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1	Wednesday, 11 July 2018	1	together. The same with documents that we'll be looking
2	(10.00 am)	2	at.
3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to	3	A. Okay, yes.
4	today's hearing.	4	Q. Okay?
5	I think we are about to hear from another witness;	5	A. Yes.
6	is that right, Mr Millett?	6	Q. You say in your statement at the very beginning in the
7	MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman, good morning. We are now	7	second paragraph:
8	going to call Joanne Smith.	8	"I am a Senior Operations Manager for the London
9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.	9	Fire Brigade with twenty three years experience of
10	JOANNE SMITH (affirmed)	10	incident management and for the last ten years at a
11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. Good morning,	11	senior operations level."
12	Ms Smith.	12	Can I just ask you, what was your role when you
13	THE WITNESS: Good morning.	13	first started at the London Fire Brigade?
14	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Are you comfortable standing up to	14	A. I first started in 1995 in Essex Fire Service as
15	give your evidence?	15	a control operator, but when I moved to London Fire
16	THE WITNESS: Yes.	16	Brigade, I was an assistant principal controller, and we
17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you want to change your mind at	17	went through a role change in 2011 and I became a senior
18	any stage, of course you may. All right?	18	operations manager.
19	THE WITNESS: Thank you.	19	Q. And you're a senior operations manager, or SOM, now?
20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.	20	A. Yes.
21	Yes, Mr Millett.	21	Q. Were you in that position on the night of the
22	Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY	22	Grenfell Tower fire
23	MR MILLETT: Good morning, Ms Smith.	23	A. I was.
24	A. Good morning.	24	Q on 13/14 June 2017? You were.
25	Q. Thank you very much for coming today to the inquiry to	25	Are you based in the control room alone or do you
	D 1		D 2
	Page 1	+	Page 3
1	help us with our investigations. We really do	1	have other areas of operation?
2	appreciate it.	2	A. We are based at the control room in Merton, and overall,
3	Can I just also start by saying that my questions	3	my responsibility is management of the London Fire
4	are intended to be short and simple, but they don't	4	Brigade control room, its staff, its policies and
5	always work out that way. So if there's anything you	5	procedures, its training, and also we have an on-call
6	don't understand about my questions or you want me to	6	responsibility to respond to incidents.
7	repeat, I'm very happy to do it or ask in a different	7	Q. Who is your immediate line manager, or who was your
8	way.	8	immediate line manager on the night of the fire?
9	If you need a break at any time, just signal and you	9	A. That would be the principal operations manager,
10	can take a break.	10	Scott Hayward.
11	A. Okay.	11	Q. Scott Hayward?
12	Q. Also, if you are more comfortable sitting down, then	12	A. Yes.
13	again, you can do that at any stage.	13	Q. Could you just explain to us, what is the role, in
14	A. Okay.	14	outline terms, of an SOM?
15	Q. Can I then start by asking you to give us your full	15	A. So it is the day-to-day management of the control room,
16	name?	16	ensuring that its staff are okay and managed in the
		1	control room. I'm in charge of six operations managers
17	A. Joanne Nicola Smith.	17	**************************************
17 18	<ul><li>A. Joanne Nicola Smith.</li><li>Q. You've got a statement in front of you which is dated</li></ul>	17	that work in the control room on a daily basis. It's
18	Q. You've got a statement in front of you which is dated	18	that work in the control room on a daily basis. It's
18 19	Q. You've got a statement in front of you which is dated 10 October 2017, the reference to which is MET0007766.	18 19	that work in the control room on a daily basis. It's policies and procedures, it's delivery of training to
18 19 20	Q. You've got a statement in front of you which is dated 10 October 2017, the reference to which is MET0007766. Now, there's a screen on your right, and on your	18 19 20	that work in the control room on a daily basis. It's policies and procedures, it's delivery of training to control staff. But we also liaise with different
18 19 20 21	Q. You've got a statement in front of you which is dated 10 October 2017, the reference to which is MET0007766.  Now, there's a screen on your right, and on your left is a big screen at the back of the room. What we	18 19 20 21	that work in the control room on a daily basis. It's policies and procedures, it's delivery of training to control staff. But we also liaise with different departments in London Fire Brigade with regard to
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18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Q. You've got a statement in front of you which is dated 10 October 2017, the reference to which is MET0007766.  Now, there's a screen on your right, and on your left is a big screen at the back of the room. What we normally do is throw up bits of the statement that we're looking at together on the screens so you can see them clearly, and the Documents Manager highlights those in yellow so that we can all focus on the relevant passages	18 19 20 21 22 23 24	that work in the control room on a daily basis. It's policies and procedures, it's delivery of training to control staff. But we also liaise with different departments in London Fire Brigade with regard to changes and are able to put a control room viewpoint on it. We manage the mobilising system. Yes.  Q. Right.  You say you're in charge of six operations managers.
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1	A. Managers, yes.	1	A. No. So we have a minimum staffing level or a model
2	Q. Are those control room operators or are they people	2	staffing level of 11 on duty. So that can be a mixture
3	senior to control room operators?	3	of control room operators and AOMs and an OM.
4	A. They're people senior to control room operators. So we	4	Q. I see. Normally, how many CROs would you have on duty
5	have six watches in the control room. The operations	5	of an ordinary watch?
6	manager is in charge of a watch. They have a number of	6	A. That can just depend on who is in. So, like I say, we
7	supervisors below them, and then we have some control	7	have 11, so we have three supervisors, so three AOMs,
8	room operators, 11 control room operators.	8	and the rest would be CROs.
9	Q. Breaking it down a little bit, you say six watches, and	9	Q. I see, okay. Are there minimum numbers of CROs at any
10	that provides 24-hour cover.	10	one time?
11	A. Yes.	11	A. Not minimum numbers of CROs, no, just minimum members of
12	Q. Does each watch work for a four-hour period?	12	staff.
13	A. No, each watch works a 12-hour day, and then a 12-hour	13	Q. I see.
14	shorter shift and then a 12-hour night, and then three	14	A. So, also, I should point out that assistant operations
15	rota days off.	15	managers, although they do a different role in the
16	Q. I see, okay. Is that the same for senior management as	16	control room, they are able to take calls as a CRO.
17	well?	17	Q. I see, okay.
18	A. No, we do office hours.	18	In terms of roles, how is your role different to
19	Q. Right, I see, okay.	19	that of an AOM?
20	You say you do office hours, so anyone at your	20	A. So the OMs, AOMs and CROs are based in the control room
21	level, SOM, would work, what, 9.00 to 5.00?	21	and carry out the control room function on their shift.
22	A. Yes.	22	I'm office-based and so therefore liaising with other
23	Q. Right, I see. What about nights?	23	departments about improvements, about changes in
24	A. Well, that's where we have an on-call. So between the	24	policies and procedures.
25	three of us there is another senior operations	25	Q. Okay.
23	three of us there is another semor operations	23	Q. Okay.
	Page 5		Page 7
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1	manager and the principal operations manager we work	1	A. A more strategic overview.
_			8
2	an on-call rota.	2	Q. I see.
3	an on-call rota.  Q. Now, you're SOM. Immediately below you in terms of the	2 3	_
		1	Q. I see.
3	Q. Now, you're SOM. Immediately below you in terms of the	3	Q. I see.  Is the same true also in relation to OMs? So you've
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3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	<ul> <li>Q. Now, you're SOM. Immediately below you in terms of the hierarchy, is it the OM?</li> <li>A. Yes, operations manager.</li> <li>Q. So, for example, Alex Norman is an OM.</li> <li>A. She is.</li> <li>Q. How many OMs do you have under you?</li> <li>A. Six.</li> <li>Q. So that's the operations managers, and under them we have, what, assistant OMs?</li> <li>A. Assistant operations managers.</li> <li>Q. How many assistant OMs do we have?</li> <li>A. There's four on each watch.</li> <li>Q. Four on each watch. And each AOM is responsible for supervising how many control room operators, is it?</li> <li>A. Yes, so 11 control room operators.</li> <li>Q. Right.</li> <li>A. But they're not individually so if you were a supervisor or an assistant operations manager and operations manager, as far as managing the room on the day in the control room, you would be responsible for all of them, not just certain individuals.</li> <li>Q. So at any one time, 24 hours, you've got 11 CROs on at</li> </ul>	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Q. I see. Is the same true also in relation to OMs? So you've got six OMs under you  A. Yes, so they're shift-based and they manage their watches. Q. Yes, and you essentially supervise them?  A. Yes. Q. Okay. Would you normally handle a 999 call yourself?  A. Not anymore, no. Q. No. Would an ops manager handle a 999 call?  A. Yes. Occasionally they would. Q. Occasionally. So occasionally but not often?  A. No, not often, but yes. Q. And AOMs, I'm assuming from the way it's grouped, they would often handle 999 calls, would they?  A. Yes. So the OM and AOMs would carry out a supervisory function and, when they were carrying that out, would tend not to or maybe answer one or two emergency calls throughout their shift. Q. I follow. Okay. Now, did you complete any training to be an SOM specifically?

1	Q. Okay. Did you receive training before you were well,	1	From 2007 to June 2017, that 10-year period, did you
2	let me ask it this way: you became a senior operations	2	receive any training on how to train people?
3	manager; before you were a senior operations manager,	3	A. Yes, I have received training on how to train people,
4	were you an operations manager?	4	although I don't deliver the training myself. I've been
5	A. Yes. I say it because I was in Essex Fire Brigade and	5	more involved with the course content.
6	it had a different role structure.	6	I also spent two years at the Chief Fire Officers
7	Q. Oh, I see, okay.	7	Association, seconded to support control rooms around
8	Let me ask it this way then: have you had any	8	the UK, and ran a number of seminars on call handling.
9	specific training in the supervisory roles that you	9	Q. Right, okay. We'll look at that then.
10	undertake as a senior operations manager?	10	Can I ask you to look at a document in our documents
11	A. Yes, so I've had numerous training courses on call	11	bundle at tab 52. I'll give you the reference:
12	handling, supervisory training, I was detached to the	12	HOM00001124, and that will come up on the screen.
13	operation command assurance team in Essex as	13	It is a report done by the LFB into the fire at
14	a non-operational station manager and completed the	14	Lakanal House in July 2009, and the report is
15	station manager managing incidents.	15	dated November 2012.
16	Q. Right. And the training on call handling, when is the	16	First of all, can I ask you, are you familiar with
17	most recent training you had on call handling prior	17	this report?
18	to June 2017, do you remember?	18	A. Yes.
19	A. 2005.	19	Q. You are.
20	Q. 2005?	20	Did you have any input into writing this report?
21	A. Yes.	21	A. Yes, a great deal.
22	Q. So would that mean that you yourself didn't have any	22	Q. A great deal?
23	training on call handling after Lakanal House?	23	A. Yes.
24	A. I haven't had any specific training on call handling,	24	Q. Right.
25	but I have been involved in the design of our training	25	You say a great deal; can you tell us in outline
	Page 9		Page 11
	0		0
1	packages that we've delivered to other control staff.	1	terms what your role was in assisting with the
2	Q. Right. I'll come to that.	2	production of this report?
3	In relation to training on your supervisory	3	A. So it was really to focus on and investigate the roles
4	function, when was the last time prior to June 2017 that	4	and actions of LFB control room during that incident in
5	you had that training?	5	the control room.
6	A. That would have been the same time, 2005.	6	Q. Did you conduct interviews with the call handlers?
7	Q. Were you with Essex at that stage?	7	A. No, we didn't, but it was mainly referring to the
8	A. Yes.	8	policies and the procedures and making recommendations.
9	Q. I see.	9	Q. How did the London Fire Brigade, when collating this
10	A. However, I have been involved in numerous incidents and	10	report, go about collecting the personal individual
11	experiential learning from those incidents, such as	11	experiences of call handlers on the night of the Lakanal
12	you've mentioned Lakanal House.	12	House fire?
13	Q. Okay.	13	A. They were interviewed by a different department.
14	I'm not sure I asked you this, when did you transfer	14	Q. But you didn't do the interviews yourself?
15	from Essex to LFB?	15	A. No.
16	А. 2007.	16	Q. Can I just ask you to look, first of all, at page 33,
17	Q. Right. Okay.	17	which is section F of the report, F.1, "Staffing in the
18	At the point of transfer into the LFB, what position	18	Control on 3 July 2009 (Green watch)".
19	did you take up?	19	We have a list of individuals who are in the control
20	A. Senior operations manager.	20	room on that night.
21	Q. It was SOM?	21	Can I ask you, the control room itself on that night
22	A. Yes.	22	was where, was it Merton?
23	Q. Was that a promotion?	23	A. No, it was at Docklands.
24	A. Yes.	24	Q. Docklands?
25	Q. It was.	25	A. Yeah, it was called GVP.
	B 40		D 42
	Page 10		Page 12

		1	
1	Q. Okay. And is that control room still operating?	1	Q from that. Were there any more, any other names you
2	A. No, we relocated to Merton.	2	can give us, who were in the Stratford control room on
3	Q. When was the relocation to Merton?	3	the night of the Grenfell Tower who were also on the
4	A. Early 2012.	4	Lakanal?
5	Q. Right. And we'll come to this in due course, but just	5	A. I was just looking at this, if this is on Lakanal,
6	while we're on that answer, was Merton a better control	6	I thought Yvonne Adams was there too, but she may not
7	room than the Docklands control room?	7	have been.
8	A. Very different. So the Merton control room was built as	8	Q. Yvonne Adams. Okay.
9	part of a fire control project, a government-led	9	Now, if you go to page 49 of this document, we see
10	project, and it had been built and available, and our	10	the start of the section, F.6, "Conclusion about
11	location at GVP we needed to vacate because, with the	11	Handling of the fire at Lakanal 3 July 2009".
12	Olympics coming, it was too near and too much of	12	We can see what the conclusions are. It's divided
13	a threat, really.	13	up into different topics: workload, premises layout,
14	Q. I see, okay.	14	situational awareness, information gathering.
15	A. So it's a better and more resilient building.	15	I just want to turn the page to page 50 and ask you
16	Q. In terms of functionality and capabilities, though, as	16	about four paragraphs, 293 to 296.
17	a control room, was it different from the Docklands	17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Are you finding it easier to read
18	control room?	18	that screen? Because you can read it on that one if
19	A. Yes, it is.	19	you
20	Q. In what way?	20	A. No, I'm finding it easier to
21	A. It's much larger, higher ceilings, so the desks are	21	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You're better on that one?
22	spaced out quite a lot, and Docklands we had a large	22	A. Yes, thank you.
23	display screen where we could see all our resources and	23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Of course.
24	we haven't got that at Merton.	24	MR MILLETT: So I just want to ask you about these four
25	Q. You haven't got that at Merton?	25	paragraphs, 293, 294, 295 and 296.
	Page 13		Page 15
1	A. No.	1	A. Yes.
2	Q. So that's a less good thing, is it?	2	Q. Having had input into this report, are you familiar with
3	A. We've managed to work without it.	3	this text?
4	Q. That's quite a subtle answer. We'll come back to that	4	A. Yes.
5	in due course.	5	Q. Okay. Did you have input into this text? Did you help
6	Just on this document, though, can I just look at	6	dun A it 9
7	4 4 .	0	draft it?
	the list.	7	A. No, we drafted the version, I believe, before this.
8	the list.  A. Yes.		
8		7	A. No, we drafted the version, I believe, before this.
	A. Yes.	7 8	A. No, we drafted the version, I believe, before this.  This was given to another team to draft.
9	A. Yes.  Q. We've got "Name" down the left-hand side and there are	7 8 9	<ul><li>A. No, we drafted the version, I believe, before this.</li><li>This was given to another team to draft.</li><li>Q. Okay. You say another team; who was that?</li></ul>
9	<ul><li>A. Yes.</li><li>Q. We've got "Name" down the left-hand side and there are names that are familiar even to me.</li></ul>	7 8 9 10	<ul><li>A. No, we drafted the version, I believe, before this.</li><li>This was given to another team to draft.</li><li>Q. Okay. You say another team; who was that?</li><li>A. In London Fire Brigade.</li></ul>
9 10 11	<ul><li>A. Yes.</li><li>Q. We've got "Name" down the left-hand side and there are names that are familiar even to me.</li><li>A. Yes.</li></ul>	7 8 9 10 11	<ul> <li>A. No, we drafted the version, I believe, before this. This was given to another team to draft.</li> <li>Q. Okay. You say another team; who was that?</li> <li>A. In London Fire Brigade.</li> <li>Q. Okay. What was that team? Was it an investigations</li> </ul>
9 10 11 12	<ul> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. We've got "Name" down the left-hand side and there are names that are familiar even to me.</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. Can you help identify any of those individuals who were</li> </ul>	7 8 9 10 11 12	<ul> <li>A. No, we drafted the version, I believe, before this. This was given to another team to draft.</li> <li>Q. Okay. You say another team; who was that?</li> <li>A. In London Fire Brigade.</li> <li>Q. Okay. What was that team? Was it an investigations team or</li> <li>A. No, I believe it was an individual from incident</li> </ul>
9 10 11 12 13	<ul> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. We've got "Name" down the left-hand side and there are names that are familiar even to me.</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. Can you help identify any of those individuals who were in the Stratford control room on the night of the</li> </ul>	7 8 9 10 11 12 13	<ul> <li>A. No, we drafted the version, I believe, before this. This was given to another team to draft.</li> <li>Q. Okay. You say another team; who was that?</li> <li>A. In London Fire Brigade.</li> <li>Q. Okay. What was that team? Was it an investigations team or</li> <li>A. No, I believe it was an individual from incident</li> </ul>
9 10 11 12 13 14	<ul> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. We've got "Name" down the left-hand side and there are names that are familiar even to me.</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. Can you help identify any of those individuals who were in the Stratford control room on the night of the Grenfell Tower fire? I think we know about Debbie Real.</li> </ul>	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	<ul> <li>A. No, we drafted the version, I believe, before this. This was given to another team to draft.</li> <li>Q. Okay. You say another team; who was that?</li> <li>A. In London Fire Brigade.</li> <li>Q. Okay. What was that team? Was it an investigations team or</li> <li>A. No, I believe it was an individual from incident management that was asked to redraft the final document.</li> </ul>
9 10 11 12 13 14 15	<ul> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. We've got "Name" down the left-hand side and there are names that are familiar even to me.</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. Can you help identify any of those individuals who were in the Stratford control room on the night of the Grenfell Tower fire? I think we know about Debbie Real.</li> <li>A. Yes, Debbie Real, Angie Gotts.</li> </ul>	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	<ul> <li>A. No, we drafted the version, I believe, before this. This was given to another team to draft. Q. Okay. You say another team; who was that? </li> <li>A. In London Fire Brigade.</li> <li>Q. Okay. What was that team? Was it an investigations team or</li> <li>A. No, I believe it was an individual from incident management that was asked to redraft the final document.</li> <li>Q. Did you see the final document before it was published?</li> </ul>
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1	"Expectations that callers would be rescued and	1	Q. I see.
2	'stay put' advice."	2	You mention training; as a result of this conclusion
3	And it says:	3	in this paragraph, what new training came in?
4	"COs"	4	A. So the training focused it was a PowerPoint training
5	That's, what, control operators?	5	and a computer-based training package that we delivered
6	A. Control operators.	6	after the Lakanal investigation, but they both during
7	Q. " had a clear expectation that fire crews would reach	7	the assessment phase of fire survival guidance, we made
8	the callers quickly. Their experience was that fire	8	sure that we entered in that control staff should ask if
9	appliances arrive quickly and that people are rescued by	9	the caller can leave the premise.
10	the Brigade. This is borne out by the fact that only	10	Q. Right. Did that training then find its way into
11	rarely, where FSG is given, do people die in fires (see	11	a policy?
12	section E3)."	12	A. Yes, it did, policy 539.
13	Then it says this:	13	Q. 539. What about 790?
14	"As rescues by crews were not immediate there is a	14	A. 790 was a policy that I helped draft, along with
15	question whether the CO and/or callers, could have	15	an operational department following that, and that is
16	assessed the risk of attempting to escape from the flat	16	aimed at operational firefighters.
17	and whether the risk of moving closer to the fire (but	17	Q. I see. Okay.
18	escaping) was less than staying put and awaiting rescue.	18	A. So control have a separate policy.
19	COs relied on advising callers to 'stay put' expecting	19	Q. Control have a separate policy, yes.
20	that this would keep callers safe from the fire."	20	Just in terms of the training and the policy, my
21	Just pausing there, we'll come to this in some	21	question really is a simple one: would they say the same
22	detail, I think, later on, but that was a lesson	22	thing?
23	learnt is this right? from the Lakanal experience?	23	A. Yes.
24	A. Yes, it was, and in our training ever since, the first	24	Q. I see. So improvements and lessons learned as a result
25	question that control officers explore with callers is	25	of this conclusion at Lakanal, paragraph 293, would find
	Page 17		Page 19
1	if they can get out and if not if there's		
		1 1	themselves into policy 530 or 7002
	if they can get out and, if not, if there's	1 2	themselves into policy 539 or 790?
2	an alternative escape route.	2	A. Yes.
2 3	an alternative escape route.  Q. Right. Okay, let's focus on that. In the training ever	2 3	A. Yes. Q. I see. Okay.
2 3 4	<ul><li>an alternative escape route.</li><li>Q. Right. Okay, let's focus on that. In the training ever since. So just focusing on this particular problem,</li></ul>	2 3 4	A. Yes.  Q. I see. Okay.  Can you summarise — without going into these
2 3 4 5	an alternative escape route.  Q. Right. Okay, let's focus on that. In the training ever since. So just focusing on this particular problem, which is a risk analysis, is what this is saying that	2 3 4 5	A. Yes.  Q. I see. Okay.  Can you summarise — without going into these policies, which I'm afraid we will have to do at some
2 3 4 5 6	an alternative escape route.  Q. Right. Okay, let's focus on that. In the training ever since. So just focusing on this particular problem, which is a risk analysis, is what this is saying that the lesson learnt from the Lakanal experience was that	2 3 4 5 6	A. Yes.  Q. I see. Okay.  Can you summarise — without going into these policies, which I'm afraid we will have to do at some stage — in simple terms what the new discipline was
2 3 4 5 6 7	an alternative escape route.  Q. Right. Okay, let's focus on that. In the training ever since. So just focusing on this particular problem, which is a risk analysis, is what this is saying that the lesson learnt from the Lakanal experience was that control operators had to balance or had to get enough	2 3 4 5 6 7	A. Yes.  Q. I see. Okay.  Can you summarise — without going into these policies, which I'm afraid we will have to do at some stage — in simple terms what the new discipline was that control operators would have to employ when
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	an alternative escape route.  Q. Right. Okay, let's focus on that. In the training ever since. So just focusing on this particular problem, which is a risk analysis, is what this is saying that the lesson learnt from the Lakanal experience was that control operators had to balance or had to get enough information to be able to advise callers as to how to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	A. Yes.  Q. I see. Okay.  Can you summarise — without going into these policies, which I'm afraid we will have to do at some stage — in simple terms what the new discipline was that control operators would have to employ when assessing the risks of staying as opposed to leaving?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	an alternative escape route.  Q. Right. Okay, let's focus on that. In the training ever since. So just focusing on this particular problem, which is a risk analysis, is what this is saying that the lesson learnt from the Lakanal experience was that control operators had to balance or had to get enough information to be able to advise callers as to how to assess the risk of staying put and awaiting rescue, or	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	A. Yes.  Q. I see. Okay.  Can you summarise — without going into these policies, which I'm afraid we will have to do at some stage — in simple terms what the new discipline was that control operators would have to employ when assessing the risks of staying as opposed to leaving?  A. Like I say, I'm not sure it was new. We are guided on
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	an alternative escape route.  Q. Right. Okay, let's focus on that. In the training ever since. So just focusing on this particular problem, which is a risk analysis, is what this is saying that the lesson learnt from the Lakanal experience was that control operators had to balance — or had to get enough information to be able to advise callers as to how to assess the risk of staying put and awaiting rescue, or moving towards escape themselves?  A. No, I think from what that's referring to is actually on the initial call, where control officers start to investigate whether they need advice to help them, so it becomes a fire survival guidance call, that actually an important question is to ask whether they can leave the premise first, rather than just assume they can't and tell them to stay put.  Q. Right.  In terms of the lessons learnt from Lakanal, what were the difficulties in making the assessment on that call that call operators were finding about whether it was safe to escape?  A. There wasn't any specific difficulties with callers; it was just something that we weren't as focused on as we	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	A. Yes.  Q. I see. Okay.  Can you summarise — without going into these policies, which I'm afraid we will have to do at some stage — in simple terms what the new discipline was that control operators would have to employ when assessing the risks of staying as opposed to leaving?  A. Like I say, I'm not sure it was new. We are guided on our fire survival guidance policy by a document, a "Dear Chief Fire Officer" letter 10/93, which dictates nationally what a fire survival guidance call is and the methods we should use during a fire survival guidance call.  So rather than add anything new into it, we just reinforced the four principles that are contained in that document and provided our control staff some extra questioning to support that.  Q. Okay. Do we find that in the RIFs that were used on the night?  A. Yes, yes.  Q. We do. That's helpful. We'll come to those in a moment — well, not in a moment, I'm afraid, but at some point.

1	294:	1	training that our control room operators didn't receive,
2	"Many callers mentioned that there was smoke outside	2	didn't cover re-assessment.
3	their flat or that there was smoke in the corridor	3	Q. Right. So the new package of training that you designed
4	preventing escape. This may have caused COs to move	4	after Lakanal House enshrined, as it were, did it, or
5	straight into the 'protect' phase of FSG and not explore	5	had contained in it a re-assessment approach?
6	alternative escape routes with the callers. There is a	6	A. Yes.
7	real risk in attempting a self-evacuation from a	7	Q. Okay.
8	building on fire that the occupant will move themselves	8	It says:
9	into a position of greater harm rather than waiting in a	9	"Moving to protect advice with the intent of keeping
10	safe location for rescue."	10	the caller safe may not always be the best solution and
11	That conclusion looks like a further detailing of	11	the call should be continually re-assessed."
12	the conclusion in paragraph 293 that we looked at.	12	In terms of continual re-assessment, how did the new
13	A. Yes.	13	approach after Lakanal through training do that? How
14	Q. Would that be fair?	14	did it achieve continual re-assessment?
15		15	
	A. Yes.		A. So that's just in the questioning, when they're
16	Q. Right. So it's part of the same theme.	16	providing advice to the caller, when they're supporting
17	Then the next paragraph, 295:	17	them, trying to keep them calm, that they will ask
18	"Assessment/re-assessment of the call/caller: Some	18	continually what the situation is like, has it got
19	COs did repeat questions to find out what was happening	19	worse. And in our reference information file, there are
20	at different stages of the call, including trying to	20	some questions that can prompt the control operator to
21	find rooms with less smoke. National guidance	21	ask that.
22	(FSC 54/2004) suggests a model which has review of	22	Q. Right.
23	assessment/initial decisions built into it, although	23	In the last part of the last sentence, where it
24	this was not included in LFB training materials. Moving	24	says:
25	to protect advice with the intent of keeping the caller	25	" some proactive call handling techniques did
	Page 21		Page 23
	- 100 - 1		
1	safe may not always be the best solution and the call	1	take place."
2	should be continually re-assessed. There may be a	2	What does that mean? What does that refer to,
3	tendency to limit re-assessment due to the protect	3	"proactive"?
4	ethos, although there is evidence that some pro-active	4	A. I think that just generally describes what our call
5	call handling techniques did take place."	5	handlers do; they are very proactive, they are thinking
6	Now, there are a number of things in there I just	6	ahead. Don't forget, they are, whilst providing advice,
7	want to ask you about.	7	talking to the caller, keeping them calm, they are
8	First of all, where it says "Some COs did repeat	8	trying to update the crews that are on scene, they are
9	questions to find out what was happening", does that	9	trying to type and talk and provide all that information
10	mean that some weren't?	10	that goes to the crews to let them know what's going on.
11	A. Yes, that was true of the night, like as you know,	11	Q. That's re-assessment of the situation within the fire
12	there was a vast amount of calls coming in and some	12	building or room?
13	operators were speaking to callers, but we found	13	A. Yes.
14	sometimes that they could have asked assessed the	14	Q. Or flat. Does that depend upon the information being
15	situation again and again.	15	given by the caller
16	Q. Yes. So would it be fair to conclude from that that the	16	A. Yes.
17	Lakanal experience was that the re-assessment approach	17	Q to the control room?
18	-	18	
19	was patchy?	19	A. Yes.  Q. What about information coming from the fire ground, the
	A. Yes.	l .	
20	Q. Right.	20	incident commander or the bridgehead?
21	A. Although, to be clear, the re-assessment is not in the	21	A. That may influence our decision and our call handling
22	national guidance, it's only assessment. So after our	22	and what advice we give as well.
23	investigation, we added the re-assessment of the call.	23	Q. It looks from elsewhere in this report that one of the
24	Q. I was going to ask you, so national guidance	24	problems experienced at Lakanal House was that there
25	A. Yes, prior to the Lakanal fire, our training, and the	25	wasn't enough information coming back from the
	Page 22		Page 24
	Page 22		FA9E 24

1	firefighters or the incident commander on the fire	1	incident ground to Control about the progress of
2	ground into the control room. Is that right?	2	firefighting and rescue efforts. It is not clear that
3	A. Yes.	3	if COs had been given information about progress that it
4	Q. So in terms of assessment/re-assessment under	4	would have influenced the advice given to callers."
5	paragraph 195, that re-assessment of the fire, how much	5	Is it right that one of the experiences from Lakanal
6	of that would need from now on or from Lakanal on	6	House was that control supervisors couldn't get
7	to include information from the fire ground and not just	7	information from the fire ground? We covered that
8	the caller?	8	a minute ago, but it looks like, from that paragraph,
9	A. I think that would be a benefit, but I don't think it's	9	that was the case.
10	needed on every occasion. As I say, we are trained to	10	A. Yes.
11	keep callers on the line, to keep them calm and	11	Q. And
12	reassured, and provide the advice that we are given.	12	A. We didn't receive any information with regard to their
13	Q. Right.	13	rescue attempts to the callers we were talking to.
14	A. So we continue to do that.	14	Q. Do you know why that was? Why control room couldn't get
15	The protective or proactive call handling again	15	information from firefighters on the incident ground?
16	might be different techniques, moving them into	16	A. I can only surmise that they were extremely busy, that
17	a different room, but it will say within the framework	17	they were carrying out their tasks and perhaps didn't
18	of fire survival guidance 10/93. If we had additional	18	realise what needed to change or what may have changed
19	information from the crews that would say that they've	19	in the control room when we were talking to callers.
20	rescued an individual, hopefully we'd be hearing that on	20	Q. Was there a command unit present at Lakanal House?
21	the telephone as well because we remain on the line to	21	A. Yes.
22	them.	22	Q. How was the communication between the control room and
23	Q. Yes. You say you remain on the line.	23	the command unit?
24	A. Yes.	24	A. I wasn't in the control room at the time, so I couldn't
25	Q. Was there any suggestion as a result of Lakanal House,	25	comment on it, but I believe from the reports and
	( · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
	Page 25		Page 27
1	and particularly this paragraph, that control room	1	
1	and particularly this paragraph, that control room		
2		1	listening to the calls and everything, it was very hard
2	operators should call the callers back if the situation	2	to get hold of the appliances and the command unit. And
3	operators should call the callers back if the situation changed and they'd left the line?	2 3	to get hold of the appliances and the command unit. And I know you've covered the control information form,
3 4	operators should call the callers back if the situation changed and they'd left the line?  A. No, so after the Lakanal House, we do advise people, if	2 3 4	to get hold of the appliances and the command unit. And I know you've covered the control information form, which is why that came about.
3 4 5	operators should call the callers back if the situation changed and they'd left the line?  A. No, so after the Lakanal House, we do advise people, if they're not being affected by fire, heat or smoke to	2 3 4 5	to get hold of the appliances and the command unit. And I know you've covered the control information form, which is why that came about.  Q. Right. Okay.
3 4 5 6	operators should call the callers back if the situation changed and they'd left the line?  A. No, so after the Lakanal House, we do advise people, if they're not being affected by fire, heat or smoke to remain in their building, and we tell them that if their	2 3 4 5 6	to get hold of the appliances and the command unit. And I know you've covered the control information form, which is why that came about. Q. Right. Okay. Just breaking that down a little bit, the Lakanal
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1	In terms of information coming back the other way,	1	not usual to receive very detailed information about
2	from the command unit or the incident command pump back	2	their firefighting or their rescue efforts.
3	to the control room, was that efficient or were there	3	Q. Right.
4	problems with that?	4	Now, your answer just now was in the present tense;
5	A. I don't know if there were problems with it. Certainly	5	does that mean that what you've just said was the
6	not with radio communications. It's just that we never	6	current practice even at the time of the Grenfell Tower
7	had any messages sent back to us to tell us the	7	fire?
8	progress.	8	A. Yes.
9	Q. At all?	9	Q. Right.
10	A. At all.	10	A. We are trained to make assumptions and to do some
11	Q. Really?	11	planning depending on what we might think is happening
12	A. We had informative messages, is what it's called, which	12	at the incident, but it would not be normal that we
13	detail how the incident is progressing, but none	13	would receive that information on a given incident.
14	relating to the rescue attempts	14	Q. Okay.
15	Q. It says halfway down this paragraph	15	Just taking a step or two back, then I'm sorry to
16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Sorry, I didn't catch the end.	16	keep pushing with this the conclusion that we see in
17	A. Sorry, I said no messages regarding the attempts to	17	this paragraph about the practice at the time of Lakanal
18	rescue the callers.	18	House, that there was much less information being passed
19	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.	19	from the incident ground to control about the progress
20	MR MILLETT: Now, in this paragraph, 296, it says:	20	of firefighting and rescue efforts, did that conclusion
21	"In line with practice at the time there was much	21	result in any change to the practice post-Lakanal about
22	less information being passed from the incident ground	22	the amount and quality of information coming from the
23	to Control about the progress of firefighting and rescue	23	fire ground to control?
24	efforts."	24	A. With regard to fire survival guidance calls, I believe
25	What was that practice at the time that's referred	25	it's written into policy 790.
	Page 29		Page 31
	1 age 27		rage 51
1	to there?	1	Q. Right. So would it be fair to summarise your evidence
2	A. So I think after the investigation into Lakanal there	2	in this way: one of the lessons learnt at Lakanal was
3	might have been a realisation that, actually, having	3	that information coming from the fire ground to control
4	that information about firefighters and rescue efforts	4	was insufficient in terms of firefighting and rescue
5	would be of benefit to the control room if they knew it.	5	efforts, and that more and better information had to
6	Q. Right. And	6	come from the fire ground to control so as to be able to
7	A. However, it isn't in general terms and we wouldn't	7	assist with quality fire survival guidance calls?
8	normally expect to or receive information apart from	8	A. I would say in broad terms, yes. But looking back to
9	informative messages or priority messages from incidents	9	that incident, I'm not sure about if the information had
10	which would detail their firefighting action or their	10	been received, what change to advice would be given to
11	rescue attempts.	11	callers.
12	Q. Right. But the practice at the time, which resulted in	12	Q. Right. Okay.
13	there being much less information being passed I just	13	A. I think that was in the
14	want to understand what the practice was which resulted	14	Q. So we'll follow this through, then, to the policies.
15	in there being much less information coming from the	15	A. Okay.
16	incident ground to control.	16	Q. Okay. We'll do that, as I say, in due course.
17	A. Yes, I	17	Before I leave that, in general terms, would it be
18	Q. What was the practice?	18	fair I don't want to suggest things to you that
19	A. Again, I didn't write that, but I don't think that the	19	one of the take-aways from the Lakanal House experience
20	practice changed. As usual, we are the ones that pass	20	was the inadequacy or insufficiency of information about
21	information to the crews and to the incident commander	21	firefighting or search and rescue coming from the fire
22	and to the incident command pump. It's not really	22	ground to the control room?
23	a two-way channel; we provide them the information and	23	A. It would be fair to say that it would have been valuable
24	they deal with the incident on the ground. If they	24	to know that we weren't able to or firefighting and
25	require anything from us, they will ask us. But it's	25	rescue attempts weren't able to reach the occupants'
	any owing it will ask usi Due it s	-5	rescale attempts weren cable to reach the occupants
	Page 30	1	Page 32

1	flats during Lakanal, yes.	1	senior officers that might ring in wanting additional
2	Q. Right, thank you.	2	information. The control room staff are very busy
3	Now, coming back to your experience, have you ever	3	responding to the incident and carrying out their own
4	dealt with any major incidents in your role as SOM?	4	functions, so we can take that pressure off them. We
5	A. Yes.	5	can support the operations manager's decision-making, if
6	Q. Which ones? Can you give us an idea of which?	6	we're required, or we can make those decisions for them,
7	A. Just as senior operations manager? I've been involved	7	and we can support the staff, usually by making a cup of
8	in a number of multiple fire survival guidance calls.	8	tea.
9	There was a fire at the Marriott Hotel when we were in	9	Q. Right.
10	Docklands. We attend the control room that's me and	10	So the CO or CRO is on a 999 call
11	my colleagues on fires above or incidents above 12	11	A. Yes.
12	pumping appliances, and we are involved there. We play	12	Q being assisted by an AOM. Where were would the AOMs
13	a support role there.	13	sit or stand?
14	Q. How many FSG calls did that involve?	14	A. Sorry, do you want general operations or during the
15	A. The Marriott Hotel? I think about six or seven.	15	night of Grenfell or a fire survival guidance call?
16	Q. Right.	16	Q. Quite right, yes, I need to be clearer.
17	A. Nothing in the scale of Lakanal, or Grenfell.	17	Generally speaking, and take Merton because that's
18	Q. What's the most in terms of numbers of FSG calls at	18	the normal place of operations, you've got a CRO who
19	a single incident that you personally have ever had to	19	takes a call from a building which is on fire.
20	handle?	20	A. Yes.
21	A. That would be the Lakanal incident prior to	21	Q. That CRO is assisted by
22	Q. Lakanal?	22	A. No, not necessarily. The CROs are trained to take those
23	A Grenfell.	23	calls and make the assessment about what resources you
24	Q. When was the Marriott Hotel?	24	need to send and mobilise those resources without
25	A. 2010.	25	support from a supervisor.
	Page 33		Page 35
	1 uge 55		1 4ge 55
1	Q. Right.	1	Q. Okay.
2	Can I just ask you now to turn to page 2 of your	2	A. They are on hand should you need them and they could
3	witness statement. You explain in the first paragraph	3	raise their hand or let someone know.
4	there the structure of the control room, and the staff.	4	Q. That was my next question: if they decided they needed
5	Physically, where would you actually sit or stand	5	help, what would they do?
6	within the control room in, let's say, Merton to start	6	A. They could raise their hand or maybe the person next to
7	with?	7	them would notice that and they would alert
8	A. Okay, so if I could just clarify, I think during the	8	a supervisor.
9	interview I began to explain about our control room	9	Q. Would it be the supervisor or would it be the AOM?
10	structure and then went on to explain what roles control	10	A. So AOMs are supervisors; they carry out the supervisory
11	carry out on a shift-by-shift basis, so they've merged	11	role.
12	those into one	12	Q. Yes, as you told us before. So they raise their hands,
13	Q. Yes.	13	the AOM is sitting next to them or stands by them, how
14	A I believe.	14	does it work physically?
15	Q. Okay.	15	A. They can either monitor them from their position so
16	A. But I would sort of stand at the back of the supervisory	16	the supervisors sit facing the control room and the
17	position.	17	control room operators. They have the ability to
18	Q. So you would have a good view of what was going on?	18	monitor the call in their headset, so they can listen
19	A. Yes.	19	in, or they could go and stand next to them.
20	Q. When would you get involved in a particular 999 call	20	Q. I see. So they can hear the call at the same time?
21	that was going on with one of your CROs?	21	A. Yes.
22	A. If they needed support and the supervisors were busy,	22	Q. They have a facility for that, do they?
23	then I might be able to offer I would be able to	23	A. Yes.
24	offer some support. But mainly it's an oversight	24	Q. Right.
25	role. We take and manage to field off some calls for	25	Then if the AOM needs help, they go to the OM, do
	Page 34		Page 36

1	they?	1	emergency calls, ensuring that their mobilisations are
2	A. Yes, they can do.	2	correct and making sure that London has sufficient fire
3	Q. Right. Then	3	cover.
4	A. But it would be unlikely that they would need help; they	4	Q. I see.
5	would be able to resolve the issue.	5	The officer in charge, is that the same thing as the
6	Q. Right.	6	officer of the watch?
7	Now, on the night of 13/14 June 2017, Brigade	7	A. No. It probably gets a bit more complicated. So the
8	control was based at Stratford, not Merton.	8	supervisors are all known as officer of the watch.
9	A. Stratford, yes.	9	Q. So you were an officer of the watch?
10	Q. That was I think because there were some kind of works	10	A. No. So if you were a supervisor, an AOM or an OM, and
11	or something happening at Merton.	11	you sit at the supervisory position, you are known as
12	A. Yes, just routine security updates with our mobilising	12	an officer of the watch.
13	system, and because of the interference, we felt it was	13	Q. I see, okay. I think I've got that.
14	better to relocate to Stratford. But we also like to	14	A. So when you pick up the phone to answer the call not
15	exercise our resilience at Stratford every other month	15	999 calls but admin calls you answer it, "Officer of
16	as well, so it just coincided.	16	the watch"
17	Q. In terms of the personnel set-up on the night of the	17	Q. Right.
18	fire, how many AOMs did you have?	18	A rather than your name or your rank.
19	A. Two AOMs and one OM on duty.	19	Q. I see. So that I am clear, an officer of the watch is
20	Q. So you had two AOMs and one OM, and the OM was Alex	20	an OM or an AOM
21	Norman, we know that.	21	A. Yes.
22	A. Yes.	22	Q but not a CRO or an SOM?
23	Q. Was there a resource management logistics officer on	23	A. No. That's right. That's correct.
24	duty that night?	24	Q. Okay. Right.
25	A. So the resource management and logistics is one of the	25	Going back to the question of the control room
	Page 37		Page 39
,	1 (1 ( ) ( ) ( )		1: 6 0 11
1	roles that a control officer can do.	1	set-up, you were working from Stratford because of
2	Q. Who was that who was occupying that role?	2	routine security updates at Merton.
3	A. I don't think it was specifically given to anyone on	3	A. Yes.
4	that night; it was just something that would've had to	4	Q. How long had control been operating out of Stratford on
5	be undertaken had we needed to use that and notify	5	that occasion?
6	Q. And I think you also had	6	A. They went across on the 13th at 8 o'clock in the
7	A additional people.	7	morning.
8	Q. Sorry, I cut off your answer. Do you want to	8	Q. Okay.
10	A. No.	9	And is that a big move? Do you have to do a lot in
10	Q. I think you also had three CROs on and two doing	10	order to move from Merton to Stratford?
11	overtime.	11	A. No, we make sure everyone knows in advance. There are
12	A. We would've had more than three CROs on. So there were	12	some phone lines that need to be transferred across, but
13	three supervisors, two AOMs and one OM. The rest would	13	it's a well-practised routine.
14	have been control operators and two of those were on	14	Q. Does it have the same facilities as Merton?
15	overtime.	15	A. Yes, more or less. It's less positions. It's smaller,
16	Q. Right. Okay.	16	so there's only 16 mobilising positions at Stratford.
17	Did the control room have its full complement of	17	Q. Only 16?
18	staff?	18	A. Only 16.
19	A. Yes, they were 11.	19	Q. As opposed to what at Merton?
20	Q. Who was the officer in charge?	20	A. 22 in the main control room and an additional seven in
21	A. That would've been Alex Norman, the OM.	21	our training suite.
22	Q. Right.	22	Q. You refer to mobilising positions; what are those?
23	What does it mean to be the officer in charge?	23	A. So they are positions which have our mobilising system
24	A. So they are primarily managing London fire control's	24	on them, so you need to log into those and then you're
25	response or London Fire Brigade's response to	25	able to take calls and mobilise.
	Page 38		Page 40
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1	Q. Can you just give me a picture of what that looks like?	1	A. It's called a call collection form, so a CCF, as we know
2	You sit down at a desk.	2	it.
3	A. Yes.	3	Q. Right. And does it come up automatically or do they
4	Q. If you're a CRO at a mobilising position, what have you	4	have to bring it up?
5	got in front of you?	5	A. It comes up automatically.
6	A. So you've got two screens in front of you, one that	6	Q. On which screen, the incident list screen or map screen?
7	contains an incident list.	7	A. You can change it, but it comes up on the incident list
8	Q. Incident list?	8	screen.
9	A. Yes.	9	Q. It's a call collection form. What are the spaces on the
10	Q. What's that?	10	form?
11	A. So that's all the incidents that are ongoing.	11	A. So it has telephone number, caller's telephone number,
12	Q. Right.	12	details about other agencies if we need to inform them,
13	A. That we're currently dealing with.	13	where we can put their reference numbers. It has the
14	Q. Yes.	14	address of the incident, or an address field where you
15	A. And then there is another screen I mean, you can	15	can put the address of the incident.
16	change them, but there's another screen which contains	16	Q. You have to input that, do you?
17	a map.	17	A. Yes, you do.
18	Q. Right.	18	Q. What other details?
19	A. And then what we call a bingo card, so they have all the	19	A. The incident type code. So what incident we are going
20	stations listed on them and all the officers on them.	20	to.
21	Q. A bingo card?	21	Q. I see. So would high-rise have its own code?
22	A. Yes.	22	A. Yes.
23	Q. Is that actually a card or is it on the screen?	23	Q. Okay. As opposed to, say, grassland?
24	A. It's on the screen.	24	A. Yes.
25	Q. Right, okay. And you can call up this bingo card, can	25	Q. And that would then, what, have a PDA, a predetermined
	Page 41		Page 43
1	vou?	1	attendance?
1 2	you?	1 2	attendance?  A. Ves. So the operator would decide which incident type
2	A. Yes.	2	A. Yes. So the operator would decide which incident type
2 3	A. Yes. Q. Just pops up.	2 3	A. Yes. So the operator would decide which incident type code to use. There's a space to put further
2 3 4	A. Yes.  Q. Just pops up.  Right, and the incident list, what is that data?	2 3 4	A. Yes. So the operator would decide which incident type code to use. There's a space to put further information, so if they needed to put any further
2 3 4 5	<ul> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. Just pops up.</li> <li>Right, and the incident list, what is that data?</li> <li>A. There's two incident lists, so there's a short version</li> </ul>	2 3 4 5	A. Yes. So the operator would decide which incident type code to use. There's a space to put further information, so if they needed to put any further information, they would write that in there or type that
2 3 4 5 6	<ul> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. Just pops up.</li> <li>Right, and the incident list, what is that data?</li> <li>A. There's two incident lists, so there's a short version where you just see the address and the incident type</li> </ul>	2 3 4 5 6	A. Yes. So the operator would decide which incident type code to use. There's a space to put further information, so if they needed to put any further information, they would write that in there or type that in there, and then they can click a button which will
2 3 4 5 6 7	<ul> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. Just pops up. Right, and the incident list, what is that data?</li> <li>A. There's two incident lists, so there's a short version where you just see the address and the incident type that we're attending, and then there's a big one which</li> </ul>	2 3 4 5	A. Yes. So the operator would decide which incident type code to use. There's a space to put further information, so if they needed to put any further information, they would write that in there or type that in there, and then they can click a button which will give them the PDA, which will offer them the PDA.
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1	Q. Not 50 metres or 18 metres or anything like that?	1 can look at the incident.	
2	A. No, no.	2 Q. Right. BOSS is a viewing platform, is it?	
3	Q. Okay. And that's something that the control room	3 A. It is a viewing platform, yes.	
4	officer would ask, is it?	4 Q. The actual platform itself, the incident log database,	
5	A. Yes.	5 has that got a name?	
6	Q. How many floors?	6 A. The information comes from Vision.	
7	A. Yes.	7 Q. Vision. Right.	
8	Q. Okay.	8 A. Which is what our mobilising system is called.	
9	Once that information has come up, what happens	9 Q. So the contents of the Vision database are visible to	
10	next? What does the CRO do next?	the CRO on the incident list screen; is that right?	
11	A. So they can click on another button and it pulls the	11 <b>A. Yes.</b>	
12	PDA it displays the PDA, which is in a histogram and	12 Q. Okay.	
13	will show the nearest resources to that incident.	13 A. If they clicked on that, yes.	
14	Q. Okay.	Q. But they are also viewable remotely by BOSS, which is	
15	And then how does the CRO send a call to the nearest	15 A. Yes.	
16	fire station to mobilise?	16 Q as you say, a viewing platform.	
17	A. So once they are happy with that predetermined	17 A. Yes.	
18	attendance and don't need to make any changes, they can	18 Q. Okay.	
19	press another button and it will automatically be sent	19 Can I ask you to look at something and see if you	
20	to the stations to mobilise the appliances.	20 can just help me with it.	
21	Q. Okay.	You have probably heard that we've been working from	n
22	Would that enable the CRO to say, "They're on their	22 something called a short incident log.	
23	way"?	23 A. Yes.	
24	A. No, they would only say they would say to a caller,	Q. Yes. Can I ask you just to look at it. It's at tab 23	
25	"Yes, they're on their way", and they mainly can	of our bundle and it's MET00013830. It's a longish	
	D 45	D 45	
	Page 45	Page 47	
1	mobilise and do mobilise appliances whilst they're still	document, even though it's called a short incident log,	
2	talking to a caller.	2 and there is a long incident log.	
3	Q. Yes. Okay.	3 A. Yes.	
	•		
4	As the incident then develops, what further	4 Q. That's the start of it. Are you familiar with this type 5 of document?	
4 5	As the incident then develops, what further information comes up on the incident list? I think you	4 Q. That's the start of it. Are you familiar with this type	
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Q. And station G27, that's North Kensington. 1 A. So each call we receive generates an incident number, so 2 2 all the other incidents and all the other calls 3 3 associated with the main incident. Q. Is that always the first responder station? 4 A. No, not necessarily; that's whose station ground that 4 Q. Right. 5 5 Now, these numbers, I mean, we can see that most of incident is on. 6 them on the right-hand side are 14062017, which is 6 Q. I see, okay. 7 7 clearly the date. Might there be more than one? Might there be more 8 8 A. Yes. than one station? 9 9 A. No, no, there will only be one station's ground, but you Q. I am guessing, but that looks like the date. Then the 10 might not get Golf 27, depending where the incident is, 10 numbers on the left-hand side, before the dash, are 11 those telephone numbers or are they assigned LFB 11 attending that station[sic]. There might be a nearer 12 12 numbers? station. 13 13 Q. And what's status F? A. No, they're just an assigned incident number. 14 A. Fire. 14 Q. So what would they be assigned to? A particular call? 15 Q. Fire. Okay. Right. 15 A. Yes, so each individual call would have its own incident 16 A. Oh, sorry, I think that's finished. It's just a data 16 number and then the control officer would take details 17 when we close and complete incidents. 17 of that call, but obviously they wouldn't mobilise 18 Q. And "Call: 00:54:29", I'm assuming that that's the first 18 a separate attendance; they would just add it to the 19 call? 19 20 Q. Right. 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Then you have "Original Type: A1", what's that? 21 A. And the main incident. 22 Q. Okay. I see. They're always six-digit numbers, are 22 A. So the original incident type that the control operator 23 put into the incident to generate the mobilisation was 23 they, starting with a 07? 24 an A1, which is a fire. 24 A. No, it just starts at 0 at the beginning of the year and 25 25 would start from there. O. A1 is fire? Page 49 Page 51 A. Yes. 1 Q. Oh, I see, okay. So looking at the first one -- there 1 2 Q. "Additional types: 10PF 15PF", I think we can guess at 2 are a couple of curiosities, though. The very first one 3 3 is 01022017. what that is, but could you just tell us? 4 A. So those would've been incident upgrades as the incident 4 A. Yes, I believe that's just a system anomaly. 5 progressed. So you can see six-pump fire, eight-pump 5 Q. I see. What about the second one, 0806? 6 fire, A1HR, which would be the high-rise attendance, 6 A. Yes. 7 fire survival guidance, G1 is major incident, PR is 7 Q. 8 June. 8 persons reported. 8 A. Again, that's just a system anomaly. 9 9 Q. Okay. And then looking at the third one, 076032, then Q. I see, okay. 10 10 A. Then it goes up to a 40-pump fire. they go on. 11 Q. Right. 11 12 12 Q. 33, 38, 39, 42, et cetera. Those are like serial Ms Smith, we've been going for just over an hour. 13 Are you comfortable to keep going for another 10 minutes 13 numbers, are they? 14 14 before we have a break --A. Yes. 15 A. Yes. 15 Q. Moving on through, then, so you can know how many calls, Q. - or would you like a break now? 16 these are all individual calls, are they? 16 17 17 A. Ten minutes. A. Yes. 18 Q. Let's keep going with this document, Mr Chairman, if we 18 Q. Right. And some of them may be from the same caller? 19 19 A. Yes. 20 Then you get, "Repeat Calls: 344", what's that? 20 Q. I see. Go three calls from the same caller would have 21 A. That's the number of calls we received in the control 21 three numbers attached to it? 22 room that night. 22 A. That's correct. 23 Q. Then underneath it we have a long list of numbers. 23 Q. Can we tell from that, then, that there were in total at 24 A. Yes. 24 Grenfell 344 calls received by CROs in the control room? 25 Q. Could you tell us what those are? 25 A. Yes. Page 50 Page 52

1	Q. Right.	1	Q. Right. And it has you as assigned at 01.29.41.
2	Over to page 8, you have "Address" and you have	2	A. Yes.
3	"Summary", and the summary would be applied into the	3	Q. While we're on it, because otherwise we'll come back to
4	database at what point? Because we can tell here it	4	it, do you know why it doesn't have a time for mobile or
5	says 40-pump fire, so we know that was after the make-up	5	for on scene for you?
6	to 40.	6	A. Yes, because I never attend the incident. I just attend
7	A. Yes.	7	control. So it would be the assign would be
8	Q. Would it be immediately afterwards or at the end of the	8	an informative page.
9	incident?	9	Q. I see. Okay.
10	A. No, that would be generated by the stop message.	10	A. Actually.
11	Q. Okay.	11	Q. So control room staff, although they're listed as
12	A. And then additional details, so it's got about reliefs	12	officers assigned with a time of assignment, don't
13	to attend.	13	generally go status 2 or status 3?
14	Q. Right.	14	A. Wouldn't generate no, because we wouldn't be attached
15	Then we go into the details of appliances, and	15	to the incident, because we wouldn't proceed to the
16	I think that's self-explanatory, but just to be clear,	16	incident.
17	you have call sign, station, status 1 and status 1	17	Q. I see.
18	is? If you could just explain to us, what is status 1?	18	A. That would be the same as actually if you look at press,
19	A. Available at their home station.	19	PR6, there would be a notification there but she
20	Q. Available. Then you have "Plus". What does that mean?	20	wouldn't attend the incident.
21	A. So the top would be the initial attendance, the first	21	Q. Right. Okay, we'll look at that.
22	attendance that we would send, and when they made the	22	Page 17 is where we have the start of sorry, can
23	incident up, anything else would show as reinforcements.	23	I just ask you something, I've just noticed it,
24	Q. We have "Mobile", which is status 2, and "On Scene",	24	actually.
25	which is status 3. I think we've established that	25	Bottom of page 16, while I'm on it, it has
	Page 53		Page 55
1	decreate attended	١,	additional data harman armandamen alastricita
1	through other witnesses.	$\begin{vmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{vmatrix}$	additional data, borough, command areas, electricity
2 3	A. Yes.  O. Then "A veilable" is that the time when they clocked	3	provider, other agency call reference and water company.  A. Yes.
4	Q. Then "Available", is that the time when they clocked off, as it were?	4	Q. Is that already on the database or does that have to be
5	•	5	inputted during an incident?
6	A. Yes, booked away from the incident. Q. Right.	6	A. No, so the borough and the command area and the
7	Now, this information we see in this box here, this	7	electricity provider will be on the incident, depending
8	is just the first page of it, would this be available	8	on the location of the incident, as will the water
9	dynamically as it evolved to a control room operator on	9	company. Other agency call ref would be those agencies
10	their screen in front of them?	10	that we've contacted, so Surrey would be one of them,
11	A. Yes. It would look different, but that information is	11	and we'd keep everyone's reference information
12	available to our control staff.	12	reference.
13	Q. Then you have "Reinforc[e]" all the way down and	13	Q. So somebody in the control room would actually have
14	"Relief", et cetera.	14	to or somebody somewhere update or input that
15	A. Yes.	15	specific data during an incident, would they?
16	Q. Then over on page 13 you have officers, call sign, name,	16	A. The other agency call reference, when they took a call
17	assign, mobile, on scene, available.	17	or informed another agency, they would ask for their
18	A. Yes.	18	reference and exchange our reference number, and they
19	Q. Again, would this information be available to any	19	would put that in that field.
20	control room operator?	20	Q. Right. During the incident?
21	A. Yes.	21	A. Yes.
22	Q. Okay.	22	Q. Right. Okay.
23	We can see your name three-quarters of the way down	23	Do you know who goes about that exercise? Is it
24	that list as BC02. Is that Brigade control number 2?	24	somebody in the control room or somebody remote from the
25	A. Yes.	25	control room?
		"	
	Page 54		Page 56
		-	

1	A 14	1	A. Channel 4.
1 2	A. It would be a control officer in the control room.	1 2	
	Whoever spoke to another agency or received a call from		Q. Okay. Is that on the main scheme radio?
3	the other agency. Q. Right, okay.	3	A. Yes.
4		4	Q. Okay. And that radio link from the pump, that's
5	Now, we can turn to page 17 and we start the actual	5	contained in the appliance, is it?
6	log of incidents, as it were. It says "Narrative" at	6	A. Yes.
7	the top.	7	Q. Can it also be sent from a fire ground radio?
8	Again, this information, as time goes on, is that	8	A. Not a fire ground radio, no.
9	available on a control room officer's screen?	9	Q. I see.
10	A. Yes.	10	A. But an Airwave radio, which officers have and I think
11	Q. So if they want to see it, they can see it?	11	command units have as well.
12	A. Yes.	12	Q. Right.
13	Q. Can you just help me as to how that information gets in	13	A. So that's just a mobile radio.
14	there? So just taking, for example, 01.13.39	14	Q. That's helpful. So you can't send a message like that
15	A. Yes.	15	from your fire ground radio.
16	Q let's just look at that, and it is an example. SAD,	16	A. No.
17	that's the op.	17	Q. You can send a message like that from either an Airwave
18	A. Yes.	18	radio which officers have
19	Q. And I think I can guess who that might be, but would you	19	A. Yes.
20	tell me?	20	Q or from the radio in the cab
21	A. Sharon Darby.	21	A. Yes.
22	Q. Yes:	22	Q of an appliance?
23	"Make Up	23	A. (Nodded assent).
24	"IUP G331 MAKE PUMPS SIX AND ONE HP."	24	Q. Okay. Is that channel 4 sometimes called RT4?
25	Now, who inputs that information into the Vision	25	A. Yes.
	Page 57		Page 59
1	system to start with?	1	Q. Okay. Right.
2	A. So Sharon would've done that. She was on the radio	2	Then that comes into the control room and
3	position that night and she would've taken a call. She	3	Sharon Darby or somebody in her position types that into
4	would have taken a radio message from Golf 331 to make	4	the Vision database?
5	the incident six and HPs one, so she would've typed that	5	A. Yes.
6	into the incident log.	6	Q. Right. Then everybody whose got access to the Vision
7	Q. Right. So the make-up starts with a decision on the	7	database can then see it?
8	incident ground with the incident commander	8	A. Yes.
9	A. Yes.	9	Q. Okay.
10	Q let's assume. It gets radioed from stop me if	10	Does that message then get confirmed in a different
11	I get this wrong.	11	way or additionally back to the fire ground?
12	A. Okay.	12	A. So our radio operators would repeat that message as soon
13	Q. It gets radioed, does it, from the incident command	13	as the message was given. So Golf 331 would make pumps
14	pump?	14	six, and as a radio operator, you would repeat that back
15	A. Yes.	15	to confirm.
16	Q. Or the pump sending the message, as the case may be, to	16	Q. I see. So is it right, then, that every time you see
17	the control room.	17	a message in here with an op next to it, which I think
18	A. Yes.	18	is invariably the case as we turn the pages, we know who
19	Q. Just pausing there, what's that radio link? What	19	typed that into the system?
20	channel is that?	20	A. Mainly. There are some computer-generated ones, so
21	A. It depends if you're north or south of the river. So	21	system-generated comments, but they do have
22	channel 2 or channel 4.	22	an operator's name next to them.
	Q. Channel 2 or channel 4?	23	Q. Right.
23	Q. Chamer 2 or chamer 4:		
	A. Yes.	24	A. I can't see one at the moment.
23		24 25	A. I can't see one at the moment.  MR MILLETT: Okay. As we turn the pages in this, which

1	we're going to do a little bit, maybe we can pick up	1	room or just because Surrey happened to receive a 999
2	some examples.	2	call relating to the incident?
3	But perhaps that may be an appropriate moment,	3	A. Surrey would've received a 999 call relating to the
4	Mr Chairman, for a break.	4	incident just because we were experiencing a vast amount
5	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Is that convenient?	5	of calls in our control room, and then the BT operator
6	MR MILLETT: Yes.	6	would have looked to pass them to our buddy service,
7	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, we'll have a break now,	7	which is North West Fire Control, but I spoke to the BT
8	give everyone a chance to stretch their legs, perhaps	8	operator on that night, or the BT exchange, and asked
9	have a cup of coffee.	9	them to pass them round to our neighbouring fire rescue
10	We'll resume at 11.30.	10	services as well.
11	THE WITNESS: Okay.	11	Q. Why doesn't North West appear on there?
12	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I have to ask you not to talk about	12	A. It probably would do. That's probably a brief. If you
13	your evidence or anything related to it during the	13	looked at the incident, that would appear as well.
14	break. Is that all right?	14	Q. Do you have fixed buddy control rooms or do you have to
15	THE WITNESS: Thank you.	15	hunt around on the night for who is available?
16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you. If you would like to go	16	A. No, so we have an MoU with North West Fire Control and
17	with the usher.	17	Staffordshire and West Mids control room. We're the
18	11.30, then, please.	18	three biggest fire control rooms in the UK and we have
19	(11.15 am)	19	a three-way partnership arrangement which we take calls
20	(A short break)	20	for each other, should we need to, and we can also
21	(11.30 am)	21	mobilise on behalf of them.
22	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, happy to carry on?	22	Q. And that buddy system, when did that come in?
23	THE WITNESS: Yes.	23	A. We've always had buddy arrangements with other fire and
24	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good, thank you.	24	rescue services. I believe the North West and
25	Yes, Mr Millett.	25	Staffordshire and West Mids was 2012.
	Page 61		Page 63
		1	
1	MR MILLETT: Mc Smith thank you	1	O Was that as a result of Lakanal House?
1	MR MILLETT: Ms Smith, thank you.	1 2	Q. Was that as a result of Lakanal House?
2	We were looking at the short incident log and I have	2	A. No.
	We were looking at the short incident log and I have some further questions on it.	2 3	A. No. Q. Okay.
2 3 4	We were looking at the short incident log and I have some further questions on it.  Can I just go back a little bit this often	2 3 4	A. No. Q. Okay. The other thing I just wanted to ask you about under
2 3 4 5	We were looking at the short incident log and I have some further questions on it.  Can I just go back a little bit this often happens after breaks, I'm afraid just to the bottom	2 3 4 5	A. No. Q. Okay. The other thing I just wanted to ask you about under additional data are the words "BABCOCKS REF", and then
2 3 4 5 6	We were looking at the short incident log and I have some further questions on it.  Can I just go back a little bit this often happens after breaks, I'm afraid just to the bottom of page 16 of the same document, where you can see	2 3 4 5 6	A. No. Q. Okay. The other thing I just wanted to ask you about under additional data are the words "BABCOCKS REF", and then you have a number underneath, FB1706140052.
2 3 4 5 6 7	We were looking at the short incident log and I have some further questions on it.  Can I just go back a little bit this often happens after breaks, I'm afraid just to the bottom of page 16 of the same document, where you can see additional data.	2 3 4 5 6 7	A. No. Q. Okay. The other thing I just wanted to ask you about under additional data are the words "BABCOCKS REF", and then you have a number underneath, FB1706140052. Can you explain what that is?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	We were looking at the short incident log and I have some further questions on it.  Can I just go back a little bit this often happens after breaks, I'm afraid just to the bottom of page 16 of the same document, where you can see additional data.  A. Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	A. No. Q. Okay. The other thing I just wanted to ask you about under additional data are the words "BABCOCKS REF", and then you have a number underneath, FB1706140052. Can you explain what that is? A. So Babcocks are the people that service our fire
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1	Q. In addition to things like mechanical breakdowns, what	1	would have two screens in front of them with the Vision
2	other services did Babcocks offer?	2	terminals on them, the map and the incident list, and
3	A. So I think they have some resources that if they're	3	they would have what we call an ICS by the side of them,
4	required at the incident, we can mobilise them.	4	which is an electronic touch-screen telephone pad, and
5	Q. Such as?	5	they would make a call from that and that would be
6	A. I can't recall offhand.	6	classed as an admin call.
7	Q. I mean, would there be human skills?	7	Q. And an admin call is made by the CRO by use of the
8		8	
9	A. No.	9	screen to whom? Who would an admin call go to?
	Q. So what kind of skills then?		A. That would depend on who we were notifying of
10	A. So they would be resources that you'd need, so not human	10	an incident. So it could be made to a senior officer,
11	kind, so they would be vehicles.	11	it could be made to a water company or electricity board
12	Q. Right. Equipment?	12	or to a command unit.
13	A. Yes.	13	Q. But it would be made, would it, to a telephone and not
14	Q. Okay.	14	a radio?
15	Do you know anything about the arrangements between	15	A. Yes, always.
16	the London Fire Brigade and Babcocks so far as supply of	16	Q. So admin calls are telephones. Airwave radios are RT4.
17	these services to vehicles and supply of equipment is	17	A. Yes.
18	concerned?	18	Q. They are both recorded.
19	A. No, that wouldn't be my area. We would just know who to	19	A. Yes.
20	contact should the incident request them.	20	Q. Where are they recorded?
21	Q. Do you recall any kind of problems with Babcocks during	21	A. They're recorded on the system. They're available for
22	the night about the supply of equipment or servicing?	22	control officers to play back on their mobilising
23	A. No, I don't.	23	system, and then they go into a database which we are
24	Q. Before we just go back to the short incident log, we	24	able to access.
25	were talking earlier about Airwave radios.	25	Q. Then we have the main scheme radio.
	Page 65		Page 67
1	A. Yes.	1	A. Yes.
2	Q. Those are portable radios which you said senior officers	2	Q. Now, that's not a piece of portable equipment.
3	have.	3	Well, let me ask you: what is the main scheme radio?
4	A. Yes.	4	A. So that is the Airwave radio.
5	Q. Above what rank? Or at what rank and above?	5	Q. Right. That's the same thing, is it?
6	A. Station manager.	6	A. Yes.
7	Q. Station manager.	7	Q. Okay. So does Airwave describe the system of
8	And those Airwave radios can access the control room	8	communication or the actual piece of kit you hold in
9	directly	9	your hand?
10	A. Yes.	10	A. That's the piece of kit.
11	Q on channel 4?	11	Q. Right. So the Airwave radio allows you to access the
12	A. Yes.	12	main scheme radio system?
13	Q. Okay.	13	A. The main scheme radio is just a historic term that we
14	Are the contents of those messages on RT4 between	14	still use.
15	Airwave radio and control room recorded?	15	Q. So Airwave and main scheme are interchangeable?
16	A. Yes.	16	A. Yes.
17	Q. Have you ever heard of something called an admin call?	17	Q. Now, in the cab, you have a radio.
18	A. Yes.	18	A. Yes.
10		1	Q. What is that radio?
19	Q. Is that the same as a message over the Airwave radio to	19	Q. What is that radio?
	Q. Is that the same as a message over the Airwave radio to control room?	19 20	A. That's an Airwave radio.
19 20	control room?	20	A. That's an Airwave radio.
19 20 21	control room?  A. No, that's a telephone conversation.	20 21	<ul><li>A. That's an Airwave radio.</li><li>Q. I see. So all appliances have an Airwave radio?</li></ul>
19 20 21 22	control room?  A. No, that's a telephone conversation.  Q. That's a telephone conversation. What is the telephone?	20 21 22	<ul><li>A. That's an Airwave radio.</li><li>Q. I see. So all appliances have an Airwave radio?</li><li>A. Yes.</li></ul>
19 20 21 22 23	control room?  A. No, that's a telephone conversation.  Q. That's a telephone conversation. What is the telephone?  Where is that telephone?	20 21 22 23	<ul> <li>A. That's an Airwave radio.</li> <li>Q. I see. So all appliances have an Airwave radio?</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. I follow. Okay. And that's just a fixed version of the</li> </ul>
19 20 21 22 23 24	control room?  A. No, that's a telephone conversation.  Q. That's a telephone conversation. What is the telephone?  Where is that telephone?  A. So that would be on our integrated communications	20 21 22 23 24	<ul> <li>A. That's an Airwave radio.</li> <li>Q. I see. So all appliances have an Airwave radio?</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. I follow. Okay. And that's just a fixed version of the portable version that station managers and above have?</li> </ul>
19 20 21 22 23	control room?  A. No, that's a telephone conversation.  Q. That's a telephone conversation. What is the telephone?  Where is that telephone?	20 21 22 23	<ul> <li>A. That's an Airwave radio.</li> <li>Q. I see. So all appliances have an Airwave radio?</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. I follow. Okay. And that's just a fixed version of the</li> </ul>
19 20 21 22 23 24	control room?  A. No, that's a telephone conversation.  Q. That's a telephone conversation. What is the telephone?  Where is that telephone?  A. So that would be on our integrated communications	20 21 22 23 24	<ul> <li>A. That's an Airwave radio.</li> <li>Q. I see. So all appliances have an Airwave radio?</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. I follow. Okay. And that's just a fixed version of the portable version that station managers and above have?</li> </ul>

O Right. That has the same functionality, does it, as the Ariwave radio held by senior officers?  A Nex. 3  A Vex. 3  A Yes. 4  O O Nay  O Nay and those calls are recorded, you say?  11 A. Vex. 9  O Finally, fire ground radios. Could you just describe those for us?  12 A. Yes. 19  A Not believe fire ground. So we have no information, or we don't hear any traffic or radio traffic on those fire ground. So we have no information, or we don't hear any traffic or radio traffic on those fire ground and so.  O Right. 19  O Are those calls recorded?  A So the cantrol speak which he was obviously it's information from calles for who English is not the building.  O Provided the call of the c				
A invasor radio held by senior officers?  A Ves.  O Okay.  So would it follow that the radio in the cab would endiver to be able to radio the control room on RT4, if you're in north london, and vice versa?  A Ves.  A Ves.  O Q. And those calls are recorded, you say?  A So I believe fire ground radios. Could you just describe the those for us?  Description of the control operator would as know many floors are in the building.  O Q. And those calls are recorded, you say?  A So I believe fire ground radios. Could you just describe those for us?  Description of the reground So we have no information, or we don't hear any traffic or radio traffers to the calls recorded?  A No.  O Right.  Going back, then, to the incident log, I just want to five attendance.  Page: 69  This is I F900000003.  Now, this is an early LTB document, if I could ask you to do that, it's tab 7 in the document, if I could ask you to do that, it's tab 7 in the document produced, incident.  Thes:  Description of the control open your own knowledge about a 4-minute gap between the initial attendance order and the make-up to four QTPA, when high rise incident ase recorded in the control officer's job is very experiential.  A Ves.  O Yes do know about that?  A Ves.  O Yes do know about that?  A No.  Yes control poor operators would ask how many floors are in the building.  A Ves.  The caller says fourth, which he was three pumpin appliances.  O Char, A Ves.  The call diverse in order to the category of the incident as you to do that, it's tab 7 in the document, if I could ask you to do that, it's tab 7 in the document, if I could ask you to food in the call the caller in the building.  The caller says fourth, which he would have a better the fire vas. A Ves.  O Then 80000003.  The caller says fourth, witch he would have be weet the fire vas. A ves.  Description from calles who many floors are in the their firest language. We do have a part of their new cultivation information from calles who many floors are in their firest language. We do have a pa	1	Q. Right. That has the same functionality, does it, as the	1	our control officer asks how many floors there are and
3 A. Yes. 5 So would it follow that the radio in the cab would enable the incident commander, for example, or the canable the incident commander, for example, or the diverse in beath to and the cantol recent on RT4, if you're in north Landon, and vice versa? 6 A. Yes. 6 Q. And those calls are recorded, you say? 6 A. Yes. 7 Yes believe fire ground radios. Could you just describe those for us? 8 The believe fire ground radios. Could you just describe those for us? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. And those calls are recorded, you say? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Finally, fire ground radios. Could you just describe those for us? 13 those was don't their are any traffic or radio information, or we don't hear any traffic or radio traffic on those fire ground radios. 15 Q. Are those calls recorded? 16 A. No. 17 A. O. Right. 18 Q. Are those calls recorded? 19 A. No. 10 Q. Right. 10 ask, you a question about the very start of the attendance. 21 If you go to a different document, if I could ask you a question about the very start of the attendance. 22 If you go to a different document, if I could ask you to look at it. 23 I high five just in the documents bundle. 24 If you go to a different document, if I could ask you a fine the inquiry. Can I just ask you to look at it. 25 Now, this is an early LFB document produced, it in the fire inquiry. Can I just ask you to look at it. 26 I fire QG71, G272 — G331 assigned to incident." 27 A. Yes. 28 A. Yes. 29 Q. You do know about that? 30 O. Then at 00.59 12, just about 4 minutes later. 31 Q. Then at 00.59 12, just about 4 minute later. 32 A. Yes. 33 Q. Then at 00.59 12, just about 4 minutes later. 34 G. Wood clammers in the assigned to the incident as part of PDA, when high rise incident ascertained." 35 A. Yes. 36 Q. You do know about that? 37 A. Yes. 38 Q. You do know about that? 39 Q. You do know about that? 30 Q. You do know about that? 31 Q. O you is pair perfaish the incident as a called, rist it, when asked, "Illow many floors have you got there?", to give the floor you're on? 31 Pape 71 I men		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	2	•
So would it follow that the radio in the cab would enable the inclident commander, for example, or the discovery to be able to radio the control room on RT4, if you're in north London, and vice versa?  A. Yes.  10. Q. And those calls are recorded, you say?  A. Yes.  11. A. Yes.  12. Q. Finally, fire ground radios. Could you just describe those for us?  13. A. So I believe fire ground radios are radios that are kept by crews to be used on the fire ground. So we have no information, or we don't hear any traffic or radio traffic on those fire ground radios.  13. Q. Are those calls recorded?  14. A. So I believe fire ground radios. So we have no information or we don't hear any traffic or radio traffic on those fire ground radios.  15. Q. Are hose calls recorded?  16. Q. Are hose calls recorded?  17. A. No.  18. Q. Are hose calls recorded?  18. Q. Are hose calls recorded?  19. A. No.  20. Q. Right.  10. Q. Sa training in how to extract information or we don't hear any traffic or radio traffic on those fire ground radios.  17. Coing back, then, to the incident log, I just want to ask you a question about the very start of the attendance.  22. If you go to a different document, if I could ask you to do that, if's tab 7 in the documents bundle.  23. Page 69  24. This is LFB00000003.  25. Now, this is an ently LFB document produced, it is a support the major of the incident o	3	•	3	to where the fire was, so we mobilised fire attendance
6 emble the incident commander, for example, or the 7 driver to he able to radio the control room on RT4, if 8 you're in north London, and vice versa? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. And those calls are recorded, you say? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Finally, fire ground radios. Could you just describe 13 those for us? 14 A. So I believe fire ground radios are radios that are kept 15 by erws to be used on the fire ground. So we have no 16 information, or we don't hear any traffic or radio 17 traffic on those fire ground radios. 18 Q. Are those calls recorded? 19 A. No. 20 Q. Right. 21 Going back, then, to the incident log. I just want 22 to asky ou a question about the very start of the 23 attendance. 24 If you go to a different document, if I could ask 25 you to do that, if is tab 7 in the documents bundle.  Page 69  1 This is I.FB0000003. 2 Now, this is an early LFB document produced, 3 I think, for the inquiry. Can I just ask you to look at 4 it. 4 it. 5 It says, halfway down, "00:54:29 First call to 6 incident." 7 Then: 8 "00:55:14 Pre-determined attendance (PDA) for call 10 for (27), G271, G272, G331 assigned to the incident as 15 part of PDA, when high rise incident ascertained." 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Do you know from your own knowledge about a 4-minute gap 18 between the initial attendance order and the make-up to 19 four pumps because of the discovery that it was 20 a high-rise? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. You do know about that? 23 A. (Nodded assent). 24 Q. Out ok know about that? 25 A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower, 26 A. No. 27 Q. You do know about that? 28 A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower, 29 C. You do know about that? 20 A. Out of know about that? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. You do know about that? 23 A. Conded assent). 24 C. Can you just explain what happened? 25 A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower, 26 A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower, 27 G. Pyes.	4	Q. Okay.	4	to the address, which was three pumping appliances.
driver to be able to radio the control room on RT4, if you're in north London, and vice versa?  A. Yes.  Q. And those calls are recorded, you say?  A. Yes.  Q. And those calls are recorded, you say?  A. So believe fire ground radios. Could you just describe those for us?  A. So believe fire ground radios are radios that are kept by crews to be used on the fire ground. So we have no information, or we don't hear any traffic or radio traffic on those fire ground radios. So we have no information, or we don't hear any traffic or radio traffic on those fire ground radios.  A. No.  Q. Are those calls recorded?  A. No.  Q. Are those calls recorded?  A. No.  Q. Right.  Q. Are those calls recorded?  A. No.  Q. Right.  D. A. No.  A. So the control operators get training in how to extract information from callers for who English is not their first language. We do have call handling training and that's done as part of their new entrusts training when they first plain the watch.  B. Q. Are those calls are recorded, you say?  A. No.  Q. Are those calls are recorded, you say?  A. No.  Q. Are those calls are recorded, you say?  A. No.  Q. Are those calls are recorded.  A. A. So the control operators get training in how to extract information from callers for whon English may not be their first language.  A. No thei	5	So would it follow that the radio in the cab would	5	Q. Okay. And normally what would happen in order to
driver to be able to radio the control room on RT4, if you're in north London, and vice versa?  A. Yes.  Q. And those calls are recorded, you say?  A. Yes.  Q. Finally, fire ground radios. Could you just describe those for us?  A. So believe fire ground radios. Could you just describe those for us?  A. So I believe fire ground radios are radios that are kept by crews to be used on the fire ground. So we have no information, or we don't hear any traffic or radio traffic on those fire ground radios.  Q. Are those calls are recorded?  A. No.  Q. Q. Right.  Q. Are those calls are recorded.  A. No.  Q. Q. Right.  A. So I believe fire ground radios. Could you just describe those for us?  It information, or we don't hear any traffic or radio traffic on those fire ground radios.  Traffic on those fire ground radios.  Q. Are those calls are recorded.  A. No.  Q. Q. Right.  Q. Are those calls are recorded.  A. No.  Q. Q. Right.  A. So I believe fire ground radios. Could you just describe those for us?  A. No.  150  Q. Are those calls are recorded, you say?  A. No.  161  A. Yes.  170  A. No.  A. So I believe fire ground radios. Could you just describe those for us?  A. No.  A. So I believe fire ground radios that are kept those for use of their firest language. We do have call handling training and that's done as part of their new entrusts training. When they're in an admit their first language. We do have call handling training and that's done as part of their new entrusts training. When they're in an admit countries to their first language. We do have a countries for whon plan in a main and that's done as part of their new entrusts training. When they're not be not their first language. We do have a countries for whon plan in the centrust training in their first language. We do have a countries for whon plan in their first language. We do have a hard that's done as part of their new entrusts training their formation from c	6	enable the incident commander, for example, or the	6	ascertain whether it's a high-rise?
9 A. Yes. 10 Q. And those calls are recorded, you say? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Finally, fire ground radios. Could you just describe the first stanguage and the fire first language? 13 those for us? 14 A. So I believe fire ground radios are radios that are kept by crews to be used on the fire ground. So we have no information or we don't hear any traffic or adio traffic on those fire ground radios. 16 Q. Are those calls recorded? 18 Q. Are those calls recorded? 19 A. No. 20 Q. Right. 21 Going back, then, to the incident log, I just want to ask you a question about the very start of the attendance. 22 attendance. 23 attendance. 24 If you go to a different document, if I could ask you to do that, it's tab 7 in the document produced, 3 I think, for the inquiry. Carl 1 just ask you to look at it. 3 I think, for the inquiry. Carl 1 just ask you to look at it. 4 it. 4 it. 5 It says, halfway down, "00-54:29 First call to incident." 7 Then: 8 "00.55:14 Pre-determined attendance (PDA) for call to fire; G271, G272 G331 assigned to incident." 9 A. Yes. 17 Q. Do you know from your own knowledge about 4-minute spape four pumps because of the discovery that it was a high-rise." 18 Do you know from your own knowledge about 4-minute apple four pumps because of the discovery that it was a high-rise. 20 Q. You do know about that? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. You do know about that? 23 A. (Noddea seent). 24 Q. Can you just explain what happened? 25 A. So I believe during the first lataguage? 26 A. So I believe during the first at call to Greafell Tower, 27 I believe during the first at call to Greafell Tower, 28 A. So I believe during the first at call to Greafell Tower, 30 Q. Carl was just explain what happened? 31 Limit, for the raquiry. 32 A. Coddea seent). 34 C. Garnyou just explain what happened? 35 A. So I believe during the first tall to Greafell Tower, 36 A. So I believe during the first all to Greafell Tower, 37 C. Q. Yes. 38 A. They have their intain the call handing training and that's done as part of PDA for a high-rise. 39 C. Gr	7		7	A. So the control operator would ask how many floors are in
10 Q. And those calls are recorded, you say? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Finally, fire ground radios. Could you just describe those for us? 13 A. So I believe fire ground radios are radios that are kept in information, or we don't hear any traffic or radio information, or we don't hear any traffic or radio traffic on those fire ground radios. 13 Q. Are those calls recorded? 14 A. No. 15 Q. Are those calls recorded? 16 Q. Are those calls recorded? 17 C. A. No. 18 Q. Are those calls recorded? 18 Q. Are those calls recorded? 19 A. No. 19 C. Are those calls recorded? 20 Q. Right. 21 Going back, then, to the incident log, I just want to ask you a question about the very start of the attendance. 22 If you go to a different document, if I could ask you to do that, if's tab 7 in the documents bundle. 23 attendance. 24 If joung to a different document, if I could ask you to do that, if's tab 7 in the documents bundle. 25 you to do that, if's tab 7 in the documents bundle. 26 It is aya, halfway down, "00.54.29 First call to incident." 27 Now, this is an early LFB document produced, incident." 28 "00.55.14 Pre-determined attendance (PDA) for call to fire G271, G272 G331 assigned to meident." 39 to fire G271, G272 G331 assigned to meident." 40 A. Yes. 41 Q. Do you know from your own knowledge about a 4-minute gap to four pumps because of the discovery that it was a high-rise. Park officer's job is very supervisors or gave an incorrect response. I believe the imitial attendance corder and the make-up to four pumps because of the discovery that it was a high-rise. In a high-rise buildings on our gazetteer, which is our mapping aid and our addressing tool, and they do have a number of high-rise buildings on our gazetteer, which is our mapping aid and our addressing tool, and they do have a number of high-rise buildings on our gazetteer, which is our mapping aid and our addressing tool, and they do have a auther of high-rise buildings on our gazetteer, which have a caller, isn't it, when asked, "How many floors have a calle	8	you're in north London, and vice versa?	8	the building.
11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Finally, fire ground radios. Could you just describe those for us? 13 those for us? 14 A. So I believe fire ground radios are radios that are kept by crews to be used on the fire ground. So we have no information, or we don't hear any traffic or radio traffic on those fire ground radios. 15 Q. Are those calls recorded? 16 Q. Particon those fire ground radios. 17 A. No. 18 Q. Are those calls recorded? 19 A. No. 20 Q. Right. 21 Going back, then, to the incident log. I just want to ask you a question about the very start of the attendance. 22 attendance. 23 attendance. 24 If you go to a different document, if I could ask you to do that, it's tab 7 in the documents bundle. 25 you to do that, it's tab 7 in the document produced, at it. 26 It says, halfway down, "00.54:29 First call to incident." 27 Then: 28 "00.55:14 Pre-determined attendance (PDA) for call to incident." 29 A. Yes. 20 Q. Su that's initially three pumps. 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. You do know from your own knowledge about a 4-minute gap a high-tise? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. You do know about that? 25 A. Yes. 26 Q. You do know about that? 27 A. Not specifically for callers for who English is not their first language. 28 A. So I believe during the first Language. 30 In that's done as part of their new entraints training when they first join the watch. 31 Os no training and that's done as part of their new entraints training when they first join the watch. 32 Os no training and that's done as part of their new entraints training when they first join the watch. 32 Os no training and that's done as part of their new entraints training when they first join the watch. 34 Os no training and that's done as part of their new entraints training when they first join the watch. 35 Os no training and not really able to describe very well what they're seeing or what they're experiencing? Is there training on that' some and not really able to describe very well what they're seeing or what they're experiencing? Is there training on that' some and not really able to de	9	A. Yes.	9	Q. Do control room operators get training in how to extract
12 Q. Finally, fire ground radios. Could you just describe those for us?  13 A. No to believe fire ground radios are radios that are kept by crews to be used on the fire ground. So we have no information, or we don't hear any traffic or radio 17 traffic on those fire ground radios.  18 Q. Are those calls recorded?  19 A. No.  20 Q. Right.  21 Going back, then, to the incident log, I just want 22 to ask you a question about the very start of the attendance.  22 If you go to a different document, if I could ask 25 you to do that, if it sub 7 in the documents bundle.  23 Page 69  1 This is LFB00000003.  2 Now, this is an early LFB document produced, 3 I think, for the inquiry. Can I just ask you to look at 4 it.  4 it.  5 It says, halfway down, "00.54.29 First call to 6 incident."  6 incident."  7 Then.  8 "00.55.14 Pre-determined attendance (PDA) for call to fire: G271, G272 G331 assigned to incident."  9 to fire: G271, G272 G331 assigned to incident as part of their new entrants training when they're coaching information from callers when may be in a panic and not really able to describe very well what they're seeing or what they're experiencing? Is there training on that?  22 A. No.  3 If think, for the inquiry. Can I just ask you to look at 4 it.  4 it.  4 it.  5 It says, halfway down, "00.54.29 First call to 6 incident."  6 incident."  6 incident."  7 Then.  8 "00.55.14 Pre-determined attendance (PDA) for call to fire: G271, G272 G331 assigned to incident as part of their new entrants training when they're experiencing? Is there training on that?  8 A. Yes.  10 Q. Then at 00.59.12, just about 4 minutes later.  11 Q. So that's initially three pumps.  12 A. Yes.  13 Q. Then at 00.59.12, just about 4 minutes later.  14 "G362 (Hammersmith) also assigned to the incident as part of their new entrants training when they're experiencies? Is there training and our addressing tool, and they do have a number of high-rise buildings on our gravetteer, which is our mapping aid and our addressing too	10	Q. And those calls are recorded, you say?	10	information from callers for whom English may not be
those for us?  A. So I believe fire ground radios are radios that are kept by crews to be used on the fire ground. So we have no information, or we don't hear any traffic or radio traffic on those fire ground radios.  Q. Archose calls recorded?  Q. Right.  Going back, then, to the incident log, I just want to sak you a question about the very start of the attendance.  If you go to a different document, if I could ask you to do that, it's tab 7 in the documents bundle.  Page 69  This is IFB00000003.  I think, for the inquiry. Can I just ask you to look at it.  I says, halfway down, "00-54:29 First call to incident."  Then:  A. Yes.  Q. Then at 00-59 12, just about 4 minutes later:  "G362 (Hammersmith) also assigned to the incident as a high-rise?" and PDA, when high rise incident as a high-rise?  Q. Do you know from your own knowledge about a 4-minute gap between the initial attendance order and the mak-up to four pumps because of the discovery that it was a high-rise? do A. Yes.  Q. You do know about that?  Q. Yes.  Q. You do know about that?  A. Yes.  Q. You do know about that?  A. Yes.  Q. You do know about that?  A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,  Then:  A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,  Then:  A. Yes.  A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,  Then:  A. Yes.  A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,  Then:  A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,  Then:  A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,  Then:  A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,  Then:  A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,  The sing of the match and the make-up to produce the first call to Grenfell Tower,  The sing of the first call to Grenfell Tower,  The sing of the first call to Grenfell Tower,  The sing of the first call to Grenfell Tower,  The sing of the first call to Grenfell Tower,  The sing of the first call to Grenfell Tower.  The sing of the first call to Grenfell Tower.  The sing of the	11	A. Yes.	11	their first language?
A. So I believe fire ground radios are radios that are kept by crews to be used on the fire ground. So we have no information, or we don't hear any traffic or radio traffic on those fire ground radios.  17 traffic on those fire ground radios.  18 Q. Are those calls recorded?  19 A. No.  20 Q. Right.  21 Going back, then, to the incident log, I just want to going back, then, to the incident log, I just want to going back, then, to the incident log, I just want to going back, then, to the incident log, I just want to going back, then, to the incident log, I just want to going back, then, to the incident log, I just want to going back, then, to the incident log, I just want to go to a different document, if I could ask you to do that, it's tab 7 in the documents bundle.  Page 69  1 This is LFB00000003.  2 Now, this is an early LFB document produced, to incident.  2 I think, for the inquiry. Can I just ask you to look at it.  3 I think, for the inquiry. Can I just ask you to look at it.  4 it.  4 it.  5 It says, halfway down, "00:54:29 First call to incident."  7 Then:  8 "00:55:14 Pre-determined attendance (PDA) for call to incident."  9 to fire: G271, G272 G331 assigned to incident."  10 A. Yes.  11 Q. Do you know from your own knowledge about a 4-minute gap between the initial attendance order and the make-up to four pumps because of the discovery that it was a part of PDA, when high rise incident ascertained."  10 A. Yes.  21 A. Yes.  22 Q. You do know about that?  23 A. Nodedde assent).  24 A. Yes.  25 A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,  25 A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,  26 A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,  27 The man that about the match and the produced of the floor you're on?  28 A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,  29 A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,  20 Can you just explain what happened?  21 A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,  22 Can you just explain what hap	12	Q. Finally, fire ground radios. Could you just describe	12	A. Not specifically for callers for who English is not
by crews to be used on the fire ground. So we have no information, or we don't hear any traffic or radio information, or we don't hear any traffic or radio traffic on those fire ground radios.  Q. Are those calls recorded?  Right.  Going back, then, to the incident log, I just want to ask you a question about the very start of the cosk, you a question about the very start of the 22 attendance.  Hiyou go to a different document, if I could ask you to do that, it's tab 7 in the documents bundle.  Page 69  This is I F100000003.  Now, this is an early LFB document produced, it is a list of the incident in the incident of incident."  It says, halfway down, 700.54.29 First call to fine: Gerrif (271, G272 G331 assigned to incident."  A. Yes.  Q. Then a 00.59 1.2, just about 4 minutes later:  Q. Then a 00.59 1.2, just about 4 minutes later:  Q. Then a 00.59 1.2, just about 4 minutes later:  Q. Do you know from your own knowledge about a 4-minute gap between the initial attendance order and the make-up to four pumps because of the discovery that it was a part of PDA, when high rise incident as part of PDA, when high rise incident as certained."  A. Yes.  Q. You do know about that?  A. Yes.  Q. You do know about that?  A. Yes.  20. You do know about that?  A. Yes.  21. A. Yes.  22. Q. You do know about that?  A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,  23. A. Sol believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,  D. So has initially three match.  D. So when they frex perimation from callers who may be in a panic and not really able to describe very well what they? coaching information from callers who may be in a panic and not really able to describe very well what they? coaching information from callers who may be in a panic and not really able to describe very well what they? coaching information from callers who may be in a panic and not really able to describe very well what they? coaching information from callers who may be in a panic and not really able to describe very well ath the type seeing	13	those for us?	13	their first language. We do have call handling training
information, or we don't hear any traffic or radio traffic on those fire ground radios.  Q. Are those calls recorded?  A. No.  Q. Right.  Going back, then, to the incident log, I just want to ask you a question about the very start of the attendance.  Brage 69  This is LFB00000003.  Now, this is an early LFB document produced, tit.  It says, halfway down, "00.54:29 First call to incident."  Then:  Then:  A. Yes.  Q. Broyn know from your own knowledge about a 4-minute gap porting four purps because of the discovery that it was a high-rise.  Q. Do you know from your own knowledge about a 4-minute gap porting for a gard and selection of the sure purps.  A. Yes.  Q. Can you just explain what happened?  A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower, or support son?  What about training for —I say "extracting" — coaxing information from callers who may be in a panic coaxing information from callers who may be in a panic and not really about training for —I say "extracting" — coaxing information from callers who may be in a panic and not really about training for —I say "extracting" — coaxing information from callers who may be in a panic and not really about training for —I say "extracting" — coaxing information from callers who may be in a panic and not really able to describe very well what they're experiencing? Is there training on that?  A. They have their nine-week training, but obviously it's all experiential. They take numerous 99 calls every day when they're experiencing? Is there training on that?  A. They have their nine-week training, but obviously it's all experiential. They take numerous 99 calls every day when they're experiencing? Is there training on that?  A. They have their nine-lays they received they and they received they received they are numerous 99 calls every day when they're experiencing? Is there training on that?  A. Yes.	14	A. So I believe fire ground radios are radios that are kept	14	and that's done as part of their new entrants training
traffic on those fire ground radios.  Q. Are those calls recorded?  A. No.  19 A. No.  19 Ging back, then, to the incident log, I just want to ask you a question about the very start of the 22 attendance.  23 attendance.  24 If you go to a different document, if I could ask you to do that, it's tab 7 in the documents bundle.  25 you to do that, it's tab 7 in the documents bundle.  26 Page 69  27  1 This is LFB00000003. 1 Ush, for the inquiry. Can I just ask you to look at it. 2 It says, halfway down, "00-54:29 First call to incident."  3 It says, halfway down, "00-54:29 First call to incident."  4 Ves.  10 Q. So that's initially three pumps.  11 Q. So that's initially three pumps.  12 A. Yes.  13 Q. Then at 00-59 12, just about 4 minutes later:  14 Gi362 (Hammersmith) also assigned to the incident as part of PDA, when high rise incident as a part of PDA, when high rise incident as part of PDA, when high rise incident as between the initial attendance order and the make-up to four pumps because of the discovery that it was a high-rise.  20 Q. Do you know from your own knowledge about a 4-minute gap between the initial attendance order and the make-up to four pumps because of the discovery that it was a high-rise buildings on our gazetteer, which is our mapping aid and our addressing tool, and they do have a number of high-rise buildings on our gazetteer, which is our mapping aid and our addressing tool, and they do have a number of high-rise buildings on our gazetteer, which is our mapping aid and our addressing tool, and they do have a number of high-rise buildings on our gazetteer, which is our mapping aid and our addressing tool, and they do have a number of high-rise buildings on our gazetteer,	15	by crews to be used on the fire ground. So we have no	15	when they first join the watch.
18 Q. Are those calls recorded? 19 A. No. 20 Q. Right. 21 Going back, then, to the incident log, I just want 22 to ask you a question about the very start of the 23 attendance. 24 If you go to a different document, if I could ask 25 you to do that, it's tab 7 in the documents bundle. 26 Page 69  1 This is LFB00000003. 1 This is LFB00000003. 2 Now, this is an early LFB document produced, 3 I think, for the inquiry. Can I just ask you to look at 4 it. 4 it. 5 It says, halfway down, "00-54/29 First call to 6 incident." 7 Then: 8 "00.55:14 Pre-determined attendance (PDA) for call 9 to fire: G271, G272 G331 assigned to incident." 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. So that's initially three pumps. 11 Q. So that's initially three pumps. 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Then at 00.59-12, just about 4 minutes later: 14 "G362 (Hammersmith) also assigned to the incident as part of PDA, when high rise incident as a high-rise? 16 Q. Do you know from your own knowledge about a 4-minute gap between the initial attendance order and the make-up to four pumps because of the discovery that it was a high-rise buildings on our gazetteer, which is our mapping aid and our addressing tool, and they do have a number of high-rise buildings on our gazetteer, which is our mapping aid and our addressing tool, and they do have a number of high-rise buildings on our gazetteer, which is our mapping aid and our addressing tool, and they do have a number of high-rise buildings on our gazetteer, which is our mapping aid and our addressing tool, and they do have a number of high-rise buildings listed on them, but not all of them. 2 Q. Yes. 2 A. Nodded assent). 2 G. You do know about that? 3 A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower, 2 So Do you therefore, to give the floor you're on? 3 So Delieve the floor you're on? 4 College aspecifically asked. "Is it a high-rise buildings listed on them, but not al	16	information, or we don't hear any traffic or radio	16	Q. So no training.
A. No. Q. Right. Q. Right. Q. Right. Q. Right. Going back, then, to the incident log, I just want to ask you a question about the very start of the attendance. Q. Right.  Zes to ask you a question about the very start of the attendance. Q. Bif you go to a different document, if I could ask you to do that, it's tab 7 in the documents bundle.  Page 69  Page 71  This is LFB00000003 Page 71  This is LFB00000003 I think, for the inquiry. Can I just ask you to look at it. It says, halfway down, "00:54:29 First call to incident." It says, halfway down, "00:54:29 First call to incident." Then: Q. So that's initially three pumps. Q. So that's initially three pumps. Q. So that's initially three pumps. Page 70  A. Yes. Then: Q. Do you know from your own knowledge about a 4-minute gap between the initial attendance corder and the make-up to for further pumps because of the discovery that it was a high-rise? A. Yes. A. Yes. A. Yes. A. No. Q. You do know about that? A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower, Q. Can you just explain what happened? A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower, Q. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower, Q. Can you got there?", to give the floor you're on?  and not really able to describe very well what they're secing or what they're on shift, and they here perincing? A. They have their nine-weck training, but obviously it's all experiential.  A. They have their nine-weck training, but obviously it's all experiential.  A. They take numerous 999 calls every day when they're on shift, and they have their raning on the ry take numerous 999 calls every day when they're on shift, and they have their raning on the ry take numerous 999 calls every day when they're on shift, and they have their on the they're on shift, and they have their raning on the representation on the first call to Grenfell Tower,  10	17	traffic on those fire ground radios.	17	What about training for I say "extracting"
20	18	Q. Are those calls recorded?	18	coaxing information from callers who may be in a panic
21 Going back, then, to the incident log, I just want 22 to ask you a question about the very start of the 23 attendance. 24 If you go to a different document, if I could ask 25 you to do that, it's tab 7 in the documents bundle.  26 Page 69  27 Page 71  1 This is LFB00000003. 2 Now, this is an early LFB document produced, 3 I think, for the inquiry. Can I just ask you to look at 4 it. 4 Obviously we can see here that originally there was 5 It says, halfway down, "00.54:29 First call to 6 incident." 7 Then: 8 "00.55:14 Pre-determined attendance (PDA) for call 9 to fire: G271, G272 G331 assigned to incident." 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. So that's initially three pumps. 11 Q. So that's initially three pumps. 11 Q. Then at 00.59.12, just about 4 minutes later: 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Then at 00.59.12, just about 4 minutes later: 14 "G362 (Hammersmith) also assigned to the incident as 15 part of PDA, when high rise incident ascertained." 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Do you know from your own knowledge about a 4-minute gap 18 between the initial attendance corder and the make-up to 19 four pumps because of the discovery that it was 20 a high-rise? 21 A. (Nodded assent). 22 Q. You do know about that? 23 all experiential. They take numerous 999 calls every 24 day when they're on shift, and they have their 25 all experiential. They take numerous 999 calls every 26 above the initial ask you to look at 27 day when they're on shift, and they have their 28 all experiential. They take numerous 999 calls every 29 day when they're on shift, and they have their 29 aut if they were having difficulties. But a control officer's job is very experiential. 20 Q. Okay.  21 Out if they were having difficulties. But a control officer's job is very experiential. 21 Q. Okay. 22 Q. You do know from in that and would help them 23 a letter their in that and would help them 24 a response or gave an incorrect response. I believe during this incident that one of our supervisors believed it was a high-rise, had a check, and then sent the countries of the discovery t	19	A. No.	19	and not really able to describe very well what they're
to ask you a question about the very start of the attendance.  24 If you go to a different document, if I could ask 25 you to do that, if's tab 7 in the documents bundle.  Page 69  Page 71  1 This is LFB00000003. 2 Now, this is an early LFB document produced, 3 I think, for the inquiry. Can I just ask you to look at 4 it. 4 Obviously we can see here that originally there was 5 If says, halfway down, "00:54:29 First call to 6 incident."  7 Then: 8 "00:55:14 Pre-determined attendance (PDA) for call 9 to fire: G271, G272 G331 assigned to incident."  10 A. Yes. 11 Q. So that's initially three pumps. 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Then at 00:59:12, just about 4 minutes later: 14 "G362 (Hammersmith) also assigned to the incident as 15 part of PDA, when high rise incident ascertained." 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Do you know from your own knowledge about a 4-minute gap 18 between the initial attendance order and the make-up to 19 four pumps because of the discovery that it was 20 a high-rise? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. You do know about that? 23 A. Role Heir nine-week training, but obviously it's all experiential. They take numerous 990 calls every day when they're on shift, and they have their supervisors to support them in that and would help them  Page 71  1 out if they were having difficulties. But a control officer's job is very experiential.  2 O. Would that be a frequent experience or not?  A. No.  A. No.  Q. Would that be a frequent experience or not?  A. There would be occasions where the callers couldn't give a response or gave an incorrect response. I believe during this incident that one of our supervisors believe during this incident that one of our supervisors 10 believed it was a high-rise, had a check, and then sent the additional attendance.  Q. Right. That would leave a lot to chance, though, wouldn't it, unless the original call handler had actually specifically asked: "Is it a high-rise?" or "Is it over five floors?"  A. Yes.  20 Dy vou do know about that?  21 A. Yes.  22 Q. You do know about that?  23 A. (Nodded assent).  2	20	Q. Right.	20	seeing or what they're experiencing? Is there training
attendance.  If you go to a different document, if I could ask you to do that, it's tab 7 in the documents bundle.  Page 69  Page 71  This is LFB00000003.  I think, for the inquiry. Can I just ask you to look at it.  It says, halfway down, "00:54:29 First call to incident."  Then:	21	Going back, then, to the incident log, I just want	21	on that?
If you go to a different document, if I could ask you to do that, it's tab 7 in the documents bundle.  Page 69  Page 71  This is LFB00000003. Now, this is an early LFB document produced, it. It says, halfway down, "00:54:29 First call to incident." Then: The	22	to ask you a question about the very start of the	22	•
Page 69  Page 71  This is LFB00000003. Now, this is an early LFB document produced, I think, for the inquiry. Can I just ask you to look at it.  It says, halfway down, "00:54:29 First call to incident."  Then:  "00:55:14 Pre-determined attendance (PDA) for call to fire: G271, G272 G331 assigned to incident."  A. Yes.  Q. So that's initially three pumps.  A. Yes.  Q. Then at 00.59.12, just about 4 minutes later:  "G362 (Hammersmith) also assigned to the incident as part of PDA, when high rise incident assertained."  A. Yes.  Q. Do you know from your own knowledge about a 4-minute gap between the initial attendance order and the make-up to four pumps because of the discovery that it was a high-rise?  Q. You do know about that?  A. Yes.  Q. You do know about that?  A. Yes.  Q. You do know about that?  A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,  25 supervisors to support them in that and would help them  Page 71  out if they were having difficulties. But a control officer's job is very experiential.  Q. Okay.  Oby (a.y.)  A. Yes.  Can I just ask you to look at a part of PDA for a high-rise.  A. No.  A. Yes.  Can I just ask you to look at a obviously we can see here that originally there was no PDA for a high-rise.  A. No. A. No. A. No. A. There would be occasions where the callers couldn't give a response or gave an incorrect response. I believe during the incident that one of our supervisors believed it was a high-rise, had a check, and then sent the additional attendance.  Can I would have a lot to chance, though, wouldn't it, unless the original call handler had actually specifically asked: "Is it a high-rise?" or "Is it over five floors?"  A. Yes, is it over five floors, which she did. We do have a number of high-rise buildings on our gazetteer, which is our mapping aid and our addressing tool, and they do have a number of high-rise buildings listed on them, but not all of them.  Q. Yes.  Can yo	23	attendance.	23	all experiential. They take numerous 999 calls every
Page 69  Page 71  This is LFB00000003.  Now, this is an early LFB document produced, I think, for the inquiry. Can I just ask you to look at  it.  Diviously we can see here that originally there was no PDA for a high-rise.  It says, halfway down, "00:54:29 First call to incident."  Then:  "00:55:14 Pre-determined attendance (PDA) for call to fire: G271, G272 G331 assigned to incident."  A. Yes.  Q. So that's initially three pumps.  A. Yes.  Q. Then at 00:59:12, just about 4 minutes later:  "G362 (Hammersmith) also assigned to the incident as part of PDA, when high rise incident ascertained."  A. Yes.  Q. Do you know from your own knowledge about a 4-minute gap between the initial attendance order and the make-up to four pumps because of the discovery that it was a high-rise?  A. Yes.  Q. You do know about that?  A. Yes.  Q. You do know about that?  A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,  Page 71  out if they were having difficulties. But a control officer's job is very experiential.  O cokay.  Obviously we can see here that originally there was no PDA for a high-rise.  A. No.  Q. Would that be a frequent experience or not?  A. No.  A. No.  A. There would be occasions where the callers couldn't give a response or gave an incorrect response. I believe during this incident that one of our supervisors believed it was a high-rise, had a check, and then sent the additional attendance.  Q. Right. That would leave a lot to chance, though, wouldn't it, unless the original call handler had actually specifically asked: "Is it a high-rise?" or "Is it over five floors?"  A. Yes, is it over five floors?"  A. Yes, is it over five floors?"  A. Yes, is it over five floors?  A. Y	24	If you go to a different document, if I could ask	24	day when they're on shift, and they have their
1 This is LFB00000003. 2 Now, this is an early LFB document produced, 3 I think, for the inquiry. Can I just ask you to look at 4 it. 4 Obviously we can see here that originally there was 5 It says, halfway down, "00:54:29 First call to 6 incident." 6 A. No. 7 Then: 7 Q. Would that be a frequent experience or not? 8 "00:55:14 Pre-determined attendance (PDA) for call 9 to fire: G271, G272 G331 assigned to incident." 9 10 A. Yes. 10 11 Q. So that's initially three pumps. 11 12 A. Yes. 12 13 Q. Then at 00.59:12, just about 4 minutes later: 12 14 "G362 (Hammersmith) also assigned to the incident as 15 part of PDA, when high rise incident ascertained." 15 16 A. Yes. 16 17 Q. Do you know from your own knowledge about a 4-minute gap between the initial attendance order and the make-up to 19 18 between the initial attendance order and the make-up to 20 20 a high-rise? 20 21 A. Yes. 21 22 Q. You do know about that? 22 23 A. (Nodded assent). 23 24 Q. Can you just explain what happened? 25 25 A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower, 25 26 Dayou steep floor you're on?	25	you to do that, it's tab 7 in the documents bundle.	25	supervisors to support them in that and would help them
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Now, this is an early LFB document produced, I think, for the inquiry. Can I just ask you to look at it. It says, halfway down, "00:54:29 First call to incident." Then: "00:55:14 Pre-determined attendance (PDA) for call to fire; G271, G272 G331 assigned to incident."  A. Yes. Q. So that's initially three pumps. A. Yes. Q. Then at 00:59:12, just about 4 minutes later: Q. Then at 00:59:12, just about 4 minutes later: A. Yes. Q. Do you know from your own knowledge about a 4-minute gap between the initial attendance order and the make-up to four pumps because of the discovery that it was a high-rise? Q. You do know about that? A. Yes. Q. You do know about that? A. Yes. Q. Can you just explain what happened? A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,  2 officer's job is very experiential. Q. Okay. Obviously we can see here that originally there was no PDA for a high-rise. A. No. A. There would be occasions where the callers couldn't give a response or gave an incorrect response. I believe during this incident that one of our supervisors believed it was a high-rise, had a check, and then sent the additional attendance. Q. Right. That would leave a lot to chance, though, wouldn't it, unless the original call handler had actually specifically asked: "Is it a high-rise?" or "Is it over five floors?" A. Yes, is it over five floors, which she did. We do have a number of high-rise buildings on our gazetteer, which is our mapping aid and our addressing tool, and they do have a number of high-rise buildings listed on them, but not all of them. Q. Yes. I mean, it's easy to get confused if you're a caller, isn't it, when asked, "How many floors have you got there?", to give the floor you're on?	1	This is LFB00000003	1	out if they were having difficulties. But a control
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it.  Obviously we can see here that originally there was no PDA for a high-rise.  It says, halfway down, "00:54:29 First call to incident."  Then:  "00:55:14 Pre-determined attendance (PDA) for call to fire: G271, G272 G331 assigned to incident."  A. Yes.  O So that's initially three pumps.  A. Yes.  O Then at 00:59:12, just about 4 minutes later:  A. Yes.  O Doyou know from your own knowledge about a 4-minute gap between the initial attendance order and the make-up to four pumps because of the discovery that it was a high-rise puildings on our gazetteer, which four pumps because of the discovery that it was a high-rise buildings listed on them, but not all of them.  A. Yes.  A. Yes.  O Evould that be a frequent experience or not?  A. There would be occasions where the callers couldn't give a response or gave an incorrect response. I believe during this incident that one of our supervisors believed it was a high-rise, had a check, and then sent the additional attendance.  Q. Right. That would leave a lot to chance, though, wouldn't it, unless the original lall handler had actually specifically asked: "Is it a high-rise?" or "Is it over five floors," or "Is it over five floors," or "Is it over five floors, which she did. We do have a number of high-rise buildings on our gazetteer, which is our mapping aid and our addressing tool, and they do have a number of high-rise buildings listed on them, but not all of them.  Q. You do know about that?  A. Yes.  I mean, it's easy to get confused if you're a caller, isn't it, when asked, "How many floors have you got there?", to give the floor you're on?		•		· · · · ·
5 It says, halfway down, "00:54:29 First call to 6 incident." 7 Then: 8 "00:55:14 Pre-determined attendance (PDA) for call 9 to fire: G271, G272 G331 assigned to incident." 9 a response or gave an incorrect response. I believe 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. So that's initially three pumps. 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Then at 00.59.12, just about 4 minutes later: 14 "G362 (Hammersmith) also assigned to the incident as 15 part of PDA, when high rise incident ascertained." 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Do you know from your own knowledge about a 4-minute gap 18 between the initial attendance order and the make-up to 19 four pumps because of the discovery that it was 20 A. Yes. 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. You do know about that? 23 A. (Nodded assent). 24 Q. Can you just explain what happened? 25 A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower, 26 M. No. 7 Q. Would that be a frequent experience or not? 8 A. No. 7 Q. Would that be a frequent experience or not? 8 A. No. 7 Q. Would that be a frequent experience or not? 8 A. There would be occasions where the callers couldn't give a response or gave an incorrect response. I believe during the incident as frequent experience or not? 8 A. There would be occasions where the callers couldn't give a response or gave an incorrect response. I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower, 9 a response or gave an incorrect response. I believe during the not; a couldn't give a response or gave an incorrect response. I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower, 9 A. No. 9 A. Nould that be a frequent experience or not?  A. No. 9 A. Nould that be a frequent experience or not?  A. No. 9 A. There would be occasions where the callers couldn't give a response or gave an incorrect response. I believe during the packet." 10 Q. Would that be a frequent experience or not?  A. Yes. 11 during this incident that one of our supervisors 12 A. Yes. 13 A. Yes, is it a high-rise?" or "Is 14 wouldleave a lot to chance, though, wouldn't it, unless the original call handler had actually specifically asked: "Is it a high-rise	4			•
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Q. Can you just explain what happened?  24 a caller, isn't it, when asked, "How many floors have you got there?", to give the floor you're on?	22	Q. You do know about that?	22	Q. Yes.
25 <b>A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,</b> 25 you got there?", to give the floor you're on?	23	A. (Nodded assent).	23	I mean, it's easy to get confused if you're
	24	Q. Can you just explain what happened?	24	a caller, isn't it, when asked, "How many floors have
Page 70 Page 72	25	A. So I believe during the first call to Grenfell Tower,	25	you got there?", to give the floor you're on?
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		Page /U		Page /2

1	A 14 com houses compliance and	1	4h our
1	A. It can happen sometimes, yes.	1 2	them.
2 3	Q. So there's room for misunderstanding, is that right, between the caller and the CRO about how many floors are	3	Q. So the control room operator obviously can receive telephone calls from members of the public
4	in the building as opposed to the floor the call is	4	A. Yes.
5	coming from?	5	Q such as the initial caller here, but can also speak
6	A. Yes, that can happen at times, but again, if it's	6	over the radio and receive radio messages?
7	registered, and if it's registered as a high-rise	7	A. Yes.
8	building on our gazetteer, we would have noticed that.	8	Q. What's the functionality that allows them to switch from
9	Additional callers would've also been asked that	9	one to the other?
10	information, and, again, it's showing how much it's sort	10	A. They can. So that would be in our ICS, our integrated
11	of teamwork, our supervisors noticed that immediately.	11	communications system. However, if you are a radio
12	Q. Yes. I guess what I'm really asking you is: are control	12	operator, you are designated that for the whole shift,
13	room operators trained to be crystal clear in asking the	13	so that task, so you wouldn't necessarily then be a call
14	question, "How many floors does the building consist	14	handler as well.
15	of?" as opposed to "What floor are you on?"	15	Q. Right.
16	A. Yes, they are trained to ask you're in flat 5[sic].	16	A. So you would either do call handling and answering 999
17	Q. Now, coming back to the short incident log, at long	17	calls or you would do the radio.
18	last here it is I just want to ask you some more	18	Q. You wouldn't swap between the two?
19	questions about how it comes to be made up.	19	A. No.
20	You said that the messages there are inputted by	20	Q. Right.
21	control room operators.	21	So SAD, Sharon Darby, 01.16.02, she's on the radio?
22	A. Yes.	22	A. Yes.
23	Q. Could you just help us, when it says "Informative"	23	Q. Okay. And she gets the message over the radio on her
24	and looking at 01.16.02 on page 17	24	headset?
25	A. Yes.	25	A. Yes.
	Page 73	-	Page 75
1	Q and there's a list of information there, what does	1	Q. How is that recorded? Does she write it down in
2	that mean? What's "Informative"?	2	manuscript and then type it in or does she
3	A. So an informative message is a message sent from the	3	A. No, she types it in automatically and she would use
4	incident ground to inform control and other people	4	what's known or what you've seen is a service request.
5	monitoring the incident what's going on.	5	Q. What is a service request?
6	Q. Right.	6	A. So a service request is something on our mobilising
7	A. It's a structured message.	7	system that allows the call-takers and supervisors to
8	Q. Right. And so that comes from the incident ground in	8	share information with the radio operator and vice
9	that form or is that	9	versa.
10	A. In that form.	10	Q. Right.
11	Q. In that form. That's by radio, is it, normally?	11	A bit lower down: "User Comment", 01.18.18, PM, what
12	A. Yes, that's usually by radio.	12	is user comment?
13	Q. So the control room operator records that somewhere?	13	A. So when an individual or a control operator turns out
14	A. Yes, they would record that and they would add that it's	14	an appliance or wants to add a comment to a message box,
15	an informative message, and they add the so the "SUP"	15	they would type it in what they wanted. So it's free
16	at the beginning, the SUP.	16	text. If you can see, one of the supervisors, Pete May,
17	Q. So it comes into the control from the incident ground,	17	is, "Turning out with message - INFORM AS ORT." So he
18	it comes over RT well, it comes over the radio, does	18	has paged an officer. The comment is system-generated,
19	it?	19	so it's a six-pump fire, aerials 1, and that's why he's
20	A. Yes.	20	being paged. And his comments he has written is "INFORM
21	Q. And the radio goes straight into the headset of the	21	AS ORT".
22	control room person?	22	Q. But looking at the comment above that:
23	A. Yes. So they have a button on their radio that they can	23	"User Comment.
24	push to talk, and on the control officer's screen they	24	"SIX PUMP FIRE AERIAL X 1 HIGH RISE PROCEDURE."
25	will get alerted as to what call sign wishes to speak to	25	A. Yes.
	Page 74		Page 76
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1	Q. That information is already on the system, because we've	1	Q. On his screen?
2	already got the make up at 01.14.12 to aerial and the	2	A. On his screen.
3	informative message. So what's the point of the user	3	Q. While he's talking?
4	comment there?	4	A. Yes.
5	A. That's because he's just paged an officer to inform him	5	Q. Okay.
_	of that six-pump fire, so it would repeat it.		
6		6	A. He will type that information into the service request.
7	Q. Oh, I see.	7	Q. Right. And it comes up on the screen looking like it
8	A. So it's going out, yes.	8	does on the page there, does it?
9	Q. Oh, I follow. So the user comment and turning out with	9	A. No, no, it doesn't, no. It's a box with some drop-down
10	message goes as the same piece of information.	10	menus and some free text spaces.
11	A. Yes.	11	Q. Okay. So he creates that request and then he sends it,
12	Q. Okay.	12	does he, to Sharon Darby?
13	Going through it, we'll come to the detail I think	13	A. Yes. So he'll create the service request, and then on
14	later, but turning to page 18, we see at 01.31.38,	14	our mobilising system, there is a list of all service
15	"Service Request", PD.	15	requests. So Sharon is on the radio and will pick up
16	"Service request Created: RT4 - G271"	16	any service request prefixed "RT4".
17	A. Yes.	17	Q. Oh, I see. I think I see. Sorry, forgive me for taking
18	Q. That is a record of what?	18	this just a bit more slowly.
19	A. That is a record of one of our control officers creating	19	A. That's okay.
20	a service request and sending the message to the radio,	20	Q. So he gets the information by the telephone on the 999
21	RT4, channel 4, and saying there's a further call to say	21	call. He types into the incident list that he's got on
22	the fire is on the 20th floor.	22	his screen a service request.
23	Q. Now, that information would have come to PD, who	23	A. Yes.
24	inputted it into the system?	24	Q. He then sends that to Sharon Darby, who is elsewhere in
25	A. That information was created by, yeah, PD, who put that	25	the incident room.
	Page 77		Page 79
1	into created a service request and added that	1	A. Elsewhere in the control room, yes.
1 2	into created a service request and added that information.	1 2	A. Elsewhere in the control room, yes.  O. In the control room
2	information.	2	Q. In the control room.
2 3	information. Q. Who is PD?	2 3	Q. In the control room.  A. Yes.
2 3 4	information. Q. Who is PD? A. Peter Duddy.	2 3 4	<ul><li>Q. In the control room.</li><li>A. Yes.</li><li>Q. He sends that remotely by computer, does he?</li></ul>
2 3 4 5	<ul><li>information.</li><li>Q. Who is PD?</li><li>A. Peter Duddy.</li><li>Q. Peter Duddy, and he would've been on the radio?</li></ul>	2 3 4 5	<ul><li>Q. In the control room.</li><li>A. Yes.</li><li>Q. He sends that remotely by computer, does he?</li><li>A. Yes.</li></ul>
2 3 4 5 6	<ul> <li>information.</li> <li>Q. Who is PD?</li> <li>A. Peter Duddy.</li> <li>Q. Peter Duddy, and he would've been on the radio?</li> <li>A. No, he was a call-taker on that night, and he would've</li> </ul>	2 3 4 5 6	<ul> <li>Q. In the control room.</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. He sends that remotely by computer, does he?</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. Then she has a screen and something comes up on her</li> </ul>
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20 (Pages 77 to 80)

1	Q. Okay. That's through her headset, is it?	1	Q. I mean, at this point, 01.31.38, there's a question mark
2	A. Yes.	2	as to whether it had or hadn't changed and we can look
3	Q. What does she have to press to get G271 to know she's	3	at that, but just in general terms, it sounds as if the
4	contacting them?	4	principal source of the information about the right pump
5	A. So she can either use a pressel switch, which is a foot	5	or command unit to send radio messages to through RT4
6	pedal, or she can press her ICS screen and communicate	6	would be the call handler and not the radio operator?
7	with them that way.	7	A. Yes, if they wanted to pass a message to the incident,
8	Q. There's a foot pedal, is there?	8	they would tend to choose the incident command pump to
9	A. Yes.	9	send it to if they knew it, if it had been declared.
10	Q. And by pressing the foot pedal, that makes the radio	10	Q. Now, we see various service requests created, service
11	live, opens the radio?	11	requests updated.
12	A. Yes.	12	A. Yes.
13	Q. Or you can do it on the screen, can you?	13	Q. Service request in progress.
14	A. Yes.	14	A. Yes.
15	Q. Is it a touch-screen?	15	Q. What's the difference between updated and in progress?
16	A. Yes.	16	A. So when you create a service request, you're the first
17	Q. That then makes the radio live. Then what does Sharon	17	person to create it and you will put in the details you
18	say?	18	want. It goes into the list and then a supervisor or
19	A. It would depend who she was calling. So in this case	19	a control operator would pick it up and mark it in
20	she could say, "Golf 271". She could call them by their	20	progress so no one else undertook those actions in the
21	call sign. You would use your call sign or the call	21	control room, and then once they had completed it, they
22	sign that she's trying to contact.	22	would mark it as completed.
23	Q. Would she get a response or?	23	Q. On completed, what does that mean?
24	A. During normal incidents, yes, she would've.	24	A. So that means the task has been performed. So if on
25	Q. Right.	25	RT4, after she picked up service requests, she would've
	Page 81		Page 83
1	A She would	1	then marked it as completed once that message was passed
1 2	A. She would.  O Okay When she's sending that message obviously in	1 2	then marked it as completed once that message was passed on.
2	Q. Okay. When she's sending that message obviously in	2	on.
2 3	Q. Okay. When she's sending that message obviously in this example it says G271 who decides where to send	2 3	on. Q. Okay.
2 3 4	Q. Okay. When she's sending that message obviously in this example it says G271 who decides where to send that message to?	2 3 4	on. Q. Okay. Just by way of an example and it is only
2 3 4 5	<ul><li>Q. Okay. When she's sending that message — obviously in this example it says G271 — who decides where to send that message to?</li><li>A. So Peter Duddy, as the call-taker, would've put on that</li></ul>	2 3 4 5	on. Q. Okay.  Just by way of an example and it is only an example if I can ask you to look at page 19, we
2 3 4 5 6	<ul> <li>Q. Okay. When she's sending that message — obviously in this example it says G271 — who decides where to send that message to?</li> <li>A. So Peter Duddy, as the call-taker, would've put on that it's a message to go to RT4, to go to Golf 271. So the</li> </ul>	2 3 4 5 6	on. Q. Okay.  Just by way of an example and it is only an example if I can ask you to look at page 19, we can see at 01.40.47 I stress, this is only
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	<ul> <li>Q. Okay. When she's sending that message obviously in this example it says G271 who decides where to send that message to?</li> <li>A. So Peter Duddy, as the call-taker, would've put on that it's a message to go to RT4, to go to Golf 271. So the control operator would've decided that.</li> <li>Q. So the call handler?</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. How would Pete Duddy know that the message should go to 271?</li> <li>A. They would always tend to send it to the incident command pump. So maybe at one time Pete has heard that the incident command pump is 271 and hasn't heard that it's been updated since then, given the time.</li> <li>Q. Right. We're going to come to that I think in due course, but the destination of a radio message over RT4 by the radio operator depends upon the state of</li> </ul>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	on.  Q. Okay.  Just by way of an example — and it is only an example — if I can ask you to look at page 19, we can see at 01.40.47 — I stress, this is only an example — "Service Request Created" —  A. Yes.  Q. Excuse me, I have this one wrong. Okay, well, take this one anyway. 01.41.35 is probably a better example: "Service Request Completed: TO CH4" That's channel 4, I'm assuming?  A. Yes.  Q. " G271 PERSONS ON THE 22ND FLOOR SMOKE COMING INTO FLAT." What does "completed" mean in that context there?  A. It means that we would've passed that message to the
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			1
1	Q. So that would be the radio operator or the call handler?	1	period of time. So Sharon might have marked them as
2	A. Yes, sorry, the radio operator.	2	completed, but we would've already passed that
3	Q. Okay.	3	information through a mobile phone.
4	So I think I've got this: in general terms is	4	Q. Right.
5	this right? the call comes in, the message is then	5	The information that we see on the short incident
6	sent by the call handler to the radio operator, remotely	6	log here that's coming up on the incident list in the
7	in the way you've described	7	control room, and would also be visible to the radio
8	A. Yes.	8	operator in the control room, as I think you said
9	Q the radio operator then sends a message to the	9	A. Yes.
10	incident ground	10	Q would that be accessible to anybody on the incident
11	A. By voice.	11	ground?
12	Q by voice	12	A. No.
13	A. Yes.	13	Q. So if the incident commander, for example, Mike Dowden
14	Q by pressing the pedal, operating the screen and then	14	here, the watch manager, wanted to know what was on the
15	speaking, and then when that person is satisfied that	15	Vision system, could he do so?
16	the message has gone to the incident ground, it	16	A. No.
17	automatically generates completed.	17	Q. Right. What if the officer in attendance was a station
18	A. She will mark a button that says "Completed" and it will	18	manager, would he or she have better access to that?
19	automatically generate on that incident log.	19	A. No.
20	Q. Okay. I missed a stage. So he or she will expressly	20	Q. Okay. What about in the command unit?
21	mark it as completed.	21	A. The command unit does take a feed from Vision, but
22	A. Yes.	22	I believe it's about personnel in attendance and
23	Q. Now, at the moment when they mark it as completed, do	23	informative messages. I'm not the expert on CSS, so
24	they have confirmation back from the incident ground	24	I know it takes a feed but I don't know what feed it
25	that the message has been received and understood?	25	takes.
	Page 85		Page 87
	- 100 00		- 464 01
1	A. Yes.	1	Q. Right. But you think it doesn't take the full picture
2	Q. How does that come, that message?	2	of the Vision log
3	A. So that would be in the radio transmission. So that	3	A. No.
4	would've been Sharon would've called up, passed that	4	Q as per this short incident log we have?
5	message on, and they would've confirmed that message.	5	A. Yes.
6	Q. So can we take it that in every case where we see	6	Q. Right. "Yes" meaning no?
7	"Service Message Completed" in this incident log, the	7	A. Yes.
8	message that was created was not just sent but received	8	Q. You agree with me it doesn't?
9	and understood and confirmed back to the control room?	9	A. I do agree with you.
10	A. Yes.	10	Q. Right.
11	Q. Right.	11	We're going to come back to this document, but
12	How would that message come back to the control room	12	that's very helpful so far, thank you.
13	from the incident ground, that the outgoing message	13	Can I then go back to the facilities at Merton as
14	A. They would've just said "Received".	14	opposed to Stratford.
15	Q. Right. And that would be recorded on the main scheme	15	A. Yes.
16	radio?	16	Q. What facilities did Stratford not have that Merton did
17	A. Yes.	17	have, do you know?
18	Q. Would there be any case where you would complete	18	A. So we have a tool at Merton control called a data
19	a service message without having an express confirmation	19	capture tool, a DCT, we refer to it. It's a stand-alone
20	from the incident ground that the message had been	20	system and it enables some of our supervisors to view
21	received?	21	an overview of London and to see, during an incident, if
22	A. There could be occasions, and if we're looking	22	they need to make some cover moves to ensure that we've
23	specifically, I believe that we had a different method	23	got sufficient fire cover.
24	of communication, so we were talking on a mobile phone	24	Q. Right, I see.
25	and not passing information over the radio at a certain	25	A. So we didn't have that at Stratford on the night.
	Page 86		Page 88
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1			
	Q. Okay. I think you've explained it, that is this	1	A. No.
2	right? tells you where you need to provide extra	2	Q. Okay.
3	cover because you've got demand	3	The top right-hand corner there's a signature, which
4	A. Yes, it's an aid that will show where our fire cover is	4	I'm guessing is Andy Hearn, but can you help with that?
5	lacking and that we need to send standby appliances into	5	A. No.
6	cover.	6	Q. No. That's okay.
7	Q. So it's to smooth out demand?	7	Going on to page 4 of this document, three-quarters
8	A. Yes.	8	of the way down. It's a timeline, but three-quarters of
9	Q. Anything else that Stratford doesn't have that Merton	9	the way, just after:
0	does?	10	" 0206 major incident declared.
1	A. It has a television. We don't have access to the	11	" Fire cover P May difficult @ Stratford
2	heli-tele in Stratford control, but it is available	12	without IT available in Merton."
3	downstairs at Stratford in the Brigade co-ordination	13	Or it could be "without it available in Merton".
14	centre.	14	Can you just help me, do you remember a discussion
5	Q. Right.	15	on that subject?
6	A. And, actually, it's very hard to get a link into our	16	A. Yes, that was referring to the DCT.
7	control room at the moment.	17	Q. That's the DCT?
18	Q. What a heli-tele link?	18	A. Yes.
19	A. Yes.	19	Q. Do you remember, what was difficult at Stratford without
20	Q. Into?	20	the DCT available?
20 21		20 21	A. So I would imagine Pete would've found that difficult to
	A. Into Merton control room.		9
22	Q. Why is that?	22	not have a visible tool that he could just glance at to
23	A. It's available upstairs in our Brigade co-ordination	23	see what fire cover needed to be put in place.
24	centre, but not available on our TV feeds.	24	Q. I see, it goes on:
25	Q. Right. And at Stratford, the same?	25	" Carried out with paper/map/experience."
	Page 89		Page 91
1	A. The same, yes.	1	A. Yes.
2	Q. In general terms, was that a problem on the night?	2	Q. What was carried out?
3	A. I didn't notice that it was a problem, and we had one of	3	A. So sorting out and working out which resources need to
4	our radios linked in with the police helicopter that was	4	go into which stations to provide an overall fire cover
4 5	our radios linked in with the police helicopter that was up, so we heard traffic from them.		
	up, so we heard traffic from them.	4	of London whilst the incident progressed.
5	up, so we heard traffic from them. Q. Yes.	4 5	of London whilst the incident progressed.  Q. Okay.
5	up, so we heard traffic from them.	4 5 6	of London whilst the incident progressed.  Q. Okay.  Can I then ask you to look at a different document,
5 6 7 8	up, so we heard traffic from them.  Q. Yes.  Can I just ask you to look at the notes that were taken of the control room debrief that were taken in the	4 5 6 7 8	of London whilst the incident progressed.  Q. Okay.  Can I then ask you to look at a different document, which is at tab 30 of our documents bundle, which is the
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1	is:	1	focusing on their role. It is just background.
2	"PRC covering the actions carried out by Control	2	Q. It's just background?
3	staff held on 24th July 2017 at the LOC."	3	A. Yes.
4	That, I think, is a reference to the meeting for	4	Q. Because 24-hour news channels won't cover necessarily
5	which we've just seen the manuscript notes, is it?	5	news that is relevant to the functions being carried out
6	A. Yes, that was the PRC we held at control.	6	by control room staff.
7	Q. Okay.	7	A. No, not at all.
8	Three entries up from the bottom, it says this:	8	Q. So it's just background, is it?
9	"The Control fallback facilities at Stratford should	9	A. Yes.
10	replicate those at the LOC, Merton."	10	Q. In terms of this television, is it normally useful to
11	Can you help with that? In what ways didn't they	11	provide a control room with a visual picture of
12	replicate	12	an incident as its unfolding?
13	A. So I believe that's referring to items like DCT, having	13	A. It's not something that we are used to at all, so
14	access to the heli-tele.	14	I would say it's not required.
15	Q. Right. Anything else?	15	Q. No.
16	A. Not that I can recall, but I wasn't the supervisor on	16	There are witnesses or people who have given witness
17	the night, so I'm sure they might have an idea of more	17	statements to the inquiry, Alex Norman and Yvonne Adams,
18	tools that they needed.	18	who say that it would help them, or would have helped
19	Q. Then the second entry down on the second page, it says:	19	them, to have had a picture of what was going on at
20	"There was no access to the helicopter downlink	20	Grenfell Tower to see how the fire was escalating in
21	(heli-tele) at Stratford Control fall-back. Review the	21	order to be able to inform the advice that they were
22	equipment at our Control fall-back locations."	22	giving to callers.
23	A. Yes.	23	Can you comment on that?
24	Q. Was it a problem on the night at Stratford that you	24	A. Yes, I think that's that could be true, if Alex and
25	couldn't access the heli-tele?	25	Yvonne believe that that would've made their
23	couldn't access the hen-tele:	23	I voline beneve that that would ve made then
	Page 93		Page 95
		l .	
1	A We actually made a conscious desision not to nut the	1	desision making different. But there was I halisys
1	A. We actually made a conscious decision not to put the	1	decision-making different. But there was I believe
2	normal TV on, so the normal the news during the	2	I talked to some of the supervisors and there was
2 3	normal TV on, so the normal the news during the incident. I'm not sure if heli-tele would've been of	2 3	I talked to some of the supervisors and there was a conscious decision not to turn on the television, and
2 3 4	normal TV on, so the normal the news during the incident. I'm not sure if heli-tele would've been of use, but, again, you would have to ask the supervisors	2 3 4	I talked to some of the supervisors and there was a conscious decision not to turn on the television, and mainly because we were overrun with talking to those
2 3 4 5	normal TV on, so the normal — the news during the incident. I'm not sure if heli-tele would've been of use, but, again, you would have to ask the supervisors if they would've found it helpful.	2 3 4 5	I talked to some of the supervisors and there was a conscious decision not to turn on the television, and mainly because we were overrun with talking to those callers and our control staff were talking to them,
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1	was told that it was broken.	1	the images on Twitter for us to know that that would've
2	A. Oh, I believe it was working.	2	been detrimental.
3	Q. You believe it was working. Okay.	3	Q. Had somebody prior to your arrival, or possibly even
4	So if he was told that it was broken, was that	4	prior to your involvement in other words, prior to
5	effectively a white lie?	5	you being paged made the decision not to turn the
6	A. I didn't overhear that conversation.	6	television on, do you know that?
7	Q. Was the television on at an earlier stage of the evening	7	A. No, I don't.
8	prior to the first call-out?	8	Q. I think one of the questions is: how would not looking
9	A. I wouldn't know, I wasn't in the control room at that	9	at the video of the outside of the tower on fire not
10	time.	10	assist the decision-making by control room staff?
11	Q. Okay.	11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think you might need to rephrase
12	A. And I believe it wasn't on when I entered the control	12	that, Mr Millett, there were at least two negatives in
13	room.	13	that question.
14	Q. Okay. It wasn't on when you entered the control room,	14	MR MILLETT: Right.
15	no, and we have a time roughly of about 2.15 or so when	15	A. Thank you.
16	you came.	16	MR MILLETT: I'll try and confine it to one.
17	A. 2.15, yes.	17	Why wouldn't looking at the video or visual images
18	Q. And we'll come to that.	18	of the tower on fire not help your staff in making the
19	Just in terms of your collective decision, were you	19	decisions they had to make?
20	party to the collective decision not to turn the TV on?	20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Did you understand that one?
21	A. Yes.	21	A. I think so.
22	Q. You were.	22	MR MILLETT: I have gone for 12 days and haven't had
23	Can you just help me as to how that decision was	23	a double negative.
24	made? First of all, who was that discussed among?	24	Let me try again: wouldn't it help to see the tower
25	A. I think it was discussed with the supervisors.	25	on fire?
	Page 97		Page 99
	0	-	O .
		1	
1	I definitely remember having that conversation with	1	A. Again, it's not something we're used to, seeing images
1 2	I definitely remember having that conversation with Pete May and us both raising concerns about showing	1 2	A. Again, it's not something we're used to, seeing images from the incident or having a visual of the incident.
		1	
2	Pete May and us both raising concerns about showing	2	from the incident or having a visual of the incident.
2 3	Pete May and us both raising concerns about showing those images on the TV.	2 3	from the incident or having a visual of the incident. We would always use the communications sent over by the
2 3 4	Pete May and us both raising concerns about showing those images on the TV.  Q. Right, okay. Were you yourself physically party to that	2 3 4	from the incident or having a visual of the incident.  We would always use the communications sent over by the incident commander as our judgement of what was
2 3 4 5	Pete May and us both raising concerns about showing those images on the TV.  Q. Right, okay. Were you yourself physically party to that discussion?  A. Yes.  Q. Where were you when that discussion was taking place?	2 3 4 5	from the incident or having a visual of the incident.  We would always use the communications sent over by the incident commander as our judgement of what was happening at the incident, and obviously we were in the
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1	Just going back to the question of buddy control	1	A. That would be by our control. It wouldn't happen on
2	rooms.	2	every occasion.
3	A. Yes.	3	Q. I see. Okay.
4	Q. A question I should have asked you earlier on.	4	How would a buddy control room know about any
5	Are you okay, would you like a break?	5	updates from the incident about, for example, a change
6	A. Yes, no, I'm fine.	6	in the advice being given by Stratford to callers?
7	Q. Yes?	7	A. So that would be down to control to inform them.
8	A. Yes.	8	MR MILLETT: I see, okay.
9	Q. Okay, buddy control rooms.	9	Mr Chairman, I'm about to turn to a different topic,
10	When a buddy control room like Surrey or North West	10	but it may be useful to have a short break now, if we
11	get involved, do they get some kind of briefing as to	11	can, and we can run on a little bit longer to lunch, if
12	the stage which the incident has reached?	12	that is convenient to you and the witness.
13	A. No, not necessarily, because it happens dynamically, it	13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: How are you feeling? Would you like
14	happens really quickly. So the first we'd know about it	14	to have a short break now?
15	would be a telephone call from BT on our critical line,	15	THE WITNESS: Yes, please.
16	which is separate from our ICS and our other	16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Probably would be a good idea.
17	communication systems, and they would ring us and tell	17	We'll take 10 minutes out, then, back at 12.35,
18	us that they've had callers in a queue for a period of	18	please, and no talking to anyone, at least not about
19	time and that they were then starting to divert them.	19	your evidence.
20	•	20	Thank you very much, if you would like to go with
	Q. Okay. So you get a call from BT on your critical line.	21	the usher, please.
21	A. Yes.	22	All right, 12.35, please. Thank you.
22	Q. What is that critical line? I think that's the first	23	
23	we've heard about that.	24	(12.25 pm)
24	A. So it's a telephone in the control room we have one	25	(A short break)
25	at Merton and one at Stratford that has a unique	23	(12.35 pm)
	Page 101		Page 103
1	single number that we provide to BT and to the	1	MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman.
2	Metropolitan Police, should they need to contact us	2	(Pause)
3	urgently.	3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, ready to carry on?
4	Q. And also to the buddy control rooms?	4	THE WITNESS: Yes.
5	A. No, the buddy control rooms have a different number that	5	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Millett, before we get going
6	they can access on access us.	6	again, what is going to suit you in terms of timing
7	Q. Right. Can those buddy control rooms communicate	7	before we break for lunch?
8	directly with the incident ground or do they have to go	8	MR MILLETT: I'm very happy to break at 1 o'clock. I may
9	through, in this case, Stratford?	9	have arrived at a natural break, but unnatural breaks
10	A. Yes, they have to come into the control room; they can't	10	work for me just as well.
11	directly talk to the incident ground.	11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right.
12	Q. Yes, I see.	12	MR MILLETT: Ms Smith, can I go back to the question of
13	How do they get their information about the	13	buddy control rooms, if I can.
14	incident?	14	A. Sorry.
15	A. So sometimes the BT operator would explain during	15	Q. That's all right.
16	a handover process that London are busy taking calls to	16	I want to do this by way of an example, if I can.
17	an incident, explain what that incident is, before	17	Can you be shown, please, the operational response
18	passing it on to the buddy control room.	18	report, which is an LFB report dated 24 May and go to
19	Q. I see, okay.	19	page 79 internal 79, which is page 80 in the
20	If there are updates from the incident, such as the	20	Relativity document. At 01.48 exactly you see it says:
21	incident commander declares a major incident or	21	"The Essex County Fire and Rescue Service Control
22	a make-up of pumps	22	Room receive the 100th 999 call in relation to Grenfell
23	A. Yes.	23	Tower, a CRO from Essex takes the call from an
24	Q how does that information get fed back to the buddy	24	individual who is inside Grenfell Tower, flat 193, 22nd
~~	control rooms?	25	floor. Call duration one minute and 12 seconds
25			or. can agranon one minute and 12 seconds
25	Control Tooling.		
25	Page 102		Page 104

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They take the call. What does Essex then do with They take the call. What does Essex then do with They take the call. What does Essex then do with They take the call. What does Essex then do with They take the call. What does Essex then do with They would treate an incident and put the details down that the call of the take they does not be send the message that they'd recorded electronically to you or they would rely on the telephone. They would treat a service message in the same way as they would create a service message in the same way as they would write any other 999 call? They would treat be on the dedicated line used for BTo or the dedicated line used for Essex or — They would treat a service message in the same way as they would write any other 999 call? They would write any other 999 call? They would write any clear to the telephone or by radio? They would write any clear to the telephone or by radio? They would write any clear to the telephone or by radio? They would write any clear to the telephone or by radio? They would write any clear to the same way as they would write any other 999 call? They would write any clear to the same way as they would write any clear to the same incident, they'd complete the call collection form and create an incident, they'd complete the call collection form and create an incident of it, and the call would write any clear to the larger incident. They would write any clear to the larger incident. They would write any clear to the same incident of it, and the call would write any clear to the larger incident. They would write any clear to the same incident of it, and the call collection form and create an incident of it, and the telephone of unrited the manned of the telephone of the call collection form and create an incident of it, and the call collection form and create an incident of it, and the call collection form and create an incident of it, and the call collection form and create an incident of it, and the call collection form and create an incident of it, and	1	(Source: 'Vision')"	1	A. Yes.
They take the call. What does Essex then do with that call?  A. No they would immediately ring London control and pass that information to us.  O. Now, just on that, first of all, you say they would ring London control.  A. Yes.  O. Would that be on a telephone or by radio?  A. Telephone.  O. Would that be on a telephone or by radio?  A. Telephone or by radio?  A. Telephone.  O. Would that be on a telephone or by radio?  A. Telephone.  O. Would that be on the dedicated line used for BT or the dedicated line used for Essex or —  A. They could use either, but I would imagine, I would present the used for Essex or —  A. They could use either, but I would imagine, I would present the used for Essex or —  A. They could use either, but I would imagine, I would present the used for Essex or —  A. They could use either, but I would imagine, I would present the used for Essex or —  A. They could use either, but I would imagine, I would present the used for Essex or —  A. They would red as the telephone.  A. They would red as the off the telephone.  A. They would red as the off the telephone.  A. They would red as the telephone.  A. Yes, They'd creat an incident, they'd complete the call collection form and create an incident of it, and then add that incident	2	Just in relation to that call, just help me with the	2	Q. Right.
5 A. So they would immediately ring London control and pass that information to us. 8 Q. Now, just on that, first of all, you say they would ring London control. 9 A. Yes. 11 Q. Would that be on a belephone or by radio? 12 A. Telephone. 13 Q. Would that be on the dedicated line used for BT or the dedicated line used for BS exec. Yer Brigade. 15 A. They could use either, but I would imagine, I would presume, they used our direct line that we have with our neighbouring brigades. So they would've appeared as Exes Fire Brigade. 16 Q. Right. We've looked at Surrey, we've talked about North 22 dedicated line. 17 would create a believe to the would be same single line or do they each have their own dedicated line. 18 arms single line or do they each have their own dedicated line. 29 A. Ves. 20 A. Ves. 30 Q and a different specific number own? So there's a specific number own dedicated line. 21 for Essex — 22 A. Ves. 31 Q. and a different specific number for North West? 32 A. Ves. 33 Q and a different specific number for North West? 34 A. Ves. 35 Q and a different specific number for North West? 36 A. A control officer. 37 Q. Control officer. Would that be one of the - I see. So any control officer in the room, not a supervisor? 38 A. A suspervisor could answer the phone if everyone else was busy. 39 A. A suspervisor could answer the phone if everyone else was busy. 40 Control officer. Would that to one of the - I see. So any control officer in the room, not a supervisor? 41 A. It would come through to a physical telephone system we use. 42 C. So this like any where 99 call? 43 A. Ves. 44 A. Yes. 45 A. Ves. 46 A. A control officer. Would that the one of the - I see. So any control officer in the room, not a supervisor? 46 A. A control officer in the one of the - I see. So any control officer in the room, not a supervisor? 47 A. A suspervisor could answer the plone if everyone else was busy. 48 A. Yes. 49 Q. Is that right? 40 A. Yes. 50 Q. So gist like any where 99 call? 51 C. O. So go you would with any other	3	process.	3	A. To London control. At London control, a control officer
6 A. So they would immediately ring London control and pass that information to us. 8 Q. Now, just on that, first of all, you say they would ring 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Would that be on a telephone or by radio? 12 A. Telephone. 13 Q. Would that be on a telephone or by radio? 14 A. Telephone. 15 A. They could use either, but I would imagine, I would 16 presume, they used our direct line that we have with our neighbouring prizades. So they would've come up and on 17 neighbouring prizades. So they would've come up and on 18 our CS they would've apparent as Esser. Fire Brigade. 16 Q. Right. We've looked at Surrey, we've talked about North 20 West, we now have Essex; do they all have access to the 21 same single line of do they each have their own dedicated line. 22 and single line of oth we gach have their own dedicated line. 23 A. Our surrounding fire and rescue services each have their own? So there's a specific number 20 Q. They each have their own? So there's a specific number 21 for Essex — 22 A. Ves. 23 A. Our surrounding fire and rescue services each have their own? So there's a specific number 24 own dedicated line. 25 Q. They each have their own? So there's a specific number 26 A. A control officer in room, 27 So there's a specific number 27 Q. Control officer. Would that be one of the —1 see. So any control officer in the room, not a supervisor? 24 A. A control officer. Would that be one of the —1 see. So any control officer in the room, not a supervisor? 25 A. A supervisor could answer the phone if everyone else was busy. 26 In terms of the message that Essex CRO would pass on, where would they record what they heard, or how 22 would they record what they heard, or how 22 would they record what they beard, or how 22 would they record what they beard, or how 22 would they record what they beard, or how 22 information six and alsa for that, so I imagine in the fire? 24 A. Yes, Yes, it would just be labelled that it would be from Essex Fire Brigade. 25 A. Yes vould they record what they beard, or how 22 informati	4	They take the call. What does Essex then do with	4	would create an incident and put the details down that
that information to us.  8 Q. Now, just on that, first of all, you say they would ring 9 London control. 9 London control. 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Would that be on a telephone or by radio? 12 A. Telephone. 13 Q. Would that be on the dedicated line used for BT or the dedicated line used for Essex or – 15 A. They could use either, but I would imagine, I would presume, they used our direct line that we have with our neighbouring brigades. So they would've come up and on our ICS they would've appeared as Essex Fire Brigade. 19 Q. Right. We've looked at Surrey, we've talked about North our dedicated lines. 20 West, we now have Essex; do they all have access to the same single line or do they each have their own dedicated line. 21 decicated lines. 22 A. Ves. 23 Q. They cach have their own? So there's a specific number. 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. They cach have their own? So there's a specific number. 25 Q. Okay. They would ring. Who would answer the telephone? 26 A. A Control officer. 27 Q. Control officer. 38 A. Our surrounding line and rescue services each have their own dedicated line. 4 A. Yes. 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Okay. They would ring. Who would answer the telephone? 5 A. A supervisor could answer the phone if everyone else was busy. 11 Q. Right. 12 Would that all come through to a physical telephone is system we use. 12 Would that call come through to the ICS, so the communication system we use. 13 Q. Jese, okay. 14 A. Yes, Would that call come through to the ICS, so the communication system we use. 15 G. See, Su Jasi like any other 999 call from a caller? 16 Q. So just like any other 999 call from a caller? 17 A. Yes, that's right. 28 A. Yes, and the firm of all control would be assume that the sexe control room operator would be assume that the repart of the fire surrival guidance calls, again, the document 1093 is still extant and is a national guidance document for all control would assume that the sexe control room operator would be assume that the feephone? 29 A. A supervisor could answer the phone if everyone else was busy. 2	5	that call?	5	Essex were providing us.
8 Q. Now, just on that, first of all, you say they would ring 9 London control. 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Would that be on a telephone or by radio? 12 A. Telephone. 13 Q. Would that be on the dedicated line used for BT or the call callection form and create an incident to the main – the larger incident.  15 A. They ould that incident to the main – the larger incident.  16 Q. Sught. We've looked at Survey, we've talked about North  17 Q. Right. We've looked at Survey, we've talked about North  18 page 105  19 Q. They swell device and rescue services each have their own dedicated line.  20 A. Our surrounding fire and rescue services each have their own dedicated line.  21 A. Yes.  22 A. Ves.  3 Q and a different specific number for North West?  4 A. Yes.  4 A. Yes.  4 A. Yes.  4 A. Yes.  5 Q. Okay. They would ring. Who would answer the telephone?  6 A. A. control officer.  9 A. A surpervisor could answer the phone if everyone else was any control offic	6	A. So they would immediately ring London control and pass	6	Q. And would Essex be able to send the message that they'd
London control.  A. Yes.  Would that be on a telephone or by radio?  A. Telephone.  O. Would that be on a telephone or by radio?  A. Telephone.  A. Telephone.  O. Would that be on the dedicated line used for BT or the dedicated line used for BT or the dedicated line used for Essex or  If dedicated line used for Essex or  If a A. They could use either, but I would imagine, I would presume, they used our direct line that we have with our neighbouring brigades. So they would've come up and on our ICS they would've appeared as Essex Fire Brigade.  O. West, we now have Essex; do they all have access to the same single line or do they each have their own dedicated line.  D. So the Stratford control room officer receiving information secondhand?  A. Yes, that's right.  O. So the Stratford control room officer receiving information is condhand?  A. Yes, that's right.  O. What safeguards or systems are there to ensure that that information is complete and accurate?  A. Yes, that's right.  O. What safeguards or systems are there to ensure that that information is complete and accurate?  A. Yes.  O. They would rely on the telephone.  O. Then the operator at the other earl of the telephone would the same way as they would with any other 999 call?  A. They would with any other 999 call?  A. Yes, that's right the same and that incident to the main — the larger incident.  O. So the Stratford control room officer receiving information from Essex was essentially getting the 999 caller's information secondhand?  A. Yes, that's right.  O. What safeguards or systems are there to ensure that that information complete and accurate?  A. Yes, that's right.  O. What safeguards or systems are there to ensure that that information from fissex was essentially getting the 999 caller's information recondhand?  A. Yes, that's right.  O. What safeguards or systems are there to ensure that that information of the fire survival guidance calls, again, the document 1093 is still extant and is a national guidance that the Fire sex control ro	7	that information to us.	7	recorded electronically to you or they would rely on the
10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Would that be on a telephone or by radio? 12 A. Telephone. 13 Q. Would that be on the dedicated line used for BT or the dedicated line used for Essex or— 14 dedicated line used for Essex or— 15 A. They could use either, but I would imagine, I would presume, they used our direct line that we have with our neighbouring brigades. So they would've come up and on on lot CS they would've appeared as Essex Fire Brigade. 19 Q. Right. We've looked at Surrey, we've talked about North 20 West, we now have Essex; do they all have access to the sanigle line or do they each have their own dedicated line. 21 Same single line or do they each have their own dedicated line. 22 A. Our surrounding fire and rescue services each have their own? So there's a specific number 23 A. Our surrounding fire and rescue services each have their own? So there's a specific number 24 own dedicated line. 25 Q. Then the operator at the other end of the telephone would dreated a service as sense uses use was they would wind that nicident to the same and then add that nicident to the main — the larger incident. 26 Q. Right. We've looked at Surrey, we've talked about North 19 caller's information is complete and accurate? 27 A. Our surrounding fire and rescue services each have their own? So there's a specific number 19 caller's information is complete and accurate? 28 A. Yes. 29 Q. Then the operator at the other end of the telephone dedicated line would was a proper that incident to the main — the larger incident. 29 Q. What safegaands or systems are there to ensure that that inificant. 20 Q. What safegaands or systems are there to ensure that that inificant. 21 Q. What safegaands or systems are there to ensure that that inificant. 22 they should — the proper in the thing of the fire survival guidance calls, again, the document 1093 is still extant and is a national guidance document for all control would assume that the Essex control room operator would assume that the Essex control room operator would assume that the Essex control	8	Q. Now, just on that, first of all, you say they would ring	8	telephone?
11 Q. Would that be on a telephone or by radio? 12 A. Telephone. 13 Q. Would that be on the dedicated line used for BT or the dedicated line used for Essex or — 14 dedicated line used for Essex or — 15 A. They could use either, but I would imagine, I would presume, they used our direct line that we have with our neighbouring brigades. So they would've appeared as Essex Fire Brigade. 16 Q. Right. We've looked at Surrey, we've talked about North 20 West, we now have Essex; do they all have access to the same single line or do they each have their own dedicated lines? 17 and the same way as they would the dedicated line without the nation our ICS they would've appeared as Essex Fire Brigade. 18 and that incident to the main — the larger incident. 19 Q. Right. We've looked at Surrey, we've talked about North 20 West, we now have Essex; do they all have access to the same single line or do they each have their own dedicated lines? 21 dedicated lines? 22 A. Our surrounding fire and rescue services each have their own dedicated line. 23 A. Our surrounding fire and rescue services each have their own? So there's a specific number 22 A. Yes. 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. They each have their own? So there's a specific number 22 and a different specific number 50 Page 105  26 Page 105  27 They ach have their own? So there's a specific number 22 and a different specific number 61 North West? 34 A. Yes. 38 A. Yes. 39 Q. — and a different specific number for North West? 34 A. Yes. 39 Q. — and a different specific number for North West? 34 A. Yes. 30 Q. — and a different specific number for North West? 35 Q. Okay. They would ring. Who would answer the telephone? 36 A. Acortrol officer. 30 Q. Right. 30 A. Yes and a different specific number of the proper for North West? 35 Q. Okay. They would ring. Who would answer the telephone 36 A. Acortrol officer. Would that be one of the — I see. So 36 any control officer in the room, not a supervisor? 36 A. Acortrol officer. 37 A. Acortrol officer in the room, not a supervisor? 38 A. Yes. 39 A. Aup	9	London control.	9	A. They would rely on the telephone.
12 A. Telephone. 13 Q. Would that be on the dedicated line used for BT or the 14 dedicated line used for Esex or — 15 A. They could use either, but I would imagine, I would 16 presume, they used our direct line that we have with our 17 neighbouring brigades. So they would've come up and on 18 our ICS they would've appeared as Esex Fire Brigade. 19 Q. Right. We've looked at Surrey, we've talked about North 22 west, we now have Esex; do they all have access to the 23 a. Our surrounding fire and rescue services each have their 24 own dedicated lines? 25 Q. They each have their own? So there's a specific number 26 page 105  Page 105  Page 107  1 for Esex — 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. — and a different specific number for North West? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Okay. They would ring. Who would answer the telephone? 6 A. A Control officer. 7 Q. Control officer. Would that be one of the — I see. So 8 any control officer in the room, not a supervisor? 9 A. A supervisor could answer the phone if everyone else was 10 busy. 11 Q. Right. Would that call come through to a physical telephone 11 sitting on a desk or would it come through — 14 A. Yes. 15 Yes. 16 Q. So the Stratford control room officer receiving information is complete and accurate? 18 information is complete and accurate? 19 Q. What safeguards or systems are there to ensure that that information is complete and accurate? 20 What safeguards or systems are there to ensure that that information is complete and accurate? 21 they should — they will be all asking the same four principles. 22 questions and following the same four principles. 23 Q. That was my next questions and following the same four principles. 24 questions and following the same four principles. 25 Q. Okay. They would ring. Who would answer the telephone? 26 A. A control officer. 27 Q. Control officer would that be one of the — I see. So 28 any control officer in the room, not a supervisor? 30 Q. Right. 31 Q. Right. 42 West was a substitute of the mean of the proper in the flat? 32 A. West was a substitute of the mean of	10	A. Yes.	10	Q. Then the operator at the other end of the telephone
13   Q. Would that be on the dedicated line used for BT or the dedicated line used for Essex or —   14   14   15   15   15   15   15   15	11	Q. Would that be on a telephone or by radio?	11	would create a service message in the same way as they
dedicated line used for Essex or —  A. They could use either, but I would imagine, I would presume, they used our direct line that we have with our neighbouring brigades. So they would've come up and on our ICS they would've appeared as Essex Fire Brigade.  Q. Right. We've looked at Surrey, we've talked about North of dedicated lines?  A. Our surrounding free and rescue services each have their own dedicated line.  Page 105  Page 105  Page 107  I for Essex —  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. A control officer.  Q. Control officer.  Q. Control officer.  A. A control officer.  Q. Control officer.  A. A control officer.  A. A control officer.  D. Right.  A. A supervisor could answer the phone if everyone else was busy.  D. Right.  A. H. would come through to the ICS, so the communication sitting on a desk or would its come through.  A. Yes, I would imagine that they would've asked the numbers of people in the flat?  A. Yes, I would imagine; is that because that's required by the ploicy?  A. Yes, Yes, it would just be labelled that it would be from Essex Fire Brigade.  In terms of the message that Essex CRO would pass  D. Roy would they record that?  D. A. Yes would they record w	12	A. Telephone.	12	would with any other 999 call?
dedicated line used for Essex or —  A. They could use either, but I would imagine, I would presume, they used our direct line that we have with our neighbouring brigades. So they would've come up and on our ICS they would've appeared as Essex Fire Brigade.  Q. Right. We've looked at Surrey, we've talked about North of dedicated lines?  West, we now have Fissex; do they all have access to the same single line or do they each have their own dedicated lines?  A. Our surrounding fire and rescue services each have their own dedicated line.  Dear 105  Page 105  Page 105  Page 107  I for Essex —  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  A. Yes.  Q. — and a different specific number for North West?  Q. — A Control officer.  Q. Control officer.  A. A control officer.  Q. Sight.  A. A control officer.  A. A control officer.  Q. Sight is an additionable that the sex control room operator would be asking the same questions and providing the same guidance that the rose would be in Stratford if they were taking the call direct?  A. Yes.  Q. Jash was my enext question. So Stratford control would assume that the Essex control room operator would be asking the same questions and providing the same guidance that the rose wou	13	Q. Would that be on the dedicated line used for BT or the	13	A. Yes. They'd create an incident, they'd complete the
presume, they used our direct line that we have with our neighbouring brigades. So they would've come up and on our ICS they would've appeared as Essex Fire Brigade.  Regibouring brigades. So they would've come up and on our ICS they would've appeared as Essex Fire Brigade.  Regibouring brigades. So they would've come up and on our ICS they would've appeared as Essex Fire Brigade.  Regibouring brigades. So they would've come up and on our ICS they would've appeared as Essex Fire Brigade.  Regibouring brigades. So they would ve appeared as Essex Fire Brigade.  Regibouring brigades. So they would ve appeared as Essex Fire Brigade.  Regibouring brigades. So they would receive year talking and information secondhand?  A. A. Yes, that's right.  Regibouring brigades. So they was essentially getting the 999 caller's information secondhand?  A. A. Yes, that's right.  Regibouring brigades. So they was essentially getting the 999 caller's information secondhand?  A. Wes, that's right.  Regibouring brigades. So they was essentially getting the 999 caller's information secondhand?  A. Wes, that's right.  Regibouring brigades or systems are there to ensure that that information secondhand?  A. Wes, that's right.  Regibouring brigades or systems are there to ensure that that information secondhand?  A. Wesl, with regard to the fire survival guidance calls, again, the document 1093 is still extant and is a national guidance document for all control staff. So Page 107  They each have their own? So there's a specific number  They should — they will be all asking the same questions and following the same four principles.  Regibouring the same questions and following the same questions and following the same questions and providing the same guidance that he or s	14	dedicated line used for Essex or	14	
neighbouring brigades. So they would've come up and on our ICS they would've appeared as Essex Fire Brigade. Q. Right. We've looked at Surrey, we've talked about North West, we now have Essex; do they all have access to the same single line or do they each have their own dedicated lines?  A. Our surrounding fire and rescue services each have their own dedicated line.  Days 105  Page 105  Page 105  Page 107  they should—they will be all asking the same questions and following the same four principles. Q. They each have their own? So there's a specific number  they should—they will be all asking the same questions and following the same four principles. Q. Okay. They would ring. Who would answer the telephone? A. A control officer. Q. Control officer. Q. Control officer. Would that be one of the—I see. So any control officer in the room, not a supervisor? A. A supervisor could answer the phone if everyone else was busy.  Would that call come through to a physical telephone sitting on a desk or would it come through to system we use. Q. So just like any other 999 call from a caller? A. Yes, Yes, it would just be labelled that it would be from Essex Fire Brigade. Q. In terms of the message that Essex CRO would pass on the would they record that?  A. Well, with regard to the fire survival guidance calls, information is complete and accurate? A. Well, with regard to the fire survival guidance calls, and information secondhan?  They will be all asking the same questions and following the same four principles.  Q. That was my next question. So Stratford control would assume that Essex control room operator would be asking the same questions and following the same four principles. Q. Control officer. Q. Control officer. Q. Control officer. Would that a control office in the room, not a supervisor? A. A supervisor could answer the phone if everyone else was busy.  Days the same questions and providing the same four principles. Q. Is that right. A. Yes.  A. Ye	15	A. They could use either, but I would imagine, I would	15	then add that incident to the main the larger
our ICS they would've appeared as Essex Fire Brigade. Q. Right. We've looked at Surrey, we've talked about North West, we now have Essex; do they all have access to the same single line or do they each have their own dedicated lines?  A. Our surrounding fire and rescue services each have their own dedicated line.  A. Our surrounding fire and rescue services each have their own dedicated line.  Days 105  Page 105  Page 107  They each have their own? So there's a specific number  Page 105  Page 107  They should—they will be all asking the same questions and following the same four principles. Q. Okay, They would ring. Who would answer the telephone? A. A control officer. Q. Control officer. Q. Control officer. Would that be one of the —I see. So any control officer in the room, not a supervisor? A. A supervisor could answer the phone if everyone else was busy. Days.  A. A supervisor could answer the phone if everyone else was sitting on a desk or would it come through— A. It would come through to the ICS, so the communication system we use.  Q. So just like any other 999 call from a caller? A. Yes, Yes, it would just be labelled that it would be from Essex Fire Brigade.  In terms of the message that Essex CRO would pass on, the document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document for all control staff. So Page 107  A. Well, with regard to the fire survival guidance calls, again, the document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance do	16	presume, they used our direct line that we have with our	16	incident.
our ICS they would've appeared as Essex Fire Brigade. Q. Right. We've looked at Surrey, we've talked about North West, we now have Essex; do they all have access to the same single line or do they each have their own dedicated lines?  A. Our surrounding fire and rescue services each have their own dedicated line.  A. Our surrounding fire and rescue services each have their own dedicated line.  Days 105  Page 105  Page 107  They each have their own? So there's a specific number  Page 105  Page 107  They should—they will be all asking the same questions and following the same four principles. Q. Okay, They would ring. Who would answer the telephone? A. A control officer. Q. Control officer. Q. Control officer. Would that be one of the —I see. So any control officer in the room, not a supervisor? A. A supervisor could answer the phone if everyone else was busy. Days.  A. A supervisor could answer the phone if everyone else was sitting on a desk or would it come through— A. It would come through to the ICS, so the communication system we use.  Q. So just like any other 999 call from a caller? A. Yes, Yes, it would just be labelled that it would be from Essex Fire Brigade.  In terms of the message that Essex CRO would pass on, the document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document for all control staff. So Page 107  A. Well, with regard to the fire survival guidance calls, again, the document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance document floy3 is still extant and is anational guidance do	17	neighbouring brigades. So they would've come up and on	17	Q. So the Stratford control room officer receiving
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Would that call come through to a physical telephone sitting on a desk or would it come through  A. It would come through to the ICS, so the communication system we use.  O. So just like any other 999 call from a caller?  A. Yes, Yes, it would just be labelled that it would be from Essex Fire Brigade.  O. I see, okay.  In terms of the message that Essex CRO would pass on, where would they record what they heard, or how would they record that?  And would that include establishing the numbers of people in the flat?  A. Yes, I would imagine that they would've asked the numbers of people in the flat?  A. Yes, I would imagine that they would've asked the numbers of people in the flat?  A. Yes, I would imagine that they would imagine; is that because that's required by the policy?  A. The policy mentions it and asks for that, so I imagine they would've followed that process if they were talking it's only 1 minute and 12 seconds, the call. It's not very long in duration to get all that information out, so I couldn't		•	11	
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on, where would they record what they heard, or how would they record that?  21 It's not very long in duration to get all that information out, so I couldn't				
22 would they record that? 22 information out, so I couldn't		•		-
				• •
		•		
Q. Right. And then they would telephone and they would 24 A. No.				
25 pass a message over orally, verbally? 25 Q. What about information in relation to children in the				
1		1		<u> </u>
Page 106 Page 108		Page 106		Page 108

1	flat or persons with mobility difficulties or other	1	it themselves if it needed an additional mobilisation.
2	physical difficulties?	2	Q. It's an example, but would Essex then drop out of the
3	A. Well, again, according to or the policy 10/93 asks if	3	picture all together or would they stay involved?
4	the caller can't get out, why can't they get out, and	4	A. No, they would not be involved anymore.
5	part of that is if they have mobility issues or if it's	5	Q. They would not be involved anymore?
6	just smoke, maybe, that's preventing them. So we do	6	A. No.
7	explore that area.	7	Q. What if calls were being handled by BT, without
8	Q. If it is an "if", it's a hypothesis a control room	8	a control room?
9	operator in Stratford had thought that the control room	9	A. So that's BT don't call handle; BT will just put
10	operator in Essex had not got enough information from	10	that pass the call through to the Fire Brigade
11	the caller, what would they do?	11	control room that's required. They are very helpful
12	A. So they could ring that caller back. It's not something	12	when they listen in. They do provide obviously, when
13	we do, so it's as I talked about earlier, it's	13	callers are waiting and they're getting frustrated with
14	a historic thing where we used to have landlines, so we	14	waiting, they do provide, I believe, some update as to
15	would never ring a landline phone and call a person back	15	what's happening at the incident because they've
16	into a potential burning or a fire.	16	overheard our exchange with the callers on occasions.
17	Q. No.	17	Q. Yes.
18	A. But nowadays, with mobile phones, we do. If we didn't	18	Would BT get involved with the call itself in terms
19	have enough information, if we wanted clarity on the	19	of the advice being given to callers or information
20	address or a different issue, we could phone the caller	20	being taken from callers?
21	back if it was a mobile phone.	21	A. Not on a normal incident, but I believe on the night of
22	Q. Okay. But you got the information secondhand, so	22	Grenfell Tower, they did become involved.
23	Stratford would ring Essex back to say, "I need more	23	Q. They did become involved?
24	information, you haven't got enough"?	24	A. Yes.
25	A. No.	25	Q. I just wanted to ask you a question or two about that.
	70.000		70
	Page 109	-	Page 111
1	Q. Or would Stratford be able to ring the caller direct?	1	If I can take you back to the control debrief
2	A. Stratford would be able to ring the caller direct.	2	manuscript document that we looked at earlier,
3	Q. How would Stratford know which number to call?	3	LFB00003113, and go to page 4.
4	A. So in the call handling process, when it's handed from	4	This is 4/5 of the way down the page. It says:
5	BT, the BT operator, to fire control room, they exchange	5	"Critical line Police + BT taking FSG."
6	the telephone number that the caller's using.	6	Then there's an asterisk, and it says:
7	Q. Right. Oh, I see. So is it the case that whenever	7	" Did not know guidance.
8	a 999 call comes in from outside into Stratford, whether	8	" Other FRS did know FSG guidance."
9	it's direct from the caller or from a buddy control	9	Do you remember the discussion at the control
10	room, you always get the number	10	debrief about that subject?
11	A. Yes, the telephone number.	11	A. Not really. I could assume what those comments meant,
12	Q. — of the caller?	12	but I can't remember the specific discussion we had.
13	A. Of the caller.	13	Q. Do you remember yourself any particular difficulties
14	Q. So you would immediately be able to cut out the buddy	14	encountered on the night because BT and the police, as
15	control room and be able to deal with the caller direct?	15	it says there, didn't know guidance?
16	A. Yes.	16	A. So I don't recall ever talking to the police and hearing
17	Q. After that call comes in from Essex with whatever	17	the police pass back information to our control room,
18	details the Essex control room has been able to take,	18	but that wouldn't be unusual. I do recall talking to BT
19	what does the control room officer at Stratford do with	19	throughout the night during that incident. I believe
20	the information?	20	they were updating us as to where they were sending
21	A. So they would've created an incident with that	21	calls. I had a conversation with them about redirecting
22	information to make sure that's logged, and depending on	22	our calls to other FRSs and not to North West anymore
23	what information was passed by Essex, they would've	23	because I thought they were overrun as well. But
24	either passed that to the radio operator via a service	24	I don't recall any concerns with how they were handling
25	request, if it needed to go to the incident, or actioned	25	the calls.
	D 440		D 442
	Page 110		Page 112

1	I did speak to them after we changed the advice and	1	receiving calls for a large amount of flooding and we
2	told residents to leave their properties to let them	2	would ask them maybe to ask the callers a couple of
3	know, because we were still receiving a vast amount of	3	questions to assess the situation. Obviously when
4	calls.	4	a caller rings up, it just forms in a queue on our ICS
5	Q. So did you have any discussions with BT themselves about	5	and we answer it systematically, so we don't know if
6	BT handling the calls in substance?	6	they're ringing for flooding or they're ringing for
7	A. No.	7	a fire or they've got someone trapped. So, again, it's
8	Q. You didn't. Okay.	8	really answering every call as quickly as we can.
9	Then just to finish this off, I think you are saying	9	Q. I see.
10	you weren't aware of a problem created by the fact that	10	Can I then ask you to look at your statement. We
11	BT didn't understand the fire survival guidance methods?	11	are going to talk about FSG now.
12	A. No. As I say, you would have to speak to a BT operator,	12	At page 2 of your statement, you explain what fire
13	but in my experience, they are extremely helpful when we	13	survival guidance is halfway down the page, middle
14	have spate conditions such as flooding, in a control	14	paragraph, and you say, by reference to the training,
15	room, and we can approach them about asking specific	15	there are four key principles: assessing the situation,
16	questions to try and assure callers that we will get to	16	offering advice, protecting the caller and providing
17	them and if they're dealing with a flood, that we are	17	rescue options.
18	aware of it.	18	A. Yes.
19	But we didn't implement that on the night, but I'm	19	Q. Those are the four principles.
20	sure when they were handing over to other fire and	20	What determines when a call or if a call is an FSG?
21	rescue services, they were briefing them about the	21	A. So when the control officer is on the phone to a caller
22	situation that we were experiencing.	22	and the caller indicates that they cannot leave their
23	Q. Yes.	23	premises by regular means due to fire, heat or smoke.
24	You refer to spate conditions. That's an accepted	24	Q. That's the next sentence of your statement, is it? You
25	expression	25	say:
	Page 113		Page 115
	- 480 - 1-0		8
1	A. Yes.	1	"These principles come in to force once the caller
2	Q I think in the LFB for lots of FSG calls, or lots of	2	has indicated that they cannot get out of their home."
3	999 calls.	3	A. Yes.
4	A. Lots of 999 calls in a prolonged period of time. So	4	Q. Okay.
5	it's a national fire control room term.	5	Would you rely on the caller to tell you that
6	Q. A surge in numbers is something you as an SOM would have	6	they're trapped and can't get out of their home or would
7	to assess, is it?	7	the control room officer ask them and probe with the
8	A. Yes.	8	caller as to what the conditions are like and whether
9	Q. At that stage, would you then liaise with BT when there	9	they can escape?
10	were spate conditions?	10	A. In my experience, the majority of callers would
11	A. Yes, that would be normal practice.	11	volunteer that information, if they couldn't leave their
12	Q. Would it be normal practice when you did liaise with BT	12	premise, if they felt they couldn't leave, but we would
13	to tell BT what the conditions were like inside the	13	also ask them.
14	building as far as you knew them?	14	Q. Okay.
15	A. No, not necessarily. But they would have picked that	15	Can we look at policy 790, which is one of the two
16	up, like I say. They do hang on, they do make sure our	16	you referred to this morning. That's in tab 5 of the
17	calls are connected to the right service, so they	17	policies bundle, "Fire survival guidance calls",
18	would've picked up from people, talking to them	18	reviewed as current, 17 April 2014.
19	themselves, what the conditions were like.	19	Can I ask you to look at paragraph 2, first of all,
20	Q. During spate conditions, would it be the case that BT	20	"fire survival guidance call definition". It's set out
21	operators would themselves be handling calls, giving FSG	21	there. What I want just to focus on is paragraph 2.3:
22	advice?	22	"Responsibility rests with control to determine that
23	A. It tends to happen with flooding. So if we had a large	23	FSG is taking place and not the fireground. The
24	amount of flooding being experienced in one area, we	24	fireground will determine whether an incident should be
25	would ring them, we would tell them that obviously we're	25	treated as Persons Reported not control."
	Page 114		Page 116

1	Now, control, in determining that an FSG is taking	1	paragraph, which is at the bottom of page 11, which is
2	place, relies it looks like on that only on the	2	paragraph 5.19, "Fire survival guidance", there at the
3	caller?	3	bottom of the page:
4	A. Yes.	4	"Detailed information, advice and guidance for
5	Q. That's right, is it?	5	control room officers is set out in accordance with Fire
6	A. That's true.	6	Service Circular 10/93 appendix A. Guidance can also be
7	Q. And the fire ground, it says, determines whether	7	found in appendix '3' of this policy and Reference
8	an incident should be treated as persons reported, not	8	Information File 'FIRE SURVIVAL GUIDANCE'."
9	control.	9	So that is in this policy and this policy is current
10	What's the difference between an FSG and persons	10	as at March 2014.
11	reported?	11	My first question is: was that revised after Lakanal
12	A. So a fire survival guidance call is actually the control	12	House?
13	operator is talking to the caller and is maintaining	13	A. Yes.
14	contact with the caller, providing advice. A persons	14	Q. In what way was that part revised?
15	reported incident could be a call to a fire where	15	A. We reiterated the principles of the fire service
16	a neighbour has mentioned that the caller or the	16	circular, the four principles we've covered. We
17	occupier is still in the premise.	17	provided additional questioning that control officers
18	Q. Right. And fire survival guidance calls can come from	18	could use.
19	any kind of building, can they?	19	Q. Right, okay. So just taking this in stages slightly, if
20	A. Yes.	20	we go to appendix 3, which is introduced by
21	Q. Doesn't necessarily need to be a high-rise?	21	paragraph 5.19, that's on page 16 of this policy, could
22	A. No.	22	you just help me identify the guidance that is supposed
23	Q. No. And is it simply one where the caller believes that	23	to be given?
24	they can't leave their premises due to the effects of	24	Am I right in thinking we pick it up at the third
25	fire?	25	paragraph down:
			1
	Page 117		Page 119
1	A. Yes, heat or smoke.	1	"Brigade Control advise callers to 'Get out and Stay
2	Q. Heat or smoke. Okay. That then defines it as an FSG,	2	out', however if a call is received from a High rise
3	does it?	3	building where Fire, Heat and Smoke are not affecting
4	A. Yes.	4	the caller, LFB would advise that"
5	Q. Okay.	5	And then there's something underneath that and it
6	What happens next? What does the control room	6	
7	operator do when they know that they are dealing with	7	says:  "You are usually safest to remain in your premises
8	a fire survival guidance call, say the person is unable	8	unless affected by fire, heat or smoke. If the situation
	to leave their premises due to the effects of fire,		changes, you should leave your premises and dial 999, if
9 10	smoke or heat?	10	you need further assistance."
11	A. So a number of actions all at the same time. They still	11	There's a quote mark I think at the end, although
12	need to get their location, confirm their address. They	12	there isn't at the beginning.
13	still need to mobilise the fire engines whilst talking	13	Leaving aside the punctuation, that sentence, is
13	to that caller. Relaying any personal information, so	14	that what we would call stay-put advice?
15	any information that the caller has given them and	15	A. Yes. You have referred to it as stay-put advice. So in
16	volunteering to them, they will record on the incident	16	policy 10/93, as I say in my statement, whilst it
	•		
17 18	log. They will mobilise an additional attendance.	17 18	provides assist — principles and assessment for situation and protection advice, the rescue options are
	I don't know if you've heard about the NFSG attendance.		
19	So they will mobilise that as well.	19	only for domestic dwelling fires, domestic dwelling
20	Q. I see.	20	buildings of one floor. So it instructs the operator
21	In terms of the guidance, can I ask you to look at	21	how to break a window and how to provide advice to that
	a different policy, which is at tab 3. This is the	22	caller to lower themselves from a first-floor window,
22	4 441 1 400 1		nut it doesn't cover any protect or any receile advice
22 23	other one you mentioned this morning, policy 539, and go	23	but it doesn't cover any protect — or any rescue advice
22 23 24	to appendix 3.	24	from a high-rise building.
22 23			* *
22 23 24	to appendix 3.	24	from a high-rise building.

1	A. But the document does refer to that in those situations	1	is addressing what? Is it addressing a situation where
2	we would follow national government guidance for	2	the caller is affected by heat or smoke
3	individuals living in high-rise premises, which	3	A. Yes.
4	I believe is that statement.	4	Q but can't get out?
5	Q. Okay.	5	A. And cannot leave, or feels that they cannot leave the
6	Now, it's really the question of how far the	6	building.
7	high-rise qualification goes.	7	Q. Okay.
8	I think you are saying it does apply to the advice	8	Now, that question, affected by fire, heat or smoke,
9	which starts "You are usually safest to remain in your	9	is a question of degree, isn't it, requiring a judgement
10	premises" that we are just highlighting now.	10	on the part of the control room officer or operator?
11	A. Yes.	11	A. No, I think we would assume the judgement of the caller
12	Q. Then there's a bit underneath it which says:	12	that stated they couldn't leave because of the smoke and
13	"Should the caller be unable to escape, an	13	felt unsafe leaving.
14	information file containing prompts are in place on the	14	Q. Okay.
15	computer-aided mobilising system to assist the control	15	How would a caller know whether they were affected
16	room officer in:	16	badly enough by smoke, heat or fire to take them into
17	"• Providing guidance to assist the caller to	17	escape territory?
18	safety.	18	A. I don't think they would. They would've just had
19	"• Provide timely and relevant information to the	19	a visible picture of what and they would've felt that
20	attending resources.	20	they couldn't leave the building because of the smoke.
21	"• Provide reassurance to the caller that help and	21	Q. I see.
22	assistance is forthcoming."	22	Does the policy say anything about how to assess
23	Is that applicable to all buildings or just to	23	escape routes before the control room operator is able
24	high-rise buildings?	24	to give FSG advice?
25	A. To all buildings.	25	A. So I think as part of the initial assessment, if
	D 121		D 122
	Page 121		Page 123
1	Q. All buildings?	1	a caller has volunteered that they can't leave the
2			
_	A. Can I just clarify, it's should the caller be unable to	2	premise, you could ask them if they had an alternative
3	A. Can I just clarify, it's should the caller be unable to escape is for all buildings, yes.	2 3	premise, you could ask them if they had an alternative means of escape. That would be pretty rare in most
		1	
3	escape is for all buildings, yes.	3	means of escape. That would be pretty rare in most
3 4	escape is for all buildings, yes.  Q. Is for all buildings.  A. Yes.  Q. But it should also apply in relation to high-rise	3 4	means of escape. That would be pretty rare in most tower blocks.
3 4 5	escape is for all buildings, yes.  Q. Is for all buildings.  A. Yes.	3 4 5	<ul><li>means of escape. That would be pretty rare in most tower blocks.</li><li>Q. Would the control room operator be dependent upon the</li></ul>
3 4 5 6	escape is for all buildings, yes.  Q. Is for all buildings.  A. Yes.  Q. But it should also apply in relation to high-rise	3 4 5 6	means of escape. That would be pretty rare in most tower blocks.  Q. Would the control room operator be dependent upon the caller making the assessment about the available
3 4 5 6 7	escape is for all buildings, yes.  Q. Is for all buildings.  A. Yes.  Q. But it should also apply in relation to high-rise buildings?  A. Yes.  Q. So might it be the case that there's a fire elsewhere in	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	<ul><li>means of escape. That would be pretty rare in most tower blocks.</li><li>Q. Would the control room operator be dependent upon the caller making the assessment about the available alternative routes?</li></ul>
3 4 5 6 7 8	escape is for all buildings, yes.  Q. Is for all buildings.  A. Yes.  Q. But it should also apply in relation to high-rise buildings?  A. Yes.  Q. So might it be the case that there's a fire elsewhere in your high-rise building, normally you're safest to stay	3 4 5 6 7 8	means of escape. That would be pretty rare in most tower blocks.  Q. Would the control room operator be dependent upon the caller making the assessment about the available alternative routes?  A. Very much so.  Q. Very much so. And would that, though, mean that the burden was on the caller to look outside their flat at
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	escape is for all buildings, yes.  Q. Is for all buildings.  A. Yes.  Q. But it should also apply in relation to high-rise buildings?  A. Yes.  Q. So might it be the case that there's a fire elsewhere in	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	means of escape. That would be pretty rare in most tower blocks.  Q. Would the control room operator be dependent upon the caller making the assessment about the available alternative routes?  A. Very much so.  Q. Very much so. And would that, though, mean that the burden was on the caller to look outside their flat at the corridor or lobby before making that assessment?
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	escape is for all buildings, yes.  Q. Is for all buildings.  A. Yes.  Q. But it should also apply in relation to high-rise buildings?  A. Yes.  Q. So might it be the case that there's a fire elsewhere in your high-rise building, normally you're safest to stay put, but if you're unable to escape then there are prompts?	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	means of escape. That would be pretty rare in most tower blocks.  Q. Would the control room operator be dependent upon the caller making the assessment about the available alternative routes?  A. Very much so.  Q. Very much so. And would that, though, mean that the burden was on the caller to look outside their flat at the corridor or lobby before making that assessment?  A. No, so I think that just refers to sometimes, you
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	escape is for all buildings, yes.  Q. Is for all buildings.  A. Yes.  Q. But it should also apply in relation to high-rise buildings?  A. Yes.  Q. So might it be the case that there's a fire elsewhere in your high-rise building, normally you're safest to stay put, but if you're unable to escape then there are prompts?  A. Yes.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	means of escape. That would be pretty rare in most tower blocks.  Q. Would the control room operator be dependent upon the caller making the assessment about the available alternative routes?  A. Very much so.  Q. Very much so. And would that, though, mean that the burden was on the caller to look outside their flat at the corridor or lobby before making that assessment?  A. No, so I think that just refers to — sometimes, you know, in a panic, if you think about a domestic house,
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	escape is for all buildings, yes.  Q. Is for all buildings.  A. Yes.  Q. But it should also apply in relation to high-rise buildings?  A. Yes.  Q. So might it be the case that there's a fire elsewhere in your high-rise building, normally you're safest to stay put, but if you're unable to escape then there are prompts?  A. Yes.  Q. For a control room officer sitting in Stratford, what	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	means of escape. That would be pretty rare in most tower blocks.  Q. Would the control room operator be dependent upon the caller making the assessment about the available alternative routes?  A. Very much so.  Q. Very much so. And would that, though, mean that the burden was on the caller to look outside their flat at the corridor or lobby before making that assessment?  A. No, so I think that just refers to sometimes, you know, in a panic, if you think about a domestic house, people forget, because they're in an unusual situation
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1	A. No.	1	"Firstly by assisting the caller to help identify a
2	Q. Was that an issue that arose at Lakanal House?	2	safe, alternative ESCAPE route for them to leave their
3	A. That the alternative escape routes	3	premises."
4	Q. The means of assessing the safety of an alternative	4	Now, in that assessment I'm sorry to focus back
5	escape route, was that an issue that arose at Lakanal?	5	on it how would a control room officer help the
6	A. Yes.	6	caller to identify a safe alternative escape route?
7	Q. It was. Given that it was an issue that arose at	7	A. So they would ask if they had an alternative exit, if
8	Lakanal, do you know why there's nothing in this policy	8	they could leave by any other means.
9	about how a control room operator would help themselves	9	Q. Alternative escape route. Supposing there is only one
10	or help the caller make that assessment? Do you know	10	escape route, but the caller doesn't know whether it's
11	why there's nothing in the policy about that?	11	safe to use it or not, what happens then?
12	A. So to be clear, with regard to the Lakanal incident,	12	A. Then I think whilst they were talking on the telephone
13	that's why we introduced the re-assessment. So, again,	13	to us, they would say they didn't feel it was safe, so
14	there was nothing about assisting an individual out of	14	we would assess the situation and try and protect them.
15	an alternative exit; it was about re-assessing the	15	Q. Then you have:
16	situation.	16	"If this is not possible, then ASSESS the situation
17	Q. I see.	17	by asking the caller direct questions."
18	A. To keep updated on the conditions.	18	You see those set out.
19	Q. Right.	19	And then it says:
20	A. Why has the document not changed or why has it not been	20	" PROTECT the caller by providing current Fire
21	added? I think we've as a group of fire control room	21	Safety advice"
22	officers across the country, we've tried to update the	22	What sort of thing would that be, current fire
23	fire survival guidance document obviously it's dated	23	safety advice?
24	in 1993 and technology has moved on, as have our	24	A. So that would be a list of questions, I don't know if
25	procedures, so we have been and we will continue to try	25	they're under this example, so it would be about moving
	Page 125		Page 127
1	and get it changed and updated.	1	to the furthest room away from the fire or the smoke; to
2	Q. Okay.	2	close the doors in between the fire, the smoke; to stop
3	A. But at the moment, that's the extant guidance that we	3	the smoke from coming in around the door frames, to put
4			
		4	•
- 5	should follow. MR MILLETT: Yes	4 5	down towels or blankets; to open a window, if they could
5 6	MR MILLETT: Yes.	5	down towels or blankets; to open a window, if they could get fresh air into their room; to get down low if the
6	MR MILLETT: Yes.  We can see the rest of the questions that are set		down towels or blankets; to open a window, if they could get fresh air into their room; to get down low if the smoke was coming into the compartment that they were in;
6 7	MR MILLETT: Yes.  We can see the rest of the questions that are set out under that appendix, and I'm interested in the first	5 6 7	down towels or blankets; to open a window, if they could get fresh air into their room; to get down low if the smoke was coming into the compartment that they were in; to cover their mouths with a wet cloth.
6 7 8	MR MILLETT: Yes.  We can see the rest of the questions that are set out under that appendix, and I'm interested in the first one. It's escape, assess, protect and rescue.	5 6 7 8	down towels or blankets; to open a window, if they could get fresh air into their room; to get down low if the smoke was coming into the compartment that they were in; to cover their mouths with a wet cloth.  Q. And then:
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6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	MR MILLETT: Yes.  We can see the rest of the questions that are set out under that appendix, and I'm interested in the first one. It's escape, assess, protect and rescue.  Before I go on, I'm so sorry, I should just say it's just gone 1 o'clock.  Mr Chairman, I notice the time.  SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, can you finish this line of questioning  MR MILLETT: Okay, I will.  SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: in the next 5 minutes? I think we must break at 1.15 in any event.  MR MILLETT: All right.  Are you all right to go on for another 5 minutes?  A. Yes.  Q. Thank you, all right.  Now, in appendix 3, it says, just below halfway down:  "Control room officers will always use the four principles of Escape, Assess, Protect and Rescue to	5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	down towels or blankets; to open a window, if they could get fresh air into their room; to get down low if the smoke was coming into the compartment that they were in; to cover their mouths with a wet cloth.  Q. And then:  "Reassure the caller and REASSESS the callers[sic] situation."  A. Yes.  Q. In terms of reassuring the caller, what would control room operators normally do or be trained to do?  A. So to reassure the callers, to keep them updated on the situation. So I think they would say things like, "We are on the way, the fire engines are on the way, the firefighters are on the way, they're there in the building".  Q. Right.  Just in terms of, "The firefighters are there in the building", that reassurance, is it the case that that reassurance would depend on up-to-date information coming back from the incident ground, from the building to the control room?

1	the firefighters are in attendance. It's true that we	1	clearer with us on the phone. It is something our
2	don't know at what floors they are, what actions they're	2	control staff are used to. They take over a quarter of
3	carrying out in the building, but we would confirm with	3	a million calls from Londoners a year.
4	the caller and try and reassure them that the fire crews	4	Q. So, in summary, is it the case that a control room
5	are there. We wouldn't necessarily need to hear	5	officer who is handling a fire survival guidance call is
6	anything back from the incident to use that phrase.	6	very much dependent upon the clarity and quality of the
7	Q. But all you would know is this right? is that the	7	information given by the caller and very much not able
8	firefighters are at the premises; you wouldn't know more	8	to depend upon information given by the firefighters on
9	precisely where they were in the premises or how close	9	the scene?
10	they were to the apartment where the caller was?	10	A. So I'd say that with every 999 call, we are very much
11	A. No.	11	dependent on what the caller tells us, what their
12	Q. So in terms of giving the reassurance, is it the case	12	assessment of the situation is, where they believe that
13	that that reassurance is actually based on quite limited	13	they are on the location and what's going on with the
14	information?	14	incident. That happens on every occasion.
15	A. I think it's based on the fact that in most incidents,	15	MR MILLETT: I understand.
16	especially the majority of our fire survival guidance	16	Is that a convenient moment?
17	calls that we take, the firefighters are there and have	17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think it is a very convenient
18	made contact with the caller within 10 minutes of us	18	moment, yes, thank you, Mr Millett.
19	being on the telephone to them.	19	We are going to break now until 2.15. Don't talk to
20	Q. Sure. I understand.	20	anyone about your evidence or anything relating to it,
21	Then re-assessing the caller's situation. You have	21	please, over the break.
22	some questions that are there set out.	22	If you would like to go with the usher, she'll look
23	To what extent would the answers to those questions	23	after you.
24	be based on the assessment made by the caller him or	24	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
25	herself in the room or flat or building where the fire	25	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
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	Page 129		Page 131
1	was?	1	MR MILLETT: Thank you very much.
2	A. So that would be all the we would rely on the caller	2	(Pause)
3	passing that information to us.	3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, 2.15, please.
4	Q. How reliable would that information be, given that the	4	(1.15 pm)
5	caller might be in a state of panic or shock?	5	(The short adjournment)
6	A. Yes, it's true, they might be, but that's our only	6	(2.15 pm)
7	source of information that we could gauge how that	7	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett. Well, the witness
8	incident is progressing and what we need to pass on to	8	will be along in a second, I think.
9	the incident ground, and if we need to try and protect	9	MR MILLETT: Right.
10	them some more or assist the caller with rescue.	10	(Pause)
11	Q. Yes.	11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right?
12	What if that person is somebody for whom English was	12	THE WITNESS: Yes, fine, thank you.
13	not a first language?	13	MR MILLETT: Ms Smith, thank you for coming back.
14	A. With regard to?	14	We were on the subject of fire survival guidance
15	Q. With regard to their ability to communicate a clear,	15	calls, and I'm going to come back to that subject in
16	rational objective set of information that would enable	16	a moment and explore it in some more detail by reference
17	the control room officer to make an adequate	17	to policy.
18	re-assessment?	18	Before I do, can I take a very short detour back to
19	A. So we could use a system called language line that we	19	a subject we were looking at before lunch, which was
20	have, but that is quite long-winded, and in most	20	calls and how they are recorded.
21	circumstances when people are asking for fire survival	21	Admin calls are telephone conversations
22	guidance, that would be too long of a delay to manage to	22	A. Yes.
23	get an interpreter on to the line. But we would try and	23	Q I think. And those admin calls are between is
24	speak as clearly and concisely as possible, sometimes	24	this right? Brigade mobile in the control room, and
25	asking if there's anybody else that could communicate	25	another telephone?
	and a sure of the sure of the communication		•
	Page 130		Page 132

1	A. No, not a Brigade mobile.	1	command unit?
2	Q. Sorry	2	A. Yes, I believe so, and we have the command unit
3	A. But just a telephone call from Brigade control or being	3	telephone numbers on our mobilising system so we can
4	received by Brigade control, not through a 999 line.	4	dial them.
5	Q. I see. Sorry, I've already introduced a confusion, I'm	5	Q. Are those mobile network telephones or are they a radio
6	sorry about that.	6	telephone?
7	So an admin call, is it landline to landline?	7	A. Mobile network telephones.
8	A. In control, yes.	8	Q. Does the command unit or a command unit also have a main
9	Q. In control.	9	scheme radio?
10	A. Yes.	10	A. Yes.
11	Q. Okay. So there's a specific telephone set, is there, in	11	Q. I see.
12	Brigade control?	12	So if I was in a command unit and I wanted to make
13	A. There's some specific telephone numbers connected to our	13	a call out or receive a call in from Brigade control, it
14	ICS that are for admin use.	14	could be done is this right? through one of three
15	Q. Right. Who would have access to those?	15	routes: mobile to mobile, such as Oliff to Meyrick.
16	A. All control staff logged on to the mobilising system.	16	A. Yes.
17	Q. Do those admin calls, or where a call is made on	17	Q. RT4.
18	an admin line, would they include calls made to or from	18	A. Via the radio.
19	that admin telephone from a mobile?	19	Q. Via radio, or Brigade telephone to command unit
20	A. Yes.	20	telephone through the designated number.
21	Q. So if somebody was calling Brigade control on that	21	A. Yes. And that's common practice at an incident when
22	number from a mobile, it would be an admin call and	22	a command unit is on scene; we would call the command
23	would be recorded?	23	unit direct and speak to them.
24	A. Yes.	24	Q. Of those three methods of communication, which ones are
25	Q. Similarly, a call from Brigade control on that line to	25	recorded?
	72		70
	Page 133		Page 135
1	a mobile would also be recorded?	1	A. The radio traffic that would go, and the admin call
			A. The fault traffic that would go, and the admin can
2	A. Yes, that's correct.		
2 3	A. Yes, that's correct.  Q. Now, we have some evidence I think to come from	2 3	dialling out from our ICS to the command unit.
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3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	<ul> <li>Q. Now, we have some evidence I think to come from Mr Oliff, and Mr Meyrick yesterday gave evidence about calls he was receiving on a mobile that was attached to his belt.</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. Are those admin calls or would they be different?</li> <li>A. So</li> <li>Q. What are they?</li> <li>A I believe Jason Oliff was using his personal or his Brigade-issue mobile phone to make contact with the command unit. There would've been two reasons for that: <ul> <li>(a) he wouldn't have been able to log on to our telephone system in control because it's just for control room operator access, so he wouldn't have been able to direct dial to one of the command units or to the incident ground using that method; and, secondly, I think he was tasked by OM Norman to pass on that information. It is very quick by voice, and also, with him doing it, it freed up one control officer to remain taking 999 calls.</li> <li>Q. Just in terms of the equipment available in the command</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	dialling out from our ICS to the command unit.  Q. Right.  Finally on this question of communications and recording, if a senior officer used his or her Airwave radio to speak to another senior officer on their Airwave radio, would that be recorded?  A. No.  Q. Right.  Can I turn then back to the question of stay put.  I want to show you a document you may or may not have seen before. Can I ask you to turn to tab 28, or LFB00001905, this is a document called "Organisational Overview" produced by the London Fire Brigade on 9 April 2018.  Can I ask you, first of all, Ms Smith, are you familiar with this document?  A. Yes, I have seen it.  Q. You've seen it. Did you have any part in compiling it?  A. No.  Q. Can I ask you to turn to page 8 internally, page 9 of the Relativity reference, and look at paragraph 8.  Under paragraph 8, you can see the rubric "Stay Put
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	<ul> <li>Q. Now, we have some evidence I think to come from Mr Oliff, and Mr Meyrick yesterday gave evidence about calls he was receiving on a mobile that was attached to his belt.</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. Are those admin calls or would they be different?</li> <li>A. So</li> <li>Q. What are they?</li> <li>A I believe Jason Oliff was using his personal or his Brigade-issue mobile phone to make contact with the command unit. There would've been two reasons for that: <ul> <li>(a) he wouldn't have been able to log on to our telephone system in control because it's just for control room operator access, so he wouldn't have been able to direct dial to one of the command units or to the incident ground using that method; and, secondly, I think he was tasked by OM Norman to pass on that information. It is very quick by voice, and also, with him doing it, it freed up one control officer to remain taking 999 calls.</li> <li>Q. Just in terms of the equipment available in the command unit or in any command unit, we heard Mr Meyrick speak of his mobile, but is there also a telephone in the</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	dialling out from our ICS to the command unit.  Q. Right.  Finally on this question of communications and recording, if a senior officer used his or her Airwave radio to speak to another senior officer on their Airwave radio, would that be recorded?  A. No.  Q. Right.  Can I turn then back to the question of stay put.  I want to show you a document you may or may not have seen before. Can I ask you to turn to tab 28, or LFB00001905, this is a document called "Organisational Overview" produced by the London Fire Brigade on 9 April 2018.  Can I ask you, first of all, Ms Smith, are you familiar with this document?  A. Yes, I have seen it.  Q. You've seen it. Did you have any part in compiling it?  A. No.  Q. Can I ask you to turn to page 8 internally, page 9 of the Relativity reference, and look at paragraph 8.  Under paragraph 8, you can see the rubric "Stay Put and Fire Survival Guidance". I just want to show you the first two paragraphs, 8.1 and 8.2 there. It says:
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	<ul> <li>Q. Now, we have some evidence I think to come from Mr Oliff, and Mr Meyrick yesterday gave evidence about calls he was receiving on a mobile that was attached to his belt.</li> <li>A. Yes.</li> <li>Q. Are those admin calls or would they be different?</li> <li>A. So</li> <li>Q. What are they?</li> <li>A I believe Jason Oliff was using his personal or his Brigade-issue mobile phone to make contact with the command unit. There would've been two reasons for that: <ul> <li>(a) he wouldn't have been able to log on to our telephone system in control because it's just for control room operator access, so he wouldn't have been able to direct dial to one of the command units or to the incident ground using that method; and, secondly, I think he was tasked by OM Norman to pass on that information. It is very quick by voice, and also, with him doing it, it freed up one control officer to remain taking 999 calls.</li> <li>Q. Just in terms of the equipment available in the command unit or in any command unit, we heard Mr Meyrick speak</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	dialling out from our ICS to the command unit.  Q. Right.  Finally on this question of communications and recording, if a senior officer used his or her Airwave radio to speak to another senior officer on their Airwave radio, would that be recorded?  A. No.  Q. Right.  Can I turn then back to the question of stay put.  I want to show you a document you may or may not have seen before. Can I ask you to turn to tab 28, or LFB00001905, this is a document called "Organisational Overview" produced by the London Fire Brigade on 9 April 2018.  Can I ask you, first of all, Ms Smith, are you familiar with this document?  A. Yes, I have seen it.  Q. You've seen it. Did you have any part in compiling it?  A. No.  Q. Can I ask you to turn to page 8 internally, page 9 of the Relativity reference, and look at paragraph 8.  Under paragraph 8, you can see the rubric "Stay Put and Fire Survival Guidance". I just want to show you

1	"The 'stay put' and 'fire survival guidance' (FSG)	1	fire, heat or smoke, we would ask if they could leave
2	advice is normally provided by Brigade Control staff	2	the premise, and they would normally say that they
3	when a caller indicates that they are trapped by a fire	3	couldn't because of smoke in the corridor or another
4	and/or unwilling to leave the property without	4	means that is stopping them leaving, and then we would
5	assistance. The advice given in these circumstances is	5	give advice and try and protect the caller.
6	based upon the established national 'stay put'	6	Q. Right.
7	principles, which are predicated on the expectation that	7	Would that depend then, again, on the assessment
8	a residential high rise premises are constructed and	8	being made by the caller as to the conditions they were
9	maintained in accordance with statutory fire safety and	9	experiencing
10	building control requirements."	10	A. Yes.
11	And then you have a reference to the national	11	Q rather than on anything known or seen or heard by the
12	stay-put policy and the Local Government Group Guidance,	12	control room officer, the CRO?
13	which I think is GRA 3.2, and it says:	13	A. Yes, that would be on information from the caller. So
14	"It states (para. 12.1, page 20) that:	14	even a change or a move to a different room or try
15	"When a fire occurs within one dwelling (or less	15	a different tactic would depend on what the caller was
16	likely, in the common parts), it is normally safe for	16	saying to the control operator about the conditions
17	other residents to remain within their own flat. This	17	within their premise.
18	principle is undoubtedly successful in an overwhelming	18	Q. Right.
19	number of fires in blocks of flats."	19	Now, given what you said about how you might change
20	Now, first of all, obviously you're not familiar	20	or qualify paragraph 8.1, this question I am about to
21	with this document, so I'm not going to ask you about	21	ask you is hypothetical, but nonetheless I would just
22	the document, but I just want to ask you about the	22	like to get your experience if you can help me with it.
23	principles.	23	What would a control room officer advise a caller
24	My first question is: do you agree, from your	24	who was calling and saying, "Well, I'm not at the moment
25	experience, with what is set out there in paragraph 8.1?	25	affected by heat, smoke or fire"
			•
	Page 137		Page 139
1	A. I would have rephrased it a different way and made it	1	A. Then
2	a bit clear. So I would've said fire survival guidance	2	Q but the control room operator knows that the fire is
3	advice is provided by Brigade control, and when a caller	3	spreading very rapidly through the building? What would
4	indicates they are trapped by fire and unwilling to	4	happen then?
5	leave the property, with regard to high-rise, the	5	A. So the advice would be that you're usually safer to
6	question that is on our policy 539 that you are usually	6	remain where you are, but if the situation changes, then
7	safest if you're not affected by fire, heat or smoke,	7	dial 999 and call us back.
8	but if the situation changes, call us back, rather than	8	Q. So the change in the situation would be again, coming
9	classing it as a blanket stay-put advice.	9	to the same point something to be assessed by the
10	Q. That's very helpful, thank you.	10	caller
11	That's quite a yes, that's very helpful.	11	A. Yes.
12	So I think you are saying that actually that the	12	Q and not by the control room operator?
13	move from stay put to evacuate is a more subtle	13	A. No.
14	case-specific one?	14	Q. Right.
15	A. Yes.	15	Can I just take you back, then, to paragraph 8.2 of
16	Q. Right.	16	this document we're still on and the reference there to
17	What is your understanding of what advice should be	17	the Local Government Group Guidance, "Fire safety in
18	given to callers who call from a high-rise block once	18	purpose-built blocks of flats".
19	the control room operator knows that compartmentation	19	I should ask you directly: are you familiar with
20	has been compromised elsewhere in the block?	20	that Local Government Group Guidance?
21	•	21	A. I don't know when that was updated. I'm familiar with
22	A. Elsewhere in the block?	21 22	the Local Government Guidance which was issued in 2009,
	Q. Yes.	23	
23	A. I would say the advice would remain the same, that we	24	after the Lakanal investigation, to 2011.
24 25	would speak to the caller, we would assess the	25	Q. Okay. We may be looking at the same thing, we may not. Can I just ask you, then, to be shown the GRA, generic
23	situation, we would ask if they are being affected by	23	Can I just ask you, then, to be shown the GRA, generic
	Page 138		Page 140

1	risk assessment, 3.2, tab 7 of the policies bundle,	1	as re-assessment in policy 539?
2	LFB000041255.	2	A. Yes, yes, and with regards to the brackets, "which may
3	The front page of that is I think this may be	3	result in a change to the advice previously given", that
4	a different document but my first question is: are	4	was an item that control wanted to be placed into
5	you familiar with this document?	5	policy 790
6	A. I'm not familiar with it. I've seen it, but I wouldn't	6	Q. And was it?
7	know the detail of its content.	7	A regarding yes changing the advice to callers in
8	Q. Okay. I'm not going to ask you about the document if	8	high-rise buildings.
9	you're not familiar with it, I'm not going to ask you	9	Q. Right, we'll come to that very shortly.
10	about the document itself, but I just want to ask you	10	It may be taking this out of order, but that change
11	one or two questions about the principles in it.	11	in advice, my question is: what circumstances would you,
12	If I can just ask you to be shown page 18	12	as a control room officer or supervisor, consider would
13	internally. So I'm not asking you about the language or	13	require the advice to be changed from "stay put" to
14	how the document came about or anything like that, just	14	"evacuate if you can"?
15	the principles.	15	A. For a control room operator?
16	Can we highlight the passage that starts "Fire	16	Q. Yes.
17	survival guidance", four paragraphs down that's it	17	A. I wouldn't expect that decision to be theirs. I'd have
18	and all four bullet points. It says:	18	expected them they are busy dealing with calls,
19	"Fire survival guidance call arrangements should	19	talking to the callers, calming those callers down,
20	include:	20	providing advice that is current at the moment.
21	"• details of how calls will be passed to and	21	I wouldn't expect that to be a decision that they would
22	recorded at the incident	22	have made.
23	"• their impact on resources and mobilising	23	The supervisors, especially if we're referring to
24	"• a re-evaluation process to ensure the balance of	24	the night, were again trying to assist with call
25	risk to the public is reviewed if circumstances change	25	handling, trying to mobilise a vast number of resources,
	Page 141		Page 143
1	(which may result in a change to the advice previously	1	make cover moves, ensure that everyone that needed to
2	given)	2	know was informed.
3	"• how information will be exchanged between	3	So with regard to individuals, they were working,
4	callers, Fire Control and commanders at the incident."	4	they were task orientated. I wouldn't have expected
5	Now, first, I should have shown you the date of this	5	them to have an overview of what was going on with the
6	policy was 2014.	6	whole control room.
7	Are you aware or were you aware in June 2017 that	7	Whilst control officers are very good at listening,
8	those principles, arrangements, should apply to fire	8	talking to a caller and overhearing other conversations,
9	survival guidance calls?	9	so they're able to keep an eye on what's going on
10	A. Yes, I was aware of the principles; I wasn't aware that	10	overall in the room, I wouldn't have expected, with that
11	that was written in that document.	11	huge call volume coming in, that anyone would've had an
12	Q. Okay.	12	overall picture of what was going on. Specifically, in
13	In terms of the principles, I want to focus on the	13	providing specific advice to individuals, yes, but not
14	third one, re-evaluation process to ensure the balance	14	overall picture of what was happening.
15	of risk to the public is reviewed if circumstances	15	Q. I follow. Okay.
16	change.	16	Just going back a little bit into that answer and
17	Would you agree that it is important to re-evaluate	17	going back to this principle, and re-evaluation process,
18	fire survival guidance advice that is being given as you	18	which may result in a change to the advice, first of
19	go?	19	all, taking the control room first of all, who would be
20	A. Yes, and I believe that would've come from one of the	20	responsible for deciding whether there should be
21	outcomes of the Lakanal investigation and that would've	21	a change in the advice?
22	<u> </u>	22	A. I was on the night.
23	been put in. Q. We saw that from policy 539, I think.	23	Q. You
23	• • •	23	A. I was on the night.
25	A. Yes. Q. To re-assess. So that's what you would be familiar with	25	Q. On that night, yes.
23	2. 1010-03003. 30 mat 5 what you would be faillified with	23	Q. On that ingitt, yes.
	Page 142		Page 144

1	A. Yes.	1	special indicators during the re-evaluation process
2	Q. That's ordinarily the case, is it, the senior operations	2	which would take a CRO over the line, as it were, from
3	manager?	3	saying, "Well, you can stay put, you're still safe to
4	A. I would've expected it to come from one of the Brigade	4	stay where you are" to putting their hand up and saying
5	senior managers, yes.	5	"I need help here, I think we may need to change the
6	Q. We're going to come on later to how that decision did	6	advice"?
7	come to be made, but at the moment I'm just looking at	7	A. There's no specific like I say, it would be triggers,
8	policy and how things normally work.	8	it would be a deterioration of the conditions. Again,
9	A. Yes.	9	not specifically for high-rise, but with domestic
10	Q. So you say it would normally be an SOM who would make	10	dwellings, low-rise, callers trapped in fire on the
11	that change or make that decision?	11	first floor, they have specific instructions how to be
12	A. In conjunction with the operations manager, yes.	12	rescued and how to help self-rescue.
13	Q. That's the next question: a re-evaluation process would	13	Q. Yes. Okay.
14	be done, would it, by the SOM in conjunction with the	14	Now, just staying with that question of change to
15	control room officer who is actually handling the call?	15	the advice previously given, we've covered the control
16	A. I would read that that the re-evaluation process would	16	room.
17	happen on every call, with every control room officer	17	Would the incident ground play any role in
18	talking that caller, providing fire survival guidance,	18	a decision by you as SOM to change the advice previously
19	but it would only be some supervisors if they weren't	19	given?
20	involved in mobilising and additional tasks or the	20	A. Yes.
21	operations manager or myself that would be able to get	21	Q. What would that be?
22	an overview of what individual control room officers are	22	A. I would say that that would be a joint discussion on how
23	advising and telling callers in the situation.	23	they are progressing on the incident ground and what in
24	Q. Okay.	24	control we are experiencing and what conditions the
25	You may have answered this already, but let's see if	25	callers are experiencing.
23	Tou may have answered and aready, our let's see it	23	cancis are experiencing.
	Page 145		Page 147
1	I can just get at it a slightly different way.	1	Q. Okay.
1 2	I can just get at it a slightly different way.  If I'm a control room officer and handling a 999	1 2	Q. Okay.  Now, that discussion, I think we can find mention of
2	If I'm a control room officer and handling a 999	2	Now, that discussion, I think we can find mention of
2 3	If I'm a control room officer and handling a 999 call which isn't being listened in on by an OM or an SOM or an AOM, I'm on my own  A. Yes.	2 3	Now, that discussion, I think we can find mention of that in policy 790, if we could just look at that. It's tab 5 of the policies bundle, and can we go to paragraph 8.7 on page 5 internally.
2 3 4	If I'm a control room officer and handling a 999 call which isn't being listened in on by an OM or an SOM or an AOM, I'm on my own A. Yes. Q what information am I looking out for from the caller	2 3 4	Now, that discussion, I think we can find mention of that in policy 790, if we could just look at that. It's tab 5 of the policies bundle, and can we go to
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	If I'm a control room officer and handling a 999 call which isn't being listened in on by an OM or an SOM or an AOM, I'm on my own  A. Yes.  Q what information am I looking out for from the caller which might trigger a change in advice? What flag	2 3 4 5 6 7	Now, that discussion, I think we can find mention of that in policy 790, if we could just look at that. It's tab 5 of the policies bundle, and can we go to paragraph 8.7 on page 5 internally.  This is policy 790 and I know you're familiar with this.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	If I'm a control room officer and handling a 999 call which isn't being listened in on by an OM or an SOM or an AOM, I'm on my own A. Yes. Q what information am I looking out for from the caller which might trigger a change in advice? What flag would A. With regard to fire survival guidance calls? Q. Yes. A. Yes, so the worsening of conditions. Having to, you know, whilst they're reassuring if they keep re-evaluating, they're checking on the conditions, so maybe it would've been heavily smoke-logged when they started or maybe light smoke-logging, but during the time, those conditions have worsened. They may be able to hear different noises, such as the fire. They may report signs of flame, that sort of Q. Would those sorts of things be something that a CRO would be trained to listen out for? A. Yes, yes, they would listen to all the information the caller is providing to them. Q. Of course it's based on experience. A. Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Now, that discussion, I think we can find mention of that in policy 790, if we could just look at that. It's tab 5 of the policies bundle, and can we go to paragraph 8.7 on page 5 internally.  This is policy 790 and I know you're familiar with this.  A. Yes.  Q. 8.7, which sits within the paragraph starting "Advise to Fire Survival Guidance callers", as we can see, says:  "In exceptional circumstances an IC may consider informing control that their advice to FSG callers should be altered e.g. to attempt to leave their property. The IC should remember that this advice may be contrary to National Policy for control staff on FSGs and liaison with the officer in charge at control will be required for agreement to change the prescriptive advice."  So when you were referring a moment ago to joint discussion with the incident ground, is that the policy that you're referring to?  A. Yes.  Q. Now, in practical terms, that suggests that the incident command and control make the decision essentially

1	A. Yes.	1	And they will also be able to access the reference
2	Q. I mean, I've suggested that, but is that actually right?	2	information file that's available to them.
3	Is it a joint decision or is it the decision by control	3	Q. Right. I'll come to that in a moment.
4	based on what the incident ground is telling you?	4	You mention the address.
5	A. Well, the policy says it's a decision by the IC at the	5	A. Yes.
6	incident. I think when it was first drafted, we had	6	Q. What about numbers of persons involved? Is that
7	that it should be a decision between the IC or the	7	something that a CRO should obtain?
8	officer in charge of control, depending on those	8	A. Yes, they will do that during the course of the
9	circumstances.	9	telephone conversation, that's not unusual. But that
10	Q. Right.	10	probably wouldn't be an initial action whilst they're
11	We can read the policy, but in terms of how it's	11	carrying out the assessment of it, that would be part of
12	carried out in practice, when a change to FSG advice is	12	their questioning, and then they would create a service
13	altered from, say, "stay put" to "escape", is the	13	request and pass that information to the en route
14	ultimate decision made by the control room or is it	14	resources.
15	a decision made by the incident commander or is it	15	Q. Right.
16	a joint decision, in practice?	16	I think there may be an easier way to do this. Can
17	A. In practice, it's only ever been done once, to my	17	I ask you to look at policy 790, which is at tab 5 of
18	knowledge, and it was a decision made by control that	18	the policy bundle, and look at paragraph 5.5, which sits
19	the incident ground agreed with.	19	within a section of this policy called "Information
20	Q. Right. That's your own personal experience, is it?	20	transfer to the incident".
21	A. Yes.	21	5.4 I think is where we should start. Just near the
22	Q. Which incident was that, are you able to remember?	22	top of the page, do you see it says:
23	A. That would have been Grenfell.	23	"Control will contact the Initial Command Pump (ICP)
24	Q. Oh, I see, right. Okay.	24	and pass the information below by appliance radio for
25	So do I take it from that that prior to Grenfell,	25	each separate FSG call. When passing this information,
	Page 149		Page 151
1	paragraph 8.7 was never tested in practice?	1	control will reference the information using the
2	A. Yes, that's right.	2	relevant flat/house number."
3	Q. That's correct, right, okay.	3	Then in 5.5 it says:
4	Just before I leave that point, does that mean that	4	"Control will attempt to gather all the information
5	in an ordinary case no, sorry.	5	on the Control Information Form"
6	Does that mean that there has never been a change as	6	That's appendix 2, which we have seen before.
7	contemplated by the policy to FSG in your experience?	7	" and relay this information to the incident as
8	A. Yes, there's never been a change.	8	and when it becomes available."
9	Q. Okay, right.	9	Then there's a list of pieces of information below
10	Now, can I then turn to what happens with FSGs in	10	it, which we can see.
11	practice in terms of what the CROs do.	11	A. Yes.
12	When a call is determined to be an FSG call, what	12	Q. Would it be normal for a CRO, when gathering information
13	action do you expect a CRO to take, just in general	13	from a caller, to take all that information in any
14	terms?	14	event?
15	A. They will take the address, find that address on our	15	A. I think that the trouble with lists and having those
16	gazetteer. They will type in some additional details of	16	information, that is ideally what we'd like to gather,
17	what the caller is saying. They will decide on the	17	but the call handling, it's not a linear process; you
18	incident type. They will mobilise those resources.	18	wouldn't go through step by step asking those questions,
19	This is why they're all still on the telephone call to	19	you'd be able to respond to what the caller was telling
20	the caller. They will mobilise the additional fire	20	you, and if they needed reassurance for a minute or two,
21	survival guidance, PDA, that we have.	21	then you would provide that rather than carrying on
22	They will alert a supervisor or their colleague next	22	regardless with the questioning.
23	door, and those colleagues will carry out some	23	So, yes, that would be obtainable, we would attempt
24	additional actions such as informing the ambulance	24	to ask, obviously, the number of the flat or the house,
25	service and notifying some officers, senior officers.	25	to get the address, the number of people that are inside
		1	
	Page 150		Page 152

1	and involved, and the location, but sometimes, just	1	an underground train crash and we were receiving calls
2	because of what the caller is saying and our engagement	2	from people in different carriages, things like that.
3	with them, that doesn't always happen, or they're	3	We could use and the crews could use those forms to pass
4	reluctant to give that information because they want to	4	that information.
5	tell you about something else that's occurring.	5	Q. Right.
	•	6	· •
6	Q. Would this information be obtained or sought by the CRO		These control information forms, are they never used
7	only once the call had become FSG or in any case?	7	because you can download or type in the information?
8	A. Once the call has become a fire survival guidance call,	8	A. Yes, it would be like double keying; we'd write it on
9	yes, they would. They would ask some similar questions	9	here and we would also put it into the incident log. So
10	on just property fires. They would ask if they believed	10	it's quicker for us to write it on our mobilising
11	there were people involved and things.	11	system. But they are used on appliances.
12	Q. Okay.	12	Q. They are used on appliances?
13	There's a reference here, as you can see, to	13	A. Yes.
14	appendix 2, which is the control information form.	14	Q. Okay. But I think you're saying they are not used in
15	A. Yes.	15	the control room?
16	Q. If we can just go to that for a second, appendix 2,	16	A. No.
17	which can be found internally on this document on	17	Q. Okay.
18	page 8. Can we just have a look at that, please.	18	Now, going back to paragraph 5 and looking at 5.1,
19	Now, this form, which is becoming familiar, again	19	that says:
20	it's in quadruplicate, white, yellow, blue and green.	20	"As soon as control has confirmed that a FSG call is
21	Who in the control room would fill that out?	21	in progress they will contact the incident ground and
22	A. So we have copies in the control room, but we don't use	22	start to pass over the initial details. At this stage
23	that because we put all that information onto our	23	it is likely to be basic information relating to the
24	mobilising system and onto the incident log.	24	number of persons involved and their location within the
25	Q. I was going to ask you: as a matter of practice, does	25	property."
	Page 153		Page 155
1	that mean you navor use this form in the central room?	1	Durchet moons of communication would that set of
1	that mean you never use this form in the control room?	1	By what means of communication would that set of
2	A. We may have done once or twice but, again, we can put	2	initial details be transmitted to the incident ground?
3	all the information and the relevant information onto	3	A. Via the radio, via the main scheme radio.
4	the mobilising system.	4	Q. Is that policy or is that practice?
5	Q. That's the incident screen, is it?	5	A. Practice.
6	A. Yes.	6	Q. Right. In fact, I should have shown you this, I think
7	Q. I see.	7	I've got the answer here anyway, paragraph 5.4, just
8	A. The incident log on Vision.	8	turning the page, says:
9	Q. Okay.	9	"Control will contact the Initial Command Pump (ICP)
10	Would that include, as per this information form,	10	and pass the information below by appliance radio for
11	number of persons within location?	11	each separate FSG call."
12	A. Yes. If we had asked that and been given that, that	12	So taking those two paragraphs together, and your
13	would.	13	answer, radio, is the norm that as soon as you've got
14	Q. So can we take it that the scheme of information	14	an FSG call, control will use the radio, RT4 if you're
15	required on the control information form is the kind of	15	north of the river
16	information that you would ordinarily expect a CRO to	16	A. Yes.
17	obtain from the caller when managing an FSG call?	17	Q to send that information to the initial command pump?
18	A. Yes. It was created as a control information form to	18	A. Yes. So that would be whilst the resources are
	use for fire survival guidance, but I was involved in	19	en route. So before they arrived, it wouldn't be
19	its creation and it was also created in case we had	20	uncommon to start receiving and dealing with a fire
		21	survival guidance call.
20			Burnance com.
20 21	another incident where we needed to take details of		O Right
20 21 22	another incident where we needed to take details of callers but not necessarily in an FSG situation, which	22	Q. Right.
20 21 22 23	another incident where we needed to take details of callers but not necessarily in an FSG situation, which is why we have "access point" written on there.	22 23	A. Yes, whilst the appliances are en route.
20 21 22	another incident where we needed to take details of callers but not necessarily in an FSG situation, which	22	

1	beginning, to confirming that an FSG call is in		
~	beginning, to commining that an 1-50 can is in	1	incident command. I wouldn't from a control room
2	progress.	2	point of view, our aim is to pass all relevant
3	What does control do by way of confirmation that	3	information to the scene of operations as quickly as
4	an FSG call is in progress?	4	possible.
5	A. So, again, two actions: they'd mobilise the FSG	5	Q. Okay.
6	additional attendance, and they would inform the	6	Would you have any expectation or experience of,
7	attending resources by radio	7	once that initial FSG call information has got to the
8	Q. Okay.	8	incident ground via the radio, what would happen to that
9	A that an FSG call is in progress.	9	information next?
10	Q. Is it the supervisor who confirms that an FSG call is in	10	A. No, I have no experience of that.
11	progress or is it the call handler?	11	Q. Now, you mentioned the RIF. Can we look at that
12	A. No, it's the call handler, it's the control operator	12	together.
13	taking the call.	13	A. Yes.
14	Q. Who does the call handler confirm that with? Is there	14	Q. I think there may be two, in fact.
15	a process of confirmation?	15	A. There is. Should be one for control operators and one
16	A. No, they would confirm that by what the caller has	16	for supervisors.
17	indicated and then providing advice to the caller.	17	Q. Yes.
18	Q. So if it's a call handler whose on the telephone to the	18	I am going to start, if I can, with the supervisors,
19	caller	19	which is in tab 9 of the policy bundle. This is the
20	A. Yes.	20	first time, I think, we've looked at this. It is
21	Q and the call handler determines that that's an FSG,	21	LFB00003541.
22	they need to send that message by radio, do they send	22	I think was up there before I finished that very
23	that message to the radio operator in the control room	23	long number.
24	as you described before?	24	Is this the document that you're referring to?
25	A. Yes.	25	A. Yes.
	Page 157		Page 159
1	Q. Then that radio operator will send the message to the	1	Q. By the supervisors RIF, yes. And why do you call it
2	ICP?	2	a RIF?
3	A. Yes.	3	A. It's called a reference information file.
4	Q. Yes. Okay, I understand.	4	Q. Okay.
5	A. They will also alert their supervisor or their colleague	5	A. It's what was described in our old mobilising system and
6	to tell them that.	6	we've just carried it through.
7	Q. Okay.	7	Q. Right.
8	What is the purpose of communicating that initial	8	Did you have any role in compiling or creating this
9	information to the fire ground?	9	guidance?
10	A. So that they're aware.	10	A. Yes, I have authorised several versions of this, but I'm
11	Q. Aware of what?	11	not sure that's one I've authorised.
12	A. That we are talking to a caller that is in the building	12	Q. Okay. Let me show you the end of this. I hope we're on
13	that cannot leave.	13	the right one. If you go to the very last page, which
14	Q. Right.	14	is the third page of this document, this one is, we can
15	What would you expect the incident ground to do with	15	see at the very bottom, approved by SOM Bagnelle
16	that information?	16	I hope that's the right way of pronouncing it.
17	A. I would expect them to write it down on the control	17	A. That would be "Bagnelle".
18	information pad and that the incident commander would	18	Q. 3 April 2014, updated 2 April 2016.
19	receive that.	19	Is this the most recent version of that document?
20	Q. Right. The incident commander would receive what?	20	A. Yes.
21	A. That information about the fire survival guidance call	21	Q. I just want to ask you one or two questions about the
22	in process.	22	contents of this.
23	Q. Okay. And will that be the piece of paper that you	23	First of all, on page 2, in the bullet points there,
24	would expect the incident commander to receive?	24	you can see what is supposed to happen.
25	A. It's really not my field of expertise going into	25	So the first bullet point is:
-	v v · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		F
	Page 158	1	Page 160

1	"CRO regularly reassesses the situation by asking	1	A. No.
2	questions as specified in FSG Operator RIF."	2	Q. Why is that?
3	I've looked at those; I think they're the same as	3	A. Purely because we had established a really good
4	those that are set out in the policy, policy 790.	4	communication system with Jason Oliff speaking directly
5	A. Yes.	5	to the command unit.
6	Q. Okay. And then:	6	Q. Now, Jason Oliff you said was the sole contact point
7	"• Supervisor or nominated person to consider:	7	between control and the ICP.
8	"• Dedicating a supervisor to act as a sole contact	8	A. Yes.
9	point between Control and	9	Q. My first question is: did you appoint him the sole
10	"• ICP/CU or officer nominated by IC to pass all	10	contact?
11	relevant information."	11	A. No.
12	Now, I'm not sure it's very well laid out, but does	12	Q. Do you know who did?
13	that mean that once an FSG is in play, a supervisor in	13	A. Yes, I believe that was OM Alex Norman.
14	the control room nominates somebody to be the sole	14	Q. Now, we have Jason Oliff arriving in the control room at
15	contact point between control and the incident ground	15	about 2 o'clock.
16	for the FSG?	16	A. Yes.
17	A. Yes.	17	Q. It's not an exact time, but about 2 o'clock, which
18	Q. Right. What about multiple FSGs?	18	I think is before you arrived.
19	A. The same principle would apply.	19	A. Yes.
20	Q. So you are going to have one person as the sole contact	20	Q. Do you know who, if anyone, was the sole contact point
21	point between control and the incident ground?	21	between control and the fire ground prior to
22	A. Yes.	22	Jason Oliff's appointment as sole contact point?
23	Q. Do you know who that was on the night of Grenfell Tower?	23	A. That would've been the radio operator, Sharon Darby.
24	A. That would've been Jason Oliff.	24	Q. Sharon Darby?
25	Q. Now, then it says:	25	A. Yes. So all the information would've gone via the radio
	Page 161		Page 163
1	"• Using M2FH or FLONOPS1 (if sufficient staff	1	before we switched to telephone.
2	available) where a large number of FSG calls are being	2	Q. I see. And who, if anybody, appointed Sharon Darby as
3	received, as this will free up the main scheme radio."	3	the sole contact point between control and the incident
4	What is M2FH?	4	ground?
5	A. So it's just an old analogue call sign for our radio	5	A. She was the radio operator on channel 4 that night for
6	channels that we have in London Fire Brigade.	6	the whole night.
7	Q. Was that in use on the night of the Grenfell Tower fire?	7	Q. I see.
8	A. No, we were using M2FN, which was channel 4.	8	Did she have particular skills or was she just
9	Q. And what about FLONOPS1?	9	appointed as part of a roll call?
10	A. So FLONOPS1	10	A. Yes, just as part of a roll call.
11	Q. What is that?	11	Q. I see.
12	A is another channel. It's just a channel 1 that we	12	I'm sorry to go back to this bullet point about M2FH
13	don't use for general messages and radio communications.	13	or FLONOPS.
14	So it's a spare channel that we can use to free up, like	14	Was there a need at any stage during the night to
15	I say, the other channels. So all the northern	15	free up the main scheme radio?
16	appliances are on that channel, so the different	16	A. No.
17	incidents will all come through that channel and that	17	Q. I see.
18	radio operator. I think what they're indicating here is	18	We're going to come back, I think, to the RIF
19	that if we were busy with other incidents and we had	19	shortly. I just want to go back into, if I can,
20	a large amount of information to pass regarding FSG	20	policy 790. I'm sorry to dot around these policies.
21	calls, we could move that on to channel 1 and pass that	21	If you look at 790, which is in tab 5 of the policy
22	information that way, and we wouldn't be disturbed by	22	bundle, and go, please, to paragraph 7.8. If we can
23	the other incidents.	23	just have that highlighted.
24	Q. Oh, I see. Did you use FLONOPS1 on the night of the	24	I should just tell you, this sits within the section
25	Grenfell Tower?	25	of this policy that is entitled "Recording and sharing
	D 1/2		D 164
	Page 162		Page 164

1	of information". It says:	1	the watch could come from anywhere. They're just admin
2	"Control has a "Command unit critical" phone line	2	calls. They could be officers just wanting an update.
3	which has a higher priority than calls to the officer of	3	But obviously if the command unit is phoning us, we have
4	the watch. This number is programmed into CU phones and	4	critical information to pass them and they want to share
5	must only be used for passing life critical	5	that with us. So we would just prioritise it in the
6	information."	6	control room to pick it up first, rather than an officer
7	We've discussed earlier today the different methods	7	of the watch call.
8	of communication and lines between the control room and	8	Q. Do you know if that command unit critical phone line was
9	the incident ground.	9	used on the night of Grenfell?
10	A. Yes.	10	A. No, it wasn't, because I think we pre-empted that and
11	Q. Which one of those is the command unit critical phone	11	Jason Oliff rung the command unit before the command
12	line?	12	unit had a chance to ring us.
13	A. So that would have been that would've been a call	13	Q. Right, I see, okay.
14	into so an admin call would've come through an admin	14	Then you were operating my mobile, I think?
15	line into our ICS to be answered. It would've been	15	A. Yes.
16	labelled "command unit critical", and officers of the	16	Q. Jason Oliff to CU8 directly.
17	watch, supervisors, would have prioritised the picking	17	A. Yes.
18	up of that telephone number or that telephone call	18	Q. Now, while a call is progressing and a CRO is on a 999
19	rather than normal officer of the watch calls.	19	call with a caller, how does the call handler, the CRO,
20	Q. So that's a line between the command unit and control,	20	simultaneously communicate with the incident ground?
21	is it?	21	A. So they do that via the radio operator. So whilst
22	A. Yes.	22	they're talking to the caller they will create a service
23	Q. Is it another designated line or is it	23	request and put that information on and then send that
24	A. Yes, so the command unit phones have a designated number	24	to the radio operator, who will then pass that to the
25	programmed in that would come through to our ICS and	25	ICP.
	Dags 165		Dags 167
	Page 165		Page 167
1	show that it was a command unit critical. So in normal	1	Q. I see. So it's essentially typing while talking?
2	practice, in relation to this policy, when the FSG CU is	2	A. Yes.
3	established, we would expect them to ring control using	3	Q. I follow.
4	that telephone number.	4	Can I just see if I can illustrate that with you by
5	Q. Right. That's from the command unit telephone itself,	5	a number of examples.
6	not the radio and not the mobile?	6	Can I ask you to go to the short incident log,
7	A. No.	7	tab 23 of the documents bundle. You can see on page 19,
8	Q. All right.	8	if we just go to that, again, this is just an example.
9	A. Command unit telephone.	9	We can see an entry at 01.40.47, HJF, service request.
10	Q. So it's the same phone line but a different number; is	10	Is that Heidi Fox?
11	that right?	11	A. Yes.
12	A. It's a different telephone number. It would come	12	Q. Okay:
13	through on our communications, our integrated	13	"Service Request.
14	communication system.	14	"Service Request Created: RT4 TO G271 FYI SEVEN
15	Q. And who would it go to? Who would pick that up in the	15	PEOPLE IN FLAT 205 ON 23RD FLOOR PERSONS UNABLE TO LEAVE
16	control room?	16	PROPERTY."
17	A. Usually a supervisor.	17	That message is attributed to HJF, Heidi Fox. Would
18	Q. Right.	18	she be the call handler, the CRO call handler, or the
19	The paragraph suggests that that line is to be used	19	radio operator?
20	for calls that have a higher priority than calls to the	20	A. No, she would be the call handler
21	officer of the watch.	21	Q. Right.
22	What are calls which have a higher priority than	22	A talking to those people.
23	calls that would be made to the officer of the watch?	23	Q. Okay. And so while she was talking to those people at
24	A. So I think that's just the terminology. It doesn't mean	24	that time, just explain to me the process whereby the
25	that it's being prioritised. Calls to the officer of	25	service request is created in the system which produces
	B		7
	Page 166		Page 168

1	the short incident log.	1	Q. Drilling down on that, where would Sharon Darby get that
2	A. So whilst she was talking to them, she would've called	2	information from?
3	up a service request and she would have written in a box	3	A. From the scene, from the incident ground.
4	those details with regard to the seven people in	4	Q. So she would be dependent on somebody on the incident
5	flat 205 on the 23rd floor. And then she would've	5	ground saying to her, "Don't send radio messages to G271
6	closed that request and it would've gone into a list for	6	anymore, send them to CU8"?
7	the radio operator on channel 4 to pick up, so	7	A. A more simplistic version, they would've said "CU8 is
8	Sharon Darby.	8	now ICP".
9	Q. Right. Then Sharon Darby picks it up from her screen.	9	Q. That message would've come to Sharon Darby over what
10	A. Yes.	10	system?
11	Q. Talk me through the next steps.	11	A. The Airwave radio, the main scheme radio.
12	A. And then relays that to the incident command point.	12	Q. The main scheme radio?
13	Q. By radio?	13	A. Yes.
14	A. By radio, yes.	14	Q. So back through RT4?
15	Q. And you say it would have gone into a list for the radio	15	A. Yes.
16	operator.	16	Q. Right. That would be recorded, would it?
17	A. Yes.	17	A. Yes.
18	Q. What does the radio operator see on his or her screen,	18	Q. Okay. Okay.
19	Sharon Darby in this case?	19	Would Sharon Darby then input that change into the
20	A. So it would be the same as the control operators are	20	Vision system?
21	seeing. There is a box on the we talked about the	21	A. Yes, she would record that message.
22	incident list; they also have a service request list and	22	Q. Okay.
23	everyone is able to access that list. But the prefix,	23	Looking at this log, on this page, the messages go
24	as a said, "RT4", would've meant that it was to go out	24	from RT4 to G271 in that example.
25	to the radio operator.	25	If and it is an "if" the incident ground pump
	Page 169		Page 171
1	O. Right. And does Heidi Fox write in "RT4 TO G271"?	1	or incident ground command unit had changed, we wouldn't
1 2	Q. Right. And does Heidi Fox write in "RT4 TO G271"?  A. Yes.	1 2	or incident ground command unit had changed, we wouldn't know that from this log, would we?
2	A. Yes.	2	know that from this log, would we?
	A. Yes.  Q. So it's the call handler who decides, if you like, which	2 3	know that from this log, would we?  A. Yes, you'd have a message that would say "CU8 is now
2 3 4	<ul><li>A. Yes.</li><li>Q. So it's the call handler who decides, if you like, which incident command pump or CU gets entered into the</li></ul>	2 3 4	know that from this log, would we?  A. Yes, you'd have a message that would say "CU8 is now ICP".
2 3 4 5	A. Yes.  Q. So it's the call handler who decides, if you like, which incident command pump or CU gets entered into the request which is then sent to the radio operator?	2 3 4 5	know that from this log, would we?  A. Yes, you'd have a message that would say "CU8 is now ICP".  Q. Well
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1	Another example, 1.45.10, SAD, service request.	1	I think it is probably convenient.
2	Again:	2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll have a short break now.
3	"RT4 TO G271 FYI SEVEN PEOPLE IN FLAT 205 ON 23RD	3	3.25, please. Thank you very much.
4	FLOOR PERSONS UNABLE TO LEAVE PROPERTY."	4	No talking to anyone about your evidence. Thank
5	That's the same message that we saw Heidi Fox	5	you.
6	sending to Sharon Darby.	6	3.25, please.
7	A. Yes.	7	(3.15 pm)
8	Q. When we see this one at 01.45.10 what is happening	8	(A short break)
9	there? Because this is Sharon Darby this time.	9	(3.25 pm)
10	A. Yes, and that tells us that she's completed and sent	10	MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, yes, can we have
11	that message via voice.	11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: The witness is coming.
12	Q. Right.	12	(Pause)
13	A. To the incident.	13	All right to carry on?
14	Q. And would she be able to correct the reference to the	14	THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you.
15	incident command pump if in fact she was sending it to	15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.
16	a command pump which was not G271?	16	MR MILLETT: Ms Smith, thank you very much for coming back
17	A. I'm not sure if you can change service requests.	17	to us.
18	Q. Right.	18	Can I just continue, then, with my examples and
19	A. I would imagine she could, but I wouldn't imagine that	19	a study of the short incident log again.
20	it would be a detail as you can see the timeline,	20	We have Sharon Darby, we were looking at this one,
21	Sharon is constantly on the radio talking to the command	21	at 01.45.10, and she's on the radio. Just to go back to
22	point at that point, and in control, we would know that	22	this, is she the one who creates this message and inputs
23	it was going to the designated place.	23	it into the system?
24	Q. The reason I ask is because by this time, it's at least	24	A. The 01.45.10? No.
25	possible that CU8 was receiving information by mobile	25	Q. Right.
23	possible that eco was receiving information by mobile	25	Q. Right.
	Page 173		Page 175
1	actually directly from or by telephone at least	1	A. That would've been the previous that would've been
2	the control room.	2	the service request created and that would've been from
3	A. From Jason Oliff?	3	Heidi Fox.
4	Q. No, because he wasn't there until 2 o'clock.	4	Q. I see.
5	A. Okay.	5	So when we see:
6	Q. But if command unit 8 was receiving information by	6	"01:45:10 SAD Service Request.
7	telephone from the control room, would that be reflected	_	"Comica Domost Commisted "
0	-	1 7	Service Request Completed"
8	in this message at 01.45.10 or not?	8	"Service Request Completed"  What is Sharon Darby's role in generating that
8 9	in this message at 01.45.10 or not?  A. No.		What is Sharon Darby's role in generating that
	A. No.	8	What is Sharon Darby's role in generating that message at 01.45?
9		8 9	What is Sharon Darby's role in generating that
9 10	A. No. Q. Right. So am I right in thinking the short incident log is	8 9 10	What is Sharon Darby's role in generating that message at 01.45?  A. She would've passed that message on to the incident
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1	Completed: RT4 TO G271" next to Sharon Darby's name, can	1	Q. Would Sharon Darby realise at least by that time that
2	we be confident that she communicated with or sent to	2	radio messages were being sent to two different command
3	G271 the message we can see there?	3	pumps, one G271 and the other CU8?
4	A. I wouldn't be confident that she sent it to Golf 271.	4	A. No. You would have to confirm with the radio traffic,
5	She could've passed it to Golf 271, but I would imagine	5	but I believe Sharon would've been aware from the
6	she would've directed it to the incident command pump or	6	beginning of where to send the radio messages. So even
7	whoever we'd last received a message from.	7	though Pete Duddy's call says Golf 271 and the other one
8	Q. Right.	8	says to Charlie Uniform 8, they would've both gone to
9	Coming back to a point I asked you about I think	9	Charlie Uniform 8.
10	a little before the break, would she have any means of	10	Q. Then at 02.10.21 we see Sharon Darby:
11	correcting the message so as to show that the message	11	"Service Request Completed: RT4 - G271"
12	she'd sent by RT4, radio, was sent not to G271 but to	12	Given that she's just 12 seconds before completed
13	CU8? Would she be able to make that correction?	13	a service request RT4 to CU8, do you know why she
14	A. Yes, she could've. She could've done that, but	14	creates a service request to G271?
15	I wouldn't have said that would've been that's really	15	A. She doesn't; she just completes that service request.
16	irrelevant in regard to our documentation and our	16	Q. Why doesn't she correct the destination of the message?
17	communication. We know it was sent. We know it	17	A. Well, if you just have a look at the incident log so
18	would've been sent to the incident ground and to the	18	the service requests are created and completed, she's
19	ICP.	19	passing all that radio traffic. She's also receiving
20	Q. Right. Now, can I just ask you then to look at page 21	20	two make-up messages in between that time and processing
21	and just to look at two examples.	21	those and sending out her own service requests to get
22	We have a service request. This is at page 21,	22	those actioned.
23	timed at 02.06.06. This is again Heidi Fox:	23	Again, if you've heard the radio traffic, it's quite
24	"RT4 TO CU8 FURTHER CALL X2 ADULTS AND 1 CHILD	24	a formal process of where we pass short bursts of
25	TRAPPED INSIDE FLAT 82 ON FLOOR 11."	25	information and then the appliance repeats those back to
	Page 177		Page 179
1	Now, that's clearly a message being sent to CU8,	1	confirm understanding.
2	Heidi Fox handling the call, Sharon Darby on the radio.	2	So it's not a very quick action in all, and the
3	A. Yes.	3	amount of action she's doing in between 02.06 and 02.11,
4	Q. We see that that's the creation of that, and we see the	4	combined with the fact that she would've sent it to the
5	completion of that is at 02.10.09, do you see that?	5	incident command point, I don't think she sees any need
6	A. Yes.	6	to, and I would understand that.
7	Q. And that is again RT4 to CU8. I think that, on what you	7	Q. When we see "Service Request Completed RT4 - G271", as
8	told us before, is Heidi Fox handling the call, sends	8	
0	<del>_</del>		we do at 02.10.21 SAD with the system that
0	the message to Sharon Darby, Sharon Darby radioed to		we do at 02.10.21, SAD, with the system that  Sharon Darby was operating, would she have got
9	the message to Sharon Darby, Sharon Darby radioed to	9	Sharon Darby was operating, would she have got
10	CU8, and she then sends the message which is completing	9	Sharon Darby was operating, would she have got a confirmation back from G271?
10 11	CU8, and she then sends the message which is completing the service request?	9 10 11	Sharon Darby was operating, would she have got a confirmation back from G271?  A. No, I believe she would've passed it to CU8 and they
10 11 12	CU8, and she then sends the message which is completing the service request?  A. Yes.	9 10 11 12	Sharon Darby was operating, would she have got a confirmation back from G271?  A. No, I believe she would've passed it to CU8 and they would've acknowledged that.
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1	confirms that the message as originally formulated has	1	incident log is the precise incident command pump or CU
2	been the subject of action, but she does not say,	2	to which Sharon Darby is sending the radio messages,
3	"Actually, I sent it to CU8". Is that what you're	3	because she will have corrected them as she went, even
4	really saying to us?	4	though when she was completing the messages, she was
5	A. Yes, yes, that's what I'm saying.	5	completing messages created by control room operators?
6	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.	6	A. Yes.
7	A. So the pertinent information would be to get across the	7	Q. I see, okay.
8	fire in the corridor floor 12 and not the	8	Can I go back then to a slightly different question,
9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: No one reformulates the original	9	which is fire survival guidance advice given by CROs to
10	form of the message.	10	callers.
11	A. No.	11	One of the four things we saw in policy 790 was
12	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: No.	12	reassurance.
13	Sorry, Mr Millett.	13	Is it quite common for CROs to reassure callers by
14	MR MILLETT: No, no, that's helpful.	14	saying, "The crews are on their way"?
15	Just one or two more questions.	15	A. Yes.
16	Taking us through a little bit later into the night	16	Q. Okay. In your experience, does offering that
17	on this same or similar topic, if you can please go to	17	reassurance have an effect on the mind of the caller in
18	page 22, it says:	18	terms of how they then go about assessing the risks to
19	"02.23.33 SAD Key.	19	themselves of fire, smoke and heat?
20	"CU7 RUN ALL FSG CALLS VIA CU7."	20	A. I don't think I could answer that confidently. It would
21	Do you see that?	21	depend on the caller. Every call is different. We
22	A. Yes.	22	would try and reassure them. Again, we could say that
23	Q. 02.23.33, if we can just have that highlighted there.	23	the fire crews are on their way, which would be factual,
24	That's clear. She creates that message.	24	and we would tell them that they were on their way or
25	If we look lower down at 02.25.32 and this may be	25	en route. Sometimes we try and tell them how far away
			•
	Page 181		Page 183
1	the same answer that the chairman asked you about	1	they are to try to allay their fears. But it would
2	there's a "Service Request Completed: RT4 CU8". That	2	depend on the individual operator as to what they say
3	looks like it completes a service request that Heidi Fox	3	with regard to reassurance next.
4	has created in respect of that flat, flat 183, at	4	We can exchange names to put them in a calmer
5	02.24.11.	5	position and to make them feel like, you know, we are
6	A. Yes.	6	a lifeline to them while we're waiting for the crews to
7	Q. I am asking this slightly backwards because I'm starting	7	turn up as well.
8	with Sharon Darby, but it looks from that that although	8	Q. Right.
10	FSG calls were now to be run via CU7, as Sharon Darby	9	A. I wouldn't be able to say if we lulled them into
10	has recorded, other people in the control room, such as	10	a position of safety.
11	Heidi Fox, handling calls are still creating messages as	11	Q. No.
12	if they're going to go to CU8 and Sharon Darby is	12	Forgive this question, but I feel I must ask it, but
13	completing them on that basis, but you think they're	13	is there a chance or a risk that when a CRO says to
14	actually being sent to CU7?	14	a caller that the crews are on their way, that might
15	A. Yes. Sharon would've received that message from CU7 to	15	induce a false sense of security in the caller so that
16	say run all FSG calls via CU7, so she would've heard	16	wouldn't actually be able to go about assessing the risk
17	that message come in from CU7 and typed that on the	17	of smoke, fire and heat accurately?
18	incident log.	18	A. They would drop in and out of assessment, re-assessment,
19	Heidi, who was call-taking and not near Sharon,	19	and reassurance, so they wouldn't go through the stages,
20	maybe wouldn't have heard that message to pick up on	20	they might say they're reassuring they're on their
21	that and still believes it's going to CU8. However,	21	way and they might ask how the conditions are doing
22	once Sharon completed that, she would've sent that to	22	next. So it would depend on those answers.
23	CU7.	23	Q. Right.
24	Q. I think we can get from this discussion and the	24	Can I take you back to policy 790 and ask you to
25	chairman's question that what you don't get out of the	25	look at paragraph 9.1. This is tab 5 of the policy
	Page 182		Page 184
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1	bundle.	1	A to the control room officer. They might hear it if
2	I want to discuss with you communications between	2	they were sitting close by to the radio, but I would
3	the incident ground and the control room. I think we've	3	doubt it.
4	probably covered quite a lot of this already but I just	4	Q. Paragraph 9.2 says:
5	want to see if I can go back to some specific questions	5	"Informative messages from the incident ground
6	in the policy.	6	should also contain an update on progress relating to
7	Section 9 of this policy is entitled "Communication	7	those specific FSG calls by both the flat/house number
8	with Control".	8	to avoid confusion."
9	9.1 says:	9	Informative messages are a particular kind of
10	"It is vital that control is kept informed of the	10	message, I think.
11	actions being taken to resolve each FSG call. The fact	11	A. Yes.
12	that control is aware of the actions being carried out	12	Q. Just help me understand it, I think we discussed this
13	on the incident ground will greatly enhance the advice	13	before, they're a sort of standard format, aren't they?
14	given to FSG callers."	14	A. Yes.
15	In the normal course of things, how is control kept	15	Q. We've seen some examples of that in the short incident
16	informed of the actions being taken to resolve FSG	16	log.
17	calls?	17	Would you expect any other kind of messages to come
18	A. So in a normal call, a fire survival guidance call, we	18	from the incident ground other than informative
19	wouldn't have much liaison with the incident ground.	19	messages?
20	We'd know when they were in attendance, they might send	20	A. In regard to fire survival guidance calls?
21	a message within the first 5 minutes, but it is norm to	21	Q. Yes.
22	know that the first sign that we know that the	22	A. On occasion they might pass additional information
23	individuals are being rescued is to hear the	23	regarding if they've managed to reach individuals, but
24	firefighters in the background or the caller tell us	24	as I've said before, if we're on the phone to a caller,
25	that they can hear firefighters in the background.	25	we would be able to hear that in the background, that
	D 405		D 407
	Page 185		Page 187
1	Q. Right.	1	they are reaching them, and that they are trying to
2	It looks from this section of the policy that the	2	break in or rescuing them.
3	intention is that control is given quite a lot of	3	Q. How would an informative message be communicated to the
4	information by the incident ground and on a continuing	4	CRO handling the call?
5	basis. Is that your experience?	5	A. So it would come from the incident commander, usually
6	A. Yes, I would agree with that's how the policy reads.	6	via the main scheme radio, to the radio operator, who
7	Q. Right. That's how the policy reads.	7	would then log that call log that message, sorry, and
8	A. Yes.	8	highlight it to the supervisor.
9	Q. In your experience, is that how the policy is carried	9	Q. And highlighting it to the supervisor, how would that be
10	into effect?	10	done? By message or
11	A. Not as no, we are very rarely kept informed of the	11	A. That would be done by service request.
12	actions being taken to resolve fire survival guidance	12	Q. By service request, even within the control room?
13	calls.	13	A. Yes.
14	Q. Right.	14	Q. Okay.
15	A. In my experience.	15	You say supervisor; is that the officer of the watch
16	Q. Okay.	16	or
17	How would a CRO who is on a call with a caller know	17	A. Yes, the officer of the watch.
18	what has happened or know what is happening on the	18	Q. Officer of the watch. Okay.
19	incident ground so as to be able to enhance the advice	19	And at 9.3 it says:
20	that that CRO is giving to an FSG caller?	20	"The outcome of every FSG call must be communicated
21	A. So they wouldn't it would come in through the radio,	21	to control."
22	I would imagine, through the main scheme radio, to the	22	How would that normally be done, if at all?
23	radio operator. That information will be directed to	23	A. I've never experienced that happening.
24	the supervisor and a supervisor may then pass that on	24	Q. Right. Okay.
25	Q. Right.	25	So can I take from your evidence that in relation to
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	Page 186		Page 188

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1	9.1, 9.2 and 9.3, that's the policy, but the practice is	1	norms or targets which say how long you should take to
2	very different?	2	get to the control room?
3	A. I've never been in the control room when that's	3	A. I believe at one time there was about an hour and a half
4	happened, yes.	4	time for us to journey in, but I'm not sure if that
5	Q. Okay.	5	exists anymore.
6	Can I now turn at last, I think, probably, to your	6	Q. At the time of Grenfell, was there an operational
7	role on the night.	7	target?
8	Now, in your witness statement and we can go to	8	A. No.
9	it at page 1, you say in the third paragraph, in the	9	Q. Okay.
10	third line, you were the on-call management on the night	10	When you're at Merton I mean, obviously don't
11	of the fire. What does that mean? What does that	11	tell us, please, where you live how long does it
12	involve?	12	usually take you to get to the control room?
13	A. So we provide 24-hour senior management cover for the	13	A. Five minutes.
14	control room and it's split into a rota, and on the	14	Q. Right. And Stratford?
15	night of that, I was the Brigade what we call the	15	A. 30 minutes.
16	Brigade duty control manager.	16	Q. And is it right that attendance at the control room is
17	So there's a certain criteria for control operators	17	a matter of urgency for you once you're paged?
18	and supervisors to follow about informing us of	18	A. Yes, we're blue light trained and we journey on blue
19	incidents, staff welfare issues, mobilising system	19	lights when we're paged.
20	problems and incidents. So they would've paged me.	20	Q. Right, okay.
21	Q. Right. You say when you're on call and this is the	21	Now, on page 3 of your statement, you say that
22	last sentence of the first paragraph, you say:	22	this the top of the page:
23	" we respond to pager communications and phone in	23	"On the night of the 13th-14th June I was working a
24	to assess situations in the first instance before	24	normal day shift but was on-call that night. At
25	deciding whether attendance is necessary."	25	approximately 0115hrs I received a 'page' regarding an
	Page 189		Page 191
1	A. Yes.	1	eight pump fire. Normal procedure is that anything that
2	Q. What criteria determine whether your attendance is	2	is eight pump or more requires senior operations
3	necessary?	3	managers to be notified."
4	A. It really depends on the situation. So we have a basic	4	Now, you said a minute ago that you would normally
5	criteria of attending the control room for incidents	5	be notified above 12.
6	above 12 pumping appliances, but it would depend on the	6	A. So attending at 12 but notified of 8.
7	severity. If there was a mobilising issue with our	7	Q. Oh, I see, okay. Right.
8	system, it would depend on the severity of that and we	8	Now, in fact, we have this incident going pumps
9	would assess that during a phone conversation to the	9	eight at 1.19 or so.
10	officer of the watch.	10	A. Yes, I think it was more like 1.30.
11	Q. Is there a particular make-up which would automatically	11	Q. More like 1.30, okay.
12	trigger your attendance at the control room?	12	Where were you when you got the pager?
13	A. Yes. 12 pumps and above — or above 12 pumps, sorry.	13	A. At home.
14	Q. Above 12?	14	Q. At home. Asleep?
15	A. Yes.	15	A. Yes.
16	Q. Right.	16	Q. At that stage, when you got the page, what tasks or
17	Who would page you? For example, in the case of	17	responsibilities did you have?
18	a 13-pump fire you probably don't have 13-pump fires.	18	A. So I'd contact the supervisors, the officer of the watch
19	A. No.	19	at the back of the room, and ask them details. They'd
20	Q. But in the case of an attendance above 12, who would	20	probably provide me instantly with some details about
2.1	page you?	21	the incident, how the control room was coping with that.
21	4 9, 999 9 4, 4 49 . 54. 555		I'm sure each of us have a different sort of questions
22	A. It would be a plan item on an incident and it would be	22	•
22 23	one of the officers of the watches that would page me.	23	to ask when we ring up and respond to a pager message.
22 23 24	one of the officers of the watches that would page me. Q. Right, okay.	23 24	to ask when we ring up and respond to a pager message. I like to know how it's impacting in control and if our
22 23	one of the officers of the watches that would page me.	23	to ask when we ring up and respond to a pager message.
22 23 24	one of the officers of the watches that would page me. Q. Right, okay.	23 24	to ask when we ring up and respond to a pager message. I like to know how it's impacting in control and if our

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1	Q. Right.	1	You say on page 3:
2	Now, who did you speak to when you called in, do you	2	" I called in and could hear background noise
3	remember?	3	that indicated the Control Room was incredibly busy."
4	A. I think initially I spoke to Pete May.	4	When you say you called in, what did you call in on?
5	Q. Right.	5	A. I rang one of the admin lines that speaks to the officer
6	Can I just ask you to look and this is just a	6	of the watch.
7	time triangulation, to verify this at the operational	7	Q. Did you call on your personal mobile?
8	response report at page 48.	8	A. My Brigade mobile.
9	At 01.29.41 we can see:	9	Q. Your Brigade mobile?
10	"Bravo Charlie 02 Senior Operations Manager (SOM)	10	A. Yes.
11	Joanne Smith who is the Duty Brigade Control Senior	11	Q. In terms of your personal radio or communications
12	Manager is paged and notified of the incident."	12	equipment, what did you carry with you that night? You
13	Now, you said about 1.30.	13	had your Brigade mobile.
14	A. Yes.	14	A. I had a Brigade mobile phone and we are issued with
15	Q. So that's as you recall it?	15	Airwave radios, handhelds, same as senior officers.
16	A. Yes.	16	Q. Is there a reason why you used the Brigade mobile to
17	Q. Right.	17	call in and not the Airwave radio?
18	Now, at that stage, in fact, did you know that the	18	A. Because most senior officers when they're responding to
19	fire had just been made up to 20 pumps?	19	a page will ring in the officer of the watch to talk to
20	A. No.	20	them about the incident prior to being ordered on. So
21	Q. Okay. Did you find that out after that?	21	they would only communicate with the radio if they were
22	A. Yes, so I think when I'm on my way, when I'm en route,	22	booking status 2, status 3.
23	my pager actuates again.	23	Q. And you can have a conversation on a telephone you can't
24	Q. Do you know why you were paged only after the make-up	24	have on a radio.
25	had reached 20?	25	A. Yes, much easier.
	Page 193		Page 195
1	A. It would have been an estion that they would have been	1	Q. Do you remember who you spoke to? I think you said
2	A. It would have been an action that they would have been processing at an eight-pump fire, but the rapid	2	Pete May; is that right?
3	make-up obviously they were getting the immediate	3	A. I believe I spoke to Pete May first when he informed me
4	resources to the incident first and carrying out	4	there was an eight-pump fire, and when I rang up again,
5	a number of paging tasks, and then they would have got	5	I believe I spoke to Debbie Real.
6	down to paging the Brigade control duty manager.	6	Q. Okay.
7	Q. Right. We have make pumps eight at 01.19.08.	7	On the initial call, what did Pete May tell you, do
8	A. Yes.	8	vou remember?
9	Q. So in your experience, would it ordinarily take	9	A. Not specific detail. I believe he said he had gone up
10	10 minutes for the page to come through to you?	10	to 10, maybe, but I would be guessing.
11	A. It could do, and on this occasion, between the make	11	Q. Okay. Can we just continue in this document, the ORR,
12	pumps eight and completing the action lists, I believe	12	and look at page 68.
13	they had a number of other make-ups that they needed to	13	Here we have another call at 01.39.08:
14	prioritise.	14	"SOM Smith calls Brigade Control for an update. She
15	Q. Yes.	15	is told by AOM Real that it is 'going absolute crazy'
16	So would it be right to say that, in fact, you	16	and they are taking lots of FSG calls. SOM Smith asks
17	should have been paged 10 minutes earlier, when it was	17	if there are any long FSG calls where people are on the
18	at eight pumps, and not at 01.29 when it had reached 20?	18	line. She is advised OM Norman is on the line to
19	A. No, I think it would've been right and proper for them	19	someone. SOM Smith also checks if the 'Vision' system
20	to, as they did, prioritise the sending and mobilising	20	is coping and instructs AOM Real to prioritise the FSG
21	of resources to the incident. They can only do one	21	calls over the Resource Management Log (RML)
22	action at a time, with three of them undertaking those	22	notifications and confirms she will be attending
23	actions. I think they did pretty well to page me within	23	Stratford."
24	10 minutes.	24	Is that the second call that you were referring to?
25	Q. Okay.	25	A. Yes. Yes, that was made en route.
	Page 194		Page 196

1	Q. I think in fact we have the transcript of that call, so	1	"JOANNE SMITH: Have we got any ones that are
2	we can look at more precisely what you say there.	2	prolonged, are we on the phone?"
3	Do you remember making that call?	3	My question is: why were you asking about long
4	A. Yes.	4	calls?
5	Q. Okay. The transcript is	5	A. Just in my experience, they are the most difficult.
6	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Before we go on, are you feeling all	6	They are quite traumatic. And it gave you a sense of
7	right?	7	what was happening. So it gave me a bit of situational
8	A. Yes, no, I'm fine, thank you.	8	awareness before I had got to the control room.
9	MR MILLETT: I was about to ask that same question.	9	Q. Yes. Okay.
10	Are you okay to look at a transcript	10	Is there a particular length of time in your head,
11	A. Yes.	11	or was there, that was significant for a call?
12	Q of a call on the night?	12	A. Yes. So part of our fire survival guidance training, we
13	A. Yes.	13	are instructed to have a session about building
14	Q. Okay, let's do that, it's in the master documents bundle	14	construction and fire behaviour, and, again, it's that
15	at tab 65, and the reference is INQ00000198.	15	
16	This is a transcript and at the top it says:	16	compartment being able to withstand roughly an hour, and
17	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	17	that was in my mind.
	" Control_Admin_Line_013908_from_BC02."	18	Q. Okay.
18 19	That's you, BC02.	19	Can I just complete the evidential picture by
	A. Yes.	1	showing you something, because I think there's something
20	Q. It's only a couple of pages. We can see that.	20	you should look at which may just complete the picture
21	Officer of the watch is Debbie Real.	21	in document terms.
22	A. Yes.	22	A. Okay.
23	Q. Okay. You say:	23	Q. If you go to tab 54, it's the control debrief manuscript
24	" it's Joanne.	24	document, this is what we looked at earlier. This is
25	"OPERATOR: Oh all right. It's going absolutely crazy	25	LFB00003113, at page 5.
	Page 197		Page 199
	1 450 177		1 486 177
1	(Inaudible)	1	I am interested in your last answer, I just want to
2	"JOANNE SMITH: I know, Debbie. Are you in charge or	2	pin it down to a document.
3	is Chris"	3	You can see two-thirds of the way down that page
4	When you say, "I know, Debbie", did you already know	4	and just to remind you, this is the manuscript note of
5	it was going crazy?	5	the review, the control debrief it says, next to
6	A. I must have, or I could hear it in the background.	6	a bullet point:
7	Q. On what oh, in the control room?	7	"Has Lakanal in mind 1 hour time mark."
8	A. In the control room. You could hear the noise	8	What is that a reference to, do you think?
9	Q. Right.	9	A. So the one-hour time mark is the compartmentation
10	A when you rang in.	10	beginning to break down, as I've already said, and
11	Q. Did it sound unusual to you?	11	Lakanal in mind was that I was aware that our control
12	A. Yes, it sounded extremely busy.	12	had been in a similar situation with the Lakanal
13	Q. Right.	13	incident.
14	And Debbie says to you in the next part:	14	Q. Right. So
15	"OPERATOR: No, Alex, Alex is in charge but we're	15	A. Where they had been on the phone for a prolonged period
16	getting loads of calls, fire survival guidance calls.	16	of time talking to callers in distress.
17	It's just gone absolutely manic. You now it's a 25-pump	17	Q. So if somebody has been on a fire survival guidance call
18	fire now?	18	for an hour, what does that tell you as a supervising
19	"JOANNE SMITH: I did hear, yes."	19	officer?
20	That, just for information, is about 1.31, so that	20	A. For me, it would tell me that the crews are having
20	had just gone 25.	21	
	, ,	22	difficulty putting out the fire or reaching that caller,
22	Then you ask, just below halfway down:	23	and that we would've run through everything we could've
23	"JOANNE SMITH: Okay, are we all right? Have we got	23	done to help that caller and that we would've given them
24	any long ones or?"	24	and tried to protect them as much as we could.
		25	O. Voo
25	You ask the same question a little bit lower down:	25	Q. Yes.
		25	Q. Yes. Page 200

1	Are you all right to continue for another 10 minutes	1	staff.
2	or so?	2	Did you know what that fire survival guidance would
3	A. Yes, that's fine.	3	have been?
4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Millett, how are you getting on	4	A. Yes, that they would have spoken to each individual
5	this afternoon? I mean, if you have	5	caller, and that caller would have indicated that they
6	MR MILLETT: No, I'm getting on very well. We are going to	6	cannot leave their premise and then they would have
7	continue into tomorrow.	7	-
8	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: In any event?	8	provided advice depending on the location of that
9	MR MILLETT: In any event. I am certainly not going to	9	caller.  Q. Okay. So is it right that at that stage, you were
10	finish, I'm afraid, tonight, and we weren't planning to	10	
11	on the timetable.	11	assuming that the practice based on the policy would be
12		12	being followed by CROs?
13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I didn't enquire as a matter of	13	A. Yes.
	criticism, but because I wonder whether we are	1	Q. I see, okay.
14	getting towards the end of the day for this witness,	14	Given that there were lots of people trapped in
15	it's been quite a	15	their flats who were being given FSG advice, what did
16	MR MILLETT: We are, and if we stopped now, that would be no	16	that tell you about how the fire was behaving, if
17	difficulty so far as I'm concerned at all.	17	anything?
18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Have you reached a sensible point?	18	A. I didn't really focus on how the fire was behaving, if
19	I mean, we could carry on for 5 minutes or so.	19	I'm honest; I was more focused on what advice we could
20	MR MILLETT: Not quite.	20	give to those callers and how we could assist those, as
21	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I sense you would quite like to	21	were our control officers.
22	break off, wouldn't you?	22	So with regard to smoke and the impact of that fire,
23	THE WITNESS: 5 minutes is fine. I'm happy to go on for	23	yes, we were considering that, but not what the fire
24	5/10 minutes.	24	what the fire behaviour was at the time.
25	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, counsel's 5 minutes	25	Q. Now, we don't see, either in the ORR or in the
	Page 201		Page 203
	1 ugc 201		rage 200
1	THE WITNESS: Is a bit longer!	1	transcript of the call, anything about asking what the
2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Is this a sensible point in your	2	operational plan was at the scene, but did you have any
3	questioning, Mr Millett?	3	thoughts at the time about finding out what was actually
4	MR MILLETT: Not completely, no.	4	going on on the ground?
5	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you like to find a completely	5	
6		1 3	A. No, not at the time while I was en route, I didn't, no.
	or more completely sensible point, but not more than,	6	A. No, not at the time while I was en route, I didn't, no.     Q. So you had your Brigade mobile with you but you also had
7	or more completely sensible point, but not more than, let's say, 5 minutes.	1	
7 8	1 2	6	Q. So you had your Brigade mobile with you but you also had
	let's say, 5 minutes.	6 7	Q. So you had your Brigade mobile with you but you also had your Airwave radio.
8	let's say, 5 minutes.  MR MILLETT: Absolutely.	6 7 8	<ul><li>Q. So you had your Brigade mobile with you but you also had your Airwave radio.</li><li>A. Airwave, yes.</li></ul>
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SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Okay, 10 o'clock tomorrow, then, and
 2
         please don't speak to anyone about your evidence
3
         overnight. All right?
 4
       THE WITNESS: Thank you.
 5
       SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you would like to go with the
 6
 7
       THE WITNESS: Yes.
 8
           (Pause)
 9
       SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Very good, Mr Millett. Give us
10
         a little bit of a hint as to where we are going to be
11
         tomorrow.
12
       MR MILLETT: We will be most of tomorrow, but I'll have
13
         another look at my notes overnight.
14
       SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Oh, you think most of tomorrow with
15
         this witness?
16
       MR MILLETT: I do think so, and I should just also say that
17
         it is very likely that some core participants will have
         further questions as a result of today's evidence and
18
19
         questions as we go during tomorrow, and it's right that
20
         I should give them an opportunity, even a short
21
         opportunity, to collate those and give them to me so
22
         that I can consider them. She is obviously a very
23
         important witness in that sense. So --
24
       SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, it might be sensible at
25
         various points to have -- and we shall have the usual
                             Page 205
 1
          breaks anyway.
 2
        MR MILLETT: Yes, indeed, absolutely.
 3
        SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It may be that it would be
 4
          convenient, when you get to the end of the questions
 5
          that you currently want to ask, to have another break so
 6
          that there can be some consideration of further
 7
          questions.
 8
        MR MILLETT: Absolutely. We have been trying to do that as
          we go, dependent on each individual witness, but I think
 9
10
          with this one, it's particularly important. I think
11
          it's also important not to rush this evidence, so if we
12
          do end up taking all day tomorrow, I do not think that
13
          that will affect the timetable adversely.
14
        SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good. Very well.
15
             Thank you, 10 o'clock tomorrow, then, please.
16
        (4.10 pm)
17
         (The hearing adjourned until Thursday, 12 July 2018 at
                        10.00 am)
18
19
                         INDEX
        JOANNE SMITH (affirmed) ......1
20
          Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY .....1
21
22
23
24
25
                             Page 206
```

	actions 12:4 48:9	admit 204:10	56:17 57:2,3	<b>Andy</b> 90:19 91:4
A 1 40.21 24 25	83:20 93:2 118:11	<b>ADULTS</b> 177:24	62:10	<b>Angie</b> 14:15,18
<b>A1</b> 49:21,24,25 <b>A1HR</b> 50:6	129:2 150:24	advance 40:11	ago 27:8 148:19	anomaly 52:4,8
ability 36:17	157:5 174:19	adversely 206:13	192:4	answer 8:20 13:6
130:15	185:11,12,16	advice 17:2 18:13	agree 88:8,9 137:24	14:4 31:4 38:8
able 4:22 7:16 18:8	186:12 194:23	21:25 23:9,16	142:17 186:6	39:14,15 42:24
32:6,24,25 34:23	actual 47:4 57:5	24:6,22 25:12	agreed 149:19	106:5,9 115:5
34:23 37:5 40:25	68:8	27:4 32:10 95:21	agreement 148:17	144:16 156:7,13
67:24 69:7 71:19	actuates 193:23	103:6 111:19	ahead 24:6	182:1 183:20
95:21 98:19 107:6	Adams 15:6,8	113:1 114:22	aid 72:19 89:4	200:1
110:1,2,14,15,18	95:17	115:16 117:14	aim 159:2	answered 145:25
123:23 131:7	add 20:15 51:18	119:4 120:14,15	aimed 19:16	165:15
134:14,17 144:9	74:14,15 76:14	120:18,21,23	air 128:5	answering 75:16
145:21 146:16	92:19 107:15	121:8 123:24	<b>Airwave</b> 59:10,17	115:8
149:22 151:1	added 22:23 78:1	127:21,23 137:2,5	65:25 66:8,15,19	answers 26:15
152:19 169:23	125:21	138:3,9,17,23	67:16 68:4,7,11	129:23 180:14
173:14 177:13	addition 14:22 65:1	139:5 140:5 142:1	68:15,20,21 69:2	184:22
184:9,16 186:19	additional 25:18	142:18 143:3,7,11	136:5,7 171:11	anybody 14:20
187:25 199:15	35:1 38:7 40:20	143:13,20 144:13	195:15,17 204:7,8	87:10 130:25
204:15	50:2 53:12 56:1	144:18,21 146:7	204:9	164:2
<b>absolute</b> 196:15	62:7 64:5,14	147:6,15,18	alert 36:7 150:22	anymore 8:11
absolutely 172:25	72:12 73:9 111:1	148:12,14,18	158:5	111:4,5 112:22
197:25 198:17	118:17 119:17	149:12 157:17	alerted 74:25	171:6 191:5
202:8 206:2,8	145:20 150:16,20	183:9 185:13	Alex 6:6 37:20	<b>anyway</b> 84:10
accepted 113:24	150:24 157:6	186:19 203:7,15	38:21 95:17,24	156:7 206:1
access 60:6 66:8	187:22	203:19	163:13 198:15,15	<b>AOM</b> 6:15 7:19
67:24 68:11 87:18	additionally 60:11	advise 18:8 26:4	<b>allay</b> 184:1	35:12 36:9,13,25
89:11 93:14,20,25	additions 174:13	120:1,4 139:23	allow 176:24	39:10,20 146:4
94:21 102:6,6	address 42:6 43:14	148:9	<b>allows</b> 68:11 75:8	196:15,20
105:20 133:15	43:14,15 53:2	advised 196:18	76:7	<b>AOMs</b> 7:3,7,20
134:16 151:1	71:4 109:20	202:14	altered 148:13	8:16,18 35:12
154:23,24 169:23	118:12 150:15,15	advising 17:19	149:13	36:10 37:18,19,20
accessible 87:10	151:4 152:25	145:23	alternative 18:2	38:13
accurate 107:22	addressing 72:19	aerial 76:24 77:2	21:6 124:2,7,16	apart 30:8
accurately 184:17	123:1,1	aerials 76:19	124:24 125:3,4,15	apartment 129:10
achieve 23:14	adequate 130:17	affect 206:13	127:2,6,7,9	appear 63:11,13
acknowledged	adjourned 206:17	affirmed 1:10	ambulance 64:25	appeared 80:20
180:12	adjournment 132:5	206:20	150:24	105:18
act 161:8	admin 39:15 66:17	afraid 20:5,23 62:5	amount 22:12	appendix 118:24
action 30:10 46:16	67:6,7,8,16	201:10	31:22 63:4 113:3	119:6,7,20 126:7
48:20 150:13	132:21,23 133:7	aftermath 90:9	114:24 115:1	126:21 152:6
151:10 180:2,3	133:14,17,18,19	afternoon 201:5	162:20 180:3	153:14,16
181:2 194:1,12,22	133:22 134:8	agencies 43:12	analogue 162:5	appliance 59:5,22
actioned 110:25	136:1 165:14,14	46:14 56:9 64:23	analysis 18:5	64:13,21 76:14
179:22	167:1 195:5	agency 56:2,9,16	and/or 17:15 137:4	151:24 156:10

				1496 200
170:7 179:25	73:9 96:25 101:4	assistance 121:22	49:11 90:17	109:12,15,21,23
appliances 17:9	108:14 154:12	137:5	121:20 157:7	112:1,17 124:16
28:2,16 33:12	177:9 182:1	assistance.' 120:10	190:5 192:6	127:4 128:23
45:20 46:1 53:15	asking 2:15 26:16	assistant 3:16 6:11	196:22	129:6 132:13,15
68:21 71:4 89:5	73:12,13 108:1,5	6:12,13,20 7:14	attributed 168:17	132:18 136:10
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
155:11,12 156:23	113:15 124:19	assisted 35:12,21	authorised 160:10	138:8 140:7,15
162:16 190:6	127:17 130:21,25	assisting 12:1	160:11	144:16,17 155:18
applicable 121:23	141:13 152:18	125:14 127:1	automatically 43:3	164:12,18,19
applied 53:3	161:1 182:7 199:3	assists 124:22	43:5 45:19 76:3	171:14 175:16,21
apply 121:8 122:6	204:1	associated 51:3	84:24 85:17,19	177:9 179:25
142:8 161:19	asks 71:1 108:18	Association 11:7	174:17 190:11	180:10 183:8
appoint 163:9	109:3 196:16	assume 18:16 58:10	available 13:10	184:24 185:5
appointed 164:2,9	<b>Asleep</b> 192:14	108:4 112:11	53:19,20 54:3,8	192:19 204:17
appointment	assent 59:23 70:23	123:11	54:12,17,19 57:9	background 94:24
163:22	assess 18:9 114:7	assuming 8:16	63:15 67:21 89:12	95:1,2,8 185:24
appreciate 2:2	115:3 123:22	49:18 84:13	89:23,24 91:12,13	185:25 187:25
approach 22:17	126:8,24 127:14	203:10	91:20 124:6	195:2 198:6
23:5,13 113:15	127:16 138:24	assumptions 31:10	134:23 151:2	<b>backup</b> 62:25
appropriate 61:3	189:24 190:9	assurance 9:13	152:8 162:2	backwards 182:7
approved 160:15	assessed 17:16	assure 113:16	avoid 187:8	<b>badly</b> 123:16
176:21	22:14 140:9	asterisk 112:6	awaiting 17:18	<b>Bagnelle</b> 160:15,17
approximately	assessing 20:8	attached 52:21	18:9	balance 18:7
191:25	115:15 125:4	55:14 94:12 134:5	aware 113:10,18	141:24 142:14
<b>April</b> 116:18	183:18 184:16	attempt 148:13	142:7,7,10,10	based 3:25 4:2 7:20
136:15 160:18,18	assessment 18:20	152:4,23	158:10,11 170:25	37:8 129:13,15,24
area 56:6 65:19	19:7 22:22 35:23	attempting 17:16	179:5 185:12	137:6 146:23
109:7 114:24	120:17 123:25	21:7	200:11	149:4 203:10
areas 4:1 56:1	124:6,11,24	attempts 27:13	awareness 15:14	basic 155:23 190:4
arose 125:2,5,7	125:10 127:4	29:14,17 30:11	94:23 199:8	basis 4:18 34:11
arrangement 63:19	129:24 131:12	32:25	74.23 177.0	182:13 186:5
arrangements	139:7 141:1	attend 33:10 42:19	В	<b>BBC</b> 96:15
63:23 65:15	151:11 184:18	53:13 55:6,6,20	<b>Babcocks</b> 64:5,8,11	BC02 54:24 197:18
141:19 142:8	assessment/initial	190:25	64:17 65:2,16,21	becoming 153:19
arrival 99:3	21:23	attendance 44:1,21	back 2:21 14:4	began 34:9
arrive 17:9	assessment/re-as	45:18 50:6 51:18	24:25 26:2,7,8,9	beginning 3:6
arrive 17.9	21:18 25:4		26:13 29:1,2,7	51:24 74:16
104:9 156:19		53:21,22 69:23	31:15 32:8 33:3	120:12 157:1
	assign 54:17 55:7	70:8,18 71:3	34:16 39:25 55:3	
163:18	assigned 51:11,13	72:12 80:23 87:17	60:11,14 62:4	179:6 200:10
arriving 163:14	51:14 55:1,12	87:22 118:17,18	65:24 67:22 69:21	behalf 63:21
ascertain 71:6	70:9,14	129:1 157:6 170:8	73:17 85:24 86:9	behaving 203:16,18
ascertained 70:15	assignment 55:12	185:20 189:25		behaviour 199:14
aside 120:13	assist 32:7 99:10	190:2,12,20	86:12 88:11,13	203:24
asked 10:14 16:14	120:17 121:15,17	191:16	90:11 94:6 100:13	believe 16:7,13,20
16:19 22:14 42:19	130:10 143:24	attendees 90:20	101:1 102:24	27:25 28:23 31:24
63:8 72:15,24	203:20	attending 42:7,19	103:17 104:12	34:14 52:4 62:13

				1 age 203
62:15 63:24 69:14	195:22	204:6	168:7 185:1	101:15,20 104:22
70:25 72:9 86:23	borne 17:10	Brigade's 38:25	197:14	104:23,25 105:2,4
87:22 92:17 93:13	<b>borough</b> 56:1,6	Brigade-issue	<b>burden</b> 124:10	105:5 106:12,16
95:25 96:1 97:2,3	64:25	134:12	<b>burned</b> 96:20	107:12,14 108:7
97:12 98:22,24	BOSS 46:25 47:2	brigades 105:17	<b>burning</b> 109:16	108:20 109:15
111:14,21 112:19	47:14	bring 43:4	bursts 179:24	110:3,4,8,17
121:4 131:12	<b>bottom</b> 14:20 55:25	broad 32:8	busy 27:16 34:22	111:9,10,18 115:8
134:11 135:2	62:5 92:12 93:8	<b>broken</b> 64:14 97:1	35:2 102:16	115:20,20 116:20
142:20 163:13	119:1,3 160:15	97:4	106:10 143:18	117:12,15 118:8
174:14 179:5	<b>box</b> 54:7 76:14 79:9	<b>BT</b> 63:5,7,8 101:15	162:19 195:3	120:2,14 131:5,10
180:11 191:3	169:3,21	101:20 102:1,15	198:12 202:19	
	brackets 143:2	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	<b>button</b> 44:6 45:11	133:3,7,17,22,25
194:12 196:3,5,9		105:13 110:5,5		135:13,13,22
believed 72:11	Bravo 193:10	111:7,9,9,18	45:19 74:23 84:25	136:1 138:8,18
153:10	break 2:9,10 50:14	112:5,14,18 113:5	85:18	140:7 141:19
believes 117:23	50:16 61:4,7,14	113:6,11,12 114:9	<u>C</u>	143:24 144:11
182:21	61:20 78:18 101:5	114:12,13,20	cab 59:20 68:17	145:15,17 146:3
belt 134:6	103:10,14,24	buddy 63:6,14,22	69:5	150:12,12,19
benefit 25:9 30:5	104:7,8,9 120:21	63:23 101:1,9,10	call 1:8 8:10,12	151:25 152:17
best 22:1 23:10	126:16 131:19,21	102:4,5,7,18,24	9:11,16,17,23,24	153:7,8,8 154:17
better 13:6,15	175:2,8 177:10	103:4 104:13	11:8 12:6,11	154:25 155:20
15:21 32:5 37:14	188:2 200:10	110:9,14	· ·	156:11,14,21
84:11 87:18	201:22 206:5	<b>building</b> 13:15 21:8	18:12,14,21,21	157:1,4,9,10,11
big 2:21 40:9 42:7	breakdowns 65:1	24:12 26:6,10	20:12,14 21:20	157:12,13,14,18
biggest 63:18	breaking 5:9 28:6	35:19 44:14 71:8	22:1,5,23 23:11	157:21 158:21
bingo 41:19,21,25	breaks 62:5 104:9	73:4,8,14 96:20	23:25 24:4,21	159:7 160:1 162:5
bit 5:9 28:6 39:7	206:1	114:14 117:19	25:15 26:2,7,8	164:9,10 165:13
42:8 61:1 62:4	bridgehead 24:20	120:3,24 122:10	34:20 35:10,15,19	165:14,18 167:7
76:11 78:18 79:18	<b>brief</b> 63:12	123:6,20 128:18	36:18,20 39:14	167:18,19,19
96:10 103:11	briefing 101:11	128:21,23 129:3	41:19,25 42:15,16	168:18,18,20
121:12 138:2	113:21	129:25 137:10	42:20,20,24 43:1	170:3 177:24
144:16 172:8	<b>Brigade</b> 3:9,13,16	140:3 158:12	43:9 45:15 46:16	178:2,8,20 179:7
181:16 198:25	4:4,21 9:5 12:9	199:13	46:24 49:18,19	183:21 185:11,18
199:7 202:1	16:10 17:10 37:7	<b>buildings</b> 72:18,20	51:1,14,15,17,19	185:18 186:17
205:10	54:24 62:12,24	120:20 121:23,24	53:17 54:16 56:2	188:4,7,20 189:15
bits 2:22	64:18 65:16 89:13	121:25 122:1,3,4	56:9,16,16 57:2	189:21 195:4,7,17
blanket 138:9	89:23 105:18	122:7 143:8	58:3 62:10,23	196:7,13,24 197:1
blankets 128:4	106:18 111:10	<b>built</b> 13:8,10 21:23	63:2,3 66:17 67:3	197:3,12 199:11
<b>block</b> 138:18,20,21	120:1 132:24	<b>bullet</b> 141:18	67:5,6,7,8 70:5,8	200:17 204:1
blocks 124:4	133:1,3,4,12,21	160:23,25 164:12	70:25 71:13 72:14	call-out 97:8
137:19 140:18	133:25 135:13,19	200:6	73:4 74:25 75:13	<b>call-taker</b> 78:6,11
<b>blue</b> 153:20 191:18	136:14 137:2	<b>bundle</b> 11:11 47:25	75:16 77:21 78:11	82:5
191:18	138:3 145:4 162:6	69:25 90:10 92:8	78:12,20,20 79:21	call-takers 76:7
<b>board</b> 67:11	189:15,16 193:11	116:17 141:1	80:22 81:20,21,21	call-taking 182:19
booked 54:5	194:6 195:8,9,13	148:4 151:18	81:21 82:8,20	call/caller 21:18
booking 46:12	195:14,16 196:14	159:19 164:22	83:6 85:1,5,6	called 12:25 29:12
	•	•	•	•

43:1 47:8,22 48:1	callers 17:1,8,15,19	143:18 146:9	caused 21:4	84:13,21 94:17,22
48:14,17 59:24	17:20,25 18:8,23	155:1 162:2,21	CCF 43:1	162:8,12,12,14,16
64:22 66:17 86:4	21:2,6 22:13	165:3,19 166:20	ceilings 13:21	162:17,21 164:5
88:18 130:19	25:11 26:2,12,23	166:20,22,23,25	central 46:23	169:7
136:13 151:19	27:4,13,19 29:18	167:2 181:20	centre 89:14,24	channels 95:4
160:3 169:2 193:2	32:11 44:13 71:10	182:9,11,16	certain 6:23 86:25	162:6,15
195:2,4	71:12,18 72:8	185:17 186:13	189:17	<b>charge</b> 4:17,25 5:6
caller 19:9 21:25	73:9 95:22 96:5,9	187:7,20 196:14	certainly 29:5	38:20,23 39:5
23:10,16 24:7,15	100:6,21,22	196:16,17,21	172:7 201:9	148:16 149:8
25:8 45:24 46:2	101:18 103:6	198:16,16 199:4	cetera 52:12 54:14	198:2,15
52:18,20 71:2	111:13,16,19,20	calm 23:17 24:7	CH4 84:12	<b>Charlie</b> 179:8,9
72:24 73:3 75:5	113:16 115:2	25:11 96:6	<b>chair</b> 90:19	193:10
106:16 109:4,11	116:10 120:1	calmer 184:4	chaired 92:25	check 72:11
109:12,20 110:1,2	126:25 128:14	calming 143:19	<b>chairman</b> 1:7 50:18	checking 146:13
110:9,12,13,15	138:18 142:4	capabilities 13:16	61:4 103:9 104:1	<b>checks</b> 196:19
115:4,16,21,22	143:7,19,19	capture 88:19	126:11 174:23	Chelsea 64:25
116:1,5,8 117:3	145:23 147:10,25	card 41:19,21,23	175:10 182:1	Chief 11:6 20:11
117:13,14,16,23	148:10,12 154:22	41:25	chairman's 182:25	CHILD 177:24
118:14,15 120:4	183:10,13 185:14	carriages 155:2	<b>chance</b> 61:8 72:13	children 108:25
120:22 121:13,17	200:16 202:25	<b>carried</b> 48:9 91:25	167:12 184:13	choose 83:8
121:21 122:2,15	203:20	92:2 93:2 95:5	<b>change</b> 1:17 3:17	<b>Chris</b> 198:3
122:25 123:2,11	callers[sic 128:9	149:12 160:6	16:20 27:18 31:21	circular 119:6,16
123:15 124:1,6,10	<b>calling</b> 26:8 81:19	185:12 186:9	32:10 41:16 43:7	circumstances 96:7
124:23 125:10	133:21 139:24	carry 7:21 8:18	44:20 103:5	130:21 137:5
127:1,6,10,17,20	calls 7:16 8:17,20	34:11 36:10 46:18	139:14,19 140:8	141:25 142:15
128:9,12 129:4,10	22:12 28:1 31:24	61:22 104:3	141:25 142:1,16	143:11 148:11
129:18,24 130:2,5	32:7 33:8,14,18	150:23 175:13	143:3,10 144:18	149:9
130:10 131:7,11	34:25 35:23 39:1	195:12 201:19	144:21 145:11	<b>clarify</b> 34:8 122:2
137:3 138:3,24	39:15,15 40:25	carrying 8:19	146:7 147:5,14,18	180:13
139:5,8,13,15,23	42:13 46:11 50:20	27:17 35:3 129:3	148:17 149:12	<b>clarity</b> 109:19
140:10 144:8	50:21 51:2 52:15	151:11 152:21	150:6,8 171:19	131:6
145:18 146:6,22	52:16,20,24 62:16	194:4	173:17	classed 67:6
150:17,20 152:13	62:18 63:5,19	case 27:9 58:16	changed 26:3,9	classing 138:9
152:19 153:2	67:16 69:10,18	60:18 81:19 86:6	27:18 30:20 82:24	clear 17:7 22:21
154:17 157:16,17	71:23 75:3,17	86:18 102:9 110:7	83:2 113:1 125:20	27:2 39:19 53:16
157:19 158:12	102:16 107:23	114:20 122:9	126:1 143:13	73:13 125:12
167:19,22 178:17	111:7 112:21,22	128:21 129:12	170:10,21 172:1	130:15 138:2
183:17,21 184:14	112:25 113:4,6	131:4 145:2 150:5	<b>changes</b> 4:22 7:23	176:16 181:24
184:15 185:24	114:2,3,4,17,21	153:7 154:20	26:7 45:18 120:9	clearer 35:16 131:1
186:17,20 187:24	115:1 116:17	169:19 180:15	138:8 140:6	<b>clearly</b> 2:24 51:7
200:21,23 203:5,5	117:18 129:17	190:17,20	changing 143:7	130:24 178:1
203:8	131:3 132:15,20	case-specific	channel 30:23	click 44:6 45:11
caller's 43:11	132:21,23 133:17	138:14	58:20,22,22,23,23	clicked 47:13 84:25
107:19 110:6	133:18 134:5,8,22	catch 29:16	59:1,24 66:11	clicking 80:22
129:21	141:21 142:9	cause 96:18 100:10	77:21 78:8 80:13	clocked 54:3
	<u> </u>	ı	I	<u> </u>

close 49:17 128:2	comes 42:20,22,24	commanders 142:4	199:20	125:18 139:8,16
129:9 187:2	43:5,7 46:5 47:6	comment 27:25	completed 9:14	146:11,13,16
closed 169:6	60:2 73:19 74:8	76:11,12,14,18,22	83:21,22,23 84:1	147:8,24 184:21
closer 17:17	74:17,18,18 79:7	76:23 77:4,9	84:12,17,22,25	conduct 12:6
<b>cloth</b> 128:7	80:6,8 85:5 110:8	92:24 95:23	85:17,18,21,23	confident 176:20
co-ordination	110:17	comments 60:21	86:7 87:2 172:19	177:2,4
89:13,23	comfortable 1:14	76:20 92:19,23	173:10 176:7,13	confidently 183:20
coaxing 71:18	2:12 50:13	112:11	176:24 177:1	confine 99:16
code 43:19,21 44:3	coming 1:25 13:12	<b>common</b> 135:21	179:11,12,18	<b>confirm</b> 60:15
44:20	22:12 24:19,25	137:16 183:13	180:7 182:2,22	118:12 129:3
coffee 61:9	29:1 30:15 31:22	communicate	completely 202:4,5	157:14,16 172:24
coincided 37:16	32:3,21 33:3 73:5	80:11 81:6 102:7	202:6	179:4 180:1
collate 205:21	73:17 80:14 84:15	130:15,25 167:20	completes 179:15	confirmation 85:24
collating 12:9	87:6 128:3,6,23	195:21	182:3	86:19 157:3,15
colleague 150:22	132:13 140:8	communicated	completing 178:10	180:10,25
158:5	144:11 172:10	174:15 177:2	182:13 183:4,5	confirmed 60:10
colleagues 33:11	175:11,16 177:9	188:3,20	194:12	86:5,9 155:20
150:23	command 9:13	communicating	completion 178:5	confirming 157:1
collecting 12:10	26:18 27:20,23	158:8	178:14	confirms 157:10
collection 43:1,9	28:2,9,9,22 29:2,2	communication	complicated 39:7	181:1 196:22
107:14	30:22 56:1,6	26:17 27:22 68:8	compromised	confused 72:23
collective 96:14	58:13 59:11 67:12	86:24 101:17	138:20	confusion 133:5
97:19,20 100:20	82:13,14,19,24	106:14 135:24	computer 80:4	187:8
combined 180:4	83:5,8 87:20,21	156:1 163:4 165:8	computer-aided	conjunction 145:12
come 10:2 11:12	134:13,17,23,24	166:14 177:17	121:15	145:14
13:5 14:4 17:21	135:1,2,8,8,12,19	185:7	computer-based	connected 114:17
20:22 26:13 32:6	135:22,22 136:2	communications	19:5	133:13
43:3 45:9 55:3	148:24 151:23	28:8 29:6 66:24	computer-genera	<b>conscious</b> 94:1 96:3
63:22 77:13,23	156:9,17 159:1	75:11 100:3 136:4	60:20	96:16
82:16 86:2,12	163:5 165:2,11,16	162:13 166:13	concentrating	consider 143:12
88:11 90:11 94:6	165:20,24 166:1,5	185:2 189:23	94:25	148:11 161:7
97:18 100:12	166:9 167:3,8,11	195:11	concerned 65:18	205:22
102:10 105:17	167:11 169:12	<b>company</b> 56:2,9	201:17	consideration
106:12,13,14	170:4,9,21,24	67:11	concerns 98:2	206:6
116:1 117:18	172:1,13,15	compartment	112:24	considering 203:23
132:15 134:3	173:15,16,21	128:6 199:15	concisely 130:24	consist 73:14
142:20 143:9	174:6,21 176:11	compartmentation	conclude 22:16	constantly 173:21
145:4,6,7 151:3	176:23 177:6	138:19 200:9	conclusion 15:10	constructed 137:8
162:17 164:18	179:2 180:5 183:1	compiled 48:7,8	19:2,25 21:11,12	construction
165:14,25 166:12	commander 24:20	compiling 136:19	31:16,20	199:14
167:1 170:14	25:1 30:21 58:8	160:8	conclusions 15:12	<b>contact</b> 64:18 65:20
171:9 182:17	69:6 87:13 100:4	complement 38:17	conditions 100:14	80:16 81:22 102:2
186:21 187:17	102:21 149:15	complete 8:23	100:22,23 113:14	117:14 129:18
188:5 194:10	158:18,20,24	49:17 86:18	113:24 114:10,13	134:12 151:23
204:17	188:5	107:13,22 199:18	114:19,20 116:8	155:21 156:9
	-	-	-	-

161:8,15,20 163:6	36:16,17 37:8	130:17 131:2,4	174:23 175:1	92:4 95:4 120:23
163:10,20,22	38:1,14,17 39:25	132:24 133:3,4,8	204:13 206:4	128:7 144:1
164:3 192:18	40:4,20 42:16	132:24 133:3,4,8	conversation 66:21	189:13
contacted 56:10	44:20 45:3 46:17	134:15,16,21	66:22 97:6 98:1	covered 27:7 28:3
64:9,11,23 174:21	48:10 49:22 50:21	135:13 137:2,10	112:21 151:9	119:16 147:15
contacting 81:4	51:16 52:24 54:9	138:3,19 139:12	190:9 195:23	185:4
contain 187:6	54:12,20,24 55:7	139:16,23 140:2	202:11	covering 93:2
contained 20:16	55:11 56:13,24,25	140:12 142:4	conversations	crash 155:1
23:5 59:5	57:1,1,9 58:17	143:4,12,15 144:6	132:21 144:8	crazy 197:25 198:5
containing 121:14	60:2 62:25 63:5,7	144:7,19 145:15	copies 153:22	crazy 196:15
contains 41:7,16	63:14,16,17,18	145:17,22 146:2	180:21	create 79:13 83:16
48:19	66:8,15,20,25	147:15,24 148:12	coping 192:21	83:17 107:4,11,13
contemplated	67:22 69:7 71:1,7	148:15,16,24	196:20	107:14 151:12
150:7	71:9 72:1 73:12	149:3,8,14,18	core 205:17	167:22 178:23
content 11:5 141:7	73:21 74:4,13,17	151:23 152:1,4,5	corner 91:3	created 46:8 77:16
contents 47:9 66:14	74:22,24 75:2	153:14,21,22	correct 39:2,23	77:25 78:1 83:10
160:22	76:13 77:19 80:1	154:1,15,18 155:6	52:22 134:2 150:3	84:7 86:8 110:21
context 84:17	80:2,8 82:7 83:19	155:15,20 156:9	173:14 178:25	113:10 154:18,20
continual 23:12,14	83:21 86:9,12	156:14 157:3,12	179:16	168:14,25 176:2
continual 23:12,11 continually 22:2	87:7,8 88:18	157:23 158:17	corrected 183:3	176:22 178:16
23:11,18	89:12,17,21 90:8	159:1,15 161:9,14	correcting 177:11	179:18 182:4
continue 25:14	90:17 93:2,6,9,21	161:15,21 163:7	correction 177:13	183:5
125:25 175:18	93:22 94:8,20,25	163:14,21 164:3	corridor 21:3	creates 78:25 79:11
196:11 201:1,7	95:6,11 96:5 97:9	165:2,8,20 166:3	124:11 139:3	175:22 179:14
continuing 186:4	97:12,14 98:9,23	166:16 167:6	178:17 181:8	181:24
contrary 148:15	99:10 100:13,21	169:20 172:22	COs 17:4,19 21:4	creating 77:19
control 3:15,25 4:2	101:1,9,10,24	173:22 174:2,7,16	21:19 22:8 27:3	82:20 160:8
4:4,15,17,18,20	102:4,5,7,10,18	174:17 182:10	could've 177:5,14	182:11
4:22 5:2,3,4,5,7,8	102:25 103:1,4,7	183:5 185:3,8,10	177:14 200:22	creation 154:20
6:16,17,22 7:3,16	104:13,21 105:6,9	185:12,15 186:3	COUNSEL 1:22	178:4,13
7:20,21 10:1 11:7	106:6,7,8 107:3,3	187:1 188:12,21	206:20	crews 17:7,14 24:8
12:4,5,18,19,21	107:3,17,25 108:3	189:3,14,16,17	counsel's 201:25	24:10 25:19 28:13
13:1,6,7,8,9,17,18	108:4 109:8,9	190:5,12 191:2,12	country 125:22	30:21 69:15 129:4
14:13,22 15:2	110:5,9,15,18,19	191:16 192:21,24	County 104:21	155:3 183:14,23
17:5,6,25 18:7,12	111:8,11 112:1,9	193:11 194:6	couple 52:2 115:2	184:6,14 200:20
19:8,18,19 20:7	112:17 113:14	195:3 196:14	197:20	criteria 189:17
20:17 23:1,20	114:5 115:21	198:7,8 199:8,23	course 1:18 11:5	190:2,5
24:17 25:2 26:1	116:7,22,25 117:1	200:5,11 202:19	13:5 14:5 15:23	critical 101:15,20
26:12,17,19,21	117:9,12 118:6	202:20,25 203:21	26:13 32:16 82:17	101:22 112:5
27:1,6,14,19,22	119:5,17 120:1	control's 38:24	94:7 146:23 151:8	165:2,5,11,16
27:24 28:3,8 29:3	121:15 122:14	Control Admin	185:15	166:1 167:4,8
29:23 30:5,16	123:10,23 124:5	197:17	courses 9:11	criticism 201:13
31:19,23 32:3,6	124:17,22 125:9	controller 3:16	cover 5:10 23:2	CRO 7:16 35:10,18
32:22 33:10 34:4	125:21 126:23	convenient 61:5	39:3 88:22,23	35:21 39:22 41:4
34:6,9,10 35:2	127:5 128:12,24	103:12 131:16,17	89:3,4,6 91:11,23	42:22 45:10,15,22
	,			, ,
		I	I	I

47:10 67:7 73:3	169:8,9,19 170:19	deciding 144:20	149:8 203:7	<b>detour</b> 132:18
104:23 106:20	170:20 171:1,9,19	189:25	depends 58:21	detrimental 96:8
139:12 146:19	172:10,11 173:6,9	decision 24:21 58:7	82:18 190:4	98:20 99:2
147:2 150:13	175:20 176:16	94:1 96:3,15,16	derived 48:18	develops 46:4
151:7 152:12	178:2,9,9,23	97:19,20,23 98:12	describe 68:7 69:12	dial 120:9 134:17
153:6 154:16	179:1,10 180:9,21	98:17 99:5 100:20	71:19	135:4 140:7
161:1 167:18,19	182:8,9,12 183:2	143:17,21 145:6	described 85:7	dialling 136:2
168:18 178:18	<b>Darby's</b> 176:8	145:11 147:18	157:24 160:5	dictates 20:11
184:13 186:17,20	177:1	148:24 149:3,3,5	describes 24:4	die 17:11
188:4	dash 51:10	149:7,14,15,16,18	design 9:25	difference 83:15
CROs 6:24 7:4,8,9	data 42:4 49:16	172:14	designated 75:12	117:10
7:11,20 34:21	56:1,15 62:7 64:5	decision-making	135:20 165:23,24	different 2:7 4:20
35:22 38:10,12	88:18	35:5 96:1 99:10	173:23	7:15,18 9:6 12:13
52:24 150:11	database 46:23	decisions 21:23	designed 23:3	13:8,17 15:13
183:9,13 203:11	47:4,9 48:18 53:4	35:6 99:19	desk 41:2 98:8	21:20 25:16,17
crystal 73:13	56:4 60:4,7 67:23	declared 83:9	106:13	54:11 60:10 69:24
CSS 87:23	92:17,20	91:10 170:24	desks 13:21	86:23 92:7 96:1
CU 165:4 166:2	date 51:7,9 142:5	declares 102:21	destination 82:17	102:5 103:9 106:3
170:4 183:1	dated 2:18 11:15	dedicated 105:13	179:16	109:20 118:22
CU7 181:20,20	104:18 125:23	105:14,22,24	detached 9:12	134:8 138:1
182:9,14,15,16,17	day 5:13 6:22 71:24	<b>Dedicating</b> 161:8	detail 17:22 29:13	139:14,15 141:4
182:23	191:24 201:14	defines 118:2	30:10 42:8 77:13	146:1,17 155:2
<b>CU8</b> 167:16 170:12	206:12	definitely 98:1	132:16 141:7	162:16 165:7
170:13 171:6,7	day-to-day 4:15	definition 116:20	170:15 173:20	166:10,12 172:9
172:3,8 173:25	days 5:15 99:22	degree 123:9	196:9	179:2 183:8,21
177:13,24 178:1,7	<b>DCT</b> 88:19 91:16	delay 130:22	<b>detailed</b> 28:21,24	189:2 192:22
178:10 179:3,13	91:17,20 93:13	deliver 11:4	31:1 119:4	difficult 91:11,19
180:11 181:3	deal 11:21,22,25	<b>delivered</b> 10:1 19:5	detailing 21:11	91:21 199:5
182:2,12,21	30:24 110:15	delivery 4:19	<b>details</b> 26:20 43:12	difficulties 18:20
<b>cup</b> 35:7 61:9	<b>dealing</b> 41:13 42:14	<b>demand</b> 89:3,7	43:18 46:10 51:16	18:23 72:1 109:1
curiosities 52:2	113:17 118:7	<b>Demands</b> 202:20	53:12,15 83:17	109:2 112:13
current 31:6	143:18 156:20	department 12:13	107:4 110:18	difficulty 200:21
116:18 119:9	202:13	19:15	141:21 150:16	201:17
127:20,22 143:20	dealt 33:4	departments 4:21	154:21 155:22	<b>direct</b> 105:16 108:7
currently 41:13	<b>Dear</b> 20:10	7:23	156:2 169:4	110:1,2,9,15
206:5	<b>Debbie</b> 14:14,15	<b>depend</b> 7:6 24:14	174:21 192:19,20	127:17 134:17
cut 38:8 110:14	196:5 197:21	67:9 81:19 128:22	deterioration 147:8	135:23
	198:2,4,14 202:11	131:8 139:7,15	determine 116:22	directed 177:6
<u>D</u>	<b>debrief</b> 90:8,17	183:21 184:2,22	116:24 122:15	186:23
daily 4:18	112:1,10 199:23	190:6,8	190:2	directly 42:22 66:9
dangerous 124:20	200:5	dependent 124:5	determined 150:12	100:6 102:8,11
Darby 57:21 60:3	decide 44:2 150:17	131:6,11 171:4	determines 115:20	140:19 163:4
75:21 78:16,22	decided 36:4 82:7	206:9	117:7 122:19	167:16 174:1
79:12,24 163:23	190:25	depending 31:11	157:21	discipline 20:6
163:24 164:2	decides 82:3 170:3	49:10 56:7 110:22	determining 117:1	discover 26:9

discovery 70:19	domestic 120:19,19	early 13:4 70:2	186:19	110:18,23 111:2
discuss 185:2	124:13 147:9	easier 15:17,20	enquire 201:12	established 53:25
<b>discussed</b> 97:24,25	door 124:16 128:3	151:16 195:25	enshrined 23:4	137:6 163:3 166:3
165:7 187:12	150:23	easy 72:23	ensure 88:22	establishing 108:12
discussion 90:12	doors 128:2	effect 183:17	107:21 141:24	et 52:12 54:14
91:14 98:5,7	<b>dot</b> 164:20	186:10	142:14 144:1	ethos 22:4
112:9,12 147:22	double 99:23 155:8	Effective 26:17	<b>ensuring</b> 4:16 39:1	evacuate 138:13
148:2,20 182:24	doubt 187:3	effectively 97:5	entered 19:8 46:12	143:14
discussions 113:5	<b>Dowden</b> 87:13	192:25	46:14 62:22,23	evening 97:7
display 13:23	downlink 93:20	effects 117:24	97:12,14 170:4	event 126:16
displaying 94:18	download 155:7	118:9	entitled 164:25	152:14 201:8,9
displays 45:12	downstairs 89:13	efficient 29:3	185:7	everybody 60:6
94:17	draft 16:6,8 19:14	efforts 27:2 29:24	entrants 71:14	everyone's 56:11
Dissanayake 90:20	<b>drafted</b> 16:7 149:6	30:4 31:2,20 32:5	entries 93:8	evidence 1:15 22:4
distress 96:18	<b>Drilling</b> 171:1	eight 192:1,2,9	entry 93:19 168:9	26:18 32:1 61:13
100:11 200:16	driver 69:7	194:7,12,18	174:20	103:19 131:20
disturbed 162:22	drop 111:2 184:18	eight-pump 50:5	equipment 65:12	134:3,4 175:4
divert 101:19	drop-down 79:9	194:2 196:4	65:17,22 68:2	188:25 204:16
divided 15:12	<b>Duddy</b> 78:4,5,10,20	either 36:15 59:17	93:22 134:23	205:2,18 206:11
Docklands 12:23	80:15 82:5,10	64:13 75:16 81:5	195:12	evidential 199:18
12:24 13:7,17,22	<b>Duddy's</b> 179:7	105:15 110:24	escalating 95:20	evolved 54:9
33:10	due 13:5 14:5 22:3	176:21 203:25	escape 17:16 18:2	exact 163:17
document 11:10	26:13 32:16 82:16	electricity 56:1,7	18:10,22 20:25	exactly 104:20
14:6 15:9 16:14	94:7 115:23	67:11	21:4,6 116:9	<b>example</b> 6:6 57:14
16:15 20:10,17	117:24 118:9	electronic 67:4	121:13 122:3,11	57:16 69:6 82:3
48:1,5 50:18 62:6	122:22	electronically	122:20,20,25	84:4,5,7,11 87:13
69:24 70:2 88:11	duration 104:25	107:7	123:17,23 124:3	103:5 104:16
90:11,13 91:7	108:21	emergency 8:20	124:25 125:3,5	111:2 127:25
92:7,14 104:20	duty 7:2,4 37:19,24	39:1	126:8,24 127:2,6	168:8 171:24
107:24,25 112:2	189:16 193:11	employ 20:7	127:9,10 149:13	173:1 190:17
121:1 125:20,23	194:6	en 28:16 151:13	Escape/alternative	examples 61:2
136:11,13,17	<b>dwelling</b> 120:19,19	156:19,23 183:25	20:25	168:5 175:18
137:21,22 140:16	137:15	193:22 196:25	escaping 17:18	177:21 187:15
141:4,5,8,10,14	dwellings 147:10	204:5	122:16	exceptional 148:11
142:11 153:17	dynamic 42:9	<b>enable</b> 45:22 69:6	especially 129:16	exchange 56:18
159:24 160:14,19	dynamically 54:9	130:16	143:23	63:8 110:5 111:16
176:20 196:11	101:13	enables 88:20	essentially 8:7	184:4
199:21,24 200:2		encountered	107:18 148:24	exchanged 142:3
documentation		112:14	168:1	Excuse 84:9
177:16	<b>e.g</b> 148:13	engagement 153:2	Essex 3:14 9:5,13	exercise 37:15
<b>documents</b> 2:24 3:1	E3 17:12	engines 64:9	10:7,15 104:21,23	56:23
11:10 69:25 90:10	earlier 65:25 97:7	118:13 128:16	105:4,14,18,20	exists 191:5
92:8 168:7 197:14	101:4 109:13	<b>English</b> 71:10,12	106:1,18,20 107:5	exit 124:16,16
<b>doing</b> 38:10 134:21	112:2 165:7	130:12	107:6,18 108:4	125:15 127:7
180:3 184:21	194:17 199:24	enhance 185:13	109:10,23 110:17	expect 30:8 143:17
L				

				1490 210
143:21 150:13	<b>extant</b> 107:24	64:6	28:12,14,20 31:7	183:9,19,23
154:16 158:15,17	126:3	fears 184:1	31:23,24 32:3,6,7	184:17 185:18
158:24 166:3	extent 129:23	fed 102:24	32:21 33:8,9	186:12 187:20
187:17	extra 20:17 89:2	feed 46:24 87:21,24	35:15,19 37:18	189:11 190:18
expectation 17:7	extract 71:9	87:24	38:24,25 39:2	192:1 193:19
137:7 159:6	extracting 71:17	feedback 100:13	42:22 45:16 49:14	194:2 196:4
Expectations 17:1	extremely 27:16	feeds 89:24	49:15,24,25 50:5	198:16,18 199:12
expected 143:18	113:13 198:12	feel 127:13 184:5	50:6,7,10 53:5	199:14 200:17,21
144:4,10 145:4	202:19	184:12	59:7,8,15 60:11	202:24 203:2,16
expecting 17:19	eye 144:9	feeling 103:13	62:12,24 63:7,9	203:18,22,23,24
experience 3:9 17:8	cyc 144.)	197:6	63:16,18,23 64:8	firefighters 19:16
17:23 18:6 22:17	F	feels 123:5	64:18 65:16 69:12	25:1 27:15 30:4
28:7 32:19 33:3	F 12:17 49:13	felt 37:13 96:7	69:14,15,17 70:9	128:17,20,25
44:11 72:7 113:13	<b>F.1</b> 12:17	100:20 116:12	71:3,3 76:19,24	128.17,20,23
116:10 137:25	<b>F.6</b> 15:10	122:21 123:13,19	77:6,22 78:13	185:24,25
139:22 146:23	face 202:18	field 34:25 43:14	88:23 89:4 90:9	firefighting 27:2
149:20 150:7	facilities 40:14	56:19 158:25	91:11,23 92:4	29:23 30:10 31:2
159:6,10 183:16	88:13,16 93:9	file 23:19 119:8	95:20 99:9,18,25	31:20 32:4,21,24
186:5,9,15 194:9	facility 36:22	121:14 151:2	104:21 105:18,23	fireground 116:23
199:5	facing 36:16 98:8	160:3	104.21 103.18,23	116:24
experienced 24:24	fact 17:10 113:10	fill 153:21	100:16 107:23	fires 17:11 33:11
114:24 188:23	118:25 129:15	final 16:14,15	111:10 113:11,20	44:13 120:19
experiences 12:11	156:6 159:14	Finally 69:12 136:4	114:5 115:7,12,23	137:19 153:10
27:5	173:15 180:4	find 19:10,25 20:19	116:17,20 117:7	190:18
experiencing 63:4	185:11 192:8	21:19,21 22:9	117:12,15,18,25	first 3:13,14 11:16
71:20 113:22	193:18 194:16	148:2 150:15	118:8,9,13 119:2	12:16 17:24 18:16
139:9 147:24,25	197:1	193:21 202:5	119:5,8,15 120:3	22:8 28:8 34:3
experiential 10:11	factual 183:23	finding 15:17,20	120:8 122:9,17,18	42:20 49:3,18
71:23 72:2	failed 64:21	18:21 204:3	120:8 122:9,17,18	52:1,2 53:21 54:8
expert 87:23	fair 21:14 22:16	fine 101:6 132:12	125:21,23 127:20	62:9,23 70:5,25
expertise 158:25	32:1,18,23	197:8 201:3,23	127:22 128:1,2,16	71:11,13,15 83:16
explain 4:13 34:3,9	fall-back 93:21,22	finish 113:9 126:12	129:4,16,25	90:16 92:11 96:11
34:10 53:18 62:10	fallback 93:9	201:10 204:16,19	130:21 131:5	96:21 97:8,24
64:7 70:24 92:16	false 184:15	finished 49:16	130:21 131:3	101:14,22 105:8
102:15,17 115:12	familiar 11:16	159:22	137:1,3,9,15	116:19 119:11
168:24	14:10 16:2 48:4	fire 3:9,13,14,15,22	138:2,4,7 139:1	126:7 130:13
explained 89:1	92:14 136:17	4:3,8,21 9:5 11:6	139:25 140:2,17	136:16,25 137:20
100:19	137:20 140:19,21	11:13 12:9,12	141:16,19 142:4,8	137:24 141:4
explaining 66:25	141:5,6,9 142:25	13:9 14:14,24	141:10,19 142:4,8	142:5 144:18,19
explaining 00.23 explore 17:25 21:5	148:6 153:19	15:11 16:10 17:7	142:18 143:18	147:11 149:6
109:7 124:19	far 6:21 65:16	17:8,17,20 18:14	148:10 150:20	159:20 160:23,25
132:16	88:12 114:14	19:7 20:10,11,12	153:8 154:19	163:9 167:6
express 86:19	121:6 183:25	20:13 21:8 22:25	156:20 158:9,21	185:21,22 189:22
expression 113:25	201:17	24:11,19 25:1,5,7	162:6,7 163:21	189:24 194:4
expression 113.23 expressly 85:20	FB1706140052	25:18 26:5 27:7	178:16 181:8	196:3
Capicssiy 05.20		23.10 20.3 21.1	170.10 101.0	170.5
		l		

first-floor 120:22	follow 8:22 32:14	framework 25:17	205:18 206:6	198:16 201:4,6,14
Firstly 127:1	68:23 69:5 77:9	free 76:15 79:10	furthest 128:1	give 1:15 2:15
<b>five</b> 44:19,19,22,23	121:2 126:4	162:3,14 164:15	<b>FYI</b> 168:14 173:3	11:11 15:2 24:22
72:16,17 191:13	144:15 168:3	freed 134:21		33:6 41:1 44:7
<b>fixed</b> 63:14 68:23	189:18	frequent 72:7	G	61:8 72:8,25
<b>flag</b> 146:7	followed 108:19	fresh 128:5	<b>G1</b> 50:7	123:24 139:5
flame 146:18	203:11	front 2:18 41:5,6	<b>G27</b> 49:1	153:4 203:20
flat 17:16 21:3	following 19:15	54:10 67:1 141:3	<b>G271</b> 70:9 77:16	205:9,20,21
24:14 26:20 44:12	108:2	FRS 112:8	81:3 82:3 84:15	given 16:8 17:11
44:13,16 73:16	<b>foot</b> 81:5,8,10	FRSs 112:22	168:14 170:1,17	24:15 25:12 26:24
84:16 104:24	force 116:1	frustrated 111:13	170:21 171:5,24	27:3,4 31:13
108:13 109:1	forget 24:6 124:14	Frustrating 28:12	172:11,12 173:3	32:10 38:3 48:23
124:10 129:25	forgive 79:17	FSC 21:22	173:16 177:1,3,12	60:13 82:15,25
137:17 152:24	184:12	FSG 17:11 21:5	178:16 179:3,11	95:16 100:12
168:15 169:5	form 28:3 43:1,9,10	26:24 33:14,18	179:14 180:7,10	103:6 111:19
173:3 177:25	74:9,10,11 107:14	112:5,8 114:2,21	180:20	118:15 119:23
178:17 182:4,4	152:5 153:14,19	115:11,20 116:23	<b>G272</b> 70:9	125:7 130:4 131:7
flat/house 152:2	154:1,10,15,18	117:1,10 118:2	<b>G331</b> 57:24 70:9	131:8 137:5
187:7	181:10	123:24 137:1	<b>G362</b> 70:14	138:18 139:19
flats 33:1 96:19	formal 179:24	148:12 149:12	gap 70:17	142:2,18 143:3
140:18 203:15	<b>format</b> 187:13	150:7,12 151:25	gather 152:4,16	147:15,19 154:12
flats.' 137:19	<b>formed</b> 42:13	153:7 154:17,22	gathering 15:14	179:12 183:9
<b>FLONOPS</b> 164:13	forms 115:4 155:3	155:20 156:11,14	152:12	185:14 186:3
FLONOPS1 162:1	155:6	157:1,4,5,9,10,21	<b>gauge</b> 130:7	200:23 202:25
162:9,10,24	formulated 181:1	159:7 161:2,13,16	gazetteer 72:18	203:14,15
<b>flood</b> 113:17	formulates 180:16	162:2,20 166:2	73:8 150:16	giving 95:22 114:21
flooding 113:14	180:20	181:20 182:9,16	general 16:25 30:7	129:12 186:20
114:23,24 115:1,6	forthcoming	185:11,14,16	32:17 35:14 83:3	glance 91:22
floor 72:25 73:4,15	121:22	186:20 187:7	85:4 90:2,16	<b>go</b> 12:10 15:9 36:19
77:22 78:13 84:15	found 22:13 91:21	188:20 196:16,17	92:16,23 150:13	36:25 42:17 46:11
104:25 120:20	94:5 119:7 153:17	196:20 203:15	162:13	48:13,13 52:10,20
147:11 168:15	four 6:14,15 14:22	FSGs 148:15	generally 24:4	53:15 55:13 61:16
169:5 173:4	15:16,24 20:16	150:10 161:18	35:17 55:13	62:4 65:24 67:8
177:25 178:17	70:19 108:2	202:14	generate 49:23	67:23 69:24 82:6
181:8	115:15,19 119:16	full 2:15 38:17 88:1	55:14 85:19	82:6,10 88:13
floors 44:19,19,22	126:23 141:17,18	fuller 48:18	generated 48:9	92:4 102:8 103:20
44:23 45:6 71:1,7	183:11	<b>function</b> 7:21 8:19	53:10 84:24	104:12,18 110:25
72:16,17,24 73:3	four-hour 5:12	10:4	generates 51:1	112:3 118:23
73:14 129:2	fourth 71:2 90:20	functionality 13:16	85:17	119:20 126:9,18
focus 2:25 12:3	Fox 168:10,17	69:1 75:8	generating 176:8	131:22 136:1
18:3 116:21 127:4	170:1,16 172:11	<b>functions</b> 35:4 95:5	generic 140:25	142:19 148:4
142:13 203:18	173:5 176:3	further 21:11 44:3	George 92:25	152:18 153:16
focused 18:24 19:4	177:23 178:2,8	44:4 46:4,10 62:3	<b>getting</b> 100:13	160:13 164:12,19
203:19	182:3,11	77:21 100:10	107:18 111:13	164:22 166:15
focusing 18:4 95:1	frames 128:3	120:10 177:24	180:14 194:3	168:6,8 169:24
				,
		l	l	l

				1490 217
171:23 172:8,13	163:3 204:14	185:3,13,19 186:4	halfway 29:15 70:5	189:4
174:14 175:21	205:9 206:14	186:19 187:5,18	115:13 126:21	happening 21:19
180:23 181:17	Gotts 14:15,18	204:4	198:22	22:9 31:11 37:11
182:12 183:8,18	government 121:2	group 125:21	Hammersmith	98:19 100:5,8
184:16,19 185:5	137:12 140:17,20	137:12 140:17,20	70:14	111:15 144:14
189:8 197:6	140:22	grouped 8:16	hand 36:2,3,6 68:9	173:8 186:18
199:23 201:23	government-led	guess 50:2 57:19	96:17 147:4	188:23 199:7
205:5,19 206:9	13:9	73:12	handed 110:4	204:9
goes 24:10 50:10	GRA 137:13	guessing 51:9 91:4	handhelds 195:15	happens 45:9 62:5
56:23 57:8 74:21	140:25	196:10	handing 113:20	101:13,14 118:6
77:10 83:18 91:24	grassland 43:23	guidance 18:14	handle 8:10,12,17	127:11 131:14
121:7 170:19	great 11:21,22,25	19:7 20:10,12,13	33:20 111:9	150:10
	greater 21:9	21:21 22:22,24	handled 78:12	
<b>going</b> 1:8 20:4 22:24 24:10 34:18	greatly 185:13	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	111:7	<b>happy</b> 2:7 16:19,21 45:17 61:22 104:8
34:21 39:25 43:19	green 12:18 153:20	25:18 28:13,14,20 31:24 32:7 33:8	handler 72:14	201:23
	Grenfell 3:22 14:14	35:15 50:7 107:23		hard 28:1 89:16
46:8 50:12,13,18	14:23 15:3 31:6		75:14 82:8,20	
61:1 69:21 74:5		107:25 108:6	83:6 85:1,6	harm 21:9
77:8,13 82:16	33:17,23 35:15	112:7,8,15 113:11	157:11,12,14,18	Hayward 4:10,11
88:11 90:10 91:7	52:24 70:25 95:20	115:13 116:17,20	157:21 167:19	he'll 79:13
95:19 101:1 104:5	98:19 100:7	117:12,18 118:8	168:18,18,20	head 199:10
104:6 115:11	104:22,24 111:22	118:21 119:2,4,6	170:3	headset 36:18
131:13,19 132:15	149:23,25 161:23	119:22 121:2,17	handlers 12:6,11	74:21 75:24 81:1
137:21 141:8,9	162:7,25 167:9	125:23 126:3,25	24:5	hear 1:5 36:20
144:5,9,12,16,17	176:17 191:6	129:16 130:22	handles 78:11	69:16 129:5
145:6 153:25	ground 24:19 25:2	131:5 132:14	handling 9:12,16	146:17 185:23,25
155:18 158:25	25:7 26:19 27:1,7	136:24 137:12	9:17,23,24 11:8	187:1,25 195:2
159:18 161:20	27:15 29:22 30:16	138:2 140:17,20	15:11 22:5 23:25	198:6,8,19 204:9
164:18 170:11,14	30:24 31:19,23	140:22 141:17,19	24:21 25:15 71:13	heard 47:21 66:17
172:15,17 173:23	32:3,6,22 49:4,9	142:9,18 145:18	75:16 110:4	82:13,14 90:5
180:19,20 182:12	58:8 59:7,8,15	146:9 148:10	112:24 113:6	101:23 106:21
182:21 192:8	60:11 69:12,14,15	150:21 153:8	114:21 131:5	118:18 134:24
196:15 197:25	69:17 74:4,8,17	154:19 156:21	143:25 145:15	139:11 179:23
198:5 201:6,9	84:19,20 85:10,16	158:21 160:9	146:2 152:17	182:16,20
202:17 204:4,16	85:24 86:13,20	183:9 185:18	178:2,8,20 182:11	hearing 1:4 25:20
204:22 205:10	87:11 100:15	186:12 187:20	188:4	112:16 206:17
Golf 49:10 58:4	102:8,11 117:7	198:16 199:12	handover 102:16	<b>Hearn</b> 90:19 91:4
60:13 81:20 82:6	128:23 130:9	200:17 202:24	hands 36:12	heat 26:5 115:23
82:25 170:6,7	134:18 147:17,23	203:2	hang 114:16	118:1,2,10 120:3
172:17 177:4,5	148:20 149:4,19	guidance' 119:8	happen 28:15 71:5	120:8 122:17,18
179:7	155:21 156:2	137:1	73:1,6 103:1	123:2,8,16 138:7
<b>good</b> 1:3,7,11,13,23	158:9,15 159:8	guided 20:9	114:23 140:4	139:1,25 183:19
1:24 14:2 28:11	161:15,21 163:21	<b>GVP</b> 12:25 13:11	145:17 153:3	184:17
28:11 34:18 61:24	164:4 165:9		159:8 160:24	heavily 146:14
92:21 100:7	167:20 171:3,5,25	<u>H</u>	happened 63:1	<b>Heidi</b> 14:16,17,18
103:16 144:7	172:1 177:18	half 191:3	70:24 186:18	168:10,17 170:1
L	=	=	=-	=

170:16 172:11	highlighting	167:25 171:8	33:21 35:3 41:7,8	149:19,22 150:18
173:5 176:3	121:10 188:9	172:4,18 177:19	42:4,5,6,11,13,17	151:20 152:7
177:23 178:2,8	highlights 2:24	ICP/CU 161:10	42:18 43:6,7,14	153:24 154:5,8,21
182:3,11,19	hint 205:10	ICS 67:3 75:10	43:15,19,19 44:2	155:9,21 156:2
held 46:21 69:2	histogram 45:12	81:6 101:16	44:8,20 45:13	158:15,18,20,24
93:3,6	historic 26:11	105:18 106:14		
heli-tele 89:12,18	68:13 109:14	115:4 133:14	46:4,5,7,8,9,9,11 46:21,22 47:1,4	159:1,8 161:15,21 164:3 165:9
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			, ,	
93:14,21,25 94:3	HJF 168:9,17	136:2 165:15,25	47:10,22 48:1,2	167:20 168:6
<b>helicopter</b> 90:4 93:20	hold 28:2 68:8	idea 33:6 93:17	48:14,15,16,22,24	169:1,12,22 170:4
	HOM00001124 11:12	100:7 103:16	48:25 49:5,10,22	170:9,21,23,24
help 2:1 14:12 16:5	*	ideally 152:16	49:23 50:4,4,7	171:3,4,25 172:1
18:13 36:5,25	home 53:19 116:2,6	identify 14:12	51:1,3,13,15,21	172:15,20 173:13
37:4 47:20 48:7	192:13,14	119:22 127:1,6	53:9,23 54:5 55:6	173:15 174:11,13
57:13 71:25 73:23	honest 203:19	illustrate 168:4	55:15,16,20 56:5	174:18 175:19
91:4,14 93:11	hope 160:12,16	image 100:24	56:7,8,15,20 58:5	176:10 177:6,18
95:18 97:23 99:18	204:23	images 98:3 99:1	58:6,8,8,13 62:2	179:17 180:5
99:24 100:18	hopefully 25:20	99:17 100:1,15	62:13,21 63:2,4	182:18 183:1,1
105:2 119:22	horrific 96:7	imagine 64:9 91:21	63:13 64:19 65:4	185:3,13,19 186:4
121:21 124:23,23	Hotel 33:9,15,24	105:15 108:14,16	65:20,24 67:2,10	186:19 187:5,15
125:9,10 127:1,5	hour 50:12 191:3	108:18 173:19,19	69:6,21 70:6,9,14	187:18 188:5
139:22 147:5,12	199:15 200:7,18	177:5 186:22	70:15 72:10 73:17	190:22 192:8,21
187:12 200:23	hours 5:18,20 6:24	<b>immediate</b> 4:7,8	74:4,5,8,17 79:21	193:12 194:4,21
helped 19:14 95:18	house 9:23 10:12	17:14 194:3	79:25 80:17 82:12	195:20 200:13
100:16	11:14 12:12 14:24	immediately 6:3	82:14,19,24 83:7	incidents 4:6 9:15
helpful 20:22 59:14	23:4 24:24 25:25	53:8 73:11 105:6	83:8 84:19,20	10:10,11 30:9
88:12 94:5 111:11	26:4 27:6,20 28:7	110:14	85:10,16,19,24	33:4,11 41:11
113:13 138:10,11	28:19 31:18 32:19	IMP 92:9,17	86:7,13,20 87:5,6	42:18 46:16 49:17
172:25 181:14	64:1 119:12	impact 141:23	87:10,13 88:4,21	51:2 57:6 81:24
hierarchy 6:4	124:13 125:2	203:22	91:10 92:5,18	129:15 162:17,19
high 44:14 70:15	152:24	impacting 192:24	94:3 95:12 100:2	162:23 189:19,20
76:24 120:2 137:8	HP 57:24	implement 113:19	100:2,4,5,15	190:5
high-rise 43:21	HPs 58:5	important 18:15	101:12 102:8,11	include 25:7 108:12
44:12,21 50:6	huge 144:11	142:17 205:23	102:14,17,17,20	133:18 141:20
70:20 71:6 72:5	human 65:7,10	206:10,11	102:21,21 103:5	154:10
72:11,15,18,20	hunt 63:15	improvements 7:23	107:4,13,14,15,16	included 21:24
73:7 117:21	hypothesis 109:8	19:24	110:21,25 111:15	including 21:20
120:24 121:3,7,24	hypothetical	inadequacy 32:20	111:21 112:19	inconvenience
122:6,10 138:5,18	139:21	Inaudible 198:1	116:24 117:8,15	204:24
143:8 147:9		incident 3:10 12:4	118:16 125:12	incorrect 72:9
higher 13:21 165:3	IC 140-11 14 140 7	16:13 24:20 25:1	128:23 129:6	incredibly 195:3
166:20,22	IC 148:11,14 149:5	26:18,19,23 27:1	130:8,9 131:14	INDEX 206:19
highlight 92:20	149:7 161:10	27:15 28:9 29:2	134:18 135:21	indicated 116:2
141:16 188:8	ICP 28:21 78:17	29:13,22 30:16,21	141:22 142:4	157:17 195:3
highlighted 164:23	151:23 156:9	30:22,24 31:12,13	147:17,23 148:20	203:5
181:23	158:2 163:7	31:19 32:9 33:19	148:23 149:4,6,15	indicates 115:22

		 	l	 
137:3 138:4	107:22 108:22,25	initially 70:11	introduced 119:20	join 71:15
indicating 162:18	109:10,19,22,24	193:4	125:13 133:5	joint 147:22 148:19
indicators 147:1	110:20,22,23	input 11:20 16:2,5	introductory	149:3,16
individual 12:10	111:19 112:17	16:22 43:16 56:14	118:25	jointly 148:25
16:13 25:20 51:15	116:11 118:14,15	171:19	invariably 60:18	journey 191:4,18
52:16 76:13	119:4,8 121:14,19	inputs 42:11 48:9	investigate 12:3	judgement 100:4
104:24 125:14	128:22 129:14	57:25 84:22	18:13	123:9,11
145:22 184:2	130:3,4,7,16	170:16 175:22	investigation 19:6	July 1:1 11:14
203:4 206:9	131:7,8 134:20	<b>inputted</b> 56:5 73:20	22:23 30:2 140:23	12:18 15:11 90:17
individually 6:19	139:13 142:3	77:24	142:21	92:25 93:3 206:17
individuals 6:23	146:6,21 151:2,13	INQ00000198	investigations 2:1	<b>June</b> 3:24 9:18 10:4
12:19 14:12 121:3	151:19,24,25	197:15	16:11	11:1 37:7 52:7
144:3,13 185:23	152:1,4,5,7,9,12	inquiry 1:22,25	involve 33:14	142:7 191:23
187:23	152:13,16 153:4,6	70:3 95:17 206:20	189:12	
<b>induce</b> 184:15	153:14,23 154:3,3	inside 96:19 104:24	<b>involved</b> 9:25 10:10	<u>K</u>
influence 24:21	154:10,14,15,16	108:15 114:13	11:5 33:7,12	keep 17:20 23:17
influenced 27:4	154:18 155:4,6,7	152:25 177:25	34:20 101:11	25:11,11 31:16
inform 43:12 74:4	155:23 156:10,17	instance 189:24	111:3,4,5,18,22	50:13,18 56:11
76:17,20 77:5	158:9,16,18,21	instances 28:20	111:23 145:20	96:6 125:18
95:21 98:20 103:7	159:3,7,9 160:3	instantly 192:20	151:6 153:1,11	128:14 144:9
157:6	161:11 162:20,22	instructed 199:13	154:19 155:24	146:12
information 15:14	163:25 165:1,6	instructions 147:11	involvement 28:18	keeping 21:25 23:9
18:8 23:19 24:9	167:4,23 171:2	instructs 120:20	99:4	24:7
24:14,19,25 25:7	173:25 174:6,15	196:20	irrelevant 177:16	Kensington 49:1
25:19 26:11,18,22	176:23 179:25	insufficiency 32:20	issue 37:5 109:20	64:25
26:25 27:3,7,12	181:7 186:4,23	insufficient 32:4	125:2,5,7 190:7	kept 69:14 185:10
27:15 28:3,13,14	187:22 198:20	integrated 66:24	issued 140:22	185:15 186:11
28:21 29:1,22	202:22	75:10 166:13	195:14	key 115:15 181:19
30:4,8,13,15,21	informative 29:12	intended 2:4	issues 92:21 109:5	keying 155:8
30:23 31:1,13,18	30:9 46:6 55:8	<b>intent</b> 21:25 23:9	189:19	<b>Kidd</b> 14:16,17,18
31:22 32:3,5,9,20	73:23 74:2,3,15	intention 186:3	item 143:4 190:22	<b>kind</b> 37:10 64:17
35:2 44:4,5,24	77:3 87:23 187:5	interchangeable	items 46:17 93:13	65:9,11,21 101:11
45:9 46:5 47:6	187:9,18 188:3	68:15	IUP 57:24	117:19 154:15
48:17,18 54:7,11	informed 56:17	interested 126:7		187:9,17
54:19 56:11 57:8	144:2 185:10,16	200:1	J	<b>kit</b> 68:8,10
57:13,25 62:22	186:11 196:3	interference 37:13	<b>Jason</b> 134:11	knew 28:24 30:5
64:12 69:16 71:10	202:13	internal 104:19	161:24 163:4,6,14	83:9 100:23
71:18 73:10 74:1	informing 46:13	internally 136:21	163:22 167:11,16	114:14 170:7
76:8 77:1,10,23	148:12 150:24	141:13 148:5	174:3	know 14:14 22:11
77:25 78:2 79:6	189:18	153:17	<b>Jo</b> 90:21	24:10 27:14 28:3
79:20 80:9,17,23	initial 18:12 53:21	interpreter 130:23	<b>Joanne</b> 1:8,10 2:17	29:5 32:24 36:3
80:24 83:4 86:25	70:18 75:5 123:25	interrupt 46:15	193:11 197:24	37:21 43:1 44:8
87:3,5 94:18,19	151:10,23 155:22	interview 34:9	198:2,19,23 199:1	44:11,12,16,17
98:18 102:13,24	156:2,9,17 158:8	interviewed 12:13	206:20	52:15 53:5 55:4
105:7 107:18,19	159:7 196:7	interviews 12:6,14	<b>job</b> 72:2 96:17	56:23 60:18 64:11
ĺ		ĺ		
	I .	1	I .	1

65:15,19 70:17,22	119:11 125:2,5,8	<b>letter</b> 20:11	195:5	58:6 62:2 65:24
81:3 82:10 87:14	125:12 140:23	level 3:11 5:21 7:1	link 58:19 59:4	69:21 73:17 85:19
87:24,24 88:17	142:21 200:7,11	7:2	89:16,18	86:7 87:6 88:2,4
90:22 97:9 99:1,6	200:12	LFB 10:15,18	linked 90:4	118:17 134:14
101:14 103:4	landline 109:15	11:13 12:4 21:24	list 12:19 14:7 41:7	153:24 154:8
110:3 112:7,8,15	133:7,7	51:11 70:2 92:9	41:8 42:4,11,13	155:9 168:6 169:1
113:3 115:5 118:7	landlines 109:14	104:18 114:2	42:17,18 43:6,7	171:23 172:2,15
118:18 123:15	language 71:11,13	120:4	46:5,7 47:10	171:23 172:2,13
124:13 125:8,10	130:13,19 141:13	LFB00000003 70:1	50:23 54:24 67:2	172.20 174.11,13
127:10,24 128:25	large 13:22 64:23	LFB00001905	74:1 79:14,21	179:17 182:18
129:2,7,8 140:21	114:23 115:1	136:13	80:10 83:18 87:6	183:1 187:16
141:7 144:2	162:2,20	LFB00003113	127:24 152:9	188:7,7 196:21
146:12 148:6	larger 13:21 107:15	90:10 112:3	169:6,15,22,22,23	logged 110:22
161:23 163:12,20	layout 15:13 16:20	199:25	listed 41:20 55:11	133:16
167:8 170:20	learned 19:24	LFB00003114 92:9	72:20	logistics 37:23,25
172:2 173:22	learning 10:11	LFB00003541	listen 36:18 111:12	logs 46:13,14
177:17,17 179:13	learnt 17:23 18:6	159:21	146:20,21 204:10	<b>London</b> 3:8,13,15
180:18 184:5	18:19 32:2	LFB000041255	listened 146:3	4:3,21 12:9 16:10
185:20,22,22	leave 18:15 19:9	141:2	listening 28:1 144:7	38:24,25 39:2
186:17,18 192:24	32:17 72:13 113:2	liaise 4:20 114:9,12	172:24	46:8 64:17,24
193:18,24 198:2,4	115:22 116:11,12	liaising 7:22	lists 42:5 152:15	65:16 69:8 88:21
198:4 203:2	117:24 118:9	liaison 148:16	194:12	92:5 102:16 105:6
knowledge 70:17	120:9 122:21	185:19	little 5:9 28:6 61:1	105:9 107:3,3
82:19 149:18	123:5,5,12,20	lie 97:5	62:4 78:18 96:10	136:14 162:6
known 39:8,11	124:1 127:2,8	life 165:5	103:11 144:16	Londoners 131:3
76:4 82:24 139:11	137:4 138:5 139:1	lifeline 184:6	172:8 177:10	long 40:4 48:2,19
knows 40:11	148:13 150:4	lift 42:15,17	181:16 198:25	50:23 73:17
138:19 140:2	158:13 168:15	<b>light</b> 146:15 191:18	205:10	108:21 130:22
172:11	173:4 203:6	lights 191:19	live 46:24 81:11,17	159:23 191:1,11
	204:22	limit 22:3	191:11	196:17 198:24
L	leaving 20:8 120:13	limited 129:13	living 44:15 121:3	199:3 204:20
labelled 106:17	123:13 139:4	line 4:7,8 25:11,21	loads 198:16	long-standing
165:16	left 2:21 26:3 48:23	25:23 26:3,24	lobby 124:11	26:11
lacking 89:5	left-hand 14:9	29:21 96:13	<b>LOC</b> 93:3,10	long-winded
laid 161:12	51:10	101:15,20,22	<b>Local</b> 137:12	130:20
<b>Lakanal</b> 9:23 10:12	legs 61:8	105:13,14,16,21	140:17,20,22	longer 103:11
11:14 12:11 14:24	length 199:10	105:24 112:5	location 13:11	202:1 204:21
15:4,5,11 17:23	lesson 17:22 18:6	126:12 130:19,23	21:10 56:8 118:12	longish 47:25
18:6,19 19:6,25	lessons 18:19 19:24	133:4,18,25 147:2	131:13 153:1	look 11:9,10 12:16
22:17,25 23:4,13	32:2	165:2,12,15,20,23	154:11 155:24	14:6 47:1,19,24
24:24 25:6,25	let's 18:3 34:6	166:10,19 167:8	203:7	54:11 55:18,21
26:4 27:5,20 28:6	48:13 50:18 57:16	189:10 196:18,18	locations 93:22	57:16 70:3 83:2
28:19 30:2 31:17	58:10 78:18	linear 152:17	log 40:24 46:8,9,11	84:5 90:7 92:7,11
32:2,19 33:1,17	145:25 197:14	lines 40:12 92:12	46:21 47:4,22	96:11,12 115:10
33:21,22 64:1	202:7	105:22 165:8	48:1,2,14 57:6	116:15,19 118:21
				<u> </u>
	<u> </u>	I	I	I

124:10 131:22	main 40:20 51:3,19	9:15 38:24 154:17	166:24 174:17	86:12,13,19,20
136:22 148:3	51:21 59:2 67:25	manic 198:17	189:11 191:10	106:20,25 107:6
151:17,18 153:18	68:3,12,13,15	manuscript 76:2	201:5,19	107:11 157:22,23
159:11 164:21	86:15 107:15	90:13 93:5 112:2	meaning 88:6	158:1 168:17
177:20,21 179:17	135:8 156:3 162:3	199:23 200:4	means 46:25 83:24	170:19 171:9,21
181:25 184:25	164:15 171:11,12	map 41:17 43:6	84:18 115:23	170:17171.7,21
193:6 196:12	186:22 188:6	67:2	124:3 125:4 127:8	172:5,10,13,21,22
197:2,10 199:20	maintained 137:9	mapping 72:19	139:4 156:1	175:3,11 174.6
205:13	maintaining	March 119:10	177:10	176:17,19,20
looked 21:12 63:6	117:13	mark 83:1,19,22	meant 112:11	177:3,7,11,11
63:13 80:10 82:22	major 33:4 50:7	85:18,21,23	169:24	178:1,9,10,23,24
105:19 112:2	91:10 102:21	120:11 200:7,9	mechanical 65:1	179:16 181:1,10
159:20 161:3	majority 116:10	marked 84:1 87:1	meeting 90:17 93:4	181:24 182:15,17
199:24	129:16	<b>Marriott</b> 33:9,15	member 98:25	182:20 185:21
looking 2:23 3:1	make-up 53:5 58:7	33:24	members 7:11	187:10 188:3,7,10
15:5 16:24 32:8	70:18 102:22	MARTIN 1:3,9,11	14:23 75:3 96:18	192:23
52:1,9 62:2 73:24	179:20 190:11	1:14,17,20 15:17	mention 19:2 148:2	messages 29:7,12
76:22 79:7 80:19	193:24 194:3	15:21,23 29:16,19	151:4	29:17 30:9,9
86:22 99:8,17	make-ups 194:13	61:5,7,12,16,22	mentioned 10:12	42:11 46:6 66:14
100:15 132:19	making 12:8 18:20	61:24 99:11,20	21:2 117:16	73:20 75:6 83:5
140:24 145:7	35:7 39:2 99:18	103:13,16 104:3,5	118:23 159:11	87:23 100:14
146:6 155:18	124:6,11 197:3	104:11 126:12,15	mentions 108:18	162:13 170:23
171:23 175:20	manage 4:23 8:5	131:17,25 132:3,7	menus 79:10	171:5,23 172:7,8
180:15	34:25 130:22	132:11 174:24	merged 34:11	174:12 179:2,6,20
looks 14:24 21:11	managed 4:16 14:3	175:2,11,15	Merton 4:2 6:25	182:11 183:2,4,5
24:23 27:8 41:1	187:23	180:13,18,25	12:22 13:2,3,6,8	187:5,9,17,19
51:9 117:2 182:3	management 3:10	181:6,9,12 197:6	13:24,25 34:6	Met 64:24
182:8 186:2	4:3,15 5:16 16:14	201:4,8,12,18,21	35:17 37:8,11	MET00013830
lot 13:22 40:9	37:23,25 189:10	201:25 202:2,5,9	40:2,10,14,19	47:25
72:13 185:4 186:3	189:13 196:21	204:14,19 205:1,5	88:13,16,18 89:9	<b>MET0007766</b> 2:19
lots 114:2,2,4	manager 2:24 3:8	205:9,14,24 206:3	89:21 91:12,13	method 86:23
196:16 203:14	3:18,19 4:7,8,9	206:14	93:10 94:8,12,15	134:18
low 128:5	5:6 6:1,1,5,20,21	master 197:14	94:18 101:25	methods 20:13
low-rise 147:10	8:12,25 9:3,3,4,10	materials 21:24	191:10	113:11 135:24
lower 76:11 120:22	9:14,15 10:20	matter 153:25	message 53:10 58:4	165:7
181:25 198:25	33:7 66:6,7 87:14	191:17 201:12	58:16 59:14,17	metres 45:1,1
<b>lulled</b> 184:9	87:18 90:21 145:3	<b>Max</b> 90:19	60:10,12,13,17	Metropolitan
lunch 103:11 104:7	145:12,21 189:16	mean 9:22 22:10	66:19 74:3,3,7,15	102:2
132:19	193:10,12 194:6	24:2 31:5 38:23	75:23 76:14,17	<b>Meyrick</b> 134:4,24
	manager's 35:5	41:15 51:5 53:20	77:3,10,20 78:10	135:15
<u> </u>	managers 4:17,25	65:7 72:23 74:2	78:16,22 80:14	<b>middle</b> 64:18
<b>M2FH</b> 162:1,4	5:1 6:10,12 7:15	83:1,23 84:17	82:2,4,6,10,17	115:13
164:12	68:24 98:25 145:5	100:12 124:9	83:7 84:1,18,22	Mids 63:17,25
<b>M2FN</b> 162:8	192:3	149:2 150:4,6	84:23 85:5,9,16	midstream 174:25
magic 44:22,24	managing 6:21	154:1,24 161:13	85:25 86:2,5,5,7,8	<b>Mike</b> 87:13
L	•	•	•	•

				<del></del>
Millett 1:6,7,21,23	mobilisation 49:23	132:3,7,11 174:24	49:4 75:13 82:22	Nicola 2:17
15:24 29:20 60:25	111:1	175:2,11,15	95:4 101:13	<b>night</b> 3:21 4:8 5:14
61:6,25 62:1	mobilisations 39:1	180:13,18,25	114:15 117:21	12:11,20,21 14:13
99:12,14,16,22	mobilise 35:24	181:6,9,12 197:6	128:25 129:5	14:24 15:3 20:20
103:8 104:1,5,8	40:25 45:16,20	201:4,8,12,18,21	154:22	22:11 35:15 37:7
104:12 126:5,14	46:1,1 51:17	201:25 202:2,5,9	necessary 189:25	37:17,24 38:4
126:17 131:15,18	63:21 65:4 118:13	204:14,19 205:1,5	190:3	50:22 58:3 62:18
132:1,7,9,13	118:17,19 143:25	205:9,14,24 206:3	need 2:9 18:13 25:6	62:19 63:8,15
174:22,25 175:10	150:18,20 157:5	206:14	26:7,8 35:16,24	64:23 65:22 78:6
175:15,16 181:13	202:21	morning 1:3,7,11	36:2 37:4 40:12	88:25 90:2 93:17
181:14 197:9	mobilised 42:14	1:13,23,24 40:7	40:24 43:12 45:18	93:24 96:14 98:24
201:4,6,9,16,20	71:3	116:16 118:23	46:18 63:20 64:18	111:21 112:14,19
202:3,4,8,10	mobilising 4:23	MoU 63:16	65:10 88:22 89:2	113:19 143:24
204:12 205:9,12	37:12 40:16,22,23	mouths 128:7	89:5 92:3 99:11	144:22,24,25
205:16 206:2,8	41:4 46:22 47:8	move 21:4,8 40:9	100:24 102:2	161:23 162:7,24
million 131:3	48:8 67:22 76:6	40:10 138:13	109:23 117:21	164:5,6,14 167:9
mind 1:17 183:17	79:14 106:23	139:14 162:21	118:12,13 120:10	176:17 181:16
199:16 200:7,11	121:15 133:16	moved 3:15 125:24	129:5 130:8,9	189:7,10,15
minimum 7:1,9,11	135:3 141:23	moves 88:22 144:1	147:5,5 157:22	191:23,24 195:12
7:11	145:20 153:24	moving 17:17	164:14 180:5	197:12
minute 27:8 104:25	154:4 155:10	18:10 21:24 23:9	needed 13:11 18:25	nights 5:23
108:20 152:20	160:5 189:19	25:16 52:15	25:10 27:18 34:22	nine-week 71:22
192:4	190:7 192:25	127:25	36:4 38:5 44:4	Nodded 59:23
minutes 50:13,17	194:20	multiple 33:8	64:14 91:23 93:18	70:23
70:13 103:17	<b>mobility</b> 109:1,5	161:18 202:14	110:25 111:1	noise 195:2 198:8
126:15,18 129:18	model 7:1 21:22		144:1 152:20	noises 146:17
185:21 191:13,15	moment 20:23,23	N	154:21 194:13	<b>Noisy</b> 202:19
194:10,17,24	60:24 61:3 85:23	name 2:16 14:9	needing 100:10	nominated 161:7
201:1,19,23,24,25	89:17 126:3	39:18 47:5 54:16	needs 36:25	161:10
202:7,15	131:16,18 132:16	54:23 60:22	negative 99:23	nominates 161:14
missed 85:20	139:24 143:20	172:22 177:1	negatives 99:12	non-operational
missing 78:9	145:7 148:19	names 14:10 15:1	neighbour 117:16	9:14
misunderstanding	151:3 174:23	184:4	neighbouring 63:9	norm 156:13
73:2	204:13	Narrative 57:6	105:17	185:21
mixture 7:2	monitor 36:15,18	national 21:21	network 135:5,7	normal 31:12 35:18
mobile 53:24 54:17	monitoring 74:5	22:22,24 107:25	never 29:6 55:6	81:24 94:2,2
55:4 59:13 86:24	month 37:15	114:5 121:2 137:6	109:15 150:1,6,8	111:21 114:11,12
87:3 109:18,21	<b>MOORE-BICK</b>	137:11 148:15	154:1 155:6	152:12 165:19
132:24 133:1,19	1:3,9,11,14,17,20	nationally 20:12	188:23 189:3	166:1 185:15,18
133:22 134:1,5,12	15:17,21,23 29:16	natural 104:9	new 19:3 20:6,9,15	191:24 192:1
134:25 135:5,7,15	29:19 61:5,7,12	near 13:12 151:21	23:3,12 71:14	normally 2:22 7:4
135:15 166:6	61:16,22,24 99:11	182:19	170:24 178:14	8:10 30:8 44:16
167:14 173:25	99:20 103:13,16	nearer 49:11	news 94:2,17,17,21	44:17 71:5 74:11
195:7,8,9,13,14	104:3,5,11 126:12	nearest 45:13,15	95:4,5 96:16	94:16 95:10
195:16 204:6	126:15 131:17,25	necessarily 35:22	<b>NFSG</b> 118:18	122:10 128:13
	,			
	1		ı	ı

				1490 223
137:2,16 139:2	154:11 155:24	occupier 117:17	125:22 126:23	103:3,8 106:5,19
145:8,10 174:19	159:23 162:2	occupying 38:2	144:7 145:22	108:11 109:22
188:22 192:4	165:4,18,24 166:4	occurring 153:5	150:25,25 165:16	113:8 116:4,14
Norman 6:6 37:21	166:10,12 168:5	occurs 92:18	167:2 190:23	118:2,5 119:19
38:21 95:17	187:7 194:5,13	137:15	195:15,18 202:20	121:5 122:25
134:19 163:13	numbers 7:9,11	October 2:19	203:21	123:7,14 126:2,14
196:18	33:18 43:13 50:23	offer 34:23,24 44:7	officers' 80:8	133:11 140:24
norms 191:1	51:5,10,11,12,22	64:17 65:2	oh 9:7 49:16 52:1	141:8 142:12
north 49:1 58:21	52:13,21 108:12		77:7,9 79:17 97:2	144:15 145:24
58:25 63:7,11,16	114:6 133:13	<b>offering</b> 115:16 183:16	110:7 149:24	147:13 148:1
63:24 69:8 101:10	135:3 151:6	offhand 65:6	162:24 192:7	149:24 150:3,9
105:19 106:3	numerous 9:11		197:25 198:7	153:12 154:9
		office 5:18,20		
112:22 156:15	10:10 71:23	office-based 7:22	205:14	155:14,17 156:24
northern 162:15	0	officer 20:11 37:23	okay 2:11,14 3:3,4	157:8 158:4,7,23
note 200:4	o'clock 40:6 104:8	38:1,20,23 39:5,6	4:16 5:16,19 7:9	159:5 160:4,12
notes 90:7,22 93:5	126:10 163:15,17	39:8,9,12,15,19	7:17,25 8:9,22 9:1	161:6 167:13
205:13	174:4 204:23	45:4 51:16 57:1	9:7 10:13,17 11:9	168:12,23 170:14
notice 36:7 90:3	205:1 206:15	66:25 67:10 71:1	13:1,14 14:22	170:14 171:18,18
126:11	<b>objective</b> 96:16	76:18 77:5 87:17	15:8 16:5,9,11,21	171:22 172:20
noticed 55:23 73:8	130:16	96:25 106:6,7,8	18:3 19:17 20:3	174:5,22 183:7,16
73:11	obtain 26:22 151:7	107:3,17 110:19	20:19 23:7 26:13	186:16 188:14,18
notification 55:19	154:17	115:21 116:7	28:5 31:14 32:12	188:24 189:5
notifications	obtainable 152:23	121:16 122:14	32:15,16 34:8,15	190:24 191:9,20
196:22		123:10 127:5	36:1 38:16 39:13	192:7,11 193:21
notified 192:3,5,6	obtained 153:6	130:17 131:5	39:24 40:8 41:25	194:25 196:6,11
193:12	obviously 28:18	134:21 136:5,6	42:20 43:23 44:10	197:5,10,14,23
notify 38:5	51:17 71:2,22	139:12,23 143:12	45:3,8,14,21 46:3	198:23 199:9,17
notifying 67:9	72:4 75:2 82:2	145:15,17 146:2	46:20 47:12,18	199:22 203:9,13
150:25	94:25 100:5	148:16 149:8	49:6,15 50:9	204:18 205:1
November 11:15	111:12 114:25	161:10 165:3,19	51:22 52:1,9	old 160:5 162:5
nowadays 109:18	115:3 125:23	166:21,23,25	53:11 54:22 55:9	<b>Oliff</b> 96:24 134:4
<b>number</b> 5:6 11:8	137:20 152:24	167:6 187:1	55:21 56:22 57:4	134:11 135:15
22:6 33:8 43:11	167:3 191:10	188:15,17,18	58:12 59:2,4,24	161:24 163:4,6,14
43:11 46:17 48:23	194:3 202:16	190:10 192:18	60:1,9,25 61:11	167:11,16 174:3
48:25 50:21 51:1	205:22	195:5,19 197:21	64:3 65:14 66:13	Oliff's 163:22
51:13,16 54:24	occasion 25:10	200:19	68:7,23 69:4 71:5	Olympics 13:12
56:18 62:13,15	26:20 40:5 103:2	officer's 57:9 72:2	72:3 75:23 77:12	<b>OM</b> 6:4,6 7:3 8:18
64:6 72:18,20	131:14 187:22	74:24	79:5,11,19 81:1	36:25 37:19,20,20
96:7 102:1,5	194:11	officers 11:6 17:25	82:2 84:3,10 85:3	38:13,21 39:10,20
105:25 106:3	occasionally 8:13	18:12 35:1 41:20	85:20 87:20 89:1	134:19 146:3
108:14 110:3,6,10	8:14,14	46:13,25 54:16	91:2,6 92:6,22	163:13 196:18
110:11 118:11	occasions 72:8	55:12 59:10,18	93:7 94:6 96:10	<b>OMs</b> 6:8,11,13 7:20
133:22 135:20	86:22 111:16	66:2 67:22 69:2	97:3,11,14 98:4	8:3,4
137:19 143:25	occupant 21:8	77:19 94:25	98:16 100:25	on-call 4:5 5:24 6:2
152:2,24,25	occupants' 32:25	100:21 119:5,17	101:5,9,20 102:19	189:10 191:24

once 45:9,17 83:21	120:20 123:10,23	original 49:21,22	119:21 136:21,21	paragraphs 15:16
84:1,24 116:1	124:5,17 125:9	72:14 181:9	137:14 141:3,12	15:25 136:25
138:18 149:17	134:16 138:19	originally 72:4	148:5 151:22	141:17 156:12
153:7,8 154:2	139:16 140:2,12	181:1	153:18 156:8	part 13:9 21:16
159:7 161:13	143:15 157:12,23	<b>ORR</b> 196:11	160:13,14,23	23:23 70:15 71:14
176:13 182:22	158:1 161:2	203:25	168:7 171:23	109:5 119:14
190:25 191:17	162:18 163:23	ORT 76:17,21	177:20,22 181:18	123:10,25 136:19
one-hour 200:9	164:5 167:21,24	ought 180:22	189:9 190:17,21	151:11 164:9,10
ones 30:20 33:6	168:19 169:7,16	out' 120:2	190:23 191:21,22	198:14 199:12
60:20 135:24	169:18,25 170:5,8	outcome 188:20	192:16 193:8	participants
198:24 199:1	170:12,20 172:23	outcomes 142:21	194:10,23 195:1	205:17
ongoing 41:11	174:18 176:17	outgoing 86:13	195:19 196:12	particular 18:4
op 57:17 60:17	184:2 186:23	outline 4:14 11:25	199:25 200:3	34:20 48:23 51:14
open 80:16,21	188:6 197:25	outside 21:2 99:9	202:10	112:13 164:8
128:4	198:15	110:8 124:10,16	page' 191:25	187:9 190:11
opens 81:11	operator's 60:22	overall 4:2 92:4	paged 76:18,20	199:10
operating 13:1 40:4	operators 5:2,3,4,8	144:10,12,14	77:5 99:5 189:20	particularly 26:1
85:14 167:14	5:8 6:16,17 7:3	overhear 97:6	191:17,19 193:12	26:23 206:10
180:9	17:5,6 18:7,21	overheard 111:16	193:24 194:17	partnership 63:19
<b>operation</b> 4:1 9:13	20:7 22:13 23:1	overhearing 144:8	pager 189:23	parts 137:16
operational 19:15	26:2 36:17 38:14	overnight 205:3,13	192:12,23 193:23	party 97:20 98:4
19:16 92:20 94:19	60:12 71:9 73:13	overrun 96:4	pages 60:18,25	pass 26:14 28:12,14
104:17 191:6	73:21 94:20	112:23	197:20	30:20 63:6,9
193:7 204:2	114:21 124:23	oversight 34:24	paging 194:5,6	78:17 80:17,23,24
operations 3:8,11	128:13 159:15	overtime 38:11,15	panic 71:18 96:18	83:7 105:6 106:20
3:18,19 4:9,17,25	169:20 183:5	overview 8:1 46:7	124:13,15 130:5	106:25 111:10
5:5,25 6:1,5,10,12	189:17	88:21 136:14	paper 158:23	112:17 130:8
6:20,21 7:14 8:25	opportunity 205:20	144:5 145:22	paper/map/exper	134:19 151:13,24
9:2,3,4,10 10:20	205:21	overwhelming	91:25	155:3,22 156:10
33:7 35:5,14,18	opposed 20:8 40:19	137:18	para 137:14	159:2 161:10
90:21 98:24 145:2	43:23 73:4,15		paragraph 3:7	162:20,21 167:4
145:12,21 159:3	88:14	P	16:24,25 19:3,25	167:24 179:24
192:2 193:10	ops 8:12	<b>P</b> 91:11	20:25 21:12,17	186:24 187:22
operator 3:15	<b>options</b> 115:17	package 19:5 23:3	25:5 26:1,14 27:8	passage 141:16
23:20 42:16 44:2	120:18	packages 10:1	29:15,20 31:17	passages 2:25
44:20 49:22 54:9	orally 106:25	pad 67:4 158:18	34:3 96:13 115:14	passed 26:21,25
54:20 60:14 63:5	order 40:10 70:18	page 12:16 15:9,15	116:19,21 119:1,2	29:22 30:13 31:18
63:8 71:7 74:13	71:5 95:21 143:10	15:15 16:24 34:2	119:21,25 136:22	84:1,18 86:4 87:2
75:2,12 76:8,13	ordered 195:20	53:2 54:8,16 55:8	136:23 137:25	110:23,24 141:21
82:7,18 83:6,19	ordinarily 145:2	55:22,25 57:5	139:20 140:15	170:13 174:21
85:1,2,6,9 87:8	154:16 194:9	62:6 73:24 77:14	148:5,9 150:1	176:10,23 177:5
102:15 107:10	<b>ordinary</b> 7:5 150:5	79:8 84:5 91:7	151:18 155:18	180:11
108:4 109:9,10	Organisational	92:12 93:19 96:12	156:7 164:22	passing 26:19
110:5,24 113:12	136:13	104:19,19 112:3,4	166:19 184:25	86:25 102:18
117:13 118:7	orientated 144:4	115:12,13 119:1,3	187:4 189:9,22	130:3 151:25
L	1	1	1	1

165:5 179:19	154:11 155:24	place 22:5 24:1	<b>policy</b> 19:11,12,14	31:21 92:21
patchy 22:18	168:15 173:4	35:18 91:23 98:7	19:18,19,20 20:1	114:11,12 135:21
Pause 104:2 132:2	pertinent 181:7	116:23 117:2	20:10 31:25	149:12,16,17
132:10 175:12	Pete 76:16 78:20	121:14 173:23	108:17,18 109:3	150:1,11 153:25
205:8	80:15 82:10,13	placed 143:4	116:15 118:22,23	156:4,5 166:2
pausing 17:21	91:21 98:2 179:7	plan 46:16,17	119:7,9,9,21	189:1 203:10
58:19	193:4 196:2,3,7	190:22 204:2	120:16 123:22	PRC 93:2,6
<b>PD</b> 77:15,23,25	Peter 14:19,20 78:4	planning 31:11	124:22 125:8,11	PRCs 92:24
78:3 178:15,18	78:5,10 82:5	201:10	132:17 137:12	Pre-determined
180:16	phase 19:7 21:5	platform 47:2,3,4	138:6 142:6,23	70:8
<b>PDA</b> 43:25 44:7,7	<b>phone</b> 39:14 40:12	47:16	143:1,5 145:8	pre-empted 167:10
45:12,12 70:8,15	86:24 87:3 106:9	play 33:12 67:22	148:3,6,15,20	precise 183:1
72:5 150:21	109:15,20,21	147:17 161:13	149:5,11 150:7	precisely 129:9
pedal 81:6,8,10	115:21 131:1	please 61:18 92:11	151:17,18,19	197:2
85:14	134:12 165:2,11	103:15,18,21,22	156:4 159:19	predetermined
people 5:2,4 11:2,3	166:10 167:8	104:17 131:21	161:4,4 164:20,21	43:25 45:17
17:9,11 26:4,20	187:24 189:23	132:3 153:18	164:25 166:2	predicated 137:7
38:7 64:8 74:4	190:9 195:14	164:22 175:3,6	183:11 184:24,25	prefix 169:23
78:12 92:18 95:16	199:2 200:15	181:17 191:11	185:6,7 186:2,6,7	<b>prefixed</b> 78:7 79:16
108:13,15 114:18	<b>phones</b> 109:18	205:2 206:15	186:9 189:1	80:10,20
124:14 130:21	165:4,24	Plus 53:20	203:10	<b>premise</b> 18:16 19:9
152:25 153:11	phoning 167:3	<b>pm</b> 76:11 103:23	pops 42:3	116:12 117:17
155:2 168:15,22	phrase 129:6	103:25 132:4,6	portable 66:2 68:2	124:2 139:2,17
168:23 169:4	physical 106:12	175:7,9 206:16	68:24 94:13	203:6
173:3 182:10	109:2	<b>point</b> 7:14 10:18	<b>position</b> 3:21 10:18	premises 15:13
196:17 203:14	physically 34:5	20:24 53:4 64:10	21:9 34:17 36:15	115:23 117:24
performed 83:24	36:14 98:4	77:3 83:1 140:9	39:11 41:4 58:3	118:9 120:7,9
performing 192:25	pick 39:14 61:1	150:4 154:23,24	60:3 100:6 184:5	121:3,10 122:21
period 5:12 11:1	79:15 83:19	159:2 160:25	184:10	127:3 129:8,9
87:1 101:18 114:4	119:24 166:15	161:9,15,21 163:6	<b>positions</b> 40:15,16	137:8
200:15	167:6 169:7	163:20,22 164:3	40:22,23	prescriptive 148:17
person 36:6 42:15	182:20	164:12 169:12	possible 127:16	present 27:20 31:4
42:16 74:22 83:17	picked 83:25	170:23,24 172:6	130:24 159:4	press 45:19 55:18
85:15 109:15	114:15,18	173:22,22 177:9	173:25	81:3,6
118:8 130:12	picking 165:17	180:5 200:6	possibly 99:3	pressel 81:5
161:7,20	picks 169:9	201:18 202:2,6	post-Lakanal	pressing 81:10
personal 12:10	picture 41:1 88:1	points 141:18	31:21	85:14
118:14 134:11	95:11,19 111:3	160:23 205:25	potential 109:16	pressure 35:4
149:20 195:7,11	123:19 144:12,14	police 64:24 90:4	PowerPoint 19:4	presume 105:16
personally 33:19	180:13 199:18,20	102:2 112:5,14,16	PR 50:7	pretty 124:3 194:23
personnel 37:17	piece 26:11 68:2,8	112:17	PR6 55:19	preventing 21:4
87:22	68:10 77:10 94:23	policies 4:4,19 7:24	practical 148:23	109:6
persons 50:8 84:15	158:23	12:8 20:5 32:14	practice 26:24	previous 176:1
109:1 116:25	pieces 152:9	116:17 141:1	29:21,25 30:12,14	previously 142:1
117:8,10,14 151:6	pin 200:2	148:4 164:20	30:18,20 31:6,17	143:3 147:15,18
			l	

primarily 38:24	110:4 141:24	protect' 21:5	punctuation	138:6 139:20
<b>principal</b> 3:16 4:9	142:14 144:17	protecting 115:16	120:13	141:4 143:11
6:1 83:4	145:13,16 147:1	protection 120:18	<b>Purely</b> 163:3	145:13 147:14
principle 137:18	152:17 157:15	protective 25:15	purpose 94:20	163:9 172:9
144:17 161:19	158:22 168:24	provide 24:9 25:12	158:8	182:25 183:8
principles 20:16	170:15 179:24	26:15 30:23 89:2	purpose-built	184:12 197:9
108:2 115:15,19	processing 179:20	92:4 95:11 102:1	140:18	198:25 199:3
116:1 119:15,16	194:2	111:12,14 120:21	push 74:24	questioning 20:18
120:17 126:24	produced 70:2	121:19,21 126:25	pushing 31:16	23:15 119:17
137:7,23 141:11	136:14	152:21 189:13	put 4:22 17:18 18:9	126:13 151:12
141:15 142:8,10	produces 168:25	192:20 202:21	18:17 43:13,15	152:22 202:3
142:13	production 12:2	provided 20:17	44:3,4 49:23	questions 1:22 2:3
<b>prior</b> 9:17 10:4	programmed 165:4	119:17 137:2	56:19 77:25 82:5	2:6 16:25 21:19
22:25 33:21 97:8	165:25	138:3 203:7	83:17 91:23 94:1	22:9 23:20 26:15
99:3,4,4 149:25	progress 26:22	provider 56:2,7	107:4 111:9	62:3,9 73:19 99:8
163:21 195:20	27:1,3 29:8,23	provides 5:10	122:11 124:19	108:2,5 113:16
prioritise 167:5	31:19 83:13,15,20	120:17	128:3 136:10,23	115:3 126:6
194:14,20 196:20	155:21 157:2,4,9	providing 23:16	138:13 142:22	127:17,24 129:22
prioritised 165:17	157:11 187:6	24:6 107:5 108:5	143:13 147:3	129:23 141:11
166:25	progressed 50:5	115:16 117:14	149:13 153:23	152:18 153:9
<b>priority</b> 30:9 165:3	92:5	121:17 127:20	154:2 155:9	160:21 161:2
166:20,22	progressing 29:13	143:20 144:13	167:23 170:6	181:15 185:5
pro-active 22:4	130:8 147:23	145:18 146:22	184:4	192:22 205:18,19
proactive 23:25	167:18	157:17	<b>put'</b> 17:2,19 137:1	206:4,7,20
24:3,5 25:15	<b>project</b> 13:9,10	<b>public</b> 75:3 141:25	137:6	queue 101:18 115:4
probably 39:7	prolonged 114:4	142:15	<b>putting</b> 28:19 147:4	quick 134:20 180:2
47:21 63:12,12	199:2 200:15	published 16:15	200:21	quicker 155:10
84:11 103:16	promotion 10:23	<b>pulls</b> 45:11		quickly 17:8,9
151:10 175:1	<b>prompt</b> 23:20	pump 28:9 29:2	Q	101:14 115:8
185:4 189:6	124:17	30:22 58:14,16	quadruplicate	159:3
190:18 192:20	<b>prompts</b> 121:14	59:4 76:24 82:13	153:20	quite 13:22 14:4
204:13	122:12	82:14,19,24 83:4	qualification 121:7	35:16 44:15
<b>probe</b> 116:7	pronouncing	83:8 151:23 156:9	qualify 139:20	129:13 130:20
<b>problem</b> 18:4 90:2	160:16	156:17 170:4,9,21	quality 31:22 32:7	138:11 179:23
90:3 93:24 113:10	<b>proper</b> 194:19	171:25 172:12	131:6	183:13 185:4
problems 24:24	properties 113:2	173:15,16 176:11	quarter 131:2	186:3 199:6
29:4,5 65:21	property 137:4	176:24 177:6	question 17:15,25	201:15,20,21
189:20	138:5 148:14	183:1 192:1,2	18:15 19:21 36:4	<b>quote</b> 120:11
procedure 76:24	153:10 155:25	pumping 33:12	39:25 44:15 69:22	
192:1	168:16 173:4	71:4 190:6	73:14 83:1 94:6	<u>R</u>
procedures 4:5,19	<b>protect</b> 21:25 22:3	<b>pumps</b> 57:24 60:13	99:13 101:1,4	radio 29:6 58:2,4
7:24 12:8 125:25	23:9 120:23 126:8	70:11,19 102:22	104:12 108:3	58:19 59:2,4,7,8
proceed 55:15	126:24 127:14,20	179:3 190:13,13	111:25 119:11	59:10,13,15,18,20
process 102:16	130:9 139:5	192:8 193:19	121:6 123:8,9	60:12,14 66:15,19
105:3 108:19	200:24	194:7,12,18	136:4,10 137:24	67:14,25 68:3,4

68:11,12,13,17,19	rank 39:18 66:5,5	121:6 146:25	record 74:14 77:18	reflecting 174:12
68:20,21 69:2,5,7	rapid 194:2	158:25 163:3	77:19 106:21,22	reformulates 181:9
69:16 74:11,12,18	rapidly 140:3	177:15 181:4	106:23 118:16	regard 4:21 27:12
74:21,23 75:6,6	rare 124:3	190:4 203:18	171:21 202:24	31:24 107:23
75:11,17,21,23	rarely 17:11 186:11	reason 173:24	recorded 66:15	125:12 130:14,15
76:8 77:20 78:5,8	rational 130:16	195:16	67:18,20,21 69:10	138:5 144:3 146:9
79:15 80:25 81:10	re-assess 142:25	reasons 64:13	69:18 76:1 86:15	169:4 170:6
81:11,17 82:17,18	re-assessed 22:2	134:13	107:7 132:20	177:16 184:3
82:23 83:5,6 85:1	23:11	REASSESS 128:9	133:23 134:1	187:20 203:22
85:2,6,9 86:3,16	re-assessing 125:15	reassesses 161:1	135:25 136:7	regarding 29:17
86:25 87:7 105:11	129:21	reassurance 121:21	141:22 171:16	143:7 162:20
110:24 135:5,9,18	re-assessment 22:3	128:21,22 129:12	172:14 182:10	187:23 191:25
135:19 136:1,6,7	22:17,21,23 23:2	129:13 152:20	recording 136:5	regardless 152:22
151:24 156:3,3,10	23:5,12,14 24:11	183:12,17 184:3	164:25	regards 143:2
156:13,14 157:7	25:5 125:13	184:19	recordings 172:24	registered 73:7,7
157:22,23 158:1	130:18 143:1	reassure 128:9,14	records 74:13	regular 115:23
159:8 162:3,5,13	184:18	129:4 183:13,22	redirecting 112:21	regularly 26:22
162:18 163:23,25	re-evaluate 142:17	reassured 25:12	redraft 16:14	161:1
164:5,15 166:6	re-evaluating	reassuring 128:12	ref 56:9 62:10 64:5	Reinforc[e 54:13
167:21,24 168:19	146:13	146:12 184:20	refer 24:2 40:22	reinforced 20:16
169:7,13,14,15,18	re-evaluation	recall 65:6,21	88:19 113:24	reinforcements
169:25 170:5,8,12	141:24 142:14	90:24 93:16	121:1 202:11	53:23
170:19,22 171:5	144:17 145:13,16	112:16,18,24	reference 2:19	reiterated 119:15
170:17,22 171.3	147:1	193:15	11:11 23:19 43:13	related 61:13
172:21 173:21	reach 17:7 32:25	receive 9:1 11:2	56:2,11,12,16,18	relating 29:14 63:2
174:12 175:21	187:23	23:1 27:12 30:8	56:18 62:11,12	63:3 131:20
174.12 173.21	reached 101:12	31:1,13 51:1 63:1	64:10,24 92:9	155:23 187:6
178:2,24 179:2,4	193:25 194:18	75:2,6 104:22	93:4 115:14 119:7	relation 8:3 10:3
179:6,19,23 183:2	201:18	135:13 158:19,20	132:16 136:22	26:23 104:22
186:21,22,23	reaching 188:1	158:24	137:11 140:16	105:2 108:25
187:2 188:6,6	200:21	received 11:3 32:10	151:1 152:1	122:6 166:2
195:11,17,21,24	read 15:17,18	46:10 50:21 52:24	153:13 156:25	188:25
204:7,9	145:16 149:11	57:2 63:3 85:25	160:3 173:14	Relativity 104:20
radioed 58:10,13	reads 186:6,7	86:8,14,21 120:2	197:15 200:8	136:22
178:9	ready 104:3	133:4 162:3 177:7	references 92:24	relay 152:7
radios 65:25 66:2,8	real 14:14,15 21:7	182:15 191:25	referred 29:25	Relaying 118:14
67:16 69:12,14,14	196:5,15,20	receives 78:10	116:16 120:15	relays 169:12
69:17 90:4 195:15	197:21 202:11	receiving 107:17	referring 12:7	relentlessly 100:22
raise 36:3,6,12	realisation 30:3	113:3 115:1 134:5	18:11 71:2 91:16	relevant 2:25 95:5
raising 98:2	realise 27:18 179:1	155:1 156:20	93:13 143:23	121:19 152:2
ran 11:8	really 2:1 12:3	173:25 174:6	148:19,21 159:24	154:3 159:2
rang 195:5 196:4	13:13 19:21 29:11	179:19	196:24	161:11
198:10	30:22 44:18 71:19	recommendations	refers 124:12	reliable 130:4
range 64:12,12,20	73:12 101:14	12:8	reflected 16:21	relied 17:19
64:23	112:11 115:8	reconnect 26:12	174:7	Relief 54:14
UT.23	112.11 113.0	1 CCOHHCCt 20.12	1/7./	IXCHCI JT. 17

				1490 220
reliefs 53:12	77:20 78:1,25	resilience 37:15	<b>RIF</b> 159:11 160:1,2	119:24 120:25
relies 117:2	79:6,11,13,16,22	resilient 13:15	161:2 164:18	122:18,23 125:19
relocate 37:14	80:16,20,21 82:20	resolve 37:5 185:11	RIFs 20:19	126:17,18,20
relocated 13:2	82:23 83:13,16	185:16 186:12	right 1:6,18 2:20	128:19 129:7
170:9	84:7,12 110:25	resource 37:23,25	4:24 5:19,23 6:18	132:3,9,11,24
relocation 13:3	151:13 167:23	196:21	9:16 10:2,17 11:9	133:15 135:14
reluctant 153:4	168:9,13,14,25	resources 13:23	11:24 13:5 17:23	136:3,9 138:16
rely 107:7,9 116:5	169:3,6,22 170:5	35:23,24 45:13	18:3,18 19:10	139:6,18 140:14
130:2	172:19 173:1	46:12 65:3,10	21:16 22:20 23:3	143:9 149:2,10,20
remain 25:21,23	174:14 176:2,6,7	80:13,22 92:3	23:22 25:2,13	149:24 150:2,3,9
26:6 96:16 120:7	176:14,25 177:22	121:20 141:23	26:13 27:5 28:5	151:3,15 155:5
121:9 122:15	178:11,14,15,16	143:25 150:18	28:17 30:6,12	156:6,22 158:14
134:21 137:17	179:11,13,14,15	151:14 156:18	31:3,9 32:1,12	158:20 160:7,13
138:23 140:6	180:7,16 182:2,3	157:7 194:4,21	33:2,16 34:1 35:9	160:16 161:18
172:17	188:11,12	202:21	35:16 36:24 37:3	166:5,8,11,18
remember 9:18	requests 79:15	respect 182:4	37:6 38:16,22	167:13 168:21
28:18 90:16 91:14	83:10,11,25	respond 4:6 152:19	39:17,23,24 41:12	169:9 170:1
91:19 98:1 112:9	173:17 179:18,21	189:23 192:23	41:18,25 42:4	171:16 172:12
112:12,13 148:14	require 30:25	responder 49:3	43:3 46:15,23	173:12,18 174:10
149:22 193:3	143:13	responding 35:3	47:2,7,10 48:7,11	174:11 175:13,25
196:1,8 197:3	required 35:6 65:4	195:18	49:15 50:11 51:4	176:12,15 177:8
remind 124:18,20	95:14 108:17	response 38:25,25	51:20 52:18 53:1	177:20 178:22
200:4	111:11 148:17	72:9,9 81:23	53:14 54:6 55:1	184:8,23 186:1,7
remote 56:24	154:15	104:17 193:8	55:21 56:20,22	186:14,25 188:24
remotely 47:14	requirements	responsibilities	57:4 58:7 59:12	189:21 190:16,24
80:4 85:6	137:10	192:17	60:1,6,16,23 61:7	191:14,16,20
repeat 2:7 21:19	requires 192:2	responsibility 4:3,6	61:14,22 62:17,25	192:7 193:1,5,17
22:8 50:20 60:12	requiring 123:9	116:22	65:12 68:5,11	194:7,16,19 196:2
60:14 77:6	rescue 17:18 18:9	responsible 6:15,22	69:1,20 72:13	197:7,25 198:9,13
repeats 179:25	21:10 27:2,13	144:20	73:2 74:6,8 75:15	198:23 200:14
rephrase 99:11	29:14,18,23 30:4	rest 7:8 38:13	75:20 76:10 78:15	201:1 203:9
rephrased 138:1	30:11 31:2,20	126:6	78:18 79:7 80:12	204:12 205:3,19
replicate 93:10,12	32:4,21,25 63:9	rests 116:22	80:18 81:25 82:16	right-hand 51:6
report 11:13,14,17	63:24 104:21	result 19:2,24	82:21 83:4 85:5	91:3
11:20 12:2,10,17	105:23 113:21	25:25 31:21 64:1	86:11,15 87:4,17	ring 35:1 44:13
16:2 24:23 28:19	115:17 120:18,23	98:12 142:1 143:3	88:1,6,10,24 89:2	101:17 105:6,8
28:24 48:19 92:9	126:8,24 130:10	144:18 205:18	89:15,25 93:15	106:5 109:12,15
104:18,18 146:18	rescued 17:1,9	resulted 30:12,14	94:6,11 98:4,14	109:23 110:1,2
193:8	25:20 147:12	resume 61:10	99:14 100:9,25	114:25 166:3
reported 50:8	185:23	204:23	102:7 103:22	167:12 192:23
116:25 117:8,11	rescues 17:14	review 21:22 93:21	104:3,11,15	195:19
117:15	rescuing 188:2	200:5	105:19 106:11,24	ringing 115:6,6
reports 27:25	residential 137:8	reviewed 116:18	107:2,20 108:9	rings 115:4
request 65:20 76:4	residents 96:19	141:25 142:15	110:7 114:17	rise 70:15 76:24
76:5,6 77:15,16	113:2 137:17	revised 119:11,14	117:5,18 119:19	120:2 137:8
	110.2 107.117		117.0,10117.17	120.2 107.0
1	I	I	I	I

risk 17:16,17 18:5	98:23 99:10	<b>round</b> 63:9	safety 121:18	68:3,12,13,15
18:9 21:7 141:1	100:13 101:10,24	route 18:2 28:16	124:24 125:4	86:15 135:9
141:25 142:15	102:10,18 103:4	124:25 125:5	127:21,23 137:9	154:14 156:3
184:13,16	104:22 106:8	127:2,6,9,10	140:17 184:10	162:3 164:15
risks 20:8 183:18	107:17 108:4	151:13 156:19,23	<b>SAI</b> 90:19	171:11,12 186:22
river 58:21,25	109:8,9 110:5,10	183:25 193:22	satisfied 85:15	188:6
156:15	110:15,18,19	196:25 204:5	saw 142:23 173:5	Scott 4:10,11
<b>RML</b> 196:21	111:8,11 112:17	routes 20:25 21:6	183:11	screen 2:20,21
role 3:12,17 4:13	113:15 114:5	123:23 124:7	saying 2:3 18:5	11:12 13:23 15:18
7:15,18 9:6 12:1	116:7 118:6 119:5	125:3 135:15	77:21 78:13 113:9	41:15,16,23,24
33:4,13 34:25	121:16 122:14	routine 37:12 40:2	121:8 138:12	42:25 43:6,6,6,8
36:11 38:2 95:1	123:10,23 124:5	40:13	139:16,24 147:3,4	47:10 54:10 57:9
147:17 160:8	124:23 125:9,21	<b>RT</b> 74:18	150:17 153:2	66:25 67:8 74:24
176:8 189:7	126:23 127:5	<b>RT4</b> 59:24 66:14	155:14 170:16	79:1,2,7,22 80:6,7
roles 7:18 9:9 12:3	128:1,5,13,24	67:16 69:7 77:16	171:5 181:4,5	80:15,19 81:6,13
34:10 38:1	129:25 130:17	77:21 78:7,17,22	183:14	85:14 90:14 92:10
roll 164:9,10	131:4 132:24	79:16 80:11,21	says 17:3,13 22:8	96:8 154:5 169:9
room 2:21 3:25 4:2	134:16 138:19	82:6,17 83:5,25	23:8,24 29:15,20	169:18
4:4,15,17,18,22	139:12,14,23	84:21 135:17	53:5 57:6 70:5	screens 2:23 41:6
5:2,3,4,5,8,8 6:16	140:2,12 143:12	156:14 168:14	71:2 73:23 82:3	67:1 80:8
6:17,21,22 7:3,16	143:15 144:6,10	169:24 170:1	85:18 93:8,19	search 32:21
7:20,21 12:4,5,20	144:19 145:15,17	171:14,24 172:8	96:24 104:20	second 3:7 52:5
12:21 13:1,7,7,8	145:22 146:2	172:11 173:3	112:4,6,15 117:7	92:25 93:19,19
13:17,18 14:13,22	147:16 149:14	177:1,12,24 178:7	120:6 121:12	96:13 132:8
15:2 23:1 24:12	153:21,22 154:1	178:16 179:11,13	126:21 127:19	153:16 196:24
24:17 25:2,17	155:15 157:23	180:7 182:2	136:25 137:13	seconded 11:7
26:1 27:14,19,22	159:1 161:14	rubric 136:23	141:18 148:10	secondhand 107:19
27:24 28:8 29:3	163:14 165:8	<b>run</b> 48:19 103:11	149:5 151:22	109:22
30:5 32:22 33:10	166:16 167:6	181:20 182:9,16	152:3 155:19	secondly 134:18
34:4,6,9 35:2	172:23 174:2,7,16	200:22	156:8 161:25	seconds 104:25
36:16,17 38:17	174:17 182:10	rung 167:11	165:1 172:11	108:20 179:12
39:25 40:20 45:3	183:5 185:3 187:1	rush 206:11	179:7,8 181:18	section 12:17 15:10
48:10 50:22 52:24	188:12 189:3,14		184:13 185:9	17:12 151:19
54:9,20 55:11	190:5,12 191:2,12	S	187:4 188:19	164:24 185:7
56:13,24,25 57:1	191:16 192:19,21	SAD 57:16 75:21	197:16 198:14	186:2
57:9 58:17 60:2	195:3 198:7,8	173:1 176:6,19	200:5	security 37:12 40:2
63:1,5,17 66:8,15	199:8 202:19,25	180:8 181:19	scale 33:17	184:15
66:20 69:7 71:9	rooms 11:7 21:21	safe 17:20 18:22	scene 24:8 28:13	see 2:23 5:16,19,23
73:2,13,21 74:13	26:12 63:14,18	21:10 22:1 23:10	53:24 54:17 55:5	7:4,9,13,17 8:2
74:22 75:2 79:25	101:2,9 102:4,5,7	127:2,6,11,13	131:9 135:22	9:7 10:9 13:14,23
80:1,2 83:21 86:9	102:25 104:13	137:16 147:3	159:3 171:3	15:9,12 16:15
86:12 87:7,8	rota 5:15 6:2	safeguards 107:21	202:14 204:2	17:11 19:1,17,24
89:17,21 90:8	189:14	safer 140:5	schematically	20:3 31:16 36:20
94:8,20 95:6,11	roughly 97:15	safest 120:7 121:9	48:11	39:4,13,19 42:6
97:9,13,14 98:9	199:15	122:10,15 138:7	scheme 59:2 67:25	43:21 47:19 48:11
L				

				1490 200
49:6 50:5,9 51:5	sees 80:14 180:5	182:14,22	severity 190:7,8	<b>showing</b> 73:10 98:2
51:22 52:1,5,20	self-evacuation	sentence 23:23	share 76:8 167:4	199:19
54:7,23 55:9,17	21:7	115:24 120:13	sharing 164:25	shown 104:17
57:11,11 59:9	self-explanatory	189:22	<b>Sharon</b> 57:21 58:2	140:25 141:12
60:7,16,16,24	53:16	separate 19:18,19	60:3 75:21 78:16	142:5 156:6
62:6,9 68:21 72:4	self-rescue 147:12	51:18 101:16	78:17,22 79:12,15	shut 42:15,16
76:16 77:7,14	seminars 11:8	151:25 156:11	79:24 80:9 81:17	side 14:9 51:6,10
79:17,17 80:9,12	send 35:24 45:15	serial 52:12	82:22 84:24 86:4	67:3 94:14
80:19 83:10 84:6	53:22 59:14,17	series 180:14	87:1 163:23,24	sign 53:17 54:16
86:6 87:5 88:21	82:3,12 83:5,9	service 3:14 63:6	164:2 169:8,9,19	74:25 81:21,21,22
88:24 90:19 91:23	89:5 107:6 156:17	64:8,25 76:4,5,6	170:19,20 171:1,9	162:5 185:22
91:24 92:24 95:20	157:22,22 158:1	77:15,16,20 78:1	171:19 172:10,11	signal 2:9
99:24 100:24	167:23 171:5,6	78:25 79:6,13,14	172:18 173:6,9,21	signature 91:3
102:12,19 103:3,8	178:22 179:6	79:16,22 80:16,20	175:20 176:8,16	significant 199:11
104:20 106:7,19	185:20	80:21 82:20 83:10	177:1 178:2,9,9	signs 146:18
110:7 115:9	sending 58:16	83:10,13,16,25	178:23 179:1,5,10	similar 26:15 153:9
118:20 123:21	77:20 82:2 112:20	84:7,12 86:7,19	180:9,21 182:8,9	181:17 200:12
125:17 126:6	173:6,15 179:21	104:21 107:11	182:12,15,19,22	Similarly 133:25
127:18 133:5	183:2 194:20	110:24 114:17	183:2	simple 2:4 19:21
135:11 136:23	sends 78:22 79:11	119:6,15 150:25	she'd 177:12	20:6
145:25 148:10	79:24 80:4 85:9	151:12 167:22	she'll 131:22	simplistic 171:7
149:24 151:22	178:8,10 180:21	168:9,13,14,25	shift 5:14 7:21 8:21	simply 117:23
152:10 153:13	senior 3:8,11,17,19	169:3,22 172:19	71:24 75:12	180:21
154:7 156:25	5:3,4,16,25 8:25	173:1,17 174:14	191:24	simultaneously
160:15,24 162:24	9:2,3,10 10:20	176:2,6,7,14,25	shift-based 8:5	167:20
164:2,7,11,17	33:7 35:1 46:25	177:22 178:11,14	shift-by-shift 34:11	single 33:19 94:15
167:13 168:1,4,7	66:2 67:10 69:2	178:15,16 179:11	shock 130:5	102:1 105:21
168:9 169:18	90:21 136:5,6	179:13,14,15,18	short 2:4 42:5	SIR 1:3,9,11,14,17
172:7,14,15,18,20	145:2,5 150:25	179:21 180:7,16	47:22 48:1,14,17	1:20 15:17,21,23
172:7,14,13,16,20	189:13 192:2	182:2,3 188:11,12	61:20 62:2 65:24	29:16,19 61:5,7
176:4,5,15,19,25	193:10,11 195:15	services 63:10,24	73:17 87:5 88:4	61:12,16,22,24
177:3 178:4,4,5	195:18	65:2,17 105:23	103:10,14,24	99:11,20 103:13
179:10 180:7	sense 184:15 199:6	113:21	132:5,18 168:6	103:16 104:3,5,11
181:21 183:7	201:21 205:23	servicing 65:22	169:1 172:20	126:12,15 131:17
185:5 192:7 193:9	sensible 201:18	session 199:13	174:11 175:2,8,19	131:25 132:3,7,11
197:20 200:3	202:2,6 205:24	set 48:11,18 116:20	179:24 187:15	174:24 175:2,11
203:13,25	sent 29:7 45:19	119:5 126:6	205:20	175:15 180:13,18
seeing 71:20 100:1	59:7 72:11 74:3	127:18 129:22	shorter 5:14 90:15	180:25 181:6,9,12
169:21 172:10	78:7,7,16 85:6	130:16 133:11	shortly 143:9	197:6 201:4,8,12
seeking 122:19,20	86:8 100:3 170:5	137:25 156:1	164:19	201:18,21,25
seen 76:4 93:5	173:10 174:12	161:4	show 42:8 45:13	202:2,5,9 204:14
98:25 136:12,18	176:13 177:2,4,12	set-up 37:17 40:1	53:23 89:4 90:12	204:19 205:1,5,9
136:19 139:11	170:13 177:2,4,12	seven 33:15 40:20	92:13 136:11,24	204.17 203.1,3,7
141:6 152:6	178:1 179:2 180:4	168:14 169:4	160:12 166:1	206:14
187:15	180:19 181:3	173:3	174:13,15 177:11	sit 34:5 35:13 36:16
107.15	100.17 101.3	113.3	1/1.13,13 1//.11	516 5 1.5 55.15 50.10

<u> </u>				1498 231
39:11 41:2	26:5 84:15 109:6	sorts 146:19	55:11 92:17 93:3	3:6 34:3 96:12
sits 148:9 151:18	115:23 118:1,2,10		94:21 95:6 96:5	
164:24	′ ′	sought 153:6 sound 198:11	96:18 98:21,25	100:19 115:10,12
	120:3,8 122:17,18		-	115:24 120:16
sitting 2:12 36:13	122:22 123:2,8,12	sounded 198:12	99:10,18 107:25	121:4 189:8
106:13 122:14	123:16,20 128:1,2	sounds 83:3	131:2 133:16	191:21 202:10,23
187:2	128:3,6 138:7	source 83:4 105:1	137:2 148:15	statements 95:17
situation 22:15	139:1,3,25 183:19	130:7	162:1 189:19	states 137:14
23:18 24:11 26:2	184:17 203:22	south 58:21	203:1	station 9:14,15
26:7,9 113:22	smoke-logged	space 44:3	staffing 7:1,2 12:17	45:16 49:1,3,4,8
115:3,15 120:8,18	146:14	spaced 13:22	Staffordshire	49:12 53:17,19
123:1 124:14,20	smoke-logging	spaces 43:9 79:10	63:17,25	66:6,7 68:24
125:16 127:14,16	146:15	spare 162:14	stage 1:18 2:13	87:17
128:10,15 129:21	smooth 89:7	spate 113:14,24	10:7 20:6 62:21	station's 49:9
131:12 138:8,25	<b>sole</b> 161:8,14,20	114:10,20	85:20 97:7 101:12	station[sic 49:11
140:6,8 145:23	163:6,9,20,22	speak 74:25 75:5	114:9 155:22	stations 41:20
154:22 161:1	164:3	113:1,12 130:24	164:14 192:16	45:20 46:25 92:4
190:4 200:12	<b>solution</b> 22:1 23:10	134:24 135:23	193:18 203:9	status 46:12,12
situational 15:14	<b>SOM</b> 3:19 4:14	136:6 138:24	stages 21:20 119:19	49:13 53:17,17,18
199:7	5:21 6:3 8:23	193:2 205:2	184:19	53:24,25 55:13,13
situations 121:1	10:21 33:4 39:22	speaking 22:13	stand 34:5,16 35:13	195:22,22
189:24	114:6 145:10,14	35:17 85:15 163:4	36:19	statutory 137:9
six 4:17,25 5:5,9	146:3 147:18	speaks 195:5	stand-alone 88:19	stay 17:2,19 18:17
6:9 8:4 33:15	160:15 193:10	special 147:1	standard 187:13	111:3 120:1
57:24 58:5 60:14	196:14,16,19	specific 9:9,24	standby 89:5	122:10 136:10,23
76:24	somebody 44:15	18:23 46:9 56:15	standing 1:14	137:1,6 138:13
six-digit 51:22	56:13,14,24,24	105:25 106:3	stands 36:13	143:13 147:3,4
six-pump 50:5	60:3 99:3 130:12	112:12 113:15	180:21	149:13
76:19 77:6	133:21 161:14	133:11,13 144:13	start 2:3,15 15:10	stay-put 120:14,15
skills 65:7,9 164:8	171:4 200:17	147:7,11 185:5	18:12 34:6 48:4	137:12 138:9
Sky 96:15	soon 28:23 60:12	187:7 196:9	48:22 51:25 55:22	stayed 98:12
slightly 90:15	155:20 156:13	specifically 8:24,25	57:5 58:1 64:21	<b>staying</b> 17:18 18:9
119:19 146:1	sorry 29:16,17	38:3 71:12 72:15	64:21 69:22	20:8 147:14
174:25 182:7	31:15 35:14 38:8	86:23 144:12	118:25 151:21	step 31:15 78:9
183:8	49:16 55:22 64:13	147:9	155:22 156:20	152:18,18
slowly 79:18 96:10	79:17 85:2 90:24	specified 161:2	159:18	steps 169:11
smaller 40:15	92:13 104:14	spent 11:6	started 3:13,14	stop 53:10 58:10
Smith 1:8,10,12,23	118:25 126:9	split 189:14	146:15	128:2
2:17 50:12 62:1	127:4 133:2,5,6	spoke 57:2 63:7	starting 51:23	stopped 201:16
90:21 104:12	150:5 164:12,20	193:4 196:1,3,5	101:19 148:9	stopped 201.10
132:13 136:16	181:13 188:7	spoken 203:4	182:7	straight 21:5 74:21
175:16 193:11	190:13 204:15	spreading 140:3	starts 51:24 58:7	strategic 8:1
196:14,16,19	sort 34:16 73:10	staff 4:4,16,20 7:12	121:9 141:16	Stratford 14:13
198:2,19,23 199:1	127:22 146:18	10:1 14:23 19:8	state 82:18 130:5	15:2 37:8,9,14,15
204:15 206:20	187:13 192:22	20:17 34:4 35:2,7	stated 123:12	40:1,4,10,16
smoke 21:2,3,21	sorting 92:3	38:18 46:17 54:12	stated 123.12 statement 2:18,22	88:14,16,25 89:9
SHIUKE 41.4,3,41	Softing 92.3	J0.10 40.1/ J4.12	Statement 2.10,22	00.14,10,23 07.9
	l			<u> </u>

				1 age 232
89:12,13,25 91:11	166:17 174:18	28:13,14,20 31:24	systems 101:17	100:22 103:18
91:19 93:9,21,24	186:24,24 188:8,9	32:7 33:8 35:15	107:21	108:20 112:16,18
94:11,13,16	188:15	50:7 107:23		114:18 117:13
101:25 102:9	supervisors 5:7 7:7	113:11 115:13	T	118:13 127:12
103:6 107:17	26:21 27:6 34:22	116:17,20 117:12	tab 11:11 47:24	143:19 144:8
108:3,6 109:9,23	36:10,16 38:13	117:18 118:8	69:25 90:9 92:8	145:18 158:12
110:1,2,3,8,19	39:8 46:18 71:25	119:2,8 125:23	116:16 118:22	167:22 168:1,22
122:14 191:14	72:10 73:11 76:7	129:16 130:21	136:12 141:1	168:23 169:2
196:23	76:16 88:20 94:4	131:5 132:14	148:4 151:17	173:21 175:4
stress 84:6	96:2 97:25 143:23	136:24 137:1	159:19 164:21	200:16
stretch 61:8	145:19 159:16,18	138:2 141:17,19	168:7 184:25	target 191:7
<b>structure</b> 9:6 34:4	160:1 165:17	142:9,18 145:18	197:15 199:23	targets 191:1
34:10	189:18 192:18	146:9 148:10	tactic 139:15	task 75:13 83:24
structured 74:7	202:21	150:21 153:8	take 2:10 7:16	144:4
study 175:19	supervisory 8:18	154:19 156:21	10:19 22:5 24:1	tasked 134:19
stuff 64:20	9:9,12 10:3 34:16	158:21 183:9	34:25 35:4,17,22	tasks 27:17 145:20
subject 91:15	36:10 39:11 94:21	185:18 186:12	40:25 42:15,16	192:16 194:5
112:10 132:14,15	98:8	187:20 198:16	51:16 63:19 71:23	tea 35:8
132:19 181:2	supply 65:16,17,22	199:12 200:17	84:10 86:6 87:21	team 9:13 16:8,9,11
substance 113:6	<b>support</b> 11:7 20:18	202:24 203:2	88:1 96:10 103:17	16:12
subtle 14:4 138:13	33:13 34:22,24	swap 75:18	105:4 110:18	teamwork 73:11
successful 137:18	35:5,7,25 64:14	switch 75:8 81:5	112:1 123:16	technical 44:15
sufficient 39:2	64:17 71:25 96:6	switched 164:1	129:17 131:2	techniques 22:5
88:23 162:1	supporting 23:16	system 4:23 37:13	132:18 140:15	23:25 25:16
suggest 32:18	supposed 119:22	40:23 46:22 47:8	147:2 149:25	technology 125:24
suggested 149:2	160:24 172:13	48:8 52:4,8 58:1	150:13,15 152:13	telephone 25:21
suggestion 25:25	Supposing 127:9	60:19 63:22 67:21	154:14,21 180:15	43:11,11 51:11
suggests 21:22	sure 10:14 19:8	67:23 68:7,12	184:24 188:25	66:21,22,22,23
148:23 166:19	20:9 32:9 39:2	75:11 76:7 77:1	191:1,12 194:9	67:4,13 75:3
<b>suit</b> 104:6	40:11 93:17 94:3	77:24 79:14 84:22	take-aways 32:19	79:20 101:15,24
suite 40:21	110:22 113:20	87:15 88:20	taken 58:3,4 90:8,8	105:11,12 106:5
summarise 20:4	114:16 129:20	106:15,23 121:15	100:20 111:20	106:12,24 107:8,9
32:1	160:11 161:12	130:19 133:16	185:11,16 186:12	107:10 110:6,11
<b>summary</b> 53:3,3	172:7 173:17	134:15 135:3	takes 35:19 78:20	127:12 129:19
131:4 202:16	191:4 192:22	153:24 154:4	87:24,25 104:23	132:21,25 133:3
<b>SUP</b> 74:15,16	<b>surge</b> 114:6	155:11 160:5	talk 24:9 61:12	133:11,13,19
supervise 8:7	surmise 27:16	163:4 166:14	74:24 102:11	134:15,25 135:3,6
supervising 6:16	<b>Surrey</b> 56:10 62:9	168:25 171:10,20	115:11 131:19	135:19,20 150:19
200:18	62:12,24,25 63:1	175:23 180:8	169:11 195:19	151:9 157:18
supervisor 6:20	63:3 101:10	189:19 190:8	talked 96:2 105:19	164:1 165:18,18
35:25 36:8,9	105:19	192:25 196:19	109:13 169:21	166:4,5,9,12
39:10 83:18 93:16	surrounding	system-generated	talking 24:7 27:13	174:1,7,16 195:23
106:8,9 143:12	105:23	60:21 76:18	27:19 46:2 65:25	telephones 67:16
150:22 157:10	survival 18:14 19:7	systematically	79:3 86:24 96:4,5	135:5,7
158:5 161:7,8,13	20:10,12,13 25:18	115:5	96:9,19 100:6,21	television 89:11

				1490 200
94:7,16 95:10	tested 150:1	114:2 120:11	93:8 135:14,24	206:12,15
96:3,21 97:7	text 16:3,5 76:16	121:8 123:11,18	194:22	tonight 201:10
98:11 99:6 100:16	79:10	123:25 124:12,13	three-quarters	204:20
televisions 94:8,12	thank 1:9,11,19,20	125:21 126:15	54:23 91:7,8	tool 72:19 88:18,19
94:15	1:25 15:22 29:19	127:12 128:15	three-way 63:19	91:22
tell 11:25 18:17	33:2 61:15,16,24	129:15 131:17	throw 2:22	tools 93:18
26:6 29:7 50:3,25	62:1 88:12 99:15	132:8,23 134:3,19	Thursday 206:17	top 48:22 53:21
52:23 53:4 57:20	103:20,22 126:20	137:13 138:12	time 2:9 6:24 7:10	57:7 91:3 92:23
101:17 114:13,25	131:18,24,25	141:3 142:23	10:4,6 26:24	151:22 191:22
116:5 153:5 158:6	132:1,12,13	147:5 148:2 149:6	27:24 29:21,25	197:16
164:24 172:21	138:10 175:3,4,14	151:16,21 152:15	30:12 31:6,17	topic 103:9 181:17
183:24,25 185:24	175:16 181:6	155:14 156:6	36:20 54:3 55:4	topics 15:13
191:11 196:7	197:8 202:9	159:14,20,22	55:12 57:8 60:16	total 52:23
200:18,20 203:16	204:14 205:4	161:3 162:18	82:13,15 87:1	touch-screen 67:4
<b>telling</b> 145:23	206:15	163:18 164:18	97:10,15 98:17,22	81:15
149:4 152:19	theirs 143:17	166:24 167:10,14	101:19 114:4	towels 128:4
180:22	theme 21:16	170:6,14,16	118:11 126:11	tower 3:22 14:14
tells 89:2 131:11	they'd 26:3 107:6	174:24 175:1	146:16 159:20	15:3 31:6 70:25
173:10	107:13,13 157:5	176:15 177:9	163:17 168:24	95:20 99:9,18,24
ten 3:10 50:17	192:19	178:7 180:5,22	173:9,24 179:1,20	100:7,14,16
tend 8:20 44:13	thing 14:2 19:22	182:13,24 183:20	191:3,4,6 193:7	104:23,24 111:22
82:12 83:8 124:15	39:5 48:14 64:4	185:3 187:10,12	194:22 199:10	124:4 161:23
tendency 22:3	68:5 96:17 109:14	189:6 192:10	200:7,9,16 203:24	162:7,25
tends 114:23	127:22 140:24	193:4,22 194:19	204:3,5,20	traffic 69:16,17
tense 31:4	things 22:6 32:18	194:23 196:1	timed 177:23	90:5 136:1 179:4
term 68:13 114:5	65:1 128:15 145:8	197:1 199:19	timeline 91:8	179:19,23
terminals 67:2	146:19 153:11	200:8 202:17,24	173:20	train 11:2,3 155:1
terminology 166:24	155:2 183:11	204:13,19 205:14	timely 26:21	trained 25:10 31:10
terms 4:14 6:3 7:18	185:15	205:16 206:9,10	121:19	35:22 73:13,16
12:1 13:16 18:19	think 1:5 14:14	206:12	times 28:12 73:6	128:13 146:20
19:20 20:6 23:12	17:22 18:11 24:4	thinking 24:5	90:11	191:18
25:4 28:19 29:1	25:9,9 30:2,19	119:24 174:11	timetable 201:11	training 4:5,19
30:7 32:4,8,17	31:11 32:13 33:15	thinks 180:19	206:13	8:23 9:1,9,11,12
33:18 37:17 83:3	34:8 37:10 38:3,6	third 52:9 96:13	<b>timing</b> 104:6	9:16,17,23,24,25
85:4 90:2,16	38:10 39:13 46:5	119:24 142:14	today 1:25 165:7	10:3,5 11:2,3,4
92:16 95:10 97:19	48:19 49:16 50:2	160:14 189:9,10	204:16	17:24 18:3 19:2,3
104:6 106:20	53:16,25 57:19	thirty 202:15	today's 1:4 205:18	19:4,4,5,10,20
111:18 118:21	59:10 60:17 62:21	<b>thought</b> 15:6 109:9	told 36:12 97:1,4	21:24 22:25 23:1
128:12,20 129:12	65:3 70:3 77:13	112:23	100:12 113:2	23:3,13 40:21
134:23 142:13	79:17 82:16 85:4	thoughts 204:3	172:18 178:8	44:9 71:9,13,14
148:23 149:11	87:8 88:1 89:1	threat 13:13	196:15 202:16,17	71:16,17,20,22
150:11,14 170:15	93:4 94:9 95:24	three 3:9 5:14,25	Tom 92:25	115:14 199:12
183:18 195:11	96:24 97:25 98:8	7:7,7 38:10,12,13	tomorrow 201:7	transcript 197:1,5
199:21	99:8,11,21 100:19	52:20,21 63:18	204:17 205:1,11	197:10,16 202:23
territory 123:17	101:22 113:9	70:11 71:4 92:12	205:12,14,19	204:1

	76.10	1 4 50 22	105 00 165 0	112 2 142 25
transfer 10:14,18	turns 76:13	underneath 50:23	125:22 167:2	113:3 143:25
151:20	TV 89:24 94:2,13	64:6 120:5 121:12	174:18 187:6	vehicles 65:11,17
transferred 40:12	97:20 98:3	understand 2:6	196:14	verbally 106:25
transmission 86:3	TVs 96:15	30:14 99:20	updated 82:15	verify 193:7
transmitted 156:2	twenty 3:9	113:11 129:20	83:11,15 125:18	versa 69:8 76:9
trapped 26:20	twice 154:2	131:15 158:4	126:1 128:14	version 16:7 42:5
78:14 115:7 116:6	Twitter 99:1	180:6 187:12	140:21 160:18	68:23,24 90:14
137:3 138:4	<b>two</b> 8:20 11:6 31:15	understanding	<b>updates</b> 37:12 40:2	160:19 171:7
147:10 177:25	37:19,20 38:10,13	138:17 180:1	42:12 102:20	versions 160:10
178:17 203:14	38:14 41:6 42:5	understood 85:25	103:5	vice 69:8 76:8
traumatic 199:6	62:9 67:1 75:18	86:9	updating 112:20	<b>video</b> 99:9,17
treated 116:25	92:24 94:8,12	undertake 9:10	upgrades 50:4	view 34:18 88:20
117:8	99:12 111:25	undertaken 38:5	upstairs 89:23	100:10 159:2
trends 92:20	116:15 134:13	undertaking	urgency 191:17	viewable 47:14
triangulation 193:7	136:25 141:11	194:22	urgently 102:3	viewing 47:2,3,16
tried 26:22 28:16	152:20 156:12	undertook 83:20	use 20:13 38:5 44:3	viewpoint 4:22
125:22 200:24	157:5 159:14	undoubtedly	67:7 68:14 76:3	<b>visible</b> 47:9 87:7
204:19	160:21 177:21	137:18	81:5,21 94:4	91:22 123:19
trigger 146:7	178:13 179:2,20	unfolding 95:12	100:3 105:15	<b>Vision</b> 47:6,7,9
190:12	181:15	<b>Uniform</b> 179:8,9	106:15 119:18	48:8 57:25 60:4,6
triggers 147:7	two-thirds 200:3	unique 100:6	126:23 127:11	67:1 87:15,21
trouble 152:15	two-way 30:23	101:25	129:6 130:19	88:2 154:8 171:20
true 8:3 22:11	type 24:9 42:6	unit 27:20,23 28:2	133:14 153:22	<b>Vision'</b> 105:1
95:24 117:6 129:1	43:19 44:2,5,8,20	28:9,22 29:2	154:1,19 155:3,3	196:19
130:6	48:4 49:21,22	67:12 83:5 87:20	156:14 162:7,13	visual 95:11 99:17
try 99:16,24 113:16	76:2,15 79:6	87:21 134:13,24	162:14,24	100:2
124:18 125:25	150:16,18 155:7	134:24 135:1,2,8	<b>useful</b> 95:10 103:10	vital 185:10
127:14 129:4	typed 58:5 60:19	135:8,12,19,22,23	user 76:11,12,23	voice 85:11,12
130:9,23 139:5,14	90:14 176:21,22	136:2 163:5 165:2	77:3,9	134:20 173:11
172:9 183:22,25	182:17	165:11,16,20,24	usher 61:17 103:21	<b>volume</b> 144:11
184:1	types 50:2 60:3	166:1,5,9 167:3,8	131:22 205:6	volunteer 116:11
trying 21:20 23:17	76:3 79:21	167:11,12 172:1	usual 30:20 31:1	volunteered 124:1
24:8,9 81:22 96:6	<b>typing</b> 168:1	172:13,16 174:6	205:25	volunteering
96:6 124:20		174:21	usually 35:7 74:12	118:16
143:24,25 146:25	U	units 59:11 134:17	92:18 94:23 120:7	
188:1 206:8	UK 11:8 63:18	unnatural 104:9	121:9 138:6 140:5	W
turn 15:15 34:2	ultimate 149:14	<b>unsafe</b> 123:13	166:17 188:5	waiting 21:9
57:5 60:18,25	unable 118:8	unusual 112:18	191:12	111:13,14 184:6
96:3,15 97:20	121:13 122:2,11	124:14 151:9		walked 98:22
98:17 99:5 103:9	122:25 168:15	198:11	V	<b>wall</b> 94:13
136:10,12,21	173:4	unwilling 137:4	vacate 13:11	want 1:17 2:6
150:10 184:7	uncommon 64:15	138:4	valuable 32:23	15:15,24 16:24
189:6	64:16,22 156:20	<b>up-to-date</b> 128:22	various 83:10	22:7 30:14 32:18
turning 76:17 77:9	underground	update 24:8 42:9	205:25	35:14 38:8 48:13
77:14 156:8	155:1	56:14 111:14	vast 22:12 63:4	57:11 69:21 73:18
	l ————————————————————————————————————	l ————————————————————————————————————	I	l .

83:18 90:12 92:19	160:16 162:22	West 63:7,11,16,17	58:5 62:23 63:3	158:17 170:1
96:12 104:16	172:9 180:20	63:24,25 101:10	73:9 78:5,6,12,16	writing 11:20 90:22
116:21 136:11,24	183:14,23,24	105:20 106:3	80:9,11 81:24	90:25
137:22 141:10	184:14,21 193:22	112:22	82:5,7,22,23	written 31:25 76:20
142:13 153:4	200:3 204:10	wet 128:7	83:25 84:18,24	142:11 154:23
160:21 164:19	ways 93:11	whilst 24:6 46:1	86:4,4,5,14 87:2	169:3
167:4 185:2,5	we'll 3:1 11:9 13:5	92:5 96:8,19	91:21 94:3,5	wrong 58:11 84:9
200:1 206:5	14:4 17:21 20:22	118:13 120:16	95:25 98:23 99:1	
wanted 64:4 76:15	26:13 32:14,16	127:12 144:7	105:17,18 108:14	X
83:7 87:14 96:17	55:3,21 61:7,10	146:12 151:10	108:19 110:21,23	X 76:24
109:19 111:25	77:13 97:18	156:18,23 167:21	114:18 123:18,19	<b>X2</b> 177:24
135:12 143:4	100:12 103:17	169:2	134:13 138:2	
wanting 35:1 167:2	143:9 175:2	white 97:5 153:20	142:20,21 144:11	Y
wants 76:14	204:22	window 120:21,22	145:4 146:14	yeah 12:25 77:25
wasn't 18:23 24:25	we're 2:22 13:6	128:4	161:24 163:23,25	year 51:24 131:3
27:24 93:16 96:25	35:6 41:13 42:7	wishes 74:25	165:13,14,15	years 3:9,10 11:6
97:9,12,14 98:11	42:14,18 55:3	withstand 199:15	169:2,5,6,24	yellow 2:25 153:20
98:22 100:13	61:1 63:17 82:16	witness 1:5,13,16	170:22,24,25	yesterday 134:4
142:10 167:10	86:22 88:11 100:1	1:19 34:3 61:11	171:7,9 176:1,1,2	<b>Yvonne</b> 15:6,8
174:4	114:25 140:16	61:15,23 95:16	176:10,13,22,23	95:17,25
watch 5:6,12,13	143:23 145:6	103:12,15 104:4	177:6,15,18 179:5	Z
6:14,15 7:5 12:18	160:12 164:18	131:24 132:7,12	179:8 180:4,11,12	
39:6,8,9,12,16,19	184:6 187:24	175:11,14 189:8	182:15,16,22	0
71:15 87:14 96:15	191:18,19 198:15	201:14,23 202:1	189:20 194:19	051:24
96:25 165:4,17,19	<b>we've</b> 10:1 14:3,9	202:10 204:18,25	200:22,23	<b>00.59.12</b> 70:13
166:21,23 167:1,7	42:19 47:21 50:12	205:4,7,15,23	wouldn't 30:7	<b>00:54:29</b> 49:18
188:15,17,18	53:25 56:10 63:23	206:9	51:17 55:14,14,15	70:5
190:10 192:18	77:1 88:22 93:5	witnesses 54:1	55:20 64:21 65:19	<b>00:55:14</b> 70:8
195:6,19 197:21	101:23 105:19,19	95:16 96:24	72:14 75:13,18	<b>01.13.39</b> 57:14
watched 94:24	119:16 125:21,22	wonder 201:13	82:25 97:9 99:17	<b>01.14.12</b> 77:2
watches 5:5,9 8:6	147:15 159:20	words 64:5 99:4	99:24 100:15,17	<b>01.16.02</b> 73:24
190:23	160:6 165:7	work 2:5 4:18 5:12	100:18 103:1	75:21
watching 98:20	178:14 180:15	5:21 6:1 14:3	112:18 129:5,8	<b>01.18.18</b> 76:11
water 56:2,8 67:11	185:3 187:15	36:14 104:10	134:14,16 141:6	<b>01.19.08</b> 194:7
way 2:5,8 8:16 9:2	Wednesday 1:1	145:8	143:17,21 144:4	<b>01.29</b> 194:18
9:8 13:20 19:10	Welcome 1:3	working 40:1 47:21	144:10 151:10	<b>01.29.41</b> 55:1 193:9
26:21 29:1 32:2	welfare 189:19	92:3 96:22 97:2,3	152:18 156:19	<b>01.31.38</b> 77:14 83:1
45:23,25 54:13,23	well-practised	144:3 191:23	159:1 162:22	<b>01.39.08</b> 196:13
60:11 81:7 84:4	40:13	workload 15:13	172:1 173:19	<b>01.40.47</b> 84:6 168:9
85:7 91:8,9	went 3:17 34:10	works 5:13 37:10	174:14 177:4,15	<b>01.41.35</b> 84:11
104:16 107:11	40:6 172:21 183:3	worse 23:19	182:20 184:9,16	<b>01.45</b> 176:9
112:4 119:14	weren't 18:24	worsened 146:16	184:19 185:19	<b>01.45.10</b> 173:8
128:16,16,17	22:10 32:24,25	worsening 146:11	186:21 201:22	174:8 175:21,24
138:1 146:1	113:10 145:19	would've 38:4,12	write 30:19 44:5	<b>01.48</b> 104:20
151:16 157:3	201:10	38:21 50:4 58:2,3	76:1 155:8,10	<b>01:45:10</b> 176:6

<b>01022017</b> 52:3	7:2,7 38:19 119:1	<b>2.3</b> 116:21	<b>296</b> 15:16,25 26:17	<b>5.00</b> 5:21
0115hrs 191:25	177:25	<b>20</b> 137:14 193:19	29:20	<b>5.1</b> 155:18 156:25
<b>02</b> 193:10	<b>11.15</b> 61:19	193:25 194:18		<b>5.19</b> 119:2,21
<b>02.06</b> 180:3	<b>11.30</b> 61:10,18,21	<b>2005</b> 9:19,20 10:6	3	<b>5.4</b> 151:21 156:7
<b>02.06.06</b> 177:23	<b>12</b> 33:11 99:22	<b>2007</b> 10:16 11:1	<b>3</b> 12:18 15:11 46:12	<b>5.5</b> 151:18 152:3
<b>02.09.08</b> 178:15	104:25 108:20	<b>2009</b> 11:14 12:18	53:25 55:13 92:25	<b>5/10</b> 201:24
<b>02.10.09</b> 178:5	178:17 179:12	15:11 140:22	118:22,24 119:20	5[sic 73:16
<b>02.10.21</b> 179:10	181:8 190:6,13,13	<b>2010</b> 33:25	126:21 160:18	<b>50</b> 15:15 16:24 45:1
180:8	190:14,20 192:5,6	<b>2011</b> 3:17 140:23	191:21 195:1,22	<b>52</b> 11:11
<b>02.11</b> 180:3	206:17	<b>2012</b> 11:15 13:4	202:10	<b>539</b> 19:12,13 20:1
<b>02.23.33</b> 181:19,23	<b>12-hour</b> 5:13,13,14	63:25	<b>3'</b> 119:7	118:23 138:6
<b>02.24.11</b> 182:5	<b>12.1</b> 137:14	<b>2014</b> 116:18 119:10	<b>3.15</b> 175:7	142:23 143:1
<b>02.25.32</b> 181:25	<b>12.25</b> 103:23	142:6 160:18	<b>3.2</b> 137:13 141:1	<b>54</b> 90:9 199:23
<b>0206</b> 91:10	<b>12.35</b> 103:17,22,25	<b>2016</b> 160:18	<b>3.25</b> 175:3,6,9	<b>54/2004</b> 21:22
<b>07</b> 51:23	<b>12119</b> 62:9	<b>2017</b> 2:19 3:24 9:18	<b>30</b> 92:8 191:15	
<b>076032</b> 52:9	<b>13</b> 54:16	10:4 11:1 37:7	<b>33</b> 12:16 52:12	6
0806 52:5	<b>13-pump</b> 190:18,18		<b>331</b> 58:4 60:13	<b>65</b> 197:15
	<b>13/14</b> 3:24 37:7	<b>2018</b> 1:1 136:15	<b>344</b> 50:20 52:24	<b>68</b> 196:12
1	<b>13th</b> 40:6	206:17	<b>38</b> 52:12	
<b>1</b> 53:17,17,18 76:19	<b>13th-14th</b> 191:23	<b>205</b> 168:15 169:5	<b>39</b> 52:12	7
76:24 104:8	<b>14062017</b> 51:6	173:3		7 69:25 141:1
108:20 126:10	15PF 50:2	<b>20th</b> 77:22 78:13	4	<b>7.8</b> 164:22
162:12,21 177:24	<b>16</b> 40:16,17,18	<b>21</b> 177:20,22	4 58:22,23 59:1,24	<b>70-inch</b> 94:12
189:9 200:7	55:25 62:6 119:21	<b>22</b> 40:20 181:18	66:11 70:13 77:21	<b>76029</b> 48:22
206:20,20	<b>17</b> 55:22 57:5 73:24	<b>22nd</b> 84:15 104:24	78:8 84:13,21	<b>79</b> 104:19,19
<b>1.15</b> 126:16 132:4	116:18	<b>23</b> 47:24 168:7	91:7 112:3 162:8	<b>790</b> 19:13,14 20:1
<b>1.19</b> 192:9	<b>18</b> 45:1 77:14	<b>23rd</b> 168:15 169:5	164:5 169:7	31:25 116:15
<b>1.30</b> 192:10,11	141:12	173:3	4-minute 70:17	143:5 148:3,6
193:13	<b>183</b> 182:4	<b>24</b> 6:24 90:17	<b>4.10</b> 206:16	151:17 161:4
<b>1.31</b> 198:20	<b>19</b> 84:5 168:7	104:18	4/5 112:4	164:20,21 183:11
<b>1.45.10</b> 173:1	<b>193</b> 104:24	<b>24-hour</b> 5:10 94:17	40 53:6	184:24
<b>10</b> 2:19 50:13	<b>195</b> 25:5	94:21 95:4 189:13	<b>40-pump</b> 50:10	8
103:17 129:18	<b>1993</b> 125:24	<b>24th</b> 93:3	53:5	<b>8</b> 40:6 52:7 53:2
194:10,17,24	<b>1995</b> 3:14	<b>25</b> 198:21	<b>42</b> 52:12	136:21,22,23
196:10 201:1		<b>25-pump</b> 198:17	<b>44-inch</b> 94:13	150.21,22,25
204:23 205:1	2	<b>27</b> 49:10	<b>48</b> 193:8	174:6 179:8,9
206:15	<b>2</b> 34:2 46:12 53:24	<b>271</b> 81:20 82:6,11	<b>49</b> 15:9	192:6
<b>10-year</b> 11:1	54:24 55:13 58:22	82:14,25 170:6,7	5	<b>8.1</b> 136:25 137:25
<b>10.00</b> 1:2 206:18	58:23 115:12	172:17 177:4,5	<b>5</b> 96:12 116:16	139:20
<b>10/93</b> 20:11 25:18	116:19 152:6	179:7	126:15,18 148:4,5	<b>8.2</b> 136:25 140:15
107:24 109:3	153:14,16 160:18	<b>28</b> 136:12	151:17 155:18	<b>8.7</b> 148:5,9 150:1
119:6 120:16	160:23 163:15,17	<b>293</b> 15:16,25 16:24	164:21 184:25	<b>80</b> 104:19
<b>100th</b> 104:22	174:4 195:22	19:25 21:12	185:21 199:25	<b>82</b> 177:25
<b>10PF</b> 50:2	<b>2.15</b> 97:15,17	<b>294</b> 15:25 21:1	201:19,23,25	04 1 / / .43
<b>11</b> 1:1 5:8 6:17,24	131:19 132:3,6	<b>295</b> 15:25 21:17	201.19,23,23	9
			202.1	
<u> </u>	•	•	•	1