

<p>1 Thursday, 20 September 2018</p> <p>2 (10.00 am)</p> <p>3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to</p> <p>4 today's hearing. We are going to continue today with</p> <p>5 the firefighter evidence.</p> <p>6 MR MILLETT: We are, Mr Chairman, yes.</p> <p>7 May I now please call Station Manager Andrew Walton.</p> <p>8 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.</p> <p>9 ANDREW WALTON (affirmed)</p> <p>10 Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY</p> <p>11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Mr Walton.</p> <p>12 Yes, Mr Millett.</p> <p>13 MR MILLETT: Mr Walton, good morning.</p> <p>14 Can I ask you, please, first, to give the inquiry</p> <p>15 your full name.</p> <p>16 A. Andrew Frederick Walton.</p> <p>17 Q. Can I say, first of all, thank you very much to you for</p> <p>18 coming to the inquiry and assisting us with our</p> <p>19 investigations. We're very grateful.</p> <p>20 If my questions are too long or you don't understand</p> <p>21 them or you want me to repeat a question, please just</p> <p>22 say. If you need a break at any stage, again, please</p> <p>23 just indicate, if you would.</p> <p>24 A. Yes, sir.</p> <p>25 Q. You have created and provided to the inquiry quite</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 1</p>	<p>1 you read that recently?</p> <p>2 A. Not as recently as the others, but I have read it, yes.</p> <p>3 Q. There is also an e-mail dated 18 June 2017, which is</p> <p>4 MET00005713. Is that it?</p> <p>5 A. Yes.</p> <p>6 Q. Then there are some handwritten contemporaneous notes at</p> <p>7 MET00005714. They run for some number of pages.</p> <p>8 Can you confirm that those are your contemporaneous</p> <p>9 written notes?</p> <p>10 A. Yes, they are.</p> <p>11 Q. You have provided I think three notebooks to</p> <p>12 us: MET00005715, MET00005716 and MET00015718.</p> <p>13 We'll look at those in due course but I've read</p> <p>14 those into the record. There's no need to go through</p> <p>15 those now.</p> <p>16 You've also provided something called "Statement</p> <p>17 Headings", which is MET00015724, which I'd like, please,</p> <p>18 to have on the screen.</p> <p>19 First of all, can you confirm that that is your</p> <p>20 document?</p> <p>21 A. Yes, it is.</p> <p>22 Q. You can see that it's identified as a record of actions</p> <p>23 at the top of the page, completed on 6 November 2017.</p> <p>24 Could you tell us what this document is?</p> <p>25 A. That was something I used in preparation for my police</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 3</p>
<p>1 a volume of written material which I'm now just going to</p> <p>2 put to you formally.</p> <p>3 First of all, your statement dated 25 January 2018</p> <p>4 at MET00010828. That's your first statement.</p> <p>5 Can I ask you in respect of that, have you read that</p> <p>6 recently?</p> <p>7 A. Yes, I have.</p> <p>8 Q. Subject to corrections made in your second statement,</p> <p>9 which I'll come to in a moment, can you confirm that its</p> <p>10 contents are true?</p> <p>11 A. Yes, they are.</p> <p>12 Q. Turning to your second statement dated</p> <p>13 17 September 2018, which goes under the reference</p> <p>14 LFB00023365, was that provided to the inquiry at the</p> <p>15 inquiry's request under rule 9?</p> <p>16 A. Yes, it was.</p> <p>17 Q. Have you read that recently?</p> <p>18 A. Yes, I have.</p> <p>19 Q. Can you confirm that the contents of that second</p> <p>20 statement are also true and accurate?</p> <p>21 A. Yes, they are.</p> <p>22 Q. You have also provided to the inquiry some</p> <p>23 contemporaneous material.</p> <p>24 First of all, appendix A to your first statement,</p> <p>25 which is MET00005712, which is there on the screen, have</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 2</p>	<p>1 statement, to guide the flow of information that I was</p> <p>2 giving to make sure that I didn't omit anything that</p> <p>3 I remembered at any other time.</p> <p>4 Q. Were you asked to produce this document?</p> <p>5 A. Because I referred to it during the police interview,</p> <p>6 I entered it as a piece of evidence.</p> <p>7 Q. But am I right in thinking nobody asked you to produce</p> <p>8 this document?</p> <p>9 A. No, it was something I produced to make sure that</p> <p>10 I didn't neglect to say something that I'd been aware of</p> <p>11 either in my contemporaneous notes or in any other</p> <p>12 recollections since the incident.</p> <p>13 Q. When you created this document, did you have any other</p> <p>14 documents in front of you to refresh your memory?</p> <p>15 A. Yes, I referred to the contemporaneous notes that have</p> <p>16 already been mentioned, and that summary that was put up</p> <p>17 that I said I hadn't looked at recently.</p> <p>18 Q. Your notebooks, did you refer to those as well?</p> <p>19 A. Yes, those are the contemporaneous notes.</p> <p>20 I did two sets of contemporaneous notes, the ones</p> <p>21 I was asked to complete at Paddington fire station --</p> <p>22 Q. Are those the ones in handwriting?</p> <p>23 A. Those are the ones on loose pages. Those are the first</p> <p>24 contemporaneous notes that you put up. Those were done</p> <p>25 on the morning of the fire.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 4</p>

<p>1 Q. Right. That's appendix A, is it, to your statement?</p> <p>2 A. Yes.</p> <p>3 Q. I see.</p> <p>4 A. The second contemporaneous notes are the ones in the</p> <p>5 notebook, and they were done on the evening following</p> <p>6 the fire --</p> <p>7 Q. Sorry, there are three notebooks.</p> <p>8 A. I was aware of two notebooks, so that was something</p> <p>9 I was going to try and come back to if you referred to</p> <p>10 them. My recollection is I used two notebooks. They</p> <p>11 are contemporaneous statement notebooks, which I had as</p> <p>12 a senior accident investigator.</p> <p>13 Upon returning home after the incident, I felt</p> <p>14 uncomfortable that I'd had to give my contemporaneous</p> <p>15 note into the Fire Brigade. I knew that my role would</p> <p>16 be a key role and I wanted to make sure that I had</p> <p>17 a note that was contemporaneous, that was in my</p> <p>18 possession, so that's why I sat down on that evening and</p> <p>19 I wrote those notes.</p> <p>20 Q. So when you say you sat down and wrote those notes,</p> <p>21 we're talking about the notes in manuscript we see at</p> <p>22 MET00005714? Let's just have those back up on the</p> <p>23 screen, if we can.</p> <p>24 A. No, those are the notes that I made at Paddington on the</p> <p>25 morning of the fire. The notes that are in the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 5</p>	<p>1 A. And that was the way that I annotated them so I could</p> <p>2 tell the order they were in.</p> <p>3 Q. So we've seen MET00005715, MET00005716, the two we've</p> <p>4 seen already, those were done in the evening, were they?</p> <p>5 A. So the ones that are on A4 page lined paper, those were</p> <p>6 done at Paddington fire station in the morning.</p> <p>7 When I returned home, as I say, I felt uncomfortable</p> <p>8 not having my own recollection in my hand. So while it</p> <p>9 was still fresh, while I was a bit more composed than</p> <p>10 I had been when I was at Paddington, I sat back down and</p> <p>11 completed the note then.</p> <p>12 Q. So we've seen the first two. I just want to show you,</p> <p>13 if I can, the last in the series, because we have three,</p> <p>14 Mr Walton, and it's MET00015718.</p> <p>15 (Pause)</p> <p>16 No, we don't have it.</p> <p>17 Well, let's move on. We'll sort that out later.</p> <p>18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We have a technical glitch.</p> <p>19 A. That's fine. I know I wrote my notes in two books.</p> <p>20 You're referring to three, I just want to make sure what</p> <p>21 the third book is so I can be accurate.</p> <p>22 MR MILLETT: Let's move on.</p> <p>23 I'm going to ask you questions under four topics and</p> <p>24 I'll tell you what they are. First of all, we're going</p> <p>25 to cover training in relation to high-rise fires;</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 7</p>
<p>1 notebooks, as you've referred to, those are</p> <p>2 contemporaneous notes that I made on the evening when</p> <p>3 I returned home.</p> <p>4 Q. Very good. We have three notebooks --</p> <p>5 A. Could I see the covers and I'll be able to say --</p> <p>6 Q. Yes. So let's look first of all at MET00005715.</p> <p>7 A. That is the first notebook of the contemporaneous notes</p> <p>8 that I made on the evening of the 17th.</p> <p>9 Q. And MET00015718.</p> <p>10 (Pause)</p> <p>11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Do we have it in hard copy?</p> <p>12 MR MILLETT: No, I don't think so.</p> <p>13 A. The notebooks I retained, I scanned those in and I sent</p> <p>14 a scanned copy in to the inquiry team, so you'll have</p> <p>15 an electronic version of those. But I've recently</p> <p>16 reviewed those notes.</p> <p>17 Q. Let me see if I can do it a different way.</p> <p>18 You've spoken of the first one, MET00005715. Let me</p> <p>19 try MET00005716, which is I think the second in the</p> <p>20 notebook series.</p> <p>21 A. I think that's the first notebook cover.</p> <p>22 Q. Right.</p> <p>23 A. Oh, no, that would be the second, it says</p> <p>24 "Grenfell Tower 2".</p> <p>25 Q. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 6</p>	<p>1 secondly, your previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower;</p> <p>2 then we're going to move to the handover of command from</p> <p>3 Mike Dowden to you and from you to DAC O'Loughlin on the</p> <p>4 night; then your role as fire sector commander and then</p> <p>5 as officer in charge of BA, just so you know where we're</p> <p>6 going today.</p> <p>7 A. Yes, sir.</p> <p>8 Q. Those are broad headings; obviously we may move around</p> <p>9 in and out of those.</p> <p>10 Before I get to the first of those, can I just ask</p> <p>11 you some questions about your general background and</p> <p>12 experience.</p> <p>13 You joined the LFB, I think, in October 2014.</p> <p>14 A. Yes.</p> <p>15 Q. And you've been a firefighter in various fire and rescue</p> <p>16 services for some 29 years in total.</p> <p>17 A. Yes. I started my career in January 1989 with the</p> <p>18 West Midlands Fire Service. I served at a city centre</p> <p>19 station that had a lot of high-rise on its area, so in</p> <p>20 the first 5 years of my career, I responded to a number</p> <p>21 of high-rise fires.</p> <p>22 I transferred from the West Midlands Fire Service</p> <p>23 into the Isle of Wight Fire Service in 1994. In my time</p> <p>24 in the Isle of Wight, I went through the ranks to</p> <p>25 station officer. That, when rank to role came in, was</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 8</p>

<p>1 assimilated to station manager B.</p> <p>2 During that time, I worked in every department in</p> <p>3 the Isle of Wight Fire and Rescue Service in</p> <p>4 a managerial role and attended numerous training courses</p> <p>5 in various aspects of different skills.</p> <p>6 Q. At the time of the fire, you were an SM based at</p> <p>7 Kingston?</p> <p>8 A. That's correct.</p> <p>9 Q. Your call sign on the night of the fire was H41S,</p> <p>10 I believe.</p> <p>11 A. Yeah, we use phonetics, so it's Hotel 41 Sierra.</p> <p>12 Q. As to timings, just very briefly, we can see you were</p> <p>13 paged at 0059 hours to monitor the incident.</p> <p>14 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>15 Q. You mobilised at 01.15, as you tell us in your</p> <p>16 statement, following the instructions to make pumps six.</p> <p>17 A. Yes.</p> <p>18 Q. You were mobile at 01.18, or thereabouts.</p> <p>19 A. That was the time I was able to get through to book</p> <p>20 mobile. As other people have said, the -- we had just</p> <p>21 changed our mobilising system to one called Vision, and</p> <p>22 it was not unusual for you not to get through on the</p> <p>23 first attempt to call fire control.</p> <p>24 So I tried to call control to book mobile, didn't</p> <p>25 get an answer. But because I was already monitoring the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 9</p>	<p>1 the input in the morning to refresh our skills, or as</p> <p>2 the actual scenario that we've been tested against.</p> <p>3 I carried out -- the last command training I've had</p> <p>4 before Grenfell I think was in March 2017. I can't</p> <p>5 remember what the content was but I would be very</p> <p>6 surprised if there wasn't a high-rise element in there.</p> <p>7 In the role of the SSSO, which is mentioned in the</p> <p>8 statement, I've been involved in delivering or</p> <p>9 facilitating the back to basics training, which in 2017</p> <p>10 the -- I think it would be the 2016/17 round, we were</p> <p>11 concentrating on high-rise firefighting and particularly</p> <p>12 about making sure that information reached the</p> <p>13 bridgehead and influenced operations.</p> <p>14 So that probably is the most recent training that</p> <p>15 I was involved in.</p> <p>16 Q. I think we know that you provided training as a station</p> <p>17 manager during that period two years before Grenfell.</p> <p>18 Can I just turn to a spreadsheet and see in a more</p> <p>19 focused way what you did.</p> <p>20 A. Yes.</p> <p>21 Q. Can I ask you to be shown LFB00003571, which is also at</p> <p>22 tab 9 of our master documents bundle.</p> <p>23 I'd like you to turn first of all, please, to</p> <p>24 page 31 of that document, which is the very last page.</p> <p>25 This is the LFB's printout spreadsheet of your training</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 11</p>
<p>1 incident and I'd heard the make pumps, I was moving to</p> <p>2 get in my vehicle and mobilise so --</p> <p>3 Q. We'll come to that detail in due course.</p> <p>4 A. Yes.</p> <p>5 Q. But just in overall terms.</p> <p>6 A. Yes, I booked mobile with control at that time, but</p> <p>7 I was already in the process of exiting.</p> <p>8 Q. We'll try and establish more exactly what time you</p> <p>9 arrived at the incident because we don't have a status 3</p> <p>10 for you, I'm afraid, in the record, so we'll try and</p> <p>11 work it out.</p> <p>12 A. Okay.</p> <p>13 Q. In terms of your training, to turn to the first of the</p> <p>14 major topics I want to cover with you, if I may, are you</p> <p>15 required, as a station manager, to do continuing or</p> <p>16 continuous training?</p> <p>17 A. Yes, we maintain our competences in all of our skill</p> <p>18 levels.</p> <p>19 Q. Can you summarise for us briefly, if you can, the</p> <p>20 training that you had received in relation to high-rise</p> <p>21 fires in the two years or so before the Grenfell Tower</p> <p>22 fire in June 2017.</p> <p>23 A. Every command assessment that I've taken in London Fire</p> <p>24 Brigade in my recollection has had a high-rise scenario</p> <p>25 as part of that command assessment, either as some of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 10</p>	<p>1 records, which starts on page 30, halfway down, in 2014,</p> <p>2 23 October 2014, and runs down to April 2018, so through</p> <p>3 the incident.</p> <p>4 I want to look at page 31 and the date mark for</p> <p>5 22 February 2017, please, which is a third of the way</p> <p>6 down. There's a date in the third column from the</p> <p>7 right, 22 February 2017. There's a bunch of dates</p> <p>8 there. I want to focus on "Firefighting in high rise</p> <p>9 buildings - 633", which is in grey shaded under the</p> <p>10 column marked "Training".</p> <p>11 It says there:</p> <p>12 "Training Supervisor - Incident Management -</p> <p>13 Buildings and Structures - Buildings and Structures -</p> <p>14 Firefighting in high rise buildings ..."</p> <p>15 That was you being a training supervisor.</p> <p>16 Just in general terms, a short question: does that</p> <p>17 show that you were supervising the delivery of training</p> <p>18 to officers on the subject of incident management,</p> <p>19 buildings and structures and firefighting in high-rise</p> <p>20 buildings at that time?</p> <p>21 A. I believe that would relate to a back to basics course</p> <p>22 at that time where I would've been a facilitator on that</p> <p>23 course.</p> <p>24 Q. A facilitator, what does that mean?</p> <p>25 A. Well, as the SSSOs, we maintain the schedule of the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 12</p>

<p>1 delivery of back to basics. Every station in the area</p> <p>2 would be involved in back to basics. It was the borough</p> <p>3 commander and the station managers within each borough</p> <p>4 that were responsible for delivering the training. We</p> <p>5 facilitated that.</p> <p>6 So the course content was provided by the SSSOs,</p> <p>7 that was prepared centrally. We acted as additional</p> <p>8 resources in the room. If need be, we led the training,</p> <p>9 but usually the local station managers led that</p> <p>10 training.</p> <p>11 Q. Did any part of that training on policy 633 that you</p> <p>12 facilitated as an SSSO involve how to go about doing</p> <p>13 a 7(2)(d) visit?</p> <p>14 A. No.</p> <p>15 Q. Did it involve how to examine the building layout and</p> <p>16 construction of a high-rise building?</p> <p>17 A. No, not prior to an incident, no.</p> <p>18 Q. Did it examine what specific building materials</p> <p>19 a high-rise building was composed of?</p> <p>20 A. No.</p> <p>21 Q. Did it examine cladding?</p> <p>22 A. No.</p> <p>23 Q. Did it examine the circumstances in which the stay-put</p> <p>24 policy in place for a particular high-rise residential</p> <p>25 block would have to be changed to a full or partial</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 13</p>	<p>1 affecting them in their flats?</p> <p>2 If the caller states they can't evacuate and they</p> <p>3 believe they should be evacuating, that's when fire</p> <p>4 survival guidance is given. To my mind, that's the only</p> <p>5 sort of reference in our policies to advising people to</p> <p>6 stay put.</p> <p>7 Q. Have you had or delivered training on policy 790?</p> <p>8 A. I've received --</p> <p>9 Q. And FSG advice in particular?</p> <p>10 A. The area of that policy that we focused on in the back</p> <p>11 to basics was the information exchange between control</p> <p>12 and the fire ground and the fire ground and the</p> <p>13 bridgehead, and making sure that that information could</p> <p>14 be used to prioritise operations.</p> <p>15 Q. I understand that. We'll come back to that possibly in</p> <p>16 due course.</p> <p>17 Have you had training on policy 539, "Emergency call</p> <p>18 management", in relation to fire survival guidance</p> <p>19 calls?</p> <p>20 A. I can't answer that off the top of my head. I'd have to</p> <p>21 see the policy to see if I've --</p> <p>22 Q. Just following up an answer that you gave, I just want</p> <p>23 to be sure that you're right about that. Can I ask you</p> <p>24 to look at policy 539 --</p> <p>25 A. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 15</p>
<p>1 evacuation?</p> <p>2 A. Something I've struggled with all the way through the</p> <p>3 inquiry is with reference to a stay-put policy. There's</p> <p>4 a building design principle that any high-rise is built</p> <p>5 so that people can stay in their premises that aren't</p> <p>6 affected directly by fire, and that is the principle</p> <p>7 that all of our procedures have been built to deal with.</p> <p>8 So when the building fails, that's the only time</p> <p>9 that an evacuation would be required, and when the</p> <p>10 building fails, an evacuation isn't possible.</p> <p>11 So I've really struggled with us being asked at what</p> <p>12 time the stay-put policy should have been changed,</p> <p>13 because we don't have a policy to tell people to stay</p> <p>14 put.</p> <p>15 So that's just a fact that I wanted to state.</p> <p>16 Q. You say you don't have a policy to tell people to stay</p> <p>17 put; is that really right?</p> <p>18 A. Yes.</p> <p>19 Q. Can I --</p> <p>20 A. In fire survival guidance it is normal, because those</p> <p>21 principles are assumed to exist, for fire control</p> <p>22 operators to confirm with a caller that under normal</p> <p>23 conditions, it's probably preferable for them to stay</p> <p>24 put in a fire situation because they're not directly</p> <p>25 affected. So the question is: is smoke and fire</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 14</p>	<p>1 Q. -- "Emergency call management", which was the one</p> <p>2 current as at March 2014, which is in tab 3 of our</p> <p>3 policy bundle. I want you to go, please, to page 16 of</p> <p>4 that, which is appendix 3, "Fire survival guidance".</p> <p>5 In the third paragraph down on that page -- we've</p> <p>6 examined this with a lot of the control room</p> <p>7 operators -- the text of the policy says:</p> <p>8 "Brigade Control advise callers to 'Get out and Stay</p> <p>9 out', however if a call is received from a High rise</p> <p>10 building where Fire, Heat and Smoke are not affecting</p> <p>11 the caller, LFB would advise that:</p> <p>12 "You are usually safest to remain in your premises</p> <p>13 unless affected by fire, heat or smoke. If the</p> <p>14 situation changes, you should leave your premises and</p> <p>15 dial 999, if you need further assistance."</p> <p>16 Tell me if this is wrong, but it looks to me as the</p> <p>17 lay reader that that is the advice that control room</p> <p>18 operators actually give to callers: you are usually</p> <p>19 safest to remain in your premises.</p> <p>20 A. I go back to the answer: the principle of a building</p> <p>21 design is that a fire would be contained in the</p> <p>22 compartment it originates in. So in those buildings,</p> <p>23 because they're designed specifically for that, it is</p> <p>24 the safest advice that you stay put unless you are</p> <p>25 directly affected by smoke or fire. So that would be</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 16</p>

<p>1 the correct advice.</p> <p>2 But this policy is aimed at fire control operators,</p> <p>3 so I have not got familiarity with this policy.</p> <p>4 Q. To go back to an earlier answer, you say -- I'm</p> <p>5 summarising I hope accurately what you said -- that stay</p> <p>6 put was a building design principle --</p> <p>7 A. Yes.</p> <p>8 Q. -- but once the building failed, then no evacuation was</p> <p>9 possible.</p> <p>10 A. On that night, that was the impression I formed --</p> <p>11 Q. I'm just summarising your evidence. I want to examine</p> <p>12 what you mean by "failed"?</p> <p>13 A. As I say, the principle is that the building is designed</p> <p>14 to have a fire resistant shaft so that firefighters can</p> <p>15 access the floor where the fire is and other features to</p> <p>16 assist the fire service.</p> <p>17 The compartmentation in the building is designed to</p> <p>18 have a minimum fire resistance so that the fire should</p> <p>19 be contained where it originates, and depending on how</p> <p>20 high the building is, is how long that period of</p> <p>21 resistance should be.</p> <p>22 The reason it is designed that way is because we</p> <p>23 cannot fight the fire from outside above a certain</p> <p>24 level. Therefore, the people within the building need</p> <p>25 to remain safe from that fire while we access the fire,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 17</p>	<p>1 considering and, if appropriate, implementing evacuation</p> <p>2 where compartmentation from the flat of origin fails?</p> <p>3 A. It had never been a consideration.</p> <p>4 Q. Right.</p> <p>5 Going to page 30, if I can just go back to the</p> <p>6 spreadsheet, Mr Walton, if we can, and look at the</p> <p>7 bottom of page 30, we can see that on 21 October you</p> <p>8 did -- this is the fifth entry up from the bottom:</p> <p>9 "CU Incident Command. Lecturer - Command Unit -</p> <p>10 Incident Management - CU Incident Command."</p> <p>11 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>12 Q. Did you facilitate that as well in your capacity as</p> <p>13 an SSSO?</p> <p>14 A. I'm not sure if that was the SSSO role or my role as</p> <p>15 a station commander. I think due to the time it was</p> <p>16 probably as a station commander. It may have been as</p> <p>17 a SSSO role. If it was in the SSSO role, it would've</p> <p>18 been in that type of training, if it was -- the back to</p> <p>19 basics training. If it was in the station manager role,</p> <p>20 it would be for one of my watch managers or crew</p> <p>21 managers who would be having what we called a Vector</p> <p>22 assessment, which is where a command unit comes to the</p> <p>23 station and we run what is known as a TDE, a tactical</p> <p>24 training exercise, where we give them a scenario and we</p> <p>25 make sure that their decision-making processes are</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 19</p>
<p>1 deal with the fire, and effect any immediate rescues</p> <p>2 where the fire is.</p> <p>3 Q. Yes. But presumably, in your experience,</p> <p>4 compartmentation in a high-rise block doesn't always</p> <p>5 hold; sometimes compartmentation in a flat or</p> <p>6 neighbouring flats will fail.</p> <p>7 A. I've never seen the internal fire resistance fail in my</p> <p>8 career.</p> <p>9 Q. Really?</p> <p>10 A. I have been aware, although I've not experienced it</p> <p>11 myself, of fires breaking out of a window and</p> <p>12 re-entering the floor above. I've not been on any fire</p> <p>13 where it's gone in that way, but that's just my</p> <p>14 experience. I know other officers have experienced</p> <p>15 that.</p> <p>16 But every flat fire I've ever fought has been</p> <p>17 contained within the compartment where it started, and</p> <p>18 the only influence it's had anywhere else is potentially</p> <p>19 that the walls of the neighbouring compartment get warm</p> <p>20 or you might get a damp patch on the ceiling of the</p> <p>21 floor below where we've fought the fire. But that's</p> <p>22 always been my personal experience.</p> <p>23 Q. Have you, as part of this training that you were</p> <p>24 facilitating -- coming back to the training --</p> <p>25 facilitated training which focused on how to go about</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 18</p>	<p>1 appropriate, that their tactics are appropriate,</p> <p>2 et cetera.</p> <p>3 Q. Did you train officers, potentially incident commanders,</p> <p>4 because that was the subject of it, specifically on how</p> <p>5 to use the decision-making model?</p> <p>6 A. That is always a key part of any training we give from</p> <p>7 a command point of view.</p> <p>8 Q. Did you train them on incident command communications?</p> <p>9 A. Without knowing the specifics of that training</p> <p>10 session -- but we always -- part of our process is to</p> <p>11 confirm command and control as part of the handover. So</p> <p>12 you talk about what the structure is, so who you're</p> <p>13 reporting to, who you're responsible for, and how you're</p> <p>14 going to communicate with those levels. So you identify</p> <p>15 if you're going to use a radio channel, if you're going</p> <p>16 to use runners, whatever the method is going to be. So</p> <p>17 that's part of dealing with an incident, so it would be</p> <p>18 assessed during that training.</p> <p>19 Q. Did you train would be incident commanders on the actual</p> <p>20 mechanics of information-gathering at handover of</p> <p>21 command?</p> <p>22 A. On my station, I've got a framework that I use</p> <p>23 personally to base my information-gathering on, my</p> <p>24 identifies of priorities, objectives, the tactics that</p> <p>25 are going to be involved and communicating that, and</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 20</p>

<p>1 I've shared that with the officers that I am responsible</p> <p>2 for. Because it is their choice if they want to use the</p> <p>3 framework I've developed or if they've got another</p> <p>4 method that they use to do that, so --</p> <p>5 Q. Sorry to cut you short, I am interested in whether</p> <p>6 you --</p> <p>7 A. So I've trained them in the use of that framework.</p> <p>8 Q. Finally, did you train would be incident commanders on</p> <p>9 how to ensure that fire survival guidance information</p> <p>10 was communicated back to the control room? Or results</p> <p>11 of deployments in response to fire survival guidance</p> <p>12 calls were communicated back to the control room?</p> <p>13 A. In the back to basics training, part of that training</p> <p>14 was the effective use of forward information boards, and</p> <p>15 making sure that the information got to the bridgehead</p> <p>16 and the response -- the operations from the bridgehead</p> <p>17 got back to fire control. So that was part of the</p> <p>18 information that was covered in that training, the</p> <p>19 importance of that feedback loop.</p> <p>20 Q. The importance of?</p> <p>21 A. Of feeding back what operations were taking place on the</p> <p>22 fire ground.</p> <p>23 Q. Just picking up one or two features of these training</p> <p>24 courses which happened in October 2016, and again, in</p> <p>25 fact, we see it at the very foot of the page,</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 21</p>	<p>1 training in London Fire Brigade. I think it's</p> <p>2 a historical reference to the system, the IT system,</p> <p>3 that originally brought that type of training into</p> <p>4 London Fire Brigade. Obviously that was probably before</p> <p>5 my time, so I've never actually -- to my knowledge, I've</p> <p>6 not used Vector in London Fire Brigade. I've used it in</p> <p>7 other Brigades, so I understand the system, but I think</p> <p>8 it's an historical reference.</p> <p>9 That training that would be referred to there</p> <p>10 would've been facilitated by the command unit staff.</p> <p>11 They would've selected a scenario -- a lot of it is</p> <p>12 whiteboard pictures and reacting to screenshots, that</p> <p>13 type of thing, in that training. It's not relying on</p> <p>14 the Vector system. I think that's just a historical</p> <p>15 reference.</p> <p>16 Q. Had you yourself previously encountered any difficulties</p> <p>17 with the Vector system?</p> <p>18 A. I've never used the Vector system in London Fire</p> <p>19 Brigade. I had no issues with it in the Isle of Wight</p> <p>20 Fire Service.</p> <p>21 Q. Turning to back to basics training, which you referred</p> <p>22 to, you've told us I think in your statement that you</p> <p>23 were an SSSO, a service standards support officer,</p> <p>24 having done 12 months at NOG, National Operational</p> <p>25 Guidance.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 23</p>
<p>1 January 2017, we can see that there was training on CU</p> <p>2 Vector tactical command training.</p> <p>3 Vector is a system, isn't it?</p> <p>4 A. Yes. As I say, because Vector is in the record -- and</p> <p>5 it's an assumption -- I'm assuming that that was me</p> <p>6 acting as a monitoring officer, in effect, whilst one of</p> <p>7 the junior officers, watch manager or crew managers on</p> <p>8 my station was going under that periodic training with</p> <p>9 a command unit where they were given a TDE, they</p> <p>10 responded to the incident. I would observe their</p> <p>11 information-gathering, their decision-making process,</p> <p>12 their identification of priorities, objectives, how they</p> <p>13 structured the fire ground, any command structure they</p> <p>14 put in place, the communications. We go through the</p> <p>15 whole aspect of incident command during a Vector</p> <p>16 session, and then we feed back if there's any areas for</p> <p>17 improvement or any really outstanding standing practice</p> <p>18 that comes out of that, we feed that back to the</p> <p>19 individual.</p> <p>20 Q. We've had evidence earlier in the inquiry from Station</p> <p>21 Manager Peter Johnson. His experience was that Vector</p> <p>22 hadn't worked for the last 9 years and was a very poor</p> <p>23 system with very poor IT backup. Was that your</p> <p>24 experience?</p> <p>25 A. Vector is the name that is associated with that type of</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 22</p>	<p>1 A. Yes.</p> <p>2 Q. What date did you become an SSSO?</p> <p>3 A. I can't be clear on that. I've tried to look back at</p> <p>4 when the actual move occurred, but it would be around</p> <p>5 the March/April sort of time of 2016.</p> <p>6 Q. March/April 2016?</p> <p>7 A. Yes.</p> <p>8 Q. Were you already at the LFB when you became an SSSO?</p> <p>9 A. Yes, I transferred into London Fire Brigade in</p> <p>10 October 2014. I went into a national team as a seconded</p> <p>11 officer from London Fire Brigade, in effect, which was</p> <p>12 National Operational Guidance.</p> <p>13 Q. My question was a bit garbled. I really meant to ask</p> <p>14 you: did you become a specific LFB SSSO or was that</p> <p>15 a national badge?</p> <p>16 A. No, SSSO was a specific role in London Fire Brigade at</p> <p>17 that time.</p> <p>18 Q. Okay.</p> <p>19 In that role, is it right that you organised certain</p> <p>20 elements of back to basics training?</p> <p>21 A. I facilitated them, and I'm not trying to be funny with</p> <p>22 the words, but I didn't develop the training programme,</p> <p>23 I didn't decide what the subject matter would be. That</p> <p>24 was all done centrally. That package was delivered to</p> <p>25 us in the south-west. We arranged the training schedule</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 24</p>

<p>1 and we provided the resources for that training, so we</p> <p>2 made sure there was the correct type of venue, we made</p> <p>3 sure that the training dummies, the drill dummies, that</p> <p>4 we use for simulated rescue were there, the smoke</p> <p>5 machines were there, the FIB boards, the ECO telemetry</p> <p>6 boards, et cetera.</p> <p>7 So we provided all the facilities for that training</p> <p>8 to take place, and we supported the local officers who</p> <p>9 delivered that training. If need be, we would deliver</p> <p>10 that training on their behalf if they felt more</p> <p>11 comfortable observing, and maybe supplementing the input</p> <p>12 from us with more of a local opinion.</p> <p>13 Q. Can I ask you to be shown a document, which is</p> <p>14 LFB00003566.</p> <p>15 That is "Back 2 Basics 2016, Tactical Decision</p> <p>16 Making, Highrise", dated 15 December 2015.</p> <p>17 Do you know who authored that?</p> <p>18 A. I don't.</p> <p>19 Q. Not you?</p> <p>20 A. No, it wasn't me.</p> <p>21 Q. Was that one of the back to basics training elements?</p> <p>22 A. I believe that would be the PowerPoint slideshow that</p> <p>23 was used as the core of that training.</p> <p>24 Q. There's another one, LFB00003568, which has a title</p> <p>25 which doesn't appear to be coming up. But does the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 25</p>	<p>1 information that was received on the fire ground got to</p> <p>2 the crews that were within the building and was used to</p> <p>3 help direct fire service operations.</p> <p>4 One of the key aspects we looked at was -- because</p> <p>5 there were two drills in the afternoon, if you like.</p> <p>6 One was a bit more of a theory session, where we were</p> <p>7 literally looking at the communications, so we put</p> <p>8 people in different rooms in the venue, and people were</p> <p>9 given an interject, a briefing, as to what was happening</p> <p>10 at that time in their role in the incident, and it was</p> <p>11 about them communicating with the correct people and</p> <p>12 making sure that the information they'd been given was</p> <p>13 what the people who received it understood. Part of</p> <p>14 that was recording information on forward information</p> <p>15 boards, and at the end of that exercise we put the</p> <p>16 boards next to each other and we looked for any</p> <p>17 discrepancies. If there were any discrepancies, we</p> <p>18 would explore: well, how did that happen? How can we</p> <p>19 make sure it doesn't happen in the real world?</p> <p>20 Q. Can I ask you to look at LFB00003568, which was the</p> <p>21 second of the two documents that we had on the screen</p> <p>22 there a moment ago, and go to internal pages 5 and 6.</p> <p>23 You can see on this page there are a lot of little</p> <p>24 arrows, bullet arrows, "Scenario expectations". You can</p> <p>25 see things like firefighter lift secured, cordons</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 27</p>
<p>1 title "Operational Scenario 2016" mean anything to you?</p> <p>2 A. Yes. So the training was delivered with input that</p> <p>3 basically described what officers should do at</p> <p>4 a high-rise incident, and that was followed by</p> <p>5 a practical exercise. So the exercise was tailored for</p> <p>6 the stations that were receiving the training that day,</p> <p>7 so it was usually a venue from their own risks. So</p> <p>8 you'd select a tower block that was within the area that</p> <p>9 that borough covered. The call sheets referred to the</p> <p>10 appliances that were in the room so that the personnel</p> <p>11 could relate to that scenario.</p> <p>12 The way the scenario played out was generic, but you</p> <p>13 made it specific to the crews that were in the room that</p> <p>14 were receiving the training.</p> <p>15 Q. Perhaps we can look at the second page of this, Paul, to</p> <p>16 make sure we have clearly the right document --</p> <p>17 A. I recognise the cover.</p> <p>18 Q. You do?</p> <p>19 A. I'm comfortable that it is the document we used.</p> <p>20 Q. Okay.</p> <p>21 Are these two documents that I've put up on the</p> <p>22 screen or packages the entirety of the back to basics</p> <p>23 training that addressed the issues and risks which arise</p> <p>24 from high-rise residential fires?</p> <p>25 A. No. As I say, the focus was about ensuring that</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 26</p>	<p>1 falling debris --</p> <p>2 A. Yes.</p> <p>3 Q. -- rescue casualty and withdraw, handover to station</p> <p>4 manager.</p> <p>5 If you go over the page, please, Paul, we can see</p> <p>6 more, and you can see a list of things there.</p> <p>7 I think if you turn to the next page as well, it</p> <p>8 runs up to, I think, 33, ending with "Debrief as Per</p> <p>9 WM 7.4". So there's a lot of things in the list.</p> <p>10 A. Yes.</p> <p>11 Q. Was that list designed to be comprehensive?</p> <p>12 A. The list covered everything that would be in policy</p> <p>13 procedures and guidance to deal with an incident, and</p> <p>14 particularly a high-rise incident. It was used as</p> <p>15 a tick list so that the officers who were observing the</p> <p>16 activity could tick off that they'd seen that element</p> <p>17 demonstrated by the officers who were carrying out the</p> <p>18 practical scenario. If anything wasn't demonstrated,</p> <p>19 then you would pursue that afterwards as a learning</p> <p>20 point.</p> <p>21 The scenarios were done on Fire Brigade premises</p> <p>22 mainly. To my memory, that year they were all done on</p> <p>23 Fire Brigade premises, so we were using Brigade training</p> <p>24 towers, which don't have lobbies in the main, aren't</p> <p>25 high-rise buildings in their own right. So some of the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 28</p>

7 (Pages 25 to 28)

<p>1 stuff we had to see that the officer referred to, you 2 know, "At this time, I would ..." so that you know it's 3 in their thought process, even though they couldn't 4 physically demonstrate it.</p> <p>5 So usually they did ship a hydrant, they did twin 6 the feed in to what would be the inlet. We fabricated 7 a lift lobby in the base of a tower. We told them that 8 the ground floor is in effect the 6th floor of a tower 9 block, the fire is on the 8th floor, so that would have 10 been the 3rd floor of the training tower --</p> <p>11 Q. I am going to stop you, Mr Walton. I'm so sorry, 12 I don't mean to be rude at all. My question is quite 13 a simple one, I hope, and you have given a long list of 14 things in there, and it's very helpful to us, but 15 I think we do need to try and keep the answers a bit 16 shorter. I'll try and keep the questions a bit more 17 focused.</p> <p>18 Just focusing on this list, was any of these 33 19 items designed to train officers on how to deal with 20 a high-rise fire where compartmentation gets breached 21 and successively those breaches grow?</p> <p>22 A. No.</p> <p>23 Q. Are any of those scenarios designed to deal with fire 24 igniting and spreading across the exterior of 25 a high-rise block?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 29</p>	<p>1 A. That would be a normal high-rise fire.</p> <p>2 Q. A normal high-rise fire?</p> <p>3 A. Yes.</p> <p>4 Q. So the training didn't focus on the spread of fire out 5 of the 14th floor, either up a floor or sideways on the 6 14th floor, or below?</p> <p>7 A. No, that was the initiator document. That is the sort 8 of thing you would get as a turnout message from fire 9 control. When they arrived, we would put injects in 10 that tested their ability to deal with a developing 11 incident.</p> <p>12 But a fire spreading out of the original compartment 13 more than through coanda effect, which is from one 14 window to another, really wasn't covered.</p> <p>15 Q. Page 8 of your statement, if I can ask you to go to 16 that, please, is where we find you dealing with, in 17 part, training.</p> <p>18 A quarter of the way down that page, you say: 19 "In terms of realistic training of fighting a fire 20 in a high rise I think this was the main subject of our 21 Back to Basics training in 2015."</p> <p>22 Pausing there, does that mean that the training 23 packages we've just seen and the facilitator card you 24 say would be handed to the incident commander or watch 25 manager you thought was realistic in terms of training?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 31</p>
<p>1 A. No, they're designed to deal with a high-rise building 2 that's behaving in the way it should.</p> <p>3 Q. Can I just ask you to look at page 3, where I think 4 there is something called an incident briefing card. 5 It's internal page 3, so page 4 of the Relativity. 6 That's the incident briefing card.</p> <p>7 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>8 Q. That I'm assuming is given to the facilitator. 9 If you look at --</p> <p>10 A. That was given to the incident commander. So the 11 officer who was in charge of the first appliance that in 12 the scenario was attending would be given that to give 13 them the sort of information they would get from 14 a turnout message from fire control. As I say, we 15 tailored it to the actual specifics of the group that 16 was there. So the reason there's no name for the 17 high-rise is we would pick a high-rise from their risk 18 information.</p> <p>19 Q. What I want to focus on is the second paragraph: 20 "The fire will be on the 14th floor with unknown 21 number of persons involved. You are 2 appliances of a 4 22 appliance PDA."</p> <p>23 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>24 Q. That's quite a small incident, I would imagine; is that 25 right?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 30</p>	<p>1 A. Yes.</p> <p>2 Q. Then you go on to say:</p> <p>3 "We were looking at making sure water supplies were 4 adequate, you established the correct Bridgehead, that 5 communication was correct, that the right equipment was 6 taken to the Bridgehead, the right recording systems 7 were used such as the Forward Information Boards (FIB) 8 which are big laminated sheets attached to the back of 9 the BA entry control boards."</p> <p>10 First, water supplies, just focusing on that as 11 an issue, did the training consider issues around water 12 supply with large-scale attendance of pumps?</p> <p>13 A. I remember on more than one occasion -- this the first 14 time I've thought about this -- I talked about 15 considering the possibility that if you had a large, 16 developed fire in a high-rise, and you had to use 17 a number of jets, you could get to the point where you 18 outstripped the capacity of the rising main. Mains are 19 designed to deliver 1,500 litres a minute. Each one of 20 our jets uses roughly 250 litres a minute. So if you 21 were using six jets on the ground, maybe four jets 22 higher up the building, you could get to the point 23 where, because of friction loss, you didn't have enough 24 water to have effective firefighting jets.</p> <p>25 So it was something we talked about, about</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 32</p>

<p>1 potentially improvising additional mains, using aerials</p> <p>2 to put hoses in the side of the building, running hoses</p> <p>3 upstairs. But to have it as a consideration.</p> <p>4 And it wasn't part of the course, but it was one of</p> <p>5 the -- where I said sometimes station managers put</p> <p>6 supplementary information in, that was one of the things</p> <p>7 I know I injected more than once.</p> <p>8 Q. Did the training cover siting and positioning of aerials</p> <p>9 in order to maximise their effectiveness?</p> <p>10 A. It talked about making sure that aerials had access,</p> <p>11 because obviously on the initial positioning of</p> <p>12 appliances, if you put them in the wrong place, once</p> <p>13 they're set in and pumping water, it's really hard to</p> <p>14 move them. So if they blocked access, you wouldn't be</p> <p>15 able to get an aerial in. So that was a consideration</p> <p>16 for the incident commanders.</p> <p>17 As far as what would be effective siting, that is</p> <p>18 dependent upon the site as to where it's going to be</p> <p>19 most effective.</p> <p>20 Q. Did training cover how to attack fire on the exterior of</p> <p>21 a building above 30 metres?</p> <p>22 A. No.</p> <p>23 Q. Communication. Did the course cover problems that could</p> <p>24 be encountered in high-rise concrete buildings?</p> <p>25 A. Communications-wise?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 33</p>	<p>1 Q. Was there training on policy 820, which is FIB use?</p> <p>2 A. Inasmuch as the relevant sections of that policy</p> <p>3 would've been referred to in the training and the</p> <p>4 diagrams and use of the casualty poster, that type of</p> <p>5 thing, would've been referenced in that training.</p> <p>6 Q. Were you ever aware that officers of the status or rank</p> <p>7 of watch manager were themselves developing their own</p> <p>8 pilot trainings on FSG call handling?</p> <p>9 A. I wasn't aware of that, no.</p> <p>10 Q. Turning to other aspects of high-rise training, do you</p> <p>11 have your own experience in relation to the management</p> <p>12 and operation of a large-scale incident, by which I mean</p> <p>13 something which was or became a major incident?</p> <p>14 A. I've never been in charge of a major incident other than</p> <p>15 that night.</p> <p>16 Q. Have you ever had any training -- we've touched on this</p> <p>17 before, but let me just ask you the question in</p> <p>18 a slightly different way -- or given any training on</p> <p>19 what should happen once it becomes apparent to</p> <p>20 an incident commander that the fire has spread</p> <p>21 vertically up the exterior of a high-rise residential</p> <p>22 block?</p> <p>23 A. It wasn't a consideration. I've never had any of that</p> <p>24 training.</p> <p>25 Q. Right.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 35</p>
<p>1 Q. Yes.</p> <p>2 A. Yes. London Fire Brigade is very well-resourced</p> <p>3 compared to a lot of brigades in the country, so we have</p> <p>4 command units and fire rescue units that carry repeater</p> <p>5 systems. So for radios, we can put in, in effect,</p> <p>6 little transceivers at various points to try and boost</p> <p>7 radio signals, and we can do the same for the telemetry</p> <p>8 systems for the breathing apparatus wearers. I'm not</p> <p>9 sure every Brigade in the country has got that, but</p> <p>10 we've got those, so we made sure that they're in the</p> <p>11 thinking of the officers.</p> <p>12 So part of the training was if you're experiencing</p> <p>13 communications issues or telemetry issues, consider</p> <p>14 putting in the feeder systems, the repeaters or the</p> <p>15 leaky feeders, which is in effect like a cable that gets</p> <p>16 laid and that again leaks the message, the transmission.</p> <p>17 Q. Did the training cover communicating or recording FSGs</p> <p>18 in large-scale incidents where there are a large number</p> <p>19 of FSG calls?</p> <p>20 A. I think the most FSGs that were considered in any</p> <p>21 training package occurring at the same time was probably</p> <p>22 two or maybe three.</p> <p>23 Q. Did the training cover the use of forward information</p> <p>24 boards?</p> <p>25 A. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 34</p>	<p>1 A. Sorry, I'll come back to that. I've had reference to</p> <p>2 coanda effect in training, obviously, which is where</p> <p>3 a fire breaks out of the window and gets back into the</p> <p>4 window of the room above. So one of the things we look</p> <p>5 for in the response to a high-rise fire is that once the</p> <p>6 immediate life threatening actions have been taken,</p> <p>7 crews do get dispatched to above, the sides and below</p> <p>8 the compartment of origin to confirm there is no</p> <p>9 break-out.</p> <p>10 Q. Just so I can get your understanding, then, in terms of</p> <p>11 where that sits in your training experience, where</p> <p>12 a fire spreads vertically up the exterior of a high-rise</p> <p>13 building, even in theoretical terms, was it your</p> <p>14 understanding as at June 2017 that compartmentation</p> <p>15 would thereby have been breached?</p> <p>16 A. I never had any training regarding vertical fire spread</p> <p>17 in an operational environment other than what I just</p> <p>18 talked about there with the coanda effect. However, as</p> <p>19 a fire safety inspecting officer, I was aware that any</p> <p>20 cladding -- you know, any facade on the outside of</p> <p>21 a building should have fire stopping that prevented it</p> <p>22 from spreading any great distance.</p> <p>23 So I would never have expected a fire to be able to</p> <p>24 spread up the outside of a building in the</p> <p>25 United Kingdom.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 36</p>

<p>1 Q. Were you aware as at June 2017 of exterior fires on 2 high-rise buildings being experienced in Dubai or 3 France? 4 A. Only from the television reports, news reports. 5 Q. How much did you know about those particular incidents? 6 A. Just what I saw on the news. 7 Q. Do I take it that that also means that you, as 8 at June 2017, had never seen a training slideshow 9 produced by the LFB in October 2016 entitled "Tall 10 building facades"? 11 A. No, I've never seen that training. 12 Q. Still focusing on training, have you ever had training 13 on when you should go from attacking the fire, if you 14 like tactical mode Oscar, offence, to evacuation, on the 15 moment you make the decision? 16 A. Not in the terms you're describing there. I've had 17 reference to phased evacuation, which is in certain 18 types of office buildings that have been designed and 19 built to facilitate that, because it's important you use 20 the features that are designed in to facilitate that. 21 As far as a high-rise residential building, I've 22 never had any training in the 29 years in the fire and 23 rescue service to do that, to effect an evacuation of 24 the whole building, when it's designed on that principle 25 that people can stay put.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 37</p>	<p>1 training on the particular dangers that cladding on the 2 exterior of high-rise blocks posed to firefighting? 3 A. I never had any training in that. I didn't believe 4 cladding could burn. 5 Q. Does that mean that you would not as at June 2017 be 6 able to identify a cladding fire? 7 A. Only from the news reports I saw. But my belief was in 8 the United Kingdom, Building Regulations would not allow 9 the circumstances to exist for cladding to burn. 10 Q. Does it follow from that that you wouldn't have been 11 able to identify the particular risks flowing from 12 a fire where the cladding had ignited and the fire had 13 spread up the exterior? 14 A. Only by applying principles from other training. So 15 I would be looking at probably applying my knowledge of 16 sandwich panel fires and some of the similarities 17 between a sandwich panel and a cladding panel, and 18 assuming that the same hazards and risks could be there. 19 So burning droplets, that type of thing. 20 Q. As a result of applying that analogy from sandwich 21 panels to cladding, what would be the appropriate 22 firefighting measures to be deployed in combating 23 a cladding fire to the best of your experience? 24 A. The only thing you could do would be to get water onto 25 the fire. Your main issue is making sure nobody gets</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 39</p>
<p>1 Q. Have you ever had or given training on when it might be 2 appropriate to use what is called a second set bag, 3 second set breathing apparatus, to assist the evacuation 4 of an occupant of any building? 5 A. No. 6 Q. Have you ever had any training or given any training in 7 relation to the prevention and mitigation of the effects 8 of smoke in a single exit like a stairwell or corridor? 9 A. Only practical firefighting, using what we call 10 hydraulic ventilation, which is where you play a hose 11 out of the compartment, through an opening, and 12 a process called the Venturi effect draws air into that 13 lower pressure that that jet creates, and that will draw 14 smoke out. But that's the only time I've ever received 15 any training about that type of ventilation. 16 In the Isle of Wight I did receive training on 17 positive pressure ventilation, because that was 18 a process that was going to be brought into the 19 Isle of Wight. I transferred out before that became 20 a front-line tactic and it wasn't available in London 21 Fire Brigade. 22 Q. We have heard quite a bit this morning already about 23 your experience or lack of experience in terms of 24 cladding fires. 25 Just to be absolutely clear, did you ever have any</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 38</p>	<p>1 injured or killed by the falling delaminating services 2 and that secondary fires don't get started by the 3 burning droplets of material. 4 Q. How would you get water onto the fire if the cladding 5 material itself was, on the exterior face, a rainscreen 6 designed to repel water? 7 A. It's not possible. 8 Q. So how would you go about attacking an exterior cladding 9 fire, to the best of your knowledge and experience as 10 at June 2017? 11 A. I believe we'll go there, but my tactic was to try and 12 stop it getting back in, because I thought we were doing 13 everything we could ... 14 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, we're going to move to a different 15 topic. 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, I think it's time we had 17 a break. 18 We're going to have a break now, Mr Walton. We'll 19 take 10 minutes out. Please don't talk to anyone about 20 your evidence while you're out of the room and we'll 21 resume at 11.10. All right? 22 If you would like to go with the usher now, she'll 23 look after you. Thank very much. 24 11.10, then, please. Thank you. 25 (11.00 am)</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 40</p>

<p>1 (A short break)</p> <p>2 (11.10 am)</p> <p>3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Walton? Happy to</p> <p>4 carry on? If at any stage you feel it's time for</p> <p>5 another break, just indicate.</p> <p>6 THE WITNESS: I will do.</p> <p>7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: No difficulty in doing that.</p> <p>8 MR MILLETT: Mr Walton, I'm now going to ask you about your</p> <p>9 previous knowledge of Grenfell Tower itself, and I am</p> <p>10 going to start with the topic of your role as station</p> <p>11 manager, if that's the right thing to say, at North</p> <p>12 Kensington.</p> <p>13 Could I ask you to go to page 11 of your first</p> <p>14 witness statement and look at the second paragraph in</p> <p>15 that:</p> <p>16 "DAC Jane PHILPOT organised for me to be detached</p> <p>17 for a couple of months into North Kensington Fire</p> <p>18 Station and, in effect, to become their Station Manager.</p> <p>19 I worked with Nick DAVIES who was the Station Manager</p> <p>20 who covered North Kensington and Kensington at that</p> <p>21 time. He concentrated on Kensington and I looked after</p> <p>22 North Kensington working under Borough Commander Rob</p> <p>23 DAVIS."</p> <p>24 Question: was that in the period April to June that</p> <p>25 you were attached to North Kensington?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 41</p>	<p>1 day-to-day lead SM at North Kensington. I'll come back</p> <p>2 to that in a minute.</p> <p>3 But you then say in the third line:</p> <p>4 "I was not able to be given admin rights by the IT</p> <p>5 department so could not carry out the full duties of a</p> <p>6 station based SM (such as approving Operational Risk</p> <p>7 Database (ORD) entries for the station) but the time was</p> <p>8 designed to give me more of an exposure to, and</p> <p>9 understanding of, the issues a LFB Station based SM</p> <p>10 faced on a day to day basis to inform my actions as a</p> <p>11 SSSO."</p> <p>12 My question is: did you ever get access to the ORD</p> <p>13 entries for North Kensington?</p> <p>14 A. Not in that role, no.</p> <p>15 Q. You say not in that role.</p> <p>16 A. No --</p> <p>17 Q. Did you ever?</p> <p>18 A. No, I never got the admin rights for North Kensington</p> <p>19 station.</p> <p>20 Q. If you couldn't see the ORD entries for North Kensington</p> <p>21 during your eight-week SM period, how could you carry</p> <p>22 out your SSSO role and audit compliance of North</p> <p>23 Kensington with its requirements?</p> <p>24 A. What I was referring to was the quality assurance of the</p> <p>25 updated entry that would then go on toward -- I didn't</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 43</p>
<p>1 A. Yes, I've looked back at my Outlook calender and I've</p> <p>2 identified that I believe I started at North Kensington</p> <p>3 probably on the day of the smoke extraction</p> <p>4 demonstration.</p> <p>5 Q. 28 April?</p> <p>6 A. I think it was my first day at the station. And then</p> <p>7 I was at the station for a period of eight weeks.</p> <p>8 Q. You say that Station Manager Nick Davis was the station</p> <p>9 manager in command of both North Ken and Kensington at</p> <p>10 the time, so you became the station manager at North</p> <p>11 Kensington, did you?</p> <p>12 A. Yes. Some stations are twinned, ie one station manager</p> <p>13 manages two station sites. Those are the ones with one</p> <p>14 appliance at each station. Other stations, where</p> <p>15 there's multiple appliances, they're managed by</p> <p>16 a dedicated station manager.</p> <p>17 So the reason I'd asked to go in there was that</p> <p>18 I had no direct experience of managing a London Fire</p> <p>19 Brigade station. All my experience was from other</p> <p>20 Brigades managing stations, so I wanted some direct</p> <p>21 experience in a London Fire Brigade station.</p> <p>22 Q. Can I ask you to look at your second witness statement</p> <p>23 [LFB00023365] and turn to paragraph 3, page 1, where you</p> <p>24 cover this topic. You say there in the third line that</p> <p>25 you spent a period of six to eight weeks acting as the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 42</p>	<p>1 have the admin rights to access that, but everybody in</p> <p>2 London Fire Brigade has access to the operational risk</p> <p>3 database and can go to specific locations and look at</p> <p>4 what the information is for that location, for that</p> <p>5 risk.</p> <p>6 But when you're in the station manager role, you</p> <p>7 quality assure the information that goes onto the ORD</p> <p>8 and make sure that the right areas have been gathered</p> <p>9 and are recorded. So you accept the update, or you</p> <p>10 reject it and send it back to the watch to re-do to the</p> <p>11 standard that you're after.</p> <p>12 Q. In your role as SSSO or station manager during that</p> <p>13 period, were you able to quality assure the information</p> <p>14 on the ORD that you could see?</p> <p>15 A. I didn't look at that station's ORD information.</p> <p>16 Q. Could you have done?</p> <p>17 A. I could have -- if I -- at that time, I'd not had that</p> <p>18 system shown to me. So I didn't know how to. That is</p> <p>19 the honest answer, I didn't know how to.</p> <p>20 After I came away from that detachment, whilst I was</p> <p>21 in the SSSOs, I spoke to my colleagues who were in the</p> <p>22 SSSO and I asked them to show me how you access the ORD,</p> <p>23 and that was via the station diary and the outside work</p> <p>24 schedule.</p> <p>25 Q. So during that eight-week period, am I right in thinking</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 44</p>

<p>1 you either couldn't or didn't know how to access the</p> <p>2 station diary and the ORD database for that station?</p> <p>3 A. I could access the station diary. I didn't know that to</p> <p>4 access the ORD information, it was via the outside work</p> <p>5 schedule, and that was something that I discussed with</p> <p>6 my colleagues when I was in the SSSO role later and was</p> <p>7 shown that method.</p> <p>8 Q. Is there a reason why you didn't ask to access the ORD</p> <p>9 information for North Kensington while you were SM at</p> <p>10 North Kensington?</p> <p>11 A. I'd spoken to Nick Davis. I'd asked to get the admin</p> <p>12 rights to actually be able to do that because I thought</p> <p>13 I needed full admin rights to be able to do that, and</p> <p>14 I did that with the IT department. When it came back</p> <p>15 that they weren't able to give two station managers the</p> <p>16 access rights, the admin rights, for a station, because</p> <p>17 Nick Davis already had those rights, myself and</p> <p>18 Nick Davis had a conversation and Nick knew that he was</p> <p>19 responsible for the admin at North Ken as well as</p> <p>20 Kensington, as was the normal practice.</p> <p>21 Q. Going back to my question, how could you carry out your</p> <p>22 role of audit compliance by North Kensington with the</p> <p>23 requirements of policy to make sure --</p> <p>24 A. As a SSSO?</p> <p>25 Q. As a SSSO without yourself having access to the IT</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 45</p>	<p>1 day-to-day administration of that station.</p> <p>2 Q. I see.</p> <p>3 A. That's the answer.</p> <p>4 Q. I see, okay.</p> <p>5 During your time at North Kensington fire station,</p> <p>6 were you ever made aware of any Grenfell Tower-related</p> <p>7 safety issues raised by any residents of the tower?</p> <p>8 A. I'm not aware of any issues being raised as coming from</p> <p>9 residents in the tower.</p> <p>10 Q. Does the name Edward Daffarn ring a bell with you?</p> <p>11 A. No.</p> <p>12 Q. So you're not aware of any issues raised by a resident</p> <p>13 called Edward Daffarn?</p> <p>14 A. No.</p> <p>15 Q. What about by the TMO? Were you ever aware of any</p> <p>16 particular fire-related or fire safety-related issues</p> <p>17 raised by the TMO during your stint at North Kensington?</p> <p>18 A. No.</p> <p>19 Q. Can I turn to the subject of section 7(2)(d) visits to</p> <p>20 the tower, and can I start by asking you to go to policy</p> <p>21 633, "High rise firefighting", which is at tab 4 of our</p> <p>22 policy bundle. I'd ask you, please, to go to internal</p> <p>23 page 19, appendix 1.</p> <p>24 First of all, looking at this policy generally, I'm</p> <p>25 assuming that you're familiar with policy 633?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 47</p>
<p>1 rights to be able to get into the ORD database for</p> <p>2 North Ken?</p> <p>3 A. So the way I would explain that is, as a SSSO, like</p> <p>4 everybody else in London Fire Brigade, I could access</p> <p>5 the recorded ORD information for a risk. When I was in</p> <p>6 the SSSOs, because that was part of my role -- bear in</p> <p>7 mind that I went into the SSSO team in the April, and</p> <p>8 almost immediately, because I'd asked to have experience</p> <p>9 on a fire station to be able to do that audit role,</p> <p>10 I was given the opportunity at North Kensington. Whilst</p> <p>11 I was at North Kensington, I realised I couldn't access</p> <p>12 that.</p> <p>13 When I went back into the SSSO role at the end of</p> <p>14 that eight-week period, that was one of the first things</p> <p>15 I raised: how can I audit this if I can't access it?</p> <p>16 Then I was shown the way you could access it.</p> <p>17 So while I was doing my SSSO role, I was accessing</p> <p>18 and auditing that information on stations as part of the</p> <p>19 quality assurance process that we did there.</p> <p>20 Q. During the eight-week period you were there, did you not</p> <p>21 demand access to the ORD information so that you could</p> <p>22 carry out that SSSO role during that period?</p> <p>23 A. I wasn't carrying out the SSSO role during that</p> <p>24 eight-week period; I was acting as the station-based</p> <p>25 station manager. So, as I say, I was dealing with the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 46</p>	<p>1 A. Yes.</p> <p>2 Q. I'm going to assume you're also familiar with the terms</p> <p>3 of appendix 1, 7(2)(d)?</p> <p>4 A. Yes.</p> <p>5 Q. Just to refresh your memory of the detail, paragraph 1</p> <p>6 says:</p> <p>7 "During 7(2) (d) visits personnel should ensure they</p> <p>8 are familiar with the following and their impact on</p> <p>9 firefighting and search and rescue operations ..."</p> <p>10 So that's the general heading.</p> <p>11 Then there's a long list of things we see in the</p> <p>12 policy in those bullet points there.</p> <p>13 My first question is: did you ever have any training</p> <p>14 yourself as to how, as an operational firefighter sent</p> <p>15 on a 7(2)(d) visit, to carry out such a visit?</p> <p>16 A. In 1989, on training school, at the time it was under</p> <p>17 the previous Fire and Rescue Services Act,</p> <p>18 section 1(1)(d), I had input about what a 1(1)(d) visit</p> <p>19 was and what you were there to do. That's the only time</p> <p>20 I've had any training in familiarisation visits.</p> <p>21 Q. So not since 1989?</p> <p>22 A. No.</p> <p>23 Q. That's receipt of training.</p> <p>24 Would it follow that you've also never delivered any</p> <p>25 training to front-line officers as to how to go about</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 48</p>

<p>1 carrying out a 7(2)(d) visit?</p> <p>2 A. Only cascade training as an operational watch manager</p> <p>3 where I was involved in carrying out those visits,</p> <p>4 leading those visits, at the stations I was on. And you</p> <p>5 would develop the more junior members of the watch,</p> <p>6 usually give them the responsibility of recording the</p> <p>7 information, explaining the significance of it.</p> <p>8 Every 7(2)(d) I've been involved with, I've always</p> <p>9 told people that they need to record every piece of</p> <p>10 information they would want to have if they were at</p> <p>11 an incident at that building.</p> <p>12 Q. But that's information that they would want to have. So</p> <p>13 the question is: did you ever train any officers as part</p> <p>14 of the training exercises you've just described on how</p> <p>15 to go about looking at each or all or any of these</p> <p>16 bullet points on this page?</p> <p>17 A. Without reading every bullet point, just from my general</p> <p>18 knowledge of this, I would say yes. Over time, every</p> <p>19 officer in the Fire Brigade will have looked at every</p> <p>20 single aspect of those and will understand the</p> <p>21 importance of them when they're on a 7(2)(d) visit, and</p> <p>22 they will record the significant areas.</p> <p>23 Q. Let me ask the question a slightly different way.</p> <p>24 Did you ever train an officer or any officers who</p> <p>25 might be asked to attend a 7(2)(d) visit to take this</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 49</p>	<p>1 "The likelihood and impact of any fire spread beyond</p> <p>2 the compartment of origin and the potential for multiple</p> <p>3 rescues."</p> <p>4 Did you train people as to how to go about ensuring</p> <p>5 that they were familiar with that?</p> <p>6 A. No.</p> <p>7 Q. Is there a reason why not?</p> <p>8 A. I don't think it was a realistic eventuality in our</p> <p>9 thinking at that time.</p> <p>10 Q. At which time?</p> <p>11 A. Like I said, the norm would be to go above, to the sides</p> <p>12 and below a compartment, so you would cover that type of</p> <p>13 aspect as you were in the building. You'd be talking</p> <p>14 about how would you access the compartments either side,</p> <p>15 how would you access the compartments above and below,</p> <p>16 and if it was an unusual type of construction, so we</p> <p>17 call it scissors type construction where a premises can</p> <p>18 be on multiple floors, these types of premises, then you</p> <p>19 would go into the specifics of that. If the fire was</p> <p>20 moving, how would we make sure that we checked above,</p> <p>21 below, and to the sides? But it would be dependent on</p> <p>22 the circumstances of the building what would be</p> <p>23 appropriate.</p> <p>24 Q. So would it follow -- correct me if this is unfair or</p> <p>25 I've misunderstood you -- that you wouldn't train</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 51</p>
<p>1 list, go to a visit and ensure they are familiar with</p> <p>2 all of those bullet points on that single visit?</p> <p>3 A. No. The way that we would do it would be we would print</p> <p>4 off a copy of the information as it would be -- so the</p> <p>5 template that would be shown on the appliance when we</p> <p>6 had a paper-based system, and when the MDT systems came</p> <p>7 in later on in my career, the actual template of the</p> <p>8 electronic form as it would appear on screen, and we</p> <p>9 made sure that every category that was relevant to the</p> <p>10 risk we were inspecting, we were visiting, was recorded.</p> <p>11 Q. Just looking down the list, would you train personnel</p> <p>12 who were doing visits always to inspect, for example,</p> <p>13 firefighting shafts?</p> <p>14 A. Only if they were present in the building.</p> <p>15 Q. Location and function of firefighting lifts?</p> <p>16 A. Same answer. They're specific to high-rise.</p> <p>17 Q. Yes. Well, this is all specific to high-rise because</p> <p>18 it's in the policy.</p> <p>19 A. The 7(2)(d) visit isn't specific to high-rise; it is any</p> <p>20 risk in your area. So we visit anything we think we may</p> <p>21 need a prior knowledge of prior to an incident occurring</p> <p>22 there and we gather relevant information on that visit.</p> <p>23 So with these specifically to a high-rise, yes, you</p> <p>24 would cover those areas in every visit to a high-rise.</p> <p>25 Q. Looking at the next bullet point:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 50</p>	<p>1 personnel to examine the likelihood and impact of any</p> <p>2 fire spread beyond the compartment of origin beyond</p> <p>3 a spread in the neighbouring flats?</p> <p>4 A. I think the key word is the second word in that</p> <p>5 sentence. It's the likelihood. So while you were</p> <p>6 there, part of what you're doing on a familiarisation</p> <p>7 visit is familiarising yourself with the features of the</p> <p>8 building, and if it's built to the correct principles,</p> <p>9 the likelihood of it spreading is negligible.</p> <p>10 Q. Looking at the next bullet point, "Occupancy and use</p> <p>11 profile", would you train visiting personnel to examine</p> <p>12 the occupancy and use profile of every high-rise block</p> <p>13 they were visiting every time they visited?</p> <p>14 A. It would be a consideration. If you knew there were</p> <p>15 persons with mobility issues, et cetera, then you would</p> <p>16 probably factor that in, that you know that there's</p> <p>17 somebody who would not be likely to be able to</p> <p>18 self-rescue in a fire situation, so therefore they would</p> <p>19 need a response from us to confirm their situation and</p> <p>20 bring them out if required.</p> <p>21 But in a private residential block, due to data</p> <p>22 protection mainly, it's rare that we know the</p> <p>23 characteristics of the individuals who live in the</p> <p>24 block.</p> <p>25 Q. Leaving aside data protection, would it not be</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 52</p>

<p>1 important, though, to any personnel visiting any</p> <p>2 high-rise residential block, to make absolutely sure</p> <p>3 they knew where persons with disabilities, mobility</p> <p>4 issues, elderly, children were within the block?</p> <p>5 A. Other than knocking every door and being lucky enough to</p> <p>6 have the occupants in the flat and asking them to give</p> <p>7 us the details of the people in the flat, we've got no</p> <p>8 way of gathering that information. Other agencies will</p> <p>9 not share that information because of data protection.</p> <p>10 Q. Have you ever asked, in your experience, a building</p> <p>11 owner, such as a borough council or a tenant management</p> <p>12 organisation, to share that information with you so that</p> <p>13 you could satisfy the provisions of appendix 1?</p> <p>14 A. Yes, I used to be the head of risk information</p> <p>15 management when I was in the Isle of Wight Fire and</p> <p>16 Rescue Service, so I ran the Isle of Wight's version of</p> <p>17 ORD, and I tried to get a data sharing agreement between</p> <p>18 the health service, the local authority, so that we</p> <p>19 would have access to that type of information, and the</p> <p>20 barrier that prevented it was nobody would sign a data</p> <p>21 sharing agreement because of data protection.</p> <p>22 Q. While you were at North Kensington -- I know it was only</p> <p>23 eight weeks -- was that something you considered doing</p> <p>24 with the TMO responsible for Grenfell Tower?</p> <p>25 A. Probably because of that experience, I assumed it</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 53</p>	<p>1 Q. While I'm on that bullet point, are you familiar, or</p> <p>2 were you familiar as at your eight-week period at North</p> <p>3 Kensington, with the national document for FRAs, generic</p> <p>4 risk assessment 3.2?</p> <p>5 A. As an operational firefighter, I wouldn't be familiar</p> <p>6 with that. But because of the roles I have had in the</p> <p>7 collaborative partnership when I was in the</p> <p>8 Isle of Wight Fire and Rescue Service and as a member of</p> <p>9 the National Operational Guidance team, I'm aware of the</p> <p>10 document.</p> <p>11 GRAs were written to capture the very generic risks</p> <p>12 that can be assumed at that type of incident that</p> <p>13 they're dealing with, and they were there to give advice</p> <p>14 to fire and rescue services as to the issues that they</p> <p>15 needed to ensure their policies and procedures dealt</p> <p>16 with to allow the right safe systems of work to be able</p> <p>17 to be introduced to deal with those issues.</p> <p>18 Q. Were you familiar with the detailed contents of GRA 3.2</p> <p>19 yourself?</p> <p>20 A. No, I never was involved with developing the national</p> <p>21 guidance for high-rise. I didn't have the</p> <p>22 responsibility for that, so I have not referred to that</p> <p>23 document per se.</p> <p>24 When I was in the collaborative partnership, the</p> <p>25 team that were doing tactical guidance for high-rise</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 55</p>
<p>1 wouldn't be possible of the Data Protection Act.</p> <p>2 Q. "Floor layouts", next one down:</p> <p>3 "Floor layouts and any building construction</p> <p>4 features which may promote rapid or abnormal fire</p> <p>5 spread, such as sandwich panels, timber-framed</p> <p>6 construction, atria or voids."</p> <p>7 Same question: did you ever train personnel on how</p> <p>8 to go about making that assessment as part of a 7(2)(d)</p> <p>9 visit?</p> <p>10 A. Yes.</p> <p>11 Q. What training would you give them?</p> <p>12 A. Again, it would be more practical, experience-based</p> <p>13 training, sharing your experience. So if we were doing</p> <p>14 a 7(2)(d) on this building, the panelling here indicates</p> <p>15 to me there's probably hidden voids. Because of the</p> <p>16 ducting in this room, there will be voids where fire</p> <p>17 could spread, so it's about considering that, looking</p> <p>18 where it goes, checking if the fire-stopping is at the</p> <p>19 compartmentation that should be there.</p> <p>20 Although you're not there doing a fire inspection,</p> <p>21 because we no longer have the regulatory powers to do</p> <p>22 that in that way, it is about making sure you're</p> <p>23 familiar with the facilities that are in the building</p> <p>24 and that you've considered how they could be breached or</p> <p>25 any way that it could influence your operations.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 54</p>	<p>1 firefighting for the 50 per cent of the UK fire services</p> <p>2 that were engaged with the collaborative partnership,</p> <p>3 they used that document as their base document when they</p> <p>4 began the process of developing the tactics that would</p> <p>5 be employed by those fire and rescue services, tailored</p> <p>6 to their specific needs, their skill sets, the risks in</p> <p>7 their area, the equipment that they had, tailored to</p> <p>8 those risks.</p> <p>9 Q. Can I ask you please to be shown that GRA, which is</p> <p>10 tab 7 of our policies bundle and turn to page 16.</p> <p>11 There is the list of bullet points which are</p> <p>12 information points to be gathered in relation to</p> <p>13 high-rise incidents, and it comes quite a long way into</p> <p>14 the passage which starts on planning.</p> <p>15 If you look at the bullet point fourth up from the</p> <p>16 bottom:</p> <p>17 "Building construction features, such as the</p> <p>18 presence and location of maisonette-style construction,</p> <p>19 sandwich panels, timber framing, cladding systems,</p> <p>20 surface mounted trunking ..."</p> <p>21 Et cetera.</p> <p>22 Did you know during your period of eight weeks as</p> <p>23 station manager at North Kensington that the national</p> <p>24 guidance required information to be gathered in relation</p> <p>25 to cladding systems?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 56</p>

<p>1 A. As I said, that guidance should have been used, and</p> <p>2 I believe was used, by policy writers in every Brigade</p> <p>3 in the country to tailor their policies to meet the</p> <p>4 risks in their area with the equipment, the training and</p> <p>5 the skills of their personnel. So it's used as a base</p> <p>6 document for Brigades to tailor their policies.</p> <p>7 So in London Fire Brigade I would comply with the</p> <p>8 policies and procedures of London Fire Brigade; in the</p> <p>9 West Midlands, it would be the West Midlands, et cetera,</p> <p>10 because it's tailored to the specifics of your area.</p> <p>11 Q. I understand that.</p> <p>12 A. So going back to your question, I wasn't aware that</p> <p>13 cladding systems were specifically mentioned in the</p> <p>14 national guidance, but I would guess -- and it's</p> <p>15 a guess -- if we went back to that list of the</p> <p>16 considerations on a 7(2)(d) in our policy, it will be</p> <p>17 one of the bullets in that list and so it would be</p> <p>18 something you would consider.</p> <p>19 Q. Right.</p> <p>20 A. Because that would be where that list in 7(2)(d) policy</p> <p>21 would've come from.</p> <p>22 Q. During that period of eight weeks, did you notice any</p> <p>23 detail about Grenfell Tower particularly on those</p> <p>24 premises' ORD information, so far as you can get it,</p> <p>25 station diary?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 57</p>	<p>1 I would be relying on the cascade training I had from my</p> <p>2 officers in the past, that I reflected that and</p> <p>3 I cascaded that to the officers I was responsible for at</p> <p>4 that time.</p> <p>5 It's about giving your experience to the crews that</p> <p>6 you are now responsible for and making sure they focus</p> <p>7 on the same areas.</p> <p>8 Q. When doing a 7(2)(d) visit, to the best of your</p> <p>9 understanding, did that require visiting personnel</p> <p>10 actually to understand the precise instructions and</p> <p>11 mechanics of a smoke control system so that they could</p> <p>12 actually operate it during an incident?</p> <p>13 A. If it was designed for that to be a feature of the</p> <p>14 system, I would expect them to gather that information.</p> <p>15 Q. Right.</p> <p>16 A. And not only to gather it, but to make sure it was</p> <p>17 available for whichever crew happened to attend</p> <p>18 an incident there, because you can't rely on it being</p> <p>19 the local station. If the local station's already</p> <p>20 committed to another incident, it would be the next</p> <p>21 nearest station that gets mobilised.</p> <p>22 So any facility like that, you would have to ensure</p> <p>23 that those instructions were obtained and that they</p> <p>24 would be available for whoever attended.</p> <p>25 One of the easiest ways is to ensure that it's</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 59</p>
<p>1 A. I didn't see the ORD for Grenfell Tower.</p> <p>2 Q. No, but the station diary?</p> <p>3 A. I didn't go through that process when I was there, but</p> <p>4 when I visited the site, I've got no recollection of</p> <p>5 seeing cladding on the building. But to qualify that,</p> <p>6 at that time, my belief was that cladding systems didn't</p> <p>7 burn. My belief was if they were installed correctly to</p> <p>8 Building Regulations, they weren't an issue in the</p> <p>9 United Kingdom.</p> <p>10 Q. Right.</p> <p>11 A. So there wouldn't be anything I was specifically</p> <p>12 focusing on unless there was obvious failure to comply,</p> <p>13 and that's where my attention would've been drawn to it.</p> <p>14 Q. We can go back to appendix 1, please, of policy 633,</p> <p>15 which was tab 4 of the policies bundle, you can also see</p> <p>16 I think six bullet points up from the bottom, maybe</p> <p>17 seven:</p> <p>18 "Means of ventilation and smoke control including</p> <p>19 location of operating switches."</p> <p>20 Again, similar question: did you ever give any</p> <p>21 training to operational crews as to how to become</p> <p>22 familiar with the means of ventilation and smoke control</p> <p>23 systems?</p> <p>24 A. It would be the same as the previous answer. It would</p> <p>25 be that while you're actually engaged in -- in effect,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 58</p>	<p>1 attached to the ORD for that risk, the operational risk</p> <p>2 database, or that there are instructions at the site,</p> <p>3 and that could be either on a wall or it could be in</p> <p>4 a premises information box, a method like that.</p> <p>5 Q. Okay. That's very helpful and we'll come back to the</p> <p>6 specifics of this particular system in due course.</p> <p>7 Before I leave this list, can I then ask you to look</p> <p>8 at the next one down:</p> <p>9 "Evacuation arrangements which may include phased</p> <p>10 evacuation."</p> <p>11 Was it your understanding that crews needed to</p> <p>12 understand or be trained on how to go about familiarity</p> <p>13 or obtaining familiarity with evacuation arrangements in</p> <p>14 every high-rise block that they attended under 7(2)(d)?</p> <p>15 A. Any premises that you attend, high-rise or other, if</p> <p>16 they've got a specific evacuation plan, you need to be</p> <p>17 aware of it, because it could and probably would affect</p> <p>18 your firefighting tactics.</p> <p>19 Q. You are qualifying the answer by "if they've got</p> <p>20 an evacuation plan". If it's a residential high-rise</p> <p>21 block with stay put in place, if you see what I mean, in</p> <p>22 other words --</p> <p>23 A. Designed to support stay put, yes.</p> <p>24 Q. That's the standing instruction to residents, then would</p> <p>25 it not follow that, nonetheless, you would still have to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 60</p>

<p>1 examine evacuation arrangements, which may include 2 phased evacuation?</p> <p>3 A. The responsible person for the building is responsible 4 for having an adequate evacuation plan. They assess 5 their building, they detail the evacuation plan. We 6 have to make sure we're aware of it so that our 7 operations will work effectively in tandem to that 8 evacuation plan being implemented.</p> <p>9 Q. So do I understand your evidence to be that where you 10 have a stay-put policy in place, put there by the 11 building owner, you wouldn't then go about examining 12 evacuation arrangements?</p> <p>13 A. No, you would. You'd say: what are the evacuation 14 arrangements for this building? This building is 15 designed and built to support stay put. Therefore, only 16 the occupants of the initial flat will need to evacuate. 17 So our focus is then on making sure we make contact 18 with the point of origin, we carry out any immediate 19 rescues and we firefight. 20 So that is taking into account the evacuation 21 arrangements of the building.</p> <p>22 Q. So where stay put is in place, you would say that you 23 would read and apply the evacuation arrangements there 24 in a way that's limited to the compartment of origin and 25 surrounding compartments?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 61</p>	<p>1 evacuation. At 7.46, it says: 2 "It may be necessary to undertake a partial or full 3 evacuation in a residential building where a 'Stay put 4 policy is normally in place." 5 So that's rather suggesting that one thing that 6 an incident commander should consider at an incident is 7 full evacuation of a high-rise residential building even 8 though a stay-put policy is in place?</p> <p>9 A. Well, it states it may be necessary to do it; it doesn't 10 say that we have to consider it and put arrangements in 11 place to achieve it.</p> <p>12 Now, I know that this looks like I'm playing with 13 words, but you don't know what the incident is you're 14 responding to. Because we're focused on a fire, we're 15 all thinking about a fire in this room. But you could 16 have a stay put building and it could be exposed to 17 a chemical leak, it could be exposed to a terrorist 18 attack, it could be anything, where you say: we need to 19 get everybody out. So that's where it would be 20 necessary to do that type of activity.</p> <p>21 The building is designed to resist a fire. There 22 could be other things that make that not appropriate for 23 people to stay in that building.</p> <p>24 Q. So are you saying that there may be other events other 25 than fires where you would evacuate a residential</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 63</p>
<p>1 A. Those are the evacuation arrangements for that building.</p> <p>2 Q. That limitation, is that personal to you or, to the best 3 of your understanding, was that shared by other senior 4 officers in the London Fire Brigade who would deliver 5 training on 7(2)(d)?</p> <p>6 A. I've not received any specific training to give me that 7 interpretation, but I think it would be fair to say that 8 an officer who is carrying out a 7(2)(d) inspection 9 would confirm what the evacuation arrangements are for 10 that building and then confirm that our tactics wouldn't 11 compromise those.</p> <p>12 I am going to expand a little bit.</p> <p>13 Where that would become an issue is in, for example, 14 a phased evacuation building, where if we curtailed that 15 phased evacuation and went to a general evacuation, that 16 could cause real issues because of the volume of people 17 who would be coming down the stairs.</p> <p>18 So it's important you do understand the arrangements 19 for the specific building, and if it's been designed and 20 built for stay put to be the appropriate use of that 21 building, you make sure that your response will tailor 22 to that.</p> <p>23 Q. Can I, in the light of that answer, take you to page 14 24 of this policy, which is paragraph 7.46 under the rubric 25 "Evacuation". There's a chunk of this policy devoted to</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 62</p>	<p>1 building in full where there is a stay-put policy is in 2 place, but not a fire?</p> <p>3 A. No, I'm definitely not saying that a fire -- it could 4 never, ever happen, because obviously you cannot rely 5 necessarily that the principle has been maintained. So 6 it might be something you have to deal with. But that's 7 a statement of fact: it may be necessary. It doesn't 8 tell you what you do about it.</p> <p>9 Q. No, it doesn't, and that leads me to this question: 10 taking paragraph 7.46, which we can see there, did you 11 ever give or receive any training on how to assess the 12 need to undertake a partial or full evacuation in 13 a residential high-rise block where a stay-put policy 14 was in place?</p> <p>15 A. No.</p> <p>16 Q. Are there any principles which would govern how 17 an incident commander would go about assessing whether 18 it was necessary to undertake such a partial or full 19 evacuation?</p> <p>20 A. I'm not aware of any guidance at all.</p> <p>21 Q. Can I then turn to a particular visit that you made to 22 Grenfell Tower. 23 Is it right that as part of your responsibilities -- 24 I think you've said it was your first day at 25 North Ken -- you went to Grenfell Tower on</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 64</p>

<p>1 28 April 2016?</p> <p>2 A. Yes. The station manager who would normally be based</p> <p>3 there had received an invitation to see a demonstration</p> <p>4 of a newly-installed smoke extraction system, and</p> <p>5 because I was there that day, he forwarded that invite</p> <p>6 to me and asked me if I would like to attend in his</p> <p>7 place. I took advantage of that invite.</p> <p>8 Q. Was that as part of a 7(2)(d) visit by the station or</p> <p>9 was that just coincidental with the visit by White Watch</p> <p>10 to Grenfell Tower on that day?</p> <p>11 A. To put a bit of context in, when I wrote my</p> <p>12 contemporaneous notes on the morning of the 17th,</p> <p>13 I remembered I'd been in the building and I remembered</p> <p>14 I'd had a smoke extraction demonstration. I also</p> <p>15 remembered that White Watch were there, and I assumed</p> <p>16 that White Watch were doing a 7(2)(d). I'd forgotten</p> <p>17 that I'd had a specific invite to see the smoke</p> <p>18 extraction, so I assumed that I must have been there to</p> <p>19 do the 7(2)(d) -- in effect I'd gone to witness</p> <p>20 a 7(2)(d).</p> <p>21 When I got asked the specific questions last week</p> <p>22 regarding that visit, I went back to my calendar,</p> <p>23 I found the invite, I remembered the circumstances more</p> <p>24 clearly.</p> <p>25 So White Watch -- because the block was under such</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 65</p>	<p>1 A. I haven't got it with me.</p> <p>2 Q. Not with you here today, but you've got it, have you?</p> <p>3 A. It's attached to the calender entry for that visit,</p> <p>4 because I attached it into the invitation on the</p> <p>5 calender.</p> <p>6 Q. When you attended, did you actually involve yourself</p> <p>7 with the 7(2)(d) visit or did you just watch the</p> <p>8 demonstration of the smoke vent system?</p> <p>9 A. As I say, the watch were doing the 7(2)(d). They were</p> <p>10 there before I arrived, so they commenced that visit.</p> <p>11 When the smoke demonstration started, they joined the</p> <p>12 group. So the aspects of the building that we visited</p> <p>13 as part of that demonstration, they would've been</p> <p>14 recording information then.</p> <p>15 So that's the only time I was engaged in the 7(2)(d)</p> <p>16 process with them, where it overlapped with the smoke</p> <p>17 demonstration.</p> <p>18 Q. You didn't do any other 7(2)(d) work other than the</p> <p>19 smoke vent?</p> <p>20 A. No.</p> <p>21 Q. Leaving aside White Watch, who from North Kensington</p> <p>22 attended the visit with you?</p> <p>23 A. White Watch and myself.</p> <p>24 Q. Just White Watch?</p> <p>25 A. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 67</p>
<p>1 an extensive renovation, a periodic inspection programme</p> <p>2 had been out in place, so every watch periodically went</p> <p>3 back and revisited the building, because the condition</p> <p>4 of the building was continually changing. It was to</p> <p>5 make sure the ORD information was up-to-date and their</p> <p>6 familiarity was up-to-date as the circumstances changed.</p> <p>7 White Watch was scheduled to carry out one of those</p> <p>8 periodic 7(2)(d)s or familiarisation visits that day.</p> <p>9 Because the smoke demonstration invite had come,</p> <p>10 I mentioned it to White Watch and they made sure that</p> <p>11 their visit coincided with the demonstration times so</p> <p>12 that they could tag onto the demonstration and become</p> <p>13 more familiar with that system as it was being put into</p> <p>14 the building.</p> <p>15 Q. Can I ask you to look, please, at paragraph 7 of your</p> <p>16 second statement, 17 September statement, paragraph 7.</p> <p>17 I want you to look at the last three lines, please.</p> <p>18 You say there:</p> <p>19 "The original invitation came from David Hughes from</p> <p>20 Rydon. In addition to Nick Davis of the LFB, the email</p> <p>21 addresses the others invited had the following</p> <p>22 extensions ..."</p> <p>23 They're there set out.</p> <p>24 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>25 Q. Have you got that original e-mail with you?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 66</p>	<p>1 Q. So Nick Davis didn't go?</p> <p>2 A. No.</p> <p>3 Q. Did anybody brief you as to the purpose of your visit?</p> <p>4 A. Not really, no more than the invitation and the e-mail,</p> <p>5 and that it was a demonstration of a smoke extraction</p> <p>6 system.</p> <p>7 Q. To the best of your understanding, was the purpose of</p> <p>8 your attending pursuant to the invitation to ensure that</p> <p>9 the smoke system was compliant with relevant standards</p> <p>10 or was it part of building control approvals?</p> <p>11 A. Neither. My understanding was it was just</p> <p>12 a demonstration of a new system so that the watch would</p> <p>13 have familiarity, I would have familiarity, and in</p> <p>14 effect for us to give any opinion or guidance that may</p> <p>15 cross our minds from an operational point of view.</p> <p>16 Q. So it was 7(2)(d) in the strict sense?</p> <p>17 A. Yes. It was familiarisation. It wasn't regulatory, it</p> <p>18 wasn't commissioning, it wasn't acceptance, it was just</p> <p>19 purely a familiarisation.</p> <p>20 Q. So would it follow that it wasn't, as it were,</p> <p>21 a training session on how to use the system?</p> <p>22 A. It was a familiarisation. So I would expect them to</p> <p>23 talk about what the system was designed to achieve, and</p> <p>24 if there were any aspects that would be of benefit to</p> <p>25 the fire service, for them to highlight that and for us</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 68</p>

<p>1 to take note of those.</p> <p>2 So it wasn't a training session per se, but</p> <p>3 I would've been really surprised if we didn't come away</p> <p>4 with a better knowledge of that system and how we might</p> <p>5 use it.</p> <p>6 Again, going back to the evacuation arrangements for</p> <p>7 the building, it's the same sort of thing; it's about us</p> <p>8 knowing what the ventilation arrangements were for the</p> <p>9 building and seeing if we would incorporate those into</p> <p>10 our tactics.</p> <p>11 Q. Did anybody show you or teach you how to operate the</p> <p>12 system in the event of a fire?</p> <p>13 A. During the visit, they did start to go into the</p> <p>14 specifics of how it could be operated from a control</p> <p>15 panel in the lobby. I don't know if it was at the</p> <p>16 beginning of the demonstration or the end, I can't</p> <p>17 remember, but I know that there was a touch-screen</p> <p>18 panel, and it was talked about that this controlled the</p> <p>19 system. It was an automatic vent system that would</p> <p>20 operate automatically if the trigger mechanism was</p> <p>21 activated indicating there was a fire. But there was</p> <p>22 a facility to manually override that and operate that.</p> <p>23 They started to talk about the specifics of that,</p> <p>24 and I said, "I need to stop you there" -- this is</p> <p>25 paraphrasing, I can't remember the exact words, this was</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 69</p>	<p>1 100 per cent sure -- is that I asked for such detailed</p> <p>2 instructions to be sent to the local station so that</p> <p>3 they could be uploaded onto the ORD appropriately.</p> <p>4 Because we don't put certain information on the ORD. We</p> <p>5 don't put access codes, that type of thing, onto ORD,</p> <p>6 because, again, there is a risk of it being compromised.</p> <p>7 The reason I'm sure that I asked in that way -- this</p> <p>8 is just to put it into context -- I explained what ORD</p> <p>9 was, I explained what an MDT was -- I can remember doing</p> <p>10 this -- which is our mobile data terminal, which is the</p> <p>11 vehicle computer, and I explained how that information</p> <p>12 would be used by crews as they arrived.</p> <p>13 Q. We'll come back to the ORD in just a moment.</p> <p>14 In your second witness statement at paragraph 11,</p> <p>15 you say, four lines down:</p> <p>16 "... as the demonstration progressed I began to feel</p> <p>17 it was possibly being treated as a formal commissioning</p> <p>18 process by the person leading the demonstration, with me</p> <p>19 and the watch being treated as though we were</p> <p>20 representing LFB as part of an acceptance process.</p> <p>21 I was concerned about this and I remember making the</p> <p>22 point to the person leading the demonstration that this</p> <p>23 could not be considered to be the case."</p> <p>24 Did you write those concerns down anywhere?</p> <p>25 A. No, didn't write that down.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 71</p>
<p>1 2016 -- "I need to stop you there, it probably or may</p> <p>2 not be us who would attend if there was an incident, it</p> <p>3 might not even be the local station, so you need to make</p> <p>4 sure that these instructions are available on site and</p> <p>5 are clear for anybody who might need to operate this</p> <p>6 system in the way you are describing, because it needs</p> <p>7 to be available at any time there is an incident in this</p> <p>8 building, irrespective of which crews attend."</p> <p>9 Q. Who did you tell that to?</p> <p>10 A. That would have been to whoever it was that was leading</p> <p>11 the demonstration and, as I say, I've assumed from the</p> <p>12 invite it was the representatives from Rydon, because</p> <p>13 the e-mail invite came from them and, as I say, that's</p> <p>14 in my Outlook diary, who that came from and who else was</p> <p>15 invited.</p> <p>16 But I really did clearly make the point that they</p> <p>17 couldn't give us the direction and think that that would</p> <p>18 be adequate. It needed to be captured in a way that it</p> <p>19 would be available on site. My expectation and</p> <p>20 belief -- although I don't remember detailing it, but</p> <p>21 I can't believe it wouldn't have happened -- is that the</p> <p>22 crew that were doing the 7(2)(d) would've made notes of</p> <p>23 anything that was specific that they could at that time</p> <p>24 that was really useful from an operational point of</p> <p>25 view, and my recollection -- but I cannot be</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 70</p>	<p>1 Q. Did you report those concerns that you had at that time</p> <p>2 to Nick Davis?</p> <p>3 A. I honestly can't remember. I don't think I did.</p> <p>4 I expressed them to the person leading the</p> <p>5 demonstration. My recollection is there was somebody</p> <p>6 from the -- for want of a better word, from the</p> <p>7 contractors that had carried out the refurbishment, and</p> <p>8 there was an engineer that had been involved either in</p> <p>9 the design or the fitting of the system, and they were</p> <p>10 leading that demonstration, and that was who I directed</p> <p>11 that to.</p> <p>12 Q. Just on that last point about refurbishment, a couple of</p> <p>13 questions there very shortly.</p> <p>14 Did you receive a briefing from David Hughes or</p> <p>15 anybody else from Rydon who had invited you regarding</p> <p>16 the process of the refurbishment at that stage?</p> <p>17 A. There was a general overview given. So one of the</p> <p>18 things that had happened was there was a temporary riser</p> <p>19 inlet prior to that week, I believe, which obviously</p> <p>20 I had no knowledge of, but I believe the access to the</p> <p>21 riser was previously on the 2nd floor via the walkway,</p> <p>22 and they'd just got to the point where they'd</p> <p>23 commissioned a new inlet on the ground floor. I think</p> <p>24 that is what had happened. That was one of the main</p> <p>25 aspects the crew were familiarising themselves with,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 72</p>

<p>1 where the new inlet for the riser was.</p> <p>2 Q. Do you know what risk rating Grenfell Tower had been</p> <p>3 allocated at the time of your visit?</p> <p>4 A. No.</p> <p>5 Q. Do you remember whether during the course of that visit</p> <p>6 there was any broader discussion of fire safety issues</p> <p>7 arising from the presence of cladding on the exterior?</p> <p>8 A. I don't remember cladding being referenced, no.</p> <p>9 Q. Going to your contemporaneous notes, if I can, and this</p> <p>10 is MET00005715, if I can take you to the bottom of</p> <p>11 page 2, and the top of page 3, you describe there ...</p> <p>12 (Pause)</p> <p>13 I'm so sorry, probably my mistake, this is</p> <p>14 MET00005715. So this is the notebook, I think, the</p> <p>15 first of two notebooks.</p> <p>16 If you go to the top of page 3, you can see that at</p> <p>17 the foot of the page on the left of the screen:</p> <p>18 "The person who did this explained to us the system</p> <p>19 could be used by firefighters to control smoke in the</p> <p>20 lift lobbies and stairs by using the panel."</p> <p>21 Do you see, Mr Walton, where I'm reading from?</p> <p>22 A. Yes.</p> <p>23 Q. If we can just have that highlighted so that everybody</p> <p>24 else can see that.</p> <p>25 Now, I have some questions about that.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 73</p>	<p>1 about this, you say:</p> <p>2 "I no longer believe that vents on more than one</p> <p>3 floor were opened, but I cannot be sure about this.</p> <p>4 I have no recollection of moving from one floor to</p> <p>5 another to see the effect of a fire on multiple floors</p> <p>6 being simulated, however it must have been my impression</p> <p>7 that it could achieve this at the time of making my</p> <p>8 notes and original statement, but I cannot remember the</p> <p>9 details of the visit well enough for me to say this was</p> <p>10 stated or demonstrated in April 2016."</p> <p>11 Just on that, just to be absolutely clear, standing</p> <p>12 there now, is your recollection, as I think you've told</p> <p>13 us, that in fact, at the time of this demonstration</p> <p>14 in April 2016, your impression was that it wasn't</p> <p>15 capable of operating on more than one floor?</p> <p>16 A. I can't recall. That's what it is.</p> <p>17 Q. Right.</p> <p>18 A. On the morning of the fire when I wrote my</p> <p>19 contemporaneous notes, that was my belief, that it would</p> <p>20 open on more than one floor and that the fan speed would</p> <p>21 increase and that it would take smoke out of more than</p> <p>22 one level. But I've got nothing to -- looking back and</p> <p>23 reflecting, I can't remember specifically having that</p> <p>24 demonstrated or having that explained to me on that</p> <p>25 inspection, on that visit. So that's why I'm saying</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 75</p>
<p>1 First of all, thinking back to the time of that</p> <p>2 visit, was it your understanding, having witnessed the</p> <p>3 demonstration, that the smoke extraction system would</p> <p>4 automatically operate on the affected lobby, and that</p> <p>5 the vents on all the other levels of the building would</p> <p>6 close?</p> <p>7 A. On the night of the fire, I didn't recall that, but --</p> <p>8 Q. Sorry, let me just be clear. This is at the time of the</p> <p>9 visit.</p> <p>10 A. So on reflection now, having been asked last week to go</p> <p>11 back to revisit that, and having the prompts of the</p> <p>12 photos that were sent to me, et cetera, that has come</p> <p>13 back into my memory, yes.</p> <p>14 Q. So did you understand at the time of the visit that the</p> <p>15 system would operate to extract smoke on only one floor</p> <p>16 at a time?</p> <p>17 A. My recollection is that it would open the vent on the</p> <p>18 floor where a pressure head had activated, and that was</p> <p>19 an unusual aspect of the system, that it was</p> <p>20 a pressure-operated system, not a smoke-operated system.</p> <p>21 Whether that's an accurate memory or not, I can't tell.</p> <p>22 So the vent would open on the lobby of the affected</p> <p>23 head, and all other vents would close.</p> <p>24 Q. In paragraph 25 of your supplemental statement, if I can</p> <p>25 just show you that, this is on page 7, just to be clear</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 74</p>	<p>1 I can't say whether or not the system was able to</p> <p>2 achieve that.</p> <p>3 Q. Going back to what you told us earlier about the set of</p> <p>4 instructions, does that mean that you saw no</p> <p>5 instructions or were given no instructions at the time</p> <p>6 of that inspection --</p> <p>7 A. They weren't there.</p> <p>8 Q. -- in 2016?</p> <p>9 You said this morning and you said in your</p> <p>10 supplemental statement, paragraph 12(iv), that you asked</p> <p>11 for a copy of instructions to be sent to the local</p> <p>12 station so that they could go onto the ORD.</p> <p>13 A. Again, it's not a 100 per cent I would swear to it, but</p> <p>14 I know that I asked for those instructions and I know</p> <p>15 that I referred to the ORD and explained what the ORD</p> <p>16 was and what the purpose of those instructions were used</p> <p>17 for. So that's why I believe I asked for those</p> <p>18 instructions to be sent so they could be put onto the</p> <p>19 ORD.</p> <p>20 Q. Let's see if we can be a little firmer than that,</p> <p>21 Mr Walton. If you can go to your supplemental</p> <p>22 statement, page 3, paragraph 12(iv), you are quite clear</p> <p>23 there, four lines up:</p> <p>24 "I recall saying a copy of the instructions should</p> <p>25 also be sent to the local station (G27) so they could be</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 76</p>

<p>1 added to the Operational Risk Database (ORD) entry for</p> <p>2 the tower so it would be available via the Mobile Data</p> <p>3 Terminal (MDT) on the attending appliances if needed. I</p> <p>4 remember explaining what an MDT was and outlining the</p> <p>5 ORD system as part of this discussion.</p> <p>6 "(v) I believe the reason I asked for these</p> <p>7 instructions was because none were present at the time</p> <p>8 of the inspection, I cannot be sure if this took place</p> <p>9 at the beginning of the demonstration or following it, I</p> <p>10 remember it being in the vicinity of the control panel</p> <p>11 though."</p> <p>12 Can you confirm that evidence?</p> <p>13 A. Yes, it's my recollection.</p> <p>14 Q. Right.</p> <p>15 A. But I can't be 100 per cent.</p> <p>16 Q. Did you ever check after this that the instructions were</p> <p>17 sent to North Kensington so that they could be entered</p> <p>18 on the ORD?</p> <p>19 A. No.</p> <p>20 Q. Why is that?</p> <p>21 A. I no longer had responsibility for North Kensington.</p> <p>22 I was in a different role and I was dealing with the</p> <p>23 workload of that role, and it never entered my mind to</p> <p>24 follow that up.</p> <p>25 Q. You say you were in a different role. You were station</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 77</p>	<p>1 up on the next visit that we can needed that. But</p> <p>2 I didn't chase that up. I didn't find out if that had</p> <p>3 happened.</p> <p>4 Q. Did you report back to Nick Davis or anybody else at</p> <p>5 North Ken that they should chase up those instructions</p> <p>6 and make sure that they were on the ORD in case they</p> <p>7 weren't received as promised?</p> <p>8 A. I never instructed anybody to follow that up. My vague</p> <p>9 recollection -- and I don't think this is a reliable</p> <p>10 recollection -- is that I did speak about the visit with</p> <p>11 Nick Davis at some point over that eight-week period,</p> <p>12 and I did talk about the fact that there was a smoke</p> <p>13 extraction system in there and that we'd asked for</p> <p>14 instructions.</p> <p>15 But I can't put my hand on my heart and say that</p> <p>16 that definitely was something I asked and explained.</p> <p>17 It's my belief. I've got faith in myself as an officer</p> <p>18 and I believe I would've done that.</p> <p>19 Q. Right.</p> <p>20 A. But I can't point to any evidence. I can't point to any</p> <p>21 really strong recollection of doing that.</p> <p>22 Q. Was it not, though, an important matter to make sure,</p> <p>23 particularly since you were only there for eight weeks</p> <p>24 or so, that your request for instructions of this system</p> <p>25 was known by North Kensington, other personnel at North</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 79</p>
<p>1 manager at North Kensington for eight weeks.</p> <p>2 A. Eight weeks.</p> <p>3 Q. 28 April, the day of this demonstration, was the first</p> <p>4 day.</p> <p>5 During that eight-week period minus one day that</p> <p>6 followed, did you not think to chase up the</p> <p>7 instructions, get them from Rydon and make sure they</p> <p>8 were put on the ORD?</p> <p>9 A. No, I would expect that to be captured in the next</p> <p>10 familiarisation visit.</p> <p>11 Q. But I thought your evidence was, as you've just</p> <p>12 confirmed, that you asked for a copy of the instructions</p> <p>13 to be sent. Are you saying now that you wouldn't expect</p> <p>14 them to be sent but you'd wait for the next 7(2)(d)</p> <p>15 visit?</p> <p>16 A. No, I would expect them to be sent, and if they hadn't</p> <p>17 been received, I would expect them to follow that up on</p> <p>18 the next 7(2)(d). As I say, there was a very short</p> <p>19 duration periodic re-inspection of the building going</p> <p>20 on. I don't know for certain, but I believe it would be</p> <p>21 about once a month or once every two months that</p> <p>22 building was revisited by a different watch to ensure</p> <p>23 that all watch managers maintain their familiarity with</p> <p>24 that building. So if we'd requested for something and</p> <p>25 we haven't received it, I would expect it to be picked</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 78</p>	<p>1 Kensington, so that if they didn't come and you didn't</p> <p>2 know about it, they would know about it and chase it up?</p> <p>3 A. The watch were there. They were there at that time. So</p> <p>4 personnel at North Kensington did know and I would</p> <p>5 expect that to be part of the ORD update.</p> <p>6 There's a comments section on the updates where you</p> <p>7 can record things like that. I would expect that to be</p> <p>8 captured. But I wouldn't have access to that without</p> <p>9 the admin rights. Normally the comments are part of</p> <p>10 what the station officer, station manager, who is doing</p> <p>11 the quality assurance of the update checks, and they</p> <p>12 then check the areas that are referenced and make sure</p> <p>13 that they've been updated to the standard that's</p> <p>14 required. And if they're not happy with any of that,</p> <p>15 you send it back to the watch to go and revisit.</p> <p>16 Q. I understand.</p> <p>17 But given the specific invitation that you'd</p> <p>18 received to go and look at this system, given the</p> <p>19 request for these instructions that you'd made, was it</p> <p>20 not your responsibility to make sure that if you didn't</p> <p>21 chase them up, Nick Davis or somebody else senior at</p> <p>22 North Kensington knew that that request had been made,</p> <p>23 instructions had been pursued, so that they could be</p> <p>24 chased up if you didn't?</p> <p>25 A. My belief was that the station knew that we'd requested</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 80</p>

<p>1 the instructions, and my belief was that they would get</p> <p>2 chased if they weren't delivered. It was a belief.</p> <p>3 Q. At the end of your eight-week period, did it occur to</p> <p>4 you to find out whether or not those instructions had</p> <p>5 been received before you left your role as station</p> <p>6 manager at North Kensington?</p> <p>7 A. No.</p> <p>8 Q. Is there a reason for that?</p> <p>9 A. I genuinely believed -- it was such a hectic sort of</p> <p>10 learning curve of being engaged with the admin on</p> <p>11 a station compared to what I'd been doing that my focus</p> <p>12 had gone from that visit on the first day at Grenfell,</p> <p>13 where I thought I'd dealt with the issues, and had moved</p> <p>14 on to the other aspects of the job that I was keeping on</p> <p>15 top of.</p> <p>16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Millett, I would quite like to</p> <p>17 offer Mr Walton a break. We've been running nearly</p> <p>18 another hour.</p> <p>19 MR MILLETT: Yes, I would like to be able to say we're</p> <p>20 moving on to another topic, but I fear not.</p> <p>21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I wasn't necessarily going to stop</p> <p>22 you at this point if you haven't finished a topic --</p> <p>23 MR MILLETT: Let's stop now. Let's take a break.</p> <p>24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Is that all right?</p> <p>25 MR MILLETT: Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 81</p>	<p>1 prior to 14 June 2017."</p> <p>2 It's got on it an entry on the fourth page</p> <p>3 internally at the bottom for February 2017.</p> <p>4 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>5 Q. My question is: do you think that there would have been</p> <p>6 a similar entry for the visit on 28 April 2016?</p> <p>7 A. I would've expected there to be an entry on the diary</p> <p>8 for that, yes.</p> <p>9 Q. Do you know who would have completed that entry?</p> <p>10 A. It would more than likely be one of the watch officers,</p> <p>11 the watch manager or the crew manager, but depending on</p> <p>12 the way the watch is run, sometimes firefighters are</p> <p>13 given permission or for their own development are asked</p> <p>14 to do those sort of entries.</p> <p>15 Q. Not you then?</p> <p>16 A. No. The station manager may well -- right, let's walk</p> <p>17 backwards. The operational risk database is linked to</p> <p>18 the outside work schedule of the station diary.</p> <p>19 Q. Like this document?</p> <p>20 A. Yes. When you first assess a premises, you give it</p> <p>21 a risk rating. The score on that risk rating determines</p> <p>22 the level of information that needs to be gathered for</p> <p>23 that premises and the frequency that the premises is</p> <p>24 going to be revisited in the future. That then</p> <p>25 automatically populates the diary for the revisits in</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 83</p>
<p>1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll have a break, Mr Walton. If</p> <p>2 I say until 12.15, would that give you a chance to</p> <p>3 stretch your legs and so on?</p> <p>4 THE WITNESS: Yes.</p> <p>5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you would like to go with the</p> <p>6 usher now, please, and don't talk with anybody about</p> <p>7 your evidence while you're out of the room.</p> <p>8 Right, 12.15, please.</p> <p>9 (12.08 pm)</p> <p>10 (A short break)</p> <p>11 (12.15 pm)</p> <p>12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, ready to carry on,</p> <p>13 Mr Walton?</p> <p>14 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.</p> <p>15 MR MILLETT: Thank you for coming back to us. Can I ask you</p> <p>16 to be shown LFB00003596.</p> <p>17 This is the station diary for North Kensington, and</p> <p>18 if you look at the first page, can I just ask, are you</p> <p>19 familiar with that as a form of document, as a form of</p> <p>20 entry?</p> <p>21 A. That's the system we use, yes.</p> <p>22 Q. Now, it's an extract given to us by LFB and it is, as</p> <p>23 you can see from the second paragraph on that page:</p> <p>24 "... a set of screenshots from the last Outside Duty</p> <p>25 Visit recorded in the Station Diary by North Kensington</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 82</p>	<p>1 the future.</p> <p>2 So if it was an annual revisit, the system would</p> <p>3 automatically try to vary the watch that attended each</p> <p>4 year, and would put an entry into their diary 12 months</p> <p>5 in advance to sort of manage that revisit process.</p> <p>6 So on the shorter visits, if that's what had been</p> <p>7 specified by the -- the station manager can set the</p> <p>8 schedule, can adjust the schedule. So, for example,</p> <p>9 where Grenfell was undertaking a refurbishment, it could</p> <p>10 well be -- I don't know -- that Nick Davis said he</p> <p>11 wanted it revisited every month, every two months,</p> <p>12 et cetera, he would adjust the schedule accordingly and</p> <p>13 the system would automatically vary the watch that</p> <p>14 attended each time.</p> <p>15 Q. Can I ask you, then, to go to the station diary ORD user</p> <p>16 guide -- actually, no, let's not look at that.</p> <p>17 Can I take you to something different.</p> <p>18 A general question: are you aware of the terms, in</p> <p>19 general terms, of LFB policy 800?</p> <p>20 A. Operational risk database, yes.</p> <p>21 Q. Are you aware that it requires an operational risk visit</p> <p>22 whereby the ORD is completed?</p> <p>23 A. Yes. Again, the process is that you identify risks</p> <p>24 within your area, and there's a number of methods that</p> <p>25 you can use to do that. You do a desktop audit, where</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 84</p>

<p>1 you do the general risk assessment initially. That 2 gives it its risk rating. That risk rating dictates 3 whether it needs a visit or whether it needs an entry, 4 and if does need an entry, it stipulates the schedule 5 for the revisits. 6 Q. Are you aware that particular attention should be given 7 to fixed installations to ensure that the information on 8 the ORD is correct? 9 A. That's part of that risk assessment process, yes. 10 Q. Can I then show you a document, and then I am going to 11 ask you some questions about it. It's LFB00003116, 12 which was also in our master documents bundle at tab 13, 13 and this is what we understand to be the ORD as 14 at June 2017, for Grenfell Tower. 15 Just looking at the first page, you can see that its 16 latest date on it is 28 April 2017, and then "Earlier 17 Visit Comments" run down back through 2016 to 2015 and 18 then 2012 on the second page. There's no need to go to 19 the second page. 20 Do you recall seeing this when you were at North 21 Kensington or was this barred to you because you didn't 22 have the IT rights? 23 A. No, this is a printout of the ORD system that would be 24 uploaded onto the -- when you access the information on 25 the MDT, this is where that information comes from. So</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 85</p>	<p>1 Negative pressure ventilation system installed to lobby 2 area of each floor, removing smoke from fire floor only, 3 panel for this located in reception area." 4 Do you remember whether it was you who entered that 5 into the ORD system so that it would appear there on the 6 MDT if you printed it off? 7 A. It wasn't me, it would be "FOSTERA", whoever that 8 reference relates to, and it would have been entered on 9 the 30th, following the visit that they gathered that 10 information. 11 Where I referred earlier to I would expect that 12 detail to be in the comments, that's where I would've 13 thought that would've been captured, that a request for 14 operating instructions to be posted to the station had 15 been made. That's where I would've expected it to be 16 captured. 17 The reason I wouldn't know that was there was 18 I didn't have the admin rights that would put that 19 quality assurance into my work queue. Basically the 20 watches have a work queue, and that's where the 21 visits -- 22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think we have your answer. 23 MR MILLETT: Just going up the page, 10 May 2016, "Plans are 24 required for MDT" and "DAVISNI" enters that. 25 You were station manager at the time during this</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 87</p>
<p>1 the comments section is where I referred earlier to 2 I would've expected a comment to have been put in there. 3 That's where that comment would be made, it would be 4 dated and the person who made the comment would be in 5 that final column. So if a station manager does the 6 quality assurance and isn't happy with what's there, 7 they put a new comment in and explain what it is they 8 need to be done and when by, and that would be on there. 9 Q. Looking at the first entry, 28 April 2017, it says: 10 "There are no comments supplied for this visit." 11 User: "DAVISNI". I'm assuming that's Nick Davis. 12 A. I would make the same assumption with the information 13 there. 14 Q. You don't. I mean, I'm assuming, but you -- 15 A. I don't know, but it makes sense. 16 Q. Does that mean that you didn't input anything into the 17 ORD which would then be reflected on the mobile data 18 terminal when you came back from your 28 April -- I am 19 showing you the wrong reference and it's my fault. 20 If you go down the page. I'm sorry, forgive me for 21 that. If you go down to 30 April 2016, and let's start 22 with that. 23 "Building works continuing, however the entrance and 24 reception area are fully open. Dry Riser fully 25 operational and located to the left of the entrance.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 86</p>	<p>1 period because 10 May is within the eight-week period 2 you were there. Do you remember the circumstances in 3 which that entry was put onto the ORD, "Plans are 4 required"? 5 A. I can speculate. 6 Q. No, don't. 7 A. I don't know. 8 Q. Then -- 9 A. I can explain. 10 Q. Well, not if you don't know. 11 A. Yeah, but I can explain -- 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let's wait and see if Mr Millett 13 asks you for an explanation. 14 MR MILLETT: Do you remember a visit or any other 15 information to Grenfell Tower which led to somebody -- 16 looks like Nick Davis, possibly -- putting into this 17 system, "Plans are required for MDT"? 18 A. The previous comment would've been placed on the update 19 by the officer that was recording the update. That 20 would then get sent to the work queue of the officer 21 with the admin rights to quality assure the entry. 22 Because I wasn't given the admin rights, that 23 would've gone to Nick Davis's work queue. He would've 24 viewed the entry and he obviously on that comment has 25 identified that there aren't adequate plans attached to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 88</p>

<p>1 that entry, and he has sent it back as a rejection to</p> <p>2 the watch that carried out the inspection or to another</p> <p>3 watch that is scheduled to do the next inspection</p> <p>4 stating that plans are required for the MDT.</p> <p>5 Q. Then you see the entry above that by "FOSTERA", 15 May,</p> <p>6 so still within your eight-week period, "Image of</p> <p>7 building added to plans."</p> <p>8 Do you remember how it came about that the image of</p> <p>9 the building was added to plans?</p> <p>10 A. Again, the process would be that because Nick Davis was</p> <p>11 the officer with the rights, he'd sent it back to the</p> <p>12 watch that carried out the original inspection. The</p> <p>13 officer has taken that comment and they've responded to</p> <p>14 it by obtaining an image of the plans and adding them to</p> <p>15 the ORD system.</p> <p>16 This is me interpreting the flow; I've got no</p> <p>17 personal knowledge of that. This is me interpreting the</p> <p>18 process.</p> <p>19 Q. We'll come back to this document shortly, but if you can</p> <p>20 go back to your first statement, please, at page 12,</p> <p>21 Mr Walton, you say in the final paragraph on that page,</p> <p>22 this back to the smoke control panel, you say:</p> <p>23 "We had the control panel on the ground floor shown</p> <p>24 to us and I think I asked if I needed to make notes but</p> <p>25 was told that no, if ever there was a fire it is an</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 89</p>	<p>1 A. Again, going back to the previous answer, it wouldn't be</p> <p>2 a requirement, but I genuinely would expect the fact</p> <p>3 that the caretaker lived locally and would be available</p> <p>4 to be captured and that their contact details would be</p> <p>5 captured. There's a section in the ORD for recording</p> <p>6 those sort of details.</p> <p>7 Q. Were you given the caretaker's details?</p> <p>8 A. I can't remember.</p> <p>9 Q. You say there's a section in the ORD for recording</p> <p>10 those. You are right, and I can show you that if you go</p> <p>11 back, please, to the ORD, tab 13 of our documents</p> <p>12 bundle, LFB00003116.</p> <p>13 If you go to internal page 5, you can see "Emergency</p> <p>14 Contacts" towards the bottom of the page, and there's</p> <p>15 a receptionist who is titled "Ms" but whose surname and</p> <p>16 forename is "varies", curiously, type: office, and then</p> <p>17 a telephone number. Then a Mr O'Connor a Ms Stephanou.</p> <p>18 Do those names ring a bell with you?</p> <p>19 A. No.</p> <p>20 Q. Do you know how they got onto the ORD?</p> <p>21 A. No.</p> <p>22 Q. Do we see there the caretaker details or even</p> <p>23 generically the idea that there's a caretaker you can</p> <p>24 get hold of to come urgently?</p> <p>25 A. Looking at the screen, no.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 91</p>
<p>1 automatic system but if you did want to use the system</p> <p>2 to help you fight the fire the caretaker lives local and</p> <p>3 would always be at the fire anyway so he would be able</p> <p>4 to do it for you or tell you what you needed to do.</p> <p>5 I wasn't based at that station and so I didn't go into</p> <p>6 the ins and outs of what you would press and what you</p> <p>7 wouldn't because I felt it was information I would not</p> <p>8 retain, rightly or wrongly, it was the sort of thing</p> <p>9 I didn't need to know."</p> <p>10 In your supplemental statement, at paragraph 13, you</p> <p>11 say -- and I paraphrase -- in your experience it's</p> <p>12 normal to have contact details for persons who can be</p> <p>13 called and asked to give advice about the building in</p> <p>14 the event of an emergency.</p> <p>15 All of that you say.</p> <p>16 First question: in your experience, is it common</p> <p>17 that the operation of a smoke clearance or smoke</p> <p>18 extraction system would be dependent on finding</p> <p>19 an off-site caretaker or responsible person?</p> <p>20 A. No, that's why we wanted the instructions, but it is</p> <p>21 normal to have people identified who can assist at</p> <p>22 an incident with additional information.</p> <p>23 Q. Did you or anybody else, to your knowledge, think to put</p> <p>24 the requirement for a caretaker to operate the smoke</p> <p>25 system on to the ORD?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 90</p>	<p>1 Q. Should that information be recorded on the ORD normally?</p> <p>2 A. Yes, I would expect if it was available that we would've</p> <p>3 recorded it as part of our information-gathering.</p> <p>4 Q. Do you know why it wasn't?</p> <p>5 A. No.</p> <p>6 Q. Whose job would it be to ensure that the caretaker</p> <p>7 information and the other information about the smoke</p> <p>8 vent system would be on the ORD?</p> <p>9 A. The person carrying out the 7(2)(d), the update visit.</p> <p>10 Q. And you say that wasn't you?</p> <p>11 A. I'm not trying to slope shoulders. I wasn't involved in</p> <p>12 the revisit; I was there for the smoke extraction</p> <p>13 demonstration.</p> <p>14 Q. To the best of our knowledge -- and this may be wrong --</p> <p>15 Mr O'Connor and Ms Stephanou were Rydon employees who</p> <p>16 would be gone once the refurbishment had finished. Did</p> <p>17 you know that?</p> <p>18 A. I didn't know that information at all.</p> <p>19 Q. If you had known that, what would you have done with the</p> <p>20 entries on the ORD? Would you have taken steps to find</p> <p>21 out who the permanent contact was?</p> <p>22 A. I would expect that -- my instruction to crews on my own</p> <p>23 station when they carry out 7(2)(d) visits is to gather</p> <p>24 every piece of information that would be useful to them</p> <p>25 when responding to an operational incident. That is</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 92</p>

<p>1 useful information; I would expect it to get gathered.</p> <p>2 Q. Looking at the detail about the ventilation system, if</p> <p>3 you can turn to the page before, at the bottom of the</p> <p>4 page it says, "Fixed installations". You can see "Dry</p> <p>5 Rising Main".</p> <p>6 "Other systems/building facilities: Smoke extraction</p> <p>7 systems. Negative pressure smoke ventilation system in</p> <p>8 lobby area of fire floor, panel located at main entrance</p> <p>9 to building."</p> <p>10 In your experience, would that be enough information</p> <p>11 to allow a watch manager who is first on the scene as</p> <p>12 incident commander to be able to operate successfully</p> <p>13 the smoke vent system in the building?</p> <p>14 A. That wouldn't give you enough information. It would</p> <p>15 trigger you to know there was a system and investigate</p> <p>16 how to use it. So if there was instructions at the</p> <p>17 panel, you'd use those.</p> <p>18 Elsewhere in the ORD there's areas for adding</p> <p>19 additional hazard information or en route</p> <p>20 considerations, those type of areas. Those could've</p> <p>21 been supplemented with more detailed instructions.</p> <p>22 The whole point of this section is that it's rapid</p> <p>23 information that you can gather in the seconds it takes</p> <p>24 to go from the fire station to the place where the</p> <p>25 incident is. It's key information. It's triggers.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 93</p>	<p>1 "Plan Name: Grenfell Tower.</p> <p>2 "...</p> <p>3 "Version: 1.</p> <p>4 "Date Effective From: 30/10/2009.</p> <p>5 "Date Documented: 30/10/2009."</p> <p>6 If that's what the mobile data terminal printed out</p> <p>7 to first responding crews on 14 June at Grenfell Tower,</p> <p>8 Mr Walton, would you say that that was sufficient to</p> <p>9 inform a watch manager as to what the plan was?</p> <p>10 A. I can't see what you're talking about on the screen.</p> <p>11 Q. Well --</p> <p>12 A. Just that panel that says what the document is?</p> <p>13 Q. Yes.</p> <p>14 A. That's not what would be printed out. If they press</p> <p>15 print for the ORD information, they would get all the</p> <p>16 ORD information. They would get the reams of</p> <p>17 information we have. They can either look at it on the</p> <p>18 MDT screen or they can print it off. If they look at it</p> <p>19 on the MDT screen as they're en route, they'll go to the</p> <p>20 en route considerations and on-arrival tactics probably,</p> <p>21 because that's the only thing they'll have time to look</p> <p>22 at.</p> <p>23 A bit later in the incident, more likely when the</p> <p>24 command unit's in attendance, this full document will be</p> <p>25 printed out, so all the plans, all of the instructions,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 95</p>
<p>1 Q. Just finishing off this point, under "En Route</p> <p>2 Considerations", since you mention it, if you look at</p> <p>3 the next page, just above the middle, fourth entry down:</p> <p>4 "Negative pressure ventilation system may have</p> <p>5 activated in lobby area of fire floor only, removing</p> <p>6 smoke from this area."</p> <p>7 Does that suggest to a watch manager en route that</p> <p>8 the ventilation system would already be operating in the</p> <p>9 lobby area of the fire floor, removing smoke from that</p> <p>10 area, at the point when the watch manager arrived?</p> <p>11 A. Yes, it would, and the significance of it is that they</p> <p>12 would consider the effects that the operation of that</p> <p>13 system would be having on the fire and any effect it may</p> <p>14 have on their firefighting tactics. Because it's</p> <p>15 designed to take smoke out of the lobby, but it could</p> <p>16 actually be affecting the way the fire is developing.</p> <p>17 So they need to use that trigger to investigate that.</p> <p>18 Q. From your visit, is that description accurate?</p> <p>19 A. I believe so, yes. I think that's a good enough summary</p> <p>20 for what we saw that day.</p> <p>21 Q. Before we leave this document, we can see that it was</p> <p>22 clearly never updated with instructions.</p> <p>23 Can I just ask you to look at page 3 under the</p> <p>24 rubric "Tactical Plan", "Operational Contingency Plan".</p> <p>25 Then we see:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 94</p>	<p>1 everything else that's on there would be available. But</p> <p>2 the initial incident commander has seconds to gather</p> <p>3 their information and start to intervene.</p> <p>4 Q. Would it be normal for the plans for a high-rise</p> <p>5 residential block to be available at the touch of</p> <p>6 a button from the mobile data terminal?</p> <p>7 A. Every one I approve, yes.</p> <p>8 Q. Do you know, to the best of your knowledge, whether the</p> <p>9 plans were available in respect of Grenfell Tower?</p> <p>10 A. I don't know.</p> <p>11 Q. Right.</p> <p>12 A. That comment earlier with Nick Davis, when he rejected</p> <p>13 it and asked for plans to be added, that is the standard</p> <p>14 way you'd respond if the plans aren't there. You'd</p> <p>15 knock it back and you'd send them back to go and get</p> <p>16 them.</p> <p>17 Q. You don't know what happened after that; is that right?</p> <p>18 A. It says image of plans added, so I assume they were</p> <p>19 added.</p> <p>20 Q. It says "Image of building added to plans". Can you</p> <p>21 help with that?</p> <p>22 A. I can't -- I don't know, I was just going on what you</p> <p>23 had shown me.</p> <p>24 Q. We may have to explore that with somebody else.</p> <p>25 Turning to the question of access, on your visit</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 96</p>

<p>1 in April 2016, were you shown how to access the building</p> <p>2 in an emergency?</p> <p>3 A. I can't remember that. I remember there was a security</p> <p>4 system. I've got a vague recollection of them talking</p> <p>5 about giving us one of the swabs, one of the entrance --</p> <p>6 Q. Fobs.</p> <p>7 A. Fobs. I remember telling them that that wouldn't be</p> <p>8 adequate because it wouldn't necessarily be these crews</p> <p>9 that attend. It wouldn't necessarily be this station</p> <p>10 that attended, so arrangements would be needed to allow</p> <p>11 access on site.</p> <p>12 Q. Can I ask you to look at the first page of the ORD</p> <p>13 document we have, LFB00003116, which we had up on the</p> <p>14 screen a moment ago.</p> <p>15 I just ask you to look at the second entry down.</p> <p>16 This is dated 15 February 2017 and I think by that stage</p> <p>17 you were no longer station manager at North Kensington.</p> <p>18 A. No, it's six months after.</p> <p>19 Q. The user was Dean Ricketts, and it says:</p> <p>20 "All building works now complete. Entry via front</p> <p>21 door. If drop key is used, this will release the</p> <p>22 internal door between entrance lobby and lift lobby.</p> <p>23 There is no 24 hour concierge but housing office is open</p> <p>24 during weekday business hours; along to the left of</p> <p>25 building opposite playground."</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 97</p>	<p>1 In this case, I would probably be looking at --</p> <p>2 probably on the en route considerations there may be</p> <p>3 something like that. But I'd check the various sections</p> <p>4 where that may have been captured and see how it's been</p> <p>5 captured.</p> <p>6 Q. Would this mean that if a fire happened in the middle of</p> <p>7 the night, a watch manager arriving wouldn't be able to</p> <p>8 contact a concierge or caretaker with ease to get them</p> <p>9 to come to the building very quickly?</p> <p>10 A. That's the way I'd interpret that comment from seeing it</p> <p>11 for the first time. And I would probably, if it was on</p> <p>12 my station, expect there to be something in en route</p> <p>13 considerations to that effect.</p> <p>14 Q. In addition to the smoke vent system, did you inspect</p> <p>15 anything else at Grenfell Tower during your visit</p> <p>16 in April 2016?</p> <p>17 A. I watched the smoke demonstration. We went to various</p> <p>18 parts of the building while it was happening. One of</p> <p>19 the things I asked for was a demonstration -- I asked</p> <p>20 them to run the fans on a lobby and I was going to try</p> <p>21 and open a flat door. I can't remember if it was on the</p> <p>22 lobby we were on or if we went to another lobby, but we</p> <p>23 went to an unoccupied flat.</p> <p>24 The system was run. I asked for it to be run at</p> <p>25 a high speed, and then I went in the flat and I opened</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 99</p>
<p>1 First of all, have you ever seen this entry before?</p> <p>2 A. No.</p> <p>3 Q. Can you remember whether, when you went to</p> <p>4 Grenfell Tower, the drop key was demonstrated to you?</p> <p>5 A. On the day of the smoke extraction demonstration?</p> <p>6 Q. Yes.</p> <p>7 A. No, I can't remember that.</p> <p>8 Q. Where it says:</p> <p>9 "There is no 24 hour concierge but housing office is</p> <p>10 open during weekday business hours; along to the left of</p> <p>11 building opposite playground."</p> <p>12 Is that sufficient, do you think, or would that be</p> <p>13 sufficient to enable a watch manager attending as</p> <p>14 incident commander to be able to get somebody out to</p> <p>15 operate the smoke vent?</p> <p>16 A. That's a comment that the officer that had done the</p> <p>17 7(2)(d) had added to the update so that the quality</p> <p>18 assuring station manager would have an idea what to</p> <p>19 check in the update. So I assume that that information</p> <p>20 is within the detail of the ORD.</p> <p>21 So as a station manager, you do scan the whole entry</p> <p>22 when there's an update, but you focus on the areas</p> <p>23 you've had an indication there's been a change. So if</p> <p>24 they've added the plans, you go and check the adequacy</p> <p>25 of the plans.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 98</p>	<p>1 the door and I watched the operation of the front door.</p> <p>2 So I checked you could open it --</p> <p>3 Q. I am going to stop you. I hope you don't think I'm</p> <p>4 being rude, but you told us that in your statement.</p> <p>5 My question --</p> <p>6 A. I inspected the fire door in the flat while I did that,</p> <p>7 that's where I was going.</p> <p>8 Q. Right.</p> <p>9 Did you ask to see the plans of the building at that</p> <p>10 visit?</p> <p>11 A. No.</p> <p>12 Q. Did you check to see whether Grenfell Tower had a PIP?</p> <p>13 A. I wasn't doing a 7(2)(d) visit. I was there on the</p> <p>14 smoke extraction demonstration so I wouldn't be asking</p> <p>15 the 7(2)(d) questions.</p> <p>16 Q. That I assume then would capture my next question, which</p> <p>17 was an information box: did you check to see whether</p> <p>18 there was an information box?</p> <p>19 A. It wasn't what I was there for.</p> <p>20 Q. Do you recall seeing an information box?</p> <p>21 A. I can't recall seeing one, no.</p> <p>22 Q. Do you recall seeing an intercom system whereby somebody</p> <p>23 visiting the tower could buzz a resident to be let in?</p> <p>24 A. Literally on you saying that, I think that's the way</p> <p>25 I accessed the building, because I got there after the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 100</p>

<p>1 7(2)(d) had started.</p> <p>2 Q. Right.</p> <p>3 A. And there were some of the other participants already</p> <p>4 there. So it literally is this second, but my</p> <p>5 recollection is that I had to press an intercom for</p> <p>6 somebody to come and open the door to let me in.</p> <p>7 Q. A resident, was that?</p> <p>8 A. Not a resident, one of the – I don't know how it works.</p> <p>9 And that's a this-second recollection, so it may not be</p> <p>10 accurate, but you saying that has made me think</p> <p>11 I pressed a buzzer and I was let into the building by</p> <p>12 the person conducting the demonstration.</p> <p>13 Q. Did you – I know this is a this-second recollection –</p> <p>14 know which buzzer to press?</p> <p>15 A. I can't remember that.</p> <p>16 Q. I want to turn to mobilisation and the information that</p> <p>17 you had yourself en route.</p> <p>18 When en route on the night, did you expect to have</p> <p>19 access to plans of Grenfell Tower via the mobile data</p> <p>20 terminal?</p> <p>21 A. At some point in the incident I would expect an incident</p> <p>22 commander to get those. Because of the nature of being</p> <p>23 a level 1 or a level 2 incident commander – level 1 are</p> <p>24 on the fire engines, level 2 are the first officer who</p> <p>25 comes in after – we don't normally get the luxury of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 101</p>	<p>1 I've never been in charge of an incident that I can</p> <p>2 remember where there's been FSG, but I've been at</p> <p>3 incidents in a different command role when they've</p> <p>4 occurred – my experience of FSGs is the caller</p> <p>5 genuinely believes they're trapped, and when the BA</p> <p>6 crews get to them, they assess the scene and they find</p> <p>7 that they're not trapped, it's just a bit of</p> <p>8 smoke-logging that to them is significant but to us is</p> <p>9 to be expected. They get reassured, they stay in their</p> <p>10 flat, we put the fire out, we ventilate the lobby and</p> <p>11 nobody else knows that there's been an issue in that</p> <p>12 flat, in that building.</p> <p>13 So that was my experience prior to then, so that is</p> <p>14 still in my thinking whilst I was en route. I genuinely</p> <p>15 believe these callers think they're trapped, but what</p> <p>16 I need to know is: are they trapped or do they think</p> <p>17 they're trapped? Because that will affect my tactics.</p> <p>18 So that was what I was thinking. But the more calls</p> <p>19 you get, the more likely it is that they are trapped,</p> <p>20 because everybody is under that feeling.</p> <p>21 Q. Hearing those calls increase in volume and intensity, as</p> <p>22 you described, did that suggest to you that</p> <p>23 compartmentation across multiple floors had been</p> <p>24 breached?</p> <p>25 A. It was a consideration, it was a possibility. If smoke</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 103</p>
<p>1 being able to go through the detail of the ORD. I would</p> <p>2 expect the initial crew en route to gather that</p> <p>3 information, probably just visually from looking at the</p> <p>4 screen, and have the key aspects of that information.</p> <p>5 If we're lucky, as I think was the case on the</p> <p>6 night, I think Mike Dowden had asked for the ORD to be</p> <p>7 printed, but I never saw a copy of it in the time I was</p> <p>8 in that role.</p> <p>9 Q. Let me ask my question in a slightly differ way.</p> <p>10 While en route, did you look for the plans of the</p> <p>11 building on a system that you had available to you?</p> <p>12 A. I don't have a system available.</p> <p>13 Q. Do you not have the MDT available to you?</p> <p>14 A. We have a car, we have a mobile phone and we have</p> <p>15 a pager.</p> <p>16 Q. En route you describe in various places, I think, in</p> <p>17 your materials many fire survival guidance calls</p> <p>18 happening.</p> <p>19 What did the increasing number of fire survival</p> <p>20 guidance calls that you could hear over the radio</p> <p>21 suggest to you about how the fire was progressing?</p> <p>22 A. I was getting really concerned en route. The nearer</p> <p>23 I got to the building and the more FSGs that came</p> <p>24 through, the more concerned I was about the potential.</p> <p>25 But my experience of FSGs prior to that night – and</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 102</p>	<p>1 had got on to the levels other than the fire level, it's</p> <p>2 an indication that the smoke is travelling, and the</p> <p>3 compartmentation is designed to contain smoke and fire.</p> <p>4 So it was a consideration. It was something I needed to</p> <p>5 confirm and clarify.</p> <p>6 Q. You say it was a consideration; did you think it?</p> <p>7 A. I thought it was a realistic possibility.</p> <p>8 Q. Can I then ask you to look at page 19 of your first</p> <p>9 statement, please, three-quarters of the way down the</p> <p>10 page. You say:</p> <p>11 "I was driving along looking and people were</p> <p>12 gesticulating 'it's over there'. I turned the corner</p> <p>13 and caught the first glimpse of the tower. It seemed</p> <p>14 like it was on fire 3/4 of its height on one face, or at</p> <p>15 least half of its height on one face there were visible</p> <p>16 flames. I have never seen anything like that before,</p> <p>17 ever."</p> <p>18 Can you just tell us which face you're talking about</p> <p>19 there?</p> <p>20 A. It would have been the east face. It was the initial</p> <p>21 face that was involved in fire.</p> <p>22 Q. I am just going to show you another part of your</p> <p>23 statement, Mr Walton, page 22, right at the top. You</p> <p>24 say:</p> <p>25 "I could see two lines of fire, I called them</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 104</p>

<p>1 ribbons of fire. There was definitely two separate</p> <p>2 vertical lines that were going from about the 4th floor</p> <p>3 up the building separately and were about 3/4 of the way</p> <p>4 up at that point."</p> <p>5 First question is: those two observations,</p> <p>6 three-quarters of the way up, and two vertical lines,</p> <p>7 were those two observations or descriptions at the same</p> <p>8 time, that is what you saw at the same moment, is it?</p> <p>9 A. My recollection is two lines of fire up the building.</p> <p>10 The one on the right was from where I could see, because</p> <p>11 I couldn't see the bottom of the tower, to the roof. My</p> <p>12 recollection is the one on the left was from where my</p> <p>13 vision was to about three-quarters of the way up.</p> <p>14 Q. Thank you, that's clear.</p> <p>15 Could you see whether the fire had actually</p> <p>16 penetrated the flats at that point?</p> <p>17 A. No.</p> <p>18 Q. You say on page 21 of your statement, if you could just</p> <p>19 look at that, three-quarters of the way down the page,</p> <p>20 you say:</p> <p>21 "As I looked at the building and saw that at least</p> <p>22 half of it on one side had visible flames and I thought,</p> <p>23 I know what's happening here, it's got balconies,</p> <p>24 they've got a load of crap on the balconies, there has</p> <p>25 been a fire in the flat and its gone on the balcony and</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 105</p>	<p>1 A. Not evacuation. My thought was that we needed to get</p> <p>2 fire crews to confirm that we were keeping the fire out</p> <p>3 of the building. That was my thought process.</p> <p>4 Q. We'll come back to that probably after the break.</p> <p>5 Before we do, can I then turn on to the next</p> <p>6 subject, which is your arrival at the scene.</p> <p>7 The first thing, I think, is the command unit.</p> <p>8 We don't have a status 3 time for you in our</p> <p>9 records. Are you able, standing there now, to tell us</p> <p>10 even roughly what sort of time you arrived?</p> <p>11 A. I can refer to the time stamps that have been used by</p> <p>12 LFB in the operational response. I've looked at that</p> <p>13 document. They estimated my arrival time as 01.40.</p> <p>14 Now, I assume that was because of a status 3 being sent.</p> <p>15 I did send a status 3.</p> <p>16 I arrived at the incident. I could hear the FSG</p> <p>17 traffic. I didn't want to block the radio traffic by</p> <p>18 booking in attendance with my radio. So I attempted</p> <p>19 three or four times to book in attendance by mobile</p> <p>20 phone and, understandably, it just rang out because it</p> <p>21 wasn't a priority to the control room.</p> <p>22 So eventually I was forced to go for going over the</p> <p>23 Airwave radio, and it took two attempts of calling up</p> <p>24 control before I was answered, but I was answered and</p> <p>25 I did book status 3. I don't know why it's not recorded</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 107</p>
<p>1 then it has gone up the balconies. These are balconies</p> <p>2 on fire, that's not a problem and I was literally</p> <p>3 thinking he's over resourced this, he's over reacted</p> <p>4 here."</p> <p>5 Why did you assume that the fire was jumping from</p> <p>6 items stored on balconies?</p> <p>7 A. Two reasons. I had a genuine belief from my background</p> <p>8 that a fire wouldn't spread up the fabric of a building</p> <p>9 in that way, and I had had a case study at one of the</p> <p>10 informal training sessions that we do as officers from</p> <p>11 an officer who had attended a fire earlier, I can't tell</p> <p>12 you the location, where that was in effect what had</p> <p>13 happened: fire had gone up the outside of a building on</p> <p>14 the balconies, it looked really spectacular, it got</p> <p>15 resourced as though it was a very major fire, and yet it</p> <p>16 was dealt with fairly easily because the fire was fought</p> <p>17 in a way that kept it on the balconies. It never</p> <p>18 entered the building, it never breached any</p> <p>19 compartmentation.</p> <p>20 Q. Even when you thought that it was balconies, did any</p> <p>21 thought cross your mind regarding the safety of the</p> <p>22 residents in flats facing the fire on the east face?</p> <p>23 A. 100 per cent, yes.</p> <p>24 Q. Did you think about the need for any kind of evacuation</p> <p>25 of those residents?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 106</p>	<p>1 in the log.</p> <p>2 Q. Do you think you heard pumps 25 over the radio at any</p> <p>3 stage?</p> <p>4 A. I hadn't got a recollection of that at the time. When</p> <p>5 I approached Mike Dowden and did a handover, part of the</p> <p>6 handover was I said, "You've got 15 pumps" and he went,</p> <p>7 "No, it's 25".</p> <p>8 Now, as you arrive at an incident, you move out of</p> <p>9 your vehicle, you're in normal day dress, you open the</p> <p>10 boot of the car, your fire kit's in the boot and you get</p> <p>11 rigged in fire kit. While I was doing that, I was</p> <p>12 trying to phone control and then I went to using the</p> <p>13 radio to book in status 3 with control.</p> <p>14 While that's happening, I'm looking at the visual</p> <p>15 situation, I'm listening to what's going on, I'm</p> <p>16 smelling the fire. And your focus moves. So my focus</p> <p>17 wasn't on the radio; my focus was on the building.</p> <p>18 So I've got no recollection of the make pumps 20 or</p> <p>19 the make pumps 25. My guess is it was around that time,</p> <p>20 which again hopefully will give some sort of indication</p> <p>21 of when I attended.</p> <p>22 Q. Let me try and get at it in a different way. I think</p> <p>23 you told us in your statement you left at 01.15.</p> <p>24 A. Yes, when the make pumps six came over, I was ready for</p> <p>25 that because I was monitoring and I was dressed and</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 108</p>

<p>1 I knew which way I was going to go and everything else</p> <p>2 we would normally do, so I started to self-mobilise,</p> <p>3 trying to phone control to tell them I was status 2.</p> <p>4 Then there's an informative message which came over,</p> <p>5 so I stopped, got my notepad out, recorded the detail of</p> <p>6 the informative message to make sure I had a good</p> <p>7 understanding of what I was going to and then continued.</p> <p>8 So I would say at 01.15 is when I was leaving the</p> <p>9 top floor of Fulham fire station.</p> <p>10 Q. The question is: how long do you think or remember it</p> <p>11 took you to get from Fulham fire station to the incident</p> <p>12 ground?</p> <p>13 A. I didn't look at any clocks, but as you've got if you</p> <p>14 refer to my statement, I had a route that I knew I was</p> <p>15 going to take. When I was almost at the tower, that</p> <p>16 route was completely blocked by roadworks, there was</p> <p>17 a gas main or something like that being put in, and the</p> <p>18 whole width of the road was blocked and there were</p> <p>19 bollards on the pavements and I had no way of going</p> <p>20 around that. So I had to do a U-turn. I thought</p> <p>21 I would turn a left, left again, parallel run the</p> <p>22 original road, get back onto my original route and then</p> <p>23 get to where I was going. When I turned that left, it</p> <p>24 went into the really complex street pattern of the</p> <p>25 estate that I'm not familiar with.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 109</p>	<p>1 in and went to the tower.</p> <p>2 MR MILLETT: Okay. That may be a convenient place for</p> <p>3 a break, Mr Chairman.</p> <p>4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.</p> <p>5 Well, we'll have a break now, Mr Walton, so you and</p> <p>6 the rest of us can have some lunch. Please don't talk</p> <p>7 to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the</p> <p>8 room, and we'll resume at 2 o'clock, please.</p> <p>9 THE WITNESS: Thank you.</p> <p>10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? If you would like to go</p> <p>11 with the usher.</p> <p>12 2 o'clock, then, please. Thank you.</p> <p>13 (1.00 pm)</p> <p>14 (The short adjournment)</p> <p>15 (2.00 pm)</p> <p>16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Now, Mr Walton, ready to carry on?</p> <p>17 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.</p> <p>18 MR MILLETT: Mr Walton, thank you for coming back to us.</p> <p>19 Can I go back to the ORD document that we looked at</p> <p>20 before the lunch break, which is LFB00003116, which is</p> <p>21 also at tab 13 of our bundle. I would like you to go to</p> <p>22 page 7 in that, please.</p> <p>23 This is what you find under "Plans and Images".</p> <p>24 It's an aerial photograph of the tower itself and</p> <p>25 a small part of the surrounding area.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 111</p>
<p>1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So how long did it take you?</p> <p>2 A. So in answer, I believe it took me 20 minutes to get</p> <p>3 from Fulham to the location.</p> <p>4 MR MILLETT: Thank you.</p> <p>5 You attended the command unit. Do you remember</p> <p>6 which number it was?</p> <p>7 A. I didn't remember it at the time, but I now know it was</p> <p>8 Fulham, which is CU8.</p> <p>9 Q. How many command unit officers were on there, do you</p> <p>10 remember?</p> <p>11 A. I only remember seeing one command unit officer.</p> <p>12 Q. Do you recall what he or she was doing?</p> <p>13 A. They were at the whiteboard. They seemed to be sorting</p> <p>14 information. I think they were filling in documents.</p> <p>15 I basically, you know, gave them my board, which is how</p> <p>16 we identify who is in attendance, and asked them for</p> <p>17 some information about who was in charge.</p> <p>18 Q. What were you told in answer to that question?</p> <p>19 A. Right, I asked, "Who is in charge?" They said, "I think</p> <p>20 it's still Mick Dowden." I said, "I've heard a Sierra</p> <p>21 call sign, I've heard other station managers book in,</p> <p>22 haven't you seen any other station managers?" They</p> <p>23 said, "You're the first station manager we've seen."</p> <p>24 And I went, "Right, I'm booked in", and I threw my board</p> <p>25 in because I was on the pavement still. Threw my board</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 110</p>	<p>1 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>2 Q. Is that what you would normally expect to find on this</p> <p>3 document in terms of detail, plans and images?</p> <p>4 A. It's not unusual to have a site image so that you could</p> <p>5 consider that when planning where aerial appliances,</p> <p>6 pumps, et cetera, might be positioned.</p> <p>7 However, I wouldn't expect that to be the only image</p> <p>8 that was there. I would expect there to be some detail</p> <p>9 of the floor plans.</p> <p>10 Q. Would an incident commander on his way to an incident</p> <p>11 want rather more than an aerial shot of the premises</p> <p>12 that you see there?</p> <p>13 A. To be honest, in that circumstance, that's probably the</p> <p>14 most useful image en route because you can look at where</p> <p>15 you're going to consider your initial appliance</p> <p>16 positioning, if it's somewhere you're not familiar with</p> <p>17 completely.</p> <p>18 But once you're dealing with an incident, I would</p> <p>19 say that site plans, as in a floor plan, would be more</p> <p>20 useful.</p> <p>21 Q. I was going to say, surely even the most general of</p> <p>22 floor plans would be more useful than an aerial shot</p> <p>23 like that to an incident commander en route.</p> <p>24 A. Once you're committing crews, you would like to know</p> <p>25 what you're committing them into, yes.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 112</p>

<p>1 Q. I'm going to press you a bit. Surely an incident 2 commander en route to an incident at a tower block would 3 want rather more by way of plans, detailed plans, than 4 an aerial shot like that, such as detailed plans of 5 where the hydrants were, detailed plans of where the dry 6 rising main outlets were, detailed plans of where the 7 smoke vent systems were, matters of that nature.</p> <p>8 A. If I received that as an ORD entry, I would send it back 9 and ask for more detailed plans to be put on the system.</p> <p>10 Q. Can I ask you to be shown, please, IWS00000169, which is 11 an e-mail -- no.</p> <p>12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: No. Not that.</p> <p>13 MR MILLETT: Not that.</p> <p>14 We'll come to it later. I don't want to spend time 15 looking for a document on my feet.</p> <p>16 Can I then ask you to turn to page 21 of your 17 statement, please.</p> <p>18 At page 21, three-quarters of the way down the page, 19 you say you looked at the building and you saw that at 20 least half of it on one side had visible flames:</p> <p>21 "... and I thought, I know what's happening here, 22 it's got balconies, they've got a load of crap on the 23 balconies ..."</p> <p>24 We've seen that before?</p> <p>25 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 113</p>	<p>1 all the way to the top."</p> <p>2 That was his vantage point and his line of sight.</p> <p>3 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>4 Q. If he could see the flats were on fire, could you not 5 also see that the flats were on fire?</p> <p>6 A. I didn't see any flats on fire from outside of the 7 building.</p> <p>8 Q. Did you see at that point an aerial in the process of 9 getting into position?</p> <p>10 A. As I was speaking to Mike Dowden as part of our handover 11 process, there was a turntable ladder positioned at the 12 south-east corner of the building, slightly on an angle, 13 and it was being raised off the bed and trained towards 14 the building. As we were talking, a firefighting 15 monitor came into operation, so it started to put water 16 onto the side of the building.</p> <p>17 Q. How high up did that turntable ladder reach in terms of 18 the reach of the water jet?</p> <p>19 A. My recollection is they went to maximum elevation, which 20 from my knowledge would be about 10 floors, and they 21 played water against the columns of fire as it was 22 elevated, and then they swept back down from the maximum 23 height they could reach, and as the monitor jet hit the 24 flame, it seemed to have an effect on it and put it out, 25 and then as it moved away, it came back.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 115</p>
<p>1 Q. I want to ask you about the visible flames very 2 specifically.</p> <p>3 My question is: at that point you were running, as 4 you say, down the road; which elevation of the building 5 were you looking at?</p> <p>6 A. As it became determined later it was the east face. It 7 was the original face that was on fire.</p> <p>8 Q. Did you see where the fire had penetrated into flats at 9 that point?</p> <p>10 A. I didn't believe that the fire had got back into the 11 building.</p> <p>12 Q. My question is: did you see --</p> <p>13 A. I didn't see any indication that the fire had got back 14 into the building.</p> <p>15 Q. A watch manager called Norman Harrison attended this 16 incident. I don't know if you know Norman Harrison.</p> <p>17 A. I don't.</p> <p>18 Q. He gave evidence yesterday. He arrived at 01.50 and 19 reached the base of the tower shortly after that. His 20 evidence in his statement is -- I'll put it to you -- he 21 said:</p> <p>22 "As we got there I noticed the tower itself from the 23 initial side that I had looked at from behind the school 24 I could now see that it wasn't just the cladding the 25 fire was coming from inside the flats from the 4th floor</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 114</p>	<p>1 So the area where the water was hitting seemed to be 2 being extinguished, but as soon as the water wasn't 3 being played on that area, it reignited.</p> <p>4 Q. You saw that yourself?</p> <p>5 A. I've got a recollection.</p> <p>6 Q. What did you think was burning when you saw that 7 happened?</p> <p>8 A. I did not have a clue what was burning. As I said 9 earlier, I had a belief that cladding would not be able 10 to be on the side of a building that burnt. So it 11 looked like it was the cladding, but I didn't know what 12 it was that was actually burning. I just didn't know.</p> <p>13 Q. You say that you believed -- as you just told us -- that 14 the cladding wouldn't be on the side of the building.</p> <p>15 Just to go back to that, was your belief as at the 16 night of the Grenfell Tower fire, that cladding wasn't 17 allowed on the side of buildings or --</p> <p>18 A. No, I believed you could clad a building, but I didn't 19 believe you could clad it in flammable material.</p> <p>20 Q. Do we take it from that that your impression or opinion, 21 thought, was that combustible cladding was not 22 permitted?</p> <p>23 A. Yes.</p> <p>24 Q. Even limited combustibility cladding, not permitted?</p> <p>25 A. That was my belief.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 116</p>

<p>1 Q. Where did you get that belief from?</p> <p>2 A. I'd spent time as a fire safety inspecting officer. I'd</p> <p>3 had to look at regulation as part of that process.</p> <p>4 I knew that -- again, this is looking back, but my</p> <p>5 belief was that flammable cladding was not allowed on</p> <p>6 the side of a building over a certain height. It could</p> <p>7 be allowed on lower level buildings because obviously it</p> <p>8 wouldn't have as much potential of an effect, but once</p> <p>9 it got over a certain height -- and I couldn't tell you</p> <p>10 what level that was, but it would be any high-rise</p> <p>11 building -- it wasn't allowed to be applied in that way.</p> <p>12 That was my belief, my understanding.</p> <p>13 Q. Have you ever had any training on Approved Document B?</p> <p>14 A. I have been trained as a fire safety inspecting officer</p> <p>15 at Moreton-in-Marsh, the National Fire Service College.</p> <p>16 I completed modules A, B and C and FSAOD8. What that</p> <p>17 means is I was trained in applying fire safety to</p> <p>18 buildings of public assembly through to residential</p> <p>19 accommodation, and I had had an introduction into</p> <p>20 understanding fire engineered solutions in buildings.</p> <p>21 Q. My question, I'll repeat it: did you have any training</p> <p>22 on Approved Document B?</p> <p>23 A. On the majority of those courses, Approved Document B</p> <p>24 was referred to, and I have had training on referring to</p> <p>25 Approved Document B and applying it to building plans,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 117</p>	<p>1 what our options were. As I've stated earlier, my focus</p> <p>2 would've been on getting crews to the inside of the</p> <p>3 building and preventing the fire getting back in, ie not</p> <p>4 fighting the external fire but trying to stop its</p> <p>5 effects.</p> <p>6 Mike mentioned that he had tasked a fire rescue unit</p> <p>7 crew to go to the roof of the tower and investigate if</p> <p>8 we could improvise any jets from above down the face of</p> <p>9 the building between the cladding and the building to</p> <p>10 try and extinguish that fire. And that is completely</p> <p>11 outside of anything any of us had ever considered</p> <p>12 before.</p> <p>13 Q. So is the answer to my question as to whether you</p> <p>14 thought you were going to be able to fight the fire from</p> <p>15 the exterior only by this roof method that Mike Dowden</p> <p>16 came up with?</p> <p>17 A. We had nothing in our toolbox to fight that fire. We</p> <p>18 were improvising.</p> <p>19 Q. Let's go to your taking over from Mike Dowden.</p> <p>20 When you saw Mike Dowden wearing the incident</p> <p>21 tabard, did you think he was still in charge?</p> <p>22 A. The tabard indicated that. The first question on my</p> <p>23 approach was, "Are you still in charge?" The reason</p> <p>24 I asked that was sometimes an incident commander is</p> <p>25 relieved of command and forgets to take their tabard</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 119</p>
<p>1 et cetera.</p> <p>2 Q. Can you give a date when you were trained or last</p> <p>3 trained on Approved Document B prior to the</p> <p>4 Grenfell Tower fire?</p> <p>5 A. Probably about 2004/2005 when I was doing those courses.</p> <p>6 Q. Is it right, then, that as at the night of the fire,</p> <p>7 when you saw it alight, your belief that it couldn't be</p> <p>8 combustible cladding was based on your training on</p> <p>9 Approved Document B which went back to 2004/2005?</p> <p>10 A. Yes.</p> <p>11 Q. Not any more recent, up-to-date versions of Approved</p> <p>12 Document B?</p> <p>13 A. No.</p> <p>14 Q. Just going back to the question of a turntable ladder,</p> <p>15 did you know that it couldn't reach the fire or a fire</p> <p>16 at the top of this building?</p> <p>17 A. I have been a turntable ladder operator, I've also been</p> <p>18 an ALP operator in my career and I was aware of the</p> <p>19 capabilities of the appliance. I knew that it was</p> <p>20 a 30-metre reach and that, in effect, the 10th floor was</p> <p>21 probably about the effective range of that appliance.</p> <p>22 Q. Did you have any thoughts when you saw that as to how</p> <p>23 the LFB was going to fight the fire externally above the</p> <p>24 reach of the turntable ladder?</p> <p>25 A. As part of the handover with Mike Dowden, we considered</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 118</p>	<p>1 off, and I knew there were other station managers, or</p> <p>2 another station manager, on the incident ground because</p> <p>3 I'd heard the call sign, and I was just confirming that</p> <p>4 he hadn't been spoken to by that officer.</p> <p>5 Q. What was your initial impression as to how Mike Dowden</p> <p>6 was coping as incident commander?</p> <p>7 A. He was agitated, but he was in control. As</p> <p>8 I approached, he was in what I wouldn't have said was</p> <p>9 the most ideal command position and I was thinking I'm</p> <p>10 going to have to pull you back to a position where</p> <p>11 you've got a better overview. But as I was walking up,</p> <p>12 he did that. So he was tasking individuals at the</p> <p>13 tower, where that tasking would be really effective, and</p> <p>14 then he brought himself away from that mêlée of people</p> <p>15 to where he could in effect review what he'd just</p> <p>16 initiated, and I joined him in that position.</p> <p>17 But what he was doing, which made me think he was</p> <p>18 agitated, was he continually changed that position. He</p> <p>19 kept moving between points. So I was walking with him</p> <p>20 as we were doing the handover, and I eventually made him</p> <p>21 stand still.</p> <p>22 Q. Right.</p> <p>23 A. That was when we were on the grass mound at the side of</p> <p>24 the tower.</p> <p>25 Q. To the east of the tower?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 120</p>

<p>1 A. Yes.</p> <p>2 Q. We can go to the detail of the policy if you'd find it</p> <p>3 helpful, but would you agree with me that the principal</p> <p>4 obligation of an officer taking incident command is to</p> <p>5 be given all relevant information by the incident</p> <p>6 commander who is being relieved?</p> <p>7 A. Yes, we have to achieve an effective briefing of the</p> <p>8 officer coming on.</p> <p>9 Q. All relevant information?</p> <p>10 A. Yes.</p> <p>11 Q. Would you also agree that the incoming incident</p> <p>12 commander should also be made fully aware of all the</p> <p>13 identified hazards on the fire ground and those people</p> <p>14 who are at risk from those hazards?</p> <p>15 A. That's part of our process, yes.</p> <p>16 Q. Let's look and see what happened.</p> <p>17 If you go to page 23 of your statement, you say just</p> <p>18 above halfway down at the last paragraph break there:</p> <p>19 "I said 'I will be taking this off you so I want a</p> <p>20 really quick and dirty handover'."</p> <p>21 Did you say that?</p> <p>22 A. Yes, almost to the word, and I think it then followed</p> <p>23 with, "I don't want you to go anywhere else, I'm going</p> <p>24 to keep you with me while we finish the handover."</p> <p>25 Q. Right. And you say:</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 121</p>	<p>1 Did you go into any further detail and tell him that</p> <p>2 those FSGs involved smoke or fire entry from higher</p> <p>3 floors?</p> <p>4 A. No. Prior to that, I'd asked Mike, "Are you still in</p> <p>5 charge?" He said yes. I said, "Haven't you seen</p> <p>6 another station manager? I know there's other station</p> <p>7 managers here." He said, "I have, but that station</p> <p>8 manager had a quick overview from me and they took the</p> <p>9 FSGs."</p> <p>10 So I knew there was a station manager who was</p> <p>11 dealing with the FSG information, so it would've wasted</p> <p>12 time me going over that information, because Mike didn't</p> <p>13 have it, it was with somebody else.</p> <p>14 So my process was to take over from Mike Dowden, and</p> <p>15 then I would find the station manager who was conducting</p> <p>16 FSGs, and I would do a similar information-gathering</p> <p>17 exchange with that officer.</p> <p>18 Q. Did you ask Mike Dowden what the conditions were like</p> <p>19 inside the building?</p> <p>20 A. It was part of my questioning. I believe the way</p> <p>21 I phrased it was -- as I think I used the phrase before</p> <p>22 today -- "I want to know: are the FSGs trapped or do</p> <p>23 they think they're trapped?" What that means is I want</p> <p>24 BA crews to have gone to the locations and made</p> <p>25 an assessment of the conditions. Because if it is just</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 123</p>
<p>1 "He started to talk so I said 'This is what I know'</p> <p>2 and I told him what I had heard over the radio, what I</p> <p>3 had seen and I told him a lot of information and then I</p> <p>4 asked 'what else do I need to know' and he started</p> <p>5 talking."</p> <p>6 Why was it that way round? Why did you start</p> <p>7 telling him what you knew rather than waiting for him to</p> <p>8 tell you what he knew?</p> <p>9 A. Normally, and I mean normally, that is something you'd</p> <p>10 do, you'd deliberately let the officer in charge speak</p> <p>11 and you let them frame their overview and then you ask</p> <p>12 clarifying questions to get any additional information</p> <p>13 that they haven't already covered. I could see what</p> <p>14 this looked like it was; I needed to get to the point of</p> <p>15 knowing what it was and what we were doing.</p> <p>16 So to speed that process up, I thought it was</p> <p>17 quicker for me to tell him what I had already gathered</p> <p>18 and for him to add to that, rather than for me to</p> <p>19 probably hear 50 per cent or 80 per cent that I already</p> <p>20 knew to get to the 20 per cent I needed.</p> <p>21 Q. Right.</p> <p>22 You say a little bit lower down you can't remember</p> <p>23 the detail:</p> <p>24 "We spoke about life I said 'I know you've got</p> <p>25 multiple FSGs ..."</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 122</p>	<p>1 that there's smoke that isn't normal to a member of the</p> <p>2 public and it's not actually trapping them, the crew</p> <p>3 would give reassurance and we would deal with it after</p> <p>4 we'd put the fire out. If it was that the conditions</p> <p>5 that they found meant they made that call that this is</p> <p>6 untenable, that's when they're trapped, and that's where</p> <p>7 we would've then directed our operations to the rescue.</p> <p>8 So asking are they trapped or do they think they're</p> <p>9 trapped is, in effect, what conditions are those people</p> <p>10 in?</p> <p>11 Q. Given what you had heard over the radio en route to the</p> <p>12 tower, did you not think, given the volume of calls</p> <p>13 coming from around the tower and particularly on high</p> <p>14 floors, that it was more likely than not that they</p> <p>15 actually were trapped rather than simply thinking they</p> <p>16 were trapped?</p> <p>17 A. Yes. The fact that everybody would need rescue was in</p> <p>18 my mind, in my thinking. The fact that nobody could</p> <p>19 escape was in my thinking.</p> <p>20 Q. Yes. So given that everybody would need rescue, as you</p> <p>21 just said, having heard what you heard, was it not then</p> <p>22 necessary as a next step to ascertain from Mike Dowden</p> <p>23 what the smoke and heat and fire conditions were like in</p> <p>24 the lobbies and in the stair?</p> <p>25 A. That's what I'd asked for.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 124</p>

<p>1 Q. Right.</p> <p>2 A. Are they trapped or do they think they're trapped?</p> <p>3 Q. That's not quite the same question.</p> <p>4 A. It is in our parlance. We understand that.</p> <p>5 Q. Do you?</p> <p>6 A. If an officer asks you, "I want BA to the FSGs, I want</p> <p>7 to know if they're trapped or they think they're</p> <p>8 trapped" -- and the next part of the sentence is, "If</p> <p>9 they are trapped, what do we need to get them out?"</p> <p>10 That is my standard phrase that I -- as I've said, I've</p> <p>11 not dealt with an FSG incident before, but I've dealt</p> <p>12 with them on every tactical exercise I've ever had</p> <p>13 and I was drawing on those exercises. I believe every</p> <p>14 exercise I've ever had has involved high-rise and FSG,</p> <p>15 and it is my normal process, and it is: what do we need</p> <p>16 to get them out if they're trapped?</p> <p>17 Q. Right, okay.</p> <p>18 Just building on that, if I can then just take you</p> <p>19 to your contemporaneous notes at page 3, and we're</p> <p>20 looking at MET00005714, which is the A4 manuscript</p> <p>21 notes.</p> <p>22 I'd like you to go, please, to page 3 of that, and</p> <p>23 a halfway down you say -- this is part of the</p> <p>24 discussion:</p> <p>25 "... I said I know you have multiple F.S.G (fire</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 125</p>	<p>1 I wasn't listening to the detail of the FSGs, there was</p> <p>2 that many of them, I just -- I started off trying to</p> <p>3 remember detail. I then knew I wouldn't be able to</p> <p>4 retain the amount of information I was receiving, so</p> <p>5 I just concentrated on knowing there was a lot of FSGs.</p> <p>6 So none of the information I'd heard on the radio</p> <p>7 indicated that fire was in the flats with the</p> <p>8 individuals. I hadn't heard that said. All I'd heard</p> <p>9 was people were saying they were trapped by smoke, in</p> <p>10 effect.</p> <p>11 So the first question was: are they trapped by</p> <p>12 smoke? The second question was: were they threatened by</p> <p>13 fire? That's what that's asking.</p> <p>14 Because when I know that -- if I know where people</p> <p>15 are trapped by smoke and if I know where people are</p> <p>16 threatened by fire, that's going to determine how</p> <p>17 I prioritise the response. Am I going to prioritise</p> <p>18 fighting the fire and stopping it reaching those people?</p> <p>19 Or am I going to -- because if the fire's not getting</p> <p>20 back in, am I going to prioritise stopping it getting</p> <p>21 back in and getting those people out that are trapped by</p> <p>22 smoke?</p> <p>23 Q. What about smoke in the flats? Given the content or at</p> <p>24 least the volume of FSG calls from people calling for</p> <p>25 fire survival guidance, did it not occur to you that</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 127</p>
<p>1 survival guidance calls) taking place, what other life</p> <p>2 risk are you aware of? He said [Mike Dowden] there</p> <p>3 could be the whole block."</p> <p>4 Pausing there, I'm going to come on to the rest of</p> <p>5 that in a minute, but when he said there could be the</p> <p>6 whole block, did you then have thoughts in your own head</p> <p>7 about whether a full or partial evacuation plan needed</p> <p>8 to be looked at?</p> <p>9 A. In my head, if they are exposed in that way, evacuation</p> <p>10 is not possible. For them to be trapped, escape isn't</p> <p>11 possible. They would die if they came out of their</p> <p>12 flats. We had to rescue them. That's where my thought</p> <p>13 process went.</p> <p>14 Q. Okay.</p> <p>15 You then go on to say you asked about whether the</p> <p>16 incident involved just an external fire or whether it</p> <p>17 was also breaching multiple floors. Do you see you say</p> <p>18 that?</p> <p>19 A. Yes, that's to try and, again --</p> <p>20 Q. Can I just ask my question. I wanted to show you what</p> <p>21 you say and then I'll ask my question.</p> <p>22 My question is: why did you need to ask him that</p> <p>23 question given the content of the FSG calls you had</p> <p>24 heard en route?</p> <p>25 A. Because I hadn't heard anything -- bearing in mind</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 126</p>	<p>1 many of them, at least, would be suffering the effects</p> <p>2 of smoke within their compartments, even though fire</p> <p>3 might not have come back in?</p> <p>4 A. They shouldn't have been. The principle of that</p> <p>5 building was that the fire and the effects of the fire</p> <p>6 would be contained in the original compartment.</p> <p>7 Obviously when we fight a fire with our procedures,</p> <p>8 we breach the fire door onto the staircase with our</p> <p>9 firefighting hose. So it could be that they've seen</p> <p>10 smoke on the staircase from that and they've assumed</p> <p>11 they're trapped.</p> <p>12 There was no indication that people were saying</p> <p>13 there was smoke and fire in their flats. So I had to</p> <p>14 determine: did they think they were trapped or were they</p> <p>15 trapped?</p> <p>16 Q. Did you ask Mike Dowden whether, to the best of his</p> <p>17 knowledge, there were calls coming in which indicated</p> <p>18 that there was smoke or fire in the flats?</p> <p>19 A. No. I knew an FSG officer was holding that detail and</p> <p>20 I intended to liaise with them afterwards.</p> <p>21 Q. Because you asked him what the life risk was and he said</p> <p>22 there could be the whole block.</p> <p>23 Did you assume at that point that he just meant that</p> <p>24 the fire was on the outside, people might or might not</p> <p>25 be trapped by smoke or fire in the exit route, but their</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 128</p>

<p>1 flats themselves were clean of smoke or heat or fire?</p> <p>2 A. That was part of my thinking, is that I hoped that the</p> <p>3 compartmentation had held up enough that people who were</p> <p>4 in their flats were in clean air, that maybe the lobbies</p> <p>5 were compromised because that's what the FSG were</p> <p>6 indicating, and that if we got on top of the fire, those</p> <p>7 people would be able to remain to the point that we</p> <p>8 either rescued them or cleared the smoke from the lobby</p> <p>9 so rescue wasn't required.</p> <p>10 Every flat that I've ever fought a fire in, my</p> <p>11 experience is that people in the immediate vicinity</p> <p>12 can't get out of their flat because there's smoke on the</p> <p>13 lobby or in the staircase because of our firefighting</p> <p>14 operations. But if they stay in their flat, we put the</p> <p>15 fire out, we clear the lobbies, we clear the staircases</p> <p>16 and there's no consequence.</p> <p>17 So I was expecting the building, hoping the</p> <p>18 building, was going to react in that way. And there had</p> <p>19 been smoke spread, because why else were we getting so</p> <p>20 many FSGs? But that the fire was the main reason for</p> <p>21 that smoke.</p> <p>22 I was maybe considering -- this is a maybe -- that</p> <p>23 it was getting back in through open windows and it was</p> <p>24 getting into areas that way. I didn't know how we could</p> <p>25 have smoke on so many different levels in one incident</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 129</p>	<p>1 at it if we need to -- you say:</p> <p>2 "... if it was getting back in [that's fire] we were</p> <p>3 in big trouble."</p> <p>4 A. Yes.</p> <p>5 Q. Would it be right to say that fire penetration from the</p> <p>6 exterior to the interior of flats was a game changer for</p> <p>7 you at that time?</p> <p>8 A. Yes.</p> <p>9 Q. Given that that was the case, and given the scale of</p> <p>10 what you could see in front of you, did you not think to</p> <p>11 explore the risks of that happening or whether that was</p> <p>12 happening with Mike Dowden?</p> <p>13 A. I had a good idea what the risks were if that fire was</p> <p>14 getting back in on multiple levels. I didn't need to</p> <p>15 explore it with Mike Dowden. I was taking charge.</p> <p>16 I would be the officer in charge of that incident as</p> <p>17 soon as we'd finished our brief handover.</p> <p>18 I had two main objectives that I wanted from</p> <p>19 Mike Dowden: were the people trapped or did they think</p> <p>20 they were trapped, ie what were the conditions they were</p> <p>21 experiencing, and is the fire getting back in? If</p> <p>22 either of those was a positive answer, if people were</p> <p>23 trapped or the fire was getting back in, I was dealing</p> <p>24 with a major incident and I was ready to declare that</p> <p>25 and take it there. That would've meant that it would've</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 131</p>
<p>1 so early. I just had no way of understanding that.</p> <p>2 Q. But if you were maybe considering, as you say, that</p> <p>3 smoke was getting in through open windows, that would</p> <p>4 surely indicate, wouldn't it, that apartments were</p> <p>5 affected by smoke and therefore the occupants were</p> <p>6 suffering the effects of smoke inside their flats?</p> <p>7 A. It's a consideration. As I'm standing there -- as</p> <p>8 a level 2 officer, without going into a long answer</p> <p>9 which obviously I'm trying to avoid, part of my job as</p> <p>10 a level 2 officer is to test the assumptions which have</p> <p>11 been made by the initial commander, because I've got the</p> <p>12 luxury of arriving a bit later, and there's possibly</p> <p>13 more information now than when they made their initial</p> <p>14 decisions. So I check what information they knew,</p> <p>15 I check what decisions they've made, I'd look for</p> <p>16 corroboration, and I'd try and make sure that any</p> <p>17 assumptions that have been made are valid, that the</p> <p>18 assumptions they've made at that time stand up to a bit</p> <p>19 more scrutiny.</p> <p>20 So although it's one of the things it could've been,</p> <p>21 it's one of the things I had to consider and I have to</p> <p>22 go through the whole range as I'm taking over in a very,</p> <p>23 very short space of time.</p> <p>24 Q. Sure.</p> <p>25 Later in your statement -- it's page 30, we can look</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 130</p>	<p>1 been a massive scale up, because as far as I was</p> <p>2 concerned, if either of those came back as</p> <p>3 an affirmative, everybody in that building needed</p> <p>4 rescue, and I would have to deal with that.</p> <p>5 Q. Yes. So in answer to your question, Mike said -- and</p> <p>6 this is on page 3 of your contemporaneous notes and I'll</p> <p>7 read it to you:</p> <p>8 "He said he had BA committed to try and determine</p> <p>9 this."</p> <p>10 That's your recollection of what he said.</p> <p>11 A. Yes.</p> <p>12 Q. Was it not essential to you at that moment, given that</p> <p>13 you didn't know trapped or not trapped, penetration or</p> <p>14 no penetration, instantaneously or as fast as you could</p> <p>15 to find out the answers to those questions, rather than</p> <p>16 just leaving it to BA wearers to determine it?</p> <p>17 A. Yes. Normally you would have radioed to the officer in</p> <p>18 charge of the bridgehead and probably conveyed that as</p> <p>19 you were doing the handover. The radios were</p> <p>20 ineffectual. There was that much traffic of different</p> <p>21 firefighters talking to each other, confirming that</p> <p>22 water was in, confirming that hoses were in place, that</p> <p>23 they'd made access to whatever -- there was that much</p> <p>24 traffic, you couldn't get in on the radios. You</p> <p>25 couldn't get a message through.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 132</p>

<p>1 So what I said to Mike Dowden was, "As soon as we 2 finish this briefing, I'm going to send you to the 3 bridgehead and I want that information." 4 So the first task I was going to give Mike Dowden, 5 the first task I did give Mike Dowden, once we'd done 6 the handover was go to the bridgehead and get me that 7 information, because we had to rely on physically people 8 moving from one location to another to get information 9 to transfer from one location to another. 10 Q. When you had that handover with Mike Dowden, how close 11 to the entrance of the tower were you standing? 12 A. We were on the grass mound at the east face of the 13 tower, probably about 15 metres, maybe 20 metres from 14 the back of the turntable ladder and the ALP was 15 positioning to our right as we were having the handover. 16 The aerial ladder platform was positioning to our right 17 as we had the handover. 18 Q. Did you have a clear view of the main entrance to the 19 tower? 20 A. I couldn't see the main entrance. My view of the front 21 face of the tower was over the turntable ladder, I could 22 see there was an appliance or maybe two appliances 23 parked in front of the tower, and I could see through 24 the side glazing the foyer and crews moving up the 25 staircase in there. I couldn't see the front door.</p> <p>Page 133</p>	<p>1 from. So I just saw members of the public leaving the 2 building, and because of what the fire looked like, and 3 I was trying to determine was it what it looked like, my 4 suspicion was that there's probably a lot of smoke 5 spread in this building, there's a good chance people 6 coming out will be affected by smoke. It was 7 an assumption. 8 Q. Did you think to act on that suspicion, go around the 9 front and talk to them about where the smoke was? 10 A. I've got officers on the fire ground that are doing 11 different jobs. I don't do every job on the incident 12 ground. 13 I was taking over command. I was in the process of 14 getting the command briefing. There were officers, 15 capable officers, at the front of the building. They're 16 not going to let somebody suffering smoke inhalation 17 walk past them, they're going to take action. 18 Q. But you say you had a suspicion; my question was really 19 whether you acted on that suspicion and if you didn't do 20 it yourself, did you ask somebody to talk to the 21 residents coming out and find out where the smoke was in 22 the building from them? 23 A. I would never have had the opportunity to, but no, 24 I didn't. 25 Q. Did Mike Dowden give you any kind of report as to</p> <p>Page 135</p>
<p>1 Q. But you could see into the stairs? 2 A. I could see into the atrium. 3 Q. Did you see any occupants of the tower coming down? 4 A. Yes, I've got recollection of seeing members of the 5 public walking out of the tower in the early stages. 6 Q. Did you see whether they were suffering from the effects 7 of smoke inhalation? 8 A. I couldn't see that from where I was. It would've been 9 my suspicion. I know that Mike informed me that the 10 original occupants of the flat had slight smoke 11 inhalation and it was part of my briefing to the LAS 12 later that that's where the occupants are, they've taken 13 in some smoke. 14 Q. What sort of numbers could you see in terms of occupants 15 evacuating? 16 A. It wasn't large numbers, it was probably ones and twos, 17 a few minutes or, you know, 30 seconds, a minute, then 18 maybe another one or two. 19 Q. You say you had a suspicion that they were suffering the 20 effects of smoke inhalation; would that not have told 21 you that compartmentation had been breached and that 22 smoke was getting right up the building? 23 A. No, it was a suspicion. I don't know where these people 24 have come from, I don't know if they've come from above 25 the fire, below the fire, I don't know where they're</p> <p>Page 134</p>	<p>1 anything the bridgehead had told him at that point about 2 internal fire or smoke spread? 3 A. No. The questions I asked Mike about BA operations, he 4 hadn't got any detail of. He said, "No, that's at the 5 bridgehead." So that was one of the reasons why I was 6 going to send him to the bridgehead, to get that 7 confirmation. 8 Q. Going back to page 23 of your statement, you say 9 a quarter of the way down that you were told -- I'm 10 summarising -- that Brett Loft had taken FSGs off 11 Mike Dowden, and you say: 12 "He said 'He's come but he took the FSGs off me' he 13 said he had given the first SM a quick overview of what 14 was happening and as a result of this he said he was 15 going to take on the FSGs. He pointed towards the tower 16 and said 'he is doing it from over there'. 17 Can you remember where he was pointing? 18 A. The general direction of the front of the building. 19 I didn't see Brett Loft -- 20 Q. You didn't see Brett Loft? 21 A. -- from where I was. 22 Q. Did you go and speak to Brett Loft? 23 A. Later on in the incident, yes. 24 Q. Was there any discussion between you and Mike Dowden 25 about the strategy and kit that you'd need safely to</p> <p>Page 136</p>

<p>1 evacuate residents, at least from the upper floors of</p> <p>2 the tower, in case it turned out they were trapped?</p> <p>3 A. No. Our procedure, our process, is to send BA to where</p> <p>4 the calls come from, and normally that's standard</p> <p>5 duration breathing apparatus, because that's what we</p> <p>6 carry on the front-line appliances, like every other</p> <p>7 service in the country. And to not put too fine a point</p> <p>8 on it, the technique is you find a casualty, you grab</p> <p>9 them, you drag them through the hazard area as fast as</p> <p>10 you can and you get them outside, because that's where</p> <p>11 they're going to get the medical treatment they need.</p> <p>12 That is the standard way of rescuing people.</p> <p>13 Q. Sorry, I am going to ask my question again.</p> <p>14 My question was: during this handover, was there any</p> <p>15 discussion between you and Mike Dowden about the</p> <p>16 strategy and the equipment that you'd need to be able</p> <p>17 safely to evacuate residents?</p> <p>18 A. Only in I want BA to every FSG, are they trapped or</p> <p>19 aren't they trapped? If they are trapped, what do we</p> <p>20 need to get them out? If it's a group of five</p> <p>21 people, I'd expect ten BA to be required to bring five</p> <p>22 people out, two for each person. So it would be a big</p> <p>23 team that would be sent. So that's the type of</p> <p>24 information that you expect the crews that make that</p> <p>25 initial contact to try and get back. Or if you get any</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 137</p>	<p>1 got BA to the FSGs. All of this information was held at</p> <p>2 the Bridgehead. I asked if he knew what was happening</p> <p>3 internally — making sure the fire wasn't getting back in</p> <p>4 and again he said that information was at the</p> <p>5 Bridgehead."</p> <p>6 So, my question is: all of those questions get</p> <p>7 answered in the way you've said there. My question</p> <p>8 is: is the information that you'd asked for from</p> <p>9 Mike Dowden information that you would expect him to</p> <p>10 give you as incident commander?</p> <p>11 A. At a smaller scale incident he would've had that</p> <p>12 information.</p> <p>13 What Mike had done was identify -- initially he</p> <p>14 dealt with a normal flat fire and they put the flat fire</p> <p>15 out, at make pumps six they extinguished the fire. It</p> <p>16 broke out of the window and got into the cladding.</p> <p>17 Once that happened, he was chasing the incident</p> <p>18 and -- what ... What he did -- and I am okay to carry</p> <p>19 on -- what he did as the initial incident commander was</p> <p>20 above and beyond anything that could've been expected of</p> <p>21 him.</p> <p>22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you like --</p> <p>23 A. I am going to compose myself for a second and I want to</p> <p>24 carry on.</p> <p>25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you want to sit down for</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 139</p>
<p>1 information prior to that, that's the sort of size of</p> <p>2 team you send to those types of locations.</p> <p>3 Q. Was there a discussion about whether you would need EDBA</p> <p>4 to be able to reach the upper parts of the tower?</p> <p>5 A. We didn't discuss it. It was in the back of my mind.</p> <p>6 But I needed to get a better understanding of what was</p> <p>7 in front of me to be able to take that further. I knew</p> <p>8 that FRU crews had been requested, I heard that on the</p> <p>9 way over, a make-up to two FRU units, so I knew there</p> <p>10 was some EDBA on site, but if we use EDBA, we need</p> <p>11 additional EDBA to act as emergency crew to be able to</p> <p>12 bring them out if they get into difficulty, because</p> <p>13 they've got that further reach.</p> <p>14 So if I was going to switch to using EDBA as</p> <p>15 a tactic, I would need to resource it correctly, so</p> <p>16 I would need to have an idea about the level of EDBA</p> <p>17 commitment I required.</p> <p>18 Q. If you could go to page 26 of your statement, please,</p> <p>19 and look a quarter of the way down, you say that the</p> <p>20 bridgehead had been established on the 2nd floor, and</p> <p>21 three lines down from that you say:</p> <p>22 "I asked if he knew how many BA were in there. He</p> <p>23 replied he didn't, they were doing that at the</p> <p>24 Bridgehead. I asked if he knew what they were doing and</p> <p>25 again he replied he didn't nor did he know if they had</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 138</p>	<p>1 a second, do.</p> <p>2 A. No.</p> <p>3 MR MILLETT: Take your time. There's no rush.</p> <p>4 (Pause)</p> <p>5 A. Okay.</p> <p>6 In my opinion, Mike had made a lot of assumptions</p> <p>7 that turned out to be correct about the nature of that</p> <p>8 fire, and he had resourced it to give us the option to</p> <p>9 try and save ...</p> <p>10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think we ought to have a couple of</p> <p>11 minutes' break.</p> <p>12 THE WITNESS: I'll take two minutes, please.</p> <p>13 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll break for 10 minutes. You go</p> <p>14 with the usher. Don't talk to anyone about the</p> <p>15 evidence. All right?</p> <p>16 Right, 2.50, please.</p> <p>17 (2.41 pm)</p> <p>18 (A short break)</p> <p>19 (2.50 pm)</p> <p>20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? Ready to go on,</p> <p>21 Mr Walton?</p> <p>22 THE WITNESS: Yes, I am, thank you for your consideration.</p> <p>23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That's all right.</p> <p>24 You might find it less troublesome if you just give</p> <p>25 short answers without so much explanation. I've noticed</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 140</p>

<p>1 sometimes it's giving the explanation that is causing</p> <p>2 you to have difficulties. Don't be frightened about</p> <p>3 just keeping it short.</p> <p>4 THE WITNESS: My only motivation in being here is to give</p> <p>5 the answers that are needed for the inquiry.</p> <p>6 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We understand that.</p> <p>7 THE WITNESS: I will take that advice.</p> <p>8 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, Mr Millett will tell you</p> <p>9 if he needs further information.</p> <p>10 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.</p> <p>11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right?</p> <p>12 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.</p> <p>13 MR MILLETT: My instructions as well.</p> <p>14 Mr Walton, during your handover from Mike Dowden,</p> <p>15 did you have any discussion with him about whether there</p> <p>16 was a single staircase for evacuation if and when it was</p> <p>17 needed?</p> <p>18 A. I asked what was the access/egress. He told me there</p> <p>19 was only one way in and out of the building and one</p> <p>20 staircase.</p> <p>21 Q. Did that affect the way you thought you would need to go</p> <p>22 about forming an evacuation plan were one needed?</p> <p>23 A. It affected my tactics. If a building has more than one</p> <p>24 staircase, you tend to designate one as a firefighting</p> <p>25 staircase for the reason that fire hose may breach</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 141</p>	<p>1 implications of that for how to go about fighting the</p> <p>2 fire?</p> <p>3 A. It would've been very brief.</p> <p>4 It was -- probably when I was saying "Is it on</p> <p>5 balconies?" Mike said, "There aren't any balconies."</p> <p>6 I then looked at the building again and I think he said,</p> <p>7 "I think it's in the cladding." That was literally it.</p> <p>8 Q. Is it right that the involvement of the cladding wasn't</p> <p>9 something that was obvious to you before that?</p> <p>10 A. As I say, I was on the misunderstanding or the belief</p> <p>11 that because it was two vertical lines, two columns, it</p> <p>12 was jumping balconies, as I approached. That really</p> <p>13 became apparent in the very early part of that handover</p> <p>14 because it was one of the first questions.</p> <p>15 Q. When Mike said to you he thought it was going up the</p> <p>16 cladding, as you told us and it's in your notes, that</p> <p>17 was the first time, was it, that you realised this</p> <p>18 wasn't balconies, it was the cladding that was involved</p> <p>19 in the fire?</p> <p>20 A. That's when that became clear to me, yes.</p> <p>21 Q. Did you then go on to discuss with Mike how you were</p> <p>22 going to tackle the fire given that it was in the</p> <p>23 cladding or the cladding was alright?</p> <p>24 A. Well, I could see the TL monitor, I could see there was</p> <p>25 a branch being trained, a jet from the ground floor</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 143</p>
<p>1 doors, et cetera, and have one as an evacuation</p> <p>2 staircase because then none of the hose will impede that</p> <p>3 evacuation.</p> <p>4 Q. Right, but here we have one staircase, so did the fact</p> <p>5 that there was a single staircase affect your strategy?</p> <p>6 A. So I didn't have those options. It meant that we had to</p> <p>7 use that staircase for firefighting and for any</p> <p>8 evacuation of rescues.</p> <p>9 Q. Did that fact affect your plans?</p> <p>10 A. It was a fact that we had to deal with.</p> <p>11 Q. How did you deal with it?</p> <p>12 A. We accepted the reality of the situation. There's</p> <p>13 nothing you can do. If you've got one staircase,</p> <p>14 there's nothing you can do about it.</p> <p>15 The aerial was there. It would always be a factor</p> <p>16 that you could perhaps go to if you needed to use the</p> <p>17 aerial for rescues if it was able to reach the</p> <p>18 particular window that was required.</p> <p>19 That's probably the only other option we've got, is</p> <p>20 to bring in an appliance, but that's only effective up</p> <p>21 to the 10th floor and only if you can get a pitch that</p> <p>22 gives you access to the windows that it would need to go</p> <p>23 to.</p> <p>24 Q. Did you have any discussion with Mike Dowden about the</p> <p>25 involvement of the cladding in the fire and the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 142</p>	<p>1 area, and that was around the time that Mike mentioned</p> <p>2 that he had tasked a FRU crew to go to the roof and see</p> <p>3 if they could get water being applied from above.</p> <p>4 Q. About the FRU crew, when he told you about that, what</p> <p>5 was your view about the viability of that operation?</p> <p>6 A. I called into question whether it was a safe enough</p> <p>7 operation, so I asked him what were the safe systems</p> <p>8 that were going to be put in place to allow a crew to be</p> <p>9 on the roof looking over the edge of a 22-storey</p> <p>10 building that's on fire.</p> <p>11 Q. What did he say?</p> <p>12 A. Basically he said it's the FRU crew that are going up --</p> <p>13 I said, "If they're going up there to do that, I want</p> <p>14 a restraint system. I want them anchored, lined on and</p> <p>15 restrained from going over the edge." He said, "It's</p> <p>16 a FRU crew, that's what I've asked them to do. They</p> <p>17 know what they're doing, they're a line crew." I went,</p> <p>18 "Okay" and I let that happen.</p> <p>19 Q. My question was: what was your view of the viability of</p> <p>20 that operation? In other words, was it going to work</p> <p>21 and either extinguish or at least in assist in</p> <p>22 extinguishing the exterior fire?</p> <p>23 A. I think one of the lines Mike used was "It's worth</p> <p>24 a go", and I think it was probably that wording, and it</p> <p>25 was worth a go, it was an option.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 144</p>

<p>1 Q. At page 26 of your witness statement, if I can just 2 quickly take you to that, at the very top of the page 3 you say: 4 "I was happy with the firefighting side of things. 5 I felt we were on top of that, it had been resourced up 6 and we had an attack on the initial fire, we had put 7 that out, we were now beginning to tackle the fire that 8 was spreading up the outside." 9 What led you to think that you were on top of the 10 fire spreading up the outside, if that's what you mean 11 there? 12 A. What I'll explain is that I meant I was happy we'd done 13 everything it was possible to do at that moment, and 14 I was directing operations to stop the fire getting back 15 into the building. 16 We were doing everything we could to tackle the 17 exterior fire and it was having no effect, so I wanted 18 our focus to be preventing it getting back in, and 19 that's the tasking that I was giving. 20 Q. Apart from the "worth a go" line crew going to the roof 21 that we've discussed, what was happening in terms of 22 exterior firefighting at the top of the tower that led 23 you to be happy, if this is what you mean, that you were 24 on top of firefighting? 25 A. I think I've explained I wasn't happy with the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 145</p>	<p>1 Q. So at that stage, during your handover with Mike, it was 2 becoming, you say, more and more the assumption that -- 3 I am trying to rephrase your evidence -- the building 4 had failed. 5 My question is really: during that discussion, did 6 you have a discussion with Mike Dowden specifically 7 about how you were going to get people out? 8 A. The only way we've got of getting people out is to grab 9 them and physically drag or carry them down the method 10 we've got of accessing them, which is that single 11 staircase. 12 Q. My question is: did you discuss that subject with 13 Mike Dowden during your handover? 14 A. There was nothing to discuss. It was the only option. 15 He would've known that. I would've been wasting time 16 discussing that with him. We send BA to where people 17 are at the point of greatest danger, so that's part of 18 the process, determining who is at most risk. That's 19 why those questions are asked. Send BA to those people, 20 grab them first, and then go down the list in an order 21 of priority in that way. But your only option is grab 22 them, drag them out the building, and get them to the 23 medical treatment they need. 24 Q. Correct me, Mr Walton, if I'm wrong or putting words in 25 your mouth, but are we to take it from that that by the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 147</p>
<p>1 situation, I wasn't happy we were being effective; I was 2 happy we were doing anything we could do with what we'd 3 got. It was impossible to fight the fire on the 4 exterior of the building on the upper floors, and what 5 we could reach, the water was having no effect. 6 Q. So when you say, "I was happy with the firefighting side 7 of things" -- 8 A. I was happy there was nothing else we could do at that 9 time and we needed to move -- change tack and we had to 10 try and stop the fire getting in. 11 Q. Going back to your discussion with Mike Dowden, did you 12 discuss with him whether stay put should be withdrawn 13 and an evacuation plan implemented? 14 A. There is no option to evacuate a building where the 15 building principle has failed to the extent that the 16 means of escape don't exist. 17 Q. Did you think at that time, during that handover, that 18 the building had failed and the means of escape did not 19 exist? 20 A. It was becoming more and more the assumption, and I just 21 needed the confirmation from BA crews inside to either 22 of those questions. Was it compromised to that level as 23 far as the means of escape was concerned? Was it 24 compromised to that level regarding fire spread from 25 external back into the building?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 146</p>	<p>1 time your handover from Mike Dowden was finished and you 2 were in command as the incident commander, you were of 3 the view that the resources had to be deployed that you 4 had available to send BA wearers into the tower and 5 extract as many people as you could? 6 A. I think Mike was at that point in his thinking when 7 I took over, and I was definitely of that opinion when 8 I took command. And both of us had been directing 9 resources to that effect, and that was the tactic that 10 I was going to continue employing. 11 Q. How were you going to go about carrying that tactic out? 12 A. Relying on the professionalism, dedication and 13 determination of the crews that were going to attend 14 that incident. 15 Q. I don't doubt what you said for a minute about the 16 characteristics of individual firefighters. Assuming 17 that that's entirely reliable, my question isn't so much 18 about the people you've got, but about the plan. I'll 19 repeat the question. 20 Having come to the conclusion, as I think you've 21 told us, that you had to deploy BA wearers into the 22 tower to extract as many people as you could, by what 23 methods, tactics, strategies, would you use the 24 resources in order to carry out that tactic? 25 A. So I needed to know where people were at greatest risk</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 148</p>

<p>1 in that building. There were a lot of people who were</p> <p>2 indicating they believed they were trapped. I needed to</p> <p>3 try and find out who was at greatest risk and they would</p> <p>4 be our priorities.</p> <p>5 So it goes back to those questions: what are the</p> <p>6 conditions inside? Where are they at their worst? What</p> <p>7 do we need to get people out of those conditions? Where</p> <p>8 is the fire threatening the most people earliest? So</p> <p>9 where is the fire getting back in? What can we do to</p> <p>10 slow that down or to stop it from happening?</p> <p>11 So those are the objectives that I'm trying to</p> <p>12 achieve, finding out where people are at most risk, and</p> <p>13 then prioritising action to deal with them in that sort</p> <p>14 of order.</p> <p>15 So that's why those questions were asked, that's why</p> <p>16 that information was so important, and that's why I was</p> <p>17 driving the incident in that direction.</p> <p>18 We were trying to stop the fire on the external as</p> <p>19 best we could. It wasn't working. I needed to make</p> <p>20 sure we were stopping it getting back inside. That</p> <p>21 would give us the time to get to the people and get them</p> <p>22 out.</p> <p>23 Q. So although you at that stage didn't know that fire was</p> <p>24 coming back into flats at that point --</p> <p>25 A. I was --</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 149</p>	<p>1 now in incident command. Very briefly, what did you do</p> <p>2 next in terms of steps?</p> <p>3 A. Okay. When I got my information off Mike, that process</p> <p>4 was continually interrupted by BA crews and officers</p> <p>5 coming to Mike for taskings, because I left Mike in the</p> <p>6 tabard, in charge, while I was getting my situational</p> <p>7 awareness, because he had got as much information --</p> <p>8 I didn't have it all off him yet. So I was comfortable</p> <p>9 to be on his shoulder and privy to the conversation but</p> <p>10 let him be the focal point and let him direct operations</p> <p>11 until I'd got that understanding.</p> <p>12 Once I got to that point, I took the tabard off him.</p> <p>13 I directed him to go to the bridgehead. I wanted him to</p> <p>14 get that information we'd talked about regarding the</p> <p>15 conditions for the FSGs, what we needed to get them out</p> <p>16 if they were trapped. Get BA to the fire face and</p> <p>17 appointed to the face of the building -- there was one</p> <p>18 face of the building -- get BA to the fire face,</p> <p>19 determine whether the fire's getting back in or not. If</p> <p>20 it looks like it's coming in, stop it. If we can't stop</p> <p>21 it, can we hold it? What do we need to do that?</p> <p>22 So those are the taskings I gave Mike and I went to</p> <p>23 send him on his way.</p> <p>24 Q. Yes.</p> <p>25 A. Another BA crew approached at the same time as the LAS</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 151</p>
<p>1 Q. Can I just put the question.</p> <p>2 Even though that was the case, am I to take it that</p> <p>3 you thought it was such a sufficient risk that the</p> <p>4 tactic you've just described should be undertaken?</p> <p>5 A. Again, without trying to put too much detail in, we only</p> <p>6 get a certain amount of information in that really short</p> <p>7 time that we can gather it. We get as much information</p> <p>8 as we can, but we have to make decisions, we haven't got</p> <p>9 time to wait for the full picture.</p> <p>10 So once we've got enough information to give us</p> <p>11 a very good indication, we have to make assumptions.</p> <p>12 And you initially deal with the incident based on those</p> <p>13 informed assumptions.</p> <p>14 Part of my process as a level 2 commander is to</p> <p>15 check those assumptions of the initial commander and</p> <p>16 then build on those assumptions, because if there is</p> <p>17 more information like I was asking for, that makes your</p> <p>18 direction more certain and you can press further</p> <p>19 forward, or if you get contrary information, you can</p> <p>20 stop that action and take the correct direction.</p> <p>21 So I have to ask those questions as a level 2</p> <p>22 commander, but it's not just a process we follow, it's</p> <p>23 because it's the only way you can deal with an incident</p> <p>24 in that dynamic early stage.</p> <p>25 Q. Having received the handover from Mike Dowden, you're</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 150</p>	<p>1 initial response approached. So I said to Mike, "You</p> <p>2 deal with the BA, I will brief the LAS." I did a JESIP</p> <p>3 command briefing to the LAS to bring them up to speed,</p> <p>4 and then directed Mike back into the building to the</p> <p>5 bridgehead.</p> <p>6 I know this is going on a bit, but it will answer</p> <p>7 your question.</p> <p>8 Once I'd dealt with the LAS, my main priorities</p> <p>9 were -- I knew we got a 25-pump make-up. I'd just had</p> <p>10 the conversation with the LAS about where their triage</p> <p>11 point was and I knew they needed Grenfell Road keeping</p> <p>12 clear for ambulances. We hadn't got a RVP declared for</p> <p>13 the LFB, let alone any other emergency service. That</p> <p>14 was a major priority to me at that time because there</p> <p>15 was probably another 10 to 15 fire engines en route,</p> <p>16 plus all the additional officers and the ambulance</p> <p>17 response that they were now initiating, and I needed to</p> <p>18 have that organised. You can't do that without a map</p> <p>19 and finding where it can go.</p> <p>20 So I needed to speak to a command unit operator to</p> <p>21 get the RVP put in. If I had either of those questions</p> <p>22 answered in the affirmative, it was going to be a major</p> <p>23 incident. I didn't know the name of the road I was on</p> <p>24 and I needed that for the METHANE message for the major</p> <p>25 incident to be declared. And I didn't know the RVP, and</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 152</p>

<p>1 I needed that for the METHANE message to be declared 2 a major.</p> <p>3 Those were in effect the operational priorities 4 I tasked Mike to deal with; these were the incident 5 management priorities that I needed to have happen. 6 So I was then looking to try and close down those 7 two areas.</p> <p>8 Q. Did Mike Dowden leave you to go to the bridgehead as you 9 had asked him to do before DAC O'Loughlin arrived?</p> <p>10 A. So as I turned from the ambulance staff and I'm thinking 11 where's my command unit crew, I need to get this info, 12 I was looking then for any watch manager, any crew 13 manager, to give them that task and to get it to the 14 command unit.</p> <p>15 Mike was walking towards the tower with the BA crew 16 he just tasked, and I turned, looking for the JO, and 17 I saw Andy O'Loughlin.</p> <p>18 So I walked to Andy O'Loughlin. I was in the 19 tabard. He said, "Are you in charge?" I said, "Yes, 20 I've just taken over from that watch manager", and Andy 21 said, "Come here" and we both briefed Andy O'Loughlin at 22 the same time.</p> <p>23 Q. How many minutes do you think elapsed roughly between 24 your finishing your handover from Mike Dowden and having 25 your initial conversation with Andy O'Loughlin?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 153</p>	<p>1 manager I've taken over from", Andy O'Loughlin then 2 shouted "Come here", he turned round and he came back 3 over. So Mike was there for the majority of my handover 4 briefing. The way it worked was I went through my 5 standard framework that I gather or disseminate 6 information, and if I said something that Mike knew 7 a little bit more information about or thought I might 8 have potentially got wrong, he would chip in and correct 9 it. So Mike stood there and interjected when he had 10 something he would add to the briefing I was giving.</p> <p>11 Q. So it was basically a handover by both of you to Andy 12 O'Loughlin?</p> <p>13 A. In effect, yes.</p> <p>14 Q. As a side question, were you aware at that point that 15 Group Manager Welch was at the incident ground?</p> <p>16 A. No.</p> <p>17 Q. Okay.</p> <p>18 How long was the handover to DAC O'Loughlin, do you 19 think?</p> <p>20 A. Because I had done the time-consuming gathering 21 situational awareness, I think it was a lot quicker. 22 I think it would probably be 90 seconds, 2 minutes max. 23 I went through the life risk we knew about, the fire 24 hazards we knew about, the other hazards we knew about, 25 what the priorities were that I'd identified, what the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 155</p>
<p>1 A. The time it took for me to brief the LAS and the time it 2 took for Mike to brief the BA crew. Probably 2 minutes. 3 I could probably recount the briefing I gave the LAS and 4 you could time it.</p> <p>5 Q. That's okay.</p> <p>6 Where physically were you at the point where you saw 7 Andy O'Loughlin?</p> <p>8 A. I'd come off the grass mound because I'd moved down onto 9 the paved area at the side of the grass bank, and I was 10 stood I believe on the footpath, but it may have been in 11 the road, and I was speaking to the LAS at that point, 12 because it was literally, "We'll put the triage point 13 here", and I'd taken about three pieces from that back 14 towards the building when I saw Andy O'Loughlin.</p> <p>15 Q. So you're more or less in the south-east corner of the 16 building?</p> <p>17 A. South-east corner, looking back, probably about 20 to 18 30 metres from the base of the tower.</p> <p>19 Q. To the south-east?</p> <p>20 A. To the south-east corner. So we're on Grenfell Road 21 where it bends into where the covered area was.</p> <p>22 Q. Was Mike Dowden present at any point when you were 23 talking to Andy O'Loughlin?</p> <p>24 A. Yes, he was there the whole time. As I say, other than 25 me saying, "I've just taken over, that is the watch</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 154</p>	<p>1 objectives I thought were, and what I was going to be 2 doing next. And Andy took that on board, he asked 3 a couple of clarifying questions, which is the normal 4 way, and then said, "Right, this is my priority, this is 5 what I want you to do" and he tasked us.</p> <p>6 Q. Did you tell Andy O'Loughlin that the fire was only on 7 the outside of the building?</p> <p>8 A. I told him that we had had a fully involved flat fire on 9 the 4th floor. BA crews had extinguished the fire but 10 it had got out into the cladding. We've now got this 11 spreading fire at the south face that you can see. 12 There's nobody in the original flat fire, we have got 13 all of the life risk out of that original flat fire. 14 We're getting multiple FSGs throughout the building. 15 We've got BA crews trying to get to the FSGs to confirm 16 what the conditions are. I've asked for BA crews to go 17 to the inside face of the building and fight the fire. 18 My priorities are X, Y, Z and that was the sort of 19 briefing that I gave.</p> <p>20 Q. So I am just trying to work out what the answer to my 21 question is.</p> <p>22 A. If you repeat the question, I'll focus on the piece that 23 fits that.</p> <p>24 Q. Did you tell Andy O'Loughlin that the fire was only on 25 the outside of the building?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 156</p>

<p>1 A. I told him that the initial fire was extinguished and we 2 had a spreading fire on the outside of the building. 3 Q. In his statement -- and clearly we'll have to explore 4 this with him when he comes to give evidence -- his 5 recollection is what he got from the briefing was that 6 the fire was only on the outside. Did you tell him 7 that? 8 A. You could infer that because I've said the fire that was 9 inside we've extinguished and we've got a fire that was 10 spreading on the outside. 11 Q. Did you discuss the effectiveness of the existing 12 firefighting measures? 13 A. I don't think I needed to, you could see from where we 14 were what was actually happening when the water hit the 15 side of the building. I didn't discuss how effective 16 they were. 17 Q. Did you have a discussion about what additional 18 firefighting measures might be necessary in order to 19 attack the fire? 20 A. I did tell him about the FRU crew that had been tasked 21 to go to the roof and see if they could implement a -- 22 and he had the same sort of questions as I'd given 23 about: is that safe? And we gave him the same sort of 24 reassurances that I'd been given, and again he accepted 25 them at face value and that was that. That was</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 157</p>	<p>1 the only reason why I can think that. 2 Q. How were they going to, out of interest, extinguish or 3 damp down the fire by going to the roof and attacking it 4 from up there? What were they actually going to do? 5 A. The idea was that if you could introduce water between 6 the cladding and the outside face of the building, in 7 effect get a wall of water between the cladding and the 8 building, a waterfall between the cladding and the 9 building, that could prevent it getting back in. 10 Q. Was any thought given to how you would actually get 11 water up to the top of the building? 12 A. There was a dry rising main. There's a main that we use 13 to get water to every level in that building. Without 14 discussing it, because we didn't, my assumption would be 15 the crew would set in at the highest outlet, run hose 16 across the top of the roof, rig it up, probably lash it 17 off in position so it could be left, and just put as 18 much water through it as they could. 19 Q. Did you have any discussion during that handover of the 20 need to get hold of ALPs, aerial ladder platforms, with 21 a higher reach than that which the LFB had, such as the 22 Surrey platform? 23 A. No. 24 Q. Did you talk about the number of FSGs? 25 A. Other than there are multiple FSGs on every level in</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 159</p>
<p>1 happening as far as we were concerned. 2 Q. Did he give you an impression as to what he thought 3 about whether that was a sensible use of EDBA resources? 4 A. He didn't stop it from happening. It wasn't so much 5 that they were EDBA crews. The FRU units carry EDBA, 6 but they also have a specialism, and the unit that we 7 were talking about was a line rescue unit, so they are 8 skilled at setting up safe systems of work using ropes 9 to restrain people from going over edges or to rescuing 10 people using lines. So it was that aspect of their 11 skills. It wasn't the EDBA that we were focused on, it 12 was the fact that they could implement the safe system 13 to allow firefighters to go to the edge of the roof of 14 a 22-storey block and not fall off. 15 Q. Was there any discussion on this topic between you, 16 Mike Dowden and Andy O'Loughlin about whether or not the 17 EDBA crew that was there -- crew of I think five, 18 actually -- would have been better used going up the 19 inside of the tower to effect rescues from the topmost 20 part of the tower? 21 A. No, it wasn't part of that discussion. 22 Q. Is there any reason you can think of as to why that 23 wasn't even on your radar? 24 A. We were focused on the unique skill they had on the fire 25 ground, which was the line rescue element, and that's</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 158</p>	<p>1 this building, it was words to that effect, I don't know 2 the exact wording, but it was -- I made the point that 3 they are all over the place in this building. There's 4 not a cluster, it's not a band, they are through it -- 5 but I didn't say it that clearly, I said, "There are 6 FSGs all over this building." 7 Q. Did you or Mike Dowden tell Andy O'Loughlin that 8 a station manager, Brett Loft as it was, had been tasked 9 with running the FSGs? 10 A. Yes, that was part of my briefing. 11 Q. You did tell him that? 12 A. Yes, I said there are multiple FSGs throughout the 13 building. There is a station manager in charge of FSGs. 14 I don't know their name, all I know is they're over 15 there at the base of tower. That was where I was moving 16 next. That was after I got the RVP and the other 17 taskings in that manner, that was the next thing: let's 18 get to the FSG, let's find out is the information 19 getting to him, is it getting from him to the 20 bridgehead? 21 Q. Did you discuss the strategy or tactic of how you were 22 going to send BA wearers into the tower and evacuate or 23 extract as many residents as you could? 24 A. The only way that we discussed that was at the moment 25 everyone is rigging and everyone is being committed.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 160</p>

<p>1 Q. Did you discuss the subject of what advice control room 2 operators should be giving to callers?</p> <p>3 A. No.</p> <p>4 Q. So stay put wasn't discussed?</p> <p>5 A. No, it wasn't, no.</p> <p>6 Q. Okay.</p> <p>7 Mr O'Loughlin says in his statement that he expected 8 that the building should protect itself from burning 9 cladding. Is that something that he discussed with you, 10 do you remember?</p> <p>11 A. I can't remember that phrase being used, no.</p> <p>12 Q. All right.</p> <p>13 In addition to briefing Andy O'Loughlin on what you 14 knew, was he aware, so far as you know, of whether there 15 was feedback from the bridgehead to the command unit or 16 the command unit to control about the success or failure 17 of particular BA deployments?</p> <p>18 A. I hadn't made contact with Brett Loft at that point. 19 That was one of the things I was going to be trying to 20 confirm.</p> <p>21 Q. Did you have a discussion with Andy O'Loughlin about the 22 effectiveness of radio communications as you were 23 experiencing them on the incident ground?</p> <p>24 A. Yes. When I said what my priorities were, one of 25 them -- it wasn't the top priority, but one of the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 161</p>	<p>1 A. If they'd have made themselves known to me, that 2 would've been one thing I would've tasked.</p> <p>3 Q. Can I just ask you to look at a CCTV image, this is 4 INQ00000343, and it's camera 3. There are two cameras 5 in the lobby of Grenfell Tower, Mr Walton, and this is 6 camera 3, looking towards the back of the lobby from the 7 main door. This is taken at an adjusted time of 8 02.01.53.</p> <p>9 Do you think you can see yourself in that image?</p> <p>10 A. I'm probably the shortest person in the image in the 11 middle of the picture.</p> <p>12 Q. With your left arm raised?</p> <p>13 A. Yes.</p> <p>14 Q. To your right, our left, there's another white helmet. 15 Do you know who that might be?</p> <p>16 A. I can't tell from that.</p> <p>17 Q. I think you told us earlier in response to my question 18 that you hadn't been able to use the mobile data 19 terminal en route, so that means you hadn't looked at 20 the ORD en route; is that right?</p> <p>21 A. Yes.</p> <p>22 Q. Did you ask Mike Dowden to operate the smoke ventilation 23 system, do you remember?</p> <p>24 A. Yes. That's an unusual layout, the base of the tower. 25 It's sort of a two-storey atrium with a glass partition</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 163</p>
<p>1 priorities, probably about the third or fourth in what 2 I said, was that radios are completely ineffectual, 3 they're swamped, we need dedicated channels as fast as 4 possible.</p> <p>5 Q. I want to examine with you in some detail a specific 6 subject, and it's the smoke ventilation system.</p> <p>7 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>8 Q. First, are you aware, even in general terms, of a policy 9 requirement that an incident commander shouldn't make 10 any changes to a high-rise building's ventilation or 11 fire safety system without first taking appropriate 12 advice from the responsible person, such as the building 13 owner or the tenant management organisation, or 14 an appropriately trained FRA personnel?</p> <p>15 A. Yes, I'm aware of that. But in reality it would be that 16 you would get the senior fire safety officer involved 17 and you'd get them talking to the responsible person and 18 you'd take the word of the FSO.</p> <p>19 Q. At that stage, were you aware of an FRA fire safety 20 person on the incident ground?</p> <p>21 A. I knew there would be one mobilised at that level of 22 mobilisation, but I hadn't seen them.</p> <p>23 Q. Did you think to have a conversation with them to look 24 at the things they should be looking at, such as the 25 fire --</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 162</p>	<p>1 at the side, and it was that unusual layout that 2 triggered my memory that I'd been in the building before 3 for the smoke demonstration.</p> <p>4 So it was like a realisation: I've been here before. 5 Then a realisation as to why I'd been there. I looked 6 around the lobby, remembering that they'd demonstrated 7 a smoke extraction system and there was a control panel 8 and I thought it was in the lobby.</p> <p>9 I saw a box on the wall and, again, the sort of 10 thought process was: well, I wouldn't know how to work 11 that, the local station might. I shouted to Mike Dowden 12 "Mike" -- because I knew he was the local station -- "is 13 that the smoke control panel? Is it working?"</p> <p>14 Q. Does this photograph capture the moment or around the 15 moment when you asked Mike Dowden that question?</p> <p>16 A. I think it's probably slightly after. Because I was 17 en route to the base of the stairs, which are on the 18 right-hand side -- the stairs are where I'm looking. 19 And so I was moving to those stairs to make my way up to 20 the bridgehead, and I think I'd directed Mike to the 21 panel and then I was -- I don't know what I'm doing, I'm 22 obviously giving some sort of instruction about what 23 I want to happen in the lobby, but my focus was on 24 getting up to the bridgehead.</p> <p>25 My recollection is I waited at the base of the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 164</p>

<p>1 stairs -- there's a glass doorway into the staircase 2 enclosure -- and I waited there for the indication as to 3 whether it was working or not, because obviously that 4 could affect the way we used it. 5 I can't remember how he indicated it, I can't 6 remember if he shook his head or he said "It's not 7 working" or "No", but I know that as I went onto the 8 staircase, I knew the smoke extraction system was not 9 working. 10 Q. Go to page 30 of your witness statement. You say much 11 the same thing, but can I just direct you to the middle 12 of the page. You say halfway down: 13 "I thought I didn't know how to use it as I hadn't 14 looked as I never thought I would have to know how to 15 use it. As he was local I thought he might know how to 16 use it so as he was on his way over to the lift I 17 shouted him and said 'Mike, that's the smoke control 18 panel do you know how to use it?' He didn't say yes or 19 no he just looked at it and I said 'Check that panel and 20 make sure it's working'. He went over and looked at it 21 and said 'No' and went to the lifts and from that my 22 assumption was that the smoke control system had failed 23 and that was why there were FSGs because they had got 24 smoke logged staircases." 25 A. All assumptions based on what I'd heard and seen.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 165</p>	<p>1 "Sir 2 "I have just recalled an action or omission by me in 3 the early stages of the Grenfell Tower incident which 4 I urgently bring to your attention. 5 "As I moved to take up the Fire Sector Commander 6 role I passed through the lobby and encountered WM 7 Dowden, G271 OIC and original incident commander. 8 I directed him to make sure the smoke extraction system 9 was operating using the control panel on the wall in the 10 lobby. He went to the panel, seemed to try and operate 11 a touch pad on the screen and came back to me and said 12 something like 'it is not working' or 'it is not 13 operating', I can not be sure of the exact wording. 14 I know my understanding was that the system had failed 15 and WM Dowden had tried to turn it on but it was not 16 responding. We then continued up to the Bridgehead to 17 carry out the roles we had been given." 18 Just looking at the e-mail that was sent four days 19 after the incident, is what you said in that e-mail 20 correct or is what you're now telling us correct, that 21 you didn't see Mike operating it? 22 A. That is more contemporaneous, so I would say that is 23 what I thought at that time. 24 Q. Mike Dowden's given some evidence to us about that when 25 he came in June, and he said that he didn't attempt to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 167</p>
<p>1 Q. That I suppose answers my question: is it fair to say 2 that you assumed the smoke control system had failed but 3 didn't check it to confirm the position yourself? 4 A. I sent an officer to check. I take the answer I get. 5 I haven't got time to go and do the jobs that I've 6 tasked other people to do. So I trust Mike Dowden, 7 I had worked with him before, I thought he was 8 a competent officer, I definitely still do, and I took 9 the answer at face value, and I've got no reason to 10 doubt it. 11 Q. Did you see him or watch him attempting to operate it? 12 A. I saw him go to the panel, he had his back to me, and he 13 turned round and gave the indication. Again, I cannot 14 recall what the indication was, I just know what I took 15 from it. 16 Q. You say you didn't see him -- is this right? -- actually 17 physically touch the panel or try to activate it 18 yourself? 19 A. I don't have any recollection of seeing that happening. 20 Q. Can I just ask you to look at your e-mail that you sent 21 after the event. It's MET00005713. 22 This is an e-mail you sent to Steve Apter on 23 18 June 2017 -- Steve Apter is director of safety and 24 assurance -- and also to Charlie Pugsley. 25 You say:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 166</p>	<p>1 operate the panel, only the key switch in the lobby. 2 Just for our own reference, that's transcript of 3 26 June 2018 at page 136, lines 1 to 10. Just so we 4 have that. 5 Just in terms of his evidence, do you think you were 6 mistaken in your e-mail when you say he attempted to 7 operate the panel? 8 A. He had his back to me. Those are probably assumptions 9 I made. He moved his arm towards the panel, and 10 I couldn't see what he was doing from where I was. So 11 they're probably assumptions. 12 The key about that e-mail is the next part of the 13 e-mail, the thing that I'm trying to draw to the 14 attention, and that's that I didn't know if I passed 15 that information on in the command chain, I can't 16 remember if it was part of my briefing, and that is key 17 information to the next incident commander. It would've 18 been key information to Richard Welch on the bridgehead 19 when he took over from me as fire sector commander from 20 me, and I genuinely, honestly believe I would've passed 21 that information on, but I cannot remember. And 22 I thought it was too important not to make it known that 23 I can't remember if I passed it on. That's why I sent 24 that e-mail. 25 Q. No, I understand. I am just actually focusing on what</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 168</p>

<p>1 you can remember about Mike Dowden's actions in front of</p> <p>2 the panel.</p> <p>3 When you were standing in front of the panel with</p> <p>4 Mike Dowden, if that is him, just after 02.00 am on the</p> <p>5 morning of the fire, did you recall anything from your</p> <p>6 2016 visit about how the system might operate?</p> <p>7 A. No. I remembered the panel was key to the operation of</p> <p>8 the system. That's all I remembered, yes.</p> <p>9 Q. Did you remember anything about the caretaker that you'd</p> <p>10 been told?</p> <p>11 A. I don't think I did. I honestly don't think it went</p> <p>12 through my brain.</p> <p>13 Q. Did you think to find out who the responsible person was</p> <p>14 who might know how to work the panel?</p> <p>15 A. I was taking over fire sector commander. I was focused</p> <p>16 on -- bearing in mind what I already said about how</p> <p>17 I got the opinion that everybody was trapped in that</p> <p>18 building and we needed to rescue them, I was focused on</p> <p>19 getting up to where that was happening and taking charge</p> <p>20 of that. So, again, it's an assumption, but my</p> <p>21 assumption would be that the commander behind me, who</p> <p>22 would probably be on the command unit, would be going</p> <p>23 through those sort of processes, because they've got the</p> <p>24 luxury of it being the next step down the chain, they've</p> <p>25 had a little bit longer, a little bit more information.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 169</p>	<p>1 A. No LFB officer would've been trained in the use of that</p> <p>2 smoke extraction system. The senior fire safety</p> <p>3 officers are trained in general terms about fixed</p> <p>4 installations, and they would use that general knowledge</p> <p>5 to interpret the system that they're encountering.</p> <p>6 That's where the local responsible person contact is so</p> <p>7 useful, because they're applying a general knowledge and</p> <p>8 the local representative has got the specifics, and they</p> <p>9 just apply that to what they're dealing with.</p> <p>10 Q. Can we look at another picture, which is INQ00000339.</p> <p>11 This is a CCTV image with an adjusted time of</p> <p>12 01.57.54, so I think that's just before you go to it.</p> <p>13 It's open.</p> <p>14 A. Yes.</p> <p>15 Q. If we zoom into it, I think we can see some written</p> <p>16 instructions at the bottom of the panel. It's not that</p> <p>17 easy to see and perhaps we need to zoom a bit more.</p> <p>18 I think it's going to get worse the closer we get.</p> <p>19 To the best of your recollection, Mr Walton, were</p> <p>20 there instructions on how to use this system?</p> <p>21 A. I never went to the panel. I never saw the panel.</p> <p>22 MR MILLETT: Right.</p> <p>23 Let me see if I can do a little better, BLA --</p> <p>24 I'm looking at the clock and I've been nudged by</p> <p>25 Mr Kinnier.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 171</p>
<p>1 Q. But that was an assumption you made?</p> <p>2 A. Yeah, it's an assumption we would all make, that as the</p> <p>3 incident progresses and you hand command on, the</p> <p>4 commander behind you -- as I said, I've checked Mike's</p> <p>5 assumptions and tried to fill any gaps that might be</p> <p>6 there. The same thing would've happened with me with</p> <p>7 Andy O'Loughlin and the same thing would've happened</p> <p>8 with him when it was taken over from him. Each incident</p> <p>9 commander fills the picture of that next step. Because</p> <p>10 it's so dynamic initially.</p> <p>11 Q. Is there any reason why, apart from trusting Mike Dowden</p> <p>12 would do it, you didn't attempt to operate the smoke</p> <p>13 ventilation system yourself?</p> <p>14 A. I knew I hadn't paid attention to the detail. I just</p> <p>15 made sure that it would've been captured and recorded as</p> <p>16 instructions. So I knew I hadn't paid attention to the</p> <p>17 detail, and I'm not there to be focused on a panel; I'm</p> <p>18 there to be focused on rescuing the people in the</p> <p>19 building. That is the role I've been given in the</p> <p>20 command structure, that's the one I'm going to deliver,</p> <p>21 and that's what I went to do.</p> <p>22 Q. To the best of your knowledge, who was the first LFB</p> <p>23 officer to attend the fire who would've been</p> <p>24 appropriately trained in the use of this smoke</p> <p>25 extraction system?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 170</p>	<p>1 Mr Chairman, perhaps this is an appropriate time for</p> <p>2 another short break.</p> <p>3 THE WITNESS: I am happy for you to do one more image, if</p> <p>4 that closes this off.</p> <p>5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Shall we go on a little bit? We'll</p> <p>6 certainly stop --</p> <p>7 MR MILLETT: We'll stop at the end of this topic then.</p> <p>8 So if you could please be shown BLA00002966.</p> <p>9 This is a photograph taken by the inquiry of the</p> <p>10 inside of the smoke vent box and the instructions that</p> <p>11 are there, Grenfell Tower smoke extract system.</p> <p>12 My question is: do you remember seeing these on the</p> <p>13 night?</p> <p>14 A. No.</p> <p>15 Q. You said you didn't look inside the box.</p> <p>16 Are these even familiar to you from your 2016</p> <p>17 introduction to the system?</p> <p>18 A. They weren't there in 2016 because that's why we asked</p> <p>19 them to write them.</p> <p>20 Q. Yes. That's a basic how to use guide.</p> <p>21 Would those instructions be the sort of things that</p> <p>22 you would expect to be on the ORD and available to</p> <p>23 an incident commander through the MDT?</p> <p>24 A. Yeah. If I'd encountered that, I would've got it onto</p> <p>25 the ORD.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 172</p>

<p>1 Q. You can see the various steps, and the second step is</p> <p>2 override for manual control of individual floors,</p> <p>3 whereby you switch the main control panel from auto to</p> <p>4 on, as you can see, and then a second key to be used in</p> <p>5 yellow smoke extract key switch in each lift lobby to</p> <p>6 manually operate dampers on individual floors.</p> <p>7 Now, I know you didn't see these instructions, does</p> <p>8 that trigger a recollection as to the kind of thing you</p> <p>9 were told about how to operate this system when you went</p> <p>10 in April 2016 to the tower?</p> <p>11 A. When I was asked specific questions last week, an image</p> <p>12 of those yellow box control panels was part of the</p> <p>13 questioning pack that was sent to me.</p> <p>14 Q. It was.</p> <p>15 A. Seeing that yellow box prompted a really, really vague</p> <p>16 recollection -- and I mean really vague -- that there</p> <p>17 was a system that affected the use of the fans on the</p> <p>18 floor, but I couldn't tell you how you did it and</p> <p>19 I couldn't really tell you what the effect of it was.</p> <p>20 Q. To the best of your recollection, do you think anybody</p> <p>21 understood these instructions on the night of the fire?</p> <p>22 A. That would be supposition by me, but I didn't know they</p> <p>23 were there.</p> <p>24 Q. In your supplemental statement, can I just ask you,</p> <p>25 please, to turn to paragraphs 42 and 44. You say in</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 173</p>	<p>1 Then in 44 you say, three lines down:</p> <p>2 "... the system protecting the lobbies and staircase</p> <p>3 failed ..."</p> <p>4 My question, because you're linking lobbies and</p> <p>5 staircases there, is: was it your understanding on the</p> <p>6 night of the fire that the system should have operated</p> <p>7 on multiple floors and also been capable of dealing with</p> <p>8 smoke in multiple lobbies and the staircase?</p> <p>9 A. Based on my contemporaneous notes, that must have been</p> <p>10 my assumption, because that's what I wrote in my</p> <p>11 contemporaneous note. Based on my reflection since</p> <p>12 I was given specific detail and I revisited that</p> <p>13 familiarisation visit in my mind, I now believe that</p> <p>14 that system covered the lobbies and it was either</p> <p>15 inferred or stated that, because it kept the lobbies</p> <p>16 clear, it would keep the staircase clear.</p> <p>17 So my assumption was that that system would keep or</p> <p>18 was designed to keep the lobby and the staircase clear,</p> <p>19 but I don't think the extraction was in the staircase,</p> <p>20 I think it was in the lobby.</p> <p>21 Q. I know we've covered this in part, having been told by</p> <p>22 Mike Dowden it's not working or words to that effect,</p> <p>23 did you think to get someone to get hold of the building</p> <p>24 owner to bring them down urgently to the tower to get it</p> <p>25 working or to find out why it wasn't working?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 175</p>
<p>1 paragraph 42 -- it's page 11 internally -- you recall</p> <p>2 Mike Dowden saying it isn't working, and then you say:</p> <p>3 "In the split second after he indicated this I took</p> <p>4 it to mean that the smoke extraction system was not</p> <p>5 operating, removing smoke from the flat lobbies or</p> <p>6 protecting the staircases from smoke entering them.</p> <p>7 I assumed this to be because the fans and vents were not</p> <p>8 operating for some reason."</p> <p>9 That's an assumption, is it, that you made on the</p> <p>10 night?</p> <p>11 A. Yes, complete assumption. As I moved from the lobby,</p> <p>12 I assumed the fire was spreading up the outside of the</p> <p>13 building in a way I didn't think it could possibly do.</p> <p>14 I knew the smoke extraction wasn't working. I knew the</p> <p>15 lifts weren't working. I suspected the fire was going</p> <p>16 to breach on multiple floors. And I had formed the</p> <p>17 opinion I couldn't rely on anything in that building,</p> <p>18 and I was moving to the bridgehead as fire sector</p> <p>19 commander to initiate rescue and firefighting on that</p> <p>20 basis.</p> <p>21 Q. Can I focus on two phrases in paragraphs 42 and 44,</p> <p>22 having shown you 42. You say in 42, three lines up from</p> <p>23 the end of the paragraph:</p> <p>24 "... removing smoke from the flat lobbies or</p> <p>25 protecting the staircases from smoke entering them."</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 174</p>	<p>1 A. I was moving to fire sector commander. I was focused</p> <p>2 completely on the rescue and the firefighting. I didn't</p> <p>3 think to get that message out of the tower to the</p> <p>4 incident commander.</p> <p>5 Q. So what would happen then? Mike said it wasn't working,</p> <p>6 you didn't pass the message on or get RBKC or the TMO</p> <p>7 there. What were your thoughts about how the smoke</p> <p>8 extraction system could then be used?</p> <p>9 A. I didn't know -- I still don't know -- if I briefed</p> <p>10 Richard Welch to that effect. I can't recall if I did</p> <p>11 or I didn't. I would expect I did. But I don't know.</p> <p>12 I would expect, but I don't know because I wasn't on the</p> <p>13 command unit, that the subsequent incident commanders</p> <p>14 would get the ORD information, they would look at what</p> <p>15 fixed installations were in the building, see if they</p> <p>16 were going to be able to be used and they would've been</p> <p>17 checking if they could use that smoke extraction, was it</p> <p>18 operating, could it work?</p> <p>19 That's what I believe would happen and I've got no</p> <p>20 reason to think it didn't happen on the night.</p> <p>21 MR MILLETT: Right.</p> <p>22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would that be a good point,</p> <p>23 Mr Millett?</p> <p>24 MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman, it would.</p> <p>25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think we'll have another break,</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 176</p>

<p>1 Mr Walton. You go with the usher. Don't talk to anyone</p> <p>2 about your evidence, please, and we'll be back at 3.50.</p> <p>3 Thank you very much.</p> <p>4 Good, 3.50, then, please.</p> <p>5 (3.42 pm)</p> <p>6 (A short break)</p> <p>7 (3.50 pm)</p> <p>8 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, are you happy to carry</p> <p>9 on, Mr Walton?</p> <p>10 THE WITNESS: Yes, I am.</p> <p>11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Very good.</p> <p>12 Yes, Mr Millett.</p> <p>13 MR MILLETT: Thank you for coming back, Mr Walton.</p> <p>14 Can I revisit one little topic about the smoke vent</p> <p>15 system on the night. We're talking about what</p> <p>16 Mike Dowden did with it.</p> <p>17 His evidence was that he went to activate the point</p> <p>18 using the keys and switch it to manual, but he decided</p> <p>19 against it because he didn't want to interfere with</p> <p>20 a fire solution in the building because it could worsen</p> <p>21 the situation for both residents and firefighters.</p> <p>22 That's the gist of his evidence.</p> <p>23 He says that he told you of his actions and then put</p> <p>24 the keys to the smoke panel in the lobby area where he'd</p> <p>25 found them.</p> <p>Page 177</p>	<p>1 towards each other. I now know it was Brian</p> <p>2 O'KEEFE[sic] but at the time I couldn't remember even</p> <p>3 though he told me his name. I told him I was up there</p> <p>4 for Fire Sector Commander and I was going to be taking</p> <p>5 the Sector. I told him I was going to organise the</p> <p>6 Bridgehead."</p> <p>7 What was his reaction to that?</p> <p>8 A. Again, the sort of briefing that took place was I told</p> <p>9 him what I wanted to know. I asked him to show me where</p> <p>10 the BA were being directed from and he showed me the</p> <p>11 entry control point. I had a quick look at the entry</p> <p>12 control point and I could see there was information</p> <p>13 starting to go on the wall, and I said, "We needed more</p> <p>14 boards up here, I don't want it on the walls, I want it</p> <p>15 on the boards."</p> <p>16 One of the officers who was actually writing the</p> <p>17 information on the wall told me there was too much</p> <p>18 information, it wouldn't go on boards, and I said, "It</p> <p>19 will if we get enough", something like that. So there</p> <p>20 was that sort of discussion there. I don't think it was</p> <p>21 with Brien O'Keeffe.</p> <p>22 I then said to Brien the tasking that I'd already</p> <p>23 talked about to Mike Dowden. So I said: I want to know</p> <p>24 about the FSGs, are we getting BA to them? Are they</p> <p>25 trapped or do they think they're trapped? If they're</p> <p>Page 179</p>
<p>1 Does that assist you with remembering what was said</p> <p>2 during your exchange with Mr Dowden in relation to the</p> <p>3 smoke vent system?</p> <p>4 A. As I say, I've got no recollection of any discussion,</p> <p>5 any conversation, with Mike after he went to the panel.</p> <p>6 There was an indication it wasn't working. I left the</p> <p>7 lobby and went to the bridgehead to take over fire</p> <p>8 sector commander. I didn't discuss anything with him,</p> <p>9 I just went. That's my recollection.</p> <p>10 Q. Turning to a different topic, which is your journey to</p> <p>11 the bridgehead, you go to the bridgehead, I think,</p> <p>12 shortly after this smoke vent discussion takes place; is</p> <p>13 that right?</p> <p>14 A. After I'd detailed him to go to the panel, yes.</p> <p>15 Q. Yes, so just after 02.00 am.</p> <p>16 A. That would be that from the picture taken, yes.</p> <p>17 Q. At page 31 of your statement you say a third of the way</p> <p>18 or a quarter of the way down, you ask, "Who is in charge</p> <p>19 on this bridgehead?" You say:</p> <p>20 "... 'Listen up. Who's in charge on this</p> <p>21 Bridgehead'. I didn't get an answer so I shouted again</p> <p>22 even more forcefully 'Listen up. Who is in charge on</p> <p>23 the Bridgehead, Station Manager wants to know' and an</p> <p>24 Irish voice (someone I didn't know) came from the corner</p> <p>25 'I'm in charge' so I shouted 'Come to me' and we headed</p> <p>Page 178</p>	<p>1 trapped, what do we need to bring them out? I want to</p> <p>2 know are we getting BA to this face? We were stood</p> <p>3 facing this direction with the balconies behind me, and</p> <p>4 so I pointed to my right to indicate the face of the</p> <p>5 building I was worried about. I said: are we getting BA</p> <p>6 wearers to this face? I want to know if this fire which</p> <p>7 is going up the outside of the building is getting back</p> <p>8 in. If it's getting back in, can we stop it? If we're</p> <p>9 going to stop it, what do we need?</p> <p>10 Once you've got that, I want to know how many BA are</p> <p>11 in, where are they, what are their priorities, where do</p> <p>12 we know is searched, where do we know there's fires --</p> <p>13 actually, that last part, where do we know there's</p> <p>14 fires, I can't remember if I said that, but I did say</p> <p>15 where do we know is searched and what resources are you</p> <p>16 going to need? I'll be back to you in about</p> <p>17 two minutes, I want those answers. Where are the FIB</p> <p>18 boards? Where is the FSG information being</p> <p>19 co-ordinated? He said, "Over there" and I went over to</p> <p>20 the watch manager doing the FIB boards.</p> <p>21 I didn't have a discussion as such; I stated what</p> <p>22 I wanted to know, "Go and get it", then I moved away.</p> <p>23 Q. You've given us a long list of questions you asked him.</p> <p>24 A. Yes.</p> <p>25 Q. Did you get answers to each of those?</p> <p>Page 180</p>

<p>1 A. No. I said -- I think it started off it would be 2 something like: do you know how many BA you've got in? 3 That's right, this would be it. I said: how many BA 4 have we got in? He said, "Come over here, I'll show you 5 the boards", and that's when I looked at the boards, 6 because that gave me an indication of how many tallies 7 are in the boards, that gives me an idea of how many 8 wearers are in. I thought: I'm not going to count the 9 tallies and I'm not going to look at the remarks column 10 of where they are, so I said to him, "This is what 11 I want to know, get that information and I will come 12 back to you." 13 Then I moved on to the FIB boards, because I was 14 going to do the same sort of process with the fire 15 survival guidance information. Then I was going to go 16 to the balcony and organise the balcony, because I'd 17 just come through that and it was not passable. I knew 18 that was the only staircase in the building and if any 19 casualties were coming out, they were going to have to 20 go across that balcony and I needed to get it clear so 21 casualties could egress. 22 Q. Let me see if I can break that down a bit by reference 23 to some specific questions. 24 Did Brien O'Keeffe at that stage, when you had that 25 discussion with him, tell you about the smoke conditions</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 181</p>	<p>1 and by that time you're ready for that information to 2 come back. 3 Q. Let's go to the point at which you were ready for the 4 information to come back to you from Brien O'Keeffe. 5 At that point, did he tell you about the smoke 6 condition in the stairs? 7 A. I didn't get to that point. As I moved from Watch 8 Manager De Silvo, who was running the FSG information, 9 I walked from the lift lobby area back towards the 10 balcony to get the balcony cleared enough for casualties 11 to pass. As I was adjacent to the base of the main 12 staircase, Group Manager Welch met me. I was still 13 wearing the incident commander tabard because when we 14 had the handover with Andy O'Loughlin and he directed me 15 to fire sector commander, I said to him, because I knew 16 there was a lot of resources going into the building, 17 "I'm going to keep this on until I get given a fire 18 sector commander tabard so they know who is in charge up 19 there." 20 Q. Mr Walton, I'm sorry, it's getting late in the afternoon 21 and I don't want to -- 22 A. This is key because I went to go to the bridgehead -- 23 Q. Let me just ask the question again -- 24 A. I'll answer the original question. I went to go to the 25 bridgehead balcony and I didn't get there, and I was</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 183</p>
<p>1 in the stairs? 2 A. I don't recall asking that information in that way, 3 I asked: are they trapped or aren't they trapped? If 4 they're trapped, what do we need to get them out? 5 Q. Did he give you any information about the smoke 6 conditions in any of the lobbies? 7 A. It would be the same answer. I never asked that 8 question so he never gave me that answer. 9 Q. Did he give you any information about how high up into 10 the building BA wearers had managed to get thus far? 11 A. That was part of the: where is searched, where are we 12 going next? 13 Q. What was his answer? 14 A. He hadn't got it. I asked him to have it ready when I 15 got back to him in the next two minutes. 16 Basically I was priming them with what I wanted to 17 know, and I wasn't going to take the time while they got 18 that information -- I was moving to the next task to 19 prime them, and then I was going to do the round robin 20 again and get the information that I'd requested. 21 It's a common way of doing this, in my opinion, 22 I believe it is, it's the way I've always done it, where 23 you prime what you need to know, and while they're doing 24 that, gathering that information, you don't stand there 25 and wait, you move to the next, prime them, prime them,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 182</p>	<p>1 relieved of the fire sector commander role by Group 2 Manager Welch, who had been sent there to take that on, 3 and I got given a different role, which was to become BA 4 logistics on the balcony. So I briefed Group Manager 5 Welch with what I was doing, and what my next task would 6 be, and that Brien O'Keeffe had been briefed to have 7 that information. Louisa De Silvo, I checked if she 8 needed any assistance and we'd agreed she could probably 9 do with a couple of crew managers to assist her and 10 I was now going to sort the balcony out. He said, 11 "Right, I'm taking over as fire sector commander, you go 12 and sort the balcony." 13 So I didn't get back to Brien O'Keeffe, so that 14 information never came. 15 Q. So is the short answer to my question about the answers 16 to the list of questions that you posed to him that you 17 didn't get the answers because you were deployed by 18 Richard Welch to do the balcony? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. You say on page 32 -- I am going to come back to Richard 21 Welch in due course -- of your statement that you moved 22 over to Louisa De Silvo, this three lines down: 23 "She also had at least two FIB boards running. The 24 one that was absolutely full had information such as 25 flat numbers, who was in it that sort of stuff and the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 184</p>

<p>1 one that was half full she was filling it in and it</p> <p>2 appeared she was talking to people on the radio getting</p> <p>3 information. I didn't want to interrupt that but in</p> <p>4 between I said 'Lou are you overwhelmed by this or can</p> <p>5 you run this' and she went 'I could do with a bit of</p> <p>6 help' so I said I would try and get her some crew</p> <p>7 managers to take some of the traffic."</p> <p>8 My first question is: did you get some crew managers</p> <p>9 to take some of the traffic?</p> <p>10 A. I believe that was part of my handover to Richard Welch.</p> <p>11 Q. Do you know whether he did?</p> <p>12 A. I don't know.</p> <p>13 Q. You say there were at least two FIBs running, one</p> <p>14 absolutely full with flat numbers and one half full, you</p> <p>15 say.</p> <p>16 I just wonder whether we can identify the full one.</p> <p>17 Can I ask you, please, to be shown MET00015935.</p> <p>18 A. That's not the board.</p> <p>19 Q. That's not the board?</p> <p>20 A. It was using the casualty poster, the board that</p> <p>21 I initially saw. It's gridded for the purpose of FSG,</p> <p>22 and that was the board that was being used by Louisa</p> <p>23 De Silvo when I got to the bridgehead.</p> <p>24 Q. Do you recognise this item at all from your visit to the</p> <p>25 bridgehead when it was on the 2nd floor?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 185</p>	<p>1 information at the side of the entry control boards.</p> <p>2 When I met Richard Welch and started to give my</p> <p>3 handover, one of the first things he asked me for was</p> <p>4 a chinagraph. As I gave him my handover, he was writing</p> <p>5 key points at the wall at the base of the staircase on</p> <p>6 that corridor. As I said stuff, he was writing the key</p> <p>7 points down.</p> <p>8 Q. Can I ask you to be shown a photograph, MET00013074.</p> <p>9 Is that familiar to you, do you think?</p> <p>10 A. No.</p> <p>11 Q. Firefighter O'Beirne gave evidence that he was writing</p> <p>12 that on the wall on the 2nd floor when the bridgehead</p> <p>13 was there.</p> <p>14 A. It could be. I didn't see any of the detail of where</p> <p>15 that was happening. I saw the act of writing on the</p> <p>16 wall, and because of the training I'd had about Lakanal</p> <p>17 where they had to relocate the bridgehead and</p> <p>18 information, it was difficult to move information, and</p> <p>19 that's where forward information boards had come from.</p> <p>20 And because I'd delivered back to basics training where</p> <p>21 that was a key aspect of it, I didn't want that</p> <p>22 happening. So I challenged it and said get more boards</p> <p>23 up, use the boards.</p> <p>24 But I didn't see that actioned because I moved on</p> <p>25 and I never got back to check again.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 187</p>
<p>1 A. Well, it's one of the boards that can be used as</p> <p>2 a forward information board. We've got three or four</p> <p>3 different laminates that can be used. One is the</p> <p>4 casualty poster which is designed specifically for FSG.</p> <p>5 I remember registering that she was using the FSG</p> <p>6 casualty poster, so I knew it was an organised,</p> <p>7 controlled management of that information.</p> <p>8 Q. On that casualty poster, do you remember in generic</p> <p>9 terms what detail there was?</p> <p>10 A. The column headings were being completed in the correct</p> <p>11 manner. So there were a number of flat numbers, there</p> <p>12 were a number of indications of how many people were in</p> <p>13 there, that type of thing. I didn't look at any of the</p> <p>14 detail. I just wanted to make sure that information was</p> <p>15 getting from the control to the incident ground and</p> <p>16 getting from the incident ground to the bridgehead, and</p> <p>17 that was an indication that there was information</p> <p>18 getting to the bridgehead. I was going to come back and</p> <p>19 go into the detail.</p> <p>20 Q. You referred to writing on the 2nd floor wall earlier on</p> <p>21 in your evidence this afternoon.</p> <p>22 Do you remember who was putting the writing up on</p> <p>23 the wall?</p> <p>24 A. At the entry control point, on the left-hand side of the</p> <p>25 board there was I think a firefighter who was writing</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 186</p>	<p>1 Q. Did you see a watch manager writing FSG information on</p> <p>2 the wall on the back of the 2nd-floor balcony?</p> <p>3 A. When I got on to the balcony on my way in, there was</p> <p>4 a watch manager at the end of the balcony. I touched</p> <p>5 base with them in the same way I touched base with</p> <p>6 Brien O'Keeffe, et cetera. So on my way in, I said,</p> <p>7 "I'm up here as fire sector commander, are you doing BA</p> <p>8 logistics?" The answer was yes. I said, "Right, I want</p> <p>9 to know what BA we've got on the balcony, what equipment</p> <p>10 we've got, I'm going to come back to you in a minute.</p> <p>11 Have that answer for me, I'll be back in about</p> <p>12 two minutes."</p> <p>13 Then I went to Brien O'Keeffe, same sort of</p> <p>14 conversation. Went to Louisa De Silvo -- and I was on</p> <p>15 that return leg when I met Richard Welch.</p> <p>16 Q. Do you remember to the best of your recollection whether</p> <p>17 you saw FSG information relating to higher floors</p> <p>18 inscribed on the walls or the forward information</p> <p>19 boards?</p> <p>20 A. I can 100 per cent say I never saw any FSG information</p> <p>21 on walls other than later in the incident, in the lobby,</p> <p>22 where Glynn Williams was doing a schematic and recording</p> <p>23 information on the wall there while I was doing the sort</p> <p>24 of lobby sector commander role that I evolved into later</p> <p>25 in the incident.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 188</p>

<p>1 Q. During the period that you were at the bridgehead, after 2 having come up there when first given the fire sector 3 commander role, during that entire period, before 4 Richard Welch came, did you learn that fire had 5 penetrated into flats above the 4th floor?</p> <p>6 A. I never had any confirmation regarding where fires were 7 located in the building. I never had any indication at 8 all at any point.</p> <p>9 Q. Did you discover how high in the building the smoke had 10 reached?</p> <p>11 A. I hadn't had that information back. I'd asked for it. 12 I didn't get back to get the answer.</p> <p>13 Q. Did you ever discover the smoke conditions in the 14 lobbies?</p> <p>15 A. No.</p> <p>16 Q. Do you think that was ever part of your responsibility?</p> <p>17 A. I'd asked the questions. I didn't get a chance to get 18 the answers.</p> <p>19 Q. Because Richard Welch took over from you?</p> <p>20 A. Because I was no longer in that role, I was on the 21 balcony organising the BA logistics to make sure we 22 didn't run out of BA, we didn't run out of equipment.</p> <p>23 Q. Let's turn to the handover to Richard Welch. 24 Can you remember, first of all, what time Group 25 Manager Welch appeared at the 2nd-floor bridgehead?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 189</p>	<p>1 her in the past, she did a good job. And that's where 2 I think I said she needs some crew managers to assist 3 her, but I can't be 100 per cent on that.</p> <p>4 I said I've asked for what we've talked about from 5 Brien O'Keeffe, I said it again. I've told him I'll be 6 coming back to him in a couple of minutes, I'm going to 7 the balcony to get the balcony sorted out.</p> <p>8 As I was saying that, I've been asked for the 9 chinagraph and the key points were being written on the 10 wall, and then Richard Welch said -- the reason 11 I mentioned the IC tabard, it's really unusual to have 12 an IC tabard on on the bridgehead, and I explained why 13 I had it on, and it was a conscious decision. So one of 14 the first things he asked me was, "Are you in charge?" 15 I explained why I was still in that tabard. He said, 16 "I'm taking over as fire sector commander", so as he 17 said that, I peeled it off and I literally threw it in 18 the corner, because I wasn't going to need it anymore. 19 So we had that exchange, he recorded the 20 information, then he said, "Right, I'm taking over as 21 fire sector commander, I'm going to make you BA 22 logistics officer, I want you to sort that balcony out, 23 I want to not run out of BA and I do not want to run out 24 of any equipment, go and make that happen."</p> <p>25 Q. During that exchange, did you tell Richard Welch that</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 191</p>
<p>1 A. I haven't got a clue. It would be about -- because 2 I spent seconds with the watch manager on the balcony, 3 probably about a minute with Brien O'Keeffe, probably 4 about the same time with Louisa De Silvo, I would guess 5 that it would be within 5 minutes of me going up the 6 staircase to take over.</p> <p>7 Q. Did you hear a radio message on your fire ground radio, 8 or even your Airwave radio for that matter, that 9 Richard Welch had taken over as incident commander?</p> <p>10 A. I can't remember that message.</p> <p>11 Q. Do you remember the declaration of a major incident?</p> <p>12 A. I can't remember that being declared over fire ground 13 radio.</p> <p>14 Q. When you first saw Richard Welch at the 2nd-floor 15 bridgehead, did he come up to you?</p> <p>16 A. We met on the corridor going in different directions, 17 and so it was on the 2nd floor, on the corridor, 18 adjacent to the staircase.</p> <p>19 Q. Did you give him a handover at that point?</p> <p>20 A. Yes. And I summarise what I just talked about, I told 21 him there's a watch manager running BA that I don't 22 know, but he seems to have a good grip of it. I don't 23 know his name, he's got an Irish accent. There's 24 a watch manager running FIB boards with FSG information 25 on, her name is Louisa De Silvo, I've been on jobs with</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 190</p>	<p>1 Andy O'Loughlin had taken over as incident commander?</p> <p>2 A. I didn't tell him, I assumed that he would've been 3 tasked by Andy O'Loughlin. I didn't know how he'd 4 arrived or anything like that. My assumption was he was 5 one of the GMs that had arrived, the incident commander, 6 who I knew was Andy O'Loughlin, had given him a task, 7 which was to relieve me, which is the normal process. 8 If a more senior officer is available and the 9 circumstances of the incident make it appropriate, the 10 senior officer takes over in the different command 11 roles.</p> <p>12 Q. Did you know that he, Richard Welch, had taken or 13 thought he'd taken incident command from Brett Loft, a 14 station manager, who he thought was incident commander?</p> <p>15 A. No.</p> <p>16 Q. You didn't?</p> <p>17 A. I had no knowledge of that.</p> <p>18 Q. During your discussion -- I won't call it a handover -- 19 with Richard Welch at the bridgehead, did you have 20 a discussion with him about re-entry of fire into the 21 building?</p> <p>22 A. I prefer to call it a handover, because it was, and 23 I didn't have a discussion insomuch as where I thought 24 it may or may not be. I didn't guess about re-entering. 25 I said one of the tasks is to get BA to this face to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 192</p>

48 (Pages 189 to 192)

<p>1 confirm if the fire is getting back in, and if it is, to 2 confirm whether we can hold it and what we need to be 3 able to do that. 4 Q. Just going back to your second statement, if we can, at 5 paragraphs 43 and 44 on page 11, you discuss in two 6 places the likelihood that the building design principle 7 for the high-rise had failed. 8 First of all, you say that in the middle of 9 paragraph 43. Can I show you that. This is I think in 10 connection with your handover from Mike Dowden. You 11 say: 12 "... it made me draw the conclusion it was likely 13 the building design principle for high rise premises had 14 failed and conditions within the building's escape 15 routes were compromised and likely to not be passable 16 without Breathing Apparatus (BA). Failure of this 'stay 17 put' building design principle could also indicate that 18 the fire as well as smoke may be spreading to multiple 19 compartments and levels if it had entered the building 20 interior. I feared this apparent smoke spread 21 throughout the building meant compartmentation and 22 separation was breached." 23 Going on to para 44, you say, picking it up in the 24 middle of the paragraph: 25 "... the system protecting the lobbies and staircase</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 193</p>	<p>1 that is what had happened. I was trying to get it 2 confirmed to make sure that everything we were doing 3 based on assumption was reasonable and was necessary. 4 And it was, and that's the answer. 5 Q. We have got to the point where you have a handover with 6 Richard Welch at the bridgehead. Looking back on your 7 time on the incident ground up to that point, at what 8 point do you think you'd come to the conclusion that the 9 building design principle for high-rise premises had 10 failed in relation to this building and that it was 11 possible or even likely that the fire was penetrating 12 back into the building? 13 A. When I put my foot on the bottom step of the stairs 14 after I'd had the report back from Mike that the smoke 15 extraction had failed. 16 Q. At that point? 17 A. With everything else I'd seen, smelt, heard, all the 18 information I'd gathered, the confirmation that that 19 system had failed, the lifts had failed, I could see the 20 fire was spreading up the outside of the building in 21 a way it should be impossible for it to do so, I had got 22 that in my head at that point. 23 I had some really earthy language about what that 24 building was at that point. I know it went through my 25 mind. The best way I can put it is: this building is</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 195</p>
<p>1 had failed, we had multiple reports throughout the 2 building that people were trapped and required rescue 3 and this indicated the compartmentation and separation 4 within the building had probably failed, causing the 5 lobbies on various levels to be impassable. There was a 6 rapidly spreading fire in the exterior fabric of the 7 building on the east face and it was possible this fire 8 was penetrating back into the building on upper floors 9 through the windows. I did not know if the 10 compartmentation within the building was intact and able 11 to check any subsequent interior spread, allowing us to 12 get BA crews in place to affect rescues and fight the 13 fire simultaneously." 14 I've shown you a lot of that. My question is 15 this: at the point at which you see Richard Welch at the 16 bridgehead and have the discussion with him, did you 17 tell him your thoughts about the likelihood that the 18 building design principle for high-rise had failed -- 19 and I'm summarising -- and that it was possible that the 20 fire was penetrating back into the building? 21 A. I can't remember the exact wording, but it was obvious 22 that we'd got multiple FSGs -- I told him what I was 23 trying to confirm, one way or the other. 24 In effect, my assumption -- and I believe 25 everybody's assumption on the fire ground -- was that</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 194</p>	<p>1 compromised completely, I cannot rely on anything. 2 Q. Did you then have a discussion with Group Manager Welch 3 about how you were going to deploy crews in order to 4 assist occupants to evacuate from the building? 5 A. I didn't have it with Group Manager Welch, I had it with 6 Brien O'Keeffe about what was his priorities, and his 7 priorities were we're getting BA to every FSG. And, 8 yes, I knew that was happening and that was part of my 9 briefing. 10 At the moment, we've got everybody arriving rigging 11 in BA, I knew that from the briefing I'd gathered from 12 Mike Dowden. They're coming in, we're holding them on 13 the balcony, they're getting called in when they're 14 needed and they're getting briefed to go to every FSG. 15 That was what was happening on that bridgehead. 16 Q. To the best of your recollection on what you saw, was 17 there any system for prioritising among the FSG calls 18 particular FSG calls? 19 A. I never saw a system for that. When I was taking over 20 that role, when I was getting my situational awareness 21 as fire sector commander, again, going back to the 22 questions I was asking, that was about identifying who 23 was at most risk, and those would've been the 24 priorities. I wouldn't have been prioritising about the 25 numbers, the age, the mobility, anything like that;</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 196</p>

<p>1 I would've been looking at: who is at most risk of this</p> <p>2 fire getting to them first? They would've been the</p> <p>3 priorities. And then those other factors would've come</p> <p>4 in as secondary factors to move people in that</p> <p>5 prioritisation.</p> <p>6 Q. Did you have a discussion with Group Manager Welch about</p> <p>7 how you would go about getting information -- accurate,</p> <p>8 reliable information -- as to which FSG callers were the</p> <p>9 ones most acutely affected by fire or smoke?</p> <p>10 A. We never had that conversation, but the FSG process is</p> <p>11 that fire control ask those questions, and they gather</p> <p>12 that information and they send it to the incident</p> <p>13 ground. So details about how many, their condition,</p> <p>14 their age, the conditions they're in, is all part of</p> <p>15 that information-gathering process, and that's what</p> <p>16 comes to us on the control information forms, and that's</p> <p>17 what should be being used to inform the bridgehead, and</p> <p>18 that's what's used by the BA co-ordinator to prioritise</p> <p>19 where they're sending people.</p> <p>20 Q. During the period that you were fire sector commander,</p> <p>21 did you ever consider the possibility that it would be</p> <p>22 impossible to extinguish the fire within the building?</p> <p>23 A. No. We were going to rescue everybody and we were going</p> <p>24 to put the fire out.</p> <p>25 Q. Did you consider the --</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 197</p>	<p>1 be one or two which after a short break I might feel</p> <p>2 I have to ask, but I hope not.</p> <p>3 Mr Chairman, might that be a convenient moment for</p> <p>4 a short break?</p> <p>5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Of course.</p> <p>6 Mr Walton, it sometimes happens after mature</p> <p>7 reflection counsel finds there are more questions to be</p> <p>8 asked. So I am going to rise for 5 minutes.</p> <p>9 Would that be long enough, do you think?</p> <p>10 MR MILLETT: Let's go with 5 minutes. If I need longer,</p> <p>11 I'll get a runner to send a message.</p> <p>12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That will give Mr Millett a chance</p> <p>13 to consider his position, and then we'll get you back</p> <p>14 and see if there are more questions.</p> <p>15 THE WITNESS: Thank you.</p> <p>16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So no talking to anyone about your</p> <p>17 evidence for the time being. If you would like to go</p> <p>18 with the usher, she'll look after you.</p> <p>19 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.</p> <p>20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, I'll say 4.30 --</p> <p>21 MR MILLETT: Yes.</p> <p>22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: -- or when you send the usher for me</p> <p>23 to say you are ready.</p> <p>24 MR MILLETT: Whichever is the earlier, or later.</p> <p>25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Later. Thank you.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 199</p>
<p>1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Are you okay?</p> <p>2 A. I am fine. I'm fine.</p> <p>3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Okay.</p> <p>4 MR MILLETT: During the period that you were fire sector</p> <p>5 commander, Mr Walton, did you consider whether it would</p> <p>6 be preferable to focus your resources on firefighting as</p> <p>7 a priority or on rescue as a priority?</p> <p>8 A. We had to do simultaneous action. If we could stop the</p> <p>9 fire getting back in, then there were no rescues that</p> <p>10 needed doing, it would be a case of clear the staircases</p> <p>11 and people can walk out tomorrow. So firefighting was</p> <p>12 a priority. The likelihood, and probably the true truth</p> <p>13 of the situation which hadn't been confirmed yet, was</p> <p>14 that fire was probably back in, in which case we needed</p> <p>15 to rescue. So we needed to carry out both until we had</p> <p>16 a confirmation one way or the other as to what should be</p> <p>17 the priority.</p> <p>18 So we were in a catch 22. There was no escape route</p> <p>19 for the people to use themselves, they had to be</p> <p>20 rescued, and we had to try and maintain that pathway for</p> <p>21 us to carry out those rescues, let alone those people to</p> <p>22 try and use it themselves. So that meant the</p> <p>23 firefighting was essential.</p> <p>24 MR MILLETT: Mr Walton, thank you very much, those are all</p> <p>25 the questions I have for you at the moment. There may</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 198</p>	<p>1 (4.25 pm)</p> <p>2 (A short break)</p> <p>3 (4.30 pm)</p> <p>4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you, Mr Walton. I think a few</p> <p>5 more questions.</p> <p>6 MR MILLETT: Mr Walton, thank you for coming back to me.</p> <p>7 First of all, there was a reference in a document</p> <p>8 I wanted to show you earlier and I didn't find it</p> <p>9 properly. Can I please ask for it to be shown. It's</p> <p>10 IWS00000169 at page 91.</p> <p>11 Now, you won't have seen this document before. It's</p> <p>12 an e-mail from Peter Maddison at KCTMO to a number of</p> <p>13 people at RBKC, and indeed others, and complaints@KCTMO</p> <p>14 as well, and also to a gentleman called Edward Daffarn,</p> <p>15 who is a resident. It's addressed to Mr Daffarn, and it</p> <p>16 says:</p> <p>17 "Dear Mr Daffarn</p> <p>18 Thank you for your message, I would respond to the</p> <p>19 issues you raise as follows."</p> <p>20 If you could have that scrolled down to the foot of</p> <p>21 that page where the title to the paragraph is</p> <p>22 "Activation of the Automatic Opening Vents (AOV)", it</p> <p>23 says:</p> <p>24 "The Automatic Opening Vents are designed to</p> <p>25 disperse smoke in the event of a fire. The old system</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 200</p>

<p>1 was beyond repair and the new system, serving floors 5 2 and above, was commissioned in January 2016." 3 Then it says this: 4 "The system does not automatically contact the Fire 5 Brigade when activated, as the brigade does not provide 6 a response in such circumstances." 7 Then it goes on to discuss a phone connection. 8 Then it says this: 9 "The Fire Brigade are aware that the system is not 10 yet fully automated and have confirmed that they are 11 comfortable with the way that the system currently 12 operates." 13 Now, that is what was being said in this e-mail, and 14 I should just have indicated that the date of this 15 e-mail, if you go to the top, is 18 April 2016, so 16 10 days before your visit. 17 A. Mm-hm. 18 Q. My question is: were you aware, either at the time of 19 your visit or after that, that, as is said here, the 20 Fire Brigade have confirmed that they are comfortable 21 with the way the system currently operates? 22 A. I had no knowledge of that. 23 Q. Next question, still on the subject of the ventilation 24 system, and you described quite graphically for us not 25 very long ago in your evidence about the moment you took</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 201</p>	<p>1 Q. Were you aware or did you become aware during the night 2 that there was an occupant of the tower on the 22nd 3 floor -- flat 193, as it turns out -- who came down and 4 escaped without breathing equipment or without PPE just 5 after 03.00 am? 6 A. I would have been in that lobby role at that time and 7 I've got no recollection of anybody coming out when 8 I was in that lobby role without the assistance of the 9 fire service. So I wasn't aware of that, no. 10 Q. On the basis that that is what happened, how are you 11 able to explain that a survivor could come down in those 12 conditions but crews can't go up? 13 A. I can't explain that. I never saw it, so I can't 14 explain that. 15 Q. Were you aware or did you become aware that occupants of 16 the building had phoned for help and that two hours into 17 the fire they still hadn't been rescued? 18 A. I was aware that FSGs were going on well into the 19 incident, so by extrapolating that, yes, I was aware 20 there were people still in FSG situations well into the 21 fire. 22 Q. Did there come a time when you were aware firefighters 23 were struggling to get above the 15th floor? 24 A. I can't remember being told that, but because of the way 25 I was involved in the implementation of additional fire</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 203</p>
<p>1 the first step on the stairs, that's when you realised 2 the building had failed, and one of the contributing 3 factors was the smoke extraction system wasn't working. 4 If the smoke extraction system had been working, do 5 you think that would have assisted self-evacuation by 6 residents and assisted firefighters in effecting 7 evacuations, from what you knew of it? 8 A. It was designed to do that on the floor that activated, 9 so I would expect it to. 10 Q. I want to ask you a number of questions about a specific 11 floor and flat. 12 Before I do that, can I just ask you in general 13 terms, do you have any recollection from the night of 14 any particular rescues, particular flats, particular 15 floors? 16 A. No. When I went to the balcony, fairly soon after that 17 I carried a casualty from the building. On my way back 18 into the building, I realised that the only way in and 19 out of the building was going to get compromised by the 20 falling debris, so I then took over the role of using 21 police riot shields over our heads to be able to access 22 and egress the building. So I stayed in the lobby and 23 managed that and stayed in that role for the next 24 6 hours, something like that. So I never was involved 25 in actually engaging with any of the rescues.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 202</p>	<p>1 mains, that type of thing, it was obvious we were having 2 difficulties, and the way I was being asked to supply 3 additional EDBA and SDBA wearers throughout the night. 4 Q. We discussed earlier in your evidence the deployment of 5 EDBA wearers, the line crew, to go to the roof. 6 A. Mm-hm. 7 Q. What eventually happened to that idea? 8 A. I never heard anything more about that. I don't know if 9 it was achieved or -- you know, if I'm talking from my 10 knowledge, I had no knowledge of that being achieved. 11 From what I've seen elsewhere in the inquiry, I know it 12 didn't happen. 13 Q. Did you ever discuss with Richard Welch, when he came to 14 the bridgehead and you started talking about getting 15 people out of the building, to put it loosely, did you 16 talk about a strategy whereby you'd work from the top 17 down or from the bottom up? 18 A. No, we prioritised the people at most risk. So that 19 would've been what we talked about. I was telling him 20 how we were going to identify who was at most risk with 21 the questions that I'd asked, and then he would decide 22 on what the priority was for rescue on that information. 23 Q. Did he ever discuss with you a strategy whereby you 24 would do floor sweeps and work your way up the building? 25 A. When I was on the BA lobby sector, so I was on the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 204</p>

<p>1 balcony on the 2nd floor controlling BA resources there, 2 the message came back to me to brief the crews that were 3 waiting on the landing, that in order to be able to 4 reduce the travel distance, as we gained control of the 5 fire situation on a floor, we would advance the 6 bridgehead, with the idea that we would systematically 7 put the fire out on the floor above, move and take that 8 ground and we would advance up the building. 9 So I was to warn crews that although they may have 10 dispatched from, say, the 2nd floor as the bridgehead, 11 when they returned, the bridgehead may be on the 12 3rd floor, it may be on the 4th floor, so make sure 13 you're aware of that situation, and if you come back to 14 where you think the bridgehead is, that could be the 15 reason why. 16 That was literally the type of briefing I was -- 17 part of the briefing I was giving to BA crews while they 18 were waiting. 19 Q. Is that when you were on the BA lobby sector? 20 A. BA logistics is the title that Richard Welch gave it. 21 So I was on the balcony and I was making sure that the 22 crews that assembled there had the minimum level of 23 equipment that I wanted them to have as a BA team, that 24 they knew where the additional equipment was, and that 25 they were fully switched on to the conditions they were</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 205</p>	<p>1 today and assisting us with our investigations. We're 2 very grateful to you. Thank you. 3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I add my thanks to that, Mr Walton. 4 It's been a long day for you and I know that from time 5 to time it's been quite distressing. But I'd like you 6 to know that your evidence is very helpful to us, and so 7 we're very grateful to you for coming along to give it. 8 But now it's over, you are free to go. 9 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. 10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. 11 (The witness withdrew) 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett. 13 MR MILLETT: Well, Mr Chairman, that concludes the evidence 14 for today. I'm grateful to you, Mr Chairman, for 15 sitting a little bit later than we would normally, but 16 we start again, if we may, 10 o'clock Monday morning. 17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. 18 MR MILLETT: With DAC O'Loughlin, I hope. 19 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, thank you all very much. 20 Yes, well, we'll break now and resume at 10 o'clock 21 on Monday morning. Thank you very much. 22 MR MILLETT: Thank you. 23 (4.45 pm) 24 (The hearing adjourned until Monday, 24 September 2018 at 25 10.00 am)</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 207</p>
<p>1 going into. 2 I remember briefing crews on that balcony that this 3 was a really serious fire. The only way anyone's going 4 to come out of this building is if you bring them out. 5 Only you know the conditions that you're working in. 6 Make sure that you don't die trying to do the 7 impossible. But don't do it lightly. Because the only 8 way they're coming out is if you get them. 9 Q. Just to be clear in terms of timing, that was when the 10 bridgehead was still on the 2nd floor -- 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. -- or had it moved to the 3rd floor? 13 A. I was probably on that bridgehead -- on that area for 14 about 10, maybe 15 minutes, before a spate of casualties 15 arrived, and the available firefighters without 16 breathing apparatus on who were being used as 17 casualty-carriers were exhausted. They were used taking 18 casualties out. So I had to take a casualty from the 19 building. 20 On my return was where I realised the exterior had 21 compromised the main -- or the only way in and out of 22 the building, and I improvised using shields. 23 MR MILLETT: Mr Walton, thank you very much, I have no 24 further questions for you. 25 I just want to say thank you to you for coming here</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 206</p>	<p>1 INDEX 2 ANDREW WALTON (affirmed)1 3 Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY1 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 208</p>

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