
 19 said they're unable to do so, it's too hot outside the
 20 door. CRO Fox said she would tell them on the radio.
 21 Husna ends the call and, as detailed below, as we'll
 22 deal with in a moment, tried to escape alone, sadly
 23 passing in the 17th floor lobby.
 24 As the Phase 1 report found, there is no entry on
 25 the SIL of any service request to that effect and no

1 other record of such radio call . However, flat 142
 2 appeared as an entry low down on Station Manager Oliff's
 3 second whiteboard and, therefore, it is likely that the
 4 information was transmitted by him by mobile telephone
 5 to Watch Manager Meyrick on CU7 at some point after
 6 around 2.23. That would be when the control room
 7 whiteboards had been set up and had started operating.
 8 Rohema Khanom, in her Metropolitan Police Service
 9 statement {COR0001147}, recalled her final call with
 10 Husna Begum. She stated:
 11 "... she was finding it difficult breathing, she was
 12 coughing continuously. I said to her you have to get
 13 out you have to try. Husna said 'I can't, it's so smoky
 14 and dark, I can't see anything'. That was our last
 15 conversation. She didn't hang up but she didn't speak
 16 to me anymore. I left my phone open and screamed out
 17 her name. I continued screaming out her name until my
 18 nephew told me to stop, he said there was no point."
 19 We don't have the time of that call.
 20 Between 3.30 and 4.00 am, Mr Hakim arrived at
 21 Grenfell Tower and waited away from the crowds. I have
 22 discussed this with him this morning. He did everything
 23 possible to get into the tower but was quite rightly
 24 told that he can't.
 25 At 3.35 a CAD message from DI9 is sent stating,

1 "Flat 142, [people] trapped at [location]".
 2 As noted in the Phase 1 report, by the time
 3 Husna Begum made her last call at 3.18, the bridgehead
 4 had moved to the ground floor. It appears that the
 5 information, the report says, about flat 142 did reach
 6 Watch Manager Williams at some time after 4 o'clock
 7 because it appeared on the right-hand part of the wall
 8 in the box for floor 17.
 9 A further CIF timed at 4.13 noted the presence again
 10 of five people in flat 142. The inscription "142"
 11 appears on the green wall on the ground floor by the
 12 bottom of the stairs, the location of the bridgehead, in
 13 a photograph taken by GM Michael Mulholland at either
 14 4.45 or 4.49. It is not entirely clear when it was put
 15 there.
 16 As the Phase 1 report found, at no stage did any
 17 incident commander ask themselves whether every FSG call
 18 of which the relevant command unit had been informed had
 19 in fact led to a deployment from the bridgehead and, if
 20 not, why not.
 21 The Phase 2 report produced by Professor Purser
 22 notes that, as Ms Husna Begum's final call ended at
 23 3.20, it is likely that she left the flat around this
 24 time, as the exterior fire broke into the bedroom.
 25 Further, as the family had survived in Mr Hamid and

1 Mr Hanif's bedroom for around an hour since the fire
 2 broke into the flat , Professor Purser states that they
 3 must have had a relatively limited exposure to smoke and
 4 asphyxiant gases, likely obtaining some fresh air from
 5 the south bedroom window, since Husna Begum was still
 6 able to speak on the telephone and to walk from the flat
 7 around this time. However, by this time it is likely
 8 she had accumulated a near incapacitating dose, which is
 9 likely to have increased rapidly once the exterior fire
 10 reached the bedroom. Professor Purser then goes on to
 11 say she is therefore likely to have collapsed in the
 12 lobby very soon after leaving the flat and was unable to
 13 reach the stair .
 14 Professor Purser also notes that measurable blood
 15 samples were only obtainable from Mr Hanif and Mr Miah.
 16 The noted concentration of carboxyhaemoglobin in blood
 17 levels was measured at 69% for Mr Hanif, well over the
 18 lethal threshold. Mr Miah's concentration was lower, at
 19 47%. However, of course, as noted and we've discussed,
 20 Mr Miah suffered from pre-existing health conditions,
 21 including a heart condition, which, as stated by
 22 Professor Purser, has shown to increase sensitivity to
 23 CO, carbon monoxide, so that death may occur at lower
 24 carbon monoxide in blood concentration.
 25 Both Mrs Begum and Mr Hamid were found to have soot

1 in their airways and an unmeasured amount of
2 carbon monoxide in their blood was present.

3 Professor Purser has stated since all flat 142
4 occupants were together in bedroom 2 during the fire,
5 they would all have had similar exposure to smoke and
6 heat, and as Husna Begum attempted to escape, he notes
7 that the increased physical activity involved in her
8 leaving the flat and further exposure to a high
9 concentration of asphyxiant gases in the 17th floor
10 lobby are then likely to have resulted in her rapid
11 collapse in the lobby, possibly within seconds, before
12 she was able to reach the stair.

13 Mr Miah, Mrs Begum, Mr Hamid and Mr Hanif left
14 charred remains. Husna Begum was found intact on the
15 17th floor lobby. Professor Purser states that it is
16 unlikely she experienced significant heat exposure or
17 burns before leaving the flat. Sadly, her body showed
18 significant burns and other heat damage, and the
19 pathologist was unable to exclude the possibility that
20 some burns may have occurred before she passed.

21 Mr Kamru Miah's life was pronounced extinct at his
22 initial post-mortem examination on 20 June. The final
23 post-mortem report for Mr Miah gave a medical cause of
24 death of "inhalation of the products of combustion and
25 ischaemic heart disease".

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1 Rabeya Begum's life was pronounced extinct at her
2 post-mortem examination on 27 June 2017. The final
3 post-mortem report for Mrs Begum gave a cause of death
4 as "consistent with the effects of fire".

5 Mr Mohammed Hamid's life was pronounced extinct by
6 members of the British Transport Police in flat 142 of
7 Grenfell on 18 June. The final post-mortem report for
8 Mr Hamid gave a medical cause of death as "consistent
9 with the effects of fire".

10 Mr Mohammed Hanif's life was pronounced extinct at
11 his post-mortem examination on 20 June at 9.30. The
12 final post-mortem report for Mr Hanif gave a medical
13 cause of death as "consistent with the effects of fire".

14 Husna Begum's life was pronounced extinct by
15 a member of the London Ambulance Service on 16 June.
16 The final post-mortem report for Husna Begum gave
17 a medical cause of death as "consistent with the effects
18 of fire".

19 Sir, consistent with the recent evidence from
20 Professor Purser, we would submit that it may be
21 appropriate to change the cause of death for
22 Rabeya Begum, Mohammed Hamid, Mohammed Hanif and
23 Husna Begum to "inhalation of fire fumes" or similar, as
24 I understand has been noted in other presentations this
25 week.

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1 Kamru Miah, Rabeya Begum, Mohammed Hamid,
2 Mohammed Hanif and Ms Husna Begum are much missed by the
3 family members they leave behind. I have spoken to
4 Hakim this morning. He lost all members of his
5 immediate family. He is a married man and finds great
6 support in his relationship with his wife. He has no
7 family members outside of his partnership with his wife.
8 Every morning, every evening, he thinks about his
9 family, and through the day he thinks about his family,
10 and he thinks what he could have done, possibly, if he
11 had been there.

12 There is no possible outcome of this or indeed any
13 legal process that could replace them, and I end this
14 presentation with the hope that we all remember the
15 people that died in the fire at the Grenfell Tower, and
16 that this Inquiry takes the opportunity, as it should do
17 and must do, to do what it can to prevent any further
18 deaths in this manner, with the understanding that this
19 must never happen again.

20 Sir.

21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Mr Stein.

22 Well, that presentation draws to a conclusion
23 today's sitting of the Inquiry. We shall rise,
24 therefore, in just a moment. But the Inquiry will
25 resume on Monday of next week at 10 o'clock in the

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1 morning, when we shall hear evidence from the
2 archaeologist who was responsible for the collection of
3 remains of the deceased from the tower, and then we
4 shall go on to hear further presentations in relation to
5 other deceased.

6 But for now, that concludes today's proceedings. We
7 sit again at 10 o'clock on Monday morning.

8 Thank you all very much.

9 (12.17 pm)

10 (The hearing adjourned until 10 am
11 on Monday, 11 July 2022)

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