1	Thursday, 6 September 2018	1	arrived at the scene at 01.35. Does that sound right to
2	(10.00 am)	2	you?
3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to	3	A. Yes.
4	today's hearing, at which we are going to hear from	4	Q. Whilst you were en route, do you recall hearing on the
5	a number of additional firefighter witnesses.	5	radio that your pump would be an FSG crew?
6	Mr Kinnier.	6	A. I don't remember, to be honest.
7	MR KINNIER: Good morning, sir, may I call Mr Nicke Merrion.	7	Q. If I might ask Paul to draw up LFB00001914_0061.
8	NICKE MERRION (affirmed)	8	Hopefully there you'll see at the bottom of the page
9	Questions by MR KINNIER	9	01.35.
10	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Mr Merrion.	10	A. Yes.
11	Sit down and make yourself comfortable. All right?	11	Q. You'll see:
12	Yes, Mr Kinnier.	12	"Golf 261 Acton's Pump Ladder interrupt the CRO
13	MR KINNIER: Good morning.	13	attempting to pass the radio message to Golf 271, North
14	First of all, could you please confirm your name for	14	Kensington's Pump Ladder, saying they will take the
15	the record?	15	'priority' message on behalf of Golf 271, North
16	A. I'm Nicke Merrion.	16	Kensington's Pump Ladder, who have not responded. The
17	Q. In front of you, hopefully you'll find a blue folder,	17	CRO passes FSG call information to Golf 261 Actor's Pump
18	and in that folder at the first tab should be your	18	Ladder saying they have a caller on the 18th floor with
19	witness statement dated 17 January of this year. Is	19	thick smoke in their flat, individuals on the 22nd floor
20	that right?	20	with smoke in their flat and a further call to fire on
21	A. Yes.	21	the 20th floor. In flat 82 people are also trapped.
22	Q. Behind that, in a separate tab, ought to be your	22	Golf 261 Acton's Pump Ladder are still on there way to
23	contemporaneous notes. Is that right?	23	the incident and they state that they will pass on the
24	A. Yes.	24	information to Golf 271, North Kensington's Pump Ladder,
25	Q. Have you read those documents recently?	25	when they arrive."
			,
	Page 1		Page 3
1	A. Yes.	1	Do you remember that?
2	Q. Do you confirm their contents are true?	2	A. No.
3	A. Yes.	3	Q. In terms of the timings of your BA wear, the LFB records
4	Q. Do you confirm that you're content for those documents	4	indicate that the SDBA was disconnected from the
5	to stand as your evidence to the inquiry?	5	appliance at 01.31 and tally out at the bridgehead was
6	A. Yes.	6	at 01.51. Does that sound right to you?
7	Q. Thank you.	7	A. Yes.
8	Now, Mr Merrion, if at any time you require a break,	8	Q. Now, you've given a detailed statement. I'm not going
9	please say so; that's no problem. Most importantly, if	9	to go through each and every element of that, but what
10	at any time my questions are unclear, please say so and	10	I would like to do is just focus on the particular FSG
11	I'll try and rephrase them so they are clear for you.	11	mission you were tasked to complete.
12	Could we deal with some basic matters first.	12	•
13	At the time of the fire, you were a firefighter		First of all, could I deal with your BA entry into
		13	the tower.
14	based at Acton; is that right?	14	First of all, do you recall, on your entry into the
14 15	based at Acton; is that right? A. Yes.	14 15	First of all, do you recall, on your entry into the tower, seeing the forward information board at the
14 15 16	based at Acton; is that right? A. Yes. Q. How long have you been a firefighter?	14 15 16	First of all, do you recall, on your entry into the tower, seeing the forward information board at the 2nd-floor bridgehead?
14 15 16 17	based at Acton; is that right? A. Yes. Q. How long have you been a firefighter? A. Now coming up to 15 years.	14 15 16 17	First of all, do you recall, on your entry into the tower, seeing the forward information board at the 2nd-floor bridgehead? A. Yes.
14 15 16 17 18	based at Acton; is that right? A. Yes. Q. How long have you been a firefighter? A. Now coming up to 15 years. Q. On the night, the appliance which you were in, the call	14 15 16 17 18	First of all, do you recall, on your entry into the tower, seeing the forward information board at the 2nd-floor bridgehead? A. Yes. Q. If I could ask Paul to put up MET00018749_0001.
14 15 16 17 18 19	 based at Acton; is that right? A. Yes. Q. How long have you been a firefighter? A. Now coming up to 15 years. Q. On the night, the appliance which you were in, the call sign was Golf 261. Is that right? 	14 15 16 17 18 19	First of all, do you recall, on your entry into the tower, seeing the forward information board at the 2nd-floor bridgehead? A. Yes. Q. If I could ask Paul to put up MET00018749_0001. Is that the forward information board you remember
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1	Q "111", and underneath that written: "8 persons".	1	A. No, I can't recall that.
2	Do you remember seeing that as you entered the	2	Q. In that extract from your statement which we've looked
3	tower?	3	at, you very specifically say that you were deployed to
4	A. No.	4	give FSG advice to stay put, ie to remain within their
5	Q. You see there the numbers "111" written down. If	5	flats. Could I ask you a few questions about that.
6	I could ask Paul to put the forward information board	6	A. Yes.
7	down and turn to your own contemporaneous notes,	7	Q. What would have been the purpose in telling the
8	MET00005470_0001.	8	occupants to stay where they were, at this stage?
9	A. Yes.	9	A. At that stage, as in other high-rise procedures, staying
10	Q. Apologies, it's always difficult reading the handwritten	10	in your flat is generally the safest place to be.
11	notes, but if you go roughly halfway down that page you	11	Q. Was it your clear understanding that you were not to
12	say, "We went to the 14 floor flat 112".	12	bring the occupants of the flats on 14 down?
13	A. Yes.	13	A. I don't remember being told that at all, no.
14	Q. When you were deployed, can you remember, were you	14	Q. Whilst you were in the lobby or in the bridgehead, did
15	deployed to flat 111 or to 112?	15	you see any residents evacuating the tower?
16	A. I can't remember now.	16	A. I remember people coming down. I don't remember it as
17	Q. If I could ask you to turn back to your witness	17	we were at the bridgehead though.
18	statement, page 5, the third paragraph on that page and	18	Q. Seeing residents coming down, were they coming down
19	line 3, you say:	19	without the assistance of a BA set, can you remember?
20	"We were told to effect Fire Survival Guidance	20	A. Very few were. Maybe one or two I think I remember
21	rescue calls (FSG) on the 14th floor. This meant that	21	seeing.
22	the advice was that it was deemed to be safest to get	22	Q. Can you remember the physical condition of the residents
23	occupants to stay in their flat. We were told to give	23	who were evacuating at that time?
24	the residents on the 14th floor this advice."	24	A. They weren't in a good state, to be honest.
25	First of all, who gave you your instructions?	25	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can you explain that a bit more?
23	That of all, who gave you your instructions:	23	SIK WINKTIN MOOKE-DICK. Can you explain that a bit more.
	Page 5		Page 7
1			
	A I can't remember now	1	A They were struggling to breathe as they were coming out.
1	A. I can't remember now. O. Was it a man or a woman?	1 2	A. They were struggling to breathe as they were coming out,
2	Q. Was it a man or a woman?	2	coughing. Yeah, things like that.
2 3	Q. Was it a man or a woman?A. I can't remember.	2 3	coughing. Yeah, things like that. MR KINNIER: Given the condition of the individuals you
2 3 4	Q. Was it a man or a woman?A. I can't remember.Q. Do you remember whether the individual had an accent,	2 3 4	coughing. Yeah, things like that. MR KINNIER: Given the condition of the individuals you witnessed whilst you were waiting to go up, did you
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. Was it a man or a woman? A. I can't remember. Q. Do you remember whether the individual had an accent, an Irish accent, for example? A. No, I can't remember. Q. What further detail were you given regarding those FSG calls on the 14th floor? A. We were just told to give them advice, tell them to stay in their flats. Q. Were you given any details of the occupants of the flats on the 14th floor? A. No. Q. Were you given any plans setting out the layout of the 14th floor? A. No. Q. Were you told whether there were any children on the 14th floor? A. No. Q. Were you given any information regarding conditions, for example, in the stairwell going up from the bridgehead to the 14th floor? A. No, I can't recall that. Q. Were you given any information regarding conditions 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	coughing. Yeah, things like that. MR KINNIER: Given the condition of the individuals you witnessed whilst you were waiting to go up, did you think whether it might be sensible or practical to take up a spare BA set with you to assist people down if that became necessary? A. No, not at that time. Q. What was the point, I suppose is the blunt question, in going up to the flats on floor 14 to tell them to stay put when that information could've been given to them by the phone? A. I don't know, to be honest. It's normal procedure in high-rise to tell people to stay in their flats. If people start coming out of their flats, to tell them to go back in and wait for any other advice. Q. In terms of your understanding of the scope of the mission, Mr Murphy and Mr Cornelius, who we will hear from later today, both say they were told to carry out search and rescue. There is no suggestion that they didn't have instructions to leave occupants there. Are you sure there was no instruction to bring the occupants down? A. No, not to me, I don't think.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q. Was it a man or a woman? A. I can't remember. Q. Do you remember whether the individual had an accent, an Irish accent, for example? A. No, I can't remember. Q. What further detail were you given regarding those FSG calls on the 14th floor? A. We were just told to give them advice, tell them to stay in their flats. Q. Were you given any details of the occupants of the flats on the 14th floor? A. No. Q. Were you given any plans setting out the layout of the 14th floor? A. No. Q. Were you told whether there were any children on the 14th floor? A. No. Q. Were you given any information regarding conditions, for example, in the stairwell going up from the bridgehead to the 14th floor? A. No, I can't recall that. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	coughing. Yeah, things like that. MR KINNIER: Given the condition of the individuals you witnessed whilst you were waiting to go up, did you think whether it might be sensible or practical to take up a spare BA set with you to assist people down if that became necessary? A. No, not at that time. Q. What was the point, I suppose is the blunt question, in going up to the flats on floor 14 to tell them to stay put when that information could've been given to them by the phone? A. I don't know, to be honest. It's normal procedure in high-rise to tell people to stay in their flats. If people start coming out of their flats, to tell them to go back in and wait for any other advice. Q. In terms of your understanding of the scope of the mission, Mr Murphy and Mr Cornelius, who we will hear from later today, both say they were told to carry out search and rescue. There is no suggestion that they didn't have instructions to leave occupants there. Are you sure there was no instruction to bring the occupants down?

1	instruction?	1	A. No, I don't.
2	A. No, I'm not 100 per cent sure.	2	Q. Paul, could I ask you to turn up a photo. The reference
3	Q. Okay.	3	is INQ00000248-249.
4	Could I ask you next about your assessment of the	4	(Pause)
5	conditions on your way up the tower.	5	Actually, we can park that. There's some
6	If I could ask you to turn to page 5 again of your	6	difficulty. I'll move on to different questions whilst
7	witness statement and the fourth paragraph, where you	7	we get that sorted.
8	say:	8	I now turn to what the conditions were like on the
9	"There was smoke on the stairs from the 2nd floor	9	14th floor itself.
10	all the way up to the 14th floor so if we had tried to	10	As you were going up, you noticed there was unusual
11	get people out from the 14th floor they wouldn't have	11	white smoke.
12	made it down. "	12	Did you ever turn off your BA to test breathing
13	Now, just dealing with that short paragraph, is that	13	conditions as you were going up?
14	a view you had on the night or is it a view you formed	14	A. No.
15	later on after your experiences within the tower?	15	Q. Did you turn off your BA once you were at the
16	A. No, that was at the time.	16	14th floor?
17	Q. Given that assessment, again I ask the question: what	17	A. I took my mask off in a flat. I can't remember which
18	consideration did you give to possible means to assist	18	one.
19	people leaving the tower, spare BA sets, for example?	19	Q. As you were going up, had anyone warned you of the scale
20	A. I don't know, to be honest.	20	of the staircase, its breadth or otherwise?
21	Q. Was there any discussion of taking up spare BA sets when	21	A. No.
22	you were in the lobby or at the bridgehead?	22	Q. What equipment did you encounter as you were going up
23	A. No.	23	the stairwell, firefighting media, et cetera?
24	Q. Given that this was a relatively early stage in your	24	A. I remember there being some hose on the stairwell.
25	journey up the tower, how did you know conditions to be	25	I can't remember anything else.
			, c
	Page 9	_	Page 11
1	so bad further up that it was unlikely that people could	1	Q. As you were going up, did you encounter any firefighters
2	come down from the 14th floor?	2	who were helping residents evacuate?
3	A. Well, I didn't know until I got to the 14th.	3	A. No, not that I can remember.
4	Q. So it's a view you formed after you got to the top?	4	Q. Were you aware that Mr Murphy and Mr Cornelius were
5	A. Yes.	5	deployed to the 14th floor at roughly the same time as
6	Q. Did anyone, whilst you were waiting at the lobby on the	6	you were?
7	bridgehead, any other firefighter coming down, give you	7	A. Yes. I don't remember their names, but I know a crew
8	any steer or guidance as to what conditions were like,	8	was deployed at the same time as us.
9	first of all, in the stairwell going up the tower?	9	Q. Were you present when they were briefed?
10	A. No, I don't remember.	10	A. No.
11	Q. You refer here to saying that conditions deteriorated	11	Q. Did you witness them as you were queueing up to go to
12	from the 2nd floor onwards. The bridgehead I think at	12	the bridgehead?
13	that stage was on the 2nd floor.	13	A. I can't remember who they are, to be honest.
14	A. Yes.	14	Q. As you were going up the tower, am I right in saying
15	Q. Are you sure that the smoke conditions were as you	15	that the ADSU sounded?
16	describe from the 2nd floor onwards and not, say, higher	16	A. Yeah.
17	up, the 5th floor, for example?	17	Q. For everyone in the room, can you explain what the ADSU
18	A. It may have been higher. 3rd or 4th floor, I think it	18	is, first of all?
19	was.	19	A. ADSU is a warning system. If we stop moving for more
20	Q. So slightly higher up from the bridgehead?	20	than 10 seconds, it sets off an alarm. It can also be
21	A. Yes.	21	set off by yourself. There's a button on it that — it
22	Q. During the deployment, as you were going up the	22	signals that you're in trouble.
23	stairwell, did you see a team coming down with a mother	23	Q. It signalled, and what did you do next?
24	and daughter as evacuees being helped with a spare BA	24	A. My ADSU went off. I told the other crew that we were
25	set and mask?	25	with that I was going to go down to entry control and
Ī	Page 10	I	Page 12
	1 age 10		1 480 12

1	have it turned off and then we'll come back up.	1	the bridgehead or the entry control point for a fresh
2	Q. When it went off, did you try and radio down to the	2	crew of firefighters to be sent up the tower in order to
3	bridgehead to say you were coming down?	3	meet any evacuees coming down from floor 14 halfway or
4	A. Yes. We let entry control know that it had gone off	4	somewhere safer?
5	accidentally.	5	A. No.
6	Q. Were you able to get through to entry control?	6	Q. Would that have been helpful?
7	A. Yes, I believe so.	7	A. I don't believe so.
8	Q. When you got down to entry control, were you given any	8	Q. Why?
9	further update as to conditions on the 14th floor at	9	A. Unless the stairwell was clear of smoke or they had
10	that stage?	10	their own oxygen supply.
11	A. No.	11	Q. Mr Omar Alhajali, who is one of the gentlemen you met,
12	Q. Were you given any further update as to the content of	12	says that he asked about whether there were any spare
13	FSGs received from the 14th floor?	13	masks. Do you remember that question being asked?
14	A. No.	14	A. I do, yes.
15	Q. Did you consider, given the conditions you encountered,	15	Q. Do you remember, what was your response?
16	taking up a spare BA set to assist residents coming	16	A. I said there wasn't.
17	down?	17	Q. What did he say to that, do you remember?
18	A. No.	18	A. I can't remember, no.
19	Q. Apologies, if I can go back to the question I asked	19	Q. Do you remember whilst you were talking to
20	earlier, whether you saw a mother and daughter coming	20	Mr Alhajali he says that smoke came into the flat and
21	down.	21 22	caused the fire alarm to go off; do you remember that?
22	Paul, if you could turn up photo reference		A. No.
23 24	INQ00000248 and then 249, might be better. No, I don't think those are the useful references.	23 24	Q. Is it possible that that happened?
25	If I can now go to the 14th floor itself, and the	25	A. It is possible, yeah. Q. If I can ask you to turn to page 7 of your witness
23	in i can now go to the 14th floor itself, and the	23	Q. If I can ask you to turn to page 7 or your witness
	Page 13		Page 15
1	flats you encountered on the 14th floor.	1	statement, and it's really the penultimate paragraph on
2	It may be useful if we turn to a plan that was	2	that page. I'll read out all of it so it's in the
3	attached to Mr Murphy's witness statement, and that	3	record:
4	reference is MET00013064-1.	4	"I think the guy in the flat I had been in came out
5	Is it right that the first flat you went to was	5	into the hallway and said that the fire was getting
6	flat 112?	6	closer. I went back into the flat I first went into and
7	A. Yes, I believe so.	7	I saw some smoke to the rear of the flat. I was only in
8	Q. There, as you say in your statement, you found two men	8	there for about 30 seconds the second time I entered.
9	with tanned in their mid to late 30s; is that right?	9	I came back out and we made the decision but we decided
10	A. Yes.	10	to move all the people on the 14th floor into one flat,
11	Q. You say in your statement that they were anxious to	11	the one we deemed to be the safest. I don't know who
12	leave the flat but you advised otherwise.	12	actually made the decision."
13	Why did you advise for them to stay in the flat?	13	Looking back now, looking at who made the decision,
14	A. Because the stairwell was so smoke-logged that I didn't	14	by a process of elimination, did you suggest that people
15	think it was a good idea for them to come through that.	15	should be moved from flats into flat 113?
16	Q. If they had elected to leave their flat and gone down in	16	A. I don't know.
17	any event, given the conditions in the lobby and the	17	Q. You can't remember or you don't
18	stairwell, what do you think would've happened?	18	A. I can't remember. I don't know.
19	A. I don't think they would've been able to make it to the	19	Q. You have no recollection at all as to who suggested it?
20	bottom.	20	A. No.
21	Q. When you were assessing whether they should go down the	21	Q. Was the decision to move everyone into flat 113 based on
22	stairs, did you take into account their age and likely	22	your assessment of smoke conditions or because of a fear
23	capacity to get down?	23	of not having enough air for you to get back down the
24	A. No.	24	tower, or were both factors in your decision-making?
25	Q. Do you think it would've been possible to radio down to	25	A. I think it was because the amount of people on that
	Page 14		Page 16
	1 agc 17		
			4 (Pages 13 to 16)

1	floor, if they did need to be evacuated, they'd all be	1	A. I think I may have gone in the hallway of flat 113.
2	in the same flat and we'd know exactly where they were.	2	Q. How long were you in the hallway for, can you remember?
3	Q. Given the decision to put people in the same flat, 113,	3	A. Not very long.
4	did you radio down to the bridgehead, or try to radio	4	Q. A minute, under a minute, more than a minute?
5	down to the bridgehead, the decision that had been made?	5	A. Under a minute.
6	A. I can't remember, to be honest.	6	Q. Who could you see from the hallway who was in flat 113?
7	Q. Do you remember anyone trying to do that?	7	A. I cannot remember, to be honest.
8	A. No, I can't remember.	8	Q. Do you remember seeing a child in there?
9	Q. You clearly used your radio at the first stage of the	9	A. No.
10	deployment to contact the entry control staging post	10	Q. How would you assess the smoke conditions within
11	that you were coming back down because your ADSU had	11	flat 113 from your perspective in the hallway?
12	started.	12 13	A. As I remember, the flats were fairly clear of smoke.
13	A. Yes.	14	Q. But when you were talking to Mr Alhajali, had you been
14	Q. Did you think to try and use your radio later on to		able to assess the smoke conditions within flat 112?
15	inform either the bridgehead or entry control that you	15	A. I don't remember there being much smoke in flat 112
16	were putting everyone in floor 14 in flat 113?	16 17	either. O. What were the amelia conditions in the labby on floor 14
17 18	A. I can't remember if we did or didn't, to be honest.	18	Q. What were the smoke conditions in the lobby on floor 14, can you remember?
	Q. During the night, did you have any issues getting	19	•
19 20	through to the bridgehead using your radio?	20	A. The lift lobby, there was a small amount of smoke.Q. Whilst you were on floor 14, did the smoke conditions
21	A. No, I don't think so.Q. So if you had decided to contact the bridgehead or entry	21	deteriorate, remain stable or improve?
22	control, your view is you could've got through?	22	A. In the lift lobby, I felt they stayed the same.
23	A. The times that I did or we did try and radio through	23	Q. Do you remember seeing a gentleman from flat 111?
24	to entry control, we didn't have any problems.	24	A. No.
25	Q. Apologies, I should've asked you this at the outset, but	25	Q. Do you remember seeing a mother and a child?
23	Q. Apologies, I should be asked you this at the outset, but	23	Q. Do you remember seeing a mother and a clinic.
	Page 17		Page 19
1	what type of radio did you have on you?	1	A No Lean't remember
1	what type of radio did you have on you? A. I had my handheld radio. I can't remember if I had BA	1 2	A. No, I can't remember. O. Were you able to form a view as to how many people were
2	A. I had my handheld radio. I can't remember if I had BA	2	Q. Were you able to form a view as to how many people were
2 3	A. I had my handheld radio. I can't remember if I had BA comms as well.	2 3	Q. Were you able to form a view as to how many people were within flat 113?
2 3 4	A. I had my handheld radio. I can't remember if I had BA comms as well. Q. Some firefighters have also discussed having mobile	2 3 4	Q. Were you able to form a view as to how many people were within flat 113?A. I can't remember, to be honest.
2 3 4 5	A. I had my handheld radio. I can't remember if I had BA comms as well. Q. Some firefighters have also discussed having mobile phones on them. They've emphasised that it's usually	2 3 4 5	 Q. Were you able to form a view as to how many people were within flat 113? A. I can't remember, to be honest. Q. Do you remember any discussion in which the number of
2 3 4 5 6	A. I had my handheld radio. I can't remember if I had BA comms as well. Q. Some firefighters have also discussed having mobile phones on them. They've emphasised that it's usually only senior officers who are allowed to have them but	2 3 4	 Q. Were you able to form a view as to how many people were within flat 113? A. I can't remember, to be honest. Q. Do you remember any discussion in which the number of people within flat 113 was discussed whilst you were
2 3 4 5 6 7	A. I had my handheld radio. I can't remember if I had BA comms as well. Q. Some firefighters have also discussed having mobile phones on them. They've emphasised that it's usually only senior officers who are allowed to have them but people do carry them with them.	2 3 4 5 6 7	 Q. Were you able to form a view as to how many people were within flat 113? A. I can't remember, to be honest. Q. Do you remember any discussion in which the number of people within flat 113 was discussed whilst you were still on the 14th floor?
2 3 4 5 6	A. I had my handheld radio. I can't remember if I had BA comms as well. Q. Some firefighters have also discussed having mobile phones on them. They've emphasised that it's usually only senior officers who are allowed to have them but	2 3 4 5 6	 Q. Were you able to form a view as to how many people were within flat 113? A. I can't remember, to be honest. Q. Do you remember any discussion in which the number of people within flat 113 was discussed whilst you were still on the 14th floor? A. No.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	A. I had my handheld radio. I can't remember if I had BA comms as well. Q. Some firefighters have also discussed having mobile phones on them. They've emphasised that it's usually only senior officers who are allowed to have them but people do carry them with them. Did you carry your mobile phone with you on the night?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 Q. Were you able to form a view as to how many people were within flat 113? A. I can't remember, to be honest. Q. Do you remember any discussion in which the number of people within flat 113 was discussed whilst you were still on the 14th floor? A. No. Q. You went back down to the bridgehead; that's right?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	A. I had my handheld radio. I can't remember if I had BA comms as well. Q. Some firefighters have also discussed having mobile phones on them. They've emphasised that it's usually only senior officers who are allowed to have them but people do carry them with them. Did you carry your mobile phone with you on the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q. Were you able to form a view as to how many people were within flat 113? A. I can't remember, to be honest. Q. Do you remember any discussion in which the number of people within flat 113 was discussed whilst you were still on the 14th floor? A. No.
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1	A. Yeah, I believe so.	1	A. No.
2	Q. How did you describe those conditions to him?	2	Q. Could I now ask you a question about training.
3	A. I can't remember if we told the officer in charge,	3	Had you been trained that it was best to leave
4	I think we told entry control, but I can't remember who	4	a group of residents on a floor that was already
5	we told, but we just said it was still very smoke-logged	5	smoke-compromised in some flats?
6	on the stairs.	6	A. No, I don't think so well, we've always been told to
7	Q. What debrief did you give as to placing the occupants of	7	leave people in their flats.
8	the flats on floor 14 in flat 113?	8	Q. Given the nature and extent of the smoke on the
9	A. I think we told entry control that everyone on the	9	14th floor, the lobby, given the nature and extent of
10	14th floor was in the same flat.	10	the smoke in the stairwell, and given the smoke
11	Q. Did you tell the officer in charge of the bridgehead?	11	conditions you'd observed, is it fair to summarise your
12	A. I think myself and Firefighter Saunders did, yes.	12	evidence in this way: you considered it was safe to
13	Q. It would've been important, given the FSG calls from the	13	leave the occupants of the flats on floor 14 in
14	14th floor, to have told the bridgehead how many people	14	flat 113?
15	were in flat 113, wouldn't it?	15	A. Yeah.
16	A. Yeah.	16	Q. Did you assume that firefighters would later go up to
17	Q. Did you tell them?	17	rescue those occupants of flat 113, or did you assume
18	A. I believe we did.	18	that the fire would be extinguished and that the
19	Q. How many people did you say were in the flat?	19	residents could evacuate safely in any event?
20	A. I can't remember now.	20	A. Our normal high-rise procedure is tell people to stay in
21	Q. Is it possible or likely that you told them that there	21	their flats, put the fire out, and then we'll tell them
22	were eight or nine people still within the flat?	22	if they need to be evacuated or if they could stay where
23	A. I can't remember.	23	they are.
24	Q. Can you remember the name of the officer to whom you	24	Q. If I could press you in answer to the question I put to
25	debriefed at the bridgehead?	25	you, did you assume that they would be rescued by
	Page 21		Page 23
1	A TAT	1	- 1-4
1	A. No.	1	a later crew?
2	Q. Do you even remember whether it was a man or a woman?	2	A. Yes.
2 3	Q. Do you even remember whether it was a man or a woman?A. No.	2 3	A. Yes.Q. Did you check as to what had in fact happened to them
2 3 4	Q. Do you even remember whether it was a man or a woman?A. No.Q. Were you aware of the other crew, namely Cornelius and	2 3 4	A. Yes.Q. Did you check as to what had in fact happened to them after you'd come down?
2 3 4 5	Q. Do you even remember whether it was a man or a woman?A. No.Q. Were you aware of the other crew, namely Cornelius and Murphy, debriefing the officer at the bridgehead?	2 3 4 5	A. Yes.Q. Did you check as to what had in fact happened to them after you'd come down?A. No.
2 3 4 5 6	 Q. Do you even remember whether it was a man or a woman? A. No. Q. Were you aware of the other crew, namely Cornelius and Murphy, debriefing the officer at the bridgehead? A. No, I don't know. 	2 3 4 5 6	 A. Yes. Q. Did you check as to what had in fact happened to them after you'd come down? A. No. Q. Were you made aware later on in the night as to what had
2 3 4 5 6 7	 Q. Do you even remember whether it was a man or a woman? A. No. Q. Were you aware of the other crew, namely Cornelius and Murphy, debriefing the officer at the bridgehead? A. No, I don't know. Q. Paul, would you please turn up the forward information 	2 3 4 5 6 7	 A. Yes. Q. Did you check as to what had in fact happened to them after you'd come down? A. No. Q. Were you made aware later on in the night as to what had happened to the occupants of flat 113?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 Q. Do you even remember whether it was a man or a woman? A. No. Q. Were you aware of the other crew, namely Cornelius and Murphy, debriefing the officer at the bridgehead? A. No, I don't know. Q. Paul, would you please turn up the forward information board at MET00018749. If that could be expanded. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 A. Yes. Q. Did you check as to what had in fact happened to them after you'd come down? A. No. Q. Were you made aware later on in the night as to what had happened to the occupants of flat 113? A. No.
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6 (Pages 21 to 24)

1	further questions?	1	A. Because the smoke-logging was so heavy in the stairwell
2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, I think that would be a good	2	at that time, I don't think people would've been able to
3	idea.	3	get out safely.
4	We'll have a short break at this stage, Mr Merrion.	4	Q. Finally, you said that you were unaware of what had
5	Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while	5	happened to the occupants of flat 113. Have you
6	you're out of the room. We'll resume at 10.40.	6	received any briefing from anyone as to what happened in
7	That will give you plenty of time, won't it?	7	flat 113?
8	MR KINNIER: Yes.	8	A. No.
9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you would like to go with the	9	Q. Had you seen any of the publicity in the press following
10	usher, please.	10	the fire?
11	(The witness withdrew)	11	A. No.
12	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, 10.40 then, please.	12	Q. Had you seen that Mr Mohammad Alhajali had been the
13	(10.33 am)	13	first reported fatality in the tower?
14	(A short break)	14	A. No.
15	(10.40 am)	15	MR KINNIER: Mr Merrion, thank you very much for your
16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Kinnier.	16	assistance with coming to the inquiry today. We're very
17	MR KINNIER: Just three supplemental questions.	17	grateful for your help. Those are all the questions
18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Shall we have Mr Merrion back.	18	I have for you.
19	(The witness returned)	19	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I add my thanks to those of
20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, Mr Merrion, I think there are	20	Mr Kinnier. It has been very helpful to hear your
21	just a few further questions that counsel wishes to ask	21	evidence. Thank you very much.
22	you.	22	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
23	THE WITNESS: Okay.	23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You go with the usher, then, please.
24	MR KINNIER: Mr Merrion, thank you very much, just a few	24	(The witness was released)
25	more supplementals.	25	MR KINNIER: Sir, thank you.
	Page 25		Page 27
1	First of all, you say in your witness statement that	1	The next witness is Mr Desmond Murphy. I don't know
2	there was no positive pressure in the stairwells at the	2	if there needs to be some domestic rearrangements.
3	tower.	3	THE USHER: Yes.
4	A. Yes.	4	MR KINNIER: Might I invite
5	Q. If there had been such positive pressure there, what	5	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think the best thing is I'll rise
6	difference do you think it would've made to conditions	6	to give you plenty of scope, but would you get the usher
7	in the stairwell you found on the night?	7	to tell me as soon as you're ready?
8	A. There would have been a clean stairwell. There would've	8	MR KINNIER: Will do.
9	been no smoke in it. Everyone could've walked out.	9	(10.45 am)
10	Q. And therefore assisted evacuation?	10	(A short break)
11	A. No, they would've been told, "Make your way out, it's	11	(10.50 am)
12	safe to do so". If the stairwell was clear of smoke	12	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Now, then, Mr Kinnier.
13	then	13	Mr Murphy, is it?
14	Q. Following on from that question, if your understanding	14	MR KINNIER: Sir, Mr Murphy.
15	of an FSG call is that you are to go up there and advise	15	Just before I do, I should formally read into the
16	the occupants to stay put, do you have a discretion, say	16	record an exhibit from Mr Merrion's police statement,
17	when you get up to the particular flat you see	17	which is MET00015865, which is simply a plan. I do that
18	conditions are such that the best thing to do, the	18	formally now.
19	safest thing to do, is to bring people down, is that	19	May I call Mr Murphy.
20	a discretion that you have and that you've exercised in	20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
21	the past?	21	DESMOND MURPHY (sworn)
22	A. Yes.	22	Questions by MR KINNIER
23	Q. It follows on from that question: given that discretion,	23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Mr Murphy.
24	why did you decide not to exercise it here in relation	24	I gather you'd like to give your evidence standing up?
25	to flat 113?	25	THE WITNESS: Yes, please.
			-
	Page 26		Page 28

1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, of course.	1	flat 111?
2	MR KINNIER: Good morning.	2	A. That's correct.
3	Would you please confirm your name for the record?	3	Q. Looking at the timings, the LFB's records indicate that
4	A. Desmond Murphy.	4	you were mobilised at 00.55, you were mobile at 00.56
5	Q. Mr Murphy, thank you very much for coming along to give	5	and that you were on scene at 01.08. Does that sound
6	evidence today. It's much appreciated.	6	right to you?
7	In front of you should be a blue folder.	7	A. That sounds about correct, yes.
8	A. Yes.	8	Q. Turning also to the timings of your deployment under
9	Q. When you open that, there should be your police witness	9	air, the LFB records indicate that the SDBA was
10	statement dated 21 January 2018; is that right?	10	disconnected from the appliance at 01.27. Does that
11	A. That's correct, yes.	11	sound about right?
12	Q. Behind that ought to be your contemporaneous note.	12	A. Yes.
13	A. Yes.	13	Q. And that tally out at the bridgehead was at 01.51.
14	Q. Behind that should be two exhibits: the first a plan of	14	A. That's about right, yes.
15	the tower and it's immediate surroundings and, secondly,	15	Q. Sounds right to you?
16	a plan of the 14th floor itself.	16	A. Yes.
17	A. Yes.	17	Q. Just for those who aren't familiar with the detail of
18	Q. Is that right?	18	timings and the tasks you carried out on the night, the
19	A. Yes.	19	time difference between your arrival at 01.08, and the
20	Q. Have you read those documents recently?	20	disconnection of the SDBA at 01.27, was that the time
21	A. Yes, I have, yes.	21	you were deploying the covering jet?
22	Q. Can you confirm their contents are true?	22	A. That's correct, yes.
23	A. They are true, apart from a couple of the names have	23	Q. The second period of time between disconnect at 01.27
24	been misspelt, but the evidence is correct, yes.	24	and 01.51, what were you doing in that time period?
25	Q. Thank you.	25	A. Making our way to the bridgehead.
	Page 29		Page 31
1	Are you content for those documents to stand as your	1	Q. Thank you.
2	evidence to the inquiry?	2	The first topic I'd like to discuss with you is just
3	A. Yes.	3	the external firefighting you carried out on the night.
4	Q. Mr Murphy, if at any stage you want a break, please do	4	At page 3 of your witness statement, at the first
5	say so, there's no problem with that. Also, if at any	5	substantive paragraph on that page J, six lines down,
6	time I ask a question which is unclear, the fault is	6	you say:
7	mine, and please ask me to put the question more	7	"I was told there were crews tackling the fire
8	clearly.	8	inside of the respective flat so me and FF CORNELIUS
9	A. Yes.	9	took the hose from FF BILLS. When there are crews
10	Q. If we could start off with some basic information first	10	within a flat, we are trained to discharge water around
11	of all.	11	a window and not into the window as this may affect the
12	At the time of the fire, is it right that you were	12	safety crew inside or cause injury to them. FF
13	a firefighter based at Kensington?	13	CORNELIUS and I were hitting the fire around the window
14	A. That's correct, yes.	14	with water but it was having no effect. The flames were
15	Q. How long have you been a firefighter?	15	continuing to spread"
16	A. 20 years.	16	Presumably you were aiming the fire around the
17	Q. On the night, the call sign of your appliance was	17	window so as to avoid injuring anyone inside?
18	Golf 331; is that right?	18	A. That correct.
19	A. Yes.	19	MR KINNIER: Sir, I have to give a trigger warning at this
20	Q. On the night, you worked with Firefighter Cornelius, who	20	stage. I am showing very briefly a video which shows
21	was your BA partner?	21	the initial firefighting outside the tower and so the
22	A. Yes.	22	tower shows flame
23	Q. Your watch manager was Watch Manager O'Keeffe?	23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Is this a still photograph?
24	A. Yes.	24	MR KINNIER: It's a video. It's a compilation we've seen
25	Q. And he was the watch manager who deployed you to	25	before.
	Page 30		Page 32

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1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If anyone feels concerned about	1	back into the building?
2	seeing a video of the tower, perhaps this would be	2	A. No, I didn't, no.
3	a good time to leave the room.	3	Q. Did you and Firefighter Cornelius have a discussion when
4	Well, I don't see anyone moving at the moment.	4	you were operating the covering jet as to whether, for
5	MR KINNIER: No. The video is set up.	5	example, compartmentation had failed or not?
6	Mr Murphy, just so I can explain, this is	6	A. Well, we had quite a few discussions, to be honest,
7	a compilation video put together by one of the inquiry's	7	because the way the fire was reacting when we first put
8	experts which shows mobile phone footage of the exterior	8	water onto it was it was something I'd never seen
9	of the tower and shows the initial firefight. The	9	before. Initially, when we put the fire, the first time
10	purpose of me putting it to you is just so I can see	10	we put the jet on, it felt like we were putting
11	whether certain individuals are you and Firefighter	11	accelerant onto it. It seemed to spread the fire and it
12	Cornelius, that's all.	12	seemed to make the fire react very aggressively. It was
13	A. Sure.	13	cracking and popping.
14	Q. Paul, if you could set that up.	14	Normally a covering jet would be used to push back
15	(Video played)	15	the heat and fire to stop it jumping to the next floor
16	Now, you see the jet just started there.	16	above, and in this case it wasn't just coming out of the
17	(Video played)	17	window, the whole of the wall was alight, the whole
18	Now, stopping there.	18	building was starting to the fire was actually
19	It's always very difficult on these things, but was	19	creeping up the side of the building.
20	that the jet you were operating?	20	So we had quite a few discussions of shock and
21	A. Yes, it is.	21	disbelief at what we were seeing. It was clearly
22	Q. So the two individuals we saw at the end of the 01.15	22	breached from the window because the fire initially was
23	frame, that was you and Firefighter Cornelius; is that	23	inside the flat and there was a lot of fire on the
24	right?	24	outside.
25	A. Yes.	25	But when we first put the jet on, there was flames
	Page 33		Page 35
1	Q. Thank you.	1	above the window and there was a lot of heat to the left
2	Now could I ask you about the separate topic of your	2	and down to the left-hand side of the window which
3	deployment under air.	3	seemed to be below the surface, behind the panels. It
4	If I could ask you again to go back to page 3 of	4	was very intense heat.
5	your witness statement, it's about eight lines from the	5	To the left of the window was a column that goes
6	bottom of that page, you say this:	6	right the way to the top of the building. That seemed
7	"WM DOWDEN told FF CORNELIUS and I to move back from	7	to be the base of the fire. It seemed to be very
8	the Tower and to go to our vehicle to get breathing	8	intense in there.
9	apparatus as it was now unsafe to stay in this position.	9	Q. When you and Firefighter Cornelius were discussing how
10	This was the only firefighting I did. In our vehicle we	10	the fire was moving and developing, did you have any
11	have Standard Duration Breathing Apparatus (SDBA), this	11	discussion as to how best you or LFB generally could
12	is one cylinder of oxygen and provides us with air for	12	fight the fire in order to contain it?
13	approximately 31 minutes. FF CORNELIUS and I left the	13	A. Well, as I said, when we put the jet onto the heat, it
14	hose and went to get breathing apparatus."	14	just seemed to accelerate and it seemed to spread the
15	When Watch Manager Dowden was giving you that order,	15	heat, spread the fire in all directions. It was
16	did you have any discussion with him or with Firefighter	16	reacting very violently.
17	Cornelius as to whether the fire was penetrating the	17	I did shout across to Mike Dowden that what we're
18	interior of the building?	18	doing is having no effect, and he said to put it under
19	A. Can you repeat the question?	19	the window, so that's what we did. Really what that was
20	Q. Yes.	20	doing was stopping it spreading downwards. But our
21	When Watch Manager Dowden came to direct you to go	21	concern was putting it around the window onto the fire,
22	inside the tower	22	it may react in a way that could affect the firefighters
23	A. Yes.	23	inside the compartment.
24	Q did you have any conversation with him, first of all,	24	Q. Were you able to have a discussion as to how best to get
25	as to whether fire had penetrated into the building or	25	residents evacuated given the way the fire was
		I	
	Page 34		Page 36

1	developing?	1	up the stairwell up to floor 14.
2	A. Not at that point, no, no.	2	A. Okay.
3	Q. Could I now turn on to BA entry control. Again, page 3	3	Q. Now, you describe those conditions on page 4 of your
4	of your witness statement, and it's the very last line,	4	witness statement in the first substantive paragraph on
5	where you say this:	5	that page.
6	"FF CORNELIUS and I spoke with WM O'KEEFE[sic] who	6	As you went up the tower, do you remember people
7	was in charge of the Bridge Head at that point, I did	7	coming down?
8	not see any other managers. He tasked us with a Fire	8	A. My only recollection of passing anyone on the stairs was
9	Survival Guidance (FSG) Search and Rescue on floor 14 to	9	on the 7th floor we passed a crew from North Kensington
10	locate a male who was in flat 111. This male had called	10	on their way down. Smoke conditions were very, very bad
11	for firefighters saying he could not get out of his flat	11	there. The only reason I recognised one of the
12	and he was told to remain in his flat for firefighters	12	firefighters, which was Firefighter Badillo, is he's the
13	to reach him."	13	same height as me with a similar sort of stance. So we
14	Did you see at this stage a female watch manager at	14	were having difficulty locating what floor we were on
15	the bridgehead?	15	because of the smoke conditions, and it didn't appear
16	A. No. The only officer I saw was Brien O'Keeffe at that	16	that every floor had numbers on the wall. So Dave
17	point.	17	Badillo showed me that underneath the emergency
18	Q. Dealing with the substance of the instructions you were	18	lighting, if you put your hand over the lighting and put
19	given by Mr O'Keeffe, were you told to search and	19	your torch on, there was small numbers underneath. That
20	rescue?	20	was the 7th floor, so from there upwards we were able to
21	A. We were told that there was an FSG call to flat 111 on	21	gauge our position.
22	the 14th floor. To me, that would indicate find them	22	Q. Do you remember seeing any residents being evacuated?
23	and try and rescue them.	23	A. No, not past that point, no.
24	Q. Did Mr O'Keeffe explicitly use the word "rescue"?	24	Q. Do you remember seeing any residents evacuating when you
25	A. I believe he did, yes, yeah.	25	were in the lobby or at the bridgehead?
	D 45		P. 20
	Page 37		Page 39
		I	
1	O. Even if he hadn't, that would've been your assumption in	1	A. To be honest, at the bridgehead I was listening to my
1 2	Q. Even if he hadn't, that would've been your assumption in any event?	1 2	A. To be honest, at the bridgehead I was listening to my brief. I was focused on what Watch Manager O'Keeffe was
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1	Q. Can you remember at what floor radio comms	1	Q. How did he seem to you physically? How was his
2	A. That was the 5th floor, the first time we used it, yeah.	2	condition? How would you assess it?
3	I also tried with my handheld radio and that didn't	3	A. He was conscious and breathing. He was stood up but, as
4	work. There was nothing.	4	I say, he was bent over double with his hand on his
5	Q. You may be following the inquiry anyway and you may have	5	stomach coughing. So he was struggling a bit, yeah.
6	seen that firefighters refer to the fact that sometimes	6	Q. You found him. What did you do next with him?
7	they carry mobile phones on them even though it's	7	A. Well, I asked him, "Are you okay?" and he indicated yes,
8	perhaps not encouraged.	8	and he shouted out we thought he said, "My kids". So
9	Were people carrying mobile phones on that night	9	Charlie, who was beside me, went straight through and to
10	that you saw?	10	search the flat, and he said I said, "How many kids?"
11	A. I don't know. I couldn't see the guy that was next to	11	or I asked him how many there were, I can't remember
12	me so I didn't notice anyone using a phone, no.	12	exactly what I said. He said, "No, my keys, my keys".
13	Q. Did you carry a mobile phone?	13	So Charlie had just literally swept the flat quickly,
14	A. No, not on that night.	14	come back out and said there wasn't any kids, because he
15	Q. Did you see anyone in your crew or any of the guys you	15	couldn't hear the gentleman talking, and I reiterated
16	were with going up to or at floor 14 use or try to use	16	that it was his keys he was looking for. I said, "You
17	a mobile phone?	17	won't need your keys, we don't need to worry about
18	A. No, no.	18	them". We stepped out of the door into the lobby.
19	Q. If I can now turn to the topic of flat 111.	19	Q. Did you only go as far as the hallway into flat 111?
20	If I could turn to the bottom of page 4 of your	20	A. Just inside the front door myself, yes.
21	statement, you say this:	21	Q. From that perspective, how would you assess, first of
22	"We walked to floor 14, our destination floor. In	22	all, the density of the smoke?
23	the lobby of floor 14, it was smoky so we shut the door	23	A. It wasn't a safe atmosphere to stay in. There didn't
24	to the stairwell to protect the 14th floor lobby and	24	appear to be any heat in there. It didn't appear as if
25	minimise smoke entering it. As we did not know the	25	there was a fire on that floor. Normally if you're
	Page 41		Page 43
1	largest of the floor and visibility was made. I accepted	1	alana da dha firra aran san faal dha madiadad baad
1	layout of the floor and visibility was poor, I suggested	1	close to the fire, you can feel the radiated heat.
2	to FF CORNELIUS that we do a 'left hand search', a	2	Obviously we'd just climbed 14 floors carrying lots
2 3	to FF CORNELIUS that we do a 'left hand search', a search of the floor starting off with the flat that we	2 3	Obviously we'd just climbed 14 floors carrying lots of equipment so we were quite hot ourselves, but it
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1	A. I looked over the shoulders of the two gentlemen at	1	and I thought that to put them all into a room so
2	flat 112 and I could see behind them that their flat was	2	they're safe all together we needed to go back down
3	clear, it was safe air, so I suggested that they step	3	quite soon, so if we got down and gave clear
4	back in and keep the door shut and asked them to take	4	instructions to the next crew where everybody is, it'd
5	Mr Murphy in with them and close the door and keep it	5	be quicker for them to come back up and make a rescue.
6	shut. We were going to search the floor and we'd be	6	Q. Stopping there, I think in your statement you say you
7	back for them, which they did.	7	and Firefighter Cornelius discussed what the best
8	Q. Next I think you went to flat 113 itself; is that right?	8	options were; is that right?
9	A. Yes, we continued a left-hand search and we went to the	9	A. That might not be quite correct. I made the decision
10	next flat, which was flat 113.	10	and reiterated to Charlie what we were going to do.
11	Q. Could you just take us through. You found flat 113.	11	Q. Can you remember, were the Acton crew with you by that
12	What did you do next?	12	stage?
13	A. We knocked and kicked the door, shouted out, "Fire	13	A. No, not at that stage. We were still on our own then.
14	Brigade". The door opened. A gentleman probably in his	14	Q. Can you remember whether you discussed your decision
15	30s answered the door. It was clean air in there as	15	with the Acton crew?
16	well. I asked him was he okay. He said yes. I said,	16	A. They didn't come onto the floor until we had swept the
17	"How many people in the flat?" He said, "My partner and	17	whole floor and put everybody into flat 113, and as we
18	my daughter." So I said to them, "Okay, stay in the	18	were leaving, they came onto the floor then, and
19	flat, keep the door closed." He did that, he shut the	19	I explained to them what we'd already done: that we'd
20	door and we moved round in a clock-wise direction to	20	searched the whole floor, found eight people and put
21	flat 114 from there.	21	them into flat 113.
22	Q. When you use the phrase "clean air", does that mean	22	Q. Once you had made your decision, were you able to radio
23	absolutely free of smoke?	23	through to the bridgehead?
24	A. Yes, it looked as safe as it does in this room, yes.	24	A. We tried again. There was no radio communications with
25	Q. You'd finished at flat 113. Are you able to remember	25	the BARIE sets or with our handhelds.
	Page 45		Page 47
1	how much air you had left at that stage?	1	Q. Given the conditions you encountered, were you able to
1 2	how much air you had left at that stage? A. We did a gauge check just at the same time that we —	1 2	Q. Given the conditions you encountered, were you able to form a view as to how many people were on floor 14 at
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1	A. When we went to flat 115 and found the lady with her	1 A. Yes, we did. Again, it was still very smoky on th	e
2	son, she was very frightened and she said, "Please don't	2 stairs. We got to about maybe the 6th floor and v	ve
3	leave us alone, don't leave me on my own."	3 caught up with in front of me was a member of	the
4	My thoughts were then to bring her across the	4 public, it looked like an elderly lady, wearing a B.	A set
5	corridor to the flat with the other three people we	5 with a mask on, and she was being led down by	
6	placed in flat 112. At that point, Charlie was checking	6 a firefighter who was walking down backwards, l	olding
7	flat 116, which was next to that, kicking the door,	7 her hands. So we escorted them down to the brid	gehead.
8	banging it. There was no answer there. So we were	8 It was quite slow progress going down.	
9	confident then we'd checked all of the flats.	9 Q. Apologies, these are lawyer-type questions for whic	h
10	So I escorted her and her son across the corridor to	I apologise: can you estimate how long it took you to	
11	flat 112, knocked the door and they opened the door.	11 get down?	
12	I looked in and it started to it looked smoky in	12 A. Time-wise, the whole evening is difficult to gaug	e .
13	there then. I don't know if that is because they'd been	13 I would say to walk down them stairs comfortable	y in
14	opening and shutting the door or whether there was smoke	clean air would probably take 5 or 7 minutes. It	
15	coming from the outside. So I made the decision then to	probably took longer than that because visibility	was
16	put them all into the flat next door, which was 113.	limited. We were taking one step at a time, feelin	
17	Q. At that stage, can you describe the smoke conditions in	way down. So it could've been maybe 8/9 minute	
18	flat 113?	down. It's difficult to tell.	
19	A. It was clear. What I would call safe air.	19 Q. Had smoke conditions in the stairwell deteriorated s	ince
20	Q. You put everyone in flat 113.	20 you'd gone up?	
21	Before you left to go down back to the bridgehead,	21 A. No, it was still thick, acrid smoke. We couldn't s	ee
22	did you carry out a headcount or anything like that?	22 our hands in front of our face.	
23	A. Yes. Yes.	23 Q. Can you remember any obstacles in the stairwell, w	hether
24	Q. How many people did you count?	firefighting media or anything else?	
25	A. Six adults and two children.	25 A. Not that I'm aware, no. Below the 5th floor ther	e were
23	A SIA addits and two conditions	25 The Note that I in aware, not below the still noof their	c were
	Page 49	Page 51	
	O. W d H d F	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	•
1	Q. Were they all within the living room on flat 113, can	hoses, but not from the 5th floor upwards, I did	n't
2	you remember?	2 notice anything, no.	n't
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2 3 4	you remember? A. At that point, I was speaking to the occupier of 113, and as the others had all gone in, they were making	 2 notice anything, no. 3 Q. You got back to the bridgehead. 4 A. Yes. 	n't
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1	crews up there now and need second sets to get them out	1	you which relate to your initial firefighting measures.
2	because the air wasn't safe for anyone to get through	2	A. Yes.
3	that.	3	Q. I'll be two minutes. Is that okay?
4	Q. You particularly said they need second sets?	4	A. Yeah, sure.
5	A. Yeah, yeah. I gave that information to Watch Manager	5	Q. You describe flames moving up the tower between the
6	O'Keeffe, and to the right of when we went upstairs,	6	panelling. What's the panelling you're referring to
7	the bridgehead was on the 2nd floor. When we came down,	7	there?
8	it had been moved to the 3rd floor. So I gave that	8	A. If you mean where I said it was like a neon light being
9	information to an ADO, I don't know who he was, after	9	turned on
10	I told Watch Manager O'Keeffe. And Firefighter	10	Q. It may be easier if you go back to page 3 of your
11	Cornelius was also giving the information to crews that	11	witness statement. It's that chunky paragraph. You'll
12	were doing the entry control board.	12	see just below halfway there's a sentence which starts:
13	Q. You told the lady exactly what you told Watch Manager	13	"Within 10-15 seconds we saw the flames move up the
14	O'Keeffe?	14	Tower between the panelling and they lit up the building
15	A. No, it was a gentleman I spoke to.	15	reminding me of neon lights being turned on in a
16	Q. Gentleman, sorry.	16	vertical line between the panels, with bright white-hot
17	A. Yes, I told him exactly where we'd been, what we'd done,	17	glow of fire then spreading rapidly left and right."
18	how many people and where they were, yeah.	18	A. What I'm referring to there is to the left of the window
19	Q. Paul, could you bring up MET00018749.	19	is almost a triangular-shaped column sticking out the
20	Do you recognise this as a forward information	20	building which ran right the way to the top. It seemed
21	board?	21	to travel up through that column.
22	A. That is a forward information board, yes.	22	Q. Could you see that the panelling itself was alight?
23	Q. You'll see in the top middle, if Paul could amplify	23	A. It initially looked as if it was below the surface and
24	that, 113, eight people, 14th floor.	24	it was a white glow. As I say, I explained, it was like
25	Did you see the forward information board being	25	a neon light being turned on.
	Page 53		Page 55
			-
1	updated with that information?	1	Q. Can you remember whether Watch Manager Dowden would have
1 2	updated with that information? A. No, I didn't notice the board, no.	1 2	Q. Can you remember whether Watch Manager Dowden would have seen that? Would he have been in a position to see
	•		
2	A. No, I didn't notice the board, no.Q. Paul, if you could take that down, and put up MET00013074.	2	seen that? Would he have been in a position to see
2 3	 A. No, I didn't notice the board, no. Q. Paul, if you could take that down, and put up MET00013074. Now, this is a photograph of a wall. You can see 	2 3	seen that? Would he have been in a position to see that? A. He was stood to my left and in a position where he could see both sides from that corner of the building. If he
2 3 4	A. No, I didn't notice the board, no. Q. Paul, if you could take that down, and put up MET00013074. Now, this is a photograph of a wall. You can see there I think it's the floor indicator of the lift.	2 3 4 5 6	seen that? Would he have been in a position to see that? A. He was stood to my left and in a position where he could see both sides from that corner of the building. If he was looking in that direction, he may have seen it,
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		Ι	
1	now and resume at 11.40.	1	A. It could well be, yes.
2	Please don't talk to anyone else about your evidence	2	Q. Just for the sake of finality, that's the second BA set
3	while we're out of the room. We'll start again at	3	that you had in mind when you recommended it to
4	11.40. There may or may not be some more questions at	4	Mr O'Keeffe?
5	that stage.	5	A. Yes, an independent set for someone else to put on, yes.
6	THE WITNESS: Okay, thank you.	6	Q. When you met David Badillo when you were going up the
7	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you like to go with the usher	7	tower, did you know that they were coming down from the
8	then please.	8	20th floor?
9	(The witness withdrew)	9	A. I didn't know where they were coming from, no.
10	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right. 11.40, then, please.	10	Q. In what condition were they when you came across
11	(11.23 am)	11	Mr Badillo, Mr Secrett and Mr Dorgu?
12	(A short break)	12	A. They were stressed, very stressed, yeah. I'm pretty
13	(11.40 am)	13	sure there was an ADSU going off, the whistle was going.
14	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Kinnier.	14	So one of them was on a warning whistle, yes.
15	MR KINNIER: Thank you. Just a few supplemental questions	15	Q. Having seen the condition they were in, how did that
16	for Mr Murphy.	16	influence your assessment, first of all, as to whether
17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right. Well, then, could you ask	17	you could get residents down from floor 14?
18	him to come back in, please.	18	A. I didn't think about that, to be honest. I noticed that
19	(The witness returned)	19	they were distressed, so my conversation with Mr Badillo
20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you, Mr Murphy. I think there	20	was very short and precise. All I needed to know was
21	are just a few more questions to ask you if you wouldn't	21	how to find out what floor we were on and then I let him
22	mind.	22	go and we carried on our way. I didn't really I was
23	MR KINNIER: Thank you very much for your patience. Just	23	focused on our task and they were on their way out.
24	a few more questions.	24	Q. One final question, Mr Murphy, is that in flat 113,
25	First of all, if I could go back to flat 113, before	25	obviously there were three adult males. Would it have
	Page 57		Page 59
1	you want healt down to the bridgehead	1	been feasible
	you went back down to the bridgehead. A. Yes.	2	
3	Q. Did you advise any or one of the occupants of flat 113	3	A. You mean originally? Q. Yes no, sorry
4	to go into the bedroom? Can you remember that?	4	A. No, there were two adults and a child.
5	A. Not that I can recall, no.	5	Q. Sorry, I wasn't clear. In flat 113, when you left,
6	Q. Can you recall any of the other firefighters	6	there would've been three adult males in there.
7	Mr Cornelius, for example advising the same?	7	A. Three adult males
8	A. No, no.	8	Q. The Alhajali brothers
9	Q. Thank you.	9	-
10		10	A. There would've been four adult males. There would've
	Now, in evidence you mentioned that, when you came back down to the bridgehead, you advised Mr O'Keeffe	11	been Mr Murphy from flat 111, the two brothers from 112
11 12		12	and the gentleman from 113, which is four adult males,
	that fresh crews needed to go up with second sets of BA.		yes.
13 14	Paul, could I ask you to turn up LFB00004828_0164.	13 14	Q. I should have been more precise: three younger males.
	If that photograph could be amplified.		A. Erm O. Evaluding Mr Murphy
15	Do you recall seeing, as you came down, a resident	15	Q. Excluding Mr Murphy.
16	being evacuated, protected with a second set of BA in	16	A. Yes, they would've been younger, yes.
17	that way?	17	Q. Would it have been feasible to ask them to help the task
18	A. Yes, as we come down, I think it was around the 6th or	18	of bringing down the other occupants of 113?
19	7th floor, we caught up with a resident that was walking	19	A. I wasn't prepared to take anybody into that stairwell
20	down, and a firefighter was walking down backwards in	20	with the smoke conditions. I don't mean to be or to
21	the smoke, leading them down. I don't know if that was	21	upset anyone, but if I'd have taken anyone down, it
22	the person because it was smoke-logged. We couldn't see	22	would've led them to a very early death. It wasn't
23	very clearly.	23	safe.
24	Q. This is around 02.19, so it may tally with you coming	24	MR KINNIER: Mr Murphy, those are all the questions I have
25	down.	25	for you today. Can I conclude by saying many thanks for
1		1	
	Page 58		Page 60

1 coming along and contributing so valuably to the 2 inquiry. 3 THE WITNESS: You're welcome. 4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. It's really helpful to have 5 your description of conditions at different points in 6 the building when you were there, so that's very good. 7 Thank you very much indeed. 8 THE WITNESS: You're welcome, thank you. 9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, would you like to go with the 10 usher, please. 11 (The witness was released) 12 MR KINNIER: Sir, thank you. There will need to be 13 a rearrangement of the domestic furniture. Might I ask 14 you to rise briefly so that those changes could be made 15 and then, once we're back, I'll call Mr Cornelius. 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, no doubt the usher can 17 tell me as soon as you're ready to resume. 18 MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir. 1 Would you like to sit down and make yourself 2 comfortable. 3 Yes, Mr Kinnier. 4 MR KINNIER: Good morning. 5 First of all, would you please confirm your name to the record. 7 A. Charles Cornelius. 9 C. Thank you very much for coming along to give evict today, it's much appreciated. 10 Usher, please. 11 folder. If you turn over the first tab, hopefully you'll find your police statement, which is dated to a rearrangement of the domestic furniture. Might I ask 13 d December last year; is that right? 14 you to rise briefly so that those changes could be made 15 and then, once we're back, I'll call Mr Cornelius. 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Well, no doubt the usher can 17 tell me as soon as you're ready to resume. 18 MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir. 19 Ush Kinnier. 10 Would you like to sit down and make yourself 10 Comfortable. 10 Comfortable. 11 Would you like to sit down and make yourself 12 MR KINNIER: to sit down and make your sherk limiture. 14 MR KINNIER: to sit down and make your sherk limiture. 15 A. Correct. 18 MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.	
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18 MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir. 18 Q. If you turn over again, hopefully you'll find the	
19 (11.48 am) 19 exhibit to your police statement, which is a plan of the	e
20 (A short break) 20 tower and its immediate surroundings?	
21 (11.56 am) 21 A. That right.	
22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Kinnier, before we take the next 22 Q. Have you read those documents recently?	
23 witness, I understand there's something that Mr Murphy, 23 A. I have.	
the last witness, would like to say in the context of Q. Do you confirm their contents are true?	
25 the hearing, so I'm minded to invite him back in to say 25 A. I do.	
Page 61 Page 63	
1 it. 1 Q. Are you content for those documents to stand as	vour
2 MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir. 2 evidence to the inquiry?	, our
3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right? 3 A. Yes.	
4 (The witness returned) 4 Q. Mr Cornelius, as I've said to the other witnesses.	if at
5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Murphy, I understand there's 5 any time you require a break, please do say so. It	
6 something you would like to say before you leave the 6 not a problem.	3
7 hearing. 7 Perhaps most importantly, if I ask a really uncl	aar
8 THE WITNESS: Yes, there is, yes. 8 question, please say so and I'll try to correct that.	,ai
9 I'd just like to say to the family members of 9 A. Okay.	
10 Denis Murphy, and the family members of the other seven 10 Q. Before we start, could we cover a couple of basi	
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1	A. Correct.	1	covering jet you were operating with Mr Murphy?
2	Q. And he was the watch manager who deployed you to	2	A. I would say it looks like it, yeah.
3	flat 111?	3	Q. It's always difficult. You saw two figures at the end
4	A. That's right.	4	of the frame. Was that you and Mr Murphy, do you think?
5	Q. The LFB's records indicate that you mobilised at 00.55,	5	A. Hard to tell from that, but I would've said yeah.
6	you were mobile at 00.56 and that you were on the scene	6	Q. Thank you.
7	at 01.08. Does that sound about right to you?	7	You mention in your statement that Watch Manager
8	A. Yes, sounds about right to me.	8	Dowden deployed you to go into the tower under air due
9	Q. Also based on the LFB records, they indicate that in	9	to the falling debris.
10	relation to your BA wear, your SDBA was disconnected	10	Did you have any discussion with Watch Manager
11	from the appliance at 01.28. Does that sound about	11	Dowden as to the fire penetrating into the interior of
12	right?	12	the building before you went in?
13	A. That sounds about right.	13	A. We had a quick discussion with Watch Manager Dowden, but
14	Q. And tallied out at the bridgehead at 01.51. Is that	14	it was fairly evident what was happening outside. It
15	about right?	15	appeared as if the fire was spreading under the
16	A. I'd say so.	16	panelling and the cladding. It wasn't clear whether it
17	Q. So for those of us who aren't familiar with	17	was actually breaching any other compartments at that
18	firefighting, in particular the tasks you carried out on	18	point. It looked to me as if it was more just under the
19	the evening, the 20 minutes difference between arrival	19	actual cladding going up the side of the building.
20	at 01.08 and the disconnect of the SDBA from the	20	Q. At that time, what were your thoughts about the risk of
21	appliance at 01.28, was that the time you were operating	21	compartmentation failing in the flats within the tower?
22	the covering jet with Firefighter Murphy?	22	A. To be honest with you, it was hard to sort of gauge what
23	A. I believe that would be right, yes.	23	was happening. I'd never seen anything like that
24	Q. The next difference of 23 minutes or so between the	24	before. I don't think many of us had. So we kind of
25	disconnect of the BA and tallying out at 01.51, that was	25	had to go on the limited information that we had from
	D 45		D 47
	Page 65		Page 67
1	you making your way from the appliance, through the	1	the outside. But as for it breaching the compartments,
2	lobby	2	I wouldn't have been able to tell at that stage whether
3	A. To the bridgehead.	3	that was a factor.
4	Q and to the bridgehead?	4	Q. At that stage, did you form any thoughts as to what
5	A. Correct.	5	measures would have to be taken to evacuate residents
6	Q. The first topic I'd like to discuss with you today,	6	from the tower?
7	Mr Cornelius, is the external firefighting.	7	A. Not really, no. It was more we were focused on the
8	The first question is: were you told to aim the jet	8	covering jet and trying basically trying to minimise the
9	only below the window or above the window?	9	fire spread. But as we put the water on around the
10	A. We were told at the time to aim the jet below the	10	window and to the side, it was effectively spreading the
11	window.	11	fire rather than containing it.
12	MR KINNIER: As before, if I can just give a trigger	12	Q. I think you say in your statement we can go to it if
13	warning. I'm going to ask Paul to put up the Bisby	13	needs be, but it's at page 6, the third substantive
14	compilation again.	14	paragraph:
15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.	15	" it looked to me like it was the gaps between
16	MR KINNIER: So if anyone would not want to see scenes of	16	the cladding were alight"
17	the initial fire, then perhaps this is the time that	17	Is that a fair summary of what you saw?
18	they should leave.	18	A. Yeah, that's correct. It wasn't necessarily the actual
19	(Pause)	19	cladding panels that I could see alight; it was the
20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, no one seems to wish to leave,	20	areas around it initially. As it developed, it seemed
21	so on you go.	21	that the areas around it or whatever was behind the
22	MR KINNIER: Paul, if you wouldn't mind playing the	22	panels were falling off, sort of melting and dropping
23	compilation.	23	down to where me and Firefighter Murphy were standing on
24	(Video Played)	24	the jet.
25	MR KINNIER: First question, Mr Cornelius: was that the	25	Q. In your witness statement, again at the bottom of the
	D 44		D (0
	Page 66		Page 68
			17 (Dagge (5 to (9)

1	third substantive paragraph at page 6, you say this:	1	page.
2	"From outside you could see that the firefighters	2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It will come up on the screen and
3	inside had no idea of what was going on."	3	the bit you need is highlighted.
4	A. Mm.	4	A. Thank you.
5	Q. Presumably on the outside.	5	MR KINNIER: As a general rule of thumb, Mr Cornelius, Paul
6	What was it that they didn't know that they should	6	is very quick at bringing up the relevant part, so it's
7	have known?	7	always easier to look at the screen.
8	A. I mean, yeah, as for not knowing, it may have been	8	In your statement, you say:
9	communicated via radio what was happening, but I would	9	"We were briefed by W/M O'KEEFFE about a fire
10	imagine from my experience, not many people would've	10	survival guidance (FSG) call at 14th floor, flat 111,
11	expected the fire spread to be happening as quickly or	11	one gentleman on his own, we then went through the
12	in the way it was from inside the building. I certainly	12	normal procedure by repeating the brief to him so that
13	wouldn't have expected that if I was in there.	13	he would know that we understood what we were doing
14	Q. When you went in the tower, whether at the lobby or the	14	before we went to the entry control officer, to give him
15	bridgehead, did you mention the way the fire was	15	our tally."
16	performing on the exterior to Watch Manager O'Keeffe or	16	Now, first things first: were you told expressly by
17	any other person there?	17	Watch Manager O'Keeffe to search and rescue?
18	A. I think by the time I got in there, Watch Manager	18	A. I don't remember the words "search and rescue", but we
19	O'Keeffe was aware of the spread outside. There had	19	were told it was a fire survival guidance call, and with
20	been a lot of people in and out of the building by that	20	that we would take it upon ourselves to sort of gauge
21	point. We did explain what was happening, but he seemed	21	the situation when we reached the 14th floor and
22	to be fairly aware that obviously something wasn't.	22	flat 111. I'm not sure, he may have said "search and
23	Q. Did you raise with him the specific point that whilst	23	rescue", but I'm not sure exactly.
24	you hadn't seen fire penetrate within the building yet,	24	Q. Just to assist you on that answer, if I could ask you to
25	is it fair to say that you thought there was a risk of	25	turn over the page to page 8 of your witness statement,
	Page 69		Page 71
1	that happening at the very least?	1	and it's about five lines down from the ten year say
2		2	and it's about five lines down from the top, you say this:
3	A. There was a risk, but at that point we wasn't — no, we didn't know for sure what was happening.	3	
4	Q. Can I now turn to a separate topic, and that's going to	4	"My understanding of an FSG call is when someone that is trapped in a fire calls the control, the control
5	entry control.	7	unat is traduced in a fire early the control, the control
	CHU Y COHUOL	5	
	•	5	will be on the phone with the individual/s and gives the
6	We don't need to go to your statement, but take it	6	will be on the phone with the individual/s and gives the person advice while the control mobilise an appliance to
7	We don't need to go to your statement, but take it from me that you say, at page 7 on the first paragraph	6 7	will be on the phone with the individual/s and gives the person advice while the control mobilise an appliance to go and rescue the individual."
7 8	We don't need to go to your statement, but take it from me that you say, at page 7 on the first paragraph there, that the bridgehead was at the 3rd floor at this	6 7 8	will be on the phone with the individual/s and gives the person advice while the control mobilise an appliance to go and rescue the individual." So, put bluntly, you saw rescue as being part and
7 8 9	We don't need to go to your statement, but take it from me that you say, at page 7 on the first paragraph there, that the bridgehead was at the 3rd floor at this point when you went in.	6 7 8 9	will be on the phone with the individual/s and gives the person advice while the control mobilise an appliance to go and rescue the individual." So, put bluntly, you saw rescue as being part and parcel of the job. Is that a fair summary?
7 8 9 10	We don't need to go to your statement, but take it from me that you say, at page 7 on the first paragraph there, that the bridgehead was at the 3rd floor at this point when you went in. A. Mm.	6 7 8 9 10	will be on the phone with the individual/s and gives the person advice while the control mobilise an appliance to go and rescue the individual." So, put bluntly, you saw rescue as being part and parcel of the job. Is that a fair summary? A. It is, yeah. If we thought that was a feasible option,
7 8 9 10 11	We don't need to go to your statement, but take it from me that you say, at page 7 on the first paragraph there, that the bridgehead was at the 3rd floor at this point when you went in. A. Mm. Q. Looking back now, do you think that's right? The reason	6 7 8 9 10 11	will be on the phone with the individual/s and gives the person advice while the control mobilise an appliance to go and rescue the individual." So, put bluntly, you saw rescue as being part and parcel of the job. Is that a fair summary? A. It is, yeah. If we thought that was a feasible option, then yes.
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1	A. No, we had no idea before we got up there.	1	a couple of people on the stairs early on.
2	Q. Whilst you were in the lobby and the bridgehead waiting	2	Q. When you say aided by firefighters, were they coming
3	to be deployed, did you see any residents evacuating?	3	down with the assistance of a second BA set or was it
4	A. Whilst we was in the bridgehead, I did see some	4	simply physical assistance?
5	residents being assisted down by firefighters and some	5	A. I think it was just physical assistance, yeah.
6	leaving of their own means. But not many, not a massive	6	Q. Now, as you were going up, Mr Murphy said that you met
7	flow. Maybe four or five.	7	Dave Badillo. Do you remember that?
8	Q. Can you remember whether any of those residents you saw	8	A. I remember meeting firefighters on the stairs. I didn't
9	were coming down with the benefit of a second BA set?	9	know at the time that was Dave, but learnt afterwards
10	A. No, not that I saw at that time.	10	that it was.
11	Q. Can you remember what the physical condition was of the	11	Q. Can you remember, did they say anything to you about
12	residents you saw at this stage while they were coming	12	what they'd experienced?
13	down whilst you were waiting at the bridgehead?	13	A. They yes, it was again, it's very hard to hear in
14	A. It varied really. There was I remember one person	14	
15	•	15	a BA set clearly what's happening. I know that Firefighter Murphy and Dave were having a conversation,
16	was over a firefighter's shoulder being brought down and	16	
	wasn't conscious. But there were other people who were	17	and I think that was with regards to Dave passing
17	walking out effectively on their own.	1	information about how you could see what floor you were
18	Q. Seeing such a difference in condition, what thoughts did	18	on, because it turned out if you sort of covered up the
19	you have as to what the conditions might well be like as	19	light and shined your torch on the wall, you could just
20	you travelled up the tower?	20	about tell the floor number that you were on. So
21	A. It was hard to say, you know. Obviously it's hard to	21	I think it was more him passing that information on. So
22	gauge where them people had come from, what floors they	22	from that point we could tell which floor we were on.
23	were in or what flats were involved. So we obviously	23	Q. Can you remember Mr Badillo saying that they'd come down
24	we knew that there was going to be some smoke, but we	24	from the 20th floor?
25	didn't know to what extent at that stage or where the	25	A. I don't recall that, no.
	Page 73		Page 75
	<u> </u>		1 age 75
1	smoke ended.	1	
		1	Q. Having seen Mr Badillo and the other firefighters, what
2	Q. Do you remember the Acton crew at the bridgehead?	2	Q. Having seen Mr Badillo and the other firefighters, what was their condition when you saw them when you
	Q. Do you remember the Acton crew at the bridgehead?A. I don't remember them at the actual bridgehead.	2 3	Q. Having seen Mr Badillo and the other firefighters, what was their condition when you saw them when you encountered them on the stairs?
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2 3 4 5	 Q. Do you remember the Acton crew at the bridgehead? A. I don't remember them at the actual bridgehead. Subsequently I learnt that they were the crew that backed us up, but I don't remember having a conversation 	2 3 4 5	 Q. Having seen Mr Badillo and the other firefighters, what was their condition when you saw them when you encountered them on the stairs? A. Again, it's very hard to say. With someone with a BA set on, it's hard enough to see their face, and with the
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 Q. Do you remember the Acton crew at the bridgehead? A. I don't remember them at the actual bridgehead. Subsequently I learnt that they were the crew that backed us up, but I don't remember having a conversation or seeing them at the actual bridgehead. Q. It flows from that, therefore, that you weren't briefed by Watch Manager O'Keeffe at the same time, you and the Acton crew? A. No. Q. Were you anywhere near them or did you sense them near you when you were receiving your briefing? A. To be honest with you, they were probably in close proximity if they were backing us up, but I don't recall them actually at the bridgehead. The first part I knew was when we were going up the stairs and there was a crew behind us. Q. The next topic I'd like to discuss with you is really conditions on the stairwell as you went from the bridgehead up to floor 14. You say in your statement at page 8 we don't need 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 Q. Having seen Mr Badillo and the other firefighters, what was their condition when you saw them when you encountered them on the stairs? A. Again, it's very hard to say. With someone with a BA set on, it's hard enough to see their face, and with the actual smoke that was in the stairwell, it was kind of hard to gauge anything, to be totally honest with you. Q. It would be useful again for those who aren't experienced in firefighting, what kit you've got the BA set on, you've got that on your shoulders. What do you have on your head? A. So you wear a face mask. I had a comms BARIE, it's called, a comms set on, so that has an earpiece and a part that sits on the top of your head. Obviously you have a helmet as well on top of that, and there's a flash hood in between them. So you do lose quite a lot of your senses, and hearing is quite impaired. Q. Now, you mentioned that you had your radio. A. Mm. Q. As you went up the stairwell, did you have effective radio communications with the bridgehead or, indeed,

19 (Pages 73 to 76)

set, and I also tried via my handheld radio, which --

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firefighters, yeah. Not a lot, but we did pass maybe

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1	they're on different channels, and I didn't get	1	A. (Nodded assent).
2	anything.	2	Q. How would you describe his physical condition when you
3	Q. Why did you need to contact them as you were going up?	3	found him?
4	A. I just wanted to inform them of our progress and what we	4	A. The gentleman was conscious and breathing. Not in
5	could see to build up a bit of a better picture at the	5	a great condition because he looked like he had taken in
6	bridgehead of what the conditions were like on the	6	quite a lot of smoke. He had sort of soot around his
7	stairwell.	7	nose and mouth and face and was coughing quite a lot.
8	Q. Did you have a mobile phone with you?	8	As soon as we saw the gentleman, we brought him out
9	A. I didn't unfortunately, not that night, no.	9	into the clearer air from his flat, because the flat was
10	Q. Did anyone else on the crew have a mobile phone with	10	more smoky than the lobby, and that's when I conducted
11	them?	11	a search of his flat because I misheard him and thought
12	A. I don't think Firefighter Murphy did either. I'm not	12	he said that he had children, kids, inside, which
13	sure about the rest of the crew.	13	transpired to be his keys.
14	Q. To what extent are radio communications an issue when	14	Q. Given his condition, given the smoke conditions in the
15	you're fighting high-rise fires in concrete buildings	15	lobby and the stairwell, would you have been able to get
16	or fires in high-rise concrete buildings, I should say?	16	him down with the air that you had left in your BA set,
17	A. Yeah, I mean, obviously it's paramount to have effective	17	in your opinion?
18	communications. I hadn't experienced that level of	18	A. No, definitely not, no.
19	difficulty before with the comms. They haven't always	19	Q. Why do you say that?
20	been perfect; it can be hard sometimes to pick up what	20	A. It would've been hard enough for anybody to get down 14
21	people are saying and sometimes they don't work.	21	flights of stairs in that smoke. I mean, the smoke was
22	Q. Can you remember which floor you were at when you ceased	22	really thick and you couldn't see your hand in front of
23	to have radio communications?	23	your face, let alone somebody who had already taken in
24	A. I'm not sure. It wasn't maybe I would say	24	a fair amount of smoke and wasn't in the best of health.
25	probably around the 7th/8th floor.	25	That was why we decided that wasn't a good course of
			·
	Page 77		Page 79
1	Q. I think Mr Murphy said 5th floor, if my memory serves	1	action at that time.
2	right.	2	Q. You found Mr Murphy. What happened next?
2 3	right. A. Yes.	2 3	
	-		Q. You found Mr Murphy. What happened next?
3	A. Yes.	3	Q. You found Mr Murphy. What happened next?A. So I went in, conducted a search of the rest of his flat
3 4	A. Yes. Q. Could be that?	3 4	Q. You found Mr Murphy. What happened next?A. So I went in, conducted a search of the rest of his flat quickly. I couldn't see anybody else. I came back out
3 4 5	A. Yes. Q. Could be that? A. Quite possibly, yes.	3 4 5	Q. You found Mr Murphy. What happened next?A. So I went in, conducted a search of the rest of his flat quickly. I couldn't see anybody else. I came back out and confirmed that there was no kids inside.
3 4 5 6	A. Yes. Q. Could be that? A. Quite possibly, yes. Q. Thank you.	3 4 5 6	 Q. You found Mr Murphy. What happened next? A. So I went in, conducted a search of the rest of his flat quickly. I couldn't see anybody else. I came back out and confirmed that there was no kids inside. We then once I come back out the flat, a few more
3 4 5 6 7	 A. Yes. Q. Could be that? A. Quite possibly, yes. Q. Thank you. Mr Cornelius, I'd now like to turn to when you get 	3 4 5 6 7	 Q. You found Mr Murphy. What happened next? A. So I went in, conducted a search of the rest of his flat quickly. I couldn't see anybody else. I came back out and confirmed that there was no kids inside. We then — once I come back out the flat, a few more residents had started to emerge into the lobby area and
3 4 5 6 7 8	 A. Yes. Q. Could be that? A. Quite possibly, yes. Q. Thank you. Mr Cornelius, I'd now like to turn to when you get to floor 14 itself. 	3 4 5 6 7 8	 Q. You found Mr Murphy. What happened next? A. So I went in, conducted a search of the rest of his flat quickly. I couldn't see anybody else. I came back out and confirmed that there was no kids inside. We then — once I come back out the flat, a few more residents had started to emerge into the lobby area and we were trying to reassure them, basically, and gauge
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3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. Yes. Q. Could be that? A. Quite possibly, yes. Q. Thank you. Mr Cornelius, I'd now like to turn to when you get to floor 14 itself. Was the lobby area clearer than the stairwell? A. It was, yeah. The lobby area to the flats was a lot clearer than the stairs, yes. Q. You carried out a search of floor 14. What method of search did you employ once you got into the lobby area of floor 14? A. So before we went through the door to the lobby area, we carried out door procedure, which is a fairly standard procedure in the Brigade to check conditions inside that area. Once we got through the door, we saw that it was clearer, and before we went in, me and Firefighter Murphy decided to follow the left-hand wall. Firefighter Murphy went first and I followed him. The first flat that we came to on the left-hand wall was flat 111 that we were tasked originally to go to. Q. Okay. And you found a gentleman in there? 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. You found Mr Murphy. What happened next? A. So I went in, conducted a search of the rest of his flat quickly. I couldn't see anybody else. I came back out and confirmed that there was no kids inside. We then — once I come back out the flat, a few more residents had started to emerge into the lobby area and we were trying to reassure them, basically, and gauge what flats they had come from. So we continued sort of a systematic search of all the other flats, knocking on the doors, trying to see who was in or not. Q. So from flat 111, you went to 112, 113, 114 and 115; is that right? A. That's correct. Q. Did Mr Murphy at any time go into flat 112, do you remember? A. I think we may have led Mr Murphy into 112 to take him out of the smoke. There was more smoke in the lobby area than in flat 112. So initially there was I believe two gentlemen in there. We put Mr Murphy in with them two. Q. How long was Mr Murphy within flat 112, can you remember? A. I'm not sure of time exactly. Probably a few minutes. Q. At this stage, just for the avoidance of doubt, were you
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. Yes. Q. Could be that? A. Quite possibly, yes. Q. Thank you. Mr Cornelius, I'd now like to turn to when you get to floor 14 itself. Was the lobby area clearer than the stairwell? A. It was, yeah. The lobby area to the flats was a lot clearer than the stairs, yes. Q. You carried out a search of floor 14. What method of search did you employ once you got into the lobby area of floor 14? A. So before we went through the door to the lobby area, we carried out door procedure, which is a fairly standard procedure in the Brigade to check conditions inside that area. Once we got through the door, we saw that it was clearer, and before we went in, me and Firefighter Murphy decided to follow the left-hand wall. Firefighter Murphy went first and I followed him. The first flat that we came to on the left-hand wall was flat 111 that we were tasked originally to go to. 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. You found Mr Murphy. What happened next? A. So I went in, conducted a search of the rest of his flat quickly. I couldn't see anybody else. I came back out and confirmed that there was no kids inside. We then — once I come back out the flat, a few more residents had started to emerge into the lobby area and we were trying to reassure them, basically, and gauge what flats they had come from. So we continued sort of a systematic search of all the other flats, knocking on the doors, trying to see who was in or not. Q. So from flat 111, you went to 112, 113, 114 and 115; is that right? A. That's correct. Q. Did Mr Murphy at any time go into flat 112, do you remember? A. I think we may have led Mr Murphy into 112 to take him out of the smoke. There was more smoke in the lobby area than in flat 112. So initially there was I believe two gentlemen in there. We put Mr Murphy in with them two. Q. How long was Mr Murphy within flat 112, can you remember? A. I'm not sure of time exactly. Probably a few minutes.

1	able to have any radio contact with the bridgehead?	1	A. There may well have been, but not that I remember.
2	A. I tried constantly to contact the bridgehead, anyone	2	Q. Given what you'd seen about conditions in the lobby, and
3	downstairs, telling them that we needed second sets and	3	in the flats on floor 14, did you consider that if the
4	what we had found, and that we wasn't going to be able	4	floor was already smoke-compromised, conditions would
5	to bring the people down the stairs. This is on both of	5	improve, stay the same, or deteriorate?
6	my radios. And Firefighter Murphy tried as well. But	6	A. It was really hard to sort of judge at the time. The
7	at no point we had anything we didn't hear any	7	lobby did have smoke in, but light smoke. Mr Murphy's
8	chatter over the radio or anything at all.	8	flat contained more smoke than the lobby area, so it
9	Q. One question that's arisen is: what difference would	9	was it seemed to us that flat 113 was clear, was
10	radio contact have made for you at that stage?	10	clean air, and that was going to be a much better option
11	A. For me, it was a big factor. It would have given me	11	than leading people into the stairwell.
12	confidence in what I was telling the people, that we	12	Q. Was your decision based solely on your assessment of
13	could send another crew of firefighters up, or more	13	smoke conditions, or was it also informed by the amount
14	crews, multiple crews, with second sets. That to me	14	of air you had left in your BA sets?
15	would've been a key element in saving them, if you like.	15	A. I mean, I factored both things into it, but for me the
16	Q. Could I ask you to turn to page 10 of your witness	16	option of leading the people down the stairs, that
17	statement.	17	wasn't available to me. It wouldn't have been a viable
18	Mr Cornelius, if at any time you want a break or	18	option at that point. So really it was smoke.
19	anything, just do shout, don't worry.	19	Q. In the extract from your witness statement, which
20	A. Thanks.	20	I quoted, you mentioned that you could go down and get
21	Q. Now, the second paragraph on that page, you say this.	21	another crew to come and help the occupants of flat 113.
22	It's probably easier if I read it out:	22	You don't say it there, but you adverted to it in
23	"Our decision to leave the 8 people in flat 113 was	23	your evidence earlier on, would you expect that fresh
24	because of the conditions in the stairwell, where there	24	crew to be carrying secondary BA sets with them?
25	was thick black smoke. If any one of them inhaled the	25	A. If that's the information that we passed over, which it
23	was then shows. If any one of them inhared the	20	The first state information that we pusped over, which is
	Page 81		Page 83
1	smake that individual would not lest long and noss out	1	was yeah I would have said that would have been
1	smoke, that individual would not last long and pass out.	1	was, yeah, I would have said that would have been
2	I don't think leading 8 people down to the ground floor	2	a massive benefit to them in aiding the people down the
2 3	I don't think leading 8 people down to the ground floor is an option because they can't hold their breath for	2 3	a massive benefit to them in aiding the people down the stairs.
2 3 4	I don't think leading 8 people down to the ground floor is an option because they can't hold their breath for that long, it is just leading them to their death and	2 3 4	a massive benefit to them in aiding the people down the stairs.Q. Now, how long were you in flat 113 before you left to go
2 3 4 5	I don't think leading 8 people down to the ground floor is an option because they can't hold their breath for that long, it is just leading them to their death and may have led to more bodies in the stairwell blocking	2 3 4 5	a massive benefit to them in aiding the people down the stairs.Q. Now, how long were you in flat 113 before you left to go back down the stairwell?
2 3 4 5 6	I don't think leading 8 people down to the ground floor is an option because they can't hold their breath for that long, it is just leading them to their death and may have led to more bodies in the stairwell blocking the way. The better option was to leave them at	2 3 4 5 6	a massive benefit to them in aiding the people down the stairs.Q. Now, how long were you in flat 113 before you left to go back down the stairwell?A. Not very long. I was more in the lobby area than in the
2 3 4 5 6 7	I don't think leading 8 people down to the ground floor is an option because they can't hold their breath for that long, it is just leading them to their death and may have led to more bodies in the stairwell blocking the way. The better option was to leave them at flat 113 where there is clean air and to stay with the	2 3 4 5 6 7	 a massive benefit to them in aiding the people down the stairs. Q. Now, how long were you in flat 113 before you left to go back down the stairwell? A. Not very long. I was more in the lobby area than in the actual flat, just checking that we had got everyone that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	I don't think leading 8 people down to the ground floor is an option because they can't hold their breath for that long, it is just leading them to their death and may have led to more bodies in the stairwell blocking the way. The better option was to leave them at flat 113 where there is clean air and to stay with the crew that came to assist while we go and get another	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 a massive benefit to them in aiding the people down the stairs. Q. Now, how long were you in flat 113 before you left to go back down the stairwell? A. Not very long. I was more in the lobby area than in the actual flat, just checking that we had got everyone that we could into the flat.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	I don't think leading 8 people down to the ground floor is an option because they can't hold their breath for that long, it is just leading them to their death and may have led to more bodies in the stairwell blocking the way. The better option was to leave them at flat 113 where there is clean air and to stay with the crew that came to assist while we go and get another crew to come and help them, and hoping that the fire	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 a massive benefit to them in aiding the people down the stairs. Q. Now, how long were you in flat 113 before you left to go back down the stairwell? A. Not very long. I was more in the lobby area than in the actual flat, just checking that we had got everyone that we could into the flat. So I was probably in the doorway of the flat for not
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1	A. Yeah, I could tell he was having a conversation. As	1	Can you confirm that when you shut the door between
2	I understand it, he was reiterating, re-affirming the	2	the lobby and the stairs on the 14th floor, this
3	same sort of thing as what I was saying, and we did give	3	prevented smoke from entering the lobby from the
4	advice to the people to close the door and to put	4	stairwell?
5	bedding at the bottom of the door, and to keep as far	5	A. Yeah, that was how I understood it. I got through the
6	away from the door and the smoke as they could at that	6	door and shut it behind me straight away as I didn't
7	time.	7	want the smoke contaminating the lobby area. It seemed
8	Q. What was the distance between you and Mr Murphy whilst	8	to be fairly effective.
9	you were standing in the lobby and he was in flat 113?	9	Q. Turning to a separate topic, and that's you going back
10	A. Maybe 3 or 4 metres, yes.	10	to the bridgehead from floor 14.
11	Q. How clearly were you able to hear what he was saying to	11	Can you remember how much air you had left as you
12	the occupants of flat 113?	12	left the lobby of floor 14?
13	A. Not particularly clearly, no.	13	A. I'm not sure exactly. I know we done a gauge check and
14	Q. So is it fair to say you were picking up the gist of	14	again tried to communicate this, which we couldn't. I'm
15	what he was saying rather than	15	not sure exactly how much air I had.
16	A. Yes.	16	Q. Had the alarm sounded?
17	Q. Did you know that the Acton crew had left flat 113	17	A. Not that I recall. It may well have, but it was quite
18	shortly after you did?	18	noisy in there. I don't remember if it did or didn't.
19	A. I was not aware of that, no.	19	Q. You say it was quite noisy in there; what was causing
20	Q. Now, you intimated this earlier on. You say at	20	the noise? What was it?
21	page 11 we can go to it if you want to of your	21	A. There was people sort of dropping equipment, moving
22	witness statement that the absence of communications	22	about, I suppose firefighting taking place, people
23	with the bridgehead made you feel that you were on your	23	trying to communicate with each others via shouting and
24	own and it was scary.	24	things like that.
25	Is that a fair summary of how you felt at the time?	25	Q. As you were going down the stairwell, did you encounter
	Page 85		Page 87
1	A Veal It left you in a predicament, really with the	1	an evacuee that had been brought down by a firefighter?
1 2	A. Yeah. It left you in a predicament, really, with the	1 2	an evacuee that had been brought down by a firefighter?
2	choice we had to make. So, yeah, I'd say that's	2	A. I did, yes.
2 3	choice we had to make. So, yeah, I'd say that's probably about right.	2 3	A. I did, yes. Q. Was she assisted with a secondary BA set?
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1	you break it down to adults and children?	1	A. Possibly. I mean, there is a chance. It looked like my
2	A. I didn't, no, I just gave a total number.	2	handwriting, but there was quite a lot going on at that
3	Q. What total did you give?	3	point and we was just trying to communicate where the
4	A. Eight.	4	people were and what happened to as many people as
5	Q. You overheard Mr Murphy debrief Mr O'Keeffe.	5	possible. So I may well have, but I can't remember
6	A. Yes.	6	clearly.
7	Q. Doing the best you can now, what was your memory of what	7	Q. Were you aware of what happened, what steps were taken
8	Mr Murphy told Mr O'Keeffe?	8	by Mr O'Keeffe, on receiving the information from you
9	A. Effectively the same as what I said. He may also have	9	and Mr Murphy to send fresh crews up to flat 113?
10	broken it down into sort of the ages and that. But,	10	A. There was a lot going on at that point and we had sort
11	yeah, he basically reiterated the same as what I did.	11	of explained the situation to as many people as
12	Q. Do you remember whether the Acton crew had reached the	12	possible. We also explained it to a station manager who
13	bridgehead ahead of you or not?	13	was at the bridgehead, who I don't know his name. But
14	A. I didn't, no. The last I saw of the Acton crew, to my	14	after that we decided to move out of the way and leave
15 16	understanding, was when we left the 14th floor and they	15 16	the building. We needed to sort of get outside and get some fresh air.
17	were still there. I don't remember them after that.	17	
18	Q. Okay.	18	Q. When you spoke to the station manager, did you pass on to him the same information you passed to Watch Manager
19	Paul, could you pull up MET00018749. Do you agree that this is a forward information	19	O'Keeffe?
20	board?	20	A. I did exactly the same, yeah.
21	A. It is, yes.	21	Q. Was it you or Mr Murphy or the pair of you?
22	Q. Do you remember seeing it at the bridgehead on your	22	A. Both of us.
23	return from floor 14?	23	Q. Were you made aware later in the night as to what had
24	A. I don't remember seeing that at all on the night.	24	happened to the people within flat 113?
25	Q. So just to complete the questions, looking at the top	25	A. No.
	Q. 50 Just to complete the questions, tooling at the top		14 110
	Page 89		Page 91
1	bit of that photograph, you'll see 113, eight people,	1	Q. When did you first become aware of what had happened?
2	14th floor. Do you remember that being written on	2	A. I had sort of heard conflicting information a few weeks
3	a board at the bridgehead?	3	or months later, but I never really fully got to know
4	A. No.	4	what happened afterwards.
5	Q. Could I ask Paul to pull up another document, which is	5	Q. A final question for you, Mr Cornelius. Thank you for
6	MET00013074.	6	your patience thus far.
7	Mr Cornelius, do you recognise that photo?	7	Paul, could I ask you to put up document
8	A. I do. I was shown that by the Metropolitan Police in my	8	MET00000578_1.
9	interview.	9	(Pause)
10	Q. First of all, is it a wall at the bridgehead? Is that	10	Mr Cornelius, there appear to be reference-related
11	right?	11	issues this morning.
12	A. I believe so.	12	I have no further questions beyond this final one.
13	Q. You'll see in the bottom-right quarter there appears to	13	Sir, that might be an opportune moment for us to try to
14	be written 113, eight people, 14th floor.	14	rectify said reference problems. If I could ask you to
15	Do you recognise the handwriting?	15	rise for 5 minutes.
16	A. I thought that it possibly is my handwriting, which	16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll take a short break now. There
17	I said to the police, but I couldn't say 100 per cent	17	may be more questions, certainly one more question, and
18	whether that was myself that wrote it or possibly	18	we'll see how we get on.
19	somebody else at the bridgehead or entry control	19	Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence
20	officer. So I guessed it could've been me, but I'm not	20	while you're out of the room.
21	100 per cent on it.	21	Shall we say quarter to?
22	Q. Do you remember writing anything on a wall at the	22	MR KINNIER: Yes, or sooner.
23	bridgehead after you'd come down from floor 14?	23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right. We'll come back as soon
24	A. Not with any real certainty, no.	24 25	as they tell us they're ready to see us. THE WITNESS: Okay.
25	Q. Is it something you are likely to have done?	23	THE WITNESS. ORAY.
	Page 90		Page 92

1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you like to go with the usher,	1	Can you remember whether this was on the wall at the
2	please.	2	bridgehead at the time you debriefed about flat 113?
3	(The witness withdrew)	3	And by that, in particular the record in relation to the
4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right. Well, I'll rise now for	4	17th floor.
5	long enough to sort out whatever problems there are and	5	A. I don't recall seeing that at all. I know there was
6	for you to consider further questions, and perhaps you'd	6	writing on the wall, but as to what it read, I didn't
7	get the usher to come and tell me when you are ready.	7	stop to look at it.
8	MR KINNIER: Will do, sir.	8	MR KINNIER: Thank you.
9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.	9	Mr Cornelius, those are all the questions I have for
10	(12.40 pm)	10	you today. The final thing left for me to say is thank
11	(A short break)	11	you very much for your help. It's been very much
12	(12.45 pm)	12	appreciated.
13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Kinnier. Have we managed to	13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'll add to that my own thanks,
14	sort out the technical problem?	14	Mr Cornelius. It's really helpful to hear from people
15	MR KINNIER: Yes, Mr Weatherby was very kind in pointing out	15	like yourself who were in the tower about conditions at
16	it was entirely my error.	16	different stages, so we're very grateful to you for
17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm sure he enjoyed that!	17	coming to tell us.
18	MR KINNIER: He didn't disguise his pleasure! Thank you	18	Thank you very much, and now you are free to go.
19	very much.	19	THE WITNESS: Cheers.
20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well done. Thank you.	20	(The witness was released)
21	(The witness returned)	21	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, Mr Kinnier.
22	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, Mr Cornelius, I think just	22	MR KINNIER: Sir, what I was minded to do was to ask you to
23	perhaps a few questions.	23	rise now, and then for us to return, say, at 1.50, if
24	THE WITNESS: Okay.	24	that's possible.
25	MR KINNIER: Mr Cornelius, as the chair said, just a few	25	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
	Page 93		Page 95
1	more questions.	1	MR KINNIER: Then to start with Mr Herrera.
2	First of all, had you known the full extent of the	2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Are we getting slightly behind the
3	fire and the conditions within the stairwell, would you	3	timetable?
4	have considered immediate evacuation of the entirety of		
		4	MR KINNIER: No. He says. Maybe false certainty and
5	the 14th floor was necessary?	5	assurance. But no, we're not. I think the next witness
6	A. I wouldn't have been able to judge it at that point. It	5	assurance. But no, we're not. I think the next witness will take perhaps longer than the balance of the three,
6 7	A. I wouldn't have been able to judge it at that point. It would've been hard for me to say until I actually	5 6 7	assurance. But no, we're not. I think the next witness will take perhaps longer than the balance of the three, but we remain on course to finish at 4.30.
6 7 8	A. I wouldn't have been able to judge it at that point. It would've been hard for me to say until I actually reached the 14th floor of what to do.	5 6 7 8	assurance. But no, we're not. I think the next witness will take perhaps longer than the balance of the three, but we remain on course to finish at 4.30. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Very good. Thank you very much.
6 7 8 9	A. I wouldn't have been able to judge it at that point. It would've been hard for me to say until I actually reached the 14th floor of what to do.Q. Were there any occasions when you were deployed in	5 6 7 8 9	assurance. But no, we're not. I think the next witness will take perhaps longer than the balance of the three, but we remain on course to finish at 4.30. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Very good. Thank you very much. All right, 1.50, then, please, thank you.
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1	statement, which is dated 30 January this year, and	1	out at 02.26?
2	behind that hopefully you'll find your contemporaneous	2	A. So tallying out from actually the job itself from where
3	note.	3	I was committed to the fire?
4	A. Yes.	4	Q. You were at the bridgehead, yes.
5	Q. Have you read both those documents recently?	5	A. Oh, at the bridgehead. Could you please repeat? Sorry.
6	A. This morning, yes.	6	Q. Yes. The SDBA was disconnected at 01.48.
7	Q. Do you confirm their contents are true?	7	A. Yes.
8	A. On the police statement, there's a couple of things that	8	Q. You tallied out at the bridgehead at 02.26.
9	are they don't fit in exactly, but it's more or less	9	A. So there was no tally in.
10	there, yes.	10	Q. I think you may when you left the entry control
11	Q. If you can highlight those when we come to the parts, we	11	point
12	can deal with it then.	12	A. Yes.
13	Are you content for both those documents to stand as	13	Q to go up the tower, that was about 02.26. Does that
14	your evidence to the inquiry?	14	sound about right?
15	A. Yes.	15	A. It does actually, yes.
16	Q. Could we first deal with some basics.	16	Q. What were you doing in the intervening half hour?
17	If at any time you need a break, please say so. If	17	A. Well, we went to the 14th floor, where we were asked to
18	at any time my questions are unclear, say so and I'll	18	rescue a family from flat number 113.
19	rephrase them.	19	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think what Mr Kinnier is asking
20	As I understand it, at the time of the fire you were	20	you is what did you do between leaving your appliance
21	a firefighter based at Lambeth; is that right?	21	A. Oh, sorry.
22	A. That's correct, yes.	22	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: and being committed by the
23	Q. You have 12 years or so experience a firefighter?	23	bridgehead.
24	A. At that time, yes.	24	A. Yes. Basically we left the appliance, walked to the
25	Q. The appliance you were assigned to on that night, the	25	tower, and basically we were told by a watch manager who
	Page 97		Page 99
1	call sign was Hotel 222?		
	can sign was moter 222!	1	was there by the entrance to either — one side or the
2	-	2	was there by the entrance to either — one side or the other, and then we were asked to go to the bridgehead to
2 3	A. Hotel 222, yes, correct.	1	other, and then we were asked to go to the bridgehead to
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1	Q. Could I ask Paul to turn up MET00005774.	1	A. She told me that we had to go to the 14th floor. There
2	If you see the screen, Mr Herrera, do you remember	2	was a family in flat 113 that needed rescuing.
3	seeing this wall chart at the lobby entrance?	3	I actually wrote on the cuff of my reflective strip
4	A. I remember seeing that wall chart at the lobby entrance	4	on my tunic "113" with a chinagraph pencil. Just for
5	when I actually left the incident. I didn't take any	5	peace of mind, 113, it's there, I know where I'm going.
6	real notice of it as I was exiting, but that was on the	6	Q. Are you sure she used the word "rescuing"?
7	wall, yes.	7	A. Maybe that's something I added, but, yeah, they
8	Q. If you can see middle column at the bottom, "113 14th".	8	needed yes, rescuing, yes, they needed
9	A. Yes.	9	Q. You understood the point of the exercise was to bring
10	Q. For want of a better phrase, did you clock that entry	10	down the occupants
11	whilst you were at the lobby?	11	A. Of 113, yes, of course.
12	A. No, I didn't, no. Sorry, sorry, I did.	12	Q. Do you remember seeing a forward information board
13	Q. You did?	13	whilst you were at the bridgehead?
14	A. I told Watch Manager Glynn Williams whilst I was in the	14	A. There was one; I didn't look at it.
15	lobby, whilst I was exiting, that that flat had been	15	Q. If I could ask Paul to draw up MET00018749, which is
16	searched and it was empty.	16	there on the screen.
17	Q. But before you went up?	17	Is that the FIB you remember seeing but not reading?
18	A. No, I didn't, no. Not before, no.	18	A. Possibly, but I was told there's a family of three
19	Q. Right, before your deployment to floor 14	19	people in 113, and going by what I see there, there
20	A. Before I was deployed, I did not see that at all, no.	20	isn't a family of three people.
21	Q. Before you were deployed to floor 14, did you see any	21	Q. You say that Watch Manager De Silvo told you to go to
22	other firefighters coming down from floor 14?	22	the 14th floor.
23	A. No.	23	In your statement you don't need to go to this,
24	Q. Before you were deployed, had you seen any residents	24	I'll put it to you you say that you were to look for
25	trying to lower themselves down out of windows?	25	a family, an adult male, female and child.
			,
	Page 101		Page 103
1	A. No.	1	A. That's correct.
2	Q. Had you heard accounts of them doing so before you were	2	Q. Do you mean a family which consisted of a man, woman and
3	deployed?	3	child?
4	A. No.	4	A. That is what I thought, that the family was that, three
5	Q. The next bit I'd like to talk to you about is the	5	people, and when we got there it became apparent that it
6	bridgehead.	6	was a family of three, yes.
7	If I could ask you to turn to page 3 of your witness	7	Q. You say, "That is what I thought". There was an element
8	statement.	8	of hesitancy in your answer. Have you changed your mind
9	Mr Herrera, very helpfully, these come up on the	9	subsequently?
10	screen, and it might be easier to look at the screen.	10	A. No. Subsequently, when we got there and I actually got
11	If I could ask Paul to put up the final paragraph on	11	to the door before getting there we left the
12	page 3.	12	bridgehead, and the bridgehead was completely from
13	You say:	13	the bridgehead onwards, black, thick smoke, you could
14	"We left the Bridgehead area/Entry Control Point	14	not see
15	through a door and the conditions changed straight	15	Q. If I could stop you there. Just to clarify how many
16	away."	16	occupants there were.
17	First of all, can you remember on what floor the	17	Could I ask you to turn to your contemporaneous
18	bridgehead was at that stage?	18	note, and roughly halfway down that note you'll see:
19	A. Yes, this is the part of my note that is actually wrong.	19	"I & FF Orchard from A24 Soho"
20	It says on my notes the bridgehead was on the 4th floor	20	A. " rigged in BA"
21	and it was on the 2nd floor.	21	Q. " in BA went to the 14th floor & rescued 3
22	Q. Who briefed you regarding your task?	22	[persons]."
23	A. Watch Manager De Silvo.	23	A. Yes.
24	Q. Doing the best you can, what precisely did she say to	24	Q. That was your understanding when you were writing the
25	you in explaining the task you were to fulfil?	25	contemporaneous notes of how many people you were
	Page 102		Page 104

	r	,	A N. 7.1. (cd.)
1	directed to rescue?	1	A. No, I don't think so.
2	A. Yes. Well, writing these contemporaneous notes, it was	2	Q. Was the situation that, put bluntly, the line was dead,
3	36 hours after the event, after being – and I was	3	or was it there was so much traffic you couldn't break
4	slightly tired, but there was a fourth person on that	4	through?
5	floor that came down with us.	5	A. Well, we tried to make contact and you try to get
6	Q. Firefighter Orchard says in her statement that she	6	through, no answer. You just assume they're busy or
7	thinks she was told six people were in flat 113 on	7	it's not working.
8	floor 14. Do you remember that at all?	8	Q. Did you have your mobile phone with you?
9	A. Not at all, no.	9	A. I did, actually, it was in my pocket.
10	Q. Did you ever take a photograph of your cuff upon which	10	Q. Did you use it?
11 12	you recorded the flat number?	11	A. No, I was wearing fire gear and gloves. It would be
13	A. No, not at all.	13	impossible to take that out of your pocket and operate a mobile phone. The only reason it was in my pocket is
14	Q. Who was your crew manager? A. Crew manager? Ben McAlonen.	14	it happened to be there and it went up with me.
15	Q. Was he behind you or near you when you were briefed	15	
16	before you were deployed up the tower?	16	Q. When you were actually in the lobby of the 14th floor
17	A. He possibly could be, but basically we were being moved	17	itself, could you make out the door numbers if you went up very close to the door itself?
18	from the lobby to the bridgehead, so I think he got	18	A. Well, this is why we ended up on the 13th floor. We
19	deployed after I'm not sure whether it was after or	19	ended up on the 13th floor thinking it was the
20	before. So we wouldn't have been there at the same	20	14th floor. We got onto the 13th floor and realised the
21	time, most probably.	21	numbers on the doors weren't what we were looking for,
22	Q. You weren't briefed at the same time?	22	because we were counting as we went up because we could
23	A. Not the same time, no.	23	not see numbers on the lobbies themselves, and it became
24	Q. The next topic is your deployment to floor 14 itself and	24	apparent we were on the wrong floor. Then we went one
25	the timings. The phrase we've been using is "tallying	25	floor up and found where we needed to be.
23	the thinings. The phrase we've been using is tanying	23	noor up and round where we needed to be.
	Page 105		Page 107
1	out".	1	Q. When you were on the 14th floor itself, was the smoke
1 2	out". A. Okay. I got yes.	1 2	Q. When you were on the 14th floor itself, was the smoke density such that you had to get down on the floor in
2	A. Okay. I got yes.	2	density such that you had to get down on the floor in
2 3	A. Okay. I got yes.Q. Departed. That's 02.26, and tallying back in when you	2 3	density such that you had to get down on the floor in order to sweep round the 14th floor?
2 3 4	A. Okay. I got yes.Q. Departed. That's 02.26, and tallying back in when you returned to the entry control point at 02.47.	2 3 4	density such that you had to get down on the floor in order to sweep round the 14th floor? A. There was no need to get on the floor because the smoke
2 3 4 5	A. Okay. I got yes.Q. Departed. That's 02.26, and tallying back in when you returned to the entry control point at 02.47.Does that sound about right to you?	2 3 4 5	density such that you had to get down on the floor in order to sweep round the 14th floor? A. There was no need to get on the floor because the smoke was ceiling to floor. It was pointless to do that.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 A. Okay. I got yes. Q. Departed. That's 02.26, and tallying back in when you returned to the entry control point at 02.47.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	density such that you had to get down on the floor in order to sweep round the 14th floor? A. There was no need to get on the floor because the smoke was ceiling to floor. It was pointless to do that. Q. Is it right to say that you met your crew manager and Firefighter Juggins on the 14th floor? A. Yes, I did, yes. Q. You made out the presence of your crew manager by this voice; is that right? A. It wasn't just his voice, his stature. I know him, I've worked with him for a number of years now, and — yes. Q. We discussed with Firefighter Cornelius the kit you were wearing on that night. To what extent does the kit you have to wear muffle voices and affect your hearing? A. It does muffle slightly, but you can make out people that you do know. Q. When you spotted your crew manager, did you ask him what flat he was searching for? A. When I saw him on the 14th floor, I was outside of 113. I said to him "Where have you been?" I think he told
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. Okay. I got yes. Q. Departed. That's 02.26, and tallying back in when you returned to the entry control point at 02.47.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	density such that you had to get down on the floor in order to sweep round the 14th floor? A. There was no need to get on the floor because the smoke was ceiling to floor. It was pointless to do that. Q. Is it right to say that you met your crew manager and Firefighter Juggins on the 14th floor? A. Yes, I did, yes. Q. You made out the presence of your crew manager by this voice; is that right? A. It wasn't just his voice, his stature. I know him, I've worked with him for a number of years now, and yes. Q. We discussed with Firefighter Cornelius the kit you were wearing on that night. To what extent does the kit you have to wear muffle voices and affect your hearing? A. It does muffle slightly, but you can make out people that you do know. Q. When you spotted your crew manager, did you ask him what flat he was searching for? A. When I saw him on the 14th floor, I was outside of 113. I said to him "Where have you been?" I think he told me, I cannot recall, but I said, "The people we've come to get out are in here, they won't open the door."

1	A. Basically we knocked and shouted again, "Fire Brigade,	1	Q. Okay.
2	we're here to get you down."	2	By this stage, how much air did you have?
3	Q. If I could ask you to turn to page 4 of your witness	3	A. We did regular gauge checks, but I was pretty confident
4	statement, and it's the bottom paragraph, three lines	4	that I was we were fine.
5	from the bottom, you say this in respect of flat 113,	5	Q. Two of the occupiers of flat 113 sort of describe you as
6	the subject of your task:	6	being calm but controlled panic. Would that be a fair
7	"The flat that we had been tasked with, Flat 113,	7	description of your demeanour as you entered the flat?
8	I am not sure which of us knocked on the door, maybe it	8	A. I could've been calm but forceful, maybe. I wanted to
9	was both of us, we were shouting 'fire brigade, we are	9	get these people out, you know, I weren't going to hang
10	here to get you out'.	10	around and put myself and other crew members in danger.
11	"I think an adult male opened the door, but	11	Q. Did any other firefighters come into flat 113 with you?
12	I believe the adult female was the first person we	12	A. I really can't answer that, sorry.
13	assisted out of the flat, so maybe she opened the door."	13	Q. Is that you just don't remember?
14	Do you recall that the occupiers of flat 113 were	14	A. I don't remember, no.
15	initially reluctant to open the door?	15	Q. You went into the sitting room of flat 113; is that
16	A. They were, yes. They were very reluctant to leave,	16	right?
17	basically, because they were in safe air, clean, safe	17	A. I believe so, yes.
18	air in that flat, and you could see from where we were	18	Q. When you went in there, was it still clean air by the
19	standing in the hallway, in thick, black smoke, you	19	time you were in the sitting room?
20	could see completely clearly the people, the silhouettes	20	A. It was clean, hazy air, because obviously the door has
21	and make them out, really.	21	been opened and we are letting in smoke.
22	Q. Firefighter Orchard, where was she standing when you	22	Q. Did you carry out a headcount of the people in that
23	were at the door of flat 113?	23	sitting room?
24	A. I'm not quite sure if she was standing slightly to my	24	A. No.
25	right or my left. It's either her or Crew Manager	25	Q. Did you form a view as to how many people were in there?
	Page 109		Page 111
1	McAlonen, so I'm not sure which one was either side of	1	A. Yes, four people. Two adults, two males, one female and
2	me.	2	a child.
3	Q. But she was relatively close to you?	3	Q. Were lights still illuminated within that sitting room?
4	A. Oh, very, yes.	4	A. No, I don't think so, but you could see through the
5	Q. She says that the occupiers slightly opened the door and	5	outside of the building being lighter to the dark that
6	you effectively made your way through. Is that a fair	6	we were in.
7	summary of how you gained access to flat 113?	7	Q. Could I ask you to turn to page 5 of your witness
8	A. It was, actually, yes.	8	statement, and it's the middle paragraph on that page,
9	Q. How far into flat 113 did you get?	9	line 4 onwards.
10	A. I made my way into what was the lobby/front room to that	10	You say this:
11	flat, yes, and stood there and tried to assess the	11	"I saw a silhouette inside the flat. I walked into
12	situation.	12	the flat, and this 'silhouette' was an adult male,
13	Q. What were the smoke conditions within the flat compared	13	I believe he was standing in the lounge area. I said
14	to the lobby	14	'fire brigade, lets go', I asked him was there anyone
15	A. Oh, clean air. They were you know, they weren't	15	else in the flat, he replied 'no, I am the last one'.
16	having major difficulties.	16	I then escorted this man out. I did not search the flat
17	Q. Do you remember saying to your crew manager words to the	17	as this man was clear that there was no one else left in
18	effect, "Ben, there's loads of people in 113, they won't	18	the premises."
19	come out. They won't open the door, they won't come	19	Now, can you help us, where in the lounge was the
20	out." Do you remember that?	20	silhouette standing?
21	A. I said there's people, I don't remember saying loads of	21	A. Well, this basically happened after the father, child
22	people, but I possibly could've said that. Loads could	22	and mother, it became apparent afterwards we got them
23	be one, two, three or four, I don't know.	23	out of the flat. They had left, and that was the
24	Q. What do you mean by "loads"?	24	last
25	A. That's what I mean.	25	Q. Are you certain those three had gone?
			•
	Page 110		Page 112
			28 (Pages 109 to 112)

1	A. Oh, yes, because I pushed them out the door. I'm not	1	Q. What was the subject matter of that discussion?
2	going to I pushed them out the door and I handed them	2	A. We enter as crews and I was with Firefighter Orchard.
3	over to my colleagues.	3	Crew Manager McAlonen had left with the female, and then
4	Q. Had you seen anyone else leave the flat other than those	4	later the father and child had left. It became apparent
5	three?	5	that Firefighter Juggins was still standing with me
6	A. No.	6	upstairs and I sort of told him that he has to keep with
7	Q. What was the visibility like in the lounge when you saw	7	his operative, you know.
8	the silhouette?	8	Q. Now, going back to the conversation you had with the
9	A. It was clear but hazy.	9	fourth individual, the man in the flat, if I could ask
10	Q. Were you able to make out, for example, eye colour or	10	you to turn to your contemporaneous note, which is at
11	hair colour?	11	MET00005520.
12	A. No, I wouldn't no.	12	You confirmed you've read that recently. Is it fair
13	Q. What was the noise like in the flat?	13	to say that you don't mention the conversation with this
14	A. There was no real noise. You know, apart from us	14	man in that note?
15	breathing with our breathing apparatus and talking,	15	A. It is, yes.
16	there was no real noise.	16	Q. Given he gave you confirmation there was no one else
17	Q. Did you have your helmet on or off?	17	left in the flat, isn't that a sort of level of detail
18	A. On.	18	you'd expect to put in a contemporaneous note, or not?
19	Q. What was the distance between you and the man?	19	A. No, not really, because the notes were only actions
20	A. Maybe to where you and I are standing and seated right	20	I thought we carried out, it wasn't something I thought
21	now, maybe less.	21	was going to be used to record the incident. I thought
22	Q. How well could you hear him?	22	that was being done in the bridgehead FIB board and what
23	A. Very well, yes.	23	we did.
24	Q. Could you make out, for example, what accent he had, if	24	Q. It would appear the first time you mentioned the
25	he had an accent?	25	discussion with the man is in your statement. Is that
23	ne nad an accent:	23	discussion with the man is in your statement. Is that
	Page 113	-	Page 115
1	A. I could, yes.	1	fair?
2	Q. What accent did he have?	2	A. No. In my statement, yes. But on that night of the
3	A. Middle Eastern.	3	incident, no.
4	Q. You'd been told there were three people in that flat.	4	Q. To who else did you mention the exchange you had with
5	A. That's what I believe I was told, yes.	5	the man?
6	Q. There was clearly a fourth person in there.	6	A. When we left and went back to the bridgehead, that had
7	A. Yes.	7	moved from 2nd floor to the ground-floor lobby, I said
8	Q. Given there were more people in there than you had been	8	to Watch Manager De Silvo that flat 113 was searched and
9	expecting, would that be a trigger for searching around	9	empty. We walked out of the property, out of the lobby
10	the entirety of the flat to see if anyone else was in	10	through the back door that was there, that's obviously
11	there?	11	been changed. I mentioned to Watch Manager Williams
12	A. No, not really, because I thought basically that I was	12	that that flat was empty, and he obviously on that wall
13	misinformed. You know, we were sent to rescue a family,	13	chart you had, he ticked off that flat was cleared.
14	they said three people, it could've been four people.	14	We walked outside to where the ambulance service
15	You know, the facts weren't, in my eyes weren't, you	15	were treating these casualties and we met the people
16	know	16	that we rescued.
17	Q. You're absolutely clear that when you asked whether	17	Q. Now
18	there was anyone else in the flat, he said, "No, I'm the	18	A. And he was on the phone to his brother.
19	only one"?	19	Q. We'll come on to that separately.
20	A. Yes.	20	A. That's what I'm getting to.
21	Q. Did you ask him to repeat that?	21	Q. We'll come on to that in a few moments.
22	A. No, I didn't.	22	One point I'm asked to make clear on his behalf is
23	Q. It appears as you left flat 113 there was a discussion	23	the gentleman you were speaking to, his name is
24	between you and Firefighter Juggins; is that right?	24	Mr Omar Alhajali, and his account is that he never said
25	A. That was, yes.	25	there was no one else left in the flat. He says there
	D 114		D 11/
	Page 114		Page 116

1	were several people still behind him in the lounge.	1	to him 'don't worry I will sort it out'. I started to
2	What would you say to that?	2	think, did I miss him as he was praying and on his
3	A. No. I could see him clearly. If there were people	3	knees. I can only presume that his brother got left
4	standing behind him, I would've seen them. I walked	4	behind, did 'Syrian man' think the mixed race man was
5	into the mid-lounge of the property.	5	his brother and that he initially thought that he had
6	Q. He also says that he did not see his brother go out	6	left the flat and only realised the error once outside?"
7	before him, only Mr Talabi, who was the occupant of	7	Now, is that a fair summary of the exchange you had
8	flat 113.	8	with Mr Alhajali outside the tower?
9	A. Okay.	9	A. Yes.
10	Q. What would be your response to that?	10	Q. The final few sentences of that paragraph where you say
11	A. He didn't see his brother leave? Well we were	11	you think Mr Alhajali may have confused the mixed-race
12	standing in that lobby. I only saw the four people	12	man with his brother, is that something you thought at
13	I saw and I asked him, "Let's go, let's go, let's go	13	the time or is that a subsequent thought you've had?
14	now, is this everyone?" And I got a yes. I'm not going	14	A. No, I thought that at the time when I exchanged
15	to hang around. If I've been told that flat has been	15	conversation with him whilst he's on the mobile phone,
16	searched and emptied not searched, but you know who's	16	and that's when I made it back to the lobby area and
17	in there, we're there to rescue, the door's open, let's	17	told Watch Manager Williams that that floor, that flat,
18	go and I didn't see any other people if there were	18	wasn't completely searched and there was an extra
19	other people, obviously I would've stayed and assisted	19	person, not more people, to my awareness, that were in
20	them to leave that property.	20	that flat and they needed to be assisted.
21	Q. Mr Alhajali would want me to suggest to you that the	21	Q. Now, Mr Alhajali says that that conversation didn't take
22	account of that conversation is mistaken. Would your	22	place.
23	response be effectively that which you've already been	23	A. Which one?
24	provided?	24	Q. The conversation we've just been dealing with now.
25	A. It must be mistaken by one of our parts, yes.	25	A. It did.
	Page 117		Page 119
			<u> </u>
1	O If I could ask you following on from what you said	1	O Thank you
1 2	Q. If I could ask you, following on from what you said about the later account	1 2	Q. Thank you. Could I retrack our steps and go back to the tower.
2	about the later account	2	Could I retrack our steps and go back to the tower.
2	about the later account A. Yes.	2 3	Could I retrack our steps and go back to the tower. A. Yes.
2 3 4	about the later account A. Yes. Q the later discussions after you left the tower.	2 3 4	Could I retrack our steps and go back to the tower. A. Yes. Q. You came down the tower and you returned to the
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1	Q. Could I ask you just to deal with the numbers point.	1	update them?
2	A. Yes.	2	A. Yes, I did.
3	Q. Could I ask Paul to bring up MET00015824.	3	Q. Sorry to retrack things, but who did you speak to when
4	Now, if that could be expanded so that we can see	4	you went back in?
5	the numbers "113 (3 rescues)".	5	A. I spoke to Watch Manager Williams, who was in the lobby
6	Sorry, it's really unclear. I apologise,	6	area, on that board. I said I know him, first names,
7	Mr Herrera. It's not coming up terribly clearly.	7	he's a friend of mine "Glynn, 113, there's still
8	A. I can see it though.	8	a person, I've spoken to the brother, he's on the phone
9	Q. Do you have it?	9	to him, there's a person in there that needs to be
10	A. I can see it.	10	rescued."
11	Q. Yes. There it refers to three rescues.	11	Q. What did he do with that information? First of all, did
12	Now, obviously you brought down four people.	12	he write it down anywhere?
13	A. Yes.	13	A. I'm not sure what he did. I can tell you what he told
14	Q. Do you know who wrote down that information on the wall?	14	me to do.
15	A. I wouldn't be able to tell you.	15	Q. What did he tell you to do?
16	Q. Are you sure you informed the bridgehead that four	16	A. He told me to put another set on, find someone else, go
17	people had come down?	17	back up there and get them out.
18	A. Yes no, I informed them that that flat had been	18	Q. What did you do then?
19	searched and emptied. The three people, that's the	19	A. I told him I wasn't capable. I was in no condition to.
20	information they gave us and they must have been going	20	Q. Because you'd just come down?
21	on what they had.	21	A. Yes.
22	Q. So at the bridgehead, they didn't know that four people	22	Q. So what did he then do once you said that?
23	had come down as opposed to the three that were the	23	A. He said go to the bridgehead and tell Watch Manager
24	subject matter of the FSG?	24	De Silvo that that floor isn't searched and to send
25	A. That's what it seems to be, yes. But I thought that	25	another crew to rescue that person.
23	A. That's what it seems to be, yes. But I thought that	25	another crew to researc that person.
	Page 121		Page 123
1	wasn't relevant at the time because they were just	1	Q. Okay. So you went up to her; is that right?
2	saying that there was a family in there. I didn't know	2	A. Yes.
3	that fourth person wasn't a member of that family.	3	Q. What did she do with that information?
4	Q. Paul, could I ask you to turn up MET00015815.	4	A. I won't be able to tell you. I just passed it on.
5	Do you recall seeing this?	5	I didn't stay around to
6	A. Was that in the lobby area?	6	Q. Let's take it stage by stage. She passed it on. Did
7	Q. At the bridgehead.	7	she write it down on anything?
8	A. No, I don't remember seeing that, sorry.	8	A. I don't know. I passed the information to her. I don't
9	Q. Do you remember seeing Group Manager Williams?	9	know what she did with it.
10	A. That is in the lobby, then, if that is there, not the	10	Q. Okay.
11	bridgehead.	11	Now, later on in the evening, is it right that you
12	Q. If we look in the right-hand column, that has "112", it	12	joined up with your crew to recuperate, so your crew
13	looks, "14", then "8P".	13	manager, Firefighters Juggins, Orchard, Evans and
14	A. Mm, yes, I can see what you're showing me, yes.	14	Bloxham?
15	Q. Did you see Group Manager Williams	15	A. Yes.
16	A. Watch manager.	16	Q. That was outside the leisure centre; is that right?
17	Q. Sorry Watch Manager Williams, write that?	17	A. Yes, it was.
18	A. No.	18	Q. Did you tell them about the further information you'd
19	Q. Did you see anyone write that?	19	gathered from Mr Alhajali?
20	A. No.	20	A. Well, Crew Manager McAlonen was present when this was
21	Q. Did you see Watch Manager De Silvo write anything?	21	all happening. He suggested to me to go back and inform
22	A. No.	22	them that there was a person still left in that flat.
23	Q. After you'd met the "Syrian man" outside the tower	23	Because he was there whilst we walked out, we recognised
24	A. Yes.	24	the people, "Oh, that's" and then we realised there
25	Q is it right that you went back into the tower to	25	was an error.
1	Page 122		Page 124

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1	Q. Were you aware on the night itself of the efforts of	1	Q. Why do you think the watch manager wanted fresh wearers?
2	Mr Alhajali trying to get back into the tower?	2	A. Obviously you're fresh, you're basically we're spent,
3	A. No.	3	basically.
4	Q. Were you aware of any other FSG calls in relation to	4	MR KINNIER: Thank you.
5	flat 113 later on in the night?	5	Mr Herrera, thank you. Those are all the questions
6	A. No.	6	I have for you at the moment.
7	Q. When did you first become aware of what had happened to	7	Sir, might I ask for a 5-minute break to see if
8	the occupants of flat 113?	8	there are any final questions?
9	A. I became aware of the occupant, not occupants, that	9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Is 5 minutes going to be long
10	evening, watching the television.	10	enough?
11	Q. Did you discuss it with your crewmates back at Lambeth	11	MR KINNIER: I think so.
12	once you'd found out that information?	12	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right.
13	A. I was at home at that time and I phoned Crew Manager	13	We are going to have a short break now, Mr Herrera,
14	McAlonen and said, "Have you seen what's on the news?"	14	so that Mr Kinnier can consider whether there's any
15	And he said, "Yes, I have."	15	other ground that he needs to cover.
16	Q. Thank you.	16	So we'll rise now. I think I am going to say we'll
17	There's a final topic of matters very different to	17	resume at 2.40. Is that all right?
18	the ones we've just been discussing I'd like to discuss	18	MR KINNIER: Yes.
19	with you. It's a technical matter and it's raised at	19	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Please don't talk to anyone about
20	page 4 of your statement. I don't necessarily need to	20	your evidence while you're out of the room, and we'll
21	take you to it, but you describe how leaky feeders can	21	come back, as I say, at 2.40 to see if there are further
22	assist with comms but are more suitable for the	22	questions.
23	underground.	23	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
24	First of all, what is a leaky feeder?	24	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you would like to go with the
25	A. Basically a booster box, leaky feeder or a booster box.	25	usher.
	Dags 125		Dago 127
	Page 125		Page 127
1	You can place them and it will help with comms. Just	1	(The witness withdrew)
2	boost the signal.	2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, 2.40, then, please.
3	Q. Why are they more appropriate underground as opposed to	3	MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.
4	overground?	4	(2.33 pm)
5	A. I wouldn't say it's more appropriate, but they do work	5	(A short break)
6	well in areas where you don't have a signal.	6	(2.40 pm)
7	Q. Do you know whether any were available or used at	7	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Kinnier, a few more
8	Grenfell Tower on the night of the fire?	8	questions?
9	A. I wouldn't be able to tell you.	9	MR KINNIER: There are, sir.
10	Q. Can you explain, what is a radio repeater? Is that	10	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
11	different to a leaky feeder?	11	(The witness returned)
12	A. They're very similar. I think leaky feeders can be used	12	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Herrera, I think Mr Kinnier
13	with cables to connect one to another. The radio	13	does have a few more questions.
14	repeater is slightly different.	14	MR KINNIER: Mr Herrera, thank you very much for coming
15	Q. In the sense it can't be connected to other devices; is	15	back, just a few more questions.
16	that right? Okay.	16	First of all, are you aware of the terms of
17	Do you know whether there were radio repeaters in	17	policy 803, search and rescue procedures?
18	use?	18	A. I must be aware, yes.
19	A. I wouldn't be able to tell you.	19	Q. Are you aware?
20	Q. You explained in your statement how you attempted to go	20	A. Yes.
21	back into the tower for a second time.	21	Q. Are you aware of the provision that where a casualty is
22	A. Yes.	22	discovered, it's necessary to perform a secondary sweep
23	Q. You were prevented from doing so by a watch manager	23	of the immediate vicinity? Are you aware of that
24	because you'd already been in once.	24	provision?
25	A. Yes.	25	A. Yes, but this wasn't a standard search and rescue; this
	D 427		D 420
	Page 126		Page 128
			32 (Pages 125 to 128)

1	was just like an FSG, "Go to that property, these people	1	no need to check to see if I had enough air.
2	are waiting for you". It wasn't a casualty sweep. This	2	Q. At that time, given the conditions you'd encountered on
3	wasn't a standard: I'm going into a flat where people	3	the way up and in the lobby, were you yourself concerned
4	may be or may not be and I'm searching for them; they	4	to get down as soon as you could safely?
5	are waiting to be rescued.	5	A. Slightly, yes, yes.
6	Q. You said you saw the family of three leave.	6	Q. Did that inform the approach you took to getting the
7	A. Yes.	7	people out of flat 113?
8	Q. Where were you when you saw them leave?	8	A. The approach I took was yeah, rapid, I wanted these
9	A. I was by the door. I actually pushed them towards the	9	people out of there quickly, because we are in a thick,
10	exit.	10	black smoke-logged lobby, and it's flammable gases. It
11	Q. So at the flat entrance door?	11	could go wrong at any time. I just wanted us and the
12	A. Yes, or standing in and pushed toward the exit where	12	people we were rescuing out of that property as quickly
13	they're helped along.	13	as possible.
14	Q. Did you see from where within the flat those three had	14	Q. Did you have time, given the size of flat 113, to look
15	come from?	15	into the bedroom and the other rooms?
16	A. They were actually by the entrance.	16	A. I possibly could've, yes.
17	Q. Could the position be that they'd come from the bedroom?	17	Do you want to know why I did not do it?
18	A. I can't answer that, sorry.	18	Q. Yes.
19	Q. Just to get the chronology right, did you see those	19	A. I assumed there was no one in there to search and look
20	three leave, then did you re-enter the flat and that's	20	for.
21	when you saw the silhouette? Is that the time sequence?	21	Q. On the basis of what you say you were told?
22	A. I didn't exit completely. I was always in that hallway	22	A. Yes.
23	entrance to the flat. I went to the door. I didn't	23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I ask this: as far as you were
24	actually physically leave the flat until I physically	24	aware, were you the last person to leave the flat?
25	left with the last gentleman.	25	A. I was the last person to leave the flat, yes.
	Page 129		Page 131
1	O. You said earlier on that you were in the middle of the	1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So the
1 2	Q. You said earlier on that you were in the middle of the lounge.	1 2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So the A. As far as I was aware.
2	lounge.	1 2 3	A. As far as I was aware.
2 3	lounge. A. Yes.	2	A. As far as I was aware. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: — person you were talking to, who
2 3 4	lounge. A. Yes. Q. So at some stage you went from the exit into the middle	2 3	A. As far as I was aware. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: person you were talking to, who you say told you that there was no one else, left in
2 3 4 5	lounge. A. Yes. Q. So at some stage you went from the exit into the middle of the lounge.	2 3 4	A. As far as I was aware. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: person you were talking to, who you say told you that there was no one else, left in front of you?
2 3 4 5 6	lounge. A. Yes. Q. So at some stage you went from the exit into the middle of the lounge. A. Yes.	2 3 4 5	 A. As far as I was aware. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: person you were talking to, who you say told you that there was no one else, left in front of you? A. Left in front of me. Yes, sir. No one left behind me.
2 3 4 5 6 7	lounge. A. Yes. Q. So at some stage you went from the exit into the middle of the lounge. A. Yes. Q. My question is: did you do that after the family of	2 3 4 5 6	 A. As far as I was aware. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: person you were talking to, who you say told you that there was no one else, left in front of you? A. Left in front of me. Yes, sir. No one left behind me. I left, Firefighter Juggins left down I left the
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1	floor 14, or floor 14 the lobby itself?	1	THE WITNESS: Can I say a few words, please?
2	A. No, Firefighter Juggins stayed with me when I believed	2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
3	he should've gone with his BA wearer as a team, he	3	THE WITNESS: What we did on that night wasn't just it's
4	should've left. He said to me I said, "What are you	4	a team effort, and I'm very, very, very sorry if I've
5	doing here?" He said, "I'm staying with you because	5	let anyone down or not done what was expected of me.
6	I want to search and find more people." I said, "No, go	6	I'm very sorry.
7	and leave with Ben."	7	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
8	Maybe I used different language, but it was down	8	Would you like to go with the usher now.
9	those lines.	9	(The witness was released)
10	Q. Before you left that flat, how would you describe your	10	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Kinnier.
11	visibility?	11	MR KINNIER: Sir, may I call the next witness, who is
12	A. Very, very, very poor. In the hallway, very poor.	12	Firefighter Nikki Upton.
13	Q. As you were on the threshold, what was the visibility	13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. As far as you know, the
14	looking into the flat?	14	present arrangements
15	A. You could look into the flat. You could see. It was	15	MR KINNIER: Just paperwork.
16	clear. Reasonably clean air. Obviously the door had	16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'll sit here while the paperwork is
17	been open for some time now, maybe 5 minutes, 10 minutes	17	organised.
18	maybe, and obviously that smoke was seeping in. But you	18	(Pause)
19	could still see. It was perfectly	19	NIKKI UPTON (affirmed)
20	Q. Given that people were found in flat 113	20	Questions by MR KINNIER
21	A. What do you mean by found, sorry?	21	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Ms Upton. Sit
22	Q. Later on.	22	down and make yourself comfortable. All right?
23	A. I wasn't aware of that.	23	Yes, Mr Kinnier.
24	Q. I suppose the ultimate point is: why didn't you see them	24	MR KINNIER: Good afternoon.
25	if they were in there, if you'd looked properly?	25	First of all, could you confirm your name for the
	Page 133		Page 135
1	A. That's the thing, I didn't see them. They weren't	1	record, please.
2	there. And especially I'm being told that he was the	2	A. Nikki Upton.
3	last person, there was no need to look. From my point	3	Q. Thank you very much for coming along to give evidence
4	of view, no, that flat was empty.	4	today.
5	Q. Beyond talking to your crew manager about the	5	loday.
6	Q. Deyond taking to your erew manager about the		In front of you you have a blue folder. Behind the
	discussions you'd had with who you described as "the		In front of you, you have a blue folder. Behind the
7	discussions you'd had with who you described as "the Syrian man" in your witness statement, did you discuss	6	first tab is hopefully your statement dated
7 8	Syrian man" in your witness statement, did you discuss	6 7	first tab is hopefully your statement dated 20 October 2017.
8	Syrian man" in your witness statement, did you discuss those conversations with any other officer, more senior	6 7 8	first tab is hopefully your statement dated 20 October 2017. A. Yes.
8	Syrian man" in your witness statement, did you discuss those conversations with any other officer, more senior officer, at Lambeth or elsewhere?	6 7 8 9	first tab is hopefully your statement dated 20 October 2017. A. Yes. Q. And behind the next tab hopefully is your
8 9 10	Syrian man" in your witness statement, did you discuss those conversations with any other officer, more senior officer, at Lambeth or elsewhere? A. After the incident?	6 7 8 9 10	first tab is hopefully your statement dated 20 October 2017. A. Yes. Q. And behind the next tab hopefully is your contemporaneous note.
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8 9 10 11 12	Syrian man" in your witness statement, did you discuss those conversations with any other officer, more senior officer, at Lambeth or elsewhere? A. After the incident? Q. Yes. A. Yes.	6 7 8 9 10 11 12	first tab is hopefully your statement dated 20 October 2017. A. Yes. Q. And behind the next tab hopefully is your contemporaneous note. A. Mm-hm. Q. Behind that hopefully then two exhibits that were
8 9 10 11	Syrian man" in your witness statement, did you discuss those conversations with any other officer, more senior officer, at Lambeth or elsewhere? A. After the incident? Q. Yes.	6 7 8 9 10 11	first tab is hopefully your statement dated 20 October 2017. A. Yes. Q. And behind the next tab hopefully is your contemporaneous note. A. Mm-hm.
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1	Q. You had had seven years' experience with the LFB?	1	A. Well, I don't think he was in charge; I think I just
2	A. Yes.	2	remember seeing him and him giving us our first
3	Q. On the night, you were the driver of Chelsea's FRU unit?	3	instruction.
4	A. Yes.	4	Q. Was there a sense when you attended the holding area of
5	Q. And the call sign for that is Golf 346?	5	priority being given to particular tasks?
6	A. Yes.	6	A. I think there was lots of people everywhere being given
7	Q. The other people on the FRU were your BA partner	7	lots of different tasks. The first thing we were told
8	Mr Reddington	8	<u> </u>
9	A. Mm.	9	was to go and get as much equipment as we could carry,
		1	which we went and did. When we come back, there was
10	Q Mr Codd	10	the aerial ladder needed to be moved and there was hose
11	A. Yes.	11	in the way. That needed to be moved, so we helped with
12	Q Mr Sime is it Mr Okoh?	12	moving that out the way. There were lots of different
13	A. Okoh, yes.	13	tasks and lots of different places.
14	Q. Thank you.	14	Q. Did you have any sense when you arrived at the holding
15	As to timings, is it right that you were mobilised	15	area that the early identification of EDBA crews was
16	at 01.33, on the road at 01.36, and at the scene at	16	a priority so that they could be assigned to the BA main
17	01.47? Does that sound about right?	17	control centre?
18	A. Sounds about right, yes.	18	A. Yes, I think obviously from when we first got there, the
19	Q. The first topic I'd like to deal with is the view of the	19	first task was to go and get equipment. So, yes, we
20	tower on your arrival.	20	knew we would be needed as EDBA, but that wasn't the
21	Was it apparent that people were trapped in the	21	first thing we were instructed to do.
22	higher floors?	22	Q. A slightly different point, but in terms of paramedics,
23	A. As in when I got off the truck and when I was actually	23	do you remember whether they'd established a casualty
24	there?	24	clearing area outside the tower at this stage?
25	Q. When you arrived at the tower.	25	A. The first interaction I had with paramedics was when
	Page 137		Page 139
	rage 137	-	1 agc 137
1	A. Yes, I think took a moment there was a bit of	1	we'd come back from going to get equipment, come back to
1 2	A. Yes, I think took a moment there was a bit of a holding area, took a moment to look up at the building	1 2	we'd come back from going to get equipment, come back to the tree area. There were two paramedics no, sorry,
		1	
2	a holding area, took a moment to look up at the building	2	the tree area. There were two paramedics no, sorry,
2 3	a holding area, took a moment to look up at the building and I remember seeing sort of lights from the upper	3	the tree area. There were two paramedics no, sorry, Crew Manager Stern, Jamal Stern, had come out of the
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10 A. No. 10 Q. Could I ask Paul to draw up MET00005774.
11 Q. Is it fair to say that no officer sought to prioritise 11 Do you remember seeing that?
 12 your EDBA role before you took it upon yourselves to go 12 A. On the ground floor? 13 in the tower? 13 Q. Of the lobby.
16 I recall. 16 A. No. 17 Q. Do you think you could or should have sought to be 17 Q. Did the watch manager in the lobby give you or your team
state of the fire? 19 A. No, I actually don't even remember encountering people 20 A. I don't think there was that much time really between 20 in the labby. It's all your bary, that hit to me. No.
20 A. I don't think there was that much time really between 20 in the lobby. It's all very hazy, that bit, to me. No,
our arrival and getting into the tower. Like I say, 21 not that I recall.
went to go and grab some equipment, come back and it was 22 Q. Moving forward to the bridgehead itself, who briefed you 23 like wight alray lette get in those
23 like, right, okay, let's get in there. 23 on your task? 24 Q. Looking at the timings themselves, the LFB records in 24 A. Watch Managers O'Keeffe and De Silvo.
respect of BA wear suggest that the EDBA was 25 Q. What precisely did Watch Manager O'Keeffe tell you to
Page 142 Page 144

1	do?	1	with more air.
2	A. We were briefed with going to the 21st floor. There's	2	Q. But you weren't told explicitly?
3	a bit of confusion here because in my head I have that	3	A. No.
4	it was 21st floor and it was flats 183 and 184, and I've	4	Q. If I can now talk about your deployment to the 21st
5	since been made aware that my contemporaneous notes say	5	floor and making your way up the tower.
6	something different.	6	It's right, isn't it, that you discovered a casualty
7	Q. I was going to come on to that. It may be easier if we	7	at about the 18th-floor level?
8	turn to your contemporaneous note, which is at	8	A. What I believe to be the 18th floor. There was no way
9	MET00005625_0001.	9	of telling the floors, and twice myself and Tom had to
10	We see just roughly below halfway down the page you	10	enter the lobby areas at various floors just to remotely
11	say:	11	figure out what floor we were on, which we found
12	"We were then tasked to go under air & commit to the	12	extremely frustrating at the time. So it was what
13	21st floor to FSG calls @ 182 & 183."	13	I guesstimate to be the 18th, because I knew I went into
14	A. Yes.	14	the lobby area and found flat 164, 16-something, and it
15	Q. Which do you think is correct now?	15	was a couple of floors up from that, so I was guessing
16	A. Well, that makes me doubt myself now. In my head since	16	it was the 18th.
17	the incident I believe I've got 183 and 184, but I don't	17	Q. It was a female casualty you found?
18	know whether that's because it rhymes with the 21st	18	A. It was.
19	floor, I'm not really too sure. I thought it was 183	19	Q. She was unresponsive; is that right?
20	and 184, but like I say, that's making me doubt myself	20	A. She was unresponsive. She was lying face-up on her back
21	now. I can't definitively remember the words it	21	down the stairs.
22	would've been Watch Manager O'Keeffe and I remember the	22	Q. Apologies for interrupting.
23	21st floor, but I can't exactly remember which flats	23	A. No, that's okay.
24	now. One of those two options.	24	Q. Are you able to provide a description of the female
25	Q. Were you given any more detail, for example conditions	25	casualty you found?
	D 145		D 147
	Page 145		Page 147
1	on the stairwell going up to the 21st floor?	1	A. She
2	A. Don't recall, no.	2	Q. Would you like a break?
3	Q. Do you remember being given any idea of the layout of	3	A. That's okay. That's okay. It was only by getting up
4	the 21st floor?	4	really sort of close and basically, you know, touching
5	A. Yes. I don't know who did it, but at one point we were	5	her with my hands that I could figure out exactly
6	taken to a wall on the left-hand side of the lifts where	6	what that she was a woman, to start with. She had
7	somebody showed us a map. I can't really even remember	7	a black top on and jeans. Again, that's me being really
8	what was on the wall. But somebody did try to say: this	8	close with my torch. And I would've guessed similarish
9	is the layout and this is where you're going and	9	age to me.
10	Q. Did you make any note of where flats 182, 183, 184,	10	Q. I think in your statement you refer to maybe mid-30s?
11	whatever it was, were?	11	A. Yeah sorry, yeah, nobody knows how old I am
12	A. No, not to my I think it was more, like, where the	12	mid-30s, something like that. Yeah, Asian-looking, but
13	stairwells were, where the doors were of the stairwells	13	she might have just been smoke-blackened. I don't
14	and	14	really know.
15	Q. Were you given any details as to occupants of those	15	Q. Were you able to assess height or anything like that?
16	particular flats, how many there were, any	16	A. Oh, no. Average.
17	vulnerabilities, any children?	17	Q. If you can't
18	A. No, not to my knowledge. I don't remember.	18	A. Average height. I don't really recall.
19	Q. Were you given any idea of conditions within the flats	19	Q. Whilst you were attempting to move the female casualty,
20	themselves?	20	you found a child; is that right?
21	A. No.	21	A. Yeah. So the female casualty was lying down the stairs,
22	Q. Were you aware that you had been specifically deployed	22	and I tried to move her and she wouldn't move. And I
23	to the 21st floor because you were EDBA wearers?	23	with a bit of investigation with my hands and my torch,
24	A. I had guessed, yeah, that's why we'd been sent up so	24	it became clear that she wasn't moving because her leg
25	high, because we had more capacity to get up that high	25	was trapped. So I don't know quite how she'd fallen
	Page 146		Page 148

1	like it, but her left leg had gone down between the	1	A. I can't remember definitively who I briefed. I mean,
2	bannisters and her foot was tucked up under the ledge of	2	Watch Manager O'Keeffe the same people would've been
3	the next platform. I was tugging and tugging and	3	at the bridgehead. I remember seeing a crew manager
4	tugging. I told Tom the situation we had and he was	4	from Tooting. But we would've passed on that
5	tugging. We couldn't move her. So I moved further up	5	information. I also saw a crew on our way down from the
6	the stairs to try and free her and that's when, yeah,	6	18th floor while we were carrying the child and said to
7	I came across the child who I believe was on the	7	them that we've left a woman behind, we didn't get to
8	platform of that level.	8	the 21st floor.
9	Q. Are you trained to carry out checks for signs of life in	9	Q. Did you tell the officers at the bridgehead that you
10	respect of unresponsive casualties?	10	hadn't got to the 21st floor?
11	A. Yes. Yes.	11	A. Yes, yes.
12	Q. Did you platform any checks on the female casualty?	12	Q. Were you aware of any actions taken thereafter to get up
13	A. No. Aside from me patting her all over and and,	13	to the 21st floor?
14	yeah, I've got gloves on, so I wouldn't have been able	14	A. I don't know. No.
15	to check for a pulse or anything like that, but if	15	Q. You had a second EDBA task later on in the evening; is
16	somebody's patting you all over, if you're alert, you're	16	that right?
17	going to say something or respond, so she was	17	A. Yes.
18	unresponsive. I couldn't tell whether she was alive or	18	Q. We don't need to turn to it, it's set out at page 10 of
19	not.	19	your witness statement. It was an EDBA mission, namely
20	Q. Were you able to carry out any checks on the child to	20	search and rescue, on the 9th floor; is that right?
21	see whether the child was responsive?	21	A. Yes.
22	A. No. Again, like I say, the child was I dragged her,	22	Q. Who deployed you on that mission?
23	so if she was alert, she would have, you know, come	23	A. I believe it was Pat Goldberg?
24	round. But I didn't take a pulse or anything like that.	24	Q. Pat Goulbourne?
25	Q. Do you have any first-aid kit with you when you are	25	A. Goulbourne, yeah.
	Page 149		Page 151
1	deployed or not?	1	Q. Can you remember the precise words of his instructions
2	A. No.	2	or the gist of the words he used in his instructions to
3	Q. Were you aware of any other casualties in the area	3	you?
4	around the 18th floor on the stairwell whilst you were	4	A. I think it was just, "9th floor, search and rescue, do
5	dealing with the female casualty and the child?	5	your best to clear the flats as best you can."
6	A. No. Not on the chairs. I didn't go up further than	6	Q. Can you help us at what time you were deployed on that?
7	finding the child on that platform. I sort of dragged	7	A. What time?
8	her from the platform. There was nobody in the	8	Q. You were deployed on that second EDBA mission?
9	immediate area.	9	A. I'd have to look at the telemetry data.
10	Q. You took the child down the stairwell and left the	10	Q. Were you given any information when you were deployed as
11	female casualty there.	11	to any change in the strategy, search and rescue as
12	A. Yes. We decided between us that the female casualty	12	opposed to targeted FSG responses?
13	couldn't be moved. She was trapped to such a degree	13	A. Sorry, can you repeat the question?
14	that we figured out later we'd either have to stand her	14	Q. When you were briefed by Mr Goulbourne, were you given
15	up completely or break her leg somehow to get her out,	15	any further information as to whether there had been
16	and I didn't know the state of either casualty, whether	16	a change in strategy, ie it's search and rescue rather
17	they were alive or passed away, but I knew any more time	17	than a direct response to a particular FSG?
18	spent on the woman who we were really struggling to free	18	A. No, other than, you know, the actual brief was search
19	and couldn't free, any more time spent on that would	19	and rescue and no flat numbers were given, no.
20	jeopardise the child more. So we made the decision to	20	Q. Based on your experience, and having got as high up the
21	take the child out who we could carry and yeah.	21	tower as you did on the night, just with one other BA
22	Q. And you brought the child down to the bridgehead.	22	partner, what were your views on the ability to evacuate
23	A. Yes.	23	the tower when you were there, so 02.30 in the morning,
24	Q. Who did you brief once you got back down to the	24	thereabouts?
25	bridgehead?	25	A. As in?
	•		
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1 Q. What were your views on the feasibility --1 people were doing on their exit from the building was 2 2 grabbing bags or whatever they could and holding them A. So if we had got to the 21st floor? 3 Q. One, could you have got to the 21st floor, do you think? 3 over their faces, and things were discarded all over the 4 A. Yeah, obviously two BA wearers being tasked with two 4 place. So on many occasions I came across bundles of 5 flats, I mean, best case scenario there's one person in 5 things which I had to check and make sure they weren't 6 6 each flat, which is quite unlikely. 7 7 Yeah, I don't know if we really had a plan of So there was quite a lot -- and hoses and other bits 8 8 of kit. There was quite a lot on the way up, at least action, I think we were just going to get up there, see 9 9 on the earlier floors. the situation, see what we were dealing with. In 10 hindsight, I think the best we could've come up with --10 Q. Would it have helped evacuation if firefighters had been 11 11 stationed on the stair point to help residents being because we didn't have a set or anything like that, 12 maybe just -- the stairwell was really smoke-logged, 12 evacuated down and assisting their transit down the 13 they wouldn't have been able to breathe for long. Best 13 tower? 14 I was thinking was get them out into the stairwell, get 14 A. Yes, in theory, if they had the equipment and means to 15 them as far as they could and then assist them the rest 15 be able to do that. But if they're just breathing in smoky air, they're still not going to -16 16 of the way in terms of carrying them or -- as best we 17 could, really. It wasn't feasible. It wasn't really 17 Q. What equipment would they have needed if that were to be 18 18 practicable? feasible, but it was best of a bad situation. 19 Q. I suspect I know the answer to this, but would it have 19 A. I've heard mention of, you know, and seen evidence of 20 20 been practicable for you to take up a second BA set in these individual face masks that I've seen since that 21 addition to carrying your own EDBA set? 2.1 would've been very, very helpful. To get anyone through 22 22 a smoky environment, even if it's two floors or one A. It would've been possible. It's not sort of standard. 23 23 And with every firefighter there having their own BA floor, they're going to come into harm, so when you're 24 set, not many firefighters are going to want to give up 24 talking about from the 21st floor, they would've needed 25 25 some sort of aid to get them down there. So those bits a BA set. There's not a stack of spare BA sets hanging Page 153 Page 155 1 around. You would've had to have taken one off 1 of -- where you've got the face mask and the individual 2 a firefighter. So that wasn't really -- yeah, that 2 breathing supply, they would've been, yeah, superb. 3 3 wasn't too feasible. Q. Given your experience in the tower at 02.30 in the 4 Q. Were larger crews than just two required for EDBA work, 4 morning, would it have been practicable to have executed 5 do you think? 5 a floor-by-floor evacuation? 6 A. You can go in more. Again, it depends sort of how many 6 A. I mean, I feel like that's a question for the officers 7 people you're going up to help, what conditions there 7 really. 8 8 are. Yeah, I think it's easier working in a crew of two Q. Fair enough. 9 Q because you've got to -- you've only got to keep tabs on A. It's not my call, that one. 10 each other. If there's a crew of four, you've got to 10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: What you can tell us, and I think 11 make sure you know where everyone is, what everyone's 11 you have already, is what were conditions like which you 12 12 doing, make sure you're all okay. So it's harder to would have to get people through? 13 negotiate a crew of four as opposed to a crew of two, 13 A. What were they like? 14 14 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. but it's not undoable. 15 Q. Do you have any views on the feasibility of evacuating 15 A. From the 4th floor upwards, we would've been unable to the residents who remained in the tower at 02.30 in the 16 get people out of there. It was really, really heavily 16 17 17 smoke-logged from the 4th floor upwards. Nobody morning? Would that have been feasible in your view 18 given the conditions you encountered on the stairwell? 18 would've been able to breathe. 19 A. As in a mass evacuation? Not without assistance, no, 19 Q. Just one final question, and that is radio comms. 20 20 the stairwells were unmanageable. What was your experience of the operation of radio 21 Q. You say they were unmanageable. First of all, were 21 comms on the night within the tower? 22 22 there any obstructions on the stairwell you encountered A. I believe radio silence. I don't recall receiving any 23 23 comms whatsoever. 24 A. Yeah, so firstly, visibility past the 4th floor was 24 Q. Did you try and radio back to the bridgehead, say when 25 nonexistent. And then, yeah, I think what a lot of 25 you discovered the casualties at around the 18th floor? Page 154 Page 156

1	A. I think I tried earlier on when we were lower down the	1	Questions by MR KINNIER
2	building and received nothing back. I think because	2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Mr McAlonen.
3	then we'd had silence the whole way up, I don't think	3	Sit down and make yourself comfortable.
4	I tried on the 18th floor because I just presumed that	4	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
5	it was not possible.	5	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Kinnier.
6	MR KINNIER: Thank you.	6	MR KINNIER: First of all, good afternoon. Would you please
7	Sir, those are all the questions I have for now.	7	confirm your name for the record.
8	Might I ask for a very brief break to see if there are	8	A. Benjamin McAlonen.
9	any supplementals?	9	Q. Thank you very much for attending the inquiry to give
10	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Of course.	10	evidence today. It's much appreciated.
11	It may be that after further consideration,	11	In front of you, there's a blue file. If you open
12	Mr Kinnier will have some more questions he'd like to	12	it, behind the first tab hopefully you'll find your
13	put to you, so we'll have a 5-minute break now and then	13	statement dated 6 February of this year. Is that right?
14	I have to ask you to come back and we'll see where we	14	A. Yes, that's correct.
15	are.	15	Q. If you turn over the page, hopefully that's your
16	Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence	16	contemporaneous note.
17	while you're out of the room.	17	A. Yes.
18	If you would like to go with the usher, we'll resume	18	Q. If you turn over the final tab, there is the exhibit to
19	at 3.30.	19	your statement, namely the plan of the tower and its
20	Would that be all right, Mr Kinnier?	20	immediate surroundings. Is that right?
21	MR KINNIER: I think so, sir.	21	A. Yes, that's correct.
22	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right. Thank you very much.	22	Q. Have you read those documents recently?
23	(The witness withdrew)	23	A. I have, yes.
24	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right. 3.30, then, please.	24	Q. Do you confirm the contents are true?
25	(3.23 pm)	25	A. Yes, to my knowledge they are, yes.
	Page 157		Page 159
1	(A short break)	1	O. Vou are content for those documents to stand as your
1	(A short break)	1	Q. You are content for those documents to stand as your
2	(3.30 pm)	2	evidence to the inquiry?
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1	Q. You are mobilised, then you're on the road, and then you	1	A. I believe it was maybe being constructed at the time, so
2	arrive.	2	he was continuously writing on it as we made entry
3	A. Yes.	3	through the main entrance.
4	Q. The first stage of that, when you're mobilised is 01.37.	4	Q. Again, can I ask you to look at the middle column and
5	Does that sound about right?	5	look at the bottom of that middle column. You'll see
6	A. I don't think that's correct as such. It may have been	6	there 113, 14th.
7	a couple of minutes before that we were actually mobile	7	Do you remember seeing that written on the wall as
8	because of the mobilising system.	8	you were in the lobby?
9	Q. You think you arrive at the scene at 01.45 or	9	A. I believe I didn't look at it in that much detail, to be
10	thereabouts?	10	fair.
11	A. Yes, sounds about right.	11	Q. Is it fair to say you didn't absorb the detail?
12	Q. It may help you get a more definite time, the LFB	12	A. No.
13	records for the BA wear indicate that the SDBA	13	Q. Before you were deployed from the bridgehead, did you
14	disconnect from the appliance was at 01.50.	14	see any other firefighters come down the tower from
15	A. Yes, that sounds about right.	15	floor 14?
16	Q. How many minutes before you disconnected had you	16	A. From the bridgehead or from the lobby?
17	arrived, can you remember?	17	Q. When you were in the bridgehead
18	A. I'd say that's pretty accurate. Was it 45 you said?	18	A. Right.
19	So, yeah, I mean, we arrived and then within a couple	19	Q did you see or meet any firefighters coming down from
20	of minutes we removed the BA sets from the appliance.	20	floor 14?
21	So that would tally up with that.	21	A. Prior to that this was in because where the
22	Q. First topic I'd like to discuss with you is what you	22	mezzanine floor was we were formed up on the
23	encountered on your arrival at the tower.	23	mezzanine, queueing there, and then we was getting sent
24	A. Okay.	24	from there up to the actual bridgehead, which was on
25	Q. On arrival, were you aware of any officers who were	25	I have to check my notes I believe it was on the
	Page 161		Page 163
		l .	
1	responsible for allocating tasks to those crews that	1	3rd floor at the time, and there was Watch Manager
1 2	responsible for allocating tasks to those crews that were arriving at the scene?	1 2	3rd floor at the time, and there was Watch Manager Watson from Hammersmith, he was detailing crews from
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1	with he gave us a small piece of paper and just said,	1	A. He said mother and child.
2	"There's flat 111, 14th floor."	2	Q. Were you given any idea as to the gender or age of the
3	Q. Did he give you any detail beyond that?	3	child?
4	A. He said a mother and child was in the flat, and	4	A. No.
5	basically to go and report to the bridgehead.	5	Q. Are you sure that you were told flat 111 and not any
6	Q. Did he give you any information regarding conditions in	6	other flat?
7	the stairwell, conditions in flat 111?	7	A. Yes, it was written on a piece of paper.
8	A. No. He did say there's it was more not just to me	8	Q. Were you aware of what instructions had been given to
9	personally, but generic to the crews along the	9	Mr Herrera and Ms Orchard in terms of the FSG?
10	bridgehead, there was a small plan that had been drawn	10	A. No.
11	of a floor layout on that mezzanine floor, and he just	11	Q. Were you aware of any other crews that had been sent up
12	said obviously, you know, "Everyone have a look at that	12	to the 14th floor in response to FSGs before you went
13	and get an idea of your layout."	13	up?
14	Q. Was it very much entrance from lobby	14	A. No, not before I was committed, no.
15	A. Yes, there was no actual details in location of flats,	15	Q. Now, if I can next turn to the question of your
16	it was just literally just and he explained it's	16	deployment and timings.
17	basically like an H shape, the floor layout.	17	The LFB records indicate that tally out at the
18	Q. Could I ask Paul to bring up document MET00015625.	18	bridgehead was at 02.31 and tally in was at 02.45.
19	Do you remember seeing that writing on the wall of	19	Does that give us the time frame for your
20	the 3rd floor? It's the bridgehead at the 3rd floor.	20	A. Yeah, I guess so. I lost all concept of time on the
21	A. I'm not 100 per cent sure, to be honest. I do remember	21	evening, to be honest.
22	there being some writing on the wall, but that was what	22	Q. The next question I'd like to ask you about is
23	I saw when I came down when I debriefed with the officer	23	conditions in the lobby of the 14th floor.
24	in charge of entry control.	24	When you got into the lobby itself, can you describe
25	Q. So were you aware of the content of the detailed	25	the conditions you encountered?
			·
	Page 165		Page 167
1	information that was on that?	1	A. The conditions were very poor. The smoke level was
2	A. Sorry, can we zoom in on the 14th floor part?	2	right down to the floor. The smoke was very thick, very
3	Q. Yes.	3	black in colour. Made visibility nigh on zero. It was
4	A. Yes, I do remember seeing that. This was when I came	4	difficult to see your hand in front of your face.
5	back down from the incident. I was debriefed with Watch	5	The actual smoke itself, although it's not unusual,
6	Manager De Silvo.	6	it seemed particularly sticky. I kept having to try and
7	Q. So after you'd	7	clear my face mask, basically, to be able to see my
8	A. This was after I'd been up to the 14th floor, basically.	8	gauge checks and stuff like that.
9	And she actually I went through where we'd been. She	9	Q. Did you encounter another crew on the 14th floor?
10	crossed off 111. I think that's 112. And she wrote the	10	A. When we first made entrance to the 14th floor, I believe
11	"3 rescues" on the thing, by 113.	11	I heard another crew and saw a torchlight on the actual
12	Q. If I could ask Paul to bring up one final photograph,	12	floor, which is normally they're quite distinctive,
13	MET00018749.	13	light from the torch within the smoke. I tried to make
14	Do you remember seeing this forward information	14	contact with that crew but I had no joy, and I thought
15	board at the bridgehead?	15	rather than waste time trying to do that, we carried on
16	A. No. It may well have been there at the time. I don't	16	with our brief, basically.
17	recall seeing it, though.	17	Q. How far away were you from the other crew? Could you
18	Q. Thank you very much.	18	estimate the distance?
19	If I can now go back to the instructions you were	19	A. It was difficult to say. I couldn't see across the
20	given.	20	lobby because the smoke was so thick, so I had
21	A. Mm-hm.	21	knowing how the distance we're talking about.
22	Q. Were you and Mr Juggins briefed by Mr Watson?	22	Q. Flat 111, was the door open, ajar, unlocked?
23	A. Yes, we was, yes.	23	A. The flat to 111 was wide open, which I thought was very
24	Q. Did you understand the reference to a lady and child to	24	unusual. In my mind, if you're someone wishing to be
25	be a mother and child or	25	rescued from a flat in a relatively safe place, you
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1	wouldn't be having your front door wide open and letting	1	do?" So because I wasn't aware of exactly where
2	all the contents of the lobby enter the flat. So	2	flat 113 was, I just said to him, "Tell them we're
3	I thought that was a bit odd in my experience, if you	3	getting them out, we're taking them down."
4	like.	4	I can't remember if I went to the door as well. But
5	Q. Did you go into flat 111?	5	that is what we done, basically, we went to the flat to
6	A. We started to make entry. Firefighter Juggins had	6	go and knock on the door again and say, "You are coming
7	a thermal imaging camera with him. He was looking,	7	out, if not we're going to break the door down and come
8	searching around the flat, and I was trying to radio to	8	in."
9	entry control to find out if there's any update, further	9	Q. Did a lady come out?
10	information, if they've already been rescued or	10	A. It all happened very rapid, the next few moments, if you
11	something like that.	11	like. I remember someone hearing coughing,
12	Q. Were you able to get through?	12	basically, a lady's coughing, and I was then obviously
13	A. No.	13	aware straight away that the people are now exposed to
14	Q. Did you knock on the door of flat 112?	14	all the smoke and conditions on the lobby.
15	A. We did. Whilst still trying to make contact with entry	15	I felt someone come in front of me. I reached out
16	control, I said to Firefighter Juggins we'll carry on	16	and grabbed it was her arm that I grabbed. And then
17	searching whilst we're here, we might as well check the	17	straight away I just thought, well, these people are
18	rest of the floor, basically. We knocked on flat 112.	18	now they're breathing all this horrible smoke and
19	We kicked the door. It's more audible, obviously, than	19	stuff, we've got to get them down straight away.
20	just a knock from a gloved hand. There was no entry, so	20	Q. How many did you take down?
21	I said we had an enforcer with us. We was going to	21	A. Initially I had this lady by the arm, and I led her over
22	force entry to flat 112, which is what we done.	22	to the stairwell, because I was quite close to the
23	Q. Was anyone within flat 112?	23	actual the door. I could literally reach out from
24	A. No.	24	where I was standing to go and make entry straight onto
25	Q. Did you then move on to the next flat, 113?	25	the staircase. So I started proceeding down the stairs
	Page 169		Page 171
1	A 337 14 161 (110 337 41 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	١,	
1	A. We exited flat 112. We was continuing on the left-hand	1	with her, and the lady tripped and fell. I lost
2	wall, and as we came a bit further along the corridor,	2	a physical hold on her.
2 3	wall, and as we came a bit further along the corridor, we then came across another crew, which immediately	2 3	a physical hold on her. I then continued down the stairs, again expecting to
2 3 4	wall, and as we came a bit further along the corridor, we then came across another crew, which immediately — as soon as I started speaking to them, it became	2 3 4	a physical hold on her. I then continued down the stairs, again expecting to find the lady either on the turn of the stairs or in the
2 3 4 5	wall, and as we came a bit further along the corridor, we then came across another crew, which immediately — as soon as I started speaking to them, it became apparent it was a Firefighter Herrera from my own	2 3 4 5	a physical hold on her. I then continued down the stairs, again expecting to find the lady either on the turn of the stairs or in the vicinity. I couldn't find her, I searched that turn of
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1	Q. Did you see whether the man was carrying a child on his	1	entry into the flat itself so I couldn't confirm that.
2	back?	2	Q. When the other crew came down from flat 113, did you ask
3	A. Not at that point, no. I wasn't aware of that.	3	them whether they'd searched flat 113 before coming
4	Later on, it	4	down?
5	Q. When you say later on, when did you become aware of	5	A. Eventually.
6	that?	6	Q. When?
7	A. Basically when I I got another guy out as well.	7	A. This was later on, outside.
8	Q. This is the second man?	8	Q. Outside when you were resting on the grassy area by the
9	A. This is the yes, the second man. The second man.	9	leisure centre; is that right?
10	Escorted him down to the stairs, went past the	10	A. To be honest, no. Afterwards we exited the building.
11	bridgehead down to 2nd floor level, I believe it	11	Eventually we had to force our way out the side of it
12	would've been, to hand over. There was some senior	12	through a window. I don't know whether you're going to
13	officers there that were taking the casualties off of	13	come on to this shortly, I'm not sure, but we actually
14	us, and I saw the it's only an assumption at the	14	came across this was sometime after as well because
15	time a guy in front of me he was in the corner of	15	there was quite an amount of debris falling, if you
16	the stairwell and he had a child on his back. They were	16	like, from the building, so actually there was
17	lifting the child off of his back. And then that's when	17	a covered walkway, and we was taking shelter under there
18	I was aware that there was a child with him as well.	18	whilst we were waiting for a safe moment to get away
19	Q. So by the time you got down there, were you aware that	19	from the tower, and this was going towards Latimer Road
20	the woman, the child and the two gentlemen had come from	20	entrance, I believe it was.
21	flat 113?	21	Whilst I was standing there waiting, Firefighter
22	A. I was still unsure of the whereabouts of the woman at	22	Herrera came out of the tower as well, and then we
23	that time.	23	basically said, like, we've got to get back to like,
24	Q. You returned to the bridgehead.	24	try and find our way back to our truck to service our
25	A. Yes.	25	sets and stuff.
	Page 173		Page 175
1	O. What did you debrief at the bridgehead?	1	When we eventually managed to get away from the
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2	A. At the bridgehead I went and saw Watch Manager De Silvo,	2	tower, as we came up towards the corner of
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1	A. We didn't speak as in like I said, "Are you okay?"	1	if you like, to escort them down the stairs. It was
2	That was literally as far as I said to him.	2	a bit of a er I can't think of the right word at
3	Q. What did he say to you?	3	the minute, but it was a bit of a long shot, if you
4	A. He was just on his phone, talking on his phone, so he	4	like, to try and bring them out as we did without them,
5	didn't really acknowledge myself.	5	you know, collapsing or whatever.
6	Q. Was he speaking in English on the phone?	6	Q. Going back to the conversation Mr Herrera was having
7	A. No.	7	with the gentleman on the phone outside.
8	Q. Did you just walk on?	8	A. Yes.
9	A. I carried on round the corner, yes.	9	Q. You walked on.
10	Q. Where was Mr Herrera during this?	10	A. Mm-hm.
11	A. He was with me on the side, but he was	11	Q. Did Mr Herrera come up and tell you
12	Q. Side-by-side with you?	12	A. Yeah.
13	A. Er I believe so, yes.	13	Q. What did he say to you this gentleman had said to him?
14	Q. Did he say anything to this gentleman?	14	A. He came running up and said
15	A. He did, yes.	15	Q. He ran up to you?
16	Q. Did you stay with Mr Herrera whilst Mr Herrera was	16	A. He ran up to me and said, "That guy's brother is still
17	having this conversation?	17	in there, he's on the phone to him now, he's still on
18	A. No, I carried on walking.	18	the 14th floor."
19	Q. So you didn't overhear what was said?	19	Q. That's what Mr Herrera said to you to the best of your
20	A. No.	20	knowledge?
21	Q. Did you ask Mr Herrera whether he'd searched flat 113	21	A. Yes.
22	before he came down?	22	Q. Did Mr Herrera say that the man had said there was no
23	A. No.	23	one else in the flat?
24	Q. Are you aware of policy 803 that governs search and	24	A. No, there wasn't time I immediately straight away
25	rescue?	25	I tried to get on my handheld radio to relay that
	Page 177		Page 179
		.	
1	A. Possibly. I wouldn't be able to know it by number, but	1	information to someone, because we was in no position
2	yes.	2	to where we were physically, there wasn't anyone
2 3	yes. Q. Are you aware of the provision that provides that where	2 3	to where we were physically, there wasn't anyone local to the actual that could use that information,
2 3 4	yes.Q. Are you aware of the provision that provides that where a casualty has been found, a secondary search ought to	2 3 4	to where we were physically, there wasn't anyone local to the actual that could use that information, if you like. So I tried to contact Watch Manager Sadler
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1	recuperating with your crew outside the tower, so with	1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, can you hold yourself in
2	Mr Herrera, Juggins, Orchard, Evans and Bloxham? Do you	2	readiness to be called back shortly?
3	remember that?	3	THE WITNESS: Of course.
4	A. Yes, we were at some point, yes.	4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll see how quickly we can do it.
5	Q. At that stage, did Mr Herrera recall the conversation	5	All right?
6	he'd had with the gentleman within flat 113?	6	THE WITNESS: Yes.
7	A. No. No, the subject never came up, to be honest.	7	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you like to go with the usher,
8	Q. Did you become aware on the night of what happened to	8	please.
9	those who had been left behind in flat 113?	9	(The witness withdrew)
10	A. Sorry, could you say that again, please?	10	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Kinnier, I'll say 4.10 or sooner
11	Q. Did you become aware on the night itself of what	11	if you are ready sooner.
12	happened to those left behind in flat 113?	12	MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.
13	A. Not on the night itself, no.	13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
14	Q. When did you first become aware of what had happened to	14	(4.05 pm)
15	them?	15	(A short break)
16	A. I believe it was maybe a couple of nights afterwards.	16	(4.10 pm)
17	Q. How did you find out?	17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Kinnier.
18	A. I think I was watching the news and that's when I became	18	MR KINNIER: Sir, two brief supplementals, with your
19	aware of, you know, what happened.	19	permission.
20	Q. One final point, distinct to the topics we've been	20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right. Shall we ask Mr McAlonen to
21	discussing, and that's telemetry problems.	21	come back in, please.
22	You refer at pages 15 and 16 of your witness	22	(The witness returned)
23	statement to manual calculations of breathing times that	23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you. I think Mr Kinnier has
24	you were required to carry out	24	a couple of questions.
25	A. Yes.	25	THE WITNESS: Sure.
	Page 181		Page 183
1	Q because of the difficulties over signal between the	1	MR KINNIER: Thank you for your patience.
2	BA set and the ECB.	2	I don't know whether you've been listening to
3	Did this have any impact on the operations during	3	Mr Herrera's evidence previously in the afternoon, but
4	the night, in your view?	4	his account was that Mr Omar Alhajali told him when they
5	A. I don't think it had any sort of direct effect, if you	5	were still in the flat that there was no one else in the
6	like. I think everybody knew the capabilities of the	6	flat, flat 113.
7	equipment and, therefore and we'd also been working	7	When did you first become aware that that was
8	on manual calculations for a number of well, for	8	Mr Herrera's recollection of what he had been told by
9	a long, long time before that, before the new telemetry	9	Mr Alhajali?
10	stuff come in. So we still was aware of, you know, the	10	A. Earlier. I was watching it upstairs.
11	right I say the right way the manual way of doing	11	Q. Had he told you he went into the lounge of flat 113 at
12	the calculations.	12	any stage?
13	MR KINNIER: Mr McAlonen, those are all the questions I have	13	A. No.
14	for you now. Might I have a brief break to see if there	14	MR KINNIER: I've no further questions. That just leaves me
15	are any supplementals?	15	to thank you for giving evidence today. It's very much
16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, from time to time, it's	16	appreciated.
17	discovered there are questions which ought to be asked	17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much for coming to
18	but haven't been, so I am going to ask you to leave us	18	give evidence, it's very valuable, and you are now free
19	for a few minutes so Mr Kinnier can check the position.	19	to go. If you would like to go with the usher. Thank
20	Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence	20	you.
21	while you're out of the room.	21	THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.
22	How long should we allow for this, Mr Kinnier?	22	(The witness was released)
23	MR KINNIER: Sir, if you are able to return at 4.10, or even	23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Now, Mr Kinnier.
24	sooner if there is an absence of questions. It may be	24	MR KINNIER: Sir, we have the seventh and final witness of
25	better if I just ask your usher.	25	the day coming up. We are just nudging 4.10. I think
	Page 182	1	Page 184

1	with a fair wind, we can complete at 4.30, but with your	1	A. Firefighter Terry Lowe, yes.
2	indulgence we may stray slightly over that, but I shall	2	Q. As to timings, the LFB's records indicate you were
3	strain every sinew to avoid passing over 4.30.	3	mobilised at 02.05, mobile at 02.07, and arrived at the
4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: This is Mr Wharnsby, is it?	4	scene at 02.21. Does that sound about right to you?
5	MR KINNIER: It is.	5	A. That sounds correct, yes.
6	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm sure, having waited to give his	6	Q. Although we'll come back to it in more detail, the
7	evidence, he'd like to get it through this afternoon, so	7	timings of your BA wear, the records provided by the LFB
8	let's do our best.	8	suggest that you tallied out at the bridgehead at 03.04.
9	MR KINNIER: I'm sure he will. Thank you, sir.	9	Does that sound about right?
10	May I call Mr Wharnsby.	10	A. Sorry, the term "tallied out", do you mean
11	JON WHARNSBY (affirmed)	11	Q. People have used "tallied in" confusingly as the
12	Questions by MR KINNIER	12	alternative.
13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Mr Wharnsby.	13	A. I was committed to BA around that time, yes.
14	Sit down and make yourself comfortable. I'm sorry	14	Q. Thank you.
15	you've waited so long to give your evidence.	15	Now, the first topic I'd like to discuss with you is
16	THE WITNESS: It's a very important process.	16	when you're at the tower, going from the lobby to the
17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. I am hoping we can get through	17	bridgehead.
18	it this afternoon.	18	A. Yes.
19	MR KINNIER: Good afternoon.	19	Q. Do you recall a watch manager writing FSG details on the
20	For the record, would you please confirm your name.	20	wall of the lobby right when you entered the building?
21	A. Jon Peter Wharnsby.	21	A. We didn't muster on the lobby, we mustered on the
22	Q. In front of you, there's a blue folder. If you open	22	mezzanine floor, and we were waiting to be committed to
23	that, hopefully you'll find your statement dated	23	the bridgehead. All I remember is a rather good drawing
24	15 January of this year. Is that right?	24	being done on the mezzanine level floor by a previous
25	A. Yes.	25	firefighter, which gave the layout where the stairs
			, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
	Page 185		Page 187
1	Q. Behind that, your contemporaneous note. Is that right?	1	were, where the flats were off the stairs, which was
2	A. That's correct.	2	quite handy. I don't recall the information you're
2	A. That's correct.Q. Have you read those documents recently?	2 3	quite handy. I don't recall the information you're talking about.
2 3 4	A. That's correct.Q. Have you read those documents recently?A. I've had a look over them this afternoon.	2 3 4	quite handy. I don't recall the information you're talking about.Q. Did a watch manager give you or any member of your team
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that was there, which was a geutkeman. I'm afraid we're from the east, we wet — I didn't really, know many people, we to finese and smarks are sort of tost on me. Q. I'll can stop you there, the slip of paper in the statement, was add it reall till, 13, thill flow; is stement, was add it reall till, 13, thill flow; is statement, was add it reall till, 13, thill flow; is statement, was add it reall till, 13, thill flow; is statement, was add it reall till, 13, thill flow; is that right? A. That's correct, a little post-it note. Q. Were you given any further detail to assist completion of this PSG ind? A. Not that I recall, no. You have a summer of them passed information to a regarding the conditions of the stativell, conditions in the particular flat? A. We had had crews coming out looking reasonably worse for wear and some of them passed information to a regarding the conditions off the stativell, on the stativell, and most bought that there was no marked alond — he numbers were not marked on the landings. So the specific information that came from receive was so tell us to make sure we count the flow because I was valually important. Other than the information, no. Q. So no details of those in tell, whether adults, men, was now, conditions of the stativell, and that was pointless until we got there because we just he had a handrail to go up. Page: 191 Deen left in the building? A. Nort was prove rescues had been made and others had content of any PSG that there had been a previous evacuation. Page: 191 Lower you work of anyone from the Lambeth crew and the people had been left betind in file 113? A. Nort and the people had been left betind in file 113? A. Nort was provided that the people had been left betind in file 113? A. Nort was provided was it on the stativell, men, no. Q. Were you aware of anyone from the Lambeth crew and the people had been left betind in file 113? A. Nort was provided that the people had been left betind in file 113? A. Nort was provided that the people had been lef				
definitely the 6th floor because at that point I was counting quite intently. There was loss of hose, a few lines of charged hose but some empty hose rolled up, and lot right? A. That's correct, a little post-it note. Q. Were you given amy further detail to assist completion of the 185 (and? A. Not that I recall, no. Not shing like conditions on the stairvell, conditions in the day and an another of the stairvell and some of them passed information to us regarding the conditions of the stairvell, on the stairvell, and most notably that there was no marked landing—the numbers were not marked on the landings. So the numbers were not marked not be landings. So the superficit information that came from cross was to tell as to make sure we count the floors because it was virilly important. Other than the information, no. Q. So on deaths of those in the flat, whether adults, men, warmen, children? A. Not that I recall, no. Q. Were you told intended the thought of the stairvell and with people coming down? A. Not that I recall, no. You discovered a casality around about the 10th floor. A. Yes, Q. Were you told that there had been a previous evacuation where only some rescues had been made and others had that was pointless until we got there because we just that the submiding? A. Not that I recall, no. Q. Were you told that there had been a previous evacuation where only some rescues had been made and others had that the hadden of the landing of the bridgehead at that they had discovered indicating to the bridgehead are you aware of the content of any PSGs that related to flat 113? A. Not was just given the flat number and the floor to proceed to. Q. Were you aware of anyone from the Lambeth crow indicating to the bridgehead are you aware of the content of any PSGs that related to flat 113? A. Not was just given the flat number and the floor to proceed to. Q. Were you aware of floor proceed to that the post of the content of any PSGs that related to flat 113? A. Not was just given the flat number and	1	that was there, which was a gentleman. I'm afraid we're	1	I remember going onto the stairwell, reasonably clean
4 Counting quite intently. There was lots of hose, a few statement, you said it read that 113, 14th floor; is 5 intended to the statement, you said it read that 113, 14th floor; is 6 to ferew coming down. 7 A. That's correct, a little post-it note. 8 Q. Were you given any turther detail to assist completion of this FSG task? 9 A. Not that I recall, no. 10 Q. Nothing like conditions on the stairwell, conditions in the purticular flat? 11 A. We had had crews coming out looking reasonably worse for the purticular flat? 12 A. We had had crews coming out looking reasonably worse for the conditions of the stairwell, on the stairwell, and most notably that there was no marked landing—the numbers were not marked to the landings. So the specific information that came from crews was to tell us important. Other than the information, no. 10 Q. So no details of flose in the flat, whether adults, men, where only some rescues had been an previous evacuation where only some rescues had been and and others had been and previous evacuation where only some rescues had been made and others had been and previous evacuation and the properties. 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Were you aware of anyone from the Lambeth crew indicating to the bridgehead that they had discovered popel had been left behind in flat 113? 13 A. Was that I recall, no. 14 You had been a previous evacuation where only some rescues had been and the haden and the properties. 15 You have provided that the properties of the record indicates you were at the bridgehead and they had discovered popel had been left behind in flat 113? 15 You have provided that the rest that being flat to me, no. 16 Q. When you were at the bridgehead and they had discovered indicates you worth of the record indicates you worth the flat to me, no. 17 Q. When you were at the bridgehead and the plan discovered popel had been left behind in flat 113? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. was you were the bridgehead and the plan discovered to proceed to. 19 Q. When you were at the bridgehead and the plan that	2	from the east, so west I didn't really know many	2	air until possibly the 6th floor, maybe almost
statement, you said it read flat 113, 14th floor, is dut right? A. That's correct, a little post-it note. Q. Were you given any further detail to assist completion of this PSC tias? A. Not that I recall, no. A. Not that I recall, no. Q. A long that conditions on the stairwell, conditions in the particular flat? A. We had had crews coming out looking reasonably worse for wear and some of them passed information to us regarding the conditions off the stairwell, and the stairwell, and the most retailsty that there was no marked landing—the numbers were not marked on the landings. So the specific information that came from crews was to tell us to make sure we count the floors because it was vitally important. Other than the information, no. Q. Were you told that there had been a previous evacuation where only some recuest had been made and others had Page 189 Page 191 been left in the building? A. A. That information wasn't given to me, no. Q. Were you were at the bridgehead — A. That information wasn't given to me, no. Q. Were you were at the bridgehead — A. That information wasn't given to me, no. Q. When you were at the produption of the stairwell and the proceed to. A. That information wasn't given to me, no. Q. When you were at the bridgehead — A. That information wasn't given to me, no. Q. When you were at the bridgehead — Q. Were you given the details of any other FSGs that related to flat 113? A. No. that I recall, no. Q. Were you given the details of any other FSGs that related to flat 113? A. Yes. Q. Were you given the details of any other FSGs that related to flat 113? A. Yes. Q. Were you given the details of any other FSGs that related to flat 113? A. Yes. Q. Were you given the details of any other FSGs that related to flat 113? A. Yes. Q. Were you were at the bridgehead — Q. Were you given the details of any other FSGs that related to flat 113? A. Yes. Q. Were you given the details of any other FSGs that related to flat 113? A. Yes. Q. Were you given the details of any other FSGs that related to fla	3	people, so the faces and names are sort of lost on me.	3	definitely the 6th floor because at that point I was
6	4	Q. If I can stop you there, the slip of paper in the	4	counting quite intently. There was lots of hose, a few
7 Q. How difficult was it to make your way through the options of this FSG task? 9 A. Nort that I recall, no. 10 A. Nort that I recall, no. 11 departicular flat? 12 q. Norting the conditions on the stairwell, conditions in the particular flat? 13 A. We had had crews coming out looking reasonably worse for wear and some of them passed information to us regarding the conditions of the stairwell, and most out the passed information to us regarding the conditions of the stairwell, and most out the passed information to us regarding to most notably that there was no marked landing—the numbers were not marked on the landings. So the specific information that came from crews was to tell us to make use we count the floors because it was vially important. Other than the information, no. 14 q. Nort that I recall, no. 15 q. O, Sone dotatis of floose in the flat, whether adults, men, where only some rescues had been a previous evacuation where only some rescues had been made and others had the passed in the building? 16 page 189 17 been left in the building? 18 A. Answer; no. 19 Q. When you wave a diapone from the Lambeth crew indicating to the bridgehead that they had discovered people had been left bethind in lat 113? 10 Q. When you wave at the bridgehead were you aware of the content of any PSGS that related to flat 113? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. When you wave at the bridgehead were you aware of the content of any PSGS that related to flat 113? 12 Q. When you wave at the bridgehead were you aware of the content of any PSGS that related to flat 113? 13 proceed to. 14 Q. When you wave at the bridgehead were you aware of the content of any PSGS that related to flat 113? 14 A. No, I was just given the details of any other FSGs that recalled was chaotic and cluttered with firefighting equipment. 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. How you were at the bridgehead were you aware of the content of any PSGS that related to flat 113? 16 A. Nort may from the flat the particular of flat 113? 17 Q. When you were at the bridgehead were you aware of the content o	5	statement, you said it read flat 113, 14th floor; is	5	lines of charged hose but some empty hose rolled up, and
sequipment on the stairwell and with people coming down? of this FSG task? A. Not that I recal, no. Nothing like conditions on the stairwell, conditions in the patricular fiar? A. We had had crews coming out looking reasonably worse for the conditions off the stairwell, on the stairwell, and most notably that there was no marked landing—the numbers were not marked on the landing. So the specific information that came from crews was to tell us important. Other than the information, no. O. So no details of those in the flat, whether adults, men, where only some rescues had been made and others had Page 189 Page 189 A. Northat I recall, no. O. Were you aware of anyone from the Lambeth crew of mode, but if was impeding. It was impeding, It was impeding, It was impeding, It was impeding. It was impeding, It was impeding. It was impeding, It was impeding, It was impeding, It was impeding. It was impeding, It was in the bild, in all 10 that was pointed with the event of the work of the work of the war of the conditions of the stairwell, and the bild, and other was a multiple was a multiple with the data was pointed with the event of the bild, and of that was pointess until we got there because we just that that was pointess until we got there because we just that that was pointess until we got there because we just that that was pointess until we got the bild, and and other was the flow, the flow of the was an another and adapted to the flow of the patients of the patients of	6	that right?	6	lots of crews coming down.
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10 A. Not that I recall, no. 10 much, but it was impeding and slowing its down a little bit, and obviously when crews were coming out with the particular flar? 12 23 24 24 25 25 26 26 26 26 26 26	8	Q. Were you given any further detail to assist completion	8	equipment on the stairwell and with people coming down?
11 Q. Nothing like conditions on the stairwell, conditions in the particular fail? 2 A. We had had crews coming out looking reasonably worse for wear and some of them passed information to us regarding to the conditions off the stairwell, and most notably that there was no marked landing—the numbers were not marked on the landings. So the specific information that came from crews was to tell us to make sure two count the floors because it was virially important. Other than the information, no. 21 Q. So no details of those in the flat, whether adults, men, women, children? 22 women, children? 23 A. Northat I recall, no. 24 Q. Were you told that there had been a previous evacuation where only some rescues had been made and others had been where only some rescues had been made and others had been depleted by the property of the prop	9	of this FSG task?	9	A. It was impeding. It wasn't difficult to get over too
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2 A. Answer: no. 3 Q. Were you aware of anyone from the Lambeth crew indicating to the bridgehead that they had discovered people had been left behind in flat 113? 5 Lasumed, just from the vicinity between them, that it was a mother and a daughter. Obviously that's an assumption I made. I just remember there being a small person and a big person. 9 A. Sorry, can you clarify? 9 Q. When you were at the bridgehead 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. — were you given the details of any other FSGs that related to flat 113? 13 Q. You took them back down to the bridgehead, did you? 14 A. No, I was just given the flat number and the floor to proceed to. 15 proceed to. 16 Q. Now, in terms of your deployment to the 14th floor, the record indicates you went under air 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. — at 03.04. 19 Q. — at 03.04. 20 As you went up the tower Mr Lowe suggests that the stairwell was chaotic and cluttered with firefighting equipment. 21 What was your recollection of the condition of the stairwells? 22 A. Yeah, I'd agree with Firefighter Lowe's account. 23 again." 26 Can you recall the sequence there? 4 A. It's possible they weren't together. I'm not sure 14 Lasumed, just from the vicinity between them, that it was a mother and a daughter. Obviously that's an assumption I made. I just remember there being a small person and a big person. 9 Q. You took them back down to the bridgehead, did you? A. Terry assisted the older person, and what I assumed to be the daughter I began to help down the stairs until they became they started to become unconscious. 11 they became they started to become unconscious. 12 Q. You got them to the bridgehead? 13 Q. You got them to the bridgehead? 14 A. Yes. Yes. 15 Q. And 16 A. Sorry, no. We got them as I proceeded down the stairs, the smoke levels had changed and I began to doubt whether I was at the 3rd floor, so I hurried my pace and came out on the mezzanine floor, and that's where I handed the casualty to someone. 24 Sorry and a came out on the mezzanine or at the bridgehead that first of	1	been left in the building?	1	"Jon helped one person down and we then went back up
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1	that casualty. I went back and Terry sorry,	1	over your shoulder to bring her down?
2	Firefighter Lowe was only just a few paces behind me,	2	A. That's correct.
3	and he handed over his casualty. We briefly carried on	3	Q. You got down to the bridgehead ahead of Mr Lowe; is that
4	with the task that we were given and we were desperate	4	right?
5	to do.	5	A. My recollection is at this point the bridgehead had been
6	Q. Did you report back at that stage to the bridgehead that	6	moved because of the change of conditions.
7	you hadn't yet completed the task to flat 113?	7	Q. Where was it?
8	A. Answer: no. There was a lot of radio traffic and	8	A. So the bridgehead had been on one of the landings of the
9	I can't remember whether Firefighter Lowe had BA comms,	9	floor. As we came down the first time, the smoke was
10	but I only had a handheld radio.	10	dropping, dropping floors. So then on the second way
11	There was a lot going on on the radio, and I felt	11	down, again, I'm not going to report to the bridgehead,
12	I don't know. I don't know whether this is	12	I'm going to get the casualty out as quickly as
13	retrospective, but at the time it was just: let's just	13	possible, so I made my way down to the mezzanine floor
14	get back up.	14	and I was made aware that the bridgehead had been moved
15	Q. Did you say to anyone at the bridgehead that because you	15	because of these changing conditions, because obviously
16	had brought down the two casualties, it was imperative	16	the people on the bridgehead haven't got BA so they need
17	that further firefighters were deployed up to the	17	to be in safe air. So this information was relayed back
18	14th floor to assist you in rescuing people from	18	to us.
19	flat 113?	19	So I made my way to the mezzanine floor, down the
20	A. No. At that point, because me and Firefighter Lowe had	20	glass stairwell, where I was met by I don't want to
21	a very brief discussion when we discovered the	21	demote him either Group Manager Goulbourne, who took
22	casualties that we should get these people out first, we	22	the casualty off me.
23	decided that once we'd got them out, we'd just go again	23	Q. Who did you debrief as to where you'd found the two
24	and we'd carry on with the initial task, which is what	24	casualties?
25	we did.	25	A. Well, once again, it's kind of firefighter sacrilege to
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1	Q. Did the conditions on the stairwell suggest to you and	1	leave your BA partner behind, but as we were on the
2	Mr Lowe that you needed further personnel to get to the	2	stairwell and heading out, I was confident I wouldn't
3	14th floor in order to rescue the occupants at flat 113?	3	lose Firefighter Lowe. So as I had the smaller casualty
4	A. No, I feel like we were capable. We had enough air to	4	and could move quicker, I left him behind briefly. Once
5	make it to complete our original task.	5	I'd handed the casualty over, obviously I now want to
6	Q. Even given the conditions you'd encountered on the	6	get back to Firefighter Lowe to make sure him and the
7	stairwell, both in terms of physical obstruction, smoke	7	casualty are okay.
8	and people coming down?	8	So with this, I went back up the stairs and I was
9	A. I guess some of the decision-making, I don't know	9	stopped by an officer. I believe it to be Group Manager
10	whether it's subconscious or just experience, but	10	Welch, I'm not sure, who informed me that I should be
11	I guess we thought if we can't get someone from the	11	leaving, and I informed him that I should be going in,
12	10th floor down then we probably won't have a chance of	12	and I went back in, we got Firefighter Lowe, and we
13	getting someone from the 14th floor down, so we got the	13	proceeded back down to where the bridgehead had moved
14	people from the 10th floor down first. Going up to the	14	now on the ground floor in the atrium.
15	14th floor, I just guess I assumed that with the that	15	Q. Did you debrief anyone at the bridgehead that you hadn't
16	you wanted to complete the task in hand quite	16	been able to complete the
17	desperately, so get to the flat on the 14th floor and	17	A. Absolutely. It's the most important information we had.
18	then consider the conditions.	18	I can't remember who was at the bridgehead, but there
19	Q. Now, it's right as you went back up the tower you	19	was a few people. Obviously it had moved at this point
20		20	
	encountered a further casualty at about the 8th floor		or was in the process of moving, so it's quite chaotic
21	level; is that right?	21	and had taken a lot of information from one place. So
22	A. Again, I believe it was two casualties, an older woman	22	I made sure at least one or two people had been told we
23	and a younger child, which again I assumed to be mother	23	didn't make our original task.
24	and daughter.	24	Q. By the time you got back to the bridgehead at that time,
25	Q. Mr Lowe helped the older woman and you threw the girl	25	were you no longer under air, presumably? Can you
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1	remember?	1	A. When we were extending the hose, we weren't under air,
2	A. In my statement I said we were low on air. What I kind	2	so which is it's outside of our policy if it's
3	of meant was we were too low on air to complete the task	3	an irrespirable atmosphere or a chance of being an
4	on the 14th floor.	4	irrespirable atmosphere, we should wear BA.
5	Q. That answers the question I was going to ask you next.	5	Me and the other crews that were with me were quite
6	Can I ask you two final topics.	6	aware that this task, along with the task of search and
7	First of all hoses. At page 9 of your witness	7	rescue on the other floors, it would've been too much to
8	statement we don't need to go to it unless it would	8	have BA. So we took it upon ourselves to do this
9	help you you sorted out hose lines.	9	without BA sets on.
10	A. Not me personally, it was a team effort.	10	The conditions were changeable, so when we had crews
11	Q. But you were part of a team that sorted out hose lines.	11	come up, the stairwell would be clear to a point and
12	Can you remember at what time you did this? It	12	then we'd have crews come up and make entry off of the
13	would be after	13	stairwell onto the floors. Every time they done that,
14	A. So as I say in my statement, after the BA wear, we went	14	it filled the stairwell up with smoke completely, to the
15	outside, helped out with some hose and some jets, and	15	point where we would push BA crews into the door and ask
16	then were asked to go and retrieve some kit to go back	16	them to shut the door behind them, and let it clear.
17	into the building. I saw this as an opportunity to get	17	There was a few times
18	back in the building and help out, so myself and	18	Q. When the doors were closed, were they effective?
19	Firefighter Benaicha went and got this kit, delivered it	19	A. When the doors were closed, they were effective. I sat
20	to the officers inside and proceeded up, where I found	20	without BA on for a period of time, and the doors were
21	my crew from Whitechapel fire station and my own crew	21	radiating heat but were keeping the smoke back.
22	and we I'm not saying necessarily it was detailed to	22	MR KINNIER: Sir, those are all the questions I have.
23	us, but it was very evident that there was only to my	23	Rather than asking you to rise, given the time, I shall
24	recollection two lines of hose in the entire building	24	give a quick scan of the hearing room. I don't see any
25	and that firefighting was needed to be carried out on	25	bids.
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1	the upper floors.	1	In those circumstances, given the time final
2	So for a period of time we were shutting off water,	2	call. There are no further points to be made. So in
3	extending lines, we brought a dividing breach up, which	3	those circumstances
4	is a piece of equipment which could split one line into	4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: No one is standing up gesticulating
5	two and just made sure it went as high as possible.	5	or saying anything, so I think it's probably safe to
6	Q. To what extent were they obstructing the stairwell?	6	infer that they don't have any other questions to
7	A. Just as normal as hose lines would obstruct the	7	suggest.
8	stairwell. There was a lot of uncharged, rolled-up	8	MR KINNIER: I think so.
9	hose.	9	So that just leaves it for me to thank you,
10	Q. Were any charged?	10	Mr Wharnsby, for coming to give evidence today. It's
11	A. I believe there was two charged, one from the bridgehead	11	been very helpful.
12	floor and then one must have been from the floor of	12	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Likewise, Mr Wharnsby, I'd like to
13	the the 4th floor maybe, of the fire, and that was	13	thank you for coming along. It's very valuable evidence
14	taken up the building. We extended both of these up to	14	and we're very grateful to you.
15	possibly the 13th floor.	15	(The witness was released)
16	Q. Okay.	16	MR KINNIER: Sir, that concludes today's business.
17	A. I'm	17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
18	Q. Were hoses still being used to fight fires at this stage	18	MR KINNIER: We have further evidence on Monday.
19	whilst you were tidying up?	19	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
20	A. I was I don't know, I'm afraid, is the answer to	20	MR KINNIER: I have no application to make, whether on my
21	that.	21	own behalf or on behalf of Mr Millett. I would invite
	Q. One final question in respect of lobby doors.	22	you to start at 10 o'clock.
22		1	SID MADTIN MOODE DICK: Vory good
	Is it fair to say that when they were closed, the	23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Very good.
22		23 24	Well, thank you very much, you've done well to get
22 23	Is it fair to say that when they were closed, the	1	* *
22 23 24	Is it fair to say that when they were closed, the lobby doors prevented the spread of smoke into the	24	Well, thank you very much, you've done well to get

1	we'll break there and resume at 10 o'clock on Monday,	
2	then, please.	
3	Thank you very much. (4.30 pm)	
4 5	(4.30 pm) (The hearing adjourned until Monday, 10 September 2018 at	
6	10.00 am)	
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