



GRENFELL TOWER INQUIRY RT

Day 274

May 9, 2022

Opus 2 - Official Court Reporters

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Monday, 9 May 2022

1  
2 (10.00 am)  
3 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to  
4 today's hearing.  
5 Today we're going to hear the first of a number of  
6 witnesses from the Tenant Management Organisation.  
7 Yes, Mr Millett.  
8 MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman, good morning. Members of the  
9 panel, good morning to you.  
10 I now call Teresa Brown, please.  
11 MS TERESA BROWN (affirmed)  
12 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you very much. That's it, sit  
13 down, make yourself comfortable.  
14 All right? Very good, thank you.  
15 Yes, Mr Millett, when you're ready.  
16 Questions from COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY  
17 MR MILLETT: Ms Brown, can I start by thanking you very much  
18 for coming to the Inquiry yet again and assisting us  
19 with our investigations, this time into the matters the  
20 subject of this module: the aftermath of the fire.  
21 Just a number of pointers by way of introduction.  
22 First, can I ask you, please, to try to keep your  
23 voice up so that the person who sits to your right and  
24 is typing there can get down everything you say very  
25 clearly. Also, don't nod or shake your head; you have

1

1 to say "Yes" or "No" as the case may be.  
2 A. Yes, yes.  
3 Q. If any of my questions are unclear, I can repeat them or  
4 put them in a different way. We can do that. That's  
5 not a problem at all.  
6 Now, you will know that we take breaks in the usual  
7 way, mid—morning and mid—afternoon, but if you need  
8 a break at any other time, then please just let us know.  
9 There is no problem, we can take a break. All right?  
10 A. Yes.  
11 Q. Now, you have made six statements to the Inquiry, and  
12 I'm going to put them to you. They will appear on the  
13 screen.  
14 The first is {TMO10048960}, dated 21 August 2018.  
15 Can we just have that up there at page 3, please.  
16 (Pause)  
17 Don't worry, it's coming.  
18 A. Yeah.  
19 Q. This always happens first thing.  
20 (Pause)  
21 There it is.  
22 Now, there's a signature there under the statement  
23 of truth, and above the date. Can you confirm that that  
24 is your signature?  
25 A. Yes.

2

1 Q. Thank you.  
2 The next statement is your second, {TMO00000895},  
3 dated 10 January 2019. If we can turn, please, in that  
4 to page 5. Let's have the first page first, page 1,  
5 first of all, to identify it. There it is. Page 5  
6 next, please. There it is. Above the date, is that  
7 your signature?  
8 A. Yes.  
9 Q. Thank you.  
10 Third statement, {TMO10048982}. That's your third  
11 statement, dated 15 March 2019. If we can go to page 10  
12 in that, please, is that your signature?  
13 A. Yes.  
14 Q. Thank you.  
15 Fourth statement, {TMO00842402}, dated  
16 4 October 2019. If we can go to page 7, please, is that  
17 your signature?  
18 A. Yes.  
19 Q. Thank you.  
20 Fifth statement, which is your second aftermath  
21 statement, which takes in your first aftermath  
22 statement, that's {TMO00869990}, dated 24 January 2020.  
23 That's your fifth statement, which I think is  
24 incorrectly identified as your fourth statement, but you  
25 correct that later.

3

1 If we can go, please, to page 18 in that document,  
2 there's a date — 18 is the signature, the date is on  
3 the next page, but is that your signature?  
4 A. That's definitely — yeah.  
5 Q. Finally, your sixth statement, which is your  
6 supplementary aftermath statement, at {TMO00894124},  
7 dated 15 December 2020. If we can go, please, to  
8 page 34 in it, there is a signature above the date. Is  
9 that your signature?  
10 A. Yes.  
11 Q. Have you had the opportunity to read all these  
12 statements recently?  
13 A. Yes.  
14 Q. And particularly the last two —  
15 A. Yes.  
16 Q. — on aftermath?  
17 A. Yes, yes.  
18 Q. Thank you.  
19 Can you confirm for us that the contents are true to  
20 the best of your knowledge?  
21 A. Yes.  
22 Q. Thank you.  
23 Now, you have given evidence to the Inquiry, as you  
24 will recall, I think, on two prior occasions. In  
25 Phase 1 of the Inquiry, you gave evidence in relation to

4

1 some of your actions on the night of the fire. What I'm  
 2 going to do today is ask you about your involvement in  
 3 the immediate aftermath in the week after the fire.  
 4 Can I deal with some background matters first.  
 5 You were the director of housing at the TMO at the  
 6 time of the Grenfell Tower fire, weren't you?  
 7 A. Yes, that's right.  
 8 Q. You were in that role from February 2014, and you left  
 9 it in June 2018, I think, as you tell us.  
 10 A. That's right.  
 11 Q. Yes. While you were director of housing, you were not  
 12 a statutory director of the company, the TMO, were you?  
 13 A. No, that's right.  
 14 Q. No, and nor were you on the board.  
 15 A. No.  
 16 Q. Nor were you a member of the executive team.  
 17 A. That's right.  
 18 Q. Yes. You reported to Sacha Jevans; yes?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. She was in the executive team.  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. She in turn reported to Robert Black; yes?  
 23 A. That's right, yes.  
 24 Q. Now, in relation to your professional background,  
 25 I think you have qualifications in housing and worked

5

1 for a number of arm's length tenant management  
 2 organisations; yes?  
 3 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 4 Q. And I think also local authorities; yes?  
 5 A. Yes.  
 6 Q. In the role of management of housing services.  
 7 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 8 Q. Let's turn, then, to the first of the topics I want to  
 9 cover with you, which is about emergency planning and  
 10 training at the TMO.  
 11 You will recall that the TMO had its own emergency  
 12 plan. Do you remember that?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. Its reference — we don't need to go to it — is at  
 15 {TMO10013898}.  
 16 In your statement, your fifth statement, you say at  
 17 paragraphs 6 and 7 {TMO00869990/2} that the TMO plan was  
 18 not in operation on the night of the Grenfell Tower fire  
 19 because it was designed for localised incidents and not  
 20 an incident as large as the Grenfell Tower fire; is that  
 21 correct?  
 22 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 23 Q. And in paragraph 7 of the same statement — let's have  
 24 that up. It's fifth statement, {TMO00869990/2},  
 25 paragraph 7. You say:

6

1 "It was recognised that the TMO did not have the  
 2 resources to be able to respond to such an incident and  
 3 that in such circumstances, the RBKC Contingency  
 4 Management Plan would operate as it did on the night of  
 5 the fire. Further, it was recognised that in such  
 6 circumstances, only one plan should be in operation  
 7 which is what occurred from an early stage following the  
 8 fire."  
 9 Can you confirm that?  
 10 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 11 Q. That's correct, yes.  
 12 Let's look, then, at the TMO emergency plan itself  
 13 now, {TMO10013898}. I'll show you the first page just  
 14 to identify the document. There it is.  
 15 If we go to page 3 {TMO10013898/3}, we can see the  
 16 revision dates. There they are. You can see that it  
 17 was last revised in February 2016, and before that in  
 18 May 2015.  
 19 If we go, please, to page 13 {TMO10013898/13}, under  
 20 "KCTMO Emergency Plan", it sets out the roles, and under  
 21 the heading "KCTMO Emergency Plan":  
 22 "This sets out the roles and responsibilities within  
 23 the KCTMO in the event of a major incident, which is  
 24 defined as ..."  
 25 And here is the definition :

7

1 "'a major incident or natural disaster resulting in  
 2 either death, injury or serious disruption to normal  
 3 life, which would acutely stretch the KCTMO's resources  
 4 and which may ultimately overwhelm the KCTMO's capacity  
 5 to manage without assistance from the Council."  
 6 Just emphasising those last few words there,  
 7 "without assistance from the Council".  
 8 Carrying on two paragraphs further down, the plan  
 9 says:  
 10 "The plan is primarily for managing local KCTMO  
 11 emergencies on, within, or surrounding our properties  
 12 and estates, one which can be managed within the  
 13 resources available to the KCTMO. However this plan can  
 14 also be used for large scale major events which would  
 15 overwhelm the KCTMO's ability to manage on its own, and  
 16 which would involve the RBKC council resources. The  
 17 difference being the scale of the emergency and the  
 18 number of people affected by it."  
 19 Now, I've read quite a bit of that to you.  
 20 Do you agree, looking at it, that this emergency  
 21 plan did in fact envisage a role for the TMO in the  
 22 event of a major incident which stretched beyond the  
 23 capabilities of the TMO, but where the TMO would be  
 24 expected to work alongside the council?  
 25 A. In that particular paragraph, it seems to imply that,

8

1 yes.

2 Q. Yes. If we go to page 28 of the TMO emergency plan

3 {TMO10013898/28}, from the fourth paragraph down, it

4 says, "Ensure" — do you see the word "Ensure" there,

5 four paragraphs down?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. "Ensure that residents' primary needs (i.e. shelter,

8 food and warmth) are met as quickly as possible. You

9 may need to open up a rest centre. Consult the block

10 details to see what the most suitable location would be

11 for this. Find out who the key holder is and make

12 preliminary contact to advise that we may need to use

13 the location as a temporary rest area.

14 "When opening up a rest centre, ensure it is made as

15 welcoming and comfortable as possible, i.e. by turning

16 on the lighting and heating, arranging tea/coffee,

17 turning on a TV or radio for entertainment (if

18 available).

19 "Allow residents to use the KCTMO's mobile phone

20 (residents may be able to organise alternative

21 accommodation by contacting their relatives/friends).

22 "Arrange for a roll-call to be taken and identify

23 any special requirements e.g. special needs,

24 disabilities.

25 "Put someone in charge of organising refreshments —

9

1 depending on the numbers involved, 2/3 persons may be

2 required to do this.

3 "Advise of any known vulnerable/less able bodied

4 residents that may come to your attention as needing

5 assistance.

6 "Other than dealing with the immediate emergency you

7 will need to assess whether contractors need to be

8 called for any making good, boarding up, security works

9 etc as a result of the emergency."

10 Now, there's quite a lot in there, but is it right

11 that the TMO emergency plan envisaged that there may be

12 situations that required TMO staff to open up and manage

13 a rest centre; yes?

14 A. Yes, but I don't think they applied to the scale of the

15 emergency that we had on the day of the fire. This is

16 very much more small scale.

17 Q. Are you saying that when a large event like the

18 Grenfell Tower fire happened, the TMO would not be

19 expected to assist in or participate in the opening up

20 of a rest centre?

21 A. I think we'd be required to assist in, but I don't think

22 in an incident of the scale of the fire that we would

23 have been expected to open rest centres. In fact,

24 the council seemed to have already taken responsibility

25 that their emergency plan was in operation and they had

10

1 that responsibility.

2 Q. In the case of a major emergency, did you expect to have

3 to wait until called upon by the council, who was

4 the category 1 responder, or did you expect to operate

5 off your own bat and then join forces with the council

6 as the emergency developed?

7 A. I would have expected the council to be in charge of the

8 emergency and for us to sit in a supporting role within

9 that.

10 Q. Right. When sitting in the supporting role, though,

11 would you expect to be asked to support and be told

12 precisely what the council wanted of you, or did you

13 expect to come in and volunteer?

14 A. I think probably we should have been asked to come in,

15 but I think we also naturally, because we wanted to do

16 what we could do to help, we came in.

17 Q. Now, even in the case of an emergency which is, you say,

18 covered by this plan, would you use the rest centres

19 listed in the RBKC emergency management plan, where

20 they're listed?

21 A. Well, I don't think that I'm saying that this plan

22 covered the plan, I'm saying it dealt with more minor

23 emergencies. I didn't expect us to be opening our

24 rest centres on a day — on the day of the fire, because

25 they would have been much more small scale. We wouldn't

11

1 have had the resources to staff a rest centre of the

2 scale that was needed.

3 Q. Where it says, in the paragraph I read to you, "When

4 opening up a rest centre, ensure it is made as welcoming

5 and comfortable as possible", which rest centres or

6 which properties would you pick for a rest centre?

7 A. So —

8 Q. Would it be those in the council's emergency plan or

9 would it be others?

10 A. No, it wouldn't be — the council emergency plan had,

11 you know, much larger-scale rest centres, as

12 I understand it. Ours were very small resident halls

13 that wouldn't have a large capacity at all.

14 Q. Did you have your own list of rest centres?

15 A. I'm pretty sure we did, but I can't say 100% now what

16 they were.

17 Q. Now, as we can see, the TMO emergency plan required TMO

18 staff to undertake a number of roles, including

19 arranging roll-call for residents, which would in turn

20 include identifying special needs or vulnerabilities.

21 Is it right that the TMO staff involved in

22 an emergency response covered at least by this plan

23 should have been adequately trained and equipped to

24 undertake those roles if the situation demanded it?

25 A. Yeah. Yes.

12

1 Q. Yes. We'll come to training in a second.  
 2 Can we go to page 17 of this document  
 3 {TMO10013898/17}. This is a cascade chart showing who  
 4 must be contacted in an emergency, "CASCADE 1 — During  
 5 Normal Working Hours", and then cascade 2 is on page 19  
 6 {TMO10013898/18}, which is outside normal working hours,  
 7 and the normal working hours are 9.00 am to 5.00 pm, and  
 8 outside working hours is 5.00 pm to 9.00 am, as you can  
 9 see.  
 10 If we go back to page 17 {TMO10013898/17}, please,  
 11 we can see that your name appears in the central green  
 12 box, "Director of Housing", underneath the "Customer  
 13 Service Centre" oval in blue; yes?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. Is it right to say that you were familiar with this  
 16 emergency plan and what was required in the event of  
 17 an emergency, such as the elements listed on the page  
 18 we've looked at, page 28, opening rest centres, being  
 19 aware of vulnerabilities, et cetera?  
 20 A. So there were staff within our teams who were  
 21 specifically trained on the out-of-hours rota, so  
 22 they're on the other document that you showed me, and  
 23 I know that they all underwent quite extensive training  
 24 with our health and safety team. They knew how to call  
 25 in things like bottled water or many other things that

13

1 we may need in a small emergency, even maybe where  
 2 people weren't evacuated but to, you know, deliver water  
 3 to people. So they did receive training.  
 4 Q. Right. But what about those on this document who  
 5 were —  
 6 A. Well, some of those are the same people, so Kiran and  
 7 Martin, they would have — and Hash, they were on the  
 8 out-of-hours team, so they would have had that training.  
 9 Q. Right.  
 10 A. And we all would have had an overview.  
 11 Q. Okay.  
 12 In terms of training, if we go to paragraph 3 of  
 13 your sixth statement, {TMO00894124/2}.  
 14 (Pause)  
 15 If we go to paragraph 3 at the foot of the page, you  
 16 say:  
 17 "I am unable to recall receiving any specific  
 18 training in relation to emergency planning and response  
 19 during my employment at the TMO."  
 20 Is that right?  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. So if you were never specifically trained on emergency  
 23 planning and response, what leads you to think that  
 24 others were?  
 25 A. Because I know that they took ... I'm just trying to

14

1 think of the word. They had more of a main role in  
 2 responding to emergencies. There were specific people  
 3 who received the training because they were more likely  
 4 to be the people who were called out during emergencies.  
 5 They were on rotas, you know, they took on that role on  
 6 a permanent although a rotating basis, and I know that  
 7 they received training.  
 8 Q. Right. But it's a fact, I think, that you never  
 9 received any training about the TMO emergency plan, even  
 10 though your details were contained within it as  
 11 a contact; is that right?  
 12 A. Yes, I think that's right.  
 13 Q. Right.  
 14 Now, in this statement you tell us, picking it up at  
 15 the foot of this page and then going over the page  
 16 {TMO00894124/2}, you say:  
 17 "However, in my previous role at Hammersmith I had  
 18 worked in departments responsible for emergency planning  
 19 and therefore was aware of how an emergency plan would  
 20 be implemented and expressions such as 'LALO', 'Bronze'  
 21 and 'Silver' were familiar to me."  
 22 What was your role at Hammersmith —  
 23 A. So —  
 24 Q. — when you were in that position?  
 25 A. I didn't — I must make very clear, I didn't have a role

15

1 for emergency planning at that, I was just part of the  
 2 community safety team, who also covered that role. So,  
 3 you know, I picked up knowledge of those expressions,  
 4 but I didn't have formal training of a council emergency  
 5 plan.  
 6 Q. I follow.  
 7 Now, I think it's right, therefore, that at the time  
 8 of the Grenfell Tower fire, you had not received any  
 9 training at all in respect of, first — is this  
 10 right? — how to manage or provide support at  
 11 rest centres.  
 12 A. No, but I had had practical experience of going to  
 13 rest centres in my career before. I had a knowledge of  
 14 what was needed and what was expected.  
 15 Q. Right. Can you give us an example?  
 16 A. So I had obviously been present some way through the  
 17 Adair fire, and in previous roles I had attended  
 18 emergencies, nothing obviously like the scale of the  
 19 fire, but, you know, I had dealt with things like gas  
 20 out and electrics out.  
 21 Q. Yes. So practical experience, but no training?  
 22 A. That's right.  
 23 Q. Now, three other topics.  
 24 Is this right: no training on identification and  
 25 maintaining records of large numbers of displaced

16

1 residents?  
2 A. No specific training.  
3 Q. And how to support large numbers of displaced residents  
4 and facilitate return to their homes?  
5 A. No specific formal training, but I would say, again,  
6 you know, having spent years in housing, I have dealt  
7 with several emergencies that I think gave me, you know,  
8 some professional experience to draw on.  
9 Q. Was the Adair Tower fire in late October 2015 an example  
10 of that?  
11 A. An example of that, yes.  
12 Q. Right. Were there other examples you could give of the  
13 same scale or similar scale?  
14 A. Off the top of my head, not, but I've worked in housing  
15 a long time and I've dealt with many different types of  
16 emergencies. But off the top of my head, I can't —  
17 Q. No.  
18 A. — think.  
19 Q. But on training, I think, also no training on the  
20 identification of the needs of residents with specific  
21 vulnerabilities and how those needs should be met in  
22 an emergency response?  
23 A. No specific training, but I would like to say some,  
24 you know, practical ... well, some initiative, I think,  
25 that I drew on.

17

1 Q. Were there any learning points that came out of the  
2 Adair Tower fire in respect of those matters, so dealing  
3 with displaced people, facilitating their return to  
4 their homes, and identifying the needs of residents with  
5 vulnerabilities?  
6 A. So I think there was some specific learning that came  
7 out for myself and Sacha, really, who were in that  
8 rest centre on the day, is that there was a lack of  
9 council presence in that rest centre. The LALO had only  
10 arrived very briefly and had left site, and it was Sacha  
11 and I were who were working in a rest centre that had  
12 been set up by volunteers. So, you know — and we had  
13 to work with somebody to rehouse people remotely. So —  
14 work with a council employee who was remote, sorry,  
15 I wasn't very clear, to help assist in that.  
16 Sorry, I am slightly lost in where I'm going. What  
17 was the question? Sorry.  
18 Q. Let's see if I can be a bit more specific.  
19 Let's look at {RBK00057975}.  
20 A. Yes.  
21 Q. Now, this is a summary of a meeting on 11 April 2016  
22 with contingency planning, housing and the KCTMO to  
23 follow up on the Adair Tower fire.  
24 A. Yeah.  
25 Q. And you can see who was there: David Kerry was there

18

1 from RBKC's contingency planning.  
2 A. Yeah.  
3 Q. You had three people from RBKC housing, including  
4 Amanda Johnson and Celia Caliskan, and from the TMO  
5 there was you and Janice Wray.  
6 Now, if you go, please, to page 3 {RBK00057975/3},  
7 you can see there "Homelessness as a result of the  
8 incident", and then an action point five bullet points  
9 down. Do you see:  
10 "ACTION — DK, AJ, TB/JW ..."  
11 A. Yeah.  
12 Q. And you're the TB there, aren't you?  
13 A. Yes, that's correct.  
14 Q. Yes, and what it says is:  
15 "In a future incident involving more than a couple  
16 of RBKC/TMO dwellings, the LALO or Contingency Planning  
17 Team will attend the site and form a Scene Incident  
18 Management Group along with Housing and TMO reps."  
19 Then the second bullet point down says:  
20 "TMO will provide details of known vulnerabilities."  
21 Did that proposal contemplate that the TMO would  
22 provide a list of people with known vulnerabilities  
23 involved in the incident who needed help, rather than  
24 generally across the whole TMO estate?  
25 A. Yes, I took this to mean that we would be at the scene

19

1 with our known list of tenants, and then we would work  
2 with the tenants and provide the information to RBKC on  
3 whom the known — what the known vulnerability was so  
4 that we were capturing that live at the time.  
5 Q. Right. So the expectation was, as you say, at the scene  
6 you would be able to have — is this right? — immediate  
7 or reasonably immediate access to a list of people in  
8 the relevant building with known vulnerabilities so that  
9 you could provide it to the council?  
10 A. Well, we would have known vulnerabilities, and I qualify  
11 that as at the time they were last reported, and then we  
12 would add to that from, you know, speaking to our  
13 residents and understanding their needs.  
14 Q. Right.  
15 Just on the action point, was the action that you  
16 would prepare and collate these details in advance of  
17 the next incident, or was the action point that at the  
18 next incident you would provide the details?  
19 A. So I understood it to be that at the next incident we  
20 would provide them, because if we just collated them at  
21 a point of time, they wouldn't necessarily still be  
22 relevant.  
23 Q. Right.  
24 From what data did you have those details so that at  
25 the next incident you could provide them?

20

1 A. So we had on our Capita system a list of all our  
 2 residents and known reported vulnerabilities, so when we  
 3 did our tenancy check — our tenancy checks, there was  
 4 questions in that around vulnerability, and after those  
 5 checks had been completed, that information would be  
 6 loaded onto our Capita system. So that was the basis  
 7 that we would draw on, and from our CRM system.  
 8 Q. Yes, the CRM system. People will recall that from  
 9 Module 3.  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. And a question from Module 3 again: how often did you  
 12 update the Capita system or the CRM system so that you  
 13 could be reasonably sure that the data pool was  
 14 reasonably up to date and accurate?  
 15 A. So the CRM system we had a single view, a first sheet,  
 16 which was our resident contact details. So when people  
 17 called in to our customer service centre, we would try  
 18 and verify the data on that. So contact details, things  
 19 like that. Our main source for updating it would have  
 20 been our tenancy checks, as I've just said, or residents  
 21 reporting any updates to us directly, because obviously  
 22 we were reliant on them to provide that information to  
 23 us if their circumstances changed, and then we would  
 24 update our systems.  
 25 Q. Did you do anything or, to your knowledge, did

21

1 Janice Wray do anything in response to this action  
 2 point?  
 3 A. I don't think more specifically than anything else that  
 4 was taking place at the time. So, you know, we were  
 5 progressing with tenancy — our tenancy check process,  
 6 and obviously we worked very hard in the years coming up  
 7 to the fire on our CRM system so that we could have more  
 8 live data about our residents.  
 9 Q. You can see, two bullet points down here, that:  
 10 "TMO will provide David Kerry with a copy of their  
 11 Emergency Plan. This plan gives details for each  
 12 tower block and estate, including details of any  
 13 identified shelters."  
 14 Now, the date of this, of course, is April 2016. Do  
 15 you remember whether, when considering this action point  
 16 and acting on it, you or anybody else in the TMO looked  
 17 at the emergency plan details for each tower block and  
 18 estate, noticed they were in some cases, and in  
 19 Grenfell Tower's case, 15 years out of date, and think  
 20 to bring them up to date?  
 21 A. I didn't send over the emergency plan. It wasn't my  
 22 role. Janice took that role, and I don't know whether  
 23 she checked it. I certainly didn't.  
 24 Q. Was there a discussion at the time in response to this  
 25 action point between you and Janice Wray about

22

1 undertaking that exercise?  
 2 A. No.  
 3 Q. Right.  
 4 Do you know whether this action point was in fact  
 5 acted upon?  
 6 A. I know that she sent a copy of the emergency plan, yes.  
 7 Q. Right. What about the attached details per block and  
 8 estate?  
 9 A. I can't say with any certainty, but I would imagine if  
 10 she was asked for it, she did, yes.  
 11 Q. Can we take it, then, that this was a perfectly good  
 12 opportunity to bring that emergency plan and its annexed  
 13 set of details for each tower block and estate up to  
 14 date as at April 2016?  
 15 A. Yes, it wouldn't have been my responsibility to do that,  
 16 but yes.  
 17 Q. Yes, but can we take it from you, at least, that that  
 18 opportunity was not taken?  
 19 A. I'm assuming from what I've seen since that it wasn't,  
 20 yeah.  
 21 Q. Can you explain why?  
 22 A. No, I couldn't explain —  
 23 Q. What was the proposed line of communication between the  
 24 TMO and RBKC's housing department to ensure that the  
 25 information on vulnerable residents could be made

23

1 available as soon as possible in the event of  
 2 an emergency?  
 3 A. Sorry, what was the first part of that, what was the  
 4 arrangement?  
 5 Q. Yes, what was the line of communication contemplated  
 6 between the TMO and the council's housing department?  
 7 A. So I think that would have been, you know, a physical  
 8 presence or an email version, depending when and where.  
 9 It would be more likely to be a physical presence as we  
 10 saw in Adair.  
 11 Q. I see. And what about other than at an incident? Was  
 12 there a line of communication where updated details on  
 13 vulnerable people in a particular block could be  
 14 channelled through to the council?  
 15 A. No, no, there was no regular sharing of our data into  
 16 the council in terms of tenancy data or ... that.  
 17 Q. So would it work this way: you would wait for  
 18 an incident, and at an incident the council would expect  
 19 you and you would expect yourselves to be able to funnel  
 20 through to whoever was in charge of housing at the  
 21 incident —  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. — the relevant data?  
 24 A. Yes, I would expect that.  
 25 Q. Yes, I see.

24

1 I want to ask you next, then, about some of the  
 2 roles that you and other TMO staff undertook in the  
 3 immediate aftermath of the fire.  
 4 If we go back to your fifth statement, please,  
 5 {TMO00869990/1}, paragraph 3, you say there:  
 6 "I was heavily involved in many issues arising in  
 7 the aftermath of the fire."  
 8 Now, that's right, is it?  
 9 A. Yes, that's right.  
 10 Q. Right. So you stand by that.  
 11 Now, is it right to say that the key areas in which  
 12 the TMO were involved were really three-fold, and I'll  
 13 just count them out to you and tell me whether you agree  
 14 or disagree.  
 15 First, presence at rest centres; yes?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. Yes.  
 18 Second, creating and maintaining lists of residents  
 19 from Grenfell Tower and the evacuated walkway properties  
 20 to identify who needed support.  
 21 A. Yes.  
 22 Q. And then, third, is this right: facilitating the return  
 23 of residents to walkway properties?  
 24 A. Yes, that's correct.  
 25 Q. Yes.

25

1 Now, I'm going to look at those or invite you to  
 2 look at those with me as we go.  
 3 Let's look at rest centres.  
 4 Now, I think it's right, isn't it — and tell me if  
 5 this is right or wrong — that you became aware that  
 6 rest centres had been set up, having been told of the  
 7 fact by your colleague, Hash Chamchoun, just after you  
 8 arrived at the scene, I think?  
 9 A. Yes, that's correct. I was there very early on, we've  
 10 established at 3.50 in the morning, and, yes, that's  
 11 when I was told by Hash the rest centres were open.  
 12 Q. Yes.  
 13 I think it's right, isn't it, that the TMO staff  
 14 were not themselves involved with setting up any  
 15 rest centres?  
 16 A. No, no, no formal role in setting them up.  
 17 Q. If we go, please, to your sixth statement  
 18 {TMO00894124/4}, paragraph 13, you say this:  
 19 "I don't recall any direction being provided by RBKC  
 20 on the role that the TMO should play at the rest centres  
 21 at this early time of the morning, but I believe the  
 22 BECC, and RBKC officers Amanda Johnson, Laura Johnson  
 23 and Rob Shaw were aware of what the TMO were doing  
 24 during the day as we were liaising with them."  
 25 So is it right that the TMO was entirely

26

1 self-directed in this respect?  
 2 A. In the early stages, yes, definitely.  
 3 Q. Yes. How did you decide, or how did the TMO to your  
 4 knowledge decide, what the TMO's role at the  
 5 rest centres was going to be?  
 6 A. So I don't think the TMO as a group decided. There was  
 7 only myself, Robert, Hash and three team leaders. So I,  
 8 you know, looking at what was happening around me,  
 9 decided that that was the most practical thing that we  
 10 could do, is to go to the rest centres and start to  
 11 support residents, and to try and collect information  
 12 about who was safe and missing, so that we could get  
 13 that to LFB initially in real time.  
 14 Q. Right.  
 15 A. And then obviously there were other roles during the  
 16 day.  
 17 Q. Right.  
 18 A. Do you want me to elaborate now?  
 19 Q. Yes, please do.  
 20 A. Yeah, so our other roles during the day were to  
 21 obviously take an account of who was safe and missing  
 22 and who required accommodation, and we provided that  
 23 information directly to RBKC so that they could assist  
 24 with their housing obligation to rehouse residents.  
 25 Q. Yes. And in terms of your specific role on 14 June,

27

1 I think you went to the St Clement's Church, which had  
 2 been set up as a rest centre.  
 3 A. I did. So I organised for the staff that I had at that  
 4 time to go to different rest centres, and I went  
 5 directly to St James's (sic).  
 6 Q. Was that the only rest centre you attended on that day?  
 7 A. Yes, or I ever attended.  
 8 Q. Right, yes, I see.  
 9 Just out of interest, did you work from the annex,  
 10 which I think is annex 14, to RBKC's contingency  
 11 management plan, which had the list of approved  
 12 rest centres on it?  
 13 A. No, no, no, we didn't consult — I didn't consult —  
 14 didn't have time to look at any annexes or documents.  
 15 Hash told me that they were — that that was what was  
 16 open, because he would have had that information from  
 17 the BECC, I assume, or the LALO.  
 18 Q. I see.  
 19 You allocated TMO staff to various rest centres,  
 20 I think, which included St Clement's Church,  
 21 Latymer Church, Rugby Portobello Club, and I think also  
 22 the Westway Centre.  
 23 A. Yeah. Are you talking about immediately or during the  
 24 course of the day? I did — during the course of the  
 25 day, we covered them all.

28



1 Q. During the course of the day, not immediately.  
 2 A. Yes, yes.  
 3 Q. Yes, I see.  
 4 How did you know that those rest centres had opened?  
 5 A. Hash told me.  
 6 Q. Right.  
 7 A. And we went around and found that to be the case.  
 8 Whether they were formally opened or voluntarily opened,  
 9 they were.  
 10 Q. Who was Hash Chamchoun's liaison at the council from  
 11 whom he would have got that information?  
 12 A. I don't know that, but he was stood next to me, so  
 13 I assumed he had got — outside the command unit, so  
 14 I assume he had got that information from — actually,  
 15 I don't know who.  
 16 Q. Okay.  
 17 What did you tell the TMO staff that their roles  
 18 would be at the rest centres?  
 19 A. So I was very clear that they should go to the  
 20 rest centres, that they should collect information  
 21 around who was safe and missing, who was there, the  
 22 names and addresses of people, and if they had any,  
 23 you know, particular needs and accommodation.  
 24 Q. As far as you were aware, do you know who had set these  
 25 rest centres up? Was it the council or was it the

29

1 community?  
 2 A. I think probably at this stage, when I first went, the  
 3 community.  
 4 Q. Let's go to {TMO00869981}. This is a list of TMO staff  
 5 allocated to various rest centres, and this bears the  
 6 time stamp on the left-hand side of the first column  
 7 there 05.30 to 14.00 on 14 June.  
 8 A. Yeah.  
 9 Q. It's entitled "Staff cover".  
 10 We can see who was allocated to the Rugby Club,  
 11 St Clement's Church, the back office at St Clement's  
 12 Church, the Methodist Church, et cetera, and at the  
 13 bottom of the page, you can see just see it, the Westway  
 14 Sports Centre.  
 15 Now, in your sixth statement at paragraph 14  
 16 {TMO00894124/4} you say you don't recall the exact date  
 17 it was produced, but it was produced after the event,  
 18 compiled from people's recollection of which TMO staff  
 19 went to which rest centre on 14 June, and also the  
 20 communication from the WhatsApp groups. Is that  
 21 correct?  
 22 A. Yeah, that's correct. My PA did — she went to some of  
 23 the rest centres on the day, and she had knowledge, and  
 24 also from the very things you said, it was collected  
 25 from that.

30

1 Q. Right.  
 2 Now, if we scroll to page 2 {TMO00869981/2}. Having  
 3 seen page 1, which is Rugby Club and the others on the  
 4 list, page 2 is 14.00 to 22.30, and again you can see  
 5 "Rugby Club", "St Clement's Church", "St Clement Church  
 6 (back office)", "Methodist Church", "Westway Sports  
 7 Centre", and then over to page 3 {TMO00869981/3},  
 8 "Latimer Christian Centre", and they're the same as the  
 9 rest centres in the earlier part of the day.  
 10 We can't see any reference there to allocation of  
 11 TMO staff to other community rest centres, such as the  
 12 Al Manaar Mosque and the St Francis of Assisi Church; is  
 13 that correct?  
 14 A. Yes, I wouldn't have known about them, otherwise —  
 15 you know, these are the ones that I knew about.  
 16 Q. Right. Was there no means of collating information for  
 17 those who had gone to the Al Manaar Mosque, or was it  
 18 simply the case that no TMO staff were sent there?  
 19 A. I didn't sent any — send anyone to those other places,  
 20 no.  
 21 Q. Did you know about them?  
 22 A. No, that's why I didn't send them to them.  
 23 Q. Right. But had you known about them, you would have  
 24 done?  
 25 A. Oh, absolutely.

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1 Q. Yes.  
 2 If we then stick with this document and go back to  
 3 page 1 {TMO00869981/1}, please, we can see that in the  
 4 time slot 5.30 am to 14.00 pm on 14 June, next to  
 5 "Rugby Club" it lists 18 staff members, starting with  
 6 Mandy Warrior, at the top of the list, and going down to  
 7 Robert Speak at the bottom.  
 8 Would it be right to say that this is a cumulative  
 9 total?  
 10 A. Yes, I wanted to explain that. This is — I mean, it  
 11 says 5.30, but we were obviously there in some of those  
 12 much earlier than that. But this is people who were  
 13 there at some point of time. For example, Maria  
 14 actually isn't on the Rugby Club, but she was very much  
 15 there from about — around 8.30/9.00 in the morning. So  
 16 whilst I would say it's nearly, you know, 100% accurate  
 17 because of its source, people would have been moving  
 18 through rest centres at different times during the day,  
 19 and that's very much in the — in a WhatsApp group. We  
 20 used that to move resources around the day.  
 21 But these are the bulk of people in the periods of  
 22 time.  
 23 Q. Yes. Yes, I see.  
 24 Taking the Rugby Club as an example, how many TMO  
 25 staff would have been there on average at any one time?

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1 A. I think — because this is the morning session, so  
 2 I know we had Louise, Mandy and Maria there, and,  
 3 you know, I would imagine that this was — the majority  
 4 of people were there. They won't have been there at  
 5 5.30 because they were — you know, we couldn't have got  
 6 them there that early, but they would have been there,  
 7 you know, from normal working office hours, I would  
 8 imagine.  
 9 Q. Yes.  
 10 Just taking that long list, where were they  
 11 recruited from and what parts of the TMO organisation  
 12 did they normally work in?  
 13 A. So I managed nearly 100 staff, so quite a lot of them  
 14 would have come from my teams, but from the — everybody  
 15 across the organisation was willing to come and help.  
 16 So you've got people from all sorts of different teams  
 17 here, from our environmental services, from resident  
 18 engagement, all sorts of people across the organisation.  
 19 Q. Right. Did you select them or did they volunteer?  
 20 A. So I don't think we selected them. I certainly —  
 21 you know, I think people just naturally came very  
 22 willingly to try and do what they could to help.  
 23 I don't think we needed to beg or ask people. You know,  
 24 our team leaders were there and, you know, got up in the  
 25 middle of the night. They were very much driven to come

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1 because they wanted to.  
 2 I mean, I obviously did — you can see in my  
 3 evidence I did ring my heads of service and get them to  
 4 come in, so I did ask them specifically to go to  
 5 a particular place, but — and then because I had a team  
 6 leader in — or a head of service in every rest centre,  
 7 they, I think, helped to organise greater staff presence  
 8 during the day when people came into the office.  
 9 Q. Yes. Did you take any particular steps to ensure that  
 10 those who were familiar with Grenfell Tower, the  
 11 building, and Grenfell Tower, the community in the  
 12 building, would be at a particular place or —  
 13 A. Well, I took Nicola Bartholomew with me first, because  
 14 she was the team leader in St Clement's — sorry, she  
 15 wasn't team leader of — she was my team leader of the  
 16 neighbourhood where Grenfell was, so I took her with me,  
 17 and actually a lot of the local staff came to  
 18 St Clement's during the day.  
 19 Q. Right. Did you select particular TMO staff based on  
 20 their knowledge of the community?  
 21 A. I took Nicola with me because I knew she would know the  
 22 most about the area.  
 23 Q. I follow.  
 24 Now, Mark Simms, who was chief executive of the P3  
 25 charity, of which the Rugby Portobello Trust was a part,

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1 has given the Inquiry a statement, and he says — and  
 2 there is no need to go to it, but it's at  
 3 {CFV00000005/20}, paragraph 93 — in terms there was no  
 4 interaction with the TMO. Is that right, to the best of  
 5 your recollection?  
 6 A. Well, I mean, I can't personally say, I wasn't there,  
 7 but we had a substantial amount of staff in the  
 8 Rugby Club. When you read the statements of my staff,  
 9 particularly Maria, who was there, you will be able to  
 10 see if she had any direct interaction with him. But  
 11 I know that she describes being downstairs in the  
 12 Rugby Portobello Club, speaking to residents and then  
 13 directing them upstairs to where RBKC were later in the  
 14 day to be rehoused. So that's what I know.  
 15 Q. Is it possible that the TMO staff attending the  
 16 Rugby Club were there but just didn't make themselves  
 17 known to those who were managing the centre?  
 18 A. So I think what I did — and I'm certain that the other  
 19 staff did this — is we tried to have tables quite close  
 20 to the entrance of the door, so that we could catch  
 21 people coming in. That was a purposeful decision to,  
 22 you know, make our presence known. I do think people  
 23 got confused between whether we were RBKC or the TMO or  
 24 volunteers. I think, you know, that did happen.  
 25 Q. Right.

35

1 A. And, you know, when you think about the fact that there  
 2 were so many displaced people during the course of this  
 3 day, you know, there were nearly a thousand people  
 4 evacuated, so, you know, the area was very busy.  
 5 I can't account for why people say we weren't there.  
 6 Q. Is it possible that one of the reasons is that you  
 7 didn't have any kind of badge or tabard?  
 8 A. Well, I had my badge on from very early on all day.  
 9 I know —  
 10 Q. But was it visible?  
 11 A. Yeah.  
 12 Q. Did it say "TMO" very clearly?  
 13 A. Yeah. It's the ID badge that we use. I had it on all  
 14 day.  
 15 Q. But you were in St Clement's Church in the back office.  
 16 What about those at the Rugby Club?  
 17 A. Well, I don't know specifically what they had on.  
 18 I can't tell you. I don't know. That — I don't know  
 19 if they were all wearing them.  
 20 Q. Is it right that you didn't allocate any staff to the  
 21 Salvation Army Church Centre in Portobello Road?  
 22 A. No, I didn't. That's —  
 23 Q. Did you know that RBKC had established what is called  
 24 a friends and relatives reception centre, or FRRC in the  
 25 lingo, from 3.30 in the afternoon of the 14th?

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1 A. I found that out later from communication that I saw  
 2 that was, you know, informing us of where to direct  
 3 people for support, but I don't think I knew that at the  
 4 time.  
 5 Q. Right. I see.  
 6 A. I mean, in — yeah.  
 7 Q. Now, Adrian Clee, who was the Grenfell Tower emergency  
 8 response lead for the Salvation Army, has provided us  
 9 with a witness statement. Can I just show you that.  
 10 That's at {CFV00000059/3}, paragraph 2. He says:  
 11 "Our Salvation Army Church Centre in Portobello Road  
 12 (the 'centre') was specifically asked by the Local  
 13 Authority to open as a place of safety during the  
 14 afternoon of 14th June for individuals who were directly  
 15 affected by the fire and relatives of those who were  
 16 awaiting news."  
 17 Were you made aware at any stage — I think you say  
 18 you were, but when were you first made aware that  
 19 the council had opened that place as a rest centre or  
 20 centre for those directly affected or awaiting news?  
 21 A. So I think I noticed that in a communication that was  
 22 circulated via our WhatsApp group that we passed on to  
 23 our staff, and I don't remember exactly what time that  
 24 was. It would be in my evidence. But there was a note  
 25 that I saw at some point about the Salvation Army.

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1 I wasn't told directly by the council.  
 2 Q. Were you aware of a friends and family reception centre  
 3 being set up at any earlier stage, so that somebody in  
 4 the position of, for example, Nabil Choucair, who has  
 5 given evidence, could go and get news, or at least news  
 6 that there was no news?  
 7 A. Not very early on, no, I was just aware of the main  
 8 rest centres.  
 9 Q. Now, let's then look at a slightly different topic, or  
 10 building on that topic, which is informing residents  
 11 about rest centres.  
 12 Can we go, please, to your fifth statement  
 13 {TMO00869990/4}, paragraph 18. It says this in the  
 14 third line:  
 15 "TMO staff were quickly mobilised to the  
 16 rest centres as they opened and to where evacuees were  
 17 directed. I do not know what arrangements were in place  
 18 to inform residents evacuating Grenfell Tower and the  
 19 surrounding properties of where the rest centres were  
 20 located. I was not based within the police cordon  
 21 however my expectation would be for the LALO to have  
 22 informed the emergency services and for the emergency  
 23 services to direct residents as they evacuated."  
 24 Is it right to say that you don't know if evacuees  
 25 were being directed and, if they were, where to?

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1 A. So I wasn't — as I say here, I wasn't behind the  
 2 cordon, apart from to go to the command unit, so  
 3 I wasn't allowed anywhere near the block, so I just  
 4 didn't know, but what I did know was that the  
 5 rest centres were filling with evacuated people. I saw  
 6 that as soon as I went into St James's.  
 7 Q. Right.  
 8 A. St Clement's.  
 9 Q. Right. But in the light of what you say here, on what  
 10 basis were you allocating staff to rest centres if you  
 11 didn't know that residents would be looking for help?  
 12 A. Well, I knew that residents would be looking for help,  
 13 and I knew that the rest centres were open, so what I'm  
 14 saying here is that I expected them to be directed to  
 15 them by the emergency services as they left the  
 16 building, because I wasn't allowed to be in, you know,  
 17 that part of the estate, I wasn't allowed to do that  
 18 myself, so all I could do was work from where I thought  
 19 that they would be directed to.  
 20 Q. I see. So did you or any other TMO staff take any steps  
 21 to communicate with the LALO or LALOs within the cordon  
 22 or anybody else within the cordon to make sure residents  
 23 were told or advised about where they could go?  
 24 A. So my understanding is that when we decided to go to  
 25 rest centres, we were by the command unit, we were right

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1 next to the command unit, the information had come from  
 2 Hash and that, you know, the BECC or the people in the  
 3 command unit knew that that's what we were doing.  
 4 Q. Were you aware that while some walkway residents were  
 5 told by police to leave their homes, they weren't told  
 6 where they could go?  
 7 A. No, I wasn't, and that's, you know, obviously not good  
 8 if that's the case, but I did know that — so, from my  
 9 point of view, I knew that the walkway residents —  
 10 a lot of the walkway residents were coming to  
 11 St James's. So at that stage I probably thought the  
 12 message had got to them, that that's where they should  
 13 go, because that's where they were — you know, a large  
 14 proportion were going.  
 15 Q. Yes, I see. And what time was that?  
 16 A. So I got there, I think, at about 4.45.  
 17 Q. Right. So residents were already coming into St James's  
 18 from the walkways, even at that early stage?  
 19 A. Yeah. So, you know, when I first got to the  
 20 rest centre, you know, I made it — myself and Nicola's  
 21 job was to go round the people in the rest centre to see  
 22 how they were, and, you know, a lot of those at that  
 23 stage were from the walkways.  
 24 Q. Did you consider allocating some of your staff to work  
 25 within the cordon with the Metropolitan Police so that

40

1 you could really both direct people on the streets to  
2 rest centres?  
3 A. This was a heavily controlled area. We weren't allowed  
4 to go anywhere near the block. I — you know, I had to  
5 come in and out of the cordon to go to the command unit,  
6 and I struggled sometimes, even with my ID, to get  
7 through there.  
8 Q. As the morning progressed, were you aware of any visual  
9 signposts, like posters or other messages in the area,  
10 to direct people to rest centres, or giving out contact  
11 numbers for help?  
12 A. I wasn't aware of any posters but, you know, there may  
13 have been. I was very focused on what I was trying to  
14 do. I don't remember posters.  
15 Q. Let's look at the Westway, then, next.  
16 Can we go to your fifth statement, page 7  
17 {TMO00869990/7}, paragraph 35. You say there:  
18 "The situation about which rest centres were staying  
19 open changed during the evening. St Clements Church  
20 chose to remain open, but I believe this was on a  
21 voluntary basis as it was not an official overnight rest  
22 centre. The Westway was the designated overnight  
23 rest centre."  
24 That's correct, is it?  
25 A. Yes, that's my understanding.

41

1 Q. And you say "during the evening"; that's the 14th?  
2 A. Yes, yes.  
3 Q. And by "designated rest centre", which is the expression  
4 you use there, do you mean that it became the central  
5 and official centre for support that would be run and  
6 managed by the council?  
7 A. Yes. We got, you know, communication during the course  
8 of the day that we were to direct people to the  
9 Westway Centre — sorry, the Westway overnight because  
10 that would be the designated rest centre.  
11 Q. Were you aware that the Westway Sports Centre had opened  
12 in the early hours of the morning on a voluntary basis,  
13 not an official rest centre by the council?  
14 A. I'm not sure if I knew that at the time.  
15 Q. Right. Do you know how the Westway Centre became the  
16 designated rest centre?  
17 A. I imagine that that was the council organising that,  
18 you know, more formally during the course of the day,  
19 later on in the afternoon, is what my view was, because  
20 definitely the communication we got was from  
21 the council.  
22 Q. And who at the council, do you remember?  
23 A. I think it was Amanda Johnson to start with and then  
24 I think it was Rob Shaw, and we communicated that to our  
25 staff in the rest centre.

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1 Q. You go on at paragraph 36 of your statement  
2 {TMO00869990/7}, as you can see, to say this:  
3 "There was some difficulty persuading people to move  
4 from other rest centres to the Westway in part due to  
5 the ongoing generosity of people in the rest centres  
6 where food continued to be provided. Donations of food  
7 and clothing had been generously flooding into all rest  
8 centres from the early hours of the morning. The number  
9 of people turning up offering to help was also large."  
10 Is it right to say that some people chose to stay at  
11 rest centres being run by the community rather than  
12 moving to the Westway Centre?  
13 A. Yes, I think that's absolutely the case, yeah.  
14 Q. Did that cause problems?  
15 A. I think it was right for them to be where they felt it  
16 was best to be. I think all we were trying to do was  
17 to, you know, direct them where the council had said was  
18 the overnight provision, because it had been set up for  
19 that, but, you know, my feeling very much is, you know,  
20 people would choose where they feel most comfortable.  
21 Q. As part of that sense that you had, did you get a sense  
22 that in some way the evacuees preferred to be helped by  
23 community volunteers rather than by somebody in  
24 an official capacity? Well, the council.  
25 A. I think people will — you know, can say that for

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1 themselves, yes.  
2 Q. But did you get a sense from what you could see?  
3 A. Well, I thought a number of different centres were being  
4 utilised. People, you know, just chose whichever form  
5 of support that they I guess thought was most useful to  
6 them and they felt comfortable.  
7 Q. I want to ask you, then, about accounting for residents  
8 at rest centres.  
9 Can we turn, please, to your sixth statement,  
10 paragraph 29 {TMO00894124/8}, and you say there at  
11 paragraph 29, foot of the page, foot of your screen:  
12 "I recall that RBKC Housing Officers attended at  
13 St Clement's Church on the afternoon of 14 June 2017 to  
14 provide direct rehousing to residents. My expectation  
15 is that they attended at all rest centres on this  
16 afternoon to provide assistance to residents identified  
17 as requiring rehousing."  
18 Now, by "all rest centres" there, are you referring  
19 to the ones listed on your earlier list we looked at  
20 earlier?  
21 A. I think I meant that ... yes, but I think actually they  
22 only had three main centres that they went to, which was  
23 St James's, Rugby and Westway. And also, you know,  
24 a number of them closed during the day and people moved,  
25 so they may have directed the staff to the ones that

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1 they thought most people were there.  
 2 Q. Right. What about the Al Manaar Mosque? Can we take it  
 3 that you didn't know, and perhaps don't know still,  
 4 whether RBKC staff attended other community  
 5 rest centres, such as the Al Manaar Mosque?  
 6 A. No, I don't know. I do know that they were at Rugby and  
 7 that they were at St James's and later the Westway, I do  
 8 know that.  
 9 Q. Okay.  
 10 Now, at paragraph 37 of your fifth statement  
 11 {TMO00869990/7}, if we can go back to that, you say at  
 12 the foot of your screen there:  
 13 "I believe that by late evening on 14 June 2017,  
 14 RBKC had managed to place the majority of people in  
 15 hotels or we had directed them to the Westway."  
 16 Are you referring there to Grenfell Tower residents,  
 17 or everyone who was evacuated, including Grenfell Tower  
 18 residents but also including the walkways?  
 19 A. I think I mainly mean Grenfell Tower, but I did know  
 20 that, by the end of the day, they had housed some people  
 21 from the walkways as well. But I — yeah.  
 22 Q. Right.  
 23 What was the basis of your information that RBKC had  
 24 managed to place the majority of evacuees in hotels?  
 25 A. So we were obviously liaising with the council very

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1 closely during the whole course of this night and day,  
 2 and we knew that they were placing people, we knew that  
 3 they were placing Grenfell Tower residents as  
 4 a priority, and then we knew that they were focusing on  
 5 housing people from the walkways who were vulnerable or  
 6 elderly or people with families. We knew that. So  
 7 I had assumed that, you know, the majority of those  
 8 people had been housed, and they were also asking for —  
 9 yeah, that's what I knew.  
 10 Q. Right. Well, we'll come to the question of  
 11 prioritisation in a moment, because I want to look at  
 12 that in a little bit more detail with you.  
 13 But just on the question of hotels, the Inquiry has  
 14 heard evidence from evacuees who were not placed in  
 15 hotels on 14 June, and in some cases for significant  
 16 periods. Did you know that at the time?  
 17 A. I do know that I knew that the next day, because we  
 18 followed up our work on the Thursday with ring — with  
 19 phoning round people in Grenfell Tower.  
 20 Q. I see. So —  
 21 A. I think some people weren't there, obviously, some  
 22 people were away, some people chose to go and stay with  
 23 other people, so I knew that there was, you know, not  
 24 a demand for everyone to be housed that first night, if  
 25 I'm putting that the right way. I know that there were

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1 some people that wouldn't have been — who wouldn't have  
 2 asked for housing on that night.  
 3 Q. Was it the case that people hadn't been contacted so  
 4 that they could know what support was available at the  
 5 rest centres?  
 6 A. So I know that myself and Kiran and other colleagues  
 7 during the day tried to ring round everybody from  
 8 Grenfell Tower who we hadn't caught in the rest centres.  
 9 We tried to phone them on several occasions during the  
 10 day so that we could give them advice about where to go  
 11 and to check that they were safe.  
 12 Q. Right. Who did you try to phone?  
 13 A. All the people who hadn't reported to the rest centre  
 14 during the course of the day, and you can see  
 15 evidence — there's a document, which is our tenancy  
 16 list, where we've matched, basically, those who we  
 17 thought were safe and missing, and on the left—hand side  
 18 of that document, whatever it is, there's a column that  
 19 shows where we were phoning round people to see where  
 20 they were.  
 21 Q. Right. Were there instances of people using  
 22 rest centres that did not have an RBKC presence  
 23 organising accommodation?  
 24 A. Sorry, can you say that again? I'm not quite sure.  
 25 Q. Yes. Was it the case that people were not put in hotels

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1 because they were using rest centres which were not RBKC  
 2 rest centres?  
 3 A. I don't know that, but I know that some people were put  
 4 in — no, I don't know the answer to that.  
 5 Q. No.  
 6 Now, turning to the question of prioritisation, can  
 7 we go, please, to page 6, back a page in this statement  
 8 {TMO00869990/6}, and look at paragraph 28. You say  
 9 there, four lines down:  
 10 "RBKC's Housing Team were focusing on booking  
 11 Grenfell Tower survivors into hotels initially."  
 12 That's right, is it?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. That's what you say.  
 15 If we go, however, to paragraph 32 of this  
 16 statement, page 7 {TMO00869990/7}, you say:  
 17 "RBKC advised us to tell residents displaced in the  
 18 cordoned off areas including Grenfell Walk, Hurstway  
 19 Walk, Testerton Walk, Barandon Walk and Treadgold House  
 20 to go to rest centres where they would be accommodated  
 21 overnight if the cordon remained in place overnight  
 22 whilst those who were elderly/vulnerable/children were  
 23 accommodated by RBKC. Teams on the ground were advised  
 24 of this."  
 25 Was there a strategy prioritising Grenfell Tower

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1 survivors for emergency accommodation over residents  
 2 from the area inside the cordon other than the tower?  
 3 A. I think there was, in terms of early in the day, I think  
 4 there was, the priority was housing Grenfell residents  
 5 first.  
 6 Q. Right. And how was that organised?  
 7 A. The council organised that.  
 8 Q. Do you know how they — what system they used?  
 9 A. Well, I know that they did a lot of bookings early in  
 10 the morning of hotels, and then I know that they came to  
 11 the rest centres, and we had been advising them through  
 12 exchange of data during the day of people who were safe  
 13 and missing, people who were in the rest centres, and  
 14 they then came to the rest centres and did the physical  
 15 booking of those — that accommodation for the  
 16 residents.  
 17 Q. Right. When they were doing that, prioritising the  
 18 Grenfell Tower residents in the way you've described,  
 19 did they have up-to-date data, or so far as was possible  
 20 up-to-date data, about who was vulnerable?  
 21 A. They had up-to-date data from — well, they had the data  
 22 that we had on our tenancy database, and I know that  
 23 they were making their own assessments of people when  
 24 they were doing bookings. They were checking — they  
 25 were doing detailed assessments of every individual when

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1 they were making bookings from the rest centres.  
 2 Q. And when they were making their own assessments of  
 3 people when doing their bookings, what criteria were  
 4 they using, to the best of your knowledge?  
 5 A. I couldn't tell you that. I don't know.  
 6 Q. Do you know whether any attention was given by RBKC to  
 7 whether the hotel accommodation being proposed for  
 8 evacuees from Grenfell Tower was suitable for the  
 9 particular needs of those evacuees?  
 10 A. I don't know that in any detail. I do know that they  
 11 were trying to match it with the needs of the people  
 12 that — you know, from — that they had — sorry. I'm  
 13 not saying that right at all.  
 14 Q. No, I understand.  
 15 A. You know, you get the gist of it.  
 16 Q. Yes, I think that's clear.  
 17 A. Sorry.  
 18 Q. To be clear, so far as you knew, they were trying to  
 19 match hotel accommodation with —  
 20 A. The needs.  
 21 Q. — the vulnerability data that you thought they had —  
 22 A. No, no, no, I'm sorry, I'm not saying that, so it's  
 23 worth us clarifying. I'm saying we had given them that  
 24 information, and I thought that they were making their  
 25 own assessments at the point of booking people into the

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1 hotels about their particular needs. So they were  
 2 getting their live data from, you know, how it was on  
 3 the ground at the time.  
 4 Q. I see.  
 5 Was there any information—sharing between the TMO  
 6 and the council about vulnerable persons and their  
 7 needs?  
 8 A. There was sort of constant information—sharing. So we  
 9 gave them the tenancy list, which had a list of what we  
 10 had known as vulnerable at that stage, and that was  
 11 shared with them.  
 12 Q. Now, Westway. Can we go, please, to your sixth  
 13 statement, page 13 {TMO00894124/13}, where you tell us  
 14 at paragraph 46 that you did not attend the  
 15 Westway Centre on 14 June or during the subsequent  
 16 period of its occupation. I think we've seen, though,  
 17 that there was a rota of TMO staff to provide support to  
 18 the evacuated residents who were there; yes?  
 19 A. Yes. I think that's a snapshot of the rota, though.  
 20 I think that's a rota at a point in time, because we had  
 21 staff in the Westway from, you know, the day of the fire  
 22 until when eventually we were asked to leave attending.  
 23 Q. Given that the Westway Centre had become the central  
 24 place for support, why didn't you attend on the 14th or  
 25 after 14 June and —

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1 A. Because I was busy doing a variety of other things, and  
 2 I — we had a rota of staff who were very capable and  
 3 confident to be there, and I didn't think that I needed  
 4 to go there.  
 5 Q. Right.  
 6 What support was provided to the TMO staff that were  
 7 assigned to the Westway Centre to enable them adequately  
 8 to support, in turn, the needs of the survivors and  
 9 residents?  
 10 A. So we had daily briefings back at the office.  
 11 I organised daily briefings to make sure that all our  
 12 staff were — we were sharing information as we knew it,  
 13 because everything was moving very fast. So we made  
 14 sure that we exchanged information on a regular basis.  
 15 You can see that through our statements. You see —  
 16 well, I'm sure we'll go there later.  
 17 So we briefed our staff and they were aware of the  
 18 services of other agencies within the Westway, so they  
 19 were aware of what — who they could, you know, direct  
 20 people to if they came to their desk.  
 21 Q. Right. On the 14th, at least, what were the other  
 22 services of the other agencies within the Westway?  
 23 A. There was a list, I remember, that was circulated on our  
 24 WhatsApp group fairly early on, on the day, I believe,  
 25 and that listed the full range of services. So there

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1 was mental health support — I'm sorry, just gone blank.  
 2 A full range of services .  
 3 Q. Right.  
 4 A. Housing were down there, RBKC housing were there. I'm  
 5 sorry, I've just gone blank on that.  
 6 Q. I think it's right, isn't it, as you tell us in your  
 7 sixth statement, paragraph 47 {TMO00894124/13}, that  
 8 there was no physical TMO presence on Saturday the 17th  
 9 and Sunday, 18 June, the first weekend following the  
 10 fire?  
 11 A. So this is something I think I'm a bit confused on,  
 12 because I think it's possible, from reading the  
 13 statements, that Mandy, Olivia or Hash may have been  
 14 there. It certainly wasn't intentional that we weren't  
 15 there, and we were doing a variety of other things, but  
 16 I can't say 100% if we were or not.  
 17 Q. Right.  
 18 Do you know how many evacuees were in the  
 19 Westway Centre over that weekend?  
 20 A. No, I don't know that.  
 21 Q. Do you know who was protecting them or catering for  
 22 their needs, such as washing, changing facilities ,  
 23 grief, prayer, or just privacy?  
 24 A. I know that — I mean, they were all the things that  
 25 I should have been able to tell you were at the Westway

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1 a moment ago, but other organisations were providing  
 2 that support.  
 3 Q. Right.  
 4 A. We knew that Rob Bush was — sorry, Rob Shaw was there  
 5 as well, and we were in telephone contact with people.  
 6 But I can't say 100% that we weren't there.  
 7 Q. Do you remember whether you or anybody else from the TMO  
 8 team was in contact with the HASG, the humanitarian  
 9 assistance steering group, or anybody from humanitarian  
 10 assistance at the Westway over that weekend?  
 11 A. I've just said I can't remember 100% whether we were.  
 12 Q. Did you yourself at any stage have any contact with the  
 13 HALO, the humanitarian assistance liaison officer?  
 14 A. No, I didn't.  
 15 Q. No. Had you heard of that role?  
 16 A. No.  
 17 Q. Was that —  
 18 A. No, not before.  
 19 Q. No? Nobody told you that somebody called Sue Redmond  
 20 from the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham had  
 21 taken on the role of HALO from 15 June?  
 22 A. I don't remember that. I don't remember that. No.  
 23 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, we're about to come to a new  
 24 topic.  
 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Yes, would you rather break at that

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1 point?  
 2 MR MILLETT: I think it's sensible to break at that point,  
 3 if we can.  
 4 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Well, Ms Brown, it's obviously  
 5 a good point to have our morning break, so we'll stop  
 6 there.  
 7 THE WITNESS: Okay.  
 8 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: We'll resume, please, at 11.30. As  
 9 you know, I said it to you on the previous occasions,  
 10 please don't talk to anyone about your evidence or  
 11 anything to do with it while you're out of the room.  
 12 All right?  
 13 THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you.  
 14 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you very much. Would you like  
 15 to go with the usher, please.  
 16 (Pause)  
 17 Thank you very much, Mr Millett. 11.30, then,  
 18 please. Thank you.  
 19 (11.13 am)  
 20 (A short break)  
 21 (11.30 am)  
 22 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: All right, Ms Brown, all set to  
 23 carry on?  
 24 THE WITNESS: Yeah.  
 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you very much.

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1 Yes, Mr Millett.  
 2 MR MILLETT: Yes, thank you very much, Mr Chairman.  
 3 I now want to ask you about the safe and missing  
 4 residents list that the TMO created and maintained in  
 5 the period after the fire .  
 6 First, I want to look at the list of persons from  
 7 Grenfell Tower itself .  
 8 Can we start with your sixth witness statement,  
 9 please, which is open in front of you on the screen,  
 10 I think, at the moment, and go back in it to page 6  
 11 {TMO00894124/6}, paragraph 19.  
 12 (Pause)  
 13 Thank you. Paragraph 19. You say there, second  
 14 line:  
 15 "Prior to mobilisation of TMO staff to rest centres,  
 16 I asked them to identify which tenants and leaseholders  
 17 were present at their centres, and to collate  
 18 information on those who were missing. The reason why  
 19 I did this was to try and provide information to the LFB  
 20 to help them identify which residents remained missing."  
 21 So that's correct, is it?  
 22 A. Yeah.  
 23 Q. Yes. Was that task directed by RBKC?  
 24 A. No, I don't remember where it was tasked from, really,  
 25 but I don't think it was by them.

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1 Q. Given that that is or might have been the case, that you  
 2 weren't tasked by RBKC to undertake that role, why did  
 3 you do it?  
 4 A. Because I think when I was standing in the command  
 5 centre, it seemed a very practical thing that I could do  
 6 to assist. I knew that it would be important and,  
 7 therefore, I set about doing that.  
 8 Q. I see. So you volunteered it?  
 9 A. I think so, yeah.  
 10 Q. Did you get any kind of direction on the type of data  
 11 that should be collected from the survivors and those  
 12 being evacuated from the tower or about how to collate  
 13 and organise and store that information?  
 14 A. I don't remember getting any direction from anybody  
 15 about it.  
 16 Q. Just to be clear, is it right that this process was in  
 17 relation to the Grenfell Tower residents as opposed to  
 18 the residents who had been evacuated from the walkways  
 19 and Treadgold House?  
 20 A. Yes, at this stage, yes.  
 21 Q. At this stage.  
 22 Now, if we stick, please, with this page  
 23 {TMO00894124/6}, and go, please, a little lower down to  
 24 paragraph 20, you say:  
 25 "This information was initially recorded on pieces

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1 of paper brought to me at St Clement's Church or in the  
 2 vicinity of that area, which I then relayed to the LFB  
 3 at the Command Unit. LFB photocopied the pages and gave  
 4 them back to me."  
 5 Et cetera.  
 6 Then you explain that there were handwritten lists  
 7 provided to Kiran, who put the information on  
 8 spreadsheets on the laptop, and then you say:  
 9 "This information was shared via email with the  
 10 BECC, RBKC, LFB, and the Casualty Bureau at Met Police,  
 11 amongst others at various times during the day as it was  
 12 updated."  
 13 Is it correct that, initially, this information was  
 14 used to give to the LFB to help with rescue efforts?  
 15 A. Yeah, I hand delivered the information on those who were  
 16 missing to the LFB from a very early stage.  
 17 Q. Right. Was it the case that, thereafter, the TMO  
 18 continued to update the safe or missing persons list and  
 19 then circulated it to a number of agencies?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. Including RBKC.  
 22 A. That's correct.  
 23 Q. Right, and for their purposes -- is this right? -- to  
 24 help them identify who needed emergency accommodation.  
 25 A. Yes, it was telling them who was safe and missing and

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1 also, yes, it was used to identify who needed  
 2 accommodation.  
 3 Q. Do you know whether the Casualty Bureau, which had been  
 4 set up at about, I think, 6.30 am, was using those lists  
 5 to help them with their enquiries coming in from those  
 6 who were looking for their loved ones?  
 7 A. I know that we certainly sent it to them. I don't know  
 8 what they did with it. But we updated that list several  
 9 times during the course of the day, I think maybe five,  
 10 six times, and we did send that information to  
 11 Casualty Bureau, definitely, and always to the BECC and  
 12 RBKC.  
 13 Q. Right. And --  
 14 A. And -- yeah.  
 15 Q. Did you appreciate when you did that that those  
 16 agencies -- I call them agencies, but the  
 17 Casualty Bureau, the BECC, the council -- would be  
 18 relying on that information in delivering their own  
 19 emergency responses?  
 20 A. I thought that they would be using it as a base and, to  
 21 a certain extent, relying on it, but I did expect people  
 22 to, you know, during the course of -- housing people and  
 23 further conversations during the course of the few days,  
 24 for people to use that as a base and add to it.  
 25 Q. Did you think at the time that it was a role best

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1 carried out by the TMO or did you think that it was  
 2 a role better undertaken by RBKC as the official  
 3 responder?  
 4 A. Well, I don't think I knew in detail about the Red Cross  
 5 links and that the Red Cross were -- did have a system  
 6 of collecting data themselves. So I don't think I knew  
 7 that at the stage that I started it.  
 8 Q. Looking back on it now, is it your view that it would  
 9 have been a role better suited to RBKC?  
 10 A. Well, I don't know ... RBKC? I don't know. They  
 11 weren't there at the time. They weren't there at the  
 12 early hours of the morning. They weren't there at 4.45,  
 13 when we started collecting the information. So  
 14 I thought it was best that we get on with it, I think,  
 15 which was most in my mind.  
 16 Q. Now, you say in paragraph 21 that you were responsible  
 17 for the process in terms of asking for the information  
 18 to be collated by TMO staff. Were you satisfied that  
 19 the staff you allocated to the various rest centres were  
 20 equipped to deal with that task?  
 21 A. I think they knew exactly what we needed. I'd  
 22 communicated the plan to them, and I think that they --  
 23 and if you look at their statements, to me it's very  
 24 clear, thankfully, that we're all saying the same thing,  
 25 that we knew what we were doing, there was a task in

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1 hand, and whilst it was on pieces of paper, there was  
 2 definitely a process that we were going through to  
 3 upload those to the spreadsheet.  
 4 Q. That process, was it a pre-existing process, or was it  
 5 a process cobbled together on the day but which, so far  
 6 as you were concerned, worked?  
 7 A. Well, it was a process that I directed on the day.  
 8 Q. Was there any training given to your staff on how to  
 9 undertake that process?  
 10 A. Not specifically, but, you know, they were used to  
 11 dealing with residents, obviously not in such awful  
 12 circumstances. But, no, there was no specific training  
 13 about rest centres specifically or collecting that. But  
 14 they were clear on what was being asked of them.  
 15 Q. I just want to show you what Mandy Warrier has told  
 16 the Inquiry in her witness statement. Can we go,  
 17 please, to {TMO10048986/4}, paragraph 17. She says:  
 18 "Teresa instructed me to go to the reception centre  
 19 that had been set up at the Harrow Club. When I got to  
 20 the Harrow Club, the manager of the Club essentially  
 21 abdicated all responsibility for the reception centre to  
 22 me. I began greeting people as they entered the centre,  
 23 making a note of who they were and what they needed.  
 24 I also made a list of any people who were allegedly  
 25 missing."

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1 She carries on at paragraph 18:  
 2 "I recall feeling like I wasn't the right person to  
 3 be running the centre as I had not received any training  
 4 on running a reception centre, however I had no choice  
 5 but to carry on."  
 6 Given the importance of the task to identify safe  
 7 and missing residents, why were staff members who were  
 8 not confident in undertaking this role, as she  
 9 apparently wasn't, asked to do so?  
 10 A. Well, I don't think she should have been asked to run  
 11 a rest centre. That's what — isn't what I sent her  
 12 there to do. I asked her to keep a — get a list of the  
 13 safe and the missing.  
 14 Q. Right. Did you have a conversation with her on the day  
 15 or a later day about her perceptions that she reflects  
 16 in paragraph 18 there?  
 17 A. I don't remember certainly(?) discussing it. I think  
 18 she is — if you look at all the other statements,  
 19 I don't think any of the other staff had a difficulty  
 20 with what they're doing. Mandy had volunteered. She  
 21 had came in in the middle of the night to try and do  
 22 what she could do to help. I did send her other  
 23 resources, and I think that's all I could do at that  
 24 time, and we obviously sent more people later on. And  
 25 she in fact moved to the Portobello Rugby Club, so she

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1 will have been supported by more staff as the day went  
 2 on.  
 3 Q. Yes, and we saw her name, certainly on the 5.30 am —  
 4 A. Yeah, yeah.  
 5 Q. — 14.00 slot at the top of the list at the Rugby  
 6 Portobello Club.  
 7 A. Yeah.  
 8 Q. When allocating staff to rest centres and asking them to  
 9 undertake this role of recording safe and missing  
 10 residents, did you consider at the time whether they  
 11 were adequately trained to do so?  
 12 A. Do you know, I — on the day, no, I did not think that  
 13 at all. They had come to site because they wanted to do  
 14 something to help. I didn't question what — you know,  
 15 they didn't question what they were doing. They were  
 16 willing to go there and do what they could to help. So  
 17 this certainly wasn't the feedback I got from Mandy at  
 18 the time. She was — you know, she worked tirelessly in  
 19 many days and weeks following this, as did other staff,  
 20 so ...  
 21 Q. Were any of the staff deployed to rest centres trained  
 22 as rest centre managers?  
 23 A. No, none of our staff were rest centre managers. That  
 24 would have been an RBKC thing, to be trained as  
 25 a rest centre manager. We weren't formally trained.

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1 Q. Right. Just to be clear, is the answer: no, they  
 2 weren't trained, but equally, they didn't actually  
 3 perform the role of rest centre managers?  
 4 A. They definitely weren't rest centre managers. It was  
 5 RBKC's role to deploy rest centre managers, which they  
 6 did in the evening.  
 7 Q. And until the evening, before the evening, who filled  
 8 the gap?  
 9 A. Well, I don't think that I saw my staff role ever to be  
 10 rest centre managers. They were there to assist with  
 11 collecting the information that I'd asked them to go  
 12 there and to support residents. I didn't ever see that  
 13 they would be in charge of rest centres. They were  
 14 an additional resource.  
 15 Q. And in providing the additional resource, was it your  
 16 view that they were doing so under the TMO's emergency  
 17 plan or just as a matter of voluntary conduct?  
 18 A. Do you know, I don't think I had time to think about in  
 19 which capacity they were doing it, just that they were  
 20 there, doing what they could to assist.  
 21 Q. Now, let's look next specifically at the process of  
 22 creating and developing the safe and missing residents  
 23 list.  
 24 Initially, I think the information, as you say, was  
 25 recorded by staff as handwritten notes. You tell us

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1 that at paragraph 20 of your sixth statement  
 2 {TMO00894124/6}, which we've seen, and then your  
 3 colleague Kiran Singh arrived at St Clement's Church and  
 4 began recording it in a spreadsheet; yes?  
 5 A. Yes, that's right. I'd asked him to bring the laptop.  
 6 Q. Yes.  
 7 Now, let's look at how that was done in detail. Can  
 8 we look at his supplementary statement, please,  
 9 {TMO00894410/1}, paragraph 3a. He says:  
 10 "I originally received a full tenancy list for the  
 11 Grenfell Tower from David Noble in the form of  
 12 a spreadsheet. I understood that this had been  
 13 extracted from Capita and detailed the names, addresses  
 14 and contact details of tenants. The extracted list was  
 15 used as the starting point for the list of safe and  
 16 missing residents from the Grenfell Tower."  
 17 Does that accord with your understanding, Ms Brown,  
 18 of how the spreadsheet was developed?  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. If we go to your fifth statement {TMO00869990/5},  
 21 paragraph 25, you see there you exhibit TB/5, just  
 22 halfway down the paragraph, and you say that includes  
 23 an email attached with a list saying "Current resident  
 24 list", which he then emailed to the BECC,  
 25 Casualty Bureau, Essex Police, Amanda Johnson, you and

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1 Robert Black on 14 June at 12.21; yes?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. Yes. Let's just go to that, then, {TMO00869930}. It's  
 4 from Kiran Singh to all those people, including you,  
 5 subject, "Current resident list":  
 6 "Hi  
 7 "Current list of safe and known missing residents of  
 8 Grenfell Tower. This is a working document which is  
 9 being updated constantly so we will provide further  
 10 updates during the day."  
 11 Note the time: 12.21.  
 12 Let's look at the spreadsheet, which is attached, as  
 13 you can see, "RESIDENT LIST" as an xls, which is  
 14 a spreadsheet. It's at {TMO00869931}. Can we have that  
 15 open, please. So we'll need the native for that,  
 16 please.  
 17 Now, you will see from the foot of the screen that  
 18 there are four sub-tabs in the spreadsheet: there's  
 19 "General", there's "Safe", there's "Missing" and there's  
 20 something called "Sheet4".  
 21 Now, is it right, looking at Kiran Singh's evidence  
 22 about how this list was generated, that the "General"  
 23 tab represents the extracted full tenancy list that he  
 24 describes?  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. Yes.  
 2 A. Well, yes, that's right.  
 3 Q. Yes, and if we open "General", I think you can see it.  
 4 Just open "General" up and scroll down. Everyone can  
 5 see what that list looks like.  
 6 If we go, please, back to Kiran Singh's statement at  
 7 paragraph 3b on page 2 {TMO00894410/2} — we're going to  
 8 come back to this document in a minute, so don't let it  
 9 go too far away — he says at 3b on page 2:  
 10 "From my understanding, this document reflected all  
 11 known occupants of each property at the Grenfell Tower  
 12 rather than just the registered tenant. As the data  
 13 contained in this document had been extracted from the  
 14 TMO's system, it would have reflected and recorded the  
 15 exact information provided by a tenant about a change,  
 16 or update in their household occupants."  
 17 Now, that's what he says.  
 18 Can I next show you what Hash Chamchoun says in his  
 19 statement, {TMO10048972/4}, paragraph 12. He says  
 20 halfway through the paragraph:  
 21 "TMO held details ..."  
 22 Do you see that?  
 23 A. Yeah.  
 24 Q. "TMO held details of the registered tenants and  
 25 leaseholder for each flat but it did not hold details of

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1 the occupants, family members and visitors. This  
 2 information was constantly being updated as information  
 3 became available and my understanding is regular updates  
 4 were given by others to the Fire Brigade and police in  
 5 order to identify those who remained missing."  
 6 Now, based on your understanding, did the general  
 7 list that I've shown you compiled by Kiran Singh contain  
 8 details of registered tenants and leaseholders of  
 9 Grenfell Tower, or was it a list of all household  
 10 occupants?  
 11 A. I think it was a mixture, and I think it was dependent  
 12 on when people probably entered the — started their  
 13 tenancies. So if you look back at the list, some of it  
 14 is just a tenant, a lead tenant, and sometimes it's the  
 15 household members. You see it repeated, you know, two  
 16 or four — might be three or four times if there were  
 17 four occupants. So it was a mixture of both. And we  
 18 would only know the leaseholder's details, not the  
 19 subtenant's details on that list.  
 20 Q. Right, and was that something you knew at the time when  
 21 Kiran Singh was compiling his list?  
 22 A. Yes, we knew that, yeah. You could see —  
 23 Q. So is this right: your baseline, then, for identifying  
 24 who was in the building on the night was not necessarily  
 25 accurate?

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1 A. So I think it's — you know, as Kiran has said in his  
2 statements and as Laura referred to last week, our  
3 information about our tenants is only as accurate as the  
4 last time it was recorded. It's a snapshot in time. So  
5 information is taken when a tenancy signs up, when you  
6 do a tenancy change, when a tenant reports a change to  
7 you, and then you can update the information. So at any  
8 point, I think we all understand that it's never going  
9 to be 100% accurate because it is also dependent on  
10 people giving information to you.

11 Q. So you might actually have a flat where the identity and  
12 characteristics of the occupant was completely different  
13 from what is contained on your list?

14 A. I wouldn't expect to see many occasions where it was  
15 completely different. I — yeah. I wouldn't expect  
16 that to be completely different, no. It would be in the  
17 case of leaseholders. I know that we did find,  
18 you know, people had sublet their property and there  
19 were different occupants completely in the case of  
20 leaseholders.

21 Q. Were you confident at the time that the list — the  
22 general list, at least — represented everyone who  
23 needed to be accounted for?

24 A. Well, no, I think we understood that there would be  
25 people in the building on that night who weren't

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1 registered tenants, who were either staying or —  
2 you know, we knew that there would be other people. All  
3 we could use was the base that we had, and it was taken  
4 from Capita on the day of the fire, so it was the latest  
5 registered information that we had.

6 Q. Can we go to {TMO10035581}. I think you probably  
7 answered this question, but let's look at what's said.  
8 It's from Robert Shaw at RBKC housing to Kiran Singh  
9 and you at 14.42 on 17 June, which was the Saturday  
10 afternoon after the fire, "Quick question":  
11 "Do we know, roughly, how many residents (not just  
12 lead tenants) were in the Tower. Been asked this by  
13 a Red Cross volunteer."  
14 First, presumably that was a question in your mind,  
15 was it, right from the start of the fire?

16 A. Yeah, that's why I was always concerned about the  
17 reliance on just using the tenants list, the tenancy  
18 list, because that wouldn't be the up-to-date account of  
19 people who would be in there. It would be, you know,  
20 more or less right, but there would be other occupants  
21 that night, there would be people who were away, people  
22 who had had children that we weren't told about,  
23 you know, it's a fluid thing. We wouldn't know at any  
24 particular point in time 100% who was in the tower on  
25 the night.

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1 Q. Yes. Indeed, if we look at the response to this email  
2 a few minutes later at {TMO10035581/4}, this is  
3 Kiran Singh's response to Robert Shaw at 14.48 on the  
4 same day, 17 June, and he says, second email down:  
5 "231 people (tenant and household members, not any  
6 visitors) that we were aware of from our IT tenancy  
7 records. This should be on the updated Grenfell 'safe'  
8 list I sent yesterday."  
9 "Obviously this is not likely to be 100% accurate as  
10 households have changed over the years and we have not  
11 always been told."  
12 So I think that makes the point, doesn't it, that at  
13 the time you were aware that the safe and missing list  
14 was based on an inaccurate or incomplete baseline?

15 A. I'd say incomplete, not necessarily — yeah, incomplete.  
16 There's always that danger. And it really is —  
17 you know, it is a partnership thing, working with  
18 residents, isn't it, to make sure that we have as much  
19 up-to-date information as we can.

20 Q. Yes. Did it occur to you at the time, therefore, that  
21 the agencies who were being sent this list were relying  
22 on that information, incomplete though it was, to offer  
23 support to those affected?

24 A. Well, I think, you know, what we were also doing was  
25 identifying the safe and missing, and we were trying to

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1 collect information about sort of other people who may  
2 have been there too. But, yes, principally the list was  
3 being matched against the tenancy list, that's right.

4 Q. Do you accept, therefore, that that meant that there  
5 were residents who would not have been accounted for and  
6 therefore not contacted?

7 A. Yes, but we could only work with what we had at the  
8 time, and we tried in various other ways to contact  
9 people, not just using the data on this day.

10 Q. What steps did you take in other ways to contact people,  
11 other than in reliance on this list?

12 A. I suppose we would have used it as a basis, but we did  
13 go to the rest centres. So if we became aware of anyone  
14 in the rest centre, we would have — who wasn't  
15 necessarily on the tenancy data ...

16 Q. Right.

17 A. Yeah. I mean, I do — you know, I've looked at some of  
18 the evidence and I've seen, for example, leaseholders —  
19 a leaseholder who had sublet to three people. Now, we  
20 didn't know those sublessee's contact details. We  
21 contacted the lessee and saw if he was all right, but he  
22 then had to make contact with the subtenants. That was  
23 the only way we could do it. I mean, it is complex.

24 Q. Yes. But using the information from people in the  
25 rest centres — so then how would it work? You would

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1 find out who they were, try and match them with those on  
2 the general list ?  
3 A. Yeah, that's right .  
4 Q. And if they weren't on it , what would you do? Would you  
5 ask them questions, who else in the tower was in the  
6 flat ?  
7 A. Yes, and that was the point of trying to get the live  
8 data.  
9 Q. Did you raise this problem about the incomplete nature  
10 of the baseline list with RBKC?  
11 A. So RBKC would have been aware of that, and I —  
12 you know, Laura Johnson, you know, I saw her evidence  
13 the other day, she's aware — most people who work in  
14 housing are aware of the complex nature of keeping data  
15 up to 100% accurate.  
16 Q. Did anybody from RBKC contribute to the development or  
17 maintenance of this list of safe and missing residents  
18 on or from 14 June?  
19 A. So there was a constant exchange of this data, even up  
20 until the 21/23 June, we were trying to match it  
21 eventually with who had been placed in hotel  
22 accommodation and we were sharing that with the council.  
23 So I also knew that they were, you know, doing —  
24 booking residents in directly , so they would have got  
25 additional information from that process and added to

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1 the information in the tenancy list .  
2 Q. I want to ask you next about how this list was updated  
3 during the course of the 14th, to start with.  
4 Can we go back to your sixth statement, please,  
5 paragraph 22 on page 6 {TMO00894124/6}, and you say  
6 there:  
7 "TMO staff at each rest centre were asked to bring  
8 the information to me initially and subsequently to  
9 Kiran so that this could be added into the spreadsheet  
10 to ensure the information was consolidated into one  
11 spreadsheet to avoid confusion. I know the caretakers  
12 (Estate Services Assistants [ESAs, as I think has been  
13 referred to elsewhere]) had a role in bringing this  
14 information to us from the rest centres. It is possible  
15 that staff emailed or phoned this information through to  
16 Kiran as well if they could not physically attend at  
17 St Clement's Church. Kiran also communicated with staff  
18 via the WhatsApp Group established."  
19 Now, if we look at paragraph 24 of your statement,  
20 please, on page 7 {TMO00894124/7}, you say there, in the  
21 last sentence, three lines down:  
22 "There was no set format for recording this  
23 information. Rather, staff used whatever resource was  
24 available in their rest centre to do this."  
25 So, taking those together, can we proceed on the

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1 basis that what I've just read to you from these two  
2 paragraphs of your statement is correct?  
3 A. No set format for recording it , as in we recorded it on  
4 pieces of paper, but there was a plan for what was done  
5 with it , not —  
6 Q. Right.  
7 Let's then look at a number of documents. Let me  
8 show you first {TMO10035210}. Is this an example of  
9 a handwritten note taken by TMO staff at a rest centre?  
10 A. It looks as though it is , yeah.  
11 Q. Yes. You've got:  
12 "Jessica 12—13 20th floor URBANO RAMIREZ."  
13 Missing there; yes? And others listed .  
14 Let's look at another one. I'm just going to show  
15 you two or three examples.  
16 {TMO10035236}. You can see on that one, halfway  
17 down:  
18 "115 Grenfell Tower — Zainab Deen ... RECORDED."  
19 What does the word "RECORDED" mean in each case?  
20 A. So that means that we would have put them onto the  
21 spreadsheet.  
22 Q. I see.  
23 Then another one at {TMO10035242}, and you can see  
24 the names there. Somebody who needs rehousing, you see,  
25 Meron Mekonnen and Yohannes Tesfaye, "Needs rehousing",

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1 flat 163. Same with Hiwot Dagnachew and  
2 Wintom Temesgen.  
3 Then last one at {TMO10035218}. You can see "Next  
4 of kin/friends", and who was missing and who was safe.  
5 You see that in the right—hand column: "Missing", and  
6 then "Safe", "Safe", "Safe".  
7 A. Yeah.  
8 Q. Did you have any concerns at the time about the accuracy  
9 of collating the information on safe and missing  
10 residents in this way?  
11 A. No, I — well, I mean, when you're in those kind of  
12 circumstances, there's obviously a margin of error, but,  
13 you know, I thought we had a process, I thought staff  
14 were clear about what they were doing, and I thought it  
15 was the best thing — best way to collect it.  
16 Q. Who was it who was reporting the missing? Were these  
17 relatives ?  
18 A. So it could have been, yes, relatives or anybody else  
19 who were going into the contact — into the — sorry,  
20 into the rest centres and providing the information to  
21 us.  
22 Q. Then if we go to your sixth statement again, please,  
23 page 5 {TMO00894124/5}, paragraph 16:  
24 "Upon arriving at St Clement's Church, myself and  
25 Nicola Bartholomew began speaking with the residents who

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1 had gathered there, introducing ourselves and taking  
2 details of anyone there. There weren't many residents  
3 there to begin with but then I recall that it really  
4 filled up. We took details of residents as they  
5 arrived, and we gave regular announcements asking all  
6 residents to register with us so we could account for  
7 them. People also advised us of relatives and friends  
8 that they could not find, and we added them to our  
9 list."

10 Now, you have confirmed that in your evidence  
11 earlier this morning, that this statement is correct, so  
12 can we proceed on the basis that that's what you did?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Yes.

15 Now, let's look at what Clare Richards says in her  
16 statement. She was chief executive of the Clement James  
17 Centre at the time of the fire, and you find her  
18 statement to the Inquiry at {CFV00000012/13}. If we go  
19 in that, please, to paragraph 89, which is a long  
20 paragraph, she says this:

21 "'The TMO staff wrote information on scraps of paper  
22 and they didn't appear to have a system. They didn't  
23 seem to be capturing an accurate record of everyone that  
24 was arriving at, or leaving the site and who they were  
25 looking for. I offered, on a number of occasions for

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1 our staff to assist the TMO staff and the use of laptops  
2 to capture all the information on a spreadsheet. They  
3 always turned down this offer. I therefore asked some  
4 staff to go around the site ensuring we had everyone's  
5 information on our spreadsheets (including their  
6 address, whether they were missing anyone and if they  
7 had somewhere to stay) and I asked the staff on the  
8 entrance to the church to note down who was entering and  
9 direct them to the TMO table and to make a note of  
10 anyone who was leaving. A member of TMO staff saw that  
11 we were doing this and asked for our records, as she  
12 said that only they should be collecting this  
13 information and that it would be very confusing if there  
14 were more than one list. We handed over the records.  
15 As the TMO continued to record their information on  
16 scraps of paper with no clear system (with the potential  
17 to miss residents), I continued to offer the assistance  
18 of our staff team and laptops. They repeatedly turned  
19 down this offer. They didn't return our records from  
20 that morning."

21 Now, just looking at the last two sentences there,  
22 is that correct?

23 A. I don't remember being made offers of laptops. What  
24 I do know is that Kiran arrived at site at 8 o'clock in  
25 the morning, so from quite early on, we had a laptop.

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1 Yes, we were using — I wouldn't call them scraps of  
2 paper, we were using pieces of paper, but we did have  
3 a method, we did have a plan. We would have not wanted  
4 to start recording, you know, information on a different  
5 database, I really felt that we needed to put it on to  
6 the one spreadsheet so that it was — you know, the  
7 margin for error was minimised as much as it could be.

8 Q. What do you have to say in response to the concern  
9 expressed here that the TMO was not capturing  
10 an accurate record of residents?

11 A. So, I mean, as I said in my statement, we went round the  
12 rest centre. We were there before Clare was, to be  
13 fair, so, you know, we went round the rest centre, we  
14 tried to catch people when there were enough numbers to  
15 do that individually, that's how we started. We then  
16 set up a table near the door so that we would be as  
17 close as we possibly could so that people couldn't avoid  
18 us — not that they would avoid us, but they couldn't  
19 miss us, is the word I really mean, and, you know, after  
20 that, we did phone round as well to try and catch  
21 people.

22 So, yes, we may have missed some people, you know,  
23 despite our best endeavours we may have missed some  
24 people, but I thought we had a process in place that  
25 could — you know, was as efficient as it could be, and

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1 I think Kiran confirms that in his evidence too.

2 Q. Did you repeatedly refuse the offer of assistance from  
3 the Clement James Centre for the use of laptops?

4 A. Yeah, I wouldn't have wanted people to start recording  
5 things on different laptops because then we would have  
6 had to amalgamate it all. That would have taken more  
7 time. I just wanted, you know, the system to be quite  
8 clear and straightforward so that staff knew what was  
9 happening.

10 Q. I see. So you declined this offer of assistance because  
11 you wanted a single system that you could operate,  
12 rather than a profusion?

13 A. Yes, that was the intent. I don't remember having  
14 a personal conversation with her about that, but that  
15 was what we were focused on: one system, one  
16 spreadsheet, to minimise the confusion.

17 Q. I see.

18 Are you the person at the Clement James Centre who  
19 asked for the records that the Clement James Centre was  
20 itself creating?

21 A. I don't remember that at all. I don't remember that  
22 conversation.

23 Q. You don't. You don't know who it was who asked —

24 A. No, I'm sorry, I don't remember that.

25 Q. Now, one of the concerns expressed by the particular

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1 member of staff of the TMO, or possibly by you, was the  
 2 potential for confusion, as you've just told us, if  
 3 there was more than one safe and missing list.  
 4 Were you aware that other community rest centres,  
 5 such as the Rugby Portobello Club, were also keeping  
 6 a list of safe and missing residents?  
 7 A. Yeah, I've seen that in our staff's statements, and  
 8 I think somebody — I don't know who it was, but  
 9 somebody did come and visit St James's at one point and  
 10 I told them what we were doing.  
 11 Q. I see, and did you try and make sure you had  
 12 a centralised list of safe and missing residents across  
 13 all rest centres?  
 14 A. Yes, so all rest centres were bringing their information  
 15 to us at St Clement James.  
 16 Q. And they knew to do that, did they?  
 17 A. Yes, they knew to do that. That was the clear  
 18 instruction from when I first sent people off in  
 19 different directions. I organised for the caretakers  
 20 to, you know, come and collect that information. Team  
 21 leaders were really clear about that. That was brought  
 22 to me initially and then to Kiran subsequently to —  
 23 Q. I see. Were they brought to you physically in a  
 24 bunch —  
 25 A. Physically, they were — yeah, and that was physically

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1 what I handed over to the LFB initially.  
 2 Q. So, to be clear, other rest centres were physically  
 3 delivering handwritten missing or —  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. — accounted for lists to you at the St Clement James —  
 6 A. That's right. That's the system we had in place.  
 7 Q. Right.  
 8 Now, let's then go back to the spreadsheet,  
 9 {TMO00869931}. This is the residents list circulated at  
 10 12.21 we saw earlier.  
 11 If we look at the "Safe" tab, please, is it correct  
 12 that the yellow highlighted rows are supposed to  
 13 indicate residents who have been reported as safe?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. Yes.  
 16 If we look at the "Missing" tab, if we open up the  
 17 "Missing" tab, please, is it the case that those  
 18 highlighted rows indicate residents who have been  
 19 reported as missing?  
 20 A. Yeah, there's a tab — a key in it as well in sheet 4.  
 21 Q. Now, if we look at some of the highlighted rows in the  
 22 "Safe" tab, please, let's go back to the "Safe" tab and  
 23 look at that a little bit more closely, we can see  
 24 a number of examples of those reported as safe.  
 25 So if we go, please, to row 11, you can see

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1 Mr D Murphy, flat 111, that's Denis Murphy, he was  
 2 reported as safe.  
 3 A. Yeah.  
 4 Q. Row 51, we can see flat 143, Mrs K Khalloufi,  
 5 Khadija Khalloufi, reported as safe. Yes? You see  
 6 that?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. Then rows 104 to 107, if we look at that, flat 182, the  
 9 El-Wahabis reported as safe.  
 10 Another example at row 136, we can see Mr S Neda  
 11 reported as safe.  
 12 Now, we know, unfortunately, that those people lost  
 13 their lives in the fire. Do you know why they're listed  
 14 on the TMO's list at this time as safe?  
 15 A. Okay, so this was one of the first of the lists that we  
 16 got — that we produced on the day. There was a — and  
 17 this was really based on information that was coming to  
 18 us, so being given to us in the rest centre.  
 19 There are further versions of this where we try and  
 20 qualify, you know, information that we were given in the  
 21 day and check it over the course of time during that day  
 22 and over the subsequent days, to try and, you know,  
 23 verify it. There's one spreadsheet where we say they  
 24 were reported as safe yesterday, but now we can't  
 25 contact them. So we attempted to qualify this data in

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1 the following few days. I accept we won't have got  
 2 everything right.  
 3 Q. No, no, I just want to understand the process as it  
 4 happened, as it unfolded.  
 5 This is the safe list, but if we also go to the  
 6 missing list in the same spreadsheet at the same time,  
 7 if we click on that, please, and let's look —  
 8 A. It's got the same highlight.  
 9 Q. — at row 11, you can see Denis Murphy listed there, and  
 10 row 51, Mrs Khadija Khalloufi again listed there.  
 11 Can you explain why they appear on Kiran's  
 12 spreadsheet as both safe and missing at the same time?  
 13 A. No, I can't. I can tell you that we did try and qualify  
 14 the information as we went on.  
 15 Q. Now, if we go back to your fifth statement  
 16 {TMO00869990/5}, please, paragraph 26, at the foot of  
 17 your screen, you say that:  
 18 "An updated copy of the list was sent by Kiran at  
 19 13.08 to the same people plus Laura Johnson at RBKC."  
 20 And you exhibit it as TB/6:  
 21 "Kiran then sent it to Rob Shaw at RBKC at 13.44 for  
 22 forwarding to RBKC teams on the ground (TB 7)."  
 23 Is it right that the information contained in these  
 24 lists was intended to be relied on by RBKC's housing  
 25 department?

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1 A. Well, they knew that it would be fluid information, it  
2 would be changing all the time, yes.  
3 Q. But nonetheless, subject to that qualification, I think  
4 your answer is yes, you knew it would be relied on by  
5 RBKC's housing department?  
6 A. But it wasn't the only time that they received the  
7 information, yes.  
8 Q. Now, let's look at TB/7 that you exhibit, and this is  
9 the list that Kiran Singh forwarded to Rob Shaw at RBKC  
10 at 13.44 on 14 June, and that is at {TMO00869954}.  
11 Now, take it from me that the same inaccurate  
12 information was recorded at rows 11, 51, 104 to 107 and  
13 136, Denis Murphy, Khadija Khalloufi, the El-Wahabis and  
14 Saber Neda at line 136. Do you know why that still  
15 inaccurate information was being sent to RBKC?  
16 A. I can't answer it any more than I could earlier.  
17 Q. Right.  
18 Do you know, was there a system for ensuring that  
19 those recorded as safe were not also recorded as missing  
20 and vice versa?  
21 A. I mean, obviously they should be cross-checked to make  
22 sure that they're not. That's, you know, really obvious  
23 to me.  
24 Q. Yes.  
25 If we look at the safe list, please, in this

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1 schedule, at row 102, we can see at row 102 you've got  
2 flat 176, Miss J Urbano Ramirez. She is on the safe  
3 list; yes? Do you see that there?  
4 A. Yes, sorry.  
5 Q. If we go back to one of the handwritten notes I showed  
6 you earlier at {TMO10035210}, you can see at the top  
7 that she's recorded as missing; yes?  
8 A. Yeah.  
9 Q. Can you account for the discrepancy?  
10 A. So these pieces — there's no time on this piece of  
11 paper, there's no time on when it was input, we may have  
12 been getting different information at different times.  
13 You know, clearly we're not going to get everything  
14 right.  
15 I do think that the judgement on that data should  
16 really be looked at a little bit later on to see,  
17 you know, did we try to verify it later on, to  
18 cross-match it with information, you know, from people  
19 who had been rehoused as well.  
20 Q. Then if we go back to your fifth statement, paragraph 27  
21 {TMO00869990/6}, you say that:  
22 "Kiran sent a further version to the same group at  
23 14.46 ... colour coding for clarity (TB 8) and updated  
24 it again at 17.27 (TB 9) ..."  
25 Let's just go to the covering email, first of all,

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1 at TB/8. That's at {TMO00869934}. He says:  
2 "Hi all  
3 "Some confusion over the list and colours. For  
4 clarity I have amalgamated into one tab of all  
5 residents.  
6 "Yellow — reported safe  
7 "Pink — known/reported missing."  
8 What was the confusion that Kiran Singh refers to  
9 here?  
10 A. I don't know what was in his mind at the time that he  
11 sent that, but it looks like he's trying to perhaps  
12 correct what was the previous errors.  
13 Q. Let's look at the updated list —  
14 A. I don't know.  
15 Q. — that he attaches, which is {TMO00869935}. We will  
16 need the native of that, please. There you can see the  
17 colour code: yellow, safe; pink, reported missing.  
18 If you click, please, on the resident list, which is  
19 the main list, there you can see the amalgamation.  
20 Can you confirm that the same colours are used in  
21 this list as in the earlier list, so yellow for safe and  
22 pink, as he calls it, or light brown for missing; yes?  
23 A. I can't remember what you just showed me on the code on  
24 sheet 4, sorry, there's a code on —  
25 Q. Oh, right. There is. Let's quickly click on that.

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1 It's sheet 4. If we click on sheet 4, there they are.  
2 They are the codes.  
3 A. Safe is yellow.  
4 Q. So it looks like the same.  
5 So click back on the residents list, and if we go  
6 down, then, to row 11 again, we can see flat 111,  
7 Denis Murphy, yellow, so he's reported as safe; row 51,  
8 Khadija Khalloufi, reported as safe; and take it from me  
9 the same with the El-Wahabis at rows 104 to 107 and  
10 Saber Neda at 136.  
11 Do you know why those individuals have still been  
12 marked as safe — this is at the end of the day — when  
13 they were in fact not safe?  
14 A. Well, this is at 17 — did you say, 17 —  
15 Q. 17.27.  
16 A. That's not the end of —  
17 Q. To be clear, this is the list circulated earlier. This  
18 is —  
19 A. Yeah, so this isn't by any means the end of the day, and  
20 in terms of us collating information, we did phone calls  
21 round in the afternoon, we did phone calls round late  
22 into the evening, so there were fairly — there were  
23 other versions, and the next day and, as I say, 21 June,  
24 so it wouldn't have been the final list. It would be  
25 information that we had received at that particular

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1 time.  
2 Q. Let's go back, then, to your sixth statement, page 8  
3 {TMO00894124/8}, paragraph 27, where you explain there  
4 what I think in essence you have just told us, but let's  
5 just look at it in your words in your statement. You  
6 say there:

7 "Information in relation to the residents that were  
8 missing and safe initially came from those registering  
9 at the rest centres but later involved a team of staff  
10 ringing all known residents of Grenfell Tower to pick up  
11 those who had not registered to provide them with  
12 support. I am unable to recall when the exercise of  
13 telephoning residents of Grenfell Tower commenced but  
14 this was certainly underway by 2.00pm."

15 Now, just taking that as read, can we next look at  
16 TB/9, which is the exhibit you referred to at  
17 paragraph 27 of your fifth statement, and I'm sorry to  
18 jump around between the documents, but if you go back to  
19 your fifth statement, page 6 {TMO00869990/6},  
20 paragraph 27, you see that you exhibit TB/9.

21 Let's look at TB/9, and can we go to {TMO00869983}.  
22 Here is a further spreadsheet. This is the one  
23 circulated at 17.27 that you've referred to in  
24 paragraph 27 of your fifth statement, and you confirm  
25 that neighbourhood teams had rung every resident they

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1 hadn't heard from.

2 So if we go to row 11 in it, please, again we can  
3 see Denis Murphy — can you see row 11 there,  
4 flat 111 —

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. — Denis Murphy, still listed as yellow, therefore safe;  
7 row 51, Khadija Khalloufi from flat 143, still listed as  
8 safe; rows 104 to 107, again the El-Wahabis, listed as  
9 safe.

10 Now, those are selected examples. Do you know why,  
11 yet again, the list of safe and missing residents  
12 continued consistently to record at least these  
13 individuals, by way of example, as safe when they were  
14 missing?

15 A. In row 105, there is a comment on that as well.

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. All I can say is that that was information we would have  
18 known at the time. I can see, for example, on row 105,  
19 it's saying — it is a safe colour, but there is a note  
20 on there, "Son may be missing".

21 Q. Yes.

22 Now, row 102, we can see here again is Jessica —  
23 well, there's a redaction. Underneath "Mrs M Urbano",  
24 against flat 176, do you see in row 102 —

25 A. I can see, yeah, row 102 —

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1 Q. — there's what is a redaction. In fact, the unredacted  
2 version — take this from me — is Jessica Urbano, who  
3 was also marked as safe. Are you able to account for  
4 that?

5 A. No, no, I'm not. I can only repeat, I would look at  
6 later versions as well. This was on the day. I'd look  
7 at later versions, and if it's still not correct, you  
8 know, all I can do is apologise. It's very distressing,  
9 I'm sure, for everybody.

10 Q. Now —

11 A. But I would look at later lists.

12 Q. Now, I appreciate, of course, that this was an evolving  
13 situation and this is what you were having at the time,  
14 but given the, as we can see, I would suggest to you,  
15 inconsistent and in many ways inaccurate information  
16 being recorded in this spreadsheet, do you accept that  
17 that could have led to family members being given the  
18 wrong information about their loved ones, as we've heard  
19 happened for people like Hanan Wahabi and her family?

20 A. Yes, it absolutely could, so could have the lists that  
21 were up in the Rugby Portobello, you know. The margin  
22 of error was there, yes, definitely, but we had a system  
23 in place to try and collect the data. We tried to  
24 verify it afterwards. Obviously other people — other  
25 organisations would have cross-referenced that data

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1 later on. Ours was the base point. Yes, I can say we  
2 won't have got everything right.

3 Q. Do you understand the source or basis of the error, how  
4 come Jessica Urbano Ramirez could have been reported as  
5 safe?

6 A. All I can think is that somebody did report her as safe  
7 in one of the rest centres. I — you know, I can see  
8 that we've got people repeated in safe and missing,  
9 I can see that, but the source of the data was from  
10 people from the rest centres so, you know, that's what  
11 we relied on. As I say, we did try to verify it later.

12 Q. Can we go to {RBK00012043}. Now, let's look at page 1  
13 of this, just to identify the document. It's:

14 "Crisis Support Team.

15 "Rest centre @ Rugby Portobello Centre — Wednesday  
16 14th June 2017.

17 "... Lead officer, Keith Robbins.

18 "Crisis Support Service, RBKC."

19 And he sat within the contingency management group  
20 in RBKC.

21 Are you familiar with this document?

22 A. No, no, I've not seen this before at all.

23 Q. At the end of the longish paragraph in the middle of  
24 your screen, there is a last sentence which says:

25 "A full list of residents and actions taken listed

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1 below."  
2 And you can see, if you go to page 2 of this  
3 document {RBK00012043/2}, it works by name and flat  
4 number and some details, and the first one you have  
5 there is Sabah Abdullah, flat 143, and in the third  
6 paragraph it says:

7 "Unfortunately, he was informed by the TMO that his  
8 missing wife was reported as safe [that's  
9 Khadija Khalloufi, she is identified in the first  
10 paragraph] and well at the St Clements rest centre. His  
11 son received a conflicting report from another TMO  
12 officer. Emergency responders (Karl and Jordon) went  
13 with his wife's sister to search nearby rest centres and  
14 were unsuccessful."

15 Can you account for how it could be that  
16 Sabah Abdullah could be told by the TMO both that his  
17 wife was safe and that his wife was missing?

18 A. No, I can't, and that must be very distressing, and I'm  
19 very sorry to hear that. All I can say is that at  
20 a point during the day we tried to circulate a list to  
21 our staff in the rest centre so that they could see the  
22 latest version of information that we had, so that they  
23 could use that as a basis, but if it was inaccurate then  
24 it would have repeated the inaccuracy. But that was  
25 an attempt to make sure that people were as informed of

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1 the data that we had at a particular point. But it was  
2 obviously a moving feast all the time.  
3 Q. Did you become aware during the course of 14 June of the  
4 risk of inconsistent information being given to loved  
5 ones about the safety or otherwise of those in the  
6 tower?

7 A. No, I wasn't aware of it on the day. No, I wasn't.

8 Q. So can we take it that you didn't take any steps to  
9 eradicate the risk of conflicting information such as  
10 this being given to family members seeking information  
11 about their loved ones in the tower?

12 A. I think all that I could have done was to record what we  
13 were — what was coming in, to make sure that that was  
14 sent round to the rest centres. As I said, we did pass  
15 on a list so that people had something to refer to.  
16 But, you know, people — no, I mean, I can't say any  
17 more than that. I wasn't aware of it being  
18 a significant problem on the day.

19 Obviously it's an awful thing to have happened.  
20 I know that, you know, residents have said they also got  
21 information that wasn't accurate from other sources, and  
22 unfortunately when you've got that many people, errors  
23 are going to be made and, you know, I'm sorry if we  
24 played a part in that.

25 Q. Now, you tell us in your fifth statement at paragraph 23

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1 {TMO00869990/5} you continued calling Grenfell residents  
2 throughout the evening, together with your colleague  
3 Kiran Singh. That's what you tell us.

4 From those that you spoke to, what were you asking  
5 them?

6 A. Sorry, can you just say that again?

7 Q. Yes. Well, let's look at your fifth statement,  
8 paragraph 23 {TMO00869990/5}. It's quite long, but in  
9 essence you say, this is three-quarters of the way  
10 through it:

11 "I remember sitting with a colleague in the evening  
12 at approximately 9pm and calling all residents from  
13 Grenfell Tower that we had been unable to get hold of  
14 during the day."

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. From those that you did get hold of, what were you are  
17 asking them? What information were you seeking from  
18 them?

19 A. I think we were just trying to see at that stage if they  
20 were safe, to make sure that we knew where everybody  
21 was, if we could account for everybody, and if we had  
22 got hold of people, we would have given them advice  
23 about where to go. We would have found out if there was  
24 anyone else missing in their household. That was what  
25 we were intending to do.

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1 Q. And what advice did you give them?

2 A. I think it varied, depending on who they were, who we  
3 could get hold of. I remember doing it, you know, very  
4 late, at about 8.30, and, to be fair, there weren't very  
5 many people we could get hold of by that stage. They  
6 were going to voicemail.

7 Q. Yes. You say that in the next sentence:

8 "A number of phones dropped into voicemail and there  
9 was no answer."

10 For those that remained uncontactable, what was the  
11 TMO's plan for trying to establish contact and offer  
12 support?

13 A. So in the next day, we did use the list and we did do  
14 another phone-round of people who we hadn't been able to  
15 get hold of. That's what I referred to earlier. There  
16 is other versions of this document where we've made  
17 further phone calls in the coming days.

18 Q. As far as you recall, was anybody from the council  
19 taking any independent steps proactively to identify  
20 Grenfell residents and their needs for the purposes of  
21 emergency accommodation or other forms of support?

22 A. So as I've said before, they were obviously verifying  
23 everybody in — as they booked them into accommodation,  
24 and my understanding was that they were — had — were  
25 doing visits in the hotels, and ... sorry, what day are

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1 we talking about?  
2 Q. 14th.  
3 A. We're still on the 14th. Yeah, so they weren't doing  
4 visits on the hotels, sorry, by then, but they were  
5 booking people in, and they would have, you know,  
6 an understanding of their needs at that time.  
7 Q. Were you aware of any RBKC staff being involved with  
8 maintaining a list of residents that you and other TMO  
9 staff were trying to do or make calls in the same way?  
10 Were they trying to make their own list?  
11 A. I don't know. I don't remember that being discussed.  
12 Q. Were they making their own calls to evacuated residents  
13 to try to locate them and give them —  
14 A. I've no idea what they were doing. I wouldn't have  
15 thought so. I thought they would be — I don't know.  
16 Q. Did you have a conversation with Laura Johnson about  
17 what steps they were taking?  
18 A. No, Laura Johnson was very aware of what we were doing  
19 because we were having conversations and sending in  
20 regular lists.  
21 Q. Now, I want to turn to a different topic, which is the  
22 experience of evacuated residents from the surrounding  
23 properties, not Grenfell Tower itself.  
24 Now, I think you tell us in your statement that  
25 there were a number of properties around Grenfell Tower,

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1 originally referred to as finger blocks but then later  
2 known as walkway properties; yes? And those are  
3 Hurstway Walk, Barandon Walk, Testerton Walk and  
4 Grenfell Walk.  
5 A. Yes.  
6 Q. They're there on the screen, plus Treadgold House and  
7 Bramley House; yes?  
8 A. Yes.  
9 Q. And this is at paragraph 63 of your sixth statement on  
10 page 18 {TMO00894124/18}.  
11 If we look at those properties on a map, can we look  
12 at that, this is I think the one you exhibit at TB/59 —  
13 A. Yeah.  
14 Q. — and summarise here. It's at {MET00080905}, and you  
15 can see where they are. They're all to the south and  
16 south east and south west of Grenfell Tower. You have  
17 Hurstway Walk to the west, the westernmost; the central  
18 is Testerton; the one to the west of Grenfell Road but  
19 the most easterly is Barandon Walk; to the east of  
20 Grenfell Road you've got Treadgold House; and then  
21 Grenfell Walk are the two blocks or two properties to  
22 the north of the walkways but to the south/south west of  
23 the tower. Yes? Yes. And you have identified at  
24 paragraph 61 how many flats in each.  
25 Now, were all of those properties evacuated on

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1 14 June?  
2 A. I thought that they were all evacuated, yes, that was my  
3 understanding, because they were all within the cordon.  
4 Q. Right. All within the cordon, and just to be clear for  
5 everybody, the cordon surrounds this entire set of  
6 properties, does it?  
7 A. Yes, absolutely.  
8 Q. Now, let's go to your sixth statement again, please,  
9 page 11 {TMO00894124/11}, paragraph 39. You say there:  
10 "The request for information on who might need  
11 accommodation overnight did include Bramley House  
12 residents. Whilst it was originally thought that  
13 Bramley House residents may need alternative  
14 accommodation, I believe that this was not subsequently  
15 required on 14 June as residents of Bramley House were  
16 not evacuated from their properties for an extended  
17 period."  
18 Now, you say that there. Proceeding on the  
19 assumption that that's correct, as you have sworn it,  
20 let's go to {TMO00869977}, which is TB/11, which you  
21 exhibit to this statement, although not in this  
22 paragraph. This is an email from David Noble on 14 June  
23 at 17.35, so this is about 8 minutes after the last list  
24 has gone out of survivors/missing, and here is an email  
25 from David Noble, and you say in your statement that

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1 that confirms that the potential number of residents  
2 evacuated was 845, and we get that number, I think — is  
3 this right? — from the second page of this email  
4 {TMO00869977/2}, where he totals up all the evacuees  
5 from the walkways and Treadgold House, and comes to  
6 a grand total of 845, as you can see at the top of your  
7 screen; yes?  
8 A. Yeah.  
9 Q. Yes. Then you've got:  
10 "Disabled?  
11 "(Multiple Items)."  
12 Underneath that.  
13 Do you know why this was a number of potential  
14 evacuees rather than an actual number of residents?  
15 A. Because it was a total list of all the information that  
16 we had, so household information as well as, you know —  
17 it won't just be a tenancy, a flat, it will be the  
18 household information related to that, so numbers of  
19 occupants.  
20 Q. I see. So this was a paper-based exercise rather than  
21 a headcount of actual evacuees?  
22 A. Yeah, it's drawn from — it's drawn in the same way as  
23 the other list from Capita —  
24 Q. Oh, I see.  
25 A. — is my understanding. So it's what's on the database.

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1 Q. Right.  
 2 Now, you also exhibit TB/10. Let's look at that.  
 3 This is exhibited to your fifth statement at  
 4 paragraph 30 {TMO00869990/6}. It is at {TMO00869925}.  
 5 This is an email from Robert Shaw, right at the foot of  
 6 the screen, at 17.05 on 14 June, and he says, "Hello  
 7 Kiran, Teresa", at the bottom of page 1, so this comes  
 8 to you, and he says {TMO00869925/2}:  
 9 "How possible is it to send over lists of tenants  
 10 who reside in the cordoned area, which I think are as  
 11 follows?"  
 12 Then he sets them out underneath his name. Do you  
 13 see that?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. Then he says:  
 16 "As you have seen, we will look to place families  
 17 with children, vulnerable, and older persons if they  
 18 cannot return tonight (which is likely), and we'd a)  
 19 like to get an idea of how many we might have to place,  
 20 as a max b) compare names/address with known vulnerable  
 21 adults and children with colleagues in ASC and FCS."  
 22 Now, if we go to your sixth statement, please, at  
 23 paragraph 38 {TMO00894124/11}, this is how you  
 24 characterise this document. This is what you say:  
 25 "To my knowledge this was the first time direct

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1 advice had been provided by RBKC for residents within  
 2 the cordon. Until this point, RBKC had focused their  
 3 efforts on rehousing the Grenfell Tower residents who it  
 4 was known were unable to return home. As the day  
 5 progressed and the cordon remained in place I believe  
 6 that it became clear that other residents would also be  
 7 affected and as such the overnight accommodation was  
 8 extended to them."  
 9 Were you concerned about RBKC's strategy to  
 10 prioritise Grenfell Tower residents for accommodation  
 11 given the significant numbers, at least on paper, to be  
 12 evacuated from the surrounding properties?  
 13 A. Well, I think the situation changed during the day as to  
 14 whether people would remain to be evacuated or not.  
 15 I think, you know, there was a period that we felt that  
 16 the people in the walkways may be able to go back. So  
 17 it seemed sensible to me that they were prioritising the  
 18 people that, you know, we knew couldn't go back.  
 19 Q. Can we then go back to the email I've just shown you,  
 20 {TMO00869977}. I picked this out. If you turn, please,  
 21 to the next page, page 2 {TMO00869977/2}, he identifies  
 22 a total of 25 disabled, as he calls it, disabled people  
 23 across the evacuated properties, but you can see here  
 24 that he doesn't provide any information about families  
 25 with children or the elderly or any other

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1 vulnerabilities, which is what Robert Shaw had asked for  
 2 in his email you've exhibited at TB/10, the one I showed  
 3 you before at 17.05.  
 4 My question is: did David Noble see what Robert Shaw  
 5 had asked for?  
 6 A. Oh, I really don't know.  
 7 Q. You don't know.  
 8 A. I wouldn't have been looking at emails that closely at  
 9 that time.  
 10 Q. Well, Robert Shaw's —  
 11 A. I wouldn't know.  
 12 Q. I'm sorry, I cut across you.  
 13 Robert Shaw's email went to you and to Kiran Singh  
 14 but wasn't sent to David Noble; did you pass it on to  
 15 David Noble?  
 16 A. I don't remember.  
 17 Q. Do you know how David Noble got the instruction to seek  
 18 out the details of disabled residents?  
 19 A. No, I'm sure you'll be able to show me.  
 20 Q. No, I don't. I'm asking you. I don't know. It's one  
 21 of those questions to which I don't know the answer.  
 22 A. I think Kiran asked him and IT provided the information  
 23 and David just passed it on, is what I think. But  
 24 I can't be 100%. I think that's my recollection of  
 25 emails that I've seen.

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1 Q. When you saw this, were you concerned that the council  
 2 had been provided with incomplete information about who  
 3 required emergency hotel accommodation?  
 4 A. No, not at that stage, no. I mean, there are other ways  
 5 in which they were — you know, they would have got that  
 6 information during the day, so, you know, they did pass  
 7 messages to us asking us to identify — you know, saying  
 8 that they would house people who were vulnerable and  
 9 families and children. That — you know, a lot of  
 10 people were in the rest centres, so we communicated that  
 11 information to them at the rest centres, so they would  
 12 have been able to go to the housing people there and  
 13 book in for accommodation.  
 14 Q. Do you know whether the information about those who  
 15 were, according to this list, disabled was based on  
 16 residents self-reporting, in the same way tenant  
 17 information was based on what the TMO was told, rather  
 18 than being proactively sought out?  
 19 A. So the list would have been based on what was reported,  
 20 but if, you know, people's needs were being identified  
 21 within the rest centres, you know, RBKC were booking in  
 22 people in the rest centres that — and they would have  
 23 been picking that up there, is my understanding.  
 24 Q. So the numbers could have been far higher? The numbers  
 25 of disabled people, let alone vulnerable people —

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1 A. Could possibly have been, yeah.  
 2 Q. Yes.  
 3 A. I don't know that, but yes.  
 4 Q. Did you go back to David Noble and tell him that the  
 5 request was not only for disabled people, but also for  
 6 families with children, the elderly and people with  
 7 other vulnerabilities, and for him to give you that  
 8 information?  
 9 A. I didn't do that at that time. I don't remember doing  
 10 it at the time. But, you know, there were so many  
 11 things going on at that time.  
 12 Q. Right. Did you note at the time that he'd only given  
 13 you some of the information which RBKC had asked for?  
 14 A. I don't remember that being, you know, key in my mind as  
 15 a memory, no, I just don't remember that.  
 16 Q. Did the TMO have access to that information?  
 17 A. They may well have done, but, you know, RBKC were  
 18 checking vulnerable people in their own way. They were  
 19 searching known people through social services and  
 20 family and children's services. There were other checks  
 21 on identifying people.  
 22 Q. Now, on that point — and this links with some evidence  
 23 that Sue Redmond gave to the Inquiry a little earlier in  
 24 this module — was there any way or any link between the  
 25 adult social care database and the —

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1 A. Housing data?  
 2 Q. — children — well, and the children's database —  
 3 A. Oh, I don't know that.  
 4 Q. — on the one hand and the housing database on the other  
 5 so that they could talk to each other —  
 6 A. No.  
 7 Q. — and mutually update?  
 8 A. They were completely separate systems. I don't know  
 9 about social services — adult and children's — that  
 10 would be a council issue. But our database was separate  
 11 from theirs, yeah.  
 12 Q. Is there any reason why the TMO database didn't speak to  
 13 the adult social care database, which I think was  
 14 a tri-borough database at the time?  
 15 A. I would imagine that's the same as any other housing  
 16 organisation and provider. They're not linked in to the  
 17 local authority database.  
 18 Q. Was that a fact you knew at the time?  
 19 A. I knew we weren't linked in to social services and  
 20 family and children, but, you know, during the course of  
 21 our regular work, if we needed to know information, we  
 22 would know to make contact, you know, on individual  
 23 families and, you know, we had very good relationships  
 24 with adult and children's services. But, you know,  
 25 that's on a general day-to-day basis, not during the

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1 emergency situation.  
 2 Q. If we go to paragraph 31 of your fifth statement,  
 3 please, page 6 {TMO00869990/6}, you say at paragraph 31  
 4 there, foot of the screen:  
 5 "David Noble provided summary details of the above  
 6 to Kiran and myself in an email timed at 17.35 ..."  
 7 Which we've looked at.  
 8 If we look at the email again — let's look at it.  
 9 This is TB/12, which you exhibit lower down, and it's at  
 10 {TMO00869945}. This is an email at 17.48. What's  
 11 happening here, I should just explain — I'm taking this  
 12 a bit too quickly. What's happening here is that he,  
 13 Robert Shaw, is sending a message to RBKC's housing  
 14 internally, copied to you, as you can see, as the last  
 15 copyee, and also to Kiran Singh, passing on the  
 16 information that he has been given, I think, from  
 17 David Noble, and he says in the second paragraph:  
 18 "The bottom line is there are 845 residents (tenants  
 19 and families), and 25 recognised as disabled by the TMO.  
 20 "We have stated we will accommodate families with  
 21 children, vulnerable people, older people, if they do  
 22 not have an alternative place they would like to stay."  
 23 Now, first of all, it's correct I think from that,  
 24 isn't it, that you could see at the time that RBKC was  
 25 relying on the data provided by David Noble, the TMO;

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1 yes?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. As far as you were aware, was anyone from RBKC taking  
 4 any separate, independent steps to identify evacuated  
 5 residents and their needs for the purposes of the  
 6 emergency accommodation and other support, or were they  
 7 simply relying on what you were giving them?  
 8 A. Yeah, if we could just go back a step. We focused on  
 9 only identifying disabled people. You also mentioned  
 10 families and children. In the list of tenants you can  
 11 see where there are households and when there are  
 12 children within that list of tenants. You know, RBKC,  
 13 even though we hadn't identified children in that list,  
 14 you can see on the tenancy list who are the children in  
 15 a number of those households.  
 16 Q. Well, wouldn't that depend? You would be able to see  
 17 they were children, in other words under 18, I suppose,  
 18 at the time they were —  
 19 A. Yeah, you can see the household composition, and I think  
 20 it's got ages on it.  
 21 Q. Right. But that would be, first of all, out of date,  
 22 but you might be able to calculate it, I suppose, but  
 23 you wouldn't know whether someone was pregnant, for  
 24 example, from that list, would you?  
 25 A. No, it wasn't — I mean, no, it wouldn't account for

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1 every single circumstance that was going on, it's not  
 2 live data, which is why I say, you know, they would  
 3 visit the rehousing staff within the rest centres and  
 4 report up-to-date data.  
 5 Q. No, but my question, just to go back to it —  
 6 A. Sorry.  
 7 Q. — was: as far as you were aware, was anyone from RBKC  
 8 taking any independent steps to identify evacuated  
 9 residents and their needs for the purposes of providing  
 10 the emergency accommodation?  
 11 A. I don't know.  
 12 Q. Now, let's go back to your fifth statement, paragraph 31  
 13 again {TMO00869990/6}. You say there, after the  
 14 reference to David Noble at the very bottom:  
 15 "This was forwarded to Rob who circulated it within  
 16 RBKC, copied to Kiran and myself noting there were 845  
 17 residents (tenants and families) from those locations  
 18 with 25 recognised as disabled."  
 19 That's what we've just looked at.  
 20 Now, if we go to your sixth statement, please,  
 21 page 9 {TMO00894124/9}, we can see how that then evolved  
 22 further.  
 23 You say there at paragraph 31, in the middle of your  
 24 screen:  
 25 "On the afternoon of 14 June, Kiran Singh updated

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1 the TMO team that RBKC had advised that, if the cordon  
 2 remained in place overnight, residents in the area  
 3 cordoned off including Grenfell Walk, Hurstway Walk,  
 4 Testerton and Barandon Walk, Bramley House and Treadgold  
 5 House would have to be accommodated overnight. We were  
 6 advised that this accommodation would be provided at the  
 7 Westway Centre unless the residents were considered to  
 8 be elderly or vulnerable in which case hotel  
 9 accommodation would be arranged. The TMO relayed this  
 10 information to the residents in the rest centres."  
 11 Now, given the potential number that we've now seen  
 12 from David Noble of 845, and the significant numbers of  
 13 people in need of accommodation, and potentially  
 14 vulnerable people too, were you concerned about RBKC's  
 15 plan to accommodate all those people at the  
 16 Westway Centre?  
 17 A. I mean, a number of them did go to stay with relatives  
 18 or friends, and I think they were also directed to do  
 19 that.  
 20 Q. Still, potentially was it not the case that even leaving  
 21 aside the disabled people and deducting 25 on those  
 22 figures from the number, you still had some 820  
 23 individuals to accommodate potentially at the  
 24 Westway Centre?  
 25 A. Yeah, it was a huge amount of evacuated residents.

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1 Q. Yes. Were you concerned about how the Westway Centre  
 2 would cope with numbers like that?  
 3 A. I was told that the Westway Centre had been set up and  
 4 I hadn't been there myself, so I didn't really know how  
 5 many beds or anything were available.  
 6 Q. Right. Did you investigate?  
 7 A. I didn't have time to go and investigate things like  
 8 that.  
 9 Q. At the time, did you have a view about whether RBKC  
 10 appreciated the magnitude of how many evacuated  
 11 residents were affected?  
 12 A. They'd certainly been given the numbers. We'd supplied  
 13 them with the information. They knew the volume.  
 14 I don't think they expected everybody to go to the  
 15 Westway Centre because, you know, I know that our  
 16 ring-around showed that quite a few people did stay with  
 17 family and friends.  
 18 Q. Now, you say in the last sentence there that the TMO  
 19 relayed this information to the residents in the  
 20 rest centres. Were those the same rest centres to which  
 21 you had allocated staff?  
 22 A. Yes, there were a lot of displaced walkway residents  
 23 within the rest centres, so we would have —  
 24 Q. Right. So that's, just to be clear, St Clement's  
 25 Church, Rugby Portobello Club, Notting Hill

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1 Methodist Church and the Latimer Christian Centre?  
 2 A. Yeah, yes.  
 3 Q. Given that you didn't have a presence at other community  
 4 rest centres, such as the Al Manaar Mosque or  
 5 St Francis of Assisi Church, and other spontaneous  
 6 community centres that had grown up offering help, is it  
 7 right that the information to go to the Westway was not  
 8 communicated to evacuated residents who had gone to  
 9 those centres, the Al Manaar for example?  
 10 A. I can't confirm what information was in those  
 11 rest centres, but no, I don't know what information was  
 12 given to them there.  
 13 Q. I mean, did you appreciate that you might have residents  
 14 from, for example, Barandon Walk who had gone to the  
 15 Al Manaar Mosque as a rest centre but didn't get the  
 16 information that they couldn't go back to their homes  
 17 and had to spend the night at the Westway?  
 18 A. I appreciated that we wouldn't have reached everybody in  
 19 the various ways that we tried. You know, that's  
 20 inevitable when you've got that many people being  
 21 evacuated. But I know that we took steps the next day  
 22 to try and catch people by our phone—arounds to,  
 23 you know, make sure that everybody had been contacted  
 24 and knew where to get help and support and advice. But  
 25 on the day, we would have missed — you know,

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1 collectively , the council , we would have missed people,  
 2 I recognise that.  
 3 Q. Did you recognise it at the time?  
 4 A. No, all I recognised is that we were — you know, I had  
 5 staff in the places where I could put them. We were  
 6 trying our very best to make sure that we captured as  
 7 many people as we could.  
 8 Q. Do you accept that many evacuated residents may not have  
 9 been at the rest centres to receive the information you  
 10 were giving them, namely to go to the Westway?  
 11 A. Yes, I do accept that, and that's why, you know, when we  
 12 had more time the next day, we took the steps that we  
 13 could to make contact with those people, so that we did  
 14 pick them up. You know, it was — yeah, may have been  
 15 12 hours after, but we did recognise it and try and put  
 16 something in place to deal with that.  
 17 Q. Yes, and we've seen in your fifth statement at  
 18 paragraph 23 {TMO00869990/5}, I think, already that you  
 19 had done a ring—round at about 9.00 pm to residents from  
 20 Grenfell Tower that you had not been able to get hold  
 21 of; is it right to say that efforts actively to contact  
 22 residents on the 14 June, at least , were in priority to  
 23 Grenfell Tower residents?  
 24 A. That's right.  
 25 Q. In fact, only to Grenfell Tower residents; you didn't do

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1 a ring—round to anyone from the walkways.  
 2 A. No, I don't think we did, unless we did it from the  
 3 office . I don't think we did on the ground.  
 4 Q. Now, other than telling people in the rest centres to go  
 5 to the Westway Centre, is it right that there were no  
 6 other attempts to communicate with evacuated residents  
 7 on 14 June who were coming from the walkways, such as,  
 8 for example, the textburst facility that the TMO had?  
 9 A. No, we didn't use that.  
 10 Q. Why is that?  
 11 A. We were relying on the rest centres. My view was,  
 12 you know, I thought people were being directed to the  
 13 rest centres. I thought that was their first port —  
 14 point of contact, and we thought that we would collect  
 15 them there.  
 16 Q. Other than telling people in the rest centres to go to  
 17 the Westway Centre, there was no other attempt,  
 18 I think — is this right? — to communicate with  
 19 evacuated residents through setting up a helpline or  
 20 posters or any other form of dissemination.  
 21 A. On that day?  
 22 Q. Yes.  
 23 A. We would have obviously had our contact centre, a call  
 24 centre, TMO call centre, so anyone phoning in to that  
 25 would have been given advice and assistance, and that

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1 was obviously in operation on the day, so residents  
 2 could have been given advice that way round.  
 3 Q. Yes.  
 4 Now, we've had evidence from a number of evacuated  
 5 residents from the walkways that they were refused entry  
 6 to the Westway Centre when they got there. Were you  
 7 aware that evacuated residents were being denied entry?  
 8 A. No, not at all .  
 9 Q. Right. Did any of your staff members assigned to  
 10 Westway report on the system in operation there, how  
 11 many evacuees from the walkways were coming?  
 12 A. I don't recall getting that information during the day.  
 13 Q. Is it right that you didn't actually know which  
 14 residents had been told to go to the Westway Centre?  
 15 You had no list of those people who had had the  
 16 information —  
 17 A. No, but I knew that our process — it was very clear  
 18 that we'd been given information by the council on how  
 19 to direct people, so our process was to let them know  
 20 through the rest centres. So I knew that we'd been  
 21 doing that. We made announcements to that effect.  
 22 Q. Do you know how many people from the evacuated walkway  
 23 properties stayed at the Westway Centre overnight?  
 24 A. No, I don't. I know that there's about 25 total, but  
 25 I don't know their make—up, whether they were Grenfell

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1 or walkways. I don't know the detail.  
 2 Q. Let's go to {TMO10035612/6}, please. This is a series  
 3 of emails on 14 June late in the evening, and if we go  
 4 to page 6, please, there's an email timed at 23.38,  
 5 halfway down the screen, as you can see there. It's  
 6 quite close to the text from the email from you, but  
 7 it's from Robert Shaw, can you see?  
 8 A. Yeah.  
 9 Q. 14 June, 23.38, to Kiran Singh and to you, Ms Brown.  
 10 Yes?  
 11 A. Yeah.  
 12 Q. Subject, "Cordon area 2 families sleeping at Westway",  
 13 and you've got:  
 14 "Ahmed Haj Ahmed ... baranden[sic] walk ...  
 15 "Single man.  
 16 "Amina J Bari ... Glenfell [sic] Walk ..."  
 17 And there are details which have been redacted.  
 18 Now, it appears that only two families were sleeping  
 19 at the Westway Centre on 14 June from the surrounding  
 20 blocks. That can't be right, can it?  
 21 A. I don't know.  
 22 Q. Right.  
 23 Now, looking at your staff lists showing who was at  
 24 which rest centre, you may recall — you don't remember  
 25 the numbers, I'll just tell you them — that you had ten

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1 members of staff at the Westway Centre on 14 June  
 2 between 14.00 and 22.30. We can look at it if you like.  
 3 A. Yeah, no, I remember. I think —  
 4 Q. Yes, and you actually identify some of them in your  
 5 sixth witness statement at paragraph 43 {TMO00894124/12}  
 6 as being there until 11.00 pm —  
 7 A. Yeah, three —  
 8 Q. — Maria Sharples, Stuart Hill and Olivia Hutchison.  
 9 Did any of them or all of them report to you how few  
 10 walkway residents were staying at the Westway Centre?  
 11 A. They didn't at the time, no.  
 12 Q. Did any of them report to you any problems with  
 13 evacuated residents being denied entry to the  
 14 Westway Centre, as some have told us they were?  
 15 A. No, I —  
 16 Q. Did you check in with —  
 17 A. Not on the day, but I knew that there were issues with  
 18 people gaining access to the walkways in days after,  
 19 when the police had not allowed them back, but I don't  
 20 remember them being denied access to the Westway on that  
 21 day.  
 22 Q. Did you check in with those individuals at the Westway  
 23 from your staff to ask them about how many residents  
 24 were using the centre from the walkways?  
 25 A. No, I didn't at this time. This is 11.30 at night.

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1 Q. Right. Did you do anything during the course of that  
 2 evening to do so?  
 3 A. Any later than that — I'd been on — I'd got up at 2.00  
 4 in the morning. I left site at 10.30. I think by this  
 5 time I might actually have been going — I went home at  
 6 10.30, so I wouldn't have been home yet. I didn't do  
 7 any more that night. I got up early and came back the  
 8 next day, but I didn't do any more that night.  
 9 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, it's just before 1 o'clock, but  
 10 I have just got one document to ask the witness about  
 11 before we turn to a different topic — a different day,  
 12 in fact — so that would be convenient.  
 13 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, yes.  
 14 MR MILLETT: Can we look, please, at {RBK00029413}, which is  
 15 an RBKC BECC log in a slightly different format from the  
 16 one we were looking at with David Kerry.  
 17 If you look at entry 228, which is now in the middle  
 18 of your screen, this is 14 June 2017, 20.30 in the  
 19 evening, and it says:  
 20 "Red Cross (Christina) contacted to say that Red  
 21 Cross staff who are walking from RPC to Westway centre  
 22 have seen people sleeping on the streets who don't  
 23 appear to know about Westway being a relief centre  
 24 overnight.  
 25 "Jack Duncton has asked Red Cross to share more

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1 precise information re location and flag it with  
 2 David Carey.  
 3 "Cristina from Red Cross telephoned at 23.40 to say  
 4 that volunteers had spotted rough sleepers on  
 5 Verity Close."  
 6 Were you aware that people were sleeping rough on  
 7 the night of 14 June?  
 8 A. No, not until now, I wasn't.  
 9 Q. Are you able to help whether or not, even on the basis  
 10 of what you now know, there were evacuees from either  
 11 the tower or the walkways who should have been at the  
 12 Westway but were sleeping rough?  
 13 A. I know that you've covered that in evidence earlier this  
 14 week of a few people that you've identified were, yeah.  
 15 Q. But you didn't know that before; is that right?  
 16 A. I didn't know that, no, otherwise I would have hoped  
 17 that we would have contacted them and given them advice,  
 18 and I know that definitely we did contact some of those  
 19 people the day after and signpost them in to assistance  
 20 for accommodation or to the Westway.  
 21 Q. Did your staff make any attempts at the time to make  
 22 sure that residents weren't sleeping rough, for example  
 23 having staff out in the streets directing people to the  
 24 Westway Centre?  
 25 A. No, we had people in all of the — in the rest centres,

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1 but I didn't have people out on the streets.  
 2 Q. On reflection, could you and other TMO staff have been  
 3 more proactive in identifying and contacting evacuated  
 4 residents and signposting them to the Westway Centre on  
 5 that night?  
 6 A. We could have all done more, I guess, more people, more  
 7 time, but I think we — you know, we had a significant  
 8 presence during the day. We had thought that people  
 9 being evacuated would be channelled into the  
 10 rest centres and we'd hoped that we would catch them  
 11 there. Going out on the street, we didn't do that.  
 12 Q. Were you aware of any efforts by RBKC, did you have  
 13 a discussion with RBKC, about how they might prevent  
 14 residents from sleeping rough for want of any better  
 15 information about where to go?  
 16 A. I don't know what they did about it, but they certainly  
 17 had people — you know, they had Red Cross people, they  
 18 had staff overnight in the Westway, so, you know, I am  
 19 surprised that if they thought that that was a problem,  
 20 if that's being reported in this log, you know, there  
 21 wouldn't be some co-ordination between the BECC and the  
 22 Westway and sending out some resources to go and speak  
 23 to these people.  
 24 MR MILLETT: Thank you.  
 25 Mr Chairman, is that a convenient moment?

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1 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Yes. It is, thank you very much.  
 2 Well, I think it's time we stopped now for a break  
 3 for lunch, Ms Brown. We'll come back at 2.05, please.  
 4 Please remember not to talk to anyone about your  
 5 evidence over the break. All right?  
 6 THE WITNESS: Thank you.  
 7 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you very much.  
 8 (Pause)  
 9 Thank you very much, Mr Millett. 2.05, then,  
 10 please. Thank you.  
 11 (1.05 pm)  
 12 (The short adjournment)  
 13 (2.05 pm)  
 14 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: All right, ready to carry on?  
 15 THE WITNESS: Yes.  
 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Thank you. Take a moment to get  
 17 organised.  
 18 THE WITNESS: Just glasses.  
 19 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.  
 20 MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman.  
 21 Ms Brown, I just want to revisit something we  
 22 touched on earlier today briefly again: TMO at the  
 23 Rugby Portobello Club.  
 24 First, do you know where the TMO staff physically  
 25 placed themselves within the club premises?

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1 A. So from Maria's, Maria Sharples' evidence, I can see  
 2 that she was saying that they had a table on the ground  
 3 floor, and then they were seeing people there as they  
 4 came in, and then they were directing people upstairs.  
 5 Q. Right. So were you aware of the layout of the club?  
 6 You've got a small reception and a larger subterranean  
 7 area?  
 8 A. I'm sorry, I don't — I wasn't in there, so I don't know  
 9 it directly. I just know that from her evidence, that's  
 10 what she was saying, and I — yeah, I think — I don't  
 11 know any more than that. I just thought it was a table  
 12 near the front on the ground floor.  
 13 Q. Right. And that's where you thought — is this  
 14 right? — the TMO staff were located?  
 15 A. Yes, because she was my head of service in that  
 16 rest centre. That's what she gives as her evidence.  
 17 Q. Right, I see. So what you know is based on her  
 18 evidence, rather than your own knowledge on the night?  
 19 A. What I know is that there were a substantial amount of  
 20 our staff in the Rugby Portobello Club. Where they  
 21 physically were in relation to anywhere else, I don't  
 22 know.  
 23 Q. Okay.  
 24 Now, let's turn to 15 June 2017, and I want to ask  
 25 you about the communication with evacuated residents.

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1 Can we go, first, please, to your fifth statement,  
 2 page 9 {TMO00869990/9}, paragraph 46. We are now at  
 3 15 June, Ms Brown, and you say in that paragraph:  
 4 "On this date, my Neighbourhood TMO team carried out  
 5 a first phone around to finger block and Treadgold House  
 6 residents to offer support and to identify where they  
 7 were, in hotels or staying with family and friends etc."  
 8 Now, we have already established that there was no  
 9 process in place, as I think you have told us, on  
 10 14 June to identify evacuated non—Grenfell residents.  
 11 Can you confirm for us that this was the first time  
 12 that attempts were made to contact evacuated residents  
 13 from those buildings?  
 14 A. Other than at the rest centres the day before, yes.  
 15 Q. Yes.  
 16 What time did your team begin these phone calls to  
 17 evacuated residents?  
 18 A. I don't know precisely, but I know they were due — done  
 19 during the day.  
 20 Q. Right.  
 21 Can I take you, then, to {TMO10036636}. Now, this  
 22 is a document, it looks like it's a script, entitled  
 23 "Calls to surrounding blocks", and you've got "Nicola B"  
 24 and then "Questions", and then underneath that "Main  
 25 message". Do you see? Which says:

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1 "Wanting to check where they are, we will continue  
 2 to liaise with emergency services and communicate when  
 3 safe to return home. You can approach the local Police  
 4 with ID for access in absolute emergencies only. At the  
 5 moment, our priority is to check you are safe and also  
 6 to ensure our customers at Grenfell."  
 7 Now, first, who drafted this document?  
 8 A. I think one of the team leaders must have done, maybe  
 9 Nicola. I didn't.  
 10 Q. How was the sentence ending "our customers at Grenfell"  
 11 supposed to end? It looks incomplete.  
 12 A. I wouldn't know that. Can we go back?  
 13 Q. Yes, go back a page.  
 14 A. "At the moment our ..."  
 15 Sorry.  
 16 (Pause)  
 17 Go back forward.  
 18 (Pause)  
 19 Q. Do you know how —  
 20 A. I don't know what she was intending to say.  
 21 Q. Right. What was a customer at Grenfell?  
 22 A. A resident, for another word, a resident, tenant,  
 23 leaseholder.  
 24 Q. Is that what you thought of them, customers?  
 25 A. Yeah.

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1 Q. Is that how the TMO regarded them?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. But these aren't people trading at arm's length with the  
 4 TMO as people buying goods or services. Why did you  
 5 call them customers?  
 6 A. I think people — over the years, people have called  
 7 residents different things. We called them tenants,  
 8 leaseholders, sometimes customers.  
 9 Q. I mean, they're not customers, are they, in reality?  
 10 They're residents to whom the council provides homes  
 11 under a statutory obligation. Can you explain how the  
 12 concept of custom ever entered into the language?  
 13 A. I think it's a term that's been used across housing  
 14 organisations over periods of time. That wouldn't be  
 15 just new to us at the TMO. We had a customer strategy.  
 16 It must have gone — you know, come from that language.  
 17 Q. Right. Was this script used for calls being made to  
 18 evacuated residents on 15 June?  
 19 A. So it looks like it is. It's — the other page looks  
 20 like it's for the walkways.  
 21 Q. Right.  
 22 If we look at page 2 {TMO10036636/2}, the title  
 23 says, "Calls to Grenfell Tower" —  
 24 A. Yeah.  
 25 Q. — with a similar list of questions.

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1 A. Yeah.  
 2 Q. And then there's a title "Message", and it says again:  
 3 "Wanting to check where they are ..."  
 4 And it goes on:  
 5 "... we will continue to liaise with emergency  
 6 services. At the moment, any belongings, they can go to  
 7 the Westway for this. If they need any funds, then they  
 8 can contact the temporary accommodation team or approach  
 9 westway sports centre."  
 10 What does the main message in this document for  
 11 evacuated residents and, indeed, Grenfell Tower  
 12 residents — well, why does it differ, in that evacuated  
 13 residents are not directed to the Westway Centre for  
 14 belongings, funds or temporary accommodation?  
 15 A. Sorry, can you just say that again?  
 16 Q. Yes, I'm afraid I garbled the question.  
 17 The question is this: you can see that the two  
 18 messages are different; why are they different? Why  
 19 does the main message for evacuated residents not direct  
 20 people to the Westway Centre for belongings, funds or  
 21 temporary accommodation, whereas the one for Grenfell  
 22 does?  
 23 A. I don't know. I don't think the intention was that you  
 24 wouldn't — that anybody couldn't receive support from  
 25 the Westway from other services that were there. There

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1 was support in many ways from the Westway, so I don't  
 2 think we would actually have deterred — we would have  
 3 encouraged people to go there if they felt they needed  
 4 the support of services there. So maybe it's just the  
 5 way that it's written. And they just — staff won't  
 6 just have had these words given to them; we had daily  
 7 briefings, we tried to keep everybody updated about what  
 8 the key messages were. So this won't have been the only  
 9 communication.  
 10 Q. Well, that may be, but on its face it looks as if  
 11 residents who had been evacuated from Grenfell Tower  
 12 were being given a different message from those  
 13 evacuated from the walkways, on its face at least.  
 14 A. Yeah.  
 15 Q. Yes. Do you know why that was?  
 16 A. No. I'm saying — I think we thought at this time that  
 17 most of the people from Grenfell Tower would have been  
 18 housed in hotels by this stage, and beyond that, I'm not  
 19 really sure why it's different. But I think, you know,  
 20 we knew that that was the main source of help and  
 21 assistance, so anyone could have gone there for support  
 22 and advice.  
 23 Q. If you go back to page 1, and indeed over to page 2, and  
 24 that's the main message for evacuated residents from the  
 25 walkways, there's no indication in there of any support

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1 being offered at all, is there, unlike the message to  
 2 the Grenfell Tower evacuees?  
 3 A. Okay, so the residents of the walkways, we're just  
 4 checking to see where they are at this stage. This is  
 5 in the day. What I had been hoping for, and I was  
 6 waiting for instructions from RBKC, was to be allowed to  
 7 go back into the cordoned area, into the walkways, and  
 8 had a team of staff on hand all day ready to go and  
 9 physically door-knock, to check whether people needed  
 10 any help and support, and, you know, in those visits and  
 11 door-knocks we did very much sign people to support from  
 12 other services, and that would have been also going to  
 13 the Westway if they wanted to.  
 14 Q. I mean, given that the policy had changed the previous  
 15 afternoon and that those evacuated from the walkway  
 16 buildings were also to be accommodated overnight at the  
 17 Westway, what was the rationale at this stage, the  
 18 morning of 15 June, for any different message, any  
 19 message different from that which was being given to the  
 20 Grenfell Tower evacuees?  
 21 A. Well, I think there was some confusion in this, because  
 22 my understanding is that nobody in the walkways had been  
 23 allowed to go home. I had understood that they'd been  
 24 evacuated by the police. But when we did these  
 25 door-knocks, we found that some people had been allowed

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1 through the cordon, and I think there's some evidence  
 2 from one of my colleagues who was saying that in these  
 3 phone—rounds, we found that there were about — I think  
 4 it was 56 people who had already been allowed in the day  
 5 before.  
 6 Q. Let's look at {TMO10036651}. This is an email from  
 7 Angelique Noble to you and other TMO staff at 18.26 on  
 8 15 June, as you can see, and we can see the table  
 9 underneath it. You've got the numbers at home, numbers  
 10 not at home, don't know, totals for each of Hurstway,  
 11 Testerton, Barandon; do you see that?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. So some were at home and some were not at home, so does  
 14 that rather make your point that not everybody was  
 15 evacuated?  
 16 A. It does.  
 17 Q. You say in your statement — let's just look at  
 18 statement number 6, page 17 {TMO00894124/17},  
 19 paragraph 58 — that the table was produced following  
 20 a call on 15 June to residents in walkways. So that's  
 21 the ring—around you're referring to, is it?  
 22 A. Yes.  
 23 Q. Let's go back to the table, if we can, please,  
 24 {TMO10036651}. Do you know, first of all, why the table  
 25 only captures residents in Hurstway, Testerton and

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1 Barandon Walks?  
 2 A. I believe that Bramley were all back, as far as we knew  
 3 it, and I think that Treadgold House we would have done  
 4 a separate ring—around. This is just reporting on  
 5 these. I suspect you will be able to find something  
 6 separate on Treadgold.  
 7 Q. All right. What about Grenfell Walk, the two buildings  
 8 just to the south of the tower?  
 9 A. Grenfell Walk, we would have called around, but I think  
 10 that would have been — my recollection is that they  
 11 were then recorded — there was a spreadsheet with  
 12 Grenfell Tower and Grenfell Walk then separated, and we  
 13 updated that list separately.  
 14 Q. Right. Do these numbers represent individual people or  
 15 households, the individual numbers?  
 16 A. It's numbered based on contacts, so I'm not quite sure.  
 17 I would imagine this is households.  
 18 Q. Right.  
 19 A. But I'm not quite sure.  
 20 Q. Can you account for why it was that some were at home  
 21 and some were not?  
 22 A. No, I can't. I was — oh, why some were at home?  
 23 Because some had been let through by the police, and  
 24 when we did the door—knock the next day, we found some  
 25 people saying they actually weren't evacuated, so

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1 I didn't really ever understand that.  
 2 Q. I see.  
 3 So if you or the council was trying to get a handle  
 4 on how many evacuees you or they had to prepare for on  
 5 the 14th, how did you, if you did, cater for the fact  
 6 that a large percentage were not being evacuated at all?  
 7 A. I couldn't have accounted for it if I didn't know that  
 8 they weren't being evacuated. I didn't — I thought  
 9 they were — I thought everyone had been evacuated.  
 10 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: I'm right, am I, in thinking that  
 11 the line that reads "Do not know" is actually: not at  
 12 home but do not know where they are?  
 13 A. Yeah. Yes, at that particular time. This is just  
 14 a snapshot, because there were other details —  
 15 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Yes, thank you.  
 16 MR MILLETT: So — right. I mean, can that be right?  
 17 Looking at the totals, you've got 56 at home, 95 not at  
 18 home, and then 216, which isn't a — how does the 216  
 19 relate to the 95?  
 20 A. So the 90 ...  
 21 (Pause)  
 22 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: Well, may I suggest that the way it  
 23 reads is that —  
 24 A. Oh, I can tell you, sorry.  
 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: I'm sorry. If you've got the

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1 answer, you tell us.  
 2 A. Yes, I have. Because they're not at home because we  
 3 know that they're either at the Westway or with  
 4 relatives and in temporary accommodation, and the others  
 5 we just didn't know at all.  
 6 MR MILLETT: Right. So you've got people you know to be at  
 7 home —  
 8 A. Yeah.  
 9 Q. — people you know not to be at home but you know where  
 10 they are —  
 11 A. Yeah.  
 12 Q. — and people whom you don't know where they are?  
 13 A. Yes, that's right.  
 14 SIR MARTIN MOORE—BICK: But assume you do know that they're  
 15 not at home; is that right?  
 16 A. Yes, in that we've called and I — yeah, we do know  
 17 they're not at home. Yeah.  
 18 Well, we think we know they're not at home, I have  
 19 to say, because, you know, we made calls and people may  
 20 or may not have been home. We did visits and people may  
 21 or not have been home. So it was actually, you know,  
 22 a picture that was quite difficult to work out.  
 23 MR MILLETT: Now, can we then go to your sixth statement  
 24 again, please, paragraph 57, page 16 {TMO00894124/16},  
 25 and you say there, at the foot of the screen:

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1 "My recollection is that a similar spreadsheet to  
2 that used to record residents who were missing and safe  
3 was created for the Team Leaders to document the  
4 conversations they had with non-Grenfell residents.  
5 This captured issues in relation to the property and  
6 included names and addresses and whether the residents  
7 were in a hotel or not."  
8 Did that process, just pausing there, start on  
9 15 June?  
10 A. Yes, I believe that it did, yeah.  
11 Q. If we go, please, to Kiran Singh's second supplemental  
12 statement, this is at {TMO00894410/4}, paragraph 4a, he,  
13 we can see, addresses how the list for walkway residents  
14 was developed, and he says in 4a:  
15 "This list [which is what he's referring to] was  
16 based on the finger blocks tenancy list. The  
17 information would have been extracted and downloaded  
18 from Capita, although I am unsure who would have done  
19 this."  
20 He continues at 4c:  
21 "This document could not have been updated prior to  
22 the fire as it was not in existence. The data was  
23 extracted from the TMO's system and the list was created  
24 post-fire. However, as above, tenancy changes within  
25 the finger blocks would have been updated on the system

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1 as and when new information was available or when  
2 tenancy information had changed. The process was that  
3 tenants would inform Customer Service Centre or their  
4 Neighbourhood Officer who would update the system as  
5 described above."  
6 Does that accord with your understanding of how the  
7 list was formulated?  
8 A. Yes.  
9 Q. As with the safe and missing list for Grenfell Tower  
10 residents, presumably you would accept that the accuracy  
11 of the information within the list was based only on the  
12 information recorded on the system, based in turn on  
13 what the TMO(sic) had told the TMO?  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. The tenants had told the TMO.  
16 A. Yes.  
17 Q. Did the TMO have a system at all in place to review and  
18 update those records regularly, whether or not they'd  
19 been told it by tenants?  
20 A. We had a — and we have covered this in previous  
21 evidence, we did have a tenancy check process, and we  
22 also had our CRM system, which we used when people  
23 called the customer service centre, and, as I've said,  
24 that was used to review tenant information on the first  
25 page.

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1 Q. Now, let's look further into the detail. Can we go to  
2 {TMO10036665}. What I'm showing you here is an example  
3 of the spreadsheet that was used to record information  
4 from the calls. Am I right?  
5 A. Yes.  
6 Q. In relation at least to the finger blocks.  
7 Now, if you go to column L on the right—hand side of  
8 the screen, and the rows highlighted in red, and scroll  
9 down the spreadsheet, you can see a number under L, if  
10 we go very slowly, in red.  
11 Pausing there, row 32:  
12 "number not valid."  
13 "message left [something]."  
14 "Number not available no vm facility."  
15 I think the second one says "message left on vm",  
16 voicemail.  
17 A. Yeah.  
18 Q. Et cetera. You can see the kinds of difficulties.  
19 Is that because the records that the TMO held for  
20 residents were not up to date?  
21 A. No, it's because the red is "Please mark red for unable  
22 to contact", so we're highlighting we haven't got hold  
23 of them. It may be because the information was not up  
24 to date, they may not have given us a new phone number,  
25 or it may just have been that we couldn't contact them

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1 at that particular time. We will have tried again.  
2 Q. But I think you accept that it would include a change of  
3 data? The reason for not contacting or being able to  
4 make —  
5 A. It may have been, yeah.  
6 Q. Let's go to another example, {TMO10034288}. What I was  
7 showing you was finger blocks and Treadgold and Bramley.  
8 This, if we go to the next one, please, this is it, and  
9 this has two tabs, "Finger blocks and [Treadgold]" and  
10 "Bramley House". Do you know why there were different  
11 spreadsheets?  
12 A. I don't know why there's not a difference between finger  
13 blocks and Treadgold separately. They're just three  
14 separate blocks.  
15 Q. Sorry, let me just compare this with the previous  
16 document we were looking at. If we go back just for  
17 a moment to {TMO10036665}.  
18 A. Yeah. So I think this is separated blocks. So this is  
19 people being given —  
20 Q. Right.  
21 A. So this is I think one ... is this the full block list?  
22 Full finger blocks, this one, that I'm now seeing.  
23 Q. This one I'm showing you is called sheet 1, and has  
24 got —  
25 A. Yeah. It's the full walkways.

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1 Q. It's the full walkways, correct. The second one I was  
 2 showing you — let's go back to that, {TMO10034288} —  
 3 has got finger blocks and Treadgold at one tab and  
 4 Bramley at another.  
 5 A. Yeah.  
 6 Q. My question is: why were there different spreadsheets?  
 7 A. I think Kiran explains this in his evidence, in that we  
 8 were allocating certain blocks certain properties for  
 9 individuals to ring around. That may be why they're  
 10 separate.  
 11 Q. Right. So is it right that TMO staff were populating  
 12 different spreadsheets with updates from their calls  
 13 with residents?  
 14 A. No, so they were amalgamated into one spreadsheet. So  
 15 I don't think that they were — yes, they were  
 16 completing them individually and then they were put into  
 17 a document, is how I understand it, so that they could  
 18 be responsible for inputting the data.  
 19 Q. Now, if you scroll across — hold on a moment. If you  
 20 scroll across slowly, you can see — keep going, keep  
 21 going, keep going — you've got a lot of redacted  
 22 information there. Just look at the kinds of  
 23 redactions. You've got columns — stop there, please —  
 24 for age; language; then under V, visual impairment; W,  
 25 hearing impairment; X, physical disability ; Y,

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1 vulnerable physical disability ; Z, mental health;  
 2 vulnerable mental health; learning difficulty ;  
 3 wheelchair user; mobility difficult ; vulnerable to  
 4 harassment; "Disabled?"  
 5 There's a lot of different categorisations of  
 6 vulnerability on that spreadsheet. Now, they've all  
 7 been redacted.  
 8 Can I compare that, though, with another example,  
 9 this time this relates to Grenfell Walk, {TMO10017543}.  
 10 This is for Grenfell Walk, as you can see. We're  
 11 actually on the Grenfell Tower tab. If we can click on  
 12 "Grenfell Walk", and scroll across, again slowly, in the  
 13 same way that we did with the last spreadsheet. We've  
 14 got age, redacted, and then redactions in columns K to  
 15 P, keep going across, but nothing else.  
 16 Is it the position that the information in the  
 17 columns that have the redacted blocks was the same so  
 18 far as vulnerability was concerned, or is it the case  
 19 that this spreadsheet didn't have any columns in it  
 20 capturing data on vulnerabilities as we saw in the  
 21 previous document?  
 22 A. I don't think I know the answer to that. I can't see —  
 23 I don't know what they are. We would have had the same  
 24 range of information available on all residents because  
 25 it was adapted — it was extracted from the Capita

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1 database.  
 2 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Do we not have an unredacted  
 3 version, Mr Millett?  
 4 MR MILLETT: Well, I'm trying to ask the question without —  
 5 A. Doing it, yeah.  
 6 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, no, if you need the  
 7 information, I imagine we've got it.  
 8 MR MILLETT: Yes. Standing here, I'm not sure of the answer  
 9 to that question.  
 10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: No, no.  
 11 MR MILLETT: Let me try it this way: do you remember there  
 12 being different kinds of spreadsheets, some of which had  
 13 the data in it and some of which didn't?  
 14 A. I don't specifically remember that, but we would have  
 15 had access to the same range of data.  
 16 Q. Let's then turn to a different topic, which is the  
 17 return of the evacuated residents.  
 18 Let's go to your fifth statement, please, at  
 19 paragraph 56 {TMO00869990/11}, where you say there, just  
 20 below halfway down:  
 21 "The role of TMO was to facilitate residents moving  
 22 back, to offer support and signpost into support  
 23 services where needed. A team of 15 TMO staff including  
 24 myself conducted a door knock of all properties in the  
 25 walkways to check on residents and advise them of up to

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1 date information about services and to direct residents  
 2 to support/counselling services where required. A sheet  
 3 was completed for each occupant noting key issues. The  
 4 Environmental Services team at the TMO collated this  
 5 information."  
 6 Now, was this role assigned to the TMO specifically  
 7 by RBKC or was it a role that the TMO assumed  
 8 voluntarily?  
 9 A. Returning residents or going to visit them?  
 10 Q. Facilitating residents moving back in or supporting —  
 11 A. The decision to return residents was made by  
 12 the council, and then we — they — well, we took the  
 13 role in leading on visiting residents as a result of  
 14 that. How it came about was all RBK(sic) decision to  
 15 return residents to the walkways.  
 16 Q. Yes. My question was a bit more focused.  
 17 A. Sorry.  
 18 Q. Perhaps I'll try it differently.  
 19 When you say the role of TMO was to facilitate  
 20 residents moving back, was that a role that the TMO  
 21 assumed voluntarily, or was it a role imposed, politely  
 22 perhaps, by the council upon TMO?  
 23 A. I'm finding it difficult to answer that question,  
 24 because ... probably because I'm thinking of why you're  
 25 asking me, because we were told that residents were

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1 moving back and then it was obviously clearly our role  
 2 to be the first point of contact and communicate with  
 3 those residents, and, you know, that wasn't forced on  
 4 us, we did that willingly.  
 5 Q. Right. But I think what you're saying is that you were  
 6 told by RBKC that the buildings were safe for them to  
 7 move back into, and then it was left to you to work out  
 8 how to do it?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Is that the position?  
 11 A. That's it.  
 12 Q. Let's go, then, to your sixth statement, please, page 16  
 13 {TMO00894124/16}, paragraph 54, top of the page, you  
 14 say:  
 15 "I was located at the TMO Office in Portobello  
 16 responding to queries and waiting to be mobilised to  
 17 knock on the doors of residents returning to the  
 18 Walkways, to offer support and see what cleaning and  
 19 repairs were required. I could only be mobilised once  
 20 confirmation was received from the BECC that this had  
 21 been authorised by Gold Group."  
 22 Now, that's correct, is it?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. That you were waiting for Gold to give the go-ahead.  
 25 If we then go to your fifth statement, then, in

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1 light of that, and go, please, to page 9  
 2 {TMO00869990/9}, paragraph 45, you say there that you:  
 3 "... recall on 15 June having discussions with  
 4 Stuart Priestley from RBKC BECC who had advised that  
 5 consideration was being given at that time to return  
 6 residents evacuated in the surrounding areas of the  
 7 Tower. I recall discussing the possible impact on  
 8 residents if this went ahead advising that if residents  
 9 returned home they would have no gas/boiler, and  
 10 consequently no hot water or cooking facilities, as the  
 11 surrounding areas ran off the Tower's heating/hot water  
 12 services. We also needed to repair damaged doors where  
 13 the police had forced entry and I suggested that  
 14 returning residents should not be rushed back until we  
 15 could ensure proper provision of services, re routing of  
 16 refuse arrangements and cleaning of the area. The door  
 17 entry system also needed to be re routed."  
 18 Now, I think it's right, isn't it, that you were  
 19 sharing concerns that you had had about the return of  
 20 evacuated residents?  
 21 A. Yes, with Stuart Priestley, yes.  
 22 Q. With Stuart Priestley of RBKC.  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. Do you remember when on 15 June you had that  
 25 conversation?

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1 A. I thought it was quite early in the morning.  
 2 Q. Right. How did Stuart Priestley respond to your  
 3 concern?  
 4 A. I said in my statement I can't actually remember what he  
 5 said. I thought he was going to take away my concerns  
 6 and feed them in to the BECC.  
 7 Q. Right. Let me put it this way: he didn't give you any  
 8 reason to think, or did he, that he wouldn't feed them  
 9 into the BECC --  
 10 A. No.  
 11 Q. -- and act on it?  
 12 A. No.  
 13 Q. As far as you were aware, was RBKC taking any steps to  
 14 address these problems, such as absence of hot water,  
 15 gas, or was this simply left to the TMO to address?  
 16 A. So it was left to us to address initially, all of those  
 17 issues were, and then I think London Gold became  
 18 involved in some of those issues later on. But  
 19 initially, yes.  
 20 Q. In paragraph 48, if you go to the bottom of the page  
 21 {TMO00869990/9}, you say:  
 22 "At approximately 8pm on the 15 June, I was  
 23 contacted by the BECC and asked to meet Police  
 24 Inspector Bean at the Kensington Leisure Centre. This  
 25 was to inspect the finger blocks ..."

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1 What was the purpose of that inspection, do you  
 2 remember?  
 3 A. Well, it says in the rest of this paragraph to check if  
 4 there were any areas that needed boarding up before  
 5 residents moved in. That's how it was presented to me.  
 6 Q. Right. Who was it at the BECC who told you or asked you  
 7 to meet Police Inspector Bean --  
 8 A. I can't remember who asked me, but they gave me the name  
 9 and the contact details.  
 10 Q. And I think you say also that you were advised that on  
 11 the inspection the intention of the Gold Group was that  
 12 the finger block residents should be returned as soon as  
 13 possible; yes?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. Yes. By Gold Group, did you understand that to mean  
 16 RBKC Gold?  
 17 A. At this time, yes.  
 18 Q. Yes. You say, "At this time"; this is at 8.00 pm on  
 19 15 June.  
 20 A. Yes, yeah, RBC(sic) --  
 21 Q. Had anyone told you about what arrangements were being  
 22 made with London Local Authority Gold?  
 23 A. No, I didn't have any awareness of that at this stage at  
 24 all, I don't think.  
 25 Q. Right.

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1 Now, you go on to say in paragraph 48, as I think  
 2 you've already captured, at the very foot of the page,  
 3 as follows:  
 4 "I repeated my concerns about it being premature due  
 5 to the lack of gas/heating etc, doors needing securing.  
 6 Fire exits from the 300 blocks provided access directly  
 7 onto Grenfell Walk the area in front of the tower with  
 8 direct views onto the tower and Grenfell walk where  
 9 there was still debris falling."

10 Now, you say "300 blocks"; what do you mean there?  
 11 A. So we looked at a picture — a map earlier of the —  
 12 Q. Yes.  
 13 A. — walkways. So the 300s were the area nearest to the  
 14 tower, so just parallel with Grenfell Walk.  
 15 Q. I see, so what you would call the finger blocks,  
 16 I think?  
 17 A. Yes, sorry, yeah.  
 18 Q. So — right.  
 19 A. Call them different things.  
 20 Q. Hurstway, Barandon and Testerton.  
 21 A. Yeah, so at the bottom of those nearest Grenfell Tower.  
 22 Q. Yes, I see. Right. Who did you repeat those concerns  
 23 to?  
 24 A. I called my manager, Sacha Jevans.  
 25 Q. And in your view, were those properties in a fit state

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1 for people to be living in?  
 2 A. I didn't go into the individual — in the individual  
 3 flats. I was concerned when I did the walkaround that  
 4 night that there was still water lying on some of the  
 5 floors where the Fire Brigade had run their hoses  
 6 through the block, so I was concerned about, you know,  
 7 an immediate need to deal with that and to do some  
 8 electric checks. So I was concerned that there was  
 9 a lot of work for us to do.  
 10 Q. What about security, doors broken into?  
 11 A. Yeah, I was concerned about the doors being broken into,  
 12 in fact, because, you know, when people are evacuated,  
 13 they were — the Fire Brigade broke them open. But  
 14 I did have my — an RD representative with us came along  
 15 on that walkabout to make the doors safe, and he did  
 16 work overnight to try and secure some of those doors  
 17 that evening.  
 18 Q. And RD is Repairs Direct?  
 19 A. Sorry, yes.  
 20 Q. What did you tell Sacha Jevans?  
 21 A. I repeated the concerns that I had about, you know, the  
 22 condition, that we needed to do the heating and hot  
 23 water, the — you know, the — I knew the door entry  
 24 wasn't operating.  
 25 Q. How did she respond?

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1 A. I think she shared those concerns, and then she in turn  
 2 spoke to Laura about them, Laura Johnson.  
 3 Q. As you say in the last sentence of this paragraph, she  
 4 told you that, "Laura said we had to go with the  
 5 Gold group decision"; that's right, is it?  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. Did Sacha Jevans tell Laura Johnson about the concerns  
 8 that you shared about the risks of returning residents  
 9 coming back into the walkway properties?  
 10 A. I believe she made her aware of what the issues were,  
 11 yes.  
 12 Q. Now, what was your view at the time about whether  
 13 the council were engaging appropriately with the  
 14 significant issues that you could see affecting  
 15 returning evacuees coming back to the walkway  
 16 properties?  
 17 A. I think the discussion very quickly moved to, you know,  
 18 how would we solve the problems? How would we get on  
 19 and, you know, make residents as comfortable as  
 20 possible?  
 21 Q. Yes, but my question was: what was your view about  
 22 whether the council was engaging in that process?  
 23 A. Well, engaging in helping us or engaging in knowing  
 24 about it?  
 25 Q. Engaging in whether it was appropriate to allow evacuees

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1 to return, given the problems that you identify?  
 2 A. I think they'd made the decision. You know, at this  
 3 point in time, they had, you know, a huge amount of  
 4 people in hotel accommodation in the middle of the  
 5 summer, and I think they had some very difficult  
 6 decisions to make about, you know, where all these  
 7 people were going to go.  
 8 Q. Right. So is it your evidence or is it your  
 9 recollection that RBKC sought to return evacuated  
 10 residents as soon as possible, despite the serious  
 11 issues with the properties?  
 12 A. We certainly carried on and returned residents to the  
 13 properties at this stage.  
 14 Q. And that was because of the lack of availability — is  
 15 this right? — of available emergency accommodation?  
 16 A. Well, the council are best to answer that. I can't  
 17 answer their decision. But that seemed to be the  
 18 reason. And also I think, you know, we thought that we  
 19 could solve some of these problems.  
 20 Q. You go on at paragraph 59, I think, of your statement at  
 21 page 17 {TMO00894124/17} to say:  
 22 "After speaking with Inspector Charles Bean  
 23 I understood that a decision to allow residents to  
 24 return had been made in principle by Gold Group by the  
 25 evening of 15 June 2017. However, this was not formally

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1 implemented until the following day when we received  
 2 further instructions. Therefore, whilst we later found  
 3 out some residents had begun to return by this point,  
 4 this was prior to authorisation by Gold Group."  
 5 Then at 75 in your fifth statement, if we can just  
 6 jump to that, page 15 {TMO00869990/15}, paragraph 75,  
 7 you say in the last sentence:  
 8 "As regards residents being forced to move back to  
 9 their homes, TMO were advised to implement the Gold  
 10 Group decision."  
 11 Did you disagree with that decision at the time?  
 12 A. I had concerns about the condition of the properties,  
 13 but I think I also understood that they had concerns  
 14 about the ability to essentially rehouse, you know,  
 15 potentially 845 people and the complexity of that. So  
 16 I think at this point I turned my attention to focus on,  
 17 you know, what could I do to clean the water, what could  
 18 I do to clean the properties, and I moved on to focusing  
 19 on solving the other problems.  
 20 Q. Right. I think you say also that some of the residents  
 21 had returned --  
 22 A. Some of them.  
 23 Q. -- to their properties before Gold had made its  
 24 decision.  
 25 A. Yeah, and in the door--knocks, we did find that some

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1 people said they wanted to remain there, they preferred  
 2 to be there than in hotel accommodation.  
 3 Q. Yes, and I think it's right, isn't it, that there was  
 4 confusing information throughout the 15th coming from  
 5 the BECC about whether or not walkway residents were  
 6 being allowed back into their homes?  
 7 A. Sorry, on the 15th?  
 8 Q. Yes.  
 9 A. Well, I had to wait for a decision for a while, yes,  
 10 that's right.  
 11 Q. Well, let's go to {TMO10035610}. This is a document  
 12 headed:  
 13 "DRAFT19/9  
 14 "Summary of Actions taken by Neighbourhood team.  
 15 Teresa Brown.  
 16 "Wednesday 14th June."  
 17 I think this is a document you drafted, is it?  
 18 A. Yeah, that's right.  
 19 Q. And some time after the fire; yes?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. Am I right that it was drafted by you on 19 September?  
 22 Is that what the 19/9 signifies?  
 23 A. That feels quite late to have drafted it, but possibly.  
 24 Q. At any rate, it's not a contemporaneous document.  
 25 A. No, definitely not, no.

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1 Q. Now, let's go to page 5 in it {TMO10035610/5}, please,  
 2 penultimate paragraph on page 5. It says:  
 3 "Confusing info from the BECC throughout the day  
 4 about when the finger blocks residents were being  
 5 allowed back into their homes. A Team was available in  
 6 the office all pm to be mobilised to go on site and  
 7 knock on the doors of residents returning to the finger  
 8 blocks to offer support and see what cleaning/repairs  
 9 were required once confirmation was received from the  
 10 BECC."  
 11 Then you go on:  
 12 "At 8pm I was telephoned by Rebeca [blank] from the  
 13 BECC and advised to meet police inspector Charles Phil  
 14 Bean on site ..."  
 15 So that puts it on 15 June; yes?  
 16 A. Yes.  
 17 Q. That's correct, is it?  
 18 So looking at this document, your reflection  
 19 a few weeks or perhaps months after the fire was that  
 20 there was confusing information from the BECC throughout  
 21 the day about when the finger block residents were being  
 22 allowed back into their homes.  
 23 A. Yes. As I'd said in my previous evidence, you know,  
 24 something we've covered earlier, is that, you know,  
 25 I had staff ready to go to the finger blocks earlier on

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1 in the day, but we didn't get permission that day.  
 2 We -- you know, the first contact I had, really, was  
 3 around this 8.00 pm, and then we -- that decision had  
 4 been made, but we didn't -- we weren't authorised to go  
 5 until the next day.  
 6 Q. Yes.  
 7 Now, we've heard evidence from a number of evacuated  
 8 residents who didn't know whether they could return home  
 9 or what they should do. Indeed, some say they tried to  
 10 go home but were turned away.  
 11 First, did you know that?  
 12 A. I have -- we obviously picked that up from the Westway,  
 13 that some people had tried to go home and had been told  
 14 that they couldn't, and I think, you know, that was  
 15 a pattern that happened over a few days. There was  
 16 misinformation sometimes from the police about whether  
 17 people could go through the cordon or not, and --  
 18 Q. Was that confusion because of confusing information  
 19 being communicated to them about when they could go  
 20 home?  
 21 A. Well, I thought that, you know, the decisions were being  
 22 made by the council, not by ourselves, in terms of who  
 23 was -- who could return when, at what time. So  
 24 I assumed that the council, you know, within the BECC --  
 25 the BECC were obviously involved in these discussions --

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1 and through Gold Group were informing other people,  
 2 you know, the police in particular, about what was  
 3 happening at what stage. I wasn't involved in the  
 4 decision-making, but that's my assumption, that they,  
 5 you know, would have told the police what was happening.  
 6 Q. Looking at this now, it suggests that there was  
 7 conflicting information all day about timing, when the  
 8 finger block residents could go back; is that right?  
 9 A. Yes, I think so. I mean, yes, that is what my evidence  
 10 is. It doesn't change in my statement. It's — I was  
 11 waiting for the instruction. It wasn't clear.  
 12 Q. Right. Just to be clear now, was it not clear that they  
 13 could or couldn't go back, or they could go back but the  
 14 timing was uncertain?  
 15 A. At this stage, until 8.00 pm, I didn't know that they  
 16 could go back officially. Sorry, that took us a while,  
 17 didn't it? I'm sorry. I didn't know till 8 o'clock.  
 18 Q. Right, I see.  
 19 You say you had a team of staff on standby all day  
 20 to do a door-knock; did you or your team actually do any  
 21 door-knocks on 15 June?  
 22 A. No, because we weren't allowed in the cordon until we  
 23 were given permission by the, you know, local authority  
 24 to do that. We weren't allowed through. So I had  
 25 had — you know, Kiran and Nicola had gone to site in

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1 the morning, but they weren't allowed through the  
 2 cordon.  
 3 Q. And I think you tell us in your fifth statement at  
 4 paragraph 51 {TMO00869990/10} that you left site about  
 5 10.30 or 11 o'clock on 15 June.  
 6 A. Yes.  
 7 Q. Yes.  
 8 Turning, then, to 16 June, you say in your fifth  
 9 statement, paragraph 54 {TMO00869990/11} — no need to  
 10 turn it up — that a decision to allow residents to  
 11 return to Treadgold House was made at 12.30 pm on  
 12 16 June; yes?  
 13 A. Yeah.  
 14 Q. Shortly after that, it's right, I think, isn't it, that  
 15 a decision was made that residents in Barandon Walk,  
 16 Testerton Walk and Hurstway Walk, except numbers 501 to  
 17 562, were allowed to return home; yes?  
 18 A. That was the instruction from the BECC, yeah.  
 19 Q. That was the instruction from the BECC, right.  
 20 Do you remember who it was in the BECC who was  
 21 giving that instruction?  
 22 A. There was an email round from that. Was that somebody  
 23 Oliver?  
 24 Q. We may see it. Let's look at it: {TMO00894201}. This  
 25 might be the email you're referring to, and if it isn't,

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1 please correct me.  
 2 If you look at the very foot of the page, page 1,  
 3 there's an email from the BECC at 12.45 to  
 4 Amanda Johnson in RBKC that appears to be passed on,  
 5 somehow, to Kiran Singh, because he attaches it. She  
 6 sends it to you, I think, in fact —  
 7 A. She does.  
 8 Q. — as you can see from the email above, and then you  
 9 send it, presumably, to Kiran Singh.  
 10 But the message itself at the foot of 1 says:  
 11 "Hello."  
 12 Then over to the top of page 2 {TMO00894201/2}:  
 13 "This is a message from the LALO on site at 12.21:  
 14 "Residents of  
 15 " ■ Barandon Walk  
 16 " ■ Testerton Walk  
 17 " ■ Hurstway Walk (except numbers 501–562)  
 18 " ■ Treadgold Street.  
 19 "Are able to return to their properties. There are  
 20 currently issues with gas and electricity supplies but  
 21 this is being looked into.  
 22 "Thank you,  
 23 "Oliver Turner."  
 24 Is that the email you were —  
 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. — thinking about?  
 2 Now, you say in your fifth statement, paragraph 56,  
 3 page 11 {TMO00869990/11} — no need to see it — that  
 4 following the Gold Group decision, you organised 11 TMO  
 5 officers to start a ring-round of tenants, telling them  
 6 that they could go home, updating them on the situation  
 7 with heating and hot water, and advising them that there  
 8 were washing facilities at the Westway; is that correct?  
 9 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. And I think also a team of 15 staff to do the door-knock  
 11 that you've already told us about.  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. What specific information and support were you providing  
 14 in the ring-round exercise?  
 15 A. So we were telling them that they could go home. We  
 16 were telling them that we were dealing with the issue of  
 17 heating and hot water.  
 18 Q. Right.  
 19 A. Yeah. At that stage, yes, we were informing them of  
 20 what the situation was, and during the course of the  
 21 next few days we gave them more information about that.  
 22 Q. Right.  
 23 During the door-knock exercise, which was  
 24 a different exercise, what specific information and  
 25 support were your team offering?

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1 A. So we were checking on their welfare, referring people  
2 in to support services where they needed one. We were  
3 asking if they needed any repairs, if there was any  
4 cleaning that was needed to be done in their properties,  
5 so if there was any debris on their balconies. Also, we  
6 were doing electric checks during this period of time,  
7 because I'd asked RD to do that after we'd been aware  
8 about the water issues. So we would have done that in  
9 properties as well. And we were also repairing doors at  
10 this stage. So, as I've said, we had RD with us on the  
11 door—knocks, so we were identifying who needed a door  
12 repaired.  
13 Q. Were door—knocks also undertaken for residents of  
14 Treadgold House?  
15 A. Yes, separate — there was a separate team sent to  
16 Treadgold House.  
17 Q. If we go to your sixth statement, please, page 20  
18 {TMO00894124/20}, paragraph 69, you say:  
19 "A door knock sheet was completed for each resident  
20 noting key issues found. These were then provided to  
21 the Environmental Services team who I believe collated  
22 them into a spreadsheet."  
23 I think you have given us some examples of this.  
24 Let me just show you one or two.  
25 First, {TMO00894125}. This one says:

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1 "16.06.17 recorded.  
2 "Name: Hurstway.  
3 "Address ..."  
4 And then there's a name there, an individual's name:  
5 "Repair Issues: no hot water, recorded."  
6 Do you see that?  
7 A. Yeah.  
8 Q. When was the template created, first of all, do you  
9 know?  
10 A. I don't know precisely, but obviously before we did  
11 those —  
12 Q. Was it one you already had or was it created in —  
13 A. Oh, I think it was created by the team leaders or heads  
14 of service during — you know, for the door knock.  
15 Q. Right. This is an example of residents being recorded  
16 with no hot water.  
17 A. No, I think "recorded" here means the same as it did on  
18 the other list. So it's been recorded and put on the  
19 spreadsheet.  
20 Q. Right.  
21 If we go to {TMO00894126}, this is, I think — is  
22 this right? — an example of someone whose name was not  
23 on the list. If you look halfway down the page:  
24 Mrs Jones, Barandon Walk, "Name not on the list".  
25 What is the list? Is that the downloaded

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1 spreadsheet?  
2 A. I suspect so, yes.  
3 Q. Right.  
4 I think we can find another one where the resident  
5 isn't at home. It's {TMO00894128}. There is no address  
6 there, it just says "Test". Maybe that's a number,  
7 Testerton Walk.  
8 A. Yes, I think it is.  
9 Q. "No answer", "No answer". Is that an example of  
10 a resident being knocked on but no —  
11 A. Not there.  
12 Q. Not there.  
13 A. Yeah.  
14 Q. Right.  
15 Now, they all say at the top "16.06.17 recorded".  
16 What does that mean?  
17 A. So that's 16 June 2017.  
18 Q. Yes. "Recorded", does that mean taken into  
19 a spreadsheet?  
20 A. Yes.  
21 Q. How was the information from these notes fed into the  
22 spreadsheets we've looked at?  
23 A. So Kiran in his evidence gives the best detail on that.  
24 So the officers who were allocated those sets of  
25 properties would upload their information into the

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1 spreadsheet, and that spreadsheet was collated and kept  
2 centrally and updated during this round of walk —  
3 following this round of walkarounds, and on the 19th and  
4 20th and, you know, going on as we continued our  
5 door—knocks, same process.  
6 Q. Right. There looks from what you have been telling us  
7 to have been a number of different ways of collating  
8 information about evacuated residents; did you have  
9 concerns at the time about whether this information was  
10 being properly centralised and was accurate?  
11 A. I think there was a process for it, and I think Kiran's  
12 very clear in his statement the process, and officers  
13 seem to have followed that process —  
14 Q. Now, I think you —  
15 A. — filling in the data.  
16 Q. I'm sorry.  
17 I think you identified a number of properties with  
18 balconies overlooking Grenfell Tower and decided that it  
19 wouldn't be appropriate for those residents to return;  
20 is that right?  
21 A. Yes, that's correct. They were really, really in close  
22 proximity to the tower and they could obviously see all  
23 of the LFB activity, and we just didn't think it was  
24 appropriate for those people to return.  
25 Q. How many properties did that relate to?

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1 A. They're all recorded in our emails going forward.  
 2 I think, off the top of my head, about seven, maybe.  
 3 I'm sorry, I can't remember the numbers. I've seen the  
 4 emails loads, but I can't remember the numbers.  
 5 Q. You say you organised a further ring—round of those  
 6 residents, telling them not to go home but to go to the  
 7 Westway.  
 8 A. Yes, that's right. We identified and then, you know,  
 9 focused on calling them.  
 10 Q. Did you come across a situation where one of the  
 11 residents wasn't contactable so that you couldn't tell  
 12 them not to go home but to go to the Westway instead?  
 13 A. Well, if we did on that day, we would have tried again  
 14 another day, I do know that.  
 15 Q. Did any of them tell you that, distressing or not, they  
 16 wanted to go back home and be in their own homes, rather  
 17 than staying in temporary accommodation?  
 18 A. I do believe that there was one family that I remember,  
 19 yes.  
 20 Q. And what happened to them? Did you allow them to go  
 21 back?  
 22 A. Yes, you know, we wouldn't have stopped somebody if  
 23 that's what they wanted to do. It was more about,  
 24 you know, trying to be thoughtful, not to be  
 25 restrictive.

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1 Q. Right.  
 2 Now, if we go, please, to your fifth statement,  
 3 paragraph 58 on page 12 {TMO00869990/12}, you say there  
 4 at the top of the page:  
 5 "A text burst was sent to all residents from  
 6 Barandon Walk, Treadgold Walk and Hurstway asking them  
 7 to return home and advising support was available at the  
 8 Westway."  
 9 And you produce it as TB/20.  
 10 A. Yeah.  
 11 Q. Just before I show it to you, you have told us that some  
 12 residents weren't supposed to return home. How did you  
 13 make sure that those residents didn't get this  
 14 textburst?  
 15 A. I don't know. I didn't send the textburst. I wasn't  
 16 involved in it. I don't know how they isolated those  
 17 people.  
 18 Q. Right.  
 19 Then if we look at TB/20, which you refer to as  
 20 an exhibit, it's at {TMO00869949}:  
 21 "Subject: Re: Text burst message for review.  
 22 "We have been made aware that you can return to your  
 23 home. We are sorry you may not have a hot water or gas  
 24 supply and so may choose to continue to stay with  
 25 friends or family or in the resource centre. Thank you

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1 for your patience while we work to reinstate services."  
 2 Who drafted that textburst message, do you know?  
 3 A. I'm not sure who drafted it, but I know that  
 4 Sacha Jevans was involved in the final version.  
 5 Q. Did you see it before it went?  
 6 A. I can't remember if I did or not.  
 7 Q. You tell us, I think, in paragraph 75 of your sixth  
 8 statement {TMO00894124/22} that the resource centre  
 9 referred to here is a reference to the Westway Centre;  
 10 yes?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. How were residents supposed to know that the resource  
 13 centre was the Westway?  
 14 A. I don't know, but that won't have been the only method  
 15 that we communicated with residents — to residents  
 16 through.  
 17 Q. Why not say "Westway Centre" and give the details,  
 18 the address, the phone number?  
 19 A. So we're very restricted on text messaging on which —  
 20 you know, how many characters you can have, but we could  
 21 have said "Westway" instead of the other word, but ...  
 22 Q. Right. I mean, was that the problem, there was  
 23 a technical limitation on how much information you could  
 24 put in a textburst?  
 25 A. Yes, that's always the case, and exactly why they

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1 weren't always appropriate to use, because it's quite  
 2 difficult to communicate messages in small —  
 3 Q. What provision was made for those people who may not  
 4 have had access to their mobile phones or for whom the  
 5 TMO had incorrect numbers so that they didn't see the  
 6 textburst?  
 7 A. So we were doing visits as well, and I believe also that  
 8 the council — definitely seen examples of this — they  
 9 called round people in hotels and told them to go back  
 10 to Treadgold. So there were other ways in which people  
 11 were communicating.  
 12 Q. Right.  
 13 Is it right that the textburst on 16 June was the  
 14 first time that this facility had been used by the TMO  
 15 to communicate with residents?  
 16 A. I believe so, yes.  
 17 Q. Why was consideration not given earlier to using it?  
 18 A. Because I think we tried to communicate personally,  
 19 you know, which we felt would be more appropriate than  
 20 sending, you know, a general text to people, given the  
 21 circumstances.  
 22 Q. Can we go to {TMO00869939} next. What I'm showing you  
 23 here is an email from Kiran Singh to Robert Shaw at  
 24 RBKC, this time 17 June 2017 at 12.41, outlining the  
 25 activities that had taken place on 16 June. He says:

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1 "Rob  
 2 "This may help also — our updated contact list for  
 3 the finger blocks, treadgold house and bramley house.  
 4 Bramley is no longer an issue — all are back."  
 5 Is that right, that by 12.41 on 17 June, that was  
 6 the Saturday, all were back?  
 7 A. That he's relating to Bramley. He's talking about  
 8 Bramley there.  
 9 Q. Oh, I see. All are back at Bramley?  
 10 A. Yeah.  
 11 Q. Then he goes on to say:  
 12 "We did a text burst to all around 4pm yesterday  
 13 which said it is safe to return and support is still  
 14 available from Westway. We also contacted those  
 15 individual properties on my previous email to advise  
 16 them it was not safe for them to return and I believe  
 17 those flats were offered alternative accommodation until  
 18 Monday — this was due to their balconies directly facing  
 19 the tower and being very close to the tower so they  
 20 could see any activity happening inside the tower by LFB  
 21 etc."  
 22 Were you aware of offers of alternative  
 23 accommodation only being made available to those  
 24 residents up until the Monday following the fire, so the  
 25 19th?

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1 A. I suppose I must have been, if Kiran knew about it,  
 2 I suppose I did know that, but it doesn't ... I'm not  
 3 entirely sure, because obviously, you know, all the  
 4 allocation of temporary accommodation was by the — made  
 5 by the council, so the details of that I'm not entirely  
 6 sure of.  
 7 Q. Right. In the next paragraph he says:  
 8 "There are a number of properties at Treadgold where  
 9 we have replaced locks/doors and who we have been unable  
 10 to contact to pass over the keys. We have people on  
 11 site now to distribute these but I believe they will be  
 12 going into Westway to provide an update and to see if we  
 13 can keep these centrally there so everyone knows where  
 14 to go to collect them rather than ringing around various  
 15 people."  
 16 A. Yeah.  
 17 Q. Is it right that some residents therefore couldn't  
 18 access their homes until they had this information  
 19 because they wouldn't have had keys to get in because  
 20 the locks had been changed?  
 21 A. So we made arrangements for these keys to be held  
 22 somewhere. We did an update to our customer service  
 23 centre for anybody phoning in to be told where they were  
 24 exactly. That messaging was repeated on to our out of  
 25 hours contractor as well, and people at the Westway knew

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1 the position and where to collect the keys. We made  
 2 sure that those arrangements were in place over the  
 3 weekend.  
 4 Q. Right. Let's look at the update, and tell me if this is  
 5 what you are referring to. This is at {TMO00869946}.  
 6 Let's just see.  
 7 This is an email from Olivia Hutchison on 16 June,  
 8 at 18.45 in the evening on that day, to supervisors at  
 9 Pinnacle and customer services, copied to, among other  
 10 people, you and Kiran Singh, subject: "KCTMO — Handover  
 11 for the weekend" — this is of course Friday evening  
 12 now — "(Grenfell Tower and surrounding areas)":  
 13 "Hi Team,  
 14 "Here is an update for tonight's shift.  
 15 "The main focus today was helping residents who were  
 16 displaced after the fire, back home. Please note the  
 17 following updates for these blocks."  
 18 And there is the set of information. All are  
 19 allowed to return to Hurstway, apart from three  
 20 addresses; all are allowed to return to Testerton, apart  
 21 from five addresses; and everyone back to Barandon.  
 22 "Grenfell Walk — Not allowed to return as location  
 23 is so near to tower."  
 24 And then Treadgold allowed to return, but with  
 25 emergency lock changes; yes? Do you see that?

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1 A. Yes.  
 2 Q. What arrangements were in place for the properties that  
 3 were not safe for return or for those with emergency  
 4 lock changes?  
 5 A. So those safe not to return (sic) were the people we  
 6 just talked about on Grenfell — sorry, on the  
 7 balconies. So we'd already communicated with them, and  
 8 then ... sorry, can you tell me your question again,  
 9 please?  
 10 Q. Yes. You have dealt with those, but what about those  
 11 who were locked out?  
 12 A. So —  
 13 Q. Was there a system for getting information to them so  
 14 that they knew where to pick up the new keys?  
 15 A. So the rest of this email explains the arrangement that  
 16 was made. So I think we would have tried to call them  
 17 where we could, and we also wanted our out-of-hours  
 18 contractor to know the arrangements should any of the  
 19 residents call directly in to the customer service  
 20 centre.  
 21 Q. How was the information that was needed by Grenfell Walk  
 22 residents communicated to them, that they weren't  
 23 allowed to return and had to go to the Westway Centre?  
 24 A. Well, it would have been communicated by us through  
 25 rest centres; possibly by the council if they'd housed

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1 people by then, or if they'd come into the rest centres  
 2 during the day and seen the council; through  
 3 phone—arounds — all of the methods that we've discussed  
 4 earlier is what we would have been trying at this —  
 5 during these days.  
 6 Q. Turning then to the period 17 to 20 June, I think it's  
 7 right that you continued with your actions relating to  
 8 the return of residents to their homes and communicating  
 9 requests for information on to the council; yes?  
 10 A. Yes, that's right, and a number of other things.  
 11 Q. Yes. Can we go, then, to {TMO00869948}. This is  
 12 an email that you exhibit to your fifth statement at  
 13 paragraph 74 {TMO00869990/14}, and it's from  
 14 Councillor Blakeman, sent at 6.57 in the morning on  
 15 19 June, that's the Monday after the fire, and it's sent  
 16 to a number, as you can see, of RBKC councillors and  
 17 staff, and it says this:  
 18 "Can someone please advise urgently and take action  
 19 on the situation of the evacuees who have been forced to  
 20 move back into their entirely unsuitable and probably  
 21 unsafe homes at Barandon Walk and Testerton Walk. The  
 22 walkway doors are being left open and people are getting  
 23 in and trying to rob the homes.  
 24 "PLEASE, PLEASE end this chaos and at least let the  
 25 ward councillors know who we are supposed to contact on

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1 all the issues residents are bringing to us."  
 2 Now, you have already told us about the concerns  
 3 that you had had about the return of evacuated residents  
 4 earlier in the week. By 19 June, which, as I say, was  
 5 the Monday after the fire, did you share  
 6 Councillor Blakeman's concerns about evacuees being  
 7 forced to move back to, as she put it, entirely  
 8 unsuitable homes?  
 9 A. So on part of the work that I did, the first — one of  
 10 the first things I did on the walkaround on the 16th was  
 11 to make sure that there were officers, police officers,  
 12 placed on what I call the blue dot map, which is the map  
 13 that we were all looking at earlier, so I made sure that  
 14 they — because I knew the door entry system wasn't  
 15 working, so I arranged for police officers to be placed  
 16 I think it's in nine locations, which are basically the  
 17 entrances to all of those walkway blocks and at the end  
 18 going on to Grenfell Tower. So, you know, I'd  
 19 recognised that this is an issue and had tried to solve  
 20 it by making sure that there was a police presence there  
 21 to stop people running through, to protect the  
 22 properties.  
 23 So in terms of security, I didn't think this was  
 24 an issue, or we'd done everything we could at that stage  
 25 to try and protect the blocks.

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1 Q. Now, as you can see from the heading, the email goes to  
 2 a number of councillors, including the leader of  
 3 the council, and it says, subject, "Message from  
 4 Mr Holgate". It doesn't come to the TMO, but it does  
 5 come to the TMO by forwarding, if we go, please, to  
 6 {TMO00869988}. You can see that the BECC forwards this  
 7 email on to you not much later that morning —  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. — 19 June 2017, copied to Nicholas Holgate. It says:  
 10 "Dear Teresa and Robert,  
 11 "Please see email, below, originally from  
 12 Cllr Blakeman. We were aware that Police were having  
 13 issues with residents gaining access to the safety  
 14 cordon but not that there were issues with thefts from  
 15 residential premises.  
 16 "Please consider for urgent action and copy the BECC  
 17 into your response to the Councillor.  
 18 "Kind regards  
 19 "Karen Crook."  
 20 Now, a number of questions about that.  
 21 First, is it correct that the BECC essentially  
 22 delegated these issues about evacuated residents'  
 23 properties to you, the TMO?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. Yes. In your view, or your understanding at the time,

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1 who had overall responsibility for the emergency  
 2 response in respect of evacuated residents from the  
 3 walkways, was it the TMO or was it the council?  
 4 A. No, we had sort of operational ability to, you know, do  
 5 the best we could within the walkways, but we certainly  
 6 weren't in control of the decision—making about what was  
 7 happening within —  
 8 Q. Right.  
 9 A. You know, it was very much still under the control of  
 10 the council.  
 11 Q. Right. But in operational terms, would it be right to  
 12 say that, in the days following the fire, the TMO were  
 13 just left to get on with it by the council in respect of  
 14 the needs of evacuated residents?  
 15 A. We were certainly working on all the solutions we could  
 16 to try and make people as comfortable as possible.  
 17 The council in particular, you know, Amanda Johnson and  
 18 Laura Johnson, they knew exactly what we were doing,  
 19 what the issues were and how we were trying to address  
 20 them. Later on, there was some help with some of the  
 21 specific issues, but I'm sure we'll come to that.  
 22 Q. Well, Amanda Johnson and Laura Johnson knew exactly what  
 23 you were doing, but were they, the council, providing  
 24 you, the TMO, with any actual support, any actual  
 25 resources?

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1 A. Not at this stage.  
 2 Q. No.  
 3 Did you receive any actual support from the TMO  
 4 executive team and the TMO leadership in relation to  
 5 provisioning for the needs of evacuated residents and  
 6 facilitating their return home?  
 7 A. I — yes, I received support from my manager, who's part  
 8 of the executive team. You know, I was constantly  
 9 updating her and the executive team in what we were  
 10 doing. So, yes. And I was working with my colleagues  
 11 across the council, particularly — sorry, across the  
 12 TMO, particularly my colleague from RD, Graham Webb, at  
 13 this stage, and he was supporting us in all the repairs  
 14 issues, and our assets team in — were helping with the  
 15 door entry issues and boiler issues.  
 16 Q. What support did you get from your manager? You were  
 17 constantly updating her, but what was she helping you  
 18 with? This is Sacha Jevans, I think.  
 19 A. Yes. I mean, the — at this stage — not at this stage.  
 20 I mean, she was constantly end of the — sorry, on the  
 21 end of the phone so that I could talk to her about any  
 22 concerns that I have. You could see earlier on, when  
 23 I was concerned when I was in the walkways, I called  
 24 her. You know, she listened to the issues and dealt  
 25 with them.

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1 Q. Now, just two more questions before I suggest a break to  
 2 the Chairman.  
 3 When John Barradell of London Local Authority Gold  
 4 took over the response to the fire on the afternoon of  
 5 16 June, the Friday afternoon, as is well recorded that  
 6 he did at that time, who did you understand to have  
 7 overall responsibility in respect of evacuated  
 8 residents? Was it the London Gold response team or was  
 9 it still the council?  
 10 A. At this stage — oh ... I'm not sure I knew that on the  
 11 Friday. I don't know if I knew that.  
 12 Q. Are you aware or were you aware at the time of  
 13 London Gold providing any support to you, the TMO, in  
 14 respect of evacuated residents in the seven days, or  
 15 five days, perhaps, from 16 June, after the fire?  
 16 A. I think the only way I recall that — their involvement  
 17 at this stage was in terms of voids, identifying any  
 18 void properties, and my colleague, Graham, led on that,  
 19 liaising with London Gold on that matter, but I wasn't  
 20 involved in that. I was copied in, but I didn't lead on  
 21 it.  
 22 MR MILLETT: Very well.  
 23 Mr Chairman, is now a convenient moment for the  
 24 break?  
 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Thank you very much.

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1 Well, we'll take the afternoon break now, Ms Brown.  
 2 We'll come back at 3.30, please.  
 3 As before, please don't talk to anyone about your  
 4 evidence while you're out. All right?  
 5 THE WITNESS: Thank you.  
 6 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.  
 7 (Pause)  
 8 Thank you very much. 3.30, please.  
 9 (3.16 pm)  
 10 (A short break)  
 11 (3.30 pm)  
 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, Ms Brown, ready to carry on?  
 13 THE WITNESS: Yes.  
 14 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good, thank you very much.  
 15 Yes, Mr Millett.  
 16 MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman.  
 17 Just a couple of communications questions, technical  
 18 though they may be.  
 19 The first is textburst. You said there was  
 20 a character limit on the number of characters you could  
 21 put into a textburst. Was any thought given to sending  
 22 two textbursts: one with one part of the information and  
 23 the second one with more information?  
 24 A. I'm sure that could have been a possibility. I wasn't  
 25 involved in the — one of the things I wasn't involved

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1 in is the textburst messaging and the context of that.  
 2 I think, yeah, partly because — yeah. So I don't know.  
 3 I don't know.  
 4 Q. All right.  
 5 Now, the WhatsApp group you referred to, first, do  
 6 you remember, when it was set up, who was on it?  
 7 A. So it was — the textburst(sic) was set up with all of  
 8 my main heads of service, team leaders, and some other  
 9 people who were on the ground on the day.  
 10 Q. Was any thought given to including any people from RBKC  
 11 on it, such as the BECC?  
 12 A. No, because it was really about our internal  
 13 communication and moving people around from the  
 14 rest centres. It was about us organising our staff, so  
 15 communicating messages and information that we needed to  
 16 share with residents.  
 17 Q. Right. Why keep that from RBKC? Why not bring them in?  
 18 A. Because a lot of the information — so — because it was  
 19 about our organisation of our staff, so they didn't need  
 20 to be involved in that. In terms of the messaging, the  
 21 messaging that we were communicating via WhatsApp was  
 22 probably coming from the council anyway, so there was no  
 23 need to re-loop them into the messaging around  
 24 rest centres closing and things like that.  
 25 Q. Now, coming back to 19 June, it's right, I think, that

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1 you and your team members took part in a second  
 2 door—knocking exercise on the 19th, the Monday; yes?  
 3 A. That's correct.  
 4 Q. If you go to your fifth statement, please, page 13  
 5 {TMO00869990/13}, paragraph 69, you say that that was to  
 6 see if more residents had returned, if we just go to  
 7 that.  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. You say:  
 10 " ... to see if more residents had returned and  
 11 giving advice and checking if anyone needed repairs."  
 12 Is it right that a number of residents had still not  
 13 returned home even as late as 19 June?  
 14 A. Yes, I think that's correct.  
 15 Q. What was keeping them away?  
 16 A. Well, I don't know. It would have been their decision  
 17 at this stage whether they came home or not. We had  
 18 been calling them and visiting them. Some were in  
 19 hotels, so they would have, you know, been rehoused. It  
 20 would have been their choice.  
 21 Q. Right.  
 22 If we turn the page to page 14 {TMO00869990/14},  
 23 please, paragraph 72, you say there:  
 24 "National Grid were on site and we did a door knock  
 25 with them offering temporary cooking facilities for

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1 residents who did not have access to gas."  
 2 Is that the same door—knocking exercise that you've  
 3 just told us about —  
 4 A. No.  
 5 Q. — or was there a third door—knocking exercise with  
 6 National Grid?  
 7 A. Oh, there were lots of different door exercises. So  
 8 there was one with National Grid to provide cooking —  
 9 temporary cooking facilities, so that's, you know,  
 10 little plates, and then there was several trips needed  
 11 to — several communications with residents and visits  
 12 to the properties to deal with reinstating gas mains.  
 13 So the — they wanted to make sure that the gas was  
 14 turned off in properties before they turned the gas on,  
 15 and then after they turned the gas on, they wanted to  
 16 check that everything was okay in the property. So we  
 17 had to make arrangements with residents to get them  
 18 either to the property or we had to access those  
 19 properties if we couldn't.  
 20 Q. So just to understand part of that last answer, you call  
 21 them little plates; were they little electric plates for  
 22 cooking?  
 23 A. Yeah, for cooking, yeah, and they were delivered in the  
 24 first couple of days, so before the Monday, cooking  
 25 facilities were made available to residents in the

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1 walkways where we could get hold of them. The issue  
 2 with the gas connection more longer term was dealt with  
 3 on 20 and 21 June, because I remember being on site  
 4 again for that.  
 5 Q. I think washing facilities for those residents were also  
 6 available at the Westway; yes?  
 7 A. Yeah, so we'd communicated that very early on, that  
 8 Westway was the place to go for washing facilities.  
 9 That had been in our first communications.  
 10 Q. Were the facilities at the Westway enough for the  
 11 numbers of residents who were expected to need them for  
 12 washing?  
 13 A. I don't think — yes, I mean, I don't know. They were  
 14 what we had available. I'm sure residents were using  
 15 other sources and other means as well.  
 16 Q. And if you turn, please, to page 15 of this statement  
 17 {TMO00869990/15}, paragraph 78, you say there that on  
 18 20 June you continued door—knocks, and you say you did  
 19 further welfare checks to establish if any returning  
 20 resident required any additional support and to  
 21 establish those who had returned.  
 22 Is it right to say that, by 20 June, some residents  
 23 had still not returned to their properties? We're now  
 24 at the Tuesday, so the seventh day after the fire; yes?  
 25 A. That's correct.

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1 Q. In the next paragraph, paragraph 79 at the foot of your  
 2 screen, you say:  
 3 "I recall we received some reports from residents at  
 4 the Westway that the police had been turning away  
 5 residents returning to the walkways. I sought  
 6 confirmation from RBKC that there had been no change in  
 7 the position of people moving back to the walkways and  
 8 I emailed the BECC clarifying the list of residents who  
 9 could and could not return home."  
 10 Do you know why the police were preventing residents  
 11 from returning to their homes, despite advice being  
 12 given before that that they could go back?  
 13 A. No, I don't know. This happened a couple of times, as  
 14 I mentioned earlier this morning. I don't know why.  
 15 But when I was aware of it, I did what I could to  
 16 communicate the issue back to the BECC and hopefully to  
 17 the police.  
 18 Q. Now, in the paragraph at the foot of this same page  
 19 {TMO00869990/16}, paragraph 83, you refer to an email  
 20 sent from Robert Black to Nicholas Holgate that you're  
 21 copied in to at TB/42.  
 22 Let's go to that. It's at {TMO00869927}. There it  
 23 is, timed at 11.01 on 20 June 2017:  
 24 "Nicholas key points for the meeting."  
 25 And if you look at item 4 it says:

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1 "[Finger] Blocks: Concern being raised by  
 2 Cllr Judith Blakeman (JB) and Police who seem to be  
 3 saying 'it is at your own risk' which is not helpful.  
 4 JB asking for copy of risk assessment which agreed this.  
 5 Residents coming back from the homes to Westway because  
 6 of mixed messages."  
 7 Were you aware that police were telling residents  
 8 that if they returned to their properties, it was at  
 9 their own personal risk?  
 10 A. No. That wasn't a helpful communication.  
 11 Q. We've seen the reference there to Judith Blakeman asking  
 12 for a copy of the risk assessment. As far as you were  
 13 aware or knew, had a risk assessment been completed  
 14 before evacuated residents were advised to return home?  
 15 A. I don't know. As I said before, that was a Gold Group  
 16 decision. I don't know the detail of what was  
 17 considered.  
 18 Q. Right. Do you recall any discussion or any thought  
 19 being given to having a risk assessment?  
 20 A. No, not at this stage, no.  
 21 Q. Would it be normal to have a risk assessment where you'd  
 22 had a mass evacuation for, for example, a gas leak or  
 23 a structural collapse of a building?  
 24 A. That would have been RBKC's role to look at that before  
 25 they made the decision.

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1 Q. Do we take it from your evidence that, so far as you're  
 2 concerned, you never heard about one being done?  
 3 A. I don't know, no.  
 4 Q. Right.  
 5 Now, we've seen the reference there to residents  
 6 coming back from their homes to Westway because of mixed  
 7 messages. Were you aware of residents coming home again  
 8 and then going back to the Westway because they were  
 9 receiving mixed messages?  
 10 A. So, as I've said, I did come across that issue a couple  
 11 of times, and where I did, I, you know, took the  
 12 appropriate action to raise that with the people who  
 13 needed to be made aware of it.  
 14 Q. Can we go back to your fifth statement, please, page 15  
 15 {TMO00869990/15}, now, and go to paragraph 79, and at  
 16 the foot of the page, in the penultimate line, second  
 17 sentence, you say:  
 18 "I sought confirmation from RBKC that there had been  
 19 no change in the position of people moving back to the  
 20 walkways and I emailed the BECC clarifying the list of  
 21 residents who could and could not return home.  
 22 I advised that there appeared to be confusion with  
 23 residents saying they had been turned away from their  
 24 blocks by the police and I thought it was worth  
 25 reiterating the position so that this could be passed to

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1 the police."  
 2 Now, did you reiterate the position because you  
 3 didn't think RBKC or the police were quite clear enough  
 4 in their own minds about the return of evacuated  
 5 residents?  
 6 A. Well, I didn't think the police were quite clear enough,  
 7 and I think it was an issue with change of shifts and  
 8 communication of information. I thought — yeah.  
 9 Q. Right. What did you expect the police to do?  
 10 A. Well, I expected them to be informed of what the  
 11 messaging should be and for them to be, you know,  
 12 continually repeating the same messaging that we all  
 13 were.  
 14 Q. Did you take the problem up with RBKC?  
 15 A. Well, RBKC are the BECC, or were the BECC — were they  
 16 the BECC at this time? But I communicated it through  
 17 the BECC, because I —  
 18 Q. Did you take them to task? Did you tell the BECC that  
 19 they were responsible for producing mixed messages?  
 20 A. I sent them an email, I sent them the details, I told  
 21 them what I thought should be happening and asked them  
 22 to communicate, so I think that was clear enough.  
 23 Q. Well, let's see, I think.  
 24 If we go, please, to {TMO00869936} —  
 25 A. I mean, could I just add that they were making the

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1 decisions about these things, so, you know, it seems  
 2 strange that they were not understanding them.  
 3 Q. Yes. They were making the decisions, but you were  
 4 trying to manage it on an operational basis, so any  
 5 problems that you had to handle as a result of their  
 6 decisions, you were free to take up with them; no? Yes?  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. Yes.  
 9 Let's look at this email that's now on the screen.  
 10 This is from you to Rob Shaw at RBKC, 20 June, 14.03:  
 11 "Hi Rob,  
 12 "Can you please send us a list of residents that you  
 13 have rehoused from Grenfell and the finger blocks and  
 14 where they have been placed. We can then cross  
 15 reference it with our own records."  
 16 Now, by rehouse there, did you mean provided with  
 17 emergency accommodation?  
 18 A. Yes, that's what I mean.  
 19 Q. Right. Was the purpose of this exercise so that you  
 20 could identify any residents that had not yet been  
 21 accommodated and had not yet returned to their own  
 22 homes?  
 23 A. Yeah, this is how I described earlier as continuing to  
 24 look at those lists to make sure that, you know, they  
 25 were up to date and we had, you know, people accounted

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1 for and knew where they were.  
 2 Q. Let's go, then, to {TMO10035589/17}, which is a long  
 3 document, but if we go to page 17 in it, this is  
 4 an email from you to Rob Shaw of RBKC at 14.03 on  
 5 20 June. It's at the foot of your screen, copied to  
 6 Kiran Singh, and subject, "List of residents that you  
 7 have rehoused".  
 8 If we turn the page, please, to page 18  
 9 {TMO10035589/18}, you say:  
 10 "Hi Rob,  
 11 "Can you please send us a list of residents ..."  
 12 And it's the email we saw before.  
 13 But then if we go back, please, to his reply on  
 14 page 17 {TMO10035589/17}, you can see what he says. He  
 15 says:  
 16 "Hello Teresa  
 17 "Yes, Mandy gave me a call earlier. We will try to  
 18 get this to you asap, as we are reconciling it now.  
 19 "Kiran, can you confirm that [Detective Sergeant]  
 20 Brian Jones is genuine? Is he known and has he been  
 21 checked out? If so, I can send the same list to him."  
 22 Then if you go up the page, please, to the next  
 23 page, page 16 {TMO10035589/16}, halfway down,  
 24 Mandy Warrior responds to Rob Shaw the next day,  
 25 21 June, at 10.59:

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1 "Hi Rob  
 2 "I am sorry to harass you as I know that you are  
 3 extremely busy.  
 4 "The police are looking for the temp accommodation  
 5 list (Grenfell) to check the police missing list as two  
 6 people yesterday were located in a hotel."  
 7 Was it the case at that point — so 20 June — that  
 8 RBKC did not have a readily available list available to  
 9 them of residents who had been accommodated as at  
 10 20 June?  
 11 A. So they would have had a list of people that they had  
 12 accommodated. We were just trying to cross-reference it  
 13 with our list.  
 14 Q. Yes, I understand that. But did RBKC have a readily  
 15 available list that they could look at so that they  
 16 could know who had and who hadn't been accommodated?  
 17 A. By them?  
 18 Q. By you or them.  
 19 A. Well, we wouldn't have accommodated anybody. You know,  
 20 the temporary rehousing was all done by RBKC.  
 21 Q. Well, all right, but temporary accommodation could  
 22 include temporary accommodation at the Westway of  
 23 evacuees from the finger blocks; no?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. Well, let me ask you: was it your understanding that

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1 this subject was only about temporary accommodation of  
 2 those from Grenfell Tower?  
 3 A. Well, this particular thing from Mandy is about  
 4 Grenfell Tower. Well, it appears to be.  
 5 Q. Yes. I mean, my question really is —  
 6 A. She —  
 7 Q. Let me see if I can cut through this. My question  
 8 really is: as at 20 June, to your knowledge, did  
 9 the council have a list of those people from the finger  
 10 blocks who hadn't returned home yet but were still in  
 11 temporary accommodation?  
 12 A. I'm pretty sure that they will have. I can't remember  
 13 what date it was sent, but we were continually liaising  
 14 with them. We definitely sent them a list on the 23rd  
 15 of Grenfell residents that we'd cross-referenced.  
 16 I can't remember the dates of the last list for the  
 17 finger blocks, but we kept them up to date regularly  
 18 with who had returned or not.  
 19 Q. Did they want your lists in relation to evacuated  
 20 properties so that they themselves could identify and  
 21 cross-refer so that they would know who needed emergency  
 22 accommodation?  
 23 A. They definitely had our lists.  
 24 Q. Right. For that purpose; is that right?  
 25 A. Well, that was the reason why we were sending them, so

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1 that we could be co-ordinated between Amanda and Laura's  
 2 section and our department, our organisation.  
 3 Q. Then if we turn to your fifth statement, page 17  
 4 {TMO00869990/17}, paragraph 91, you say there, at the  
 5 foot of the screen:  
 6 "After 20 June, TMO staff and Repairs Direct  
 7 operatives continued to remain on site to support  
 8 residents, answer their enquiries and carry out any  
 9 necessary repairs. Ongoing welfare door knocks in the  
 10 walkways and phone calls to assess who had returned home  
 11 and those in hotel accommodation, were made."  
 12 So is it the case that even after the first week  
 13 following the fire, there were still evacuated residents  
 14 who had still not been accounted for?  
 15 A. I'm not sure whether this was more about welcoming them  
 16 back if they came out of the hotels and returned to the  
 17 properties by this stage. People didn't all return  
 18 immediately. People — some people never returned and  
 19 some people returned a week or two later. So it was —  
 20 you know, it was a changing climate.  
 21 Q. Right.  
 22 Now, if we stick with this statement and look up  
 23 a paragraph there, you say in paragraph 90 that:  
 24 "A letter to residents was in preparation to  
 25 advise/update on a number of matters. This letter was

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1 chased with Gold Control so we could deliver it that  
 2 week. It was delivered on 22nd June."  
 3 You exhibit at it at TB/52. It's at {TMO00869984}  
 4 and it says:  
 5 "For residents at Hurstway Walk, Testerton Walk and  
 6 Barandon Walk: update following the fire at  
 7 Grenfell Tower."  
 8 You can see at the foot of the screen it says  
 9 22 June 2017.  
 10 Do you know who drafted this document?  
 11 A. I think our comms team drafted it.  
 12 Q. It provides an update to residents about what the TMO  
 13 had been doing in the aftermath of the fire; yes?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. Yes. Why was that information also not available for  
 16 Treadgold House residents?  
 17 A. We did do a separate communication with Treadgold,  
 18 I believe. I can't tell you on what date, but I do know  
 19 that we did a letter to them.  
 20 Q. This was the first written update to residents, wasn't  
 21 it?  
 22 A. Yes, that's right.  
 23 Q. I think it's correct that there was some delay with this  
 24 letter being circulated.  
 25 A. Well, I think we had been communicating in person up

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1 until this point and, yes, it was delivered later than  
 2 I would have hoped.  
 3 Q. Right. Why was that?  
 4 A. I'm not quite sure. I got confused in the statement  
 5 you've just referred to, because I said that that was  
 6 Gold Group that delayed it at that stage. They  
 7 definitely had to sign off all our future  
 8 correspondence, so there were delays in that process.  
 9 But I think this was just done by us internally, and,  
 10 yes, it did take longer than I would have liked, but we  
 11 were communicating separately before this time.  
 12 Q. You have said that Gold Group "had to sign off on all  
 13 our future correspondence". Was that the arrangement,  
 14 that once Gold had come in on the afternoon of Friday,  
 15 16 June, you couldn't make any formal communications, at  
 16 least, with residents without Gold Group's say—so?  
 17 A. Yes, that's absolutely the case. I prepared a daily  
 18 briefing, I think, from about — of all the key  
 19 messages, because I wanted to be proactive in terms of  
 20 telling residents about the complex cleaning schedule  
 21 that we had, you know, which block we'd be in which day,  
 22 what we were doing, and all that had to go through  
 23 Gold Group. So you see some of that information in the  
 24 letters that Barry Quirk sent out to residents in July,  
 25 and then finally there was another letter on 27 July.

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1 Q. Who told you that all of your communications with your  
 2 residents had to be signed off by London Local Authority  
 3 Gold?  
 4 A. There is a direct email. It came to me via Sacha, but  
 5 it was from Robyn Fairman. There's an email directly  
 6 from her telling us that.  
 7 Q. Go back to your fifth statement, please, page 18  
 8 {TMO00869990/18}, paragraph 93. This is where you pick  
 9 this point up, and you say in paragraph 93, in the third  
 10 line:  
 11 "We continued to produce further written briefings  
 12 but the London Gold Group wanted to review our  
 13 communication with residents and we were unable to  
 14 contact residents directly by letter about matters such  
 15 as our extensive cleaning programme, refuse chutes being  
 16 blocked, re-routing fire exits, repair of door entry  
 17 systems etc. without approval of our draft letters. We  
 18 were not permitted to send the next letter to  
 19 27 July 2017."  
 20 Is it right that there was no further written update  
 21 to residents between 22 June until 27 July?  
 22 A. So there was a letter, as I referred to just a minute  
 23 earlier, that Barry Quirk sent out to the walkway  
 24 residents, which gave them a little bit of an update in  
 25 the back of — about some of our work on reinstating

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1 services and where we were with that, and so it was  
 2 contained within that letter, but it wasn't from us  
 3 directly.  
 4 Q. You continue and say:  
 5 "The briefings were initially produced to be forward  
 6 looking but given the delay in being able to send them,  
 7 it became a record of what had been done ... The  
 8 approval from Gold Control took much longer than we  
 9 would have liked meaning that communications to our  
 10 residents was delayed. That was one source of concern."  
 11 Can you give us some idea of the delay involved?  
 12 A. Timewise?  
 13 Q. Time.  
 14 A. Well, as I say, I started doing my briefings. So we did  
 15 this one — the previous one we talked about on the  
 16 22nd. I think I started producing fresh briefings just  
 17 after that. We wanted to communicate to people about  
 18 changes in the evacuation arrangements at the back of  
 19 the block. So it was from then, really, until 12 July,  
 20 which was the first communication, then again on the  
 21 27th. So it was a continual process all this time.  
 22 Q. I'd like to turn to a different topic now, which is  
 23 information—sharing and support in the delivery of the  
 24 emergency relief response.  
 25 Can we go to your sixth statement, please, page 20

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1 {TMO00894124/20}, paragraph 71. You say there, in the  
2 fourth line:

3 "We also had daily briefings with the Team Leaders  
4 at least in the initial few days to share information  
5 and the messaging we wanted to give to ensure a good  
6 exchange between all front facing staff."

7 On which day did those start, those briefings?

8 A. So the first one we had was on 15 June, and I held them  
9 every day for a while, and then as we were doing — as  
10 I moved on to doing the briefings that we just talked  
11 about, I got everyone to provide me an update by  
12 10 o'clock in the morning, and then that information was  
13 circulated and discussed with our teams.

14 Q. Right. Did you deliver the briefings?

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. Yes, and where did those briefings take place?

17 A. At the — at our office.

18 Q. Right.

19 You continue and you say:

20 "Following this Olivia [Hutchison] provided a daily  
21 briefing for sharing with staff in our Customer Services  
22 Centre and for our out of hours provider, for instance  
23 see Olivia's email of 15 June enclosed at  
24 exhibit TB/18."

25 You see that?

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1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. And you give an example.

3 Were you involved in any team briefings with members  
4 of the executive team, including Robert Black, to share  
5 information and discuss the TMO's response with them?

6 A. Yes. Robert held some briefings with all our staff.

7 I think the first one was on the 16th. There were  
8 others, maybe the 20th, and we definitely hold — held  
9 an executive and senior management team meeting before  
10 the end of this first week, where we were all sharing  
11 information around what we were doing, so everyone was  
12 updated on the various work strands that we were doing.

13 Q. If we go to your sixth statement, page 15  
14 {TMO00894124/15}, back five pages, please, paragraph 52,  
15 you say, and this is in the last three lines:

16 "There was also a TMO representative, Robert Black,  
17 present at the Gold Group meetings where information was  
18 shared and regular updates given on the work we were  
19 doing."

20 What process was in place for TMO staff on the  
21 ground to update Robert Black in advance of these RBKC  
22 Gold meetings?

23 A. So we — I think I might have briefed him. I can't  
24 remember exactly, but we were — he was asking for  
25 updates and we were giving them. So you just looked at

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1 an example of an email that he sent earlier — that  
2 Robert sent earlier, and that information would have  
3 come from Graham and myself on the ground to update him  
4 before he went into Gold Group.

5 Q. Right. How would Robert Black normally share the  
6 information that he had received from RBKC Gold Group  
7 meetings with you or your team?

8 A. Probably through — well, firstly in that executive team  
9 meeting that I've just explained with the T — and SMT,  
10 and then I think we just got calls and emails and  
11 updates via Sacha. So various different ways, depending  
12 on the nature of what it was.

13 Q. How regularly were you in contact with Robert Black in  
14 the first seven days after the fire?

15 A. I would say fairly regularly. I can't give you times or  
16 dates, but — no, I can't give you times and dates,  
17 but ...

18 Q. Did you speak to him on the phone or was it mainly by  
19 email?

20 A. I can't remember. I would imagine it was a variety of  
21 things, both phone calls and emails, and of course in  
22 person. As I say, he came to our main office on the  
23 16th and did a presentation to all our staff, so I saw  
24 him then, and he did another one a few days after,  
25 so ...

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1 Q. Right.

2 Did you get any support, any actual practical  
3 support, from the executive team, Robert Black in  
4 particular, to help you fulfil the various roles that  
5 your team had undertaken in the immediate aftermath of  
6 the fire?

7 A. I think we got what we needed. I don't think we needed  
8 any more than what we had. We had the right specialists  
9 involved in trying to solve the issues, and then we  
10 relied on other experts later on to help us with some of  
11 those technically difficult issues. Robert did help  
12 with organising for some additional staff to be brought  
13 into our organisation, basically to backfill myself and  
14 some other staff so that we could be free to do all the  
15 things that we needed to do on the ground. So it was  
16 backfilling our staff so that they could help with,  
17 you know, our day job, supporting all our other  
18 residents, because we had, you know, thousands of other  
19 residents to look after, and he definitely organised for  
20 that.

21 Q. Did you feel adequately supported by Robert Black in  
22 your response?

23 A. Yes, I did.

24 Q. You did. You had no criticisms at the time of his own  
25 involvement?

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1 A. No.  
2 Q. RBKC, I want to ask you one or two questions about  
3 the council.  
4 Let's go back to your fifth statement, please,  
5 page 8 {TMO00869990/8}, paragraph 41. You say in that  
6 paragraph, two-thirds of the way down your screen, in  
7 the last sentence:  
8 "There was good liaison, sharing of information and  
9 support between the TMO and RBKC teams on the day of the  
10 fire and the coming weeks."  
11 How was information generally shared between RBKC  
12 and the TMO teams in the immediate aftermath?  
13 A. So I think in a variety of ways. It would have been  
14 emails, it would have been phone calls. I spoke to  
15 Amanda a lot, to Laura quite a bit. It was in any way  
16 we needed to, phone, email. Amanda was on site one day  
17 as well, I remember.  
18 Q. Did you feel that you received clear and timely  
19 communication from RBKC about what was required of the  
20 TMO in the immediate aftermath?  
21 A. Yes, I think, given the circumstances on the day of the  
22 fire, they were communicating messages to us. Yeah,  
23 I think we got that right. I think there was  
24 appropriate and good liaison between the TMO and Amanda  
25 and Laura's teams, yes.

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1 Q. You did.  
2 Gold, then.  
3 Was there a system in place under the TMO's own  
4 emergency plan to increase capacity in the event of  
5 a mass homelessness event such as the Grenfell Tower  
6 fire?  
7 A. No, because that wouldn't have been our responsibility,  
8 that would have been an RBKC responsibility to gear up  
9 for mass evacuation and rehousing.  
10 Q. Can we look at {RBK00010176}. This is an email thread  
11 containing an email from Barbara Brownlee, as you can  
12 see at the bottom part of your screen, who was at  
13 Westminster City Council, which was forwarded through  
14 RBKC, through the BECC, to Laura Johnson and  
15 Stuart Priestley on 16 June at 11.51.  
16 Let's look at the message. She says -- and we can  
17 see that it gets filtered through higher up the email  
18 run, but she says this:  
19 "There are currently unofficial calls for  
20 assistance, coming from K&C's TMO for help. They have  
21 used what's app [sic] to send out a message to some  
22 London councils saying that their staff are exhausted  
23 and they need resources on for the weekend.  
24 "I also now have emails from housing consultancies  
25 saying the same thing.

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1 "This is a disorganised and very unofficial way to  
2 raise help after we have been offering it since the very  
3 beginning.  
4 "I am concerned that too many inexperienced staff  
5 [will] descend upon the respite centres without any  
6 planning and simply make the situation worse.  
7 "Please can you raise with K&C BEC."  
8 Do you know from whom the TMO had asked for  
9 assistance from London Councils?  
10 A. As I said to you just a minute ago, I know that Robert  
11 organised for some additional support for us, for staff  
12 for the CSC and to backfill myself and some other staff.  
13 I don't recall -- I don't know how he asked that  
14 request. I can't imagine sending out on WhatsApp, but  
15 I don't know, because I wasn't involved in that.  
16 Q. Are you saying that Robert Black asked for support or  
17 an increase in the capacity from other councils?  
18 A. I don't know who he asked. What I am saying is that  
19 I know he organised some resources on the weekend after  
20 the fire because there were people backfilling myself  
21 and another couple of senior management team staff, and  
22 we had some additional resources in the customer service  
23 centre, and that enabled us to create what we called  
24 a Grenfell team, so that we could really focus on the  
25 work that we needed to do in the weeks and coming

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1 months. So, yes, that helped us considerably.  
2 Q. Let's see if we can just pin this down to a document,  
3 because I think we can.  
4 A. Can we?  
5 Q. If we look at {RBK00001923/2}. This is an email run  
6 entitled "request for resources", and in the middle of  
7 the screen, here is one on 19 June 2017 at 10.45 in the  
8 morning from somebody called Radojka Miljevic at  
9 Campbell Tickell, who were, I think, management  
10 recruitment consultants, and it goes to Barbara Brownlee  
11 at Westminster, and she says:  
12 "We've had a call from the TMO this morning  
13 regarding quite a considerable input of staff resources  
14 that they are requesting -- some people have not turned  
15 up for work today. Whilst we have been looking at how  
16 we might backfill the four most senior posts (at least  
17 temporarily) it doesn't seem appropriate to be trying to  
18 fill all the other resource gaps appearing, and we  
19 assume that in any case this is best done through the  
20 command centre."  
21 Does that relate to what you were telling us earlier  
22 about Robert Black seeking additional resources?  
23 A. I don't know whether he contacted Radojka. I can't tell  
24 you if the two are related.  
25 Q. Right. You don't know.

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1 If we look at what happens to this, if you go up the  
 2 chain, please, to the bottom of page 1 {RBK00001923/1},  
 3 where we can pick it up best, Barbara Brownlee forwards  
 4 this on to Amanda Johnson at RBKC:  
 5 "Hi both  
 6 "Just to put on your radar that the TMO are  
 7 requesting resources from specific places but we need to  
 8 coordinate this via London wide and please will you  
 9 investigate when you are over there."  
 10 You get the reply from Amanda Johnson above that on  
 11 20 June 2017 at 12:58:  
 12 "Barbara  
 13 "At this morning's meeting you explained that  
 14 resources would not be made available to support the TMO  
 15 in terms of housing management staff.  
 16 "The TMO is now struggling to mobilise staff to  
 17 support people back into their homes (I am clarifying  
 18 the number of staff that have not attended work today).  
 19 Staff are extremely frightened and the lack of staff  
 20 will significantly undermine our ability to get people  
 21 back into their homes, accelerating already heightened  
 22 tensions.  
 23 "The London Wide response has been extremely helpful  
 24 in supporting RBKC and I am struggling to see why this  
 25 cannot be extended to the TMO, as there is a direct

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1 impact on our tenants and staff safety.  
 2 "Can you please raise this with GOLD?"  
 3 Were you aware yourself that the London Gold  
 4 response team was not going to make resources available  
 5 to support the TMO?  
 6 A. I didn't know any of this conversation was going on.  
 7 Q. Right.  
 8 A. And I don't think that I felt under-resourced to do the  
 9 job either. With the assistance that we did have,  
 10 I didn't feel that I was lacking. I certainly didn't  
 11 feel that we had a huge amount of staff who weren't  
 12 turning up for work.  
 13 Q. Can you account for how it could be that Amanda Johnson  
 14 came to the view that the TMO were struggling to  
 15 mobilise staff?  
 16 A. I don't know that. I think we would have struggled had  
 17 we not had backfills, and they were organised by Robert  
 18 in that first weekend, so this is after that.  
 19 Q. Right. At that point, though, did you feel adequately  
 20 supported by London Gold — this was the John Barradell  
 21 team — in responding to the needs of the residents?  
 22 A. So I think where we needed help from London Gold on  
 23 technical issues, they assisted. For example, when we  
 24 had to rebuild the walkways — sorry, the fire exits at  
 25 the end of the block, I was asked to arrange a meeting

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1 with someone from Gold, London Gold, and those resources  
 2 were made available to help with that, and that was  
 3 really helpful. So I think where we needed them, we got  
 4 them.  
 5 Q. Right.  
 6 Turning then to central government.  
 7 Was any support provided to you, the TMO, from  
 8 central government in the first week after the fire, do  
 9 you remember?  
 10 A. No. No.  
 11 Q. Can I show you something from central government. Can  
 12 we go, please, to {BEI00002844/12}. This is a witness  
 13 statement from Sebastian Bassett—James, who was  
 14 an official in the BEIS.  
 15 If we go, please, to paragraph 49, he says:  
 16 "My experience of the Local Government (Kensington &  
 17 Chelsea London Borough Council) and TMO was less  
 18 positive. I had significant difficulties in making  
 19 contact with both Local Government and the TMO, the  
 20 latter of which were being asked to provide the first  
 21 line response to a tragedy of unprecedented scale."  
 22 Do you agree with his characterisation that the TMO  
 23 had been asked to provide the first—line response or, in  
 24 your mind, was it RBKC who was doing that?  
 25 A. I think RBKC were to provide the first line of response.

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1 I don't know when this was written, but yes.  
 2 Q. He continues at paragraph 50:  
 3 "One matter that stood out for me was the response  
 4 from the TMO. There were roles that we expected the TMO  
 5 to handle which were not being done. An example is  
 6 making properties safe for the gas to be turned on. The  
 7 BEIS team in the Westway Centre were working with the  
 8 gas network distribution team who were putting the gas  
 9 back on in individual properties. The team required  
 10 a locksmith but neither the BEIS team nor the gas team  
 11 were assisted by the TMO. Further assistance was  
 12 therefore needed from DCLG to put pressure on the TMO to  
 13 take action."  
 14 Do you agree with any of that?  
 15 A. I don't know where that's come from. I told you earlier  
 16 in my evidence today that I was on site on 21 June  
 17 with — the gas people were there, and on the 20th,  
 18 trying to gain access to these properties. So I don't  
 19 understand where he formed that view from.  
 20 Q. If we turn to page 4, paragraph 15 of his second  
 21 statement {BEI00002849/4}, he says there:  
 22 "Whilst BEIS and the TMO both had representatives  
 23 present at the Westway Centre, the representatives from  
 24 TMO at the Westway Centre did not have the necessary  
 25 authority to make decisions, authorise actions or

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1 respond to the queries that the Utilities Coordination  
2 Cell sought to address."

3 Then he continues at paragraph 19 on page 5  
4 {BEI00002849/5}, if we can just go to that, at the  
5 bottom of the page:

6 "From memory, colleagues at the Westway Centre  
7 reported by phone that although there were  
8 representatives from other agencies and organisations  
9 working together to resolve the gas safety and property  
10 access situation, the TMO representatives at the centre  
11 were not able to provide answers to our queries or  
12 commit resource to resolving actions. Our queries for  
13 the TMO therefore went unanswered from the 20 to  
14 21 June 2017."

15 Now, I've shown you two passages from this  
16 official's statement.

17 First, do you agree that the TMO staff assigned to  
18 the Westway Centre did not have the authority to make  
19 key decisions, and may not have had all of the  
20 information to answer queries —

21 A. Well, it depends what they were being asked, but they  
22 certainly — we had on-call people all the time, and  
23 myself and Graham answered — I think Graham got  
24 involved in calls from — in relation to gas, I can't  
25 quite remember. I'm pretty sure that he did. But

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1 anyone at the Westway would have been able to contact  
2 us, and I would have thought this would have gone  
3 through BECC if there was any issues with us not doing  
4 what we needed to do at this stage. But I don't  
5 understand it because, as far as I could see, we  
6 responded when we were asked.

7 Q. Do you not recall any instance at all of having your  
8 representatives unable to provide answers to BEIS's  
9 queries or commit resources?

10 A. I'm sure there were times when they couldn't answer them  
11 directly, but I know that they would have contacted  
12 an appropriate member of staff, passed on the message,  
13 and got a response another way. I don't know in  
14 relation to this. But, as I say, I would check Graham's  
15 statement because I think he was contacted by Cadent.

16 Q. If we look at page 6, please, of this same statement  
17 {BEI00002849/6}, he explains what the utilities  
18 co-ordination cell's role was there, and in the middle  
19 of the paragraph he says:

20 "As we were unable to get answers from, or help  
21 progress actions through, the TMO, we were unable to  
22 fulfil our primary role. We could still take steps to  
23 assist victims and residents but could not complete  
24 those tasks which were most important to us. In my  
25 opinion, this led to the victims and residents being

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1 left frustrated for a longer period than necessary."

2 Do you agree, from what you knew and did at the  
3 time, that residents were left without information and  
4 assistance for longer than necessary?

5 A. I don't know in relation to this. I mean, what I do  
6 know is that we had teams on site on the 20th and 21st  
7 dealing with these issues, so I don't know where he —  
8 where these queries were directed, but I know that,  
9 you know, I was on the ground on the 21st, we had RD  
10 staff assisting with — sorry, Repairs Direct staff  
11 assisting with forced entries and repairing doors. So  
12 I'm — I have to say, I'm not really understanding this.

13 Q. Right.

14 Looking back on it, was it appropriate for the TMO,  
15 as you understood it at the time, to be fulfilling key  
16 roles in the immediate aftermath of the fire, such as,  
17 for example, supporting 845 evacuated residents and  
18 organising the restoration of utilities to all these  
19 homes?

20 A. Was it appropriate? I never considered that it wasn't  
21 appropriate. I just focused on trying to do the best we  
22 could, and where we needed specialist technical help,  
23 which was definitely with the boilers and the fire  
24 escapes, we did ask for help. I know James Rudge asked  
25 for some help from other people and from London Gold in

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1 relation to issues we had with the door entry system.  
2 He asked if anyone could assist with getting supplies  
3 quicker, and I don't know if he got an answer to that.  
4 But I think we called in people where we needed them.

5 Q. Was it your view or understanding that too high  
6 an expectation was accorded to the TMO to fulfil roles  
7 that should have been undertaken by RBKC and then by  
8 London Gold?

9 A. Can you repeat that? Sorry.

10 Q. Yes. Do you consider that it was too much to ask the  
11 TMO to fulfil roles that should have been fulfilled by  
12 RBKC, or later London Gold?

13 A. I don't know whether it was too much to ask. I know  
14 that we responded where we could. I know that our  
15 cleaning company did an excellent job in helping us with  
16 refuse issues. So I think we got on with it, didn't  
17 really think about it, you know, we didn't think about  
18 asking for help unless we needed help, and — I suppose,  
19 and it was around those technical areas that we did. We  
20 brought in additional resources from our cleaning  
21 company. So I think we just tried to focus on solving  
22 the problems.

23 The heating, obviously, was very complicated  
24 technically, and, you know, you'll know the army were  
25 sent in to solve that, but I think we did go with the

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1 original solution that our technical people in the TMO  
 2 had suggested, but it just took some time to implement.  
 3 Q. I mean, cutting through this, in general terms, given  
 4 that there was no formal role for the TMO based on the  
 5 Civil Contingencies Act or the edifice of regulation and  
 6 guidance, statutory or non-statutory, which sat under  
 7 it, and given that the RBKC never made a specific  
 8 request, would it be right to characterise the entirety  
 9 of the TMO's involvement in the aftermath of the  
 10 Grenfell Tower fire as voluntary?  
 11 A. I don't say — do you know, I wasn't aware of all the  
 12 arrangements, you know, the technical — you know, the  
 13 contingency arrangements at a higher level. I didn't  
 14 know who was supposed to do what or, you know, who was  
 15 in charge some days, but I did know that we were just  
 16 focused on what we needed to do to assist in any way  
 17 that we could. That's what I know.  
 18 MR MILLETT: Yes, thank you very much.  
 19 Well, Ms Brown, you'll be glad to hear that I've  
 20 come to the end of my prepared questions. There may be  
 21 one or two others that I haven't asked you but which, on  
 22 reflection, I should, and there may be other questions  
 23 that others may wish to be asked of you.  
 24 So I'm going to ask the Chairman to take the  
 25 standard break, if I may —

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1 THE WITNESS: Yeah.  
 2 MR MILLETT: — and we will come back and finish off  
 3 shortly.  
 4 THE WITNESS: Okay.  
 5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.  
 6 Well, you have been here often enough now to know  
 7 that at this stage we have a short break to see if there  
 8 are any more questions that we ought to put to you.  
 9 I'm going to say we'll come back at 4.30, unless  
 10 I get a message from Mr Millett that more time is  
 11 required, and then at that point we'll see if there are  
 12 any more questions for you.  
 13 THE WITNESS: Okay.  
 14 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right?  
 15 THE WITNESS: Thank you.  
 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. Would you go  
 17 with the usher, please.  
 18 (Pause)  
 19 Well, Mr Millett, we'll say 4.30. If you need more  
 20 time, get the usher to come and tell us.  
 21 MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman, thank you.  
 22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.  
 23 (4.21 pm)  
 24 (A short break)  
 25 (4.30 pm)

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1 THE WITNESS: Sorry.  
 2 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, take a moment.  
 3 All right?  
 4 THE WITNESS: Sorted.  
 5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Very good.  
 6 Well, now, Mr Millett, any questions?  
 7 MR MILLETT: Yes, I have a few, I think.  
 8 The first relates to a very, very specific incident.  
 9 Now, you told us this morning that you sought to  
 10 supplement the pre-existing list of residents with  
 11 information collected at rest centres about who were  
 12 missing. We saw some of the documents, some of the  
 13 pieces of paper, the manuscript pieces of paper.  
 14 I want to ask you about one particular incident, if  
 15 I may, please. This is taken from the statement of  
 16 Channel Spence, who was Gary Maunders' niece, and he was  
 17 staying overnight with his friend in flat 161.  
 18 If we can go, please, to {IWS00001657}. This is the  
 19 second witness statement of Channel Spence. If we can  
 20 go, please, in it to page 3 {IWS00001657/3},  
 21 paragraph 10, she says:  
 22 "At some point I was made aware that I may be able  
 23 to find out things at St Clement James Church so we  
 24 headed there. I spoke to someone who I believe was from  
 25 the TMO, I am not sure now how I knew this. She was not

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1 friendly and seemed to be quite hostile. I explained  
 2 that I was looking for my uncle he didn't live there but  
 3 he was staying with someone called Debbie. She said  
 4 Deborah and she asked if she was a white blonde lady.  
 5 I said that I didn't know. She said almost as if she  
 6 was recollecting and speaking to herself rather than me  
 7 that she knows of a woman called Deborah (as opposed to  
 8 Debbie) who she used to talk to and that she lived on  
 9 such and such floor. I can't now recall which floor she  
 10 said. I said I didn't know. I didn't get any further  
 11 assistance."  
 12 Now, this was happening at St Clement's Church,  
 13 which is I think where you were; yes?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. Could this have been you to whom she spoke?  
 16 A. I don't think so. I don't recall this conversation.  
 17 Q. Right.  
 18 A. I very much — unless — I don't know when it was. No  
 19 idea what time it was.  
 20 Q. No, nor is that clear from the statement, but did you  
 21 know somebody called Debbie or Deborah in the tower?  
 22 A. No.  
 23 Q. Right.  
 24 A. I don't recall this.  
 25 Q. Right. Do you recall a mixed race woman asking you

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1 about a Debbie or a Deborah?  
 2 A. No, and I'm sure I wasn't the only blonde woman in the  
 3 St Clement's Church.  
 4 Q. Are you able to explain why Gary Maunders' name — as he  
 5 was the visitor visiting Debbie, Debbie Lamprell as it  
 6 turns out — did not feature on the Grenfell Tower  
 7 spreadsheet compiled by 16 June and shared with  
 8 Gold Group, the one we looked at?  
 9 A. No, I don't. I can't answer those individual  
 10 circumstances. I'd need access to, you know,  
 11 information, tenancy records, to have a look at that.  
 12 I couldn't possibly answer that now.  
 13 Q. The reason I'm asking you about this particular incident  
 14 is this is, we believe, the only instance of a visitor  
 15 not making it on to the list, so in a particular  
 16 category, but you can't help, I think?  
 17 A. I'm sorry, I can't.  
 18 Q. Right.  
 19 Can I then take you to another document, which is  
 20 {CLG00005723}. This is an email from Sally Randall to  
 21 Kerry MacHale in the office of Melanie Dawes and others.  
 22 Now, I don't think you would have seen this.  
 23 A. No, definitely not until now.  
 24 Q. It doesn't appear to have been sent to you, but I'll  
 25 read it to you. It says:

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1 "Spoke to Barbara Brownlee:  
 2 "Impression of what's going on  
 3 " ■ TMO has no leadership — everyone, including K&C  
 4 is 'dithering'.  
 5 " ■ TMO staff are drifting around, traumatised,  
 6 rumours that some are cleaning computer records.  
 7 " ■ Staff preoccupied with likelihood of criminal  
 8 charges. No—one is taking care of the staff.  
 9 " ■ A handful are trying to do the job, but are still  
 10 very traumatised and working with no leadership.  
 11 " ■ They cannot get reliable information — e.g. on  
 12 the state of the finger blocks."  
 13 That's just a handful of the observations made by  
 14 Sally Randall in central government, DCLG, to her  
 15 colleagues, based on what Barbara Brownlee at  
 16 Westminster had told her.  
 17 Do you recognise any of these observations?  
 18 A. I have no idea where she's — how she's — what she's  
 19 based those observations on, so I'm not sure that  
 20 I could comment. For my part, I didn't feel that people  
 21 were dithering around. I thought people were incredibly  
 22 traumatised by what happened, but what I saw in our  
 23 staff were staff who were focused on getting on with the  
 24 job and doing what they could to support people.  
 25 I don't recall us being dithering or unable to act or

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1 cope. And I don't think — I think people made  
 2 judgements, got impressions, didn't — and I don't know  
 3 what they were based on, because I never talked to  
 4 Barbara Brownlee. I don't know who did.  
 5 Q. So can we take it from what you've just told us that you  
 6 would reject the accuracy of the impression that  
 7 Barbara Brownlee had gained in the five bullet points  
 8 I've read to you from this document?  
 9 A. Yes, I would. But I would say we won't have got  
 10 everything right. You will know that. But I can say we  
 11 tried very hard and I don't think we were dithering.  
 12 Q. Right.  
 13 A. I think we were focused, we had clear jobs to do, we had  
 14 an amazingly difficult time to reinstate services on top  
 15 of dealing with, you know, a huge amount of evacuated  
 16 residents. But I didn't feel that there was no  
 17 leadership. I felt our staff worked incredibly hard and  
 18 pulled together.  
 19 Q. So you told us you never spoke to Barbara Brownlee.  
 20 A. No.  
 21 Q. Did you speak to anyone at Westminster?  
 22 A. No.  
 23 Q. Did you have any contact at all with anybody in London  
 24 Local Authority Gold about what you were doing, about  
 25 your resources?

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1 A. So I did have contact with the man who came — I'm  
 2 sorry, I can't remember his name. I had brief contact  
 3 with the man who wanted to come and do an inspection in  
 4 terms of the walkways, to look at the fire exits, and  
 5 I arranged for somebody to go out with him, so I had  
 6 that contact personally. I don't think I had any other  
 7 direct contact with London Gold. I'm trying to think.  
 8 So, yeah, I don't know where these views are formed  
 9 from. I certainly never spoke to Barbara Brownlee at  
 10 all.  
 11 Q. Did you ever speak to anyone in central government,  
 12 particularly about matters —  
 13 A. No, but they also formed views on us and I don't know  
 14 how they were formed, yeah.  
 15 Q. Finally, Ms Brown, looking back on the evidence we've  
 16 covered over the course of the day and looking back on  
 17 the aftermath as you recall it in your statements, is  
 18 there anything that you would say today that you would  
 19 have done differently, had you had the chance?  
 20 A. I think the issue of contacting next of kin is something  
 21 that really sort of I dwell on, and I think that's  
 22 something that residents should work with housing  
 23 organisations on, because we won't always have known the  
 24 details of next of kin. We did have a question on our  
 25 tenancy check process, and clearly there were a lot of

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1 distressed next of kin looking for information, and  
 2 I think it would have been very helpful if we'd had more  
 3 details that we could have shared with, say, the  
 4 Casualty Bureau, so that they could have communicated  
 5 with those residents much earlier. I don't think it  
 6 would have been our role necessarily, but I think it  
 7 would be very important to have those next of kin  
 8 details in people's databases going forward.  
 9 MR MILLETT: Ms Brown, thank you very much for that, and  
 10 thank you for your evidence overall. It remains only  
 11 for me to thank you very much for coming yet again to  
 12 the Inquiry and assisting us with your evidence, helping  
 13 us with our investigations, so thank you very much  
 14 indeed.  
 15 THE WITNESS: Thank you.  
 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I should thank you as well,  
 17 Ms Brown, on behalf of all the three members of the  
 18 panel. You have given evidence now three times, which  
 19 I think is unusual to say the least, and it's been very  
 20 helpful to us now to hear what you can tell us about  
 21 what happened in the days after the fire. So we're very  
 22 grateful to hear from you, and you're now free to go.  
 23 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.  
 24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.  
 25 (The witness withdrew)

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1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, thank you, Mr Millett. That  
 2 must be it for today, but we have another witness coming  
 3 tomorrow.  
 4 MR MILLETT: We do, Mr Robert Black tomorrow morning.  
 5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good. Thank you very much. So  
 6 we'll adjourn there and we'll resume at 10 o'clock  
 7 tomorrow, please.  
 8 MR MILLETT: Thank you.  
 9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.  
 10 (4.41 pm)  
 11 (The hearing adjourned until 10 am  
 12 on Tuesday, 10 May 2022)  
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