

<p>1 Monday, 16 July 2018</p> <p>2 (10.00 am)</p> <p>3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to</p> <p>4 today's hearing. I think we are going to hear from</p> <p>5 somebody new today; is that right, Mr Millett?</p> <p>6 MR MILLETT: That is right, Mr Chairman, we are going to</p> <p>7 call Jason Oliff now to give evidence.</p> <p>8 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good, thank you.</p> <p>9 JASON OLIFF (sworn)</p> <p>10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Mr Oliff. Good</p> <p>11 morning.</p> <p>12 Would you like to sit down and make yourself</p> <p>13 comfortable.</p> <p>14 There's rather an intimidating range of folders in</p> <p>15 front of you, but counsel will take you to the bits that</p> <p>16 are needed, and documents should be shown up on the</p> <p>17 screen next to you.</p> <p>18 Yes, Mr Millett.</p> <p>19 Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY</p> <p>20 MR MILLETT: Mr Oliff, thank you very much for coming.</p> <p>21 Could you please give the inquiry your full name?</p> <p>22 <b>A. My name's Jason Andrew Oliff</b></p> <p>23 Q. Thank you.</p> <p>24 Can I say, first of all, thank you very much for</p> <p>25 coming to give evidence today and assisting us with our</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 1</p>	<p>1 here?</p> <p>2 <b>A. No. No.</b></p> <p>3 Q. Now, also exhibited to your statement are a number of</p> <p>4 exhibits: JAO/2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. I am just going to</p> <p>5 read their numbers into the record.</p> <p>6 Your statement is MET00012791.</p> <p>7 Your contemporaneous notes at JAO/2 are MET00016911.</p> <p>8 JAO/3 is MET00016909.</p> <p>9 The first whiteboard photograph at JAO/4 is</p> <p>10 MET00016912.</p> <p>11 Your second whiteboard photograph is MET00016906.</p> <p>12 There's a handwritten list of flats and occupants at</p> <p>13 MET00016909, that's JAO/6.</p> <p>14 JAO/7 is a phone bill, a personal phone bill of</p> <p>15 yours, MET00016910.</p> <p>16 <b>A. Yes, it's not a personal mobile; that's a London Fire</b></p> <p>17 <b>Brigade mobile phone.</b></p> <p>18 Q. Right. But it's your own, as it were --</p> <p>19 <b>A. Yes, it's personal issue from --</b></p> <p>20 Q. It's Brigade-issue but issued to you personally.</p> <p>21 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>22 Q. We'll look at that.</p> <p>23 In terms of your career, if I can start with that,</p> <p>24 you joined the London Fire Brigade in 1990, didn't you?</p> <p>25 <b>A. That's correct.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 3</p>
<p>1 investigations. It is very much appreciated.</p> <p>2 My questions are supposed to be short and simple.</p> <p>3 If they turn out not to be, or you don't understand</p> <p>4 a question I've asked you because I've asked it badly or</p> <p>5 something like that, just ask me to repeat the question</p> <p>6 or put it in a different way and I will do.</p> <p>7 If at any time you want to have a break, we can have</p> <p>8 a break. No problem with that. Just say, "I want to</p> <p>9 have a break" and we will stop.</p> <p>10 <b>A. Okay.</b></p> <p>11 Q. There's water on your right. There is also a screen on</p> <p>12 your right on the desk which will display any document</p> <p>13 or any part of your witness statement that we are going</p> <p>14 to go to.</p> <p>15 <b>A. Okay, thank you.</b></p> <p>16 Q. Can I ask you then, first of all, about your statement,</p> <p>17 which you should find in a little blue file in front of</p> <p>18 you at tab A or on the screen. It's dated</p> <p>19 21 February 2018.</p> <p>20 Have you read it recently?</p> <p>21 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>22 Q. Can you confirm that its contents are true and accurate?</p> <p>23 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>24 Q. Have you discussed your statement or the evidence that</p> <p>25 you are going to give today with anybody before coming</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 2</p>	<p>1 Q. And have you served actively as a firefighter since</p> <p>2 then?</p> <p>3 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>4 Q. You've worked, I think, at numerous London fire</p> <p>5 stations.</p> <p>6 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>7 Q. Could you list them for us, please?</p> <p>8 <b>A. I started off at Ilford fire station. From there</b></p> <p>9 <b>I started doing some temporary acting up to leading</b></p> <p>10 <b>firefighter at Shoreditch, Bethnal Green, Bow. I was</b></p> <p>11 <b>promoted to leading firefighter at Bow. From there</b></p> <p>12 <b>I moved to Barking White Watch, where I was promoted to</b></p> <p>13 <b>sub-officer.</b></p> <p>14 <b>I then -- when we went to rank to role, I was then</b></p> <p>15 <b>compulsorily moved as a watch manager A to Silvertown</b></p> <p>16 <b>fire station, and then I done a number of temporary</b></p> <p>17 <b>roles as a watch manager B to Leyton and East Ham.</b></p> <p>18 <b>I was then promoted into our fire safety department</b></p> <p>19 <b>from there. After spending a spell in there, I was</b></p> <p>20 <b>transferred to Barking, back to Barking Green Watch,</b></p> <p>21 <b>where I was there for seven years before I went for</b></p> <p>22 <b>promotion, started doing temporary promotion to station</b></p> <p>23 <b>manager, until I was finally promoted to Chiswick and</b></p> <p>24 <b>Feltham to where I am now, being transferred back over</b></p> <p>25 <b>to Homerton.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 4</p>

1 Q. Right. Can I ask you to pull the microphone just  
 2 a little bit closer to you so we can hear you just a bit  
 3 better. Thank you very much.  
 4 **A. Yes, is that better?**  
 5 Q. I think you became a station manager in October 2016; is  
 6 that right?  
 7 **A. That's correct, yes.**  
 8 Q. So on the night of the Grenfell Tower fire,  
 9 13/14 June 2017, what was your rank at the LFB?  
 10 **A. That was a station manager on development.**  
 11 Q. On development?  
 12 **A. Yes.**  
 13 Q. Right.  
 14 **A. When you're initially promoted, you have to complete**  
 15 **like a development period to show that you're competent**  
 16 **to be able to carry out that role.**  
 17 Q. After Grenfell, when did you cease being in development  
 18 and assume the full role of station manager?  
 19 **A. That was on 17 May this year.**  
 20 Q. Right.  
 21 Now, your work as a firefighter, at what point did  
 22 it involve work in the Brigade control room? When did  
 23 you switch to that?  
 24 **A. When I was initially promoted to station manager, I was**  
 25 **informed that one of the tags that I would have to take**

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1 **on would be officer of the day tag, and that involved**  
 2 **working at Merton control and liaising with our resource**  
 3 **management centre and the control staff and officer of**  
 4 **the watch.**  
 5 Q. You say "one of the tags that I would have to take on  
 6 would be officer of the day tag". What is a tag?  
 7 **A. A tag is a specialist role that a senior officer for**  
 8 **London Fire Brigade has to take on. As a station**  
 9 **manager, you're supposed to have a minimum of two**  
 10 **specialist tags, and obviously there's different roles**  
 11 **across. So you could be like a tactical adviser,**  
 12 **rescue, bulk media adviser, officer of the day, there's**  
 13 **numerous roles.**  
 14 Q. And officer of the day is one that takes you into the  
 15 control room, is it?  
 16 **A. It is, yes.**  
 17 Q. Right. And can you choose which tags to take on or are  
 18 they distributed to --  
 19 **A. With regards to the officer of the day tag, that is a --**  
 20 **well, it's a compulsory tag that station managers are**  
 21 **required to take on.**  
 22 Q. Okay.  
 23 So is it the case that every officer of the London  
 24 Fire Brigade who is promoted to SM, station manager --  
 25 **A. It never used to be, but the year that I was promoted,**

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1 **because I think there was a shortage of people with that**  
 2 **particular tag, they made it a compulsory tag that**  
 3 **officers take on. It gives you an overview of how**  
 4 **London Fire Brigade is run as well, so ...**  
 5 Q. Okay.  
 6 In general terms, what is the balance of activities,  
 7 the sharing of activities, between active front-line  
 8 firefighting and control room activity that a station  
 9 manager, any station manager in London, would undertake?  
 10 **A. So when you refer to actually active involvement with**  
 11 **being at control, it's only whilst you're officer of the**  
 12 **day. So there is a rota that you're put on where you'll**  
 13 **be officer of the day for -- it can be anything -- it's**  
 14 **normally around about every four weeks you'll cover the**  
 15 **role of officer of the day 1, and then in between that**  
 16 **you'll be given additional officer of the day 2 duties.**  
 17 Q. Right.  
 18 How much time do you spend as officer of the day?  
 19 How long is an officer of the day slot?  
 20 **A. It's normally a 24 -- when you're on a 24-hour rota**  
 21 **call.**  
 22 Q. So would it be the case that every station manager in  
 23 active service in London would expect to be given  
 24 24 hours in the control room every four weeks?  
 25 **A. Well, you're not there for 24 hours. Initially you**

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1 **report there at 8 o'clock in the morning, you liaise**  
 2 **with the resource management centre co-ordinator and the**  
 3 **officer of the watch for control, you get an overview of**  
 4 **the resources that are available for the London Fire**  
 5 **Brigade at that time, personnel, appliances, what**  
 6 **incidents have happened the night before, what incidents**  
 7 **are going on at that particular time. There's a certain**  
 8 **amount of duties that you carry out during the morning**  
 9 **period. Part of that will include an appliance off the**  
 10 **run report that gets forwarded to principal managers.**  
 11 **Once you've completed those duties, then you can**  
 12 **leave control. So you can normally end up leaving**  
 13 **control for around about midday.**  
 14 Q. Right, okay.  
 15 **A. Then from that time, you resume your operational role as**  
 16 **well, so you're available by pager. So if you are the**  
 17 **nearest station manager to a particular large incident,**  
 18 **you can still get mobilised to it.**  
 19 Q. Yes, I see. Okay.  
 20 On average, within that 24-hour on-call slot for the  
 21 control room, how often would you actually have to go  
 22 into the control room and see it in operation?  
 23 **A. So as officer of the day, if a significant incident**  
 24 **occurs, if there's six fire appliances attending**  
 25 **an incident, you'll be paged so that you can monitor it.**

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1 **If that incident then progresses to eight fire**  
 2 **appliances, then you have to mobilise to the control.**  
 3 **So you book -- we call it booking status 2, so we**  
 4 **mobilise with blue lights and sirens to get there so**  
 5 **that we liaise with the officer of the watch, the**  
 6 **control staff and the operational side.**  
 7 Q. I see, okay.  
 8 So just in general terms, would it be the case,  
 9 then, that any station manager -- indeed, any station  
 10 manager who attended the Grenfell Tower fire on the  
 11 night -- would have a significant degree of experience  
 12 of how the Brigade control centre worked?  
 13 **A. I would -- it's a bit difficult to answer that because**  
 14 **not everybody who was promoted before I was would have**  
 15 **the officer of the day tag. So there are senior**  
 16 **officers out there, there are station managers out**  
 17 **there, who haven't got the officer of the day tag, so**  
 18 **they wouldn't have an overview of what those roles and**  
 19 **duties would require.**  
 20 Q. Can I just explore that a bit more.  
 21 When did the officer of the day tag come in, as it  
 22 were, automatically for station managers?  
 23 **A. The year that I got promoted, I was told from that point**  
 24 **on, because they had a shortage of officer of the day**  
 25 **tags, London Fire Brigade was looking at any person that**

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1 **was promoted from that time would take that role on.**  
 2 Q. So it wasn't retrospective in respect of people who were  
 3 station managers before that?  
 4 **A. No. There were station managers before who had the**  
 5 **officer of the day tag, but I can't say whether all**  
 6 **station managers -- well, I know all station managers**  
 7 **never had the officer of the day tag.**  
 8 Q. Do you know why London Fire Brigade brought in the new  
 9 officer of the day tag policy for all new station  
 10 managers?  
 11 **A. I think it was just the fact that they had a shortage of**  
 12 **station managers applying to take that role on.**  
 13 Q. And prior to the fire, 14 June 2017, do you know how  
 14 many times you have been officer of the day?  
 15 **A. That was the first time that I was officer of the day.**  
 16 Q. That night?  
 17 **A. That night, yeah, that day. I started officer of the**  
 18 **day at 0800 hours on the 13th.**  
 19 Q. Right.  
 20 Now, can I just ask you to look at your statement  
 21 and look at page 2. Can I ask you to go to the middle  
 22 of page 2. As I said, best to look at it on the screen  
 23 on your right if that's not inconvenient.  
 24 You say:  
 25 "My shift began at 0800 hours and was a twenty-four

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1 (24) hour duty. Under normal circumstances I would have  
 2 attended Merton on this day as this would have been  
 3 where the control centre was based however, Merton was  
 4 closed for repairs and as such I attended Stratford  
 5 which is the brigades fall back mobilising control  
 6 centre."  
 7 Now --  
 8 **A. When I said it was closed, Merton wasn't actually**  
 9 **closed, they was carrying out updates and upgrades on**  
 10 **the computer servers at Merton, so whilst they're doing**  
 11 **that they transfer it to the fallback control, which is**  
 12 **at Stratford.**  
 13 Q. Now, this -- as you told us -- was the first time you  
 14 had attended or had been in the role of officer of the  
 15 day. Does that mean that this was the first time you'd  
 16 attended Stratford?  
 17 **A. Having worked pretty much most of my career in the**  
 18 **north-east area, I've been to Stratford quite a few**  
 19 **times. I've seen the fallback control at Stratford**  
 20 **before.**  
 21 Q. Was this the first time you had attended it in the  
 22 capacity of officer of the day?  
 23 **A. Yes.**  
 24 Q. On the previously occasions you'd attended it, did you  
 25 have to undertake any operational roles?

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1 **A. So.**  
 2 Q. So what would you be doing there?  
 3 **A. What, before?**  
 4 Q. Yes.  
 5 **A. Before, just familiarisation visits, just to show what**  
 6 **the capabilities are.**  
 7 Q. Okay. Right.  
 8 Before your attendance on the night of 14 June, were  
 9 you familiar with the individual officers in control of  
 10 the operations room?  
 11 **A. No. I mean, control is very similar to a fire station**  
 12 **where they've got, I think, four or five different**  
 13 **watches. There's quite a large number of staff so --**  
 14 **and, again, as a new officer of the day, I wasn't**  
 15 **particularly familiar with the control staff or the**  
 16 **officer of the watch.**  
 17 Q. Had you worked with Jo Smith before?  
 18 **A. I hadn't, no.**  
 19 Q. What about Adrian Fenton?  
 20 **A. I'd worked with Adrian before, yeah, because he's the**  
 21 **operational principal manager. I worked with him at**  
 22 **lower levels before he was promoted to --**  
 23 Q. What about Alex Norman?  
 24 **A. No.**  
 25 Q. Had you worked with her before?

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1 **A. No.**  
 2 Q. Now, do you know when Merton closed for repairs and the  
 3 operation of control moved to Stratford?  
 4 **A. Yeah, it was swapped over that morning.**  
 5 Q. That morning?  
 6 **A. Yes, the 13th.**  
 7 Q. Do you know how long it was envisaged that Merton would  
 8 be closed for?  
 9 **A. No, I didn't. I wasn't.**  
 10 Q. In your experience, was there any difference between the  
 11 Merton and Stratford control rooms in terms of  
 12 functionality or capabilities?  
 13 **A. Stratford is a slightly smaller room but it has the same**  
 14 **capabilities as what Merton has.**  
 15 Q. Right.  
 16 Now, if we move to page 3 of your statement. Just  
 17 below halfway down, you say:  
 18 "At 01.25 I received another pager alert."  
 19 I think, in fact, you'd received one earlier -- is  
 20 that right? -- in relation to Grenfell?  
 21 **A. No. No, that was the -- 01.25 was the first pager**  
 22 **message. When I refer to receiving another pager**  
 23 **message, as officer of the day, you carry out a number**  
 24 **of duties with regard to personnel issues, resources**  
 25 **within the Fire Brigade, that you deal with and liaise**

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1 **with the resource management centre.**  
 2 **That particular day was a very, very busy day**  
 3 **officer of the duty -- officer of the watch -- sorry,**  
 4 **officer of the day-wise, but 01.25 was the first pager**  
 5 **message that I had with regards to Grenfell.**  
 6 Q. You say you were told that it was a page alert to  
 7 an eight-pump fire.  
 8 **A. That's correct.**  
 9 Q. In fact, at that stage, it had gone to a 10-pump fire;  
 10 did you know that?  
 11 **A. I didn't at that time. As I say, my initial pager**  
 12 **message that came across -- and I think there was a --**  
 13 **I'm not sure whether I'd taken a photograph of the**  
 14 **actual initial pager message that I sent, it was just**  
 15 **informing me of an eight-pump fire at Grenfell.**  
 16 **With regards to our pager system, sometimes the**  
 17 **pager messages are slightly delayed. So the initial**  
 18 **pager message could have come out, by that time it had**  
 19 **gone 10. It could've changed quite quickly.**  
 20 Q. Okay. It's hard to tell from the photograph, but could  
 21 you just turn to or be shown your second exhibit, JAO/2,  
 22 at MET00016911.  
 23 **A. Sorry, can you repeat that? I can't hear you.**  
 24 Q. Sorry, it's actually for the Documents Director, who  
 25 will bring it up on the screen. That's JAO/2, your

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1 second exhibit.  
 2 Now, it's difficult to read it, but we may just try  
 3 to do our best.  
 4 If you could just be shown in magnified form what's  
 5 in the window of the pager.  
 6 I should ask: is this a photograph of your pager?  
 7 **A. Yes.**  
 8 Q. At the moment you got the call?  
 9 **A. That is the pager message I received informing me there**  
 10 **was an eight-pump -- we was attending -- it says at the**  
 11 **top "FYI we are attending an 8 pump fire on A43 ground",**  
 12 **and then they give you the incident number.**  
 13 Q. Right. Okay.  
 14 Can one tell the time on that?  
 15 **A. There is a second picture of the pager which has the**  
 16 **date and time on, I believe.**  
 17 Q. That's MET00016908, Mr Documents Director, I think,  
 18 which is JAO/3.  
 19 Would that be it?  
 20 **A. That's correct.**  
 21 Q. 01.25?  
 22 **A. Yeah, that's the second part.**  
 23 **On the right-hand side of the pager you'll see an up**  
 24 **and down -- like a scroll. So the first part of the**  
 25 **message would've been upper and then you scroll down and**

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1 **that bit comes up underneath.**  
 2 Q. Can I just ask you, that photograph, was that taken at  
 3 the time you were paged or afterwards?  
 4 **A. That was afterwards. I believe that was in the morning**  
 5 **at Stratford because you can see the white notepad**  
 6 **that's underneath it.**  
 7 Q. Yes, okay.  
 8 So the pager records, does it, the message?  
 9 **A. It does, yes.**  
 10 Q. And retains it on it?  
 11 **A. Yes, it does, until it gets deleted.**  
 12 Q. As I say, in fact, it had just gone 10 at that stage,  
 13 but you didn't know that?  
 14 **A. Not at that time, no.**  
 15 Q. You then say in your statement, this three lines down:  
 16 "I telephoned the control centre immediately after  
 17 receiving the page alert, it could only have been thirty  
 18 (30) seconds to a minute between the two (2) events.  
 19 I was informed on the telephone that the fire was on  
 20 A43s ground and was now a fifteen (15) pump fire.  
 21 I remember thinking that this was growing very quickly.  
 22 I showed myself status two (2) with the control."  
 23 Now, what did you think was happening with the speed  
 24 of make-up like that?  
 25 **A. Normally, with that -- when an incident progresses that**

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<p>1 quickly, we've got quite a serious developed fire in                  2 a premises. You try to make a mental picture of                  3 possibly what is going on, and that particular time                  4 I just thought it's a very large incident, we're going                  5 to need a lot of resources there and it's going to need                  6 quite a lot of strategic co-ordination with regards to                  7 control and the incident ground.                  8 Q. Right.                  9 Can I just turn then to a slightly separate subject                  10 before coming back to the night itself, and that's the                  11 question of training.                  12 Now, as officer of the day, going to the control                  13 centre, you were going in -- is this right? -- to take                  14 responsibility for the control and handling of fire                  15 survival guidance calls and other calls coming in?                  16 <b>A. No, no, no. When you get paged to an eight-pump fire,</b>                  17 <b>you go to control and part of your duties is to liaise</b>                  18 <b>with the officer of the watch and the control staff, and</b>                  19 <b>you act as an assistant or adviser to the operational</b>                  20 <b>side and the control side. So you may have to assist</b>                  21 <b>the control staff doing particular duties, or you may</b>                  22 <b>just liaise with the operation on the fire ground and</b>                  23 <b>control regarding different issues.</b>                  24 Q. Okay. Just in terms of adviser to control staff --                  25 <b>A. Yes, that's to do with the operational side. So they</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 17</p>	<p>1 Does part of your function and responsibility                  2 involve assisting control room operators or operations                  3 managers with what advice to give callers?                  4 <b>A. Not normally, no.</b>                  5 Q. Does it follow from that that any part of your function                  6 involves assessing or assisting operations managers to                  7 assess when a call goes from being an ordinary 999 call,                  8 as it were, to a fire survival guidance call?                  9 <b>A. No, the control staff make that decision, whether it's</b>                  10 <b>a fire survival guidance call.</b>                  11 Q. Right.                  12 <b>A. They've had the specific training to deal with that.</b>                  13 Q. And have you had specific training to deal with that?                  14 <b>A. Not taking a 999 call as a fire survival guidance, no.</b>                  15 Q. At the time of the night of the fire, had you had                  16 training on policy 790, fire survival guidance calls?                  17 <b>A. I've read the policy numerous times because it was part</b>                  18 <b>of the promotion. Part of the promotion process to</b>                  19 <b>station manager, you have to have an overview and a</b>                  20 <b>very, very good knowledge of a number of the Fire</b>                  21 <b>Brigade policies, and I've read that a number of times.</b>                  22 As a watch manager, part of my role when I was                  23 a watch manager was to give training sessions, knowledge                  24 training sessions, to my firefighters in those                  25 particular policies so that should a fire survival</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 19</p>
<p>1 may be dealing with stuff and they might question you                  2 regarding operational procedures and stuff like that.                  3 We may also assist with stuff like relief plans and                  4 gathering information.                  5 We used to -- at that particular time, part of the                  6 duties of the officer of the day is to get what was                  7 called a headline board up and running. So you'd have                  8 a whiteboard where you put the incident number, the                  9 address, the last informative message, who the officer                  10 in charge was, stuff like that.                  11 Q. Let's take it a little bit more slowly.                  12 First of all, you mention assisting with stuff like                  13 relief plans.                  14 <b>A. Yes.</b>                  15 Q. What do you mean by relief plan?                  16 <b>A. When we have a large incident, obviously firefighters</b>                  17 <b>that are out on the incident ground work extremely hard,</b>                  18 <b>so the London Fire Brigade has a policy in place where</b>                  19 <b>after four hours on the fire ground, fire crews are</b>                  20 <b>normally relieved with fresh crews from other stations.</b>                  21 <b>So they'll draw fresh crews from further away to come in</b>                  22 <b>and relieve the crews that are actually on the incident</b>                  23 <b>ground so that we've got constant crews attending the</b>                  24 <b>incident.</b>                  25 Q. Okay. Yes, I see, okay.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 18</p>	<p>1 guidance call come in whilst you was attending an                  2 operational incident, those firefighters would know what                  3 the procedures were.                  4 Q. Okay. We'll come back to 790 in due course, but what                  5 about policy 539?                  6 <b>A. Just remind me which one that is, sorry?</b>                  7 Q. Yes. Policy 539 is emergency call management.                  8 <b>A. Yes, no, I wouldn't have had training in that because</b>                  9 <b>that's to do with control staff; it's not to do with the</b>                  10 <b>operational side.</b>                  11 Q. Right. Okay.                  12 Would the same apply to what Ms Smith last week                  13 called the RIFs, the fire survival guidance operator and                  14 fire survival guidance supervisor --                  15 <b>A. No, because --</b>                  16 Q. -- reference information file?                  17 <b>A. -- again, that's specific to control operator staff.</b>                  18 Q. Okay.                  19 Would you have had training or be familiar with the                  20 national guidance, the generic risk assessment published                  21 by the Department for Communities and Local Government                  22 in February 2014?                  23 <b>A. Can you repeat the question, sorry?</b>                  24 Q. I think the answer may be no, but I'll try it anyway.                  25 Were you familiar with the national guidance for</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 20</p>

1 high-rise buildings, fire in high-rise buildings, GRA or  
 2 generic risk assessment 3.2, published by the Department  
 3 for Communities and Local Government?  
 4 **A. I'm aware of the national guidelines regarding fire  
 5 survival guidance stay-put policy, but the actual policy  
 6 you're stating, no.**  
 7 Q. Okay. You're familiar with the national principles, at  
 8 least --  
 9 **A. Yes.**  
 10 Q. -- if not the document?  
 11 **A. Yes.**  
 12 Q. Okay.  
 13 In terms of training, you say you were aware of and  
 14 had read policy 790 --  
 15 **A. Yes.**  
 16 Q. -- as part of your promotion to station manager. Was  
 17 there any specific training on how to implement what the  
 18 policy requires?  
 19 **A. From the operational side of it, where you're receiving  
 20 fire survival guidance information from control, yes.  
 21 From the control side of it, I would say no.**  
 22 Q. No, okay.  
 23 Can I just explore this just a little bit. If you  
 24 go to policy 790, which is tab 5 of the policies bundle,  
 25 I'd like you to look at section 9. We'll come back to

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1 this in due course in relation to specifics, but just in  
 2 general terms. It's page 5 internally, and if section 9  
 3 could just be highlighted.  
 4 This is "Communication with Control", and just  
 5 looking at it, this is part of 790, can we take it that  
 6 you're familiar with this?  
 7 **A. Yes.**  
 8 Q. And looking at paragraph 9.1, it says:  
 9 "It is vital that control is kept informed of the  
 10 actions being taken to resolve each FSG call. The fact  
 11 that control is aware of the actions being carried out  
 12 on the incident ground will greatly enhance the advice  
 13 given to FSG callers."  
 14 Did you ever get specific training on how control  
 15 can keep itself informed of the actions being taken to  
 16 resolve each FSG call?  
 17 **A. Normally -- well, the training and the policy states  
 18 that once the fire survival guidance information has  
 19 been passed to the operational or the fire ground, that  
 20 any information -- so if this fire survival guidance has  
 21 been passed and crews have then been allocated to go and  
 22 deal with that fire survival guidance, that information  
 23 is normally fed back via the main scheme radio to  
 24 control, so that if control are still on the phone to  
 25 those people, they can inform them that firefighters are**

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1 **on their way to rescue or to deal with the situation.**  
 2 Q. Right. Okay.  
 3 You say the information is normally fed back via the  
 4 main scheme radio to control. Just pausing there, is  
 5 that something you were trained in, the method of the  
 6 fire ground passing the information back to control?  
 7 **A. All firefighters receive a certain amount of training  
 8 with regards to using the main scheme radio. Normally  
 9 at significant incidents we'd have an incident command  
 10 pump set up where there would be an incident command  
 11 operator, a firefighter or a junior officer would be  
 12 allocated to be in charge of the incident command pump,  
 13 and information would then be passed via the incident  
 14 command pump to control.**  
 15 Q. Via the main scheme radio?  
 16 **A. Via the main scheme radio.**  
 17 Q. On the command pump?  
 18 **A. On the incident command pump or the -- at an initial  
 19 attendance, an incident command pump is normally set up  
 20 as -- or one of the fire engines, one of the fire  
 21 appliances, is set up as an initial command pump, so  
 22 that's you're immediate -- your first level of command  
 23 and control so that you have a radio link between the  
 24 fire ground and the control room.**  
 25 Q. Right. Is what you're telling us something that has

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1 come to you through your own personal experience or has  
 2 it come to you through training?  
 3 **A. That's come through training. There is a policy on  
 4 setting up an incident command pump which firefighters  
 5 are trained in.**  
 6 Q. Right.  
 7 Have you got personal experience, or had you had  
 8 personal experience as at the night of the  
 9 Grenfell Tower fire, of the incident ground passing back  
 10 to control the actions being taken to resolve a fire  
 11 survival guidance call?  
 12 **A. As a watch manager, I have been on the other side of the  
 13 operational ground where we've received fire survival  
 14 guidance and we've dealt with the incident and sent  
 15 informative messages back to control to say what actions  
 16 were taken, yes.**  
 17 Q. You say sent informative messages back to control.  
 18 **A. Yes.**  
 19 Q. Is that the way that it would be done?  
 20 **A. Yes. Yes, so with regard to the main scheme radio,  
 21 there's a number of different types of messages we would  
 22 send. So the first one may be a priority message where  
 23 we request additional resources. Then we send  
 24 an informative message to give an overview of the type  
 25 of incident, depending on how long the incident actually**

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1 lasts. There may be more than one type of informative  
 2 message. Then at the end of the incident, once we've  
 3 sort of like had the incident under control, we can do  
 4 a fire surrounding or a stop message for that particular  
 5 type of incident.  
 6 Q. Would an informative message always provide tailor-made  
 7 and specific information about what was happening on the  
 8 fire ground to resolve the FSG call?  
 9 A. That is part of the fire survival guidance policy, that  
 10 once the fire survival guidance information has been  
 11 passed to the fire ground and crews have been allocated  
 12 to deal with that information, then there should be  
 13 an informative sent back to control to inform them to  
 14 say what actions are being taken.  
 15 Sometimes that informative message may be the fact  
 16 that fire crews have ascended to whatever particular  
 17 floor and a number of people were rescued from that  
 18 floor so that they know that the fire survival guidance  
 19 information has been dealt with.  
 20 Q. In your experience or training, would the informative  
 21 message being passed back from the fire ground to  
 22 control always accurately -- or reasonably accurately --  
 23 provide control with enough information to be able to  
 24 advise the caller as to whether or not it was safe to  
 25 try to use the emergency exit?

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1 A. Are you saying that the -- sorry, can you repeat the  
 2 question?  
 3 Q. Yes.  
 4 Would the informative message coming back from the  
 5 fire ground to control always be accurate enough to be  
 6 able to help the CRO advise the caller as to whether it  
 7 was safe to use the escape route?  
 8 A. That information could be sent back, yes.  
 9 Q. But would an informative message do the job or would you  
 10 need something a bit more tailor-made?  
 11 A. Normally on the fire ground, unless a command unit is in  
 12 the process, the only means of actually communicating  
 13 with control is via the main scheme radio, so any  
 14 information that would be passed back would be via the  
 15 main scheme radio.  
 16 From my own personal experiences, advice from the  
 17 fire ground regarding escape routes has never been  
 18 passed back because normally fire crews are sent to deal  
 19 with people that have come under fire survival guidance  
 20 issues.  
 21 Q. Right. Okay.  
 22 Looking back at the policy, the second sentence of  
 23 9.1 says:  
 24 "The fact that control is aware of the actions being  
 25 carried out on the incident ground will greatly enhance

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1 the advice given to FSG callers."  
 2 Were you aware of the desirability of having the  
 3 incident ground provide you in the control room with the  
 4 actions being carried out on the incident ground?  
 5 A. Are you talking about on the particular night?  
 6 Q. On the night of the fire.  
 7 A. On the night of the incident, we was receiving so many  
 8 fire survival guidance calls. Normally, the fire  
 9 survival guidance information comes via the main scheme  
 10 radio. The call operators were inundated with radio  
 11 traffic and phone calls from people within the tower  
 12 block. I was actually passing the information via my  
 13 mobile phone from the control room to the command unit.  
 14 And I did receive -- I wouldn't say I received specific  
 15 information regarding every individual fire survival  
 16 guidance call, but I did receive some information back  
 17 regarding some of the fire survival guidance calls that  
 18 had been -- I think there's some --  
 19 Q. Okay. We'll come to that in due course.  
 20 But in general terms, and ignoring Grenfell itself,  
 21 in your training, you were aware, were you, of the  
 22 desirability of control knowing as much as possible as  
 23 to what was happening on the incident ground so as to  
 24 enhance the advice?  
 25 A. Yes, because that information -- if we've got people

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1 that are trapped in their property, whether it be a flat  
 2 or a house, control can then pass the information to the  
 3 occupants that are trapped to let them know that fire  
 4 crews are on their way, they are aware of where they  
 5 are, they know where they are and that the crews are on  
 6 their way to rescue them.  
 7 Q. Is there any other way of the fire ground communicating  
 8 with control other than by the use of informative  
 9 messages in general terms?  
 10 A. On larger incidents, there would be a command unit. On  
 11 the command unit, they have a telephone number which is  
 12 logged into their telephone, which is a critical life  
 13 information line, which is a priority telephone line  
 14 that goes straight through to control. There's a red  
 15 telephone at the head table. If the command units use  
 16 that telephone line, it's like a priority line. The  
 17 officer of the watch can answer it, so they can get  
 18 specific critical life information directly from the  
 19 command unit.  
 20 Q. Looking at paragraph 9.3 of the policy:  
 21 "The outcome of every FSG call must be communicated  
 22 to control."  
 23 Again, would that be done by informative message  
 24 normally or would it normally be done by --  
 25 A. Depending on the size of the incident, that could be via

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1 **the main scheme radio or via telephone line via the**  
 2 **command unit.**  
 3 Q. When it says "outcome of every FSG call", what does that  
 4 mean?  
 5 **A. That means if the fire survival guidance call has been**  
 6 **dealt with, so fire crews have gone up and rescued the**  
 7 **occupants.**  
 8 Q. Just in general terms, what if the outcome of a call is  
 9 that at the moment the crew is unable to reach the  
 10 caller who is trapped?  
 11 **A. With the exception of what happened on that night, I've**  
 12 **never been put in that situation. I've never heard of**  
 13 **that situation occurring. Fire crews have always been**  
 14 **sent to deal with fire survival guidance calls, and**  
 15 **depending on the outcome, whether they've rescued them**  
 16 **or whether unfortunately people have lost their lives,**  
 17 **I've never known that information being passed back**  
 18 **saying that we cannot get to them.**  
 19 Q. In training terms, did you have any training after  
 20 Lakanal House on the lessons learnt from Lakanal House?  
 21 **A. Yes. There was a case study that was circulated that**  
 22 **fire crews were taken through.**  
 23 Q. Right.  
 24 Do you remember when you were shown that case study?  
 25 **A. I don't, no. I mean, it's a long time ago.**

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1 Q. Are you familiar with an LFB report on the lessons  
 2 learnt or conclusions to be drawn from the Lakanal House  
 3 fire?  
 4 **A. I probably haven't read the report, no.**  
 5 Q. You wouldn't have read it?  
 6 **A. No.**  
 7 Q. Let me just show it you and see if it's familiar. If  
 8 you haven't read it, I won't ask you about it.  
 9 That's the first page. I was going to ask you about  
 10 some specific paragraphs, particularly paragraphs 293 to  
 11 296, which are on page 50.  
 12 Just looking at them, Mr Oliff, I don't want to  
 13 spend time on this if you are not familiar with the  
 14 report, but just looking at paragraph 293, "Expectations  
 15 that callers would be rescued and 'stay put' advice", is  
 16 that something you've seen before in this form? Have  
 17 you seen this report or a report like it on this  
 18 subject?  
 19 (Pause)  
 20 **A. Yes, I haven't read that report, but that is in other --**  
 21 **part of other policies. That's part of the advice, the**  
 22 **expectations of what control staff would be giving to**  
 23 **people in fire survival guidance. There's like four**  
 24 **concepts.**  
 25 Q. Just looking at that, then, I know you haven't seen this

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1 before, but do you think you got training, either in  
 2 approaching station manager status or before that, on  
 3 the matters that are covered by that paragraph?  
 4 **A. Training with respect to ...?**  
 5 Q. In respect to anything covered by that paragraph.  
 6 Let me put it more specifically. In the third line  
 7 it says:  
 8 "As rescues by crews were not immediate there is a  
 9 question whether the CO and/or callers, could have  
 10 assessed the risk of attempting to escape from the flat  
 11 and whether the risk of moving closer to the fire (but  
 12 escaping) was less than staying put and awaiting rescue.  
 13 COs relied on advising callers to 'stay put' expecting  
 14 that this would keep callers safe from the fire."  
 15 My question is: did you ever, after Lakanal House,  
 16 get any training on that question, on the problems that  
 17 arise from COs relying on callers --  
 18 **A. I think the CO refers to the call operator, which is not**  
 19 **part of the operational side of the firefighter**  
 20 **training.**  
 21 Q. Okay.  
 22 Then looking at 296, which is about communication  
 23 between the control and the incident command, it says:  
 24 "There is evidence of information passing from  
 25 Control to the incident ground and only one occasion

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1 when the details of a flat with people trapped were not  
 2 passed in a timely way. Control supervisors regularly  
 3 tried to obtain information about the progress with the  
 4 incident particularly in relation to callers being given  
 5 FSG. In line with practice at the time there was much  
 6 less information being passed from the incident ground  
 7 to Control about the progress of firefighting and rescue  
 8 efforts. It is not clear that if COs had been given  
 9 information about progress that it would have influenced  
 10 the advice given to callers."  
 11 So the lesson learnt there seems to be that the  
 12 incident ground wasn't passing enough information back  
 13 to control to be able to assist them with their calls.  
 14 Did you, after Lakanal House, get any specific  
 15 training on how to improve communications between the  
 16 fire ground and the control room so as to be able to  
 17 help the control room manage the calls?  
 18 **A. The fire survival guidance policy was brought out and**  
 19 **crews were trained in that. As a watch manager, we gave**  
 20 **crews knowledge sessions with regards to the importance**  
 21 **of passing information backwards to control. But**  
 22 **specifically training-wise, no.**  
 23 Q. Okay.  
 24 You say you gave crews knowledge sessions with  
 25 regard to the importance --

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1 **A. Yes, it's training sessions on the actual policy and**  
 2 **about the information required that needs to go back to**  
 3 **control.**  
 4 Q. Right.  
 5 Did you give them training on how specific to be in  
 6 relation to a specific call? In other words, training  
 7 them to pass clear and accurate information back to the  
 8 control room about the actual progress at that moment of  
 9 a particular rescue?  
 10 **A. The information that normally goes back comes from the**  
 11 **initial fire survival guidance information. So you'll**  
 12 **be given fire survival guidance information for**  
 13 **a specific flat number. That information -- once the**  
 14 **person's rescued, they'd go write on the informative**  
 15 **message, "Flat so-and-so, two people rescued by BA crews**  
 16 **via internal staircase", and that information would then**  
 17 **go back.**  
 18 Q. How important would it be for the incident ground to  
 19 have the specific flat number, particularly when you  
 20 have a high-rise building?  
 21 **A. For the information going to the fire ground, that is**  
 22 **very important because -- not only just the flat number,**  
 23 **the floor number, how many people are involved. For**  
 24 **that information to go to the fire ground is imperative**  
 25 **because that information, the sector commander can then**

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1 **allocate crews to go and deal with that particular**  
 2 **information.**  
 3 Q. Yes.  
 4 Can I now go back to the question of the Stratford  
 5 control room.  
 6 On page 8 of your statement -- you can put the  
 7 policies away for the moment -- you say at the bottom of  
 8 the page:  
 9 "Merton was closed for repairs at the time."  
 10 And then it says:  
 11 "Merton always has a large screen television  
 12 switched on and I believe this is an invaluable tool in  
 13 decision making when an incident like this is  
 14 unfolding."  
 15 Now, why is it invaluable?  
 16 **A. The screens at Merton -- and they do have a screen at**  
 17 **Stratford -- is normally -- one screen is normally on**  
 18 **Sky News and Sky News normally tends to be first on**  
 19 **scene, so you get an overview picture of the type of**  
 20 **incident that's going on. There is a second screen**  
 21 **which can have, I'm led to believe, a downlink from the**  
 22 **police helicopter, so a police helicopter can send**  
 23 **pictures to the command room or Brigade co-ordination**  
 24 **centre so that the principal managing -- the Brigade**  
 25 **co-ordination centre can have a view of what's actually**

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1 **going on at the incident.**  
 2 **So for personnel that are in the actual -- so for**  
 3 **people that are actually in the control room, you've got**  
 4 **a physical picture of the actual incident that's being**  
 5 **dealt with.**  
 6 Q. You say on page 9 of your statement:  
 7 "I believe that having access to the images of this  
 8 event as it happened would have assisted us (the LFB) in  
 9 making assessments from our remote location."  
 10 Could you just explain how seeing images like that  
 11 on the television of Grenfell Tower would've assisted  
 12 the control room?  
 13 **A. So from my point of view, I wouldn't have had the**  
 14 **authority to change decisions in the control room at**  
 15 **that time, but it may have given the officer of the**  
 16 **watch or the senior operations manager or the deputy**  
 17 **assistant commissioner an overview of the development of**  
 18 **the incident, and they may have been able to make**  
 19 **an assessment to change the stay-put policy.**  
 20 Q. What would they have been able to see from the  
 21 television images if the television had been on in the  
 22 Stratford control room which would've enabled the senior  
 23 control room staff to change the stay-put policy?  
 24 **A. They would've been able to see an overview of the actual**  
 25 **incident, how it was progressing, how quickly it was**

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1 **progressing, the actions of -- you wouldn't have**  
 2 **directly been able to see the actions of the**  
 3 **firefighters, but you'd be able to see an overview of**  
 4 **the actual -- and how quickly it was developing and how**  
 5 **fast the fire was spreading.**  
 6 Q. What would looking at the television have provided the  
 7 control room staff with that they couldn't get from  
 8 direct contact by speaking to the incident commander or  
 9 the ICP or the CU on the fire ground?  
 10 **A. I think it's an old adage of a picture paints a thousand**  
 11 **words, and you get an overview by seeing a television**  
 12 **screen with a particular scene or whatever, you'd get**  
 13 **an overview of what the firefighters and the senior**  
 14 **officers that are actually on the incident ground are**  
 15 **dealing with.**  
 16 Q. From your experience, what is the purpose of having  
 17 a television on in the control room showing a 24-hour  
 18 news feed?  
 19 **A. Again, it gives an overview of specific incidents. So**  
 20 **if there's a breaking news story or a serious incident,**  
 21 **whether it be a fire or police-related or LAS-related**  
 22 **incident, you can get an overview of what's going on.**  
 23 Q. Right.  
 24 In your experience of control room, such as it was,  
 25 is seeing news feeds of a major developing fire

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1 something which does assist control room operators make  
 2 decisions?  
 3 **A. When you're in the control room that night -- and,**  
 4 **again, at that particular time I had limited experience**  
 5 **because it was my first time as an officer of the day --**  
 6 **and when you're monitoring calls as well and you're**  
 7 **listening for information via the main scheme radios,**  
 8 **you're trying to formulate a mental picture of the**  
 9 **incident and what actions the crews are taking, how the**  
 10 **incident is developing. But having a screen up in that**  
 11 **control centre, as I said, you know, a picture paints**  
 12 **a thousand words, so it would give everyone in that room**  
 13 **an overview of what the London Fire Brigade and the**  
 14 **other emergency services were dealing with that night.**  
 15 Q. Jo Smith, when she came to give evidence last week, said  
 16 on a few occasions -- just for the transcript, it's  
 17 Day 21, page 95, and Day 22 at page 173, just for our  
 18 purposes -- and I paraphrase, that the purpose of having  
 19 the television on normally would just be background and  
 20 wouldn't be used as an information-gathering tool to  
 21 enable control room officers --  
 22 **A. Generally that is true, but, again, this was my comment**  
 23 **that I made, and this is with hindsight of the actual**  
 24 **incident taking place, that that would've been**  
 25 **an invaluable tool to have at that particular time.**

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1 Q. Okay. What do you think -- and it's hindsight, and  
 2 I take your point on that, so there's only so far we can  
 3 take it, but what would it have given the control room  
 4 operators -- I think you've answered this: it's the  
 5 general pictorial overview rather than any specific  
 6 information.  
 7 **A. I think for that particular incident -- and, again, it's**  
 8 **been said a thousand times that it was unprecedented --**  
 9 **you know, an incident like that has never been seen in**  
 10 **London and I think that would've given an overview of**  
 11 **how stretched and how under pressure the emergency**  
 12 **services were that night.**  
 13 Q. Now, in your statement, at the top of page 9, we were  
 14 just on it and I jumped the sentence deliberately, but  
 15 the sentence before the one I was asking you about says  
 16 this:  
 17 "When I arrived at Stratford one of the first things  
 18 I noticed was that the television was switched off,  
 19 I was informed that it was broken."  
 20 Now, you say "one of the first things I noticed was  
 21 that the television was switched off". Was that  
 22 a thought you had at the time?  
 23 **A. Yeah, because as you walk into the Stratford control**  
 24 **room, you've got like a -- the head desk is basically**  
 25 **straight in front of you and the screen is behind it and**

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1 **it was switched off, and because, as I say, from my own**  
 2 **personal experience, any particular major incident --**  
 3 **and this was quite clearly going to be one of those**  
 4 **types of incident because of the way that the incident**  
 5 **was made up very, very quickly, the amount of resources**  
 6 **that were requested from the incident ground -- that**  
 7 **would've been, especially for the centre of London,**  
 8 **probably a breaking news story in some way, shape or**  
 9 **form.**  
 10 Q. So were you surprised that the television was not on?  
 11 **A. I just noticed that it was off, and when I said to**  
 12 **I think it was the officer of the watch, I was just**  
 13 **informed it was broken, it wasn't working.**  
 14 Q. Right. So the officer of the watch told you it was  
 15 broken; is that right?  
 16 **A. Sorry?**  
 17 Q. The officer of the watch told you it was broken?  
 18 **A. I'm not 100 per cent certain, but I'm sure it was. In**  
 19 **saying that, there were other screens -- at Stratford,**  
 20 **there is downstairs, where they normally set up the**  
 21 **Brigade co-ordination centre, there are another two**  
 22 **screens, but obviously, as officer of the day, I stayed**  
 23 **in the control room, so I didn't have privilege to**  
 24 **actually go down and view those screens.**  
 25 Q. Who was the officer of the watch that night?

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1 **A. I can't remember her name, I'm sorry.**  
 2 Q. Did you try the television for yourself?  
 3 **A. No, I didn't, no. No. It was immediate. As soon as**  
 4 **I walked into the control room, it was evident that all**  
 5 **the call operators, the head table where the officer of**  
 6 **the watch sits, was inundated with calls and information**  
 7 **that was going on. It was a very, very busy control**  
 8 **room.**  
 9 Q. Do you remember whether the television was ever turned  
 10 on that night or did it stay off?  
 11 **A. No, it wasn't.**  
 12 Q. You mentioned the other screen and, indeed, on page 9  
 13 you go on to say that at Merton there's a link to the  
 14 helicopter images.  
 15 **A. There's a facility that they have to be able to do**  
 16 **a downlink. It's the same as what they have with our**  
 17 **command units. But I can't say whether that was**  
 18 **actually put in place on the night, so I didn't get --**  
 19 **the BCC bit is downstairs, underneath the control room.**  
 20 **It's in a different room.**  
 21 Q. Is that the heli-tele link?  
 22 **A. Yes.**  
 23 Q. I will just ask you to look at the IMP report, which is  
 24 tab 30 of the documents bundle. This is an incident  
 25 report which was published afterwards. If you look

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1 at page 2.  
 2 **A. Did you say tab 30?**  
 3 Q. Yes, tab 30. It will come up on the screen. It's  
 4 actually on the screen already. It's much easier to  
 5 look at that.  
 6 I give tab 30 to Mr Documents controller,  
 7 otherwise ...  
 8 Yes, so I should just say when I give out a number  
 9 or a tab, it's for the document controller's benefit.  
 10 Then he puts it up on the screen and then we can look at  
 11 it together. But if you want to look at it in paper  
 12 form --  
 13 **A. No, that's fine.**  
 14 Q. If you go to the second page it says under  
 15 "Development", second entry:  
 16 "There was no access to the helicopter downlink  
 17 (heli-tele) at Stratford Control fall-back. Review the  
 18 equipment at our Control fall-back locations."  
 19 That was what the conclusion of the incident review  
 20 was.  
 21 Do you remember that, that there was no access  
 22 during the night at Stratford to the heli-tele?  
 23 **A. Well, as I say, I mean, I was in the control room all**  
 24 **night and the screen that was behind the head table**  
 25 **I was told was not working, so there was no -- in the**

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1 **actual control room itself. I wasn't aware that the**  
 2 **screens downstairs, they had no link to that.**  
 3 Q. Right. Okay.  
 4 Now, do you remember whether there were any other  
 5 issues with the Stratford control room's facilities on  
 6 that night?  
 7 **A. Not as far as I'm aware, no. It was just an extremely**  
 8 **busy room. Everybody was working flat out.**  
 9 Q. In the control room, do you normally have or can you get  
 10 access to the operational risk database for a building?  
 11 **A. You can -- you can ... I'm not sure about control.**  
 12 **I couldn't say whether you could or couldn't with**  
 13 **control. I know via the command units you can, via the**  
 14 **fire appliances that are on the incident grounds that**  
 15 **you can. I couldn't say whether you can do it at**  
 16 **control or not.**  
 17 Q. What about the contents of a mobile data terminal for  
 18 a particular building?  
 19 **A. Not as far as I'm aware.**  
 20 Q. Okay.  
 21 In your experience -- I suppose given this was the  
 22 first time, this is a slightly stunted question -- but  
 23 did you think on the night that it might be necessary to  
 24 look at the operational risk database or ask somebody to  
 25 do so in order to get more information about the tower?

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1 **A. That is normally done on the incident ground. So part**  
 2 **of the incident commander's role would be**  
 3 **information-gathering, and part of that would be to look**  
 4 **at the mobile data terminal, either via the command unit**  
 5 **or via a fire appliance, to gather plans and information**  
 6 **regarding the building.**  
 7 Q. How normally would a control room operator -- or,  
 8 indeed, the supervisors and operations managers in the  
 9 control room -- know of any given building whether  
 10 a stay-put policy was in place?  
 11 **A. Any high-rise building normally has a stay-put policy in**  
 12 **place.**  
 13 Q. So that would be an assumption the control room would  
 14 make?  
 15 **A. Yes, that is national guidelines.**  
 16 Q. Okay.  
 17 How would the control room know about any escape  
 18 routes or stairs and other active or passive fire  
 19 prevention measures in any given building?  
 20 **A. Control wouldn't. Not as far as I'm aware. That sort**  
 21 **of information would be on the MDT or the ORD, which the**  
 22 **incident commander should be made aware of.**  
 23 Q. Okay.  
 24 **A. So normally at a six-pump fire and above, part of the**  
 25 **officer cadre that would attend that type of incident**

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1 **would be a senior fire safety officer, and part of his**  
 2 **role would be to look at plans and look at the fire**  
 3 **precautions within a building so that he can advise the**  
 4 **incident commander of those facilities within**  
 5 **a building.**  
 6 Q. In your experience, would it be normal, then, for the  
 7 control room -- whether the CRO handling the call or any  
 8 of the supervising managers -- to know little or nothing  
 9 about the layout of the building, number of staircases  
 10 or any active or passive fire survival or fire  
 11 prevention --  
 12 **A. I would say that's the case, probably. I can't be**  
 13 **100 per cent certain, but as far as I'm aware, that**  
 14 **information is normally dealt with on the actual fire**  
 15 **ground.**  
 16 **As I say, I'm not a control operator, so I've been**  
 17 **trained in the operational side of it, not the control**  
 18 **operations side of it.**  
 19 Q. So when a control room operator is giving advice to  
 20 a caller who is feeling the effects of heat, smoke or  
 21 fire in their flat, how would the control room operator  
 22 be able to assess the safety for the caller of leaving  
 23 their flat and utilising the escape route or routes?  
 24 **A. That's a question for a call operator. I'm not a call**  
 25 **operator. I don't take the 999 calls. So I don't know**

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<p>1 <b>how they have been trained to carry out that risk</b></p> <p>2 <b>assessment to deem where it's safe or not.</b></p> <p>3 Q. If the control room operator and anybody in the control</p> <p>4 room doesn't have access to the operational risk</p> <p>5 database or any information about the layout and</p> <p>6 structure of the building, how can a control room</p> <p>7 operator give any kind of advice to a caller as to the</p> <p>8 means of escape?</p> <p>9 <b>A. There is standard information that a call operator would</b></p> <p>10 <b>give to a person who was deemed trapped in their flat</b></p> <p>11 <b>about surviving within that compartment until fire crews</b></p> <p>12 <b>reached them.</b></p> <p>13 Q. Okay, but before that person is actually trapped and</p> <p>14 can't get out but is looking at their options, they're</p> <p>15 affected by smoke, heat or fire in their flat, and</p> <p>16 there's a discussion going on between the caller and the</p> <p>17 control room operator about getting out --</p> <p>18 <b>A. The control operator would put the question --</b></p> <p>19 Q. Could I just ask my question: how can the control room</p> <p>20 operator give advice if he or she doesn't actually know</p> <p>21 about what the building contains in terms of escape</p> <p>22 routes?</p> <p>23 <b>A. I can't answer that question because, as I say, I'm not</b></p> <p>24 <b>a control operator. I can only speculate and say the</b></p> <p>25 <b>control operator would question the occupant, because</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 45</p>	<p>1 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Are you all right?</p> <p>2 THE WITNESS: I'm fine, yes.</p> <p>3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll do that and have a longer</p> <p>4 break at somewhere near 11.30.</p> <p>5 MR MILLETT: Yes, let's do that.</p> <p>6 At page 3 of your statement, just going back to</p> <p>7 that, if I can, Mr Oliff, we've covered this, you've</p> <p>8 said you were paged at 01.25 and we've seen your pager.</p> <p>9 Had you ever heard of Grenfell Tower?</p> <p>10 <b>A. I hadn't, no.</b></p> <p>11 Q. You also say that, as officer of the day, you would</p> <p>12 receive an alert in the event of a six-pump fire?</p> <p>13 <b>A. Normally, yes.</b></p> <p>14 Q. What would you be required to do if you were told it was</p> <p>15 a six-pump fire?</p> <p>16 <b>A. If it was a six-pump fire, I'd probably turn on my</b></p> <p>17 <b>radio, I'd monitor what radio traffic was going back</b></p> <p>18 <b>between the fire ground and the control room, and</b></p> <p>19 <b>I would probably also log on to remote -- log on to the</b></p> <p>20 <b>control system, we've got BOSS and Vision, that would</b></p> <p>21 <b>bring up the incident so that I could see where the</b></p> <p>22 <b>incident was and have an overview of the actual incident</b></p> <p>23 <b>itself.</b></p> <p>24 Q. It's a matter of record here that this fire at</p> <p>25 Grenfell Tower became a six-pump fire at 1.13. Did you</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 47</p>
<p>1 <b>the occupant would know the layout of the building, the</b></p> <p>2 <b>occupant would know where the escape routes are and the</b></p> <p>3 <b>layout of the building themselves. And if the occupant</b></p> <p>4 <b>of that flat deems that they can't escape from that</b></p> <p>5 <b>flat, the control operator would go to the stay-put</b></p> <p>6 <b>policy and start giving them advice about how to prevent</b></p> <p>7 <b>smoke entering the room, the best place for them to be</b></p> <p>8 <b>within their priority.</b></p> <p>9 MR MILLETT: Mr Oliff, we've been going for more than</p> <p>10 an hour and I'm grateful to you.</p> <p>11 Mr Chairman, it may be appropriate to have a break</p> <p>12 now.</p> <p>13 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, we could have a break now.</p> <p>14 How are you getting on, Mr Oliff?</p> <p>15 THE WITNESS: I'm fine, thank you.</p> <p>16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: How are you getting on, Mr Millett?</p> <p>17 MR MILLETT: I'm fine. I've come to a natural point for</p> <p>18 a break.</p> <p>19 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I wonder if we can go on for another</p> <p>20 quarter of an hour or a bit more and then have a longer</p> <p>21 break, otherwise we have two breaks.</p> <p>22 MR MILLETT: Yes.</p> <p>23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I mean, will that be convenient?</p> <p>24 MR MILLETT: We could go on for quarter of an hour and then</p> <p>25 take a big break.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 46</p>	<p>1 receive -- and I think the answer is no -- an alert</p> <p>2 at --</p> <p>3 <b>A. No, no.</b></p> <p>4 Q. Do you know why not?</p> <p>5 <b>A. I don't know. Again, I can only speculate and assume</b></p> <p>6 <b>that it went from six to eight very, very quickly. By</b></p> <p>7 <b>the time it got to our pager -- paging, which is part of</b></p> <p>8 <b>R&amp;L, which is part of the control room staff, it just</b></p> <p>9 <b>came straight over as an eight-pump fire.</b></p> <p>10 Q. You then showed yourself as status 2, you say.</p> <p>11 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>12 Q. We have -- there's no need to turn it up -- you calling</p> <p>13 in at 01.27.03. Would that be about right?</p> <p>14 <b>A. Yeah, if that's what the records show. I do remember it</b></p> <p>15 <b>taking a while for my phone call to be answered.</b></p> <p>16 Q. Yes. We have a call. It's probably best if I show it</p> <p>17 to you for completeness.</p> <p>18 Could you please be shown page 42 of the ORR.</p> <p>19 This is the first time we've looked at this</p> <p>20 document. This is --</p> <p>21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We do not have it yet.</p> <p>22 MR MILLETT: No, we haven't yet, I'm waiting.</p> <p>23 Before it comes up, I'll tell you what it is. This</p> <p>24 is a very detailed report put together by the London</p> <p>25 Fire Brigade, minute by minute, and in parts second by</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 48</p>

<p>1 second, based on information available to them.</p> <p>2 A third of the way down [internal] page 42, it says:</p> <p>3 "01:27:03 - SM Oliff who is the nominated Officer of</p> <p>4 the Day (Officer of the Day 1) contacts the paging</p> <p>5 officer to acknowledge receipt of the eight pump fire.</p> <p>6 He confirms that Control are located at Stratford and</p> <p>7 states he will proceed to Control."</p> <p>8 <b>A. Sorry, can you just confirm the time again?</b></p> <p>9 Q. I'm so sorry --</p> <p>10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I don't think we're seeing the right</p> <p>11 page.</p> <p>12 MR MILLETT: We are not on the right page. It's page 42.</p> <p>13 I am sorry, I am busy reading away, not realising it</p> <p>14 wasn't on your screen. There it is, 01.27.03.</p> <p>15 I'm sorry, Mr Chairman.</p> <p>16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: No, that's all right.</p> <p>17 MR MILLETT: There it says:</p> <p>18 "01:27:03 - SM Oliff who is the nominated Officer of</p> <p>19 the Day (Officer of the Day 1) contacts the paging</p> <p>20 officer to acknowledge receipt of the eight pump fire.</p> <p>21 He confirms that Control are located at Stratford and</p> <p>22 states he will proceed to Control."</p> <p>23 The source of that is an admin call. Can you help</p> <p>24 with what an admin call is?</p> <p>25 <b>A. That's just where an officer calls via their mobile</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 49</p>	<p>1 in my own vehicle [redacted]. I was no more than one</p> <p>2 (1) mile into the journey when I heard over the airwave</p> <p>3 radio 'Make Pumps Twenty-Five (25)'."</p> <p>4 <b>A. Yes. When I said I was about a mile into the journey,</b></p> <p>5 <b>I mean, that was just a guesstimate.</b></p> <p>6 Q. Sure.</p> <p>7 We have the time stamp for make pumps 25 at</p> <p>8 01.31.30. I don't need to show you that in the log. So</p> <p>9 that's what it was at that time.</p> <p>10 Would that be about right?</p> <p>11 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>12 Q. In terms of your departure time and the time you got</p> <p>13 that message?</p> <p>14 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>15 Q. Right. Then you go on to say:</p> <p>16 "At that time I recall thinking that things had gone</p> <p>17 badly wrong somehow, given the time frame, the number of</p> <p>18 pumps and the fact that this was a fire inside a flat."</p> <p>19 <b>A. That's correct.</b></p> <p>20 Q. You say you thought things had gone badly wrong somehow;</p> <p>21 can you just expand on that? What do you mean? What</p> <p>22 were your thoughts at the time?</p> <p>23 <b>A. I mean, normally with regard to high-rise and fires in</b></p> <p>24 <b>flats, they're normally confined to the compartment. On</b></p> <p>25 <b>rare occasions they do break out through windows and</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 51</p>
<p>1 <b>phone to control paging.</b></p> <p>2 Q. Right. So this message, did it go over your Brigade</p> <p>3 mobile?</p> <p>4 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>5 Q. In your experience, are Brigade mobile calls recorded?</p> <p>6 <b>A. I'm not sure. I'm not aware.</b></p> <p>7 Q. You carry an Airwave radio, don't you, as a station</p> <p>8 manager?</p> <p>9 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>10 Q. Was it possible that in fact you sent this message over</p> <p>11 your Airwave radio?</p> <p>12 <b>A. No, I sent this message over my phone.</b></p> <p>13 Q. Right.</p> <p>14 <b>A. There should be a phone log in my evidence there</b></p> <p>15 <b>somewhere, which should reflect the time of the phone</b></p> <p>16 <b>call.</b></p> <p>17 Q. That mobile that you used for that call, do you</p> <p>18 remember, was it the same mobile that you used to speak</p> <p>19 to the command unit --</p> <p>20 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>21 Q. -- during the course of the night?</p> <p>22 <b>A. Answer: yes.</b></p> <p>23 Q. Just going back to your statement, at the bottom of</p> <p>24 page 3, you say in the penultimate paragraph:</p> <p>25 "I made my way to the control centre on blue lights</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 50</p>	<p>1 <b>spread vertically sometimes to the flat above, sometimes</b></p> <p>2 <b>the flat above that. Very rarely do they go past that.</b></p> <p>3 <b>Again, listening to the make-ups without no</b></p> <p>4 <b>informative, you're trying to picture what is actually</b></p> <p>5 <b>developing at that incident, and for that amount of</b></p> <p>6 <b>resources to be sent to a high-rise fire, the incident</b></p> <p>7 <b>was obviously developing very, very rapidly.</b></p> <p>8 Q. Right.</p> <p>9 You're able to communicate by your mobile phone and</p> <p>10 you also have an Airwave radio. Were you able at that</p> <p>11 time to communicate with the incident commander if you'd</p> <p>12 wanted to?</p> <p>13 <b>A. Not whilst en route, no.</b></p> <p>14 Q. Right.</p> <p>15 <b>A. (1) because I'm driving, and (2) officer of the day</b></p> <p>16 <b>would not directly liaise with the incident commander on</b></p> <p>17 <b>the fire ground.</b></p> <p>18 Q. Okay. Did you know who the incident commander was at</p> <p>19 that stage while you were driving in?</p> <p>20 <b>A. No, I didn't.</b></p> <p>21 Q. If you'd wanted to know, could you have asked anybody?</p> <p>22 <b>A. When I arrived at control I could've found out who the</b></p> <p>23 <b>incident commander was.</b></p> <p>24 MR MILLETT: We'll come to that in a moment.</p> <p>25 In fact, that is where we get to.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 52</p>

<p>1 Mr Chairman, that probably is a convenient moment 2 for a break. It's just before 11.15. 3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right. We'll break now and come 4 back at 11.30. 5 Now, Mr Oliff, we are going to have a break. I have 6 to ask you, please, not to talk about your evidence or 7 anything relating to it during the break. 8 If you go with the usher now, we'll start again at 9 11.30. Thank you very much. 10 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 11 (The witness withdrew) 12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good, 11.30, please. 13 (11.15 am) 14 (A short break) 15 (11.30 am) 16 MR MILLETT: Thank you, Mr Chairman. If we could have the 17 witness back, please. 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, he is on his way. 19 (The witness returned) 20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, Mr Oliff, are you ready to 21 keep going? 22 THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you. 23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. 24 MR MILLETT: Mr Oliff, thank you for coming back to us. 25 At the foot of page 3 of your witness statement, if</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 53</p>	<p>1 Q. Right. Okay. Well, we may have to explore that in some 2 other way. 3 You say that you were advised that the incident had 4 recently been moved to a make pumps 30 and was asked to 5 try and contact DAC Lee Drawbridge. 6 Now, do you know that this was never a 30-pump fire; 7 it went from 25 to 40? 8 <b>A. I wasn't aware of that, no. I mean, I'm just stating 9 what I remember at the time.</b> 10 Q. Do you know or can you remember who advised you that the 11 incident had been made up above 25 pumps? 12 <b>A. I remember going into the control room, speaking to the 13 officer of the watch and, again, offering my assistance 14 and what was required of me, what they wanted me to do. 15 The officer of the watch asked if I could try to contact 16 Deputy Assistant Commissioner Lee Drawbridge because he 17 was on our recall. I said I would do that, so I went 18 into one of the back offices, logged onto the computers, 19 got his phone number and tried to call him.</b> 20 Q. Right. 21 Now, you think that that conversation happened with 22 the officer of the watch after the pumps had been 23 upgraded or made up beyond 25? 24 <b>A. Yes, definitely.</b> 25 Q. Okay.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 55</p>
<p>1 I can just ask you to look at that, you say: 2 "It took me about twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) 3 minutes to arrive at Stratford mobilising control." 4 I just want to get an idea of the timing. 5 You were paged at 01.25, and we have you en route at 6 the time when you heard over the Airwave radio that 7 pumps had been made 25, and that's 01.31.30. 8 <b>A. Yes.</b> 9 Q. On that basis, 20 to 25 minutes, that would put you 10 arriving at the control room at about 01.50 or 01.55. 11 <b>A. Around about that time, yes.</b> 12 Q. Round about that time. 13 <b>A. That is a guesstimate as well, but it is around about 14 that time.</b> 15 Q. Okay. And you don't recall any more precisely, do you, 16 what time you arrived? 17 <b>A. No. No.</b> 18 Q. When you arrived, you say on page 4 at the very top: 19 "I asked the OOW [officer of the watch] what I was 20 needed to do ..." 21 I think you can't remember who the OOW was; is that 22 right? 23 <b>A. I can picture her face but I can't remember her name.</b> 24 Q. Jo Smith? 25 <b>A. No, Jo Smith was the senior operations manager.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 54</p>	<p>1 If I can just ask you to look at the short incident 2 log, which is tab 23 of our documents bundle, and go to 3 page 21. 4 At 02.03.41 we have, somewhat unhelpfully: 5 "Make Up 6 "IUP G271 MAKE PUMPS 25." 7 Now, in fact, as I said before, pumps 25 had been 8 made at 01.31 -- 9 <b>A. Yes. On the incident log, sometimes the make-up bits 10 get repeated further down.</b> 11 Q. Oh, I see. 12 <b>A. Even though it was a lot earlier, sometimes they get 13 repeated on the incident logs.</b> 14 Q. Right. Okay. 15 So if I ask you then just to look at another 16 document, which is tab 7 of our documents bundle, which 17 is LFB00000003 and turn to page 2 in that. 18 Just halfway down the page -- and this is an LFB 19 record -- we have at 02.04.09, we have: 20 "MESSAGE FROM INCIDENT: 'CU8 MAKE PUMPS 40'." 21 Now, assuming that that's a correct time mark for 22 that make-up, does that help you put a time on the 23 conversation you had with the officer of the watch when 24 you asked her what was needed? 25 <b>A. It's around about that time. I mean, by the time I'd</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 56</p>

1 actually arrived at control, there's security gates to  
 2 get in, there's security doors to go through, by the  
 3 time you actually get up into the control room itself --  
 4 as I say, it was a very, very busy control room -- the  
 5 officer of the watch was, again, very, very busy. So by  
 6 the time I'd introduced myself and asked what I could  
 7 do, it's probably on the same sort of lines. I may have  
 8 misheard. There's a possibility that I misheard from 30  
 9 to 40.  
 10 Q. Right.  
 11 Did you ask who the incident commander was?  
 12 A. Not at that time, no. At the time, I could see that  
 13 they was being over -- well, I wouldn't say overwhelmed,  
 14 but they was extremely busy, and what I could do to  
 15 assist them, and so part of that was I was asked if  
 16 I could try to recall Deputy Assistant Commissioner  
 17 Lee Drawbridge.  
 18 Q. But Lee Drawbridge wasn't on the fire ground, was he?  
 19 A. No, no, he was what we call as on recall duty,  
 20 I believe, which is basically they're off duty unless  
 21 a major incident occurs and then you can be contacted  
 22 and recalled to carry out specific roles.  
 23 Q. Why was it more important to get hold of Lee Drawbridge  
 24 and not to try to speak to the incident commander,  
 25 whoever it was?

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1 A. That's not part of my role as officer of the day;  
 2 I wouldn't speak to the incident commander.  
 3 Q. You made an attempt, I think, to get hold of  
 4 Lee Drawbridge -- in fact, no fewer than nine attempts  
 5 to get hold of him?  
 6 A. That's correct.  
 7 Q. And they all failed, you say?  
 8 A. Yes, just went through to answer phone.  
 9 Q. Is that normal, to have nine failed attempts like that?  
 10 A. No, I just carried on trying, one after the other, there  
 11 was no answer. So I didn't know, you know, what his  
 12 location was. I thought after that time he's not going  
 13 to answer his phone, so I will then go on and carry out  
 14 other duties.  
 15 Q. Right.  
 16 I think, cutting a long story short, you went back  
 17 to the OOW, said you couldn't get hold of  
 18 Lee Drawbridge, and she said try Danny Egan, officer of  
 19 the day number 2.  
 20 A. No, because of the situation that was going on in the  
 21 control room and how busy it was, as officer of the day  
 22 I thought that it would probably be prudent to get  
 23 an additional station manager in there to assist with  
 24 other duties that needed to be carried out. So I said  
 25 to the officer of the watch can we get OD2 paged so that

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1 we've got some further assistance in the control room,  
 2 and OD2 for that night was Station Manager Danny Egan.  
 3 Q. And as you say on page 4 of your statement, a third of  
 4 the way down, you were informed that SM Egan had been  
 5 mobilised to the incident.  
 6 Did you speak to Station Manager Egan at that point?  
 7 A. I didn't, no. No, the officer -- one of the control  
 8 operators said that Mr Egan had already been mobilised  
 9 to the incident. I then asked if Station Manager  
 10 Paul McClenaghan had -- whether he had been mobilised to  
 11 the incident. They said no, he hadn't. So knowing that  
 12 Paul McClenaghan camps out in Dagenham, which is  
 13 relatively close to Stratford, I asked if  
 14 Paul McClenaghan could be paged and asked to attend the  
 15 control centre.  
 16 Q. Did you know that Station Manager McClenaghan was  
 17 actually an FSG and rescue specialist?  
 18 A. He has different tags. He's also an -- at that  
 19 particular time -- inter-agency liaison officer, which  
 20 we call an ILO, which also would've been an asset  
 21 because he can then liaise with other agencies such as  
 22 the police and the ambulance service.  
 23 Q. Did you know that at about that time, the fire at  
 24 Grenfell Tower had been declared a major incident?  
 25 A. I hadn't, no.

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1 Q. You didn't. Okay.  
 2 The time for that is 02.06.38 according to the short  
 3 incident log. You don't have a recollection of that?  
 4 A. At that time, I was in the command room. I didn't  
 5 have -- I wasn't -- I didn't have access to a main  
 6 scheme radio. I wasn't listening to a main scheme  
 7 radio. I was liaising with the officer of the watch at  
 8 that particular time.  
 9 Q. You say, just halfway down page 4 of your statement:  
 10 "The head table of the control room was very busy  
 11 with information coming into them."  
 12 Can I just get a picture of what that means in terms  
 13 of layout, first of all.  
 14 The head table of the control room; where is that  
 15 situated in relation to the rest of the control room?  
 16 A. So if you want to take this room as an example, so you'd  
 17 have a head table which is here, you'd have a screen  
 18 behind it, and then control operators desks are either  
 19 side of that (Indicates).  
 20 Q. Right.  
 21 A. At the head desk, you have the officer -- you normally  
 22 have two officer of the watches and other staff there.  
 23 Q. Who normally sits at the head table?  
 24 A. That's normally officer of the watches. So you normally  
 25 have, I believe, two officer of the watches on duty at

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<p>1 <b>any one time, and then you have another control operator</b></p> <p>2 <b>there.</b></p> <p>3 Q. You mention a screen behind the head table?</p> <p>4 <b>A. Yes, there's normally a television screen, which is the</b></p> <p>5 <b>one which I referred to that wasn't on.</b></p> <p>6 Q. What about the heli-tele link television screen?</p> <p>7 <b>A. No, as I say, there was nothing there that night.</b></p> <p>8 Q. The head table, does that have telephones on it?</p> <p>9 <b>A. Yes, telephones, computer screens, there's an intercom,</b></p> <p>10 <b>which that particular night was linked to the police</b></p> <p>11 <b>helicopter.</b></p> <p>12 Q. What telephone sets does it have on it?</p> <p>13 <b>A. Desk telephone sets plus the critical information line</b></p> <p>14 <b>telephone.</b></p> <p>15 Q. Is that the red one?</p> <p>16 <b>A. The red one.</b></p> <p>17 Q. Who has charge of the red telephone?</p> <p>18 <b>A. That normally comes -- the critical line telephone</b></p> <p>19 <b>normally comes from the command units, so if there's</b></p> <p>20 <b>risk critical or life risk critical information, the</b></p> <p>21 <b>command units have a telephone number direct to that</b></p> <p>22 <b>particular phone within the control room.</b></p> <p>23 Q. What about lines used or usable by BT or buddy control</p> <p>24 rooms such as Essex or North West? Would that come</p> <p>25 through on the red phone or other phones?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 61</p>	<p>1 Sharon Darby who was, we were told, the radio operator</p> <p>2 on the night in the control room, all night.</p> <p>3 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>4 Q. Do you remember that?</p> <p>5 <b>A. I don't remember that, no.</b></p> <p>6 Q. Do you remember anybody occupying the role of radio</p> <p>7 operator?</p> <p>8 <b>A. No. No, I wouldn't be able to say who it was that</b></p> <p>9 <b>night.</b></p> <p>10 Q. Right. Okay. We'll come back to that topic shortly.</p> <p>11 Just continuing with your statement, in the next</p> <p>12 sentence you say:</p> <p>13 "I was asked to take information from the Police</p> <p>14 Helicopter, during this event I spoke with the Police</p> <p>15 Helicopter twice."</p> <p>16 First of all, who asked you to take information from</p> <p>17 the police helicopter?</p> <p>18 <b>A. That was the officer of the watch.</b></p> <p>19 Q. And you say, "I spoke with the Police Helicopter twice";</p> <p>20 how did you do that?</p> <p>21 <b>A. On the head desk, there's a tannoy system. There's a</b></p> <p>22 <b>press button on the tannoy and you speak into the</b></p> <p>23 <b>microphone and there was a speaker on the head desk.</b></p> <p>24 <b>When they transmitted, it came out on the speaker on the</b></p> <p>25 <b>desk.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 63</p>
<p>1 <b>A. That would probably come through on other phones.</b></p> <p>2 <b>Again, not being a control operator, I wouldn't know</b></p> <p>3 <b>which phones they would use for that, whether they'd</b></p> <p>4 <b>just come through on a direct line to our control staff.</b></p> <p>5 Q. Okay.</p> <p>6 Now, you say the head table was very busy with</p> <p>7 information coming into them; where was that information</p> <p>8 coming from?</p> <p>9 <b>A. That was coming from all directions. That was coming</b></p> <p>10 <b>from the actual call operators themselves with regard to</b></p> <p>11 <b>fire survival guidance; it was coming from -- the police</b></p> <p>12 <b>helicopter was on the interlink -- there's like a tannoy</b></p> <p>13 <b>microphone with a speaker, there's information coming in</b></p> <p>14 <b>from that. Very, very busy.</b></p> <p>15 Q. In terms of the control room operators communicating or</p> <p>16 sending information to the head table, how do they do</p> <p>17 that?</p> <p>18 <b>A. There was control operators coming up to the head -- up</b></p> <p>19 <b>to the desk, speaking to the officer of the watch and</b></p> <p>20 <b>passing bits of paper backwards and forwards with</b></p> <p>21 <b>information on.</b></p> <p>22 Q. Do you remember a radio operator in the control room?</p> <p>23 <b>A. All the control operators are radio operators.</b></p> <p>24 Q. Right.</p> <p>25 We've heard quite a lot of evidence last week about</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 62</p>	<p>1 Q. Right.</p> <p>2 You go on to say:</p> <p>3 "The first time I spoke with them I was receiving</p> <p>4 information from them about the fire and where the fire</p> <p>5 was spreading."</p> <p>6 Just pausing there, how soon after arrival in the</p> <p>7 control room did you start to receive information from</p> <p>8 the police helicopter?</p> <p>9 <b>A. So from my memory -- and, again, there are a few blank</b></p> <p>10 <b>spots -- I arrive in -- following the phone</b></p> <p>11 <b>conversations with or trying to phone the deputy</b></p> <p>12 <b>assistant commissioner, I went back into the room.</b></p> <p>13 <b>I then requested an additional station manager be</b></p> <p>14 <b>mobilised to control, and then that would be my first</b></p> <p>15 <b>instance of speaking to the police helicopter. I was</b></p> <p>16 <b>asked to speak to them and take information from them.</b></p> <p>17 Q. How did you get hold of them? Did you have a number to</p> <p>18 ring or a radio?</p> <p>19 <b>A. For?</b></p> <p>20 Q. To the police helicopter.</p> <p>21 <b>A. No, as I've said, it's done by an intercom -- there's</b></p> <p>22 <b>a tannoy system, there is a tannoy microphone that was</b></p> <p>23 <b>on the desk, and it was basically they was calling us</b></p> <p>24 <b>up, I then pressed the button, spoke to the police</b></p> <p>25 <b>helicopter, came through -- it was almost like a radio</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 64</p>



1 **system.**  
 2 Q. I see. So it's a dedicated radio line to the police  
 3 helicopter?  
 4 **A. Yes.**  
 5 Q. Does that utilise the normal channels we've been hearing  
 6 about, channel 1, channel 4 --  
 7 **A. No, this is separate. This would be a separate channel**  
 8 **direct from the police helicopter to the control room.**  
 9 Q. So this doesn't use the main scheme link?  
 10 **A. No.**  
 11 Q. What about FLONOPS?  
 12 **A. No, FLONOPS is our main scheme radio channels that we**  
 13 **have.**  
 14 Q. You say you were receiving information from them about  
 15 the fire and where the fire was spreading.  
 16 What were they telling you?  
 17 **A. The first time that I spoke to them, they was saying**  
 18 **that it was spreading up -- again, it's a little bit**  
 19 **vague -- that the fire was spreading quite rapidly up**  
 20 **the east side of the building. It had reached**  
 21 **a certain -- I can't remember what floor it had**  
 22 **particularly reached. I acknowledged that I'd received**  
 23 **that information.**  
 24 **Then I asked I think it was the officer of the watch**  
 25 **to get that information passed via the Airwave radio to**

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1 **the command unit at the incident.**  
 2 Q. Right.  
 3 You say spreading quite rapidly up the east side of  
 4 the building; did they say anything about any other  
 5 facade or side?  
 6 **A. Not that I remember at that time. They gave me**  
 7 **information about fire spread up the building and where**  
 8 **it was going. I took that information and then passed**  
 9 **that, as I say, to one of the call operators to pass to**  
 10 **the incident ground via the command unit.**  
 11 Q. What would that mean to you, the fact that the fire was  
 12 spreading rapidly up the east face?  
 13 **A. That information would be useful to the officers and the**  
 14 **firefighters on the incident ground to know that they've**  
 15 **got -- the fire is still spreading, it's still**  
 16 **a developing fire.**  
 17 Q. Right. So you pass that information to the incident  
 18 ground via the command unit?  
 19 **A. I asked the control operator to get that information**  
 20 **passed to the incident ground, yes.**  
 21 Q. Right. Let's break that up a little bit.  
 22 First of all, passing that to the command unit, do  
 23 you remember which command unit it was at that stage?  
 24 **A. I believe there was two command units on site, there was**  
 25 **Charlie Uniform 8 and Charlie Uniform 7.**

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1 Q. Do you remember which it was?  
 2 **A. Sorry?**  
 3 Q. Do you remember which it was at that point?  
 4 **A. I don't know which one it went to. From my memory,**  
 5 **I passed it over to the call operator to pass it via the**  
 6 **Airwave radio. I know that Charlie Uniform 7 was**  
 7 **responsible for doing the fire survival guidance**  
 8 **information, so I can only speculate that it went to**  
 9 **Charlie Uniform 8.**  
 10 Q. Right.  
 11 Just pursuing that a bit, you say that you asked the  
 12 call operator to pass it via the Airwave radio.  
 13 **A. Yes, pass that information to the officer of the watch.**  
 14 Q. Who is the call operator?  
 15 **A. I passed that information -- I gave the information to**  
 16 **the officer of the watch and asked if they could pass**  
 17 **that information via the Airwave radio. So the officer**  
 18 **of the watch would have then given that information to**  
 19 **the radio operator.**  
 20 Q. Did you see or hear that information being passed over  
 21 the Airwave radio?  
 22 **A. I didn't, no.**  
 23 Q. Did you then also pass that information to the other  
 24 managers in the control room or the control room  
 25 operators?

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1 **A. At that time -- I was the only officer at that**  
 2 **particular time, from what I remember. I'm not sure**  
 3 **whether they'd just arrived. I was the only senior**  
 4 **officer that was in the control room at that time.**  
 5 Q. To your knowledge, was there any direct link between the  
 6 police helicopter and the command unit?  
 7 **A. I can't say, I don't know.**  
 8 Q. Would there normally be?  
 9 **A. There is a facility for -- there's a heli-tele downlink**  
 10 **and communications that way, but I can't say whether**  
 11 **that was up and running at that time.**  
 12 Q. Do you know why the control room would be being used as  
 13 a middleman, a link in the communication chain, between  
 14 the helicopter and the command unit?  
 15 **A. I can only, again, speculate that that system wasn't set**  
 16 **up and that was their only direct link, was via our**  
 17 **control room.**  
 18 Q. Right.  
 19 Did you seek to find out why the control room was  
 20 being used as a link in a communication chain in that  
 21 way?  
 22 **A. No, I didn't.**  
 23 Q. The second occasion, looking at your statement, is where  
 24 they -- that's the police helicopter -- we'll just look  
 25 at it:

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1 "... were informing me that a flat on the eighth  
 2 (8th) floor appeared to have sheets tied together being  
 3 lowered out of the window and the occupants trying to  
 4 climb out of the window to safety. I was informing the  
 5 OOW of this information and in turn the OOW asked me to  
 6 relay this to the incident control on the ground."  
 7 How long after arriving in the control room did you  
 8 get that information from the police helicopter?  
 9 **A. After the first contact with the police helicopter,**  
 10 **there was a very short time after that. I literally**  
 11 **went away -- I can't remember where I went, but I came**  
 12 **back within a couple of minutes and then the police**  
 13 **helicopter was calling up again. So, again, I contacted**  
 14 **the police helicopter and that information was passed to**  
 15 **me.**  
 16 Q. Okay. You say:  
 17 "... the OOW asked me to relay this to the incident  
 18 control on the ground."  
 19 Did you do that?  
 20 **A. I can't remember at this time. If the officer of the**  
 21 **watch had asked me to do it, I would've done it probably**  
 22 **by my mobile phone.**  
 23 Q. Right, okay. We'll come to the means with which you  
 24 communicated with the command units shortly.  
 25 You think by your mobile phone, so not by radio.

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1 **A. That's correct.**  
 2 Q. Right.  
 3 Do you remember whether in relation to that specific  
 4 information, you recorded it anywhere?  
 5 **A. No. As I say, at that particular time it was a very,**  
 6 **very busy time in the control room, and looking and**  
 7 **taking time, time stamping everything that we was doing,**  
 8 **just wasn't viable.**  
 9 Q. Now, you then go on to say that DAC Fenton arrived at  
 10 the control and set up the Brigade co-ordination centre,  
 11 BCC.  
 12 How soon after your arrival do you remember  
 13 DAC Fenton arriving?  
 14 **A. It's got to be within sort of like 15/20 minutes.**  
 15 Q. You then say:  
 16 "I was instructed by DAC FENTON to take  
 17 responsibility for the control of the Fire Survival  
 18 Guidance Calls ..."  
 19 Did he give you that instruction as soon as he  
 20 arrived or --  
 21 **A. Not directly as soon as he arrived. I think he came in,**  
 22 **he updated himself on the situational awareness. He**  
 23 **came over to me said, "We're going to be setting up the**  
 24 **BCC", and he asked me to take responsibility for the**  
 25 **fire survival guidance calls. He instructed me to use**

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1 **two whiteboards that were available in the control room**  
 2 **to use the recording device for the fire survival**  
 3 **guidance calls.**  
 4 Q. Two whiteboards, you say to use the recording device?  
 5 **A. Use it, yeah -- any information that I got was to be**  
 6 **recorded onto the whiteboards.**  
 7 Q. Right, okay.  
 8 Now, just pausing there, before you arrived, do you  
 9 know who was in charge of the fire survival guidance  
 10 system?  
 11 **A. That would've been the control -- control room would've**  
 12 **been in charge of that.**  
 13 Q. Do you remember who?  
 14 **A. No.**  
 15 Q. Was it the officer of the watch or somebody else?  
 16 **A. The officer of the watch would have had an overview of**  
 17 **it but, again, I couldn't say who had specifically taken**  
 18 **control of it and was dealing with it all.**  
 19 Q. Do you know who was in charge of passing information  
 20 from the control room to the incident ground prior to  
 21 your arrival?  
 22 **A. So normal procedures and protocol would be that fire**  
 23 **survival guidance calls would be communicated over the**  
 24 **airwaves from control to either a command unit or the**  
 25 **incident command pump at the incident.**

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1 Q. Yes, and prior to your arrival, do you know or did you  
 2 find out who was communicating --  
 3 **A. No.**  
 4 Q. -- over the airwaves to the incident ground?  
 5 **A. No, I didn't know that at the time.**  
 6 Q. When you arrived, did you take any kind of handover from  
 7 the person who had been doing FSG?  
 8 **A. No.**  
 9 Q. When DAC Fenton instructed you to take over the FSG, did  
 10 you take any kind of handover from the person who had  
 11 been doing it?  
 12 **A. No.**  
 13 Q. Do you know why?  
 14 **A. Again, it was just so busy in there. Everybody was**  
 15 **working flat out and I was just instructed to take**  
 16 **control of fire survival guidance. My role would be --**  
 17 **I was given a brief that my role would be to collate**  
 18 **fire survival guidance information from the control**  
 19 **operators and then pass that to the incident ground.**  
 20 Q. Okay.  
 21 When you took over that role, did you seek to learn  
 22 what was happening on the incident ground to resolve  
 23 each FSG call?  
 24 **A. At that particular time, the amount of fire survival**  
 25 **guidance information calls that were coming in, I didn't**

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<p>1 <b>have time to ask them questions. It was literally</b></p> <p>2 <b>a case of one fire survival guidance call coming in</b></p> <p>3 <b>after the other, and being on the telephone, literally</b></p> <p>4 <b>passing the information constantly for a number of hours</b></p> <p>5 <b>to the command unit.</b></p> <p>6 Q. Okay.</p> <p>7 At the point at which you took over responsibility</p> <p>8 for handling the FSG calls in the way that you were, did</p> <p>9 you take any steps to find out about the building, its</p> <p>10 layout, its construction or anything like that?</p> <p>11 <b>A. Again, with the amount of information that I was</b></p> <p>12 <b>receiving from the call operators, I only had time to</b></p> <p>13 <b>concentrate on the information that I was passing over.</b></p> <p>14 <b>That particular information for me probably would've</b></p> <p>15 <b>been -- that wouldn't have been pertinent to what I was</b></p> <p>16 <b>actually doing. My role was to send risk critical life,</b></p> <p>17 <b>people who were at risk or lives are in danger to the</b></p> <p>18 <b>command unit so that actions could be taken on the fire</b></p> <p>19 <b>ground.</b></p> <p>20 Q. In doing that exercise, were you aware of any</p> <p>21 contingency plans, fallback plans, for evacuation, total</p> <p>22 or partial, for Grenfell Tower?</p> <p>23 <b>A. Not at that time, not when I initially started, no.</b></p> <p>24 Q. Did there come a time when you did become aware of such</p> <p>25 plans?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 73</p>	<p>1 <b>but I wasn't sure that he had; again, it's just making</b></p> <p>2 <b>assumptions.</b></p> <p>3 Q. Okay.</p> <p>4 Just moving on, then, with your statement. At the</p> <p>5 bottom of page 4, you say, after discussing the tasking</p> <p>6 that DAC Fenton gave you:</p> <p>7 " I utilised two (2) white boards for this task and</p> <p>8 used them to record and chart all the information</p> <p>9 received into the control room ..."</p> <p>10 Then you produce them.</p> <p>11 Let's just have those open in front of us. I don't</p> <p>12 know whether we're able to do a split screen,</p> <p>13 Mr Documents Director, and have them there. It is JAO/4</p> <p>14 and JAO/5. It would be very useful to have them both on</p> <p>15 the screen at the same time if we can, and if we can't,</p> <p>16 we can't, but I just want to identify these to start</p> <p>17 with.</p> <p>18 Ah, we can, that's wonderful. Thank you.</p> <p>19 So these are JAO/4 and JAO/5. Could you first of</p> <p>20 all just help us identify which one was where? Which</p> <p>21 one was to the left and to the right of the other?</p> <p>22 <b>A. So the left-hand board was the first board which</b></p> <p>23 <b>I started. Where it says flat 182, 21st floor, that was</b></p> <p>24 <b>the first fire survival guidance information that</b></p> <p>25 <b>I passed over to the command unit.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 75</p>
<p>1 <b>A. Such plans for?</b></p> <p>2 Q. Total or partial evacuation.</p> <p>3 <b>A. Are you saying like preplanned? Preplanned evacuation</b></p> <p>4 <b>of the building?</b></p> <p>5 Q. Yes.</p> <p>6 <b>A. No, I wasn't aware of any of them.</b></p> <p>7 Q. Okay.</p> <p>8 Did the control room have available to it in some</p> <p>9 form the history of the building, the type of building</p> <p>10 materials used in it, escape routes --</p> <p>11 <b>A. Not that I'm aware of.</b></p> <p>12 Q. -- cladding, things like that?</p> <p>13 <b>A. Not that I'm aware of, no.</b></p> <p>14 Q. Right. Okay.</p> <p>15 Did you know who the senior fire safety officer was</p> <p>16 on duty that night?</p> <p>17 <b>A. We don't have one -- normally on each rota there's</b></p> <p>18 <b>normally a number of station officers -- again, going</b></p> <p>19 <b>back to the tags -- who have a tag as a senior fire</b></p> <p>20 <b>safety officer.</b></p> <p>21 <b>I'm aware that Station Manager Danny Egan has</b></p> <p>22 <b>a senior fire safety officer tag, and when I was made</b></p> <p>23 <b>aware that he'd been mobilised to that incident, knowing</b></p> <p>24 <b>that it was in north-west London, that was probably one</b></p> <p>25 <b>of the reasons why he had been mobilised to it, as a --</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 74</p>	<p>1 Q. Okay. So were these up, as it were, blank at the same</p> <p>2 time and filled in at the same time?</p> <p>3 <b>A. Yes. When they was pointed out to me by DAC Fenton,</b></p> <p>4 <b>they was just clear whiteboards.</b></p> <p>5 Q. Okay. Did you fill them out simultaneously or one after</p> <p>6 the other?</p> <p>7 <b>A. No, just one after the other, so the one on the left was</b></p> <p>8 <b>completed first and then went over to the one on the</b></p> <p>9 <b>right-hand side.</b></p> <p>10 Q. As further information came in, did you update each one?</p> <p>11 <b>A. Yes. Again, because of the amount of information that</b></p> <p>12 <b>I was receiving -- so if you have a look at -- I think</b></p> <p>13 <b>it's the third entry down. I think it's got 133,</b></p> <p>14 <b>they've got information, so if you come down a little</b></p> <p>15 <b>bit to the left-hand side -- if you go to the left.</b></p> <p>16 Q. Yes.</p> <p>17 <b>A. 133, it's showing a little arrow to the side saying</b></p> <p>18 <b>"rescued", and then 201, if you go to the very far</b></p> <p>19 <b>right-hand side, there's a little line, it says "now</b></p> <p>20 <b>unconscious".</b></p> <p>21 Q. Yes. Right. I see.</p> <p>22 In terms of handwriting, can you just identify,</p> <p>23 whose handwriting is that on the first one, JAO/4?</p> <p>24 <b>A. That's mine.</b></p> <p>25 Q. All of it?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 76</p>

1 **A. All of that is mine, yes.**  
 2 Q. There's a difference between the green pen and the black  
 3 pen. Why is that?  
 4 **A. I don't know. That is all my writing.**  
 5 Q. Okay.  
 6 Then looking at the one next door to it, JAO/5,  
 7 again, is that your handwriting?  
 8 **A. Yes.**  
 9 Q. All of it?  
 10 **A. Yes.**  
 11 Q. What about where it says 193, 23rd, 10 people?  
 12 **A. Yes.**  
 13 Q. You think that's your handwriting?  
 14 **A. That's my handwriting, yes.**  
 15 Q. Can you account for why you suddenly switched to green?  
 16 **A. I know I was having trouble with one of the pens,**  
 17 **a couple of the pens started running out, so --**  
 18 Q. Jo Smith gave evidence -- sorry.  
 19 **A. And a couple of times, looking back at my call -- at the**  
 20 **time when I gave my statement, I thought that I was**  
 21 **constantly on the phone to the command unit, but when**  
 22 **I looked, there was short breaks in between. So there**  
 23 **may have been times where I'd liaise with call operators**  
 24 **where they've given me more information or I've received**  
 25 **information back, and then gone and spoke to the call**

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1 **operators or the officer of the watch and then come back**  
 2 **to the board, I put the pen down and then picked**  
 3 **a different pen up to write the information on the**  
 4 **board.**  
 5 Q. Okay.  
 6 Jo Smith gave evidence last week that the entry for  
 7 193 in green, 10 people, was her. Do you remember  
 8 whether that might be so?  
 9 **A. No, I don't, no.**  
 10 Q. Who else --  
 11 **A. As far as I'm aware, I was the only person who was**  
 12 **writing on those boards.**  
 13 Q. Okay.  
 14 Now, you say at the bottom of page 4 of your  
 15 statement that that would include the flat number, floor  
 16 number, number of occupants and conditions.  
 17 **A. Yes.**  
 18 Q. When you look at the second whiteboard, you see that  
 19 once you get to the fourth entry down, 83 on the 11th,  
 20 you don't get number of occupants. Similarly, 123 on  
 21 the 15th, you don't get the number of occupants.  
 22 Indeed, 113 on the 14th.  
 23 **A. On the -- sorry to interrupt, but on the information**  
 24 **I was just putting -- if there was no number of**  
 25 **occupants in there then I hadn't received that**

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1 **information.**  
 2 Q. Would it not be vitally important to obtain the  
 3 information as to the number of occupants?  
 4 **A. At the time of completing these boards, I wasn't in**  
 5 **direct contact with the call operators. I was being**  
 6 **given small pieces of paper with the information on. It**  
 7 **didn't have the call operator's name or identification**  
 8 **who had taken the call, so it would've been very, very**  
 9 **difficult for me and time consuming to go back to the**  
 10 **call operator to try and gather that type of**  
 11 **information. Because this information was coming in**  
 12 **constantly from either the call operators or I was**  
 13 **receiving information back from the command unit, it**  
 14 **would've been too time-consuming.**  
 15 **To get the information to the command unit, as**  
 16 **I say, that these people were trapped was more important**  
 17 **than finding out how many people was in there so that we**  
 18 **got crews up there to deal with the fire survival**  
 19 **guidance calls.**  
 20 Q. Okay.  
 21 Now, in terms of the source of information on these  
 22 boards, where were you getting this information from?  
 23 **A. As I say, the calls were coming in to the call**  
 24 **operators, the call operators were then approaching me,**  
 25 **I was given small pieces of paper with the flat number,**

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1 **what floor it was on and information regarding the**  
 2 **people inside the property and/or conditions inside that**  
 3 **premises.**  
 4 Q. Okay.  
 5 Now, let's just take this a bit more slowly. The  
 6 call operator is on the phone to the caller --  
 7 **A. Yes.**  
 8 Q. -- and gets -- let's take, for example, the first entry  
 9 on the first page, so this is the very first one you  
 10 write down. Left-hand board, flat 182, 21st floor,  
 11 three children, two adults, "Leave", I think it says.  
 12 **A. Yes.**  
 13 Q. Now, that information you wrote there, as you said,  
 14 using the green pen.  
 15 **A. Yes.**  
 16 Q. You say that it comes from the control room operators.  
 17 What do they do? They're on the phone. While  
 18 they're on the call, are they writing?  
 19 **A. I can only assume. I mean, I was -- a call operator**  
 20 **came up to me, I had different people come up to me,**  
 21 **give me pieces of information on little squares of paper**  
 22 **or little pieces of paper with the flat number, the**  
 23 **floor number and some additional information, and then**  
 24 **I then passed that directly to the command unit and**  
 25 **I recorded it up on the board.**

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1 Q. In terms of the people coming to you, were you at the  
 2 head table?  
 3 **A. No. No, I was in the corner of the control room.**  
 4 Q. In the corner of the control room?  
 5 **A. Yes. So the head table was here and I was in the corner**  
 6 **on the far right-hand side (Indicates).**  
 7 **The head table was -- there was just too many people**  
 8 **there, there was too much information going backwards**  
 9 **and forwards. You had the senior operations manager,**  
 10 **two officer of the watches, DAC Fenton was there, so to**  
 11 **be able to communicate clearly and concisely to the**  
 12 **command unit, I had two whiteboards over in the far**  
 13 **corner of the control room that was up on the wall,**  
 14 **control operator staff knew that I was over there, so**  
 15 **any fire survival guidance information came over to me,**  
 16 **was passed to me, I passed it to the command unit and**  
 17 **recorded it up on the boards.**  
 18 Q. Just picking apart this little bit of detail.  
 19 Who were the individuals, do you remember, who were  
 20 bringing you the pieces of paper?  
 21 **A. As far as I'm aware, they're control operators.**  
 22 Q. So had they finished their calls when they brought you  
 23 the pieces of paper or were they able to continue the  
 24 calls while bringing you the pieces of paper?  
 25 **A. They wouldn't have been on the calls. They wouldn't**

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1 **have been on the calls. But, again, with our fire**  
 2 **survival guidance policy, because of the amount of calls**  
 3 **that come in, it does state they can terminate those**  
 4 **calls if the situation changes. If it stays the same**  
 5 **and they need to take further calls then they can go on**  
 6 **to other calls.**  
 7 **I'm not sure -- I can't say whether the person or**  
 8 **persons who kept coming up to me were runners, but as**  
 9 **far as I am aware, they was control operator staff.**  
 10 Q. Right. You think they might have been runners, do you?  
 11 **A. No, control don't have runners, so I would say they was**  
 12 **control operator staff.**  
 13 Q. Does that mean that they would've had to have finished  
 14 their calls before they were able to leave their desks  
 15 with the pieces of paper and bring them to you at the  
 16 whiteboard?  
 17 **A. I can't answer that, I don't know.**  
 18 Q. From what you were seeing and experiencing on the night,  
 19 was that the position?  
 20 **A. I had a lot of different people come up to me with**  
 21 **information on bits of paper, with fire survival**  
 22 **guidance information that was passed to me and then**  
 23 **I passed that information on.**  
 24 Q. If a control room operator, in the course of an ongoing  
 25 call to a caller, told them that they were informing the

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1 crews now of the situation, "I'm sending a message to  
 2 the crews", how would they do that whilst still being on  
 3 the call, do you know?  
 4 **A. I can't answer that question because, as I say, I'm not**  
 5 **the call operator. All I can tell you is what I did on**  
 6 **the night. As I say, I was in the corner of the room**  
 7 **with the two whiteboards and I was receiving information**  
 8 **from control operator staff with fire survival guidance**  
 9 **information. I can't say directly whether they was or**  
 10 **was not directly on fire survival guidance calls.**  
 11 Q. Right. Can you help -- maybe you can't -- with any  
 12 communications between control room operators and the  
 13 radio operator?  
 14 **A. No, that's not part of my role.**  
 15 Q. Did you know that the radio operator -- okay, let me try  
 16 something slightly different.  
 17 Can you please go to the short incident log and go  
 18 to, for example, page 21.  
 19 I'm going to show you a message which was sent at  
 20 a time when you were in the control room on the basis of  
 21 what you've told us so far.  
 22 At the foot of the page you can see, at 02.09.08:  
 23 "Service Request Created: RT4 - G271 - FIRE IN  
 24 CORRIDOR FLOOR 12 - CALLER TRAPPED FLAT 95."  
 25 And then that service request is completed at

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1 02.10.21, just a minute and a half or so later.  
 2 Do you see that?  
 3 **A. Yes.**  
 4 Q. Now, this is from the short incident log. Can you help  
 5 us answer this question: how did the person, SAD,  
 6 complete that service request and then log it in that  
 7 way?  
 8 **A. I can't answer that question.**  
 9 Q. Jo Smith told us that this kind of process was where  
 10 a control room operator on the phone sent a message on  
 11 the computer to the radio operator and then the radio  
 12 operator contacted the relevant command pump --  
 13 **A. Yes.**  
 14 Q. -- with the message. That was the gist of her evidence.  
 15 **A. That would be -- as I say, that looks like that's gone**  
 16 **over the Airwave radio to the incident command pump, but**  
 17 **I wasn't aware of that, that that message had gone.**  
 18 Q. Not maybe in relation to that message, but were you  
 19 aware then generally that while you were passing  
 20 messages from your whiteboard to the command unit,  
 21 someone else in the control room was passing the same,  
 22 similar or different messages over the radio --  
 23 **A. That's quite possible.**  
 24 Q. It's possible.  
 25 **A. Mm.**

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1 Q. Okay. Did you know that?  
 2 **A. At the time, no.**  
 3 Q. Right.  
 4 **A. As I say, our normal protocol for fire survival guidance**  
 5 **is that they would be passed via the Airwave radio.**  
 6 **But, again, as this was an unprecedented incident, the**  
 7 **amount of fire survival guidance information that was**  
 8 **coming in, it was passed over to me to pass the**  
 9 **information to the command unit.**  
 10 Q. Okay. We're going to get to that in due course.  
 11 A little bit more of a run-up, though.  
 12 Before you started the whiteboard system, what  
 13 system was in place, do you know, in the control room,  
 14 for recording the kind of information that needed to be  
 15 passed to the incident ground?  
 16 **A. So normal procedures, again -- at the time of the**  
 17 **incident, I wasn't aware that any was in place, but**  
 18 **normal procedures for fire survival guidance is that the**  
 19 **call operator will contact the incident command pump or**  
 20 **the command unit. They would then transfer that**  
 21 **information, the radio operator, and the incident**  
 22 **command pump or the command unit would then record that**  
 23 **information on what's called a control information form.**  
 24 **It's in quadruple form; one bit is kept on the incident**  
 25 **command bit and then the other three are passed out**

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1 **around the incident ground. Normally one goes to the**  
 2 **fire survival guidance co-ordinator, one goes to the**  
 3 **bridgehead where the search sector commander is so that**  
 4 **they're aware that they've got fire survival guidance,**  
 5 **they know where to direct crews to.**  
 6 Q. Right. Just so we're absolutely clear about this, this  
 7 is contained in policy 790, tab 5 of the policies  
 8 bundle, appendix number 2, control information form, on  
 9 page 8.  
 10 Can I just ask you just to see that to verify that  
 11 we're talking about the same thing.  
 12 Is that what you're referring to?  
 13 **A. That's correct.**  
 14 Q. That's used in the command unit?  
 15 **A. In the command unit or the incident command pump to take**  
 16 **initial fire survival guidance information.**  
 17 Q. Okay. You say one bit is kept on the incident command  
 18 unit?  
 19 **A. So you'll see in the top left-hand corner where it says**  
 20 **"White copy: ICP", ICP stands for incident command pump**  
 21 **or vehicle.**  
 22 Q. You say, I think, in your last answer but one, that one  
 23 goes to the fire survival guidance co-ordinator --  
 24 **A. Yes.**  
 25 Q. -- and one goes to the bridgehead. Now, who would be

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1 the survival guidance co-ordinator to whom one copy  
 2 would go on the incident ground?  
 3 **A. So whenever we have a fire survival guidance incident,**  
 4 **a station manager would've been mobilised to that**  
 5 **incident and he would have been given the role as fire**  
 6 **survival guidance co-ordinator so that when he arrived**  
 7 **at the incident, he would also mobilise a separate**  
 8 **command unit to deal with all the fire survival guidance**  
 9 **information and he would co-ordinate all the information**  
 10 **with regards to fire survival guidance between the**  
 11 **command unit, the control unit and the firefighters or**  
 12 **the control at the bridgehead.**  
 13 Q. And from the time you started dealing with the FSG  
 14 calls, who was the fire survival guidance co-ordinator,  
 15 do you remember?  
 16 **A. I don't know. The information -- I was speaking**  
 17 **directly to the command unit staff. So, again, you**  
 18 **would utilise the command unit staff to gather**  
 19 **information or take information from the command unit,**  
 20 **and then as that -- you would then pass that information**  
 21 **on to the search co-ordinator.**  
 22 Q. Okay. You also said, now a number of answers ago, that  
 23 one of these copies would also go to the bridgehead; is  
 24 that right?  
 25 **A. Well, yeah, the bridgehead is the focal point from where**

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1 **the operations will be taking place with regards to**  
 2 **high-rise premises, and at that you'd have a fire sector**  
 3 **commander and you'd normally have a search sector**  
 4 **commander as well, so that if you get that information,**  
 5 **you can liaise with the sector commander so that**  
 6 **resources can be deployed to rescue the people in that**  
 7 **fire survival guidance information.**  
 8 Q. So in the normal course of things, you would expect  
 9 a copy -- yellow, blue or green -- to go to the  
 10 bridgehead --  
 11 **A. Yes.**  
 12 Q. -- from the command unit?  
 13 **A. Yes.**  
 14 Q. Normally, how would that piece of paper be taken from  
 15 the command unit to the bridgehead?  
 16 **A. Well, that information can be passed via handheld radios**  
 17 **from the FSG to the search co-ordinator. At the**  
 18 **bridgehead they may have -- or they should have --**  
 19 **what's called a FIB, a forward information recording**  
 20 **board, so that information can then -- once the**  
 21 **information has been transferred via handheld radio,**  
 22 **you'd have a record on the forward information board to**  
 23 **say where the fire survival guidance calls or**  
 24 **information is, how many people, et cetera, so that,**  
 25 **again, resources can then be deployed to that area, and**

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1 **then a physical copy could then be passed via runner to**  
 2 **the bridgehead.**  
 3 Q. So would you normally then have a dual system of FSG  
 4 information coming from the command unit or ICP, one by  
 5 piece of paper through a runner, and the other by radio?  
 6 **A. The initial information would've been passed via**  
 7 **handheld radio and then backed up with a hard copy so**  
 8 **that any information that -- so that no information is**  
 9 **actually missed.**  
 10 Q. I see.  
 11 So I am absolutely clear, the normal method of  
 12 communication between the command unit and the  
 13 bridgehead in relation to an FSG call is by handheld  
 14 radio -- that's fire ground radio, is it?  
 15 **A. That's fire ground radio, yeah. That's the quickest and**  
 16 **most expedient way of transferring information on the**  
 17 **fire ground. Whether that happened or not because of**  
 18 **the -- again, I shouldn't speculate, but again, I can**  
 19 **only imagine that the handheld radios were extremely**  
 20 **busy that night. So in them situations, other channels**  
 21 **can be used, but if that is the case, it may have been**  
 22 **quicker to pass the fire survival guidance information**  
 23 **via the form.**  
 24 Q. Just in terms of normal operations, handheld radio is  
 25 the primary method of communication --

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1 **A. Yes.**  
 2 Q. -- is that right? And then the appendix 2, CIF, control  
 3 form copy is, as it were, backup?  
 4 **A. It's a backup and it's a belt and braces.**  
 5 Q. Yes, exactly, belt and braces is a good expression. All  
 6 right.  
 7 Is the control information form ever used in the  
 8 Brigade control room?  
 9 **A. Not that I'm aware of, no.**  
 10 Q. I think we were on the system in place in the control  
 11 room before you instituted the whiteboard system for  
 12 recording FSG details. We may have deviated a little  
 13 from that topic.  
 14 Just going back to that, can you just help me answer  
 15 that question.  
 16 What was the system in place before you started the  
 17 whiteboard system for recording FSG information?  
 18 **A. So standard procedure for fire survival guidance**  
 19 **information is to pass the information by the Airwave**  
 20 **radio to the incident command vehicle.**  
 21 Q. So would it be recorded at all in the control room or  
 22 would it just go straight from the CRO to the --  
 23 **A. That would be recorded on the -- I believe that would've**  
 24 **been recorded on the incident log. You've got like --**  
 25 **whenever information is passed via the handheld radio,**

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1 **it's normally recorded in the incident log.**  
 2 **Where you showed them ones before and it's on the**  
 3 **incident log, that shows that it's been passed via our**  
 4 **Airwave radio.**  
 5 Q. Right. Okay. Let's just perhaps take an earlier  
 6 example, then, before you got involved.  
 7 If you go back to the short incident log at  
 8 page 18 -- again, this is an example, I don't want  
 9 people to think I am asking you all the questions I have  
 10 about a specific call -- but at 01.31.38 there is  
 11 a service request. PD, which we now know is Pete Duddy,  
 12 creates a service request:  
 13 "... RT4 - G271 - FURTHER CALL TO SAY FIRE ON 20TH  
 14 FLOOR ALSO - PEOPLE TRAPPED."  
 15 Now, we don't know the flat number or the numbers of  
 16 people, but that message going to the incident ground,  
 17 you say, do you, that that would've gone directly from  
 18 the control room operator who was managing the call,  
 19 straight to the incident ground?  
 20 **A. That would've gone via the radio operator, yes.**  
 21 Q. Okay.  
 22 You say via the radio operator, is that a different  
 23 person in the control room from the person handling the  
 24 call?  
 25 **A. Again, because I'm the operational side, I'm not sure of**

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1 **the control operator's procedure for passing that**  
 2 **information to the radio operator.**  
 3 Q. Right.  
 4 So you can't help me with whether there was, as  
 5 I say, a parallel or a different system, but you think  
 6 it was done by radio?  
 7 **A. I can only say what I can see. It looks like there was**  
 8 **a number of bits of information that was passed via the**  
 9 **Airwave radio to Golf 271 with regards to further**  
 10 **information that was coming in with regards to calls to**  
 11 **fires within the building.**  
 12 Q. Was anything insufficient about that system of using the  
 13 Airwave radio direct from the CRO?  
 14 **A. Sorry, can you repeat that?**  
 15 Q. Yes, let me try it a different way.  
 16 When DAC Fenton instructed you to start using the  
 17 whiteboard system to record the information, was there  
 18 anything wrong with the system that was being used  
 19 before?  
 20 **A. The Airwave radio is one channel and there was a lot of**  
 21 **radio traffic going backwards and forwards from the**  
 22 **incident. It would've tied up a lot of Airwave radio**  
 23 **time giving all that information over to the command**  
 24 **unit via the Airwave radio.**  
 25 Q. Okay.

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<p>1 Now, you then start communicating the information on 2 your whiteboard to the incident ground. 3 In the early stages of that, what method of 4 communication did you use? 5 <b>A. As soon as I started with the whiteboards, I was using 6 my Brigade mobile phone.</b> 7 Q. Did you ever use your Airwave radio to communicate with 8 the incident ground? 9 <b>A. No.</b> 10 Q. Is there a reason for that? 11 <b>A. Because my role as officer of the day is not to have 12 direct contact with the fire ground via the Airwave 13 radio.</b> 14 Q. And who did you ring? 15 <b>A. Charlie Uniform 7.</b> 16 Q. 7? 17 <b>A. Yeah.</b> 18 Q. Not 8? 19 <b>A. Not that I'm aware, no. I'm sure it was Charlie 20 Uniform 7.</b> 21 Q. Right. So -- 22 <b>A. I could be wrong because I know there was two command 23 units there and I was definitely speaking to one or the 24 other.</b> 25 Q. Which individual was it on the CU that you were speaking</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 93</p>	<p>1 <b>A. Sorry, could you just scroll up a little bit? Sorry.</b> 2 <b>No, there's one at ...</b> 3 Q. We have the last -- 4 <b>A. Yeah, no, I'm just looking because the first previous -- 5 I think it's the first previous nine would've been the 6 phone calls to Deputy Assistant Commissioner 7 Lee Drawbridge and then from there I went onto the 8 command unit.</b> 9 Q. Ah, that's very helpful. 10 <b>A. Also, as well, if you look at 01.25, that would've been 11 the call once I'd been paged to control.</b> 12 Q. Right. Okay. Well, we've redacted those out of, 13 I suppose, an abundance of caution, but I can tell you 14 that the calls from 01.57 to 02.02, there are nine of 15 them and they are to the same number. 16 <b>A. Yes, that would've been Deputy Assistant Commissioner 17 Lee Drawbridge.</b> 18 Q. Right. Then there's a call at 01.27 to an 0203 number. 19 <b>A. Yes. As I say, I think the initial call that I made to 20 control when I was paged was 01.25, but I think it was 21 extremely busy, so by the time I'd tried and tried or 22 tried again, it was 01.27 by the time they answered and 23 I booked status 2.</b> 24 Q. When you did your statement for the police, presumably 25 you had the document in front of you?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 95</p>
<p>1 to? 2 <b>A. It would've been one of the command operator staff. 3 I didn't have his name.</b> 4 Q. Does the name Daniel Meyrick mean anything to you? 5 <b>A. No. No, again, at the time of the incident, formalities 6 of taking people's names just didn't happen.</b> 7 Q. Okay. 8 So let's look at your phone records, if we can, 9 these are exhibited at JAO/7, which is MET00016910. 10 Let's see if we can get a detailed picture. 11 First of all, let's just see if we can time the 12 calls. 13 Mr Documents Director, if we can just put up the 14 third page, there. Then if we can highlight those that 15 are highlighted in yellow towards the bottom of the 16 page. I can just be clear about these: these are all of 17 them. There is a second or I should say last page of 18 this bill, but it doesn't have any relevant calls on it. 19 Now, we have a time for the first of the relevant 20 calls at 02.06, and we've redacted part of the number, 21 but we can see, other than the partially redacted 22 number, the duration of the call, and the happy fact 23 that it doesn't cost you anything. 24 Was that the first call, do you think, you made? 25 Around about that time, 02.06?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 94</p>	<p>1 <b>A. Not at the time, no.</b> 2 Q. You didn't. 3 <b>A. Not at the time. The police requested the records after 4 I'd given the statement.</b> 5 Q. Having seen the records, did they confirm what you said 6 in your statement? 7 <b>A. Yes, yes.</b> 8 Q. Looking then at the time mark of 02.06 for 15 minutes 9 and 58 seconds, would that be the first call to the 10 relevant command unit? 11 <b>A. Yes, and, again, that could've been the information -- 12 again, that could've been the initial information 13 regarding the information from the police helicopter.</b> 14 Q. Can I just ask you to go back to the short incident log 15 and look at -- 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Are we coming back to this document, 17 Mr Millett? 18 MR MILLETT: We are, very much so, yes. We are going to 19 flip around a bit. 20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That's all right. 21 MR MILLETT: Page 22 of the short incident log for the time 22 mark of 02.23.33. 23 It says there SAD -- we know that to be 24 Sharon Darby: 25 "Key.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 96</p>

24 (Pages 93 to 96)



<p>1 "CU7 RUN ALL FSG CALLS VIA CU7."  2 <b>A. So that would've been the command unit that I would've</b>  3 <b>been phoning.</b>  4 Q. Would that mean that prior to 02.23, you weren't  5 speaking to CU7?  6 <b>A. No, that would've been -- I would've still been speaking</b>  7 <b>to them. That's just that Charlie Uniform 7's just</b>  8 <b>confirmed that they are dealing with all the fire</b>  9 <b>survival guidance calls.</b>  10 Q. Okay.  11 <b>A. They was probably dealing with it before that message</b>  12 <b>went or that message came out.</b>  13 Q. Right. Okay.  14 But just to be clear, you think that this call at  15 02.06 is the first call to the incident ground?  16 <b>A. Yes. Again, I can't actually remember the first call,</b>  17 <b>whether that was the information via the police</b>  18 <b>helicopter or whether that was the initial first fire</b>  19 <b>survival guidance call.</b>  20 Q. Okay. Okay.  21 Now, it lasts for, as you see, 15 minutes and  22 58 seconds, which would take you to about 02.21.  23 <b>A. I would say because of the time that I was on the phone</b>  24 <b>that that would've been the fire survival guidance</b>  25 <b>calls.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 97</p>	<p>1 weren't operating a parallel system?  2 <b>A. No.</b>  3 Q. Okay.  4 Now, prior to your arrival, did you know how FSG  5 calls were being passed to the incident ground?  6 <b>A. Again, our fire survival guidance policy would normally</b>  7 <b>be that that information would've gone via the Airwave</b>  8 <b>radio.</b>  9 Q. Did you know whether they were being passed to one unit  10 or more than one unit?  11 <b>A. Again, going back to our policy, normally when we</b>  12 <b>receive fire survival guidance information, a separate</b>  13 <b>command unit and, as I say, a station manager are</b>  14 <b>mobilised specifically to deal with fire survival</b>  15 <b>guidance information. So as soon as that command unit</b>  16 <b>is in attendance and it is confirmed that they're taking</b>  17 <b>over, then they would receive all the information</b>  18 <b>regarding fire survival guidance.</b>  19 Q. Okay.  20 Now, in the control debrief notes, which I am going  21 to show you -- these are LFB00003113. Can we just open  22 those up. If I can show you page 4 of those, please.  23 I should just tell you what this document is to  24 start with. These are notes, handwritten notes, taken  25 by, we think, the chair of a control debrief meeting,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 99</p>
<p>1 Q. Yes.  2 Now, I just want to flip back, I'm afraid, to the  3 short incident log at page 21, and just ask you about  4 the calls we looked at a minute ago.  5 At 02.09.08 you can see PD, Pete Duddy, making  6 a service request:  7 "... RT4 - G271 - FIRE IN CORRIDOR FLOOR 12 - CALLER  8 TRAPPED FLAT 95."  9 Then that is completed, as we saw, at 02.10.21.  10 Do you know whether or do you remember whether while  11 you were on your mobile to the command unit, other  12 people in the control room were also passing fire  13 survival guidance details to the incident ground via the  14 radio?  15 <b>A. I didn't know. I wasn't aware of that, no.</b>  16 Q. Would it surprise you to learn that that was happening?  17 <b>A. With regards to what was going on in the control room,</b>  18 <b>no, it wouldn't surprise me because there would be</b>  19 <b>an overlap time of -- there would've probably been</b>  20 <b>an overlap time of information going via the Airwave</b>  21 <b>radio to what I was doing.</b>  22 Q. Did anybody tell you or discuss with you in the control  23 room as you started this fire survival guidance  24 communication with the fire ground that you should  25 liaise with the radio operator to make sure that you</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 98</p>	<p>1 Andy Hearn, which took place on 24 July 2017.  2 <b>A. Sorry, can you speak up a little bit? I didn't quite</b>  3 <b>catch that.</b>  4 Q. Yes.  5 These are handwritten notes, we think taken by the  6 chair of the meeting, Andy Hearn, of a meeting which  7 took place on 24 July 2017 to debrief the control room,  8 and you can see the attendees there.  9 I don't think you're present, but present were  10 Debbie Real, Peter May, Keith Diamond, Jo Smith, Adam,  11 who we know now to be Adam Crinion, Alex Norman and  12 Adrian, and that's Adrian Fenton, we think.  13 Then if you look at the fourth page of this  14 document, it says, just before halfway down the page:  15 "SM Oliff arrives -- Offers help.  16 "-- Opens up line with CU."  17 Now, I just wanted to ask you about that.  18 When you opened up a line with CU, I think you said  19 you only used your mobile.  20 <b>A. Yes, it's just a communication line.</b>  21 Q. Right. Was there not a line open to the CU before that?  22 <b>A. I can't answer that. I don't know.</b>  23 Q. Do you know before you arrived whether fire survival  24 guidance messages were being passed to the incident  25 control pump or to a CU?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 100</p>

1 **A. I wasn't given any information regarding that at the**  
2 **time.**  
3 Q. Is that because you didn't have a handover from the  
4 person who was in charge of passing FSG information to  
5 the control unit before you arrived?  
6 **A. Say that again, sorry?**  
7 Q. Is that because you didn't have a handover?  
8 **A. I can't say whether I had a handover or not. As I say,**  
9 **the actual control room that night was -- everyone was**  
10 **at full steam. They was at full capacity. Everyone was**  
11 **working very, very hard.**  
12 **Time for a normal policies and protocols were --**  
13 **there wasn't time for a lot of it. It was basically**  
14 **given a job, get on and do it.**  
15 Q. The note also says -- just for completeness, I'll show  
16 this to you:  
17 "-- All FSGs passed this way.  
18 "-- Mobile phone -- personal mobile, no other way."  
19 Now, obviously you didn't write this, and I'm making  
20 an assumption that that's describing what you did, but  
21 that looks like it says that all FSGs were passed by you  
22 on your mobile and not by any other means.  
23 **A. Yes.**  
24 Q. Would that be consistent with your recollection?  
25 **A. Yes.**

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1 Q. Right.  
2 On that basis, can I then ask you to look at one or  
3 two of these calls. I want you to look, please, first  
4 at the short incident log at page 21. Keep your phone  
5 records -- if they can be kept on the board with the  
6 split screen, we may be able to do this by split screen.  
7 We've succeeded before this morning, so fortune favours  
8 the brave, Mr Documents Director.  
9 Brilliant, it can be done!  
10 Now, can I then ask you to look at the entry on  
11 page 21 at 02.05.55.  
12 Well, let's actually try a better one. Let's try  
13 02.06.06, which is an easier one. 02.06.06 we have  
14 service request made by HJF, which is Heidi Fox, we've  
15 discovered.  
16 "Service Request Created: RT4 TO CU8 FURTHER CALL X2  
17 ADULTS AND 1 CHILD TRAPPED INSIDE FLAT 82 ON FLOOR 11."  
18 And that's at, as I say, 02.06, so that would be  
19 just about the same time as you start your call, do you  
20 see that?  
21 **A. Yes.**  
22 Q. Which lasts for 15 minutes and 58 seconds.  
23 **A. Yes.**  
24 Q. Now, if we look across to the whiteboard, the first  
25 whiteboard, if we can just have that up -- and I daren't

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1 ask whether we can do triple split screens. But if you  
2 look at the first one --  
3 **A. Yes.**  
4 Q. -- we have --  
5 **A. Yes, might have got that wrong with -- the first board**  
6 **might have been the one on the right-hand side.**  
7 Q. I was going to ask you, yes, the first one looks as  
8 if --  
9 **A. Yes, the first one would've been the right-hand side,**  
10 **sorry.**  
11 Q. Flat 82 -- yes, okay. Well, that solves that question.  
12 **A. Yes.**  
13 Q. But you have the details up there, written in black pen,  
14 "82 11th Bed front door". Can you help with what that  
15 means?  
16 **A. Say that again, sorry?**  
17 Q. It says -- is it "Bed front door"?  
18 **A. Outside front door. That's two adults, one child, fire**  
19 **was outside front door.**  
20 Q. I see. But before that it says "Bed front door" or "Bad  
21 front door". Do you know what that says?  
22 **A. Might be "Behind front door". Might have just been**  
23 **a little abbreviation I used, "Behind front door".**  
24 Q. It's probably an unimportant detail.  
25 The point I want to ask you about is you've recorded

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1 flat 82, 11th floor and got those details down there.  
2 Is that a call that you sent by mobile?  
3 **A. Yes.**  
4 Q. And you sent it to a command unit, you think?  
5 **A. Yes.**  
6 Q. Can you then explain why at the same time we have the  
7 same message being sent --  
8 **A. So if you go back to the call log, if we can.**  
9 Q. Go back to the call log, yes, you can, absolutely,  
10 02.06.  
11 **A. So what I'm seeing there is that the initial call from**  
12 **that come in at 02.06 at the time that I was taking over**  
13 **for the fire survival guidance. Because that's put**  
14 **through via a computer request to the radio operator,**  
15 **there may have been a delay of that being sent over to**  
16 **the command unit via the Airwave radio. So that's just**  
17 **an overlap of the control operator staff and myself**  
18 **taking over the fire survival guidance.**  
19 Q. Right. And it says RT4 to CU8, and we heard Jo Smith  
20 last week explaining that it was CU8.  
21 Does that help you with your recollection of --  
22 **A. No, my recollection --**  
23 Q. -- which command unit you were talking to?  
24 **A. My recollection was I was talking to Charlie Uniform 7,**  
25 **which I think had been allocated as the fire survival**

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1 **guidance command unit.**  
 2 Q. Right.  
 3 Just looking at the short incident log on page 22,  
 4 02.24.11, just running your eye down, from 02.24.11,  
 5 a third of the way down the page, we have a number of  
 6 calls running to 03.10.51. That's over three pages.  
 7 I just pick them up. We have flat 183 -- I'll  
 8 abbreviate -- and then again at 02.25.32, and then again  
 9 at 02.27.04, flat 94, and then again --  
 10 **A. Yeah, it looks like they were still sending information**  
 11 **to Charlie Uniform 8.**  
 12 Q. Right. Okay. That's what I was wondering.  
 13 Just focusing on flat 94, there's a service request  
 14 created, Heidi Fox, at 02.27.04 to CU8, and that's then  
 15 completed 44 seconds later by Sharon Darby, "FLAT 94 ON  
 16 12TH FLOOR TWO ADULTS STILL TRAPPED INSIDE". You see  
 17 both of those?  
 18 **A. Yes.**  
 19 Q. Now, that looks like it's just after your first call,  
 20 but perhaps during your second call, which is only  
 21 2 minutes.  
 22 But I just want to ask you, if you go back to your  
 23 whiteboard -- I'm sorry to ask you to juggle so many  
 24 documents -- we don't find a record of flat 94 on either  
 25 board.

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1 **A. I can only say that I never received that information.**  
 2 Q. Might it be the case -- I don't want you to speculate,  
 3 but is it possible -- which of course invites  
 4 speculation -- let me put it this way: do you recall  
 5 instances of flats not making it to the whiteboard but  
 6 nonetheless being communicated to the --  
 7 **A. No, everything that I received via the call operators or**  
 8 **the control staff I passed to the incident and recorded**  
 9 **straight on the board.**  
 10 Q. Can you explain why we see a message going from control,  
 11 Sharon Darby, in relation to flat 94 at that time which  
 12 doesn't make it onto your whiteboard?  
 13 **A. The only explanation I can give is that I never received**  
 14 **any information. I never got passed the call**  
 15 **information informing me of flat 94.**  
 16 Q. Right. And to be fair to you, there are then instances  
 17 of other flats which are both the subject of radio  
 18 messages on the short incident log and do go onto the  
 19 whiteboard. So, for example, flat 142, if you go to the  
 20 top of page 23, you can see that at 02.29.31, we have:  
 21 "Service Request Created: RT4 TO CU8 FLAT 142 ON  
 22 17TH FLOOR LEVEL FIVE ADULTS INCLUDING TWO ELDERLY  
 23 PERSONS INSIDE ..."  
 24 And that is a service request completed a couple  
 25 of minutes later.

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1 That's flat 142.  
 2 If you go to your whiteboard, and go to JAO/5, it's  
 3 a little bit faint, but two-thirds of the way down the  
 4 whiteboard we can see "142 17th 5 adults", and it's not  
 5 that clear after that. Can you help with that? It  
 6 says ... looks like it says "5 adults", "2 adults" ...  
 7 it's hard to know.  
 8 Can you read that for us?  
 9 **A. I think 142 is five adults and then 173 is two adults**  
 10 **and additional information came in that they was in the**  
 11 **stairwell.**  
 12 Q. So that's a different flat. But 142, what you don't get  
 13 on the whiteboard and you do get in the short incident  
 14 log is the information includes two elderly persons  
 15 inside the flat.  
 16 So when you're recording your FSG calls, are you  
 17 capturing all the information that the control room  
 18 operator is gathering from the caller?  
 19 **A. I was recording what was passed to me on pieces of**  
 20 **paper.**  
 21 Q. Right. When you were passed a piece of paper that  
 22 simply said five adults, what assumptions did you make  
 23 about whether that information was complete?  
 24 **A. Well, I wasn't, I was taking it that that was the**  
 25 **information that they had been given.**

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1 Q. Also, can you explain how you pass this information  
 2 over, but at the same time, it seems, the information is  
 3 also going with a little bit more detail to the incident  
 4 ground by radio, by RT4?  
 5 **A. Can you repeat that, sorry?**  
 6 Q. Can you explain how at the same time as you're writing  
 7 up that information and passing it to the command unit  
 8 by mobile, it looks like from the short incident log  
 9 it's also going by radio?  
 10 **A. I can't answer that. I can't answer why. Everything**  
 11 **that was written up on that board was passed to me on**  
 12 **small pieces of paper and that's what I put up on that**  
 13 **board. Any information I got back from the command unit**  
 14 **or from the call operators I recorded on that board.**  
 15 Q. Right, okay. I just have one more question, to which  
 16 I suspect the answer might be the same.  
 17 If you go to the short incident log at page 22,  
 18 there's a call at 02.27.04, which I think we looked at  
 19 before which says:  
 20 "Service Request Created: RT4 TO CU8 FLAT 94 ON 12TH  
 21 FLOOR TWO ADULTS STILL TRAPPED INSIDE."  
 22 Then that is completed 40 seconds or so later by  
 23 Sharon Darby. We see -- yes, I'm sorry, I think I've  
 24 covered that actually.  
 25 Do you remember any discussion about which command

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1 pump you should be talking to, whether it should be  
 2 G271, CU8 or CU7?  
 3 **A. All I can remember is I was talking to Charlie**  
 4 **Uniform 7.**  
 5 Q. Right. Do you remember any discussion about  
 6 prioritisation of calls?  
 7 **A. No, that would've been a fire ground decision-making.**  
 8 Q. Can I just ask you to look at the ORR at page 81. At  
 9 the top of the page at 01.50.49, we see:  
 10 "CRO Adams telephones the CU believed to be CU 8 and  
 11 WM Meyrick answers the phone. CRO Adams relays the  
 12 following FSG Calls information; flat 133, Floor 16 and  
 13 flat 182, 21st floor."  
 14 Now, this is before you arrive in the control room.  
 15 **A. Yes.**  
 16 Q. But I just want to show this to you and then ask you  
 17 a question about it.  
 18 "CU request an idea of priority from Control who  
 19 confirm the following ..."  
 20 Then you see some detail.  
 21 Then in the last sentence it says:  
 22 "CU ask if Control can prioritise calls based on  
 23 smoke density going forward."  
 24 Now, do you remember, when you started running the  
 25 FSG calls in the way we've been discussing, whether

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1 anybody told you that control had been asked by the CU  
 2 to prioritise calls based on smoke density?  
 3 **A. No. No, I was given no handover or brief regarding**  
 4 **that.**  
 5 Q. Right.  
 6 Was there any discussion that you had with anybody  
 7 in the control room or anybody at the incident ground  
 8 about the control room prioritising calls based on smoke  
 9 density?  
 10 **A. No.**  
 11 Q. So far as you were concerned, was there any  
 12 prioritisation of calls?  
 13 **A. As far as I was aware, I was given information regarding**  
 14 **fire survival guidance information calls and then I was**  
 15 **passing that over to the command unit. I personally was**  
 16 **not prioritising which calls to where. The information**  
 17 **that I was passing over, some information was saying**  
 18 **that there was fire outside front doors or persons**  
 19 **believed to have gone unconscious. They would've been**  
 20 **prioritised on the fire ground.**  
 21 MR MILLETT: Right. Okay.  
 22 Mr Chairman, we are sort of mid-topicish. It may be  
 23 a convenient moment for a break. I know that Mr Oliff  
 24 has been going for a while.  
 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, we could do. We can probably

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1 afford to take the extra 10 minutes, can we, over the  
 2 adjournment?  
 3 MR MILLETT: Yes, we can.  
 4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, we are going to stop now for  
 5 the moment, Mr Oliff. We'll carry on at 2 o'clock, and  
 6 please don't talk to anyone about your evidence over the  
 7 break. All right?  
 8 THE WITNESS: Okay, thank you.  
 9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.  
 10 (The witness withdrew)  
 11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Very good, 2 o'clock, then, please.  
 12 (12.50 pm)  
 13 (The short adjournment)  
 14 (2.00 pm)  
 15 (The witness returned)  
 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Oliff?  
 17 THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you.  
 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Are you ready to carry on?  
 19 THE WITNESS: Yes.  
 20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good, thank you very much.  
 21 Yes, Mr Millett.  
 22 MR MILLETT: Mr Oliff, could I ask you, please, to go to  
 23 your witness statement at page 5 at the top.  
 24 You're talking about how the normal communication is  
 25 done between the control room and the incident ground,

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1 and you say at the top:  
 2 "Given how busy the head table was and the volume of  
 3 information being received I used my own mobile phone  
 4 [redacted]. I contacted the command unit CU7 and  
 5 I remained in almost constant contact with CU7 up until  
 6 06.40am ..."  
 7 Then you exhibit the log or the phone bill which  
 8 refers to those calls.  
 9 A number of questions about that.  
 10 First of all, is this something you had ever come  
 11 across before or done before, that is speaking directly  
 12 to a command unit by your Brigade mobile?  
 13 **A. No. No, something that probably hasn't come out from**  
 14 **this is that this was not a normal procedure. Normal**  
 15 **procedure in dealing with fire survival guidance calls**  
 16 **is that information is normally passed to, say, command**  
 17 **vehicles via the Airwave radio. On this occasion,**  
 18 **because of the -- using the Airwave radio is normally**  
 19 **suitable and sufficient for a low number of fire**  
 20 **survival guidance calls. But, again, because of, again,**  
 21 **the unprecedented type of incident we was dealing with,**  
 22 **the amount of information that was being passed to the**  
 23 **control room, it was something that was basically**  
 24 **adapted so that we could record the information and make**  
 25 **sure that any fire survival guidance information was**

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1 passed to the command unit and dealt with by the fire  
 2 crews on the ground.  
 3 Q. Did anybody advise you or tell you to use your Brigade  
 4 mobile rather than the Airwave radio?  
 5 A. No. No. (1) I didn't have access to an Airwave radio  
 6 to do that and, secondly, to use my Brigade mobile phone  
 7 was my decision.  
 8 Q. Why didn't you have access to an Airwave radio?  
 9 A. Because the Airwave -- I had my own personal one, which  
 10 I left in my vehicle when I arrived at the incident,  
 11 because part of my role as officer of the day is not  
 12 normally to use or communicate with the fire ground or  
 13 incident commander directly; it's to liaise with the  
 14 officer of the watch and the control officer staff and  
 15 assist them in duties. My role is not to directly  
 16 communicate with the fire ground as I was officer of the  
 17 day.  
 18 Q. Whose idea was it, then, for you to use your Brigade  
 19 mobile rather than --  
 20 A. That was my -- at the time I was briefed that I was to  
 21 take over responsibility for fire survival guidance  
 22 information by Deputy Assistant Commissioner  
 23 Adrian Fenton. I was told to use the two whiteboards to  
 24 record information, and then it was my decision to use  
 25 my mobile phone to contact the command unit and pass the

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1 information that way.  
 2 Because I was in the corner of the room, I could  
 3 pass information and record information on the board at  
 4 the same time. Also, there were instances where I was  
 5 called over to control operators' desks that were  
 6 carrying out fire survival guidance information. So  
 7 I was still in contact with the fire ground and then if  
 8 I needed to liaise with a call operator, I could do that  
 9 as well.  
 10 Q. Oh, I see. Did you do that? You actually went over to  
 11 control room operators while they were --  
 12 A. There was a couple that I did, I got called over to  
 13 because they was asking -- there was some very difficult  
 14 situations and I was asked to give advice or try and  
 15 make a decision with regards to what to tell the person  
 16 who was on the end of the phone.  
 17 Q. Right. Okay, I didn't realise that. So how many  
 18 occasions would you say that happened on?  
 19 A. At least twice, from what I can remember, twice, two or  
 20 three times, I can't --  
 21 Q. Okay. We may come to an instance of a call a little bit  
 22 later on, but you say twice, two or three times. Okay.  
 23 Why those particular calls? What was particular  
 24 about the calls which took you --  
 25 A. I think the call operators were on the phone to people

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1 inside the building, and I think they -- I'm not sure  
 2 whether they was -- with regards to the advice that they  
 3 was giving, they was asking me what they should tell the  
 4 actual people.  
 5 Q. They were asking you, were they?  
 6 A. Yeah. Well, on one particular occasion, there was one  
 7 bit where the call operator wasn't sure what to tell the  
 8 people who were involved.  
 9 Q. Right. Do you know who that call operator was?  
 10 A. I don't know the name off by heart, no.  
 11 Q. Was it a male or female?  
 12 A. It was a female.  
 13 Q. Do you know the flat number or the floor of the caller?  
 14 A. Yes, I do. I think that was flat -- without regarding  
 15 to my statement, I think it was 183 on the 21st floor.  
 16 Q. We'll come back to that one.  
 17 In order to go assist, though, was there nobody else  
 18 who could've assisted those control room operators in  
 19 the control room?  
 20 A. There was -- from my recollection, there were other  
 21 officers in the control room, but I was the nearest one,  
 22 and because I was dealing with the fire survival  
 23 guidance information then, I was asked.  
 24 Q. Were there any difficulties or disadvantages in using  
 25 your Brigade mobile as opposed to using, for example,

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1 your Airwave radio or the dedicated telephone line on  
 2 the head table?  
 3 A. So as I've stated before, I don't actually have -- part  
 4 of my role as officer of the day would not be to be in  
 5 radio communications with the fire ground in any way,  
 6 shape or form. So I wouldn't normally speak to the  
 7 incident commander or the command unit staff. That is  
 8 normally done by the control operator, radio operator,  
 9 from control.  
 10 The decision -- the benefits of me using my mobile  
 11 phone was it enabled me to be mobile within the actual  
 12 control centre, be able to record information up on the  
 13 board and not be tied to a landline at a desk. And as  
 14 I said before, there was occasions where I was called  
 15 over to a control operator who was on the phone giving  
 16 fire survival guidance information -- it gave me  
 17 mobility within the actual control centre.  
 18 Q. Is one of the disadvantages of using your mobile that  
 19 the calls you were making to the command unit were not  
 20 recorded?  
 21 A. You could say that, yes, you could say that's  
 22 a disadvantage, but at the time it was the most  
 23 expedient way I found of transferring information that  
 24 I was given to the command unit, with the fact that  
 25 I was trying to get -- I was given lots of information

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1 via small pieces of paper, and, as I say, moving about  
 2 in the control room. Because I was in the corner of the  
 3 control room. If I needed to move about, I was still  
 4 able to talk to the command unit, instead of having to  
 5 put the phone down, walk across the control room and  
 6 then walk back and start talking to the command unit  
 7 again.  
 8 Q. Can I ask you to look back at a document we looked at  
 9 this morning, which was the incident report, the IMP,  
 10 tab 30 of the documents bundle.  
 11 Can I just ask you to look at the first page of  
 12 that, third entry down, next to "Development".  
 13 The first item is:  
 14 "1/2 The sharing of Fire Survival Guidance (FSG)  
 15 information between Control and the fireground was  
 16 carried out by operational officers who were supporting  
 17 Control staff within the Stratford control room."  
 18 Clearly, as you've explained, Mr Oliff, you were  
 19 doing that, but there's a reference there to operational  
 20 officers in the plural. Was there anybody else doing  
 21 the job you were doing on that night once you'd taken  
 22 over FSG?  
 23 A. No. At one point Station Manager Paul McClenaghan came  
 24 up when he arrived at the control centre, he came over  
 25 and we were discussing what we was doing, but then he

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1 was I believe given another task to carry out, another  
 2 job to carry out, so I remained and pretty much did the  
 3 fire survival guidance thing on my own.  
 4 Q. In the next item down, 2/2, it says this:  
 5 "2/2 The communication link was by mobile to mobile  
 6 phone, not the dedicated line (within PN790 [policy  
 7 790]); therefore the conversations were not recorded."  
 8 The recommendation is:  
 9 "Reinforce FSG training, reminding staff of the need  
 10 to use the dedicated line which is secure and recorded."  
 11 So my question is when you were told to take over  
 12 the fire survival guidance calls by DAC Fenton, was  
 13 there a dedicated line which was secure and recorded  
 14 which you could have used?  
 15 A. At the time, not that I was aware of. At the time I was  
 16 given a task and a job to do and I got on and done it to  
 17 the best of my ability. I made the decision to use my  
 18 mobile phone because I thought it would be easier for  
 19 recording information and allow me the freedom to move  
 20 about and liaise with control operator staff within the  
 21 control room.  
 22 Q. Yes. My question was -- let me ask it a different way.  
 23 Did you know --  
 24 A. No.  
 25 Q. -- that there was a dedicated line which was secure and

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1 recorded that you could've used?  
 2 A. No, I didn't.  
 3 Q. Nobody pointed that out to you?  
 4 A. Not at the time, no.  
 5 Q. Now, can I just ask you to go back to your exhibit  
 6 number 7, your list of calls, third page of the  
 7 document.  
 8 They appear -- just help me if this is right -- to  
 9 be outgoing calls from your mobile.  
 10 A. That's correct.  
 11 Q. So does that mean you always called the command unit?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. And they didn't call you?  
 14 A. No.  
 15 Q. Okay. Did they know how to get hold of you if they  
 16 wanted to? Did the person in the command unit have your  
 17 number?  
 18 A. I don't know. I'm not sure. I can't answer that.  
 19 Q. When you called the command unit -- I mean, there is  
 20 a number there, most of it has been redacted -- you were  
 21 using your mobile; what line were you using?  
 22 A. I believe that's the team leader's mobile phone. The  
 23 team leader's mobile phone.  
 24 Q. Who gave you that number?  
 25 A. One of the -- I'm not sure whether it was the officer of

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1 the watch. It was someone who was at the head table.  
 2 Q. And that number, do you know what rang in the command  
 3 unit? Was it a mobile or was it a fixed line or  
 4 reception in the command unit itself?  
 5 A. I was just given the phone. I wasn't sure whether it  
 6 was a mobile phone or whether it was a fixed phone  
 7 within the command unit.  
 8 Q. Right.  
 9 The first three digits of the number, 079, does that  
 10 help you remember whether it was a mobile you were  
 11 ringing or whether it was a --  
 12 A. I assume with 079 it would've been a mobile.  
 13 Q. But that's an assumption?  
 14 A. That's an assumption, so, again, I can't confirm it.  
 15 Q. Did you find you had frequent and easy access to that  
 16 number?  
 17 A. Yes. If I rang it, they answered straight away.  
 18 Q. Do you remember, did you always speak to the same person  
 19 throughout the night?  
 20 A. Yes, it sounded like the same person. I can't confirm  
 21 it was but it definitely sounded like the same person  
 22 who was answering the phone.  
 23 Q. Right.  
 24 Now, at the time you look control of the FSG calls,  
 25 were you aware of how many had come in at that point?

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1 **A. No.**  
 2 Q. Did you ask?  
 3 **A. No, I didn't, no.**  
 4 Q. Is there any reason why you didn't ask?  
 5 **A. Again, I can just refer back to how busy and how much**  
 6 **information that was coming in. As I say, I was given**  
 7 **a specific job to do, a task to do, and at that**  
 8 **particular time it was more important to get the**  
 9 **information that we were receiving in control to the**  
 10 **command unit at the fire ground so that the people at**  
 11 **the fire ground could take action to try and rescue the**  
 12 **people who were trapped.**  
 13 Q. Did you know what kind of advice the CROs were giving  
 14 callers at the time you took over FSG?  
 15 **A. At that particular time, I was aware it was a stay-put**  
 16 **policy. The stay-put policy was -- or information was**  
 17 **given for the people to stay in their premises and**  
 18 **advice was being given how to try and stay safe whilst**  
 19 **they was in there.**  
 20 Q. You say you were aware of that; how were you aware of  
 21 that?  
 22 **A. I can't remember whether I ever heard that they were**  
 23 **still at a stay-put policy, but I know further in my**  
 24 **statement I had a conversation with the person who was**  
 25 **on the command unit, and I gathered information from him**

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1 **which I then passed to Adrian Fenton and Jo Smith, they**  
 2 **were standing by the head desk, and I said, "This is the**  
 3 **information that I've just received", and both of them**  
 4 **were discussing about changing the stay-put policy to**  
 5 **evacuate.**  
 6 Q. We are going to come to that. We are just getting  
 7 a little bit ahead. Just focussing on my question,  
 8 which is: when you first started taking over the  
 9 management of fire survival guidance calls in the --  
 10 **A. So the national guideline -- national guidelines is that**  
 11 **we --**  
 12 Q. Can I just ask my question, sorry, which is: when you  
 13 first took over, how did you know that the advice being  
 14 given by the control room operators was stay put?  
 15 **A. I remember being told but I can't remember who told me.**  
 16 Q. Okay.  
 17 Do you know or do you remember what conditions the  
 18 callers were reporting when you first took over  
 19 management of the FSG?  
 20 **A. When I first took over, there was a number of calls**  
 21 **coming in saying there was smoke coming into flats,**  
 22 **people have tried to get out of their flats, the lobby**  
 23 **areas were heavily smoke-logged. There was another**  
 24 **couple further on where we had reports of someone saying**  
 25 **there was fire directly outside their front door. It**

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1 **was a vast array of different conditions in different**  
 2 **flats.**  
 3 Q. Did you have a view at the time about whether continuing  
 4 to give the stay-put advice, as you call it, was the  
 5 right thing to do or that it should be changed?  
 6 **A. At the time, when I was dealing with the fire survival**  
 7 **guidance information, my main concern was getting that**  
 8 **information to the command unit, and because of the**  
 9 **amount of information that I was being given, I didn't**  
 10 **really have time to consider whether they should change**  
 11 **the stay-put advice, until I actually spoke to command**  
 12 **unit 7 and gained further information, and that's when**  
 13 **I approached Deputy Assistant Commissioner Adrian Fenton**  
 14 **and Jo Smith at the head table.**  
 15 Q. Okay. Let's pick that up, then.  
 16 If you go to your statement and go to page 5, where  
 17 we are at the moment. You say -- this is the middle of  
 18 the page:  
 19 "I remember that the television inside the control  
 20 centre wasn't working, I had noticed this when I first  
 21 walked into the control and I had asked the OOW why the  
 22 television wasn't on and been informed that it was  
 23 broken."  
 24 I'm going to that now because there's a build-up to  
 25 the stay put issue.

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1 Is that right; you remember that you were told it  
 2 was broken?  
 3 **A. Yes.**  
 4 Q. "This made it difficult for us to know and picture what  
 5 was going on at the incident itself."  
 6 Then you say:  
 7 "I recall asking the operator at CU7 where the  
 8 Bridge Head was located as I was trying to build a  
 9 picture in my head of the situation."  
 10 Now, just pausing there, do you remember when you  
 11 asked that question? How long after starting?  
 12 **A. I'd taken over -- I'd taken over as passing fire**  
 13 **survival guidance information, and I'd been doing it for**  
 14 **a while, I passed quite a lot of information over, and**  
 15 **I was trying to build a mental picture in my mind about**  
 16 **what was happening at the incident.**  
 17 **Our operational policy is that we normally set up**  
 18 **a bridgehead two floors below the fire.**  
 19 Q. Yes.  
 20 **A. I remember asking the control operator, because of the**  
 21 **amount of information -- the fire survival guidance,**  
 22 **I hadn't heard any informatives back from the incident**  
 23 **with regards to how the fire had developed at that time**  
 24 **because I was concentrating on the information, asked**  
 25 **him about where the bridgehead was located. I was**

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1 **informed that the bridgehead was located on the ground**  
 2 **floor of the building. And -- yeah, it was on the**  
 3 **ground floor of the building at that particular time.**  
 4 **I was then informed by the control operator that**  
 5 **they was having difficulty getting fire crews --**  
 6 Q. Hang on, we're just getting ahead of ourselves a little  
 7 bit.  
 8 **A. Sorry.**  
 9 Q. I'll come to that in a moment. We are going to come to  
 10 it.  
 11 Can I ask you this question: you asked the question  
 12 of the operator on CU7 where the bridgehead was located;  
 13 why did you ask that question?  
 14 **A. Again, I was trying to get a mental picture of what was**  
 15 **happening at the incident. As I say, normally,**  
 16 **operationally, we set up a bridgehead two floors below**  
 17 **the fire, yet we was having reports of fire on a lot of**  
 18 **the upper floors. So I was trying to get a mental**  
 19 **picture of how far the actual fire had spread within the**  
 20 **building.**  
 21 Q. What was the purpose of having that information?  
 22 **A. To try and find out -- normally we set up a bridgehead**  
 23 **within the actual building itself, and to find out that**  
 24 **the actual bridgehead had actually been moved to the**  
 25 **ground floor outside means that -- it just showed -- it**

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1 **just put a mental picture in my mind that this was**  
 2 **a major incident.**  
 3 Q. And you say:  
 4 "I was told that the Bridge Head was on the ground  
 5 floor outside of the building ..."  
 6 **A. Yes.**  
 7 Q. "... this was unusual as the Bridge Head is normally  
 8 positioned two (2) floors below the fire floor."  
 9 When you were told that, what did you do with that  
 10 information?  
 11 **A. Well, this is where all the other information comes in**  
 12 **with it, because it was one conversation with regards to**  
 13 **where the bridgehead was, the information that the**  
 14 **command operator gave me with regards to fire crews**  
 15 **having difficulty getting to the upper floors, and the**  
 16 **information that came back due to the possible dangerous**  
 17 **nature or stability of the building, they had a gold**  
 18 **meeting and the commissioner was considering withdrawing**  
 19 **the fire crews. So that was all one piece of**  
 20 **information that I gathered.**  
 21 Q. Okay.  
 22 **A. Once I'd received that information, I thought it was**  
 23 **pertinent to go and then tell the Deputy Assistant**  
 24 **Commissioner Adrian Fenton and Jo Smith, who was**  
 25 **standing at the head table in the control room.**

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1 Q. Let's try and take this in stages, then, in terms of the  
 2 timing.  
 3 In this paragraph, you've given us information you  
 4 got from the fire ground. So bridgehead had moved to  
 5 the ground floor, and then fire crews having difficulty  
 6 getting above the 15th floor, and then information that  
 7 a gold meeting had concluded and the commissioner was  
 8 considering withdrawing the fire crews because of the  
 9 dangerous condition of the tower block.  
 10 **A. Yes.**  
 11 Q. Now, those three pieces of information, did they come in  
 12 separate conversations or in one conversation?  
 13 **A. That was all one conversation.**  
 14 Q. Looking at your phone log, if we can just jump back to  
 15 that, JAO/7, MET00016910.  
 16 Looking at the times of the calls, we have one at  
 17 02.06 for 15 minutes, 58 seconds; then a short one at  
 18 02.23, 2 minutes and 40 seconds; one at 02.33, 8 minutes  
 19 and 44 seconds; and then one at 02.44 that lasts for an  
 20 hour and 35 minutes-odd.  
 21 Which, if any, of those calls do you think you  
 22 got --  
 23 **A. I would say the --**  
 24 Q. -- those pieces of information?  
 25 **A. -- between the 02.33 and the 02.44.**

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1 Q. Okay.  
 2 **A. I can't be 100 per cent certain.**  
 3 Q. So you think it was during the 8-minute and 44-second  
 4 conversation?  
 5 **A. I didn't say that; I said it could've been the 02.44.**  
 6 **It could've been between the two.**  
 7 Q. You say "between the two"; are there any other calls  
 8 that you made which aren't recorded on this list?  
 9 **A. Well, again, I mean, the 8 minutes are literally**  
 10 **within -- the 8 minutes are literally within 4 minutes**  
 11 **of the hour and 44, so --**  
 12 Q. Okay.  
 13 **A. So between 02.33 and the phone conversation between**  
 14 **02.44. So it could've been either of those --**  
 15 Q. I understand.  
 16 What is it that prompts that recollection about that  
 17 time period?  
 18 **A. Just the sheer amount of -- number of fire survival**  
 19 **guidance calls and information we was receiving from the**  
 20 **incident ground.**  
 21 Q. Now, you say at the bottom of page 5 of your statement:  
 22 "An informal meeting took place involving DAC FENTON  
 23 and another DAC who's name I cannot recall ..."  
 24 **A. That would be Jo Smith.**  
 25 Q. That's Jo Smith?

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1 **A. Yeah, Adrian Fenton and Jo Smith were standing at the**  
2 **head table having a discussion, and I came over and gave**  
3 **them the information that I'd just gained on the phone.**  
4 Q. Okay. So this meeting was in the control room, was it?  
5 **A. It was in the control room. As I say, it was**  
6 **an informal thing. I received that information and, as**  
7 **soon as I got that information, I approached DAC Fenton**  
8 **and Jo Smith so that I could relay that to them.**  
9 Q. Okay.  
10 Do you know how long DAC Fenton had been in the  
11 control room for when you approached him?  
12 **A. I couldn't say. He was backwards and forwards. As**  
13 **I say, a lot of my time was concentrating on receiving**  
14 **information from the call operators and passing it to**  
15 **the command unit.**  
16 Q. Okay. So this informal meeting took place after you'd  
17 received these two pieces of information?  
18 **A. They was standing at the head desk having**  
19 **a conversation, and as soon as I got that information,**  
20 **I thought that was quite an important piece of**  
21 **information that I received. I just wanted to make sure**  
22 **that they was aware that that had gone on on the fire**  
23 **ground.**  
24 Q. Right.  
25 You then go on to say:

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1 "... as a result of this latest information DAC  
2 FENTON informed me that the FSG advice would have to be  
3 changed."  
4 **A. Whilst we was standing there, there was a small**  
5 **conversation between Adrian Fenton and Jo Smith where**  
6 **they looked at each other and went, "We need to change**  
7 **the advice that's being given on the fire survival**  
8 **guidance calls."**  
9 Q. Right.  
10 I put the statement to you and you've now said  
11 "whilst we were standing there, there was a small  
12 conversation between Adrian Fenton and Jo Smith and they  
13 looked at each other". Can you remember what they said  
14 to each other?  
15 **A. We need to change the information, the fire survival**  
16 **guidance information --**  
17 Q. Right.  
18 **A. -- to get everybody out.**  
19 Q. Jo Smith's given evidence that the decision to change  
20 the advice and depart from the stay-put advice was her  
21 decision, with which Mr Fenton agreed. Can you comment  
22 on that?  
23 **A. I would say that -- at that particular time, it was**  
24 **a very -- they was having a conversation at the head**  
25 **table. I approached them with this information, told**

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1 **them the information. I'm not sure what they was**  
2 **talking about before I approached them. I approached**  
3 **them, I gave them the information and there was a very**  
4 **short conversation where it was like they both agreed**  
5 **that the fire survival guidance information should be**  
6 **changed from a stay-put policy to get everybody out.**  
7 Q. Right.  
8 Just to try to pinpoint the timing of that decision,  
9 you very helpfully told us that it was either shortly  
10 after 2.33 or shortly after 2.44.  
11 Can I just ask you to go back to the control debrief  
12 note which we have in our master documents bundle at  
13 tab 51, and look at page 6, please.  
14 Just to remind you what this document is, Mr Oliff,  
15 this is the 24 July handwritten notes of Andy Hearn, who  
16 chaired it, of a meeting to debrief from the control  
17 room, and it says at the top of page 6:  
18 "DAC Fenton -- Arrives speaks to SM Oliff.  
19 "-- Arranges collection of FSG calls.  
20 "-- Whiteboards/paper.  
21 "Gets SM McClenaghan to assist."  
22 Then:  
23 "- 02.35 -- stay Put advice changed."  
24 "-- Info from incident ground [to] ORT [and] CU via  
25 SM Oliff."

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1 **A. So it would have been the 02.33 phone call that I got**  
2 **that information then.**  
3 Q. Okay. Would you agree that that is correct?  
4 **A. Yes.**  
5 Q. About 02.35?  
6 **A. Yes.**  
7 Q. Okay.  
8 Then a little bit lower down, it says:  
9 "-- Jo Smith aware of Lakanal -- '1 hour'.  
10 "Jo Smith listening to Stratford control room and  
11 forming an opinion.  
12 "-- DAC Fenton wants to check with fire ground.  
13 "-- Jo Smith makes decision and tells A Norman.  
14 "-- Advice to wet towels over mouth.  
15 "-- Hold hands/stay together.  
16 "-- Get out -- could be last chance."  
17 I've read you that in full.  
18 Do you remember any discussions between Jo Smith and  
19 Adrian Fenton or yourself about any of those matters?  
20 **A. No. No, I literally approached Adrian Fenton and**  
21 **Jo Smith, gave them the information. There was a very**  
22 **brief, "We need to change the stay-put policy to get**  
23 **out!". I then went back to carry on with the fire**  
24 **survival guidance information-passing. So if I got any**  
25 **further information, I carried on passing it over to the**

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1 **command unit.**  
 2 Q. Do you remember any discussion -- I think you've  
 3 answered this, but let me ask it anyway -- whereby  
 4 DAC Fenton says, "I want to check with the fire ground  
 5 before we change the advice?"  
 6 **A. No, I don't.**  
 7 Q. You don't.  
 8 **A. No.**  
 9 Q. Okay.  
 10 Now, immediately after that decision you heard be  
 11 made, did either DAC Fenton or Jo Smith tell you what to  
 12 do with that information?  
 13 **A. With regards to the change of the stay-put policy? No,**  
 14 **because I was just dealing with still passing the**  
 15 **information for fire survival guidance calls to the**  
 16 **command unit. I was aware that an announcement was made**  
 17 **in the control room to change the stay-put policy.**  
 18 Q. Okay.  
 19 So far as you know, how were control room operators  
 20 informed of the change in advice?  
 21 **A. I think it was just verbally. There was no phones or**  
 22 **paggers; I think it was just a case of making sure all**  
 23 **call operators knew that the policy had changed.**  
 24 Q. How was that done?  
 25 **A. By word of mouth, being told.**

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1 Q. Being told, what, face-to-face?  
 2 **A. Yeah, verbally.**  
 3 Q. Do you remember who went round the control room --  
 4 **A. I don't know.**  
 5 Q. -- telling the CROs?  
 6 **A. No, I don't.**  
 7 Q. Do you know what they were told to say?  
 8 **A. No.**  
 9 Q. Do you know whether CROs were able to give the callers  
 10 any guidance as to how to assess whether it was safe to  
 11 leave?  
 12 **A. No.**  
 13 Q. Going on to the top of page 6, you say in the third  
 14 line:  
 15 "The call operators had now been advised that the  
 16 advice we were providing had now changed and that they  
 17 should encourage occupants of the flats to make their  
 18 way out of the building if it was safe for them to do  
 19 so."  
 20 **A. That's correct.**  
 21 Q. Was that something you heard? Did you hear that the  
 22 advice that the call operator should be giving is to  
 23 encourage occupants to make their way out of the  
 24 building if it was safe to do so?  
 25 **A. Yes.**

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1 Q. Who did you hear that from?  
 2 **A. That's come -- I'm sure that came from Jo Smith when**  
 3 **they changed the stay-put policy.**  
 4 Q. Did you hear Jo Smith telling the operators that?  
 5 **A. I can't be 100 per cent certain that I heard it, but**  
 6 **I know that was the advice that was given.**  
 7 Q. Did you know whether she or any other CROs had any  
 8 information as to what kind of conditions callers would  
 9 be entering if they did leave their flats and try to  
 10 make their way out?  
 11 **A. Sorry, can you repeat that?**  
 12 Q. Did you know whether Jo Smith or any of the control room  
 13 operators had any information as to the kinds of  
 14 conditions that callers would face if they took the  
 15 advice to get out and use the escape routes?  
 16 **A. With all the fire survival guidance calls that were**  
 17 **coming in, they was aware that conditions in a lot of**  
 18 **the lobbies and the stairwells were heavily smoke-logged**  
 19 **or there were fire conditions in some of the lobbies.**  
 20 Q. Yes. You heard that, did you?  
 21 **A. Well, the information that I was being passed, there was**  
 22 **a lot of information which stated that callers were**  
 23 **saying that there was smoke in their flats, there was**  
 24 **smoke in the areas outside their flats.**  
 25 Q. Now, you go on to say:

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1 "The stairwell of a building should be a protected  
 2 area, this means that it should be protected from smoke  
 3 and heat for a certain duration in the event of a fire,  
 4 so if people were able to get to the stairwell it was  
 5 hoped that they could exit the building."  
 6 Now, do you remember having any conversations on the  
 7 night, at the time of the change of the stay-put policy,  
 8 about the likelihood of people being able to get out,  
 9 given the conditions in the lobbies and the stair?  
 10 **A. No, no.**  
 11 Q. Do you remember having any thoughts about it?  
 12 **A. At that time, when the -- the information -- when the**  
 13 **policy was changed from stay put to get everyone out of**  
 14 **the building, that decision was made knowing that --**  
 15 **well, I interpreted that as that that may be their only**  
 16 **way out of the building, if they make their own way out.**  
 17 Q. Right.  
 18 At the moment when the decision to revoke stay put  
 19 was taken, you say -- I'm sorry to ask you to go back to  
 20 page 5 -- that one of the pieces of information that you  
 21 had from CU7 -- this is two-thirds of the way down  
 22 page 5 -- was that a gold meeting had concluded and that  
 23 CU7 had been informed that the commissioner was  
 24 considering withdrawing all the fire crews.  
 25 Is that what you heard from CU7, that gold command

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<p>1 was considering it?</p> <p>2 <b>A. That's the information that I was passed from the</b></p> <p>3 <b>operator, from Charlie Uniform 7.</b></p> <p>4 Q. How did you understand that? Did you understand that</p> <p>5 that decision had been made to withdraw the crews or</p> <p>6 merely it was being considered?</p> <p>7 <b>A. No, it was passed that they was considering because of</b></p> <p>8 <b>the dangerous -- because of the possible dangerous</b></p> <p>9 <b>structure of the building.</b></p> <p>10 Q. Okay.</p> <p>11 Now, Mr Meyrick, who was the watch manager who says</p> <p>12 he was the one in contact with you all night by mobile,</p> <p>13 says -- I'm summarising his evidence -- that you asked</p> <p>14 him to confirm with the incident commander that the</p> <p>15 stay-put advice could be changed.</p> <p>16 Do you remember that?</p> <p>17 <b>A. That I asked if the stay-put advice could be changed?</b></p> <p>18 Q. Yes. Do you remember that?</p> <p>19 <b>A. I don't remember that, no.</b></p> <p>20 Q. He also says that he confirmed it with Assistant</p> <p>21 Commissioner Roe and then told you that the stay-put</p> <p>22 advice had been changed.</p> <p>23 <b>A. I don't remember that.</b></p> <p>24 Q. You don't remember that?</p> <p>25 <b>A. No.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 137</p>	<p>1 <b>A. No.</b></p> <p>2 Q. You didn't?</p> <p>3 <b>A. No.</b></p> <p>4 Q. Did you speak to anyone on the fire ground about that</p> <p>5 decision?</p> <p>6 <b>A. No.</b></p> <p>7 Q. Do you remember being told by Mr Meyrick or anybody else</p> <p>8 on the fire ground that the advice had already been</p> <p>9 changed at the scene?</p> <p>10 <b>A. I can't recall that conversation, no. I'm not saying it</b></p> <p>11 <b>didn't happen, but I don't have -- I can't recall it.</b></p> <p>12 Q. Right.</p> <p>13 Do you remember the involvement of somebody called</p> <p>14 Group Manager Stephen West?</p> <p>15 <b>A. With regard to?</b></p> <p>16 Q. Well, with regards to the fire at Grenfell Tower on the</p> <p>17 night.</p> <p>18 <b>A. No, no.</b></p> <p>19 Q. He says -- I'm summarising his evidence and it will have</p> <p>20 to be explored with him, because he hasn't yet come to</p> <p>21 give evidence -- that he took a call from DAC Fenton who</p> <p>22 was asking for permission from the commissioner to</p> <p>23 change the stay-put advice. Do you remember anything</p> <p>24 about that?</p> <p>25 <b>A. I was on the opposite -- I wouldn't have been privy to</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 139</p>
<p>1 Q. Okay.</p> <p>2 What understanding did you have about the need for</p> <p>3 the incident commander to be involved in the decision to</p> <p>4 change the stay-put advice?</p> <p>5 <b>A. It was part of our policy that the incident commander</b></p> <p>6 <b>can, in liaison with the officer of the watch or the</b></p> <p>7 <b>officer in charge of control, change the stay-put</b></p> <p>8 <b>policy, but it does state in our policy that that would</b></p> <p>9 <b>be going against national guidelines. But, again, that</b></p> <p>10 <b>would be in exceptional circumstances.</b></p> <p>11 Q. Do you know whether DAC Fenton or Jo Smith was party to</p> <p>12 a conversation with the incident commander about stay</p> <p>13 put?</p> <p>14 <b>A. I don't know.</b></p> <p>15 Q. You don't know. You don't remember it or you don't</p> <p>16 know?</p> <p>17 <b>A. I wasn't privy to any of those types of conversation.</b></p> <p>18 <b>If I got information that I felt was pertinent to some</b></p> <p>19 <b>of the decision-making that went on in the control room,</b></p> <p>20 <b>then I would go and inform Adrian Fenton and then</b></p> <p>21 <b>I would go back to my duties of passing information</b></p> <p>22 <b>regarding the fire survival guidance.</b></p> <p>23 Q. After the decision was made that you heard being made by</p> <p>24 Jo Smith and DAC Fenton, did you speak to the command</p> <p>25 unit about that decision?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 138</p>	<p>1 <b>that conversation, as I say, because I was --</b></p> <p>2 <b>Adrian Fenton and Jo Smith were at the head table most</b></p> <p>3 <b>of the time and I was in the corner.</b></p> <p>4 Q. Were you aware at all that DAC Fenton had attempted to</p> <p>5 or had in fact contacted the incident ground seeking</p> <p>6 authorisation or permission to change the stay-put</p> <p>7 advice?</p> <p>8 <b>A. No, I wasn't aware of that.</b></p> <p>9 Q. After the stay-put advice had been changed, Watch</p> <p>10 Manager Meyrick said that there wasn't a noticeable</p> <p>11 change in the advice coming through from control to</p> <p>12 callers. That was his perception of it.</p> <p>13 What was your perception of it?</p> <p>14 <b>A. Say that again, sorry?</b></p> <p>15 Q. I am just going to put this to you: in his evidence,</p> <p>16 Watch Manager Meyrick said that after the decision to</p> <p>17 change the stay-put advice and tell everyone to get out</p> <p>18 had been made, he didn't notice any change in the advice</p> <p>19 being given by control room operators to callers. That</p> <p>20 was his perception of it. What was your perception of</p> <p>21 it?</p> <p>22 <b>A. My perception was that once the decision was made, the</b></p> <p>23 <b>call operators were trying to get people to evacuate the</b></p> <p>24 <b>building.</b></p> <p>25 Q. Now, I want to ask you about some of your evidence on</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 140</p>

<p>1 pages 6 and 7 of your statement, which you mentioned 2 earlier, which was the call from flat 183. 3 Now, first of all, I think we can correct something 4 in your statement. If you look at page 6, a quarter of 5 the way down, just after the beginning of the second 6 paragraph, you say: 7 "I was called over by a female operator, I am unsure 8 of her name. This operator was speaking with a male who 9 was inside his flat with his family. The flat was 10 number one hundred and eighty-two (182) located on the 11 twenty-first (21st) floor." 12 Now, earlier this afternoon I think you said 183. 13 Can you remember which flat number it was? 14 <b>A. I'm not sure if it was 182 or 183.</b> 15 Q. I think, take this from me, that it was 183. 16 <b>A. Yeah.</b> 17 Q. That wouldn't jar with your recollection? 18 <b>A. Yes.</b> 19 Q. Was this conversation or this event, being called over 20 by the female operator, after the stay-put advice had 21 been changed? 22 <b>A. Yes.</b> 23 Q. Do you remember approximately what time this took place? 24 <b>A. No, things were whizzing, time was whizzing, because</b> 25 <b>there was so much going on.</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 141</p>	<p>1 <b>A. That was reasonably early on. That was when the</b> 2 <b>stay-put policy was still in force.</b> 3 Q. So when you went to the female control room operator's 4 desk to assist with the call, was that long after -- 5 <b>A. Yes, that was a fair time after that.</b> 6 Q. Is that whiteboard entry there, "183 21st 2 adults 7 (preg)", et cetera, is that the call that you ultimately 8 ended up assisting with? 9 <b>A. No, that was one that came in before that.</b> 10 Q. Okay. But that's the same flat -- 11 <b>A. Same flat, yes.</b> 12 Q. -- and the same people, is it? Right. 13 Now, in your statement you say, five lines down from 14 the beginning of the paragraph: 15 "When I approached the operator turned to me and 16 said 'where are the fire fighters?'" 17 Now, what did you do by way of a response or say by 18 way of response? 19 <b>A. The operator had -- because we'd changed the stay-put</b> 20 <b>policy, the operator had told the people in the flat to</b> 21 <b>evacuate. She's managed to talk them into the</b> 22 <b>staircase. The call operator at the time said to me she</b> 23 <b>expected that there would be firefighters within the</b> 24 <b>staircase, and when she called me over she said, "Where</b> 25 <b>are the firefighters?" And then she said, "I've got</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 143</p>
<p>1 Q. When that happened, were you still on the mobile phone 2 to the command unit? 3 <b>A. I can't remember -- I think this may have been one of</b> 4 <b>the times -- I can't remember if I was still on the</b> 5 <b>phone or not.</b> 6 Q. Okay. 7 Is this something you'd ever done before, go up to 8 a CRO and give assistance as to what advice to give to 9 a caller? 10 <b>A. Yes.</b> 11 Q. You had? 12 <b>A. No, it was the first time I'd done it, yeah.</b> 13 Q. It was the first time you'd ever done it? 14 <b>A. It was the first time I was officer of the day, so it</b> 15 <b>was the first time I had actually been in the control</b> 16 <b>centre as giving advice. I'd done the training part of</b> 17 <b>it, but obviously ...</b> 18 Q. Now, if you go to JAO/5 which is the photograph of your 19 whiteboard, I think this is the first one you did, you 20 can see about halfway down the page, 183 -- it's 21 a little bit faint but we can either move the screen or 22 duck down, "183 21st 2 adults (preg) 3 children stuck in 23 flat". So you wrote that on the board there. 24 At what stage in the night do you think you wrote 25 that on the board?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 142</p>	<p>1 <b>them into the staircase but I thought firefighters would</b> 2 <b>be there", and I said, "Well, no, the firefighters are</b> 3 <b>having difficulty getting above the" -- I think it was</b> 4 <b>the 11th or 15th floor. They was having troubles</b> 5 <b>because of the intensity of the fire and the conditions</b> 6 <b>in there, they was having trouble getting above that</b> 7 <b>floor.</b> 8 Q. Yes. And you go on to say: 9 "The male on the phone had entered the stairwell as 10 instructed but there were no fire fighters to assist 11 them in leaving the building, the operator had 12 anticipated that there would be fire fighters to 13 assist." 14 Do you know whether, after you had been told by the 15 incident ground that firefighters couldn't get above the 16 15th floor, that information was passed to the control 17 room operators? 18 <b>A. I can't confirm that, no. I don't know.</b> 19 Q. You don't know? 20 <b>A. No.</b> 21 Q. Is there any reason why that information wouldn't have 22 been passed to the control room operators? 23 <b>A. I remember passing it -- as I say, it was</b> 24 <b>a conversation -- that conversation I had with</b> 25 <b>Adrian Fenton and Jo Smith at the head table, and</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 144</p>

1 **I passed that information over to them. I don't know**  
 2 **whether that would've been passed on to the call**  
 3 **operators.**  
 4 Q. Right.  
 5 Now, you go on to describe in summary the experience  
 6 you had of the call. Can I just ask you how you heard  
 7 what was going on on the call?  
 8 First of all, where were you standing?  
 9 **A. I was standing basically next to the call operator.**  
 10 Q. Did you have an earpiece into the call?  
 11 **A. I didn't, no, I was listening to basically what she was**  
 12 **telling me.**  
 13 Q. Could you hear what was said from the other end by the  
 14 caller?  
 15 **A. No, she was just explaining it to me whilst I was**  
 16 **standing there.**  
 17 Q. Right. So when you go on to say:  
 18 "The male was informing the operator that the  
 19 stairwell was smoke logged and that he was having  
 20 trouble breathing."  
 21 Is that something you heard from her?  
 22 **A. Yes.**  
 23 Q. What did she do? Did she repeat that so you could hear  
 24 it?  
 25 **A. Yes.**

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1 Q. And did you stay with the operator until the call ended?  
 2 **A. Yes.**  
 3 Q. You did.  
 4 Then you go on to say -- this is the last paragraph  
 5 on page 6:  
 6 "I considered the options, this was a highly  
 7 stressful situation and I did not have the luxury of  
 8 deliberating over the choices."  
 9 Then you say this:  
 10 "Having seen the events unfolding at Grenfell Tower  
 11 on the television and having knowledge of the conditions  
 12 in the stairwell, I thought it unlikely that the male  
 13 would be able to make it back, find his wife and still  
 14 make it out of the building with all of his  
 15 children ..."  
 16 Now, first of all, when you say "Having seen the  
 17 events unfolding at Grenfell Tower on the television",  
 18 what television are you referring to?  
 19 **A. So earlier on in my statement there was a part where**  
 20 **I mentioned that Station Manager McClenaghan arrived and**  
 21 **came in and asked me if I had seen what was going on at**  
 22 **the incident, and then he showed me a news article or**  
 23 **a news clip that he had on his mobile phone, which was**  
 24 **obviously at a distance to show the whole tower block**  
 25 **that was on fire.**

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1 Q. I see. And that, to be fair to you, is at the bottom of  
 2 page 5 of your statement. So just to be clear, that's  
 3 a reference to that, is it?  
 4 **A. Yes.**  
 5 Q. To the pictures on Paul McClenaghan's --  
 6 **A. Yes, he came in and said, "Have you seen what's going**  
 7 **on?" and I was like, "Well, no", and he showed me a very**  
 8 **brief clip of the actual incident, a news clip on his**  
 9 **mobile phone.**  
 10 Q. Did you think that what he showed you by way of a clip  
 11 on his mobile was helpful to you in assessing the  
 12 situation?  
 13 **A. At that -- again, that was at the time that I'd already**  
 14 **taken over the fire survival guidance calls, but it gave**  
 15 **me -- it allowed me to see what we was actually up**  
 16 **against and the conditions that the crews on the ground**  
 17 **were dealing with.**  
 18 Q. You say that was at the time you had already taken over  
 19 the fire survival guidance calls. Can I just get this  
 20 point of detail in timing.  
 21 At what point did Paul McClenaghan show you the  
 22 pictures on his phone?  
 23 **A. I can't remember exactly. I know I'd taken over the**  
 24 **fire survival guidance. I'm sure the -- pretty much**  
 25 **most of the -- half or at least all of the first**

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1 **whiteboard that I was completing had been completed, and**  
 2 **then he came in. He came in because he was backwards**  
 3 **and forwards because he was doing other tasks. So he**  
 4 **came in and asked me had I seen what was actually -- and**  
 5 **I was like, "Well, no, because I can't" -- and he showed**  
 6 **me a clip of it. Which I was quite -- I must admit,**  
 7 **I was quite astonished.**  
 8 Q. Do you remember whether you saw the pictures on his  
 9 phone before or after this stay-put advice was changed?  
 10 **A. That would be possibly before. That would've been**  
 11 **close -- it would've been close around the time that it**  
 12 **was --**  
 13 Q. Right, around that time?  
 14 **A. Yeah.**  
 15 Q. Okay.  
 16 Now, going back to page 6, you say in the same  
 17 sentence:  
 18 "Having seen the events unfolding at Grenfell Tower  
 19 on the television [which is his mobile phone] and having  
 20 knowledge of the conditions in the stairwell ..."  
 21 **A. So the --**  
 22 Q. Let me ask my question: where did you get your knowledge  
 23 of conditions in the stairwell from?  
 24 **A. So you've missed part of the actual -- part of my**  
 25 **statement, which is further up, where the actual male on**

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<p>1 <b>the telephone was describing to the call operator the</b>  2 <b>conditions within the staircase and that he was finding</b>  3 <b>it difficult to breathe.</b>  4 Q. Okay.  5 Before you heard the call or before you heard what  6 the control room operator was saying about what she was  7 being told, did you have any other knowledge or any  8 other source of knowledge about the conditions in the  9 stairs or the lobbies?  10 <b>A. Well, again, the fire survival guidance information that</b>  11 <b>I was being passed described that there was heavy</b>  12 <b>smoke-logging on the landings and in the staircases.</b>  13 Q. Okay.  14 Now, do you remember the origin of the call about  15 that family on the 21st floor?  16 <b>A. Sorry, I don't get the question.</b>  17 Q. Yes.  18 When you wrote on the whiteboard, as we've seen  19 a minute ago, flat 183, 21st floor, and then the details  20 of the family, do you remember where that information  21 originated?  22 <b>A. Again, all of that information on the whiteboard, they</b>  23 <b>were small pieces of paper that were handed to me with</b>  24 <b>the flat number, what floor they was on and how many</b>  25 <b>people, and some of the bits of paper described the</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 149</p>	<p>1 <b>A. With the exception of Kent, no.</b>  2 Q. Right. Okay.  3 <b>A. I do remember a number of control operators coming up to</b>  4 <b>the whiteboards, looking at the whiteboards, to see</b>  5 <b>whether the information they had was up on the board.</b>  6 <b>There was a couple of times where call operators, they'd</b>  7 <b>been given further fire survival guidance information,</b>  8 <b>they checked the whiteboards and see that the</b>  9 <b>information was already up there, gave me the pieces of</b>  10 <b>paper and then they went back to their control desks.</b>  11 Q. Okay. And when the Kent call came in, how did it come  12 in? Which line did it come in on?  13 <b>A. I'm not sure which telephone line. I was informed by</b>  14 <b>one of the control operators that they'd had a call</b>  15 <b>regarding that information, but we'd already had that up</b>  16 <b>on our -- we already had the fire survival guidance</b>  17 <b>information up on our board and had already notified the</b>  18 <b>command unit of the incident.</b>  19 Q. So you don't know how -- is this right? -- that fire  20 service, Kent Fire and Rescue Service, communicated with  21 the control room?  22 <b>A. No. No, I know they contacted London control by phone.</b>  23 Q. Did you know that there's a designated line for all of  24 the buddy control rooms to be able to contact the LFB  25 control room on?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 151</p>
<p>1 <b>conditions within the flat or outside the flat and</b>  2 <b>others didn't.</b>  3 Q. Okay.  4 Do you remember whether Essex Fire Service had any  5 involvement in any calls?  6 <b>A. Not Essex, Kent.</b>  7 Q. Not Essex, Kent. You don't remember --  8 <b>A. I don't remember Essex -- no, not from Essex.</b>  9 <b>I remember there was -- we received -- again, quite late</b>  10 <b>on we received -- information came to me that they'd had</b>  11 <b>a call from Kent Fire Brigade saying that relatives had</b>  12 <b>received a phone call from occupants within the tower,</b>  13 <b>and then Kent Fire Brigade had then passed that over to</b>  14 <b>London control.</b>  15 Q. Yes, and if you look at page 7 of your statement,  16 three-quarters of the way down that page, you say:  17 "We received a call from Kent Fire Brigade at one  18 point and this happened because a family inside the  19 Tower had called a friend or family member who in turn  20 contacted 999, because the reside in Kent the call got  21 passed to us through Kent."  22 When you took on responsibility for the FSG calls,  23 having been instructed to do so by DAC Fenton, were you  24 aware that there were other control rooms outside London  25 taking 999 calls in respect of Grenfell Tower?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 150</p>	<p>1 <b>A. As I said before, I'm not a control operator, so</b>  2 <b>I don't -- I'm not sure of their procedures or policies</b>  3 <b>with regards to that. I know we do have some direct</b>  4 <b>line to major risks within the London area that we do --</b>  5 <b>like airports and stuff like that, but I wasn't aware</b>  6 <b>with regards to other brigades.</b>  7 Q. Okay. So you were put in charge of FSG calls but didn't  8 know that there were buddy control rooms who were going  9 to be handling FSG calls and passing them through --  10 <b>A. No, I wasn't aware that other brigades would be dealing</b>  11 <b>with other fire survival guidance calls, no.</b>  12 Q. So when you got this call from Kent through the CRO,  13 were you surprised that there were --  14 <b>A. No, not at all, no. I mean, the information I was given</b>  15 <b>that relatives had phoned through to -- because they was</b>  16 <b>in the Kent area, it had gone through -- because they</b>  17 <b>lived in Kent, they'd phoned 999, which had gone through</b>  18 <b>to Kent control, and then Kent control had gone straight</b>  19 <b>through -- had contacted London.</b>  20 Q. I see. I see.  21 Did you have any information at all about other  22 control rooms providing FSG assistance to Stratford  23 because of the sheer volume of calls being received by  24 Stratford?  25 <b>A. No. The only thing I was aware of was the information</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 152</p>

1 **I was given by call operators. I wasn't aware where the**  
 2 **information had come from. So a lot of the times**  
 3 **I assumed that the information I was being given had**  
 4 **come from residents within the tower block.**  
 5 Q. So nobody during the night giving you information said  
 6 to you there are two or three other -- or in fact five  
 7 other services taking calls in respect of  
 8 Grenfell Tower?  
 9 **A. No.**  
 10 Q. Right.  
 11 **A. I think the main part of -- the fact was that we was**  
 12 **getting the important information regarding the people**  
 13 **trapped in the tower block to the fire ground, and**  
 14 **I think stuff like the information where the call had**  
 15 **come from or originated from wasn't high on the priority**  
 16 **list of passing through; it was more about knowing where**  
 17 **people were trapped and where we needed to send the fire**  
 18 **crews.**  
 19 Q. Maybe you can't help with this, but could I just ask you  
 20 to look at a document, which is LFB00003625.  
 21 It's a question I could, I suppose, and should have  
 22 asked you earlier on in your evidence, but since we're  
 23 talking about non-London fire services, it comes up now.  
 24 This document is a log, an incident log, kept by  
 25 Essex Fire and Rescue Services, and it's in reverse

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1 chronological order, so it starts at 20.45 on 14 June,  
 2 but as we scroll down to page 3, if we could, there's  
 3 a time mark of 02.14.  
 4 At 02.14, if I can just ask Mr Documents Director to  
 5 highlight the text there, it says:  
 6 "On the Grenfell Tower regeneration there is  
 7 an emergency fire arrangement paragraph.  
 8 "Their policy states to stay put unless otherwise  
 9 advised, Grenfell was designed to rigorous fire safety  
 10 standards.  
 11 "Each front door for each flat can withstand a fire  
 12 for up to 30 minutes."  
 13 Now, we may need to explore how Essex came by that  
 14 information and what it is, but can you help? From your  
 15 experience of the night, do you know what that means?  
 16 Let me --  
 17 **A. I've no clue where they got that information from. This**  
 18 **is something that I would not have seen.**  
 19 Q. When you arrived and started taking over FSG calls, were  
 20 you aware that there was an emergency fire arrangement  
 21 paragraph, whatever that is?  
 22 **A. No.**  
 23 Q. Were you told or did you discover that Grenfell was  
 24 designed to rigorous safety standards?  
 25 **A. To be fair, most high-rise tower blocks should be,**

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1 **should have fire -- most flats in high-rise buildings**  
 2 **should have an hour's fire resistancy to be able to**  
 3 **contain the fire.**  
 4 Q. Can you explain why Essex would have that information to  
 5 be able to put it onto their log?  
 6 **A. I can't, no.**  
 7 Q. Okay.  
 8 Also on the subject of non-LFB call handling, were  
 9 you aware when you took on responsibility for fire  
 10 survival guidance that Alexandra Norman in the control  
 11 room had asked BT operators to take FSG calls?  
 12 **A. No, I wasn't aware of that.**  
 13 Q. Did you ever become aware during the night of that fact?  
 14 **A. No. As I say, my primary role at the control centre was**  
 15 **to take information from the call operators and then**  
 16 **just pass it to the command unit.**  
 17 Q. Yes.  
 18 Now, we've seen you doing that with the whiteboard  
 19 and the mobile phone and the logs. From the logs, it  
 20 looks as if you're on your mobile for, in one instance,  
 21 an hour and a half, from 02.44 until about 04.15.  
 22 **A. Yes.**  
 23 Q. During that long call, do you remember ever getting any  
 24 information back from --  
 25 **A. Erm --**

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1 Q. Let me just finish the question -- from the incident  
 2 ground about what BA deployments were happening and how  
 3 successful rescues were?  
 4 **A. No. No, I didn't. There were a couple on the**  
 5 **whiteboard where I got information back saying that**  
 6 **they'd been rescued. There was only a couple that**  
 7 **I recall. But, no, I didn't get any information**  
 8 **regarding how BA resources had been deployed.**  
 9 Q. Given the policy that we looked at together this  
 10 morning, specifically policy 790, paragraphs 9.1 and  
 11 9.3, which are about information coming back to the  
 12 control room from the incident ground, did you press the  
 13 command unit for any detailed information about how  
 14 specific FSG calls were going or how specific rescues  
 15 were going?  
 16 **A. No, I didn't, no.**  
 17 Q. Is there a reason why you didn't?  
 18 **A. It's just the simple fact that -- again, I will mention,**  
 19 **this was not a usual incident. This was an**  
 20 **unprecedented incident that no one in London has seen.**  
 21 **It just was out of the norm. Our normal fire survival**  
 22 **guidance procedures are that it's sort of done over the**  
 23 **Airwave radio, so for it to be taken away and given to**  
 24 **myself and two whiteboards and pass the information by**  
 25 **mobile phone was something that I've never seen or heard**

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1 of being done before.

2 **The amount of information that was being passed over**

3 **to the command units, I would imagine that the fire**

4 **crews on the ground were extremely stretched, and any**

5 **information that they did get back, they could – any**

6 **information that they did have with regards to people**

7 **being rescued, they would send back when they had the**

8 **time to do so.**

9 Q. Did you not think, though, that it was critical, in

10 order for the CROs to be able to give the best advice

11 they could to the callers when they were handling the

12 FSG calls, to press the incident ground for detailed

13 information as to deployments to that flat or that

14 floor?

15 **A. So if you want to have a look at my call records**

16 **again – if you want to get my call records up.**

17 Q. Yes, sure. That's JAO/7. Third page.

18 **A. I just want to confirm for the record, at the times that**

19 **I was on that phone, phoning the command unit, I was**

20 **passing information over to the command unit regarding**

21 **fire survival guidance information, that was a constant**

22 **stream of information that night. There wasn't**

23 **really – I didn't really have time to sit down and**

24 **start questioning what was being done with regards to**

25 **this fire survival guidance call, what's going on with**

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1 **this fire survival guidance call. The amount of**

2 **information that was being passed over at that time,**

3 **I didn't really have time to start questioning the**

4 **command unit staff with regards to what's being done**

5 **with regard to this flat and this particular flat.**

6 **When you have a look at the actual times that I was**

7 **on there and how long over that period from 02.05 to**

8 **nearly 06.40 in the morning, that was dealing with fire**

9 **information that I was giving to the command unit.**

10 Q. Can we summarise your evidence really in this way: your

11 role really at this incident was to gather FSG

12 information, collate it, record it on the whiteboards

13 and pass it by Brigade mobile to the command unit?

14 **A. Yes.**

15 Q. And that's it?

16 **A. That was it, yeah.**

17 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, it may be a convenient moment for

18 a break. There are one or two --

19 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I was about to suggest that, so

20 that's very fortunate.

21 MR MILLETT: I could tell you were.

22 There are one or two further questions I think

23 I have to follow up with and there may be some other

24 stray questions too, so would now be a convenient break?

25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think it would. Is 10 minutes

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1 going to be long enough for this purpose?

2 MR MILLETT: If we make it 15, that would enable us

3 comfortably to finish Mr Oliff's evidence this

4 afternoon.

5 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I was going to say 3.25, which is

6 over 10 and less than 15 minutes.

7 Mr Oliff, we're going to have a break. We'll resume

8 at 3.25 and please don't talk to anyone about your

9 evidence during the break. All right?

10 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.

12 (The witness withdrew)

13 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, 3.25, please. Thank you.

14 (3.07 pm)

15 (A short break)

16 (3.25 pm)

17 (The witness returned)

18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Oliff? I think just

19 a few more questions.

20 MR MILLETT: Yes.

21 Mr Oliff, can I ask you, please, to look at page 6

22 of your statement.

23 I just want to take you back to the discussion that

24 you were having with the control room operator who was

25 talking to the gentleman from flat 183. Just one or two

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1 questions about this.

2 In the middle of the page you say:

3 "I explained to the operator that fire fighters were

4 having difficulty in getting past the eleventh (11th)

5 floor. I told the operator that the family needed to

6 keep going and try to reach safety."

7 Now, I just want to ask you about difficulty getting

8 past the 11th floor.

9 First of all, do you know what the difficulty was in

10 firefighters getting past the 11th floor?

11 **A. So referring back to what we discussed earlier, when**

12 **I received the information from the command unit that --**

13 **I was given the information that firefighters were**

14 **finding it difficult to get past -- I'm sure it was the**

15 **11th floor, due to fire conditions, heat and smoke.**

16 Q. Do you know where you got that information from?

17 **A. That came from the person I was speaking to in the**

18 **command unit. He informed me that -- it was all part of**

19 **the same conversation with regards to the bridgehead,**

20 **firefighters having difficulty getting past the 11th**

21 **floor and the commissioner considering evacuating fire**

22 **crews because of the dangerous structure.**

23 Q. So would it be right, then, that during those calls or

24 perhaps during that very long call you had with the

25 officer in the command unit, you did get some

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1 information about what was happening on the fire ground?  
 2 **A. Yes, I did say that. I mean, there were instances where**  
 3 **I had small pieces of information come back. If you put**  
 4 **the whiteboards up, there was a couple on there where**  
 5 **I'd made remarks next to flat numbers where it said**  
 6 **they'd been rescued.**  
 7 Q. Just so I'm clear, the difficulty in getting past the  
 8 11th floor --  
 9 **A. Yes.**  
 10 Q. -- that's later than the -- well, different from getting  
 11 past the 15th floor.  
 12 **A. Yes, there was 11th and 15th floor, there was -- on the**  
 13 **first part of it, I can't quite remember. I remember**  
 14 **him saying -- I thought that it was 11th. It may have**  
 15 **been 11th and 15th.**  
 16 Q. Well, I was going to ask you, because when you explain  
 17 halfway down page 5, you said that you were told by CU7  
 18 that fire crews were having difficulty ascending above  
 19 the 15th floor and that was one of the things that led  
 20 to the stay-put policy being changed. We looked at  
 21 a time for that. This looks like it's later, and I'm  
 22 asking --  
 23 **A. No, it was the same. I think in my mind I wasn't sure**  
 24 **whether it was the 11th or the 15th. But the**  
 25 **information came from the command unit stating that fire**

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1 **crews were having difficulty getting to the upper floors**  
 2 **from the 11th or 15th up.**  
 3 Q. So is the effect of what you are saying that when you  
 4 were standing next to the control room operator giving  
 5 the advice, you were remembering what the command unit  
 6 had told you about difficulty accessing the building --  
 7 **A. Yes.**  
 8 Q. -- earlier on?  
 9 **A. Yes.**  
 10 Q. I see. So it could be the 15th floor?  
 11 **A. Could've been, yes.**  
 12 Q. Now, you say the difficulties were -- well, just  
 13 focusing on the difficulties, was that -- originally, if  
 14 you look at the statement on page 5, you say fire crews  
 15 were having difficulty ascending -- let's just get this  
 16 up -- above the 15th floor due to the intensity of the  
 17 fire.  
 18 **A. Yes. Yes, it was the same conversation.**  
 19 Q. It's the same conversation.  
 20 So what would that mean in terms of being able to go  
 21 up the stairwell?  
 22 **A. Well, that would mean that the stairwell is probably**  
 23 **heavily smoke-logged.**  
 24 Q. No fire on the stairwell?  
 25 **A. Again, I was only repeating back what I'd been told by**

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1 **the command crew.**  
 2 Q. Right.  
 3 If firefighters by this stage were wearing EDBA,  
 4 what would the difficulties be in ascending up the  
 5 stairwell if it was smoke-logged?  
 6 **A. I can't confirm whether fire crews at that point were**  
 7 **wearing EDBA. I wasn't -- I didn't have any knowledge**  
 8 **of the actual operations that were taking place at the**  
 9 **time.**  
 10 Q. Okay.  
 11 Now, can I then ask you to look at your whiteboards  
 12 again, this is JAO/4 and JAO/5, and let's have them both  
 13 up there at the same time.  
 14 So it's MET00016912 and MET00016906.  
 15 First of all, we can see what's on the whiteboard.  
 16 Did you record anywhere repeat calls?  
 17 **A. No.**  
 18 Q. So not on the whiteboard but not anywhere else either;  
 19 is that right?  
 20 **A. If there was a repeat call and we already had the fire**  
 21 **information up on that board, then I would confirm with**  
 22 **the command unit that we've received further calls to**  
 23 **that address. I wouldn't then double it up because**  
 24 **I already had it recorded that -- we was already aware**  
 25 **of that fire survival guidance information.**

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1 Q. Okay. I see. So is there anywhere, then, a written  
 2 record of a repeat information back to the CU?  
 3 **A. No.**  
 4 Q. Right. Was there a system in place for dealing with  
 5 repeat calls from a particular flat or particular  
 6 caller?  
 7 **A. No. I mean, if I got any information in a different --**  
 8 **any additional information or there was a change in**  
 9 **circumstances, if I already had it recorded up on that**  
 10 **board then I would change some of the information that**  
 11 **was there and pass that over to the command unit as**  
 12 **well.**  
 13 Q. Yes. Okay.  
 14 Was there a system for calling callers back if  
 15 information about them changed or when the stay-put  
 16 advice changed?  
 17 **A. Because I wasn't actually dealing with the direct**  
 18 **telephone calls with the occupants, I can't answer that.**  
 19 Q. From your own knowledge, you don't know; is that fair?  
 20 **A. I don't know whether they was called back.**  
 21 Q. Going back just to look at the whiteboard JAO/4, so the  
 22 one on the left, just to the right of the redaction mark  
 23 there's some faint handwriting it looks like it says  
 24 "SM Yates", "AC Mills", and then something.  
 25 **A. That was already on the whiteboard and wouldn't come off**

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<p>1 <b>before I started the actual recording.</b></p> <p>2 Q. Right. So that's historic --</p> <p>3 <b>A. Yes, that was something that was on there and it</b></p> <p>4 <b>wouldn't come off. Someone had done it in permanent</b></p> <p>5 <b>marker and it had stayed on there.</b></p> <p>6 Q. Okay.</p> <p>7 Now, can I show you some documents that are</p> <p>8 exhibited to Mr Fenton's statement. These are at</p> <p>9 MET00017094, and it's a run of documents. I just want</p> <p>10 to see if you recognise these, that's all. I'm not</p> <p>11 going to take you through every single one, but just in</p> <p>12 terms on the type of documents.</p> <p>13 He says these are pieces of paper that he took from</p> <p>14 the control room, and I just wonder if you can help.</p> <p>15 I'll take a couple at random.</p> <p>16 First of all, can you be shown page 3.</p> <p>17 It's a little bit faint. I wonder if it can be made</p> <p>18 clearer.</p> <p>19 Just looking at that piece of paper, is that</p> <p>20 something you recognise --</p> <p>21 <b>A. No.</b></p> <p>22 Q. -- in terms of its type?</p> <p>23 <b>A. No. No. The information I was given on basically small</b></p> <p>24 <b>bits that had been torn off of A4 bits of paper.</b></p> <p>25 Q. Bits of -- so scraps?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 165</p>	<p>1 Can you please go to page 16. So this is</p> <p>2 MET00017094, page 16.</p> <p>3 Now, if that can be expanded, if you look at the</p> <p>4 lower part of that piece of paper, it says "23rd flr</p> <p>5 flat 201 believed to be" something, and then the word</p> <p>6 "unconscious" appears.</p> <p>7 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>8 Q. Do you see that?</p> <p>9 <b>A. Yes.</b></p> <p>10 Q. Then if you look at the left-hand whiteboard, JAO/4,</p> <p>11 third entry down -- okay, we've gone a bit fast. That's</p> <p>12 okay. Look at 201, 23rd floor, so third entry down,</p> <p>13 "2ye old 11 people -- now unconscious".</p> <p>14 Do you remember how the information on the piece of</p> <p>15 paper got onto the whiteboard?</p> <p>16 <b>A. Say again, sorry?</b></p> <p>17 Q. Do you remember how the information we see on the piece</p> <p>18 of paper --</p> <p>19 <b>A. I was passed a piece of paper with that information on.</b></p> <p>20 Q. Okay.</p> <p>21 <b>A. As I say, all the pieces of paper I was given was like</b></p> <p>22 <b>corners that were torn off of A4 pieces. So it may have</b></p> <p>23 <b>been written down again and then passed to me.</b></p> <p>24 Q. Mr Documents Manager, I wonder whether we can have that</p> <p>25 FSG board up at the same time as page 16 of MET00017094,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 167</p>
<p>1 <b>A. Scraps of paper, yes.</b></p> <p>2 Q. Just looking at that page, we have a reference to flat</p> <p>3 152, 18th floor, four persons, three children, "from</p> <p>4 police", I think it says.</p> <p>5 Looking at JAO/4, the first whiteboard page, it</p> <p>6 says, "152 18th 4 adults, 3 children -- left flat".</p> <p>7 Now, can you help us make a connection between what</p> <p>8 is written on the whiteboard there -- "152 18th" -- and</p> <p>9 what's written on this piece of paper?</p> <p>10 <b>A. So the information I -- can you show me the whiteboard,</b></p> <p>11 <b>please?</b></p> <p>12 Q. Yes. If you can go back to the -- yes.</p> <p>13 <b>A. So 152 --</b></p> <p>14 Q. Looking at the very bottom. The first question</p> <p>15 I suppose I should ask you: "152 18th" is written in</p> <p>16 black --</p> <p>17 <b>A. So that would've been the information that would've been</b></p> <p>18 <b>passed to me that there was originally four adults and</b></p> <p>19 <b>three children in the flat but they've now left the</b></p> <p>20 <b>flat. That information may have changed, they may have</b></p> <p>21 <b>been trapped in that flat, but then I may have been</b></p> <p>22 <b>updated to say that they've now left the flat. Once --</b></p> <p>23 <b>that could've happened after the stay-put policy was</b></p> <p>24 <b>changed.</b></p> <p>25 Q. Okay. Now, let's just look at another one.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 166</p>	<p>1 just to make a comparison, to see whether the</p> <p>2 information on the whiteboard is derived from this piece</p> <p>3 of paper.</p> <p>4 If you compare the wording, the word "unconscious"</p> <p>5 is misspelt in both places, and in fact the handwriting</p> <p>6 looks quite similar, but that's not for me to say.</p> <p>7 Can you explain how the information, including the</p> <p>8 information about unconscious and the spelling mistake,</p> <p>9 goes from the piece of paper onto the whiteboard?</p> <p>10 <b>A. That might -- again, that may have come on the piece of</b></p> <p>11 <b>paper that I was given and that's how I wrote it up,</b></p> <p>12 <b>writing it from the piece of paper.</b></p> <p>13 Q. So can we conclude from that that at least page 16, the</p> <p>14 piece of paper was something that was handed to you</p> <p>15 while you were at the whiteboard?</p> <p>16 <b>A. That piece of paper wasn't because, as I say, all the</b></p> <p>17 <b>pieces of paper that I was given was small pieces of</b></p> <p>18 <b>paper. It was like corners torn off of --</b></p> <p>19 Q. I see. So the piece of paper at page 16 you say wasn't</p> <p>20 a piece of paper that you were handed?</p> <p>21 <b>A. If that's a full A4 piece of paper, I wasn't given any</b></p> <p>22 <b>full A4 pieces of paper. Mine were just corners torn</b></p> <p>23 <b>off of other A4 pieces of paper.</b></p> <p>24 Q. Okay. Right.</p> <p>25 Can you explain how the same spelling mistake came</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 168</p>

1 to be made on both the piece of paper and on the  
 2 whiteboard?  
 3 **A. That would've been where I just basically copied it off**  
 4 **of the snippet of paper that I was given.**  
 5 Q. Do you think the piece of paper we have on the  
 6 right-hand side of the screen is a photocopy of  
 7 something you were handed and then recorded onto the  
 8 whiteboard?  
 9 **A. That looks like a full piece of A4 paper that's given to**  
 10 **me, but I didn't receive any pieces of A4 piece of**  
 11 **paper; I just received little corners that were torn**  
 12 **off.**  
 13 Q. Right.  
 14 Finally, can I ask you to look at JAO/6 which is  
 15 MET00016909.  
 16 This is a list of flats, floors, adults and  
 17 children. Do you know what this document is?  
 18 **A. Yes, that's -- after 06.40, when there was no further**  
 19 **fire survival guidance information, I was approached by**  
 20 **Adrian Fenton and asked to just formulate a document**  
 21 **just to say what flats and floor numbers and people --**  
 22 **the amount of people -- estimating the amount of people**  
 23 **that we'd dealt with through the fire survival guidance**  
 24 **calls.**  
 25 **He just asked me to collate some information from**

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1 **the whiteboards to say what fire survival guidance phone**  
 2 **calls we'd dealt with, what flats they was in, what**  
 3 **floor, how many people we estimated or was on the**  
 4 **information that we was given.**  
 5 Q. Okay.  
 6 Can you help with some of the manuscript on it?  
 7 Against flat 74 on floor 10, adults two, and there's  
 8 some writing next to the 2. Do you know what that says?  
 9 Perhaps we can have it enlarged.  
 10 **A. "Making way out".**  
 11 Q. "Making" --  
 12 **A. Looks like "Making way out".**  
 13 Q. Something way out.  
 14 **A. That's when I first started doing it and I was going to**  
 15 **start putting what was up on the whiteboards, but I sort**  
 16 **of like realised he wasn't after that, he was just after**  
 17 **how many fire survival guidance calls we'd received,**  
 18 **what flat they was from, what floor they was on, how**  
 19 **many adults were involved and how many children were**  
 20 **involved.**  
 21 Q. And opposite number 83, floor 11, adults one, there's  
 22 a piece of handwriting. Can you decipher that?  
 23 **A. Let me see. (Pause)**  
 24 **No, I can't. I couldn't tell you. Without actually**  
 25 **seeing the document, I couldn't tell you.**

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1 Q. But in general terms I think -- would this be right? --  
 2 the information that you collated on this piece of paper  
 3 in this list was derived from the whiteboard?  
 4 **A. The two whiteboards, yes.**  
 5 Q. The two whiteboards.  
 6 Can I just then go back finally to what I was  
 7 showing you before, DAC Fenton's exhibit. I just want  
 8 to ask you to look at MET00017094, pages 23 and 24.  
 9 First of all, do you know what this is? Have you  
 10 scene this piece of paper before?  
 11 **A. I haven't, no.**  
 12 Q. Might you be able to assist with what the ticks mean  
 13 against each number?  
 14 **A. No, I don't know.**  
 15 Q. Was there any system that you had in the control room  
 16 for being able to tick off flats that had been cleared  
 17 or instances where deployments of BA wearers to FSG  
 18 callers had been successful?  
 19 **A. The only way that I done that is if I received**  
 20 **information back from the command unit, and if you have**  
 21 **a look at the whiteboards, there's a couple where I've**  
 22 **either circled them with an arrow saying "Rescued" or**  
 23 **they've left the flat.**  
 24 Q. Right.  
 25 Do you know or did you know at the time of the

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1 system of recording FSG calls on the command unit?  
 2 **A. Do I know of the system?**  
 3 Q. Yes.  
 4 **A. Are you talking about like the headline board, like the**  
 5 **whiteboard, or are you talking about the command --**  
 6 **command[sic] of information?**  
 7 Q. I don't want to show you a document if you can't help me  
 8 with it, but my general question is: did you know on the  
 9 night of what system was being used on the command unit  
 10 to record the information you were giving them?  
 11 **A. So as I say, our normal policy is that any fire survival**  
 12 **guidance information initially goes on the control of**  
 13 **information form. But actually what system they was**  
 14 **using on the command unit, I don't know.**  
 15 Q. You don't know.  
 16 If flats were cleared or the BA deployments were  
 17 successful --  
 18 **A. Sorry?**  
 19 Q. If flats were cleared or BA deployments were successful,  
 20 were you told about it?  
 21 **A. Again, I only received very minimal information back, on**  
 22 **one or two flats to notify me of the outcome.**  
 23 Q. Right. Can I ask you to look at page 9 of your  
 24 statement.  
 25 In the last sentence you say:

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1 "I was present in the control room when this was  
2 discussed ..."  
3 That's the changing of the advice:  
4 "... but I am not certain if this would be detailed  
5 in a written decision log within the control room.  
6 Normally any key decisions are recorded in a decision  
7 log held on the ground, not in the control room."  
8 Do you know whether there was a written decision log  
9 retained or kept in the Stratford control room on the  
10 night of the fire?  
11 **A. No, I wasn't aware of that. I know that if a key**  
12 **decision is made on the fire ground then that's recorded**  
13 **on the command support system on the command units. But**  
14 **as for control, I wasn't aware whether they have**  
15 **a system in place to record key decisions.**  
16 MR MILLETT: Yes, thank you very much.  
17 Mr Chairman, I have no further questions for  
18 Mr Oliff.  
19 Mr Oliff, thank you. I have no further questions  
20 for you, and I just want to say thank you very much for  
21 coming here today and assisting the inquiry with its  
22 investigations. Thank you very much.  
23 THE WITNESS: Thank you.  
24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I would like to add my thanks,  
25 Mr Oliff. This probably hasn't been terribly agreeable,

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1 coming to give evidence, but we're very grateful for  
2 your doing so because it provides us with a lot of  
3 valuable material in pursuit of our investigations. So  
4 thanks very much indeed.  
5 THE WITNESS: Thank you.  
6 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And now you are free to go. Thank  
7 you.  
8 (The witness was released)  
9 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, we have reached the end of the  
10 oral evidence for today. DAC Fenton is coming tomorrow  
11 to give evidence.  
12 Between now and then, I am urged by Mr Kinnier that  
13 there is some material that needs to be read into the  
14 record.  
15 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.  
16 MR MILLETT: He knows more about it than I do, so I think he  
17 will now take over that exercise.  
18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right.  
19 MR KINNIER: Sir, it's now proposed to read into the record  
20 the evidence of two witnesses, the first of whom is  
21 Alex De St Aubin and the second of whom is  
22 Mr Danny Bills.  
23 So with your permission, first of all, may  
24 I formally read into the record the statement of  
25 Mr De St Aubin. The reference is MET00012464, together

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1 with his contemporaneous note, MET00005530.  
2 The reference for Mr Daniel Bills's evidence is  
3 MET00005490.  
4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, thank you.  
5 MR KINNIER: Thank you very much.  
6 MR MILLETT: Right. Well, that was quick!  
7 So, Mr Chairman, I think that concludes the work of  
8 the inquiry for today.  
9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good. Thank you very much. So  
10 we'll resume tomorrow at 10 o'clock with another  
11 witness.  
12 MR MILLETT: We do, thank you.  
13 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good.  
14 Well, as you hear, that's all we've got to do today.  
15 We will break now and resume at 10 o'clock tomorrow  
16 morning. Look forward to seeing you all then.  
17 Thank you very much.  
18 (3.47 pm)  
19 (The hearing adjourned until Tuesday, 17 July 2018 at  
20 10.00 am)  
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