

<p>1 Wednesday, 12 September 2018</p> <p>2 (10.00 am)</p> <p>3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to</p> <p>4 today's hearing, at which we are going to hear from some</p> <p>5 more firefighter witnesses.</p> <p>6 Yes, Mr Kinnier.</p> <p>7 MR KINNIER: Good morning, sir. The first witness today is</p> <p>8 Firefighter Michael Wood.</p> <p>9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.</p> <p>10 MICHAEL WOOD (sworn)</p> <p>11 Questions by MR KINNIER</p> <p>12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Mr Wood.</p> <p>13 Yes, Mr Kinnier.</p> <p>14 MR KINNIER: Good morning.</p> <p>15 Would you please confirm your name for the record.</p> <p>16 A. My name is Michael Wood.</p> <p>17 Q. Good morning, Mr Wood. Many thanks for coming along</p> <p>18 today. It's much appreciated.</p> <p>19 On the lectern there is a blue folder, and if you</p> <p>20 open the blue folder and turn to the first tab, there</p> <p>21 should be your witness statement dated 29 January of</p> <p>22 this year; is that right?</p> <p>23 A. I can't see the date on it. Oh, yeah, I've got it,</p> <p>24 yeah, 29th.</p> <p>25 Q. If you turn to the next tab --</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 1</p>	<p>1 background.</p> <p>2 First of all, is it right you are a firefighter and,</p> <p>3 at the time of the fire, you were based at Brixton?</p> <p>4 A. That's correct.</p> <p>5 Q. That you became a firefighter in 2003?</p> <p>6 A. Correct.</p> <p>7 Q. And that the call sign of the appliance you rode on the</p> <p>8 night was Hotel 242?</p> <p>9 A. That's correct.</p> <p>10 Q. As to timings, the LFB records indicate you were</p> <p>11 mobilised at 02.05, mobile at 02.08 and you arrived at</p> <p>12 the scene at 02.28.</p> <p>13 Does that sound about right to you?</p> <p>14 A. It does, yes.</p> <p>15 Q. The first topic of questions I'd like to discuss with</p> <p>16 you is BA entry and deployment within the tower. You</p> <p>17 had a number of entries into the tower, so the first one</p> <p>18 I want to deal with is the very first one.</p> <p>19 A. Right.</p> <p>20 Q. When you went into the tower for the first time, is it</p> <p>21 right to say that the foyer was crowded and chaotic?</p> <p>22 A. Yeah, it was.</p> <p>23 Q. Is it right you waited there for between 5 and</p> <p>24 10 minutes?</p> <p>25 A. Around about that, 10 minutes, yeah.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 3</p>
<p>1 A. Yes.</p> <p>2 Q. -- hopefully there should be your contemporaneous note.</p> <p>3 The next tab rather than the next page.</p> <p>4 A. Oh, got you, yes.</p> <p>5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Probably called tab B.</p> <p>6 A. Yeah, there is, yeah.</p> <p>7 MR KINNIER: That's your contemporaneous note?</p> <p>8 A. Yeah.</p> <p>9 Q. If you turn to the final tab, hopefully you should find</p> <p>10 your exhibits, four exhibits you appended to your police</p> <p>11 statement; is that right?</p> <p>12 A. That's right.</p> <p>13 Q. Have you read those documents recently?</p> <p>14 A. Yes.</p> <p>15 Q. Do you confirm their contents are true?</p> <p>16 A. Yes.</p> <p>17 Q. Are you content for those documents to stand as your</p> <p>18 evidence to this inquiry?</p> <p>19 A. Yes.</p> <p>20 Q. Mr Wood, if at any time you need a break, please say so,</p> <p>21 that's not a problem.</p> <p>22 Secondly, if any of my questions are unclear at any</p> <p>23 stage, please say so and I'll rephrase.</p> <p>24 A. Okay.</p> <p>25 Q. Before we start, could I ask you some basic questions of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 2</p>	<p>1 Q. Did you see any residents passing by you evacuating the</p> <p>2 tower?</p> <p>3 A. Yes.</p> <p>4 Q. Can you remember how many?</p> <p>5 A. No.</p> <p>6 Q. Can you remember what condition they were in as they</p> <p>7 left?</p> <p>8 A. Varied conditions.</p> <p>9 Q. If you could describe to us the range of conditions you</p> <p>10 witnessed.</p> <p>11 A. Some were being walked out, some were being carried out.</p> <p>12 Q. Were any being assisted out using second BA sets?</p> <p>13 A. I can't remember.</p> <p>14 Q. After some time, you shifted to a room on the left-hand</p> <p>15 side of the lobby which you thought was a community</p> <p>16 room; is that right?</p> <p>17 A. It was like a space, I don't know what the purpose of</p> <p>18 that room was.</p> <p>19 Q. Was it at this time, when you were waiting in the lobby,</p> <p>20 that you saw a small boy saying, "My brother died in</p> <p>21 there"?</p> <p>22 A. I can't remember the exact room. It was somewhere</p> <p>23 around the lobby area.</p> <p>24 Q. Was it around this time that you saw the LFB</p> <p>25 commissioner Dany Cotton and a senior officer?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 4</p>

<p>1 A. Yes.</p> <p>2 Q. Is it right that the senior officer addressed the men</p> <p>3 and women who were in the lobby?</p> <p>4 A. Yes.</p> <p>5 Q. Is it right that the senior officer gave a speech in</p> <p>6 which you were told that, first of all, it was okay to</p> <p>7 work outside procedures and, secondly, he also said that</p> <p>8 if anyone didn't want to do that, that was fine as well.</p> <p>9 Is that a fair summary of what you were told?</p> <p>10 A. That's a fair summary.</p> <p>11 Q. What did you take him to mean by the phrase "working</p> <p>12 outside procedures"? What did you think it meant in</p> <p>13 practice for you?</p> <p>14 A. That it was going to be very difficult because of the</p> <p>15 nature of the fire and that we would probably have to do</p> <p>16 things above and beyond what we'd normally do within our</p> <p>17 safety procedures.</p> <p>18 Q. And were you content to do that?</p> <p>19 A. I was.</p> <p>20 Q. Now, as I understand it, due to congestion in the lobby</p> <p>21 area, you and others were sent outside the tower after</p> <p>22 a period of time; is that right?</p> <p>23 A. Correct.</p> <p>24 Q. Can you remember now -- I apologise, it's always</p> <p>25 difficult asking questions about times -- how long you</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 5</p>	<p>1 whilst you were waiting at the lobby or the bridgehead?</p> <p>2 A. I can't remember.</p> <p>3 Q. Now, you moved to the bridgehead. Can you remember on</p> <p>4 what floor the bridgehead was at that stage?</p> <p>5 A. It had been moved. It was on the ground or the 1st.</p> <p>6 Ground.</p> <p>7 Q. Are you sure about that at this stage?</p> <p>8 A. No.</p> <p>9 Q. Did you see a Watch Manager Morrison at that stage, when</p> <p>10 you were at the bridgehead?</p> <p>11 A. Yeah.</p> <p>12 Q. Is it right that you were put into a queue with</p> <p>13 Firefighter Lawrence, and ahead of you were Firefighters</p> <p>14 Sonson and Cuthbert?</p> <p>15 A. Correct.</p> <p>16 Q. What brief were you given at the bridgehead?</p> <p>17 A. To clear -- to check the flats on the 4th and the</p> <p>18 5th floor.</p> <p>19 Q. Were you also told to carry out a right-hand search?</p> <p>20 A. That's correct.</p> <p>21 Q. Were you given any further detail by the watch manager</p> <p>22 before you were deployed?</p> <p>23 A. Not that I remember.</p> <p>24 Q. So no detail of any particular flats or any particular</p> <p>25 occupants of flats that you ought to be looking out for</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 7</p>
<p>1 were waiting outside the tower before your second entry?</p> <p>2 A. Up to 20 minutes. I can't say.</p> <p>3 Q. Don't worry. If you can't remember, don't worry.</p> <p>4 A. Yeah.</p> <p>5 Q. If I can turn to your second entry into the tower. You</p> <p>6 went from the lobby to the bridgehead; is that right?</p> <p>7 A. That's right.</p> <p>8 Q. Again, was it congested or not congested, the lobby and</p> <p>9 the bridgehead?</p> <p>10 A. It wasn't as congested as it was the first time, but</p> <p>11 there's still quite a few people about.</p> <p>12 Q. Was it congested with firefighters or firefighters and</p> <p>13 casualties evacuating from higher up the tower?</p> <p>14 A. The same. More firefighters than casualties.</p> <p>15 Q. In terms of the casualties you saw, are you able to</p> <p>16 describe for us what condition they were in as they</p> <p>17 evacuated the tower?</p> <p>18 A. Again, I can't remember like who was -- what casualty</p> <p>19 was there at what time. Some were being carried out,</p> <p>20 some were being walked out.</p> <p>21 Q. Again, do you remember any evacuating whilst assisted</p> <p>22 with a second BA set?</p> <p>23 A. I can't remember.</p> <p>24 Q. Apologies for putting a particular recollection, do you</p> <p>25 recall seeing two Taiwanese women leaving the tower</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 6</p>	<p>1 or rescuing?</p> <p>2 A. I can't remember.</p> <p>3 Q. If I can talk to you about that deployment to the 4th</p> <p>4 and 5th floor and, first of all, the conditions of the</p> <p>5 stairwell.</p> <p>6 You tallied out at 03.47. Does that sound about</p> <p>7 right?</p> <p>8 A. I'll have to take your word for it. I wasn't looking at</p> <p>9 the time.</p> <p>10 Q. Is it right that you encountered a man on the stairs in</p> <p>11 the foyer who was in a frantic state saying he had lost</p> <p>12 his wife?</p> <p>13 A. That's correct.</p> <p>14 Q. You continued with your task and went up the tower; is</p> <p>15 that right?</p> <p>16 A. That's right.</p> <p>17 Q. Can you describe for us the conditions you encountered</p> <p>18 as you left the bridgehead and started to make your way</p> <p>19 up to the 4th floor?</p> <p>20 A. Yeah, it was smoky.</p> <p>21 Q. Can you describe for us the density? How thick was the</p> <p>22 smoke?</p> <p>23 A. It got thicker as we went through onto the floor.</p> <p>24 Q. What colour was it?</p> <p>25 A. Like black.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 8</p>

<p>1 Q. As you were going up, is it right that you saw three 2 firefighters come past you -- and you're not too sure, 3 it was either on the 2nd, 3rd or 4th floors -- with 4 a female casualty?</p> <p>5 A. Correct.</p> <p>6 Q. Looking back on it now, are you able to be more precise 7 about the floor on which you encountered the female 8 casualty being brought down by the three firefighters?</p> <p>9 A. I'd say it was the 4th.</p> <p>10 Q. You say that she was almost if not unconscious; is that 11 a fair summary of her condition that you witnessed?</p> <p>12 A. She was, yeah.</p> <p>13 Q. And they were really struggling with her; is that right?</p> <p>14 A. Yeah, they were collapsing.</p> <p>15 Q. You took the lady from them and carried her down; is 16 that right?</p> <p>17 A. That's right.</p> <p>18 Q. Then you took her to the mezzanine. You took her to the 19 mezzanine, and then is it right that you went back up 20 the tower to regroup with Firefighter Lawrence?</p> <p>21 A. That's what I done, yeah.</p> <p>22 Q. Firefighter Lawrence had stayed up, had he, at or about 23 the 4th floor whilst you took the lady down?</p> <p>24 A. Yeah, because he was still going up.</p> <p>25 Q. As you were going up to see Firefighter Lawrence, you</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 9</p>	<p>1 and suggested you went to the 5th floor; is that right?</p> <p>2 A. Sounds about right.</p> <p>3 Q. So you went up to the 5th floor. Can you describe for 4 us what you encountered on the 5th floor?</p> <p>5 A. Yeah, it was really hot and smoky, and we went in 6 a room, in a flat, the front door was burnt off, and 7 just -- it was all full of fire. Just checking if there 8 was anyone in there. But it was so hot, like, I knew 9 there would be no one in there. I checked it anyway 10 just in case and there was no one in there.</p> <p>11 Q. Can you describe the condition of the interior of the 12 flat you went to search?</p> <p>13 A. It was all on fire, and it was really hot.</p> <p>14 Q. How far into the flat were you able to go?</p> <p>15 A. Right through it.</p> <p>16 Q. So from the entrance door to the far wall with the 17 window in?</p> <p>18 A. Yeah.</p> <p>19 Q. How many of the flats did you search on the 5th floor?</p> <p>20 A. Two.</p> <p>21 Q. Then because of the temperature and the circumstances 22 you encountered, is it right that you went back down to 23 the bridgehead?</p> <p>24 A. Yeah, my air started running out.</p> <p>25 Q. Had your alarm sounded by this stage?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 11</p>
<p>1 met a man coming down the stairs; is that right?</p> <p>2 A. A casualty, yeah.</p> <p>3 Q. He was coughing, spluttering, saying "Help me".</p> <p>4 A. He was, yeah.</p> <p>5 Q. In your statement, you describe his legs giving way.</p> <p>6 A. Yeah, he collapsed when he's seen me.</p> <p>7 Q. Then you describe him half fainting into your arms; is 8 that a fair summary?</p> <p>9 A. Sort of thing.</p> <p>10 Q. And you carried him down?</p> <p>11 A. I did.</p> <p>12 Q. Did you leave him at the mezzanine or on the ground 13 floor?</p> <p>14 A. Mezzanine, because then the people from BA entry control 15 could see us and they come running up.</p> <p>16 Q. When you brought down the first lady and then this 17 gentleman, did you brief anyone at the bridgehead as to 18 where you'd found these individuals?</p> <p>19 A. I can't remember, I just got back up to do what I had to 20 do.</p> <p>21 Q. Okay.</p> <p>22 After you brought the man down to the mezzanine, you 23 then went back up to the 4th floor; is that right? You 24 met Firefighter Sonson and Cuthbert who said they had 25 searched the 4th floor, they had two more flats to go</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 10</p>	<p>1 A. I think so. I think so.</p> <p>2 Q. You returned to the bridgehead and you tallied in at 3 04.02. Again, is that a precise time you can't remember 4 now?</p> <p>5 A. I wouldn't know the time.</p> <p>6 Q. Did you brief the bridgehead of the conditions you'd 7 found on the 5th floor?</p> <p>8 A. Yeah, I would've done, but I can't remember what I said.</p> <p>9 Q. Can you remember who you briefed at the bridgehead?</p> <p>10 A. No.</p> <p>11 Q. Now, you had a third entry into the tower later on in 12 the evening. Is it right that you were deployed to the 13 9th or 10th floor to remove a body?</p> <p>14 A. The 11th.</p> <p>15 Q. In short, you found the body of a deceased woman on the 16 stairwell between -- was it the 10th and the 11th floor?</p> <p>17 A. Like on the 11th.</p> <p>18 Q. Now --</p> <p>19 A. As far as I remember.</p> <p>20 Q. We don't need to go into it, but for a range of reasons 21 and after some time, you were unable to bring the 22 deceased woman out of the tower; is that right?</p> <p>23 A. Yeah, we never got her all the way down.</p> <p>24 Q. How far down the tower were you able to take the 25 casualty?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 12</p>

<p>1 A. To the 9th floor.</p> <p>2 MR KINNIER: Mr Wood, thank you very much, those are all the</p> <p>3 questions I have for you at this stage.</p> <p>4 I don't think there are going to be any further</p> <p>5 questions, sir, but if I may ask you briefly to rise.</p> <p>6 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you like a few minutes just to</p> <p>7 check?</p> <p>8 MR KINNIER: Yes.</p> <p>9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Wood, it sometimes happens that</p> <p>10 although Mr Kinnier thinks he has finished asking</p> <p>11 questions, he finds he hasn't, so we are going to rise</p> <p>12 for a couple of minutes now.</p> <p>13 Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence</p> <p>14 while you're out of the room, and we'll come back in --</p> <p>15 do you need 5 minutes?</p> <p>16 MR KINNIER: I think so, thanks.</p> <p>17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll come back at 10.20 and then</p> <p>18 we'll see if there are more questions for you. All</p> <p>19 right? If you would like to go with the usher, please.</p> <p>20 Right, 10.20, then, please.</p> <p>21 MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.</p> <p>22 (10.15 am)</p> <p>23 (A short break)</p> <p>24 (10.20 am)</p> <p>25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, Mr Wood, I'm pleased to say</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 13</p>	<p>1 question.</p> <p>2 If you want a break at any time, that's absolutely</p> <p>3 fine, just let me know.</p> <p>4 A. No worries.</p> <p>5 Q. Can I start by asking you to look in the front of the</p> <p>6 blue folder that is in front of you. The first document</p> <p>7 there should be a copy of your witness statement dated</p> <p>8 5 January 2018; is that right?</p> <p>9 A. Yes, that's correct.</p> <p>10 Q. For the record, that's MET000080586.</p> <p>11 Have you read a copy of that statement?</p> <p>12 A. Yes, I have, yes.</p> <p>13 Q. Can you confirm that the contents are true to the best</p> <p>14 of your knowledge?</p> <p>15 A. Indeed, yes.</p> <p>16 Q. Thank you.</p> <p>17 Behind the second tab should be a copy of your</p> <p>18 contemporaneous note.</p> <p>19 A. Yes, that's correct.</p> <p>20 Q. Again, for the record, that's MET00005414.</p> <p>21 Behind the third tab we have your exhibit, which is</p> <p>22 three separate hand-drawn sketches that you've produced?</p> <p>23 A. That's correct, yes.</p> <p>24 Q. That's MET00015753.</p> <p>25 Are you happy for those documents to stand as your</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 15</p>
<p>1 that there are no further questions to put to you, so it</p> <p>2 just remains for me to thank you very much indeed for</p> <p>3 coming to give your evidence and you are now free to go.</p> <p>4 The usher will look after you. Thank you for coming.</p> <p>5 THE WITNESS: Thank you.</p> <p>6 (The witness withdrew)</p> <p>7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Kinnier.</p> <p>8 MR KINNIER: Sir, the next witness is Watch Manager Daniel</p> <p>9 Morrison, who will be examined by Ms Curtain. So there</p> <p>10 will be a changeover of both counsel and witness. There</p> <p>11 is no need to change the furniture, I'm told.</p> <p>12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So I probably don't need to rise.</p> <p>13 MR KINNIER: You don't need to rise, sir.</p> <p>14 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Very good.</p> <p>15 DANIEL MORRISON (sworn)</p> <p>16 Questions by MS CURTAIN</p> <p>17 MS CURTAIN: Can you please confirm your name for the</p> <p>18 record.</p> <p>19 A. Daniel Robert Morrison.</p> <p>20 Q. Good morning, Mr Morrison.</p> <p>21 First of all, thank you very much for coming along</p> <p>22 to give evidence today. It's very much appreciated.</p> <p>23 I'm going to ask you a series of questions about</p> <p>24 your experience at the incident. If anything I ask is</p> <p>25 not clear, please say so and I will rephrase the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 14</p>	<p>1 evidence to the inquiry?</p> <p>2 A. I am indeed, yes.</p> <p>3 Q. Thank you very much.</p> <p>4 If we can just start with some basics, you are</p> <p>5 currently a watch manager, I believe, based at Beckenham</p> <p>6 fire station?</p> <p>7 A. I am indeed, yes.</p> <p>8 Q. As at June 2017, you were based at Tooting fire station?</p> <p>9 A. Yes.</p> <p>10 Q. And your rank there was a crew manager plus?</p> <p>11 A. Yes.</p> <p>12 Q. The plus indicating that you can act as watch manager if</p> <p>13 required?</p> <p>14 A. Yes.</p> <p>15 Q. But I think it's right that on the night of the</p> <p>16 incident, so the night of 13 June, you were in your</p> <p>17 capacity as crew manager; is that correct?</p> <p>18 A. I was indeed, although my collar markings still had my</p> <p>19 watch manager rank on, which I believe in previous</p> <p>20 witness statements is why I've been referred to as</p> <p>21 a watch manager.</p> <p>22 Q. I see.</p> <p>23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So if we see photographs, as we</p> <p>24 may --</p> <p>25 A. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 16</p>

<p>1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: -- you would be wearing a white</p> <p>2 helmet?</p> <p>3 A. I would be wearing a yellow helmet, but because we had</p> <p>4 our helmets off most of the time, it's denoted by the</p> <p>5 markings on your collar, so I had my watch manager</p> <p>6 markings on.</p> <p>7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.</p> <p>8 MS CURTAIN: Thank you, that's very helpful.</p> <p>9 You were on the night driving Tooting's pump, which</p> <p>10 is call sign Hotel 352; is that right?</p> <p>11 A. I was in charge, so I wasn't driving. I was in charge</p> <p>12 of Hotel 352, yes.</p> <p>13 Q. Thank you.</p> <p>14 The LFB documents that we have indicate that</p> <p>15 Hotel 352 was on the road at 02.09, and it arrived at</p> <p>16 the incident at 02.25. Do those times sound about right</p> <p>17 to you?</p> <p>18 A. Yes, yes, roughly.</p> <p>19 Q. You say in your witness statement -- I'm looking at</p> <p>20 page 5, the second paragraph, and this is eight lines</p> <p>21 down -- Mr Morrison, all the documents I am going to ask</p> <p>22 you to look at will come up on the screen. You can see</p> <p>23 the big screen there. There is also a screen to the</p> <p>24 right of you which might be easier.</p> <p>25 A. All right, yes, thank you.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 17</p>	<p>1 Q. No. Okay.</p> <p>2 A. Sorry.</p> <p>3 Q. Do you know if it was CU7 or CU8?</p> <p>4 A. I wouldn't know.</p> <p>5 Q. Do you remember who was on it when you went to hand in</p> <p>6 your board?</p> <p>7 A. No, I don't, I'm afraid.</p> <p>8 Q. Do you remember if FSG information was taken on the</p> <p>9 command unit?</p> <p>10 A. No, I wouldn't know.</p> <p>11 Q. Okay.</p> <p>12 You then say -- this is the third paragraph of</p> <p>13 page 5, the third line down -- that a station manager</p> <p>14 directed you to go up to the entry control point on the</p> <p>15 3rd floor.</p> <p>16 A. Yes.</p> <p>17 Q. So we are clear, the entry control point is located</p> <p>18 where the bridgehead is; is that right?</p> <p>19 A. Yes, that's right.</p> <p>20 Q. You entered the tower through the main entrance.</p> <p>21 A. Yes.</p> <p>22 Q. Do you remember when you were in the ground-floor lobby</p> <p>23 seeing Watch Manager Williams there?</p> <p>24 A. At that point the entrance lobby wasn't that congested.</p> <p>25 But I didn't take note of who was in there, I'm afraid.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 19</p>
<p>1 Q. You explained that on arrival:</p> <p>2 "We tried to find out where the BA staging area was</p> <p>3 and someone pointed towards the tower."</p> <p>4 A. Yes.</p> <p>5 Q. Were you aware that, by this stage in the incident,</p> <p>6 there was an initial BA staging area being set up by the</p> <p>7 leisure centre?</p> <p>8 A. No. No, we weren't. As I walked across the green with</p> <p>9 my crew, I asked another firefighter where the BA</p> <p>10 station area was and they pointed towards there, so</p> <p>11 that's where I sent my crew.</p> <p>12 Q. So you sent your crew to the tower and you then went to</p> <p>13 book in at the command unit; is that right?</p> <p>14 A. Yes.</p> <p>15 Q. You've marked the location of the command unit on your</p> <p>16 exhibits and I'm going to ask Paul, the documents</p> <p>17 director, just to bring that up briefly.</p> <p>18 So at the bottom of the page, that looks like it's</p> <p>19 the command unit that was parked on Grenfell Road. Do</p> <p>20 you know if that's right?</p> <p>21 A. I wouldn't know the name of the road.</p> <p>22 Q. If we put it another way, it wasn't the command unit</p> <p>23 that was on Bomore Road, which I think is where you say</p> <p>24 you parked?</p> <p>25 A. I wouldn't know where Bomore Road is.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 18</p>	<p>1 Q. Did you see anyone transcribing FSG information onto the</p> <p>2 wall of the ground-floor lobby?</p> <p>3 A. No.</p> <p>4 Q. You then say -- this is over the page at page 6 of your</p> <p>5 witness statement, and the first paragraph, four lines</p> <p>6 from the bottom:</p> <p>7 "I saw two Watch Managers [this is once you are at</p> <p>8 the bridgehead] Brian O'Keith from Kensington ..."</p> <p>9 I think that should be Brien O'Keeffe. Is that</p> <p>10 right?</p> <p>11 A. Yes.</p> <p>12 Q. And Louisa De Silvo?</p> <p>13 A. Yes.</p> <p>14 Q. With a crew manager and a firefighter whose names you</p> <p>15 don't remember?</p> <p>16 A. No.</p> <p>17 Q. Do you remember anyone else being on the bridgehead at</p> <p>18 this point?</p> <p>19 A. It was very congested. They seemed to be the only ones</p> <p>20 that were there in a managing capacity, so ...</p> <p>21 Q. I was going to ask who you understood to be in charge of</p> <p>22 the bridgehead.</p> <p>23 A. My understanding at that time was Brien O'Keeffe was in</p> <p>24 charge of the bridgehead, and Lou De Silvo was in charge</p> <p>25 of the entry control.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 20</p>

<p>1 Q. Do you have any recollection of Group Manager Welch 2 being on the bridgehead at this point?</p> <p>3 A. No.</p> <p>4 Q. What about Group Manager Goulbourne?</p> <p>5 A. No, not at that time.</p> <p>6 Q. Not on the 3rd floor?</p> <p>7 A. No, not at that time.</p> <p>8 Q. You explain -- and this is the last line of the same 9 paragraph on page 6 -- you told them that you were there 10 to assist them and you were told to take on the role of 11 communications officer.</p> <p>12 A. Yes, that's correct.</p> <p>13 Q. Just moving down to the next paragraph, you go on to 14 explain what that role involves. You say:</p> <p>15 "The BA crews would be briefed by the officer 16 committing them into the building and I would be their 17 point of contact via a dedicated channel on the radio. 18 In this case Channel 6. I would pass on any information 19 that need to be transmitted or received to the Entry 20 Control Officer. All communications would all go 21 through me."</p> <p>22 Just breaking that down, who was it who tasked you 23 with this role?</p> <p>24 A. I don't remember. It would've been either Watch Manager 25 O'Keeffe or Watch Manager De Silvo. But it was the next</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 21</p>	<p>1 they've reached the floor that they're supposed to 2 search, they will let us know. If they come across any 3 casualties, they would let us know. If they were having 4 any difficulties. All that information would be 5 expected to be passed back to the bridgehead or the 6 entry control.</p> <p>7 Q. Just so we're clear on the limits of the role of 8 a communications officer, would a communications officer 9 also be involved in briefing crews before they're 10 committed?</p> <p>11 A. Initially, on the 3rd floor, no, and as per the policy, 12 not generally. But when we moved down to the ground 13 floor, the logistics and the geography of where everyone 14 was positioned meant that I was the closest to the crews 15 being committed and at the base of the stairs, and so 16 a lot of the time the brief would be passed on through 17 me.</p> <p>18 Q. Thank you. We are going to come on to your time at the 19 ground floor.</p> <p>20 A. Yes.</p> <p>21 Q. What about taking debriefings from crews who were 22 returning from deployments? If we just focus on your 23 time at the bridgehead on the 3rd floor, was that 24 something you were involved in?</p> <p>25 A. Yes. They would come back -- again, they would look</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 23</p>
<p>1 role that an officer would then slip into as part of the 2 sort of bridgehead team.</p> <p>3 Q. The person who briefed you, whoever that was, were they 4 able to give you a briefing?</p> <p>5 A. No. It does come under one of the policies that that is 6 what a communications officer would do, so there wasn't 7 a necessity to brief me.</p> <p>8 Q. Were they able to tell you anything, for example, about 9 how many BA crews had already been committed?</p> <p>10 A. That information wasn't passed on, but it was easily 11 visible. Having a look at the entry control boards, you 12 could see how many tallies were in. So it wouldn't 13 necessarily be information, timely information, that was 14 necessary at that point.</p> <p>15 Q. What about any information about any difficulties that 16 have been experienced up until that point with radio 17 communications?</p> <p>18 A. I don't remember anything being passed on like that.</p> <p>19 Q. Could you give us an idea, just so we are aware, of the 20 sort of information that BA crews, once they are 21 committed under air, might need to be communicating back 22 to the bridgehead via the comms officer?</p> <p>23 A. So as part of the policy, they're supposed to inform us, 24 keep us updated with their air that they have left. Any 25 predominant landmarks that they come across, so if</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 22</p>	<p>1 normally for the closest officer, and generally that was 2 me. So when I arrived, there were quite a few crews 3 already committed, so, as they were coming down and 4 tallying out, there was information being passed back 5 and forward.</p> <p>6 Q. I now have just a few questions for you about how radio 7 comms were functioning, and if we focus again at this 8 point just during your time at the bridgehead when it 9 was on the 3rd floor.</p> <p>10 A. Yes.</p> <p>11 Q. If I can ask you to have a look at page 7 of your 12 statement -- apologies for jumping around a little 13 bit -- and the third line down, where you say:</p> <p>14 "The radios were only functional up to a few floors 15 and then the comms were lost as you went higher."</p> <p>16 Was that the case right from the start, right when 17 you took on the role of comms officer?</p> <p>18 A. Yes, yes, there was initially maybe a five- or six-floor 19 capability, and that soon dwindled down to just a few.</p> <p>20 Q. To be clear, that's five or six floors above the 21 bridgehead?</p> <p>22 A. Yes.</p> <p>23 Q. Right.</p> <p>24 A. Yes.</p> <p>25 Q. So if the bridgehead is on the 3rd floor, do you</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 24</p>

6 (Pages 21 to 24)

<p>1 remember the specific floor? Would that mean that it</p> <p>2 was --</p> <p>3 A. No, no, there was, as the crews went higher, we lost</p> <p>4 comms with them after a few floors.</p> <p>5 Q. Did that remain the constant upper limit throughout the</p> <p>6 incident or did it vary?</p> <p>7 A. Yes. No, it only came down from there.</p> <p>8 Q. Did you make the BA crews who were about to be committed</p> <p>9 aware of the difficulties before they went under air?</p> <p>10 A. There would've been discussions about comms, and,</p> <p>11 because of that, we had actually reverted to writing</p> <p>12 information on the reflective strips, so that -- because</p> <p>13 there was no way of them double-checking where they were</p> <p>14 supposed to go if they'd forgotten.</p> <p>15 Q. Just moving a little bit on in your witness statement --</p> <p>16 this is staying on page 7, the second paragraph -- you</p> <p>17 say:</p> <p>18 "It was early on that there was a big overload of</p> <p>19 information being passed about, there were crews</p> <p>20 reporting they were bringing casualties down, there were</p> <p>21 crews reporting that they couldn't complete their brief</p> <p>22 as they had found casualties on the stairway that needed</p> <p>23 assistance."</p> <p>24 To be clear, this is BA crews who are committed</p> <p>25 under air communicating with you on channel 6 on the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 25</p>	<p>1 Q. You say a little bit further on in your statement --</p> <p>2 this is the second paragraph, eight lines from the</p> <p>3 bottom:</p> <p>4 "Crews also reported that on a lot of floors they</p> <p>5 went to they didn't have water and conditions were too</p> <p>6 dangerous to progress to where they needed to get to."</p> <p>7 Do you remember which floors specifically had no</p> <p>8 water?</p> <p>9 A. No, I don't, I'm afraid.</p> <p>10 Q. Do you have any recollection of how long that went on</p> <p>11 for, if it was a constant or --</p> <p>12 A. No, it did seem to be a continuous theme throughout the</p> <p>13 hours I was at the bridgehead.</p> <p>14 Q. I now have a few questions for you -- and again, we're</p> <p>15 focusing still on the time when the bridgehead was on</p> <p>16 the 3rd floor -- on the FSG information that was coming</p> <p>17 in. I am going to ask you to look back at page 6 of</p> <p>18 your witness statement, and this is the bottom</p> <p>19 paragraph. You say:</p> <p>20 "When I arrived the FSG ... were being passed from</p> <p>21 the Command Unit to us at the Bridgehead to brief crews</p> <p>22 where to go. Initially I didn't know if the FSG were</p> <p>23 being relayed by radio or by slips of paper ..."</p> <p>24 You then go on to talk about what was happening when</p> <p>25 you were on the ground floor, which we're going to come</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 27</p>
<p>1 radio?</p> <p>2 A. Both on channel 6 and on their way past the bridgehead</p> <p>3 to take their casualties downstairs.</p> <p>4 Q. Specifically, when a crew was reporting to you that they</p> <p>5 hadn't been able to complete a brief, either once</p> <p>6 they're in the tower and they're communicating on the</p> <p>7 radio or when they come back down, what did you do with</p> <p>8 that information?</p> <p>9 A. It would've been stored, written down, whether on the</p> <p>10 forward information board or on the wall, and we would</p> <p>11 be looking to get another crew in to complete that task.</p> <p>12 Q. When you say that you would be looking to get another</p> <p>13 crew in to complete it, did you have any involvement</p> <p>14 then in selecting which crew would be briefed as</p> <p>15 a substitute crew, as it were, or --</p> <p>16 A. No, it was the next crew available at that moment in</p> <p>17 time.</p> <p>18 Q. Were you involved in then briefing them and telling them</p> <p>19 where to go or was that someone else?</p> <p>20 A. I was involved in the brief itself because I would also</p> <p>21 be required to know their brief so that communications</p> <p>22 between us, if it was possible, I was aware of where</p> <p>23 they're going. So in one way or another I was involved</p> <p>24 in the brief. Whether that brief had been passed down</p> <p>25 to me to relay to the crew or not, I can't remember.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 26</p>	<p>1 on to.</p> <p>2 But sticking with the 3rd floor for the moment, do</p> <p>3 you now have any clearer recollection of how information</p> <p>4 was reaching you when the bridgehead was on the</p> <p>5 3rd floor?</p> <p>6 A. Not on the 3rd floor, no.</p> <p>7 Q. Did you have any involvement in receiving that FSG</p> <p>8 information when the bridgehead was on the 3rd floor?</p> <p>9 A. Not to my recollection.</p> <p>10 Q. Did you have any involvement in recording the FSG</p> <p>11 information as it came in?</p> <p>12 A. I can remember writing on the wall. I think -- well,</p> <p>13 no, I don't. I know some of the information I wrote on</p> <p>14 the wall was information received by crews as to where</p> <p>15 they were going to those, but the actual FSG</p> <p>16 information, I wasn't aware of.</p> <p>17 Q. Do you remember Louisa De Silvo writing on the wall --</p> <p>18 A. Yes.</p> <p>19 Q. -- when she was managing the FSG information?</p> <p>20 Can I ask you just to look very briefly at one of</p> <p>21 her photographs of the 3rd-floor wall. It's</p> <p>22 MET00015819, and this is one of the exhibits to Louisa</p> <p>23 De Silvo's witness statement.</p> <p>24 Is that familiar to you?</p> <p>25 A. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 28</p>

<p>1 Q. Are you able to recognise any of that handwriting as 2 your own? 3 A. Not in that picture. Shoreditch and Lambeth, look like 4 my handwriting. 5 Q. Your handwriting? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Do you remember anything specifically about those 8 deployments? 9 A. I remember flat 113 being a constant target for us 10 throughout, and just having problems actually getting 11 there. 12 Q. Do you remember anything more specific about flat 113? 13 A. No, not anything pertinent. 14 Q. Okay. 15 You say -- and this is the very bottom of page 6, so 16 the last two words of page 6: 17 "BA crews at this time were only dealing with FSG 18 calls." 19 I just want to clarify what you mean here. 20 Are you saying that all the BA crews who were 21 committed were only committed in response to specific 22 FSG information rather than firefighting? 23 A. To my knowledge, yes. 24 Q. So you don't have any recollection of firefighters being 25 committed from the 3rd floor to deal with firefighting?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 29</p>	<p>1 that you placed a firefighter at the base of the stairs 2 to relay communications, but it wasn't working. 3 Can you just explain what the firefighter was doing? 4 How was the firefighter relaying communications? 5 A. So the firefighter, we were hoping, might act as a radio 6 booster, so we could pass the information to the 7 firefighter, and then if they could then go five floors 8 above them, we were reaching the 7th floor. 9 Q. I see. 10 A. Just in the hope to gain better communication. 11 Q. So effectively acting as a runner with a radio -- 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. -- going up into the tower? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Do you know who that firefighter was? 16 A. At one point it -- I'm afraid I don't know her name, but 17 it was a firefighter from Shoreditch. 18 Q. You also refer -- this is again at the very bottom of 19 page 8 of your statement -- to getting an aerial 20 repeater from the fire and rescue unit which is designed 21 to boost radio signal. 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. You say just over the page, second line down: 24 "They took a while to put them in place and in the 25 meantime all that could be heard on Channel 6 was a high</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 31</p>
<p>1 A. No. 2 Q. Do you know if that was because someone at the 3 bridgehead had made a specific decision to only use BA 4 crews for FSG calls, or are you just describing what was 5 going on? 6 A. I wouldn't know the reasoning behind it. The bridgehead 7 was very, very crowded, and we still didn't have enough 8 crews for the jobs being detailed for them. So they 9 were the priority for the BA crews. 10 Q. We're now going to move on to when the bridgehead moved 11 down to the ground floor, and we have an approximate 12 time for that of 03.08 or a little bit later. Does that 13 sound about right to you? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Again, I just want to start by asking a few questions on 16 comms and how those were functioning once you were down 17 on the ground floor. This is at page 8 of your witness 18 statement, the second paragraph, the last line, you say: 19 "I can't be specific with times but we were starting 20 to struggle with communications above the 5th and 6th 21 floors." 22 Was this broadly the same situation that you were 23 encountering when the bridgehead was on the 3rd floor? 24 A. Yes, yes. 25 Q. You say -- this is the bottom paragraph of page 8 --</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 30</p>	<p>1 pitched noise and this made hearing more difficult in 2 the Bridgehead." 3 Did the high-pitched noise occur just for the period 4 you were trying to get the aerial repeater installed or 5 were you installing the repeater -- 6 A. No, the high-pitched noise occurred on channel 6. We 7 looked to change channels and also get the repeaters put 8 in place. It just meant the high-pitched noise rendered 9 the radios unusable. 10 Q. So would it be right that you were trying to install the 11 repeaters in order to address the problem created by the 12 high-pitched noise? 13 A. Yes, indeed, yes. 14 Q. Do you remember roughly what time this occurred? 15 A. I'm afraid I don't. 16 Q. How long did it go on for, do you know? 17 A. The high-pitched noise -- it only went on for maybe 5 or 18 10 minutes because we had to turn off that channel 19 because it just made the atmosphere inaudible, so 20 nothing could be heard. 21 Q. You go on -- and this might lead us on to the next 22 point, which is just at the top of the same page of your 23 witness statement, you talk about channel 2, and you 24 say: 25 "A decision was made to change to channel 2 and a</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 32</p>

<p>1 Station Manager told me that we needed permission from</p> <p>2 the Command Unit. I politely told him to go and check</p> <p>3 as we were already using channel 2 and we had committed</p> <p>4 crews using channel 2."</p> <p>5 Does it follow from the discussion we were just</p> <p>6 having about the high-pitched noise on channel 6 that</p> <p>7 you started using channel 2 in response --</p> <p>8 A. Yes, in response to the high-pitched noise, we changed</p> <p>9 to channel 2, just so that we had a chance of some</p> <p>10 communication. And, yeah, it's a channel that should be</p> <p>11 used by officers on the fire ground, but it was the only</p> <p>12 one available for us to use.</p> <p>13 Q. Whose decision was it to start using channel 2?</p> <p>14 A. Myself.</p> <p>15 Q. Do you remember if a message got back to the command</p> <p>16 unit that you were now using channel 2 to communicate?</p> <p>17 A. The station manager who informed me I needed permission,</p> <p>18 I told him to go and ask who he wanted to ask, but we</p> <p>19 were using channel 2. So he went off to just clarify</p> <p>20 that.</p> <p>21 Q. Do you know why he thought that permission was required?</p> <p>22 A. Policy states that permission is required. I'm not too</p> <p>23 sure on the implications of using different radio</p> <p>24 channels.</p> <p>25 Q. I'm going to ask Paul to bring up just briefly a passage</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 33</p>	<p>1 incident, and the inquiry has received a statement from</p> <p>2 him. He referred to when he was being briefed by you.</p> <p>3 You explained there were problems on channel 6. He</p> <p>4 mentioned that you might have been using channel 1.</p> <p>5 Does that ring any bells or does that --</p> <p>6 A. No.</p> <p>7 Q. No? You think that's incorrect?</p> <p>8 A. No, at no point was I using channel 1. The radio</p> <p>9 traffic alone would've been too busy for the bridgehead</p> <p>10 to be using channel 1 for BA crews.</p> <p>11 Q. Just finally on the issue of comms when you were on the</p> <p>12 ground floor, there are a couple of entries in what we</p> <p>13 refer to as the short incident log that you might be</p> <p>14 able to help us with.</p> <p>15 A. Okay.</p> <p>16 Q. Or you might not.</p> <p>17 I am going to ask Paul to bring those up, it's</p> <p>18 MET00013830. Thank you.</p> <p>19 You might have seen this document in the context of</p> <p>20 the inquiry already, Mr Morrison. It's a log of the key</p> <p>21 messages that were going back and forth between the</p> <p>22 incident ground and control, and we have an entry at</p> <p>23 03.44.12, and again a similar one at 03.44.20. This is</p> <p>24 CU8, which was the incident command unit at the time,</p> <p>25 requesting urgent assistance by a radio engineer to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 35</p>
<p>1 from your contemporaneous notes, and it's on the second</p> <p>2 page, second paragraph, four lines down, and you're</p> <p>3 talking about this decision to start using channel 2,</p> <p>4 you say:</p> <p>5 "We made a decision to change the new crews to</p> <p>6 channel 2, keeping channel 6 open for crews already in."</p> <p>7 Can you explain how that works, how you're able to</p> <p>8 maintain comms with BA crews over two separate channels</p> <p>9 at the same time?</p> <p>10 A. By using two different radios. Each radio --</p> <p>11 everybody's handheld radio can be changed to a different</p> <p>12 channel, and so everybody had the ability to have their</p> <p>13 radio on channel 2 or channel 6. Because we already had</p> <p>14 crews under air in the building on channel 6, we kept</p> <p>15 one radio at channel 6, and then a separate radio at</p> <p>16 channel 2 for the new crews going in.</p> <p>17 Q. Was that a manageable system?</p> <p>18 A. It's not ideal but we managed.</p> <p>19 Q. Did it assist with comms?</p> <p>20 A. No, because we still had the problem on channel 6 and we</p> <p>21 still had sort of black spots above the 5th or 6th</p> <p>22 floor.</p> <p>23 Q. You refer later on in your witness statement -- we don't</p> <p>24 need to go there, but we know you were relieved by</p> <p>25 a crew manager from Wandsworth much later on into the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 34</p>	<p>1 assist with channel 2 for fire ground.</p> <p>2 Then we have a little bit later on -- this is</p> <p>3 page 32 of the same document -- the same message again</p> <p>4 at 05.18.02.</p> <p>5 Do you remember requesting technical assistance with</p> <p>6 channel 2 at any time? Do you think those messages had</p> <p>7 come from you?</p> <p>8 A. No, that would be above my pay grade. That would be for</p> <p>9 one of the senior officers in the command unit to</p> <p>10 facilitate any medium outside what we carry.</p> <p>11 Q. Do you remember a radio engineer assisting at any point?</p> <p>12 A. No, not at all.</p> <p>13 Q. Okay.</p> <p>14 I am now just moving on to FSG information and,</p> <p>15 again, how that was being managed once you were on the</p> <p>16 ground floor.</p> <p>17 A. Yes.</p> <p>18 Q. If I can ask Paul to turn up your statement again, this</p> <p>19 is page 8 and the second paragraph, you say:</p> <p>20 "As I looked towards the base of the stairs the</p> <p>21 green walls I was writing on were behind me with the ECB</p> <p>22 next to me. I was writing the call signs of the crews</p> <p>23 going in, what we would call them over the radio. It's</p> <p>24 important that each call sign is individual and we have</p> <p>25 a procedure that your call sign would be the position</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 36</p>

<p>1 where you would be riding on your appliance and they 2 were given a call sign. It was by now that we were not 3 sending up crews of 2 but crews of 4 & 5. With crews 4 arriving and wearing EDBA ... it was easier to have my 5 own list of who was going in and to where. I was 6 physically speaking to them myself and crossing them out 7 when they came down." 8 Just first of all, is it usually the role of 9 a communications officer to be making those kind of 10 written records at the bridgehead? 11 A. No. 12 Q. We've already established that Louisa De Silvo was also 13 writing on that same green wall at the bridgehead, and 14 we're going to look at a couple of photos that she made 15 of the information that was collected there. 16 But can I just start by clarifying whether the list 17 that you say you were making -- so who was going in and 18 who was coming out -- was separate to the list that 19 Louisa De Silvo was making, or were you both 20 contributing to the same list? 21 A. No. No, we all had separate sections of the wall. 22 Q. If I can now ask about the processes that were being 23 followed in relation to the FSG information that was 24 coming in to the bridgehead. 25 There's a passage in your statement that deals with</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 37</p>	<p>1 another crew up, and whilst they were annotating on 2 their walls I'd write the details of the call sign on 3 mine and brief the crews where they were going. 4 Q. Do you remember if that system, so getting the 5 information on individual slips from firefighter note 6 pads, was that in place right from the start when the 7 bridgehead was on the ground floor or was there any 8 change at all? 9 A. From memory, it took a while for that to sort of 10 progress to that. I can't remember it being passed on 11 in any other form, I can only remember the notepads. 12 Q. Thank you. 13 I'm just going to ask Paul to bring up briefly, just 14 by way of example, LFB00001929. 15 This is an exhibit from Mr O'Keeffe's witness 16 statement. These are slips that he says he found in his 17 tunic at the end of the night. I am not proposing to 18 ask you anything about the specific information on there 19 unless there is anything that you can recall, but just 20 as an example, is that the kind of form in which you 21 were receiving FSG information to your recollection? 22 A. No, there was a bit more detail than that. A single FSG 23 was on a single piece of paper. So they were 24 individual. 25 Q. So would they have been -- I think you said firefighter</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 39</p>
<p>1 this. It's page 9, second paragraph, just from the top, 2 the end of the first line, you say: 3 "I was getting the FSG calls from a Station Manager 4 who was bringing them in. The FSG was relayed between 5 myself and the others at the [bridgehead]. The crews 6 were given the FSG personally by me and I asked if they 7 understood the conditions they were going into and the 8 task that was asked of them and to get there if they 9 could." 10 I just want to break that down again. 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. When you say that you were getting FSG calls from 13 a station manager who brought them in, again, do you 14 have any recollection of what form the information was 15 coming to you in? 16 A. So they were coming on individual sheets from a 17 firefighter's notepad. 18 Q. I see. 19 A. And it would be a name, if there was a name, the flat 20 number, the floor number, and any other details. 21 Because of the geography of where we were all standing, 22 I was the first person that they were meeting, so they 23 would be handing them to me, and then I'd be passing 24 that information on to Watch Manager De Silvo and Watch 25 Manager O'Keeffe, and then we would be looking to send</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 38</p>	<p>1 notepads rather than control information forms? 2 A. Yes, yes. 3 Q. And -- 4 A. So it would be the same size as those bits of paper -- 5 Q. I see. 6 A. -- but the information on the bit of paper wouldn't have 7 a list of flats like that, it would be an individual 8 flat and a floor and any details. 9 Q. Okay, thank you. 10 When you say that the station manager gave that 11 information to you, that was you personally as well as 12 other people on the bridgehead, or do you think you were 13 the main conduit? 14 A. So the physical piece of paper would've come to me 15 because of where I was standing closest to the door. 16 Normally they would also be shouting out the information 17 to inform all of us, but then between the three of us we 18 would then -- one was writing down the floor number, one 19 was writing down the flat number. 20 At that time, without the plans, it was very 21 difficult to know where on each floor each individual 22 flat was. You couldn't say, you know, it's the second 23 door to your right because we didn't know. 24 So, yeah, it was literally just that information, 25 and then the crews would come in and, again, because</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 40</p>

<p>1 I was the first one they were coming to, it just evolved 2 into me telling them and briefing them. 3 Q. Do you remember who the station manager who was bringing 4 you the information was? 5 A. I'm afraid not, no. 6 Q. Does the name Station Manager Wolfenden mean anything to 7 you? 8 A. Only through the inquiry, but personally, no. 9 Q. Okay. 10 Do you have any recollection of slips of paper being 11 brought to you by the BA crews who were about to be 12 committed rather than through a station manager? 13 A. No, I don't, no. 14 Q. Who was making decisions about where to commit specific 15 BA crews to in response to the FSG information that was 16 being received? Was that part of your role? 17 A. Between the three of us, it was sort of a general 18 discussion between the three of us, and then there were 19 a few that became a little bit more of a priority 20 because of the number of times they came up and also the 21 people that were inside. 22 Q. Did you have discussions about how to prioritise FSGs 23 and deployments of BA crews? 24 A. No. Apart from a couple that came up and they became 25 naturally a priority because of the amount of times they</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 41</p>	<p>1 someone else when you left or -- 2 A. I can't remember passing them on, but they would've been 3 passed on. 4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, thank you very much. 5 MS CURTAIN: Mr Morrison, are you okay to look at a couple 6 of photos? 7 A. By all means, yes. 8 Q. I am going to show you two exhibits again from Louisa 9 De Silvo's witness statement. I am going to ask Paul to 10 put them up side by side. The first one -- which, Paul, 11 if you could put on the left-hand side of the screen -- 12 is MET00015820, and on the right -- there it is -- 13 MET00015817. 14 Mr Morrison, the reason I've asked Paul to put them 15 up like that is because Louisa De Silvo said when she 16 gave evidence that she thought the photo you see on the 17 right was a continuation of the information you see in 18 the photograph on the left. 19 A. Yes. So that large section in the photo on the left -- 20 Q. Yes. 21 A. Not the grid on the left, but the four lists. 22 Q. Yes. 23 A. They're all mine. 24 Q. I see. 25 A. So that section, yes.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 43</p>
<p>1 came up, it normally was a -- we've got another one, the 2 next crew in, and it was just a conveyor belt. 3 Q. I am going to now ask you to look at a couple of photos 4 that we have of the writing on the green wall on the 5 bridgehead. I was going to ask first of all if you 6 are -- 7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Before you do, could I just ask one 8 question? 9 MS CURTAIN: Of course. 10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You received these slips of paper -- 11 A. Yes, sir. 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: -- on firefighter notebook sheets. 13 A. Yes. 14 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: What did you do with them? Did you 15 have a systematic way of passing them to one of the 16 other people at the bridgehead? 17 A. No, once the information was annotated onto the wall, 18 those slips became void, and when I was relieved, I had 19 a handful of them that was passed on. 20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right. But you retained them while 21 you were there -- 22 A. Yes. 23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: -- carrying out your role? 24 A. Yes. 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And then, what, you gave them to</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 42</p>	<p>1 Q. Thank you. 2 Again, do you remember anything in particular about 3 the specific FSGs, the specific flats? 4 A. Only difficulty getting to one, but that was the only 5 one that -- only 113, the fact that it just kept coming 6 up. But there was no other flat that ... 7 Q. Okay, thank you. 8 I now want to ask you about something that you say 9 in page 10 -- 10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Sorry, before we leave that 11 picture -- could we get the pictures up again, please? 12 You were writing down call signs. 13 A. Yes, sir. 14 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Could we just look at an example? 15 I don't know whether it's possible to enlarge this and 16 retain its legibility, but I would just like to see the 17 sort of thing you were writing down, if we could. 18 It's quite difficult to ... right, we can see 19 a whole column on the right-hand side of the enlargement 20 there. Is that a list of call signs? 21 A. Yes. So there were four lists of call signs there. 22 Initially crews were coming as they were on their own 23 appliance, but towards the end, because of firefighters 24 wanting to get back in, it was literally, "Who else can 25 I go in with?", and so we were making up call signs just</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 44</p>

<p>1 so that we don't duplicate them.</p> <p>2 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.</p> <p>3 A. So you might have one from East Ham, two from Shoreditch</p> <p>4 and one from Tooting going in, and we would have to work</p> <p>5 out a call sign for them.</p> <p>6 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Then we can see you've -- or</p> <p>7 someone -- has crossed out call signs.</p> <p>8 A. Yes, so as they came out, we put down how many were in</p> <p>9 the crew, so the circled times 2, times 4, times 5,</p> <p>10 would be how many were in that crew, their call sign,</p> <p>11 and then any other details that we would need.</p> <p>12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And I suspect, or at least I think</p> <p>13 I know what it means, when you put a line through it --</p> <p>14 A. It means they were out.</p> <p>15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.</p> <p>16 MS CURTAIN: Thank you very much.</p> <p>17 Mr Morrison, I am going to take you to the first</p> <p>18 paragraph of page 10 of your statement, which will come</p> <p>19 up on the screen. You say:</p> <p>20 "A lot of the tactics and decisions were being made</p> <p>21 by Commander Pat GOLDBOURNE[sic] he was in charge of the</p> <p>22 Bridgehead."</p> <p>23 Again, this is when the bridgehead was on the ground</p> <p>24 floor.</p> <p>25 A. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 45</p>	<p>1 FSG calls, did someone at the time say, "We're not</p> <p>2 prioritising FSG calls anymore", or is that you looking</p> <p>3 back --</p> <p>4 A. No, it was just a change in tactic because of our</p> <p>5 inability to communicate with crews, our inability to,</p> <p>6 in a timely fashion, send another crew up because they</p> <p>7 can't achieve their goal. There was also cases where</p> <p>8 FSGs were moving between flats. The tactic was decided</p> <p>9 that maybe we should clear each floor, floor-by-floor,</p> <p>10 and work our way up. So we started in the lower floors</p> <p>11 with SDBA and the upper floors with EDBA.</p> <p>12 Q. Who was it who decided which floor a particular BA crew</p> <p>13 would be committed to?</p> <p>14 A. It was systematic, so we started at the bottom. We</p> <p>15 almost put the tower into two sectors: an EDBA sector</p> <p>16 and an SDBA sector, and we started from the bottom of</p> <p>17 each sector and worked up.</p> <p>18 Q. This might be linked to a passage in your</p> <p>19 contemporaneous note, if I can ask Paul to bring it up.</p> <p>20 It's page 2 and the second paragraph from the bottom.</p> <p>21 You say:</p> <p>22 "SDBA crews started to be committed to the lower</p> <p>23 floors and EDBA to floors above floor 9."</p> <p>24 Are you talking about the same --</p> <p>25 A. Yes. Before that, when we were still answering FSGs,</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 47</p>
<p>1 Q. "I only remember seeing him for the first time when we</p> <p>2 relocated the Bridgehead down to the foyer and he was</p> <p>3 stood on the first flight of stairs. Our priority for a</p> <p>4 long time was to get crews in and deal with FSG.</p> <p>5 Firefighters were getting to their FSG and coming down</p> <p>6 with casualties, some however couldn't get to complete</p> <p>7 their task as they had come across casualties on the</p> <p>8 stairs or being told by other crews that there were</p> <p>9 casualties in the flats they had just come out of.</p> <p>10 Decisions were made because of the difficulties the</p> <p>11 crews were having getting up the stairs and crews</p> <p>12 helping casualties down the stairs. A decision was made</p> <p>13 not to prioritise FSG calls but to start searching floor</p> <p>14 by floor."</p> <p>15 Just to be clear here, you refer to Commander</p> <p>16 Pat Goulbourne in that paragraph.</p> <p>17 A. Yes.</p> <p>18 Q. Was the decision to start this systematic floor-by-floor</p> <p>19 search his decision or was that someone else's?</p> <p>20 A. My belief is that it was his decision, but it was very</p> <p>21 late on. It was very late on that morning.</p> <p>22 Q. When you say "very late on", do you have any idea how</p> <p>23 long after the bridgehead moved to the ground floor?</p> <p>24 A. No, I'm afraid not.</p> <p>25 Q. When you describe the decision as one not to prioritise</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 46</p>	<p>1 depending on where they were, we would look at the</p> <p>2 ability of a crew to get to them. So if it was on an</p> <p>3 upper floor, we would be looking at EDBA crews. So it</p> <p>4 was a tactic that we used before changing to</p> <p>5 a systematic search.</p> <p>6 Q. So just to be clear, on the decision that EDBA would go</p> <p>7 to floors above floor 9, was that part of the change in</p> <p>8 tactics as you described it and the systematic</p> <p>9 floor-by-floor search?</p> <p>10 A. No, it was something we were using before with the</p> <p>11 normal FSGs, just on the realisation that the standard</p> <p>12 duration crews weren't getting up that high. So if we</p> <p>13 have had an FSG call higher, we would be looking to</p> <p>14 commit an EDBA crew rather than an SDBA crew.</p> <p>15 Q. At the time when you implemented this systematic</p> <p>16 floor-by-floor approach, were you aware of anything</p> <p>17 going on on the other side of the glass partition on the</p> <p>18 ground-floor lobby in terms of management of FSG</p> <p>19 information there?</p> <p>20 A. No.</p> <p>21 Q. Do you know if anyone ever communicated back to the</p> <p>22 command unit that there had been this change in</p> <p>23 approach?</p> <p>24 A. No, I don't.</p> <p>25 Q. What about the station manager who you say was bringing</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 48</p>

<p>1 in slips of information?</p> <p>2 A. I don't recall, I'm afraid.</p> <p>3 Q. I'm going to ask Paul to bring your contemporaneous note</p> <p>4 back up, please. This is the same page, third paragraph</p> <p>5 from the bottom, and you say:</p> <p>6 "Although the methodical approach had been</p> <p>7 implemented ..."</p> <p>8 And I think there you're referring to the systematic</p> <p>9 floor-by-floor approach, but say if that's not correct.</p> <p>10 A. If I'm honest, I don't recall.</p> <p>11 Q. You can't recall.</p> <p>12 A. No. I know we did have an EDBA crew that went missing</p> <p>13 for a while and we had to send another crew in to look</p> <p>14 for them, but, yeah, I can't recall that, sorry.</p> <p>15 Q. Do you know, just focusing on the first part of that</p> <p>16 sentence --</p> <p>17 A. No -- yes, yeah, yeah --</p> <p>18 Q. The methodical approach and then you say crews were</p> <p>19 still being redirected for FSGs. Are you able to</p> <p>20 remember what you might have meant?</p> <p>21 A. No.</p> <p>22 Q. Do you remember there ever being a discussion whilst you</p> <p>23 were at the bridgehead, when it was on the ground floor,</p> <p>24 between senior officers about who was in charge of where</p> <p>25 to commit BA crews to?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 49</p>	<p>1 the 3rd floor.</p> <p>2 Q. Do you know if there were ever discussions between those</p> <p>3 managing the bridgehead, either when it was on the</p> <p>4 3rd floor or when it was on the ground floor, about</p> <p>5 possibly committing EDBA exclusively and dispensing with</p> <p>6 SDBA?</p> <p>7 A. There was discussions about sending in solely EDBA. But</p> <p>8 at the time, the manpower -- we still had SDBA that were</p> <p>9 able to reach the lower floors, which is why we tried to</p> <p>10 look at sending crews where they could get to.</p> <p>11 Q. Were those discussions when the bridgehead was on the</p> <p>12 3rd floor or on the ground floor?</p> <p>13 A. On the ground floor.</p> <p>14 Q. Do you remember who was involved in those discussions?</p> <p>15 A. I don't, I'm afraid.</p> <p>16 MS CURTAIN: Mr Morrison, I have no further questions for</p> <p>17 you. It may be that there are a couple more that arise.</p> <p>18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.</p> <p>19 MS CURTAIN: So, sir, if I could ask for the usual</p> <p>20 5 minutes, please.</p> <p>21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, I'm just wondering whether at</p> <p>22 this stage we might indulge ourselves by having</p> <p>23 a slightly longer break.</p> <p>24 MS CURTAIN: I think we can probably afford to, yes.</p> <p>25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Morrison, it does sometimes occur</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 51</p>
<p>1 A. No, I don't.</p> <p>2 Q. Do you remember a decision ever being taken not to</p> <p>3 commit any crews at all above a specific floor in the</p> <p>4 building?</p> <p>5 A. No, I don't.</p> <p>6 Q. Finally, Mr Morrison, I just have a few brief questions</p> <p>7 for you on the supply of BA wearers.</p> <p>8 A. Yes.</p> <p>9 Q. And EDBA specifically.</p> <p>10 You make one comment about this. This is page 12 of</p> <p>11 your witness statement in the last paragraph, four lines</p> <p>12 down. You say:</p> <p>13 "I believe that if we had had more EDBA sets earlier</p> <p>14 on, we may have been able to reach people trapped on the</p> <p>15 higher floors."</p> <p>16 Did you have concerns about EDBA resources</p> <p>17 specifically on the night of the incident itself?</p> <p>18 A. As the incident progressed, we did, just because of the</p> <p>19 inability for SDBA to reach affected floors.</p> <p>20 Q. Do you remember -- apologies again if I'm asking</p> <p>21 impossible questions -- a broad time of when that</p> <p>22 started to become a concern for those who were at the</p> <p>23 bridgehead?</p> <p>24 A. I would've said -- I was aware of it on the ground</p> <p>25 floor, but it's something that didn't pass my mind on</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 50</p>	<p>1 that additional questions occur to counsel when they</p> <p>2 think they've finished, so we'll have a break now for</p> <p>3 about 10 minutes, and then we'll see after that whether</p> <p>4 there are more questions that they want to ask you.</p> <p>5 THE WITNESS: Okay.</p> <p>6 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So while you're out of the room,</p> <p>7 please don't talk to anyone about the content of your</p> <p>8 evidence. We'll resume at 11.20. Perhaps you could go</p> <p>9 with the usher and she'll look after you.</p> <p>10 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.</p> <p>11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? Thank you.</p> <p>12 All right, 11.20, then, please.</p> <p>13 (11.10 am)</p> <p>14 (A short break)</p> <p>15 (11.20 am)</p> <p>16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think just a few more questions,</p> <p>17 Mr Morrison. All right?</p> <p>18 Yes, Ms Curtain.</p> <p>19 MS CURTAIN: Thank you very much, Mr Morrison. I'm afraid</p> <p>20 I'm going to ask you to look back at your witness</p> <p>21 statement just briefly. This is page 3 and it's the</p> <p>22 bottom paragraph. You're talking about training and</p> <p>23 high-rise training specifically --</p> <p>24 A. Yes.</p> <p>25 Q. -- and policy.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 52</p>

<p>1 Four lines down you say:</p> <p>2 "The brigade has a high rise black and white policy</p> <p>3 and what our procedures are."</p> <p>4 The question is simply: do you mean something</p> <p>5 specific by a black and white policy?</p> <p>6 A. Yes, just that it's down in writing as regards to what</p> <p>7 our procedures are at high-rise incidents, so there is</p> <p>8 a reference point.</p> <p>9 Q. Do you know which policy you're referring to</p> <p>10 specifically there?</p> <p>11 A. So some of what we used that night would come under the</p> <p>12 BA policy and some is high-rise, firefighting in</p> <p>13 high-rise buildings.</p> <p>14 Q. Thank you very much.</p> <p>15 One question about when you first went up to the</p> <p>16 bridgehead on the 3rd floor and you say that you could</p> <p>17 see how many BA crews had been committed because it was</p> <p>18 obvious from the entry control boards.</p> <p>19 A. Yes.</p> <p>20 Q. Can you tell us, is it possible to tell from the entry</p> <p>21 control boards whether crews that have been committed</p> <p>22 are EDBA or SDBA wearers? Is that something that is</p> <p>23 shown of the boards?</p> <p>24 A. Yes, but at that time I don't remember seeing any EDBA.</p> <p>25 Q. Just another question about what was on the bridgehead</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 53</p>	<p>1 floor --</p> <p>2 A. Yes.</p> <p>3 Q. -- and thinking about flat 113, were you aware at any</p> <p>4 point of a BA crew coming into the bridgehead with</p> <p>5 a slip of paper with FSG information on it for flat 113</p> <p>6 whose brief was then changed to go and search a floor</p> <p>7 rather than go to a particular flat?</p> <p>8 A. No.</p> <p>9 Q. That's not something you were aware of?</p> <p>10 A. No, I'm afraid not.</p> <p>11 Q. One final question on specific flats.</p> <p>12 If I could ask Paul to bring up those two exhibits</p> <p>13 from Louisa De Silvo's witness statement side-by-side</p> <p>14 again. So it's MET00015817 to the left, and then</p> <p>15 MET15820 on the right.</p> <p>16 Looking at the right-hand photograph, you might be</p> <p>17 able to see, about two-thirds to the bottom on the</p> <p>18 right-hand side of that photo is marked flat 142.</p> <p>19 A. Where am I looking? Sorry.</p> <p>20 Q. So if you see -- I think it might be just to the left of</p> <p>21 that, Paul.</p> <p>22 (Pause)</p> <p>23 Does the number 142 trigger any recollection for</p> <p>24 you?</p> <p>25 A. I'm afraid not, no.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 55</p>
<p>1 when it was on the 3rd floor, do you remember seeing</p> <p>2 a forward information board there?</p> <p>3 A. Yes.</p> <p>4 Q. Can I ask Paul to bring that up. The document is</p> <p>5 MET00018749.</p> <p>6 Do you know if that's the same forward information</p> <p>7 board that you saw?</p> <p>8 A. I'm afraid I wouldn't know the contents of it. I knew</p> <p>9 that it was being used, but the contents of it -- it was</p> <p>10 the other side of the entry control boards to where</p> <p>11 I was stood.</p> <p>12 Q. You can see on that board that we have the 14th floor</p> <p>13 marked, and we've discussed a little bit about</p> <p>14 flat 113 --</p> <p>15 A. Yes.</p> <p>16 Q. -- specifically, and you said that at some point in the</p> <p>17 night it became a focus.</p> <p>18 Do you have any broad estimate of the time at which</p> <p>19 that flat might have become a focus for those on the</p> <p>20 bridgehead?</p> <p>21 A. I only remember it from when I was on the ground floor</p> <p>22 and our inability to get to it. So it would've been</p> <p>23 later on. That was my memory of that particular flat.</p> <p>24 Q. Thank you.</p> <p>25 Again, when the bridgehead was on the ground</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 54</p>	<p>1 Q. Were you aware if any crews were briefed to go to 142?</p> <p>2 A. Not from memory, no.</p> <p>3 Q. Finally -- and this really is the final question -- when</p> <p>4 you were based on the ground floor, you were obviously</p> <p>5 in a good position to see the sort of condition that</p> <p>6 returning firefighters were in when they were coming</p> <p>7 back from deployments. You talk about it a little bit</p> <p>8 in your statement, I don't need to take you there.</p> <p>9 But one question that has been asked is whether you</p> <p>10 can just describe what sort of condition they were in</p> <p>11 when you saw them. Were there specific symptoms that</p> <p>12 you picked up on?</p> <p>13 A. We had guys that were being carried out by our own crews</p> <p>14 due to heat stress and total exhaustion.</p> <p>15 Obviously I wasn't up there, but the conditions were</p> <p>16 brutal and the crews were being punished and pushing</p> <p>17 themselves beyond what any of our policies state they</p> <p>18 should go to.</p> <p>19 And, yeah, we had firefighters collapsing, being</p> <p>20 administered oxygen right next to the entry control. At</p> <p>21 one point, the whole foyer was just covered in remnants</p> <p>22 of, like, emergency aid kits, helmets floating about</p> <p>23 from where we'd literally stripped firefighters and</p> <p>24 carried them off.</p> <p>25 It was really brutal.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 56</p>

1 MS CURTAIN: Mr Morrison, thank you. That's the last of my
 2 questions. It just leaves me to thank you for coming
 3 along today to give evidence.
 4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, I add my thanks to that of
 5 Ms Curtain, Mr Morris. It is very helpful to us to hear
 6 your account of what you did that evening, and we're
 7 very grateful to you. Thank you very much indeed.
 8 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
 9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you would like to go with the
 10 usher, then, please.
 11 (The witness withdrew)
 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Ms Curtain.
 13 MS CURTAIN: Sir, there will now be a change of witness and
 14 a change of counsel, so it may be an appropriate moment
 15 to have another break.
 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We have a change of furniture too?
 17 MS CURTAIN: I believe not, actually, no.
 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right. But it would be
 19 convenient, would it, for me to rise for a moment?
 20 MS CURTAIN: Probably for a moment, sir. Thank you very
 21 much.
 22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right. Well, I will rise for as
 23 long as it is necessary, and you can ask the usher to
 24 get me when you're ready.
 25 MS CURTAIN: Thank you very much, sir.

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1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
 2 (11.30 am)
 3 (A short break)
 4 (11.36 am)
 5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.
 6 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, I now call Group Manager Patrick
 7 Goulbourne.
 8 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
 9 PATRICK GOULBOURNE (sworn)
 10 Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY
 11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Mr Goulbourne.
 12 Yes, Mr Millett.
 13 MR MILLETT: Mr Goulbourne, could we begin by your giving us
 14 your full name, please.
 15 **A. Patrick Wayne Goulbourne.**
 16 Q. Can I say, first of all, thank you very much to you for
 17 coming to the inquiry and assisting us with our
 18 investigations. We do appreciate it very much.
 19 **A. Thank you.**
 20 Q. My questions are intended to be short and simple. Often
 21 they're not. If you want me to repeat it or to put the
 22 question in a different way, I'm always very happy to do
 23 that, so please just indicate.
 24 If you need a break at any stage, please just let me
 25 know and we can arrange one.

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1 **A. Okay.**
 2 Q. Can I please ask you to take your two witness
 3 statements, which are either in a blue file in front of
 4 you or we'll look at on the screen, which is on the desk
 5 to your right, or on the big screens at the back, if you
 6 want.
 7 The first one is dated 5 July 2017, and its
 8 reference is MET00010759.
 9 The second one is dated 22 February 2018 and its
 10 reference is MET00013111.
 11 Can I ask you, have you read both of those
 12 statements recently?
 13 **A. Yes, I have.**
 14 Q. Can you confirm for us that the contents are true?
 15 **A. Yes, I can.**
 16 Q. Now, you also have three exhibits, which are sketches
 17 which were made by you, I think, and those are
 18 MET00015873, MET00015874 and MET00015875. There's no
 19 need to look at those now; we may do in due course.
 20 Have you discussed your statements or your evidence
 21 that you're going to give to us today with anybody
 22 before coming here?
 23 **A. No, I haven't.**
 24 Q. Can I start, therefore, with the position you occupied
 25 in June 2017.

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1 At that time, were you a borough commander?
 2 **A. Yes, I was the borough commander of Tower Hamlets at the**
 3 **time.**
 4 Q. Is that the same thing as a group manager?
 5 **A. Yes, it is.**
 6 Q. That was your rank in June 2017. Is it your current
 7 role still?
 8 **A. No. I'm currently a deputy assistant commissioner.**
 9 Q. You're now a DAC?
 10 **A. Yes, I am.**
 11 Q. When were you made a DAC?
 12 **A. 1 November last year.**
 13 Q. Right.
 14 In the summer of 2017, in your role as borough
 15 commander, did you have any other major engagements, as
 16 well as Grenfell Tower?
 17 **A. Yes, I had a really busy couple of weeks. I was one of**
 18 **the first commanders for the London Bridge terrorist**
 19 **attack, and a few days later I was a command officer at**
 20 **Grenfell, and then five days later I was on scene**
 21 **commander at the Finsbury Park terrorist attack.**
 22 Q. When you made these statements I just referred to, were
 23 you in the middle of assisting authorities on those
 24 events as well as Grenfell Tower?
 25 **A. Yes, I was.**

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15 (Pages 57 to 60)

<p>1 Q. Can you explain to us in broad terms what 2 responsibilities a group manager or borough commander 3 has?</p> <p>4 A. Yes, so the responsibility of all the staff in 5 a borough, including the buildings, the property. So, 6 internally, you're responsible for the Fire Brigade in 7 that area, and also how it delivers its services, 8 whether that be its response, whether it will be its 9 overall response, and also its proactive work, so its 10 community engagement, its community safety.</p> <p>11 Then there's the external work, which is working 12 with partners. So the borough commander is an integral 13 link ensuring working with the local authority, working 14 with chief execs, with the ambulance service, the 15 police, the NHS, ensuring that the full weight of the 16 fire service can support all activities, including 17 things like youth engagement.</p> <p>18 Q. So being borough commander at Tower Hamlets at the time, 19 did you have responsibility for overseeing the delivery 20 of training to front-line firefighters in your borough?</p> <p>21 A. So part of the training, mostly about quality assurance 22 of that training to ensure it's being delivered, 23 certainly through what we'll call DAMOP, development and 24 maintenance of operational professionalism. That's 25 supported by a central training programme, which is not</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 61</p>	<p>1 Q. Now, you say in your witness statement -- can I take you 2 to the first of those, it's page 3 of the first of the 3 statements, that's the one that's dated 5 July 2017. 4 Can I ask you to go to the third paragraph in that 5 statement.</p> <p>6 You say that, as a rule, you train for high-rise 7 quite a lot on station.</p> <p>8 Now, it's a short sentence. What do you mean by "on 9 station"?</p> <p>10 A. So watch managers will look at what training their 11 watches require. As the borough commander of Tower 12 Hamlets and previously -- I'd only just gone to Tower 13 Hamlets. For the previous three years I was borough 14 commander for Islington. So inner city stations with 15 lots of high-rise buildings, you try to get those crews 16 to train quite considerably.</p> <p>17 The Brigade also did a package called back to 18 basics, and the theme of back to basics, which was one 19 of the training packages we did across the borough, has 20 been high-rise firefighting as well. Mainly about 21 on-arrival tactics, plans, and certainly how you would 22 operate at the initial part of an operational incident 23 at high-rise incidents.</p> <p>24 Q. In the year or so prior to the fire at Grenfell Tower, 25 did any of the high-rise training you oversaw the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 63</p>
<p>1 the direct responsibility of a borough commander, but 2 that's delivered by our training and development 3 department.</p> <p>4 Q. As part of that function at that time, June 2017, were 5 you responsible for overseeing any training on fire 6 survival guidance?</p> <p>7 A. Overseeing the training at stations, quality assuring 8 it, yes. So we have 11 service standards that we work 9 to, and a borough commander and a station manager can 10 deliver service standard visits at stations. So it's 11 a quality assurance of the training and the activity 12 taken. So service standard 2 deals with operational 13 matters. So I, as a borough commander, could go to any 14 of my watches, whether planned or unplanned, doing 15 quality assured standard of training and what they're 16 delivering.</p> <p>17 Q. Did you do that in relation specifically to the delivery 18 of training on the subject of fire survival guidance 19 calls?</p> <p>20 A. Specific to delivery of fire survival guidance, I would 21 say no, but in terms of our overall operational 22 response, which could include fire survival guidance, 23 then yes.</p> <p>24 Q. What about high-rise firefighting?</p> <p>25 A. Yes, absolutely.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 62</p>	<p>1 quality assurance in respect of cover the question 2 specifically of ignition or fire spread on a facade of 3 a high-rise building?</p> <p>4 A. No.</p> <p>5 Q. So would I be right in thinking, therefore, that you 6 never saw, let alone delivered, any quality assurance 7 over any training on a slideshow called "Tall Buildings 8 Facades". Does that ring a bell with you?</p> <p>9 A. No.</p> <p>10 Q. Do you know anything about training programmes covering 11 the question of the ignition or the fire spread on 12 a facade of a high-rise building prior to 13 Grenfell Tower?</p> <p>14 A. On the facade, no, but we have training on fire 15 extension, fire spreading in high-rise buildings.</p> <p>16 Q. Let's say in the two years or so leading up to Grenfell, 17 do you remember doing any quality assurance or 18 overseeing any training specifically on the subject of 19 how to go about doing a full or partial evacuation of 20 a high-rise residential block?</p> <p>21 A. Training, no. We plan for evacuating and rescue quite 22 considerably, but in terms of utilising the building 23 resources to do full and partial evacuations, we didn't 24 train for that.</p> <p>25 Q. Just leading on from that, do I take it also that that</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 64</p>

<p>1 means that you would also not oversee the training for</p> <p>2 or deliver training for circumstances in which you would</p> <p>3 consider implementing an evacuation of a building which</p> <p>4 had a stay-put policy in place?</p> <p>5 A. Certainly we would talk around the operational tactics.</p> <p>6 So a decision an incident commander has to make at</p> <p>7 a high-rise is what to do with the people on the floor</p> <p>8 of the floor of the fire of origin. So there's</p> <p>9 a decision to make whether you evacuate the whole floor</p> <p>10 if the fire's in a flat, or you can actually keep people</p> <p>11 to stay put. So certainly those decisions are made.</p> <p>12 To just put a bit of context around the training for</p> <p>13 evacuation, a lot of that depends on the facilities that</p> <p>14 a building has got to carry out evacuation, and many</p> <p>15 buildings just don't have the facility to carry out</p> <p>16 a full evacuation of a block.</p> <p>17 Q. To your knowledge, did you deliver training or oversee</p> <p>18 training on -- it's quite specific, this -- the</p> <p>19 circumstances when you would expand the scope of</p> <p>20 evacuation beyond the immediate compartment of origin</p> <p>21 and surrounding compartments?</p> <p>22 A. Not specifically, no.</p> <p>23 Q. I am going to turn now to your mobilisation and arrival</p> <p>24 at Grenfell.</p> <p>25 In your first statement on page 1, at the foot of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 65</p>	<p>1 Q. What were the problems around your mobilisation?</p> <p>2 A. Okay. So I wasn't actually on duty that evening.</p> <p>3 I performed a specific task the evening before where</p> <p>4 I was recalled to duty. I'm a national inter-agency</p> <p>5 liaison officer, so I work quite closely with other</p> <p>6 agencies, and I was recalled to do some specific tasks.</p> <p>7 Because it crossed over between the hours of midnight,</p> <p>8 because I was placed on recall and I was recalled, they</p> <p>9 had to book me back on duty. After I finished those</p> <p>10 duties, I booked back off, and it seemed by accident</p> <p>11 I was not booked off. So on the evening -- I was not</p> <p>12 physically on duty that evening.</p> <p>13 Q. But you were in practice continually on duty?</p> <p>14 A. So because I'm the borough commander for Tower Hamlets,</p> <p>15 my base location is Whitechapel. So even though I'd</p> <p>16 gone back to my call-out base, which is my home, because</p> <p>17 the system thought I was on duty, it showed me at</p> <p>18 Whitechapel. But I was actually off duty that evening.</p> <p>19 Q. Right.</p> <p>20 Could I ask you, at the time when you were mobilised</p> <p>21 at 01.15.28, according to this record, when had you last</p> <p>22 been to bed?</p> <p>23 A. I was in bed when the pager went off.</p> <p>24 Q. How much sleep had you had?</p> <p>25 A. Well, I got home quite late that evening because I've</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 67</p>
<p>1 the page you say -- this is four lines up from the</p> <p>2 bottom, pick it up mid-sentence:</p> <p>3 "... as at 01.45am on Wednesday 14 June I received a</p> <p>4 pages[sic] message and a call from the Watch."</p> <p>5 We have, just pausing there, a recorded mobilisation</p> <p>6 time for you as just a little before that -- in fact,</p> <p>7 quite a bit before that -- at 01.15.28.</p> <p>8 My question is: would that sound more likely,</p> <p>9 01.15.28?</p> <p>10 A. Yes, there was some issues around my mobilisation that</p> <p>11 evening.</p> <p>12 Q. Right. Let's just dig into that a little bit.</p> <p>13 If I can ask you to be shown LFB00000002.</p> <p>14 This is the mobilisation spreadsheet that we have</p> <p>15 from the LFB. It's tab 17 of the master documents</p> <p>16 bundle for those who have that. It shows a recorded</p> <p>17 time for your call with control, line 16, as 01.46.52.</p> <p>18 That's time mobile. But time mobilised, if you look to</p> <p>19 the left of that, is 01.15.28. It shows group manager,</p> <p>20 Whitechapel, and F115, being the call sign, which</p> <p>21 I think is you.</p> <p>22 A. Yes.</p> <p>23 Q. So can we take it from this record that you were</p> <p>24 actually mobilised at 01.15.28?</p> <p>25 A. Yes, I was.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 66</p>	<p>1 got a cadet unit, so even though I'd had a late night,</p> <p>2 I promised the cadets I would go and see them, so</p> <p>3 I worked with the cadets and young people until about</p> <p>4 8 o'clock, so I got home about 9.15 and went to bed</p> <p>5 probably about 11 o'clock.</p> <p>6 Q. Right.</p> <p>7 Going back to your statement, if I can just take you</p> <p>8 back to the bottom of page 1, you say:</p> <p>9 "The control operator I spoke to sounded like she</p> <p>10 was distressed."</p> <p>11 My first question is: did you call the control room,</p> <p>12 having been paged?</p> <p>13 A. No, so I didn't hear the pager, and there is a procedure</p> <p>14 that if an officer does not respond to a pager message,</p> <p>15 they get paged twice, and if they don't respond to the</p> <p>16 pager message, then control call them, because it's</p> <p>17 a welfare -- because you don't know if the officer is in</p> <p>18 trouble. So I actually responded to my mobile phone.</p> <p>19 It was the mobile phone that woke me up.</p> <p>20 Q. Was that your Brigade mobile?</p> <p>21 A. Yes, it was.</p> <p>22 Q. The control room would have that number presumably for</p> <p>23 you?</p> <p>24 A. Yes.</p> <p>25 Q. That explains the end of the sentence before, the "call</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 68</p>

<p>1 from the watch".</p> <p>2 Looking at the conversation you had, you say she</p> <p>3 sounded like she was distressed. Do you know who you</p> <p>4 spoke to?</p> <p>5 A. No, I don't.</p> <p>6 Q. When you say she sounded like she was distressed, why</p> <p>7 was that?</p> <p>8 A. We know the control staff personally and they're amazing</p> <p>9 people, so generally they're very calm and they are</p> <p>10 great at giving us pertinent information about the</p> <p>11 incident. The control operator that called -- obviously</p> <p>12 I hadn't responded to her pager. They were obviously</p> <p>13 very, very busy, and basically said, "Are you going?"</p> <p>14 And because I just woke up, I kind of said, "Going to</p> <p>15 what?" And then she started giving me details of the</p> <p>16 incident: we've got a 20-pump fire with multiple FSGs.</p> <p>17 I then said, "I'm actually not on duty", but she -- it</p> <p>18 was clear that she was so busy, she didn't have time to</p> <p>19 debate. And actually, on hearing that -- I remember --</p> <p>20 I was really fortunate, I remember hearing some of the</p> <p>21 tapes to Lakanal and some of the control operators</p> <p>22 during Lakanal having similar conversations, and</p> <p>23 I thought: I'm not going to waste her time. I must be</p> <p>24 still showing on duty.</p> <p>25 To be honest, I've never heard control operators</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 69</p>	<p>1 A. No, just assisting in gaining information and passing it</p> <p>2 on to the relevant correct people.</p> <p>3 Q. Going back to the bottom, then, of page 1 of your</p> <p>4 statement, you say that the control room officer told</p> <p>5 you:</p> <p>6 "... 'No you are on duty. There is a 20 pump fire,</p> <p>7 multiple FSG/s, Grenfell Tower'."</p> <p>8 Just to put a time mark on this, we know that there</p> <p>9 was a make-up to 20 pumps at 01.29.46. That was the</p> <p>10 service request in response to what had come from the</p> <p>11 fire ground, make pumps 20 at 01.29.</p> <p>12 Does that help you time this call you had with the</p> <p>13 control room? Was it around that time or was it perhaps</p> <p>14 a little later than that?</p> <p>15 A. I would've thought it was slightly later. I think the</p> <p>16 request for make pumps 20 would've triggered</p> <p>17 mobilisations, and because I hadn't responded to the</p> <p>18 pager message, I think there would've been some process</p> <p>19 that would've taken -- it wouldn't have taken that long,</p> <p>20 maybe 5 or 10 minutes later.</p> <p>21 Q. You have in your statement that she said to you that</p> <p>22 there were multiple FSGs. Were those her words or is</p> <p>23 that your description of what she said?</p> <p>24 A. From what I can recall, I'm pretty sure that's what she</p> <p>25 said to me.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 71</p>
<p>1 sound that distressed. I thought we needed help and</p> <p>2 there was no point to argue, I must go, and so I went.</p> <p>3 Q. Can I just go off point for a moment and ask you about</p> <p>4 what you just said about hearing the calls from Lakanal.</p> <p>5 Were you at Lakanal House?</p> <p>6 A. No, I was a staff officer during Lakanal House. I was</p> <p>7 a staff officer to the assistant commissioner.</p> <p>8 Q. So you didn't attend the incident?</p> <p>9 A. No.</p> <p>10 Q. What role did you have in the incident?</p> <p>11 A. So post the incident I assisted the assistant</p> <p>12 commissioner with some of the investigation and</p> <p>13 documents, supporting staff, et cetera.</p> <p>14 Q. Was it in that context that you listened to the control</p> <p>15 room calls?</p> <p>16 A. I heard a few, yes.</p> <p>17 Q. Did you hear FSG calls?</p> <p>18 A. No, I didn't hear FSG calls, no.</p> <p>19 Q. What kinds of calls did you listen to as part of that</p> <p>20 exercise?</p> <p>21 A. Most of that was admin calls between officers, just to</p> <p>22 assist the assistant commissioner to get the information</p> <p>23 about the investigation of officers' actions.</p> <p>24 Q. Did you have any input into the compiling or drafting of</p> <p>25 what turned into the Lakanal House report?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 70</p>	<p>1 Q. Did you ask her about FSGs when she told you that?</p> <p>2 A. No.</p> <p>3 Q. What did you take from that?</p> <p>4 A. It's not so much taken from the information, because it</p> <p>5 was just the tone and -- she was fairly distressed in</p> <p>6 her tone and it's -- I like to say it's rare, but you</p> <p>7 just don't often hear -- you know, control operators</p> <p>8 take difficult calls every single day. It takes a lot</p> <p>9 to get them flustered. And for me, there was no point</p> <p>10 in adding to her stress. It sounded like they needed</p> <p>11 assistance and I'm an officer and I was going to go, so</p> <p>12 I went.</p> <p>13 Q. How soon after that discussion did you leave, do you</p> <p>14 think?</p> <p>15 A. You know, fortunately I know my way around London pretty</p> <p>16 well. My kit is pretty much all ready in a bag, ready</p> <p>17 to go, so I just got some clothes, got my uniform on and</p> <p>18 I would probably have been out of the house in under</p> <p>19 5 minutes.</p> <p>20 Q. We have your status 2 time, your mobile to incident</p> <p>21 time, as 01.46.52, which is in the short incident log at</p> <p>22 page 13, if I can just ask you to look at that. You're</p> <p>23 the second entry down under officers, F115, Goulbourne,</p> <p>24 Patrick. Shows you assigned at 01.15.28, as we saw</p> <p>25 before, and then mobile at 01.46.52.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 72</p>

<p>1 My question is: does that sound about right for you?</p> <p>2 A. Yes, it does.</p> <p>3 Q. We don't have a recorded arrival time for you to the</p> <p>4 incident, so I'm going to try to work through with you</p> <p>5 to see where we get to.</p> <p>6 You set off how long after booking status 2, do you</p> <p>7 think?</p> <p>8 A. I was in my car travelling at status 2 on to the</p> <p>9 incident, so a few minutes.</p> <p>10 Q. Did you book status 2 before or after you left?</p> <p>11 A. Booked status 2 on the telephone, get changed, pick up</p> <p>12 your kit and then leave. Generally, if you don't know</p> <p>13 your way, you spend a bit of time looking at the</p> <p>14 geographia just so you know the route you're about to</p> <p>15 take, especially as senior officers. We travel some</p> <p>16 distance, so you don't want to get going and then try to</p> <p>17 work your way; it's best to plot your route en route so</p> <p>18 you don't make any mistakes.</p> <p>19 I know my way around London pretty well and I used</p> <p>20 to be stationed at North Kensington, I knew</p> <p>21 Grenfell Tower, so I knew the route I was about to take.</p> <p>22 Q. When you say you booked over the telephone status 2, was</p> <p>23 that during the same conversation with the control</p> <p>24 officer?</p> <p>25 A. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 73</p>	<p>1 coming in, in your statement you say, in the first main</p> <p>2 paragraph on page 2, third line of that paragraph:</p> <p>3 "The volume of calls was [phenomenal]. The</p> <p>4 controller was [reeling] of lists of calls from people</p> <p>5 who were trapped."</p> <p>6 Do you see that?</p> <p>7 Just before we look at some detail, are there any</p> <p>8 that stand out particularly in your memory?</p> <p>9 A. In terms of FSG calls?</p> <p>10 Q. Yes.</p> <p>11 A. No, what stands out for me was just the volume. I've</p> <p>12 never heard anything like it. The moment I turned my</p> <p>13 radio on, it was alive, and it was like that until I got</p> <p>14 to the incident. It was just call after call. So</p> <p>15 I really couldn't tell you any detail.</p> <p>16 I was probably more listening out for incident</p> <p>17 messages, incident messages from incident commanders,</p> <p>18 make-up messages, informative messages, to tell me what</p> <p>19 was going on to the incident.</p> <p>20 Q. Had you in your experience ever heard that volume and</p> <p>21 intensity of fire survival guidance information over the</p> <p>22 radio en route to an incident?</p> <p>23 A. I've never heard anything like it, ever.</p> <p>24 Q. Did you have any thoughts en route as to what kinds of</p> <p>25 strategy or tactics the incident commander at the scene</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 75</p>
<p>1 Q. So we can time that conversation to that mobilisation.</p> <p>2 What communications equipment did you have with you</p> <p>3 in your car en route?</p> <p>4 A. So a standard officer airwave radio, which allows me to</p> <p>5 monitor the main scheme radio channel, so I could hear</p> <p>6 the control operators calling up individual call signs,</p> <p>7 giving them information or receiving information, and</p> <p>8 I could also hear the control operator passing FSGs.</p> <p>9 I also had a personal fire ground radio which</p> <p>10 officers generally turn on as soon as you get in your</p> <p>11 car. It won't give you any information, but the closer</p> <p>12 you get to the incident, you'll be able to start to pick</p> <p>13 up the fire ground radio traffic.</p> <p>14 Q. How close do you have to be to start picking up the</p> <p>15 traffic?</p> <p>16 A. You probably need a radio engineer, I'm unsure, but</p> <p>17 probably just under a mile, I would say, depending on</p> <p>18 the geographia of the building. If it's a clear line of</p> <p>19 sight, probably a little bit further.</p> <p>20 I wouldn't want to mislead you on detail, but, you</p> <p>21 know, as you get closer, you will start to pick up radio</p> <p>22 traffic. It's really useful because it gives you a feel</p> <p>23 of what you are about to go to.</p> <p>24 Q. Again, picking up on something you said a moment ago</p> <p>25 about hearing individual call signs and information</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 74</p>	<p>1 should be adopting?</p> <p>2 A. En route, no. I was just trying to get some situational</p> <p>3 awareness of what we were going to. Because I know</p> <p>4 Grenfell Tower, I know it's a high-rise -- I heard</p> <p>5 a make-up -- so when the officer in charge is giving</p> <p>6 assistance messages, you think there must be something</p> <p>7 really significant going on.</p> <p>8 En route, I remember travelling up the Marylebone</p> <p>9 Road, and I think, as I kind of turned past Madame</p> <p>10 Tussauds and started going to the elevated section of</p> <p>11 the Westway, at that point I saw the building. And it</p> <p>12 was complete shock.</p> <p>13 But I kind of professionally hoped it was either</p> <p>14 scaffolding, I was hoping it was a building under</p> <p>15 construction, and generally sometimes we see some quite</p> <p>16 spectacular fires like that, but it's scaffolding with</p> <p>17 netting which gives you the fire extension. But the</p> <p>18 closer you got to the job, the more you started seeing</p> <p>19 people out on the street, the whole scene coming up, you</p> <p>20 knew you was attending something quite extraordinary.</p> <p>21 Q. In your then 20 years' experience as a firefighter with</p> <p>22 the LFB, what was the maximum number of FSG calls you</p> <p>23 had experienced at a single incident?</p> <p>24 A. At an incident I've been to?</p> <p>25 Q. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 76</p>

<p>1 A. No more than two. Obviously most people know about 2 Lakanal, and I think it went to seven, maybe a little 3 bit more than that, but -- I don't know if that is 4 exactly right, but I can remember it was seven or eight 5 or nine, maybe, but that was the highest. I've never 6 heard the number of calls we were receiving that night. 7 Q. If we can get a picture from the contemporaneous 8 evidence of the kinds of calls you might have been 9 hearing, can I ask you, please, to go to page 19 of the 10 short incident log, the SIL. 11 Given we have you mobile to incident at 01.46.52, if 12 we look at page 19 and start halfway down that page, at 13 01.43.19: 14 "Service Request Created: RT4 - G271 - PEOPLE STUCK 15 IN FLATS ON 10TH FLOOR." 16 Just cast your eye down the page, and we can see 17 that minute-by-minute, pretty much, there are RT4 -- 18 which is radio transmission calls -- coming out of the 19 control room. These are recorded on the Vision system. 20 Does this -- just looking at the page -- give us 21 an impression of the calls you were hearing? 22 A. Yeah, absolutely. 23 Q. Right. 24 So when it says RT4, that is broadcast over the 25 radio. Could you hear those calls?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 77</p>	<p>1 the absence of an address, a flat number, was a problem? 2 A. No, I didn't have any thoughts because I was -- I'm not 3 even too sure at 01.43 I was mobile. 4 If I was on scene and I received that information, 5 knowing there was people stuck on the 10th floor 6 would've been more information than I would've had 7 anyway and it would've been very useful. 8 Q. Just going back to your journey, in your statement on 9 page 2, you say in the fourth paragraph that you pulled 10 into the Marylebone Road and you recall hearing 11 Rocky Welch take over as incident commander. 12 Rocky, that's Richard Welch? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. That's his nickname, is it? Right. 15 We have a time for that as 02.04, and just for the 16 record, that's the short incident log at page 21. We 17 can see it if you like. 18 Does that kind of time ring a bell with you? 19 A. Yeah. 20 Q. You say you also heard it called 40 pumps. You heard it 21 "called make pumps 40", you say. You also say this was 22 a major incident. 23 My questions are: did you hear a calling of a major 24 incident? 25 A. Yes, I did, via the radio.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 79</p>
<p>1 A. Yes. 2 Q. So you were tuned in to RT4? 3 A. Yes, so North Ken is on our radio channel, which is 4 FLON-OPS 4. 5 Q. Were you able at that stage to form an impression as to 6 whether the information being given in those radio 7 messages was sufficiently detailed to be able to help 8 the incident ground start to effect rescues? 9 A. Yeah, we've got a policy and a process for FSGs and 10 I had no doubt that they were probably processing those 11 FSGs and getting that information off to the bridgehead 12 as soon as possible and deploying crews. 13 Q. Did you have any particular thoughts about it at the 14 time, as to whether the information being communicated 15 was sufficiently detailed? 16 A. No, I had no thoughts. I heard radio transmission that 17 were perfectly in tune with the details that you'd give 18 an FSG; it was just the volume that was very different. 19 Q. This isn't really so much a question for you, but I want 20 to see if I can get a specific answer. 21 Looking at the one at 01.43.19, which is a service 22 request from PD, which is I think Pete Duddy in the 23 control room, he says, "PEOPLE STUCK IN FLATS ON 24 10TH FLOOR". We don't see any addresses there. 25 Do you remember having any thoughts about whether</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 78</p>	<p>1 Q. Where were you at that point, when you heard it called 2 a major incident? 3 A. I was not far from scene. I didn't go up the Westway 4 because I knew my way around the back so I was 5 travelling some side roads between where Alpha 21 6 Paddington is and where -- back to the scene of 7 Grenfell. So I was in back roads around that area. 8 Q. So you still hadn't yet arrived? 9 A. No, I hadn't arrived yet, but I was probably no more 10 than 6 or 7 minutes out, if that. 11 Q. So we have a time of the calling of the major incident 12 at 02.06.48. We have it in the short incident log at 13 page 21. Given that that's the time of that, 6 or 14 7 minutes later would take you to about 02.14. 15 Would that be about the time you arrived? 16 A. Yeah, I think that's approximately about right, yes. 17 Q. Okay. I know it's difficult to be exact, but we're 18 trying to pin it down. 19 A. Yes, I tried to book in via the RT -- I was going to 20 book in via the RT, but there was so much radio traffic, 21 and actually myself booking status 3 was probably the 22 least important bit of information that would've been on 23 that radio, so I left it alone and booked on in the 24 command unit, ensuring they could do their FSGs and 25 speak to fire engines that were mobile.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 80</p>

<p>1 Q. In your statement on page 2, in the paragraph third from 2 bottom -- it's difficult to navigate one's way around 3 the paragraph numbers but it starts "Straight away I had 4 my business head on". This is en route, so we haven't 5 yet arrived. 6 "The fire was from bottom to top with vertical and 7 lateral spread. I remember thinking is it the facia, is 8 it scaffolding, is it netting. I then saw that this was 9 not a building under construction." 10 Does that mean that you discounted in your mind the 11 possibility of a scaffolding or netting-related fire? 12 A. Yes, when I didn't see any and it wasn't a building 13 under construction, then yes. 14 Q. So having worked out that it wasn't a building under 15 construction, what did you think was alright? 16 A. I was unsure. 17 Q. Had you heard of cladding fires in the past at that 18 time? 19 A. Yes, we've watched -- as officers, you try and 20 investigate and see what happens around the world. 21 There was a fire in I think it was Dubai. That's been 22 quite famous. So senior officers work on rota groups, 23 so you talk through tactical plans and things you see. 24 So we've talked about lateral fire spread and tactics 25 we'd use.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 81</p>	<p>1 tactical decision-making exercises just to run through 2 command for ourselves just as refreshers. 3 Q. These rota groups, who would be on them normally? 4 A. So every shift every day in London in the London Fire 5 Brigade, senior officers at station manager, group 6 manager level, they sit on particular rota groups. So 7 at that time, I was an officer on north rota 2. So 8 north rota 2 has a number of officers that it needs to 9 be on shift per day, a number of station managers, 10 a number of group managers. So you're the same group 11 that follow the same shift pattern, almost like a watch 12 does. 13 Q. These discussions, would they be noted down? Would 14 there be a written record of these discussions? 15 A. No, they're generally informal, generally us getting 16 together as professional officers and talking about 17 operational tactics. 18 Q. Can you give us a flavour of what kind -- even if in 19 short terms -- of strategies, tactics you would adopt 20 when faced with a fire on the exterior such as Dubai or 21 France? 22 A. Well, part of that would be about what external 23 firefighting you can do, what resources you'd need, what 24 internal firefighting or what actual building 25 construction, what fixed installations could help you.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 83</p>
<p>1 Q. What sort of tactics would have come out of those senior 2 officer discussions about lateral fire spread? 3 A. A lot of it would be around resources, because some of 4 your tactical decision would be what are the priorities 5 for you and what resources you would need. You would 6 work to policy, so we have a high-rise policy, we'd work 7 to that, but it would be what resources and how you 8 would plan to tackle a fire that was actually travelling 9 that far. 10 I remember some of those discussions because 11 certainly there was one in France where it moved from 12 balcony to balcony, but it never -- it went vertically 13 but it never travelled laterally. It had never breached 14 the compartmentation. So you still had a difficult 15 fire, but we hadn't really talked about what happens 16 when it starts breaching each compartment up, because if 17 I'm perfectly honest, that's something I don't think 18 I've ever seen and didn't expect to see. 19 Q. These discussions you're talking about, who were they 20 with? 21 A. So senior officers working on a rota group. We often 22 work together. So we often meet, certainly when we're 23 on duty for weekends, and we'll sit and talk not only 24 about incidents we've gone to together, and probably 25 debriefed them, but sometimes we do things called</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 82</p>	<p>1 You know, certainly I think in Dubai they had sprinklers 2 so it stopped internal -- the lateral fire spread, so we 3 talked about the management of that, what that looks 4 like. 5 So kind of a range of tactics you would talk about 6 and a range of challenges you may face. A large 7 incident, sometimes you need to just consider about 8 siting of appliances, movement of people. 9 Q. These discussions that you were having, although 10 informal as you say, did they lead anywhere? Did they 11 lead into any specific consideration of training or 12 ensuring that front-line firefighters were aware of the 13 things that had to be considered? 14 A. No. I mean, officers have their regular what we call 15 incident command training we go to, which is 16 centrally-led training, and there's a whole incident 17 command process that does that anyway. So when you take 18 a command role, certainly incident command role, you're 19 subject to the PRO/PRC process, that's the performance 20 review of operations or the performance review of 21 command, where there's an independent chair and they 22 will review all of your command decisions at an 23 incident. You will be awarded development points or be 24 awarded positive points depending on your performance 25 that will be placed onto your individual training</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 84</p>

<p>1 records, which will then decide whether you get 2 development or notable performance.</p> <p>3 Also, your performance is monitored by a monitoring 4 officer. So whenever you're an incident commander, 5 there's always an officer one rank above you monitoring 6 your performance, and also the operational review team 7 who monitor organisational performance.</p> <p>8 So when I talk about our tactical decision-making 9 exercises, they're informal between us, but they 10 supplement some of things we learn through the formal 11 process anyway.</p> <p>12 Q. What I am trying to get a feel for is how widespread 13 intelligence or discussion about external fire spread 14 through cladding such as the Dubai experience was in the 15 London Fire Brigade prior to Grenfell.</p> <p>16 Was it limited to the senior groups' informal 17 discussions, or was it more widespread, with an attempt 18 to push the experience downstream into the operational 19 line?</p> <p>20 A. That's really hard for me to say. I know what we used 21 to talk about and officers discuss incidents all of the 22 time. We attend incidents as rota groups together and 23 share information. But that's in addition to the formal 24 process that I've just described.</p> <p>25 Q. Coming back to the facts of the night, then, when you</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 85</p>	<p>1 A. No, I wouldn't have thought that. At Grenfell Tower, 2 you know, in terms of building construction, for me, 3 I knew the tower. It was a classic 1970s block of 4 flats: it's concrete floors, concrete ceilings, fire 5 doors, partitions. You generally don't get fire spread 6 in buildings like that. So I would not have expected it 7 at all.</p> <p>8 Q. You say you knew the tower; did you know it had been the 9 subject of a large refurbishment in 2016?</p> <p>10 A. No. So I was stationed at North Kensington between 1997 11 and I think 2000. I'd been to Grenfell Tower for 12 a range of incidents, whether shut in lifts, floodings, 13 some fires, some bin chute fires, and it was a 1970s 14 block of flats with no cladding when I saw it. I then 15 transferred to Tottenham and I didn't go back to 16 Grenfell Tower.</p> <p>17 Q. So the answer is you didn't know about the 18 refurbishment?</p> <p>19 A. No.</p> <p>20 Q. Moving on, if I can take you to page 2 of your statement 21 and look at the second-last paragraph, which starts 22 "I went to the command unit", you say that you went to 23 the command unit and Dave O'Neill was being briefed by 24 Andy Loughlin. Is that Andy O'Loughlin?</p> <p>25 A. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 87</p>
<p>1 saw the fire on the exterior and discounted netting or 2 scaffolding, did you think back to Dubai?</p> <p>3 A. If I'm honest, no. I just wanted to get to the command 4 unit because I felt they needed more people and they 5 needed assistance. And if I was in their position, 6 I would've expected every single officer to get there as 7 soon as possible.</p> <p>8 Q. Did you have any thoughts at the time or could you see 9 whether this was a fire only on the outside or could you 10 see whether it penetrated into some of the flats by that 11 stage?</p> <p>12 A. No, I had seen that there was some lateral fire spread 13 into some of the flats, but, again, I didn't know 14 whether it had actually breached all of the 15 compartmentation. You generally get -- you know, I've 16 been a firefighter in central London stations for most 17 of my career. You will pick up high-rise fires from 18 experience. Some will spread, some will spread outside 19 and go through windows, and it looked like some had gone 20 vertically and up through some windows. But at that 21 point, I didn't know whether it had breached the 22 compartmentation and into the communal areas.</p> <p>23 Q. Did you have any thoughts at that stage, when you saw 24 the fire first, about whether there should be full or 25 partial evacuation of the building?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 86</p>	<p>1 Q. "... who was the incident commander."</p> <p>2 At the foot of the page you say:</p> <p>3 "I would say that from my turning up and getting to 4 the Command Unit was less than five minutes."</p> <p>5 So if we have you arriving at just before 02.15 or 6 so, would it be right -- you tell me -- you get to the 7 command unit at about 02.20 or so?</p> <p>8 A. Yes.</p> <p>9 Q. Did you hear any message broadcast over FLON-OPS 4 or on 10 the fire ground radio that Andy O'Loughlin had been made 11 IC?</p> <p>12 A. I really can't remember hearing it, no.</p> <p>13 Q. How did you come to know that he was IC, incident 14 commander?</p> <p>15 A. I spoke to him in the command unit and he was standing 16 there, and I asked him, I said, "You've taken over from 17 Richard Welch?" My words would've been, "Have you taken 18 over from Rocky?" and he said, "Yeah, I'm IC."</p> <p>19 Q. Right.</p> <p>20 A. It's not discounting that he probably did send that 21 message, I just didn't hear it. I may have been out my 22 car at that time and walked, because I had some distance 23 to walk from where I parked.</p> <p>24 Q. To be clear, where was this command unit?</p> <p>25 A. I really can't remember. I remember asking some</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 88</p>

<p>1 firefighters, "Where's the command unit?" and them 2 pointing me in the right direction. I walked down 3 a couple of streets, but I couldn't tell you where 4 I was. 5 Q. You don't know whether it was Bomore or Grenfell Road? 6 A. I'm really sorry. 7 Q. When you arrived, was it handling fire survival guidance 8 messages? 9 A. No. 10 Q. It wasn't. 11 Again, just a time marker, we have an arrival time 12 for Dave O'Neill of 02.12. Just for our reference, 13 that's the mobilisation spreadsheet at line 44, so we 14 have that on the transcript. So your arrival at the 15 command unit would be, as I think we've established, 16 a little bit after that. 17 Do you remember DAC O'Loughlin sending a message at 18 02.16 to make FRUs 10? 19 A. No, I didn't hear that message. 20 Q. You describe, as we've just seen in your statement on 21 page 2, second paragraph from bottom, going to the 22 command unit and hearing the briefing. 23 You say in your statement that sector safety had 24 been given to Dave, if you see that, and then you say: 25 "I asked who was doing the search Sector and Fire</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 89</p>	<p>1 floors. You can get a flat going up, a floor in the 2 middle and a flat going down off the same floors. You 3 wouldn't be able to do one floor above, one floor below 4 with that type of building construction. 5 So as a general rule, the fire sector commander will 6 sit at the bridgehead but will have the operational 7 control of the fire sector, which is generally one floor 8 below and one floor above the fire, depending on the 9 geography of the building. 10 Q. And search sector? 11 A. The search sector would be the floors above the fire 12 sector. So if we were getting fire extension, that's 13 someone to control the operations above the fire. 14 Q. Following on from that, when you arrived at the command 15 unit, to your knowledge, had command been split into 16 spans of control, into those three areas, or did that 17 happen after you arrived or while you were arriving? 18 A. I couldn't really say whether -- I would've expected 19 they would've been split. It's not unusual that as 20 incidents progress in size, then you increase the rank 21 of the officer that is being a sector commander. 22 Q. Did you get the impression, though, when you arrived 23 that those spans of control had already been created? 24 A. I hadn't really heard, because you don't pick up the 25 fire ground radio traffic until you're about a mile</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 91</p>
<p>1 Sector and was told that Rocky [Richard Welch] had both 2 fire and search." 3 Can you explain first of all what sector safety 4 means. What is that? 5 A. So when we split a fire ground or an incident ground 6 into operational spans of control, we also will put not 7 only a commander, maybe a sector commander in place, but 8 we'll put a safety officer in place to work with the 9 sector commander to control safety within a specific 10 area. What we generally will do then is put 11 an overarching senior sector safety to ensure the 12 co-ordination of all of the safety officers in each 13 sector. So when pertinent information may be found that 14 may be central, that can get disseminated via sector 15 safety and they will co-ordinate that on behalf 16 generally of an incident commander. 17 Q. Fire sector, can you explain what that is? 18 A. So the fire sector commander is the person who -- when 19 the incident, certainly at high-rise, is sectorised, so 20 where the fire is, it's generally the floor above and 21 the floor below the fire. But that's depending on the 22 geography of the building. I know North Kensington very 23 well and we've got a multitude of different types of 24 blocks of flats. Trelick Tower on North Ken's ground 25 is very different. One balcony feeds three different</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 90</p>	<p>1 away, so I wouldn't have known who Dave was being 2 detailed to take over from, so I really couldn't answer 3 that. But certainly when I asked Andy -- I keep saying 4 Rocky, sorry, I apologise -- Richard was the fire sector 5 commander as GM, so I offered myself as search sector as 6 a group manager to take an important role in the 7 incident. 8 Q. Well, I wonder if that's quite right. In your statement 9 you say you asked who was doing the search sector and 10 fire sector and was told that Rocky had both fire sector 11 and search. 12 First of all, who told you that? 13 A. Andy O'Loughlin. 14 Q. It looks as if in fact he had been given both sectors. 15 Is that right or had he only been given fire? 16 A. He was managing the bridgehead at that moment, so 17 I think at that point Andy was changing the 18 sectorisation. Because as officers come, it allows 19 you -- those officers available to be able to deliver 20 those tasks, and I was one of those officers. 21 Q. He hadn't been there for very long, as we know, but did 22 you get the impression from that that Rocky had been 23 given both fire and search? 24 A. No, because the fire was so extensive, I think Rocky was 25 given fire because unfortunately most of it was on fire.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 92</p>

<p>1 Q. Absolutely. But what about search? Was that separate 2 or given to somebody else at that stage or -- 3 A. No. I didn't take over search sector from anybody. 4 Q. So who was running search sector? 5 A. Technically, because the fire was from the top to the 6 bottom, it was all fire. So generally there's no fire 7 in the search sector; the search sector is there for 8 smoke spread and searching and generally casualty 9 reassurance. But because by the time I turned up there 10 was certainly fire from around the 4th to the top, it 11 would've been hard to delineate a search sector. 12 Q. When you came into the command unit and had this 13 discussion with DAC O'Loughlin, where was Richard Welch 14 at that stage, do you remember? 15 A. No. 16 Q. He wasn't on the CU? 17 A. He wasn't on the CU. 18 Q. You say in the same paragraph, in the last line: 19 "Because I knew the ground and know the crews I 20 wanted to be in there so I got myself put in with 21 Rocky." 22 Does that mean it was your suggestion to take up 23 a role on the bridgehead? 24 A. Yes, I offered it to Andy. I wanted to help, like any 25 officer would, so I offered it up.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 93</p>	<p>1 A. No. 2 Q. Did you know whether there had been any discussion about 3 committing EDBA wearers at that point? 4 A. I saw EDBA wearers on the ground and I knew they were 5 committing, but at that point I wouldn't have expected 6 to get that information. I got the information from DAC 7 O'Loughlin that Richard was in charge of the bridgehead 8 and also that the bridgehead was on the 3rd floor. 9 Q. Did you learn anything from DAC O'Loughlin about what 10 fire survival guidance information was coming in and 11 being co-ordinated? 12 A. No. I'd heard the FSGs obviously en route, and I knew 13 there was a separate command unit delivering the FSG 14 information, so I didn't have a discussion with DAC 15 O'Loughlin. 16 Q. Did you have any discussion with him about the calls 17 that you'd heard being reeled off by the control room as 18 you'd heard en route? 19 A. No. 20 Q. Moving then on to your going to the tower, which is the 21 next topic. 22 Can I ask you, are you all right to continue or do 23 you need a break? 24 A. I'm fine, thank you. 25 Q. You then make your way to the tower, and on the foot of</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 95</p>
<p>1 Q. What did you say to him? 2 A. I said, "I'll go and support Rocky" -- sorry, Richard. 3 Q. You can call him Rocky, it's fine. 4 A. I said there's a lot going on, the fire's extended, and 5 he said that's fine. I said we'll put fire and 6 search -- we talked about putting fire and search 7 together because it was quite complex. 8 Q. So you actually suggested your role to DAC O'Loughlin 9 rather than him telling you what he wanted you to do? 10 A. No, it was a discussion. He talked about roles that 11 were available, and I was quite keen to try and assist 12 and say, "Look, I'm more than happy to go and help with 13 that." 14 Q. Did you, in this discussion with DAC O'Loughlin, discuss 15 the nature of the fire spread? 16 A. No. 17 Q. Did he brief you or did he brief anybody about the fire 18 being on the outside of the building only? 19 A. So I overheard some of his brief to Dave O'Neill talking 20 about fire spread and talking about safety outside, but 21 like most commanders, you don't interfere in a briefing 22 because he's delivering important information to 23 Dave O'Neill. 24 Q. Did you know which floors BA wearers were being 25 committed to at that point?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 94</p>	<p>1 page 2 you recall passing a pump and the Paddington 2 turntable ladder and a group of firefighters under the 3 Westway waiting to go in. 4 Just to be clear, when you say Westway, do you mean 5 the Westway there? 6 A. Well, it was the -- yeah, elevated section of the 7 roadway above. 8 Q. Which side of the building was that in relation to the 9 entrance? 10 A. So the main entrance, the way the Westway kind of faced 11 it, and the firefighters were underneath there waiting 12 to go in, waiting to be called in. 13 Q. Most people call the elevated section the walkway. The 14 Westway is actually the A40. 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Just so we're getting the terminology. 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. All right. 19 Do you remember how long that was, when you got to 20 the tower, after arriving first at the command unit? 21 A. Andy briefed Dave first. That would've probably took 22 a minute or so. He briefed me afterwards and then 23 I made my way from the command unit. So I would be 2 or 24 3 minutes, maybe a little longer, but I would have 25 thought it would be under 5 minutes.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 96</p>

<p>1 Q. I should've asked you before I asked that question how 2 long your briefing with DAC O'Loughlin took, but I think 3 you say 2 or 3 minutes?</p> <p>4 A. Yeah. There was so much going on, it wasn't long 5 briefings, it was to the point, salient points, and try 6 and get in to get to work.</p> <p>7 Q. Can you give us an impression, at the time you arrived 8 at the entrance to the tower, how many firefighters were 9 waiting outside the tower? We know there was a group 10 waiting outside the tower at that stage. How big was 11 that, would you say?</p> <p>12 A. Really hard to estimate. 20 or 30. A fair amount of BA 13 wearers were waiting to go in.</p> <p>14 Q. Could you see how the BA wearers were being marshalled 15 at that stage?</p> <p>16 A. Yeah, there was a watch manager there. Watch manager 17 had comms, and it seemed there was a system that when -- 18 it was almost being used as like a staging area. So 19 when the bridgehead or whoever was upstairs, I didn't 20 really know at that time, wanted crews, it seems like 21 they would radio down a number and then they would spot 22 them and walk in.</p> <p>23 Q. Did you know that a station manager had been tasked to 24 oversee that group of firefighters as part of a BA main 25 control exercise?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 97</p>	<p>1 Q. How many could you see, do you think?</p> <p>2 A. I definitely saw a crew, and generally those riding fire 3 and rescue units would go together, so it was either 4 a crew of four or five.</p> <p>5 Q. Were they in the queue with everyone else or was there 6 a separate queue for EDBA?</p> <p>7 A. No, they were in the queue with everybody else. Because 8 access was difficult, the access was controlled by the 9 watch manager, because you had to be spotted to get in, 10 or else something may have fell on your head.</p> <p>11 Q. We'll come to look at this in a bit more detail in 12 a moment.</p> <p>13 Taking you to your statement, page 3, fourth line 14 down, you say:</p> <p>15 "The lobby itself was pretty quiet, there were 16 firefighters and kit there. I continued walking up and 17 as I did so people were walking down, their eyes 18 streaming, fully blackened faces, screaming, crying."</p> <p>19 You then go on to say, a few lines down:</p> <p>20 "In this instance the bridgehead was situated on the 21 3rd floor."</p> <p>22 Again, just trying to get a precise time on this --</p> <p>23 I think we can -- can I ask you to be shown INQ00000322.</p> <p>24 This is a photograph taken from camera 4 of 25 Grenfell Tower's CCTV. There were a number of cameras</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 99</p>
<p>1 A. Not at that point, no.</p> <p>2 Q. Did you come to know that, later?</p> <p>3 A. Yes.</p> <p>4 Q. When was that? When did you think you came to know 5 that, roughly?</p> <p>6 A. I really wouldn't want to guess. So I knew we had that 7 system in place, and certainly when the bridgehead was 8 relocated to the ground floor we had a process that was 9 supported by Nick Myatt, where I asked Nick Myatt to get 10 me a number of EDBA wearers ready, a number of SDBAs 11 ready. We'd split them so we could give them briefings. 12 I always wanted a pool of 20 EDBA and 15 SDBA ready, and 13 he must not let that deplish[sic]. So as we were 14 moving and using BA crews, he was working I think with 15 Andy Walton to ensure that the people outside in the 16 staging area then supplemented the people in the holding 17 area downstairs on the ground floor. But that was 18 later, after relocating.</p> <p>19 Q. At the point when you entered the tower, could you gain 20 an impression of how many EDBA wearers there were 21 available there?</p> <p>22 A. No. There were EDBA but I couldn't tell you how many at 23 that point.</p> <p>24 Q. Could you see them?</p> <p>25 A. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 98</p>	<p>1 on the ground floor. We'll be looking at some of these 2 pictures in the course of your evidence. This is the 3 first one and this is camera 4 with an adjusted time 4 mark of 02.28.12.</p> <p>5 Can you identify yourself in that picture?</p> <p>6 A. Yes, I'm standing in the doorway.</p> <p>7 Q. If we pan back out again, you will see that on the right 8 in the photograph, but on the left as you come in -- 9 group manager's left, if you see what I mean -- there 10 are two firefighters doing something on the wall. Did 11 you notice what they were doing when you came in?</p> <p>12 A. No.</p> <p>13 Q. Did you notice anybody there at all?</p> <p>14 A. No.</p> <p>15 Q. It didn't go on your radar?</p> <p>16 A. No.</p> <p>17 Q. The next picture is INQ00000323, if we could just 18 quickly look at that. This is camera 2, which is at the 19 foot of the stairs, behind the glass partition, with 20 an adjusted time mark of 02.28.20, so this is 8 seconds 21 after you first entered the tower. We see you going 22 upstairs.</p> <p>23 Where were you going? Where were you headed?</p> <p>24 A. To the bridgehead to meet Richard Welch.</p> <p>25 Q. On page 3, going back to your statement, in the first</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 100</p>

<p>1 main paragraph on that page, which starts "The lobby 2 covers the ground floor", you say -- I can probably take 3 this quickly: 4 "As you enter that door the FSG was set up to the 5 left." 6 Then you go on to describe the rest of the lobby. 7 When you say in your statement "the FSG was set up 8 to the left", going back to my question, is that 9 something you learnt later, after you did this 10 statement, or is it something you actually recall from 11 the night -- 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Have you spotted the passage, 13 Mr Goulbourne? 14 A. No, sorry. 15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That makes two of us then. 16 MR MILLETT: I'm so sorry, I'm going a bit too -- 17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I was just wondering whether we were 18 on the right page. 19 MR MILLETT: It's my fault, I've given the wrong reference. 20 It's page 4, I'm so sorry, not page 3. Mr Chairman, 21 thank you. 22 That paragraph starts: 23 "The lobby covers the ground floor and is set up as 24 follows:- there is a door leading into the block that 25 faces towards the Westway. As you enter that door the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 101</p>	<p>1 found it on the 3rd floor. 2 Q. Who was in charge of the bridgehead when you arrived 3 there? 4 A. Richard Welch. 5 Q. Anybody else? 6 A. Nick Myatt was there. Gareth Cook was there. But I was 7 unsure what their roles were, but they were performing 8 some roles on behalf of Richard Welch. I remember 9 seeing Louisa De Silvo and Brien O'Keeffe, and they were 10 around the BA board. There was a comms operator. 11 Q. Who was that? 12 A. Michael -- name's gone, sorry. Yeah, that's who 13 I remember on the bridgehead at that time. 14 I mean, the bridgehead was unbelievably busy and 15 there was lots and lots of firefighters, and lots and 16 lots -- I used to be on the Red Watch, so I know lots of 17 those firefighters, so I saw lots of faces I knew, but 18 there were lots of people there, some in BA, some not, 19 people passing kit and equipment, et cetera. 20 Q. As a matter of general impression, did you get a sense 21 that there was order or was it chaotic? 22 A. I mean, it was order in terms of Richard Welch was 23 desperately trying to deploy crews, but there was so 24 much to do. 25 The geography of the building weren't great for</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 103</p>
<p>1 FSG was set up to the left." 2 My question is: is that something you remember from 3 the night independently or is that something you learnt 4 after you did your statement? 5 A. So I remember that, but that was later on in the 6 evening. So when I first went to the bridgehead, FSGs 7 were being handled upstairs. Later on that evening, 8 when we relocated the bridgehead, where those 9 firefighters were in that picture, that's where the FSGs 10 were being taken. 11 Q. I follow. 12 To go back to what you said before, when you first 13 went into the tower, you didn't notice them there? 14 A. No. 15 Q. That's clarified that. 16 Coming back to page 3 -- and this time I mean 17 page 3 -- the second paragraph goes on to say, just 18 three lines up from the end of it: 19 "In this instance the bridgehead was situated on the 20 3rd floor." 21 Do you remember how you knew that the bridgehead was 22 on the 3rd floor? 23 A. Yes, Andy O'Loughlin, when I got my brief, told me the 24 bridgehead was on the 3rd floor, and then I made my way 25 into the tower and went straight to the bridgehead and</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 102</p>	<p>1 a bridgehead, but that's what we had to work with, so 2 when I got there, it was very, very busy. Imagine BA 3 crews coming in, BA crews coming out, information coming 4 in, casualties coming in various states past the 5 bridgehead. It was a difficult scene, but Richard was 6 really clear that he was definitely trying to pump BA 7 crews upstairs and there were FSG calls being taken, 8 crews being deployed. 9 Q. Just breaking that down, then. 10 First of all, did you see how individual BA crews 11 were being given their deployment instructions? 12 A. No, Richard Welch was briefing and the crews were going. 13 Q. We've had quite a bit of evidence before today that 14 there was a system at that stage whereby, to summarise 15 it, FSG information was coming into the lobby, recorded 16 on the wall after 02.15, and then a watch manager, Watch 17 Manager Watson, was essentially writing them down and 18 then giving written instructions on chits of paper to 19 individual BA crews. 20 Did you see that in operation yourself at that time? 21 A. Not at that time, but that process was done later on 22 when we relocated the bridgehead. So when the 23 bridgehead was relocated downstairs, we split certain 24 areas into individual tasks. 25 Q. We'll come to that.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 104</p>

<p>1 When you first arrived at the bridgehead on the 2 3rd floor, did you see the process by which 3 Richard Welch was giving deployment instructions to BA 4 wearers? 5 A. No, Richard -- I'm pretty sure he said FSGs were coming 6 in and they were being taken, I think, by Louisa 7 De Silvo, but I may be wrong. There was someone around 8 the BA board taking FSG calls and Richard Welch was 9 deploying crews. 10 Q. When you say taking FSG calls, you mean actually 11 receiving them from outside the tower or somewhere else 12 in the tower? 13 A. Because I'd just got to the bridgehead, I really won't 14 know where they were coming from, but at the bridgehead 15 they were receiving information and deploying crews. 16 Q. Did you see how the information was arriving? 17 A. No. 18 Q. Did you notice whether it was on a piece of paper or by 19 radio? 20 A. No, sorry. 21 Q. Do you recall seeing anybody recording FSG information 22 at the bridgehead when it was on the 3rd floor when you 23 first arrived there? 24 A. I think at an early stage I saw a FIB board in use, but 25 whether the FIB board was any good because of the volume</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 105</p>	<p>1 information which had been inscribed on the wall by 2 Louisa De Silvo. 3 Do you remember seeing that? 4 A. No, but I remember a discussion around ensuring that the 5 information of FSGs was transferred when we relocated 6 the bridgehead. 7 Q. How much time did you actually spend at the bridgehead 8 when it was on the 3rd floor? 9 A. I'm sorry, I'd probably only roughly estimate, but 10 I would've thought it was probably 30 minutes, 35, 11 40 minutes max. 12 Q. During that time -- is this right? -- you never noticed 13 any officer inscribing fire survival guidance on the 14 wall? 15 A. Well, in the time of getting to Richard, I got my brief 16 around how we were going to operate together, and it 17 was -- I think there were a couple of things that we 18 needed in terms of organising some firefighting jets, 19 et cetera, which I resolved on his behalf. 20 I remember it was quite early we had a conversation 21 that the bridgehead was compromised, and we should move 22 it down, and the conversation then was about ensuring 23 that all of the information required was moved down to 24 the bridgehead. And I remember we had a conversation 25 around there were still BA crews being deployed and we</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 107</p>
<p>1 of information, I don't know. At that point, because 2 I'd come on as a second commander, I was focusing on 3 meeting with Richard through the crowd to get a brief 4 and then we could start to split and understand what 5 each other's task would be. 6 Q. The FIB board, can you give us an impression of what you 7 saw, to the best of your memory, on the FIB board? 8 A. No, because at that point I'd just been introduced to 9 the incident. I didn't have a command role, so 10 I wouldn't have interfered because I would've been 11 interfering in something that was ongoing. My primary 12 focus was to get a brief off of Richard, and once 13 I received that brief, then I would've been clear on 14 what my role was going to be going forward. 15 Q. Did you notice any fire survival guidance calls being 16 recorded on the wall at the bridgehead while it was on 17 the 3rd floor? 18 A. I don't recollect information going on a wall, no. 19 Q. Let's see if I can prompt a recollection. 20 Could I ask you to go to MET00015596. 21 This is one of a number of photographs which are all 22 quite similar. 23 This was taken at around about 03.08 as the 24 bridgehead moved down from the 3rd floor to the ground 25 floor. We've had evidence before that it's FSG</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 106</p>	<p>1 both didn't want to leave BA crews upstairs on their own 2 knowing that they were coming down in quite difficult 3 states, the BA crews, with casualties, and suddenly they 4 come back to an empty bridgehead. So we were having 5 a conversation about who was going to stay. 6 One of us had to relocate the bridgehead down. 7 I remember -- I'm pretty sure it was Rocky went 8 downstairs and ensured that crews were being deployed, 9 and I stayed with Gareth Cook for a short time because, 10 as we were relocating the bridgehead, an FSG call came 11 through for a flat on the 3rd floor, so we decided to 12 break the door down and search that flat and then wait 13 for the firefighters to come down. So I remember 14 shouting to the firefighters to come back because we're 15 relocating the bridgehead. 16 Q. You said in the answer before that you were at the 17 bridgehead while it was on the 3rd floor for probably 18 30 minutes, 35, 40 minutes max. 19 Were you there continuously during that period or 20 did you come and go? 21 A. No, I think I propped downstairs for something. I can't 22 remember what it was. Whether I assisted a casualty -- 23 I did something. So I wasn't continuously at the 24 bridgehead. 25 Q. Where were you standing for most of the time in relation</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 108</p>

27 (Pages 105 to 108)

<p>1 to the entry control boards when the bridgehead was on</p> <p>2 the 3rd floor, do you remember?</p> <p>3 A. So at the onset I was nearer to the stairwell. The</p> <p>4 entry control was further in where Richard was and there</p> <p>5 were quite a number of BA crews in there. I allowed for</p> <p>6 some activity before I kind of forced my way through to</p> <p>7 Richard.</p> <p>8 Q. So could you actually see the entry control boards being</p> <p>9 used?</p> <p>10 A. Yes.</p> <p>11 Q. You could see the information going on them?</p> <p>12 A. Yes, and I certainly overheard talks of FSG. That</p> <p>13 information was definitely there because it's there, but</p> <p>14 I really can't recall physically seeing it myself.</p> <p>15 Q. Going back to your statement, at page 3 of your</p> <p>16 statement, about a quarter of the way down the page, the</p> <p>17 paragraph starts "In the bridgehead is the BA board".</p> <p>18 Can you see that?</p> <p>19 "This shows which crews are deployed with breathing</p> <p>20 equipment, where they are, how long they have been</p> <p>21 deployed and so on. I could see from the board that we</p> <p>22 had BA crews committed to the third and fourth floors."</p> <p>23 The BA board is the entry control board, is it?</p> <p>24 A. Yes.</p> <p>25 Q. And you say:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 109</p>	<p>1 probably in people's statements. Certainly there was</p> <p>2 a flat on the 16th floor and a flat on the 18th floor</p> <p>3 that I was desperate to get to because the information</p> <p>4 we got from the FSGs were that there were a number of</p> <p>5 residents that had gone into one flat, and we knew they</p> <p>6 were a priority.</p> <p>7 Q. We'll come to that.</p> <p>8 Just focusing for the moment, though, on what detail</p> <p>9 was being recorded on the entry control officer boards</p> <p>10 while it was on the 3rd floor, can I just press that</p> <p>11 again.</p> <p>12 Was there any detail of numbers of people in the</p> <p>13 flats and particular flat numbers or was it just floors?</p> <p>14 A. I mean, my look of the BA board was really cursory.</p> <p>15 Just a quick glance, are crews committed, a few bits of</p> <p>16 pertinent information and then I was off briefing and</p> <p>17 doing other jobs.</p> <p>18 Q. Did you gain any impression during the 30 to 40 minutes</p> <p>19 you said you were at the bridgehead while it was on the</p> <p>20 3rd floor about numbers of EDBA wearers being committed?</p> <p>21 A. No.</p> <p>22 Q. You can't help us with whether there was an increasing</p> <p>23 number of EDBA wearers at that stage, or whether there</p> <p>24 were none or lots? Can you help us with that?</p> <p>25 A. No, I don't recall at that point the EDBA wearers on the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 111</p>
<p>1 "I could see from the board that we had BA crews</p> <p>2 committed to the third and fourth floors."</p> <p>3 Does the entry control board identify which floors</p> <p>4 crews are committed to?</p> <p>5 A. So the entry control officer, once the BA crew get their</p> <p>6 brief, will annotate the board, not only – used to be</p> <p>7 about the time of whistle, et cetera, how much air</p> <p>8 they've got, but also where they're going.</p> <p>9 Q. How much detail did you observe on the entry control</p> <p>10 boards per crew?</p> <p>11 A. Just general, that I can remember. Just floor they were</p> <p>12 going to. I certainly saw initials about right-hand</p> <p>13 search, left-hand search, but it would be written in</p> <p>14 kind of an acronym. And comms channel, comms.</p> <p>15 Q. Did you see any details about particular flat numbers</p> <p>16 being recorded on the entry control board?</p> <p>17 A. I can't remember, but I do remember the conversations in</p> <p>18 the briefings that people were talking about FSGs on</p> <p>19 floors.</p> <p>20 Q. Did you remember seeing any details about numbers of</p> <p>21 persons trapped in each flat, or any flat?</p> <p>22 A. Not at that point, but certainly when we relocated the</p> <p>23 bridgehead downstairs, there was really clear</p> <p>24 information coming on what flats and what floors they</p> <p>25 were on. There was a number of flats – I think it's</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 110</p>	<p>1 board.</p> <p>2 Q. In your statement you go on to say -- this is</p> <p>3 immediately after what I've just shown you, a third of</p> <p>4 the way down page 3, just to get back there:</p> <p>5 "I spoke to Rocky who had been to see what was going</p> <p>6 on. His eyes were streaming from the smoke."</p> <p>7 Just pausing there, was there smoke at the</p> <p>8 bridgehead, or was that smoke somewhere else in the</p> <p>9 building?</p> <p>10 A. So when we relocated the bridgehead, that was because</p> <p>11 the bridgehead was compromised because of smoke.</p> <p>12 Whether his eyes were streaming, I really don't know.</p> <p>13 Q. Eyes streaming from smoke. He had been to see what was</p> <p>14 going on. Do you know how far he got up the building?</p> <p>15 A. No, but I know Richard a while and as a good officer,</p> <p>16 you always want to try and have a look to see exactly</p> <p>17 what it is you are committing your crews to, so</p> <p>18 I would've thought he would've took a cursory look.</p> <p>19 Q. Did he tell you how far he had got?</p> <p>20 A. No.</p> <p>21 Q. Did he give you an impression of what sort of conditions</p> <p>22 he had seen on his visit up the tower?</p> <p>23 A. Yes.</p> <p>24 Q. What?</p> <p>25 A. Terrible.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 112</p>

<p>1 Q. Terrible in what sense?</p> <p>2 A. It was difficult, he said -- I remember him talking</p> <p>3 about the smoke condition is pretty heavy and the</p> <p>4 conditions are pretty poor.</p> <p>5 Q. You go on to say:</p> <p>6 "He told me that there were what we call snatch</p> <p>7 rescues taking place on some of the upper floors with</p> <p>8 crews making their way down with people. Some had got</p> <p>9 up as far as the 20th floor but were unable to connect</p> <p>10 hoses to the outlet risers due to the fire."</p> <p>11 Was any of that information apparent from the BA</p> <p>12 boards?</p> <p>13 A. Not that I can recall. That's not saying it wasn't</p> <p>14 there. Like I say, my look at the BA board was quite</p> <p>15 cursory at that time.</p> <p>16 Q. When you say "snatch rescues", are you referring to</p> <p>17 rescues carried out when firefighters are deployed to</p> <p>18 respond to particular fire survival guidance calls or</p> <p>19 something else?</p> <p>20 A. At the early parts of incidents, firefighters, sometimes</p> <p>21 in BA or without BA, can be deployed just to push to see</p> <p>22 how far they can get to make as much effect they can get</p> <p>23 in the quickest time possible, and sometimes they're</p> <p>24 what we call snatch rescues. Generally, policy is that</p> <p>25 we should have a bridgehead two floors below the fire</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 113</p>	<p>1 fire?</p> <p>2 A. No. At that point, Richard had got some crews</p> <p>3 committed. We were talking about what the conditions</p> <p>4 were and how difficult they were. He also mentioned</p> <p>5 about the difficulty -- we've got multiple FSGs. What</p> <p>6 it seemed like was that when -- the fire was so severe</p> <p>7 that when the crews had to -- I probably need to put</p> <p>8 some context behind it.</p> <p>9 So the geography of the building was really</p> <p>10 difficult, because favourably as a firefighter you'd</p> <p>11 want a dry riser outlet somewhere near the stairwell,</p> <p>12 somewhere in a protected lobby. That would make your</p> <p>13 life far easier. Unfortunately, the dry riser outlet</p> <p>14 was in the lobby at the furthest point away from the</p> <p>15 door. That meant that any lobby that was compromised by</p> <p>16 fire meant we couldn't set in unless you put that fire</p> <p>17 out, and then that's time-consuming.</p> <p>18 So I remember a conversation about the crews had to</p> <p>19 find a floor where they could get to the riser, then to</p> <p>20 set in, which means you have to run the hose up the</p> <p>21 stairs, and then once you went into a compartment, you</p> <p>22 are then going into a compartment that's involved. But</p> <p>23 unfortunately those elements of combustion that have</p> <p>24 breached the fire separation are going to end up in the</p> <p>25 stairwell, and that seems to be what happened.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 115</p>
<p>1 and deploy BA crews. Sometimes in urgencies, crews do</p> <p>2 try and do snatch rescues.</p> <p>3 Q. When you say:</p> <p>4 "Some had got up as far as the 20th floor but were</p> <p>5 unable to connect hoses to the outlet risers due to the</p> <p>6 fire."</p> <p>7 A number of things.</p> <p>8 First of all, is that something that Richard Welch</p> <p>9 told you? That's your recalling his telling you that,</p> <p>10 is it?</p> <p>11 A. I really can't recollect. We must have talked about</p> <p>12 where we can set into a riser.</p> <p>13 Q. Do you remember being told anything about whether BA</p> <p>14 wearers going to the 20th floor was a single occasion or</p> <p>15 on repeated occasions?</p> <p>16 A. No. We talked about what crews were committed, and at</p> <p>17 that point some crews had already done those snatch</p> <p>18 rescues, people had been brought down from my</p> <p>19 understanding, and now the fire had -- that was</p> <p>20 obviously a little bit earlier, and now where the fire</p> <p>21 had taken hold, you know, crews were now going into</p> <p>22 compartments on what I thought was the 4th and</p> <p>23 5th floor.</p> <p>24 Q. At that stage, was it still the idea that BA crews would</p> <p>25 be committed to the 20th floor in order to fight the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 114</p>	<p>1 Where you had such a severe fire, when BA crews --</p> <p>2 the first -- or I can't say the first, but those BA</p> <p>3 crews at that point, had gone in, it seemed that the</p> <p>4 smoke had gone into the stairwell and the bridgehead on</p> <p>5 the 3rd floor got compromised.</p> <p>6 Q. Just continuing on the theme of the bridgehead on the</p> <p>7 3rd floor being compromised, as you've just mentioned,</p> <p>8 when you first arrived at the 3rd-floor bridgehead, was</p> <p>9 the air clear there or was it smoky?</p> <p>10 A. It wasn't clear, but it was enough for us to do work,</p> <p>11 you know. It was at a point where we would just work</p> <p>12 through it.</p> <p>13 Q. Before you moved down, what were the conditions like at</p> <p>14 that stage?</p> <p>15 A. They just worsened pretty quickly.</p> <p>16 Q. Where was the smoke coming from that made it worsen on</p> <p>17 the 3rd floor, do you remember?</p> <p>18 A. Well, I know BA crews were committed, so generally you</p> <p>19 would think it was where we had to commit a crew into</p> <p>20 some upper floors where fire was in that lobby and then</p> <p>21 it would've made itself into the stairwell and probably</p> <p>22 pushed its way down, but I couldn't confirm that. But</p> <p>23 crews were committed and the bridgehead was compromised,</p> <p>24 so we had no choice but to move it.</p> <p>25 Q. So this was smoke coming onto the 3rd floor, into the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 116</p>

<p>1 lobby, from, what, downwards through the stairwell, is</p> <p>2 that what you're saying?</p> <p>3 A. Yes.</p> <p>4 Q. Had you ever come across that before, that phenomenon?</p> <p>5 A. Yes. Not so long ago I went to what was a 12-pump fire</p> <p>6 at Dorrington Point, Bow. Much the same. Bridgehead</p> <p>7 got compromised. Bridgehead was on the 5th. It's</p> <p>8 unusual, but it does occur, and there are occasions</p> <p>9 where we have to move bridgeheads. It's not ideal,</p> <p>10 preferably we get a bridgehead set and we're able to do</p> <p>11 firefighting and search and rescue operations, but every</p> <p>12 now and again, geographies of buildings, the way fire</p> <p>13 spreads, we have to move bridgeheads. Unfortunately</p> <p>14 this night we had to.</p> <p>15 Q. Do you remember whether there were firefighters being</p> <p>16 sent up without any firefighting media at all?</p> <p>17 A. During the time I was at the 3rd floor?</p> <p>18 Q. Yes.</p> <p>19 A. No, but I know at certain points during the evening</p> <p>20 I sent firefighters up without firefighting media.</p> <p>21 Q. Later on in your statement, and this was when the</p> <p>22 bridgehead was on the ground floor, you say -- it's</p> <p>23 page 5 of your statement, if I can just show you the</p> <p>24 fourth paragraph there, page 5, you say that:</p> <p>25 "We were still using the outlet risers on floors 3</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 117</p>	<p>1 source. So that was kind of one plan.</p> <p>2 Another plan was to also go around and just</p> <p>3 double-check -- I had this conversation with Richard,</p> <p>4 just really concerned that we'd covered all bases.</p> <p>5 Was there a bit of fixed installation we could use?</p> <p>6 Was there another secret stairwell around the building?</p> <p>7 Was there a void we could use? So we tasked someone to</p> <p>8 pretty much go around every single cupboard, every</p> <p>9 single door. We didn't want to be at this job in two</p> <p>10 hours and someone went, "Tada! Look what you've</p> <p>11 missed!" So we pretty much tried everything.</p> <p>12 Q. Going back to my point about water though, does the fact</p> <p>13 that you were using extensions up to floor 7 and 8 mean</p> <p>14 that you weren't getting water above those floors?</p> <p>15 A. Internally, no.</p> <p>16 Q. There's a reference later on in your statement to</p> <p>17 getting hoses attached to risers on the 9th floor. Was</p> <p>18 that later in the incident?</p> <p>19 A. Yes.</p> <p>20 Q. How much later in the incident?</p> <p>21 A. So that was purely dependent on firefighting and</p> <p>22 knocking down those floors to enable us to get to that</p> <p>23 riser which was in the lobby. So it was, you know,</p> <p>24 an unbelievable amount of work and, you know, the</p> <p>25 firefighters did some incredible work just to get us to</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 119</p>
<p>1 and 4 so we used extension hoses to allow the fire to be</p> <p>2 fought higher up. This allowed the hoses up as far as</p> <p>3 floor 7/8. This mean[t] that everything was protected</p> <p>4 up to the 6th floor but I wanted to get another extended</p> <p>5 jet ..."</p> <p>6 You go on to say you couldn't achieve that.</p> <p>7 What sort of time was that, that you were still</p> <p>8 using outlet risers on the 3rd and 4th floor and then</p> <p>9 extension hoses? That was clearly once you got down to</p> <p>10 the ground floor, but how long after that, do you</p> <p>11 remember?</p> <p>12 A. No, sorry, I really couldn't guess. I know it was</p> <p>13 an issue that we tried to resolve a number of ways.</p> <p>14 That's when we were down on the ground floor, I asked</p> <p>15 a number of people to carry out specific tasks for me to</p> <p>16 resolve it. So one of the ways was I remember tasking</p> <p>17 Gareth Cook to go around the building to see if we could</p> <p>18 get a turntable ladder up. So a turntable ladder not</p> <p>19 only can act as a rescue platform but has got a fixed</p> <p>20 line which can act as another dry riser.</p> <p>21 So what I asked was Gareth to see if we could get a</p> <p>22 TL up. We could get the TL up to around the 8th, smash</p> <p>23 it through a window. That would also be another means</p> <p>24 of escape, and we could get jets off the TL. So if we</p> <p>25 could do that, that means we can get an additional water</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 118</p>	<p>1 be able to use those risers.</p> <p>2 MR MILLETT: I am looking at the time. I'm going to come</p> <p>3 now to look specifically at your role while the</p> <p>4 bridgehead was on the 3rd floor.</p> <p>5 Mr Chairman, that might be a convenient moment for</p> <p>6 a break.</p> <p>7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It sounds as though it would, yes.</p> <p>8 Mr Goulbourne, we're going to have a break now so we</p> <p>9 can all get some lunch.</p> <p>10 Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence</p> <p>11 while you're out of the room.</p> <p>12 We'll resume at 2 o'clock, please.</p> <p>13 THE WITNESS: Thank you.</p> <p>14 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you would like to go with the</p> <p>15 usher, she'll show you out.</p> <p>16 How are you getting on, Mr Millett?</p> <p>17 MR MILLETT: We'll finish well within the afternoon, or</p> <p>18 within the afternoon anyway.</p> <p>19 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good.</p> <p>20 2 o'clock, then, please.</p> <p>21 (1.00 pm)</p> <p>22 (The short adjournment)</p> <p>23 (2.00 pm)</p> <p>24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Ready to carry on, Mr Goulbourne?</p> <p>25 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, thank you.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 120</p>

<p>1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.</p> <p>2 Yes, Mr Millett.</p> <p>3 MR MILLETT: Thank you for coming back to us.</p> <p>4 Can I just pick up on one or two aspects of the</p> <p>5 evidence that you gave before the break.</p> <p>6 The first relates to the difficulties that you said</p> <p>7 were presented by the geography of the building relating</p> <p>8 to the position of the fire hydrants, the --</p> <p>9 A. Dry riser.</p> <p>10 Q. The dry riser outlets. I use the word "hydrants"</p> <p>11 because it's a word you use.</p> <p>12 If I could ask you to look at your second statement</p> <p>13 please. You don't use it here, but elsewhere. If you</p> <p>14 look at the first paragraph of that statement, you say</p> <p>15 that:</p> <p>16 "... whilst I was posted to North Kensington back in</p> <p>17 1997 I recall attending Grenfell Tower for various</p> <p>18 reasons. We would attend the usual types of calls there</p> <p>19 such as smell of burning in the lifts, rubbish chutes</p> <p>20 alight that type of thing. I also recall carrying out</p> <p>21 dry riser there visits [sic] as well."</p> <p>22 My question is: in those early years when you</p> <p>23 visited the tower, do you remember noticing the location</p> <p>24 of the dry riser outlets and recording them or noting</p> <p>25 them as in the wrong place or in an inconvenient place?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 121</p>	<p>1 A. I don't know what they did before. I'm pretty sure they</p> <p>2 would've done 360s, they would've sent people round.</p> <p>3 But during my period, when I had a command role, I asked</p> <p>4 for it to be done again, just -- we had such a difficult</p> <p>5 job. I just needed to see what was available to us and</p> <p>6 that -- I just wanted to check we hadn't missed</p> <p>7 anything, but we hadn't.</p> <p>8 Q. Taking this a little bit more slowly, can I ask you to</p> <p>9 look at high-rise policy 633, which was in force</p> <p>10 in June 2017.</p> <p>11 Turn, please, to clause 6.3. This is in tab 4 of</p> <p>12 our policies bundle.</p> <p>13 You'll find paragraph 6.3 at the bottom of page 8,</p> <p>14 and I want to direct your attention to paragraph (f) on</p> <p>15 page 9.</p> <p>16 It begins on page 8 by saying, "On arrival", and it</p> <p>17 says what the incident commander should do under 6.3</p> <p>18 "To establish effective command and control, the IC</p> <p>19 should ..."</p> <p>20 Then over the page at (f), just carrying it through,</p> <p>21 you can see that it says:</p> <p>22 "(f) Establish the location and status of any fire</p> <p>23 control, fire engineering and/or fixed installation</p> <p>24 systems."</p> <p>25 My question is: when you arrived at the incident,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 123</p>
<p>1 A. Noting them, yes, because we used to do fire safety</p> <p>2 inspections called G visits, and part of those G visits</p> <p>3 were inspecting dry risers. So we would've gone to the</p> <p>4 inlet on the ground floor, tested each outlet on each</p> <p>5 floor, so I would've noted where they were, but we</p> <p>6 wouldn't have noted whether they were in the wrong</p> <p>7 place. That would've been the officer in charge if he</p> <p>8 felt something was defective. If there was an issue</p> <p>9 with the riser then the officer in charge -- back then</p> <p>10 I was a firefighter -- obviously back then would have</p> <p>11 the ability to report a defect.</p> <p>12 Q. Right.</p> <p>13 A. I don't recall any defects being reported.</p> <p>14 Q. On the night, which was of course 20 years later, and</p> <p>15 this may be a bit of a stretch, but did you have any</p> <p>16 recollection of a problem that you yourself personally</p> <p>17 had experienced in your early days with the dry riser</p> <p>18 outlets at Grenfell?</p> <p>19 A. No.</p> <p>20 Q. Another thing you told us before the break was about the</p> <p>21 need to do a thorough search of the building to make</p> <p>22 sure you hadn't missed anything in terms of chutes,</p> <p>23 ducts, exit routes.</p> <p>24 At what point, first, was the decision made to have</p> <p>25 a thorough examination of that kind, do you remember?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 122</p>	<p>1 did you take any steps to find out, once you had been</p> <p>2 briefed by Andy O'Loughlin, what the incident commander</p> <p>3 or incident commanders before him had done by way of</p> <p>4 establishing these matters?</p> <p>5 A. Not between myself and Andy O'Loughlin, no.</p> <p>6 Q. Did you make any assumptions that this had been done or</p> <p>7 did you make no assumption?</p> <p>8 A. Yeah, expectation is an IC will check all the things</p> <p>9 that are available to them to use at their disposal.</p> <p>10 Q. When you decided to do it again, as you told us, who did</p> <p>11 you ask?</p> <p>12 A. So when it was -- so the reason why I asked was because</p> <p>13 of the issues with water. So because the fire was so</p> <p>14 extensive, generally we will take a firefighting jet</p> <p>15 from two different floors, so you've got two</p> <p>16 firefighting jets. One jet you use as a firefighting</p> <p>17 jet and one jet you use as a backup jet. Generally, for</p> <p>18 most compartment fires, that's more than adequate. This</p> <p>19 was beyond anything I think I would ever imagine, and</p> <p>20 two jets off the dry riser was going to be insufficient.</p> <p>21 We managed to get two more jets off the dry riser.</p> <p>22 But at that point with, you know, four big water jets</p> <p>23 off of one single dry riser, at some point, to get</p> <p>24 an adequate water supply for each jet, you're going to</p> <p>25 overrun the supply that you're getting.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 124</p>

<p>1 So what triggered us was I was trying to look for 2 more water, and if I could get the turntable ladder up, 3 that would give us another additional source of getting 4 water. So that was one of the big triggers for trying 5 to look for a different way. 6 Q. That was the trigger. My question was: who did you ask 7 to do that exercise? 8 A. Gareth Cook. Group Manager Gareth Cook was tasked to go 9 and see if he could get the aerial up to use it as a dry 10 riser. 11 Q. The task was given to him when you were on the 3rd floor 12 at the bridgehead; is that right? 13 A. No, no, at the ground floor we did that. 14 Q. So that was later. I see, okay. 15 Did you task him to look inside the building or to 16 do a 360 outside the building or both? 17 A. Gareth Cook went outside the building. At some point, 18 Nick Myatt did an internal search inside the building to 19 see if there were any other means we could use. 20 Q. Did they report back to you? 21 A. Yes, they did. 22 Q. At the moment when you asked for that to be done, you 23 said the trigger for that decision was water supply 24 problems. Does that mean -- correct me if I'm wrong -- 25 that part at least of the strategy at that stage was</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 125</p>	<p>1 a particular floor unless they had water with them? 2 A. Our general procedure is that we would always send some 3 firefighting media. We generally don't send crews with 4 no water above a fire to go and search for people. We 5 generally have to protect them with firefighting media 6 and protect their access and egress. You could be 7 sending them into a place where they'd never come back. 8 Q. So can you tell us -- this is a general question 9 throughout the night -- did the reach of water, the 10 ability to get water to the higher floors, dictate how 11 far you could send crews up the building? 12 A. No, because we went outside of policy and put fire crews 13 above floors without firefighting media. 14 Q. Without water. Right. 15 While we're still on 633, can I ask a related 16 question about it. Can I ask you to look at appendix 1. 17 It's page 19. 18 This is 7(2)(d), and I am not going to ask you about 19 7(2)(d) visits themselves, but I just want to ask you 20 about this shopping list here. 21 Can I take it you're familiar with this policy and 22 in particular this -- I call it a shopping list, but 23 perhaps that is a bit colloquial. These are the things 24 which should be inspected by personnel on such visits, 25 and I want to just pick out one in the middle of the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 127</p>
<p>1 still firefighting? 2 A. No, simultaneous action, so firefighting and search and 3 rescue. 4 Q. So the strategy at that stage still included 5 firefighting, did it? 6 A. Absolutely, because the way the fire was burning across 7 multiple floors, the only way to start to effectively 8 try and rescue casualties was to put firefighters above 9 fires, which is unusual for our normal tactics. We 10 wouldn't put firefighters above the fire. 11 So the only way I physically could think of a plan 12 to do that was using SDBA crews to protect access and 13 egress. So we put SDBA crews with firefighting jets to 14 protect the route in and out for crews going above the 15 fire to try and rescue. 16 Q. We may come back to this later, but I am interested in 17 that last answer. 18 Does that tell us that in fact you wouldn't be able 19 to send search and rescue crews to perform that role 20 unless they also had water? 21 A. Sorry, I don't understand the question. 22 Q. Let me put the question a different way. 23 Does that mean, from what you've told us, that you 24 would not be able to send a search and rescue crew to 25 respond to a particular FSG call to a particular flat on</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 126</p>	<p>1 list, which says: 2 "Floor layouts and any building construction 3 features which may promote rapid or abnormal fire 4 spread, such as sandwich panels, timber-framed 5 construction, atria or voids." 6 My question is: have you personally been involved in 7 delivering or receiving or quality assuring any training 8 relating to the risks which are posed by modern 9 refurbishment or construction materials? 10 A. We've done several training packages over my career. 11 Certainly one that sticks out was post the fatal fire 12 for Fleur Lombard. She unfortunately died when she was 13 fighting a fire because of sandwich panels. Sandwich 14 panels can deliver extensive, quick, rapid fire spread 15 hidden. 16 So, yes, I've done training, whether it's to -- 17 basically, yes, we've done some form of training during 18 my career. 19 Q. When was the fire in which Fleur Lombard perished? 20 A. I can't remember. It was some time ago, Fleur Lombard. 21 Q. Do you remember when these training packages were 22 delivered, even roughly? 23 A. No, but in our DAMOP there's a number of training 24 packages in terms of firefighting, building 25 construction, et cetera, that we do. I really -- unless</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 128</p>

<p>1 I looked at my training record, I can't remember the 2 dates. I've certainly took part in them. 3 Q. Do you remember yourself having any thoughts about 4 whether the contents of that training package was any 5 use to the decisions you made on the night of the 6 Grenfell Tower fire? 7 A. I would say that all the training that I've had has 8 culminated in something that you can use operationally, 9 so yes. 10 Q. Can I go back to where I promised you I would start 11 after the break, which was your actual tasks on the 12 3rd floor. 13 When you got to the bridgehead when it was on the 14 3rd floor, did you have a conversation with Group 15 Manager Welch about what you should do? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Did he give you a briefing? 18 A. He gave me an overall view of the activity that was 19 going on on the bridgehead at that point. 20 Q. Can you briefly summarise that for us? 21 A. Yes. He said he's committed crews. They're finding 22 really difficult conditions. He's got multiple FSGs at 23 the time that he was dealing with. And I started to say 24 some of the things that I'd seen. We talked about how 25 I could assist.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 129</p>	<p>1 supporting tasks at that point. There were some urgent 2 pieces around passing information to get kit and 3 equipment brought upstairs. I can't remember exactly, 4 but I'm pretty sure we needed some more bits of 5 firefighting media, some more thermal imaging cameras 6 and get messages to crews, and we just talked a little 7 bit about how the structure was working. 8 So there was a period of time when I just supported 9 what they were doing on the 3rd floor and then got 10 a brief about how we were going to make this operation 11 work together. 12 Q. So would this be right, following from what you've said: 13 that for the first period or part of the time you were 14 at the 3rd-floor bridgehead, you were simply in 15 an assisting role, then there came a time when you were 16 given a specific role? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. What was that specific role? 19 A. By the time we got to discussing about what -- that 20 I was going to take over the search sector and what 21 floors that would be, that was when the bridgehead was 22 compromised and we moved the bridgehead down, and then 23 we delivered that on the ground floor, not on the 24 3rd floor. 25 Q. So would it follow from that that, actually, you weren't</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 131</p>
<p>1 Q. Did he ask you to do anything specifically? 2 A. No, he didn't ask me to do anything specifically. 3 Q. Did you have any particular role? 4 A. So I said I'd come and I'd take over the role as search 5 sector commander. 6 Q. In brief terms, what would that involve? 7 A. Well -- 8 Q. At that time, there. 9 A. There? 10 Q. Mm. 11 A. We were going to then have to decide what part of the 12 building that I could take some command and control for 13 and how we would split the building between us. 14 Q. Did you make that decision? 15 A. No, we never got to that decision because we relocated 16 the bridgehead. 17 Q. Right, but you relocated the bridgehead, I think, some 18 30 to 40 minutes later. So when you first arrived at 19 the 3rd-floor bridgehead, when it was at the 3rd 20 floor -- this is what I am focusing on -- what was your 21 specific role at that time? 22 A. So it took a while for me to get to Richard because 23 there was so much going on and I had to allow some of 24 that to play out. By the time we got to a brief, we had 25 a quick overview of the incident, and I did some</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 130</p>	<p>1 actually given a specific task to perform while the 2 bridgehead was on the 3rd floor for very long before it 3 moved? 4 A. No. 5 Q. How long before it moved do you think you were tasked 6 specifically? 7 A. I mean, by the time we relocated to the ground floor, 8 you know, we were halfway through the brief of what we 9 were going to do anyway. So by the time I got to the 10 ground floor, we were in a place where we had split the 11 work and decided to start to split the task of each 12 individual to ensure that the whole plan could come 13 together. 14 Q. All right. We'll come back to that in a moment. 15 Before we do, can I still ask you some 16 3rd floor-related questions. 17 Did Group Manager Welch, while you were on the 18 3rd floor, tell you that he had a strategy in place for 19 his operation? Did he explain the strategy to you? 20 A. He definitely explained his plan. 21 Q. Which was what? 22 A. So he -- 23 Q. At that stage. 24 A. At that stage it was literally taking FSG calls, getting 25 them processed and committing search and rescue and</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 132</p>

<p>1 firefighting. They were committing crews to do FSG 2 calls, and a number of crews, from my recollection, had 3 already been committed in addition to the firefighting 4 crew.</p> <p>5 But there was certainly conversations about what 6 those conditions were like, because there was concerns 7 about FSGs going and whether we had the water to be able 8 to protect them against the severity of the fire. So he 9 was doing an amazing job, a real balancing act, trying 10 to do the FSG calls whilst we were trying to extend the 11 firefighting jets that were off the 3rd and 4th floors 12 at that point.</p> <p>13 Q. In his statement to the inquiry -- and we'll explore 14 this with him, of course, when he comes to give 15 evidence -- he says, page 6 of his statement, that you 16 worked with his designated FSG team to brief the BA 17 crews on safety issues and also where they would be 18 going.</p> <p>19 Do you remember that being so?</p> <p>20 A. I remember a talk about FSGs but not the detail.</p> <p>21 Q. Do you remember working with his designated FSG team, as 22 he put it?</p> <p>23 A. Yes, I remember working with Louisa De Silvo, I remember 24 working with Brien O'Keeffe. They were, as you can 25 imagine, inundated with work and I just wanted to make</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 133</p>	<p>1 A. No.</p> <p>2 Q. You don't remember that?</p> <p>3 A. FSGs were being prioritised because that's where we knew 4 people were trapped, and they were deploying crews to 5 try and get those people.</p> <p>6 Q. Do you know whether there was any system in place for 7 deciding which ones to treat as more urgent, more 8 pressing, than others?</p> <p>9 A. Yeah. At that time, no.</p> <p>10 Q. Was there any discussion while the bridgehead was on the 11 3rd floor about the need to commit EDBA specifically?</p> <p>12 A. I knew they wanted to commit EDBA but I can't recall 13 a discussion about it.</p> <p>14 Q. Do you remember whether there was any discussion or any 15 system in place for deciding whether to send EDBA crews 16 or SDBA crews to particular floors?</p> <p>17 A. No, but I recall making those decisions when we reached 18 the ground floor.</p> <p>19 Q. We'll come back to that.</p> <p>20 Do you know whose role it was while the bridgehead 21 was on the 3rd floor to make sure that you had enough 22 EDBA resources available?</p> <p>23 A. In Richard's system, I know he was working with 24 Nick Myatt, and Nick Myatt was providing support for him 25 in terms of crews.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 135</p>
<p>1 sure and see how I could assist for a period of time.</p> <p>2 Q. What exactly did you do in that role, assisting Louisa 3 and Brien?</p> <p>4 A. So I asked about the process to get the clarity of 5 information for where they were getting the FSGs and how 6 they were recording. But if I can recall, I don't think 7 that was long, if it was more than a minute or so before 8 we had to relocate the bridgehead. So by the time I got 9 to that point, I don't remember spending much time there 10 before we went back down to the ground floor.</p> <p>11 Q. So your recollection is that's your work on FSGs didn't 12 occupy very long before you moved?</p> <p>13 A. No. No.</p> <p>14 Q. Did Group Manager Welch indicate to you whether there 15 was any kind of prioritisation of FSG calls?</p> <p>16 A. No, the FSG calls were the priority.</p> <p>17 Q. Yes, but among FSG calls, did you get any kind of 18 instruction or briefing from Group Manager Welch as to 19 how, between themselves, they were being prioritised?</p> <p>20 A. No, I'm not sure ...</p> <p>21 Q. Well, let me give you an example.</p> <p>22 Did you discover that anybody had had said, well, 23 these FSG calls must be prioritised on the basis of the 24 nature of the occupants: elderly, children, people with 25 mobility difficulties?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 134</p>	<p>1 Q. Did there ever come a time when the bridgehead was on 2 the 3rd floor that you ran out of EDBA wearers?</p> <p>3 A. Sorry, I don't recall that.</p> <p>4 Q. You told us before that you didn't see any FSG 5 information being written on the wall of the 3rd floor 6 and we looked at that photograph.</p> <p>7 Can I just show you something else to see if it 8 triggers a recollection, which is the forward 9 information board. It's MET00018749.</p> <p>10 This is a board. I'm not sure whether it's 11 necessarily a forward information board, but it's 12 a board with FSG information on it.</p> <p>13 Does this look familiar to you?</p> <p>14 A. Yes, it does.</p> <p>15 Q. Can you help me, what is it?</p> <p>16 A. That is a forward information board with FSGs on it.</p> <p>17 Q. Do you remember seeing this forward information board 18 with this information on it at any point in the night?</p> <p>19 A. I remember an FSG board with -- it must have been that 20 one, because I remember that was part of the 21 conversation about ensuring that the FSG information was 22 transferred from the 3rd floor back to the ground floor, 23 and a FIB board was taken down and the information 24 transferred onto the wall.</p> <p>25 So I would say yes, but because there was so much</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 136</p>

<p>1 information, I can't guarantee it was this exact board, 2 but by the looks of the information, then yes, looks 3 like it. 4 Q. Do you think -- sorry to interrupt you. 5 A. But just by looks of the information, then yes, it looks 6 like it was the board. 7 Q. Was that information board there on the 3rd floor when 8 you arrived at the bridgehead? 9 A. There was a forward information board in use on the 10 3rd floor. 11 Q. Was it this board? 12 A. I really couldn't confirm if it was this board or that 13 board. 14 Q. Just looking at the details on that, just casting your 15 eye down the list of flats and floors, is there any flat 16 or floor that stands out in your memory or prompts 17 a recollection of any particular FSG call? 18 A. No. 19 Q. Okay. 20 A. I remember we searched a flat, an FSG flat, on the 21 3rd floor. I can't remember if it was flat 9. It was 22 the last FSG that came in as we was moving the 23 bridgehead. 24 Q. While the bridgehead was on the 3rd floor, did you have 25 your main scheme radio with you?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 137</p>	<p>1 A. Yes, and towards the incident when we relocated to the 2 ground floor, where radio traffic was extensive and we 3 couldn't get through, we also used runners, and also the 4 ORT, the officer review team, which was GM Mick 5 Mulholland and GM Matt Cook. They were also relaying 6 messages to the command unit for us. 7 Q. Now, you say handheld; is that the fire ground radio? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. You were in communication with the CU. Just so that 10 I am clear, which command unit was it, was it 7 or 8? 11 Was it the FSG unit or the incident command unit? 12 A. I was speaking to the incident command. I don't recall 13 ever speaking to the FSG unit. 14 Q. Do we take it from that that you never yourself received 15 FSG information over the radio from a command unit? 16 A. No, and I generally wouldn't want to interfere in that 17 process because they're sending risk-critical 18 information. So once they've designated who is going to 19 get the FSG information, once you're happy with that 20 process, you leave it alone to make sure it doesn't get 21 compromised. 22 Q. Can I take you to your statement, the first statement, 23 and ask you to look at page 3, and go to the bottom of 24 the page, six lines up. After the reference to the 25 sketch, you say:</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 139</p>
<p>1 A. Yes, I did carry it with me. 2 Q. Did you use it to communicate with the command unit at 3 all? 4 A. No, you generally wouldn't use the main scheme radio to 5 speak to the command unit, because that would be 6 transmitting on FLON-OPS 4, which is generally between 7 control -- either other assets coming or control and the 8 incident commander. 9 Q. Did you communicate with the command unit at all by 10 radio while you were on the 3rd floor? 11 A. Yes, I tried to, but the radio traffic was vast. 12 Q. Which radio did you use? 13 A. Fire ground radio. 14 Q. Could you have used your airwave radio? 15 A. Generally, no. Generally, our policy is that we -- at 16 incidents, unless you're a specific officer, so our 17 national inter-agency liaison officers use their 18 airwaves, but generally at fires we leave our airwaves 19 and don't take them onto the fire ground. 20 Q. We've had some evidence from Peter Johnson last week 21 that he was confident, he said, that you were in 22 communication with CU8 by airwave radio. How does that 23 stand with your recollection? 24 A. No. I wasn't. I spoke to the CU via handheld radio. 25 Q. By handheld?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 138</p>	<p>1 "We had also received a call to FSG on the 3rd floor 2 so while the bridgehead was being relocated to the 3 lobby, myself and Cooky took an enforcer ..." 4 When you say "we" received a call, do I take it from 5 your evidence that wasn't you personally but somebody at 6 the bridgehead? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. That was while the bridgehead was being relocated from 9 the 3rd floor to the lobby. Right. 10 Do you remember how that FSG call -- because you've 11 referred to it specifically -- came in, paper or radio? 12 A. No, I don't recall how it came in, but I'm pretty sure 13 it was Louisa De Silvo who called the FSG for the 14 3rd floor, and we just said as it's relocating, we will 15 take it. Me and Gareth Cook, which I said in my 16 statement, took an enforcer and knocked the door down 17 and went and searched. 18 Q. Let's move to the subject of the move of the bridgehead 19 down to the ground floor. 20 Now, we have had some evidence from Watch Manager 21 O'Keefe that the movement of the bridgehead to the 22 ground floor happened as a result of a firefighter 23 coming onto the bridgehead and saying that the fire was 24 around the bridgehead. 25 Do you remember that?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 140</p>

35 (Pages 137 to 140)

<p>1 A. No.</p> <p>2 Q. Do you remember -- this is also some evidence from</p> <p>3 Gareth Cook -- that there was talk at least of fire</p> <p>4 having got below the bridgehead? Do you remember that?</p> <p>5 A. I don't recall that. I do recall a conversation between</p> <p>6 myself and Group Manager Welch that the smoke condition</p> <p>7 in the bridgehead was untenable for a bridgehead and we</p> <p>8 had to relocate.</p> <p>9 Q. So far as you're concerned, the reason for moving the</p> <p>10 bridgehead down to the ground floor was the presence of</p> <p>11 smoke at the 3rd floor and not fire below the</p> <p>12 bridgehead?</p> <p>13 A. Yes.</p> <p>14 Q. We've just closed down the statement, but it doesn't</p> <p>15 matter. In the part of the statement I was showing you,</p> <p>16 you've exhibited a sketch, I think, of the layout of the</p> <p>17 ground floor once you moved the bridgehead to the ground</p> <p>18 floor. Perhaps we'll look at that. It's MET00015874.</p> <p>19 Is that it? That is your sketch?</p> <p>20 A. Yes, it is.</p> <p>21 Q. Can we just go through this.</p> <p>22 First of all, at the top of the diagram, you've</p> <p>23 I think written "Entrance". I'm interpreting your</p> <p>24 handwriting, but is that there?</p> <p>25 A. Sorry. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 141</p>	<p>1 crews that were waiting in staging outside would come in</p> <p>2 via the back door, and Andy Walton was communicating</p> <p>3 with the watch manager on the other side. So when</p> <p>4 Nick Myatt needed crews, Andy Walton controlled that.</p> <p>5 But also, more importantly, we needed to get the</p> <p>6 casualties out the short route. So when casualties were</p> <p>7 coming down the stairs, there was a casualty handling</p> <p>8 crew at the bottom of the stairs. They took the</p> <p>9 casualties through the short route, out the Westway and</p> <p>10 down to casualty clearing point.</p> <p>11 Q. We may be able to do this with a photograph, so if we</p> <p>12 can keep the diagram on the screen, please, Paul, and</p> <p>13 put up the photograph we looked at earlier, INQ00000322,</p> <p>14 just so we clearly have your evidence about the short</p> <p>15 route.</p> <p>16 We can see in the photograph, there's you coming in</p> <p>17 the front door, FSG on the wall, and then a door with</p> <p>18 a sign next to it marked "Grenfell Tower Community</p> <p>19 Room".</p> <p>20 Is that the door to the short route?</p> <p>21 A. No, that's the door to the back door.</p> <p>22 Q. That's where you've marked back door, is it?</p> <p>23 A. Yes.</p> <p>24 Q. What was the short route, just looking back at the</p> <p>25 diagram, that the casualties were being taken out?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 143</p>
<p>1 Q. Don't apologise, it's pretty clear.</p> <p>2 So can we take it that the top of the diagram is the</p> <p>3 south side?</p> <p>4 A. Yes.</p> <p>5 Q. Therefore, to the left we have the east, to the right</p> <p>6 the west and on the bottom the north. You then mark</p> <p>7 "FSG" next to that entrance with a ring around it. Do</p> <p>8 you see?</p> <p>9 A. Yes.</p> <p>10 Q. Is that to signify the recording of FSG information that</p> <p>11 was going on on the wall on the left as you go in?</p> <p>12 A. Yes, with Station Manager Pete Wolfenden.</p> <p>13 Q. Anybody else you recall?</p> <p>14 A. There was another watch manager there.</p> <p>15 Q. Yes.</p> <p>16 A. May have been Williams.</p> <p>17 Q. Yes. All right</p> <p>18 A. And Andy Walton was by that doorway.</p> <p>19 Q. You've marked Andy Walton, as we can see, the writing</p> <p>20 says "Andy Walton". You say he was by that doorway.</p> <p>21 What was he doing there, do you know?</p> <p>22 A. So a number of things. Probably at that time he was</p> <p>23 organising getting some resources in. We implemented</p> <p>24 the one-way system, so by the bottom right-hand corner,</p> <p>25 it's the back door. What we were doing was all the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 142</p>	<p>1 A. So the doorway that I'm walking through, that is the</p> <p>2 doorway straight out towards the covered walkway. You</p> <p>3 get to the covered walkway, turn left, walk on and that</p> <p>4 is the casualty clearing point down there.</p> <p>5 Q. What was the back door used for then?</p> <p>6 A. That was used for bringing our crews in.</p> <p>7 Q. I see.</p> <p>8 A. So crews coming in, crews coming out and the territorial</p> <p>9 support group that were supporting us that night, they</p> <p>10 converged at the back door to help crews come in and</p> <p>11 out, their access and egress.</p> <p>12 Q. So EDBA wearers and SDBA wearers, once this had come</p> <p>13 down to the ground floor, would come in through, as it</p> <p>14 were, the back door, but casualties would go out through</p> <p>15 the front?</p> <p>16 A. Yes.</p> <p>17 Q. That's how it worked, is it? Yes.</p> <p>18 Now, you have on the diagram two lines that run</p> <p>19 top-left to bottom or mid-right. What are those?</p> <p>20 A. Can I point to them? Is that okay?</p> <p>21 Q. Yes.</p> <p>22 A. Are we talked these? (Indicates).</p> <p>23 Q. Yes.</p> <p>24 A. Okay.</p> <p>25 So after Gareth Cook had came back and couldn't --</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 144</p>

<p>1 because of the falling debris and because of the</p> <p>2 conditions outside, we couldn't use the turntable ladder</p> <p>3 as an additional stairwell and dry riser. We needed</p> <p>4 more firefighting jets because of the severity of the</p> <p>5 fire. So I detailed Gareth to deliver a water officer</p> <p>6 job, and I said, "Unfortunately, if you can't find a dry</p> <p>7 riser to give me more water, you are going to have to</p> <p>8 run a hose from the nearest fire engine into the</p> <p>9 building and up the stairwell", which is a pretty</p> <p>10 difficult task.</p> <p>11 So they found the nearest pump, to their credit, got</p> <p>12 an additional water supply from a pump outside, ran it</p> <p>13 through the back door, put a lightweight portable pump</p> <p>14 just by the exit. Because of the fumes, we couldn't</p> <p>15 have the lightweight portable pump inside, so the pump</p> <p>16 was left at the front door. And then they ran hose from</p> <p>17 the lightweight portable pump, pulled it aloft up to the</p> <p>18 mezzanine floor and then ran a hose up the internal side</p> <p>19 of the building to give extra water jets.</p> <p>20 Q. Do you remember roughly what time that was put in place?</p> <p>21 Was it after the bridgehead came down to the ground</p> <p>22 floor?</p> <p>23 A. That took place on the ground floor.</p> <p>24 Q. We may have an image of it. INQ00000317, if you could</p> <p>25 be shown that very briefly.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 145</p>	<p>1 you into the stairs. So Nick Myatt had the door, and</p> <p>2 when I required or Richard required resources, we went</p> <p>3 to Nick and either got our SDBA or EDBA crews. Once it</p> <p>4 started to deplete, Nick knew to go to Andy Walton or A</p> <p>5 another outside to ensure they were replenished. So we</p> <p>6 had constant crews all the time.</p> <p>7 Q. I see. So EDBA wearers pool there, SDBA wearers pool</p> <p>8 there, and going back to Andy Walton, which is where we</p> <p>9 started this, what was his job?</p> <p>10 A. So Andy Walton was assisting the communications between</p> <p>11 requesting from the officer outside who was holding</p> <p>12 officers to bring them in and also assisting where we</p> <p>13 were moving casualties out.</p> <p>14 Q. Were you aware of a Station Manager Loft involved in any</p> <p>15 activity?</p> <p>16 A. I know Brett Loft, but Brett Loft -- I didn't work with</p> <p>17 him within the lobby that evening. I'm pretty sure he</p> <p>18 was elsewhere doing FSGs at a command unit, potentially.</p> <p>19 But I had no direct contact with Brett that evening.</p> <p>20 Q. Did you know by the time the bridgehead got down to the</p> <p>21 ground floor that something called BA main control had</p> <p>22 been set up?</p> <p>23 A. Yes, I knew BA main control was set up.</p> <p>24 Q. Did you know who was in charge of BA main control?</p> <p>25 A. No, I can't remember the name of the officer.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 147</p>
<p>1 Is that what you are describing?</p> <p>2 A. Yes.</p> <p>3 Q. Right. We may come back to that photograph in due</p> <p>4 course, we'll see.</p> <p>5 Continuing with your diagram if we can. You have in</p> <p>6 the middle "SDBA 20" against what I think we can all</p> <p>7 agree is the glass partition between the main lobby and</p> <p>8 the stairwell.</p> <p>9 What does "SDBA 20" signify?</p> <p>10 A. So I requested through Nick Myatt that there must be 20</p> <p>11 wearers available at that holding area at all times.</p> <p>12 Q. Related to that, we have in the bottom right-hand corner</p> <p>13 of the diagram "EDBA" in a ring with a "30" next to it.</p> <p>14 What does that signify?</p> <p>15 A. Exactly the same brief: I want 30 EDBA wearers available</p> <p>16 at all times.</p> <p>17 Q. Were the SDBA wearers on the west side of the glass</p> <p>18 wall? Was that where the queue for them was?</p> <p>19 A. Yes.</p> <p>20 Q. And the EDBA wearers standing where?</p> <p>21 A. They were in a side room. Actually, I think that was</p> <p>22 the lift lobby, that's where they were.</p> <p>23 Q. Do you remember who was running the EDBA group?</p> <p>24 A. So Nick Myatt, so where he circled, that was the single</p> <p>25 door partitioned between the glass partition that took</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 146</p>	<p>1 Q. If I suggested to you it was Brett Loft, would that</p> <p>2 help?</p> <p>3 A. It would -- yeah, make sense.</p> <p>4 Q. Did you know of the involvement of a Station Manager</p> <p>5 Kipling?</p> <p>6 A. Yes, Dan Kipling?</p> <p>7 Q. Yes. What was he doing, do you know?</p> <p>8 A. I can't remember, I thought he was helping with FSGs on</p> <p>9 a command unit.</p> <p>10 Q. When the bridgehead came down to the ground floor, did</p> <p>11 you notice Watch Managers Williams and Watson there</p> <p>12 managing FSGs in the place you have indicated now by the</p> <p>13 wall on the left as you come in?</p> <p>14 A. Yes.</p> <p>15 Q. You did?</p> <p>16 A. Yes.</p> <p>17 Q. Is that the first time you noticed what they were doing?</p> <p>18 A. Yes.</p> <p>19 Q. Did you see what they were actually doing at that stage?</p> <p>20 A. Didn't note the detail, I just knew they were processing</p> <p>21 FSG calls.</p> <p>22 Q. Did you speak to them?</p> <p>23 A. No, Richard Welch spoke to them.</p> <p>24 Q. So far as you know, was that the first time</p> <p>25 Richard Welch spoke to them about FSG calls?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 148</p>

<p>1 A. I really couldn't say if that was the first time they 2 spoke. 3 Q. Okay. 4 Now, in your statement at page 4, your first 5 statement, if you go to the second paragraph, I showed 6 you this earlier this morning, you say: 7 "The lobby covers the ground floor and is set up as 8 follows ..." 9 Then we have the FSG being set up to the left. 10 You then say: 11 "There is a separate room off the lobby which has 12 a door leading outside to a grassed area ..." 13 We've looked at that. 14 You then go on to say, two lines up from the bottom: 15 "I manned the BA board which I positioned at the 16 bottom of the stairs." 17 I just want to focus on that bit of your evidence, 18 if I can. 19 Can I ask you, first of all, so we can work out what 20 this involved, to look at some photographs. 21 INQ00000327, first of all. This is a CCTV shot 22 taken on camera 2 with an adjusted time mark of 23 03.15.43. 24 First of all, can you identify yourself in this 25 picture?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 149</p>	<p>1 Q. You knew they were there? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Did you know at this point -- so 03.16.41 -- what they 4 were doing? 5 A. Yes, they were processing FSG calls. 6 Q. Did you actually see for yourself physically what they 7 were doing? 8 A. Yes, they were processing, they were writing bits down 9 on the walls, there was some bits of paper with FSGs 10 that were being processed. 11 Q. You saw that for yourself, did you? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Did you see anybody bringing them pieces of paper from 14 the outside? 15 A. No. 16 Q. Did you see how they were receiving FSG information from 17 the outside? 18 A. No. 19 Q. Were they on their radios, did you see? 20 A. I really don't know. But I know they were receiving 21 information and that was the key part. 22 Q. All right. 23 If we go to the next picture, which is INQ00000329, 24 this is an adjusted time stamp, camera 2, at 03.16.48, 25 this appears to show you setting up the entry control</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 151</p>
<p>1 A. Yes, I can. I'm the one pointing. 2 Q. So this is 03.15. What is happening at this point, can 3 you help? 4 A. It's -- sorry. 5 Q. The next picture is at INQ00000328, and this is taken on 6 camera 4 at an adjusted time mark of 03.16.41, so not 7 very long afterwards. 8 We think we can identify you in this picture, but 9 perhaps you can help us. 10 A. I can. 11 Q. Are you in this picture? 12 A. So I'm helping move one of the telemetry boards. 13 Q. Where were you moving them from? 14 A. So I was just a bit concerned that I thought that that 15 area would have too much going on and I wanted BA to be 16 in a specific area to be able to manage the resources, 17 so I made a decision to split where the BA entry control 18 was and where the FSG was and where the SDBA and EDBA 19 were pooling, because there was just too much going on 20 in that area. 21 Q. Did you notice when you were doing this movement the 22 three officers standing by the wall on the left by the 23 door? We can see the two white helmets and the 24 unhelmeted officer there. 25 A. Yes, I knew they were there.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 150</p>	<p>1 board at the bottom of the main stairs. 2 Can you confirm that's you first of all? 3 A. Yes, it is me. 4 Q. Okay. Is that what you're referring to? 5 A. Yes, it's nice and clear. They were in a place of 6 peace. Entry control and managing BA crews is 7 a risk-critical task for us and I wanted them to be in 8 a place where they could operate effectively. Also, it 9 just reduces the distance. They were at the bottom of 10 the stairs. Because also what was going to be really 11 key was not only the information we were getting from 12 FSGs, but the information we were getting from crews as 13 they were returning back at the bottom of the stairs. 14 Q. Just taking this a little bit more slowly, was it your 15 decision to separate physically the FSG information you 16 could see being received and recorded on the wall on the 17 left of the lobby on the one hand, and on the other the 18 operation of the entry control boards on the other? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Did you think at the time that you made that decision 21 that that might create a risk of miscommunication, that 22 physical distance? 23 A. No, I was more concerned that there was too much going 24 on for the BA to be effective. So you had a number of 25 risk-critical elements that were right on top of each</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 152</p>

<p>1 other at that point, including the number of resources 2 that were having to be pooled to be deployed and there 3 needed to be some sort of separation. The distance 4 wasn't that great and the key was ensuring that that 5 information got passed over, which it did. 6 Q. Okay. The key was ensuring that information got passed 7 over. 8 Did you think, however, that the presence of a glass 9 wall and a doorway might create a barrier between the 10 FSG information coming into the tower and being recorded 11 by the watch managers at the wall, and the entry control 12 board operation? 13 A. No, the door was open and it allowed the entry control 14 to operate as well. 15 Q. Just following up on the last answer but one, you say 16 the information got passed over. 17 Once the bridgehead came down to the ground floor, 18 could you describe for us how that information went from 19 the watch managers operating the FSGs by the wall to the 20 bridgehead? 21 A. Yes. So, initially, FSGs were deploying -- deploying 22 crews to -- BA crews. Initially, they were on the 23 ground floor. The FSGs were doing the right thing, they 24 were trying to prioritise, but they weren't getting the 25 picture of what the conditions were and where we're</p> <p>Page 153</p>	<p>1 with FSG information and destinations? 2 A. So originally when the bridgehead got moved back down, 3 Pete Wolfenden, speaking with Richard Welch, tasked some 4 BA crews to deploy to FSG calls. 5 Q. How was that done in terms of providing information to 6 crews? Did Pete Wolfenden give crews pieces of paper? 7 A. I don't know. I know they were briefed with FSGs and 8 then deployed. 9 Q. At that time, where were you standing when that was 10 happening? 11 A. I think at that point, that was when you saw me just 12 organising the ground floor, and then I had 13 a conversation or a briefing with Richard Welch deciding 14 on what that looked like. Because what it really meant 15 was we had only extended jets to so far, and where the 16 fire now was, you know, pretty much from the 6th floor 17 onwards really taking hold across the floors, it meant 18 that those firefighters going up to those FSG calls were 19 going without firefighting media. There was a view that 20 knowing the conditions and the information that we were 21 getting back from those crews, if we didn't put some 22 sort of control to protect their egress, we could've 23 deployed them and they may have got into difficulty. 24 Q. When you made the decision to change the system, so as 25 to make it more systematic, could you tell us, what</p> <p>Page 155</p>
<p>1 putting the firefighting jets to do the rescues. 2 My view, my tactical plan, was that if the entry 3 control and the FSGs and all the firefighters are there 4 in one place, you end up having people with really 5 important roles but doing other people's roles and it 6 cross-pollinates too much. What it really needed at 7 that point was people with a specific task to focus on 8 those specific tasks to be part of that plan. 9 So the reason why I moved it is so FSGs could focus 10 on getting clarity of FSG calls and bring them to the 11 entry control, who would log them. Because there was so 12 many FSG calls at that point, I moved to systematic 13 searching to get each FSG, because the conditions were 14 very poor. 15 What it then meant is because the FSGs were so 16 sporadic, you could deploy a BA crew to an FSG to the 17 15th floor, and then a second later an FSG would come in 18 for the 8th floor. That means you're walking BA crews 19 past FSGs. If we weren't methodical enough, we would've 20 been missing people. It was clear from the information 21 coming back that those people tasked certainly for upper 22 floors were not making the upper floors because they 23 were coming across casualties and coming back. 24 Q. So at the start of the operation of the bridgehead at 25 the ground floor, who was actually tasking the crews</p> <p>Page 154</p>	<p>1 change did you make? 2 A. Yeah, so at that period, Pete was absolutely right to 3 deploy those crews, but as conditions change, the 4 tactics have to change. So what that then meant is it 5 was -- it's probably easier with that sketch that 6 I drew. You had your pool of SDBA and your pool of EDBA 7 crews. SDBA were going to work up to the 10th floor. 8 They were going to do search and rescue on the floors 9 that we hadn't cleared, but they were also going to 10 protect the access and egress, because we were still 11 getting multiple FSGs. 12 There were certainly a couple of floors -- I think 13 I've mentioned the 16th and 18th floors -- where we knew 14 information that some of the flats residents had pooled 15 into and we were trying to get to those floors where we 16 knew there was many casualties. But I had to put a plan 17 in place that EDBA could go and rescue them and a way to 18 ensure that we protected the rescue and protected them 19 coming back out. So we were pushing EDBA crews up as 20 high as we could, as far as they could get. 21 So I probably need to put some clarity over the 22 answer I've just given you. What that meant in terms of 23 process was Pete Wolfenden's job changed to focus on 24 FSGs, pass that over to where Louisa De Silvo and 25 Brien O'Keeffe were working on the board. Nick Myatt</p> <p>Page 156</p>

<p>1 was delivering those crews and then myself and 2 Richard Welch were deploying crews.</p> <p>3 What we would do is we would look at the floors that 4 we needed to get to, brief those crews, and then Louisa 5 De Silvo and Brien O'Keeffe, BA control, would tell the 6 crews what FSGs were on the floor they were going to, 7 and their view was to get all the FSGs off of that 8 floor. Because we had to ensure we were firefighting 9 and doing search and rescue, but doing it in a really 10 methodical way.</p> <p>11 Q. I am going to unpack that. That's a long answer and 12 there's a lot in it.</p> <p>13 A. Sorry.</p> <p>14 Q. That's okay, I'm going to unpack it slowly with you if 15 I can.</p> <p>16 The first question is: how long after the bridgehead 17 moved down to the ground floor did you make the decision 18 to change the approach to FSG?</p> <p>19 A. I don't really recall how long, but it was based on the 20 information that we were getting from the BA crews, and 21 information that myself and Richard got ourselves. We 22 as commanders went up and crews were telling us that the 23 conditions were pretty unbearable. Certainly the 24 information we'd got from crews near the 9th floor was 25 that it was white hot and you can't get past it. So at</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 157</p>	<p>1 off our list. I think on the list you start to see some 2 crosses go through as we start to work our way through 3 it.</p> <p>4 Q. What information did you have when you decided which 5 floor to send crews to?</p> <p>6 A. Part of that was from the information from crews when 7 they debriefed us. So if they'd gone to the 6th floor, 8 which some crews did, and they said, "We've gone in, the 9 fire's still burning but we've checked all the floors, 10 it's now clear", that enables you to focus on other 11 floors.</p> <p>12 Q. To what extent did you rely on information still coming 13 from the wall, as it were, through Pete Wolfenden on 14 pieces of paper?</p> <p>15 A. Oh, absolutely, because that's telling you where the 16 people are and the FSGs are, and that was the difficult 17 part that the EDBA crews had and the SDBA crews. So 18 even though we were methodical, we pushed EDBA crews as 19 hard as we could, and part of that was saying to the 20 EDBA crews: "We've got multiple people trapped on the 21 upper floors, I'm really sorry, but it is what it is 22 tonight. We're going to protect you, practical 23 firefighting is going to keep you alive, but you are 24 going to have to go above the fire floor, I'm going to 25 push you as hard as you can go", and none of them turned</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 159</p>
<p>1 times we went and checked.</p> <p>2 Q. Again, we'll come back to that.</p> <p>3 My next question is: did you tell Watch Manager 4 Williams and Watch Manager Watson that you made a change 5 to the way in which BA wearers were going to be 6 deployed?</p> <p>7 A. No, I didn't, but Richard Welch did, and that was 8 a conversation that me and Richard Welch -- and Richard 9 said, "I'll go and do it".</p> <p>10 Q. We'll come back to that.</p> <p>11 Let's take this in stages, if I can.</p> <p>12 First of all, once the bridgehead moved down to the 13 ground floor, can you explain how your role related to 14 Louisa De Silvo's role who was recording FSG information 15 on the green wall?</p> <p>16 A. Yes, so I had control with Richard over the deployment 17 and decisions of where crews were going to go. Part of 18 that was Louisa was collating the FSG information from 19 FSG, and between herself and Brien O'Keeffe, I asked 20 them to -- I would designate a floor for a BA crew to go 21 to and they would tell them all the FSGs on that floor.</p> <p>22 Also, Louisa would be debriefing the crews as they 23 come back to ensure that all the tasks were being done. 24 So as we deployed them to a floor, they could check off 25 the flat numbers they'd been to and we could tick them</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 158</p>	<p>1 their back on that.</p> <p>2 So we pushed EDBA crews up as hard as we could get, 3 but certainly at the start the 7th wasn't great, the 8th 4 was bad and they were telling me in the early stages the 5 9th was just impassable at that point. And we knew we 6 had to do some work on the 9th to then push on to try to 7 get to those casualties on the upper floors.</p> <p>8 Q. Again, we'll come back to that, just taking this in 9 stages.</p> <p>10 Operationally, were you physically taking 11 firefighter tallies off firefighters?</p> <p>12 A. No.</p> <p>13 Q. Who was doing that?</p> <p>14 A. Louisa and Brien.</p> <p>15 Q. On page 4 of your statement you refer, two lines up from 16 the bottom, to running an FIB. You say:</p> <p>17 "As part of my remit I also ran an F.I.B — Forward 18 Information Board, Louisa Bryan [sic] ran this for me." 19 That's clearly "Louisa and Brien".</p> <p>20 A. Yes.</p> <p>21 Q. "This was so I could note the location of the FSGs and 22 where people were trapped what floors, flat numbers, who 23 was allocated and so on, so that when people were 24 rescued and crews were out I could mark it on the board. 25 "As the F.I.B was not big enough to cope with the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 160</p>

<p>1 volume of FSGs coming in. I decided to utilise the wall 2 so that I could clearly see who was allocated where, 3 where the FSGs were and who had been brought out." 4 Just on all of that, we may be able to mark a time 5 for that. Can I show you a photograph, INQ00000330. 6 A. Yes, I think when I said "I", I think that's the kind of 7 royal "we" as the kind of team, because I certainly 8 wouldn't mark it on the wall, that was Louisa and Brien. 9 Q. I was going to ask you that. But just to go to this 10 photograph, INQ00000330, this is camera 2 with 11 an adjusted time of 03.23.39. I think that's you in the 12 centre of the picture. 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. You are talking with Louisa on the left -- 15 A. That is Louisa. 16 Q. -- and Brien O'Keeffe on the right. 17 Is this before information started being written on 18 the wall, do you remember? 19 A. No, I think information was written on the wall at that 20 point. We had the BA boards in the bottom corner. 21 I think we also probably had a couple of crews at that 22 point that had come down in a pretty exhausted state and 23 we were putting them around the corner trying to give 24 them rehab. 25 Q. Is that what's happening on the left-hand side of</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 161</p>	<p>1 Q. That will save some time, I suspect. 2 Do you recall whether the FSG information on the 3 ground floor wall was put onto the walls only after you 4 and the rest of the bridgehead team had moved down, or 5 was there some on the wall when you got there, by which 6 I mean the wall opposite the stairs, the green wall? 7 A. Louisa De Silvo and Brien had come down and they were 8 always going to transfer that information, and they were 9 down before us, and they worked really hard that night, 10 so I would be shocked if they hadn't already started 11 transferring that information onto the wall. 12 Q. Are you familiar with the wall handwriting of particular 13 people who wrote on the wall 14 A. Sorry, no. 15 Q. Let me try one thing -- 16 A. Okay. 17 Q. -- at risk of taking too long with it. MET00015816. 18 Are you able to identify who wrote any of that up 19 there? 20 A. Sorry, no. 21 Q. You're not, all right. 22 Do you remember, once the bridgehead had started 23 operating on the ground floor, how FSG information was 24 physically coming in to the bridgehead space? 25 A. Yes, most of it was coming in face-to-face, but they</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 163</p>
<p>1 picture? 2 A. I think so, essentially. 3 Q. We can see Richard Welch on the right there in the white 4 helmet. 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Was the bridgehead in operation at this point? Were 7 those boards, the entry control boards we see there on 8 the left, actually live? 9 A. The bridgehead was in operation as soon as we got to the 10 ground floor. That was the point we were actually 11 deploying crews. 12 Q. Then, as I've said to you, the FIB wasn't big enough to 13 cope so you used the wall. 14 Did you personally write on the wall? 15 A. No, that was Louisa and Brien. 16 Q. Was anybody else writing on the wall apart from Louisa 17 and Brien? 18 A. Yes. I've forgotten his name. He was here before me. 19 That's really bad. He was doing comms. The comms 20 operator. 21 Q. Morrison? 22 A. That's it, thank you. Sorry. 23 Q. If I was to ask you some questions about who wrote what 24 on the wall, would you be able to help? 25 A. I'm sorry, no.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 162</p>	<p>1 were being left also with a physical piece of paper. 2 Q. They would've been left; who would've been left? 3 A. So information was being passed from -- the watch 4 manager was coming over sometimes, Williams, and they 5 were making contact with Mr Morrison, Louisa or Brien 6 and ensuring that transfer. 7 Q. Do you remember which watch manager it was bringing 8 pieces of paper into the bridgehead? 9 A. No, I don't. I think it was a few of them, a few people 10 were doing it. 11 Q. Were they the same watch managers who were managing or 12 running the FSGs by the wall -- 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. -- in the main lobby? 15 A. Yes, but at some point they probably may have asked 16 someone a favour to run it over. 17 MR MILLETT: Right, okay. 18 I think now is a convenient moment for a break for 19 you. 20 A. Yes, please. 21 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, I think the witness has had 22 an hour of me. That's probably enough. 23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You are making quite good progress, 24 aren't you? 25 MR MILLETT: Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 164</p>

<p>1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We can certainly afford to have 2 10 minutes. 3 Yes, we'll have a 10-minute break, Mr Goulbourne. 4 Again, please don't speak to anyone about your evidence 5 while you're out of the room, and we'll resume at 3.10. 6 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? 8 3.10, then, please. 9 (3.00 pm) 10 (A short break) 11 (3.20 pm) 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm sorry to have kept you waiting, 13 Mr Goulbourne, but we are now ready to go on. 14 MR MILLETT: Mr Goulbourne, thank you for coming back. 15 When you started operating the bridgehead on the 16 ground floor, who was ultimately responsible for 17 deployments of BA wearers? 18 A. I was, but with Richard Welch. 19 Q. Right. You were with him. 20 Who was the ultimate decision-maker between you two 21 or did you agree everything? 22 A. No, we didn't agree everything, we just worked together 23 and spoke together about what crews we were deploying. 24 Q. You told us earlier the information you used was 25 a combination of information from debriefs from crews</p> <p>Page 165</p>	<p>1 At what point did you make that decision? 2 A. I can't remember the exact time. It felt fairly quickly 3 after we moved to the ground floor, but I really 4 couldn't exactly tell you the time. 5 Q. The first deployment of EDBA crews after the move of the 6 bridgehead to the ground floor we have at about 03.29. 7 Would that be right? 8 A. It sounds right. 9 Q. Did you, when you made your decision as to where to send 10 the crews to, select the floors in a particular order? 11 A. So for SDBA crews, yes. So they were starting off at 12 the first floor of fire that we had left to start 13 knocking it down. But I was deploying multiple crews, 14 so some crews had firefighting in the floors but some 15 crews had protecting the escape route, and we pushed the 16 EDBA crews as high as we could. 17 Q. How high was that? 18 A. So initially the EDBA crews couldn't get as far as the 19 9th, but after some firefighting, they pushed on to the 20 10th, the 11th, up to the 12th and 13th at some point. 21 Q. Did you know where the FSG floors were? 22 Let me put it a different way. 23 Was there a limit below which there were no FSG 24 calls? 25 A. We had a list of all of the FSG calls and we were</p> <p>Page 167</p>
<p>1 arriving from within the building and information coming 2 to you from the wall, if I can put it that way, in the 3 lobby? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. The way information came to you from the lobby was chits 6 of paper. Did that continue to be the case throughout 7 the time you were operating the bridgehead on the ground 8 floor? 9 A. Yes, information kept on coming from FSG. Obviously 10 some of that information was face-to-face where people 11 were passing them over, but they would be backed up by 12 almost a hard copy. 13 Q. Did you sometimes send EDBA or SDBA wearers to different 14 flats or floors than were marked on the chits of paper? 15 A. Did I send EDBA wearers to different floors marked on 16 the sheet? 17 Q. Yes. 18 A. I sent them to a number of floors, so yes, I would do. 19 Q. Turning then to this question of the change in strategy 20 to a systematic search, you say in your statement, just 21 to anchor it somewhere -- and this is page 4, fifth 22 paragraph, first line: 23 "As we were getting notified of FSGs on every floor 24 I decided on systematic searching and which floors to 25 commit crews to at any given time."</p> <p>Page 166</p>	<p>1 systematically working our way through to get all of 2 those FSGs. 3 Q. Did you know that once the bridgehead had moved down to 4 the ground floor, the only active FSG calls were for the 5 11th floor and above? 6 A. At some point I knew because we were clearing those 7 floors. And also I knew at some point during the 8 evening we had information that all of the FSGs had 9 stopped. 10 Q. When the bridgehead moved down to the ground floor and 11 started operating there, what would you do with a chit 12 that said 18th floor, for example? 13 A. We would hold the chit for the 18th floor because we 14 knew that we had crews working -- depending on what time 15 of the night that was, we knew that the 18th floor was 16 a priority because there was an FSG, but we also knew 17 crews couldn't get that far. So we always had that 18 group of EDBA wearers of 30, so I knew there was crews 19 we could send there, but we had to do some work to get 20 them there. 21 Q. Do you know from recollection what the highest floor -- 22 I think you mentioned 13th -- was to where you sent 23 an EDBA crew? 24 A. Yes. So during parts of the night -- I was really 25 fortunate, I knew a lot of the crews there personally.</p> <p>Page 168</p>

<p>1 I knew it needed experienced firefighters to take some 2 additional risks on the additional risks they were 3 already taking. So a few crews that I knew, one was 4 from East Ham, I asked them a specific task and I just 5 asked them to push and take as much risk as you can and 6 let me know as far you can get. And they came back down 7 the stairs in a pretty difficult state and said that 8 unless I get some -- unless I win the fight on the 9 11th floor -- they pushed on to the 13th, ducked into 10 the 14th for a time, and they said they were on the 11 edge. They said if you don't fix the 11th floor, 12 everyone will die, in terms of firefighters coming back, 13 unless you fix that.</p> <p>14 Q. Do you remember at least roughly how soon that was after 15 you started operating the bridgehead on the ground 16 floor?</p> <p>17 A. I couldn't recall, but I pushed EDBA crews at fairly 18 regular intervals to -- we were getting decent updates 19 back from the crews we were sending to the worst points. 20 After we won the fight on the 9th floor, they were 21 pushing hard on the 10th and the 11th.</p> <p>22 The crews were coming back. They were saying the 23 11th was just white hot. Everything was alight. They 24 were getting to the stairwell, trying to get into the 25 lobby -- it was a fight just to get into the lobby.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 169</p>	<p>1 11th floor, would you or did you tell Watson or Williams 2 or Wolfenden that a deployment to that floor couldn't be 3 made?</p> <p>4 A. No, we kept FSG live on the board by the entry control, 5 but I didn't tell Watson and Wolfenden and -- probably 6 in hindsight that should've gone back to them, but we 7 were just so busy, we were focusing on trying to get 8 those crews to those floors.</p> <p>9 Q. Were you able to communicate with either the command 10 unit or the control room about the inability to respond 11 to FSG calls above a particular floor at any point?</p> <p>12 A. Yes, so the ORT officers were doing lots of running for 13 us, trying to get messages away, and also the operations 14 commander at that point was Andy O'Loughlin, so he was 15 coming in at regular intervals to get briefings on how 16 the progress was going. The incident commander at that 17 point was Andy Roe, along with the commissioner, who 18 came in to get briefings for updates.</p> <p>19 So not specifically to the CU, but certainly to the 20 command chain. They knew where we were going, they knew 21 the plan, but also they knew the difficulties that we 22 were facing.</p> <p>23 Q. Do you recall a heated or emotional or passionate -- 24 forget the adjective, but you get the sense -- do you 25 recall a discussion of that nature involving Watch</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 171</p>
<p>1 In the meantime, they were trying to work out 2 a system, and the system was working. There were 3 a couple of crews that were amazing for me that weren't 4 in BA, they were from Whitechapel and Shoreditch, who 5 were just helping with hose and casualties. But what we 6 had to do is because we still had residual fire in some 7 of the floors -- it's kind of hard to explain, but 8 because we were pushing crews into some of the lower 9 floors, it would compromise the stairwell where the EDBA 10 crews were. Anybody on the stairwell would have to be 11 on their bellies because it would be too ferocious in 12 there.</p> <p>13 Any time I had a casualty, the comms had to be 14 pretty good, and the system was good that they were 15 speaking to each, shutting the door, clearing the 16 stairwell, bringing people down.</p> <p>17 I know I have painted a really complicated picture. 18 We were having discussions. What we didn't want to do 19 is try to fight the fire into floors but then compromise 20 the only escape route we had because we had one 21 stairwell.</p> <p>22 I hope that complicated way makes sense.</p> <p>23 Q. Focusing on the communications about FSG, if you did get 24 at the bridgehead a chit or other information of an FSG 25 call above the 11th floor, but couldn't get above the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 170</p>	<p>1 Manager Williams and Station Manager Wolfenden and Group 2 Manager Welch about why it was that FSG calls above 3 certain floors were not being responded to?</p> <p>4 A. Yes. Myself and Richard spoke about that and, yes, they 5 did have a fairly heated conversation. But these are 6 passionate officers in a really difficult day. It's not 7 unusual and not unexpected. We're all professional 8 officers that are trying to do our best, so we had no 9 problem with having difficult conversations. But 10 ultimately, I and Richard had to make command decisions 11 on the information that we had.</p> <p>12 Q. Just trying to pinpoint that in terms of timing, can you 13 be shown a picture, which is INQ00000332.</p> <p>14 This is camera 2, adjusted time at 03.40.20, so half 15 an hour or less after the bridgehead came down to the 16 ground floor. It shows Louisa De Silvo I think on the 17 bottom-left and then three officers on the right.</p> <p>18 Can you identify them?</p> <p>19 A. I can see me and Richard but I don't know who we are 20 speaking to.</p> <p>21 Q. We think that's Watch Manager Williams. We have 22 a relatively reliable identification of him.</p> <p>23 Do you remember this three-way discussion at about 24 this point?</p> <p>25 A. No, I don't remember the discussion.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 172</p>

<p>1 Q. Can I turn to the next picture, which is taken at</p> <p>2 6 seconds later, INQ00000333.</p> <p>3 Again, can you identify the people on the right-hand</p> <p>4 side of the picture? There's you, I think, and Louisa.</p> <p>5 We think that's Watch Manager Williams.</p> <p>6 A. I still can't, no, sorry.</p> <p>7 Q. Then at INQ00000334, which is an adjusted time of</p> <p>8 03.41.04, showing Watch Manager Williams -- I think we</p> <p>9 know it's him -- talking to Louisa De Silvo, and you,</p> <p>10 I think, are in the background on the right.</p> <p>11 Do you remember that incident or that discussion?</p> <p>12 A. No. But myself and Richard -- I was really clear, we</p> <p>13 had information about where the firefighting and the</p> <p>14 protection was for those crews. We also had the</p> <p>15 information that was coming back from those crews; the</p> <p>16 FSGs didn't. But the FSGs were performing a really</p> <p>17 single function, and that's how we split the room up, to</p> <p>18 ensure that people could focus on specific tasks to make</p> <p>19 sure we had complete clarity. If that was</p> <p>20 a conversation, I have no doubt that's what I was</p> <p>21 saying.</p> <p>22 Q. Just finishing up with this line, does this help us or</p> <p>23 does this not help us identify the timing of what we've</p> <p>24 called the heated discussion, but the discussion about</p> <p>25 matching up FSGs?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 173</p>	<p>1 were given different briefings by you and Group Manager</p> <p>2 Welch when they got to the bridgehead on the other side</p> <p>3 of the glass wall?</p> <p>4 A. No. We asked for that to stop. I didn't expect that to</p> <p>5 continue, and Nick Myatt was ensuring that no BA crews</p> <p>6 with anything but specific briefings were going past</p> <p>7 that door.</p> <p>8 Q. We have some evidence that a crew manager, Crew Manager</p> <p>9 Mayne, who had a buddy called Lundquist, tallied out at</p> <p>10 03.29.</p> <p>11 He says he was initially tasked by a senior officer</p> <p>12 to go to flat 113 in response to an FSG call, but he</p> <p>13 then said he was retasked by you to go to floor 4 and</p> <p>14 firefight.</p> <p>15 Does that trigger a recollection?</p> <p>16 A. If it's an SDBA crew, then yes, I deployed SDBA crews.</p> <p>17 SDBA crews at that point were protecting access and</p> <p>18 egress and firefighting on lower floors. So if someone</p> <p>19 had given them a different brief, yes, I would've</p> <p>20 rebriefed them, because that wasn't in the plan. The</p> <p>21 plan was ensuring that EDBA crews -- we were starting to</p> <p>22 make progress, but progress meant travel distance and</p> <p>23 travel distance meant I needed to put EDBA crews to</p> <p>24 ensure we were getting the crews with the longest</p> <p>25 duration to start to make that travel distance and SDBA</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 175</p>
<p>1 A. Yes, it looks that way.</p> <p>2 Q. Does it trigger a recollection, is really my question?</p> <p>3 A. I absolutely remember having a conversation with</p> <p>4 Richard, that we've agreed and we're going to</p> <p>5 transition, that's the best tactic forward, and that</p> <p>6 FSGs shouldn't be deploying BA crews on their own</p> <p>7 because the only way they could do that would be to</p> <p>8 deploy them without the firefighting media and without</p> <p>9 knowledge of what was coming back, and that was really</p> <p>10 clear.</p> <p>11 Q. Using the pictures and timings, does that help you</p> <p>12 recall how long after the bridgehead came down to the</p> <p>13 ground floor that discussion took place?</p> <p>14 A. Yes, I would agree.</p> <p>15 Q. I don't want to push you into agreeing for the sake of</p> <p>16 it. Does it match your recollection?</p> <p>17 A. I do recall having the conversation with Richard about</p> <p>18 that very detail, so that does bring that back to me,</p> <p>19 that Mr Williams was there.</p> <p>20 Q. In relation to this point specifically and just pursuing</p> <p>21 it, after that discussion, was it your impression that</p> <p>22 the officers on the other side of the glass partition,</p> <p>23 Williams and Watson, or at least Williams for the time</p> <p>24 being, were continuing to allocate specific FSGs to</p> <p>25 firefighters as they went past, and then firefighters</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 174</p>	<p>1 were supporting that on the lower floors.</p> <p>2 Q. In fact, I've put this to you on the basis it's Mayne</p> <p>3 and Lundquist. Indeed, it was them. Does this help:</p> <p>4 they were a Battersea crew wearing EDBA and not SDBA.</p> <p>5 So just to repeat the question: do you remember</p> <p>6 retasking an EDBA crew from Battersea who had originally</p> <p>7 been tasked to go to flat 113 with a new task to go to</p> <p>8 floor 4 and firefight?</p> <p>9 A. No.</p> <p>10 Q. You don't remember that?</p> <p>11 A. No, I specifically would not have put an EDBA crew to</p> <p>12 the 4th floor.</p> <p>13 Q. So what would you do with EDBA crews? Would you call</p> <p>14 them off in response to particular FSG calls and ask</p> <p>15 them to go as high as they could towards it, or would</p> <p>16 you just take an EDBA crew as it presented itself?</p> <p>17 A. So when I was deploying EDBA crews, it was to upper</p> <p>18 floors and to go to FSGs on those floors.</p> <p>19 What I hadn't done is I hadn't deployed crews above</p> <p>20 the floors where we were having difficulty getting past,</p> <p>21 because there was no point. I would just make the</p> <p>22 stairwell congested.</p> <p>23 In regards to the lower floors, the 4th floor at</p> <p>24 that point in the operation, even though the fire was of</p> <p>25 origin there, it wasn't giving us any issues. So</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 176</p>

<p>1 I wouldn't have deployed anybody there because all the 2 activity was on floors above the 4th. 3 Q. Just pursuing that answer a bit further and anchoring it 4 in your statement, if you go to page 5 of your statement 5 and look at the third paragraph on that page, please, 6 you will see that you say, after having described the 7 decision to put crews of four in SDBA to fight the fire 8 on the 4th and 5th floors, you then go on to say: 9 "This then enabled me to push EDBA crews through to 10 work the floors above the fire to the lowest floors 11 where FSGs had been identified. This strategy was 12 outside policy, it was purely practical firefighting." 13 That is essentially what you've told us earlier 14 today. I want to focus on which floors we're talking 15 about. 16 Which were the lowest floors where FSGs had been 17 identified? 18 A. I can't remember which at that point of the incident. 19 I mean, the lowest floor we had an FSG was the 20 3rd floor, which I searched with Gareth Cook very early 21 on in the incident. There were FSGs on a number of 22 lower floors, but they were starting to be cleared 23 relatively quickly as EDBA crews were pushing on. So in 24 terms of the timeline of the incident, I'm kind of 25 unsure, I'm sorry.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 177</p>	<p>1 we were pushing them, deploying as many crews as we 2 could to try to resolve that to try to enable them to 3 get further. 4 The bit that you struggle with is if you then deploy 5 a crew and you get a firefighter emergency and you lose 6 a crew, it then suddenly diverts your firefighting 7 effort to go and find those firefighters, so we needed 8 to keep that rescue operation as continuous as we could 9 and really push hard to go to those upper floors. 10 Q. Focusing on the three floors you've referred to above 11 the 11th, you said 14th, 16th and 18th, you said the 12 highest floor to which you recall deploying an EDBA crew 13 was the 14th. First of all -- 14 A. At that point. 15 Q. At that point. Which point are you talking about? 16 A. So I think at the stage of the incident where I'm still 17 working -- SDBA crews were working pretty much at some 18 point up to the 10th, because as we started to win the 19 floors, it started to become a little bit easier. We 20 were able to reposition some of the hoses out of the dry 21 risers then to upper floors which then allowed us to 22 extend a little bit higher. 23 But pushing on on that, there were specific crews 24 that I had asked to push on past the 11th and really 25 outside of where they were to see how far they could</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 179</p>
<p>1 Q. During the time that you were responsible for or 2 assisting with deployments in response to FSGs at the 3 bridgehead, what was the highest floor to which you 4 recall sending an EDBA crew in response to an FSG call? 5 A. Once we'd gone to systematic searching, I think probably 6 the 14th. 7 Q. Do you have a recollection of that? 8 A. I remember sending a crew to the 14th, yeah. That's 9 when I asked them to go as far as you can. So it's back 10 to my earlier statement where I was told that the 11th 11 is bad beyond belief, and I asked a crew that we -- we 12 had mounting FSGs still that were live and there were 13 a number of floors that particularly stayed with me. 14 One was on the 16th floor and one was on the 18th floor. 15 And I was desperate to get crews there. I mean 16 desperate to get crews there. 17 Q. Do you remember the flat number on the 16th floor? 18 A. I really don't. I remembered the flat numbers, but as 19 time has gone on, I've forgot those, but I knew the 20 floors. And I knew they were dotted around the 21 building, but those in particular because of the 22 information we were getting that there was multiple 23 people in specific flats on those floors. But we knew 24 until we managed to get crews to be able to get that far 25 and to get water, we were struggling to get to them. So</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 178</p>	<p>1 get, and they were saying they got to the 13th, top of 2 the 14th, but couldn't get any further. 3 Later on in the incident, when they started to win 4 the fight for the 11th, they were able to push on 5 further. 6 Q. Do you recall which station the crew you deployed to the 7 14th floor came from? 8 A. The first one was East Ham, Foxtrot 44. 9 Q. How many, four? 10 A. I think I sent in a crew of five. 11 Q. And how far did they get? 12 A. They pushed on past the 11th, got to the 12th, did 13 a cursory search, raced to the 13th they said, and then 14 on the 13th, in the stairwell, you do kind of five steps 15 and you do a mezzanine, and at that point they were 16 pretty beat up and they felt they would not have got 17 back. 18 So they told me there were some casualties, which we 19 knew later on, there were some casualties in the lobby 20 of the 13th floor, but they were clearly deceased. They 21 came back and gave me that information. 22 Q. We've got a deployment of a crew of five from East Ham 23 after 7 am, which is quite late into the incident. 24 Does that seem right to you? 25 A. No, it was well before that.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 180</p>

<p>1 Q. You say they got to the 14th, did they?</p> <p>2 A. That's what they told me.</p> <p>3 Q. Did they effect a rescue there?</p> <p>4 A. There was no rescue they could -- they only poked their</p> <p>5 head into the 14th. It was too hot. They were melting,</p> <p>6 they said. That's when they came back and told me it's</p> <p>7 just far, far too hot for them to go without water to</p> <p>8 effect that rescue. So the tactic at that point was to</p> <p>9 push and try and calm the 11th down. We were never</p> <p>10 going to put it all out, we just needed to get to</p> <p>11 a point where it made conditions better to push crews</p> <p>12 higher.</p> <p>13 Q. Who was doing the debriefing when crews came down?</p> <p>14 Obviously you were; what about Richard Welch, was he</p> <p>15 taking debriefs as well?</p> <p>16 A. Yes, and Louisa De Silvo and Brien O'Keeffe around the</p> <p>17 entry control board.</p> <p>18 Q. Did you all confer about particular debriefs, so you</p> <p>19 each knew what every debrief involved?</p> <p>20 A. I wouldn't say every debrief, but certainly as debriefs</p> <p>21 came, we were conferring, certainly myself and</p> <p>22 Richard Welch, around tactics and progression, how was</p> <p>23 the plan working, how far were we pushing crews, what</p> <p>24 were the conditions against the FSGs and how far we</p> <p>25 could really push them. But, you know, in between that</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 181</p>	<p>1 pressure punching down the stairwell as you had those</p> <p>2 crews punching up.</p> <p>3 To their credit, they wanted to push on, but at some</p> <p>4 point I had to stop them because we were desperate to</p> <p>5 get the FSGs, really desperate to get them, but what</p> <p>6 happened was the crews were getting soaked with water</p> <p>7 because of the jet as they were going up the stairs and</p> <p>8 then going into a fire compartment and getting boiled.</p> <p>9 They were still trying to push through to do that. In</p> <p>10 the end, we had to fix that water because they were</p> <p>11 getting punished.</p> <p>12 Q. To go back to my question, do you remember when you</p> <p>13 deployed an EDBA crew to the 16th floor?</p> <p>14 A. No, I can't remember the time, I'm sorry.</p> <p>15 Q. The same question for the 18th floor, do you have any</p> <p>16 recollection of when?</p> <p>17 A. In my command, I don't think I ever got to the 18th</p> <p>18 floor.</p> <p>19 Q. Can we take it that the 14th was the upper limit of the</p> <p>20 floors to which you actually sent EDBA crews?</p> <p>21 A. Yes.</p> <p>22 Q. Deployed EDBA crews.</p> <p>23 A. Yes, because of the conditions that were first at the</p> <p>24 9th and certainly then pushing the 10th and the 11th.</p> <p>25 The 11th was particularly the one where crews were</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 183</p>
<p>1 time, you know, you had various systems going on on the</p> <p>2 ground floor. I had a firefighter rehab bit around the</p> <p>3 corner because firefighters were coming down and</p> <p>4 collapsing with exhaustion, we were trying to look after</p> <p>5 them, and we had a casualty handling area on the other</p> <p>6 side where we were taking casualties out.</p> <p>7 Q. That's the 14th.</p> <p>8 Looking at the 16th, you say you sent crews to the</p> <p>9 16th floor.</p> <p>10 Do you remember when you deployed an EDBA crew --</p> <p>11 I'm assuming you mean an EDBA crew -- to the 16th floor?</p> <p>12 A. No, but it was coming towards my period in command when</p> <p>13 we -- because we'd encountered a number of problems as</p> <p>14 well during that part.</p> <p>15 So Grenfell wasn't a wet riser, it was a dry riser,</p> <p>16 which meant we had to connect our hoses externally into</p> <p>17 the dry riser inlet. During a period of the night where</p> <p>18 the debris had fallen off, it chopped the hose in half,</p> <p>19 which meant that we lost the internal delivery hose,</p> <p>20 which meant we lost water to the building. It meant</p> <p>21 myself and Richard and Andy Walton had to deploy crews</p> <p>22 underneath where the debris was falling to fix the hose</p> <p>23 to get the water pressure back on.</p> <p>24 During another period on the 11th floor, one of the</p> <p>25 70-millimetre water jets burst, so we had water under</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 182</p>	<p>1 saying it was just too bad.</p> <p>2 Q. Can I just ask you to be shown a picture, which is</p> <p>3 MET00005774. This is a picture of the wall in the lobby</p> <p>4 on the ground floor. It says at the top: "Above 10</p> <p>5 EDBA, Below 10 SDBA". Pete Wolfenden has told us that</p> <p>6 he wrote that up there.</p> <p>7 Do you have a recollection of a discussion about the</p> <p>8 10th floor being the boundary between SDBA and EDBA</p> <p>9 deployment?</p> <p>10 A. Yes.</p> <p>11 Q. When was that discussion with Pete Wolfenden?</p> <p>12 A. No, I didn't have that discussion with Pete Wolfenden.</p> <p>13 Q. Let me take it in stages.</p> <p>14 First of all, who did you have the discussion with?</p> <p>15 A. I spoke to Richard and had this discussion with</p> <p>16 Nick Myatt, who was looking after the pool of resources,</p> <p>17 and what he was doing was giving crews, before they got</p> <p>18 a detailed brief, an overview brief. So by the time</p> <p>19 they got to me, they had an idea of what the plan was.</p> <p>20 And Louisa De Silvo and Brien, who were taking</p> <p>21 information as crews were going to them with their</p> <p>22 floors and also as they were coming back to be</p> <p>23 debriefed.</p> <p>24 Q. Do you remember where the discussion took place between</p> <p>25 Pete Wolfenden and Richard Welch about that?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 184</p>

<p>1 A. No. I know I spoke to Richard but I don't know the 2 discussion between Richard and Pete. 3 Q. Do you remember whether he went into the lobby from the 4 bridgehead area to speak to Pete Wolfenden about that? 5 A. We were all in the ground-floor lobby, so a number of 6 discussions took place through the night in that lobby 7 area where the crews were congregating, so I would've 8 expected they would've spoke there. 9 Q. Do you remember being party to the discussion about the 10 division between EDBA and SDBA wearers at the 11 10th floor? 12 A. I can't remember being party to it, but I may have been. 13 Q. Would you like a break? 14 A. Yeah, I think I will take a break, please. 15 MR MILLETT: It has been indicated to me that it may help 16 you. 17 Mr Chairman, could we take 5 minutes? 18 Is that enough time, I should ask you? 19 THE WITNESS: Yeah, that's fine. 20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: 5 minutes enough? 21 THE WITNESS: Yes. 22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll say until 3.55. 23 Don't speak to anyone about your evidence. Thank 24 you. Go with the usher, please. 25 (The witness withdrew)</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 185</p>	<p>1 We talked about a deployment to flat 113 which was 2 changed and you said you didn't recall it, I think. 3 If it wasn't you, who else could've made that 4 change? 5 A. Richard Welch could've. 6 Q. Anybody else? 7 A. I wouldn't have expected that, unless Louisa or Brien 8 had some information, but they would've checked that 9 with either myself or Richard first. 10 Q. Where a change like that would be made, so that 11 a deployment or instruction to a crew as a result of 12 an FSG call let's say above the 11th floor was changed 13 so that it would no longer happen and you held the chit, 14 as it were, why was that not communicated back to the 15 guys handling the FSG at the wall and then back to 16 eventually the control room so that the call handlers 17 would know? 18 A. I don't recall someone's brief being changed. So I know 19 we had a system in place, we had EDBA crews and SDBA 20 crews and they were being deployed by myself or Richard. 21 Q. Going back to the question of the 10th floor being the 22 boundary between SDBA and EDBA deployments, was this 23 around the same time as what we've called, perhaps 24 unfortunately now, the heated or passionate discussion 25 between or with Watch Manager Williams and Station</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 187</p>
<p>1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Millett, before I leave you, how 2 are you getting on? 3 MR MILLETT: Fine. We will finish by 4.30. We have to 4 finish by 4.30. 5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If it turns out you're not ready by 6 3.55, it would be good if you could send the usher with 7 a message, otherwise the witness is sitting there 8 wondering what's going on. 9 MR MILLETT: Quite right. I was distracted rather. 10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That's all right, don't worry. 11 3.55, please. 12 (3.50 pm) 13 (A short break) 14 (3.55 pm) 15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Goulbourne? Are you 16 happy to carry on? 17 THE WITNESS: Yes. 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If at any other stage you think you 19 need a break, just do indicate. You don't have to wait 20 to be asked. 21 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 22 MR MILLETT: Mr Goulbourne, thank you for coming back. 23 Could I just clarify one thing that arises out of 24 some questions I asked you about a deployment to the 25 14th floor which was changed.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 186</p>	<p>1 Manager Wolfenden about deployment, or was it a separate 2 occasion? 3 A. No, it's just part of the tactical plan. It was to 4 enable a focus on specific areas, just to enable 5 simultaneous working. So we needed a plan to certainly 6 work on the floors below the 10th that were still 7 alight, that were still causing us some issues, because 8 don't forget, every time you went through the single 9 door from the stairwell into the lobby, you compromised 10 the stairwell with smoke. So we still had work going on 11 in there, but still were pushing hard to certainly focus 12 on those exceptionally bad floors to enable progress to 13 upper floors, knowing that we'd, you know, in the 14 earlier part of the incident had firefighters up to the 15 top, but now conditions were just so poor that we needed 16 to do some focused work on the floors to enable 17 progression. 18 Q. Do you remember any of the officers managing the FSG 19 calls -- at this time Wolfenden and Williams -- 20 expressing any concerns about the decision only to 21 deploy EDBA wearers above the 10th floor? 22 A. No. 23 Q. Once you'd made the decision only to deploy EDBA wearers 24 above the 10th floor, were crews continuing to present 25 at the bridgehead carrying chits of specific FSG</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 188</p>

<p>1 information for calls above the 10th floor?</p> <p>2 A. I don't recall crews presenting with chits. The sheets</p> <p>3 of paper that were coming from FSGs were being passed</p> <p>4 directly to the entry control. The crews were then</p> <p>5 getting their briefs, so from myself or Richard, to the</p> <p>6 floor they were going to, and then they were getting the</p> <p>7 FSGs that were on that floor from entry control.</p> <p>8 At that point, it may be that Louisa or Brien gave</p> <p>9 them the sheet of paper in case they wanted to carry it,</p> <p>10 but they were getting briefs as well.</p> <p>11 Q. Because I thought we'd come to a position where at the</p> <p>12 beginning when the bridgehead was on the ground floor,</p> <p>13 crews were coming into the bridgehead control with chits</p> <p>14 of paper with FSG calls on them.</p> <p>15 A. Very early, so very early in that point, but that's the</p> <p>16 point where myself and Richard stopped FSGs deploying</p> <p>17 crews by themselves.</p> <p>18 Q. Right. So very early.</p> <p>19 Let me take a question arising out of that.</p> <p>20 Can I ask you, please, to be shown LFB00001929.</p> <p>21 These are chits of paper. Most of them bear Pete</p> <p>22 Wolfenden's handwriting, all but two. The two are the</p> <p>23 middle ones at the top. Some are marked 04.10, 04.30,</p> <p>24 04.20, 04.10, 04.05, and they are all -- well, you can</p> <p>25 see the floors, some are for the 14th floor.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 189</p>	<p>1 specific sheet of paper, which I don't. There was</p> <p>2 a number of bits of paper that were passed, but</p> <p>3 I wouldn't know each specific one. But I certainly know</p> <p>4 that the FSGs were passing sheets of paper to entry</p> <p>5 control, so that's entirely correct.</p> <p>6 Q. What were you doing with the FSGs, such as the one we</p> <p>7 see second from the left, flats 111 through to 115 on</p> <p>8 the 14th floor? What allocations of EDDBA or SDBA were</p> <p>9 you making as a result of receiving that information?</p> <p>10 A. It depends on -- so if that was at 04.10, I really can't</p> <p>11 recall at what stage we were in terms of the</p> <p>12 firefighting operation and how far we could get. So if</p> <p>13 it was at the period of the night where we were unable</p> <p>14 to push those crews past the 11th, then we would've held</p> <p>15 those FSGs waiting to ensure that we are able to push</p> <p>16 those crews by knocking back the fire on the 11th.</p> <p>17 If it was further on, where I was asking certain</p> <p>18 crews to push on, then they would've been allocated --</p> <p>19 those who we allocated the 14th floor, they would've</p> <p>20 been given that information by Brien or Louisa and</p> <p>21 pushed on if I've allocated a crew to the 14th floor.</p> <p>22 Q. Did you know in general terms that this system was</p> <p>23 operating, that Pete Wolfenden was continuing to bring</p> <p>24 chits in with FSG information written on them from</p> <p>25 higher floors and giving them to the bridgehead to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 191</p>
<p>1 Do you remember seeing these?</p> <p>2 A. That piece of paper, no.</p> <p>3 Q. Watch Manager O'Keeffe gave evidence that he had found</p> <p>4 these in his tunic at the end of the night and handed</p> <p>5 them to the LFB after the incident. Do you remember</p> <p>6 yourself seeing Watch Manager O'Keeffe receiving chits</p> <p>7 like this from Pete Wolfenden or anybody else coming</p> <p>8 from the wall?</p> <p>9 A. No.</p> <p>10 Q. You don't?</p> <p>11 A. Sorry, no.</p> <p>12 Q. Does it surprise you to see these?</p> <p>13 A. No, I'm not surprised. If FSGs are getting information,</p> <p>14 it may be that he wrote that information down and time</p> <p>15 stamped it. What I wouldn't be sure is what activity</p> <p>16 occurred on the basis of what those pieces of paper</p> <p>17 were, especially if Brien found them in his pocket.</p> <p>18 Q. If that evidence is right -- obviously we'll have to</p> <p>19 consider it -- it does show that chits of paper were</p> <p>20 coming from the wall and being given to the bridgehead</p> <p>21 as late as 04.30 with FSGs above the 11th floor.</p> <p>22 My question is really first of all whether you knew</p> <p>23 about that, and I think you've said no. So my next</p> <p>24 question is: well, who would know about it if not you?</p> <p>25 A. Sorry, I thought the question was did I know about this</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 190</p>	<p>1 action?</p> <p>2 A. Yeah, we never stopped trying to receive the information</p> <p>3 from FSG.</p> <p>4 That particular sheet of paper looks like an overall</p> <p>5 summary of some of the information they've got rather</p> <p>6 than some single pieces of paper which were, "I've got</p> <p>7 an FSG on et cetera floor". So I would be shocked if we</p> <p>8 would've sent -- I certainly wouldn't have expected or</p> <p>9 would've wanted to send a crew with a sheet of paper</p> <p>10 that details the 11th, the 12th, the 14th and the 15th</p> <p>11 and the 10th on it. We just wouldn't deploy a crew in</p> <p>12 that way; that's too much work.</p> <p>13 Q. If you don't remember, obviously you'll say so, but what</p> <p>14 would you or did you do at the bridgehead in response to</p> <p>15 that? I think you said you would've held the chit back.</p> <p>16 What would've happened to the information?</p> <p>17 A. Right, so, you know, knowing that -- I'm not too sure of</p> <p>18 the timing -- but if it was the 11th floor, I would've</p> <p>19 deployed, which I did, crews to the 11th floor and said</p> <p>20 to the EDDBA crew, "You're going to go to the 11th,</p> <p>21 there's a firefighting jet" -- I think at that point,</p> <p>22 when we was at the 11th, there was a firefighting jet</p> <p>23 coming from the 9th. I would've told them, "There's</p> <p>24 SDBA crews protecting your access and egress, but you've</p> <p>25 still got serious fire below you". Then they would've</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 192</p>

<p>1 gone to Louisa and Louisa or Brien would've gone, "And 2 you've got an FSG in flat 81, 82, 83 and 84". 3 Q. In terms of floors, we have Station Manager Wolfenden's 4 evidence that he spoke to Group Manager Welch, as 5 a result of which Group Manager Welch told him that he 6 would try to get to or possibly above the 15th floor. 7 My question is: do you recall any such discussion 8 yourself? 9 A. No. It depends what time of the night. So very early 10 on in the night, when we felt we could make progress 11 because the fire wasn't extensive, we were pushing on as 12 high as we could, and certainly there was talks of 15th, 13 16th floor. But the information we then got back from 14 crews is that the conditions have just deteriorated, 15 it's just too difficult, so it's just around the timing 16 of that. 17 Q. This is a question I should've asked you earlier, but 18 this is a convenient moment to ask it: earlier on in the 19 night, do you recall a specific discussion about 20 difficulties or struggling to get above the 15th floor? 21 A. No, not specifically the 15th floor, but certainly heard 22 crews who had gone to do rescues struggling to come 23 back. I can't recall what floor they were from, but 24 certainly crews had really pushed themselves into 25 a place of difficulty and were struggling to come back</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 193</p>	<p>1 on the 11th and upwards. 2 Q. Pete Wolfenden said that he wrote that up there at about 3 04.30, "no one above 15th", but you say you don't 4 remember any discussion about that at that time? 5 A. Sorry, no. 6 Q. Do you remember any discussion that Station Manager 7 Myatt had with you about that subject, or any floor in 8 particular at about this time? 9 A. Sorry, no. I remember having a number of discussions 10 with Nick but, I'm sorry, I can't remember the content 11 of it. 12 Q. Can I also ask you then to be shown an exhibit of 13 Station Manager Egan's, which is MET00013049, which is 14 his fifth exhibit. 15 (Pause) 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I don't think that is going to work, 17 Mr Millett. 18 MR MILLETT: Let me try a different ... 19 (Pause) 20 Let's try a different reference: MET00015634. 21 Now, this is a whiteboard from CU7 which records, if 22 you see in the black writing on the right-hand side of 23 the whiteboard, "From SM Wolfenden @ 04.25 BA crews 24 committed to 15th floor", and then, "@ 04.45 BA crews 25 only committed up to 11th floor not 15th".</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 195</p>
<p>1 to a place of safety. 2 Q. Going back, then, earlier in the night to the time when 3 you first arrived at the bridgehead when it was on the 4 3rd floor, do you remember any discussion about crews 5 struggling to get above the 15th floor at that stage, so 6 from 02.20 or so? 7 A. Sorry, not specifically the 15th, but I do remember 8 a crew coming back, and I thought they came back from 9 a higher floor, maybe the 20th, saying they pretty much 10 ran and jumped and fell back to the floors. They didn't 11 think they was going to make it. 12 Q. I'm asking specifically about the 15th floor at that 13 early point. 14 A. The 15th floor, as a specific floor, then no, sorry. 15 Q. Moving forward in time, then, can I show you 16 a photograph, MET00005776. 17 This a photograph of the main lobby wall. It's not 18 that easy to see, but we can magnify it, underneath the 19 yellow wires just by the doorjamb we can see that 20 somebody has written "04.30 no one above 15th". 21 Does that help you recall any kind of discussion 22 about not deploying crews above the 15th floor? 23 A. I don't recall having that discussion specifically about 24 the 15th floor, but I certainly recall having 25 discussions about the difficulties and the fire spread</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 194</p>	<p>1 First of all, at 04.25, do you remember a discussion 2 either with Pete Wolfenden or Richard Welch about 3 committing crews to the 15th floor as recorded there? 4 A. No. But that seems that the message at 04.45 was 5 a clarification of the one at 04.25, which would confirm 6 the 11th floor issue that we were having. 7 Q. Is that your reading of that now or is that a 8 recollection of what happened on the night? 9 A. No, that would be my reading of that now. 10 Q. Looking at those two pieces of data, does that help us 11 time the decision whereby crews were limited only to 12 going to the 11th floor? 13 A. Yeah, the timing indicates the difficulties that we were 14 faced on what floor they were. 15 Q. Was that before or after, do you think, the decision was 16 made only to commit EDBA crews above the 10th floor, as 17 recorded on the wall that we saw earlier? 18 A. I would say that was probably afterwards because we were 19 focusing on SDBA below 10th for protection. 20 Q. Do you have any recollection of Station Manager Egan 21 coming to speak to you when the bridgehead was on the 22 ground floor? 23 A. I don't remember speaking to Dan Egan all night. 24 Q. You know Dan Egan? 25 A. I know Dan Egan.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 196</p>

<p>1 Q. He gave evidence and he said that there was a discussion 2 between him, you and Group Manager Welch in which he 3 expressed concern -- I'm summarising his evidence -- 4 that too much focus was being put on putting the fire 5 out and not enough on getting the people out of the 6 building. That was his recollection. 7 Do you recall that? 8 A. I don't remember seeing Station Manager Egan all night. 9 Q. Okay. Did you talk to him at all during the night? 10 A. I don't remember seeing him all night. 11 Q. You didn't see him, but did you talk to him? 12 A. If I saw him, would I talk him? 13 Q. Did you speak to Station Manager Egan by radio at any 14 point during the night? 15 A. No, I didn't speak to him at all, sorry. 16 Q. Okay. 17 A. That is, I don't remember speaking to him through the 18 night. 19 Q. Okay. 20 Let me turn to a different topic: stay put. 21 In your supplemental statement on page 3, in the 22 second paragraph, you say that you were aware that 23 Andy Roe had changed the stay-put policy. It's the 24 second paragraph. Do you see that? You say: 25 "The conditions within the building forced that</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 197</p>	<p>1 the stay-put advice? 2 A. Yes, potentially, but I really can't remember. I know 3 that there was so much information coming in, but, you 4 know, it could've been communicated, I may have missed 5 it, I just really can't remember. 6 Q. Mr Welch says in his supplemental statement -- I don't 7 need to take you to this, it's page 9 -- that he thought 8 he became aware of the change to the stay-put advice 9 around 08.00 am. 10 Do you remember anything happening around that time 11 which would trigger a recollection about a change in the 12 stay-put advice in your mind? 13 A. No, I was focused on other things at that time. I knew 14 I still had a rescue to take place. If I recall, 15 I remember us being really focused that we still had 16 a casualty on the 10th and 11th and I was deploying 17 crews to get those two. 18 Q. Where were you at about 08.00 am? 19 A. Still in the lobby. 20 Q. At the bridgehead? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Where was he at 08.00 am? 23 A. Richard? In the lobby. 24 Q. At the bridgehead. 25 A. Yeah, or around that area on the ground floor. He</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 199</p>
<p>1 change and at that point I had already begun systematic 2 searching due to the sheer volume of people." 3 Do you remember roughly, at least, what time you 4 learnt that Andy Roe had changed the stay-put policy? 5 A. Sorry, no, I don't. 6 Q. Do you think it was -- pressing that -- before or after 7 the bridgehead came down to the ground floor that you 8 learnt that he had changed the stay-put policy? 9 A. It wouldn't have been when I was on the bridgehead on 10 the 3rd floor, so it would've taken place when I was on 11 the ground floor, but I really couldn't give 12 a definitive time. 13 I saw DAC Andy O'Loughlin and Andy Roe periodically 14 through the night, so did Richard, and we were passing 15 information over our plan and our tactics and also 16 theirs, but I couldn't honestly tell you what time that 17 was. 18 Q. So you think you learnt about the change in stay-put 19 advice when you were on the ground floor? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Do you remember or know when Andy Roe actually changed 22 that advice or authorised the change of that advice? 23 A. The exact time, sorry, no. 24 Q. Do you know if anybody on the bridgehead was consulted 25 by Andy Roe or anybody else about the decision to change</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 198</p>	<p>1 could've been standing on the other side by the crews or 2 Nick Myatt or FSGs, but he was certainly on the ground 3 floor. 4 Q. But you don't remember him receiving that information at 5 about 08.00 am? 6 A. Sorry, no. 7 Q. Did the change in stay-put advice, as you recall it 8 happening, result in any change to the tactics or 9 strategy being used at the bridgehead? 10 A. No, we were systematic searching at that point because 11 we were dictated by the fire of how far we could go. 12 Q. Slightly different topic. Can I ask you to look at the 13 short incident log, please at page 22. I want you to 14 look at the time mark of 02.17.36. 15 You'll see there that at -- actually, I apologise, 16 02.38.21, you can see that a dangerous structure 17 engineer was the subject of a service request. 18 Do you remember that? 19 A. Yes. I remember we had the discussion and requested -- 20 or requested the IC, but the IC had already called for 21 a dangerous structure engineer. We were worried about 22 the stability of the building. 23 Q. If you look across to page 22, which is where I wanted 24 to start, we see the first request for that at 02.17.36, 25 which is a message from CU8, "REQUEST DANGEROUS</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 200</p>

50 (Pages 197 to 200)

<p>1 STRUCTURE ENGINEER".</p> <p>2 Now, at that point, were you aware that a DSE had</p> <p>3 been called for, do you recall that?</p> <p>4 A. Yes, there was some discussion -- I can't recall whether</p> <p>5 it was exactly that time, but we certainly called for</p> <p>6 a DSE. That was normal practice. We had real concerns</p> <p>7 that the building had potential to collapse.</p> <p>8 Q. You had only just arrived at this stage, so this would</p> <p>9 be around about the same time as your arrival. Do you</p> <p>10 remember actually having any discussion with anybody at</p> <p>11 that time about the need to call a DSE?</p> <p>12 A. No, I certainly had that discussion on the bridgehead</p> <p>13 though.</p> <p>14 Q. Do you know why, given that a DSE had been called for</p> <p>15 because of those concerns at 02.17.36, stay-put advice</p> <p>16 was still being given to those in the building.</p> <p>17 A. No, calling the DSE is normal practice if you are</p> <p>18 worried about and concerned about building stability.</p> <p>19 It doesn't potentially mean it's going to collapse. You</p> <p>20 want an assessment to be able to make a decision about</p> <p>21 what your tactical plan is going forward. We knew we</p> <p>22 had a severe fire and obviously -- I doubt if I would've</p> <p>23 been privy to that conversation at that point, but</p> <p>24 certainly later on in the incident we was concerned</p> <p>25 about how stable the building was.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 201</p>	<p>1 made a decision between us that it was still a persons</p> <p>2 reported fire, it was still FSGs, we were those people's</p> <p>3 last hope, and if it was bad, it was bad, but we had to</p> <p>4 carry on trying to rescue them.</p> <p>5 Q. In general terms, Mr Goulbourne, did there come a point</p> <p>6 when it was obvious to you that rescue from the top</p> <p>7 floors of the tower, the higher floors of the tower,</p> <p>8 would be impossible?</p> <p>9 A. No. No, we never gave up hope at all, not throughout</p> <p>10 the whole of that operation. People do miraculous</p> <p>11 things in incidents, and there was always a view that</p> <p>12 there could be someone in a void, there could be someone</p> <p>13 hiding somewhere, and we were their hope. We weren't</p> <p>14 going to give up, not a chance.</p> <p>15 Q. Did there ever come a point when you thought that</p> <p>16 evacuation was the only option?</p> <p>17 A. No. I always thought we were going to commit and get</p> <p>18 crews up to rescue people. And again, I probably just</p> <p>19 need to quantify that, you know, detailing how difficult</p> <p>20 evacuation was, that the conditions in the stairwell</p> <p>21 were really, really difficult. If I deployed, as</p> <p>22 I would, multiple firefighters on multiple floors into</p> <p>23 that, and then the elements of that combustion were in</p> <p>24 that stairwell, which there were, I had firefighters</p> <p>25 working for long periods of time just on their bellies</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 203</p>
<p>1 Q. Would it be in accordance with policy or normal practice</p> <p>2 to continue to give callers stay-put advice while at the</p> <p>3 same time calling for a dangerous structures engineer</p> <p>4 because of the concerns you've identified?</p> <p>5 A. Yeah, it could be. A lot of it depends on what you</p> <p>6 think and what part you think is subject to collapse.</p> <p>7 We call a dangerous structure engineer not because</p> <p>8 sometimes of partial collapse. It may be that we have</p> <p>9 a concern about other structures. It may be a walkway</p> <p>10 that might affect the operations that might collapse, it</p> <p>11 might be something to do with part of the building that</p> <p>12 may deliver a partial collapse. So it generally doesn't</p> <p>13 always mean that it's grave, we just want an assessment</p> <p>14 because of concerns.</p> <p>15 Q. Would the fact that you had concerns which led to a DSE</p> <p>16 being called not prompt you at least to consider the</p> <p>17 wisdom of continuing to give stay-put advice to callers?</p> <p>18 A. I think it would've been something for the IC to</p> <p>19 consider, but it depends on what they called the DSE for</p> <p>20 in terms of collapse at that point. I know what we</p> <p>21 called the DSE for later on in the incident, because we</p> <p>22 were concerned that the building was in grave -- not in</p> <p>23 grave danger, but we were just concerned that there was</p> <p>24 potential for collapse, but we had to make a decision</p> <p>25 about whether we were going to stay and carry on, and we</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 202</p>	<p>1 because they couldn't stand up, you wouldn't have been</p> <p>2 able to evacuate people in those conditions. You</p> <p>3 would've evacuated them to their death. It would've</p> <p>4 made the operation fail.</p> <p>5 Q. I have one more question, just to go back to something</p> <p>6 you said this morning when we first started talking</p> <p>7 about compartmentation and cladding.</p> <p>8 It was in the context of my questions about training</p> <p>9 and the fire in a high-rise in France, and you said:</p> <p>10 "... we hadn't really talked about what happens when</p> <p>11 it starts breaching each compartment up, because if I'm</p> <p>12 perfectly honest, that's something I don't think I've</p> <p>13 ever seen and didn't expect to see."</p> <p>14 Just a clarificatory question, did you mean you had</p> <p>15 never seen and didn't expect a fire travelling up the</p> <p>16 side of a building, or did you mean you didn't expect it</p> <p>17 to breach back into particular compartments?</p> <p>18 A. Yeah, we've seen fires travel up facades for a number of</p> <p>19 reasons. The most common one is balconies, external</p> <p>20 balconies. We've just had probably the hottest summer</p> <p>21 we've had in a long while. If someone has a BBQ on an</p> <p>22 open balcony, sometimes you get fire spread quite</p> <p>23 rapidly. I think we've recently seen a fire in Camden</p> <p>24 that did exactly that.</p> <p>25 But to breach the compartmentation on multiple</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 204</p>

<p>1 floors going that way, I've never seen anything like</p> <p>2 that in my life.</p> <p>3 Q. When you say "going that way", do you mean from the</p> <p>4 outside to the inside?</p> <p>5 A. Yes.</p> <p>6 Q. You've never seen that before?</p> <p>7 A. No.</p> <p>8 Q. That's what you meant, is it?</p> <p>9 A. Yeah. We've all been to fires that have breached</p> <p>10 compartmentation potentially on one floor, it's come out</p> <p>11 of a flat into a lobby or come out of a flat into</p> <p>12 a communal hallway or stairwell. But even on multiple</p> <p>13 floors, you would expect at some point the</p> <p>14 compartmentation to do what it does. You don't expect</p> <p>15 multiple failures on multiple floors. It's something</p> <p>16 I hope I never see again, if I'm honest.</p> <p>17 MR MILLETT: No.</p> <p>18 Mr Goulbourne, thank you very much. You will be</p> <p>19 delighted to know those are all the questions I have,</p> <p>20 subject to anything which might potentially emerge.</p> <p>21 Mr Chairman, I am, as it were, completed at 4.25,</p> <p>22 let it be noted. In the usual way, there may be one or</p> <p>23 two questions that occur.</p> <p>24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So you would like 5 minutes to check</p> <p>25 that?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 205</p>	<p>1 MR MILLETT: Quite so.</p> <p>2 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: -- just let me know.</p> <p>3 MR MILLETT: I hope it didn't have a silencing effect.</p> <p>4 That's the last thing I would want to achieve. So let</p> <p>5 me make that clear.</p> <p>6 There are two more questions I have, so I can get</p> <p>7 the witness back, please.</p> <p>8 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, shall we have Mr Goulbourne</p> <p>9 back, please.</p> <p>10 (The witness returned)</p> <p>11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think, Mr Goulbourne, there are</p> <p>12 a few more questions.</p> <p>13 THE WITNESS: Okay, thank you.</p> <p>14 MR MILLETT: They'll be very short.</p> <p>15 It's really to follow up on two things.</p> <p>16 You said at the end of your evidence that you never</p> <p>17 gave up hope. Does that apply to -- I know this is</p> <p>18 difficult to answer -- those who were calling from</p> <p>19 floors above floor 11, floor 14, 16, 18?</p> <p>20 A. Yes, we were never, ever going to stop trying to reach</p> <p>21 them. So to a man and woman, every single crew that</p> <p>22 certainly were working under our command at that point,</p> <p>23 we were still keen to keep on trying. Even when the FSG</p> <p>24 calls went quiet, we kept on going.</p> <p>25 Q. Given the conditions that you described as were being</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 207</p>
<p>1 MR MILLETT: Less than 5 minutes so I can let the witness go</p> <p>2 at 4.30 as promised.</p> <p>3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Goulbourne, it sometimes happens</p> <p>4 that counsel need time to check they haven't got any</p> <p>5 more questions, so I am going to rise now.</p> <p>6 Perhaps you could also leave the room, and don't</p> <p>7 talk to anyone about your evidence, of course. We'll</p> <p>8 get you back in no later than 4.30.</p> <p>9 THE WITNESS: Thank you.</p> <p>10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: There might be some more questions,</p> <p>11 but we'll have to see then. All right, thank you very</p> <p>12 much.</p> <p>13 All right, 4.30 or earlier.</p> <p>14 MR MILLETT: Yes.</p> <p>15 (4.25 pm)</p> <p>16 (A short break)</p> <p>17 (4.30 pm)</p> <p>18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.</p> <p>19 MR MILLETT: Yes. First of all, Mr Chairman, by saying what</p> <p>20 I said about there only being 5 minutes, I didn't mean</p> <p>21 to stop people asking me to ask questions. It may have</p> <p>22 had that chilling effect. I hope it hadn't.</p> <p>23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think I made it clear to you that</p> <p>24 if you need more time, and by extension if other people</p> <p>25 need more time --</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 206</p>	<p>1 reported to you by returning EDBA crews in the</p> <p>2 debriefs -- white hot, huge amounts of heat and smoke --</p> <p>3 what did you think was going to happen on those higher</p> <p>4 floors to allow you later to reach the callers there?</p> <p>5 A. We were going to make the conditions better by tackling</p> <p>6 the fire on each of the floors that were obviously</p> <p>7 feeding the difficult floors. Once we got it to</p> <p>8 a stage -- I'd never say we'd got that under control,</p> <p>9 but we'd get to a point where it was bearable, we'd have</p> <p>10 just pushed on. Certainly as a commander, I went up to</p> <p>11 the 9th and 11th to check how bad it was for the crews,</p> <p>12 and I was certainly on my belly. There were terrible</p> <p>13 conditions. But we had to keep on going. That's what</p> <p>14 those crews, especially all those BA crews, did; they</p> <p>15 kept on trying to get to the point of making conditions</p> <p>16 bearable to push on further.</p> <p>17 Q. But in reality, given the conditions you yourself</p> <p>18 observed on those higher floors, how could you have had</p> <p>19 any real hope that you would be able to eventually send</p> <p>20 crews to rescue people effectively?</p> <p>21 A. In my 20 years in the fire service, I've seen people</p> <p>22 survive all sorts, and you would be surprised. If you</p> <p>23 give up hope, suddenly you find them tucked away. Crews</p> <p>24 rescue people in fridges and cupboards and all sorts of</p> <p>25 places that they find survivable. We would not stop</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 208</p>

<p>1 until we've searched every single room, every single</p> <p>2 cupboard, every single door, until we're satisfied we've</p> <p>3 got everybody, and that would've been the only time we</p> <p>4 would've stopped.</p> <p>5 Q. What level of personal risk were crews exposed to by</p> <p>6 virtue of their deployment to those higher floors?</p> <p>7 A. We're still shocked that we brought everyone home.</p> <p>8 I think we were preparing for firefighters to die.</p> <p>9 Q. So shocked in a good way?</p> <p>10 A. Yeah, absolutely.</p> <p>11 We'd made a decision very early that we were going</p> <p>12 to push on trying to rescue people, despite concerns</p> <p>13 certainly later on about the stability of the building,</p> <p>14 and that was going back to my point that we were not</p> <p>15 going to give up hope, certainly myself and Richard had</p> <p>16 that conversation. And firefighters deal in just facts,</p> <p>17 and at some point, once you make a decision, you move</p> <p>18 the emotion out the way and the facts are those people</p> <p>19 were relying on us. We ...</p> <p>20 Q. All right.</p> <p>21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Just take your time.</p> <p>22 (Pause)</p> <p>23 A. We take our responsibility really seriously. It's</p> <p>24 an honour to protect this city, and if it's an honour to</p> <p>25 protect your city, you're not going to give that up.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 209</p>	<p>1 tomorrow. I know you've been very kind in allowing me</p> <p>2 a 9.30 start as a result of me asking you because we</p> <p>3 have quite a long day.</p> <p>4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, I apologise to everyone else in</p> <p>5 the room for that.</p> <p>6 MR MILLETT: I should too. It wasn't easy.</p> <p>7 But we've published the timetable for tomorrow and</p> <p>8 Monday. We're calling four witnesses from the control</p> <p>9 room and one witness from the control room of North West</p> <p>10 Fire Service.</p> <p>11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right.</p> <p>12 MR MILLETT: We had provisionally indicated we were going to</p> <p>13 be calling Sharon Lancaster from Essex Fire and Rescue</p> <p>14 Service, but we are unable to call her tomorrow or</p> <p>15 Monday because of the timetabling.</p> <p>16 We are going to call her on another day soon, I want</p> <p>17 to give that assurance. We do want to call her, it is</p> <p>18 our intention to do so. The difficulty is just fitting</p> <p>19 her in along with the other control room officers</p> <p>20 tomorrow and Monday. There's just no time in the</p> <p>21 timetable for it because there are a number of important</p> <p>22 questions we want to cover with her. So I'm sorry about</p> <p>23 that, but we will be calling her as soon as we can.</p> <p>24 So that means that for tomorrow the order is</p> <p>25 Alexandra Norman and Peter Duddy, and for Monday it is</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 211</p>
<p>1 It's painful that we lost 72 people that evening, but we</p> <p>2 were never going to give up on them.</p> <p>3 MR MILLETT: No, no. Mr Goulbourne, that's very clear, and</p> <p>4 we're very grateful for that explanation.</p> <p>5 Those are all the questions I have.</p> <p>6 THE WITNESS: Thank you.</p> <p>7 MR MILLETT: I want to say thank you very much for coming to</p> <p>8 us and assisting us with our investigations. We very</p> <p>9 much appreciate it. Thank you.</p> <p>10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I certainly add my thanks to that.</p> <p>11 It's really helpful to us to hear your account of what</p> <p>12 you were doing during the night in question, and we're</p> <p>13 very grateful to you for coming. I'm sorry if it's been</p> <p>14 a distressing and difficult experience.</p> <p>15 THE WITNESS: No, that's fine. Thank you.</p> <p>16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You're free to go now. If you would</p> <p>17 like to go with the usher, she'll look after you.</p> <p>18 THE WITNESS: Okay.</p> <p>19 (The witness withdrew)</p> <p>20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, now, Mr Millett.</p> <p>21 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, I want to say just one or two</p> <p>22 things about the timetable if I may.</p> <p>23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.</p> <p>24 MR MILLETT: There has been a little bit of behind the</p> <p>25 scenes work. We've published the timetable for</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 210</p>	<p>1 Debbie Real, Aisha Jabin and Angie Gotts.</p> <p>2 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good. Thank you very much. So</p> <p>3 we'll break now and start at 9.30 tomorrow.</p> <p>4 MR MILLETT: I'm most grateful.</p> <p>5 I should also say there's going to be a fire alarm</p> <p>6 test in 8 minutes' time, so I don't want people to be</p> <p>7 distressed about what that is. It's the usual Wednesday</p> <p>8 4.45 test, but as we're just after 4.30, I should just</p> <p>9 mention that.</p> <p>10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.</p> <p>11 9.30 tomorrow, then, please, thank you very much.</p> <p>12 (4.40 pm)</p> <p>13 (The hearing adjourned until Thursday, 13 September 2018 at</p> <p>14 9.30 am)</p> <p>15 INDEX</p> <p>16 MICHAEL WOOD (sworn)1</p> <p>Questions by MR KINNIER1</p> <p>17</p> <p>DANIEL MORRISON (sworn)14</p> <p>18 Questions by MS CURTAIN14</p> <p>19 PATRICK GOULBOURNE (sworn)58</p> <p>Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY58</p> <p>20</p> <p>21</p> <p>22</p> <p>23</p> <p>24</p> <p>25</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 212</p>

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