1     Monday, 13 June 2018     1     fire spread via and on the exterior of the tower and the fire and smoke spread via thin the rower. He will be a fire of the tower and the welcome to this week barring, our expression from the various of expert witness instructed by the impairs.     We will also has from Professor Fuzzr. He will be dealing with the issues relating to the professor burst. He will be materials present in the tower on the night of the fire.       9     Yes, M. Grang.     We will also has from Professor Fuzzr. He will be dealing with the issues relating to the professor burst. He will be				
2     (1000 am)     2     fire and smoke spread within the issue:       3     SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK. Well, good morning, everyone, and     3       4     welcome to this week's hearing.     We will also hear from Professor Purser. He will be dealing with the issue: relating to the production of trote gases, mediang the the issue; relating to the production of trote gases, mediang the two into the gases.       7     Yes, Ma Gange.     M. Chairman, the vow       9     This is the first of face days of expert     M. Chairman, the core participaties were informed by terrer informed professor Purser. He will be dealing with the issues relating to the provided in the substruction. The well be growided in his opaing submission, the impairs solution in the core when will identify the arrive in the informed in the opaing submission, the impair solution in the core when will identify the arrive in the informed in the opaing submission, the impair solution in the core and when will identify the arrive in the informed in the opaing and intervent in the fire. Concentrating the intervention is to state in the core and safery measures which ware present in the Underse sub. Decades presentition will also the core presentation will also the core intervention will also the care intervention.       10     Dre tane with weight in the intervention will also the care intervention.     The mean intervention	1	Monday, 18 June 2018	1	fire spread to and on the exterior of the tower and the
3SIK MARTIN MODRE-BICK. Well, good musting, everyone, and welcome to this work's hearings. We're going to begin the subscar function by the inquity.3We will also hear from Professor Purzers. He will be dealing with the issues relating to the production of tracing gases, including the toxicity performance of materials present in the tower on the night of the first.6expert vitteness instructed by the inquity.67Yes, MG Gange.M7Wis MM SGRANCE: Mr Chairman, thank you.77This is for first diver days of capert77res Mit So add and Professor Lake Boly. As 1178Mr Mitter outfield in a looping submission, the 121113parasset returns the with be 1314context the fictual evidence may in the questions which arise out of their oral evidence, those should be submitted to the inquity solicitor's mailbox by Monday. Speeptner 2018.15and pasavis fire and safety mesaners which were present and pasavis fire and safety mesaners which were present and pasavis fire and safety mesaners of the the evidence of the fire.16Dr Law with evidence safe and safety mesaners which were present and safety mesaners which were prese		•		-
4       dealing with the issues rotating to production of         5       the week by baring some presentations from the various         6       expert witnesses instructed by the inquity.         7       Yes, Ms Gange.         7       With Chairman, the core participants were informed by         9       MS GRANCE: Mr Chairman, thank you.         9       This is the first of three days of expert         9       This is the first of three days of expert         10       presentations. These will be given by D Bathan Lane,         11       propose of these expert presentations is to as in         12       mark and probability of the expert presentations is to as in         13       purpose of these expert presentations is to as in         14       context the factual evidence which will show ith durity the exists         16       Dr lane will be nitrofhering key aspects of the         16       Dr lane will be nitrofhering key aspects of the earier         17       retic calling the hashes.         18       and possive fire and strep measuration, and in         19       in the tower at the fine of the fire.         20       Thoresorn Nic Dasid's presentation of the investigation, and in         23       professor Nic Dasid's presentation of the investigation, and in         24       us ab				-
5two key by semina some presentations from the various5toxic gases, including the toxicity preformance of6expert witnesses instructed by the inquiry.7instails present in the tower on the night of the file.7Yes, Ms Grange.7Mr Chairman, the core participants were informed by8MS GRANCE: Mr Chairman, the awy sould9guestions for the inquiry reperts when they provide10presentations. These will be given by Dr Burbara Lane.10guestions for the inquiry reperts when they provide11release of the end of the fire.11inquiry solicitof's mainbox by Monday. 3 September 2018.12Mr Millett outlined in his opening submissions, the12If there are any further questions which uit is out of13guestions of the fire dury solicity of mainbox by Monday. 3 September 2018.1114endets of fire inducing key aspects of the1515and passive fire and safety measures which were present1816preview18the context of the forthcoming expert material.17Professor Nic Davidy presentation will address2018and passive dury and waid ideres of fire, sand, third, a summary of2419initial fire within the kitchen of flat 16.119precision fire fortherm anges of the tower before the fire,20Professor Nic David Weil discore the fire, and also some detailed inages of the tower before the fire,21initial fire with the kitchen of flat 16.22Professor Nic David Weil discore the fire, fare of fire which with which				
6       expert witnesses instructed by the inquiry.       6       materials present in the tower on the inquiry capter wave informed by         7       Yes, Ms Grange       7       Mr Chairman, the ave informed by         9       MS GRANCE. Mr Chairman, the ave informed by       10       Mr Chairman, the core participants were informed by         9       This is the first of three days of expert       9       10       Mr Chairman, the core participants were informed by         10       presentation. These will by given by D Bubran Lane,       11       11       11       11         11       purpose of these expert presentations is to as in       12       11				
7       Yes, Mi Grange       7       Mr Claiman, the core participations are informed by         8       Mis GRANGE: Mr Chaiman, thank you.       8         9       This is the first of there days of expert         10       presentations. These will be given by D Barbara Lane,       9         11       proteors Numb Nc Deade and Protessor Late Barby. As       10         12       Mr Millett outlined in his opening submissions, the       11       factual evidence, head after fast time, then those will         13       parpose of these expert presentations is to set in       13       factual evidence head after fast time, then those will         14       context the factal evidence which will shortly be       11       factual evidence head after fast time, then those will         15       called in Phase 1.       15       factual evidence head after fast time, then those will         16       Dr Lane, who will give today's       presentation, I need to give some tigger warnings about         16       there primipal logies: first, the basic science of       12         17       Prior to calling Dr Lane, who will give today's       presentation of Dr Lane, who will give today's         13       particular what evidence such as first markings can tell       22         21       there preiminary analysis of the cause and origin of the       22				
8       MS GRANGE: MC lairman, floady you.       8       letter fast weak that if they wish to suggest relevant         9       This is the first of these days of expert       9       questions for the inquiry experts when they provide         11       presemations. These will be given by Dr Barbara Lane,       10       11       11         12       Mr Miller outling in his ice points pathwisens, the       11       11       11       11         13       purpose of these expert presentations, the       12       11       11       12       12       13       12       14				
9     This is the first of three days of expert     9     questions for the inquiry experts when they provide       10     Protessor Numb Nic Darde and Protessor Lake Baby, As     11       12     purpose of these expert presentations is to so in     13       13     purpose of these expert presentations is to so in     13       14     context the factual evidence which will shortly be     14       15     called in Phase 1.     15       16     Dr Law will be introducing key aspects of the     16       17     building and its history, and will dentify the active     17       18     and passive fire and active presentation. I need to be provided no later than five, clear working       19     the content of the force.       20     Thore is so in in the tower at the time of the fire.       21     today will contain images of the tower before the fire.       22     the content of the force the fire.       23     particula vidence such as fire markings can tell       24     initial fire within the kitchen of flat 16.       25     her preliminary analysis of the cause and origin of the       26     Page 1       27     page 1       28     initial fire within the kitchen of flat 16.       29     Page 3       11     initial fire within the kitchen of flat 16.       29     Page 1<		-		
10       presentations. These will be given by Dr Barbara Lane,       10       their oral evidence, those should be submitted to the         11       Professor Niam Nic Dadd and Professor Lake Bibly. As       11       input: solicitor's mailbox by Moday, 3 September 2018.         12       Mf Millet outline of his opening submissions, the       12       If there are any further questions which arise out of         13       purpose of these expert presentations is to set in       13       factual evidence, those should be submitted to the         14       context the factual evidence which will shortly be       13       factual evidence, the card after that time, then those will         16       Dr Law will be introducing key aspects of the       16       Prior to calling Dr Lane, who will give today's         19       in the tower at the time of the fire.       10       Prior to calling Dr Lane, who will give today's         21       fire, second, the element of fire investigation, and in       20       The presentation of Dr Lane withe will take place         22       fire, second, the clement of fire investigation, and in       22       ad also some detailed images of certain parts of the         23       particular what evidence such as fire matring sora tell       23       building after the fire, concentrating on the physical         24       tase second, the clement of flat 16.       Professor Bibly with the kitchen of flat 16.				
11       Professor Niem Nie Daeid and Professor Lake Bisby. As       11       inguiny solicitor's mailbox by Monday, 3 September 2018.         12       Mr Millett outlined in his opening submissions, the set in       12       If there are any further questions which ares out of         13       parpose of these expert presentations is to set in       13       If actual evidence had after that time, then those will         14       context the future of the free       15       days before the relevant expert is due to give oral         15       and passor fine and after meanser which were present       16       Professor Nic Daeids presentation, 1 need to be provided no later their warnings about         10       In to tower of the time of the free       19       Professor Nic Daeids presentation, 1 need to give some trigger varnings about         20       Professor Nic Daeids presentation, and in       22       Professor Bisby will be explaining certain key         21       initial free within the kitchen of fat 16.       1       In a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to operate.         23       scientific concepts relevant to far far.       16       Iwill be calladi mages of the add werd mage and the windows and fare and the windows in the fareer of the fare.         24       initial free within the kitchen of fat 16.       1       11       In a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to operate.       11         25 <td></td> <td>• •</td> <td></td> <td></td>		• •		
12       Mr Millett outlined in his opening submissions, the       12       If there are any further questions which arise out of         13       purpose of these expert presentations is to set in       13       If there are any further questions which arise out of         14       concert the future divence which will shortly be       14       In the tower at the inter of the future       15         16       Dr Lane will be introducing key supcets of the       16       16       17       Professor Nic Dacid's presentation will address       10         19       in the tower at the inter of the investigation, and in       18       17       The presentation of Dr Lane which will take place         12       fire; scond, the element of fire investigation, and in       22       10       The presentation of the forthcorming expert material         24       us about the origin of a fire; and, third, a summary of       23       24       10       In a flat whice referece to how stap the is intended to         25       prefersor Bisby will be explaining certain key       3       1       in a flat whice fire recore, which will fabor be fire and the windows         26       Page 1       Intertor of fast 16.       1       1       in a flat whice fire recore to how stap the is intended to         27       revidence which will fabor be fire and the relindows       1       1       in a flat whice				
13       purpose of these expert presentations is to set in       13       factual evidence heard after that time, then those will         14       context the factual evidence which will shortly be       14       need to be provided to later than five clear working         15       called in Phase 1.       15       adys before the relevant expert is due to give oral         16       Dr. Lane will be introducing key aspects of the       16       17         18       and passis fire and safety measures which were present       18       presentation, fued to give some trigger warnings about         19       in the tower at the time of the fire.       20       Professor Nic Daeds presentation will address       20         21       three principal topics: first, the basis celence of       21       The presentation of Dr Lane which will take place         22       today will contain images of the tower before the fire,       20       The presentation of Dr Lane which will take place         23       particular what evidencings can set 1       23       today will contain images of the tower before the fire,         24       in thild fire within the kitchen of flat 16.       21       today will contain images of the tower before the fire,         25       ber preliminary analysis of the cause and origin of the       25       today will contain images of the tower set of the subuotand ta fire doors. There will also set out the prelimi		-		
14       context the factual evidence which will shortly be       14       need to be provided no later than five clear working         15       called in Phase 1.       15       days before the relevant expert is due to give oral         16       Dr. Lane will be introducing key aspects of the       16         17       building and its history, and will identify the active       17         18       and passive fire and safety messares which were present       18         10       in the tower at the time of the fire.       18         20       Professor Nic Dacid's presentation will address       20         21       fire; scond, the element of fire investigation, and in       22         22       fire; scond, the element of fire investigation, and in       22         23       particular what evidence such as fire markings can tell       23         24       us about the origin of a fire; and, third, a summary of       24         25       her preliminary analysis of the cause and origin of the       25         26       Professor Bisby will be explaining certain key       26         27       initial fire within the kitchen of flat 16.       1         28       recreatin materials present in the facade and the windows       1         36       certain materials present in the facade and the windows       1				
15       called in Phase 1.       15       days before the relevant expert is due to give oral         16       Dr Lane will be introducing key aspects of the       16       vidence.         18       and passive fire and safety messures which were present       17       Professor Nic Bael's presentation will address         19       in the tower at the time of the fire.       19       10       Professor Nic Bael's presentation and in         21       fire; second, the element of fire investigation, and in       22       and also some detailed images of the tower before the fire,         22       fire; second, the element of fire investigation, and in       23       building after the fire, concentrating on the physical         24       us about the origin of a fire; and, third, a summary of       24       features of, for example, the cladding, the windows and         25       her preliminary analysis of the cause and origin of the       25       Page 3         1       initial fire within the kitchen of flat 16.       1       in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to         2       professor Bisby will be explaining certain key       3       1       in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to         3       scientific concepts relevant of Ammonability and flame       1       in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to         4       spread, a				
16     Dr Lane will be introducing key aspects of the building and its history, and will identify the active     16     evidence.       17     Band passive free and assive free and asso can be regine of the free.     17     Prior to calling Dr Lane, who will give today's presentation. I need to give some trigger warnings about the content of the forthcoming expert material.       20     The presentation of DP Lane which will lake place today will contain images of the tower before the free, and also some detailed images of certain parts of the particular what evidence such as fire markings can tell     12       21     the preliminary analysis of the cause and origin of the     25       23     scientific concepts relevant to flammability and flame spread, and will describe the material properties of certain materials present in the facade and the windows for in the tower. He will also sto ut the preliminary revidence which will be called first, and from the stower on the night of the fire.     1     in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to operate.       10     It is hoped that these expert presentations will assis in setting the framework and context to the fire fighters, who will be called first, and from the stower and the will will colled, material properties of fire fighters, who will be called first, and from the stower and who will give evidence from September.     10     Mr Andrew Kinnier (QC will call Professor Nic Daeid tomorrow.       11     <		-		
17       building and its history, and will identify the active       17       Prior to calling Dr Lane, who will give today's         18       and passive fire and safety measures which were present       18       presentation, I need to give some trigger warnings about         20       Professor Nic Dacid's presentation will address       20       The presentation of Dr Lane, who will give today's         21       three principal topics: first, the basic science of       21       today will contain images of the tower before the fire,         22       fire; scoend, the element of fire investigation, and in       22       and also ome detailed images of the tower before the fire,         23       particular what evidence such as fire markings can tell       23       and also ome detailed images of the tower before the fire,         24       us about the origin of a fire; and, third, a summary of       24       features of, for example, the cladding, the windows and         25       her preliminary analysis of the cause and origin of the       25       free doors. There will also be a simulation of a fire         24       value and ill for within the kitchen of flat 16.       1       in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to         25       professor Nicb David       free doors. The ewill also so tout the preliminary       3         3       scientific concepts relevant to flat metrial properties of       1       in a fl				
18       and passive fire and safety measures which were present       18       presentation, I need to give some trigger warnings about         19       in the tower at the time of the fire.       19       the content of the forthcoming expert material.         20       Professor Nic Deadify presentation will address       21       the optical what evidence such as fire markings can tell       23         21       us about the origin of a fire; and, third, a summary of       24       takes on the preluminary analysis of the cause and origin of the         23       particular what evidence such as fire markings can tell       23         24       us about the origin of a fire; and, third, a summary of       24         25       her preluminary analysis of the cause and origin of the       25         26       Professor Nic Daedi       page 1       Page 3         1       initial fire within the kitchen of flat 16.       1       in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to operate.         2       Professor Nic Daedi, which will       3       I will be calling Dr Lane today.         4       spread, and will describe the material properties of the fire.       1       in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to origin, flat 16, after the fire, the burnt-out compare. It will also include videos solving the early development of the fire and thermal imges of the fire.         10       It is hoped that thes				
19       in the tower at the time of the fire.       19       the content of the forthcoming expert material.         20       Professor Nic Daeidy presentation will address       20       The presentation of Dr Lane which will take place         21       three principal topics: first, the basic science of       21       The presentation of Dr Lane which will take place         22       fire; second, the element of fire investigation, and in       22       and also some detailed images of the tower before the fire,         24       us about the origin of a fire; and, third, a summary of       23       bit preliminary analysis of the cause and origin of the         25       her preliminary analysis of the cause and origin of the       24       features of, for example, the cladding, the windows and         24       professor Bisby will be explaining certain key       3       in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to         25       portessor Bisby will be explaining certain key       3       Twill be calling Dr Lane today.         3       scientific concepts relevant to flammability and flame       3       Twill be calling Dr Lane today.         4       spread, and will describe the material properties of       1       in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to         6       in the tower. He will also sect und the windows       5       fitake place tomorow, will contain detailed images of the <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>				
20       Professor Nic Daeids presentation will address       20       The resentation of Dr Lane which will take place         21       three principal topics: first, the basic science of       21       and also some detailed images of the tower before the fire,         23       particular what evidence such as fire markings can tell       22       and also some detailed images of the tower before the fire,         24       us about the origin of a fire; and, third, a summary of       24       features of, for example, the cladding, the windows and         25       her preliminary analysis of the cause and origin of the       25       fire doors. There will also be a simulation of a fire         24       us about the origin of a fire; and, third, a summary of       24       features of, for example, the cladding, the windows and         25       in initial fire within the kitchen of flat 16.       1       in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to         26       operate.       1       in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to         3       scientific concepts relevant to flammability and flame       3       1       will be called images of the         4       spread, and will describe the material properties of       1       ita flat to origin, flat 16, after the fire, the burnt-out         5       certain materials present in the facade and the windows       flat of origin, flat 16, after the fire, hob				
21       three principal topics: first, the basic science of       21       today will contain images of the tower before the fire,         22       fire; second, the element of fire investigation, and in       22       and also some detailed images of certain parts of the         23       particular what evidence such as fire markings can tell       23       building after the fire, concentrating on the physical         24       us about the origin of a fire; and, third, a summary of       25       fire doors. There will also be a simulation of a fire         25       Professor Bisby will be explaining certain key       3       scientific concepts relevant to flammability and flame         3       scientific concepts relevant to flammability and flame       1       in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to         6       in the tower. He will also set out the preliminary       2       I will be calling Dr Lane today.         7       evidence which assists in understanding the pattern of       1       the first origin, flat 16, after the fire, the burnt-out         10       It is hoped that these expert presentations will       1       the first origin flat 16, together with the playing of         11       assist in setting the framework and context to the       1       firefighting in flat 16, together with the playing of         12       factual evidence. It is at that time that the experts       1       with the play				•
22       fire; second, the element of fire investigation, and in       22       and also some detailed images of certain parts of the         23       particular what evidence such as fire markings can tell       23       and also some detailed images of certain parts of the         24       us about the origin of a fire; and, third, a summary of       24       features of, for example, the cladding, the windows and         25       her preliminary analysis of the cause and origin of the       25       ma flax with reference to how stay put is intended to         24       scientific concepts relevant to flammability and flame       1       in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to         25       scientific concepts relevant to flammability and flame       3       I will be calling Dr Lane today.         4       spread, and will describe the material properties of       1       in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to         5       certain materials present in the facade and the windows       1       in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to         6       in the tower. He will also set out the preliminary       2       I will be calling Dr Lane today.         7       evidence which assits in understanding the pattern of       1       flat of origin, flat 16, after the fire, the burnt-out         9       tive index will also include videos showing the       early development of the fire with the p		-		
23       particular what evidence such as fire markings can tell       23       building after the fire, concentrating on the physical         24       us about the origin of a fire, and, third, a summary of       24       54         25       her preliminary analysis of the cause and origin of the       24       54         26       Page 1       Page 3         1       initial fire within the kitchen of flat 16.       1       in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to operate.         2       Professor Bisby will be explaining certain key       5       in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to operate.         3       spread, and will describe the material properties of       1       in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to         5       certain materials present in the facade and the windows       1       The presentation of Professor Nic Dacid, which will take place tomorrow, will contain detailed images of the         6       in the tower. He will also set out the preliminary       6       flat of origin, flat 16, ofgether with the playing of         7       evidence which assists in understanding the pattern of       7       compartment. It will also include videos showing the         8       flame spread out of flat 16 and over the exterior of the       9       firefighting in flat 16, together with the playing of         10       It is hoped that these expert pr				
24       us about the origin of a fire; and, third, a summary of       24       features of, for example, the cladding, the windows and         25       her preliminary analysis of the cause and origin of the       25       features of, for example, the cladding, the windows and         26       Page 1       Page 3         1       initial fire within the kitchen of flat 16.       1       in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to         2       scientific concepts relevant to flammability and flame       3       in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to         3       scientific concepts relevant to flammability and flame       3       I will be calling Dr Lane today.         4       spread, and will describe the material properties of       4       The presentation of Professor Nic Dacid, which will         5       certain materials present in the facade and the windows       5       flat of origin, flat 16, after the fire, the burnt-out         6       in the tower. He will also so tot the preliminary       7       evidence which assists in understanding the pattern of         7       evidence which suits of the fire.       16       and origin, flat 16, ingether with the playing of         10       It is hoped that these expert presentations will       10       the first 999 call by Mr Kebde.         11       assist in setting the framework and context to the       11 </td <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>				
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Page 1Page 31initial fire within the kitchen of flat 16.1in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to operate.3scientific concepts relevant to flammability and flame 42in a flat with reference to how stay put is intended to operate.4spread, and will describe the material properties of 54The presentation of Professor Nic Dacid, which will take place tomorrow, will contain detailed images of the flat of origin, flat 16, after the fire, the burnt-out compartment. It will also include videos showing the early development of the fire and thermal images of the firefighting in flat 16, together with the playing of the firefighters, who will be called first, and from the bereaved and survivors of the fire who escaped from the take place this Wednesday, will include a large number of images and videos depicting the external flame spread on the night of the fire, who will give evidence from September.Mr Andrew Kinnier QC will call Professor Nic Dacid tomorrow.13firefighters, who will give evidence from September.11Mr Andrew Kinnier QC will call Professor Nic Dacid tomorrow.14bereaved and survivors of the fire who escaped from the tower and who will give evidence in October, and once they have heard and taken account of the factual experts in their Phase 1 reports, those will be tested once they have heard and taken account of the factual experts, and in particular Professor Jose Torero, who expressed in their reports on Phase 1 sisues.923At that stage, we will also hear from other inquiry experts, and in particular Professor Jose Torero, who experts, and in particular Professor Jose Torero, who expressed in the ire portos on Phase I sisues.			1	features of, for example, the cladding, the windows and
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Day 5

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1	Mr Millett will call Professor Bisby.	1	Edinburgh.
2	So I would now like to call Dr Lane.	2	DR LANE: Yes, I am.
3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, thank you.	3	MS GRANGE: Thank you.
4	DR BARBARA LANE (sworn)	4	I outline that, Dr Lane, so that everyone will
5	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. Sit down if	5	appreciate the expertise that you are able to bring to
6	you like.	6	bear and your experience in dealing with the matters
7	MS GRANGE: Thank you, Dr Lane.	7	this inquiry has asked you to consider.
8	Can you give the inquiry your full name?	8	Are the factual matters set out in your report true
9	DR LANE: Dr Barbara Lane.	9	to the best of your knowledge and belief?
10	MS GRANGE: I'm going to put to you a number of propositions	10	DR LANE: Yes, they are.
11	which I hope will be uncontroversial.	11	MS GRANGE: Does your report accurately set out your
12	You have provided to the inquiry a preliminary	12	opinions on matters relevant to this inquiry?
13	Phase 1 report which is dated 12 April 2018 and which	13	DR LANE: Yes, it does.
14	consists of 21 chapters and 11 appendices, A to K.	14	MS GRANGE: Thank you, Dr Lane.
15	DR LANE: Yes, I have.	15	Now, in your own time, please, would you go ahead
16	MS GRANGE: That report addresses in particular the active	16	and give your oral presentation.
17	and passive fire protection measures within the tower	17	DR LANE: Okay, thank you.
18	and the extent to which they failed to control the	18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you would like to stand or sit,
19	spread of fire and smoke and contributed to the speed at	19	you do whichever is most comfortable.
20	which the fire spread.	20	DR LANE: I'll move around a bit.
21	DR LANE: That's correct.	21	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, do that too.
22	MS GRANGE: As you indicate in the declaration in section 21	22	DR LANE: Good morning.
23	of your report, you have provided it in the same way as	23	I've arranged my opening presentation into an
24	you would have provided a report to a court.	24	ordered series of subjects as follows.
25	DR LANE: That's correct.	25	First, this morning I will start by explaining the
	Page 5		Page 7
1	MS GRANGE: In section 1.1 and appendix A to your report,	1	original construction materials and the original
2	you have outlined your background and experience	2	building form and layout when Grenfell Tower was
3	relevant to the matters in this inquiry.	3	designed and built between 1967 and 1974. I will
4	DR LANE: Yes, I have.	4	provide information on the external landscape around the
5	MS GRANGE: Now, we don't need to rehearse all of that in	5	tower at that time also.
6	detail today, but I want to pick out some key points.	6	I will then provide a detailed presentation on the
7	You are a director of Arup, which is an independent	7	fire safety requirements for high-rise residential
8	company of designers, planners, engineers, consultants	8	buildings in England.
9	and technical specialists addressing professional	9	In part 1, I will address the Building Regulations
10	services in the built environment.	10	and the requirement to provide a stay-put strategy, how
11	DR LANE: Yes, I am.	11	it is a design condition and why it is not a Fire
12	MS GRANGE: You specialise in fire safety engineering in the	12	Brigade policy. I will address how this is the single
13	built environment and you have 20 years' experience in	13	safety condition required to be provided.
14	the construction industry in England and	14	In part 2, I will explain each of the required
15	internationally.	15	active and passive fire protection measures that are
16	DR LANE: That's correct.	16	provided for the stay-put strategy.
17	MS GRANGE: You are a chartered fire safety engineer, having	17	I will then move specifically on to Grenfell Tower.
18	graduated from Trinity College Dublin.	18	I will explain the summary time-line I have derived
19	DR LANE: Yes, that's correct.	19	regarding the recorded building works to the tower since
20	MS GRANGE: You are a fellow of Arup, which is an honorary	20	1974, before explaining, in chronological order, each
21	title awarded to exceptional individuals within the	21	of: the replacement of the passenger lifts which took
22	firm.	22	place in 2005; the replacement of the majority of the
23	DR LANE: Yes, I am.	23	flat entrance fire doors in 2011; a description of the
24	MS GRANGE: Finally, you are also a fellow of the Royal	24	gas supply refurbishment works which had commenced in
25	Academy of Engineering and the Royal Society of	25	2016 and were still in progress the night of the fire.
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18 June 2018

1	Levill dans de directe dan weet of the offerman	1	that allowed access from each of the finger blocks over
1 2	I will then dedicate the rest of the afternoon session to describing in detail the works that were	2	that allowed access from each of the finger blocks over to the tower. The finger blocks extend to the south
3	undertaken on the building as part of the primary	$\begin{vmatrix} 2\\ 3 \end{vmatrix}$	side of Grenfell Tower and enclose two large green
4	refurbishment carried out between 2012 and 2016. This	4	spaces. The area to the immediate east of
5	includes a description of the work done to the interior	5	Grenfell Tower is Lancaster Green and there were
6	of the building as well as the works done to the	6	children's play areas to the immediate west. To the
7	exterior of the building.	7	north side lies Silchester Road.
8	I will provide an overview and then explain in the	8	Grenfell Tower is owned by the local authority,
9	following order the external works to the immediate	9	Kensington and Chelsea London Borough Council.
10	surroundings of Grenfell Tower: the reconfiguration of	10	Grenfell Tower was part of their provision of social
11	ground level to level 3; the reconfiguration of the	11	housing in the borough. The management of social
12	internal fire main; the refurbishment of the existing	12	housing in the borough was devolved in 1996 to the
13	smoke control system; the provision of a new heating	13	Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation.
14	system and the new hot and cold water systems, before	14	Originally, the main fire vehicle access designed
15	ending with a detailed explanation of the materials	15	for was via Grenfell Road at the south end of the tower.
16	forming the rainscreen cladding works as I have found	16	Based on the original design drawings, it also appears
17	them in my work for the inquiry.	17	that fire vehicles could also have accessed the building
18	My colleagues working with me on my factual	18	via Silchester Road at the north end of the tower if
19	investigations are Susan Deeny, Peter Woodburn,	19	that was needed.
20	Tom Parker, Alfie Chapman, Daniel Antonellis and	20	As shown in this 3D model, fire vehicles approach
21	Graeme Flint.	21	the building from Grenfell Road in the south, with
22	Dr Flint is in attendance to operate the series of	22	access to the southeast corner of the tower provided by
23	photos, illustrations and animations throughout the	23	driving under the level 2 walkway.
24	presentation which we have provided in order to help	24	In this series of photographs, this southern
25	understand the technical issues I'm focusing on today.	25	approach route is shown, which was the state before the
	Page 9		Page 11
1	The original building construction and layout	1	last refurbishment works occurred. The height between
1 2	The original building construction and layout. As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary	1 2	last refurbishment works occurred. The height between the road surface and the underside of the walkway
	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary	1 2 3	the road surface and the underside of the walkway
2		2	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres.
2 3	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building	2 3	the road surface and the underside of the walkway
2 3 4	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building with a basement level and a ground to level 23	2 3 4	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres. The presence of the walkway is important in
2 3 4 5	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building with a basement level and a ground to level 23 inclusive, plus a plant room located above level 23 at	2 3 4 5	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres. The presence of the walkway is important in retrospect because it means that, whilst it was tall
2 3 4 5 6	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building with a basement level and a ground to level 23 inclusive, plus a plant room located above level 23 at roof level. It is a residential block built in the	2 3 4 5 6	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres. The presence of the walkway is important in retrospect because it means that, whilst it was tall enough to allow fire vehicles to access underneath the
2 3 4 5 6 7	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building with a basement level and a ground to level 23 inclusive, plus a plant room located above level 23 at roof level. It is a residential block built in the early 1970s and is located in the Lancaster West Estate	2 3 4 5 6 7	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres. The presence of the walkway is important in retrospect because it means that, whilst it was tall enough to allow fire vehicles to access underneath the walkway for the purposes of internal firefighting, such
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building with a basement level and a ground to level 23 inclusive, plus a plant room located above level 23 at roof level. It is a residential block built in the early 1970s and is located in the Lancaster West Estate in the North Kensington area of London.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres. The presence of the walkway is important in retrospect because it means that, whilst it was tall enough to allow fire vehicles to access underneath the walkway for the purposes of internal firefighting, such a walkway provides an obstacle for unplanned external
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building with a basement level and a ground to level 23 inclusive, plus a plant room located above level 23 at roof level. It is a residential block built in the early 1970s and is located in the Lancaster West Estate in the North Kensington area of London. The Lancaster West Estate is located in the Royal	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres. The presence of the walkway is important in retrospect because it means that, whilst it was tall enough to allow fire vehicles to access underneath the walkway for the purposes of internal firefighting, such a walkway provides an obstacle for unplanned external firefighting, as became required during the fire.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building with a basement level and a ground to level 23 inclusive, plus a plant room located above level 23 at roof level. It is a residential block built in the early 1970s and is located in the Lancaster West Estate in the North Kensington area of London. The Lancaster West Estate is located in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. The estate was	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres. The presence of the walkway is important in retrospect because it means that, whilst it was tall enough to allow fire vehicles to access underneath the walkway for the purposes of internal firefighting, such a walkway provides an obstacle for unplanned external firefighting, as became required during the fire. High-reach appliances would need to move out from underneath the walkway to deploy their ladder or platform and to deploy their stabilisation systems.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building with a basement level and a ground to level 23 inclusive, plus a plant room located above level 23 at roof level. It is a residential block built in the early 1970s and is located in the Lancaster West Estate in the North Kensington area of London. The Lancaster West Estate is located in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. The estate was designed by Clifford Wearden & Associates in the late 1960s. Phase 1 was approved in 1970 and consisted of the tower as well as three low-rise residential blocks	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres. The presence of the walkway is important in retrospect because it means that, whilst it was tall enough to allow fire vehicles to access underneath the walkway for the purposes of internal firefighting, such a walkway provides an obstacle for unplanned external firefighting, as became required during the fire. High-reach appliances would need to move out from underneath the walkway to deploy their ladder or platform and to deploy their stabilisation systems. The areas around the east, north and west side of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building with a basement level and a ground to level 23 inclusive, plus a plant room located above level 23 at roof level. It is a residential block built in the early 1970s and is located in the Lancaster West Estate in the North Kensington area of London. The Lancaster West Estate is located in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. The estate was designed by Clifford Wearden & Associates in the late 1960s. Phase 1 was approved in 1970 and consisted of the tower as well as three low-rise residential blocks called finger blocks. These are Testerton Walk,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres. The presence of the walkway is important in retrospect because it means that, whilst it was tall enough to allow fire vehicles to access underneath the walkway for the purposes of internal firefighting, such a walkway provides an obstacle for unplanned external firefighting, as became required during the fire. High-reach appliances would need to move out from underneath the walkway to deploy their ladder or platform and to deploy their stabilisation systems. The areas around the east, north and west side of the building were quite open, with a mixture of grassy
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building with a basement level and a ground to level 23 inclusive, plus a plant room located above level 23 at roof level. It is a residential block built in the early 1970s and is located in the Lancaster West Estate in the North Kensington area of London. The Lancaster West Estate is located in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. The estate was designed by Clifford Wearden & Associates in the late 1960s. Phase 1 was approved in 1970 and consisted of the tower as well as three low-rise residential blocks called finger blocks. These are Testerton Walk, Hurstway Walk and Barandon Walk. They are three- and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres. The presence of the walkway is important in retrospect because it means that, whilst it was tall enough to allow fire vehicles to access underneath the walkway for the purposes of internal firefighting, such a walkway provides an obstacle for unplanned external firefighting, as became required during the fire. High-reach appliances would need to move out from underneath the walkway to deploy their ladder or platform and to deploy their stabilisation systems. The areas around the east, north and west side of the building were quite open, with a mixture of grassy areas and hard landscaping. It is useful to orientate
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building with a basement level and a ground to level 23 inclusive, plus a plant room located above level 23 at roof level. It is a residential block built in the early 1970s and is located in the Lancaster West Estate in the North Kensington area of London. The Lancaster West Estate is located in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. The estate was designed by Clifford Wearden & Associates in the late 1960s. Phase 1 was approved in 1970 and consisted of the tower as well as three low-rise residential blocks called finger blocks. These are Testerton Walk, Hurstway Walk and Barandon Walk. They are three- and four-storey buildings.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres. The presence of the walkway is important in retrospect because it means that, whilst it was tall enough to allow fire vehicles to access underneath the walkway for the purposes of internal firefighting, such a walkway provides an obstacle for unplanned external firefighting, as became required during the fire. High-reach appliances would need to move out from underneath the walkway to deploy their ladder or platform and to deploy their stabilisation systems. The areas around the east, north and west side of the building were quite open, with a mixture of grassy areas and hard landscaping. It is useful to orientate from the south side, where the three finger blocks are
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building with a basement level and a ground to level 23 inclusive, plus a plant room located above level 23 at roof level. It is a residential block built in the early 1970s and is located in the Lancaster West Estate in the North Kensington area of London. The Lancaster West Estate is located in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. The estate was designed by Clifford Wearden & Associates in the late 1960s. Phase 1 was approved in 1970 and consisted of the tower as well as three low-rise residential blocks called finger blocks. These are Testerton Walk, Hurstway Walk and Barandon Walk. They are three- and four-storey buildings. Construction of Grenfell Tower by contractors	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres. The presence of the walkway is important in retrospect because it means that, whilst it was tall enough to allow fire vehicles to access underneath the walkway for the purposes of internal firefighting, such a walkway provides an obstacle for unplanned external firefighting, as became required during the fire. High-reach appliances would need to move out from underneath the walkway to deploy their ladder or platform and to deploy their stabilisation systems. The areas around the east, north and west side of the building were quite open, with a mixture of grassy areas and hard landscaping. It is useful to orientate from the south side, where the three finger blocks are located.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building with a basement level and a ground to level 23 inclusive, plus a plant room located above level 23 at roof level. It is a residential block built in the early 1970s and is located in the Lancaster West Estate in the North Kensington area of London. The Lancaster West Estate is located in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. The estate was designed by Clifford Wearden & Associates in the late 1960s. Phase 1 was approved in 1970 and consisted of the tower as well as three low-rise residential blocks called finger blocks. These are Testerton Walk, Hurstway Walk and Barandon Walk. They are three- and four-storey buildings. Construction of Grenfell Tower by contractors AE Symes of Leyton, London, commenced in 1972, with the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres. The presence of the walkway is important in retrospect because it means that, whilst it was tall enough to allow fire vehicles to access underneath the walkway for the purposes of internal firefighting, such a walkway provides an obstacle for unplanned external firefighting, as became required during the fire. High-reach appliances would need to move out from underneath the walkway to deploy their ladder or platform and to deploy their stabilisation systems. The areas around the east, north and west side of the building were quite open, with a mixture of grassy areas and hard landscaping. It is useful to orientate from the south side, where the three finger blocks are located. Originally, outside and around the tower at ground
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building with a basement level and a ground to level 23 inclusive, plus a plant room located above level 23 at roof level. It is a residential block built in the early 1970s and is located in the Lancaster West Estate in the North Kensington area of London. The Lancaster West Estate is located in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. The estate was designed by Clifford Wearden & Associates in the late 1960s. Phase 1 was approved in 1970 and consisted of the tower as well as three low-rise residential blocks called finger blocks. These are Testerton Walk, Hurstway Walk and Barandon Walk. They are three- and four-storey buildings. Construction of Grenfell Tower by contractors AE Symes of Leyton, London, commenced in 1972, with the tower completed in 1974.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres. The presence of the walkway is important in retrospect because it means that, whilst it was tall enough to allow fire vehicles to access underneath the walkway for the purposes of internal firefighting, such a walkway provides an obstacle for unplanned external firefighting, as became required during the fire. High-reach appliances would need to move out from underneath the walkway to deploy their ladder or platform and to deploy their stabilisation systems. The areas around the east, north and west side of the building were quite open, with a mixture of grassy areas and hard landscaping. It is useful to orientate from the south side, where the three finger blocks are located. Originally, outside and around the tower at ground level were positioned a ballgame pitch, nursery play
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building with a basement level and a ground to level 23 inclusive, plus a plant room located above level 23 at roof level. It is a residential block built in the early 1970s and is located in the Lancaster West Estate in the North Kensington area of London. The Lancaster West Estate is located in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. The estate was designed by Clifford Wearden & Associates in the late 1960s. Phase 1 was approved in 1970 and consisted of the tower as well as three low-rise residential blocks called finger blocks. These are Testerton Walk, Hurstway Walk and Barandon Walk. They are three- and four-storey buildings. Construction of Grenfell Tower by contractors AE Symes of Leyton, London, commenced in 1972, with the tower completed in 1974. To help explain the external spaces around the	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ \end{array} $	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres. The presence of the walkway is important in retrospect because it means that, whilst it was tall enough to allow fire vehicles to access underneath the walkway for the purposes of internal firefighting, such a walkway provides an obstacle for unplanned external firefighting, as became required during the fire. High-reach appliances would need to move out from underneath the walkway to deploy their ladder or platform and to deploy their stabilisation systems. The areas around the east, north and west side of the building were quite open, with a mixture of grassy areas and hard landscaping. It is useful to orientate from the south side, where the three finger blocks are located. Originally, outside and around the tower at ground level were positioned a ballgame pitch, nursery play areas and other amenity landscaping. From online
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building with a basement level and a ground to level 23 inclusive, plus a plant room located above level 23 at roof level. It is a residential block built in the early 1970s and is located in the Lancaster West Estate in the North Kensington area of London. The Lancaster West Estate is located in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. The estate was designed by Clifford Wearden & Associates in the late 1960s. Phase 1 was approved in 1970 and consisted of the tower as well as three low-rise residential blocks called finger blocks. These are Testerton Walk, Hurstway Walk and Barandon Walk. They are three- and four-storey buildings. Construction of Grenfell Tower by contractors AE Symes of Leyton, London, commenced in 1972, with the tower completed in 1974. To help explain the external spaces around the outside of Grenfell Tower, I have drawn on some	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres. The presence of the walkway is important in retrospect because it means that, whilst it was tall enough to allow fire vehicles to access underneath the walkway for the purposes of internal firefighting, such a walkway provides an obstacle for unplanned external firefighting, as became required during the fire. High-reach appliances would need to move out from underneath the walkway to deploy their ladder or platform and to deploy their stabilisation systems. The areas around the east, north and west side of the building were quite open, with a mixture of grassy areas and hard landscaping. It is useful to orientate from the south side, where the three finger blocks are located. Originally, outside and around the tower at ground level were positioned a ballgame pitch, nursery play areas and other amenity landscaping. From online mapping services, it is apparent that the amenity
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building with a basement level and a ground to level 23 inclusive, plus a plant room located above level 23 at roof level. It is a residential block built in the early 1970s and is located in the Lancaster West Estate in the North Kensington area of London. The Lancaster West Estate is located in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. The estate was designed by Clifford Wearden & Associates in the late 1960s. Phase 1 was approved in 1970 and consisted of the tower as well as three low-rise residential blocks called finger blocks. These are Testerton Walk, Hurstway Walk and Barandon Walk. They are three- and four-storey buildings. Construction of Grenfell Tower by contractors AE Symes of Leyton, London, commenced in 1972, with the tower completed in 1974. To help explain the external spaces around the outside of Grenfell Tower, I have drawn on some additional information not currently in my report, using	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\end{array} $	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres. The presence of the walkway is important in retrospect because it means that, whilst it was tall enough to allow fire vehicles to access underneath the walkway for the purposes of internal firefighting, such a walkway provides an obstacle for unplanned external firefighting, as became required during the fire. High-reach appliances would need to move out from underneath the walkway to deploy their ladder or platform and to deploy their stabilisation systems. The areas around the east, north and west side of the building were quite open, with a mixture of grassy areas and hard landscaping. It is useful to orientate from the south side, where the three finger blocks are located. Originally, outside and around the tower at ground level were positioned a ballgame pitch, nursery play areas and other amenity landscaping. From online mapping services, it is apparent that the amenity landscaping around the base of the tower was largely
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building with a basement level and a ground to level 23 inclusive, plus a plant room located above level 23 at roof level. It is a residential block built in the early 1970s and is located in the Lancaster West Estate in the North Kensington area of London. The Lancaster West Estate is located in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. The estate was designed by Clifford Wearden & Associates in the late 1960s. Phase 1 was approved in 1970 and consisted of the tower as well as three low-rise residential blocks called finger blocks. These are Testerton Walk, Hurstway Walk and Barandon Walk. They are three- and four-storey buildings. Construction of Grenfell Tower by contractors AE Symes of Leyton, London, commenced in 1972, with the tower completed in 1974. To help explain the external spaces around the outside of Grenfell Tower, I have drawn on some additional information not currently in my report, using online mapping services and commercially available	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres. The presence of the walkway is important in retrospect because it means that, whilst it was tall enough to allow fire vehicles to access underneath the walkway for the purposes of internal firefighting, such a walkway provides an obstacle for unplanned external firefighting, as became required during the fire. High-reach appliances would need to move out from underneath the walkway to deploy their ladder or platform and to deploy their stabilisation systems. The areas around the east, north and west side of the building were quite open, with a mixture of grassy areas and hard landscaping. It is useful to orientate from the south side, where the three finger blocks are located. Originally, outside and around the tower at ground level were positioned a ballgame pitch, nursery play areas and other amenity landscaping. From online mapping services, it is apparent that the amenity landscaping around the base of the tower was largely retained until around 2012.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building with a basement level and a ground to level 23 inclusive, plus a plant room located above level 23 at roof level. It is a residential block built in the early 1970s and is located in the Lancaster West Estate in the North Kensington area of London. The Lancaster West Estate is located in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. The estate was designed by Clifford Wearden & Associates in the late 1960s. Phase 1 was approved in 1970 and consisted of the tower as well as three low-rise residential blocks called finger blocks. These are Testerton Walk, Hurstway Walk and Barandon Walk. They are three- and four-storey buildings. Construction of Grenfell Tower by contractors AE Symes of Leyton, London, commenced in 1972, with the tower completed in 1974. To help explain the external spaces around the outside of Grenfell Tower, I have drawn on some additional information not currently in my report, using online mapping services and commercially available context models of the surrounding area.	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres. The presence of the walkway is important in retrospect because it means that, whilst it was tall enough to allow fire vehicles to access underneath the walkway for the purposes of internal firefighting, such a walkway provides an obstacle for unplanned external firefighting, as became required during the fire. High-reach appliances would need to move out from underneath the walkway to deploy their ladder or platform and to deploy their stabilisation systems. The areas around the east, north and west side of the building were quite open, with a mixture of grassy areas and hard landscaping. It is useful to orientate from the south side, where the three finger blocks are located. Originally, outside and around the tower at ground level were positioned a ballgame pitch, nursery play areas and other amenity landscaping. From online mapping services, it is apparent that the amenity landscaping around the base of the tower was largely retained until around 2012. In this image, all the areas around the building
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	As I've explained in section 3 of my preliminary Phase 1 report, Grenfell Tower is a 25-storey building with a basement level and a ground to level 23 inclusive, plus a plant room located above level 23 at roof level. It is a residential block built in the early 1970s and is located in the Lancaster West Estate in the North Kensington area of London. The Lancaster West Estate is located in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. The estate was designed by Clifford Wearden & Associates in the late 1960s. Phase 1 was approved in 1970 and consisted of the tower as well as three low-rise residential blocks called finger blocks. These are Testerton Walk, Hurstway Walk and Barandon Walk. They are three- and four-storey buildings. Construction of Grenfell Tower by contractors AE Symes of Leyton, London, commenced in 1972, with the tower completed in 1974. To help explain the external spaces around the outside of Grenfell Tower, I have drawn on some additional information not currently in my report, using online mapping services and commercially available	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	the road surface and the underside of the walkway structure is approximately 4.8 metres. The presence of the walkway is important in retrospect because it means that, whilst it was tall enough to allow fire vehicles to access underneath the walkway for the purposes of internal firefighting, such a walkway provides an obstacle for unplanned external firefighting, as became required during the fire. High-reach appliances would need to move out from underneath the walkway to deploy their ladder or platform and to deploy their stabilisation systems. The areas around the east, north and west side of the building were quite open, with a mixture of grassy areas and hard landscaping. It is useful to orientate from the south side, where the three finger blocks are located. Originally, outside and around the tower at ground level were positioned a ballgame pitch, nursery play areas and other amenity landscaping. From online mapping services, it is apparent that the amenity landscaping around the base of the tower was largely retained until around 2012.

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r		1	
1	red. In its original form, therefore, fire vehicles	1	the floor is provided by the concrete cross walls
2	could have moved around the base of the tower as	2	between the flats.
3	follows: three-quarters of the south side; full access	3	To add further detail to the description I've
4	to the east and north side; half of the west side.	4	currently included in my report, the floor slabs were
5	Pedestrians and, therefore, firefighters could	5	20 centimetres thick. The walls enclosing the protected
6	additionally reach all parts of the outside of the	6	lobbies, stairs and lift shafts on every level are
7	building originally at ground level as I have marked	7	collectively referred to as the core walls. The
8	here.	8	thickness of the core walls vary between 20 and
9	Originally, there were three main pedestrian entry	9	30 centimetres.
10	routes into Grenfell Tower. At ground level,	10	The perimeter beams are approximately 25 centimetres
11	firefighters could access the lifts within the central	11	thick. The perimeter columns are approximately
12	core there. Alternatively, they could climb one of the	12	70 centimetres square. This does not include the
13	three open stairs external to the tower up to the	13	precast ridge facing that was used as sacrificial form
14	walkway at level 2. At this level 2, access was also	14	work. This ridged facing, as visible today on the
15	possible into the central core, to the protected	15	tower, was permanently connected to the columns through
16	internal stair and the original lifts. Therefore,	16	the provision of metal wires embedded in the concrete.
17	firefighters would've been able to access the inside of	17	The structural walls between flats were 20 centimetres
18	the tower by the walkway. However, fire vehicle access	18	thick.
19	was only provided at ground level.	19	The original external wall of Grenfell Tower
20	Grenfell Tower is 67.3 metres tall. Originally, it	20	consisted of exposed concrete surfaces and glazing. The
20	contained 120 one- and two-bedroom flats. There were	21	perimeter beams were solid concrete. The opening
22	six dwellings per floor on 20 of the 24 storeys, with	22	between each perimeter beam was filled with a
23	the other four storeys being used for non-residential	23	combination of sliding windows held in aluminium frames
24	purposes. It was originally intended to house up to 600	24	and non-structural, non-combustible infill panels. The
25	people. Levels ground, 1 and 3 were more flexible open	25	specific material of the infill panels is currently
	people. Leves ground, i and o were more nemore open		······
	Page 13		Page 15
1	spaces which were created for uses such as a nursery.	1	unknown, but I understand it to consist of
	spaces which were created for uses such as a nursery, offices and a community health centre. Level 2 was left		unknown, but I understand it to consist of asbestos-bearing cementitious material.
1 2 3	offices and a community health centre. Level 2 was left	1 2 3	asbestos-bearing cementitious material.
2	offices and a community health centre. Level 2 was left entirely open as a continuation of the walkway	2	asbestos-bearing cementitious material. As you can see in this photograph and highlighted by
2 3	offices and a community health centre. Level 2 was left	2 3	asbestos-bearing cementitious material. As you can see in this photograph and highlighted by the yellow dotted line, the windows fully filled the
2 3 4	offices and a community health centre. Level 2 was left entirely open as a continuation of the walkway connecting to the adjacent blocks of the Lancaster West Estate.	2 3 4	asbestos-bearing cementitious material. As you can see in this photograph and highlighted by
2 3 4 5	offices and a community health centre. Level 2 was left entirely open as a continuation of the walkway connecting to the adjacent blocks of the Lancaster West Estate. Each storey in Grenfell Tower is 2.6 metres high,	2 3 4 5	asbestos-bearing cementitious material. As you can see in this photograph and highlighted by the yellow dotted line, the windows fully filled the space vertically between the top of one perimeter beam and the underside of the next beam.
2 3 4 5 6	offices and a community health centre. Level 2 was left entirely open as a continuation of the walkway connecting to the adjacent blocks of the Lancaster West Estate. Each storey in Grenfell Tower is 2.6 metres high, except for level 2, which is 4.3 metres high, and	2 3 4 5 6	asbestos-bearing cementitious material. As you can see in this photograph and highlighted by the yellow dotted line, the windows fully filled the space vertically between the top of one perimeter beam and the underside of the next beam. Horizontally, the metal window frames were fixed
2 3 4 5 6 7	offices and a community health centre. Level 2 was left entirely open as a continuation of the walkway connecting to the adjacent blocks of the Lancaster West Estate. Each storey in Grenfell Tower is 2.6 metres high, except for level 2, which is 4.3 metres high, and level 3, which has a height of 3.9 metres.	2 3 4 5 6 7	asbestos-bearing cementitious material. As you can see in this photograph and highlighted by the yellow dotted line, the windows fully filled the space vertically between the top of one perimeter beam and the underside of the next beam. Horizontally, the metal window frames were fixed directly to the concrete structure on three sides and to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	offices and a community health centre. Level 2 was left entirely open as a continuation of the walkway connecting to the adjacent blocks of the Lancaster West Estate. Each storey in Grenfell Tower is 2.6 metres high, except for level 2, which is 4.3 metres high, and level 3, which has a height of 3.9 metres. Grenfell Tower has a plan floor area of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	asbestos-bearing cementitious material. As you can see in this photograph and highlighted by the yellow dotted line, the windows fully filled the space vertically between the top of one perimeter beam and the underside of the next beam. Horizontally, the metal window frames were fixed directly to the concrete structure on three sides and to the infill panel on the fourth side. The external wall
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	offices and a community health centre. Level 2 was left entirely open as a continuation of the walkway connecting to the adjacent blocks of the Lancaster West Estate. Each storey in Grenfell Tower is 2.6 metres high, except for level 2, which is 4.3 metres high, and level 3, which has a height of 3.9 metres. Grenfell Tower has a plan floor area of approximately 22 by 22 metres. It has a single central	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	asbestos-bearing cementitious material. As you can see in this photograph and highlighted by the yellow dotted line, the windows fully filled the space vertically between the top of one perimeter beam and the underside of the next beam. Horizontally, the metal window frames were fixed directly to the concrete structure on three sides and to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	offices and a community health centre. Level 2 was left entirely open as a continuation of the walkway connecting to the adjacent blocks of the Lancaster West Estate. Each storey in Grenfell Tower is 2.6 metres high, except for level 2, which is 4.3 metres high, and level 3, which has a height of 3.9 metres. Grenfell Tower has a plan floor area of approximately 22 by 22 metres. It has a single central reinforced concrete core, reinforced concrete floors and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	asbestos-bearing cementitious material. As you can see in this photograph and highlighted by the yellow dotted line, the windows fully filled the space vertically between the top of one perimeter beam and the underside of the next beam. Horizontally, the metal window frames were fixed directly to the concrete structure on three sides and to the infill panel on the fourth side. The external wall of the building was, therefore, entirely non-combustible.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	offices and a community health centre. Level 2 was left entirely open as a continuation of the walkway connecting to the adjacent blocks of the Lancaster West Estate. Each storey in Grenfell Tower is 2.6 metres high, except for level 2, which is 4.3 metres high, and level 3, which has a height of 3.9 metres. Grenfell Tower has a plan floor area of approximately 22 by 22 metres. It has a single central reinforced concrete core, reinforced concrete floors and with perimeter reinforced concrete columns. Reinforced	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	asbestos-bearing cementitious material. As you can see in this photograph and highlighted by the yellow dotted line, the windows fully filled the space vertically between the top of one perimeter beam and the underside of the next beam. Horizontally, the metal window frames were fixed directly to the concrete structure on three sides and to the infill panel on the fourth side. The external wall of the building was, therefore, entirely non-combustible. The external wall was a single system. This meant
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	offices and a community health centre. Level 2 was left entirely open as a continuation of the walkway connecting to the adjacent blocks of the Lancaster West Estate. Each storey in Grenfell Tower is 2.6 metres high, except for level 2, which is 4.3 metres high, and level 3, which has a height of 3.9 metres. Grenfell Tower has a plan floor area of approximately 22 by 22 metres. It has a single central reinforced concrete core, reinforced concrete floors and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	asbestos-bearing cementitious material. As you can see in this photograph and highlighted by the yellow dotted line, the windows fully filled the space vertically between the top of one perimeter beam and the underside of the next beam. Horizontally, the metal window frames were fixed directly to the concrete structure on three sides and to the infill panel on the fourth side. The external wall of the building was, therefore, entirely non-combustible.
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$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\end{array} $	offices and a community health centre. Level 2 was left entirely open as a continuation of the walkway connecting to the adjacent blocks of the Lancaster West Estate. Each storey in Grenfell Tower is 2.6 metres high, except for level 2, which is 4.3 metres high, and level 3, which has a height of 3.9 metres. Grenfell Tower has a plan floor area of approximately 22 by 22 metres. It has a single central reinforced concrete core, reinforced concrete floors and with perimeter reinforced concrete columns. Reinforced concrete cross walls were provided to separate each flat at level 4 to level 23 inclusive. These walls did not extend to the basement level, nor did these walls exist at ground to level 3. The structural stability mechanism for Grenfell Tower is that of a conventional concrete building, with a lateral stability core in the middle of the building and concrete columns around the perimeter	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ \end{array} $	asbestos-bearing cementitious material. As you can see in this photograph and highlighted by the yellow dotted line, the windows fully filled the space vertically between the top of one perimeter beam and the underside of the next beam. Horizontally, the metal window frames were fixed directly to the concrete structure on three sides and to the infill panel on the fourth side. The external wall of the building was, therefore, entirely non-combustible. The external wall was a single system. This meant there was no void or space concealed within that external wall. From here, I will refer to such spaces, concealed spaces, as cavities. Cavities are spaces enclosed by elements of a building or contained within an element of the building. I will be presenting more information on the issue of cavities and building construction later in my presentation.
$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\end{array} $	offices and a community health centre. Level 2 was left entirely open as a continuation of the walkway connecting to the adjacent blocks of the Lancaster West Estate. Each storey in Grenfell Tower is 2.6 metres high, except for level 2, which is 4.3 metres high, and level 3, which has a height of 3.9 metres. Grenfell Tower has a plan floor area of approximately 22 by 22 metres. It has a single central reinforced concrete core, reinforced concrete floors and with perimeter reinforced concrete columns. Reinforced concrete cross walls were provided to separate each flat at level 4 to level 23 inclusive. These walls did not extend to the basement level, nor did these walls exist at ground to level 3. The structural stability mechanism for Grenfell Tower is that of a conventional concrete building, with a lateral stability core in the middle of the building and concrete columns around the perimeter supporting gravity loads. The floor is a flat	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\end{array} $	<ul> <li>asbestos-bearing cementitious material.</li> <li>As you can see in this photograph and highlighted by the yellow dotted line, the windows fully filled the space vertically between the top of one perimeter beam and the underside of the next beam.</li> <li>Horizontally, the metal window frames were fixed directly to the concrete structure on three sides and to the infill panel on the fourth side. The external wall of the building was, therefore, entirely non-combustible.</li> <li>The external wall was a single system. This meant there was no void or space concealed within that external wall.</li> <li>From here, I will refer to such spaces, concealed spaces, as cavities. Cavities are spaces enclosed by elements of a building or contained within an element of the building. I will be presenting more information on the issue of cavities and building to describe the</li> </ul>
$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\end{array} $	offices and a community health centre. Level 2 was left entirely open as a continuation of the walkway connecting to the adjacent blocks of the Lancaster West Estate. Each storey in Grenfell Tower is 2.6 metres high, except for level 2, which is 4.3 metres high, and level 3, which has a height of 3.9 metres. Grenfell Tower has a plan floor area of approximately 22 by 22 metres. It has a single central reinforced concrete core, reinforced concrete floors and with perimeter reinforced concrete columns. Reinforced concrete cross walls were provided to separate each flat at level 4 to level 23 inclusive. These walls did not extend to the basement level, nor did these walls exist at ground to level 3. The structural stability mechanism for Grenfell Tower is that of a conventional concrete building, with a lateral stability core in the middle of the building and concrete columns around the perimeter supporting gravity loads. The floor is a flat reinforced concrete slab transferring load directly to	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\end{array} $	asbestos-bearing cementitious material. As you can see in this photograph and highlighted by the yellow dotted line, the windows fully filled the space vertically between the top of one perimeter beam and the underside of the next beam. Horizontally, the metal window frames were fixed directly to the concrete structure on three sides and to the infill panel on the fourth side. The external wall of the building was, therefore, entirely non-combustible. The external wall was a single system. This meant there was no void or space concealed within that external wall. From here, I will refer to such spaces, concealed spaces, as cavities. Cavities are spaces enclosed by elements of a building or contained within an element of the building. I will be presenting more information on the issue of cavities and building construction later in my presentation. I now move inside the building to describe the original construction of the window and the external
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	offices and a community health centre. Level 2 was left entirely open as a continuation of the walkway connecting to the adjacent blocks of the Lancaster West Estate. Each storey in Grenfell Tower is 2.6 metres high, except for level 2, which is 4.3 metres high, and level 3, which has a height of 3.9 metres. Grenfell Tower has a plan floor area of approximately 22 by 22 metres. It has a single central reinforced concrete core, reinforced concrete floors and with perimeter reinforced concrete columns. Reinforced concrete cross walls were provided to separate each flat at level 4 to level 23 inclusive. These walls did not extend to the basement level, nor did these walls exist at ground to level 3. The structural stability mechanism for Grenfell Tower is that of a conventional concrete building, with a lateral stability core in the middle of the building and concrete columns around the perimeter supporting gravity loads. The floor is a flat reinforced concrete slab transferring load directly to the core. At the perimeter of the building, loads are	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\end{array} $	<ul> <li>asbestos-bearing cementitious material.</li> <li>As you can see in this photograph and highlighted by the yellow dotted line, the windows fully filled the space vertically between the top of one perimeter beam and the underside of the next beam.</li> <li>Horizontally, the metal window frames were fixed directly to the concrete structure on three sides and to the infill panel on the fourth side. The external wall of the building was, therefore, entirely non-combustible.</li> <li>The external wall was a single system. This meant there was no void or space concealed within that external wall.</li> <li>From here, I will refer to such spaces, concealed spaces, as cavities. Cavities are spaces enclosed by elements of a building or contained within an element of the building. I will be presenting more information on the issue of cavities and building to describe the original construction of the window and the external wall internally.</li> </ul>
$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	offices and a community health centre. Level 2 was left entirely open as a continuation of the walkway connecting to the adjacent blocks of the Lancaster West Estate. Each storey in Grenfell Tower is 2.6 metres high, except for level 2, which is 4.3 metres high, and level 3, which has a height of 3.9 metres. Grenfell Tower has a plan floor area of approximately 22 by 22 metres. It has a single central reinforced concrete core, reinforced concrete floors and with perimeter reinforced concrete columns. Reinforced concrete cross walls were provided to separate each flat at level 4 to level 23 inclusive. These walls did not extend to the basement level, nor did these walls exist at ground to level 3. The structural stability mechanism for Grenfell Tower is that of a conventional concrete building, with a lateral stability core in the middle of the building and concrete columns around the perimeter supporting gravity loads. The floor is a flat reinforced concrete slab transferring load directly to the core. At the perimeter of the building, loads are transferred into the columns directly by the floor and	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	asbestos-bearing cementitious material. As you can see in this photograph and highlighted by the yellow dotted line, the windows fully filled the space vertically between the top of one perimeter beam and the underside of the next beam. Horizontally, the metal window frames were fixed directly to the concrete structure on three sides and to the infill panel on the fourth side. The external wall of the building was, therefore, entirely non-combustible. The external wall was a single system. This meant there was no void or space concealed within that external wall. From here, I will refer to such spaces, concealed spaces, as cavities. Cavities are spaces enclosed by elements of a building or contained within an element of the building. I will be presenting more information on the issue of cavities and building construction later in my presentation. I now move inside the building to describe the original construction of the window and the external wall internally. Here is a photograph of the inside of a two-bedroom

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1 This is taken from section 8.4 of my report. The 1 The basement has been used since 1974 as a plant 2 photograph shows the original form of the interior 2 space for the various electrical, gas, water and heating 3 window finishes and the windows themselves. The windows 3 systems in the building, with multiple services shafts 4 were originally side sliding metal framed windows in 4 rising up from the basement through every storey in the 5 a wooden frame fixing system. As I have already noted, 5 tower. 6 these windows and the adjacent infill panels fully Level 24 is roof level. This level had a fully 6 7 filled the space between each perimeter beam from floor 7 enclosed plant space in the central portion of the 8 to floor. 8 storey, with an open walkway around the perimeter of the 9 The window cills, the window jambs on both sides and 9 roof. A ladder was also provided to the roof of this 10 the head of the window appear to be lined in timber. 10 main plant enclosure. There, at the roof of the plant 11 The original infill panel also appears to have been 11 enclosure, was located: the outlets from the flues from 12 faced with timber on the room side. 12 the basement gas boilers; the outlets from the smoke 13 Below the windows, a plasterboard covered with 13 control system; the outlets from the lift motor room and 14 a polymeric insulation, a product called purlboard, was 14 lift shaft ventilation systems; the permanently open 15 applied directly to the concrete perimeter beams. This 15 vent provided at the top of the stairs; the output vents layer of purlboard was also applied to the concrete 16 16 to the waste pipe stacks serving each of the flats on 17 ceiling in a small area close to the external wall, but 17 each of the floors. 18 ran along the full perimeter of every room in every flat 18 This ends my explanation of Grenfell Tower and its 19 at ceiling level. 19 surrounding area as it was designed and constructed 20 Therefore, in terms of combustible material, the 20 between 1967 and 1974. 21 original design contained the internal timber surrounds 21 I will now set out the fire safety requirements for 22 and timber lining of the infill panel, as well as the 22 high-rise residential buildings in England and, in doing 23 purlboard above and below the window on the room side. 23 so, address specifically the design requirement to 24 This combustible material did not extend to the outside 24 provide a stay-put strategy. I will explain how it is 25 of the building. 25 designed and how it is intended to operate. Page 17 Page 19 1 After a short break in the second part of this 1 Levels ground, 1 and 3 contained a nursery at ground 2 floor, community use rooms at level 1 and a health 2 presentation, I will then explain each of the active and 3 3 passive fire protection measures required to create the centre at level 3. 4 4 The layout of levels 4 to 23 were the same on every safety condition, the stay-put strategy. 5 storey. There were six flats on each of these storeys. 5 Building fire safety is dealt with through the 6 6 The flats in each corner were two-bedroom flats, and the requirements of the Building Regulations. The Building 7 7 Regulations state that the requirements shall not retaining two, one on each side of the core, were 8 8 one-bedroom flats. Reinforced concrete cross walls and require anything to be done except for the purpose of 9 9 floors separated each flat on level 4 to level 23. securing reasonable standards of health and safety for 10 Therefore, each flat was enclosed in fire-resisting 10 persons in or about buildings and any others who may be 11 construction. This is known as compartmentation and 11 affected by buildings or matters connected with 12 12 I will further describe this concept later on. buildings. 13 13 The Building Regulations contains a series of Within the central core was a common lobby that 14 14 requirements; they are all listed on this slide. provided access to each of the flats. This lobby also 15 provided access to the residential lifts and the only 15 Fire safety requirements are dealt with in part B of 16 16 the Building Regulations: Part B -- fire safety. means of escape, the single escape stairs. This lobby 17 17 was a separate compartment to the flats and enclosed The Building Regulations make clear that 18 18 Approved Document B, fire safety, is approved by the within its own fire-resisting concrete walls. 19 The original smoke control system used automatic 19 Secretary of State for the purposes of the 2000 20 vents on the north wall of the lobby to exhaust smoke 20 regulations. Approved Document B is therefore what 21 21 I refer to as the statutory guidance document in my into smoke exhaust shafts on the north side, with fresh 22 air being supplied from fresh air shafts through 22 report and in this presentation. 23 23 automatic vents on the south wall of the lobby. These Fire safety requirements are considered by means of 24 five specific requirements. I've reproduced each one on

smoke and fresh air fans were provided for firefightersto operate if required.

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each of the next five slides.

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B1 deals with means of warning and escape. The 1 1 to design and construction stages only. 2 2 building shall be designed and constructed so that there There is a further requirement for any building to 3 3 which the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order will are appropriate provisions for the early warning of 4 fire, and appropriate means of escape in case of fire 4 apply once that building is occupied; that is 5 from the building to a place of safety outside the 5 a requirement to make a full plan submission. This building capable of being safely and effectively used at 6 6 means providing a description of the proposed building 7 7 all material times. work and any other plans necessary to show that the work 8 8 Requirement B2 deals with the requirements to would comply with regulations. 9 inhibit internal fire spread as it relates to the 9 The final requirement is the requirement of the 10 internal linings of a building. 10 local authority to provide a completion certificate for 11 Requirement B3 deals with further requirements for 11 buildings to which the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) 12 internal fire spread as relates to the structural 12 Order will apply. 13 stability of the building, subdividing a building with 13 I note the requirement for a local authority to 14 fire-resisting construction and preventing the unseen 14 ascertain, after taking all reasonable steps, that the 15 spread of fire and smoke within concealed spaces. 15 relevant requirements specified in the certificate have 16 16 Requirement B4 makes requirements regarding external been satisfied. The relevant requirements mean the 17 17 fire spread and, specifically, that the external walls requirements of regulation 38 regarding the required 18 of the building shall adequately resist the spread of 18 fire safety information being provided to the 19 fire over the wall and from one building to another, 19 responsible person and the five requirements of part B. 20 having regard to the height, use and position of the 20 I note also that the Building Regulations currently 21 building. It makes requirements for the fire 21 state that such a certificate is not conclusive evidence 22 22 performance of the roof of the building. that the requirements specified have been complied with. 23 Requirement B5, the fifth and last of these building 23 These are the requirements under the Building 24 requirements, deals with the requirements for access and 24 Regulations. 25 25 facilities for the fire services. Specifically, it I would like now to draw your attention to Page 21 Page 23 requires that the building shall be designed and 1 1 Approved Document B for fire safety, which is approved, 2 constructed so as to provide reasonable facilities to 2 as I said, by the Secretary of State for the purposes of 3 3 assist firefighters in the protection of life. Further, what's called practical guidance with respect to the 4 4 it requires that reasonable provision shall be made requirements contained in the Building Regulations. 5 5 Therefore, Approved Document B communicates practical within the site of the building to enable fire 6 appliances to gain access to the building. 6 guidance for the five fire safety requirements, B1 to B5 7 7 There are three other general requirements, but inclusive. 8 specifically relating to fire safety. 8 I note it acknowledges that there may well be 9 9 The first of these three is the requirement to alternative ways of achieving compliance with the 10 provide fire safety information, regulation 38. This 10 requirements. I have no evidence that such 11 requires the person carrying out the building work to 11 an alternative approach was considered in matters 12 give fire safety information to the responsible person 12 relating to Grenfell Tower and will therefore not 13 for that building no later than the date of completion 13 mention the concept of an alternative approach again. 14 14 of the work and as reproduced on this slide. The I will refer to this statutory guidance document, 15 responsible person is the person who owns or controls 15 Approved Document B. 16 Just as the Building Regulations directly connect 16 the building. 17 The required fire safety information to be provided 17 design and construction-related duties to the Regulatory 18 is defined in the Building Regulations as information 18 Reform (Fire Safety) Order, so too does the approved 19 relating to the design and construction of the building 19 document make that clear. 20 which will assist the responsible person operate and 20 Approved Document B states, for blocks of flats, the 21 21 maintain the building with reasonable safety. This is Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order applies to the 22 for any building where the Regulatory Reform (Fire 22 common parts of blocks of flats only. It advises it 23 23 Safety) Order applies. This is the legislation that would be useful for designers to carry out a preliminary 24 provides for fire safety duties when buildings are 24 fire risk assessment of the building as part of the 25 25 completed and occupied. The Building Regulations relate design process, and how this fire risk assessment can Page 22 Page 24

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1	then be used in the Building Regulations submission and	1	remains cited in the Building Regulations. It is now
2	can be used to assist the fire safety enforcing	2	superseded by British Standard 9991 called, "Fire safety
3	authority in providing advice on any additional	3	in the design, management and use of residential
4	provisions that may be necessary in the occupied	4	buildings".
5	building.	5	BS 9991 does refer to the stay-put strategy and in
6	However, for high-rise residential buildings the	6	four specific locations.
7	Housing Act 2005 also applies and exists in parallel	7	First, regarding escape, which is almost identical
8	with the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order.	8	to the text used in Approved Document B. It goes
9	Section 3 of the Housing Act requires local housing	9	further and refers to occasions where operational
10	authorities to keep housing conditions in their area	10	conditions are such that the fire and rescue service
11	under review and to investigate and take action against	11	decide to evacuate the building. This is the only
12	hazards that may be present. Fire is explicitly	12	reference in the standard and no specific provisions are
13	referenced as a relevant hazard in section 10 of the	13	made in order to enable the communication of this change
14	Act.	14	or the management of this change with regard to the
15	Where fire hazards are identified in the common	15	provision of active and passive fire protection measures
16	parts of flats, the Act requires the local housing	16	within the building.
17	authority to consult the local fire authority, where	17	Secondly, BS 9991 refers to the need for additional
18	possible, before taking action.	18	protection to the staircase by the provision of smoke
19	It is important to note that the Housing Act 2004	19	control because of the stay-put strategy.
20	states the common parts of a building include the	20	Thirdly, regarding an increase in fire resistance
21	structure and the exterior of the building.	21	periods for structure for the occupants of other
22	Before I explain the stay-put strategy, it's	22	dwellings remaining in place.
23	important to note that the term "stay put" is not used	23	Finally, it specifically references the stay-put
24	anywhere in Approved Document B. It states:	24	strategy regarding the fire performance of the external
25	"a. the fire is generally in a flat;	25	face of the building. It says flame spread over or
23	a. ale nie is generally in a naa,		
	Page 25		Page 27
1	"b. there is no reliance on external rescue	1	within an external wall construction should be
2	"c. measures in section 8 provide a high degree	2	controlled to avoid creating a route for rapid fire
3	of compartmentation and therefore a low probability of	3	spread by bypassing compartment floors of walls. This
4	fire spread beyond the flat of origin, so that	4	is particularly important, it says, where a stay-put
5	simultaneous evacuation of the building is unlikely to	5	strategy is in place.
6	be necessary; and	6	I would like to conclude with a reminder from the
7	"d. although fires may occur in the common parts of	7	very first British Standard code of practice for flats,
8	the building, the materials and construction used there	8	referred to as CP3, where in 1962 it provided the first
9	should prevent the fabric from being involved beyond the	9	explanation of the stay-put strategy, where occupants,
10	immediate vicinity"	10	if they choose, remain safely on their own floor and
11	It further states these provisions assume that, in	11	occupants on the floor on which the fire occurs, and in
12	the design of the building, reliance should not be	12	some circumstances those floors in the immediate
13	placed on external rescue by the fire and rescue	13	vicinity of the fire, should be free to reach safety in
14	service, nor should it be based on an assumption that	14	another part of the building via the staircase. Since
15	the fire and rescue service will attend an incident	15	that time, a total building evacuation has not been
16	within a given time.	16	provided for when designing the active and passive fire
17	This approved document has been prepared on the	17	protection measures.
18	basis that, in an emergency, the occupants of any part	18	I have set out each of the statutory guidance
19	of a building should be able to escape safely without	19	document, Approved Document B, and the British Standards
20	any external assistance.	20	since 1962 because they all provide the same requirement
21	Approved Document B refers for means of escape from	21	for active and passive fire protection measures in
22	flats to a British Standard, British Standard 5588	22	high-rise residential buildings.
23	part 1, which is called "Fire precautions in the design,	23	I note that whilst stay put is directly referenced
24	construction and use of buildings: code of practice for	24	in the British Standards, no such mention of it nor what
25	residential buildings". This is no longer current but	25	it relies upon is provided in Approved Document B.
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1	I will refer to those published guidance documents	1	This is in order to explain how the design of the active
2	at times throughout my presentation today. These	2	and passive fire protection measures, which includes the
3	published guidance documents are all matters of Building	3	external wall fire response, provides the safety
4	Regulations; they are not matters of Fire Brigade	4	condition required, which is for the building residents
5	policy.	5	and for the firefighters. The content of this section
6	The stay-put strategy.	6	of my presentation is drawn from section 3.2, 3.3, 3.4
7	During a single flat fire, the occupants of that	7	and section 18 of my report.
8	flat evacuate and all other occupants are safe if they	8	In the event of a fire in a flat, a fire detection
9	remain where they are. The concept of being safe to	9	and alarm system should be present in the flat and raise
10	remain where they are during a fire is the stay-put	10	the alarm for occupants in that flat only. No alarm
11	strategy.	11	will sound anywhere else in the building. The Fire
12	It is the single safety condition provided for	12	Brigade will not be alerted automatically.
13	through the statutory guidance document,	13	Once alerted to the fire, the occupants should leave
14	Approved Document B, and all versions of the British	14	the flat with the door shut behind them. To support
15	Standards for flats to date.	15	this first stage of evacuation from the flat itself,
16	It is a single safety condition, but with multiple	16	a protected entrance hall is required within the flat.
17	layers of protection provided. These layers of	17	In a single stair building, the person from within
18	protection, or safety layers, are provided through the	18	the flat on fire must first escape through the common
19	required active and passive fire protection	19	lobby over to the stair entrance.
20	measures: the building construction, including its	20	A range of fire protection measures are provided to
21	external walls, the internal compartmentation in the	21	protect the occupants when travelling through the
22	building and the structural stability system of the	22	lobby: fire-resisting walls around the flat of fire
23	building, or the active fire protection measures, such	23	origin; fire-resisting walls around the protected lobby
24	as smoke control to the staircase. One of the other	24	and around the protected stairs; fire doors in the
25	layers of safety is something I have chosen to refer to	25	relevant fire-resisting walls; a smoke control system
	Page 29		Page 31
1	in my Phase 1 report as "defend in place" firefighting.	1	extracting heat and smoke from the protected lobby,
2	Since 1962, CP3 states the guiding principle in the	2	designed to prevent smoke from being able to penetrate
3	recommendations which follow is safety of life. In	3	into the stairs, but providing some local protection in
4	securing this, means of escape, construction and	4	the lobby too; controls on materials in the common lobby
5	firefighting all play a part.	5	to prevent rapid fire spread through this part of the
6	Section 701 goes on to state that in high blocks of	6	escape route in the event fire breaks out of the flat
7	flats it is essential that provision should be made to	7	compartment.
8	assist the fire service in applying water to a fire as	8	People in adjoining dwellings on the same floor do
9	early as possible. The need to apply water early in	9	not automatically evacuate. They have received no alarm
10	a fire and the need for the fire being extinguished	10	or signal to evacuate. The design is focused,
11	early are required of the Fire Brigade. This form of	11	therefore, on containing a fire within the flat of fire
12	firefighting is provided for by means of the active and	12	origin, creating a single flat fire event. This is
13	passive fire protection measures in the building too.	13	provided through the fire-resisting walls and floors in
14	So the building construction, its active fire safety	14	that flat.
15	systems and the firefighting in combination provide the	15	The final side of the fire-resisting box is the
16	safety of life and are the foundation of the stay-put	16	external wall. In accordance with the Building
17	strategy.	17	Regulations, the construction of the external walls are
18	Defend in place firefighting also relies on the high	18	required to adequately resist the spread of fire.
19	degree of compartmentation in a high-rise residential	19	Therefore, the people in adjoining flats on the same
20	building, because it is this compartmentation which	20	floor, who rely on the same horizontal escape route
21	enables this single flat fire event upon which the	21	through the lobby, are protected, because the design
22	stay-put strategy relies. This compartmentation is the	22	intent is that the fire stays within this one
23	very basis of design.	23	compartment or box around the flats. Everything is
24	I will now narrate an explanation of how the	24	invested in preventing the internal spread of fire. The
25	stay-put strategy is designed to function in a fire.	25	required external wall fire performance based on
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1		1	
1	adequately resisting the spread of fire is intended to		The protection measures in the lobby and the stair,
2	prevent an external fire scenario beyond the single flat	2	however, are also provided to create a safe working
3	on fire.	3	environment for the Fire Brigade. The Fire Brigade
4	Equally, people on the floors above the floor where the flat fire has started are also to be protected from	4	require this safe working environment in order to be able to access the building, travel up to the flat on
5 6	the single flat fire below them, again, by the measures	6	fire, and suppress the fire in that flat early. They
7	provided to contain the fire in one flat; again, through	7	also rely on the safe working environment in the lobby
8	the compartmentation to the flats, lobby and stairs,	8	and the stairs to allow them time and a protected route
9	along with the lobby smoke control; and, again, the	9	to travel to rescue any residents in what is expected to
10	external wall and the requirements for the construction	10	be the immediate vicinity of the flat on fire.
10	of that external wall should also provide protection to	11	Nothing more extensive than that is provided for
11	the people in the flats above the flat on fire.	12	through the building design requirements for the
12	A person requiring assistance will also need to	13	stay-put strategy. The requirements of the Building
13	escape from their flat to the lobby. Once they are out	14	Regulations to provide active and passive fire
15	in the lobby, they are now separated from the immediate	15	protection measures are relied on by all building
16	effects of the fire in the flat. However, protection	16	occupants during a fire all residents and all
17	measures for the lobby are not intended to provide	17	firefighters.
18	indefinite protection and it may not be safe for	18	Since the first code of practice for fire safety in
19	a person to remain within the lobby.	19	flats was published, it states:
20	At this stage, the choices available to a person	20	"Reliance on such appliances as manipulative types
21	requiring assistance to escape are: to escape using the	21	of escape or mobile ladders is considered
22	stairs if they are able; to use an evacuation lift with	22	unsatisfactory."
23	assistance from building management if such assistance	23	High-rise residential buildings must, therefore, be
24	is available; to use the firefighting lift with	24	designed on the basis that firefighting does not occur
25	assistance from the Fire Brigade; to be carried down the	25	from outside. This concept has been carried over into
	D 22		D 25
	Page 33		Page 35
1	stairs by firefighters, building management staff or	1	all modern design codes, where the regulations require
2	potentially their neighbours.	2	provisions only for internal firefighting in high-rise
3	There is no provision required in the statutory	3	residential buildings.
4	guidance for residential buildings, unlike other	4	Therefore, the Building Regulations require adequate
5	building types, to provide equipment for those persons,	5	access to buildings for firefighters and their vehicles
6	so there is no provision made for them to either contact	6	only at the entry point to the building and nowhere else
7	building management, should they even be present in	7	around the building.
8	a building, nor to communicate directly with the fire	8	The provisions made for firefighting are also based
9	service present in the building. The person can only	9	entirely on an internal fire occurring. By design,
10	make a personal 999 call. In other building types,	10	these provisions are made on the assumption that
11	refuges with communication devices are required.	11	a single internal flat fire and contained within the
12	Once occupants of the flat on fire have made their	12	compartment will occur.
13	way through the lobby, the final part of their	13	The construction of the external wall to this
14	evacuation is down the stairs. Once down the stairs,	14	compartment is to adequately resist the spread of fire,
15	they should now phone 999 and alert the Fire Brigade to	15	such that mitigating a spreading external fire is not
16	the fire.	16	incorporated into any of the other protection measures
17	The protection provided to stairs is intended to	17	in the building as provided for the firefighters. The
18	physically prevent the penetration of smoke and fire	18	external fire scenario not happening is critical to
19 20	into the stair enclosure by provision of fire-resisting	19	maintaining this box around each flat. The high degree
20	construction, including the stair door; prevent smoke	20	of compartmentation is also required for safe
21	from entering the stair by provision of fire-resisting	21	firefighting in high-rise residential buildings.
22	lobbies, including the flat entrance fire door and smoke	22 23	Therefore, on the basis of internal firefighting
23 24	ventilation systems; and so also prevent the spread of fire and smoke blocking use of the protected stair for	23	only, Approved Document B provides for suitable road access and a parking space for a single fire vehicle
24 25	any residents above the fire floor.	24	within 18 metres of the firefighter entrance and the
25	any residents above the me noor.		which to more of the menginer entrance and the
	Page 34		Page 36

1	fire main inlets. It is from here the Fire Brigade will	1	compartmentation is so important when firefighters split
2	prepare for internal firefighting operations.	2	the building into sectors.
3	Once inside the building, the following is provided	3	Firefighters rely on the compartmentation and the
4	for firefighters: a firefighting stair; a firefighting	4	smoke control to the lobby to also set up any search
5	lift, which is a lift that can be operated under sole	5	sectors needed above a fire sector. They rely on the
6	Fire Brigade control and has safety features to permit	6	protected stairs and lobby to move safely to any of
7	it to be used during a fire; a firefighting main,	7	these required search sectors.
8	a dedicated system for conveying firefighting water to	8	They rely on the compartmentation and smoke control
9	the upper floors of a building; a protected lobby on	9	within the building to set up what they call the lobby
10	every floor, including a smoke control system;	10	sector, which is below the fire sector and used for
11	a protected space between the firefighting stairs and	11	co-ordination of all their required logistics. Again,
12	all flats.	12	they rely on the protected stairs and lobbies to move
13	The design requirements provide for the following	13	safely up and down to the lobby sector.
14	firefighting process. On arrival, the Fire Brigade will	14	Finally, the firefighting lifts are provided so that
15	secure a water supply for firefighting from outside the	15	they can be safely used during the fire to transport
16	building by means of the required water hydrant in close	16	firefighters and their equipment to a floor of their
17	proximity to the building. The firefighting teams move	17	choice.
18	towards the building and enter.	18	Two final points.
19	The statutory guidance provides them with a	19	The fire protection measures must be constructed and
20	firefighting lift within a protected lobby. The	20	then maintained to ensure they are fit for purpose in
21	firefighters can approach the firefighting lift and take	21	the event of fire. The stay-put strategy is provided
22	it under their direct control. The lift is then used by	22	through design construction and ongoing maintenance.
23	fire crews to carry their equipment, such as hoses,	23	All building occupants, including the Fire Brigade, rely
24	tools and breathing apparatus, and, by design, is	24	on it in the event of a fire. It is the single safety
25	assumed to go to the lobby two floors below the fire.	25	condition provided for in the design of high-rise
	Page 37		Page 39
1	This lobby becomes the bridgehead, which is an area	1	residential buildings in England.
2	used to muster firefighters and their equipment. This	2	The statutory guidance makes no provision within the
3	lobby is designed to protect the firefighters from fire	3	building for anything other than a stay-put strategy.
4	and smoke on the fire floor above and maintain a safe	4	There is no means of warning nor a means to communicate
5	air environment there. That is air safe to breathe	5	the need to increase the areas to be evacuated as is
6	without the protection of breathing apparatus.	6	currently regulated for other building uses.
7	Firefighters will be tasked with approaching the	7	As I explain in my report, I consider the building's
8	flat containing the fire and extinguishing it. From	8	stay-put strategy to have failed at 1.26 am, and that
9	within the stair, they connect their fire hose and	9	all events after that time occurred in the context of
10	branch into the building fire main.	10	the total loss of the only safety condition provided
11	Firefighters use the protected stair to walk up to	11	for.
12	the fire floor with the charged hose. They are provided	12	Thank you.
13	with sufficient water by means of the building fire main	13	MS GRANGE: We were going to take a 15-minute break at this
14	provisions, and this includes the provision to charge	14	point.
15	a second hose as may be required to protect those	15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. That would be convenient,
16	firefighters who are now in the flat on fire and	16 17	would it, to have a break now? DR LANE: Yes, please, thank you.
17	suppressing that fire there.	17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, let's say resume at 11.15
18	The firefighters are now operating within what they	19	-
19 20	term the fire sector. One example of this is a fire	20	sharp. All right? Thank you very much. (11.00 am)
20	sector which includes the fire floor, the floor above	20	(A short break)
21 22	and below. The active and passive fire protection measures are required to prevent a fire from	21	(11.15 am)
22	significantly spreading beyond a single flat in the fire	22	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Dr Lane, when you're ready.
23 24	significantly spreading beyond a single that in the fire sector.	23	DR LANE: Okay, thank you.
24 25	I have found it useful to understand how	25	Okay, I'm just going to start the second part about
23	- have round it append to understand now		
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<sup>10 (</sup>Pages 37 to 40)

-		1	
1	fire safety in a high-rise.	1	If a fire separating element is to be effective,
2	In table 3.1 of my Phase 1 report I have provided	2	every joint or imperfection of fit or opening to allow
3	a full list of the active and passive fire protection	3	services to pass through the element should be
4	measures required through the Building Regulations for	4	adequately protected by sealing or fire-stopping so that
5	high-rise blocks of flats.	5	the fire resistance of the element is not impaired.
6	A passive fire protection system is one that is	6	Approved Document B defines a fire stop as:
7	an inherent part of the building construction and so	7	"A seal provided to close an imperfection of fit or
8	does not require any further power, action or	8	design tolerance between element or components, to
8 9		9	restrict the passage of fire and smoke."
-	intervention to perform its intended purpose.		
10	By contrast an active fire protection measure is one	10	Fire doors are also a form of protection to
11	that must undertake an action of some kind, either	11	an opening in fire-resisting compartment enclosures.
12	automatically or manually, in order to perform its	12	A fire door is defined in British Standard 8412 as:
13	intended purpose. Active protection measures typically	13	"A door which, together with its frame and hardware
14	also require a power supply in order to perform their	14	as installed in a building, is intended (when closed) to
15	function.	15	restrict the passage of fire and/or smoke, and is
16	I will first describe the required passive fire	16	capable of meeting specified performance criteria to
17	protection measures.	17	those ends."
18	Buildings are required to be subdivided into	18	As with the tested performance of compartment walls
19	fire-resisting compartments to prevent the spread of	19	and floors and fire-stopping, there are also required
20	fire. These compartments are constructed from walls,	20	methods for demonstrating the specific performance
21	floors and fire doors, required to have fire resistance.	21	criteria set for fire doors through fire testing.
22	Approved Document B defines fire resistance as	22	Appendix I of my Phase 1 report identifies five
23	follows:	23	specific types of fire door that are critical to
24	"The ability of a component or construction of	24	maintaining the compartmentation required to support the
25	a building to satisfy for a stated period of time, some	25	stay-put strategy, as well as support the defend in
	Page 41		Page 43
1	or all of the appropriate criteria specified in the	1	place firefighting. These are: fire doors in
1 2	or all of the appropriate criteria specified in the relevant standard test."	1 2	place firefighting. These are: fire doors in a protected stair enclosure; main flat entrance fire
	relevant standard test."		a protected stair enclosure; main flat entrance fire
2	relevant standard test." These compartments, or fire-resisting boxes, are	2	a protected stair enclosure; main flat entrance fire doors; protected lift shaft fire doors; the doors within
2 3	relevant standard test." These compartments, or fire-resisting boxes, are required in multiple locations: the box enclosing each	2 3	a protected stair enclosure; main flat entrance fire doors; protected lift shaft fire doors; the doors within the protected entrance hall in a flat; doors into any
2 3 4	relevant standard test." These compartments, or fire-resisting boxes, are required in multiple locations: the box enclosing each flat; the box enclosing every lobby; the box enclosing	2 3 4	a protected stair enclosure; main flat entrance fire doors; protected lift shaft fire doors; the doors within the protected entrance hall in a flat; doors into any fire protected service shafts.
2 3 4 5	relevant standard test." These compartments, or fire-resisting boxes, are required in multiple locations: the box enclosing each flat; the box enclosing every lobby; the box enclosing any vertical or horizontal shafts; the box enclosing the	2 3 4 5	a protected stair enclosure; main flat entrance fire doors; protected lift shaft fire doors; the doors within the protected entrance hall in a flat; doors into any
2 3 4 5 6 7	relevant standard test." These compartments, or fire-resisting boxes, are required in multiple locations: the box enclosing each flat; the box enclosing every lobby; the box enclosing any vertical or horizontal shafts; the box enclosing the escape stair.	2 3 4 5 6 7	a protected stair enclosure; main flat entrance fire doors; protected lift shaft fire doors; the doors within the protected entrance hall in a flat; doors into any fire protected service shafts. Moving to the external wall component of the enclosure to a flat.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	relevant standard test." These compartments, or fire-resisting boxes, are required in multiple locations: the box enclosing each flat; the box enclosing every lobby; the box enclosing any vertical or horizontal shafts; the box enclosing the escape stair. These internal compartment walls and floors protect	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	a protected stair enclosure; main flat entrance fire doors; protected lift shaft fire doors; the doors within the protected entrance hall in a flat; doors into any fire protected service shafts. Moving to the external wall component of the enclosure to a flat. This image shows the external wall forming one side
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	relevant standard test." These compartments, or fire-resisting boxes, are required in multiple locations: the box enclosing each flat; the box enclosing every lobby; the box enclosing any vertical or horizontal shafts; the box enclosing the escape stair. These internal compartment walls and floors protect the occupants of the building. This is achieved by	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	a protected stair enclosure; main flat entrance fire doors; protected lift shaft fire doors; the doors within the protected entrance hall in a flat; doors into any fire protected service shafts. Moving to the external wall component of the enclosure to a flat. This image shows the external wall forming one side of the fire-resisting box enclosing a flat.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	relevant standard test." These compartments, or fire-resisting boxes, are required in multiple locations: the box enclosing each flat; the box enclosing every lobby; the box enclosing any vertical or horizontal shafts; the box enclosing the escape stair. These internal compartment walls and floors protect the occupants of the building. This is achieved by preventing the fire from spreading to adjacent flats or	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	a protected stair enclosure; main flat entrance fire doors; protected lift shaft fire doors; the doors within the protected entrance hall in a flat; doors into any fire protected service shafts. Moving to the external wall component of the enclosure to a flat. This image shows the external wall forming one side of the fire-resisting box enclosing a flat. Regulation B4 requires the external walls are
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	relevant standard test." These compartments, or fire-resisting boxes, are required in multiple locations: the box enclosing each flat; the box enclosing every lobby; the box enclosing any vertical or horizontal shafts; the box enclosing the escape stair. These internal compartment walls and floors protect the occupants of the building. This is achieved by preventing the fire from spreading to adjacent flats or to shared public spaces through the provision of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	a protected stair enclosure; main flat entrance fire doors; protected lift shaft fire doors; the doors within the protected entrance hall in a flat; doors into any fire protected service shafts. Moving to the external wall component of the enclosure to a flat. This image shows the external wall forming one side of the fire-resisting box enclosing a flat. Regulation B4 requires the external walls are constructed so that the risk of ignition from
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	relevant standard test." These compartments, or fire-resisting boxes, are required in multiple locations: the box enclosing each flat; the box enclosing every lobby; the box enclosing any vertical or horizontal shafts; the box enclosing the escape stair. These internal compartment walls and floors protect the occupants of the building. This is achieved by preventing the fire from spreading to adjacent flats or to shared public spaces through the provision of fire-resisting walls and floors and protecting any	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	a protected stair enclosure; main flat entrance fire doors; protected lift shaft fire doors; the doors within the protected entrance hall in a flat; doors into any fire protected service shafts. Moving to the external wall component of the enclosure to a flat. This image shows the external wall forming one side of the fire-resisting box enclosing a flat. Regulation B4 requires the external walls are constructed so that the risk of ignition from an external source and the spread of fire over their
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1		1	
1	walls of multi-storey buildings' for cladding	1	I present here the structural form of Grenfell Tower
2	systems using full-scale data from [British Standard]	2	as an example. I described earlier this morning how the
3	8414"	3	floors, walls, beams and columns all contributed to the
4	That report is referred to as BR 135.	4	designed fire stability system.
5	So taking each of paragraph 12.6 to 12.9 in turn	5	Approved Document B states that the load-bearing
6	first.	6	elements of the structure of the building must be
7	Section 12.6 of Approved Document B states:	7	capable of withstanding the effects of fire for an
8	"The external surfaces of walls should meet the	8	appropriate period without loss of stability. Approved Document B defines this as resistance to
9 10	provisions in diagram 40."	9	••
10	Section 12.7 states: "In a building with a storey 18m or more above	10 11	collapse, the ability to maintain low-bearing capacity during a fire.
11	ground level any insulation product, filler material	11	For concrete buildings like Grenfell Tower, the
12	(not including gaskets, sealants and similar) etc used	12	structural fire resistance of the structure is achieved
13	in the external wall construction should be of limited	13	through the depth and thickness of the member, and
14	combustibility"	14	a specific depth of concrete insulating the embedded
16	Finally, section 12.8 and 12.9 relate to cavity	16	steel reinforcing bars. This combination of concrete
10	barriers. The Approved Document B advises:	17	and the reinforcing bars provide the stability system.
18	"9.2 The provisions necessary to restrict the	18	Structural fire resistance is a passive fire
19	spread of smoke and flames through cavities are broadly	19	protection measure because it requires no power to
20	for the purpose of subdividing:	20	activate and, once installed, remains an intrinsic part
20	"a. cavities which could otherwise form a pathway	21	of the building safety condition.
22	around a fire-separating element and closing the edges	22	Approved Document B states:
23	of cavities; therefore reducing the potential for unseen	23	"B2.i. The choice of materials for walls and
24	fire spread; and	24	ceilings can significantly affect the spread of a fire
25	"b. [subdividing] extensive cavities	25	and its rate of growth, even though they are not likely
	Page 45		Page 47
1	"Consideration should also be given to the	1	to be the materials first ignited.
2	construction and fixing of cavity barriers provided for	2	"It is particularly important in circulation spaces
3	these purposes and the extent to which openings in them	3	where linings may offer the main means by which fire
4	should be protected."	4	spreads and where rapid spread is most likely to prevent
5	Section 12.5 of Approved Document B states that, as	5	occupants from escaping."
6	an alternative to following that guidance in 12.6 to	6	Therefore, for a means of escape to comply with
7	12.9, as I have just set out, the fire performance of	7	regulation B1, capable of being safely and effectively
8	the construction of external walls can be determined	8	used at all material times, it is required that the
9	instead by reference to BR 135. This describes a fire	9	surfaces of walls and ceilings within protected lobbies
10	test for external cladding systems so that they can be	10	and stairs are materials that restrict fire spread.
11	installed as close to typical end-use conditions as	11	Additionally, in accordance with clause 5.19,
12	possible, and subject to a specific localised fire.	12	firefighting stairs must be constructed of materials of
13	So either carrying out this test or complying with	13	limited combustibility.
14	the guidance set out in Approved Document B is intended	14	I have described the passive fire protection
15	to provide the required performance to the external wall	15	measures. They are considered to be materials, products
16	of the flat.	16	and structures. Their required fire performance and how
17	That external wall should therefore be constructed	17	to achieve that performance is then addressed in
18	so that the risk of ignition from an external source and	18	appendix A of the Approved Document B. Appendix A
19	the spread of fire over its surface is restricted by	19	describes each of the different classes of performance
20	making provision for the external wall materials to have	20	and each of the appropriate methods of test.
21	low rates of heat release. That is the provision made	21	Appendix A states:
			"In such asses the material product or structure
22	for the external portion of the box around each flat.	22	"In such cases the material, product or structure
23	Another passive fire protection measure is the	23	should:
23 24	Another passive fire protection measure is the provision of an overall stability system for the	23 24	should: "a. be in accordance with the specification or
23	Another passive fire protection measure is the	23	should:

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1	meeting that performance; or.	1	intention is that occupants of that flat should have
2	"b. have been assessed from test evidence against	2	sufficient time to evacuate before the entrance hall
3	appropriate standards, or by using relevant design	3	becomes impassable due to fire or smoke.
4	guides, as meeting that performance; or	4	Under certain circumstances, a detection system may
5	"c. where tables of notional performance are	5	need to be enhanced by installing additional detectors
6	included in this document, conform with an appropriate	6	in the living room and the kitchen, or in all of the
7	specification given in these tables"	7	rooms in the flat. Where more than one detector and
8	Therefore, the fire resistance of walls, floors and	8	alarm unit is provided in a flat, they must be
9	doors are determined using a standard furnace.	9	interlinked so that all of the units sound an alarm on
10	I present in this image a furnace designed to undertake	10	activation of any one device.
11 12	standard fire-resisting resistance testing on floor	11	Approved Document B, section 5.36, states that all
12	systems. This image shows a modern furnace test of a door to determine its fire resistance. The gas	12	escape routes should have adequate artificial lighting
13	temperatures within the furnace must follow the	13	which illuminates the route if the main supply fails.
14	-	14	For a high-rise block of flats, the common lobby and
15	temperature with time profile shown here, reaching 1,000 degrees Celsius after approximately an hour and	15 16	stair shaft require emergency lighting. Emergency
10	a half.	17	lighting is connected to the main lighting circuit in
18	There are a multitude of reaction to fire tests as	18	the building for normal power, but it is also provided with a backup battery installed within the light fitting
19	applied to the performance of the materials forming the	18	with a backup battery instance within the light futing with the capacity to run the light for a minimum
20	external wall which I have explained in substantial	20	duration of three hours in case the mains supply fails.
20	detail in appendix F of my Phase 1 report.	20	The spacing of emergency lighting is controlled to give
21	Finally, I present three images replicated from the	21	a minimum light level over all parts of the escape route
22	BR 135 guide, which shows how it explains the concept of	22	in the event of a mains power failure.
23	fire spread through external wall cavities, and then two	23	Smoke control is an important provision to protect
25	photos from the fire test it represents: BS 8144. These	25	escape routes. Approved Document B states it is
25	photos nom me ne test n'represents. D5 8144. These	2.5	escape routes. Approved Document B states it is
	Page 49		Page 51
1	photos are a before and after example of a cladding fire	1	probable that some smoke will get into the common
1 2	photos are a before and after example of a cladding fire test.	1 2	probable that some smoke will get into the common corridor or lobby from a fire in a flat, if only because
1 2 3	photos are a before and after example of a cladding fire test. It is essential that there are no fundamental	2	corridor or lobby from a fire in a flat, if only because
2	test.	1	corridor or lobby from a fire in a flat, if only because the entrance door will be opened when the occupants
2 3	test. It is essential that there are no fundamental	2 3	corridor or lobby from a fire in a flat, if only because the entrance door will be opened when the occupants escape the flat. Therefore, section 2.25 of
2 3 4	test. It is essential that there are no fundamental differences between the tested construction and the designed for construction of an external wall. This is	2 3 4	corridor or lobby from a fire in a flat, if only because the entrance door will be opened when the occupants escape the flat. Therefore, section 2.25 of Approved Document B states that there should, therefore,
2 3 4 5	test. It is essential that there are no fundamental differences between the tested construction and the	2 3 4 5	corridor or lobby from a fire in a flat, if only because the entrance door will be opened when the occupants escape the flat. Therefore, section 2.25 of Approved Document B states that there should, therefore, be some means of ventilating the common corridors or
2 3 4 5 6	test. It is essential that there are no fundamental differences between the tested construction and the designed for construction of an external wall. This is also true of any fire-resisting feature, such as fire	2 3 4 5 6	corridor or lobby from a fire in a flat, if only because the entrance door will be opened when the occupants escape the flat. Therefore, section 2.25 of Approved Document B states that there should, therefore,
2 3 4 5 6 7	test. It is essential that there are no fundamental differences between the tested construction and the designed for construction of an external wall. This is also true of any fire-resisting feature, such as fire doors, too. Such fundamental differences mean the test	2 3 4 5 6 7	corridor or lobby from a fire in a flat, if only because the entrance door will be opened when the occupants escape the flat. Therefore, section 2.25 of Approved Document B states that there should, therefore, be some means of ventilating the common corridors or lobbies to control smoke and so protect the common
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$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	test. It is essential that there are no fundamental differences between the tested construction and the designed for construction of an external wall. This is also true of any fire-resisting feature, such as fire doors, too. Such fundamental differences mean the test evidence can no longer be relied upon to demonstrate compliance with the provisions made in Approved Document B. I will now move on to active protection measures. An active fire protection measure is one that must undertake an action of some kind and typically requires a power supply, as I said earlier. In appendix G2.3 of my Phase 1 report, I describe the requirements for residential detection and alarm systems. The design guidance in Approved Document B is to provide independent fire detection and alarm systems within each flat and for the purposes of raising the alarm in that flat only. The minimum requirement for locations of detectors within the flats is within the protected entrance hall. This is intended to sound an alarm when smoke first starts to enter the protected entrance hall in the flat,	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ 24\\ \end{array} $	corridor or lobby from a fire in a flat, if only because the entrance door will be opened when the occupants escape the flat. Therefore, section 2.25 of Approved Document B states that there should, therefore, be some means of ventilating the common corridors or lobbies to control smoke and so protect the common stairs. This offers additional protection to that provided by the fire doors to the stair. There are two basic types of smoke control system identified in section 2 of Approved Document B. These are natural smoke ventilation, and, as an alternative to the natural ventilation provisions, mechanical ventilation to the stair or lobby. Approved Document B refers on to other guidance available for the design of smoke control systems using pressure differentials, this guidance is BS EN 12101, part 6. This diagram shows a simplified section through a building. A fire has started in a flat; however, the smoke has not yet passed into the common lobbies and therefore the ventilation system has not yet activated. When smoke enters the common lobby, either by leaking through the door or if the door is opened during an escape, the smoke ventilation system is activated by

13 (Pages 49 to 52)

1	control systems then have common activation process.	1	required until the firefighting teams are advancing into
2	The vents on the fire floor only remain open. All other	2	the fire floor.
3	vents close. The vent at the top of the stair opens. The fans, if present, in the system, start up.	3 4	Firefighting lifts are lifts with specific protection and control mechanisms to permit them to be
4 5	If the system uses natural ventilation then fans are	5	used safely by the Fire Brigade during a fire.
6	not required. In this type of system, hot smoke rises	6	This figure identifies the key features of a modern
7	up a smoke shaft under the effects of natural buoyancy	7	firefighting lift. The protection measures for
8	and vents to outside above the roof of the building.	8	firefighting lifts I will be describing in more detail
9	A chimney effect is created, pulling air and smoke out	9	later on.
10	of the lobby.	10	But it is because of these protection measures to
11	An alternative to the natural system is a mechanical	11	firefighting lifts that Approved Document B also states:
12	ventilation system. This type of system can be designed	12	"Where a firefighting lift has been provided to
13	to use the same kind of shaft as the natural system;	13	satisfy requirement B5, this can be utilised as part of
14	however, it relies on an extract fan at the top of the	14	a management plan for evacuating disabled people. Any
15	shaft, pulling smoke into the lobby and up into the	15	such plan should include a contingency for when the Fire
16	shaft. The extract fan is signalled to start at the	16	and Rescue Service arrive."
17	same time as the lobby vents are signalled to open from	17	I will discuss this again later.
18	activation of a smoke detector in the lobby being	18	Fire mains are installed in a building and equipped
19	protected.	19	with valves, et cetera, so that the Fire Brigade may
20	There is an alternative to this mechanical	20	connect hoses for water to fight fires inside the
21	ventilation system too. This is called a pressurisation	21	building. Fire mains may be of the dry type, which are
22	system. The difference is rather than pulling the smoke	22	normally empty and are supplied with water through a
23	out from the lobby, the fan instead pushes air down and	23	hose from a Fire Brigade pumping appliance outside the
24	into the stair enclosure. The intention is this air	24	building. Alternatively, they may be of the wet type,
25	prevents the smoke in the lobby entering the stairs.	25	where they are kept full of water and supplied from
	Page 53		Page 55
1	The smalles in the lephy is then either nucled up a shaft	1	tanks and numps from inside the building. There should
1	The smoke in the lobby is then either pushed up a shaft	1	tanks and pumps from inside the building. There should be a facility to allow a wet system to be replanished
2	provided for that purpose, or is pushed out of the	2	be a facility to allow a wet system to be replenished
2 3	provided for that purpose, or is pushed out of the building through some other opening, such as open	2 3	be a facility to allow a wet system to be replenished from a pumping appliance in an emergency also.
2 3 4	provided for that purpose, or is pushed out of the building through some other opening, such as open windows.	2 3 4	be a facility to allow a wet system to be replenished from a pumping appliance in an emergency also. Regarding a dry main, there are two limiting factors
2 3	provided for that purpose, or is pushed out of the building through some other opening, such as open windows. Regardless of the type, all smoke control systems	2 3	be a facility to allow a wet system to be replenished from a pumping appliance in an emergency also. Regarding a dry main, there are two limiting factors in this system: the ability of the fire engine pump to
2 3 4 5	provided for that purpose, or is pushed out of the building through some other opening, such as open windows. Regardless of the type, all smoke control systems are designed to operate for a fire on one floor only.	2 3 4 5	be a facility to allow a wet system to be replenished from a pumping appliance in an emergency also. Regarding a dry main, there are two limiting factors in this system: the ability of the fire engine pump to raise water up the building, and the amount of pressure
2 3 4 5 6	provided for that purpose, or is pushed out of the building through some other opening, such as open windows. Regardless of the type, all smoke control systems	2 3 4 5 6	be a facility to allow a wet system to be replenished from a pumping appliance in an emergency also. Regarding a dry main, there are two limiting factors in this system: the ability of the fire engine pump to
2 3 4 5 6 7	provided for that purpose, or is pushed out of the building through some other opening, such as open windows. Regardless of the type, all smoke control systems are designed to operate for a fire on one floor only. This floor is normally selected automatically by the	2 3 4 5 6 7	be a facility to allow a wet system to be replenished from a pumping appliance in an emergency also. Regarding a dry main, there are two limiting factors in this system: the ability of the fire engine pump to raise water up the building, and the amount of pressure that the pipe being used can withstand. With a dry
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	provided for that purpose, or is pushed out of the building through some other opening, such as open windows. Regardless of the type, all smoke control systems are designed to operate for a fire on one floor only. This floor is normally selected automatically by the smoke control system programming, which relies on the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	be a facility to allow a wet system to be replenished from a pumping appliance in an emergency also. Regarding a dry main, there are two limiting factors in this system: the ability of the fire engine pump to raise water up the building, and the amount of pressure that the pipe being used can withstand. With a dry rising main, the further up the building the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	provided for that purpose, or is pushed out of the building through some other opening, such as open windows. Regardless of the type, all smoke control systems are designed to operate for a fire on one floor only. This floor is normally selected automatically by the smoke control system programming, which relies on the location of the detector that has first activated. In	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	be a facility to allow a wet system to be replenished from a pumping appliance in an emergency also. Regarding a dry main, there are two limiting factors in this system: the ability of the fire engine pump to raise water up the building, and the amount of pressure that the pipe being used can withstand. With a dry rising main, the further up the building the firefighters are, the lower the water pressure available
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	provided for that purpose, or is pushed out of the building through some other opening, such as open windows. Regardless of the type, all smoke control systems are designed to operate for a fire on one floor only. This floor is normally selected automatically by the smoke control system programming, which relies on the location of the detector that has first activated. In addition, a manual override for use by the Fire Brigade	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	be a facility to allow a wet system to be replenished from a pumping appliance in an emergency also. Regarding a dry main, there are two limiting factors in this system: the ability of the fire engine pump to raise water up the building, and the amount of pressure that the pipe being used can withstand. With a dry rising main, the further up the building the firefighters are, the lower the water pressure available at the outlet. This is because water pressure is
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14 (Pages 53 to 56)

1	A pump or set of pumps is provided within the	1	blocks of flats was to place the rising main outlet in
2	building to pump water through the vertical pipe. It	2	the common lobby. The current guidance is for the
3	does not need a fire service pump appliance.	3	rising main outlet to be positioned in the protected
4	The pumps are automatically controlled to keep the	4	stair.
5	fire main filled and pressurised with water at all	5	The firefighting hoses for the fire mains are not
6	times. Therefore, water can be drawn at any floor by	6	provided in the building nor through design, but are the
7	the fire service immediately. There is no delay as	7	Fire Brigade's own equipment.
8	occurs in a dry riser, where the fire service must	8	This ends my description of the active fire
9	manually charge the fire main when they arrive at the	9	protection measures.
10	fire.	10	Finally, the presence of these active and passive
11	The pumps and the pipes are designed to deliver the	11	fire protection measures are intended to create
12	minimum pressure deemed required for effective	12	a layered safety approach. They provide the means for
13	firefighting at the highest floors of the building. So	13	early internal defend in place firefighting. They
14	a wet rising main reduces the time required for the fire	14	provide the means to limit the fire and smoke spread
15	service to secure firefighting water and, more	15	from a flat fire out to the lobby and help prevent fire
16	importantly, is designed specifically to ensure adequate	16	and smoke spread to the escape stair. They create the
17	flow and pressure of water on every floor of the	17	high degree of compartmentation to support the stay-put
18	building. Performance of this main type does not worsen	18	strategy in high-rise residential buildings.
19	on the highest floors.	19	Those layers of safety are required to prevent
20	The standard for the fire main design, British	20	reliance on the fire and rescue services for safe
21	Standard 9990, states in section 6.3.1 that wet fire	21	evacuation, as so clearly stated in the statutory
22	mains systems are intended to supply two outlets at any	22	guidance document. The terms of reference for those
23	one time. Therefore, if any more than two hoses are	23	layers of protection are to mitigate the effects of
24 25	used, the water flow and pressure from any one outlet	24	a single flat fire, with minor fire and smoke spread
25	will be reduced. The standard does not make any	25	into the adjacent lobby.
	Page 57		Page 59
1	specific statements on the number of firefighting jets	1	Those layers of safety are not designed to protect
2	a dry main is intended to support.	2	from a multi-storey building envelope fire, nor are they
3	However, as I have described, the maximum pressure	3	designed to protect from a series of internal flat fires
4	in the main is limited by the ability of the pipe to	4	occurring on multiple storeys in a building. Such
5	withstand the pressure being introduced by the fire pump	5	events are not considered as relevant design events in
6	appliance. As more hoses draw water off the main, the	6	the current terms of reference for those layers of
7	pressure and flow to each hose will drop. Fire mains	7	safety.
8	are also designed for a single internal fire event.	8	That ends my more general presentation and I'm now
9	Whether the main is a dry or wet main, the design	9	going to specifically speak about Grenfell Tower for the
10	guidance for the location of landing valves where the	10	rest of the day.
11	Fire Brigade plug in to obtain water from is that they	11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, thank you very much.
12	should be sited and their outlets directed such that	12	DR LANE: In this next part of my opening presentation,
13	access to them is unobstructed; personnel can safely lay	13	I will provide a summary of works undertaken at
14	out and charge hose lines before entering the fire	14	Grenfell Tower since the building was originally
15	compartment; there is minimal risk of any discharge of	15	completed in 1974.
16	water from the outlets coming into contact with lift	16	I have provided a chronology in appendix D4 of my
17	controls and lift communications equipment or of flowing	17	report of the design and construction of Grenfell Tower,
18	into the lift well; there is minimal risk of exposure to	18	as well as the timing of any significant modifications.
19	fire from the accommodation if a door is open; hoses can	19	The items in this chronology as relate to
20	be connected, charged and advanced into the	20	refurbishment works on the tower have been identified
21	accommodation without excessive kinking of the hose line	21	using records made available to me and specifically from
22	or obstruction to fire doors and exit routes.	22	planning applications, Building Regulations
23	In addition, the location of the outlets presented	23	applications, fire risk assessments and other contract
24		24	documents, including, for example, the health and safety
24	in the design guidance has changed over time. When	24	documents, menuting, for example, the nearth and safety
24 25	in the design guidance has changed over time. When Grenfell Tower was built, the guidance for high-rise	24	file from the 2005 lift replacement works.

15 (Pages 57 to 60)

1	I carried out a detailed review of works to	1	highlighted in yellow. Specifically, these were the
2	Grenfell Tower since 1974 for two specific	2	refurbishment of lobbies on all floors in 1985, the
3	reasons: first, because I wanted to understand if any	3	refurbishment of levels 3 and 4 in 1986 and, finally,
4	significant change to the original fire safety features	4	the works in the primary refurbishment.
5	have been made; second, to understand the dates of any	5	Five of the nine sets of internal layout works dealt
6	such changes. This was for the purposes of	6	only with the non-residential floors. One set of
7	understanding the appropriate legislation and	7	internal works undertaken in 1980 was not specific on
8	regulations as may have applied at the time of that	8	location.
9	change. This was important when analysing the	9	Whilst I have substantial detail on the most recent
10	compliance requirements, and so the performance	10	primary refurbishment, there is little detail available
11	requirements, for the active and passive fire protection	11	on the specifics of the other eight sets of internal
12	measures in Grenfell Tower on the night of the fire. It	12	works that occurred.
13	also helped me understand the range of legislation and	13	Four of the 19 recorded refurbishments included work
13	regulation as applied to Grenfell Tower, and helped me	14	to the lifts in Grenfell Tower. In 2005, all three
15	conclude on what, if any, difference in requirements	15	lifts in the building were fully replaced. This
16	that range created.	16	consisted of the two main lifts serving all floors and
17	As I stated in section 3.4 of my preliminary Phase 1	17	a smaller hydraulic lift that was provided to access
18	report, in respect of all the fire safety measures	18	level 2 and 3 from ground. To enable these works,
19	I have investigated, I have explained my understanding	19	additional preparatory work was also needed separately
20	of what was required by the regulations and the relevant	20	in 2004. These were works to build a new brick
20	statutory guidance at the time of construction of	20	enclosure at ground level to contain the new hydraulic
21	Grenfell Tower. I have also then explained what is	22	lift equipment for one of the three lifts.
22	required under the current Building Regulations and its	23	The other two sets of work on lifts in
23	statutory guidance.	24	Grenfell Tower were undertaken as part of the primary
24	In this image, I have produced a time-line with the	25	refurbishment. First, in 2013, the low-level access
23	in this image, I have produced a time-line with the	25	refutoisiment. Thist, in 2015, the low-level access
	Page 61		Page 63
1	dates of the key changes made to Grenfell Tower since	1	lift between ground and level 3 was removed as part of
2	the first recorded works in 1979. I have derived this	2	the demolish works for the tower. Then, later, in the
3	time-line presented on this slide here from the	3	primary refurbishment, the lift shafts were modified to
4	information contained in a chronology of works submitted	4	permit the lifts to also serve levels 1 and 3, where
5	by the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, and	5	previously they did not.
6	through inspection of various contract documents	6	Three of the 19 recorded refurbishments included
7	provided to me.	7	work to fire doors within Grenfell Tower. Fire door
8	The first recorded works on Grenfell Tower was	8	replacements were carried out within the tower in 1985,
9	a Building Regulations application for improvement to	9	2011, and finally during the final primary
10	the ground floor community rooms in 1979. Between 1979	10	refurbishment. The 1985 works replaced an undetermined
10	and 2017, there is evidence of a total of 19 different	11	number of flat entrance fire doors in unknown locations
12	sets of works undertaken to various parts of the	12	in the building. The Building Regulations application
13	building, including the final refurbishment from 2012 to	13	provided to me and associated with the works did not
14	2016.	14	define the exact number of doors.
15	For the purposes of this presentation, works include	15	In 2011, a programme of flat entrance door
16	alterations or modifications or even replacement of	16	replacements was undertaken. This involved fitting 106
10	existing elements of the building or its services.	17	replacement flat entrance doors to tenanted flats. No
18	I have identified different types of refurbishment work	18	works were done to 12 leaseholder flats or two tenanted
19	with different colours on the time-line I have provided	19	flats.
20	in this slide.	20	Finally, in the last primary refurbishment, new
20	I will now explain those works, separated into	20	stair doors, new flat entrance fire doors and fire doors
21	types.	21	to other rooms were provided on levels ground, 1, 2
23	Nine of the 19 recorded changes to the building	23	and 3 only.
23	relate to its internal layout. Three of those nine	24	Two of the 19 refurbishments since 1974 were to the
25	dealt with the residential floors of the building,	25	external construction of the building. Specifically, in
			, and the second s
	Page 62		Page 64

1	2008, the flat roof coverings at roof level on top of	1	These central lifts did not serve level 1 and level 3.
2	the building were replaced. Then the overcladding of	2	Therefore, these passenger lifts were for the purposes
3	the whole building which took place from 2012 to 2016.	3	of accessing the floors in the tower with flats only.
4	In 2016, one gas supply riser running vertically up	4	Before describing the works undertaken to the lifts
5	the building was decommissioned and replaced with a new	5	in Grenfell Tower, I want to first describe the two
6	gas supply pipe. The appointed gas expert,	6	types of lift for firefighting. There are two types in
7	Rodney Hancox, is investigating all aspects of the gas	7	the context of Grenfell Tower because, since the tower
8	supply to Grenfell Tower and will cover these matters in	8	was built, the requirements for lifts for firefighting
9	detail, including the history of gas supply-related	9	has changed. This occurred in 1992. Therefore,
10	works for the tower. I have incorporated the most	10	understanding the lift requirements for firefighting
11	recent works in 2016 only for the purposes of my fire	11	before and after 1992 is relevant.
12	safety-related work as they relate to compartmentation.	12	For lifts to be suitable for firefighting, they
13	As a result of my understanding of the works carried	13	require special features to allow the Fire Brigade to
14	out to Grenfell Tower since 1974, I provided in	14	access them during a fire and for the lifts to be robust
15	section 4 of my report the specific refurbishment works	15	enough to continue operating in a fire scenario.
16	that I considered to be relevant to my investigation of	16	Since 1971, prior to the construction of
17	the active and passive systems that existed in	17	Grenfell Tower, there has been a requirement for the
18	Grenfell Tower. This is due to their direct influence	18	provision of a lift which may be used by the Fire
19	on the eventual performance of the fire safety measures	19	Brigade within high-rise residential buildings. At that
20	on the night of the fire. These are: the lift	20	time, lifts with specific firefighting provisions were
21	replacement works in 2005; the tenant flat entrance door	21	referred to as fire lifts.
22	replacement in 2011; the refurbishment works between	22	In 1992, the name used to describe these lifts
23	2012 and 2016; and the new tenant gas supply, which was	23	changed to firefighting lifts, and the required safety
24	incomplete the night of the fire.	24	provisions to enable lifts to be safely used by
25	I will deal with each of these in turn in the next	25	firefighters in a fire was changed also. This term,
			menghers mu me was enanged also. This term,
	Page 65		Page 67
1	series of presentations	1	firefighting lift and the associated requirements for
1	series of presentations.	1	firefighting lift, and the associated requirements for such lifts are in general still in force today
2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right.	2	such lifts are in general still in force today.
2 3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right. DR LANE: The first of the relevant works is in relation to	2 3	such lifts are in general still in force today. To understand the fire safety features for a lift,
2 3 4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right. DR LANE: The first of the relevant works is in relation to the lifts provided in Grenfell Tower and so the status	2 3 4	such lifts are in general still in force today. To understand the fire safety features for a lift, it is useful to understand the basic components of
2 3 4 5	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right. DR LANE: The first of the relevant works is in relation to the lifts provided in Grenfell Tower and so the status of that lift provision the night of the fire.	2 3 4 5	such lifts are in general still in force today. To understand the fire safety features for a lift, it is useful to understand the basic components of a lift system and the terms used to describe it. These
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17 (Pages 65 to 68)

	can obtain and control the use of a lift without	1	of the higher standard of protection now provided to
1 2	interference from other persons, and the requirement of	2	firefighting lifts.
3	a maximum distance between the stair and lift of no more	3	I will now explain the lift replacement works.
4	than 10 metres. The lift car should have a platform	4	A complete replacement of the central lift system
5	area of not less than 1.5 metres squared, a capacity of	5	was undertaken in 2005. From reviewing the
6	550 kilograms and reach the top floor from ground level	6	specification within the health and safety file prepared
7	within one minute. Finally, the requirement that the	7	for the works, the standard of lifts specified then was
8	electrical supply to any fire lift should be provided by	8	consistent with the historic fire lift standard and not
9	a sub-main circuit exclusive to the lift, with the cable	9	the firefighting standard applicable in 2005.
10	supplying current passing through routes of negligible	10	Further modification works were also undertaken
11	fire risk.	11	during the primary refurbishment. The scope of this
12	If we now consider the fire safety requirements for	12	modification was to increase the number of floors served
13	a firefighting lift, there is a clear difference in	13	by the two central lifts. During these works, the lifts
14	standard. As I have illustrated in this image, the	14	were not upgraded either to the applicable firefighting
15	number of features required in a firefighting lift as	15	standard.
16	required from 1992 onwards is substantially greater.	16	The scope of the lift refurbishment works in 2005
17	Of the 15 features required for the new firefighting	17	was substantial. It included replacing all associated
18	lift, three of those provisions were also required for	18	equipment and machinery. New lift cars were installed,
19	the historic fire lift shown here in blue. They relate	19	new lift landing doors were installed, call points and
20	to the size of the lift car, the minimum travel time for	20	controls. The openings in the lift shaft were also
21	the lift to reach the top floor and the provision of	21	increased in width. The lift was not at this time
22	a fire switch for the Fire Brigade.	22	upgraded to serve level 1 and 3 and, therefore,
23	Four of the 15 required features for a firefighting	23	continued not to serve every floor of the building, as
24	lift were also required for a fire lift, but a higher	24	is required for a firefighting lift.
25	standard is now required. I have shown those features	25	Later during the primary refurbishment, new openings
	Page 69		Page 71
1	in orange. For example, the lift is required to serve	1	in the lift shaft were created on levels 1 and 3 as
2	every floor, not just residential floors. The power	2	a way to access the new residential flats on these
3	supply is required to be fire protected, not routed	3	
4		3	levels. Therefore, after the primary refurbishment,
4	through areas of negligible fire risk. The minimum	4	levels. Therefore, after the primary refurbishment, both lifts could be used to access every floor, as is
4 5	capacity of the lift car has increased to 630 kilograms.	1	both lifts could be used to access every floor, as is required for the firefighting lift standard.
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5 6 7	capacity of the lift car has increased to 630 kilograms. Finally, there are eight additional fire safety features required for a firefighting lift compared to	4 5 6 7	both lifts could be used to access every floor, as is required for the firefighting lift standard. During 2005, the two lift cars were increased in size and capacity. The plan drawing on the left
5 6 7 8	capacity of the lift car has increased to 630 kilograms. Finally, there are eight additional fire safety features required for a firefighting lift compared to a fire lift, which I've shown in blue/grey here. These	4 5 6 7 8	both lifts could be used to access every floor, as is required for the firefighting lift standard. During 2005, the two lift cars were increased in size and capacity. The plan drawing on the left indicates the smaller, original lift car and, on the
5 6 7 8 9	capacity of the lift car has increased to 630 kilograms. Finally, there are eight additional fire safety features required for a firefighting lift compared to a fire lift, which I've shown in blue/grey here. These are more substantial features. For example, two	4 5 6 7 8 9	both lifts could be used to access every floor, as is required for the firefighting lift standard. During 2005, the two lift cars were increased in size and capacity. The plan drawing on the left indicates the smaller, original lift car and, on the right, the larger, replacement lift car. The openings
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1	ground level, indicating that, prior to 2016, the fire	1	I've described the role of fire doors in protecting
2	control switch at level 2 was operational. The 2005	2	door openings in compartments. Compartmentation is the
3	specification also included an emergency intercom system	3	primary fire protection measure for the single safety
4	which is required for a firefighting lift only; however,	4	condition, the stay-put strategy.
5	I've not yet been able to observe whether this system was installed on site.	5	Where doors are required within walls requiring fire
6		6	resistance, those doors must be self-closing or lockable
7	Therefore, following the 2005 and 2012 to 2016 works, the lifts specified for Grenfell Tower contained	7	fire doors according to the statutory guidance. There are various performance requirements that they
8 9	a number of fire safety features which I have	9	need to achieve and must be subjected to fire testing to
10	highlighted in green in this illustration. These	10	confirm these performance requirements.
10	provisions satisfied the requirements for a historic	11	These requirements have changed over time since
11	fire lift; they did not satisfy all of the requirements	11	1974, when the tower was built. Fire doors are tested
13	for a firefighting lift as existed at the time of the	12	as a whole assembly, which is in the state it is
14	2005 and the 2012 to 2016 refurbishment works.	14	installed in a building. Importantly, this includes the
15	Key features that were required to meet the standard	15	hardware, glazing, seals around the door and several
16	but which were not specified are: a secondary power	16	other components. These components are shown in the
17	supply was not specified; electrical schematics showed	17	next slide.
18	it had an independent power supply, the exact cable	18	But before I move on, to show that a door assembly
19	routing is not known; the lift landing doors were not	19	meets the required standard, the door assembly should be
20	specified as requiring any fire resistance when they	20	in accordance with the specification or design which has
21	were required to have 60 minutes' fire resistance; no	21	been shown by test to be capable of meeting that
22	water protection measures were specified for electrical	22	performance, or have been assessed from test evidence
23	equipment within the lift car and well; an escape hatch	23	against appropriate standards or by using relevant
24	was not specified for the replacement lift car.	24	design guides as meeting that performance.
25	As the lifts were not specified to meet the standard	25	These are the components of a fire door assembly.
	D 72		D 75
	Page 73		Page 75
1	of a firefighting lift, they could not, therefore, also	1	In appendix I2.2 of my report, I listed out 44 features
2	be relied upon for evacuation because, as it states in	2	that form a fire door. Of these, the principal
3	Approved Document B, where a firefighting lift has been	3	components are: the door leaf; the doorframe; the
4	provided to satisfy requirement B5, this can be utilised	4	architrave, which is a trim that serves to mask the
5	as part of a management plan for evacuating disabled	5	joint between a doorframe and the surrounding structure;
6	people. Any such plan should include a contingency for	6	a self-closing device; an intumescent fire seal; and
7	when the fire and rescue services arrive.	7	a smoke seal, which is for the purposes of restricting
8	That ends my lift talk.	8	the flow of cold smoke.
9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.	9	Fitted to the door leaf is various ironmongery,
10	DR LANE: Will I keep going?	10	which includes latches, locks, letter plates and
11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, what is your next topic and	11	handles. As indicated in this diagram, everything
12	how long	12	together is known as the door assembly and every
13	DR LANE: I can move on to doors now or have a break and do	13	component is relevant to the fire performance of the
14	doors later.	14	system.
15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: How long do you think doors might	15	I will now describe the location of the specific
16	keep us going for?	16	doors in Grenfell Tower which were required to be fire
17	MS GRANGE: 15 minutes.	17	doors. These are the fire doors required to maintain
18	DR LANE: About 12 to 15 minutes.	18	the compartmentation to all flats, the stairs and the
19 20	MS GRANGE: We can do the 15 minutes now and then break for	19	openings on to all the lobbies and to other risers.
20	lunch, if that's convenient.	20	Within the core of Grenfell Tower, on levels 4 to
21	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Shall we do the doors?	21	23, all of the fire doors were installed in the
22 23	DR LANE: Yes, I'll just do the doors. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.	22 23	partitions forming the core of the tower. To indicate
23 24	DR LANE: I will now describe the works that were undertaken	23	each of these, a diagram of the protected lobby and stairs is shown.
24	to fire doors in Grenfell Tower in 2011.	24	First, flat entrance fire doors. The front door of
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Day 5

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1 every flat should be a fire door as it separates the 1 only be fitted with locks readily openable from the 2 2 flat from the protected lobby. There are six of these inside without a key. 3 doors per floor on levels 4 to 23 and they are indicated 3 Regarding glazing, any door containing glazing 4 in yellow. 4 should have been tested with the glazing in place, or 5 The lift shafts must also be a separate fire 5 an assessment have been made to show that it would meet compartment and should be separated from the protected 6 the required performance. The glazing must have 6 7 insulation fire resistance in addition to integrity fire 7 lobby as the lift doors open on to the protected lobby. 8 8 resistance, because table A4, "Limitations on the use of The two doors to the lifts of each lobby, therefore, 9 9 should achieve a specified fire resistance, as shown in uninsulated glazed elements on escape routes", as 10 vellow here. 10 presented in Approved Document B states no part of the wall or door leaf between residential sleeping 11 The refuse chute room is also required to be 11 12 a separate fire compartment, and so the single door to 12 accommodation and a common escape route of a single 13 13 the refuse chute room on every level is required to be stairway building can contain uninsulated glazing. 14 a fire-resisting door, and that is located at the yellow 14 The fire door product to replace the flat entrance 15 marking there. 15 doors in Grenfell Tower was Suredor GRP, as manufactured 16 Finally, the single door to the protected stair at 16 by Manse Masterdor limited. The brochure for Suredor 17 each level. The protected stair is another separate 17 GRP doors describes the doors as a fibre glass composite 18 18 door which was successfully tested for the integrity and fire compartment and so was also required to be provided 19 with a fire door. 19 stability criteria for 30 minutes. The brochure does 20 not state that the doors have been tested for cold smoke 20 In 2011, a programme of fire door replacements at 21 Grenfell Tower was undertaken. This 3D image of 21 leakage as required, nor for the insulation component of 22 22 fire resistance. Grenfell Tower indicates in the model the flat entrance 23 23 doors on a typical level. Zooming out to the extent of The photograph on the left shows the exact single 24 the full screen, you can see the doors that were 24 test specimen that was used to achieve those test 25 replaced in the tower and the doors that were not 25 results. It does not feature any glazing or a number or Page 77 Page 79 1 nameplate, for example. It does feature a specific 1 replaced as part of these works. That's their 2 2 latch, lock, letter box, handle and spyhole. The locations 3 3 self-closer on the tested specimen was externally The programme of work was undertaken by the TMO to replace the front door of dwellings occupied by Royal 4 4 mounted on the door. 5 Borough of Kensington and Chelsea tenants. 106 fire 5 In Grenfell Tower, the Manse Masterdor specification 6 doors appear to have been supplied and installed by 6 sheet specified 58 unglazed Suredor fire doors were 7 7 installed, an example I observed as shown on the left. Manse Masterdor to replace the main flat entrance doors. 8 8 This is based on their door replacement schedule, which 48 glazed Suredor fire doors were installed, an example 9 0 included 104 tenanted flats and two leaseholder flats. I observed is shown on the right. 10 Therefore, 14 fire doors that were not replaced 10 Sorry, I got a little bit mixed up there. On the 11 consisted 12 leaseholder flats and two tenant flats. 11 right. 12 12 These works did not specify new doors for the lifts, With regard to the ironmongery, the Manse Masterdor 13 13 specification sheet specified different locks, different stairs, refuse chute room or any other riser in the 14 letter boxes, different self-closing devices and hinge 14 tower, nor any of the doors on levels ground to 3. 15 The standard for the fire safety performance for the 15 types to that provided for within the fire test. flat entrance fire doors at the time of installation is 16 Regarding the 14 flat entrance doors which were not 16 17 described in Approved Document B. The key requirements 17 replaced, there is little evidence available regarding 18 18 are: integrity fire resistance of 30 minutes when tested those doors as they have mostly been destroyed by the 19 19 to the fire resistance test, British Standard 476, fire. In considering if those doors were the originals 20 part 22; the doors should be fitted with smoke seals 20 as installed in 1974, it is now useful to note that the 21 21 requirements were different at that time. restricting air leakage around head and jambs; no 22 glazing is permitted unless that glazing has been 22 The main differences for a flat entrance door at 23 23 demonstrated to achieve an insulation performance that that time were: 24 is equivalent to the integrity performance of the door; 24 Self-closing devices were different. This could be 25 25 a self-closing device is required; the fire door should achieved using what's called rising butt hinges, which Page 78 Page 80

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1	are the wedged-shaped hinges shown in this photograph.	1	doors as installed in 1974.
2	These are no longer acceptable.	2	Fire doors are a crucial element of the stay-put
3	Integrity rating of 20 minutes. This is 10 minutes	3	strategy as they represent an opportunity for weak spots
4	less than the 2011 standard.	4	to form in the fire-resisting partitions that separate
5	A 12-millimetre rebate was also required to prevent	5	a flat fire from occupants either on that floor where
6	smoke spread, which I will now explain.	6	the fire has started or occupants in flats above the
7	In both 2011 and in 1974, fire doors have	7	floor the fire has started. Fire doors are, therefore,
8	incorporated measures to stop the spread of smoke. In	8	a Building Regulations requirement as a passive fire
9	1974, this was in the form of an overlap between the	9	protection measure. Faulty fire doors mean faulty
10	door and the frame known as a rebate. In the picture on	10	compartmentation and compartmentation is the primary
11	the left, the door would swing into the frame away from	11	basis of the stay-put strategy.
12	the viewer and be stopped from swinging any further once	12	Thank you.
13	in the frame by the rebate. The depth of rebate	13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
14	required was specified rather than a limit on the rate	14	Now, you've been speaking almost non-stop for quite
15	of air passing through the door.	15	a long time. Would you like a break now?
16	In 2011, preventing the spread of smoke was and	16	DR LANE: Yes, I would.
17	still is usually accomplished by smoke seals, which	17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, I'm not surprised.
18	could be brush-like or rubber-like strips around all	18	Thank you very much, you've given us a lot to think
19	sides of a door that are designed specifically to seal	19	about.
20	airflow around the edge of a door.	20	We will break then in a moment. It's a little
21	Regarding the stair fire doors, I have no records of	21	earlier than usual. If we resume at 2 o'clock, is that
22	replacement works to the stair doors. Therefore, I have	22	going to give you enough time to finish?
23	assumed that the stair doors were the original doors as	23	DR LANE: Absolutely fine.
24	fitted In 1974. Again, comparing the requirements for	24	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. In that case,
25	stair doors in 1974 as opposed to the requirements set	25	we'll rise now and resume at 2 o'clock, please.
	Page 81		Page 83
1	out now in Approved Document B.	1	(12.25 pm)
2	In both 1974 and 2011, stair doors were required to	2	(The short adjournment)
3	be self-closing. In 1974, an integrity fire resistance	3	(2.00 pm)
4	rating of 30 minutes was required; current standards	4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
5	would be for a 60-minute integrity rating. In 1974	5	MS GRANGE: Thank you. Dr Lane is going to continue with
6	a 25-millimetre rebate was required; the current	6	the second half of your presentation.
7	standard would require smoke seals with prescribed	7	DR LANE: Thank you.
8	limits on airflow. I observed in Grenfell Tower that	8	Okay, I am just going to finish on works before the
9	the rebate was 12 millimetres, not 25, on the stair fire	9	primary refurbishment and so discuss the gas supply
10	doors. A 12-millimetre rebate would indicate that this	10	replacement works that were underway the night of the
11	is a 20-minute fire door.	11	fire.
12	To summarise the fire door provision within	12	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
13	Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017, 106 of the 120 flat	13	DR LANE: Regarding Grenfell Tower, I'm interested in gas
14	entrance doors were replaced which Suredor GRP doors.	14	supplies for two specific fire safety-related issues
15	The remaining 14 doors comprised of leaseholder flats	15	only.
16	and two tenanted flats. They are assumed to be original	16	First, the supply of gas through Grenfell Tower
17	doors; however, few remain to be investigated. The lift	17	penetrated multiple compartments. How those
18	landing doors were replaced in the 2005 lift works with	18	penetrations were protected to maintain compartmentation
19	no specified fire resistance. The stair fire doors have	19	is therefore relevant to the stay-put strategy.
20	no documentation or records defining any replacement, so	20	The second issue of interest is the provision made
21	it is assumed they are the original doors as installed	21	with respect to shutting off the gas supplies during
22	and appear to have fire resistance of 20 minutes.	22	a fire. This is important when considering gas as
23	For the refuse chute room doors, currently no	23	a fuel source in a room or a flat during a fire.
24	documentation or records of the replacements are	24	Gas safety matters are the subject of investigation
25	available and so it is assumed they are the original	25	by the gas expert appointed to the inquiry,
	Page 82		Page 84

21 (Pages 81 to 84)

1	Rodney Hancox, and his work will include gas shut-off	1	vertically up four shafts in the building core. The
2	issues. The inquiry will then need to understand any	2	term used for a vertical pipe that distributes upwards
3	additional fire scenarios where caused by gas supply	3	through a building is "riser".
4	when his work is completed.	4	These four gas risers continued up the building and,
5	I investigated the gas service installations at	5	at some point between the basement level and level 4,
6	Grenfell Tower by reviewing design and construction	6	the four risers were split into six. This split and its
7	documentation and by observing evidence on site.	7	location requires further investigation.
8	I relied on two services specialists I work with at	8	However, what is clear is these six risers continued
9	Arup, Mr Joe Wade and Mr Conor Hoey, in particular when	9	up the building to level 23. One of each of these six
10	trying to decipher the gas supply routes throughout the	10	risers passed through each flat. These original gas
11	tower. During our site inspections on 7, 8 and	11	risers connected every floor of Grenfell Tower from
12	9 November 2017, my team located the gas supplies and	12	basement level to level 23.
13	traced the pipework to understand how the systems were	13	The gas risers passed through each compartment
14	distributed throughout Grenfell Tower. This was	14	floor, connecting all the compartments they passed
15	a complex process, particularly within the basement.	15	through. Therefore, these risers are also required to
16	My findings as a result, and as they relate to fire	16	be protected to maintain compartmentation.
17	safety compartmentation requirements only, are	17	Approved Document B requires that pipes which
18	summarised in the following presentation.	18	penetrate a compartment are to be protected in one of
19	There were two original gas supplies in	19	two ways: the pipe should be fire-stopped at every
20	Grenfell Tower.	20	compartment wall or floor that it penetrates, or the
21	The first gas supply I refer as to the landlord	21	pipe should be enclosed, with the protected shaft formed
22	supply. This served boilers that provided communal	22	with fire-resisting construction. Where gas pipes are
23	heating and hot water for Grenfell Tower, as well as the	23	enclosed in protected shafts, they also require
24	three finger blocks located south of Grenfell Tower.	24	ventilation at the top and bottom of the shaft for
25	The landlord gas supply entered Grenfell Tower through	25	safety reasons.
	Page 85		Page 87
1	the cost building elevation	1	It is important to note that Approved Degument P
1	the east building elevation.	1	It is important to note that Approved Document B
2	It entered at a high level within the basement	2	states that gas service and installation pipes should
2 3	It entered at a high level within the basement level, nearly 5 metres above finished floor level. The	2 3	states that gas service and installation pipes should not be incorporated within a protected stairway unless
2 3 4	It entered at a high level within the basement level, nearly 5 metres above finished floor level. The landlord gas supply was then routed horizontally along	2 3 4	states that gas service and installation pipes should not be incorporated within a protected stairway unless the gas installation is in accordance with the
2 3 4 5	It entered at a high level within the basement level, nearly 5 metres above finished floor level. The landlord gas supply was then routed horizontally along the basement level where it served the original boilers.	2 3 4 5	states that gas service and installation pipes should not be incorporated within a protected stairway unless the gas installation is in accordance with the requirements for installation and connection set out in
2 3 4 5 6	It entered at a high level within the basement level, nearly 5 metres above finished floor level. The landlord gas supply was then routed horizontally along the basement level where it served the original boilers. During the primary refurbishment, new boilers were	2 3 4 5 6	states that gas service and installation pipes should not be incorporated within a protected stairway unless the gas installation is in accordance with the requirements for installation and connection set out in the Pipelines Safety Regulations and the Gas Safety
2 3 4 5 6 7	It entered at a high level within the basement level, nearly 5 metres above finished floor level. The landlord gas supply was then routed horizontally along the basement level where it served the original boilers. During the primary refurbishment, new boilers were installed to provide a new central heating system for	2 3 4 5 6 7	states that gas service and installation pipes should not be incorporated within a protected stairway unless the gas installation is in accordance with the requirements for installation and connection set out in the Pipelines Safety Regulations and the Gas Safety (Installation and Use) Regulations.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	It entered at a high level within the basement level, nearly 5 metres above finished floor level. The landlord gas supply was then routed horizontally along the basement level where it served the original boilers. During the primary refurbishment, new boilers were installed to provide a new central heating system for Grenfell Tower. The original landlord gas supply was	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	states that gas service and installation pipes should not be incorporated within a protected stairway unless the gas installation is in accordance with the requirements for installation and connection set out in the Pipelines Safety Regulations and the Gas Safety (Installation and Use) Regulations. These specific requirements are not provided within
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	It entered at a high level within the basement level, nearly 5 metres above finished floor level. The landlord gas supply was then routed horizontally along the basement level where it served the original boilers. During the primary refurbishment, new boilers were installed to provide a new central heating system for Grenfell Tower. The original landlord gas supply was therefore extended to serve these new boilers.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	states that gas service and installation pipes should not be incorporated within a protected stairway unless the gas installation is in accordance with the requirements for installation and connection set out in the Pipelines Safety Regulations and the Gas Safety (Installation and Use) Regulations. These specific requirements are not provided within Approved Document B for fire safety and they require
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	It entered at a high level within the basement level, nearly 5 metres above finished floor level. The landlord gas supply was then routed horizontally along the basement level where it served the original boilers. During the primary refurbishment, new boilers were installed to provide a new central heating system for Grenfell Tower. The original landlord gas supply was therefore extended to serve these new boilers. The original boilers were retained and they	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	states that gas service and installation pipes should not be incorporated within a protected stairway unless the gas installation is in accordance with the requirements for installation and connection set out in the Pipelines Safety Regulations and the Gas Safety (Installation and Use) Regulations. These specific requirements are not provided within Approved Document B for fire safety and they require other safety measures to be installed, for example for
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1     flats were in fiss flat 2 becation on the southeast     1     appointed gas expert at this time.       2     corner. Therefore, 13 flats were afficient by the gas     1     The horizontal pipes that supplid gas to flats in       4     transport of the source of the lat 2     The horizontal pipes that supplit gas to flats in       5     The other five rises supplying gas to flats in     1     and the protected stair compartment wall. The pipe       6     boation 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 on each floor between     6     should be five-stopped at each compartment wall. The pipe       7     presting and pipes that remained in     8     1     understand that these works to the horizontal       9     operation and were present the night of the fire is also     0     10     10     and the protected stair.       11     Horsever, an entirely new residential gas supply with the cast building elevation taks     1     11     14 June 2017.       12     The location 2     0     10     11     14 June 2017.       13     server through the cast building elevation also     10     10     10     10       14     This location 2.     10     11     14 June 2017.     10     10     10       14     This location 2.     11     14 June 2017.     10     10     10     10       15     the coundition of which				
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3       leak and subsequent decommissioning of the flat 2       3       location 2 therefore left his vertical itser in the         4       related gar rise in 2016.       sati, penetrated the protected stari compartment wall         6       hould be fire-stopped at cach compartment wall in the pipe         7       hevels 4 and 23 remained in service. The configion of         9       operation and vere present the night of the its is also         10       being investigated by the other expert.         11       Thowever, an entirely new residential gas supply was         11       Thowever, an entirely new residential gas supply in a started the protected stari         12       On 14 Anne 2017 there were three gas supply in pipe was then routed from the east elevation of the         13       served flats in location 2.         14       June 2017 there were three gas supply in pipe was then routed from the east elevation of the         15       free meet the tower at hower how then routed vertical up up to east on the night of the and incomplete vertilation works and incomplete vertilating were installed learing out<	2	corner. Therefore, 13 flats were affected by the gas	2	The horizontal pipes that supplied gas to flats in
4       static prectated by the protected static compartment wall         5       The other five sizes supplying as to flats in         6       location 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 on each floor between         7       levels 4 and 23 remained in service. The condition of         8       remained in service. The condition of         9       operation and ware present the night of the fire is also         9       operation and ware present the night of the fire is also         11       However, an entirely new residential gas supply was         12       instalked to replace the decommissioned riser that         13       served flats in location 2.         14       This new residential gas supply with the down makes to more three gas supplies in         15       freendefl Tower frong lags supply with the import on the cast elevation of the         16       the suifuing, where it was then routed vertically up the         17       the building, where it was then outed vertically up the         18       the duffing the fire is and over to sorve flat 2.         19       the building, where it was then outed vertically up the         20       A new vertical route was chosen through the         21       the suifur of the fire summary flat summary the summary summar	3		3	location 2 therefore left this vertical riser in the
6       location 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 on each floor between       6       should be first-stoped at each compariment wall it         7       levels 4 and 23 remained in service. The condition of the sets five other original gars sizes that termained in       7       penetrates or enclosed with a protected shall.         8       these five other original gars sizes that termained in       7       penetrates or enclosed with a protected shall.         9       operation and were present the night of the fire is also       9       pies were planed for June 2017, Athouse works had commenced by         11       However, an entirely new residential gas supply with the east building elevation also.       11       14 June 2017.         12       On 14 June 2017 athouse works had commenced by       11       14 June 2017.         13       served filts in location 2       11       14 June 2017.         14       This new residential gas supply with no impact on tompaction, an original residential gas supply.       11       14 June 2017.         14       trendered that with the east building elevation also.       16       and a new residential gas supply. with a impact on compartmentation, an original residential gas supply.         16       trendered that with a star or model vertically up the first is a star.       16       and a new residential gas supply.         17       the weelf star in down ore to serve fith a 2 locacations, as had previously occurred. Horizo	4	related gas riser in 2016.	4	stair, penetrated the protected stair compartment wall
1       levels 4 and 23 remained in service. The condition of the set also process of the other original gas risers that remained in a operation and were present the night of the fire is also point investigated by the other expert.       1       Iunderstand that these works to the horizontal pipes were planned for June 2017, although 1 have seen no evidence that any of thoses works had commenced by installed to replace the decommissioned riser that is installed the replace the decommissioned riser that is installed to replace the decommissioned riser that is installed to replace the replace the cover athet the core of the cover th	5	The other five risers supplying gas to flats in	5	and then penetrated the flat compartment wall. The pipe
8       these five other original gas srisers that remained in operation and were present the hight of the fire is also being investigated by the other expert.       8       Funderstand that these works to the horizontal pipes were planned for June 2017, although I have seen or evidence that may of those works had commerced by the same hulding las supply was installed to replace the decommissioned riser that served flats in location 2.         11       However, an entirely new residential gas supply was instanced the decommissioned riser that served flats in location 2.       11       14       June 2017.         12       This new residential gas supply, was informed the decommissioned riser that served the tower at basement level. The gas supply, which had incomplete compartmentation works and incomplete ventilation works and incomplete ventilation.         19       the building, where it was then routed vertically up the twoe.       18       the might of the fire.         21       A new vertical route was chosen through the ray optical data gas supply, which had incomplete contained which had incomplete vereintation.       19       that works and incomplete vertilation.         22       protected stair from the stair protected stair from the two cores.       18       the wide had protected stair from the stair exiting into each the form that vertical route was chosen through the stair stait by fire-resisting compartmentation was substantial and the twork was the related the towner the stair sto the asset corner.       20	6	location 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 on each floor between	6	should be fire-stopped at each compartment wall it
9     operation and very present the night of the fire is also being investigated by the other expert.     9     pipes were planned for June 2017, there were three gas supplies in no evidence that any of those works had commenced by       12     installed to replace the decommissioned riser that served flass in location 2.     11     14 June 2017.       13     served flass in location 2.     00 14 June 2017 there were three gas supplies in or evidence that any of those works had commenced by       14     This new residential gas supply entered     12     00 14 June 2017.       14     This new residential gas supply entered     14     compartmentation; an original residential gas supply, which had incomplete compartmentation works and incomplete ventilation works the night of the fire.       19     the building, where it was them routed vertically up the protected stair from levels 2 to 21, rather than directly through the flat 2 locations, as had previously correct.     20     Naw, Vertical route was chosen through the protected stair from levels 2 to 21, rather than directly through the flat 2 locations, as had previously correct.     21     SIR MARTIN MOORE-BCK: Thenk you.       23     directly through the flat 2.     These horizontal pipes penetrated the protected stair compartment wall and the flat compartment wall and the flat compartment wall and the sturb stormer.     23     SIR MARTIN MOORE-BCK: Thenk you.       24     The southese correct.     Page 91     24     The refurbishment.       25     refurbishment the flat comparintent wall and the flat compartment wall an	7	levels 4 and 23 remained in service. The condition of	7	penetrates or enclosed with a protected shaft.
10       being investigated by the other expert.       10       no evidence that any of those works had commenced by         11       However, an entirely new residential gas supply entered       11       12       0       14 June 2017.         12       Formfell Tower through the cast huilding devation also.       13       Grenfell Tower through the cast huilding devation of the       14       13       Grenfell Tower through the cast huilding devation of the         13       building to the southeast service shaft in the core of       14       and a new residential gas supply which had incomplete         14       A new vertical route was chosen through the       16       17       propertiestation which had incomplete         15       the routient of the southeast service shaft in the core of       18       the night of the fire.         12       A new vertical route was chosen through the       18       building, where it was then routed vertically up the         16       troit and over to serve flat 2. These       10       Thank you.       20       Okay, for the remainder of the alternoon, Pm going         17       the vertical route was chosen through the       18       building of the stair and over to serve flat 2. These       18       Device the stair and over to serve flat 2. These         16       thorizontal pipes perticated the protected stair       17       primary refurbishment was finded	8	these five other original gas risers that remained in	8	I understand that these works to the horizontal
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13       served flats in location 2.       13       Grenfell Tower: residential gas supply, with no impact on compartmentation; an original residential gas supply, the condition of which is currently being investigated;         14       This new residential gas supply entered       14       compartmentation; an original residential gas supply, the condition of which is currently being investigated;         15       the thuilding, the southeast service shaft in the core of the building, where it was then routed vertically up the tower.       16       and a new residential gas supply, which had incomplete ventilation works and incomplete ventilation works and incomplete ventilation works and incomplete ventilation works and in a new residential gas supply which had incomplete ventilation works and in the proceeding of the aftermoon, I'm going         21       A new vertical route was chosen through the tower.       18       the night of the fire.         23       directly through the flat 2 locations, as had previously of from that vertical riser in the stair, exiting into each       20       Okay, for the remainder of the aftermoon, I'm going         24       botizontal pipes mentrated the protected stair and over to serve flat 2. These horizontal pipes penetrated the protected stair short within the lobby. This was to be the free case at every level requiring a residential gas supply       1       primary refurbishment.         25       relevant storey. Within the lobber, This was to be the free star at ory. Within the lobber, This was to be the free star at ory. Within the lobber, this was to be the free star shory. The star at level 2. Learently have no info	11	However, an entirely new residential gas supply was	11	14 June 2017.
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15       Grenfell Tower through the east building elevation also.       15       the condition of which is currently being investigated;         16       It entered the tower at basement level. The gas supply       16       and a new residential gas supply, which had incomplete         17       pipe was then routed from the east elevation of the building, where it was then routed vertically up the       16       and a new residential gas supply, which had incomplete         18       building to the southeast service shaft in the core of       18       the night of the frinc.         19       Thank you.       20       Okay, for the remainder of the alternoon, I'm going         21       A new vertical route was chosen through the       21       to talk about the primary feurbishment.         23       directly through the flat 2 locations, as had previously       23       DR LANE: Whith an overview of the whole thing first.         24       Deby outside the stair and over to serve flat 2. These       16       primary refurbishment.         25       refurbishment was funded by the Royal Borough of       7         36       were yible from whith the tower. These horizontal pipes partent wall and the fat compartment wall and the fat compartment wall as subtriming the safet if that pipe is completely separated from         26       mot considered to be contained within a protected stair shaft if that pipe is completely separated from         27       n	13	served flats in location 2.	13	Grenfell Tower: a landlord gas supply with no impact on
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17       pipe was then routed from the east elevation of the building to the southeast service shaft in the core of the building, where it was then routed vertically up the tower.       17       compartmentation works and incomplete ventilation works         20       A new vertical route was chosen through the tower.       18       the night of the fire.         21       A new vertical route was chosen through the tower.       10       Thank you.         23       directly through the flat 2 locations, as had previously occurred. Horizontal pipes were installed leading out from that vertical riser in the stair, exiting into each       23       DR LANE: With an overview of the whole thing first.         24       bobby outside the stair and over to serve flat 2. These horizontal pipes penetrated the protected stair compartment wall and the flat compartment wall on each relevant storey within the tobby. This was to be the case at every level requiring a residential gas supply in the southeast corner.       1       primary refurbishment was funded by the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and the Rydon general scope of the refurbishment vert released in 2012.         18       that protected stair from that protected stair shaft by fire-resisting construction.       1       primary refurbishment was funded by the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and the funds for the refurbishment of two lifts to include two new doors.         9       Approved Document B for fire safety advises a pipe is not considered to be contained within a protected star shaft if that prise is completely separated from that protecid stair shaft by fire-resisting construction.	15	Grenfell Tower through the east building elevation also.	15	the condition of which is currently being investigated;
18       building to the southeast service shaft in the core of         19       the building, where it was then routed vertically up the         20       tower.         21       A new vertical route was chosen through the         23       protected stair from levels 2 to 21, rather than         23       directly through the flat 2 locations, as had previously         24       occurred. Horizontal pipes were installed leading out         25       from that vertical riser in the stair, exiting into each         26       Page 89         27       horizontal pipes penetrated the protected stair         3       compartment wall and the flat compartment wall on each         4       relevant storey within the tower.         5       pipes ran under the false ceiling in each lobby and so         6       were visible from within the lobby. This was to be the         7       case at every level requiring a residential gas supply         10       is not considered to be contained within a protected         11       tobby outside the vertical pipe within the stair to         7       proyed Document B         6       were visible from within the tower.         7       project as follows:         8       Adption of two olifts to include two new doors.         9 <t< td=""><td>16</td><td>It entered the tower at basement level. The gas supply</td><td>16</td><td>and a new residential gas supply, which had incomplete</td></t<>	16	It entered the tower at basement level. The gas supply	16	and a new residential gas supply, which had incomplete
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Page 89       Page 91         1       lobby outside the stair and over to serve flat 2. These       1       primary refurbishment.         2       horizontal pipes penetrated the protected stair       2       The refurbishment was funded by the Royal Borough of         3       compartment wall and the flat compartment wall on each       3       Kensington and Chelsea and the funds for the         4       relevant storey within the tower. These horizontal       5       The primary refurbishment was substantial and         5       were visible from within the lobby. This was to be the       6       I would like to read the Rydon general scope of the         7       case at every level requiring a residential gas supply       5       The primary refurbishment was substantial and         10       is not considered to be contained within a protected       1       would like to read the Rydon general scope of the         11       stair shaft if that pipe is completely separated from       11       additional residential accommodation (nine new flats).         12       that protected stair shaft by fire-resisting       12       Relocation and refurbishment of the hoxing club.         13       Relocation and refurbishment of the nursery.       13       Relocation for ew community room.         14       Tobserved the vertical pipe within the stair to       14       Provision of new community room. </td <td>24</td> <td>occurred. Horizontal pipes were installed leading out</td> <td>24</td> <td>Between 2012 and 2016, the TMO commissioned a major</td>	24	occurred. Horizontal pipes were installed leading out	24	Between 2012 and 2016, the TMO commissioned a major
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2horizontal pipes penetrated the protected stair compartment wall and the flat compartment wall on each relevant storey within the tower. These horizontal2The refurbishment was funded by the Royal Borough of3compartment wall and the flat compartment wall on each relevant storey within the tower. These horizontal3Kensington and Chelsea and the funds for the refurbishment was substantial and4relevant storey within the tobby. This was to be the case at every level requiring a residential gas supply in the southeast corner.5The primary refurbishment was substantial and I would like to read the Rydon general scope of the project as follows:9Approved Document B for fire safety advises a pipe is not considered to be contained within a protected stair shaft if that pipe is completely separated from that protected stair shaft by fire-resisting construction.8Adaption of two lifts to include two new doors.12that protected stair shaft by fire-resisting construction.12Relocated and refurbishment of the podium levels to provide additional residential accommodation (nine new flats).14I observed the vertical pipe within the stair to have been enclosed by construction, as shown in this imformation available to me as to the fire performance possible from that construction.1819Where a gas pipe is enclosed, Approved Document B states:19New heating system to all areas.21"8.41. A protected shaft conveying piped flammable gas should be adequately ventilated direct to the outside air by ventilation openings at high and low level in the shaft."2122This condition is being explored by the in	1	lobby outside the stair and over to serve flat 2. These	1	primary refurbishment
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25This condition is being explored by the inquiry's25Alterations to the door entry system.			23	environmental ventilation systems.
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Page 90 Page 92	23 24	outside air by ventilation openings at high and low level in the shaft."	24	Alterations to the dry riser system.
	23 24	outside air by ventilation openings at high and low level in the shaft." This condition is being explored by the inquiry's	24	Alterations to the dry riser system. Alterations to the door entry system.

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1	External hand and asft landscening	1	lavel 2. At the third floor, four new flots were
1	External hard and soft landscaping.	1 2	level 2. At the third floor, four new flats were
2	The project scope included external works. The	$\begin{vmatrix} 2\\ 3 \end{vmatrix}$	provided, resulting in a total of nine.
3 4	image on screen shows the contract boundary for the works as defined in 2012. External works	4	Reconfiguring these internal spaces caused the need to reconfigure the lift and stair access and so make
5	included: demolition of an existing circular ramp	5	them fully available at those levels also.
	connecting the level 2 walkway to the play area to the	6	As I have already explained this morning, the small
6 7	west of Grenfell Tower; demolition of an existing	7	lift that originally served ground level to level 3 was
8	walkway that connected level 2 to the grass area to the	8	demolished. Access to the main lifts was then modified
0 9	north of the tower; and new hard and soft landscaping	9	so that these two lifts could now be accessed from
10	within the contract boundary on the north, south, east	10	levels 1 and 3, as originally they were not. I have
10	and west sides of the tower.	11	explained the modifications to the lift and will not
11	According to the sustainability and energy statement	12	explain them any further.
12	for the primary refurbishment, improving the insulation	12	With regard to the existing stairs, modifications
13	levels of the walls, roof and windows was the top	13	were made to stairs between ground level and level 3.
15	priority of this refurbishment. The chosen strategy is	15	No modifications were made to the central stair from
16	to wrap the building in a thick layer of insulation and	16	level 4 to roof. Three small internal stairs were
10	then over-clad with a rainscreen to protect the	17	demolished between ground and level 3. The location of
18	insulation from the weather and from physical damage.	18	these stairs is highlighted in red in the left-hand
19	The resulting works can be summarised as follows:	19	image.
20	The overcladding of the building envelope at ground	20	New balconies were constructed, highlighted green in
21	comprised a glass reinforced concrete cladding to the	21	the right-hand image, to connect a new open stair in the
22	columns and the installation of glazed curtain walls to	22	new multi-storey entrance lobby located in the southeast
23	the new entrance lobby on the southeast corner.	23	corner, highlighted in blue, over to the central and
24	From levels 1 to 23, it consisted of the addition of	24	closed lobby at levels 1 and 2. From level 3, access
25	a drained and ventilated rainscreen cladding system,	25	via the main central protected stair and lobby was
_			
	Page 93		Page 95
1	which comprised of a backing wall by means of the	1	provided.
2	existing tower external wall and a cavity containing	2	The internal changes from ground to level 3 also
3	thermal insulation, and an outer layer formed with	3	required modifications to the existing internal fire
4	rainscreen cladding panels.	4	main so that it became accessible at these levels. The
5	Two different types of rainscreen cladding panels	5	existing smoke control system was also modified to
6	were used at first and second floor, a product called	6	incorporate the new lobbies at ground, level 1, 2 and 3.
7	CGL wall plank, and then from levels 3 to 23,	7	The operation of the system was changed and new power
8	a Reynobond 55 PE aluminium composite panel in two	8	supplies and controls were also provided during the
9	colours: pure white for the horizontal panels at third	9	refurbishment.
10	floor only, and smoke silver colour provided on all	10	A new heating system and booster cold water system
11	columns and all horizontal panels on levels 4 to 23 and	11	were provided in the building. This required works in
12	the crown of the building. New double glazed windows	12	all lobbies, all flats and all non-residential spaces.
13	and insulating core panels between them were installed.	13	Inside every existing flat, work was required to
14	I have focused my analysis in my Phase 1 report on	14	install a new heat interface unit for individual control
15	the external wall construction of the original	15	of heating and hot water, and new low temperature hot
16	residential floors. The cladding on the lower floors	16	water pipes to supply that heat interface unit and new
17	was not involved in the fire.	17	cold water pipes. A total of 440 radiators were
18	There were many changes made to the internal layouts	18	installed.
19	of ground level to level 3. A new, tall entrance lobby	19	The primary refurbishment therefore
20	was created, with a new open staircase within it. A new	20	included: substantial work inside the building on all
21	community room was provided at ground level. The	21	levels; the overcladding on all levels of the exterior
22	nursery was moved from the first floor down to ground.	22	of the building; it included works done externally,
23 24	At the first floor, a second community room and four new flots were provided. A new flot was provided at level 2	23	demolition of ramps and walkways and hard and soft
24 25	flats were provided. A new flat was provided at level 2 and the boxing club was moved from ground level up to	24 25	landscaping within the contract boundary. I will focus in detail on the rainscreen cladding
23	and the boxing club was moved from ground level up to	2.5	i will focus in detail on the famscreen clauding
1	Page 94		Page 96

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1	component of the primary refurbishment works later, but	1	fire doors were provided to the modified protected stair
2	first I would like to provide more information about	2	enclosure at those lower levels.
3	some of the other works done to Grenfell Tower during	3	Some of the existing fire safety systems in the
4	the primary refurbishment, and so I will provide more	4	residential areas at level 4 and above were then
5	information on each of the external works, the	5	extended down to serve these reconfigured levels. These
6	reconfiguration of lower floors, the fire main works,	6	fire safety systems included the firefighting lifts, dry
7	the refurbishment of the existing smoke control system,	7	rising main and the smoke control system.
8	the new heating and hot water system and the new cold	8	According to the design guidance referenced at the
9	water system. This is in order to provide greater	9	time of the original construction, buildings over
10	clarity on how those works impacted the fire safety	10	60 metres required a wet fire main. According to the
11	features in Grenfell Tower.	11	wording in the design guidance, the building height was
12	The contract boundary for the primary refurbishment	12	to be measured to any floor of the building. The plant
13	is outlined in red. According to the primary	13	room was 65.5 metres above ground in Grenfell Tower.
14	refurbishment design documentation, external hard and	14	Therefore, a wet fire main was required when the tower
15	soft landscaping was provided within this boundary.	15	was originally constructed. However, a dry main was
16	There were changes to external pedestrian access to	16	provided.
17	Grenfell Tower. The external walkway that connected the	17	Works were carried out to this existing dry main
18	north side of level 2 to the grass area was demolished.	18	during the primary refurbishment. The inlet valve which
19	The external walkway that connected Grenfell Tower to	19	is used by the Fire Brigade to charge the fire main with
20	the finger blocks at level 2 was closed at the south	20	water was relocated from the central core of the
21	building envelope, and the circular ramp, as I said,	21	building at ground level to the exterior of the
22	that connected this walkway to the play area west of the	22	building, next to the main entrance on the south
23	tower was demolished.	23	elevation.
24	As a result of the circular ramp demolition, the	24	New piping connected this new inlet to the existing
25	pedestrian path between the area south of	25	main. Vertical and horizontal piping was installed as
	Page 97		Page 99
1	Grenfell Tower, where the main building entrance is	1	part of these works. I do not know the exact route or
1	Grenfell Tower, where the main building entrance is located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became	1	part of these works. I do not know the exact route or length of piping added however, the new inlet is
2	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became	2	length of piping added; however, the new inlet is
	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path.	2 3	length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the
2 3	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south,	2 3 4	length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main.
2 3 4	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately	2 3 4 5	length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main. New connections for firefighting hoses were
2 3 4 5	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately around the tower, within the contract boundary.	2 3 4 5 6	length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main. New connections for firefighting hoses were installed at the first, second and third floor, so that
2 3 4 5 6	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately around the tower, within the contract boundary. As I explained earlier, the primary fire vehicle	2 3 4 5 6 7	length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main. New connections for firefighting hoses were
2 3 4 5 6 7	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately around the tower, within the contract boundary. As I explained earlier, the primary fire vehicle access to Grenfell Tower was via Grenfell Road on the	2 3 4 5 6	length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main. New connections for firefighting hoses were installed at the first, second and third floor, so that the dry rising main served every floor above ground level.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately around the tower, within the contract boundary. As I explained earlier, the primary fire vehicle	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main. New connections for firefighting hoses were installed at the first, second and third floor, so that the dry rising main served every floor above ground level. At the time of the primary refurbishment, the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately around the tower, within the contract boundary. As I explained earlier, the primary fire vehicle access to Grenfell Tower was via Grenfell Road on the south side. During my site visits, I observed that the fire access to the south and east elevations was	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main. New connections for firefighting hoses were installed at the first, second and third floor, so that the dry rising main served every floor above ground level. At the time of the primary refurbishment, the existing smoke control system was reaching the end of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately around the tower, within the contract boundary. As I explained earlier, the primary fire vehicle access to Grenfell Tower was via Grenfell Road on the south side. During my site visits, I observed that the fire access to the south and east elevations was maintained after the primary refurbishment.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main. New connections for firefighting hoses were installed at the first, second and third floor, so that the dry rising main served every floor above ground level. At the time of the primary refurbishment, the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately around the tower, within the contract boundary. As I explained earlier, the primary fire vehicle access to Grenfell Tower was via Grenfell Road on the south side. During my site visits, I observed that the fire access to the south and east elevations was maintained after the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the left shows the fire vehicle	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main. New connections for firefighting hoses were installed at the first, second and third floor, so that the dry rising main served every floor above ground level. At the time of the primary refurbishment, the existing smoke control system was reaching the end of its serviceable life. The smoke control system was
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately around the tower, within the contract boundary. As I explained earlier, the primary fire vehicle access to Grenfell Tower was via Grenfell Road on the south side. During my site visits, I observed that the fire access to the south and east elevations was maintained after the primary refurbishment.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main. New connections for firefighting hoses were installed at the first, second and third floor, so that the dry rising main served every floor above ground level. At the time of the primary refurbishment, the existing smoke control system was reaching the end of its serviceable life. The smoke control system was refurbished to improve performance and reliability, as I understand matters.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately around the tower, within the contract boundary. As I explained earlier, the primary fire vehicle access to Grenfell Tower was via Grenfell Road on the south side. During my site visits, I observed that the fire access to the south and east elevations was maintained after the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the left shows the fire vehicle access route leading to the south side of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main. New connections for firefighting hoses were installed at the first, second and third floor, so that the dry rising main served every floor above ground level. At the time of the primary refurbishment, the existing smoke control system was reaching the end of its serviceable life. The smoke control system was refurbished to improve performance and reliability, as I understand matters. It was also changed from a stand-alone smoke control
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately around the tower, within the contract boundary. As I explained earlier, the primary fire vehicle access to Grenfell Tower was via Grenfell Road on the south side. During my site visits, I observed that the fire access to the south and east elevations was maintained after the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the left shows the fire vehicle access route leading to the south side of Grenfell Tower. The area underneath the elevated	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main. New connections for firefighting hoses were installed at the first, second and third floor, so that the dry rising main served every floor above ground level. At the time of the primary refurbishment, the existing smoke control system was reaching the end of its serviceable life. The smoke control system was refurbished to improve performance and reliability, as I understand matters.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately around the tower, within the contract boundary. As I explained earlier, the primary fire vehicle access to Grenfell Tower was via Grenfell Road on the south side. During my site visits, I observed that the fire access to the south and east elevations was maintained after the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the left shows the fire vehicle access route leading to the south side of Grenfell Tower. The area underneath the elevated concrete walkway was within the contract boundary of the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main. New connections for firefighting hoses were installed at the first, second and third floor, so that the dry rising main served every floor above ground level. At the time of the primary refurbishment, the existing smoke control system was reaching the end of its serviceable life. The smoke control system was refurbished to improve performance and reliability, as I understand matters. It was also changed from a stand-alone smoke control system to a combined smoke control system and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately around the tower, within the contract boundary. As I explained earlier, the primary fire vehicle access to Grenfell Tower was via Grenfell Road on the south side. During my site visits, I observed that the fire access to the south and east elevations was maintained after the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the left shows the fire vehicle access route leading to the south side of Grenfell Tower. The area underneath the elevated concrete walkway was within the contract boundary of the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the right	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main. New connections for firefighting hoses were installed at the first, second and third floor, so that the dry rising main served every floor above ground level. At the time of the primary refurbishment, the existing smoke control system was reaching the end of its serviceable life. The smoke control system was refurbished to improve performance and reliability, as I understand matters. It was also changed from a stand-alone smoke control system to a combined smoke control system and environmental system. The environmental system was
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately around the tower, within the contract boundary. As I explained earlier, the primary fire vehicle access to Grenfell Tower was via Grenfell Road on the south side. During my site visits, I observed that the fire access to the south and east elevations was maintained after the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the left shows the fire vehicle access route leading to the south side of Grenfell Tower. The area underneath the elevated concrete walkway was within the contract boundary of the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the right shows the hardstanding on the east side of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main. New connections for firefighting hoses were installed at the first, second and third floor, so that the dry rising main served every floor above ground level. At the time of the primary refurbishment, the existing smoke control system was reaching the end of its serviceable life. The smoke control system was refurbished to improve performance and reliability, as I understand matters. It was also changed from a stand-alone smoke control system to a combined smoke control system and environmental system. The environmental system was installed to mitigate the heat gains from the new
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately around the tower, within the contract boundary. As I explained earlier, the primary fire vehicle access to Grenfell Tower was via Grenfell Road on the south side. During my site visits, I observed that the fire access to the south and east elevations was maintained after the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the left shows the fire vehicle access route leading to the south side of Grenfell Tower. The area underneath the elevated concrete walkway was within the contract boundary of the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the right shows the hardstanding on the east side of Grenfell Tower. A new hardstanding was provided to this	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main. New connections for firefighting hoses were installed at the first, second and third floor, so that the dry rising main served every floor above ground level. At the time of the primary refurbishment, the existing smoke control system was reaching the end of its serviceable life. The smoke control system was refurbished to improve performance and reliability, as I understand matters. It was also changed from a stand-alone smoke control system to a combined smoke control system and environmental system. The environmental system was installed to mitigate the heat gains from the new communal heating system.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately around the tower, within the contract boundary. As I explained earlier, the primary fire vehicle access to Grenfell Tower was via Grenfell Road on the south side. During my site visits, I observed that the fire access to the south and east elevations was maintained after the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the left shows the fire vehicle access route leading to the south side of Grenfell Tower. The area underneath the elevated concrete walkway was within the contract boundary of the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the right shows the hardstanding on the east side of Grenfell Tower. A new hardstanding was provided to this area during the primary refurbishment.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main. New connections for firefighting hoses were installed at the first, second and third floor, so that the dry rising main served every floor above ground level. At the time of the primary refurbishment, the existing smoke control system was reaching the end of its serviceable life. The smoke control system was refurbished to improve performance and reliability, as I understand matters. It was also changed from a stand-alone smoke control system to a combined smoke control system and environmental system. The environmental system was installed to mitigate the heat gains from the new communal heating system.
$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ \end{array} $	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately around the tower, within the contract boundary. As I explained earlier, the primary fire vehicle access to Grenfell Tower was via Grenfell Road on the south side. During my site visits, I observed that the fire access to the south and east elevations was maintained after the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the left shows the fire vehicle access route leading to the south side of Grenfell Tower. The area underneath the elevated concrete walkway was within the contract boundary of the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the right shows the hardstanding on the east side of Grenfell Tower. A new hardstanding was provided to this area during the primary refurbishment.	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ \end{array} $	<ul> <li>length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main.</li> <li>New connections for firefighting hoses were installed at the first, second and third floor, so that the dry rising main served every floor above ground level.</li> <li>At the time of the primary refurbishment, the existing smoke control system was reaching the end of its serviceable life. The smoke control system was refurbished to improve performance and reliability, as I understand matters.</li> <li>It was also changed from a stand-alone smoke control system to a combined smoke control system and environmental system. The environmental system was installed to mitigate the heat gains from the new communal heating system.</li> <li>The original smoke control system in Grenfell Tower included a fresh air shaft and a smoke extract shaft</li> </ul>
$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ \end{array} $	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately around the tower, within the contract boundary. As I explained earlier, the primary fire vehicle access to Grenfell Tower was via Grenfell Road on the south side. During my site visits, I observed that the fire access to the south and east elevations was maintained after the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the left shows the fire vehicle access route leading to the south side of Grenfell Tower. The area underneath the elevated concrete walkway was within the contract boundary of the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the right shows the hardstanding on the east side of Grenfell Tower. A new hardstanding was provided to this area during the primary refurbishment.	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ \end{array} $	<ul> <li>length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main.</li> <li>New connections for firefighting hoses were installed at the first, second and third floor, so that the dry rising main served every floor above ground level.</li> <li>At the time of the primary refurbishment, the existing smoke control system was reaching the end of its serviceable life. The smoke control system was refurbished to improve performance and reliability, as I understand matters.</li> <li>It was also changed from a stand-alone smoke control system to a combined smoke control system and environmental system. The environmental system was installed to mitigate the heat gains from the new communal heating system.</li> <li>The original smoke control system in Grenfell Tower included a fresh air shaft and a smoke extract shaft serving all of the residential lobbies. It had no</li> </ul>
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately around the tower, within the contract boundary. As I explained earlier, the primary fire vehicle access to Grenfell Tower was via Grenfell Road on the south side. During my site visits, I observed that the fire access to the south and east elevations was maintained after the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the left shows the fire vehicle access route leading to the south side of Grenfell Tower. The area underneath the elevated concrete walkway was within the contract boundary of the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the right shows the hardstanding on the east side of Grenfell Tower. A new hardstanding was provided to this area during the primary refurbishment. Regarding the reconfiguration of the lower levels, these levels were reconfigured to provide nine additional flats and reconfigured non-residential	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\end{array} $	<ul> <li>length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main.</li> <li>New connections for firefighting hoses were installed at the first, second and third floor, so that the dry rising main served every floor above ground level.</li> <li>At the time of the primary refurbishment, the existing smoke control system was reaching the end of its serviceable life. The smoke control system was refurbished to improve performance and reliability, as I understand matters.</li> <li>It was also changed from a stand-alone smoke control system to a combined smoke control system and environmental system. The environmental system was installed to mitigate the heat gains from the new communal heating system.</li> <li>The original smoke control system in Grenfell Tower included a fresh air shaft and a smoke extract shaft serving all of the residential lobbies. It had no environmental air purpose. Each lobby had a fresh air</li> </ul>
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ \end{array}$	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately around the tower, within the contract boundary. As I explained earlier, the primary fire vehicle access to Grenfell Tower was via Grenfell Road on the south side. During my site visits, I observed that the fire access to the south and east elevations was maintained after the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the left shows the fire vehicle access route leading to the south side of Grenfell Tower. The area underneath the elevated concrete walkway was within the contract boundary of the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the right shows the hardstanding on the east side of Grenfell Tower. A new hardstanding was provided to this area during the primary refurbishment. Regarding the reconfiguration of the lower levels, these levels were reconfigured to provide nine additional flats and reconfigured non-residential accommodation. A tall, multi-storey entrance foyer was	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\end{array} $	<ul> <li>length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main.</li> <li>New connections for firefighting hoses were installed at the first, second and third floor, so that the dry rising main served every floor above ground level.</li> <li>At the time of the primary refurbishment, the existing smoke control system was reaching the end of its serviceable life. The smoke control system was refurbished to improve performance and reliability, as I understand matters.</li> <li>It was also changed from a stand-alone smoke control system to a combined smoke control system and environmental system. The environmental system was installed to mitigate the heat gains from the new communal heating system.</li> <li>The original smoke control system in Grenfell Tower included a fresh air shaft and a smoke extract shaft serving all of the residential lobbies. It had no environmental air purpose. Each lobby had a fresh air inlet on one side of the lobby and a smoke exhaust vent</li> </ul>
$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	located, and the area west of Grenfell Tower became an at-level direct pedestrian path. New hardstandings were provided on the north, south, east and west sides of Grenfell Tower, immediately around the tower, within the contract boundary. As I explained earlier, the primary fire vehicle access to Grenfell Tower was via Grenfell Road on the south side. During my site visits, I observed that the fire access to the south and east elevations was maintained after the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the left shows the fire vehicle access route leading to the south side of Grenfell Tower. The area underneath the elevated concrete walkway was within the contract boundary of the primary refurbishment. The photograph on the right shows the hardstanding on the east side of Grenfell Tower. A new hardstanding was provided to this area during the primary refurbishment. Regarding the reconfiguration of the lower levels, these levels were reconfigured to provide nine additional flats and reconfigured non-residential accommodation. A tall, multi-storey entrance foyer was created with an open stair within it, and the balconies	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	<ul> <li>length of piping added; however, the new inlet is approximately 8.5 metres from the location of the original dry rising main.</li> <li>New connections for firefighting hoses were installed at the first, second and third floor, so that the dry rising main served every floor above ground level.</li> <li>At the time of the primary refurbishment, the existing smoke control system was reaching the end of its serviceable life. The smoke control system was refurbished to improve performance and reliability, as I understand matters.</li> <li>It was also changed from a stand-alone smoke control system to a combined smoke control system and environmental system. The environmental system was installed to mitigate the heat gains from the new communal heating system.</li> <li>The original smoke control system in Grenfell Tower included a fresh air shaft and a smoke extract shaft serving all of the residential lobbies. It had no environmental air purpose. Each lobby had a fresh air inlet on one side of the lobby. A manual so-called</li> </ul>

25 (Pages 97 to 100)

1	All lobbies contained four vents: two high-level		set was installed in the rooftop plant room and
2	vents on the north wall and two low-level vents on the	2	connected to the two north shafts. Both fans had dual
3	south wall. These vents were mechanical, so they could	3	power supplies consisting of a primary power and backup
4	open and close to allow airflow in and out of the lobby.	4 5	power supply. A weather housing was provided over the
5	Originally, the low-level vents connected directly into two fresh air shafts on the south side of the	6	top of the shaft. In the event of a fire and were smoke to enter
6 7	lobby. A fresh air supply fan was installed at the	7	a lobby, smoke detectors within the lobbies were
8	bottom of the south shafts on level 3.	8	intended to trigger the control system to fire mode.
9	The high-level vents connected directly into two	9	This is a photograph of one of the smoke detectors in
10	smoke exhaust shafts on the north side of the lobby.	10	the level 3 lobby for smoke control activation.
10	A smoke extract fan was installed at the top of the	11	The sequence of events in smoke mode was intended to
12	north shaft at the roof.	12	be as follows. Firstly, the vents on all other floors
13	There was a smoke detector in each lobby. If smoke	13	should shut and all the vents on the floor where smoke
14	was detected in the lobby, the vents in that particular	14	has been detected open. This is to isolate the non-fire
15	lobby were intended to open. The vents on other floors	15	floors from the floor where the fire is located, and to
16	were intended to remain closed.	16	direct the full capacity of the smoke control system to
17	The south low-level vents were to supply fresh air	17	the fire floor only.
18	to the lobby. The north high-level vents were to	18	The roof smoke exhaust fan should turn on and pull
19	extract smoke from the lobby.	19	air and smoke out of the lobby vents, up the north
20	This existing smoke control system was refurbished	20	shaft, where it vents from the building at roof level.
21	and extended during the primary refurbishment and to	21	The environmental fan at level 2 should shut down.
22	work as both an environmental ventilation system and	22	The separate smoke extract fan should then turn on and
23	a smoke control system. The original vent openings in	23	pull air and smoke out of the lobby vents, down the
24	levels 4 to 23 lobbies were retained during the	24	south shafts and vent from the building through the
25	refurbishment. This meant, again, each lobby had	25	second floor external wall.
	Page 101		Page 103
	1 420 101		1 uge 105
1	low-level and high-level vents. The vertical shafts	1	As air and smoke is extracted from the lobby by all
2	were extended downwards to serve the newly created	2	the vents within it, air is drawn into the lobby from
3	residential lobbies on the first, second and third	3	the stair. A permanently open vent was also located at
4	floors and the existing lift lobby at ground.	4	the roof of the stair. Fresh air was intended to be
5	At level 2, the existing connection to the outside	5	drawn down through the stair and into the lobby. The
6	of the building was replaced, including new fan sets.	6	flow of fresh air through the open stair door or through
7	These new fans at level 2 were connected to the south	7	the gaps around the stair door, if the stair door was
8	shaft by horizontal ducts. These photographs show smoke	8	closed, is intended to prevent smoke entering the stair
9	exhaust fans at level 2. The smoke extract fan set at	9	from the lobby. This is the design intent, to maintain
10	level 2 had dual power supplies, a primary power supply	10	the protected stair as a safe space for escape and $\mathbf{c} = \mathbf{c} + \mathbf{c}$
11	and a backup power supply in case primary power was	11	fire fighting.
12	lost. The ducts connect to the outside of the building	12	According to design documentation, the refurbished
13	by a vent above the entrance on the south elevation.	13	smoke control system was also designed to allow
14 15	This photograph shows the ductwork used to connect the fans to the south shaft and on to the external face	14 15	firefighters to change the floor of operation of the smoke control system, so change it from the current
15	of the building. The ducts were positioned in the new	15	floor of operation to any other floor. The smoke
17	of the building. The ducts were positioned in the new	10	
17	stair enclosure, directly above the escape route from	17	control system was to be designed to operate on a single
10	stair enclosure, directly above the escape route from the internal protected stair at level 2	17	control system was to be designed to operate on a single floor at any one time.
19	the internal protected stair at level 2.	18	floor at any one time.
19 20	the internal protected stair at level 2. Just like the original vents, the new vents were	18 19	floor at any one time. Within the entrance foyer, a control panel was
20	the internal protected stair at level 2. Just like the original vents, the new vents were mechanical. In environmental mode, they were intended	18	floor at any one time. Within the entrance foyer, a control panel was provided. This was to enable the Fire Brigade to close
	the internal protected stair at level 2. Just like the original vents, the new vents were mechanical. In environmental mode, they were intended to open and close to allow air in and out of the lobby	18 19 20	floor at any one time. Within the entrance foyer, a control panel was provided. This was to enable the Fire Brigade to close all vents on all floors in a single operation. I have
20 21	the internal protected stair at level 2. Just like the original vents, the new vents were mechanical. In environmental mode, they were intended to open and close to allow air in and out of the lobby in day-to-day use. In smoke mode, they were intended to	18 19 20 21 22	floor at any one time. Within the entrance foyer, a control panel was provided. This was to enable the Fire Brigade to close all vents on all floors in a single operation. I have requested further information on this system.
20 21 22	the internal protected stair at level 2. Just like the original vents, the new vents were mechanical. In environmental mode, they were intended to open and close to allow air in and out of the lobby in day-to-day use. In smoke mode, they were intended to open and close to allow smoke into the shaft from	18 19 20 21	floor at any one time. Within the entrance foyer, a control panel was provided. This was to enable the Fire Brigade to close all vents on all floors in a single operation. I have requested further information on this system. According to design documentation, the smoke control
20 21 22 23	the internal protected stair at level 2. Just like the original vents, the new vents were mechanical. In environmental mode, they were intended to open and close to allow air in and out of the lobby in day-to-day use. In smoke mode, they were intended to	18 19 20 21 22 23	floor at any one time. Within the entrance foyer, a control panel was provided. This was to enable the Fire Brigade to close all vents on all floors in a single operation. I have requested further information on this system.
20 21 22 23 24	the internal protected stair at level 2. Just like the original vents, the new vents were mechanical. In environmental mode, they were intended to open and close to allow air in and out of the lobby in day-to-day use. In smoke mode, they were intended to open and close to allow smoke into the shaft from a single lobby.	18 19 20 21 22 23 24	floor at any one time. Within the entrance foyer, a control panel was provided. This was to enable the Fire Brigade to close all vents on all floors in a single operation. I have requested further information on this system. According to design documentation, the smoke control system was also provided with override switches on each

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1	Operation of the switch should allow the Fire Brigade to	1	Cold water pipes were run from water tanks on the
2	open the vents on that floor only and lock the switches	2	roof down through the protected lobbies also. One pipe
3	on all other floors so that those vents could not be	3	was run from the 23rd floor down to the 14th floor.
4	accidentally opened at the same time.	4	A second pipe was run from the 23rd floor down to the
5	Returning this mechanical switch to its original	5	third floor. This pipe then continued down to the
6	position should close the vents on that floor and unlock	6	basement level and fed risers to residential flats and
7	the switches on every other floor. This is intended to	7	non-residential accommodation areas on ground floor to
8	enable the Fire Brigade to operate the smoke control	8	level 2. Cold water pipes were routed across the
9	system on any chosen floor using that respective key	9	ceiling of each lobby to each of the flats.
10	switch.	10	In every lobby between the 4th and 23rd level, a new
11	A new heating and hot water system and cold water	11	partition and doors were constructed around the vertical
12	system was installed, and these systems served every	12	pipes. A new ceiling was also installed in every lobby
13	floor and every flat in Grenfell Tower. Pipes were	13	below the new pipes.
14	routed throughout the tower, from the basement level	14	This ends my description of some of the works within
15	through to the roof level, and into each and every flat	15 16	the primary refurbishment.
16	and non-residential accommodation. Each pipe	17	I will next provide an explanation of the cladding,
17	penetration through a compartment wall and floor was		but we might take a short break.
18	therefore required to be protected. New boilers were	18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you like to do that now?
19 20	installed in the basement to serve this new system, and	19	DR LANE: Yes, I would, please.
20	the landlord gas supply, as I've explained, was extended	20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, we'll break for a short time now. I suggest we resume at 2.55.
21	to supply those boilers. The original boilers were	21 22	
22	retained and they continued to serve the three finger	22	Thank you very much. (2.40 pm)
23	blocks.	23	
24 25	In addition to the new boilers in the basement, the	24	(A short break)
23	new heating and hot water system included a heat	23	(2.55 pm)
	Page 105	ļ	Page 107
1	interface unit in each of the flats. The intention was	1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Dr Lane, when you're ready.
2	it was to provide space heating and instantaneous hot	2	DR LANE: Thank you.
3	water for that respective space. A pair of flow and	3	Okay, the final part of my presentation today is
4	return pipes connected each heat interface unit to the	4	about the external wall refurbishment.
5	new boilers in the basement. I am going to refer to	5	During the 2012 to 2016 primary refurbishment,
6	each pair as a riser to simplify my explanation of the	6	a comprehensive recladding of the external wall of the
7	pipe routing throughout the building.	7	existing building was undertaken. To do this, the
8	Five risers connected the basement to level 2,	8	existing external wall construction was over-clad with a
9	serving all flats and non-residential accommodation on	9	ventilated rainscreen system. New windows were
10	these levels. A sixth riser connected the basement to	10	installed and new linings to those windows were
11	level 23, serving all flats on levels 3 to 23. This	11	installed internally.
12			
12	riser entered the protected stairway between levels 3	12	I will first describe the multiple components of
12	riser entered the protected stairway between levels 3 and 4 only. This riser then continued up the building	12 13	I will first describe the multiple components of a ventilated rainscreen system and the fire safety
			* *
13	and 4 only. This riser then continued up the building	13	a ventilated rainscreen system and the fire safety
13 14	and 4 only. This riser then continued up the building through each protected lobby from levels 4 to 23, but	13 14	a ventilated rainscreen system and the fire safety provisions required for external wall construction,
13 14 15	and 4 only. This riser then continued up the building through each protected lobby from levels 4 to 23, but within a riser cupboard in the lobbies.	13 14 15	a ventilated rainscreen system and the fire safety provisions required for external wall construction, before describing in detail the materials and
13 14 15 16	and 4 only. This riser then continued up the building through each protected lobby from levels 4 to 23, but within a riser cupboard in the lobbies. The pipes appear to have been fire-stopped at each	13 14 15 16	a ventilated rainscreen system and the fire safety provisions required for external wall construction, before describing in detail the materials and arrangement of materials as I have found them at this
13 14 15 16 17	and 4 only. This riser then continued up the building through each protected lobby from levels 4 to 23, but within a riser cupboard in the lobbies. The pipes appear to have been fire-stopped at each floor level, but I currently have no information	13 14 15 16 17	a ventilated rainscreen system and the fire safety provisions required for external wall construction, before describing in detail the materials and arrangement of materials as I have found them at this stage.
13 14 15 16 17 18	and 4 only. This riser then continued up the building through each protected lobby from levels 4 to 23, but within a riser cupboard in the lobbies. The pipes appear to have been fire-stopped at each floor level, but I currently have no information available to me as to the fire performance possible from	13 14 15 16 17 18	a ventilated rainscreen system and the fire safety provisions required for external wall construction, before describing in detail the materials and arrangement of materials as I have found them at this stage. Today I am only describing materials; I'm not
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	and 4 only. This riser then continued up the building through each protected lobby from levels 4 to 23, but within a riser cupboard in the lobbies. The pipes appear to have been fire-stopped at each floor level, but I currently have no information available to me as to the fire performance possible from that construction.	13 14 15 16 17 18 19	a ventilated rainscreen system and the fire safety provisions required for external wall construction, before describing in detail the materials and arrangement of materials as I have found them at this stage. Today I am only describing materials; I'm not presenting my Phase 1 report opinions on fire
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	and 4 only. This riser then continued up the building through each protected lobby from levels 4 to 23, but within a riser cupboard in the lobbies. The pipes appear to have been fire-stopped at each floor level, but I currently have no information available to me as to the fire performance possible from that construction. A pair of pipes then routed out of this riser	13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	a ventilated rainscreen system and the fire safety provisions required for external wall construction, before describing in detail the materials and arrangement of materials as I have found them at this stage. Today I am only describing materials; I'm not presenting my Phase 1 report opinions on fire performance, testing or compliance status.
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	<ul><li>and 4 only. This riser then continued up the building through each protected lobby from levels 4 to 23, but within a riser cupboard in the lobbies.</li><li>The pipes appear to have been fire-stopped at each floor level, but I currently have no information available to me as to the fire performance possible from that construction.</li><li>A pair of pipes then routed out of this riser cupboard latterly across the ceiling, passing in through</li></ul>	13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	a ventilated rainscreen system and the fire safety provisions required for external wall construction, before describing in detail the materials and arrangement of materials as I have found them at this stage. Today I am only describing materials; I'm not presenting my Phase 1 report opinions on fire performance, testing or compliance status. The rainscreen cladding system was a drained and
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	and 4 only. This riser then continued up the building through each protected lobby from levels 4 to 23, but within a riser cupboard in the lobbies. The pipes appear to have been fire-stopped at each floor level, but I currently have no information available to me as to the fire performance possible from that construction. A pair of pipes then routed out of this riser cupboard latterly across the ceiling, passing in through the compartment wall to each flat. The pipes appear to	13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	a ventilated rainscreen system and the fire safety provisions required for external wall construction, before describing in detail the materials and arrangement of materials as I have found them at this stage. Today I am only describing materials; I'm not presenting my Phase 1 report opinions on fire performance, testing or compliance status. The rainscreen cladding system was a drained and ventilated system. I have referred to the British
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	and 4 only. This riser then continued up the building through each protected lobby from levels 4 to 23, but within a riser cupboard in the lobbies. The pipes appear to have been fire-stopped at each floor level, but I currently have no information available to me as to the fire performance possible from that construction. A pair of pipes then routed out of this riser cupboard latterly across the ceiling, passing in through the compartment wall to each flat. The pipes appear to have been fire-stopped at that compartment wall also,	13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	a ventilated rainscreen system and the fire safety provisions required for external wall construction, before describing in detail the materials and arrangement of materials as I have found them at this stage. Today I am only describing materials; I'm not presenting my Phase 1 report opinions on fire performance, testing or compliance status. The rainscreen cladding system was a drained and ventilated system. I have referred to the British Standard code of practice for stone-based rainscreen
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	and 4 only. This riser then continued up the building through each protected lobby from levels 4 to 23, but within a riser cupboard in the lobbies. The pipes appear to have been fire-stopped at each floor level, but I currently have no information available to me as to the fire performance possible from that construction. A pair of pipes then routed out of this riser cupboard latterly across the ceiling, passing in through the compartment wall to each flat. The pipes appear to have been fire-stopped at that compartment wall also, but, again, I have no information available as to the	13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	a ventilated rainscreen system and the fire safety provisions required for external wall construction, before describing in detail the materials and arrangement of materials as I have found them at this stage. Today I am only describing materials; I'm not presenting my Phase 1 report opinions on fire performance, testing or compliance status. The rainscreen cladding system was a drained and ventilated system. I have referred to the British Standard code of practice for stone-based rainscreen cladding in describing the key components of

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1	This image is a correction through a ventilated	1			
2	5 6 6 1		left-hand side of the screen now. For clarity, I have		
3	layer, also referred to as the rainscreen. This outer	3	changed the original Approved Document B marked dark		
4	layer is intended to shelter the building from the	4	grey to a blue colour.		
5	5 5 5 1		The image on the right is how diagram 40 would apply		
6			to Grenfell Tower. Ground to level 5 are less than		
	7 The second key part now highlighted is a cavity		18 metres above ground. Level 6 to roof level are more		
	8 behind this outer layer, a cavity which can include		than 18 metres above ground. A building height of		
	9 insulation and which is intended to collect any water		18 metres or more means any external wall surface above 18 metres must achieve either class 0, national class,		
10 11	which passes through the joints in the rainscreen layer, and to permit such water to flow down to a point where	10 11	or class B-S3, D2, the European class, or better.		
11	it can be collected and drained from the cavity. The	12	I have based my opinion on the fire performance of		
12	insulation layer should not completely fill the cavity.	12	the rainscreen panels installed on Grenfell Tower on the		
13	A cavity is also defined in Approved Document B as	13	basis of diagram 40.		
14	a space enclosed by elements of a building or contained	15	Paragraph 12.7 requires any insulation product,		
16	within an element. It can also be referred to as	16	filler material not including gaskets, sealants and		
17	a concealed space.	17	similar et cetera used in the external wall of		
18	Where insulation is provided within the cavity, it	18	buildings greater than 18 metres to be of limited		
19	should not completely fill the cavity so as it does	19	combustibility.		
20	indeed ensure water can flow down to a point where it is	20	The classification "limited combustibility" is		
20	collected and drained.	21	defined in appendix A in Approved Document B, and		
22	The third key component of a rainscreen system is	22	I refer you to all the detail in appendix F of my		
23	the backing wall which sits behind the cavity and the	23	Phase 1 report. But in the very simplest of meanings,		
24	outer layer. The backing wall is intended to provide	24	a material of limited combustibility is either		
25	a barrier to air infiltration and water ingress into the	25	a non-combustible material or a material which produces		
	_				
	Page 109		Page 111		
1	building.	1	very little flame under heating. All of this must be		
2	Regarding the fire safety requirements, requirement	2	determined using either British or European reaction to		
3			determined using entier British of European reaction to		
5	B4 makes requirements regarding external fire spread	3	fire tests.		
4	B4 makes requirements regarding external fire spread and, specifically, part 1 of B4 requires the external				
		3	fire tests.		
4	and, specifically, part 1 of B4 requires the external	3 4	fire tests. I have made the basis of my opinion clear and in		
4 5	and, specifically, part 1 of B4 requires the external walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread	3 4 5	fire tests. I have made the basis of my opinion clear and in detail in appendix F in my Phase 1 report, that		
4 5 6	and, specifically, part 1 of B4 requires the external walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the wall.	3 4 5 6	fire tests. I have made the basis of my opinion clear and in detail in appendix F in my Phase 1 report, that Approved Document B provides no definition of filler		
4 5 6 7	and, specifically, part 1 of B4 requires the external walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the wall. Approved Document B also states that the provisions	3 4 5 6 7	fire tests. I have made the basis of my opinion clear and in detail in appendix F in my Phase 1 report, that Approved Document B provides no definition of filler material, nor why that excludes gaskets, sealants and		
4 5 6 7 8	<ul><li>and, specifically, part 1 of B4 requires the external walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the wall.</li><li>Approved Document B also states that the provisions are made in section 12 for the fire resistance of</li></ul>	3 4 5 6 7 8	fire tests. I have made the basis of my opinion clear and in detail in appendix F in my Phase 1 report, that Approved Document B provides no definition of filler material, nor why that excludes gaskets, sealants and similar, et cetera.		
4 5 6 7 8 9	<ul><li>and, specifically, part 1 of B4 requires the external walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the wall.</li><li>Approved Document B also states that the provisions are made in section 12 for the fire resistance of external walls and to limit the susceptibility of the</li></ul>	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	fire tests. I have made the basis of my opinion clear and in detail in appendix F in my Phase 1 report, that Approved Document B provides no definition of filler material, nor why that excludes gaskets, sealants and similar, et cetera. I have explained why I apply paragraph 12.7, insulation materials and products, to insulation products only.		
4 5 6 7 8 9 10	<ul><li>and, specifically, part 1 of B4 requires the external walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the wall.</li><li>Approved Document B also states that the provisions are made in section 12 for the fire resistance of external walls and to limit the susceptibility of the external surfaces of walls to ignition and to fire</li></ul>	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	fire tests. I have made the basis of my opinion clear and in detail in appendix F in my Phase 1 report, that Approved Document B provides no definition of filler material, nor why that excludes gaskets, sealants and similar, et cetera. I have explained why I apply paragraph 12.7, insulation materials and products, to insulation products only. Finally, paragraphs 12.8 and 12.9, relate to the		
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	<ul> <li>and, specifically, part 1 of B4 requires the external walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the wall.</li> <li>Approved Document B also states that the provisions are made in section 12 for the fire resistance of external walls and to limit the susceptibility of the external surfaces of walls to ignition and to fire spread.</li> <li>I will now explain section 12.</li> <li>In paragraph 12.5, as I explained this morning, it describes two methods to meet the regulation: that</li> </ul>	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	fire tests. I have made the basis of my opinion clear and in detail in appendix F in my Phase 1 report, that Approved Document B provides no definition of filler material, nor why that excludes gaskets, sealants and similar, et cetera. I have explained why I apply paragraph 12.7, insulation materials and products, to insulation products only. Finally, paragraphs 12.8 and 12.9, relate to the provision of cavity barriers within the external wall construction. Cavity barriers are a construction		
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	<ul> <li>and, specifically, part 1 of B4 requires the external walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the wall.</li> <li>Approved Document B also states that the provisions are made in section 12 for the fire resistance of external walls and to limit the susceptibility of the external surfaces of walls to ignition and to fire spread.</li> <li>I will now explain section 12.</li> <li>In paragraph 12.5, as I explained this morning, it describes two methods to meet the regulation: that either the construction of the external wall should meet</li> </ul>	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	fire tests. I have made the basis of my opinion clear and in detail in appendix F in my Phase 1 report, that Approved Document B provides no definition of filler material, nor why that excludes gaskets, sealants and similar, et cetera. I have explained why I apply paragraph 12.7, insulation materials and products, to insulation products only. Finally, paragraphs 12.8 and 12.9, relate to the provision of cavity barriers within the external wall construction. Cavity barriers are a construction provided to close a concealed space against penetration		
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	<ul> <li>and, specifically, part 1 of B4 requires the external walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the wall.</li> <li>Approved Document B also states that the provisions are made in section 12 for the fire resistance of external walls and to limit the susceptibility of the external surfaces of walls to ignition and to fire spread.</li> <li>I will now explain section 12.</li> <li>In paragraph 12.5, as I explained this morning, it describes two methods to meet the regulation: that either the construction of the external wall should meet the specific guidance within paragraphs 12.6 to 12.9, or</li> </ul>	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	fire tests. I have made the basis of my opinion clear and in detail in appendix F in my Phase 1 report, that Approved Document B provides no definition of filler material, nor why that excludes gaskets, sealants and similar, et cetera. I have explained why I apply paragraph 12.7, insulation materials and products, to insulation products only. Finally, paragraphs 12.8 and 12.9, relate to the provision of cavity barriers within the external wall construction. Cavity barriers are a construction provided to close a concealed space against penetration of smoke or flame, or they are provided to restrict the		
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18 June 2018

1	In this image, I have indicated where vertical and	1 2	of the system for testing. It requires the complete
2			cladding assembly to be tested. The complete assembly
3	created by windows in a rainscreen cladding system. In this image, I have shown where horizontal cavity	3	is defined within as complete cladding assembly, including sheeting rails, fixings, cavities, insulation
4		5	and membranes, coatings, flashings or joints, and these
	5 barriers are required at the junction of the internal		are to be specified by the test sponsor and affixed to
	6 compartment floor and the external rainscreen cladding 7 system.		the masonry test walls using their proprietary system
<ol> <li>system.</li> <li>In this image, I have shown where vertical cavity</li> </ol>		78	fixing.
9	barriers are required at the junction of the internal	9	The performance criteria that Approved Document B,
10	compartment wall and the external rainscreen cavity,	10	paragraph 12.5, refers to is defined in annex A of
10	which would result in the cavity behind the rainscreen	11	BR 135. It states performance of the system is to be
12	cladding to be subdivided like this.	12	evaluated against three criteria: external fire spread,
13	Finally, in this image, I have shown where	13	described as fire spread up the building envelope by way
14	horizontal cavity barriers are required at the head of	14	of the surface of the external cladding system; internal
15	the rainscreen cladding to close the top of the cavity.	15	fire spread, described as fire which spreads unseen
16	This is the crown at Grenfell Tower.	16	through the external cladding system; and, finally,
17	The statutory guidance document, Approved	17	mechanical performance. Whilst failure criteria are
18	Document B, also makes provisions for the construction	18	defined for external fire spread and internal fire
19	of cavity barriers. They are required to achieve at	19	spread, no failure criteria are defined for mechanical
20	least 30 minutes integrity and 15 minutes insulation	20	performance. I will be considering these matters
21	fire resistance. Specifically around openings, cavity	21	separately.
22	barriers may instead be formed of specified materials of	22	I have taken two main actions to confirm the
23	a minimum thickness. In addition, cavity barriers must	23	materials and their arrangement used in the overcladding
24	be tightly fitted to rigid construction. Where it is	24	and internal lining of the external wall of
25	not possible to tightly fit the cavity barrier,	25	Grenfell Tower. I carried out detailed on-site
	Page 113		Page 115
1	a different protection method, called fire-stopping,	1	inspections on 6 October, 1 November and every day
2	must be used in those locations instead.	2	between 7 and 9 November. I have carried out a detailed
2 3	must be used in those locations instead. Fire-stopping has a different purpose to a cavity	2 3	between 7 and 9 November. I have carried out a detailed review of evidence from the relevant parties provided to
2 3 4	must be used in those locations instead. Fire-stopping has a different purpose to a cavity barrier. It has a higher standard of fire resistance.	2 3 4	between 7 and 9 November. I have carried out a detailed review of evidence from the relevant parties provided to me by the inquiry. I will update my Phase 1 work if any
2 3 4 5	must be used in those locations instead. Fire-stopping has a different purpose to a cavity barrier. It has a higher standard of fire resistance. The required fire resistance of fire-stopping for	2 3 4 5	between 7 and 9 November. I have carried out a detailed review of evidence from the relevant parties provided to me by the inquiry. I will update my Phase 1 work if any additional evidence becomes available. I have focused
2 3 4 5 6	must be used in those locations instead. Fire-stopping has a different purpose to a cavity barrier. It has a higher standard of fire resistance. The required fire resistance of fire-stopping for a residential building greater than 30 metres is two	2 3 4 5 6	between 7 and 9 November. I have carried out a detailed review of evidence from the relevant parties provided to me by the inquiry. I will update my Phase 1 work if any additional evidence becomes available. I have focused my analysis on the external wall construction of the
2 3 4 5 6 7	must be used in those locations instead. Fire-stopping has a different purpose to a cavity barrier. It has a higher standard of fire resistance. The required fire resistance of fire-stopping for a residential building greater than 30 metres is two hours' integrity and insulation at the junction between	2 3 4 5 6 7	between 7 and 9 November. I have carried out a detailed review of evidence from the relevant parties provided to me by the inquiry. I will update my Phase 1 work if any additional evidence becomes available. I have focused my analysis on the external wall construction of the original residential floors.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	must be used in those locations instead. Fire-stopping has a different purpose to a cavity barrier. It has a higher standard of fire resistance. The required fire resistance of fire-stopping for a residential building greater than 30 metres is two hours' integrity and insulation at the junction between the compartment floors. It is one-hour integrity and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	between 7 and 9 November. I have carried out a detailed review of evidence from the relevant parties provided to me by the inquiry. I will update my Phase 1 work if any additional evidence becomes available. I have focused my analysis on the external wall construction of the original residential floors. The image on the left illustrates the existing
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	must be used in those locations instead. Fire-stopping has a different purpose to a cavity barrier. It has a higher standard of fire resistance. The required fire resistance of fire-stopping for a residential building greater than 30 metres is two hours' integrity and insulation at the junction between the compartment floors. It is one-hour integrity and insulation at the junction of the internal compartment	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	between 7 and 9 November. I have carried out a detailed review of evidence from the relevant parties provided to me by the inquiry. I will update my Phase 1 work if any additional evidence becomes available. I have focused my analysis on the external wall construction of the original residential floors. The image on the left illustrates the existing construction of the external wall of Grenfell Tower, the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	must be used in those locations instead. Fire-stopping has a different purpose to a cavity barrier. It has a higher standard of fire resistance. The required fire resistance of fire-stopping for a residential building greater than 30 metres is two hours' integrity and insulation at the junction between the compartment floors. It is one-hour integrity and insulation at the junction of the internal compartment walls with the external wall.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	between 7 and 9 November. I have carried out a detailed review of evidence from the relevant parties provided to me by the inquiry. I will update my Phase 1 work if any additional evidence becomes available. I have focused my analysis on the external wall construction of the original residential floors. The image on the left illustrates the existing construction of the external wall of Grenfell Tower, the existing solid concrete perimeter beams, concrete
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	must be used in those locations instead. Fire-stopping has a different purpose to a cavity barrier. It has a higher standard of fire resistance. The required fire resistance of fire-stopping for a residential building greater than 30 metres is two hours' integrity and insulation at the junction between the compartment floors. It is one-hour integrity and insulation at the junction of the internal compartment walls with the external wall. Therefore, if a rainscreen outer layer was not	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	between 7 and 9 November. I have carried out a detailed review of evidence from the relevant parties provided to me by the inquiry. I will update my Phase 1 work if any additional evidence becomes available. I have focused my analysis on the external wall construction of the original residential floors. The image on the left illustrates the existing construction of the external wall of Grenfell Tower, the existing solid concrete perimeter beams, concrete columns with decorative concrete cladding, both were
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	must be used in those locations instead. Fire-stopping has a different purpose to a cavity barrier. It has a higher standard of fire resistance. The required fire resistance of fire-stopping for a residential building greater than 30 metres is two hours' integrity and insulation at the junction between the compartment floors. It is one-hour integrity and insulation at the junction of the internal compartment walls with the external wall. Therefore, if a rainscreen outer layer was not interpreted by the designer as rigid construction, then	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	between 7 and 9 November. I have carried out a detailed review of evidence from the relevant parties provided to me by the inquiry. I will update my Phase 1 work if any additional evidence becomes available. I have focused my analysis on the external wall construction of the original residential floors. The image on the left illustrates the existing construction of the external wall of Grenfell Tower, the existing solid concrete perimeter beams, concrete columns with decorative concrete cladding, both were retained. The aluminium frame sliding windows were
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	must be used in those locations instead. Fire-stopping has a different purpose to a cavity barrier. It has a higher standard of fire resistance. The required fire resistance of fire-stopping for a residential building greater than 30 metres is two hours' integrity and insulation at the junction between the compartment floors. It is one-hour integrity and insulation at the junction of the internal compartment walls with the external wall. Therefore, if a rainscreen outer layer was not interpreted by the designer as rigid construction, then fire-stopping would be required instead of cavity barriers. Approved Document B does not state either way if rainscreen systems are considered rigid construction. Now I will describe the second method referred to in the Approved Document B. The second method is to meet the performance criteria which are given in BRE report 135 using full-scale test data from British Standard	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	between 7 and 9 November. I have carried out a detailed review of evidence from the relevant parties provided to me by the inquiry. I will update my Phase 1 work if any additional evidence becomes available. I have focused my analysis on the external wall construction of the original residential floors. The image on the left illustrates the existing construction of the external wall of Grenfell Tower, the existing solid concrete perimeter beams, concrete columns with decorative concrete cladding, both were retained. The aluminium frame sliding windows were removed. These windows were replaced with new window frames containing glazed panels and insulating polystyrene core panels, and a small window to accommodate the kitchen extract fan. The external overcladding of the existing wall was to create a ventilated rainscreen cladding system and so resulted in: the original building external wall used as
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	must be used in those locations instead. Fire-stopping has a different purpose to a cavity barrier. It has a higher standard of fire resistance. The required fire resistance of fire-stopping for a residential building greater than 30 metres is two hours' integrity and insulation at the junction between the compartment floors. It is one-hour integrity and insulation at the junction of the internal compartment walls with the external wall. Therefore, if a rainscreen outer layer was not interpreted by the designer as rigid construction, then fire-stopping would be required instead of cavity barriers. Approved Document B does not state either way if rainscreen systems are considered rigid construction. Now I will describe the second method referred to in the Approved Document B. The second method is to meet the performance criteria which are given in BRE report 135 using full-scale test data from British Standard 8414. I will be producing a separate report on this matter and will not go into detail at this stage, only to show this image on the left of a ventilated	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	between 7 and 9 November. I have carried out a detailed review of evidence from the relevant parties provided to me by the inquiry. I will update my Phase 1 work if any additional evidence becomes available. I have focused my analysis on the external wall construction of the original residential floors. The image on the left illustrates the existing construction of the external wall of Grenfell Tower, the existing solid concrete perimeter beams, concrete columns with decorative concrete cladding, both were retained. The aluminium frame sliding windows were removed. These windows were replaced with new window frames containing glazed panels and insulating polystyrene core panels, and a small window to accommodate the kitchen extract fan. The external overcladding of the existing wall was to create a ventilated rainscreen cladding system and so resulted in: the original building external wall used as the backing wall; a new weatherproof membrane between the new windows and the existing concrete structure; new thermal insulation applied directly to the backing wall;
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$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	must be used in those locations instead. Fire-stopping has a different purpose to a cavity barrier. It has a higher standard of fire resistance. The required fire resistance of fire-stopping for a residential building greater than 30 metres is two hours' integrity and insulation at the junction between the compartment floors. It is one-hour integrity and insulation at the junction of the internal compartment walls with the external wall. Therefore, if a rainscreen outer layer was not interpreted by the designer as rigid construction, then fire-stopping would be required instead of cavity barriers. Approved Document B does not state either way if rainscreen systems are considered rigid construction. Now I will describe the second method referred to in the Approved Document B. The second method is to meet the performance criteria which are given in BRE report 135 using full-scale test data from British Standard 8414. I will be producing a separate report on this matter and will not go into detail at this stage, only to show this image on the left of a ventilated rainscreen system installed on the test apparatus for conducting a British Standard 8414 fire test.	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	between 7 and 9 November. I have carried out a detailed review of evidence from the relevant parties provided to me by the inquiry. I will update my Phase 1 work if any additional evidence becomes available. I have focused my analysis on the external wall construction of the original residential floors. The image on the left illustrates the existing construction of the external wall of Grenfell Tower, the existing solid concrete perimeter beams, concrete columns with decorative concrete cladding, both were retained. The aluminium frame sliding windows were removed. These windows were replaced with new window frames containing glazed panels and insulating polystyrene core panels, and a small window to accommodate the kitchen extract fan. The external overcladding of the existing wall was to create a ventilated rainscreen cladding system and so resulted in: the original building external wall used as the backing wall; a new weatherproof membrane between the new windows and the existing concrete structure; new thermal insulation applied directly to the backing wall; a rainscreen cladding panels as the outer layer.

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1	now before I go through each one in turn.	1	position of the window is 185 millimetres further out	
2	(Pause)		relative to the original windows.	
3	First, I would like to talk specifically about the	3	Additionally, the new position of the window frames	
4	new window frames with glazing and insulating		relative to the existing external wall structure also	
5	5 polystyrene core panels.		introduced a gap around the edges of the new windows.	
6	6 This image shows the assembly of the windows,		The design anticipated this gap to vary between 35 and	
7	7 including glazing panels, larger insulating core panels		90 millimetres as the existing columns were not	
8			perfectly straight. The gaps that I was able to observe	
9	mounted in the centre.	9	on site varied between 30 and 120 millimetres.	
10	The new window frames marked in blue were system	10	To close the gap introduced by the alterations to	
11	5-20Hi+ tilt and turn windows, which were manufactured	11	the size and position of the new windows, a damp proof	
12	by Metal Technology Systems. The frames were made from	12	course, also called a membrane of ethylene propylene	
13	polyester powder coated aluminium alloy. Aluminium is	13 diene monomer rubber, referred to as EPDM, was us		
14	not a combustible material unless it is ground into	14 a weatherproof seal. EPDM is a synthetic rubber and		
15	a powder.	15	a combustible material.	
16	The glazing in the window frames is highlighted in	16	The photograph on screen now was taken during my	
17	dashed red. The glazing used was a double glazing	17	site investigation, viewing the new window frames where	
18	system with a 6-millimetre toughened glass pane either	18	they meet the columns. Highlighted with the dashed	
19	side of a 16-millimetre argon-filled cavity. Glass is	19	line, visible in the gap once the external cladding	
20	not a combustible material.	20	panel is removed from view, is the damp proof course.	
21	The white panel, indicated in a dashed pink, is	21	In this image highlighted with the dashed line,	
22	an insulating core panel. This infill panel was	22	visible in the gap once the internal linings were	
23	a product called Aluglaze manufactured by Panel Systems		removed from view, is the black EPDM.	
24	Limited. The panels installed were 1.2 metres high and		The new thermal insulation was directly fixed to the	
25	1 metre wide. Aluglaze is described by its suppliers as	25	perimeter beams and the vertical concrete columns.	
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1	comprising aluminium bonded to an insulating core.	1	Two layers of thermal insulation were fixed directly	
2	A 25-millimetre Styrofoam core was specified for these	2	to the face of the building above and below the windows.	
3	panels. Styrofoam is extruded polystyrene and extruded	3	A single layer of thermal insulation was fixed directly	
4	polystyrene is combustible.	4	to the face of the columns. Each were fixed using	
5	I have highlighted the smaller window insert	5	a 180-millimetre stake screwed into the face of the	
6	insulating core panels in dashed yellow. These panels	6	existing concrete perimeter beam or column. The	
7	were 530 millimetres by 500. This panel was specified	7	180-millimetre stakes pierced the insulation, therefore	
8	to be a core of 25-millimetre Kingspan TP10 insulation.	8	mechanically fixing it to the existing structure.	
9	TP10 is a polyisocyanurate, which is a combustible	9	On the columns, this was a single layer of	
10	material.	10	100-millimetre thick polymeric foam insulation with	
11	However, I did not find Kingspan in those locations	11	an aluminium foil outer facing. The designation shows	
12	where I inspected them; I found more Aluglaze-type	12	that it was manufactured by Celotex. The product used	
13	panels with a polystyrene core. The foam insulation	13	was Celotex RS5000, which is made from polyisocyanurate	
14	observed on site was light blue, which is consistent	14	foam. This is commonly shortened to PIR. PIR is	
15	with the Styrofoam, which is extruded polystyrene, and	15	a combustible material.	
16	as specified for the main infill panels.	16	On the perimeter beams, the same insulation	
17	This whole window assembly, including the glazing	17	material, Celotex RS5000 PIR, was affixed in two	
18	and the insulation core panels, was then fixed to the	18	separate layers of 80 millimetres directly to the wall.	
19	outside face of the existing horizontal concrete	19	This photograph shows the perimeter beam area after one	
20	perimeter beams, as illustrated here.	20	of the two insulation boards has been removed, revealing	
21	I remind you the horizontal concrete above and below	21	the second layer of insulation behind it. An expanding	
22	the windows are beams which support the internal floor.	22	foam was used as joint filler to partly fill joint gaps	
23	The window frame is bolted onto the outside of the	23	associated with the insulation throughout the rainscreen	
24	existing external wall using metal brackets at the top	24	system.	
25	and bottom of the window frame. Therefore, the new	25	The Harley material data sheets show this was	
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1	a polyurethane foam.	1	insulation itself to support it.
2	Purchase orders show that, due to supply issues with		The photograph on the right-hand side is a close-up
3	Celotex RS5000, 276 metres squared of a Kingspan	$\begin{vmatrix} 2\\ 3 \end{vmatrix}$	image of the rail. It is a U shape with metal bolts
4	product, Kooltherm K15 rainscreen board of 80-millimetre	4	connecting the two sides. The Arconic Reynobond 55 PE
5	thickness, was ordered as a substitute. These Kingspan		panels were hung on these bolts.
6			This photograph shows one of the rainscreen panels
7			being removed from the building as I witnessed it. It
8	-		shows the 3D shape of the panel and the slots cut into
9	outer layer. At Grenfell Tower, these were	9	the edge to hang on the bolts within the cladding rails.
10	Reynobond 55 PE aluminium composite panels. They were	10	This animation illustrates the application of the
11	installed on the vertical length of the columns and in	11	rainscreen cladding panels to the horizontal perimeter
12	horizontal runs above and below the windows of each	12	beam and the vertical columns.
13	floor meeting the columns. I have highlighted the	13	As shown on screen now, gaps were left between
14	location of the panels below a window in the photograph	14	aluminium composite panels in their installed position.
15	on screen. These panels were typically 1.3 by	15	On site in the areas I inspected, I noted that the panel
16	1.2 metres wide below the windows.	16	gaps range between 15 and 30 millimetres. At the edge
17	I have also highlighted the location of the panels	17	of the panels in these gaps the polyethylene core is
18	that were installed on the columns of the building.	18	clearly visible, and polyethylene is combustible, as
19	These panels were typically 2.5 metres high and	19	I said.
20	0.55 metres wide.	20	The installation of a rainscreen cladding system to
21	Arconic Reynobond 55 PE aluminium composite panels	21	the outside of the existing building created cavities
22	consist of 0.5-millimetre aluminium sheets either side	22	between the existing concrete wall and the new
23	of a 3-millimetre thick polyethylene core. Polyethylene	23	rainscreen outer layer. The cavity formed between the
24			original concrete structure and the rainscreen cladding
25			above and below the windows is illustrated on screen.
		25	
	Page 121		Page 123
		1	
1	flat papels. These flat papels can either be screwed or	1	This covity contained two lovers of 80 millimetre
1	flat panels. These flat panels can either be screwed or riveted into the support frame as shown on the left hand	1	This cavity contained two layers of 80-millimetre
2	riveted into the support frame as shown on the left-hand	2	either Celotex or Kingspan insulation on the perimeter
2 3	riveted into the support frame as shown on the left-hand image on screen.	2 3	either Celotex or Kingspan insulation on the perimeter beams. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the
2 3 4	riveted into the support frame as shown on the left-hand image on screen. Alternatively, the edges of the panels can be bent,	2 3 4	either Celotex or Kingspan insulation on the perimeter beams. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the aluminium composite
2 3 4 5	riveted into the support frame as shown on the left-hand image on screen. Alternatively, the edges of the panels can be bent, making a 3D shape. Slots are cut in the edges of the	2 3 4 5	either Celotex or Kingspan insulation on the perimeter beams. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel is 156 millimetres.
2 3 4 5 6	riveted into the support frame as shown on the left-hand image on screen. Alternatively, the edges of the panels can be bent, making a 3D shape. Slots are cut in the edges of the panels so they can be hung on a support rail behind.	2 3 4 5 6	either Celotex or Kingspan insulation on the perimeter beams. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel is 156 millimetres. The cavity was also formed between the concrete
2 3 4 5 6 7	riveted into the support frame as shown on the left-hand image on screen. Alternatively, the edges of the panels can be bent, making a 3D shape. Slots are cut in the edges of the panels so they can be hung on a support rail behind. Therefore, the support is then hidden behind the front	2 3 4 5 6 7	either Celotex or Kingspan insulation on the perimeter beams. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel is 156 millimetres. The cavity was also formed between the concrete structure and the rear face of the aluminium composite
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	riveted into the support frame as shown on the left-hand image on screen. Alternatively, the edges of the panels can be bent, making a 3D shape. Slots are cut in the edges of the panels so they can be hung on a support rail behind. Therefore, the support is then hidden behind the front face of the panel. These are called modular cassettes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	either Celotex or Kingspan insulation on the perimeter beams. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel is 156 millimetres. The cavity was also formed between the concrete structure and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel attached to the columns. The column cavity
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	riveted into the support frame as shown on the left-hand image on screen. Alternatively, the edges of the panels can be bent, making a 3D shape. Slots are cut in the edges of the panels so they can be hung on a support rail behind. Therefore, the support is then hidden behind the front face of the panel. These are called modular cassettes. This modular cassette method was the method of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	either Celotex or Kingspan insulation on the perimeter beams. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel is 156 millimetres. The cavity was also formed between the concrete structure and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel attached to the columns. The column cavity contained 100-millimetre thick insulation. Therefore,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	riveted into the support frame as shown on the left-hand image on screen. Alternatively, the edges of the panels can be bent, making a 3D shape. Slots are cut in the edges of the panels so they can be hung on a support rail behind. Therefore, the support is then hidden behind the front face of the panel. These are called modular cassettes. This modular cassette method was the method of supporting the rainscreen cladding at Grenfell Tower.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	either Celotex or Kingspan insulation on the perimeter beams. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel is 156 millimetres. The cavity was also formed between the concrete structure and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel attached to the columns. The column cavity contained 100-millimetre thick insulation. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	riveted into the support frame as shown on the left-hand image on screen. Alternatively, the edges of the panels can be bent, making a 3D shape. Slots are cut in the edges of the panels so they can be hung on a support rail behind. Therefore, the support is then hidden behind the front face of the panel. These are called modular cassettes. This modular cassette method was the method of supporting the rainscreen cladding at Grenfell Tower. Vertical metal channels were attached to the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	either Celotex or Kingspan insulation on the perimeter beams. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel is 156 millimetres. The cavity was also formed between the concrete structure and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel attached to the columns. The column cavity contained 100-millimetre thick insulation. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the ACP here is 139 millimetres.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	riveted into the support frame as shown on the left-hand image on screen. Alternatively, the edges of the panels can be bent, making a 3D shape. Slots are cut in the edges of the panels so they can be hung on a support rail behind. Therefore, the support is then hidden behind the front face of the panel. These are called modular cassettes. This modular cassette method was the method of supporting the rainscreen cladding at Grenfell Tower. Vertical metal channels were attached to the building exterior at approximately 1.15-metre centres,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	either Celotex or Kingspan insulation on the perimeter beams. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel is 156 millimetres. The cavity was also formed between the concrete structure and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel attached to the columns. The column cavity contained 100-millimetre thick insulation. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the ACP here is 139 millimetres. Horizontal cavity barriers were installed on both
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	riveted into the support frame as shown on the left-hand image on screen. Alternatively, the edges of the panels can be bent, making a 3D shape. Slots are cut in the edges of the panels so they can be hung on a support rail behind. Therefore, the support is then hidden behind the front face of the panel. These are called modular cassettes. This modular cassette method was the method of supporting the rainscreen cladding at Grenfell Tower. Vertical metal channels were attached to the building exterior at approximately 1.15-metre centres, as measured on site. These vertical channels were	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	either Celotex or Kingspan insulation on the perimeter beams. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel is 156 millimetres. The cavity was also formed between the concrete structure and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel attached to the columns. The column cavity contained 100-millimetre thick insulation. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the ACP here is 139 millimetres. Horizontal cavity barriers were installed on both the columns and horizontal perimeter beams at
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	riveted into the support frame as shown on the left-hand image on screen. Alternatively, the edges of the panels can be bent, making a 3D shape. Slots are cut in the edges of the panels so they can be hung on a support rail behind. Therefore, the support is then hidden behind the front face of the panel. These are called modular cassettes. This modular cassette method was the method of supporting the rainscreen cladding at Grenfell Tower. Vertical metal channels were attached to the building exterior at approximately 1.15-metre centres, as measured on site. These vertical channels were bolted to the underside of the metal brackets supporting	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	either Celotex or Kingspan insulation on the perimeter beams. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel is 156 millimetres. The cavity was also formed between the concrete structure and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel attached to the columns. The column cavity contained 100-millimetre thick insulation. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the ACP here is 139 millimetres. Horizontal cavity barriers were installed on both the columns and horizontal perimeter beams at Grenfell Tower. The photograph on screen now shows
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	riveted into the support frame as shown on the left-hand image on screen. Alternatively, the edges of the panels can be bent, making a 3D shape. Slots are cut in the edges of the panels so they can be hung on a support rail behind. Therefore, the support is then hidden behind the front face of the panel. These are called modular cassettes. This modular cassette method was the method of supporting the rainscreen cladding at Grenfell Tower. Vertical metal channels were attached to the building exterior at approximately 1.15-metre centres, as measured on site. These vertical channels were bolted to the underside of the metal brackets supporting the new window frames.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	either Celotex or Kingspan insulation on the perimeter beams. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel is 156 millimetres. The cavity was also formed between the concrete structure and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel attached to the columns. The column cavity contained 100-millimetre thick insulation. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the ACP here is 139 millimetres. Horizontal cavity barriers were installed on both the columns and horizontal perimeter beams at Grenfell Tower. The photograph on screen now shows a horizontal cavity barrier fixed to the front face of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	riveted into the support frame as shown on the left-hand image on screen. Alternatively, the edges of the panels can be bent, making a 3D shape. Slots are cut in the edges of the panels so they can be hung on a support rail behind. Therefore, the support is then hidden behind the front face of the panel. These are called modular cassettes. This modular cassette method was the method of supporting the rainscreen cladding at Grenfell Tower. Vertical metal channels were attached to the building exterior at approximately 1.15-metre centres, as measured on site. These vertical channels were bolted to the underside of the metal brackets supporting the new window frames. These cladding rails were in turn fixed back onto	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ \end{array} $	either Celotex or Kingspan insulation on the perimeter beams. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel is 156 millimetres. The cavity was also formed between the concrete structure and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel attached to the columns. The column cavity contained 100-millimetre thick insulation. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the ACP here is 139 millimetres. Horizontal cavity barriers were installed on both the columns and horizontal perimeter beams at Grenfell Tower. The photograph on screen now shows a horizontal cavity barrier fixed to the front face of a column on Grenfell Tower. The cavity barrier is
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	riveted into the support frame as shown on the left-hand image on screen. Alternatively, the edges of the panels can be bent, making a 3D shape. Slots are cut in the edges of the panels so they can be hung on a support rail behind. Therefore, the support is then hidden behind the front face of the panel. These are called modular cassettes. This modular cassette method was the method of supporting the rainscreen cladding at Grenfell Tower. Vertical metal channels were attached to the building exterior at approximately 1.15-metre centres, as measured on site. These vertical channels were bolted to the underside of the metal brackets supporting the new window frames. These cladding rails were in turn fixed back onto the new window brackets.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	either Celotex or Kingspan insulation on the perimeter beams. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel is 156 millimetres. The cavity was also formed between the concrete structure and the rear face of the aluminium composite panel attached to the columns. The column cavity contained 100-millimetre thick insulation. Therefore, the depth of cavity between the insulation and the rear face of the ACP here is 139 millimetres. Horizontal cavity barriers were installed on both the columns and horizontal perimeter beams at Grenfell Tower. The photograph on screen now shows a horizontal cavity barrier fixed to the front face of a column on Grenfell Tower. The cavity barrier is mechanically fixed in place using metal support
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1	open state horizontal cavity barriers. They come with	1	windows in the refurbishment, which I will describe
2	instructions to be installed with a 25-millimetre gap		shortly, are also not considered to meet the performance
3	between the front face of the cavity barrier and the		of a cavity barrier as defined in Approved Document B.
4	rear face of the rainscreen outer layer, allowing	4	No cavity barriers were specified at the head of the
5	5 drainage of any moisture within the rainscreen cladding		external wall cavity up by the so-called crown. I have
6			yet to carry out an inspection of that area to check if
7			they were anyway.
8 This horizontal cavity barrier consists of		8	I will now move to the materials on the interior of
9			the tower.
10			This photo from prior to the refurbishment
11			illustrates the original windows and material lining the
12	to the barrier. In the event of exposure to fire, the	12	window reveals on the left. When the original windows
13	intumescent strip expounds outwards and is intended to	13	were removed, the highlighted lying materials were also
14	close the gap between the cavity barrier as installed	14	removed. New materials were then installed internally
15	and the rear face of the rainscreen panel.	15	around each of the windows. The materials highlighted
16	These two photographs show the horizontal ventilated	16	here are the final finished linings. As you can see,
17	cavity barrier installed below a window at Grenfell	17	the location of the new materials installed was limited
18	Tower. Several notches were cut in the cavity barrier	18	to the top, bottom and both sides of every window
19	to allow the cladding rail for the rainscreen panels to	19	opening.
20	pass through. The picture on the right-hand of the	20	The materials applied internally included:
21	screen then shows how the cladding rail passes through	21	Existing timber, part of the original window
22	the horizontal ventilated cavity barrier. The	22	linings. This solid timber material is highlighted in
23	photograph on the left-hand side of the screen shows the	23	blue in the image of the original construction which is
24	same cavity barrier with the cladding rail removed,	24	on the left.
25	showing the gap that was cut in the cavity barrier.	25	New uPVC linings around the window opening. UPVC,
	Page 125		Page 127
1	Vertical cavity barriers were installed on 10 of the	1	plasticised polyvinyl chloride, is a solid plastic
2	14 columns of the tower. For the vertical cavity	2	combustible material. This is highlighted in orange in
2 3	14 columns of the tower. For the vertical cavity barriers, the Harley design drawings specified SIDERISE	2 3	combustible material. This is highlighted in orange in the right-hand side image.
2 3 4	14 columns of the tower. For the vertical cavity barriers, the Harley design drawings specified SIDERISE RVG full fill cavity barriers. The image on the right	2 3 4	combustible material. This is highlighted in orange in the right-hand side image. Pieces of insulation placed between the existing
2 3 4 5	14 columns of the tower. For the vertical cavity barriers, the Harley design drawings specified SIDERISE RVG full fill cavity barriers. The image on the right is taken from SIDERISE product literature. It shows the	2 3 4 5	combustible material. This is highlighted in orange in the right-hand side image. Pieces of insulation placed between the existing concrete construction and this uPVC lining. This is
2 3 4 5 6	14 columns of the tower. For the vertical cavity barriers, the Harley design drawings specified SIDERISE RVG full fill cavity barriers. The image on the right is taken from SIDERISE product literature. It shows the SIDERISE RVG full fill cavity barriers are to be	2 3 4 5 6	combustible material. This is highlighted in orange in the right-hand side image. Pieces of insulation placed between the existing concrete construction and this uPVC lining. This is highlighted in yellow in the right-hand image, as well
2 3 4 5 6 7	14 columns of the tower. For the vertical cavity barriers, the Harley design drawings specified SIDERISE RVG full fill cavity barriers. The image on the right is taken from SIDERISE product literature. It shows the SIDERISE RVG full fill cavity barriers are to be installed over the full depth of the cavity, leaving no	2 3 4 5 6 7	combustible material. This is highlighted in orange in the right-hand side image. Pieces of insulation placed between the existing concrete construction and this uPVC lining. This is highlighted in yellow in the right-hand image, as well as other larger pieces of thermal insulation underneath
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	14 columns of the tower. For the vertical cavity barriers, the Harley design drawings specified SIDERISE RVG full fill cavity barriers. The image on the right is taken from SIDERISE product literature. It shows the SIDERISE RVG full fill cavity barriers are to be installed over the full depth of the cavity, leaving no gap. It is a mineral wool product which is	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	combustible material. This is highlighted in orange in the right-hand side image. Pieces of insulation placed between the existing concrete construction and this uPVC lining. This is highlighted in yellow in the right-hand image, as well as other larger pieces of thermal insulation underneath all four sides of the uPVC linings, which I will also
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$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	14 columns of the tower. For the vertical cavity barriers, the Harley design drawings specified SIDERISE RVG full fill cavity barriers. The image on the right is taken from SIDERISE product literature. It shows the SIDERISE RVG full fill cavity barriers are to be installed over the full depth of the cavity, leaving no gap. It is a mineral wool product which is non-combustible. On site I observed instead that the horizontal cavity barrier product, SIDERISE RH25 open state cavity barrier, had been rotated and installed vertically. It had also been installed with the intumescent strip facing into the existing concrete structure. This photo shows the SIDERISE RH25 cavity barrier rotated and installed in the vertical position. A gap was observed between the roughly cut mineral wool barrier and the rainscreen panel. I observed some required cavity barriers not to have been installed at Grenfell Tower. This image illustrates the cavity barriers present in the external wall cavity. It can be seen there are no cavity barrier products installed around the openings made by the windows.	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	<ul> <li>combustible material. This is highlighted in orange in the right-hand side image.</li> <li>Pieces of insulation placed between the existing concrete construction and this uPVC lining. This is highlighted in yellow in the right-hand image, as well as other larger pieces of thermal insulation underneath all four sides of the uPVC linings, which I will also explain.</li> <li>Firstly, timber batons and, in places, timber board, which formed part of the original linings to the window reveals, were left directly affixed to the concrete construction. I have shown the position of these materials in the images on the screen here.</li> <li>The timber materials themselves can be seen in this image, which shows the condition when all the newly installed linings have been removed. Where the original timber lining was retained, this was approximately 195 millimetres wide and, as can be seen in the image on the left, does not extend out to the new window position; a gap exists.</li> <li>While inspecting the external wall of Grenfell Tower, I observed foam-type filler materials placed in these gaps. This image on the right is a view</li> </ul>
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	<ul> <li>14 columns of the tower. For the vertical cavity barriers, the Harley design drawings specified SIDERISE RVG full fill cavity barriers. The image on the right is taken from SIDERISE product literature. It shows the SIDERISE RVG full fill cavity barriers are to be installed over the full depth of the cavity, leaving no gap. It is a mineral wool product which is non-combustible.</li> <li>On site I observed instead that the horizontal cavity barrier product, SIDERISE RH25 open state cavity barrier, had been rotated and installed vertically. It had also been installed with the intumescent strip facing into the existing concrete structure.</li> <li>This photo shows the SIDERISE RH25 cavity barrier rotated and installed in the vertical position. A gap was observed between the roughly cut mineral wool barrier and the rainscreen panel.</li> <li>I observed some required cavity barriers not to have been installed at Grenfell Tower. This image illustrates the cavity barriers present in the external wall cavity. It can be seen there are no cavity barrier products installed around the openings made by the</li> </ul>	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\end{array} $	<ul> <li>combustible material. This is highlighted in orange in the right-hand side image.</li> <li>Pieces of insulation placed between the existing concrete construction and this uPVC lining. This is highlighted in yellow in the right-hand image, as well as other larger pieces of thermal insulation underneath all four sides of the uPVC linings, which I will also explain.</li> <li>Firstly, timber batons and, in places, timber board, which formed part of the original linings to the window reveals, were left directly affixed to the concrete construction. I have shown the position of these materials in the images on the screen here.</li> <li>The timber materials themselves can be seen in this image, which shows the condition when all the newly installed linings have been removed. Where the original timber lining was retained, this was approximately 195 millimetres wide and, as can be seen in the image on the left, does not extend out to the new window position; a gap exists.</li> <li>While inspecting the external wall of Grenfell Tower, I observed foam-type filler materials</li> </ul>
$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	14 columns of the tower. For the vertical cavity barriers, the Harley design drawings specified SIDERISE RVG full fill cavity barriers. The image on the right is taken from SIDERISE product literature. It shows the SIDERISE RVG full fill cavity barriers are to be installed over the full depth of the cavity, leaving no gap. It is a mineral wool product which is non-combustible. On site I observed instead that the horizontal cavity barrier product, SIDERISE RH25 open state cavity barrier, had been rotated and installed vertically. It had also been installed with the intumescent strip facing into the existing concrete structure. This photo shows the SIDERISE RH25 cavity barrier rotated and installed in the vertical position. A gap was observed between the roughly cut mineral wool barrier and the rainscreen panel. I observed some required cavity barriers not to have been installed at Grenfell Tower. This image illustrates the cavity barriers present in the external wall cavity. It can be seen there are no cavity barrier products installed around the openings made by the windows.	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\\24\end{array} $	<ul> <li>combustible material. This is highlighted in orange in the right-hand side image.</li> <li>Pieces of insulation placed between the existing concrete construction and this uPVC lining. This is highlighted in yellow in the right-hand image, as well as other larger pieces of thermal insulation underneath all four sides of the uPVC linings, which I will also explain.</li> <li>Firstly, timber batons and, in places, timber board, which formed part of the original linings to the window reveals, were left directly affixed to the concrete construction. I have shown the position of these materials in the images on the screen here.</li> <li>The timber materials themselves can be seen in this image, which shows the condition when all the newly installed linings have been removed. Where the original timber lining was retained, this was approximately 195 millimetres wide and, as can be seen in the image on the left, does not extend out to the new window position; a gap exists.</li> <li>While inspecting the external wall of Grenfell Tower, I observed foam-type filler materials placed in these gaps. This image on the right is a view</li> </ul>

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1	corner. In the gap above, between the window frame and	$\begin{vmatrix} 1\\2 \end{vmatrix}$	rainscreen overcladding around the openings.	
2	the existing concrete face of the building, an orange		Approved Document B, however, does permit cavity	
3	foam filler material can be seen.		barriers around openings to be formed of specific	
4			materials of a minimum thickness. These include: steel,	
5	2 37		at least 0.5 millimetres thick; timber, at least	
6	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		38 millimetres thick; polyethylene sleeved mineral wool	
7	original timber window linings and the new window frame	7	or mineral wool slab under compression;	
	8 location. I have found no evidence of a specific		calcium silicate, cement-based or gypsum-based boards,	
9	insulation product or material specified for this	9	at least 12 millimetres thick.	
10	location. In this image, I have illustrated the	10	The materials as I have just described them	
11	locations that it was observed; that is around all four	11	installed internally at Grenfell Tower around the	
12	sides.	12	openings created by the new windows do not meet these	
13	This image shows a polymeric insulation foam with	13	requirements. As the internal materials cannot be	
14	foil facing installed at the head of the window between	14	considered as cavity barriers either, no cavity barriers	
15	the new window frame and original timber lining. The	15	of any kind were present around the window openings	
16	final window material has been removed by others. There	16	within Grenfell Tower.	
17	are no identifying logos or labels on this sample.	17	Finally, whilst inspecting the external wall of the	
18	The pictures on screen now were taken during my site	18	tower, I observed a soft material above each window.	
19	investigation, looking right at the opening between the	19	Specifically, I observed a strip of board adjacent to	
20	original infill panel between windows and the new	20	the head of the window. The top-right image shows it	
21	Aluglaze insulating core panel. In this location,	21	was an 8-millimetre hardboard and a 12-millimetre foam.	
22	I found 25-millimetre thick polymeric foam sealing the	22	I observed a portion of the board which had been removed	
23	edge of the void created between the old and the new	23	by others in flat 23. The board was labelled ICI	
24 25	infill panel. The markings on the aluminium foil facing	24	purlboard, which is a polyurethane foam and plasterboard	
25	of the insulation appears to indicate that it was	25	composite product, and polyurethane is also	
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1	Celotex TB4000, noting the Celotex logo highlighted with	1	a combustible plastic material.	
2	the orange dashed box. TB4000 is a PIR insulation.	2	This concludes my description of the materials used	
3	This requires formal identification via testing,	3	and how they were arranged and fixed for the external	
4	however, as the design drawings do not show insulation	4	and internal refurbishment of the external wall of	
5	in this location.	5	Grenfell Tower.	
6	Further samples of insulation removed from the	6	Thank you.	
7	underside of the uPVC show a different product logo.	7	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much indeed.	
8	The green logo, highlighted with the orange dashed	8	Thank you.	
9	circle here, is consistent with the Kingspan Therma	9	MS GRANGE: Thank you, sir. That concludes Dr Lane's	
10	range of PIR which, as I have explained, is combustible.	10	presentation today and we will commence again tomorrow	
11	This, too, requires formal identification via testing.	11	at 10 am with the presentation of	
12	Now turning to the uPVC lining itself.	12	Professor Niamh Nic Daeid.	
13	I observed the uPVC lining to all four sides of each	13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, thank you.	
14	window. The material is a rigid combustible plastic	14	MS GRANGE: Thank you.	
15	used for a variety of construction purposes.	15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So we'll finish there and we'll be	
16	Where the uPVC lining had been removed by others,	16	back here at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.	
17	I was able to observe its thickness as 10 millimetres.	17	Thank you all very much.	
18	The zigzag pattern I observed on the underside of the	18	(3.40 pm)	
19	uPVC lining was replicated on the original timber	19	(The hearing adjourned until Tuesday, 19 June 2018 at	
20	linings from which they had been removed, indicating the	20	10.00 am)	
21	uPVC lining was glued in position.	21	INDEX	
22	These images illustrate the final finished surface	22	DR BARBARA LANE (sworn)5	
23	of the uPVC lining to the window openings.	23		
24	I have earlier explained that no cavity barriers	24		
25	were installed within the external cavity of the	25		
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			- "50	

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