

<p>1 Wednesday, 26 September 2018</p> <p>2 (9.30 am)</p> <p>3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to</p> <p>4 today's hearing. We are going to hear in moment now</p> <p>5 from Mr Roe.</p> <p>6 MR MILLETT: Good morning, Mr Chairman.</p> <p>7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Morning, Mr Roe.</p> <p>8 THE WITNESS: Morning, sir. Morning, sir.</p> <p>9 MR MILLETT: Morning, Mr Roe.</p> <p>10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Ready to carry on, I hope.</p> <p>11 MR MILLETT: Before I do, Mr Chairman, can I just make</p> <p>12 a housekeeping or timetabling point to you, Mr Chairman,</p> <p>13 which I think other members of the public don't know</p> <p>14 yet.</p> <p>15 At the moment, in our schedule for today we have</p> <p>16 Watch Manager Kentfield.</p> <p>17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.</p> <p>18 MR MILLETT: He was scheduled to come to give evidence this</p> <p>19 afternoon.</p> <p>20 At just after the end of hearing yesterday, we</p> <p>21 received from the Metropolitan Police a statement from</p> <p>22 him running to some 21 or so pages, very recently</p> <p>23 signed, which we have yet to study in detail. It has</p> <p>24 not been disclosed and it would need to go through the</p> <p>25 redactions and disclosure process before it were</p> <p>Page 1</p>	<p>1 Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY (continued)</p> <p>2 MR MILLETT: Mr Roe, good morning.</p> <p>3 <b>A. Morning, sir.</b></p> <p>4 Q. Can I ask you to revisit with me a topic very briefly</p> <p>5 that we discussed yesterday.</p> <p>6 Were you aware at any time of a pilot exercise</p> <p>7 developed by a watch manager called Peter Johnson, who</p> <p>8 was on the command unit team, which demonstrated the</p> <p>9 operational difficulties that crews would run into once</p> <p>10 FSG numbers got up to seven or so?</p> <p>11 <b>A. No, I wasn't aware of that.</b></p> <p>12 Q. Were you aware that a watch manager had developed</p> <p>13 a training exercise of that kind which was deemed not</p> <p>14 necessary or relevant by senior members of the LFB?</p> <p>15 <b>A. No, I wasn't aware of that.</b></p> <p>16 Q. Can I then turn to the topic of stay put.</p> <p>17 If you go to your Roe log, which is MET00005404 and</p> <p>18 turn to the first page of that, please, we can see that</p> <p>19 at 02.47, the very first entry on the log, we see:</p> <p>20 "AC Roe takes over and receives handover from DAC</p> <p>21 O'Loughlan[sic].</p> <p>22 "AC Roe records decision to deviate from FSG advice</p> <p>23 being delivered to FSG callers by control staff and</p> <p>24 advise people to make efforts to leave the building.</p> <p>25 Fire Sector is briefed to that effect."</p> <p>Page 3</p>
<p>1 disclosed.</p> <p>2 In the light of that, it would be unfair to</p> <p>3 everybody, I think, including Mr Kentfield, to be called</p> <p>4 to give evidence this afternoon when his evidence would</p> <p>5 be based only on his contemporaneous note.</p> <p>6 In those circumstances, we have taken steps with the</p> <p>7 LFB to postpone his evidence to a date to be fixed, as</p> <p>8 it were, pending detailed consideration of his statement</p> <p>9 and its disclosure to all CPs so that they can consider</p> <p>10 it as well. We will update you and the public in due</p> <p>11 course on whether, and if so when, we intend to call</p> <p>12 him.</p> <p>13 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.</p> <p>14 MR MILLETT: It may well be that all the questions we have</p> <p>15 for him are answered by his statement.</p> <p>16 So that's the position with Mr Kentfield.</p> <p>17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you for drawing everyone's</p> <p>18 attention to that. It's regrettable that we can't take</p> <p>19 his evidence today and I'm sorry about that,</p> <p>20 particularly because it's another disruption to the</p> <p>21 LFB's arrangements, but we really have no option.</p> <p>22 MR MILLETT: Yes, I agree. Thank you.</p> <p>23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So thank you for telling us. Yes.</p> <p>24 MR MILLETT: There we are.</p> <p>25 ANDREW ROE (continued)</p> <p>Page 2</p>	<p>1 In your statement, you say, page 4, the penultimate</p> <p>2 paragraph:</p> <p>3 "At 0247 hrs I asked CU to contact control and ask</p> <p>4 them to stop giving stay put advice if they still were.</p> <p>5 This was based on the fire spread in the building and</p> <p>6 the number of persons trapped. At the same time control</p> <p>7 asked for the same thing. I agreed and asked them to</p> <p>8 now advise people to make best efforts to escape."</p> <p>9 <b>A. Yes. So when I got --</b></p> <p>10 Q. Can I just --</p> <p>11 <b>A. Apologies.</b></p> <p>12 Q. I am just showing you that so you know what is recorded</p> <p>13 about this decision.</p> <p>14 I don't know if you've been following the inquiry,</p> <p>15 but we've heard evidence from DAC O'Loughlin that he was</p> <p>16 the one who was told by control that the stay-put advice</p> <p>17 had been changed at control by Jo Smith and</p> <p>18 Adrian Fenton, and he told you that the decision had</p> <p>19 been taken when you arrived on the command unit.</p> <p>20 Is that your recollection or is your recollection</p> <p>21 something different?</p> <p>22 <b>A. My recollection is something different. But that's not</b></p> <p>23 <b>to say that Andy didn't say that. At the end of the</b></p> <p>24 <b>day, I was in charge of the incident for a long time and</b></p> <p>25 <b>there were many interactions with Andy, but I don't</b></p> <p>Page 4</p>

<p>1 remember that. What I remember is thinking very clearly 2 as I got onto the unit that I wanted to end stay put. 3 I had a brief conversation with Nick Thatcher in the 4 first instance about the civil disorder situation, that 5 was the first conversation I had. He was the acting MPS 6 inspector. 7 I then turned to Jackie McConochie and, although 8 speaking to her, basically informed the entire command 9 unit that I was taking over because I wanted to take 10 that responsibility from Andy and I wanted that logged 11 and that she was to be my loggist, and then said the 12 first decision I wanted recorded was that I wanted to 13 end stay-put advice. 14 I then turned to the command unit staff to then give 15 them that same instruction, to make contact with 16 control, and oddly found I didn't have to because 17 control were on the phone. I don't know what command 18 unit officer it was, I don't know their name, I can't 19 remember their name; all I can tell you is he was 20 a white, middle-aged man, bald -- because I can see it 21 in my head -- 22 Q. Johnson -- 23 A. It may well have been Pete Johnson -- turned across to 24 me and said -- 25 Q. You weren't supposed to hear that, that was under my</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 5</p>	<p>1 determined I was going to make that decision before 2 I stepped onto the unit. I think what it shows is that 3 there was a triangulation in terms of my own assessment 4 of the incident and obviously what had occurred in 5 control. I wasn't aware, as you've just explained to 6 me, that control had taken that decision earlier. That 7 hadn't been communicated to me, I had no awareness of 8 that. 9 As far as I was concerned, I'd come to that 10 assessment on the basis of what I'd heard in control, 11 what I'd seen as regards the tower itself and the 12 viability of the advice that we would've been giving as 13 regards stay put considering the conditions in the 14 building, and then, having got onto the unit, found in 15 that moment that obviously they'd come to the same 16 conclusion. 17 Andy may well have briefed me to that effect 18 afterwards, but I don't remember it. 19 Q. Do you remember investigating with or through Peter 20 Johnson, or whoever it was, with control what were the 21 factors which went into making that decision? 22 A. No. And actually at that point in the incident, that 23 wasn't my priority, because I was very clear about 24 what -- that's why I think it's important I own it as my 25 decision, in the sense that I was there, I had some</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 7</p>
<p>1 breath to Mr Kinnier, but that would be my next 2 question! 3 A. Sorry, I did pick it up, but it may well have been Pete 4 Johnson. He turned to me, holding the phone, and said, 5 "Control are on the phone asking to end stay-put advice, 6 what do you want to do?" I said, "Well, I want to end 7 it anyway, so you can tell them yes and I think we 8 should be advising people they need to make best efforts 9 to escape." 10 Q. Neither Jo Smith nor DAC Fenton recall that they asked 11 for permission to change the advice. They said they 12 made the decision themselves within the control room and 13 were simply communicating that decision to the incident 14 ground. 15 A. That may well have been the case, but what was 16 communicated to me, bearing in mind I didn't have 17 a direct conversation with either Jo or Adrian about 18 this, was that they were asking, and I just said yes. 19 Because that concurred with my own assessment of what 20 was occurring at the incident. 21 Q. So in the log we see that you record the decision to 22 deviate, do we read that as decision made by the control 23 room, with which you were agreeing, or your decision as 24 incident commander? 25 A. No, I would hold that as my decision because I'd</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 6</p>	<p>1 situational awareness, I saw how the tower was behaving. 2 I knew that although that was a difficult decision -- 3 and it's not a straightforward decision to end stay put, 4 it isn't going to guarantee necessarily a greater level 5 of survivability for those poor people trapped inside 6 the tower, but what I was very clear about is it was no 7 longer valid advice, it was not something we could 8 reasonably give people, because, actually, all the 9 safeguards that building regulation would normally give 10 you had been stripped away, and therefore we shouldn't 11 be advising people in that regard. 12 So that was where my decision lay, and what I saw on 13 the incident ground did not permit me to allow that to 14 continue because it just wasn't correct. 15 Q. Did you get any sense, though, when you arrived on the 16 command unit and the decision was made, that the 17 decision had not only previously been made sometime 18 before that, but was now being acted on by the control 19 room? 20 A. No, I didn't. But at that point, obviously what I'd 21 done is walked via the tower, had a snapshot of how the 22 fire survival guidance sector was being run from Tom 23 Goodall. This all happened quite quickly, sequentially. 24 I'm starting to form an opinion in my own mind using the 25 decision-making model about what my priorities were, my</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 8</p>

<p>1 primary objectives, and how I was going to deliver 2 activity to meet those objectives. So I was very 3 fixated on my own needs to establish a structure to meet 4 those priorities, and, actually, once I'd come to the 5 decision that that was the right decision, I didn't 6 necessarily need to dissect that in depth. There was 7 too much dynamic on the incident ground to do that.</p> <p>8 In particular, I was very concerned about the 9 potential for civil disorder. That was actually my 10 priority getting on the back of the unit. I felt that 11 at the point we were at, yes, stay put was extremely 12 important, that was the first decision I wanted to make, 13 but actually, at an even more basic level, I needed 14 someone to regain control of the incident ground as 15 a whole, I needed better cordons in place, I needed my 16 people given the space to operate without facing the 17 moral pressure, completely understandably, from the 18 families and community that were there faced with this 19 awful sight, but actually I really did need that space. 20 That was my greatest concern.</p> <p>21 My feeling was I wouldn't be able to get the numbers 22 of people into the block that I wanted from the fire 23 service if we didn't create some space at the base of 24 the tower, and I was worried, actually, about the safety 25 of residents and members of the community who I felt</p> <p>Page 9</p>	<p>1 no longer guarantee the integrity of the 2 compartmentation that was going to protect them, and 3 therefore they almost had to take their own judgement as 4 to what was going to place them at greater risk.</p> <p>5 So, actually, I would've expected control 6 operators -- if there had been less calls, by the way -- 7 to perhaps interrogate a caller about the nature of the 8 conditions in their flat, what kind of risk was posed to 9 them and perhaps help them to come to that decision 10 themselves. Because, actually, my sense was that 11 conditions could've been so variable inside the tower 12 that some people might have continued to be safer 13 staying put, other people would've benefited from 14 leaving the flats.</p> <p>15 There was every possibility from what I'd seen even 16 briefly coming past the tower that the lobby was 17 compromised, so it wasn't necessarily that we were 18 putting people into a hugely safer environment by 19 suggesting they could leave the flat than they were in 20 the flat. To be honest, it was like a devil's choice. 21 People were in a terrible place where the whole of the 22 building had failed, but what we couldn't do was 23 reasonably suggest they were safe staying put.</p> <p>24 So it would've been about a discussion about their 25 individual circumstances, trying to gauge whether we</p> <p>Page 11</p>
<p>1 were on the edge of almost taking matters into their own 2 hands and going back into the tower. There was almost 3 that sense from the conversations people had attempted 4 to have with me on the way. That was actually my 5 priority, which is why the first thing I said to anyone 6 when I saw the police officer, Nick Thatcher, when I got 7 on the unit, was actually expressing my concern about 8 that and a desire that he call in extra resources to 9 take control of the situation which, to their credit, 10 they did.</p> <p>11 In fact, I think I specifically asked for the 12 Territorial Support Group, so police who specialise in 13 managing civil disorder, and they turned out to be very, 14 very useful in a different context later in the 15 incident.</p> <p>16 Q. Can we focus on the change in the stay-put advice 17 recorded in your log. I just want to keep this as tight 18 as possible to that issue.</p> <p>19 Regardless of who made the decision and whether they 20 were separate decisions or when, what advice did you 21 think should now be given to people who were still in 22 the building?</p> <p>23 A. I think that is extremely difficult. I think the advice 24 would be an honest one, which would be that the 25 conditions inside the building were such that we could</p> <p>Page 10</p>	<p>1 were going to get to them in time, which, again, I think 2 would've been almost impossible in the context of the 3 volume of calls coming in, and we talked about the 4 difficulties of that feedback loop yesterday.</p> <p>5 So I think, actually, control operators were 6 themselves in an almost impossible position in terms of 7 managing the volume of calls, trying to judge a distant 8 situation, having recognised themselves and from the 9 incident ground that stay put was no longer valid. 10 Actually, I think we were in the realms of something we 11 hadn't encountered before either on that scale or of 12 that nature.</p> <p>13 Q. What did you expect or at least hope would change for 14 the better, or perhaps not change for the worse, as 15 a result of the change to the stay-put advice or the 16 advice that you were giving or wanted to give to FSG 17 callers?</p> <p>18 A. I hoped that for some residents in the building it would 19 give them the opportunity to escape via the lobby whilst 20 they still had a chance to do so. But I would caveat 21 that by saying that I was under no illusions -- 22 absolutely no illusions -- that we were at a stage of 23 the incident, at the point that I took over, that anyone 24 inside that building, including my own firefighters, 25 were at great peril. It wouldn't have mattered where</p> <p>Page 12</p>

<p>1 you were in the building, above that 4th floor, you were</p> <p>2 in great danger. Because there was no way we could</p> <p>3 guarantee control of fire spread.</p> <p>4 It was like a fire storm is the only way I can</p> <p>5 describe it. The level of fire spread -- lateral,</p> <p>6 horizontally, vertically, downwards -- was to such</p> <p>7 an extreme that I think it would've become very</p> <p>8 difficult to provide good advice to callers in</p> <p>9 particular, because whilst they might have been able to</p> <p>10 describe the circumstances of fire spread in their own</p> <p>11 flat, what they wouldn't have an awareness of is the</p> <p>12 conditions if they were worsening immediately outside</p> <p>13 the flat or maybe two floors below.</p> <p>14 So we've heard evidence of floors above the fire</p> <p>15 being in a better state than ones below, and then yet</p> <p>16 another floor above being in a worse state. That's very</p> <p>17 unusual to have that inconsistency between different</p> <p>18 floors, because the fire is spreading in such</p> <p>19 an unpredictable and wild manner, whether through voids</p> <p>20 or just through the ferocity of the fire itself.</p> <p>21 So I think they were in an extremely difficult</p> <p>22 position, the control operators.</p> <p>23 Q. Can I ask you to look, please, at the control debrief</p> <p>24 which is LFB00003113, and go, please, to page 6 in that.</p> <p>25 This is a PRC review for the control room, I should</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 13</p>	<p>1 would that be similar to or consistent with the advice</p> <p>2 that Jo Smith was telling her control room operators to</p> <p>3 give?</p> <p>4 A. I think Jo's given some excellent guidance there.</p> <p>5 I think that's about as good advice as you could give,</p> <p>6 actually. Whether that would have necessarily protected</p> <p>7 people in the circumstances they found themselves, no.</p> <p>8 But, actually, in terms of the best advice a control</p> <p>9 operator could give, I think that's excellent advice.</p> <p>10 Q. Let me just ask you this: did you go about, even</p> <p>11 briefly, an exercise of balancing the risk of leaving</p> <p>12 the caller in a flat which may become affected by smoke</p> <p>13 or fire or heat on the one hand with, on the other, the</p> <p>14 risks inherent in taking them through a smoke-logged</p> <p>15 exit route?</p> <p>16 A. I'm sorry, could you repeat that question?</p> <p>17 Q. Did you balance the two risks, one against the other:</p> <p>18 leaving the caller in a flat which may become</p> <p>19 smoke-affected or heat-affected or fire-affected on the</p> <p>20 one hand, with on the other hand taking them through</p> <p>21 a smoke-logged exit route?</p> <p>22 A. Yes. That was the thought process I'd gone through as</p> <p>23 I walked from the base of the tower, and I did grapple</p> <p>24 with that because that's not a straightforward decision.</p> <p>25 What drove me to my final decision was internal</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 15</p>
<p>1 just tell you, and these are also manuscript notes of</p> <p>2 a meeting which was held on 24 July 2017. Jo Smith was</p> <p>3 present at it as well as a number of other control room</p> <p>4 officers.</p> <p>5 If you go to page 6:</p> <p>6 "0235 -- stay-put advice changed.</p> <p>7 "-- info from incident ground [to] ORT, CU via SM</p> <p>8 Oliff.</p> <p>9 "-- DAC Fenton views news on TV in BCC.</p> <p>10 "-- Jo Smith aware of Lakanal -- '1 hour'.</p> <p>11 "-- Jo Smith listening to Stratford control room and</p> <p>12 forming an opinion.</p> <p>13 "-- DAC Fenton wants to check with fire ground.</p> <p>14 "-- Jo Smith makes decision and tells A Norman.</p> <p>15 "-- Advice to wet towels over mouth.</p> <p>16 "-- Hold hands/stay together.</p> <p>17 "-- Get out -- could be last chance."</p> <p>18 First question, going back to the topic we looked at</p> <p>19 a minute ago: were you aware that that advice had been</p> <p>20 given and was being given from 02.35?</p> <p>21 A. No, I wasn't, and I wasn't aware of the level of detail</p> <p>22 that was being given in terms of that advice, no.</p> <p>23 Q. So in terms of the detail of that advice, "get out --</p> <p>24 could be last chance", when you advised, as we see in</p> <p>25 the log, that people make efforts to leave the building,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 14</p>	<p>1 compartmentation had failed to such an extent,</p> <p>2 I couldn't see any flat ultimately in that building</p> <p>3 remaining as a survivable environment. Because</p> <p>4 I couldn't gauge fully the extent to which that would</p> <p>5 happen, so the timescales within that would happen,</p> <p>6 bearing in mind that what I had seen was that every flat</p> <p>7 I could see was fully involved, vented, fire inside it,</p> <p>8 I felt I had to take a decision on the bigger picture</p> <p>9 because I suppose, again, that's what I'm there for in</p> <p>10 my role.</p> <p>11 I didn't think it was manageable, actually, because</p> <p>12 of the volume of calls, to try and dissect it into</p> <p>13 individual flats at that point, at that moment. I was</p> <p>14 thinking, I guess, about the broader picture and as many</p> <p>15 people as we could save as possible.</p> <p>16 Q. Did you ask DAC O'Loughlin at this time, during his</p> <p>17 briefing or at the moment you made your decision that</p> <p>18 the advice should be changed, as to why he hadn't taken</p> <p>19 the decision to depart from stay put already?</p> <p>20 A. No, because it wouldn't have affected the progress of</p> <p>21 the incident moving forward. I think it would've been</p> <p>22 unhelpful to Andy to do that. I wasn't there at the</p> <p>23 point where he may or may not have made that decision.</p> <p>24 I wasn't aware of the conditions in the tower at the</p> <p>25 point he was there and may or may not have made that</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 16</p>

<p>1 decision. So, to be honest with you, it didn't even  2 cross my mind, because I had what I had. I had a job to  3 do turning up there, taking over, setting priorities,  4 setting activity to meet those priorities. Actually, it  5 was fairly pointless to go back and dissect at that  6 point why a decision had or hadn't been made. I was  7 just clear in my own decision and I knew what I needed  8 to do to push activity forward. So I just don't think  9 it would've been helpful at that point.</p> <p>10 Also, I needed Andy to do a job for me. Andy had  11 absorbed massive pressure for a period of time as  12 incident commander, but I still needed him to go out  13 with confidence, with my trust, to handle a really  14 difficult job maintaining momentum tactically against my  15 objectives.</p> <p>16 Q. He had been there on the incident ground for some 45 to  17 50 minutes, almost an hour before you had --</p> <p>18 A. Mm.</p> <p>19 Q. -- and had been incident commander for some 45 minutes  20 or so before you took over.</p> <p>21 Were you not interested to know, as part of your own  22 assessment of this risk, why he hadn't made the decision  23 that you were about to make?</p> <p>24 A. No, because I think what I was presented with was so  25 stark that, actually, from my perspective, I was very</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 17</p>	<p>1 Q. Given that it was, as you just said, a big decision with  2 important ramifications, and not one you could just make  3 just like that --</p> <p>4 A. No.</p> <p>5 Q. -- wouldn't it have been helpful to you to know what he  6 hadn't seen, but you could now see, and why he hadn't  7 seen it?</p> <p>8 A. No, I don't think it would, because, as I've said,  9 again, I think it's very hard, standing here today, to  10 explain to you the visual impact of that incident. So  11 I think there are some things absolutely -- that's  12 an entirely reasonable question, because at some  13 incidents you would want to have that discursive kind of  14 brief where you understood how we got to that point and  15 why, perhaps, the decision you were considering was  16 perhaps not appropriate or was perhaps more nuanced than  17 it might be in these circumstances.</p> <p>18 But I can only tell you that what I had seen in  19 terms of fire spread in all directions, the full failure  20 of compartmentation, left me in no doubt that we could  21 no longer reasonably offer that advice.</p> <p>22 How we had got to that point, without wanting to  23 sound brutal, was almost irrelevant to me. I knew what  24 I had, I knew what I had to do. I didn't have the time  25 in that moment, faced actually with the potential for</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 19</p>
<p>1 clear about my decision. What may have happened before  2 actually could've been entirely different an hour  3 before. The conditions inside the building could've  4 been entirely different an hour before. Or even,  5 actually, looking at the fire and the way the fire was  6 spreading before my eyes, very different quarter of  7 an hour before. In some ways, it would've been  8 irrelevant to dissect that. What I saw was what I saw.  9 The information I was getting from control verified my  10 own feelings in terms of the volume of FSG calls.</p> <p>11 So, genuinely, I just wouldn't have needed to  12 dissect that piece of decision-making at that point.  13 I think it's entirely appropriate that the inquiry does,  14 I think it's entirely appropriate our PRC did because  15 it's important to learn why people make decisions to  16 take learning forward. But at that point in time, with  17 the dynamic of that incident, with a job to do, and  18 needing to maintain the confidence of Andy in himself  19 and to maintain a view that I trusted him and I needed  20 him to get out there and do a job, I think it would've  21 been unhelpful for him because it's a big decision with  22 such obvious ramifications that, actually, I'm not sure  23 it would've been helpful in the context of incident  24 command at that point. And it wouldn't have changed my  25 decision.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 18</p>	<p>1 some civil disorder, with what I could see was a massive  2 breathing apparatus operation already underway, to try  3 and dissect what had happened in the previous hour if  4 I felt I didn't need to.</p> <p>5 That may well sound cold-hearted, but I think that's  6 part of the decision-making process. You take the  7 information you need. At that point in time, I was  8 satisfied that I had enough information to take that  9 decision and, having taken it, I didn't then need to go  10 over it. I needed to get on with other things and start  11 to place a structure onto the incident.</p> <p>12 Q. I understand that in terms of leadership style. Really  13 what I am after is the process of making this decision.</p> <p>14 It comes to this: why were you not curious to  15 understand why what was obvious to you was not obvious  16 to Andy O'Loughlin, who was the incident commander you  17 were taking over from?</p> <p>18 A. Because I knew what I had, and at the risk of repeating  19 myself, I think that it wouldn't have been helpful at  20 that point to dissect that. It was more about me having  21 taken a clear decision because I was faced with the  22 reality of what I was faced with, and actually, because  23 I hadn't seen conditions prior to me taking over, there  24 could've been a wide range of variables that meant  25 Andy's experience of that incident was very different.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 20</p>

<p>1 So, for example, Mike Dowden's experience would've 2 been very different from mine because he was there right 3 at the start, when it was just a fridge alight. So 4 Mike's journey through that incident would've been 5 hugely different from mine, because he was 6 decision-making in the context of an incident that was 7 getting away, that had actually started as one thing but 8 then had become something unbelievable.</p> <p>9 Andy, actually, if I was to imagine what it might 10 have been like the hour before me, and I don't know what 11 it was like, was probably in a not dissimilar place, 12 where he was looking at an incident where he thought 13 maybe he had an opportunity to do something, where 14 perhaps there was more protection inside the building 15 than at the point where I took over, and that was 16 possibly why he didn't do that.</p> <p>17 But in a way, I didn't need to know that, because 18 what I did know is at the point I took over, that advice 19 was no longer appropriate for the people inside the 20 building, despite the challenge of then giving them 21 alternate advice because of the internal conditions that 22 made almost any part of the building perilous.</p> <p>23 So I just didn't need to dissect it, and I don't 24 think I consciously even thought I needed to dissect 25 that. I didn't think, "I could ask him that but I'm not</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 21</p>	<p>1 leader. Yes, it's my decision to hold, but I would give 2 people the space to ask questions and challenge, and 3 I would've expected Andy, and Andy knows me well enough, 4 that he could've stepped forward and said, "Actually, 5 with the greatest of respect, Andy, you have taken that 6 decision over the course of the last 10 minutes, I have 7 other information, I think you might need to think about 8 that."</p> <p>9 At no point did Andy challenge that decision. He 10 was entirely comfortable with it, and then we moved on 11 to what were my priorities and how he was going to help 12 me as part of the overall structure.</p> <p>13 Q. Given his lack of challenge and his lack of presentation 14 to you of any further information that he had which you 15 didn't, did it occur to you that he must have been 16 operating, or at least was operating, in an information 17 gap? You had information that he didn't have.</p> <p>18 A. Absolutely, but again, I think as I said yesterday, 19 I think that is the normality of a dynamic incident. 20 You're constantly operating in an information gap.</p> <p>21 What I can only talk about is my own 22 decision-making, and I was comfortable, on the basis of 23 the information I had, that I was right to take that 24 decision and that decision was right at that point in 25 time.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 23</p>
<p>1 going to". I was just so clear in my own mind about 2 that one particular decision, having thought about it, 3 having gathered information from a variety of sources, 4 that having made it, I just needed to state it, record 5 it, ensure it was communicated to the incident ground, 6 verify that control knew that I had understood why they 7 wanted to and that we were going to hold to that, and 8 then move forward with taking control of the incident.</p> <p>9 Q. How did you know, though, whether Andy O'Loughlin had or 10 didn't have good reasons for holding on to the stay-put 11 advice?</p> <p>12 A. Because I think if he had, he would've challenged me at 13 the point I made that decision. I couldn't have been 14 any clearer in my communication. He was on the command 15 unit. I stated it to the entire command unit. Andy 16 absolutely had an opportunity at that point to say -- 17 and we've got a relationship, I've known Andy for a long 18 time, he's a good officer -- he would've said, "Andy, 19 actually, how have you come to that?" We have enough of 20 a relationship that he could've challenged me.</p> <p>21 One of the other things to reiterate, to give you 22 a context, is that I knew most of the officers working 23 for me very, very well, the senior officers, and I have 24 an open leadership style where I would welcome critical 25 challenge, because I think that's part of being a good</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 22</p>	<p>1 So in a way, what happened before, I could've dwelt 2 on it, but I'm not sure that would've been effective 3 leadership or decision-making at that point in time at 4 the incident. I think what I needed to do at that 5 incident, and it was very clear to me, was that I needed 6 to establish some very basic structure and control to 7 enable us to sustain what was going to be a massive 8 breathing apparatus operation.</p> <p>9 My greatest concern at that point, actually, was 10 firstly creating more open space for our people to 11 operate in, so getting effective cordons in with the 12 help of the police, and ensuring that we could resource 13 it, because my greatest fear -- we have enough 14 resources, absolutely, in the London Fire Brigade to 15 sustain that incident, but getting them there, turning 16 them over, ensuring there was a system to safely deploy 17 people into the building so we could have this mass BA 18 operation, they were the things in my mind, because 19 without that logistic support and resourcing, we were 20 simply not going to be able to sustain the tempo of 21 operations that I'd seen as I walked past the tower. 22 They were the things that really grabbed me as 23 a priority.</p> <p>24 In a way, the advice that was given to people was 25 obviously very important in terms of helping manage</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 24</p>

6 (Pages 21 to 24)

<p>1 an impossible situation, providing some care and</p> <p>2 reassurance to people in a desperate situation on the</p> <p>3 end of the phone. But in many ways, in the context of</p> <p>4 that big operation, the advice was somewhat irrelevant,</p> <p>5 because everyone inside that tower was in absolute</p> <p>6 danger and, actually, my sense was it was going to be</p> <p>7 a minimal number of people who were going to be able to</p> <p>8 get themselves out on their own, absolute minimal, and</p> <p>9 we were going to have to rescue everyone that was still</p> <p>10 in there. My thought was it was a mass rescue operation</p> <p>11 and no one was getting out there without a BA crew</p> <p>12 helping them. Even if they could walk down the stairs,</p> <p>13 we would need a crew with them.</p> <p>14 That was what my focus was on.</p> <p>15 Q. Why wasn't the stay-put advice changed earlier?</p> <p>16 A. I can't tell you that because I wasn't there at that</p> <p>17 point in the incident, and I think it would be genuinely</p> <p>18 unfair on Andy and other officers to hypothesise on the</p> <p>19 basis of hindsight, because what I did see of that fire</p> <p>20 when I turned up was it was changing at such a rate of</p> <p>21 knots that almost anything could've been occurring</p> <p>22 inside the building at an earlier point in the incident.</p> <p>23 So I actually think it's unfair. I think people</p> <p>24 have to hold their own decisions at that point based on</p> <p>25 the information they had. I think it would be easy for</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 25</p>	<p>1 and an update on what we were doing, and that was where</p> <p>2 the communication was going to have to happen from.</p> <p>3 The only way we were going to communicate with</p> <p>4 residents from the scene was when we got a BA crew to</p> <p>5 them, so it was very important that our BA crews knew we</p> <p>6 were taking people out of there and that everyone was</p> <p>7 going to have to be rescued.</p> <p>8 Q. Did you take steps to find out whether control were</p> <p>9 doing callbacks to residents who had already called?</p> <p>10 A. No, because at the end of the day, we had very</p> <p>11 experienced commanders inside control. So if we talk</p> <p>12 about delegated command again, that is a normal part of</p> <p>13 process. I would've expected callbacks to callers who</p> <p>14 they've had to come off the line from.</p> <p>15 However, again, I think I've got to set it in the</p> <p>16 context of the volume. I was aware, because at some</p> <p>17 point I'd spoken to Adrian about it, that we had maybe</p> <p>18 nine control operators in the control room that night.</p> <p>19 If they're handling the volume of calls we were, my</p> <p>20 expectation was some of that would've gone out to other</p> <p>21 control rooms around the country potentially, the</p> <p>22 overspill, and that, actually, just to manage that</p> <p>23 volume and callback would've been very difficult for</p> <p>24 them.</p> <p>25 But that would've been an expectation for me based</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 27</p>
<p>1 me to hypothesise and criticise based on a subjective</p> <p>2 opinion, but I really don't know what the conditions</p> <p>3 were inside that block 10 minutes earlier before</p> <p>4 I arrived, an hour earlier, and therefore I think it</p> <p>5 would be wrong of me to try and decide what should've</p> <p>6 been the right advice at that point.</p> <p>7 All I know is at the point I turned up, that advice</p> <p>8 was absolutely unsustainable.</p> <p>9 Q. Tell me, what plan did you have for ensuring that the</p> <p>10 occupants who were still within the building knew that</p> <p>11 the advice had changed and that they now had to leave at</p> <p>12 all costs?</p> <p>13 A. So there was no way of effecting mass communication from</p> <p>14 the scene because the building had deteriorated to such</p> <p>15 an extent that, actually, you know, just the overall</p> <p>16 level of sound, the chaos of it, would've meant it would</p> <p>17 be very difficult to communicate to residents on mass</p> <p>18 anyway. Without wanting to sound facetious,</p> <p>19 a loudhailer would've been of no use, there was no</p> <p>20 tannoy system. I can't think of the method, at the</p> <p>21 point at which that building was, where we could've</p> <p>22 communicated with all the residents from scene.</p> <p>23 My expectation was it all hinged on the advice that</p> <p>24 control was going to give people, because inevitably</p> <p>25 people were going to ring our control for reassurance</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 26</p>	<p>1 on our processes, that some level of callback would be</p> <p>2 occurring.</p> <p>3 Q. Does that mean that, in a normal incident, a callback</p> <p>4 would occur as a matter of practice?</p> <p>5 A. Absolutely, yes, and that's my experience of FSG. Where</p> <p>6 there's more manageable numbers, our call-handlers will</p> <p>7 make every effort to maintain contact with those people</p> <p>8 and close the feedback loop. Because, again, I suppose</p> <p>9 I'd ask the inquiry, perhaps, to reflect on the position</p> <p>10 those control operators find themselves in. I think,</p> <p>11 actually, they are the most exposed people in many ways,</p> <p>12 because they are remote from the incident so they have</p> <p>13 very little power to immediately effect the rescue.</p> <p>14 They are handling the emotions and the challenge of</p> <p>15 having an immensely distressed and scared person on the</p> <p>16 end of the phone. My experience of our control</p> <p>17 operators is they are always desperate to maintain</p> <p>18 contact and provide reassurance, because that's what</p> <p>19 their role is.</p> <p>20 So, yes, I would imagine they would've been very</p> <p>21 motivated, and I know, because I've spoken to them since</p> <p>22 and visited them at control, that for many of them, the</p> <p>23 burden of not being able to do that in the way they</p> <p>24 wanted to and would've normally expected to has weighed</p> <p>25 very, very heavily on them. It's been immensely</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 28</p>

<p>1 <b>distressing for them.</b></p> <p>2 Q. Jo Smith gave evidence that as a matter of custom and</p> <p>3 practice, control room officers don't tend to call back</p> <p>4 callers unless they're on a mobile and have been cut off</p> <p>5 because they wouldn't want to take them through a fire</p> <p>6 back to a landline to answer it again, if that might put</p> <p>7 them in danger. That was the effect of her evidence.</p> <p>8 I'm summarising it I hope accurately.</p> <p>9 <b>A. You are, and that's what I'm talking about. So we're</b></p> <p>10 <b>talking about people who have made a call, have come off</b></p> <p>11 <b>the line on a mobile and can be recontacted.</b></p> <p>12 Q. Cut off she was talking about.</p> <p>13 <b>A. Yes, so the line has been cut dead. That's my</b></p> <p>14 <b>understanding of how the callback process works and</b></p> <p>15 <b>I would've expected them to be doing that where they</b></p> <p>16 <b>could. But I think that would've been extraordinarily</b></p> <p>17 <b>difficult in the circumstances.</b></p> <p>18 Q. But where they weren't cut off, but where the call had</p> <p>19 ended because the controller had ended it or the caller</p> <p>20 had ended it, my question is more directed to calling</p> <p>21 people back who had called historically and whose</p> <p>22 numbers were on the system to tell them that the advice</p> <p>23 had now changed.</p> <p>24 <b>A. No, I wouldn't have an expectation of them doing that,</b></p> <p>25 <b>and, again, particularly in the volume of calls that</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 29</p>	<p>1 <b>A. I didn't, but I guess that's a normal thing for a block</b></p> <p>2 <b>of that size.</b></p> <p>3 Q. Did you explore whether that could be used to</p> <p>4 communicate with residents to communicate to them that</p> <p>5 the stay-put advice had changed?</p> <p>6 <b>A. I have to say I didn't, I didn't consider it, but then</b></p> <p>7 <b>again, I think in the context of knowing that the fire</b></p> <p>8 <b>lift wasn't operating, that we'd lost almost every other</b></p> <p>9 <b>building system, including the fixed installations, so</b></p> <p>10 <b>the smoke ventilation system, perhaps if I had even</b></p> <p>11 <b>thought of it, I wouldn't have assumed it particularly</b></p> <p>12 <b>would be useful.</b></p> <p>13 <b>Again, there is something about the fact that</b></p> <p>14 <b>someone's got to answer that. I'm presuming you would</b></p> <p>15 <b>have to contact individual flats. I'm not sure how</b></p> <p>16 <b>manageable that would be, because my experience of</b></p> <p>17 <b>intercom systems is they don't generally have a function</b></p> <p>18 <b>where you can press one button and contact every flat.</b></p> <p>19 <b>But, no, I have to say, it wasn't a consideration at</b></p> <p>20 <b>the time. That wasn't how we were going to make contact</b></p> <p>21 <b>with and communicate with people from the incident</b></p> <p>22 <b>ground.</b></p> <p>23 Q. Moving back to your entry in the Roe log, you say in the</p> <p>24 last sentence under 02.47:</p> <p>25 "Fire Sector is briefed to that effect."</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 31</p>
<p>1 <b>they had received, that's not my understanding of how</b></p> <p>2 <b>the process works.</b></p> <p>3 <b>But I should hasten to add, I'm not a control room</b></p> <p>4 <b>specialist and I'm not intimately involved with those</b></p> <p>5 <b>processes. My focus would be on ensuring that we are</b></p> <p>6 <b>providing the information back into them to engage with</b></p> <p>7 <b>callers as per our procedures and that that enables them</b></p> <p>8 <b>to do their role.</b></p> <p>9 Q. Did you have any thoughts as to how, where people had</p> <p>10 called and been told to stay put by controllers, and</p> <p>11 then the advice had changed, you were going to</p> <p>12 communicate to those callers that the advice had changed</p> <p>13 so that the advice they'd been given previously should</p> <p>14 not be acted on?</p> <p>15 <b>A. I have to say that I didn't drill down to that level of</b></p> <p>16 <b>detail. I felt that was the responsibility of control,</b></p> <p>17 <b>having taken part in that decision themselves, to manage</b></p> <p>18 <b>that process from their end. What was of upmost</b></p> <p>19 <b>importance to me was that we got crews to people as</b></p> <p>20 <b>quickly as possible and in volume to kind of honour the</b></p> <p>21 <b>change in advice.</b></p> <p>22 Q. Did you know that the building had an intercom system,</p> <p>23 so you press a buzzer and can be let into a flat?</p> <p>24 <b>A. You mean like a door entry system?</b></p> <p>25 Q. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 30</p>	<p>1 Fire sector was the bridgehead, was it?</p> <p>2 <b>A. It was everyone inside the tower, basically. So not</b></p> <p>3 <b>just the bridgehead. So what I wanted was Pat and</b></p> <p>4 <b>Richard to be briefed to that effect. I asked for that</b></p> <p>5 <b>message to be sent from the command unit, out to the</b></p> <p>6 <b>fire sector, so Pat and Richard specifically, to let</b></p> <p>7 <b>them know that stay-put advice had ended, and that's</b></p> <p>8 <b>what Jackie has recorded there. So I would've</b></p> <p>9 <b>verbalised that. I would've said to the command unit,</b></p> <p>10 <b>"Can we make sure, now that the advice has changed, that</b></p> <p>11 <b>is passed out to the fire ground as an immediate</b></p> <p>12 <b>priority and to the fire sector."</b></p> <p>13 Q. Did you hear the briefing to that effect yourself?</p> <p>14 <b>A. No.</b></p> <p>15 Q. Turning to how you would then act on this changed</p> <p>16 advice.</p> <p>17 How, in practical terms, would you go about</p> <p>18 evacuating everybody in the tower?</p> <p>19 <b>A. I think "evacuation" is the wrong term. At the point</b></p> <p>20 <b>I took over the incident, there was going to be no</b></p> <p>21 <b>evacuation; there was going to be multiple individual</b></p> <p>22 <b>rescues. So an evacuation gives you the idea that we</b></p> <p>23 <b>were going to somehow take large groups of people out in</b></p> <p>24 <b>a managed way through some form of mass communication,</b></p> <p>25 <b>which is what a normal staged phased evacuation would</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 32</p>



<p>1 be. There was no evacuation in the context of that 2 building. It was going to be individual rescues from 3 individual flats, bringing people out in challenging 4 circumstances. My major priority was to ensure we had 5 the volume of people inside to be able to do that as 6 best we could.</p> <p>7 So I think "evacuation" in some ways is a bit of 8 a misleading term. There is no way you could've 9 effected a mass evacuation from that building. It was 10 going to be about our crews leading people out through 11 a really difficult situation.</p> <p>12 Q. Building on that answer, what was your plan to effect 13 mass rescue? In outline, what were the nuts and bolts 14 of that plan?</p> <p>15 A. So very simply, perhaps if I can wind it back a bit, 16 I actually had a more immediate problem in terms of 17 effecting mass rescue, which was about getting 18 firefighters into the building without them being very 19 seriously injured or killed. So I had a very serious 20 concern about the level of debris fall. I was seeing 21 large pieces of concrete, I was seeing very large metal 22 sheets. My fear was actually that probably the most 23 dangerous element at that point was getting firefighters 24 into the building. So I wanted that considered as 25 a primary objective for Andy O'Loughlin, to try and</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 33</p>	<p>1 where appliances were arriving onto the incident ground, 2 where officers were being briefed at the point they 3 arrived that they were likely to be used for breathing 4 apparatus, that they would then move into BA main 5 control, BA main control would be in direct 6 communication with the fire sector, and that the fire 7 sector would be advising, with Andy's oversight, because 8 he was overseeing BA main control, FSG and the fire 9 sector, the numbers of people to safely go in so that we 10 didn't compromise ourselves in terms of having too many 11 people in there so we couldn't operate effectively, and 12 I wanted that to be continuous.</p> <p>13 My challenge I set Andy was that I did not want a 14 break in BA operations. I wanted that to be continuous, 15 because I knew prioritisation would be difficult, I knew 16 we were likely to be compromised by the nature of 17 building, and therefore the only way we were really 18 going to make progress was just to ensure a continuous 19 volume of people in there.</p> <p>20 Q. Was it possible that the change in stay put meant that 21 you now had people coming into the stairs and into the 22 lobbies that you otherwise wouldn't have had before and 23 that would've affected the dynamics of people flow in 24 the building?</p> <p>25 A. Absolutely. That's the balance of that decision. So</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 35</p>
<p>1 establish some form of safe access and egress for our 2 crews and any casualties they brought out.</p> <p>3 So at a very basic level, I just needed to safely 4 get people into the building. I think that gives you 5 an idea again of the sort of dynamism of the incident, 6 that as a commander at my level, I was actually having 7 to think about how we even got people into the building, 8 never mind a plan beyond that as to how we would manage 9 their progress inside the building.</p> <p>10 So having set that as an immediate priority, and 11 actually that's where the Territorial Support Group -- 12 I would like to say for the record what immensely brave 13 men and women they are, because some of those people did 14 hundreds of runs back and forth under the debris fall, 15 and that is not what they are trained for. So I would 16 like placed on the record how immensely grateful we are 17 as a service to the Metropolitan Police Service for 18 doing that, because they absolutely went above and 19 beyond.</p> <p>20 But having established access and egress, my plan 21 was to build on what Andy had already established. 22 I thought we had a good, basic structure that was simple 23 enough for everybody to understand, and it was about 24 ensuring we had a volume of people inside BA main 25 control, that behind that we had a logistics system</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 34</p>	<p>1 I was acutely aware we had a single staircase. It's not 2 designed for both our personnel and personnel trying to 3 leave being on it. But I didn't have a choice.</p> <p>4 So, again, that's why it was important the fire 5 sector knew the advice had changed, because they then 6 needed to be aware they might need to manage that flow 7 of people out against the stream of people we wanted to 8 go in.</p> <p>9 My general sense, though, was very few people were 10 going to be able to make their way out on their own, so, 11 actually, I thought it was more likely that it was about 12 ensuring we had a constant flow of breathing apparatus 13 crews up inside the building as far as they could to 14 rescue people.</p> <p>15 Q. Did you talk to Pat Goulbourne and Richard Welch at the 16 bridgehead specifically about how the change in stay-put 17 advice might affect the way they were briefing and 18 deploying crews into the tower and the pattern of that 19 deployment?</p> <p>20 A. No, because, again, I think that's a level of detail 21 that I wouldn't need to go into with two such 22 experienced officers, particularly having delegated them 23 the tactical command of that sector. I would expect 24 them to know that as professional fire officers. 25 They're inevitably going to have to manage that. It's</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 36</p>

<p>1 a fairly common-sense factor to manage within that 2 environment.</p> <p>3 You've got a single access staircase, we are going 4 to commit crews in. If we've changed the stay-put 5 advice, there is very obviously every possibility that 6 people are going to be coming out, and therefore Pat and 7 Richard were going to have to manage that.</p> <p>8 Q. You've quite rightly, perhaps, described how unusual 9 this event was, but you now say that this a fairly 10 common-sense factor to manage within that environment.</p> <p>11 How sure were you that Pat and Richard had the right 12 experience and training to manage a potential sudden 13 influx of people into the single exit route which was 14 smoke-logged in a 24-storey building which was 15 a whole-building fire?</p> <p>16 A. Very sure, because I trust those officers and I've been 17 on many incidents with them, including high-rise. 18 Actually, it's probably again worth setting a wider 19 context. Post-Lakanal, we experienced for probably two 20 years, and we've experienced it post-Grenfell 21 unsurprisingly, a period of time where people no longer 22 felt secure in the context of stay-put advice and so 23 would self-evacuate in very large numbers while we were 24 trying to get into high-rise buildings.</p> <p>25 I've attended a number of high-rises where you've</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 37</p>	<p>1 but certainly post-Grenfell we've experienced it again 2 with high-rise fires, completely understandably, because 3 residents feel very anxious about the validity of the 4 stay-put advice, unfortunately.</p> <p>5 Q. To be frank, this was an experience new to you on the 6 night. I think we've all got from yesterday's evidence 7 that this was the first time you as an incident 8 commander had had to change the stay-put advice so that 9 everybody in a tower block had to be rescued, to cut 10 a long story short.</p> <p>11 Given that that was new to you as incident 12 commander, how could you be sure, without going and 13 talking to them about the granular nuts and bolts of 14 their plan, that Pat and Richard knew what to do?</p> <p>15 A. Because I did go and talk to them about the detail of 16 their plan, but that I think falls into the category of 17 one of the general principles and understanding that 18 I would expect a fire officer to have, that you will 19 have to manage the flow in and out of people. That's 20 not necessarily something that I would need to discuss 21 because, actually, I think that's an assumption I could 22 make.</p> <p>23 I think there are other elements of their plan I was 24 much more interested in, ie the challenge of progressing 25 within the building, what were the fire conditions like</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 39</p>
<p>1 only got a single flat fire of no great significance, 2 but the entire block, on discovering that, post-Lakanal, 3 have emptied out.</p> <p>4 So, actually, for experienced commanders like Pat 5 and Richard, who had served in the eastern command, 6 which is our busiest command, I knew they had 7 encountered that and I would've expected them to 8 understand how they might have to manage that problem.</p> <p>9 So I was confident. That's based on my relationship 10 with them and my experience of being at other incidents 11 with them.</p> <p>12 Q. But you say in that last answer that experienced 13 commanders like Pat and Richard, having served in the 14 eastern command, had encountered that.</p> <p>15 I mean, are you sure they had actually encountered 16 a fire like Grenfell before in their lives so they could 17 operate from the basis of experience?</p> <p>18 A. No, none of us had encountered a fire like Grenfell. 19 I think Grenfell is an exceptional event in any fire 20 officer's career, so I'd absolutely not suggest that, 21 but what they would've encountered is the difficulties 22 of managing our entry into a block, even for 23 a relatively minor fire, where residents were trying to 24 get out. That is a fairly common phenomenon 25 post-Lakanal. It tailed off after a couple of years,</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 38</p>	<p>1 that were preventing them, for example, progressing 2 beyond a certain floor. I was much more interested in 3 that in the context of my primary objectives. That 4 caused me much more anxiety about general progress in 5 terms of clearing floors and moving up the building, 6 because there were certainly times during the incident 7 where I didn't have a comfortable feeling about how we 8 were progressing, and that was where the focus of my 9 discussions lay with Pat and Richard when I did see 10 them. I wanted to know what was preventing them moving 11 at a quicker pace up the building. It was my job to 12 drive that.</p> <p>13 I was less concerned about their management of 14 people in and out because I feel that's a level of 15 detail that as group commanders, senior, experienced 16 operational officers, I would expect them to manage in 17 the course of their duties.</p> <p>18 Q. You said at the beginning of the last answer you did go 19 and talk to them about the detail of their plan.</p> <p>20 First question: when did you go and do that, at what 21 point?</p> <p>22 A. I can't remember exact timings, but I went into the 23 tower on a number of occasions. I would have to 24 probably refer back to the log.</p> <p>25 So I went early on into the tower. I saw Pat and</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 40</p>

<p>1 Richard -- or maybe just Pat at that point, and I had</p> <p>2 a conversation about how far they thought they could</p> <p>3 push up inside the building. My conversation each time,</p> <p>4 actually, focused on pretty much the same elements.</p> <p>5 Once I made the stay put, that was done in part for me.</p> <p>6 We weren't going to reverse that. The conditions in the</p> <p>7 tower weren't going to get any better, so in a way that</p> <p>8 went.</p> <p>9 What then became a continuous re-evaluation of</p> <p>10 important decision-making was how long could I safely</p> <p>11 keep on putting firefighters into the building and how</p> <p>12 we were progressing. They were my two questions,</p> <p>13 really, continuously throughout the 10 hours I was in</p> <p>14 command, because they were the two things that were</p> <p>15 going to affect both the safety of my firefighters and</p> <p>16 the efficacy of our operations: how far were we</p> <p>17 progressing and was it still safe reasonably to put</p> <p>18 firefighters into there, taking into account our own</p> <p>19 powers and duties?</p> <p>20 Q. My second question is: what did you discover about the</p> <p>21 nuts and bolts of the plan at the bridgehead?</p> <p>22 A. What I discovered was that Pat and Richard were sharing</p> <p>23 responsibility for it, which I was comfortable with,</p> <p>24 they know each other, they have a good relationship, as</p> <p>25 far as I'm aware. It was too big for one person to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 41</p>	<p>1 particular FSG information?</p> <p>2 A. Absolutely not. I think it would have been</p> <p>3 inappropriate at my level of command, overseeing the</p> <p>4 entire operation, to try to drill into that level of</p> <p>5 detail.</p> <p>6 If I'd got drawn into the detail of what crews were</p> <p>7 going to what flat -- don't get me wrong, it would have</p> <p>8 been absolutely different -- if had been maybe ten FSG</p> <p>9 calls, I would've had the time, the space, and</p> <p>10 I would've wanted to know how we were prioritising. In</p> <p>11 the context of over 100 FSG calls, I think actually</p> <p>12 I could've lost myself in that detail. What I needed to</p> <p>13 ensure -- because it wasn't a given -- was that we were</p> <p>14 continuing to maintain progress, that we had enough</p> <p>15 resources, that we were managing the wider environment,</p> <p>16 that I was mindful of the welfare of our people, that</p> <p>17 actually, just at a macro level, I was still right in my</p> <p>18 decision to continue to commit crews into the building,</p> <p>19 because that should not be taken as an assumption. That</p> <p>20 caused me great concern.</p> <p>21 Whilst I was very sure that the core of the building</p> <p>22 would hold, actually from what I'd seen in terms of the</p> <p>23 debris fall, what I was hearing from the building, the</p> <p>24 amount of time a fire of that ferocity had been burning,</p> <p>25 I was very much less sure about the edges of the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 43</p>
<p>1 handle. It appeared to me, from the short conversation</p> <p>2 I had, that Richard was on the whole handling the</p> <p>3 bridgehead, and that Pat was ensuring that there was</p> <p>4 a throughput of crews up and through, although I'm quite</p> <p>5 sure that swapped over at times over the course of the</p> <p>6 incident.</p> <p>7 What was clear to me was that there was some system</p> <p>8 for ensuring FSG information got to the crews, the crews</p> <p>9 were continuously being committed through the</p> <p>10 bridgehead, and that, most importantly, Pat and Richard</p> <p>11 were very, very focused on maintaining progress.</p> <p>12 So as the overall incident commander, looking at it</p> <p>13 in the big picture, I needed to be assured that Pat and</p> <p>14 Richard had no illusions that what was important to me</p> <p>15 was we were continuously driving momentum and progress</p> <p>16 and we could not let that stall. It's a constant</p> <p>17 judgement for them about how much risk they were</p> <p>18 prepared to expose our firefighters to, and that was</p> <p>19 actually very difficult decision-making for a host of</p> <p>20 reasons.</p> <p>21 So that was what the majority of my conversations</p> <p>22 focused on: how far they could get, what would be</p> <p>23 preventing them, why couldn't we overcome that.</p> <p>24 Q. As part of the nuts and bolts of their plan, did you</p> <p>25 investigate with them what they were doing with</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 42</p>	<p>1 building, the edges of the floor plate, the columns at</p> <p>2 the edges of the building that were taking the brunt of</p> <p>3 the heat, I was fairly sure that significant spalling</p> <p>4 was occurring, so breakdown of the concrete which would</p> <p>5 expose the rebar, and that I had the potential of losing</p> <p>6 edges of the building, partial collapses. I had to</p> <p>7 constantly juggle whether or not it was still okay for</p> <p>8 me to commit firefighters into that environment knowing</p> <p>9 they're at very great risk.</p> <p>10 So everyone in our job accepts that there are times</p> <p>11 when you are going to have to risk your own life in</p> <p>12 a measured way to save others. But this incident took</p> <p>13 us to a place actually somewhere beyond that, and that</p> <p>14 was something I had to come back to continuously, to</p> <p>15 judge actually whether I was doing the right thing by my</p> <p>16 own people under what is laid down in the Human Rights</p> <p>17 Act, for example, and whether what I was doing was</p> <p>18 justified by the powers we have under the Fire and</p> <p>19 Rescue Services Act.</p> <p>20 Q. You said if it had been ten FSG calls, you'd have had</p> <p>21 the time, the space and have wanted to know how you were</p> <p>22 prioritising.</p> <p>23 My third question is: did you ask the simple</p> <p>24 question: how are you prioritising?</p> <p>25 A. I'd asked it of Tom Goodall in terms of had he got</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 44</p>

<p>1 a system, but I didn't delve into it in the detail.</p> <p>2 I know from Tom's board that he had prioritised, but</p> <p>3 I think as I said yesterday, that wasn't my priority,</p> <p>4 because my sense was that that prioritisation was only</p> <p>5 good in the moment. Conditions were changing</p> <p>6 continuously. It would've been almost impossible to</p> <p>7 judge who was a greater priority than another, and</p> <p>8 therefore my focus had to be on just making sure I was</p> <p>9 supporting my sector commanders by making sure they</p> <p>10 never ran out of resources and they understood we must</p> <p>11 maintain continual progress.</p> <p>12 Q. Did you endeavour to make sure that other emergency</p> <p>13 services like the MPS, the LAS and the NPAS were aware</p> <p>14 of the change in the advice?</p> <p>15 A. I think at some point I had mentioned it in a tactical</p> <p>16 command meeting. So I think either the first one or</p> <p>17 a subsequent one, I informed all the other agencies that</p> <p>18 we had ended stay-put advice. I can't remember my exact</p> <p>19 words, but I think I did that.</p> <p>20 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, we're going to turn to a different</p> <p>21 topic. It's 10.30.</p> <p>22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It might be a good point to have</p> <p>23 a short break.</p> <p>24 I think we are going to have a short break, Mr Roe.</p> <p>25 An hour would be enough for most people giving evidence.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 45</p>	<p>1 can you, from an institutional perspective, tell us what</p> <p>2 information you as an incident commander would need to</p> <p>3 have in front of you in order to make the decision</p> <p>4 whether to keep the stay-put advice, as we've called it,</p> <p>5 in place or to depart from it and give the advice you</p> <p>6 gave?</p> <p>7 A. Do you mean that in terms of -- sorry, to clarify</p> <p>8 this -- the information we would provide to our officers</p> <p>9 to aid them with that decision?</p> <p>10 Q. No, let me put the question again and I hope more</p> <p>11 clearly to you.</p> <p>12 As an incident commander, what information would you</p> <p>13 need to have in front of you in order reliably to make</p> <p>14 the decision to depart from stay put?</p> <p>15 A. So I would want to have, as I did on the night,</p> <p>16 an understanding of what callers might be facing in</p> <p>17 their flats, so a sense of what was happening at the</p> <p>18 control end. I think that would be very important.</p> <p>19 I would like to know the extent of fire spread, as far</p> <p>20 as I could, through the building. I would need to see</p> <p>21 clear proof that compartmentation had failed on a scale</p> <p>22 that meant that stay put was no longer viable, and</p> <p>23 I would need to understand the level of compartmentation</p> <p>24 failure in a whole-building context. So were there</p> <p>25 parts of the building where it was still viable to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 47</p>
<p>1 THE WITNESS: Thank you.</p> <p>2 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You go with the usher, if you would.</p> <p>3 Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while</p> <p>4 you're out of the room. We'll be back at 10.40, please.</p> <p>5 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.</p> <p>6 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, 10.40, then, please.</p> <p>7 (10.30 am)</p> <p>8 (A short break)</p> <p>9 (10.40 am)</p> <p>10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Roe?</p> <p>11 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.</p> <p>12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Before we continue, can I just</p> <p>13 mention one thing. You probably know that your every</p> <p>14 word is being taken down by the stenographer, but</p> <p>15 I think it would make her task a little easier if you</p> <p>16 could try and speak a little more slowly and maybe keep</p> <p>17 your answers a little shorter, then she catches up to</p> <p>18 some extent between you and Mr Millett. All right?</p> <p>19 THE WITNESS: I promise, sir.</p> <p>20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.</p> <p>21 Yes, Mr Millett.</p> <p>22 MR MILLETT: Can I go back a little bit. I said I was</p> <p>23 coming to a new topic and I will, but I just want to</p> <p>24 backtrack a little bit on one or two things.</p> <p>25 Just in terms of the stay-put advice being changed,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 46</p>	<p>1 maintain that advice and, actually, if we had a smaller</p> <p>2 number of callers, would you not change the advice in</p> <p>3 totality for a block but partially for a block, for</p> <p>4 example.</p> <p>5 Those are the sort of sources of information I would</p> <p>6 go to and the information I would want.</p> <p>7 Q. Those factors, which you set out very clearly, to the</p> <p>8 best of your knowledge and experience, were they to be</p> <p>9 found in any policy or any training as it existed</p> <p>10 in June 2017?</p> <p>11 A. I think the only training that I had that was relevant</p> <p>12 to it was the post-Lakanal training package. I can't</p> <p>13 remember whether it specifically refers to ending stay</p> <p>14 put, I'm not sure it does, but certainly made it clear</p> <p>15 to officers that you had to consider the possibility of</p> <p>16 buildings not reacting in a high-rise residential</p> <p>17 environment in the way you'd expect. That's the only</p> <p>18 training package I think we've provided that would bear</p> <p>19 relevance to that.</p> <p>20 Q. Coming back to this question of the nuts and bolts of</p> <p>21 the bridgehead plan and we were discussing together</p> <p>22 before the break. I just want to explore the timing of</p> <p>23 that.</p> <p>24 First of all, can you tell us, did you leave to go</p> <p>25 to the tower before or after your first TCM?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 48</p>

<p>1 A. I'm not sure, is the honest answer, because I was in 2 charge for a very long time. Where I've got things 3 time-stamped by other people, I've got a greater surety 4 about my timings. There's clearly things that I am sure 5 about because I remember the conversations. All I can 6 tell you is that I was in the tower very early on during 7 my time at the incident. I can't remember whether it 8 was before the TCM or after the TCM. Obviously 9 I gathered situational awareness into the unit by going 10 past the tower, but at a time either shortly after the 11 TCM or potentially before the TCM, I had been in the 12 tower, because I'd spoken to crews.</p> <p>13 I remember early on in the incident speaking to 14 crews on mass both outside and inside the tower.</p> <p>15 Q. Let's see if we can just drill a bit further down into 16 this. Can I ask you to be shown your contemporaneous 17 note.</p> <p>18 We can see from page 3 that at 02.47 -- this is the 19 second entry down -- you refer to the stay-put advice 20 being changed, and then at 02.54 is the briefings, and 21 that goes on.</p> <p>22 Then over the page you see at 03.09 you ask the CU 23 to order Lee Drawbridge onto the incident. At 03.10, 24 the CU confirm you had a possible firefighter emergency. 25 "I stuck my head outside the unit and saw the same</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 49</p>	<p>1 imprinted on my mind, actually, as a visit to the tower, 2 so I'm able to remember that very clearly.</p> <p>3 I can't say with any confidence whether I went 4 before that or if I went after that again until another 5 occasion when I went in where I am clear about it, 6 because I remember going in with the commissioner. 7 I remember thinking at the time the commissioner was 8 putting herself in very considerable danger and this was 9 an extremely unusual situation to be in, when one's own 10 commissioner is running the possibility of being badly 11 injured or killed at an incident.</p> <p>12 Q. Let's see if we can get to the detail by some pictures. 13 Can I ask, first of all, for Paul to put up a photograph 14 on the CCTV that we have.</p> <p>15 It's not the clearest, but this is at an adjusted 16 time of about 03.02. I'm afraid I'm unable at the 17 moment to give you the precise adjusted time to the 18 second.</p> <p>19 Do you see yourself in that picture?</p> <p>20 A. I think I do, I think I'm -- there's no point pointing. 21 I think I'm standing behind the gentleman wearing 22 a command staff tabard, and Matt Cook is standing to my 23 right, Dany Cotton is standing between Matt Cook and 24 someone else, I don't know who that is, standing in the 25 corner.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 51</p>
<p>1 police officer ..."</p> <p>2 03.15, you ask the CU to request the urgent 3 attendance of a dangerous structures engineer.</p> <p>4 03.20, the first TCM, then there's the detail of 5 that.</p> <p>6 At 03.39, Matt Cook and Andy O'Loughlin getting onto 7 the unit and you get your first update.</p> <p>8 It's not until we get to over the page, some time 9 after 03.39, page 5, middle of the the page, you say:</p> <p>10 "I then went to the base of the tower to go into the 11 Lobby."</p> <p>12 On the basis of our read on the contemporaneous 13 notes that you did after the incident, it looks as if 14 you didn't go to the base of the tower to go into the 15 lobby until at or after, and probably after, 03.39. Is 16 that right?</p> <p>17 A. I think what the statement reflects is what I can 18 remember with accuracy. To be fair, I may well have 19 gone into the tower before, but I couldn't tell you 20 when. I went into the tower a number of times. The 21 reason I remembered that particularly was because of the 22 incident involving, you know, a poor gentleman who 23 jumped from the tower. That stuck very clearly in my 24 mind because unfortunately he just missed me and hit the 25 firefighter in front of me. So that is pretty much</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 50</p>	<p>1 Q. I'm sorry, I'm not entirely sure where you're pointing.</p> <p>2 A. Yes, there, where the arrow is, I think that's me.</p> <p>3 Q. Why do you think that's you?</p> <p>4 A. Because of my helmet markings and because I recognise my 5 hand movements, actually, I move my hands a lot when 6 I talk, so that is me, and I would imagine that's one of 7 the points I was talking to all the BA crews in there 8 about the extremity of the situation they were in, and 9 that whilst we were continuing to commit them into the 10 building, I expected them to take particular care with 11 each other, because we were trusting their professional 12 judgement to progress as far as they could without 13 putting themselves in the danger of losing their lives.</p> <p>14 Q. Just tell us about the helmet markings. What are the 15 distinguishing marks on the helmet that identifies that 16 as you?</p> <p>17 A. That's the markings for an assistant commissioner, so 18 the single thick band, and I'm wearing the incident 19 commander tabard as well. So that is certainly me.</p> <p>20 Q. Right, okay.</p> <p>21 How long was that visit? As I say, it's not in your 22 contemporaneous note or, indeed, in your log.</p> <p>23 A. I've got to say, it's some as a surprise to me I was in 24 the tower at that time. This is the first time I've 25 seen this and understood myself to be in the tower at</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 52</p>

<p>1 that time. But I think it reflects what I said earlier,  2 which is I think I've got a good memory of a number of  3 things throughout the incident. Obviously where Jackie  4 was making a log of my decisions, I'm clear about the  5 time. I've referred back to Vision for times when  6 orders went from me, although I would accept that  7 although the Vision log says a certain time, I'm likely  8 to have given the order earlier, potentially, and  9 there's been some delay to going.</p> <p>10 Actually, if I'm honest, I'm surprised I was in the  11 tower at that point. I don't remember going before the  12 TCM particularly.</p> <p>13 Q. Doing the best you can, Mr Roe, and I know it's  14 difficult, did you have a discussion with Richard Welch  15 and Pat Goulbourne at the bridgehead at this time?</p> <p>16 A. I would've seen one of them at this point, because the  17 one thing I do know is I know I went into the tower on  18 a number of occasions, and there wasn't a occasion where  19 I didn't speak to either Richard or Pat, because of the  20 sole purpose of me going into that tower would be to  21 consider what the tempo of operations was, did we have  22 a system whereby we were maintaining continuous  23 committal of crews up inside the tower, what was  24 actually the general composure of my firefighters? What  25 was the internal condition of the building, actually,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 53</p>	<p>1 discussion, or any discussion at all, with Richard Welch  2 and Pat Goulbourne?</p> <p>3 A. No, I think I did, because whilst I might have got the  4 time out of sequence, what I do know --</p> <p>5 Q. Sorry, my fault. I should finish the question.</p> <p>6 Does that mean that you didn't have a nuts and bolts  7 discussion, or any discussion at all, with Richard Welch  8 and Pat Goulbourne at this time?</p> <p>9 A. No, because as far as I can recollect, every time I went  10 into the tower, the priority for me was to speak to  11 either Richard or Pat, because whilst I would've gained  12 some situational awareness from observing, the real  13 purpose of going into there was to get a first-hand  14 update from Pat or Richard because they were my fire  15 sector commanders. From what I recollect, there wasn't  16 an occasion when I went into the tower where I didn't  17 speak to them at least briefly to ascertain progress and  18 have an understanding of their broad outline plan.</p> <p>19 Q. I'm just trying to get a handle on when you did first  20 have this briefing with Pat Goulbourne and  21 Richard Welch.</p> <p>22 If we go on to page 5 of your contemporaneous note,  23 which is in the long block of text or narrative which  24 follows the time mark of 03.39 on page 4, Mr Roe, it's  25 the foot of the page:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 55</p>
<p>1 even from lobby level to be able to make some sort of  2 assessment of that.</p> <p>3 Q. Did you go upstairs at this point?</p> <p>4 A. No. Actually, I didn't go upstairs at any point more  5 than a few steps. I didn't go to the bridgehead at any  6 point. That wasn't my purpose for going in there.  7 I needed to speak to my sector commanders primarily.  8 That's an information-gathering exercise to see them  9 face-to-face, because our own communications on the fire  10 ground were challenging because of the level of radio  11 traffic.</p> <p>12 Q. At this time, adjusted, it appears that the bridgehead  13 was still on the 3rd floor.</p> <p>14 A. Mm.</p> <p>15 Q. From what you could see, was the bridgehead down on the  16 ground floor by that stage, as best you recall?</p> <p>17 A. I don't recall the bridgehead being on the ground floor  18 at that stage, no. I think it was still upstairs at  19 that point, if I can remember it correctly. I mean,  20 I have to say, my memory of this happening at this  21 time -- this has genuinely come as a surprise to me that  22 I'm inside the tower at this point, at that time. But  23 that probably reflects the length of time I was in  24 command and the dynamic nature of the incident.</p> <p>25 Q. Does that mean that you didn't have a nuts and bolts</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 54</p>	<p>1 "I received a quick brief from Pat Goulbourne and  2 Richard Welch ..."</p> <p>3 Can you see that? Probably easier to look on the  4 screen.</p> <p>5 A. Apologies.</p> <p>6 Q. This is in the block of narrative which starts at page 4  7 with the time mark of 03.39:</p> <p>8 "I received a quick brief from Pat Goulbourne and  9 Richard Welch who were running the Fire sector between  10 them, they told me they had cleared as best as possible  11 up to the 8th at that point ..."</p> <p>12 I don't need the detail at this point, I'll come to  13 it later.</p> <p>14 Just in terms of timing, are we to take it that the  15 first time you had a brief from Pat Goulbourne and  16 Richard Welch to discover what they were doing in the  17 fire sector was after 03.39?</p> <p>18 A. No, I don't think so, now you've shown me that, because  19 if I'd been in the tower at 03.02, I would've had  20 a brief from Pat and Richard. It may well be I've  21 conflated more than one visit because of the span of  22 time I was at the incident.</p> <p>23 I remember going into the tower a number of times.  24 The ones I can absolutely pin down in terms of detail  25 are the ones I've recorded, because I know I left the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 56</p>

<p>1 unit because it was stamped and recorded that I'd gone.</p> <p>2 But I would not have not received a brief from Pat</p> <p>3 or Richard when I was in the tower. To the best of my</p> <p>4 recollection, every time I was in the tower, I had</p> <p>5 a brief from Pat or Richard, because I simply would not</p> <p>6 have gone into the tower without wanting that.</p> <p>7 Now, whether I've got the time wrong within my</p> <p>8 statement, yes, quite possibly, or whether in fact I've</p> <p>9 combined two conversations, I think that's entirely</p> <p>10 possible in the context of my memory. But, actually, if</p> <p>11 I'd gone in to get a brief inside the tower then</p> <p>12 I would've got it earlier.</p> <p>13 Q. Let's try and take this in stages.</p> <p>14 At 03.02 or thereabouts, allowing for the adjustment</p> <p>15 of the time, you would've had to have gone up to the</p> <p>16 bridgehead, which was on the 3rd floor. Do you remember</p> <p>17 doing that?</p> <p>18 A. No, and I don't think I did. So I can only tell you</p> <p>19 what I remember.</p> <p>20 Q. Do you remember -- and I know you don't remember very</p> <p>21 much of that early 03.02 visit to the tower -- whether</p> <p>22 then or later either of Pat Goulbourne or Richard Welch</p> <p>23 came down from the bridgehead to speak to you?</p> <p>24 A. Yes, definitely. I spoke to Pat and Richard, or either</p> <p>25 Pat on his own or Richard on his own, at the foot of the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 57</p>	<p>1 forward. In fact, they were invaluable to me. Because</p> <p>2 of the difficulties with communications, they</p> <p>3 effectively became, for long periods of time, my conduit</p> <p>4 of information back and forth being carried out</p> <p>5 face-to-face. So going to Andy O'Loughlin, going into</p> <p>6 the fire sector, triangulating the information from fire</p> <p>7 sector to Andy and back to me and giving me</p> <p>8 a situational brief. That's a very important part of</p> <p>9 their role.</p> <p>10 Q. I showed you the photograph at 03.02 in fairness to you</p> <p>11 because it's evidence, as you've confirmed, that you</p> <p>12 were in the tower at that stage. But if you ignore that</p> <p>13 for the moment, would that, on the basis of your</p> <p>14 recollection that you had prior to seeing that picture,</p> <p>15 mean that you didn't in fact do a face-to-face brief</p> <p>16 with Richard Welch or Pat Goulbourne about what they</p> <p>17 were doing until almost an hour after the stay-put</p> <p>18 advice was changed, after 03.39?</p> <p>19 A. I think on the basis of my recollection -- I would like</p> <p>20 to think if I was in the tower, I did, but that has come</p> <p>21 as a surprise to me seeing that. And, actually, if I'm</p> <p>22 going by the statement, it would've been as it's</p> <p>23 time-stamped, which is 03.39, and yes, that would be the</p> <p>24 case, so I would've got a face-to-face brief from</p> <p>25 Richard and Pat at that point. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 59</p>
<p>1 stairs on more than one occasion to receive a brief.</p> <p>2 Q. Did you ever speak to them at the foot of the stairs</p> <p>3 when the bridgehead was not at the foot of the stairs?</p> <p>4 A. Sorry, could you ask that question again?</p> <p>5 Q. Did you ever speak to either of Pat Goulbourne or</p> <p>6 Richard Welch at the foot of the stairs, as you've just</p> <p>7 said, when the bridgehead was not itself at the foot of</p> <p>8 the stairs?</p> <p>9 A. I can't recollect that level of detail. All I know is</p> <p>10 that I would've expected to speak to Pat or Richard when</p> <p>11 I went in. To be fair, I can't remember going in at</p> <p>12 03.01, but that would've been my expectation and that's</p> <p>13 what my memory is. But as I said, it was a surprise to</p> <p>14 me I was in the tower at 03.01/03.02.</p> <p>15 Q. Doing the best you can with your recollection, how long</p> <p>16 after the change in the stay-put advice at 02.47 did you</p> <p>17 speak, do you think, to Richard Welch and Pat Goulbourne</p> <p>18 about their plan?</p> <p>19 A. Well, before I'd seen that CCTV footage, I would've said</p> <p>20 it would've been the visit that's recorded on the</p> <p>21 statement at 03.39, I would've thought it was then,</p> <p>22 because prior to that I was relying very heavily on</p> <p>23 Matt Cook and Mick Mulholland to keep me updated in the</p> <p>24 context of situational awareness while I was putting in</p> <p>25 the structures to support and drive the incident</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 58</p>	<p>1 So I'm certain I did have a face-to-face brief with</p> <p>2 either Pat or Richard at that point. The fact that</p> <p>3 I was in there earlier -- you know, you've genuinely</p> <p>4 caught me by surprise and I'm having to think about the</p> <p>5 events of the evening that, actually, did I have</p> <p>6 a face-to-face brief at 03.00 in the morning from one of</p> <p>7 them?</p> <p>8 Q. You can't remember, and that's fair enough. But on the</p> <p>9 footing of your statement and the contemporaneous notes,</p> <p>10 can you help me with this: why would you have left it</p> <p>11 from 02.47 to after 03.39 to have a face-to-face</p> <p>12 discussion with Pat Goulbourne and Richard Welch?</p> <p>13 A. Because I had officers to provide me with an update of</p> <p>14 situational awareness who were speaking to those</p> <p>15 officers face-to-face on a regular basis. I was at the</p> <p>16 very beginning of taking over a major incident that was</p> <p>17 likely to have an effect across the whole of the London</p> <p>18 environment, never mind the local environment it was in.</p> <p>19 I needed to be sure that the structures that were going</p> <p>20 to support any activity on the incident ground,</p> <p>21 regardless of the tactical plan, were being gathered and</p> <p>22 managed appropriately, and I needed to brief officers</p> <p>23 who were going to take those roles forward into</p> <p>24 a delegated command.</p> <p>25 So I think it's more about -- I could've taken the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 60</p>

<p>1 time, and clearly I did go into the tower at 03.00 to</p> <p>2 gather some situational awareness, but actually my</p> <p>3 recollection was focusing on putting in place the</p> <p>4 structures to drive the incident forward.</p> <p>5 I think, again, whilst situational awareness is</p> <p>6 absolutely vital for an incident commander in my</p> <p>7 position, what I am relying on inevitably because of the</p> <p>8 size of the incident, the spans of control I had, was</p> <p>9 trust in the officers who had delegated command to make</p> <p>10 sensible decisions within their sector based on their</p> <p>11 own situational awareness and receive continual update</p> <p>12 on that basis through whatever means I could. I had</p> <p>13 that from a number of means.</p> <p>14 So I had Dave O'Neill, who was very important to me</p> <p>15 in terms of information updates. The sector safety</p> <p>16 commander. He was giving me regular updates about the</p> <p>17 challenges of getting into the building, the scale of</p> <p>18 debris fall, the potential of collapse, and Dave is an</p> <p>19 urban search and rescue specialist, so his advice was</p> <p>20 particularly valuable.</p> <p>21 Matt Cook and Mick Mulholland were pretty much on</p> <p>22 a cycle of going out to the incident ground, confirming</p> <p>23 situational awareness as I'd asked them to and then</p> <p>24 coming back to me and confirming my understanding of</p> <p>25 what was going on and whether we were maintaining</p> <p>Page 61</p>	<p>1 Other options might also be available, e.g. use of high</p> <p>2 intensity light or a loudhailer."</p> <p>3 Did you discuss those tactical options listed there</p> <p>4 with anybody?</p> <p>5 A. Not as I remember, but actually we have an issue, or we</p> <p>6 had an issue at that time, from what I remember,</p> <p>7 generally with the availability of the downlink working</p> <p>8 on the command unit. So, actually, whilst the</p> <p>9 information the helicopter gives you in many instances</p> <p>10 is very useful -- so say I had a large industrial</p> <p>11 building where I didn't have a full view of the roof and</p> <p>12 I wanted to understand the fire spread, very useful</p> <p>13 information and I would request it.</p> <p>14 To be fair, I don't think in the context of Grenfell</p> <p>15 it would've been my immediate priority, because it</p> <p>16 wasn't going to give me anything I didn't already know.</p> <p>17 I already knew the extent of fire spread, I could see it</p> <p>18 very clearly. We were close to the tower. It was</p> <p>19 obvious what it was. A vertical view of that was not</p> <p>20 going to tell me anything other than perhaps what</p> <p>21 buildings might be at risk close to it, but I'd already</p> <p>22 had that information from elsewhere.</p> <p>23 High intensity light or a loudhailer would've been</p> <p>24 not useful at all in that context for two reasons.</p> <p>25 Firstly, the volume of noise. The only thing I can</p> <p>Page 63</p>
<p>1 progress against my objectives, and I had Andy</p> <p>2 O'Loughlin checking in face-to-face with me.</p> <p>3 Because of the challenges of communication, all</p> <p>4 those conversations tended to be face-to-face, either</p> <p>5 coming onto the unit or me occasionally getting off the</p> <p>6 unit to have the conversations.</p> <p>7 Q. Helicopters. Different topic.</p> <p>8 A. Helicopters.</p> <p>9 Q. Were you aware that there was an NPAS helicopter at the</p> <p>10 incident, or above the incident, at about 02.47, at the</p> <p>11 time you took over command?</p> <p>12 A. I may have been. I can't remember it as a point of</p> <p>13 detail, but I would've expected them to be there because</p> <p>14 it was inevitable the Met helicopter would've been up.</p> <p>15 Q. Can I ask you to look, please, at MET00018761. This is</p> <p>16 an NPAS report dated 3 October 2017 by Inspector Simon</p> <p>17 Hepworth. I can take you, please, to page 2, last</p> <p>18 bullet point.</p> <p>19 This is three lines down from the start of that</p> <p>20 bullet point where we see this:</p> <p>21 "The tactical options available at incidents such as</p> <p>22 Grenfell Tower include video and/or thermal imaging</p> <p>23 downlink to the incident commander, recording of video</p> <p>24 evidence, monitoring by the crew and verbal information</p> <p>25 passed to the incident commander and stills photography.</p> <p>Page 62</p>	<p>1 describe it to you is to perhaps go back to my military</p> <p>2 experience, which is I've never heard a volume of noise</p> <p>3 at an incident in the fire service that I could compare</p> <p>4 it to. The only comparison I had was to very, very</p> <p>5 serious large-scale civil disorder at Drumcree,</p> <p>6 actually, where the level of noise was absolutely</p> <p>7 deafening. So to have tried to have spoken with</p> <p>8 a loudhailer to anyone would've been impossible because</p> <p>9 of that volume of noise. You couldn't hear anything.</p> <p>10 If you were going to use a high intensity light,</p> <p>11 that wouldn't have helped us. We didn't have an issue</p> <p>12 with lighting on the external of the building.</p> <p>13 Actually, I wouldn't have wanted a helicopter</p> <p>14 too close to the building full stop, because it would've</p> <p>15 been difficult to judge, I would guess -- and I'm not</p> <p>16 a pilot -- a safe proximity because of the scale of the</p> <p>17 fire and the products of combustion coming from it. The</p> <p>18 effect of downdraft would possibly have had a really</p> <p>19 detrimental effect on the building as well. So to use</p> <p>20 those two final tactical options would've been, I think,</p> <p>21 inappropriate.</p> <p>22 I think later on we considered as a very limited</p> <p>23 possibility calling in coastguard search and rescue</p> <p>24 because of reports of people on the roof, but I have to</p> <p>25 say, I don't think I'd have ever used that. We</p> <p>Page 64</p>



<p>1 considered that as an option, but in the context of the</p> <p>2 building, I don't think that would be a safe option for</p> <p>3 rescue. We just had to consider it because it was</p> <p>4 a tool in our arsenal.</p> <p>5 Q. I think you answered not just my question but several</p> <p>6 other questions I was going to follow up with.</p> <p>7 Somewhere in there there was something about the</p> <p>8 downlink not working.</p> <p>9 Did you know whether it was not working or whether</p> <p>10 the message was actually scrambled?</p> <p>11 A. To be fair, to me, it would've been the same thing. So</p> <p>12 my understanding of that is that organisationally we</p> <p>13 discovered -- I don't know whether it was pre or</p> <p>14 post-Grenfell -- something about the encrypting of</p> <p>15 information from the helicopter meant we couldn't pick</p> <p>16 it up for a period of time on our unit. That's my</p> <p>17 understanding of it.</p> <p>18 On the night, I cannot genuinely recollect whether</p> <p>19 I had that conversation. I would expect I would've</p> <p>20 done, but it's not recorded in any of my decision logs,</p> <p>21 so I can't rightfully claim to say I definitely did.</p> <p>22 But it's a normal expectation as an incident commander</p> <p>23 at my level to say: have we got the helicopter up? Have</p> <p>24 we got a heli-tele downlink?</p> <p>25 Unfortunately, my experience over a period of time</p> <p>Page 65</p>	<p>1 development comment that has been picked up through the</p> <p>2 PRC process, but I think that would've arisen from them.</p> <p>3 From my point of view, it would certainly be</p> <p>4 something I would've wanted to be working on the unit,</p> <p>5 so you could apply that logic as equally to the command</p> <p>6 unit as you could to Stratford control. I think ideally</p> <p>7 we would want that, it's a very useful piece of</p> <p>8 information.</p> <p>9 Q. Therefore, were you hampered in any way by not having</p> <p>10 the heli-tele downlink working and giving you images?</p> <p>11 A. On the scale of that incident, no. I don't think in the</p> <p>12 context of this incident it would've made much</p> <p>13 difference. It's always useful to have a vertical view,</p> <p>14 but I wouldn't say it hampered my decision-making, no,</p> <p>15 or particularly changed my situational awareness.</p> <p>16 Q. Might you have been able through the heli-tele downlink</p> <p>17 to identify still living occupants at windows?</p> <p>18 A. No, I don't think from the view they had -- my</p> <p>19 experience of heli-tele is I think that would've been</p> <p>20 difficult.</p> <p>21 I couldn't rule that out. To be fair, I'm not an</p> <p>22 expert, I don't fly the helicopter and I don't operate</p> <p>23 the imaging equipment. But I doubt it would've had much</p> <p>24 use to us. Then we would've had the issue of tying that</p> <p>25 information up with what we were giving to crews</p> <p>Page 67</p>
<p>1 around that time was that the answer was normally, "No,</p> <p>2 we haven't because we can't receive the information."</p> <p>3 Q. Can I ask you to go to the IMP report for this incident,</p> <p>4 which is tab 30 of the documents bundle, and turn in</p> <p>5 that to page 2, please. This is LFB00003114.</p> <p>6 First of all, I should ask you, are you familiar</p> <p>7 with this document?</p> <p>8 A. Yes.</p> <p>9 Q. I jumped in rather at page 2.</p> <p>10 A. I haven't read it since the PRC, but yes, I recognise</p> <p>11 the document.</p> <p>12 Q. I can show you page 1 if you want.</p> <p>13 A. No, that's fine.</p> <p>14 Q. Let's look together at the second entry down under</p> <p>15 "Development", and the observation there is:</p> <p>16 "There was no access to the helicopter downlink</p> <p>17 (heli-tele) at Stratford Control fall-back. Review the</p> <p>18 equipment at our Control fall-back locations."</p> <p>19 As a development item, am I right in thinking that</p> <p>20 this indicates that the absence of a helicopter downlink</p> <p>21 at Stratford was a problem?</p> <p>22 A. I mean, I can't speak for the people who were at</p> <p>23 Stratford, but clearly it's there because -- I can only</p> <p>24 assume that they must have felt it was something that</p> <p>25 would've been useful for them to be recorded as a</p> <p>Page 66</p>	<p>1 internally and what we were committing them to.</p> <p>2 So, no, I don't think that would've been a major</p> <p>3 factor in terms of our overall decision-making or our</p> <p>4 intent in terms of the rescue operation.</p> <p>5 Q. Can I ask you, please, to go to your contemporaneous</p> <p>6 notes at page 3. Where in the middle of the page you</p> <p>7 describe your briefings and you say:</p> <p>8 "I asked Andy to become my operations commander with</p> <p>9 responsibility for the fire sector, FSG operation and BA</p> <p>10 main control ... I confirmed Steve West in command</p> <p>11 support would be responsible for keeping the fire sector</p> <p>12 resourced ..."</p> <p>13 I've shown you that as a platform for your witness</p> <p>14 statement, where on page 5, if you just go to that, you</p> <p>15 add to that. It's your first statement, page 5, the top</p> <p>16 of the page. You say:</p> <p>17 "I explained to Andy I had two priorities for him.</p> <p>18 The first and most important was to work with Dave</p> <p>19 O'Neill to establish safe access/egress due to the</p> <p>20 significant amount of debris coming off the</p> <p>21 building ..."</p> <p>22 We've discussed that already this morning.</p> <p>23 "The second was to drive the rescue effort as hard</p> <p>24 as possible - focusing on saveable life."</p> <p>25 Did you give Andy O'Loughlin any clue as to how, in</p> <p>Page 68</p>

<p>1 practical terms, to go about that?</p> <p>2 <b>A. I can't remember the detail of the briefing to that</b></p> <p>3 <b>level. What I do know is I set those priorities out, we</b></p> <p>4 <b>talked about the need for continual assessment of how</b></p> <p>5 <b>safe it was to commit our crews into the building, which</b></p> <p>6 <b>ties in in part with the instruction to work with</b></p> <p>7 <b>Dave O'Neill and be mindful of the possibility of</b></p> <p>8 <b>building collapse.</b></p> <p>9 <b>I would've expected Andy, because of the discussion</b></p> <p>10 <b>we had, to just focus on volume of BA crews in. I do</b></p> <p>11 <b>remember saying something along the lines: we need to</b></p> <p>12 <b>maintain a continuous breathing apparatus operation at</b></p> <p>13 <b>great volume into the building.</b></p> <p>14 <b>Q. I know this is you giving Andy O'Loughlin your briefing</b></p> <p>15 <b>as ops commander, but when you received your briefing</b></p> <p>16 <b>from him, did he give you any clue about the strategy</b></p> <p>17 <b>being carried out in the fire sector?</b></p> <p>18 <b>A. Yes, because he'd confirmed that he had put in place</b></p> <p>19 <b>an operation to commit as many breathing apparatus crews</b></p> <p>20 <b>as possible into the building and I concurred with his</b></p> <p>21 <b>view on that, that it was going to be very difficult to</b></p> <p>22 <b>prioritise in detail and, therefore, we had to focus on</b></p> <p>23 <b>just continuous volume of crews in to make sure we swept</b></p> <p>24 <b>everybody up in the rescue operation. The only way we</b></p> <p>25 <b>could do that was to ensure we had that volume in there.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 69</p>	<p>1 <b>Q. Mr Roe, I apologise for what I am about to say, and</b></p> <p>2 <b>I don't mean any disrespect. That's not just a very</b></p> <p>3 <b>long answer to a simple and short question, but what</b></p> <p>4 <b>I am trying to do is elicit the facts on the night by</b></p> <p>5 <b>asking you a set of questions to which there should be</b></p> <p>6 <b>short answers. What I am not after is your opinion of</b></p> <p>7 <b>how things went unless I ask for that.</b></p> <p>8 <b>So it might shorten things and help you if we just</b></p> <p>9 <b>focus on, if we can, the answer to my question, because</b></p> <p>10 <b>it normally leads to another question that builds on</b></p> <p>11 <b>that.</b></p> <p>12 <b>Do you see?</b></p> <p>13 <b>A. Absolutely. Apologies.</b></p> <p>14 <b>Q. Let's try that out and see how we go.</b></p> <p>15 <b>The next question, following on from the answer to</b></p> <p>16 <b>my last question, which was yes, I think, was: did he</b></p> <p>17 <b>give you specific details of the way in which he was</b></p> <p>18 <b>carrying out the strategy of search and rescue?</b></p> <p>19 <b>A. I think that was the answer I was trying to give you.</b></p> <p>20 <b>So it was that process by which we were committing</b></p> <p>21 <b>people into the building, and then ensuring that they</b></p> <p>22 <b>went up into the building in as great a volume as</b></p> <p>23 <b>possible.</b></p> <p>24 <b>In terms of detail -- do you mean detail in terms of</b></p> <p>25 <b>what floors they would search first or how they would</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 71</p>
<p>1 <b>That was very challenging.</b></p> <p>2 <b>I think I need to set that in the context. So to</b></p> <p>3 <b>maintain the volume -- and, actually, I'm really proud</b></p> <p>4 <b>of the officers like Dan Kipling, who ran BA main</b></p> <p>5 <b>control, and Dave O'Neill, who was securing and managing</b></p> <p>6 <b>the access/egress. Those were extremely complex tasks.</b></p> <p>7 <b>It's not as simple as people just walking into the</b></p> <p>8 <b>building. This was the management, the recovery, the</b></p> <p>9 <b>refreshing of sets, BA sets, to maintain a continuous</b></p> <p>10 <b>stream of people into a building which was very</b></p> <p>11 <b>difficult to access, maintaining egress for the other</b></p> <p>12 <b>crews coming out, to not have a break in that operation,</b></p> <p>13 <b>as far as I'm aware, I think was entirely impressive on</b></p> <p>14 <b>those officers' part. I think that was very, very, very</b></p> <p>15 <b>difficult.</b></p> <p>16 <b>Actually, whilst I think you can focus on the</b></p> <p>17 <b>question of prioritisation, my sense was the best way we</b></p> <p>18 <b>were going to give people the best chance of being</b></p> <p>19 <b>rescued was simply to flood the building with</b></p> <p>20 <b>firefighters, and to do that, it was a massive effort to</b></p> <p>21 <b>do that as safely as we possibly could, maintaining</b></p> <p>22 <b>throughput of resources so there wasn't a break.</b></p> <p>23 <b>To my knowledge, there was never a break in</b></p> <p>24 <b>committal unless there was a reason to fight the fire to</b></p> <p>25 <b>enable committal to continue.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 70</p>	<p>1 <b>progress inside the building? Is that perhaps what you</b></p> <p>2 <b>mean?</b></p> <p>3 <b>Q. You tell me. I mean, go with that, yes. Did he give</b></p> <p>4 <b>you the detail of those things?</b></p> <p>5 <b>A. We had a conversation on general principles about -- we</b></p> <p>6 <b>wanted to progress as far as firefighting conditions</b></p> <p>7 <b>would allow and that we should seek to push beyond that.</b></p> <p>8 <b>I think he may have made reference to a specific floor,</b></p> <p>9 <b>but I can't remember.</b></p> <p>10 <b>But my general thrust was that he was an experienced</b></p> <p>11 <b>officer. As long as progress was maintained as best as</b></p> <p>12 <b>possible in the face of difficult firefighting</b></p> <p>13 <b>conditions, the tactical plan in terms of taking people</b></p> <p>14 <b>out the building would in a sense be down to him and</b></p> <p>15 <b>Richard and Pat.</b></p> <p>16 <b>Q. Specifically, did Andy O'Loughlin tell you during the</b></p> <p>17 <b>course of his briefing to you on handover that he had</b></p> <p>18 <b>been trying to get information both from the fire sector</b></p> <p>19 <b>and from the FSG sector for some time but to no avail?</b></p> <p>20 <b>A. No, he didn't mention that in that handover.</b></p> <p>21 <b>Q. Would you have expected him to do that?</b></p> <p>22 <b>A. To tell me that he hadn't had any information from them?</b></p> <p>23 <b>Q. Yes.</b></p> <p>24 <b>A. If it had been a relevant factor and I had been</b></p> <p>25 <b>operating in an absence of information, yes. I didn't</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 72</p>

<p>1 <b>feel I was operating in an absence of information in</b>  2 <b>terms of determining the primary objectives and driving</b>  3 <b>progress forward.</b>  4 Q. On page 5 of your statement, just a little bit lower  5 down, four lines up from the bottom of that same  6 paragraph we were on, you say:  7 "The final part of my brief to Andy was CU would set  8 up channel 2 as a command channel on the fire ground  9 radio and that my immediate priority was to get the  10 police to secure the cordon."  11 On that question of the radio channel, why did you  12 think you needed to set up a separate channel?  13 <b>A. I wanted a separate command channel so we had the space</b>  14 <b>to talk and discuss, share situational information,</b>  15 <b>confirm and agree priorities. That was going to be very</b>  16 <b>difficult on channel 1 because of the volume of traffic</b>  17 <b>on channel 1 simply because of the numbers of</b>  18 <b>firefighters we had on the incident ground, and</b>  19 <b>therefore constantly interrupting and trying to take</b>  20 <b>a priority.</b>  21 <b>I think for everyone on the radio that night,</b>  22 <b>everything they were saying was a priority, obviously,</b>  23 <b>within their individual circumstances, so I wanted the</b>  24 <b>space where the command team could talk to each other,</b>  25 <b>discuss decisions, drive progress without constantly</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 73</p>	<p>1 <b>runners, face-to-face communication and doing our best</b>  2 <b>with channel 1 or mobile phones.</b>  3 Q. In the next paragraph you say that at 02.57, after the  4 reference to the PPV, third line down:  5 "Channel 2 would not work so we reverted back to  6 channel 1 ..."  7 Does that mean that, in fact, by 02.57, only  8 10 minutes after you had taken command or so, you  9 discovered that channel 2 didn't work?  10 <b>A. That feels about right, yes.</b>  11 Q. Do you know why it didn't work?  12 <b>A. To be honest with you, I didn't dissect it in entirety.</b>  13 <b>I may have said, "Can we be sure about that?", that's</b>  14 <b>probably the extent of it, but the command unit crew</b>  15 <b>were very definite in telling me that channel 2 wasn't</b>  16 <b>working. In fact, they were upset about it because I'm</b>  17 <b>sure they understood how important that would've been to</b>  18 <b>me and why it would've been an important factor in that</b>  19 <b>incident.</b>  20 Q. Can I ask you, please, to be shown page 25 of the short  21 incident log.  22 You'll see on that page that at 03.44.20, there's  23 a make-up request from control:  24 "SUP CU8 REQUEST URGENT ATTENDANCE OF RADIO ENGINEER  25 TO ASSIST WITH CHANNEL 2 FOR FIRE GROUND."</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 75</p>
<p>1 <b>having to find space within the overall level of radio</b>  2 <b>communication.</b>  3 Q. Were you concerned that a system such as channel 2 had  4 not already been established by the time you arrived?  5 <b>A. No, I wasn't concerned, but I wanted it set up. Again,</b>  6 <b>I wasn't reflecting on what had come previously.</b>  7 <b>I didn't really have the time and space to do that.</b>  8 <b>I just wanted it because I knew that would be a better</b>  9 <b>way of communicating it. I wasn't seeking to judge</b>  10 <b>anything at that point, I just needed to put in place</b>  11 <b>a structure and drive progress.</b>  12 Q. Did you set one up?  13 <b>A. Tried to. So I gave an instruction to the CU to set</b>  14 <b>channel 2 up. I asked them to pass that information out</b>  15 <b>to the incident ground that channel 2 would be set up</b>  16 <b>and, therefore, the command team should turn to</b>  17 <b>channel 2, only to find not long after that they had</b>  18 <b>been unable to set channel 2 up, which to be frank was</b>  19 <b>frustrating, and that we would have to revert to</b>  20 <b>channel 1.</b>  21 <b>At a later stage we had a limited Airwave network</b>  22 <b>between myself and Lee Drawbridge to talk about the</b>  23 <b>logistics and resourcing, which became increasingly</b>  24 <b>important.</b>  25 <b>But after that point, we had to work on the basis of</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 74</p>	<p>1 It appears that message went at 03.44, as you can  2 see, and we don't I think have a message, at least in  3 the short incident log, before that relating to  4 channel 2.  5 Can you explain why the message wasn't sent or the  6 service request wasn't made until then?  7 <b>A. No, I can't, and I wouldn't seek to excuse it. That's</b>  8 <b>probably something that could've gone earlier, actually</b>  9 <b>seeing that.</b>  10 Q. Did you actually know that a radio engineer had been  11 paged to attend the incident at 01.35.27?  12 <b>A. I didn't know that. But I do remember that request</b>  13 <b>going.</b>  14 Q. You remember that request going --  15 <b>A. I do.</b>  16 Q. How did you --  17 <b>A. Because I do remember -- because looking at it makes me</b>  18 <b>remember a conversation about a radio engineer coming.</b>  19 <b>Because I was frustrated with the communications on the</b>  20 <b>night, because we were relying so much on mobile phone,</b>  21 <b>face-to-face and runners.</b>  22 Q. Do you remember when you first discovered that a radio  23 engineer had been paged some time before your arrival,  24 in fact a good hour and a quarter before your arrival?  25 <b>A. I don't think I did know that. I think you telling me</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 76</p>

<p>1 <b>now is the first time I heard a radio engineer was paged</b>  2 <b>at 01.35.</b>  3 Q. I see. Because you say "I do remember that request  4 going".  5 <b>A. No, I remember this request going off the CU.</b>  6 Q. I see, but you don't remember there was a request at  7 01.35?  8 <b>A. No, I don't.</b>  9 Q. Do you know, from your recollection, when the radio  10 engineer arrived to try to sort out channel 2?  11 <b>A. No, I don't recollect when they arrived. All I do know</b>  12 <b>is that there was never a successful setting-up of</b>  13 <b>channel 2, whether the radio engineer arrived or not.</b>  14 Q. Did that hamper your communications as IC on the night?  15 <b>A. Yes, communications were extremely difficult on the</b>  16 <b>night. People really had to work very hard to ensure we</b>  17 <b>were maintaining each other's situational awareness.</b>  18 Q. You mentioned this a minute ago, I think. Is it right  19 an Airwave command channel was set up at some point?  20 <b>A. Yes.</b>  21 Q. That was using two channels, FLON-OPS 1 and FLON-OPS 3.  22 Do you remember that?  23 <b>A. I do. I don't remember the specifics of the channels</b>  24 <b>used, but I remember using that Airwave channel to talk</b>  25 <b>to Lee and possibly other officers as well.</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 77</p>	<p>1 Q. Do you know why it wasn't set up sooner than that?  2 <b>A. I don't think we had the structures in place to make</b>  3 <b>best use of it, actually. I think we were still in</b>  4 <b>a stage there where we were ensuring people were</b>  5 <b>briefed, that we had people actually in a physical</b>  6 <b>position to start managing the resources, and also, the</b>  7 <b>issue with setting up an Airwave network is that not all</b>  8 <b>officers will, as practice, carry their handheld</b>  9 <b>Airwave. You would need to confirm that people had it.</b>  10 Q. Can I ask you, then, to go to the PRC notes, just to  11 pick up on that last point, and go to page 6. This is  12 LFB00003112, and two-thirds of the way down that page  13 you see:  14 "Issues with comms -- officers left Airwaves in car.  15 "I felt really constrained by comms."  16 "Officers left Airwaves in car" I want to focus on.  17 Are officers meant to take their Airwave radios with  18 them onto the incident ground?  19 <b>A. As written in our policy, no, which I think should be</b>  20 <b>changed, and I felt that, to be fair, prior to this</b>  21 <b>incident, because we'd set up an Airwave comms network</b>  22 <b>on the Croydon tram crash and it was immensely useful.</b>  23 <b>I'd done it on other incidents previously. So I felt</b>  24 <b>that that was something in a policy that was focused on</b>  25 <b>security because of the need for digital communications</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 79</p>
<p>1 Q. Do you recall when those Airwave command channels were  2 set up, roughly what time?  3 <b>A. I think they were set up about the time that Lee</b>  4 <b>Drawbridge had arrived at the incident, so I think it</b>  5 <b>coincided with when Lee arrived and then we set those</b>  6 <b>up, because I now had someone who was going to handle</b>  7 <b>a very significant resourcing effort for me and</b>  8 <b>I really, really did need to be in communication with</b>  9 <b>him.</b>  10 <b>I would add, of course, that most of the time I'm</b>  11 <b>not handling my own communication. I'm giving an</b>  12 <b>instruction and I've got someone who's doing that for me</b>  13 <b>on the command unit. So it wouldn't necessarily be me</b>  14 <b>directly talking to those officers, but I would be</b>  15 <b>seeking information using that network via a proxy, via</b>  16 <b>one of my officers who was doing it for me.</b>  17 Q. In fact, we can see from page 7 of your log that you  18 briefed Lee Drawbridge at 04.35 am.  19 Sorry, let me put a slightly different point to you.  20 In fact, Lee Drawbridge says in his statement that  21 a second Airwave channel was set up just shortly after  22 04.00 am. That's what he says. It's a simpler way of  23 going about the same point.  24 Does that accord with your recollection?  25 <b>A. Yes, I think it does.</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 78</p>	<p>1 <b>to remain secure in a multi-agency emergency service</b>  2 <b>environment, so they're left in the car for security,</b>  3 <b>but, actually, I think that bit of policy needed to</b>  4 <b>change, because I would rather they had their handheld</b>  5 <b>Airwaves with them to exactly deal with the sort of</b>  6 <b>situation I faced. But I had no confidence that they</b>  7 <b>all would have them because of that policy.</b>  8 Q. The chairman is listening carefully to what you've just  9 said about that, but just going back to the night, was  10 the view that that policy should be changed a view that  11 you held before the Grenfell Tower incident?  12 <b>A. Yes.</b>  13 Q. Was it something you raised with the very few people who  14 were senior to you?  15 <b>A. Yes, and I think there had been a discussion about</b>  16 <b>changing it. I can't remember the exact particulars,</b>  17 <b>but I am sure that it had probably arisen as a PRC point</b>  18 <b>perhaps in other incidents.</b>  19 Q. Really?  20 <b>A. Yes.</b>  21 Q. Was it being taken forward at that stage as a policy  22 change?  23 <b>A. I don't know. But the conversations I had, people had</b>  24 <b>agreed with it. I don't hold responsibility for that</b>  25 <b>policy, but my sense was that, yes, people understood</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 80</p>

<p>1 <b>that. I mean, I think there is a debate about the</b></p> <p>2 <b>security of those Airwave, because whilst it's very</b></p> <p>3 <b>important for us to communicate on the fire ground,</b></p> <p>4 <b>obviously they're a very security-sensitive piece of kit</b></p> <p>5 <b>that would enable someone, if it went to the wrong</b></p> <p>6 <b>place, to have access to secure digital communications,</b></p> <p>7 <b>for example the police responding to a terrorist</b></p> <p>8 <b>incident. So there is always a balance between the</b></p> <p>9 <b>security and availability of that equipment. I guess</b></p> <p>10 <b>that's where that had come from.</b></p> <p>11 <b>But on balance, for me, my personal opinion is that</b></p> <p>12 <b>we should end that piece of policy and officers should</b></p> <p>13 <b>be carrying their Airwave onto the incident ground.</b></p> <p>14 Q. To go back to page 5 of your witness statement, the same</p> <p>15 paragraph we were looking at, the second paragraph, you</p> <p>16 say:</p> <p>17 "At 0257 hrs I requested Positive Pressure</p> <p>18 Ventilation (PPV)/Specialist Entry Recovery Team (SERT)</p> <p>19 via the duty DAC. My reasoning was we might be able to</p> <p>20 use to fan and high pressure lance technology in some</p> <p>21 way."</p> <p>22 How did you think the PPV would be able to work in</p> <p>23 the circumstances you were seeing?</p> <p>24 <b>A. I couldn't say for definite that it would work, but,</b></p> <p>25 <b>again, it's about having the tools in your arsenal</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 81</p>	<p>1 Q. You also say that in the last sentence of this</p> <p>2 paragraph:</p> <p>3 "I asked the unit to get a better map but they</p> <p>4 confirmed the command support system wasn't working."</p> <p>5 Short sentence, two issues.</p> <p>6 First of all, when you say "better map", what were</p> <p>7 you after? Was that a diagram or a plan of the</p> <p>8 building?</p> <p>9 <b>A. I think a map in all contexts, so a better map of the</b></p> <p>10 <b>wider area that we could see in larger scale so I had an</b></p> <p>11 <b>understanding of other things that were likely to be</b></p> <p>12 <b>impacted. So, for example, you've got Latimer Road tube</b></p> <p>13 <b>very close to Grenfell. I was greatly concerned about</b></p> <p>14 <b>the possible impact as we got closer to rush hour on the</b></p> <p>15 <b>tube line, both in terms of risk to people on that tube</b></p> <p>16 <b>line, the wider impact on the transport network, and</b></p> <p>17 <b>I would've liked an understanding of that.</b></p> <p>18 <b>I wanted better plans of the floor plates, because</b></p> <p>19 <b>I would've liked the BA crews to have that.</b></p> <p>20 <b>So I think it was on every level I wanted better</b></p> <p>21 <b>information visually about the area and the specifics of</b></p> <p>22 <b>the tower itself.</b></p> <p>23 Q. We'll come to talk about plans specifically in a minute,</p> <p>24 but just focusing then on the command system not</p> <p>25 working.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 83</p>
<p>1 <b>available. So even if you discount them, there's</b></p> <p>2 <b>nothing to hurt getting them there, and things always</b></p> <p>3 <b>have to move a distance, so you might as well get them</b></p> <p>4 <b>moving.</b></p> <p>5 <b>So it wasn't that I was definite that PPV would be</b></p> <p>6 <b>of use, but I could see that we might use it in some way</b></p> <p>7 <b>to improve conditions potentially in the lobby, that we</b></p> <p>8 <b>might be able to drive smoke out of the lobby area so it</b></p> <p>9 <b>was better for officers and crews in that part of the</b></p> <p>10 <b>building.</b></p> <p>11 Q. Did you make any enquiry of anybody on the incident</p> <p>12 ground about whether there was a smoke ventilation of</p> <p>13 extraction system in the building?</p> <p>14 <b>A. I don't know whether I made the enquiry, but I certainly</b></p> <p>15 <b>had a conversation at one point with someone -- it might</b></p> <p>16 <b>have been Matt or Mick -- about the fact that there was</b></p> <p>17 <b>a smoke ventilation system that wasn't working. So</b></p> <p>18 <b>I knew there was a fixed installation, but it wasn't</b></p> <p>19 <b>working.</b></p> <p>20 Q. Did you investigate why it wasn't working?</p> <p>21 <b>A. No, because I think, looking at the building, I was</b></p> <p>22 <b>convinced that, along with the fire lift and other</b></p> <p>23 <b>aspects of the building's system, it was the extent of</b></p> <p>24 <b>damage and fire spread to the building that was</b></p> <p>25 <b>preventing it working.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 82</p>	<p>1 Was that the command support system, or CSS, on CU8,</p> <p>2 which you were on?</p> <p>3 <b>A. So, yes, I was told that CSS wasn't working on CU8.</b></p> <p>4 Q. Were you surprised?</p> <p>5 <b>A. No.</b></p> <p>6 Q. Does that tell us that they don't often work?</p> <p>7 <b>A. I think that they work inconsistently. So it didn't</b></p> <p>8 <b>particularly surprise me because I've been at a number</b></p> <p>9 <b>of incidents where CSS hadn't worked, and it wasn't for</b></p> <p>10 <b>want -- organisationally, we're trying to fix it.</b></p> <p>11 <b>There's been a huge amount of effort in trying to fix</b></p> <p>12 <b>what is an aging system and we're now in the process of</b></p> <p>13 <b>procuring an entirely new system to replace it. But,</b></p> <p>14 <b>no, I wasn't surprised.</b></p> <p>15 Q. You say you're now in the process of procuring an</p> <p>16 entirely new system; were you in that process prior to</p> <p>17 the Grenfell Tower fire?</p> <p>18 <b>A. Yes. My understanding is that process had started</b></p> <p>19 <b>before the Grenfell Tower fire. So, again, it's not my</b></p> <p>20 <b>area of responsibility, but there have been continued</b></p> <p>21 <b>organisational frustration with CSS. That was well</b></p> <p>22 <b>known, it was well noted, it was a repeated point raised</b></p> <p>23 <b>on PRCs, PROs, on the incident management database.</b></p> <p>24 <b>Work was beginning, as far as I understand it, to</b></p> <p>25 <b>procure a new system to replace CSS, which was an aging</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 84</p>

<p>1 system and at times inconsistently operating.</p> <p>2 Q. Did the absence of CSS hamper you personally in your</p> <p>3 role as IC on the night?</p> <p>4 <b>A. In some aspects, because you get access to better</b></p> <p>5 <b>mapping. Actually, I think the organisational part of</b></p> <p>6 <b>CSS would've been less useful because of the scale of</b></p> <p>7 <b>the incident, actually. So you can create</b></p> <p>8 <b>an organisational structure. That would've been useful</b></p> <p>9 <b>in some ways, but, actually, it was so large in terms of</b></p> <p>10 <b>the resources coming on, I think the information</b></p> <p>11 <b>would've been crowded. It was primarily the mapping,</b></p> <p>12 <b>really.</b></p> <p>13 Q. I was going to ask you, in what aspects specifically</p> <p>14 were you hampered by the absence of working CSS?</p> <p>15 <b>A. I think it was more than anything the mapping. I would</b></p> <p>16 <b>really have liked the mapping.</b></p> <p>17 Q. The non-functioning of the CSS looks from your statement</p> <p>18 to be something you experienced at 02.57; is that right?</p> <p>19 <b>A. If that's what it says in the statement, that would be</b></p> <p>20 <b>to the best of my recollection.</b></p> <p>21 Q. The reason I ask you is if you go to your log at page 2,</p> <p>22 you can see that at 04.03, which is a good hour and</p> <p>23 a quarter or so later, it says, three entries up from</p> <p>24 the bottom:</p> <p>25 "Command Support System has gone down."</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 85</p>	<p>1 (11.45 am)</p> <p>2 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Roe, ready to</p> <p>3 continue?</p> <p>4 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.</p> <p>5 MR MILLETT: Thank you for coming back to us.</p> <p>6 Can I take you now to 03.20 and your first TCM.</p> <p>7 In your witness statement at page 6, if you please</p> <p>8 go to that, you see in the middle of the page you say:</p> <p>9 "At 0320 hrs I chaired the first Tactical</p> <p>10 Coordination Meeting, details are recorded in the</p> <p>11 decision log (exhibit ADR/2). In summary this included</p> <p>12 the use of the TSG to deal with a deteriorating public</p> <p>13 order situation, the safety of partners within the inner</p> <p>14 cordon and no one should be moving independently of the</p> <p>15 fire service ..."</p> <p>16 Then at the end of the paragraph, you say:</p> <p>17 "I requested plans from the Local Authority, which I</p> <p>18 did not get."</p> <p>19 I want to focus on this question of plans.</p> <p>20 At that stage, did you consider that not having</p> <p>21 plans of the building was affecting your ability to make</p> <p>22 command decisions?</p> <p>23 <b>A. I think at the level I was operating, no, because I was</b></p> <p>24 <b>making big command decisions about the broad thrust of</b></p> <p>25 <b>the incident. But for those officers I delegated</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 87</p>
<p>1 I'm asking really whether that was the first time it</p> <p>2 had gone down and it had been operating until then, or</p> <p>3 whether it had not been operating at all.</p> <p>4 <b>A. No, it had not been operating at all. So this is</b></p> <p>5 <b>Jackie's log, isn't it? Whether I've asked her to do</b></p> <p>6 <b>that or whether she's noted that, I couldn't tell you.</b></p> <p>7 <b>But, no, command support had not been working prior to</b></p> <p>8 <b>then, I'm sure it wasn't.</b></p> <p>9 Q. Do you know why Jackie would've noted it at that time</p> <p>10 rather than at the start?</p> <p>11 <b>A. Genuinely, no.</b></p> <p>12 MR MILLETT: Okay.</p> <p>13 Mr Chairman, I'm going to turn to a different topic.</p> <p>14 I always say that, I hope to stick to it. It may be</p> <p>15 a convenient moment for another of our hourly breaks.</p> <p>16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That would seem sensible. We'll</p> <p>17 have another short break now.</p> <p>18 As before, please don't talk to anyone else about</p> <p>19 your evidence, and we'll resume at 11.45, please.</p> <p>20 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.</p> <p>21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, if you would like to go with</p> <p>22 the usher. Thank you.</p> <p>23 Right, 11.45, please.</p> <p>24 (11.35 am)</p> <p>25 (A short break)</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 86</p>	<p>1 command to to form a tactical plan -- so for example Pat</p> <p>2 and Richard particularly were going to have to</p> <p>3 continuously judge to what level they could push people</p> <p>4 up inside the building, sometimes have to draw people</p> <p>5 back, what would be their priority as to what level they</p> <p>6 would go to, perhaps even missing floors, and to do</p> <p>7 that, it was always going to be better if they had</p> <p>8 detailed plans that showed the floor plates.</p> <p>9 Q. Did you know they didn't have plans?</p> <p>10 <b>A. I didn't know that they didn't have -- well, to be fair</b></p> <p>11 <b>I assumed they didn't have plans because we didn't have</b></p> <p>12 <b>anything on the ORD, and I asked whether we had plans</b></p> <p>13 <b>from the local authority and we didn't, so I assumed</b></p> <p>14 <b>they didn't have plans in that sense.</b></p> <p>15 Q. Right. Let's explore that a little bit if we can.</p> <p>16 I understand your last answer about you not needing</p> <p>17 them, but they would. Did they tell you, "We don't have</p> <p>18 any plans, can you get them for us"?</p> <p>19 <b>A. I can't remember, but I would've wanted them as a matter</b></p> <p>20 <b>of course because I think that is a very important part</b></p> <p>21 <b>of the information for our crews to have. So I would've</b></p> <p>22 <b>asked anyway.</b></p> <p>23 Q. You said also that you didn't have anything on the ORD.</p> <p>24 This anticipates some questions I have later, but did</p> <p>25 you check the ORD when you got onto the command unit?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 88</p>

<p>1 <b>A. I think I answered that yesterday, actually. I hadn't</b>  2 <b>checked it in the detail but I had asked the command</b>  3 <b>unit staff to tell me whether or not there was useful</b>  4 <b>information on the ORD, whether it would be of use to me</b>  5 <b>and I was told, actually, no.</b>  6 Q. You've also I think covered this, but I want to look at  7 it a bit more closely.  8 On the night of the fire, would you have expected  9 that the plans would be available to the incident  10 commander who was first at the scene?  11 <b>A. Yes, I would've expected a plan of the floor plate on</b>  12 <b>the ORD.</b>  13 Q. If not on the ORD, would you expect it in a premises  14 information box or an electronic premises information  15 box?  16 <b>A. Depending on the type of building, yes. It's not</b>  17 <b>mandatory for a tower of Grenfell's type to have</b>  18 <b>a premises information box, but I would've expected</b>  19 <b>crews to have had access to a plan of some sort through</b>  20 <b>those systems, yes.</b>  21 Q. You say plan of some sort; can you just give us a rough  22 feel for how detailed the plans you would ordinarily  23 expect to be available would be?  24 <b>A. On an ORD entry for a block of this nature?</b>  25 Q. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 89</p>	<p>1 <b>was required, they might have maps.</b>  2 <b>So lots of sources where you might get a map from.</b>  3 <b>In worst case, actually, I would expect a degree of</b>  4 <b>common sense to be applied as an officer because you</b>  5 <b>want to know that floor plate and layout of the flats.</b>  6 <b>You would normally go to an unaffected floor if you</b>  7 <b>didn't have a good plan and draw yourself a plan. So</b>  8 <b>you'd go to an unaffected floor, have a look at the</b>  9 <b>make-up of that floor and then draw yourself</b>  10 <b>a diagrammatic representation of that floor so you could</b>  11 <b>plan off that and work off that.</b>  12 Q. In your last answer you said -- I want to follow this a  13 -- "if they were lucky enough to have a premises  14 information box then you might go to that".  15 When you say "lucky enough", does that indicate  16 that, actually, premises information boxes to your  17 experience were rarities in London?  18 <b>A. Not rarities in that there's a lot of them, but</b>  19 <b>obviously there's a huge amount of building stock in</b>  20 <b>London. You don't need a premises information box on</b>  21 <b>every type of premise.</b>  22 Q. I am talking about high-rise in particular.  23 <b>A. High-rise in particular, no, my experience is that you</b>  24 <b>wouldn't normally have a premises information box,</b>  25 <b>actually. So I think one of the reasons for ending up</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 91</p>
<p>1 <b>A. So an outline plan of the floor plate, in particular, so</b>  2 <b>numbers of flats on each floor, and, you know,</b>  3 <b>an outline drawing of the size and shape of the building</b>  4 <b>with marking as to perhaps where perhaps dry riser</b>  5 <b>outlets might be, hydrants external to the building. So</b>  6 <b>a plan that would allow people to put our high-rise</b>  7 <b>procedure into effect, so where the hydrant is, where</b>  8 <b>you're augmenting supply, the nature of the block in</b>  9 <b>terms of how the flats are split within the block and</b>  10 <b>an understanding of the floor plate: are there four</b>  11 <b>flats on each floor? Are there two? The nature of the</b>  12 <b>lobby. So that sort of detail.</b>  13 Q. If that sort of detail as you described it wasn't  14 available on the ORD, where would you expect a watch  15 manager or incident commander of any level to get them  16 from?  17 <b>A. Well, if they were lucky enough to have a premises</b>  18 <b>information box there, you might go to that. At</b>  19 <b>a larger incident, as I did, you would perhaps ask the</b>  20 <b>local authority who would have access to housing</b>  21 <b>records, to maps and plans of all the buildings within</b>  22 <b>their purview, so there's two possible sources.</b>  23 <b>Depending on the type of building, a responsible</b>  24 <b>person who is responsible for the fire risk assessment</b>  25 <b>of that building, in a commercial building, where one</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 90</p>	<p>1 <b>with the EPIP was that, actually, it was a challenge to</b>  2 <b>have the metal floor diagram plates and a premises</b>  3 <b>information box in every high-rise. That was part of</b>  4 <b>the reason for the EPIP system, the electronic -- trying</b>  5 <b>to think of the way to describe it -- electronic plan</b>  6 <b>system, because actually there isn't a premises</b>  7 <b>information box at every high-rise premise, no.</b>  8 Q. Are you aware of the contents of the London resilience  9 plan?  10 <b>A. Not in detail as regarding premises information boxes,</b>  11 <b>no.</b>  12 Q. We may have to revisit that either later or with  13 somebody else.  14 Would you have expected any previous incident  15 commander attending this incident to have requested  16 plans of some kind of this building before your arrival?  17 <b>A. Before my arrival?</b>  18 Q. Mm.  19 <b>A. I think that's an early expectation of incident</b>  20 <b>commanders, yes, but, again, in defence of my junior</b>  21 <b>officers that night, they had an awful lot to deal with,</b>  22 <b>and, actually, they may not have had someone immediately</b>  23 <b>available to request those plans from. So if they</b>  24 <b>weren't on our system, and there wasn't someone from the</b>  25 <b>local authority they would've been able to get them</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 92</p>

<p>1 from, or if they haven't identified a premises</p> <p>2 information box, then, actually, I think I can excuse</p> <p>3 them that.</p> <p>4 But, yes, that is something that I would've expected</p> <p>5 in the gathering information part of the decision-making</p> <p>6 model. So that's one of the first things you would</p> <p>7 think about is: have I got plans? Where can I get plans</p> <p>8 from?</p> <p>9 Q. Turning to you, what efforts did you make to request</p> <p>10 plans of the building?</p> <p>11 A. Repeated requests through a number of tactical command</p> <p>12 meetings. So directly to the local authority</p> <p>13 representative at those meetings. I think repeatedly</p> <p>14 outside of those meetings possibly as well. I think it</p> <p>15 was a question I kept on coming back to because</p> <p>16 I became -- I couldn't understand why they weren't able</p> <p>17 to get them to me, actually. I think it took</p> <p>18 an unreasonably long amount of time to get those plans</p> <p>19 to use. We did get them in the end, but it was very</p> <p>20 much later in the incident.</p> <p>21 Q. Did you request plans at the very first TCM, do you</p> <p>22 think?</p> <p>23 A. I can't recollect. I know I certainly did a number of</p> <p>24 TCMs. Whether I did on the first one, I can't</p> <p>25 recollect. I know from reading my own decision log</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 93</p>	<p>1 would've been one of the things I would've expected to</p> <p>2 ask.</p> <p>3 Q. Okay.</p> <p>4 A. That was what my -- it's been recorded faithfully by the</p> <p>5 police officer who is recording that interview, so</p> <p>6 that's what I said and that's what I believed at that</p> <p>7 time.</p> <p>8 Q. If you turn to page 5 of your log, you can see halfway</p> <p>9 down the page there's a discussion at 06.13 with the</p> <p>10 DSE, district surveyor. At the end of that, it says,</p> <p>11 "Will attempt to locate plans."</p> <p>12 Do you think that was the first time in the night</p> <p>13 when you discussed plans?</p> <p>14 A. No, definitely not. I discussed plans over a period of</p> <p>15 time much earlier than that.</p> <p>16 Q. This is the first mention in your log of any discussion</p> <p>17 about plans.</p> <p>18 A. No, I'm certain I'd asked about plans on more than one</p> <p>19 occasion prior to that. I can't give you the exact</p> <p>20 timing, I'm sorry, but I'm really certain about that.</p> <p>21 Q. Doing the best you can to recollect, do you remember who</p> <p>22 you asked the plans of?</p> <p>23 A. Well I think I asked the local authority representative</p> <p>24 on tactical command meetings for the plans. That's what</p> <p>25 I recollect. I can't recall necessarily the first</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 95</p>
<p>1 that, actually, it's not recorded there that I did, but</p> <p>2 I can't remember whether I did or didn't.</p> <p>3 Q. Is it something you would've expected Jackie McConochie</p> <p>4 to have logged, your request for plans?</p> <p>5 A. To be fair to Jackie, not necessarily, because although</p> <p>6 Jackie is an experienced officer, and had worked in fire</p> <p>7 investigation, we don't formally train large numbers of</p> <p>8 people to be incident loggists. So she was doing her</p> <p>9 best as a loggist. To assume anything about that would</p> <p>10 be wrong of me. Again, I think she did an incredible</p> <p>11 job over a long period of time logging many decisions.</p> <p>12 Q. If you go to your witness statement, which we're</p> <p>13 probably still on, actually, at page 6, you do time the</p> <p>14 request for plans as at the first tactical co-ordination</p> <p>15 meeting at 03.20, but we don't see it in the log or,</p> <p>16 indeed, in your contemporaneous note.</p> <p>17 My question is: where did you get that time from as</p> <p>18 the time at which you asked for plans?</p> <p>19 A. So is this one of the police interviews?</p> <p>20 Q. Yes, this is your first witness statement.</p> <p>21 A. Yes. So the first interview I had with the police was</p> <p>22 very long, and I was recalling as best I could at that</p> <p>23 point within the interview, so I guess it probably came</p> <p>24 from there. I think when asked, when I was talking</p> <p>25 about the detail of what I covered in the TCM, that</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 94</p>	<p>1 meeting I did ask them, but my feeling is that I did it</p> <p>2 earlier.</p> <p>3 I certainly asked the CU crews to see if they could</p> <p>4 get me plans earlier on and I know I asked that question</p> <p>5 on more than one occasion, because they're the people</p> <p>6 likely to facilitate that contact with the other</p> <p>7 agencies who are there, and I'd asked on more than one</p> <p>8 occasion. It was definitely before 06.13 in the</p> <p>9 morning.</p> <p>10 Q. Do you remember the name of the local authority liaison</p> <p>11 officer or other officer that you asked to get the</p> <p>12 plans?</p> <p>13 A. No, but it would've been whoever had attended the</p> <p>14 meetings, because I think we'd had a change of LALO at</p> <p>15 some point in the incident as well.</p> <p>16 Q. Yes, you did. Does the name Nick Layton ring a bell?</p> <p>17 A. Nick Layton does ring a bell, yes.</p> <p>18 Q. And then Mike Rumble?</p> <p>19 A. Yes, they both do. Both names now you said them do, but</p> <p>20 I wouldn't immediately remember them until you reminded</p> <p>21 me.</p> <p>22 Q. Nick Layton we have a statement from. He hasn't come to</p> <p>23 give evidence yet, so we'll need to explore this with</p> <p>24 him, but I want your recollection. He says that he was</p> <p>25 there between 02.30 and 07.00 am. He came onto the CU</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 96</p>



<p>1 at 02.30 and left the incident at 07.00 am. But during 2 that period he wasn't asked for plans at all. Can you 3 comment on that?</p> <p>4 <b>A. That's not my recollection of it. I recollect asking --</b> 5 <b>again, you're going to have to forgive me, obviously</b> 6 <b>I was talking to many people over the course of a very</b> 7 <b>long period of time, and my recollection is that I made</b> 8 <b>requests through the CU, and certainly earlier than</b> 9 <b>06.13, and spoken to someone in the local authority</b> 10 <b>about availability of plans. That is my recollection.</b></p> <p>11 Q. Were you on the command unit at that time when you made 12 that request?</p> <p>13 <b>A. Yes. At any point I would've made that request,</b> 14 <b>I would've been on the command unit.</b></p> <p>15 Q. If you go on in the log to page 7, just above halfway 16 down, just above the time mark of 07.35, this appears at 17 the very end of the note dealing with the TCM that 18 starts the page before at 07.13.</p> <p>19 Do you see that?</p> <p>20 <b>A. Yes, I do.</b></p> <p>21 Q. It says:</p> <p>22 "Andy Roe requests plans from Local Authority LALO 23 is Mr Rumble."</p> <p>24 This is the fourth TCM.</p> <p>25 It looks from that as if you didn't ask the LALO for</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 97</p>	<p>1 "I asked the CU crew why we still didn't have plans 2 of the building, they confirmed again there were none on 3 ORD but there were meant to be a set in a premises 4 information box in the lobby of the tower according to 5 the ORD entry. I asked for this information to be 6 relayed to the fire sector and made a note to ask for a 7 set from the LA at the meeting again."</p> <p>8 That last comment there rather suggests that you 9 were asking the CU crew but you hadn't yet asked the LA, 10 unless the word "again" rather indicates you had already 11 asked.</p> <p>12 Can you just explain? You say you made a note to 13 ask for a set from the LA, the local authority, at the 14 meeting again. Can you just help us with that?</p> <p>15 <b>A. Absolutely. I mean, I don't know whether I'd asked the</b> 16 <b>local authority before this point for certain, but what</b> 17 <b>I can confirm is I have a strong recollection of asking</b> 18 <b>the CU to contact someone in the local authority to ask</b> 19 <b>for the plans.</b></p> <p>20 <b>I think I did ask before this time, but I can't give</b> 21 <b>you an exact time. I just know it was something that</b> 22 <b>actually became very important to me, and I remember</b> 23 <b>thinking over the course of the incident: I don't</b> 24 <b>understand why I haven't been furnished with this set of</b> 25 <b>plans because they would be very useful to my crews. It</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 99</p>
<p>1 any plans at any earlier stage, according to this log. 2 Can you comment on that?</p> <p>3 <b>A. That may well be as recorded in the log, but I am</b> 4 <b>certain that I asked for plans, either via the CU or</b> 5 <b>directly to someone in the local authority, prior to</b> 6 <b>that time. That is my recollection.</b></p> <p>7 Q. If you go to your second witness statement at page 7, 8 just to round this point off a bit, you say there, about 9 halfway down the page in the text:</p> <p>10 "I asked for 5 hours for the building plans from the 11 Local Authority. I would have wanted these a lot 12 earlier to get a better understanding of the building."</p> <p>13 How do you measure that 5 hours?</p> <p>14 <b>A. I couldn't tell you now where I'd measured that from to.</b> 15 <b>But I have a very clear recollection of being frustrated</b> 16 <b>that I didn't have a detailed set of plans from the</b> 17 <b>local authority and that I had to ask repeatedly,</b> 18 <b>I thought over an extended period of time. So that is</b> 19 <b>what my recollection is. I remember requesting, via the</b> 20 <b>CU and certainly to someone directly in the local</b> 21 <b>authority on more than one occasion, plans, and over</b> 22 <b>an extended period of time.</b></p> <p>23 Q. If you go to your contemporaneous notes and turn to 24 page 8, we see under the time mark of 04.51, this is the 25 last entry before 05.16:</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 98</p>	<p>1 <b>became something that, actually, I felt had taken far</b> 2 <b>too long to be given to us.</b></p> <p>3 <b>So I can only apologise if I can't give you the</b> 4 <b>start and finish of that process to try and get some,</b> 5 <b>but I'm very clear that I had earlier conversations than</b> 6 <b>06.13 about wanting those plans and wanting the local</b> 7 <b>authority to supply them.</b></p> <p>8 Q. Do you remember being told by the CU crew that there was 9 a premises information box, according to the ORD entry?</p> <p>10 <b>A. Well, as was written on that statement, I must have</b> 11 <b>been, because that was when the memories were fresher in</b> 12 <b>my mind, but I can't remember the exact conversation.</b> 13 <b>If I'm written it, I imagine at that point I must have</b> 14 <b>remembered it, so yes.</b></p> <p>15 Q. Did you know that, in fact, the ORD had an entry of 16 "false" underneath the box in the premises information 17 box part of the ORD?</p> <p>18 <b>A. No, I didn't.</b></p> <p>19 Q. Do you remember who told you that to the ORD did say 20 there was a premises information box</p> <p>21 <b>A. No, I don't. I don't remember who specifically on the</b> 22 <b>CU crew did, but I do remember there being</b> 23 <b>a conversation about a PIB and I do remember asking that</b> 24 <b>that information went to the fire sector. The exact</b> 25 <b>detail of that conversation, the length of it, I can't,</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 100</p>

<p>1 in sort of granular detail, but I do remember that</p> <p>2 conversation happening, yes.</p> <p>3 Q. When you were told, according to your note, by the CU</p> <p>4 crew that there was a premises information box according</p> <p>5 the two ORD entry, did you chase up somebody to go and</p> <p>6 open the premises information box and get the plans?</p> <p>7 A. No, because where that was of use was for Pat and</p> <p>8 Richard, and that was one small piece of information</p> <p>9 within a mass of information, and I just wanted it</p> <p>10 confirmed that that message had gone to the incident</p> <p>11 ground and, therefore, they would have the opportunity</p> <p>12 to pull plans out.</p> <p>13 Following up again repeatedly on where detailed</p> <p>14 plans were, again, I would've expected a return of</p> <p>15 information about that, if they had found a very</p> <p>16 detailed set of plans.</p> <p>17 Q. Do you know if anybody from the TMO or the council were</p> <p>18 asked about the premises information box?</p> <p>19 A. About the premises information box?</p> <p>20 Q. Yes.</p> <p>21 A. No, I don't.</p> <p>22 Q. Do you know why not?</p> <p>23 A. No, I don't.</p> <p>24 Q. Do you remember what time you eventually did receive the</p> <p>25 plans?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 101</p>	<p>1 You had those plans at some point, but roughly, do</p> <p>2 you remember when you first saw them?</p> <p>3 A. No, I can't give you an exact time. I know I did though</p> <p>4 because now I've seen them, that does remind me.</p> <p>5 Q. Did you send those plans or make a copy of those plans</p> <p>6 and get a copy sent to the bridgehead?</p> <p>7 A. Yes, so I made a request for them to be copied -- either</p> <p>8 the original to go -- because I think what's pinned up</p> <p>9 is a photocopy, actually, from somewhere, and I don't</p> <p>10 know whether that came from outside of the unit, but</p> <p>11 I think we held a copy and I think the originals went to</p> <p>12 the fire sector. So I did ask for those to go.</p> <p>13 Q. On a related point, do you remember seeing a board on</p> <p>14 CU8 showing the flats and floors?</p> <p>15 A. I can't recollect the detail of it, no.</p> <p>16 Q. Let's see if I can help you. Could you please be shown</p> <p>17 MET00015927.</p> <p>18 This is another photograph taken on CU8. You can</p> <p>19 see the time at 06.44 in the morning. On the right-hand</p> <p>20 side of the picture you can see a plate or board with</p> <p>21 floor level and flat numbers.</p> <p>22 Do you remember seeing that at any point on the</p> <p>23 night?</p> <p>24 A. I actually don't, no.</p> <p>25 Q. If it was on CU7, which it might have been, do you</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 103</p>
<p>1 A. I can't remember the exact time, but I know we did</p> <p>2 receive a set of plans. I don't know whether it's</p> <p>3 recorded in a TCM. I can't remember the detail of my</p> <p>4 own log. But we certainly did receive plans of the</p> <p>5 floor plate.</p> <p>6 Q. Since you mention it, it is recorded. It's 08.45. If</p> <p>7 you go to page ... forgive me, I have a wrong reference</p> <p>8 there.</p> <p>9 The thing I want to show you, then, is the plans</p> <p>10 themselves. If you go to LFB00001968, let's try it this</p> <p>11 way. Go, please, to pages 49 and 51.</p> <p>12 Are those the plans that you received at some point?</p> <p>13 A. Yes, I think they are, because I saw them briefly. I do</p> <p>14 have a memory of that. So that seems familiar to me,</p> <p>15 yes.</p> <p>16 Q. Let's just see if we can pin this down as a time.</p> <p>17 Can I ask you to be shown MET00018729.</p> <p>18 That's a photograph taken on CU8, and if we blow it</p> <p>19 up, do you think we can see those plans on that picture?</p> <p>20 A. Yes, I can.</p> <p>21 Q. So they came in at some time ...</p> <p>22 If I can ask you to be shown INQ00000164.</p> <p>23 (Pause)</p> <p>24 I am going to cancel that, much to your relief and</p> <p>25 I suspect that of others. Let's move on.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 102</p>	<p>1 remember seeing it there at any point?</p> <p>2 A. No, I don't, no.</p> <p>3 Q. Do you know anything about the removal of this kind of</p> <p>4 thing, kind of plate, from the building by a watch</p> <p>5 manager or any other officer?</p> <p>6 A. No, I have no recollection of that. That wasn't a piece</p> <p>7 of information I was made aware of, that we had removed</p> <p>8 a plate with the floor numbers on. Not to the best of</p> <p>9 my recollection anyway.</p> <p>10 Q. We've had some evidence from Watch Manager Watson, who</p> <p>11 was a watch manager at the incident assisting the</p> <p>12 co-ordination of FSG information to the bridgehead at</p> <p>13 an earlier stage in the incident, that he drew or asked</p> <p>14 a crew manager to draw a plan on the wall of the</p> <p>15 2nd floor mezzanine so that BA crews could be briefed</p> <p>16 about where to go. Do you remember seeing that on the</p> <p>17 wall at any stage during the night?</p> <p>18 A. No, because I don't think I went up to the mezzanine.</p> <p>19 Q. Can I just show you one or two informative messages from</p> <p>20 the scene.</p> <p>21 First of all, page 25 of the short incident log,</p> <p>22 where at 03.48.17, halfway down the page -- so this</p> <p>23 is pretty much exactly an hour after you took over, just</p> <p>24 over an hour, incident command. There's an informative</p> <p>25 message:</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 104</p>

<p>1 "SUP CU8 FROM AC ROE [so it comes from you] A</p> <p>2 RESIDENTIAL BLOCK OF 24 FLOORS 25M X 25M FIRE FROM 2ND</p> <p>3 TO 24TH FLOOR APPROX 100 INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED FSG MAJOR</p> <p>4 INCIDENT DECLARED HIGH RISE PROCEDURE IMPLEMENTED ..."</p> <p>5 That says the building has 24 floors; is that what</p> <p>6 you believed at the time?</p> <p>7 A. Yes.</p> <p>8 Q. Which did you think was the topmost floor?</p> <p>9 A. Oh, in numbers of the numbering?</p> <p>10 Q. Yes.</p> <p>11 A. So a building of 24 floors, but in terms of numbering,</p> <p>12 it's numbered from ground to 23rd, I believe. But it's</p> <p>13 correct to say that's a building of 24 floors. That's</p> <p>14 our protocols for describing it in an informative</p> <p>15 message. But in terms of what I remember, it's ground</p> <p>16 to 23rd.</p> <p>17 Q. So just in brief, you count the ground floor as floor 1?</p> <p>18 A. Yes. Yes, so it's 24 floors because that's the number</p> <p>19 of floors.</p> <p>20 Q. Just sticking with the short incident log, did you have</p> <p>21 access to this log in CU8?</p> <p>22 A. No, because it wouldn't -- no, I didn't.</p> <p>23 Q. Were you listening out to radio messages coming from</p> <p>24 control?</p> <p>25 A. My control operators would be. Again, I think I've got</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 105</p>	<p>1 memory of that. So it's an approximation. And the</p> <p>2 purpose of that message is to inform those people who</p> <p>3 are monitoring remotely and the wider organisation about</p> <p>4 the scale of the incident, rather than acting as</p> <p>5 a definitive record of exactly how many people were</p> <p>6 involved at that point.</p> <p>7 Obviously if we can give that, that's very</p> <p>8 important, that would be your aspiration, but actually</p> <p>9 what is more important is we are telling the story of</p> <p>10 the incident so people understand how it's progressing,</p> <p>11 the challenge we're facing, and therefore can use it to</p> <p>12 inform their own decision-making remote from the</p> <p>13 incident.</p> <p>14 Q. Did you get that information from Tom Goodall do you</p> <p>15 think face-to-face or by some kind of radio</p> <p>16 communication?</p> <p>17 A. I couldn't tell you, in the context of how that message</p> <p>18 was composed, I couldn't tell you. But I would think</p> <p>19 that would be where it would come from.</p> <p>20 Q. If you go to your contemporaneous note and look at</p> <p>21 page 5, which is the second page of narrative which</p> <p>22 starts on page 4 under the time stamp of 03.39, you see</p> <p>23 in the third entry down on page 5:</p> <p>24 "As we passed CU7 I stepped on to take a short brief</p> <p>25 from Tom Goodall he told me that he had over 100 people</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 107</p>
<p>1 to go back to my role at the incident, because it's</p> <p>2 necessary for me to have the space to hold the full span</p> <p>3 of control across all those different commanders, the</p> <p>4 bigger picture, talking to the monitoring officer, Dany,</p> <p>5 thinking about the big piece.</p> <p>6 What I can't do is monitor the radio, so I've got</p> <p>7 a radio operator to do that who will highlight relevant</p> <p>8 messages to me. I'm relying, again, on the professional</p> <p>9 skills and judgement of those command unit operators.</p> <p>10 I would've known that message went because I would</p> <p>11 verify all messages that went, because someone would</p> <p>12 have drafted it based on information gathered from</p> <p>13 a number of sources, whether it's the team leader of the</p> <p>14 CU going out and gathering their own situational</p> <p>15 awareness, talking to ORT and coming back in, or</p> <p>16 interrogating ORT or another command officer for that</p> <p>17 information.</p> <p>18 Q. Just focusing on some detail in that message, we can use</p> <p>19 the one at 03.48.17, although there are similar messages</p> <p>20 like it elsewhere in the log, you can see "APPROX 100</p> <p>21 INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED".</p> <p>22 Did you get that 100 figure from Tom Goodall?</p> <p>23 A. Yes. So at that point I still don't think we had</p> <p>24 a complete handle from my perspective on the numbers of</p> <p>25 FSG calls because they were coming in. So that is my</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 106</p>	<p>1 involved in fire survival calls at his best</p> <p>2 estimate ..."</p> <p>3 Would it be right you got the 100 from him then?</p> <p>4 A. I would think so, yes. But, actually, it was very hard</p> <p>5 to get accurate information for quite a long time at the</p> <p>6 incident about overall numbers, because my sense every</p> <p>7 time I spoke to Tom was that they were changing</p> <p>8 constantly and it was hard, actually, to verify whether</p> <p>9 an original call that had come from a flat hadn't then</p> <p>10 been duplicated. We had a conversation about the fact</p> <p>11 people were moving. It was very difficult to pin down</p> <p>12 whether that was a new call, a separate call, or the</p> <p>13 same group of people who already called earlier, if that</p> <p>14 makes sense.</p> <p>15 He was doing his absolute best in the face of a very</p> <p>16 considerable volume of calls.</p> <p>17 Q. Just continuing with the timing. You step onto CU7 and</p> <p>18 get that information from him, as you just told us.</p> <p>19 Can I just ask you to look at MET00015705, which is</p> <p>20 a photograph taken by DAC O'Loughlin on CU7, and you can</p> <p>21 see at 03.47, so sometime after 03.39, which fits in</p> <p>22 your narrative in your contemporaneous note at page 5,</p> <p>23 you can see that on the whiteboard there, although it's</p> <p>24 not crystal clear from the picture, on the right-hand</p> <p>25 side, 03.47, 127 adults and 38 kids, which is, as we can</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 108</p>

<p>1 see, quite a lot more than 100 involved, so 166.</p> <p>2 My question is: did Tom Goodall not give you that</p> <p>3 information?</p> <p>4 <b>A. No, I think I can remember that information, but what</b></p> <p>5 <b>I do remember is a conversation about how the numbers</b></p> <p>6 <b>didn't necessarily reflect the FSGs, because one FSG</b></p> <p>7 <b>could incorporate any number of people, and also those</b></p> <p>8 <b>people had potentially moved.</b></p> <p>9 Q. Did you see that at that time, do you think, when you</p> <p>10 stepped onto CU7?</p> <p>11 <b>A. I can't say for certain I did. I know that I had</b></p> <p>12 <b>a conversation with Tom Goodall and he reflected that we</b></p> <p>13 <b>had approximately 100 FSGs and that he was trying to</b></p> <p>14 <b>basically triangulate the information so we could get to</b></p> <p>15 <b>a better place about the accuracy of it.</b></p> <p>16 Q. Help me with another picture. This is MET00008735.</p> <p>17 Do you recognise this whiteboard in this state?</p> <p>18 <b>A. Not in the exact detail of it, but that is the board off</b></p> <p>19 <b>CU8, I think.</b></p> <p>20 Q. Yes. That was my next question, CU8.</p> <p>21 It says in the middle, just a little bit below the</p> <p>22 top, 03.47 in black ink, do you see?</p> <p>23 <b>A. I do.</b></p> <p>24 Q. It says FSG, 03.47, 114 adults, 35 children, and then</p> <p>25 rescues, three, from flat 92. So that's 149 people in</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 109</p>	<p>1 approximately 100 individuals. Do you think that the</p> <p>2 message approximately 100 individuals was accurate?</p> <p>3 <b>A. I think that what it reflects is that we didn't have</b></p> <p>4 <b>confidence in exact numbers and it would've been wrong</b></p> <p>5 <b>to put them into the informative message.</b></p> <p>6 Again, I'd like to reflect on a piece of experience</p> <p>7 in my past at the tram crash, where another agency had</p> <p>8 made a mistake about the number of fatalities and</p> <p>9 persons involved. Until you have that information with</p> <p>10 certainty, actually to place it on the record as</p> <p>11 a certainty is wrong, because that can be very damaging</p> <p>12 at a later date to survivors, families. I think what it</p> <p>13 says is the truth: it was approximately 100 people,</p> <p>14 because that felt about the scale of it, and it</p> <p>15 reflected a conversation I'd had with Tom.</p> <p>16 But I would be very reluctant to put a definitive</p> <p>17 figure into an informative message that is going to go</p> <p>18 into the record if I didn't know it to be entirely</p> <p>19 accurate. My great problem throughout that incident was</p> <p>20 it was almost impossible to get with any degree of</p> <p>21 accuracy at any one moment in time where we were with</p> <p>22 the FSG calls because of the volume and nature of</p> <p>23 continuous breathing apparatus rescue activity.</p> <p>24 Q. I've shown you two photographs from around 03.47, one</p> <p>25 showing 166 persons were involved and one showing 149</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 111</p>
<p>1 total.</p> <p>2 Did you see this board at that time, do you think?</p> <p>3 <b>A. I was constantly going back to the board, but I think</b></p> <p>4 <b>what the board doesn't reflect is the constant requests</b></p> <p>5 <b>by myself for information about FSGs and trying to</b></p> <p>6 <b>drive, as sensitively as I could, Tom to get into</b></p> <p>7 <b>a place where we were accurately capturing the numbers.</b></p> <p>8 <b>That was very difficult throughout the evening. I felt</b></p> <p>9 <b>we were constantly fluctuating in terms of those numbers</b></p> <p>10 <b>and I never felt I got a complete handle on the numbers</b></p> <p>11 <b>sat any one time, I never had that confidence, because</b></p> <p>12 <b>it just felt like the volume of calls coming in and the</b></p> <p>13 <b>way it was changing, both because of people being</b></p> <p>14 <b>rescued and coming out, probably the change of tasking</b></p> <p>15 <b>to crews meant it was very hard, and callers coming off</b></p> <p>16 <b>the line.</b></p> <p>17 So the fact that information was being held in so</p> <p>18 many places, actually, it was really, really difficult</p> <p>19 to ever get to a definitive point. It was something</p> <p>20 obviously I wanted to know because it tells you the</p> <p>21 story of the incident and how we were progressing those</p> <p>22 numbers.</p> <p>23 Q. We've seen the times of these totals, 03.47, on both</p> <p>24 CUs, and I've shown you the informative message going at</p> <p>25 03.48.17 on page 25 of the short incident log which says</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 110</p>	<p>1 persons were involved. My question is: would it not</p> <p>2 have been more accurate for those reading informative</p> <p>3 messages for you to have written or perhaps corrected</p> <p>4 the informative message to say approximately 150 rather</p> <p>5 than leaving it at 100, which might suggest understating</p> <p>6 the persons involved?</p> <p>7 <b>A. Could we go back to the informative message so I can</b></p> <p>8 <b>read it? Would you mind?</b></p> <p>9 Q. Of course. It's page 25 of the SIL, short incident log.</p> <p>10 <b>A. Thank you.</b></p> <p>11 Q. It's 03.48.17 in the middle of the page.</p> <p>12 <b>A. Having shown me that information, I don't think it's</b></p> <p>13 <b>incorrect to say that that probably would have been</b></p> <p>14 <b>a better approximation. But that is what I have</b></p> <p>15 <b>recorded on the message at that point. I may well have</b></p> <p>16 <b>had my reasons for that in terms of approving the</b></p> <p>17 <b>message, but in terms of that wording, I would agree</b></p> <p>18 <b>with that. I think 150 might have been more accurate at</b></p> <p>19 <b>that point.</b></p> <p>20 Q. Did that lead or might that have led to a tendency to</p> <p>21 understate the urgency or need for resourcing of this</p> <p>22 incident to people reading the log?</p> <p>23 <b>A. Absolutely not. People are under no illusions from the</b></p> <p>24 <b>conversations I had with colleagues at a senior level,</b></p> <p>25 <b>with Dany as the commissioner, that we were facing the</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 112</p>

<p>1 <b>most exceptional incident of our careers. To be frank,</b></p> <p>2 <b>just the 100 alone is still more FSG calls than we'd</b></p> <p>3 <b>experienced in the previous ten years. It would</b></p> <p>4 <b>absolutely not have affected the resourcing of the</b></p> <p>5 <b>incident. At the height of the incident, I believe we</b></p> <p>6 <b>had 75 appliances there in total, the largest single</b></p> <p>7 <b>deployment of appliances since the Second World War.</b></p> <p>8 <b>So, no.</b></p> <p>9 Q. Same point, but can I move you forward in your log and</p> <p>10 go, please, to page 5 in that log, which has a time mark</p> <p>11 of 05.50.</p> <p>12 Just below the top of the page, at this time, this</p> <p>13 is another TCM, middle of that first chunk, it says:</p> <p>14 "Tom running FSG - Tom Goodall: FSG 171 persons - 38</p> <p>15 Children &amp; 133 Adults from 45 flats.</p> <p>16 "58 persons from 21 flats P3."</p> <p>17 Against that background, can I then show you -- so</p> <p>18 we can have perhaps both on at the same time, Paul --</p> <p>19 page 33 of the short incident log, where at 06.48 we</p> <p>20 have another informative from you, three-quarters of the</p> <p>21 way down the page. Do you see?</p> <p>22 We can put both up at the same time. We can perhaps</p> <p>23 do this more easily, Mr Roe.</p> <p>24 06.48.43, and the informative message, as you can</p> <p>25 see, says:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 113</p>	<p>1 would be: having sent a message saying approximately</p> <p>2 100, which stayed the same as it had for the last</p> <p>3 3 hours, why didn't you then correct it after the 05.50</p> <p>4 tactical co-ordination meeting to bring it up-to-date</p> <p>5 and show 171?</p> <p>6 <b>A. Isn't 06.48 an hour later than the tactical</b></p> <p>7 <b>co-ordination meeting you're referring to?</b></p> <p>8 Q. You are absolutely right. It certainly is.</p> <p>9 <b>A. That's why I'm saying in that process of an hour, I'm</b></p> <p>10 <b>not sure what would've changed. But, actually, I would</b></p> <p>11 <b>absolutely take your point. We probably could've</b></p> <p>12 <b>reflected more accurately. But I would've had an</b></p> <p>13 <b>anxiety about that, as I originally stated, because it</b></p> <p>14 <b>was very difficult to ever get to an accurate number.</b></p> <p>15 Q. Yes. I was being perhaps over-fair to you, but that is</p> <p>16 helpful.</p> <p>17 Can I then turn to the question of information flow</p> <p>18 regarding FSGs.</p> <p>19 In general, were you kept up-to-date of the FSG</p> <p>20 picture throughout the night?</p> <p>21 <b>A. Yes, I was. So I felt comfortable from the situational</b></p> <p>22 <b>updates that Matt and Mick were giving me that I had</b></p> <p>23 <b>an understanding of the general progress of FSG,</b></p> <p>24 <b>notwithstanding the great difficulty in tying down the</b></p> <p>25 <b>detail of it -- yes, I was -- which was that we were</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 115</p>
<p>1 "CU8 FROM AC ROE RESIDENTIAL BLOCK OF 24 FLOORS ...</p> <p>2 APPROX 100 INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED ..."</p> <p>3 Just on that, it looks as if the 100 individuals</p> <p>4 involved hasn't changed at all since this informative</p> <p>5 message first went at 03.48, some 3 hours before 06.48</p> <p>6 when we see this message.</p> <p>7 Putting the two pieces of information up on the</p> <p>8 screen, my question is: why did you send a message which</p> <p>9 said that it was approximately 100 individuals involved</p> <p>10 when you were told or about to be told that in fact it</p> <p>11 was up to 171?</p> <p>12 <b>A. I couldn't tell you, to be honest, Mr Millett. So what</b></p> <p>13 <b>I would reflect is that, you know, it may well have been</b></p> <p>14 <b>more accurate to state that number as higher. I think</b></p> <p>15 <b>I would accept that point, absolutely. But I don't</b></p> <p>16 <b>think it changes the course of that incident, nor the</b></p> <p>17 <b>nature of resourcing we placed on it, and it may well be</b></p> <p>18 <b>just a symptom of the fact that I was extremely busy,</b></p> <p>19 <b>that the broad thrust of the message satisfied me, and</b></p> <p>20 <b>at that point it was used for internal information.</b></p> <p>21 Again, although that does seem very different from</p> <p>22 05.50, I'm not sure what the numbers were at 06.48, to</p> <p>23 be fair.</p> <p>24 Q. To be fair to you, the message comes two minutes before</p> <p>25 the tactical co-ordination meeting, so the next question</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 114</p>	<p>1 continuously committing crews to the information we were</p> <p>2 receiving and were making progress.</p> <p>3 What I did at a later stage of the incident when Tom</p> <p>4 had the space to do it -- so to begin with, Tom</p> <p>5 Goodall -- I would not have wanted to take him off CU7.</p> <p>6 He was too busy. He was too fundamental to the</p> <p>7 operation of that FSG system. But as we got further</p> <p>8 into the incident, and it was clear that those numbers</p> <p>9 were reducing, I felt we were moving to a stage where we</p> <p>10 needed to try and accurately capture and record within</p> <p>11 the decision log the numbers because, you know,</p> <p>12 tragically we had to prepare ourselves for the fact we</p> <p>13 may be removing from rescuing survivors to recovery, and</p> <p>14 then I started to bring him into the unit to give me</p> <p>15 those numbers.</p> <p>16 Q. So the answer to my question is yes. What I want now to</p> <p>17 do is work out what -- if you can give us a shopping</p> <p>18 list of sources of information, we can run down those.</p> <p>19 Did you get up-to-date information from DAC</p> <p>20 O'Loughlin throughout the night?</p> <p>21 <b>A. Yes, I did, face-to-face and via Matt and Mick.</b></p> <p>22 Q. Was that mainly at the hourly TCM meetings or separate</p> <p>23 from those?</p> <p>24 <b>A. No, both, actually, so across the piece. So he both</b></p> <p>25 <b>gave me a regular update face-to-face. Matt and Mick</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 116</p>

<p>1 were constantly on and off the unit updating me. They</p> <p>2 were basically doing a cycle between the units, the</p> <p>3 tower and back. I think they basically did that all</p> <p>4 night.</p> <p>5 Q. Did you get direct information from Tom Goodall on</p> <p>6 a regular basis about the process of FSGs?</p> <p>7 A. Via Matt and Mick to begin with and then face-to-face</p> <p>8 within the TCMs, yes.</p> <p>9 Q. Face-to-face within the TCMs?</p> <p>10 A. Yes.</p> <p>11 Q. Who gave briefings on FSG at the TCMs?</p> <p>12 A. Tom spoke about the numbers, from what I remember,</p> <p>13 because he held the numbers, and far better for him</p> <p>14 because he's coming on with that information first hand</p> <p>15 to say it. So I would've turned to Tom as part of the</p> <p>16 progress of the meetings to say, "Tom, could you now</p> <p>17 update all concerned with where we are with the fire</p> <p>18 survival guidance calls and the numbers of people you</p> <p>19 think are involved."</p> <p>20 Q. Just going to the 05.50 TCM meeting at page 5 of your</p> <p>21 log, you see that you get a briefing from Tom Goodall</p> <p>22 there, we've looked at it before, just have it back</p> <p>23 again, "Tom running FSG", 171. Is that the kind of</p> <p>24 level of detail that you were getting?</p> <p>25 A. In the --</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 117</p>	<p>1 numbers because of the shifting nature of it.</p> <p>2 Otherwise it was coming back in from primarily Mick,</p> <p>3 Matt and when I was briefed by Andy O'Loughlin.</p> <p>4 Q. Did you receive during the course of the night</p> <p>5 information about particular patterns of success or</p> <p>6 failure of deployments to particular floors?</p> <p>7 A. Yes, but that was in the context of the progress of the</p> <p>8 BA operation as a whole. So it was more about where</p> <p>9 were we able to send BA crews to. So I was very</p> <p>10 interested in how we were progressing up the building</p> <p>11 and what might prevent us from progressing further, and</p> <p>12 what got reflected back to me was it kind of ebbed and</p> <p>13 flowed. So there were times you thought you were taking</p> <p>14 control of a floor in terms of firefighting and were</p> <p>15 able to progress past it, only then to find that the</p> <p>16 floor had again become involved very significantly in</p> <p>17 fire and crews were having to come back down through it.</p> <p>18 So that again had then shifted Pat and Richard's</p> <p>19 tactics to perhaps pull crews back a bit, and then</p> <p>20 recommit to try to push further back upwards.</p> <p>21 Q. So in that macro sense, did you become aware at any time</p> <p>22 of difficulties getting above the 15th floor?</p> <p>23 A. Yes, and not only the 15th floor, but other floors.</p> <p>24 So --</p> <p>25 Q. We'll come to those. Let's just focus on the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 119</p>
<p>1 Q. In the TCM meeting.</p> <p>2 A. Yes.</p> <p>3 Q. Were you getting any greater level of detail outside the</p> <p>4 TCM meetings from Tom Goodall?</p> <p>5 A. No, it was generally a reflection of where he was, that</p> <p>6 snapshot in time of how many calls they were having to</p> <p>7 handle, the general fact that information was going into</p> <p>8 the tower, but it was a constantly shifting picture.</p> <p>9 So I wasn't looking in my position for a level of</p> <p>10 detail about individuals, where they were in flats.</p> <p>11 Really what I wanted desperately was for the number to</p> <p>12 reduce and the number of recorded rescues to increase.</p> <p>13 That, again, was something I began to press more for as</p> <p>14 time went on because I wanted to close that loop.</p> <p>15 That's how we ended up at the number of 65. We had</p> <p>16 someone sent out to try and triangulate that</p> <p>17 information, which was difficult to gather.</p> <p>18 Q. Do you remember Tom Goodall giving you any other</p> <p>19 detailed information about precise figures of FSGs other</p> <p>20 than these?</p> <p>21 A. I remember putting my head into CU7 and receiving</p> <p>22 a brief from Tom on a number of occasions where he told</p> <p>23 me where he thought he was at, and the accuracy of that</p> <p>24 information increased obviously as the incident went on,</p> <p>25 although there was never complete confidence in the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 118</p>	<p>1 15th floor.</p> <p>2 Do you remember when you were told about</p> <p>3 difficulties getting above the 15th floor?</p> <p>4 A. No, I don't remember the time, no.</p> <p>5 Q. We have some evidence from one of the wall drawings, and</p> <p>6 we'll look at it, it was about 04.25. Does that ring</p> <p>7 a bell?</p> <p>8 A. It doesn't ring a bell, but I would've thought that's</p> <p>9 accurate if that's what's recorded.</p> <p>10 Q. What about the 11th floor as another candidate?</p> <p>11 A. I remember having specific conversations about the</p> <p>12 11th floor and the challenge of dealing with the</p> <p>13 11th floor. The 11th floor seemed to become a problem,</p> <p>14 actually, in terms of fire spread and our people</p> <p>15 progressing beyond it. So the challenge of the BA</p> <p>16 operations -- and I think it's worth just focusing on</p> <p>17 the fact that that BA operation was entirely devoted to</p> <p>18 rescue. The only reason to firefight was to progress</p> <p>19 rescue, not to control the fire, to extinguish it, but</p> <p>20 just to progress rescue operations. So when talking</p> <p>21 about progress of crews, that in my mind was</p> <p>22 inextricably linked to the rescue operation, not the</p> <p>23 ability to extinguish the fire. That's why I needed to</p> <p>24 know the physical progress of crews.</p> <p>25 The 11th floor was certainly a problem. I remember</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 120</p>

<p>1 having a conversation, I think with Pat Goulbourne, 2 about progress beyond the 11th. 3 Q. Do you remember roughly what time that was? 4 A. I don't, but it would be recorded because it would've 5 been when I went inside the tower, because I never spoke 6 to Pat or Richard except when I was in the tower. 7 Q. Do you remember what the particular problem was about 8 getting above the 11th floor? 9 A. Yeah, that the conditions on the 11th floor deteriorated 10 to the extent it was not possible to put firefighters 11 into it. So I think what they described to me was 12 basically unsustainable firefighting conditions, so 13 an immense conflagration of heat, smoke, fire, that made 14 progress of the rescue operation almost impossible. 15 Therefore they needed to resolve the firefighting 16 situation on the 11th floor to be able to progress 17 beyond it. 18 But the 11th floor wasn't the only time that 19 happened. We had a number of conversations throughout 20 the night where this was happening on repeated occasions 21 on different floors, sometimes in a way that surprised 22 us. So thinking we'd worked past a floor, only to find 23 that the way the fire was behaving, it had come back 24 down the building, was back underneath those crews and 25 we were having to pull back and repeat the process</p> <p>Page 121</p>	<p>1 room yourself? 2 A. I didn't, because they were so -- I mean, my impression 3 of control at that point was that they were at the point 4 of being overwhelmed by the volume of calls. There was 5 a direct line from an officer called Jason Oliff into 6 the FSG unit, and that was the direct link in. So their 7 focus was on maintaining that operation, because that's 8 what they were fully occupied with. 9 I could've asked the command unit to pick up the 10 phone to control, and we did have contact with control 11 throughout the night periodically, so it's not that 12 there wouldn't have been a line of communication in, but 13 in terms of a continuous line of communication, that 14 would've been maintained rightly with the fire survival 15 guidance sector. 16 Q. Am I right in thinking that it's not you personally who 17 spoke to control but the operator on CU7? 18 A. No, it would've been the operator on CU7 speaking into 19 control, yes. 20 Q. So you personally didn't make any contact with control? 21 A. No, I wouldn't have picked the phone up to control or 22 got on to the radio to control myself personally, no. 23 Q. Given you were in CU8 and Tom Goodall was on CU7 and was 24 that line of control, how did you monitor or continually 25 observe the communications that he was having with</p> <p>Page 123</p>
<p>1 continuously to make progress. 2 Q. When you received information about particular floors, 3 rather than specific responses to FSG deployments, which 4 I'll come back to, but in relation to floors, did you 5 then feed back or get somebody on the command unit to 6 feed that back to control? 7 A. In terms of progress past the floors? 8 Q. In terms of difficulty getting above particular floors. 9 A. I can't recollect whether I did. I would've liked to 10 think I did, but I can't remember whether I did. 11 Q. You say, "I would've like to think I did"; is that 12 because it was essential that control would know if they 13 had callers above particular floors which couldn't be 14 accessed? 15 A. I think it has to be balanced, actually, with what you 16 tell those callers, because actually that was rapidly 17 changing. So I would be wary of telling someone that we 18 weren't going to put any crews above the 11th floor 19 when, actually, I was determined that we were going to 20 put crews above the 11th floor, it was just a matter of 21 time. 22 But I would acknowledge that that is useful 23 information for control operators to have 24 an understanding of progress within the building, yes. 25 Q. Did you have a direct line of contact with the control</p> <p>Page 122</p>	<p>1 control? 2 A. Because as part of the FSG system, that is part of Tom's 3 brief to me about how the system was working and whether 4 we were being able to maintain a complete throughput of 5 information from control into the tower. I was assured 6 that he had a continuous open line of communication into 7 control, he had been clear about that, and at no point 8 did I have any reason to believe that stopped, because 9 the times I did see him, it was clear, actually, when 10 I was on the unit, someone was continuously talking to 11 control, and it was clear information was passing 12 because things were shifting all the time. 13 Q. In general terms -- we'll come to specifics later on -- 14 were you aware that there was an absence of information 15 coming back from the bridgehead about particular 16 deployments in response to FSG calls to CU7? 17 A. I think generally I was aware of the fact that we were 18 struggling to close the loop, yes. I mean, it's the 19 same as I responded yesterday, that I knew that that was 20 something we needed to improve on and just struggled 21 throughout the evening to close that loop. 22 Q. Are you happy to continue? We can take a break now. 23 I'm conscious we do hourly rests. 24 A. If it's all right, I wouldn't mind 5 minutes, if that's 25 okay.</p> <p>Page 124</p>

<p>1 <b>SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK:</b> Of course. We're going to stop 2 anyway -- 3 <b>A.</b> Sorry, I'm not aware of the time. 4 <b>SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK:</b> No, no, you can't see the clock, can 5 you! It's 12.40. We normally stop for a break at 6 1 o'clock. We don't have to; we can stop at any time 7 that seems convenient. So if you feel that it's time to 8 have a break now, we can break, and maybe take an early 9 lunch and come back a bit early, or -- 10 <b>A.</b> If Mr Millett is in the flow of his questions, I'm happy 11 to carry on until 1 o'clock for lunch. 12 <b>SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK:</b> Are you? 13 <b>A.</b> I am, yes. 14 <b>SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK:</b> Let's see if we can find a suitable 15 point this side of 1 o'clock, shall we? 16 MR MILLETT: Yes, certainly. That may be possible. 17 <b>SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK:</b> If you feel the need for a break -- 18 <b>A.</b> I'm fine, I just I couldn't see the clock, I wasn't 19 sure. 20 MR MILLETT: It's okay, I am watching it. 21 03.39. Can I take you, first of all, to your log, 22 the Roe log, page 2, where there is a reference at that 23 time to a sitrep with Matt Cook. 24 What's a sitrep? 25 <b>A.</b> A situational update, so a brief to me.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 125</p>	<p>1 unpick it, and I think it's after this point I went into 2 the tower because I really wanted to talk to Pat 3 face-to-face about the use of EDBA and actually the fact 4 that we'd moved the bridgehead and what that meant to 5 progress. 6 Q. Did Pat come to the command unit to have this discussion 7 with you, or was this something that you were being told 8 about by Matt? 9 <b>A.</b> This was relayed to me by Matt Cook. 10 Q. So just going back to my question, to your understanding 11 was the entry control point on the 4th floor or was the 12 4th floor the highest point which BA crews could get to 13 at that point? 14 <b>A.</b> At that point, when I got told that, I wasn't clear. 15 I wanted to understand exactly how EDBA was being used. 16 Q. What did you learn? 17 <b>A.</b> When we went inside, at the point I then did speak to 18 Pat, it was that the bridgehead had moved to the ground 19 floor and that we were committing crews from the ground 20 floor upwards at that point, was the information I then 21 received, and that we were pushing our way back up the 22 building. It had been a complete withdrawal because of 23 conditions and then a push back into the building, but 24 they progressed relatively quickly with that. I can't 25 remember the exact floor they had got to.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 127</p>
<p>1 Q. What's "rep"? 2 <b>A.</b> So a situational response. 3 Q. Report? 4 <b>A.</b> Report, rather, sorry, so situational report from 5 Matt Cook. 6 Q. This is after the first TCM, as we can see, and it says 7 there: 8 "Pat Goulbourne (PG) in fire sector carried out a 9 tactical withdrawal of all BA and moved bridgehead to 10 ground floor. EDBA being committed to 4th floor for 11 search and rescue and firefighting. Make up for EDBA 12 requested from PG." 13 Just focusing on, first of all, your being told that 14 the bridgehead had moved to the ground floor and EDBA 15 being committed to the 4th floor for search and rescue, 16 I just want to understand what you understood by that. 17 Did that mean to you at the time that the entry 18 control point was on the 4th floor or that they can only 19 get to the 4th floor at highest? 20 <b>A.</b> I understood -- that caused me great concern, actually, 21 that particular sitrep, because I felt it indicated 22 a considerable worsening of conditions inside the tower. 23 And actually I needed to unpick why we were using EDBA 24 that way, but I trusted Pat, I reasoned that he had 25 a could reason for doing it. But actually I did need to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 126</p>	<p>1 Q. Can I just deviate slightly. This is a situation report 2 with Matt Cook, did it happen on the CU? 3 <b>A.</b> Yes. 4 Q. We know that because it's been logged? 5 <b>A.</b> Yes. 6 Q. So do we take it that Jackie McConochie -- I think you 7 said this yesterday -- didn't go around the incident 8 ground with you? 9 <b>A.</b> No. 10 Q. So any discussion we see here is one that takes place on 11 the CU? 12 <b>A.</b> Yes, so everything recorded here is taking place on the 13 CU. 14 Q. At that point you are still on the CU and you are being 15 told this by Matt Cook. Did you explore with him what 16 he meant when he said "EDBA being committed to 4th floor 17 for search and rescue"? 18 <b>A.</b> I can't remember the conversation in the detail at this 19 point. What I do remember about that conversation is 20 wanting to understand about the use of EDBA and how we 21 were balancing the use of EDBA with SDBA. Because EDBA 22 is a very useful resource, obviously we have a limited 23 amount of EDBA in London, and I wanted to know that we 24 were using it in a way that made sense. 25 Q. Jackie records:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 128</p>



<p>1 "Make up for EDBA requested from PG.  2 "AR [I assume that's you]: Update from LOC reference  3 EDBA resources."  4 Just explain what she means by "update from LOC".  5 <b>A. So I went back, I wanted an update from the London -- so</b>  6 <b>control, because that's where the Brigade co-ordination</b>  7 <b>centre, the BCC, was situated -- I wanted to know where</b>  8 <b>every single EDBA set in London was, including our</b>  9 <b>reserves, so I know that we hold reserves at the</b>  10 <b>protective equipment group kind of depot in Croydon.</b>  11 <b>And the conclusion I was coming to is that I wanted</b>  12 <b>every EDBA set in London and everyone who could</b>  13 <b>competently wear an EDBA set to be at that incident.</b>  14 Q. Did you or Matt Cook speak to Adrian Fenton in control  15 about what extra EDBA was available in London?  16 <b>A. I don't think I did personally, I don't know who did,</b>  17 <b>but that would've been -- that update would've been</b>  18 <b>requested in the context of my command unit staff. So</b>  19 <b>someone's going to have gone and done it, and I would've</b>  20 <b>expected some feedback about what the disposition was in</b>  21 <b>terms of locations of EDBA, support pumps. So it's not</b>  22 <b>just the FRUs that can wear EDBA, we have the support</b>  23 <b>pumps as well. And I just wanted to understand exactly</b>  24 <b>what we had left, to get them there.</b>  25 Q. Were you given to think at that point that there weren't</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 129</p>	<p>1 and then there's a turning out message for EDBA. That  2 gets repeated, you can see down the page. In between  3 the user comments, you can see "Turning out with message  4 - FOR EDBA", and it was repeated several times, and then  5 ends up at 04.03 with a turning out message to attend  6 with all EDBA sets available.  7 Were those your requests, or rather did they come  8 from you originally?  9 <b>A. I think requests for EDBA happened from more than one</b>  10 <b>place because -- and I can't remember the exact sequence</b>  11 <b>of it. I know that I wanted it and had left</b>  12 <b>an instruction to get all EDBA at one point. I think</b>  13 <b>Dany had also received some information and ordered all</b>  14 <b>EDBA sets actually in London at one point. I think what</b>  15 <b>we found was when we came back together that those two</b>  16 <b>things had occurred.</b>  17 Q. Yes, and we'll no doubt explore this with her when she  18 comes to give evidence, but it looks as if she actually  19 also made a command decision that there be more EDBA  20 found. We can see that actually in the incident log,  21 your Roe log, rather, at 03.58. It's just below 03.39,  22 it's page 2 of the log:  23 "All EDBA in Brigade to be ordered to the incident."  24 That comes from the commissioner.  25 So you recall that. You had left the CU by then,</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 131</p>
<p>1 enough EDBA present on the incident ground at that time?  2 <b>A. No, that was the first I'd heard that Pat wanted more</b>  3 <b>EDBA.</b>  4 Q. Did you find out why?  5 <b>A. I think when we went into the tower I had an answer,</b>  6 <b>yes, which was that we wanted EDBA because that was</b>  7 <b>going to allow us to reach the highest points in the</b>  8 <b>tower eventually, but even in the context of</b>  9 <b>firefighting in the lower reaches of the tower it</b>  10 <b>enabled us to carry out tasks for a longer duration and</b>  11 <b>could be used in that sense. But it was more -- it's</b>  12 <b>about the wear time, because that's what EDBA gives you,</b>  13 <b>so it gives you duration and reach, effectively, because</b>  14 <b>of the duration.</b>  15 Q. I think, just correct me if I'm wrong, what happens  16 after this discussion is that you go to the tower,  17 because we see you do that after 03.39 in your  18 contemporaneous note.  19 <b>A. Yes.</b>  20 Q. We'll come to that.  21 Just before we do, can I show you the short incident  22 log at page 26, and I would like to go to time mark  23 03.55.39 on page 26. It starts at the top of the  24 page -- it actually starts at the bottom of the previous  25 page, but it doesn't matter -- 03.55.39, "User comment",</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 130</p>	<p>1 I think, had you?  2 <b>A. Yes, I had.</b>  3 Q. So looking at the turning out messages to attend with  4 all EDBA sets available, which I showed you on the short  5 incident log, were those your messages?  6 <b>A. I can't recollect.</b>  7 Q. Did you think at that stage that there was a deficit in  8 the supply of EDBA?  9 <b>A. It wasn't necessarily I thought there was a deficit, but</b>  10 <b>what I did anticipate, having heard that, was that we</b>  11 <b>were going to need to make greater use of EDBA. And</b>  12 <b>actually we were so close to having all the EDBA in</b>  13 <b>London there anyway, I just factored in that actually if</b>  14 <b>at this stage of the incident Pat was making the request</b>  15 <b>we should factor forward that we were going to</b>  16 <b>reasonably make use of all of the EDBA available to us,</b>  17 <b>and therefore I would want that.</b>  18 Q. Just a couple of detail points.  19 Do you recall problem with there being telemetry  20 batteries being flat on EDBA supplied cylinders?  21 <b>A. I only learnt that after the incident.</b>  22 Q. You didn't know it during the incident?  23 <b>A. No, I didn't know it during the incident.</b>  24 Q. Do you recall whether there was a problem with the BA  25 discovers not being available for some of the cylinders?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 132</p>

<p>1 <b>A. Not during the incident, but post the incident I learnt</b>  2 <b>that. My understanding is these were the reserve sets</b>  3 <b>that came from the the protective equipment group depot</b>  4 <b>in Croydon, but I didn't know at the time of the</b>  5 <b>incident, no.</b>  6 Q. So, so far as you're concerned, neither of those caused  7 you or anybody else a problem; is that right?  8 <b>A. In the context of maintaining a continuous breathing</b>  9 <b>apparatus operation, no.</b>  10 Q. Did it cause any specific problems?  11 <b>A. Because I wasn't aware of it, no, I'm not aware that it</b>  12 <b>did.</b>  13 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, I think that is a convenient  14 moment, I am going to move on to something else, move on  15 in the story.  16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Give me some help - how are we  17 getting on?  18 MR MILLETT: We are getting on okay.  19 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I am sure we are, Mr Millett, but  20 I was really wondering whether we could say 2 o'clock.  21 MR MILLETT: We can say 2 o'clock.  22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, we'll break there,  23 Mr Roe, and have a slightly longer than usual lunch  24 break. Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence  25 while you're out of the room and we'll resume at</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 133</p>	<p>1 Meeting (TCGM) between various organisations such as the  2 Police/housing/TFL/water authority/Council, and others.  3 During this meeting, AC Roe had asked the Council to  4 provide plans of the building, including the internal  5 layout. It is vital that we have plans, as mentioned  6 when I was talking about 72D visits. There was no  7 detailed information or comprehensive notes of the  8 building layout from a London Fire Brigade aspect ...  9 All we had was a recent photograph ..."  10 If you go three lines down, he says:  11 "The female representing the Council said that she  12 would get the internal layout plans for us and was  13 working on it. About 45 minutes later, I went onto the  14 incident ground and spoke to the same female asking for  15 an update on these plans. She told me she had not yet  16 found the plans and were still working on it. At a TCG  17 meeting later that morning, AC Roe asked the female for  18 the plans again and they still were not present. AC ROE  19 expressed that this will be a big thing that when asked  20 for one thing, the Council could not provide it. This  21 had slowed the crews down in accessing the incident."  22 I have shown you a lot of that, partly for context  23 but also because there's quite a bit in it.  24 Do you remember a female employee of the council  25 telling you that the plans were not yet available?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 135</p>
<p>1 2 o'clock, please.  2 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.  3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? You go with the usher  4 then, please.  5 Thank you, 2 o'clock, then, please.  6 (12.55 pm)  7 (The short adjournment)  8 (2.00 pm)  9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Roe, happy to  10 continue?  11 THE WITNESS: Of course, sir.  12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.  13 When you you're ready, Mr Millett.  14 MR MILLETT: Mr Roe, welcome back, thanks for coming back to  15 us.  16 Can I just show you, still on the subject of plans,  17 a passage in a statement which is already in evidence in  18 the inquiry from Peter Johnson. I wonder if that could  19 be got up on to the screen at pages 14 and 15. It's  20 MET00013235.  21 If we go to page 14 at the foot of the page, he  22 says:  23 "Soon after that ..."  24 It's not exactly easy to see precisely when that is:  25 "... there was another Tactical Co-ordination Group</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 134</p>	<p>1 <b>A. I don't remember it specifically being a woman, but I do</b>  2 <b>remember, as I said earlier, repeatedly asking for plans</b>  3 <b>to representatives of the council and becoming</b>  4 <b>increasingly, if I'm honest, irritated by their</b>  5 <b>inability to give them to me. I felt it was something</b>  6 <b>I wanted the crew to have.</b>  7 Q. We're trying to identify the person you spoke to, you  8 see, and I just wondered if you could help us with that?  9 <b>A. I'm sorry, I can't. In the context of how many people</b>  10 <b>I spoke to that night, which was considerable, I can't.</b>  11 Q. Do you know the names of any particular council  12 employees you spoke to?  13 <b>A. Other than what's recorded in the log, I can't. I don't</b>  14 <b>hold the detail of specific names.</b>  15 <b>I think probably the one name actually that does</b>  16 <b>stick in my mind is John, the DSE, because I had regular</b>  17 <b>contact with him, and I definitely asked him for plans</b>  18 <b>as well, actually. I asked him if he could get access</b>  19 <b>to his plans in his role as the dangerous structures</b>  20 <b>engineer.</b>  21 Q. All right.  22 Can I then ask you to be shown two short clips of  23 video, and I should just say for everyone, these do not  24 show any fire on the outside of the building, these are  25 clips taken from body-worn footage of the police that we</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 136</p>

<p>1 have, and these particular clips are clips of meetings 2 inside CU8.</p> <p>3 If we could just play the first of those. We may 4 have to play it. Twice it's about 2 minutes long, but 5 I will have some questions about it. The best thing to 6 do is to see it all the way through first. We'll need 7 the volume up on full, I think 8 (Video Played)</p> <p>9 I have shown you that in full without any adornment. 10 We are going to look at it again and I am going to ask 11 Paul to stop and ask questions as we go. It won't take 12 too long.</p> <p>13 First of all, I should tell you and everybody 14 looking at this that the time mark on that needs to be 15 put forward one hour. So this is at 07.29 into 07.30. 16 The clip in fact is from, as adjusted, 07.29.06 to 17 07.30.54. That's the main period we want to look at.</p> <p>18 The second thing is, as you can see, it's body-worn 19 footage from the the police and the police officer's 20 head, as you can see, is on the left of the screen. 21 This is clearly taken from the footage on his shoulder. 22 This is Inspector Thatcher.</p> <p>23 So if we can start that again, Paul, please, and 24 I'll ask you to stop and I'll ask questions as we go. 25 (Video Played)</p> <p>Page 137</p>	<p>1 We can stop at the natural end. 2 Just a couple of questions.</p> <p>3 The first is you can hear Tom Goodall giving some 4 detail about the floors and flats per floor. Was that 5 the first time you'd heard that detail?</p> <p>6 <b>A. No, not at all. I'd had detail around the disposition 7 of the block and our progress within it from almost the 8 start of my tenure in command at the incident.</b></p> <p>9 Q. Then you go on to say that you didn't want this recorded 10 in the minutes, but the absence of plans was a major 11 deficiency and would be highlighted later.</p> <p>12 Why didn't you want it recorded in the minutes?</p> <p>13 <b>A. Because I wanted to explain the gravity of what was 14 happening. I suppose at that point in the incident 15 I wanted to give them a chance to get us the plans, but 16 I felt they weren't listening to me because I had been 17 asking repeatedly over time, and I just wanted him to 18 understand that he should understand, in this context, 19 because of the nature of that incident, that people 20 would be held accountable, and absolutely rightly so, 21 that's the whole point of this process, and I felt they 22 had been entirely deficient in not making those plans 23 available.</b></p> <p>24 Q. I think we see from the next clip, which is the second 25 clip we have -- this is also body-worn footage. Also if</p> <p>Page 139</p>
<p>1 Just pause there. Are you asking the questions, how 2 many floors?</p> <p>3 <b>A. I can't tell you because I can't see the context of the 4 rest of that meeting. It seems like I'm mid-sentence or 5 mid-question. So I'm very sorry, but I can't, no.</b></p> <p>6 Q. Let's see if we can identify the people in this.</p> <p>7 First of all, who is the gentleman in the bottom 8 right-hand corner with the grey hair?</p> <p>9 <b>A. I don't know his name, if you were to ask me now, but he 10 was the representative from the local authority. So 11 I would recognise him as the LALO, local authority 12 liaison officer.</b></p> <p>13 Q. The officer with the closely cropped haircut and the 14 glasses on his head looks to us like Tom Goodall.</p> <p>15 <b>A. So Tom Goodall -- with the glasses perched on top of his 16 head is definitely Tom Goodall because what I did ask is 17 him to give the FSG information.</b></p> <p>18 Q. Do you know who the third individual is in the middle?</p> <p>19 <b>A. That would be the LAS on-scene commander.</b></p> <p>20 Q. Let's just continue. 21 (Video Played)</p> <p>22 Pause there, is that you speaking?</p> <p>23 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>24 Q. Right. Continue, please. 25 (Video Played)</p> <p>Page 138</p>	<p>1 one adjusts it forward an hour, it's timed at 08.55.45 2 and it runs until 08.55.54. 3 (Video Played)</p> <p>4 It's a very short clip. I was trying to play it 5 backwards. Perhaps we should just play it again 6 (Video Played)</p> <p>7 Now, it's not that clear.</p> <p>8 <b>A. I understood that.</b></p> <p>9 Q. What did you understand?</p> <p>10 <b>A. I was saying thank you for the plans and I think we've 11 recorded that we've received them. Is that what I'm 12 saying there?</b></p> <p>13 Q. Shall we listen to it one more time?</p> <p>14 <b>A. Yes.</b> 15 (Video Played)</p> <p>16 Q. Having heard that three times, can you confirm that that 17 is you thanking whoever it was who provided them, the 18 full plans?</p> <p>19 <b>A. Yes, that's me thanking them for having completed that 20 action.</b></p> <p>21 Q. Two questions arise from that.</p> <p>22 First of all, who provided them in the end, do you 23 know?</p> <p>24 <b>A. I can't tell you. It was a representative from the 25 local authority. I can't tell you the individual.</b></p> <p>Page 140</p>

<p>1 Q. Do you know where they got them from?</p> <p>2 <b>A. No, because, again, that wasn't of my concern. I just</b></p> <p>3 <b>wanted them.</b></p> <p>4 Q. We've seen the time mark here of 08.55.45 to 54.</p> <p>5 How long before this time do you think those plans</p> <p>6 arrived, to your knowledge?</p> <p>7 <b>A. I couldn't tell you.</b></p> <p>8 Q. Right.</p> <p>9 <b>A. You know, I genuinely couldn't tell you at that point.</b></p> <p>10 Q. Who told you that they'd arrived, do you remember?</p> <p>11 <b>A. No.</b></p> <p>12 Q. Coming back to your progress on the night, I want to</p> <p>13 take it up at the bottom of page 6 of your first</p> <p>14 statement, please. The last paragraph starts with:</p> <p>15 "At 0339 hrs Matt Cook and Andy O'Loughlin got onto</p> <p>16 the unit and gave me an update face to face."</p> <p>17 Just to match that up with your contemporaneous</p> <p>18 note, that is page 4 of that and says pretty much the</p> <p>19 same thing.</p> <p>20 At the bottom of that page you say, after describing</p> <p>21 what you discussed with those two officers:</p> <p>22 "I decided I needed to go to the tower lobby and</p> <p>23 make a decision as incident commander as to whether the</p> <p>24 continuing rescue effort was tenable in the face of such</p> <p>25 significant internal fire spread and such a significant</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 141</p>	<p>1 stage.</p> <p>2 <b>A. We may well have done, but I can't remember.</b></p> <p>3 Q. Okay.</p> <p>4 You then go to the tower. You say in the next</p> <p>5 paragraph on page 7:</p> <p>6 "The Commissioner arrived on the unit I briefed</p> <p>7 her."</p> <p>8 I'm assuming, from the way this is laid out in your</p> <p>9 statement, that she arrived on the unit and you briefed</p> <p>10 her before you went to the tower to make the decision</p> <p>11 you described; is that right?</p> <p>12 <b>A. I'm not sure without seeing the order of things. So is</b></p> <p>13 <b>this after I've gone to the tower and come back out?</b></p> <p>14 Q. That's really what I'm asking you.</p> <p>15 <b>A. No, I can't tell from -- it happened quickly, so I can't</b></p> <p>16 <b>see from the overall statement.</b></p> <p>17 Q. Let's look at the contemporaneous notes. This may</p> <p>18 clarify.</p> <p>19 Page 4, we have the first chunk of text, 03.39,</p> <p>20 where you say, as you do in your statement, that you</p> <p>21 needed to go to the tower to make a decision. Then in</p> <p>22 the next and last block on that page you say:</p> <p>23 "The Commissioner arrived on the unit, I gave her a</p> <p>24 situational brief ..."</p> <p>25 My question was: did she arrive on the unit before</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 143</p>
<p>1 external risk of partial collapse and the resulting</p> <p>2 debris."</p> <p>3 Had anything happened between the time you took over</p> <p>4 and then made the decision that the advice to those</p> <p>5 within the building should be changed, until this point,</p> <p>6 03.39 and after, so that you felt you now needed to make</p> <p>7 a decision as to whether the continuing rescue effort</p> <p>8 was tenable?</p> <p>9 <b>A. It was the movement of the bridgehead that concerned me,</b></p> <p>10 <b>because to move a bridgehead is a significant thing to</b></p> <p>11 <b>do. That bridgehead needs to be a stable environment</b></p> <p>12 <b>where we continue to commit people into the building.</b></p> <p>13 <b>To move it has a profound effect on the operation of</b></p> <p>14 <b>search and rescue itself, because you're having to move</b></p> <p>15 <b>the whole apparatus. So to do so is not a small</b></p> <p>16 <b>decision. That told me that something must have</b></p> <p>17 <b>deteriorated inside the building. I'd already come to</b></p> <p>18 <b>the conclusion that the entire building system had</b></p> <p>19 <b>failed, that we were putting firefighters at very high</b></p> <p>20 <b>risk even just to get them into the building. To now</b></p> <p>21 <b>find that not only perhaps were we not progressing in</b></p> <p>22 <b>the way I hoped, but the bridgehead shifted downwards,</b></p> <p>23 <b>I really wanted to confirm myself exactly where we were</b></p> <p>24 <b>at with matters.</b></p> <p>25 Q. You still hadn't I think got a DSE on site at that</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 142</p>	<p>1 you left for the tower to make the decision that you say</p> <p>2 you wanted to go and make?</p> <p>3 <b>A. Yes, I think she did.</b></p> <p>4 Q. Right.</p> <p>5 <b>A. Apologies, I didn't quite understand your first</b></p> <p>6 <b>question, but I do now.</b></p> <p>7 Q. You then left for the tower, and essentially you left</p> <p>8 her on the unit, as you say, for continuity while you</p> <p>9 went out on to the incident ground.</p> <p>10 Did your loggist stay on CU8?</p> <p>11 <b>A. Yes, Jackie stayed on CU8, because on leaving the CU and</b></p> <p>12 <b>having the commissioner arrive as the monitoring</b></p> <p>13 <b>officer, effectively she was acting as the caretaker</b></p> <p>14 <b>incident commander at that point, because it would've</b></p> <p>15 <b>been difficult for me to communicate effectively as</b></p> <p>16 <b>incident commander from out on the incident ground.</b></p> <p>17 <b>I needed someone to be in the place where all</b></p> <p>18 <b>communications were coming into to be able to maintain</b></p> <p>19 <b>an overall view of the incident while I went and</b></p> <p>20 <b>sense-checked my situational awareness. That's normal</b></p> <p>21 <b>practice in terms of that role.</b></p> <p>22 Q. Let's see if we can get a timing on this. Go to your</p> <p>23 log, please, if you would, your Roe log, as I call it,</p> <p>24 and you see that on page 2 you say, just below halfway</p> <p>25 down, still under the time mark of 03.39:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 144</p>

<p>1 "AR [I'm assuming that's you]: Explains the command 2 structure to MC and Commissioner." 3 MC I imagine is Matt Cook. 4 <b>A. That's correct.</b> 5 Q. Did he not know the command structure at that stage? 6 <b>A. I think that's just the way Jackie's noted it.</b> 7 <b>I would've briefed the commissioner -- so I would be</b> 8 <b>directly briefing the commissioner. So this is the</b> 9 <b>first moment I'm aware the commissioner is on the</b> 10 <b>command unit with me, and I am briefing her, because</b> 11 <b>she's my monitoring officer, as to the structure of the</b> 12 <b>incident so she can validate my decision-making, confirm</b> 13 <b>whether she's comfortable with the objectives I've set</b> 14 <b>and the structure we were using to meet those</b> 15 <b>objectives.</b> 16 <b>Matt's an ORT officer standing next to her and he</b> 17 <b>would've received the same brief, and actually would've</b> 18 <b>provided a degree of objective critical challenge as</b> 19 <b>well, potentially, because that's their role, regardless</b> 20 <b>of rank, actually.</b> 21 Q. After that briefing, you leave to go to the tower and 22 leave Jackie McConochie with the commissioner on CU8. 23 You can see the next item is 03.55: 24 "DT Super Gold to Commissioner FSA to Police to get 25 out."</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 145</p>	<p>1 <b>reassurance in the fact that our thought processes were</b> 2 <b>the same having subsequently read that record when I've</b> 3 <b>returned to the unit.</b> 4 Q. Just trying to get a feel for when you came back onto 5 the unit. 6 Looking down the log, at 04.06: 7 "AR: Sit rep on incident ground." 8 Jackie wasn't with you on the incident ground as 9 you've told us, so how did that come to be in the log at 10 04.06? 11 <b>A. No, that's just the way she's worded it. I think I'm</b> 12 <b>back on the unit then. I think that refers to</b> 13 <b>a situational report about the incident ground. At no</b> 14 <b>point was Jackie with me on the incident ground, so for</b> 15 <b>her to record that, that must have taken place back on</b> 16 <b>the unit.</b> 17 Q. In terms of a spread of time, can we take it on the 18 basis that you left the command unit at perhaps just 19 before 03.55 to go to the tower, but were back on the 20 command unit by 04.06? 21 <b>A. I think I might have left slightly earlier than 03.55,</b> 22 <b>potentially, because I'm not sure it would've taken me</b> 23 <b>that long to give the initial brief to the commissioner,</b> 24 <b>because at that point, because of the news I'd had</b> 25 <b>around the bridgehead coming down, I would have wanted</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 147</p>
<p>1 Do you think you were on the command unit at that 2 point or had you already gone? 3 <b>A. I think I'm off at that point because I think that</b> 4 <b>refers to the blocks adjacent to Grenfell Tower --</b> 5 <b>apologies, is that Barandon Walk?</b> 6 Q. Or Treadgold House. 7 <b>A. One of those. I think, from what I remember, I came</b> 8 <b>back onto the unit later -- and I don't know whether</b> 9 <b>it's recorded -- to be told the commissioner had</b> 10 <b>a conversation with the police representative, and that</b> 11 <b>information was about residents in nearby blocks being</b> 12 <b>at risk. She had taken the decision that those blocks</b> 13 <b>should be evacuated.</b> 14 Q. Okay. 15 Then at 03.58 you can see she makes a command 16 decision that EDDBA be reworn. I'm assuming she's was on 17 the CU and you weren't at that stage? 18 <b>A. No, but I was having -- actually, I find some</b> 19 <b>reassurance in this, in the sense that I was separately</b> 20 <b>having that conversation, I think, about this time, with</b> 21 <b>Pat Goulbourne, and I had come to the conclusion that</b> 22 <b>EDDBA would need to be reworn. So I think we came to the</b> 23 <b>same conclusion separately. I can't tell you what</b> 24 <b>information gave the commissioner reason to take that</b> 25 <b>decision, because I wasn't on the unit, but I find some</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 146</p>	<p>1 <b>to get out there and see that. So I think that would've</b> 2 <b>been fairly quick. But it's certainly between 03.39 and</b> 3 <b>04.06, I've got off the unit and I've spent some time</b> 4 <b>off the unit to improve my situational awareness.</b> 5 Q. So at least we have a spread of time when we know you're 6 off the unit. 7 <b>A. Absolutely, yes.</b> 8 Q. At the most you say it is between 03.39, a little bit 9 after that, and 04.06 when you come back on? 10 <b>A. Yes, I'll agree with that.</b> 11 Q. During that period, I think you went to CU7; is that 12 right? 13 <b>A. I can't remember exactly. I probably would have to</b> 14 <b>refer back to my statement. But I would've thought</b> 15 <b>I did, because if I'm going past it, I would've taken</b> 16 <b>the opportunity to stick my head in to Tom Goodall and</b> 17 <b>see how that was going. I'd have wanted to take that</b> 18 <b>opportunity en route to the tower.</b> 19 Q. We've covered this earlier this morning, it's page 5, 20 I don't want to go back to that, it's just in terms of 21 what you did on that tour. 22 You go to CU7 -- just to be fair to you, I'll take 23 you back to it again. Page 5 of the contemporaneous 24 note, third item down: 25 "As we passed CU7 I stepped on to take a short brief</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 148</p>

<p>1 from Tom Goodall ..."</p> <p>2 How long do you think that brief lasted?</p> <p>3 <b>A. Probably a minute or 2 minutes. It wouldn't have been</b></p> <p>4 <b>a long brief.</b></p> <p>5 Q. No. We discussed that yesterday.</p> <p>6 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>7 Q. Which is where you said you were happy with their</p> <p>8 orderly system, but the word "happy" wasn't right.</p> <p>9 <b>A. Yes, "happy" is not an appropriate word.</b></p> <p>10 Q. Then you went, I think, to BA control, because that's</p> <p>11 what we have next, Dan Kipling and Nick Saunders.</p> <p>12 Where was BA main control?</p> <p>13 <b>A. So BA main control was on a grassed area in front of the</b></p> <p>14 <b>tower.</b></p> <p>15 Q. Did they give you any information about the sufficiency</p> <p>16 of EDDB supply at that point?</p> <p>17 <b>A. I can't remember the detail of the conversation, but</b></p> <p>18 <b>what was clear to me was that there was an obvious</b></p> <p>19 <b>system in operation to prepare wearers to be committed</b></p> <p>20 <b>into the tower, that there was clear holding points</b></p> <p>21 <b>where people were either returning, being refreshed,</b></p> <p>22 <b>being got ready to be committed, and that there was</b></p> <p>23 <b>a system under operation.</b></p> <p>24 <b>I didn't question them, I don't think, about</b></p> <p>25 <b>turnover of EDDB at that point. But, to be fair,</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 149</p>	<p>1 <b>obviously the incident involving the poor gentleman who</b></p> <p>2 <b>had jumped from the tower had delayed that somewhat,</b></p> <p>3 <b>because I had to deal with the immediacy of that as</b></p> <p>4 <b>well.</b></p> <p>5 Q. The next picture is at an adjusted time of 03.55.54</p> <p>6 which is -- I've taken this slightly out of order,</p> <p>7 actually. I think the better order would be to show you</p> <p>8 INQ00000388.</p> <p>9 Can you see yourself in that picture?</p> <p>10 <b>A. Yes, I can.</b></p> <p>11 Q. Where are you?</p> <p>12 <b>A. I'm not entirely sure, to be honest with you, within the</b></p> <p>13 <b>layout of that floor. That might have been the point --</b></p> <p>14 Q. Sorry, in the picture.</p> <p>15 <b>A. Oh, apologies. I'm to the far right, and I believe that</b></p> <p>16 <b>is Richard Welch and Pat Goulbourne I'm talking to.</b></p> <p>17 Q. Who is wearing the red chequered tabard?</p> <p>18 <b>A. That will be someone from the command unit.</b></p> <p>19 Q. Indeed. Who might that be, do you know?</p> <p>20 <b>A. I've no idea.</b></p> <p>21 Q. Does the name Mark Kentfield ring a bell?</p> <p>22 <b>A. No, it doesn't ring a bell for me, because my focus</b></p> <p>23 <b>would've been on talking to the sector commanders</b></p> <p>24 <b>because they held the situational information, the</b></p> <p>25 <b>update I needed, and were responsible for the BA</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 151</p>
<p>1 <b>I don't remember the detail of the conversation I had.</b></p> <p>2 Q. Following your tour, in the next item down, you say:</p> <p>3 "I then went to the base of the tower ..."</p> <p>4 And you got a brief from Dave O'Neill on safety.</p> <p>5 Do you see that?</p> <p>6 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>7 Q. I think we can pin this down with a CCTV image which</p> <p>8 I think you might be able to help us with. INQ00000387.</p> <p>9 This is a CCTV image taken from the Grenfell lobby</p> <p>10 camera 3 at adjusted time of 03.50.44.</p> <p>11 Can you see yourself in that picture?</p> <p>12 <b>A. I can. I am standing near the signage that says</b></p> <p>13 <b>"Grenfell Tower Community Room" talking to an officer</b></p> <p>14 <b>with their helmet off.</b></p> <p>15 Q. With his arm pointing to the right?</p> <p>16 <b>A. Yes, that's right.</b></p> <p>17 Q. Do you know who that is?</p> <p>18 <b>A. I think that looks like Pete Wolfenden from behind.</b></p> <p>19 Q. We would agree with you.</p> <p>20 Does that help you identify the time at which you</p> <p>21 went into the tower on this tour?</p> <p>22 <b>A. Well, I would suggest it was moments before that I got</b></p> <p>23 <b>into the tower, because you had to sprint to get into</b></p> <p>24 <b>the tower. Although what I would say is that I'd been</b></p> <p>25 <b>ready to go into the tower earlier than that, but</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 150</p>	<p>1 <b>operations. It was very important to me that I got that</b></p> <p>2 <b>information from them.</b></p> <p>3 Q. I am assuming you could see what we can see from this</p> <p>4 picture, which is that the bridgehead was now down at</p> <p>5 the foot of the stairs on the ground floor there.</p> <p>6 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>7 Q. That was the BA entry control point.</p> <p>8 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>9 Q. If we go on to INQ00000391, you're still in the tower at</p> <p>10 this point, and this is at an adjusted time of 03.55.54.</p> <p>11 Do you think you can see yourself in that picture?</p> <p>12 <b>A. I think I'm leaving the tower at that point and I'm</b></p> <p>13 <b>walking past Pete Wolfenden, going out past the</b></p> <p>14 <b>"Grenfell Tower Community Room" sign.</b></p> <p>15 Q. So on the basis of those time marks, coming in before</p> <p>16 03.50, but not long before 03.50, as we've seen, and</p> <p>17 then leaving at an adjusted time of 03.55.54, does that</p> <p>18 help us identify the time span, more or less, that you</p> <p>19 were in the tower?</p> <p>20 <b>A. I would say that's an accurate reflection. I think</b></p> <p>21 <b>I was in there 4 or 5 minutes, I got the information</b></p> <p>22 <b>I needed and then I got out and went back out.</b></p> <p>23 Q. That's helpful.</p> <p>24 During that period of 4 or 5 minutes you were in the</p> <p>25 tower, did you have a briefing with Pat Goulbourne and</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 152</p>

<p>1 Richard Welch?</p> <p>2 <b>A. Yes, I did.</b></p> <p>3 Q. Where did you have that briefing?</p> <p>4 <b>A. I can't tell you exactly -- I can't locate myself</b></p> <p>5 <b>exactly in the base of the tower. I don't want to say</b></p> <p>6 <b>it's at the base of the stairs because I think because</b></p> <p>7 <b>you've shown me that photo, it's the first time I've</b></p> <p>8 <b>seen that photo, I might assume that. All I know is</b></p> <p>9 <b>I had a face-to-face briefing with Pat and Richard in</b></p> <p>10 <b>the tower.</b></p> <p>11 Q. Can I then, having established the time, see if we can</p> <p>12 establish the content of that briefing.</p> <p>13 Can I ask you, please, to go to page 8 of your first</p> <p>14 witness statement and look at the second paragraph</p> <p>15 there.</p> <p>16 Just to set this in a wider context, this is in the</p> <p>17 part of your statement dealing with this tour out of the</p> <p>18 command unit. You say:</p> <p>19 "I received a quick update from Pat Goulbourne and</p> <p>20 Richard Welch who were running the fire sector between</p> <p>21 them. They told me they had cleared as best as possible</p> <p>22 up to the 8th floor and were having to fire fight hard</p> <p>23 to get beyond that but had had crews earlier in the</p> <p>24 incident well up beyond that to possibly the 20th and</p> <p>25 21st floors. They were both calm and focused with an</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 153</p>	<p>1 <b>hard as possible back up the building, clearing as they</b></p> <p>2 <b>went.</b></p> <p>3 Q. Do you know roughly when they'd started that systematic</p> <p>4 bottom-up approach?</p> <p>5 <b>A. Do you mean prior to my command?</b></p> <p>6 Q. Well, prior to your arrival in the building?</p> <p>7 <b>A. Inside the building? No, I don't. But what I would say</b></p> <p>8 <b>is that the brief I'd had from Andy O'Loughlin was that</b></p> <p>9 <b>he had Pat and Richard in there and they were attempting</b></p> <p>10 <b>to make progress as far as possible up inside the</b></p> <p>11 <b>building, and that would've meant to me that they were</b></p> <p>12 <b>clearing floor by floor, because that was generally the</b></p> <p>13 <b>approach, and working simultaneously on the fire</b></p> <p>14 <b>survival guidance calls as information came in.</b></p> <p>15 Q. What did you understand the EDBA wearers were being used</p> <p>16 for?</p> <p>17 <b>A. To project as high as possible into the building because</b></p> <p>18 <b>of travel times, but also for specific tasks where</b></p> <p>19 <b>needed.</b></p> <p>20 Q. To your understanding from this briefing, were crews</p> <p>21 being committed to respond to particular FSG rescues or</p> <p>22 was this just being done floor by floor?</p> <p>23 <b>A. No, they were definitely being specifically tasked.</b></p> <p>24 Q. Did you find out what would happen where an FSG call or</p> <p>25 FSG details had come to the bridgehead for a floor above</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 155</p>
<p>1 immediate aim to fight through to the 12th floor despite</p> <p>2 having intermittent issues with water supply due to</p> <p>3 burst branch/hydrant lengths as a result of falling</p> <p>4 debris or hoses getting burnt through. Pat confirmed we</p> <p>5 needed more EDBA and I explained I had asked for every</p> <p>6 EDBA asset in London. We discussed the stability of the</p> <p>7 building and at that point we had received no reports of</p> <p>8 issues with the concrete superstructure columns or</p> <p>9 floors."</p> <p>10 There's quite a lot in that I just want to unpack</p> <p>11 with you.</p> <p>12 First of all, was your impression at this time, from</p> <p>13 this briefing, that Pat Goulbourne and Richard Welch</p> <p>14 were doing a systematic search of each floor from the</p> <p>15 bottom up?</p> <p>16 <b>A. I can't remember the exact detail of the brief, but my</b></p> <p>17 <b>view is that they were working their way systemically up</b></p> <p>18 <b>the building, because that was the nature of the</b></p> <p>19 <b>questions I asked them and the information I received</b></p> <p>20 <b>back. So I was very focused on clearing as best we</b></p> <p>21 <b>could, floor by floor, pushing up the building, because</b></p> <p>22 <b>it's clear we've been pushed back down.</b></p> <p>23 Q. Do you know whether that was a system that they'd</p> <p>24 already started?</p> <p>25 <b>A. No, I don't. But I know that I needed them to push as</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 154</p>	<p>1 here, let's say, the 8th floor, what were they doing</p> <p>2 with that information at the bridgehead, so far as you</p> <p>3 could see?</p> <p>4 <b>A. Well, I don't know if this was then, because again,</b></p> <p>5 <b>obviously, I was in command for a long period and had</b></p> <p>6 <b>many conversations, but I do remember having</b></p> <p>7 <b>a conversation about crews on the basis of a risk</b></p> <p>8 <b>assessment if necessary being pushed above a fire floor</b></p> <p>9 <b>without fire extinguishing media, which I found</b></p> <p>10 <b>extremely concerning, but I felt I had to trust Pat and</b></p> <p>11 <b>Richard in terms of their professional judgement and</b></p> <p>12 <b>experience in having to do that to make best efforts to</b></p> <p>13 <b>rescue people. I think that did happen.</b></p> <p>14 <b>So that may well have happened in that conversation.</b></p> <p>15 <b>I don't know whether it did or whether that was a later</b></p> <p>16 <b>conversation, but my expectation would be that,</b></p> <p>17 <b>actually, sometimes people were being pushed beyond</b></p> <p>18 <b>where we were reasonably expecting to be able to control</b></p> <p>19 <b>the fire.</b></p> <p>20 Q. I know it was not a particularly long period of time you</p> <p>21 were there, but during that period, did you find out how</p> <p>22 FSG details were coming into the tower from outside, at</p> <p>23 that point?</p> <p>24 <b>A. Well, I knew that already from the system that Tom had</b></p> <p>25 <b>shown me, explained to me, from my own observation,</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 156</p>

<p>1 because it was clear that sheets were coming in with me  2 as I went into the tower, came back of the tower, it was  3 very clear there was a linear system to bring them into  4 the bottom of the tower. It was clear information was  5 being documented on the wall. It was clear Pete  6 Wolfenden was involved in that, as was a watch manager  7 I now know to be Glynn Williams -- I didn't know his  8 name at the time. I was satisfied there was a passage  9 of information in.</p> <p>10 Q. Did you look closely at the linear system?</p> <p>11 A. When you say closely, no more than that I was  12 comfortable that I could see sheets coming in, being  13 given to crews, an element of briefing happening, and  14 that then those crews were progressing to the  15 bridgehead. So I was comfortable with that. And,  16 actually, again, I didn't want to get involved in that  17 level of detail. I was more concerned about the fact  18 the bridgehead had moved. That raised a greater  19 question for me about the firefighting conditions  20 internally and, most importantly, my decision around the  21 risk I was placing firefighters in. That was of the  22 greatest concern to me at that point: was I still able  23 to commit firefighters reasonably into this building  24 taking into account the conditions?</p> <p>25 Q. Can I pick something out of your last answer. You</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 157</p>	<p>1 detail. I couldn't tell you faithfully that I do  2 remember that. But what I do remember for definite is  3 the information going into the tower, there being  4 a method of recording, and that there were sheets inside  5 the tower. Who was holding them, I'm sorry, I can't  6 remember the exact detail.</p> <p>7 Q. Do you remember discussing with Richard Welch or  8 Pat Goulbourne whether those sheets that you saw were  9 being used for briefing crews by them?</p> <p>10 A. No, I didn't delve down into that level of detail,  11 because my primary concern at that point was: why have  12 we had to move the bridgehead? Are we now operating in  13 conditions that are becoming increasingly untenable?  14 What is your resourcing requirement? How far are we  15 able to push up inside the building? What is the likely  16 rate of progress as well? And if I'm honest, to be  17 absolutely clear in my intent that we continued,  18 regardless of the difficulties, to carry out BA search  19 and rescue conditions, despite operations, despite the  20 difficulties, and to impress on them my desire that they  21 push momentum as hard as possible.</p> <p>22 It was a conversation more in that context. It was  23 the big picture, which is: Pat, Richard, are you able to  24 continue operations? Have you got any specific  25 information about the stability of the building? Where</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 159</p>
<p>1 helpfully said that you could see sheets coming in being  2 given to crews.</p> <p>3 Could you just explain what you saw. Sheets of  4 paper with what? FSG on them?</p> <p>5 A. Yes, so our template sheet. So I remember being  6 outside, lining up to go to the parapet just before  7 Shaun Murphy was hit by the gentleman who jumped, and  8 I remember to my left someone collating sheets and then  9 someone bringing -- I just remember seeing the sheets  10 and then I remember seeing sheets inside, I remember the  11 information written on the wall, and that there was  12 clearly communication between all parties involved in  13 that kind of linear delivery of information.</p> <p>14 Q. Did you see the watch managers, the officers, at the  15 wall giving sheets of paper with FSG information on them  16 to crews?</p> <p>17 A. I can't remember in the exactitude of that detail, but  18 my memory is that that information -- I must have some  19 memory of it because I have a memory of that  20 information -- I've seen that information inside the  21 tower. Yes.</p> <p>22 Q. I know it's difficult, but do you remember the crews  23 holding those pieces of paper when going to the entry  24 control?</p> <p>25 A. I would just not have been looking at that level of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 158</p>	<p>1 are we in the building? Why have we moved the  2 bridgehead? We need to drive that back up and we need  3 to move back up the building.</p> <p>4 Q. Right.</p> <p>5 A. It was about maintaining -- because my great fear  6 throughout the incident is that people were scared,  7 people were traumatised, it was a massive logistical  8 effort to keep the operation going. My primary focus  9 was we had to maintain progress. Progress was not a  10 give. Progress had to be driven and motivated through  11 the leadership of individual officers, through the  12 courage and tenacity of firefighters themselves, and,  13 actually, that had to be my focus. It had to be the big  14 picture to drive that momentum, drive the progress  15 through.</p> <p>16 So I'm there to set strategy. My command officers  17 are there to define the detail of the tactics which in  18 some aspects I would have to validate, and the  19 firefighters are there to deliver the tactics. That's  20 kind of how the incident command structure works, in  21 effect.</p> <p>22 So, for me, it was more important to me that we were  23 meeting our broad strategic objectives at that incident,  24 which is: we must continue to drive progress inside the  25 tower despite the difficulties. But I needed to have</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 160</p>



<p>1 an adult conversation about whether it was safe to do</p> <p>2 so, recognising the very great moral dilemma that would</p> <p>3 put me in if I decided to remove crews from the</p> <p>4 building.</p> <p>5 Q. Looking at what you said in that last answer about the</p> <p>6 command officers defining the detail of the tactics.</p> <p>7 Did you question them about why, when designing</p> <p>8 those tactics, they hadn't already pushed the EDBA</p> <p>9 resources they had as far up into the building at</p> <p>10 an earlier stage than now?</p> <p>11 A. I don't know whether I had a conversation about EDBA</p> <p>12 then, or later, but there was certainly a point in the</p> <p>13 incident where I wanted to know why we weren't balancing</p> <p>14 the use of SDBA and EDBA differently. I think I had</p> <p>15 that conversation on the unit and asked for the message</p> <p>16 to be passed back, because I wanted to know why we</p> <p>17 weren't pushing EDBA as far as we could up within the</p> <p>18 building, back-filling with SDBA to the point where its</p> <p>19 limit of exploitation was exhausted. So I definitely</p> <p>20 had that conversation at some point in the incident.</p> <p>21 Q. Do you remember when?</p> <p>22 A. I'm really sorry, Mr Millett, I don't.</p> <p>23 Q. Do you know what happened to that suggestion that you</p> <p>24 made?</p> <p>25 A. Yes, I think that either Matt Cook or Mick Mulholland</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 161</p>	<p>1 you don't want a constant rotation of crews. But that</p> <p>2 is always balanced with the effects of heat and fire on</p> <p>3 our own crews. It's a delicate decision to take because</p> <p>4 you don't want to overexpose people either. But, again,</p> <p>5 I would be trusting Pat or Richard in the minutiae of</p> <p>6 those decisions if it was task-focused.</p> <p>7 But as a general principle, I was very clear that we</p> <p>8 needed to use SDBA[sic] as far as possible to reach the</p> <p>9 upper floors of the building and drive SDBA in behind</p> <p>10 it.</p> <p>11 Q. Can I ask you to be shown a picture, which is</p> <p>12 MET00005774.</p> <p>13 This is a close-up, or I think the best picture we</p> <p>14 have, of the lobby wall, which is there on the screen</p> <p>15 now. Can I just ask you to look at the top of that.</p> <p>16 Pete Wolfenden wrote on that:</p> <p>17 "Above 10 EDBA, Below 10 SDBA."</p> <p>18 Can you tell us anything about that?</p> <p>19 A. I don't remember reading that. The only thing I can say</p> <p>20 about that wall and the boards inside the FSG command</p> <p>21 unit was that I asked for them to be photographed</p> <p>22 repeatedly as information came to act as a record so</p> <p>23 that, actually, there would be an opportunity to</p> <p>24 question it at a later date and see if there was any</p> <p>25 learning coming from it.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 163</p>
<p>1 took that and took that to the fire sector. Because I'm</p> <p>2 sure I asked that on more than one occasion.</p> <p>3 Q. And the result of that request was what?</p> <p>4 A. Some clarification about how we were using EDBA and why</p> <p>5 we needed the EDBA resources, which was to push up as</p> <p>6 far as we could into the tower.</p> <p>7 At one point, we were only using EDBA. That was</p> <p>8 what prompted that question, actually. That was the</p> <p>9 point at which I asked it. There was a point in the</p> <p>10 incident when we were only using EDBA. I was given some</p> <p>11 rationale as to why that was. My answer to that was</p> <p>12 that's fine, if that's what you think is required at</p> <p>13 this moment in time due to the circumstances, the</p> <p>14 conditions, but at the earliest opportunity -- and I do</p> <p>15 remember having this conversation, and I'm sorry,</p> <p>16 I can't exactly remember the location -- we needed to</p> <p>17 get back to a place where we were using EDBA with</p> <p>18 maximum efficiency and pushing SDBA up behind it.</p> <p>19 Q. Do you remember being told about deployments of EDBA to</p> <p>20 low floors, for example the 4th floor?</p> <p>21 A. I may well have been. That wouldn't necessarily have</p> <p>22 concerned me if it was focused on undertaking</p> <p>23 a particular task, because EDBA isn't just about</p> <p>24 distance of travel, it's about duration of wear. So</p> <p>25 there are certainly tasks on the incident ground where</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 162</p>	<p>1 Q. Do you remember issuing a command or one of the sectors</p> <p>2 issuing a command and telling you about it that above 10</p> <p>3 EDBA, below 10 SDBA?</p> <p>4 A. I don't remember the specific numbers, but I do remember</p> <p>5 more than one conversation about use of SDBA and EDBA</p> <p>6 and where the limits of exploitation for each were.</p> <p>7 I don't remember the specifics of the floor numbers</p> <p>8 because these things ebbed and flowed continuously over</p> <p>9 the duration of the incident.</p> <p>10 Q. Do you remember anybody writing a grid on the wall at</p> <p>11 a later stage in the evening showing what floors had</p> <p>12 been cleared?</p> <p>13 A. I can't say I remember the exact detail of what was</p> <p>14 written on the wall, but I remember a range of</p> <p>15 information being written on the wall and just</p> <p>16 reflecting that, actually, this was a sign of how</p> <p>17 extremely difficult things had become because the very</p> <p>18 processes we'd put in place post-Lakanal to prevent that</p> <p>19 ever happening again had seemingly not been adequate.</p> <p>20 Q. Well, I'll come back to that in a minute, if I may,</p> <p>21 because I am interested in that answer, but before I do</p> <p>22 that, just following your tour, I think after, as we've</p> <p>23 seen, this brief visit, 4, 5, 6 minutes or so, to tower,</p> <p>24 you go back to the command unit; is that right?</p> <p>25 A. That's correct.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 164</p>

<p>1 Q. You then go back to the tower again at 04.20. The</p> <p>2 reason I suggest that to you is that you say that in</p> <p>3 your statement at page 9, last paragraph:</p> <p>4 "At 0420 I went back inside the tower to the lobby.</p> <p>5 I was briefed by Pat and Richard. I asked them to start</p> <p>6 using SDBA to follow behind the EDBA crews to make best</p> <p>7 use of resources."</p> <p>8 You have that as a separate discussion at 04.20.</p> <p>9 Do you think that's right, first of all?</p> <p>10 <b>A. That's obviously what I recollected.</b></p> <p>11 Q. I don't think we have a CCTV image of you coming in at</p> <p>12 that stage. It doesn't matter.</p> <p>13 Are you sure that's not part of the same discussion</p> <p>14 you had earlier in the tower, the one we talked about --</p> <p>15 <b>A. I can't recollect, but what I do know is that</b></p> <p>16 <b>I absolutely had that conversation, and actually reading</b></p> <p>17 <b>that, that's one of the conversations I'm referring to,</b></p> <p>18 <b>which is that I needed SDBA -- because I was concerned</b></p> <p>19 <b>that we were asking EDBA wearers to wear twice.</b></p> <p>20 <b>I accepted we had to do that, but I wanted to minimise</b></p> <p>21 <b>the repeated wearing of EDBA because of the duration of</b></p> <p>22 <b>the set, and it was just the most efficient way to use</b></p> <p>23 <b>our resources. We had a greater number and availability</b></p> <p>24 <b>in terms of relief or bringing additional machines on of</b></p> <p>25 <b>SDBA, and therefore I wanted to use that as efficiently</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 165</p>	<p>1 <b>that he was making every effort to record information in</b></p> <p>2 <b>the face of a system that had basically failed him.</b></p> <p>3 Q. I have one more question and then we can take a break,</p> <p>4 if I may just ask it.</p> <p>5 Given you've identified that as the conversation, do</p> <p>6 you think now that the time mark in your statement of</p> <p>7 04.20 on page 9 is incorrect and that in fact --</p> <p>8 <b>A. It must be, because I didn't have that conversation more</b></p> <p>9 <b>than once, so I can only reflect that's the case. It</b></p> <p>10 <b>must have been all part of the same journey into the</b></p> <p>11 <b>tower.</b></p> <p>12 MR MILLETT: Thank you very much.</p> <p>13 Mr Chairman, I think it is appropriate if we take</p> <p>14 a break now. I am doing very well.</p> <p>15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: In that case, we'll have a break!</p> <p>16 MR MILLETT: For time anyway!</p> <p>17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll have a break, Mr Roe.</p> <p>18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.</p> <p>19 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think we're probably safe to say</p> <p>20 3 o'clock, aren't we, Mr Millett?</p> <p>21 MR MILLETT: Yes. I'm feeling generous.</p> <p>22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: 3 o'clock. No discussing your</p> <p>23 evidence, please.</p> <p>24 Would you like to go with the usher.</p> <p>25 THE WITNESS: Thank you.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 167</p>
<p>1 <b>as possible to its maximum level of usage and reserve</b></p> <p>2 <b>EDBA for those tasks that were absolutely vital for EDBA</b></p> <p>3 <b>to be used for.</b></p> <p>4 Q. The reason I'm asking you this rather arcane question is</p> <p>5 because if you go to your statement on page 9, you</p> <p>6 say -- this is the 04.20 briefing -- halfway down the</p> <p>7 page:</p> <p>8 "There was one WM who was writing up FSG information</p> <p>9 on the wall. He was close to tears and tried to</p> <p>10 apologise for doing so. I put my arm around him and</p> <p>11 gave him reassurances."</p> <p>12 We do have a picture which I just want to show you,</p> <p>13 which is INQ00000390, which is camera 4 in the lobby,</p> <p>14 with an adjusted time mark of 03.55.47, so that's during</p> <p>15 the period of your first trip we looked at before.</p> <p>16 Help me with this. Can you see you in that picture?</p> <p>17 <b>A. I can. I've got my arm around someone I now know to be</b></p> <p>18 <b>Glynn Williams, and I can definitely remember that</b></p> <p>19 <b>conversation because he was distraught that he was</b></p> <p>20 <b>having to write things on the wall. I just felt</b></p> <p>21 <b>appalled for him because he was clearly a professional</b></p> <p>22 <b>officer trying to do his best and was trying to make</b></p> <p>23 <b>excuses for his own actions in the face of what was just</b></p> <p>24 <b>incredible pressure, and I wanted him to know that, as</b></p> <p>25 <b>the incident commander, I knew he was doing his best and</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 166</p>	<p>1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good. 3 o'clock, then, please.</p> <p>2 (2.50 pm)</p> <p>3 (A short break)</p> <p>4 (3.00 pm)</p> <p>5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, all ready to carry on?</p> <p>6 THE WITNESS: I am, sir.</p> <p>7 MR MILLETT: Mr Roe, thank you for coming back.</p> <p>8 Can I just ask you to go back very, very briefly to</p> <p>9 one or two things we were talking about before.</p> <p>10 First of all, in terms of asking for plans, at the</p> <p>11 point at which you took over, were you aware whether</p> <p>12 control or anybody else in the Brigade had asked RBKC</p> <p>13 for plans or not?</p> <p>14 <b>A. I wasn't, no.</b></p> <p>15 Q. Similarly, on a related topic, were you aware whether</p> <p>16 anybody at control had asked RBKC for a dangerous</p> <p>17 structures engineer?</p> <p>18 <b>A. I think I was aware that a dangerous structure engineer</b></p> <p>19 <b>had been requested because I think that was part of</b></p> <p>20 <b>Andy O'Loughlin's brief to me. I believe that Andy had</b></p> <p>21 <b>made that request. That's what I recollect. So I was</b></p> <p>22 <b>confident a DSE had been requested.</b></p> <p>23 Q. Going back to the discussion about strategy which, just</p> <p>24 before the break, you very helpfully told us was during</p> <p>25 your visit to the tower just before 03.00 am or around</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 168</p>

<p>1 about that time.</p> <p>2 Did you have any discussion with Richard Welch or</p> <p>3 Pat Goulbourne about the need to make sure that</p> <p>4 firefighters when they got to floors knocked on all the</p> <p>5 doors on the floors to alert any occupants who remained</p> <p>6 in their flats?</p> <p>7 <b>A. No, again, I didn't go down to that level of granular</b></p> <p>8 <b>detail in terms of tactical delivery. For me, it was</b></p> <p>9 <b>the bigger strategic question, which was: can we</b></p> <p>10 <b>maintain this rescue operation in the face of the</b></p> <p>11 <b>conditions inside the tower? It was in a very real</b></p> <p>12 <b>sense: can we continue to commit crews, and if we are</b></p> <p>13 <b>continuing to commit crews, how far can we get them?</b></p> <p>14 <b>That was the question I needed answered at my level.</b></p> <p>15 Q. There is also one thing I need to clarify with you.</p> <p>16 In your evidence this afternoon -- at the moment</p> <p>17 it's on the electronic version of the transcript at</p> <p>18 page 156, line 24 -- you said you needed SDBA as far as</p> <p>19 possible to reach the upper floors. Did you mean EDBA?</p> <p>20 <b>A. EDBA, yes. So EDBA would've been used for the furthest</b></p> <p>21 <b>penetration you could to the higher floors and SDBA</b></p> <p>22 <b>following up behind.</b></p> <p>23 Q. You have described in your witness statement at page 9,</p> <p>24 which is where we I think left off -- we've clarified</p> <p>25 the time mark there, but just going back to the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 169</p>	<p>1 <b>information being rubbed by someone inadvertently, of</b></p> <p>2 <b>losing it in some way, so that really concerned me.</b></p> <p>3 <b>That's exactly why we wanted to have the FIB board</b></p> <p>4 <b>system so that people didn't have to resort to writing</b></p> <p>5 <b>information on walls.</b></p> <p>6 Q. Was your concern with not using the FIB board system to</p> <p>7 do with the amount of information that wasn't being</p> <p>8 recorded -- let me put the question slightly different,</p> <p>9 start at particular stages.</p> <p>10 Under the FIB board system which was brought in,</p> <p>11 which I think is policy 820, do you remember that</p> <p>12 there's an appendix which sets out a template with</p> <p>13 a whole lot of detail about what should go onto a FIB?</p> <p>14 <b>A. Yes, absolutely. So the good thing about a FIB board is</b></p> <p>15 <b>it gives you a structure on which to record the</b></p> <p>16 <b>information. Obviously, at the point you're deviating</b></p> <p>17 <b>from using the FIB board -- again, these are people</b></p> <p>18 <b>under high stress, very high volume of information, they</b></p> <p>19 <b>are now having to write on the wall that information.</b></p> <p>20 <b>You know, they haven't got just the visual structure of</b></p> <p>21 <b>a FIB board to work to. I'm fairly sure that they</b></p> <p>22 <b>would've tried to recreate it on the wall. However,</b></p> <p>23 <b>there is a risk that, actually, it's not going to be</b></p> <p>24 <b>done in such a structured way. That is inevitable when</b></p> <p>25 <b>you're writing things on a wall.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 171</p>
<p>1 substance of the discussion, page 9, last paragraph, you</p> <p>2 discuss the FSG writing on the wall there.</p> <p>3 Can I just ask you to look at the PRC notes, which</p> <p>4 is LFB00003112, and go, please, to page 5.</p> <p>5 This is back to the discussion that you were having</p> <p>6 on that day as part of the review, and in the middle of</p> <p>7 that page it says:</p> <p>8 "Not so happy with chinagraph writing on walls --</p> <p>9 indication couldn't get on FIBs + indication of where</p> <p>10 we'd got to."</p> <p>11 I just want to explore what that is about.</p> <p>12 What were your concerns about chinagraph writing on</p> <p>13 the wall?</p> <p>14 <b>A. I think exactly what I've described previously. I saw</b></p> <p>15 <b>it as an example of a system we put in place to address</b></p> <p>16 <b>a previously identified point of learning post-Lakanal</b></p> <p>17 <b>having not been sufficient to deal with the fire</b></p> <p>18 <b>survival guidance calls in the volume we were receiving</b></p> <p>19 <b>them. I mean, that was what drove me to ask Tom and</b></p> <p>20 <b>whatever officer I did ask inside the tower to</b></p> <p>21 <b>repeatedly photograph the boards, because my great</b></p> <p>22 <b>concern with chinagraph on walls in a firefighting</b></p> <p>23 <b>environment where there might be water, where you have</b></p> <p>24 <b>a lot of people, is you can start to erode that</b></p> <p>25 <b>information, and you run a real danger of that</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 170</p>	<p>1 <b>They will have done their absolute best, so there is</b></p> <p>2 <b>no intended criticism of the junior officers involved.</b></p> <p>3 <b>They were doing their best in the context of a great</b></p> <p>4 <b>volume of information with the FIB boards not having had</b></p> <p>5 <b>the space.</b></p> <p>6 <b>But, no, I would not be happy in that context.</b></p> <p>7 Q. Let's see if we can get a little bit more granularity on</p> <p>8 that answer.</p> <p>9 Can I ask you, please, to be shown policy 820, which</p> <p>10 is LFB00000188, it's at tab 19 of our policy bundle, and</p> <p>11 go to page 9 of the Relativity reference, which is</p> <p>12 figure 3 in appendix 1. This is some way into the</p> <p>13 document.</p> <p>14 Mr Roe, tell me if you're not familiar with this.</p> <p>15 <b>A. I am familiar with the casualty information template.</b></p> <p>16 Q. I don't know whether this can be blown up so that you</p> <p>17 can see the detail on the left-hand side. It's not</p> <p>18 terribly clear, but there's a lot of detail down that</p> <p>19 left-hand side. For my purposes, you don't need to know</p> <p>20 what it is.</p> <p>21 Was your concern about using the chinagraph that</p> <p>22 this particular detail wasn't being captured on the wall</p> <p>23 per FSG?</p> <p>24 <b>A. No, not to the level of granular detail, because in the</b></p> <p>25 <b>context of the volume of calls they had, actually I'm</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 172</p>

<p>1 not sure they'd have been able to capture the full range 2 of information this template encapsulates. But it's 3 just the simple fact that this is neat, it is ordered, 4 there are columns, you can clearly read across, whereas 5 inevitably if you're writing freehand on a wall with 6 chinagraph, in the volume of information that was going 7 on there -- I mean, I was very concerned that we got to 8 that point.</p> <p>9 It told me I suppose from my perspective, because 10 I'm always looking at my perspective from the bigger 11 story of the incident, and what it told me was that our 12 systems had been outstripped by the volume of 13 information coming in, and my officers were having to 14 improvise in a way that I didn't find entirely 15 satisfactory, but they had no choice, because 16 realistically there was nowhere else to record that 17 information in terms of space and the equipment they had 18 available, so therefore they were doing their utmost 19 best to capture vital information that was going to help 20 progress the rescue effort.</p> <p>21 Q. But the specific concern was, what, that information 22 would be deleted or not captured in some way?</p> <p>23 A. I don't think it's as specific as that. It's just that 24 I think by any measure having to write something on 25 a wall in regard to casualty information, people coming</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 173</p>	<p>1 Going back one page, page 2, you told us earlier on 2 that by 04.06 you'd come onto the CU because you had 3 that sitrep about the incident ground, that's why it was 4 logged by Jackie; yes?</p> <p>5 A. Yes.</p> <p>6 Q. Then you give a brief to Lee Drawbridge at 04.11.</p> <p>7 A. Yes.</p> <p>8 Q. Then 04.12, various other entries, and same at 04.22.</p> <p>9 You're not, it appears, referred to between 04.12 10 and 04.34?</p> <p>11 A. So.</p> <p>12 Q. "... Commissioner introduces and establishes priorities 13 in AR absence."</p> <p>14 My question is: although you came back onto the CU 15 before 04.06, when did you leave again, because you 16 clearly did?</p> <p>17 A. I think that's when I went to brief Lee Drawbridge. But 18 I would need to look -- may I just look back through the 19 timeline? Because I remember briefing the 20 commissioner --</p> <p>21 Q. Yes.</p> <p>22 A. -- and then wanting to go and speak to Lee Drawbridge in 23 person. It was very important to me I spoke to Lee in 24 person, so I had to get over to CU1, where he was going 25 to be, to brief him face-to-face. I think it's that</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 175</p>
<p>1 out of the flats, it's just not going to be captured in 2 as clear and neat a way and in a way that -- so it was 3 more likely to be erased for a start. That was my 4 reason for asking for repeated photos to be taken in 5 case even within the compass of the incident, you might 6 have had to have gone back to find some information if 7 that was required.</p> <p>8 Q. Would it be fair to describe your concern here that the 9 post-Lakanal policy had been tested to destruction and 10 found wanting?</p> <p>11 A. Absolutely. That's an absolutely fair description of 12 where we'd got to.</p> <p>13 Q. Okay.</p> <p>14 You then, I think, go back to CU8, and you've 15 helpfully assisted us with that, at 04.06, we're there, 16 at page 3 of your log.</p> <p>17 You then have a TCM, I think, that was initially 18 chaired by Commissioner Cotton at 04.34. If you go to 19 your log, we will see that.</p> <p>20 It's just below halfway down the page: 21 "04:34 22 "Tactical Coordination Meeting - Commissioner 23 introduces and establishes priorities in AR absence." 24 It's the absence I just want first of all to clarify 25 with you.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 174</p>	<p>1 part of the incident.</p> <p>2 Q. Let me help you with that. We can pick this up at 3 page 6 of your contemporaneous note. At the bottom of 4 the page, at 04.11 you're told Lee Drawbridge is on CU1, 5 and at the top of 7 you go to CU1.</p> <p>6 A. Yes. So I think that period reflects me going to see 7 Lee, and my recollection was that I went into the tower 8 on the way back. But I think the footage you've shown 9 me -- because I think this is the point where I'd said 10 I'd put my arm around Glynn Williams, but clearly I'd 11 done that at 03.58 or whenever the time stamp was of 12 that particular visit to the tower.</p> <p>13 Q. To be fair to you, because it's not that clear and we're 14 trying to piece this together --</p> <p>15 A. Absolutely, I understand why you need to do this.</p> <p>16 Q. -- you and I, on page 7 of your contemporaneous note, 17 you say, "I made my way to CU1", and then in the third 18 item down you say: 19 "I walked back to CU 8 via the tower. I once again 20 got a quick situational update from Andy O'Loughlin ..." 21 Did you go into the tower to have that situational 22 update from him?</p> <p>23 A. No, Andy I met outside. I don't think I had 24 a conversation with Andy inside the tower.</p> <p>25 Q. You then say:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 176</p>

<p>1 "I then waited for an MPS officer with shield and 2 went back into the Lobby." 3 That's 04.20. 4 <b>A. That was to the best of my memory, yeah.</b> 5 Q. So we've obviously got a question of recollection here. 6 Really the question is: is your recollection that you've 7 given us today correct or are these contemporaneous 8 notes the more reliable? 9 <b>A. I don't think I can tell you, genuinely, because I think</b> 10 <b>I was in command of the incident for such a long time</b> 11 <b>that I've tried to piece together my memory of the</b> 12 <b>incident based on the timings that were recorded for me,</b> 13 <b>decisions that were recorded for me, whether it was</b> 14 <b>ordering on resources. My memory says that I walked</b> 15 <b>back from CU1 where I'd spoken to Lee via the tower. My</b> 16 <b>memory says that I went into the tower.</b> 17 <b>But I can't argue with the CCTV footage I've seen</b> 18 <b>for the first time today. So the truth is I can't quite</b> 19 <b>piece together how that has happened.</b> 20 <b>My memory still tells me I went into the tower, but</b> 21 <b>your CCTV tells me that the actions I thought I carried</b> 22 <b>out in the tower at that point had in fact occurred</b> 23 <b>perhaps as part of a previous visit. I think that's</b> 24 <b>just a function of memory and having been in charge of</b> 25 <b>a complex incident over such a long period of time and</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 177</p>	<p>1 Q. Did you get any information from Andy O'Loughlin or 2 anybody after 04.22 that at 04.22 there were no active 3 FSGs? 4 <b>A. I didn't have that information at that point, but</b> 5 <b>I think I got onto the unit at the point that the</b> 6 <b>commissioner was giving an update. And also I'd picked</b> 7 <b>up on some information somewhere on that journey --</b> 8 <b>that's why I think I went to the tower, because</b> 9 <b>I remember that TCM and talking about progress. Now,</b> 10 <b>whether I picked that up from the brief Andy O'Loughlin</b> 11 <b>had given me, that may well have been the case because</b> 12 <b>that brief was face-to-face.</b> 13 <b>I think where Andy O'Loughlin is referred to there,</b> 14 <b>I don't know whether he's on the unit at that time</b> 15 <b>because he's done the briefing with me and then moved</b> 16 <b>on, or whether that's Mick passing Andy's information on</b> 17 <b>because obviously I wasn't on the unit. I don't know</b> 18 <b>whether that was just Mick on the unit speaking on</b> 19 <b>behalf of Andy, so passing his update on. I have no</b> 20 <b>idea because obviously I wasn't there.</b> 21 Q. It looks from your contemporaneous note that you went 22 back to CU8 via the tower, possibly went into the lobby 23 again, went back to CU8, and on the way back checked on 24 BA main control. 25 Did you, do you think, go into CU7 on the way back</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 179</p>
<p>1 <b>doing my best to remember.</b> 2 Q. Going back to the Roe log, 04.34, page 3 -- I'm so 3 sorry. There's something I want to cover with you 4 before that. 5 At 04.22, "Mick Mulholland (MM) gives update". 6 I should cover that with you first, actually: 7 "... Crews up to 10th floor in EDBA. SDAB[sic] 4th 8 and 5th floors. 7th, 8th and 9th floor considering using 9 aerial. EDBA is being used quickly. 10 "Andy O'Loughlan[sic] - no active FSGs at this time 11 and last were on 7th, 8th and 9th floors. Crews in and out 12 is compromised by debris drop down and several 13 casualties jumping." 14 This is 04.22. Do I take it you weren't on the CU 15 at that time and not privy to that discussion? 16 <b>A. No, because I came back onto the unit at the point the</b> 17 <b>commissioner had started to chair the SCG. I came</b> 18 <b>literally as she was starting it. She'd done the</b> 19 <b>introduction, she'd laid out some priorities, probably</b> 20 <b>based on that sitrep, to be fair, and the conversation</b> 21 <b>I had with her before I left. Then I took over the</b> 22 <b>chairing of the TCM so she could resume her monitoring</b> 23 <b>officer duties and actually also pick up some other</b> 24 <b>functions which were beginning to bring some pressure to</b> 25 <b>bear on the incident.</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 178</p>	<p>1 to CU8? 2 <b>A. I think I did because wherever possible I would stick my</b> 3 <b>head into CU7 to see how FSG was doing, and the one</b> 4 <b>thing I do remember is speaking to -- I'm fairly sure</b> 5 <b>I spoke to large numbers of BA crews again coming</b> 6 <b>through BA main control.</b> 7 Q. Let me see if something is familiar to you. 8 Can I ask you, please, to look at MET00015936. This 9 is a whiteboard on CU7 we've heard quite a lot about, 10 and I just want to look with you at the black writing 11 a third of the way down on the right-hand side where it 12 says: 13 "From SM Wolfenden @ 04.25 BA crews committed to the 14 15th floor." 15 And then underneath: 16 "@ 04.45 crews only committed up to 11th floor not 17 15th floor." 18 Taking each in turn, do you remember finding out, 19 either then or after then, that at 04.25 crews were 20 being committed to the 15th floor? 21 <b>A. I don't remember picking that information up off CU7 at</b> 22 <b>that point because I've delivered information from</b> 23 <b>wherever I'd gathered it differently inside the TCM. So</b> 24 <b>if I'd seen that information and registered it and then</b> 25 <b>walked the very short distance from CU7 to CU8,</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 180</p>

<p>1 I would've used that set against the timings.</p> <p>2 But, I mean, actually, I don't see -- if I think</p> <p>3 about the timings of the TCM, that doesn't seem to</p> <p>4 square with the timings. Sorry, you've confused me</p> <p>5 slightly here, because the first one would be relevant,</p> <p>6 the 04.25, but not the 04.45, because I think I started</p> <p>7 the TCM by -- was it 04.35?</p> <p>8 Q. If we go to page 3 --</p> <p>9 A. It was literally at the start of it I got back on.</p> <p>10 Q. Well, yes. It is 04.34. If we go to page 3 of the Roe</p> <p>11 log. I am just asking you about the first one, 04.25.</p> <p>12 A. Okay, sorry, I just wanted to clarify that for my own</p> <p>13 understanding.</p> <p>14 Q. Fair enough. My question really is: before coming back</p> <p>15 onto CU8 and engaging in the start of the next TCM at</p> <p>16 04.34, did you pass CU7? I am trying to work out</p> <p>17 whether, if you did, you saw the whiteboard?</p> <p>18 A. I would've looked at the system rather than the details</p> <p>19 on the whiteboard. I wouldn't have interrogated it.</p> <p>20 I would've been more interested in FSG numbers, progress</p> <p>21 of the FSG operation. How was Tom? How was he? How</p> <p>22 were his staff? How were they coping with the demands</p> <p>23 of that system? That would've been the line of</p> <p>24 questioning, and whether he thought we were still</p> <p>25 maintaining a clear line of communication into the BA</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 181</p>	<p>1 Q. Do you remember any sense of perhaps confusion on the</p> <p>2 night as to whether there may have been a wet riser in</p> <p>3 the building?</p> <p>4 A. No, not from my perspective. It was very clear there</p> <p>5 was a dry riser because we were augmenting supply, and</p> <p>6 actually we had intermittent problems with water supply</p> <p>7 because of the challenge of hose lines being cut, the</p> <p>8 volume of water we needed and the ability of Thames</p> <p>9 Water to supply sufficient pressure through the mains</p> <p>10 system to supply those needs.</p> <p>11 Q. Also at 05.50, just immediately under that, we see</p> <p>12 there's the next tactical co-ordination meeting.</p> <p>13 I assume you chair that.</p> <p>14 A. Yes.</p> <p>15 Q. 05.50.</p> <p>16 A. If it doesn't say otherwise, yes.</p> <p>17 Q. By then you've got crews up to the 14th floor:</p> <p>18 "Dangers for our crews. No water - there may be a</p> <p>19 decision to not commit above 14th due to risk."</p> <p>20 Then you get an update of FSG, which we looked at</p> <p>21 before this morning.</p> <p>22 You say a bit lower down:</p> <p>23 "115 unaccounted for. Very difficult to establish</p> <p>24 exact numbers due to self evac."</p> <p>25 That self-evac problem, can I explore that with you.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 183</p>
<p>1 crews.</p> <p>2 Q. Right.</p> <p>3 Turning, to a differed topic, a little bit later on</p> <p>4 in the night, if I can take you to Roe log, page 4, at</p> <p>5 05.20 we see a number of things, but four lines down you</p> <p>6 say:</p> <p>7 "AR: is wet riser up and running."</p> <p>8 Did you think there was a wet riser in the building?</p> <p>9 A. No, it was clear from the start there was a dry riser.</p> <p>10 Q. Do you know why it says wet riser?</p> <p>11 A. I've no idea, but I was quite busy throughout the night,</p> <p>12 I've probably made a grammatical error, but I was very</p> <p>13 clear it was a dry riser because one of our issues was</p> <p>14 the continuing challenge of augmenting it in the face of</p> <p>15 hose lines being cut continuously by falling debris.</p> <p>16 Q. We may look at that in just a moment.</p> <p>17 Before I leave the wet riser point, can I ask you to</p> <p>18 look at page 5, at the top of the page, and it's I think</p> <p>19 half an hour later, 05.50:</p> <p>20 "Tom Goodall: Wet riser is poor ..."</p> <p>21 Were you present for that when he said that, do you</p> <p>22 think?</p> <p>23 A. I can't remember that sentence, but, again, you know,</p> <p>24 I was in no doubt there was a dry riser. There was</p> <p>25 a dry rising system.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 182</p>	<p>1 Did you know that people were exiting the tower even</p> <p>2 in the early stages of the incident without a record</p> <p>3 being taken of which flat or even which floor they'd</p> <p>4 come from?</p> <p>5 A. Yes.</p> <p>6 Q. At what point did you learn that?</p> <p>7 A. I think from the start of the incident because it was</p> <p>8 obvious that people had been leaving that building, as</p> <p>9 you would absolutely expect residents to have done the</p> <p>10 minute they had any cognisance of how serious the fire</p> <p>11 was.</p> <p>12 Q. Did you take any steps to put in place a system for</p> <p>13 recording that information either from crews or from</p> <p>14 residents who were able to give that information as they</p> <p>15 exited?</p> <p>16 A. As they came out of the tower during my time in command?</p> <p>17 Q. Yes.</p> <p>18 A. I would've expected a record as far as was possible to</p> <p>19 be kept of anyone coming out of the tower. That is</p> <p>20 encompassed within the FSG system. Whether they rescued</p> <p>21 themselves, in effect walking out of there, or whether</p> <p>22 our crews guided them out, I would see them as someone</p> <p>23 incorporated within the FSG system.</p> <p>24 So that 115, I think I do remember the detail of</p> <p>25 this. This was a conversation where I was trying to</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 184</p>

<p>1 press Tom for who we thought was unaccounted for within 2 those numbers, and my recollection is that was his best 3 estimate, but that was very difficult to come to because 4 of the issue around people having come out prior to not 5 just me taking over but throughout the entire kind of 6 compass of the incident, because of the nature of the 7 tempo of operations and the gap I've already highlighted 8 in returning information. We were chasing that 9 information the whole incident.</p> <p>10 Q. So my question was: did you take any steps to put in 11 place a system for recording that information?</p> <p>12 A. I wouldn't have expected anyone to be coming out of the 13 tower without their details -- that, again, is 14 a tactical decision that I would've expected when we're 15 following our processes and fire survival guidance 16 processes, to have recorded the names and disposition of 17 the people coming out of the tower.</p> <p>18 I suppose the fallback to that is I would've 19 expected those people also to be picked up at some point 20 within rest centres, within the system to gather 21 casualties once they'd come out of the tower beyond our 22 cordons as well.</p> <p>23 So there was a number of sources of information 24 where I felt we could've all been working together as 25 agencies to start piecing that information together.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 185</p>	<p>1 system as laid down in our policy. What was clear to me 2 was that was very, very difficult, and that's how we 3 ended up in a place where information was being written 4 on a wall in chinagraph. But I would've expected that 5 as part of the return loop we've discussed previously.</p> <p>6 Q. I think it follows from your last answer: was the system 7 working?</p> <p>8 A. Not in entirety, because of the volume of calls, because 9 of the level of BA operation, because of the stress and 10 level of effort that firefighters and officers were 11 under, and the length of time they were having to 12 undertake those duties. I think I had to be realistic 13 that with the scale, the complexity, the awful nature of 14 the incident, things were not always going to go exactly 15 as I wanted it, and my job as an incident commander was 16 always trying to come back to drive progress and to try 17 and close the gaps where we could.</p> <p>18 Q. Can I then turn on to a different topic, which we find 19 on page 14 of your first statement at the foot of the 20 page.</p> <p>21 You say: 22 "At 0642hrs BCC offered me a 42m aerial appliance 23 from Surrey FRS, I accepted the [offer] and asked it to 24 mobilise. This was with a view to replace our ALP which 25 only has a 30m reach."</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 187</p>
<p>1 Q. Sorry, perhaps I'm not being very clear. 2 Given that you knew from the start that identifying 3 who was coming out, which flat they were coming from, 4 which floor they were coming from, was difficult, my 5 question really is: knowing it was difficult, did you 6 put in place or try to put in place a system for 7 recording that information?</p> <p>8 A. That is the FSG system. So what I'm saying is my belief 9 in that crews were doing their best to do so is that -- 10 as part of the FSG system, it's anyone coming out of 11 that building. We needed to make a record of anyone 12 coming out of that building, having put that system in 13 place.</p> <p>14 Q. What was that record?</p> <p>15 A. So the record would've been unfortunately what Glynn is 16 writing on the wall, because this is the information of 17 anyone exiting the building, whether we're carrying them 18 out or they've been able to walk down themselves or a BA 19 crew has assisted them out. Anyone leaving that 20 building, there was only one point of entry or exit. I 21 would expect that information to be recorded as part of 22 the single system. If we'd put in place a separate 23 system to collect that information, that would've made 24 things even more complicated.</p> <p>25 So it's encompassed within the whole fire survival</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 186</p>	<p>1 I just want to focus on that for a moment. 2 Did you know, before BCC told you about it, that 3 Surrey had a 42-metre aerial?</p> <p>4 A. No, I did not.</p> <p>5 Q. Did it come as a surprise to you?</p> <p>6 A. Yes.</p> <p>7 Q. Did it come as a surprise to you that the LFB did not 8 have one?</p> <p>9 A. No, because I know how our aerials operate, how many 10 we've got and what height they operate to.</p> <p>11 Q. Did you know whether any other FRSs within the M25 or 12 just outside the M25 had a 42-metre ladder?</p> <p>13 A. No, I didn't. And, to be fair, when I was offered this, 14 again, I suppose it's a general approach, which was, 15 actually, having been offered it, I might have found 16 a utility for it. I didn't see at that point any reason 17 to turn the offer down.</p> <p>18 It wouldn't have been used for external firefighting 19 because that wasn't our concern at that point; what 20 I thought it might offer me is some advantage in terms 21 of being able to look at the external condition of the 22 building at height and might be able to offer some 23 flexibility with that over a 30-metre aerial ladder 24 platform.</p> <p>25 Q. You say some flexibility with it; for doing what with?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 188</p>

<p>1 A. In terms of just being able to get higher, perhaps the 2 way we positioned it. I hadn't seen the machine so 3 I wasn't sure how it was going to be sighted, whether we 4 could get it in, because obviously we don't have it as 5 a piece of kit. 6 But, again, it wasn't something I was going to 7 refuse because, having been offered it, and now finding 8 out one did exist, I could see that we might have a use 9 for it so I welcomed the offer and asked for it to come. 10 Q. What effect would the presence of a 42-metre ladder such 11 as Surrey had have had on exterior firefighting had it 12 attended at an earlier stage of the incident, or perhaps 13 the start of the incident? 14 A. Again, I think it's very difficult for me to answer that 15 in hindsight, but my gut feeling is absolutely none, 16 because I think the way that that fire spread, it was 17 almost like a petrol fire. There was something very 18 wrong about the way it spread externally. I'm not sure 19 the water supply through a single aerial appliance 20 would've been sufficient to stop the progress of it, 21 actually, I very much doubt that, because it was 22 spreading vertically, laterally and downwards because of 23 the nature of the cladding material. So I'm not sure it 24 would've made a huge difference. 25 Q. Did you actually observe for yourself the effect of the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 189</p>	<p>1 people having to exhaust themselves carrying it up -- 2 kit in particular -- many flights of stairs. 3 Q. Do you know at what point in the incident the fire lift 4 would've ceased assisting if it had been working? 5 A. No. I think it's impossible for me to judge that, 6 because I would've had to be present at that stage of 7 the incident to judge the point at which actually the 8 fire lift would no longer really have been a factor in 9 progressing the incident. Nor actually do I know at 10 what point it failed. I just know when I came and took 11 over, the fire lift was not in operation, and, actually, 12 I have to say, even if it had been, I'm not sure we 13 would've been using it, because I think the change in 14 conditions on every floor was such that you're making 15 the judgement about using the fire lift to arrive at 16 a floor probably a floor below where you want to attack 17 the fire, whereas actually the nature of that fire 18 internally and externally in the way it was spreading, 19 moving, changing, was it would be very difficult to 20 judge where you were safely sending firefighters to. 21 The only way really to safely progress through that 22 building was up through the stairs, judging conditions 23 as you went. If you're in a fire lift, even though 24 that's a protected shaft and lift, you run the risk at 25 the point where you have fire spread to the extent of</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 191</p>
<p>1 exterior jets on the progress of the fire at any stage 2 in the incident? 3 A. Yes, when I walked about, and it was negligible. 4 Q. Can you explain why you say that? 5 A. Because the way that the jet -- well, I can only explain 6 it in the scale of the fire. So the jets were hitting 7 the building, but they weren't noticeably reducing the 8 spread or the ferocity of the fire as I saw it. What 9 was obvious to me was there was going to come a point 10 where the combustible material had burnt itself out. 11 Q. Turning to the question of fire lifts, at the bottom of 12 page 7 of your second witness statement, if I can ask 13 you to go to that, about halfway down the paragraph: 14 "Earlier in the incident the fire lift and smoke 15 management system if functioning would have assisted in 16 addressing the incident." 17 I just want to focus on the fire lift. 18 What thoughts did you have about whether this 19 building actually had what you refer to as a fire lift? 20 A. Well, it's a requirement in a building of that kind that 21 we would have access to the lift that we would have sole 22 control of for the purposes of moving people and 23 equipment. Obviously in a building the scale of 24 Grenfell, that's invaluable in getting our resources to 25 a point as quickly and efficiently as possible without</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 190</p>	<p>1 Grenfell of getting out into a very, very dangerous 2 situation. 3 So I'm not sure we'd have been using the fire lift 4 very much anyway at the point I took over, even if it 5 had been functioning. 6 Q. Can I then ask you about field telephones. Don't look 7 puzzled. 8 A. No, are you referring to the Matel telephone system? 9 Q. Yes. You're onto it. 10 Can I just ask you, is there a practical reason why 11 those weren't used on the night to connect the command 12 unit, either CU7 or CU8, with the bridgehead? 13 A. I think the likelihood of that system operating 14 effectively would be unlikely, and I have to admit, 15 I thought we'd stopped carrying those on the command 16 unit, the Matel telephone system. 17 Q. What led you to think that? 18 A. I can't tell you. 19 Q. I'm not saying you're wrong, but what led you to think 20 that? 21 A. It's just something I remember. But I also do remember 22 having used them in training, and my experience of them 23 would've been that would've been an extremely tricky 24 environment to run a field telephone system. You would 25 effectively have to run it into the building by the same</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 192</p>



<p>1 route we were making access. It's a long run. You're</p> <p>2 upstairs. It represents to a degree a trip hazard in</p> <p>3 what is already a very crowded environment. So I'm not</p> <p>4 sure that would've been a suitable solution to that</p> <p>5 issue.</p> <p>6 Q. Right.</p> <p>7 A. Not when we had mobile phones, which people were using</p> <p>8 as well.</p> <p>9 Q. Leaving aside the trip hazard and the physical</p> <p>10 difficulties of laying the line as you've described, if</p> <p>11 it had been available, would it have helped in assisting</p> <p>12 the communications, reliable, clear communications?</p> <p>13 A. Not in my opinion, no. What we needed to do was make</p> <p>14 better use of available Airwaves, so not having it</p> <p>15 located in people's cars, to have had channel 2 set up</p> <p>16 and working and, where necessary, make best use of</p> <p>17 mobile phones. I think those are all more effective</p> <p>18 forms of communication than the Matel field telephone</p> <p>19 system.</p> <p>20 Q. Just one or two questions on the DSE. We've had</p> <p>21 a little discussion about that before. We'll have</p> <p>22 a little bit more.</p> <p>23 Can I ask you, please, to be shown the IMP, the</p> <p>24 incident report at master docs tab 30. If you go to</p> <p>25 page 2, please.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 193</p>	<p>1 They're likely to offer some specifics about how</p> <p>2 long a material structure might last, what the possible</p> <p>3 effects of fire on it might be. Although, I have to</p> <p>4 say, my experience of dangerous structure engineers at</p> <p>5 incidents is inconsistent, because some will be able to</p> <p>6 offer some judgement on that, some will actually refuse</p> <p>7 to offer judgement on that, and others will actually be</p> <p>8 well informed. It's very much a mixed bag in terms of</p> <p>9 the information you get. There's not, I would suggest,</p> <p>10 a particularly consistent standard in terms of the</p> <p>11 information we receive from DSEs at times.</p> <p>12 I think it's a system that could be improved,</p> <p>13 actually, for the benefit of firefighters and officers</p> <p>14 as a general point. I think that's really what the</p> <p>15 thrust of that is about.</p> <p>16 Q. You've expressed I think some scepticism, if that's the</p> <p>17 right word, there, but just looking at your own</p> <p>18 experience on the night, if I can just show you two</p> <p>19 things in your log. Page 5, first of all, under the</p> <p>20 time mark of 06.13 we can see the DSE is there:</p> <p>21 "DSE District Surveyor - could not get high enough.</p> <p>22 No floor collapse pan cake. Frame building. Max fire</p> <p>23 resistance 4hrs. FF shaft 2 hrs - if columns spall -</p> <p>24 not saying will collapse. If no people - let it burn."</p> <p>25 We talked about plans earlier.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 195</p>
<p>1 We looked at this earlier this morning in the</p> <p>2 context of the heli-tele, but if you look again at</p> <p>3 page 2, four entries up from the bottom of the page,</p> <p>4 still under "Development", we can see that the author</p> <p>5 has put in one of three items relating to the dangerous</p> <p>6 structure engineer:</p> <p>7 "1/3 Dangerous Structure Engineers (DSE) could not</p> <p>8 provide an adequate assessment on risk areas and there</p> <p>9 was a delay in them arriving at the incident. Work with</p> <p>10 Local Authorities, the London Resilience Forum ..."</p> <p>11 There's some other recommendations there as well</p> <p>12 which I don't need to ask you about.</p> <p>13 What I do want to ask you about is: did the DSE's</p> <p>14 delaying in arriving at the scene affect your plan or</p> <p>15 knowledge regarding the stability of the building?</p> <p>16 A. No, it didn't, and the reason for that is because whilst</p> <p>17 we have a DSE system which is useful in some aspects, my</p> <p>18 experience at more extreme incidents is even the best</p> <p>19 dangerous structural engineers are coming from</p> <p>20 a building control and building construction background,</p> <p>21 and therefore no reasonable dangerous structure engineer</p> <p>22 is going to tell me it is all right to put people into</p> <p>23 that building. They simply won't make that call. It</p> <p>24 always reverts to our professional judgement on the</p> <p>25 basis of our own understanding of building construction.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 194</p>	<p>1 Then if you go on to the bottom of page 6, a later</p> <p>2 meeting at 07.13, TCM, which is introduced by you, three</p> <p>3 entries up from the bottom:</p> <p>4 "John Allen District Surveyor confirms</p> <p>5 superstructure will not come down, other parts, corners,</p> <p>6 slabs will drop down."</p> <p>7 It looks from this as though John Allen did give you</p> <p>8 a pretty unambiguous piece of advice about structural</p> <p>9 integrity; is that fair?</p> <p>10 A. I think that's a summarisation of a more complex</p> <p>11 conversation. He was not as definite as to say slabs</p> <p>12 will drop down, no. He just said there was a very real</p> <p>13 possibility it might happen. But I've been alive to</p> <p>14 that possibility from the moment I've taken the incident</p> <p>15 over, actually. So it was just a continual professional</p> <p>16 judgement as to how we were going to continue to commit</p> <p>17 crews into the building, and also how we were going to</p> <p>18 use the information from the crews themselves.</p> <p>19 There's a reference in one of my statements to some</p> <p>20 generic information coming back from use of thermal</p> <p>21 image cameras, so understanding the ambient temperature</p> <p>22 of walls and structures, as to whether that might lead</p> <p>23 us to believe there's degrading of the concrete.</p> <p>24 I mean, that is a very subjective call, but that,</p> <p>25 after all, is what I get paid my wage for. That's our</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 196</p>

<p>1 decision because we're prepared to operate in 2 a situation that's perhaps more risk-laden than 3 a district surveyor is going to, and they're not going 4 to give us the assurance that we would necessarily want 5 because, to be fair to them, it's not their profession. 6 I think that's the essential kind of tension between 7 the advice that DSEs sometimes give you. It's focused 8 very much on building site safety. At the point where 9 you have the numbers of people trapped inside the 10 building that I had and our crews had, and the extent of 11 fire spread, I fully accepted that there was the 12 potential for partial collapse. It was just 13 a continuous judgement as to how close we were to that 14 based on my own experience, my own understanding of 15 building construction, the advice from someone like 16 Dave O'Neill, our safety officer, very, very experienced 17 urban search and rescue operative, the lead for 18 technical rescue in the Brigade, years of working with 19 DSEs, understanding the effects of catastrophic 20 collapse, and having those conversations. 21 My experience of DSEs, and rightly so, is they're 22 invariably cautious, because that is the nature of their 23 work, but that's not always helpful to us because I was 24 making decisions in a different context, which is I was 25 balancing, I suppose, at a strategic decision-making</p> <p>Page 197</p>	<p>1 that if you could go back and change, you would? 2 A. At that point in time, no. Because I think there is 3 always room in big organisations for improvement to 4 systems, to improve training. I think there's always 5 room for improvement to the underlying conditions in 6 which our people operate. But, actually, in terms of 7 the response of the night, I could not have been prouder 8 to be a London firefighter, nor lead the men and women 9 of the London Fire Brigade, because I felt that they 10 operated in the best traditions of our 150-year history 11 and put themselves at enormous risk for hour after hour 12 after hour, and that we were battling against what was 13 frankly an absolute failure of the building system, and 14 they had done their absolute best in intolerable 15 circumstances. 16 I have nothing but praise for my junior officers and 17 my crews who performed well beyond what was acceptable 18 in terms of their physical and mental capacity, and, 19 actually, in some numbers have paid the price 20 consequently. 21 It was a privilege to lead them and I'm very proud 22 of what they did. 23 MR MILLETT: Mr Roe, I have no further questions for you. 24 That isn't to say that there won't be any further 25 questions for you which I might consider over a short</p> <p>Page 199</p>
<p>1 level, the human rights of those people inside the tower 2 against the human rights of my own people, and the 3 decision I'd come to was that the people inside the 4 tower, because they didn't have PPE, were not expecting 5 the situation they were in, had no training as to how 6 they would try to resolve that situation, were a greater 7 priority at times than my own people, I'm afraid. 8 So whilst they were also of the greatest priority to 9 me in terms of wanting to ensure I didn't risk them in 10 an unmanaged, unconsidered way, actually, because they 11 did have PPE, they did have training, and because we 12 have a duty as a public authority to support that part 13 of the Human Rights Act, I felt I was justified in 14 taking that decision, particularly because it's 15 enshrined as part of our statutory duties, and also 16 there's further guidance in documents such as the HSE's 17 document, "Heroism in the fire service", which accepts 18 that at times we may compromise the human rights of our 19 own people to protect those of the public in a perilous 20 situation. 21 Q. Mr Roe, thank you. I have one more question for you at 22 this stage. 23 It's this: looking back on the night and the period 24 during which you attended as incident commander, is 25 there any aspect of the Brigade's response to this fire</p> <p>Page 198</p>	<p>1 break, which I am going to ask the chairman for now. 2 Subject to that, thank you very much. 3 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. 4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We will have a short break now, 5 Mr Roe, because sometimes further questions emerge. 6 THE WITNESS: Absolutely. 7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll come back at 3.50 and then 8 we'll see whether there are further things we need to 9 ask you. 10 In the meantime, if you would like to go with the 11 usher, she'll look after you. 12 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 13 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. 14 Good, 3.50, please. 15 (3.45 pm) 16 (A short break) 17 (3.50 pm) 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think just a few more questions. 19 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett. 21 MR MILLETT: Mr Roe, I'll keep these as brief as I can. 22 Fire lift. We looked at that very shortly before we 23 rose just now. I just want to go back. There were one 24 or two questions I did want to ask you. 25 Did you know from the time you took over command</p> <p>Page 200</p>

<p>1 that the lift key for the lift, the fireman's lift key, 2 had never working or didn't work on the night? 3 <b>A. I didn't know the detail of why the fire lift wasn't</b> 4 <b>working, but I was told categorically that the fire lift</b> 5 <b>was not in operation and was not working.</b> 6 Q. And therefore couldn't be subjected to firefighter 7 control? 8 <b>A. Again, I didn't know the specifics of why we didn't have</b> 9 <b>control of the lift, I was just told the lift couldn't</b> 10 <b>be operated in the way we wanted it to, it wasn't in</b> 11 <b>operation.</b> 12 Q. If it wasn't working in the sense that it couldn't be 13 brought under firefighter control, would you expect 14 crews to take steps, or what steps they could, to 15 disable the lift so that it couldn't be used by 16 residents? 17 <b>A. No, I'm not sure I would've done, because they weren't</b> 18 <b>using it. But ideally we would want to secure the lift.</b> 19 <b>And also I'm not aware of the nature of that building</b> 20 <b>and where the lift motor room was. So I have to say,</b> 21 <b>actually, it's not something I considered.</b> 22 Q. As a matter of practice, as at the night, coming back to 23 perhaps where we started yesterday -- which seems a long 24 time ago now -- would it be your experience that where 25 a firefighter arrived at a high-rise block and found</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 201</p>	<p>1 The question is: as a matter of safety, in your 2 experience, was it not better to keep the lifts out of 3 the control of residents so that they didn't find 4 themselves in a lift and expelled into a floor filled 5 with smoke? 6 <b>A. I have to say, I've never been in a situation where the</b> 7 <b>use of the lifts would've had that effect, and it hadn't</b> 8 <b>been a consideration to me prior to you stating it now.</b> 9 Q. Okay. 10 Different topic. 11 Were you aware during the course of the night -- 12 I know this is a point of detail, but let's see if I can 13 prompt a recollection -- that there was a survivor, 14 surviving occupant, who had come down from the 22nd 15 floor after 03.00 am? 16 <b>A. Is this the gentleman we eventually rescued at 08.25 in</b> 17 <b>the morning?</b> 18 Q. No, somebody who came down after 03.00 am from flat 193 19 without any BA or any protective equipment. Is that 20 something you knew on the night? 21 <b>A. No, because that's why I asked the question, because the</b> 22 <b>only real bit of detail I hold is the last person we</b> 23 <b>brought out, which I think was at 08.25 in the morning.</b> 24 Q. Were you aware that FSG callers had been calling on 25 several occasions, but up to two hours into the fire,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 203</p>
<p>1 that the fire lift or firefighter's lift, depending on 2 which it was, wasn't capable of being brought under 3 control, they would isolate it so it couldn't be used by 4 residents? 5 <b>A. No, I wouldn't expect that because, actually, if we</b> 6 <b>couldn't use it because we can't bring it under control,</b> 7 <b>I wouldn't seek to deny that necessarily to a resident.</b> 8 <b>Again, it depends on the nature of the incident</b> 9 <b>itself. Something like Grenfell, where every floor is</b> 10 <b>alight, I suppose you could've considered that because</b> 11 <b>it may well be that you didn't want a resident to step</b> 12 <b>into the lift and then come out into an environment that</b> 13 <b>wasn't safe for them, so that could've been</b> 14 <b>a consideration. At other incidents, if you're unable</b> 15 <b>to control it -- generally we don't want people to use</b> 16 <b>lifts at all in terms of evacuation or leaving the</b> 17 <b>building, we want them to use the stairs because that is</b> 18 <b>the safest, most controlled way of doing it. I wouldn't</b> 19 <b>necessarily expect a firefighter to go and then isolate</b> 20 <b>that lift as a task, no.</b> 21 Q. You wouldn't? 22 <b>A. No.</b> 23 Q. In this particular case, one of the difficulties we have 24 is that the lifts weren't brought under control and that 25 had certain consequences.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 202</p>	<p>1 they hadn't yet been rescued? Were you aware of waiting 2 times of that magnitude? 3 <b>A. I wasn't aware of the detail of it, but that does not</b> 4 <b>surprise me at all, because it would be dependent on</b> 5 <b>their location and our ability to reach the floors. So</b> 6 <b>I wouldn't say that surprises me, no. I think that's,</b> 7 <b>again, a reflection of the extreme nature of the</b> 8 <b>situation we found ourselves in.</b> 9 Q. So it wouldn't surprise you. 10 Can I just ask you about the ability to rescue 11 people from the roof. This question I am asking you 12 just to allay any public suspicion about it. 13 Did you ever consider evacuating residents from the 14 roof? 15 <b>A. By use of helicopter?</b> 16 Q. At all. 17 <b>A. No, because I think it would've been impossible without</b> 18 <b>the use of a helicopter. So in a non-fire scenario,</b> 19 <b>actually having been head of technical rescue, I did</b> 20 <b>quite a lot of work with the Marine and Coastguard</b> 21 <b>Agency and coastguard rescue helicopters, so it's within</b> 22 <b>the capability of using our contacts pan-London to call</b> 23 <b>in an MCA search and rescue helicopter, and you would be</b> 24 <b>able to take people off a roof if you needed to.</b> 25 <b>Actually, they have that capability to do it in the</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 204</p>

<p>1 London airspace. It would take some time for them to 2 arrive because they're coming from the coast. 3 But in the context of Grenfell, although 4 I considered it, because I felt it was reasonable to 5 consider it as a resource that we had, I was fairly 6 certain we were never going to be able to use it because 7 of the effects of downdraft on the fire, actually the 8 difficulty of the rescuer being on a winch potentially 9 going down into a very hazardous environment, what 10 I would judge to be the difficulty of the pilot to judge 11 the products of combustion and the likely effect it 12 might have on the airframe, there were lots of reasons 13 why I just don't think that was a viable rescue option. 14 I just don't think rescuing anyone from the roof was 15 viable.</p> <p>16 Q. If I just follow that up a little bit, if I may, just 17 briefly. 18 If you go to page 12 of your first witness 19 statement, you say: 20 "At 0540 hrs Mick Mulholland came back to the unit." 21 Then halfway down the paragraph you say: 22 "I considered the possibility of requesting maritime 23 and coastguard agency search and rescue (MCA SAR) helo 24 support as London does not have a winch rescue 25 capability. My reservations with this option were the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 205</p>	<p>1 discounted it. 2 Q. Discounted it because? 3 A. Because I think the effects on the fire would've been 4 profound with the downdraft. I didn't think it was 5 a tenable rescue methodology because of the risk to the 6 rescuer, and also because of the way that the building 7 was engulfed in flame, frankly. 8 Q. What would it have taken to rescue people from the top 9 floors or the roof? 10 A. We'd have had to get firefighters up onto the roof and 11 bring them down through the internal staircase. There 12 was no other method. As the lead for technical rescue 13 in the Brigade we could've considered some use of line 14 rescue, but you're not able to use line rescue, so rope 15 rescue, effectively, in a heat and smoke -- you know, in 16 a hot environment because they're nylon ropes and 17 they're going to melt. And obviously there's no way of 18 bringing them down the outside of the building in 19 an environment where most of the outside of the building 20 is alight. 21 So the only two things available to me were either 22 rescue from above, which is HELO, search and rescue 23 helicopter, which I'd seen used in -- helped plan the 24 use of major floodings outside of London, so 25 I understood it quite well as a capability, or bring</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 207</p>
<p>1 45 min minimum arrival time and the possible effect of 2 downdraft on the fire whilst we had so many people 3 trapped and firefighters inside." 4 What prompted you at that time, 0540 hours, to 5 consider the possibility of requesting a helicopter 6 rescue? 7 A. Because if I did have people on the roof I was prepared 8 to consider anything, again as a possible resource. So 9 it's about getting things moving. My sense was that 10 I was never going to use it, but being told that we had 11 -- at that point, you know, there was information that 12 we had people trapped on the roof of the building. 13 I considered the possibility, I rang up Dan Daly -- 14 so this prompted a phone call to Dan Daly, who was the 15 AC then holding AC1 cover because Richard Mills had gone 16 to the Lambeth operations room of the Metropolitan 17 Police -- and I said that I needed a message passed into 18 SOR, so that operations room, where the request for HELO 19 support would be made, just to warm them up to the 20 possibility. Because if we were going to use them, if 21 I took the decision that we could use them obviously you 22 wanted them alive to the possibility we needed them and 23 therefore they were ready to go. That was my sole 24 consideration there. I rang Dan, I told him that we 25 might want them, warm them up, and then very quickly</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 206</p>	<p>1 them down the internal staircase. Neither one of those 2 were particularly viable options. I felt fairly, you 3 know, anxious about the fact that we had people on the 4 roof, to be frank, when someone told me. So I thought 5 that was going to be almost impossible to resolve. 6 Q. You say that the downdraft was the problem. Was it that 7 that eventually made you, or ultimately made you 8 discount the rescue by helicopter? 9 A. I think it's a combination of all the factors. So the 10 effective downdraft, and not really being able to 11 quantify what effect that would have on the fires and 12 our crews and the residents that might be left in there. 13 So you would be very hard to judge what the downdraft 14 would do if you were then winching someone down, so 15 you're in proximity to winch someone down to effect 16 a number of rescues, you are going to get that, they 17 produce a considerable downdraft. 18 I think the fact that I also thought, having seen 19 that system in use, actually it was going to be almost 20 impossible to put someone on the end of a winch to get 21 someone out. Let alone, you know, effectively dropping 22 a line into a fire environment. 23 There was just too many, you know, impracticalities 24 to overcome. So that there was lots of reasons why 25 I would discount it.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 208</p>

<p>1 Q. Finally, gas, gas supply.</p> <p>2 A. Mm.</p> <p>3 Q. Can I take you to your first statement, which we're</p> <p>4 still in, and go to page 17.</p> <p>5 The middle of the page there you refer to the</p> <p>6 National Grid presenting at the CU having been requested</p> <p>7 as part of the major incident. That's at or after</p> <p>8 08.10.</p> <p>9 If we go to the Roe log at page 7, just at the foot</p> <p>10 of the page, you can see in the second entry:</p> <p>11 "[Cadent] Gas former National Grid. Will isolate 3</p> <p>12 separate locations that will isolate building</p> <p>13 Grenville[sic] Tower and 1 other building."</p> <p>14 The question is: what steps did you take to secure</p> <p>15 the attendance of Cadent before that?</p> <p>16 A. I knew that the attendance of the utilities had been</p> <p>17 requested because Andy -- I think Andy O'Loughlin had</p> <p>18 briefed me to that effect, that he had requested the</p> <p>19 attendance of the utility companies. I felt that there</p> <p>20 was likely to be gas supply involved in the building,</p> <p>21 but it wasn't a priority, you know, in the first part of</p> <p>22 the incident to chase that, it wasn't my top priority,</p> <p>23 my main priority was the overall kind of fire, really.</p> <p>24 But it was something I was going to have to come to.</p> <p>25 I think that was chased on more than one occasion in</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 209</p>	<p>1 A. To be frank I'd made that assumption fairly early on</p> <p>2 myself because my experience of these blocks is they're</p> <p>3 very often a gas supply in them. I actually had had it</p> <p>4 in my head that it may have been one of the factors as</p> <p>5 to the fire spread, that something had become involved.</p> <p>6 I can't remember exactly when but I think I'd had some</p> <p>7 reports back that there was likely to have been</p> <p>8 involvement of gas supply.</p> <p>9 So actually it would've been one of the things that</p> <p>10 I would've considered very early on, because of the</p> <p>11 nature that, you know, it had been one of many variables</p> <p>12 in relation to fire spread and the ferocity of the fire,</p> <p>13 and actually some of our difficulties in extinguishing</p> <p>14 the fires at times. So I felt with the level of</p> <p>15 destruction that was being visited on the building</p> <p>16 I would have been entirely surprised if all of the</p> <p>17 utilities, electric and gas, hadn't been involved in</p> <p>18 some way.</p> <p>19 Q. Just in terms of the difficulties for firefighters, what</p> <p>20 difficulties are those that gas presented?</p> <p>21 A. Well, they're difficult to extinguish because it</p> <p>22 continues to burn, you know, it's not just a simple task</p> <p>23 just of putting it out with a jet of water.</p> <p>24 MR MILLETT: I see, okay.</p> <p>25 Mr Roe, thank you very much, those are all my extra</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 211</p>
<p>1 terms of their ETA. Again, I can't be sure of that. It</p> <p>2 would've been something because it's a matter of course,</p> <p>3 it's a process thing that all officers in command are</p> <p>4 likely to want to know about to request, to chase, if</p> <p>5 they haven't attended. But that is fairly consistent</p> <p>6 with my experience of utilities attending.</p> <p>7 Q. What, that they don't turn up or take some time?</p> <p>8 A. No, they do, but it can take some time, because</p> <p>9 obviously they're not on a blue light service and they</p> <p>10 will need to identify a team that has the skills to be</p> <p>11 able to isolate supply, particularly in something like</p> <p>12 the context of Grenfell where it's not going to be as</p> <p>13 simple as just isolating a single domestic supply or</p> <p>14 something to a small building. No, it didn't</p> <p>15 particularly surprise me.</p> <p>16 Q. Well, we can look at the short incident log and find</p> <p>17 numerous entries for that as we go. That's a matter of</p> <p>18 record.</p> <p>19 Just going back to your statement, in the last</p> <p>20 sentence in that same paragraph, you say:</p> <p>21 "I was sure burning gas supplies in the flats were</p> <p>22 adding to the difficulties for firefighters."</p> <p>23 At what point in the night did you learn or come to</p> <p>24 realise that burning gas supplies in the flats was</p> <p>25 causing difficulties for firefighters?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 210</p>	<p>1 questions that I had. I think it just remains for me to</p> <p>2 thank you very much for your patience in answering my</p> <p>3 questions. I've kept you there a long time. I'm very</p> <p>4 grateful to you for coming to the inquiry and assisting</p> <p>5 us with our investigations. So thank you very much.</p> <p>6 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.</p> <p>7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And on behalf of the inquiry I would</p> <p>8 like to thank you very much as well. I am sure you only</p> <p>9 too well aware how important your evidence is for us,</p> <p>10 and we're very grateful to you for coming along and</p> <p>11 giving it I'm afraid at rather great length, but you</p> <p>12 understand that can't sometimes be avoided.</p> <p>13 But thank you very much indeed.</p> <p>14 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.</p> <p>15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And now you're free to go.</p> <p>16 THE WITNESS: Thank you.</p> <p>17 (The witness withdrew)</p> <p>18 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, that's the business for the day.</p> <p>19 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.</p> <p>20 MR MILLETT: We now have the commissioner tomorrow. I'm not</p> <p>21 going to ask you to sit at 9.30, 10 o'clock should do</p> <p>22 it.</p> <p>23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good, very good. Well, then, in</p> <p>24 that case we'll break now and resume at 10 o'clock</p> <p>25 tomorrow, and look forward to hearing from the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 212</p>

1 Commissioner then.  
2 MR MILLETT: Very good, thank you.  
3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.  
4 Good. 10 o'clock tomorrow, please, thank you.  
5 (4.10 pm)  
6 (The hearing adjourned until  
7 Thursday, 27 September 2018 at 10.00 am)  
8 INDEX  
9 ANDREW ROE (continued) .....2  
10 Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY .....3  
11 (continued)  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Page 213

54 (Page 213)

<b>A</b>	<b>AC1</b> 206:15	78:10	<b>advising</b> 6:8 8:11 35:7	<b>amount</b> 43:24 68:20 84:11 91:19 93:18 128:23 171:7
<b>ability</b> 87:21 120:23 183:8 204:5,10	<b>accept</b> 53:6 114:15	<b>adding</b> 210:22	<b>aerial</b> 178:9 187:22 188:3,23 189:19	<b>and/or</b> 62:22
<b>able</b> 9:21 13:9 24:20 25:7 28:23 33:5 36:10 51:2 54:1 67:16 81:19 81:22 82:8 92:25 93:16 119:9,15 121:16 124:4 144:18 150:8 156:18 157:22 159:15,23 173:1 184:14 186:18 188:21,22 189:1 195:5 204:24 205:6 207:14 208:10 210:11	<b>acceptable</b> 199:17	<b>additional</b> 165:24	<b>aerials</b> 188:9	<b>ANDREW</b> 2:25 213:9
<b>absence</b> 66:20 72:25 73:1 85:2 85:14 124:14 139:10 174:23,24 175:13	<b>accepted</b> 165:20 187:23 197:11	<b>address</b> 170:15	<b>affect</b> 36:17 41:15 194:14	<b>Andy</b> 4:23,25 5:10 7:17 16:22 17:10 17:10 18:18 20:16 21:9 22:9,15,17 22:18 23:3,3,5,9 25:18 33:25 34:21 35:13 50:6 59:5,7 62:1 68:8,17,25 69:9,14 72:16 73:7 97:22 119:3 141:15 155:8 168:20,20 176:20 176:23,24 178:10 179:1,10,13,19 209:17,17
<b>absolute</b> 25:5,8 108:15 172:1 199:13,14	<b>accepts</b> 44:10 198:17	<b>addressing</b> 190:16	<b>agencies</b> 45:17 96:7 185:25	<b>Andy's</b> 20:25 35:7 179:16
<b>absolutely</b> 12:22 19:11 22:16 23:18 24:14 26:8 28:5 34:18 35:25 38:20 43:2,8 56:24 61:6 64:6 71:13 99:15 112:23 113:4 114:15 115:8,11 139:20 148:7 159:17 165:16 166:2 171:14 174:11,11 176:15 184:9 189:15 200:6	<b>access</b> 34:1,20 37:3 66:16 70:11 81:6 85:4 89:19 90:20 105:21 136:18 190:21 193:1	<b>adequate</b> 164:19 194:8	<b>agency</b> 111:7 204:21 205:23	<b>answer</b> 29:6 31:14 33:12 38:12 40:18 49:1 66:1 71:3,9 71:15,19 88:16 91:12 116:16 130:5 157:25 161:5 162:11 164:21 172:8 187:6 189:14
<b>absorbed</b> 17:11	<b>access/egress</b> 68:19 70:6	<b>adjustment</b> 57:14	<b>aging</b> 84:12,25	<b>answered</b> 2:15 65:5 89:1 169:14
<b>AC</b> 3:20,22 105:1 114:1 135:3,17,18 206:15	<b>accessed</b> 122:14	<b>adjusts</b> 140:1	<b>ago</b> 14:19 77:18 201:24	<b>answering</b> 212:2
	<b>accessing</b> 135:21	<b>admit</b> 192:14	<b>agree</b> 2:22 73:15 112:17 148:10 150:19	<b>answers</b> 46:17 71:6
	<b>accord</b> 78:24	<b>adornment</b> 137:9	<b>agreed</b> 4:7 80:24	<b>anticipate</b> 132:10
	<b>account</b> 41:18 157:24	<b>ADR/2</b> 87:11	<b>agreeing</b> 6:23	<b>anticipates</b> 88:24
	<b>accountable</b> 139:20	<b>Adrian</b> 4:18 6:17 27:17 129:14	<b>aid</b> 47:9	<b>anxiety</b> 40:4 115:13
	<b>accuracy</b> 50:18 109:15 111:21 118:23	<b>adult</b> 161:1	<b>aim</b> 154:1	<b>anxious</b> 39:3 208:3
	<b>accurate</b> 108:5 111:2,19 112:2,18 114:14 115:14 120:9 152:20	<b>adults</b> 108:25 109:24 113:15	<b>airframe</b> 205:12	<b>anybody</b> 63:4 82:11 101:17 133:7 164:10
	<b>accurately</b> 29:8 110:7 115:12 116:10	<b>advantage</b> 188:20	<b>airspace</b> 205:1	
	<b>acknowledge</b> 122:22	<b>advice</b> 3:22 4:4,16 5:13 6:5,11 7:12 8:7 10:16,20,23 12:15,16 13:8 14:6,15,19,22,23 15:1,5,8,9 16:18 19:21 21:18,21 22:11 24:24 25:4 25:15 26:6,7,11 26:23 29:22 30:11 30:12,13,21 31:5 32:7,10,16 36:5 36:17 37:5,22 39:4,8 45:14,18 46:25 47:4,5 48:1 48:2 49:19 58:16 59:18 61:19 142:4 196:8 197:7,15	<b>Airwave</b> 74:21 77:19,24 78:1,21 79:7,9,17,21 81:2 81:13	
	<b>act</b> 32:15 44:17,19 163:22 198:13	<b>advise</b> 3:24 4:8	<b>Airwaves</b> 79:14,16 80:5 193:14	
	<b>acted</b> 8:18 30:14	<b>advised</b> 14:24	<b>alert</b> 169:5	
	<b>acting</b> 5:5 107:4 144:13		<b>alight</b> 21:3 202:10 207:20	
	<b>action</b> 140:20		<b>alive</b> 196:13 206:22	
	<b>actions</b> 166:23 177:21		<b>allay</b> 204:12	
	<b>active</b> 178:10 179:2		<b>Allen</b> 196:4,7	
	<b>activity</b> 9:2 17:4,8 60:20 111:23		<b>allow</b> 8:13 72:7 90:6 130:7	
	<b>acutely</b> 36:1		<b>allowing</b> 57:14	
	<b>add</b> 30:3 68:15		<b>ALP</b> 187:24	
			<b>alternate</b> 21:21	
			<b>ambient</b> 196:21	

168:12,16 179:2 <b>anyway</b> 6:7 26:18 88:22 104:9 125:2 132:13 167:16 192:4 <b>apologies</b> 4:11 56:5 71:13 144:5 146:5 151:15 <b>apologise</b> 71:1 100:3 166:10 <b>appalled</b> 166:21 <b>apparatus</b> 20:2 24:8 35:4 36:12 69:12,19 111:23 133:9 142:15 <b>appeared</b> 42:1 <b>appears</b> 54:12 76:1 97:16 175:9 <b>appendix</b> 171:12 172:12 <b>appliance</b> 187:22 189:19 <b>appliances</b> 35:1 113:6,7 <b>applied</b> 91:4 <b>apply</b> 67:5 <b>approach</b> 155:4,13 188:14 <b>appropriate</b> 18:13 18:14 19:16 21:19 149:9 167:13 <b>appropriately</b> 60:22 <b>approving</b> 112:16 <b>APPROX</b> 105:3 106:20 114:2 <b>approximately</b> 109:13 111:1,2,13 112:4 114:9 115:1 <b>approximation</b> 107:1 112:14 <b>AR</b> 129:2 145:1 147:7 174:23 175:13 182:7 <b>arcane</b> 166:4	<b>area</b> 82:8 83:10,21 84:20 149:13 <b>areas</b> 194:8 <b>argue</b> 177:17 <b>arisen</b> 67:2 80:17 <b>arm</b> 150:15 166:10 166:17 176:10 <b>arrangements</b> 2:21 <b>arrival</b> 76:23,24 92:16,17 155:6 206:1 <b>arrive</b> 143:25 144:12 191:15 205:2 <b>arrived</b> 4:19 8:15 26:4 35:3 74:4 77:10,11,13 78:4 78:5 141:6,10 143:6,9,23 201:25 <b>arriving</b> 35:1 194:9 194:14 <b>arrow</b> 52:2 <b>arsenal</b> 65:4 81:25 <b>ascertain</b> 55:17 <b>aside</b> 193:9 <b>asked</b> 4:3,7,7 6:10 10:11 32:4 44:25 61:23 68:8 74:14 83:3 86:5 88:12 88:22 89:2 94:18 94:24 95:18,22,23 96:3,4,7,11 97:2 98:4,10 99:1,5,9 99:11,15 101:18 104:13 123:9 135:3,17,19 136:17,18 154:5 154:19 161:15 162:2,9 163:21 165:5 168:12,16 187:23 189:9 203:21 <b>asking</b> 6:5,18 71:5 86:1 97:4 99:9,17 100:23 135:14	136:2 138:1 139:17 143:14 165:19 166:4 168:10 174:4 181:11 204:11 <b>aspect</b> 135:8 198:25 <b>aspects</b> 82:23 85:4 85:13 160:18 194:17 <b>aspiration</b> 107:8 <b>assessment</b> 6:19 7:3,10 17:22 54:2 69:4 90:24 156:8 194:8 <b>asset</b> 154:6 <b>ASSIST</b> 75:25 <b>assistant</b> 52:17 <b>assisted</b> 174:15 186:19 190:15 <b>assisting</b> 104:11 191:4 193:11 212:4 <b>assume</b> 66:24 94:9 129:2 153:8 183:13 <b>assumed</b> 31:11 88:11,13 <b>assuming</b> 143:8 145:1 146:16 152:3 <b>assumption</b> 39:21 43:19 211:1 <b>assurance</b> 197:4 <b>assured</b> 42:13 124:5 <b>attack</b> 191:16 <b>attempt</b> 95:11 <b>attempted</b> 10:3 <b>attempting</b> 155:9 <b>attend</b> 76:11 131:5 132:3 <b>attendance</b> 50:3 75:24 209:15,16 209:19	<b>attended</b> 37:25 96:13 189:12 198:24 210:5 <b>attending</b> 92:15 210:6 <b>attention</b> 2:18 <b>augmenting</b> 90:8 182:14 183:5 <b>author</b> 194:4 <b>Authorities</b> 194:10 <b>authority</b> 87:17 88:13 90:20 92:25 93:12 95:23 96:10 97:9,22 98:5,11 98:17,21 99:13,16 99:18 100:7 138:10,11 140:25 198:12 <b>authority/Council</b> 135:2 <b>avail</b> 72:19 <b>availability</b> 63:7 81:9 97:10 165:23 <b>available</b> 62:21 63:1 82:1 89:9,23 90:14 92:23 129:15 131:6 132:4,16,25 135:25 139:23 173:18 193:11,14 207:21 <b>avoided</b> 212:12 <b>aware</b> 3:6,11,12,15 7:5 14:10,19,21 16:24 27:16 36:1 36:6 41:25 45:13 62:9 70:13 92:8 104:7 119:21 124:14,17 125:3 133:11,11 145:9 168:11,15,18 201:19 203:11,24 204:1,3 212:9 <b>awareness</b> 7:7 8:1 13:11 49:9 55:12	58:24 60:14 61:2 61:5,11,23 67:15 77:17 106:15 144:20 148:4 <b>awful</b> 9:19 92:21 187:13 <hr/> <b>B</b> <b>BA</b> 24:17 25:11 27:4,5 34:24 35:4 35:5,8,14 52:7 68:9 69:10 70:4,9 83:19 104:15 119:8,9 120:15,17 126:9 127:12 132:24 149:10,12 149:13 151:25 152:7 159:18 179:24 180:5,6,13 181:25 186:18 187:9 203:19 <b>back</b> 9:10 10:2 14:18 17:5 29:3,6 29:21 30:6 31:23 33:15 34:14 40:24 44:14 46:4,22 48:20 53:5 59:4,7 61:24 64:1 75:5 80:9 81:14 87:5 88:5 93:15 106:1 106:15 110:3 112:7 117:3,22 119:2,12,17,19,20 121:23,24,25 122:4,5,6 124:15 125:9 127:10,21 127:23 129:5 131:15 134:14,14 141:12 143:13 146:8 147:4,12,15 147:19 148:9,14 148:20,23 152:22 154:20,22 155:1 157:2 160:2,3 161:16 162:17 164:20,24 165:1,4
--	--	---	---	--



168:7,8,23 169:25 170:5 174:6,14 175:1,14,18 176:8 176:19 177:2,15 178:2,16 179:22 179:23,23,25 181:9,14 187:16 196:20 198:23 199:1 200:7,23 201:22 205:20 210:19 211:7 <b>back-filling</b> 161:18 <b>background</b> 113:17 194:20 <b>backtrack</b> 46:24 <b>backwards</b> 140:5 <b>badly</b> 51:10 <b>bag</b> 195:8 <b>balance</b> 15:17 35:25 81:8,11 <b>balanced</b> 122:15 163:2 <b>balancing</b> 15:11 128:21 161:13 197:25 <b>bald</b> 5:20 <b>band</b> 52:18 <b>Barandon</b> 146:5 <b>base</b> 9:23 15:23 50:10,14 150:3 153:5,6 <b>based</b> 2:5 4:5 25:24 26:1 27:25 38:9 61:10 106:12 177:12 178:20 197:14 <b>basic</b> 9:13 24:6 34:3,22 <b>basically</b> 5:8 32:2 109:14 117:2,3 121:12 167:2 <b>basis</b> 7:10 23:22 25:19 38:17 50:12 59:13,19 60:15 61:12 74:25 117:6	147:18 152:15 156:7 194:25 <b>batteries</b> 132:20 <b>battling</b> 199:12 <b>BCC</b> 14:9 129:7 187:22 188:2 <b>bear</b> 48:18 178:25 <b>bearing</b> 6:16 16:6 <b>becoming</b> 136:3 159:13 <b>began</b> 118:13 <b>beginning</b> 40:18 60:16 84:24 178:24 <b>behalf</b> 179:19 212:7 <b>behaving</b> 8:1 121:23 <b>belief</b> 186:8 <b>believe</b> 105:12 113:5 124:8 151:15 168:20 196:23 <b>believed</b> 95:6 105:6 <b>bell</b> 96:16,17 120:7 120:8 151:21,22 <b>benefit</b> 195:13 <b>benefited</b> 11:13 <b>best</b> 4:8 6:8 15:8 33:6 48:8 53:13 54:16 56:10 57:3 58:15 70:17,18 72:11 75:1 79:3 85:20 94:9,22 95:21 104:8 108:1 108:15 137:5 153:21 154:20 156:12 163:13 165:6 166:22,25 172:1,3 173:19 177:4 178:1 185:2 186:9 193:16 194:18 199:10,14 <b>better</b> 9:15 12:14 13:15 41:7 74:8	82:9 83:3,6,9,18 83:20 85:4 88:7 98:12 109:15 112:14 117:13 151:7 193:14 203:2 <b>beyond</b> 34:8,19 40:2 44:13 72:7 120:15 121:2,17 153:23,24 156:17 185:21 199:17 <b>big</b> 18:21 19:1 25:4 41:25 42:13 87:24 106:5 135:19 159:23 160:13 199:3 <b>bigger</b> 16:8 106:4 169:9 173:10 <b>bit</b> 33:7,15 46:22 46:24 49:15 73:4 80:3 88:15 89:7 98:8 109:21 119:19 125:9 135:23 148:8 172:7 182:3 183:22 193:22 203:22 205:16 <b>black</b> 109:22 180:10 <b>block</b> 9:22 26:3 31:1 38:2,22 39:9 48:3,3 55:23 56:6 89:24 90:8,9 105:2 114:1 139:7 143:22 201:25 <b>blocks</b> 146:4,11,12 211:2 <b>blow</b> 102:18 <b>blown</b> 172:16 <b>blue</b> 210:9 <b>board</b> 45:2 103:13 103:20 109:18 110:2,3,4 171:3,6 171:10,14,17,21 <b>boards</b> 163:20	170:21 172:4 <b>body-worn</b> 136:25 137:18 139:25 <b>bolts</b> 33:13 39:13 41:21 42:24 48:20 54:25 55:6 <b>bottom</b> 73:5 85:24 130:24 138:7 141:13,20 154:15 157:4 176:3 190:11 194:3 196:1,3 <b>bottom-up</b> 155:4 <b>box</b> 89:14,15,18 90:18 91:14,20,24 92:3,7 93:2 99:4 100:9,16,17,20 101:4,6,18,19 <b>boxes</b> 91:16 92:10 <b>branch/hydrant</b> 154:3 <b>brave</b> 34:12 <b>break</b> 35:14 45:23 45:24 46:8 48:22 70:12,22,23 86:17 86:25 124:22 125:5,8,8,17 133:22,24 167:3 167:14,15,17 168:3,24 200:1,4 200:16 212:24 <b>breakdown</b> 44:4 <b>breaks</b> 86:15 <b>breath</b> 6:1 <b>breathing</b> 20:2 24:8 35:3 36:12 69:12,19 111:23 133:8 <b>bridgehead</b> 32:1,3 36:16 41:21 42:3 42:10 48:21 53:15 54:5,12,15,17 57:16,23 58:3,7 103:6 104:12 124:15 126:9,14	127:4,18 142:9,10 142:11,22 147:25 152:4 155:25 156:2 157:15,18 159:12 160:2 192:12 <b>brief</b> 5:3 19:14 56:1 56:8,15,20 57:2,5 57:11 58:1 59:8 59:15,24 60:1,6 60:22 73:7 105:17 107:24 118:22 124:3 125:25 143:24 145:17 147:23 148:25 149:2,4 150:4 154:16 155:8 164:23 168:20 175:6,17,25 179:10,12 200:21 <b>briefed</b> 3:25 7:17 31:25 32:4 35:2 78:18 79:5 104:15 119:3 143:6,9 145:7 165:5 209:18 <b>briefing</b> 16:17 32:13 36:17 55:20 69:2,14,15 72:17 117:21 145:8,10 145:21 152:25 153:3,9,12 154:13 155:20 157:13 159:9 166:6 175:19 179:15 <b>briefings</b> 49:20 68:7 117:11 <b>briefly</b> 3:4 11:16 15:11 55:17 102:13 168:8 205:17 <b>Brigade</b> 24:14 129:6 131:23 135:8 168:12 197:18 199:9
--	---	---	---	---

207:13 <b>Brigade's</b> 198:25 <b>bring</b> 115:4 116:14 157:3 178:24 202:6 207:11,25 <b>bringing</b> 33:3 158:9 165:24 207:18 <b>broad</b> 55:18 87:24 114:19 160:23 <b>broader</b> 16:14 <b>brought</b> 34:2 171:10 201:13 202:2,24 203:23 <b>brunt</b> 44:2 <b>brutal</b> 19:23 <b>build</b> 34:21 <b>building</b> 3:24 4:5 7:14 8:9 10:22,25 11:22 12:18,24 13:1 14:25 16:2 18:3 21:14,20,22 24:17 25:22 26:10 26:14,21 30:22 31:9 33:2,9,12,18 33:24 34:4,7,9 35:17,24 36:13 37:14 39:25 40:5 40:11 41:3,11 43:18,21,23 44:1 44:2,6 47:20,25 52:10 53:25 61:17 63:11 64:12,14,19 65:2 68:21 69:5,8 69:13,20 70:8,10 70:19 71:21,22 72:1,14 82:10,13 82:21,24 83:8 87:21 88:4 89:16 90:3,5,23,25,25 91:19 92:16 93:10 98:10,12 99:2 104:4 105:5,11,13 119:10 121:24 122:24 127:22,23	135:4,8 136:24 142:5,12,17,18,20 154:7,18,21 155:1 155:6,7,11,17 157:23 159:15,25 160:1,3 161:4,9 161:18 163:9 182:8 183:3 184:8 186:11,12,17,20 188:22 190:7,19 190:20,23 191:22 192:25 194:15,20 194:20,23,25 195:22 196:17 197:8,10,15 199:13 201:19 202:17 206:12 207:6,18,19 209:12,13,20 210:14 211:15 <b>building's</b> 82:23 <b>buildings</b> 37:24 48:16 63:21 90:21 <b>builds</b> 71:10 <b>bullet</b> 62:18,20 <b>bundle</b> 66:4 172:10 <b>burden</b> 28:23 <b>burn</b> 195:24 211:22 <b>burning</b> 43:24 210:21,24 <b>burnt</b> 154:4 190:10 <b>burst</b> 154:3 <b>busiest</b> 38:6 <b>business</b> 212:18 <b>busy</b> 114:18 116:6 182:11 <b>button</b> 31:18 <b>buzzer</b> 30:23	155:24 194:23 196:24 204:22 206:14 <b>call-handlers</b> 28:6 <b>callback</b> 27:23 28:1 28:3 29:14 <b>callbacks</b> 27:9,13 <b>called</b> 2:3 3:7 27:9 29:21 30:10 47:4 108:13 123:5 <b>caller</b> 11:7 15:12 15:18 29:19 <b>callers</b> 3:23 12:17 13:8 27:13 29:4 30:7,12 47:16 48:2 110:15 122:13,16 203:24 <b>calling</b> 29:20 64:23 203:24 <b>calls</b> 11:6 12:3,7 16:12 18:10 27:19 29:25 43:9,11 44:20 106:25 108:1,16 110:12 111:22 113:2 117:18 118:6 123:4 124:16 155:14 170:18 172:25 187:8 <b>calm</b> 153:25 <b>camera</b> 150:10 166:13 <b>cameras</b> 196:21 <b>cancel</b> 102:24 <b>candidate</b> 120:10 <b>capability</b> 204:22 204:25 205:25 207:25 <b>capable</b> 202:2 <b>capacity</b> 199:18 <b>capture</b> 116:10 173:1,19 <b>captured</b> 172:22 173:22 174:1 <b>capturing</b> 110:7	<b>car</b> 79:14,16 80:2 <b>care</b> 25:1 52:10 <b>career</b> 38:20 <b>careers</b> 113:1 <b>carefully</b> 80:8 <b>caretaker</b> 144:13 <b>carried</b> 59:4 69:17 126:8 177:21 <b>carry</b> 1:10 79:8 125:11 130:10 159:18 168:5 <b>carrying</b> 71:18 81:13 186:17 191:1 192:15 <b>cars</b> 193:15 <b>case</b> 6:15 59:24 91:3 167:9,15 174:5 179:11 202:23 212:24 <b>casualties</b> 34:2 178:13 185:21 <b>casualty</b> 172:15 173:25 <b>catastrophic</b> 197:19 <b>catches</b> 46:17 <b>categorically</b> 201:4 <b>category</b> 39:16 <b>caught</b> 60:4 <b>cause</b> 133:10 <b>caused</b> 40:4 43:20 126:20 133:6 <b>causing</b> 210:25 <b>cautious</b> 197:22 <b>caveat</b> 12:20 <b>CCTV</b> 51:14 58:19 150:7,9 165:11 177:17,21 <b>ceased</b> 191:4 <b>centre</b> 129:7 <b>centres</b> 185:20 <b>certain</b> 40:2 53:7 60:1 95:18,20 98:4 99:16 109:11 202:25 205:6	<b>certainly</b> 39:1 40:6 48:14 52:19 67:3 82:14 93:23 96:3 97:8 98:20 102:4 115:8 120:25 125:16 148:2 161:12 162:25 <b>certainty</b> 111:10,11 <b>chair</b> 178:17 183:13 <b>chaired</b> 87:9 174:18 <b>chairing</b> 178:22 <b>chairman</b> 1:6,11,12 45:20 80:8 86:13 133:13 167:13 200:1 212:18 <b>challenge</b> 21:20 22:25 23:2,9,13 28:14 35:13 39:24 92:1 107:11 120:12,15 145:18 182:14 183:7 <b>challenged</b> 22:12 22:20 <b>challenges</b> 61:17 62:3 <b>challenging</b> 33:3 54:10 70:1 <b>chance</b> 12:20 14:17 14:24 70:18 139:15 <b>change</b> 6:11 10:16 12:13,14,15 30:21 35:20 36:16 39:8 45:14 48:2 58:16 80:4,22 96:14 110:14 191:13 199:1 <b>changed</b> 4:17 14:6 16:18 18:24 25:15 26:11 29:23 30:11 30:12 31:5 32:10 32:15 36:5 37:4 46:25 49:20 59:18
--	---	--	---	--

67:15 79:20 80:10 114:4 115:10 142:5 <b>changes</b> 114:16 <b>changing</b> 25:20 45:5 80:16 108:7 110:13 122:17 191:19 <b>channel</b> 73:8,8,11 73:12,13,16,17 74:3,14,15,17,18 74:20 75:2,5,6,9 75:15,25 76:4 77:10,13,19,24 78:21 193:15 <b>channels</b> 77:21,23 78:1 <b>chaos</b> 26:16 <b>charge</b> 4:24 49:2 177:24 <b>chase</b> 101:5 209:22 210:4 <b>chased</b> 209:25 <b>chasing</b> 185:8 <b>check</b> 14:13 88:25 <b>checked</b> 89:2 179:23 <b>checking</b> 62:2 <b>chequered</b> 151:17 <b>children</b> 109:24 113:15 <b>chinagraph</b> 170:8 170:12,22 172:21 173:6 187:4 <b>choice</b> 11:20 36:3 173:15 <b>chunk</b> 113:13 143:19 <b>circumstances</b> 2:6 11:25 13:10 15:7 19:17 29:17 33:4 73:23 81:23 162:13 199:15 <b>civil</b> 5:4 9:9 10:13 20:1 64:5	<b>cladding</b> 189:23 <b>claim</b> 65:21 <b>clarification</b> 162:4 <b>clarified</b> 169:24 <b>clarify</b> 47:7 143:18 169:15 174:24 181:12 <b>clear</b> 7:23 8:6 17:7 18:1 20:21 22:1 24:5 42:7 47:21 48:14 51:5 53:4 98:15 100:5 108:24 116:8 124:7,9,11 127:14 140:7 149:18,20 154:22 157:1,3,4 157:5 159:17 163:7 172:18 174:2 176:13 181:25 182:9,13 183:4 186:1 187:1 193:12 <b>cleared</b> 56:10 153:21 164:12 <b>clearer</b> 22:14 <b>clearest</b> 51:15 <b>clearing</b> 40:5 154:20 155:1,12 <b>clearly</b> 5:1 47:11 48:7 49:4 50:23 51:2 61:1 63:18 66:23 137:21 158:12 166:21 173:4 175:16 176:10 <b>clip</b> 137:16 139:24 139:25 140:4 <b>clips</b> 136:22,25 137:1,1 <b>clock</b> 125:4,18 <b>close</b> 28:8 63:18,21 64:14 83:13 118:14 124:18,21 132:12 166:9 187:17 197:13	<b>close-up</b> 163:13 <b>closely</b> 89:7 138:13 157:10,11 <b>closer</b> 83:14 <b>clue</b> 68:25 69:16 <b>co-ordination</b> 94:14 104:12 114:25 115:4,7 129:6 134:25 183:12 <b>coast</b> 205:2 <b>coastguard</b> 64:23 204:20,21 205:23 <b>cognisance</b> 184:10 <b>coincided</b> 78:5 <b>cold-hearted</b> 20:5 <b>collapse</b> 61:18 69:8 142:1 195:22,24 197:12,20 <b>collapses</b> 44:6 <b>collating</b> 158:8 <b>colleagues</b> 112:24 <b>collect</b> 186:23 <b>columns</b> 44:1 154:8 173:4 195:23 <b>combination</b> 208:9 <b>combined</b> 57:9 <b>combustible</b> 190:10 <b>combustion</b> 64:17 205:11 <b>come</b> 1:18 7:9,15 9:4 11:9 22:19 27:14 29:10 44:14 54:21 56:12 59:20 74:6 81:10 83:23 96:22 107:19 108:9 119:17,25 121:23 122:4 124:13 125:9 127:6 130:20 131:7 142:17 143:13 146:21 147:9 148:9 155:25 164:20	175:2 184:4 185:3 185:4,21 187:16 188:5,7 189:9 190:9 196:5 198:3 200:7 202:12 203:14 209:24 210:23 <b>comes</b> 20:14 105:1 114:24 131:18,24 <b>comfortable</b> 23:10 23:22 40:7 41:23 115:21 145:13 157:12,15 <b>coming</b> 11:16 12:3 35:21 37:6 46:23 48:20 61:24 62:5 64:17 68:20 70:12 76:18 85:10 87:5 93:15 105:23 106:15,25 110:12 110:14,15 117:14 119:2 124:15 129:11 134:14 141:12 144:18 147:25 152:15 156:22 157:1,12 158:1 163:25 165:11 168:7 173:13,25 180:5 181:14 184:19 185:12,17 186:3,3 186:4,10,12 194:19 196:20 201:22 205:2 212:4,10 <b>command</b> 3:8 4:19 5:8,14,17 8:16 18:24 22:14,15 27:12 32:5,9 36:23 38:5,6,14 41:14 43:3 45:16 51:22 54:24 60:24 61:9 62:11 63:8 67:5 68:10 73:8 73:13,24 74:16	75:8,14 77:19 78:1,13 83:4,24 84:1 85:25 86:7 87:22,24 88:1,25 89:2 93:11 95:24 97:11,14 104:24 106:9,16 122:5 123:9 127:6 129:18 131:19 139:8 145:1,5,10 146:1,15 147:18 147:20 151:18 153:18 155:5 156:5 160:16,20 161:6 163:20 164:1,2,24 177:10 184:16 192:11,15 200:25 210:3 <b>commander</b> 6:24 17:12,19 20:16 34:6 39:8,12 42:12 47:2,12 52:19 61:6,16 62:23,25 65:22 68:8 69:15 89:10 90:15 92:15 138:19 141:23 144:14,16 166:25 187:15 198:24 <b>commanders</b> 27:11 38:4,13 40:15 45:9 54:7 55:15 92:20 106:3 151:23 <b>comment</b> 67:1 97:3 98:2 99:8 130:25 <b>comments</b> 131:3 <b>commercial</b> 90:25 <b>commissioner</b> 51:6 51:7,10 52:17 112:25 131:24 143:6,23 144:12 145:2,7,8,9,22,24 146:9,24 147:23 174:18,22 175:12
---	---	--	--	---

175:20 178:17 179:6 212:20 213:1 <b>commit</b> 37:4 43:18 44:8 52:9 69:5,19 142:12 157:23 169:12,13 183:19 196:16 <b>committal</b> 53:23 70:24,25 <b>committed</b> 42:9 126:10,15 128:16 149:19,22 155:21 180:13,16,20 <b>committing</b> 68:1 71:20 116:1 127:19 <b>common</b> 38:24 91:4 <b>common-sense</b> 37:1,10 <b>comms</b> 79:14,15,21 <b>communicate</b> 26:17 27:3 30:12 31:4,4,21 81:3 144:15 <b>communicated</b> 6:16 7:7 22:5 26:22 <b>communicating</b> 6:13 74:9 <b>communication</b> 22:14 26:13 27:2 32:24 35:6 62:3 74:2 75:1 78:8,11 107:16 123:12,13 124:6 158:12 181:25 193:18 <b>communications</b> 54:9 59:2 76:19 77:14,15 79:25 81:6 123:25 144:18 193:12,12 <b>community</b> 9:18,25 150:13 152:14	<b>companies</b> 209:19 <b>compare</b> 64:3 <b>comparison</b> 64:4 <b>compartmentation</b> 11:2 16:1 19:20 47:21,23 <b>compass</b> 174:5 185:6 <b>competently</b> 129:13 <b>complete</b> 106:24 110:10 118:25 124:4 127:22 <b>completed</b> 140:19 <b>completely</b> 9:17 39:2 <b>complex</b> 70:6 177:25 196:10 <b>complexity</b> 187:13 <b>complicated</b> 186:24 <b>composed</b> 107:18 <b>composure</b> 53:24 <b>comprehensive</b> 135:7 <b>compromise</b> 35:10 198:18 <b>compromised</b> 11:17 35:16 178:12 <b>concern</b> 9:20 10:7 24:9 33:20 43:20 126:20 141:2 157:22 159:11 170:22 171:6 172:21 173:21 174:8 188:19 <b>concerned</b> 7:9 9:8 40:13 74:3,5 83:13 117:17 133:6 142:9 157:17 162:22 165:18 171:2 173:7 <b>concerning</b> 156:10	<b>concerns</b> 170:12 <b>conclusion</b> 7:16 129:11 142:18 146:21,23 <b>concrete</b> 33:21 44:4 154:8 196:23 <b>concurred</b> 6:19 69:20 <b>condition</b> 53:25 188:21 <b>conditions</b> 7:13 10:25 11:8,11 13:12 16:24 18:3 20:23 21:21 26:2 39:25 41:6 45:5 72:6,13 82:7 121:9,12 126:22 127:23 157:19,24 159:13,19 162:14 169:11 191:14,22 199:5 <b>conduit</b> 59:3 <b>confidence</b> 17:13 18:18 51:3 80:6 110:11 111:4 118:25 <b>confident</b> 38:9 168:22 <b>confirm</b> 49:24 73:15 79:9 99:17 140:16 142:23 145:12 <b>confirmed</b> 59:11 68:10 69:18 83:4 99:2 101:10 154:4 <b>confirming</b> 61:22 61:24 <b>confirms</b> 196:4 <b>conflagration</b> 121:13 <b>conflated</b> 56:21 <b>confused</b> 181:4 <b>confusion</b> 183:1 <b>connect</b> 192:11 <b>conscious</b> 124:23	<b>consciously</b> 21:24 <b>consequences</b> 202:25 <b>consequently</b> 199:20 <b>consider</b> 2:9 31:6 48:15 53:21 65:3 87:20 199:25 204:13 205:5 206:5,8 <b>considerable</b> 51:8 108:16 126:22 136:10 208:17 <b>consideration</b> 2:8 31:19 202:14 203:8 206:24 <b>considered</b> 33:24 64:22 65:1 201:21 202:10 205:4,22 206:13 207:13 211:10 <b>considering</b> 7:13 19:15 178:8 <b>consistent</b> 15:1 195:10 210:5 <b>constant</b> 36:12 42:16 110:4 163:1 <b>constantly</b> 23:20 44:7 73:19,25 108:8 110:3,9 117:1 118:8 <b>constrained</b> 79:15 <b>construction</b> 194:20,25 197:15 <b>contact</b> 4:3 5:15 28:7,18 31:15,18 31:20 96:6 99:18 122:25 123:10,20 136:17 <b>contacts</b> 204:22 <b>contemporaneous</b> 2:5 49:16 50:12 52:22 55:22 60:9 68:5 94:16 98:23 107:20 108:22	130:18 141:17 143:17 148:23 176:3,16 177:7 179:21 <b>content</b> 153:12 <b>contents</b> 92:8 <b>context</b> 10:14 12:2 18:23 21:6 22:22 25:3 27:16 31:7 33:1 37:19,22 40:3 43:11 47:24 57:10 58:24 63:14 63:24 65:1 67:12 70:2 107:17 119:7 129:18 130:8 133:8 135:22 136:9 138:3 139:18 153:16 159:22 172:3,6,25 194:2 197:24 205:3 210:12 <b>contexts</b> 83:9 <b>continual</b> 45:11 61:11 69:4 196:15 <b>continually</b> 123:24 <b>continue</b> 8:14 43:18 46:12 70:25 87:3 124:22 134:10 138:20,24 142:12 159:24 160:24 169:12 196:16 <b>continued</b> 2:25 3:1 11:12 84:20 159:17 213:9,10 <b>continues</b> 211:22 <b>continuing</b> 43:14 52:9 108:17 141:24 142:7 169:13 182:14 <b>continuity</b> 144:8 <b>continuous</b> 35:12 35:14,18 41:9 53:22 69:12,23 70:9 111:23
--	---	--	---	--

123:13 124:6 133:8 197:13 <b>continuously</b> 41:13 42:9,15 44:14 45:6 88:3 116:1 122:1 124:10 164:8 182:15 <b>control</b> 3:23 4:3,6 4:16,17 5:16,17 6:5,12,22 7:5,6,10 7:20 8:18 9:14 10:9 11:5 12:5 13:3,22,23,25 14:3,11 15:2,8 18:9 22:6,8 24:6 26:24,25 27:8,11 27:18,18,21 28:10 28:16,22 29:3 30:3,16 34:25 35:5,5,8 47:18 61:8 66:17,18 67:6 68:10 70:5 75:23 105:24,25 106:3 119:14 120:19 122:6,12 122:23,25 123:3 123:10,10,17,19 123:20,21,22,24 124:1,5,7,11 126:18 127:11 129:6,14 149:10 149:12,13 152:7 156:18 158:24 168:12,16 179:24 180:6 190:22 194:20 201:7,9,13 202:3,6,15,24 203:3 <b>controlled</b> 202:18 <b>controller</b> 29:19 <b>controllers</b> 30:10 <b>convenient</b> 86:15 125:7 133:13 <b>conversation</b> 5:3,5 6:17 41:2,3 42:1	65:19 72:5 76:18 82:15 100:12,23 100:25 101:2 108:10 109:5,12 111:15 121:1 128:18,19 146:10 146:20 149:17 150:1 156:7,14,16 159:22 161:1,11 161:15,20 162:15 164:5 165:16 166:19 167:5,8 176:24 178:20 184:25 196:11 <b>conversations</b> 10:3 42:21 49:5 57:9 62:4,6 80:23 100:5 112:24 120:11 121:19 156:6 165:17 197:20 <b>convinced</b> 82:22 <b>Cook</b> 50:6 51:22,23 58:23 61:21 125:23 126:5 127:9 128:2,15 129:14 141:15 145:3 161:25 <b>Coordination</b> 87:10 174:22 <b>copied</b> 103:7 <b>coping</b> 181:22 <b>copy</b> 103:5,6,11 <b>cordon</b> 73:10 87:14 <b>cordons</b> 9:15 24:11 185:22 <b>core</b> 43:21 <b>corner</b> 51:25 138:8 <b>corners</b> 196:5 <b>correct</b> 8:14 105:13 115:3 130:15 145:4 164:25 177:7 <b>corrected</b> 112:3 <b>correctly</b> 54:19	<b>costs</b> 26:12 <b>Cotton</b> 51:23 174:18 <b>could've</b> 11:11 18:2 18:3 20:24 22:20 23:4 24:1 25:21 26:21 33:8 43:12 60:25 76:8 115:11 123:9 185:24 202:10,13 207:13 <b>council</b> 101:17 135:3,11,20,24 136:3,11 <b>COUNSEL</b> 3:1 213:9 <b>count</b> 105:17 <b>country</b> 27:21 <b>couple</b> 38:25 132:18 139:2 <b>courage</b> 160:12 <b>course</b> 2:11 23:6 40:17 42:5 72:17 78:10 88:20 97:6 99:23 112:9 114:16 119:4 125:1 134:11 203:11 210:2 <b>cover</b> 178:3,6 206:15 <b>covered</b> 89:6 94:25 148:19 <b>CPs</b> 2:9 <b>crash</b> 79:22 111:7 <b>create</b> 9:23 85:7 <b>creating</b> 24:10 <b>credit</b> 10:9 <b>crew</b> 25:11,13 27:4 62:24 75:14 99:1 99:9 100:8,22 101:4 104:14 136:6 186:19 <b>crews</b> 3:9 27:5 30:19 33:10 34:2 36:13,18 37:4 42:4,8,8 43:6,18	49:12,14 52:7 53:23 67:25 69:5 69:10,19,23 70:12 82:9 83:19 88:21 89:19 96:3 99:25 104:15 110:15 116:1 119:9,17,19 120:21,24 121:24 122:18,20 127:12 127:19 135:21 153:23 155:20 156:7 157:13,14 158:2,16,22 159:9 161:3 163:1,3 165:6 169:12,13 178:7,11 180:5,13 180:16,19 182:1 183:17,18 184:13 184:22 186:9 196:17,18 197:10 199:17 201:14 208:12 <b>critical</b> 22:24 145:18 <b>criticise</b> 26:1 <b>criticism</b> 172:2 <b>cropped</b> 138:13 <b>cross</b> 17:2 <b>crowded</b> 85:11 193:3 <b>Croydon</b> 79:22 129:10 133:4 <b>crystal</b> 108:24 <b>CSS</b> 84:1,3,9,21,25 85:2,6,14,17 <b>CU</b> 4:3 14:7 49:22 49:24 50:2 73:7 74:13 77:5 96:3 96:25 97:8 98:4 98:20 99:1,9,18 100:8,22 101:3 106:14 128:2,11 128:13,14 131:25 144:11 146:17 175:2,14 176:19	178:14 209:6 <b>CU1</b> 175:24 176:4 176:5,17 177:15 <b>CU7</b> 103:25 107:24 108:17,20 109:10 116:5 118:21 123:17,18,23 124:16 148:11,22 148:25 179:25 180:3,9,21,25 181:16 192:12 <b>CU8</b> 75:24 84:1,3 102:18 103:14,18 105:1,21 109:19 109:20 114:1 123:23 137:2 144:10,11 145:22 174:14 179:22,23 180:1,25 181:15 192:12 <b>curious</b> 20:14 <b>CUs</b> 110:24 <b>custom</b> 29:2 <b>cut</b> 29:4,12,13,18 39:9 182:15 183:7 <b>cycle</b> 61:22 117:2 <b>cylinders</b> 132:20 132:25 <hr/> <b>D</b> <hr/> <b>DAC</b> 3:20 4:15 6:10 14:9,13 16:16 81:19 108:20 116:19 <b>Daly</b> 206:13,14 <b>damage</b> 82:24 <b>damaging</b> 111:11 <b>Dan</b> 70:4 149:11 206:13,14,24 <b>danger</b> 13:2 25:6 29:7 51:8 52:13 170:25 <b>dangerous</b> 33:23 50:3 136:19 168:16,18 192:1 194:5,7,19,21
--	--	---	---	---

195:4 <b>Dangers</b> 183:18 <b>Dany</b> 51:23 106:4 112:25 131:13 <b>database</b> 84:23 <b>date</b> 2:7 111:12 163:24 <b>dated</b> 62:16 <b>Dave</b> 61:14,18 68:18 69:7 70:5 150:4 197:16 <b>day</b> 4:24 27:10 170:6 212:18 <b>dead</b> 29:13 <b>deafening</b> 64:7 <b>deal</b> 80:5 87:12 92:21 151:3 170:17 <b>dealing</b> 97:17 120:12 153:17 <b>debate</b> 81:1 <b>debrief</b> 13:23 <b>debris</b> 33:20 34:14 43:23 61:18 68:20 142:2 154:4 178:12 182:15 <b>decide</b> 26:5 <b>decided</b> 141:22 161:3 <b>decision</b> 3:22 4:13 4:18 5:12 6:12,13 6:21,22,23,25 7:1 7:6,21,25 8:2,3,12 8:16,17 9:5,5,12 10:19 11:9 14:14 15:24,25 16:8,17 16:19,23 17:1,6,7 17:22 18:1,21,25 19:1,15 20:9,13 20:21 22:2,13 23:1,6,9,24,24 30:17 35:25 43:18 47:3,9,14 65:20 87:11 93:25 116:11 131:19	141:23 142:4,7,16 143:10,21 144:1 146:12,16,25 157:20 163:3 183:19 185:14 197:1 198:3,14 206:21 <b>decision-making</b> 8:25 18:12 20:6 21:6 23:22 24:3 41:10 42:19 67:14 68:3 93:5 107:12 145:12 197:25 <b>decisions</b> 10:20 18:15 25:24 53:4 61:10 73:25 87:22 87:24 94:11 163:6 177:13 197:24 <b>DECLARED</b> 105:4 <b>deemed</b> 3:13 <b>defence</b> 92:20 <b>deficiency</b> 139:11 <b>deficient</b> 139:22 <b>deficit</b> 132:7,9 <b>define</b> 160:17 <b>defining</b> 161:6 <b>definite</b> 75:15 81:24 82:5 159:2 196:11 <b>definitely</b> 57:24 65:21 95:14 96:8 136:17 138:16 155:23 161:19 <b>definitive</b> 107:5 110:19 111:16 <b>definitively</b> 166:18 <b>degrading</b> 196:23 <b>degree</b> 91:3 111:20 145:18 193:2 <b>delay</b> 53:9 194:9 <b>delayed</b> 151:2 <b>delaying</b> 194:14 <b>delegated</b> 27:12 36:22 60:24 61:9 87:25	<b>deleted</b> 173:22 <b>delicate</b> 163:3 <b>deliver</b> 9:1 160:19 <b>delivered</b> 3:23 180:22 <b>delivery</b> 158:13 169:8 <b>delve</b> 45:1 159:10 <b>demands</b> 181:22 <b>demonstrated</b> 3:8 <b>deny</b> 202:7 <b>depart</b> 16:19 47:5 47:14 <b>dependent</b> 204:4 <b>depending</b> 89:16 90:23 202:1 <b>depends</b> 202:8 <b>deploy</b> 24:16 <b>deploying</b> 36:18 <b>deployment</b> 36:19 113:7 <b>deployments</b> 119:6 122:3 124:16 162:19 <b>depot</b> 129:10 133:3 <b>depth</b> 9:6 <b>describe</b> 13:5,10 64:1 68:7 92:5 174:8 <b>described</b> 37:8 90:13 121:11 143:11 169:23 170:14 193:10 <b>describing</b> 105:14 141:20 <b>description</b> 174:11 <b>designed</b> 36:2 <b>designing</b> 161:7 <b>desire</b> 10:8 159:20 <b>desperate</b> 25:2 28:17 <b>desperately</b> 118:11 <b>despite</b> 21:20 154:1 159:19,19 160:25 <b>destruction</b> 174:9	211:15 <b>detail</b> 1:23 14:21 14:23 30:16 36:20 39:15 40:15,19 43:5,6,12 45:1 50:4 51:12 56:12 56:24 58:9 62:13 69:2,22 71:24,24 72:4 89:2 90:12 90:13 92:10 94:25 100:25 101:1 102:3 103:15 106:18 109:18 115:25 117:24 118:3,10 128:18 132:18 136:14 139:4,5,6 149:17 150:1 154:16 157:17 158:17 159:1,6,10 160:17 161:6 164:13 169:8 171:13 172:17,18,22,24 184:24 201:3 203:12,22 204:3 <b>detailed</b> 2:8 88:8 89:22 98:16 101:13,16 118:19 135:7 <b>details</b> 71:17 87:10 155:25 156:22 181:18 185:13 <b>deteriorated</b> 26:14 121:9 142:17 <b>deteriorating</b> 87:12 <b>determined</b> 7:1 122:19 <b>determining</b> 73:2 <b>detrimental</b> 64:19 <b>developed</b> 3:7,12 <b>development</b> 66:15 66:19 67:1 194:4 <b>deviate</b> 3:22 6:22 128:1 <b>deviating</b> 171:16	<b>devil's</b> 11:20 <b>devoted</b> 120:17 <b>diagram</b> 83:7 92:2 <b>diagrammatic</b> 91:10 <b>differed</b> 182:3 <b>difference</b> 67:13 189:24 <b>different</b> 4:21,22 10:14 13:17 18:2 18:4,6 20:25 21:2 21:5 43:8 45:20 62:7 78:19 86:13 106:3 114:21 121:21 171:8 187:18 197:24 203:10 <b>differently</b> 161:14 180:23 <b>difficult</b> 8:2 10:23 13:8,21 17:14 26:17 27:23 29:17 33:11 35:15 42:19 53:14 64:15 67:20 69:21 70:11,15 72:12 73:16 77:15 108:11 110:8,18 115:14 118:17 144:15 158:22 164:17 183:23 185:3 186:4,5 187:2 189:14 191:19 211:21 <b>difficulties</b> 3:9 12:4 38:21 59:2 119:22 120:3 159:18,20 160:25 193:10 202:23 210:22,25 211:13,19,20 <b>difficulty</b> 115:24 122:8 205:8,10 <b>digital</b> 79:25 81:6 <b>dilemma</b> 161:2 <b>direct</b> 6:17 35:5 117:5 122:25
---	---	--	---	---

123:5,6 <b>directed</b> 29:20 <b>directions</b> 19:19 <b>directly</b> 78:14 93:12 98:5,20 145:8 <b>disable</b> 201:15 <b>disclosed</b> 1:24 2:1 <b>disclosure</b> 1:25 2:9 <b>discount</b> 82:1 208:8,25 <b>discounted</b> 207:1,2 <b>discover</b> 41:20 56:16 <b>discovered</b> 41:22 65:13 75:9 76:22 <b>discovering</b> 38:2 <b>discovers</b> 132:25 <b>discursive</b> 19:13 <b>discuss</b> 39:20 63:3 73:14,25 170:2 <b>discussed</b> 3:5 68:22 95:13,14 141:21 149:5 154:6 187:5 <b>discussing</b> 48:21 159:7 167:22 <b>discussion</b> 11:24 53:14 55:1,1,7,7 60:12 69:9 80:15 95:9,16 127:6 128:10 130:16 165:8,13 168:23 169:2 170:1,5 178:15 193:21 <b>discussions</b> 40:9 <b>disorder</b> 5:4 9:9 10:13 20:1 64:5 <b>disposition</b> 129:20 139:6 185:16 <b>disrespect</b> 71:2 <b>disruption</b> 2:20 <b>dissect</b> 9:6 16:12 17:5 18:8,12 20:3 20:20 21:23,24 75:12	<b>dissimilar</b> 21:11 <b>distance</b> 82:3 162:24 180:25 <b>distant</b> 12:7 <b>distinguishing</b> 52:15 <b>distraught</b> 166:19 <b>distressed</b> 28:15 <b>distressing</b> 29:1 <b>district</b> 95:10 195:21 196:4 197:3 <b>docs</b> 193:24 <b>document</b> 66:7,11 172:13 198:17 <b>documented</b> 157:5 <b>documents</b> 66:4 198:16 <b>doing</b> 27:1,9 29:15 29:24 34:18 42:25 44:15,17 53:13 56:16 57:17 58:15 59:17 75:1 78:12 78:16 94:8 95:21 108:15 117:2 126:25 154:14 156:1 166:10,25 167:14 172:3 173:18 178:1 180:3 186:9 188:25 202:18 <b>domestic</b> 210:13 <b>door</b> 30:24 <b>doors</b> 169:5 <b>doubt</b> 19:20 67:23 131:17 182:24 189:21 <b>Dowden's</b> 21:1 <b>downdraft</b> 64:18 205:7 206:2 207:4 208:6,10,13,17 <b>downlink</b> 62:23 63:7 65:8,24 66:16,20 67:10,16 <b>downwards</b> 13:6	142:22 189:22 <b>drafted</b> 106:12 <b>draw</b> 88:4 91:7,9 104:14 <b>Drawbridge</b> 49:23 74:22 78:4,18,20 175:6,17,22 176:4 <b>drawing</b> 2:17 90:3 <b>drawings</b> 120:5 <b>drawn</b> 43:6 <b>drew</b> 104:13 <b>drill</b> 30:15 43:4 49:15 <b>drive</b> 40:12 58:25 61:4 68:23 73:25 74:11 82:8 110:6 160:2,14,14,24 163:9 187:16 <b>driven</b> 160:10 <b>driving</b> 42:15 73:2 <b>drop</b> 178:12 196:6 196:12 <b>dropping</b> 208:21 <b>drove</b> 15:25 170:19 <b>Drumcree</b> 64:5 <b>dry</b> 90:4 182:9,13 182:24,25 183:5 <b>DSE</b> 95:10 136:16 142:25 168:22 193:20 194:7,17 195:20,21 <b>DSE's</b> 194:13 <b>DSEs</b> 195:11 197:7 197:19,21 <b>DT</b> 145:24 <b>due</b> 2:10 68:19 154:2 162:13 183:19,24 <b>uplicated</b> 108:10 <b>duration</b> 130:10,13 130:14 162:24 164:9 165:21 <b>duties</b> 40:17 41:19 178:23 187:12 198:15	<b>duty</b> 81:19 198:12 <b>dwelt</b> 24:1 <b>dynamic</b> 9:7 18:17 23:19 54:24 <b>dynamics</b> 35:23 <b>dynamism</b> 34:5 <hr/> <b>E</b> <hr/> <b>e.g</b> 63:1 <b>earlier</b> 7:6 25:15,22 26:3,4 53:1,8 57:12 60:3 76:8 95:15 96:2,4 97:8 98:1,12 100:5 104:13 108:13 136:2 147:21 148:19 150:25 153:23 161:10 165:14 175:1 189:12 190:14 194:1 195:25 <b>earliest</b> 162:14 <b>early</b> 40:25 49:6,13 57:21 92:19 125:8 125:9 184:2 211:1 211:10 <b>easier</b> 46:15 56:3 <b>easily</b> 113:23 <b>eastern</b> 38:5,14 <b>easy</b> 25:25 134:24 <b>ebbed</b> 119:12 164:8 <b>EDBA</b> 126:10,11 126:14,23 127:3 127:15 128:16,20 128:21,21,23 129:1,3,8,12,13 129:15,21,22 130:1,3,6,12 131:1,4,6,9,12,14 131:19,23 132:4,8 132:11,12,16,20 146:16,22 149:16 149:25 154:5,6 155:15 161:8,11 161:14,17 162:4,5 162:7,10,17,19,23	163:17 164:3,5 165:6,19,21 166:2 166:2 169:19,20 169:20 178:7,9 <b>edge</b> 10:1 <b>edges</b> 43:25 44:1,2 44:6 <b>effect</b> 3:25 7:17 28:13 29:7 31:25 32:4,13 33:12 60:17 64:18,19 90:7 142:13 160:21 184:21 189:10,25 203:7 205:11 206:1 208:11,15 209:18 <b>effected</b> 33:9 <b>effecting</b> 26:13 33:17 <b>effective</b> 24:2,11 193:17 208:10 <b>effectively</b> 35:11 59:3 130:13 144:13,15 192:14 192:25 207:15 208:21 <b>effects</b> 163:2 195:3 197:19 205:7 207:3 <b>efficacy</b> 41:16 <b>efficiency</b> 162:18 <b>efficient</b> 165:22 <b>efficiently</b> 165:25 190:25 <b>effort</b> 28:7 68:23 70:20 78:7 84:11 141:24 142:7 160:8 167:1 173:20 187:10 <b>efforts</b> 3:24 4:8 6:8 14:25 93:9 156:12 <b>egress</b> 34:1,20 70:11 <b>either</b> 6:17 12:11 45:16 49:10 53:19
---	--	---	---	---

55:11 57:22,24 58:5 60:2 62:4 92:12 98:4 103:7 149:21 161:25 163:4 180:19 184:13 192:12 207:21 <b>electric</b> 211:17 <b>electronic</b> 89:14 92:4,5 169:17 <b>element</b> 33:23 157:13 <b>elements</b> 39:23 41:4 <b>elicit</b> 71:4 <b>emerge</b> 200:5 <b>emergency</b> 45:12 49:24 80:1 <b>emotions</b> 28:14 <b>employee</b> 135:24 <b>employees</b> 136:12 <b>emptied</b> 38:3 <b>en</b> 148:18 <b>enable</b> 24:7 70:25 81:5 <b>enabled</b> 130:10 <b>enables</b> 30:7 <b>encapsulates</b> 173:2 <b>encompassed</b> 184:20 186:25 <b>encountered</b> 12:11 38:7,14,15,18,21 <b>encrypting</b> 65:14 <b>endeavour</b> 45:12 <b>ended</b> 29:19,19,20 32:7 45:18 118:15 187:3 <b>ends</b> 131:5 <b>engage</b> 30:6 <b>engaging</b> 181:15 <b>engineer</b> 50:3 75:24 76:10,18,23 77:1,10,13 136:20 168:17,18 194:6 194:21	<b>engineers</b> 194:7,19 195:4 <b>engulfed</b> 207:7 <b>enormous</b> 199:11 <b>enquiry</b> 82:11,14 <b>enshrined</b> 198:15 <b>ensure</b> 22:5 33:4 35:18 43:13 69:25 77:16 198:9 <b>ensuring</b> 24:12,16 26:9 30:5 34:24 36:12 42:3,8 71:21 79:4 <b>entire</b> 5:8 22:15 38:2 43:4 142:18 185:5 <b>entirely</b> 18:2,4,13 18:14 19:12 23:10 52:1 57:9 70:13 84:13,16 111:18 120:17 139:22 151:12 173:14 211:16 <b>entirety</b> 75:12 187:8 <b>entries</b> 85:23 175:8 194:3 196:3 210:17 <b>entry</b> 3:19 30:24 31:23 38:22 49:19 66:14 81:18 89:24 98:25 99:5 100:9 100:15 101:5 107:23 126:17 127:11 152:7 158:23 186:20 209:10 <b>environment</b> 11:18 16:3 37:2,10 43:15 44:8 48:17 60:18,18 80:2 142:11 170:23 192:24 193:3 202:12 205:9 207:16,19 208:22	<b>EPIP</b> 92:1,4 <b>equally</b> 67:5 <b>equipment</b> 66:18 67:23 81:9 129:10 133:3 173:17 190:23 203:19 <b>erased</b> 174:3 <b>erode</b> 170:24 <b>error</b> 182:12 <b>escape</b> 4:8 6:9 12:19 <b>essential</b> 122:12 197:6 <b>essentially</b> 144:7 <b>establish</b> 9:3 24:6 34:1 68:19 153:12 183:23 <b>established</b> 34:20 34:21 74:4 153:11 <b>establishes</b> 174:23 175:12 <b>estimate</b> 108:2 185:3 <b>ETA</b> 210:1 <b>evac</b> 183:24 <b>evacuated</b> 146:13 <b>evacuating</b> 32:18 204:13 <b>evacuation</b> 32:19 32:21,22,25 33:1 33:7,9 202:16 <b>evening</b> 60:5 110:8 124:21 164:11 <b>event</b> 37:9 38:19 <b>events</b> 60:5 <b>eventually</b> 101:24 130:8 203:16 208:7 <b>everybody</b> 2:3 32:18 34:23 39:9 69:24 137:13 <b>everyone's</b> 2:17 <b>evidence</b> 1:18 2:4,4 2:7,19 4:15 13:14 29:2,7 39:6 45:25	46:3 59:11 62:24 86:19 96:23 104:10 120:5 131:18 133:24 134:17 167:23 169:16 212:9 <b>exact</b> 40:22 45:18 80:16 95:19 99:21 100:12,24 102:1 103:3 109:18 111:4 127:25 131:10 154:16 159:6 164:13 183:24 <b>exactitude</b> 158:17 <b>exactly</b> 80:5 104:23 107:5 127:15 129:23 134:24 142:23 148:13 153:4,5 162:16 170:14 171:3 187:14 211:6 <b>example</b> 21:1 40:1 44:17 48:4 81:7 83:12 88:1 162:20 170:15 <b>excellent</b> 15:4,9 <b>exceptional</b> 38:19 113:1 <b>excuse</b> 76:7 93:2 <b>excuses</b> 166:23 <b>exercise</b> 3:6,13 15:11 54:8 <b>exhaust</b> 191:1 <b>exhausted</b> 161:19 <b>exhibit</b> 87:11 <b>exist</b> 189:8 <b>existed</b> 48:9 <b>exit</b> 15:15,21 37:13 186:20 <b>exited</b> 184:15 <b>exiting</b> 184:1 186:17 <b>expect</b> 12:13 36:23 39:18 40:16 48:17	65:19 89:13,23 90:14 91:3 184:9 186:21 201:13 202:5,19 <b>expectation</b> 26:23 27:20,25 29:24 58:12 65:22 92:19 156:16 <b>expected</b> 11:5 23:3 27:13 28:24 29:15 38:7 52:10 58:10 62:13 69:9 72:21 89:8,11,18 92:14 93:4 94:3 95:1 101:14 129:20 184:18 185:12,14 185:19 187:4 <b>expecting</b> 156:18 198:4 <b>expelled</b> 203:4 <b>experience</b> 20:25 21:1 28:5,16 31:16 37:12 38:10 38:17 39:5 48:8 64:2 65:25 67:19 91:17,23 111:6 156:12 192:22 194:18 195:4,18 197:14,21 201:24 203:2 210:6 211:2 <b>experienced</b> 27:11 36:22 37:19,20 38:4,12 39:1 40:15 72:10 85:18 94:6 113:3 197:16 <b>expert</b> 67:22 <b>explain</b> 19:10 76:5 99:12 129:4 139:13 158:3 190:4,5 <b>explained</b> 7:5 68:17 154:5 156:25 <b>Explains</b> 145:1 <b>exploitation</b> 161:19
--	---	--	--	--



164:6 <b>explore</b> 31:3 48:22 88:15 96:23 128:15 131:17 170:11 183:25 <b>expose</b> 42:18 44:5 <b>exposed</b> 28:11 <b>expressed</b> 135:19 195:16 <b>expressing</b> 10:7 <b>extended</b> 98:18,22 <b>extent</b> 16:1,4 26:15 46:18 47:19 63:17 75:14 82:23 121:10 191:25 197:10 <b>exterior</b> 189:11 190:1 <b>external</b> 64:12 90:5 142:1 188:18,21 <b>externally</b> 189:18 191:18 <b>extinguish</b> 120:19 120:23 211:21 <b>extinguishing</b> 156:9 211:13 <b>extra</b> 10:8 129:15 211:25 <b>extraction</b> 82:13 <b>extraordinarily</b> 29:16 <b>extreme</b> 13:7 194:18 204:7 <b>extremely</b> 9:11 10:23 13:21 51:9 70:6 77:15 114:18 156:10 164:17 192:23 <b>extremity</b> 52:8 <b>eyes</b> 18:6	<b>face-to-face</b> 54:9 59:5,15,24 60:1,6 60:11,15 62:2,4 75:1 76:21 107:15 116:21,25 117:7,9 127:3 153:9 175:25 179:12 <b>faced</b> 9:18 19:25 20:21,22 80:6 <b>facetious</b> 26:18 <b>facilitate</b> 96:6 <b>facing</b> 9:16 47:16 107:11 112:25 <b>fact</b> 10:11 31:13 57:8 59:1,15 60:2 75:7,16 76:24 78:17,20 82:16 100:15 108:10 110:17 114:10,18 116:12 118:7 120:17 124:17 127:3 137:16 147:1 157:17 167:7 173:3 177:22 208:3,18 <b>factor</b> 37:1,10 68:3 72:24 75:18 132:15 191:8 <b>factored</b> 132:13 <b>factors</b> 7:21 48:7 208:9 211:4 <b>facts</b> 71:4 <b>failed</b> 11:22 16:1 47:21 142:19 167:2 191:10 <b>failure</b> 19:19 47:24 119:6 199:13 <b>fair</b> 50:18 58:11 60:8 63:14 65:11 67:21 79:20 88:10 94:5 114:23,24 148:22 149:25 174:8,11 176:13 178:20 181:14 188:13 196:9	197:5 <b>fairly</b> 17:5 37:1,9 38:24 44:3 148:2 171:21 180:4 205:5 208:2 210:5 211:1 <b>fairness</b> 59:10 <b>faithfully</b> 95:4 159:1 <b>fall</b> 33:20 34:14 43:23 61:18 <b>fall-back</b> 66:17,18 <b>fallback</b> 185:18 <b>falling</b> 154:3 182:15 <b>falls</b> 39:16 <b>false</b> 100:16 <b>familiar</b> 66:6 102:14 172:14,15 180:7 <b>families</b> 9:18 111:12 <b>fan</b> 81:20 <b>far</b> 7:9 36:13 41:2 41:16,25 42:22 47:19 52:12 55:9 70:13 72:6 84:24 100:1 117:13 133:6 151:15 155:10 156:2 159:14 161:9,17 162:6 163:8 169:13,18 184:18 <b>fatalities</b> 111:8 <b>fault</b> 55:5 <b>fear</b> 24:13 33:22 160:5 <b>feed</b> 122:5,6 <b>feedback</b> 12:4 28:8 129:20 <b>feel</b> 39:3 40:14 73:1 89:22 125:7,17 147:4 <b>feeling</b> 9:21 40:7 96:1 167:21	189:15 <b>feelings</b> 18:10 <b>feels</b> 75:10 <b>felt</b> 9:10,25 16:8 20:4 30:16 37:22 66:24 79:15,20,23 100:1 110:8,10,12 111:14 115:21 116:9 126:21 136:5 139:16,21 142:6 156:10 166:20 185:24 198:13 199:9 205:4 208:2 209:19 211:14 <b>female</b> 135:11,14 135:17,24 <b>Fenton</b> 4:18 6:10 14:9,13 129:14 <b>ferocity</b> 13:20 43:24 190:8 211:12 <b>FF</b> 195:23 <b>FIB</b> 171:3,6,10,13 171:14,17,21 172:4 <b>FIBs</b> 170:9 <b>field</b> 192:6,24 193:18 <b>fight</b> 70:24 153:22 154:1 <b>figure</b> 106:22 111:17 172:12 <b>figures</b> 118:19 <b>filled</b> 203:4 <b>final</b> 15:25 64:20 73:7 <b>Finally</b> 209:1 <b>find</b> 27:8 28:10 74:1,17 119:15 121:22 125:14 130:4 142:21 146:18,25 155:24 156:21 173:14 174:6 187:18	203:3 210:16 <b>finding</b> 180:18 189:7 <b>fine</b> 66:13 125:18 162:12 <b>finish</b> 55:5 100:4 <b>fire</b> 3:25 4:5 8:22 9:22 13:3,4,5,10 13:14,18,20 14:13 15:13 16:7 18:5,5 19:19 24:14 25:19 29:5 31:7,25 32:1 32:6,11,12 35:6,6 35:8 36:4,24 37:15 38:1,16,18 38:19,23 39:18,25 43:24 44:18 47:19 54:9 55:14 56:9 56:17 59:6,6 63:12,17 64:3,17 68:9,11 69:17 70:24 72:18 73:8 75:25 81:3 82:22 82:24 84:17,19 87:15 89:8 90:24 94:6 99:6 100:24 103:12 105:2 108:1 117:17 119:17 120:14,19 120:23 121:13,23 123:14 126:8 135:8 136:24 141:25 153:20,22 155:13 156:8,9,19 162:1 163:2 170:17 184:10 185:15 186:25 189:16,17 190:1,6 190:8,11,14,17,19 191:3,8,11,15,17 191:17,23,25 192:3 195:3,22 197:11 198:17,25 199:9 200:22 201:3,4 202:1
<b>F</b>				
<b>face</b> 72:12 108:15 141:16,16,24 166:23 167:2 169:10 182:14				

203:25 205:7	138:7 139:3,5	91:9,10 92:2	30:5 40:8 45:8	15:7 48:9 101:15
206:2 207:3	140:22 141:13	102:5 103:21	69:10,22 70:16	131:15,20 135:16
208:22 209:23	143:19 144:5	104:8,15 105:3,8	71:9 79:16 87:19	156:9 174:10
211:5,12,12	145:9 153:7,13	105:17,17 119:14	119:25 123:7	188:15 201:25
<b>fire-affected</b> 15:19	154:12 165:9	119:16,22,23	151:22 160:8,13	204:8
<b>firefight</b> 120:18	166:15 168:10	120:1,3,10,12,13	188:1 190:17	<b>four</b> 73:5 90:10
<b>firefighter</b> 49:24	174:24 177:18	120:13,25 121:8,9	<b>focused</b> 41:4 42:11	182:5 194:3
50:25 199:8 201:6	178:6 181:5,11	121:16,18,22	42:22 79:24	<b>fourth</b> 97:24
201:13,25 202:19	187:19 195:19	122:18,20 126:10	153:25 154:20	<b>Frame</b> 195:22
<b>firefighter's</b> 202:1	205:18 209:3,21	126:10,14,15,18	162:22 197:7	<b>frank</b> 39:5 74:18
<b>firefighters</b> 12:24	<b>first-hand</b> 55:13	126:19 127:11,12	<b>focusing</b> 61:3 68:24	113:1 208:4 211:1
33:18,23 41:11,15	<b>firstly</b> 24:10 63:25	127:19,20,25	83:24 106:18	<b>frankly</b> 199:13
41:18 42:18 44:8	<b>fits</b> 108:21	128:16 139:4	120:16 126:13	207:7
53:24 70:20 73:18	<b>fix</b> 84:10,11	151:13 152:5	<b>follow</b> 65:6 91:12	<b>free</b> 212:15
121:10 142:19	<b>fixated</b> 9:3	153:22 154:1,14	165:6 205:16	<b>freehand</b> 173:5
157:21,23 160:12	<b>fixed</b> 2:7 31:9	154:21,21 155:12	<b>following</b> 4:14	<b>fresher</b> 100:11
160:19 169:4	82:18	155:12,22,22,25	71:15 101:13	<b>fridge</b> 21:3
187:10 191:20	<b>flame</b> 207:7	156:1,8 162:20	150:2 164:22	<b>front</b> 47:3,13 50:25
195:13 206:3	<b>flat</b> 11:8,19,20	164:7 178:7,8	169:22 185:15	149:13
207:10 210:22,25	13:11,13 15:12,18	180:14,16,17,20	<b>follows</b> 55:24 187:6	<b>FRS</b> 187:23
211:19	16:2,6 30:23	183:17 184:3	<b>foot</b> 55:25 57:25	<b>FRSs</b> 188:11
<b>firefighting</b> 72:6,12	31:18 38:1 43:7	186:4 191:14,16	58:2,3,6,7 134:21	<b>FRUs</b> 129:22
119:14 121:12,15	103:21 108:9	191:16 195:22	152:5 187:19	<b>frustrated</b> 76:19
126:11 130:9	109:25 132:20	202:9 203:4,15	209:9	98:15
157:19 170:22	184:3 186:3	<b>floors</b> 13:13,14,18	<b>footage</b> 58:19	<b>frustrating</b> 74:19
188:18 189:11	203:18	40:5 71:25 88:6	136:25 137:19,21	<b>frustration</b> 84:21
<b>fireman's</b> 201:1	<b>flats</b> 11:14 16:13	103:14 105:2,5,11	139:25 176:8	<b>FSA</b> 145:24
<b>fires</b> 39:2 208:11	31:15 33:3 47:17	105:13,18,19	177:17	<b>FSG</b> 3:10,22,23
211:14	90:2,9,11 91:5	114:1 119:6,23	<b>footing</b> 60:9	12:16 18:10 28:5
<b>first</b> 3:18,19 5:4,5	103:14 113:15,16	121:21 122:2,4,7	<b>forgive</b> 97:5 102:7	35:8 42:8 43:1,8
5:12 9:12 10:5	118:10 139:4	122:8,13 138:2	<b>form</b> 8:24 32:24	43:11 44:20 68:9
14:18 39:7 40:20	169:6 174:1	139:4 153:25	34:1 88:1	72:19 104:12
45:16 48:24,25	210:21,24	154:9 162:20	<b>formally</b> 94:7	105:3 106:25
50:4,7 51:13	<b>flexibility</b> 188:23	163:9 164:11	<b>former</b> 209:11	109:6,24 111:22
52:24 55:19 56:15	188:25	169:4,5,19,21	<b>forming</b> 14:12	113:2,14,14
66:6 68:15,18	<b>flights</b> 191:2	178:8,11 204:5	<b>forms</b> 193:18	115:19,23 116:7
71:25 76:22 77:1	<b>FLON-OPS</b> 77:21	207:9	<b>forth</b> 34:14 59:4	117:11,23 122:3
83:6 86:1 87:6,9	77:21	<b>flow</b> 35:23 36:6,12	<b>Forum</b> 194:10	123:6 124:2,16
89:10 93:6,21,24	<b>flood</b> 70:19	39:19 115:17	<b>forward</b> 16:21 17:8	138:17 155:21,24
94:14,20,21 95:12	<b>floodings</b> 207:24	125:10	18:16 22:8 23:4	155:25 156:22
95:16,25 103:2	<b>floor</b> 13:1,16 40:2	<b>flowed</b> 119:13	59:1 60:23 61:4	158:4,15 163:20
104:21 113:13	44:1 54:13,16,17	164:8	73:3 80:21 113:9	166:8 170:2
114:5 117:14	57:16 72:8 83:18	<b>fluctuating</b> 110:9	132:15 137:15	172:23 180:3
125:21 126:6,13	88:8 89:11 90:1,2	<b>fly</b> 67:22	140:1 212:25	181:20,21 183:20
130:2 137:3,6,13	90:10,11 91:5,6,8	<b>focus</b> 10:16 25:14	<b>found</b> 5:16 7:14	184:20,23 186:8

186:10 203:24 <b>FSGs</b> 109:6,13 110:5 115:18 117:6 118:19 178:10 179:3 <b>full</b> 19:19 63:11 64:14 106:2 137:7 137:9 140:18 173:1 <b>fully</b> 16:4,7 123:8 197:11 <b>function</b> 31:17 177:24 <b>functioning</b> 190:15 192:5 <b>functions</b> 178:24 <b>fundamental</b> 116:6 <b>furnished</b> 99:24 <b>further</b> 23:14 49:15 116:7 119:11,20 198:16 199:23,24 200:5,8 <b>furthest</b> 169:20	63:7 118:5 124:17 155:12 202:15 <b>generic</b> 196:20 <b>generous</b> 167:21 <b>gentleman</b> 50:22 51:21 138:7 151:1 158:7 203:16 <b>genuinely</b> 18:11 25:17 54:21 60:3 65:18 86:11 141:9 177:9 <b>getting</b> 9:10 18:9 21:7 24:11,15 25:11 33:17,23 50:6 61:17 62:5 82:2 117:24 118:3 119:22 120:3 121:8 122:8 133:17,18 154:4 190:24 192:1 206:9 <b>give</b> 1:18 2:4 5:14 8:8,9 12:16,19 15:3,5,9 22:21 23:1 26:24 47:5 51:17 63:16 68:25 69:16 70:18 71:17 71:19 72:3 89:21 95:19 96:23 99:20 100:3 103:3 107:7 109:2 116:14,17 131:18 133:16 136:5 138:17 139:15 147:23 149:15 160:10 175:6 184:14 196:7 197:4,7 <b>given</b> 9:16 10:21 14:20,20,22 15:4 19:1 23:13 24:24 30:13 39:11 43:13 53:8 100:2 123:23 129:25 157:13 158:2 162:10 167:5 177:7	179:11 186:2 <b>gives</b> 32:22 34:4 63:9 130:12,13 171:15 178:5 <b>giving</b> 4:4 7:12 12:16 21:20 45:25 59:7 61:16 67:10 67:25 69:14 78:11 115:22 118:18 139:3 158:15 179:6 212:11 <b>glasses</b> 138:14,15 <b>Glynn</b> 157:7 166:18 176:10 186:15 <b>go</b> 1:24 3:17 13:24 14:5 15:10 17:5 17:12 20:9 32:17 35:9 36:8,21 39:15 40:18,20 46:2,22 48:6,24 50:10,14,14 54:3 54:4,5 55:22 61:1 64:1 66:3 68:5,14 69:1 71:14 72:3 79:10,11 81:14 85:21 86:21 87:8 88:6 90:18 91:6,8 91:14 94:12 97:15 98:7,23 101:5 102:7,10,11 103:8 103:12 104:16 106:1 107:20 111:17 112:7 113:10 128:7 130:16,22 134:3 134:21 135:10 137:11,24 139:9 141:22 143:4,21 144:2,22 145:21 147:19 148:20,22 150:25 152:9 153:13 158:6 164:24 165:1 166:5 167:24	168:8 169:7 170:4 171:13 172:11 174:14,18 175:22 176:5,21 179:25 181:8,10 187:14 190:13 193:24 196:1 199:1 200:10,23 202:19 205:18 206:23 209:4,9 210:17 212:15 <b>goes</b> 49:21 <b>going</b> 1:4 7:1 8:4 9:1 10:2 11:2,4 12:1 14:18 22:1,7 23:11 24:7,20 25:6,7,9 26:24,25 27:2,3,7 30:11 31:20 32:20,21,23 33:2,10 35:18 36:10,25 37:3,6,7 39:12 41:6,7,15 43:7 44:11 45:20 45:24 49:9 51:6 53:9,11,20 54:6 55:13 56:23 58:11 59:5,5,22 60:19 60:23 61:22,25 63:16,20 64:10 65:6 69:21 70:18 73:15 76:13,14 77:4,5 78:6,23 80:9 85:13 86:13 88:2,7 97:5 102:24 106:14 110:3,24 111:17 117:20 118:7 122:18,19 125:1 127:10 129:19 130:7 132:11,15 133:14 137:10,10 148:15,17 152:13 158:23 159:3 160:8 168:23 169:25 171:23	173:6,19 174:1 175:1,24 176:6 178:2 187:14 189:3,6 190:9 194:22 196:16,17 197:3,3 200:1 205:6,9 206:10,20 207:17 208:5,16 208:19 209:24 210:12,19 212:21 <b>Gold</b> 145:24 <b>good</b> 1:3,6 3:2 13:8 15:5 22:10,18,25 34:22 41:24 45:5 45:22 53:2 76:24 85:22 91:7 168:1 171:14 200:14 212:23,23 213:2,4 <b>Goodall</b> 8:23 44:25 106:22 107:14,25 109:2,12 113:14 116:5 117:5,21 118:4,18 123:23 138:14,15,16 139:3 148:16 149:1 182:20 <b>Goulbourne</b> 36:15 53:15 55:2,8,20 56:1,8,15 57:22 58:5,17 59:16 60:12 121:1 126:8 146:21 151:16 152:25 153:19 154:13 159:8 169:3 <b>grabbed</b> 24:22 <b>grammatical</b> 182:12 <b>granular</b> 39:13 101:1 169:7 172:24 <b>granularity</b> 172:7 <b>grapple</b> 15:23 <b>grassed</b> 149:13 <b>grateful</b> 34:16
---	--	---	---	--

---

**G**


---

**gained** 55:11  
**gap** 23:17,20 185:7  
**gaps** 187:17  
**gas** 209:1,1,11,20  
210:21,24 211:3,8  
211:17,20  
**gather** 61:2 118:17  
185:20  
**gathered** 22:3 49:9  
60:21 106:12  
180:23  
**gathering** 93:5  
106:14  
**gauge** 11:25 16:4  
**general** 36:9 39:17  
40:4 53:24 72:5  
72:10 115:19,23  
118:7 124:13  
163:7 188:14  
195:14  
**generally** 31:17

212:4,10 <b>gravity</b> 139:13 <b>great</b> 12:25 13:2 38:1 43:20 44:9 69:13 71:22 111:19 115:24 126:20 160:5 161:2 170:21 172:3 212:11 <b>greater</b> 8:4 11:4 45:7 49:3 118:3 132:11 157:18 165:23 198:6 <b>greatest</b> 9:20 23:5 24:9,13 157:22 198:8 <b>greatly</b> 83:13 <b>Grenfell</b> 38:16,18 38:19 62:22 63:14 80:11 83:13 84:17 84:19 146:4 150:9 150:13 152:14 190:24 192:1 202:9 205:3 210:12 <b>Grenfell's</b> 89:17 <b>Grenville[sic]</b> 209:13 <b>grey</b> 138:8 <b>grid</b> 164:10 209:6 209:11 <b>ground</b> 6:14 8:13 9:7,14 12:9 14:7 14:13 17:16 22:5 31:22 32:11 35:1 54:10,16,17 60:20 61:22 73:8,18 74:15 75:25 79:18 81:3,13 82:12 101:11 105:12,15 105:17 126:10,14 127:18,19 128:8 130:1 135:14 144:9,16 147:7,8 147:13,14 152:5	162:25 175:3 <b>group</b> 10:12 34:11 40:15 108:13 129:10 133:3 134:25 <b>groups</b> 32:23 <b>guarantee</b> 8:4 11:1 13:3 <b>guess</b> 16:14 31:1 64:15 81:9 94:23 <b>guidance</b> 8:22 15:4 117:18 123:15 155:14 170:18 185:15 198:16 <b>guided</b> 184:22 <b>gut</b> 189:15 <hr/> <b>H</b> <b>hair</b> 138:8 <b>haircut</b> 138:13 <b>half</b> 182:19 <b>halfway</b> 95:8 97:15 98:9 104:22 144:24 166:6 174:20 190:13 205:21 <b>hamper</b> 77:14 85:2 <b>hampered</b> 67:9,14 85:14 <b>hand</b> 15:13,20,20 52:5 117:14 <b>handheld</b> 79:8 80:4 <b>handle</b> 17:13 42:1 55:19 78:6 106:24 110:10 118:7 <b>handling</b> 27:19 28:14 42:2 78:11 <b>handover</b> 3:20 72:17,20 <b>hands</b> 10:2 52:5 <b>hands/stay</b> 14:16 <b>happen</b> 16:5,5 27:2 128:2 155:24 156:13 196:13 <b>happened</b> 8:23 18:1 20:3 24:1	121:19 131:9 142:3 143:15 156:14 161:23 177:19 <b>happening</b> 47:17 54:20 101:2 121:20 139:14 157:13 164:19 <b>happens</b> 130:15 <b>happy</b> 124:22 125:10 134:9 149:7,8,9 170:8 172:6 <b>hard</b> 19:9 68:23 77:16 108:4,8 110:15 153:22 155:1 159:21 208:13 <b>hasten</b> 30:3 <b>hazard</b> 193:2,9 <b>hazardous</b> 205:9 <b>head</b> 5:21 49:25 118:21 137:20 138:14,16 148:16 180:3 204:19 211:4 <b>hear</b> 1:4 5:25 32:13 64:9 139:3 <b>heard</b> 4:15 7:10 13:14 64:2 77:1 130:2 132:10 139:5 140:16 180:9 <b>hearing</b> 1:4,20 43:23 212:25 213:6 <b>heat</b> 15:13 44:3 121:13 163:2 207:15 <b>heat-affected</b> 15:19 <b>heavily</b> 28:25 58:22 <b>height</b> 113:5 188:10,22 <b>held</b> 14:2 80:11 103:11 110:17	117:13 139:20 151:24 <b>heli-tele</b> 65:24 66:17 67:10,16,19 194:2 <b>helicopter</b> 62:9,14 63:9 64:13 65:15 65:23 66:16,20 67:22 204:15,18 204:23 206:5 207:23 208:8 <b>helicopters</b> 62:7,8 204:21 <b>helmet</b> 52:4,14,15 150:14 <b>helo</b> 205:23 206:18 207:22 <b>help</b> 11:9 23:11 24:12 60:10 71:8 99:14 103:16 109:16 133:16 136:8 150:8,20 152:18 166:16 173:19 176:2 <b>helped</b> 64:11 193:11 207:23 <b>helpful</b> 17:9 18:23 19:5 20:19 115:16 152:23 197:23 <b>helpfully</b> 158:1 168:24 174:15 <b>helping</b> 24:25 25:12 <b>Hepworth</b> 62:17 <b>Heroism</b> 198:17 <b>high</b> 63:1,23 64:10 81:20 105:4 142:19 155:17 171:18,18 195:21 <b>high-rise</b> 37:17,24 39:2 48:16 90:6 91:22,23 92:3,7 201:25 <b>high-rises</b> 37:25 <b>higher</b> 114:14	169:21 189:1 <b>highest</b> 126:19 127:12 130:7 <b>highlight</b> 106:7 <b>highlighted</b> 139:11 185:7 <b>hindsight</b> 25:19 189:15 <b>hinged</b> 26:23 <b>historically</b> 29:21 <b>history</b> 199:10 <b>hit</b> 50:24 158:7 <b>hitting</b> 190:6 <b>hold</b> 6:25 14:16 22:7 23:1 25:24 43:22 80:24 106:2 129:9 136:14 203:22 <b>holding</b> 6:4 22:10 149:20 158:23 159:5 206:15 <b>honest</b> 10:24 11:20 17:1 49:1 53:10 75:12 114:12 136:4 151:12 159:16 <b>honour</b> 30:20 <b>hope</b> 1:10 12:13 29:8 47:10 86:14 <b>hoped</b> 12:18 142:22 <b>horizontally</b> 13:6 <b>hose</b> 182:15 183:7 <b>hoses</b> 154:4 <b>host</b> 42:19 <b>hot</b> 207:16 <b>hour</b> 17:17 18:2,4,7 20:3 21:10 26:4 45:25 59:17 76:24 83:14 85:22 104:23,24 115:6,9 137:15 140:1 182:19 199:11,11 199:12 <b>hour'</b> 14:10
---	---	--	---	--

<b>hourly</b> 86:15 116:22 124:23 <b>hours</b> 41:13 98:10 98:13 114:5 115:3 203:25 206:4 <b>House</b> 146:6 <b>housekeeping</b> 1:12 <b>housing</b> 90:20 <b>hrs</b> 4:3 81:17 87:9 141:15 195:23 205:20 <b>HSE's</b> 198:16 <b>huge</b> 84:11 91:19 189:24 <b>hugely</b> 11:18 21:5 <b>human</b> 44:16 198:1 198:2,13,18 <b>hundreds</b> 34:14 <b>hurt</b> 82:2 <b>hydrant</b> 90:7 <b>hydrants</b> 90:5 <b>hypothesise</b> 25:18 26:1 <hr/> <b>I</b> <hr/> <b>IC</b> 77:14 85:3 <b>idea</b> 32:22 34:5 151:20 179:20 182:11 <b>ideally</b> 67:6 201:18 <b>identified</b> 93:1 167:5 170:16 <b>identifies</b> 52:15 <b>identify</b> 67:17 136:7 138:6 150:20 152:18 210:10 <b>identifying</b> 186:2 <b>ignore</b> 59:12 <b>illusions</b> 12:21,22 42:14 112:23 <b>image</b> 150:7,9 165:11 196:21 <b>images</b> 67:10 <b>imagine</b> 21:9 28:20 52:6 100:13 145:3	<b>imaging</b> 62:22 67:23 <b>immediacy</b> 151:3 <b>immediate</b> 32:11 33:16 34:10 63:15 73:9 154:1 <b>immediately</b> 13:12 28:13 92:22 96:20 183:11 <b>immense</b> 121:13 <b>immensely</b> 28:15 28:25 34:12,16 79:22 <b>IMP</b> 66:3 193:23 <b>impact</b> 19:10 83:14 83:16 <b>impacted</b> 83:12 <b>IMPLEMENTED</b> 105:4 <b>importance</b> 30:19 <b>important</b> 7:24 9:12 18:15 19:2 24:25 27:5 36:4 41:10 42:14 47:18 59:8 61:14 68:18 74:24 75:17,18 81:3 88:20 99:22 107:8,9 152:1 160:22 175:23 212:9 <b>importantly</b> 42:10 157:20 <b>impossible</b> 12:2,6 25:1 45:6 64:8 111:20 121:14 191:5 204:17 208:5,20 <b>impracticalities</b> 208:23 <b>impress</b> 159:20 <b>impression</b> 123:2 154:12 <b>impressive</b> 70:13 <b>imprinted</b> 51:1 <b>improve</b> 82:7	124:20 148:4 199:4 <b>improved</b> 195:12 <b>improvement</b> 199:3,5 <b>improvise</b> 173:14 <b>inability</b> 136:5 <b>inadvertently</b> 171:1 <b>inappropriate</b> 43:3 64:21 <b>incident</b> 4:24 6:13 6:20,24 7:4,22 8:13 9:7,14 10:15 12:9,23 14:7 16:21 17:12,16,19 18:17,23 19:10 20:11,16,25 21:4 21:6,12 22:5,8 23:19 24:4,5,15 25:17,22 28:3,12 31:21 32:20 34:5 35:1 39:7,11 40:6 42:6,12 44:12 47:2,12 49:7,13 49:23 50:13,22 51:11 52:18 53:3 54:24 56:22 58:25 60:16,20 61:4,6,8 61:22 62:10,10,23 62:25 64:3 65:22 66:3 67:11,12 73:18 74:15 75:19 75:21 76:3,11 78:4 79:18,21 80:11 81:8,13 82:11 84:23 85:7 87:25 89:9 90:15 90:19 92:14,15,19 93:20 94:8 96:15 97:1 99:23 101:10 104:11,13,21,24 105:4,20 106:1 107:4,10,13 108:6 110:21,25 111:19	112:9,22 113:1,5 113:5,19 114:16 116:3,8 118:24 128:7 129:13 130:1,21 131:20 131:23 132:5,14 132:21,22,23 133:1,1,5 135:14 135:21 139:8,14 139:19 141:23 144:9,14,16,16,19 145:12 147:7,8,13 147:14 151:1 153:24 160:6,20 160:23 161:13,20 162:10,25 164:9 166:25 173:11 174:5 175:3 176:1 177:10,12,25 178:25 184:2,7 185:6,9 187:14,15 189:12,13 190:2 190:14,16 191:3,7 191:9 193:24 194:9 196:14 198:24 202:8 209:7,22 210:16 <b>incidents</b> 19:13 37:17 38:10 62:21 79:23 80:18 84:9 194:18 195:5 202:14 <b>include</b> 62:22 <b>included</b> 87:11 <b>including</b> 2:3 12:24 31:9 37:17 129:8 135:4 <b>inconsistency</b> 13:17 <b>inconsistent</b> 195:5 <b>inconsistently</b> 84:7 85:1 <b>incorporate</b> 109:7 <b>incorporated</b> 184:23	<b>incorrect</b> 112:13 167:7 <b>increase</b> 118:12 <b>increased</b> 118:24 <b>increasingly</b> 74:23 136:4 159:13 <b>incredible</b> 94:10 166:24 <b>independently</b> 87:14 <b>INDEX</b> 213:8 <b>indicate</b> 91:15 <b>indicated</b> 126:21 <b>indicates</b> 66:20 99:10 <b>indication</b> 170:9,9 <b>individual</b> 11:25 16:13 31:15 32:21 33:2,3 73:23 138:18 140:25 160:11 <b>individuals</b> 105:3 106:21 111:1,2 114:2,3,9 118:10 <b>industrial</b> 63:10 <b>inevitable</b> 62:14 171:24 <b>inevitably</b> 26:24 36:25 61:7 173:5 <b>inextricably</b> 120:22 <b>influx</b> 37:13 <b>info</b> 14:7 <b>inform</b> 107:2,12 <b>information</b> 18:9 20:7,8 22:3 23:7 23:14,16,17,20,23 25:25 30:6 42:8 43:1 47:2,8,12 48:5,6 59:4,6 61:15 62:24 63:9 63:13,22 65:15 66:2 67:8,25 72:18,22,25 73:1 73:14 74:14 78:15 83:21 85:10 88:21
---	--	---	---	---

89:4,14,14,18 90:18 91:14,16,20 91:24 92:3,7,10 93:2,5 99:4,5 100:9,16,20,24 101:4,6,8,9,15,18 101:19 104:7,12 106:12,17 107:14 108:5,18 109:3,4 109:14 110:5,17 111:9 112:12 114:7,20 115:17 116:1,18,19 117:5 117:14 118:7,17 118:19,24 119:5 122:2,23 124:5,11 124:14 127:20 131:13 135:7 138:17 146:11,24 149:15 151:24 152:2,21 154:19 155:14 156:2 157:4,9 158:11,13 158:15,18,20,20 159:3,25 163:22 164:15 166:8 167:1 170:25 171:1,5,7,16,18 171:19 172:4,15 173:2,6,13,17,19 173:21,25 174:6 179:1,4,7,16 180:21,22,24 184:13,14 185:8,9 185:11,23,25 186:7,16,21,23 187:3 195:9,11 196:18,20 206:11	<b>informed</b> 5:8 45:17 195:8 <b>inherent</b> 15:14 <b>initial</b> 147:23 <b>initially</b> 174:17 <b>injured</b> 33:19 51:11 <b>ink</b> 109:22 <b>inner</b> 87:13 <b>INQ00000164</b> 102:22 <b>INQ00000387</b> 150:8 <b>INQ00000388</b> 151:8 <b>INQ00000390</b> 166:13 <b>INQ00000391</b> 152:9 <b>inquiry</b> 3:1 4:14 18:13 28:9 134:18 212:4,7 213:9 <b>inside</b> 8:5 10:25 11:11 12:24 16:7 18:3 21:14,19 25:5,22 26:3 27:11 32:2 33:5 34:9,24 36:13 41:3 49:14 53:23 54:22 57:11 72:1 88:4 121:5 126:22 127:17 137:2 142:17 155:7,10 158:10,20 159:4 159:15 160:24 163:20 165:4 169:11 170:20 176:24 180:23 197:9 198:1,3 206:3 <b>inspector</b> 5:6 62:16 137:22 <b>installation</b> 82:18 <b>installations</b> 31:9 <b>instance</b> 5:4	<b>instances</b> 63:9 <b>institutional</b> 47:1 <b>instruction</b> 5:15 69:6 74:13 78:12 131:12 <b>integrity</b> 11:1 196:9 <b>intend</b> 2:11 <b>intended</b> 172:2 <b>intensity</b> 63:2,23 64:10 <b>intent</b> 68:4 159:17 <b>interactions</b> 4:25 <b>intercom</b> 30:22 31:17 <b>interested</b> 17:21 39:24 40:2 119:10 164:21 181:20 <b>intermittent</b> 154:2 183:6 <b>internal</b> 15:25 21:21 53:25 114:20 135:4,12 141:25 207:11 208:1 <b>internally</b> 68:1 157:20 191:18 <b>interrogate</b> 11:7 <b>interrogated</b> 181:19 <b>interrogating</b> 106:16 <b>interrupting</b> 73:19 <b>interview</b> 94:21,23 95:5 <b>interviews</b> 94:19 <b>intimately</b> 30:4 <b>intolerable</b> 199:14 <b>introduced</b> 196:2 <b>introduces</b> 174:23 175:12 <b>introduction</b> 178:19 <b>invaluable</b> 59:1 190:24	<b>invariably</b> 197:22 <b>investigate</b> 42:25 82:20 <b>investigating</b> 7:19 <b>investigation</b> 94:7 <b>investigations</b> 212:5 <b>involved</b> 16:7 30:4 105:3 106:21 107:6 108:1 109:1 111:9,25 112:1,6 114:2,4,9 117:19 119:16 157:6,16 158:12 172:2 209:20 211:5,17 <b>involvement</b> 211:8 <b>involving</b> 50:22 151:1 <b>irrelevant</b> 18:8 19:23 25:4 <b>irritated</b> 136:4 <b>isolate</b> 202:3,19 209:11,12 210:11 <b>isolating</b> 210:13 <b>issue</b> 10:18 63:5,6 64:11 67:24 79:7 185:4 193:5 <b>issues</b> 79:14 83:5 154:2,8 182:13 <b>issuing</b> 164:1,2 <b>item</b> 66:19 145:23 148:24 150:2 176:18 <b>items</b> 194:5	14:2,10,11,14 15:2 29:2 <b>Jo's</b> 15:4 <b>job</b> 17:2,10,14 18:17,20 40:11 44:10 94:11 187:15 <b>John</b> 136:16 196:4 196:7 <b>Johnson</b> 3:7 5:22 5:23 6:4 7:20 134:18 <b>journey</b> 21:4 167:10 179:7 <b>judge</b> 12:7 44:15 45:7 64:15 74:9 88:3 191:5,7,20 205:10,10 208:13 <b>judgement</b> 11:3 42:17 52:12 106:9 156:11 191:15 194:24 195:6,7 196:16 197:13 <b>judging</b> 191:22 <b>juggle</b> 44:7 <b>July</b> 14:2 <b>jumped</b> 50:23 66:9 151:2 158:7 <b>jumping</b> 178:13 <b>June</b> 48:10 <b>junior</b> 92:20 172:2 199:16 <b>justified</b> 44:18 198:13
<b>information-gath...</b> 54:8 <b>informative</b> 104:19 104:24 105:14 110:24 111:5,17 112:2,4,7 113:20 113:24 114:4			<b>J</b> <b>Jackie</b> 5:7 32:8 53:3 86:9 94:3,5,6 128:6,25 144:11 145:22 147:8,14 175:4 <b>Jackie's</b> 86:5 145:6 <b>Jason</b> 123:5 <b>jet</b> 190:5 211:23 <b>jets</b> 190:1,6 <b>Jo</b> 4:17 6:10,17	<b>K</b> <b>keep</b> 10:17 41:11 46:16 47:4 58:23 160:8 200:21 203:2 <b>keeping</b> 68:11 <b>Kentfield</b> 1:16 2:3 2:16 151:21 <b>kept</b> 93:15 115:19 184:19 212:3 <b>key</b> 201:1,1

<b>kids</b> 108:25 <b>killed</b> 33:19 51:11 <b>kind</b> 3:13 11:8 19:13 30:20 92:16 104:3,4 107:15 117:23 119:12 129:10 158:13 160:20 185:5 190:20 197:6 209:23 <b>Kinnier</b> 6:1 <b>Kipling</b> 70:4 149:11 <b>kit</b> 81:4 189:5 191:2 <b>knew</b> 8:2 17:7 19:23,24 20:18 22:6,22 26:10 27:5 35:15,15 36:5 38:6 39:14 63:17 74:8 82:18 124:19 156:24 166:25 186:2 203:20 209:16 <b>knocked</b> 169:4 <b>knots</b> 25:21 <b>know</b> 1:13 4:12,14 5:17,18 17:21 19:5 21:10,17,18 22:9 26:2,7,15 28:21 30:22 32:7 36:24 40:10 41:24 43:10 44:21 45:2 46:13 47:19 50:22 51:24 53:13,17,17 55:4 56:25 57:20 58:9 60:3 63:16 65:9,13 69:3,14 75:11 76:10,12,25 77:9,11 79:1 80:23 82:14 86:9 88:9,10 90:2 91:5 93:23,25 96:4 99:15,21 100:15 101:17,22 102:1,2	103:3,10 104:3 109:11 110:20 111:18 114:13 116:11 120:24 122:12 128:4,23 129:7,9,16 131:11 132:22,23 133:4 136:11 138:9,18 140:23 141:1,9 145:5 146:8 148:5 150:17 151:19 153:8 154:23,25 155:3 156:4,15,20 157:7,7 158:22 161:11,13,16,23 165:15 166:17,24 171:20 172:16,19 179:14,17 182:10 182:23 184:1 188:2,9,11 191:3 191:9,10 200:25 201:3,8 203:12 206:11 207:15 208:3,21,23 209:21 210:4 211:11,22 <b>knowing</b> 31:7 44:8 186:5 <b>knowledge</b> 48:8 70:23 141:6 194:15 <b>known</b> 22:17 84:22 106:10 <b>knows</b> 23:3 <hr/> <b>L</b> <hr/> <b>LA</b> 99:7,9,13 <b>lack</b> 23:13,13 <b>ladder</b> 188:12,23 189:10 <b>laid</b> 44:16 143:8 178:19 187:1 <b>Lakanal</b> 14:10 <b>LALO</b> 96:14 97:22 97:25 138:11 <b>Lambeth</b> 206:16	<b>lance</b> 81:20 <b>landline</b> 29:6 <b>large</b> 32:23 33:21 33:21 37:23 63:10 85:9 94:7 180:5 <b>large-scale</b> 64:5 <b>larger</b> 83:10 90:19 <b>largest</b> 113:6 <b>LAS</b> 45:13 138:19 <b>lasted</b> 149:2 <b>lateral</b> 13:5 <b>laterally</b> 189:22 <b>Latimer</b> 83:12 <b>lay</b> 8:12 40:9 <b>laying</b> 193:10 <b>layout</b> 91:5 135:5,8 135:12 151:13 <b>Layton</b> 96:16,17,22 <b>lead</b> 112:20 196:22 197:17 199:8,21 207:12 <b>leader</b> 23:1 106:13 <b>leadership</b> 20:12 22:24 24:3 160:11 <b>leading</b> 33:10 <b>leads</b> 71:10 <b>learn</b> 18:15 127:16 184:6 210:23 <b>learning</b> 18:16 163:25 170:16 <b>learnt</b> 132:21 133:1 <b>leave</b> 3:24 11:19 14:25 26:11 36:3 48:24 145:21,22 175:15 182:17 <b>leaving</b> 11:14 15:11 15:18 112:5 144:11 152:12,17 184:8 186:19 193:9 202:16 <b>led</b> 112:20 192:17 192:19 <b>Lee</b> 49:23 74:22 77:25 78:3,5,18 78:20 175:6,17,22	175:23 176:4,7 177:15 <b>left</b> 19:20 56:25 60:10 79:14,16 80:2 97:1 129:24 131:11,25 137:20 144:1,7,7 147:18 147:21 158:8 169:24 178:21 208:12 <b>left-hand</b> 172:17 172:19 <b>length</b> 54:23 100:25 187:11 212:11 <b>lengths</b> 154:3 <b>let's</b> 49:15 51:12 57:13 66:14 71:14 88:15 102:10,16 102:25 103:16 119:25 125:14 138:6,20 143:17 144:22 156:1 172:7 203:12 <b>level</b> 8:4 9:13 13:5 14:21 26:16 28:1 30:15 33:20 34:3 34:6 36:20 40:14 43:3,4,17 47:23 54:1,10 58:9 64:6 65:23 69:3 74:1 83:20 87:23 88:3 88:5 90:15 103:21 112:24 117:24 118:3,9 157:17 158:25 159:10 166:1 169:7,14 172:24 187:9,10 198:1 211:14 <b>LFB</b> 2:7 3:14 188:7 <b>LFB's</b> 2:21 <b>LFB00000188</b> 172:10 <b>LFB00001968</b> 102:10	<b>LFB00003112</b> 79:12 170:4 <b>LFB00003113</b> 13:24 <b>LFB00003114</b> 66:5 <b>liaison</b> 96:10 138:12 <b>life</b> 44:11 68:24 <b>lift</b> 31:8 82:22 190:14,17,19,21 191:3,8,11,15,23 191:24 192:3 200:22 201:1,1,1 201:3,4,9,9,15,18 201:20 202:1,1,12 202:20 203:4 <b>lifts</b> 190:11 202:16 202:24 203:2,7 <b>light</b> 2:2 63:2,23 64:10 210:9 <b>lighting</b> 64:12 <b>liked</b> 83:17,19 85:16 122:9 <b>likelihood</b> 192:13 <b>limit</b> 161:19 <b>limited</b> 64:22 74:21 128:22 <b>limits</b> 164:6 <b>line</b> 27:14 29:11,13 75:4 83:15,16 110:16 122:25 123:5,12,13,24 124:6 169:18 181:23,25 193:10 207:13,14 208:22 <b>linear</b> 157:3,10 158:13 <b>lines</b> 62:19 69:11 73:5 135:10 182:5 182:15 183:7 <b>lining</b> 158:6 <b>link</b> 123:6 <b>linked</b> 120:22 <b>list</b> 116:18 <b>listed</b> 63:3
--	---	--	---	--

<b>listen</b> 140:13	106:20 110:25	12:9 19:21 21:19	208:24	139:22 167:1
<b>listening</b> 14:11	112:9,22 113:9,10	37:21 47:22	<b>loudhailer</b> 26:19	191:14 193:1
80:8 105:23	113:19 116:11	130:10 133:23	63:2,23 64:8	197:24
139:16	117:21 125:21,22	191:8	<b>low</b> 162:20	<b>man</b> 5:20
<b>literally</b> 178:18	130:22 131:20,21	<b>look</b> 13:23 56:3	<b>lower</b> 73:4 130:9	<b>manage</b> 24:25
181:9	131:22 132:5	62:15 66:14 89:6	183:22	27:22 30:17 34:8
<b>little</b> 28:13 46:15	136:13 144:23,23	91:8 107:20	<b>lucky</b> 90:17 91:13	36:6,25 37:1,7,10
46:16,17,22,24	147:6,9 174:16,19	108:19 120:6	91:15	37:12 38:8 39:19
73:4 88:15 109:21	178:2 181:11	137:10,17 143:17	<b>lunch</b> 125:9,11	40:16
148:8 172:7 182:3	182:4 195:19	153:14 157:10	133:23	<b>manageable</b> 16:11
193:21,22 205:16	209:9 210:16	163:15 170:3		28:6 31:16
<b>lives</b> 38:16 52:13	<b>logged</b> 5:10 94:4	175:18,18 180:8	<b>M</b>	<b>managed</b> 32:24
<b>living</b> 67:17	128:4 175:4	180:10 182:16,18	<b>M25</b> 188:11,12	60:22
<b>lobbies</b> 35:22	<b>logging</b> 94:11	188:21 192:6	<b>machine</b> 189:2	<b>management</b> 40:13
<b>lobby</b> 11:16 12:19	<b>loggist</b> 5:11 94:9	194:2 200:11	<b>machines</b> 165:24	70:8 84:23 190:15
50:11,15 54:1	144:10	210:16 212:25	<b>macro</b> 43:17	<b>manager</b> 1:16 3:7
82:7,8 90:12 99:4	<b>loggists</b> 94:8	<b>looked</b> 14:18	119:21	3:12 90:15 104:5
141:22 150:9	<b>logic</b> 67:5	117:22 166:15	<b>magnitude</b> 204:2	104:10,11,14
163:14 165:4	<b>logistic</b> 24:19	181:18 183:20	<b>main</b> 34:24 35:4,5	157:6
166:13 177:2	<b>logistical</b> 160:7	194:1 200:22	35:8 68:10 70:4	<b>managers</b> 158:14
179:22	<b>logistics</b> 34:25	<b>looking</b> 18:5 21:12	137:17 149:12,13	<b>managing</b> 10:13
<b>LOC</b> 129:2,4	74:23	42:12 76:17 81:15	179:24 180:6	12:7 38:22 43:15
<b>local</b> 60:18 87:17	<b>logs</b> 65:20	82:21 118:9 132:3	209:23	70:5 79:6
88:13 90:20 92:25	<b>London</b> 24:14	137:14 147:6	<b>mains</b> 183:9	<b>mandatory</b> 89:17
93:12 95:23 96:10	60:17 91:17,20	158:25 161:5	<b>maintain</b> 18:18,19	<b>manner</b> 13:19
97:9,22 98:5,11	92:8 128:23 129:5	173:10 195:17	28:7,17 43:14	<b>manuscript</b> 14:1
98:17,20 99:13,16	129:8,12,15	198:23	45:11 48:1 69:12	<b>map</b> 83:3,6,9,9
99:18 100:6	131:14 132:13	<b>looks</b> 50:13 85:17	70:3,9 124:4	91:2
138:10,11 140:25	135:8 154:6	97:25 114:3	144:18 160:9	<b>mapping</b> 85:5,11
194:10	194:10 199:8,9	131:18 138:14	169:10	85:15,16
<b>locate</b> 95:11 153:4	205:1,24 207:24	150:18 179:21	<b>maintained</b> 72:11	<b>maps</b> 90:21 91:1
<b>located</b> 193:15	<b>long</b> 4:24 22:17	196:7	123:14	<b>Marine</b> 204:20
<b>location</b> 162:16	39:10 41:10 49:2	<b>loop</b> 12:4 28:8	<b>maintaining</b> 17:14	<b>maritime</b> 205:22
204:5	52:21 55:23 58:15	118:14 124:18,21	42:11 53:22 61:25	<b>mark</b> 55:24 56:7
<b>locations</b> 66:18	59:3 71:3 72:11	187:5	70:11,21 77:17	97:16 98:24
129:21 209:12	74:17 93:18 94:11	<b>losing</b> 44:5 52:13	123:7 133:8 160:5	113:10 130:22
<b>log</b> 3:17,19 6:21	94:22 97:7 100:2	171:2	181:25	137:14 141:4
10:17 14:25 31:23	108:5 137:4,12	<b>lost</b> 31:8 43:12	<b>major</b> 33:4 60:16	144:25 151:21
40:24 52:22 53:4	141:5 147:23	<b>lot</b> 52:5 91:18	68:2 105:3 139:10	166:14 167:6
53:7 75:21 76:3	149:2,4 152:16	92:21 98:11 109:1	207:24 209:7	169:25 195:20
78:17 85:21 86:5	156:5,20 177:10	135:22 154:10	<b>majority</b> 42:21	<b>marking</b> 90:4
87:11 93:25 94:15	177:25 193:1	170:24 171:13	<b>make-up</b> 75:23	<b>markings</b> 52:4,14
95:8,16 97:15	195:2 201:23	172:18 180:9	91:9	52:17
98:1,3 102:4	212:3	204:20	<b>making</b> 7:21 20:13	<b>marks</b> 52:15
104:21 105:20,21	<b>longer</b> 8:7 11:1	<b>lots</b> 91:2 205:12	45:8,9 53:4 87:24	152:15
			116:2 132:14	



<b>MARTIN</b> 1:3,7,10 1:17 2:13,17,23 45:22 46:2,6,10 46:12,20 86:16,21 87:2 125:1,4,12 125:14,17 133:16 133:19,22 134:3,9 134:12 167:15,17 167:19,22 168:1,5 200:4,7,13,18,20 212:7,15,19,23 213:3 <b>mass</b> 24:17 25:10 26:13,17 32:24 33:9,13,17 49:14 101:9 <b>massive</b> 17:11 20:1 24:7 70:20 160:7 <b>master</b> 193:24 <b>match</b> 141:17 <b>Matel</b> 192:8,16 193:18 <b>material</b> 189:23 190:10 195:2 <b>Matt</b> 50:6 51:22,23 58:23 61:21 82:16 115:22 116:21,25 117:7 119:3 125:23 126:5 127:8,9 128:2,15 129:14 141:15 145:3 161:25 <b>Matt's</b> 145:16 <b>matter</b> 28:4 29:2 88:19 122:20 130:25 165:12 201:22 203:1 210:2,17 <b>mattered</b> 12:25 <b>matters</b> 10:1 142:24 <b>Max</b> 195:22 <b>maximum</b> 162:18 166:1 <b>MC</b> 145:2,3	<b>MCA</b> 204:23 205:23 <b>McConochie</b> 5:7 94:3 128:6 145:22 <b>mean</b> 28:3 30:24 38:15 47:7 54:19 54:25 55:6 59:15 66:22 71:2,24 72:2,3 75:7 81:1 99:15 123:2 124:18 126:17 155:5 169:19 170:19 173:7 181:2 196:24 <b>means</b> 61:12,13 129:4 <b>meant</b> 20:24 26:16 35:20 47:22 65:15 79:17 99:3 110:15 127:4 128:16 155:11 <b>measure</b> 98:13 173:24 <b>measured</b> 44:12 98:14 <b>media</b> 156:9 <b>meet</b> 9:2,3 17:4 145:14 <b>meeting</b> 14:2 45:16 87:10 94:15 96:1 99:7,14 114:25 115:4,7 117:20 118:1 135:1,3,17 138:4 160:23 174:22 183:12 196:2 <b>meetings</b> 93:12,13 93:14 95:24 96:14 116:22 117:16 118:4 137:1 <b>melt</b> 207:17 <b>members</b> 1:13 3:14 9:25 <b>memories</b> 100:11 <b>memory</b> 53:2 54:20	57:10 58:13 102:14 107:1 158:18,19,19 177:4,11,14,16,20 177:24 <b>men</b> 34:13 199:8 <b>mental</b> 199:18 <b>mention</b> 46:13 72:20 95:16 102:6 <b>mentioned</b> 45:15 77:18 135:5 <b>message</b> 32:5 65:10 76:1,2,5 101:10 104:25 105:15 106:10,18 107:2 107:17 110:24 111:2,5,17 112:4 112:7,15,17 113:24 114:5,6,8 114:19,24 115:1 131:1,3,5 161:15 206:17 <b>messages</b> 104:19 105:23 106:8,11 106:19 112:3 132:3,5 <b>met</b> 62:14 176:23 <b>MET00005404</b> 3:17 <b>MET00005774</b> 163:12 <b>MET00008735</b> 109:16 <b>MET00013235</b> 134:20 <b>MET00015705</b> 108:19 <b>MET00015927</b> 103:17 <b>MET00015936</b> 180:8 <b>MET00018729</b> 102:17 <b>MET00018761</b> 62:15	<b>metal</b> 33:21 92:2 <b>method</b> 26:20 159:4 207:12 <b>methodology</b> 207:5 <b>Metropolitan</b> 1:21 34:17 206:16 <b>mezzanine</b> 104:15 104:18 <b>Mick</b> 58:23 61:21 82:16 115:22 116:21,25 117:7 119:2 161:25 178:5 179:16,18 205:20 <b>mid-question</b> 138:5 <b>mid-sentence</b> 138:4 <b>middle</b> 50:9 68:6 87:8 109:21 112:11 113:13 138:18 170:6 209:5 <b>middle-aged</b> 5:20 <b>Mike</b> 21:1 96:18 <b>Mike's</b> 21:4 <b>military</b> 64:1 <b>Millett</b> 1:6,9,11,18 2:14,22,24 3:2 45:20 46:18,21,22 86:12 87:5 114:12 125:10,16,20 133:13,18,19,21 134:13,14 161:22 167:12,16,20,21 168:7 199:23 200:20,21 211:24 212:18,20 213:2 <b>Mills</b> 206:15 <b>min</b> 206:1 <b>mind</b> 6:16 8:24 16:6 17:2 22:1 24:18 34:8 50:24 51:1 60:18 100:12 112:8 120:21 124:24 136:16 <b>mindful</b> 43:16 69:7	<b>mine</b> 21:2,5 <b>minimal</b> 25:7,8 <b>minimise</b> 165:20 <b>minimum</b> 206:1 <b>minor</b> 38:23 <b>minute</b> 14:19 77:18 83:23 149:3 164:20 184:10 <b>minutes</b> 17:17,19 23:6 26:3 75:8 114:24 124:24 135:13 137:4 139:10,12 149:3 152:21,24 164:23 <b>minutiae</b> 163:5 <b>misleading</b> 33:8 <b>missed</b> 50:24 <b>missing</b> 88:6 <b>mistake</b> 111:8 <b>mixed</b> 195:8 <b>Mm</b> 17:18 54:14 92:18 178:5 209:2 <b>mobile</b> 29:4,11 75:2 76:20 193:7 193:17 <b>mobilise</b> 187:24 <b>model</b> 8:25 93:6 <b>moment</b> 1:4,15 7:15 16:13,17 19:25 45:5 51:17 59:13 86:15 111:21 133:14 145:9 162:13 169:16 182:16 188:1 196:14 <b>moments</b> 150:22 <b>momentum</b> 17:14 42:15 159:21 160:14 <b>monitor</b> 106:6 123:24 <b>monitoring</b> 62:24 106:4 107:3 144:12 145:11 178:22
--	--	--	---	--

<b>MOORE-BICK</b> 1:3,7,10,17 2:13 2:17,23 45:22 46:2,6,10,12,20 86:16,21 87:2 125:1,4,12,14,17 133:16,19,22 134:3,9,12 167:15 167:17,19,22 168:1,5 200:4,7 200:13,18,20 212:7,15,19,23 213:3 <b>moral</b> 9:17 161:2 <b>morning</b> 1:3,6,7,8 1:8,9 3:2,3 60:6 68:22 96:9 103:19 135:17 148:19 183:21 194:1 203:17,23 <b>motivated</b> 28:21 160:10 <b>motor</b> 201:20 <b>mouth</b> 14:15 <b>move</b> 22:8 35:4 52:5 82:3 102:25 113:9 133:14,14 142:10,13,14 159:12 160:3 <b>moved</b> 23:10 109:8 126:9,14 127:4,18 157:18 160:1 179:15 <b>movement</b> 142:9 <b>movements</b> 52:5 <b>moving</b> 16:21 31:23 40:5,10 82:4 87:14 108:11 116:9 190:22 191:19 206:9 <b>MPS</b> 5:5 45:13 177:1 <b>Mulholland</b> 58:23 61:21 161:25 178:5 205:20	<b>multi-agency</b> 80:1 <b>multiple</b> 32:21 <b>Murphy</b> 158:7 <hr/> <b>N</b> <hr/> <b>name</b> 5:18,19 96:10 96:16 136:15 138:9 151:21 157:8 <b>names</b> 96:19 136:11,14 185:16 <b>narrative</b> 55:23 56:6 107:21 108:22 <b>National</b> 209:6,11 <b>natural</b> 139:1 <b>nature</b> 11:7 12:12 35:16 54:24 89:24 90:8,11 111:22 114:17 119:1 139:19 154:18 185:6 187:13 189:23 191:17 197:22 201:19 202:8 204:7 211:11 <b>near</b> 150:12 <b>nearby</b> 146:11 <b>neat</b> 173:3 174:2 <b>necessarily</b> 8:4 9:6 11:17 15:6 39:20 78:13 94:5 95:25 109:6 132:9 162:21 197:4 202:7,19 <b>necessary</b> 3:14 106:2 156:8 193:16 <b>need</b> 1:24 6:8 9:6 9:19 20:4,7,9 21:17,23 23:7 25:13 36:6,21 39:20 47:2,13,20 47:23 56:12 69:4 69:11 70:2 78:8 79:9,25 91:20	96:23 112:21 125:17 126:25 132:11 137:6 146:22 160:2,2 169:3,15 172:19 175:18 176:15 194:12 200:8 210:10 <b>needed</b> 9:13,15,15 17:7,10,12 18:11 18:19 20:10 21:24 22:4 24:4,5 34:3 36:6 42:13 43:12 54:7 60:19,22 73:12 74:10 80:3 116:10 120:23 121:15 124:20 126:23 141:22 142:6 143:21 144:17 151:25 152:22 154:5,25 155:19 160:25 162:5,16 163:8 165:18 169:14,18 183:8 186:11 193:13 204:24 206:17,22 <b>needing</b> 18:18 88:16 <b>needs</b> 9:3 137:14 142:11 183:10 <b>negligible</b> 190:3 <b>neither</b> 6:10 133:6 208:1 <b>network</b> 74:21 78:15 79:7,21 83:16 <b>never</b> 34:8 45:10 60:18 64:2 70:23 77:12 110:10,11 118:25 121:5 201:2 203:6 205:6 206:10 <b>new</b> 39:5,11 46:23 84:13,16,25	108:12 <b>news</b> 14:9 147:24 <b>Nick</b> 5:3 10:6 96:16 96:17,22 149:11 <b>night</b> 27:18 39:6 47:15 65:18 71:4 73:21 76:20 77:14 77:16 80:9 85:3 89:8 92:21 95:12 103:23 104:17 115:20 116:20 117:4 119:4 121:20 123:11 136:10 141:12 182:4,11 183:2 192:11 195:18 198:23 199:7 201:2,22 203:11 203:20 210:23 <b>nine</b> 27:18 <b>noise</b> 63:25 64:2,6 64:9 <b>non-fire</b> 204:18 <b>non-functioning</b> 85:17 <b>normal</b> 27:12 28:3 31:1 32:25 65:22 144:20 <b>normality</b> 23:19 <b>normally</b> 8:9 28:24 66:1 71:10 91:6 91:24 125:5 <b>Norman</b> 14:14 <b>note</b> 2:5 49:17 52:22 55:22 94:16 97:17 99:6,12 101:3 107:20 108:22 130:18 141:18 148:24 176:3,16 179:21 <b>noted</b> 84:22 86:6,9 145:6 <b>notes</b> 14:1 50:13 60:9 68:6 79:10 98:23 135:7	143:17 170:3 177:8 <b>noticeably</b> 190:7 <b>notwithstanding</b> 115:24 <b>NPAS</b> 45:13 62:9 62:16 <b>nuanced</b> 19:16 <b>number</b> 4:6 14:3 25:7 37:25 40:23 48:2 50:20 53:2 53:18 56:23 61:13 84:8 93:11,23 105:18 106:13 109:7 111:8 114:14 115:14 118:11,12,15,22 121:19 165:23 182:5 185:23 208:16 <b>numbered</b> 105:12 <b>numbering</b> 105:9 105:11 <b>numbers</b> 3:10 9:21 28:6 29:22 35:9 37:23 73:17 90:2 94:7 103:21 104:8 105:9 106:24 108:6 109:5 110:7 110:9,10,22 111:4 114:22 116:8,11 116:15 117:12,13 117:18 119:1 164:4,7 180:5 181:20 183:24 185:2 197:9 199:19 <b>numerous</b> 210:17 <b>nuts</b> 33:13 39:13 41:21 42:24 48:20 54:25 55:6 <b>nylon</b> 207:16 <hr/> <b>O</b> <hr/> <b>o'clock</b> 125:6,11,15 133:20,21 134:1,5
--	---	---	---	---

167:20,22 168:1 212:21,24 213:4 <b>O'Loughlan[sic]</b> 3:21 178:10 <b>O'Loughlin</b> 4:15 16:16 20:16 22:9 33:25 50:6 59:5 62:2 68:25 69:14 72:16 108:20 116:20 119:3 141:15 155:8 176:20 179:1,10 179:13 209:17 <b>O'Loughlin's</b> 168:20 <b>O'Neill</b> 61:14 68:19 69:7 70:5 150:4 197:16 <b>objective</b> 33:25 145:18 <b>objectives</b> 9:1,2 17:15 40:3 62:1 73:2 145:13,15 160:23 <b>observation</b> 66:15 156:25 <b>observe</b> 123:25 189:25 <b>observing</b> 55:12 <b>obvious</b> 18:22 20:15,15 63:19 149:18 184:8 190:9 <b>obviously</b> 7:4,15 8:20 24:25 37:5 49:8 53:3 73:22 81:4 91:19 97:5 107:7 110:20 118:24 128:22 151:1 156:5 165:10 171:16 177:5 179:17,20 189:4 190:23 206:21 207:17 210:9	<b>occasion</b> 51:5 53:18 55:16 58:1 95:19 96:5,8 98:21 162:2 209:25 <b>occasionally</b> 62:5 <b>occasions</b> 40:23 53:18 118:22 121:20 203:25 <b>occupant</b> 203:14 <b>occupants</b> 26:10 67:17 169:5 <b>occupied</b> 123:8 <b>occur</b> 23:15 28:4 <b>occurred</b> 7:4 131:16 177:22 <b>occurring</b> 6:20 25:21 28:2 44:4 <b>October</b> 62:16 <b>oddly</b> 5:16 <b>offer</b> 19:21 187:23 188:17,20,22 189:9 195:1,6,7 <b>offered</b> 187:22 188:13,15 189:7 <b>officer</b> 5:18 10:6 22:18 39:18 50:1 72:11 91:4 94:6 95:5 96:11,11 104:5 106:4,16 123:5 138:12,13 144:13 145:11,16 150:13 166:22 170:20 177:1 178:23 197:16 <b>officer's</b> 38:20 137:19 <b>officers</b> 14:4 22:22 22:23 25:18 29:3 35:2 36:22,24 37:16 40:16 47:8 48:15 60:13,15,22 61:9 70:4 77:25 78:14,16 79:8,14 79:16,17 81:12	82:9 87:25 92:21 141:21 158:14 160:11,16 161:6 172:2 173:13 187:10 195:13 199:16 210:3 <b>officers'</b> 70:14 <b>Oh</b> 105:9 151:15 <b>okay</b> 44:7 52:20 86:12 95:3 124:25 125:20 133:18 143:3 146:14 174:13 181:12 203:9 211:24 <b>Oliff</b> 14:8 123:5 <b>on-scene</b> 138:19 <b>once</b> 3:9 9:4 41:5 167:9 176:19 185:21 <b>one's</b> 51:9 <b>ones</b> 13:15 56:24 56:25 <b>open</b> 22:24 24:10 101:6 124:6 <b>operate</b> 9:16 24:11 35:11 38:17 67:22 188:9,10 197:1 199:6 <b>operated</b> 199:10 201:10 <b>operating</b> 23:16,16 23:20 31:8 72:25 73:1 85:1 86:2,3,4 87:23 159:12 192:13 <b>operation</b> 20:2 24:8,18 25:4,10 43:4 68:4,9 69:12 69:19,24 70:12 116:7 119:8 120:17,22 121:14 123:7 133:9 142:13 149:19,23 160:8 169:10 181:21 187:9	191:11 201:5,11 <b>operational</b> 3:9 40:16 <b>operations</b> 24:21 35:14 41:16 53:21 68:8 120:16,20 152:1 159:19,24 185:7 206:16,18 <b>operative</b> 197:17 <b>operator</b> 15:9 106:7 123:17,18 <b>operators</b> 11:6 12:5 13:22 15:2 27:18 28:10,17 105:25 106:9 122:23 <b>opinion</b> 8:24 14:12 26:2 71:6 81:11 193:13 <b>opportunity</b> 12:19 21:13 22:16 101:11 148:16,18 162:14 163:23 <b>ops</b> 69:15 <b>option</b> 2:21 65:1,2 205:13,25 <b>options</b> 62:21 63:1 63:3 64:20 208:2 <b>ORD</b> 88:12,23,25 89:4,12,13,24 90:14 99:3,5 100:9,15,17,19 101:5 <b>order</b> 47:3,13 49:23 53:8 87:13 143:12 151:6,7 <b>ordered</b> 131:13,23 173:3 <b>ordering</b> 177:14 <b>orderly</b> 149:8 <b>orders</b> 53:6 <b>ordinarily</b> 89:22 <b>organisation</b> 107:3 <b>organisational</b> 84:21 85:5,8	<b>organisationally</b> 65:12 84:10 <b>organisations</b> 135:1 199:3 <b>original</b> 103:8 108:9 <b>originally</b> 115:13 131:8 <b>originals</b> 103:11 <b>ORT</b> 14:7 106:15 106:16 145:16 <b>other's</b> 77:17 <b>outlets</b> 90:5 <b>outline</b> 33:13 55:18 90:1,3 <b>outside</b> 13:12 49:14 49:25 93:14 103:10 118:3 136:24 156:22 158:6 176:23 188:12 207:18,19 207:24 <b>outstripped</b> 173:12 <b>over-fair</b> 115:15 <b>overall</b> 23:12 26:15 42:12 68:3 74:1 108:6 143:16 144:19 209:23 <b>overcome</b> 42:23 208:24 <b>overexpose</b> 163:4 <b>overseeing</b> 35:8 43:3 <b>oversight</b> 35:7 <b>overspill</b> 27:22 <b>overwhelmed</b> 123:4
--	--	---	---	---

---

**P**


---

**P3** 113:16  
**pace** 40:11  
**package** 48:12,18  
**page** 3:18 4:1 13:24  
14:5 49:18,22  
50:8,9,9 55:22,24  
55:25 56:6 62:17

66:5,9,12 68:6,6 68:14,15,16 73:4 75:20,22 78:17 79:11,12 81:14 85:21 87:7,8 94:13 95:8,9 97:15,18 98:7,9 98:24 102:7 104:21,22 107:21 107:21,22,23 108:22 110:25 112:9,11 113:10 113:12,19,21 117:20 125:22 130:22,23,24,25 131:2,22 134:21 134:21 141:13,18 141:20 143:5,19 143:22 144:24 148:19,23 153:13 165:3 166:5,7 167:7 169:18,23 170:1,4,7 172:11 174:16,20 175:1,1 176:3,4,16 178:2 181:8,10 182:4,18 182:18 187:19,20 190:12 193:25 194:3,3 195:19 196:1 205:18 209:4,5,9,10 <b>paged</b> 76:11,23 77:1 <b>pages</b> 1:22 102:11 134:19 <b>paid</b> 196:25 199:19 <b>pan</b> 195:22 <b>pan-London</b> 204:22 <b>paper</b> 158:4,15,23 <b>paragraph</b> 4:2 73:6 75:3 81:15,15 83:2 87:16 141:14 143:5 153:14 165:3 170:1	190:13 205:21 210:20 <b>parapet</b> 158:6 <b>part</b> 17:21 20:6 21:22 22:25 23:12 27:12 30:17 41:5 42:24 59:8 69:6 70:14 73:7 82:9 85:5 88:20 92:3 93:5 100:17 117:15 124:2,2 153:17 165:13 167:10 168:19 170:6 176:1 177:23 186:10,21 187:5 198:12,15 209:7,21 <b>partial</b> 44:6 142:1 197:12 <b>partially</b> 48:3 <b>particular</b> 9:8 13:9 22:2 43:1 52:10 90:1 91:22,23 119:5,6 121:7 122:2,8,13 124:15 126:21 136:11 137:1 155:21 162:23 171:9 172:22 176:12 191:2 202:23 <b>particularly</b> 2:20 29:25 31:11 36:22 50:21 53:12 61:20 67:15 84:8 88:2 156:20 195:10 198:14 208:2 210:11,15 <b>particulars</b> 80:16 <b>parties</b> 158:12 <b>partly</b> 135:22 <b>partners</b> 87:13 <b>parts</b> 47:25 196:5 <b>pass</b> 74:14 181:16 <b>passage</b> 134:17 157:8	<b>passed</b> 32:11 62:25 107:24 148:25 161:16 206:17 <b>passing</b> 124:11 179:16,19 <b>Pat</b> 32:3,6 36:15 37:6,11 38:4,13 39:14 40:9,25 41:1,22 42:3,10 42:13 53:15,19 55:2,8,11,14,20 56:1,8,15,20 57:2 57:5,22,24,25 58:5,10,17 59:16 59:25 60:2,12 72:15 88:1 101:7 119:18 121:1,6 126:8,24 127:2,6 127:18 130:2 132:14 146:21 151:16 152:25 153:9,19 154:4,13 155:9 156:10 159:8,23 163:5 165:5 169:3 <b>patience</b> 212:2 <b>pattern</b> 36:18 <b>patterns</b> 119:5 <b>Paul</b> 51:13 113:18 137:11,23 <b>pause</b> 102:23 138:1 138:22 <b>pending</b> 2:8 <b>penetration</b> 169:21 <b>penultimate</b> 4:1 <b>people</b> 3:24 4:8 6:8 8:5,8,11 9:16,22 10:3,21 11:12,13 11:18,21 14:25 15:7 16:15 18:15 21:19 23:2 24:10 24:17,24 25:2,7 25:23 26:24,25 27:6 28:7,11 29:10,21 30:9,19	31:21 32:23 33:3 33:5,10 34:4,7,13 34:24 35:9,11,19 35:21,23 36:7,7,9 36:14 37:6,13,21 39:19 40:14 43:16 44:16 45:25 49:3 64:24 66:22 70:7 70:10,18 71:21 72:13 77:16 79:4 79:5,9 80:13,23 80:25 83:15 88:3 88:4 90:6 94:8 96:5 97:6 107:2,5 107:10,25 108:11 108:13 109:7,8,25 110:13 111:13 112:22,23 117:18 120:14 136:9 138:6 139:19 142:12 149:21 156:13,17 160:6,7 163:4 170:24 171:4,17 173:25 184:1,8 185:4,17 185:19 190:22 191:1 193:7 194:22 195:24 197:9 198:1,2,3,7 198:19 199:6 202:15 204:11,24 206:2,7,12 207:8 208:3 <b>people's</b> 193:15 <b>perched</b> 138:15 <b>performed</b> 199:17 <b>peril</b> 12:25 <b>perilous</b> 21:22 198:19 <b>period</b> 17:11 37:21 65:16,25 94:11 95:14 97:2,7 98:18,22 137:17 148:11 152:24 156:5,20,21	166:15 176:6 177:25 198:23 <b>periodically</b> 123:11 <b>periods</b> 59:3 <b>permission</b> 6:11 <b>permit</b> 8:13 <b>person</b> 28:15 41:25 90:24 136:7 175:23,24 203:22 <b>personal</b> 81:11 <b>personally</b> 85:2 123:16,20,22 129:16 <b>personnel</b> 36:2,2 <b>persons</b> 4:6 111:9 111:25 112:1,6 113:14,16 <b>perspective</b> 17:25 47:1 106:24 173:9 173:10 183:4 <b>Pete</b> 5:23 6:3 150:18 152:13 157:5 163:16 <b>Peter</b> 3:7 7:19 134:18 <b>petrol</b> 189:17 <b>PG</b> 126:8,12 129:1 <b>phased</b> 32:25 <b>phenomenon</b> 38:24 <b>phone</b> 5:17 6:4,5 25:3 28:16 76:20 123:10,21 206:14 <b>phones</b> 75:2 193:7 193:17 <b>photo</b> 153:7,8 <b>photocopy</b> 103:9 <b>photograph</b> 51:13 59:10 102:18 103:18 108:20 135:9 170:21 <b>photographed</b> 163:21 <b>photographs</b> 111:24 <b>photography</b> 62:25
--	---	---	--	--

<p><b>photos</b> 174:4</p> <p><b>physical</b> 79:5</p> <p>120:24 193:9</p> <p>199:18</p> <p><b>PIB</b> 100:23</p> <p><b>pick</b> 6:3 65:15</p> <p>79:11 123:9</p> <p>157:25 176:2</p> <p>178:23</p> <p><b>picked</b> 67:1 123:21</p> <p>179:6,10 185:19</p> <p><b>picking</b> 180:21</p> <p><b>picture</b> 16:8,14</p> <p>42:13 51:19 59:14</p> <p>102:19 103:20</p> <p>106:4 108:24</p> <p>109:16 115:20</p> <p>118:8 150:11</p> <p>151:5,9,14 152:4</p> <p>152:11 159:23</p> <p>160:14 163:11,13</p> <p>166:12,16</p> <p><b>pictures</b> 51:12</p> <p><b>piece</b> 18:12 67:7</p> <p>81:4,12 101:8</p> <p>104:6 106:5 111:6</p> <p>116:24 176:14</p> <p>177:11,19 189:5</p> <p>196:8</p> <p><b>pieces</b> 33:21 114:7</p> <p>158:23</p> <p><b>piecing</b> 185:25</p> <p><b>pilot</b> 3:6 64:16</p> <p>205:10</p> <p><b>pin</b> 56:24 102:16</p> <p>108:11 150:7</p> <p><b>pinned</b> 103:8</p> <p><b>place</b> 9:15 11:4,21</p> <p>20:11 21:11 44:13</p> <p>47:5 61:3 69:18</p> <p>74:10 79:2 81:6</p> <p>109:15 110:7</p> <p>111:10 128:10,12</p> <p>131:10 144:17</p> <p>147:15 162:17</p>	<p>164:18 170:15</p> <p>184:12 185:11</p> <p>186:6,6,13,22</p> <p>187:3</p> <p><b>placed</b> 34:16</p> <p>114:17</p> <p><b>places</b> 110:18</p> <p><b>placing</b> 157:21</p> <p><b>plan</b> 26:9 33:12,14</p> <p>34:8,20 39:14,16</p> <p>39:23 40:19 41:21</p> <p>42:24 48:21 55:18</p> <p>58:18 60:21 72:13</p> <p>83:7 88:1 89:11</p> <p>89:19,21 90:1,6</p> <p>91:7,7,11 92:5,9</p> <p>104:14 194:14</p> <p>207:23</p> <p><b>plans</b> 83:18,23</p> <p>87:17,19,21 88:8</p> <p>88:9,11,12,14,18</p> <p>89:9,22 90:21</p> <p>92:16,23 93:7,7</p> <p>93:10,18,21 94:4</p> <p>94:14,18 95:11,13</p> <p>95:14,17,18,22,24</p> <p>96:4,12 97:2,10</p> <p>97:22 98:1,4,10</p> <p>98:16,21 99:1,19</p> <p>99:25 100:6 101:6</p> <p>101:12,14,16,25</p> <p>102:2,4,9,12,19</p> <p>103:1,5,5 134:16</p> <p>135:4,5,12,15,16</p> <p>135:18,25 136:2</p> <p>136:17,19 139:10</p> <p>139:15,22 140:10</p> <p>140:18 141:5</p> <p>168:10,13 195:25</p> <p><b>plate</b> 44:1 89:11</p> <p>90:1,10 91:5</p> <p>102:5 103:20</p> <p>104:4,8</p> <p><b>plates</b> 83:18 88:8</p> <p>92:2</p>	<p><b>platform</b> 68:13</p> <p>188:24</p> <p><b>play</b> 137:3,4 140:4</p> <p>140:5</p> <p><b>Played</b> 137:8,25</p> <p>138:21,25 140:3,6</p> <p>140:15</p> <p><b>please</b> 3:18 13:23</p> <p>13:24 46:3,4,6</p> <p>62:15,17 66:5</p> <p>68:5 75:20 86:18</p> <p>86:19,23 87:7</p> <p>102:11 103:16</p> <p>113:10 133:24</p> <p>134:1,4,5 137:23</p> <p>138:24 141:14</p> <p>144:23 153:13</p> <p>167:23 168:1</p> <p>170:4 172:9 180:8</p> <p>193:23,25 200:14</p> <p>213:4</p> <p><b>pm</b> 134:6,8 168:2,4</p> <p>200:15,17 213:5</p> <p><b>point</b> 1:12 7:22</p> <p>8:20 9:11 12:23</p> <p>16:13,23,25 17:6</p> <p>17:9 18:12,16,24</p> <p>19:14,22 20:7,20</p> <p>21:15,18 22:13,16</p> <p>23:9,24 24:3,9</p> <p>25:17,22,24 26:6</p> <p>26:7,21 27:17</p> <p>32:19 33:23 35:2</p> <p>40:21 41:1 45:15</p> <p>45:22 51:20 53:11</p> <p>53:16 54:3,4,6,19</p> <p>54:22 56:11,12</p> <p>59:25 60:2 62:12</p> <p>62:18,20 67:3</p> <p>74:10,25 77:19</p> <p>78:19,23 79:11</p> <p>80:17 82:15 84:22</p> <p>94:23 96:15 97:13</p> <p>98:8 99:16 100:13</p> <p>102:12 103:1,13</p>	<p>103:22 104:1</p> <p>106:23 107:6</p> <p>110:19 112:15,19</p> <p>113:9 114:15,20</p> <p>115:11 123:3,3</p> <p>124:7 125:15</p> <p>126:18 127:1,11</p> <p>127:12,13,14,17</p> <p>127:20 128:14,19</p> <p>129:25 131:12,14</p> <p>139:14,21 141:9</p> <p>142:5 144:14</p> <p>146:2,3 147:14,24</p> <p>149:16,25 151:13</p> <p>152:7,10,12 154:7</p> <p>156:23 157:22</p> <p>159:11 161:12,18</p> <p>161:20 162:7,9,9</p> <p>168:11 170:16</p> <p>171:16 173:8</p> <p>176:9 177:22</p> <p>178:16 179:4,5</p> <p>180:22 182:17</p> <p>184:6 185:19</p> <p>186:20 188:16,19</p> <p>190:9,25 191:3,7</p> <p>191:10,25 192:4</p> <p>195:14 197:8</p> <p>199:2 203:12</p> <p>206:11 210:23</p> <p><b>pointing</b> 51:20 52:1</p> <p>150:15</p> <p><b>pointless</b> 17:5</p> <p><b>points</b> 52:7 130:7</p> <p>132:18 149:20</p> <p><b>police</b> 1:21 10:6,12</p> <p>24:12 34:17 50:1</p> <p>73:10 81:7 94:19</p> <p>94:21 95:5 136:25</p> <p>137:19,19 145:24</p> <p>146:10 206:17</p> <p><b>Police/housing/T...</b></p> <p>135:2</p> <p><b>policy</b> 48:9 79:19</p> <p>79:24 80:3,7,10</p>	<p>80:21,25 81:12</p> <p>171:11 172:9,10</p> <p>174:9 187:1</p> <p><b>poor</b> 8:5 50:22</p> <p>151:1 182:20</p> <p><b>posed</b> 11:8</p> <p><b>position</b> 2:16 12:6</p> <p>13:22 28:9 61:7</p> <p>79:6 118:9</p> <p><b>positioned</b> 189:2</p> <p><b>Positive</b> 81:17</p> <p><b>possibility</b> 11:15</p> <p>37:5 48:15 51:10</p> <p>64:23 69:7 196:13</p> <p>196:14 205:22</p> <p>206:5,13,20,22</p> <p><b>possible</b> 10:18</p> <p>16:15 30:20 35:20</p> <p>49:24 56:10 57:10</p> <p>68:24 69:20 71:23</p> <p>72:12 83:14 90:22</p> <p>121:10 125:16</p> <p>153:21 155:1,10</p> <p>155:17 159:21</p> <p>163:8 166:1</p> <p>169:19 180:2</p> <p>184:18 190:25</p> <p>195:2 206:1,8</p> <p><b>possibly</b> 21:16 57:8</p> <p>64:18 70:21 77:25</p> <p>93:14 153:24</p> <p>179:22</p> <p><b>post</b> 133:1</p> <p><b>post-Grenfell</b></p> <p>37:20 39:1 65:14</p> <p><b>Post-Lakanal</b></p> <p>37:19 38:2,25</p> <p>48:12 164:18</p> <p>170:16 174:9</p> <p><b>postpone</b> 2:7</p> <p><b>potential</b> 9:9 19:25</p> <p>37:12 44:5 61:18</p> <p>197:12</p> <p><b>potentially</b> 27:21</p> <p>49:11 53:8 82:7</p>
--	---	---	--	--

109:8 145:19 147:22 205:8 <b>power</b> 28:13 <b>powers</b> 41:19 44:18 <b>PPE</b> 198:4,11 <b>PPV</b> 75:4 81:22 82:5 <b>PPV)/Specialist</b> 81:18 <b>practical</b> 32:17 69:1 192:10 <b>practice</b> 28:4 29:3 79:8 144:21 201:22 <b>praise</b> 199:16 <b>PRC</b> 13:25 18:14 66:10 67:2 79:10 80:17 170:3 <b>PRCs</b> 84:23 <b>pre</b> 65:13 <b>precise</b> 51:17 118:19 <b>precisely</b> 134:24 <b>premise</b> 91:21 92:7 <b>premises</b> 89:13,14 89:18 90:17 91:13 91:16,20,24 92:2 92:6,10 93:1 99:3 100:9,16,20 101:4 101:6,18,19 <b>prepare</b> 116:12 149:19 <b>prepared</b> 42:18 197:1 206:7 <b>presence</b> 189:10 <b>present</b> 14:3 130:1 135:18 182:21 191:6 <b>presentation</b> 23:13 <b>presented</b> 17:24 211:20 <b>presenting</b> 209:6 <b>press</b> 30:23 31:18 118:13 185:1 <b>pressure</b> 9:17	17:11 81:17,20 166:24 178:24 183:9 <b>presuming</b> 31:14 <b>pretty</b> 41:4 50:25 61:21 104:23 141:18 196:8 <b>prevent</b> 119:11 164:18 <b>preventing</b> 40:1,10 42:23 82:25 <b>previous</b> 20:3 92:14 113:3 130:24 177:23 <b>previously</b> 8:17 30:13 74:6 79:23 170:14,16 187:5 <b>price</b> 199:19 <b>primarily</b> 54:7 85:11 119:2 <b>primary</b> 9:1 33:25 40:3 73:2 159:11 160:8 <b>principle</b> 163:7 <b>principles</b> 39:17 72:5 <b>prior</b> 20:23 58:22 59:14 79:20 84:16 86:7 95:19 98:5 155:5,6 185:4 203:8 <b>priorities</b> 8:25 9:4 17:3,4 23:11 68:17 69:3 73:15 174:23 175:12 178:19 <b>prioritisation</b> 35:15 45:4 70:17 <b>prioritise</b> 69:22 <b>prioritised</b> 45:2 <b>prioritising</b> 43:10 44:22,24 <b>priority</b> 7:23 9:10 10:5 24:23 32:12 33:4 34:10 45:3,7	55:10 63:15 73:9 73:20,22 88:5 198:7,8 209:21,22 209:23 <b>privilege</b> 199:21 <b>privy</b> 178:15 <b>probably</b> 21:11 33:22 37:18,19 40:24 46:13 50:15 54:23 56:3 75:14 76:8 80:17 94:13 94:23 110:14 112:13 115:11 136:15 148:13 149:3 167:19 178:19 182:12 191:16 <b>problem</b> 33:16 38:8 66:21 111:19 120:13,25 121:7 132:19,24 133:7 183:25 208:6 <b>problems</b> 133:10 183:6 <b>procedure</b> 90:7 105:4 <b>procedures</b> 30:7 <b>process</b> 1:25 15:22 20:6,13 27:13 29:14 30:2,18 67:2 71:20 84:12 84:15,16,18 100:4 115:9 117:6 121:25 139:21 210:3 <b>processes</b> 28:1 30:5 147:1 164:18 185:15,16 <b>procure</b> 84:25 <b>procuring</b> 84:13,15 <b>produce</b> 208:17 <b>products</b> 64:17 205:11 <b>profession</b> 197:5 <b>professional</b> 36:24	52:11 106:8 156:11 166:21 194:24 196:15 <b>profound</b> 142:13 207:4 <b>progress</b> 16:20 34:9 35:18 40:4 42:11,15 43:14 45:11 52:12 55:17 62:1 72:1,6,11 73:3,25 74:11 115:23 116:2 117:16 119:7,15 120:18,20,21,24 121:2,14,16 122:1 122:7,24 127:5 139:7 141:12 155:10 159:16 160:9,9,10,14,24 173:20 179:9 181:20 187:16 189:20 190:1 191:21 <b>progressed</b> 127:24 <b>progressing</b> 39:24 40:1,8 41:12,17 107:10 110:21 119:10,11 120:15 142:21 157:14 191:9 <b>project</b> 155:17 <b>promise</b> 46:19 <b>prompt</b> 203:13 <b>prompted</b> 162:8 206:4,14 <b>proof</b> 47:21 <b>PROs</b> 84:23 <b>protect</b> 11:2 198:19 <b>protected</b> 15:6 191:24 <b>protection</b> 21:14 <b>protective</b> 129:10 133:3 203:19 <b>protocols</b> 105:14 <b>proud</b> 70:3 199:21	<b>prouder</b> 199:7 <b>provide</b> 13:8 28:18 47:8 60:13 135:4 135:20 194:8 <b>provided</b> 48:18 140:17,22 145:18 <b>providing</b> 25:1 30:6 <b>proximity</b> 64:16 208:15 <b>proxy</b> 78:15 <b>public</b> 1:13 2:10 87:12 198:12,19 204:12 <b>pull</b> 101:12 119:19 121:25 <b>pumps</b> 129:21,23 <b>purpose</b> 53:20 54:6 55:13 107:2 <b>purposes</b> 172:19 190:22 <b>purview</b> 90:22 <b>push</b> 17:8 41:3 72:7 88:3 119:20 127:23 154:25 159:15,21 162:5 <b>pushed</b> 154:22 156:8,17 161:8 <b>pushing</b> 127:21 154:21 161:17 162:18 <b>put</b> 3:16 4:4 5:2 7:13 8:3 9:11 11:13,23 12:9 16:19 29:6 30:10 35:20 41:5,17 47:10,14,22 48:14 51:13 69:18 74:10 78:19 90:6 111:5 111:16 113:22 121:10 122:18,20 137:15 161:3 164:18 166:10 170:15 171:8 176:10 184:12
---	--	--	---	--

185:10 186:6,6,12 186:22 194:5,22 199:11 208:20 <b>putting</b> 11:18 41:11 51:8 52:13 58:24 61:3 114:7 118:21 142:19 211:23 <b>puzzled</b> 192:7	<b>quick</b> 56:1,8 148:2 153:19 176:20 <b>quicker</b> 40:11 <b>quickly</b> 8:23 30:20 127:24 143:15 178:9 190:25 206:25 <b>quite</b> 8:23 37:8 42:4 57:8 108:5 109:1 135:23 144:5 154:10 177:18 180:9 182:11 204:20 207:25	<b>reading</b> 93:25 112:2,22 163:19 165:16 <b>ready</b> 1:10 87:2 134:13 149:22 150:25 168:5 206:23 <b>real</b> 55:12 169:11 170:25 196:12 203:22 <b>realise</b> 210:24 <b>realistic</b> 187:12 <b>realistically</b> 173:16 <b>reality</b> 20:22 <b>really</b> 2:21 9:19 17:13 20:12 24:22 26:2 33:11 35:17 41:13 64:18 70:3 74:7 77:16 78:8,8 79:15 80:19 85:12 85:16 86:1 95:20 110:18,18 118:11 127:2 133:20 142:23 143:14 161:22 171:2 177:6 181:14 186:5 191:8,21 195:14 208:10 209:23 <b>realms</b> 12:10 <b>reason</b> 50:21 70:24 85:21 92:4 120:18 124:8 126:25 146:24 165:2 166:4 174:4 188:16 192:10 194:16 <b>reasonable</b> 19:12 194:21 205:4 <b>reasonably</b> 8:8 11:23 19:21 41:17 132:16 156:18 157:23 <b>reasoned</b> 126:24 <b>reasoning</b> 81:19	<b>reasons</b> 22:10 42:20 63:24 91:25 112:16 205:12 208:24 <b>reassurance</b> 25:2 26:25 28:18 146:19 147:1 <b>reassurances</b> 166:11 <b>rebar</b> 44:5 <b>recall</b> 6:10 54:16 54:17 78:1 95:25 131:25 132:19,24 <b>recalling</b> 94:22 <b>receive</b> 58:1 61:11 66:2 101:24 102:2 102:4 119:4 195:11 <b>received</b> 1:21 30:1 56:1,8 57:2 69:15 102:12 122:2 127:21 131:13 140:11 145:17 153:19 154:7,19 <b>receives</b> 3:20 <b>receiving</b> 116:2 118:21 170:18 <b>recognise</b> 52:4 66:10 109:17 138:11 <b>recognised</b> 12:8 <b>recognising</b> 161:2 <b>recollect</b> 55:9,15 58:9 65:18 77:11 93:23,25 95:21,25 97:4 103:15 122:9 132:6 165:15 168:21 <b>recollected</b> 165:10 <b>recollection</b> 4:20 4:20,22 57:4 58:15 59:14,19 61:3 77:9 78:24 85:20 96:24 97:4 97:7,10 98:6,15	98:19 99:17 104:6 104:9 176:7 177:5 177:6 185:2 203:13 <b>recommendations</b> 194:11 <b>recommit</b> 119:20 <b>recontacted</b> 29:11 <b>record</b> 6:21 22:4 34:12,16 107:5 111:10,18 116:10 147:2,15 163:22 167:1 171:15 173:16 184:2,18 186:11,14,15 210:18 <b>recorded</b> 4:12 5:12 10:17 32:8 56:25 57:1 58:20 65:20 66:25 87:10 94:1 95:4 98:3 102:3,6 112:15 118:12 120:9 121:4 128:12 136:13 139:9,12 140:11 146:9 171:8 177:12,13 185:16 186:21 <b>recording</b> 62:23 95:5 159:4 184:13 185:11 186:7 <b>records</b> 3:22 90:21 128:25 <b>recovery</b> 70:8 81:18 116:13 <b>recreate</b> 171:22 <b>red</b> 151:17 <b>redactions</b> 1:25 <b>reduce</b> 118:12 <b>reducing</b> 116:9 190:7 <b>refer</b> 40:24 49:19 148:14 190:19 209:5 <b>reference</b> 72:8 75:4
<b>Q</b>	<b>R</b>			
<b>quantify</b> 208:11 <b>quarter</b> 18:6 76:24 85:23 <b>question</b> 6:2 14:18 15:16 19:12 29:20 40:20 41:20 44:23 44:24 47:10 48:20 55:5 58:4 65:5 70:17 71:3,9,10 71:15,16 73:11 87:19 93:15 94:17 96:4 109:2,20 112:1 114:8,25 115:17 116:16 127:10 143:25 144:6 149:24 157:19 161:7 162:8 163:24 166:4 167:3 169:9 169:14 171:8 175:14 177:5,6 181:14 185:10 186:5 190:11 198:21 203:1,21 204:11 209:14 <b>questioning</b> 181:24 <b>questions</b> 2:14 3:1 23:2 41:12 65:6 71:5 88:24 125:10 137:5,11,24 138:1 139:2 140:21 154:19 193:20 199:23,25 200:5 200:18,24 212:1,3 213:9	<b>radio</b> 54:10 73:9,11 73:21 74:1 75:24 76:10,18,22 77:1 77:9,13 105:23 106:6,7 107:15 123:22 <b>radios</b> 79:17 <b>raised</b> 80:13 84:22 157:18 <b>ramifications</b> 18:22 19:2 <b>ran</b> 45:10 70:4 <b>rang</b> 206:13,24 <b>range</b> 20:24 164:14 173:1 <b>rank</b> 145:20 <b>rapidly</b> 122:16 <b>rarities</b> 91:17,18 <b>rate</b> 25:20 159:16 <b>rationale</b> 162:11 <b>RBKC</b> 168:12,16 <b>re-evaluation</b> 41:9 <b>reach</b> 130:7,13 163:8 169:19 187:25 204:5 <b>reaches</b> 130:9 <b>reacting</b> 48:16 <b>read</b> 6:22 50:12 66:10 112:8 147:2 173:4			

102:7 125:22 129:2 172:11 196:19 <b>referred</b> 53:5 175:9 179:13 <b>referring</b> 115:7 165:17 192:8 <b>refers</b> 48:13 146:4 147:12 <b>reflect</b> 28:9 109:6 110:4 111:6 114:13 167:9 <b>reflected</b> 109:12 111:15 115:12 119:12 <b>reflecting</b> 74:6 164:16 <b>reflection</b> 118:5 152:20 204:7 <b>reflects</b> 50:17 53:1 54:23 111:3 176:6 <b>refreshed</b> 149:21 <b>refreshing</b> 70:9 <b>refuse</b> 189:7 195:6 <b>regain</b> 9:14 <b>regard</b> 8:11 173:25 <b>regarding</b> 92:10 115:18 194:15 <b>regardless</b> 10:19 60:21 145:19 159:18 <b>regards</b> 7:11,13 <b>registered</b> 180:24 <b>regrettable</b> 2:18 <b>regular</b> 60:15 61:16 116:25 117:6 136:16 <b>regulation</b> 8:9 <b>reiterate</b> 22:21 <b>related</b> 103:13 168:15 <b>relating</b> 76:3 194:5 <b>relation</b> 122:4 211:12 <b>relationship</b> 22:17	22:20 38:9 41:24 <b>relatively</b> 38:23 127:24 <b>Relativity</b> 172:11 <b>relayed</b> 99:6 127:9 <b>relevance</b> 48:19 <b>relevant</b> 3:14 48:11 72:24 106:7 181:5 <b>reliable</b> 177:8 193:12 <b>reliably</b> 47:13 <b>relief</b> 102:24 165:24 <b>reluctant</b> 111:16 <b>relying</b> 58:22 61:7 76:20 106:8 <b>remain</b> 80:1 <b>remained</b> 169:5 <b>remaining</b> 16:3 <b>remains</b> 212:1 <b>remember</b> 5:1,1,19 7:18,19 40:22 45:18 48:13 49:5 49:7,13 50:18 51:2,6,7 53:11 54:19 56:23 57:16 57:19,20,20 58:11 60:8 62:12 63:5,6 69:2,11 72:9 76:12,14,17,18,22 77:3,5,6,22,23,24 80:16 88:19 94:2 95:21 96:10,20 98:19 99:22 100:8 100:12,19,21,22 100:23 101:1,24 102:1,3 103:2,13 103:22 104:1,16 105:15 109:4,5 117:12 118:18,21 120:2,4,11,25 121:3,7 122:10 127:25 128:18,19 131:10 135:24 136:1,2 141:10	143:2 146:7 148:13 149:17 150:1 154:16 156:6 158:5,8,9 158:10,10,17,22 159:2,2,6,7 161:21 162:15,16 162:19 163:19 164:1,4,4,7,10,13 164:14 166:18 171:11 175:19 178:1 179:9 180:4 180:18,21 182:23 183:1 184:24 192:21,21 211:6 <b>remembered</b> 50:21 100:14 <b>remind</b> 103:4 <b>reminded</b> 96:20 <b>remote</b> 28:12 107:12 <b>remotely</b> 107:3 <b>removal</b> 104:3 <b>remove</b> 161:3 <b>removed</b> 104:7 <b>removing</b> 116:13 <b>rep</b> 126:1 147:7 <b>repeat</b> 15:16 121:25 <b>repeated</b> 84:22 93:11 121:20 131:2,4 165:21 174:4 <b>repeatedly</b> 93:13 98:17 101:13 136:2 139:17 163:22 170:21 <b>repeating</b> 20:18 <b>replace</b> 84:13,25 187:24 <b>report</b> 62:16 66:3 126:3,4,4 128:1 147:13 193:24 <b>reports</b> 64:24 154:7 211:7	<b>representation</b> 91:10 <b>representative</b> 93:13 95:23 138:10 140:24 146:10 <b>representatives</b> 136:3 <b>representing</b> 135:11 <b>represents</b> 193:2 <b>request</b> 50:2 63:13 75:23,24 76:6,12 76:14 77:3,5,6 92:23 93:9,21 94:4,14 97:12,13 103:7 132:14 162:3 168:21 206:18 210:4 <b>requested</b> 81:17 87:17 92:15 126:12 129:1,18 168:19,22 209:6 209:17,18 <b>requesting</b> 98:19 205:22 206:5 <b>requests</b> 93:11 97:8 97:22 110:4 131:7 131:9 <b>required</b> 91:1 162:12 174:7 <b>requirement</b> 159:14 190:20 <b>rescue</b> 25:9,10 28:13 33:13,17 36:14 44:19 61:19 64:23 65:3 68:4 68:23 69:24 71:18 111:23 120:18,19 120:20,22 121:14 126:11,15 128:17 141:24 142:7,14 156:13 159:19 169:10 173:20 197:17,18 204:10	204:19,21,23 205:13,23,24 206:6 207:5,8,12 207:14,14,15,22 207:22 208:8 <b>rescued</b> 27:7 39:9 70:19 110:14 184:20 203:16 204:1 <b>rescuer</b> 205:8 207:6 <b>rescues</b> 32:22 33:2 109:25 118:12 155:21 208:16 <b>rescuing</b> 116:13 205:14 <b>reservations</b> 205:25 <b>reserve</b> 133:2 166:1 <b>reserves</b> 129:9,9 <b>resident</b> 202:7,11 <b>residential</b> 48:16 105:2 114:1 <b>residents</b> 9:25 12:18 26:17,22 27:4,9 31:4 38:23 39:3 146:11 184:9 184:14 201:16 202:4 203:3 204:13 208:12 <b>resilience</b> 92:8 194:10 <b>resistance</b> 195:23 <b>resolve</b> 121:15 198:6 208:5 <b>resort</b> 171:4 <b>resource</b> 24:12 128:22 205:5 206:8 <b>resourced</b> 68:12 <b>resources</b> 10:8 24:14 43:15 45:10 70:22 79:6 85:10 129:3 161:9 162:5
---	---	--	---	---



165:7,23 177:14 190:24 <b>resourcing</b> 24:19 74:23 78:7 112:21 113:4 114:17 159:14 <b>respect</b> 23:5 <b>respond</b> 155:21 <b>responded</b> 124:19 <b>responding</b> 81:7 <b>response</b> 124:16 126:2 198:25 199:7 <b>responses</b> 122:3 <b>responsibility</b> 5:10 30:16 41:23 68:9 80:24 84:20 <b>responsible</b> 68:11 90:23,24 151:25 <b>rest</b> 138:4 185:20 <b>rests</b> 124:23 <b>result</b> 12:15 154:3 162:3 <b>resulting</b> 142:1 <b>resume</b> 86:19 133:25 178:22 212:24 <b>return</b> 101:14 187:5 <b>returned</b> 147:3 <b>returning</b> 149:21 185:8 <b>reverse</b> 41:6 <b>revert</b> 74:19 <b>reverted</b> 75:5 <b>reverts</b> 194:24 <b>review</b> 13:25 66:17 170:6 <b>revisit</b> 3:4 92:12 <b>reworn</b> 146:16,22 <b>Richard</b> 32:4,6 36:15 37:7,11 38:5,13 39:14 40:9 41:1,22 42:2 42:10,14 53:14,19	55:1,7,11,14,21 56:2,9,16,20 57:3 57:5,22,24,25 58:6,10,17 59:16 59:25 60:2,12 72:15 88:2 101:8 121:6 151:16 153:1,9,20 154:13 155:9 156:11 159:7,23 163:5 165:5 169:2 206:15 <b>Richard's</b> 119:18 <b>right</b> 9:5 21:2 23:23,24 26:6 37:11 43:17 44:15 46:6,10,18 50:16 51:23 52:20 66:19 75:10 77:18 85:18 86:21,23 87:2 88:15 108:3 115:8 123:16 124:24 133:7,22 134:3,9 136:21 138:24 141:8 143:11 144:4 148:12 149:8 150:15,16 151:15 160:4 164:24 165:9 168:5 182:2 193:6 194:22 195:17 <b>right-hand</b> 103:19 108:24 138:8 180:11 <b>rightfully</b> 65:21 <b>rightly</b> 37:8 123:14 139:20 197:21 <b>rights</b> 44:16 198:1 198:2,13,18 <b>ring</b> 26:25 96:16,17 120:6,8 151:21,22 <b>RISE</b> 105:4 <b>riser</b> 90:4 182:7,8,9 182:10,13,17,20 182:24 183:2,5	<b>rising</b> 182:25 <b>risk</b> 11:4,8 15:11 17:22 20:18 42:17 44:9,11 63:21 83:15 90:24 142:1 142:20 146:12 156:7 157:21 171:23 183:19 191:24 194:8 198:9 199:11 207:5 <b>risk-laden</b> 197:2 <b>risks</b> 15:14,17 <b>Road</b> 83:12 <b>Roe</b> 1:5,7,9 2:25 3:2,17,20,22 31:23 45:24 46:10 53:13 55:24 71:1 87:2 97:22 105:1 113:23 114:1 125:22 131:21 133:23 134:9,14 135:3,17,18 144:23 167:17 168:7 172:14 178:2 181:10 182:4 198:21 199:23 200:5,21 209:9 211:25 213:9 <b>role</b> 16:10 28:19 30:8 59:9 85:3 106:1 136:19 144:21 145:19 <b>roles</b> 60:23 <b>roof</b> 63:11 64:24 204:11,14,24 205:14 206:7,12 207:9,10 208:4 <b>room</b> 6:12,23 8:19 13:25 14:3,11 15:2 27:18 29:3 30:3 46:4 123:1 133:25 150:13 152:14 199:3,5	201:20 206:16,18 <b>rooms</b> 27:21 <b>rope</b> 207:14 <b>ropes</b> 207:16 <b>rose</b> 200:23 <b>rotation</b> 163:1 <b>rough</b> 89:21 <b>roughly</b> 78:2 103:1 121:3 155:3 <b>round</b> 98:8 <b>route</b> 15:15,21 37:13 148:18 193:1 <b>rubbed</b> 171:1 <b>rule</b> 67:21 <b>Rumble</b> 96:18 97:23 <b>run</b> 3:9 8:22 116:18 170:25 191:24 192:24,25 193:1 <b>runners</b> 75:1 76:21 <b>running</b> 1:22 51:10 56:9 113:14 117:23 153:20 182:7 <b>runs</b> 34:14 140:2 <b>rush</b> 83:14	114:19 157:8 <b>Saunders</b> 149:11 <b>save</b> 16:15 44:12 <b>saveable</b> 68:24 <b>saw</b> 8:1,12 10:6 18:8,8 40:25 49:25 102:13 103:2 158:3 159:8 170:14 181:17 190:8 <b>saying</b> 12:21 69:11 73:22 115:1,9 140:10,12 186:8 192:19 195:24 <b>says</b> 53:7 78:20,22 85:19,23 95:10 96:24 97:21 105:5 109:21,24 110:25 111:13 113:13,25 126:6 134:22 135:10 141:18 150:12 170:7 177:14,16 180:12 182:10 <b>scale</b> 12:11 47:21 61:17 64:16 67:11 83:10 85:6 107:4 111:14 187:13 190:6,23 <b>scared</b> 28:15 160:6 <b>scenario</b> 204:18 <b>scene</b> 26:14,22 27:4 89:10 104:20 194:14 <b>scepticism</b> 195:16 <b>SCG</b> 178:17 <b>schedule</b> 1:15 <b>scheduled</b> 1:18 <b>scrambled</b> 65:10 <b>screen</b> 56:4 114:8 134:19 137:20 163:14 <b>SDAB[sic]</b> 178:7 <b>SDBA</b> 128:21 161:14,18 162:18
---	---	---	--	--

163:9,17 164:3,5 165:6,18,25 169:18,21 <b>SDBA</b> [sic 163:8 <b>search</b> 61:19 64:23 71:18,25 126:11 126:15 128:17 142:14 154:14 159:18 197:17 204:23 205:23 207:22 <b>second</b> 41:20 49:19 51:18 66:14 68:23 78:21 81:15 98:7 107:21 113:7 137:18 139:24 153:14 190:12 209:10 <b>sector</b> 3:25 8:22 31:25 32:1,6,12 35:6,7,9 36:5,23 45:9 54:7 55:15 56:9,17 59:6,7 61:10,15 68:9,11 69:17 72:18,19 99:6 100:24 103:12 123:15 126:8 151:23 153:20 162:1 <b>sectors</b> 164:1 <b>secure</b> 37:22 73:10 80:1 81:6 201:18 209:14 <b>securing</b> 70:5 <b>security</b> 79:25 80:2 81:2,9 <b>security-sensitive</b> 81:4 <b>see</b> 3:18,19 5:20 6:21 14:24 16:2,7 19:6 20:1 25:19 40:9 47:20 49:15 49:18,22 51:12,19 54:8,15 56:3 62:20 63:17 71:12	71:14 75:22 76:2 77:3,6 78:17 79:13 82:6 83:10 85:22 87:8 94:15 95:8 96:3 97:19 98:24 102:16,19 103:16,19,20 106:20 107:22 108:21,23 109:1,9 109:22 110:2 113:21,25 114:6 117:21 124:9 125:4,14,18 126:6 128:10 130:17 131:2,3,20 134:24 136:8 137:6,18,20 138:3,6 139:24 143:16 144:22,24 145:23 146:15 148:1,17 150:5,11 151:9 152:3,3,11 153:11 156:3 157:12 158:1,14 163:24 166:16 172:7,17 174:19 176:6 180:3,7 181:2 182:5 183:11 184:22 188:16 189:8 194:4 195:20 200:8 203:12 209:10 211:24 <b>seeing</b> 33:20,21 59:14,21 76:9 81:23 103:13,22 104:1,16 143:12 158:9,10 <b>seek</b> 72:7 76:7 202:7 <b>seeking</b> 74:9 78:15 <b>seemingly</b> 164:19 <b>seen</b> 7:11 11:15 16:6 19:6,7,18 20:23 24:21 43:22 52:25 53:16 58:19	103:4 110:23 141:4 152:16 153:8 158:20 164:23 177:17 180:24 189:2 207:23 208:18 <b>self</b> 183:24 <b>self-evac</b> 183:25 <b>self-evacuate</b> 37:23 <b>send</b> 103:5 114:8 119:9 <b>sending</b> 191:20 <b>senior</b> 3:14 22:23 40:15 80:14 112:24 <b>sense</b> 7:25 8:15 10:3 11:10 25:6 36:9 45:4 47:17 70:17 72:14 80:25 88:14 91:4 108:6 108:14 119:21 128:24 130:11 146:19 169:12 183:1 201:12 206:9 <b>sense-checked</b> 144:20 <b>sensible</b> 61:10 86:16 <b>sensitively</b> 110:6 <b>sent</b> 32:5 76:5 103:6 115:1 118:16 <b>sentence</b> 31:24 83:1,5 182:23 210:20 <b>separate</b> 10:20 73:12,13 108:12 116:22 165:8 186:22 209:12 <b>separately</b> 146:19 146:23 <b>September</b> 1:1 213:7 <b>sequence</b> 55:4	131:10 <b>sequentially</b> 8:23 <b>serious</b> 33:19 64:5 184:10 <b>seriously</b> 33:19 <b>SERT</b> 81:18 <b>served</b> 38:5,13 <b>service</b> 9:23 34:17 34:17 64:3 76:6 80:1 87:15 198:17 210:9 <b>services</b> 44:19 45:13 <b>set</b> 27:15 34:10 35:13 48:7 69:3 70:2 71:5 73:7,12 74:5,12,13,15,18 77:19 78:2,3,5,21 79:1,21 98:16 99:3,7,13,24 101:16 102:2 129:8,12,13 145:13 153:16 160:16 165:22 181:1 193:15 <b>sets</b> 70:9,9 131:6,14 132:4 133:2 171:12 <b>setting</b> 17:3,4 37:18 79:7 <b>setting-up</b> 77:12 <b>seven</b> 3:10 <b>shaft</b> 191:24 195:23 <b>shape</b> 90:3 <b>share</b> 73:14 <b>sharing</b> 41:22 <b>Shaun</b> 158:7 <b>she'd</b> 178:18,19 <b>she'll</b> 200:11 <b>sheet</b> 158:5 <b>sheets</b> 33:22 157:1 157:12 158:1,3,8 158:9,10,15 159:4 159:8	<b>shield</b> 177:1 <b>shifted</b> 119:18 142:22 <b>shifting</b> 118:8 119:1 124:12 <b>shopping</b> 116:17 <b>short</b> 39:10 42:1 45:23,24 46:8 71:3,6 75:20 76:3 83:5 86:17,25 104:21 105:20 107:24 110:25 112:9 113:19 130:21 132:4 134:7 136:22 140:4 148:25 168:3 180:25 199:25 200:4,16 210:16 <b>shorten</b> 71:8 <b>shorter</b> 46:17 <b>shortly</b> 49:10 78:21 200:22 <b>should've</b> 26:5 <b>shoulder</b> 137:21 <b>show</b> 66:12 102:9 104:19 113:17 115:5 130:21 134:16 136:24 151:7 166:12 195:18 <b>showed</b> 59:10 88:8 132:4 <b>showing</b> 4:12 103:14 111:25,25 164:11 <b>shown</b> 49:16 56:18 68:13 75:20 102:17,22 103:16 110:24 111:24 112:12 135:22 136:22 137:9 153:7 156:25 163:11 172:9 176:8 193:23
--	---	--	--	--

<b>shows</b> 7:2 <b>side</b> 103:20 108:25 125:15 172:17,19 180:11 <b>sight</b> 9:19 <b>sighted</b> 189:3 <b>sign</b> 152:14 164:16 <b>signage</b> 150:12 <b>signed</b> 1:23 <b>significance</b> 38:1 <b>significant</b> 44:3 68:20 78:7 141:25 141:25 142:10 <b>significantly</b> 119:16 <b>SIL</b> 112:9 <b>similar</b> 15:1 106:19 <b>Similarly</b> 168:15 <b>Simon</b> 62:16 <b>simple</b> 34:22 44:23 70:7 71:3 173:3 210:13 211:22 <b>simpler</b> 78:22 <b>simply</b> 6:13 24:20 33:15 57:5 70:19 73:17 194:23 <b>simultaneously</b> 155:13 <b>single</b> 36:1 37:3,13 38:1 52:18 113:6 129:8 186:22 189:19 210:13 <b>sir</b> 1:3,7,8,8,10,17 2:13,17,23 3:3 45:22 46:2,5,6,10 46:11,12,19,20 86:16,20,21 87:2 87:4 125:1,4,12 125:14,17 133:16 133:19,22 134:2,3 134:9,11,12 167:15,17,18,19 167:22 168:1,5,6 200:3,4,7,13,18 200:19,20 212:6,7	212:14,15,19,23 213:3 <b>sit</b> 147:7 212:21 <b>site</b> 142:25 197:8 <b>sitrep</b> 125:23,24 126:21 175:3 178:20 <b>situated</b> 129:7 <b>situation</b> 5:4 10:9 12:8 25:1,2 33:11 51:9 52:8 80:6 87:13 121:16 128:1 192:2 197:2 198:5,6,20 203:6 204:8 <b>situational</b> 8:1 49:9 55:12 58:24 59:8 60:14 61:2,5,11 61:23 67:15 73:14 77:17 106:14 115:21 125:25 126:2,4 143:24 144:20 147:13 148:4 151:24 176:20,21 <b>size</b> 31:2 61:8 90:3 <b>skills</b> 106:9 210:10 <b>slabs</b> 196:6,11 <b>slightly</b> 78:19 128:1 133:23 147:21 151:6 171:8 181:5 <b>slowed</b> 135:21 <b>slowly</b> 46:16 <b>SM</b> 14:7 180:13 <b>small</b> 101:8 142:15 210:14 <b>smaller</b> 48:1 <b>Smith</b> 4:17 6:10 14:2,10,11,14 15:2 29:2 <b>smoke</b> 15:12 31:10 82:8,12,17 121:13 190:14 203:5 207:15	<b>smoke-affected</b> 15:19 <b>smoke-logged</b> 15:14,21 37:14 <b>snapshot</b> 8:21 118:6 <b>sole</b> 53:20 190:21 206:23 <b>solution</b> 193:4 <b>somebody</b> 92:13 101:5 122:5 203:18 <b>someone's</b> 31:14 129:19 <b>somewhat</b> 25:4 151:2 <b>Soon</b> 134:23 <b>sooner</b> 79:1 <b>SOR</b> 206:18 <b>sorry</b> 2:19 6:3 15:16 47:7 52:1 55:5 58:4 78:19 95:20 125:3 126:4 136:9 138:5 151:14 159:5 161:22 162:15 178:3 181:4,12 186:1 <b>sort</b> 34:5 48:5 54:1 77:10 80:5 89:19 89:21 90:12,13 101:1 <b>sound</b> 19:23 20:5 26:16,18 <b>sources</b> 22:3 48:5 90:22 91:2 106:13 116:18 185:23 <b>space</b> 9:16,19,23 23:2 24:10 43:9 44:21 73:13,24 74:1,7 106:2 116:4 172:5 173:17 <b>spall</b> 195:23 <b>spalling</b> 44:3	<b>span</b> 56:21 106:2 152:18 <b>spans</b> 61:8 <b>speak</b> 46:16 53:19 54:7 55:10,17 57:23 58:2,5,10 58:17 66:22 127:17 129:14 175:22 <b>speaking</b> 5:8 49:13 60:14 123:18 138:22 179:18 180:4 <b>specialise</b> 10:12 <b>specialist</b> 30:4 61:19 <b>specific</b> 71:17 72:8 120:11 122:3 133:10 136:14 155:18 159:24 164:4 173:21,23 <b>specifically</b> 10:11 32:6 36:16 48:13 72:16 83:23 85:13 100:21 136:1 155:23 <b>specifics</b> 77:23 83:21 124:13 164:7 195:1 201:8 <b>spent</b> 148:3 <b>split</b> 90:9 <b>spoke</b> 57:24 108:7 117:12 121:5 123:17 135:14 136:7,10,12 175:23 180:5 <b>spoken</b> 27:17 28:21 49:12 64:7 97:9 177:15 <b>spread</b> 4:5 13:3,5 13:10 19:19 47:19 63:12,17 82:24 120:14 141:25 147:17 148:5 189:16,18 190:8	191:25 197:11 211:5,12 <b>spreading</b> 13:18 18:6 189:22 191:18 <b>sprint</b> 150:23 <b>square</b> 181:4 <b>stability</b> 154:6 159:25 194:15 <b>stable</b> 142:11 <b>staff</b> 3:23 5:14 51:22 89:3 129:18 181:22 <b>stage</b> 12:22 54:16 54:18 59:12 74:21 79:4 80:21 87:20 98:1 104:13,17 116:3,9 132:7,14 143:1 145:5 146:17 161:10 164:11 165:12 189:12 190:1 191:6 198:22 <b>staged</b> 32:25 <b>stages</b> 57:13 171:9 184:2 <b>staircase</b> 36:1 37:3 207:11 208:1 <b>stairs</b> 25:12 35:21 58:1,2,3,6,8 152:5 153:6 191:2,22 202:17 <b>stall</b> 42:16 <b>stamp</b> 107:22 176:11 <b>stamped</b> 57:1 <b>standard</b> 195:10 <b>standing</b> 19:9 51:21,22,23,24 145:16 150:12 <b>stark</b> 17:25 <b>start</b> 20:10 21:3 62:19 79:6 86:10 100:4 137:23 139:8 165:5
--	---	--	---	--

170:24 171:9 174:3 181:9,15 182:9 184:7 185:25 186:2 189:13 <b>started</b> 21:7 84:18 116:14 154:24 155:3 178:17 181:6 201:23 <b>starting</b> 8:24 178:18 <b>starts</b> 56:6 97:18 107:22 130:23,24 141:14 <b>state</b> 13:15,16 22:4 109:17 114:14 <b>stated</b> 22:15 115:13 <b>statement</b> 1:21 2:8 2:15 4:1 50:17 57:8 58:21 59:22 60:9 68:14,15 73:4 78:20 81:14 85:17,19 87:7 94:12,20 96:22 98:7 100:10 134:17 141:14 143:9,16,20 148:14 153:14,17 165:3 166:5 167:6 169:23 187:19 190:12 205:19 209:3 210:19 <b>statements</b> 196:19 <b>stating</b> 203:8 <b>statutory</b> 198:15 <b>stay</b> 3:16 4:4 5:2 7:13 8:3 9:11 12:9 16:19 30:10 35:20 41:5 47:14 47:22 48:13 144:10 <b>stay-put</b> 4:16 5:13 6:5 10:16 12:15 14:6 22:10 25:15 31:5 32:7 36:16	37:4,22 39:4,8 45:18 46:25 47:4 49:19 58:16 59:17 <b>stayed</b> 115:2 144:11 <b>staying</b> 11:13,23 <b>stenographer</b> 46:14 <b>step</b> 108:17 202:11 <b>stepped</b> 7:2 23:4 107:24 109:10 148:25 <b>steps</b> 2:6 27:8 54:5 184:12 185:10 201:14,14 209:14 <b>Steve</b> 68:10 <b>stick</b> 86:14 136:16 148:16 180:2 <b>sticking</b> 105:20 <b>stills</b> 62:25 <b>stock</b> 91:19 <b>stop</b> 4:4 64:14 125:1,5,6 137:11 137:24 139:1 189:20 <b>stopped</b> 124:8 192:15 <b>storm</b> 13:4 <b>story</b> 39:10 107:9 110:21 133:15 173:11 <b>straightforward</b> 8:3 15:24 <b>strategic</b> 160:23 169:9 197:25 <b>strategy</b> 69:16 71:18 160:16 168:23 <b>Stratford</b> 14:11 66:17,21,23 67:6 <b>stream</b> 36:7 70:10 <b>stress</b> 171:18 187:9 <b>stripped</b> 8:10 <b>strong</b> 99:17 <b>structural</b> 194:19	196:8 <b>structure</b> 9:3 20:11 23:12 24:6 34:22 74:11 85:8 145:2 145:5,11,14 160:20 168:18 171:15,20 194:6,7 194:21 195:2,4 <b>structured</b> 171:24 <b>structures</b> 50:3 58:25 60:19 61:4 79:2 136:19 168:17 196:22 <b>struggled</b> 124:20 <b>struggling</b> 124:18 <b>stuck</b> 49:25 50:23 <b>study</b> 1:23 <b>style</b> 20:12 22:24 <b>subject</b> 134:16 200:2 <b>subjected</b> 201:6 <b>subjective</b> 26:1 196:24 <b>subsequent</b> 45:17 <b>subsequently</b> 147:2 <b>substance</b> 170:1 <b>success</b> 119:5 <b>successful</b> 77:12 <b>sudden</b> 37:12 <b>sufficiency</b> 149:15 <b>sufficient</b> 170:17 183:9 189:20 <b>suggest</b> 11:23 38:20 112:5 150:22 165:2 195:9 <b>suggesting</b> 11:19 <b>suggestion</b> 161:23 <b>suggests</b> 99:8 <b>suitable</b> 125:14 193:4 <b>summarisation</b> 196:10 <b>summarising</b> 29:8 <b>summary</b> 87:11	<b>SUP</b> 75:24 105:1 <b>Super</b> 145:24 <b>superstructure</b> 154:8 196:5 <b>supplied</b> 132:20 <b>supplies</b> 210:21,24 <b>supply</b> 90:8 100:7 132:8 149:16 154:2 183:5,6,9 183:10 189:19 209:1,20 210:11 210:13 211:3,8 <b>support</b> 10:12 24:19 34:11 58:25 60:20 68:11 83:4 84:1 85:25 86:7 129:21,22 198:12 205:24 206:19 <b>supporting</b> 45:9 <b>suppose</b> 16:9 28:8 139:14 173:9 185:18 188:14 197:25 202:10 <b>supposed</b> 5:25 <b>sure</b> 18:22 24:2 31:15 32:10 37:11 37:16 38:15 39:12 42:5 43:21,25 44:3 45:8,9,12 48:14 49:1,4 52:1 60:19 69:23 75:13 75:17 80:17 86:8 114:22 115:10 125:19 133:19 143:12 147:22 151:12 162:2 165:13 169:3 171:21 173:1 180:4 189:3,18,23 191:12 192:3 193:4 201:17 210:1,21 212:8 <b>surety</b> 49:3 <b>surprise</b> 52:23 54:21 58:13 59:21	60:4 84:8 188:5,7 204:4,9 210:15 <b>surprised</b> 53:10 84:4,14 121:21 211:16 <b>surprises</b> 204:6 <b>Surrey</b> 187:23 188:3 189:11 <b>surveyor</b> 95:10 195:21 196:4 197:3 <b>survivability</b> 8:5 <b>survivable</b> 16:3 <b>survival</b> 8:22 108:1 117:18 123:14 155:14 170:18 185:15 186:25 <b>surviving</b> 203:14 <b>survivor</b> 203:13 <b>survivors</b> 111:12 116:13 <b>suspect</b> 102:25 <b>suspicion</b> 204:12 <b>sustain</b> 24:7,15,20 <b>swapped</b> 42:5 <b>swept</b> 69:23 <b>symptom</b> 114:18 <b>system</b> 24:16 26:20 29:22 30:22,24 31:9,10 34:25 42:7 45:1 53:22 74:3 82:13,17,23 83:4,24 84:1,12 84:13,16,25 85:1 85:25 92:4,6,24 116:7 124:2,3 142:18 149:8,19 149:23 154:23 156:24 157:3,10 167:2 170:15 171:4,6,10 181:18 181:23 182:25 183:10 184:12,20 184:23 185:11,20 186:6,8,10,12,22
---	--	--	---	--

186:23 187:1,6 190:15 192:8,13 192:16,24 193:19 194:17 195:12 199:13 208:19 <b>systematic</b> 154:14 155:3 <b>systemically</b> 154:17 <b>systems</b> 31:17 89:20 173:12 199:4	185:10 201:14 204:24 205:1 209:3,14 210:7,8 <b>taken</b> 2:6 4:19 7:6 16:18 20:9,21 23:5 30:17 43:19 46:14 60:25 75:8 80:21 100:1 102:18 103:18 108:20 136:25 137:21 146:12 147:15,22 148:15 150:9 151:6 174:4 184:3 196:14 207:8 <b>takes</b> 3:20 128:10 <b>talk</b> 23:21 27:11 36:15 39:15 40:19 46:3 52:6 73:14 73:24 74:22 77:24 83:23 86:18 127:2 133:24 <b>talked</b> 12:3 69:4 165:14 195:25 <b>talking</b> 29:9,10,12 39:13 52:7 78:14 91:22 94:24 97:6 106:4,15 120:20 124:10 135:6 150:13 151:16,23 168:9 179:9 <b>tannoy</b> 26:20 <b>task</b> 46:15 162:23 202:20 211:22 <b>task-focused</b> 163:6 <b>tasked</b> 155:23 <b>tasking</b> 110:14 <b>tasks</b> 70:6 130:10 155:18 162:25 166:2 <b>TCG</b> 135:16 <b>TCGM</b> 135:1 <b>TCM</b> 48:25 49:8,8 49:11,11 50:4 53:12 87:6 93:21	94:25 97:17,24 102:3 113:13 116:22 117:20 118:1,4 126:6 174:17 178:22 179:9 180:23 181:3,7,15 196:2 <b>TCMs</b> 93:24 117:8 117:9,11 <b>team</b> 3:8 73:24 74:16 81:18 106:13 210:10 <b>tears</b> 166:9 <b>technical</b> 197:18 204:19 207:12 <b>technology</b> 81:20 <b>telemetry</b> 132:19 <b>telephone</b> 192:8,16 192:24 193:18 <b>telephones</b> 192:6 <b>tell</b> 5:19 6:7 14:1 19:18 25:16 26:9 29:22 47:1 48:24 49:6 50:19 52:14 57:18 63:20 72:3 72:16,22 84:6 86:6 88:17 89:3 98:14 107:17,18 114:12 122:16 137:13 138:3 140:24,25 141:7,9 143:15 146:23 153:4 159:1 163:18 172:14 177:9 192:18 194:22 <b>telling</b> 2:23 15:2 75:15 76:25 107:9 122:17 135:25 164:2 <b>tells</b> 14:14 110:20 177:20,21 <b>temperature</b> 196:21 <b>template</b> 158:5	171:12 172:15 173:2 <b>tempo</b> 24:20 53:21 185:7 <b>ten</b> 43:8 44:20 113:3 <b>tenable</b> 141:24 142:8 207:5 <b>tenacity</b> 160:12 <b>tend</b> 29:3 <b>tended</b> 62:4 <b>tendency</b> 112:20 <b>tension</b> 197:6 <b>tenure</b> 139:8 <b>term</b> 32:19 33:8 <b>terms</b> 7:3 12:6 14:22,23 15:8 18:10 19:19 20:12 24:25 32:17 33:16 35:10 40:5 43:22 44:25 46:25 47:7 56:14,24 61:15 68:3,4 69:1 71:24 71:24 72:13 73:2 83:15 85:9 90:9 105:11,15 110:9 112:16,17 119:14 120:14 122:7,8 123:13 124:13 129:21 144:21 147:17 148:20 156:11 165:24 168:10 169:8 173:17 188:20 189:1 195:8,10 198:9 199:6,18 202:16 210:1 211:19 <b>terrible</b> 11:21 <b>terribly</b> 172:18 <b>Territorial</b> 10:12 34:11 <b>terrorist</b> 81:7 <b>tested</b> 174:9 <b>text</b> 55:23 98:9	143:19 <b>Thames</b> 183:8 <b>thank</b> 2:17,22,23 46:1,5,11,20 86:20,22 87:5 112:10 134:2,5,12 140:10 167:12,18 167:25 168:7 198:21 200:2,3,12 200:13 211:25 212:2,5,6,8,13,14 212:16 213:2,3,4 <b>thanking</b> 140:17,19 <b>thanks</b> 134:14 <b>Thatcher</b> 5:3 10:6 137:22 <b>thereabouts</b> 57:14 <b>thermal</b> 62:22 196:20 <b>they'd</b> 7:15 30:13 141:10 154:23 155:3 173:1 184:3 185:21 <b>thick</b> 52:18 <b>thing</b> 4:7 10:5 21:7 31:1 44:15 46:13 53:17 63:25 65:11 102:9 104:4 135:19,20 137:5 137:18 141:19 142:10 163:19 169:15 171:14 180:4 210:3 <b>things</b> 19:11 20:10 22:21 24:18,22 41:14 46:24 49:2 49:4 53:3 71:7,8 72:4 82:2 83:11 93:6 95:1 124:12 131:16 143:12 164:8,17 166:20 168:9 171:25 182:5 186:24 187:14 195:19 200:8 206:9
<b>T</b>				
<b>tab</b> 66:4 172:10 193:24 <b>tabard</b> 51:22 52:19 151:17 <b>tactical</b> 36:23 45:15 60:21 62:21 63:3 64:20 72:13 87:9 88:1 93:11 94:14 95:24 114:25 115:4,6 126:9 134:25 169:8 174:22 183:12 185:14 <b>tactically</b> 17:14 <b>tactics</b> 119:19 160:17,19 161:6,8 <b>tailed</b> 38:25 <b>take</b> 2:18 5:9 10:9 11:3 16:8 18:16 20:6,8 23:23 27:8 29:5 32:23 52:10 56:14 57:13 60:23 62:17 73:19 79:17 87:6 107:24 115:11 116:5 124:22 125:8,21 128:6 137:11 141:13 146:24 147:17 148:17,22 148:25 163:3 167:3,13 178:14 182:4 184:12				

207:21 211:9 <b>think</b> 1:13 2:3 6:7 7:2,24 10:11,21 10:23,23 12:1,5 12:10 13:7,21 15:4,5,9 16:11,21 17:8,24 18:13,14 18:20 19:8,9,11 20:5,19 21:24,25 22:12,25 23:7,7 23:18,19 24:4 25:17,23,23,25 26:4,20 27:15 28:10 29:16 31:7 32:19 33:7 34:4,7 36:20 38:19 39:6 39:16,21,23 43:2 43:11 45:3,15,16 45:19,24 46:15 47:18 48:11,18 50:17 51:20,20,21 52:2,3 53:1,2 54:18 55:3 56:18 57:9,18 58:17 59:19,20 60:4,25 61:5 63:14 64:20 64:22,25 65:2,5 67:2,6,11,18,19 68:2 70:2,13,14 70:16 71:16,19 72:8 73:12,21 76:2,25,25 77:18 78:3,4,25 79:2,3 79:19 80:3,15 81:1,22 82:21 83:9,20 84:7 85:5 85:10,15 87:23 88:20 89:1,6 91:25 92:5,19 93:2,7,13,14,17 93:22 94:10,24 95:12,23 96:14 99:20 102:13,19 103:8,11,11 104:18 105:8,25	106:23 107:15,18 108:4 109:4,9,19 110:2,3 111:1,3 111:12 112:12,18 114:14,16 117:3 117:19 120:16 121:1,11 122:10 122:11,15 124:17 127:1 128:6 129:16,25 130:5 130:15 131:9,12 131:14 132:1,7 133:13 136:15 137:7 139:24 140:10 141:5 142:25 144:3 145:6 146:1,3,3,7 146:20,22 147:11 147:12,21 148:1 148:11 149:2,10 149:24 150:7,8,18 151:7 152:11,12 152:20 153:6 156:13 161:14,25 162:12 163:13 164:22 165:9,11 167:6,13,19 168:18,19 169:24 170:14 171:11 173:23,24 174:14 174:17 175:17,25 176:6,8,9,23 177:9,9,23 179:5 179:8,13,25 180:2 181:2,6 182:8,18 182:22 184:7,24 187:6,12 189:14 189:16 191:5,13 192:13,17,19 193:17 195:12,14 195:16 196:10 197:6 199:2,4 200:18 203:23 204:6,17 205:13 205:14 207:3,4	208:9,18 209:17 209:25 211:6 212:1 <b>thinking</b> 5:1 16:14 51:7 66:19 99:23 106:5 121:22 123:16 <b>third</b> 44:23 75:4 107:23 138:18 148:24 176:17 180:11 <b>thought</b> 15:22 21:12,24 22:2 25:10 31:11 34:22 36:11 41:2 58:21 98:18 118:23 119:13 120:8 132:9 147:1 148:14 177:21 181:24 185:1 188:20 192:15 208:4,18 <b>thoughts</b> 30:9 190:18 <b>three</b> 62:19 85:23 109:25 135:10 140:16 194:5 196:2 <b>three-quarters</b> 113:20 <b>throughput</b> 42:4 70:22 124:4 <b>thrust</b> 72:10 87:24 114:19 195:15 <b>Thursday</b> 213:7 <b>ties</b> 69:6 <b>tight</b> 10:17 <b>time</b> 3:6 4:6,24 12:1 16:16 17:11 18:16 19:24 20:7 22:18 23:25 24:3 31:20 37:21 39:7 41:3 43:9,24 44:21 49:2,7,10 50:8 51:7,16,17	52:24,24 53:1,5,7 53:15 54:12,21,22 54:23 55:4,8,9,24 56:7,15,22 57:4,7 57:15 59:3 61:1 62:11 63:6 65:16 65:25 66:1 72:19 74:4,7 76:23 77:1 78:2,3,10 86:1,9 93:18 94:11,13,17 94:18 95:7,12,15 97:7,11,16 98:6 98:18,22,24 99:20 99:21 101:24 102:1,16,21 103:3 103:19 105:6 107:22 108:5,7 109:9 110:2,11 111:21 113:10,12 113:18,22 118:6 118:14 119:21 120:4 121:3,18 122:21 124:12 125:3,6,7,23 126:17 130:1,12 130:22 133:4 137:14 139:5,17 140:13 141:4,5 142:3 144:25 146:20 147:17 148:3,5 150:10,20 151:5 152:10,15 152:17,18 153:7 153:11 154:12 156:20 157:8 162:13 166:14 167:6,16 169:1,25 176:11 177:10,18 177:25 178:10,15 179:14 184:16 187:11 195:20 199:2 200:25 201:24 205:1 206:1,4 210:7,8 212:3	<b>time-stamped</b> 49:3 59:23 <b>timed</b> 140:1 <b>timeline</b> 175:19 <b>times</b> 40:6 42:5 44:10 50:20 53:5 56:23 85:1 110:23 119:13 124:9 131:4 140:16 155:18 195:11 198:7,18 204:2 211:14 <b>timescales</b> 16:5 <b>timetabling</b> 1:12 <b>timing</b> 48:22 56:14 95:20 108:17 144:22 <b>timings</b> 40:22 49:4 177:12 181:1,3,4 <b>TMO</b> 101:17 <b>today</b> 1:15 2:19 19:9 177:7,18 <b>today's</b> 1:4 <b>told</b> 4:16,18 30:10 56:10 84:3 89:5 100:8,19 101:3 107:25 108:18 114:10,10 118:22 120:2 126:13 127:7,14 128:15 135:15 141:10 142:16 146:9 147:9 153:21 162:19 168:24 173:9,11 175:1 176:4 188:2 201:4 201:9 206:10,24 208:4 <b>Tom</b> 8:22 44:25 106:22 107:14,25 108:7 109:2,12 110:6 111:15 113:14,14 116:3,4 117:5,12,15,16,21 117:23 118:4,18
---	---	--	--	---

118:22 123:23 138:14,15,16 139:3 148:16 149:1 156:24 170:19 181:21 182:20 185:1 <b>Tom's</b> 45:2 124:2 <b>tomorrow</b> 212:20 212:25 213:4 <b>tool</b> 65:4 <b>tools</b> 81:25 <b>top</b> 68:15 109:22 113:12 130:23 138:15 163:15 176:5 182:18 207:8 209:22 <b>topic</b> 3:4,16 14:18 45:21 46:23 62:7 86:13 168:15 182:3 187:18 203:10 <b>topmost</b> 105:8 <b>total</b> 110:1 113:6 <b>totality</b> 48:3 <b>totals</b> 110:23 <b>tour</b> 148:21 150:2 150:21 153:17 164:22 <b>towels</b> 14:15 <b>tower</b> 7:11 8:1,6,21 9:24 10:2 11:11 11:16 15:23 16:24 24:21 25:5 32:2 32:18 36:18 39:9 40:23,25 41:7 48:25 49:6,10,12 49:14 50:10,14,19 50:20,23 51:1 52:24,25 53:11,17 53:20,23 54:22 55:10,16 56:19,23 57:3,4,6,11,21 58:14 59:12,20 61:1 62:22 63:18 80:11 83:22 84:17	84:19 89:17 99:4 117:3 118:8 121:5 121:6 124:5 126:22 127:2 130:5,8,9,16 141:22 143:4,10 143:13,21 144:1,7 145:21 146:4 147:19 148:18 149:14,20 150:3 150:13,21,23,24 150:25 151:2 152:9,12,14,19,25 153:5,10 156:22 157:2,2,4 158:21 159:3,5 160:25 162:6 164:23 165:1,4,14 167:11 168:25 169:11 170:20 176:7,12 176:19,21,24 177:15,16,20,22 179:8,22 184:1,16 184:19 185:13,17 185:21 198:1,4 209:13 <b>traditions</b> 199:10 <b>traffic</b> 54:11 73:16 <b>tragically</b> 116:12 <b>train</b> 94:7 <b>trained</b> 34:15 <b>training</b> 3:13 37:12 48:9,11,12,18 192:22 198:5,11 199:4 <b>tram</b> 79:22 111:7 <b>transcript</b> 169:17 <b>transport</b> 83:16 <b>trapped</b> 4:6 8:5 197:9 206:3,12 <b>traumatised</b> 160:7 <b>travel</b> 155:18 162:24 <b>Treadgold</b> 146:6 <b>triangulate</b> 109:14	118:16 <b>triangulating</b> 59:6 <b>triangulation</b> 7:3 <b>tricky</b> 192:23 <b>tried</b> 64:7 74:13 166:9 171:22 177:11 <b>trip</b> 166:15 193:2,9 <b>trust</b> 17:13 37:16 61:9 156:10 <b>trusted</b> 18:19 126:24 <b>trusting</b> 52:11 163:5 <b>truth</b> 111:13 177:18 <b>try</b> 16:12 20:2 26:5 33:25 43:4 46:16 57:13 71:14 77:10 100:4 102:10 116:10 118:16 119:20 186:6 187:16 198:6 <b>trying</b> 11:25 12:7 36:2 37:24 38:23 55:19 71:4,19 72:18 73:19 84:10 84:11 92:4 109:13 110:5 136:7 140:4 147:4 166:22,22 176:14 181:16 184:25 187:16 <b>TSG</b> 87:12 <b>tube</b> 83:12,15,15 <b>turn</b> 3:16,18 45:20 66:4 74:16 86:13 95:8 98:23 115:17 180:18 187:18 188:17 210:7 <b>turned</b> 5:7,14,23 6:4 10:13 25:20 26:7 117:15 <b>turning</b> 17:3 24:15 32:15 93:9 131:1 131:3,5 132:3	182:3 190:11 <b>turnover</b> 149:25 <b>TV</b> 14:9 <b>twice</b> 137:4 165:19 <b>two</b> 13:13 15:17 36:21 37:19 41:12 41:14 46:24 57:9 63:24 64:20 68:17 77:21 83:5 90:11 90:22 101:5 104:19 111:24 114:7,24 131:15 136:22 140:21 141:21 168:9 193:20 195:18 200:24 203:25 207:21 <b>two-thirds</b> 79:12 <b>tying</b> 67:24 115:24 <b>type</b> 89:16,17 90:23 91:21 <hr/> <b>U</b> <hr/> <b>ultimately</b> 16:2 208:7 <b>unable</b> 51:16 74:18 202:14 <b>unaccounted</b> 183:23 185:1 <b>unaffected</b> 91:6,8 <b>unambiguous</b> 196:8 <b>unbelievable</b> 21:8 <b>unconsidered</b> 198:10 <b>underlying</b> 199:5 <b>underneath</b> 100:16 121:24 180:15 <b>understand</b> 20:12 20:15 34:23 38:8 47:23 63:12 84:24 88:16 93:16 99:24 107:10 126:16 127:15 128:20 129:23 139:18,18 140:9 144:5	155:15 176:15 212:12 <b>understandably</b> 9:17 39:2 <b>understanding</b> 29:14 30:1 39:17 47:16 55:18 61:24 65:12,17 83:11,17 84:18 90:10 98:12 115:23 122:24 127:10 133:2 155:20 181:13 194:25 196:21 197:14,19 <b>understate</b> 112:21 <b>understating</b> 112:5 <b>understood</b> 19:14 22:6 45:10 52:25 75:17 80:25 126:16,20 140:8 207:25 <b>undertake</b> 187:12 <b>undertaking</b> 162:22 <b>underway</b> 20:2 <b>unfair</b> 2:2 25:18,23 <b>unfortunately</b> 39:4 50:24 65:25 186:15 <b>unhelpful</b> 16:22 18:21 <b>unit</b> 3:8 4:19 5:2,9 5:14,18 7:2,14 8:16 9:10 10:7 22:15,15 32:5,9 49:9,25 50:7 57:1 62:5,6 63:8 65:16 67:4,6 75:14 78:13 83:3 88:25 89:3 97:11,14 103:10 106:9 116:14 117:1 122:5 123:6,9 124:10 127:6 129:18 141:16
--	--	--	---	--

143:6,9,23,25 144:8 145:10 146:1,8,25 147:3 147:5,12,16,18,20 148:3,4,6 151:18 153:18 161:15 163:21 164:24 178:16 179:5,14 179:17,18 192:12 192:16 205:20 <b>units</b> 117:2 <b>unmanaged</b> 198:10 <b>unpack</b> 154:10 <b>unpick</b> 126:23 127:1 <b>unpredictable</b> 13:19 <b>unreasonably</b> 93:18 <b>unsurprisingly</b> 37:21 <b>unsustainable</b> 26:8 121:12 <b>untenable</b> 159:13 <b>unusual</b> 13:17 37:8 51:9 <b>up-to-date</b> 115:4 115:19 116:19 <b>update</b> 2:10 27:1 50:7 55:14 60:13 61:11 116:25 117:17 125:25 129:2,4,5,17 135:15 141:16 151:25 153:19 176:20,22 178:5 179:6,19 183:20 <b>updated</b> 58:23 <b>updates</b> 61:15,16 115:22 <b>updating</b> 117:1 <b>upmost</b> 30:18 <b>upper</b> 163:9 169:19 <b>upset</b> 75:16 <b>upstairs</b> 54:3,4,18	193:2 <b>upwards</b> 119:20 127:20 <b>urban</b> 61:19 197:17 <b>urgency</b> 112:21 <b>urgent</b> 50:2 75:24 <b>usage</b> 166:1 <b>use</b> 26:19 63:1 64:10,19 67:24 79:3 81:20 82:6,6 87:12 89:4 93:19 101:7 106:18 107:11 127:3 128:20,21 132:11 132:16 161:14 163:8 164:5 165:7 165:22,25 189:8 193:14,16 196:18 196:20 202:6,15 202:17 203:7 204:15,18 205:6 206:10,20,21 207:13,14,24 208:19 <b>useful</b> 10:14 31:12 63:10,12,24 66:25 67:7,13 79:22 85:6,8 89:3 99:25 122:22 128:22 194:17 <b>user</b> 130:25 131:3 <b>usher</b> 46:2 86:22 134:3 167:24 200:11 <b>usual</b> 133:23 <b>utilities</b> 209:16 210:6 211:17 <b>utility</b> 188:16 209:19 <b>utmost</b> 173:18	<b>validity</b> 39:3 <b>valuable</b> 61:20 <b>variable</b> 11:11 <b>variables</b> 20:24 211:11 <b>variety</b> 22:3 <b>various</b> 135:1 175:8 <b>vented</b> 16:7 <b>ventilation</b> 31:10 81:18 82:12,17 <b>verbal</b> 62:24 <b>verbalised</b> 32:9 <b>verified</b> 18:9 <b>verify</b> 22:6 106:11 108:8 <b>version</b> 169:17 <b>vertical</b> 63:19 67:13 <b>vertically</b> 13:6 189:22 <b>viability</b> 7:12 <b>viable</b> 47:22,25 205:13,15 208:2 <b>video</b> 62:22,23 136:23 137:8,25 138:21,25 140:3,6 140:15 <b>view</b> 18:19 63:11 63:19 67:3,13,18 69:21 80:10,10 144:19 154:17 187:24 <b>views</b> 14:9 <b>Vision</b> 53:5,7 <b>visit</b> 51:1 52:21 56:21 57:21 58:20 164:23 168:25 176:12 177:23 <b>visited</b> 28:22 211:15 <b>visits</b> 135:6 <b>visual</b> 19:10 171:20 <b>visually</b> 83:21 <b>vital</b> 61:6 135:5	166:2 173:19 <b>voids</b> 13:19 <b>volume</b> 12:3,7 16:12 18:10 27:16 27:19,23 29:25 30:20 33:5 34:24 35:19 63:25 64:2 64:9 69:10,13,23 69:25 70:3 71:22 73:16 108:16 110:12 111:22 123:4 137:7 170:18 171:18 172:4,25 173:6,12 183:8 187:8	116:16 126:16 132:17 137:17 139:9,12 141:12 148:20 153:5 154:10 157:16 163:1,4 166:12 170:11 174:24 178:3 180:10 188:1 190:17 191:16 194:13 197:4 200:23,24 201:18 202:11,15 202:17 206:25 210:4 <b>wanted</b> 5:2,9,10,12 5:12 9:12,22 12:16 22:7 28:24 32:3 33:24 35:12 35:14 36:7 40:10 43:10 44:21 63:12 64:13 67:4 72:6 73:13,23 74:5,8 83:18,20 88:19 98:11 101:9 110:20 116:5 118:11,14 127:2 127:15 128:23 129:5,7,11,23 130:2,6 131:11 136:6 139:13,15 139:17 141:3 142:23 144:2 147:25 148:17 161:13,16 165:20 165:25 166:24 171:3 181:12 187:15 201:10 206:22 <b>wanting</b> 19:22 26:18 57:6 100:6 100:6 128:20 174:10 175:22 198:9 <b>wants</b> 14:13 <b>War</b> 113:7
---	---	---	--	---



<b>warm</b> 206:19,25 <b>wary</b> 122:17 <b>wasn't</b> 3:11,15 7:5 7:23 8:14 11:17 14:21,21 16:22,24 25:15,16 31:8,19 31:20 43:13 45:3 53:18 54:6 55:15 63:16 70:22 74:5 74:6,9 75:15 76:5 76:6 79:1 82:5,17 82:18,20 83:4 84:3,9,14 86:8 90:13 92:24 97:2 104:6 118:9 121:18 125:18 127:14 132:9 133:11 141:2 146:25 147:8 149:8 168:14 171:7 172:22 179:17,20 188:19 189:3,6 201:3,10 201:12 202:2,13 204:3 209:21,22 <b>watch</b> 1:16 3:7,12 90:14 104:4,10,11 157:6 158:14 <b>watching</b> 125:20 <b>water</b> 154:2 170:23 183:6,8,9,18 189:19 211:23 <b>Watson</b> 104:10 <b>way</b> 10:4 11:6 13:2 13:4 18:5 21:17 24:1,24 26:13 27:3 28:23 32:24 33:8 35:17 36:10 36:17 41:7 44:12 48:17 67:9 69:24 70:17 71:17 74:9 78:22 79:12 81:21 82:6 92:5 102:11 110:13 113:21 121:21,23 126:24	127:21 128:24 137:6 142:22 143:8 145:6 147:11 154:17 165:22 171:2,24 172:12 173:14,22 174:2,2 176:8,17 179:23,25 180:11 189:2,16,18 190:5 191:18,21 198:10 201:10 202:18 207:6,17 211:18 <b>ways</b> 18:7 25:3 28:11 33:7 85:9 <b>we'll</b> 46:4 83:23 86:16,19 96:23 119:25 120:6 124:13 130:20 131:17 133:22,25 137:6 167:15,17 193:21 200:7,8 212:24 <b>we're</b> 29:9 45:20 84:10,12 94:12 107:11 125:1 136:7 167:19 174:15 176:13 185:14 186:17 197:1 209:3 212:10 <b>we've</b> 4:15 13:14 22:17 37:4,20 39:1,6 47:4 48:18 68:22 104:10 110:23 117:22 140:10,11 141:4 148:19 152:16 154:22 164:22 169:24 177:5 180:9 187:5 188:10 193:20 <b>wear</b> 129:13,22 130:12 162:24 165:19 <b>wearers</b> 149:19	155:15 165:19 <b>wearing</b> 51:21 52:18 151:17 165:21 <b>Wednesday</b> 1:1 <b>weighed</b> 28:24 <b>Welch</b> 36:15 53:14 55:1,7,21 56:2,9 56:16 57:22 58:6 58:17 59:16 60:12 151:16 153:1,20 154:13 159:7 169:2 <b>welcome</b> 1:3 22:24 134:14 <b>welcomed</b> 189:9 <b>welfare</b> 43:16 <b>went</b> 7:21 34:18 40:22,25 41:8 50:10,20 51:3,4,5 53:6,17 55:9,16 58:11 71:7,22 76:1 81:5 100:24 103:11 104:18 106:10,11 114:5 118:14,24 121:5 127:1,17 129:5 130:5 135:13 143:10 144:9,19 148:11 149:10 150:3,21 152:22 155:2 157:2 165:4 175:17 176:7 177:2,16,20 179:8 179:21,22,23 191:23 <b>weren't</b> 5:25 29:18 41:6,7 92:24 93:16 122:18 129:25 139:16 146:17 161:13,17 178:14 190:7 192:11 201:17 202:24 <b>West</b> 68:10	<b>wet</b> 14:15 182:7,8 182:10,17,20 183:2 <b>whilst</b> 12:19 13:9 43:21 52:9 55:3 55:11 61:5 63:8 70:16 81:2 194:16 198:8 206:2 <b>white</b> 5:20 <b>whiteboard</b> 108:23 109:17 180:9 181:17,19 <b>whole-building</b> 37:15 47:24 <b>wide</b> 20:24 <b>wider</b> 37:18 43:15 83:10,16 107:3 153:16 <b>wild</b> 13:19 <b>Williams</b> 157:7 166:18 176:10 <b>winch</b> 205:8,24 208:15,20 <b>winching</b> 208:14 <b>wind</b> 33:15 <b>windows</b> 67:17 <b>withdrawal</b> 126:9 127:22 <b>withdrew</b> 212:17 <b>witness</b> 1:8 46:1,5 46:11,19 68:13 81:14 86:20 87:4 87:7 94:12,20 98:7 134:2,11 153:14 167:18,25 168:6 169:23 190:12 200:3,6,12 200:19 205:18 212:6,14,16,17 <b>WM</b> 166:8 <b>Wolfenden</b> 150:18 152:13 157:6 163:16 180:13 <b>woman</b> 136:1 <b>women</b> 34:13 199:8	<b>wonder</b> 134:18 <b>wondered</b> 136:8 <b>wondering</b> 133:20 <b>word</b> 46:14 99:10 149:8,9 195:17 <b>worded</b> 147:11 <b>wording</b> 112:17 <b>words</b> 45:19 <b>work</b> 68:18 69:6 74:25 75:5,9,11 77:16 81:22,24 84:6,7,24 91:11 116:17 171:21 181:16 194:9 197:23 201:2 204:20 <b>worked</b> 84:9 94:6 121:22 <b>working</b> 22:22 63:7 65:8,9 67:4,10 75:16 82:17,19,20 82:25 83:4,25 84:3 85:14 86:7 124:3 135:13,16 154:17 155:13 185:24 187:7 191:4 193:16 197:18 201:2,4,5 201:12 <b>works</b> 29:14 30:2 160:20 <b>World</b> 113:7 <b>worried</b> 9:24 <b>worse</b> 12:14 13:16 <b>worsening</b> 13:12 126:22 <b>worst</b> 91:3 <b>worth</b> 37:18 120:16 <b>would've</b> 7:12 11:5 11:13,24 12:2 13:7 16:21 17:9 18:7,20,23 21:1,4 22:12,18 23:3 24:2 26:16,19 27:13,20,23,25
---	--	---	---	--

28:20,24 29:15,16 32:8,9 35:23 38:7 38:21 43:9,10 45:6 53:16 55:11 56:19 57:12,15 58:10,12,19,20,21 59:22,24 62:13,14 63:15,23 64:8,14 64:20 65:11,19 66:25 67:2,4,12 67:19,23,24 68:2 69:9 75:17,18 83:17,19 85:6,8 85:11 86:9 88:19 88:21 89:11,18 92:25 93:4 94:3 95:1,1 96:13 97:13,14 101:14 106:10 111:4 115:10,12 117:15 120:8 121:4 122:9 122:11 123:14,18 129:17,17,19 144:14 145:7,17 145:17 147:22 148:1,14,15 151:23 155:11 169:20 171:22 181:1,18,20,23 184:18 185:14,18 186:15,23 187:4 189:20,24 191:4,6 191:13 192:23,23 193:4 201:17 203:7 204:17 207:3 210:2 211:9 211:10 <b>wouldn't</b> 9:21 12:25 13:11 16:20 18:11,24 19:5 20:19 29:5,24 31:11 35:22 36:21 64:11,13 67:14 76:7 78:13 91:24 96:20 105:22	123:12,21 124:24 149:3 162:21 181:19 185:12 188:18 202:5,7,18 202:21 204:6,9 <b>write</b> 166:20 171:19 173:24 <b>writing</b> 164:10 166:8 170:2,8,12 171:4,25 173:5 180:10 186:16 <b>written</b> 79:19 100:10,13 112:3 158:11 164:14,15 187:3 <b>wrong</b> 26:5 32:19 43:7 57:7 81:5 94:10 102:7 111:4 111:11 130:15 189:18 192:19 <b>wrote</b> 163:16 <hr/> <b>X</b> <hr/> <b>X</b> 105:2 <hr/> <b>Y</b> <hr/> <b>yeah</b> 121:9 177:4 <b>years</b> 37:20 38:25 113:3 197:18 <b>yesterday</b> 1:20 3:5 12:4 23:18 45:3 89:1 124:19 128:7 149:5 201:23 <b>yesterday's</b> 39:6 <hr/> <b>Z</b> <hr/> <b>0</b> <hr/> <b>01.35</b> 77:2,7 <b>01.35.27</b> 76:11 <b>02.30</b> 96:25 97:1 <b>02.35</b> 14:20 <b>02.47</b> 3:19 31:24 49:18 58:16 60:11 62:10 <b>02.54</b> 49:20	<b>02.57</b> 75:3,7 85:18 <b>0235</b> 14:6 <b>0247</b> 4:3 <b>0257</b> 81:17 <b>03.00</b> 60:6 61:1 168:25 203:15,18 <b>03.01</b> 58:12 <b>03.01/03.02</b> 58:14 <b>03.02</b> 51:16 56:19 57:14,21 59:10 <b>03.09</b> 49:22 <b>03.10</b> 49:23 <b>03.15</b> 50:2 <b>03.20</b> 50:4 87:6 94:15 <b>03.39</b> 50:6,9,15 55:24 56:7,17 58:21 59:18,23 60:11 107:22 108:21 125:21 130:17 131:21 142:6 143:19 144:25 148:2,8 <b>03.44</b> 76:1 <b>03.44.20</b> 75:22 <b>03.47</b> 108:21,25 109:22,24 110:23 111:24 <b>03.48</b> 114:5 <b>03.48.17</b> 104:22 106:19 110:25 112:11 <b>03.50</b> 152:16,16 <b>03.50.44</b> 150:10 <b>03.55</b> 145:23 147:19,21 <b>03.55.39</b> 130:23,25 <b>03.55.47</b> 166:14 <b>03.55.54</b> 151:5 152:10,17 <b>03.58</b> 131:21 146:15 176:11 <b>0320</b> 87:9 <b>0339</b> 141:15 <b>04.00</b> 78:22	<b>04.03</b> 85:22 131:5 <b>04.06</b> 147:6,10,20 148:3,9 174:15 175:2,15 <b>04.11</b> 175:6 176:4 <b>04.12</b> 175:8,9 <b>04.20</b> 165:1,8 166:6 167:7 177:3 <b>04.22</b> 175:8 178:5 178:14 179:2,2 <b>04.25</b> 120:6 180:13 180:19 181:6,11 <b>04.34</b> 174:18 175:10 178:2 181:10,16 <b>04.35</b> 78:18 181:7 <b>04.45</b> 180:16 181:6 <b>04.51</b> 98:24 <b>04.34</b> 174:21 <b>0420</b> 165:4 <b>05.16</b> 98:25 <b>05.20</b> 182:5 <b>05.50</b> 113:11 114:22 115:3 117:20 182:19 183:11,15 <b>0540</b> 205:20 206:4 <b>06.13</b> 95:9 96:8 97:9 100:6 195:20 <b>06.44</b> 103:19 <b>06.48</b> 113:19 114:5 114:22 115:6 <b>06.48.43</b> 113:24 <b>0642hrs</b> 187:22 <b>07.00</b> 96:25 97:1 <b>07.13</b> 97:18 196:2 <b>07.29</b> 137:15 <b>07.29.06</b> 137:16 <b>07.30</b> 137:15 <b>07.30.54</b> 137:17 <b>07.35</b> 97:16 <b>08.10</b> 209:8 <b>08.25</b> 203:16,23 <b>08.45</b> 102:6 <b>08.55.45</b> 140:1	141:4 <b>08.55.54</b> 140:2 <hr/> <b>1</b> <hr/> <b>1</b> 14:10 66:12 73:16 73:17 74:20 75:2 75:6 77:21 105:17 125:6,11,15 172:12 209:13 <b>1/3</b> 194:7 <b>10</b> 23:6 26:3 41:13 75:8 163:17,17 164:2,3 212:21,24 213:4 <b>10.00</b> 213:7 <b>10.30</b> 45:21 46:7 <b>10.40</b> 46:4,6,9 <b>100</b> 43:11 105:3 106:20,22 107:25 108:3 109:1,13 111:1,2,13 112:5 113:2 114:2,3,9 115:2 <b>10th</b> 178:7 <b>11.35</b> 86:24 <b>11.45</b> 86:19,23 87:1 <b>114</b> 109:24 <b>115</b> 183:23 184:24 <b>11th</b> 120:10,12,13 120:13,25 121:2,8 121:9,16,18 122:18,20 180:16 <b>12</b> 205:18 <b>12.40</b> 125:5 <b>12.55</b> 134:6 <b>127</b> 108:25 <b>12th</b> 154:1 <b>133</b> 113:15 <b>14</b> 134:19,21 187:19 <b>149</b> 109:25 111:25 <b>14th</b> 183:17,19 <b>15</b> 134:19 <b>150</b> 112:4,18 <b>150-year</b> 199:10 <b>156</b> 169:18
---	--	--	---	---

<b>15th</b> 119:22,23 120:1,3 180:14,17 180:20 <b>166</b> 109:1 111:25 <b>17</b> 209:4 <b>171</b> 113:14 114:11 115:5 117:23 <b>19</b> 172:10 <b>193</b> 203:18 <hr/> <b>2</b> <hr/> <b>2</b> 62:17 66:5,9 73:8 74:3,14,15,17,18 75:5,9,15,25 76:4 77:10,13 85:21 125:22 131:22 133:20,21 134:1,5 137:4 144:24 149:3 175:1 193:15,25 194:3 195:23 213:9 <b>2.00</b> 134:8 <b>2.50</b> 168:2 <b>2017</b> 14:2 48:10 62:16 <b>2018</b> 1:1 213:7 <b>20th</b> 153:24 <b>21</b> 1:22 113:16 <b>21st</b> 153:25 <b>22nd</b> 203:14 <b>23rd</b> 105:12,16 <b>24</b> 14:2 105:2,5,11 105:13,18 114:1 169:18 <b>24-storey</b> 37:14 <b>24TH</b> 105:3 <b>25</b> 75:20 104:21 110:25 112:9 <b>25M</b> 105:2,2 <b>26</b> 1:1 130:22,23 <b>27</b> 213:7 <b>2nd</b> 104:15 105:2 <hr/> <b>3</b> <hr/> <b>3</b> 49:18 62:16 68:6 77:21 114:5 115:3	150:10 167:20,22 168:1 172:12 174:16 178:2 181:8,10 209:11 213:9 <b>3.00</b> 168:4 <b>3.45</b> 200:15 <b>3.50</b> 200:7,14,17 <b>30</b> 66:4 193:24 <b>30-metre</b> 188:23 <b>30m</b> 187:25 <b>33</b> 113:19 <b>35</b> 109:24 <b>38</b> 108:25 113:14 <b>3rd</b> 54:13 57:16 <hr/> <b>4</b> <hr/> <b>4</b> 4:1 55:24 56:6 107:22 141:18 143:19 152:21,24 164:23 166:13 182:4 <b>4.10</b> 213:5 <b>42-metre</b> 188:3,12 189:10 <b>42m</b> 187:22 <b>45</b> 17:16,19 113:15 135:13 206:1 <b>49</b> 102:11 <b>4hrs</b> 195:23 <b>4th</b> 13:1 126:10,15 126:18,19 127:11 127:12 128:16 162:20 178:7 <hr/> <b>5</b> <hr/> <b>5</b> 50:9 55:22 68:14 68:15 73:4 81:14 95:8 98:10,13 107:21,23 108:22 113:10 117:20 124:24 148:19,23 152:21,24 164:23 170:4 182:18 195:19 <b>50</b> 17:17	<b>51</b> 102:11 <b>54</b> 141:4 <b>58</b> 113:16 <b>5th</b> 178:8 <hr/> <b>6</b> <hr/> <b>6</b> 13:24 14:5 79:11 87:7 94:13 141:13 164:23 176:3 196:1 <b>65</b> 118:15 <hr/> <b>7</b> <hr/> <b>7</b> 78:17 97:15 98:7 143:5 176:5,16 190:12 209:9 <b>72D</b> 135:6 <b>75</b> 113:6 <b>7th</b> 178:8,11 <hr/> <b>8</b> <hr/> <b>8</b> 98:24 153:13 176:19 <b>8'and</b> 178:11 <b>820</b> 171:11 172:9 <b>8th</b> 56:11 153:22 156:1 178:8 <hr/> <b>9</b> <hr/> <b>9</b> 165:3 166:5 167:7 169:23 170:1 172:11 <b>9.30</b> 1:2 212:21 <b>92</b> 109:25 <b>9th</b> 178:8,11		
--	--	---	--	--