

<p>1 Monday, 17 September 2018</p> <p>2 (10.00 am)</p> <p>3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to</p> <p>4 today's hearing. We are going to continue with control</p> <p>5 room staff, I think. Is that right, Mr Millett?</p> <p>6 MR MILLETT: Yes, it is right, Mr Chairman. Good morning.</p> <p>7 I'd now like to call, please, Assistant Operations</p> <p>8 Manager Debbie Real.</p> <p>9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, thank you.</p> <p>10 DEBBIE REAL (sworn)</p> <p>11 Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY</p> <p>12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.</p> <p>13 Yes, Mr Millett.</p> <p>14 MR MILLETT: Good morning, Ms Real.</p> <p>15 A. Good morning.</p> <p>16 Q. Can I ask you first of all to give us your full name?</p> <p>17 A. It's Deborah Rebecca Francis Real.</p> <p>18 Q. Thank you.</p> <p>19 First of all, thank you very much for attending</p> <p>20 today and assisting us with our investigations; we're</p> <p>21 very appreciative of your efforts.</p> <p>22 My questions are intended to be short and simple;</p> <p>23 sometimes they're not, so if you need me to put the</p> <p>24 question in a different way or repeat the question, I'm</p> <p>25 very happy to do that.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 1</p>	<p>1 questions about your role in the LFB and your training</p> <p>2 and experience.</p> <p>3 I think it's right that you've been at the LFB since</p> <p>4 1991.</p> <p>5 A. Yes, I started as a temp in 1991 and then I took up</p> <p>6 a permanent role in 1992.</p> <p>7 Q. At the time of the fire, you were assistant operations</p> <p>8 manager in the control room; is that right?</p> <p>9 A. Yes, that's correct.</p> <p>10 Q. Is that still your role?</p> <p>11 A. Yes.</p> <p>12 Q. You were promoted to that role in I think 2005 to 2006.</p> <p>13 A. Yes, that's correct.</p> <p>14 Q. Turning to training.</p> <p>15 Following your promotion to AOM, if I can use</p> <p>16 a shorthand, in 2005/2006, did you have any training on</p> <p>17 the role of an AOM?</p> <p>18 A. It was more on-the-job training.</p> <p>19 Q. Was there any training, even in that early stage, as to</p> <p>20 how to manage a control room where there are multiple</p> <p>21 FSGs coming in?</p> <p>22 A. No, no.</p> <p>23 Q. In your statement on page 6, paragraph 2, if I can just</p> <p>24 ask you to turn to that, you say:</p> <p>25 "I have had previous experiences of fires in high</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 3</p>
<p>1 Similarly, if you need a break at any time, please</p> <p>2 just indicate and we can break. All right?</p> <p>3 A. Okay, thank you.</p> <p>4 Q. We have your witness statement dated 23 October 2017</p> <p>5 that you gave to the Metropolitan Police, and that is</p> <p>6 MET00007696.</p> <p>7 Have you read it recently?</p> <p>8 A. I have, yes.</p> <p>9 Q. Can you confirm that it's accurate?</p> <p>10 A. It is.</p> <p>11 Q. And that its contents are true?</p> <p>12 A. Yes.</p> <p>13 Q. We have two examples to that, which we don't I think</p> <p>14 need to put up necessarily yet: MET00013082, and</p> <p>15 MET00013083.</p> <p>16 Are you content for your statement and its exhibits,</p> <p>17 as well as what you're going to tell us, to stand as</p> <p>18 your evidence to the inquiry?</p> <p>19 A. Yes, I am.</p> <p>20 Q. Have you discussed your statement or the evidence that</p> <p>21 you are going to give to us with anybody before coming</p> <p>22 here today?</p> <p>23 A. No, I haven't.</p> <p>24 Q. Thank you.</p> <p>25 Can I start then by asking you, first of all, some</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 2</p>	<p>1 rise buildings such as the Lakanal fire in 2009. On the</p> <p>2 day of Lakanal I was an AOM and went over to a CRO who</p> <p>3 was taking an FSG call, which I listened to as the AOM.</p> <p>4 The caller sadly passed away whilst on the phone."</p> <p>5 What was your role in the control room on the night</p> <p>6 of the Lakanal House fire, can you remember?</p> <p>7 A. So I was assistant operations manager, a supervisor.</p> <p>8 Q. Do you remember how many FSG calls there were on that</p> <p>9 night, on that incident?</p> <p>10 A. I don't remember how many. At a guess, I'd say maybe</p> <p>11 eight or ten.</p> <p>12 Q. What lessons with regard to the control room do you</p> <p>13 remember being learnt as a result of the Lakanal House</p> <p>14 experience?</p> <p>15 A. So, personally, the belief that once the Fire Brigade</p> <p>16 turned up at an incident, the expectation that they</p> <p>17 would rescue people was -- it didn't always happen.</p> <p>18 Q. So can I summarise what you just the said to me that as</p> <p>19 a result of Lakanal, your personal take-away, if you</p> <p>20 like, was that it wasn't always necessarily the case</p> <p>21 that crews would respond to an FSG call that you were</p> <p>22 taking?</p> <p>23 A. And be able to rescue the people.</p> <p>24 Q. Did you have any specific training following Lakanal?</p> <p>25 A. Just FSG training, just normal training that everybody</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 4</p>

1 **else had.**
 2 Q. Does that mean that between 2005/2006, when you started
 3 and after Lakanal House, you didn't have any training,
 4 but as a result of Lakanal House you had FSG training?
 5 **A. We had FSG training. There was certain changes to FSG**
 6 **guidance, so we did refresher training and I remember**
 7 **doing a workshop with the command unit.**
 8 Q. When was that? Do you remember the dates roughly?
 9 **A. So the last workshop I did was in 2016, with the command**
 10 **unit.**
 11 Q. That was the command unit, was it?
 12 **A. Yes, yes.**
 13 Q. Did the command unit crews come to the control room?
 14 **A. Yes, they did, yes.**
 15 Q. We had some evidence about that from Alex Norman last
 16 week.
 17 **A. Yes.**
 18 Q. I don't know whether you're familiar with that, but she
 19 described a training session where command unit officers
 20 came to the control room and the FSG communications and
 21 call handling was trained on.
 22 **A. Yes, it was like scenario-based training.**
 23 Q. Yes. Right. So 2016.
 24 Have you personally been involved in any other fires
 25 in high-rise buildings, other than Lakanal House, where

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1 there have been multiple FSG calls?
 2 **A. Not multiple FSG, no.**
 3 Q. What's the highest number of FSG calls that you have
 4 ever had to handle in your career from a single
 5 incident?
 6 **A. So I would say Lakanal.**
 7 Q. Lakanal?
 8 **A. Yes.**
 9 Q. Were you in the control room on day of the Adair Tower
 10 fire?
 11 **A. No.**
 12 Q. At page 3 of your statement, if I can just ask you to go
 13 back to that, you say in paragraph 1, in the middle of
 14 the paragraph:
 15 "The system that we now use is called 'VISION'. It
 16 is about 2 years old and I have received training in
 17 using the system. We received very little refresher
 18 training. There are occasional glitches when the system
 19 'VISION' doesn't recognise the address given by the
 20 caller."
 21 You go on to explain what problems that causes.
 22 In your experience, given the lack of refresher
 23 training as you describe here in your statement, have
 24 you ever experienced difficulties in practice in using
 25 the Vision system?

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1 **A. Yes.**
 2 Q. What sort of difficulties?
 3 **A. Not being able to find addresses.**
 4 Q. Anything else?
 5 **A. So Vision works on postcodes.**
 6 Q. Right.
 7 **A. So difficulties when people don't know their postcode,**
 8 **and inputting addresses and the system not recognising**
 9 **them.**
 10 Q. Right. So address-finding is one.
 11 **A. Yes.**
 12 Q. Any other difficulties?
 13 **A. There have been other issues when Vision first came in.**
 14 **They seem to have been resolved.**
 15 Q. On the night of the Grenfell fire in June 2017, do you
 16 remember having any difficulties using the Vision system
 17 then?
 18 **A. No.**
 19 Q. Can I then turn to another topic, which is FSG and stay
 20 put.
 21 On page 3 of your witness statement, which we're
 22 still on, in the last paragraph on that page, you talk
 23 about the stay-put policy, and you say in the second
 24 line there:
 25 "The standard guidance given to callers who are

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1 inside a high rise building is to 'stay put' if they are
 2 not affected by the fire."
 3 Just pausing there, how do you understand the word
 4 "affected" there?
 5 **A. So if the fire is in their property, that's how**
 6 **I understand "affected by fire".**
 7 Q. I should've asked you a question before that.
 8 The way you've defined it there, does that come out
 9 of your understanding of LFB policy?
 10 **A. Yes.**
 11 Q. Right.
 12 **A. Yes.**
 13 Q. Perhaps I should just show you that. It's policy 539,
 14 which is "Emergency call management", which is at tab 3
 15 of our policies bundle. If I can ask you to look at
 16 page 16, which is appendix 3, in the fourth paragraph
 17 there, it says:
 18 "You are usually safest to remain in your premises
 19 unless affected by fire, heat or smoke. If the
 20 situation changes, you should leave your premises and
 21 dial 999, if you need further assistance."
 22 Staying on your statement and looking at the word
 23 "affected" in that sentence there, how would a flat or
 24 a house be affected by heat, fire or smoke?
 25 **A. So my understanding would be that the fire had actually**

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<p>1 moved into their property from another flat.</p> <p>2 Q. What about smoke?</p> <p>3 A. Again, my understanding is if their property was</p> <p>4 smoke-filled, the whole property was smoke-filled.</p> <p>5 Q. This may sound a slightly vague question, but how much</p> <p>6 smoke would you, as a control room operator or AOM,</p> <p>7 think was necessary to be in a flat before it was</p> <p>8 affected so that you would then no longer advise</p> <p>9 an occupant to stay put?</p> <p>10 A. I don't really know, to be honest.</p> <p>11 Q. Going back to your statement, you also say in the same</p> <p>12 paragraph, four lines down:</p> <p>13 "A change in the guidance can only be made by a</p> <p>14 Senior Manager in the control room or by a senior</p> <p>15 officer at the scene. This decision is not made by an</p> <p>16 OM or AOM in the control room."</p> <p>17 Are you familiar with London Fire Brigade</p> <p>18 policy 790, "Fire survival guidance calls"?</p> <p>19 A. I would have to see it to --</p> <p>20 Q. Okay, perhaps that can come up, please. It's in our</p> <p>21 policy bundle at tab 5.</p> <p>22 This is LFB policy 790 current as at June 2017.</p> <p>23 Does this look familiar to you?</p> <p>24 A. I believe I have seen it, yes.</p> <p>25 Q. Do you think you might have had some training on this?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 9</p>	<p>1 commander, having spoken first to the control room?</p> <p>2 A. Control, yes.</p> <p>3 Q. Senior officers in the control room.</p> <p>4 A. Yes.</p> <p>5 Q. That's true of a high-rise residential block, is it?</p> <p>6 A. Yes. Yes.</p> <p>7 Q. Prior to the night of the Grenfell Tower fire, had you</p> <p>8 had any experience of any senior manager, an AOM or OM,</p> <p>9 in the control room changing the standing stay-put</p> <p>10 advice for a high-rise residential block from stay put</p> <p>11 to get out?</p> <p>12 A. No, that's the first time.</p> <p>13 Q. Can we then turn to the night of the fire.</p> <p>14 Can we first look at the photograph we've had last</p> <p>15 week of the Stratford control room in the Brigade</p> <p>16 control report, which is page 175. Just to remind us</p> <p>17 all about that, that's LFB00004790. There it is.</p> <p>18 Can you tell us where you were sitting, to the best</p> <p>19 of your recollection, Ms Real, on the night of</p> <p>20 Grenfell Tower? This is a photograph of the Stratford</p> <p>21 control room.</p> <p>22 A. So where the operations manager is sitting in the middle</p> <p>23 at the back, I was to their right-hand side looking --</p> <p>24 yes, that's correct -- to the right-hand side, the</p> <p>25 right-hand position.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 11</p>
<p>1 A. Yes.</p> <p>2 Q. Can I ask you to look, please, at paragraph 8.7, which</p> <p>3 is on page 5. It says:</p> <p>4 "In exceptional circumstances an IC may consider</p> <p>5 informing control that their advice to FSG callers</p> <p>6 should be altered e.g. to attempt to leave their</p> <p>7 property. The IC should remember that this advice may</p> <p>8 be contrary to National Policy for control staff on FSGs</p> <p>9 and liaison with the officer in charge at control will</p> <p>10 be required for agreement to change the prescriptive</p> <p>11 advice."</p> <p>12 So when you say in your statement that the decision</p> <p>13 would not be made by an OM or AOM in the control room,</p> <p>14 I just wonder whether that's really right in light of</p> <p>15 the policy here that we see?</p> <p>16 A. So it would come from the incident commander at the</p> <p>17 scene. But, yes, they would have a discussion with</p> <p>18 whoever was in charge at control.</p> <p>19 Q. Right.</p> <p>20 A. But I believe the actual decision would come from the</p> <p>21 incident.</p> <p>22 Q. I see.</p> <p>23 So do I understand your evidence this way: that</p> <p>24 a change in the standing stay-put advice would only be</p> <p>25 made with the ultimate permission of the incident</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 10</p>	<p>1 Q. You say the right-hand side; right-hand of the picture</p> <p>2 or --</p> <p>3 A. As you're looking at the picture.</p> <p>4 Q. Who were you sitting next to?</p> <p>5 A. So the operations manager, Alex Norman.</p> <p>6 Q. Who were you facing?</p> <p>7 A. So I was facing several control officers.</p> <p>8 Q. Do you remember who they were?</p> <p>9 A. So to my left I had Pam Jones and Yvonne Adams.</p> <p>10 Opposite me was Christine Howson, Sarah Russell,</p> <p>11 Angie Gotts and Sharon Darby. I could see everybody</p> <p>12 really in the room.</p> <p>13 Q. Were you numbering from the left or right in the list of</p> <p>14 names?</p> <p>15 A. So that was from my left.</p> <p>16 Q. From your left?</p> <p>17 A. Yes.</p> <p>18 Q. So from your left you had Pam Jones, then Yvonne Adams,</p> <p>19 then Christine Howson, then Sarah Russell and then</p> <p>20 Angie Gotts?</p> <p>21 A. And Sharon Darby, yes, and then Peter Duddy.</p> <p>22 Q. Sharon Darby on the radio?</p> <p>23 A. Yes.</p> <p>24 Q. Could you in general terms hear what they were saying</p> <p>25 when you weren't yourself engaged on a call?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 12</p>

1 **A. So at the beginning of the incident, I did hear a call**
 2 **that Pam took because she was to my left. But as the**
 3 **incident progressed, I didn't hear calls because it was**
 4 **just so busy.**
 5 Q. Did you get up and move about much?
 6 **A. I think I did get up a couple of times just to check how**
 7 **people were. But, no, I was just focused on what I was**
 8 **doing.**
 9 Q. On page 4 of your statement you mention a television,
 10 and you say in the fourth paragraph down in the second
 11 line:
 12 "At Stratford Control there is a TV in the room
 13 behind the supervisor's desk but I'm not sure if it was
 14 working that night."
 15 If it had been working, ie functional, operable,
 16 would it have been turned on?
 17 **A. It could have been, but the position it's in, most**
 18 **people wouldn't be able to see it anyway, so ...**
 19 Q. How often had you managed the control room at Stratford
 20 before the night of Grenfell Tower?
 21 **A. I can't say how often.**
 22 Q. No, but roughly --
 23 **A. Probably in a year, maybe once or twice.**
 24 Q. Okay. So you've had enough experience of the room --
 25 **A. Yes.**

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1 Q. -- to be able to know what was usual or not usual about
 2 it?
 3 **A. Yes.**
 4 Q. Would it be usual in Stratford to have that television
 5 on?
 6 **A. It would depend on the watch, if they decided to put it**
 7 **on.**
 8 Q. Did anybody ever tell you on that night that the TV
 9 wasn't working?
 10 **A. No.**
 11 Q. Did you know that Jo Smith, as she's told us, ordered
 12 that it not be switched on so that CROs wouldn't be
 13 distracted by it?
 14 **A. No, not on the night, no.**
 15 Q. Did you have any kind of picture at all from the
 16 incident ground as to what was happening at the tower?
 17 **A. No, not at all.**
 18 Q. Did that hamper you in your work in any way, just looked
 19 at generally?
 20 **A. No. No, because we were just getting on with our role,**
 21 **our functions and we didn't really have time to look at**
 22 **anything.**
 23 Q. On the night of the fire, what was your role initially?
 24 **A. So I was a supervisor, assistant operations manager.**
 25 Q. Assisting Alex Norman?

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1 **A. Yes.**
 2 Q. And you were there from the start of the incident?
 3 **A. Yes.**
 4 Q. You say on page 5 of your statement, if we can just look
 5 at that, in the third main paragraph, halfway down the
 6 paragraph that starts "At 01:13":
 7 "I made the decision to deal with all the make ups,
 8 carrying out mobilising and action plans."
 9 Just pausing there, what's an action plan, can you
 10 just help us?
 11 **A. So it's an action that's associated with a particular**
 12 **address or a particular incident type code. So it's**
 13 **a further action that we would have to carry out after**
 14 **taking a call.**
 15 Q. So can you give me an example?
 16 **A. So, for example, if you took a call to a road traffic**
 17 **collision, an action plan would be presented to order**
 18 **an ambulance, inform the police and to inform the**
 19 **station manager. So it's further actions.**
 20 Q. Can you give me an example of a further action or action
 21 plan in relation to this incident, Grenfell Tower?
 22 **A. So as the incident was made up, there were action plans**
 23 **to page senior officers.**
 24 Q. Right.
 25 **A. To contact Thames Water, Environment Agency, police. So**

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1 **each time the incident is made up, we would then update**
 2 **police and ambulance.**
 3 Q. Each time you did those things that you've described by
 4 way of example, did that involve liaising with the
 5 incident commander or did you just do that --
 6 **A. No, no, it didn't, no.**
 7 Q. Right, I see.
 8 Generally speaking, did your role in mobilisations
 9 give you any awareness of the seriousness of the fire or
 10 the nature of the fire spread at Grenfell?
 11 **A. So in the beginning it just, you know, seemed a normal**
 12 **high-rise call, which is standard to being made up to**
 13 **a six-pump fire. But as it was made up so quickly, yes,**
 14 **it became apparent that, you know, something had gone**
 15 **wrong.**
 16 Q. Yes.
 17 **A. Something was not normal.**
 18 Q. As you've just said, you became aware that something had
 19 gone wrong. At some point, while becoming aware of
 20 that, did you have any thoughts yourself about whether
 21 the advice to callers to stay put and await rescue was
 22 the right advice to continue to give?
 23 **A. I think I'd had a conversation with Alex at some point,**
 24 **sort of saying, you know, we didn't know what was**
 25 **happening, we didn't know if people were being rescued.**

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1 **We were taking all these calls, it was relentless, and**
 2 **we weren't getting any information back whether people**
 3 **were being rescued.**
 4 **So I think I remember having a conversation with**
 5 **Alex, you know, with some concern.**
 6 Q. Do you remember at what point in the night that
 7 discussion took place?
 8 **A. No, I can't put a time on it, sorry.**
 9 Q. Was it during the accelerating make-ups or was it
 10 afterwards, do you think?
 11 **A. It was during, it was during.**
 12 Q. Maybe we'll come back to that in a moment.
 13 Just going from the general question I asked you to
 14 the more specific, at page 5 of your statement, which
 15 we're on at the moment, you say two paragraphs on down
 16 the page:
 17 "I was aware of the large number of FSG calls that
 18 were being taken by the CROs and at one point the OM
 19 Alexandra Norman took 2 to 3 calls and I could hear her
 20 talking as she was sat close to me."
 21 When did you start to become aware of the large
 22 number of FSG calls, do you think? Tell me by reference
 23 to the number of pumps.
 24 **A. So I believe it was, looking back at timelines, probably**
 25 **about 01.30.**

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1 Q. Why do you say that?
 2 **A. Because I've seen -- I knew at the beginning of the**
 3 **incident, there was only a few calls, and it seemed to**
 4 **be quite some time before the influx of FSG calls**
 5 **started to come in. And I have seen evidence since the**
 6 **incident that it was around 01.25/01.30.**
 7 Q. At what point in time do you think you started to become
 8 aware that calls were coming in from all over the
 9 building?
 10 **A. I can't really remember. Sorry.**
 11 Q. Did you listen in to any of the calls at that early
 12 stage?
 13 **A. I don't think I did, no.**
 14 Q. Can I ask you to look at the operational response report
 15 version 2, LFB00004828, and turn, please, to page 87.
 16 Now, we have there -- it's on the screen -- at the
 17 time mark of 01.39.08, you take a call from SOM Smith
 18 who is calling for an update, and it goes on:
 19 "AOM Real explains that they are taking lots of FSG
 20 calls and states that it is now a 25 pump fire. SOM
 21 Smith asks if there are any long FSG calls where people
 22 are on the line and AOM Real states that OM Norman is on
 23 the line to someone. SOM Smith also checks if the
 24 system is coping and tells AOM Real to prioritise the
 25 FSG calls over the Resource Management Logistics

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1 notifications. SOM Smith confirms she will be attending
 2 Stratford."
 3 First question: do you know where Jo Smith was at
 4 the time you spoke to her as recorded there?
 5 **A. I believe she was in the car on her way.**
 6 Q. En route.
 7 It says she told you to prioritise FSG calls over
 8 resource management calls. Do you remember what you
 9 thought she meant by that?
 10 **A. So when I was on the phone to her, I remember stating to**
 11 **her that, you know, we were really busy, we were taking**
 12 **all these FSG calls. One of our roles is if there's**
 13 **a large incident, we have to take over the resource**
 14 **management logistics side of it, and we have to notify**
 15 **senior officers of large incidents. So I had mentioned**
 16 **to her on the phone that we were unable to do that**
 17 **because we were just inundated with calls and we had**
 18 **nobody free to do those notifications.**
 19 Q. Did you do anything in response to her instruction to
 20 prioritise FSG calls over --
 21 **A. So that just means that Joanne said to just deal with**
 22 **the FSG calls, rather than doing the logistics part.**
 23 Q. Did that mean that there was a delay, perhaps, in paging
 24 senior officers to get to the incident?
 25 **A. No, so this is not to do with officers attending the**

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1 **incident, this is like staff officers to notify them**
 2 **that there's a large incident going on.**
 3 Q. When you say "staff officers", can you give me an idea
 4 of what sort of rank?
 5 **A. So staff officer that represents the three top officers,**
 6 **the commissioner and assistant Commissioners.**
 7 Q. Okay.
 8 **A. So we page their staff officer to notify them of a large**
 9 **incident as it's being made up, just to make them aware**
 10 **of it.**
 11 Q. So when you were prioritising FSG calls, are you saying
 12 that wasn't at the expense of paging front-line people?
 13 **A. No, not at all.**
 14 Q. At that stage -- we're looking at 01.39 or so -- were
 15 you taking any steps to ensure that control room
 16 officers were making sure they got all the required
 17 information from callers?
 18 **A. No, I couldn't. I couldn't. I was busy doing all the**
 19 **mobilising and it was just impossible to support those**
 20 **control officers.**
 21 Q. Was anybody in the control room, to your knowledge,
 22 making sure that control room officers were checking or
 23 making sure that they got all information to do with
 24 flat numbers, conditions in the flat, numbers of people
 25 in the flat?

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1 **A. There was nobody available to do that.**
 2 Q. Same question about mobility issues, elderly, children?
 3 **A. No, there was nobody, no supervisor available to be able**
 4 **to do that.**
 5 Q. I see.
 6 Can I take you to a call summary that Control Room
 7 Officer Adams received.
 8 It's page 52 of the control report, Paul.
 9 She makes a call at 01.50.49 on the landline to
 10 a mobile phone allocated in command unit 8 -- just look
 11 at the top of the screen there -- to pass on FSG calls,
 12 and we can see from the text there what she does. She
 13 passes on two details in respect of two particular
 14 flats, 113 and 182, and they're summarised there.
 15 Underneath it, it says:
 16 "The Command Unit Operator asks CRO Adams if there
 17 is a priority for the calls being passed to them and
 18 asks Control to indicate a priority by smoke density."
 19 Then it continues about flat 182.
 20 Just focusing on that request to Control Room
 21 Operator Adams, if there is a priority, and asks control
 22 to indicate a priority by smoke density, first of all,
 23 did you know that Control Room Operator Adams had
 24 received that message and that request?
 25 **A. No.**

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1 Q. It would follow, I suppose, that you would not know
 2 whether she passed that on to others?
 3 **A. No.**
 4 Q. Would you expect her to have passed that on to you or
 5 Alex Norman?
 6 **A. In normal circumstances, yes. But at that time, just --**
 7 **everybody was just so busy.**
 8 Q. Going back to your statement, on page 5, please, in the
 9 sixth paragraph down -- probably easier to go from the
 10 bottom up, it's the second-last one -- you say:
 11 "During the morning I also answered the critical
 12 phone from other fire services and BT. They were
 13 passing me details of FSG calls that they were taking.
 14 I took the details of the calls and passed the
 15 information onto the Officer of the Day. I also
 16 answered the ESS radio channel where the police
 17 helicopter was passing information on to us."
 18 First of all, is that line recorded?
 19 **A. The critical line?**
 20 Q. Yes.
 21 **A. I don't believe it is, no.**
 22 Q. You refer to the officer of the day; who was that, do
 23 you remember?
 24 **A. That was Jason Oliff.**
 25 Q. I think you recall that he started setting up the

Page 22

1 whiteboard system in the control room at about 02.00 am?
 2 **A. Yes.**
 3 Q. Did you pass on to him information that you got from the
 4 critical phone?
 5 **A. Yes.**
 6 Q. You did?
 7 **A. I'd written it down on a piece of paper and passed that**
 8 **over.**
 9 Q. You put it on a piece of paper and handed it to him?
 10 **A. Yes.**
 11 Q. What did he then do with it, do you remember?
 12 **A. I can't be sure what he did with it.**
 13 Q. Did you have any other discussions with other fire and
 14 rescue services or with BT other than details of FSG
 15 calls that they'd taken?
 16 **A. Any other discussions?**
 17 Q. With any other fire and rescue service or with BT.
 18 **A. So they were all calls that they were passing through to**
 19 **us, FSG calls.**
 20 Q. They were all FSG calls, were they?
 21 **A. Yes.**
 22 Q. Just before we leave that paragraph, at the very end of
 23 that paragraph you say:
 24 "I also answered the ESS radio channel where the
 25 police helicopter was passing information on to us."

Page 23

1 Is that channel recorded?
 2 **A. No, I don't believe so.**
 3 Q. What communications equipment would those radio messages
 4 come into the control room on?
 5 **A. So that's the handheld radio.**
 6 Q. So who would have a handheld radio in the control room?
 7 **A. Sorry, it's an Airwave handheld radio.**
 8 Q. In the control room, who had the Airwave?
 9 **A. So it's just sitting on the desk.**
 10 Q. Is there only one or more than one?
 11 **A. I believe there's only one at Stratford.**
 12 Q. There's one at Stratford?
 13 **A. Yes.**
 14 Q. It's a loose piece of equipment, is it?
 15 **A. Yes. Yeah, yeah.**
 16 Q. It's on. Where does it sit?
 17 **A. Just on the supervisors' desk.**
 18 Q. So that was in front of Alex Norman, was it, at the
 19 beginning of the night?
 20 **A. It was probably nearer to me at the time.**
 21 Q. Nearer to you?
 22 **A. (Nodded assent)**
 23 Q. It was on a loud speaker, was it?
 24 **A. Yes.**
 25 Q. So you could hear clearly what was coming out of it?

Page 24

1 **A. Yes.**
 2 Q. Did you answer this radio channel by speaking back to
 3 the person communicating into the control room at any
 4 point?
 5 **A. I did at times, yes.**
 6 Q. Do you remember what you would tell them in general
 7 terms?
 8 **A. So basically it was they were passing information, what**
 9 **they could see, and we were just saying, "Received".**
 10 Q. We know you didn't have a heli-tele downlink at
 11 Stratford --
 12 **A. No.**
 13 Q. -- which worked on the night. Did that hamper you in
 14 your work?
 15 **A. At the time of the incident, I don't believe it did**
 16 **because everyone was just concentrating on what they**
 17 **were doing.**
 18 Q. Would it have been easier -- I know it's difficult with
 19 hindsight -- to do your work seeing visually through the
 20 heli-tele downlink what was actually happening rather
 21 than relying on what you were being told over the radio?
 22 **A. It may have helped. I don't know if we would've done**
 23 **anything different because it's not our decision to tell**
 24 **people to -- you know, our guidance is to keep people**
 25 **safe in their flat until they're rescued.**

Page 25

1 Q. Did you pass these radio messages you got from this
 2 radio channel to Jason Oliff at the whiteboard?
 3 **A. Yes.**
 4 Q. So far as you know, did he pass those on to the command
 5 unit?
 6 **A. Yes, I believe he was on the mobile phone.**
 7 Q. That would've included communicating these messages that
 8 you had received through this radio route, would it?
 9 **A. Yes, everything that came into him, he passed over.**
 10 Q. Can I ask you to look at page 120 of the control report,
 11 back to that.
 12 We can see there that there's a time mark of
 13 03.06.48. It says:
 14 "The Radio Operator at Brigade Control passes
 15 a message to Command Unit 7.
 16 "Charlie Uniform 7, er, the police helicopter has
 17 informed us they've got a thermal image camera on the
 18 south west corner. There's a heat source of people on
 19 the 17th floor and second from the top floor, er, also
 20 people on the 21st balcony."
 21 Do you have a recollection of taking that radio
 22 message on that radio channel?
 23 **A. No, I don't remember that, no.**
 24 Q. Were you aware generally that the police helicopter
 25 possessed thermal imaging capabilities?

Page 26

1 **A. No.**
 2 Q. Did you get wind of the fact that the command unit was
 3 getting these messages?
 4 **A. I wasn't aware of that message. I was aware that all**
 5 **the messages with information was being passed over to**
 6 **the command unit.**
 7 Q. Do you have a recollection of this message or this kind
 8 of message coming into the control room which would
 9 indicate that the police from their helicopter could
 10 actually identify a heat source representing persons
 11 high in the building?
 12 **A. I don't remember them talking about heat source. The**
 13 **messages that I heard were talking about floors where**
 14 **they could see people.**
 15 Q. Then page 125 of the control report a little further on,
 16 time mark of 03.14.22:
 17 "The Radio Operator at Brigade Control sends
 18 informative message to Command Unit 7.
 19 "Charlie Uniform 7. Erm, further information from
 20 the police helicopter, on the west aspect of the
 21 building, multiple occupants are three floors from the
 22 top. Over."
 23 Again, do you know who that radio operator was at
 24 Brigade control sending that message?
 25 **A. So the radio operator would've been Sharon Darby passing**

Page 27

1 **that message.**
 2 Q. She was radio operator all through the night, wasn't
 3 she?
 4 **A. Yes.**
 5 Q. So that would've been her.
 6 Do you know how she got that message from the police
 7 helicopter if not through the radio message on the
 8 Airwave radio that you've just referred us to?
 9 **A. So she wouldn't have been able to hear the Airwave**
 10 **radio. So it would've been someone that would have**
 11 **passed her that message to pass over to Charlie**
 12 **Uniform 7.**
 13 Q. These messages go to CU7; what about passing those
 14 messages over to CU8?
 15 **A. I don't know if they got passed to CU8.**
 16 Q. I am assuming you were aware that, around 02.20, the CU
 17 designated to deal with FSG calls changed from CU8 to
 18 CU7.
 19 **A. I wasn't aware at the time.**
 20 Q. You weren't?
 21 **A. No. No.**
 22 Q. Can I just ask you, then, to look, to make sure we have
 23 got this clear, at the short incident log, tab 23 of the
 24 documents bundle, and turn to page 22.
 25 In the middle of the page, at a time mark of

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<p>1 02.23.33, Sharon Darby puts a radio message which says: 2 "Key 3 "CU7 RUN ALL FSG CALLS VIA CU7." 4 Were you aware of that? 5 A. I wasn't aware at the time, no, I was focused on doing 6 the mobilising. 7 Q. Did you have access to the Vision log throughout the 8 night? 9 A. Yes, I did. 10 Q. If that had been inputted into the incident log by 11 Sharon Darby at the time, is there any reason why you 12 wouldn't have seen it? 13 A. I could've seen it, but the logs would've been massive, 14 the amount of logs on the system. 15 Q. Would a change in command unit dealing with FSG calls 16 have been an important matter, though, for the control 17 room managers to know about? 18 A. So it was more important for Sharon to know that so that 19 she was aware of any calls -- any messages that were 20 sent via service requests with FSG information, she knew 21 the command unit to pass it to. That was more important 22 for her to know. 23 Q. Was it not also, though, important for you, in your 24 position as AOM, to ensure that all the CROs and 25 yourself knew which command unit was handling FSG calls</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 29</p>	<p>1 If you go, please, to LFB00003113, they're there on 2 the screen. This is a manuscript version of a meeting 3 of the PRC for control of 24 July 2017. 4 You can look down the list of attendees, and you are 5 the first one named there, Debbie Real, assistant 6 operations manager. 7 Do you remember this meeting? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. This note was taken by somebody present and it's signed 10 by Andy Hearn, who was the chair. 11 If I can ask you to look, please, first of all, at 12 page 3 at the top, it says: 13 "Calls coming in - stay put advice given. 14 "- callers hang up and told to ring back if 15 worsens." 16 Was that generally the position in the control room 17 at the time? 18 A. On the night, yes. 19 Q. It was? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Then if you go to page 6, a quarter of the way down the 22 page, there's a time mark of 02.35, "Stay put advice 23 changed", and then some detail underneath that. 24 Do you agree that's about the time when the stay-put 25 advice was changed?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 31</p>
<p>1 at the incident ground? 2 A. It wouldn't have made a difference, really. 3 Q. Can I go to page 6 of your statement and ask you to look 4 at paragraph 1. 5 You say there at the the top: 6 "At some point in the morning the decision was made 7 to change the 'stay put' advice that we were giving to 8 callers. It changed to telling callers to escape. I 9 believe this decision to 'escape' was made by SOM Joanne 10 Smith along with the duty DAC Adrian Fenton and the OIC 11 on the incident ground. Joanne informed Alexandra 12 Norman of this decision first and she in turn informed 13 both myself and Peter May. I then made sure that all 14 the CROs were made aware of this decision. The callers 15 were told to 'get out' of the tower, by holding hands, 16 assist one another and to make a run for it. My feeling 17 about this decision was that it should have been made 18 sooner." 19 I've read that all to you. I have a number of 20 questions that arise from it. 21 First of all, do you remember what time or about 22 what time this decision was made? 23 A. No, I don't recall. 24 Q. Let me show you the debrief notes that we have, just to 25 see if that ties in with your recollection.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 30</p>	<p>1 A. Yes, it was around that time. 2 Q. Do you think that that was also the time that you were 3 told about it or became aware of it? 4 A. Yes, it would've been about that time. 5 Q. Do you remember who at the meeting mentioned the time of 6 02.35? Was it you or somebody else? 7 A. I don't know. I don't remember. 8 Q. In your statement you say that you believe the decision 9 was made by Jo Smith along with Adrian Fenton and the 10 OIC on the incident ground. 11 Were you privy to the discussions on this subject 12 between Jo Smith and Adrian Fenton? 13 A. No. 14 Q. You weren't? 15 A. No. 16 Q. Did you know whether they sought the permission of the 17 incident commander before being able to change the 18 advice? 19 A. I don't know. 20 Q. You don't know? 21 A. I don't know. 22 Q. What can you remember of the involvement of the incident 23 commander that you mention in your statement in the 24 decision to change the stay-put advice? 25 A. I believe they were on the phone to him.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 32</p>

1 Q. Do you remember whether they made the decision and
 2 communicated it to him, or whether it was a joint
 3 decision between the control room and the incident
 4 commander?
 5 **A. I can't say for sure. I can't say for sure. I mean,**
 6 **I believe Joanne was the instigator, but ...**
 7 Q. Do you remember exactly what the new advice was that was
 8 to be given to callers?
 9 **A. So it was to escape or get together to hold hands, to**
 10 **put wet towels and sheets over them.**
 11 **SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you like to have a break?**
 12 THE WITNESS: Yes, please.
 13 MR MILLETT: Okay, let's rise for a few minutes.
 14 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll have a short break now.
 15 Yes, you go with the usher, but don't talk to anyone
 16 about your evidence, please. All right?
 17 I think I am going to make this a slightly longer
 18 break than I might ordinarily do. I think the witness
 19 needs time to settle down and compose herself.
 20 MR MILLETT: That's a very good idea.
 21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm going to say 11 o'clock. All
 22 right? 11 o'clock, please.
 23 (10.50 am)
 24 (A short break)
 25 (11.00 am)

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1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? Do you feel happy to
 2 carry on?
 3 THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you.
 4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you do need a break, just make it
 5 clear.
 6 THE WITNESS: Okay, thank you.
 7 MR MILLETT: Ms Real, thank you very much for coming back to
 8 us. I know this is not easy, and I'm sorry, I'm going
 9 to have to just keep pursuing this line of questions --
 10 **A. Okay.**
 11 Q. -- to see how far we go.
 12 Can I ask you, if you don't mind, to look back at
 13 the document we were looking at, which was the control
 14 debrief notes at page 6. Halfway down the page --
 15 I should just say, if you need another break at any
 16 other time, just say, it's not a problem.
 17 **A. Sorry?**
 18 Q. If you need a break at any other time, just tell me and
 19 we can break again.
 20 **A. Okay, thank you.**
 21 Q. Halfway down the page, it says:
 22 "Advice - to wet towels over mouth.
 23 "- hold hands/stay together.
 24 "- get out - could be last chance."
 25 Do you remember who said that in the meeting, who

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1 referred to those words in the meeting as the advice
 2 that was given?
 3 **A. Not in the meeting.**
 4 Q. Do you remember whether that advice that CROs were told
 5 to past on was in those terms?
 6 **A. Yes.**
 7 Q. "Could be last chance"?
 8 **A. Yes.**
 9 Q. Do you recall going around telling people that that is
 10 the advice they had to give?
 11 **A. Yes.**
 12 Q. Do you remember what you told control room officers to
 13 say?
 14 **A. So it was that, to -- if there was more than one person,**
 15 **all get together, try and stay together, hold hands, and**
 16 **it was the wet towels or sheets to cover themselves, and**
 17 **to -- I think it was to run for it.**
 18 Q. How did you communicate that advice or that advice that
 19 had to be given? How did you communicate that to the
 20 other control room staff?
 21 **A. So I did it verbally.**
 22 Q. You went up to them and said, "You must tell them to get
 23 out at all costs" or these terms?
 24 **A. Yes.**
 25 Q. What did you tell them to say to callers if they had

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1 a caller who felt that, whatever happened, they simply
 2 couldn't get out?
 3 **A. It was that that advice -- I mean, I just went up to**
 4 **them once to tell them that advice.**
 5 Q. At that time, when you were going around the control
 6 room telling people to change the advice and telling
 7 callers to get out, did you yourself have any
 8 expectation that crews would be able to rescue
 9 residents?
 10 **A. Yes, there's always that expectation that they would.**
 11 Q. Were you ever aware that crews were struggling to get
 12 above the 15th floor?
 13 **A. No.**
 14 Q. Were there enough supervisors in the control room at
 15 that point, about 02.35 or so, to get around all the
 16 CROs to give them this advice?
 17 **A. We were able to do it, yes.**
 18 Q. There was you, there was Alex Norman and there was
 19 Peter May.
 20 **A. Yes.**
 21 Q. You all went round?
 22 **A. We were all able to go around and tell people, because**
 23 **it was important.**
 24 Q. Going back to your statement, in the last sentence you
 25 said:

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1 "My feeling about this decision was that it should
 2 have been made sooner."
 3 Was that your feeling on the night?
 4 **A. I think it was afterwards, in hindsight.**
 5 Q. Right.
 6 **A. Because of Lakanal as well. And, yeah, it was in**
 7 **hindsight, I think**
 8 Q. Given what you told us earlier about the lessons learnt
 9 from Lakanal no longer to always assume that crews could
 10 get to callers, once the advice changed, what
 11 assumptions did you have about the ability of crews to
 12 rescue callers?
 13 **A. At the time, I still wasn't aware that they were unable**
 14 **to get to the callers.**
 15 Q. Was that information you had or was that an assumption
 16 you were making?
 17 **A. An assumption.**
 18 Q. But in the light of Lakanal, the question is: why were
 19 you making that assumption?
 20 **A. Because we weren't getting any information that they**
 21 **couldn't, and it was still an expectation that they**
 22 **would be able to.**
 23 Q. Do you remember yourself making any efforts to get hard
 24 information about the progress of particular rescues
 25 from the incident ground?

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1 **A. I wasn't able to due to the fact of, you know, what**
 2 **I was doing, mobilising appliances, and I was just**
 3 **focused on that role.**
 4 Q. Can I turn to another subject, which is callbacks.
 5 Jo Smith gave evidence to the inquiry back in July
 6 that, as a matter of practice, the control room never
 7 calls FSG callers back unless perhaps they get cut off
 8 and are on a mobile.
 9 Is that your experience?
 10 **A. Yes, yes, we would not call someone back, definitely not**
 11 **on a landline.**
 12 Q. Can I just show you something then in the control room
 13 report, it's page 45, 01.43.48. There is a summary of
 14 a call:
 15 "NWFC [North West] take a call from a BT Operator in
 16 Nottingham who are passing on an abandoned call that it
 17 meant for the Brigade. The CRO says he will call the
 18 number back."
 19 Do you know whether on the night buddy control rooms
 20 such as North West would call people back or did call
 21 people back?
 22 **A. I don't know. I don't know.**
 23 Q. What about when the advice changed? Do you know whether
 24 they called people back at that stage?
 25 **A. I don't know.**

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1 Q. Turning to the question of the MPS and the LAS, can
 2 I ask you to look at the control report at page 92, at
 3 the time mark of 02.27.36. It shows that you made
 4 a call to the London Ambulance Service control room to
 5 inform them that a major incident had been declared by
 6 the London Fire Brigade.
 7 The first question is: is that something that's
 8 routinely done when a major incident is declared, call
 9 the LAS?
 10 **A. Yes, so as it was a call that I had already spoken to**
 11 **the ambulance, each time the incident is made up, the**
 12 **action plan would state to update the London Ambulance**
 13 **and police. So that was an update.**
 14 Q. At what point in the make-ups did that call requirement
 15 to the LAS take over? Was it six or eight pumps or
 16 higher?
 17 **A. So as soon as it's persons reported, an ambulance would**
 18 **be ordered, and then each time the incident was**
 19 **upgraded, you would go through to them and update them.**
 20 Q. Was it you doing that?
 21 **A. Yes.**
 22 Q. That's part of your action plan that you described
 23 earlier, is it?
 24 **A. Yes.**
 25 Q. I see.

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1 If you go, please, to the short incident log, we can
 2 see that a declared major incident happened at 02.03,
 3 and this is page 21.
 4 At 02.06.38 you can see:
 5 "SAD Make Up
 6 "TUP CU8 FROM GM WELCH THIS IS A MAJOR INCIDENT."
 7 Had you called the LAS prior to that?
 8 **A. So I'd spoken to the LAS on a number of occasions when**
 9 **the incident was made up pump-wise, and then when this**
 10 **message came in, I would've picked up that message and**
 11 **then called the ambulance service.**
 12 Q. Right, I see.
 13 **A. When I'd upgraded the incident.**
 14 Q. Your first call I think you said was when it was persons
 15 reported.
 16 **A. Yes, to the ambulance.**
 17 Q. To the London Ambulance Service. We have a time mark
 18 for that at 01.28.40. There's no need to look at that.
 19 Did you know the London Ambulance Service had called
 20 in at 01.52.56, or about then, to tell the LFB that they
 21 themselves were making a significant incident?
 22 **A. No, I wasn't aware.**
 23 Q. Can I just show you that. It's in the control report
 24 itself at page 54.
 25 At 01.52.56:

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1 "CRO Gotts takes a call from the London Ambulance
 2 Service who inform her they are making the
 3 Grenfell Tower fire a significant incident."
 4 You didn't know about that?
 5 **A. I didn't.**
 6 Q. What would the expression "significant incident" coming
 7 from the LAS mean in the control room?
 8 **A. It wouldn't mean anything to us. There wouldn't be any**
 9 **actions for us to take. It would be for the LAS.**
 10 Q. What would be the point of telling the LFB that the LAS
 11 had called this a significant incident?
 12 **A. It's just an update that they're also classing it as a**
 13 **significant incident.**
 14 Q. Would you pass that on to the command unit?
 15 **A. Possibly. I don't know if it was passed.**
 16 Q. We saw at the control report at page 92 that at 02.37.26
 17 you called the LAS to tell them that there was a major
 18 incident.
 19 Do you know why you waited half an hour or so after
 20 Group Manager Welch declared a major incident to pass
 21 that on to the LAS?
 22 **A. Was it half an hour? I didn't realise.**
 23 Q. Let me show you. If you go to page 92 of the control
 24 room report, we looked at this before, 02.37.26, that's
 25 your call to the London Ambulance Service. Then if we

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1 keep that open on one side of the page and then go to
 2 page 21 of the short incident log and the time mark of
 3 02.06.38, you can see that at 02.06.38 in the short
 4 incident log, right-hand side of the screen:
 5 "SAD Make Up
 6 "IUP CU8 FROM GM WELCH THIS IS A MAJOR INCIDENT."
 7 But that message doesn't seem to be passed on to the
 8 London Ambulance control room until 02.37.26, as you can
 9 see on the left-hand side of the screen.
 10 First of all, is that right? Was there a half an
 11 hour gap between the declaration from the incident
 12 ground that this was a major incident and you passing
 13 that message on to the London Ambulance Service control
 14 room?
 15 **A. So it looks like the IUP was 02.06. I'm not sure what**
 16 **time I picked it up. But I was also carrying out**
 17 **mobilising. It says there I'd picked up a make command**
 18 **units four. I believe I was still dealing with the make**
 19 **pumps 40 with action plans. So I had a number of people**
 20 **to contact and page, so that was possibly why the delay.**
 21 Q. When you made this call, were you aware at that time
 22 that the MPS, the Metropolitan Police Service, were also
 23 taking calls from people trapped in the tower?
 24 **A. I wasn't aware, no.**
 25 Q. Were you aware that staff in the control room, Adams and

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1 Gotts in particular, were providing FSG advice to the
 2 MPS?
 3 **A. No, I wasn't aware.**
 4 Q. You didn't know that?
 5 **A. No.**
 6 Q. Does that mean you can't help me understand why the MPS
 7 weren't told at that stage that the stay-put advice had
 8 changed?
 9 **A. No, I wasn't -- no, I --**
 10 Q. You can't help with that?
 11 **A. (Indicated dissent).**
 12 Q. Do you know if the MPS control room were ever told by
 13 the LFB control room that the stay-put advice had
 14 changed?
 15 **A. I don't know.**
 16 Q. When a major incident is called, as we've just seen, at
 17 02.06.38, what normally happens in the control room?
 18 **A. So from our point of view, we would upgrade the**
 19 **incident, major incident declared, and there would be**
 20 **a number of actions, a number of people to tell,**
 21 **a number of officers to page.**
 22 Q. Are you supposed to call RBKC?
 23 **A. Sorry?**
 24 Q. Are you required to or supposed to call RBKC, Royal
 25 Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, or the council --

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1 **A. That may have been an action. I do recall speaking to**
 2 **someone, but I think that was possibly earlier on in the**
 3 **incident.**
 4 Q. Let's have a look. Can I ask you to go to page 96 of
 5 the control report. At 02.42.38 we can see that you
 6 call London Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, LBKC, to
 7 report the major incident declaration.
 8 "The LBKC Operator says that they are aware and asks
 9 if the Brigade need anything from them. AOM Real
 10 explains that she is required to inform the Borough Duty
 11 Officer. The LBKC Operator gives the reference ..."
 12 And there is the number.
 13 Was that the first occasion on which the control
 14 room had called Kensington and Chelsea, the council, to
 15 report the major incident?
 16 **A. I can't be sure. I thought they possibly would've been**
 17 **contacted earlier, I'm not sure.**
 18 Q. Do you remember making any subsequent calls to LBKC?
 19 **A. I don't remember, no.**
 20 Q. Can I just ask you to look at one entry, which is at
 21 03.48.56.
 22 Well, let me ask it this way: were you aware of
 23 a call made at about 03.50 where the operator tells the
 24 control room that they've been in touch with the council
 25 and they're not giving a number and won't give a number?

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1 **A. No, I'm not aware of that call.**
 2 Q. Finally, can I just ask you one or two questions about
 3 a specific call.
 4 Can I ask you to turn back in the control room
 5 report to page 137 and look, please, at the time mark of
 6 03.33.46.
 7 You take a call from a female caller in flat 133 on
 8 the 16th floor who cannot get out.
 9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think we may have the wrong
 10 reference there.
 11 MR MILLETT: Yes, I do. You're quite right. Well, not
 12 quite.
 13 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It's the next one.
 14 MR MILLETT: You take a call from a female caller in
 15 flat 182 on the 11th floor. There are two calls that
 16 come in simultaneously, but it's the bottom of the page.
 17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: No, next one down.
 18 MR MILLETT: Paul, if we go to the bottom of the same page,
 19 03.33.46, last paragraph.
 20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: There are two with the same timings.
 21 MR MILLETT: "03:33:46 AOM Real takes a call from a female
 22 caller in flat 82 on the 11th floor who reports that the
 23 fire is in her bedroom and front room. AOM Real
 24 explains that the best advice is to leave but the caller
 25 states that they will not be able to do it. The caller

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1 says there are two adults and her daughter who is six
 2 years old, the caller says they have tried to get out
 3 but there is too much smoke and begs for help. AOM Real
 4 explains that she will tell crews again and if they
 5 definitely cannot get out then they should stay
 6 together, get on the floor and stay there for as long as
 7 possible. AOM Real asks the caller what her name is and
 8 she says 'Natasha' and AOM Real gives her name, she then
 9 asks what her daughter's name is and encourages her to
 10 stay calm for her daughter. AOM Real repeats the FSG
 11 advice and tells Natasha that the Brigade are trying to
 12 get to all the floors and she will pass on the details
 13 to the crews."
 14 Now, I've read that all to you.
 15 Do you remember this call?
 16 **A. I do, yes.**
 17 Q. You told them, as we can see from the summary, that you
 18 will tell the crews again.
 19 At that point, did you have any expectation in your
 20 own mind that the crews were going to be able to rescue
 21 the caller?
 22 **A. To be honest, I couldn't be sure, which is why I was**
 23 **telling her to get out.**
 24 Q. Yes. You say the best advice is to leave.
 25 Did you have, or did the control room operators

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1 generally have, enough information from the ground to be
 2 able to give very clear advice?
 3 **A. No, we didn't have much information coming back.**
 4 Q. When it says that you told them they should stay
 5 together, get on the floor and stay there for as long as
 6 possible, was that consistent, do you think, with the
 7 advice that CRO staff had been given to pass on to
 8 callers that in no uncertain terms they must leave?
 9 **A. Yes. Yes, so I had said on several occasions that the**
 10 **best advice was to leave. And, like I say, holding**
 11 **hands, staying together. But I do remember that she had**
 12 **said to me that she just could not get out, so I was**
 13 **trying to protect her and say, you know, just -- if you**
 14 **think you need to stay, to stay as long as you possibly**
 15 **feel you can, but the advice was to go.**
 16 Q. Do you remember whether you assisted her to assess the
 17 conditions outside the flat so as to know whether she
 18 could make a safe escape or not?
 19 **A. I didn't assist her. I believed her when she told me**
 20 **that she couldn't get out, so I assumed that she had**
 21 **tried.**
 22 Q. You assumed that she'd tried but you didn't go into the
 23 details with her?
 24 **A. No, I didn't, no.**
 25 Q. Normally, would that be the job that a CRO would do, to

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1 help the caller make an assessment, with the assistance
 2 of the CRO, of whether or not escape was possible?
 3 **A. Well, it's difficult because we don't know what the**
 4 **situation is like outside. So we could be saying to**
 5 **them -- you know, if we said to them to open the door**
 6 **and, you know, more smoke came in -- I didn't know what**
 7 **the situation was in the corridor outside her front**
 8 **door. She had told me that she couldn't get out, so**
 9 **I just assumed that it was so bad that she couldn't.**
 10 **But like I say, it's difficult to ask them to open**
 11 **the front door because, you know, lots more smoke may**
 12 **come in and make it worse.**
 13 Q. Did you have any information from other sources about
 14 the conditions in the lobby on that floor or in the
 15 stairwell?
 16 **A. No, not from other sources, no.**
 17 Q. Would it have assisted you to have that information from
 18 the incident ground?
 19 **A. It may have done, but at that time the advice was to get**
 20 **out.**
 21 Q. Whatever the conditions?
 22 **A. Yes, at that point it was, yes.**
 23 MR MILLETT: Ms Real, thank you very much. I have no more
 24 further questions for you myself.
 25 Mr Chairman, in the usual way, there may be one or

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<p>1 two that may occur, so I am going to ask you to rise for 2 5 minutes or so.</p> <p>3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.</p> <p>4 We are going to have a very short break so counsel 5 can consider whether there are any more questions they 6 need to ask you. If you would like to go with the usher 7 and be ready to come back at 11.30.</p> <p>8 THE WITNESS: Thank you.</p> <p>9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Please don't to talk to anyone about 10 your evidence while you're out. Thank you very much.</p> <p>11 All right, 11.30, please.</p> <p>12 (11.25 am)</p> <p>13 (A short break)</p> <p>14 (11.30 am)</p> <p>15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, I think counsel has a few 16 questions for you.</p> <p>17 THE WITNESS: Okay.</p> <p>18 MR MILLETT: Ms Real, thank you very much for coming back to 19 continue to help us.</p> <p>20 There are a couple I skipped over which I should've 21 asked you and didn't.</p> <p>22 Can I go back, please, first of all, to the control 23 report at page 45, which is the call from NWFC at 24 01.43.48.</p> <p>25 It's not necessarily a call you know about, but let</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 49</p>	<p>1 A. I don't know.</p> <p>2 Q. You don't know?</p> <p>3 A. No.</p> <p>4 Q. You were sitting, I think, as you told us earlier, in 5 the control room on that night opposite Control Room 6 Officer Adams.</p> <p>7 A. She was to the left of me.</p> <p>8 Q. Yvonne Adams. She was to your left?</p> <p>9 A. Yes, yes.</p> <p>10 Q. How clearly could you hear what she was saying to 11 callers?</p> <p>12 A. I couldn't hear anything, no, there was so much noise, 13 you could not hear specifics of what people were saying.</p> <p>14 Q. You couldn't hear the specifics?</p> <p>15 A. No.</p> <p>16 Q. So if I was to ask you about what you specifically 17 learnt from specific calls that she was dealing with --</p> <p>18 A. You could not hear, no.</p> <p>19 Q. Moving to a different topic, communicating the change of 20 stay-put advice.</p> <p>21 First of all, do you remember who told you or 22 instructed you to change that advice?</p> <p>23 A. So it was Alex Norman.</p> <p>24 Q. Alex Norman?</p> <p>25 A. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 51</p>
<p>1 me get your evidence about it.</p> <p>2 It refers to an abandoned call being passed on 3 that's meant for the Brigade.</p> <p>4 In general terms, what do you understand by 5 an abandoned call?</p> <p>6 A. So it's when someone would dial 999, possibly speak to 7 the BT operator, and when they transfer them to the Fire 8 Brigade, the caller has cleared the line.</p> <p>9 Q. The caller has cleared the line?</p> <p>10 A. Yes.</p> <p>11 Q. Is it always the caller who clears the line?</p> <p>12 A. Yes.</p> <p>13 Q. Might the line have been cut off in some way?</p> <p>14 A. No, abandoned call is the caller has cleared the line.</p> <p>15 Q. When you say they've cleared the line, does it mean 16 they've pressed their phone so that they've terminated 17 the call?</p> <p>18 A. Yes.</p> <p>19 Q. It's not some accident of communication?</p> <p>20 A. No.</p> <p>21 Q. I see, thank you.</p> <p>22 My next question is: we were talking about 23 communications with the LAS; do you remember whether the 24 LAS was ever told about the change to the stay-put 25 advice?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 50</p>	<p>1 Q. Did she give you a briefing herself about what to 2 communicate?</p> <p>3 A. Yes. She did, yes.</p> <p>4 Q. How did she do that? Did she write it down?</p> <p>5 A. No, she just verbally said to me the advice.</p> <p>6 Q. Did she tell you or give you an idea of how firmly 7 advice must be given to callers that you had to tell the 8 CROs to pass on?</p> <p>9 A. Well, she told me the advice.</p> <p>10 Q. Did she give you any indication of what kind of tone 11 that CROs should use?</p> <p>12 A. No.</p> <p>13 Q. How uncompromising the language should be?</p> <p>14 A. No, no.</p> <p>15 Q. When you went around, when you spoke to the CROs 16 themselves, do you remember what you told them about the 17 tone that they should use or how uncompromising their 18 language should be in terms of the choices?</p> <p>19 A. No, I didn't. I just told them the advice to give.</p> <p>20 Q. Right.</p> <p>21 A. I didn't tell them how to say it, just --</p> <p>22 Q. You didn't?</p> <p>23 A. No.</p> <p>24 Q. So you left it to the individual CROs as to how to pass 25 on that advice?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 52</p>

1 **A. Yes.**
 2 Q. I see.
 3 Was there a way in which that change in advice or
 4 what should now be advised to callers could be broadcast
 5 more generally around the control room, like a tannoy or
 6 some sort of general communications system?
 7 **A. There wouldn't have been on the night because control**
 8 **officers were just constantly taking calls on the phone.**
 9 **So the only way was to go up to them personally and tell**
 10 **them, because they were still on the line.**
 11 Q. I think you told me earlier that there were enough
 12 supervisors to be able to go around the room and give
 13 that advice to CROs to pass on.
 14 **A. At that point, yes.**
 15 Q. At that point.
 16 **A. Yes.**
 17 Q. If that is so, why were supervisors not able to check
 18 during the earlier part of the night, when FSG calls
 19 began to come in, that CROs were taking all information
 20 that they were supposed to take from callers?
 21 **A. Because all the supervisors were busy.**
 22 Q. So when the supervisors went round the control room
 23 telling control room operators what advice to give, did
 24 that mean they had stopped doing what they were doing
 25 before?

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1 **A. There were still actions, there were still calls, but it**
 2 **was important to get that information at that time.**
 3 MR MILLETT: Yes, I see.
 4 Ms Real, I have no further questions for you. It
 5 just remains for me to say thank you very much for
 6 coming here and assisting us with our investigations.
 7 We really do appreciate it, so thank you.
 8 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
 9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I would add my thanks to those of
 10 Mr Millett. It's very helpful for us to hear your own
 11 experience of that night, and I'm sorry that at times
 12 it's been distressing to go over it again, but we're
 13 very grateful. Thank you very much indeed.
 14 So now you're free to go. If you would go with the
 15 usher, she'll look after you.
 16 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
 17 (The witness withdrew)
 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.
 19 MR MILLETT: Now, Mr Chairman, our next witness is
 20 Aisha Jabin, who is a CRO from the North West Fire
 21 Service. She's come down from Manchester especially to
 22 help us today.
 23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right.
 24 MR MILLETT: I just want to make sure that she is here and
 25 able to give evidence, but I don't want to ask for very

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1 long. So perhaps if we were to rise until 11.45, that
 2 might --
 3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Are there things that need to be
 4 done?
 5 MR MILLETT: There may be a few things that need to be done,
 6 but I'm more than happy to take a shorter break. It
 7 might be sensible to take 5 minutes rather than the full
 8 nine.
 9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That's going to make it difficult by
 10 the clock. Let's say 11.45, then everyone knows exactly
 11 where we are.
 12 MR MILLETT: Thank you.
 13 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, 11.45, please.
 14 (11.37 am)
 15 (A short break)
 16 (11.45 am)
 17 AISHA JABIN (affirmed)
 18 Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY
 19 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you. Do sit down and make
 20 yourself comfortable.
 21 Yes, Mr Millett.
 22 MR MILLETT: Ms Jabin, could you please give us your full
 23 name.
 24 **A. Aisha Jabin.**
 25 Q. Thank you.

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1 Can I start by saying thank you very much to you for
 2 attending today and assisting us with our
 3 investigations. We're very grateful to you.
 4 You've given us a statement, which is MET00008028,
 5 dated 24 November 2017.
 6 Is that your statement that we see on the screen?
 7 **A. Yes.**
 8 Q. Have you read it recently?
 9 **A. Yes.**
 10 Q. Can you confirm for us that its contents are true and
 11 accurate?
 12 **A. Yes.**
 13 Q. Are you happy for this witness statement to stand as
 14 your evidence to the inquiry, along with everything else
 15 you'll tell us today?
 16 **A. Yes.**
 17 Q. Have you discussed your statement or the evidence that
 18 you're going to give to us today with anybody before
 19 coming here?
 20 **A. No.**
 21 Q. My questions are supposed to be short and simple. I say
 22 this to all witnesses. If you don't understand my
 23 question or you want me to rephrase it, I'm very happy
 24 to do that. Similarly, if you want a break at any time,
 25 just say and we'll have a break?

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1 **A. Okay.**
 2 Q. Ms Jabin, your role is a control room operator at North
 3 West Fire Service; is that right?
 4 **A. That's right, yes.**
 5 Q. I think you've been in that role since June 2014?
 6 **A. That's correct.**
 7 Q. Have you had any training for how to handle a fire in
 8 a high-rise building, a high-rise residential building?
 9 **A. It's all formed in part of the training when you first**
 10 **start. You have a four-week intensive course and that**
 11 **covers high-rise buildings, flats, everything.**
 12 Q. Are you aware of something called the stay-put policy?
 13 **A. Yes.**
 14 Q. Very briefly, can you tell us what your understanding of
 15 the stay-put policy is?
 16 **A. My understanding of the stay-put policy is that,**
 17 **particularly in high-rise buildings, if there's a fire**
 18 **in the building, the occupants are to stay put unless**
 19 **it's safe to leave. But generally they would stay put**
 20 **and the fire service would come and rescue them.**
 21 Q. Have you had training about fire survival guidance
 22 calls?
 23 **A. Yes.**
 24 Q. Can you tell us very briefly what that training
 25 involved?

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1 **A. So you simulate incidents. We also have floor charts**
 2 **and paper sort of -- a work through that you can go**
 3 **through questions or what sort of questions to ask. And**
 4 **we have been trained on a PowerPoint before, given**
 5 **a scenario and then what sort of questions you would**
 6 **ask, what sort of advice you would give, fire survival**
 7 **guidance mainly.**
 8 Q. Have you had training, as part of that training, on how
 9 to deal with multiple FSG calls from a single incident?
 10 **A. Not multiple, but it would -- you would -- fire survival**
 11 **guidance is fire survival guidance, so you would give it**
 12 **to either one or multiple people.**
 13 Q. The training you had, was that at the beginning of your
 14 employment at North West or has there been refresher
 15 training or regular training on FSG calls since then?
 16 **A. We have refresher training every 12 months.**
 17 Q. Is there a policy at North West Fire and Rescue Services
 18 covering fire survival guidance? Is there a written
 19 policy?
 20 **A. I'm not sure what you mean.**
 21 Q. Is there a document that NWFRS puts out so control room
 22 officers understand what they're supposed to do?
 23 **A. We have our own documents that we sort of use as**
 24 **a reference in terms of questioning. As far as I know,**
 25 **fire survival guidance is national, so I'm not sure if**

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1 **there's a document directly for North West Fire Control.**
 2 Q. Can I ask you to look at page 3 of your statement.
 3 You mention in the second paragraph on that page,
 4 it's really the first main paragraph which starts:
 5 "As Control Room Operators, we may deal with Fire
 6 Survival Guidance. This guidance is used when a caller
 7 tells us they cannot get out of the building due to fire
 8 or smoke."
 9 Then you go on to say a couple of lines down:
 10 "When a call initiates fire survival guidance,
 11 I would amend the incident code on the system, which
 12 then creates a flow chart of questions to ask the
 13 caller."
 14 Then you give some details there.
 15 Can I just see if we can identify that. Can you
 16 please be shown MET00018245. That is a flow chart.
 17 Is that the flow chart you were referring to in your
 18 statement?
 19 **A. I didn't use that flow chart on the night, but yes,**
 20 **that's generally what we would use.**
 21 Q. Thank you. We may need to look at that in detail later.
 22 In your experience, just standing back from the
 23 detail, or in your experience as it was at June 2017,
 24 when the Grenfell Tower fire happened, had you dealt
 25 with any live FSG calls?

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1 **A. Not where I've had to give fire survival guidance to**
 2 **a trapped caller, no, not -- the first time I've had to**
 3 **give fire survival guidance was for Grenfell.**
 4 Q. On page 2 of your statement -- we're still on it -- you
 5 explain the overflow system. This is the last paragraph
 6 on page 2, if we can just look at it.
 7 You say:
 8 "We may receive a call from outside the North West
 9 area. The North West Fire Service takes the overflow of
 10 calls from the London Fire Brigade. If there is a delay
 11 of over 5 minutes in answering a call in London, it will
 12 be forwarded to us at the North West Control. This
 13 tends to be done automatically by the 999 operators as
 14 they are aware of the overflow and tell us that the call
 15 is for London, and the LFB could also call us to make us
 16 aware."
 17 **A. (Nodded assent).**
 18 Q. First of all, I just want to ask you how this works.
 19 You say that if there's a delay of over 5 minutes it
 20 gets forwarded. Is that an automatic forwarding system
 21 or does that require somebody at BT or another call
 22 handler to send it manually?
 23 **A. It would be passed manually, but the agreement would**
 24 **first have to be made by BT with London Fire Brigade.**
 25 Q. When you refer to a delay of over 5 minutes, does that

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1 mean someone has been on the call ringing for 5 minutes
 2 and not getting an answer?
 3 **A. Potentially, yes.**
 4 Q. Can someone's call be passed on to a buddy control room
 5 like NW sooner than 5 minutes?
 6 **A. Yes.**
 7 Q. Does that happen?
 8 **A. I'm not sure what the arrangements were that night, but**
 9 **it could be a case where they could've been passed**
 10 **through if London weren't able to take them.**
 11 Q. How would LFB make your control room, NW, aware that
 12 they had a call for London?
 13 **A. Sorry, repeat that.**
 14 Q. How would the operator, the BT operator, make your
 15 control room aware that they had received a call?
 16 **A. They would announce the call, pass the contact number,**
 17 **if there is one, and say that this call is for London**
 18 **Fire Brigade.**
 19 Q. Is there a dedicated line in your control room that
 20 rings where BT are passing that call to you?
 21 **A. If it's a 999 call, they will pass it through the**
 22 **operators, but to initiate the -- so, for example, if**
 23 **they were going to let North West Fire Control know, BT**
 24 **would first contact North West Fire Control on the**
 25 **critical line to let them know.**

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1 Q. On page 2 and 3 of your statement you refer to the
 2 critical line. Looking at the bottom of page 2, you
 3 say:
 4 "After taking the information from the caller, we
 5 would contact the London Fire Brigade control room using
 6 the critical line, and pass on the information."
 7 Just breaking that down a bit, when the call comes
 8 into your control room, North West, is there a critical
 9 line that BT rings saying, "We've got a call from
 10 a caller in London about a London incident", or does it
 11 just come through on the ordinary --
 12 **A. It would come through on a 999 line.**
 13 Q. So it would come up like any other call in the area?
 14 **A. Yes.**
 15 Q. In your own area, would it?
 16 **A. (Nodded assent).**
 17 Q. I see. So it wouldn't go automatically through to
 18 an operations manager or assistant operations manager --
 19 **A. No.**
 20 Q. -- it could come through to any control room operator?
 21 Right. So that's the call coming into your control
 22 room.
 23 When you're referring to the critical line here in
 24 your statement, you're referring to the line out from
 25 your control room to the LFB?

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1 **A. Yes.**
 2 Q. That line, having clarified that, which line is that?
 3 Not in terms of number, but is there a specific number
 4 that you would call the LFB with?
 5 **A. We had a dedicated number for London control that night,**
 6 **which is put up on the whiteboards to contact them with**
 7 **any information.**
 8 Q. You'd put that up on the whiteboards, I see, so that
 9 everybody in the control room could see what number to
 10 call?
 11 **A. That's right.**
 12 Q. How soon after the first call that came in from BT for
 13 London did the whiteboard system start operating in the
 14 North West control room, do you remember?
 15 **A. I'm not sure. I was on a break at the time. I got**
 16 **recalled.**
 17 Q. Who was running the North West fire control room on the
 18 night of the Grenfell Tower fire? Who was managing it?
 19 **A. We had team leaders there. Two team leaders and then**
 20 **the operations manager was called in.**
 21 Q. Who was the operations manager?
 22 **A. Ged Basson.**
 23 Q. Could you say that again, I'm sorry?
 24 **A. Ged Basson.**
 25 Q. Basson?

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1 **A. Ops Manager Basson.**
 2 Q. Basson, okay.
 3 When the call came in from 999, would you expect
 4 them to give you the details of the incident or the
 5 details of any particular call that they had already
 6 got, or would they just pass the call over to you
 7 straight away?
 8 **A. The operator would pass the call over and advise us it's**
 9 **for London. We would then proceed to take location**
 10 **details and the nature of the incident.**
 11 Q. Would you expect LFB to send you details or tell you
 12 about any details of the incident once you started
 13 taking calls from BT?
 14 **A. In this instance, the duty team leader was made aware by**
 15 **London control that there was a high-rise building fire**
 16 **and that we could potentially get some calls.**
 17 Q. Do you remember at roughly what time that call was made?
 18 **A. Again, I'm sorry, I was on a break at the time, so I'm**
 19 **not sure.**
 20 Q. Did you have any information on your system up at North
 21 West Fire Control about the premises which were the
 22 subject of these calls?
 23 **A. No.**
 24 Q. Did you have any means yourself in the control room to
 25 assess the progress of the fire?

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1 **A. As operators we didn't, no.**
 2 Q. Did you have any means of being able to contact the
 3 command units on the incident ground direct?
 4 **A. We don't have that information, no.**
 5 Q. No.
 6 **A. That's why we had the dedicated critical line to contact**
 7 **London Fire Brigade. Any information would have been**
 8 **passed through there.**
 9 Q. You say you wouldn't have used it, but was there
 10 actually a system in place for being able to communicate
 11 directly with the incident ground?
 12 **A. No.**
 13 Q. So the critical line is used by you, as you say, to pass
 14 information that you get over to London.
 15 That critical line, is that a dedicated line linking
 16 North West with LFB?
 17 **A. That's correct.**
 18 Q. It's a landline.
 19 Are the contents recorded? Are the discussions
 20 recorded?
 21 **A. I'm not sure, but if it was called from an operator's**
 22 **station, then yes, it would.**
 23 Q. Is there any other means, other than this critical line,
 24 by which North West could pass call information to the
 25 LFB?

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1 **A. Possibly by mobile phones.**
 2 Q. Do you remember whether that was a method used on the
 3 night of the fire?
 4 **A. I can't remember, but we do have mobile phones in**
 5 **control.**
 6 Q. Is there a way for a North West CRO who is handling
 7 a 999 call or an FSG call to receive written information
 8 about the call, about the incident, about the progress
 9 of the fire?
 10 **A. To receive information?**
 11 Q. Yes.
 12 **A. We don't have that means, no.**
 13 Q. Is there a way for a North West control room operator
 14 handling such a call to send, transmit, information that
 15 you get from the caller down to the LFB so that they
 16 could pass it on to the incident ground?
 17 **A. No, it was all done through the dedicated number.**
 18 Q. What about e-mail, would that be used?
 19 **A. It could be used.**
 20 Q. Can I just ask you to look at something, which is
 21 LFB00003627. If you could go, please, to page 2 of this
 22 document.
 23 If you look at the time mark of 03.17.19, which is
 24 the last but one entry, it says, after some code:
 25 "COMMENT= EMAILED TO LONDON FRS". I just wanted to ask

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1 you what that signified.
 2 **A. It would signify that an e-mail was sent with the**
 3 **incident details to London FRS.**
 4 Q. Who would send that e-mail, or who did send that e-mail
 5 to the best of your recollection or information?
 6 **A. Looking at the position, that the -- 03 would've been**
 7 **a team leader.**
 8 Q. Right, I see.
 9 Can you just help me, what is "caddispnw"?
 10 **A. Yes, it's a position, a work station.**
 11 Q. A work station?
 12 **A. Yeah.**
 13 Q. What does it mean?
 14 **A. It just means it's position number 3.**
 15 Q. Right, I see. So you can tell exactly who sent that
 16 e-mail.
 17 **A. Well, not exactly who, but I know it was at position 3.**
 18 Q. Would e-mailing be a normal way in which North West
 19 would send information to control rooms handling
 20 an incident?
 21 **A. It can be done, yes. Sometimes in spate conditions as**
 22 **well, we do use e-mail as a method of communication.**
 23 Q. In general, had you ever taken calls through this
 24 overflow or buddy system prior to the night of the
 25 Grenfell Tower fire?

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1 **A. I'm trying to recall ... I can't recall prior to this.**
 2 Q. Again, this may be outside your experience, but let me
 3 just ask it anyway: if you're on a long call and you're
 4 receiving information during the call from the caller
 5 which updates your information, when would you pass that
 6 updated information back to the main control room, in
 7 this case London? Would it be during the call or after
 8 it had finished?
 9 **A. To give you an instance of my call, it was passed within**
 10 **the first few minutes because of the severity of it.**
 11 **Generally, if there is fire survival guidance initiated,**
 12 **we would pass that information as soon as possible.**
 13 Q. When you say "my call", you mean the call you had with
 14 the lady caller on the 23rd floor?
 15 **A. Yes.**
 16 Q. Okay.
 17 Turning to a slightly different topic, which is
 18 callbacks.
 19 **A. Yes.**
 20 Q. As a matter of practice, does the North West Fire system
 21 automatically record all phone numbers from FSG callers
 22 or 999 callers as they come up on the system?
 23 **A. Yes.**
 24 Q. How does it appear? How many numbers would appear on
 25 the system in front of you at any one time?

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1 **A. It would be per call. Do you mean contact numbers?**
 2 Q. Yes.
 3 **A. You'd get per call, so you'd get one.**
 4 Q. If you wanted to find out who called 5 minutes before or
 5 10 minutes, before could you scroll up and find out what
 6 the number was?
 7 **A. You could do an incident search because you'd log every**
 8 **call.**
 9 Q. Do you know whether North West has a practice of not
 10 calling callers back to update them with information, or
 11 to keep tabs on them?
 12 **A. If there's an abandoned call or if the caller**
 13 **disconnects before being connected, we would always ring**
 14 **them back.**
 15 Q. What about other cases, where it's not an abandoned call
 16 or the caller gets disconnected?
 17 **A. It would depend on if the resources are available to be**
 18 **able to ring somebody back. We've never had to do it,**
 19 **so I'm not sure.**
 20 Q. What would you do if the general advice which now had to
 21 be given to callers changed? Would you call them back
 22 in that instance?
 23 **A. If I could, yes.**
 24 Q. I should've asked you this first: have you ever had
 25 experience of having to call back a caller to tell them

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1 that the stay-put advice had changed and they now had to
 2 get out?
 3 **A. No.**
 4 Q. So calling them back has never arisen in your
 5 experience; is that right?
 6 **A. That's right.**
 7 Q. What about just calling them back to see how they're
 8 getting on? Would you ever do that?
 9 **A. Again, it would depend on activity in the control room**
 10 **at the time. But I've never had to experience that.**
 11 Q. Let me see if you could help me with a specific example.
 12 Can I ask you, please, to be shown the control report,
 13 page 45.
 14 Now, at 01.43.48, Ms Jabin, we see at the bottom of
 15 the page:
 16 "NWFC take a call from a BT Operator in Nottingham
 17 who are passing on an abandoned call that is meant for
 18 the Brigade. The CRO says he will call the number
 19 back."
 20 The CRO is a male so it's not you, but can I just
 21 ask you, did you know whether on the night buddy CROs
 22 like you or like North West would call people back where
 23 there was an abandoned call such as this?
 24 **A. That's right.**
 25 Q. Can I turn to the night of the fire.

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1 You say -- and I don't need to take you to this in
 2 your statement -- that you remember Paula, your team
 3 leader, telling you about a 25-pump fire in London.
 4 Do you remember what time that was, roughly?
 5 **A. Roughly around 01.25, 01.20.**
 6 Q. You'd come in from your break at that stage, had you, or
 7 you hadn't had it yet?
 8 **A. Yes, I was recalled, yes.**
 9 Q. We know the incident was made pumps 25 at 01.31, so does
 10 that help you with your recollection in making it more
 11 specific?
 12 **A. Not really.**
 13 Q. Okay.
 14 Do you know where your team leader had got the
 15 information from that there was a 25-pump fire in
 16 progress in London?
 17 **A. London Fire Brigade control.**
 18 Q. Did your team leader tell you anything else about the
 19 incident?
 20 **A. Just that we were taking the overspill of calls and that**
 21 **it was a high-rise fire.**
 22 Q. Right.
 23 **A. That's all we knew at the time.**
 24 Q. Do you remember whether North West had started already
 25 to take overspill calls at the point you were told by

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1 Paula that there was a 25-pump fire in progress?
 2 **A. I can't recall if any of my colleagues were on the phone**
 3 **already when I walked back into the room.**
 4 Q. Right.
 5 Let's look at some records. Can I ask you, please,
 6 to be shown LFB00004790, page 34.
 7 Now, time mark of 01.36.23, we see the Glasgow BT
 8 operator passing a caller to the North West:
 9 "The caller gives her name as Mariko Koisuma-Lewis
 10 and is in flat nine on the third floor. She tells the
 11 BT Operator that she can feel heat and it is smoky."
 12 You can see the rest of the details there. I don't
 13 need to read them all out to you.
 14 My question is: do you remember that call coming
 15 through to the control room from Glasgow BT?
 16 **A. If it wasn't me, no.**
 17 Q. Let's see if we can move this forward then.
 18 Can I ask you, please, to be shown LFB00003598.
 19 This is something called an incident search, and can
 20 I ask you to look at page 1, which is where it starts at
 21 01.35.32.
 22 Can you just tell us in broad terms what this
 23 document is, or what this log is, if we go to the second
 24 page?
 25 **A. So we've got the incident number there, the incident**

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1 **type, which was high-rise. We've logged on there that**
 2 **London Fire Brigade are aware of the incident, which is**
 3 **25 pumps at the time, and that the caller is on the**
 4 **3rd floor. We've got the caller's contact number there,**
 5 **what time the call was taken and what position it was**
 6 **taken at.**
 7 Q. Turning to the second page, which is page 1 in the
 8 document, we can see the log starting.
 9 It's page 3 in Relativity, page 1 of the document.
 10 Can you just tell us in general terms what that
 11 shows?
 12 **A. So --**
 13 Q. Just to help you, it's called a chronology report for
 14 this incident. We have lots of time marks down the
 15 left-hand side --
 16 **A. Yes.**
 17 Q. -- coming from various positions, I think it is, in the
 18 North West control room.
 19 **A. Yes.**
 20 Q. My first question is: is each person at those different
 21 positions in the control room inputting into
 22 an electronic log?
 23 **A. Yes.**
 24 Q. Would this log be available to everybody else in the
 25 control room?

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1 **A. Yes.**
 2 Q. I see.
 3 Can I just ask you to look then at 01.47.12:
 4 "COMMENT= CRO TRYING TO KEEP THE CALLER CALM AND
 5 GIVE HER FIRE SAFETY ADVICE BUT SHE IS TALKING TO OTHER
 6 MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY."
 7 Do you remember who that CRO was, was that you?
 8 **A. No.**
 9 Q. You said earlier that these different position numbers
 10 correspond to different places in the control room?
 11 **A. Yes.**
 12 Q. Do you remember which was yours on the night?
 13 **A. 11.**
 14 Q. Who was at caddispnw09, do you remember?
 15 **A. I can't recall.**
 16 Q. So is it right that these entries would be typed in by
 17 the operator in real time?
 18 **A. That's correct.**
 19 Q. Would all those entries be visible on all screens in the
 20 North West control room?
 21 **A. If they click onto the incident, yes.**
 22 Q. What visibility would the LFB have of that information,
 23 do you think?
 24 **A. I'm not sure if they have access to that, but I'm not**
 25 **sure.**

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1 Q. If you look at the top of page 4, which is internal
 2 page 2, you see a time mark of 01.49.03, and it says:
 3 "COMMENT= NO ANSWER FROM LONDON FIRE SERVICE."
 4 What does that signify, do you know? Can you help
 5 us with that?
 6 **A. I'm not sure what it signifies. That looks like it was**
 7 **from one of the team leaders' positions, but I would**
 8 **imagine it's that they tried to contact London Fire**
 9 **Brigade and couldn't get through at that time.**
 10 Q. At 1.49.32, just a few entries down, it says just before
 11 the end:
 12 "... LFB ARE AWARE OF INCIDENT - 25PUMP INCIDENT =
 13 CALLER IS ON THE THIRD FLOOR."
 14 Don't speculate if you don't know because this comes
 15 from a different position, but what does that indicate?
 16 **A. I'm not sure.**
 17 Q. Well, when the controller put "LFB ARE AWARE OF
 18 INCIDENT" --
 19 **A. Yes.**
 20 Q. -- would that show us that this particular person had
 21 spoken to the LFB or got information from the LFB?
 22 **A. It could signify anything. It could mean that London**
 23 **Fire Brigade are aware that there's a high-rise building**
 24 **fire, not necessarily the details of this particular**
 25 **call.**

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1 Q. If you go back to your statement, Ms Jabin, and go to
 2 the bottom of page 3, you start quite a long description
 3 of a call, you say:
 4 "I sat down and straight away I took a call.
 5 I spoke with a lady I eventually knew to be called
 6 'Debbie'.
 7 I just want to ask you a few questions about that
 8 call, she was on the 23rd floor.
 9 Can I ask you to go then to the Brigade control
 10 report, it's the document we looked at a minute ago, and
 11 go, please, to page 41.
 12 There's a summary, a long summary of it. We can see
 13 at the bottom of the summary, if we just have that
 14 expanded, the call duration is 40 minutes and
 15 23 seconds. It starts at 01.41.18, that's the time
 16 mark.
 17 I have a number of questions about it I want to ask
 18 you, so it would be better for me just to read this to
 19 you. It's a summary, it's not the full transcript:
 20 "NWFC take a call from a caller stating that she is
 21 on the top floor at Grenfell Tower and that there is
 22 thick smoke and she is in someone else's flat. She
 23 explains that she is in the bedroom in flat 201 on the
 24 23rd floor and cannot breathe. The NWFC CRO asks if the
 25 caller can get to a window to get some air but the

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<p>1 caller says she cannot see because the smoke is too 2 thick. The caller then repeats she is in someone else's 3 flat and states that there are about ten of them. The 4 NWFC CRO passes on advice about blocking doors and 5 keeping low. At approximately 01:45 the NWFC CRO states 6 that she has passed on the information to the crews. 7 The caller says her name is Debbie and that she is 8 originally from flat 161. Debbie states that everyone 9 is in the bedroom with the door shut but that everyone 10 is being sick with smoke. At around 01:53 Debbie is 11 told the crews will get you out. The NWFC CRO asks if 12 there are any children and Debbie states that she thinks 13 there are two but maybe more, one baby and one 14 schoolchild. By approximately 02:03 Debbie says the 15 windows are cracking and flames are at the windows. At 16 2:06:31 Debbie states that the flat is on fire and that 17 they must get out of the room that they are in. There 18 is a lot of commotion and shouting while Debbie tries to 19 get out. It is not clear why she cannot get out of the 20 room. Debbie states that she cannot move or breathe and 21 that she is too hot and the NWFC Operator reiterates the 22 advice to the caller to get out if she can." 23 Now, I am going to proceed on the assumption that 24 that's a sufficiently accurate summary of the long call 25 that you had.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 77</p>	<p>1 or was that it? 2 A. No, I had advised her to see if she could get to 3 a window, but they couldn't get to a window because she 4 couldn't see, the smoke was too thick. 5 And then I'm not sure how long after, but the flat 6 caught fire, the bedroom caught fire, so that was no 7 longer an option, and at that point I asked her to 8 leave, asked them all to leave, if they could, but at 9 that point she had attempted to leave, but she just 10 couldn't open the door. 11 Q. Yes. 12 When the call started, or perhaps how soon after the 13 start of the call -- did you think that this was an FSG 14 call straight away? 15 A. No. 16 Q. At what point in the call, do you remember, did this 17 become an FSG call? 18 A. Maybe about 2 or 3 minutes into the call, as soon as she 19 told me that they couldn't get out and there was a lot 20 of smoke in the property. 21 Q. Okay. 22 Now, originally she didn't know the flat number. 23 A. No. 24 Q. But she did know the floor, which was the 23rd floor. 25 A. That's right.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 79</p>
<p>1 The first question I have is: having read you the 2 summary, is there anything you want to say about that 3 summary, whether it's accurate or whether there's 4 anything extra that you wish to add to it? 5 A. It says it's not clear why she cannot get out of the 6 room. In the call, Debbie did tell me that the reason 7 they couldn't get out was because there was people on 8 the other side of the room that they were trying to get 9 out of and that's why she couldn't get out. 10 Q. Right. You remember that clearly, do you? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Yes. Sorry, I should say, are you all right? 13 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Do you need a break? 14 MR MILLETT: I'll try and take this as shortly and as gently 15 as I can. 16 When she told you in the third line that she cannot 17 breathe, did you think that she was affected by smoke so 18 that the advice to stay put would now have to be 19 examined? 20 A. Yeah. But there was no way for -- she couldn't get out, 21 so the best advice I could give her at the time was to 22 stay low and cover her mouth. 23 Q. So because she had told you about this difficulty in 24 physically getting out of the room, did you go further 25 with her and explore whether she could make a safe exit</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 78</p>	<p>1 Q. Did that cause any difficulties? 2 A. No, because we still passed the details on to London 3 Fire Brigade. 4 Q. Yes. 5 A. It was a starting point, even though we didn't know what 6 flat it was at the time. 7 Q. I think you say in your statement that your colleague 8 Brian was sitting next to you. 9 A. That's right. 10 Q. And he immediately phoned London and told them. 11 A. That's right. 12 Q. Did you ask your supervisor to listen in on the call? 13 A. No, they were already on another call. 14 Q. Okay. 15 Just to go back to your statement and look at what 16 you say about your colleague -- this page 4, middle 17 paragraph -- you say: 18 "My colleague Brian was sat next to me had overheard 19 the information was I taking regarding the 10 people 20 trapped and the floor they were on and he immediately 21 phoned London and informed them. By that point Debbie 22 managed to tell me what flat they were in and she told 23 me that she ran up from the 16th floor to get away from 24 the smoke." 25 Do you know who Brian called?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 80</p>

<p>1 A. I'm not sure who he spoke to.</p> <p>2 Q. What's Brian's name, full name?</p> <p>3 A. Brian Bradshaw.</p> <p>4 Q. Is he a CRO or is he an OM or AOM?</p> <p>5 A. He's a CRO.</p> <p>6 Q. We do have something I just want to show you. Can I ask</p> <p>7 you to be shown page 47 of the control report, and this</p> <p>8 is a time mark of 01.46 exactly at the foot of the page.</p> <p>9 "AOM Real takes a call from NWFC who provide</p> <p>10 additional information from their call at 01:43:00.</p> <p>11 NWFC confirm the location of flat nine as being on the</p> <p>12 third floor and report a call from flat 161 on the 23rd</p> <p>13 floor where there are 10 people trapped in one bedroom.</p> <p>14 AOM Real confirms this information and NWFC Operator</p> <p>15 states that they have someone on the line to the caller.</p> <p>16 It should be noted that flat 161 is not on the 23rd</p> <p>17 floor."</p> <p>18 That's an addition so don't worry about that.</p> <p>19 Just looking at what is said there about that</p> <p>20 conversation, and looking at the time, does that help</p> <p>21 you with your recollection as to what time Brian spoke</p> <p>22 to the control room in London?</p> <p>23 A. If that call was passed by Brian then it would've been</p> <p>24 at that time.</p> <p>25 Q. Do you know whether Brian called LFB back with any</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 81</p>	<p>1 way down, the caller says:</p> <p>2 "CALLER: If we get any more definitive flat numbers</p> <p>3 and people we'll come back to you.</p> <p>4 "OPERATOR: Okay, all right thanks very much for</p> <p>5 that."</p> <p>6 Do you remember Brian telling London that if they</p> <p>7 get any more definitive flat numbers and people that you</p> <p>8 would come back to them?</p> <p>9 A. I don't remember, no.</p> <p>10 Q. Because you were on the call?</p> <p>11 A. I was focused on the call, yes.</p> <p>12 Q. That leads to the next question: do you know whether</p> <p>13 Brian did call the LFB back once the accurate</p> <p>14 information about the flat number was given to you by</p> <p>15 the caller?</p> <p>16 A. I'm not sure if Brian would have. I was aware in</p> <p>17 between my call that he did take a couple of other calls</p> <p>18 for London, so I'm not sure.</p> <p>19 Q. Let's see if we can follow the progress of that updating</p> <p>20 through the log.</p> <p>21 Can I ask you please to be shown LFB00003618.</p> <p>22 There's the first page, just so you have the details of</p> <p>23 that, 01.47.07 and the closing ID is caddispnw03.</p> <p>24 If you go to page 3, which is page 1 internally, we</p> <p>25 start with the time mark of 01.47.17, a third of the way</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 83</p>
<p>1 further information?</p> <p>2 A. I'm not sure.</p> <p>3 Q. Right.</p> <p>4 Let me just see if I can show you the transcript of</p> <p>5 that call because there's a couple of specific questions</p> <p>6 I think I should ask you.</p> <p>7 Can the witness please be shown LFB00000689.</p> <p>8 If you look at the first page, this is a call that</p> <p>9 lasts 50 seconds and comes from NWFC. It's got a number</p> <p>10 of pages. The first page, or page 2 of the Relativity</p> <p>11 reference says:</p> <p>12 "OPERATOR: Fire Brigade.</p> <p>13 "CALLER: Hiya London.</p> <p>14 "OPERATOR: Hi.</p> <p>15 "CALLER: Right, it's North West Fire Control again.</p> <p>16 "OPERATOR: Hi.</p> <p>17 "CALLER: Er, we give you flat nine ...</p> <p>18 "...</p> <p>19 "CALLER: And we've got fan - flat 161 -</p> <p>20 "OPERATOR: 161, yeah.</p> <p>21 "CALLER: - on the 23rd floor.</p> <p>22 "OPERATOR: Yeah.</p> <p>23 "CALLER: With ten people trapped."</p> <p>24 You can see that on the rest of that page.</p> <p>25 Then turning the page to page 3, two-thirds of the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 82</p>	<p>1 down that page, where it says flat 161, 23rd floor, "10</p> <p>2 PEOPLE IN THE FLAT IN BEDROOM UNABLE".</p> <p>3 I'll follow this down. It then goes on at 01.51.09,</p> <p>4 "45 YEAR OLD FEMALE STRUGGLING TO BREATH[E]".</p> <p>5 That's come -- as have all of these so far -- from</p> <p>6 11, from your position. So is that you entering this as</p> <p>7 you're speaking?</p> <p>8 A. That's right.</p> <p>9 Q. Then at 01.51.48, "INCIDENT UPDATED", and then you add</p> <p>10 in, "UNSURE OF FLAT NUMBER 23RD FLOOR".</p> <p>11 A. That's when I established that Debbie lived on the</p> <p>12 16th floor and went up to the 23rd, and at that point we</p> <p>13 were unsure what flat it was. 161 given to us earlier</p> <p>14 was her flat.</p> <p>15 Q. Again, under the next entry, 01.52.34, you go on to say,</p> <p>16 "UNSURE OF FLAT NUMBER 23RD FLOOR FLAT 201", and I think</p> <p>17 that's the first time in the log we see the actual flat</p> <p>18 number, flat 201, where she's calling from.</p> <p>19 And then somebody in position 5 underneath that</p> <p>20 writes, "UNSURE OF FLAT NUMBER 23RD FLOOR FLAT</p> <p>21 Do you know who sat at position 5?</p> <p>22 A. I can't recall.</p> <p>23 Q. Do you know why somebody would write "UNSURE OF FLAT</p> <p>24 NUMBER" there having been told it's flat 201?</p> <p>25 A. I'm not sure.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 84</p>

<p>1 Q. Then if we turn the page, 01.53.09, position 11, that's 2 you, inputs "10 PEOPLE IN FLAT 201 23RD FLOOR". 3 It looks like -- is this right? -- you were by that 4 stage quite sure that it was flat 201. Is that -- 5 A. That's right. 6 Q. Then lower down you input at 02.01.13 -- we revert to 7 "UNSURE OF FLAT NUMBER 23RD FLOOR FLAT 201". 8 Do you know why you reverted to "unsure"? 9 A. I'm not sure I reverted and I don't know why that's 10 there, sorry. 11 Q. Because we then see that in the next two entries, also 12 from position 11, at 02.02.01 and 02.02.53, "UNSURE OF 13 FLAT NUMBER". You can't explain that? 14 A. No, I'm not sure why that's there. 15 Q. Okay. 16 I just want to show you something you may not have 17 seen before, which is the London Fire Brigade's short 18 incident log, page 21, just tracing this through the 19 London end of it. 20 At page 21, at time mark 02.01.43 -- so this is 21 after you writing in that it was 10 people in flat 201 22 on the 23rd floor -- we can see the LFB entering 23 an entry in their log at 02.01.43, "FLAT 161, 23RD FLR 24 10 PERSONS" and some other details. That's all passed 25 over, as you can see, to CU8 at approximately 01.50.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 85</p>	<p>1 make their up to them." 2 Did you know that the LFB knew about the call by the 3 time you gave her that reassurance? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. How did you know that? 6 A. Because it was prior to that that Brian had passed the 7 call over. 8 Q. What did you know as a matter of fact about where the 9 crews were? 10 A. I didn't know where they were. 11 Q. Did you know that the crews had actually been committed 12 to her floor? 13 A. I didn't know that, no. 14 Q. Did you receive any information back from the LFB about 15 the progress of the crews? 16 A. No, we didn't. 17 Q. Or the speed or progress or location of the fire and 18 smoke? 19 A. Not as control operators, no. I'm not sure if the team 20 leaders were updated. 21 Q. So what was the basis for your telling Debbie that the 22 firefighters knew they were inside and would make their 23 way up to them? 24 A. Because the information had been passed to London Fire 25 Brigade. We would imagine that they would've passed it</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 87</p>
<p>1 It looks as if the information being inputted at 2 02.01.43 which had been passed over at 01.50 hadn't 3 caught up with the flat number, 161 being actually 201. 4 Obviously you're not responsible for that, but my 5 question is: looking at that, do you know whether Brian 6 or anybody else in the North West control room ever 7 called anybody back and told them clearly that the flat 8 number wasn't 161 but was definitely 201? 9 A. I can't be sure if anybody called back, but I do recall 10 when I provided my statement that somebody did call them 11 back, I'm just not sure who. 12 Q. How would that call have been made? On the critical 13 line or another system? 14 A. It could be on the critical line or from the position, 15 whatever was free at the time. But as I say, I was 16 focusing on the call, so I'm not sure if and when that 17 call was made. 18 Q. Going back to your statement, Ms Jabin, if we can, go 19 back to page 4. 20 Just before the end of the first main paragraph on 21 page 4 you say: 22 "I told her the usual guidance - get down low and as 23 they had already barricaded themselves in I just tried 24 to reassure her as much as I could. I kept telling her 25 that the firefighters knew they were inside and would</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 86</p>	<p>1 on to the incident ground -- 2 Q. Right. 3 A. -- regarding trapped callers. 4 Q. So is this fair: it was an assumption you were making 5 rather than working on factual information? 6 A. It was more a reassurance than assumption. 7 Q. I follow, okay. 8 So when you say it was more of a reassurance than 9 an assumption, does that mean that you would give 10 reassurances to people even though you weren't confident 11 that they were based in fact? 12 A. It's not so much about not being confident. Generally 13 when information is passed for trapped callers, it's 14 always passed to the incident ground. So that's what we 15 expect, that the information was going to London and 16 then they would've passed it to their incident ground, 17 because we don't have any means of contacting them. 18 Q. We then know from your statement, also on page 4, the 19 very bottom of the page, that you are told by Paula, 20 your team leader, to tell Debbie to get out. 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. We can see that at the bottom of the page: 23 "I told Debbie this straight away and she went to 24 the door but because it was barricaded she could not get 25 out. She kept screaming and screaming that they needed</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 88</p>

1 to get out but they simply could not because of the
 2 barricade."
 3 Did the barricade information, do you think, get
 4 passed to the LFB?
 5 **A. I'm not sure.**
 6 Q. Okay.
 7 **A. The information was passed that the flat was now on**
 8 **fire, but I'm not sure who made the call.**
 9 Q. On page 5 of your statement, at the foot of the page,
 10 you say:
 11 "At that point, our team leader told us that they
 12 had spoken to London and the advice had changed to
 13 callers. They were now telling them to get out. I
 14 think this was between 2.30am-3am, but I cannot be
 15 sure."
 16 You say "at that point" and you've given the time
 17 reference.
 18 My first question is: how was that change in advice
 19 communicated to you?
 20 **A. We were told as a control room by the team leaders, who**
 21 **shouted out to us that the advice had changed and stay**
 22 **put was no longer in force, and we had to tell them to**
 23 **get out any way they could.**
 24 Q. Were you told face-to-face by --
 25 **A. Yes.**

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1 Q. Not with a sign or anything like that?
 2 **A. No.**
 3 Q. Were you told how to give that advice, in what terms or
 4 tone to use with callers?
 5 **A. We were told to advise to use wet towels and wrap**
 6 **them over themselves and leave by any safe route that**
 7 **they could find.**
 8 Q. Were you told by your team leader what sort of language
 9 to use to make it absolutely clear that callers had to
 10 leave?
 11 **A. I think I would've known to be assertive with my tone.**
 12 **But generally we're quite assertive with call handling,**
 13 **so I don't think it was something that she needed to**
 14 **tell us.**
 15 Q. Okay.
 16 You then go on to describe a call from a male on the
 17 16th floor. You say:
 18 "I was very brief and surprisingly very calm."
 19 Do you mean he was surprisingly very calm?
 20 **A. He was very calm, yes.**
 21 Q. "He said to me that he was trapped on the 16th floor.
 22 I told him he had to leave and advised him to use wet
 23 towels and wrap himself in them and make his way out.
 24 He said, 'thank you' and the call was ended. It was
 25 very brief. I phoned London and informed them of the

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1 call and passed on the basic details."
 2 First of all, do you remember how long before you
 3 took that call you'd been told by Paula about the change
 4 in advice?
 5 **A. I hadn't taken a call from London for at least about 15**
 6 **or 20 minutes before that, so it was before I took that**
 7 **call. But I couldn't tell you exactly what time. It**
 8 **could've been 03.00 am, possibly just after.**
 9 Q. Let me just see if I can locate the call a bit more
 10 precisely.
 11 **A. Sure.**
 12 Q. If you look at the control room report at page 118, and
 13 look at the time mark, please, of 03.04 exactly:
 14 "NWFC make a call back to the number given by the BT
 15 Operator at Portadown in a call at 03:03:48 ... The NWFC
 16 Operator introduces herself and asks if the male on the
 17 line is in flat 123 on the 15th floor. He states that
 18 he is on the 16th floor, and then says 'They are here!.'
 19 Then you give the advice.
 20 It goes on:
 21 "She says explicitly that the person needs to get
 22 out, He replies 'okay'. She asks how many people are
 23 there. He just says 'cool' and the call cuts off."
 24 That looks like a callback. Do you know why
 25 specifically you called that number back?

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1 **A. It came through to me as an abandoned call, so I would**
 2 **call that back.**
 3 Q. So you remember that?
 4 **A. Yes.**
 5 Q. That was an abandoned call. Right, I see.
 6 Is that the call that you're referring to in your
 7 statement?
 8 **A. Sorry, say that again.**
 9 Q. Is that call that I've summarised there on the screen
 10 for you the call that you're referring to in your
 11 statement?
 12 **A. Yes.**
 13 Q. Did you call any callers back that you'd spoken to to
 14 tell them that the advice had changed at any stage?
 15 **A. No, because I only took three calls. One was Debbie's**
 16 **initial call, which was 40 minutes, the second call was**
 17 **a passer by and the third call was the male. I didn't**
 18 **take any other calls.**
 19 Q. Do you know whether anybody else in the North West
 20 control room called any callers back to tell them the
 21 advice had now changed and that they should get out?
 22 **A. I can't be sure, I'm sorry.**
 23 Q. Can I just ask you one small point of detail.
 24 Can I ask you to go back to LFB00003618.
 25 I asked you about an e-mail earlier. If you look at

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1 page 4 of that log, at 03.04.30, position 3 says, "EMAIL
 2 SENT TO LONDON FRS WITH DETAILS".
 3 Can you help us any more with what that e-mail was
 4 or why it was sent then or what it would have said?
 5 **A. I'm not sure of the contents of the e-mail. I wasn't**
 6 **aware that an e-mail was sent.**
 7 Q. Right.
 8 **A. When they say details, I would imagine it's just the**
 9 **updated details on the incident that I put on.**
 10 Q. Were there any other e-mails that you can remember sent
 11 by NWFC to LFB in their control room with details of
 12 particular calls?
 13 **A. Not during my time while I was on the phone to Debbie,**
 14 **no.**
 15 MR MILLETT: Thank you very much, Ms Jabin, I have no
 16 further questions for you.
 17 Mr Chairman, I have no more questions, but there may
 18 be that there are one or two things, looking over my
 19 notes, I may need to re-visit or ask the witness. So
 20 maybe a short break would be convenient.
 21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: 5 minutes will be enough, won't it?
 22 Ms Jabin, we sometimes have a break at this stage
 23 just so counsel can check if there are any questions
 24 which haven't been put.
 25 So I am going to ask you to leave us in just

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1 a moment and we'll come back at 12.50 and see whether
 2 there are any more questions for you then. All right?
 3 Don't talk to anyone about your evidence, please,
 4 while you're out of the room. If you would now like to
 5 go with the usher, she'll look after you.
 6 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
 7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
 8 All right, 12.50, then, please.
 9 (12.45 pm)
 10 (A short break)
 11 (12.55 pm)
 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Ms Jabin? A few more
 13 questions, I think.
 14 Yes, Mr Millett.
 15 MR MILLETT: Ms Jabin, yes, first of all, at the beginning
 16 of the Debbie call, do you remember being told pretty
 17 well straight away that she couldn't breathe?
 18 **A. Not straight away, no, not that I recall.**
 19 Q. I'm going to have to show you just one or two things in
 20 the transcript then, if I may. I'm not going to show
 21 you the whole thing.
 22 Could the witness be shown LFB00000486, page 3. It
 23 is there on the screen in front of you.
 24 This is at the start of the call. In fact, we can
 25 start at page 2. This is probably the best place to

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1 take both questions. It starts off:
 2 "CALLER: Hello?"
 3 "OPERATOR: Hello. It's the fire service here.
 4 Where are you?"
 5 "CALLER: We're on the top floor at Grenfell Tower.
 6 Please help us.
 7 "OPERATOR: Right. Listen. Listen to me. What's
 8 your address?"
 9 "CALLER: (inaudible) thick smoke. I'm in someone
 10 else's flat."
 11 I'll come back to the someone else's flat point in
 12 a moment, but looking at thick smoke, looking down the
 13 page, you say four lines up from the bottom:
 14 "OPERATOR: Yeah? W11 -? Right, are you able to get
 15 near a window?"
 16 "CALLER: We can't. The smoke's too thick ..."
 17 Then at the bottom of the page:
 18 "OPERATOR: Right, so are you on the tenth floor, did
 19 you say?"
 20 "CALLER: No, the 23rd."
 21 Then it goes on over the page.
 22 Then in the middle of page 3 or just above the
 23 middle:
 24 "CALLER: I can't breathe."
 25 Just at that point in the call, just a minute or two

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1 in, we can see there's thick smoke in the flat and the
 2 caller can't breathe.
 3 My question is: why did you not seek to explore with
 4 her at that stage any means by which she could get out?
 5 **A. Because initially I needed the location. I needed to**
 6 **know where she was.**
 7 **I mean, I've not listened to the call since. I took**
 8 **it, so I can't recall exactly -- maybe it was a moment**
 9 **of panic, but I needed to know exactly where she was in**
 10 **order to be able to help her.**
 11 **And then after that -- I mean, previously I do ask**
 12 **her, "Are you near a window" before I cut out, but it's**
 13 **just processing a lot of information in a small amount**
 14 **of time. It wasn't in any particular order.**
 15 Q. Once you did find where she was, flat 201, we can look
 16 at page 16 internally of the transcript, this is some
 17 way into the call. You see at the top of the page
 18 you're asking:
 19 "CALLER: What is this flat number? 171? 201, 201.
 20 "OPERATOR: 201? You're in flat 201.
 21 "CALLER: Yeah.
 22 "OPERATOR: Flat 201, 23rd floor?
 23 "CALLER: Yeah. Yeah."
 24 It looks like that's the first time you get that
 25 information.

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<p>1 My question now is: at that point, once you did know 2 what flat she was in, why did you not then seek to 3 explore with her any means of getting out? 4 We see on that page -- 5 A. Yeah. I can't recall -- as I say, I can't recall the 6 call since I took it. 7 Q. All right. 8 A. But I think because she gave me the impression that she 9 was trapped, maybe -- I can't honestly say why, 10 I couldn't tell you. 11 Q. I mean, it looks from the transcript as if she only 12 found out she was trapped a little bit later on in the 13 call, and so the question is: why, after finding out 14 exactly where she was but before discovering she was 15 barricaded in, did you not explore with her means of 16 escape? 17 A. I can't remember. 18 Q. Okay. 19 Now, going back to page 2, in the fifth line down 20 she says: 21 "CALLER: ... thick smoke. I'm in someone else's 22 flat." 23 Then go on to page 8 of the transcript, where she 24 says the same thing in the middle of that page. She 25 says:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 97</p>	<p>1 or seen this transcript since taking it. 2 Q. If you look at page 29 of the transcript, towards the 3 foot of the page, the caller says: 4 "... there's an elderly man here and there's women 5 here, all women other than that, I think. I've lost my 6 friend. He's disappeared. I don't know where he is. 7 We came up together. He's gone. I don't know where he 8 is." 9 Is there a reason why it appears you didn't ask for 10 any more details about him? 11 A. I don't recall. I can't recall hearing that. 12 Q. So you can't help me get to the bottom of why you didn't 13 ask for further details about the identity or 14 identifying features, perhaps, of this friend? 15 A. I can't remember hearing that. 16 Q. All right. 17 Just more generally, was there on the night the 18 possibility for your control room to obtain some sort of 19 visual coverage or impression of what was happening at 20 Grenfell Tower? 21 A. Yeah, we have the news streaming on one of the screens 22 in the control room. My back was to it at the time. 23 Throughout my call, the first call to Debbie, we had no 24 visual. It was maybe -- well, shortly after I'd spoken 25 to Debbie and the call had ended we had visuals, only</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 99</p>
<p>1 "CALLER: I don't know. I don't know who these 2 people are. 3 "OPERATOR: Oh, you don't know who they are? Right. 4 Okay. 5 "CALLER: No. 6 "OPERATOR: So is it, is it your flat? 7 "CALLER: Uh? No, it's someone else's, no. 8 "OPERATOR: Oh, it's somebody else's? Have you all 9 sort of, like, gone into one flat? 10 "CALLER: Yes." 11 My question is: at that stage, why did you not seek 12 to speak to the occupier to find out what the layout of 13 the flat was so you could find out where the exit was 14 and what was outside it? 15 A. Given the situation at the time, she was in quite 16 a distressed state, so I wouldn't have asked her to pass 17 the phone to anybody else. I think I just wanted to 18 reassure her that help was on the way at the time. The 19 owners -- or to speak to the owner didn't even cross my 20 head at that time. 21 Q. Okay. 22 Do you remember being told by the caller she'd lost 23 her friend? They'd come from another flat and she'd 24 lost her friend? 25 A. I can't recall. As I say, I've not listened to the call</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 98</p>	<p>1 because I heard my colleagues say, "Oh my God", and when 2 I turned around, that's the first visual I had of it, 3 which was maybe 10 minutes after speaking to Debbie. 4 Q. What was the visual on? 5 A. The high-rise building. 6 Q. No, was it a television in the control room? 7 A. Yeah. 8 Q. So did someone put the control room television on? 9 A. The news is streaming on one of the screens. 10 Q. Let me get this clear. At page 6 of your statement, in 11 the third paragraph, you say: 12 "Throughout the night there was a TV on in the room 13 with Sky News playing. This is not unusual and is 14 standard practice in the Control Room." 15 So the TV was on. 16 At what point do you remember seeing images of 17 Grenfell Tower on the television? 18 A. It was after my call ended with Debbie and before I took 19 the call from the male on the 16th floor. I can't tell 20 you what time it was. 21 Q. Was there a heli-tele downlink facility in the North 22 West control room? 23 Do you know what I mean by heli-tele downlink? 24 A. No. 25 Q. A means by which helicopter footage can be downloaded</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 100</p>

1 straight into the control room so the control room
 2 operators can see what was happening from the
 3 helicopter's point of view?
 4 **A. No.**
 5 Q. You didn't have the facility for that?
 6 **A. Not that I know of, no.**
 7 Q. Right, okay, thank you.
 8 More generally, how many control room staff are
 9 there on duty on any given night shift?
 10 **A. Five CROs, control room operators, and two team leaders.**
 11 Q. How many were on duty that night?
 12 **A. Five control room operators and two team leaders.**
 13 MR MILLETT: Thank you very much.
 14 Ms Jabin, thank you very much. I have no further
 15 questions for you. I'm very grateful to you for coming
 16 here and assisting us with our investigations. It's
 17 been very helpful and I'm very grateful to you, so thank
 18 you very much.
 19 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. I should thank you as well.
 20 It's really been very helpful to hear your account of
 21 your experience that evening, I hope it's not been too
 22 distressing, and we're very grateful to you for coming
 23 to us. Thank you very much.
 24 All right, you're now free to go. If you would like
 25 to go with the usher.

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1 (The witness withdrew)
 2 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That is a convenient moment.
 3 MR MILLETT: It is, Mr Chairman, yes.
 4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, we'll break now. 2.05,
 5 please.
 6 MR MILLETT: Thank you.
 7 (1.07 pm)
 8 (The short adjournment)
 9 (2.05 pm)
 10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Now, Mr Millett, I understand you
 11 want to have Ms Jabin back.
 12 MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman, I am going to recall
 13 Ms Jabin. There were one or two short topics I should
 14 have covered and I inadvertently didn't.
 15 (The witness was recalled)
 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Ms Jabin, I'm sorry that we've had
 17 to ask you to come back again, but I don't think it will
 18 take very long. Please consider yourself still under
 19 oath. All right?
 20 MR MILLETT: Yes. I'm going to ask the chairman and the
 21 witness whether it's necessary to reswear Ms Jabin.
 22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I don't think so. She understands
 23 the position.
 24 MR MILLETT: I'm sorry to ask you to come back and I hope
 25 I haven't inconvenienced you. There were some questions

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1 I'm afraid I overlooked at the very end of your
 2 evidence.
 3 The first question is this: after the Grenfell Tower
 4 incident was over, was there a debriefing session in the
 5 North West control room about the incident?
 6 **A. Yes, there was.**
 7 Q. Can you tell us how soon after the incident that
 8 happened?
 9 **A. I can't recall exactly the date, but it was within the**
 10 **first few days of Grenfell. I would say maybe two or**
 11 **three days after.**
 12 Q. Did you attend it?
 13 **A. I did attend, yes.**
 14 Q. Do you remember whether it was documented in any way,
 15 whether the meeting was recorded or --
 16 **A. I'm sorry, I can't recall.**
 17 Q. Casting your mind back to that meeting, can you tell us
 18 to the best of your recollection what the take-away
 19 messages were, lessons learnt from the incident?
 20 **A. I'm not -- to be honest, I can't recall that we had any**
 21 **feedback. The majority of the time was discussing -- we**
 22 **all discussed what obviously -- what sort of calls were**
 23 **taken, how we'd passed the messages to London, but**
 24 **whether there was any feedback at that time, I don't**
 25 **recall.**

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1 Q. As a result of that control debrief, do you remember
 2 whether there were any decisions to improve or change
 3 the systems in place at North West?
 4 **A. In the aftermath of Grenfell --**
 5 Q. Yes.
 6 **A. -- I think North West Fire Control, taking calls for**
 7 **maybe Manchester high-rises, the predetermined**
 8 **attendance was increased, just for the high rises,**
 9 **I believe.**
 10 Q. Any other changes that you remember?
 11 **A. Not that I recall, just that the predetermined**
 12 **attendances were changed, so there was a greater**
 13 **attendance, and a special appliance mobilised at the**
 14 **same time. There is, again, a flow chart we can use as**
 15 **soon as we identify it's a high-rise to establish how**
 16 **many floors there are, what floor the fire is on,**
 17 **et cetera.**
 18 Q. Just going back to your memory of the debrief meeting,
 19 what was the main focus of the meeting, in terms of how
 20 the control room at North West acted on the night, do
 21 you remember?
 22 **A. From what I recall the feedback was quite positive.**
 23 **I don't recall any negativity. At the time, North West**
 24 **Fire Control did all they could to assist in answering**
 25 **the calls or passing the details to and fro to London**

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<p>1 Fire Brigade. But other than that, I don't recall any</p> <p>2 sort of negativity. All in all, we believe that it was</p> <p>3 handled as well as possible given the circumstances.</p> <p>4 Q. Can you just tell me, who is currently the operations</p> <p>5 manager in charge of the North West control room?</p> <p>6 A. We have a number of operations managers. Do you mean</p> <p>7 a senior operations manager?</p> <p>8 Q. Yes, I do.</p> <p>9 A. That would be Tessa Tracey.</p> <p>10 Q. Tessa?</p> <p>11 A. Tracey.</p> <p>12 Q. Tracey as in T-R-A-C-E-Y?</p> <p>13 A. That's correct.</p> <p>14 Q. Thanks very much.</p> <p>15 One more topic, just to go back to the call with</p> <p>16 Debbie that lasted for 40 minutes.</p> <p>17 A. Yes.</p> <p>18 Q. Or just close to 40 minutes we looked at this morning.</p> <p>19 You recall -- we looked at the summary -- that after</p> <p>20 a period of time, she told you that the window was being</p> <p>21 cracked because of fire.</p> <p>22 A. Correct.</p> <p>23 Q. That's something like 20 minutes into the call or just</p> <p>24 over.</p> <p>25 Is the risk of fire spread due to the passage of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 105</p>	<p>1 that you were trained to do?</p> <p>2 A. Changing advice is not something a control operator</p> <p>3 would instigate; that would come from the fire ground.</p> <p>4 Q. In terms of advice to the individual caller as to how to</p> <p>5 keep themselves safe, would that change as you got</p> <p>6 further and better information about the conditions in</p> <p>7 the flat?</p> <p>8 A. That's right, yes.</p> <p>9 Q. You were trained to do that, were you?</p> <p>10 A. Yes.</p> <p>11 Q. As part of your initial training when you first --</p> <p>12 A. Refresher training. Initial training gives you the</p> <p>13 basic guidelines of what fire survival guidance is, the</p> <p>14 reason why we use fire survival guidance and what point</p> <p>15 we would use it. During refresher training, you would</p> <p>16 touch up on if it was a more complex call, but as I say,</p> <p>17 again, it's -- something like that, you could never</p> <p>18 train yourself for.</p> <p>19 Q. Did you have any specific training on how to listen out</p> <p>20 during long calls for changes in conditions?</p> <p>21 A. Not particularly. It's based on the circumstances of</p> <p>22 the call and the information that you get at the time.</p> <p>23 Q. When Debbie told you that fire was cracking the windows,</p> <p>24 did that trigger anything in your mind about how to</p> <p>25 change the advice or change the kind of help you were</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 107</p>
<p>1 time during a call one of the factors which you as a CRO</p> <p>2 would take into account when evaluating the kind of</p> <p>3 advice to give?</p> <p>4 A. In this scenario, I couldn't possibly comment, because</p> <p>5 I didn't know what Debbie was up against or what any</p> <p>6 other trapped callers were. I couldn't possibly</p> <p>7 comment.</p> <p>8 Q. Right. Let me see if I can get at it this way.</p> <p>9 During a long call -- and it may be the first one</p> <p>10 you've ever done, so perhaps your experience is limited,</p> <p>11 would you think you would have to keep listening out for</p> <p>12 changes in smoke conditions, fire conditions, heat</p> <p>13 conditions, so as to modulate/change your advice off the</p> <p>14 back of that?</p> <p>15 A. Again, it would depend on the individual circumstances</p> <p>16 of the call. So if they told me that it was getting</p> <p>17 smokier or if it was getting hot, then the advice might</p> <p>18 change, yes. But in that circumstance on that night,</p> <p>19 the only advice I could give her was from what she had</p> <p>20 told me.</p> <p>21 Q. Casting your mind back to your training on handling FSG</p> <p>22 calls --</p> <p>23 A. Yes.</p> <p>24 Q. -- is that kind of monitoring, listening out, changing</p> <p>25 the advice in response to changing conditions something</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 106</p>	<p>1 giving her?</p> <p>2 A. I did tell her to get out of the flat immediately.</p> <p>3 Unfortunately she couldn't. So my advice at that point</p> <p>4 would just have been further fire survival guidance</p> <p>5 because she couldn't get out.</p> <p>6 MR MILLETT: Right. Thank you very much.</p> <p>7 Ms Jabin, I have no further questions, or further</p> <p>8 follow-up questions, I should say, for this witness. So</p> <p>9 that's all I have.</p> <p>10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You are confident there are no other</p> <p>11 questions that are going to be suggested?</p> <p>12 MR MILLETT: Yes, I am.</p> <p>13 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right.</p> <p>14 Well, Ms Jabin, thank you very much. I'm sorry, as</p> <p>15 I say, we had to keep you here longer than you might</p> <p>16 have wished, but you are now free to go and catch</p> <p>17 a train while you can.</p> <p>18 Anyway, thank you very much.</p> <p>19 THE WITNESS: Thank you.</p> <p>20 (The witness withdrew)</p> <p>21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.</p> <p>22 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, our next witness is Control Room</p> <p>23 Officer Angela Gotts.</p> <p>24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.</p> <p>25 ANGELA GOTTS (sworn)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 108</p>

27 (Pages 105 to 108)

<p>1 Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY</p> <p>2 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Ms Gotts. Sit</p> <p>3 down and make yourself comfortable there.</p> <p>4 MR MILLETT: Good afternoon, Ms Gotts.</p> <p>5 A. Good afternoon.</p> <p>6 Q. Could I please ask you to start by giving us your full</p> <p>7 name.</p> <p>8 A. Mrs Angela Gotts.</p> <p>9 Q. Would you prefer me to address you as Mrs Gotts or</p> <p>10 Ms Gotts?</p> <p>11 A. Mrs Gotts or Angie.</p> <p>12 Q. Right.</p> <p>13 Can I say, first of all, thank you very much for</p> <p>14 attending today and helping us with our --</p> <p>15 A. Sorry, I can't really hear you very well. Is it me?</p> <p>16 Q. I'll try and speak up.</p> <p>17 Thank you very much for coming today and assisting</p> <p>18 us with our investigations. We're very appreciative of</p> <p>19 that.</p> <p>20 If my questions are too long or you don't understand</p> <p>21 them or can't hear them or you want me to ask it in</p> <p>22 a different way, I'm happy to do that. If you want to</p> <p>23 take a break at any stage, I'm also happy to take</p> <p>24 a break, we can do that.</p> <p>25 Can I ask you, first, to look at your statement,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 109</p>	<p>1 Q. Is it right that you undertook both of those roles on</p> <p>2 the night, so standby module and CRO?</p> <p>3 A. Yes.</p> <p>4 Q. After calls started coming in from Grenfell Tower,</p> <p>5 I think you stopped doing standby module and</p> <p>6 concentrated only on taking calls.</p> <p>7 A. I think I'd finished standby module about midnight.</p> <p>8 Q. Okay.</p> <p>9 A. Or, no, maybe -- I think I was doing that between 12.00</p> <p>10 and 01.00ish, and stopped then.</p> <p>11 Q. Right.</p> <p>12 Mrs Gotts, you completed your training to be a CRO</p> <p>13 when you first started, that's what you say in your</p> <p>14 statement.</p> <p>15 Can you just tell us, what was that training?</p> <p>16 A. What, when I initially joined?</p> <p>17 Q. Yes. Very briefly, if you can remember.</p> <p>18 A. The radio procedures, call-taking, getting the correct</p> <p>19 information, and also updating appliance availability.</p> <p>20 Q. That was a course you did when you first started, is it?</p> <p>21 A. Yes.</p> <p>22 Q. That was in 1981?</p> <p>23 A. Yes.</p> <p>24 Q. Between 1981 and June 2017, did you have any further</p> <p>25 training?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 111</p>
<p>1 which is MET00007694. That's the statement that you</p> <p>2 gave to the Metropolitan Police on 11 October 2017.</p> <p>3 A. Yes.</p> <p>4 Q. Can I ask you, have you read it recently?</p> <p>5 A. Probably back in June.</p> <p>6 Q. Right. Back in June.</p> <p>7 From what you recall of your re-reading it, are its</p> <p>8 contents true?</p> <p>9 A. Yes.</p> <p>10 Q. Have you discussed your statement or the evidence that</p> <p>11 you're going to give to the inquiry today with anybody</p> <p>12 before coming here today?</p> <p>13 A. No, no.</p> <p>14 Q. Can I start with your role at LFB. You're a control</p> <p>15 room officer, a CRO.</p> <p>16 A. Yes.</p> <p>17 Q. And you've been a CRO I think since 1981?</p> <p>18 A. That's right.</p> <p>19 Q. You also say in your witness statement -- I don't think</p> <p>20 I need to show you -- that you could also take on the</p> <p>21 role of radio operator.</p> <p>22 A. Yes.</p> <p>23 Q. And you monitor the standby module, which organises all</p> <p>24 the stations across London; is that right?</p> <p>25 A. Well, the firefighter cover, yes, personnel cover. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 110</p>	<p>1 A. On new systems. A couple of fire survival guidance</p> <p>2 training sessions.</p> <p>3 Q. When were those, do you remember?</p> <p>4 A. 2010 and 2012.</p> <p>5 Q. Who delivered those, do you remember?</p> <p>6 A. I can't remember.</p> <p>7 Q. Looking at the 2012 one, was that in response to the</p> <p>8 fire at Lakanal House?</p> <p>9 A. Yes.</p> <p>10 Q. Were you trained specifically on policy 790, "Fire</p> <p>11 survival guidance calls"?</p> <p>12 A. I believe so, yes.</p> <p>13 Q. What about policy 539, "Emergency call management"?</p> <p>14 A. Call handling, yes.</p> <p>15 Q. What about what we call the reference information files,</p> <p>16 which I think you've referred to in your statement? Did</p> <p>17 you get training on those?</p> <p>18 A. No, you just know how to look those up.</p> <p>19 Q. Okay.</p> <p>20 Did you at any stage ever receive any specific</p> <p>21 training on how to handle 999 calls from a high-rise</p> <p>22 residential block?</p> <p>23 A. It sort of comes under the umbrella of the fire survival</p> <p>24 guidance training. I don't think in that training</p> <p>25 session it was discussed, you know, particular as</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 112</p>

1 **high-rise as we're talking about that night, but**
 2 **certainly blocks of flats, I would say.**
 3 Q. Have you ever had any training on or advice about how to
 4 gather the best information you can from a 999 caller?
 5 **A. Well, it's the same as every single 999 call that you**
 6 **would take, it would be the same.**
 7 Q. What about when a call becomes an FSG call, fire
 8 survival guidance, have you ever had any training on how
 9 to extract the best information from someone in that
 10 situation?
 11 **A. Not specifically, really. Obviously a lot of calls that**
 12 **we take are people in stressful situations, so it's all**
 13 **the same, really.**
 14 Q. The 2012 training that you said was in the aftermath of
 15 the Lakanal House fire, what was your main take-away
 16 from that specific training session, do you know? Can
 17 you remember?
 18 **A. No, I can't remember.**
 19 Q. Have you had any specific training in evacuation
 20 strategies?
 21 **A. Not that I can remember.**
 22 Q. How to help the incident ground evacuate?
 23 **A. No.**
 24 Q. Have you had any training in what to do when the
 25 building has only a single emergency exit route?

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1 **A. No.**
 2 Q. So would it follow you've also had no training on what
 3 advice to give where the single exit route is
 4 smoke-logged?
 5 **A. No, not that I can recall.**
 6 Q. In your statement -- we can look at it, it's page 4, in
 7 paragraph 2, which is below halfway down -- you say:
 8 "In my experience I have dealt with a few FSGs but
 9 not many. Perhaps only four or five."
 10 You say you were present at Lakanal and you go on to
 11 describe that experience.
 12 When you say four or five, is that four or five at
 13 a single incident or four or five in a total of
 14 31 years?
 15 **A. Probably total of all that time.**
 16 Q. Really?
 17 **A. Yes.**
 18 Q. So that's an average of one FSG call every six years in
 19 a 31-year career?
 20 **A. Yes.**
 21 Q. Did your training ever cover what to do if numbers of
 22 FSGs rise beyond one or two?
 23 **A. No.**
 24 Q. Even after Lakanal House?
 25 **A. Not that I remember, no.**

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1 Q. Do you remember what the number of FSG calls that you
 2 handled at Lakanal was?
 3 **A. FSG, I had one from Lakanal, yes.**
 4 Q. After Lakanal House, were you involved in the review
 5 done by the LFB of the LFB's response to that fire?
 6 **A. No.**
 7 Q. You weren't?
 8 **A. (Indicated dissent).**
 9 Q. Were you aware of the conclusions in a report that the
 10 LFB produced?
 11 **A. I thought that it was mentioned that we should have**
 12 **plans more of the buildings. Apart from that, I can't**
 13 **really remember. I did read the report at the time but**
 14 **I can't remember specifics.**
 15 Q. So when the report came out, which was in 2012, you
 16 remember reading it. Let me show it to you and let's
 17 see --
 18 **A. Well, I followed the inquiry, to be honest, rather**
 19 **than -- I think. I just seem to remember that it was**
 20 **advised we should have plans, but I'm not sure where**
 21 **I've got that from.**
 22 Q. You said you read the report. Let me see if we're
 23 talking about the same thing. Let me ask you to be
 24 shown HOM00001124.
 25 This is a report produced by the LFB dated

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1 November 2012. Is this the report you remember reading?
 2 **A. I'm not sure.**
 3 Q. It's quite long.
 4 **A. Yes, no, I'm not sure.**
 5 Q. Let me see if I can take you to some conclusions.
 6 If you go to page 50, please, in that document. I'm
 7 not going to grind thorough every paragraph with you,
 8 but just looking at paragraphs 293 to 296, headed
 9 "Expectations that callers will be rescued and 'stay
 10 put' advice", "Escape/alternative escape routes",
 11 Assessment/re-assessment of the call/caller" and
 12 "Effective communication between Control and incident
 13 command", those four paragraphs, do you remember at any
 14 stage reading those?
 15 **A. No.**
 16 Q. Did you ever get any training post-Lakanal on any of
 17 those four topics? Take your time to scan your eye down
 18 them again.
 19 (Pause)
 20 **A. Sorry, what was the question again, please?**
 21 Q. My question was: having looked at those four topics
 22 there, did you ever get any training after Lakanal on
 23 any of those that you can remember?
 24 **A. It may have been mentioned in the 2012, I'm not sure.**
 25 Q. Right, okay.

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1 As an experienced CRO, what do you remember
 2 changing, if anything, in the control room as a result
 3 of Lakanal House?
 4 **A. Just on a personal thing?**
 5 Q. Yes.
 6 **A. I suppose after Lakanal I realised that people aren't**
 7 **always rescued and it made me very mindful of --**
 8 Q. So when you say that, do you mean the assumption that
 9 crews would always reach callers was not always
 10 reliable?
 11 **A. Mm.**
 12 Q. That's your personal take-away, was it?
 13 **A. (Nodded assent).**
 14 Q. I know we're not talking about very many FSGs, but did
 15 that change the way you did or would handle an FSG call
 16 after Lakanal?
 17 **A. Well, no, another one I had, the people were rescued and**
 18 **it was a successful outcome.**
 19 Q. That's an FSG --
 20 **A. The one I think I've said in my statement, they got**
 21 **their heads out through the skylight, they were rescued.**
 22 Q. I see. Okay.
 23 On page 4 of your witness statement, which we're
 24 still on, at the foot of that page, you say:
 25 "Normal advice for calls to high rise buildings has

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1 always been to stay. This is based upon the
 2 understanding that the construction of the building
 3 should allow about one hour's grace in which the fire is
 4 contained and should allow plenty of time for the caller
 5 to be rescued once the fire fighters have attended which
 6 usually takes between 4-5 minutes."
 7 Just to see if I can understand your understanding
 8 of stay put.
 9 **A. Mm-hm.**
 10 Q. Can I ask you, please, to be shown policy 539, which is
 11 tab 3 of our policy bundle, and go to appendix 3. This
 12 is on page 16.
 13 Appendix 3 is headed, "Fire survival guidance", and
 14 three paragraphs down, it says:
 15 "Brigade Control advise callers to 'Get out and Stay
 16 out', however if a call is received from a High rise
 17 building where Fire, Heat and Smoke are not affecting
 18 the caller, LFB would advise that:
 19 "You are usually safest to remain in your premises
 20 unless affected by fire, heat or smoke. If the
 21 situation changes, you should leave your premises and
 22 dial 999, if you need further assistance."
 23 There's a quote mark at the end there.
 24 My question is: is that advice what you understand
 25 by the stay-put advice?

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1 **A. Yes.**
 2 Q. Was that your understanding on the night of the fire?
 3 **A. Yes.**
 4 Q. So would it be right that your understanding is that
 5 you're usually safest to remain unless you're affected
 6 by fire, heat or smoke?
 7 **A. Yes.**
 8 Q. How would you -- speaking generally -- in your
 9 experience go about determining if a caller's premises
 10 are affected by fire, heat or smoke?
 11 **A. How do I go about it?**
 12 Q. How would you go about determining whether the premises
 13 are affected?
 14 **A. From what they tell you, really.**
 15 Q. What sort of information do you need to make your own
 16 assessment as a CRO about whether those premises are
 17 affected by fire, heat or smoke? What information do
 18 you need?
 19 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Just forgive us, do we have
 20 a problem with the microphone?
 21 (Pause)
 22 All right, thank you. All right?
 23 **A. Okay.**
 24 MR MILLETT: Shall I ask the question again?
 25 **A. Yes.**

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1 Q. Okay.
 2 We're looking at the question whether or not
 3 premises are affected by fire, heat or smoke, and my
 4 question is: you as a control room operator, with your
 5 many years of experience, what information do you need
 6 to get from the caller to be able to make the assessment
 7 as to whether the caller is affected?
 8 **A. Well, I presume they don't exactly always know where the**
 9 **fire is, so it's very difficult to work that out,**
 10 **really.**
 11 Q. So how do you go about getting that information?
 12 **A. The fire survival -- as I said, you know, there was no**
 13 **choice with the ones I was telling you about with their**
 14 **head out the skylight, they had smoke billowing up from**
 15 **below and they could not get out at all.**
 16 **It's very difficult to know what direction the smoke**
 17 **is coming from, where would be safest to go.**
 18 Q. Are you reliant entirely on what you're being told by
 19 the caller when you make your assessment about whether
 20 the caller is affected by fire, heat or smoke?
 21 **A. First of all, I suppose, we're going by the calls -- you**
 22 **know, previous calls and if we've had any informative**
 23 **messages, so I'd also use that.**
 24 Q. Would you also use, in addition to informative messages,
 25 information that you were getting from other CROs in the

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1 control room around you?
 2 **A. In some situations, yes, but on that night, there were**
 3 **too many calls for clear detail.**
 4 Q. We'll come back to that.
 5 You mention informative messages. They come from
 6 the incident ground.
 7 **A. Yes.**
 8 Q. How often would you expect messages to come from the
 9 incident ground which would update you so as to enable
 10 you to assess whether the particular caller was affected
 11 by fire, heat or smoke?
 12 **A. I'm not familiar with the exact timings. They are**
 13 **supposed to send them every so often, but I'm not sure**
 14 **the timings of that.**
 15 Q. What other information would you expect to come back
 16 from the incident ground apart from information in
 17 informative messages?
 18 **A. Assistance messages, or stop messages if they've dealt**
 19 **with the fire.**
 20 Q. What's an assistance message?
 21 **A. Would be a make-up, make pumps six, eight, ten.**
 22 Q. In making your assessment about whether it is safe for
 23 a caller to stay or whether they're affected by heat or
 24 smoke or fire, did you ever get any training whereby you
 25 would use information which you didn't get from the

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1 caller, but from elsewhere, either in the control room
 2 or from the incident ground, and use that information?
 3 **A. No, I've never had training on -- I mean, if I -- no,**
 4 **I haven't had training on that.**
 5 Q. On page 6 of your witness statement, if we can go back
 6 to that, you say at the top of the page in the middle of
 7 the incident you say:
 8 "... I remember thinking, 'oh my God, this is worse
 9 than Lakanal!."
 10 At the very top of the page.
 11 Then in the first main paragraph you refer to the
 12 fact that a friend of yours was blamed for advice at
 13 Lakanal that she gave. That's all set out there.
 14 Then you say:
 15 "The blame was all put on her. Since then I have
 16 not been comfortable with telling people to stay put in
 17 their flats. I will tell the caller what I can and
 18 I will certainly pass all of their details (flat number,
 19 floor number, number of people and location) to the fire
 20 fighters but I will not tell them to stay. I would
 21 assure the caller that the fire fighters know exactly
 22 where they were but it was to be their own personal
 23 decision as to whether they decided to stay or go. It
 24 was not a decision I would make for them."
 25 Now, I just want to just understand that a bit

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1 better.
 2 When you say you weren't comfortable telling people
 3 to stay put in their flats, was that a view that you had
 4 on the night of the fire?
 5 **A. Well, not -- I mean, I think it's not worded terribly**
 6 **well, but after I heard make pumps 25, I knew that**
 7 **something had happened, and I didn't know where the**
 8 **people were in relation to the fire, the way the fire**
 9 **was spreading. I just didn't know if it was better for**
 10 **them to stay or go. I just couldn't make the choice for**
 11 **them.**
 12 Q. We'll come to that because that answers, in general
 13 terms, a question I have in a few minutes' time.
 14 Before we get there, Mrs Gotts, can I ask you in
 15 general terms, when you say "Since then [since Lakanal]
 16 I have not been comfortable with telling people to stay
 17 put in their flats", my question really is this: on the
 18 night of the Grenfell Tower incident, was that
 19 discomfort that you describe in your statement something
 20 that you had then?
 21 **A. Yes, it was. But until make pumps 25, I think I was**
 22 **telling people to stay in their flats.**
 23 Q. Are we to understand from what you say in your statement
 24 here -- if it's wrongly-worded then please say -- that
 25 you think the advice is generally wrong?

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1 **A. No, no, I'm just not -- because of -- it didn't work out**
 2 **too well at Lakanal, I was -- I'm not going to ...**
 3 **I just ... I wouldn't say I'm not comfortable,**
 4 **I wouldn't say I wouldn't tell them to stay, but I'm**
 5 **just not happy within myself because of things that**
 6 **happened before.**
 7 Q. Is that feeling that you had about giving people that
 8 advice something that you ever raised with senior
 9 management in the LFB?
 10 **A. No.**
 11 Q. So this is just a personal feeling of your own?
 12 **A. Mm.**
 13 Q. You kept it to yourself, did you?
 14 **A. Yes. I just felt terrible inside.**
 15 Q. Okay.
 16 Then you also say in the same paragraph -- I have
 17 read it to you -- that you would assure the caller the
 18 firefighters know exactly where they are, and you say it
 19 was to be their own personal decision as to whether they
 20 decided to stay or go.
 21 Was that your own personal practice at the time of
 22 the Grenfell Tower fire, that you would always assure
 23 the callers?
 24 **A. I didn't feel I could decide for them.**
 25 Q. Right.

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1 **A. I know I was alone in that, but I just could not.**
 2 Q. When you say "I would assure the caller that the fire
 3 fighters know exactly where they were", was that
 4 an invariable practice of yours at the time?
 5 **A. I hope so.**
 6 Q. Would there always be an information basis for giving
 7 that assurance?
 8 **A. I always passed the information on to the fire ground.**
 9 Q. But when you assured callers that the firefighters know
 10 exactly where they were, as you say, would you --
 11 **A. I tried to. I hoped I did.**
 12 Q. My question is: would you give that advice even though
 13 you didn't have any factual basis for knowing that the
 14 firefighters knew where the caller were?
 15 **A. Well, the information was being passed over to the fire**
 16 **ground, so ...**
 17 Q. Does that mean that you would always assume that the
 18 firefighters would know where they were as soon as the
 19 information was passed over to the fire ground?
 20 **A. Well, yes.**
 21 Q. Even after --
 22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: What I am understanding from what
 23 you're saying is that whatever information you got, you
 24 passed on to the fire ground.
 25 **A. Mm.**

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1 **SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Is that what you are intending to**
 2 **say?**
 3 **A. Mm.**
 4 **SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Does that meet your question or are**
 5 **you putting a different question?**
 6 MR MILLETT: Not quite.
 7 Assuming the information was passed on to the fire
 8 ground, would you also go on to assume it had been acted
 9 on by the crews?
 10 **A. Yes.**
 11 Q. So the crews were actually going up to rescue people?
 12 **A. Yes.**
 13 Q. Is that so even after your own personal lesson learnt at
 14 Lakanal that the assumption that people would always be
 15 rescued, if I've understood this right, wasn't
 16 necessarily correct?
 17 **A. You've always got to hope they'll be rescued.**
 18 Q. So it's a hope?
 19 **A. Yes.**
 20 Q. Now --
 21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, again, I'm sorry to keep
 22 interrupting you, Mr Millett, but am I right in
 23 understanding that you passed on the information, you
 24 assumed that it would be acted upon, and you hoped that
 25 the action would be successful?

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1 **A. Yes.**
 2 **SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: But in the circumstances, you**
 3 **couldn't tell whether it would be or not?**
 4 **A. No, no, no.**
 5 **SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You may or may not have been told**
 6 **whether it was or not?**
 7 **A. Yes.**
 8 **SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Is that all right?**
 9 MR MILLETT: Yes, you may not have been told whether it was
 10 or not, but in those circumstances -- we'll look at some
 11 examples in due course, but just generally I want to get
 12 a feel for your practice -- you would give the
 13 assurance -- is this right? -- because you knew the
 14 information was passed to the incident ground, you hoped
 15 that it would be acted on -- have I summarised this
 16 fairly? Because if I haven't, somebody will complain.
 17 But you didn't know that the crews were there or on
 18 their way when telling people that --
 19 **A. I knew they were on scene, and ...**
 20 Q. Right.
 21 **A. So that was all we could do at that point, I thought.**
 22 Q. When you say in your statement "I would assure the
 23 caller that the fire fighters know exactly where they
 24 were", I'm just trying to get a feel for how confident
 25 you were that that was actually happening when you gave

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1 assurances to caller?
 2 **A. Well, I don't definitely know because I'm not on scene,**
 3 **but that was what the expectation is.**
 4 Q. At the top of page 4 of your statement, you explain what
 5 an FSG call is. You say -- it's very short:
 6 "A FSG is a call in which a caller has said that
 7 they are trapped and cannot get out."
 8 Just to look at the policy, if I can, can I ask you,
 9 please, to be shown policy 790, and to turn in that,
 10 please, to paragraph 2.1, which you'll find on page 2.
 11 It says:
 12 "A FSG call is a call received into control where
 13 the caller believes that they are unable to leave their
 14 premises due to the effects of fire, and where the
 15 control officer remains on the line [that bit is in
 16 bold] providing appropriate advice. The call continues
 17 until either the caller is able to leave by their own
 18 means, is rescued by the Fire Brigade, or the telephone
 19 line is cleared. It should be noted that a caller may
 20 clear the line after the FSG process has commenced but
 21 that will not necessarily mean a cancellation of that
 22 process."
 23 Now, when it says in the first and second line
 24 "unable to leave their premises due to the effects of
 25 fire", what do you understand that to mean, "due to the

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<p>1 effects of fire"?</p> <p>2 A. Well, the effects of fire is the smoke, so I presume</p> <p>3 they're unable to leave either due to fire or smoke.</p> <p>4 Q. Is it for the CRO to determine, in your experience and</p> <p>5 understanding, if a call is an FSG call?</p> <p>6 A. Yes.</p> <p>7 Q. What information would you use to assess whether the</p> <p>8 call had become or had started out as an FSG call?</p> <p>9 A. Well, when they tell you they can't leave the property</p> <p>10 and it's being affected by smoke or fire or --</p> <p>11 Q. So it's the key information that they think they can't</p> <p>12 get out?</p> <p>13 A. Mm.</p> <p>14 Q. That's what makes it an FSG call, is it?</p> <p>15 A. Yes.</p> <p>16 Q. If we look on in the policy to paragraph 8.1 on page 5,</p> <p>17 it says:</p> <p>18 "8 Advice to Fire Survival Guidance callers</p> <p>19 "8.1 Control officers will always use the four</p> <p>20 principles of Escape, Assess, Protect and Rescue to</p> <p>21 provide guidance to FSG callers."</p> <p>22 If we look down the page, the requirement is first</p> <p>23 to assist the caller to identify a safe alternative</p> <p>24 escape. That's 8.2.</p> <p>25 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 129</p>	<p>1 A. Sorry, would I rely on the caller for?</p> <p>2 Q. Would you ever rely on other sources of information</p> <p>3 other than what the caller was telling you about whether</p> <p>4 it was safe for them to get out?</p> <p>5 A. Okay. Normally on an FSG you have a supervisor or</p> <p>6 another colleague come over, so that does relieve quite</p> <p>7 a lot of the pressure, because it's quite pressurised</p> <p>8 dealing with those calls. So if you've only got two or</p> <p>9 three FSG calls in, you can have a colleague with you,</p> <p>10 and it's very difficult typing, listening, being aware</p> <p>11 what else is going on in the room all at the same time.</p> <p>12 So if there were only two or three FSG calls at a time,</p> <p>13 we could apply the policy to the full probably.</p> <p>14 Q. This may save a bit of time: are you saying that in</p> <p>15 general terms, with all the calls you got on the night,</p> <p>16 you didn't go about examining safe routes of escape</p> <p>17 where the callers were telling you they were trapped?</p> <p>18 A. No.</p> <p>19 Q. Even though it was in policy 790 and --</p> <p>20 A. I didn't remember that part of the policy.</p> <p>21 Q. All right.</p> <p>22 The RIF, was that easily accessible to you on the</p> <p>23 night of the fire?</p> <p>24 A. I think as soon as you type in an address and the map</p> <p>25 goes up, it then disappears all the time, so it's</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 131</p>
<p>1 Q. "Firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a</p> <p>2 safe, alternative escape route for them to leave their</p> <p>3 premises."</p> <p>4 Now, that's the policy.</p> <p>5 In your experience, Mrs Gotts, how do you know, how</p> <p>6 do you find out whether there is a safe alternative</p> <p>7 escape route? What do you do to find that out?</p> <p>8 A. I didn't remember that part of the policy.</p> <p>9 Q. On the night of the fire?</p> <p>10 A. No, I didn't remember about finding out about</p> <p>11 an alternative escape route.</p> <p>12 Q. Did you not?</p> <p>13 A. No.</p> <p>14 Q. Right.</p> <p>15 Did you use the RIF on the night of the fire?</p> <p>16 A. No, it was too busy.</p> <p>17 Q. Did you remember the contents of the RIF in general</p> <p>18 terms?</p> <p>19 A. General, but it was just -- we were overwhelmed with</p> <p>20 calls. There was just 20 calls waiting at all times.</p> <p>21 Q. In the normal case, where you haven't got multiple</p> <p>22 calls, would you normally be able to use information</p> <p>23 about the caller being trapped coming from other sources</p> <p>24 or would you only ever rely on what the caller was</p> <p>25 telling you?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 130</p>	<p>1 a matter of relicking on it.</p> <p>2 Q. You said a couple of times that you didn't remember that</p> <p>3 part of the policy.</p> <p>4 Did you remember the part of the policy that</p> <p>5 requires you to go into the next stages, reassure or</p> <p>6 reassess and then rescue?</p> <p>7 A. Well, the calls were lasting about 90 seconds each</p> <p>8 because of the multiple numbers coming in. So, no,</p> <p>9 I possibly didn't go into as much detail as maybe</p> <p>10 I would've on another occasion.</p> <p>11 Q. Going back to your statement, Mrs Gotts, you say at the</p> <p>12 top of page 4, very top:</p> <p>13 "In the event of a FSG there are certain things that</p> <p>14 we have to do. For example, we have to inform a</p> <p>15 supervisor immediately usually by waving our hand, so</p> <p>16 that they can listen to the call as well. On nights</p> <p>17 however this is not always possible because our team</p> <p>18 numbers can be smaller."</p> <p>19 Is it the invariable practice with FSGs that you</p> <p>20 would always raise your hand and get a supervisor to</p> <p>21 listen?</p> <p>22 A. Yes.</p> <p>23 Q. Did you manage to do that on the night of the fire?</p> <p>24 A. No.</p> <p>25 Q. Did you try to?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 132</p>

1 **A. Everyone was overwhelmed with work.**
 2 Q. Even at the start?
 3 **A. Yes.**
 4 Q. You refer to the team being smaller. You say:
 5 "On nights however this is not always possible
 6 because our team numbers can be smaller."
 7 Was that a problem on the night of Grenfell Tower?
 8 **A. Well, there was 11 on duty that night. Sometimes they**
 9 **run on nine or ten. I think they're looking to drop the**
 10 **number to ten anyway.**
 11 Q. So team numbers being smaller wasn't itself a problem --
 12 is this right? --
 13 **A. I think --**
 14 Q. -- on that night?
 15 **A. With 11 you can do two or three FSG calls at a time and**
 16 **perhaps keep to the policy.**
 17 Q. Right.
 18 Also on page 4 of your statement, a third of the way
 19 down the page, you say -- it's about halfway through the
 20 first main paragraph:
 21 "It is also very important that we get how many
 22 people are reported to be inside and have that
 23 information passed over. The collection of names is not
 24 something that would be routinely done. In such calls,
 25 speed is of the essence and what we really need to know

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1 is the address where they are and how many people are
 2 inside."
 3 So you've got those three.
 4 Would you say those three were the most important --
 5 address, where they are and how many people are
 6 inside -- when collecting details from callers?
 7 **A. Obviously, yes, the address and where they are in the**
 8 **building, how many people inside. I mean, that's**
 9 **probably the -- you know ... yes, I would say it's quite**
 10 **important. But the address and where they are is the**
 11 **most important.**
 12 Q. Why is it important to have all that information?
 13 **A. So the firefighters know where to go.**
 14 Q. Can I just take you back into policy 790 -- I'm sorry to
 15 keep jumping in and out of it -- and ask you to go to
 16 page 3, paragraph 5.5.
 17 It says there -- we can look at it together,
 18 Mrs Gotts:
 19 "Control will attempt to gather all the information
 20 on the Control Information Form ... and relay this
 21 information to the incident as and when it becomes
 22 available."
 23 Then you have eight bullet points on the shopping
 24 list:
 25 "• number of flat/house;

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1 "• number of persons involved;
 2 "• location of caller within premises and access
 3 point;
 4 "• condition of their location e.g. heavy smoke,
 5 slight smoke;
 6 "• proximity to fire if known;
 7 "• latest advice given by control;
 8 "• time of FSG call
 9 "• time updated."
 10 When you've done FSG calls in the past, do you
 11 usually try to obtain all that information?
 12 **A. Yes. Obviously in a high-rise as high as that night,**
 13 **and proximity to fire is not -- you know, the poor**
 14 **people didn't know where they were -- where the fire is**
 15 **for us to work out their proximity from their point of**
 16 **view. Everything we do is timed anyway.**
 17 Q. And let me just --
 18 **A. I think the condition of their location, the heavy or**
 19 **light, slight smoke, is down to an individual's**
 20 **interpretation of the amount of smoke.**
 21 Q. Would you interrogate the caller -- perhaps
 22 "interrogate" is a strong word -- but would you
 23 investigate with the caller what kind of smoke they're
 24 experiencing when they called?
 25 **A. If I didn't have 20 calls waiting, maybe I possibly --**

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1 Q. Right, I see.
 2 Can I just ask you to look at the fire survival
 3 guidance operator, what you call the reference
 4 information file, which I think you said you didn't have
 5 in your mind on the night of the fire.
 6 If you go to the last page, there's a reference
 7 under paragraph 2.3, to a similar shopping list of
 8 information to be collected.
 9 Under the rubric "2.3 Control Information Form", you
 10 get a similar shopping list, premises number, name of
 11 caller, et cetera.
 12 At the bottom it says:
 13 "Any additional information (if provided or
 14 requested from incident, other information may include
 15 AGE, GENDER, and CAPABILITY of those involved)."
 16 Would you normally ask questions of an FSG caller
 17 about whether or not they had mobility issues or they
 18 were elderly or they had children present?
 19 **A. In all my experience, people normally volunteer that**
 20 **information. It's not something that -- I don't think**
 21 **I've ever needed to ask, they tell you.**
 22 **And, yes, I would ask or maybe explore that if we**
 23 **only had two or three calls to deal with.**
 24 Q. In your experience prior to Grenfell Tower, do you
 25 remember ever handling a fire survival guidance call

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1 where you asked questions such as, "Are there any
 2 elderly people or children present or people present
 3 with mobility difficulties?
 4 **A. My call at Lakanal, the lady told me she was disabled.**
 5 Q. She volunteered that, did she?
 6 **A. Yes, she volunteered that.**
 7 Q. Is there a reason you don't actively go out and ask that
 8 information so as to build a picture of the caller?
 9 **A. As I say, if we only had two or three calls coming in,**
 10 **we can deal with all those points. But when you're**
 11 **overwhelmed, as we were that night, I think the calls**
 12 **were lasting 90 seconds each.**
 13 Q. Would it be an important matter for you to know when
 14 deciding how to give advice or what advice to give to
 15 know whether there were children or elderly people in
 16 the particular flat who were trapped?
 17 **A. The firefighters would rescue whoever they found in the**
 18 **flat, they wouldn't -- they would rescue everybody they**
 19 **could.**
 20 Q. Right.
 21 **A. The way I, you know, also see it, I understand others**
 22 **may need more help, but on that night, time was**
 23 **pressured.**
 24 Q. If you did get information that somebody had mobility
 25 issues or were bed-bound or elderly or young, would you

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1 pass that on to the fire ground?
 2 **A. Yes.**
 3 Q. You would?
 4 **A. As I say, but if you've only got two or three calls**
 5 **coming in, yes, then you get into more of a conversation**
 6 **with the callers.**
 7 Q. Right.
 8 Just sticking with the RIF for the moment it says on
 9 page 3, under paragraph 1.6, in the middle of the page,
 10 "Record advice". This is under the rubric of protecting
 11 caller/providing FSG, and here is the advice:
 12 "Explore possibility of caller moving to a 'safer'
 13 room ..."
 14 Et cetera:
 15 "Record advice passed on VISION and communicate to
 16 IC including the Premise number (unique identifier) of
 17 caller."
 18 Were you aware on the night of Lakanal that you
 19 should be doing that, recording the advice that you were
 20 giving on Vision and sending it to the IC?
 21 **A. I think a couple of calls that I took, although I may**
 22 **have passed the information, they didn't duplicate quick**
 23 **enough. So whilst they was still -- I made sure the**
 24 **information went across, there may have been a couple of**
 25 **calls that didn't get accepted by the -- because I had**

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1 **another call come in, so there may have been two or**
 2 **three that were not recorded on Vision, that it was just**
 3 **pure -- trying to duplicate the call and not duplicating**
 4 **it in time for taking the next call, but I know that**
 5 **those flat numbers went over.**
 6 Q. How would that advice normally be communicated to the
 7 incident ground from the control room?
 8 **A. I'd create a service request, send it to the appropriate**
 9 **radio channel.**
 10 Q. Right. So via radio --
 11 **A. Yes.**
 12 Q. -- normally?
 13 **A. Yes.**
 14 Q. Would you also record information that you got from
 15 callers on a control information form?
 16 **A. On that night, I didn't have any control information**
 17 **forms.**
 18 Q. But normally?
 19 **A. No, I've never used one.**
 20 Q. You've never used one?
 21 **A. No.**
 22 Q. In 31 years, you've never used one?
 23 **A. I don't think so, no. I've seen them but I haven't used**
 24 **one.**
 25 Q. Right, let me just show you what I mean so that we're

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1 talking about the same thing.
 2 Can I ask you to be shown FSG policy 790,
 3 appendix 2. This was the policy which was live as at
 4 the night of the Grenfell Tower fire, and appendix 2 is
 5 there on page 8.
 6 It's a quadruplicate information form, white, yellow
 7 blue, green copy.
 8 Just to be clear, are you saying that you've never
 9 used one of these in your career?
 10 **A. They weren't on the table -- they weren't at Stratford**
 11 **that night.**
 12 Q. Would they be at Merton normally?
 13 **A. I think there are some on the desks, yes. I've never**
 14 **used one, though.**
 15 Q. You've never used one?
 16 **A. No.**
 17 Q. Have you ever seen any colleagues using one?
 18 **A. I don't think so, no.**
 19 Q. Right.
 20 Staying with policy 790, that takes me to ask some
 21 questions about paragraph 9 on page 5. Communication
 22 with control". Paragraph 9.1 says:
 23 "It is vital that control is kept informed of the
 24 actions being taken to resolve each FSG call. The fact
 25 that control is aware of the actions being carried out

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<p>1 on the incident ground will greatly enhance the advice 2 given to FSG callers." 3 Normally, leaving aside Grenfell for the moment, 4 would you expect to be kept informed of the actions 5 being taken to resolve FSG calls from the incident 6 ground? 7 A. I mean, at Lakanal, we didn't have anything. The only 8 other one I've said to you about, the people at the 9 skylight, the stop message was received and it was 10 mentioned. I knew they'd been rescued because I'd heard 11 it. So until the night of Grenfell, I hadn't ... 12 I haven't been -- you know, but I haven't really been in 13 the situation where I would've been updated apart from 14 Lakanal or Grenfell. 15 Q. This policy postdates Lakanal, I should tell you. 16 A. Oh, sorry, okay. 17 Q. So -- 18 A. Okay. 19 Q. So this was one of those things that was supposed -- 20 I think, we'll find out later -- to reflect Lakanal 21 House. 22 A. Only another time when I was on a radio when we had FSG 23 calls, so I was in a different position. 24 Q. Let me ask you more generally, as at the night of the 25 Grenfell Tower fire, were you aware of the principle</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 141</p>	<p>1 and team structure on the night. 2 Paragraph 1 on page 5 of your statement, you say: 3 "On the night of the 14th June we were working the 4 night shift. I think there were eleven CROs working 5 along with three supervisors — AOMs Debbie REAL and Pete 6 MAY and the Operations Manager, Alex NORMAN." 7 In fact, I think we've established there were 8 actually eight CROs and three, making 11 in total. 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. You say on page 5, in the next line, "No one above the 11 rank of OM was present." 12 A. Mm-hm. 13 Q. Is that usual? Is it usual that the senior operations 14 manager is not present on a night shift? 15 A. No, no one above the rank of OM. OM is the highest rank 16 on night duties. 17 Q. I see. Okay. 18 A. Mm. 19 Q. So Alex Norman was the OM? 20 A. Yes, that's normal for her to be in charge. 21 Q. I follow. 22 We know control was working from the Stratford 23 fallback, as you say, because of routine maintenance at 24 Merton. Can I show you a picture of the control room we 25 have at Stratford.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 143</p>
<p>1 encapsulated in paragraph 9.1, that it was vital that 2 control was kept informed of the actions being taken to 3 resolve -- 4 A. No, I wasn't really aware of that. 5 Q. You weren't, right, okay. 6 Just worth going back a moment to paragraph 2.1 of 7 policy 790, and I showed you the words in bold where 8 a FSG call is happening, the control officer remains on 9 the line providing appropriate advice. 10 You say in your statement, if I can just then turn 11 to that, page 7, in general terms that you would know if 12 people got out. You say in the middle of the page: 13 "I know that some people got rescued ..." 14 My question really is this: before Grenfell, did you 15 ever handle an FSG call where you didn't stay on the 16 line? 17 A. No. 18 Q. Now, at Grenfell, as we'll come to see, there were many, 19 many calls where you didn't stay on the line. 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Therefore, paragraph 2.1 of the policy wasn't adhered 22 to. Is there a reason for that, in general terms? 23 A. Just because we were overwhelmed with calls. 24 Q. I can turn, against that background of your experience, 25 to the night itself and look, first of all, at the role</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 142</p>	<p>1 It's page 175 of the control report, Paul. 2 There it is. 3 Using that photograph -- we'll blow it up a bit more 4 so you can see it more clearly -- 5 A. Mm-hm. 6 Q. -- can you just tell us where you were sitting on that 7 night? 8 A. Opposite Alex Norman in the middle bank opposite -- the 9 middle of the bank opposite. 10 Q. We think we know where Alex Norman was sitting. 11 A. There's a red line going through the screen, I think 12 that's where I was sitting. 13 Q. A red line, what -- 14 A. Going through the screen, the middle bank there. 15 Q. So there are three arrows: left, middle and right. 16 A. The middle arrow is going through a screen. 17 Q. Yes. 18 A. That's where I was sitting. 19 Q. So you were there on the left of the picture? That was 20 your chair on the left? 21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would it be easier -- 22 A. That blue -- shall I stand up? 23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you like to point it out to 24 us. If you can. 25 A. That would be my screen (Indicates).</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 144</p>

1 **SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So your screen is not where the**
 2 **arrow is actually finishing but the middle one. Thank**
 3 **you very much.**
 4 MR MILLETT: So pretty much immediately opposite
 5 Alex Norman?
 6 **A. Yes.**
 7 Q. Who was sitting next to you on your right?
 8 **A. Sarah Russell.**
 9 Q. On your left?
 10 **A. Sharon Darby.**
 11 Q. Sharon Darby, operating the radio?
 12 **A. Yes.**
 13 Q. You say in the same paragraph:
 14 "The Control Room is much smaller than Merton."
 15 Was that a help on the night or a hindrance?
 16 **A. I think so, I think it was a help.**
 17 Q. Why is that?
 18 **A. Because everybody sits so far apart at Merton. We work**
 19 **as a team, a lot of team work. I mean -- so you could**
 20 **sort of hear -- you know, I knew people were talking**
 21 **about the 17th floor, you know, smoke travelling, so**
 22 **I was aware already of what was going on in the room.**
 23 Q. So you could actually hear what other people were
 24 saying?
 25 **A. Well, not whole conversations, just snips really.**

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1 Q. Did you ever have any discussions between calls with
 2 your colleagues sitting either near you or even not so
 3 near you about particular calls?
 4 **A. Not discussions, no, too busy.**
 5 Q. You also say that you don't have access to the National
 6 Police Air Service downlink, there's no heli-tele link?
 7 **A. No.**
 8 Q. Well, I don't say you say it, sorry, it's in the control
 9 report, but that's right, I think, there's no access to
 10 the heli-tele link?
 11 **A. No, no.**
 12 Q. Would that have helped you on the night, do you think?
 13 **A. I don't know really.**
 14 Q. Is that a tool you ever use as a CRO?
 15 **A. No.**
 16 Q. So seeing the downlink doesn't assist you -- is that
 17 right? -- with the sort of advice that you would give
 18 a caller?
 19 **A. I don't know if it would've helped looking back, really.**
 20 Q. Do you usually have the a 24-hour news television feed
 21 at Merton?
 22 **A. It is normally on.**
 23 Q. At Stratford?
 24 **A. Sorry, do we have it -- it's normally on at Merton but**
 25 **there wasn't anything on at Stratford.**

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1 Q. Do you know why the television wasn't running at
 2 Stratford?
 3 **A. No, I don't know.**
 4 Q. Did you enquire?
 5 **A. No.**
 6 Q. Would it be normal not to have it on at Stratford?
 7 **A. Yes, I don't think people are worried about having the**
 8 **telly on really.**
 9 Q. Would it have helped, do you think, having a TV with
 10 24-hour news showing during the night?
 11 **A. That particular night?**
 12 Q. Yes.
 13 **A. I honestly couldn't say. It was quite late on in the**
 14 **night before I saw a picture of what was happening.**
 15 Q. Did anybody turn the television on at some point?
 16 **A. I don't think so.**
 17 Q. On page 5 of your statement, if we look at it, in the
 18 middle, you say:
 19 "The night began like any other."
 20 Then you say just below halfway down the page:
 21 "I remember, whilst walking out for my break, the
 22 initial call for Grenfell Tower. I was aware of Pete
 23 MAY discussing the attendance required."
 24 Do you remember what he said?
 25 **A. He said something along the lines of, "We had this the**

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1 **other day", and he didn't mean a call for**
 2 **Grenfell Tower; he meant that where the address had been**
 3 **put in, flat 16, Grenfell Tower, because that was the**
 4 **address and we had an address record for**
 5 **16 Grenfell Tower, it had taken off the high-rise**
 6 **attendance and made it, I think, three pumping**
 7 **appliances.**
 8 **So he noticed that Grenfell was a high-rise and it**
 9 **should have a high-rise attendance on it, which**
 10 **I believe at the time was four pumping appliances, and**
 11 **Pete then manually put on the other machine, the other**
 12 **fire appliance, to make it the four for high-rise**
 13 **attendance.**
 14 Q. You go on to say:
 15 "Shortly afterwards I heard a bang on the door from
 16 Pete MAY. He stated that there was a '10 pump fire' and
 17 'Persons Reported' and we needed to make our way back to
 18 the Control Room due to the influx of calls."
 19 You heard a bang on the door; what was the door he
 20 banged on?
 21 **A. I think the recall hadn't worked.**
 22 Q. The recall, what's that?
 23 **A. It's a button. As soon as there's multiple or a major**
 24 **incident or multiple calls coming in, they press**
 25 **a recall so anyone who's on break comes straight back.**

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1 Q. Do you have like a pager with you?
 2 **A. No, it should be a buzzer throughout the building. But**
 3 **I'm guessing that didn't work because he went down the**
 4 **corridor and I was getting changed and he banged on the**
 5 **door and said "10-pump fire, come back".**
 6 Q. I see. So he left the control room, came down the
 7 corridor, banged on the changing room door and hoicked
 8 you back in, effectively?
 9 **A. Yes.**
 10 Q. So after he called you back in, you started taking
 11 calls.
 12 **A. Yes.**
 13 Q. Was that straight away?
 14 **A. Yes.**
 15 Q. We have a record of about 70 calls that you took between
 16 01.26.27 and 06.14.47, and we haven't been able to
 17 identify any obviously long gaps or breaks.
 18 Did you take a break at any point during the night?
 19 **A. I went to the toilet once.**
 20 Q. I am not going to try and work out when that was.
 21 At the early stages of these calls as they started
 22 to come in, did you record the information you were
 23 given by the caller?
 24 **A. As far as I'm aware, I was sending messages to Sharon on**
 25 **the radio.**

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1 Q. So just talk us through how you would do that. You'd
 2 get a call and then what would you do next with the
 3 information that you got from the call?
 4 **A. Well, I would duplicate the call, so attach it to the**
 5 **main body of the incident log, and then create a service**
 6 **request, head it up to channel 4 so Sharon knew it was**
 7 **for her. First of all probably would've addressed it to**
 8 **Golf 271, but once a command unit gets in attendance,**
 9 **you'd head it up to them. Then I'd pass on, you know,**
 10 **people are reporting they're on the 8th floor or**
 11 **whatever floor.**
 12 Q. How was the information that you gave to Sharon Darby in
 13 those early stages passed to the incident ground, do you
 14 know?
 15 **A. She passed it by voice.**
 16 Q. Did there come a time when you were aware a whiteboard
 17 system was implemented?
 18 **A. Yes.**
 19 Q. Who by, do you remember?
 20 **A. I think it was a station manager, Oliff, was over in the**
 21 **corner doing that.**
 22 Q. And on page 6 of your statement we see you say something
 23 about that. You say at the very foot of the page, after
 24 you refer to Jason Oliff:
 25 "It was quicker to write the messages by hand on

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1 pieces of paper than it was to type them and wait for
 2 the system to send so I would write them and take it
 3 straight to the white boards. In the end I think
 4 everyone was doing it that way."
 5 I just want to investigate with you a little bit
 6 about how this system worked.
 7 What were you writing on?
 8 **A. I had a large pad, and I had the flat numbers. As I was**
 9 **passing them over, I was putting a line through them.**
 10 Q. I see.
 11 **A. There was no way -- once Station Manager Oliff was**
 12 **running the whiteboard, there was no other way to give**
 13 **him the information because he wouldn't pick up the**
 14 **service request or anything like that. That was the**
 15 **most expedient way really of getting over to him, going**
 16 **over there and passing the information that way.**
 17 Q. Right. So were they on A4 pieces of paper or small
 18 scraps?
 19 **A. Well, I had a pad, and as I was telling him, I was**
 20 **putting a thin line through all those flat numbers and**
 21 **I was going over to him. Not after every call; I think**
 22 **I was having a few and then going over.**
 23 Q. I see. Okay.
 24 **A. So I'm not sure whether he wrote them down on another**
 25 **piece of paper or -- some of them he already had on the**

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1 **whiteboard. Quite a lot of them I think he already had**
 2 **on the whiteboard.**
 3 Q. How did you know to use that system? Did somebody tell
 4 you to?
 5 **A. I think it was just, you know, "Pass all these calls to**
 6 **the station manager" and it was announced in the room,**
 7 **I think. I'm not sure, I just knew to do it.**
 8 Q. How soon after starting to take calls did you start
 9 writing FSG information on pieces of paper and taking
 10 them up to --
 11 **A. I don't know.**
 12 Q. Was it immediately the whiteboards started or sometime
 13 after that, do you think?
 14 **A. Probably as the whiteboard started, I would think.**
 15 **I don't know what time that was though.**
 16 Q. Did that mean physically leaving your desk and going up
 17 to the whiteboard?
 18 **A. Yes, over to him. It wasn't far.**
 19 Q. But you have to leave your desk?
 20 **A. Yes. So you couldn't shout, you know, or --**
 21 Q. Did you have to take your headphones off and physically
 22 walk round to him, hand him the piece of paper and walk
 23 back again?
 24 **A. Yes. A couple of steps. It wasn't far.**
 25 Q. Do you think that system started before Jason Oliff

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<p>1 arrived?</p> <p>2 A. I don't know.</p> <p>3 Q. We've heard some evidence from Jason Oliff, and his time</p> <p>4 of arrival seems to be about between 01.50 and 01.55 am.</p> <p>5 My question is: would that correspond with your</p> <p>6 recollection?</p> <p>7 A. I really couldn't say. It would be a guess.</p> <p>8 Q. Were you able, do you think, to get sufficiently</p> <p>9 detailed information about the calls to Jason Oliff?</p> <p>10 A. The flat number is the most important, where people are.</p> <p>11 Q. What about numbers of occupants trapped and the</p> <p>12 conditions in flats, did you get information to him</p> <p>13 about that, do you think?</p> <p>14 A. No, not that I remember.</p> <p>15 Q. And disabilities, ages of occupants?</p> <p>16 A. I don't remember.</p> <p>17 Q. Okay.</p> <p>18 Did you send any messages to Sharon Darby after the</p> <p>19 Oliff whiteboard system was implemented?</p> <p>20 A. I'm not sure.</p> <p>21 MR MILLETT: Okay.</p> <p>22 I'm conscious, Mr Chairman, that we've been going</p> <p>23 for an hour and these questions are quite wearing.</p> <p>24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.</p> <p>25 MR MILLETT: Perhaps we should take a short break.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 153</p>	<p>1 point when the fire is a 10-pump fire.</p> <p>2 A. Yes.</p> <p>3 Q. Before that, am I right in thinking that you weren't</p> <p>4 involved in the Grenfell incident at all?</p> <p>5 A. No, I was on the radio until 1 o'clock. I think the</p> <p>6 call came in just before 01.00, and then at 1 o'clock</p> <p>7 I went to break.</p> <p>8 Q. I see.</p> <p>9 A. And then Sharon relieved me on the radio and then -- so</p> <p>10 when Pete called me, I was then call-taking.</p> <p>11 Q. How long are your breaks normally at that time of the</p> <p>12 night?</p> <p>13 A. An hour.</p> <p>14 Q. We have a time for make pumps 10 as 01.24.34. That's</p> <p>15 page 17 of the short incident log. I don't need to show</p> <p>16 you that.</p> <p>17 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>18 Q. That's the time when it was made to 10 according to</p> <p>19 that. So it would follow, would it, that you came into</p> <p>20 the incident or the control room after that, after 01.24</p> <p>21 or so?</p> <p>22 A. Mm.</p> <p>23 Q. Do you remember a persons reported message being made</p> <p>24 from the incident ground?</p> <p>25 A. Yes, I do.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 155</p>
<p>1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you welcome a break?</p> <p>2 THE WITNESS: I would, yes.</p> <p>3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You probably would, wouldn't you?</p> <p>4 Yes.</p> <p>5 Right, we'll have a break. Could we afford to give</p> <p>6 ourselves 10 minutes?</p> <p>7 MR MILLETT: Yes.</p> <p>8 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, we'll give ourselves</p> <p>9 10 minutes.</p> <p>10 If you would like to go with the usher. I have to</p> <p>11 ask you not to talk with anyone about your evidence</p> <p>12 while you're out of the room. Thank you.</p> <p>13 We'll come back at 3.25. Thank you very much.</p> <p>14 Right, 3.25, then, please.</p> <p>15 (3.15 pm)</p> <p>16 (A short break)</p> <p>17 (3.25 pm)</p> <p>18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, happy to carry on,</p> <p>19 Mrs Gotts?</p> <p>20 THE WITNESS: Yes.</p> <p>21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good.</p> <p>22 MR MILLETT: Mrs Gotts, thank you for coming back to us and</p> <p>23 helping us.</p> <p>24 You describe in your statement, as you did before</p> <p>25 the break, that you come into the control room at the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 154</p>	<p>1 Q. What did you make of that? Did that mean anything to</p> <p>2 you?</p> <p>3 A. That there were people -- on the fire ground, they were</p> <p>4 confirming there were persons reported.</p> <p>5 Q. What does that mean?</p> <p>6 A. People inside the building, needing rescuing.</p> <p>7 Q. Needing rescuing?</p> <p>8 A. Mm.</p> <p>9 Q. What did that tell you about the fire, the nature of the</p> <p>10 fire, the seriousness of the fire?</p> <p>11 A. Well, even a small fire you can have persons reported</p> <p>12 messages, so on its own it wouldn't tell me the capacity</p> <p>13 of the fire, if you like.</p> <p>14 Q. You then start taking calls and we have the first call</p> <p>15 that you took --</p> <p>16 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>17 Q. -- at 01.26.27. There are three more. Then you take</p> <p>18 your first call from inside the tower at 01.30.38.</p> <p>19 Just in general terms, that sort of timing, does</p> <p>20 that accord with your recollection?</p> <p>21 A. Yes. It must be. Pete called me at make pumps 10.</p> <p>22 Q. Between coming back into the control room and taking</p> <p>23 your first call, do you remember what the acceleration</p> <p>24 of the make-ups was, how fast it was?</p> <p>25 A. No.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 156</p>

1 Q. Let me tell you what happened. At 01.28, persons
 2 reported; at 01.29.53, make pumps 20; at 01.31, make
 3 pumps 25.
 4 Do you remember that? Do you remember that speed of
 5 acceleration?
 6 **A. I can't put a time on any of it, I'm afraid.**
 7 Q. Do you have a general impression of --
 8 **A. I know it's quick, I think.**
 9 Q. What did that acceleration of make-ups tell you about
 10 the nature of the fire or its spread?
 11 **A. The fire hadn't been contained in its compartment, so**
 12 **therefore we've got quite a problem.**
 13 Q. What kind of problem did you think you were going to
 14 have to be dealing with?
 15 **A. Well, probably residents -- I think I knew by then it**
 16 **was quite a tall building, so I didn't know where the**
 17 **fire was going to go, so --**
 18 Q. Okay.
 19 On the top of page 6 of your statement, if you could
 20 just look at that, you say it all took -- well, bottom
 21 of page 5 you say:
 22 "It all turned into a blur. I think I took a call
 23 from a man on the 8th floor and told him the fire was on
 24 the 4th and that he would be safe where he was. He
 25 seemed to be happy with that information at the time.

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1 I think at some point there was an incident upgrade; I
 2 cannot remember if it was then a fifteen or twenty pump
 3 fire but I remember thinking, 'Oh my God, this is worse
 4 than Lakanal!.'
 5 At that point, when you had that thought -- "Oh my
 6 God, this is worse than Lakanal" -- what did you think
 7 in terms of the scale of the fire or speed of fire
 8 spread at that point?
 9 **A. Well, obviously, I only ever deal with these incidents**
 10 **from the office, not actually on scene, so it told me**
 11 **that this was going to be a huge incident.**
 12 Q. At that stage, huge incident, did you have any concerns
 13 with the advice you were giving or beginning to give?
 14 **A. Because the Lakanal thought was in my mind, I was very**
 15 **worried about obviously the people inside and what the**
 16 **best thing for them to do was.**
 17 Q. Did you raise those concerns or worries with your
 18 supervisor?
 19 **A. No, we were too busy.**
 20 Q. Can I ask you to look at the control debrief notes which
 21 you may not have seen before. This is LFB00003113.
 22 These are notes of a meeting which took place for
 23 a control debrief on 24 July 2017, and it doesn't appear
 24 that you were present at that meeting.
 25 **A. No.**

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1 Q. So I'm not going to ask you anything about what happened
 2 at the meeting.
 3 But if you look at page 3 of the document, it says
 4 at the top of the page:
 5 "Calls coming in - stay put advice given.
 6 "- callers hang up and told to ring back if
 7 worsens."
 8 That is early on in the incident.
 9 Do you remember whether you were told to give that
 10 advice?
 11 **A. No, I don't remember.**
 12 Q. Were you told by anybody ever to hang up but not stay on
 13 the line once you'd established it was an FSG call?
 14 **A. Was I told by anybody?**
 15 Q. Yes.
 16 **A. No.**
 17 Q. Then on page 4, and this is after 01.45, we can see just
 18 three lines down from the top of the page, it says:
 19 "Stay put advice remains -- block vents, move to
 20 other rooms etc.
 21 "People told to get out if they can as first
 22 question.
 23 "Control knew firefighters were being committed to
 24 rescue -- expectation this will happen."
 25 Now, difficult with timing, but at or before 01.45,

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1 and that first 20 minutes or so you were involved, did
 2 you know that firefighters were being committed or did
 3 you expect that would happen?
 4 **A. Just expect it. I didn't know.**
 5 Q. While we're on that page, to prevent me having to come
 6 back to it, if you look at the foot of the page, and
 7 this is after 02.06, so a little bit later, it says:
 8 "No info coming back from incident ground as to
 9 progress/rescues/flats cleared."
 10 Was that your experience, that there was no
 11 information coming back from the incident ground?
 12 **A. No -- well, I wasn't told any, but ...**
 13 Q. So you agree with this note, do you, that there was no
 14 information --
 15 **A. Yes.**
 16 Q. -- to the best of your recollection?
 17 **A. Yes.**
 18 Q. Did you ever receive any information from the incident
 19 ground about the conditions within the building?
 20 **A. No.**
 21 Q. Nothing about fire spread, smoke spread?
 22 **A. No.**
 23 Q. Heat?
 24 **A. No.**
 25 Q. Were you ever asked to prioritise FSG calls in any way?

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<p>1 A. No, I don't think so.</p> <p>2 Q. Do you remember being told or asked by anybody in the</p> <p>3 control room to indicate a priority by smoke density?</p> <p>4 A. No.</p> <p>5 Q. You don't remember anybody asking you to find out what</p> <p>6 the smoke density was within a particular flat?</p> <p>7 A. No.</p> <p>8 Q. Can I just ask you to look at the control report,</p> <p>9 please, and turn to page 53.</p> <p>10 I think this is the first time I've shown you this</p> <p>11 document. This is a report published by the LFB</p> <p>12 recently which is a minute-by-minute timeline of what</p> <p>13 happened in the control room.</p> <p>14 At the top of that page -- perhaps I should start at</p> <p>15 the bottom of the page. It starts at 01.50.49 and it's</p> <p>16 Yvonne Adams calling CU8 to hand over or pass over</p> <p>17 information.</p> <p>18 At the bottom of page 52, which is where we should</p> <p>19 start with this, it says:</p> <p>20 "The Command Unit Operator ..."</p> <p>21 Just so you're clear in your mind, Mrs Gotts, this</p> <p>22 at 01.50.49, so you have been involved in the incident</p> <p>23 for about 25 minutes or so.</p> <p>24 "The Command Unit Operator asks CRO Adams if there</p> <p>25 is a priority for the calls being passed to them and</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 161</p>	<p>1 control room.</p> <p>2 Q. Right.</p> <p>3 A. I'm not sure.</p> <p>4 Q. At what point in the night do you think you were told</p> <p>5 that the fire was on the 4th floor?</p> <p>6 A. The initial call.</p> <p>7 Q. You were still in the control room at that point,</p> <p>8 I think you said.</p> <p>9 A. Yes.</p> <p>10 Q. Before your break.</p> <p>11 A. It may -- I'm not sure if it was an informative or if it</p> <p>12 had said that there was a fire on the 4th floor, I'm not</p> <p>13 sure.</p> <p>14 Q. Let's try and pin this down. I may have given you</p> <p>15 a false lead.</p> <p>16 If you go to the short incident log at page 17,</p> <p>17 let's see if we can trace this through.</p> <p>18 At 01.16.02, two-thirds of the way down that page,</p> <p>19 you can see an informative message:</p> <p>20 "SUP FROM G272 RESIDENTIAL BLOCK OF FLATS OF 20</p> <p>21 FLOORS 25M X 25M FIVE ROOMED FLAT ON 4TH FLOOR 75 PER</p> <p>22 CENT ALIGHT HIGH RISE PROCEDURE [IMPLEMENTED] MDT IN USE</p> <p>23 TACTICAL MODE OSCAR."</p> <p>24 Now, at 01.16, you are, I think, out of the control</p> <p>25 room?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 163</p>
<p>1 asks Control to indicate a priority by smoke density.</p> <p>2 CRO Adams explains that the caller in 182 is quite</p> <p>3 panicky, has smoke in the flat and is still on the</p> <p>4 phone. The Command Unit Operator summarises that the</p> <p>5 smoke is heaviest on the 21st floor."</p> <p>6 My question, having shown you that, is: were you</p> <p>7 made aware that the smoke was heaviest on the 21st</p> <p>8 floor?</p> <p>9 A. No.</p> <p>10 Q. I want to ask you now, if I can, a few questions about</p> <p>11 some specific calls that you took.</p> <p>12 First of all, in your witness statement, on</p> <p>13 page 5 -- and we saw this very briefly as we passed it</p> <p>14 a few minutes ago -- if you go to the bottom of page 5,</p> <p>15 you refer to a call from a man on the 8th floor. You</p> <p>16 say you told him the fire was on the 4th.</p> <p>17 Do you remember any further details about this call?</p> <p>18 A. No. I think I passed the information over via the radio</p> <p>19 to tell them that there was smoke on the 8th floor.</p> <p>20 Q. We don't seem to have a record of that, but I just want</p> <p>21 to get your recollection.</p> <p>22 Do you remember what point in the night, or by</p> <p>23 reference perhaps to the level of make-ups there were,</p> <p>24 you took that call?</p> <p>25 A. No, I think that was shortly after I returned to the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 162</p>	<p>1 A. Yes.</p> <p>2 Q. Because you only came in when it was pumps 10, and we</p> <p>3 can see lower down that's at 01.24 or so.</p> <p>4 When you came into the control room and you went</p> <p>5 back to your station, did you look at the Vision log?</p> <p>6 A. Sharon would've posted that up in the service request</p> <p>7 lines, so it would be sitting up there -- it would be</p> <p>8 headed up "SUP", but I would be able to read that as</p> <p>9 I sat down. I could probably see that that was the</p> <p>10 message sent.</p> <p>11 Q. So is that where you got the information about the fire</p> <p>12 originally being on the 4th floor from?</p> <p>13 A. Yes, it must be, yes.</p> <p>14 Q. Okay.</p> <p>15 On page 6 of your statement, if you just go back to</p> <p>16 that, in the third paragraph -- this may be jumping</p> <p>17 ahead in the night -- you say:</p> <p>18 "Over the course of the night I think I took</p> <p>19 something in the region of about 80 calls, I was later</p> <p>20 told. I do not really remember them. I remember one</p> <p>21 man I spoke to, a father of five, say that the fire was</p> <p>22 coming through the walls of his flat. I felt totally</p> <p>23 useless as there was nothing I could do to help these</p> <p>24 people. I told him there was nothing I could do and</p> <p>25 that he was better off with his family. I ended the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 164</p>

<p>1 call by saying I would make absolutely sure the crews 2 knew where he was — it was just horrible." 3 That's there in your statement. 4 Again, we are having difficulty finding a record of 5 this specific call. 6 Can you help us now, do you remember anything else 7 about that call? 8 A. I think father of five is wrong; I think there were five 9 people. 10 Q. Right. 11 A. Two adults and three children, I think. 12 Q. Right. 13 A. Maybe. 14 Q. Do you remember roughly what sort of time in the night 15 that was? 16 A. I think that was quite late on. 17 Q. Do you remember whether the call he made to you or the 18 call you had was his first call or subsequent call? 19 A. I believe I would've gone over to Jason's board -- 20 Jason, sorry, Station Manager Oliff, and the flat number 21 was already up there. 22 Q. Was already up there? 23 A. (Nodded assent). 24 Q. So it was a later call? 25 A. I believe so, yes.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 165</p>	<p>1 confirms that the fire is on the fourth floor. The 2 caller asks if they should stay in the flat and CRO 3 Gotts responds that she is unable to advise the caller 4 but will let the crews know that the caller is on the 5 22nd floor." 6 Call duration 1 minute 22 seconds. 7 Now, the transcript for that is LFB00000311. I am 8 just going to ask you one or two questions about the 9 actual detail of that, if I may. 10 We start with the first page, and this will become 11 more familiar to you as we go through, these are LFB 12 transcripts. 13 At the top there next to "Event" we can see the time 14 of 01.30.38. It's the second number from the right, 15 that's how we know it's that time. That's the LFB time 16 they've put on it. 17 If we turn to page 2, we can see the text of the 18 call: 19 "OPERATOR: Fire brigade. 20 "CALLER: Hello, it's from Grenfell Tower. 21 "OPERATOR: Yeah? 22 "CALLER: And (Several inaudible words) the 22nd 23 floor. 24 "OPERATOR: You're on the 22nd? 25 "CALLER: Yes, and there's all smoke now.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 167</p>
<p>1 Q. Have you any recollection as to roughly which floor it 2 was in the tower, how high up? 3 A. No, I can't remember. 4 Q. Do you remember whether you actually told him to leave, 5 get out? 6 A. I told him to get away from the fire. I think he was 7 just blocked in by the fire and he told me it was just 8 coming through the walls, he had nowhere to go. 9 Q. Did you explore with him actually what the exit routes 10 were like, so you could satisfy yourself that he 11 genuinely -- 12 A. It sounded like it was past any exit routes to me. 13 Q. Let's come back earlier in the night. We'll look at the 14 first call you actually took from the tower itself, 15 which is at 01.30.38, and I'd like to go if I can, first 16 of all, to the control report, page 26. 17 I am going to do this with all of these I'm going to 18 show you. I'm not going to show you all 70, Mrs Gotts, 19 but I am going to show you the summary first and then 20 we'll look at the transcript in part. 21 This is at 01.30.38 and it says: 22 "CRO Gotts takes a call from a female caller who 23 states she is in her neighbours house on the 22nd floor 24 of Grenfell Tower and they can smell smoke. CRO Gotts 25 advises the caller to get fresh air from the window and</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 166</p>	<p>1 "OPERATOR: Yeah, we are -- you need to get to the 2 window and get some fresh air, okay? 3 "CALLER: Yeah. 4 "OPERATOR: I'll let them know you're up there. 5 "CALLER: So, can you make sure we're -- 6 "OPERATOR: Yeah (Overspeaking) 7 "CALLER: Like, can you actually -- do you know 8 actually which floor it's a fire -- there's a fire? 9 "OPERATOR: It's a block -- a flat on the fourth 10 floor alright." 11 Just pausing there, that's the opening part of the 12 discussion. 13 You then go on on the next page, page 3, if we can 14 just look at that quickly, to establish what floor it 15 is, and a halfway down the page the caller says: 16 "CALLER: 22nd floor. 17 "OPERATOR: 22nd? 18 "CALLER: 22nd floor, yeah. 19 "OPERATOR: All right. Okay. 20 "CALLER: (Overspeaking) 21 "OPERATOR: We are there. All right, I'll let them 22 know. Thank you." 23 I'll come to the rest of it in a moment. 24 But we don't see anywhere in this call you actually 25 taking a number for the flat.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 168</p>

1 **A. No, no, I don't.**
 2 Q. Can you help us, why is that?
 3 **A. I don't -- I don't know.**
 4 Q. Because this is quite early on.
 5 **A. Yeah, I don't know, I'm sorry.**
 6 Q. Right.
 7 Going back to page 2, you're told -- and we just
 8 looked at it -- a third of the way down, "there's all
 9 smoke now", and you say "you need to get to the window
 10 and get some fresh air."
 11 We don't I think see you exploring with the caller
 12 whether there's a way of safely getting out and getting
 13 to the exit routes. Is there a reason for that?
 14 **A. No. I thought the fire was still on the 4th floor so**
 15 **I thought, you know, it was just maybe some smoke**
 16 **travelling up.**
 17 Q. But you didn't explore the detail with the caller?
 18 **A. I don't think she knew really.**
 19 Q. When you say, as you do at the bottom of the page,
 20 "a flat on the fourth floor is alight", what was the
 21 basis or source of that information?
 22 **A. Well, from the informative, I would think.**
 23 Q. Did you hear anything around you in the control room
 24 that might suggest that the fire had travelled higher up
 25 the building than the 4th floor?

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1 **A. I think I'd heard smoke mentioned but not fire**
 2 **particularly.**
 3 Q. Right.
 4 If you look at the top of page 3, the caller says:
 5 "CALLER: Yeah, well, our neighbour told us it's
 6 actually from (Inaudible).
 7 "OPERATOR: Oh, I see. Okay. Yeah, well, we are
 8 there, and I'll let them know you're on the 20th but
 9 you've just got some smoke up there. You're okay --"
 10 My question there is when you say, "Oh, I see", what
 11 did you see? What did you understand the caller had
 12 told you?
 13 **A. I don't know.**
 14 Q. You don't know?
 15 **A. I can't remember the call so I don't know, I'm afraid.**
 16 Q. Did you know or pick up from around you that Peter Duddy
 17 was on a call at the same time to a caller from
 18 flat 196 -- he had taken the call 38 seconds earlier --
 19 which was next door where the caller had told him that
 20 that flat was on fire?
 21 **A. No, I didn't know that.**
 22 Q. If you had been told that a fire was on the 22nd floor,
 23 would it have made a difference to the advice that you
 24 then went on to give?
 25 **A. It may do because that to me just says she's got some**

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1 **smoke up there. I didn't know the fire was up there at**
 2 **that point, I don't believe.**
 3 Q. Right.
 4 Are you sure in your own mind that you fully
 5 understood what she was saying to you?
 6 **A. Maybe I didn't. I thought so at the time. Maybe**
 7 **I didn't. From that I understand, it was just some**
 8 **smoke travelled up there.**
 9 Q. I know it's difficult to recollect.
 10 **A. Yes, I can't really remember the call, so ...**
 11 Q. I was going to ask you, do you have any recollection of
 12 any communication difficulties, language difficulties,
 13 things like that?
 14 **A. No, I don't remember any problems like that.**
 15 Q. Did the caller to your mind appear lucid and
 16 comprehensible?
 17 **A. Well, yes. I mean, by the sounds of that call, they**
 18 **sound as though they are, but, again, I can't actually**
 19 **remember the call, so ...**
 20 Q. It looks from this transcript also that you didn't get
 21 a number for the number of occupants in the flat.
 22 **A. No.**
 23 Q. Is there a reason for that?
 24 **A. No, I'm sorry, I don't know.**
 25 Q. You then go on to say over the page -- you were asked

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1 "Do we stay in the flat?", this page 4, and your answer
 2 is:
 3 "OPERATOR: Well, I obviously can't really advise
 4 you, but I'll let the firemen know you're there, okay?"
 5 What information do you think you were missing from
 6 the caller which meant that you couldn't advise them?
 7 What did you need?
 8 **A. I don't know about their escape route, that would be**
 9 **more hazardous. I don't know whether it's better for**
 10 **them to stay in the flat at that point with smoke up**
 11 **there.**
 12 Q. But could you have asked them for that information so
 13 you could've advised them?
 14 **A. Maybe, but she sounds like she's saying there's some**
 15 **smoke up there. There might be worse smoke further**
 16 **down. You just don't know what you're sending them**
 17 **into.**
 18 **From our end, it's very difficult to know where the**
 19 **smoke is worse, if you're better up there. You could**
 20 **send them down into smoke. It's just so -- it's a hard**
 21 **thing to call. It really is a hard thing to call.**
 22 Q. Yes. We see the extent to which you explored the
 23 thickness of smoke and the possible exit routes, which
 24 isn't a great deal. I mean, is there a reason why you
 25 didn't press the caller?

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<p>1 A. Maybe I should've done, you know. It's very different 2 looking at it here to listening to it on the night. 3 Q. At this point, 01.30, were you aware of how serious the 4 fire spread had become? 5 A. What make-up messages had we received then? 6 Q. You were at 20 at 01.29. 7 A. That's quite bad fire spread, I would assume. 8 Q. Putting that information next to the information you got 9 and understood from this call -- 10 A. Yeah, I really can't answer your question, I'm afraid. 11 Q. Right. 12 Turning to the next call, which is at 01.38.37, 13 we'll start with the control room report at page 37, the 14 foot of the page. 15 This is a call the summary of which reads as 16 follows: 17 "CRO Gotts takes a call from a very calm male caller 18 who reports a fire in Grenfell Tower and asks what to do 19 because the fire is spreading. He asks if he should 20 stay put because the fire is in the next door kitchen. 21 The caller asks if the Brigade is on site and CRO 22 confirms that there are lots of them and that she will 23 let the crews know that he is there. Caller says he is 24 in flat 95 on the 12th floor and there are children in 25 the flat. He is advised to try and get some fresh air</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 173</p>	<p>1 completed. Do you see that? "PERSONS TRAPPED IN FLAT 2 ON 12TH FLOOR - UNABLE TO LEAVE?" 3 A. That's means she's successfully passed it over, so she's 4 completed it. 5 Q. Does that mean the extra information about fire on the 6 floor and children in the flat wasn't passed over to the 7 incident ground? 8 A. No, she just passed what I sent to her. 9 Q. Would it have been important for the incident ground to 10 know, so that they could, if they wanted to, prioritise 11 calls, that they were trapped and that there were 12 children involved? 13 A. Well, yes, it possibly would've done, but they want to 14 rescue everybody. 15 Q. Going on in the control report, the next call is 16 page 45, 01.43.19. 17 This is where you take a call from flat 82 on the 18 11th floor. The caller has called previously, with an 19 incident number, at 01.28.26: 20 "The caller talks about her husband and states she 21 has a daughter but it is unclear if she is in the flat. 22 The caller explains that this is her second call to the 23 Brigade and confirms that they cannot get out because of 24 the smoke outside the door." 25 The call lasts 1 minute and 21 seconds.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 175</p>
<p>1 from a window and block anywhere where smoke is coming 2 from." 3 It's linked to another call at 01.26.58 and the 4 duration of the call is 1 minute and 19 seconds. 5 Now, we start off, I think, with this call, looking 6 at page 19, if we can, of the short incident log, just 7 to compare the detail of the call with the message. 8 At page 19 we can see that Sharon Darby at 9 01.40.40 -- AG, that's you, I think. 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Create a service request: 12 "Service Request Created: TO CH4 ..." 13 That's channel 4? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Or RT4: 16 "... G271 PERSONS TRAPPED IN FLAT ON 12TH FLOOR ..." 17 That's a service request you created. 18 You didn't, I think, add anything about smoke or 19 fire on that floor. Is there a reason for that? 20 A. No, I don't know. 21 Q. When you created that service request, did that mean 22 that it went to Sharon Darby? 23 A. That's right, yes. 24 Q. We can see that at 01.45.15, just lower down the page, 25 Sharon Darby creates that request as a service request</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 174</p>	<p>1 We'll look at the transcript in a moment, but just 2 looking at that summary, where you're told they can't 3 get out because of the smoke outside the door, would 4 that be an FSG call straight away then? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Looking at that summary, would you need to ask for the 7 number of people involved in the flat? 8 A. It looks like there's three, but -- 9 Q. Did you have an understanding of that from the call? 10 A. I can't remember the call, to be honest. 11 Q. Let me show you the transcript so we have the whole 12 thing. 13 This is transcript number LFB00000323. 14 You can see from that that it's timed at 01.43.19, 15 and on page 2, halfway down, you're told: 16 "CALLER: I'm ringing from Grenfell Tower, I know you 17 know but there's smoke coming in my house now." 18 So they're affected by smoke. 19 And then you say: 20 "OPERATOR: Can you block up the bottom of the door, 21 stop the smoke coming in -- 22 "CALLER: Yeah, we've blocked the bottom of the door, 23 yeah, we've done all of 24 "OPERATOR: Okay. 25 "CALLER: Please send someone. At least get me out</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 176</p>

1 of the window way anyway please (overspeaking) --
 2 "OPERATOR: What floor are you now?
 3 "CALLER: 82(.) They know, I've rung already.
 4 "OPERATOR: Sorry, what floor?
 5 "CALLER: The 11th.
 6 "OPERATOR: The 11th? Okay.
 7 "CALLER: Yeah.
 8 "OPERATOR: Well, I can just let them know again.
 9 There's a few people caught in flats there. Can you get
 10 some fresh air from the window?"
 11 It continues down the page.
 12 At the bottom of the page:
 13 "CALLER: No. The stairs will be completely full of
 14 smoke now.
 15 "OPERATOR: They're filled with smoke, are they?
 16 "CALLER: Yeah.
 17 "OPERATOR: Okay. I'll let them [know]."
 18 Halfway down page 4:
 19 "CALLER: (overspeaking) Please, can you find out,
 20 please, how long they're gonna be? I need to get out.
 21 Please, I've got a daughter.
 22 "OPERATOR: Okay. And you're on the 11th floor?"
 23 It doesn't look as if you explored alternative
 24 escape routes with the caller.
 25 **A. No, I didn't think to do that. I didn't remember that**

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1 **action.**
 2 Q. You were told that the caller had a daughter. Did you
 3 pass those details to the incident ground straight away?
 4 **A. Either over to Jason -- sorry, Station Manager Oliff on**
 5 **his whiteboard, or through the radio channels.**
 6 Q. Let's just look at the whiteboard. It's MET00016906.
 7 Let's just get that up on the screen to make sure we've
 8 traced this through.
 9 We're looking at 82 at the very top, 11th.
 10 **A. Mm.**
 11 Q. Looks like "Bed front door 2 adults, 1 child
 12 outside ..."
 13 So it looks like the number of people have been
 14 obtained, but you don't know when that was passed over
 15 to the incident ground?
 16 **A. No.**
 17 Q. Do you remember how Jason Oliff got that information up
 18 on that whiteboard?
 19 **A. No, I didn't see.**
 20 Q. Okay.
 21 Next call is page 51 of the control report,
 22 01.47.49, where you take a call from inside
 23 Grenfell Tower.
 24 "The caller asks how they are going to get out. CRO
 25 Gotts confirms the floor number and the caller states

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1 they are on the 10th floor. The caller then repeatedly
 2 states that they are going outside. The phone is handed
 3 to a young child who states there is smoke in the
 4 corridor but other residents are leaving. The caller
 5 asks for advice on what to do and CRO Gotts advises that
 6 they block the doors up and she will tell the
 7 firefighters where they are however she is unable to
 8 advise the best thing as she is not there. CRO Gotts
 9 advises that the fire started on the fourth floor."
 10 Now, that's the summary.
 11 If we look at the transcript -- this is number
 12 LFB00000330 -- again, time is 01.47.49, as we can see
 13 from the top right-hand corner. It's quite a quick call
 14 so we can probably see the whole thing, but I want to
 15 focus on one or two parts of it.
 16 On page 2 it starts:
 17 "OPERATOR: Hello, Fire Brigade.
 18 "CALLER 1: Please, we are still inside. How are we
 19 gonna go out?
 20 "OPERATOR: What floor are you on?
 21 "CALLER 1: 10th floor, 10th floor, please.
 22 "OPERATOR: And it's Grenfell Tower, is it?"
 23 And it continues. But if one looks through the
 24 whole of that call, we don't see you getting the actual
 25 flat address anywhere.

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1 Is there a reason why you didn't do that?
 2 **A. No, just the speed of taking the calls, I would say.**
 3 Q. Nor do we see you getting the number of persons in the
 4 flat. The same again; is that right?
 5 **A. Just the speed of knowing how many calls are waiting and**
 6 **just pressure of work, really.**
 7 Q. Right.
 8 You can see straight away that they ask you, "How
 9 are we gonna go out?" I'm sorry these questions are
 10 becoming rather repetitive, but is there a reason why
 11 you didn't explore with these callers what the
 12 conditions in the escape route were?
 13 **A. Well, the thing is they're on -- so that one's on the**
 14 **10th floor. The conditions on that floor would be very**
 15 **different to all the way down, so ...**
 16 Q. Yes, exactly.
 17 **A. From where I am or where they are, they don't know the**
 18 **conditions all the way down. It's a very difficult**
 19 **thing to call.**
 20 Q. I understand, but is there a reason why with this call
 21 you didn't ask them to explore with you to see what --
 22 because the conditions could change depending on where
 23 they were in the building, whether there was actually
 24 an escape route?
 25 **A. Well, because I think I just felt I couldn't have stayed**

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<p>1 on the phone that long maybe, there was so many calls 2 waiting. 3 Q. Was it not important, though, given they were telling 4 you they were essentially stuck, not to see with them 5 whether they were actually stuck and couldn't get out as 6 opposed to taking them at their word? 7 A. I suppose I did rather take them at their word. I was 8 still hoping the firefighters would get up to the 9 10th floor. 10 Q. You get told about the conditions in the flat and you 11 give them some advice about blocking the smoke. 12 Three-quarters of the way down page 2: 13 "CALLER 1: We're gonna go outside. 14 "OPERATOR: Well, it's up to you, I'm not -- I can't 15 advise you to do that. Is there smoke all in the 16 corridors? 17 "CALLER 1: (overspeaking) can't advise to do that. 18 Can't advise -- 19 "OPERATOR: I can't advise, you know, obviously, I'm 20 not there." 21 There seems from that to be a bit of confusion where 22 you're actually asking, "Is there smoke in the 23 corridor?" and don't get an answer. 24 Can I just ask, is there a reason my you didn't 25 follow up on that question, "Is there smoke in the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 181</p>	<p>1 Q. -- or did you still think it was on the 4th? 2 A. I didn't. I didn't. No, I didn't have any update, no. 3 We only had one informative, I think. 4 Q. Could you not hear other people in the control room 5 taking calls from higher up the building? 6 A. Yes, smoke does travel throughout a building. Not 7 necessarily that the fire has spread everywhere, the 8 smoke can travel. 9 Q. The next call is at control report page 55, where you 10 answer a call at 01.54.23. The summary is short: 11 "CRO Gotts takes a call from a female caller in flat 12 205 on the 23rd floor who states the fire is starting to 13 rise and they have nowhere to go. The caller explains 14 that the crews know already but that the flat is now 15 full of smoke and there are seven of them in there. The 16 caller says that the fire is going to come through the 17 window and they do not know what to do. CRO Gotts 18 checks with the caller that they cannot get out of the 19 flat and says she will let the crews know urgently." 20 The transcript is at LFB00000333. 21 It's a very short call. Looking at the top-right, 22 it's 01.54.23, as we can see, so we'll just have it 23 there. 24 It looks as if this wasn't the first call from 25 flat 205. Did you know that, do you think, when you</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 183</p>
<p>1 corridors?" 2 A. No, I can't remember the call, so, sorry, I can't say. 3 Q. Given that it was clearly an FSG call, because they were 4 trapped -- well, let me ask: do you accept that it was 5 an FSG call because they said they were stuck? 6 A. They said they were stuck, yes. 7 Q. Did that make it an FSG call? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Given that, is there a reason why you didn't stay on the 10 line with them until they were rescued? 11 A. No, perhaps I should've done, but, again, there were so 12 many calls coming in. We were just overwhelmed. 13 Q. Did you think to call a supervisor over? 14 A. Everybody was working flat out. 15 Q. On page 4, you ask, just above halfway: 16 "OPERATOR: No. So, you're on the 10th, are you? 17 "CALLER 2: Yes. 18 "OPERATOR: It was on the, it was on the 4th. 19 "CALLER 2: It was on the 4th? 20 "OPERATOR: It was on the 4th it started. But I'll 21 let them know you're there." 22 By this stage, did you have any updated information 23 about the spread of the fire and smoke up the 24 building -- 25 A. No.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 182</p>	<p>1 took this call? 2 A. Oh, I can't remember. 3 Q. In general terms, just standing back from the detail of 4 this call, how would you normally manage a change of 5 information about a flat that had already come in and 6 was in the system and where the details had already been 7 passed over to the incident ground? 8 A. We were so overwhelmed that we all just did our very 9 best. I don't know that updates as such were passed. 10 I don't know that information, if they were passed, 11 updates. 12 Q. How would you normally -- normally, if there is 13 a normal -- convey the development of the information 14 about a particular call to the incident ground? 15 A. If we had only a manageable amount of calls coming in, 16 it's a very different situation, they can be updated 17 continually. But on that night, it just was not 18 possible. 19 Q. Was this the first occasion when you realised that the 20 fire was no longer contained on the 4th floor but was 21 high up in the building or rising up the building? 22 A. Oh, I can't say, to be definitely honest. 23 Q. Now, they say on page 2, two-thirds of the way down, 24 "we're stuck". Do you see that? 25 The caller says:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 184</p>

<p>1 "CALLER: No, there's no way. We're - the flat's 2 already full of smoke. Can't go out. We're, we're 3 stuck. 4 "OPERATOR: No. So we're telling them again and 5 again where the people are and they're trying to send 6 people up. 7 "CALLER: Okay. But the fire's coming up to the 8 floor, what are we going to do ... 9 "OPERATOR: Just - the fire's coming through the 10 door? 11 "CALLER: It's going to come through the window in a 12 second." 13 In the end you go on to say, "I'll let them know", 14 and halfway down page 3, you say: 15 "OPERATOR: Yeah, so I can just let them know that, 16 that you're there. Okay? 17 "CALLER: They know, they know we're here, we just 18 need someone to hurry and come. 19 "OPERATOR: Yeah, I'll, I'll reinforce that for you. 20 "CALLER: Please, please. 21 "OPERATOR: The urgency, that's flat 205 - 22 "CALLER: Please. Yes. 23 OPERATOR: Flat 205? 24 "CALLER: Yeah. 25 "OPERATOR: Yeah, what floor?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 185</p>	<p>1 being very scared and states that they are on the 12th 2 floor. He explains that when they open the front door 3 there is a lot of smoke and CRO Gotts says that she is 4 unable to advise but if the caller thinks its safe to 5 try and leave then that is their choice, however, 6 normally the Brigade would suggest blocking up anywhere 7 that smoke can get in. CRO Gotts reassures the caller 8 that the Brigade is there and will come and find them. 9 The caller states that they can't breathe so CRO Gotts 10 asks if there is a window in the flat that might provide 11 some fresh air. The caller states that there are fire 12 balls falling past the window and that there are three 13 people in the flat. CRO Gotts suggests they try to 14 block it up a bit more or go to the window to get some 15 fresh air if they are unable to get out. CRO Gotts then 16 confirms that the crews are aware that they are on the 17 12th floor." 18 Call duration 3 minutes 39 seconds. 19 The reference for that is LFB00000346, which is the 20 transcript. 21 Just before we go to the transcript, looking at the 22 summary, you're told that the caller is in a flat on the 23 12th floor, but it looks as if you don't seek to get the 24 flat number from the caller. 25 Again, is there a reason for that?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 187</p>
<p>1 "CALLER: 2, 2, 23rd, right at the top. 2 "OPERATOR: The 23rd. Okay, I'll let them know, all 3 right? 4 "CALLER: Yeah. Okay. Please. 5 "OPERATOR: Okay, thank you, bye, bye." 6 What would you do to let the crews know urgently and 7 that there was a urgency about this particular call? 8 What did you do? 9 A. I think I just checked that we had the information over 10 on the whiteboards. 11 Q. Was there a quicker way of getting the crews to know 12 that there was a very, very urgent call? 13 A. No, that was the quickest way for us. 14 Q. Having told the occupants of flat 205 that you would 15 reinforce the urgency with the crews, what did you 16 actually do to do that, do you remember? 17 A. Just went over and checked that the further information 18 had been sent. 19 Q. Had it? 20 A. I passed it over, whether -- as far as I'm aware, yes. 21 Q. The next call is at 02.15.07 which is control report 22 page 73. 23 I'll just read the summary: 24 "CRO Gotts takes a call from a male caller who 25 begins by apologising for calling again but reports</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 186</p>	<p>1 A. No. No. 2 Q. Okay. 3 We've seen a number of calls where you didn't do 4 that. Just going back to your statement on page 7, you 5 say in the fifth line down: 6 "I constantly made sure I had the flat numbers to 7 pass over to the Command Unit." 8 Looking at the calls we've -- 9 A. No. 10 Q. -- looked at, do you think that's not correct? 11 A. No, that's not really correct in the statement, is it? 12 No. 13 Q. Okay, thank you. 14 Can I just show you the transcript of that call, 15 which is LFB00000346. Halfway down page 2, having got 16 the floor, you say: 17 "OPERATOR: Okay. I mean, is it that there's a lot 18 of smoke outside your place as well? 19 "CALLER: (Several inaudible words) when you go 20 outside the door, you can see just smoke (Inaudible) and 21 outside (Several inaudible words). 22 "OPERATOR: I mean, is it -- I can't advise you -- if 23 you think it's safe to try and leave, it's up to you, 24 but I would -- 25 "CALLER: (Overspeaking)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 188</p>

<p>1 "OPERATOR: Normally we say block up the -- where the 2 smoke's coming in." 3 Just pausing there, you're told there's smoke 4 outside. Again, the same question: we don't see you 5 exploring with this caller means of escape, whether 6 actually the smoke is something he or she could get 7 through. Why is that? 8 A. I didn't remember about the further means of escape. 9 Q. The same question and same answer again, is it? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Right. 12 Then you say at the top of page 3: 13 "OPERATOR: Yes, they -- the firemen are there. They 14 know you're there. They're going to come and find you, 15 okay? There's just lots of floors, isn't there. That's 16 the trouble." 17 Did you have any specific information to be able to 18 assure that caller that the crews actually knew that 19 that caller was there and awaiting rescue? 20 A. Well, I think they knew there were people trapped on 21 that floor, didn't they? 22 Q. But you didn't have any updated information, did you, to 23 be able to tell him that? 24 A. No, no. 25 Q. Now, halfway down page 5, the caller says:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 189</p>	<p>1 Q. Okay. 2 Just going back to page 3, after you give them the 3 assurance that the crews know you're there, the top of 4 the page. You're asked by the caller: 5 "CALLER: Is it all all right?" 6 "OPERATOR: Pardon?" 7 "CALLER: Is it all going well?" 8 "OPERATOR: I can't hear what you're saying." 9 "CALLER: Is the fire being (Overspeaking)" 10 "OPERATOR: Yeah, they're putting the fire out. 11 They're trying to put the fire out, okay?" 12 "CALLER: Okay." 13 What information did you have to be able to answer 14 his question "Is it all going well?" with what you tell 15 him, "Yeah, they're putting the fire out. They're 16 trying to put the fire out"? What information did you 17 have from the fire ground about that? 18 A. It's just an expectation with experienced fire crews on 19 scene really. 20 Q. So the assurance you gave him, were you satisfied in 21 your mind it was reliable? 22 A. I knew the firefighters would be doing their best. 23 Q. Is that quite the same thing as saying they're putting 24 the fire out? 25 A. Maybe not, but that's all I could say at the time.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 191</p>
<p>1 "CALLER: Fireballs, fireballs. There's fireballs 2 (Several inaudible words) they're falling down on us. 3 "OPERATOR: What's falling down?" 4 "CALLER: Fireballs." 5 "OPERATOR: Fireballs are falling down, what, past 6 your window? 7 "CALLER: Yeah. 8 "OPERATOR: Oh, you'll have to keep away from that. 9 You did say that you had a window ..." 10 You go on to explore that. 11 On this fireballs question, what impression did you 12 get of the fire at this point when the caller told you 13 there were fireballs falling down outside? 14 A. I had no idea what that could be. 15 Q. Did you relay that information on to anybody else in the 16 control room, that there were fireballs falling down? 17 A. No. 18 Q. Is there a reason why you didn't do that? 19 A. I mean, they would've seen it on scene presumably if 20 there's fireballs falling down, that was more, you know, 21 something they would know on scene. I thought that was 22 enough information really. 23 Q. Right. 24 A. I didn't think it would make any difference to anybody 25 in the control room that there were fireballs.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 190</p>	<p>1 Q. Did you have any thoughts in your own head about whether 2 this fire could be tackled at all by this stage? 3 A. No, I'm not a firefighter. I had no idea of the process 4 of it all. 5 Q. We see a number of these assurances being given by you 6 and other control room operators at the time, and my 7 question really is: how could you be sure to give these 8 assurances where you didn't have any solid information 9 back from the fire ground? 10 A. Because that's just what we do as a service, do our best 11 to save life, extinguish fires and rescue people. 12 Q. Do you know or have a recollection of giving assurances 13 to people which didn't turn out to be right, which meant 14 that they stayed in their flats longer than they 15 should've done? 16 A. No, I don't, no, I don't know. 17 Q. Can I turn to a different call, which is you taking 18 a call from the London Ambulance Service. This 19 is control report page 54 at 01.52.56. 20 "CRO Gotts takes a call from the London Ambulance 21 Service who inform her they are making the Grenfell 22 Tower fire a significant incident." 23 Do you have a recollection of that? 24 A. No. 25 Q. Did you pass that information on to anyone, that the LAS</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 192</p>

1 were making the Grenfell Tower fire a significant
 2 incident?
 3 **A. I wouldn't have thought so, no.**
 4 Q. Why is that?
 5 **A. We would go by our own -- if we declare it ourselves**
 6 **a major incident, that's what we'd act upon. If the**
 7 **ambulance service makes it significant, it was already**
 8 **major, I presume, from our point of view, so I think**
 9 **nearly everything from the London Fire Brigade was**
 10 **attending anyway, so ...**
 11 Q. Can I ask you to look, then, at the second hour ORR,
 12 which is LFB00004828, page 139. I want to just show you
 13 a call taken at 02.09.25.
 14 It says:
 15 "CRO Gotts takes a call at Brigade Control from the
 16 MPS Control Room reporting that they have received an
 17 abandoned call from a female who is trapped with her son
 18 in flat 115 and states that she does not know where the
 19 exits are. The MPS CRO gives a CAD reference number of
 20 543. The MPS CRO informs CRO Gotts that his supervisor
 21 is reporting that they are getting lots of calls from
 22 people trapped in the building and asks if there is any
 23 advice that they can give to callers. CRO Gotts states
 24 to close windows, block up doors but if windows offer
 25 air -- open them. The MPS then confirm that the Brigade

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1 are not directing people to fire exits and CRO Coils
 2 explains that they do not know where the exits are and
 3 that she has spoken to a few people who have left but
 4 have had to return to their flats because of the amount
 5 of smoke. CRO Gotts explains that as Fire is
 6 unpredictable, the Brigade do not generally tell people
 7 to leave but if they think they can leave safely then
 8 they should do so. The MPS CRO asks CRO Gotts if she
 9 can arrange for the Brigade CRO supervisor to speak to
 10 the MPS supervisor in the MPS Control Room. CRO Gotts
 11 says she will try but says it is very busy at the
 12 moment."
 13 First of all, do you have any independent
 14 recollection of that call --
 15 **A. No, I don't.**
 16 Q. -- that I have just shown you?
 17 You're being asked by the Met for what safety advice
 18 to pass on, and you say you don't know where the fire
 19 exits are. This is now 02.12, so well over an hour into
 20 this escalating incident.
 21 Is it right really that you didn't know even by this
 22 point that there was only a single exit route out of the
 23 building down the main stairs, or the only stairs?
 24 **A. No, I didn't, no.**
 25 Q. You didn't?

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1 **A. No.**
 2 Q. Even an hour into this incident, you didn't know that?
 3 **A. No.**
 4 Q. Okay.
 5 We don't see you or anybody else in the control room
 6 pressing the command unit for updated information as to
 7 what the conditions were in the stairs and lobbies at
 8 different levels.
 9 Is that something you thought of doing at this stage
 10 when you were asked by the Met as to what advice to give
 11 callers?
 12 **A. No, it's not something I would've thought of doing.**
 13 Q. Do you know whether anybody else did?
 14 **A. No, I don't know.**
 15 Q. Did you consult with a supervisor in the room or anybody
 16 in the room about what advice to give the Met when they
 17 asked?
 18 **A. No, I can't remember. I would've thought I would've**
 19 **said to someone that the Met wanted information, but**
 20 **I can't remember if I did or not. Under normal**
 21 **circumstances, I would've done, but I can't remember if**
 22 **I did on that occasion.**
 23 Q. We know that Group Manager Welch declared the fire
 24 a major incident at 02.07 or so, round about then.
 25 Did you know that at that time or round about that

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1 time?
 2 **A. No, I'm not sure.**
 3 Q. Would you have been able to see it on the Vision log?
 4 **A. Yes, if I had time to look at it. I didn't go through**
 5 **the log. If it was up on the service request, I may**
 6 **have noticed it. Sharon possibly would've shouted that**
 7 **out. But, again, I don't know if I was busy on**
 8 **something else, I might not have heard.**
 9 Q. Do you have any recollection of changing your advice or
 10 approach as a result --
 11 **A. No, I can't. I can't really remember the night at all,**
 12 **to be fair.**
 13 Q. Can I turn to a slightly different topic, which is the
 14 change in the stay-put advice.
 15 If you go to your witness statement at page 7,
 16 Mrs Gotts, you say in the first main paragraph there:
 17 "Initially the advice to give residents was to
 18 remain. I remember at some point in the night someone
 19 shouts that the advice was to get out. I do not know
 20 what time this was said."
 21 On the transcripts we've seen, you were in fact
 22 telling people to get out if they felt they could do so
 23 safely.
 24 So why did you do that if the advice was, as you've
 25 said, to remain?

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<p>1 A. Sorry, I was telling people to get out if they could do 2 so safely?</p> <p>3 Q. We've seen a number of transcripts --</p> <p>4 A. Yes, yes.</p> <p>5 Q. -- where in various different ways you say, "Well, 6 I can't really advise you, if you can get out, get out." 7 But here you say initially the advice to give residents 8 was to remain.</p> <p>9 Does that mean that you weren't telling people to 10 remain or you were?</p> <p>11 A. Initially it was, wasn't it? Before make pumps 25, for 12 me.</p> <p>13 Q. So "initially" means right at the very start?</p> <p>14 A. Yes.</p> <p>15 Q. It changed soon after that?</p> <p>16 A. Only for me. I don't know what everybody else was -- 17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask, are you speaking 18 here about what you were saying to people or what the 19 standard advice was?</p> <p>20 A. The standard, really, I think.</p> <p>21 MR MILLETT: I see, okay.</p> <p>22 Still on page 7 of your statement, you state in the 23 second paragraph at the end: 24 "By that point in the night FSG advice was 25 pointless."</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 197</p>	<p>1 Q. Did anybody come up to you with a piece of paper saying 2 "Change the advice to stay put"?</p> <p>3 A. No, no pieces of paper, no.</p> <p>4 Q. Are you sure about that?</p> <p>5 A. I don't think so.</p> <p>6 Q. Did anybody advise you as to what to tell the callers?</p> <p>7 A. I don't remember that happening.</p> <p>8 Q. Do you remember being told to give advice to put wet 9 towels over mouth, hold hands, stay together, get out, 10 could be last chance?</p> <p>11 A. No, I can't remember that but --</p> <p>12 Q. Sorry to press the point, but do you remember ever being 13 told to tell people to get out at all costs or come what 14 may or it could be their last chance?</p> <p>15 A. I can't remember.</p> <p>16 Q. Do you remember being told that firefighters were having 17 any kind of difficulty rescuing people or getting to 18 people above a particular floor?</p> <p>19 A. I think I heard someone say that they're not going to 20 get to them all, something along those lines, but 21 I don't know who said that.</p> <p>22 Q. Do you remember roughly when that was?</p> <p>23 A. No, no idea.</p> <p>24 Q. Let me just put one or two calls to you. 25 Control report, page 96, which is a call you took at</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 199</p>
<p>1 What point in the night are you referring to there?</p> <p>2 A. Much later on, I think. Much later on.</p> <p>3 Q. When you say much later, was that after the advice had 4 changed from stay put --</p> <p>5 A. No, I mean much, much later on.</p> <p>6 Q. What, after dawn, do you think?</p> <p>7 A. Possibly, yes.</p> <p>8 Q. Could you see dawn? Did you have any exterior windows 9 so you could see?</p> <p>10 A. Yes. I don't remember -- you know, all of a sudden we 11 all realised it was light.</p> <p>12 Q. The control debrief notes that we looked at before 13 say -- I don't necessarily need to take you back to 14 that -- that the advice was changed at 02.35 am. Does 15 that accord with your recollection?</p> <p>16 A. No, I've no idea.</p> <p>17 Q. Do you remember whether the change in stay-put advice 18 was communicated to you?</p> <p>19 A. I just remember somebody saying, "Tell them to get out".</p> <p>20 Q. Was it told to you personally?</p> <p>21 A. I thought someone just walked past me and said it. I'm 22 not sure if it was said to me directly or whether it was 23 a general announcement.</p> <p>24 Q. Do you know who that was? Do you remember who that was?</p> <p>25 A. No, not 100 per cent, no.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 198</p>	<p>1 02.42.14 with persons in flat 183 on the 18th floor. If 2 we can get the summary up, it's 02.42.14:</p> <p>3 "CRO Gotts takes a call from a male caller who asks 4 for a helicopter to rescue them as they are going to 5 die. He states that there are nine people in flat 153 6 on the 18th floor and that 152 is alight. CRO Gotts 7 asks if the caller can move away from the side of the 8 flat next to 152 and suggests that the caller blocks up 9 where the smoke is coming in. The caller states that 10 they are trying but that no one is helping them and that 11 they need to be evacuated. The caller says that smoke 12 is coming into the flat and CRO Gotts states that if 13 they cannot leave then they need to block up where the 14 smoke is coming in from. CRO Gotts explains that she 15 will pass the information to the crews. The caller says 16 thank you and goes off the line."</p> <p>17 Call duration, 3 minutes 38 seconds.</p> <p>18 Noting the time stamp of 02.42.14, Mrs Gotts, and 19 I know it's difficult to remember, do you know if by 20 this time you had been told about the change to the 21 stay-put advice?</p> <p>22 A. No, I don't know when I was told.</p> <p>23 Q. You find out that they're in flat 153 and there are nine 24 of them and that 152 is on fire. You also find out that 25 nobody is trying to evacuate them. Then you discover</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 200</p>

<p>1 that they're on the 18th floor.</p> <p>2 Is there a reason why you didn't tell them to get</p> <p>3 out at all costs or they might die?</p> <p>4 A. No, I can only assume that it sounded to me as if they</p> <p>5 couldn't, you know.</p> <p>6 Q. Did you know by this time that crews were having</p> <p>7 difficulty getting above the 15th floor?</p> <p>8 A. No, I didn't, no.</p> <p>9 Q. You say -- we see this from the summary -- that you</p> <p>10 would pass information to the crews.</p> <p>11 What did you have in mind that you were going to do</p> <p>12 in order to alert the crews to the situation?</p> <p>13 A. Well, just to go over and check that the information had</p> <p>14 gone over.</p> <p>15 Q. Did you do that?</p> <p>16 A. Yes, all my calls I went and checked that the</p> <p>17 information went over.</p> <p>18 Q. How did you check?</p> <p>19 A. Went over to the station manager and made sure the calls</p> <p>20 had gone through to the command unit.</p> <p>21 Q. What did you look at to check?</p> <p>22 A. His whiteboard and spoke to him. He was on the phone</p> <p>23 a lot as well, you know, at the same time.</p> <p>24 Q. Did you speak to Jason Oliff while he was on the call to</p> <p>25 reinforce the urgency?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 201</p>	<p>1 may be we can finish --</p> <p>2 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It may well be Mrs Gotts has other</p> <p>3 things scheduled for tomorrow.</p> <p>4 MR MILLETT: Shall we find out?</p> <p>5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mrs Gotts, as you've heard, counsel</p> <p>6 hasn't quite finished asking questions. Now, the</p> <p>7 alternatives are that we have a few minutes' break,</p> <p>8 because you have been giving evidence for another hour</p> <p>9 or so without a break, and then we continue for another</p> <p>10 20 minutes -- well, let's be perhaps more realistic,</p> <p>11 half an hour -- and we finish your evidence tonight.</p> <p>12 The alternative is that we have to ask you to come back</p> <p>13 tomorrow.</p> <p>14 Do you have a personal preference?</p> <p>15 THE WITNESS: I'd rather finish tonight, if that's okay.</p> <p>16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm not surprised to hear you say</p> <p>17 that. Right.</p> <p>18 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, I'm in your hands. I personally</p> <p>19 would prefer to finish tonight. This is an important</p> <p>20 witness for lots of people.</p> <p>21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: The witness needs a bit of a break</p> <p>22 though, so we'll have a 5-minute break now.</p> <p>23 THE WITNESS: Okay.</p> <p>24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you like to go with the usher,</p> <p>25 and of course not talk to anyone about your evidence</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 203</p>
<p>1 A. I can't remember.</p> <p>2 Q. You said you spoke to him.</p> <p>3 A. Yeah, I did speak to him during the night, but whether</p> <p>4 about that specific one or not, I don't know.</p> <p>5 Q. In general terms, did you interrupt his call or speak to</p> <p>6 him while he was on the phone?</p> <p>7 A. No, not interrupt his calls exactly.</p> <p>8 Q. Did you have any idea at this point or form any idea as</p> <p>9 to how realistic it was that crews would be able to go</p> <p>10 up to the 18th floor? This is now 02.42.</p> <p>11 A. No, not definite knowledge that there weren't going to</p> <p>12 get up there.</p> <p>13 Q. Again, was this an assumption that they would do all</p> <p>14 they could?</p> <p>15 A. Yes, they always do.</p> <p>16 MR MILLETT: I'm looking at the time, Mr Chairman, and</p> <p>17 I regret to say I'm not quite finished. I have a few</p> <p>18 questions to ask, but I'm not sure that we're going to</p> <p>19 finish within 5 minutes.</p> <p>20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, what's a realistic estimate?</p> <p>21 MR MILLETT: I think probably about 15 or 20 minutes more.</p> <p>22 Then there may be some further questions I will need</p> <p>23 to --</p> <p>24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That's quite a long time.</p> <p>25 MR MILLETT: I am anxious not to ask you to sit late. It</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 202</p>	<p>1 while you're out of the room.</p> <p>2 Could you come back 4.35 or just after. All right?</p> <p>3 Thank you very much.</p> <p>4 Mr Millett, I'm prepared to sit on a bit, but</p> <p>5 I think that we are reaching that time in the day when</p> <p>6 everyone's concentration is beginning to be a bit taxed.</p> <p>7 MR MILLETT: I agree, that's why I was suggesting rising</p> <p>8 now, but if it's convenient -- it's obviously important</p> <p>9 that the witness is comfortable and we get the best</p> <p>10 evidence.</p> <p>11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: She is getting a bit of a break now,</p> <p>12 but what I want to know from you is you said 15 to</p> <p>13 20 minutes --</p> <p>14 MR MILLETT: If I can be 15 minutes, that will allow</p> <p>15 a little bit of time, but I don't want to rush the</p> <p>16 process.</p> <p>17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Nor do I. On the other hand, in</p> <p>18 fairness to everyone we ought to have some sort of</p> <p>19 cut-off point tonight and people can work to it, and</p> <p>20 I think that's going to be 5 o'clock.</p> <p>21 MR MILLETT: Very good.</p> <p>22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Is that all right? Can you manage</p> <p>23 that?</p> <p>24 MR MILLETT: Absolutely. Let's see where we go.</p> <p>25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Others who may want to consider</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 204</p>

51 (Pages 201 to 204)

<p>1 about supplementary questions, we'll obviously go 2 through the usual process and give you a chance to raise 3 them with Mr Millett, but we all have to work within 4 a sensible deadline this evening. 5 So I'm going to sit again at 4.35 or very shortly 6 after, and we'll regard 5 o'clock as a deadline. 7 All right? Thank you. 8 (4.33 pm) 9 (A short break) 10 (4.40 pm) 11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mrs Gotts? Thank you. 12 Yes, Mr Millett. 13 MR MILLETT: Mrs Gotts, thank you for coming back to us. 14 I'm going to ask you one or two questions on one or 15 two more calls. 16 First, could you go to page 57 of the control 17 report, which is a little bit earlier on in the night 18 than where we'd got to. At 01.57.45 you took a call 19 from a caller: 20 "... who reports that they have tried to get out but 21 it is full of smoke and they cannot breathe CRO Gotts 22 asks the caller to confirm that they cannot get out 23 several times which the caller confirms repeatedly. CRO 24 Gotts then suggests that the caller block the doors to 25 try and stop the smoke from getting in and double checks</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 205</p>	<p>1 him but the caller says there is no one up there and the 2 call cuts off." 3 Did you pass information on to Jason Oliff at the 4 whiteboard, and therefore on to the incident ground, 5 that this was a caller who was elderly and therefore 6 unable himself to exit without assistance? 7 A. No, I don't remember saying about anybody being elderly. 8 Q. At all during the night? 9 A. I don't remember that call, no, I don't. 10 Q. Generally speaking, do you remember taking calls from 11 people who were unable to exit without assistance 12 because of their age or other difficulties? 13 A. No, I don't remember being told that. I don't remember. 14 Q. On a similar theme, if I can ask you to go back to the 15 call we looked at earlier at 01.54 from flat 205, do you 16 remember we looked at that? That's transcript 17 LFB00000333. We looked at this earlier on, and perhaps 18 it's better just to go back to the transcript so you 19 have it in front of you. 20 You're told in the first third of that page: 21 "CALLER: Yeah, we're in, we're in the building, 22 everyone knows we're in 205 there's seven of us here. 23 The fire's starting to rise to 205 now and we're gonna 24 go - we've got nowhere to go." 25 Then halfway down the page you're told, "We're</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 207</p>
<p>1 that the caller cannot leave the flat. She says the 2 best thing to do is stay where he is and try and block 3 the smoke. CRO Gotts asks the flat number and the 4 caller states that it is flat 92 which is on the 12th 5 floor. CRO Gotts then confirms that this message will 6 be passed over and the Brigade will get to them as soon 7 as they can." 8 The call lasts 2 minutes 14 seconds. 9 Do you remember this call particularly? 10 A. No. 11 Q. Do you remember taking a call from a child at any point? 12 A. No, no, I don't. 13 Q. You don't? 14 A. No. 15 Q. You've no recollection of taking a call from anybody who 16 was child or said they were a chilled? 17 A. No, no, I don't remember that at all. 18 Q. Next page is page 106 in the same report. This a call 19 at 02.51.38 where you make a call to a number given by 20 Surrey FRS at 02.48.49, we don't need to see that: 21 "A male answers the phone and is very distressed and 22 shouts that the flames are coming from next door. CRO 23 Gotts tells him to cover himself with wet towels and get 24 out. He asks if she is serious and states that he is 67 25 years of age. CRO Gotts asks if a neighbour can help</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 206</p>	<p>1 stuck". 2 "CALLER: No, there's no way. We're - the flat's 3 already full of smoke. Can't go out. We're, we're 4 stuck." 5 Now, we've seen you didn't explore means of access 6 with them. When people told you that they were stuck, 7 did you think at the time that it was important to 8 establish why they were stuck? 9 A. Because of the amount of calls, the fact that they were 10 stuck is all I needed to know, I felt at the time. 11 Q. Can people be stuck, for the purposes of FSG, for 12 a number of reasons, not just the conditions but also 13 because of their own mobility issues or age or matters 14 of that nature? 15 A. No, I don't really know, I didn't explore that, as you 16 know, but I assumed he just meant -- as I say, they 17 normally mention that themselves. 18 Q. In these circumstances, was it relevant or important to 19 establish with the callers whether it was mobility 20 issues or age or matters of that nature which were 21 causing them to be stuck? 22 A. Maybe it could've been, but the amount of calls and the 23 speed at which we were working, it was just immense, an 24 immense workload. Maybe I could've explored it more, 25 but I'm afraid I didn't.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 208</p>

<p>1 Q. Coming back to the timing of the stay-put advice, I'd 2 like you to look, please, at the same report, control 3 report, page 102. 4 At the foot of that page you can see a call at 5 02.48.49, and you take a call from Surrey FRS who have 6 had another call from the daughter-in-law of the 7 resident trapped on the 22nd floor: 8 "The Surrey CRO passes the mobile phone number of 9 the resident and asks if CRO Gotts could give him a 10 ring. CRO Gotts confirms that we have just been told to 11 tell people to put wet cloths over their mouths and try 12 to get out and the Surrey CRO responds by explaining 13 that the resident is 70 years old." 14 Incident number, then call duration 1 minute 15 43 seconds. 16 Now, it's a timing question I'm after. You say that 17 "we have just been told to tell people to put wet cloths 18 over their mouths and try to get out" and the time is 19 02.48.49. 20 Can we be sure, therefore, that by that time, at the 21 latest, you had been told -- you perfectly knew about 22 the change in advice? 23 A. Yes, I must have. 24 Q. Did you know if Surrey was aware of the change in advice 25 already before you told them about that?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 209</p>	<p>1 leave? 2 A. I think I took them at their word that they explained 3 they cannot get out. 4 Q. You took them at their word. You didn't seek to -- 5 A. No, I maybe should've repeated it again. 6 Q. Did you understand fully what the effect of the change 7 in advice was that you were supposed to pass on to 8 callers, that they must get out, it's their only chance? 9 A. Yes, I should've said it more forcefully, maybe. 10 Q. Did you seek help or advice from a supervisor as to how 11 to handle this call given that the advice was to tell 12 them to get out -- 13 A. No. No. 14 Q. -- but they were telling you they couldn't? 15 A. I'd explained what they needed to do and they said they 16 couldn't. I took them at their word, the fact that they 17 couldn't, you know. I understood them to know the 18 situation outside better than me, I'm afraid. 19 Q. By that time, did you know or were you told that crews 20 weren't accessing the higher floors, for example -- 21 A. I can't remember. 22 Q. -- above the 15th floor? 23 A. I don't know if we were told that. 24 Q. Again, same question as before, when you told them that 25 you would let the firemen know, what did you have in</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 211</p>
<p>1 A. No, I don't know. I don't know. 2 Q. Let's look at another call you took after that, some 3 7 minutes later, page 239 of the second hour ORR 4 transcript this time. So not the control report but the 5 second hour ORR at LFB00004828, page 239. 6 This is at 02.55.38, so the bottom of the page. 7 "CRO Gotts takes a call from a male caller in flat 8 183 on the 21st floor who states that they cannot get 9 out because it is too smoky. CRO Gotts says they need 10 to put wet towels over themselves and leave the flat but 11 the caller explains that they cannot. CRO Gotts then 12 asks if they can block up where the smoke is coming in 13 or get to a window that can provide fresh air and the 14 caller states that is what they are doing but there are 15 three kids, three adults and one heavily pregnant wife. 16 CRO Gotts confirms and states that she will let the 17 crews know." 18 Call duration 1 minute 17 seconds. 19 Now, my question is, having shown you the summary, 20 Mrs Gotts: given that you've been told by 02.47, as 21 we've just seen, to tell the occupants to get out, can 22 you help us with why you told these callers, once they 23 said they couldn't get out, to block up the smoke or 24 where the smoke was coming in instead of spelling out to 25 them that they must make all efforts at all costs to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 210</p>	<p>1 mind that you were going to do? 2 A. Checking that the information had been passed over. 3 Q. Did you? Did you pass -- 4 A. I checked everything had gone over. 5 Q. Who did you check that with? 6 A. Well, with Station Manager Oliff. 7 Q. Now, there's a call, turning to a later call, at 8 03.08.56 from flat 193 on the 22nd floor. Can I take 9 you to that summary on page 122 of the control report. 10 This is the summary and we'll look at the 11 transcript. At the top of the page: 12 "CRO Gotts takes a call from a caller in flat 193 on 13 the 22nd floor reporting that they are burning. The 14 caller asks if they can escape through a big window on a 15 helicopter and CRO Gotts explains the Brigade is sending 16 big ladders. The caller says they can get out if CRO 17 Gotts sends a helicopter or the 20 people will die and 18 CRO Gotts tells the caller that she will let the crews 19 know. The caller keeps screaming and shouting. CRO 20 Gotts repeatedly tries to get the caller to leave the 21 building, covering themselves with wet towels." 22 I'd like just to look at parts of the transcript 23 with you. It's LFB00000406. 24 As you can see from the top-right, it's a call at 25 03.08.56, the transcript runs to some 6 pages or so.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 212</p>

<p>1 Just over 6 pages. 2 If I can show you page 2, first of all. 3 You're asked a third of the way down: 4 "Can we escape to a helicopter to leave?" 5 And then: 6 "OPERATOR: So, are you able to get some air from 7 where there's no -- the side where there's no fire? 8 "CALLER 1: No, nobody (Several inaudible words). 9 "OPERATOR: Sorry? 10 "CALLER 1: (Several inaudible words) helicopter -- I 11 can see the helicopter. Can we escape from the 12 helicopter, please? 13 "OPERATOR: No, well, we're coming up to you inside. 14 They're sending -- 15 "CALLER 1: Yeah? 16 "OPERATOR: -- some further big ladders, okay? 17 "CALLER 1: Sorry, yes, yes, we can (Overspeaking) 18 "OPERATOR: They're sending more ladders. So, what 19 flat number are you in? 20 "CALLER 1: What -- 193, 193. From the window we can 21 escape. Can you send us the helicopter, please? 22 "OPERATOR: Okay. What floor are you on?" 23 And there is a discussion about the floor. 24 Just on that exchange, big ladders were coming, did 25 you have any information in your hands when you took</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 213</p>	<p>1 "OPERATOR: -- that you need that, okay, but if you 2 -- are you sure you can't get out the other way? 3 "CALLER 1: Yeah. Yes." 4 Then there's a discussion about towels. 5 Then at the bottom of page 4: 6 "CALLER 2: Helicopter, helicopter; 20 people are 7 dying! Please!" 8 Then there's further discussion on page 5. 9 Then on page 6: 10 "OPERATOR: Yeah, they're sending more ladders. 11 So -- we are sending more ladders, but in the 12 meantime -- 13 "CALLER 2: Please! 14 "OPERATOR: -- try and soak all your towels. 15 "CALLER 2: Yes, yes, if you send helicopter, we can 16 escape. 17 "OPERATOR: Okay. All right. Well, I'll pass that 18 over -- 19 "CALLER 2: Please! 20 "OPERATOR: -- to let them know where you are, okay?" 21 Now, having seen all or most of the transcript, the 22 last words or discussion about helicopter are: 23 "CALLER: ... if you send a helicopter, we can 24 escape. 25 "OPERATOR: Okay. All right. Well, I'll pass that</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 215</p>
<p>1 this call that the LFB was actually sending big ladders 2 which would be able to access this high floor? 3 A. No, I don't know why I said that. 4 Q. Right. So does that mean that you didn't have a basis 5 for telling them that -- 6 A. No, I'm afraid not, no. 7 Q. Right. 8 At the time of this call -- so this is 03.08 -- the 9 advice to trapped residents had been changed to 10 immediate evacuation. 11 Did you know whether this family had previously been 12 given any advice to evacuate? 13 A. No, I didn't know. 14 Q. Did you consider the impact that telling these callers 15 that ladders were being brought would have on any 16 earlier advice which might have been given to get out? 17 A. No. 18 Q. We've seen a little bit of a discussion about 19 helicopters. Just continuing on page 3, top of the 20 page, I've just shown you that you're asked: 21 "CALLER: ... Can you send us the helicopter, please? 22 "OPERATOR: Okay. What floor are you on?" 23 You discuss the floor: 24 "OPERATOR: 22nd floor? Okay. I'll let them know -- 25 CALLER 1: Yeah.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 214</p>	<p>1 over --" 2 Did you mean to leave them with an impression that 3 the helicopter would come and save them? 4 A. Not really, no, I don't know. 5 Q. What did you actually think would happen with the 6 helicopter, whether the helicopter rescue was actually 7 realistic? 8 A. Well, I didn't know. I assumed it wasn't because it 9 tends to fan the flames, so ... 10 Q. Is there a reason why you didn't tell these callers, 11 "Look, you're not going to be rescued by a helicopter, 12 so forget that, you've got to get out!"? 13 A. I don't know. I suppose I just didn't want to send them 14 into too much of a panic because they seemed to think 15 that was their only way. But maybe I should have 16 pressed more with the wet towels. 17 MR MILLETT: Mrs Gotts, thank you, you've been extremely 18 patient with my questions. 19 I have no more questions for this witness, 20 Mr Chairman. 21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Do we need to take a few minutes to 22 check that? 23 MR MILLETT: It would be sensible to do that. 24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mrs Gotts, it's just possible there 25 may be one or two more questions.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 216</p>

<p>1 THE WITNESS: Okay.</p> <p>2 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So I'll rise for 2 or 3 minutes and</p> <p>3 then we'll get you back and see whether there are</p> <p>4 questions or not. All right? Would you like to go with</p> <p>5 the usher, please.</p> <p>6 Mr Millett, if I say no more than 5 minutes, you'll</p> <p>7 understand that if it's less, I shall be pleased.</p> <p>8 MR MILLETT: Very good.</p> <p>9 (4.57 pm)</p> <p>10 (A short break)</p> <p>11 (5.00 pm)</p> <p>12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you, Mrs Gotts. I don't know</p> <p>13 whether there are more questions.</p> <p>14 MR MILLETT: There are a couple more. I hope they are</p> <p>15 pretty short.</p> <p>16 First of all, can I ask you to be shown, please,</p> <p>17 page 7 of your witness statement.</p> <p>18 In the middle of the page, at the end of the</p> <p>19 paragraph, you say:</p> <p>20 "I also remember that there was a red phone that</p> <p>21 rang incessantly. I think it was BT advising us that</p> <p>22 there were calls outstanding."</p> <p>23 You say you think it was BT; can I just ask you,</p> <p>24 this red phone, where does it sit in the control room?</p> <p>25 A. It's sat -- I think it was, like, between Debbie Real</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 217</p>	<p>1 At 03.12.56 you take a call:</p> <p>2 "... from a male caller in flat 133 on the 16th</p> <p>3 floor. There is a smoke alarm audible in the</p> <p>4 background. CRO Gotts asks if he has tried to get out,</p> <p>5 the caller says he is nearly fainting. CRO Gotts</p> <p>6 repeats the advice to cover themselves with wet towels</p> <p>7 and get out. CRO Gotts keeps trying to encourage him to</p> <p>8 leave and asks who he is with. The caller replies that</p> <p>9 he is in the flat with his wife. The caller is</p> <p>10 struggling to breathe and says they have tried to leave</p> <p>11 twice and CRO Gotts asks if he has blocked everything</p> <p>12 up. CRO Gotts says she will tell the crews but repeats</p> <p>13 the advice to leave."</p> <p>14 At that stage, 03.12, that's some time after the</p> <p>15 stay-put advice has changed. Did you believe at that</p> <p>16 time that the firefighters could actually get to the</p> <p>17 16th floor?</p> <p>18 A. I didn't know.</p> <p>19 Q. You didn't know?</p> <p>20 A. No.</p> <p>21 Q. Did you think that at that stage rescue from the</p> <p>22 16th floor was unlikely at best?</p> <p>23 A. I didn't know, to be fair.</p> <p>24 Q. Was it obvious to you that you should've told him he's</p> <p>25 got to get out at all costs, or they had to get out at</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 219</p>
<p>1 and Alex Norman.</p> <p>2 Q. Do you know what it does normally?</p> <p>3 A. I've asked since because the noise was terrible.</p> <p>4 Q. Right.</p> <p>5 A. And I think it's the BT critical line, but it was</p> <p>6 ringing all the time.</p> <p>7 Q. Did you know that on the night?</p> <p>8 A. No, it was just awful.</p> <p>9 Q. You say it rang incessantly; did people ever answer it?</p> <p>10 A. I believe they did when they were free.</p> <p>11 Q. Did you see that for yourself?</p> <p>12 A. No, I wasn't really looking at what everyone was doing.</p> <p>13 Q. You say it rang incessantly all night; was it answered</p> <p>14 incessantly all night or did it ring and ring?</p> <p>15 A. Yes, it was answered, but it was having to ring for</p> <p>16 quite a while because everybody was really busy.</p> <p>17 Q. Whose responsibility was it to answer?</p> <p>18 A. One of the supervisors.</p> <p>19 Q. You didn't see who that was?</p> <p>20 A. No.</p> <p>21 Q. Can I just ask you then about two calls, one at 03.12.56</p> <p>22 and one at 03.33.46, which is in the control room report</p> <p>23 we have at pages 124 and 137.</p> <p>24 I'll take the first one because it's probably the</p> <p>25 simplest, page 124.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 218</p>	<p>1 all costs?</p> <p>2 A. Well, I have told him a few times to cover themselves --</p> <p>3 Q. We had some evidence from Peter Duddy last week that he</p> <p>4 was telling people after 02.42 -- there are a number of</p> <p>5 instances that he was giving very clear advice to get</p> <p>6 out in his way.</p> <p>7 Did you hear him do that?</p> <p>8 A. No.</p> <p>9 Q. Did you hear him tell callers assertively that come what</p> <p>10 may, they had to leave?</p> <p>11 A. No.</p> <p>12 MR MILLETT: You didn't, right.</p> <p>13 Mrs Gotts, I have no further questions for you.</p> <p>14 Those are all the further questions I had. It only</p> <p>15 remains for me to thank you very much for enduring my</p> <p>16 questions and assisting the inquiry. We're very, very</p> <p>17 grateful to you and I'm sorry that we've kept you late.</p> <p>18 THE WITNESS: That's okay. Thank you very much.</p> <p>19 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much for coming,</p> <p>20 Mrs Gotts. As Mr Millett said, I am sorry we've kept</p> <p>21 you and everybody else rather late this evening, but it</p> <p>22 has been very important to hear your evidence. So thank</p> <p>23 you for coming. All right? You are free to go.</p> <p>24 (The witness withdrew)</p> <p>25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm sorry to have kept you all even</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 220</p>

1 later than I said I would, but that's the end for today
2 and we'll resume at 10 o'clock tomorrow.
3 MR MILLETT: 10 o'clock tomorrow. Thank you.
4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
5 (5.05 pm)
6 (The hearing adjourned until Tuesday, 18 September 2018 at
7 10.00 am)
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