

<p>1 Wednesday, 1 August 2018</p> <p>2 (9.30 am)</p> <p>3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to</p> <p>4 today's hearing. We are going to hear from further</p> <p>5 firefighters.</p> <p>6 MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman, we are. Good morning. We</p> <p>7 are now going to hear from Michael Mulholland.</p> <p>8 MICHAEL MULHOLLAND (sworn)</p> <p>9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Mr Mulholland.</p> <p>10 Good morning.</p> <p>11 THE WITNESS: Good morning.</p> <p>12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett?</p> <p>13 Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY</p> <p>14 MR MILLETT: Mr Mulholland, good morning.</p> <p>15 A. Good morning.</p> <p>16 Q. Can I ask you, please, first of all, to give us your</p> <p>17 full name?</p> <p>18 A. Michael Bernard Mulholland.</p> <p>19 Q. I want to say, first of all, thank you very much to</p> <p>20 you --</p> <p>21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Could you pause a second.</p> <p>22 Can you hear all right?</p> <p>23 (Pause)</p> <p>24 We might have to ask you to keep your voice up</p> <p>25 a bit, Mr Mulholland, because not only do people need to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 1</p>	<p>1 conjunction with the interview transcript."</p> <p>2 Having read the statement recently, are you</p> <p>3 satisfied that the statement doesn't omit anything of</p> <p>4 importance that you would like to tell us?</p> <p>5 A. Sorry, could you repeat that?</p> <p>6 Q. Can you confirm, having read the statement recently,</p> <p>7 that your statement doesn't leave out anything important</p> <p>8 that you would like to tell us?</p> <p>9 A. No, it doesn't leave anything out, no.</p> <p>10 Q. Are you satisfied that it reflects your best</p> <p>11 recollection of the events that it covers?</p> <p>12 A. Yes.</p> <p>13 Q. Have you discussed your statement or the evidence that</p> <p>14 you are going to give to us today with anybody before</p> <p>15 coming here?</p> <p>16 A. No.</p> <p>17 Q. You have got some contemporaneous notes as well, which</p> <p>18 are dated 14 June, and those are MET00005218, 19, 20,</p> <p>19 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and you also have 39 exhibited</p> <p>20 photographs. I will just read out the references to</p> <p>21 those: that's MET00018713 to MET00018751.</p> <p>22 Have you looked at those photographs recently?</p> <p>23 A. I only saw them recently when they were submitted into</p> <p>24 evidence.</p> <p>25 Q. I will come to ask you about one or two of those later</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 3</p>
<p>1 hear you in the room, but the lady doing the</p> <p>2 transcription needs to hear you as well.</p> <p>3 MR MILLETT: Mr Mulholland, thank you very much, first of</p> <p>4 all, for coming here today to give evidence to assist us</p> <p>5 with your investigations. We do very much appreciate</p> <p>6 it.</p> <p>7 My questions are intended to be short and simple.</p> <p>8 They often don't work out that way, so if you want me to</p> <p>9 repeat a question, I'm very happy to do so. If you need</p> <p>10 a break at any time, just signal, and we can take</p> <p>11 a break.</p> <p>12 Can I ask you, please, first of all, to take your</p> <p>13 statement, which is MET00007865. You will have it in</p> <p>14 the blue file in front of you at the front, but what we</p> <p>15 tend to do is examine it when we go to it by looking at</p> <p>16 the screen. There is a monitor on your right on the</p> <p>17 desk, which you can look at as well.</p> <p>18 As to that statement, have you read it recently?</p> <p>19 A. Yes.</p> <p>20 Q. Can you confirm that its contents are true?</p> <p>21 A. Yes.</p> <p>22 Q. Can I just ask you to look at the first paragraph of</p> <p>23 the witness statement, three lines down, where it says:</p> <p>24 "This statement does not purport to be complete and</p> <p>25 for completeness and accuracy it must be read in</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 2</p>	<p>1 on.</p> <p>2 Can I start by just asking you some questions about</p> <p>3 your position and the function of the ORT. You are</p> <p>4 currently a station manager at Tooting and Wandsworth,</p> <p>5 aren't you?</p> <p>6 A. No, not any longer. I was a station manager at Tooting</p> <p>7 and Wandsworth when I gave my statement. I have since</p> <p>8 taken up a new post as borough commander at Hammersmith</p> <p>9 and Fulham since April of this year.</p> <p>10 Q. Forgive me.</p> <p>11 As at 13/14 June 2017, you were, I think, station</p> <p>12 manager at Wimbledon?</p> <p>13 A. Yes, that's correct.</p> <p>14 Q. How long had you been a station manager at that date?</p> <p>15 A. Approximately three years.</p> <p>16 Q. In your statement, you say in the second paragraph on</p> <p>17 page 2 that you were also part of the operational review</p> <p>18 team, the ORT.</p> <p>19 You say in the third paragraph on page 2:</p> <p>20 "As the ORT we attend operational incidents to audit</p> <p>21 against policy and procedure, best practice and help</p> <p>22 incident command."</p> <p>23 You can see we have highlighted those words up on</p> <p>24 the screen for you.</p> <p>25 As to that, can I ask you first, when you refer to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 4</p>

<p>1 auditing against policy, does that mean that the ORT has 2 a monitoring and compliance function?</p> <p>3 A. Yes, but I can probably frame it slightly better than 4 that. That's probably a little bit brief.</p> <p>5 So we audit against policy and procedure when we 6 attend incidents, and we carry out safe systems of work, 7 firefighter safety. We can guide, advise, support the 8 incident command chain. As an ORT officer, we sit 9 outside the incident command chain and we are not part 10 of the decision-making process.</p> <p>11 So when we audit that incident, we are an 12 experienced group of officers, but our auditing against 13 policy and procedure for our experiences is done through 14 direct observation. So we are a presence on the fire 15 ground where we can capture operational learning to, 16 like, drive organisational improvement, basically.</p> <p>17 Q. In simple terms, does that mean you go to an incident 18 where the ORT is required by the number of pumps made up 19 and -- well, perhaps I can stop there and you can answer 20 that.</p> <p>21 A. Sorry, yes, we do, but it's mandatory for us to attend 22 a fire call of six pumps or more, and when the incident 23 goes to eight pumps or more, that triggers a second ORT 24 officer to attend. So, yes, anything over six pumps, 25 broadly speaking, will attract an ORT officer. We do</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 5</p>	<p>1 on the IMP database.</p> <p>2 The learning to come from that could be individual, 3 team, organisational or something to do with equipment 4 within the fire service. If it comes down to personnel, 5 that report will go to that individual's line manager 6 for that to be actioned.</p> <p>7 Q. When you refer to an IMP, I think we have the one for 8 Grenfell in the bundle. Can I just ask you to be shown 9 tab 30, which is LFB00003114, just very quickly, just to 10 see if we can capture what you are talking about.</p> <p>11 That is the IMP report for the incident at 12 Grenfell Tower.</p> <p>13 Is that the sort of document that you are referring 14 to when you talk about an incident management report?</p> <p>15 A. That would be what the document would look like once we 16 had finished that PRC process. It is very similar to 17 that, but you would enter it onto the IMPDS system. It 18 would look similar to that.</p> <p>19 Q. Did you have input into the creation of this document, 20 do you think?</p> <p>21 A. No. When we carry out our role, effectively, we are 22 a reporting tool for the organisation at incidents. So 23 we will come back and put that onto the system. It 24 needs to be checked by the IMP team to accept it and it 25 gets passed on to the relevant department.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 7</p>
<p>1 attend other incidents, but in terms of fires, that 2 would be our ...</p> <p>3 Q. When you say auditing against policy, does that in 4 essence mean you go around an incident ground making 5 sure that the operations are compliant with LFB policies 6 as written?</p> <p>7 A. Yes.</p> <p>8 Q. When you do that, do you generally record observations 9 that you make on the incident ground as you are there?</p> <p>10 A. No, not always, no.</p> <p>11 Q. Do you do it sometimes?</p> <p>12 A. Yes, occasionally. I mean, what we use is -- we make 13 some notes or we'll do it maybe post-incident.</p> <p>14 One of the other tasks we have as an ORT officer is 15 when we capture the learning -- or identify learning 16 points, we have a database within the London Fire 17 Brigade, the incident monitoring process database, where 18 that information can be put onto the database when we 19 have identified trends or learning.</p> <p>20 But any fire over six pumps attracts an internal 21 review of -- performance review of command, and those 22 learning points will be brought to that review of 23 command where an independent chair sits and the incident 24 will be discussed with the incident commander to that 25 incident, and any learning taken from that will appear</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 6</p>	<p>1 Q. In your statement, when you say you help incident 2 command, if we can just go back to that again, how do 3 you achieve that? How do you go about helping incident 4 command?</p> <p>5 A. I'd rather go back to what I said originally, actually, 6 about guide, advise and support. That's simplifying it 7 somewhat, really.</p> <p>8 Q. Okay.</p> <p>9 A. But it can be in a myriad of ways. It really depends on 10 the incident. There's an element of adaptability with 11 what we do within our role. But generally it can be 12 that we are going out onto the fire ground to confirm 13 that the instructions that's been given are actually 14 happening, that structures are in place. We are subject 15 to safe systems of work. Because it's naturally -- 16 particularly a large incident, it takes a while for you 17 to get things in place. It doesn't happen just in, 18 like, two minutes. It's something you proactively do, 19 but it can take a while to do that.</p> <p>20 That can also happen with an escalation of incident 21 where you have more officers coming on and then you 22 start to putting them into positions to strengthen the 23 command structure.</p> <p>24 Q. In simple terms, is the ORT's role to assist an incident 25 commander to comply with policy where you observe that</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 8</p>

1 he or she might not be complying with policy?

2 **A. Yes. Yes. But, like I say, it would be the incident**

3 **commander's decision to, you know, make an incident up**

4 **or, you know, do stuff.**

5 Q. Yes.

6 **A. We would be there to assist and guide if asked or**

7 **requested.**

8 Q. That would then inevitably feed into the decisions made

9 by the incident commander, would it?

10 **A. Potentially, yes. I mean, if we were going out on**

11 **a fire ground, for example, and I was coming back and**

12 **giving updates to the incident commander, you're hoping**

13 **the updates you're giving him would enhance his**

14 **situational awareness of the incident, and that would**

15 **hopefully aid his decision-making process in moving the**

16 **tactical plan forward.**

17 Q. Is the role of the ORT set out in any policy or

18 procedure document?

19 **A. Sorry, can you repeat that?**

20 Q. Is the role of the ORT set out in any policy or

21 procedure document?

22 **A. There is an ORT note, yes.**

23 Q. Did you have training to be a member of the ORT?

24 **A. Yes, I can -- it's something that you have to -- within**

25 **the organisation, posts are advertised, so you have to**

Page 9

1 **give an expression of interest. Once that's been**

2 **accepted, you have to sit a knowledge test. Once you've**

3 **passed the knowledge test, you have a period of**

4 **shadowing with existing ORT officers that have been**

5 **fully in a functioning role for quite a long time. That**

6 **will take several months. During that shadowing period,**

7 **we also have to sit through a shadowing period of**

8 **the performance review commands that I previously spoke**

9 **about, because we attend those as well. At the end of**

10 **that, we have to have a level 3 incident command**

11 **exercise, and if you pass that, you become a functioning**

12 **officer on the ORT.**

13 Q. Is there a minimum level of seniority below which you're

14 not qualified to be a member of the ORT?

15 **A. Broadly speaking, it's station managers and group**

16 **managers that are in the ORT.**

17 Q. Does that mean that anybody being admitted into the ORT

18 would have good experience of being an incident

19 commander?

20 **A. Yes.**

21 Q. You were in the ORT on the night of Grenfell.

22 Had you had training on high-rise firefighting

23 policy and fire survival guidance policy, 633 and 790?

24 **A. Yes, I've had training on high-rise policy, most**

25 **definitely, over a number of years as a junior officer.**

Page 10

1 **I probably had high-rise training at Fire Service**

2 **College in Moreton-in-Marsh and then, as I've gone**

3 **through my junior officer promotions, high-rise**

4 **training -- this is obviously outside of the high-rise**

5 **training that you would have done at station -- and then**

6 **when I got to senior officer, up to station manager,**

7 **high-rise training yet again, and I vaguely remember on**

8 **one of my -- we do incident management assessments. We**

9 **have to do that as a requirement in the Fire Brigade**

10 **every year. You have to attend an incident management**

11 **course that's provided by our external training**

12 **provider, Babcock, and I remember attending one of those**

13 **where the actual simulated incident I was given by the**

14 **training provider was a high-rise incident.**

15 Q. Have you ever had training on how to fight a fire on the

16 exterior of a building?

17 **A. Well, no. I mean, other than using covering jets and an**

18 **aerial appliance, but no specific training on the**

19 **exterior of a building.**

20 Q. Did you ever get any training, either generally or as

21 part of the ORT, in how to approach a fire where the

22 material on the exterior has ignited and the fire is

23 spreading?

24 **A. No. I've never attended an incident where the exterior**

25 **skin of a building has ignited in my career, so, no,**

Page 11

1 **I haven't had any training on that, sorry, to answer**

2 **your question.**

3 Q. That's very helpful.

4 Have you ever had any training on FSG

5 communications?

6 **A. I've had FSG training that I've done locally when at**

7 **stations, and when we have attended an incident command**

8 **course where there's been an FSG incident. I have not**

9 **had any centrally programmed training that has taken**

10 **place in the Fire Brigade. I wasn't in that role of**

11 **people that came out, I wasn't assigned it.**

12 Q. Did you ever have any training on how to go about

13 effecting a full or partial evacuation of a residential

14 high-rise block?

15 **A. No.**

16 Q. Now, in your statement in the third paragraph on

17 page 2 -- I'm sorry, it's quite difficult to navigate

18 around, but I counted the third one down -- you say that

19 in relation to your position on the ORT, generally you

20 liaise with the monitoring officer. It is the second

21 line. You say:

22 "Then we will highlight any learning that comes out

23 of the jobs but we generally when at incidents we[sic]

24 liaise with the Monitoring Officer."

25 Can you just explain what the role of a monitoring

Page 12

1 officer involves?
 2 **A. Yes, I can. That's actually probably not written very**
 3 **well because I've jumped on two things there.**
 4 **Yes, the monitoring officer of a job is effectively**
 5 **the monitoring officer on most jobs. So if we just talk**
 6 **specifically about fires, which might make it a little**
 7 **bit easier, at a four-pump fire, four machines will**
 8 **attend and a station manager will attend that as**
 9 **a monitoring officer, and that officer will be**
 10 **responsible for making contact with the incident**
 11 **commander and effectively guide, advise and support them**
 12 **in the role they're undertaking during that incident.**
 13 **Obviously if the incident needs more resources and**
 14 **it gets escalated, that monitoring officer would then**
 15 **take charge of that job and then another monitoring**
 16 **officer would be ordered onto the incident to monitor**
 17 **the new incident commander.**
 18 Q. How does the monitoring officer role relate to the
 19 function that the ORT performs?
 20 **A. As I said earlier on, because we sit outside the**
 21 **incident command chain, we are not one of**
 22 **the decision-makers; we are there to guide, advise and**
 23 **support. The monitoring officer really is the first**
 24 **port of call for the incident commander.**
 25 **So it's about -- you know, you need to allow your**

Page 13

1 **staff to command and you need to trust your staff to**
 2 **have the training. So ultimately, what we do is as an**
 3 **ORT officer, I would speak to the monitoring officer**
 4 **rather than the incident commander, because if you do**
 5 **that, you've now got two people talking to the incident**
 6 **commander. So I would have observations, possibly, or**
 7 **I might just be arriving and introducing myself that**
 8 **I was on the fire ground. I might say to the monitoring**
 9 **officer, "Is there anything you have picked up yet that**
 10 **needs addressing? Are you happy with the tactical**
 11 **plan?", and we will have a brief conversation about**
 12 **that, and I might go off and action something for them,**
 13 **rather than having that conversation directly with the**
 14 **IC, because they are dealing with more pressing things.**
 15 **Does that make sense?**
 16 Q. So drawing an imaginary line, a wall, between the ORT
 17 and the incident command structure which you say you sit
 18 outside --
 19 **A. Yes.**
 20 Q. -- the monitoring officer is part of that command
 21 structure and the ORT observes and assists from outside
 22 that?
 23 **A. Yes, we would feed in at that level, yes.**
 24 Q. I want to turn to the call-out to Grenfell, if I can.
 25 On the night of the fire at Grenfell Tower, you were

Page 14

1 designated as the ORT officer.
 2 **A. Correct, yes.**
 3 Q. That's what you say in your statement. I think that's
 4 a reference to the rota system for the ORT, isn't it?
 5 **A. Yes, it is.**
 6 Q. I think you also say Group Manager Matthew Cook was also
 7 on the rota that night.
 8 **A. Yes, he was.**
 9 Q. In the third paragraph on page 2, you say it is
 10 mandatory for an ORT officer to go to an incident with
 11 six or more appliances, and if the incident goes to
 12 eight pumps, that triggers two ORT officers to attend.
 13 Is that why you were mobilised, because the incident
 14 had been made six?
 15 **A. Yes, we were originally paged for the make pumps six.**
 16 Q. As a station manager, do you have an Airwave radio?
 17 **A. I do.**
 18 Q. Did you have your Airwave radio on and with you after
 19 you received your mobilisation message?
 20 **A. Yes, I did.**
 21 Q. Did you hear any information over the Airwave radio or
 22 any other radio you had with you about who the incident
 23 commander was when you were mobilised?
 24 **A. The information I had before I left to go to the**
 25 **incident was Watch Manager Dowden was the incident**

Page 15

1 **commander.**
 2 Q. Did you get any information about the location of
 3 the incident command pump?
 4 **A. The location of the incident --**
 5 Q. Yes.
 6 **A. No.**
 7 Q. In your statement on page 3, if I can turn to that, you
 8 say in the fourth paragraph down that when control of an
 9 incident changes, the change is relayed to everyone in
 10 attendance at the fire.
 11 How is that normally done?
 12 **A. So best practice would dictate if you attend an incident**
 13 **and you take over as a new incident commander, you would**
 14 **send a message to control over the main scheme radio,**
 15 **say that you're now the incident commander, and then**
 16 **transmit a message over the handheld fire ground radio,**
 17 **channel 1, saying the name of the new incident**
 18 **commander.**
 19 Q. What happens if there is a lot of traffic on the main
 20 scheme or the fire ground radio?
 21 **A. It's not normally a problem on the main scheme. There**
 22 **could be issues on channel 1 if channel 1 was very, very**
 23 **busy.**
 24 Q. Can I just ask you to look at your contemporaneous note.
 25 At the very beginning of that, if we just flip to that,

Page 16

<p>1 you say right at the very start:</p> <p>2 "I received the ordering at home as I am a flexi</p> <p>3 officer and proceeded to the incident on MP6 after Steve</p> <p>4 West ORT shadow calling control and assigning us to</p> <p>5 incident."</p> <p>6 I just want to ask you about "shadow". Can you</p> <p>7 explain what the role of an ORT shadow is?</p> <p>8 A. Yes, sorry, that's obviously a colloquialism we use in</p> <p>9 the brigade. As I explained earlier on about my</p> <p>10 training to be an ORT officer, I said you have several</p> <p>11 months shadowing the fully on-the-run functional ORT</p> <p>12 officers. Group Manager West was carrying out that role</p> <p>13 on my rota with myself and Group Manager Cook at the</p> <p>14 time.</p> <p>15 Q. Oh, I see. So he was shadowing you?</p> <p>16 A. Yes.</p> <p>17 Q. Because he was in training, he hadn't completed his</p> <p>18 training?</p> <p>19 A. Yes.</p> <p>20 Q. I see. Did you have a discussion with Steve West?</p> <p>21 A. Yes. Steve actually rang the page in to control.</p> <p>22 Q. Were you en route when you had that discussion?</p> <p>23 A. No.</p> <p>24 Q. Did you have a discussion with Group Manager Welch while</p> <p>25 you were en route to Grenfell?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 17</p>	<p>1 to you. I will just show you that. It is right at the</p> <p>2 very bottom of page 3. You say in the second line:</p> <p>3 "I took a picture of the building to try and gather</p> <p>4 my thoughts. It looked abnormal to me as the fire was</p> <p>5 rising vertically going up the face of Sector 4 and</p> <p>6 Sector 3."</p> <p>7 When you say "it looked abnormal", can you expand on</p> <p>8 that? What do you mean by that?</p> <p>9 A. Yes, I can.</p> <p>10 Firstly, I've never in my career seen the outside of</p> <p>11 a building alight like this building was alight, and it</p> <p>12 was -- I suppose the best word to describe it, it was</p> <p>13 spitting flame or burning embers off the front face of</p> <p>14 the building, and it had, you know, travelled incredibly</p> <p>15 quickly. I had never ever seen anything like that.</p> <p>16 I obviously knew there was a significant problem with</p> <p>17 the building.</p> <p>18 Q. Did you have any thoughts about what it might be that</p> <p>19 was alight?</p> <p>20 A. No. If I'm honest, I think my first original thought</p> <p>21 was probably 99 per cent of tower blocks we go to in</p> <p>22 London are concrete, and concrete doesn't catch fire,</p> <p>23 and obviously my first view of this was when I was some</p> <p>24 distance away. As I got nearer, and obviously the</p> <p>25 incident escalated, I realised there was something fixed</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 19</p>
<p>1 A. I ...</p> <p>2 Q. Let me help you. That was slightly unfair, actually.</p> <p>3 If we just go down into your contemporaneous note</p> <p>4 a little bit lower down the page, you say:</p> <p>5 "I also had a conversation with GM West (ORT shadow)</p> <p>6 and GM Welch en route to incident. I felt that there</p> <p>7 was a significant incident in process."</p> <p>8 My having shown you that, does that --</p> <p>9 A. Then, yes.</p> <p>10 Q. Do you have a recollection of the conversation?</p> <p>11 A. A vague recollection. Yeah, it would have been very</p> <p>12 brief, because obviously we're driving to the incident</p> <p>13 on, you know, blue lights and audible --</p> <p>14 Q. Do you have a recollection about what you talked about?</p> <p>15 A. I believe it was effectively about what was going on,</p> <p>16 because it was escalating quite quickly and it was</p> <p>17 a case of "See you there".</p> <p>18 Q. Now, arrival at Grenfell Tower. We have a status 3</p> <p>19 time, arrival time, for you at Grenfell of 01.51.36 am,</p> <p>20 and that's the LFB's operational response report at</p> <p>21 page 81. I don't need to take you to it. That's what</p> <p>22 it says.</p> <p>23 My question is: does that sound about right to you?</p> <p>24 A. Yes, that sounds about right.</p> <p>25 Q. You say in your statement that the fire looked abnormal</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 18</p>	<p>1 to the outside of the building, but I didn't know what</p> <p>2 it was that could be burning that quickly.</p> <p>3 Q. You'd never come across a cladding fire in your career?</p> <p>4 A. I've come across a cladding fire or UPV sections, but</p> <p>5 nothing to the severity that this was burning at.</p> <p>6 Q. When did you come across a UPV section fire?</p> <p>7 A. It's difficult to recall that accurately. Four or five</p> <p>8 years ago, probably. But it was the bottom part of</p> <p>9 a window. So effectively the panel was -- it could have</p> <p>10 been a whole window, but they put a uPVC solid panel in</p> <p>11 that that extended outside the front face. That caught</p> <p>12 light. But on that occasion, the fire stayed within the</p> <p>13 compartment; it was dealt with. It didn't go up the</p> <p>14 exterior of the building like this was.</p> <p>15 Q. While I'm on the subject, had you heard, as at the night</p> <p>16 of the Grenfell Tower fire, of a fire at Shepherds Court</p> <p>17 in Shepherd's Bush?</p> <p>18 A. I had heard of it, yes.</p> <p>19 Q. Had you heard of anything particular about</p> <p>20 Shepherds Court?</p> <p>21 A. I didn't attend the incident. I mean, within our peer</p> <p>22 group, we had a discussion about Shepherds Court and</p> <p>23 that the fire had spread up a few floors. I haven't</p> <p>24 seen the official report from the fire investigation</p> <p>25 team post-incident. But, yes, I believe that travelled</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 20</p>

5 (Pages 17 to 20)

<p>1 three floors.</p> <p>2 But, again, the compartmentation, I understand, held</p> <p>3 out long enough for us to get in and put the fire out on</p> <p>4 those floors.</p> <p>5 Q. In the discussions you had about Shepherds Court after</p> <p>6 Shepherds Court happened, which was August 2016, was</p> <p>7 there any discussion about the risks of fire spread</p> <p>8 posed by exterior cladding?</p> <p>9 A. No, not at that time, I don't think.</p> <p>10 Q. Is this right: you never got any training on the lessons</p> <p>11 learned from Shepherds Court?</p> <p>12 A. No.</p> <p>13 Q. In the same sentence, you refer to sectors, sector 4 and</p> <p>14 sector 3.</p> <p>15 At the point at which you arrived, had sectorisation</p> <p>16 been effected?</p> <p>17 A. No.</p> <p>18 Q. So when you refer to sector 4 and sector 3, what is that</p> <p>19 a reference to?</p> <p>20 A. Sorry, I thought that might help the context when I was</p> <p>21 giving my interview, that people would know what that</p> <p>22 meant, but I'm happy to explain that, if you need me to.</p> <p>23 Q. Yes. What are sector 4 and sector 3?</p> <p>24 A. Obviously I've seen some of the inquiry, so maybe it</p> <p>25 might be easier -- so sector 3 would be the north side</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 21</p>	<p>1 a couple of firefighters -- I can't be sure of that --</p> <p>2 where CU8 was and they pointed me back out the way</p> <p>3 I came, so I effectively went out the way I came. I'm</p> <p>4 not sure where I turned into, but I came to the top of</p> <p>5 Bomore Road and CU8 was there parked on the corner.</p> <p>6 Q. Were you looking for CU8 in particular?</p> <p>7 A. I was, because en route I'd heard control call CU8 and</p> <p>8 generally the first command unit there will take up the</p> <p>9 incident command.</p> <p>10 Q. Did you hear any messages going from control to CU8</p> <p>11 which were fire survival guidance messages?</p> <p>12 A. I vaguely have a recollection of it going to CU8; I have</p> <p>13 more of a recollection of FSG calls going to appliances</p> <p>14 more than CU8.</p> <p>15 Q. Do you remember who the officers were at CU7, first of</p> <p>16 all? Did you see any officers at CU7?</p> <p>17 A. No.</p> <p>18 Q. Was CU7 occupied?</p> <p>19 A. I didn't go to CU7.</p> <p>20 Q. You got to CU8, did you?</p> <p>21 A. Yes.</p> <p>22 Q. Do you remember who was on board CU8 when you got there?</p> <p>23 A. I don't remember the name of the firefighter or the</p> <p>24 watch officer, but there was only one command unit</p> <p>25 operative on the unit when I got on there. There was</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 23</p>
<p>1 of the building and sector 4 would be the east side.</p> <p>2 Q. In your statement on page 4, if I can just take you to</p> <p>3 it, you say in the second paragraph, at the very bottom:</p> <p>4 "I wanted to make contact via the Incident Commander</p> <p>5 or the Monitoring Officer and establish if the Command</p> <p>6 Unit (CU) was there because that is my first port of</p> <p>7 call."</p> <p>8 Can I just try and be clear, are you talking here</p> <p>9 about the incident command unit?</p> <p>10 A. Sorry, could you repeat that, sorry?</p> <p>11 Q. Yes. When you refer to "the command unit", are you</p> <p>12 talking about the incident command unit?</p> <p>13 A. Yes.</p> <p>14 Q. Did you find out who was the incident commander when you</p> <p>15 arrived?</p> <p>16 A. No. When I arrived, I was still under the impression</p> <p>17 that the incident commander was Watch Manager Dowden.</p> <p>18 Q. When you arrived, did you go straight to the command</p> <p>19 unit?</p> <p>20 A. Not straight to the command unit. I went onto the fire</p> <p>21 ground via the leisure centre onto the green, which</p> <p>22 would have been onto the east side. I had a quick look,</p> <p>23 took a few observations, and I started walking down</p> <p>24 towards Grenfell Road. There was a CU parked there, but</p> <p>25 I knew that was Wembley's. I asked I believe it was</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 22</p>	<p>1 nobody else on the unit.</p> <p>2 Q. At the time you arrived, were you aware of any other</p> <p>3 officers present other than Mike Dowden?</p> <p>4 A. I probably can't honestly answer that. Vaguely.</p> <p>5 I would have heard people booking in status 3. But my</p> <p>6 expectation would be, because that incident had gone up</p> <p>7 so quickly, our PDAs trigger officer mobilisations, so</p> <p>8 I was confident there were senior officers on the way.</p> <p>9 Q. Did you take steps to find out who they were and when</p> <p>10 they might arrive?</p> <p>11 A. Only when I got on to CU8.</p> <p>12 Q. You I think refer in the paragraph we are looking at in</p> <p>13 your statement to making contact via the incident</p> <p>14 commander or the monitoring officer.</p> <p>15 When you refer to the monitoring officer there, did</p> <p>16 you know that there was a monitoring officer on the fire</p> <p>17 ground or were you just assuming that there would be</p> <p>18 because of the number of pumps?</p> <p>19 A. Well, there'd always be a monitoring officer on the fire</p> <p>20 ground. I wasn't assuming they would be there because</p> <p>21 it was a call in the middle of the night and most of</p> <p>22 the senior officers would be travelling from what we</p> <p>23 call a camp-out base or home. Sometimes the MO might</p> <p>24 get there before the incident commander.</p> <p>25 Q. So is the answer to that that you didn't know whether</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 24</p>

6 (Pages 21 to 24)

<p>1 a monitoring officer was yet there?</p> <p>2 A. Correct, sorry.</p> <p>3 Q. Can we then look at the location of the incident command</p> <p>4 unit. We discussed that a little bit just now.</p> <p>5 You say you think you went to CU7 first in the next</p> <p>6 paragraph, and then you went to CU8.</p> <p>7 Do you remember, when you got to CU8, how many</p> <p>8 people were there, roughly?</p> <p>9 A. There was one.</p> <p>10 Q. Who was that, do you know?</p> <p>11 A. The command unit operative.</p> <p>12 Q. The command unit operative?</p> <p>13 A. One of the watch officers that rides the command unit,</p> <p>14 sorry.</p> <p>15 Q. Do you know who that was?</p> <p>16 A. I don't recall their name, no, sorry.</p> <p>17 Q. How long after you arrived and were status 3 do you</p> <p>18 think you arrived at command unit 8?</p> <p>19 A. I think the best timescale I can give, I have myself</p> <p>20 approximately getting on the command unit around</p> <p>21 2 o'clock, so approximately maybe, I don't know, 8 to</p> <p>22 10 minutes after getting there. Because -- sorry, have</p> <p>23 I answered that? Do you want me to continue on?</p> <p>24 Q. Yes.</p> <p>25 A. When I got onto the command unit, like I say, there was</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 25</p>	<p>1 Q. Was Watch Manager Meyrick the officer you saw on CU8?</p> <p>2 A. I know he works -- it could have been. If it was,</p> <p>3 I don't have a recollection of it being Watch Manager</p> <p>4 Meyrick.</p> <p>5 Q. You refer to a team leader, and you couldn't see the</p> <p>6 team leader.</p> <p>7 Is the team leader someone senior on the CU</p> <p>8 normally?</p> <p>9 A. No, that's a role that's allocated between them. So</p> <p>10 they ride a maximum of three or a minimum of two on the</p> <p>11 command units. They are both watch managers; it is just</p> <p>12 a role they allocate themselves on different shifts.</p> <p>13 Q. What does the team leader do?</p> <p>14 A. So the team leader initially would go out and make</p> <p>15 contact with the incident commander, try and map the</p> <p>16 fire ground, come back and then he would assist the</p> <p>17 incident commander throughout the incident as it</p> <p>18 escalated with, you know, the command support function.</p> <p>19 Q. Did you ever find out who the team leader for CU8 was?</p> <p>20 A. I have subsequently found out, but I didn't know on the</p> <p>21 night who it was.</p> <p>22 Q. You say subsequently; I might as well ask you, who was</p> <p>23 it?</p> <p>24 A. I believe it was Watch Manager Kentfield.</p> <p>25 Q. You say in your statement, as you have just told us,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 27</p>
<p>1 one CU operative on there. I asked him where the team</p> <p>2 leader was. He said to me the team leader was out on</p> <p>3 the fire ground trying to make contact with the incident</p> <p>4 commander. We did have another brief conversation, but</p> <p>5 I can't really remember the detail of that.</p> <p>6 Then I went over to the TV screen on the command</p> <p>7 unit, which is the command support system, to see if</p> <p>8 I could start looking at the list of officers that were</p> <p>9 attending, and I would say within probably 30 seconds to</p> <p>10 a minute after that, Group Manager Welch and Station</p> <p>11 Manager Loft came onto the command unit.</p> <p>12 Q. Did the CSS work?</p> <p>13 A. I didn't get to see all the officers. From my</p> <p>14 recollection, the green light was up in the top corner,</p> <p>15 which would indicate that it's active.</p> <p>16 Q. That was on CU8?</p> <p>17 A. Yes, CU8, yes.</p> <p>18 Q. But you didn't get any information off the CSS at that</p> <p>19 time?</p> <p>20 A. No.</p> <p>21 Q. Just dealing with who you encountered, have you ever</p> <p>22 heard of or met Station Manager Meyrick, Dan Meyrick?</p> <p>23 A. Station Manager Meyrick?</p> <p>24 Q. Sorry, Watch Manager Meyrick.</p> <p>25 A. Yes, I have.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 26</p>	<p>1 that within a few minutes of arriving on CU8, Group</p> <p>2 Manager Richard Welch and Station Manager Brett Loft</p> <p>3 arrived at the CU.</p> <p>4 You remember that, do you?</p> <p>5 A. Yes, I do.</p> <p>6 Q. Do you remember whether they were talking about</p> <p>7 anything?</p> <p>8 A. They were having a conversation when they came onto the</p> <p>9 unit, but I wasn't privy or I couldn't hear what they</p> <p>10 were saying as they were getting on.</p> <p>11 Q. You say in your statement, just a little bit below</p> <p>12 halfway down on page 4, after the conversation that you</p> <p>13 didn't hear what they were talking about, you say, just</p> <p>14 picking it up in the middle:</p> <p>15 "... at that stage Richard WELCH was effectively the</p> <p>16 most senior [ranking] officer there so he took charge of</p> <p>17 the incident."</p> <p>18 I just want to ask you a little bit about that.</p> <p>19 Who did you understand Richard Welch to be taking</p> <p>20 charge from?</p> <p>21 A. Watch Manager Dowden.</p> <p>22 Q. Watch Manager Dowden?</p> <p>23 A. Yes.</p> <p>24 Q. Okay.</p> <p>25 Did you have any understanding about what Station</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 28</p>

7 (Pages 25 to 28)

1 Manager Loft's role was at that point?
 2 **A. No.**
 3 Q. Because, of course, he was senior to Watch Manager
 4 Dowden.
 5 **A. Yes, he was, but at that point, we had obviously**
 6 **a dynamic incident unravelling in front of us that was**
 7 **clearly escalating. It was probably a 25-pump fire**
 8 **there, so Richard Welch being the GM would trump the**
 9 **station manager in terms of incident command.**
 10 **Also, the expectation would be that the GM would**
 11 **take that, not the SM.**
 12 Q. Did you know when Station Manager Loft had arrived at
 13 the incident ground?
 14 **A. No.**
 15 Q. Did you ask yourself the question, "Well, why is
 16 Mike Dowden still the incident commander, given that
 17 he's only a watch manager, when Station Manager Loft is
 18 here?"
 19 **A. I wasn't aware of any previous communications that had**
 20 **happened obviously prior to my arrival. I wasn't**
 21 **surprised that Watch Manager Dowden was in charge of**
 22 **a 20-pump fire, because he'd made the call for a 20-pump**
 23 **fire, insomuch as the incident had escalated so quickly**
 24 **that, as the incremental messages went, there would be**
 25 **senior officers en route.**

Page 29

1 **So I just thought it was that either some of the**
 2 **senior officers hadn't attended yet, or maybe they had**
 3 **made contact with Mike Dowden and possibly had taken**
 4 **over, but I hadn't heard verbally over the radio that**
 5 **there was a new incident commander. So by nature of**
 6 **that, I defaulted to the fact I still felt Watch Manager**
 7 **Dowden was incident commander.**
 8 Q. Did you hear Brett Loft say anything about what his role
 9 at that point was?
 10 **A. I didn't speak to Brett Loft, if I'm honest. I directed**
 11 **all my attention at that point to Richard Welch.**
 12 Q. Did you hear any mention of Station Manager Andy
 13 Walton's involvement at that stage?
 14 **A. No.**
 15 Q. We have a booking-in time for him status 3 at the
 16 command unit of 01.43.12.
 17 Did you know he had arrived on the incident ground
 18 at that point?
 19 **A. No, I hadn't seen Andy before. Not until I got to the**
 20 **fire ground did I start seeing more officers.**
 21 Q. So you weren't aware that he had arrived before Group
 22 Manager Welch?
 23 **A. No. Just to put it in a bit of context, I knew he had**
 24 **been paged to attend the incident, so I knew he was**
 25 **en route, but I wouldn't have been aware -- unless I'd**

Page 30

1 **physically heard him book status 3 on his Airwave, but**
 2 **we do that via our call signs and sometimes I can't**
 3 **remember the call signs of the officers, so their call**
 4 **sign won't necessarily correlate with their name.**
 5 Q. No, I see that.
 6 Now, we have a booking-in time for
 7 Andy McLoughlin[sic], DAC Andy McLoughlin, as 01.54.30.
 8 That's the time we have for him arriving and being
 9 status 3.
 10 Did you know that DAC McLoughlin had arrived before
 11 Group Manager Welch?
 12 **A. Sorry, it's O'Loughlin. In my statement it is**
 13 **DAC O'Loughlin.**
 14 **I didn't know, but obviously the size of**
 15 **the incident at that point would have generated the**
 16 **paging of the deputy assistant commissioner. So I knew**
 17 **there would be one en route. But before I left,**
 18 **I hadn't captured that information from control or from**
 19 **Steve West.**
 20 Q. Can we summarise it this way: you weren't aware of any
 21 handovers of incident command from Mike Dowden to
 22 Andy Walton and then from Andy Walton to DAC O'Loughlin?
 23 **A. No.**
 24 Q. Now, we have a record in the short incident log of
 25 Richard Welch taking over or confirming his taking over

Page 31

1 as incident commander at 02.04.20. I don't need to show
 2 it to you unless you want to see it. But does that time
 3 sound about right to you?
 4 **A. Yes, that sounds fairly accurate. That would tie in**
 5 **with I think the timestamp I have of me arriving on CU8**
 6 **and Group Manager Welch and Station Manager Loft coming**
 7 **on that unit as quickly as that, yes.**
 8 Q. Were you clear in your mind as to who had been and who
 9 was now in fact incident commander?
 10 **A. I was clear in my mind that Watch Manager Dowden was the**
 11 **incident commander, because I hadn't been told**
 12 **otherwise, and I was more than clear in my mind after**
 13 **the conversation with Group Manager Welch that he was**
 14 **now the incident commander because we sent that message**
 15 **while we were standing in the command unit and that went**
 16 **back to control.**
 17 Q. Did you see, hear or observe any handover between
 18 Mike Dowden and Richard Welch?
 19 **A. No.**
 20 Q. Would it be normal for there to be no handover between
 21 incident commanders at an incident?
 22 **A. No, it wouldn't be normal, but there was nothing normal**
 23 **about this incident. I think we needed to start getting**
 24 **a greater level of control in the incident, and Richard**
 25 **took on the responsibility at the level that he's at**

Page 32

<p>1 within the organisation to take charge of that incident.</p> <p>2 Q. Did you know whether Mike Dowden would be aware that he</p> <p>3 had been relieved of incident command in favour of Group</p> <p>4 Manager Welch?</p> <p>5 A. I think by nature of the incident, when he'd gone down</p> <p>6 to the tower, he would have come across Mike Dowden</p> <p>7 outside. So Richard would have had the experience to</p> <p>8 bump into him and tell him that, I would think. But --</p> <p>9 Q. You don't know?</p> <p>10 A. The necessity was to get a greater level of control down</p> <p>11 at that tower at that time, and that was the right</p> <p>12 decision to make.</p> <p>13 Q. Would it be important, though, for Mike Dowden to know</p> <p>14 that he had been relieved of incident command?</p> <p>15 A. Yes, it would, but it would have happened at some point.</p> <p>16 But it was critical that we got a more senior ranking</p> <p>17 officer down onto that fire ground.</p> <p>18 Q. Did you, yourself, take any steps to find out whether</p> <p>19 Mike Dowden knew that he was being relieved of incident</p> <p>20 command and being replaced by Richard Welch?</p> <p>21 A. Sorry, we are jumping the gun a little bit here because</p> <p>22 there is another little bit in my statement that will</p> <p>23 slow this conversation up a little bit, shall I say.</p> <p>24 Would you like me to --</p> <p>25 Q. Yes, I know, but I'm asking you a specific question</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 33</p>	<p>1 point by Richard, because Richard had made the incident</p> <p>2 up.</p> <p>3 Q. To 40?</p> <p>4 A. To 40. That's a significant fire for us in London.</p> <p>5 I think the time of day, the amount of FSG calls that</p> <p>6 were starting to come in and the amount of people and</p> <p>7 residents potentially in that building, that's why it</p> <p>8 went to a major incident.</p> <p>9 Q. Did you know at the time that the police had themselves</p> <p>10 declared a major incident just after 01.30?</p> <p>11 A. No.</p> <p>12 Q. Just going back to the question of handover from</p> <p>13 Mike Dowden, I think you told us that there wasn't</p> <p>14 effectively a handover from Mike Dowden of incident</p> <p>15 command to Richard Welch.</p> <p>16 Would it not be important for them to have</p> <p>17 a handover so Richard Welch could essentially take over</p> <p>18 seamlessly from Mike Dowden?</p> <p>19 A. Yes, best practice would be that you would have</p> <p>20 a handover, most definitely. It is something that we</p> <p>21 encourage and is done to the best of our abilities,</p> <p>22 depending on how dynamic an incident is. But</p> <p>23 Richard Welch never went to Mike Dowden as incident</p> <p>24 commander.</p> <p>25 Q. Was there a risk, then, that Richard Welch would not</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 35</p>
<p>1 about Mike Dowden.</p> <p>2 A. The message went over the radios, I can't confirm</p> <p>3 whether that was acknowledged, on channel 1.</p> <p>4 Q. In your statement, you say that you and Matt and all of</p> <p>5 you had a discussion about there being a major incident.</p> <p>6 This is the bottom part of page 4 of your statement. It</p> <p>7 has been picked up there very cannily by the Documents</p> <p>8 Director.</p> <p>9 Can I just ask you, can you just tell us what that</p> <p>10 discussion involved?</p> <p>11 A. Yes, to give that a bit of context, Matt arrived on the</p> <p>12 command unit not long after I had with Group Manager</p> <p>13 West. En route to the incident, Group Manager Cook and</p> <p>14 AC Roe had had a conversation about giving consideration</p> <p>15 for major incident. It was Group Manager Cook, myself</p> <p>16 and Group Manager Welch, to be fair, who had that</p> <p>17 conversation.</p> <p>18 Following that conversation, Richard, being incident</p> <p>19 commander, decided that he was going to declare it</p> <p>20 a major incident, and that message was also sent over</p> <p>21 the main scheme radio.</p> <p>22 Q. What factors did you take into account, or did you</p> <p>23 observe Richard Welch taking into account, when deciding</p> <p>24 that this fire was a major incident?</p> <p>25 A. I think obviously the incident had been made up at that</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 34</p>	<p>1 receive from Mike Dowden all the information that he</p> <p>2 would need to start and take on the role of incident</p> <p>3 commander?</p> <p>4 A. No, because I think when Richard Welch got to the fire</p> <p>5 ground, there was a conversation with Mike Dowden and</p> <p>6 Mike Dowden was aware that he'd been put in to run the</p> <p>7 fire sector.</p> <p>8 Q. At this point, when Richard Welch declares a major</p> <p>9 incident and pumps 40, did you know whether DAC Roe or</p> <p>10 Commissioner Dany Cotton were en route?</p> <p>11 A. AC Roe --</p> <p>12 Q. Sorry, AC Roe.</p> <p>13 A. They were en route? No, I didn't know they were</p> <p>14 en route, but, again, as I explained earlier, with the</p> <p>15 PDA's we have and the incremental -- you know they would</p> <p>16 have been notified. So I can't say 100 per cent they</p> <p>17 were en route, but I knew they were en route because of</p> <p>18 the size of the incident.</p> <p>19 Q. At the top of page 5 of your statement, you say:</p> <p>20 "I imagine pretty early on K and C would have been</p> <p>21 informed, it triggers a lot of established working</p> <p>22 parties, support networks, local hospitals that kind of</p> <p>23 thing."</p> <p>24 When you say "it triggers", is that a reference to</p> <p>25 the declaration of major incident?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 36</p>

9 (Pages 33 to 36)

1 **A. Yes, it is.**
 2 Q. Were you aware whether in fact K&C, Kensington and
 3 Chelsea, had been informed that have there was a major
 4 incident?
 5 **A. No, I had no contact with K&C throughout the course of**
 6 **the evening.**
 7 Q. You then go on to say that Richard Welch tasked Steve --
 8 I think that's Steve West -- with getting the METHANE
 9 message, and then you explain what METHANE is in your
 10 statement.
 11 Can you just explain in simple terms for us what
 12 METHANE does? What is the effect of sending out
 13 a METHANE message?
 14 **A. So the METHANE message is an acronym for a message we**
 15 **send from the fire ground once we have declared a major**
 16 **incident. That's about letting the other blue light**
 17 **responders know. It is a recognised message that sits**
 18 **within the protocols of joint working amongst the**
 19 **emergency services. So that would go to the police and**
 20 **ambulance control rooms and they would be aware that we**
 21 **have now declared a major incident.**
 22 Q. One of the letters in the acronym is "Number and type of
 23 casualties". If you scroll down, you can see METHANE
 24 stands for: major incident; exact location; type of
 25 incident; hazards; access; number and type of

Page 37

1 casualties; emergency services present and required.
 2 Do you know what the contents of the METHANE message
 3 were for number and type of casualties?
 4 **A. No.**
 5 Q. How would the METHANE message be broadcast? What medium
 6 would be used to broadcast a METHANE message?
 7 **A. That would go over the main scheme radio.**
 8 Q. Main scheme?
 9 **A. To control.**
 10 Q. So it would go to control and then control would
 11 disseminate it, would they --
 12 **A. Yes.**
 13 Q. -- from there to the other responders?
 14 **A. Correct.**
 15 Q. Small point, but let me just get this right: in the
 16 control room, would they respond to a METHANE message or
 17 would they respond to a declaration of a major incident,
 18 or do the two always go together?
 19 **A. Sorry, can you repeat that?**
 20 Q. Yes.
 21 So far as you know, would the control room respond
 22 to the declaration of a major incident or would they
 23 respond to the METHANE message that would follow it?
 24 **A. Well, they would respond to both. So the declaration of**
 25 **major incident would get more vehicles mobilised, and**

Page 38

1 **the METHANE message -- even though we said we'd already**
 2 **declared a major incident, the METHANE message is to**
 3 **enhance, if you like, the situational awareness, you**
 4 **know, a snapshot of what we have got. So that would**
 5 **just go over the main scheme radio and that would be**
 6 **repeated back to whoever had sent it.**
 7 Q. What does the control room do at the moment a major
 8 incident is declared? Do you know?
 9 **A. I don't know, sorry. I don't.**
 10 Q. We then turn to the arrival of DAC O'Loughlin, and you
 11 cover that in the next paragraph in your statement. You
 12 say:
 13 "We were starting to build a tactical plan when DAC
 14 O'LOUGHLAN[sic] arrived on the Unit."
 15 Can you explain there what you mean by "a tactical
 16 plan"?
 17 **A. So this was a very brief discussion. We'd started**
 18 **talking about getting some station managers down to the**
 19 **tower and start putting a command structure in place.**
 20 **That would have been, you know, getting hold of --**
 21 **meeting up with Watch Manager Dowden to get information**
 22 **off of him and then to progress the incident on. But**
 23 **while we were having a discussion about that,**
 24 **DAC O'Loughlin came onto the command unit.**
 25 Q. What was the plan that you were beginning to put

Page 39

1 together at the moment he arrived?
 2 **A. We were discussing about getting down to the tower as**
 3 **quick as we could with a couple of station managers and**
 4 **starting to build some structure in, and make sure that,**
 5 **you know, the water supplies had been -- which they**
 6 **already were, because I had seen that out of**
 7 **the periphery of my sight, and making sure we were**
 8 **getting BA into that building as quickly and as**
 9 **expediently as we could.**
 10 Q. Who was involved in formulating that plan, apart from
 11 you?
 12 **A. That was a discussion with the incident command chain,**
 13 **if you like, at that time.**
 14 Q. Who was that?
 15 **A. Group Manager Welch and myself and Group Manager Matt**
 16 **Cook. But, like I say, the conversation didn't take**
 17 **long because Andy O'Loughlin came onto the unit.**
 18 Q. When you were discussing that plan -- and I know you say
 19 you didn't get very far with it -- did you consider what
 20 to do about the stay-put policy?
 21 **A. No, not at that time.**
 22 Q. Did you consider the possibility of implementing a full
 23 or partial evacuation of the building?
 24 **A. No.**
 25 Q. Now, we have DAC O'Loughlin's arrival on the command

Page 40

1 unit as 01.54.30. Now, that's a soft time; it is not
 2 a confirmed time. But does that sound about right to
 3 you?
 4 **A. Sorry, could you repeat the officer's name and the time?**
 5 Q. I will show you the reference in the ORR for that. It
 6 is page 84, if you can just be shown that.
 7 This is an LFB product document, a report. They
 8 source the time as best they can, and at 01.54.30,
 9 two-thirds of the way down the page:
 10 "Echo 6, DAC O'Loughlin arrives at Grenfell Tower
 11 although he does not book in with Control on the radio
 12 or phone as both were busy and he doesn't want to
 13 interrupt the FSG calls. He noted the time on his phone
 14 when he arrived and put this in his MPS Witness
 15 Statement."
 16 The source of that information is his own phone and
 17 his witness statement.
 18 Does that trigger a recollection with you as to the
 19 time at which he arrived?
 20 **A. It's difficult to answer. He may well have arrived at**
 21 **the incident, but he wasn't on the command unit.**
 22 Q. You then say in your statement, if you go back to your
 23 statement, in the same paragraph, next sentence:
 24 "As DAC he became the Incident Commander and he
 25 assumed command. He asked Richard to go to the

Page 41

1 Bridgehead to run it for him, to tackle the fire as best
 2 we could and effectively take on the Fire Sector.
 3 I then left the Command Unit with Richard WELCH."
 4 Was there a handover between Richard Welch and
 5 DAC O'Loughlin?
 6 **A. Yes, inasmuch as "I was IC and now you're going to be**
 7 **IC". We didn't have a significant amount of information**
 8 **about the fire ground, but I believe that Andy, whilst**
 9 **walking to the command unit, had observed what was**
 10 **happening. So I believe he probably walked in that way,**
 11 **but you would have to ask Andy to confirm that,**
 12 **obviously.**
 13 Q. How long, roughly, had Richard Welch been incident
 14 commander when DAC O'Loughlin took over incident
 15 commander? Roughly.
 16 **A. Five minutes. Five or six minutes, I would say. Maybe**
 17 **less.**
 18 Q. When DAC O'Loughlin took over incident command, was
 19 a message sent on the main scheme radio or by RT4 back
 20 to control?
 21 **A. I don't know. I can't confirm that.**
 22 MR MILLETT: We have been going for just over an hour,
 23 Mr Mulholland. Are you happy to continue for a further
 24 15 minutes or so?
 25 THE WITNESS: I'll have a break, if that's all right.

Page 42

1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you like a break now?
 2 THE WITNESS: Is that okay?
 3 MR MILLETT: Yes.
 4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Ten minutes, would that be all right
 5 with you?
 6 THE WITNESS: That'd be fine.
 7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Is that all right with you,
 8 Mr Millett?
 9 MR MILLETT: Absolutely.
 10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We will stop now for just over
 11 10 minutes and start again at 10.45 am. Please don't
 12 talk to anyone about your evidence when you are out of
 13 the room.
 14 THE WITNESS: No problem.
 15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you like to go with the usher?
 16 We will start again at 10.45 am, please.
 17 (10.33 am)
 18 (A short break)
 19 (10.47 am)
 20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Mulholland? Ready to
 21 carry on?
 22 THE WITNESS: Yes.
 23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.
 24 MR MILLETT: Mr Mulholland, thank you very much for coming
 25 back to us.

Page 43

1 First of all, can I just tell you what we have in
 2 the record, so we can fix it, about DAC O'Loughlin's
 3 taking over.
 4 We have a radio message to control timed at 02.11.48
 5 which says that DAC O'Loughlin is now officer in charge.
 6 02.11.48 -- does that roughly chime with your
 7 recollection?
 8 **A. Best I can recollect, I don't believe I was on the**
 9 **command unit when that message went. I probably left**
 10 **the command unit a couple of minutes before that, so ...**
 11 Q. Right. Did you hear it? Did you hear the message?
 12 **A. I don't recall hearing it going, no.**
 13 Q. Did you know at the time, then, that DAC O'Loughlin had
 14 taken over incident command?
 15 **A. Yes, because I was on the command unit and witnessed the**
 16 **conversation between him and Group Manager Welch --**
 17 Q. I see.
 18 **A. -- saying that he was going to take over the job and**
 19 **send Richard to the tower.**
 20 Q. The reference to the message is LFB00002151.
 21 Can I go back to your statement, then, please, and
 22 ask you to look at page 5.
 23 You say in the top quarter of that that
 24 Richard Welch tasked Steve with giving the METHANE
 25 message, and you explain what the METHANE message is;

Page 44

<p>1 I don't think you say there that Steve actually sent the 2 METHANE message. 3 My question is: do you know whether it was actually 4 sent? 5 A. No, I can't confirm that. 6 Q. How would a METHANE message, if sent, be recorded? 7 A. Generally, that would be written down on a message pad 8 on the command unit. It would be handed to the comms 9 officer on the command unit and they would send the 10 message over the main scheme radio. 11 Q. Would it be recorded on Vision? 12 A. Yes. My understanding is if that message went to 13 control and control received it, there would be a record 14 of it somewhere. 15 Q. If it was sent, there would be a record of it? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. We don't actually have a record of it, at least in the 18 short incident log. Does that surprise you? 19 A. It would surprise me if we didn't have it if it was 20 sent, yes. 21 Q. You say, in the paragraph that starts just after the 22 METHANE message, and we looked at this before the break, 23 "We were starting to build the tactical plan". 24 When you were discussing the tactical plan with 25 Richard Welch and Matt Cook, were you aware of any</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 45</p>	<p>1 serious incident. 2 Q. But beyond that? Beyond that, did you get any 3 understanding of what DAC's understanding was about what 4 was alight and why? 5 A. No. 6 Q. Did you have a discussion with DAC O'Loughlin about what 7 you thought was alight and why? 8 A. Not me personally, no. 9 Q. Was there any discussion that you saw or heard or 10 observed in any way with DAC O'Loughlin about the 11 stay-put policy? 12 A. No, not at that time. 13 Q. Not at that time. What about evacuation? 14 A. No, I don't believe so. 15 Q. Now, you refer to "the fire sector"; what was the fire 16 sector that you refer to there in your statement? 17 A. Well, the fire sector was effectively from the 3rd floor 18 to the 23rd. 19 Q. That's the whole building, effectively? 20 A. Effectively, yes. 21 Q. Had there been any sectorisation at the stage at which 22 DAC O'Loughlin arrives? 23 A. I don't believe so. Not that I'd been told of. 24 Q. Do you remember when sectorisation was applied? 25 A. To the best of my knowledge, when Group Manager Welch</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 47</p>
<p>1 existing tactical plan? 2 A. No. 3 Q. So far as you were concerned, this tactical plan that 4 you were starting to build was the first tactical plan 5 that there was; is that right? 6 A. Sorry, could you repeat that? 7 Q. Yes. 8 The tactical plan that you were beginning to discuss 9 with Richard Welch and Matt Cook when DAC O'Loughlin 10 arrived was the first tactical plan you knew about for 11 the incident; is that right? 12 A. Yes, but only inasmuch as -- because I hadn't been on 13 the fire ground. So I think the previous attendance and 14 Watch Manager Dowden would have had a tactical plan they 15 would have implemented at the time. 16 Q. You then go on to say: 17 "He [Andy O'Loughlin] asked Richard to go to the 18 Bridgehead to run it for him, to tackle the fire as best 19 we could and effectively take on the Fire Sector." 20 Did DAC O'Loughlin say anything about how to fight 21 the fire? 22 A. No, I don't believe so. 23 Q. Did you gain any understanding about what DAC O'Loughlin 24 thought about the nature of the fire? 25 A. I think his initial thoughts were that it was a very</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 46</p>	<p>1 went down to the tower. I'm not saying that it wasn't 2 already put in place. There was order -- Group Manager 3 Welch got into the tower before I did. When I arrived, 4 there was order there. So Richard effectively went to 5 take over the fire sector. 6 Q. DAC O'Loughlin has given us a statement -- or, rather, 7 he's given the police a statement which we have seen -- 8 in which he refers to the discussion he had with you and 9 Group Manager Matt Cook, and he says that he asked you 10 to make sure things were safe and working well and to 11 help him command and oversee the incident and make sure 12 things were in place. That's more or less verbatim what 13 he says in his statement. 14 Is that consistent with your recollection of 15 the conversation you had with him? 16 A. I have a recollection of the conversation; I don't 17 remember that much detail of that. 18 Q. Can you remember anything about what DAC O'Loughlin said 19 to you? 20 A. Yeah, other than -- yes, to go down to the fire ground 21 with Richard and support in the early stages to see if 22 there was anything he needed in terms of resources and 23 making sure we were effectively getting an attack on the 24 fire and getting to as many of those FSG calls as we 25 could.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 48</p>

12 (Pages 45 to 48)

1 Q. Was that consistent with your continuing in an ORT
 2 capacity or was that you now getting involved with
 3 operations?
 4 **A. I think I was still in my ORT capacity at that point.**
 5 Q. You think?
 6 **A. But -- I was in my ORT capacity at that point. As the**
 7 **job went along, I think there was more adaptability**
 8 **required. But at that point, I was going down in my ORT**
 9 **capacity.**
 10 Q. Is that how you understood DAC O'Loughlin's instruction?
 11 **A. Yes.**
 12 Q. You then say you left the command unit with
 13 Richard Welch. Did anybody else go with you?
 14 **A. My recollection is it was myself and Group Manager Welch**
 15 **initially. I think Group Manager Cook followed shortly**
 16 **after, a bit of distance behind us. I don't recall**
 17 **anybody else walking down to the tower with me at that**
 18 **point.**
 19 Q. There are two Cooks.
 20 **A. There are two Cooks.**
 21 Q. Which Cook was it that went with you?
 22 **A. GM Cook.**
 23 Q. That's Gareth?
 24 **A. No, that would be Matt.**
 25 Q. Sorry, that's Matt Cook, not Gareth Cook. Okay.

Page 49

1 **A. At the time of Grenfell -- sorry, there is a bit**
 2 **of mix-up -- Gareth Cook was a station manager; he's now**
 3 **subsequently a group manager.**
 4 Q. Hence my mistake. But your recollection is that, so far
 5 as any Cook went with you, it was Matt?
 6 **A. Yes, not directly with us, but, you know, back behind us**
 7 **somewhat.**
 8 Q. Can you tell us how much further communication you then
 9 had with DAC O'Loughlin throughout the rest of
 10 the incident?
 11 **A. I had more contact with DAC O'Loughlin. It's hard to**
 12 **say how much contact I had. I mean, on several**
 13 **occasions, I would have had contact with him and given**
 14 **him updates or --**
 15 Q. Okay.
 16 Can I ask you, please, to turn to the middle of
 17 page 5 of your statement, where you say:
 18 "CU7 was assigned as the FSG Unit. They would have
 19 a FS Co-Ordinator who would run that and would be
 20 collating all the information on the FSG calls that were
 21 coming in from Control. "
 22 Then you go on to explain what they would do:
 23 "... log the information from the call — location
 24 where they are — and this would then be passed to the
 25 Incident Commander so he had an idea of where we were

Page 50

1 and to the Fire Sector where we were committing BA so
 2 they could tell the crews where they needed to go and
 3 depending upon which floor prioritise where to go."
 4 I have read that all to you. I have a number of
 5 questions about it.
 6 When did you learn that CU7 had been assigned as the
 7 FSG unit?
 8 **A. I'd find that very difficult to give you a time. I was**
 9 **told by my colleague Group Manager Cook that CU7 had**
 10 **been assigned as the FSG command unit with Group Manager**
 11 **Goodall as the FSG co-ordinator and assisted by Station**
 12 **Manager Egan.**
 13 Q. What --
 14 **A. Time-wise --**
 15 Q. So sorry. Please continue.
 16 **A. Time-wise, I'd find it very difficult, but, again, I'd**
 17 **like to think that a message may have been sent to say**
 18 **that CU7 were accepting FSG calls or were the FSG unit,**
 19 **so that might be able to timestamp, if it helps.**
 20 Q. Can I ask you then to be shown tab 23, which is the
 21 short incident log. Can you go, please, to page 22.
 22 You can see at 02.23.33 there's a message:
 23 "SAD. Key
 24 "CU7 RUN ALL FSG CALLS VIA CU7."
 25 That's the short incident log, which is a record of

Page 51

1 the message coming from the control room by radio, it
 2 appears. The time mark is what I want to show you:
 3 02.23.33.
 4 Would that be consistent with your recollection as
 5 to when you discovered that CU7 was the FSG unit?
 6 **A. It's feasible, yes. I do have trouble with some of**
 7 **the timings, but if that's what's gone in there, yes,**
 8 **it's feasible that's the time.**
 9 Q. You refer to the FS or FSG co-ordinator being -- was it
 10 Group Manager Goodall?
 11 **A. Yes.**
 12 Q. Do you know what that would involve? What would
 13 co-ordinator involve? What would that role be?
 14 **A. Well, Tom would be responsible for collating that**
 15 **information that comes in through control, hopefully**
 16 **trying to get some order and sense in that, and get that**
 17 **to the bridgehead by means so that the FSG calls could**
 18 **be actioned as quickly and as expediently as possible.**
 19 Q. Just breaking that down a little bit in terms of what
 20 you would expect, what would be the communication link
 21 from the control room to CU7 normally?
 22 **A. Normally, it would be done by -- you could do it by**
 23 **phone. There's a phone on the command unit to do that.**
 24 **There's a direct -- I don't know the number -- there's**
 25 **a direct line in to control that's dedicated from**

Page 52

1 **the command unit, so they could do that. Or you could**
 2 **change radio channels on the main scheme radio to do**
 3 **that if that was designated.**
 4 Q. Are both of those means of communication recorded?
 5 **A. I believe so. I have very limited knowledge of control.**
 6 **If it comes through on their main system, then I would**
 7 **think it's probably recorded, but I'm not 100 per cent**
 8 **certain. But if it goes over the main scheme radio, it**
 9 **would be recorded.**
 10 Q. I'm talking about communications between the control
 11 room and CU7.
 12 **A. Yes, so if there's FSG information being passed between**
 13 **CU7 and control via main scheme, that would be recorded.**
 14 **I'm not quite sure if they used the phone on the command**
 15 **unit, whether the phone it contacts in control is -- I'm**
 16 **not certain of that. You'd have to probably get that**
 17 **from control.**
 18 Q. Did you see for yourself the communications between the
 19 control room and CU7 on the night?
 20 **A. No, I didn't go on CU7.**
 21 Q. You didn't go onto CU7, okay.
 22 The next link in the chain: how would you normally
 23 expect the personnel on CU7 to record the FSG
 24 information that they were getting from control?
 25 **A. On a control information form.**

Page 53

1 Q. Then what would they do with that control information
 2 form?
 3 **A. That would be written out by whoever was taking the**
 4 **information and a slip would be kept on the command**
 5 **unit. Ordinarily, you'd transmit the message by radio,**
 6 **but you've also got a hard copy of the FSG call as well.**
 7 Q. You say you didn't go onto command unit 7; did you come
 8 to know during the night of how FSG messages were coming
 9 in to CU7?
 10 **A. Coming in, no. I assumed they were all coming from**
 11 **control.**
 12 Q. Did you come to know during the night how FSG messages
 13 were being sent from command unit 7 to the bridgehead?
 14 **A. That was by runners and radio, a mix of both.**
 15 Q. How much detail did you come to know about that?
 16 **A. I guess enough detail to know that they were the two**
 17 **forms of what was happening. So once Group Manager Cook**
 18 **had informed me that CU7 had been set up as FSG, I went**
 19 **into the tower to observe that that system and process**
 20 **was happening.**
 21 Q. Did you come to discover that there was a watch manager
 22 standing outside the tower collating FSG information and
 23 sending it in to the tower?
 24 **A. No.**
 25 Q. Now, you say that you left the bridgehead, and just

Page 54

1 beyond the paragraph we are on, you say:
 2 "Richard WELCH continued on into the building while
 3 I attempted what we call a 360 to try and establish what
 4 was going on."
 5 Could you just tell us what a 360 is?
 6 **A. Yes. Effectively, that's just me trying to take in, for**
 7 **my situational awareness, an observation of the fire**
 8 **ground. Even though it might not be round, we walk**
 9 **round the fire ground, so it's, you know, a term we use,**
 10 **360.**
 11 Q. How far did you get?
 12 **A. I wasn't able to -- so I went from the south side**
 13 **around -- I went around to the playground, to the west**
 14 **side, towards the north. I wasn't able to get back**
 15 **around the north side because there was too much**
 16 **material and debris planing off the building at that**
 17 **point. So I went back around to the south side and**
 18 **walked up the east side to have a look.**
 19 Q. Did you have a fire ground radio with you?
 20 **A. I did.**
 21 Q. Did you have an Airwave radio with you?
 22 **A. Yes.**
 23 Q. Could you hear any messages coming over it at that time?
 24 **A. On both?**
 25 Q. On either.

Page 55

1 **A. I heard messages on my handheld radio but not on my**
 2 **Airwave radio.**
 3 Q. Did you hear any messages on your fire ground radio
 4 about anything particular that sticks in your mind while
 5 you were doing your 360?
 6 **A. Not at that point. I mean, it was still at that point**
 7 **very, very dynamic. There was an awful lot of people --**
 8 **so the radio traffic on channel 1 was very heavy.**
 9 Q. When you were doing your 360 or partial 360, as far as
 10 you could get, did you have any thoughts about full or
 11 partial evacuation of the tower at that point?
 12 **A. Not at that point because I hadn't got into the tower**
 13 **and I needed to get an awareness of what was happening**
 14 **and what we were doing.**
 15 Q. Could you see for yourself whether the fire had
 16 penetrated into flats?
 17 **A. That was difficult to say at the time. Obviously,**
 18 **I wasn't familiar with the block at all, and looking up**
 19 **from being quite close to the tower, I wasn't sure**
 20 **whether it was all windows and balconies. It appeared**
 21 **like it had got into the tower. There may have been**
 22 **a couple of flats. But that was really the only**
 23 **observation I had at that point, once I got back.**
 24 Q. Did you have any information as to the conditions of
 25 smoke or heat or fire inside the building at that point?

Page 56

1 A. No.

2 Q. Did you seek any information as to the conditions within

3 the building at that point?

4 A. **Not at that point, but then I had my handheld radio on**

5 **the fire ground channel, channel 1. I would have**

6 **probably picked up more of that on channel 6, which was**

7 **the BA channel. So, no.**

8 Q. Did you switch to channel 6 to try to find out what the

9 BA crews were saying?

10 A. **No, because at that point we were still trying to**

11 **establish the brief for Andy O'Loughlin to get down to**

12 **the tower, set up the fire sector and start committing**

13 **BA and getting as much information as we could to make**

14 **an attack on the fire and to get to as many FSG calls as**

15 **we could.**

16 Q. What did you learn from your partial 360?

17 A. **That we did have a very, very significant incident, and**

18 **I was still perplexed at how a building could be burning**

19 **like that on the exterior. And I think one of my**

20 **thoughts at that point was there must be a flammable**

21 **blanket wrapped around this building.**

22 **SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Mulholland, are you comfortable**

23 **carrying on?**

24 A. **Yes, I'm fine, yes. Just the tracking of the fire was**

25 **nothing -- I'd never ever seen anything like that in my**

Page 57

1 **whole career. I don't think cumulatively, with the**

2 **hundreds of years of experience we had at the fire**

3 **ground that night, I don't think anybody else had ever**

4 **seen what was happening.**

5 MR MILLETT: You go on to say in your statement at the

6 bottom of the page:

7 "I then went into the building to see Richard WELCH

8 at the Bridgehead ..."

9 I'm trying to give you a paragraph number. It is

10 not very easy. It is about four-fifths of the way down.

11 You have got it there:

12 "... which at that time was on the third floor."

13 Do you know how long the bridgehead had been on the

14 3rd floor for when you went in, just to give us an idea

15 of a time mark?

16 **A. I don't. I mean, that's the best recollection I have:**

17 **that it was on the 3rd floor. I don't know how long it**

18 **had been on the 3rd floor.**

19 Q. You say a few lines down from that:

20 "I got up to the 3rd floor and there were two Watch

21 Managers alongside Richard. Entry Control was there and

22 we had committed BA crews extensively into the building

23 at that stage. I obtained an update from Richard so

24 I could feed back to command unit as the radios weren't

25 working very well."

Page 58

1 Can you remember what the content of Richard Welch's

2 update was?

3 **A. Well, obviously, it was very dynamic at that point.**

4 **There was still a lot of BA on that mezzanine landing**

5 **being fed up the stairs.**

6 **Richard's update at that point was that we were**

7 **getting crews into the building up to some of the FSG**

8 **calls, and I observed over his shoulder while he was**

9 **talking to me that the entry control boards were**

10 **populated with tallies, which would tell me that BA**

11 **crews were committed. I basically just asked him -- it**

12 **would appear that we were going to be BA-intensive.**

13 **I mention that slightly later in my statement. But it**

14 **was more about the resources for me now. It was about**

15 **driving forward the resources to help with that plan**

16 **going forward to get into that building and get as many**

17 **people as we could.**

18 Q. Did you discuss the possibility with Richard Welch about

19 the need for EDDBA?

20 Sorry, that's a bad question. Can I rephrase the

21 question.

22 Did you have a discussion with Richard Welch at that

23 stage about the need for EDDBA?

24 **A. No, but I think the two of us being fairly experienced**

25 **officers, because we'd gone make pumps 40, we knew we**

Page 59

1 **were going to have a certain amount of FRUs on it, so we**

2 **would have EDDBA in attendance to utilise.**

3 Q. Did you have enough EDDBA in attendance at that stage, do

4 you think?

5 **A. It's hard to quantify if we had enough -- I mean, we had**

6 **EDDBA there; whether they were actually committed at that**

7 **time, I don't know. There was more FRUs asked for and,**

8 **obviously, as the incident escalated, more and more**

9 **EDDBAs came. But EDDBAs are only carried on FRUs. So at**

10 **that point, I hadn't noticed -- and this is to the best**

11 **of my recollection -- I don't believe EDDBA were**

12 **committed at that time.**

13 Q. Did you have a discussion with Richard Welch about how

14 far up into the tower you could get crews with SDBA,

15 standard?

16 **A. Not at that point, no.**

17 Q. Did you update Richard Welch with what you had seen on

18 the outside of the tower as a result of your partial

19 360?

20 **A. Yes, I believe so.**

21 Q. What did you tell him?

22 **A. I told him from when I had arrived the fire had now**

23 **tracked around to the north face and was burning across**

24 **that face of the building, and that was pretty much it.**

25 **It was obviously getting worse.**

Page 60

1 Q. Did you observe how fire survival guidance information
 2 was coming to the 3rd-floor bridgehead?
 3 **A. So I observed when I went into the tower there was**
 4 **a watch manager on my left-hand side of the lobby, Watch**
 5 **Manager Williams, and he was passing information up to**
 6 **Watch Manager Watson, I think it was at the time.**
 7 Q. You remember that, do you?
 8 **A. Sorry?**
 9 Q. You remember that, do you?
 10 **A. Yes. Yeah, yeah, I visibly remember seeing the two of**
 11 **them there. I can't recall the exact detail they were**
 12 **saying, but Watch Manager Williams was passing**
 13 **something, Watch Manager Watson was saying something**
 14 **back, and then Watch Manager Watson was going into --**
 15 **there was a single door on the 2nd-floor mezzanine and**
 16 **he was going in through there to hand on the FSG**
 17 **information to go to the bridgehead.**
 18 Q. At the bridgehead, did you observe for yourself how the
 19 entry control officer or the bridgehead commander were
 20 recording FSG information?
 21 **A. I don't remember physically taking note of how they were**
 22 **recording it. From memory, I recall a FIB being there.**
 23 Q. A FIB?
 24 **A. Forward information board, sorry, I beg your pardon.**
 25 **A forward information board.**

Page 61

1 **No, that was left to Richard to do that detail.**
 2 **I didn't have that conversation with him at that time.**
 3 Q. Did you see any fire survival guidance information being
 4 written on the wall by the bridgehead on the 3rd floor
 5 are?
 6 **A. The honest answer is I can't recall at that time.**
 7 **I went back in the building at a later date and saw**
 8 **writing on the wall. If I'm honest, I can't say it was**
 9 **at that first time I went in, but there was writing on**
 10 **the wall on the 3rd floor.**
 11 Q. Do you remember when you got to the bridgehead how FSG
 12 information was coming to those at the bridgehead?
 13 **A. From Watch Manager Watson up to the bridgehead, and that**
 14 **information was being disseminated to the entry control**
 15 **officers to brief the crews to commit into the building.**
 16 Q. Who was bringing the FSG, so far as you saw, at that
 17 point to the bridgehead? Was it Watch Manager Watson or
 18 was it the crews themselves that were being given
 19 information?
 20 **A. I can't recall that.**
 21 Q. Did you have any discussion with Richard Welch about the
 22 communication chain for FSG?
 23 **A. No, not at that point. I don't think we did.**
 24 Q. In your statement, you say -- I have just read it to
 25 you -- that you obtained an update from him, you say,

Page 62

1 "so I could feed back to command unit as the radios
 2 weren't working very well".
 3 First, which command unit are you referring to, CU7
 4 or CU8?
 5 **A. No, no, CU8. So I would go back into -- my feedbacks**
 6 **predominantly throughout this incident would go back to**
 7 **the incident command vehicle, not CU7.**
 8 Q. At that stage, did you know who was running CU8?
 9 **A. Sorry, as in -- do you mean who the incident commander**
 10 **was?**
 11 Q. No, who was running CU8? Who was in charge of CU8 at
 12 that point when you were having your update from
 13 Richard Welch at the bridgehead?
 14 **A. DAC O'Loughlin was incident commander.**
 15 Q. So he would be based on CU8, would he?
 16 **A. Yes.**
 17 Q. Then you say the radios weren't working very well. What
 18 was your experience at that point of the radios?
 19 **A. I think, to the best of my recollection, at that point**
 20 **it was just the amount of traffic that was trying to be**
 21 **transmitted over the channel.**
 22 Q. Which channel?
 23 **A. Channel 1, sorry.**
 24 Q. So those are the fire ground radios?
 25 **A. Fire ground.**

Page 63

1 Q. You then say at the top of page 6 of your statement that
 2 you returned to CU7, and you say:
 3 "When I returned to CU7 Tom GOODALL had been tasked
 4 to run the FSG which then told me that we were beginning
 5 to get further structure in place."
 6 At that stage, when you returned to CU7, could you
 7 see who was running FSGs in there?
 8 **A. No, sorry, this is actually an anomaly in my statement.**
 9 Q. I was wondering about that.
 10 **A. I think when I was giving the police -- I think I was**
 11 **verbalising the information I'd been given from Group**
 12 **Manager Cook. So it was Group Manager Cook told me that**
 13 **CU7 had been tasked as FSG vehicle, and that's how I had**
 14 **that information that Group Manager Goodall had been**
 15 **tasked with FSG, so we were getting further structure in**
 16 **place and Station Manager Egan was assisting him.**
 17 Q. That's Group Manager Matt Cook?
 18 **A. Group Manager Matt Cook, yes.**
 19 Q. So, as you said in your evidence this morning, you
 20 didn't go onto CU7?
 21 **A. Yes, I'm sorry, that's an anomaly in the statement, yes.**
 22 Q. Did Group Manager Matt Cook tell you what structure for
 23 FSG CU7 was running, what the system was?
 24 **A. No, only that he was in charge of it and he was**
 25 **facilitating it, and, like I say, I went into the lobby**

Page 64

1 **at that early stage to make sure the system and process**
 2 **were starting to work.**
 3 **It was so dynamic. That information had to get to**
 4 **the bridgehead so we could get BA crews into that**
 5 **building.**
 6 Q. I follow.
 7 Just so I'm clear, though, in your statement you
 8 have described what was happening with FSG in the first
 9 three lines of that paragraph. You say:
 10 "... GOODALL had been tasked to run the FSG which
 11 then told me that we were beginning to get further
 12 structure in place. He was being assisted by Dan
 13 EAGAN[sic] who is Station Manager and they were feeding
 14 information from the FSG CU into the lobby."
 15 Do I take it from what you have just told us that
 16 all of that in your statement is something you were told
 17 by Group Manager Matt Cook rather than seeing it for
 18 yourself?
 19 **A. Yes, although the last bit about the lobby, I obviously**
 20 **observed that bit because that was the bit that I picked**
 21 **up on the FSG chain on, was from the lobby going to the**
 22 **bridgehead.**
 23 Q. I know I have asked you this before, but just revisiting
 24 it: did you become aware at some point during the night
 25 that a watch manager was operating on a car bonnet and

Page 65

1 then bins under the covered area a system of fire
 2 survival guidance information which was then being run
 3 into the tower by a runner?
 4 **A. No, I didn't.**
 5 Q. Your say in the next sentence:
 6 "My role was to continue to revisit the fire ground
 7 and report back to the Command Unit."
 8 Again, I'm assuming that's CU8.
 9 Did you report back to the command unit what you had
 10 learnt from Group Manager Matt Cook about the fire
 11 survival guidance methods or system that you have
 12 described in your statement there?
 13 **A. No, I didn't. Group Manager Cook would probably have**
 14 **relayed that to CU8 if he had been present when that had**
 15 **been established as the fire survival guidance.**
 16 Q. You say:
 17 "My role was to continue to revisit the fire ground
 18 and report back ..."
 19 How did you report back?
 20 **A. When I could, over the fire ground radio, channel 1.**
 21 **Predominantly, it was face to face, having to leave the**
 22 **tower and go back to the command unit to give situation**
 23 **updates to the incident command chain.**
 24 Q. When you couldn't get contact through the radio, you
 25 would run up and down, would you, or walk up and down?

Page 66

1 **A. Yes, I would try and move as quickly as I could, yes.**
 2 Q. At the top of page 6, just in the next sentence, in
 3 fact, you say:
 4 "The thread of the whole of my notes reflects this.
 5 I was back and forth, back and forth either checking the
 6 tactical plan was in place, supporting other sectors or
 7 carrying out a task I may have been assigned such as
 8 giving resource update and so on."
 9 You are describing here, I suspect, the whole night;
 10 is that right?
 11 **A. Yes.**
 12 Q. Encapsulating it?
 13 **A. Yes. Probably poorly.**
 14 Q. What was the tactical plan as it evolved that you were
 15 referring to there?
 16 **A. I think the tactical plan on the night obviously was**
 17 **predominantly the tower, for obvious reasons. It was**
 18 **just initially, I think, to extinguish the fire as best**
 19 **we could and get to as many FSG calls that we could**
 20 **physically get to to help as many residents as we could**
 21 **that were in that dire situation.**
 22 **As it went on, there was an element, I think, of**
 23 **fighting the fire to get to the FSG calls, and then**
 24 **later on, as much as we could in terms of putting safety**
 25 **in for our own personnel, it was a rescue mission.**

Page 67

1 Q. Did you ever become aware of any particular plan to get
 2 information about deployments of BA wearers back to the
 3 control room in some way?
 4 **A. Sorry, could you repeat that?**
 5 Q. Yes. Let me see if I can get at it this way. Can I ask
 6 you to look at LFB 790, which you told us earlier you
 7 were familiar with from training. I would like to ask
 8 you to look, please, at paragraph 9, which is on page 5
 9 internally.
 10 This is paragraph 9 of FSG, 790. This is the
 11 edition or version which was current as of April 2014
 12 and, so far as we know, current as at the night of the
 13 Grenfell Tower fire. 9 says "Communication with
 14 Control". Paragraph 9.1 says:
 15 "It is vital that control is kept informed of the
 16 actions being taken to resolve each FSG call. The fact
 17 that control is aware of the actions being carried out
 18 on the incident ground will greatly enhance the advice
 19 given to FSG callers."
 20 First of all, were you aware of or alive to this
 21 policy requirement as at the night of the Grenfell Tower
 22 fire?
 23 **A. I am aware of that policy document, yes.**
 24 Q. Did the tactical plan that you have referred to involve
 25 a plan by which control was kept informed of the actions

Page 68

1 being taken to resolve each FSG call as per
 2 paragraph 9.1 of this policy?
 3 **A. I wasn't aware that control weren't being informed.**
 4 Q. You weren't aware that they weren't being informed?
 5 **A. No.**
 6 Q. Did you take steps yourself to make sure that
 7 paragraph 9.1 was being complied with in your role as
 8 ORT?
 9 **A. The honest answer is no, because at that stage of**
 10 **the night, it was critical to have that incident**
 11 **resourced as much as we could to address the**
 12 **firefighting tactical plan and to have the resources**
 13 **ready to be deployed to try and get to as many people as**
 14 **we could. So --**
 15 Q. Ignoring --
 16 **A. -- that was my --**
 17 Q. I'm so sorry.
 18 **A. That was my focus at that time, and I deemed that to be**
 19 **critical.**
 20 Q. Ignoring the firefighting tactical plan for the moment,
 21 and just focusing on deployments to try to get as many
 22 people as you could, was it important -- or, in the
 23 words of the policy, vital -- to keep control informed
 24 about the results of particular deployments so that
 25 control would know, to be able to advise callers, about

Page 69

1 whether crews were in fact on their way to rescue them
 2 or not?
 3 **A. It may have helped, but I think the amount of FSG calls**
 4 **we were having at that point, to collate that**
 5 **accurately, transmit that back to control, with the**
 6 **amount of calls that they were taking, would have been**
 7 **a very, very difficult task, and I'm not sure how**
 8 **accurate the information might be that would go back.**
 9 Q. To your knowledge, did anybody set about a task of
 10 trying to establish whether paragraph 9.1 of the policy
 11 was being adhered to?
 12 **A. Not to my knowledge, no.**
 13 Q. To your knowledge, did anybody try to establish a system
 14 of ensuring that paragraph 9.1 of this policy was
 15 adhered to?
 16 **A. I think initially when I went into the tower**
 17 **I observed -- sorry, not when I first went into the**
 18 **tower; at some point when I was in the tower, when there**
 19 **was rescues being effected and residents coming out,**
 20 **I did observe Watch Manager Williams have a conversation**
 21 **either with a crew or a resident, and that was recorded**
 22 **on the wall. So maybe I made the assumption that**
 23 **details were being recorded and being sent back.**
 24 **But I think the difficult thing for me is I didn't**
 25 **stay in one place on that fire ground and I couldn't**

Page 70

1 **take over every single role, and I didn't sit within the**
 2 **FSG command chain. So -- does that answer the question?**
 3 **SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.**
 4 MR MILLETT: At paragraph 9.2 of the policy, it requires:
 5 "Informative messages from the incident ground
 6 should also contain an update on progress relating to
 7 those specific FSG calls by both the flat/house number
 8 to avoid confusion."
 9 Do you know whether anybody took steps to find out
 10 whether the informative messages from the incident
 11 ground did contain the information required by the
 12 policy here?
 13 **A. I don't know the answer to that. I think you'd be best**
 14 **placed asking someone that was on the incident command**
 15 **vehicle if that went. I'm not aware of the messages**
 16 **that went on that night.**
 17 Q. 9.3 says:
 18 "The outcome of every FSG call must be communicated
 19 to control."
 20 Again, same set of questions: to your knowledge, do
 21 you know whether anybody took any steps to ensure that
 22 the outcome of every FSG call was communicated to
 23 control from the incident ground?
 24 **A. No, I don't, but, again, I never expected to ever go to**
 25 **an incident where we were going to have over 130 FSG**

Page 71

1 **calls. My interpretation of that policy would be it**
 2 **would be difficult to manage that amount of FSG calls at**
 3 **one single incident.**
 4 Q. Did anybody attempt to or discuss the idea of standing
 5 back and looking at whether or not the outcome of
 6 particular deployments were sent back to the control
 7 room, and trying to work out whether a system could be
 8 devised for getting as much information back as
 9 possible?
 10 **A. I didn't. Again, you may be able to ask the officers**
 11 **that were on CU8. They may be able to backfill that and**
 12 **give some clarity on that. But not from where I was in**
 13 **the tower, watching the process of the FSGs coming in**
 14 **and the residents coming out.**
 15 Q. As ORT, whose task you told us earlier this morning was
 16 to audit compliance with policy, was it not your role or
 17 the ORT team's role to do their best to ensure that
 18 paragraphs 9.1 to 9.3, as we have looked at, in
 19 policy 790 were complied with?
 20 **A. Partly. However, at the risk of sounding repetitive, at**
 21 **a normal incident -- and that's probably using the wrong**
 22 **word -- I would expect to deal with three or four FSGs,**
 23 **max, which is quite an easy thing to do. I think the**
 24 **sheer number of FSG information that we had was very,**
 25 **very difficult -- and I'm probably underselling it --**

Page 72

1 very, very difficult to process, and I felt it was more
 2 important to get into that building, to get to as many
 3 people as we could and try to contain the fire to allow
 4 us to do that.

5 Q. Was there a point in time which came when you thought
 6 that the number of FSG calls would defeat any
 7 application of this policy?

8 **A. I think it significantly challenged it. It may be**
 9 **something we have to look at as a learning piece. But,**
 10 **yeah, it was difficult.**

11 Q. Perhaps I can put the question, and forgive me for
 12 putting it slightly more bluntly: did the ORT give up on
 13 securing adherence with this part of this policy before
 14 they'd even tried?

15 **A. I think that's a little unfair, to say we gave up. Like**
 16 **I say, it was challenging. I wasn't in the bridgehead**
 17 **all the time. I had many other roles to carry out on**
 18 **the fire ground in terms of giving updates. I wasn't**
 19 **sitting within the immediate FSG command chain. So**
 20 **I don't -- no, I don't think we gave up on it.**

21 Q. Can I then go back to the command structure.
 22 On page 6 of your statement, you describe bumping
 23 into Matt Cook outside the tower. Just so I can show
 24 you where in the statement you say that, it is three
 25 paragraphs from the bottom. You say he told you that

Page 73

1 Andy Roe had been made incident commander.
 2 Do you see that?

3 **A. Yes.**

4 Q. Do you know roughly what time that was?

5 **A. I don't, but, again, I'm sure a message was sent over**
 6 **the radio saying that AC Roe was now incident commander.**
 7 **So that would give a timestamp.**

8 Q. You are right about that. There is an informative
 9 message confirming he is IC at 02.44. For our
 10 reference, it is page 23 of the short incident log.
 11 Do you know whether Matt Cook's information to you
 12 was before or after the informative message?

13 **A. I genuinely don't know. All I can assume is at the**
 14 **point that happened, Matt had maybe been back at CU8**
 15 **after doing a task and had found that information out.**
 16 **So when we came together at the top of Grenfell Road, he**
 17 **informed me of that.**

18 Q. Do you remember whether Matt Cook told you anything
 19 about a change in the stay-put advice?

20 **A. Yeah, Matt Cook did tell me the stay put had changed,**
 21 **but from the best of my recollection, it wasn't at the**
 22 **same time as this information exchange.**

23 Q. When was it? Do you remember?

24 **A. It's difficult to say. I would say approximately 10 to**
 25 **15 minutes after that.**

Page 74

1 Q. Was there a discussion of that change on any of
 2 the occasions when you went back to CU8 to update them?

3 **A. Sorry, could you repeat that?**

4 Q. It is my fault. It is a bad question.
 5 Was the subject of the change in the stay-put advice
 6 mentioned by you or discussed with you on any of
 7 the occasions when you went back to CU8 to update them?

8 **A. No, because Group Manager Cook informed me that stay put**
 9 **had changed. I believe I was coming back in from the**
 10 **west side at that point when I saw him in the south-west**
 11 **corner. He told me that the FSG advice -- sorry, the**
 12 **stay-put advice had changed. He had been into the tower**
 13 **and informed the bridgehead it had changed. I may have**
 14 **acknowledged it when I went back to CU8 to say, "I know,**
 15 **I'm aware it's now changed and the residents are coming**
 16 **out".**

17 Q. If we go to your statement on page 8, if I can just run
 18 forward to that, and look towards the bottom of that
 19 page, you can see that, about seven lines up from the
 20 bottom, you say:
 21 "At this point we had SDBA on the 4th and 5th floor
 22 and EDDBA crews on the 11th, fire-fighting and conducting
 23 search and rescue. In my mind, from what I was hearing
 24 we are now starting to penetrate further up the
 25 building. So I went back to give that update to the

Page 75

1 Incident Commander. I believe that this update was
 2 recorded."

3 Can I be clear, was this an update to CU8?

4 **A. Yes, all my updates were to CU8 and the incident**
 5 **commander.**

6 Q. Was this information information that you had taken
 7 directly from the bridgehead, do you think?

8 **A. Yes.**

9 Q. Do you remember who at the bridgehead?

10 **A. I can't remember exactly who, but it would either have**
 11 **been Group Manager Welch or Group Manager Goulbourne.**
 12 **It would be one of those two people and no one else.**

13 Q. Do you remember where the bridgehead was at that point?

14 **A. I think it was ground floor.**

15 Q. We have got a record in Andy Roe's log, if I can ask for
 16 that to be shown to you, MET00005404, page 3.
 17 Can I just ask you to look at that. There's a time
 18 mark of 04.22, which is about a quarter of the way down
 19 the page:
 20 "Mick Mulholland (MM) gives update; Crews up to 10th
 21 floor in EDDBA. [SDBA] 4th and 5th floors. 7th, 8th and
 22 9th floor considering using aerial. EDDBA is being used
 23 quickly."
 24 Is that the update that you are referring to, do you
 25 think, that you are referring to in your statement?

Page 76

1 **A. It could be. If I'm honest, I don't ever remember**
 2 **mentioning anything about an aerial.**
 3 Q. No, you're right?
 4 **A. That could be feasible that's my update. The fact that**
 5 **I'm having a few issues with time, this is probably**
 6 **helpful because I did do quite a few updates back to the**
 7 **command unit, so hopefully that timestamp will help in**
 8 **terms of time.**
 9 **So, yes, it is feasible. I'm not -- the aerial**
 10 **is -- I don't have a recollection of mentioning anything**
 11 **about an aerial. It just wouldn't have been possible.**
 12 Q. To be clear, does this mean that the 10th floor was the
 13 highest floor being reached by BA wearers at this time?
 14 **A. I would suggest yes, but for clarity, you'd probably**
 15 **need to speak to Group Manager Welch or Group Manager**
 16 **Goulbourne. But I would say yes.**
 17 Q. Are you saying yes because you remember it or are you
 18 saying yes because I have shown you the document?
 19 **A. I remember being told it. The fact that you've put**
 20 **04.22 on there and the crews are up to the 10th, that**
 21 **would suggest that's where they were in the building at**
 22 **that point.**
 23 Q. Do you have any recollection of being told or finding
 24 out that crews weren't being deployed above the
 25 15th floor at any point?

Page 77

1 **A. I have a vague recollection of a conversation with Group**
 2 **Manager Welch. I won't be able to timestamp it for you.**
 3 **I will be able to tell you it was on the ground-floor**
 4 **lobby, and I believe I'd gone to get an update or to see**
 5 **if they were all right, and I think a crew had just come**
 6 **out. I can't be 100 per cent sure if it was the 15th or**
 7 **13th, but the crew informed him that it was like**
 8 **a furnace up there.**
 9 Q. Do you happen to remember which station the crew had
 10 come from?
 11 **A. No.**
 12 Q. You don't know who the crew were?
 13 **A. No. The BA crew weren't present at that point. It was**
 14 **probably moments after they'd moved off.**
 15 **SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Millett, how are you getting on?**
 16 MR MILLETT: Very well. I have about 15 or 20 minutes left.
 17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm just wondering whether it would
 18 be good to have a break.
 19 MR MILLETT: Yes, we can break.
 20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would that be a good time?
 21 MR MILLETT: Yes, perfectly good time.
 22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you like another break,
 23 Mr Mulholland? We have been going about an hour.
 24 THE WITNESS: Okay, no problem.
 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We will break now and have

Page 78

1 a slightly longer break and resume at 12 noon.
 2 Don't talk to anyone about your evidence.
 3 THE WITNESS: No.
 4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Go with the usher.
 5 12 o'clock, then, please.
 6 (11.45 am)
 7 (A short break)
 8 (12.03 pm)
 9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Mulholland. Happy to
 10 keep going? Thank you.
 11 MR MILLETT: Can I ask you, please, to be shown a picture,
 12 which is MET0005774.
 13 This is a photograph of the wall which Watch Manager
 14 Williams was writing on, and he was writing fire
 15 survival guidance information on it. At the very top of
 16 the wall, it says, you will see:
 17 "Above 10 EDDBA.
 18 "Below 10 SDBA."
 19 Watch Manager Williams told us that he didn't write
 20 that; he thinks that was Pete Wolfenden, Watch Manager
 21 Wolfenden.
 22 Does that trigger a recollection in your mind about
 23 a division between EDDBA deployments and SDBA
 24 deployments?
 25 **A. I remember seeing it on the wall. It doesn't trigger**

Page 79

1 **a memory of how we were divvying up the deployments, no.**
 2 Q. Can I just take you back to something earlier which
 3 I had, I'm sorry, failed to put to you, and should have
 4 done.
 5 If you go to page 3 of your statement, just below
 6 halfway down, you have got a description of fire
 7 survival guidance calls and what they are, and
 8 prioritisation there, and then in the next paragraph you
 9 say:
 10 "I don't know how many we actually took but I do
 11 remember en route there were several FSG called relayed
 12 to the fire ground. I was trying to keep a mental
 13 not[e] of the number because I was driving and couldn't
 14 write anything down. Nor did I wish to pull over as
 15 I needed to get to the incident as soon as possible.
 16 I probably counted 7 or 8 on my fingers as I was
 17 driving. To the best of my recollection I would say
 18 most of them were between the 10th and 22nd floor."
 19 I have given you the whole of that to give the
 20 context to my question.
 21 When you say, "To the best of my recollection
 22 I would say most of them were between the 10th and 22nd
 23 floor", was that information that you were receiving
 24 whilst en route?
 25 **A. It was information that was being transmitted over the**

Page 80

<p>1 main scheme radio.</p> <p>2 Q. While you were en route?</p> <p>3 A. Yes.</p> <p>4 Q. Did you evaluate that information or did you use that</p> <p>5 information when putting together your tactical plan?</p> <p>6 A. I'm sorry, my tactical plan or --</p> <p>7 Q. Or the tactical plan.</p> <p>8 A. It was used inasmuch as that information had been passed</p> <p>9 already into the tower and crews had already been</p> <p>10 committed to the tower.</p> <p>11 Q. Can I just explore that a little bit.</p> <p>12 From your knowledge and your involvement, the</p> <p>13 information that most of the FSG calls were coming from</p> <p>14 floors between 10 and 22, was that information used in</p> <p>15 developing an overall tactical plan or strategy?</p> <p>16 A. I wouldn't say most of the calls were coming between the</p> <p>17 10th and 22nd. Maybe that's poor language. Just in</p> <p>18 that snapshot in time en route to the incident, to the</p> <p>19 best of my recollection, the seven FSG calls I heard</p> <p>20 seemed to be within those floors.</p> <p>21 Q. Yes.</p> <p>22 A. I think there were FSGs coming in on other floors as</p> <p>23 well.</p> <p>24 Q. From what we have seen, it's correct to say that, at the</p> <p>25 time you were en route, most of the FSG calls were</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 81</p>	<p>1 Q. As part of this tactical plan being developed based on</p> <p>2 in part this information, FSG calls from higher floors,</p> <p>3 what thought was given to the need to have the right</p> <p>4 number of EDDBA wearers there?</p> <p>5 A. The thought was definitely given to having EDDBA wearers</p> <p>6 there. Geographically, our EDDBA on front-line</p> <p>7 appliances are carried on all FRUs that are</p> <p>8 strategically placed across the London area, so they may</p> <p>9 have longer travel times. But I believe there was</p> <p>10 a message sent at some point to make FRUs 10, and</p> <p>11 obviously as the incident escalated or sometime during</p> <p>12 the incident, I think we had our whole entire Protective</p> <p>13 Equipment Group of air supply at the job.</p> <p>14 So I don't believe at any point there was an issue</p> <p>15 with us not having enough or running out of BA, whether</p> <p>16 that be SDBA or EDDBA.</p> <p>17 Q. We were discussing prioritisation a minute ago,</p> <p>18 prioritisation of FSG calls.</p> <p>19 Do you know whether any prioritisation of FSG calls</p> <p>20 was taking place, to your knowledge?</p> <p>21 A. I can't speak for CU7 because, as I said earlier,</p> <p>22 I didn't go on CU7.</p> <p>23 I recall overhearing a conversation in the lobby</p> <p>24 between Watch Manager Williams and -- I can't remember,</p> <p>25 sorry, the other person. But he had control information</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 83</p>
<p>1 between the 10th and the 22nd floor, so I'm not seeking</p> <p>2 to challenge that or correct it in any way.</p> <p>3 But on the basis that that's correct, my question</p> <p>4 is: did that information -- the fact that FSG calls were</p> <p>5 coming in from the top half of the building, if you</p> <p>6 like -- feed in to the tactical plan that was being put</p> <p>7 together?</p> <p>8 A. Yes, inasmuch as, once you've got that FSG information,</p> <p>9 we would commit BA crews to those flats as quickly and</p> <p>10 expediently as we can. So, yes, it would take part of</p> <p>11 the tactical plan.</p> <p>12 Q. Does that mean that there was some kind of</p> <p>13 prioritisation of rescues on the higher floors as part</p> <p>14 of the tactical plan that you were developing?</p> <p>15 A. There was prioritisation after I got there. I don't</p> <p>16 think I could answer you honestly -- I'm sure there was,</p> <p>17 but obviously this was me en route, so I couldn't</p> <p>18 confirm that that happened, but I'm sure there would be.</p> <p>19 I mean, everybody that serves in London Fire Brigade</p> <p>20 realises how important, significant an FSG call is, and</p> <p>21 they will do their level best to get to where they can</p> <p>22 get to if they can get there.</p> <p>23 So I guess in answer to your question, I'm sure it</p> <p>24 was, but I wasn't at the incident, so I couldn't say to</p> <p>25 you 100 per cent: yes, that happened.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 82</p>	<p>1 forms and they were looking at the information on it and</p> <p>2 trying to get information on the wall to prioritise to</p> <p>3 send up to the bridgehead.</p> <p>4 Q. Who would you have expected to be taking responsibility</p> <p>5 for prioritisation of FSG calls?</p> <p>6 A. Again, that's a very difficult question to answer. You</p> <p>7 know, in an ideal world, at a fairly normal incident,</p> <p>8 that would probably sit with your FSG co-ordinator, in</p> <p>9 terms of how he's briefed people to do that. But the</p> <p>10 level of calls we were getting in was just nothing we'd</p> <p>11 ever witnessed before. We'd never had to deal with</p> <p>12 anything like this. And the system, in terms of it</p> <p>13 transferring to bridgehead, was working. You know, that</p> <p>14 information was going to the bridgehead.</p> <p>15 Q. Is there a policy -- or at least a practice, if not</p> <p>16 a policy -- as to who normally is responsible for</p> <p>17 prioritisation of multiple FSG calls?</p> <p>18 A. Again, I would say that -- again, it would sit with an</p> <p>19 FSG co-ordinator.</p> <p>20 Q. Right.</p> <p>21 A. But I guess, how do we -- I don't understand necessarily</p> <p>22 how we describe multiple FSG calls. I think it would be</p> <p>23 a much easier task to undertake if you had seven or</p> <p>24 eight. If you get 135, that makes that task</p> <p>25 significantly more difficult.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 84</p>

1 Q. Can I then ask you to look at page 6 of your statement,
 2 where about a third of the way down you refer to
 3 Richard Welch requesting more BA. Do you see?
 4 The paragraph starts -- just to be fair to you,
 5 I will give you the full context. You say:
 6 "I got back into the building and got back up to see
 7 Richard WELCH again. I believe we were still at the
 8 3rd floor at this point. We had a conversation about
 9 how he was making progress. I established there was
 10 only one staircase and it was quite narrow and then
 11 I again had another conversation with Richard about BA
 12 because it was becoming very clear that it was going to
 13 be BA intensive and we were going to chew through a lot
 14 of breathing apparatus. He requested more BA so I left
 15 the building to see whether we had set up a BA sector
 16 I saw there were 8 EDDBA wearers standing there."
 17 Pausing there, where was --
 18 **A. They were standing outside -- at that point, there had**
 19 **been a marshalling area set up outside the south**
 20 **entrance and -- this is an estimation -- I think it was**
 21 **approximately 20 BA wearers standing outside, but there**
 22 **was also BA wearers still inside the tower that hadn't**
 23 **been committed. So that about he needs more BA, I hope**
 24 **that's not interpreted as we haven't got any BA; we did,**
 25 **it was just about me going out and, again, how I was**

Page 85

1 **resourcing the bridgehead to aid the incident plan. So**
 2 **I spoke to the EDDBA crews and got them to go in to the**
 3 **bridgehead.**
 4 Q. Let's just take this in stages.
 5 First of all, was anybody marshalling the EDDBA
 6 wearers in the marshalling area?
 7 **A. Yes, there was.**
 8 Q. Do you know who it was?
 9 **A. It was Watch Manager -- I'm not 100 per cent certain.**
 10 **I think it might have been Watch Manager Brown, but I'm**
 11 **not 100 per cent certain on that.**
 12 Q. Is that Stewart Brown?
 13 **A. Yes.**
 14 Q. Did you have a conversation with Watch Manager Brown, if
 15 it was him?
 16 **A. I vaguely remember a conversation, but I can't recall**
 17 **the detail of it, I'm sorry.**
 18 Q. Were you able to identify who the eight BA wearers were,
 19 or any one of them?
 20 **A. No.**
 21 Q. Did you speak to the eight or one of their number?
 22 **A. No. I believe that conversation was with Watch Manager**
 23 **Brown. I just said, "I need to take these BA wearers in**
 24 **to the bridgehead", and they followed me in.**
 25 Q. What happened next? Did you take them up to the

Page 86

1 bridgehead?
 2 **A. Yes. Yeah -- well, no, actually, I didn't take them to**
 3 **the bridgehead. It was obvious, because there was still**
 4 **a line of BA wearers on the mezzanine floor, and I just**
 5 **told them to follow the line up to the mezzanine floor**
 6 **and report to Group Manager Welch, "Let him know you've**
 7 **come into the building".**
 8 Q. So did they join the back of the queue?
 9 **A. They may well have done after they spoke to Group**
 10 **Manager Welch. I told them to go and speak to Group**
 11 **Manager Welch. If Group Manager Welch decided not to**
 12 **deploy them, that would be his call running the fire**
 13 **sector.**
 14 Q. Where was Group Manager Welch standing at this point?
 15 Was he at the bridgehead?
 16 **A. I didn't see him when I went back into the tower, so I'm**
 17 **going to make the assumption that he was at the**
 18 **bridgehead, yes.**
 19 Q. Just trying to get a time mark on this discussion with
 20 the eight EDDBA wearers, at that point, were you aware of
 21 who the incident commander was?
 22 **A. Yes, DAC O'Loughlin -- sorry, I beg your pardon.**
 23 **Timestamp. It's difficult. Is there any other times we**
 24 **can look at to help with --**
 25 Q. Yes. We are told that Andy Roe became incident

Page 87

1 commander at 02.44 or so, give or take a few seconds.
 2 Do you think that this discussion with these EDDBA
 3 wearers was before or after that?
 4 **A. It's difficult to answer. I'd say maybe before.**
 5 Q. Can I just ask you to look at paragraph 9 of your
 6 statement --
 7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Page 9?
 8 MR MILLETT: I'm so sorry, Mr Chairman, you're quite right,
 9 page 9. In the third paragraph you say:
 10 "I revisited the Bridgehead again to find out how
 11 things were going. They told me that conditions were
 12 still challenging for the crews and I asked them what
 13 their resource requirement was because we were using
 14 EDDBA and SDBA and whether there would be any challenge
 15 for us in terms of still being able to do that longer
 16 term. They told me they would need 20 EDDBA and 15 SDBA
 17 an hour. They currently had SDBA on the 6th and 7th
 18 floors and EDDBA on the 11th and 12th floors."
 19 Now, do you remember from the top of your head what
 20 sort of time that revisit of the bridgehead took
 21 place?
 22 **A. No, I don't have an exact time. The bridgehead was**
 23 **definitely on the ground floor.**
 24 Q. Let me just see if I can help. This is not a memory
 25 test and I'm perhaps being a bit unfair on you in asking

Page 88

1 you to remember it.
 2 If you go, please, to AC Roe's log, which is
 3 MET00005404.
 4 At the top, you will see 04.53, "MM: resources
 5 update ..."
 6 This is you, I'm assuming, MM:
 7 "... currently using 20 x EDDBA & 15 SDBA per hour.
 8 EDDBA on 11th and 12 floors. SDBA on 6th and 7th
 9 floors."
 10 Does that help you with the timing?
 11 **A. Yes, that would be a good example of one of the updates**
 12 **I provided to AC Roe, and as he had a loggist on the**
 13 **command unit, I would have to say that that's an**
 14 **accurate reflection of what's happening.**
 15 Q. When you use "using 20 x EDDBA & 15 SDBA per hour", is
 16 that the rate of deployment governed by the available
 17 wearers or is it the rate of use of the equipment?
 18 **A. That's my words in the -- I think it's more a projection**
 19 **of what they thought they were going to use. There was**
 20 **obviously still BA in the tower. I think that was**
 21 **a projection given so we could start future planning for**
 22 **BA resources that need to come on in terms of getting**
 23 **charged cylinders back and all that. So I think a**
 24 **projection of 35 an hour.**
 25 Q. It says EDDBA on 11th and 12th floors. Does that help

Page 89

1 you recall how far up in the building at that point any
 2 BA wearer -- EDDBA or SDBA -- was getting?
 3 **A. I would suggest that indicates that they were at the**
 4 **12th floor.**
 5 Q. While we are on this, can I just pick something up with
 6 you. You say -- or someone says in the last line
 7 there -- I think this is the loggist who has logged
 8 this:
 9 "CU staff report building plans should be in fire
 10 box in lobby."
 11 Do you remember there being any discussion about
 12 looking for building plans in the fire box in the lobby?
 13 **A. No, I don't.**
 14 Q. Did you know whether there was a fire box in the lobby?
 15 **A. I don't recall seeing a fire box in the lobby.**
 16 Q. Did you look for one?
 17 **A. No, I didn't personally, no.**
 18 Q. Would that not have been important as part of an overall
 19 tactical plan, to see if there was a fire box and see
 20 what its contents are?
 21 **A. Yes, ordinarily you'd like to think that the first crews**
 22 **arriving would have that as their on-arrival tactics.**
 23 **I think, with the greatest respect, at 5 o'clock in**
 24 **the morning -- I guess what I'm trying to say, them**
 25 **plans would have been more useful earlier on if they had**

Page 90

1 **been obtained. I'm not sure how that would have helped**
 2 **necessarily with the tactical plan at 5 o'clock in the**
 3 **morning.**
 4 Q. That leads to another question: do you know what
 5 prompted the discussion about building plans being in
 6 the fire box?
 7 **A. No. I wasn't in the command unit, so I can only assume**
 8 **that that conversation was recorded around the time that**
 9 **I'd given my update. But my update generally was given**
 10 **from the door. I don't know who would have been having**
 11 **the conversation about it.**
 12 Q. At the foot of page 9, you say, just above the list of
 13 senior officers, "I again did my own ORT evaluation" and
 14 set out the structure, and then you list the structure.
 15 Where did you get that information from, do you
 16 remember?
 17 **A. About the structure?**
 18 Q. Yes.
 19 **A. So that structure would appear on the command unit, on**
 20 **the command support system. But then, going around the**
 21 **fire ground, you could then directly observe that those**
 22 **officers were in place and carrying out those roles.**
 23 **I believe that's something I did simultaneously with my**
 24 **colleague Group Manager Cook.**
 25 Q. When you say "something I did", does that mean it was

Page 91

1 you who put that command structure in place?
 2 **A. No, that would be the incident commander's**
 3 **responsibility. Sorry, that's probably a poor choice of**
 4 **words.**
 5 Q. So which incident commander put the structure that you
 6 have referred to there in place, do you remember?
 7 **A. No, I don't. I mean, it could be incremental because,**
 8 **obviously, as the incident increases and you get more**
 9 **and more officers, some of that could have been put in**
 10 **by DAC O'Loughlin and then it could have been further**
 11 **strengthened by AC Roe, or it might be that AC Roe put**
 12 **it all in. You'd have to talk to someone on CU8 to get**
 13 **clarification in relation to that.**
 14 Q. You will see at the bottom:
 15 "Command Support DAC DRAWBRIDGE ..."
 16 Do you know when he appeared on the incident ground?
 17 **A. Time-wise, no. I mean, I'm sure it would be on the end**
 18 **of incident log, but I'm not sure what time**
 19 **DAC Drawbridge arrived, no.**
 20 Q. What was his role?
 21 **A. His role was -- he was on a command unit remote from the**
 22 **job and effectively had a logistical role. So he would**
 23 **have been overseeing -- this would be off the back of**
 24 **our major incident, in terms of supporting back-of-house**
 25 **business as usual, crews coming back on the following**

Page 92

1 **morning, how we would have deployed to the incident. So**
 2 **he was involved in doing resources, marshalling, the**
 3 **relief plan and BA. So he would open up all those**
 4 **communication links to talk to those people to make sure**
 5 **that that was still going on in the background to help**
 6 **resource the incident.**
 7 Q. I see. You refer to this I think at the top of page 10
 8 of your statement, where you in the fourth line say that
 9 the "back of the house" support was running.
 10 You have used that expression just now; what is
 11 "back of the house"?
 12 **A. It is probably a poor explanation from me. It's just**
 13 **about – it is not the front line of LFB; it is about us**
 14 **sorting out, you know, like I say, our resources. You**
 15 **have a shift-change coming up the next morning. You**
 16 **have to look at where the appliances were going to come.**
 17 **We were having reliefs, how we were going to get the**
 18 **reliefs in. It was doing all that pre-planning for**
 19 **hours ahead.**
 20 Q. You say it was another command unit; was that CU1?
 21 **A. Yes, it was.**
 22 Q. That was I think on Bramley Road; is that right?
 23 **A. That rings a bell, but I can't be 100 per cent certain.**
 24 Q. We actually have an arrival time for CU1 of 02.59.36, so
 25 just before 3 am.

Page 93

1 Do you remember when it was that you first went to
 2 check on them, or to check with them?
 3 **A. I don't remember the time. I do remember coming back**
 4 **from CU1 at one point and giving an update to AC Roe, who**
 5 **that may well be logged on his loggist, if that helps.**
 6 **But I don't think I would be able to give a time.**
 7 Q. What was the line of communication between CU8, which is
 8 where Andy Roe was, and the rest of the commanders, and
 9 CU1?
 10 **A. I'm not sure. I think via radio, but I can't confirm**
 11 **that.**
 12 Q. On page 10, two-thirds of the way down, you explain that
 13 you were relieved by Group Manager Simpson and Group
 14 Manager Cane, I think; is that right?
 15 **A. Yes.**
 16 Q. We have got their arrival times as 07.21 am on 14 June.
 17 That's in LFB document number 2.
 18 Does that sound about right to you?
 19 **A. Possibly. At that stage, I remember it was daylight.**
 20 **I'm not going to be able to give you any more accurate**
 21 **than that.**
 22 Q. You say in your statement, two-thirds of the way down
 23 page 10, looking at the last paragraph on the screen
 24 which starts "We weren't resource intensive":
 25 "Unbeknown to us upon their arrival they too

Page 94

1 conducted a walk round to establish situational
 2 awareness before the hand-over was carried out. We
 3 informed AC ROE that we were going to conduct a handover
 4 and then took GM SIMPSON and GM CANE on a walk round the
 5 fire ground which took quite a while as they had to take
 6 in quite a lot of information."
 7 On that walk, did you explain what the tactical plan
 8 was at that stage?
 9 **A. We spoke about a tactical plan. I think they might have**
 10 **had that information off CU8 before we walked around.**
 11 **But we certainly spoke about still committing to the**
 12 **building and working up the floors to get to the flats.**
 13 Q. I see.
 14 You refer a bit lower down to what the priorities of
 15 the incident commander were, just in the second-last
 16 line there. You say:
 17 "We literally did the whole ground with them and
 18 basically highlighted what the current tactical plan
 19 was, resourcing, what the priorities of the Incident
 20 Commander were and the status of the incident relief."
 21 What were the incident command priorities that you
 22 explained to them at that point?
 23 **A. We were still trying to get up the tower at that stage.**
 24 **I can't remember what floor we were on, but the**
 25 **priorities were to get into as many flats as we can and**

Page 95

1 **extinguish as much of the fire as we could, because**
 2 **there was fire breaking out in different flats, to try**
 3 **to do that. Still keep an eye on the FSG calls, even**
 4 **though they had stopped, I believe, at that point.**
 5 **There was searching going on.**
 6 **And the bit about the incident relief, I'm not**
 7 **sure – I don't know if I'm referring to the fact that**
 8 **maybe the incident relief hadn't been completed, was**
 9 **being completed. Because from memory they put in a 20**
 10 **or 25-pump relief. That might be what I'm referencing**
 11 **there.**
 12 Q. When you refer to incident relief, do you mean pumps
 13 being replaced by new oncoming pumps?
 14 **A. Yes.**
 15 Q. Would you just give me one second.
 16 Can I ask you to look, please, at your exhibits.
 17 Now, you have 39 photographs which you have exhibited.
 18 I will just have the first page up on the screen, if
 19 I can.
 20 I just want to ask you one or two general questions
 21 about these photographs and then one or two specific
 22 questions.
 23 First of all, are all these exhibits photographs you
 24 took?
 25 **A. Yes.**

Page 96

1 Q. What did you take them on?
 2 **A. My mobile phone.**
 3 Q. Now, many of them are different photographs. Are you
 4 able to tell us what kind of timeframe you took them in?
 5 **A. The latter parts of the incident. So if I had to give**
 6 **an estimation, I would say maybe between 4.00 and 6.00.**
 7 **I'm not 100 per cent certain. I don't know whether the**
 8 **photographs have a timestamp on them.**
 9 Q. Not the ones we have, no.
 10 **A. Okay. To the best of my knowledge, to give an**
 11 **approximation, I would say maybe around that time.**
 12 Q. What prompted you to take those photographs?
 13 **A. That was an instruction I got from the commissioner.**
 14 **The commissioner asked me to go out and try and take as**
 15 **many photographs as I could --**
 16 Q. Right.
 17 **A. -- at the bridgehead and stairwells, which isn't an**
 18 **unusual request. We do generally take photographs at**
 19 **larger incidents for post-incident debrief, for**
 20 **learning, and obviously I'm assuming, with the severity**
 21 **of this incident, maybe to think about using it for**
 22 **possible outcomes of further investigation. But I'm**
 23 **paraphrasing there and maybe putting words in someone's**
 24 **mouth.**
 25 Q. Did you take them all at roughly the same time on, as it

Page 97

1 were, a photographic tour?
 2 **A. Yes, pretty much. I didn't stay in the building very**
 3 **long. It was literally a whirlwind: snap, snap, snap,**
 4 **snap, snap, snap, to capture it. I took some pictures**
 5 **of the bridgehead that was still being utilised and**
 6 **still quite busy, so I had to pick my moment. So it was**
 7 **literally getting in and taking the photographs as best**
 8 **I could and get out.**
 9 Q. Can I ask you to look, please, first at MET00018749.
 10 What is that?
 11 **A. That is a forward information board.**
 12 Q. Do you remember where you took that photograph of
 13 the forward information board?
 14 **A. No. There's a white wall behind it.**
 15 Q. Yes.
 16 **A. So I would suggest it was probably in the ground-floor**
 17 **lobby, but I can't be 100 per cent certain.**
 18 Q. We may be able to get there slightly more easily.
 19 Can you go, please, or be shown, MET00018724.
 20 I think I could probably answer this question
 21 myself, but I will ask you anyway: is that the same
 22 forward information board that we have seen in the
 23 previous picture I have just shown you?
 24 **A. It would be difficult to say to you 100 per cent, but**
 25 **I think it feasible to say that could be the same board.**

Page 98

1 **It might be, you know, the two halves.**
 2 Q. Fair enough.
 3 If you then go, please, to INQ00000235. It is not
 4 in this list.
 5 Now, we know that that's Watch Manager O'Keeffe
 6 descending the stairs at an unadjusted time of 03:10,
 7 coming down from the 3rd-floor bridgehead to the
 8 ground-floor bridgehead. We have had some evidence
 9 about that.
 10 What can you see? Do you know what Watch Manager
 11 O'Keeffe is carrying in his left hand?
 12 **A. That is a forward information board, yes.**
 13 Q. Looking at the next picture I want to show you, which is
 14 INQ00000258, just to see if we can establish a sequence,
 15 you can see that there is a firefighter with something
 16 there in his left hand under his left arm. It's still
 17 got a yellow rim on it.
 18 What is that? Can you help us identify what that
 19 is?
 20 **A. It looks like a forward information board.**
 21 Q. Yes.
 22 Then if you look, please, at INQ00000259, and just
 23 have that focused on something leaning against the white
 24 wall there, can you help us identify that?
 25 **A. Yes. That does look -- I don't know whether it is the**

Page 99

1 **colour of the photograph, but it does look like**
 2 **a forward information board. I wouldn't say**
 3 **100 per cent, because the top colour is normally -- the**
 4 **band across the top is normally brighter than that, but**
 5 **it's feasible that it is. I wouldn't be able to say**
 6 **100 per cent it is.**
 7 Q. Going back to the photograph at -- we will have both of
 8 those up, if we can, the INQ we have just had and this
 9 picture.
 10 Does the previous picture I showed you, INQ00000259,
 11 help you recollect where the forward information board
 12 in the left-hand picture was when you took that picture?
 13 **A. No.**
 14 Q. You said it was leaning against the white wall on the
 15 ground floor; looking at the right-hand photograph, does
 16 that help?
 17 **A. It helps that it's on the ground floor. I wouldn't be**
 18 **able to say that the picture on the left is the board**
 19 **that is the picture on the right. I think that would be**
 20 **impossible for me to ...**
 21 Q. Let me have one more go at this.
 22 If you go, please, to MET00018733, what is that?
 23 This is one of the photographs I think you took.
 24 **A. Okay.**
 25 Q. Does that help you identify the forward information

Page 100

1 board leaning against the wall on the ground floor?
 2 **A. That was shown in the previous picture on the right-hand**
 3 **side?**
 4 Q. Well, at all.
 5 **A. It helps me -- does it expand at all? No.**
 6 Q. It could expand, yes. Why don't we have it expanded to
 7 show the top of the forward information board.
 8 **A. I don't remember -- it could be. I mean, I can't make**
 9 **out this recess here. I'm pointing to the board, sorry.**
 10 **I can't make out the recess in the picture on the left.**
 11 **It could well be the same board.**
 12 Q. If you compare the sort of grey -- is the recess the
 13 grey shaded area on the left of the photograph that you
 14 are talking about?
 15 **A. It's similar. Again, I wouldn't be able to**
 16 **100 per cent. I think it's feasible it could be that**
 17 **board, but I wouldn't be able to confirm that**
 18 **100 per cent.**
 19 MR MILLETT: Mr Mulholland, I have got no further questions
 20 for you. Thank you very much. I'm very grateful to you
 21 for coming here and assisting us with our
 22 investigations. It really is very helpful. Thank you.
 23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I would like to add my thanks as
 24 well, because all the evidence we have obtained is
 25 really very helpful in piecing together the overall

Page 101

1 picture, so thank you very much for coming along to do
 2 your bit.
 3 MR MILLETT: I have seen a signal from below, but there may
 4 be a question.
 5 MR FRIEDMAN: It will be very short. If we could have
 6 a short break, I would appreciate it.
 7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I was just about to say you are free
 8 to go, Mr Mulholland, but it looks like you may not be.
 9 MR MILLETT: May I suggest, Mr Chairman -- I did think we
 10 might get all these -- that we take a break now for
 11 lunch?
 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, I think the witness would
 13 probably quite like to know that he can get away.
 14 I would rather take -- can we keep this one to five
 15 minutes?
 16 MR MILLETT: Absolutely.
 17 MR FRIEDMAN: Certainly for my part.
 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We will take five minutes so counsel
 19 can get themselves organised, so we will come back at
 20 12.50 pm. If there are any more questions, I think it
 21 is best to deal with them then. Then you will be free
 22 to go.
 23 THE WITNESS: No problem.
 24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you like to go with the usher,
 25 please.

Page 102

1 (The witness withdrew)
 2 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We will break for five minutes.
 3 Back at 12.50 pm, please.
 4 (12.45 pm)
 5 (A short break)
 6 (12.51 pm)
 7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I suspect some more questions have
 8 been found, have they, Mr Millett?
 9 MR MILLETT: Yes, they have. So I shall do my best to ask
 10 them as economically as possible.
 11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Mulholland is on his way,
 12 I think.
 13 (The witness returned)
 14 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, Mr Mulholland, I'm sorry, they
 15 found some more questions to ask you.
 16 THE WITNESS: That's fine.
 17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I hope not too many. All right?
 18 Yes, go ahead.
 19 MR MILLETT: Thank you very much, Mr Mulholland, for your
 20 patience.
 21 First of all, can I ask you to look at the telemetry
 22 data that we have in our master documents bundle at
 23 tab 1.
 24 I will tell you what this is before I ask you about
 25 it. This is a spreadsheet compiled by the LFB derived

Page 103

1 from all the electronic data collected from all the BA
 2 sets in use at Grenfell Tower on the night of the fire.
 3 Just helping you with this, it runs across from the
 4 left to the right. On the left-hand side, you can see
 5 what kind of breathing apparatus has been used. You
 6 have the station, the wearer if known, and then running
 7 across the page from there, you have the vehicle charger
 8 disconnection times, the switch-on button, tally out and
 9 other matters I don't need to ask you about, including
 10 initial pressure, logged onto ECB, et cetera, and then
 11 you have the tally-in time, final pressure and the end
 12 of wear time.
 13 Can I ask you to look at "BA Time Line (5)", where
 14 we begin to see the bulk of EDDBA. There has been marked
 15 in orange the EDDBA wearers. You can see that the first
 16 two on that page are Chelsea and Euston, and then
 17 there's a group of about 10, I think, EDDBA wearers below
 18 that from various stations -- Euston, Battersea, Chelsea
 19 and Battersea again.
 20 Just taking one or two examples, if you look at the
 21 Euston crew, the three for Euston -- Brooks, Morcos and
 22 Joseph, you have a time for disconnection for the
 23 vehicle charger, taking Brooks, at 02.18.43. He's an
 24 EDDBA wearer, who disconnects from the vehicle at that
 25 time and is switched on at 03.03 and tallies out at

Page 104

1 03.05, which is about 45 minutes.
 2 If I'm right that that demonstrates that there is
 3 a period of time from disconnection of the EDDBA
 4 equipment from the vehicle that it was being carried in
 5 to the tallying-out time of the crew on the deployment
 6 of 45 minutes or so -- that is a period of 45 minutes.
 7 Can you explain from what you saw and knew on the
 8 night why there was a period of 45 minutes between
 9 disconnection of the equipment from the vehicle on which
 10 it was carried and the deployment of the EDDBA wearer?
 11 **A. No, I can't, sorry.**
 12 Q. One can say the same, I think, about a lot of the other
 13 EDDBA wearers. You can see disconnection times at around
 14 the same sort of time mark and the same sort of delay
 15 period, about 40 minutes.
 16 Does this trigger a recollection in what those EDDBA
 17 crews were doing between disconnecting their equipment
 18 from the vehicle and getting deployed?
 19 **A. No. I wouldn't know what time Euston booked in at the**
 20 **incident. I don't know where they parked their vehicle.**
 21 **I'm sorry, I can't explain the time. I can't really**
 22 **have anything to do with the BA sector. It could have**
 23 **been they were held there for a while before they were**
 24 **called onto the bridgehead. You'd probably need to**
 25 **maybe get a more accurate answer from one of the other**

Page 105

1 **sectors that were doing BA.**
 2 Q. When you saw the eight EDDBA wearers outside the tower,
 3 as you told us earlier on, did you have a discussion --
 4 I know you told us you had a discussion with Watch
 5 Manager Brown about them. Was a part of that discussion
 6 about how long they had been waiting?
 7 **A. No.**
 8 Q. Were you aware, even in general terms, about any delays
 9 in getting EDDBA wearers into the tower?
 10 **A. Not that was brought to my attention, no.**
 11 Q. Can I just ask you a couple of equipment questions.
 12 At the foot of page 6 of your statement, you refer
 13 to a discussion you had with Richard Welch about the
 14 benefits of getting positive pressure ventilation down
 15 to the scene, and you explain that it's effectively
 16 a big fan.
 17 What were the benefits of a PPV?
 18 **A. Just to get that into context, the reason we had**
 19 **a discussion about PPV was the smoke was starting to**
 20 **pool in the staircase and going down to the ground-floor**
 21 **lobby. So I can't quite timestamp this, when we had**
 22 **this, but I think this would probably be on the end of**
 23 **incident report, because I -- I had a conversation with**
 24 **Richard because the smoke was coming down the staircase.**
 25 **I think very soon, if not before, this is around the**

Page 106

1 **time the bridgehead moved to the ground floor. So I'm**
 2 **not 100 per cent certain if this conversation happened**
 3 **on the 3rd floor or the ground floor.**
 4 **We needed to try and clear the smoke because we were**
 5 **worried about the possibility of the bridgehead being**
 6 **compromised. So I left the bridgehead, went back to the**
 7 **command unit, spoke to AC Roe, got permission for PPV.**
 8 **I was instructed to ring DAC Fenton at BCC to request**
 9 **it. This I did. I reported back to AC Roe it had been**
 10 **ordered and sometime later it arrived at the incident.**
 11 **It didn't give us the effect we hoped it would give us.**
 12 **I think just to put a little bit of context around**
 13 **this, PPV in London isn't carried on front-line**
 14 **appliances, so none of the operational firefighters are**
 15 **trained in PPV.**
 16 **We have trained operatives, subject matter experts,**
 17 **if you want, that would actually arrive with the**
 18 **equipment and they will set it up and get it to work for**
 19 **you.**
 20 **That didn't work. As a result of that, there was**
 21 **a conversation between Group Manager Welch and Group**
 22 **Manager Goulbourne to smash the windows in the**
 23 **ground-floor lobby to try and alleviate the smoke**
 24 **conditions that we were experiencing.**
 25 Q. We have a time mark in the short incident log for the

Page 107

1 turning-out message for PPV to incident of 03.07.56. Is
 2 that consistent with your recollection?
 3 **A. If that's on the log and that's something that's been**
 4 **ordered by control, then that would be an accurate**
 5 **reflection, I would suggest.**
 6 Q. The PPV arrived; do you remember who they arrived with?
 7 I think in your statement you say it arrived with
 8 a station manager.
 9 **A. Yes, I do. It arrived with Station Manager Wainwright,**
 10 **Station Manager Harding and I think Watch Manager**
 11 **Wilson.**
 12 Q. We have an arrival time for Station Manager Harding of
 13 04.15. Does that sound about right to you?
 14 **A. If that's on the log from control, yes; however, it's --**
 15 Q. It's not; it's on the LFB -- a separate log.
 16 **A. Okay. If that's on an official document, it's fine.**
 17 **It might be worth me pointing out that I believe**
 18 **Station Manager Harding would probably have come from**
 19 **his home address and somebody else would have brought**
 20 **the PPV, so those times may overlap somewhat in terms of**
 21 **it -- so I'm not disputing that Harding was there at**
 22 **that time, but there's a possibility that PPV might not**
 23 **have been. Alternatively, it could have been. I can't**
 24 **timestamp the PPV for you.**
 25 Q. Could the PPV have been used to clear smoke in the

Page 108

1 single stairwell of the building, do you think?
 2 **A. Potentially. As I explained, it's not on the run on any**
 3 **front-line appliances, so no personnel in the Fire**
 4 **Brigade are trained in utilising PPV at an operational**
 5 **incident. We have trained staff. I don't know how**
 6 **many, if I'm honest. But we have got some subject**
 7 **matter experts that do that and they bring it to the**
 8 **incident and they would control the PPV.**
 9 Q. Do you know why it took an hour for the PPV to arrive?
 10 **A. No, I don't.**
 11 Q. Can I just then ask you one more question about
 12 equipment.
 13 In your statement, you say on page 9 in the second
 14 paragraph:
 15 "Communications (comms) via radio had become an
 16 issue and we were telling all officers in the command
 17 chain to change to Channel 2 on the radios."
 18 Was that your decision, to change to channel 2?
 19 Whose was it, do you know?
 20 **A. I don't know for definite. I'm assuming it was probably**
 21 **the incident commander.**
 22 Q. Then you say:
 23 "Again Matt COOK and I divided the ground and went
 24 round to some of the Sector Commanders to relay this
 25 message and this was with the agreement of the Command

Page 109

1 Unit. We also dispatched the leaky feeders into the
 2 stairwells to assist with comms. It was all fairly
 3 dynamic."
 4 Could you explain what a leaky feeder is?
 5 **A. Yes, sorry, that doesn't assist with comms. That's**
 6 **a misinterpretation. So a leaky feeder is something**
 7 **that we use in relation to our telemetry equipment. In**
 8 **simple terms, it's a transformer with an antenna on it**
 9 **that can receive a signal. You can put a repeater**
 10 **further up that boosts the signal to keep the signal**
 11 **live for telemetry equipment.**
 12 Q. Did it work? Did the dispatch of leaky feeders into the
 13 stairwells give some assistance?
 14 **A. On telemetry?**
 15 Q. On anything.
 16 **A. Well, it doesn't work for comms; it just works for**
 17 **telemetry. I didn't hear anything coming back saying**
 18 **that it hadn't worked or that there were issues with the**
 19 **telemetry.**
 20 Q. What sort of time do you think you dispatched leaky
 21 feeders in to assist with telemetry?
 22 **A. I really can't say.**
 23 Q. Okay.
 24 What are they normally carried on, leaky feeders?
 25 **A. You get them on the FRUs. So if the FRUs were there,**

Page 110

1 **they would have been available for staff to use.**
 2 Q. How many did you need to dispatch into the tower?
 3 **A. I believe it was only one.**
 4 MR MILLETT: Oh, right. Okay.
 5 Mr Mulholland, you will be pleased to know, I think,
 6 that I have no further questions for you. I think that
 7 is that.
 8 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right.
 9 MR MILLETT: Mr Mulholland, I repeat what I said to you
 10 before: I am very grateful to you for coming along today
 11 and assisting us with our enquiries. It is very much
 12 appreciated.
 13 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, I endorse it. I am not going
 14 to repeat what I said earlier, but you know we are very
 15 grateful to you for coming along to give us your help.
 16 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
 17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And now you are free to go.
 18 (The witness was released)
 19 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
 20 2.05 pm, then, please.
 21 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, yes, the next witness will be at
 22 2.05 pm. I don't know whether we will finish her this
 23 afternoon. I'm in some degree of doubt about that.
 24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let's see how we get on.
 25 MR MILLETT: Let's see how we go.

Page 111

1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: 2.05 pm, thank you.
 2 (1.05 pm)
 3 (The short adjournment)
 4 (2.11 pm)
 5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.
 6 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, can I call our next witness,
 7 please: Control Room Officer Sharon Darby.
 8 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, thank you.
 9 SHARON DARBY (affirmed)
 10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
 11 Now, you would like to give your evidence sitting
 12 down, would you?
 13 THE WITNESS: Yes, please.
 14 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Make yourself comfortable.
 15 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Millett is going to ask you some
 17 questions.
 18 Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY
 19 MR MILLETT: Good afternoon, Ms Darby.
 20 **A. Good afternoon.**
 21 Q. Could I start by asking you to give us your full name,
 22 please?
 23 **A. Sharon Angela Darby.**
 24 Q. Can I start also by saying thank you very much for
 25 attending the inquiry to give evidence to us. It does

Page 112

<p>1 help us enormously with our investigations and we are 2 very grateful to you.</p> <p>3 My questions are supposed to be short and simple; 4 they don't always turn out that way. If you don't 5 understand a particular question or you want me to 6 repeat it, I'm very happy to do so, or to put the 7 question in a different way.</p> <p>8 If you need a break at any stage, just let us know 9 and we can take a break.</p> <p>10 Can I start with your statement. You should have in 11 front of you, but don't, a copy in paper form of your 12 statement. We are going to work on the screen. On the 13 desk in front of you on the right you have a monitor 14 which will have your statement on it.</p> <p>15 A. I've got my glasses.</p> <p>16 Q. Can you just look at that. It is dated 23 October 2017.</p> <p>17 A. Yes.</p> <p>18 Q. Its reference number is MET00013961. Have you read it 19 recently?</p> <p>20 A. Sorry?</p> <p>21 Q. Have you read it recently?</p> <p>22 A. Yes, yes.</p> <p>23 Q. Can you confirm for us that the contents are true?</p> <p>24 A. Yes.</p> <p>25 Q. Have you discussed your statement or your evidence with</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 113</p>	<p>1 A. In 2015, we had a new system, and so that sort of 2 overtook a lot of the other training.</p> <p>3 Q. Who, in the two or three years leading up to the 4 Grenfell Tower fire in June 2017, gave you that 5 training? Who delivered the training?</p> <p>6 A. Our training department, I believe.</p> <p>7 Q. Right.</p> <p>8 A. So we have got a couple of people who are dedicated to 9 training, and they would have done that. It's 10 a presentation.</p> <p>11 Q. How long before the night of the Grenfell Tower fire was 12 your last training session?</p> <p>13 A. 2013.</p> <p>14 Q. 2013?</p> <p>15 A. 2013, yes.</p> <p>16 Q. Have you ever had any training regarding dealing with 17 multiple FSG calls?</p> <p>18 A. No.</p> <p>19 Q. In your training to deal with FSG calls, what was the 20 number of FSG calls that you were trained to handle?</p> <p>21 A. One.</p> <p>22 Q. One?</p> <p>23 A. Mmm.</p> <p>24 Q. Are you familiar from your training with policy 790, 25 "Fire survival guidance"?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 115</p>
<p>1 anybody before coming here today?</p> <p>2 A. No.</p> <p>3 Q. Can I start by asking you a few questions about your 4 role and career and your training.</p> <p>5 A. Yes.</p> <p>6 Q. You are a control room officer with the LFB.</p> <p>7 A. Yes.</p> <p>8 Q. When you wrote your witness statement, you said that you 9 that the 13 years' experience --</p> <p>10 A. Yes.</p> <p>11 Q. -- as at October 2017.</p> <p>12 A. Yes.</p> <p>13 Q. Have you always worked in the control room?</p> <p>14 A. Yes.</p> <p>15 Q. Can you give us an idea of what training you have had to 16 be a control room officer?</p> <p>17 A. Well, initially, when you start the job, you have -- 18 I think we had six to eight weeks' training, which 19 covers the whole role, and then after that, we have 20 different types of training; some of it might be online 21 and some of it's with a training team.</p> <p>22 The FSG training is biannually, and the training -- 23 even though I have said on my statement we have quite 24 a lot of training, my last FSG training was 2013.</p> <p>25 Q. Right.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 114</p>	<p>1 A. I do not know what that policy -- I don't know the 2 number. Is it fire survival guidance?</p> <p>3 Q. Yes.</p> <p>4 A. I'm aware of it. I wouldn't know the policy word for 5 word, but I'm aware of it.</p> <p>6 Q. Have you been trained on it?</p> <p>7 A. The training would be in accordance with that policy.</p> <p>8 Q. What about policy 539, which is "Emergency call 9 management"?</p> <p>10 A. Again, I would be aware of the policy, and, again, that 11 is probably part of our initial training.</p> <p>12 Q. Did you ever get any --</p> <p>13 A. We get updates.</p> <p>14 Q. You do get updates?</p> <p>15 A. Yeah, but a lot of the updates are online or by email.</p> <p>16 Q. How often did you get those updates?</p> <p>17 A. When the policies might have a slight alteration.</p> <p>18 Q. Apart from that, did you get refresher training on FSG 19 calls?</p> <p>20 A. 2013 was the last.</p> <p>21 Q. Were you, yourself, involved in handling calls for 22 a fire at Lakanal House in south London in 2009?</p> <p>23 A. No.</p> <p>24 Q. Have you had any training specifically about the lessons 25 learnt from the Lakanal House fire?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 116</p>

<p>1 A. I believe that the training -- we did have fire survival 2 training after Lakanal House, and I believe it might 3 have slightly changed from the lessons from 4 Lakanal House. But I don't know -- obviously 5 Lakanal House was in 2009, so it's quite a long time 6 ago, so I'm not quite sure about the differences, but 7 I know that we had more training after Lakanal House. 8 Q. Did you ever receive training as a control room staff 9 member in relation to understanding operational issues 10 at high-rise buildings? 11 A. No. 12 Q. Did you ever get any training on understanding 13 engineered solutions? 14 A. No. 15 Q. Did you get training in relation to how to capture 16 relevant information from 999 callers and pass that to 17 operational firefighters? 18 A. Yes, as part of the fire survival guidance. 19 Q. You did? You got that training? 20 A. Fire survival guidance would include obtaining 21 information to pass to the crew. 22 Q. Was the last training that you got on that, capturing 23 the relevant information and passing it to operational 24 fire crews, also 2013, or was there training later than 25 that?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 117</p>	<p>1 you can try and make a conference call, if you like, 2 with an interpreter. But it's not an easy process. 3 Q. Do you know -- 4 A. And that's if you can get one with that language. 5 Q. Do you know where they come from, these interpreters, 6 who supplies them? 7 A. No. 8 Q. Do you know how many languages are available? 9 A. No. 10 Q. Did you ever have any training on clarifying with 11 callers as to whether they or people in their house or 12 flat have any kind of disabilities or mobility issues? 13 A. That would be part of the questions that we would ask, 14 so it's part of the -- obviously, with training, there's 15 a number of questions to try and get from the caller 16 information, so that might be one of the questions that 17 we would ask. 18 Q. When you say it might be one of the questions, would it 19 be one of the questions you would ask as a matter of 20 course? 21 A. I'm not sure if it's in -- I don't know. There would be 22 a line of things that you would ask the caller, and 23 I guess you would ask them if there's anyone else in the 24 property with them and where they are, and it would lead 25 from that, if they have any mobility issues.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 119</p>
<p>1 A. No, 2013. 2 Q. Has your training ever involved how to deal with persons 3 who don't have English as their first language? 4 A. No. 5 Q. Does your training or has your training ever involved 6 dealing with persons who come from different cultures, 7 ethnic minority cultures? 8 A. No, the training doesn't involve that. The initial 9 training, we have a -- you can get an interpreter on 10 the -- but obviously there's quite a process to get an 11 interpreter on the telephone if the person can't speak 12 English. But apart from that, it's nothing specific 13 from training for that. 14 Q. In your experience, have you ever had to call on the 15 services of an interpreter? 16 A. Once. 17 Q. Once? 18 A. Yes, years ago. 19 Q. Do you remember what the language was? 20 A. I can't, I'm afraid. I don't remember. 21 Q. How easily available are interpreters to the control 22 room staff? 23 A. It's not an easy process. If I needed an interpreter, 24 I would ask the officer of the watch that I needed one, 25 and they would get someone on the telephone, or try --</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 118</p>	<p>1 Q. In your statement, if I can just go to it, on page 3, in 2 paragraph 2 you say -- and this is really halfway down, 3 if I can just direct your attention to that. I will 4 start at the beginning: 5 "The night of the Grenfell Tower fire, there were a 6 huge amount of Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls. A 7 FSG is essentially when a caller tells us that they 8 cannot get out of a property. This could be down to a 9 variety of reasons but most commonly due to fire or 10 smoke." 11 Just pausing there, could you just explain your 12 understanding of at what point a call becomes an FSG 13 call? 14 A. If they are being affected by fire or smoke, then you 15 would ask them to leave the property, and at that point, 16 they would say, "I can't leave the property", and you 17 ask them why they can't leave the property, and it could 18 be because they have a disability or it could be that 19 there's more fire and smoke outside their property. So 20 that's when you start the fire survival guidance of 21 trying to keep them safe and give them help, direction, 22 of what to do next. 23 Q. So any call which is a call where the caller can leave 24 safely -- is this right? -- is not a fire survival 25 guidance call, in your understanding?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 120</p>

1 **A. No. Fire survival guidance is if they cannot leave the**
 2 **property.**
 3 Q. On page 3, in the third paragraph, you say in the last
 4 sentence:
 5 "In my thirteen years' service I have had a few FSGs
 6 but not many. They are not very common to be honest."
 7 **A. No.**
 8 Q. How many FSG calls have you had in your career, do you
 9 think?
 10 **A. I don't know the number, but it's probably a handful.**
 11 Q. Have you ever experienced any multiple FSG calls?
 12 **A. No.**
 13 Q. Do you know of colleagues who have had to handle
 14 multiple FSG calls?
 15 **A. I know of colleagues that have.**
 16 Q. Right.
 17 **A. And obviously for Lakanal House.**
 18 Q. Is it common?
 19 **A. No, it's not common.**
 20 Q. When you're advising an FSG caller who is not able to
 21 leave the premises due to the effects of fire, heat or
 22 smoke, would you expect to have information in your
 23 hands from the incident ground about the conditions in
 24 the building, as well as information from the caller?
 25 **A. When you've got a fire survival guidance going on,**

Page 121

1 **that's usually while the crews are actually making their**
 2 **way to the property, and then -- because normally**
 3 **obviously the crews would arrive, we would be telling**
 4 **the crews where that caller is in the property, and they**
 5 **go straight to them. The information might come after**
 6 **they've actually rescued that person. So the priority**
 7 **is to get to that person and get them out.**
 8 Q. When you are advising an FSG caller, would you get
 9 information about the conditions in the escape route?
 10 **A. Sorry, I don't quite understand.**
 11 Q. Well, if somebody calls up and says, "I'm trapped,
 12 I can't get out", would you ask the caller to tell you
 13 about what the conditions in the escape route are or
 14 would you not go there?
 15 **A. Yes, because you would say, "Why can't you get out?",**
 16 **and they would tell you they can't because the escape**
 17 **route is smoke-filled or there's fire out there. So**
 18 **you're getting information from the caller, trying to**
 19 **assess advice.**
 20 Q. If the firefighters were on site on the incident
 21 ground --
 22 **A. If they were ...? Sorry?**
 23 Q. If they were on the incident ground at the time an FSG
 24 call was going on, would you expect to have information
 25 from the incident ground about how near the firefighters

Page 122

1 were to the FSG caller?
 2 **A. Possibly. Like I said earlier, the priority is to get**
 3 **to that caller before messages come back. Obviously**
 4 **because we are relaying the information to them of where**
 5 **that person is, so the priority is for them to go to**
 6 **that person, and then they might give us information**
 7 **once they have -- but obviously the priority is to get**
 8 **to the person first.**
 9 Q. Do you remember that as part of the advice that you give
 10 an FSG caller, you are required to reassure the caller
 11 and keep reassessing their situation?
 12 **A. Yes.**
 13 Q. Would it be normal to reassure the caller by reference
 14 to how near the firefighters are to them?
 15 **A. Yes.**
 16 Q. In order to know how near the firefighters are to the
 17 FSG caller, who would you be dependent on for that
 18 information?
 19 **A. Well, the radio operator might be asking them how close**
 20 **they are. On our map system, we now have a tool on**
 21 **there where you can see the location of where the**
 22 **appliance is moving, so that's really -- yeah, we can**
 23 **ask them, you know, how far away they are.**
 24 **But in London, you expect an appliance to sort of**
 25 **get to an incident within sort of 10 minutes anyway.**

Page 123

1 Q. Where the firefighters are on the incident ground
 2 already and you have an ongoing fire survival guidance
 3 call, who would you expect anyone in the control room to
 4 speak to on the incident ground to get the information
 5 about how close the crews are to the FSG caller?
 6 **A. The radio operator is the person that speaks to the fire**
 7 **crew in the control room.**
 8 Q. Who is it who the radio operator speaks to at the
 9 incident ground?
 10 **A. Well, there would be someone on the appliance who is**
 11 **responsible for sending the radio messages. The**
 12 **messages might come from the watch manager, for example,**
 13 **but it might not be the watch manager actually speaking**
 14 **to, because he will obviously be dealing with the**
 15 **incident.**
 16 Q. If you go to page 3 of your statement, or stay on
 17 page 3, and look at the third paragraph, you say:
 18 "Generally speaking the advice, however, around any
 19 fire in the first instance will be to get out if safe to
 20 do so."
 21 **A. Mmm.**
 22 Q. "It is only when the caller says they are unable to get
 23 out will the FSG kick in and we tell them to remain and
 24 follow the guidance."
 25 **A. That is more around a house, though. For a high-rise,**

Page 124

1 **it's slightly different. But for a house -- if someone**
 2 **is in a house or in a low-level building, the advice**
 3 **would be to get out straight away.**
 4 Q. If you got an FSG call which, as you said before, by
 5 definition was where they were trapped and couldn't get
 6 out, what would be the purpose of telling them to
 7 remain?
 8 **A. What would, sorry, be the ...?**
 9 Q. What would be the purpose of telling them to stay where
 10 they are?
 11 **A. Well, if they can't leave because it's dangerous to**
 12 **leave or they're unable to leave for some reason, then**
 13 **obviously you need to keep them safe, or try and help**
 14 **them to remain safe in the property.**
 15 Q. This may be just the language of the statement here, but
 16 you say:
 17 "It is only when the caller says they are unable to
 18 get out will the FSG kick in and we tell them to
 19 remain ..."
 20 My question was: why would you tell them to remain
 21 if they were already stuck?
 22 **A. It's not worded greatly, but obviously if they can't get**
 23 **out, they have got no choice but to remain, have they?**
 24 Q. Exactly.
 25 **A. So it's actually just helping them and reassuring them**

Page 125

1 **because they have to remain.**
 2 Q. Okay.
 3 Can I then just see if we can clear this away,
 4 because there may be a misunderstanding.
 5 On page 6 of your statement, you talk about the
 6 stay-put policy. This is in the fourth line from the
 7 top of the page. You say:
 8 "The 'stay put' policy is a directive from the Home
 9 Office and is exactly what we have been told to give as
 10 advice in these circumstances. As I stated earlier, the
 11 stay put policy is in place for high rise buildings in
 12 the event that callers are unable to get safely out of
 13 their property."
 14 Again, I just want to ask you: why would you be
 15 telling people to stay put if the callers are unable to
 16 get safely out of their property?
 17 **A. We call it the stay-put policy, but obviously it**
 18 **wouldn't be -- you would be trying to help people. If**
 19 **they can't get out of the building, they are not going**
 20 **to go. If they are scared -- if they are saying,**
 21 **"I can't get out because there's a fire outside my**
 22 **flat", then obviously -- or if it doesn't affect their**
 23 **flat, then obviously for a high-rise, the advice is that**
 24 **they might be safer to stay inside their flat. In**
 25 **normal circumstances, it should be a contained,**

Page 126

1 **fireproof space, so you're not sending them out to more**
 2 **danger.**
 3 Q. But if they are already trapped and on the other end of
 4 an FSG call, then is it right that actually stay-put
 5 advice has no place because you can't tell people to
 6 stay put if they're stuck?
 7 **A. No, it's just a phrase, isn't it, "the stay-put policy".**
 8 **You know, obviously if people can't get out, then you've**
 9 **got to help them while they stay in.**
 10 **For a high-rise, it might be that they're not being**
 11 **affected -- if they're not being affected by the smoke**
 12 **and the fire, it would be safer for them to stay put --**
 13 **to stay inside the flat.**
 14 Q. At what point when a caller calls do you take the step
 15 of trying to identify a safe alternative escape route?
 16 **A. When a caller calls -- are you talking about high-rise?**
 17 Q. Let's go with a high-rise, yes.
 18 **A. If a caller is saying that there's a fire in the**
 19 **building, there's smoke coming in, or whatever --**
 20 **obviously if they say they can't get out because there's**
 21 **smoke outside, you've got to go by what the caller says**
 22 **to you and try and assess and give -- you know, just**
 23 **help them with -- you're getting information from the**
 24 **caller. You can't see what they're seeing, so it's**
 25 **trying just to -- for them to say, "There's smoke out**

Page 127

1 **there. I can't go out there."**
 2 Q. What if the caller rings up and says, "Well, I'm not
 3 trapped at the moment, but I don't want to stay because
 4 I'm frightened and I can see smoke coming up the
 5 building and fire coming up the building. I'm not
 6 trapped at the moment." If that happens, what advice do
 7 you give?
 8 **A. If someone is frightened and they want to leave, then**
 9 **they must leave, but I can only go by what I'm**
 10 **trained -- and the policy that we are trained with. You**
 11 **know, it might be safer for them to stay in their flat**
 12 **if it is not affected.**
 13 Q. Are you trained to try to help them identify a safe
 14 alternative escape route?
 15 **A. Well, yes, if they're saying, you know, "I can get out,**
 16 **I can go down the stairs, I can go, I can get out", then**
 17 **they should do that. If they can't, then obviously you**
 18 **have to -- fire survival guidance has to --**
 19 Q. Really what I'm asking is if there is a stage before
 20 fire survival guidance to a trapped person where the
 21 advice is given to a person who isn't or doesn't think
 22 they are trapped and wants to get out, but needs help
 23 assessing whether or not it's safe for them to go
 24 through the escape route.
 25 Can you just help us with what advice you give the

Page 128

1 caller in that situation?
 2 **A. Sorry, you're going to have to ... Sorry, could you**
 3 **repeat?**
 4 Q. An example of one of the questions I promised you
 5 I might ask.
 6 Where you've got a call that comes in and the caller
 7 says, "I'm not trapped, I can leave. I'm mobile and
 8 I can leave. I'm not stuck. I can see a little bit of
 9 smoke outside my door. I think I can get through it but
 10 I'm very worried about staying", do you give that caller
 11 advice about how to get through the escape route?
 12 **A. Probably not. I mean, if they said they can leave,**
 13 **I would say to them, "Okay, if you can leave safely,**
 14 **go."**
 15 Q. So does that mean that in fact the assessment --
 16 **A. "If you want to go, then go."**
 17 Q. Does that mean that the assessment of the safety of
 18 the escape route is left to the caller?
 19 **A. They might want to stay on the phone with you, which is**
 20 **absolutely fine. We would do that. We might say, "Do**
 21 **you want me to stay on the line with you while you go**
 22 **down the stairs?", and we can do that.**
 23 Q. Can I just ask you to be shown policy 790, which is
 24 "Fire survival guidance calls". I want to show you
 25 page 3. Can I start with paragraph 5.5.

Page 129

1 If you are not familiar with this, Ms Darby, please
 2 tell me, but this is paragraph 5.5 of policy number 790.
 3 It says:
 4 "Control will attempt to gather all the information
 5 on the Control Information Form (see Appendix 2) and
 6 relay this information to the incident as and when it
 7 becomes available."
 8 Then you will see there is a list of things control
 9 should gather.
 10 **A. Mm-hm.**
 11 Q. My first question is: in your experience, is this
 12 information always -- or routinely, at least -- recorded
 13 on a control information form in the control room?
 14 **A. It's probably more recorded on the log so that the**
 15 **information can be passed over to the fire crews. I've**
 16 **never actually used a control information form.**
 17 Q. Have you observed your colleagues in the control room
 18 using control information forms?
 19 **A. No, no, because that's -- like I said earlier, fire**
 20 **survival guidance is not that common, and certainly when**
 21 **we have multiple of them, we weren't filling in the**
 22 **form. I don't remember if they were actually on the**
 23 **desks at Stratford.**
 24 Q. Just to be absolutely clear about what I am asking you
 25 about, can you just be shown appendix 2 to this

Page 130

1 document. There is a control information form.
 2 **A. Mmm.**
 3 Q. Are you familiar with that as a form at least?
 4 **A. I have seen it, yes.**
 5 Q. In what context?
 6 **A. Well, it is on --**
 7 Q. Apart from being tacked on the back of the policy.
 8 **A. We have got some forms on the desks at Merton.**
 9 Q. You do?
 10 **A. Yes.**
 11 Q. Do you ever use them?
 12 **A. I have never used one.**
 13 Q. Do you have or did you have them at Stratford?
 14 **A. I don't remember seeing them.**
 15 Q. Going back to the shopping list, if we can, Mr Documents
 16 Director, at paragraph 5.5, you can see a list of eight
 17 detailed pieces of information that you have to collect.
 18 In your experience, is this information always
 19 obtained?
 20 **A. Yes. We certainly would find obviously the number of**
 21 **the house/flat, the number of persons, the location, the**
 22 **conditions, their proximity to the fire. So, yes, we**
 23 **would get as much of that information as we can.**
 24 Q. When it says "time updated", what do you understand by
 25 that? Do you have an understanding about what that

Page 131

1 means?
 2 **A. I don't know, actually, what that bit means. "Time**
 3 **of FSG call", maybe -- I don't know. I don't want to --**
 4 Q. I know you've only handled a handful in your experience,
 5 so perhaps this is slightly unfair, but in that
 6 experience, do you remember updating FSG calls, updating
 7 callers or updating fire crews?
 8 **A. Yes, but that, like I say, would be done -- just**
 9 **updating the crews of where the caller is and the**
 10 **condition, you know, how it's progressing, and obviously**
 11 **letting the caller know that the crews are close, and**
 12 **when they get -- we tell them, "They're arriving now,**
 13 **someone is coming to you".**
 14 Q. In your experience, would you be able to update the
 15 caller by calling them back to tell them fresh
 16 information?
 17 **A. We wouldn't do that, especially on a landline or**
 18 **anything like that, no.**
 19 Q. But people nowadays use mobiles.
 20 **A. We wouldn't call -- we wouldn't let -- no. We don't**
 21 **call them back.**
 22 Q. That's a matter of practice and custom, is it?
 23 **A. The thing is, if you're doing a fire survival call,**
 24 **you're not going to let the caller hang up until -- for**
 25 **one call, when there's one call going on, you keep the**

Page 132

1 **caller on the line until the fire crews have got there.**
 2 Q. Right.
 3 **A. But for multiple, it's obviously -- for multiple, it's**
 4 **slightly different.**
 5 Q. Yes. I see what you are saying.
 6 So you say "slightly different"; could you just
 7 expand on that? How different?
 8 **A. Can you repeat the question, sorry?**
 9 Q. Yes. It is really this question of updating. I can
 10 understand how you might update the fire crews about new
 11 information you're getting --
 12 **A. About ringing back, yes. We wouldn't ring a caller**
 13 **back.**
 14 Q. But I think you said with a normal fire survival
 15 guidance call you wouldn't let them go in the first
 16 place.
 17 **A. No.**
 18 Q. You'd always keep them on the line.
 19 **A. No, that's right.**
 20 Q. That then leads to the question: well, what happens
 21 where there are multiple FSG calls -- and I know you
 22 have fairly limited experience of those -- would you be
 23 able to keep them on the line?
 24 **A. I wasn't taking fire survival guidance calls that night,**
 25 **so I can't really comment, but I don't think it was**

Page 133

1 **possible to keep everybody on the line because of**
 2 **the amount of calls that were coming in.**
 3 Q. Just looking at 5.5, it requires control to relay this
 4 information to the incident as and when it becomes
 5 available, as we can see.
 6 Can I just confirm how that information gets passed
 7 to the incident ground?
 8 **A. Via the radio.**
 9 Q. Via the radio. Can you just tell us, which channel is
 10 that normally?
 11 **A. There's two channels of the radio. We have the south**
 12 **channel, which is channel 2, and the north -- north of**
 13 **the river, if you like -- for channel 4.**
 14 Q. If you just turn or look at the bottom of the page, it
 15 says:
 16 "If [underlined] control has sufficient resources
 17 then M2FH FLON-OPS-01 could be used to free up the main
 18 scheme Firelink radio if there are a large number of FSG
 19 calls."
 20 Have you yourself had experience of using FLONOPS?
 21 **A. FLONOPS is the radio channel we use, but FLONOPS 1 is**
 22 **like a spare. So we are using FLONOPS 2 and FLONOPS 4**
 23 **all the time, but FLONOPS 1 is a spare channel.**
 24 Q. This is a question I have been asking myself for a week
 25 or two: does FLONOPS stand for "fire London operations"?"

Page 134

1 **A. Yes.**
 2 Q. 01 is a spare, you say?
 3 **A. Yes.**
 4 Q. So FLONOPS is just another word for "channel", so
 5 channel 4, FLONOPS 4, RT4, it's interchangeable?
 6 **A. Exactly.**
 7 Q. How would use of FLONOPS 1 free up the main scheme fire
 8 link radio?
 9 **A. If you've got enough staff, you could have a dedicated**
 10 **channel just to pass fire survival guidance calls, if**
 11 **you've got enough staff on to do that.**
 12 Q. Just on the question of numbers of staff, I think you
 13 say in your statement that the normal complement during
 14 a shift is 11 in the control room.
 15 **A. Yes, that's the minimum number.**
 16 Q. In your experience, has it ever gone below that?
 17 **A. It has done, yes.**
 18 Q. Does it sometimes go above that?
 19 **A. Yes, yes.**
 20 Q. What's the maximum number of staff members you've ever
 21 worked with in a control room on a shift?
 22 **A. I'm not entirely sure. 14, 15, 16. On one watch, that**
 23 **is, sorry. Because in the daytime -- obviously this was**
 24 **at night, but in the daytime you might have two watches**
 25 **overlapping.**

Page 135

1 Q. I will come back to the question of whether enough staff
 2 could have created a dedicated line radio link shortly.
 3 Just focusing on the question of passing information
 4 to the incident ground, which is what we are looking at,
 5 which is paragraph 5.5 of policy 790, who would the
 6 control room pass that information to in the first
 7 place?
 8 **A. In the first place, it would be the pump ladder who has**
 9 **got the watch manager on it. He is in charge initially.**
 10 **So it would be to that pump, the pump ladder who's got**
 11 **the watch manager.**
 12 Q. That's the incident commander?
 13 **A. Yes.**
 14 Q. Once the command unit arrives, what happens then?
 15 **A. The command unit will take over the radio traffic.**
 16 Q. Who makes and communicates to you the decision to send
 17 radio messages about FSG calls to the CU, the command
 18 unit, instead of the incident command pump?
 19 **A. Sorry, who ...?**
 20 Q. Who makes that decision?
 21 **A. Who makes what decision?**
 22 Q. Who makes the decision to send radio messages about FSG
 23 calls to the command unit as opposed to the incident
 24 command pump?
 25 **A. Who makes the decision? Well, the command unit takes**

Page 136

1 **over. So when that command unit -- so the radio**
 2 **operator would know that the command unit has taken over**
 3 **and to direct then the calls to the command unit.**
 4 Q. So, in essence, it's the radio operator who knows to
 5 send it to the CU instead of the ICP?
 6 **A. Yes.**
 7 Q. Let me just show you the paragraph, to be fair to you.
 8 Paragraph 5.10:
 9 "In the event that control gets no response from the
 10 ICP they will contact an appliance en-route and pass the
 11 FSG information to them. The completed form must be
 12 passed to the IC on arrival and a copy retained at the
 13 ICP."
 14 Do you know why control are required to pass the
 15 information to an appliance which is en route rather
 16 than a different appliance already at the incident
 17 ground?
 18 **A. To be honest with you, if you can't raise the appliance**
 19 **who is in attendance with the watch manager on it, then**
 20 **you might try one of the other appliances, but they're**
 21 **probably not going to respond to you because obviously**
 22 **they are dealing with the fire. So the appliance**
 23 **en route is -- they're also monitoring the radio, so**
 24 **they can hear you, and so to pass the information to the**
 25 **appliance en route is to just ensure that the**

Page 137

1 **information is passed and does get to the incident**
 2 **commander.**
 3 Q. In your experience, and in your knowledge from your
 4 training, would it not be normal for one member of
 5 the firefighting operational crew to stay with the
 6 pump --
 7 **A. Yes.**
 8 Q. -- and listen to messages coming through on the main
 9 scheme radio?
 10 **A. That's how it normally works.**
 11 Q. If you look back at paragraph 5.9 of the policy:
 12 "All FSG call information must be passed to the IC
 13 who will decide what action should be taken."
 14 In your experience and in your training, is it your
 15 understanding that that means all the information that
 16 was gathered in that long shopping list we looked at?
 17 **A. Yes. That's right. All the information that we have**
 18 **gathered will be passed over to the incident commander.**
 19 Q. When a command unit is in place on the incident ground,
 20 would you normally leave it to the command unit to pass
 21 that information to the incident commander?
 22 **A. Yes. The command unit will take over that**
 23 **responsibility.**
 24 **SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I ask you, how does the radio**
 25 **operator in the control room know that the command unit**

Page 138

1 **has taken over? Do you get a message from the command**
 2 **unit?**
 3 **A. Exactly. He will come up on the radio and tell me he's**
 4 **now in charge -- he's taken over, as such, yes.**
 5 **SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.**
 6 MR MILLETT: Ms Darby, I am very conscious we have been
 7 going for 45 minutes. Would you like to take a break
 8 now, or we can go on for a little bit, if you want to?
 9 THE WITNESS: Yes, please, if that's all right, thank you.
 10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You would like a break? Yes, all
 11 right. We can have a break now.
 12 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
 13 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Shall we say 3.05 pm? That gives
 14 you 10 minutes.
 15 THE WITNESS: Oh, just five minutes is fine.
 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right. We will try 3.00 pm,
 17 then.
 18 Can I ask you not to talk about your evidence,
 19 please, to anyone while you are out of the room.
 20 THE WITNESS: Of course.
 21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You go with the usher, and then we
 22 will continue in just over five minutes.
 23 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
 24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, then, we will resume at
 25 3.00 pm, please.

Page 139

1 (2.53 pm)
 2 (A short break)
 3 (3.00 pm)
 4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Ms Darby? Happy to carry
 5 on.
 6 THE WITNESS: Yes.
 7 MR MILLETT: Thank you, Ms Darby, for coming back to us.
 8 Can I just ask you a couple of follow-up questions.
 9 First of all, I asked you some questions earlier on
 10 about asking callers about whether they have mobility
 11 issues or whether they are elderly or have children or
 12 things like that, and you said that it would be one of
 13 the questions that you would ask and so it was part of
 14 policy.
 15 Can I just put it to you that, in fact, there's no
 16 written policy we have been able to find in the LFB
 17 policies which say that control room staff handling FSG
 18 calls, or emergency calls -- particularly FSG calls --
 19 should find out about, for example, mobility issues.
 20 **A. Okay.**
 21 Q. So when you say it was one of the questions you would
 22 ask, is that because you were trained to ask anyway or
 23 as a matter of practice?
 24 **A. Probably from the training. Like I say, if you ask**
 25 **a caller to go to another room, to get furthest away**

Page 140

1 **from the fire or wherever the fire or the smoke is, then**
 2 **obviously they are going to tell you if they can't**
 3 **because they have mobility issues. A caller will**
 4 **generally give you that information anyway.**
 5 Q. Would you normally, as a matter of practice, ask whether
 6 there are any children in the house or flat where you
 7 are handling an FSG?
 8 **A. Yes, you would ask if there is anyone else with them,**
 9 **yes.**
 10 Q. What about elderly people? Would you ask about that?
 11 **A. Not particularly specifically elderly, but obviously you**
 12 **would ask the caller if there is anyone else in the flat**
 13 **or the building with them in there as well.**
 14 Q. We also discussed this question of ringing back just
 15 before the break, and you said normally you wouldn't
 16 need to because they would stay on the line.
 17 **A. Yes.**
 18 Q. What would happen if your call got cut off during an FSG
 19 call?
 20 **A. If it was on a landline, we wouldn't ring back, because**
 21 **you could be -- wherever the phone might be, you could**
 22 **put them in more danger. It's not practice to ring**
 23 **a caller back.**
 24 Q. No, you said.
 25 **A. I can't really answer that. I think if they're on**

Page 141

1 **a mobile, I probably would attempt to call them back, if**
 2 **I had one call going on, if it was one call I was**
 3 **dealing with.**
 4 Q. Going back, if I can, to policy 539, at page 17, under
 5 the word "General". Tab 3 of the policies bundle. This
 6 is "Emergency call management", and this is appendix 3.
 7 It is the second page of appendix 3. I want to ask you
 8 one or two questions about this.
 9 It says:
 10 "General
 11 "Other control room officers and supervisory staff
 12 will assist the CRO carrying out the Fire Survival
 13 Guidance call by ensuring all relevant information
 14 regarding the caller's situation is passed via both the
 15 airwave radio and via telephone when a command unit is
 16 in attendance."
 17 Do you know why it requires the information to be
 18 sent via both radio and telephone when a CU is present?
 19 **A. No. It may be a supervisor would ring the command unit**
 20 **when it's in attendance, and I'm not a supervisor. From**
 21 **my point of view, it would be -- the other control room**
 22 **officers and supervisory staff, if you have one fire**
 23 **survival guidance going on, obviously will assist in**
 24 **that. You might need an ambulance, so someone else will**
 25 **call the ambulance; someone else will be updating the**

Page 142

1 **radio operator.**
 2 **For the telephone with the command unit, that might**
 3 **be more the officer of the watch that would do that.**
 4 Q. Which telephone would be used in the control room to
 5 contact the command unit?
 6 **A. One that's on the officer of the watch's --**
 7 Q. Is that --
 8 **A. I don't know if that's a handheld or on the ICS system,**
 9 **I'm not sure.**
 10 Q. Is it a solid telephone on the head table?
 11 **A. There is, but whether that's for special purposes, I'm**
 12 **not sure.**
 13 Q. We can read the text for ourselves, but in your
 14 experience of FSG calls, does that result in there being
 15 a set or pair of parallel lines of communication between
 16 the control room and the incident ground, one by radio
 17 and one by telephone?
 18 **A. For a control officer, it's the radio. So if it's by**
 19 **telephone, that's a supervisor's role, which is not --**
 20 **I'm not a supervisor, so I can't answer.**
 21 Q. Would you expect the same information to be passed by
 22 the supervisor by telephone and by the radio operator by
 23 radio to the incident ground, to the command unit?
 24 **A. Well, yes, all the information that we have got should**
 25 **be going over the radio, so, yes.**

Page 143

1 Q. In your experience, if you were on the radio and the
 2 supervisor was on the telephone, would you speak to the
 3 same person in the command unit or different people in
 4 the command unit?
 5 **A. Probably -- it would have to be different. You wouldn't**
 6 **be able to be on the phone and on the radio.**
 7 Q. Do you think it contemplates simultaneous messages being
 8 sent, phone and radio?
 9 **A. Yeah, I would have thought they would be different**
 10 **people.**
 11 Q. Would the control room keep track of the information
 12 given on the radio and on the telephone in order to
 13 ensure that the messages were consistent?
 14 **A. Well, the information should be going on the log. So**
 15 **you're passing the information -- when you're taking**
 16 **fire survival guidance and that, you're typing in a lot**
 17 **of information, so that's going onto the log so the**
 18 **radio operator can pass that information.**
 19 Q. Just so I'm clear, you have got the information about
 20 the FSG on the log, and that's inputted by --
 21 **A. The call taker.**
 22 Q. -- the call taker.
 23 **A. Mmm.**
 24 Q. Then the radio operator -- is this right? -- has sight
 25 of the log and then passes that information to the CU?

Page 144

1 **A. Yeah, what we have is -- the procedure for that is**
 2 **a service request.**
 3 Q. Yes.
 4 **A. Which is like a message box. The call operator who is**
 5 **taking the details will open up the service request box,**
 6 **which is like message information, and will input the**
 7 **details. That message will have the incident number on**
 8 **it, and if that person's opened up the incident, it will**
 9 **automatically be attached to that message box. They**
 10 **will type information for the radio operator to pass**
 11 **over.**
 12 **So they will save that message box. The message box**
 13 **will -- we have a list, which everyone in the control**
 14 **room can see, of service requests, and it will say on**
 15 **there for RT4, for example, and the RT4 operator will**
 16 **open that box and relay that information.**
 17 Q. Would the supervisor also have access to the log and
 18 give the same information by telephone to the CU?
 19 **A. I don't know what the supervisor would pass.**
 20 Q. Can I go back to -- I'm sorry to jump around these
 21 policies -- policy 790, if I can. I just want to show
 22 you two things in here.
 23 First of all, if I can ask you to look at
 24 paragraph 7.5, it says:
 25 "The Command Support System (CSS) has a messages

Page 145

1 screen that records messages sent to and from the
 2 incident ground once a CU has been mobilised. Messages
 3 sent by Firelink radio relating to FSG calls are
 4 recorded here."
 5 Then it goes on to say:
 6 "There is also a conferencing facility on CSS which
 7 is available for remote users. Control has CSS access
 8 and sensitive information relating to specific calls can
 9 be communicated by this method."
 10 **A. I think that's a supervisor that has access to that.**
 11 Q. That was my first question.
 12 **A. I'm not really familiar with CSS.**
 13 Q. Are you familiar with the CSS system?
 14 **A. No.**
 15 Q. You're not.
 16 Can I then ask you to look at paragraph 9 of
 17 the same policy on the next page, which is
 18 "Communication with Control", and just draw your
 19 attention to paragraph 9.1:
 20 "It is vital that control is kept informed of the
 21 actions being taken to resolve each FSG call. The fact
 22 that control is aware of the actions being carried out
 23 on the incident ground will greatly enhance the advice
 24 given to FSG callers."
 25 As a control room operator, what information would

Page 146

1 you expect normally to receive from the incident ground
 2 about an FSG call?
 3 **A. That they have reached the person.**
 4 Q. Apart from that, would you expect to get any other
 5 information, do you think?
 6 **A. With regards to the FSG call?**
 7 Q. Yes.
 8 **A. I don't really -- we know when the fire engine reaches**
 9 **the incident. We are passing the information to the**
 10 **fire engine -- obviously we know when he gets there,**
 11 **he's status 3. We are passing where that person is, and**
 12 **the only thing I can think of what they would come back**
 13 **with is that they have rescued that person.**
 14 Q. Would you ever expect to get information by way of
 15 update about how near the crews are getting to the
 16 destination before they get there?
 17 **A. They will be status 2 when they are en route to that**
 18 **incident. Certainly if we are saying we have someone**
 19 **on -- "How long do you expect to be?", and they can give**
 20 **us an ETA. But I'm not quite sure ...**
 21 Q. Have you any experience of handling an FSG call in
 22 a high-rise building?
 23 **A. No, I think my -- not that I can recall.**
 24 Q. Have you any experience of having to get updates from
 25 the incident ground about how close the crews are to the

Page 147

1 FSG caller?
 2 **A. I don't recall getting updates, like, "We are two**
 3 **minutes away", or whatever, unless we maybe ask them.**
 4 **Sorry.**
 5 Q. Would you expect to receive an update about the outcome
 6 of an FSG call?
 7 **A. Yes.**
 8 Q. I want to turn to the night of the fire, if I can.
 9 On the night of the fire, you I think moved on to
 10 the role of radio operator covering channel 4; is that
 11 right?
 12 **A. Yes.**
 13 Q. You were undertaking that role, I think, when the first
 14 call came in from Grenfell Tower.
 15 **A. Yes.**
 16 Q. Was there another radio operator in --
 17 **A. There was. There was another radio operator, on**
 18 **channel 2.**
 19 Q. On channel 2?
 20 **A. Yes.**
 21 Q. Who was that, do you know?
 22 **A. Sarah Russell.**
 23 Q. We know, I think, that she came on to help doing calls
 24 at some point.
 25 **A. That's correct. When it started to get very busy and we**

Page 148

1 started to get a queue of calls, it became apparent that
 2 one of us should obviously start taking calls. That was
 3 the priority. So I then took over both channels.
 4 Q. So you used channels 2 and 4, did you?
 5 A. Yes.
 6 Q. So you basically borrowed south London's radio
 7 capability?
 8 A. I was the radio operator for the whole of London.
 9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You were effectively the radio
 10 operator for both north and south of the river?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: But you didn't use channel 2 to
 13 handle north of the river traffic?
 14 A. No. They would stick with channel 2.
 15 MR MILLETT: In your witness statement, if I can just go
 16 back to it, at the bottom of page 3, you explain that
 17 you completed an exercise with Christine Howson on the
 18 standby desk, I think, and then moved across to
 19 channel 4.
 20 A. Yes.
 21 Q. You call it "the busier channel", you say.
 22 A. Channel 4 is the busier, yes.
 23 Q. Is it just habitually the busier channel?
 24 A. Yes, it covers a bigger area.
 25 Q. Busier than channel 2? That's the comparison?

Page 149

1 A. Generally, it usually is, yes.
 2 Q. When you moved across to the radio -- is there a seat,
 3 a specific seat?
 4 A. I was in another room doing the standbys with Christine.
 5 I was assisting her. She took the lead on that and
 6 I was just assisting her. So that was in a different
 7 room in the building.
 8 So when I came back into the control room when those
 9 duties were done, I went on to channel 4. That was my
 10 position for the night.
 11 Q. Can you just give us an idea of physically where you sit
 12 as a radio operator in the control room?
 13 A. Well, we were at Stratford that night.
 14 Q. I mean Stratford, yes.
 15 A. So it's more at the back of the room -- we call the
 16 supervisors the back of the room, so the opposite to the
 17 supervisors. You have, like -- it's very difficult to
 18 explain. So a row of -- three positions here
 19 (Indicates) with two radio operators and a relief, who
 20 would also take calls, and then around the room we have
 21 call-takers, and then in front is the supervisors,
 22 facing everybody.
 23 Q. So you've got a clear line of sight to the supervisor?
 24 A. Yes, everybody did have, really.
 25 Q. Did the supervisor have a clear line of sight to you?

Page 150

1 A. Yes.
 2 Q. We will come to look at some of the individuals later
 3 on, but when you talk about the supervisor, who are you
 4 talking about on that night?
 5 A. I'm talking about officer of the watch and the officer
 6 in charge. So officer in charge was Alex Norman.
 7 Q. Alex Norman?
 8 A. And officers of the watch were Peter May and
 9 Debbie Real.
 10 Q. What about Jo Smith?
 11 A. She is above Alex, but she came in later, so she wasn't
 12 on duty. She came in because of how the incident went.
 13 Q. Yes.
 14 On page 2 of your statement, just going back to it,
 15 in the second paragraph you say:
 16 "A radio operator is the essential link between the
 17 crews on the ground and the Control Room."
 18 I just want to have a look at that a little bit
 19 further.
 20 How do control room operators, people taking 999
 21 calls, normally convey messages to you as the radio
 22 operator?
 23 A. Again, this is going back to the service request box.
 24 So on the system in front of us, we have a screen with
 25 all the incidents on there. The incident that you want,

Page 151

1 you will open up a message box with the incident number
 2 in it, or you might open that incident and it will link
 3 it to it. You put your information into the message
 4 box, which is the service request, and it will say
 5 "RT4", and it will say the call sign of whoever is the
 6 officer in charge, and then they -- if it's a priority,
 7 like an FSG, they will call out and say, "Message on 4",
 8 and the radio operator then -- when they save that
 9 message, it goes into the list, and the radio operator
 10 can see the list and obviously there's messages on there
 11 for RT4. Open up that message and relay it to the
 12 officer in charge, or the incident command, or the fire
 13 ground.
 14 Q. You say open it up and relay it to the fire ground.
 15 A. To whoever I'm communicating with on that incident. So
 16 when I said, like, earlier, the pump ladder with the
 17 watch manager on it to start with.
 18 Q. Just focusing on what's happening inside the control
 19 room for the moment, I think what you're saying is that
 20 CROs normally convey messages to you as the radio
 21 operator through the Vision log?
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. It comes up on your screen, does it, and you see it?
 24 A. Yes.
 25 Q. And you say what you see on the screen to the incident

Page 152

1 ground via radio?
 2 **A. Yes.**
 3 Q. Would CROs normally convey messages to you while still
 4 on the calls or wait for the calls to finish before
 5 typing in messages?
 6 **A. They might put more information on a service log, but**
 7 **generally in this case I was just passing over --**
 8 **I don't remember them sort of -- I mean, if it was one**
 9 **call, then you might call across with more info as well,**
 10 **but when we were getting lots of calls, it was just**
 11 **going on the service requests.**
 12 Q. On the night of the fire, did it work in the way you
 13 have just described, with the use of the Vision log?
 14 **A. Yes.**
 15 Q. It did, did it?
 16 **A. Yes.**
 17 Q. We have heard some evidence from Jason Oliff, who
 18 arrived in the control room at about 2.00 am, that
 19 control room officers were writing FSG information on
 20 pieces of paper and then walking them up to him.
 21 **A. Well, that was later on, and that was -- initially, it**
 22 **was all done through the radio.**
 23 Q. Right.
 24 **A. It got to a point when obviously we were taking a lot of**
 25 **fire survival guidance calls, and the radio is not just**

Page 153

1 **for passing fire survival guidance calls; it's also the**
 2 **link between fire ground and control. So the radio was**
 3 **taking other messages, like the make-ups and, you know,**
 4 **people getting there, et cetera. So it wasn't just fire**
 5 **survival guidance.**
 6 **So later on, when they'd arrived, due to the amount**
 7 **of calls being taken, I think the decision was made to**
 8 **start passing things to him, because he was on the phone**
 9 **to the ground, because it was quicker that way because**
 10 **of the amount of traffic, obviously, on the radio as**
 11 **well as the fire survival guidance.**
 12 Q. We will probably come to this later on, but was there
 13 a period of time when you were taking Vision messages
 14 from control room operators and radioing them to the
 15 incident ground at the same time as Jason Oliff was
 16 sending them by mobile phone to the incident ground?
 17 **A. To be honest, I don't know. I don't know. That is**
 18 **possible.**
 19 Q. You don't remember?
 20 **A. I was so busy on the radio, and that -- I don't know.**
 21 **A decision was made at the point for people to start**
 22 **passing the pieces of paper over, so that's generally**
 23 **what started to happen. It might have happened**
 24 **gradually, but eventually that's what happened.**
 25 Q. We will probably come back to that.

Page 154

1 But going back to this question of communication and
 2 the use of the Vision system, can I just ask a general
 3 question: did the Vision system cope on the night with
 4 the volume of messages or were there problems with it?
 5 **A. The Vision system did cope that night because we -- it's**
 6 **a new system and we have had teething problems with it,**
 7 **but we were at Stratford, which is the fallback centre,**
 8 **and the Vision, as I understand it, the server, was**
 9 **changed over -- we have an A server and a B server, so A**
 10 **at Merton and B at Stratford.**
 11 Q. Right.
 12 **A. So because the server was changed to the B server, there**
 13 **wasn't so much information on the B server, so it was**
 14 **coping with the amount of information going into it. It**
 15 **wasn't slowing down or anything like -- it was okay on**
 16 **the night.**
 17 Q. Can I just see if we can illustrate what you have been
 18 telling us through some examples, working with the short
 19 incident log.
 20 Can I ask you to be shown the short incident log and
 21 go to page 20. It's tab 23 of our master documents
 22 bundle.
 23 This is, I stress, an example.
 24 You see the time mark of 01.55.18 on page 20. You
 25 have:

Page 155

1 "Service Request Created: RT4 - G271 - CALLER IN
 2 FLAT 95 HAS FLAMES COMING IN WINDOW."
 3 We can see that that's updated at 01.55.35, just
 4 below it:
 5 "Service Request Updated from RT4 - G271 - CALLER IN
 6 FLAT 95 HAS FLAMES COMING IN WINDOW, to RT4 - G271 -
 7 CALLER IN FLAT 95 FLOOR 12 HAS FLAMES COMING IN WINDOW."
 8 So the update is "floor 12". Do you see that?
 9 **A. Yes.**
 10 Q. PD is the person -- is this right? -- creating the
 11 service request?
 12 **A. Yes.**
 13 Q. Is that Peter Duddy?
 14 **A. Yes.**
 15 Q. He is the control room operator. What's happening is he
 16 is typing the service request into Vision and sending it
 17 to you, effectively?
 18 **A. Yes.**
 19 Q. I say "updated" because "floor 12" is new information,
 20 as we can see.
 21 Then if you turn the page to 21, we can see that the
 22 service request is completed at 01.56.44, the second
 23 entry down:
 24 "Service Request Completed: RT4 - G271 - CALLER IN
 25 FLAT 95 FLOOR 12 HAS FLAMES COMING IN WINDOW."

Page 156

1 When it's completed, what is happening?
 2 **A. So he will pass that information -- when it's completed,**
 3 **then I've passed the information.**
 4 Q. By radio?
 5 **A. By radio.**
 6 Q. RT4 is radio channel 4?
 7 **A. Yes.**
 8 Q. What does the T stand for, is that "transmission"?
 9 **A. What is -- sorry?**
 10 Q. RT. What does RT stand for?
 11 **A. It's just "radio traffic". RT4 is -- sorry, "radio**
 12 **transmission". It's M2FN, RT4, same thing, the phrase**
 13 **we would use.**
 14 Q. Finally, to complete the picture, if we look at the
 15 radio transmissions at 01.56 -- perhaps we can look at
 16 this, this is LFB00002057. That is a radio
 17 transmission. It's a transcript of the radio
 18 transmission.
 19 **A. Okay.**
 20 Q. "FEMALE SPEAKER: Flat 95 on the 12th floor has flames
 21 coming in the window, over."
 22 The first question is: was that you?
 23 **A. Yes.**
 24 Q. We can see the message being sent to the incident
 25 ground.

Page 157

1 Now, at that stage, at 01.56.23, we know that was
 2 a command unit in place.
 3 **A. Okay.**
 4 Q. We have evidence earlier from earlier witnesses in the
 5 inquiry who say that that was, at that stage, CU8.
 6 **A. Okay.**
 7 Q. Do you know who you were speaking to on CU8?
 8 **A. No, you don't take a name; you just call up that call**
 9 **sign, CU8.**
 10 Q. Okay.
 11 We can see the time at 01.56.23. Looking back at
 12 the short incident log, you can see that at 01.56.44,
 13 the service request is completed, and SAD is the
 14 initial -- I'm assuming that's you?
 15 **A. Yes.**
 16 Q. Does that mean that you complete the request on the
 17 short incident log or on the Vision log system after
 18 you've sent the radio message that you just looked at?
 19 **A. Yes.**
 20 **SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask to clarify my own**
 21 **understanding: if you look at the "Service request**
 22 **completed", it has "RT4 - G271" which is the incident**
 23 **command pump, whereas you actually radioed CU8. Now, is**
 24 **that -- well, you had better explain it.**
 25 **A. All I have done is ticked that service request box. So**

Page 158

1 **I need to type that information in. The call-taker --**
 2 **SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That's put in by the original CRO**
 3 **who creates the request.**
 4 **A. Yes.**
 5 **SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: From that point on, it remains as he**
 6 **created it.**
 7 **A. Yes, I haven't changed it.**
 8 **SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That's what I thought, thank you.**
 9 MR MILLETT: Can I just explore that a little bit further.
 10 If you go back, then, to LFB00002057, which is the
 11 radio message we were looking at a moment ago, you can
 12 see at top, which I didn't take you to and I should have
 13 done it says "Event" and there are a lot of letters and
 14 numbers and then it says:
 15 "... Control_FSG_6_to_CU8."
 16 So it looks as if the system has picked up the fact
 17 that you have passed the radio message to CU8.
 18 Would you expect the recording system to record
 19 which CU you are sending the message to?
 20 **A. Would I expect -- well, yes, yes, of course, it's taped.**
 21 Q. To take the chairman's point a little further, does that
 22 mean that although the person who created the service
 23 request -- which I think in this case was Pete Duddy,
 24 thought the messages were still being sent to G271 as
 25 the initial command pump, you knew actually they should

Page 159

1 go to CU8?
 2 **A. Yes.**
 3 Q. Next question: do you remember how you found out that
 4 CU8 was the command unit which had arrived?
 5 **A. Yes, I do. I know that Golf -- I was calling up**
 6 **Golf 271 with the priority message -- I don't know if it**
 7 **was that one, but I was calling up Golf 271 and I wasn't**
 8 **getting a response because obviously they were very**
 9 **busy. And Charlie Uniform 8 came up on the radio and**
 10 **spoke to me and said, "We are just setting up, can you**
 11 **pass it over to us?", and obviously, like I said**
 12 **earlier, a command unit does take over, so from that**
 13 **moment I started passing them to him.**
 14 Q. So to summarise this, does that mean that the control
 15 room officers creating messages didn't know that --
 16 **A. Well, they might not necessarily know that because it**
 17 **was so busy, but they do know that obviously Golf 271 is**
 18 **attached to that incident, and that's the important**
 19 **thing: that those messages were going to the right**
 20 **incident.**
 21 Q. Is there any way of amending the Vision system when you
 22 mark it as "Service request completed" to show that in
 23 fact the message was being sent to CU8 and not G271?
 24 **A. It's not standard practice to do that, because, I mean,**
 25 **it is taped, and it does log it, so it's not standard**

Page 160

1 **practice -- I wouldn't change a service request**
 2 **information. It was -- I could put "CU8 is now" -- but**
 3 **usually they will come up and say "CU8 is now incident**
 4 **command pump", but it was so busy that that might not**
 5 **have actually been said. If they had said that, I would**
 6 **have typed -- because I'm listening and typing at the**
 7 **same time, and I would have typed that in. But it was**
 8 **so busy, it was just a case of getting the information**
 9 **across to them and, you know, it was ...**
 10 Q. Was there a way in which those on CU8 could access the
 11 Vision log and themselves type in an information message
 12 or something to say, "Please pass all messages to CU8"?
 13 **A. Well, I don't know what they have on the command unit.**
 14 **I have never seen what they're using. So I don't know**
 15 **the answer to that.**
 16 Q. Right.
 17 **A. But, like I say, it is taped and starting to get logged**
 18 **that it's CU8.**
 19 Q. Just going back to being told about setting up, if I can
 20 ask you to be shown LFB00003078.
 21 (Pause)
 22 We will perhaps come back to that.
 23 Can I just explore another example with you, and if
 24 you can't remember anything about it, then say so and
 25 I'll stop.

Page 161

1 I'm going to ask you about flat 111 on the 14th
 2 floor. Are you okay with that?
 3 **A. Yes.**
 4 Q. Now, there were two service requests, and we know
 5 information about it was passed via what we understand
 6 is called an admin line call. Are you familiar with
 7 admin line calls?
 8 **A. Yes.**
 9 Q. If you go first of all to page 61 of the ORR, and should
 10 just tell you what the ORR is: it's a report put
 11 together at the end of May for -- I will say for the
 12 inquiry, but by the LFB, and they have shared it with
 13 the inquiry and everybody else, which is a timeline of
 14 the first hour of the fire with some detail in it.
 15 At page 61, there is a table at the bottom of
 16 the page, and you can see in the table that one of
 17 the flats listed, the second one down, is flat number
 18 111. I just stress for everybody in the room that that
 19 is an example only I'm using this for.
 20 We can see from the table the call was received into
 21 the control room at 01.25.16 in relation to flat 111 on
 22 the 14th floor saying they were trapped by smoke.
 23 Do you see that?
 24 **A. Yes.**
 25 Q. We know from a document I'm going to show you that at

Page 162

1 01.35.24, so 10 minutes or so later, Alex Norman sent
 2 details about this flat to CU8.
 3 Can I just ask the witness to be shown INQ00000194.
 4 That is timed at 01.35.24, as you can see from the
 5 middle of the event information at the top. If
 6 Mr Documents Director can turn to the next page, near
 7 the bottom of the page you can see that Alex Norman --
 8 and we have been told it's Alex Norman by Jo Smith who
 9 told us of this -- says:
 10 "CONTROL: Right, so I've got flat number 111.
 11 "CU8: 111.
 12 "CONTROL: Which is on the 14th floor."
 13 If you go to the next page, "14th floor" is repeated
 14 at the top there.
 15 My first question is, having shown you the receipt
 16 of the call at 01.25 and the message to CU8 at 01.35 by
 17 Alex Norman: did you know Alex Norman was contacting the
 18 CU on the incident ground?
 19 **A. No. But that might be part of her role. I mean, she**
 20 **was the officer in charge. But, no.**
 21 Q. She didn't tell you, did she, that she was contacting --
 22 **A. No, she wouldn't tell me.**
 23 Q. Did you see her on a phone passing messages to CU8 or to
 24 the incident ground?
 25 **A. No, I don't recall.**

Page 163

1 Q. If you go back to the short incident log, please, and
 2 look at page 19, at the time mark of 01.43.58, CH makes
 3 a service request:
 4 "... RT4 G271 FLAT 111 14TH FLOOR TRAPPED IN
 5 BATHROOM SMOKE COMING IN."
 6 CH is I think Christine Howson, I have worked that
 7 out; is that right?
 8 **A. Yes.**
 9 Q. Can you help me with how Christine Howson would have got
 10 that information?
 11 **A. The caller may have rung back and then spoken to**
 12 **Christine.**
 13 Q. Then if you look at 01.44.56 you can see SAD, which is
 14 you:
 15 "Service Request Completed: RT4 G271 ..."
 16 And you repeat the message.
 17 **A. Yes.**
 18 Q. I know this is an example, but did you know that at that
 19 stage in the evening you were passing radio messages for
 20 fire survival guidance calls in relation to the same
 21 flats that Alex Norman was passing messages to via admin
 22 line?
 23 **A. I didn't know that, no.**
 24 Q. Does it surprise you to find out?
 25 **A. To be honest, I don't think it really matters. I think**

Page 164

1 the fact that they were getting the information, even if
 2 they have got it once or twice, that's the important
 3 thing.
 4 Q. Can you explain why the radio message that I have just
 5 shown you was sent something like eight minutes after
 6 Alex Norman's call to CU8?
 7 A. Well, the call that Christine spoke to, she made that
 8 request at 01.43, so that would assume that maybe the
 9 caller's rung back and got Christine, and then I've
 10 passed it over straight away.
 11 Q. There's then a second service request for the same flat
 12 at 01.51.13, if you go to page 20 of the short incident
 13 log. This is HJF this time, which I think I have worked
 14 out is Heidi Fox.
 15 A. Heidi.
 16 Q. She makes a service request:
 17 "... RT4 TO G271 INFO REC FROM ..."
 18 Is that Surrey?
 19 A. Yes.
 20 Q. "... CALLER IN FLAT 111 ON THE 14TH FLOOR IS IN THE
 21 BATHROOM AREA WITH SMOKE ENTERING ROOM HE IS HAVING
 22 DIFFICULTIES IN BREATHING."
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. That service request was completed at 01.54.05, if you
 25 look a bit further down the page, by SAD -- that's you.

Page 165

1 A. Mm-hm.
 2 Q. Again, can you explain why there was a further service
 3 request in relation to this FSG caller?
 4 A. Well, again, the caller has rung back or spoken to
 5 Surrey Police -- has rung 999 and probably couldn't get
 6 through to us and was diverted to Surrey Police.
 7 Q. Right.
 8 A. Heidi's got that information from the police and sent it
 9 on a service request. So, I mean, I think callers were
 10 ringing back and speaking to different people in the
 11 control room, but you wouldn't necessarily collate all
 12 that information -- you wouldn't pick up that maybe the
 13 same caller was ringing back. Several people could have
 14 spoken to that same caller, and it would still be the
 15 information they were getting. Because obviously it's
 16 an update as well of -- smoke is in -- he's now having
 17 difficulties breathing. So all the information would
 18 still be passed.
 19 Q. Right.
 20 A. Heidi wouldn't have known maybe that Christine had
 21 spoken to that caller.
 22 Q. If you had known that Alex Norman had already passed
 23 a message about this flat to command unit 8, do you
 24 think you would have still sent this radio transmission?
 25 A. I was just sending all the service request messages.

Page 166

1 I wasn't thinking if anyone else was sending it. I was
 2 just sending what was being sent to me.
 3 Q. Can I just turn to the radio messages then that were
 4 sent --
 5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask a question: if
 6 a service request is created on the Vision system and
 7 not actioned, does the system throw up an alarm of some
 8 sort?
 9 A. I don't think it does with a service request. If it's
 10 not actioned, it will just sit there until someone
 11 actually completes it.
 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
 13 MR MILLETT: Can I just show you one or two radio messages.
 14 First of all, LFB00002305. This is operator to
 15 Charlie Uniform -- or, rather -- do you know whether
 16 that's an incoming message or an outgoing message? It
 17 starts:
 18 "OPERATOR: Charlie Uniform 8, go ahead. Over."
 19 A. So that's from me to -- I think that's from me to
 20 Charlie Uniform 8.
 21 Q. I would assume that "operator" is you. So you're
 22 calling Charlie Uniform 8.
 23 A. Hang on a minute ...
 24 Q. It may be the other way around.
 25 A. It's a bit confusing. I think I'm calling up Charlie

Page 167

1 Uniform 8 and they're obviously sending over that
 2 information.
 3 Q. You can see the information:
 4 "We're being advised that people on the 10th floor
 5 are asking to leave their flats. Are you able to go and
 6 check them?"
 7 That's presumably you speaking to CU8?
 8 A. Yes.
 9 Q. I'm putting that to you because it seems obvious.
 10 A. I wasn't waiting for an answer. I was just saying, "Can
 11 you go and check them".
 12 Q. Then you say:
 13 "... traffic, we've got info received from
 14 Surrey Police. Um, caller on the 14th floor in Flat 111
 15 is in the bathroom with smoke entering the room and he's
 16 having difficulties breathing. Over."
 17 Looking back at the short incident log at 01.54.05,
 18 page 20, I have shown you this before. You've got the
 19 service request completed and you've got the radio
 20 message.
 21 When you sent the message, were you essentially
 22 reading the service request in progress at 01.53.52
 23 aloud down the phone to CU8?
 24 A. Oh, I see, there's --
 25 Q. It is my fault. I have confused you. I have shown you

Page 168

<p>1 the radio message --</p> <p>2 A. The one in progress means that I've seen that message</p> <p>3 and I might be trying to raise them. The one which says</p> <p>4 "completed" is I have now passed that information.</p> <p>5 Q. Then at LFB00002324, we have got a message at 01.53.31,</p> <p>6 and this is, as you can see, timed at 01.53:31 from the</p> <p>7 event configuration at the top:</p> <p>8 "OPERATOR: Okay, that was Flat 111. Can you confirm</p> <p>9 what floor that's on?</p> <p>10 "CALLER: Fourteen."</p> <p>11 Again, is that CU8 asking you the question and you</p> <p>12 responding?</p> <p>13 A. Yes. He's asking me can I confirm the floor.</p> <p>14 Q. Having shown you that, can we get from that that when</p> <p>15 you speak to CU8 by radio in relation to an FSG call,</p> <p>16 you are essentially reading off to CU8 what you have got</p> <p>17 on your Vision log in front of you?</p> <p>18 A. Yes.</p> <p>19 Q. Ms Darby, I've just been reminded of the time.</p> <p>20 A. I'm okay for another --</p> <p>21 Q. Would you like a break?</p> <p>22 A. I'm okay for 10 or 15 minutes.</p> <p>23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Let's see where Mr Millett is going</p> <p>24 for the rest of the afternoon.</p> <p>25 Mr Millett, you have a few more questions,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 169</p>	<p>1 3.55 pm. Don't talk to anyone about your evidence,</p> <p>2 please. If you would like to go with the usher now and</p> <p>3 have a short timeout.</p> <p>4 THE WITNESS: Okay.</p> <p>5 (The witness withdrew)</p> <p>6 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We will resume at 3.55 pm, please.</p> <p>7 (3.48 pm)</p> <p>8 (A short break)</p> <p>9 (3.56 pm)</p> <p>10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: While we are waiting for the</p> <p>11 witness, can I just say that I heard the announcement</p> <p>12 about the so-called fire drill later on this afternoon.</p> <p>13 It is not actually a drill; no one is expected to leave</p> <p>14 the building in a hurry. There will be a test of</p> <p>15 the fire alarm, and if you listen carefully, you will</p> <p>16 hear that we will be told "Take no action" or something</p> <p>17 similar. So there is no need to evacuate.</p> <p>18 MR MILLETT: Thank you, Mr Chairman.</p> <p>19 If we can have the witness back, then, please.</p> <p>20 (The witness returned)</p> <p>21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Ms Darby?</p> <p>22 THE WITNESS: Yes.</p> <p>23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Are you happy to carry on?</p> <p>24 THE WITNESS: Yes.</p> <p>25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Millett, before you continue,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 171</p>
<p>1 I suspect?</p> <p>2 MR MILLETT: I do. We can carry on for --</p> <p>3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you think that you may need to go</p> <p>4 on until 4.15 or even 4.30, I think the witness might</p> <p>5 prefer to have a break at this point.</p> <p>6 THE WITNESS: I'll take advice from yourself.</p> <p>7 MR MILLETT: Why don't we take a break now?</p> <p>8 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I just ask you, are you content,</p> <p>9 subject to any other developments, to go on until, let's</p> <p>10 say, 4.30 pm?</p> <p>11 THE WITNESS: Of course, yes.</p> <p>12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: In that case, I think it would be in</p> <p>13 everyone's interests to have a short break now, just</p> <p>14 five minutes or so, and then Mr Millett can feel free to</p> <p>15 use the afternoon.</p> <p>16 MR MILLETT: I ought just to be candid with the chair and</p> <p>17 the witness; I am not going to finish my questions of</p> <p>18 the witness this afternoon, I'm afraid. It is not great</p> <p>19 news for you, Ms Darby, I'm afraid, and I'm sorry about</p> <p>20 that.</p> <p>21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: But the more questions we have</p> <p>22 today, the fewer there should be tomorrow. I say</p> <p>23 "should" because you never know, of course.</p> <p>24 MR MILLETT: That's the theory. I'm so sorry about that.</p> <p>25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We will have a break now until</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 170</p>	<p>1 I think we should work on the basis that 4.30 pm is an</p> <p>2 absolute deadline; all right?</p> <p>3 MR MILLETT: For the time being, yes.</p> <p>4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: No, not for the time being!</p> <p>5 MR MILLETT: Okay, not for the time being.</p> <p>6 Ms Darby, sorry about that.</p> <p>7 Can I just ask you to turn to a different subject,</p> <p>8 which is the information that you get back from crews on</p> <p>9 the ground.</p> <p>10 Page 4 of your statement in the second paragraph,</p> <p>11 you say in the fourth line:</p> <p>12 "The process would be to receive a message from the</p> <p>13 ground regarding the scene incident. They could request</p> <p>14 either a 'make up' of appliances or request other</p> <p>15 resources. The message is then processed through VISION</p> <p>16 and picked up by another CRO who will action it and</p> <p>17 allocate the required resources."</p> <p>18 Do you have any part to play in that exercise as</p> <p>19 a radio operator?</p> <p>20 A. As the radio operator, you take the message from the</p> <p>21 incident commander, and it might be saying, for example,</p> <p>22 "make pumps six". So I'm listening to him, I'm typing</p> <p>23 in -- I'm opening a service request, typing in "make</p> <p>24 pumps six", and when I save that service request, I will</p> <p>25 shout out to the room so they all know that there is an</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 172</p>

1 **urgent message coming out, and I will shout out "make**
 2 **pumps six". Then that service request will go into that**
 3 **list again and one of the control officers will pick it**
 4 **up and do the actions required.**
 5 Q. Do you shout out all messages that come from the
 6 incident ground or only those that relate to resources?
 7 **A. Anything urgent. Like, for example -- definitely**
 8 **make-ups, we always shout out. If it was an ambulance,**
 9 **we would shout out there's an ambulance request.**
 10 Q. Why do you shout it out?
 11 **A. If it's urgent, so that it brings the attention to the**
 12 **people that are in the room and they know that they have**
 13 **got to deal with that quickly.**
 14 Q. On the night, did you do that shouting out for all 999
 15 calls or FSG messages that came in so that the control
 16 room would know about --
 17 **A. Well, I didn't get FSG messages from the ground. I got**
 18 **make-ups from the crews and, yes, I shouted out all the**
 19 **make-ups.**
 20 Q. So you say you didn't get FSG messages from the ground.
 21 That's right, is it?
 22 **A. Well, we are doing the FSG, aren't we? So we are**
 23 **passing the FSG information to them and they are**
 24 **receiving the information.**
 25 Q. Did you get any feedback or communication back from the

Page 173

1 incident ground about FSG messages?
 2 **A. No.**
 3 Q. Was that at any stage during the night of the
 4 Grenfell Tower fire?
 5 **A. Not about rescues or anything like that.**
 6 Q. If all radio messages are logged onto Vision, as we have
 7 seen, does that mean that all the other CROs in the room
 8 can see them?
 9 **A. They can. They have to go through the log and it can**
 10 **get quite long.**
 11 Q. You have to scroll, have you?
 12 **A. You've got to scroll.**
 13 Q. Does that mean that when they are speaking to a caller,
 14 they know or can see that a message has been sent to the
 15 fire ground?
 16 **A. Oh, yes -- you mean while they are on the line to them?**
 17 Q. Yes.
 18 **A. They might shout out "RT4 message". I will pick it up**
 19 **and send it. They will know when I have completed it**
 20 **that it's been sent.**
 21 Q. To take an example, I showed you the messages created
 22 and completed in relation to flat 111.
 23 **A. Yes.**
 24 Q. If flat 111 called back into the control room and got
 25 another control room operator, for example --

Page 174

1 **A. They are not going to scroll through all the messages**
 2 **because they won't have time to do that.**
 3 Q. But could they do that?
 4 **A. Well, I suppose they could, but we wouldn't have had**
 5 **time to look through all the messages like that. There**
 6 **were, like, priority calls -- emergency calls waiting,**
 7 **and it got to the point of -- we didn't have time to**
 8 **scroll through and see who's already called. Just pick**
 9 **up the calls and get the information that you're taking**
 10 **across.**
 11 Q. If a caller asked a control room operator, "Are the
 12 crews on their way?", would the control room operator be
 13 able to answer the question by scrolling up and looking
 14 at the Vision log and seeing the message completed?
 15 **A. Message completed will mean that I've passed that**
 16 **information to the crew. The control officer will know**
 17 **that the crews are there or on their way because it**
 18 **shows on the incident all the appliances that are**
 19 **assigned to that incident, and they change colour as to**
 20 **when they're on their way and they change colour to red**
 21 **when they are actually in attendance. So they can see**
 22 **when people are -- they will know if the fire engines**
 23 **are in attendance there.**
 24 Q. But to be able to answer the question to a fire survival
 25 guidance caller, "Are the crews on their way up to me in

Page 175

1 this high-rise? Where are they?", would a control room
 2 operator be able to get that information?
 3 **A. When it's multiple calls like that, we are saying to**
 4 **them, "We are going to pass the information to the**
 5 **ground and we will make sure they get the information of**
 6 **where you are".**
 7 Q. Does it follow that all that a control room operator
 8 would be able to do is either to resend the message --
 9 **A. Yeah.**
 10 Q. -- to the fire ground via you on the radio --
 11 **A. Yes.**
 12 Q. -- or perhaps an admin line call from the telephone, or
 13 tell the caller that a message has been sent?
 14 **A. Yes, "We will let the crews know where you are".**
 15 Q. Does it follow from that that the control room operator
 16 wouldn't be able to get information from the incident
 17 ground to be able to say to the caller, "They are two
 18 floors below you and on their way up"?
 19 **A. No.**
 20 Q. Would officers on the incident command pump or the
 21 command unit have access to the Vision log to be able to
 22 see what radio messages were being sent?
 23 **A. I don't know what they have access to.**
 24 Q. At the bottom of page 4 of your statement, you say:
 25 "I remember thinking that although we were passing a

Page 176

1 lot of information to the ground crews, it was taking
 2 time to receive informative messages back. An
 3 informative message keeps us informed of the situation
 4 on the ground and gives us detail about the fire."
 5 Let me just pause there. You say it was taking time
 6 to receive informative messages; did that cause you
 7 difficulties?
 8 **A. No, because the priority was the fire survival guidance**
 9 **calls. The informative message -- I think they sent one**
 10 **when it was make pumps six, but then the informative**
 11 **message -- the next one came a lot later. But that was**
 12 **because the radio really -- the priority was getting the**
 13 **fire survival information across to them. And the**
 14 **make-ups, that was another priority, because they needed**
 15 **to get the resources down there as quick as possible.**
 16 Q. So the messages you are talking about here are
 17 resourcing messages --
 18 **A. Yes.**
 19 Q. -- and an informative message?
 20 **A. The informative message that the crew would send, ie you**
 21 **know, a building of how many floors and that sort of**
 22 **message, that came much later, because the radio was**
 23 **very busy dealing with passing the fire survival**
 24 **guidance, so they were taking all that information, and**
 25 **also they were having to make the incident up, and it**

Page 177

1 **was going up very quickly. So the information coming**
 2 **back to the radio and to the control room -- it went up**
 3 **to, like, make pumps 40 in the end. So that was taking**
 4 **over that.**
 5 Q. Just continuing on that theme, at the top of page 5 of
 6 your statement, you say:
 7 "However, the crews were very good at responding to
 8 the FSG messages and relaying make up messages back to
 9 us."
 10 **A. Yes.**
 11 Q. You have told us about relaying make-up messages.
 12 **A. Yes.**
 13 Q. I just want to look at when you say "the crews were very
 14 good at responding to the FSG messages". What do you
 15 mean when you say they were very good at --
 16 **A. Sorry, what I mean is that I was able to call them up**
 17 **and I was able to get hold of them quickly to pass the**
 18 **information. So when I say they were good at**
 19 **responding, they were good at responding to me for me to**
 20 **pass -- there wasn't much of a delay. I was able to**
 21 **pass things fairly quickly.**
 22 Q. I think you have told us that at no stage were you told
 23 of the progress of any particular fire survival guidance
 24 call yourself?
 25 **A. Sorry, I didn't hear you.**

Page 178

1 Q. I think you said at no stage were you told of
 2 the progress of any individual fire survival guidance
 3 call yourself; is that right?
 4 **A. No, not via the radio, no.**
 5 Q. In any other way, do you think?
 6 **A. No, I don't know.**
 7 Q. Okay.
 8 **A. Not for me.**
 9 Q. Did you or anybody else in the control room, to your
 10 knowledge, try throughout the night to get any further
 11 information from the incident ground about the progress
 12 of rescues or --
 13 **A. Well, I think Alex Norman was trying to get more**
 14 **information.**
 15 Q. She was, was she?
 16 **A. Mmm.**
 17 Q. Did you see her or hear her trying do that?
 18 **A. Well, it was a long time ago, so actually just hearing**
 19 **conversations and things, but I know that -- maybe**
 20 **subsequent, I know, but I do know she was trying to get**
 21 **that information.**
 22 Q. Do you know how successful she was?
 23 **A. No, and obviously when Jason Oliff and Adrian Fenton**
 24 **came in, she was probably trying to get them to get that**
 25 **information as well.**

Page 179

1 Q. Did the fact that you weren't -- and I'm really asking
 2 you for your perspective -- getting any information back
 3 from the incident ground about the progress of fire
 4 survival guidance calls or rescues hamper you in your
 5 ability to assist fire survival guidance callers or
 6 assist operators to assist those callers?
 7 **A. I wouldn't say it hampered -- I wasn't taking calls, so**
 8 **I don't know from their point of view.**
 9 Q. Do you know whether the absence of that information
 10 hampered control room operators in giving advice to
 11 callers?
 12 **A. I don't know. It was just so busy. They were just**
 13 **trying to just get through it, you know, take ...**
 14 Q. At the top of page 5 of your statement which we have
 15 just been looking at, you say:
 16 "For a long time all we knew officially was that
 17 there was a fire on the fourth floor, but we had no idea
 18 how it was getting bigger and bigger - only that more
 19 pumps were needed."
 20 When you say "officially", does that mean there was
 21 some unofficial knowledge that you also had?
 22 **A. No, we would just -- I guess we were guessing by the**
 23 **fact they were making it up obviously there was more**
 24 **going on than the fire on the 4th floor, but that's all**
 25 **we knew. We didn't know how or what was happening. But**

Page 180

1 **obviously we knew it was getting bigger because they**
 2 **were making it up.**
 3 Q. Does that mean you didn't know about what was actually
 4 alight on the building?
 5 **A. No.**
 6 Q. Does that mean you didn't know about the speed of
 7 the fire spread?
 8 **A. We knew it was -- it's difficult. We knew that it was**
 9 **being made up very quickly. I mean, when it gets to,**
 10 **like, 10, 15, 20, you know that it's a big fire and it's**
 11 **getting serious, but originally all we knew was that**
 12 **we'd been called to a fire on the 4th floor, and**
 13 **obviously that didn't really change -- we didn't really**
 14 **know what was going on from that for a while.**
 15 Q. Did you think more information from the incident ground
 16 about the fire itself would have helped you or helped
 17 other control room operators advise callers?
 18 **A. Yes, it would have helped.**
 19 Q. In what way?
 20 **A. Well, we could have -- if we'd have known the fire was**
 21 **maybe spreading, we -- it's very difficult for me to**
 22 **answer that question because I wasn't taking calls.**
 23 **I wasn't in that role. But obviously it probably would**
 24 **have helped Alex as well if she'd have known a bit more**
 25 **what was going on.**

Page 181

1 Q. If you turn to page 6 of your statement, just jumping
 2 ahead for a moment, at the top of that page you say
 3 this:
 4 "There were no TVs on Stratford and I did not see
 5 anything relating to the fire until about 5am when it
 6 started to get much quieter in the Control Room."
 7 I think it may be, again, a language thing, but when
 8 you say "there were no TVs on Stratford", do you mean
 9 there were no TVs at Stratford --
 10 **A. No, sorry, the TV wasn't switched on.**
 11 Q. It was switched off, okay.
 12 Do you know why it was switched off?
 13 **A. It didn't even occur to me, to be honest. It wasn't on**
 14 **at the beginning of the night and it didn't occur to me**
 15 **that it should be on or anything.**
 16 Q. Then you say in the next sentence:
 17 "We had purely been reliant on the crews to update
 18 us on what was happening."
 19 **A. Yes.**
 20 Q. On what you told us already this afternoon, I think you
 21 told us that in fact you didn't get any information back
 22 from the crews.
 23 **A. No, not until a lot later. We didn't have -- we didn't**
 24 **know what was -- we can only go by what --**
 25 Q. You say in the next sentence:

Page 182

1 "I remember 'Googling' the fire and [thought] to
 2 myself, 'oh my God, we've been telling people to stay
 3 put [in] that!'"
 4 **A. It's very clumsily written. I didn't say this word for**
 5 **word. This has been dictated and taken down.**
 6 Q. Okay. What's your recollection?
 7 **A. It was a shock. By the time that we actually started to**
 8 **see images, it was, like, 5/6 o'clock in the morning,**
 9 **and some of us started to sort of look it up on the**
 10 **news, and it was a shock, what we were seeing.**
 11 Q. We will come to it, but do you remember what time the
 12 stay-put advice was changed?
 13 **A. I have no idea.**
 14 Q. You don't?
 15 **A. I do remember Joanne Smith going around the room and**
 16 **telling people to change the advice, but I don't know**
 17 **what time that was.**
 18 Q. Okay.
 19 **A. It probably was after the make pumps 40, major incident.**
 20 Q. Did you realise by 5 am, in fact, that the stay-put
 21 advice had been changed some hours before?
 22 **A. Oh, yeah, by -- yes, I knew that. It had changed, yes.**
 23 Q. So when you say "we were telling people to stay put [in]
 24 that" --
 25 **A. Like I say, that's worded very clumsily.**

Page 183

1 Q. Do you think that if you'd seen images earlier, that
 2 would have affected the advice -- this is not a fair
 3 question because you weren't giving advice.
 4 I will move to the next topic, if I can, which is
 5 the first FSG information.
 6 Do you remember off the top of your head from your
 7 recollection when the first FSG calls started to come
 8 in?
 9 **A. No, I can't remember a timeline. It might have been**
 10 **after make pumps six. I'm not entirely certain.**
 11 Q. Now, you say on page 4 of your statement, about a third
 12 of the way down, after the reference to make pumps 15
 13 and straight up to 25, you say:
 14 "That is twenty five fire engines at one scene. It
 15 was obvious then that this was really bad and very rare.
 16 Suddenly there was an influx of calls that began to come
 17 in to the Control Room from residents."
 18 **A. Okay, so it's make pumps 25. Like I say, it did go up**
 19 **very, very quickly.**
 20 Q. Yes. We have make pumps 25 at 01.31 or so.
 21 **A. Okay.**
 22 Q. Do you remember which appliance you radioed with the
 23 first of the FSG calls?
 24 **A. Golf 271.**
 25 Q. It was 271?

Page 184

1 **A. Yes.**
 2 Q. Do you remember if you had any success in speaking with
 3 anybody at G271 when you first called them?
 4 **A. Yes. It was Golf 271 or Golf 272. I certainly was able**
 5 **to get them initially.**
 6 Q. You could?
 7 **A. Yes.**
 8 Q. Do you remember who you spoke to?
 9 **A. No, because you don't get a name. You just go on the**
 10 **call sign. But the messages were initially coming from**
 11 **Watch Manager Dowden. He was in charge.**
 12 Q. Do you remember that there came a time when you could
 13 get no reply from G271?
 14 **A. Yes.**
 15 Q. What did you do? Do you remember?
 16 **A. Yeah, I believe there was a couple of times that**
 17 **happened. Another appliance who had just got in**
 18 **attendance -- I can't remember whether it was Golf 361**
 19 **possibly, came up on the radio. I kept trying, I kept**
 20 **saying "Priority". He came up and said, "We have just**
 21 **got here, do you want to give the information to us?",**
 22 **which I did, and he said, "We will pass it straight to**
 23 **the incident commander".**
 24 Q. We have record of Acton's pump ladder, G261,
 25 intercepting the FSG information. That's in accordance

Page 185

1 with your recollection, is it?
 2 **A. That would be, yes.**
 3 Q. On page 4 of your statement, at the top, you say:
 4 " ... I was aware of the message to 'make pumps
 5 4' ..."
 6 This is right at the very start.
 7 **A. Yes.**
 8 Q. If we look at the short incident log at page 17, which
 9 is where it starts, the incident starts at 00.59.12.
 10 **A. Sorry, it wasn't make pumps four, it might have been**
 11 **make pumps six. In my statement, I didn't remember it**
 12 **correctly.**
 13 Q. My question is, we can't actually see that make-up
 14 message on the short incident log.
 15 **A. Then it wouldn't have -- they wouldn't have been said.**
 16 Q. Do you know the background to the incident being made up
 17 to four pumps?
 18 **A. No, I only know that the high-rise was put on it, the**
 19 **attendance. That's all I know. If they didn't say to**
 20 **me "make pumps four", then that didn't happen. I would**
 21 **have typed everything they said into the log, so it**
 22 **would be on there.**
 23 Q. It's only that you say "I was aware of the message to
 24 make pumps four" --
 25 **A. Well, I've remembered it incorrectly; it's six.**

Page 186

1 Q. I see. Okay.
 2 Then on page 4, a little bit lower down, you
 3 describe at the end of that paragraph, if I can just
 4 show you a sentence, three lines up:
 5 "I recall from there it was declared a major
 6 incident."
 7 **A. Yes.**
 8 Q. "There is a procedure for things to be declared a major
 9 incident. It would be declared the officer in charge of
 10 the scene. The resulting procedure in the Control Room
 11 is then dealt with through the supervisors."
 12 **A. Yes.**
 13 Q. My question is: what is the procedure in the control
 14 room that is dealt with through the supervisors?
 15 **A. Well, I'm not a supervisor, so I don't actually know**
 16 **that.**
 17 Q. You don't know the procedure?
 18 **A. I do remember shouting out that this is a major**
 19 **incident, and Alex obviously took -- and Alex, Debbie**
 20 **and Peter would have done the action -- what they needed**
 21 **to do for that. I wouldn't have had any involvement in**
 22 **that.**
 23 Q. Do you know what practical difference the incident being
 24 declared a major incident made to your operations in the
 25 control room?

Page 187

1 **A. Well, it was a 40 by then anyway, so it was -- no.**
 2 **I don't know. I don't deal with that, when it gets that**
 3 **far.**
 4 Q. Are you familiar with something called a METHANE
 5 message?
 6 **A. No.**
 7 Q. Have you ever heard of a METHANE message?
 8 **A. No.**
 9 Q. Do you recall being asked to put a METHANE message out?
 10 **A. No.**
 11 Q. Did you know that the police had declared a critical
 12 incident at 01.26 and a major incident at 01.32?
 13 **A. I don't recall.**
 14 Q. Do you remember whether the police contacted the control
 15 room to tell you that a major incident had been
 16 declared?
 17 **A. They would speak to the supervisors about it.**
 18 Q. If I can turn to page 5 of your statement and ask you to
 19 look at the second paragraph two lines down, you say:
 20 "I cannot really remember the names of the senior
 21 officers present but I think they started to come in at
 22 around the fifteen pump mark."
 23 We know from looking at the short incident log --
 24 and I will show this to you, if you like, it's
 25 page 17 -- that the incident was made 15 pumps at

Page 188

1 01.28.09, where you can see:
 2 "Make Up
 3 "IUP G271 MAKE PUMPS 15 MAKE AERIALS X 2."
 4 And it's got your initials next to the message.
 5 When we see that, that's you, is it, recording in
 6 the Vision log that you have had a radio message from
 7 the incident ground for a make-up?
 8 **A. That's correct.**
 9 Q. As you told us. That time, 01.28.09, is make pumps 15.
 10 **A. Correct.**
 11 Q. In terms of the senior officers, are you able to give us
 12 some names, do you think?
 13 **A. Of who?**
 14 Q. Of who it was who were coming in.
 15 **A. Well, I didn't really know them at the time. I know who**
 16 **they are now, but at the time I didn't really know.**
 17 Q. We have, just on timings, got the first of the senior
 18 officers coming in as Jason Oliff, who arrives at
 19 between 01.50 and 01.55 or so, it is not exactly clear,
 20 and that's what he told us, which is sometime after
 21 pumps were made 15; in fact, it's after pumps were made
 22 25.
 23 **A. Okay. But he's got to -- he would be paged --**
 24 Q. Yes.
 25 **A. -- and he's got to get there, so that might be the delay**

Page 189

1 **obviously. He'd be paged at that point and he's got to**
 2 **proceed to the control room.**
 3 Q. It is really just a timing question because you say you
 4 think they started to come in at around the 15-pump
 5 mark, but in fact the pumps were made 25 at 01.31 and
 6 Oliff comes in at 01.50 to 01.55.
 7 **A. Okay.**
 8 Q. So do you think in fact the 15-pump mark is right?
 9 **A. Not necessarily. Not necessarily. Like I say, a lot of**
 10 **that was more a supervisory role with -- when they come**
 11 **in.**
 12 Q. Do you happen to remember who the first senior officer
 13 was who came into the control room?
 14 **A. I know now. I think it was Mr Oliff.**
 15 Q. Jason Oliff, was it?
 16 **A. Yes, Jason.**
 17 Q. Now, three-quarters of the way down page 5, you say --
 18 I'm just trying to link it to a time point:
 19 "When we had gone to forty pumps they took over the
 20 communication with the Command Unit on the ground and
 21 passed on the FSGs directly to them. I think they used
 22 mobile phones to do this."
 23 A few lines on from that, because you describe what
 24 they do, you say:
 25 "My role then became one of liaising with the crews

Page 190

1 about specific resources that were required such as
 2 extra breathing apparatus (BA) or further Fire and
 3 Rescue Units (FRUs)."
 4 Et cetera.
 5 **A. Yes.**
 6 Q. Does that happen as soon as Jason Oliff comes in and
 7 starts speaking on the mobile to the command unit, or
 8 did it happen later?
 9 **A. It might not have happened straight away. I don't know**
 10 **when the decision was made for people to start passing**
 11 **him the messages, so it might have taken a little while**
 12 **and it might have overlapped. I'm not sure of**
 13 **the times.**
 14 Q. Let's just take this in stages, then.
 15 Can I then move to a similar topic but a slightly
 16 different topic --
 17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Millett, do you think it is
 18 sensible to go to a new topic now? Perfectly
 19 understandably, you said you will need this witness to
 20 come back tomorrow.
 21 MR MILLETT: I would like not to have to do so, for her
 22 sake, but I'm afraid I do have about another hour or 45
 23 minutes of questions.
 24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm sure she would prefer not to
 25 come back tomorrow, but I don't think any of us would be

Page 191

1 wise to sit here for another hour.
 2 MR MILLETT: No, I'm not going to ask you to do that.
 3 Perhaps the best thing to do would be to pause now --
 4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It just seemed if you are going to
 5 move to something different and self-contained, it would
 6 be better to stop.
 7 MR MILLETT: It is slightly different, but not completely.
 8 What I want to talk about is the whiteboard system and
 9 the question of overlapping -- possibly overlapping --
 10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think that would be something we
 11 could start tomorrow without too much discontinuity,
 12 isn't it?
 13 MR MILLETT: Yes.
 14 Ms Darby, I'm sorry to ask you to do this, and
 15 I hope it is not inconvenient to you, but is it possible
 16 that you might be able to come back for an hour in the
 17 morning and assist us?
 18 THE WITNESS: Yes, of course.
 19 MR MILLETT: I'm sorry, it has been very helpful?
 20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I will ask the next question before
 21 Mr Millett prompts me: would it be inconvenient for you
 22 to be back here at 9.30 am tomorrow?
 23 THE WITNESS: Not at all.
 24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would that be all right?
 25 THE WITNESS: That's fine.

Page 192

<p>1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I suppose, Mr Millett, that would be 2 the sensible thing to do. 3 MR MILLETT: So that's a consent application. Yes, it would 4 be, I would be very grateful. Thank you. 5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think it would be in everyone's 6 interests if we break at this point. As Mr Millett 7 said, I'm sorry, we are going to have to ask you to come 8 back tomorrow. I hope we are only an hour or so. 9 I can't guarantee it, I'm afraid. 10 So if you would, please, back at 9.30 am, and don't 11 talk to anyone about your evidence overnight. Is that 12 all right? 13 THE WITNESS: Yes, of course. 14 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much indeed. I look 15 forward to seeing you tomorrow. If you would like to go 16 with the usher, she will look after you. 17 (The witness withdrew) 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Millett, I thought we had better 19 be prepared for an earlier start. We have got two 20 witnesses in the list for tomorrow, haven't we? 21 MR MILLETT: Yes. Joking apart, I am genuinely grateful. 22 We have Firefighter Beale and Crew Manager 23 Batcheldor. I haven't spoken to Mr Kinnier at any 24 length about how long he anticipates being with 25 Firefighter Beale, but I don't think it will be that</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 193</p>	<p>1 2 3 I N D E X 4 MICHAEL MULHOLLAND (sworn)1 5 6 Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY1 7 8 SHARON DARBY (affirmed)112 9 10 Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY112 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 195</p>
<p>1 long. I will cut my cloth accordingly with Crew Manager 2 Batcheldor. 3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It will obviously be very 4 unsatisfactory for Mr Batcheldor to be part heard 5 tomorrow. 6 MR MILLETT: Indeed. 7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can you try to ensure that he isn't? 8 MR MILLETT: Yes. 9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think we can assume that you can 10 have the full day tomorrow, but no more. Is that all 11 right? 12 MR MILLETT: Yes, thank you very much, Mr Chairman, I have 13 the point. 14 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We will resume at 9.30 am tomorrow. 15 Thank you very much. 16 (4.30 pm) 17 (The hearing was adjourned to 18 Thursday, 2 August 2018 at 9.30 am) 19 20 21 22 23 24 25</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 194</p>	

A				
abilities 35:21	action 14:12 138:13	195:7	72:2 120:6 134:2	137:10,15,16,18
ability 180:5	171:16 172:16	afraid 118:20	154:6,10 155:14	137:22,25 184:22
able 51:19 55:12,14	187:20	170:18,19 191:22	Andy 30:12,19 31:7	185:17
69:25 72:10,11	actioned 7:6 52:18	193:9	31:7,22,22 40:17	appliances 15:11
78:2,3 86:18	167:7,10	afternoon 111:23	42:8,11 46:17	23:13 83:7 93:16
88:15 94:6,20	actions 68:16,17,25	112:19,20 169:24	57:11 74:1 76:15	107:14 109:3
97:4 98:18 100:5	146:21,22 173:4	170:15,18 171:12	87:25 94:8	137:20 172:14
100:18 101:15,17	active 26:15	182:20	Angela 112:23	175:18
121:20 132:14	Acton's 185:24	ago 20:8 83:17	announcement	application 73:7
133:23 140:16	actual 11:13	117:6 118:18	171:11	193:3
144:6 168:5	adaptability 8:10	159:11 179:18	anomaly 64:8,21	applied 47:24
175:13,24 176:2,8	49:7	agreement 109:25	answer 5:19 12:1	appreciate 2:5
176:16,17,21	add 101:23	ahead 93:19 103:18	24:4,25 41:20	102:6
178:16,17,20	address 69:11	167:18 182:2	62:6 69:9 71:2,13	appreciated 111:12
185:4 189:11	108:19	aid 9:15 86:1	82:16,23 84:6	approach 11:21
192:16	addressing 14:10	air 83:13	88:4 98:20 105:25	approximately
abnormal 18:25	adhered 70:11,15	airwave 15:16,18	141:25 143:20	4:15 25:20,21
19:4,7	adherence 73:13	15:21 31:1 55:21	161:15 168:10	74:24 85:21
absence 180:9	adjourned 194:17	56:2 142:15	175:13,24 181:22	approximation
absolute 172:2	adjournment 112:3	alarm 167:7 171:15	answered 25:23	97:11
absolutely 43:9	admin 162:6,7	Alex 151:6,7,11	antenna 110:8	April 4:9 68:11
102:16 129:20	164:21 176:12	163:1,7,8,17,17	anticipates 193:24	area 66:1 83:8
130:24	admitted 10:17	164:21 165:6	anybody 3:14	85:19 86:6 101:13
AC 34:14 36:11,12	Adrian 179:23	166:22 179:13	10:17 49:13,17	149:24 165:21
74:6 89:2,12	advertised 9:25	181:24 187:19,19	58:3 70:9,13 71:9	arm 99:16
92:11,11 94:4	advice 68:18 74:19	align 19:11,11,19	71:21 72:4 86:5	arrival 18:18,19
95:3 107:7,9	75:5,11,12 122:19	47:4,7 181:4	114:1 179:9 185:3	29:20 39:10 40:25
accept 7:24	123:9 124:18	alive 68:20	anyway 98:21	93:24 94:16,25
accepted 10:2	125:2 126:10,23	alleviate 107:23	123:25 140:22	108:12 137:12
accepting 51:18	127:5 128:6,21,25	allocate 27:12	141:4 188:1	arrive 24:10 107:17
access 37:25 145:17	129:11 146:23	172:17	apart 40:10 116:18	109:9 122:3
146:7,10 161:10	170:6 180:10	allocated 27:9	118:12 131:7	arrived 21:15
176:21,23	183:12,16,21	allow 13:25 73:3	147:4 193:21	22:15,16,18 24:2
account 34:22,23	184:2,3	alongside 58:21	apparatus 85:14	25:17,18 28:3
accuracy 2:25	advise 5:7 8:6	aloud 168:23	104:5 191:2	29:12 30:17,21
accurate 32:4 70:8	13:11,22 69:25	alteration 116:17	apparent 149:1	31:10 34:11 39:14
89:14 94:20	181:17	alternative 127:15	appear 6:25 59:12	40:1 41:14,19,20
105:25 108:4	advised 168:4	128:14	91:19	46:10 48:3 60:22
accurately 20:7	advising 121:20	Alternatively	appeared 56:20	92:19 107:10
70:5	122:8	108:23	92:16	108:6,6,7,9
achieve 8:3	aerial 11:18 76:22	ambulance 37:20	appears 52:2	153:18 154:6
acknowledged 34:3	77:2,9,11	142:24,25 173:8,9	appendix 130:5,25	160:4
75:14	AERIALS 189:3	amending 160:21	142:6,7	arrives 41:10 47:22
acronym 37:14,22	affect 126:22	amount 35:5,6 42:7	appliance 11:18	136:14 189:18
	affirmed 112:9	60:1 63:20 70:3,6	123:22,24 124:10	arriving 14:7 28:1

31:8 32:5 90:22 132:12 asked 9:6 22:25 26:1 41:25 46:17 48:9 59:11 60:7 65:23 88:12 97:14 140:9 175:11 188:9 asking 4:2 33:25 71:14 88:25 112:21 114:3 123:19 128:19 130:24 134:24 140:10 168:5 169:11,13 180:1 assess 122:19 127:22 assessing 128:23 assessment 129:15 129:17 assessments 11:8 assigned 12:11 50:18 51:6,10 67:7 175:19 assigning 17:4 assist 2:4 8:24 9:6 27:16 110:2,5,21 142:12,23 180:5,6 180:6 192:17 assistance 110:13 assistant 31:16 assisted 51:11 65:12 assisting 64:16 101:21 111:11 150:5,6 assists 14:21 assume 74:13 91:7 165:8 167:21 194:9 assumed 41:25 54:10 assuming 24:17,20 66:8 89:6 97:20 109:20 158:14	assumption 70:22 87:17 attached 145:9 160:18 attack 48:23 57:14 attempt 72:4 130:4 142:1 attempted 55:3 attend 4:20 5:6,21 5:24 6:1 10:9 11:10 13:8,8 15:12 16:12 20:21 30:24 attendance 16:10 46:13 60:2,3 137:19 142:16,20 175:21,23 185:18 186:19 attended 11:24 12:7 30:2 attending 11:12 26:9 112:25 attention 30:11 106:10 120:3 146:19 173:11 attract 5:25 attracts 6:20 audible 18:13 audit 4:20 5:5,11 72:16 auditing 5:1,12 6:3 August 1:1 21:6 194:18 automatically 145:9 available 89:16 111:1 118:21 119:8 130:7 134:5 146:7 avoid 71:8 aware 24:2 29:19 30:21,25 31:20 33:2 36:6 37:2,20 45:25 65:24 68:1 68:17,20,23 69:3	69:4 71:15 75:15 87:20 106:8 116:4 116:5,10 146:22 186:4,23 awareness 9:14 39:3 55:7 56:13 95:2 awful 56:7 <hr/> B B 155:9,10,12,13 BA 40:8 51:1 57:7 57:9,13 58:22 59:4,10 65:4 68:2 77:13 78:13 82:9 83:15 85:3,11,13 85:14,15,21,22,23 85:24 86:18,23 87:4 89:20,22 90:2 93:3 104:1 104:13 105:22 106:1 191:2 BA-intensive 59:12 Babcock 11:12 back 7:23 8:2,5 9:11 23:2 27:16 32:16 35:12 39:6 41:22 42:19 43:25 44:21 50:6 55:14 55:17 56:23 58:24 61:14 62:7 63:1,5 63:6 66:7,9,18,19 66:22 67:5,5 68:2 70:5,8,23 72:5,6,8 73:21 74:14 75:2 75:7,9,14,25 77:6 80:2 85:6,6 87:8 87:16 89:23 92:23 92:25 93:9,11 94:3 100:7 102:19 103:3 107:6,9 110:17 123:3 131:7,15 132:15 132:21 133:12,13 136:1 138:11	140:7 141:14,20 141:23 142:1,4 145:20 147:12 149:16 150:8,15 150:16 151:14,23 154:25 155:1 158:11 159:10 161:19,22 164:1 164:11 165:9 166:4,10,13 168:17 171:19 172:8 173:25 174:24 177:2 178:2,8 180:2 182:21 191:20,25 192:16,22 193:8 193:10 back-of-house 92:24 backfill 72:11 background 93:5 186:16 bad 59:20 75:4 184:15 balconies 56:20 band 100:4 base 24:23 based 63:15 83:1 basically 5:16 59:11 95:18 149:6 basis 82:3 172:1 Batcheldor 193:23 194:2,4 bathroom 164:5 165:21 168:15 Battersea 104:18 104:19 BCC 107:8 Beale 193:22,25 becoming 85:12 beg 61:24 87:22 began 184:16 beginning 16:25 39:25 46:8 64:4 65:11 120:4	182:14 believe 18:15 20:25 22:25 27:24 42:8 42:10 44:8 46:22 47:14,23 53:5 60:11,20 75:9 76:1 78:4 83:9,14 85:7 86:22 91:23 96:4 108:17 111:3 115:6 117:1,2 185:16 bell 93:23 benefits 106:14,17 Bernard 1:18 best 3:10 4:21 16:12 19:12 25:19 35:19,21 41:8 42:1 44:8 46:18 47:25 58:16 60:10 63:19 67:18 71:13 72:17 74:21 80:17 80:21 81:19 82:21 97:10 98:7 102:21 103:9 192:3 better 5:3 158:24 192:6 193:18 beyond 47:2,2 55:1 biannually 114:22 big 106:16 181:10 bigger 149:24 180:18,18 181:1 bins 66:1 bit 1:25 5:4 13:7 18:4 25:4 28:11 28:18 30:23 33:21 33:22,23 34:11 49:16 50:1 52:19 65:19,20,20 81:11 88:25 95:14 96:6 102:2 107:12 129:8 132:2 139:8 151:18 159:9 165:25 167:25 181:24 187:2 blanket 57:21
--	--	--	--	---

block 12:14 56:18	breathing 85:14	60:24 62:7,15	129:6 132:3,20,21	166:9 180:5,6,11
blocks 19:21	104:5 165:22	65:5 73:2 75:25	132:23,25,25	181:17
blue 2:14 18:13	166:17 168:16	77:21 82:5 85:6	133:15 138:12	calling 17:4 132:15
37:16	191:2	85:15 87:7 90:1,9	141:18,19 142:1,2	160:5,7 167:22,25
bluntly 73:12	Brett 28:2 30:8,10	90:12 91:5 95:12	142:2,6,13,25	calls 23:13 35:5
board 23:22 61:24	bridgehead 42:1	98:2 109:1 121:24	144:21,22 145:4	41:13 48:24 50:20
61:25 98:11,13,22	46:18 52:17 54:13	125:2 126:19	146:21 147:2,6,21	51:18,24 52:17
98:25 99:12,20	54:25 58:8,13	127:19 128:5,5	148:6,14 149:21	57:14 59:8 67:19
100:2,11,18 101:1	61:2,17,18,19	141:13 147:22	150:15 152:5,7	67:23 70:3,6 71:7
101:7,9,11,17	62:4,11,12,13,17	150:7 171:14	153:9,9 158:8,8	72:1,2 73:6 80:7
boards 59:9	63:13 65:4,22	177:21 181:4	162:6,20 163:16	81:13,16,19,25
Bomore 23:5	73:16 75:13 76:7	buildings 117:10	165:6,7 169:15	82:4 83:2,18,19
bonnet 65:25	76:9,13 84:3,13	126:11	176:12 178:16,24	84:5,10,17,22
book 31:1 41:11	84:14 86:1,3,24	bulk 104:14	179:3 185:10	96:3 115:17,19,20
booked 105:19	87:1,3,15,18	bump 33:8	call-out 14:24	116:19,21 120:6
booking 24:5	88:10,20,22 97:17	bumping 73:22	call-taker 159:1	121:8,11,14
booking-in 30:15	98:5 99:7,8	bundle 7:8 103:22	call-takers 150:21	122:11 127:14,16
31:6	105:24 107:1,5,6	142:5 155:22	called 80:11 105:24	129:24 132:6
boosts 110:10	brief 5:4 14:11	burning 19:13 20:2	162:6 174:24	133:21,24 134:2
borough 4:8	18:12 26:4 39:17	20:5 57:18 60:23	175:8 181:12	134:19 135:10
borrowed 149:6	57:11 62:15	Bush 20:17	185:3 188:4	136:17,23 137:3
bottom 19:2 20:8	briefed 84:9	busier 149:21,22	caller 119:15,22	140:18,18,18
22:3 34:6 58:6	brigade 6:17 11:9	149:23,25	120:7,23 121:20	143:14 146:3,8
73:25 75:18,20	12:10 17:9 82:19	business 92:25	121:24 122:4,8,12	148:23 149:1,2
92:14 134:14	109:4	busy 16:23 41:12	122:18 123:1,3,10	150:20 151:21
149:16 162:15	brighter 100:4	98:6 148:25	123:10,13,17	153:4,4,10,25
163:7 176:24	bring 109:7	154:20 160:9,17	124:5,22 125:17	154:1,7 162:7
box 90:10,12,14,15	bringing 62:16	161:4,8 177:23	127:14,16,18,21	164:20 173:15
90:19 91:6 145:4	brings 173:11	180:12	127:24 128:2	175:6,6,9 176:3
145:5,9,12,12,16	broadcast 38:5,6	button 104:8	129:1,6,10,18	177:9 180:4,7
151:23 152:1,4	broadly 5:25 10:15		132:9,11,15,24	181:22 184:7,16
158:25	Brooks 104:21,23	C	133:1,12 140:25	184:23
Bramley 93:22	brought 6:22	C 36:20	141:3,12,23 148:1	camp-out 24:23
break 2:10,11	106:10 108:19	call 5:22 13:24 22:7	156:1,5,7,24	candid 170:16
42:25 43:1,18	Brown 86:10,12,14	23:7 24:21,23	164:11 165:20	Cane 94:14 95:4
45:22 78:18,19,22	86:23 106:5	29:22 31:2,3,3	166:3,4,13,14,21	cannily 34:7
78:25 79:1,7	build 39:13 40:4	50:23 54:6 55:3	168:14 169:10	capability 149:7
102:6,10 103:2,5	45:23 46:4	68:16 69:1 71:18	174:13 175:11,25	capacity 49:2,4,6,9
113:8,9 139:7,10	building 11:16,19	71:22 82:20 87:12	176:13,17	capture 5:15 6:15
139:11 140:2	11:25 19:3,11,11	112:6 116:8	caller's 142:14	7:10 98:4 117:15
141:15 169:21	19:14,17 20:1,14	118:14 119:1	165:9	captured 31:18
170:5,7,13,25	22:1 35:7 40:8,23	120:12,13,23,23	callers 68:19 69:25	capturing 117:22
171:8 193:6	47:19 55:2,16	120:25 122:24	117:16 119:11	car 65:25
breaking 52:19	56:25 57:3,18,21	124:3 125:4	126:12,15 132:7	career 11:25 19:10
96:2	58:7,22 59:7,16	126:17 127:4	140:10 146:24	20:3 58:1 114:4

121:8 carefully 171:15 carried 60:9 68:17 83:7 95:2 105:4 105:10 107:13 110:24 146:22 carry 5:6 7:21 43:21 73:17 140:4 170:2 171:23 carrying 17:12 57:23 67:7 91:22 99:11 142:12 case 18:17 153:7 159:23 161:8 170:12 casualties 37:23 38:1,3 catch 19:22 caught 20:11 cause 177:6 cent 19:21 36:16 53:7 78:6 82:25 86:9,11 93:23 97:7 98:17,24 100:3,6 101:16,18 107:2 centrally 12:9 centre 22:21 155:7 certain 53:8,16 60:1 86:9,11 93:23 97:7 98:17 107:2 184:10 certainly 95:11 102:17 130:20 131:20 147:18 185:4 cetera 104:10 154:4 191:4 CH 164:2,6 chain 5:8,9 13:21 40:12 53:22 62:22 65:21 66:23 71:2 73:19 109:17 chair 6:23 170:16 Chairman 1:6 88:8	102:9 111:21 112:6 171:18 194:12 chairman's 159:21 challenge 82:2 88:14 challenged 73:8 challenging 73:16 88:12 change 16:9 53:2 74:19 75:1,5 109:17,18 161:1 175:19,20 181:13 183:16 changed 74:20 75:9 75:12,13,15 117:3 155:9,12 159:7 183:12,21,22 changes 16:9 channel 16:17,22 16:22 34:3 56:8 57:5,5,6,7,8 63:21 63:22,23 66:20 109:17,18 134:9 134:12,12,13,21 134:23 135:4,5,10 148:10,18,19 149:12,14,19,21 149:22,23,25 150:9 157:6 channels 53:2 134:11 149:3,4 charge 13:15 28:16 28:20 29:21 33:1 44:5 63:11 64:24 136:9 139:4 151:6 151:6 152:6,12 163:20 185:11 187:9 charged 89:23 charger 104:7,23 Charlie 160:9 167:15,18,20,22 167:25 check 94:2,2 168:6	168:11 checked 7:24 checking 67:5 Chelsea 37:3 104:16,18 chew 85:13 children 140:11 141:6 chime 44:6 choice 92:3 125:23 Christine 149:17 150:4 164:6,9,12 165:7,9 166:20 circumstances 126:10,25 cladding 20:3,4 21:8 clarification 92:13 clarify 158:20 clarifying 119:10 clarity 72:12 77:14 clear 22:8 32:8,10 32:12 65:7 76:3 77:12 85:12 107:4 108:25 126:3 130:24 144:19 150:23,25 189:19 clearly 29:7 close 56:19 123:19 124:5 132:11 147:25 cloth 194:1 clumsily 183:4,25 co-ordinator 50:19 51:11 52:9,13 84:8,19 collate 70:4 166:11 collating 50:20 52:14 54:22 colleague 51:9 91:24 colleagues 121:13 121:15 130:17 collect 131:17 collected 104:1	College 11:2 colloquialism 17:8 colour 100:1,3 175:19,20 come 3:25 7:2,23 20:3,4,6 27:16 33:6 35:6 54:7,12 54:15,21 78:5,10 87:7 89:22 93:16 102:19 108:18 118:6 119:5 122:5 123:3 124:12 136:1 139:3 147:12 151:2 154:12,25 161:3 161:22 173:5 183:11 184:7,16 188:21 190:4,10 191:20,25 192:16 193:7 comes 7:4 12:22 52:15 53:6 129:6 152:23 190:6 191:6 comfortable 57:22 112:14 coming 2:4 3:15 8:21 9:11 32:6 43:24 50:21 52:1 54:8,10,10 55:23 61:2 62:12 70:19 72:13,14 75:9,15 81:13,16,22 82:5 92:25 93:15 94:3 99:7 101:21 102:1 106:24 110:17 111:10,15 114:1 127:19 128:4,5 132:13 134:2 138:8 140:7 156:2 156:6,7,25 157:21 164:5 173:1 178:1 185:10 189:14,18 command 4:22 5:8 5:9 6:21,23 8:2,4	8:23 10:10 12:7 13:21 14:1,17,20 16:3 22:5,9,11,12 22:18,20 23:8,9 23:24 25:3,11,12 25:13,18,20,25 26:6,7,11 27:11 27:18 29:9 30:16 31:21 32:15 33:3 33:14,20 34:12 35:15 39:19,24 40:12,25 41:21,25 42:3,9,18 44:9,10 44:14,15 45:8,9 48:11 49:12 51:10 52:23 53:1,14 54:4,7,13 58:24 63:1,3,7 66:7,9,22 66:23 71:2,14 73:19,21 77:7 89:13 91:7,19,20 92:1,15,21 93:20 95:21 107:7 109:16,25 136:14 136:15,17,18,23 136:24,25 137:1,2 137:3 138:19,20 138:22,25 139:1 142:15,19 143:2,5 143:23 144:3,4 145:25 152:12 158:2,23 159:25 160:4,12 161:4,13 166:23 176:20,21 190:20 191:7 commander 4:8 6:24 8:25 9:9,12 10:19 13:11,17,24 14:4,6 15:23 16:1 16:13,15,18 22:4 22:14,17 24:14,24 26:4 27:15,17 29:16 30:5,7 32:1 32:9,11,14 34:19 35:24 36:3 41:24
--	--	--	--	--

42:14,15 50:25 61:19 63:9,14 74:1,6 76:1,5 87:21 88:1 92:5 95:15,20 109:21 136:12 138:2,18 138:21 172:21 185:23 commander's 9:3 92:2 commanders 32:21 94:8 109:24 commands 10:8 comment 133:25 commissioner 31:16 36:10 97:13 97:14 commit 62:15 82:9 committed 58:22 59:11 60:6,12 81:10 85:23 committing 51:1 57:12 95:11 common 121:6,18 121:19 130:20 commonly 120:9 comms 45:8 109:15 110:2,5,16 communicated 71:18,22 146:9 communicates 136:16 communicating 152:15 communication 50:8 52:20 53:4 62:22 68:13 93:4 94:7 143:15 146:18 155:1 173:25 190:20 communications 12:5 29:19 53:10 53:18 109:15 compare 101:12 comparison 149:25	compartment 20:13 compartmentation 21:2 compiled 103:25 complement 135:13 complete 2:24 157:14 158:16 completed 17:17 96:8,9 137:11 149:17 156:22,24 157:1,2 158:13,22 160:22 164:15 165:24 168:19 169:4 174:19,22 175:14,15 completely 192:7 completeness 2:25 completes 167:11 compliance 5:2 72:16 compliant 6:5 complied 69:7 72:19 comply 8:25 complying 9:1 compromised 107:6 concerned 46:3 concrete 19:22,22 condition 132:10 conditions 56:24 57:2 88:11 107:24 121:23 122:9,13 131:22 conduct 95:3 conducted 95:1 conducting 75:22 conference 119:1 conferencing 146:6 confident 24:8 configuration 169:7 confirm 2:20 3:6	8:12 34:2 42:11 42:21 45:5 82:18 94:10 101:17 113:23 134:6 169:8,13 confirmed 41:2 confirming 31:25 74:9 confused 168:25 confusing 167:25 confusion 71:8 conjunction 3:1 conscious 139:6 consent 193:3 consider 40:19,22 consideration 34:14 considering 76:22 consistent 48:14 49:1 52:4 108:2 144:13 contact 13:10 22:4 24:13 26:3 27:15 30:3 37:5 50:11 50:12,13 66:24 137:10 143:5 contacted 188:14 contacting 163:17 163:21 contacts 53:15 contain 71:6,11 73:3 contained 126:25 contemplates 144:7 contemporaneous 3:17 16:24 18:3 content 59:1 170:8 contents 2:20 38:2 90:20 113:23 context 21:20 30:23 34:11 80:20 85:5 106:18 107:12 131:5 continue 25:23 42:23 51:15 66:6	66:17 139:22 171:25 continued 55:2 continuing 49:1 178:5 control 16:8,14 17:4,21 23:7,10 31:18 32:16,24 33:10 37:20 38:9 38:10,10,16,21 39:7 41:11 42:20 44:4 45:13,13 50:21 52:1,15,21 52:25 53:5,10,13 53:15,17,19,24,25 54:1,11 58:21 59:9 61:19 62:14 68:3,14,15,17,25 69:3,23,25 70:5 71:19,23 72:6 83:25 108:4,14 109:8 112:7 114:6 114:13,16 117:8 118:21 124:3,7 130:4,5,8,13,13 130:16,17,18 131:1 134:3,16 135:14,21 136:6 137:9,14 138:25 140:17 142:11,21 143:4,16,18 144:11 145:13 146:7,18,20,22,25 150:8,12 151:17 151:20 152:18 153:18,19 154:2 154:14 156:15 160:14 162:21 163:10,12 166:11 173:3,15 174:24 174:25 175:11,12 175:16 176:1,7,15 178:2 179:9 180:10 181:17 182:6 184:17	187:10,13,25 188:14 190:2,13 Control_FSG_6_... 159:15 conversation 14:11 14:13 18:5,10 26:4 28:8,12 32:13 33:23 34:14 34:17,18 36:5 40:16 44:16 48:15 48:16 62:2 70:20 78:1 83:23 85:8 85:11 86:14,16,22 91:8,11 106:23 107:2,21 conversations 179:19 convey 151:21 152:20 153:3 Cook 15:6 17:13 34:13,15 40:16 45:25 46:9 48:9 49:15,21,22,25,25 50:2,5 51:9 54:17 64:12,12,17,18,22 65:17 66:10,13 73:23 74:18,20 75:8 91:24 109:23 Cook's 74:11 Cooks 49:19,20 cope 155:3,5 coping 155:14 copy 54:6 113:11 137:12 corner 23:5 26:14 75:11 correct 4:13 15:2 25:2 38:14 81:24 82:2,3 148:25 189:8,10 correctly 186:12 correlate 31:4 Cotton 36:10 counsel 1:13 102:18 112:18
--	---	--	---	--

195:5,9	172:8 173:18	cultures 118:6,7	188:2	delays 106:8
counted 12:18	175:12,17,25	cumulatively 58:1	dealing 14:14 26:21	delivered 115:5
80:16	176:14 177:1	current 68:11,12	115:16 118:6	demonstrates
couple 23:1 40:3	178:7,13 182:17	95:18	124:14 137:22	105:2
44:10 56:22	182:22 190:25	currently 4:4 88:17	142:3 177:23	department 7:25
106:11 115:8	critical 33:16 69:10	89:7	dealt 20:13 187:11	115:6
140:8 185:16	69:19 188:11	custom 132:22	187:14	dependent 123:17
course 11:11 12:8	CRO 142:12 159:2	cut 141:18 194:1	Debbie 151:9	depending 35:22
29:3 37:5 119:20	172:16	cylinders 89:23	187:19	51:3
139:20 159:20	CROs 152:20 153:3		debrief 97:19	depends 8:9
170:11,23 192:18	174:7	D	debris 55:16	deploy 87:12
193:13	CSS 26:12,18	D 195:2	decide 138:13	deployed 69:13
Court 20:16,20,22	145:25 146:6,7,12	DAC 31:7,10,13,22	decided 34:19	77:24 93:1 105:18
21:5,6,11	146:13	36:9 39:10,13,24	87:11	deployment 89:16
cover 39:11	CU 22:6,24 26:1	40:25 41:10,24	deciding 34:23	105:5,10
covered 66:1	27:7 28:3 65:14	42:5,14,18 44:2,5	decision 9:3 33:12	deployments 68:2
covering 11:17	90:9 136:17 137:5	44:13 46:9,20,23	109:18 136:16,20	69:21,24 72:6
148:10	142:18 144:25	47:6,10,22 48:6	136:21,22,25	79:23,24 80:1
covers 3:11 114:19	145:18 146:2	48:18 49:10 50:9	154:7,21 191:10	deputy 31:16
149:24	159:19 163:18	50:11 63:14 87:22	decision-makers	derived 103:25
created 136:2	CU1 93:20,24 94:4	92:10,15,19 107:8	13:22	descending 99:6
156:1 159:6,22	94:9	DAC's 47:3	decision-making	describe 19:12
167:6 174:21	CU7 23:15,16,18	Dan 26:22 65:12	5:10 9:15	73:22 84:22 187:3
creates 159:3	23:19 25:5 50:18	danger 127:2	decisions 9:8	190:23
creating 156:10	51:6,9,18,24,24	141:22	declaration 36:25	described 65:8
160:15	52:5,21 53:11,13	dangerous 125:11	38:17,22,24	66:12 153:13
creation 7:19	53:19,20,21,23	Dany 36:10	declare 34:19	describing 67:9
crew 70:21 78:5,7,9	54:9,18 63:3,7	Darby 112:7,9,19	declared 35:10	description 80:6
78:12,13 104:21	64:2,3,6,13,20,23	112:23 130:1	37:15,21 39:2,8	designated 15:1
105:5 117:21	83:21,22	139:6 140:4,7	187:5,8,9,24	53:3
124:7 138:5	CU8 23:2,5,6,7,10	169:19 170:19	188:11,16	desk 2:17 113:13
175:16 177:20	23:12,14,20,22	171:21 172:6	declares 36:8	149:18
193:22 194:1	24:11 25:6,7	192:14 195:7	dedicated 52:25	desks 130:23 131:8
crews 51:2 57:9	26:16,17 27:1,19	data 103:22 104:1	115:8 135:9 136:2	destination 147:16
58:22 59:7,11	28:1 32:5 63:4,5,8	database 6:16,17	deemed 69:18	detail 26:5 48:17
60:14 62:15,18	63:11,11,15 66:8	6:18 7:1	defaulted 30:6	54:15,16 61:11
65:4 70:1 75:22	66:14 72:11 74:14	date 4:14 62:7	defeat 73:6	62:1 86:17 162:14
76:20 77:20,24	75:2,7,14 76:3,4	dated 3:18 113:16	definite 109:20	177:4
81:9 82:9 86:2	92:12 94:7 95:10	day 35:5 194:10	definitely 10:25	detailed 131:17
88:12 90:21 92:25	158:5,7,9,23	daylight 94:19	35:20 83:5 88:23	details 70:23 145:5
105:17 117:24	159:17 160:1,4,23	daytime 135:23,24	173:7	145:7 163:2
122:1,3,4 124:5	161:2,3,10,12,18	deadline 172:2	definition 125:5	developed 83:1
130:15 132:7,9,11	163:2,11,16,23	deal 72:22 84:11	degree 111:23	developing 81:15
133:1,10 147:15	165:6 168:7,23	102:21 115:19	delay 105:14	82:14
147:25 151:17	169:11,15,16	118:2 173:13	178:20 189:25	developments

170:9	discovered 52:5	doubt 111:23	east 22:1,22 55:18	element 8:10 67:22
devised 72:8	discuss 46:8 59:18	Dowden 15:25	easy 58:10 72:23	email 116:15
dictate 16:12	72:4	22:17 24:3 28:21	118:23 119:2	embers 19:13
dictated 183:5	discussed 3:13 6:24	28:22 29:4,16,21	ECB 104:10	emergency 37:19
difference 187:23	25:4 75:6 113:25	30:3,7 31:21	Echo 41:10	38:1 116:8 140:18
differences 117:6	141:14	32:10,18 33:2,6	economically	142:6 175:6
different 27:12	discussing 40:2,18	33:13,19 34:1	103:10	en 17:22,25 18:6
96:2 97:3 113:7	45:24 83:17	35:13,14,18,23	EDBA 59:19,23	23:7 29:25 30:25
114:20 118:6	discussion 17:20,22	36:1,5,6 39:21	60:2,3,6,11 75:22	31:17 34:13 36:10
125:1 133:4,6,7	17:24 20:22 21:7	46:14 185:11	76:21,22 79:17,23	36:13,14,17,17
137:16 144:3,5,9	34:5,10 39:17,23	draw 146:18	83:4,5,6,16 85:16	80:11,24 81:2,18
150:6 166:10	40:12 47:6,9 48:8	Drawbridge 92:15	86:2,5 87:20 88:2	81:25 82:17
172:7 191:16	59:22 60:13 62:21	92:19	88:14,16,18 89:7	137:15,23,25
192:5,7	75:1 87:19 88:2	drawing 14:16	89:8,15,25 90:2	147:17
difficult 12:17 20:7	90:11 91:5 106:3	drill 171:12,13	104:14,15,17,24	en-route 137:10
41:20 51:8,16	106:4,5,13,19	drive 5:16	105:3,10,13,16	Encapsulating
56:17 70:7,24	discussions 21:5	driving 18:12 59:15	106:2,9	67:12
72:2,25 73:1,10	dispatch 110:12	80:13,17	EDBAs 60:9,9	encountered 26:21
74:24 84:6,25	111:2	Duddy 156:13	edition 68:11	encourage 35:21
87:23 88:4 98:24	dispatched 110:1	159:23	effect 37:12 107:11	endorse 111:13
150:17 181:8,21	110:20	due 120:9 121:21	effected 21:16	engine 147:8,10
difficulties 165:22	disputing 108:21	154:6	70:19	engineered 117:13
166:17 168:16	disseminate 38:11	duties 150:9	effecting 12:13	engines 175:22
177:7	disseminated 62:14	duty 151:12	effectively 7:21	184:14
dire 67:21	distance 19:24	dynamic 29:6	13:4,11 18:15	English 118:3,12
direct 5:14 52:24	49:16	35:22 56:7 59:3	20:9 23:3 28:15	enhance 9:13 39:3
52:25 120:3 137:3	diverted 166:6	65:3 110:3	35:14 42:2 46:19	68:18 146:23
directed 30:10	divided 109:23		47:17,19,20 48:4	enormously 113:1
direction 120:21	division 79:23	E	48:23 55:6 92:22	enquiries 111:11
directive 126:8	divvying 80:1	E 195:2	106:15 149:9	ensure 71:21 72:17
directly 14:13 50:6	document 7:13,15	EAGAN[sic] 65:13	156:17	137:25 144:13
76:7 91:21 190:21	7:19 9:18,21 41:7	earlier 13:20 17:9	effects 121:21	194:7
Director 34:8	68:23 77:18 94:17	36:14 68:6 72:15	Egan 51:12 64:16	ensuring 70:14
131:16 163:6	108:16 131:1	80:2 83:21 90:25	eight 5:23 15:12	142:13
disabilities 119:12	162:25	106:3 111:14	84:24 86:18,21	enter 7:17
disability 120:18	documents 34:7	123:2 126:10	87:20 106:2	entering 165:21
disconnecting	103:22 131:15	130:19 140:9	114:18 131:16	168:15
105:17	155:21 163:6	152:16 158:4,4	165:5	entire 83:12
disconnection	doing 2:1 56:5,9,14	160:12 184:1	either 11:20 30:1	entirely 135:22
104:8,22 105:3,9	74:15 93:2,18	193:19	55:25 67:5 70:21	184:10
105:13	105:17 106:1	early 36:20 48:21	76:10 172:14	entrance 85:20
disconnects 104:24	132:23 148:23	65:1	176:8	entry 58:21 59:9
discontinuity	150:4 173:22	easier 13:7 21:25	elderly 140:11	61:19 62:14
192:11	door 61:15 91:10	84:23	141:10,11	156:23
discover 54:21	129:9	easily 98:18 118:21	electronic 104:1	equipment 7:3

83:13 89:17 105:4 105:9,17 106:11 107:18 109:12 110:7,11 escalated 13:14 19:25 27:18 29:23 60:8 83:11 escalating 18:16 29:7 escalation 8:20 escape 122:9,13,16 127:15 128:14,24 129:11,18 especially 132:17 essence 6:4 137:4 essential 151:16 essentially 35:17 120:7 168:21 169:16 establish 22:5 55:3 57:11 70:10,13 95:1 99:14 established 36:21 66:15 85:9 estimation 85:20 97:6 et 104:10 154:4 191:4 ETA 147:20 ethnic 118:7 Euston 104:16,18 104:21,21 105:19 evacuate 171:17 evacuation 12:13 40:23 47:13 56:11 evaluate 81:4 evaluation 91:13 evening 37:6 164:19 event 126:12 137:9 159:13 163:5 169:7 events 3:11 eventually 154:24 everybody 82:19	134:1 150:22,24 162:13,18 everyone's 170:13 193:5 evidence 2:4 3:13 3:24 43:12 64:19 79:2 99:8 101:24 112:11,25 113:25 139:18 153:17 158:4 171:1 193:11 evolved 67:14 exact 37:24 61:11 88:22 exactly 76:10 125:24 126:9 135:6 139:3 189:19 examine 2:15 example 9:11 89:11 124:12 129:4 140:19 145:15 155:23 161:23 162:19 164:18 172:21 173:7 174:21,25 examples 104:20 155:18 exchange 74:22 exercise 10:11 149:17 172:18 exhibited 3:19 96:17 exhibits 96:16,23 existing 10:4 46:1 expand 19:7 101:5 101:6 133:7 expanded 101:6 expect 52:20 53:23 72:22 121:22 122:24 123:24 124:3 143:21 147:1,4,14,19 148:5 159:18,20 expectation 24:6	29:10 expected 71:24 84:4 171:13 expediently 40:9 52:18 82:10 experience 10:18 33:7 58:2 63:18 114:9 118:14 130:11 131:18 132:4,6,14 133:22 134:20 135:16 138:3,14 143:14 144:1 147:21,24 experienced 5:12 59:24 121:11 experiences 5:13 experiencing 107:24 experts 107:16 109:7 explain 12:25 17:7 21:22 37:9,11 39:15 44:25 50:22 94:12 95:7 105:7 105:21 106:15 110:4 120:11 149:16 150:18 158:24 165:4 166:2 explained 17:9 36:14 95:22 109:2 explanation 93:12 explore 81:11 159:9 161:23 expression 10:1 93:10 extended 20:11 extensively 58:22 exterior 11:16,19 11:22,24 20:14 21:8 57:19 external 11:11 extinguish 67:18 96:1 extra 191:2	eye 96:3 <hr/> F <hr/> face 19:5,13 20:11 60:23,24 66:21,21 facilitating 64:25 facility 146:6 facing 150:22 fact 30:6 32:9 37:2 67:3 68:16 70:1 77:4,19 82:4 96:7 129:15 140:15 146:21 159:16 160:23 165:1 180:1,23 182:21 183:20 189:21 190:5,8 factors 34:22 failed 80:3 fair 34:16 85:4 99:2 137:7 184:2 fairly 32:4 59:24 84:7 110:2 133:22 178:21 fallback 155:7 familiar 56:18 68:7 115:24 130:1 131:3 146:12,13 162:6 188:4 fan 106:16 far 38:21 40:19 46:3 50:4 55:11 56:9 60:14 62:16 68:12 90:1 123:23 188:3 fault 75:4 168:25 favour 33:3 feasible 52:6,8 77:4 77:9 98:25 100:5 101:16 fed 59:5 feed 9:8 14:23 58:24 63:1 82:6 feedback 173:25 feedbacks 63:5	feeder 110:4,6 feeders 110:1,12,21 110:24 feeding 65:13 feel 170:14 felt 18:6 30:6 73:1 FEMALE 157:20 Fenton 107:8 179:23 fewer 170:22 FIB 61:22,23 fifteen 188:22 fight 11:15 46:20 fighting 67:23 file 2:14 filling 130:21 final 104:11 Finally 157:14 find 22:14 24:9 27:19 33:18 51:8 51:16 57:8 71:9 88:10 131:20 140:16,19 164:24 finding 77:23 fine 43:6 57:24 103:16 108:16 129:20 139:15 192:25 fingers 80:16 finish 111:22 153:4 170:17 finished 7:16 fire 5:14,22 6:16,20 7:4 8:12 9:11 10:23 11:1,9,15 11:21,22 12:10 13:7 14:8,25 16:10,16,20 18:25 19:4,22 20:3,4,6 20:12,16,16,23,24 21:3,7 22:20 23:11 24:16,19 26:3 27:16 29:7 29:22,23 30:20 33:17 34:24 35:4
---	--	---	--	--

36:4,7 37:15 42:1 42:2,8 46:13,18 46:19,21,24 47:15 47:15,17 48:5,20 48:24 51:1 55:7,9 55:19 56:3,15,25 57:5,12,14,24 58:2 60:22 61:1 62:3 63:24,25 66:1,6,10,15,17 66:20 67:18,23 68:13,22 70:25 73:3,18 79:14 80:6,12 82:19 87:12 90:9,12,14 90:15,19 91:6,21 95:5 96:1,2 104:2 109:3 115:4,11,25 116:2,22,25 117:1 117:18,20,24 120:5,6,9,14,19 120:20,24 121:1 121:21,25 122:17 124:2,6,19 126:21 127:12,18 128:5 128:18,20 129:24 130:15,19 131:22 132:7,23 133:1,10 133:14,24 134:25 135:7,10 137:22 141:1,1 142:12,22 144:16 147:8,10 148:8,9 152:12,14 153:12,25 154:1,2 154:4,11 162:14 164:20 171:12,15 174:4,15 175:22 175:24 176:10 177:4,8,13,23 178:23 179:2 180:3,5,17,24 181:7,10,12,16,20 182:5 183:1 184:14 191:2 fire-fighting 75:22	firefighter 5:7 23:23 99:15 193:22,25 firefighters 1:5 23:1 107:14 117:17 122:20,25 123:14,16 124:1 firefighting 10:22 69:12,20 138:5 Firelink 134:18 146:3 fireproof 127:1 fires 6:1 13:6 first 1:16,19 2:3,12 2:22 4:25 13:23 19:20,23 22:6 23:8,15 25:5 44:1 46:4,10 62:9 63:3 65:8 68:20 70:17 86:5 90:21 94:1 96:18,23 98:9 103:21 104:15 118:3 123:8 124:19 130:11 133:15 136:6,8 140:9 145:23 146:11 148:13 157:22 162:9,14 163:15 167:14 184:5,7,23 185:3 189:17 190:12 Firstly 19:10 five 20:7 42:16,16 102:14,18 103:2 139:15,22 170:14 184:14 fix 44:2 fixed 19:25 flame 19:13 flames 156:2,6,7,25 157:20 flammable 57:20 flat 119:12 126:22 126:23,24 127:13 128:11 141:6,12	156:2,6,7,25 157:20 162:1,17 162:21 163:2,10 164:4 165:11,20 166:23 168:14 169:8 174:22,24 flat/house 71:7 flats 56:16,22 82:9 95:12,25 96:2 162:17 164:21 168:5 flexi 17:2 flip 16:25 FLON-OPS-01 134:17 FLONOPS 134:20 134:21,21,22,22 134:23,25 135:4,5 135:7 floor 47:17 51:3 58:12,14,17,18,20 62:4,10 75:21 76:14,21,22 77:12 77:13,25 80:18,23 82:1 85:8 87:4,5 88:23 90:4 95:24 100:15,17 101:1 107:1,3,3 156:7,8 156:19,25 157:20 162:2,22 163:12 163:13 164:4 165:20 168:4,14 169:9,13 180:17 180:24 181:12 floors 20:23 21:1,4 76:21 81:14,20,22 82:13 83:2 88:18 88:18 89:8,9,25 95:12 176:18 177:21 focus 69:18 focused 99:23 focusing 69:21 136:3 152:18 follow 38:23 65:6	87:5 124:24 176:7 176:15 follow-up 140:8 followed 49:15 86:24 following 34:18 92:25 foot 91:12 106:12 forgive 4:10 73:11 form 53:25 54:2 113:11 130:5,13 130:16,22 131:1,3 137:11 forms 54:17 84:1 130:18 131:8 formulating 40:10 forth 67:5,5 forty 190:19 forward 9:16 59:15 59:16 61:24,25 75:18 98:11,13,22 99:12,20 100:2,11 100:25 101:7 193:15 found 27:20 74:15 103:8,15 160:3 four 13:7 20:7 72:22 186:10,17 186:20,24 four-fifths 58:10 four-pump 13:7 Fourteen 169:10 fourth 16:8 93:8 126:6 172:11 180:17 Fox 165:14 frame 5:3 free 102:7,21 111:17 134:17 135:7 170:14 fresh 132:15 FRIEDMAN 102:5 102:17 frightened 128:4,8 front 2:14,14 19:13	20:11 29:6 93:13 113:11,13 150:21 151:24 169:17 front-line 83:6 107:13 109:3 FRUs 60:1,7,9 83:7 83:10 110:25,25 191:3 FS 50:19 52:9 FSG 12:4,6,8 23:13 35:5 41:13 48:24 50:18,20 51:7,10 51:11,18,18,24 52:5,9,17 53:12 53:23 54:6,8,12 54:18,22 57:14 59:7 61:16,20 62:11,16,22 64:4 64:13,15,23 65:8 65:10,14,21 67:19 67:23 68:10,16,19 69:1 70:3 71:2,7 71:18,22,25 72:2 72:24 73:6,19 75:11 80:11 81:13 81:19,25 82:4,8 82:20 83:2,18,19 84:5,8,17,19,22 96:3 114:22,24 115:17,19,20 116:18 120:6,7,12 121:8,11,14,20 122:8,23 123:1,10 123:17 124:5,23 125:4,18 127:4 132:3,6 133:21 134:18 136:17,22 137:11 138:12 140:17,18 141:7 141:18 143:14 144:20 146:3,21 146:24 147:2,6,21 148:1,6 152:7 153:19 166:3 169:15 173:15,17
--	---	--	---	---

173:20,22,23 174:1 178:8,14 184:5,7,23 185:25 FSGs 64:7 72:13,22 81:22 121:5 190:21 Fulham 4:9 full 1:17 12:13 40:22 56:10 85:5 112:21 194:10 fully 10:5 17:11 function 4:3 5:2 13:19 27:18 functional 17:11 functioning 10:5 10:11 furnace 78:8 further 1:4 42:23 50:8 64:5,15 65:11 75:24 92:10 97:22 101:19 110:10 111:6 151:19 159:9,21 165:25 166:2 179:10 191:2 furthest 140:25 future 89:21	23:8 45:7 91:9 97:18 124:18 141:4 150:1 153:7 154:22 generated 31:15 genuinely 74:13 193:21 Geographically 83:6 getting 25:20,22 28:10 32:23 37:8 39:18,20 40:2,8 48:23,24 49:2 53:24 57:13 59:7 60:25 64:15 72:8 78:15 84:10 89:22 90:2 98:7 105:18 106:9,14 122:18 127:23 133:11 147:15 148:2 153:10 154:4 160:8 161:8 165:1 166:15 177:12 180:2,18 181:1,11 give 1:16 2:4 3:14 10:1 25:19 34:11 51:8 58:9,14 66:22 72:12 73:12 74:7 75:25 80:19 85:5 88:1 94:6,20 96:15 97:5,10 107:11,11 110:13 111:15 112:11,21 112:25 114:15 120:21 123:6,9 126:9 127:22 128:7,25 129:10 141:4 145:18 147:19 150:11 185:21 189:11 given 8:13 11:13 29:16 48:6,7 50:13 62:18 64:11 68:19 80:19 83:3 83:5 89:21 91:9,9	128:21 144:12 146:24 gives 76:20 139:13 177:4 giving 9:12,13 21:21 34:14 44:24 64:10 67:8 73:18 94:4 180:10 184:3 glasses 113:15 GM 18:5,6 29:8,10 49:22 95:4,4 go 2:15 5:17 6:4 7:5 8:2,3,5 12:12 14:12 15:10,24 18:3 19:21 20:13 22:18 23:19 27:14 37:7,19 38:7,10 38:18 39:5 41:22 41:25 43:15 44:21 46:16,17 48:20 49:13 50:22 51:2 51:3,21 53:20,21 54:7 58:5 61:17 63:5,6 64:20 66:22 70:8 71:24 73:21 75:17 79:4 80:5 83:22 86:2 87:10 89:2 97:14 98:19 99:3 100:21 100:22 102:8,22 102:24 103:18 111:17,25 120:1 122:5,14 123:5 124:16 126:20 127:17,21 128:1,9 128:16,16,23 129:14,16,16,21 133:15 135:18 139:8,21 140:25 145:20 149:15 155:21 159:10 160:1 162:9 163:13 164:1 165:12 167:18 168:5,11 170:3,9	171:2 173:2 174:9 182:24 184:18 185:9 191:18 193:15 God 183:2 goes 5:23 15:11 53:8 146:5 152:9 going 1:4,7 3:14 8:12 9:10 18:15 19:5 23:10,12,13 34:19 35:12 42:6 42:22 44:12,18 49:8 55:4 59:12 59:16 60:1 61:14 61:16 65:21 71:25 78:23 79:10 84:14 85:12,13,25 87:17 88:11 89:19 91:20 93:5,16,17 94:20 95:3 96:5 100:7 106:20 111:13 112:16 113:12 121:25 122:24 126:19 129:2 131:15 132:24,25 137:21 139:7 141:2 142:2,4,23 143:25 144:14,17 151:14,23 153:11 155:1,14 160:19 161:19 162:1,25 169:23 170:17 175:1 176:4 178:1 180:24 181:14,25 183:15 192:2,4 193:7 Golf 160:5,6,7,17 184:24 185:4,4,18 good 1:3,6,10,11,14 1:15 10:18 78:18 78:20,21 89:11 112:19,20 178:7 178:14,15,18,19 Goodall 51:11 52:10 64:3,14	65:10 Googling' 183:1 Goulbourne 76:11 77:16 107:22 governed 89:16 gradually 154:24 grateful 101:20 111:10,15 113:2 193:4,21 great 170:18 greater 32:24 33:10 greatest 90:23 greatly 68:18 125:22 146:23 green 22:21 26:14 Grenfell 7:8,12 10:21 14:24,25 17:25 18:18,19 20:16 22:24 41:10 50:1 68:13,21 74:16 104:2 115:4 115:11 120:5 148:14 174:4 grey 101:12,13 ground 5:15 6:4,9 8:12 9:11 14:8 16:16,20 22:21 24:17,20 26:3 27:16 29:13 30:17 30:20 33:17 36:5 37:15 42:8 46:13 48:20 55:8,9,19 56:3 57:5 58:3 63:24,25 66:6,17 66:20 68:18 70:25 71:5,11,23 73:18 76:14 80:12 88:23 91:21 92:16 95:5 95:17 100:15,17 101:1 107:1,3 109:23 121:23 122:21,23,25 124:1,4,9 134:7 136:4 137:17 138:19 143:16,23
G				
G261 185:24 G271 156:1,5,6,24 158:22 159:24 160:23 164:4,15 165:17 185:3,13 189:3 gain 46:23 Gareth 49:23,25 50:2 gather 19:3 130:4,9 gathered 138:16,18 general 96:20 106:8 142:5,10 155:2 generally 6:8 8:11 11:20 12:19,23				

146:2,23 147:1,25 151:17 152:13,14 153:1 154:2,9,15 154:16 157:25 163:18,24 172:9 172:13 173:6,17 173:20 174:1,15 176:5,10,17 177:1 177:4 179:11 180:3 181:15 189:7 190:20 ground-floor 78:3 98:16 99:8 106:20 107:23 group 5:12 10:15 15:6 17:12,13,24 20:22 26:10 28:1 30:21 31:11 32:6 32:13 33:3 34:12 34:13,15,16 40:15 40:15 44:16 47:25 48:2,9 49:14,15 50:3 51:9,10 52:10 54:17 64:11 64:12,14,17,18,22 65:17 66:10,13 75:8 76:11,11 77:15,15 78:1 83:13 87:6,9,10 87:11,14 91:24 94:13,13 104:17 107:21,21 guarantee 193:9 guess 54:16 82:23 84:21 90:24 119:23 180:22 guessing 180:22 guidance 10:23 23:11 61:1 62:3 66:2,11,15 79:15 80:7 115:25 116:2 117:18,20 120:6 120:20,25 121:1 121:25 124:2,24 128:18,20 129:24	130:20 133:15,24 135:10 142:13,23 144:16 153:25 154:1,5,11 164:20 175:25 177:8,24 178:23 179:2 180:4,5 guide 5:7 8:6 9:6 13:11,22 gun 33:21 <hr/> H <hr/> habitually 149:23 half 82:5 halfway 28:12 80:6 120:2 halves 99:1 Hammersmith 4:8 hamper 180:4 hampered 180:7,10 hand 61:16 99:11 99:16 hand-over 95:2 handed 45:8 handful 121:10 132:4 handheld 16:16 56:1 57:4 143:8 handle 115:20 121:13 149:13 handled 132:4 handling 116:21 140:17 141:7 147:21 handover 32:17,20 35:12,14,17,20 42:4 95:3 handovers 31:21 hands 121:23 hang 132:24 167:23 happen 8:17,20 78:9 141:18 154:23 186:20 190:12 191:6,8 happened 21:6	29:20 33:15 74:14 82:18,25 86:25 107:2 154:23,24 185:17 191:9 happening 8:14 42:10 54:17,20 56:13 58:4 65:8 89:14 152:18 156:15 157:1 180:25 182:18 happens 16:19 128:6 133:20 136:14 happy 2:9 14:10 21:22 42:23 79:9 113:6 140:4 171:23 hard 50:11 54:6 60:5 Harding 108:10,12 108:18,21 hazards 37:25 head 88:19 143:10 184:6 hear 1:4,7,22 2:1,2 15:21 23:10 28:9 28:13 30:8,12 32:17 44:11,11 55:23 56:3 110:17 137:24 171:16 178:25 179:17 heard 20:15,18,19 23:7 24:5 26:22 30:4 31:1 47:9 56:1 81:19 153:17 171:11 188:7 194:4 hearing 1:4 44:12 75:23 179:18 194:17 heat 56:25 121:21 heavy 56:8 Heidi 165:14,15 166:20 Heidi's 166:8	held 21:2 105:23 help 4:21 8:1 18:2 21:20 48:11 59:15 67:20 77:7 87:24 88:24 89:10,25 93:5 99:18,24 100:11,16,25 111:15 113:1 120:21 125:13 126:18 127:9,23 128:13,22,25 148:23 164:9 helped 70:3 91:1 181:16,16,18,24 helpful 12:3 77:6 101:22,25 192:19 helping 8:3 104:3 125:25 helps 51:19 94:5 100:17 101:5 high 126:11 high-rise 10:22,24 11:1,3,4,7,14 12:14 117:10 124:25 126:23 127:10,16,17 147:22 176:1 186:18 higher 82:13 83:2 highest 77:13 highlight 12:22 highlighted 4:23 95:18 HJF 165:13 hold 39:20 178:17 home 17:2 24:23 108:19 126:8 honest 19:20 30:10 62:6,8 69:9 77:1 109:6 121:6 137:18 154:17 164:25 182:13 honestly 24:4 82:16 hope 85:23 103:17 192:15 193:8	hoped 107:11 hopefully 9:15 52:15 77:7 hoping 9:12 hospitals 36:22 hour 42:22 78:23 88:17 89:7,15,24 109:9 162:14 191:22 192:1,16 193:8 hours 93:19 183:21 house 93:9,11 116:22,25 117:2,4 117:5,7 119:11 121:17 124:25 125:1,2 141:6 house/flat 131:21 Howson 149:17 164:6,9 huge 120:6 hundreds 58:2 hurry 171:14 <hr/> I <hr/> IC 14:14 42:6,7 74:9 137:12 138:12 ICP 137:5,10,13 ICS 143:8 idea 50:25 58:14 72:4 114:15 150:11 180:17 183:13 ideal 84:7 identified 6:19 identify 6:15 86:18 99:18,24 100:25 127:15 128:13 ignited 11:22,25 Ignoring 69:15,20 illustrate 155:17 images 183:8 184:1 imaginary 14:16 imagine 36:20 immediate 73:19
--	--	--	---	--

<p>IMP 7:1,7,11,24 IMPDS 7:17 implemented 46:15 implementing 40:22 importance 3:4 important 3:7 33:13 35:16 69:22 73:2 82:20 90:18 160:18 165:2 impossible 100:20 impression 22:16 improvement 5:16 incident 4:22 5:8,9 5:11,17,22 6:4,9 6:17,23,24,25 7:11,14 8:1,3,10 8:16,20,24 9:2,3,9 9:12,14 10:10,18 11:8,10,13,14,24 12:7,8 13:10,12 13:13,16,17,21,24 14:4,5,17 15:10 15:11,13,22,25,25 16:3,4,9,12,13,15 16:17 17:3,5 18:6 18:7,12 19:25 20:21 22:4,9,12 22:14,17 23:9 24:6,13,24 25:3 26:3 27:15,17,17 28:17 29:6,9,13 29:16,23 30:5,7 30:17,24 31:15,21 31:24 32:1,9,11 32:14,21,21,23,24 33:1,3,5,14,19 34:5,13,15,18,20 34:24,25 35:1,8 35:10,14,22,23 36:2,9,18,25 37:4 37:16,21,24,25 38:17,22,25 39:2 39:8,22 40:12 41:21,24 42:13,14</p>	<p>42:18 44:14 45:18 46:11 47:1 48:11 50:10,25 51:21,25 57:17 60:8 63:6,7 63:9,14 66:23 68:18 69:10 71:5 71:10,14,23,25 72:3,21 74:1,6,10 76:1,4 80:15 81:18 82:24 83:11 83:12 84:7 86:1 87:21,25 92:2,5,8 92:16,18,24 93:1 93:6 95:15,19,20 95:21 96:6,8,12 97:5,21 105:20 106:23 107:10,25 108:1 109:5,8,21 121:23 122:20,23 122:25 123:25 124:1,4,9,15 130:6 134:4,7 136:4,12,18,23 137:16 138:1,18 138:19,21 143:16 143:23 145:7,8 146:2,23 147:1,9 147:18,25 151:12 151:25 152:1,2,12 152:15,25 154:15 154:16 155:19,20 157:24 158:12,17 158:22 160:18,20 161:3 163:18,24 164:1 165:12 168:17 172:13,21 173:6 174:1 175:18,19 176:16 176:20 177:25 179:11 180:3 181:15 183:19 185:23 186:8,9,14 186:16 187:6,9,19 187:23,24 188:12 188:12,15,23,25</p>	<p>189:7 incidents 4:20 5:6 6:1 7:22 12:23 97:19 151:25 include 117:20 including 104:9 incoming 167:16 inconvenient 192:15,21 incorrectly 186:25 increases 92:8 incredibly 19:14 incremental 29:24 36:15 92:7 independent 6:23 indicate 26:15 indicates 90:3 150:19 individual 7:2 179:2 individual's 7:5 individuals 151:2 inevitably 9:8 influx 184:16 info 153:9 165:17 168:13 information 6:18 15:21,24 16:2 26:18 31:18 36:1 39:21 41:16 42:7 50:20,23 52:15 53:12,24,25 54:1 54:4,22 56:24 57:2,13 61:1,5,17 61:20,24,25 62:3 62:12,14,19 64:11 64:14 65:3,14 66:2 68:2 70:8 71:11 72:8,24 74:11,15,22 76:6 76:6 79:15 80:23 80:25 81:4,5,8,13 81:14 82:4,8 83:2 83:25 84:1,2,14 91:15 95:6,10</p>	<p>98:11,13,22 99:12 99:20 100:2,11,25 101:7 117:16,21 117:23 119:16 121:22,24 122:5,9 122:18,24 123:4,6 123:18 124:4 127:23 130:4,5,6 130:12,13,15,16 130:18 131:1,17 131:18,23 132:16 133:11 134:4,6 136:3,6 137:11,15 137:24 138:1,12 138:15,17,21 141:4 142:13,17 143:21,24 144:11 144:14,15,17,18 144:19,25 145:6 145:10,16,18 146:8,25 147:5,9 147:14 152:3 153:6,19 155:13 155:14 156:19 157:2,3 159:1 161:2,8,11 162:5 163:5 164:10 165:1 166:8,12,15 166:17 168:2,3 169:4 172:8 173:23,24 175:9 175:16 176:2,4,5 176:16 177:1,13 177:24 178:1,18 179:11,14,21,25 180:2,9 181:15 182:21 184:5 185:21,25 informative 71:5 71:10 74:8,12 177:2,3,6,9,10,19 177:20 informed 36:21 37:3 54:18 68:15 68:25 69:3,4,23</p>	<p>74:17 75:8,13 78:7 95:3 146:20 177:3 initial 46:25 104:10 116:11 118:8 158:14 159:25 initially 27:14 49:15 67:18 70:16 114:17 136:9 153:21 185:5,10 initials 189:4 input 7:19 145:6 inputted 144:20 INQ 100:8 INQ00000194 163:3 INQ00000235 99:3 INQ00000258 99:14 INQ00000259 99:22 100:10 inquiry 1:13 21:24 112:18,25 158:5 162:12,13 195:5,9 inside 56:25 85:22 126:24 127:13 152:18 inasmuch 29:23 42:6 46:12 81:8 82:8 instance 124:19 instructed 107:8 instruction 49:10 97:13 instructions 8:13 intended 2:7 intensive 85:13 94:24 intercepting 185:25 interchangeable 135:5 interest 10:1 interests 170:13 193:6</p>
--	---	---	---	---

internal 6:20	Joking 193:21	38:2,21 39:4,8,9	187:15,17,23	learnt 66:10 116:25
internally 68:9	Joseph 104:22	39:20 40:5,18	188:2,11,23	leave 3:7,9 66:21
interpretation 72:1	jump 145:20	42:21 44:13 45:3	189:15,15,16	120:15,16,17,23
interpreted 85:24	jumped 13:3	50:6 52:12,24	190:14 191:9	121:1,21 125:11
interpreter 118:9	jumping 33:21	54:8,12,15,16	knowledge 10:2,3	125:12,12 128:8,9
118:11,15,23	182:1	55:9 58:13,17	47:25 53:5 70:9	129:7,8,12,13
119:2	June 3:18 4:11	60:7 63:8 65:23	70:12,13 71:20	138:20 168:5
interpreters 118:21	94:16 115:4	68:12 69:25 71:9	81:12 83:20 97:10	171:13
119:5	junior 10:25 11:3	71:13,21 74:4,11	138:3 179:10	left 15:24 31:17
interrupt 41:13		74:13 75:14 78:12	180:21	42:3 44:9 49:12
interview 3:1 21:21	K	80:10 83:19 84:7	known 104:6	54:25 62:1 78:16
introducing 14:7	K 36:20	84:13 86:8 87:6	166:20,22 181:20	85:14 99:11,16,16
investigation 20:24	K&C 37:2,5	90:14 91:4,10	181:24	100:18 101:10,13
97:22	keep 1:24 69:23	92:16 93:14 96:7	knows 137:4	104:4 107:6
investigations 2:5	79:10 80:12 96:3	97:7 99:1,5,10,25		129:18
101:22 113:1	102:14 110:10	102:13 105:19,20	L	left-hand 61:4
involve 52:12,13	120:21 123:11	106:4 109:5,9,19	ladder 136:8,10	100:12 104:4
68:24 118:8	125:13 132:25	109:20 111:5,14	152:16 185:24	leisure 22:21
involved 34:10	133:18,23 134:1	111:22 113:8	lady 2:1	length 193:24
40:10 49:2 93:2	144:11	116:1,1,4 117:4,7	Lakanal 116:22,25	lessons 21:10
116:21 118:2,5	keeps 177:3	119:3,5,8,21	117:2,4,5,7	116:24 117:3
involvement 30:13	Kensington 37:2	121:10,13,15	121:17	let's 86:4 111:24,25
81:12 187:21	Kentfield 27:24	123:16,23 127:8	landing 59:4	127:17 169:23
involves 13:1	kept 54:4 68:15,25	127:22 128:11,15	landline 132:17	170:9 191:14
issue 83:14 109:16	146:20 185:19,19	132:2,3,4,10,11	141:20	letters 37:22
issues 16:22 77:5	Key 51:23	133:21 137:2,14	language 81:17	159:13
110:18 117:9	kick 124:23 125:18	138:25 142:17	118:3,19 119:4	letting 37:16
119:12,25 140:11	kind 36:22 82:12	143:8 145:19	125:15 182:7	132:11
140:19 141:3	97:4 104:5 119:12	147:8,10 148:21	languages 119:8	level 10:10,13
IUP 189:3	Kinnier 193:23	148:23 154:3,17	large 8:16 134:18	14:23 32:24,25
	knew 19:16 22:25	154:17,20 158:1,7	larger 97:19	33:10 82:21 84:10
J	30:23,24 31:16	160:5,6,15,16,17	lead 119:24 150:5	LFB 6:5 41:7 68:6
Jason 153:17	33:19 36:17 46:10	161:9,13,14 162:4	leader 26:2,2 27:5	93:13 94:17
154:15 179:23	59:25 105:7	162:25 163:17	27:6,7,13,14,19	103:25 108:15
189:18 190:15,16	159:25 180:16,25	164:18,18,23	leading 115:3	114:6 140:16
191:6	181:1,8,8,11	167:15 170:23	leads 91:4 133:20	162:12
jets 11:17	183:22	172:25 173:12,16	leaky 110:1,4,6,12	LFB's 18:20
Jo 151:10 163:8	know 9:3,4 13:25	174:14,19 175:16	110:20,24	LFB00002057
Joanne 183:15	18:13 19:14 20:1	175:22 176:14,23	leaning 99:23	157:16 159:10
job 13:4,15 44:18	21:21 24:16,25	177:21 179:6,19	100:14 101:1	LFB00002151
49:7 83:13 92:22	25:10,15,21 27:2	179:20,20,22	learn 51:6 57:16	44:20
114:17	27:18,20 29:12	180:8,9,12,13,25	learned 21:11	LFB00002305
jobs 12:23 13:5	30:17 31:10,14	181:3,6,10,14	learning 5:15 6:15	167:14
join 87:8	33:2,9,13,25 35:9	182:12,24 183:16	6:15,19,22,25 7:2	LFB00002324
joint 37:18	36:9,13,15 37:17	186:16,18,19	12:22 73:9 97:20	169:5

LFB00003078 161:20	139:8 151:18 159:9,21 187:2 191:11	London's 149:6 long 4:14 10:5 21:3 25:17 34:12 40:17 42:13 58:13,17 98:3 106:6 115:11 117:5 138:16 147:19 174:10 179:18 180:16 193:24 194:1	56:7 59:4 85:13 95:6 105:12 114:24 115:2 116:15 144:16 153:24 159:13 177:1,11 182:23 190:9	4:14 7:5 11:6 13:8 15:6,16,25 17:12,13,24 22:17 26:10,11,22,23,24 27:1,3,24 28:2,2 28:21,22 29:1,3,9 29:12,17,17,21 30:6,12,22 31:11 32:6,6,10,13 33:4 34:12,13,15,16 39:21 40:15,15 44:16 46:14 47:25 48:2,9 49:14,15 50:2,3 51:9,10,12 52:10 54:17,21 61:4,5,6,12,13,14 62:13,17 64:12,12 64:14,16,17,18,22 65:13,17,25 66:10 66:13 70:20 75:8 76:11,11 77:15,15 78:2 79:13,19,20 83:24 86:9,10,14 86:22 87:6,10,11 87:11,14 91:24 94:13,14 99:5,10 106:5 107:21,22 108:8,9,10,10,12 108:18 124:12,13 136:9,11 137:19 152:17 185:11 193:22 194:1
LFB00003114 7:9 liaise 12:20,24 liaising 190:25 light 20:12 26:14 37:16 lights 18:13 limited 53:5 133:22 line 7:5 12:21 14:16 19:2 52:25 87:4,5 90:6 93:8,13 94:7 95:16 104:13 119:22 126:6 129:21 133:1,18 133:23 134:1 136:2 141:16 150:23,25 162:6,7 164:22 172:11 174:16 176:12 lines 2:23 58:19 65:9 75:19 143:15 187:4 188:19 190:23 link 52:20 53:22 135:8 136:2 151:16 152:2 154:2 190:18 links 93:4 list 26:8 91:12,14 99:4 130:8 131:15 131:16 138:16 145:13 152:9,10 173:3 193:20 listed 162:17 listen 138:8 171:15 listening 161:6 172:22 literally 95:17 98:3 98:7 little 5:4 13:6 18:4 25:4 28:11,18 33:21,22,23 52:19 73:15 81:11 107:12 129:8	live 110:11 lobby 61:4 64:25 65:14,19,21 78:4 83:23 90:10,12,14 90:15 98:17 106:21 107:23 local 36:22 locally 12:6 location 16:2,4 25:3 37:24 50:23 123:21 131:21 Loft 26:11 28:2 29:12,17 30:8,10 32:6 Loft's 29:1 log 31:24 45:18 50:23 51:21,25 74:10 76:15 89:2 92:18 107:25 108:3,14,15 130:14 144:14,17 144:20,25 145:17 152:21 153:6,13 155:19,20 158:12 158:17,17 160:25 161:11 164:1 165:13 168:17 169:17 174:9 175:14 176:21 186:8,14,21 188:23 189:6 logged 90:7 94:5 104:10 161:17 174:6 loggist 89:12 90:7 94:5 logistical 92:22 London 6:16 19:22 35:4 82:19 83:8 107:13 116:22 123:24 134:25 149:8	longer 4:6 79:1 83:9 88:15 look 2:17,22 7:15 7:18 16:24 22:22 25:3 44:22 55:18 68:6,8 73:9 75:18 76:17 85:1 87:24 88:5 90:16 93:16 96:16 98:9 99:22 99:25 100:1 103:21 104:13,20 113:16 124:17 134:14 138:11 145:23 146:16 151:2,18 157:14 157:15 158:21 164:2,13 165:25 175:5 178:13 183:9 186:8 188:19 193:14,16 looked 3:22 18:25 19:4,7 45:22 72:18 138:16 158:18 looking 2:15 23:6 24:12 26:8 56:18 72:5 84:1 90:12 94:23 99:13 100:15 134:3 136:4 158:11 159:11 168:17 175:13 180:15 188:23 looks 99:20 102:8 159:16 lot 16:19 36:21	lots 153:10 low-level 125:2 lower 18:4 95:14 187:2 lunch 102:11 <hr/> M <hr/> M2FH 134:17 M2FN 157:12 machines 13:7 main 16:14,19,21 34:21 38:7,8 39:5 42:19 45:10 53:2 53:6,8,13 81:1 134:17 135:7 138:8 major 34:5,15,20 34:24 35:8,10 36:8,25 37:3,15 37:21,24 38:17,22 38:25 39:2,7 92:24 183:19 187:5,8,18,24 188:12,15 make-up 178:11 186:13 189:7 make-ups 154:3 173:8,18,19 177:14 making 6:4 13:10 24:13 40:7 48:23 85:9 122:1 180:23 181:2 manage 72:2 management 7:14 11:8,10 116:9 142:6 manager 4:4,6,12	marked 104:14

marshalling 85:19 86:5,6 93:2	McLoughlin 31:7 31:10	45:2,6,7,10,12,22 51:17,22 52:1	76:16 89:3	103:8,9,19 111:4
MARTIN 1:3,9,12 1:21 43:1,4,7,10 43:15,20,23 57:22 71:3 78:15,17,20 78:22,25 79:4,9 88:7 101:23 102:7 102:12,18,24 103:2,7,11,14,17 111:8,13,17,19,24 112:1,5,8,10,14 112:16 138:24 139:5,10,13,16,21 139:24 140:4 149:9,12 158:20 159:2,5,8 167:5 167:12 169:23 170:3,8,12,21,25 171:6,10,21,23,25 172:4 191:17,24 192:4,10,20,24 193:1,5,14,18 194:3,7,9,14	McLoughlin[sic] 31:7 mean 5:1,17 6:4,12 9:10 10:17 11:17 19:8 20:21 39:15 50:12 56:6 58:16 60:5 63:9 77:12 82:12,19 91:25 92:7,17 96:12 101:8 129:12,15 129:17 150:14 153:8 158:16 159:22 160:14,24 163:19 166:9 174:7,13,16 175:15 178:15,16 180:20 181:3,6,9 182:8 means 52:17 53:4 132:1,2 138:15 169:2 meant 21:22 medium 38:5 meeting 39:21 member 9:23 10:14 117:9 138:4 members 135:20 memory 61:22 80:1 88:24 96:9 mental 80:12 mention 30:12 59:13 mentioned 75:6 mentioning 77:2,10 Merton 131:8 155:10 message 15:19 16:14,16 32:14 34:2,20 37:9,13 37:14,14,17 38:2 38:5,6,16,23 39:1 39:2 42:19 44:4,9 44:11,20,25,25	54:5 74:5,9,12 83:10 108:1 109:25 139:1 145:4,6,7,9,12,12 152:1,3,7,9,11 157:24 158:18 159:11,17,19 160:6,23 161:11 163:16 164:16 165:4 166:23 167:16,16 168:20 168:21 169:1,2,5 172:12,15,20 173:1 174:14,18 175:14,15 176:8 176:13 177:3,9,11 177:19,20,22 186:4,14,23 188:5 188:7,9 189:4,6 messages 23:10,11 29:24 54:8,12 55:23 56:1,3 71:5 71:10,15 123:3 124:11,12 136:17 136:22 138:8 144:7,13 145:25 146:1,2 151:21 152:10,20 153:3,5 154:3,13 155:4 159:24 160:15,19 161:12 163:23 164:19,21 166:25 167:3,13 173:5,15 173:17,20 174:1,6 174:21 175:1,5 176:22 177:2,6,16 177:17 178:8,8,11 178:14 185:10 191:11 met 26:22 MET00005218 3:18 MET00005404	MET00007865 2:13 MET00013961 113:18 MET00018713 3:21 MET00018724 98:19 MET00018733 100:22 MET00018749 98:9 MET00018751 3:21 MET0005774 79:12 METHANE 37:8,9 37:12,13,14,23 38:2,5,6,16,23 39:1,2 44:24,25 45:2,6,22 188:4,7 188:9 method 146:9 methods 66:11 Meyrick 26:22,22 26:23,24 27:1,4 mezzanine 59:4 61:15 87:4,5 Michael 1:7,8,18 195:3 Mick 76:20 middle 24:21 28:14 50:16 163:5 Mike 24:3 29:16 30:3 31:21 32:18 33:2,6,13,19 34:1 35:13,14,18,23 36:1,5,6 Millett 1:6,12,14 2:3 42:22 43:3,8,9 43:23,24 58:5 71:4 78:15,16,19 78:21 79:11 88:8 101:19 102:3,9,16	111:9,21,25 112:5 112:6,16,19 139:6 140:7 149:15 159:9 167:13 169:23,25 170:2,7 170:14,16,24 171:18,25 172:3,5 191:17,21 192:2,7 192:13,19,21 193:1,3,6,18,21 194:6,8,12 mind 32:8,10,12 56:4 75:23 79:22 minimum 10:13 27:10 135:15 minority 118:7 minute 26:10 83:17 167:23 minutes 8:18 25:22 28:1 42:16,16,24 43:4,11 44:10 74:25 78:16 102:15,18 103:2 105:1,6,6,8,15 123:25 139:7,14 139:15,22 148:3 163:1 165:5 169:22 170:14 191:23 misinterpretation 110:6 mission 67:25 mistake 50:4 misunderstanding 126:4 mix 54:14 mix-up 50:2 MM 76:20 89:4,6 Mm-hm 130:10 166:1 Mmm 115:23 124:21 131:2 144:23 179:16 MO 24:23

mobile 97:2 129:7 142:1 154:16 190:22 191:7	192:4,10,20,24 193:1,5,14,18 194:3,7,9,14	46:24	54:12 58:3 65:24 67:9,16 68:12,21 69:10 71:16 104:2	58:9 71:7 72:24 73:6 80:13 83:4 86:21 94:17
mobiles 132:19	Morcos 104:21	123:16 147:15 163:6	105:8 115:11 120:5 133:24 135:24 148:8,9	113:18 115:20 116:2 119:15 121:10 130:2
mobilisation 15:19	Moreton-in-Marsh 11:2	nearer 19:24	150:10,13 151:4 153:12 155:3,5,16 173:14 174:3	131:20,21 134:18 135:15,20 145:7 152:1 162:17
mobilisations 24:7	morning 1:3,6,10 1:11,14,15 64:19 72:15 90:24 91:3 93:1,15 183:8 192:17	necessarily 31:4 84:21 91:2 160:16 166:11 190:9,9	179:10 182:14	163:10
mobilised 15:13,23 38:25 146:2	mouth 97:24	necessity 33:10	noon 79:1	numbers 135:12 159:14
mobility 119:12,25 140:10,19 141:3	move 67:1 184:4 191:15 192:5	need 1:25 2:9 13:25 14:1 18:21 21:22 32:1 36:2 59:19 59:23 77:15 83:3 86:23 88:16 89:22 104:9 105:24 111:2 113:8 125:13 141:16 142:24 159:1 170:3 171:17 191:19	normal 32:20,22,22 72:21 84:7 123:13 126:25 133:14 135:13 138:4	
moment 39:7 40:1 69:20 98:6 128:3 128:6 152:19 159:11 160:13 182:2	moved 78:14 107:1 148:9 149:18 150:2	needed 32:23 48:22 51:2 56:13 80:15 107:4 118:23,24 177:14 180:19 187:20	normally 16:11,21 27:8 52:21,22 53:22 84:16 100:3 100:4 110:24 122:2 134:10 138:10,20 141:5 141:15 147:1 151:21 152:20 153:3	<hr/> O <hr/>
moments 78:14	moving 9:15 123:22	needs 2:2 7:24 13:13 14:10 85:23 128:22	Norman 151:6,7 163:1,7,8,17,17 164:21 166:22 179:13	o'clock 25:21 79:5 90:23 91:2 183:8
monitor 2:16 13:16 113:13	MP6 17:3	networks 36:22	Norman's 165:6	O'Keeffe 99:5,11
monitoring 5:2 6:17 12:20,24,25 13:4,5,9,14,15,18 13:23 14:3,8,20 22:5 24:14,15,16 24:19 25:1 137:23	MPS 41:14	never 11:24 19:10 19:15 20:3 21:10 35:23 57:25 71:24 84:11 130:16 131:12 161:14 170:23	north 21:25 55:14 55:15 60:23 134:12,12 149:10 149:13	O'LOUGHLAN[...] 39:14
months 10:6 17:11	Mulholland 1:7,8,9 1:14,18,25 2:3 42:23 43:20,24 57:22 76:20 78:23 79:9 101:19 102:8 103:11,14,19 111:5,9 195:3	news 170:19 183:10	not[e] 80:13	O'Loughlin 31:12 31:13,22 39:10,24 40:17 41:10 42:5 42:14,18 44:5,13 46:9,17,20,23 47:6,10,22 48:6 48:18 50:9,11 57:11 63:14 87:22 92:10
MOORE-BICK 1:3,9,12,21 43:1,4 43:7,10,15,20,23 57:22 71:3 78:15 78:17,20,22,25 79:4,9 88:7 101:23 102:7,12 102:18,24 103:2,7 103:11,14,17 111:8,13,17,19,24 112:1,5,8,10,14 112:16 138:24 139:5,10,13,16,21 139:24 140:4 149:9,12 158:20 159:2,5,8 167:5 167:12 169:23 170:3,8,12,21,25 171:6,10,21,23,25 172:4 191:17,24	<hr/> N <hr/>	night 10:21 14:25 15:7 20:15 24:21 27:21 53:19 54:8	note 9:22 16:24 18:3 61:21	O'Loughlin's 40:25 44:2 49:10
	name 1:17 16:17 23:23 25:16 31:4 41:4 112:21 158:8 185:9		noted 41:13	observation 5:14 55:7 56:23
	names 188:20 189:12		notes 3:17 6:13 67:4	observations 6:8 14:6 22:23
	narrow 85:10		noticed 60:10	observe 8:25 32:17 34:23 54:19 61:1 61:18 70:20 91:21
	naturally 8:15		notified 36:16	observed 42:9 47:10 59:8 61:3 65:20 70:17 130:17
	nature 30:5 33:5		nowadays 132:19	observes 14:21
			number 5:18 10:25 24:18 37:22,25 38:3 51:4 52:24	obtained 58:23 62:25 91:1 101:24 131:19

obtaining 117:20	17:3,10 22:5	190:6,14,15 191:6	opposite 150:16	101:25
obvious 67:17 87:3 168:9 184:15	23:24 24:7,14,15 24:16,19 25:1	omit 3:3	orange 104:15	overhearing 83:23
obviously 11:4 13:13 17:8 18:12 19:16,23,24 21:24 29:5,20 31:14 34:25 42:12 56:17 59:3 60:8,25 65:19 67:16 82:17 83:11 89:20 92:8 97:20 117:4 118:10 119:14 121:17 122:3 123:3,7 124:14 125:13,22 126:17 126:22,23 127:8 127:20 128:17 131:20 132:10 133:3 135:23 137:21 141:2,11 142:23 147:10 149:2 152:10 153:24 154:10 160:8,11,17 166:15 168:1 179:23 180:23 181:1,13,23 187:19 190:1 194:3	27:1 28:16 33:17 44:5 45:9 61:19 112:7 114:6,16 118:24 143:3,6,18 151:5,5,6 152:6 152:12 163:20 175:16 187:9 190:12 officer's 41:4 officers 5:12 8:21 10:4 15:12 17:12 23:15,16 24:3,8 24:22 25:13 26:8 26:13 29:25 30:2 30:20 31:3 59:25 62:15 72:10 91:13 91:22 92:9 109:16 142:11,22 151:8 153:19 160:15 173:3 176:20 188:21 189:11,18 official 20:24 108:16 officially 180:16,20 oh 17:15 111:4 139:15 168:24 174:16 183:2,22 okay 8:8 28:24 43:2 49:25 50:15 53:21 78:24 97:10 100:24 108:16 110:23 111:4 126:2 129:13 140:20 155:15 157:19 158:3,6,10 162:2 169:8,20,22 171:4 172:5 179:7 182:11 183:6,18 184:18,21 187:1 189:23 190:7 Oliff 153:17 154:15 179:23 189:18	on-arrival 90:22 on-the-run 17:11 once 7:15 10:1,2 37:15 54:17 56:23 82:8 118:16,17 123:7 136:14 146:2 165:2 oncoming 96:13 ones 97:9 ongoing 124:2 online 114:20 116:15 open 93:3 145:5,16 152:1,2,11,14 opened 145:8 opening 172:23 operating 65:25 operational 4:17,20 5:15 18:20 107:14 109:4 117:9,17,23 138:5 operations 6:5 49:3 134:25 187:24 operative 23:25 25:11,12 26:1 operatives 107:16 operator 123:19 124:6,8 137:2,4 138:25 143:1,22 144:18,24 145:4 145:10,15 146:25 148:10,16,17 149:8,10 150:12 151:16,22 152:8,9 152:21 156:15 167:14,18,21 169:8 172:19,20 174:25 175:11,12 176:2,7,15 operators 150:19 151:20 154:14 180:6,10 181:17 opposed 136:23	order 48:2,4 52:16 123:16 144:12 ordered 13:16 107:10 108:4 ordering 17:2 ordinarily 54:5 90:21 organisation 7:22 9:25 33:1 organisational 5:16 7:3 organised 102:19 original 19:20 159:2 originally 8:5 15:15 181:11 ORR 41:5 162:9,10 ORT 4:3,18,20 5:1 5:8,18,23,25 6:14 9:17,20,22,23 10:4,12,14,16,17 10:21 11:21 12:19 13:19 14:3,16,21 15:1,4,10,12 17:4 17:7,10,11 18:5 49:1,4,6,8 69:8 72:15,17 73:12 91:13 ORT's 8:24 ought 170:16 outcome 71:18,22 72:5 148:5 outcomes 97:22 outgoing 167:16 outside 5:9 11:4 13:20 14:18,21 19:10 20:1,11 33:7 54:22 60:18 73:23 85:18,19,21 106:2 120:19 126:21 127:21 129:9 overall 81:15 90:18	overlap 108:20 overlapped 191:12 overlapping 135:25 192:9,9 overnight 193:11 oversee 48:11 overseeing 92:23 overtook 115:2
				P
				pad 45:7 page 4:17,19 12:17 15:9 16:7 17:21 18:4,21 19:2 22:2 28:12 34:6 36:19 41:6,9 44:22 50:17 51:21 58:6 64:1 67:2 68:8 73:22 74:10 75:17 75:19 76:16,19 80:5 85:1 88:7,9 91:12 93:7 94:12 94:23 96:18 104:7 104:16 106:12 109:13 120:1 121:3 124:16,17 126:5,7 129:25 134:14 142:4,7 146:17 149:16 151:14 155:21,24 156:21 162:9,15 162:16 163:6,7,13 164:2 165:12,25 168:18 172:10 176:24 178:5 180:14 182:1,2 184:11 186:3,8 187:2 188:18,25 190:17 paged 15:15 30:24 189:23 190:1 paging 31:16 pair 143:15

<p>panel 20:9,10</p> <p>paper 113:11 153:20 154:22</p> <p>paragraph 2:22 4:16,19 12:16 15:9 16:8 22:3 24:12 25:6 39:11 41:23 45:21 55:1 58:9 65:9 68:8,10 68:14 69:2,7 70:10,14 71:4 80:8 85:4 88:5,9 94:23 109:14 120:2 121:3 124:17 129:25 130:2 131:16 136:5 137:7,8 138:11 145:24 146:16,19 151:15 172:10 187:3 188:19</p> <p>paragraphs 72:18 73:25</p> <p>parallel 143:15</p> <p>paraphrasing 97:23</p> <p>pardon 61:24 87:22</p> <p>parked 22:24 23:5 105:20</p> <p>part 4:17 5:9 11:21 14:20 20:8 34:6 73:13 82:10,13 83:1,2 90:18 102:17 106:5 116:11 117:18 119:13,14 123:9 140:13 163:19 172:18 194:4</p> <p>partial 12:13 40:23 56:9,11 57:16 60:18</p> <p>particular 20:19 23:6 56:4 68:1 69:24 72:6 113:5 178:23</p>	<p>particularly 8:16 140:18 141:11</p> <p>parties 36:22</p> <p>Partly 72:20</p> <p>parts 97:5</p> <p>pass 10:11 117:16 117:21 135:10 136:6 137:10,14 137:24 138:20 144:18 145:10,19 157:2 160:11 161:12 176:4 178:17,20,21 185:22</p> <p>passed 7:25 10:3 50:24 53:12 81:8 130:15 134:6 137:12 138:1,12 138:18 142:14 143:21 157:3 159:17 162:5 165:10 166:18,22 169:4 175:15 190:21</p> <p>passes 144:25</p> <p>passing 61:5,12 117:23 136:3 144:15 147:9,11 153:7 154:1,8,22 160:13 163:23 164:19,21 173:23 176:25 177:23 191:10</p> <p>patience 103:20</p> <p>pause 1:21,23 161:21 177:5 192:3</p> <p>pausing 85:17 120:11</p> <p>PD 156:10</p> <p>PDAs 24:7 36:15</p> <p>peer 20:21</p> <p>penetrate 75:24</p> <p>penetrated 56:16</p> <p>people 1:25 12:11</p>	<p>14:5 21:21 24:5 25:8 35:6 56:7 59:17 69:13,22 73:3 76:12 84:9 93:4 115:8 119:11 126:15,18 127:5,8 132:19 141:10 144:3,10 151:20 154:4,21 166:10 166:13 168:4 173:12 175:22 183:2,16,23 191:10</p> <p>perfectly 78:21 191:18</p> <p>performance 6:21 10:8</p> <p>performs 13:19</p> <p>period 10:3,6,7 105:3,6,8,15 154:13</p> <p>periphery 40:7</p> <p>permission 107:7</p> <p>perplexed 57:18</p> <p>person 83:25 118:11 122:6,7 123:5,6,8 124:6 128:20,21 144:3 147:3,11,13 156:10 159:22</p> <p>person's 145:8</p> <p>personally 47:8 90:17</p> <p>personnel 7:4 53:23 67:25 109:3</p> <p>persons 118:2,6 131:21</p> <p>perspective 180:2</p> <p>Pete 79:20 159:23</p> <p>Peter 151:8 156:13 187:20</p> <p>phone 41:12,13,16 52:23,23 53:14,15 97:2 129:19 141:21 144:6,8</p>	<p>154:8,16 163:23 168:23</p> <p>phones 190:22</p> <p>photograph 79:13 98:12 100:1,7,15 101:13</p> <p>photographic 98:1</p> <p>photographs 3:20 3:22 96:17,21,23 97:3,8,12,15,18 98:7 100:23</p> <p>phrase 127:7 157:12</p> <p>physically 31:1 61:21 67:20 150:11</p> <p>pick 90:5 98:6 166:12 173:3 174:18 175:8</p> <p>picked 14:9 34:7 57:6 65:20 159:16 172:16</p> <p>picking 28:14</p> <p>picture 19:3 79:11 98:23 99:13 100:9 100:10,12,12,18 100:19 101:2,10 102:1 157:14</p> <p>pictures 98:4</p> <p>piece 73:9</p> <p>pieces 131:17 153:20 154:22</p> <p>piecing 101:25</p> <p>place 8:14,17 12:10 39:19 48:2,12 64:5,16 65:12 67:6 70:25 83:20 88:21 91:22 92:1 92:6 126:11 127:5 133:16 136:7,8 138:19 158:2</p> <p>placed 71:14 83:8</p> <p>plan 9:16 14:11 39:13,16,25 40:10 40:18 45:23,24</p>	<p>46:1,3,4,8,10,14 59:15 67:6,14,16 68:1,24,25 69:12 69:20 81:5,6,7,15 82:6,11,14 83:1 86:1 90:19 91:2 93:3 95:7,9,18</p> <p>planing 55:16</p> <p>planning 89:21</p> <p>plans 90:9,12,25 91:5</p> <p>play 172:18</p> <p>playground 55:13</p> <p>please 1:16 2:12 43:11,16 44:21 50:16 51:15,21 68:8 79:5,11 89:2 96:16 98:9,19 99:3,22 100:22 102:25 103:3 111:20 112:7,13 112:22 130:1 139:9,19,25 161:12 164:1 171:2,6,19 193:10</p> <p>pleased 111:5</p> <p>pm 79:8 102:20 103:3,4,6 111:20 111:22 112:1,2,4 139:13,16,25 140:1,3 170:10 171:1,6,7,9 172:1 194:16</p> <p>point 21:15 29:1,5 30:9,11,18 31:15 33:15 35:1 36:8 38:15 49:4,6,8,18 55:17 56:6,6,11 56:12,23,25 57:3 57:4,10,20 59:3,6 60:10,16 62:17,23 63:12,18,19 65:24 70:4,18 73:5 74:14 75:10,21 76:13 77:22,25</p>
---	--	---	---	---

78:13 83:10,14 85:8,18 87:14,20 90:1 94:4 95:22 96:4 120:12,15 127:14 142:21 148:24 153:24 154:21 159:5,21 170:5 175:7 180:8 190:1,18 193:6 194:13 pointed 23:2 pointing 101:9 108:17 points 6:16,22 police 35:9 37:19 48:7 64:10 166:5 166:6,8 168:14 188:11,14 policies 6:5 116:17 140:17 142:5 145:21 policy 4:21 5:1,5,13 6:3 8:25 9:1,17,20 10:23,23,24 40:20 47:11 68:21,23 69:2,23 70:10,14 71:4,12 72:1,16 72:19 73:7,13 84:15,16 115:24 116:1,4,7,8,10 126:6,8,11,17 127:7 128:10 129:23 130:2 131:7 136:5 138:11 140:14,16 142:4 145:21 146:17 pool 106:20 poor 81:17 92:3 93:12 poorly 67:13 populated 59:10 port 13:24 22:6 posed 21:8 position 4:3 12:19	150:10 positions 8:22 150:18 positive 106:14 possibility 40:22 59:18 107:5 108:22 possible 52:18 72:9 77:11 80:15 97:22 103:10 134:1 154:18 177:15 192:15 possibly 14:6 30:3 94:19 123:2 185:19 192:9 post 4:8 post-incident 6:13 20:25 97:19 posts 9:25 potentially 9:10 35:7 109:2 PPV 106:17,19 107:7,13,15 108:1 108:6,20,22,24,25 109:4,8,9 practical 187:23 practice 4:21 16:12 35:19 84:15 132:22 140:23 141:5,22 160:24 161:1 PRC 7:16 pre-planning 93:18 predominantly 63:6 66:21 67:17 prefer 170:5 191:24 premises 121:21 prepared 193:19 presence 5:14 present 24:3 38:1 66:14 78:13 142:18 188:21 presentation 115:10	pressing 14:14 pressure 104:10,11 106:14 presumably 168:7 pretty 36:20 60:24 98:2 previous 29:19 46:13 98:23 100:10 101:2 previously 10:8 prior 29:20 priorities 95:14,19 95:21,25 prioritisation 80:8 82:13,15 83:17,18 83:19 84:5,17 prioritise 51:3 84:2 priority 122:6 123:2,5,7 149:3 152:6 160:6 175:6 177:8,12,14 185:20 privy 28:9 proactively 8:18 probably 5:3,4 11:1 13:2 19:21 20:8 24:4 26:9 29:7 42:10 44:9 53:7,16 57:6 66:13 67:13 72:21 72:25 77:5,14 78:14 80:16 84:8 92:3 93:12 98:16 98:20 102:13 105:24 106:22 108:18 109:20 116:11 121:10 129:12 130:14 137:21 140:24 142:1 144:5 154:12,25 166:5 179:24 181:23 183:19 problem 16:21 19:16 43:14 78:24	102:23 problems 155:4,6 procedure 4:21 5:5 5:13 9:18,21 145:1 187:8,10,13 187:17 proceed 190:2 proceeded 17:3 process 5:10 6:17 7:16 9:15 18:7 54:19 65:1 72:13 73:1 118:10,23 119:2 172:12 processed 172:15 product 41:7 programmed 12:9 progress 39:22 71:6 85:9 168:22 169:2 178:23 179:2,11 180:3 progressing 132:10 projection 89:18,21 89:24 promised 129:4 promotions 11:3 prompted 91:5 97:12 prompts 192:21 property 119:24 120:8,15,16,17,19 121:2 122:2,4 125:14 126:13,16 Protective 83:12 protocols 37:18 provided 11:11 89:12 provider 11:12,14 proximity 131:22 pull 80:14 pump 16:3 136:8 136:10,10,18,24 138:6 152:16 158:23 159:25 161:4 176:20 185:24 188:22	pumps 5:18,22,23 5:24 6:20 15:12 15:15 24:18 36:9 59:25 96:12,13 172:22,24 173:2 177:10 178:3 180:19 183:19 184:10,12,18,20 186:4,10,11,17,20 186:24 188:25 189:3,9,21,21 190:5,19 purely 182:17 purport 2:24 purpose 125:6,9 purposes 143:11 put 6:18 7:23 20:10 21:3 30:23 36:6 39:25 41:14 48:2 73:11 74:20 75:8 77:19 80:3 82:6 92:1,5,9,11 96:9 107:12 110:9 113:6 126:11,15 127:6,12 140:15 141:22 152:3 153:6 159:2 161:2 162:10 183:3,23 186:18 188:9 put' 126:8 putting 8:22 39:19 67:24 73:12 81:5 97:23 168:9
Q				
qualified 10:14 quantify 60:5 quarter 44:23 76:18 question 2:9 12:2 18:23 29:15 33:25 35:12 45:3 59:20 59:21 71:2 73:11 75:4 80:20 82:3 82:23 84:6 91:4				

98:20 102:4	R	rang 17:21	receipt 163:15	113:18 123:13
109:11 113:5,7	radio 15:16,18,21	ranking 28:16	receive 36:1 110:9	184:12
125:20 130:11	15:22 16:14,16,20	33:16	117:8 147:1 148:5	references 3:20
133:8,9,20 134:24	30:4 34:21 38:7	rare 184:15	172:12 177:2,6	referencing 96:10
135:12 136:1,3	39:5 41:11 42:19	rate 89:16,17	received 15:19 17:2	referred 68:24 92:6
141:14 146:11	44:4 45:10 52:1	reached 77:13	45:13 162:20	referring 7:13 63:3
155:1,3 157:22	53:2,2,8 54:5,14	147:3	168:13	67:15 76:24,25
160:3 163:15	55:19,21 56:1,2,3	reaches 147:8	receiving 80:23	96:7
167:5 169:11	56:8 57:4 66:20	read 2:18,25 3:2,6	173:24	refers 48:8
175:13,24 181:22	66:24 74:6 81:1	3:20 51:4 62:24	recess 101:9,10,12	reflection 89:14
184:3 186:13	94:10 109:15	113:18,21 143:13	recognised 37:17	108:5
187:13 190:3	123:19 124:6,8,11	reading 168:22	recollect 44:8	reflects 3:10 67:4
192:9,20	134:8,9,11,18,21	169:16	100:11	refresher 116:18
questions 1:13 2:7	135:8 136:2,15,17	ready 43:20 69:13	recollection 3:11	regarding 115:16
4:2 51:5 71:20	136:22 137:1,4,23	Real 151:9	18:10,11,14 23:12	142:14 172:13
96:20,22 101:19	138:9,24 139:3	realise 183:20	23:13 26:14 27:3	regards 147:6
102:20 103:7,15	142:15,18 143:1	realised 19:25	41:18 44:7 48:14	relate 13:18 173:6
106:11 111:6	143:16,18,22,23	realises 82:20	48:16 49:14 50:4	relating 71:6 146:3
112:17,18 113:3	143:25 144:1,6,8	really 8:7,9 13:23	52:4 58:16 60:11	146:8 182:5
114:3 119:13,15	144:12,18,24	26:5 56:22 101:22	63:19 74:21 77:10	relation 12:19
119:16,18,19	145:10 146:3	101:25 105:21	77:23 78:1 79:22	92:13 110:7 117:9
129:4 140:8,9,13	148:10,16,17	110:22 120:2	80:17,21 81:19	117:15 162:21
140:21 142:8	149:6,8,9 150:2	123:22 128:19	105:16 108:2	164:20 166:3
169:25 170:17,21	150:12,19 151:16	133:9,25 141:25	183:6 184:7 186:1	169:15 174:22
191:23 195:5,9	151:21 152:8,9,20	146:12 147:8	record 6:8 31:24	relay 109:24 130:6
queue 87:8 149:1	153:1,22,25 154:2	150:24 164:25	44:2 45:13,15,17	134:3 145:16
quick 22:22 40:3	154:10,20 157:4,5	177:12 180:1	51:25 53:23 76:15	152:11,14
177:15	157:6,11,11,15,16	181:13,13 184:15	159:18 185:24	relayed 16:9 66:14
quicker 154:9	157:17 158:18	188:20 189:15,16	recorded 45:6,11	80:11
quickly 7:9 18:16	159:11,17 160:9	190:3	53:4,7,9,13 70:21	relaying 123:4
19:15 20:2 24:7	164:19 165:4	reason 106:18	70:23 76:2 91:8	178:8,11
29:23 32:7 40:8	166:24 167:3,13	125:12	130:12,14 146:4	released 111:18
52:18 67:1 76:23	168:19 169:1,15	reasons 67:17	recording 61:20,22	relevant 7:25
82:9 173:13 178:1	172:19,20 174:6	120:9	159:18 189:5	117:16,23 142:13
178:17,21 181:9	176:10,22 177:12	reassessing 123:11	records 146:1	reliant 182:17
184:19	177:22 178:2	reassure 123:10,13	red 175:20	relief 93:3 95:20
quieter 182:6	179:4 185:19	reassuring 125:25	refer 4:25 7:7	96:6,8,10,12
quite 10:5 12:17	189:6	REC 165:17	21:13,18 22:11	150:19
18:16 53:14 56:19	radioed 158:23	recall 20:7 25:16	24:12,15 27:5	reliefs 93:17,18
72:23 77:6 85:10	184:22	44:12 49:16 61:11	47:15,16 52:9	relieved 33:3,14,19
88:8 95:5,6 98:6	radioing 154:14	61:22 62:6,20	85:2 93:7 95:14	94:13
102:13 106:21	radios 34:2 58:24	83:23 86:16 90:1	96:12 106:12	remain 124:23
114:23 117:5,6	63:1,17,18,24	90:15 147:23	reference 15:4	125:7,14,19,20,23
118:10 122:10	109:17	148:2 163:25	21:19 36:24 41:5	126:1
147:20 174:10	raise 137:18 169:3	187:5 188:9,13	44:20 74:10	remains 159:5

<p>remember 11:7,12 23:15,22,23 25:7 26:5 28:4,6 31:3 47:24 48:17,18 59:1 61:7,9,10,21 62:11 74:18,23 76:9,10,13 77:1 77:17,19 78:9 79:25 80:11 83:24 86:16 88:19 89:1 90:11 91:16 92:6 94:1,3,3,19 95:24 98:12 101:8 108:6 118:19,20 123:9 130:22 131:14 132:6 153:8 154:19 160:3 161:24 176:25 183:1,11,15 184:6 184:9,22 185:2,8 185:12,15,18 186:11 187:18 188:14,20 190:12</p> <p>remembered 186:25</p> <p>reminded 169:19</p> <p>remote 92:21 146:7</p> <p>repeat 2:9 3:5 9:19 22:10 38:19 41:4 46:6 68:4 75:3 111:9,14 113:6 129:3 133:8 164:16</p> <p>repeated 39:6 163:13</p> <p>repeater 110:9</p> <p>repetitive 72:20</p> <p>rephrase 59:20</p> <p>replaced 33:20 96:13</p> <p>reply 185:13</p> <p>report 7:5,11,14 18:20 20:24 41:7 66:7,9,18,19 87:6 90:9 106:23</p>	<p>162:10</p> <p>reported 107:9</p> <p>reporting 7:22</p> <p>request 97:18 107:8 145:2,5 151:23 152:4 156:1,5,11,16,22 156:24 158:13,16 158:21,25 159:3 159:23 160:22 161:1 164:3,15 165:8,11,16,24 166:3,9,25 167:6 167:9 168:19,22 172:13,14,23,24 173:2,9</p> <p>requested 9:7 85:14</p> <p>requesting 85:3</p> <p>requests 145:14 153:11 162:4</p> <p>required 5:18 38:1 49:8 71:11 123:10 137:14 172:17 173:4 191:1</p> <p>requirement 11:9 68:21 88:13</p> <p>requires 71:4 134:3 142:17</p> <p>rescue 67:25 70:1 75:23 191:3</p> <p>rescued 122:6 147:13</p> <p>rescues 70:19 82:13 174:5 179:12 180:4</p> <p>resend 176:8</p> <p>resident 70:21</p> <p>residential 12:13</p> <p>residents 35:7 67:20 70:19 72:14 75:15 184:17</p> <p>resolve 68:16 69:1 146:21</p> <p>resource 67:8</p>	<p>88:13 93:6 94:24</p> <p>resourced 69:11</p> <p>resources 13:13 48:22 59:14,15 69:12 89:4,22 93:2,14 134:16 172:15,17 173:6 177:15 191:1</p> <p>resourcing 86:1 95:19 177:17</p> <p>respect 90:23</p> <p>respond 38:16,17 38:21,23,24 137:21</p> <p>responders 37:17 38:13</p> <p>responding 169:12 178:7,14,19,19</p> <p>response 18:20 137:9 160:8</p> <p>responsibility 32:25 84:4 92:3 138:23</p> <p>responsible 13:10 52:14 84:16 124:11</p> <p>rest 50:9 94:8 169:24</p> <p>result 60:18 107:20 143:14</p> <p>resulting 187:10</p> <p>results 69:24</p> <p>resume 79:1 139:24 171:6 194:14</p> <p>retained 137:12</p> <p>returned 64:2,3,6 103:13 171:20</p> <p>review 4:17 6:21,21 6:22 10:8</p> <p>revisit 66:6,17</p> <p>revisitation 88:20</p> <p>revisited 88:10</p> <p>revisiting 65:23</p> <p>Richard 28:2,15,19 29:8 30:11 31:25</p>	<p>32:18,24 33:7,20 34:18,23 35:1,1 35:15,17,23,25 36:4,8 37:7 41:25 42:3,4,13 44:19 44:24 45:25 46:9 46:17 48:4,21 49:13 55:2 58:7 58:21,23 59:1,18 59:22 60:13,17 62:1,21 63:13 85:3,7,11 106:13 106:24</p> <p>Richard's 59:6</p> <p>ride 27:10</p> <p>rides 25:13</p> <p>right 1:22 2:16 17:1 18:23,24 19:1 21:10 32:3 33:11 38:15 41:2 42:25 43:4,7,20 44:11 46:5,11 67:10 74:8 77:3 78:5 79:9 83:3 84:20 88:8 93:22 94:14,18 97:16 100:19 103:17 104:4 105:2 108:13 111:4,8 113:13 114:25 115:7 120:24 121:16 127:4 133:2,19 138:17 139:9,11,16,24 140:4 144:24 148:11 153:23 155:11 156:10 160:19 161:16 163:10 164:7 166:7,19 171:21 172:2 173:21 179:3 186:6 190:8 192:24 193:12 194:11</p> <p>right-hand 100:15</p>	<p>101:2</p> <p>rim 99:17</p> <p>ring 107:8 133:12 141:20,22 142:19</p> <p>ringing 133:12 141:14 166:10,13</p> <p>rings 93:23 128:2</p> <p>rise 126:11</p> <p>rising 19:5</p> <p>risk 35:25 72:20</p> <p>risks 21:7</p> <p>river 134:13 149:10 149:13</p> <p>Road 22:24 23:5 74:16 93:22</p> <p>Roe 34:14 36:9,11 36:12 74:1,6 87:25 89:12 92:11 92:11 94:4,8 95:3 107:7,9</p> <p>Roe's 76:15 89:2</p> <p>role 7:21 8:11,24 9:17,20 10:5 12:10,25 13:12,18 17:7,12 27:9,12 29:1 30:8 36:2 52:13 66:6,17 69:7 71:1 72:16 72:17 92:20,21,22 114:4,19 143:19 148:10,13 163:19 181:23 190:10,25</p> <p>roles 73:17 91:22</p> <p>room 2:1 38:16,21 39:7 43:13 52:1 52:21 53:11,19 68:3 72:7 112:7 114:6,13,16 117:8 118:22 124:3,7 130:13,17 135:14 135:21 136:6 138:25 139:19 140:17,25 142:11 142:21 143:4,16 144:11 145:14</p>
---	---	---	---	---

146:25 150:4,7,8 150:12,15,16,20 151:17,20 152:19 153:18,19 154:14 156:15 160:15 162:18,21 165:21 166:11 168:15 172:25 173:12,16 174:7,24,25 175:11,12 176:1,7 176:15 178:2 179:9 180:10 181:17 182:6 183:15 184:17 187:10,14,25 188:15 190:2,13 rooms 37:20 rota 15:4,7 17:13 roughly 25:8 42:13 42:15 44:6 74:4 97:25 round 55:8,9 95:1,4 109:24 route 17:22,25 18:6 23:7 29:25 30:25 31:17 34:13 36:10 36:13,14,17,17 80:11,24 81:2,18 81:25 82:17 122:9 122:13,17 127:15 128:14,24 129:11 129:18 137:15,23 137:25 147:17 routinely 130:12 row 150:18 RT 157:10,10 RT4 42:19 135:5 145:15,15 152:5 152:11 156:1,5,6 156:24 157:6,11 157:12 158:22 164:4,15 165:17 174:18 run 36:6 42:1 46:18 50:19 51:24 64:4	65:10 66:2,25 75:17 109:2 rung 164:11 165:9 166:4,5 runner 66:3 runners 54:14 running 63:8,11 64:7,23 83:15 87:12 93:9 104:6 runs 104:3 Russell 148:22 <hr/> S <hr/> SAD 51:23 158:13 164:13 165:25 safe 5:6 8:15 48:10 120:21 124:19 125:13,14 127:15 128:13,23 safely 120:24 126:12,16 129:13 safer 126:24 127:12 128:11 safety 5:7 67:24 129:17 sake 191:22 Sarah 148:22 satisfied 3:3,10 save 145:12 152:8 172:24 saw 3:23 27:1 47:9 62:7,16 75:10 85:16 105:7 106:2 saying 16:17 28:10 44:18 48:1 57:9 61:12,13 74:6 77:17,18 110:17 112:24 126:20 127:18 128:15 133:5 147:18 152:19 162:22 168:10 172:21 176:3 185:20 says 2:23 18:22 44:5 48:9,13	68:13,14 71:17 79:16 89:25 90:6 122:11 124:22 125:17 127:21 128:2 129:7 130:3 131:24 134:15 142:9 145:24 159:13,14 163:9 169:3 scared 126:20 scene 106:15 172:13 184:14 187:10 scheme 16:14,20,21 34:21 38:7,8 39:5 42:19 45:10 53:2 53:8,13 81:1 134:18 135:7 138:9 screen 2:16 4:24 26:6 94:23 96:18 113:12 146:1 151:24 152:23,25 scroll 37:23 174:11 174:12 175:1,8 scrolling 175:13 SDBA 60:14 75:21 76:21 79:18,23 83:16 88:14,16,17 89:7,8,15 90:2 seamlessly 35:18 search 75:23 searching 96:5 seat 150:2,3 second 1:21 4:16 5:23 12:20 19:2 22:3 96:15 109:13 142:7 151:15 156:22 162:17 165:11 172:10 188:19 second-last 95:15 seconds 26:9 88:1 section 20:6 sections 20:4	sector 19:5,6 21:13 21:14,18,18,23,23 21:25 22:1 36:7 42:2 46:19 47:15 47:16,17 48:5 51:1 57:12 85:15 87:13 105:22 109:24 sectorisation 21:15 47:21,24 sectors 21:13 67:6 106:1 securing 73:13 see 4:23 7:10 17:15 17:20 18:17 23:16 26:7,13 27:5 31:5 32:2,17 37:23 44:17 48:21 51:22 53:18 56:15 58:7 62:3 64:7 68:5 74:2 75:19 78:4 79:16 85:3,6,15 87:16 88:24 89:4 90:19,19 92:14 93:7 95:13 99:10 99:14,15 104:4,14 104:15 105:13 111:24,25 123:21 126:3 127:24 128:4 129:8 130:5 130:8 131:16 133:5 134:5 145:14 152:10,23 152:25 155:17,24 156:3,8,20,21 157:24 158:11,12 159:12 162:16,20 162:23 163:4,7,23 164:13 168:3,24 169:6,23 174:8,14 175:8,21 176:22 179:17 182:4 183:8 186:13 187:1 189:1,5 seeing 30:20 61:10	65:17 79:25 90:15 127:24 131:14 175:14 183:10 193:15 seek 57:2 seeking 82:1 seen 19:10,15 20:24 21:24 30:19 40:6 48:7 57:25 58:4 60:17 81:24 98:22 102:3 131:4 161:14 169:2 174:7 184:1 self-contained 192:5 send 16:14 37:15 44:19 45:9 84:3 136:16,22 137:5 174:19 177:20 sending 37:12 54:23 124:11 127:1 154:16 156:16 159:19 166:25 167:1,2 168:1 senior 11:6 24:8,22 27:7 28:16 29:3 29:25 30:2 33:16 91:13 188:20 189:11,17 190:12 seniority 10:13 sense 14:15 52:16 sensible 191:18 193:2 sensitive 146:8 sent 32:14 34:20 39:6 42:19 45:1,4 45:6,15,20 51:17 54:13 70:23 72:6 74:5 83:10 142:18 144:8 146:1,3 157:24 158:18 159:24 160:23 163:1 165:5 166:8 166:24 167:2,4
--	---	---	---	---

168:21 174:14,20 176:13,22 177:9 sentence 21:13 41:23 66:5 67:2 121:4 182:16,25 187:4 separate 108:15 sequence 99:14 serious 47:1 181:11 server 155:8,9,9,12 155:12,13 serves 82:19 service 7:4 11:1 121:5 145:2,5,14 151:23 152:4 153:6,11 156:1,5 156:11,16,22,24 158:13,21,25 159:22 160:22 161:1 162:4 164:3 164:15 165:11,16 165:24 166:2,9,25 167:6,9 168:19,22 172:23,24 173:2 services 37:19 38:1 118:15 session 115:12 set 9:17,20 54:18 57:12 70:9 71:20 85:15,19 91:14 107:18 143:15 sets 104:2 setting 160:10 161:19 seven 75:19 81:19 84:23 severity 20:5 97:20 shaded 101:13 shadow 17:4,6,7 18:5 shadowing 10:4,6,7 17:11,15 shared 162:12 Sharon 112:7,9,23 195:7	she'd 181:24 sheer 72:24 Shepherd's 20:17 Shepherds 20:16 20:20,22 21:5,6 21:11 shift 135:14,21 shift-change 93:15 shifts 27:12 shock 183:7,10 shopping 131:15 138:16 short 2:7 31:24 43:18 45:18 51:21 51:25 74:10 79:7 102:5,6 103:5 107:25 112:3 113:3 140:2 155:18,20 158:12 158:17 164:1 165:12 168:17 170:13 171:3,8 186:8,14 188:23 shortly 49:15 136:2 shoulder 59:8 shout 172:25 173:1 173:5,8,9,10 174:18 shouted 173:18 shouting 173:14 187:18 show 19:1 32:1 41:5 52:2 73:23 99:13 101:7 129:24 137:7 145:21 160:22 162:25 167:13 187:4 188:24 showed 100:10 174:21 shown 7:8 18:8 41:6 51:20 76:16 77:18 79:11 98:19 98:23 101:2 129:23 130:25	155:20 161:20 163:3,15 165:5 168:18,25 169:14 shows 175:18 side 21:25 22:1,22 55:12,14,15,17,18 61:4 75:10 101:3 104:4 sight 40:7 144:24 150:23,25 sign 31:4 152:5 158:9 185:10 signal 2:10 102:3 110:9,10,10 significant 18:7 19:16 35:4 42:7 57:17 82:20 significantly 73:8 84:25 signs 31:2,3 similar 7:16,18 101:15 171:17 191:15 simple 2:7 5:17 8:24 37:11 110:8 113:3 simplifying 8:6 Simpson 94:13 95:4 simulated 11:13 simultaneous 144:7 simultaneously 91:23 single 61:15 71:1 72:3 109:1 SIR 1:3,9,12,21 43:1,4,7,10,15,20 43:23 57:22 71:3 78:15,17,20,22,25 79:4,9 88:7 101:23 102:7,12 102:18,24 103:2,7 103:11,14,17 111:8,13,17,19,24 112:1,5,8,10,14	112:16 138:24 139:5,10,13,16,21 139:24 140:4 149:9,12 158:20 159:2,5,8 167:5 167:12 169:23 170:3,8,12,21,25 171:6,10,21,23,25 172:4 191:17,24 192:4,10,20,24 193:1,5,14,18 194:3,7,9,14 sit 5:8 10:2,7 13:20 14:17 71:1 84:8 84:18 150:11 167:10 192:1 site 122:20 sits 6:23 37:17 sitting 73:19 112:11 situation 66:22 67:21 123:11 129:1 142:14 177:3 situational 9:14 39:3 55:7 95:1 six 5:22,24 6:20 15:11,14,15 42:16 114:18 172:22,24 173:2 177:10 184:10 186:11,25 size 31:14 36:18 skin 11:25 slight 116:17 slightly 5:3 18:2 59:13 73:12 79:1 98:18 117:3 125:1 132:5 133:4,6 191:15 192:7 slip 54:4 slow 33:23 slowing 155:15 SM 29:11 Small 38:15 smash 107:22	Smith 151:10 163:8 183:15 smoke 56:25 106:19,24 107:4 107:23 108:25 120:10,14,19 121:22 127:11,19 127:21,25 128:4 129:9 141:1 162:22 164:5 165:21 166:16 168:15 smoke-filled 122:17 snap 98:3,3,3,4,4,4 snapshot 39:4 81:18 so-called 171:12 soft 41:1 solid 20:10 143:10 solutions 117:13 somebody 108:19 122:11 someone's 97:23 somewhat 8:7 50:7 108:20 soon 80:15 106:25 191:6 sorry 3:5 5:21 9:19 12:1,17 17:8 21:20 22:10,10 25:2,14,16,22 26:24 31:12 33:21 36:12 38:19 39:9 41:4 46:6 49:25 50:1 51:15 59:20 61:8,24 63:9,23 64:8,21 68:4 69:17 70:17 75:3 75:11 80:3 81:6 83:25 86:17 87:22 88:8 92:3 101:9 103:14 105:11,21 110:5 113:20 122:10,22 125:8
--	---	---	--	--

129:2,2 133:8 135:23 136:19 145:20 148:4 157:9,11 170:19 170:24 172:6 178:16,25 182:10 186:10 192:14,19 193:7 sort 7:13 88:20 101:12 105:14,14 110:20 115:1 123:24,25 153:8 167:8 177:21 183:9 sorting 93:14 sound 18:23 32:3 41:2 94:18 108:13 sounding 72:20 sounds 18:24 32:4 source 41:8,16 south 55:12,17 85:19 116:22 134:11 149:6,10 south-west 75:10 space 127:1 spare 134:22,23 135:2 speak 14:3 30:10 77:15 83:21 86:21 87:10 118:11 124:4 144:2 169:15 188:17 SPEAKER 157:20 speaking 5:25 10:15 124:13,18 158:7 166:10 168:7 174:13 185:2 191:7 speaks 124:6,8 special 143:11 specific 11:18 33:25 71:7 96:21 118:12 146:8 150:3 191:1 specifically 13:6	116:24 141:11 speed 181:6 spitting 19:13 spoke 10:8 86:2 87:9 95:9,11 107:7 160:10 165:7 185:8 spoken 164:11 166:4,14,21 193:23 spread 20:23 21:7 181:7 spreading 11:23 181:21 spreadsheet 103:25 staff 14:1,1 90:9 109:5 111:1 117:8 118:22 135:9,11 135:12,20 136:1 140:17 142:11,22 stage 28:15 30:13 47:21 58:23 59:23 60:3 63:8 64:6 65:1 69:9 94:19 95:8,23 113:8 128:19 158:1,5 164:19 174:3 178:22 179:1 stages 48:21 86:4 191:14 staircase 85:10 106:20,24 stairs 59:5 99:6 128:16 129:22 stairwell 109:1 stairwells 97:17 110:2,13 stand 134:25 157:8 157:10 standard 60:15 160:24,25 standby 149:18 standbys 150:4 standing 32:15 54:22 72:4 85:16	85:18,21 87:14 stands 37:24 start 4:2 8:22 17:1 26:8 30:20 32:23 36:2 39:19 43:11 43:16 57:12 89:21 112:21,24 113:10 114:3,17 120:4,20 129:25 149:2 152:17 154:8,21 186:6 191:10 192:11 193:19 started 22:23 39:17 148:25 149:1 154:23 160:13 182:6 183:7,9 184:7 188:21 190:4 starting 35:6 39:13 40:4 45:23 46:4 65:2 75:24 106:19 161:17 starts 45:21 85:4 94:24 167:17 186:9,9 191:7 stated 126:10 statement 2:13,18 2:23,24 3:2,3,6,7 3:13 4:7,16 8:1 12:16 15:3 16:7 18:25 22:2 24:13 27:25 28:11 31:12 33:22 34:4,6 36:19 37:10 39:11 41:15,17,22,23 44:21 47:16 48:6 48:7,13 50:17 58:5 59:13 62:24 64:1,8,21 65:7,16 66:12 73:22,24 75:17 76:25 80:5 85:1 88:6 93:8 94:22 106:12 108:7 109:13 113:10,12,14,25	114:8,23 120:1 124:16 125:15 126:5 135:13 149:15 151:14 172:10 176:24 178:6 180:14 182:1 184:11 186:3,11 188:18 station 4:4,6,11,14 10:15 11:5,6 13:8 15:16 26:10,22,23 28:2,25 29:9,12 29:17 30:12 32:6 39:18 40:3 50:2 51:11 64:16 65:13 78:9 104:6 108:8 108:9,10,12,18 stations 12:7 104:18 status 18:18 24:5 25:17 30:15 31:1 31:9 95:20 147:11 147:17 stay 70:25 74:20 75:8 98:2 124:16 125:9 126:8,11,15 126:24 127:6,9,12 127:13 128:3,11 129:19,21 138:5 141:16 183:2,23 stay-put 40:20 47:11 74:19 75:5 75:12 126:6,17 127:4,7 183:12,20 stayed 20:12 staying 129:10 step 127:14 steps 24:9 33:18 69:6 71:9,21 Steve 17:3,20,21 31:19 37:7,8 44:24 45:1 Stewart 86:12 stick 149:14 sticks 56:4	stop 5:19 43:10 161:25 192:6 stopped 96:4 straight 22:18,20 122:5 125:3 165:10 184:13 185:22 191:9 strategically 83:8 strategy 81:15 Stratford 130:23 131:13 150:13,14 155:7,10 182:4,8 182:9 strengthen 8:22 strengthened 92:11 stress 155:23 162:18 structure 8:23 14:17,21 39:19 40:4 64:5,15,22 65:12 73:21 91:14 91:14,17,19 92:1 92:5 structures 8:14 stuck 125:21 127:6 129:8 stuff 9:4 subject 8:14 20:15 75:5 107:16 109:6 170:9 172:7 submitted 3:23 subsequent 179:20 subsequently 27:20 27:22 50:3 success 185:2 successful 179:22 Suddenly 184:16 sufficient 134:16 suggest 77:14,21 90:3 98:16 102:9 108:5 summarise 31:20 160:14 supervisor 142:19 142:20 143:20,22
---	--	---	---	--

144:2 145:17,19 146:10 150:23,25 151:3 187:15 supervisor's 143:19 supervisors 150:16 150:17,21 187:11 187:14 188:17 supervisory 142:11 142:22 190:10 supplies 40:5 119:6 supply 83:13 support 5:7 8:6 13:11,23 26:7 27:18 36:22 48:21 91:20 92:15 93:9 145:25 supporting 67:6 92:24 suppose 19:12 175:4 193:1 supposed 113:3 sure 6:5 23:1,4 40:4 40:7 48:10,11,23 53:14 56:19 65:1 69:6 70:7 74:5 78:6 82:16,18,23 91:1 92:17,18 93:4 94:10 96:7 117:6 119:21 135:22 143:9,12 147:20 176:5 191:12,24 surprise 45:18,19 164:24 surprised 29:21 Surrey 165:18 166:5,6 168:14 survival 10:23 23:11 61:1 62:3 66:2,11,15 79:15 80:7 115:25 116:2 117:1,18,20 120:6 120:20,24 121:1 121:25 124:2	128:18,20 129:24 130:20 132:23 133:14,24 135:10 142:12,23 144:16 153:25 154:1,5,11 164:20 175:24 177:8,13,23 178:23 179:2 180:4,5 suspect 67:9 103:7 170:1 switch 57:8 switch-on 104:8 switched 104:25 182:10,11,12 sworn 1:8 195:3 system 7:17,23 15:4 26:7 53:6 54:19 64:23 65:1 66:1 66:11 70:13 72:7 84:12 91:20 115:1 123:20 143:8 145:25 146:13 151:24 155:2,3,5 155:6 158:17 159:16,18 160:21 167:6,7 192:8 systems 5:6 8:15	95:7,9,18 tactics 90:22 take 2:10,12 8:19 10:6 13:15 16:13 18:21 22:2 23:8 24:9 29:11 33:1 33:18 34:22 35:17 36:2 40:16 42:2 44:18 46:19 48:5 55:6 65:15 69:6 71:1 80:2 82:10 86:4,23,25 87:2 88:1 95:5 97:1,12 97:14,18,25 102:10,14,18 113:9 127:14 136:15 138:22 139:7 150:20 158:8 159:12,21 160:12 170:6,7 171:16 172:20 174:21 180:13 191:14 taken 4:8 6:25 12:9 30:3 44:14 68:16 69:1 76:6 137:2 138:13 139:1,4 146:21 154:7 183:5 191:11 taker 144:21,22 takes 8:16 136:25 talk 7:14 13:5 43:12 79:2 92:12 93:4 126:5 139:18 151:3 171:1 192:8 193:11 talked 18:14 talking 7:10 14:5 22:8,12 28:6,13 39:18 53:10 59:9 101:14 127:16 151:4,5 177:16 tallies 59:10 104:25 tally 104:8 tally-in 104:11	tallying-out 105:5 taped 159:20 160:25 161:17 task 67:7 70:7,9 72:15 74:15 84:23 84:24 tasked 37:7 44:24 64:3,13,15 65:10 tasks 6:14 team 4:18 7:3,24 20:25 26:1,2 27:5 27:6,7,13,14,19 114:21 team's 72:17 teething 155:6 telemetry 103:21 110:7,11,14,17,19 110:21 telephone 118:11 118:25 142:15,18 143:2,4,10,17,19 143:22 144:2,12 145:18 176:12 tell 3:4,8 33:8 34:9 44:1 50:8 51:2 55:5 59:10 60:21 64:22 74:20 78:3 97:4 103:24 122:12,16 124:23 125:18,20 127:5 130:2 132:12,15 134:9 139:3 141:2 162:10 163:21,22 176:13 188:15 telling 109:16 122:3 125:6,9 126:15 155:18 183:2,16,23 tells 120:7 Ten 43:4 tend 2:15 term 55:9 88:16 terms 5:17 6:1 8:24 29:9 37:11 48:22 52:19 67:24 73:18	77:8 84:9,12 88:15 89:22 92:24 106:8 108:20 110:8 189:11 test 10:2,3 88:25 171:14 text 143:13 thank 1:9,19 2:3 43:24 71:3 79:10 101:20,22 102:1 103:19 111:16,19 112:1,8,10,15,24 139:5,9,12,23 140:7 159:8 167:12 171:18 193:4,14 194:12 194:15 thanks 101:23 that' 183:3 That'd 43:6 theme 178:5 theory 170:24 they'd 73:14 78:14 154:6 thing 36:23 70:24 72:23 132:23 147:12 157:12 160:19 165:3 182:7 192:3 193:2 things 8:17 13:3 14:14 48:10,12 88:11 119:22 130:8 140:12 145:22 154:8 178:21 179:19 187:8 think 4:11 7:7,20 15:3,6 19:20 21:9 24:12 25:5,18,19 32:5,23 33:5,8 34:25 35:5,13 36:4 37:8 45:1 46:13,25 49:4,5,7 49:15 51:17 53:7 57:19 58:1,3
--	---	--	---	---

T

T 157:8
tab 7:9 51:20
103:23 142:5
155:21
table 143:10 162:15
162:16,20
tacked 131:7
tackle 42:1 46:18
tactical 9:16 14:10
39:13,15 45:23,24
46:1,3,4,8,10,14
67:6,14,16 68:24
69:12,20 81:5,6,7
81:15 82:6,11,14
83:1 90:19 91:2

59:24 60:4 61:6 62:23 63:19 64:10 64:10 67:16,18,22 70:3,16,24 71:13 72:23 73:8,15,20 76:7,14,25 78:5 81:22 82:16 83:12 84:22 85:20 86:10 88:2 89:18,20,23 90:7,21,23 93:7 93:22 94:6,10,14 95:9 97:21 98:20 98:25 100:19,23 101:16 102:9,12 102:20 103:12 104:17 105:12 106:22,25 107:12 108:7,10 109:1 110:20 111:5,6 114:18 121:9 128:21 129:9 133:14,25 135:12 141:25 144:7 146:10 147:5,12 147:23 148:9,13 148:23 149:18 152:19 154:7 159:23 164:6,25 164:25 165:13 166:9,24 167:9,19 167:25 170:3,4,12 172:1 177:9 178:22 179:1,5,13 181:15 182:7,20 184:1 188:21 189:12 190:4,8,14 190:21 191:17,25 192:10 193:5,25 194:9 thinking 167:1 176:25 thinks 79:20 third 4:19 12:16,18 15:9 58:12 85:2 88:9 121:3 124:17	184:11 thirteen 121:5 thought 19:20 21:20 30:1 46:24 47:7 73:5 83:3,5 89:19 144:9 159:8 159:24 183:1 193:18 thoughts 19:4,18 46:25 56:10 57:20 thread 67:4 three 2:23 4:15 21:1 27:10 65:9 72:22 73:24 104:21 115:3 150:18 187:4 three-quarters 190:17 throw 167:7 Thursday 194:18 ticked 158:25 tie 32:4 time 2:10 10:5 17:14 18:19,19 21:9 24:2 26:19 30:15 31:6,8 32:2 33:11 35:5,9 40:13,21 41:1,2,4 41:8,13,19 44:13 46:15 47:12,13 50:1 51:8 52:2,8 55:23 56:17 58:12 58:15 60:7,12 61:6 62:2,6,9 69:18 73:5,17 74:4,22 76:17 77:5,8,13 78:20 78:21 81:18,25 87:19 88:20,22 91:8 92:18 93:24 94:3,6 97:11,25 99:6 104:11,12,13 104:22,25 105:3,5 105:14,19,21 107:1,25 108:12	108:22 110:20 117:5 122:23 131:24 132:2 134:23 154:13,15 155:24 158:11 161:7 164:2 165:13 169:19 172:3,4,5 175:2,5 175:7 177:2,5 179:18 180:16 183:7,11,17 185:12 189:9,15 189:16 190:18 Time-wise 51:14,16 92:17 timed 44:4 163:4 169:6 timeframe 97:4 timeline 162:13 184:9 timeout 171:3 times 83:9 87:23 94:16 104:8 105:13 108:20 185:16 191:13 timescale 25:19 timestamp 32:5 51:19 74:7 77:7 78:2 87:23 97:8 106:21 108:24 timing 89:10 190:3 timings 52:7 189:17 today 2:4 3:14 111:10 114:1 170:22 today's 1:4 told 27:25 32:11 35:13 47:23 51:9 60:22 64:4,12 65:11,15,16 68:6 72:15 73:25 74:18 75:11 77:19,23 79:19 87:5,10,25 88:11,16 106:3,4	126:9 161:19 163:8,9 171:16 178:11,22,22 179:1 182:20,21 189:9,20 Tom 52:14 64:3 tomorrow 170:22 191:20,25 192:11 192:22 193:8,15 193:20 194:5,10 194:14 tool 7:22 123:20 Tooting 4:4,6 top 23:4 26:14 36:19 44:23 64:1 67:2 74:16 79:15 82:5 88:19 89:4 93:7 100:3,4 101:7 126:7 159:12 163:5,14 169:7 178:5 180:14 182:2 184:6 186:3 topic 184:4 191:15 191:16,18 tour 98:1 tower 7:12 14:25 18:18 19:21 20:16 33:6,11 39:19 40:2 41:10 44:19 48:1,3 49:17 54:19,22,23 56:11 56:12,19,21 57:12 60:14,18 61:3 66:3,22 67:17 68:13,21 70:16,18 70:18 72:13 73:23 75:12 81:9,10 85:22 87:16 89:20 95:23 104:2 106:2 106:9 111:2 115:4 115:11 120:5 148:14 174:4 track 144:11 tracked 60:23	tracking 57:24 traffic 16:19 56:8 63:20 136:15 149:13 154:10 157:11 168:13 trained 107:15,16 109:4,5 115:20 116:6 128:10,10 128:13 140:22 training 9:23 10:22 10:24 11:1,4,5,7 11:11,14,15,18,20 12:1,4,6,9,12 14:2 17:10,17,18 21:10 68:7 114:4,15,18 114:20,21,22,22 114:24,24 115:2,5 115:5,6,9,12,16 115:19,24 116:7 116:11,18,24 117:1,2,7,8,12,15 117:19,22,24 118:2,5,5,8,9,13 119:10,14 138:4 138:14 140:24 transcript 3:1 157:17 transcription 2:2 transferring 84:13 transformer 110:8 transmission 157:8 157:12,17,18 166:24 transmissions 157:15 transmit 16:16 54:5 70:5 transmitted 63:21 80:25 trapped 122:11 125:5 127:3 128:3 128:6,20,22 129:7 162:22 164:4 travel 83:9 travelled 19:14
--	--	--	---	--

20:25	38:18 49:19,20	understood 49:10	63:12 67:8 71:6	variety 120:9
travelling 24:22	54:16 58:20 59:24	undertake 84:23	75:2,7,25 76:1,3	various 104:18
trends 6:19	61:10 76:12 96:20	undertaking 13:12	76:20,24 77:4	vehicle 63:7 64:13
tried 73:14	96:21 99:1 104:16	148:13	78:4 89:5 91:9,9	71:15 104:7,23,24
trigger 24:7 41:18	104:20 115:3	unfair 18:2 73:15	94:4 132:14	105:4,9,18,20
79:22,25 105:16	134:11,25 135:24	88:25 132:5	133:10 147:15	vehicles 38:25
triggers 5:23 15:12	142:8 145:22	Uniform 160:9	148:5 156:8	ventilation 106:14
36:21,24	148:2 150:19	167:15,18,20,22	166:16 182:17	verbalising 64:11
trouble 52:6	162:4 167:13	168:1	updated 131:24	verbally 30:4
true 2:20 113:23	176:17 188:19	unit 22:6,9,11,12	156:3,5,19	verbatim 48:12
trump 29:8	193:19	22:19,20 23:8,24	updates 9:12,13	version 68:11
trust 14:1	two-thirds 41:9	23:25 24:1 25:4	50:14 66:23 73:18	vertically 19:5
try 19:3 22:8 27:15	94:12,22	25:11,12,13,18,20	76:4 77:6 89:11	view 19:23 142:21
55:3 57:8 67:1	type 37:22,24,25	25:25 26:7,11	116:13,14,15,16	180:8
69:13,21 70:13	38:3 145:10 159:1	28:9 30:16 32:7	147:24 148:2	visibly 61:10
73:3 96:2 97:14	161:11	32:15 34:12 39:14	updating 132:6,6,7	Vision 45:11
107:4,23 118:25	typed 161:6,7	39:24 40:17 41:1	132:9 133:9	152:21 153:13
119:1,15 125:13	186:21	41:21 42:3,9 44:9	142:25	154:13 155:2,3,5
127:22 128:13	types 114:20	44:10,15 45:8,9	UPV 20:4,6	155:8 156:16
137:20 139:16	typing 144:16	49:12 50:18 51:7	uPVC 20:10	158:17 160:21
179:10 194:7	153:5 156:16	51:10,18 52:5,23	urgent 173:1,7,11	161:11 167:6
trying 26:3 52:16	161:6 172:22,23	53:1,15 54:5,7,13	use 6:12 17:8 55:9	169:17 172:15
55:6 57:10 58:9		58:24 63:1,3 66:7	81:4 89:15,17,19	174:6 175:14
63:20 70:10 72:7	U	66:9,22 77:7	104:2 110:7 111:1	176:21 189:6
80:12 84:2 87:19	ultimately 14:2	89:13 91:7,19	131:11 132:19	vital 68:15 69:23
90:24 95:23	Um 168:14	92:21 93:20 107:7	134:21 135:7	146:20
120:21 122:18	unable 124:22	110:1 136:14,15	149:12 153:13	voice 1:24
126:18 127:15,25	125:12,17 126:12	136:18,23,25	155:2 157:13	volume 155:4
169:3 179:13,17	126:15	137:1,2,3 138:19	170:15	
179:20,24 180:13	unadjusted 99:6	138:20,22,25	useful 90:25	W
185:19 190:18	Unbeknown 94:25	139:2 142:15,19	users 146:7	Wainwright 108:9
turn 14:24 16:7	underlined 134:16	143:2,5,23 144:3	usher 43:15 79:4	wait 153:4
39:10 50:16 113:4	underselling 72:25	144:4 158:2 160:4	102:24 139:21	waiting 106:6
134:14 148:8	understand 21:2	160:12 161:13	171:2 193:16	168:10 171:10
156:21 163:6	28:19 84:21 113:5	166:23 176:21	usual 92:25	175:6
167:3 172:7 182:1	122:10 131:24	190:20 191:7	usually 122:1 150:1	walk 55:8 66:25
188:18	133:10 155:8	units 27:11 191:3	161:3	95:1,4,7
turned 23:4	162:5	unofficial 180:21	utilise 60:2	walked 42:10 55:18
turning-out 108:1	understandably	unravelling 29:6	utilised 98:5	95:10
TV 26:6 182:10	191:19	unsatisfactory	utilising 109:4	walking 22:23 42:9
TVs 182:4,8,9	understanding	194:4		49:17 153:20
twenty 184:14	28:25 45:12 46:23	unusual 97:18	V	wall 14:16 62:4,8
twice 165:2	47:3,3 117:9,12	up' 172:14	vague 18:11 78:1	62:10 70:22 79:13
two 3:25 8:18 13:3	120:12,25 131:25	update 58:23 59:2	vaguely 11:7 23:12	79:16,25 84:2
14:5 15:12 27:10	138:15 158:21	59:6 60:17 62:25	24:4 86:16	98:14 99:24

100:14 101:1	143:3 151:5,8	35:23,25 36:4,8	Wilson 108:11	110:16 113:12
Walton 31:22,22	152:17 185:11	37:7 40:15 42:3,4	Wimbledon 4:12	153:12 172:1
Walton's 30:13	watch's 143:6	42:13 44:16,24	window 20:9,10	worked 110:18
Wandsworth 4:4,7	watches 135:24	45:25 46:9 47:25	156:2,6,7,25	114:13 135:21
want 1:19 2:8	watching 72:13	48:3 49:13,14	157:21	164:6 165:13
14:24 17:6 25:23	water 40:5	55:2 58:7 59:18	windows 56:20	working 36:21
28:18 32:2 41:12	Watson 61:6,13,14	59:22 60:13,17	107:22	37:18 48:10 58:25
52:2 96:20 99:13	62:13,17	62:21 63:13 76:11	wise 192:1	63:2,17 84:13
107:17 113:5	way 2:8 23:2,3 24:8	77:15 78:2 85:3,7	wish 80:14	95:12 155:18
126:14 128:3,8	31:20 41:9 42:10	87:6,10,11,11,14	withdrew 103:1	works 27:2 110:16
129:16,19,21,24	47:10 58:10 68:3	106:13 107:21	171:5 193:17	138:10
132:3 139:8 142:7	68:5 70:1 76:18	Welch's 59:1	witness 1:11 2:23	world 84:7
145:21 148:8	82:2 85:2 94:12	Welcome 1:3	41:14,17 42:25	worried 107:5
151:18,25 178:13	94:22 103:11	Wembley's 22:25	43:2,6,14,22	129:10
185:21 192:8	113:4,7 122:2	went 22:20 23:3	78:24 79:3 102:12	worse 60:25
wanted 22:4	147:14 153:12	25:5,6 26:6 29:24	102:23 103:1,13	worth 108:17
wants 128:22	154:9 160:21	32:15 34:2 35:8	103:16 111:16,18	wouldn't 30:25
wasn't 12:10,11	161:10 167:24	35:23 44:9 45:12	111:21 112:6,13	32:22 77:11 81:16
24:20 28:9 29:19	175:12,17,20,25	48:1,4 49:7,21	112:15 114:8	100:2,5,17 101:15
29:20 35:13 41:21	176:18 179:5	50:5 54:18 55:12	139:9,12,15,20,23	101:17 105:19
48:1 55:12,14	181:19 184:12	55:13,17 58:7,14	140:6 149:15	116:4 126:18
56:18,19 69:3	190:17	61:3 62:7,9 64:25	163:3 170:4,6,11	132:17,20,20
73:16,18 74:21	ways 8:9	67:22 70:16,17	170:17,18 171:4,5	133:12,15 141:15
82:24 91:7 133:24	we'll 6:13	71:15,16 75:2,7	171:11,19,20,22	141:20 144:5
151:11 154:4	we're 18:12 168:4	75:14,25 87:16	171:24 191:19	161:1 163:22
155:13,15 160:7	we've 168:13 183:2	94:1 107:6 109:23	192:18,23,25	166:11,12,20
167:1 168:10	we[sic] 12:23	150:9 151:12	193:13,17	175:4 176:16
178:20 180:7	wear 104:12	178:2	witnessed 44:15	180:7 186:15,15
181:22,23 182:10	wearer 90:2 104:6	weren't 30:21	84:11	187:21
182:13 186:10	104:24 105:10	31:20 58:24 63:2	witnesses 158:4	wrapped 57:21
watch 15:25 22:17	wearers 68:2 77:13	63:17 69:3,4,4	193:20	write 79:19 80:14
23:24 25:13 26:24	83:4,5 85:16,21	77:24 78:13 94:24	Wolfenden 79:20	writing 62:8,9
27:1,3,11,24	85:22 86:6,18,23	130:21 180:1	79:21	79:14,14 153:19
28:21,22 29:3,17	87:4,20 88:3	184:3	wondering 64:9	written 6:6 13:2
29:21 30:6 32:10	89:17 104:15,17	west 17:4,12,20	78:17	45:7 54:3 62:4
39:21 46:14 54:21	105:13 106:2,9	18:5 31:19 34:13	word 19:12 72:22	140:16 183:4
58:20 61:4,4,6,12	Wednesday 1:1	37:8 55:13 75:10	116:4,5 135:4	wrong 72:21
61:13,14 62:13,17	week 134:24	whilst 42:8 80:24	142:5 183:4,5	wrote 114:8
65:25 70:20 79:13	weeks' 114:18	whirlwind 98:3	worded 125:22	
79:19,20 83:24	Welch 17:24 18:6	white 98:14 99:23	183:25	
86:9,10,14,22	26:10 28:2,15,19	100:14	words 4:23 69:23	<hr/> X <hr/>
99:5,10 106:4	29:8 30:11,22	whiteboard 192:8	89:18 92:4 97:23	x 89:7,15 189:3
108:10 118:24	31:11,25 32:6,13	Williams 61:5,12	work 2:8 5:6 8:15	195:2
124:12,13 135:22	32:18 33:4,20	70:20 79:14,19	26:12 65:2 72:7	<hr/> Y <hr/>
136:9,11 137:19	34:16,23 35:15,17	83:24	107:18,20 110:12	yeah 18:11 48:20
				61:10,10 73:10

74:20 87:2 116:15 123:22 144:9 145:1 176:9 183:22 185:16 year 4:9 11:10 years 4:15 10:25 20:8 58:2 115:3 118:18 years' 114:9 121:5 yellow 99:17	02.04.20 32:1 02.11.48 44:4,6 02.18.43 104:23 02.23.33 51:22 52:3 02.44 74:9 88:1 02.59.36 93:24 03.03 104:25 03.05 105:1 03.07.56 108:1 03:10 99:6 04.15 108:13 04.22 76:18 77:20 04.53 89:4 07.21 94:16	169:8 174:22,24 112 195:7,9 11th 75:22 88:18 89:8,25 12 79:1,5 89:8 156:7,8,19,25 12.03 79:8 12.45 103:4 12.50 102:20 103:3 12.51 103:6 12th 88:18 89:25 90:4 157:20 13 114:9 13/14 4:11 130 71:25 135 84:24 13th 78:7 14 3:18 94:16 135:22 14th 162:1,22 163:12,13 164:4 165:20 168:14 15 42:24 74:25 78:16 88:16 89:7 89:15 135:22 169:22 181:10 184:12 188:25 189:3,9,21 15-pump 190:4,8 15th 77:25 78:6 16 135:22 17 142:4 186:8 188:25 19 3:18 164:2	2.00 153:18 2.05 111:20,22 112:1 2.11 112:4 2.53 140:1 20 3:18 78:16 85:21 88:16 89:7,15 96:9 155:21,24 165:12 168:18 181:10 20-pump 29:22,22 2009 116:22 117:5 2013 114:24 115:13 115:14,15 116:20 117:24 118:1 2014 68:11 2015 115:1 2016 21:6 2017 4:11 113:16 114:11 115:4 2018 1:1 194:18 21 3:19 156:21 22 3:19 51:21 81:14 22nd 80:18,22 81:17 82:1 23 3:19 51:20 74:10 113:16 155:21 23rd 47:18 24 3:19 25 3:19 184:13,18 184:20 189:22 190:5 25-pump 29:7 96:10 26 3:19 271 160:6,7,17 184:24,25 185:4 272 185:4 2nd-floor 61:15	31:9 76:16 80:5 93:25 120:1 121:3 124:16,17 129:25 142:5,6,7 147:11 149:16 3.00 139:16,25 140:3 3.05 139:13 3.48 171:7 3.55 171:1,6 3.56 171:9 30 7:9 26:9 35 89:24 360 55:3,5,10 56:5 56:9,9 57:16 60:19 361 185:18 39 3:19 96:17 3rd 47:17 58:14,17 58:18,20 62:4,10 85:8 107:3 3rd-floor 61:2 99:7
Z				
0	1			
00.59.12 186:9 01 135:2 01.25 163:16 01.25.16 162:21 01.26 188:12 01.28.09 189:1,9 01.30 35:10 01.31 184:20 190:5 01.32 188:12 01.35 163:16 01.35.24 163:1,4 01.43 165:8 01.43.12 30:16 01.43.58 164:2 01.44.56 164:13 01.50 189:19 190:6 01.51.13 165:12 01.51.36 18:19 01.53.31 169:5 01.53.52 168:22 01.54.05 165:24 168:17 01.54.30 31:7 41:1 41:8 01.55 189:19 190:6 01.55.18 155:24 01.55.35 156:3 01.56 157:15 01.56.23 158:1,11 01.56.44 156:22 158:12 01:53:31 169:6	1 1:1 16:17,22,22 34:3 56:8 57:5 63:23 66:20 103:23 134:21,23 135:7 195:3,5 1.05 112:2 10 25:22 43:11 74:24 79:17,18 81:14 83:10 93:7 94:12,23 104:17 123:25 139:14 163:1 169:22 181:10 10.33 43:17 10.45 43:11,16 10.47 43:19 100 36:16 53:7 78:6 82:25 86:9,11 93:23 97:7 98:17 98:24 100:3,6 101:16,18 107:2 10th 76:20 77:12 77:20 80:18,22 81:17 82:1 168:4 11 135:14 11.45 79:6 111 162:1,18,21 163:10,11 164:4 165:20 168:14	2 2 4:17,19 12:17 15:9 25:21 94:17 109:17,18 120:2 130:5,25 134:12 134:22 147:17 148:18,19 149:4 149:12,14,25 151:14 189:3 194:18	3	3 10:10 16:7 18:18 19:2,6 21:14,18 21:23,25 24:5 25:17 30:15 31:1
			4	4 19:5 21:13,18,23 22:1,2 28:12 34:6 134:13,22 135:5,5 148:10 149:4,19 149:22 150:9 152:7 157:6 172:10 176:24 184:11 186:3 187:2 4' 186:5 4.00 97:6 4.15 170:4 4.30 170:4,10 172:1 194:16 40 35:3,4 36:9 59:25 105:15 178:3 183:19 188:1 45 105:1,6,6,8 139:7 191:22 4th 75:21 76:21

180:24 181:12	9		
5	9 68:8,10,13 88:5,7		
5.3 36:19 44:22 50:17	88:9 91:12 109:13		
68:8 90:23 91:2	146:16		
104:13 178:5	9.1 68:14 69:2,7		
180:14 183:20	70:10,14 72:18		
188:18 190:17	146:19		
5.10 137:8	9.2 71:4		
5.5 129:25 130:2	9.3 71:17 72:18		
131:16 134:3	9.30 1:2 192:22		
136:5	193:10 194:14,18		
5.9 138:11	95 156:2,6,7,25		
5/6 183:8	157:20		
539 116:8 142:4	99 19:21		
5am 182:5	999 117:16 151:20		
5th 75:21 76:21	166:5 173:14		
	9th 76:22		
6			
6 41:10 57:6,8 64:1			
67:2 73:22 85:1			
106:12 126:5			
182:1			
6.00 97:6			
61 162:9,15			
633 10:23			
6th 88:17 89:8			
7			
7 54:7,13 80:16			
7.5 145:24			
790 10:23 68:6,10			
72:19 115:24			
129:23 130:2			
136:5 145:21			
7th 76:21 88:17			
89:8			
8			
8 25:18,21 75:17			
80:16 85:16 160:9			
166:23 167:18,20			
167:22 168:1			
81 18:21			
84 41:6			
8th 76:21			