

<p>1 Monday, 3 September 2018</p> <p>2 (11.15 am)</p> <p>3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.</p> <p>4 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, we are now going to call our next</p> <p>5 witness, who is Group Manager Thomas Goodall.</p> <p>6 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.</p> <p>7 THOMAS GOODALL (affirmed)</p> <p>8 Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY</p> <p>9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. Sit down,</p> <p>10 Mr Goodall, make a yourself comfortable.</p> <p>11 All right?</p> <p>12 MR MILLETT: Mr Goodall, good morning.</p> <p>13 A. Morning.</p> <p>14 Q. Could I start by asking you to give your full name to</p> <p>15 the inquiry, please?</p> <p>16 A. Thomas Goodall.</p> <p>17 Q. Thank you very much for attending today. We are very</p> <p>18 much appreciative of your evidence that is to come.</p> <p>19 Can I ask you, please, to turn to your witness</p> <p>20 statement, which should be in the little blue bundle in</p> <p>21 front of you, or else on the monitor in front of you.</p> <p>22 The MET reference for that is MET000083296.</p> <p>23 Can I ask you, have you read this statement</p> <p>24 recently?</p> <p>25 A. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 1</p>	<p>1 A. The typed version was done shortly after I'd done the</p> <p>2 written -- the handwritten notes. I can't precisely</p> <p>3 remember when.</p> <p>4 Q. Did somebody ask you to do the typed version?</p> <p>5 A. No, I think I did it myself just to neaten up and review</p> <p>6 the handwritten notes.</p> <p>7 Q. Thank you very much.</p> <p>8 You've also got 13 exhibits, which are all labelled</p> <p>9 under THG/1 but which have different MET numbers. I'll</p> <p>10 read those into the record if I can: they are</p> <p>11 MET00015924 to MET00015936 inclusive. So numbers from</p> <p>12 24 to 36 as the last two digits. If we could take those</p> <p>13 all as read into the record, I would be grateful.</p> <p>14 My questions are intended to be short and simple.</p> <p>15 Sometimes they don't turn out that way, so if there's</p> <p>16 anything you want me to repeat or rephrase, please don't</p> <p>17 hesitate, and if you need a break at any stage, please</p> <p>18 just signal.</p> <p>19 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>20 Q. I want to start briefly with your career at the LFB and</p> <p>21 something about training.</p> <p>22 You joined the LFB, I think, in January 2003.</p> <p>23 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>24 Q. I think you say you were part of the targeted</p> <p>25 development fast track process.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 3</p>
<p>1 Q. Can you confirm that its contents are true?</p> <p>2 A. Yes.</p> <p>3 Q. You have some contemporaneous notes as well.</p> <p>4 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>5 Q. Those are at MET00005435. That's the handwritten one.</p> <p>6 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>7 Q. That's yours, is it?</p> <p>8 A. Yes, that is mine.</p> <p>9 Q. There's also I think a typed version, or typed one, at</p> <p>10 MET00015923. Is that yours as well?</p> <p>11 A. That looks like mine as well, yes.</p> <p>12 Q. Thank you very much.</p> <p>13 Did you write them both on the same day or did they</p> <p>14 come separately?</p> <p>15 A. No, I wrote the contemporaneous notes on the afternoon</p> <p>16 of 15 June when we returned to Paddington fire station</p> <p>17 directly after the incident. So I wrote the majority of</p> <p>18 those contemporaneous notes then.</p> <p>19 Q. Is that the handwritten notes?</p> <p>20 A. That's the handwritten notes, and then retrospectively</p> <p>21 I typed them up again, and obviously the statement was</p> <p>22 taken. I've forgotten the date of the statement from</p> <p>23 the Metropolitan Police, but that was taken at a later</p> <p>24 date.</p> <p>25 Q. What about the typed version?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 2</p>	<p>1 A. Yes.</p> <p>2 Q. Is that right?</p> <p>3 You were promoted to station manager in 2010?</p> <p>4 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>5 Q. That's right, is it?</p> <p>6 A. I was temporarily promoted to station manager in 2010,</p> <p>7 and then I was substantively promoted, I believe, in</p> <p>8 2011, off the top of my head.</p> <p>9 Q. Yes.</p> <p>10 You I think were promoted to group manager some time</p> <p>11 just over three years ago?</p> <p>12 A. About three years ago, give or take.</p> <p>13 Q. You were group manager on the night of the Grenfell fire</p> <p>14 in June 2017?</p> <p>15 A. Yes.</p> <p>16 Q. You are now group manager with the job title of policy,</p> <p>17 fire and operational support?</p> <p>18 A. Yes.</p> <p>19 Q. Was that your role on the night of the fire?</p> <p>20 A. Yes.</p> <p>21 Q. You say in your statement that the role focuses on</p> <p>22 policies such as search and rescue and compartment</p> <p>23 firefighting; is that right?</p> <p>24 A. That's right, yes.</p> <p>25 Q. Does that include compliance with/implementation of FSG</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 4</p>

<p>1 policy 790?</p> <p>2 A. The FSG policy -- I'm afraid I can't remember exactly</p> <p>3 whether that sits under my remit. But I've got an awful</p> <p>4 lot of policies that sit within the operational, policy,</p> <p>5 fire department remit. Sorry, I believe that the fire</p> <p>6 survival guidance policy sits within a different team,</p> <p>7 which is the incident management policy team.</p> <p>8 Q. So what sits in your team? What policies sit within</p> <p>9 your team?</p> <p>10 A. Firefighting policies. I'm responsible for operational</p> <p>11 support, so things like operational support units,</p> <p>12 high-volume pumps. I'm responsible for bulk media</p> <p>13 advisers. There's a whole raft of different policies</p> <p>14 that sit within my department and specifically my team.</p> <p>15 Q. Can you just help me, you mentioned the incident command</p> <p>16 management policy team a moment ago.</p> <p>17 A. Yes.</p> <p>18 Q. Who heads that, or who headed that at the time of the</p> <p>19 Grenfell fire, do you know?</p> <p>20 A. I can tell you at the moment that department is led by</p> <p>21 Peter Critchell, DAC Critchell, and Julian Spooner,</p> <p>22 Group Manager Julian Spooner.</p> <p>23 Q. Ah, yes.</p> <p>24 A. Who are -- I believe that it's one of their policies.</p> <p>25 Each policy is essentially -- each department team has</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 5</p>	<p>1 Q. So far as training is concerned, in your career at the</p> <p>2 LFB, but particularly focusing on the two or three years</p> <p>3 prior to Grenfell in June 2017, did you have any</p> <p>4 training on fire spread in high-rise buildings?</p> <p>5 A. It's difficult for me to remember the precise timing of</p> <p>6 when I received the training, but I definitely had</p> <p>7 an input post-Lakanal, where we went through the unusual</p> <p>8 fire spread and the challenges that that presented. So</p> <p>9 I've had an input on that formally, but also through the</p> <p>10 process of promotion and self-development, stuff like</p> <p>11 fire survival guidance is a policy that's relatively</p> <p>12 regularly read. I've read it relatively regularly for</p> <p>13 various promotion rounds. Likewise high-rise policy.</p> <p>14 So in that respect, I've had a reasonable amount of</p> <p>15 input --</p> <p>16 Q. Right.</p> <p>17 A. -- on fire spread.</p> <p>18 Likewise, when we do incident command exercises,</p> <p>19 fire survival guidance, high-rise, it's very often</p> <p>20 a topic. The scenario that will be chosen is very often</p> <p>21 a high-rise scenario that has a fire survival guidance</p> <p>22 element in it.</p> <p>23 To my knowledge, and certainly in my experience,</p> <p>24 I've never done an exercise on the scale of the Grenfell</p> <p>25 incident. They tend to be big incidents but not on the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 7</p>
<p>1 responsibility for a range of different policies, and my</p> <p>2 understanding is the incident management policy team are</p> <p>3 responsible for fire survival guidance.</p> <p>4 Q. What about operational risk-management? Which policy</p> <p>5 team does that sit within?</p> <p>6 A. Which number? Do you know off the top of your head what</p> <p>7 number that is?</p> <p>8 Q. I think 800.</p> <p>9 A. 800. I believe that is central operations, but I'm not</p> <p>10 100 per cent certain on that.</p> <p>11 Q. What about high-rise firefighting 633?</p> <p>12 A. That sits within my realm.</p> <p>13 Q. We'll come back to policies later and we may re-visit</p> <p>14 some of these questions as we go, but you say in your</p> <p>15 statement on page 3 that you have a specialist tag --</p> <p>16 A. Yes.</p> <p>17 Q. -- of hazardous material and environmental protection</p> <p>18 officer.</p> <p>19 A. Yes.</p> <p>20 Q. And also senior accident investigating officer and bulk</p> <p>21 media adviser.</p> <p>22 A. Yes.</p> <p>23 Q. Any of those roles you've listed, did you undertake any</p> <p>24 of them on the night of the fire?</p> <p>25 A. No.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 6</p>	<p>1 magnitude of what we faced on the 14th.</p> <p>2 Q. Is there a reason for that?</p> <p>3 A. I think it's because we didn't expect it. The</p> <p>4 organisation didn't believe -- didn't expect a building</p> <p>5 to behave in that way, so we -- and I think the opening</p> <p>6 statement from the LFB makes it reasonably clear that</p> <p>7 that is not a scenario that we reasonably anticipated.</p> <p>8 Q. Is there a reason for that?</p> <p>9 A. In the context of building regulation, in the context of</p> <p>10 the historical development of firefighting and</p> <p>11 firefighting techniques, I think, you know, that would</p> <p>12 be the underpinning reason why we didn't expect</p> <p>13 a building to behave like that.</p> <p>14 Indeed, I think in my statement I do make the point</p> <p>15 that when I saw -- as I was approaching the incident</p> <p>16 over the Westway, I do remember looking to my left and</p> <p>17 seeing the building what appeared to be fully alight and</p> <p>18 thinking to myself: this should not be happening in the</p> <p>19 UK, this should not be happening in London, this is not</p> <p>20 how buildings are supposed to behave. That's not to say</p> <p>21 I haven't seen buildings behave in that way; there's</p> <p>22 footage of buildings in other countries behaving in that</p> <p>23 way. But the expectation in the UK is that that is not</p> <p>24 how buildings should behave in a fire scenario, and that</p> <p>25 would underpin why we don't have, you know, that kind</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 8</p>

<p>1 of -- we wouldn't have done that as an incident command</p> <p>2 exercise.</p> <p>3 Q. You say there's footage of other buildings in other</p> <p>4 countries behaving in that way.</p> <p>5 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>6 Q. Did you know that at the time of the fire?</p> <p>7 A. Yes.</p> <p>8 Q. I see.</p> <p>9 A. Yes.</p> <p>10 Q. Was this knowledge of footage in other countries</p> <p>11 something that you think was widespread or at least</p> <p>12 shared within the LFB at the time of the fire?</p> <p>13 A. I couldn't say whether it was widely known. I couldn't</p> <p>14 say if it's widely known.</p> <p>15 Q. Can you give us some examples of --</p> <p>16 A. I believe there's a -- Dubai, a couple of incidents in</p> <p>17 Dubai, where there's been external fire spread on</p> <p>18 a building, on a high-rise building. I couldn't give</p> <p>19 you the detailed analysis, but I've seen probably three</p> <p>20 or four buildings where external fire spread has been</p> <p>21 a factor in different countries.</p> <p>22 Q. Did you receive or give any training on external fire</p> <p>23 spread of the kind seen in the footage of the Dubai</p> <p>24 fire?</p> <p>25 A. No. So I think it's fair to say that, organisationally,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 9</p>	<p>1 Q. I'll go straight then to the general conclusion on</p> <p>2 page 25, if I can, which is the general conclusion in</p> <p>3 a box there with some text in bold.</p> <p>4 Have you ever seen that before?</p> <p>5 A. I don't believe so, no. I'm not aware that I have.</p> <p>6 Q. Just picking the text out then, it says:</p> <p>7 "As a general principle the external envelop[sic] of</p> <p>8 the building should not contribute to the fire spread</p> <p>9 along the facade.</p> <p>10 "New construction material and method of</p> <p>11 construction are being used in facades and with a</p> <p>12 limited understanding of their fire</p> <p>13 behaviour/performance."</p> <p>14 Just pausing there, were those ideas or those</p> <p>15 principles something that you were aware of as at the</p> <p>16 night of the fire?</p> <p>17 A. Specifically, no. But I think within the context of</p> <p>18 fire service operations, we always predicate and plan on</p> <p>19 the basis of regulation and rules and Building</p> <p>20 Regulations and our own procedures, but within the back</p> <p>21 of your mind you always have to be prepared for events</p> <p>22 that are outside the norm. Inevitably, there's only so</p> <p>23 much you can do for unforeseen or unexpected events.</p> <p>24 But there is a sense in which the Fire Brigade is always</p> <p>25 prepared for events outside the norm, but there's</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 11</p>
<p>1 post-Lakanal, we were aware of unusual fire spread. We</p> <p>2 were aware of a fire being able -- that was a new risk</p> <p>3 that came out of the Lakanal incident. We were aware of</p> <p>4 fires that could spread laterally, spread down, they</p> <p>5 could travel through ducting, they could travel through</p> <p>6 concealed voids within buildings, and there was</p> <p>7 a different emphasis post that incident. But in terms</p> <p>8 of the Grenfell experience, which was the entire</p> <p>9 external envelope, that hadn't been anticipated, and</p> <p>10 I had never done any training and I had never delivered</p> <p>11 any training in preparation for an incident of that</p> <p>12 scale.</p> <p>13 Q. Let me just put a document to you and see if it rings</p> <p>14 a bell. Can I ask you please to be shown, which is</p> <p>15 tab 10 of our documents bundle, a slideshow entitled</p> <p>16 "Tall buildings facades". It's LFB00003521.</p> <p>17 Now, it's dated 13 July 2016, but we are assured</p> <p>18 that this is actually not the date. It was produced, in</p> <p>19 fact, sometime in October. We know that not least</p> <p>20 because much of its focus is the fire at Shepherds Court</p> <p>21 in August 2016.</p> <p>22 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>23 Q. First of all, just looking at the front page, is this</p> <p>24 a document that rings a bell with you?</p> <p>25 A. I'm afraid not, no.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 10</p>	<p>1 a degree to which you can prepare for it.</p> <p>2 Q. Looking at the next part of the slide, it says:</p> <p>3 "There is a need to understand:</p> <p>4 "• What products are being used in the facade system</p> <p>5 and their fire behaviour; And</p> <p>6 "• If they are used appropriately and meet the</p> <p>7 relevant guidance.</p> <p>8 "These could affect the way fires develop and spread</p> <p>9 in a building."</p> <p>10 My question is: was that principle or those</p> <p>11 principles something that, so far as you know, was</p> <p>12 shared within the LFB as at June 2017?</p> <p>13 A. I don't -- specifically, around the specific things that</p> <p>14 are referenced there, no, I don't believe that was</p> <p>15 widely shared. Certainly I don't have a strong sense</p> <p>16 that that was something I was exposed to. So I have to</p> <p>17 say no, I don't think that was widely known or shared in</p> <p>18 the LFB.</p> <p>19 Q. Does it come as a surprise to you to learn that the LFB</p> <p>20 had in its sights, as it were, these kind of principles</p> <p>21 as at --</p> <p>22 A. No, it doesn't, because I think we're always</p> <p>23 re-evaluating risk, we're always looking at ways in</p> <p>24 which we might do things differently, different</p> <p>25 challenges. In that respect, it doesn't surprise me</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 12</p>

<p>1 that we were looking at it. Equally, it doesn't</p> <p>2 surprise me that it wasn't widely shared amongst the</p> <p>3 workforce because it was probably one of many competing</p> <p>4 different risks that were being viewed at the time.</p> <p>5 Q. Right.</p> <p>6 Going back to an answer you gave earlier on about</p> <p>7 input into training, can you share with us what your</p> <p>8 input into fire spread in high-rise buildings was?</p> <p>9 Just to be more specific in terms of time frame, in</p> <p>10 the two to three years fire to the Grenfell fire</p> <p>11 in June 2017, what was your input into training in fire</p> <p>12 spread in high-rise buildings?</p> <p>13 A. It wouldn't -- beyond -- so within the LFB there's</p> <p>14 a process whereby our policies are converted into</p> <p>15 training materials, and the training that's delivered is</p> <p>16 underpinned by various LFB policies.</p> <p>17 So beyond my input into the policy positions,</p> <p>18 I wouldn't have had -- I don't believe I had a -- in</p> <p>19 that two/three-year window, I don't think I did have</p> <p>20 a specific remit to talk about rapid external fire</p> <p>21 spread within high-rise policy and, therefore, by</p> <p>22 extension, within the training.</p> <p>23 Q. Turning to the question of evacuation, full or partial,</p> <p>24 did you ever have any input into or receive any training</p> <p>25 in relation to how to evacuate a residential high-rise</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 13</p>	<p>1 Building Regulations. So where the Building</p> <p>2 Regulations, for example, speak of full or partial</p> <p>3 evacuation, my question, coming back to it, is: did you</p> <p>4 ever receive or have any input into the design of any</p> <p>5 training as to how to go about a full or partial</p> <p>6 evacuation, in that sense, of a high-rise residential</p> <p>7 block?</p> <p>8 A. I never had an input on how to evacuate a building that</p> <p>9 wasn't designed to be evacuated in those ways, and</p> <p>10 I didn't input into how we might do that.</p> <p>11 Q. So to the best of your knowledge, was there any</p> <p>12 training, designed training package, which existed as to</p> <p>13 how an incident commander of any seniority would go</p> <p>14 about that exercise?</p> <p>15 A. Not to my knowledge, no.</p> <p>16 Q. Thank you.</p> <p>17 I'm going to turn to the night of the fire and your</p> <p>18 role on it, which I think you cover in some detail in</p> <p>19 your witness statement.</p> <p>20 I want to focus, if I can, on the role you took in</p> <p>21 managing FSG information on CU7.</p> <p>22 A. Yes.</p> <p>23 Q. Can we start at page 6 of your witness statement.</p> <p>24 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>25 Q. You say on page 6 that you were status 2 --</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 15</p>
<p>1 block?</p> <p>2 A. In the context of Grenfell, no.</p> <p>3 Q. You say in the context of Grenfell. Can you explain?</p> <p>4 A. Well, in the context of a rapidly escalating fire, in</p> <p>5 a building not designed to support evacuation, then no,</p> <p>6 I didn't have any training that supports that. We have</p> <p>7 a range of policies that talk about evacuation</p> <p>8 strategies. You may have a commercial building with</p> <p>9 a strategy to evacuate floors above a potential alarm,</p> <p>10 and then the floor itself, or, you know, a range of</p> <p>11 different strategies, but they're normally in buildings</p> <p>12 which are built and designed around those particular</p> <p>13 strategies.</p> <p>14 I think in the context of Grenfell, I'm not entirely</p> <p>15 sure that the word "evacuation" is the right term.</p> <p>16 Certainly from the point at which I was there, I think</p> <p>17 it becomes mass rescue. It's rescuing as many --</p> <p>18 everybody in the building rather than evacuation.</p> <p>19 "Evacuation" implies an element of control,</p> <p>20 a systematic nature of it. The time pressures at</p> <p>21 Grenfell were wholly different. It wasn't -- is that</p> <p>22 clear, that the use of the word "evacuation" perhaps is</p> <p>23 slightly misleading here?</p> <p>24 Q. Well, it's a word I pick because it's a word that</p> <p>25 appears in national and LFB policies and, indeed, in the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 14</p>	<p>1 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>2 Q. -- at, you say -- this is the middle of the page --</p> <p>3 01.37 am.</p> <p>4 A. Uh-huh.</p> <p>5 Q. You say you remember you had your main scheme radio on.</p> <p>6 You say you think you arrived on scene -- this is the</p> <p>7 end of the next paragraph -- at 02.04 am.</p> <p>8 Now, those are quite precise times.</p> <p>9 A. Yes.</p> <p>10 Q. Is that because you recalled those specifically or did</p> <p>11 you look at a document to refresh your memory when you</p> <p>12 made your statement?</p> <p>13 A. That was a document. That was the log of the incident</p> <p>14 that allowed me to be specific about that.</p> <p>15 Q. I ask you because they correspond exactly with the short</p> <p>16 incident log, page 13, which I don't need to show you.</p> <p>17 Now, on page 7 of your statement, if you look at</p> <p>18 that, you say at the top of the page:</p> <p>19 "I got myself kitted up and it took me a few minutes</p> <p>20 to find the Command Unit which was Command Unit 8 ..."</p> <p>21 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>22 Q. And you say you handed in your nominal roll board to the</p> <p>23 command unit crew. You go on to say that you made</p> <p>24 yourself known to the incident commander --</p> <p>25 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 16</p>

<p>1 Q. -- a little bit lower down the page. That was DAC 2 O'Loughlin, Andy O'Loughlin. 3 First of all, how long did it take you after arrival 4 and going status 3 to get to CU8, roughly? 5 A. It's very difficult to be specific, but I have 6 a recollection that the incident ground was quite 7 confused. I put detail on my statement about where 8 I parked my car. I can't remember off the top of my 9 head how far away from the unit that was, but I have 10 a recollection that I had to ask a few people where the 11 command unit was to allow me to book in, and the 12 consequence of that is it must have been 5 minutes at 13 least, I would've thought, before I found the unit and 14 was in a position to make myself known to the incident 15 commander. 16 Q. You say you parked at the Stoneleigh Place junction of 17 Ansleigh Place? 18 A. Mm-hm. 19 Q. How far is that roughly in metres -- 20 A. I'm sorry, I don't know the geography of the area well 21 enough to be able to answer that. 22 Q. Similarly, what time do you think you made yourself 23 known to DAC O'Loughlin? 24 A. I'm guessing something like 5/10 minutes. 5 minutes 25 after I booked in attendance to the incident. It could</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 17</p>	<p>1 I was driving there and potentially would've heard 2 en route, but I'm afraid I can't remember the detail. 3 There was an awful lot of radio traffic at the time. 4 Q. Just trying to pin it down in terms of timing, did you 5 for example hear a message that Group Manager Welch had 6 taken over as incident commander? 7 A. I don't recall. I don't recall. 8 Q. What about the declaration of a major incident, do you 9 remember hearing that? 10 A. No. 11 Q. Okay. 12 You say halfway down page 7, in the second line of 13 the third paragraph on that page: 14 "He [Andy O'Loughlin] had just instructed Station 15 Manager (SM) Dan EGAN to manage the FSGs." 16 A. Mm-hm. 17 Q. Then you say in the next sentence: 18 "My assumption is that due to the scale of the 19 incident they wanted to make sure there was sufficient 20 control and command in that risk critical area so he 21 asked me to take over from Dan straight away." 22 Now, a number of questions about that. 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. First of all, to your knowledge at the time, had Station 25 Manager Egan done anything yet regarding FSGs at the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 19</p>
<p>1 have been -- it's really difficult to be specific 2 because, you know -- I can't remember if I rang in -- 3 there's a number of ways of booking present at the 4 incident; sometimes that's done on the main scheme 5 radio, sometimes that's done by telephone. I can't 6 remember off the top of my head which method I used. If 7 it's by phone, it could take several efforts to get 8 through to control. 9 So the time of booking in with the log, whether 10 I got there a bit earlier, I'm not 100 per cent sure 11 whether I got through on the walk into the unit, but 12 there's probably a 10-minute window between booking in 13 and actually getting to the unit. 14 Q. Did you have your main scheme radio with you en route -- 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. -- to CU8? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Were you listening to it? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Did you hear any messages over it about who the incident 21 commander was? 22 A. I can't recall. There was an awful lot of traffic. 23 I think -- it's very difficult to say -- to remember in 24 any detail what messages I heard. I have thought at 25 length about the messages that I would've intercepted as</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 18</p>	<p>1 moment you were given the task to take over management? 2 A. My recollection is that we were both on the unit pretty 3 well at the same time, and that Dan may have got off the 4 unit just before I was instructed, but it was seconds 5 rather than minutes. My strong impression is that we 6 both left the unit together and we both went to CU7 at 7 roughly the same time. 8 Q. Did you hear or observe DAC O'Loughlin giving Dan Egan 9 the task of managing the FSGs? 10 A. I don't recall. I don't think so, but that's not to say 11 it didn't happen. I don't recall how I was aware that 12 Dan was responsible for FSGs. I recall that -- my 13 recollection is I probably got it from Andy that he 14 said, "I've given it to Dan, but can you go and support 15 him as well because of the scale of the incident". 16 Q. Okay. So is this right: the time between Station 17 Manager Egan leaving CU8 to go and do the job and you 18 being given that task was very short? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Okay. Do you know where Station Manager Egan was going? 21 A. We were both going I think on to Grenfell Walk, where 22 command unit 7 was stationed -- was parked. We both 23 walked around there. I went on -- I can't remember if 24 Dan came on to the unit with me, but we went on to CU7. 25 A colleague of mine, Dan Kipling, was trying to set up</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 20</p>

<p>1 BA main control on that command unit. We effectively 2 took the unit off him and he went on to run that from 3 the grass mound outside the leisure centre. But we took 4 the unit to start the process of collating the detail 5 that we had on FSGs. 6 I've read Dan's submissions and his witness 7 testimony to the inquiry. 8 Q. Dan Egan? 9 A. Yes. So I'm aware that there's a slight contradiction 10 between his position and mine. So I'm not 100 per cent 11 sure whether or not he went off and then did stuff away 12 from the unit, which is quite possible, whilst I was 13 getting that unit ready to do the fire survival 14 guidance. 15 Q. I was going to ask you a little bit about that. 16 A. Sure. 17 Q. First of all, do you recall walking with Dan Egan from 18 CU8 to CU7? 19 A. I have a recollection of following -- of the two of us 20 walking together. That's my recollection. 21 Q. Did Dan Egan give you a handover of the role that he had 22 had to you at any point? 23 A. Not that I recall. 24 Q. Just focusing back on your arrival and time at CU8. 25 A. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 21</p>	<p>1 being there and I definitely remember him effectively 2 being the link with BCC along with Tony Peckham. 3 Q. What about Watch Manager Tony Peckham? 4 A. Yes, I remember. I remember his role on CU7 vividly and 5 clearly. You know, both him and Dan were tireless. 6 They had a really, really challenging and difficult 7 role. 8 Q. Again, Dan Meyrick? 9 A. Dan Meyrick and Tony. My understanding was they were -- 10 in my statement, I make reference to Dan Meyrick, but 11 Tony Peckham was also doing that interface with the 12 Brigade control centre, with control, with DAC 13 Adrian Fenton, to get the detail of the fire survival 14 guidance calls. 15 Q. We'll come to that in a little bit more detail in just 16 us moment. 17 Before we do, can I just ask you about Station 18 Manager Brett Loft. 19 Do you recall him being present on either CU8 or 20 CU7? 21 A. I don't, I'm afraid. 22 Q. Do you know who he is? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Were you aware that he had assumed responsibility for 25 managing FSG calls prior to you being given that</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 23</p>
<p>1 Q. How long were you on CU8 for? 2 A. Minutes. Not long at all. 3 Q. Did you observe messages being received by anybody on 4 CU8 from control about FSG? 5 A. I haven't got a strong personal memory of those messages 6 coming through. I know they were there because one of 7 my earliest decisions was to ask that they stop giving 8 the fire survival guidance messages to command unit 8 9 and give them to command unit 7, because it was clear 10 that they were overwhelmed with the volume of 11 information coming in, the amount of detail that they 12 had to process, not just the fire survival guidance but 13 the general incident command. 14 Q. Do you remember who was sitting at the two radio desks 15 within CU8 when you were on it? 16 A. I'm afraid I don't. I can't remember that. 17 Q. Do you remember whether Station Manager Dan Meyrick was 18 there? 19 A. Watch Manager Dan Meyrick was -- 20 Q. Watch Manager, sorry. 21 A. I know he was with me on command unit 7. Precisely the 22 mechanics of getting from command unit 8 to command 23 unit 7 -- I'm guessing that he came across with us when 24 effectively command unit 7 was put in charge of fire 25 survival guidance calls. So I definitely remember Dan</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 22</p>	<p>1 responsibility by DAC O'Loughlin? 2 A. No. 3 Q. That wasn't something you knew? 4 A. No. 5 Q. Right. 6 A. I am aware that there were a number of officers 7 throughout the incident ground who had the role of FSG. 8 I've subsequently learned that from viewing the evidence 9 that's been presented here. I think my role was very 10 much about trying to consolidate that widespread -- the 11 fact that there was multiple FSG activity going on. So 12 I saw myself, my role, as very much trying to become 13 a focal point and to consolidate the different streams, 14 the different areas that had started doing that FSG 15 guidance. 16 Q. Did DAC O'Loughlin tell you at any stage that Station 17 Manager Brett Loft had been involved at one stage -- 18 A. Not that I'm aware, no. 19 Q. -- in at least one of those streams of FSG information? 20 A. Not that I'm aware. 21 Q. Did you speak to Station Manager Loft at any stage 22 during the incident? 23 A. I don't recall. 24 Q. Do you know whether anybody else who had been or 25 continued to be responsible for FSG handling spoke to</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 24</p>

<p>1 Station Manager Loft?</p> <p>2 A. I don't know. I don't know. I think -- again, in my</p> <p>3 statement I reference the structure that we put in</p> <p>4 place. So I had Dan Egan effectively as a station</p> <p>5 manager with me on command unit 7, and he was the link</p> <p>6 to the bridgehead. My understanding is that that role</p> <p>7 was completed by Pete Wolfenden, who was effectively our</p> <p>8 link to the bridgehead, to the deployment of crews into</p> <p>9 the building. So it's possible that Pete talked to</p> <p>10 Brett, but I can't give you a definitive answer either</p> <p>11 way.</p> <p>12 Q. Looking at page 7 of your statement, if we can, the</p> <p>13 third paragraph down, five lines down from the beginning</p> <p>14 of that, you say:</p> <p>15 "There were FSG structures in place ..."</p> <p>16 A. Yes.</p> <p>17 Q. "... but I don't recall ever being given a detailed</p> <p>18 brief of what they were and how effective they were</p> <p>19 being."</p> <p>20 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>21 Q. First of all, who told you what those structures were?</p> <p>22 A. I can't honestly say whether I was told. One could</p> <p>23 extrapolate that fire survival guidance structures were</p> <p>24 in place because there was the information being taken</p> <p>25 from CU8 and it was being passed to the command unit,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 25</p>	<p>1 and relatively simple. I think the complexity is to</p> <p>2 take the dynamism of the incident and the event and the</p> <p>3 confusion around it and to try to simplify that as much</p> <p>4 as possible.</p> <p>5 Q. You say that your role was to find out what the</p> <p>6 structures were --</p> <p>7 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>8 Q. -- and how to apply the procedure and policy as best you</p> <p>9 could to suit the information.</p> <p>10 First of all, did you speak to anybody about what</p> <p>11 the structures were?</p> <p>12 A. I don't recall -- but in -- I don't recall having that</p> <p>13 conversation with anybody, but I know that there were</p> <p>14 people at the bridgehead, so I had Louisa De Silvo and</p> <p>15 Glynn Williams at the bridgehead who were doing fire</p> <p>16 survival guidance. They were helping co-ordinate the</p> <p>17 activity at the bridgehead. I can't remember the</p> <p>18 precise -- the mechanisms whereby I found that out, and</p> <p>19 whether or not what happened was me applying a more</p> <p>20 systematic structure to it or whether I built on the</p> <p>21 existing structures. I'm afraid I can't remember</p> <p>22 precise detail on how that happened.</p> <p>23 Q. Can you remember how you went about finding out?</p> <p>24 A. So within my statement, my recollection is that I needed</p> <p>25 to apply a structure to this incident, a process, and</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 27</p>
<p>1 and the procedure is there and I would've expected that</p> <p>2 to be in place. It's difficult for me to say whether</p> <p>3 when I wrote that in the statement, that's a sort of</p> <p>4 retrospective. I knew there were structures in</p> <p>5 existence, but I don't recall anybody ever briefing me</p> <p>6 about what was in place.</p> <p>7 Q. Right.</p> <p>8 If nobody briefed you about what was in place, how</p> <p>9 would you go about doing the task that Andy O'Loughlin</p> <p>10 had just given you, which was to essentially run the FSG</p> <p>11 calls from now on?</p> <p>12 A. So within the context of fire service operations, it's</p> <p>13 not unusual, given the limited information that initial</p> <p>14 decisions will be made on across a range of different</p> <p>15 command functions, to get to a point in an incident</p> <p>16 where you need somebody to consolidate, where you need</p> <p>17 somebody to find out what's going on, and apply</p> <p>18 a structure to that. So my role I saw was to find out</p> <p>19 what the structures were, find out how we apply the</p> <p>20 procedure and the policy as best we could to suit the</p> <p>21 incident, and get the vital information about locations</p> <p>22 of people transferred from control to the bridgehead, to</p> <p>23 the deployments.</p> <p>24 I mean, I talk in my statement about the concept of</p> <p>25 fire survival guidance being relatively straight forward</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 26</p>	<p>1 I've forgotten the precise order in which it happened,</p> <p>2 I suspect it happened all -- you know, simultaneous</p> <p>3 activity, in that the first thing to do was to clarify</p> <p>4 the links between Brigade control and the fire ground,</p> <p>5 which was command unit 7, and that was the message that</p> <p>6 was sent at about 02.20-something saying all the FSGs</p> <p>7 should go to command unit 7.</p> <p>8 Q. Did you send that message?</p> <p>9 A. I asked for it to be sent. I have a recollection that</p> <p>10 I asked for it to be sent. Then it was about confirming</p> <p>11 that we had a clear link between my command unit and the</p> <p>12 bridgehead. Now, I believe that was Dan Egan and</p> <p>13 Pete Wolfenden. And then, as it were, the final piece</p> <p>14 of that puzzle was to start to get a handle on the huge</p> <p>15 volumes of information about where people were, the</p> <p>16 flats that were involved, the numbers that were</p> <p>17 involved.</p> <p>18 Q. Before you put in place whatever structure it is you did</p> <p>19 put in place, and we'll look at that, I just want to get</p> <p>20 a feel for what the structure was before your input.</p> <p>21 First of all, and it may be you don't know, what was</p> <p>22 the existing structure on CU8 at the time of your</p> <p>23 arrival?</p> <p>24 A. I don't know.</p> <p>25 Q. When fire survival guidance moved to CU7 --</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 28</p>

<p>1 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>2 Q. -- what was the structure at that stage, in the initial</p> <p>3 stages?</p> <p>4 A. I don't recall the specific structure, I'm afraid.</p> <p>5 Q. Let me be more specific: do you remember who was</p> <p>6 receiving information from control on CU7 at the start?</p> <p>7 A. No.</p> <p>8 Q. Do you remember how information --</p> <p>9 A. Sorry, can you ask that question again?</p> <p>10 Q. Yes, who on CU7 --</p> <p>11 A. On CU7, my understanding was that that would've been Dan</p> <p>12 and Tony Peckham who would've been receiving the</p> <p>13 information on CU7.</p> <p>14 Q. What medium of communication were they receiving?</p> <p>15 A. I think it was mobile phones. I think they -- Dan</p> <p>16 Meyrick had a mobile phone glued to his ear for hours</p> <p>17 and hours. I believe that was the method by which it</p> <p>18 was coming through.</p> <p>19 Q. Tony Peckham told us he was on the radio all the time.</p> <p>20 A. It wouldn't surprise me. Tony was sat on the command</p> <p>21 unit -- I'm sure you've seen the pictures, but he was</p> <p>22 sat in the radio operator's chair.</p> <p>23 Q. Do you remember whether, first of, all they were</p> <p>24 recording the information they were getting from</p> <p>25 control?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 29</p>	<p>1 of sheets of yellow and white paper with the fire</p> <p>2 survival guidance information on it. We had scraps of</p> <p>3 paper that had been given to us by Met Police. We had</p> <p>4 all sorts -- we had people stopping us and telling us</p> <p>5 about their relatives.</p> <p>6 What we initially started to do, and I think there's</p> <p>7 a photograph of it that I provided in the evidence, is</p> <p>8 just to list the flats on one of the whiteboards. So we</p> <p>9 listed all of the flats and the fire survival guidance</p> <p>10 calls that were in those flights. It quickly became</p> <p>11 clear that that wouldn't be a sufficiently systematic</p> <p>12 approach to try to identify where people were trapped.</p> <p>13 That's when we developed the grid of the flats and the</p> <p>14 floors, which again I think we've provided as</p> <p>15 photographic evidence, and that's the thing which has</p> <p>16 the image which has the different codes on it.</p> <p>17 Q. Which we are going to come to.</p> <p>18 Just on what you've just said, I just want to break</p> <p>19 that up a little bit.</p> <p>20 First of all, the photograph. Can you please be</p> <p>21 shown it. I think this is the one. Please confirm it.</p> <p>22 It is MET00015930.</p> <p>23 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>24 Q. Is that the photograph? Or is that the whiteboard you</p> <p>25 were just describing?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 31</p>
<p>1 A. I've recently gone through this in my own mind about how</p> <p>2 we were capturing the detail. I know we had sheaths of</p> <p>3 paper with the existing fire survival guidance</p> <p>4 information that had been gathered together. I don't</p> <p>5 know how that got to the unit, but I remember Norm</p> <p>6 Harrison, Watch Manager Norman Harrison, was collating</p> <p>7 that detail. I can't remember off the top of my head</p> <p>8 whether or not Tony was recording that on the fire</p> <p>9 survival guidance pads, or elsewhere, I'm afraid.</p> <p>10 The only thing I can say is that the units were</p> <p>11 impounded, so if you've got loads and loads and loads</p> <p>12 of -- reams of paper, that would indicate that that's</p> <p>13 where they were being recorded. I can't remember</p> <p>14 whether they were recorded on that or message pads or</p> <p>15 other details.</p> <p>16 Q. Just following up on something you just said, you say</p> <p>17 you remember Norman Harrison, Watch Manager Harrison</p> <p>18 collating the detail?</p> <p>19 A. Yes.</p> <p>20 Q. This is on CU7, is it?</p> <p>21 A. Yes.</p> <p>22 Q. Just describe that for us. What was he doing to collate</p> <p>23 the detail --</p> <p>24 A. So I asked Norm initially -- because when we went to the</p> <p>25 unit, we went with a load of information. We had a load</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 30</p>	<p>1 A. Yes. I believe that's the initial attempt to quantify</p> <p>2 the scale of the fire survival guidance.</p> <p>3 Q. Right. Now, just tracing this through, first of all, is</p> <p>4 that whiteboard on CU8 or CU7?</p> <p>5 A. CU7.</p> <p>6 Q. Is it a whiteboard or is it actually --</p> <p>7 A. It looks like a laminated sheet of paper. Laminated</p> <p>8 sheet.</p> <p>9 Q. So that was done on CU7. Whose handwriting is that?</p> <p>10 A. I can't definitively say, but my recollection is that</p> <p>11 was being done by Norm.</p> <p>12 Q. Norman Harrison?</p> <p>13 A. Yes.</p> <p>14 Q. Do you know whether that information had been</p> <p>15 transported from CU8 to CU7 and had been transcribed</p> <p>16 onto the white laminated board by him or did he write</p> <p>17 this down as it came in?</p> <p>18 A. So my recollection is that that started on CU7. So we</p> <p>19 started doing that on CU7. It's possible that came</p> <p>20 across from CU8, but my recollection is that we started</p> <p>21 doing that on CU7, and that was with all of the data and</p> <p>22 all the information that had been given to us in order</p> <p>23 to start the fire survival guidance -- to start the fire</p> <p>24 survival guidance on command unit 7.</p> <p>25 Q. What had that information been collated from, do you</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 32</p>

<p>1 remember?</p> <p>2 A. The different -- the sheets of the fire survival</p> <p>3 guidance pad, so the FSG pad, with the different -- with</p> <p>4 the four sheets. So we had a pile of those. We also</p> <p>5 had scraps of paper. It was the various information</p> <p>6 streams that were coming in to us. So specifically the</p> <p>7 pad of information, the scraps of paper, and then the</p> <p>8 stuff that we picked up from relatives and from the Met</p> <p>9 Police.</p> <p>10 Q. Right.</p> <p>11 First of all, pads, that's the quadruplicate</p> <p>12 coloured fire survival guidance information forms that</p> <p>13 form appendix 1 to policy 790, I think?</p> <p>14 A. Yes.</p> <p>15 Q. Right.</p> <p>16 So far as scraps of paper are concerned, what are</p> <p>17 those scraps of paper?</p> <p>18 A. So we had bits of paper I think from -- I can't exactly</p> <p>19 remember where they'd come from, but scraps of paper</p> <p>20 saying -- they could well have come from the police,</p> <p>21 saying that there's somebody trapped in so-and-so flat.</p> <p>22 Because they were handling a number of calls on our</p> <p>23 behalf and we were getting stuff from police officers</p> <p>24 outside our command unit.</p> <p>25 Q. Okay. I want to try and put an example, if I can, of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 33</p>	<p>1 somebody on it?</p> <p>2 A. They were coming to us from CU7 -- sorry, they were</p> <p>3 coming to us. My recollection is we were getting stuff</p> <p>4 from a range of different sources, as I say, from the</p> <p>5 fire survival guidance sheets, from the existing</p> <p>6 structures that had been put in place, but also from the</p> <p>7 police and from members of the public. There was a kind</p> <p>8 of -- there was a flood of information.</p> <p>9 Q. Okay.</p> <p>10 Can I ask you to look at, again, while we're on it,</p> <p>11 page 29, next page of the exhibit. This appears to be</p> <p>12 a list of flats with some FSG detail on it.</p> <p>13 A. Yes.</p> <p>14 Q. Do you recall seeing lists like this on CU7?</p> <p>15 A. No, I don't recall specifically seeing lists like that.</p> <p>16 Again, lists of that nature would be consistent with the</p> <p>17 sort of stuff that we were getting in.</p> <p>18 Q. Do you know or do you remember who compiled or would</p> <p>19 have compiled a list like this on CU7?</p> <p>20 A. My recollection is that we wouldn't have been</p> <p>21 compiling -- the core list, as it were, the central</p> <p>22 repository for the information we were getting were the</p> <p>23 whiteboards. We were trying to get stuff onto the</p> <p>24 whiteboards. So if we had had a list of this nature, my</p> <p>25 understanding is that we would've tried to transpose</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 35</p>
<p>1 a scrap of paper. I'd like you just to confirm whether</p> <p>2 it's the kind of thing you're referring to which</p> <p>3 would've gone to make up the initial board.</p> <p>4 Could you please be shown LFB00001968 and go to</p> <p>5 page 18.</p> <p>6 Is that the kind of scrap of paper that you were</p> <p>7 referring to?</p> <p>8 A. I don't recall specifically seeing that scrap or scraps</p> <p>9 that looked identical to that, but I had a sense that</p> <p>10 there were -- this information was coming to us from</p> <p>11 a range of sources.</p> <p>12 Q. Right.</p> <p>13 A. So that's entirely consistent with my memory.</p> <p>14 Q. Okay.</p> <p>15 I'll ask you while we're on it, what about page 28</p> <p>16 of the same exhibit?</p> <p>17 A. Again --</p> <p>18 Q. 28, Mr Documents Director. I'm so sorry.</p> <p>19 A. Yes, again, consistent with my memory. I don't recall</p> <p>20 that specific piece of paper, but consistent with the</p> <p>21 sort of stuff we were getting, yes.</p> <p>22 Q. Do you recognise that handwriting?</p> <p>23 A. No.</p> <p>24 Q. Were the scraps of paper coming in to CU7 from outside</p> <p>25 or were the scraps of paper being produced within CU7 by</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 34</p>	<p>1 that to the whiteboard rather than create a list.</p> <p>2 It's possible that Tony or Dan, in receiving the</p> <p>3 information from control, would've written a handwritten</p> <p>4 note onto a piece of paper that they would've then</p> <p>5 transposed onto the whiteboard, but we were trying to</p> <p>6 have a single repository of the detail which we could</p> <p>7 then consistently transfer to the bridgehead for BA</p> <p>8 crews to be then committed from it.</p> <p>9 Q. Still on this exhibit, can I ask you to be shown,</p> <p>10 please, page 13, going back. This is a message which</p> <p>11 looks like it's going to you.</p> <p>12 A. Yes.</p> <p>13 Q. It says:</p> <p>14 "From east side sector 4 safety officer WMB</p> <p>15 Beale ..."</p> <p>16 Watch Manager B Beale:</p> <p>17 "... A241.</p> <p>18 "Resident still in flat on 10th or 11th flr. Hose</p> <p>19 reel jet strapped to ALP cage has forced external fire</p> <p>20 away from flat. Resident appears to be in fresh air but</p> <p>21 needs rescuing internally."</p> <p>22 Do you remember receiving that message?</p> <p>23 A. No. No, I don't remember personally receiving that</p> <p>24 message, no.</p> <p>25 Q. Okay.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 36</p>

<p>1 A. That's not to say it didn't get to command unit 7 and 2 that it wasn't recorded, but I don't recall that 3 reaching me specifically, no. 4 Q. Do you recall whether any messages at all were given to 5 you or sent to you specifically of that nature? 6 A. I'm afraid I can't be specific on that one. I don't 7 know. 8 Q. Now, do you remember -- again, at the early stages on 9 CU7 -- how information was going from CU7 into the 10 incident ground? 11 A. So, as I say, I mentioned before, my recollection is 12 that Dan Egan, Station Manager Dan Egan, and Station 13 Manager Pete Wolfenden established quite a strong 14 communications link that transferred the information 15 that we had on the command unit up to the bridgehead. 16 What's really, really hard for me to say is exactly when 17 that definitive link was put in. It's quite possible -- 18 because I don't think Pete was there right from the 19 beginning, from when we set up the command unit. 20 I think he was there quite early, but it's quite 21 possible that Dan was initially talking to the crews 22 inside the building who had been given the job of fire 23 survival guidance, and then Pete took up the mantle 24 within the bridgehead and within the building. 25 But I do recall at one stage a colleague of mine</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 37</p>	<p>1 would've been to the bridgehead, to the watch managers 2 who were operating at the bridgehead, but subsequently 3 I believe it was to Pete Wolfenden, who was 4 co-ordinating the fire survival guidance within the 5 bridgehead, and getting the information transferred to 6 him. 7 But -- 8 Q. Where was -- 9 A. -- we also used runners -- sorry, we also used runners. 10 I think I talk about a watch manager, Shaun Coltress and 11 a firefighter, Mandeep Singh, who were running 12 information to both the bridgehead but also, I believe, 13 to various parts of the incident ground as well. 14 Q. Do you remember whether Dan Egan left CU7 to go to the 15 tower? 16 A. I was aware that Dan had a fluid role. He was moving 17 around the incident ground, certainly in the early 18 stages, and there were points where he would physically 19 take a message to either the bridgehead or to different 20 parts of the incident ground. I was aware of that, yes. 21 Q. Just coming back to where we were a minute ago, what 22 left CU7 was a combination -- is this right? -- of 23 pieces of paper through runners, perhaps Coltress and 24 Mandeep Singh -- 25 A. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 39</p>
<p>1 Group Manager Matt Cook, who was an operational review 2 team officer at the time, telling me that he -- his role 3 as an operational review team officer is to kind of 4 quality assure what's going on on the incident ground, 5 and my recollection -- because I didn't have 6 an opportunity to go to the bridgehead and confirm that 7 things were -- that the information was passing 8 seamlessly from us to them, but he told me that it was 9 working pretty well, he thought it was working 10 successfully and that we were getting that information 11 to the bridgehead. 12 Q. Let's see if we can break this up a bit. 13 In the initial stages of the operation of CU7 for 14 fire survival guidance -- 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. -- when you were there -- 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. -- what method was being used to send the information 19 that Tony Peckham and Dan Meyrick had recorded into the 20 fire ground? 21 A. So it's really difficult to be absolutely specific 22 because I think there was a number of methods. We were 23 using radio communications with the bridgehead, 24 I believe, by Dan Egan. So Dan was effectively passing 25 the information out from command unit 7. Initially that</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 38</p>	<p>1 Q. -- and radio messages? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. And -- 4 A. So within the context of what we're trying to achieve, 5 you're trying to achieve a load of different things at 6 once. You're trying to make sure that the information 7 you've got, which is absolutely risk critical to the 8 people in the building, is being transferred out to the 9 bridgehead, which is where that information is most 10 useful because that's where they will task BA crews to 11 then commit the searches and the rescue operations, but 12 at the same time you're trying to collate the detail. 13 So there's a kind of a competing demand there of being 14 systematic, orderly, getting a clear structure on it, 15 but at the same time trying not to delay the passage of 16 information from the incident ground. 17 I confess that the sheer volume of information that 18 we had at the time means it's really quite difficult to 19 remember precisely the details of how that information 20 was transferring from command unit 7 to the bridgehead. 21 Q. Okay. 22 What did you do, if anything, to ensure that the 23 information leaving CU7 both by radio and in paper form 24 was consistent as well as up-to-date? 25 A. So this was -- in my statement, I talk about the use of</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 40</p>

<p>1 the whiteboard and the systematic approach to try to</p> <p>2 capture the detail that we were receiving. So what we</p> <p>3 did was we took all of the information that we were</p> <p>4 receiving and we started to collate it on to the</p> <p>5 whiteboard.</p> <p>6 It's not accurate. It will never be -- it won't be</p> <p>7 definitive. There was -- subsequently I've learnt that</p> <p>8 people were moving around the building, they were moving</p> <p>9 from flat to flat. This meant that the numbers in the</p> <p>10 flats were changing. So it would've been nigh on</p> <p>11 impossible to give absolute -- to be definitively</p> <p>12 certain of the information that we'd got. What we are</p> <p>13 trying to do is to capture as much as possible of that</p> <p>14 information and move it on successfully to the</p> <p>15 bridgehead.</p> <p>16 Now, I didn't do anything specifically -- as</p> <p>17 I mentioned before, I didn't have the capacity or the</p> <p>18 time to quality assure that process, to make sure that</p> <p>19 the detail that was travelling from the command unit to</p> <p>20 the bridgehead was absolutely accurate. But my</p> <p>21 colleague Matt Cook, and it was more of his role within</p> <p>22 that operational review team, was doing that. So he</p> <p>23 came back to me and he said, "Looks like it's working,</p> <p>24 it looks like the detail you're capturing on your board</p> <p>25 matches what's going on at the bridgehead."</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 41</p>	<p>1 information to somebody within the tower, and it was</p> <p>2 being relayed up to the bridgehead so that the</p> <p>3 deployments could be made.</p> <p>4 That's his evidence. Can you recall that?</p> <p>5 A. I don't recall that conversation, but, again, that</p> <p>6 wouldn't be necessarily inconsistent with what</p> <p>7 I understood to be happening, in that Dan had made links</p> <p>8 with the bridgehead and was transferring that across.</p> <p>9 So it's quite possible that that conversation took</p> <p>10 place. I don't recall it, I'm afraid.</p> <p>11 Q. Did you know at the time that there was a watch manager</p> <p>12 standing in the lobby of the tower receiving written FSG</p> <p>13 call information and writing it up on the wall? Did you</p> <p>14 know that at the time?</p> <p>15 A. No, I don't recall that at the time. But, again,</p> <p>16 I think within that phase of the incident, that hugely</p> <p>17 dynamic phase of the incident, that wouldn't be</p> <p>18 inconsistent. People know the importance of this</p> <p>19 information and they are trying, as best they can, to</p> <p>20 get it to the place it needs to be, which is the</p> <p>21 bridgehead, so that the deployments can be made. It</p> <p>22 wouldn't be inconsistent to have multiple people doing</p> <p>23 that and to have had that happen.</p> <p>24 Q. In your contemporaneous note, if we can just look at</p> <p>25 it -- and I'm referring to the manuscript version on</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 43</p>
<p>1 So, in that respect, whilst I didn't do it myself,</p> <p>2 I had some assurance that the process was working.</p> <p>3 Q. In terms of radio contact between Dan Egan while he was</p> <p>4 on CU7 -- do you know who he was speaking to?</p> <p>5 A. My recollection is that he was speaking to</p> <p>6 Pete Wolfenden most of the time.</p> <p>7 Q. Most of the time. Was that so from the start of the</p> <p>8 operation of CU7 or from later on?</p> <p>9 A. It's very difficult to say. It couldn't have been from</p> <p>10 the start because I don't think Pete was there at the</p> <p>11 same time as Dan, so it would've been to the bridgehead,</p> <p>12 colleagues on the bridgehead. And Dan would've had to</p> <p>13 find out who he was talking to, so it wouldn't be</p> <p>14 immediate. There would've been a process of</p> <p>15 establishing links for him. But I believe he did that</p> <p>16 quite early on when that happened.</p> <p>17 Q. Now, did you know that there was a watch manager</p> <p>18 operating a collating system for FSG on a car bonnet</p> <p>19 latterly by dustbins under the covered walkway outside</p> <p>20 the tower?</p> <p>21 A. No, I didn't.</p> <p>22 Q. Dan Egan has said in his statement, and he confirmed it</p> <p>23 in his evidence when he came to the inquiry in July,</p> <p>24 that he explained to you that you did have a firefighter</p> <p>25 at the base of the tower on a car bonnet passing</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 42</p>	<p>1 page 2, you say, a third of the way down the page --</p> <p>2 A. Uh-huh.</p> <p>3 Q. Sorry, it should be the manuscript version, not the</p> <p>4 typed version, the manuscript version.</p> <p>5 (Pause)</p> <p>6 It's MET00005435, Mr Documents Director.</p> <p>7 Thank you very much.</p> <p>8 Just a third of the way down -- in fact, it's just</p> <p>9 above halfway down -- it says:</p> <p>10 "WM Paul ..."</p> <p>11 It looks like "Sandel".</p> <p>12 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>13 Q. "... WM Da Silva[sic] and WM Glen were already in situ</p> <p>14 in the building and were co-ordinating existing FSG</p> <p>15 efforts."</p> <p>16 You have referred to Watch Manager Paul Sandel. Who</p> <p>17 was that?</p> <p>18 A. I'm afraid I can't recall the specific detail of that,</p> <p>19 I'm afraid. No, I can't -- I couldn't tell you what his</p> <p>20 role -- it's not a name that rings a bell, I'm afraid.</p> <p>21 Q. Doing the best you can with your recollection -- and</p> <p>22 I know it's difficult, given the circumstances in which</p> <p>23 you came to produce this document -- do you know how the</p> <p>24 name "Sandel" came to you? Did somebody tell you? Is</p> <p>25 it something you remember?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 44</p>

<p>1 A. I'm sorry, I can't recall. I can't recall how that name 2 came to me. Unless -- no, I would be speculating about 3 how it had come to me. 4 Q. What about Glen, watch Manager Glen? Same question: do 5 you remember how you -- 6 A. I think that might be Glynn Williams. 7 Q. Yes. 8 A. But again -- and I know that Louisa De Silvo was working 9 on the fire survival guidance in the building. But, 10 again, it's difficult to know exactly where that 11 information came from because obviously, you know, I've 12 been aware of the evidence that has been given by those 13 two people, so it's quite hard to be specific about 14 where I would've heard that from. 15 Q. When you wrote-hand "and were co-ordinating the existing 16 FSG efforts", what did you remember they were actually 17 doing by way of co-ordination? 18 A. I don't recall. I don't recall the specifics, other 19 than that they would've been taking that detail and 20 passing it to the bridgehead and to the officers 21 deploying BA crews. So it would've been an expectation 22 rather than a definitive understanding. 23 Q. Right. 24 In order to put an overall structure on fire 25 survival guidance so that it got from the control room</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 45</p>	<p>1 and therefore didn't need to provide that scrutiny? 2 Does that make sense? 3 Q. There are two ideas there. Just focus on the one I'm 4 after, which is: did you find out from any source what 5 the links in the chain of communication were from CU7 to 6 the bridgehead? 7 A. Yes, I understood the links between CU7 and the 8 bridgehead. But that evolved. So I didn't have -- 9 I never -- I don't recall specifically finding out the 10 links on arrival. I think I put over my structure over 11 what was there, if that makes sense. 12 Q. Yes. 13 A. I didn't find out the detail of links before I put my 14 structure in place, no. 15 Q. Let's turn to your structure in place. 16 What did you put in place when you did carry out the 17 task DAC O'Loughlin had given you? 18 A. So that would've been Dan Egan to Pete Wolfenden. That 19 was my perception of the link between my command unit 20 and the bridgehead. 21 Q. Could you just break that up for me? Show us each link 22 in the chain. 23 A. Once the structure had been applied, Dan in effect was 24 the output from the command unit, took the detail that 25 we had from the whiteboards, from the information that</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 47</p>
<p>1 to the bridgehead in a consistent, up-to-date and 2 seamless fashion, was it important to you to understand 3 what the mechanism of communication was between the 4 command unit and the bridgehead, link-by-link in the 5 chain? 6 A. Sorry, could you ask the question again? 7 Q. Yes. Yes, I will. Let's break it up. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. I think you told us earlier that your task that you were 10 essentially given by DAC O'Loughlin was to put 11 an overall structure on fire survival guidance. That's 12 right, is it? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. In order to do that job, was it important to you to find 15 out for yourself what the methods of communication were 16 between the command unit, CU7, and the bridgehead? 17 A. So it's a difficult question to answer, but my -- the 18 obvious answer for me is that I gave that -- that 19 would've been given to Dan Egan, in that respect, so 20 I would ask Dan to make that link. So I can't remember 21 the specifics of the link, but I did ask -- but my 22 understanding was that it was happening. 23 So it's very difficult to answer. Did I put it in 24 place? Did I scrutinise the links? Or did I have 25 evidence to me suggesting that the links were working</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 46</p>	<p>1 was being gathered, and transferred that to the 2 bridgehead. That was then taken by Pete, who then was 3 managing that process at the bridgehead. That was my 4 understanding of what was happening. That was the 5 process that I believe was corroborated by Matt. 6 Q. Right. So just breaking that down, once your structure 7 was in place -- 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. -- and you were happy that it was being run from CU7 -- 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. -- how did the information about incoming FSGs leave CU7 12 and go to the incident ground? 13 A. So it was my impression that that was done by Dan, 14 effectively Dan Egan. Station Manager Dan Egan was 15 passing the information from us to the bridgehead. 16 Q. Where was he? 17 A. He was on the unit much of the time, but also he 18 physically, I think, went to the bridgehead on a number 19 of occasions. 20 Q. Now, to your observation, whenever Dan Egan passed 21 a message from CU7 to the incident ground -- whether 22 it's the bridgehead or the lobby we can come to in 23 a moment -- how did he do it? Did he pick up an FSG 24 form and recite its contents down the radio, or what did 25 he do?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 48</p>

<p>1 A. I don't know. I can't recall in detail how he did that.</p> <p>2 My recollection was it would've been through a range of</p> <p>3 different methods. So it was either radio or physically</p> <p>4 going to the lobby or the bridgehead to pass that</p> <p>5 information.</p> <p>6 Q. When he was not on CU7, but had gone to the lobby to</p> <p>7 pass on information, how was information then being</p> <p>8 passed to the incident ground in his absence?</p> <p>9 A. I don't recall. I don't recall whether Norm stepped in</p> <p>10 or whether we used Shaun Coltress or Mandeep, but it's</p> <p>11 possible that that's where the runners would've been</p> <p>12 used. But, again, it's very difficult to say</p> <p>13 definitively.</p> <p>14 Q. Even after you put your structure in place on CU7, is it</p> <p>15 still the case that you were using both the radio</p> <p>16 communication method and the runner method?</p> <p>17 A. Yes.</p> <p>18 Q. Right.</p> <p>19 A. Very likely. I can't give you an absolutely definitive</p> <p>20 answer, but it's very likely, yes.</p> <p>21 Q. Did that continue throughout the night, until the FSG</p> <p>22 calls stopped?</p> <p>23 A. Again, it would be a guess, I can't definitively say</p> <p>24 whether it did. My perception was that the structure</p> <p>25 became more stable throughout the night because we had</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 49</p>	<p>1 that's when I put in the watch managers at the two rest</p> <p>2 centres to try and find out which flats the people that</p> <p>3 had come out of the building had come from. And, again,</p> <p>4 it's referenced in my statement.</p> <p>5 Q. Right.</p> <p>6 Now, the grid that you refer to, is that something</p> <p>7 that you used to co-ordinate and make consistent the</p> <p>8 messages going out from CU7?</p> <p>9 A. Yes, so that was an attempt to have a single repository</p> <p>10 for all of the information that we'd had coming in. So</p> <p>11 we put the grid on one of the whiteboards within the</p> <p>12 command unit. That was the -- I believe it was six,</p> <p>13 seven columns and 24 rows of where all of the flats were</p> <p>14 and the calls that we were receiving specifically from</p> <p>15 those flats, so that when we passed the information, we</p> <p>16 weren't working off the long list, which we felt was</p> <p>17 confusing, we were working from a slightly more</p> <p>18 systematic grid.</p> <p>19 Q. Let's look at that. It is MET00015924.</p> <p>20 That's I think the grid --</p> <p>21 A. Yes.</p> <p>22 Q. -- that you're talking about.</p> <p>23 A. Yes.</p> <p>24 Q. I suggest that to you. But do you remember how long</p> <p>25 after CU7 started operating that you set that system up?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 51</p>
<p>1 time to then start to think about other elements of the</p> <p>2 incident, which I refer to in my statement, which is the</p> <p>3 activity about cross-referencing where the survivors had</p> <p>4 gone to the rest centres, the survivor reception</p> <p>5 centres. But, again, it would be really difficult to</p> <p>6 say. It would be really difficult to be absolutely</p> <p>7 definitive about it.</p> <p>8 Q. Coming back to a question I put to you before, after you</p> <p>9 put your structure in place --</p> <p>10 A. Yes.</p> <p>11 Q. -- and you were still having radio and runners with</p> <p>12 information, were any steps taken by anybody to ensure</p> <p>13 that the information on a flat-by-flat basis was</p> <p>14 consistent and up to date?</p> <p>15 A. I've mentioned the role of the operational review team</p> <p>16 officer Matt Cook before. Now, I cannot be sure that --</p> <p>17 so it's quite possible that we took the detail from the</p> <p>18 grid in command unit 7, and that was transferred to --</p> <p>19 I believe there was a grid within the lobby or the</p> <p>20 bridgehead area. Now, I don't recall putting any</p> <p>21 definitive efforts in to specifically identify whether</p> <p>22 that detail was correct because it was quite fluid, we</p> <p>23 were still getting huge -- the volume of calls was still</p> <p>24 enormous, but we were aware of the need to try and -- to</p> <p>25 get more definitive information on those figures, and</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 50</p>	<p>1 A. I can't, I'm afraid. I think that photograph was taken</p> <p>2 quite late into the incident.</p> <p>3 Q. Yes.</p> <p>4 A. So it's -- no, I can't remember exactly when it went up.</p> <p>5 But it would've had to have been long enough for us to</p> <p>6 write it down on the board to the left of that, realise</p> <p>7 that that wasn't working effectively and then transfer</p> <p>8 it across to that more systematic approach.</p> <p>9 Q. The board to the left of that is MET00015936. If we can</p> <p>10 perhaps have both up at the same time.</p> <p>11 (Pause)</p> <p>12 Right. Can you just --</p> <p>13 A. Ah, okay.</p> <p>14 Q. Could you just explain to us, first of all, what is, if</p> <p>15 you can, the whiteboard on the left of the screen there?</p> <p>16 A. Okay. So I think this is -- I'm mistaken here. So when</p> <p>17 we talked about the laminated sheet, that was what</p> <p>18 I thought we were looking at before. So this is what</p> <p>19 actually -- this was where we started the process of</p> <p>20 collating that detail and quickly realised that that</p> <p>21 wasn't going to be enough, so we then moved to the grid.</p> <p>22 So I spoke earlier on today about --</p> <p>23 Q. You did.</p> <p>24 A. -- the activity that Norm had done, which is to</p> <p>25 record -- that's what I think that might be. So that</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 52</p>

<p>1 laminated sheet could well actually then have come from 2 somewhere else, and I can't be -- 3 Q. If the laminated sheet is not that, what is the 4 laminated sheet? 5 A. It's very possible that that was from command unit 8, 6 but I don't know for sure. 7 Q. Right. I see. 8 Who wrote up the information on the whiteboard on 9 the left? 10 A. I believe that was Norm Harrison. 11 Q. That's Norm Harrison. 12 The grid idea, was that your idea? 13 A. I think so. 14 Q. Who designed it and wrote it up on the board? 15 A. My recollection is that it was Norm doing the filling in 16 on the board, but it's possible that Dan -- because my 17 memory is that Dan was standing -- so if we look at that 18 board now, Dan was standing to the right of the board, 19 at the back of the command unit, and Norm was standing 20 to the left at the front of the command unit. My 21 recollection was Norm was doing that work, but it's 22 quite possible that Dan would've put some detail on 23 there as well right. 24 Q. In general terms, once the grid system had started, do 25 you remember, what was the source of the information</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 53</p>	<p>1 himself, so he could've updated that information. There 2 wasn't a formal process. It was updated as required. 3 Dan or Tony would speak to Norm, Norm would update the 4 board. 5 Q. Okay. 6 I'm going to come back to these, if I can, in due 7 course. Just taking a step back a bit because we've 8 gone quite a long way into this material. 9 Going back to DAC O'Loughlin's instructions, he says 10 in his statement -- and he's obviously going to come and 11 give evidence to us -- that he told you that the key 12 priority was co-ordinating FSG calls and establishing 13 how many people you had inside the building, how many of 14 those were talking to control, how many were a priority, 15 he says, and how many you needed to get to quickly? 16 A. Sure. 17 Q. That's what he says in his statement. 18 Do you remember him saying that, or any of that, to 19 a you? 20 A. I don't recall the specifics of that conversation, but 21 that's not to say it didn't happen. Equally, that would 22 be kind of a given for the fire survival guidance calls 23 and the management of those calls, that those would be 24 key priorities. 25 Q. He also says that he suggested that the priorities would</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 55</p>
<p>1 which Norm would use to fill in the grid? 2 A. So initially it would've been the paper, the stash, the 3 stack of data that we'd received, the information that 4 we'd received on the existing fire survival guidance 5 calls, but then as the incident progressed, we would've 6 had more information from control via Dan and Tony about 7 the detail of those specific flats. 8 So there's a transfer of information from the stack 9 of paperwork to the board on the left, then to the board 10 on the right-hand side. 11 That then would've been corroborated by the further 12 information we were receiving from control. 13 Q. Okay. 14 So when the grid had to be changed because you had 15 new updated information coming to you from control, how 16 would that new updated information go from the person on 17 the end of the mobile or radio, which was Tony Peckham 18 or Dan Meyrick, to the whiteboard grid? 19 A. So either Dan or Norm would transfer that information 20 onto the board. 21 Q. Right. 22 A. That's my recollection. 23 Q. How would they get that information from Meyrick or 24 Peckham? Were they told it orally? 25 A. Dan Meyrick himself would've been taking the calls</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 54</p>	<p>1 most likely be the people on the upper floors and those 2 in the north-east corner of the building, because the 3 fire was anticipated to go upwards and not to move 4 laterally around the building. Again, he says that in 5 his statement and obviously we'll have to examine that 6 with him, but do you remember being told that? 7 A. No. 8 Q. Do you remember having any discussion with DAC 9 O'Loughlin about how to prioritise FSG information? 10 A. No. 11 Q. Do you remember having any thoughts of your own about 12 how to go about prioritising FSG information? 13 A. This is something that I thought long and hard about, so 14 yes, the prioritisation of fire survival guidance 15 calls -- it's really difficult to talk in terms -- it 16 seems almost a misnomer to talk about prioritisation. 17 Pretty well from the moment I arrived at the incident, 18 everybody in that building would have been regarded as 19 a priority for rescue. The circumstances were that 20 everybody needed to be got out as quickly as possible. 21 Within the structure, the prioritisation from 22 control would've been -- we would've received the 23 information from control saying that people were trapped 24 by either the smoke or the conditions in their flats. 25 That would've formed part of the priority. I think in</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 56</p>

<p>1 my statement I talk about prioritisation of lines that 2 had done dead, that we're trying to get to people who 3 we've lost contact with.</p> <p>4 Likewise, there would've been a range of different 5 competing priorities -- flats with children in them, 6 flats with people with wheelchairs in them -- throughout 7 the night, where we would've been attempting to 8 prioritise those.</p> <p>9 But it's such a fine balance between knowing that 10 everybody -- efforts needed to have been made to get 11 everybody out, so everybody in the building was 12 a priority, but at the same time, that detail changed, 13 and given the sheer volume of different calls we were 14 receiving, the specifics of the prioritisation are quite 15 difficult to recall, if I'm honest.</p> <p>16 Q. So correct me if I'm wrong in summarising your evidence 17 inaccurately, but is what you are saying that in fact 18 prioritisation changed dynamically --</p> <p>19 A. Absolutely.</p> <p>20 Q. -- as the incident --</p> <p>21 A. Absolutely. So control would've received information 22 from the people they were speaking to on the telephone. 23 That would've conditioned the way they prioritised the 24 calls that they gave to us. Likewise, we received 25 information from those people, and that would've</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 57</p>	<p>1 A. No, there weren't any definitive fixed priorities. No.</p> <p>2 Q. Did the bridgehead know, to the best of your knowledge, 3 that -- I think this is what you said -- ultimately they 4 were the ones who had to make the final decision as to 5 whether to prioritise rescue A over rescue B?</p> <p>6 A. I'm not sure I would couch it in quite those terms, but 7 they ultimately had control about where people were 8 deployed to. So I provided as best I could the 9 information on where people were, who they were, and why 10 they were trapped, but they ultimately knew where they 11 could get to and where they couldn't get to. So the 12 ultimate decision about where crews were deployed to did 13 sit with the bridgehead.</p> <p>14 Q. Did you ever find out or come to know that 15 prioritisation had been asked for on the basis of smoke 16 density?</p> <p>17 A. No, I don't recall that off the top of my head. I don't 18 recall that being a particular factor.</p> <p>19 I've talked again at length in my statement about 20 the closure of the feedback -- of the loop, about the 21 information we were getting back from the bridgehead, 22 and that within fire survival guidance procedure and 23 policy, we attempt, as far as possible, to close the 24 loop. So I will get the information, the fire survival 25 guidance co-ordinator will get the information from</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 59</p>
<p>1 coloured how we prioritised it. That information 2 would've then gone to the bridgehead. The bridgehead 3 would've then -- they know which floors they've got 4 access to, which floors they can't get access to. That 5 could very well have shifted the priorities for them.</p> <p>6 So if I told them that there were people on the 18th 7 floor that required rescue because the line had gone 8 dead, but they knew they couldn't get BA crews up there, 9 whilst they're obviously a priority, everybody was 10 a priority in that building, they would've then had to 11 make some really, really tough decisions about where 12 they committed crews to.</p> <p>13 As the crews are committed into the building, they 14 have been given a specific brief to get to the 15 16th floor, but if they meet somebody on the stairwell 16 who in their opinion is in immediate risk of losing 17 their lives, then their priorities need to shift.</p> <p>18 So it was entirely -- I think in the initial opening 19 statement that the LFB provided, that dilemma was across 20 the board throughout the incident. There were times 21 when people's individual decision-making had to be made 22 against what they faced in front of them.</p> <p>23 Q. Were there any fixed priorities? So, for example, come 24 what may, one must prioritise children first or people 25 with mobility issues first or the elderly?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 58</p>	<p>1 control from the person in the flat, we will pass that 2 to the bridgehead. The bridgehead will then deploy 3 crews to make that rescue. They will then tell us that 4 that rescue has been completed and then we will feed 5 that back to Brigade control to let them know.</p> <p>6 I've said in my statement that we never really 7 managed to complete that loop. It's my view that we 8 didn't complete that loop just because of the sheer 9 volume of calls that we were receiving, the sheer amount 10 of information that we were receiving, we were 11 processing, and then we were trying to pass on to the 12 bridgehead. It just wasn't realistic for them to be 13 able to give us definitive feedback on what we'd asked 14 for and where we'd asked folks to be deployed to.</p> <p>15 Q. I'll come back to that part of your answer in a moment, 16 or perhaps a little bit later.</p> <p>17 Can I just go back then a step and ask you some 18 questions about the move from CU8 to CU7.</p> <p>19 Do you remember why it was decided that CU7 should 20 be the dedicated CU for FSGs when CU8 had already been 21 receiving a number of them and handling them?</p> <p>22 A. I don't -- I wasn't privy to the specifics of that 23 decision, but what I can tell you is that the volume of 24 information that was passing through CU8 would've meant 25 it would've been unfeasible to manage the detail of the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 60</p>

<p>1 fire survival guidance calls and run the incident, the</p> <p>2 command and control element of the incident, from one</p> <p>3 unit. It would be entirely appropriate to move elements</p> <p>4 of the command and control process from one command unit</p> <p>5 to another, and I think there was multiple command units</p> <p>6 involved on the night of Grenfell.</p> <p>7 So I can't remember which unit it was, but there was</p> <p>8 a logistics unit which provided support, provided</p> <p>9 resources to the incident ground, there was a fire</p> <p>10 survival guidance unit and there was a command unit.</p> <p>11 That would be entirely consistent with fire service</p> <p>12 operations, to move -- to get to a position where you</p> <p>13 can manage the sheer volume of information.</p> <p>14 Q. Why wasn't CU7, when it arrived -- which it did after</p> <p>15 CU8 -- designated as the IC unit --</p> <p>16 A. I don't know.</p> <p>17 Q. -- and leave FSG on CU8 where it had started?</p> <p>18 A. I don't know.</p> <p>19 Q. Was there a reason for that, do you know?</p> <p>20 A. Not that I'm aware of, I don't know.</p> <p>21 Q. In terms of facilities on CU7, did CU7 have a CSS?</p> <p>22 A. Yes.</p> <p>23 Q. Do you remember whether it was working?</p> <p>24 A. I don't know whether it was working. I know we didn't</p> <p>25 use it. We didn't use CSS, as far as I'm aware, on CU7.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 61</p>	<p>1 Firelink detail from CSS. But I think the process that</p> <p>2 we had, the detail that we captured from Tony and from</p> <p>3 Dan, was effective in terms of getting that on the grid</p> <p>4 system that we had.</p> <p>5 But, also, in terms of the sheer volume of stuff</p> <p>6 that we had, I'm not sure how effective CSS would have</p> <p>7 been about cross-referencing that detail.</p> <p>8 Q. Why is that?</p> <p>9 A. Because of just the sheer volume and going through pages</p> <p>10 of messages to track and trace all of that detail</p> <p>11 could've been quite time consuming. But, again, that's</p> <p>12 speculation. I don't know that for --</p> <p>13 Q. Do you know whether a positive decision was made on the</p> <p>14 fire ground that night not to use the CSS?</p> <p>15 A. I don't. I didn't make a positive decision not to use</p> <p>16 CSS. We made positive decisions to put in place the</p> <p>17 structures that we did; I didn't make a positive</p> <p>18 decision not to use CSS.</p> <p>19 Q. Did you ask, yourself or anybody, why aren't we using</p> <p>20 the CSS?</p> <p>21 A. No.</p> <p>22 Q. Did it come up for discussion at all?</p> <p>23 A. Not that I recall, no.</p> <p>24 Q. Was there a command unit critical phone on the CU?</p> <p>25 A. I believe so yes.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 63</p>
<p>1 Q. You didn't use it. Is there a reason for that?</p> <p>2 A. The systems that we had in place at the time didn't</p> <p>3 require it. That was my understanding.</p> <p>4 Q. That was your understanding. Where did you get that</p> <p>5 understanding --</p> <p>6 A. Sorry, not -- we didn't use it because we didn't -- it</p> <p>7 wouldn't have provided assistance to what we were doing.</p> <p>8 Q. Would it record FSG information?</p> <p>9 A. I'm not sure. I don't know.</p> <p>10 Q. How familiar are you with the operation of a CSS?</p> <p>11 A. Not enormously. Not enormously.</p> <p>12 Q. Was there anybody on CU7 that night who was familiar</p> <p>13 with the operation of a CSS?</p> <p>14 A. So Watch Manager Harrison and Tony and Dan Meyrick were</p> <p>15 all CU operators, so they would've been familiar with</p> <p>16 CU7 -- with CSS, sorry. And I think -- my understanding</p> <p>17 is that within Tony's evidence he provides -- he speaks</p> <p>18 about the command and support system.</p> <p>19 Q. Right. Because -- you know this, don't you, I hope --</p> <p>20 CSS actually records messages sent by Firelink?</p> <p>21 A. Yes.</p> <p>22 Q. So would it not have been a useful resource at least to</p> <p>23 be able to have in one accessible place the FSG messages</p> <p>24 that were coming in?</p> <p>25 A. Certainly, possibly, it would've been good to have the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 62</p>	<p>1 Q. Was it working?</p> <p>2 A. I don't know.</p> <p>3 Q. Was it used?</p> <p>4 A. I don't know.</p> <p>5 Q. When you say you don't know, you don't remember?</p> <p>6 A. I don't recall, no.</p> <p>7 Q. What about the heli-tele?</p> <p>8 A. I don't think we used the heli-tele. We didn't use the</p> <p>9 heli-tele on CU7, no.</p> <p>10 Q. Do you know, again, whether that was the result of</p> <p>11 a positive decision or not?</p> <p>12 A. I'm not sure it would've provided any value,</p> <p>13 effectively. A heli-tele would've given us an external</p> <p>14 view of the incident. It wouldn't -- I'm not sure it</p> <p>15 would've provided any great support in terms of the fire</p> <p>16 survival guidance calls.</p> <p>17 Q. It would've enabled you, wouldn't it, to monitor and</p> <p>18 provide updates on external fire spread?</p> <p>19 A. Possibly, yes, but I don't think -- but in that</p> <p>20 context -- we knew that the building was being engulfed</p> <p>21 in a fire. In terms of being able to see that and</p> <p>22 provide further updates, I'm not entirely -- I don't</p> <p>23 think that would've been the role of the fire survival</p> <p>24 guidance co-ordination unit. That would've sat better</p> <p>25 with the incident command, if that makes sense. We</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 64</p>

<p>1 had -- we didn't have the capacity, I don't think, to be 2 able to do that external monitoring as well and provide 3 that feedback. 4 Q. Did you know that people had been reported, a number of 5 people, on the roof of the building? 6 A. We did have information to that effect at one point, 7 yes. 8 Q. So would it not have been helpful for those in CU7 9 handling FSG to know whether there were in fact people 10 on the roof? 11 A. We had a number of -- I remember quite late on in the 12 incident somebody reporting that there was somebody on 13 the roof. It was really difficult for me to know how 14 that information had got -- how that information had 15 been acquired because there was so much smoke, there was 16 so much density of fire. We also had reports quite late 17 on that there were people flashing torches from upper 18 floors. We made every effort, when that information 19 came in, to try and corroborate that, but there were 20 a number of information streams that came into us that 21 in the end proved to be not valid or we were unable to 22 corroborate what that information was and whether or not 23 they were accurate. 24 You can imagine that in the context of the incident, 25 the scale of the incident, there were frequently threads</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 65</p>	<p>1 MR MILLETT: I think the answer to that would probably lie 2 in my review of my notes, which is not a very helpful 3 answer to your question, I appreciate. 4 Quite well. I won't finish by lunchtime. 5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right. 6 MR MILLETT: Or rather: but I won't finish by lunchtime. 7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: But maybe over the adjournment you 8 will be able to review your notes? 9 MR MILLETT: Exactly. 10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. 11 Mr Goodall, how are you feeling? We would normally 12 break at 1 o'clock for some lunch. That's another 13 quarter of an hour. Do you feel comfortable going on 14 for another quarter of an hour? 15 A. Absolutely. 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Shall we go on, Mr Millett. Thank 17 you very much. 18 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, thank you very much. 19 Can I take you to policy 790, if you could be shown 20 that, please, which is at tab 5 of our policy bundle. 21 I know you are familiar with this. 22 A. I am. 23 Q. I just want to ask you about paragraphs 7.6 and 7.7. If 24 we can just go to page 4, at the bottom. 25 7.6 says:</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 67</p>
<p>1 of information, like people on the roof -- I mean, there 2 was one point very, very late on in the incident where 3 we had information that was potentially somebody on the 4 roof, which in my entire -- my whole experience of the 5 fire service, if there had been anybody on the roof, it 6 would have been utterly unsurvivable at that stage in 7 the incident. We still tried our best to corroborate 8 that information, get further detail, but it was quite 9 clear that that was unlikely to be accurate information. 10 Q. Would it not have been useful to use the heli-tele link 11 on CU7 -- 12 A. I don't think the -- 13 Q. -- in order to verify the report of whether there were 14 people on the roof or not? 15 A. I don't think -- my reading of the incident and my 16 perception of the incident is that the volume of smoke 17 and the volume of fire would've made it almost 18 impossible for the heli-tele to see the top of the 19 building, and therefore people stuck on the top of the 20 building. 21 MR MILLETT: Now, I'm going to turn to another topic. 22 Mr Chairman, I'm not keen to take a break myself 23 now, if we can go on for another 15 minutes. 24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: How are you getting on with this 25 witness?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 66</p>	<p>1 "As soon as resources allow, the IC should give 2 priority to appointing a dedicated officer known as a 3 FSG co-ordinator (minimum role of SM), to collate record 4 and retain all the information on FSG calls received and 5 the subsequent actions on the incident ground." 6 Am I right in thinking that that was you, that DAC 7 O'Loughlin as the IC gave you that role? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Then there's something about the briefing, communication 10 lines and limits of authority. 11 Did DAC O'Loughlin give you those communication 12 lines and limits of authority? 13 A. I don't recall the specifics of it, but I think I was 14 reasonably clear on my role within that FSG -- 15 Q. Right, but did he give you -- 16 A. I don't recall. 17 Q. It says: 18 "The ... briefing ... must explain the communication 19 lines and their limits of authority." 20 A. I don't recall receiving that briefing, no. 21 Q. Right. 22 7.7: 23 "One of the first actions of this dedicated officer 24 should be to speak by telephone to a supervisor at 25 control to gather the latest information on the progress</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 68</p>

<p>1 of FSG calls."</p> <p>2 Did you do that?</p> <p>3 A. No, I didn't.</p> <p>4 Q. Why not?</p> <p>5 A. Volume of calls. So the sheer volume of the calls that</p> <p>6 we had, the fact that I had a link between the Brigade</p> <p>7 co-ordinating centre and control via Dan Meyrick and via</p> <p>8 Tony Peckham, and just the volume of information that we</p> <p>9 were getting in. I didn't have a chance to speak with</p> <p>10 the supervisor. And if I'm honest, I didn't know --</p> <p>11 I couldn't have quoted you verbatim that policy detail</p> <p>12 on the morning of 14 June 2017, I couldn't have quoted</p> <p>13 it, so it's quite possible that I wasn't aware that was</p> <p>14 a dedicated role of the fire survival guidance</p> <p>15 co-ordinator.</p> <p>16 In terms of the information that that conversation</p> <p>17 might elicit, I think that we had that detail, we had</p> <p>18 that link with control via Dan and via Tony.</p> <p>19 Q. Okay.</p> <p>20 Just going back to your answer a minute ago, when</p> <p>21 you say, "if I'm honest, I didn't know", you couldn't</p> <p>22 quote the policy verbatim, maybe not, but on the morning</p> <p>23 of 14 June, would you at least have known the principle</p> <p>24 of what it is that somebody --</p> <p>25 A. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 69</p>	<p>1 Q. Can I then go back to finish off one or two questions</p> <p>2 that I said I would put over about the transfer from CU8</p> <p>3 to CU7.</p> <p>4 A. Yes.</p> <p>5 Q. At the bottom of page 8 of your statement, if I can go</p> <p>6 back to it, you say that your priority when you got to</p> <p>7 CU7 was to ensure that CU8 were not getting any more FSG</p> <p>8 calls.</p> <p>9 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>10 Q. Why did you have to ensure that CU8 stopped receiving</p> <p>11 FSG calls?</p> <p>12 A. Because they -- I mentioned this before, in terms of</p> <p>13 managing the amount of information within the command</p> <p>14 and control structure of any incident, if CU8 was being</p> <p>15 inundated with fire survival guidance calls but at the</p> <p>16 same time trying to build the structures to manage the</p> <p>17 broad incident, it would've been -- it's too much for</p> <p>18 that single command unit to be able to manage.</p> <p>19 Therefore, it's consistent with fire service operations</p> <p>20 that we move tasks around the incident ground, we move</p> <p>21 responsibilities to different parts of the incident</p> <p>22 ground, to different command units.</p> <p>23 So that statement is absolutely about allowing CU8</p> <p>24 to manage the broader incident whilst me taking</p> <p>25 responsibility for the fire survival guidance management</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 71</p>
<p>1 Q. -- appointed an FSG co-ordinator would have to do?</p> <p>2 A. Yes.</p> <p>3 Q. You would?</p> <p>4 A. I would, but equally, it would be dishonest of me to</p> <p>5 suggest that I knew specifically one of my roles was to</p> <p>6 contact the supervisor at control to gather latest</p> <p>7 information. That process took place, I believe, but</p> <p>8 I didn't do it. I wouldn't have known in the morning</p> <p>9 that that was my responsibility.</p> <p>10 Q. Does that tell us that you in fact weren't trained in</p> <p>11 how to go about conducting the role of FSG co-ordinator</p> <p>12 in a way that meant that you were familiar with policy?</p> <p>13 A. It would indicate that I don't have the minute -- the</p> <p>14 kind of specific detail about -- absolute detail about</p> <p>15 all of the policies that we possess within the London</p> <p>16 Fire Brigade. I have an understanding of the broad</p> <p>17 principles of the role of fire survival guidance</p> <p>18 co-ordinator. There's a range of different policies</p> <p>19 that we require to kind of understand, and if I'm</p> <p>20 honest, I didn't know that specific element of that</p> <p>21 specific policy.</p> <p>22 Q. Do you know or do you remember, sitting here, whether</p> <p>23 that specific element of that specific policy was ever</p> <p>24 the subject of any training?</p> <p>25 A. I don't know. I couldn't honestly tell you.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 70</p>	<p>1 and the information that was coming in to the incident</p> <p>2 ground.</p> <p>3 Q. You mentioned earlier an informative radio message being</p> <p>4 sent at about 02.20 from CU7 to control saying run all</p> <p>5 FSG messages through CU7.</p> <p>6 A. Yes.</p> <p>7 Q. We have that in the short incident log as 02.24.54,</p> <p>8 which I think roughly corresponds with your</p> <p>9 recollection.</p> <p>10 A. Yes.</p> <p>11 Q. Do you remember whether any FSG data was passed to or</p> <p>12 from CU8 after that time?</p> <p>13 A. No, I don't. I'm aware from evidence provided to the</p> <p>14 inquiry that that did happen, but I wasn't aware at the</p> <p>15 time.</p> <p>16 Q. You weren't aware of it?</p> <p>17 A. No.</p> <p>18 Q. Okay.</p> <p>19 We looked at the laminated board which you say was</p> <p>20 done by Norman Harrison earlier on this morning at</p> <p>21 LFB00015930.</p> <p>22 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>23 Q. First of all, were you involved in transferring FSG</p> <p>24 information which had been received onto CU8 to CU7?</p> <p>25 Were you involved in that transfer?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 72</p>

<p>1 A. Specific transfer of the information, no. That I think 2 was managed by Norm and -- sorry, by the command unit 3 staff who came with me and supported me. I don't recall 4 specifically carrying anything or doing the specifics. 5 Q. You don't? 6 A. No. 7 Q. Okay. 8 The flexible laminated sheet we looked at earlier 9 and I just referred to, was that something you remember 10 being taken from CU8 to CU7? 11 A. I'm afraid I don't, no. 12 Q. I just want to ask you about a specific call made at 13 02.28. If I can ask you to be shown INQ00000204, which 14 is a transcript of a radio message from the control room 15 at 02.28.27, you can see that there. 16 A. Mm-hm. 17 Q. It relates to flat 205. The controller in the control 18 room is CRO Adams. 19 Now, can we have a look at this transcript. If you 20 could just move down into the next page. You can see 21 control says, "Hello, it's Control again", reading down: 22 "CONTROL: Hi. We've got Flat 205. 23 "748: Flat 205, yeah? 24 "CONTROL: Yeah, 23rd Floor. 25 "748: Yeah, we've got that."</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 73</p>	<p>1 Q. You don't know whether this message came in to CU7 or to 2 CU8? 3 A. No. 4 Q. Looking at this page, you can see it says, the third 5 line down: 6 "CONTROL: The fire's in the living room in their 7 flat. 8 "748: Right, any further -- 9 "CONTROL: I'm telling them to leave. 10 "748: Right. 11 "CONTROL: Okay? 12 "748: You are telling them to leave, are you? 13 "CONTROL: I believe we are, if it's in there." 14 My question is: would you expect that information to 15 have come to you on the command unit? 16 A. Yes. I think I would expect that information to come to 17 me on the command unit, yes. But to come to the command 18 unit and then to be updated on the boards. 19 Q. Yes, well, thank you, that was my next question. So if 20 you go to -- 21 A. So in terms -- if I just elaborate a little bit, I think 22 this is a transcript of a call -- we were receiving 23 information of this nature constantly. Different flats, 24 different people, different numbers. So there was 25 definitely a point where it wouldn't have been</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 75</p>
<p>1 The controller is speaking to somebody called "748". 2 Who is that, do you know? 3 A. I don't know who 748 is. 4 Q. You don't know what 748 means? 5 A. No. 6 Q. Right. 7 It looks like it's going to -- well, is this -- you 8 can see the subject is seven adults. 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Seven adults in there getting quite desperate. Just 11 continuing down, if you can scroll down a bit further. 12 And 748 says: 13 "748: Right. Can they tell us what the conditions 14 are, please? 15 "CONTROL: Hold on, quick check what's happening. Is 16 there fire coming in? The fire's going in their flat. 17 "748: The fire is entering their flat in Flat 205?" 18 Then keep going ... Just go to the next page: 19 "CONTROL: I think that's what they're saying." 20 Now, just looking at that transcript, I just wonder, 21 is there anything familiar to you about this call? 22 A. No. 23 Q. Okay. 24 A. No, this is -- no, I don't remember specifically this 25 call, no.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 74</p>	<p>1 appropriate for that information to sit with me, to 2 reside with me exclusively. It was the team within the 3 command unit that was vitally important to the collating 4 of that information. 5 It's really difficult to be specific about the 6 individual calls, but we were getting multiple calls of 7 this nature, multiple bits of information saying that 8 there were seven adults in a room, heavily smoke-logged, 9 or children, heavily smoke-logged. So it wouldn't have 10 been appropriate for that to sit solely with me because 11 I wouldn't have been able to manage that volume on 12 a personal level. It had to be managed as a team by the 13 command unit, or command unit 7, and it's to their 14 eternal credit that they kept doing that throughout 15 really, really challenging and harrowing detailed 16 information. 17 Q. Right. 18 Now, if I can just ask you to look at the 19 whiteboard, and this is MET00015924. I just want to see 20 whether it matches. 21 If we expand it and look at flat 205, we can see 22 that on 205 there's a red tick, someone has put "8" in 23 green and there's a "2" next to it -- looks like a "2" 24 in a ring next to it. 25 Given the information that we've seen from the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 76</p>

19 (Pages 73 to 76)

<p>1 transcript, and making all allowances for differences of</p> <p>2 timing because we don't know when this photograph was</p> <p>3 taken, can you explain the difference between the</p> <p>4 information in the transcript about flat 205 and why the</p> <p>5 grid says "205", "8" and "2" in a circle?</p> <p>6 A. So my perception on the night -- or I thought on the</p> <p>7 night that potentially control had been suggesting to</p> <p>8 the people in the flats that they move from their flats</p> <p>9 to flats on the same floor or different floors, where</p> <p>10 the fire was either not so intense or the smoke was not</p> <p>11 so intense. It transpires that isn't what happened.</p> <p>12 But my understanding was that people moved themselves,</p> <p>13 they moved themselves from flat to flat. So it's quite</p> <p>14 possible that the transcript you have just shown me --</p> <p>15 what was the timing of that transcript?</p> <p>16 Q. 02.28.</p> <p>17 A. It's quite possible at 02.28 the figure was seven, and</p> <p>18 at 3/4 o'clock in the morning, someone else had joined</p> <p>19 them in that flat and it had become eight.</p> <p>20 There were a number of -- you'll see on that</p> <p>21 board -- so 201 it says 11. There are a number of flats</p> <p>22 where we've got higher numbers than one would expect in</p> <p>23 a building of that nature. It was my impression that</p> <p>24 people were moving around the building. Initially</p> <p>25 I thought they'd been asked to move by control.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 77</p>	<p>1 third row or column in, you can see the "3" is in black,</p> <p>2 three children, I assume, and a "2" in a ring in green,</p> <p>3 two adults. But what does the ringing mean?</p> <p>4 A. I don't know. I'm afraid I can't recall.</p> <p>5 Q. Pan out a bit again. Can you help us with what the --</p> <p>6 well, you can see the asterisk, "BA have gone there".</p> <p>7 A. Yes.</p> <p>8 Q. Was that legend on the whiteboard from the start, "BA</p> <p>9 have gone there"?</p> <p>10 A. I don't recall exactly when that went on there. That</p> <p>11 key would've developed throughout the night. So there</p> <p>12 would've been -- as detail had arisen, we would've added</p> <p>13 more detail. So if you look on the board, I think there</p> <p>14 are ticks, red ticks, in some of the flats, for example</p> <p>15 153, 154. I think that is a reference to BA -- we have</p> <p>16 information back to say that BA crews have been to those</p> <p>17 flats.</p> <p>18 Q. That tallies with questions I've asked people before,</p> <p>19 because there's no tick in the key and there's no</p> <p>20 referred asterisk in the grid, so --</p> <p>21 A. No, the red -- so if you look -- so the asterisk is the</p> <p>22 colour, as it were. So where I've got 11 adults,</p> <p>23 they're in green. Where I've got one child, they're in</p> <p>24 black. Where I've done the BA, it's a red tick. The</p> <p>25 priorities, which is also in red, that's the boxes and</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 79</p>
<p>1 Subsequently I think I learnt that they moved of their</p> <p>2 own volition for obvious reasons.</p> <p>3 Q. Okay.</p> <p>4 While we're on this, and in the few minutes we have</p> <p>5 before the lunch break, can you explain the key that's</p> <p>6 used on this board? We'll start with the green</p> <p>7 asterisk, adults.</p> <p>8 A. Yes.</p> <p>9 Q. Is that self-explanatory?</p> <p>10 A. Yes.</p> <p>11 Q. Okay. And kids in black writing.</p> <p>12 A. Yes.</p> <p>13 Q. Is that also self-explanatory?</p> <p>14 A. Yes.</p> <p>15 Q. So, for example, where we see flat 193 --</p> <p>16 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>17 Q. -- you can see a "2" in a ring and a "3" in black, "2"</p> <p>18 in a ring in green and "3" in black. Does that mean two</p> <p>19 adults, three children?</p> <p>20 A. Yes.</p> <p>21 Q. What does the ring around the "2" mean, do you know?</p> <p>22 This is flat 193, for example.</p> <p>23 A. Sorry, which flat?</p> <p>24 Q. 193. Sorry, we need to enlarge it, I think. It is only</p> <p>25 by way of example. If we look at 193, second line down,</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 78</p>	<p>1 the circles and the P, if that makes sense.</p> <p>2 Q. I see.</p> <p>3 Continuing on the subject of information back, in</p> <p>4 general terms, how did the information come back to CU7</p> <p>5 about deployments of BA to particular flats?</p> <p>6 A. That would've been either via the runners or the radio</p> <p>7 traffic from Dan. I don't specifically remember the</p> <p>8 route back in to the command unit.</p> <p>9 Q. Does anything on this grid or this key tell you how</p> <p>10 successful deployments were?</p> <p>11 A. I mentioned before we attempted to try to corroborate</p> <p>12 the rescues that had been completed by getting watch</p> <p>13 managers to go to the rescue centres. So from when this</p> <p>14 photograph was taken, this, I believe, would've had</p> <p>15 evidence -- would've had information that we'd received</p> <p>16 from the rest centres, which was the bar and grill and</p> <p>17 the leisure centre. So I talk here -- so if you look at</p> <p>18 the bottom, there's a green dot that says "Left</p> <p>19 premises". So that, I believe, would've been</p> <p>20 information we'd got from the watch managers at those</p> <p>21 casualty recovery centres at the bar and grill and the</p> <p>22 leisure centre.</p> <p>23 So we would've -- as people came out -- it was quite</p> <p>24 late on in the incident when we managed to achieve this,</p> <p>25 but as people were coming out, we were trying to find</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 80</p>

<p>1 out which flat they were in, where they'd come from and 2 mark that off so we would be able to narrow the search. 3 Q. Now, in terms of the tick, "BA have gone there", that 4 was information I think you've said that came back from 5 the bridgehead. 6 A. It must have been. 7 Q. You say it must have been; do you know? 8 A. No. I can't give you absolute definitive, but 9 I can't -- it couldn't have come back any other way. 10 Q. Do you know who was writing the tick on the board? 11 A. I don't recall. I think it was Norm. It could've been 12 any one of that command unit team. 13 Q. Do you know whether whoever was writing the tick on the 14 board or anybody else in the CU was relaying information 15 about deployments back to the control room? 16 A. Again, my perception is that we didn't relay a great 17 deal of information back to control just because of the 18 sheer volume of the information that we had. 19 MR MILLETT: Right. I'll come back to that. 20 Mr Chairman, I'm really halfway through this board, 21 but I am conscious that we have gone on for an hour and 22 three-quarters. It might be appropriate to have 23 a break. 24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think it would, really, because 25 there's a risk that you'll take longer than you think.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 81</p>	<p>1 as you said, it would have been utterly unsurvivable? 2 That was, I think, your evidence. 3 A. That's my opinion that -- it's impossible for me to 4 absolutely, definitively -- because I don't know what 5 the conditions were, but even at the point where I'm 6 en route to the incident and the fire appears to have 7 worked its way up one side of the building completely, 8 the quantity of smoke and associated heat that would've 9 gone with that fire, I find it very difficult to imagine 10 conditions on the roof would've been survivable for 11 a long period of time. 12 Q. Is it right that you didn't actually have a clear visual 13 impression of the fire spread? 14 A. I saw the fire spread throughout the incident because 15 there were periods of time where I left the unit and was 16 on the incident ground, so I would've seen the fire 17 spread, but I couldn't definitively tell you which 18 floors it was in, at which time, how long it took to 19 spread from one face of the building to another. It 20 would not be possible for me to give you that. 21 Q. Were you actually ever aware of the actual conditions on 22 the roof? 23 A. No. 24 Q. So you can't say definitively, can you, that if people 25 had been on the roof, it would or would not have been</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 83</p>
<p>1 MR MILLETT: Yes. 2 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right. 3 MR MILLETT: There is that risk. 4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, Mr Goodall, thank you very 5 much. We're going to have a break now so that you and 6 everybody else can have some lunch. Please don't talk 7 to anyone about your evidence or anything related to it 8 while you're out of the room. 9 We'll start again at 2.05, please. All right? 10 Thank you very much. 11 Right, 2.05, please. 12 (1.05 pm) 13 (The short adjournment) 14 (2.05 pm) 15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Goodall, happy to 16 carry on? 17 THE WITNESS: Yes, absolutely. 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good, thank you. 19 MR MILLETT: Mr Goodall, thank you for coming back. 20 Before I go back to the grid on the whiteboard, 21 could I just ask you very briefly one or two questions 22 about the heli-tele link we were looking at or we 23 discussed earlier this morning. 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. Is it right that if there had been anybody on the roof,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 82</p>	<p>1 survivable? 2 A. No, I can't definitively. 3 Q. Can I go back to the grid that we were looking at, which 4 is MET00015924. 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Now, we'd gone some way down through the key. 7 A. Uh-huh. 8 Q. Just one or two things I want to do with you about this, 9 you explain the tick and you said "BA have gone there". 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Does that mean they have been deployed there or does it 12 mean they actually had gone into the flats or to the 13 flats and come back? 14 A. I don't know definitively whether or not they've gone 15 there. It would've made sense in my mind to have marked 16 the matrix when they had gone to a flat, if they -- let 17 me rephrase that. 18 So I think the tick refers to definitive -- now 19 I think of it, it refers to definitive evidence we had 20 from BA crews that they'd gone to a flat. 21 Q. So they'd actually visited it -- 22 A. So if you look, for example, flat 205, the fact that 23 there's a tick there means that we would've had a report 24 that BA -- it is likely to have meant that we had 25 a report that BA crews had made it to that flat.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 84</p>

<p>1 Q. Right.</p> <p>2 A. But one needs to understand that that -- the figure of</p> <p>3 eight in that flat could have gone up at a later date or</p> <p>4 a later time, and my understanding of the incident is</p> <p>5 that crews didn't make it high in the building after the</p> <p>6 initial stages of that incident. So the point at which</p> <p>7 a BA crew had got to a flat does not necessarily</p> <p>8 correspond with the information on that matrix. It's</p> <p>9 possible that the detail went up at different times.</p> <p>10 Q. Yes, I see.</p> <p>11 I wonder if we can illustrate that with the very</p> <p>12 example we have at the moment.</p> <p>13 A. Sure.</p> <p>14 Q. I wonder if on the screen we can keep this picture but</p> <p>15 also put up MET00008663, Mr Documents Director, which is</p> <p>16 we think -- well, you help me -- an earlier version of</p> <p>17 the grid in CU7.</p> <p>18 A. Yes.</p> <p>19 Q. First of all, we can compare, I think, the tables at the</p> <p>20 bottom, because you can see that --</p> <p>21 A. Yes.</p> <p>22 Q. -- on the left-hand side, which doesn't have a dot P and</p> <p>23 a green "Left premises", the right-hand side one does,</p> <p>24 it also doesn't have "Casualty info", whereas the</p> <p>25 left-hand side does.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 85</p>	<p>1 Q. -- which corresponds with the seven we talked about</p> <p>2 earlier.</p> <p>3 A. Yes.</p> <p>4 Q. Then it goes up to eight.</p> <p>5 A. Yes.</p> <p>6 Q. Does that help you with your evidence about how this</p> <p>7 grid evolved?</p> <p>8 A. So that kind of confirms what I suggested before the</p> <p>9 break, that we were -- we didn't have definitive</p> <p>10 evidence of people moving flats, but we extrapolated</p> <p>11 from the fact that, as is the case with 205, it had gone</p> <p>12 from seven to eight persons in that flat, we'd had</p> <p>13 reports of an increase because people had moved, and</p> <p>14 that -- it confirms what we knew about -- sorry, it</p> <p>15 confirms what I said before about the board being</p> <p>16 evolving and being constantly updated.</p> <p>17 Q. Again, just to repeat it, to the best of your</p> <p>18 recollection, the tick means not simply deployed but</p> <p>19 deployed and visited?</p> <p>20 A. That is -- that would -- I believe that's the case, yes.</p> <p>21 Q. You believe that's the case. Why do you say that?</p> <p>22 A. Why do I hesitate?</p> <p>23 Q. Why do you say that? What was the basis of your</p> <p>24 recollection that that is so?</p> <p>25 A. Because deploying -- because I don't think I would've</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 87</p>
<p>1 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>2 Q. Does that tell us something about which was the earlier</p> <p>3 and which was the later?</p> <p>4 A. So from those two pictures, I would say the picture on</p> <p>5 the right, as I'm looking at it, would be an earlier</p> <p>6 photograph than the one on the left.</p> <p>7 Q. Now, we have some reason to suggest to you that the</p> <p>8 photograph of the grid on the right was taken at about</p> <p>9 03.15, approximately.</p> <p>10 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>11 Q. Would that -- it's hard to ask you whether that is</p> <p>12 something you recall --</p> <p>13 A. I don't recall -- I mean, do you know where the</p> <p>14 photograph came? Was it one that I took on my phone</p> <p>15 or --?</p> <p>16 Q. No, on our information at the moment, it's somebody</p> <p>17 called Watch Manager Girling.</p> <p>18 A. Right.</p> <p>19 Q. Do you know Watch Manager Girling?</p> <p>20 A. No, I don't. That doesn't ring a bell.</p> <p>21 Q. Just comparing, then, the two cells for 205, you can see</p> <p>22 on the right-hand side, the earlier one --</p> <p>23 A. Yes.</p> <p>24 Q. -- it says "205 [tick] 7".</p> <p>25 A. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 86</p>	<p>1 put a tick into that box unless I'd had evidence that --</p> <p>2 I'd had some feedback to say something had happened,</p> <p>3 that something warranted recording. If I've asked -- if</p> <p>4 there's a number in a box -- number against the flat,</p> <p>5 ie there's people in that flat, and I've passed that to</p> <p>6 the bridgehead, that, as it were, is captured. I know</p> <p>7 that's happened because I've written it on the board, or</p> <p>8 somebody has written it on the board, that information</p> <p>9 is likely to be passed to the deployment. When I get</p> <p>10 something back, that justifies me updating, or</p> <p>11 colleagues updating that board to indicate something's</p> <p>12 happened.</p> <p>13 So I'm really sorry to not be able to give you</p> <p>14 an absolutely definitive response, but that would be my</p> <p>15 best, best understanding of why a tick is placed in that</p> <p>16 box.</p> <p>17 Q. During the process of the radio communications coming in</p> <p>18 from control or mobile communications into the CU and</p> <p>19 then on out and then the information being updated as</p> <p>20 you go, you've explained what's been going on, but can</p> <p>21 you just tell us, what were you personally doing</p> <p>22 throughout that time?</p> <p>23 A. So I've reflected over the break. You've asked me some</p> <p>24 very specific questions about individuals, individual</p> <p>25 actions, and my perception of the activity that took</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 88</p>

<p>1 place on command unit 7 was very much a team effort, it 2 was very much -- you know, whilst we might -- initially 3 Norm may have drawn up the table, might have filled it 4 in, it's quite possible that I put some information on 5 that, that I updated it, that Dan did it. I don't think 6 Tony moved from his seat, he was pretty well constantly 7 there, but again -- and in that respect I was 8 co-ordinating the activity of the three watch managers, 9 plus the runners, plus Dan Egan, plus the information 10 that was flowing in and out.</p> <p>11 Sometimes I reflect on -- it's quite hard to 12 understand exactly, specifically what I did, but I think 13 it was -- my sense of my own performance was that I was 14 co-ordinating the activity.</p> <p>15 So when you asked me before the break about the 16 specific flat numbers and the specific detail, I don't 17 have a strong sense that the specifics of the flats were 18 coming through me. My understanding is that that was 19 going through the members of the team and being 20 co-ordinated, and it was my job to co-ordinate that flow 21 of information.</p> <p>22 I think I need to reiterate the context in which 23 this is happening, the stressful environment, the 24 enormous pressure. We know exactly -- all of the 25 members of that command unit team and the fire survival</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 89</p>	<p>1 Q. Did you do anything to innovate or suggest changes as 2 you went?</p> <p>3 A. So my sense is that the key was my idea. But, again, it 4 would be really -- it would be disingenuous of me to say 5 that it might not have come from one of the other 6 colleagues within the team. It's quite possible that 7 someone said, "Why don't we put this key up?" and I 8 went, "Yes, great idea, let's do that".</p> <p>9 But it is really important to emphasise the activity 10 that took place on the command unit, and the activity of 11 the runners and the fire survival guidance people at the 12 bridgehead, was very much -- it was a team activity. It 13 was a lot of people with a common aim and a common goal 14 working together to make the flow of information as 15 smooth as possible.</p> <p>16 Q. Just going back, then, if we can, to the whiteboard on 17 the left-hand side, MET00015924, and the key at the 18 bottom. I think we got some way through this.</p> <p>19 You've explained the red "BA have gone there".</p> <p>20 The next one is "P" in a ring, "Priority".</p> <p>21 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>22 Q. Can you explain that?</p> <p>23 A. Again, I'll go back to the answer I gave you before the 24 break, that that would've been based on information that 25 we'd received from control about whether or not</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 91</p>
<p>1 guidance knew the implications for the people in that 2 building as soon as we got there. So there's a level of 3 personal pressure on the decision-making that needs to 4 be understood, but also the sheer volume of information 5 that's passing through. It wouldn't necessarily have 6 been the right thing for me to have an individual hold 7 on that information. I think that would've led to 8 a logjam, a stifling, a stopping of the flow.</p> <p>9 So my sense is that I co-ordinated activities but 10 without drilling down into the absolute minutiae of each 11 bit of information, each core, if that makes sense.</p> <p>12 Q. Right. So would it be right to describe your role as 13 essentially overseeing what was going on --</p> <p>14 A. Yes.</p> <p>15 Q. -- as opposed to yourself having communications or 16 recording information as it came?</p> <p>17 A. Yes. Yes.</p> <p>18 Q. When you say "co-ordinating", your job was to 19 co-ordinate, functionally what did that involve? How 20 did you co-ordinate?</p> <p>21 A. It's really difficult kind of to give you specific 22 examples of what that looks like, but that's managing 23 the roles that were given out to people and managing the 24 flow of information, and making sure that the structures 25 that we have in place are working as best they can.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 90</p>	<p>1 an individual's -- that there were fires in a flat or 2 people had lost consciousness or a range of different 3 bits of information and factors that we received, and 4 specifically -- so, as I said before, everybody in the 5 building, everybody was a priority. Throughout the 6 incident, there were times when information would come 7 in to say that a flat was particularly heavily 8 smoke-logged or the fire had broken through to a flat or 9 there were children involved. That may have notionally 10 raised them up on a priority list.</p> <p>11 The second bit, the P with the box around it, is 12 self-explanatory. So as the incident progresses, people 13 have gone from, "My flat is heavily smoke-logged" to 14 "There's fire in my flat", or they've lost consciousness 15 and the line has gone dead, and they've been -- we on 16 the command unit have said we think that that is 17 a raised priority because clearly they're running out of 18 time.</p> <p>19 Q. Still on this picture, then, there's then a blue dot 20 with what looks like an "F" next to it. What's that, 21 can you help?</p> <p>22 A. I'm afraid -- the only thing that occurs to me is 23 whether or not that refers to a known fatality, 24 possibly, but -- and I can't see -- so I think 25 there's -- flat 92 appears to have a dot in it, but</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 92</p>

<p>1 I can't see whether that's -- that there are any other</p> <p>2 references. Because there was points during the</p> <p>3 incident where we were aware of where people had died</p> <p>4 and we'd had that information.</p> <p>5 Q. Where did that information come from to you in CU7, do</p> <p>6 you remember?</p> <p>7 A. I remember a colleague of mine, Group Manager</p> <p>8 Dave O'Neill, talking to me about a woman who died on</p> <p>9 the stairs, who was in situ on the stairs.</p> <p>10 But it would've come back the same route as the</p> <p>11 information in relation to the location of where BA</p> <p>12 crews had come, the similar route back in.</p> <p>13 Q. We discussed before the lunch break what the numbers in</p> <p>14 rings represented and I'm not sure you were very clear</p> <p>15 about that.</p> <p>16 A. No, and I think I can offer a bit more detail on that on</p> <p>17 reflection now.</p> <p>18 So I think that the numbers in rings refer to the</p> <p>19 people who we cross-referenced, I think.</p> <p>20 Q. Cross-referenced to what?</p> <p>21 A. To the bar and grill, the casualty rescue centre. So my</p> <p>22 impression on looking again at the matrix is that where</p> <p>23 we had information to say that a person had been rescued</p> <p>24 from a flat, then we were able to put that on the board,</p> <p>25 and that -- yes, that was part of trying to triangulate</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 93</p>	<p>1 A. Yes.</p> <p>2 Q. So you actually transposed across from one to the other?</p> <p>3 A. Yes.</p> <p>4 Q. Finally on the grid, if we can just look at it, and just</p> <p>5 have that alone on the screen, there's something</p> <p>6 I noticed I want to ask you about to see if you</p> <p>7 remember.</p> <p>8 If we just have, Mr Documents Director, the grid on</p> <p>9 the screen, MET00015924. Can it be enlarged and focus,</p> <p>10 if we can, on the little piece of paper hanging on the</p> <p>11 top right-hand corner of the whiteboard.</p> <p>12 Now, I want to know whether you can identify that --</p> <p>13 A. I'm sorry --</p> <p>14 Q. -- piece of paper?</p> <p>15 A. I'm sorry, I can't. I can't tell you what that either</p> <p>16 said or why that's been placed there, I'm afraid.</p> <p>17 Q. I think we can do better, or I can do better.</p> <p>18 Can you please be shown LFB00001968, please, page 17</p> <p>19 of that run of documents. We may have to look at them</p> <p>20 side-by-side.</p> <p>21 First of all, is that something that you recall</p> <p>22 seeing on the night?</p> <p>23 A. No. No, no, not specifically, no.</p> <p>24 Q. All right.</p> <p>25 Now, let's see if we can do this. If you keep that</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 95</p>
<p>1 the information we had.</p> <p>2 Q. That's helpful. Let's see if we can illustrate this.</p> <p>3 If you can keep, Mr Documents Director, this grid on</p> <p>4 the screen and show the witness MET00015936.</p> <p>5 We may have to zoom in and out. This shouldn't take</p> <p>6 long.</p> <p>7 This is the whiteboard which was on the left,</p> <p>8 I think, of the grid.</p> <p>9 A. Yes.</p> <p>10 Q. The grid was on its right. It's on the screen in the</p> <p>11 wrong place but it doesn't matter.</p> <p>12 If we can just test what you've just told us, does</p> <p>13 this work? If you look at flat 205, for example, in the</p> <p>14 grid you have a "2" --</p> <p>15 A. Two people, yeah.</p> <p>16 Q. -- in a ring?</p> <p>17 A. Yes.</p> <p>18 Q. And when you look on the right-hand side, 205, "x 2</p> <p>19 people"?</p> <p>20 A. Yeah, and 176 is three people.</p> <p>21 Q. Yes, exactly.</p> <p>22 A. That's consistent.</p> <p>23 Q. And 94, two people -- you can't see it at the moment.</p> <p>24 A. Yes.</p> <p>25 Q. That's how it works, is it?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 94</p>	<p>1 on the screen, Mr Documents Director, and then go back</p> <p>2 to the grid at MET00015924.</p> <p>3 Can you see the piece of paper on the right anywhere</p> <p>4 in the picture on the left of the screen?</p> <p>5 A. So that looks like the same piece of paper, yes.</p> <p>6 Q. Do you remember how that got there?</p> <p>7 A. No.</p> <p>8 Q. Do you remember when it might have got there?</p> <p>9 A. No.</p> <p>10 Q. Do you remember anything about it at all?</p> <p>11 A. No.</p> <p>12 Q. Do you know --</p> <p>13 A. I think what's interesting about that piece of paper is</p> <p>14 that it implies that there's been a movement from</p> <p>15 flat 115 to 113, which is consistent with what I've said</p> <p>16 about the people moving within the building, but I don't</p> <p>17 know -- it would be speculation, but it's possible that</p> <p>18 that went up as a kind of early indication of that, but</p> <p>19 then as that happened more frequently and we were</p> <p>20 getting more information, it wasn't possible to put</p> <p>21 every piece of paper on the board. I don't know</p> <p>22 specifically. I couldn't honestly answer specifically</p> <p>23 why that had gone up on the board.</p> <p>24 Q. Now, I am showing you the picture on the left, but the</p> <p>25 one on the right has a redaction in it and the version</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 96</p>

<p>1 on the left should also have a redaction in it as well, 2 for the record. But I think the answer is you can't 3 help with that. 4 Do you know anything about a move from flat 115 to 5 113? 6 A. No. 7 Q. Right. Okay. Thank you. 8 Before I move on to another topic, there are one or 9 two other documents showing flat numbers which I want to 10 show you to see if they ring a bell. 11 First of all, can I ask you to be shown MET00016967. 12 (Pause) 13 Now, this is either an envelope or a piece of paper 14 which Watch Manager Sadler gave evidence about in July. 15 According to his evidence, he was given this while he 16 was collating fire survival guidance forms on a car 17 bonnet? 18 A. Mm-hm. 19 Q. He took a photograph of this document he had received 20 and sent it to the bridgehead. 21 A. Mm-hm. 22 Q. Now, do you recognise this piece of paper? 23 A. No. 24 Q. You can see "Brett Loft IC" there. 25 A. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 97</p>	<p>1 113", in a way those pieces of paper become redundant. 2 I don't need to worry about those. I can focus my 3 understanding on that bored and use that as the best way 4 to transfer the information from control, from us, to 5 the deployment for BA crews and rescue crews. 6 Q. If I were to show you any other specific lists, would 7 you be able to help me? 8 A. I'm afraid it's unlikely. 9 Q. Let's try one more. MET00015731. That is exhibit 3 to 10 Crew Manager Batterbee's exhibits. He gave evidence in 11 the first week of our hearings. It was a list that he 12 gave to those co-ordinating -- 13 A. I don't recognise it, but I think it also -- what it 14 does is highlight -- I think what it does is indicative 15 of the scale -- of the number of calls that were coming 16 in, in that it -- there was so many calls coming in with 17 such rapidity that people were taking the information as 18 best they could in the early stages of the incident. 19 Q. I am asking you specifically about this document -- 20 A. No, I don't. 21 Q. -- rather than drawing inferences from it. 22 A. No. 23 Q. You don't. Right, okay. 24 Now, moving on then, to a linked question. 25 You told us earlier that radio communications were</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 99</p>
<p>1 Q. We talked about him earlier. 2 A. Mm-hm. 3 Q. Looking at the list of flats under it, do these ring 4 a bell about -- 5 A. I'm afraid not. But, again, within the context of the 6 volume of paper and scraps and forms that were present 7 on the night, it would be almost impossible for me to be 8 sure. As I said before, in that co-ordination role, 9 I didn't specifically see or look at those detailed bits 10 of paper. That role was being done by colleagues, as 11 far as I recall. 12 Q. So you don't remember seeing pieces of paper which were 13 not control information forms but with lists of flats -- 14 A. Yes, I do -- I don't specifically remember seeing them. 15 I know they existed. I know that they were part of the 16 information that we received on the command unit, and 17 they were part of that bundle of information that we 18 were trying to make sense of to collate and quantify the 19 numbers of people involved. 20 So I think this helps to understand the purpose of 21 the matrix, in that if I've got a matrix up on the board 22 which is the single repository of all the information 23 for flat 113, then I know that if I've got nine pieces 24 of paper with 113 written on it, and then I've got Dan 25 Meyrick coming in and saying, "We've got an update from</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 98</p>	<p>1 in place to communicate FSG information from CU7 to the 2 bridgehead. 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. Which channel was being used, do you remember? 5 A. I can't remember. I can't remember, I'm afraid, off the 6 top of my head. 7 Q. Now, Watch Manager Williams, Glynn Williams, gave 8 evidence -- and, indeed, Dan Egan has given evidence -- 9 that the system for taking FSG information and 10 communicating it to the bridgehead changed at some point 11 in the night. Now, Glynn Williams says it was about 12 4 am or a little bit before, with Pete Wolfenden on the 13 radio, and then there was a direct line of communication 14 between the CU, CU7, and him. 15 A. Uh-huh. 16 Q. Do you remember that? 17 A. I don't remember when it happened. I don't remember 18 specifically when that change of radio traffic happened, 19 but that is consistent with my memory of the structures 20 that we put in place. 21 I think my view is it probably happened earlier than 22 4 o'clock, but Pete Wolfenden would probably be able to 23 give you a stronger idea of exactly when it happened, 24 but maybe he won't, I don't know. 25 Q. Do you remember the involvement of somebody called Watch</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 100</p>

<p>1 Manager Furnell?</p> <p>2 A. Yes. I believe -- I think it's in my statement --</p> <p>3 forgive me, there are so many different names flying</p> <p>4 around, but I think it's Tom Furnell --</p> <p>5 Q. It is.</p> <p>6 A. -- and I think he -- I asked him to do the casualty</p> <p>7 clearing, that role of identifying casualties. But that</p> <p>8 was quite late on in the incident, so it's possible he</p> <p>9 had had a role prior to that.</p> <p>10 Q. He has provided us with a statement -- and, again, he'll</p> <p>11 have to explain this to us when he comes -- and he says</p> <p>12 he took a photograph of the CU7 whiteboard, that you</p> <p>13 asked him to do that, and to take it to something called</p> <p>14 the survival guidance unit at the base of the tower.</p> <p>15 Does this ring a bell with you?</p> <p>16 A. The survival guidance unit?</p> <p>17 Q. Yes.</p> <p>18 A. That feels to me -- if it's at the base of the tower,</p> <p>19 then that would've been about making sure that the</p> <p>20 detail in that matrix was reflected at the base of the</p> <p>21 tower, where they had a -- where they were co-ordinating</p> <p>22 their recording of the information that we were giving</p> <p>23 them.</p> <p>24 Q. But do you actually have your own recollection about</p> <p>25 asking Watch Manager Furnell to do that?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 101</p>	<p>1 I suspect it was because it was in a top pocket or</p> <p>2 somewhere slightly damp, very sweaty. Even in the</p> <p>3 context of a command unit, I'm away from the incident,</p> <p>4 but it's still a febrile, sweaty, relatively hostile</p> <p>5 environment for a piece of sensitive IT equipment, and</p> <p>6 there were a number of occasions where I had to key</p> <p>7 in -- there's a fail-safe device on the phone that if</p> <p>8 the lock doesn't work, you have to put in a password and</p> <p>9 press enter repeatedly, and if you don't get it right,</p> <p>10 it threatens to delete your entire memory of your phone</p> <p>11 and all the contacts on it. There were a number of</p> <p>12 occasions where I had to repeatedly do that. I was</p> <p>13 thinking: oh my God, if I lose all my contacts, if</p> <p>14 I want to make contact with command unit staff or</p> <p>15 colleagues on the incident ground using my phone, that's</p> <p>16 not going to help. That would be very bad.</p> <p>17 So I wouldn't have relied on a text message or</p> <p>18 an MMS message being sent through to the bridgehead. It</p> <p>19 wouldn't have felt a secure way of passing that</p> <p>20 information to me.</p> <p>21 Q. So you would rather rely on taking a photograph on the</p> <p>22 phone and then sending the phone by hand physically?</p> <p>23 A. Yes. Or in effect giving the information via phone,</p> <p>24 an image of the information, to a colleague, and then</p> <p>25 the colleague going to that point and then</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 103</p>
<p>1 A. I'm afraid I don't.</p> <p>2 Q. If he's right and you did tell him to do that and he did</p> <p>3 it, do you know whether there's a good reason why you</p> <p>4 couldn't just take a photograph of the whiteboard</p> <p>5 yourself on your own phone and ping it to Louisa</p> <p>6 De Silvo at the bridgehead?</p> <p>7 A. I wouldn't have had Louisa De Silvo's telephone number.</p> <p>8 Q. Or anybody else's?</p> <p>9 A. I wouldn't have regarded that as a reliable method of</p> <p>10 communication. I would've -- even now, actually, if I'm</p> <p>11 honest, I would -- that information I would like to</p> <p>12 transfer with a person from me to him. I think it's</p> <p>13 a good thing. I think if I did ask him to do it, it was</p> <p>14 an intelligent thing to do, it was the right thing to do</p> <p>15 in terms of capturing that detail and then going to</p> <p>16 where the detail was being recorded, to brief crews, the</p> <p>17 BA crews committing. I think that would've been a good</p> <p>18 thing, and I think to do it in that way would've been</p> <p>19 a more secure way.</p> <p>20 I think -- and my experience of IT solutions and IT</p> <p>21 within the context of Grenfell is that they are not as</p> <p>22 reliable. Specifically, my phone kept on trying to lock</p> <p>23 me out during the course of the incident.</p> <p>24 Q. Your Brigade mobile?</p> <p>25 A. My Brigade mobile. Now, I don't know why that was.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 102</p>	<p>1 cross-referencing what they can see on a wall or board</p> <p>2 or wherever they were keeping that information in the</p> <p>3 bridgehead or the lobby, cross-referencing against that</p> <p>4 the information on their phone to double check what they</p> <p>5 were getting. That would seem like a more sensible</p> <p>6 approach to me.</p> <p>7 Q. Would the journey of the telephone physically from CU7</p> <p>8 to the bridgehead not take time?</p> <p>9 A. Yes.</p> <p>10 Q. And so why would that be a better method than simply</p> <p>11 using a more --</p> <p>12 A. Because --</p> <p>13 Q. -- traditional means of electronic communication?</p> <p>14 A. Within the context of the operations -- within all fire</p> <p>15 service operations, time is absolutely of the essence,</p> <p>16 but accurately is also vitally important as well, and</p> <p>17 there's a balance to be struck between doing things</p> <p>18 instantly and doing things as accurately as possible.</p> <p>19 My sense is if I'd attempted to transfer that</p> <p>20 information, it would've taken me a while to find out</p> <p>21 whose phone they've got, who is answering their phone in</p> <p>22 the lobby, who is available, who is using their phone.</p> <p>23 Firefighters -- whether or not they've even got them</p> <p>24 with them, whether the bridgehead commanders have got --</p> <p>25 sorry, the fire sector commanders have got their phone</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 104</p>

<p>1 with them or the individuals have got their phone with 2 them. It doesn't seem as reliable a method to me. 3 Q. Finally on this subject about the photograph, Watch 4 Manager Furnell says that you asked him to take the 5 picture on your phone. Do you remember that? Was it 6 your phone he took it on? 7 A. No, I don't, I'm afraid. 8 Q. Do you have your Brigade mobile -- you still have it 9 with you, do you? 10 A. It's recently changed, but that phone is still -- I've 11 taken -- all the images from that were submitted to the 12 Met Police as part of my evidence package, I believe. 13 Q. They were, were they? Right. 14 Now, going to your statement at paragraph 19, you 15 say in your statement there that -- it's the middle of 16 the page 4 paragraphs down: 17 "We periodically lost communication during the 18 course of the incident. Radios were dipping out but I 19 wouldn't say that was anything other than normal in all 20 communications, not just the LFB's. But my experience 21 with the links between our CU and the Bridgehead is that 22 the radios seemed to work, and if they didn't work we 23 sent a runner." 24 When you say you periodically lost communications, 25 first of all, what do you mean by "periodically" --</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 105</p>	<p>1 Q. Are there any specific examples that you remember 2 standing out about when you failed to send a 3 communication effectively? 4 A. It would be entirely normal in that respect that you 5 might need to supplement a request. So you might want 6 to get hold of somebody over a radio, not be able to and 7 then send a runner. 8 Q. Was your experience of this periodic loss of 9 communications, was that throughout the night or were 10 there particular points in the night when it was worse 11 than others? 12 A. I think that's a general statement referring to 13 throughout the night. I don't remember it being 14 a particular event. 15 Q. You say if the radios didn't work, you sent a runner, as 16 I've just read to you. 17 A. Mm-hm. 18 Q. How many runners did you have at the CU which you used 19 to communicate with the bridgehead? 20 A. I've talked about Shaun Coltress I talked about 21 Mandeep Singh. There could've been more. I can't 22 honestly remember. 23 As I said at the bottom of that paragraph that 24 you've highlighted, I never had to do anything in terms 25 of resourcing. There was a sense in which I always had</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 107</p>
<p>1 A. So it's possible that you are trying to raise somebody 2 on a radio and you can't raise them. You can't -- so it 3 may well have been I was trying to get hold of Dan or 4 Pete, or Dan Egan was trying to get hold of somebody 5 else and, for whatever reason, we couldn't raise them. 6 Q. You say "for whatever reason"; were there any reasons 7 that you -- 8 A. So there are a myriad of reasons why somebody might not 9 answer their radio. So if you're involved in a briefing 10 or you're passing some information and your radio 11 starts -- there's a lot of radio traffic which isn't 12 necessarily for you, you might well turn your radio 13 down. That might mean while you're delivering 14 a briefing, delivering some information, receiving some 15 information, you might not hear somebody call you up. 16 You may well choose to -- it may well be quiet because 17 you need to focus on the briefing that you're giving, 18 and that in that context the communication might break 19 down. I think there are occasions when you'll get 20 patchy radio coverage or a specific geographic location 21 might mean that radio signals might not travel to that 22 individual. 23 So it's not uncommon within the kind of fast moving 24 and complex environment for people not to answer their 25 radios immediately.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 106</p>	<p>1 people coming to me and making themselves available to 2 me, which I'm very grateful for. I didn't have to go 3 out and say, "I need X number of additional resources". 4 There was always a constant supply of people who had 5 potentially redeployed themselves, they'd done one job, 6 they were then looking for further work to do. 7 Q. On that subject, the runner system that you used, was 8 that because radios weren't working periodically or were 9 you always going to use runners of paper anyway? 10 A. It's very difficult to be specific but, as I say, the 11 use of runners is not uncommon. If there's 12 a particularly vital piece of information or 13 a particularly -- or you're unsure of a piece of 14 information travelling from where you are to where it 15 needs to be, you might supplement that with a runner, 16 you might supplement that with physically transferring 17 that message across. 18 Q. When the communication by radio took over at some point 19 in the night, which we've discussed -- 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. -- between CU7 and Pete Wolfenden, did you still 22 continue to use runners after that? 23 A. My sense is that I didn't use Shaun or Mandeep deep into 24 the incident. So I suspect that that was done earlier 25 rather than later, and then once we got secure links, we</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 108</p>

<p>1 would've used them less. But I wouldn't like to say</p> <p>2 I didn't use a runner after Dan and Pete had got that</p> <p>3 strong link. It wouldn't be appropriate for me to say</p> <p>4 that because I may well have used someone else to run</p> <p>5 specific messages.</p> <p>6 Q. Given what you told us about the periodic loss of radio</p> <p>7 communication throughout the incident -- your words --</p> <p>8 during the course of the incident, why did you resort to</p> <p>9 using radio in the main as the method of communication</p> <p>10 and use runners less?</p> <p>11 A. Because my impression was that the comms -- and I think</p> <p>12 I mention it here, I don't have a strong impression that</p> <p>13 we had a real difficulty with the communications, that</p> <p>14 the radios appeared -- I felt that I had a reasonable</p> <p>15 link between -- there was a reasonable flow via that</p> <p>16 comms link from myself -- from CU7, rather -- to the</p> <p>17 bridgehead lobby, to that deployment area within the</p> <p>18 building.</p> <p>19 Q. At any point during the night did you or, to your</p> <p>20 knowledge, anyone on CU7 have direct communication with</p> <p>21 the bridgehead?</p> <p>22 A. Oh, who are we talking about? The sector commanders at</p> <p>23 the bridgehead or --?</p> <p>24 Q. Well, first of all, start with the sector commanders at</p> <p>25 the bridgehead.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 109</p>	<p>1 communication with Louisa De Silvo at the bridgehead?</p> <p>2 A. So in broad operational terms, you don't want to</p> <p>3 over-complicate the links. You don't want to have</p> <p>4 multiple people talking to the person. You want that</p> <p>5 link to be as simple as possible. So if I've got Dan</p> <p>6 Egan speaking to colleagues at the bridgehead to give</p> <p>7 them the information, it's not a good principle to have</p> <p>8 me overlaying that. It's better for me to have that</p> <p>9 single line of communication going through one person as</p> <p>10 a principle, because then you'll get a circumvention of</p> <p>11 the lines of communication, you'll get multiple people</p> <p>12 in, and then you start to get -- in my experience, that</p> <p>13 can lead to confusion about the information that's</p> <p>14 transferring from one place to another if you've got</p> <p>15 multiple lines going into one individual.</p> <p>16 I don't know what happened with Louisa. I don't</p> <p>17 know how many people she was speaking to. But the kind</p> <p>18 of -- what we would've been aspiring to would've been --</p> <p>19 and from what you're suggesting, this is what appears to</p> <p>20 have happened -- that Dan would've been the person from</p> <p>21 us, would've been the flow out of information, and that</p> <p>22 would've gone to Pete Wolfenden, and then Pete would've</p> <p>23 briefed the crews there about what was happening. So</p> <p>24 that would've been Louisa and Glynn Williams, I believe,</p> <p>25 if that makes sense.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 111</p>
<p>1 A. I don't think I had direct links with either Group</p> <p>2 Manager Goulbourne or Group Manager Richard Welch</p> <p>3 I don't think I spoke to them directly and I'm not sure</p> <p>4 whether colleagues did, whether Pete would've done or</p> <p>5 Dan would've done.</p> <p>6 Q. What about Watch Manager O'Keeffe?</p> <p>7 A. No, I don't recall having a direct conversation with</p> <p>8 Watch Manager O'Keeffe.</p> <p>9 Q. What about Watch Manager De Silvo?</p> <p>10 A. Again, I think I spoke to Louisa outside the building,</p> <p>11 but it would've -- it wasn't whilst she was doing the</p> <p>12 bridgehead, I believe. But, again -- I think.</p> <p>13 Q. We heard from Watch Manager Sadler that he did have</p> <p>14 direct communication with Watch Manager Louisa De Silvo</p> <p>15 using channel 3. He said he would send her priority</p> <p>16 calls.</p> <p>17 First of all, were you aware of that?</p> <p>18 A. Watch Manager Sadler was the person working on the car</p> <p>19 bonnet?</p> <p>20 Q. Yes, and then on the bins.</p> <p>21 A. No.</p> <p>22 Q. You don't?</p> <p>23 A. No.</p> <p>24 Q. Secondly, is there any reason why you yourself in CU7 or</p> <p>25 anybody else in CU7 could themselves not have direct</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 110</p>	<p>1 Rather than me coming in as an overlay on top of</p> <p>2 that, it's better to have one person, one line of comms.</p> <p>3 It prevents confusion, prevents overlap of information,</p> <p>4 and keeping it simple is a -- given the complexity and</p> <p>5 variety of information that you've got coming in,</p> <p>6 keeping it as simple as possible is an important</p> <p>7 principle to apply in this context.</p> <p>8 Q. Wouldn't it follow, then, that it would be better to</p> <p>9 have a direct line of communication from CU7 -- whether</p> <p>10 you or Dan Egan -- and Louisa or anybody else managing</p> <p>11 the bridgehead rather than going --</p> <p>12 A. No, I don't --</p> <p>13 Q. Let me just finish the question -- rather than going via</p> <p>14 Pete Wolfenden or anyone else somewhere else in the</p> <p>15 building?</p> <p>16 A. I don't think so, because what you're dealing with is --</p> <p>17 the complexity and sheer volume of information is</p> <p>18 that -- one needs to co-ordinate the activity rather</p> <p>19 than get into the detail of the activity. Actually, it</p> <p>20 wouldn't have been simpler, I don't think, to have all</p> <p>21 of the information passing through me as an individual</p> <p>22 and on to the bridgehead. I think that would've delayed</p> <p>23 and slowed that passage of information.</p> <p>24 Q. Why?</p> <p>25 A. Because it would've created a single point -- a single</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 112</p>

<p>1 logjam, and I think that that co-ordinating role is as</p> <p>2 important. Putting in place the structures to allow</p> <p>3 that passage of information is my sense of my own role</p> <p>4 in that rather than handling the information personally.</p> <p>5 Q. Leaving aside your own role for the moment and just</p> <p>6 looking at it in the round, would it not be better,</p> <p>7 given the need for simplicity, to have had as few links</p> <p>8 in the communication chain as possible?</p> <p>9 A. It's very difficult for me to say -- so the links on my</p> <p>10 side are quite sparse. The command unit links are</p> <p>11 quite -- there aren't many. We've got the information</p> <p>12 coming in via Dan and Tony, recorded by Norm, excepting</p> <p>13 what I've said about the kind of team operation there</p> <p>14 and different people sort of taking up the slack, that</p> <p>15 information going out from Dan.</p> <p>16 How that information is then managed in the</p> <p>17 bridgehead or in the lobby sector where it was collated,</p> <p>18 that is very much down to that side of the incident. It</p> <p>19 might well be that Louisa was overwhelmed just keeping</p> <p>20 up with updating her matrix, her board, her evidence,</p> <p>21 likewise Watch Manager O'Keeffe, that actually that was</p> <p>22 enough of a role, given the volume of the traffic,</p> <p>23 rather than to have her also managing calls coming into</p> <p>24 her, then transferring that information onto a board and</p> <p>25 then briefing somebody else about where to go.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 113</p>	<p>1 So I can only tell them the information that I've</p> <p>2 got and I've received. I don't know the specifics, and</p> <p>3 my understanding of the incident was the specifics and</p> <p>4 the access and where we could get to and where we</p> <p>5 couldn't get to and which floors and flats were</p> <p>6 accessible was changing all the time. The conditions</p> <p>7 were deteriorating at such a rate and our ability to get</p> <p>8 to places was changing all the time.</p> <p>9 So it very much would've been how they choose to use</p> <p>10 that information.</p> <p>11 Q. Was there a method by which you kept tabs on how they</p> <p>12 chose to use that information?</p> <p>13 A. So I talk about this in my statement, about this is</p> <p>14 perhaps the area where we struggled to complete that FSG</p> <p>15 loop.</p> <p>16 Q. I am going to come on to that in a moment.</p> <p>17 A. So very much where the information came back, we tried</p> <p>18 to capture it, the red ticks on the board, but the</p> <p>19 volume of information we got back was -- we weren't</p> <p>20 getting that much information back about where people</p> <p>21 were going.</p> <p>22 Q. I am going to come to that in just a moment, but before</p> <p>23 I do, would it be fair -- and if it's not fair, please</p> <p>24 say -- to summarise your thinking on the structure that</p> <p>25 you put in place is that it had a hard boundary between</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 115</p>
<p>1 So I think the answer to your question is very much</p> <p>2 about the volume of information that was coming in, that</p> <p>3 it --</p> <p>4 Q. Yes. You say in that last answer that how the</p> <p>5 information is managed at the bridgehead or lifts or in</p> <p>6 the lobby is very much down to that side of the</p> <p>7 incident.</p> <p>8 Do I take it from that answer that when you were</p> <p>9 instructed to be FSG co-ordinator, you regarded FSG</p> <p>10 co-ordination within or by the building as somebody</p> <p>11 else's job?</p> <p>12 A. So what you do with the information, what happens with</p> <p>13 the information when it goes into the building, as</p> <p>14 I mentioned earlier on this morning, I'll pass the</p> <p>15 information to effectively that bridgehead fire sector</p> <p>16 commander -- fire sector of the incident, and, yes, it</p> <p>17 is up to them how they then manage that information, how</p> <p>18 they then prioritise.</p> <p>19 As I said before, I could well have said to them</p> <p>20 that we've got eight people in flat 205 on the 24th</p> <p>21 floor, but if they can't get above the 11th floor,</p> <p>22 there's very little they can do about that. They may</p> <p>23 well choose to commit crews to a flat on the lower</p> <p>24 floors which they know they can get access to but they</p> <p>25 haven't yet got the detail.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 114</p>	<p>1 you and the building, in the sense that your</p> <p>2 responsibility for structuring FSG management ended once</p> <p>3 the information went into the building and it was then</p> <p>4 left to those running the bridgehead to decide what to</p> <p>5 do with it?</p> <p>6 A. So I don't think -- I think within the context of the</p> <p>7 FSG policy and procedure, I think there would have to be</p> <p>8 a softer boundary between the two, so that if you were</p> <p>9 dealing -- if we're dealing with one, two, three, four,</p> <p>10 seven FSG calls on a scale that we're more familiar</p> <p>11 with, then I think my role would be much more about</p> <p>12 pressing for that feedback to close that particular</p> <p>13 feedback loop, close that loop.</p> <p>14 Let's say that, you know, as we had in Lakanal,</p> <p>15 where you have a relatively finite number of flats</p> <p>16 involved and we're not getting to the person, I think</p> <p>17 the FSG co-ordinator's role there is slightly different,</p> <p>18 you know, I can press for more information on</p> <p>19 a particular flat or a particular resident.</p> <p>20 The thing that was unique about Grenfell was just</p> <p>21 the sheer volume and scale. I think as the opening</p> <p>22 statements from the LFB said, this was more FSGs in one</p> <p>23 night than we'd had in the previous ten years.</p> <p>24 The scale of it prevented the detailed transfer of</p> <p>25 information back, if that makes sense. The scale of it</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 116</p>

<p>1 meant that it was all that we could do to pass the 2 information, pass the detail to the sector commanders in 3 the fire sector to then deploy their crews and then to 4 try and attempt a rescue.</p> <p>5 So the short answer to your question is I think 6 actually there was. In this context at Grenfell, my job 7 was to pass the information to the bridgehead and they 8 then did what they could with it, given the context of 9 it.</p> <p>10 The slightly longer answer is that, in an ideal 11 situation, there would've been more co-ordination.</p> <p>12 Q. You told us earlier -- perhaps the best way to deal with 13 this is to go to page 13 of your statement and look at 14 the third paragraph on that page:</p> <p>15 "I am confident that the information was passing to 16 the Bridgehead but because of the sheer volume of 17 numbers and the work the Bridgehead had to do it was not 18 possible for them to feed back to us exactly what they 19 had done. In the end we did close some of the loops off 20 by doing the research as I said with the rescue 21 centres ..."</p> <p>22 You told us earlier that you did get some 23 information back about deployments and visiting flats?</p> <p>24 A. Yes.</p> <p>25 Q. Just focusing on that, how did that information come</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 117</p>	<p>1 affected what I was doing. We were still, to the best 2 of our ability, trying to say to the fire sector, the 3 bridgehead: this is where people are, this is how many 4 people we think are trapped, these are the conditions in 5 which they're trapped in, can you do anything, can you 6 commit crews to them? I think that that process 7 happened. The fact that we didn't feed back on it 8 didn't materially affect whether or not we could effect 9 rescues to those people.</p> <p>10 Q. If you weren't getting up-to-date information back from 11 the bridgehead about the success or failure of any 12 particular deployment, how did control know what advice 13 to give to 999 callers who had been calling and were 14 still trapped where crews had been deployed there but 15 had not succeeded?</p> <p>16 A. So my understanding of the advice that was given -- so 17 by the time I'm getting there, the advice that's being 18 given is consistent with national guidance that -- it 19 was -- one of the dilemmas that we talk about in the 20 initial statements for the LFB was that the control 21 officers knew that the people in those particular flats 22 were in trouble if they stayed in their flats and were 23 in trouble if they left. So by the time I'm getting 24 there, by the time I'm putting in place the structures 25 that I've got, we know that those people need assistance</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 119</p>
<p>1 back to CU7? Was it by radio or by runner or any other 2 way?</p> <p>3 A. I don't know. I can't remember. When we were talking 4 about the red ticks on that matrix, so that would've 5 been that -- I can't remember the details of specific -- 6 but that also refers to the work we did again with 7 Tom Furnell, and I've forgotten the name of the other 8 watch manager, but I had two discrete locations, one was 9 the bar and grill and one was the leisure centre, and 10 off the top of my head I believe we had many more people 11 go through the bar and grill. So that refers also to -- 12 when I talk about the research at the rescue centres, 13 that's what I'm talking about there. That's about 14 speaking to the casualties, speaking to the LAS, 15 speaking to the people who come out the building and 16 finding out where they'd come from.</p> <p>17 Q. Did the absence of information -- or the feedback, as 18 you describe it in your statement -- cause you any 19 difficulties in the job you were doing?</p> <p>20 A. Of course it meant it was -- it would've been much 21 better to be able to speak to control and tell them 22 exactly what we were doing and tell them what we were 23 achieving, what we weren't achieving.</p> <p>24 But in terms of the scale of the incident, what we 25 were trying to achieve, I don't think it materially</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 118</p>	<p>1 to get out. We're trying, as far as possible, to get BA 2 crews to provide the rescue, provide the assistance to 3 get those people out.</p> <p>4 I'm not sure materially if it would've made a great 5 deal of difference to them if we'd have been able to 6 give them detail about where particular BA crews had 7 been sent or hadn't been sent, if I'm honest.</p> <p>8 But, again, if I'm honest, that's verging on 9 speculation rather than a factual --</p> <p>10 Q. Let's see if we can just nail this down a bit more. Can 11 I ask you to look at policy 790, which is at tab 5 -- 12 there's a beeping noise. I'm not sure where it's coming 13 from, but if it could be eliminated, please.</p> <p>14 I'd like you to go to policy 790, tab 5 of our 15 policies bundle, and be shown, please, section 9, 16 "Communication with Control", page 5.</p> <p>17 A. Yes.</p> <p>18 Q. Now, having a look at this policy, 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 --</p> <p>19 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>20 Q. -- are you familiar with this part of this policy?</p> <p>21 A. This is what I talk about in terms of that closure of 22 that loop, yes.</p> <p>23 Q. So on the night of the fire, were you aware of these 24 policy requirements?</p> <p>25 A. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 120</p>

<p>1 Q. Looking at 9.1, it says:</p> <p>2 "It is vital that control is kept informed of the</p> <p>3 actions being taken to resolve each FSG call. The fact</p> <p>4 that control is aware of the actions being carried out</p> <p>5 on the incident ground will greatly enhance the advice</p> <p>6 given to FSG callers."</p> <p>7 A. Yes.</p> <p>8 Q. So you were aware of that?</p> <p>9 A. Yes.</p> <p>10 Q. Can I ask you, what steps were taken to keep control</p> <p>11 informed of the actions taken to resolve each FSG call?</p> <p>12 A. So this is what I've said before. This is the area that</p> <p>13 I don't think we ever fully achieved. We weren't in</p> <p>14 a position -- and, again, I think I make reference to it</p> <p>15 in my statement. The FSG policy is written -- my</p> <p>16 understanding of the FSG policy is it was written in</p> <p>17 direct response to Lakanal, and you'll see from the</p> <p>18 appendices to that policy it talks about -- it has</p> <p>19 pro formas with I think up to seven flats on it.</p> <p>20 The scale of the incident at Grenfell was such that</p> <p>21 this policy was never going to be able to cope with the</p> <p>22 fact that we had, to the best of my knowledge, I think</p> <p>23 45 flats involved, or people in 45 flats. It was</p> <p>24 almost -- I just don't think the policy would ever have</p> <p>25 coped with an incident on the scale -- with ten years'</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 121</p>	<p>1 disingenuous of me to say that I wasn't aware of that</p> <p>2 and that that kind of -- the co-ordination of the search</p> <p>3 co-ordinator and the fire survival guidance sector</p> <p>4 commander would've been -- in an incident of this</p> <p>5 nature, should've been happening. I don't know whether</p> <p>6 there was one appointed. Again, what I will say is that</p> <p>7 given the sheer volume of information that was coming</p> <p>8 on, you know, it doesn't surprise me that it didn't</p> <p>9 happen.</p> <p>10 MR MILLETT: Very well. Thank you.</p> <p>11 Mr Chairman, I am now --</p> <p>12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It's a bit distracting, isn't it?</p> <p>13 MR MILLETT: We are all doing our best to ignore --</p> <p>14 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I noticed the efforts going on.</p> <p>15 MR MILLETT: We've been going an hour. I'm near the end of</p> <p>16 my questions. It may be now is an appropriate moment</p> <p>17 for a 5-minute break while --</p> <p>18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It may be that ...</p> <p>19 MR MILLETT: I'll carry on then.</p> <p>20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: How much longer do you think?</p> <p>21 MR MILLETT: About 10 minutes, I think, probably.</p> <p>22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You could manage 10 minutes?</p> <p>23 A. Certainly.</p> <p>24 MR MILLETT: I am conscious there may be one or two other</p> <p>25 questions which --</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 123</p>
<p>1 worth of fire survival guidance in a single night.</p> <p>2 Q. Did anybody take any steps to tell control that the</p> <p>3 difficulties being experienced on the incident ground</p> <p>4 with the sheer number of FSG calls meant that</p> <p>5 controllers were not going to be able to be in</p> <p>6 a position to update callers accurately?</p> <p>7 A. Not that I'm aware of. I didn't speak to control to</p> <p>8 tell them that, no.</p> <p>9 Q. Did that thought cross your mind?</p> <p>10 A. No, I'll be honest, it -- again, you know, I don't want</p> <p>11 to sound like a broken record, but my sense is of things</p> <p>12 happening incredibly -- the volume of information and</p> <p>13 the speed at which things were happening was such that</p> <p>14 I don't recall. It never occurred to me.</p> <p>15 Q. Now, in your statement, you say -- and it's page 20,</p> <p>16 there's no need to go to it -- that you don't know if</p> <p>17 there was a formal search sector.</p> <p>18 Do you know whether there was a search co-ordinator</p> <p>19 appointed?</p> <p>20 A. I don't.</p> <p>21 Q. Were you aware of the policy requirement that</p> <p>22 information and updates on FSG calls must be passed to</p> <p>23 the officer performing the role of search co-ordinator?</p> <p>24 A. Again, subsequently, one's reviewed this stuff at</p> <p>25 length. In broad terms, yes. I think it would be</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 122</p>	<p>1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Oh, yes, I was thinking of when we</p> <p>2 take a break.</p> <p>3 MR MILLETT: Very good. All right, I'll carry on then.</p> <p>4 In your statement, if you could go to it -- it's</p> <p>5 page 9, please -- you say -- and it's in the last</p> <p>6 paragraph, I suppose, the fifth paragraph down:</p> <p>7 "It may well have been appropriate to give the</p> <p>8 information to the Incident Commander about what we were</p> <p>9 receiving but I think at the time the right thing to do</p> <p>10 was to gather all the information."</p> <p>11 I just want to ask you about that.</p> <p>12 Did you actually take any steps to give the incident</p> <p>13 commander, from time to time, the information about fire</p> <p>14 survival guidance calls and their progress?</p> <p>15 A. So there were -- again, if you refer to the records in</p> <p>16 relation to command unit 8, there will have been</p> <p>17 tactical co-ordination group meetings throughout the</p> <p>18 night, and I attended those to give information about</p> <p>19 the numbers involved, about the activities that were</p> <p>20 taking place in relation to the fire survival guidance</p> <p>21 calls. So there was a process whereby I did pass</p> <p>22 information.</p> <p>23 That specific sentence I think in my statement, it's</p> <p>24 more about right at that early stage of the incident</p> <p>25 where we weren't necessarily passing the information</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 124</p>

<p>1 about the -- it's part of the process of passing the</p> <p>2 information both to control and also to the incident</p> <p>3 commander, and I don't think that happened at the early</p> <p>4 stage, particularly at the early stage. It certainly</p> <p>5 happened once I started attending the tactical</p> <p>6 co-ordination group meetings.</p> <p>7 But, again, I think that is about me observing that</p> <p>8 there were things that we would've liked to have done</p> <p>9 but we couldn't do because of the sheer volume of what</p> <p>10 we were dealing with.</p> <p>11 Q. Let's just look at the log, then, of those meetings, if</p> <p>12 we can. Can we have up, please, MET00005404, which is</p> <p>13 a logged timeline which was exhibited to the Assistant</p> <p>14 Commissioner Roe's statement and taken by his loggist,</p> <p>15 Watch Manager McConochie.</p> <p>16 Now, there's a meeting at 3.20 on page 1.</p> <p>17 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>18 Q. If we just go down to that. It looks like the first</p> <p>19 one. It looks like you weren't at that. Is that right?</p> <p>20 A. If I'm not there on the minutes then, yes, I think it's</p> <p>21 fair to assume.</p> <p>22 Q. If you go to page 3, there's another meeting either</p> <p>23 04.34, there's a TCM:</p> <p>24 "Commissioner introduces and establishes priorities</p> <p>25 in AR absence."</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 125</p>	<p>1 Q. Right.</p> <p>2 Do you know how soon after Andy Roe took over as</p> <p>3 incident commander you gave him FSG details?</p> <p>4 A. I can't recall specifically.</p> <p>5 Q. Okay.</p> <p>6 The reason I show you this one is because this is</p> <p>7 the first occasion on which your name appears as</p> <p>8 attending a tactical co-ordination meeting. Would that</p> <p>9 be right, 05.40?</p> <p>10 A. I don't think that's correct. I think I attended ones</p> <p>11 before then.</p> <p>12 Q. You are mentioned again at 05.50, if we just look over</p> <p>13 the next page, page 5, please, top of the page:</p> <p>14 "Tom Goodall: Wet riser is poor and supply is being</p> <p>15 augmented ... Crews committed with limited weight of</p> <p>16 attack ..."</p> <p>17 Et cetera.</p> <p>18 Again, there's no mention there of FSG. Do you know</p> <p>19 why that was? It's now 05.50 in the morning and we</p> <p>20 haven't had any evidence so far on this log of you</p> <p>21 referring to FSG.</p> <p>22 A. No.</p> <p>23 Q. Then there's a meeting at 05.50.</p> <p>24 A. So 05.50, where it says "Tom running FSG", so that</p> <p>25 I think was -- that was one of the later meetings that</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 127</p>
<p>1 Again, I don't think we see the list of attendees</p> <p>2 there. Do you know whether you attended --</p> <p>3 A. If that meeting was chaired by the commissioner, then</p> <p>4 I don't think I was in attendance there.</p> <p>5 Q. We see there's no discussion of FSGs there.</p> <p>6 A. No.</p> <p>7 Q. At 05.40, which is the next page, page 4, please, we</p> <p>8 see, towards the bottom of the page:</p> <p>9 "Tom Goodall: reports of person on building roof and</p> <p>10 feeding live to Facebook."</p> <p>11 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>12 Q. Then:</p> <p>13 "AR [Andy Roe]: MCA Hele to consider winching off -</p> <p>14 investigating."</p> <p>15 This goes back to the point about the roof before.</p> <p>16 A. Yes.</p> <p>17 Q. But my question here was we don't see you mentioning or</p> <p>18 discussing FSG here. This looks like the first time</p> <p>19 you're referred to.</p> <p>20 A. That's not consistent with my recollection. My</p> <p>21 recollection is that -- and I say so in my statement --</p> <p>22 I provided briefings to the tactical co-ordination group</p> <p>23 meetings on, I believe, three occasions, and on the</p> <p>24 fourth occasion I went with Group Manager Greg Ashman</p> <p>25 who took over from me in that FSG co-ordination role.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 126</p>	<p>1 I'd attended.</p> <p>2 Q. Okay.</p> <p>3 A. Because my recollection is that that figure of 171 was</p> <p>4 the final figure that I had -- that I had concluded, but</p> <p>5 I had provided detail before then because the figure had</p> <p>6 gone up. My recollection was that I was providing</p> <p>7 information prior to that.</p> <p>8 Q. Where were these tactical co-ordination meetings?</p> <p>9 A. Command unit 8.</p> <p>10 Q. So you had to go from 7 to 8?</p> <p>11 A. Yes.</p> <p>12 Q. How long did that take you on each occasion?</p> <p>13 A. I could've been 10, 20 minutes.</p> <p>14 Q. To get from CU7 to 8?</p> <p>15 A. Oh, no, to get from 7 to 8 was moments, they were</p> <p>16 literally around the corner from each other, but the</p> <p>17 time that one spent on the command units could've been</p> <p>18 10/20 minutes, depending on the length and duration of</p> <p>19 the meetings.</p> <p>20 Q. Your recollection is what, as to the timing, roughly, as</p> <p>21 to when you first gave Andy Roe an update as to the FSG</p> <p>22 situation?</p> <p>23 A. 3 o'clock, 4 o'clock, something like that, but that's --</p> <p>24 I would've hoped that that would've been captured in</p> <p>25 the minutes, but I can't be definitive.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 128</p>

<p>1 Q. Okay.</p> <p>2 Now, you referred a number of times in your evidence</p> <p>3 to information from the casualty centres, and we've seen</p> <p>4 a whiteboard about that. Just one or two pictures, if</p> <p>5 I can, just to run them past you.</p> <p>6 Could you please, first of all, be shown -- well,</p> <p>7 first of all, what time do you think you started to</p> <p>8 collate the information from the rescue centres?</p> <p>9 A. I can't remember exactly. I think I make reference to</p> <p>10 it in my statement, so perhaps it's in there. I can't</p> <p>11 remember without reviewing my statement. Was I talking</p> <p>12 about 3 or 4 o'clock, something like that, maybe</p> <p>13 a little later?</p> <p>14 Q. Yes, you do. Just to be fair to you, it is in your</p> <p>15 statement, top of page 13, if the witness can be shown</p> <p>16 that. It starts at the bottom of page 12.</p> <p>17 A. Yes. So that would be my sense of the timings, but --</p> <p>18 Q. Okay.</p> <p>19 A. It is a sense that -- I'm sure you've heard this from</p> <p>20 a great many of the witnesses -- the sense of time</p> <p>21 becomes very, very confused.</p> <p>22 Q. Can I ask you to be shown MET00015705, please, which is</p> <p>23 a photograph exhibited to DAC O'Loughlin's witness</p> <p>24 statement.</p> <p>25 This looks like the whiteboard on the left we saw</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 129</p>	<p>1 by reference to those time marks?</p> <p>2 A. Sorry, so the top line would've been that -- the green</p> <p>3 number of 04.50 I believe would be talking about the</p> <p>4 adults and the children corresponding there. So at</p> <p>5 04.50, the figures were 133 adults and 38 children, 38</p> <p>6 people accounted for. From --</p> <p>7 Q. Just pause there, 133 adults what, rescued or still in</p> <p>8 the building?</p> <p>9 A. Still in the building.</p> <p>10 Q. Still in the building?</p> <p>11 A. Still in the building.</p> <p>12 Q. 38 kids still in the building?</p> <p>13 A. So that makes the figure of 171, which is my sense --</p> <p>14 when I -- that is the figure that I think we got to in</p> <p>15 terms of understanding how many people were involved.</p> <p>16 Q. Right.</p> <p>17 A. The figure of 38 is the people we believe are accounted</p> <p>18 for, so that will have been done in terms of the rescue</p> <p>19 centres, and you can see from there that the shading --</p> <p>20 the effect of that blue colour for the 38 people</p> <p>21 accounted for corresponds to the 3s with the circle on</p> <p>22 it in the matrix. I think it looks like it's the same</p> <p>23 pen used to write that figure as write the 3s on the</p> <p>24 board, implying that that's part of that collation of</p> <p>25 the activity that was done at the rescue -- at the bar</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 131</p>
<p>1 earlier on, but this looks like an earlier version of</p> <p>2 it. Would that be right?</p> <p>3 A. That looks consistent with the board that you showed me</p> <p>4 a picture of before.</p> <p>5 Q. This has a time stamp or time written on it of 03.47,</p> <p>6 127 adults and 38 kids.</p> <p>7 Do you recognise that?</p> <p>8 A. In the sense -- yes, I do.</p> <p>9 Q. Was this on CU7?</p> <p>10 A. I think so, yes.</p> <p>11 Q. Do you think that's the first write-up of collating the</p> <p>12 casualty information?</p> <p>13 A. No, because I don't -- we don't have a picture of the</p> <p>14 corresponding whiteboard, effectively the matrix</p> <p>15 whiteboard, do we? So it wouldn't be possible to say</p> <p>16 whether or not I'd started the matrix at this point. My</p> <p>17 recollection is by 03.47 that matrix would've started to</p> <p>18 go up. We would've had that other board available.</p> <p>19 Q. If you could then be shown MET00015936, which I think we</p> <p>20 looked at earlier when we were talking about collation.</p> <p>21 That is timed at -- well, you can see various times</p> <p>22 on there.</p> <p>23 A. 04.50 yes.</p> <p>24 Q. Well, 04.25, 04.45 then 04.50 at the top.</p> <p>25 Could you just explain for us the evolution of this</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 130</p>	<p>1 and grill and the leisure centre in terms of</p> <p>2 corroborating where people had come from, where they'd</p> <p>3 been rescued from.</p> <p>4 Does that make sense?</p> <p>5 Q. Well, sort of, if I can answer your question. Now</p> <p>6 answer mine. 38 people accounted for. I've done a very</p> <p>7 brief tally earlier on of the numbers rescued/evacuated.</p> <p>8 I may be wrong about this, but I think it comes to more</p> <p>9 than 38.</p> <p>10 A. Yes.</p> <p>11 Q. So how does the total of people --</p> <p>12 A. So that would've been -- so that figure of 38 people,</p> <p>13 I'm interpreting from that image you're showing me, is</p> <p>14 04.50. The figure of 65 could well have been later. So</p> <p>15 once we've got more information about people recovered</p> <p>16 and rescued. It's quite possible also that I haven't --</p> <p>17 I've never tallied up the board of the matrix on the</p> <p>18 right-hand side, the circles, whether they add up to 65,</p> <p>19 I don't know. But it's possible that we would've had</p> <p>20 information that people had been rescued but we wouldn't</p> <p>21 have been able to identify which flats they'd come from.</p> <p>22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Millett, it's 3.15.</p> <p>23 MR MILLETT: Yes.</p> <p>24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think if we're going to have</p> <p>25 a break --</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 132</p>

<p>1 MR MILLETT: Now is the time.</p> <p>2 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: -- this is the time to have it.</p> <p>3 MR MILLETT: Very good.</p> <p>4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You may have some more questions.</p> <p>5 MR MILLETT: I may have some more, but not very many.</p> <p>6 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Shall we have a break?</p> <p>7 MR MILLETT: Yes.</p> <p>8 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Goodall, we'll have a short break</p> <p>9 now, 10 minutes. Don't talk to anyone about your</p> <p>10 evidence, please, and be ready to start again at 3.25.</p> <p>11 Is that all right? Thank you.</p> <p>12 3.25, then, please.</p> <p>13 (3.15 pm)</p> <p>14 (A short break)</p> <p>15 (3.25 pm)</p> <p>16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Goodall?</p> <p>17 A. Yes.</p> <p>18 MR MILLETT: Mr Goodall, can I start just by asking you, do</p> <p>19 you know why a count of people leaving the building was</p> <p>20 not put in place at an earlier stage than the stage that</p> <p>21 you started collating the whiteboard on the left?</p> <p>22 A. I don't know.</p> <p>23 Q. Do you agree with me that without recording who was</p> <p>24 leaving the building, it was impossible to know whether</p> <p>25 the FSGs and your requests for rescues had been complied</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 133</p>	<p>1 resourcing and finding the people to do the role, and</p> <p>2 with the competing priorities of the information coming</p> <p>3 in and needing to act on that information, the focus</p> <p>4 would've been on facilitating the rescues rather than</p> <p>5 totting up who had come out. But I completely agree</p> <p>6 with your initial statement that it makes it very</p> <p>7 difficult if that's not happening.</p> <p>8 Q. Would you also agree therefore that it would make it</p> <p>9 very difficult to know who or how many people were still</p> <p>10 in the tower?</p> <p>11 A. Yes.</p> <p>12 Q. On page 12 of your statement, you refer to the casualty</p> <p>13 clearing centres or areas.</p> <p>14 A. Mm-hm.</p> <p>15 Q. You say they became your focus at one point.</p> <p>16 A. Yes.</p> <p>17 Q. This is the second paragraph on that page. Just</p> <p>18 a couple of short questions on that.</p> <p>19 You go on to say:</p> <p>20 "However at one of the TCG meetings [that's the</p> <p>21 tactical co-ordination group meeting] somebody started</p> <p>22 talking about six or seven potential rescue centres that</p> <p>23 had been set up by the council, but they didn't have any</p> <p>24 staff in them and this over complicated things."</p> <p>25 Just on that evidence, do you remember who said</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 135</p>
<p>1 with?</p> <p>2 A. Yes, it would've made it very difficult.</p> <p>3 Again, I think it's worth trying to apply a little</p> <p>4 bit of context to this. So right in the early stages of</p> <p>5 any incident, there's a balance between how you deploy</p> <p>6 your resources, and in the context of Grenfell Tower,</p> <p>7 the deployment of resources to allow you to make the</p> <p>8 rescues would've been a higher priority than tallying up</p> <p>9 who was coming out.</p> <p>10 So certainly it's not unusual, within any fire where</p> <p>11 there are people involved, to be working with partial</p> <p>12 information quite deep into the incident, and knowing</p> <p>13 that you have to do a full and detailed search of the</p> <p>14 building. Even if you think you've got the right number</p> <p>15 of people from the right number of premises, you would</p> <p>16 still be factoring into your incident command decisions</p> <p>17 a process whereby you systematically search through the</p> <p>18 whole building that was affected by the fire. In the</p> <p>19 context of Grenfell, as you can appreciate, that didn't</p> <p>20 happen until days and days and days after the actual</p> <p>21 incident.</p> <p>22 Q. Was there a reason why you couldn't have a system early</p> <p>23 on of tagging, identifying, who was coming out of the</p> <p>24 building?</p> <p>25 A. It would've just been about resourcing, just about</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 134</p>	<p>1 that?</p> <p>2 A. I don't recall, but there was a colleague -- there was</p> <p>3 a representative there, I believe, from the council, and</p> <p>4 they were talking about multiple locations where</p> <p>5 people -- where casualties might have been congregating.</p> <p>6 Now, I refer to those as potential rescue centres, but</p> <p>7 my understanding subsequently is that they never got</p> <p>8 established as definitive rescue centres. But it was --</p> <p>9 we weren't clear, they weren't staffed, we didn't know</p> <p>10 potentially where -- who had gone to those places.</p> <p>11 As I say in my statement, my understanding was we --</p> <p>12 by that I mean the LFB and to a greater or lesser extent</p> <p>13 the LAS, the London Ambulance Service -- were working</p> <p>14 through the bar and the grill and the leisure centre.</p> <p>15 That was where I put my focus on, but that was my</p> <p>16 understanding. I can't quite remember exactly how</p> <p>17 I established that they were more valid as potential</p> <p>18 clearing points for casualties, but that's my</p> <p>19 recollection.</p> <p>20 Q. When you say in your statement "and this over</p> <p>21 complicated things", is that something you are</p> <p>22 attributing to the speaker or is that your own evidence</p> <p>23 or view?</p> <p>24 A. So ...</p> <p>25 Q. Let me put the question in a slightly different way.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 136</p>

<p>1 You say at one of these meetings somebody started</p> <p>2 talking about six or seven rescue centres, et cetera,</p> <p>3 and you say they didn't have any staff in them and this</p> <p>4 overcomplicated things.</p> <p>5 Is that something that the person said, this</p> <p>6 overcomplicated things?</p> <p>7 A. So my recollection is that the representative from the</p> <p>8 council was talking about a number of locations where</p> <p>9 people might be, but they didn't have any detail, they</p> <p>10 weren't staffed. There wasn't anything valuable that</p> <p>11 I could use in terms of collating the information that</p> <p>12 I had on my matrix and about locations. So that's what</p> <p>13 I'm talking about in terms of making things more</p> <p>14 complicated or more difficult to understand.</p> <p>15 Q. That's your evidence, is it?</p> <p>16 A. Yes.</p> <p>17 Q. Rather than what was said?</p> <p>18 A. Yes.</p> <p>19 Q. Now, going back a little bit in the evidence that you</p> <p>20 gave earlier today about the first time you arrived at</p> <p>21 CU8.</p> <p>22 A. Yes.</p> <p>23 Q. Do you remember any discussion when you first arrived at</p> <p>24 the command unit about the efficacy of the stay-put</p> <p>25 advice, the good sense in keeping the stay-put advice?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 137</p>	<p>1 A. I think that was the tenet of all on our activity. It</p> <p>2 was quite clear that, as I've said before numerous times</p> <p>3 now, it was obvious from relatively early on in the</p> <p>4 incident that there were people in that building who</p> <p>5 needed to be got out as a matter of priority and that</p> <p>6 everybody in that building needed some form of effective</p> <p>7 rescue by the time I'm attending, which is 02.00/02.30</p> <p>8 in the morning.</p> <p>9 Q. Do you remember having any discussion about changing the</p> <p>10 advice given by control room staff to callers if in fact</p> <p>11 that flat could not be reached by BA crews?</p> <p>12 A. No. The first I recall about discussions about stay put</p> <p>13 were when we were notified at around -- it's on the log</p> <p>14 about the point at which Assistant Commissioner Andy Roe</p> <p>15 explicitly changed the guidance. That's when I recall</p> <p>16 that being referenced. I don't recall a discussion or</p> <p>17 conversation taking place before then.</p> <p>18 Q. Right.</p> <p>19 Now, you remember, I think, receiving reports from</p> <p>20 a Firefighter Collins, Steve Collins --</p> <p>21 A. Yes.</p> <p>22 Q. -- and, indeed, from the public about a resident on the</p> <p>23 11th floor.</p> <p>24 A. Yes.</p> <p>25 Q. Do you remember that?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 139</p>
<p>1 A. No. I don't think it was explicit -- I don't recall it</p> <p>2 explicitly being discussed, no.</p> <p>3 Q. Do you remember whether Norman Harrison said anything</p> <p>4 about changing that advice?</p> <p>5 A. I don't recall Norm saying anything. That's not to say</p> <p>6 he didn't say it, but I don't recall that discussion</p> <p>7 taking place, no.</p> <p>8 Q. Daniel Egan remembers that there was a discussion and</p> <p>9 that Norman Harrison said that he thought the advice</p> <p>10 should be changed. I am paraphrasing what he said at</p> <p>11 transcript 15. But do you remember any discussion at</p> <p>12 all involving Norman Harrison about changing the</p> <p>13 stay-put advice?</p> <p>14 A. I don't recall specifically a discussion that took place</p> <p>15 between myself, Norm or Dan about whether or not we</p> <p>16 should change the stay-put advice.</p> <p>17 Q. Do you --</p> <p>18 A. That's not to say we didn't have a discussion where we</p> <p>19 might -- it's not to say there wouldn't have been</p> <p>20 a discussion where we talked about getting everybody</p> <p>21 out, but that's not the same thing as necessarily</p> <p>22 a specific discussion about changing the stay-put</p> <p>23 guidance.</p> <p>24 Q. Did you have a discussion about getting everybody out</p> <p>25 with anybody?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 138</p>	<p>1 A. Yes.</p> <p>2 Q. That's Mr Bonifacio, in fact.</p> <p>3 A. Right.</p> <p>4 Q. Do you remember, what reports did you or anybody else on</p> <p>5 CU7 receive from Firefighter Collins or members of the</p> <p>6 public about that resident?</p> <p>7 A. Is it Firefighter Collins or Watch Manager Collins?</p> <p>8 Q. I'm so sorry, Watch Manager Collins.</p> <p>9 A. So --</p> <p>10 Q. Steve Collins.</p> <p>11 A. Steve Collins. I can remember doing a number of things</p> <p>12 in response to the information about the person who was</p> <p>13 seen waving from the window, but I can't precisely</p> <p>14 remember where that information came in from.</p> <p>15 Q. Do you remember what action you took or anybody else</p> <p>16 took, if any, in response to --</p> <p>17 A. So we were having real difficulties identifying which</p> <p>18 flat he was in and which specific -- now, my</p> <p>19 understanding is that he was visually impaired and hard</p> <p>20 of hearing, so he wouldn't necessarily have been</p> <p>21 providing his location to control, and we were having</p> <p>22 real difficulties in identifying the floor and the flat</p> <p>23 number.</p> <p>24 So at one point, I went into the building -- this</p> <p>25 must have been quite late on in the incident, sort of 5,</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 140</p>

<p>1 6 o'clockish -- and what I was trying to do was to get 2 up to a position in the building where I could -- the 3 initial floors of the building was the boxing club and 4 then there were a couple of floors which didn't match 5 the layout of the flats as they go up. What I was 6 trying to achieve was to go to one of the lower floors 7 and see how the layout of each floor was. So one could 8 imagine that flat number 12 would've been in the same 9 location as flat number 22 as you work your way up the 10 building. That's often the case with high-rise 11 buildings. I was trying to extrapolate from the 12 internal layout of the building where this man who is 13 waving from the window could be, which flat he was. 14 My recollection was I couldn't get high enough in 15 the building because of the conditions, and I couldn't 16 give definitive information. Also, I have 17 a recollection that it wasn't long after that attempt 18 that we had news that he had been rescued by BA crews. 19 Q. Normally you would expect to have plans available, 20 wouldn't you, at an incident like this? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Do you know whether any plans were ever provided? 23 A. We had real problems getting plans. 24 Q. From your knowledge, who was asked for plans by anybody 25 in the LFB?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 141</p>	<p>1 the same -- in the context of the specific incident at 2 Grenfell, it wasn't that long into the incident where 3 there was so much smoke-logging, there was so much 4 damage to the premises, there would've been difficulty 5 even if we'd have had plans on locating specific flats. 6 That's my understanding of it. 7 Q. We discussed earlier today the use of the CSS on CU7. 8 I think you said it was never switched on. I want to go 9 back to that. 10 Can I ask you, please, to be shown MET00005404 and 11 go, please, to page 2. 12 You can see that at 04.03, which is lower down the 13 page, you can see somebody says, "Command Support System 14 has gone down." 15 I don't know whether you were at a meeting where 16 that was said to Andy Roe, but do you remember the 17 command support system going down as recorded there? 18 A. No. No, I don't have a specific recollection. And 19 I wouldn't necessarily -- the role I was doing, as 20 I said before, we didn't utilise CSS on command unit 7, 21 and as a consequence -- if it had gone down on CU8, it 22 wouldn't be something that I was aware of. 23 Q. Okay. 24 Daniel Egan's evidence was that the CSS crashed 25 three or four times on the night. As far as CU7 is</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 143</p>
<p>1 A. So I believe the council were asked repeatedly by the 2 command team. That was my understanding. 3 Q. Who asked? Do you know who asked? 4 A. I have a recollection that at one of the tactical 5 co-ordination groups, Andy Roe explicitly asked one of 6 the representatives of the council. I don't remember 7 that person's name. 8 Q. Does the name Leyton, Nick Leyton, ring a bell with you? 9 A. No, it doesn't, I'm afraid. 10 Q. Do you know whether plans eventually became available? 11 A. So I think I make reference in my statement some time 12 about 7 o'clock. I think I make reference to plans 13 being made available then. 14 Q. Would plans be the sort of thing that you would expect 15 to be available on the mobile data terminal? 16 A. Potentially, yes. Potentially. 17 Q. Potentially. That sounds like -- 18 A. It depends on the detail that's carried on the MDT, and 19 it depends on the layout of the building and the numbers 20 of premises that there are on a particular station 21 ground. 22 Q. Would it have helped you to have plans on the MDT on the 23 night? 24 A. Yes. Obviously, I think the more information and the 25 more detail, it would've assisted us. But I think in</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 142</p>	<p>1 concerned, what's your recollection of that? 2 A. I don't recall that. I don't recall whether -- as 3 I say, I didn't think we used it. Dan's evidence may 4 contradict me, but I don't recall using it on CU7. 5 I think the -- without wishing to denigrate our IT 6 systems, the command unit system, it's certainly not 7 uncommon for us to have issues with the command support 8 system either breaking down or not working consistently. 9 It wouldn't have been a surprise to me if it had gone 10 down. 11 Q. It wouldn't be a surprise to you if it had gone down? 12 A. No. 13 Q. In your experience prior to Grenfell, was that a 14 problem -- 15 A. It's not uncommon. It's not uncommon for that system 16 not to work particularly efficiently or for it not to 17 work at all. 18 Q. Do you know from your own recollection whether, prior to 19 the Grenfell Tower fire, people in the LFB had raised 20 with IT or with the providers problems with the CSS? 21 A. I think it was well known, yes. 22 Q. For how long had it been well known that the CSS was 23 prone to crashing? 24 A. I wouldn't like to say, give a time duration, but 25 certainly within -- in my experience, it wasn't</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 144</p>

<p>1 uncommon, no.</p> <p>2 Q. Do you know from your own knowledge whether any steps</p> <p>3 were being taken within the LFB to remedy the problem?</p> <p>4 A. I don't know, no.</p> <p>5 Q. In general terms, are there any specific flats or floors</p> <p>6 or rescues that stand out in your memory?</p> <p>7 A. So the colleague -- so, again, this is very difficult,</p> <p>8 because I now work quite closely with Steve Collins, so</p> <p>9 I've talked to him at length about what he did, how he</p> <p>10 managed to prevent the fire spread from outside the</p> <p>11 building, getting to this man in the flat, so obviously</p> <p>12 that one sticks in my memory because I work with Steve.</p> <p>13 But in relation to others, no. I'm afraid there was so</p> <p>14 many flats involved, so many people involved, it's hard</p> <p>15 to specifically recall a particular rescue.</p> <p>16 Q. No, okay.</p> <p>17 A. I mean, you know, again, it's been very personally</p> <p>18 affecting to see all of the stories of individual</p> <p>19 rescues and it would be impossible to kind of separate</p> <p>20 out the stuff that I knew on the night and the stuff</p> <p>21 that I subsequently read and the acts of individual</p> <p>22 heroism of firefighters performing well and above their</p> <p>23 normal duties.</p> <p>24 Q. Let me just try one on you and see if this is an example</p> <p>25 or not. Can you please be shown LFB00001968. I'd ask</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 145</p>	<p>1 Q. No, okay.</p> <p>2 Can I ask you then to look at MET00015935, which</p> <p>3 I think is a photograph you've exhibited to your</p> <p>4 statement.</p> <p>5 What is that a photograph of?</p> <p>6 A. So that's a photograph of a forward information board</p> <p>7 and --</p> <p>8 Q. Did you take that photograph?</p> <p>9 A. If that board was on the command unit at about</p> <p>10 5/6 o'clock in the morning when we were asked to record</p> <p>11 and take as many photographs of everything, yes, but it</p> <p>12 could've been taken by loads of people. As I say, all</p> <p>13 the photographs on my phone I had of the incident were</p> <p>14 provided to the Met Police.</p> <p>15 So that's an image of a forward information board.</p> <p>16 Now, the forward information board is the yellow</p> <p>17 plexiglass piece of plastic. That board has a range of</p> <p>18 different pro formas that we put on it for different</p> <p>19 incident purposes. That one is the incident plan.</p> <p>20 There's also a fire survival guidance pro forma.</p> <p>21 Again, I think the reason that wouldn't have been</p> <p>22 used is just the sheer volume of calls, the sheer volume</p> <p>23 of FSG calls we were dealing with. You wouldn't have</p> <p>24 had enough space on that board. So what that appears to</p> <p>25 have been is whoever has filled that in has filled in</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 147</p>
<p>1 you, please, to go to page 28 in that.</p> <p>2 Just picking up flat 175, 20th floor, five persons</p> <p>3 at the bottom of this piece of paper, does this trigger</p> <p>4 any recollection about what you might remember about the</p> <p>5 rescue?</p> <p>6 A. No, I'm afraid not, other than to say -- it depends what</p> <p>7 that piece of information refers to and it depends -- so</p> <p>8 that piece of paper's meaning would've changed if it was</p> <p>9 information coming back from the operations, from the</p> <p>10 bridgehead, to me to say that those people had been</p> <p>11 rescued, or whether that's information that's being</p> <p>12 provided to them to inform them that there are five</p> <p>13 people in flat 20 that need rescue. It's not clear from</p> <p>14 that piece of paper which that is.</p> <p>15 My guess is that if it's, you know, 20th floor,</p> <p>16 flat 175 on the 20th floor, then if it's rescues, it</p> <p>17 would've happened very, very -- it would've been in the</p> <p>18 early stages of the incident. If that piece of paper</p> <p>19 refers to a moment in time later in the incident, there</p> <p>20 would've been people still in flat 175 on the</p> <p>21 20th floor.</p> <p>22 Q. Looking at the other flats or floors, 161, 204, 14, 9,</p> <p>23 do they bring back, just looking at that, any</p> <p>24 recollection?</p> <p>25 A. No, I'm afraid not.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 146</p>	<p>1 the incident plan with the detail of the fire survival</p> <p>2 guidance calls that they received.</p> <p>3 It's very difficult for me to say when that</p> <p>4 information was provided. It's quite possible that in</p> <p>5 the earlier stages of the incident, or during -- as we</p> <p>6 collated all the information, that's another piece of</p> <p>7 information about where people were located, about which</p> <p>8 flats were involved. And that information would've gone</p> <p>9 off the -- I would've asked for that -- or, actually,</p> <p>10 somebody, probably Norm, would've taken that information</p> <p>11 and put that onto the broader matrix, the one we've been</p> <p>12 looking at on the right-hand side, the one with the key</p> <p>13 on it.</p> <p>14 Q. Assuming that this photograph was taken when this board</p> <p>15 had been brought on to CU7 --</p> <p>16 A. No.</p> <p>17 Q. -- do you remember --</p> <p>18 A. No, that's not -- I wouldn't assume that. It's quite</p> <p>19 possible that the board had been brought on some time</p> <p>20 before the photograph was taken. So it's quite --</p> <p>21 I wasn't photographing stuff as we went along. There</p> <p>22 was a point where I think it was Andy Roe asked us to</p> <p>23 take photographs of as much stuff as we could.</p> <p>24 Up until that point, we'd been too busy dealing with</p> <p>25 the volume of calls, the volume of information. It's</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 148</p>

<p>1 quite possible that that board came onto the unit long 2 before the photograph was taken.</p> <p>3 Q. Do you remember whether this board was added to by 4 anybody on CU7 or do you think or do you remember 5 whether what we see there is the totality of the 6 information as brought onto CU7?</p> <p>7 A. I think it would've been unlikely that we would've 8 chosen to put information on that board. My sense is 9 that would've been information we would've taken and 10 then tried to apply -- put into the command unit 11 systems.</p> <p>12 MR MILLETT: Yes.</p> <p>13 Mr Goodall, I have no further questions for you, 14 you'll be very pleased to hear. The chairman will also 15 be very pleased to hear.</p> <p>16 I want to say thank you very much and express my 17 gratitude to you for coming along and assisting us with 18 our investigations. Thank you very much.</p> <p>19 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I add my thanks to that, Mr Goodall. 20 I'm sorry it's taken you rather longer than you probably 21 hoped to give your evidence.</p> <p>22 THE WITNESS: That's quite all right.</p> <p>23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We're very grateful to you. It has 24 been very helpful to us. Thank you very much.</p> <p>25 THE WITNESS: Thank you.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 149</p>	<p>1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good afternoon, Mr Myatt. Sit down 2 and make yourself comfortable. I'm sorry we've kept you 3 waiting rather a long time, but now is your moment.</p> <p>4 Thank you.</p> <p>5 MR MILLETT: Mr Myatt, good afternoon.</p> <p>6 First of all, can I say thank you very much for 7 coming to give evidence today and assisting the inquiry 8 with our investigations. We really do appreciate it.</p> <p>9 Can I ask you first of all to give your full name to 10 the chairman?</p> <p>11 A. Nicholas Liam Myatt.</p> <p>12 Q. My questions are intended to be short and simple, but if 13 you have any difficulty understanding them or want me to 14 repeat any question, I'm very happy to do so. Equally, 15 if you need a break at any stage -- although we will 16 only be going for about 40 minutes -- you need only 17 indicate.</p> <p>18 Can I ask you first of all, please, to take your 19 statement which should be in the first tab of the blue 20 bundle in front of you or else on the screen, and we 21 tend to look at it on the screen.</p> <p>22 I think you've done two, is that right, two 23 statements?</p> <p>24 A. One statement to the police.</p> <p>25 Q. Yes, and an exhibit statement.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 151</p>
<p>1 (The witness was released)</p> <p>2 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, Mr Millett.</p> <p>3 MR MILLETT: We have another witness.</p> <p>4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.</p> <p>5 MR MILLETT: Station Manager Nicholas Myatt, who I would 6 like to call next.</p> <p>7 I should just tell you, Mr Chairman, I am most 8 unlikely to finish him this afternoon, and that does 9 create some timetabling difficulties. So if we were to 10 run to 4.30 with him in anticipation of I hope what is 11 not becoming the usual application on this --</p> <p>12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let's get him started.</p> <p>13 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, before he comes in, Ms Jones, who 14 sits to my right, tells me we need to make sure that the 15 desk is organised, so perhaps we could just do that. It 16 will take about a minute. She says two, but I have 17 halved her estimate.</p> <p>18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I take counsel's estimate at face 19 value.</p> <p>20 MR MILLETT: If we could rearrange the desk.</p> <p>21 (Pause)</p> <p>22 Mr Chairman, thank you very much, I think we are 23 ready for the witness.</p> <p>24 NICHOLAS MYATT (affirmed)</p> <p>25 Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 150</p>	<p>1 A. Yes.</p> <p>2 Q. We need both. The first one is dated 21 November 2017, 3 and that is MET00007783.</p> <p>4 Just looking at that, have you read that statement 5 recently?</p> <p>6 A. Yes.</p> <p>7 Q. Can you confirm that its contents are true?</p> <p>8 A. Yes.</p> <p>9 Q. There's also a second statement, which is an exhibit 10 statement, dated 3 October 2017. That's MET00007860, 11 which we may also have available. That is it, yes.</p> <p>12 Can you confirm that's yours?</p> <p>13 A. I don't recognise that. The previous statement, yes.</p> <p>14 Q. Right. Well, perhaps look at the text of it. You say: 15 "On Tuesday 3rd October 2017 ..."</p> <p>16 A. It might have been that the first meeting that might 17 have been typed out, and then when the police officer 18 came back we carried on the second, possibly. Yes.</p> <p>19 Q. All right.</p> <p>20 A. I mean, it's my name and it's the same text as the other 21 document, so ...</p> <p>22 Q. Very well.</p> <p>23 Can I then ask you to be shown the next document, 24 which is your contemporaneous notes, which is 25 MET00005231.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 152</p>

<p>1 A. Yes.</p> <p>2 Q. Can you confirm that those are yours?</p> <p>3 A. Yes.</p> <p>4 Q. Have you read those recently, do you think?</p> <p>5 A. Yes.</p> <p>6 Q. I think you also have four exhibits NLM/2, 3, 4 and 5.</p> <p>7 I'll just give the numbers to those: MET00015612,</p> <p>8 MET00013070, MET00013067, MET00013069. They needn't be</p> <p>9 brought up on the screen, I'm just reading those into</p> <p>10 the record so they are now publicly available.</p> <p>11 Finally in this introductory, have you discussed</p> <p>12 your statement or your evidence with anybody before</p> <p>13 coming here today?</p> <p>14 A. No.</p> <p>15 Q. Now, you've been a station manager for more than</p> <p>16 14 years; is that right?</p> <p>17 A. Correct.</p> <p>18 Q. That was your rank on the night of the fire, was it?</p> <p>19 A. Correct.</p> <p>20 Q. You are based at Battersea?</p> <p>21 A. Correct.</p> <p>22 Q. Your were based there on the night of the fire?</p> <p>23 A. Yes.</p> <p>24 Q. You've been based at North Kensington fire station in</p> <p>25 the past, haven't you?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 153</p>	<p>1 just a support officer within the bridgehead.</p> <p>2 Q. What does the term lobby commander mean to you?</p> <p>3 A. Well, it's a sector -- it's a role that's allocated to</p> <p>4 someone and comes with a long list of responsibilities</p> <p>5 and actions, whereas I wasn't briefed that particular</p> <p>6 evening.</p> <p>7 Q. So so far as you were concerned, you weren't briefed as</p> <p>8 lobby commander?</p> <p>9 A. No.</p> <p>10 Q. Had you ever had any training on being a lobby</p> <p>11 commander, for what it's worth?</p> <p>12 A. No. I mean, I've obviously studied the policies, had to</p> <p>13 teach other staff the policies. Other than that, no.</p> <p>14 I've not actually -- promotion, incident command</p> <p>15 exercises that we do for promotion, various bits and</p> <p>16 pieces. I may have used a lobby commander but not --</p> <p>17 nothing sort of properly formal.</p> <p>18 Q. In a sentence, if you can, what does a lobby commander</p> <p>19 do?</p> <p>20 A. Manages stuff within the lobby.</p> <p>21 Q. Very fine answer to a very fine question!</p> <p>22 A. Resources, responsibility, staff, safety. It's a big</p> <p>23 long list.</p> <p>24 Q. More seriously though, is it a role that is related to</p> <p>25 high-rise firefighting specifically?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 155</p>
<p>1 A. A long time ago, yes.</p> <p>2 Q. What were the years, do you remember?</p> <p>3 A. No, as a crew manager, so a long time ago.</p> <p>4 Q. You're also, I think, an urban search and rescue</p> <p>5 adviser --</p> <p>6 A. Correct.</p> <p>7 Q. -- a senior accident investigator --</p> <p>8 A. Yes.</p> <p>9 Q. -- and a press officer?</p> <p>10 A. Yes.</p> <p>11 Q. That's in your statement.</p> <p>12 Did you undertake any of those roles on the night of</p> <p>13 the fire?</p> <p>14 A. No.</p> <p>15 Q. I think on the night of the fire you were given -- well,</p> <p>16 there is some evidence that we have that you were given</p> <p>17 the task of lobby commander on the night of the fire.</p> <p>18 Do you recall that?</p> <p>19 A. No, not lobby commander, no. I was there in a support</p> <p>20 role to Group Manager Welch on the night.</p> <p>21 Q. In his statement he refers to you being appointed or</p> <p>22 instructed as the lobby commander, but does that phrase</p> <p>23 mean anything to you?</p> <p>24 A. Well, I know what the phrase -- what the term is, but</p> <p>25 I would suggest that I wasn't a lobby commander, I was</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 154</p>	<p>1 A. Yes. It's a sector within our high-rise policy, which</p> <p>2 is usually below the fire sector, and, yes, comes with</p> <p>3 quite a lot of responsibilities.</p> <p>4 Q. Do any of those responsibilities relate to fire survival</p> <p>5 information handling?</p> <p>6 A. Without having the list in front of me, I wouldn't be</p> <p>7 able to honestly give you a yes or no, but I would have</p> <p>8 liked to have thought in there somewhere is liaising</p> <p>9 with then any FSG network -- any FSG systems that might</p> <p>10 be in your lobby, yes, in your area of responsibility.</p> <p>11 Q. On high-rise firefighting, am I right in thinking you</p> <p>12 have had in the past, or had had as at June 2017,</p> <p>13 training on high-rise firefighting?</p> <p>14 A. Repeat that question.</p> <p>15 Q. As at June 2017, had you had training on high-rise</p> <p>16 firefighting?</p> <p>17 A. Again, since I have joined the fire service, I've</p> <p>18 trained in high-rise, whether it be policy or drills or</p> <p>19 exercises. I've been to remote training locations and</p> <p>20 taken part in exercises. I've had to teach other staff</p> <p>21 the policy. I've gone into it in great depth with going</p> <p>22 for promotions and things. And recently -- well, no,</p> <p>23 not recently -- four years ago I co-ordinated</p> <p>24 an exercise myself in a high-rise block.</p> <p>25 So training-wise, yes, I think I've done a bit, but</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 156</p>

<p>1 never been on a high-rise course, in effect.</p> <p>2 Q. More specifically, have you ever had any training or</p> <p>3 given any training to how to spot fires in exterior</p> <p>4 material, exterior cladding on high-rise buildings?</p> <p>5 A. No.</p> <p>6 Q. On page 7 of your statement, you say -- there's no need</p> <p>7 to go to it -- you attended the fire at Shepherds Court,</p> <p>8 or Shepherd's Bush, you say, and you used that</p> <p>9 experience at Grenfell Tower.</p> <p>10 You were at Shepherds Court, the fire at Shepherds</p> <p>11 Court, were you?</p> <p>12 A. Yes.</p> <p>13 Q. In August 2016?</p> <p>14 A. Yes.</p> <p>15 Q. In general terms, what lessons did you learn from the</p> <p>16 Shepherds Court fire specifically about fire spread on</p> <p>17 the exterior of the building?</p> <p>18 A. I wouldn't say I learnt anything. The risks of fire</p> <p>19 spread externally were the same that night as previous</p> <p>20 fires I've been to. It can happen, it depends on the</p> <p>21 combustible material that's on the outside of the</p> <p>22 building.</p> <p>23 So some people have balconies where they keep, you</p> <p>24 know, plants and wooden decking and things. Obviously</p> <p>25 if it catches fire, it could go upwards and catch fire</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 157</p>	<p>1 Q. Okay.</p> <p>2 Let's turn to the arrival on the night. On page 3</p> <p>3 of your witness statement, you say that your pager went</p> <p>4 off at 01.38 am and you were paged to go to a 25-pump</p> <p>5 fire. You were at home.</p> <p>6 You say 01.38. Do you get that figure from your</p> <p>7 pager itself or a document, or is that something you</p> <p>8 recall off the top of your head?</p> <p>9 A. No, that figure would've come from the (inaudible)</p> <p>10 report, or from the report, sorry, that is on a computer</p> <p>11 that I can access.</p> <p>12 Q. You say a little bit lower down that you had your</p> <p>13 Firelink radio with you.</p> <p>14 A. Yes.</p> <p>15 Q. You also had a fire ground radio; is that right?</p> <p>16 A. Correct.</p> <p>17 Q. You had both?</p> <p>18 A. Yes.</p> <p>19 Q. You also had your mobile.</p> <p>20 A. Yes.</p> <p>21 Q. Is that your Brigade mobile?</p> <p>22 A. Yes.</p> <p>23 Q. So you had these three pieces of kit; is that right?</p> <p>24 A. Yes.</p> <p>25 Q. Okay.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 159</p>
<p>1 and then you get a spread outside of the building. So</p> <p>2 it's very much dependent on what flammable materials are</p> <p>3 on the exterior of the building. If it's just concrete,</p> <p>4 you're not going to get as much fire spread.</p> <p>5 Q. It sounds from that last answer as if you have had some</p> <p>6 experience of combustible materials being part of the</p> <p>7 structure of the exterior of a building and igniting; is</p> <p>8 that right?</p> <p>9 A. Operational experience, yes, but I think you referred to</p> <p>10 have I had any training on it. Well, no, I've had no</p> <p>11 training, but I've had operational experience of fire</p> <p>12 spread, yes.</p> <p>13 Q. Fire spread on combustible exterior material,</p> <p>14 structurally attached to the outside of the building?</p> <p>15 A. Well, in terms of things like plastic windows that, you</p> <p>16 know, are fitted into some high-rise blocks, that can</p> <p>17 cause -- you know, that can be a link for fire spread.</p> <p>18 Q. What about cladding specifically?</p> <p>19 A. Yes, my knowledge of cladding isn't that great, so</p> <p>20 I wasn't aware of how fast it could spread until the</p> <p>21 night obviously of Grenfell.</p> <p>22 Q. Prior to Grenfell, had you given or received any</p> <p>23 training on any lessons learnt from Shepherd's Bush fire</p> <p>24 in general?</p> <p>25 A. No.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 158</p>	<p>1 In the last paragraph on that page you say you rang</p> <p>2 the control room:</p> <p>3 "I then picked up my phone and rang the control room</p> <p>4 to get information about the fire that I was going to."</p> <p>5 Do you remember which line you used to get through</p> <p>6 to the control room?</p> <p>7 A. Mm, no, that would've probably been done on my landline</p> <p>8 at home.</p> <p>9 Q. Right, I see. When you say "I then picked up my phone",</p> <p>10 that's not the Brigade mobile, that's your home phone.</p> <p>11 A. My home line.</p> <p>12 Q. Is there a speed dial to the control room or some</p> <p>13 dedicated line you used to get through to the control</p> <p>14 room?</p> <p>15 A. There's a couple of ways. Obviously it's got voice</p> <p>16 recognition now, our system, so I could just say</p> <p>17 "Control" and it will put me through to a control</p> <p>18 number, a generic number at control.</p> <p>19 Q. You say "I could"; is that what happened? Did you do</p> <p>20 that?</p> <p>21 A. That night, I wouldn't remember. You know, it's either</p> <p>22 double -- yeah, I can't remember the number, but there's</p> <p>23 two ways. It's easier just to say "Control" and it goes</p> <p>24 straight through.</p> <p>25 Q. Okay. Don't tell us what the number is, but I just</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 160</p>

<p>1 wondered if there was a dedicated line that took you 2 straight into the control room. There was. 3 Do you remember who you spoke to? 4 A. No. 5 Q. Was it a senior control room operative or somebody -- 6 A. I don't know who it was. You know, you ring through and 7 there's someone that's allocated to paging, and the 8 person that's allocated to paging, I don't know what 9 rank or what role they've got, but that's where you get 10 the information from. 11 Q. Now, at the top of page 5 of your statement, you 12 describe your journey, or you are in the middle of 13 describing your journey to the tower, and four lines up 14 from the bottom, you say: 15 "I cannot remember any specific details but I may 16 have also heard an informative message, which is a 17 message from the incident command unit to control 18 capturing information about the incident, telling them 19 what's in front of them and what we need so that they 20 can record it at control. I listened to this so that I 21 was semi-prepared for what to expect when I arrived." 22 A. Mm. 23 Q. Do you remember the content of that informative message 24 now, sitting here? 25 A. No.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 161</p>	<p>1 log, but in your statement at page 7 you say, and this 2 is the first paragraph, that you arrived at about 3 2 o'clock. 02.00 am. Why do you say about 02.00 am? 4 What prompts that recollection? 5 A. That's purely estimated on the journey time. There was 6 no traffic that night. With the urgency of needing to 7 get there, I've got the A3 that I drive up, which is 8 quite a quick route. I'm familiar with where the 9 address is, having used to work there many years ago. 10 So it was quite quick in getting there. 11 Q. In your contemporaneous note, if I can just ask you to 12 look at that, at the top of page 2 -- so this is 13 contemporaneous note, which is MET00005231 -- the top of 14 page 2, you say: 15 "On arrival at approximately 02:10 ..." 16 I want to see whether we can find out whether it's 17 2 o'clock or 2.10. 18 A. I wouldn't know. The timings that night for me -- 19 I arrived in the dark and when I left it was light. 20 Q. My question really is: why do you say 02.10 here and in 21 your statement -- 22 A. Because it's estimated. 23 Q. Is there a reason why you thought it might be 02.10 as 24 opposed to 2 o'clock? 25 A. Not really. Again, I've estimated.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 163</p>
<p>1 Q. If I can take you to the short incident log at page 17, 2 tab 23 of the documents bundle, if you could just kindly 3 be shown that, page 17 of the short incident log. 4 You can see that there is an informative message at 5 01.16.02, and it says: 6 "SUP FROM G272 RESIDENTIAL BLOCK OF FLATS OF 20 7 FLOORS ..." 8 Et cetera, we can read it on the screen. 9 Does this informative message ring a bell with you? 10 A. Well, if you were to scroll forward to after 01.38, 11 there may well be a message that was recorded. 12 Q. Well, indeed so. The next one we have is at 02.04. 13 A. Yes, so -- 14 Q. Which is on page 21, "CU7 GM WELCH NOW IC". 15 A. Yes, 2.01 -- so my journey from my house to the 16 incident, this is the time frame, these are the sorts of 17 things I would've heard that evening. 18 Q. Looking at that informative message, do you think that 19 was what you heard en route as the informative message? 20 A. I think I heard most of the stuff on that page, but 21 whether I remember that detail is a different matter. 22 Q. So do you remember hearing that the incident was 23 declared a major incident while you were en route? 24 A. That I don't remember, I must admit, yes. 25 Q. We don't have a status 3 for you on the short incident</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 162</p>	<p>1 Q. On page 6 of your statement, you say in the second 2 paragraph there: 3 "As I was walking a couple of people came up to me 4 and patted me on the back. A woman also walked up to me 5 and threw her telephone at me. She said her daughter 6 was on one of the top floors, I think it might have been 7 the 19th or the 22nd floor." 8 Then you go on to say this: 9 "The stay put policy was in the forefront of my mind 10 and I felt a bit obliged to say something. I said to 11 the person on the phone, 'Look, we're here. I can see 12 the fire, I'm sure crews are aware. Phone ring 999 and 13 report it then the crews will come and save you.' This 14 was around 2 o'clock in the morning." 15 There's a description of the person who you spoke to 16 and gave you the phone. 17 Now, my questions are these. First of all, did you 18 seek information from the caller as to the conditions in 19 the flat she was calling from? 20 A. No, I didn't. I was specifically brief in that phone 21 call. I didn't think it was appropriate for me to deal 22 with that. This person needed to be directed to a more 23 robust recording mechanism of where they were, what the 24 conditions were like, which really could then be 25 prioritised by the incident commander, whether that</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 164</p>

<p>1 person needed to be saved immediately or saved in 2 a queue with other people that needed saving. 3 Q. Did you ask her for her floor or flat number? 4 A. I don't recall that, no. I wouldn't want that 5 information, because for me to have taken that 6 information, you know -- it wouldn't have been 7 appropriate for me to do that. For me to walk onto the 8 command unit and say, "I've taken this call, here's 9 a bit of paper with a number and a flat on it", didn't 10 seem right. So to advise that caller to ring 999, where 11 that call would've been put through to our Merton 12 control and we would've made a formal record of the 13 information that you are suggesting, that information 14 would've got fed directly to the incident commander. 15 Q. That was your assumption, was it? 16 A. Well, that's the process. 17 Q. Yes. 18 You said: 19 "... report it then the crews will come and save 20 you." 21 What was the factual basis for your advice to the 22 caller that the crews would come and save her? 23 A. Well, I don't know if there's smoke in the flat, so 24 knowing the fantastic job that we usually do, that is 25 what is likely to happen. So to give someone some good,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 165</p>	<p>1 O'Loughlin? 2 A. Well, I didn't hear it. I'm not aware of that change. 3 I may have been changing into my fire kit, I may be 4 parking up, walking up to the command unit when that 5 message was sent. I may have missed that message. 6 I don't recall hearing it. 7 Q. When did you first discover DAC O'Loughlin was incident 8 commander? 9 A. When I walked onto the command unit. 10 Q. You went to the incident command unit. Is that CU8? 11 A. I believe so, yes. 12 Q. You say it's the one on Grenfell Road, that's page 6 of 13 your statement at the bottom in the third line. 14 You go on to say that the FSG command unit was on 15 Bomore Road. So three lines up from the bottom: 16 "The other command unit on Bomore Road was dealing 17 with FSG messages." 18 In simple terms, which one of those was closer to 19 the tower, as you recall it? 20 A. Well, I did submit a diagram of what my understanding 21 was of where the command units were, and this was 22 something that during this interview -- the picture I've 23 got in my mind was that I went to one command unit 24 first, which was kind of on the right-hand side as I was 25 looking at the tower, to then be directed to the other</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 167</p>
<p>1 encouraging advice maybe was what was behind my thoughts 2 with that sentence. 3 Q. At that stage in the evening, did you have any 4 information to hand to you to know how easy or difficult 5 it was for BA crews going into the tower actually to 6 reach the destination they were deployed to? 7 A. No, no. 8 Q. On the same page in your statement, page 7, in the next 9 paragraph, you say: 10 "I think that DAC O'LOUGHLIN was the incident 11 commander at this time in the early stages of 12 establishing command and control." 13 You say "I think" he was the incident commander. 14 Did you know it or is this -- 15 A. Well, I reported to DAC O'Loughlin, so whether the 16 monitoring officer for DAC O'Loughlin had arrived and 17 had taken over and was taking a back seat position, 18 I don't know. I reported to DAC O'Loughlin. That's why 19 I put that I think he was the incident commander. 20 Q. I think you said you had heard over the main scheme 21 radio that the incident commander was now Group Manager 22 Welch; is that right? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. So at what point do you remember the role of incident 25 commander changing from Group Manager Welch to DAC</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 166</p>	<p>1 command unit, which was the command and control one, 2 which was on the left as I'm looking at the tower, but 3 it transpires that it was actually the other way around. 4 So I'm not sure -- I know I went to one first, it was 5 the FSG command unit, and was redirected to the command 6 and control command unit. 7 Q. Do you remember how long it took you to reach the first 8 of those command units? 9 A. From when? 10 Q. From your car. 11 A. From my car? 12 Q. Yes. 13 A. Not far at all. I parked quite close to where it turned 14 out the command unit was. 15 Q. You say the command unit, the ultimate incident command 16 unit? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Was that the command unit that retained command -- 19 A. Both. 20 Q. -- throughout the incident? 21 A. Again, both were quite -- I was quite nearby. 22 Q. The command unit you went to first, is that the one that 23 retained incident command throughout the incident? 24 A. No. No, I went to the FSG command unit first. I could 25 see that that wasn't the correct one and got redirected</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 168</p>

<p>1 to where the command unit for command and control was</p> <p>2 where I should book in with the incident commander.</p> <p>3 Q. There's a confusion which has crept in here which is</p> <p>4 partly because of timing, because the role of FSG was</p> <p>5 switching from one to the other.</p> <p>6 A. Right.</p> <p>7 Q. So let me see if I can get at it this way: when you</p> <p>8 arrived at the first command unit you visited --</p> <p>9 A. Yes.</p> <p>10 Q. -- who was in charge of it, do you remember?</p> <p>11 A. No, don't know that question. The next question, if it</p> <p>12 was who was in charge of the second command unit, it was</p> <p>13 O'Loughlin.</p> <p>14 Q. Did you see or talk to anybody on the first command unit</p> <p>15 that you went to?</p> <p>16 A. No. I saw there were quite a few people on there, very</p> <p>17 busy, and then when I tried to book in and realised</p> <p>18 I was on the wrong one, then I got redirected to the</p> <p>19 other command unit.</p> <p>20 Q. Did you observe from what you could see whether FSG</p> <p>21 calls were being handled on the first command unit that</p> <p>22 you went to?</p> <p>23 A. All I saw was extremely busy people.</p> <p>24 Q. On page 8 of your statement, you say that -- this is the</p> <p>25 second paragraph -- you offered DAC O'Loughlin that you</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 169</p>	<p>1 overview of what is going on and what you've got."</p> <p>2 A. Yes.</p> <p>3 Q. Do you remember when you arrived at that command unit</p> <p>4 whether you did see information captured on headline</p> <p>5 boards and whiteboards?</p> <p>6 A. Well, I know I did, but to tell you what I saw, no,</p> <p>7 I don't remember.</p> <p>8 Q. Do you remember whether the information that you did see</p> <p>9 was detailed and voluminous or scanty?</p> <p>10 A. I saw detailed stuff, that I came away from that unit</p> <p>11 with enough information that I needed to carry on with</p> <p>12 the task that I was given.</p> <p>13 Q. Do you remember what you saw in terms of overall command</p> <p>14 or incident command on CU8 when you turned up there?</p> <p>15 A. I saw some colleagues writing things up on boards.</p> <p>16 I could see that resources had been allocated to FSG.</p> <p>17 I could see that resources had been allocated because</p> <p>18 this board was pretty much full up. I got the</p> <p>19 information that I needed and I asked the question who</p> <p>20 was working up at the bridgehead, to which I got the</p> <p>21 reply it was at the time Group Manager Welch. That's</p> <p>22 when I suggested that -- how many resources are up there</p> <p>23 helping Group Manager Welch. I believed he was up there</p> <p>24 on his own. Turns out he wasn't, but I was under the</p> <p>25 impression he was on his own, so that's why I suggested</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 171</p>
<p>1 would go to the fire, to the bridgehead, and he agreed.</p> <p>2 I'm summarising what you say there.</p> <p>3 At the end of that paragraph, you say:</p> <p>4 "... I don't think he was established enough to know</p> <p>5 what he needed."</p> <p>6 I just want to ask you, what do you mean by that?</p> <p>7 A. Well, the speed of the incident being made up and the</p> <p>8 speed of the fire spreading and the amount of people</p> <p>9 that were involved was all in a very tight time frame.</p> <p>10 For 25 fire engines to suddenly start arriving and for</p> <p>11 networks to be set up and communication networks, there</p> <p>12 was so much to do that night. I'm not sure that DAC</p> <p>13 O'Loughlin was -- at that time, it was very dynamic and</p> <p>14 wasn't on top of everything that needed to be put in</p> <p>15 place for us to have a real confident structure in</p> <p>16 place.</p> <p>17 Q. Right. Now --</p> <p>18 A. Quite normal for it to be like that at the early stages.</p> <p>19 Q. I see.</p> <p>20 On page 9 of your statement, just pursuing that</p> <p>21 a little bit more, five lines down from the top of</p> <p>22 page 9, you say:</p> <p>23 "The overall command of that unit would have been</p> <p>24 captured in the headline boards and the whiteboards so</p> <p>25 if you have a quick look around you can get a good</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 170</p>	<p>1 that I go up there.</p> <p>2 Q. Did DAC O'Loughlin give you any sort of briefing?</p> <p>3 A. No. You could see that there were so many things that</p> <p>4 DAC O'Loughlin needed to get in place, and with the fact</p> <p>5 that we sort of knew each other a bit, he knew about</p> <p>6 what information I would need. He could see I'd already</p> <p>7 gleaned some from looking around at the command unit's</p> <p>8 boards and things, and the role itself, of going up to</p> <p>9 help someone up at the bridgehead, would be more</p> <p>10 detailed, I think, when you got up there.</p> <p>11 So the early part of the incident commander sending</p> <p>12 out resources to get jobs done, I think that was kind of</p> <p>13 the stage that DAC O'Loughlin was at.</p> <p>14 Q. So does it come to this: you went onto the CU, saw there</p> <p>15 was lots going on, said to DAC O'Loughlin "I'll go and</p> <p>16 help up at the bridgehead and see what I can do", and he</p> <p>17 said yes?</p> <p>18 A. Not quite as briefly as you put it.</p> <p>19 Q. Is that the sense of it?</p> <p>20 A. It's about allocating resources and priorities. You</p> <p>21 could see DAC O'Loughlin was trying to get as much done</p> <p>22 to ensure FSG and rescue and water supplies and staffing</p> <p>23 levels and resources were all on site and managed</p> <p>24 properly. The resources that we had there at the time,</p> <p>25 you could see that maybe what was going on inside the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 172</p>

<p>1 building from a managing perspective, from a command and</p> <p>2 control perspective, could do with some more resources</p> <p>3 to support it, hence the reason I was -- you know, it</p> <p>4 was agreed I should go up to the bridgehead.</p> <p>5 Q. No, I understand that. What I'm really trying to get</p> <p>6 a feel for is really whether what you did was something</p> <p>7 you were told to do by DAC O'Loughlin or you volunteered</p> <p>8 to do and he agreed.</p> <p>9 A. Well, a bit of both. I volunteered to do it, because</p> <p>10 like most teams, like most group managers, sometimes we</p> <p>11 need a bit of advice and a bit of, you know, a second</p> <p>12 opinion on something. I looked around and saw what was</p> <p>13 going on and thought, well, maybe getting some more</p> <p>14 resources up in the tower might be a good move. DAC</p> <p>15 O'Loughlin sort of agreed with that and that's why I got</p> <p>16 that task.</p> <p>17 Q. Absolutely.</p> <p>18 At that stage, when you took this, as it were,</p> <p>19 agreed briefing with DAC O'Loughlin, did you realise or</p> <p>20 did you know that this was now a 40-pump fire?</p> <p>21 A. No.</p> <p>22 Q. You didn't?</p> <p>23 A. No.</p> <p>24 Q. You hadn't heard that announced or called for on the</p> <p>25 main scheme radio?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 173</p>	<p>1 "I got into the building at about 2.15am and started</p> <p>2 making my way to find GM WELCH. I went up the</p> <p>3 staircase ..."</p> <p>4 I just want to see if we can pin down some timings</p> <p>5 here.</p> <p>6 Can I ask you, first of all, please, to be shown the</p> <p>7 second hour ORR produced by the LFB and go to page 172.</p> <p>8 We have a time mark of 02.23, if you look at that.</p> <p>9 Ah, no, I'm so sorry, it's internal page 172, it's</p> <p>10 external page 173, so that was the next page.</p> <p>11 You can see there, four lines up or four entries up</p> <p>12 from the bottom, at 02.23, and it's in italics with</p> <p>13 an asterisk so it's not a confirmed time, it says:</p> <p>14 "SM Myatt enters the building via the main</p> <p>15 entrance."</p> <p>16 A. Yes.</p> <p>17 Q. There's a source identified as camera 4.</p> <p>18 Just before I show you that, would that time roughly</p> <p>19 correspond with your recollection?</p> <p>20 A. Yes.</p> <p>21 Q. Let's look at the picture. Could I ask you, please, to</p> <p>22 be shown INQ00000294. There it is.</p> <p>23 Can you identify yourself in that picture?</p> <p>24 A. The only one with the white helmet. Does look a bit</p> <p>25 like me.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 175</p>
<p>1 A. No.</p> <p>2 Q. Really? When did you first discover that it was</p> <p>3 a 40-pump fire?</p> <p>4 A. At some point while I was up at the tower managing</p> <p>5 resources.</p> <p>6 Q. How did you discover that?</p> <p>7 A. Just for general conversation with colleagues -- with</p> <p>8 officers.</p> <p>9 Q. On page 9 of your statement in the second paragraph, you</p> <p>10 say:</p> <p>11 "When I left the Command Unit my objective was to</p> <p>12 get up to bridgehead ..."</p> <p>13 You just see that there:</p> <p>14 "... see what was going on and speak to Group</p> <p>15 Manager (GM) WELCH."</p> <p>16 What was his role? Did you know what his role was?</p> <p>17 A. He was the bridgehead commander.</p> <p>18 Q. Did DAC O'Loughlin or anybody else tell you that?</p> <p>19 A. Yes.</p> <p>20 Q. Did they tell you what Group Manager Welch's job was?</p> <p>21 A. No. Just by telling me he was in charge of the</p> <p>22 bridgehead is enough.</p> <p>23 Q. On the next page of your statement, towards the</p> <p>24 bottom -- page 10, this is -- you say, four lines up</p> <p>25 from the bottom:</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 174</p>	<p>1 Q. We can do better in a moment.</p> <p>2 A. Yes.</p> <p>3 Q. The reason I'm putting that to you is not only that</p> <p>4 corresponds with the time and that looks like the</p> <p>5 picture referred to in the ORR, but you're talking to</p> <p>6 somebody without a helmet who is standing by the door.</p> <p>7 Do you know who that is?</p> <p>8 A. Now, that I think was Dan Meyrick. No. I'm not very</p> <p>9 good with names.</p> <p>10 Q. Try again.</p> <p>11 A. I know the guy in the front, that's Guy Tillotson.</p> <p>12 I know -- but the guy in the back, I thought was -- I'd</p> <p>13 been referring to him as Dan Meyrick.</p> <p>14 Q. Ah, okay.</p> <p>15 A. Now, that might not be the case.</p> <p>16 Q. We think it's Glynn Williams, to give the game away.</p> <p>17 Does that ring a bell with you?</p> <p>18 A. Again, my poor association with names and faces. The</p> <p>19 guy there I know really -- I speak to him quite a lot,</p> <p>20 but I honestly thought that his name was Dan Meyrick.</p> <p>21 So whether my statement therefore is wrong throughout</p> <p>22 and instead of Dan Meyrick you should be putting</p> <p>23 Glynn Williams -- if that's Glynn Williams --</p> <p>24 Q. We'll have a think about that and see whether that helps</p> <p>25 or not.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 176</p>

<p>1 Moving on to the next picture in terms of focusing</p> <p>2 your arrival in the tower time-wise, can I ask you to</p> <p>3 look at the next photograph in the sequence. Can you</p> <p>4 identify yourself there?</p> <p>5 A. Yes, yes, that's me.</p> <p>6 Q. That's you. Right. We then have you I think walking</p> <p>7 across the lobby.</p> <p>8 The next one is INQ00000296, coming down the stairs.</p> <p>9 Now, that's adjusted to give us a time of 02.33. So it</p> <p>10 looks as if there were 11 minutes or so during which you</p> <p>11 went upstairs and then came back down again.</p> <p>12 Does that tally with your recollection?</p> <p>13 A. I was very familiar with that staircase for the period</p> <p>14 of time that I was there. I went up several times, down</p> <p>15 several times.</p> <p>16 Q. What were you doing going up and down the stairs?</p> <p>17 A. Helping with casualties that were coming out, helping</p> <p>18 teams, getting more crews to come up and help. Just</p> <p>19 generally managing.</p> <p>20 Q. Right.</p> <p>21 Can I ask you to be shown INQ00000297, which is CCTV</p> <p>22 camera 4 at 02.33.44 as adjusted. It shows two people</p> <p>23 in white helmets, one of whom has a piece of paper in</p> <p>24 his left hand in the foreground and the other is bending</p> <p>25 over talking to who I think we know to be</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 177</p>	<p>1 possibly Glynn Williams and not Dan Meyrick who you saw</p> <p>2 in the lobby?</p> <p>3 A. Yes, and I owe Dan Meyrick an apology and Glynn Williams</p> <p>4 as well.</p> <p>5 Q. You'll appreciate the rather cumbersome way in which</p> <p>6 I've had to get to this, but all right, thank you very</p> <p>7 much.</p> <p>8 Do you know or do you remember what he was doing?</p> <p>9 A. Co-ordinating fire survival guidance.</p> <p>10 Q. What were you doing talking to him?</p> <p>11 A. Finding --</p> <p>12 Q. What was your --</p> <p>13 A. Right now I can't remember what I was doing at that</p> <p>14 particular moment, but I liaised with Glynn Williams on</p> <p>15 numerous occasions to find out what were his priorities,</p> <p>16 where was he getting -- you know, what floors did he</p> <p>17 need to get access to and what help did he need and just</p> <p>18 in general.</p> <p>19 Q. To your knowledge, were they committing BA crews?</p> <p>20 A. Yes.</p> <p>21 Q. Do you know what the line of communication was between</p> <p>22 him, Glynn Williams, standing there and anybody else up</p> <p>23 in the building?</p> <p>24 A. No. No, I don't know who he was talking to. I know he</p> <p>25 was talking to the command unit, that was where he was</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 179</p>
<p>1 Glynn Williams, who is holding pieces of paper in his</p> <p>2 hand.</p> <p>3 Do you remember talking to that helmetless officer</p> <p>4 with pieces of paper?</p> <p>5 A. I spoke to that gentleman many times that particular</p> <p>6 evening.</p> <p>7 Q. Right.</p> <p>8 A. So, yes.</p> <p>9 Q. You did.</p> <p>10 You say in your statement at page 11 -- we may be</p> <p>11 able to iron this out:</p> <p>12 "As I entered the building I also remember SM Peter</p> <p>13 WOLFEDEN[sic] and a Watch Manager (WM), whose name I</p> <p>14 think was Dan MEYRICK were on the ground floor foyer</p> <p>15 area managing the fire survival guidance calls."</p> <p>16 Then you go on to say lower down in that paragraph,</p> <p>17 when describing the FSG managers:</p> <p>18 "... who on this occasion were Peter WOLFEDEN and</p> <p>19 Dan MEYRICK. Pete WOLFEDEN and Dan MEYRICK had a board</p> <p>20 in that lobby with all the information that they were</p> <p>21 receiving from control with these bits of paper on it</p> <p>22 and all sorts."</p> <p>23 Now, showing you this picture, and I think you now</p> <p>24 are in doubt about whether it was Dan Meyrick properly</p> <p>25 so-called or whether that it was Glynn Williams, was it</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 178</p>	<p>1 getting some information from. I know that they were</p> <p>2 committing crews up to address those fire survival</p> <p>3 guidance calls.</p> <p>4 Q. Did you observe he who we now know to be Glynn Williams</p> <p>5 talking to or shouting up at anybody on the balcony on</p> <p>6 the 2nd floor?</p> <p>7 A. I don't recall it -- probably would've been</p> <p>8 Richard Welch up there, I don't know.</p> <p>9 Q. Do you remember where Glynn Williams was getting the</p> <p>10 pieces of paper from, who was bringing them to him?</p> <p>11 A. No, I wouldn't have known that.</p> <p>12 Q. How long did you spend with Glynn Williams discussing</p> <p>13 fire survival guidance call detailed information?</p> <p>14 A. Quite a long period of time. Until -- I remember the</p> <p>15 FSG being quite established, I remember liaising with</p> <p>16 Pete Wolfenden as well. They seemed to be working that</p> <p>17 together. There was a BA -- you know, a BA entry</p> <p>18 control that was being managed the other side of the</p> <p>19 lift entry. Just generally liaising with Glynn, Pete</p> <p>20 and Richard Welch.</p> <p>21 Q. I think you said a moment ago that Glynn Williams was</p> <p>22 talking to the command unit. Did you see him or hear</p> <p>23 him actually talking to the command unit?</p> <p>24 A. No, I --</p> <p>25 Q. No.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 180</p>

<p>1 A. I've assumed that he was, yeah.</p> <p>2 MR MILLETT: Okay. Thank you.</p> <p>3 Mr Chairman, I'm looking at the clock.</p> <p>4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.</p> <p>5 MR MILLETT: It says 4.30.</p> <p>6 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It does.</p> <p>7 MR MILLETT: I am not willing to weary you or the witness,</p> <p>8 who hasn't been long there, with any further questions</p> <p>9 this evening. We can go on a little bit, but I am not</p> <p>10 going to finish him tonight.</p> <p>11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: In that case, it might be better to</p> <p>12 stop now.</p> <p>13 MR MILLETT: I think it might.</p> <p>14 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can you give me and the witness any</p> <p>15 rough indication of how much more time is going to be</p> <p>16 required?</p> <p>17 MR MILLETT: Subject to anything changing overnight, I would</p> <p>18 estimate another hour, which would actually be about</p> <p>19 right for my estimate of this witness to start.</p> <p>20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, Mr Myatt, I'm sorry we haven't</p> <p>21 finished your evidence today, but since we started so</p> <p>22 late, perhaps that's not much of a surprise. I am going</p> <p>23 to ask you to come back tomorrow morning. Mr Millett</p> <p>24 says an hour, it might be a little bit longer, but we'll</p> <p>25 see how we go.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 181</p>	<p>1 right?</p> <p>2 THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you.</p> <p>3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank very much indeed. If you</p> <p>4 would like to go with the usher please.</p> <p>5 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, I'm grateful.</p> <p>6 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, well, 9.30 tomorrow.</p> <p>7 Assuming we don't get a message from Mr Myatt. Thank</p> <p>8 you very much.</p> <p>9 (4.30 pm)</p> <p>10 (The hearing adjourned until Tuesday, 4 September 2018 at</p> <p>11 9.30 am)</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 183</p>
<p>1 Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence or</p> <p>2 anything to do with it overnight, if you wouldn't mind,</p> <p>3 and resume at 10 o'clock tomorrow.</p> <p>4 MR MILLETT: May I apply for an earlier start, Mr Chairman.</p> <p>5 I am conscious there is a long cast of witnesses to get</p> <p>6 through tomorrow and it's quite an ambitious timetable</p> <p>7 this week. We do need to press on. I do apologise for</p> <p>8 asking again, but if we say 9.30.</p> <p>9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'll ask the witness.</p> <p>10 Would it be difficult for you to come here and start</p> <p>11 at 9.30?</p> <p>12 THE WITNESS: It's not difficult for me. I would agree to</p> <p>13 that.</p> <p>14 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good.</p> <p>15 THE WITNESS: I would need to discuss that obviously with my</p> <p>16 colleagues.</p> <p>17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.</p> <p>18 THE WITNESS: I can't see it being a problem, but I'd rather</p> <p>19 discuss it with them first before agreeing to it.</p> <p>20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you are happy with 9.30, I'll say</p> <p>21 9.30. If there's a serious problem, you'd better get</p> <p>22 someone, if you would, to let the inquiry team know this</p> <p>23 evening.</p> <p>24 THE WITNESS: Yes.</p> <p>25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Otherwise, we'll assume 9.30. All</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 182</p>	<p>1 THOMAS GOODALL (affirmed)1</p> <p>2 Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY1</p> <p>3 NICHOLAS MYATT (affirmed)150</p> <p>4 Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY150</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10</p> <p>11</p> <p>12</p> <p>13</p> <p>14</p> <p>15</p> <p>16</p> <p>17</p> <p>18</p> <p>19</p> <p>20</p> <p>21</p> <p>22</p> <p>23</p> <p>24</p> <p>25</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 184</p>

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