

<p>1 Tuesday, 17 July 2018</p> <p>2 (10.00 am)</p> <p>3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to</p> <p>4 another day's hearing.</p> <p>5 Mr Millett, we are going to hear from another</p> <p>6 witness, I think.</p> <p>7 MR MILLETT: We are, Mr Chairman, yes. I'd like to invite</p> <p>8 DAC Adrian Fenton to come now to give evidence.</p> <p>9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, thank you.</p> <p>10 ADRIAN FENTON (sworn)</p> <p>11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much indeed.</p> <p>12 Good morning, Mr Fenton.</p> <p>13 THE WITNESS: Good morning.</p> <p>14 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Sit down, make yourself comfortable.</p> <p>15 There's water on the table if you would like it.</p> <p>16 THE WITNESS: Thank you.</p> <p>17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Millett will be asking you</p> <p>18 questions. If at any stage you feel that you need</p> <p>19 a break, just indicate and we'll take action. All</p> <p>20 right?</p> <p>21 THE WITNESS: Okay, thank you.</p> <p>22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.</p> <p>23 Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY</p> <p>24 MR MILLETT: Good morning, Mr Fenton.</p> <p>25 Could you please give the inquiry your full name?</p> <p>Page 1</p>	<p>1 Q. Have you discussed your statement or your evidence that</p> <p>2 you're going to give to the inquiry with anybody before</p> <p>3 coming here today?</p> <p>4 A. No, I haven't.</p> <p>5 Q. Okay.</p> <p>6 Now, we also have a note, which is MET00005290,</p> <p>7 which says that it was compiled by you on 14 June, which</p> <p>8 is a document we now have on the screen.</p> <p>9 It's a fairly long document, I'm not going to show</p> <p>10 it all to you, but you say, I think, that you compiled</p> <p>11 this from contemporaneous notes you made on</p> <p>12 17 June 2017.</p> <p>13 A. Yes, I did.</p> <p>14 Q. That's right, is it?</p> <p>15 A. Yes.</p> <p>16 Q. Yes. And the records were made by your loggist, Watch</p> <p>17 Manager Lee Small, on 14 June; yes?</p> <p>18 A. Yes.</p> <p>19 Q. Okay.</p> <p>20 I think there's also a voice record made by yourself</p> <p>21 by mobile on 18 June 2017.</p> <p>22 A. Yes, that's correct.</p> <p>23 Q. Have you had a chance to review this note recently?</p> <p>24 A. Yes, I have.</p> <p>25 Q. You have. Okay.</p> <p>Page 3</p>
<p>1 A. Adrian Patrick Fenton.</p> <p>2 Q. Thank you.</p> <p>3 Can I just say, first of all, thank you very much</p> <p>4 for coming along to attend today and help us with our</p> <p>5 inquiries. We do appreciate it.</p> <p>6 I'm going to be asking you quite a few questions.</p> <p>7 If you don't understand any of them or would like me to</p> <p>8 repeat them, I'm very happy to do so, or to put the</p> <p>9 question in a different way.</p> <p>10 Similarly, if at any stage you need a break, we can</p> <p>11 take a break. It's not a problem.</p> <p>12 A. Thank you.</p> <p>13 Q. Now, you've provided the inquiry -- or, rather, you've</p> <p>14 provided the police -- with a statement dated</p> <p>15 4 January 2018, and it's Relativity reference is</p> <p>16 MET000080569, which should now be up there on the</p> <p>17 screen.</p> <p>18 We have two screens at the back of the room and</p> <p>19 a screen on your desk which you're looking at, so best</p> <p>20 to use that.</p> <p>21 Have you read it recently?</p> <p>22 A. Yes, I have, yes.</p> <p>23 Q. Can you please confirm that its contents are true and</p> <p>24 accurate to the best of your belief?</p> <p>25 A. Yes, they are.</p> <p>Page 2</p>	<p>1 Now, we also have some documents. I wouldn't call</p> <p>2 them formal exhibits to your statement, but they are</p> <p>3 documents which have two separate Relativity numbers.</p> <p>4 Let me go to those straight away. These are MET00017094</p> <p>5 and MET00017390, and each of those is a separate</p> <p>6 clutch of documents which I want to ask you about.</p> <p>7 Let me ask you about them now, not to get them out</p> <p>8 of the way completely, but at least to be able to</p> <p>9 identify them.</p> <p>10 Let's start with the first of those, MET00017094.</p> <p>11 That's the first page, which is the police evidence</p> <p>12 identifier.</p> <p>13 If we can turn to the next page, it looks like the</p> <p>14 outside of an envelope.</p> <p>15 A. Yes, that's my writing on that envelope, yes.</p> <p>16 Q. And it's entitled "FSG details from control collected by</p> <p>17 DAC Fenton, OIC in control/BCC on the night of</p> <p>18 Grenfell Tower".</p> <p>19 A. Yes, so OIC would be in the BCC, but not the OIC of</p> <p>20 control; that would have been Jo Smith.</p> <p>21 Q. Yes.</p> <p>22 If you then go to the next page and the pages that</p> <p>23 follow, can you just identify for us in outline terms</p> <p>24 what these documents are? There's the first page, which</p> <p>25 is page 3. There's details of flats and people and</p> <p>Page 4</p>

<p>1 floors.</p> <p>2 Do you know what these documents are?</p> <p>3 A. These were the documents that control staff were taking</p> <p>4 the FSG information on, and then this was passed over to</p> <p>5 Jason Oliff, who was in the corner writing the</p> <p>6 information up on the dry whiteboards.</p> <p>7 Q. Right.</p> <p>8 A. On the day or in the morning there was a pile of</p> <p>9 documents and I just picked the whole pile up, so</p> <p>10 I couldn't go through it individually and say each</p> <p>11 individual one was -- they was just on a pile next to</p> <p>12 the dry whiteboard, so I just put the whole lot in one</p> <p>13 envelope.</p> <p>14 Q. I see. And they were already piled up, were they?</p> <p>15 A. Yes.</p> <p>16 Q. You just picked them up and put them in an envelope?</p> <p>17 A. Yes.</p> <p>18 Q. What time did you do that, do you remember?</p> <p>19 A. I would say that's probably around between 0600 and 0700</p> <p>20 on the morning.</p> <p>21 Q. Okay. And were there two piles or one pile?</p> <p>22 A. I couldn't give you -- they were just on the floor by</p> <p>23 the dry whiteboards.</p> <p>24 Q. Right. Okay.</p> <p>25 We'll look through these in due course. Can I just</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 5</p>	<p>1 up?</p> <p>2 A. My recollection is that there was a mixture of pieces of</p> <p>3 paper that were by the dry whiteboards that I picked up.</p> <p>4 So a range of A4 sheets to pieces that were ripped off</p> <p>5 to half sheets, really. So a complete variation.</p> <p>6 Q. Okay. You have a clear recollection of that, do you?</p> <p>7 A. Sorry?</p> <p>8 Q. Do you have a clear recollection of that?</p> <p>9 A. Yes. That's what was on -- all the papers that I've put</p> <p>10 in that envelope were all the papers that were on the</p> <p>11 floor by the dry whiteboards.</p> <p>12 Q. Right. We'll come to look at the details of those then</p> <p>13 later on.</p> <p>14 I said I'd come back to the second page of this</p> <p>15 second group of documents. If we can go back to that,</p> <p>16 MET00017390, page 2. This is a list of flats, floors,</p> <p>17 adults, children, entitled "Fire Survival Guidance</p> <p>18 14/06/17" with the incident number on the right.</p> <p>19 Can you identify the writing at the top?</p> <p>20 A. Yes, "Current 07.20", my signature, and I wrote that.</p> <p>21 So I asked Jason Oliff to collate that information off</p> <p>22 the dry whiteboards and then I wanted to sign it so that</p> <p>23 there was currency at what time that was signed and</p> <p>24 detailed.</p> <p>25 Q. Right. So just to summarise what you've just said to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 7</p>
<p>1 show you the other -- I wouldn't call it exhibit, but</p> <p>2 the other group of documents, which is MET00017390. It</p> <p>3 looks like a continuation, or a continuation in kind, of</p> <p>4 these documents.</p> <p>5 Just flipping through the pages, Mr Documents</p> <p>6 Director -- I'll come back to that document in a moment,</p> <p>7 but moving forwards -- page 2, moving forwards, again,</p> <p>8 looking at that page, and then the next page -- that's</p> <p>9 page 4, page 5, that's on its side -- again, what are</p> <p>10 these documents?</p> <p>11 A. So I'm not familiar with the content; however, they are</p> <p>12 the pieces of paper -- they look very familiar to all</p> <p>13 the pieces of paper that were utilised on the night that</p> <p>14 I picked up at the end of the shift in the morning.</p> <p>15 Q. In terms of the size of these pieces of paper, were they</p> <p>16 all A4 or were they smaller pieces of --</p> <p>17 A. They were completely varied.</p> <p>18 Q. They were completely varied?</p> <p>19 A. Yes.</p> <p>20 Q. Mr Oliff yesterday came to give evidence and I showed</p> <p>21 him these pieces of paper, and he said the pieces of</p> <p>22 paper he was getting were smaller pieces of paper; they</p> <p>23 weren't generally -- or weren't -- A4 pieces of paper.</p> <p>24 What's your recollection about the actual physical</p> <p>25 shape and size of the pieces of paper that you picked</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 6</p>	<p>1 us, that is Jason Oliff's summary of the fire survival</p> <p>2 guidance in terms of flat, floor, adults and children</p> <p>3 that he took from the whiteboards at the end of the</p> <p>4 night?</p> <p>5 A. Yes, that's correct.</p> <p>6 Q. Then you signed it off.</p> <p>7 When you signed it off, did you verify that written</p> <p>8 list against the content of the FSG whiteboards?</p> <p>9 A. No, I didn't. I took Jason's word that he'd done that.</p> <p>10 He's a competent officer and I shouldn't have to check</p> <p>11 that.</p> <p>12 Q. We'll come back in due course to these documents, but</p> <p>13 thank you very much for identifying them.</p> <p>14 Can I go back to the beginning, as it were.</p> <p>15 You are a deputy assistant commissioner with nearly</p> <p>16 24 years' experience, now 25 years' experience, I think.</p> <p>17 A. Yes.</p> <p>18 Q. I think you were made a DAC in March 2016; is that</p> <p>19 right?</p> <p>20 A. That's correct.</p> <p>21 Q. Now, on page 2 of your witness statement, if you look at</p> <p>22 it, please, three-quarters of the way down page 2 -- and</p> <p>23 I'm sorry, these statements don't have paragraph numbers</p> <p>24 and often quite a lot of block text, so we have to</p> <p>25 navigate our way through it. What we'll do is throw the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 8</p>

<p>1 statement up on the screen and use a yellow highlight to</p> <p>2 focus on the passage.</p> <p>3 It says:</p> <p>4 "Throughout my career I have trained in dealing with</p> <p>5 Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) as an operational officer."</p> <p>6 Just pausing there, did your training include</p> <p>7 lessons learnt from the Lakanal House fire?</p> <p>8 A. So I'd done the Lakanal House fire online development</p> <p>9 programme that was put forward for all staff.</p> <p>10 Q. Right. Pausing there, an online development programme</p> <p>11 put forward for all staff. When was that put forward?</p> <p>12 A. I can't remember the exact date, it was quite a while</p> <p>13 ago, but I think it would be in my training records.</p> <p>14 Q. How does an online development programme work?</p> <p>15 A. It's an online system that staff go on to, I think it's</p> <p>16 within something called Big Learning, and it's like</p> <p>17 a CBT, computer-based training.</p> <p>18 Q. How often did you do that after it came out?</p> <p>19 A. It was allocated to all staff to complete. I couldn't</p> <p>20 give you a date when that was, but that was -- it was</p> <p>21 actually for all operational staff.</p> <p>22 Q. Right. All operational staff?</p> <p>23 A. As far as I'm aware, so --</p> <p>24 Q. Right, so from front-line firefighters to the</p> <p>25 commissioner?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 9</p>	<p>1 documents bundle [HOM00001124], which is the LFB's</p> <p>2 official report, main report, into the role and actions</p> <p>3 of LFB control at the Lakanal House fire</p> <p>4 dated November 2012.</p> <p>5 There is also at tab 53, for completeness, a lengthy</p> <p>6 set of annexes. Annex A is about Lakanal and annex B is</p> <p>7 a comparison between national guidance and LFB policy</p> <p>8 and training. I don't know if they help terribly much.</p> <p>9 What I want to show you is the conclusions about the</p> <p>10 handling of the the fire at Lakanal on page 50. I just</p> <p>11 want to ask you to look at paragraphs 293 to 296 of</p> <p>12 that.</p> <p>13 Before I do that, can I ask you, are you familiar</p> <p>14 with this report at all?</p> <p>15 A. I'm aware of that report but I haven't read it.</p> <p>16 Q. Right. Okay. Let's see how far we get, then.</p> <p>17 If you look at paragraphs 293 to 296 on page 50,</p> <p>18 they're there. Can I start just by asking you about</p> <p>19 293, "Expectations that callers would be rescued and</p> <p>20 'stay put' advice". In the middle of the paragraph it</p> <p>21 says -- well, I will start the paragraph:</p> <p>22 "COs had a clear expectation that fire crews would</p> <p>23 reach the callers quickly. Their experience was that</p> <p>24 fire appliances arrive quickly and that people are</p> <p>25 rescued by the Brigade."</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 11</p>
<p>1 A. I couldn't be 100 per cent sure, so I don't know. I'm</p> <p>2 not part of the training department who would've</p> <p>3 allocated it out, so ...</p> <p>4 Q. In terms of big messages -- and it's difficult to ask</p> <p>5 you questions without that online programme in front of</p> <p>6 us -- what do you remember were the big take-away</p> <p>7 messages from that online Lakanal House training?</p> <p>8 A. I couldn't give you those answers; that training was</p> <p>9 done several years ago.</p> <p>10 Q. I see, several years ago. Was it repeated after the</p> <p>11 first time you did it?</p> <p>12 A. No, I haven't repeated it, no.</p> <p>13 Q. How soon before the Grenfell Tower fire did you do your</p> <p>14 online Lakanal House training, do you remember?</p> <p>15 A. No, I can't give you those dates.</p> <p>16 Q. Did that training specifically include communications</p> <p>17 between the control room and the incident ground in</p> <p>18 relation to FSG calls?</p> <p>19 A. So with the training package, unfortunately, as I've</p> <p>20 mentioned, it was done several years ago. I don't know</p> <p>21 the date of when I completed that and I couldn't</p> <p>22 recollect what the content was to give you details of</p> <p>23 what that was.</p> <p>24 Q. Let's see if we can get at this in a slightly different</p> <p>25 way. Can I ask you to look, please, at tab 52 of our</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 10</p>	<p>1 Just pausing there, in your experience up to the</p> <p>2 time of the Grenfell Tower in June 2017, that</p> <p>3 expectation, was that something that persisted, do you</p> <p>4 think? That control room operators continued to expect</p> <p>5 that fire crews would reach callers quickly?</p> <p>6 A. I would say that would be an expectation, but with the</p> <p>7 caveat that that would be probably a single fire</p> <p>8 survival call.</p> <p>9 Q. Right, okay.</p> <p>10 Similarly, "Their experience was that fire</p> <p>11 appliances arrive quickly and people are rescued by the</p> <p>12 Brigade", was that a continuing or persisting</p> <p>13 expectation up to the time of the Grenfell Tower?</p> <p>14 A. Yes, I would say so, yes.</p> <p>15 Q. Then it goes on in the middle of the paragraph:</p> <p>16 "As rescues by crews were not immediate there is a</p> <p>17 question whether the CO and/or callers, could have</p> <p>18 assessed the risk of attempting to escape from the flat</p> <p>19 and whether the risk of moving closer to the fire (but</p> <p>20 escaping) was less than staying put and awaiting rescue.</p> <p>21 COs relied on advising callers to 'stay put' expecting</p> <p>22 that this would keep callers safe from the fire."</p> <p>23 That sharing of assessment of risk between CO and</p> <p>24 callers, or CO or callers, is that something that</p> <p>25 persisted up until the night of the Grenfell Tower fire,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 12</p>

<p>1 in your experience?</p> <p>2 A. Yes, I would suggest that a control operator would be</p> <p>3 comfortable that stay put would be the safest place with</p> <p>4 compartmentation in place.</p> <p>5 Q. Right.</p> <p>6 Do you know whether the lessons learnt from Lakanal</p> <p>7 House led to an improvement or change in the way in</p> <p>8 which control room operators assessed or assisted the</p> <p>9 caller to assess the safety of escape?</p> <p>10 A. I couldn't give you that answer because I don't know how</p> <p>11 control operators have been trained or how their</p> <p>12 training has been changed. I'm not involved in the</p> <p>13 control side.</p> <p>14 Q. Okay. Okay.</p> <p>15 If you go, then, to 294, you may say the same thing</p> <p>16 but let me just put it to you:</p> <p>17 "Escape/alternative escape routes: Many callers</p> <p>18 mentioned that there was smoke outside their flat or</p> <p>19 that there was smoke in the corridor preventing escape.</p> <p>20 This may have caused COs to move straight into the</p> <p>21 'protect' phase of FSG and not explore alternative</p> <p>22 escape routes with the callers."</p> <p>23 First of all, can you help us, in your experience</p> <p>24 and knowledge, having had the training you say you've</p> <p>25 had, what does moving straight into the protect phase of</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 13</p>	<p>1 career you've trained in dealing with fire survival</p> <p>2 guidance as an operational officer --</p> <p>3 A. Operational officer, so on the operations side, so</p> <p>4 that's being on the incident ground, not in control.</p> <p>5 Q. I follow.</p> <p>6 A. So they are two completely different aspects.</p> <p>7 Q. Oh, I see. So you're dealing with fire survival</p> <p>8 guidance on the incident ground, not in the control</p> <p>9 room?</p> <p>10 A. On the incident ground, not in control.</p> <p>11 Q. Bear with me, then, we may be able to take this much</p> <p>12 more shortly, but just looking at appendix 3 so we're</p> <p>13 familiar with the four principles you're talking about</p> <p>14 and we know what they are, that's appendix 3, page 16 of</p> <p>15 23, and the four principles, am I right in thinking, are</p> <p>16 set out there at the bottom of the page? So,</p> <p>17 essentially, escape or identify a safe alternative</p> <p>18 escape, then if that's not possible, assess by asking</p> <p>19 questions, and then begin to protect by providing</p> <p>20 current fire safety advice, reassure the caller and</p> <p>21 reassess the caller's situation.</p> <p>22 Are those the four principles?</p> <p>23 A. So I'm aware of those four principles that are in</p> <p>24 policy 790.</p> <p>25 Q. Right.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 15</p>
<p>1 FSG mean?</p> <p>2 A. Yet again, that is a call operator's role and that</p> <p>3 wouldn't have been part of my training, but my</p> <p>4 understanding of the protect phase would be the four</p> <p>5 principles that control operators would utilise.</p> <p>6 Q. Those four principles are set out in the policies, are</p> <p>7 they?</p> <p>8 A. Yes.</p> <p>9 Q. Right. Those are the basics of fire survival guidance,</p> <p>10 are they?</p> <p>11 A. That's the principles that control operators would use.</p> <p>12 Q. Right.</p> <p>13 Just to be clear what we're talking about, I'll just</p> <p>14 follow this up by reference to a policy.</p> <p>15 Can I ask you to look at policy 539 "Emergency call</p> <p>16 management", tab 3 of the policies bundle, and look,</p> <p>17 please, at appendix 3.</p> <p>18 First of all, my question is: are you familiar with</p> <p>19 this LFB policy?</p> <p>20 A. I'm aware of that policy but, yet again, it's a control</p> <p>21 policy so it wouldn't be one that I would be -- I would</p> <p>22 have read.</p> <p>23 Q. Would you not have had training on this?</p> <p>24 A. No.</p> <p>25 Q. Because when you say in your statement throughout your</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 14</p>	<p>1 Now, you're aware of those, but you say from</p> <p>2 an operational not a control room point of view?</p> <p>3 A. Yes.</p> <p>4 Q. Going back, if we can, then, please, to paragraph 294 of</p> <p>5 the Lakanal House report, in your experience from the</p> <p>6 operational point of view, was there a change after this</p> <p>7 report in the way in which control room operators</p> <p>8 explored alternative escape routes with callers? Is</p> <p>9 there a change to the culture or the policy or the</p> <p>10 training, do you know?</p> <p>11 A. I couldn't recollect, going back to that period of time,</p> <p>12 what the change was, and, like I say, not being involved</p> <p>13 in control operators' training or in their roles,</p> <p>14 I wouldn't be able to really give you that answer.</p> <p>15 Q. Right. Just a couple more questions on this and I fear</p> <p>16 I'm going to get the same answer, but I think I need to</p> <p>17 just try it with you.</p> <p>18 In the last sentence of 294, it says:</p> <p>19 "There is a real risk in attempting a</p> <p>20 self-evacuation from a building on fire that the</p> <p>21 occupant will move themselves into a position of greater</p> <p>22 harm rather than waiting in a safe location for rescue."</p> <p>23 That risk, did that risk change, or the assessment</p> <p>24 of that risk change, to your knowledge, after Lakanal</p> <p>25 House?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 16</p>

<p>1 A. So not sure if that changed from Lakanal House, but as 2 for ourselves, we would always look that 3 compartmentation of the building will keep members -- or 4 people safe within their premises until the Fire Brigade 5 can get there to rescue them. 6 Q. Right. But at a point where the building is on fire and 7 a caller says, "There's smoke in my corridor and outside 8 my flat", so that the risk of an unsafe evacuation had 9 to be assessed, was there a change in the way in which 10 that risk was assessed as a result of Lakanal House? 11 A. I'm sorry, I can't give you the full, comprehensive 12 answer on that because it's not something that I've been 13 involved with, with control. 14 Q. Right. Let me just try one more question on 196. 15 On 196 -- 16 A. 296? 17 Q. Sorry, 296: 18 "Effective communication between Control and 19 incident command: There is evidence of information 20 passing from Control to the incident ground and only one 21 occasion when the details of a flat with people trapped 22 were not passed in a timely way. Control supervisors 23 regularly tried to obtain information about the progress 24 with the incident particularly in relation to callers 25 being given FSG. In line with practice at the time</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 17</p>	<p>1 the first page of this first of all. 2 Again, like 539, is this a policy that you're 3 familiar with or were trained on? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. So you were trained on this one; is that right? 6 A. Yes, I'm familiar with that policy, and I've had 7 training in certain aspects of that policy. 8 Q. Okay. 9 Now, this one, as you can see from this front page, 10 was reviewed as current on 17 April 2014. So this was, 11 as far as we know, the up-to-date FSG policy within the 12 LFB as at the time of the Grenfell Tower fire. 13 I just want to show you -- there's lots of it that 14 is relevant -- paragraph 9, "Communication with 15 Control". Para 9.1. It says: 16 "It is vital that control is kept informed of the 17 actions being taken to resolve each FSG call. The fact 18 that control is aware of the actions being carried out 19 on the incident ground will greatly enhance the advice 20 given to FSG callers." 21 Now, on or as at the night of the Grenfell Tower 22 fire, were you aware that that was a policy -- 23 A. Could you say that first bit of the question again, 24 sorry? Just on the -- 25 Q. As at the night of the Grenfell Tower fire, were you</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 19</p>
<p>1 there was much less information being passed from the 2 incident ground to Control about the progress of 3 firefighting and rescue efforts. It is not clear that 4 if COs had been given information about progress that it 5 would have influenced the advice given to callers." 6 My question is, having seen that: do you know 7 whether, as a result of Lakanal House and the training 8 and experiences of it, there was a change to the 9 practice of how much information came back from the 10 incident ground to control about the progress of 11 firefighting and rescue efforts, particularly in 12 relation to FSG callers? 13 A. So as mentioned before, going back to Lakanal, I can't 14 exactly pinpoint for you when or how that change came 15 into place as in my own memories; however, as 16 an operational officer, I know that the information back 17 from the incident ground is something that an officer 18 will try and do to keep control informed of progress. 19 Q. Right. Okay. 20 We'll come, I think, to a policy that may cover that 21 in a moment, to be fair to you, to put that into 22 a policy context. 23 In fact, I'll do it now, actually. 24 Could you look at policy 790, which you'll find in 25 the policies bundle at tab 5. I'd like just to show you</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 18</p>	<p>1 aware that this was policy? 2 A. Yes, I was aware as at the night of the Grenfell Tower 3 this was policy; however, I would just like to say, on 4 the night of Grenfell Tower -- this relates very much to 5 a single or maybe two fire survival guidance going on; 6 that night was unprecedented. The numbers and the 7 information coming in can change how that policy 8 could've worked on the night. 9 Q. Right. You say a single or -- 10 A. It's very unusual to have more than one or two, maybe 11 tops three, fire survival guidance calls in one go. Not 12 the amount that we had on that night. 13 Q. Do you know how many fire survival guidance calls there 14 were at Lakanal House? 15 A. Not off the top of my head, no. 16 Q. It was more than one, though, wasn't it? 17 A. Yes, it was multiple, yes, but not on the scale of 18 Grenfell. 19 Q. No, I understand that. Okay. 20 So are you saying that this policy is fit for, in 21 your experience, one or two -- 22 A. No, I wouldn't like to put an exact figure, but it's not 23 fit for multiple numbers of the night -- that we had at 24 Grenfell Tower. That was unprecedented, and the numbers 25 coming in -- to cope with that amount of information</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 20</p>

<p>1 coming in was not something that is easy to resource or 2 manage. 3 Q. Right. Then looking at 9.2: 4 "Informative messages from the incident ground 5 should also contain an update on progress relating to 6 those specific FSG calls by both the flat/house number 7 to avoid confusion." 8 Again, were you aware that this was policy as at the 9 night of the Grenfell Tower fire? 10 A. Yes, I was aware, and, again, I relate back to my last 11 answer, without repeating it. It relates to exactly the 12 same thing. 13 Q. And 9.3: 14 "The outcome of every FSG call must be communicated 15 to control." 16 Again, that's clearly -- 17 A. It's exactly the same, yes. 18 Q. All right. Okay. Well, we'll examine this in a bit 19 more detail, but I think the answer is -- would it be 20 fair to summarise your evidence this way -- you were 21 aware that this was policy -- 22 A. Yes, but to put it into practice -- 23 Q. -- but to put it into practice was are you saying not 24 possible because of the volume of -- 25 A. Practical.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 21</p>	<p>1 or discretion that a call operator had, but you are 2 saying not, are you? 3 A. I mean, like I say, why it's in capitals and emphasised 4 to that point, I'm really not sure why it's written like 5 that in my statement, but there is always a choice. 6 Stay-put policy is something that we look for 7 compartmentation; however, it depends on what the fire 8 is, what the incident is. If you're talking about 9 a fire survival guidance within, say, a house, for 10 example, the call operator may ask that they can lower 11 themselves out the first-floor window. So that advice 12 isn't set in stone in that aspect. 13 Q. I understand. 14 Then you go on to say: 15 "A fire should be contained within a compartment by 16 fire doors and the construction of the building i.e. 17 Concrete floors which will assist in preventing fire 18 spread. It is usually safer for people to stay where 19 they are to prevent a mass exodus and panic. I don't 20 know how long the 'stay put' policy has been in place, 21 but it is well known to be national policy." 22 Now, just on that, do you know what your 23 understanding of stay put, as you've expressed it there, 24 is based on? 25 A. As in -- could you rephrase that?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 23</p>
<p>1 Q. Not practical. 2 A. Like you say, we can explore that, can't we? 3 Q. Okay. 4 Now, putting policy away for the moment, I just want 5 to ask you one more general thing on the same subject. 6 In your statement, at page 3, you say at the top of 7 the page, three lines down: 8 "With regards to the stay put policy, it is advice 9 that MAY be given to an individual who is trapped by 10 fire. The Call Operators MAY tell a caller to remain in 11 a flat and await rescue from crews." 12 Now, this reflects your understanding, does it, of 13 the stay-put policy and its implementation? 14 A. So I'm not sure why "may" is in capital letters. It's 15 not something -- I've no recollection why that is -- 16 I emphasised at that point. 17 Q. Right. Okay. 18 I mean, would you correct the sentence or these two 19 sentences in any way, then? 20 A. Yes, I would say that with regards to stay-put policy, 21 it's advice that would be given to an individual who is 22 trapped by fire. The operator would tell a caller to 23 remain in the flat and await rescue from crews. 24 Q. Right. I was going to ask you, because the use of the 25 word "may" would indicate there was some kind of choice</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 22</p>	<p>1 Q. What is your understanding that you've expressed there 2 based on? Is it based on a document or training or 3 experience? 4 A. So if you are saying about a fire should be contained in 5 a compartment, that's from training. All residential -- 6 or all flats, we as the fire service would expect the 7 building to react to compartmentation and that the fire 8 would remain in that compartment, allowing the fire 9 service the time to attend to the building, gain entry 10 to the building, put the fire out, and rescue the 11 persons involved. 12 Q. Yes. 13 A. So that is what I mean by compartmentation within the 14 building. 15 Q. Yes. 16 Where a building's compartmentation might fail, 17 would you expect the building or the building owners to 18 have any contingency plans or training for what to do in 19 order to effect a partial or total evacuation? 20 A. Why would you have an expectation that it would fail? 21 Q. That's a rhetorical question. I can't answer a 22 rhetorical question, the same as you can't. 23 A. But you've asked me the same question. You said if it 24 was to fail, why -- 25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: A better question possibly might be</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 24</p>

<p>1 whether anyone should foresee the possibility and, if 2 that was foreseen as a possibility, have any plans for 3 dealing with it. 4 A. If that was a possibility then the building should be 5 built to suit full evacuation with a PA system and 6 systems in place to allow the residents or the occupiers 7 of the building to know that a full evacuation is 8 needed. It would have to have a fire alarm, it would 9 have to have many other fire safety points in place to 10 support that within the building. 11 MR MILLETT: Right. 12 In your experience, just following that up, if you 13 take a high-rise building where all you know about it is 14 that a stay-put policy is in place -- that's all you 15 know about it -- would you expect there to be in place, 16 also, a contingency plan for total or partial 17 evacuation? 18 A. No, not necessarily, because if the building has 19 compartmentation, the fire should not be spreading out 20 of the compartmentation, so there wouldn't be 21 an expectation for a full or phased evacuation within 22 that building, because it wouldn't be required. Because 23 the fire should not be spreading outside of the 24 compartment. 25 Q. In your experience, have you ever, in your many years of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 25</p>	<p>1 13 July 2016. In fact, that's a wrong date; it was 2 eventually produced in October 2016, after the Shepherds 3 Court fire in the August of that year. 4 My first and perhaps only question is: have you ever 5 seen this slideshow before? 6 A. It does seem familiar, but I couldn't recite its 7 content. 8 Q. Right. 9 If we can just flip through the pages, the first two 10 and three pages, just see if this is familiar to you. 11 If you go to page 2, you can see three photographs 12 of tall buildings with exteriors on fire: Groxny, The 13 Address, Dubai and Tamweel Tower in Dubai. 14 First of all, are you familiar with those fires? 15 A. I'm not aware of them, no, not -- I mean, I've seen 16 those pictures before but I couldn't tell you the detail 17 of the fires, no. 18 Q. You say you've seen those pictures before -- 19 A. The slide looks familiar, so I would suggest I'd seen 20 this, but I couldn't recite or give you the exact 21 detail. 22 Q. So the slide looks familiar. Okay, let's see if we can 23 just push a bit further and see how familiar. 24 The next page is page 3. Same sort of thing, 25 exterior fires in Shanghai and Baku in Azerbaijan in</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 27</p>
<p>1 front-line firefighting, encountered fire spreading out 2 of the compartment of origin, or smoke or heat? 3 A. Only from possibly one floor to the next floor, and 4 that's what we call the coanda effect, where it may come 5 out of a window and hug the side of the building and go 6 back inside a window in the next floor. But not as it 7 behaved on the night of the 14th, no. 8 Q. Right. 9 Were you aware generally or from training or 10 intelligence within the LFB, being quite senior, of 11 a fire at Shepherds Court in August 2016? 12 A. So I was aware of that fire, but I did not attend that 13 fire. 14 Q. No. 15 Were you aware of any learning or education 16 internally within the LFB about the lessons learnt from 17 that fire? 18 A. Not that I could recite sitting here without looking 19 into it. 20 Q. Let me just show you a document to see if you're 21 familiar with it. 22 Can I ask you to look at the master documents 23 bundle, tab 10. 24 Now, this is a slideshow which runs to some 38-odd 25 pages. It's dated, or appears to be dated,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 26</p>	<p>1 2015. Looks like 15 December 2015. 2 Again, are these photographs familiar from that LFB 3 slide? 4 A. Not necessarily, no. 5 Q. Then running through it, there's one other slide with 6 photographs of fires at Basingstoke and Garnock Court. 7 Then page 5, if I can show you that, that is a slide 8 entitled "External Fire Spread", with a diagram which 9 shows a primary fire and upwards spread to secondary 10 fires up the building, rapid fire spread in the 11 left-hand box, and the point of the slide is in bold on 12 the bottom right-hand side, where it says: 13 "It is important that the facade does not contribute 14 significantly to the fire spread." 15 Do you remember seeing a slide like this within 16 a slideshow? 17 A. Sitting here, no, I'm not familiar necessarily with that 18 particular slide. 19 Q. Right. Okay. 20 Just looking at the conclusions -- I'll see if we 21 can take this quite quickly -- if you go to page 25, 22 "General Conclusion", I'll just show you this and see if 23 it rings a bell. That's the general conclusion in the 24 slide. I just want to see if this triggers 25 a recollection:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 28</p>

<p>1 "As a general principle the external envelop of the 2 building should not contribute to the fire spread along 3 the facade. 4 "New construction material and method of 5 construction are being used in facades and with a 6 limited understanding of their fire 7 behaviour/performance. 8 "There is a need to understand: 9 "• What products are being used in the facade system 10 and their fire behaviour; And 11 "• If they are used appropriately and meet the 12 relevant guidance. 13 These could affect the way fire develop and spread 14 in a building." 15 Now, that was a slideshow or the conclusions of 16 a slideshow created by the LFB in, we think, 17 October 2016, at any rate after the Shepherds Court 18 fire. 19 Do you remember these general conclusions or 20 anything like them being trained on, discussed, within 21 the LFB? 22 A. So I would be aware of the conclusions there, but I'm 23 not familiar or don't remember seeing that actual slide. 24 Q. Right. 25 A. So I couldn't 100 per cent sit here and say I've seen</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 29</p>	<p>1 it. 2 Q. In more general terms, as at the night of the 3 Grenfell Tower fire, would you have expected front-line 4 firefighters to be aware of the risk of fire spread up 5 the exterior, an igniting exterior of a high-rise? 6 A. Not to the magnitude that it happened on the night, no. 7 Q. At all? 8 A. No, not to that extent, not to travel from the fourth 9 floor to the 24th floor in, I mean -- and I'll pick 10 a timeline -- 30 minutes -- I've not got that detail. 11 But in the rapid spread that that fire went around the 12 building, no, it would not be an expectation. 13 Q. That covers the extent and speed, but just in terms of 14 the risk in the abstract, just to repeat the question in 15 a slightly different way, as at the night of the fire, 16 would you have expected front-line firefighters to be 17 aware that there was a risk in any high-rise building 18 that the exterior could ignite? 19 A. To a certain extent, as in like a coanda effect or 20 a gentle spread from one floor to another, but not 21 throughout the whole building, no. 22 Q. Right. 23 Can I then ask you to look at page 2 of your 24 statement. I just want to ask you about who was on 25 duty.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 31</p>
<p>1 that slideshow. 2 Q. Now, you say you're aware of the conclusions there; do 3 you know where that awareness comes from? When did it 4 originate, do you think? 5 A. I think that's general experience, looking at general 6 principles. The external of the envelope should not 7 contribute to fire spread. As we say, with a high-rise 8 building we'd expect that compartmentation would remain 9 in the building, and, in principle, why would someone 10 put a cladding on the outside of the building that would 11 contribute to fire spread? I think that's probably 12 a common-sense -- 13 Q. Now, you mention cladding; as at the night of the 14 fire -- 15 A. Okay, cladding or facade. 16 Q. Okay. But as at the night of the fire, in your 17 experience, the fact that facades -- cladding, if you 18 like, as a type of facade -- were at risk of 19 contributing to fire spread up the exterior of the 20 building, was that fact known or that risk known to 21 front-line firefighters? 22 A. There is always a risk that you could be aware that 23 something could contribute; however, if we're talking 24 about the building in general as in Grenfell, no, I was 25 not aware what Grenfell was clad in or what was around</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 30</p>	<p>1 You say on page 2, a third of the way down: 2 "In the role of Deputy Assistant Commissioner (DAC) 3 whilst on a 24 hr duty, there would be 2 operational 4 DAC's and 1 recall DAC ..." 5 Do you know who were the operational DACs on duty, 6 apart from you? 7 A. Yes, there was me and Andy O'Loughlin, and 8 Andy O'Loughlin was also the duty DAC that night, so 9 it's a dual role. 10 Q. Who was the recall DAC on duty? 11 A. That would have been Lee Drawbridge. 12 Q. Why is there a recall DAC on duty? 13 A. So should we be in the position that something escalates 14 or should both DACs be called out to two incidents, then 15 we would recall the duty DAC to cover the operational 16 rota or to give further cover, should it be required. 17 Q. Just a little bit further down, you say: 18 "The Duty DAC provides strategic direction and 19 support with issues that arise via Control and Resource 20 Management Centre. As a Duty DAC I would deal with the 21 issue, or if felt necessary, escalate it to the duty 22 an[sic] Assistant Commissioner." 23 Can you just explain that, who do you escalate and 24 issue to? 25 A. Assistant commissioner.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 32</p>

<p>1 Q. Right, okay.</p> <p>2 You say that:</p> <p>3 "The Duty DAC provides strategic direction and</p> <p>4 support with issues that arise via Control and [RMC]."</p> <p>5 Can you just explain a bit more about what that</p> <p>6 means? What are issues that arise via control and the</p> <p>7 resource management centre?</p> <p>8 A. So that would be predominantly looking at short-term and</p> <p>9 long-term planning. The resource management centre</p> <p>10 would look at how we distribute our firefighters across</p> <p>11 pan-London to ensure that we maintain our core strategic</p> <p>12 aims and objectives, which is providing a front-line</p> <p>13 service.</p> <p>14 Sometimes we don't have the right officers in the</p> <p>15 right place. Sometimes we will need to move officers</p> <p>16 and firefighters around the organisation to ensure that</p> <p>17 we get the appliances on the run. And sometimes the</p> <p>18 officer of the day, control or resource management would</p> <p>19 require further direction on choices and which direction</p> <p>20 to take this, and this is basically to ensure that we</p> <p>21 maintain and maximise our front-line service during that</p> <p>22 shift.</p> <p>23 Q. Right.</p> <p>24 You need software, I think, to do that, don't you?</p> <p>25 You need a computer program to be able to smooth out</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 33</p>	<p>1 Duty DAC Andy O'LOUGHLIN. He informed me that he was</p> <p>2 attending an 8 pump high rise incident."</p> <p>3 Was that the first you heard about the fire at</p> <p>4 Grenfell Tower?</p> <p>5 A. Yes.</p> <p>6 Q. As one of the DACs on duty, would you expect to be</p> <p>7 notified of a fire at eight pumps or sooner than eight</p> <p>8 pumps?</p> <p>9 A. I'd be notified at eight pumps because a DAC would then</p> <p>10 attend and they would be attending in the role of</p> <p>11 monitoring the group manager. So whether that came</p> <p>12 via -- normally we internally as the DACs would phone</p> <p>13 each other and speak to each other and communicate to</p> <p>14 ensure that we're all aware where each other are.</p> <p>15 Q. You say:</p> <p>16 "The DAC will go to an 8 pump fire in a monitoring</p> <p>17 officer's role for the Group Manager who will be in</p> <p>18 charge at that point."</p> <p>19 So just taking it in stages.</p> <p>20 First of all, at eight pumps, is it right that</p> <p>21 a group manager is or should be the incident commander?</p> <p>22 A. That's correct.</p> <p>23 Q. Right.</p> <p>24 What does it mean to take on a monitoring officer's</p> <p>25 role?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 35</p>
<p>1 peaks and troughs.</p> <p>2 A. Not necessarily -- what, as in -- could you confirm? As</p> <p>3 in the duty DAC or as in an RMC officer or --</p> <p>4 Q. The process of making sure that you have the right</p> <p>5 resources in the right part of London --</p> <p>6 A. Yes.</p> <p>7 Q. -- would require a software program.</p> <p>8 A. So there is a software programme called the Standby</p> <p>9 Module which is utilised by the RMC, the resource</p> <p>10 management centre, and that is a module that links to</p> <p>11 StARS and a lot of our other systems to ensure that we</p> <p>12 have the right skills, the right firefighter in the</p> <p>13 right place, to ensure that we provide the service.</p> <p>14 Q. Do you remember whether that was working efficiently on</p> <p>15 the night of the fire?</p> <p>16 A. So I wasn't the duty DAC at the beginning of the night,</p> <p>17 so Andy O'Loughlin was within that role. I had not been</p> <p>18 told that there was any issues with the SBN, so, no,</p> <p>19 I wasn't aware.</p> <p>20 Q. Right. Okay.</p> <p>21 Now, on page 4 of your statement, if I can just turn</p> <p>22 to the topic of your role on the night, you say there</p> <p>23 that you were called at 01.25 on the Wednesday evening,</p> <p>24 and you say:</p> <p>25 "... I was in bed when I received a call from the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 34</p>	<p>1 A. So the DAC would attend to monitor and help advise and</p> <p>2 assist the group manager in the role of incident</p> <p>3 commander, but also, should the incident escalate, then</p> <p>4 we've already got the next tier of officer en route and</p> <p>5 at the incident ready to take charge, and then should</p> <p>6 the DAC take charge, then an assistant commissioner will</p> <p>7 turns up and monitor, and that continues all the way</p> <p>8 through the incident command chain.</p> <p>9 Q. At the moment when you were mobilised, who was the group</p> <p>10 manager that you were going to be monitoring as</p> <p>11 monitoring officer?</p> <p>12 A. No, so you're incorrect there. So the DAC was</p> <p>13 mobilised, as in Andy O'Loughlin, and he was the DAC</p> <p>14 that attended the incident and he was the one that would</p> <p>15 be monitoring the group manager, not myself. So</p> <p>16 Andy O'Loughlin just informed me to say that he was</p> <p>17 going to the incident and could he pass the duty DAC</p> <p>18 role over to me so that I could then take that role from</p> <p>19 him because he was now going to be attending the</p> <p>20 incident.</p> <p>21 Q. I follow.</p> <p>22 At that point, though, who was the group manager in</p> <p>23 charge, do you know?</p> <p>24 A. At the time, I didn't know, but I do now; it was</p> <p>25 Richard Welch. So I knew by the time I was in my car</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 36</p>

<p>1 and en route to Stratford, I heard that it was</p> <p>2 Richard Welch then, but at that period of time, no,</p> <p>3 I wasn't aware who it was.</p> <p>4 Q. Right. We'll come to that in a moment.</p> <p>5 So at the time when you got this first call from the</p> <p>6 duty DAC, Andy O'Loughlin, at 01.25, did you know who</p> <p>7 the incident commander was?</p> <p>8 A. No, I didn't.</p> <p>9 Q. Did you ask?</p> <p>10 A. No, because I wouldn't ask because I wouldn't be</p> <p>11 attending the incident. That would be down to -- that</p> <p>12 would be Andy O'Loughlin's role as the DAC attending the</p> <p>13 incident ground.</p> <p>14 Q. You then say, in the next paragraph, again about a third</p> <p>15 of the way down the page, on page 4 of your statement:</p> <p>16 "I also turned my airwave radio on to listen to what</p> <p>17 was happening. At 01:31 hours the incident went to a 25</p> <p>18 pump fire with multiple Fire Survival Guidance (FSG)</p> <p>19 calls."</p> <p>20 Where were you at that point?</p> <p>21 A. I was still at my camp-out location.</p> <p>22 Q. Right.</p> <p>23 How did you discover that, at that time, the</p> <p>24 incident had become a 25-pump fire?</p> <p>25 A. I can't be 100 per cent sure whether that would have</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 37</p>	<p>1 A. I could hear fire survival guidance calls going over the</p> <p>2 radio at that time and I've taken that assumption.</p> <p>3 That's why I've written it at that period of time.</p> <p>4 Q. Okay.</p> <p>5 Can you give me an example of a kind of fire</p> <p>6 survival guidance call you heard in the way you've just</p> <p>7 explained it?</p> <p>8 A. It would've been control contacting the incident ground</p> <p>9 to say that they were receiving a call with the detail</p> <p>10 of the call.</p> <p>11 Q. Details being what? Can you --</p> <p>12 A. I couldn't recite what I heard on the night because --</p> <p>13 Q. No, but the kind of thing.</p> <p>14 A. It would've been from control to say the flat, the floor</p> <p>15 and the number of the persons, and why and how they're</p> <p>16 trapped.</p> <p>17 Q. Right.</p> <p>18 A. Or what the reason is for the call, as in whether it's</p> <p>19 heat, smoke ...</p> <p>20 Q. Do you know who in the control room was sending those</p> <p>21 messages to the incident ground?</p> <p>22 A. No. No, I wouldn't have any -- I wouldn't know who the</p> <p>23 control operators are.</p> <p>24 Q. Okay.</p> <p>25 Did you know to whom they were being sent? Could</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 39</p>
<p>1 been via the Airwave radio or whether I was paged.</p> <p>2 Unfortunately I can't remember how I was informed. But</p> <p>3 I would have been paged at some stage by control to say</p> <p>4 it had gone to a 25-pump fire, but I may have already</p> <p>5 gleaned that information prior to control getting the</p> <p>6 opportunity to page me by turning on my Airwave radio</p> <p>7 and listening to the incident.</p> <p>8 Q. Right. You go on to say:</p> <p>9 "... with multiple Fire Survival Guidance ...</p> <p>10 calls."</p> <p>11 Again, how did that message get to you, that there</p> <p>12 were multiple fire survival guidance calls?</p> <p>13 A. I would have heard them on the radio. I would've taken</p> <p>14 the assumption from when I wrote that that I picked them</p> <p>15 up on the Airwave radio.</p> <p>16 So I had the opportunity to turn my radio on and</p> <p>17 listen to Airwave traffic between control, the incident</p> <p>18 ground and the incident commanders, and I would be able</p> <p>19 to pick up information that would have been transmitted.</p> <p>20 So it's almost like a listening post.</p> <p>21 Q. Yes, I see.</p> <p>22 Being like a listening post, did you hear somebody</p> <p>23 say, "There are multiple fire survival guidance calls",</p> <p>24 or did you actually work out that there were multiple</p> <p>25 fire survival guidance calls from the traffic?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 38</p>	<p>1 you hear who was receiving those at the other end?</p> <p>2 A. I can't remember where they would have been transmitted.</p> <p>3 They would have either gone to an ICP or to a command</p> <p>4 unit, but I couldn't be specific at that time.</p> <p>5 Q. Do you remember hearing -- again, in general terms --</p> <p>6 whether the ICP or the CU receiving the messages by</p> <p>7 radio responded saying "Confirmed" or --</p> <p>8 A. No, because by this time I'll be getting myself ready to</p> <p>9 actually leave my premises and get into my car and</p> <p>10 attend. So the radio would be on for me to listen as in</p> <p>11 background to try and gather information going forward,</p> <p>12 but at that time I was probably getting ready to leave</p> <p>13 my house.</p> <p>14 Q. Right.</p> <p>15 Being the listening post and hearing these numerous</p> <p>16 FSG calls being radioed from the control room to the</p> <p>17 incident ground, what were your thoughts about the kind</p> <p>18 of incident that you were going to?</p> <p>19 A. For it to go from my recollection from an eight, and</p> <p>20 I didn't hear in between, to a 25, it's obviously</p> <p>21 an escalating incident of some form. This is the very</p> <p>22 early stages for me, as in me being informed, so at that</p> <p>23 stage I would be looking to try and gather information.</p> <p>24 But my information was limited at that stage, because</p> <p>25 I've only just been remotely informed and I'm about to</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 40</p>

<p>1 call control as well. So ...</p> <p>2 Q. Yes. And you did call control, as you say:</p> <p>3 "I phoned our control room and told them that</p> <p>4 I would attend control to setup a BCC — Brigade</p> <p>5 Coordination Centre, Control informed me they would show</p> <p>6 me as status 7 and attached to this incident."</p> <p>7 First of all, just clear this one out of the way,</p> <p>8 what is status 7?</p> <p>9 A. Status 7 is a status that an officer can use that takes</p> <p>10 them out of the operational cadre, as in control can no</p> <p>11 longer use them to send them to an operational incident.</p> <p>12 So Vision or our mobilising system wouldn't</p> <p>13 automatically then pick me up and send me to the</p> <p>14 incident. So it's a way of attaching me to control and</p> <p>15 the incident, but ensuring if it escalates and asks for</p> <p>16 another DAC, it wouldn't send myself because I already</p> <p>17 had been assigned a role.</p> <p>18 Q. Right. Okay.</p> <p>19 A Brigade co-ordination centre, what is that?</p> <p>20 A. So a Brigade co-ordination centre can be set up -- it</p> <p>21 would normally be set up at headquarters or at Merton,</p> <p>22 where control normally are, but it can be set up</p> <p>23 wherever deemed necessary.</p> <p>24 A Brigade co-ordination centre is set up to put</p> <p>25 extra management and governance in place for a large</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 41</p>	<p>1 A. So I've received a pager message as an operational</p> <p>2 officer during the day to inform me that control, who</p> <p>3 are normally located at the lock at Merton, had</p> <p>4 relocated to our fallback control at Stratford and that</p> <p>5 they were located there.</p> <p>6 My decision to not go to Merton and not go to HQ was</p> <p>7 based on rationale that control would be at Stratford.</p> <p>8 Having worked at Stratford over numerous roles and</p> <p>9 positions over the years, I was fully aware that</p> <p>10 Stratford had the facilities to facilitate a BCC, and so</p> <p>11 I made the decision that it was best to be at the same</p> <p>12 location as control. It will be the floor below, and</p> <p>13 the room below, because we don't necessarily set the BCC</p> <p>14 up with control because it doesn't have to be allocated</p> <p>15 with control because, as I say, it can be for an event</p> <p>16 or a pandemic, and that was my experience and</p> <p>17 operational decision on the night.</p> <p>18 Q. Right. It sounds as if you had a choice to set it up at</p> <p>19 Merton but decided not to. I thought Merton was closed.</p> <p>20 Was that not so?</p> <p>21 A. Well, Merton -- I don't know what was happening at</p> <p>22 Merton, so whether they were having maintenance that</p> <p>23 night or it was a general normal fallback position, I'm</p> <p>24 not aware. But Merton can facilitate the BCC.</p> <p>25 Q. Now, that's very helpful, but partly my question wasn't</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 43</p>
<p>1 incident or event, internal event, or a pandemic, and</p> <p>2 it's to ensure that whilst the event or incident is</p> <p>3 running, the Brigade can maintain its strategic aims and</p> <p>4 objectives, which is to basically, in simple terms, make</p> <p>5 sure that we provide our core business, front line,</p> <p>6 whilst the incident is running and going. So it would</p> <p>7 be looking at long and short-term planning for reliefs,</p> <p>8 communications, not on the incident ground but</p> <p>9 externally with media.</p> <p>10 We'd set up potentially four cells pending what is</p> <p>11 required and depending on the incident or the event or</p> <p>12 the pandemic or the reason. It could be for business</p> <p>13 continuity reasons.</p> <p>14 Q. Is there a particular pump or make-up number that would</p> <p>15 trigger the establishment of a BCC?</p> <p>16 A. So a BCC can be set up for -- it doesn't have to be</p> <p>17 an incident, so it can be an internal business</p> <p>18 continuity reason. So the BCC is at the discretion of</p> <p>19 the commissioner's group and the duty AC, assistant</p> <p>20 commissioner; however, as a duty DAC I could see that</p> <p>21 that's the direction of travel and it needed to be set</p> <p>22 up, and confirm that with the duty AC on the night.</p> <p>23 Q. Was it your decision to set up the BCC at Stratford?</p> <p>24 A. Yes.</p> <p>25 Q. Okay. What led you to that decision?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 42</p>	<p>1 as good as it should've been.</p> <p>2 My question should've been: what led you to set up</p> <p>3 a BCC at all?</p> <p>4 A. Because at that stage it was at 25 pumps, and so I knew</p> <p>5 we would need a relief plan, we would need to look at</p> <p>6 how we were going to do short and long-term planning for</p> <p>7 the future to ensure -- once you take 25 pumps out of</p> <p>8 service delivery, out of the front line, we'd need to</p> <p>9 make sure that we still have strategic cover across the</p> <p>10 Brigade and that we maintain the resources.</p> <p>11 And also the incident ground would ask -- and this</p> <p>12 would come via control, not to the BCC but via</p> <p>13 control -- whether there was resources or things that we</p> <p>14 could assist with on the incident ground.</p> <p>15 So we wouldn't get involved in the operations on the</p> <p>16 actual fire ground but we would look at how we could</p> <p>17 support the incident and ensure, as I say, that we</p> <p>18 maintained our core business and strategic aims across</p> <p>19 the Brigade.</p> <p>20 Q. Yes, I see.</p> <p>21 Later on in your statement, page 12, just below the</p> <p>22 top of page 12, three lines down, you say:</p> <p>23 "The BCC was still in a raw format. It was not how</p> <p>24 I would have liked it, but we did not have the staff</p> <p>25 needed to set it up fully."</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 44</p>

<p>1 Can I just ask you: what didn't you have when you 2 set the BCC up that you would have liked to have had?</p> <p>3 A. So the BCC would be run by myself. I would normally be 4 down in the BCC to run the Brigade co-ordination centre, 5 and then I would have officers in place to support me 6 and to run the cells within the BCC that were required.</p> <p>7 On the night, I had to reprioritise my role and my 8 position, and could see that I needed to remain in 9 control, which isn't a position I would normally be in. 10 And, also, at numerous times I had officers that were 11 facilitating the cells in the BCC, but I had to script 12 them out to prioritise what they were doing and get them 13 to do some other roles that were required.</p> <p>14 The BCC would more come into play further down into 15 the incident, as in supporting, going forward, as we 16 went in -- we had 40 pumps there at that stage. We 17 would have gone in to putting 20 further pumps in. We 18 would have had to look at 9.30 the next morning, the 19 change of shift, where were the staff? Did staff turn 20 up? They had no fire engine then because it was now at 21 the incident ground. We have something we called 22 standbys, direct and indirect standbys, which is part of 23 RMC, moving staff around.</p> <p>24 So without drilling really into the detail of what 25 the BCC would do, it's looking at the logistics, the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 45</p>	<p>1 to the last paragraph. You say there:</p> <p>2 "At the same time, another colleague of mine, Steve 3 LEADER, heard my radio noise and came in to speak to 4 me."</p> <p>5 You say you gave him a quick brief, told him there 6 was a 25-pump fire. Then you say:</p> <p>7 "I asked Steve to open my laptop and look at our 8 BOSS system."</p> <p>9 Now, did you ask him to communicate the information 10 from the BOSS system to you?</p> <p>11 A. No. So the BOSS system is a remote part of Vision, so 12 Vision is our mobilising system, and BOSS is a system 13 that senior officers and other members of staff can 14 remotely access. It is a view point only, so you can't 15 change it, alter it or put any information into it; it's 16 purely for data for us to look at and we can gather.</p> <p>17 So if you was a remote monitoring officer, you could 18 gather information of how the incident was progressing, 19 what size the incident was, location. It's purely for 20 data only.</p> <p>21 Q. Now, at the time you asked Steve Leader to open your 22 laptop, where were you?</p> <p>23 A. I was still at my camp-out house, getting ready to 24 leave.</p> <p>25 Q. Right, I see. I was going to ask you: why couldn't you</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 47</p>
<p>1 resources and what is needed to maintain our business 2 during the incident, but also supporting the incident 3 with the resources that they needed without stripping 4 out the fire service.</p> <p>5 Q. Now, you've mentioned a few times the idea of cells. 6 You said there were four cells and one of the things you 7 said was that you didn't have support officers to run 8 the cells within BCC.</p> <p>9 What are cells?</p> <p>10 A. So they are four cells. They have four functions. You 11 don't have to set them all up; you set up what is 12 required on the night. So you would have 13 a communication cell, a resources and logistics cell, 14 a operational cell and a planning cell.</p> <p>15 Q. I see. Okay.</p> <p>16 A. These four cells will support the Brigade depending on 17 what the requirements are, because every BCC would be 18 different because it depends what the requirement is and 19 what it's been set up for.</p> <p>20 Q. Would any of those cells, for example communication or 21 operational, assist the communication between the 22 control room and the fire ground?</p> <p>23 A. No.</p> <p>24 Q. Right.</p> <p>25 Looking at page 4 of your statement, can I take you</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 46</p>	<p>1 open your laptop and use BOSS to look at what was on the 2 system?</p> <p>3 A. Because I was getting ready to leave the premises to 4 attend Stratford and I was utilising Steve, as he was 5 there, to gain as much information as I could without 6 delaying my departure from my camp-out base.</p> <p>7 Q. So he opens the laptop, looks at the BOSS system, and 8 that would've enabled you to look at what is on Vision; 9 is that right?</p> <p>10 A. Yes, to a certain extent, but in that circumstance, to 11 be honest, I'd left the premises before I'd gained -- 12 because I needed to get away. I was just trying to 13 utilise every avenue to gain as much information as 14 possible.</p> <p>15 Q. Yes. Okay.</p> <p>16 You go on to say, at the bottom of the page:</p> <p>17 "This is to get an overview of the incident and 18 I can look at this system remotely from my laptop which 19 is what I did."</p> <p>20 Just to be clear, did you look at your laptop or did 21 Steve look at your laptop?</p> <p>22 A. No, it was my laptop and Steve was opening my laptop to 23 get the information for me whilst I was getting ready to 24 leave the premises. By the time he had logged onto the 25 system, I hadn't gained much more information and I'd</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 48</p>

<p>1 left the premises by then.</p> <p>2 Q. So when you say "I can look at this system remotely from</p> <p>3 my laptop which is what I did", did you?</p> <p>4 A. No. So, as I said, I went to open the laptop, turn it</p> <p>5 on, put the system in place, Steve Leader went to open</p> <p>6 it. By the time we'd got the system up and running, I'd</p> <p>7 not had the time or did not sit there and look at the</p> <p>8 information. It would've been more for him to open it</p> <p>9 up and relay it to me as I was leaving the premise, but</p> <p>10 no, no further information.</p> <p>11 Q. Did he relay information to you as you were leaving?</p> <p>12 A. No.</p> <p>13 Q. He didn't, okay.</p> <p>14 So at what point did you leave, do you think? Let</p> <p>15 me ask it a different way.</p> <p>16 How soon after being told that there was a 25-pump</p> <p>17 fire in progress did you leave your camp-out?</p> <p>18 A. I couldn't give you a specific timescale. There</p> <p>19 would've been a phone call to control, a phone call to</p> <p>20 Andy Roe, to inform him of my decision to do the BCC and</p> <p>21 to do it at Stratford and head to Stratford. He told me</p> <p>22 he was attending. I would've got dressed, grabbed my</p> <p>23 Airwave radio, keys and bits and left the premises.</p> <p>24 Q. Right. Okay.</p> <p>25 What communication device did you use to call</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 49</p>	<p>1 scene. I didn't know who the group manager was at that</p> <p>2 stage.</p> <p>3 Q. Right.</p> <p>4 You say at the bottom of page 4:</p> <p>5 "... I called Assistant Commissioner Andy Roe to let</p> <p>6 him know what I was doing (to attend Control and setup a</p> <p>7 BCC)."</p> <p>8 Why did you call him?</p> <p>9 A. So I have now been given the role of duty DAC and he was</p> <p>10 AC1, so knowing the size of the incident -- AC1 is</p> <p>11 assistant commissioner 1 -- he would've been going to</p> <p>12 the incident, so I was just informing him that I would</p> <p>13 be setting up a BCC to support the Brigade throughout</p> <p>14 the duration of the incident.</p> <p>15 Q. Again, did you call him on your mobile?</p> <p>16 A. I would suggest so, yes.</p> <p>17 Q. You don't remember precisely?</p> <p>18 A. No, I would suggest at that time I'm at my camp-out, so</p> <p>19 it would either have been via my mobile or</p> <p>20 Steve Leader's, so I suggest it would be mine, or</p> <p>21 Andy Roe could've called me.</p> <p>22 Q. You then say at the top of page 5:</p> <p>23 "A short while later I left my camp out base and</p> <p>24 whilst en-route, AC2 Richard MILLS called me."</p> <p>25 Who is he?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 51</p>
<p>1 control?</p> <p>2 A. It would've been my mobile phone.</p> <p>3 Q. Your Brigade mobile?</p> <p>4 A. I would suggest so, unless I asked Steve to phone them</p> <p>5 on his mobile, I really couldn't confirm. Because he</p> <p>6 was assisting me, as he was there, to leave the</p> <p>7 premises.</p> <p>8 Q. That call would've gone through to what communication</p> <p>9 line or device within the control room?</p> <p>10 A. It would have -- I would've either phoned one of</p> <p>11 three -- it would've either been the paging, which is an</p> <p>12 admin line, officer of the watch, which is an admin</p> <p>13 line, or gone to control itself. Sometimes I will phone</p> <p>14 the officer of the watch as duty AC because the normal</p> <p>15 control and paging lines are normally busy with them</p> <p>16 dealing with other officers trying to book in.</p> <p>17 Q. Right.</p> <p>18 At the moment you left, do you know whether you knew</p> <p>19 who the incident commander was?</p> <p>20 A. I would have known Andy O'Loughlin would've been</p> <p>21 en route. I'd have known it had gone to a 25-pump fire,</p> <p>22 which means Andy O'Loughlin would've taken over when he</p> <p>23 got there; however, at a 25-pump fire, then Andy Roe</p> <p>24 would've taken over when he got there. So at that</p> <p>25 stage, I didn't know that Richard Welch was even on</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 50</p>	<p>1 A. So as with the DAC system, we have two operational DACs</p> <p>2 and, as mentioned, one is duty DAC and then also we have</p> <p>3 a recall. The same with the assistant commissioners.</p> <p>4 So they will have AC1, who is you could say in simpler</p> <p>5 terms like the duty AC, but would also attend the</p> <p>6 incident, and AC2 can be stood up should AC1 attend</p> <p>7 an incident and then they stand in to the role of the</p> <p>8 AC1.</p> <p>9 Q. Did he call you on your mobile or did he speak to you</p> <p>10 over the Airwave radio?</p> <p>11 A. No, we wouldn't have conversation over the Airwave radio</p> <p>12 because that is for the operational incident, and we</p> <p>13 would take up Airwave traffic which would be needed to</p> <p>14 be prioritised by the incident ground.</p> <p>15 Q. Was your Airwave on?</p> <p>16 A. Sorry?</p> <p>17 Q. Was your Airwave radio on and receiving messages?</p> <p>18 A. I would say it was on; however, if I'm on the phone then</p> <p>19 I would've turned it down to do the phone call.</p> <p>20 Q. In the first sentence of the next paragraph, five lines</p> <p>21 down from the top of page 5, you say:</p> <p>22 "During the journey to Stratford I had my radio on</p> <p>23 and could hear the incident escalating."</p> <p>24 What radio was that? Was that your Airwave or --</p> <p>25 A. That would be my Airwave. So a senior officer's Airwave</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 52</p>

<p>1 is a handheld radio about so size with an aerial, so</p> <p>2 it's portable so that you can listen to it whilst</p> <p>3 mobile.</p> <p>4 Q. You say, "I could hear the incident escalating". What</p> <p>5 could you hear?</p> <p>6 A. I could just hear a lot of radio traffic to and fro.</p> <p>7 I couldn't be specific what was coming back, but you</p> <p>8 could generally pick up that an incident is escalating</p> <p>9 by radio traffic to and fro between control and the</p> <p>10 incident ground.</p> <p>11 Q. Could you hear that traffic between the control room and</p> <p>12 the incident ground on your Airwave radio?</p> <p>13 A. Yes.</p> <p>14 Q. So that's the same listening post you described earlier?</p> <p>15 A. Yes. So my Airwave radio is what I described as</p> <p>16 a listening post at my camp-out base, yes.</p> <p>17 Q. Would that include messages being sent by control to the</p> <p>18 incident ground on RT4, channel 4?</p> <p>19 A. Yes, that would've been RT4, so that's the Airwave,</p> <p>20 that's the listening -- that's what I was listening to.</p> <p>21 Q. If you wanted to speak to control on RT4, could you?</p> <p>22 A. I could do, but it wouldn't be appropriate because RT4</p> <p>23 can only -- you can only have one conversation at a</p> <p>24 time, and the priority has got to be the incident ground</p> <p>25 and the appliances that are attending and dealing with</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 53</p>	<p>1 my journey in general from my camp-out base to arriving</p> <p>2 at Stratford. So that's over probably a 20/30-minute</p> <p>3 period.</p> <p>4 MR MILLETT: We'll come to that after the break.</p> <p>5 Mr Chairman, if I could just ask one question --</p> <p>6 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You can go a bit longer if you want</p> <p>7 to.</p> <p>8 MR MILLETT: All right, thank you.</p> <p>9 Do you mind if we go a little bit longer?</p> <p>10 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So long as we have a break in about</p> <p>11 10 minutes.</p> <p>12 Are you comfortable?</p> <p>13 THE WITNESS: I'm more than happy to carry on. Yes, I'm</p> <p>14 happy to carry on.</p> <p>15 MR MILLETT: Let's continue, thank you.</p> <p>16 Yes. So you left -- just to try to get a time frame</p> <p>17 on this --</p> <p>18 A. Yes.</p> <p>19 Q. -- after it had become a 25-pump fire, which we know was</p> <p>20 at 01.31.</p> <p>21 A. Yes.</p> <p>22 Q. It took you, you say, 20 to 25 minutes to get to</p> <p>23 Stratford.</p> <p>24 A. So I wouldn't say I walked straight out the house at</p> <p>25 01.31 at that time period of time. So I left the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 55</p>
<p>1 the incident. So for me to do an admin call or a call</p> <p>2 on RT4 would not be appropriate.</p> <p>3 Q. Okay. So you say you can only do one call at a time;</p> <p>4 that's true, is it, of RT4?</p> <p>5 A. Sorry, could you say that again?</p> <p>6 Q. You said in your last answer that you could only have</p> <p>7 one conversation at a time on RT4.</p> <p>8 A. Yes.</p> <p>9 Q. Is that the same for channel 1 as well?</p> <p>10 A. Yes.</p> <p>11 Q. I see.</p> <p>12 Now, when you say "I could hear the incident</p> <p>13 escalating" --</p> <p>14 A. Do you mean -- so FLONOPS channel 1?</p> <p>15 Q. Yes, I think it is FLONOPS.</p> <p>16 A. On the Airwave.</p> <p>17 Q. Okay.</p> <p>18 You say, "I could hear the incident escalating";</p> <p>19 what could you hear about the incident that was</p> <p>20 escalating?</p> <p>21 A. It's just general radio traffic. So at that time in the</p> <p>22 morning -- and it's just -- I really can't be specific</p> <p>23 because I can't remember what the traffic was at that</p> <p>24 time, but there was a lot of radio traffic going on.</p> <p>25 And that's -- when I say escalating, I'm talking about</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 54</p>	<p>1 premises at whatever time it took me to get ready and</p> <p>2 walk out and leave.</p> <p>3 Q. Right. And then it took you 20 to 25 minutes to get to</p> <p>4 Stratford, so that --</p> <p>5 A. That is an estimated time, so I couldn't be</p> <p>6 100 per cent. And like I said, there were a few phone</p> <p>7 calls that I made with control, with Andy Roe, prior and</p> <p>8 as I was leaving.</p> <p>9 Q. Okay.</p> <p>10 Do you remember hearing that Group Manager Welch was</p> <p>11 now incident commander?</p> <p>12 A. So en route, I did hear make pumps 40 and that did come</p> <p>13 from Group Manager Welch, yes. So I heard that probably</p> <p>14 in between trying to make phone calls on the way whilst</p> <p>15 the radio was on.</p> <p>16 Q. How close do you remember you were to Stratford when you</p> <p>17 heard make pumps 40 and Welch being IC?</p> <p>18 A. I would suggest probably on the A13, and that's just</p> <p>19 a guess. That's just an estimate in my mind.</p> <p>20 Q. Okay, on the A13, I'm not sure that quite does it for</p> <p>21 me. Can you give us --</p> <p>22 A. Not specific enough.</p> <p>23 Q. No, it isn't. How long before you arrived do you think</p> <p>24 you heard the message make pumps 40 and</p> <p>25 Group Manager Welch now IC?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 56</p>

<p>1 A. So I would suggest that's quite early on to me leaving,</p> <p>2 getting in my car and going up the road. Probably</p> <p>3 5/10 minutes.</p> <p>4 Q. Okay.</p> <p>5 A. And I've got to be completely honest, that is purely</p> <p>6 a guesstimate. I really can't pinpoint and I wouldn't</p> <p>7 want to pinpoint times for you because I can't be</p> <p>8 specific on that.</p> <p>9 Q. I understand. We have in the short incident log a time</p> <p>10 mark for those messages of 02.03.41 for pumps being made</p> <p>11 40 and 02.04.20 for Group Manager Welch being --</p> <p>12 A. Sorry, what times were they?</p> <p>13 Q. 02.03 and 02.04, roughly.</p> <p>14 A. Right. Okay.</p> <p>15 Q. So before 02.05 in the morning.</p> <p>16 Now, before that did you hear, while you were</p> <p>17 en route, fire survival guidance messages going from</p> <p>18 control to the incident ground?</p> <p>19 A. Whilst en route I was making several phone calls at the</p> <p>20 time, so I was heading to the BCC and I was trying to</p> <p>21 mobilise other officers and other staff to ensure that</p> <p>22 I had them there as early as possible to assist. So my</p> <p>23 radio at some stages was probably turned down while</p> <p>24 I was doing these calls.</p> <p>25 Q. Right. And you were making calls on what device?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 57</p>	<p>1 Q. First of all, would this be the sort of information that</p> <p>2 you would have been able to see if your laptop had fired</p> <p>3 up in time and you could use the BOSS to look at the</p> <p>4 Vision system?</p> <p>5 A. Yes, it would've been that sort of information, but</p> <p>6 obviously that would've meant I was remaining at my</p> <p>7 premises and not making myself mobile and attending</p> <p>8 where I was ordered to attend.</p> <p>9 Q. Yes. But then looking at that page and then turning to</p> <p>10 the next page, page 20, running from 01.46 to 01.55 and</p> <p>11 so on on to page 21, again loads of messages.</p> <p>12 Are these the kinds of messages that you remember</p> <p>13 hearing even in the background on your Airwave radio</p> <p>14 en route to the incident?</p> <p>15 A. Yes, I would surmise that I would've heard some of those</p> <p>16 messages, but as I've said, you know, making the calls</p> <p>17 and speaking to officers and staff en route, I was</p> <p>18 prioritising what I needed to do for my role, which was</p> <p>19 to set up the BCC.</p> <p>20 Q. Yes.</p> <p>21 A. And that is the role that I'd been mobilised for and</p> <p>22 tasked to set up and do.</p> <p>23 Q. Right.</p> <p>24 A. So that was my immediate priority at the time.</p> <p>25 Q. Were you aware at that time or during that journey that</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 59</p>
<p>1 A. So a hands-free device.</p> <p>2 Q. Okay. All right. So your radio was turned down. So</p> <p>3 even though it was turned down, you say in your</p> <p>4 statement you could hear the incident escalating?</p> <p>5 A. Yes, and that's as I've said, so I would've heard a fire</p> <p>6 survival guidance or some as I was going, I would've</p> <p>7 heard make pumps 40, there was a couple of bits that you</p> <p>8 can pick up as you're making calls in between. However,</p> <p>9 my radio was turned down at that time because I was</p> <p>10 trying to mobilise other staff to get to the BCC so that</p> <p>11 I could get things up and running as quick as possible</p> <p>12 to support.</p> <p>13 Q. Okay.</p> <p>14 Can I ask you to look at the short incident log at</p> <p>15 tab 23 of the documents bundle and turn to page 19.</p> <p>16 I am not going to take you to any specific messages,</p> <p>17 but we can see throughout page 19, which starts at the</p> <p>18 top at 01.35.36, so after pumps made 25 which, as I said</p> <p>19 before, was 01.31. So either you've left or you are</p> <p>20 getting ready to leave. If you scroll right down the</p> <p>21 page, you can see numerous messages passing from the</p> <p>22 control room to the incident ground, and we see that on</p> <p>23 this document as service requests created and completed.</p> <p>24 Do you see that?</p> <p>25 A. Yes.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 58</p>	<p>1 the Metropolitan Police had called a major incident?</p> <p>2 A. No.</p> <p>3 Q. Okay.</p> <p>4 Now, in your witness statement on page 5 you say</p> <p>5 a quarter of the way down:</p> <p>6 "On my way to Stratford after mobilising myself I</p> <p>7 took the decision to self mobilise Steve LEADER, asking</p> <p>8 him to perform the role of setting up the BCC."</p> <p>9 What does self-mobilise mean?</p> <p>10 A. Yeah, probably not the right terminology, self-mobilise,</p> <p>11 but -- so all officers or all staff that are mobilised</p> <p>12 to an incident are all done via control. So our</p> <p>13 control -- so it's all done in one place and one person</p> <p>14 or one -- as in control has that overview of where all</p> <p>15 our operational officers are.</p> <p>16 Q. Oh, I see.</p> <p>17 A. I could see that I needed to get staff there as quick as</p> <p>18 possible to set up the BCC. Steve Leader is a competent</p> <p>19 group manager, I've known him quite a while. I knew</p> <p>20 that he could facilitate and set up a BCC. So I phoned</p> <p>21 him up, knowing his location to the incident, that it</p> <p>22 was unlikely that he was to be mobilised by control,</p> <p>23 I phoned him up, told him to mobilise to Stratford, to</p> <p>24 assist in setting the BCC up, told him that he could</p> <p>25 come on the blue light, that I'd given him permission to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 60</p>

<p>1 do that.</p> <p>2 However, should control page him during his journey</p> <p>3 to Stratford, he was to prioritise the call from control</p> <p>4 and go to the incident, but to let me know once he had</p> <p>5 prioritised that with control and then I would</p> <p>6 reallocate that role to someone else.</p> <p>7 Now, knowing how busy control were with the make-ups</p> <p>8 and the FSGs, I was trying to take some of the work away</p> <p>9 from them and also to set up the BCC at the quickest and</p> <p>10 most expedient way.</p> <p>11 Q. Now, you say in your statement that you took that</p> <p>12 decision to mobilise/self-mobilise Steve Leader on the</p> <p>13 way to Stratford?</p> <p>14 A. Yes.</p> <p>15 Q. Had anything changed between your being paged initially</p> <p>16 and leaving the house or the camp-out base and being on</p> <p>17 the way to Stratford that meant that you now thought</p> <p>18 that you needed Steve Leader in the role of setting up</p> <p>19 the BCC?</p> <p>20 A. Nothing specific apart from, as I say, the general</p> <p>21 escalation that is the points that we was speaking</p> <p>22 about. So I don't think there was any particular</p> <p>23 trigger, just in my own mind I wanted to get the</p> <p>24 resources there as quick as possible, and I knew control</p> <p>25 would be busy and so I decided to do that off my own</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 61</p>	<p>1 Steve Leader now to set up the BCC".</p> <p>2 A. Like I say, it was the number of FSGs coming in, the</p> <p>3 escalation, the rapid escalation of the incident going</p> <p>4 up to 40 pumps, and also it was just -- in my own way of</p> <p>5 working, I wanted to be efficient, as in getting the</p> <p>6 officers there as quick as possible.</p> <p>7 Q. And --</p> <p>8 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Millett, I'm wondering if we're</p> <p>9 getting to a good point, are we?</p> <p>10 MR MILLETT: Not really, but we can stop now. Yes, I think</p> <p>11 is probably the diplomatic answer.</p> <p>12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think we will all benefit from</p> <p>13 a short break.</p> <p>14 Mr Fenton, we're going to have a break now. Please</p> <p>15 don't talk about your evidence or anything related to it</p> <p>16 while you are out of the room.</p> <p>17 If you would like to go with the usher and we'll</p> <p>18 resume at 11.40, please.</p> <p>19 (The witness withdrew)</p> <p>20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: 11.40 then, please</p> <p>21 (11.25 am)</p> <p>22 (A short break)</p> <p>23 (11.40 am)</p> <p>24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Fenton? Ready to</p> <p>25 carry on?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 63</p>
<p>1 back and authority.</p> <p>2 Q. Did you make that decision to mobilise Steve Leader</p> <p>3 before or after you'd heard that the fire had been made</p> <p>4 up to 40 pumps?</p> <p>5 A. I couldn't confirm.</p> <p>6 Q. Okay. What about before or after hearing that</p> <p>7 Group Manager Welch had become incident commander?</p> <p>8 A. I only knew that Group Manager Welch was in charge when</p> <p>9 I heard make pumps 40. That was the point that I knew</p> <p>10 he was in charge.</p> <p>11 Q. What I am trying to get a feel for is what was it about</p> <p>12 the escalation that led you to decide that you needed</p> <p>13 Steve Leader to set up the BCC?</p> <p>14 A. So the incident was rapidly made up, there were multiple</p> <p>15 fire survival guidance calls, and I could just see that</p> <p>16 it was an escalating incident. I had no detail of the</p> <p>17 incident, but I just could see that there was going to</p> <p>18 be a need for the BCC to support the incident going</p> <p>19 forward.</p> <p>20 Q. Because you left your camp-out base at a time when it</p> <p>21 was already 25.</p> <p>22 A. Yes.</p> <p>23 Q. It didn't go 40 until 02.04 or 02.03 while you were</p> <p>24 still en route, and I wonder what it was about the</p> <p>25 incident that led you to say to yourself, "I need</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 62</p>	<p>1 THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you.</p> <p>2 MR MILLETT: Mr Fenton, thank you for coming back.</p> <p>3 Can I just ask you about an earlier answer that you</p> <p>4 gave to the inquiry when I was asking you about</p> <p>5 compartmentation and the contingency plan or</p> <p>6 a contingency plan for full or partial evacuation.</p> <p>7 Do you remember we had an exchange this morning</p> <p>8 about a rhetorical question?</p> <p>9 A. Yes.</p> <p>10 Q. It's page 25, lines 6 to 12 of the current transcript.</p> <p>11 I just want to re-visit your answer, where you say</p> <p>12 that -- the gist of it is that if the building has</p> <p>13 compartmentation then fire shouldn't be spreading and</p> <p>14 you therefore wouldn't have an expectation -- or you say</p> <p>15 there wouldn't be an expectation --</p> <p>16 A. I haven't got it up at the moment.</p> <p>17 Q. No, you haven't and I'm not sure it's possible for me to</p> <p>18 display parts of the transcript at the same time, but</p> <p>19 take it from me that you said that there wouldn't be</p> <p>20 an expectation for a full or phased evacuation.</p> <p>21 I just want to be able to explore that a little bit.</p> <p>22 Are you saying, first of all, that it is a general</p> <p>23 assumption by incident commanders that because high-rise</p> <p>24 buildings are built on the basis that any fire would be</p> <p>25 contained in a compartment and so fire shouldn't spread</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 64</p>

<p>1 out of it, an incident commander would not expect to</p> <p>2 have to undertake full or partial evacuation?</p> <p>3 A. That is correct, because, first of all, how would the</p> <p>4 incident commander communicate that information to every</p> <p>5 person or occupant within the building to actually</p> <p>6 inform them that we were doing a full or phased</p> <p>7 evacuation?</p> <p>8 Secondly, is the building suitably built to</p> <p>9 facilitate that? And if the building is built to</p> <p>10 facilitate that, I would suggest that it would have</p> <p>11 an intercom or it would have a fire alarm and it would</p> <p>12 have the facilities there to actually be able to</p> <p>13 facilitate a full or phased evacuation.</p> <p>14 Q. Well, those are valid questions that arise, but in terms</p> <p>15 of general expectation, you ask the questions, I think,</p> <p>16 rhetorically, in answering my question, negatively; in</p> <p>17 other words, you would not expect there to be a full or</p> <p>18 phased evacuation because otherwise you have these</p> <p>19 difficulties.</p> <p>20 A. Yes.</p> <p>21 Q. Can I take you to policy 633, which is in the policy</p> <p>22 bundle at tab 4. I just want to show you one part of</p> <p>23 this. I'll just show you the front page, if I can, to</p> <p>24 start with.</p> <p>25 This is "High rise firefighting", policy 633, and</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 65</p>	<p>1 Depending on the size of the high-rise, depending on</p> <p>2 the size of the fire, depending on the situation, then,</p> <p>3 yes, a full evacuation, if possible, could be</p> <p>4 implemented. But it would depend on the building, the</p> <p>5 size, the size of the fire, all the considerations and</p> <p>6 all the factors that the incident commander would have</p> <p>7 to put into play.</p> <p>8 So I was looking at the situation with the actual</p> <p>9 incident on the 14th, and how we would've communicated</p> <p>10 that to all residents at the time, I'm not sure. But</p> <p>11 that would have been, as we say, a consideration for the</p> <p>12 incident commander, who has all that information at the</p> <p>13 time.</p> <p>14 Q. So I think the answer you're actually giving me is that</p> <p>15 actually an incident commander would have to be alert to</p> <p>16 the need to undertake either a full or a partial</p> <p>17 evacuation?</p> <p>18 A. It could be a consideration, but as I did say and I will</p> <p>19 say again, it depends on the situation, the</p> <p>20 circumstances, the size of the building, number of</p> <p>21 floors, where the fire is and what the situation is at</p> <p>22 the time.</p> <p>23 Q. Would your expectation be that any high-rise building</p> <p>24 would have an evacuation plan devised as part of the</p> <p>25 occupier's fire risk assessment?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 67</p>
<p>1 this was current as at 1 June 2015, so current as at the</p> <p>2 night of the Grenfell Tower fire.</p> <p>3 First of all, can I ask: are you familiar with this</p> <p>4 policy?</p> <p>5 A. Yes, I am.</p> <p>6 Q. Can I take you to page 14 internally and paragraphs 7.45</p> <p>7 and 7.46 under the rubric "Evacuation". The policy</p> <p>8 says:</p> <p>9 "7.45. The IC should consider following the</p> <p>10 evacuation plan devised as part of the occupier's fire</p> <p>11 risk assessment, unless the fire situation dictates</p> <p>12 otherwise.</p> <p>13 "7.46. It may be necessary to undertake a partial</p> <p>14 or full evacuation in a residential building where</p> <p>15 a 'Stay put' policy is normally in place."</p> <p>16 Now, this policy indicates that that is something</p> <p>17 that an incident commander should be considering.</p> <p>18 In the light of that policy, is it really right to</p> <p>19 say that there wouldn't be an expectation on the part of</p> <p>20 an incident commander to have to undertake full or</p> <p>21 partial evacuation?</p> <p>22 A. I would say partial evacuation, depending on what we</p> <p>23 call partial evacuation, depending if we are talking</p> <p>24 a floor or we're talking two floors, that's probably</p> <p>25 a feasibility.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 66</p>	<p>1 A. That is a possibility. I wouldn't know what every</p> <p>2 building or what their risk assessments are.</p> <p>3 Q. In terms of your understanding of policy, 7.45, which</p> <p>4 refers to "the evacuation plan devised as part of the</p> <p>5 occupier's fire risk assessment", in your experience as</p> <p>6 a DAC and having had the training and knowing about this</p> <p>7 policy, would it be your expectation that a high-rise</p> <p>8 building such as Grenfell Tower would actually have</p> <p>9 an evacuation plan?</p> <p>10 A. Not for the entire tower block, no.</p> <p>11 Q. Right.</p> <p>12 A. Because I don't -- I mean, in my understanding, I don't</p> <p>13 know how you would communicate a full evacuation to 24</p> <p>14 floors of the tower block.</p> <p>15 Q. But 7.46 says that it may be necessary to undertake</p> <p>16 a partial or full evacuation.</p> <p>17 A. And as I mentioned previously, it would depend on the</p> <p>18 size of the building, the height, what facilities are</p> <p>19 also there, is there an intercom, are there twin</p> <p>20 staircases. Every building would have and can -- yes,</p> <p>21 there can be for a building, but not necessarily how it</p> <p>22 would be implemented in every building.</p> <p>23 Q. So in the case of a building where there may be</p> <p>24 difficulties in undertaking a full evacuation, what</p> <p>25 would you expect an incident commander to do or to</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 68</p>

<p>1 consider?</p> <p>2 A. If an incident commander was to consider full evacuation</p> <p>3 of a building, they would have to consider the escape</p> <p>4 routes, what routes, how would we get the personnel out</p> <p>5 of the fire, where is the fire, would we be putting</p> <p>6 people into a more dangerous environment? Where is the</p> <p>7 smoke travel? Where's the heat? Every situation would</p> <p>8 be slightly different. Is there a single staircase? Is</p> <p>9 there a dual staircase? The firefighters, would they be</p> <p>10 actually in the escape route or -- not the escape route,</p> <p>11 wrong word -- would they be in the staircase actually</p> <p>12 doing firefighting operations?</p> <p>13 So all these would have to become part of the</p> <p>14 incident commander's plan to put that into a considered</p> <p>15 option.</p> <p>16 Q. Yes. And in order to form part of the incident</p> <p>17 commander's plan, would you expect all the answers to</p> <p>18 the questions you've just listed to be immediately</p> <p>19 available to the incident commander on the fire ground?</p> <p>20 A. It's a possibility, yes. I mean, it depends yet again</p> <p>21 where they are and what the premises are, so there</p> <p>22 are -- that information can be gathered by the incident</p> <p>23 commander.</p> <p>24 Q. You say it's a possibility, but would you not then</p> <p>25 expect that an incident commander would immediately have</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 69</p>	<p>1 is in there.</p> <p>2 Q. As a matter of practice and in your experience as at the</p> <p>3 night of the fire, would it be your expectation that</p> <p>4 a high-rise building and the plans for it and the ORD</p> <p>5 information for it would contain that information so as</p> <p>6 to be able to equip an incident commander with the</p> <p>7 relevant information?</p> <p>8 A. There would be information in there, yes.</p> <p>9 Q. Would be or should be?</p> <p>10 A. Should be -- yeah, there would be information within</p> <p>11 the -- both.</p> <p>12 Q. While we're on this page, can I just ask you to look at</p> <p>13 paragraph 7.47, second sentence:</p> <p>14 "Evacuation can be made more resource intensive if</p> <p>15 the occupants have an impaired ability to make their own</p> <p>16 way to safety; for example, disabled persons or those</p> <p>17 under the affect of alcohol or drugs may need greater</p> <p>18 assistance."</p> <p>19 Again, would you expect, as at the time of the fire,</p> <p>20 an incident commander easily to be able to put his or</p> <p>21 her hands on information that would assist them in</p> <p>22 evacuating the building partially or fully if that were</p> <p>23 needed?</p> <p>24 A. Are you saying if there's impaired ability to make their</p> <p>25 own way out to safety?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 71</p>
<p>1 all the answers to those questions at his or her</p> <p>2 fingertips in order to be able to consider alternatives</p> <p>3 to firefighting?</p> <p>4 A. Yes, they would need them at their disposal to make</p> <p>5 those decisions.</p> <p>6 Q. Where would you expect an incident commander to get that</p> <p>7 information to answer all those questions from?</p> <p>8 A. So they could look at the operational risk database,</p> <p>9 depending what information is on there; they could look</p> <p>10 at a premise information box on the side of the</p> <p>11 building, there could be information on there; and also</p> <p>12 potentially from the -- if there was local building</p> <p>13 management in place, they would be able to give further</p> <p>14 information. So it's all about information-gathering.</p> <p>15 Q. So are you saying that the operational risk database, or</p> <p>16 premises information box, or both, would or should</p> <p>17 normally provide information which would answer all the</p> <p>18 questions you listed for us a moment ago?</p> <p>19 A. It could do.</p> <p>20 Q. When you say it could do --</p> <p>21 A. It could do. I can't be specific because I don't know</p> <p>22 what's on every single ORD or every premise information</p> <p>23 box. So, yes, it should be -- some form of information</p> <p>24 will be in there, but I can't give you the details of</p> <p>25 every single premise across London and what information</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 70</p>	<p>1 Q. Yes.</p> <p>2 A. Yes. So the information should be available to the</p> <p>3 incident commander in that situation, should they need</p> <p>4 to consider an evacuation.</p> <p>5 Q. Now, can I just go back to something else that you</p> <p>6 referred to in the earlier part of your evidence this</p> <p>7 morning. That was computer-based training post-Lakanal</p> <p>8 House.</p> <p>9 Can I ask you to be shown LFB00003751.</p> <p>10 I think this is actually the monitoring and action</p> <p>11 plan that came in as a result of Lakanal House.</p> <p>12 Can I just ask you, first of all: are you familiar</p> <p>13 with this document or anything like it?</p> <p>14 A. No, I'm not.</p> <p>15 Q. Okay.</p> <p>16 I'll take this very briefly. Can I just ask you to</p> <p>17 look at paragraph 3, which is on, I think, page 3.</p> <p>18 Right. This is about incident command training, and</p> <p>19 if we just enlarge it, if you look at paragraph 3.3 --</p> <p>20 paragraph 3 starts:</p> <p>21 "The Brigade review its policies and procedures</p> <p>22 concerning incident command, having regard to whether it</p> <p>23 is effective for the choice of the IC to be tied closely</p> <p>24 to the number or types of appliances attending an</p> <p>25 incident and training to be given to ICs to enhance</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 72</p>

<p>1 their training in relation to the following ..."</p> <p>2 Then if you look at 3:</p> <p>3 "3. To anticipate that a fire might behave in</p> <p>4 a manner inconsistent with the compartmentation</p> <p>5 principle."</p> <p>6 Now, you can then see across the page that there's</p> <p>7 some text -- quite a lot of text -- about how that was</p> <p>8 going to be implemented by Babcock with management</p> <p>9 training, and in the last paragraph of the first main</p> <p>10 column, underneath the yellow, it says:</p> <p>11 "The Lakanal House training package, that</p> <p>12 specifically address the recommendations is formally</p> <p>13 managed by the Learning & Development Team directly with</p> <p>14 Babcock."</p> <p>15 First of all, Babcock. Can you tell us about their</p> <p>16 involvement in LFB training?</p> <p>17 A. Babcock are an independent provider of our training. So</p> <p>18 they're an independent company that we pay to provide</p> <p>19 our training.</p> <p>20 Q. Did their training teams comprise members or ex-members</p> <p>21 of the LFB?</p> <p>22 A. Yes, they can do, yes.</p> <p>23 Q. They can do, but do they?</p> <p>24 A. Well, certain teams have ex-members of LFB. It's quite</p> <p>25 a big department or team, so, yes.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 73</p>	<p>1 Q. What was he looking at to give you that?</p> <p>2 A. His mobile phone. I've either got it off my mobile</p> <p>3 phone or from Lee Drawbridge saying that's the time</p> <p>4 I called him.</p> <p>5 Q. Have you provided your mobile phone records to the</p> <p>6 police?</p> <p>7 A. Yes.</p> <p>8 Q. You did. Okay.</p> <p>9 Now, you say:</p> <p>10 "I couldn't get through at first and when he called</p> <p>11 me back, the incident was made up to 40 pumps with many</p> <p>12 FSG calls in progress."</p> <p>13 Looking at the short incident log, as we have, and</p> <p>14 we saw 40 pumps was at 02.03, or thereabouts, that would</p> <p>15 mean, would it, that this discussion you had with</p> <p>16 Lee Drawbridge was after that? So we can time that</p> <p>17 discussion to after 02.03, can we?</p> <p>18 A. Yes.</p> <p>19 Q. Yes.</p> <p>20 You asked him, you say, to log on and see if he</p> <p>21 could contact the operational resilience support</p> <p>22 officer, ORSO, and mobilise them to the BCC.</p> <p>23 What is an ORSO?</p> <p>24 A. So an operational resilience support officer are watch</p> <p>25 managers who are trained in setting up the BCC, Brigade</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 75</p>
<p>1 Q. Does this prompt a recollection of getting</p> <p>2 computer-based training from Babcock on the subject of</p> <p>3 what would happen if compartmentation fails?</p> <p>4 A. No, that document doesn't -- I'm not familiar with that</p> <p>5 document.</p> <p>6 Q. Okay. You're not familiar with the document, okay.</p> <p>7 Right, well, I won't pursue that. It's a long and</p> <p>8 complicated document and not an easy read, but we may</p> <p>9 look at that with others.</p> <p>10 Can I then turn back to where we had got to just</p> <p>11 before the break, which is your arrival at the Brigade</p> <p>12 control centre.</p> <p>13 Now, in your statement you say, just below halfway</p> <p>14 down page 5, where the paragraph starts:</p> <p>15 "At 0149 hours, I called the recall DAC -</p> <p>16 Lee DRAWBRIDGE ... [and told him] that he was to stand</p> <p>17 up as the recall DAC."</p> <p>18 Now, you say 01.49 hours; how can you be so precise</p> <p>19 about the timing of that call, do you know?</p> <p>20 A. Because Lee Drawbridge informed me afterwards that he</p> <p>21 had had missed calls on his phone and that was the time</p> <p>22 that I called him.</p> <p>23 Q. So when you did your statement, where did you get that</p> <p>24 very precise information from, do you know?</p> <p>25 A. From Lee Drawbridge.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 74</p>	<p>1 co-ordination centre, and they would be in charge of</p> <p>2 particular cells, as mentioned before, or they would</p> <p>3 assist in whatever role was required in the BCC. So</p> <p>4 they're -- should I say, they're very good officers to</p> <p>5 get there early because they will assist in setting</p> <p>6 a BCC up, and knowing I was doing that at Stratford,</p> <p>7 which isn't a location normally -- I wanted to get them</p> <p>8 there as quickly as possible.</p> <p>9 Q. Were there any particular people with current</p> <p>10 operational fire ground experience?</p> <p>11 A. They're operational watch managers; however, they are</p> <p>12 not working currently at a fire station, so they</p> <p>13 wouldn't be attending incidents at the moment, but they</p> <p>14 would work in a department up at headquarters. But they</p> <p>15 are qualified to the role of a watch manager.</p> <p>16 Q. Did you succeed in mobilising an ORSO to BCC?</p> <p>17 A. Lee would have mobilised those ORSOs for me, yes.</p> <p>18 Q. Who were they, do you know?</p> <p>19 A. There was four that came all together, but two to start</p> <p>20 with. They are on my list in my statement. So to be</p> <p>21 honest, I can't remember which two came first.</p> <p>22 Q. Right. You say you've referred to them in your</p> <p>23 statement.</p> <p>24 A. Yes, so in my statement it says the staff that I had in</p> <p>25 the BCC.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 76</p>

<p>1 Q. Okay.</p> <p>2 Now, you then go on to say that you arrived -- if</p> <p>3 you go over to page 3 of your statement, that's what</p> <p>4 I was looking for, there's a little list.</p> <p>5 A. That's the list of names, yes.</p> <p>6 Q. We have four watch managers, Wilson, Small, Malone and</p> <p>7 Rex, and they were the four, were they?</p> <p>8 A. Yes, they were the four. So Steve Leader would've</p> <p>9 arrived first. Lee Drawbridge would've mobilised the</p> <p>10 two that were on recall that night, so there was only</p> <p>11 two on recall, and then later on at some stage that</p> <p>12 night, I authorised for the two who were not on recall</p> <p>13 to be contacted at home, off duty, and ask if they were</p> <p>14 willing to step up and come in off duty, which they did.</p> <p>15 Q. Yes. Then you go on to say, two-thirds of the way down</p> <p>16 page 5:</p> <p>17 "The journey to Stratford from my camp out base is</p> <p>18 only 20-25 minutes depending on traffic. Between</p> <p>19 0200-0220 hours I arrived at Stratford Fire Station."</p> <p>20 We've discussed that before.</p> <p>21 A. Yes.</p> <p>22 Q. On the basis of what I've shown you, do you still think</p> <p>23 that's correct? It looks like it was after 02.04</p> <p>24 though.</p> <p>25 A. Yes. So I arrived after Joanne Smith, and unfortunately</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 77</p>	<p>1 support her staff."</p> <p>2 That's what you saw, is it, when you first went into</p> <p>3 the control room?</p> <p>4 A. For those two particular officers, yes.</p> <p>5 Q. Do you remember who was officer of the watch?</p> <p>6 A. Yes, Alex Norman.</p> <p>7 Q. Alex Norman?</p> <p>8 A. Yes.</p> <p>9 Q. And what, do you remember, was her role when you</p> <p>10 arrived?</p> <p>11 A. I can't remember where she was or what she was doing at</p> <p>12 the time. So I would always go to the most senior</p> <p>13 person in the room to start with and that's how</p> <p>14 I remember looking round, looking for Joanne and seeing</p> <p>15 where she was. And also Jason would have been the only</p> <p>16 other operational officer in the room other than the</p> <p>17 control officers, so that's probably why I pinpointed</p> <p>18 those two officers to start with.</p> <p>19 Q. Now, at the top of page 6 of your statement, you say</p> <p>20 this:</p> <p>21 "After introducing myself I told them that I was</p> <p>22 going to set up the BCC downstairs on the ground floor."</p> <p>23 You say you introduced yourself; did you know</p> <p>24 Jo Smith?</p> <p>25 A. Yes, I know Jo Smith and Jason Oliff, so I know them</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 79</p>
<p>1 I can't pinpoint my arrival at Stratford to a specific</p> <p>2 time because obviously I wasn't looking at my watch at</p> <p>3 the time.</p> <p>4 Q. So Joanne Smith was there when you arrived?</p> <p>5 A. Yes.</p> <p>6 Q. She says that she had arrived about 2.15 or so, so would</p> <p>7 that help you be more accurate as to your timing?</p> <p>8 A. So it would've been after 2.15, then, because Jo was</p> <p>9 already there and up in control and in the room when</p> <p>10 I arrived.</p> <p>11 Q. Okay.</p> <p>12 Do you remember whether Jo had been there for long</p> <p>13 or she'd just arrived or what?</p> <p>14 A. I couldn't be very specific, but I think she'd probably</p> <p>15 been there 10/15 minutes.</p> <p>16 Q. What was she doing when you arrived, do you remember?</p> <p>17 A. She was talking to her control officers, she was working</p> <p>18 the room, going around the room and speaking to her</p> <p>19 control officers at the time.</p> <p>20 Q. Okay.</p> <p>21 Now, you say at the bottom of the page:</p> <p>22 "In the middle of the room was the Officer of the</p> <p>23 Day — Jason OLIFF who was on the phone, and the Senior</p> <p>24 Operations Manager Joanne SMITH who was going around the</p> <p>25 room speaking to call operators trying to assist and</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 78</p>	<p>1 both. So I've worked with Jo previously.</p> <p>2 Q. And you say you were going to set up the BCC downstairs.</p> <p>3 But you then go on to say:</p> <p>4 "My role was to set up the BCC but I could see my</p> <p>5 priority now was going to be assist with coordination of</p> <p>6 FSG calls in control, and that the priority was to</p> <p>7 record all the Fire Survival Guidance information</p> <p>8 without it being lost or duplicated."</p> <p>9 Why did you see that as your priority?</p> <p>10 A. So if I set a bit of a scene of when I've arrived, I've</p> <p>11 arrived at Stratford -- so Stratford control was on the</p> <p>12 first floor, and the BCC, or as it -- it's not</p> <p>13 a specific BCC, it's the north-east area team offices,</p> <p>14 but it can facilitate a BCC should you require it.</p> <p>15 So, first of all, I've gone straight upstairs to</p> <p>16 inform Jo, just as common courtesy, to say I'm here and</p> <p>17 I'm going to go downstairs and I'm going to start</p> <p>18 getting up the Brigade co-ordination centre, as was my</p> <p>19 role and what I was paged and mobilised to do.</p> <p>20 When I entered the room -- so Stratford control is</p> <p>21 a smaller room than Merton. The footprint is a smaller</p> <p>22 room. And the noise, the noise level -- you could see</p> <p>23 that every single operator was fully engaged in -- the</p> <p>24 time when I first walked in I didn't realise were FSGs,</p> <p>25 but was fully engaged on the phone, on the radio, or</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 80</p>

<p>1 everyone was fully engaged and working and there was 2 quite a lot of noise in the room -- controlled, but it 3 was a noisy -- you could see it was an active room and 4 there was a massive amount of information coming in. 5 And seeing that, once I gained the information that 6 they were looking -- they were dealing with a vast 7 number of FSG calls, and my concern was to look at 8 a system and assist Jo in her role and look at a system 9 of how we could record and get the information across to 10 the fire ground as the most expedient way. 11 Q. Right. 12 In coming to that conclusion, that FSG information 13 and its recording accurately was your priority, were you 14 drawing on any prior experience? 15 A. So I've had no prior experience of working in control 16 and dealing with FSGs, but I could just see the pure 17 amount of information coming in. Normal protocol would 18 be for this information to go over the Airwave radio. 19 I can probably -- looking at the amount of airtime 20 traffic that would've taken for all that information to 21 be passed over the Airwave, and that would release 22 an operator to do another role, rather than 23 concentrating on sending that over the Airwave to the 24 fire ground, and also it would give everyone a visual 25 picture in the room, having it up on the whiteboard,</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 81</p>	<p>1 experience -- because they are the experienced control 2 staff -- and they were happy with that decision, then we 3 moved that forward. 4 Q. How was the FSG information being recorded at the time 5 you arrived? 6 A. Normal protocols. 7 Q. Which is what? 8 A. Which would've been from a control operator passing it 9 to a radio operator who would put it on to the system 10 and spoken to the fire ground. 11 Q. Just pause there and let's just break that up and look 12 at it a bit more closely. 13 So when you arrive, normal system in operation. 14 What was the control room operator doing him or herself 15 to record the information that they were getting? 16 A. Which control room operator? 17 Q. Well, in general, all of them. 18 A. So at the time they were writing on pieces of paper. 19 Q. Right. Was that a standard form of pad or was it just 20 a bit of paper by the phone? 21 A. No, they were the pieces of paper that you showed me, or 22 part of the pieces of paper that you showed me earlier 23 on. 24 Q. So they wrote that down during the call or after the 25 call was concluded, do you know?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 83</p>
<p>1 that everybody could see the information on the 2 whiteboard and the number of calls we was receiving. 3 Q. Now, by 2 am or so, the number of FSG calls that had 4 been received by the control room was over 115. Did you 5 know that? 6 A. No, I didn't. 7 Q. Does that surprise you, that number? 8 A. Yes, that's a hell of a lot, yes. 9 Q. And when you arrived in the control room and you could 10 see all the CROs busy on the phone, did you form 11 an impression as to whether those were active FSG calls 12 properly so-called or whether they were just what 13 I might call ordinary 999 calls? 14 A. No, I would say they were active FSG calls. 15 Q. How did you know that? 16 A. Just the information I gathered straight away from Jo 17 and looking round the room and seeing. So I went 18 straight to Jo first of all and had -- so I didn't walk 19 into the room and just make that decision; there was 20 some information-gathering. I spoke to Jo first. She 21 told me what was happening, where we were, and looking 22 at the situation at the time, that was a decision that 23 I made. 24 But having spoken to Jo and at that time Alex Norman 25 on my view of what we could do, gleaned on their</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 82</p>	<p>1 A. I couldn't give you that detail. 2 Q. On what you could see, what were the control room 3 operators doing with those pieces of paper? 4 A. At that time, I don't know. 5 Q. Okay. Did you see them getting up from their desks and 6 taking the pieces of paper to somebody? 7 A. No. 8 Q. Do you know how those pieces of paper were being 9 collected, at the time of your arrival, from the control 10 room operators? 11 A. Not at my time of arrival, no. 12 Q. How, at the time of your arrival, was the information 13 which was being gathered by the CROs from callers being 14 communicated to the radio operator? 15 A. Unfortunately I can't give you that information because 16 that's a control -- that's a role within control and I'm 17 not sure how control or their systems -- how they would 18 do that, so -- 19 Q. Do you know whether it was by typing it into the system 20 and sending it to the radio operator? 21 A. I would suggest so, yes. 22 Q. But do you know that? 23 A. No, not 100 per cent, because I don't work with the 24 control operators and I don't have a complex 25 understanding of how a control operator would work.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 84</p>

<p>1 I have a basic understanding, but I'm not trained to -- 2 or I've not gone through the control operator's role. 3 Q. At the point of arrival, before the whiteboard system 4 started, how was each FSG message being communicated to 5 the fire ground? 6 A. I would suggest that was being done by the Airwave 7 radio. 8 Q. Right. You say you would suggest it. 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Did you see it? 11 A. Everyone -- the room -- so if I set you the scene, 12 you've got the room, every single operator is on either 13 a headset with a phone call or a headset for the radio. 14 I wouldn't be able to tell you: that's the radio 15 operator, that's an FSG operator, that -- I don't know 16 their roles and where they sit and how they work. So 17 you're drilling for my level probably too far down into 18 the detail for me to give you a confirmed answer, 19 probably. 20 Q. Fair enough, okay. 21 Was anybody making sure at the point of your arrival 22 that FSG information wasn't being lost or duplicated? 23 A. Yes, so I would definitely say so and you would need to 24 speak to a control operator to confirm that. 25 Q. Right.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 85</p>	<p>1 survival guidance would be recorded on a system that 2 they use. 3 Q. Okay. 4 At the point of your arrival, did you have access -- 5 either downstairs or in the control room -- to the 6 Vision system? 7 A. I would never have access to Vision because Vision is 8 control's and I wouldn't have access to that. Should 9 I have wanted to leave the control room and go and find 10 a remote computer somewhere to log on and then log on 11 and have a look, yes, I could've looked on to BOSS if 12 that was what I needed to do. 13 Q. Given that you had decided that your priority was to 14 assist with co-ordination of FSG calls in control and to 15 record the FSG information, was it not important to you 16 to log on to Vision and see what messages had already 17 been sent and recorded in that system so as to get 18 a picture of the flow of information and the detail? 19 A. So I was aware that FSGs were going on, I was aware that 20 control were recording them however they would normally 21 record them, and I offered an alternative system, due to 22 the multitude and number that was happening, to try and 23 relieve the pressure in the room and to make sure that 24 it was more streamlined for the number and the amount 25 coming through.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 87</p>
<p>1 Were you aware of any calls coming in from other 2 control rooms? 3 A. Not at that period of time, no. 4 Q. Did there come a point later in the evening when you 5 became aware? 6 A. Yes, later on in the evening, Jo Smith informed me that 7 other control rooms were supporting us. 8 Q. Did she tell you how many? 9 A. No. 10 Q. Did she tell you which? 11 A. No. But, like I say, that wouldn't have come under my 12 remit or under my role; Jo was just giving me the 13 overview so I had an understanding of what was 14 happening. 15 Q. When a message was sent from the control room to the 16 incident ground at the point you arrived, do you know 17 how the fact that that message was being sent was being 18 recorded? 19 A. No. 20 Q. Did you know whether it was being recorded? 21 A. I would suggest that it would've gone on to our system 22 as in normal protocol. How control work, as I've 23 explained previously, I'm not trained in that arena and 24 I wouldn't have that understanding of how they would 25 normally record their systems. But I do know that fire</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 86</p>	<p>1 I wouldn't have the understanding, like I've said 2 previously, of how or where or what control do because 3 it's not a role I perform. 4 Q. Did anybody say to you -- Jo Smith or Jason Oliff, for 5 example -- "The system we're using at the the moment to 6 record information being sent to the incident commander 7 is not working"? 8 A. No, no one said at any time it wasn't working. 9 Q. So the solution that you'd come up with to use 10 whiteboards, was that a solution to a problem that you 11 were facing or not? 12 A. It was just a solution I offered up to the room as the 13 way we could deal with the vast number that was coming 14 in and to try and assist with keeping that data going 15 through that one channel. So Jason was on the mobile 16 phone at the time, and that is when I came up with the 17 idea of him standing with these whiteboards and to write 18 all the information on the whiteboards as he was 19 relaying it to the incident ground. 20 Q. Right. You came up with the solution, but my question 21 is really: was there a problem to which this was 22 a solution? 23 A. No, not that I'm aware, that there was a problem, apart 24 from the vast amount and number that was coming in, and 25 potentially I suppose you could say there was</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 88</p>

<p>1 a potential for control staff to become overwhelmed with</p> <p>2 the number to come in. It was a solution that I put</p> <p>3 forward and it was a solution that was agreed between</p> <p>4 me, Jo and Alex, and in their experience as control</p> <p>5 operators, if they're happy with that, I will work on</p> <p>6 their experience and I was happy to proceed it.</p> <p>7 Q. Do you know whether Jo Smith or Alex Norman or</p> <p>8 Jason Oliff, for that matter, informed the control room</p> <p>9 staff generally that the new whiteboard system was going</p> <p>10 to be used to record FSG information being sent to the</p> <p>11 fire ground?</p> <p>12 A. Yes. So that would've been something that Jo and Alex</p> <p>13 would have informed her staff, that that's the process</p> <p>14 we were starting to do.</p> <p>15 Q. Do you know whether the radio operator was specifically</p> <p>16 told to stop sending messages to the fire ground?</p> <p>17 A. I couldn't give you -- I wouldn't know the detail of who</p> <p>18 or what individual they spoke to at the time.</p> <p>19 Q. Okay.</p> <p>20 A. So I couldn't drill into that depth of detail for you.</p> <p>21 Q. At that early stage, after you'd arrived, seen the</p> <p>22 control room, talked to Jo Smith and Jason Oliff, did</p> <p>23 you know or get a feel for the kind of advice that was</p> <p>24 being given by control room operators to callers?</p> <p>25 A. I was aware at that time the advice was to stay put.</p> <p>Page 89</p>	<p>1 conversation; I'm just saying that is how I would take</p> <p>2 the assumption I got that information.</p> <p>3 Q. Right.</p> <p>4 Just help me with something. Stay put, you have</p> <p>5 explained what that was in your statement and you told</p> <p>6 us earlier this morning, but if someone is trapped in</p> <p>7 their flat and is getting FSG, fire survival guidance,</p> <p>8 they haven't got a choice, have they? They have to stay</p> <p>9 put because they can't get out.</p> <p>10 A. Depending on the circumstances. If they are trapped in</p> <p>11 their flat by -- but it depends on what calls and -- so</p> <p>12 there was numerous calls that went on that night and,</p> <p>13 like I said, I didn't get involved in the detail of what</p> <p>14 control operators -- or what advice they were giving at</p> <p>15 that stage. So I wouldn't know the detail of any of the</p> <p>16 calls. I've not listened to any of the calls.</p> <p>17 Q. Did Jo Smith tell you about the general flavour of the</p> <p>18 advice that was being given --</p> <p>19 A. I would say --</p> <p>20 Q. -- as part of the stay-put advice?</p> <p>21 A. I would say not at that stage because we're talking at</p> <p>22 the very early stages of me probably walking through the</p> <p>23 door.</p> <p>24 Q. Can you just help with something, then, in general from</p> <p>25 your experience and training. We have stay put as</p> <p>Page 91</p>
<p>1 Q. Right.</p> <p>2 A. But I was -- I didn't listen in to a call or stand with</p> <p>3 an operator at that stage and listen to the call they</p> <p>4 were giving.</p> <p>5 Q. When you say you were aware that the advice was to stay</p> <p>6 put, but didn't listen to a call or stand with</p> <p>7 an operator, how were you aware that that was the nature</p> <p>8 of the advice?</p> <p>9 A. I couldn't give you a specific who told me, but I would</p> <p>10 take an assumption that it would've been Joanne who told</p> <p>11 me at the time.</p> <p>12 Q. I was going to ask you: was it an assumption you made or</p> <p>13 was it something you think Jo Smith told you?</p> <p>14 A. No, that would've been part of our discussion and</p> <p>15 a discussion that we would've had.</p> <p>16 Q. Okay. Part of the discussion. And in part of that</p> <p>17 discussion which discussed stay put, what was the actual</p> <p>18 nature of the advice that Jo Smith told you was being</p> <p>19 imparted? Was it stay put at all costs or stay put if</p> <p>20 you can?</p> <p>21 A. No, there was no detail. She wouldn't have given me the</p> <p>22 detail of the advice. That's control's role and her</p> <p>23 role. She just told me that she was keeping stay put --</p> <p>24 the advice as it was.</p> <p>25 As I say, I'm taking -- I can't remember that actual</p> <p>Page 90</p>	<p>1 a concept and we have FSG as a concept.</p> <p>2 At what point in the development of a fire or</p> <p>3 a caller's experience of a fire does the advice become</p> <p>4 fire survival guidance advice?</p> <p>5 A. So stay-put advice -- fire survival guidance is given</p> <p>6 when an individual is trapped within their premise,</p> <p>7 their flat, their house, their -- wherever they are,</p> <p>8 through smoke, heat or fire.</p> <p>9 Q. Right. So would it mean that as a matter of logic, at</p> <p>10 least, in your experience, you wouldn't be giving or</p> <p>11 need to give stay-put advice to someone who was trapped</p> <p>12 because they were put anyway?</p> <p>13 A. No, stay put and fire survival are different.</p> <p>14 Q. Yes. Yes. So fire survival guidance is not given to</p> <p>15 someone who needs to be told to stay put; it's given to</p> <p>16 someone who can't escape even if they wanted to?</p> <p>17 A. Yes, yes.</p> <p>18 Q. Am I right?</p> <p>19 A. Yes.</p> <p>20 Q. So --</p> <p>21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Or is it a case of someone who says</p> <p>22 he can't escape?</p> <p>23 A. Yes, it depends.</p> <p>24 MR MILLETT: Right. So just working this through a bit more</p> <p>25 and drawing on your experience, if we may, when a fire</p> <p>Page 92</p>

<p>1 survival guidance call is in process, is some or all of</p> <p>2 that an attempt by the operator to work out whether or</p> <p>3 not there is a safe means of escape, or is it simply</p> <p>4 advice as to how to survive in circumstances where there</p> <p>5 is no escape?</p> <p>6 A. So you're talking of specific training for a call</p> <p>7 operator and a call operator's advice and what they</p> <p>8 give. I have no input or had no training in what a call</p> <p>9 operator or what advice they would give. That's</p> <p>10 a control role.</p> <p>11 Q. Going back, then, to the discussion you had with</p> <p>12 Jo Smith, and you got the impression from her, at least,</p> <p>13 that she was saying that the advice was stay put, I am</p> <p>14 just trying to work out what that meant to you.</p> <p>15 A. In what context?</p> <p>16 Q. Well, in the context of your arrival, lots of FSG calls</p> <p>17 in progress, your concern that you needed to prioritise</p> <p>18 them and your discussion with Jo Smith. In that</p> <p>19 context --</p> <p>20 A. So, as I said, I can't remember a specific conversation</p> <p>21 or discussion, as I've previously said, with Jo. I'm</p> <p>22 taking the assumption that that's where I gained that</p> <p>23 information. So there is a lot happening within a short</p> <p>24 period of time, the control room is very, very busy,</p> <p>25 there was a lot of conversations and a lot of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 93</p>	<p>1 A. Yes.</p> <p>2 Q. Am I right in thinking, from what you've just told us,</p> <p>3 that from your discussions with Jo Smith and from what</p> <p>4 you understood, the advice was still: "You are going to</p> <p>5 be rescued"?</p> <p>6 A. Yes.</p> <p>7 Q. Right.</p> <p>8 A. At that stage.</p> <p>9 Q. At that stage.</p> <p>10 A. Yes.</p> <p>11 Q. Okay.</p> <p>12 So can we take it then -- and this may be fair or</p> <p>13 unfair -- that the expression "stay-put advice" is</p> <p>14 shorthand for "You are going to be rescued"?</p> <p>15 A. You're safer to stay in your compartment, and if and</p> <p>16 when, if necessary, the fire service will come to you.</p> <p>17 However, every circumstance is different and, as</p> <p>18 I said -- so in a normal flat, high-rise situation, the</p> <p>19 fire wouldn't be leaving the compartment as it did on</p> <p>20 the night, and it wouldn't be spreading round the</p> <p>21 envelope of the building as it did on the night, and so</p> <p>22 normal stay-put advice would be the advice to be given.</p> <p>23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would it be perhaps fairer to say</p> <p>24 that the stay-put advice is an answer to the question by</p> <p>25 the person who is calling: "Should I stay where I am or</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 95</p>
<p>1 information flying around, and I'm just saying that</p> <p>2 somewhere or somehow, I was aware that we were still</p> <p>3 giving -- or we were still following the stay-put</p> <p>4 advice.</p> <p>5 Q. Right.</p> <p>6 You were still following the stay-put advice. I'm</p> <p>7 sorry to keep --</p> <p>8 A. Or control were.</p> <p>9 Q. What did that mean in practice, still following the</p> <p>10 stay-put advice?</p> <p>11 A. So if -- this, again, is an assumption, because I don't</p> <p>12 know what control would say or how they would speak to</p> <p>13 staff because I'm not a control officer and it's not an</p> <p>14 environment I would normally work in. So I'm taking the</p> <p>15 assumption that if this was someone who was in their</p> <p>16 flat and they were phoning up to say that they could see</p> <p>17 there was smoke outside their window or something,</p> <p>18 control would still be in the position of saying, "Stay</p> <p>19 where you are, the fire service will come to you".</p> <p>20 Q. Right. Okay.</p> <p>21 A. But you're asking me to give details of something that</p> <p>22 probably I'm not privy to and I wasn't aware of that</p> <p>23 detail on the night.</p> <p>24 Q. No, but I am asking you about your actual understanding</p> <p>25 on the actual night.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 94</p>	<p>1 should I try to get out?"</p> <p>2 A. Yes.</p> <p>3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Having described the conditions in</p> <p>4 the immediate area.</p> <p>5 A. Yes. But, as I say, I can't give specifics on each</p> <p>6 individual conversation or each call. As you said,</p> <p>7 there were absolutely numerous calls on that night and</p> <p>8 I wasn't aware of the detail of each conversation or any</p> <p>9 of the conversations held.</p> <p>10 MR MILLETT: You made that very clear. It's just I think</p> <p>11 we're seeking to get an understanding of what you</p> <p>12 understood at that moment of what stay put meant, and</p> <p>13 you have answered the chairman's question.</p> <p>14 We'll come back to it in due course.</p> <p>15 Can I just ask you this: were you aware, on or</p> <p>16 around the time of your arrival at the Brigade control</p> <p>17 centre, that the incident ground had asked for</p> <p>18 a dangerous structure engineer to be called?</p> <p>19 A. I was made aware -- I think it is logged and minuted</p> <p>20 quite a bit further down through the following morning.</p> <p>21 I couldn't give you a specific time, but not at that</p> <p>22 stage, no.</p> <p>23 Q. I can. If you go, please, to the short incident log,</p> <p>24 tab 23, and go, please, to page 22, at 02.17.36 you see,</p> <p>25 Mr Fenton, we have a service request:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 96</p>

<p>1 "... EMG CU8 REQUEST DANGEROUS STRUCTURE ENGINEER 2 GAS AND ELECTRICITY BOARD AND LOCAL AUTHORITY LIAISON 3 OFFICER." 4 Leave aside gas and electricity and the LALO. 5 Does this log entry prompt a recollection? 6 A. So I wouldn't, as the DAC for the Brigade co-ordination 7 centre, that is not information that would be given to 8 me and it's not information that I would be expected to 9 know. That is for the operational staff or officers on 10 the fire ground, and that would be a request that comes 11 to control for control to utilise the request and make 12 sure that they got a dangerous structure engineer to the 13 incident ground. 14 So it's not information that I would have been 15 given. It's not within my role. 16 Q. Okay. 17 Taking it in stages, first of all, why would 18 an incident commander request a dangerous structure 19 engineer? 20 A. You'd have to ask the incident commander that. 21 Q. You've been an incident commander, I am assuming, in 22 your long career at the LFB. 23 A. Yes, but I can't answer what their rationale was, what 24 their thinking was and why they as an individual 25 requested that; you would have to ask the individual who</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 97</p>	<p>1 Q. It is a hypothetical question, but what I'm trying to 2 gauge is, using your experience, what that information 3 would tell the control room about the seriousness of the 4 fire and the consequences for the people still in the 5 building. 6 A. So it would tell control, as limited as that is just 7 a line of information they've been given, it would tell 8 control that there's potential concerns with the 9 structure of the building. But in what levels or to 10 what stage, I don't think a control operator would 11 perceive. And also a control operator would be there to 12 facilitate the request. So it's a request to our admin 13 control operator asking for a dangerous structure 14 engineer. So then they would have gone on to the system 15 and ordered or found a dangerous structure engineer to 16 attend the incident. 17 Q. You say you didn't know about that message, but would 18 that have been useful information to you in recording 19 and taking charge of fire survival guidance? 20 A. It's a piece of information that I could have known 21 about, but like I say, the role of the night -- 22 I wouldn't have said I took charge of the fire survival 23 guidance; I said we put a system in place jointly, me 24 and Jo, on how the fire survival guidance could be 25 recorded. The fire survival guidance would have</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 99</p>
<p>1 requested it. 2 Q. Well, my question was: why would an incident commander 3 request a dangerous structure engineer? So perhaps 4 I could put it slightly differently. 5 In any given circumstances, at any given fire, why 6 would any given incident commander in the LFB request 7 a dangerous structure engineer? 8 A. Because they would have concerns over the structure of 9 the building. 10 Q. Right. 11 A. So that's why they would request one. 12 Q. Okay. 13 A. Potentially. 14 Q. What would the fact that the incident commander had 15 concerns over the structure of the building tell you 16 about the seriousness of the fire and the consequences 17 for the people still in the building? 18 A. So as I've said earlier on, I wasn't aware of this 19 information and I wouldn't have been given that 20 information in the role that I was performing. It 21 wouldn't have come to me. 22 Q. No, that doesn't answer my question, I'm afraid, 23 Mr Fenton. 24 A. So was this a hypothetical question rather than specific 25 to the night?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 98</p>	<p>1 remained in control; we were just looking at a system of 2 how we can make sure it got to the fire ground the 3 quickest way and recorded efficiently on the board. 4 Q. Now, on page 8 of your statement, a third of the way 5 down, it says: 6 "At 0320 hours Control received an informative from 7 the incident ground requesting a Dangerous Structure 8 Engineer as soon as possible." 9 Was that the first time you learnt that the incident 10 ground requested a dangerous structure engineer? 11 A. Yes, that was, and if I remember rightly, the reason 12 I was informed of it was: was I happy for the dangerous 13 structure engineer to be blue-lighted? So the decision 14 that came to me as the BCC was: was I happy to authorise 15 them to be blue-lighted to the incident ground? 16 Q. When you learnt that a dangerous structure engineer had 17 been requested, did that affect your thinking as to the 18 seriousness of the fire and the consequences for the 19 occupants of the building at that time? 20 A. At 03.20 -- and I'm taking the assumption that's the 21 time on there -- the seriousness of the fire was 22 already -- I was already aware of the development of the 23 situation by then. 24 Q. Yes. 25 I am going slightly backwards in this. You say at</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 100</p>

<p>1 3.20 control received an informative from the incident 2 ground. What is that? 3 A. It's a request. So it's an information message, 4 basically. It's a request from the incident to control. 5 So anything that the incident ground requests, they will 6 send a message into control as soon as possible. So I'm 7 taking the assumption they were already asked for 8 a dangerous structure engineer, and that's where they've 9 asked for it to be blue-lighted to the incident ground, 10 which I authorised. 11 Q. To be fair to you, if you go to page 24 of the SIL, 12 short incident log, tab 23 of the documents bundle, and 13 turn to page 24 and look at the time mark for 03.15.32, 14 you can see that there the radio operator creates a key: 15 "EMG CU8 REQUEST URGENT ATTENDANCE OF DANGEROUS 16 STRUCTURE ENGINEER AND STRESS THIS IS A MATTER OF 17 URGENCY AND PRIORITY." 18 Is that the informative message you're referring to 19 in your statement? 20 A. I can't remember where and exactly time or what message. 21 My memory of that night was that I was asked was I happy 22 for a dangerous structure engineer, as I've said, to be 23 blue-lighted to the incident, which I authorised 24 immediately. 25 Q. Do you know -- maybe you don't -- why you would've</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 101</p>	<p>1 would bring the information to him. He would then write 2 the information on the boards and tell the Command Unit 3 at the same time." 4 Just pausing there, was that the totality of your 5 instruction to Jason Oliff? 6 A. No, that's me writing it -- I gave him a brief of what 7 he was to do, where he was to sit, how and the reason 8 why we were doing it, and to keep an open line at all 9 times and that he was to be the sole person that the 10 information was to go through. 11 Q. Okay. It looks from the way you've phrased this that he 12 was already using the phone system to speak to the 13 command unit before the system of whiteboard recording 14 was established. Is that right? 15 A. Jason Oliff was on the phone at the time. I'm not 16 100 per cent sure what information or what that 17 conversation was, but that is when I said to keep that 18 open line with the command unit. 19 Q. Right. But my question was really: is it the case that, 20 from what you could see, he was already using the phone 21 system -- 22 A. I can't confirm that. 23 Q. -- to speak to the command unit before the whiteboard 24 system -- 25 A. He was speaking to the command unit --</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 103</p>
<p>1 learnt about the need for a dangerous structure engineer 2 at 3.20 as per that message at 3.15, but not the one 3 at -- 4 A. Because as I've said, my role, as being in charge of the 5 BCC, it wasn't -- I wouldn't have been informed of every 6 message and messages coming from the fire ground. 7 Q. So did somebody at 3.20 tell you that the incident 8 ground wanted a dangerous structure engineer or were you 9 looking at the radio? 10 A. No, someone requested. So someone physically came up to 11 me, whether I was in control or the BCC, and physically 12 requested was I happy to authorise for the dangerous 13 structure engineer to be blue-lighted to the incident 14 ground, which, as I said, I authorised and said yes. 15 Q. You then say, if you go back to page 6 of your 16 statement, that -- and this is four lines down -- that 17 you identified two whiteboards. You say: 18 "I dragged them to the corner of the room and spoke 19 to Jason DUFF ..." 20 That should be Oliff, I presume? 21 A. Yes, that's a typo. 22 Q. "... who was on the phone to a Command Unit at the time. 23 Once off the phone I briefed him to keep a phone line 24 open to the Command Unit regarding the Fire Survival 25 Guidance calls. I told him to sit by the boards and we</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 102</p>	<p>1 Q. -- was established? 2 A. Sorry, I overspoke, sorry. 3 Q. I'll put the question again. 4 From what you could see, was he already using 5 a phone to speak to the command unit and pass on 6 messages to the command unit before the whiteboard 7 recording system was established? 8 A. So, yes, he was on the phone, I can confirm that. 9 I can't confirm what his conversation was with the 10 command unit and what he was passing over to them, no, 11 I can't. 12 Q. And your reference to "phone", what kind of phone was 13 that? 14 A. That would be his Brigade mobile. 15 Q. Right. 16 Do you know how long -- maybe you don't -- but could 17 you see or tell or know how long he had been using his 18 mobile to speak to the fire ground before the whiteboard 19 instruction, as it were, was given, before you told him 20 to start using the whiteboards? 21 A. No, the room was, like I said, so busy, every single 22 person was on a different phone or headset. I wasn't 23 standing next to Jason to -- and that was far from my 24 priorities, to see how long he was on the phone or who 25 he was on the phone to.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 104</p>

<p>1 Q. Right. Do you know which command unit he was speaking 2 to?</p> <p>3 A. At that time, no.</p> <p>4 Q. No. Did you know --</p> <p>5 A. CU7. So at a later date, he confirmed with me that he 6 was speaking to CU7. That's when the dry whiteboard or 7 the whiteboard was set up and that system was in play.</p> <p>8 Q. Right. Did you know whether he ever spoke to anybody on 9 CU8?</p> <p>10 A. No, I can't confirm who he had spoken to or who he 11 didn't, no.</p> <p>12 Q. Just going back to the short incident log at page 22, we 13 have a key message at 02.23.33. Just after the 14 dangerous structure engineer, actually. 02.23.33, and 15 that says:</p> <p>16 "CU7 RUN ALL FSG CALLS VIA CU7."</p> <p>17 Do you remember that message being input into the 18 system?</p> <p>19 A. No, because I had no access, as I said, to the messages 20 and I wasn't looking at the messages.</p> <p>21 Q. Right. Did you know, even if not by looking at the 22 system, that that message had been sent and that now FSG 23 calls had to go via CU7?</p> <p>24 A. No.</p> <p>25 Q. 02.23.33 is either at the time you arrived or shortly</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 105</p>	<p>1 you say in your statement at page 6, fifth line down.</p> <p>2 You say you spoke to Jason Oliff and he was on the phone 3 to a command unit. You told us it was a mobile.</p> <p>4 My question is: did you have any thoughts about 5 whether his calls would be recorded?</p> <p>6 A. Not at that time because his conversation -- I don't 7 know what his conversation -- it wouldn't be necessarily 8 a recordable conversation.</p> <p>9 Q. No. Did you know that Brigade mobile telephone calls 10 are not recorded?</p> <p>11 A. Yes, I am aware of that.</p> <p>12 Q. Did that fact influence your decision to establish the 13 whiteboard recording system?</p> <p>14 A. Not at the time, no. At the time it was just purely how 15 can we prioritise the calls and get them over to the 16 incident ground.</p> <p>17 Q. As you said.</p> <p>18 Do you know or do you remember whether Alex Norman 19 was still talking to the incident ground?</p> <p>20 A. I can't recall what individual officers were doing in 21 such a dynamic situation and a dynamic room. I wouldn't 22 be able to recall where she was or what she was doing.</p> <p>23 Q. Right. Can I just take you to your contemporaneous 24 notes, the number of which we read to the record at the 25 beginning of your evidence this morning. Can I show you</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 107</p>
<p>1 after, I think, the time you arrived.</p> <p>2 Do you remember any messages going to CU8 at all?</p> <p>3 A. No, I wouldn't have been aware of who was talking to 4 who.</p> <p>5 Q. Now, when you saw Jason Oliff using his mobile to speak 6 to the command unit, was that normal procedure or was 7 that not normal procedure?</p> <p>8 A. It wouldn't be a normal procedure for an FSG. That 9 would, like I said, have gone through -- I mean, in 10 normal procedure for fire survival guidance, me and 11 Jason wouldn't even be in the room, we wouldn't even be 12 there, so it would have solely been control who would've 13 dealt with fire survival guidance. Due to the 14 unprecedented number, the scale, of the incident, that's 15 when the BCC was put into place and hence we were there. 16 Due to them being overwhelmed and the number coming in, 17 that's when I decided that I would help and assist 18 wherever I could at the time because that was obviously 19 the priority.</p> <p>20 Q. Seeing Jason Oliff on the mobile, did that trigger 21 a thought in your mind about whether the calls he was 22 making would be recorded?</p> <p>23 A. At what stage? When I first came in or when the dry 24 whiteboard was set up?</p> <p>25 Q. When you saw him on his phone to the command unit, as</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 106</p>	<p>1 page 3, second paragraph on that page.</p> <p>2 You describe the instruction you gave to Jason Oliff 3 to sit by the boards whilst keeping an open line with 4 the CU. You say:</p> <p>5 "... I recall it was CU7). All FSG information was 6 then recorded on the wipe boards whilst JO relayed this 7 information to the CU. This ensured no information was 8 lost and went via one dedicated route ensuring no 9 duplication or confusion."</p> <p>10 Now, just to be clear, were you satisfied, having 11 set up that system, that there was no duplication, no 12 parallel provision of information to the fire ground?</p> <p>13 A. At that time, no, I was not aware that it was going via 14 any other form.</p> <p>15 Q. Did you subsequently become aware that it might have 16 done?</p> <p>17 A. Only after seeing the inquiry -- when Jo was in here 18 recently.</p> <p>19 MR MILLETT: Let's just finish that little point off and 20 then maybe we can have a break, Mr Chairman.</p> <p>21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, I should think so.</p> <p>22 MR MILLETT: Right.</p> <p>23 If you go to the short incident log, we'll pick it 24 up from 02.23.33 on page 22, which says, "CU7 RUN ALL 25 FSG CALLS VIA CU7".</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 108</p>

<p>1 We still have calls being recorded or messages being 2 recorded, such as, for example, at 02.25.32 we have 3 service request completed for flat 183, and then at 4 02.27 we have service request created for flat 94, which 5 is completed 4 seconds later by Sharon Darby. 6 Then going on, we have at 02.29 a service request 7 created for flat 142, which is completed at 02.31, and, 8 indeed, at 02.40.11 we have a service request created 9 for flat 152 which is completed at 02.41. 10 Just looking at the timings, do you think that those 11 service messages were being completed and created while 12 Jason Oliff was on the phone to the command unit? 13 A. I would suggest the dry whiteboard was definitely set up 14 at that period of time; however, these logs on here, 15 I can't confirm control have entered them -- whether 16 they've entered them for recording purposes or -- I'm 17 not sure. So I wouldn't -- so far as I was concerned, 18 all information was coming via Jason, via the board, and 19 going to the fire ground. 20 Q. Right. 21 To be fair to you, the references to CU8 in those 22 instances I've shown you I asked Ms Smith about, and she 23 confirmed that actually that was CU7 and that, in fact, 24 the messages that had been sent by Sharon Darby were 25 CU7. We verified that by reference to the records of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 109</p>	<p>1 Now, going back, if I can, to your contemporaneous 2 note, page 3, where we were looking before at the second 3 paragraph, just below the second paragraph you have four 4 bullet points: 5 "Information recorded was: 6 "• The flat numbers and the floor they were on 7 "• The amount of people that were inside the flat - 8 Adult/child 9 "• The progress and updates from calls coming in 10 "• Advice that was given by the control staff." 11 Now, when you say "Information recorded was", is 12 that reference to the actual information that was 13 recorded or is that a reference to what was intended by 14 the system you established? 15 A. That was the intention of the system. 16 Q. Did it succeed? 17 A. So the information went across to the fire ground. Some 18 of the information possibly didn't go onto the board, 19 but the board wasn't a reference -- it was only 20 a reference point to know that that information had gone 21 across to the fire ground. 22 Q. Can we look at the whiteboards, which you will find in 23 the master documents bundle at tabs 68 and 69. 24 Just to orientate you in terms of your recollection, 25 we've set them up now on a duplicate screen here. The</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 111</p>
<p>1 those messages. 2 A. Right. 3 Q. But even having told you that, does it surprise you to 4 see that these messages are being sent at that time -- 5 A. I wasn't aware -- 6 Q. -- by radio? 7 A. I wasn't aware they were being duplicated and sent by 8 radio. 9 Q. Okay. 10 Now, the idea was, as we've seen from your 11 contemporaneous notes, that all FSG information -- as it 12 says, all FSG information -- was to be recorded on the 13 whiteboards whilst Jason Oliff relayed that information 14 to the command unit. 15 Do you know how the command unit would've recorded 16 that information at the other end? 17 A. I would've -- no, I would be surmising, so no. I didn't 18 at the time, no, and I wouldn't have known because 19 that's on the incident ground and remote to where I am. 20 Q. Did you ask Jason Oliff or Jo Smith how they thought the 21 information was being recorded in the command unit? 22 A. No, because that would've been down to the commander -- 23 not the incident commander, but the commander -- whoever 24 was in charge at that part on the incident ground. 25 Q. Right.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 110</p>	<p>1 one on the left I think is in fact the one that was done 2 second, and the one on the right was the one that was 3 done first, so you'll have to read right to left, if 4 that's all right. 5 First of all, do you remember who held the pen for 6 the whiteboard? 7 A. So Jason Oliff would have predominantly scribed on the 8 board and done the writing; however, there were 9 occasions that other staff, while Jason was on the 10 phone, put information up while Jason relayed that 11 information to the fire ground. 12 Q. Right. And Jo Smith told us on Thursday, I think it 13 was, last week, that on the right-hand screen, where you 14 see 193, 22nd floor, 10 people, in green, she put that 15 up there. She was very definitive about that. Do you 16 remember that? 17 A. I would not remember any specific entries because 18 I wasn't standing next to the board to put them up. 19 However, I do know that Jo and other staff did 20 participate and scribe on the board. But I would say 21 95 per cent was Jason Oliff; however, other staff did 22 participate. 23 Q. How much of this process did you actually see going on, 24 in terms of the information coming from the control room 25 operators to the whiteboard and then the whiteboard</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 112</p>

<p>1 being scribed?</p> <p>2 A. Predominantly my time was spent in control; however,</p> <p>3 I did go down to the BCC at times to facilitate some of</p> <p>4 the parts in the BCC. And I did spend a lot of my</p> <p>5 time -- I'm not sure you're aware of the layout of the</p> <p>6 room -- standing by the -- what can we call it? -- the</p> <p>7 officer of the watch's desk, I think is probably the</p> <p>8 best terminology, the head desk or --</p> <p>9 Q. Right.</p> <p>10 A. -- where the officer of the watch stands.</p> <p>11 Q. That was Alex Norman?</p> <p>12 A. Sorry?</p> <p>13 Q. That was Alex Norman?</p> <p>14 A. Yes, Alex Norman is the officer of the watch.</p> <p>15 Q. So there's a head desk which has phones on it, doesn't</p> <p>16 it?</p> <p>17 A. Yes.</p> <p>18 Q. I think one of them is a red phone; do you remember</p> <p>19 that?</p> <p>20 A. It's a critical phone, yes.</p> <p>21 Q. Did that ring when you were there?</p> <p>22 A. I can't -- loads -- all phones were ringing, because --</p> <p>23 I don't answer the phones or I wouldn't have picked one</p> <p>24 up or I wouldn't -- I wouldn't have known.</p> <p>25 Q. I mean, there is some evidence from Ms Gotts in her</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 113</p>	<p>1 A. I saw pieces of paper coming across the room. Like</p> <p>2 I say, to set the scene, the room is very dynamic, it's</p> <p>3 busy at the time, I'm receiving numerous phone calls,</p> <p>4 I'm being asked numerous -- to make decisions by several</p> <p>5 different people in different directions, and so my</p> <p>6 vision or overview of standing by the board or watching</p> <p>7 numerous -- different staff took pieces of paper across</p> <p>8 the room to Jason, but who and how -- I know Alex did at</p> <p>9 times, I know Joanne did at times.</p> <p>10 Q. Right.</p> <p>11 A. And to be honest, probably right at the beginning,</p> <p>12 I probably took a couple of bits over to Jason just</p> <p>13 purely to get it up and running as a runner.</p> <p>14 Q. Right.</p> <p>15 Did you have any designated runners during the</p> <p>16 course of the night?</p> <p>17 A. There was no staff. Everyone had a role, everyone was</p> <p>18 constant -- everyone was on the phone dealing with the</p> <p>19 phones coming in. Like I said, every single person in</p> <p>20 that room was fully engaged in a role or a job.</p> <p>21 Q. Do you remember whether any control room operators</p> <p>22 themselves took their headsets off and ran across the</p> <p>23 room with a piece of paper to Jason?</p> <p>24 A. A control operator -- I saw control operators take them</p> <p>25 across too, but whether they were -- what role they were</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 115</p>
<p>1 statement who remembers that red phone rang incessantly?</p> <p>2 A. Ms who, sorry?</p> <p>3 Q. Gotts.</p> <p>4 A. Gotts.</p> <p>5 Q. Does the name not mean anything to you?</p> <p>6 A. No.</p> <p>7 Q. Right. Okay.</p> <p>8 All right, never mind that. Do you remember the red</p> <p>9 phone ringing incessantly?</p> <p>10 A. Like I say, I wasn't standing next to where the red</p> <p>11 phone was and there were numerous phones and a lot of</p> <p>12 noise in the room and I wouldn't have picked up on any</p> <p>13 one phone ringing more than any other.</p> <p>14 Q. Now, you mentioned earlier about the process by which</p> <p>15 the information comes to Jason Oliff or perhaps Jo Smith</p> <p>16 or other staff writing on the whiteboard, and you said</p> <p>17 it was through these pieces of paper which we looked at</p> <p>18 right at the beginning of your evidence.</p> <p>19 A. Yes.</p> <p>20 Q. Did those pieces of paper come to you at all?</p> <p>21 A. No.</p> <p>22 Q. Right. So did you have a good view from where you were</p> <p>23 standing by the head table of those pieces of paper</p> <p>24 being carried across the room to Jason Oliff by the</p> <p>25 whiteboards?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 114</p>	<p>1 doing at the time and who they were, I couldn't give you</p> <p>2 that detail.</p> <p>3 Q. Now, when the whiteboard system was started, was it</p> <p>4 started in blank with the first entry, which I think is</p> <p>5 82, 11th floor, being written up in response to</p> <p>6 a specific piece of paper, or was it started in response</p> <p>7 to a batch of information which was sitting there and</p> <p>8 recorded as a list?</p> <p>9 A. Yet again, I couldn't give you that -- I wasn't standing</p> <p>10 with Jason directly when he started. So I detailed him</p> <p>11 to set the board up and left him to perform that role,</p> <p>12 and Jo and Alex would tell the control room staff that</p> <p>13 that's the process and what we're doing.</p> <p>14 Q. Can you just help me -- maybe again you can't -- with</p> <p>15 the order of things. The information comes on a piece</p> <p>16 of paper --</p> <p>17 A. Yes.</p> <p>18 Q. -- to Jason Oliff. He then writes it on the whiteboard.</p> <p>19 A. Yes.</p> <p>20 Q. He then communicates it by mobile phone?</p> <p>21 A. So he had a open line, an open phone and he's</p> <p>22 continuously doing that as he's writing the information</p> <p>23 up on the board. Or as I said, on occasions, when</p> <p>24 someone came over, they would highlight the piece of</p> <p>25 paper to him, the information, and they'd write it on</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 116</p>

<p>1 the board for him. That's just purely as a scribe.</p> <p>2 Q. What about repeat calls? What if there was a second or</p> <p>3 third or fourth call to the control room where there had</p> <p>4 been a development of the fire or heat or smoke in the</p> <p>5 flat or a change in the advice? Would that get recorded</p> <p>6 on the whiteboard?</p> <p>7 A. So wouldn't have been made aware of repeat calls, as</p> <p>8 I say, and I'm sorry, sometimes -- as my role,</p> <p>9 I would've been standing back and overseeing what was</p> <p>10 going on and dealing with the BCC. So I wouldn't have</p> <p>11 known if there were repeat calls and how they would've</p> <p>12 put them on the board, so if someone had -- if a control</p> <p>13 operator went over to Jason and said, "This is a repeat</p> <p>14 call", if there was an upgrade on that call, then he</p> <p>15 would've passed that information over.</p> <p>16 Q. Okay.</p> <p>17 For example, can I just put one example to you. We</p> <p>18 can go to this, MET00017390, page 12, we have a message</p> <p>19 which says "Flat 204 23rd flr one person". Just note</p> <p>20 the expression "one person".</p> <p>21 Then when you go back to the whiteboard, the</p> <p>22 left-hand whiteboard, it says 204 -- four up from the</p> <p>23 bottom --</p> <p>24 A. Sorry, which board are you looking at?</p> <p>25 Q. Left-hand whiteboard.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 117</p>	<p>1 Mr Chairman, is that a convenient moment?</p> <p>2 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, I think it is. Thank you very</p> <p>3 much.</p> <p>4 We are going to have another break now, Mr Fenton.</p> <p>5 I will have to ask you again not to talk to anyone about</p> <p>6 your evidence or anything related to it over the break,</p> <p>7 and we'll resume at 2 o'clock, please.</p> <p>8 (1.00 pm)</p> <p>9 (The short adjournment)</p> <p>10 (2.00 pm)</p> <p>11 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, we can now have Mr Fenton back.</p> <p>12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, here he is.</p> <p>13 MR MILLETT: Here he is.</p> <p>14 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Fenton, ready to carry</p> <p>15 on?</p> <p>16 THE WITNESS: Yes.</p> <p>17 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Very good.</p> <p>18 MR MILLETT: Mr Fenton, can I take you to your witness</p> <p>19 statement again and go back to page 6. I want to just</p> <p>20 take you to the middle of page 6, which sits in a part</p> <p>21 of your statement after the first part of page 6 which</p> <p>22 deals with your brief to Jason Oliff.</p> <p>23 You can see in the first part of that page that you</p> <p>24 cover your brief to him, whiteboards, et cetera, and</p> <p>25 then you describe the procedure.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 119</p>
<p>1 A. Yes.</p> <p>2 Q. Four up from the bottom, "204 23 flr -- 1 disabled</p> <p>3 male". So it looks as if the message, "one person", has</p> <p>4 evolved into something more detailed, "I disabled male".</p> <p>5 Can you help with how those messages evolved, or</p> <p>6 that message might have evolved in that way, using that</p> <p>7 as an example?</p> <p>8 A. So as I said earlier, and that's making an assumption</p> <p>9 that a control operator has now come -- or a piece of</p> <p>10 paper's come back over to Jason on the board, and the</p> <p>11 information has now been updated from the previous time,</p> <p>12 and so he's updated the board and would have passed that</p> <p>13 information over to the command unit.</p> <p>14 Q. Right. This is a question I suppose I should've asked</p> <p>15 him, but do you remember whether he deleted information</p> <p>16 or rubbed it off the board and replaced it with fresh</p> <p>17 information as it came in to him?</p> <p>18 A. I couldn't answer what he actually done.</p> <p>19 Q. Do you remember whether that happened?</p> <p>20 A. No, I don't.</p> <p>21 Q. Okay.</p> <p>22 A. I mean, it says one disabled male and the previous said</p> <p>23 one adult male, so I would take the assumption that</p> <p>24 that's been changed and updated.</p> <p>25 MR MILLETT: Right. Okay. All right.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 118</p>	<p>1 Then you come in the middle of that page to say</p> <p>2 this:</p> <p>3 "I was advised by control or Jason OLIFF (I am not</p> <p>4 sure which) that crews were struggling to get beyond the</p> <p>5 15th floor of the tower."</p> <p>6 Now, can I just ask you when you think you were told</p> <p>7 that by control or Jason Oliff?</p> <p>8 A. Quite early in the time in the morning that I was there,</p> <p>9 so quite shortly after my arrival.</p> <p>10 Q. Quite shortly after your arrival, okay.</p> <p>11 A. Yes. Sorry, I probably didn't phrase that the easiest</p> <p>12 way.</p> <p>13 Q. That's okay. I just want to get a time frame for that.</p> <p>14 Are you sure that it was the 15th floor?</p> <p>15 A. Yes, I'm pretty comfortable it was the 15th floor.</p> <p>16 Q. Right. Joanne Smith says she thinks it might have been</p> <p>17 the 18th floor but accepts that it could've been the</p> <p>18 15th floor. Do you have a recollection?</p> <p>19 A. I mean, from memory, I would say it's the 15th floor,</p> <p>20 but I could be wrong.</p> <p>21 Q. Right.</p> <p>22 Now, you then say in the next sentence:</p> <p>23 "There is a SMALL television in the control room.</p> <p>24 Joanne Smith said she didn't want it on due to the</p> <p>25 stress with all the FSG calls and did not want it</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 120</p>

<p>1 distracting her staff. I went with that decision. 2 There was no necessity for the Control Room Officers to 3 see what was going on. At the same time, I knew there 4 would be a television downstairs in the BCC for me to 5 get a visual picture as the Deputy Assistant 6 Commissioner."</p> <p>7 Now, what would the television in the control room 8 usually be used for?</p> <p>9 A. I've been to control at Merton, and there's two, 10 I think, two large screens, top of my memory -- and that 11 is from memory -- and they would just be on in the 12 background. So one -- I think one of the TV screens 13 normally has an update, says that strategic resource has 14 been released or, you know, information of what's 15 happening with RMC and the day-to-day running and 16 resources. And sometimes I've been down there and the 17 other television's been on and it's had news in the 18 background and other times it hasn't been on at all.</p> <p>19 Q. Would the television being on be useful to control room 20 officers and control room supervising officers and 21 managers in the carrying out of their functions?</p> <p>22 A. As in what aspect?</p> <p>23 Q. Well, would seeing what is on the television, on the 24 news feed part of the television, be useful to assist 25 control room officers or supervisors to carry out their</p> <p>Page 121</p>	<p>1 that what Joanne Smith told you was her view?</p> <p>2 A. No, that was the view of what Jo was saying for the 3 control officers.</p> <p>4 Q. Right.</p> <p>5 A. So that's obviously their protocol.</p> <p>6 Q. Now, can I go back to this question of the whiteboard 7 and what was logged and what wasn't logged which we 8 looked at shortly before the lunch break.</p> <p>9 In your statement on page 6, just go back above the 10 paragraph which we looked at a minute ago. You say 11 a quarter of the way down:</p> <p>12 "I told him [that's Jason Oliff] to sit by the 13 boards and we would bring the information to him. He 14 would then write the information on the boards and tell 15 the Command Unit at the same time."</p> <p>16 Then you say:</p> <p>17 "The information included flat numbers, floors 18 numbers, amount of people inside the flat including 19 numbers of adults/children, and any progress that came 20 from calls coming in."</p> <p>21 Just taking that list in order, was it important for 22 the information being recorded on the whiteboard to 23 record flat numbers, particularly?</p> <p>24 A. So the information -- the priority, the most important 25 part, is that the right information goes to the incident</p> <p>Page 123</p>
<p>1 jobs?</p> <p>2 A. So it wouldn't be for me to say, not knowing exactly 3 their jobs and their roles; however, I had that 4 conversation with Joanne. Joanne said that it wasn't 5 necessary. She didn't want the control staff to have 6 the television on and further distress them with what 7 they were doing. That's her environment and she runs 8 the control, so I went with her decision.</p> <p>9 Q. Okay.</p> <p>10 A. Now, myself being an operational officer, I'm not used 11 to being remote from an incident and personally I wanted 12 to give myself a pictorial view, and that's why I wanted 13 to have a look at the television downstairs.</p> <p>14 Q. Right. Did Jo Smith tell you that the TV was broken?</p> <p>15 A. No, no.</p> <p>16 Q. All right. Did you get the impression that it wasn't 17 broken but that she just decided that it shouldn't be 18 on?</p> <p>19 A. There was no question whether the TV was broken or not 20 broken. No one -- that was not raised or mentioned in 21 any conversation.</p> <p>22 Q. Okay. When you say in your statement:</p> <p>23 "There was no necessity for the Control Room 24 Officers to see what was going on."</p> <p>25 Was that your decision or thought at the time or was</p> <p>Page 122</p>	<p>1 ground. But, yes, it is beneficial to ensure that the 2 information on the whiteboard is correct.</p> <p>3 Q. And also the amount of people inside the flat, would 4 that be important for the incident ground to know?</p> <p>5 A. Yes.</p> <p>6 Q. Yes. Would that reflect the fire survival guidance 7 information-gathering that you would expect a control 8 operator to gather from the caller?</p> <p>9 A. It is my perception that, yes, that is part of the 10 information-gathering that a control operator will do, 11 yes.</p> <p>12 Q. You did tell us earlier that you're not familiar with 13 policy 539, so I won't put it to you, but would you know 14 from your training or experience that relevant 15 information to be passed to the incident ground should 16 include -- should include -- number of persons involved, 17 condition of the location, so smoke, heat, fire, 18 et cetera, and proximity to the fire, location of caller 19 within the premises and the latest FSG advice, things 20 like that?</p> <p>21 A. Yes, that is relevant information.</p> <p>22 Q. Right.</p> <p>23 Going to a policy you said you were familiar with, 24 if I can just show you policy 790 again, which is in 25 tab 5 of the policies bundle. I just want to show you</p> <p>Page 124</p>

<p>1 that. We looked at it earlier, Mr Fenton. I just want 2 to go back to this, and this time look at paragraph 5.4 3 and 5.5 on page 3. 4 Now 5.4 says: 5 "Control will contact the Initial Command Pump (ICP) 6 and pass the information below by appliance radio for 7 each separate FSG call. When passing this information, 8 control will reference the information using the 9 relevant flat/house number." 10 Now, never mind by radio for the moment, we've 11 covered that. Just looking at the list of information 12 in 5.5 that must be passed to the ICP by control, it 13 says this: 14 "Control will attempt tempt to gather all the 15 information on the Control Information Form (see 16 Appendix 2) and relay this information to the incident 17 as and when it becomes available." 18 Then you see a list: 19 "• number of flat/house; 20 "• number of persons involved; 21 "• location of caller within premises and access 22 point; 23 "• condition of their location e.g. heavy smoke, 24 slight smoke; 25 "• proximity to fire if known;</p> <p>Page 125</p>	<p>1 bundle -- there they are -- when you looked at the 2 information as it was going down onto the whiteboard, 3 were you satisfied that the control room operators had 4 gathered all that information required by policy and 5 passed it to Jason Oliff? 6 A. So I was satisfied that the information was going 7 across. However, like I stated previously, it's not my 8 role to get involved with the control operators or to 9 speak to the control operators. So this was 10 an additional system that we put in place to cover on 11 the night. So as far as I was aware on the night, the 12 right information was going across by Jason Oliff. 13 Q. Now, just taking it in stages -- 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. -- what steps did you take to ensure that the control 16 room operators gathered all those items of information 17 that policy requires: number of flat, persons involved, 18 et cetera? 19 A. I didn't make those steps because, as I said, it's not 20 my role to -- I wouldn't have checked with the control 21 operators to check what information they're gathering. 22 So, normally, I wouldn't be working in control. So 23 This was over and above and outside my normal role. So 24 I was there assisting and it wouldn't be my role to 25 normally go round the control operators.</p> <p>Page 127</p>
<p>1 "• latest advice given by control; 2 "• time of FSG call 3 "• time updated." 4 On the night, were you aware, was it in your mind, 5 that control had to gather that information from the 6 callers if they could? 7 A. Yes, that is the information that's in the policy and 8 that's the information you'd expect control to gather. 9 Q. And would you expect them to use the control information 10 form at appendix 2 -- we can look at the appendix -- in 11 doing that? 12 A. I don't know the protocol which control would normally 13 utilise or do. So, unfortunately, no, I can't answer 14 that. 15 Q. When you tasked Jason Oliff with the whiteboard job, if 16 I can use a shorthand, did you remind him of the need to 17 ensure that all those items of information listed in 18 paragraph 5.5 were gathered by the control room 19 operators and recorded on the whiteboard? 20 A. So I gave Jason Oliff, as we said, a brief of what was 21 needed. I can't recollect word-for-word exactly what 22 the brief was and what I told him, but I would say that 23 it was along that lines, yes. 24 Q. Right. If we can just now have the two whiteboards up 25 on the screen, so tabs 68 and 69 of the documents</p> <p>Page 126</p>	<p>1 Q. Whose role would it be? 2 A. It would be down to Joanne Smith in charge of control. 3 Q. Next question, then: did you get a chance during your 4 observations to check to see what the information was 5 being recorded by control room operators on the pieces 6 of paper that you saw being carried to the whiteboards? 7 A. So, no, because, like -- if I can set the scene again 8 and wind you back to the position that I was in at that 9 time and on the night, there was a multitude of phone 10 calls, people requesting information from myself, asking 11 me for updates on resources, the BCC, all different 12 parts of information. 13 I tasked the job to be done by a station manager and 14 that's the task I expected to be performed, so -- 15 Q. Did you -- sorry. 16 A. No, fine. 17 Q. So sorry. 18 Did you oversee the way in which he was carrying out 19 that task? 20 A. At times I would've come over and confirmed and say, "Is 21 the information going across? Is the right information 22 going across?" That's as far as that probably went at 23 that time because, as I said, it was very dynamic and 24 everyone was completely full on with a task, with 25 numerous calls and information coming in non-stop.</p> <p>Page 128</p>

<p>1 Q. Looking at these whiteboards -- let's just take the very 2 first entry we see on the very first of the whiteboards, 3 82, 11th floor. 4 Now, I tried with Jason Oliff yesterday to read 5 this. It looks like "Bed front door" or "Bad front 6 door", I'm not sure; can you help with that? 7 A. No. 8 Q. "2 adults, 1 child outside [something]." 9 If that was the totality of the information that 10 Jason Oliff was given, did that reflect control's 11 attempt to gather all the information that policy 12 requires? 13 A. So I would say that the information on the board is not 14 necessarily the information that was passed over on the 15 mobile phone. So I spoke to Jason and he confirmed that 16 everything -- all the information that needed to go 17 across was going across via phone. Whether the boards 18 have changed through the night, so whether some 19 information has been updated, changed or removed through 20 the course of the incident, I really couldn't give you 21 that information. 22 Q. Right. 23 It's clear from this that, although we get the floor 24 and the flat, we don't get location of caller within 25 premises and access point, which is one of the items of</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 129</p>	<p>1 A. As I mentioned previously, I gave Jason Oliff the task 2 of passing the fire survival guidance information to the 3 fire ground and recording the information on the board 4 that control was passing over to him. 5 Q. Right. 6 Let me work this through by means of an example, and 7 it is just an example, if I can. 8 Flat 194. If you take the clutch of documents that 9 you produce -- we looked at this morning -- the bits of 10 paper you gathered up at the end of the night and you 11 put in the envelope and you then gave to the police, 12 I just want to show you two of those. 13 MET00017390, page 10, and that says next to 194, 14 "22nd heavy s", which must be smoke. Okay? 15 Then there's another document like this referring to 16 flat 194, at page 19, if we can just go to that. Same 17 Relativity document, page 19: 18 "Flat 194 - 22nd floor. No reply from friend." 19 Now, in fact, there were three calls made in respect 20 of that flat to control. 21 Then when you look at the whiteboard for that flat 22 on the left-hand whiteboard, 194, you get: 23 "22nd flr -- Heavy smoke. 1 adult." 24 It looks as if -- well, it's hard to tell where one 25 adult comes from because we haven't seen the reference</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 131</p>
<p>1 information to be gathered and sent to the incident. 2 That's right, isn't it? Just looking at the 3 whiteboard, you don't get that. 4 A. If you were to take what's written on the board, yes. 5 Q. Nor do we get proximity to fire, if known. 6 A. If that's the information that control would normally 7 gather. 8 Q. Right. Nor indeed the latest advice given by control or 9 the time of the FSG call or the update? 10 A. Sorry, could you repeat that? 11 Q. Nor the latest advice given by control. You don't get 12 that. 13 A. I still -- sorry. 14 Q. So we don't see from the whiteboard either that we get 15 the latest advice given to the caller by control? 16 A. Yes. Like I say, I can't tell you why or what advice or 17 what was written on the board. The information came 18 across on the pieces of paper and then the board was 19 used as a recording process to say what information had 20 gone or that the flat had actually been sent across. 21 Q. What instruction did you give to Jason Oliff to record 22 the detail of any given call, such as fire coming 23 through the window, thickness of smoke, occupants unable 24 to breathe? What general instruction did you give him 25 to record that?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 130</p>	<p>1 to one adult in the pieces of paper. 2 The first question I suppose I have to ask you 3 is: do you think the pieces of paper were complete when 4 you swept them up and put them in the envelope? 5 A. No, I would certainly say that I didn't gather -- that 6 was just the pieces of paper that I managed to locate by 7 the board, so I couldn't confirm that that was all the 8 pieces. Definitely not. 9 Q. So can you help us with where Jason Oliff got the one 10 adult from? 11 A. No, I can't -- I can't. 12 Q. Okay. 13 On the piece of paper on the right of the screen you 14 see: "No reply from friend". That looks like some new 15 information. It doesn't look like it's recorded on the 16 whiteboard against that flat. 17 A. So -- 18 Q. Can you help with that about why that might be? 19 A. I mean, I wasn't privy to seeing all these pieces of 20 paper. I wasn't standing by the board and putting the 21 information on the board. And so the board was 22 continuously updated, information was coming across, and 23 as I said, I had other roles and other jobs that I was 24 dealing with at the time. Jason Oliff being sort of 25 allocated that role, he's a station manager, he's</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 132</p>

<p>1 a competent station manager, and I would've expected him 2 to perform that role.</p> <p>3 Q. If that was the totality of the information about 4 flat 194 -- and it is only an example -- by Jason Oliff, 5 based on the two pieces of paper we've seen, is it the 6 case that control was not gathering all of the 7 information and relaying it through Jason Oliff to the 8 command unit?</p> <p>9 A. I can't answer that question for you, can I?</p> <p>10 Q. Do you think that the gathering of information -- let me 11 ask it this way: what instruction did you give to 12 Jason Oliff to ensure that all the information in 13 accordance with policy should be gathered and recorded?</p> <p>14 A. So as I mentioned previously, I gave Jason a brief, 15 asked him to gather the information that control passed 16 across to put onto the dry whiteboard and to make sure 17 all the information went across to the fire ground 18 directly.</p> <p>19 Now, the board could've changed, the information 20 could've changed through the night, there could've been 21 additional pieces of paper. I was in multiple locations 22 with multiple roles and multiple decisions to make, and 23 I did not stand by the board for the duration of that 24 night --</p> <p>25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Can I ask you this: when you gave</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 133</p>	<p>1 came from the fire ground, apart from where I mention in 2 the 15th floor.</p> <p>3 Q. Yes.</p> <p>4 A. That crews were struggling to get past the 15th floor.</p> <p>5 Q. That you say came from control or Jason Oliff.</p> <p>6 A. Yes, via the incident ground.</p> <p>7 Q. Right. Do you know who it was on the incident ground 8 who sent that information into the control room?</p> <p>9 A. It would've come -- I take the assumption from the 10 command unit, so all information or all correspondence 11 will go via command unit to control.</p> <p>12 Q. Did you take steps to ask Jason Oliff, or anybody else 13 in the control room, to press the incident ground for 14 what was happening operationally at the incident ground?</p> <p>15 A. Not at the time. So I would have -- I was waiting -- or 16 an informative message is the way that we give updates 17 on the incident ground, so I would have expected 18 an informative message to come back from the incident 19 ground to give us an update.</p> <p>20 Q. Would an informative message system be useful or 21 appropriate given the volume of fire survival guidance 22 calls and the number of people in the building needing 23 assistance?</p> <p>24 A. So an informative on the night, I would suggest that 25 everyone was fully engaged in operations, and to have</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 135</p>
<p>1 the instructions to Mr Oliff --</p> <p>2 A. Yes.</p> <p>3 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: -- did you tell him to check that 4 the information he got from the control room operators 5 covered all the heads of information that the policy 6 suggests they should have included?</p> <p>7 A. So the control operators weren't bringing the pieces of 8 paper --</p> <p>9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: No, my question is: did you give him 10 instructions to check up on the control operators --</p> <p>11 A. No. No, I didn't. I wouldn't have asked Jason to 12 double check with control because my expectation is that 13 the right information would have been coming across, 14 otherwise that would have caused a further delay with 15 another double-checking the information -- so you would 16 have the information going one way and then you'll be 17 checking back going the other way before you're relaying 18 the information across.</p> <p>19 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, thank you.</p> <p>20 MR MILLETT: Now, this is the system to record information 21 coming or going to the incident ground.</p> <p>22 A. Yes.</p> <p>23 Q. Do you know what, if any, information was coming from 24 the incident ground?</p> <p>25 A. I was not made aware of any update or information that</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 134</p>	<p>1 time to formulate or get that message back -- and I am 2 surmising because I wasn't on the incident ground -- it 3 took time before the incident commander was in 4 a position to send that back.</p> <p>5 Q. We have in the short incident log an example of 6 an informative message. I'll just show it to you?</p> <p>7 A. Yes.</p> <p>8 Q. It's tab 23, page 23, of the short incident log.</p> <p>9 This is, I think, the third informative message we 10 have on the night, the second one being about 11 Group Manager Welch.</p> <p>12 But at 02.42.03, "Informative", and there you can 13 see it, it's a list of I suppose events or facts.</p> <p>14 "SUP CUB FROM DAC OLOUGHLIN A RESIDENTIAL BLOCK OF 15 FLATS 27 FLOORS 25M X 25M FIRE ON ALL FLOORS FROM 2ND TO 16 27TH FLOOR LARGE NUMBER OF PERSONS INVOLVED FSG CALLS 17 BEING DEALT WITH MAJOR INCIDENT DECLARED HIGH RISE 18 PROCEDURE IMPLEMENTED TL ALP EDDBA MAIN CONTROL FSG 19 GROUND MONITOR 5 JETS SAFETY CORDEN[sic] IN PLACE 20 TACTICAL MODE OSCAR."</p> <p>21 Now, as a summary of everything, someone like you 22 would be able to interpret that, how useful would 23 an informative message like that as a system of 24 communication be in order for the incident ground 25 properly and fully to tell control what was happening in</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 136</p>

<p>1 respect of each fire survival guidance call?</p> <p>2 A. For the number of calls that we had on the night,</p> <p>3 I think that would've been -- I don't think that that</p> <p>4 would have been feasible for them. The fire survival</p> <p>5 guidance calls were coming in so thick and fast that</p> <p>6 I don't think there would be an opportunity for them to</p> <p>7 give us an update. And like I say, I wasn't on the</p> <p>8 incident ground, so I am only making -- surmising what</p> <p>9 position they would've been in on the incident ground.</p> <p>10 Q. Putting yourself in the shoes and using your experience</p> <p>11 of being an operational officer on the incident ground,</p> <p>12 did you have any thoughts on the night as to what sort</p> <p>13 of information you as an incident commander would have</p> <p>14 wanted control to know about fire survival guidance in</p> <p>15 progress?</p> <p>16 A. To be honest, at the time and on the night, that wasn't</p> <p>17 a thought -- we was so busy just dealing with the</p> <p>18 incoming calls and the number of calls coming in that</p> <p>19 I just don't think anyone had time to even step back and</p> <p>20 think of anything else apart from dealing with what was</p> <p>21 coming in to us. The amount of information and the</p> <p>22 amount of calls coming in to control was just</p> <p>23 relentless.</p> <p>24 Q. Certainly.</p> <p>25 My question really is this: you have operational</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 137</p>	<p>1 of communication and saying, "Get me the incident</p> <p>2 commander, I want to know what's happening with the</p> <p>3 crews"?</p> <p>4 A. So it wouldn't be appropriate for me in my role to</p> <p>5 contact the incident commander on the incident ground.</p> <p>6 So there is a commander chain, and how the command chain</p> <p>7 works: the incident deals with the incident; my role,</p> <p>8 where I am remote in the BCC and in control, it's not</p> <p>9 for me to contact the incident commander direct.</p> <p>10 An incident commander has many spans of control,</p> <p>11 loads of information coming in. If remote officers</p> <p>12 start phoning the incident commander, that's going to</p> <p>13 detract him from what he's trying to deal with on the</p> <p>14 incident ground.</p> <p>15 And I wouldn't use the Airwave radio to contact the</p> <p>16 incident commander because that would block the Airwave</p> <p>17 for further traffic going on.</p> <p>18 So control have, I believe, an alert that comes up</p> <p>19 on their system, which would then tell them to ask the</p> <p>20 incident ground for an informative or an update.</p> <p>21 Q. Did you not ask yourself how it was that control room</p> <p>22 operators could accurately advise callers without</p> <p>23 actually knowing what was going on on the incident</p> <p>24 ground at the time?</p> <p>25 A. So at the time, we were dealing with the information</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 139</p>
<p>1 experience, and you told us a number of times not really</p> <p>2 control room experience, but from an operational point</p> <p>3 of view, being in the control room, did it occur to you</p> <p>4 at any time to think to yourself, "I need to know what's</p> <p>5 going on on the ground so that I can tell the staff in</p> <p>6 the control room to tell the callers what's happening"?</p> <p>7 A. So, yes, I was after a visual picture of what was</p> <p>8 happening on the incident ground, so that's why I went</p> <p>9 down to look at the monitor screen in the BCC to get</p> <p>10 that visual overview of what was happening on the</p> <p>11 incident ground.</p> <p>12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That's not really your question, is</p> <p>13 it, Mr Millett? You are really asking Mr Fenton to</p> <p>14 imagine that you are the incident commander, imagine you</p> <p>15 were on the ground, what information you would like the</p> <p>16 control room to have to help them do their job properly.</p> <p>17 A. So in an ideal world, I would've, as an incident</p> <p>18 commander -- yes, I would've liked control to have</p> <p>19 an update on where all the fire survival guidance calls</p> <p>20 were. I can't say how the incident ground or where the</p> <p>21 incident ground was to be able to do that or not do</p> <p>22 that.</p> <p>23 MR MILLETT: Instead of waiting to receive informative</p> <p>24 messages such as that, what was to stop you thinking in</p> <p>25 that way, using your Airwave radio or some other means</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 138</p>	<p>1 that had come in and, like I say, it wasn't for me to</p> <p>2 start prompting the incident ground for an update on</p> <p>3 where we were on the incident. At the time, we were,</p> <p>4 like I said, just inundated with information coming in,</p> <p>5 so we were dealing with that.</p> <p>6 Q. You say it wasn't for you; who was it for?</p> <p>7 A. That would be for the monitoring officer or via control.</p> <p>8 Q. Who was the monitoring officer? Do you mean the</p> <p>9 monitoring officer on the incident ground?</p> <p>10 A. On the fire ground, so to ensure that the right</p> <p>11 information is coming back.</p> <p>12 Q. So was your way of thinking to leave it to them to</p> <p>13 volunteer the information to you?</p> <p>14 A. No, because it wasn't something that crossed my mind at</p> <p>15 the time, as I said, because we were so busy dealing</p> <p>16 with what we were dealing with at the time. So it's not</p> <p>17 a consideration that crossed my mind at the time.</p> <p>18 Q. You were very busy sending information to the fire</p> <p>19 ground; did you not want to know what was happening to</p> <p>20 it?</p> <p>21 A. Yes, and that is -- I went down and, like I said, I was</p> <p>22 trying to gather a visual picture myself to get</p> <p>23 an understanding of what was happening on the incident</p> <p>24 ground.</p> <p>25 Q. That's a visual picture that you looked at on the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 140</p>

<p>1 television downstairs in the control room.</p> <p>2 A. Yes.</p> <p>3 Q. But that would have given you a visual picture of, what,</p> <p>4 the outside of the building?</p> <p>5 A. Yes.</p> <p>6 Q. What would it have told you about the smoke, fire and</p> <p>7 heat conditions within the building?</p> <p>8 A. No, it wouldn't have given me that information.</p> <p>9 Q. That information could only, couldn't it, have come from</p> <p>10 the incident ground?</p> <p>11 A. So, yeah, I didn't ask the incident ground and we didn't</p> <p>12 ask the incident ground for that information.</p> <p>13 Q. Really the question I think I have is: why, given that</p> <p>14 you were interested to know what the building looked</p> <p>15 like from the outside, weren't you interested to pursue</p> <p>16 detailed information from the incident ground as to what</p> <p>17 was happening on the inside?</p> <p>18 A. As I said, at the time, I can only say that we were</p> <p>19 tasked-orientated with what was happening and that</p> <p>20 wasn't something that crossed my mind at that time.</p> <p>21 Q. Having been told that the crews couldn't access the</p> <p>22 building above the 15th floor, did you seek to find out</p> <p>23 why that was?</p> <p>24 A. So we were told that crews couldn't get above the 15th</p> <p>25 floor, and that is the actual time and period that me</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 141</p>	<p>1 flat on the same floor or on a different floor. Suppose</p> <p>2 that had happened. Was there a system in place by which</p> <p>3 the control room could be updated as to the physical</p> <p>4 location of that person?</p> <p>5 A. So yet again you're asking me a question -- I wasn't</p> <p>6 involved in that process. So, yes, if the fire ground</p> <p>7 came back or the control got told that there was</p> <p>8 a change of the advice -- change of the location,</p> <p>9 I would've expected that to go from the control operator</p> <p>10 to Jason Oliff to put up on the board and relay that</p> <p>11 information back to the fire ground.</p> <p>12 Q. You would've expected that, but did you give Jason Oliff</p> <p>13 instructions to tell the incident ground that that is</p> <p>14 what they should be telling him?</p> <p>15 A. So I wouldn't expect to tell Jason Oliff. He's</p> <p>16 a qualified station manager and I'd expect him to</p> <p>17 perform that role. So he would've gone to the -- he</p> <p>18 would've given that information across.</p> <p>19 Q. Right.</p> <p>20 Was there a system -- I'm talking generically -- in</p> <p>21 the control room with the whiteboard</p> <p>22 information-recording to record movements of individual</p> <p>23 occupants from one place in the building to another?</p> <p>24 A. So as I said, if the information came to Jason, and it</p> <p>25 was changed, I would expect Jason to have updated or</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 143</p>
<p>1 and Jo had that discussion and we discussed changing the</p> <p>2 stay put.</p> <p>3 Q. Yes. My question was: did you seek to find out why</p> <p>4 crews couldn't access the building above the 15th floor?</p> <p>5 A. So I took the assumption they couldn't access any</p> <p>6 further because of the fire itself.</p> <p>7 Q. You assumed that, but did you not take steps actually to</p> <p>8 ask the question of those who were present on the</p> <p>9 incident ground?</p> <p>10 A. No.</p> <p>11 Q. Why is that?</p> <p>12 A. It didn't come across -- it didn't come to me to ask</p> <p>13 that question at the time.</p> <p>14 Q. Assuming that it was the fire, as you call it, would</p> <p>15 that mean -- just thinking about it -- fire in the</p> <p>16 stairwell itself, in the means of escape?</p> <p>17 A. So we were told that they couldn't get through above the</p> <p>18 15th floor because of the heat and smoke. That's as far</p> <p>19 as the information I had come back from the incident</p> <p>20 ground at the time.</p> <p>21 Q. You didn't seek to interrogate it?</p> <p>22 A. I didn't pursue it, no.</p> <p>23 Q. Can I just ask you a specific question.</p> <p>24 Supposing a resident had called from a particular</p> <p>25 flat but then had been moved by fire crews into another</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 142</p>	<p>1 changed the board and relayed that information back to</p> <p>2 the incident ground.</p> <p>3 Q. Right.</p> <p>4 Can I then ask you to look at page 7 of your</p> <p>5 statement. A third of the way down, you say:</p> <p>6 "Whilst I was in the BCC when Steve was setting it</p> <p>7 up, I saw that the television was switched on. It was</p> <p>8 the first time that I had a visual picture of the tower</p> <p>9 from Sky News. One side of the tower was fully engulfed</p> <p>10 in fire, with flames coming outside the windows. It had</p> <p>11 escalated from a flat fire to a building fire very</p> <p>12 quickly."</p> <p>13 The television was switched on; was it on when you</p> <p>14 arrived?</p> <p>15 A. No, it wasn't on when I arrived, but when I came down to</p> <p>16 the BCC to check on Steve to see how he was getting on</p> <p>17 setting up, that's when he had Sky News on.</p> <p>18 Q. Did he put it on, do you think?</p> <p>19 A. I take the assumption he put it on. I don't know who</p> <p>20 actually turned it on down there.</p> <p>21 Q. Okay.</p> <p>22 Now, just to get a time point on that, Steve -- this</p> <p>23 is Steve Leader --</p> <p>24 A. Yes.</p> <p>25 Q. -- I'm assuming Steve Leader, he I think arrived at</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 144</p>

<p>1 control -- do you know when he arrived?</p> <p>2 A. I've put a time in my statement. I couldn't be specific</p> <p>3 where that time came from, so ...</p> <p>4 Q. Yes. No need to go back to it, but at the bottom of</p> <p>5 page 6, you say:</p> <p>6 "At 0230 hours Steve LEADER arrived at</p> <p>7 Stratford ..."</p> <p>8 So I'm assuming that that's right.</p> <p>9 Did you look at the television only after he</p> <p>10 arrived, ie only after 02.30?</p> <p>11 A. It would've been after -- it would've been when Steve</p> <p>12 was down there, yes.</p> <p>13 Q. Right. Okay.</p> <p>14 So we can pinpoint reasonably well the time at which</p> <p>15 you saw what you saw on the television?</p> <p>16 A. Pretty much.</p> <p>17 Q. Yes.</p> <p>18 Now, you say it was fully engulfed in fire and had</p> <p>19 escalated from a flat fire to a building fire very</p> <p>20 quickly.</p> <p>21 When you saw the television, is that the first time</p> <p>22 you were aware of those things?</p> <p>23 A. I was very surprised to see the external envelope of the</p> <p>24 building, the amount that was alight. I've never in my</p> <p>25 career seen a fire travel or move that fast around the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 145</p>	<p>1 information that Jo was giving me with her side of the</p> <p>2 amount of fire survival guidance coming in, and she also</p> <p>3 mentioned the length of call.</p> <p>4 Q. Right.</p> <p>5 Now, you go on in your statement:</p> <p>6 "At that time there had not been an informative</p> <p>7 message from the incident ground."</p> <p>8 Just going back to the short incident log, we can</p> <p>9 see the informative -- we looked at it a minute ago on</p> <p>10 page 23 -- coming in at 02.42.03.</p> <p>11 So can we pinpoint this discussion with Jo Smith you</p> <p>12 had about stay put at between 02.30, which is when</p> <p>13 Steve Leader arrives, you say in your statement, and</p> <p>14 02.42?</p> <p>15 A. Yes.</p> <p>16 Q. That 12-minute period?</p> <p>17 A. I would suggest so, yes.</p> <p>18 Q. That's very helpful.</p> <p>19 So you then go on to say:</p> <p>20 "Joanne is experienced in FSG calls and has</p> <p>21 experience from the Lakanal fire, so I asked for her</p> <p>22 advice and views."</p> <p>23 That's how it was, was it, you said to her --</p> <p>24 A. Joanne's a very experienced control operator, has worked</p> <p>25 in control a long time. I know she had involvement in</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 147</p>
<p>1 external envelope of a building.</p> <p>2 Q. You say very surprised; do you mean you were surprised</p> <p>3 at the -- do you mean that this was, as it were,</p> <p>4 a career first, experience first, or were you surprised</p> <p>5 that you'd not been told before that of the</p> <p>6 conditions --</p> <p>7 A. No, it was a career first for me to see -- at this stage</p> <p>8 I probably -- I think I have only been probably there</p> <p>9 5 minutes or just recently arrived.</p> <p>10 Q. You then go on to say in the next paragraph:</p> <p>11 "I went back up to the control room and told Joanne</p> <p>12 Smith what I had seen on the television, with it showing</p> <p>13 the tower fully engulfed in fire. We also had the</p> <p>14 information that the crews were unable to go above the</p> <p>15 15th floor."</p> <p>16 You then go on to say -- and we'll come to it in</p> <p>17 some more detail in a minute -- that you changed the</p> <p>18 stay-put advice.</p> <p>19 Is it what you saw on the television that</p> <p>20 effectively operated on your mind to agree with her to</p> <p>21 change the advice?</p> <p>22 A. It was a combination. So it was that crews couldn't get</p> <p>23 past the 15th floor; it was my pictorial view and</p> <p>24 understanding of what was actually happening on the</p> <p>25 incident ground, being remote; and also with the</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 146</p>	<p>1 the Lakanal fire and had involvement with fire survival</p> <p>2 guidance calls at that time. With it being her</p> <p>3 environment, I was after her experience and her</p> <p>4 understanding, coupled with the information that I was</p> <p>5 also bringing.</p> <p>6 Q. Okay.</p> <p>7 You go on to say:</p> <p>8 "Following a discussion around what I saw on the TV,</p> <p>9 the information on the crews unable to get above the</p> <p>10 15th and the large number of FSG calls being taken by</p> <p>11 control, we both agreed that the advice needed to be</p> <p>12 changed. It was at that point the advice changed."</p> <p>13 Now, just in terms of those three ingredients,</p> <p>14 discussion around what you saw on the TV, information on</p> <p>15 the crews being unable to get above the 15th and large</p> <p>16 number of FSG calls, let's just take each of those, as</p> <p>17 it were, in reverse order.</p> <p>18 Is it right that you knew about the large number of</p> <p>19 FSG calls when you arrived?</p> <p>20 A. So I knew, yes, that there was fire survival guidance</p> <p>21 calls.</p> <p>22 Q. So you already knew that.</p> <p>23 You told us earlier that the information on the</p> <p>24 crews being unable to get above the 15th floor was</p> <p>25 something that you learnt pretty soon after arrival, if</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 148</p>

<p>1 not on arrival; is that right?</p> <p>2 A. Yes, it's pretty close to my arrival.</p> <p>3 Q. Pretty close to arrival.</p> <p>4 So would it follow, then, that it was what you saw</p> <p>5 on the TV that tipped you over the edge, as it were, to</p> <p>6 go to Jo Smith and say, "What is your advice on stay</p> <p>7 put?"</p> <p>8 A. So it was the catalogue of all of these informations</p> <p>9 coming together, and the final part was the pictorial</p> <p>10 view of the incident, and that's when I went straight</p> <p>11 upstairs, back from the BCC, to speak to Jo in control</p> <p>12 and that's where we had that discussion.</p> <p>13 Q. My question really is: was seeing what you saw on the TV</p> <p>14 the influencing factor that led you to go and seek her</p> <p>15 advice?</p> <p>16 A. For me, as an operational officer, that pictorial view,</p> <p>17 yes.</p> <p>18 Q. So without seeing the television view of the tower on</p> <p>19 fire, would you have gone back to Jo Smith and said,</p> <p>20 "I think we need to change the advice" or "What's your</p> <p>21 advice about the stay-put advice?"</p> <p>22 A. I don't know. I can't answer that question. I mean,</p> <p>23 that's the events that happened on the night.</p> <p>24 Q. Really I am asking you the same question a different</p> <p>25 way: is seeing what you saw on the television something</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 149</p>	<p>1 "It was at that point the advice changed. On making</p> <p>2 the decision, Joanne went around the control room and</p> <p>3 told all the Control Room Officers of the change in</p> <p>4 advice, and to tell people to get out of the tower."</p> <p>5 First of all, is that sentence describing the change</p> <p>6 in advice?</p> <p>7 A. No, that's probably how I've written that. What advice</p> <p>8 Jo told her control operators -- I don't know the exact</p> <p>9 advice what she's told them. So she went round and</p> <p>10 dealt with -- and I think Alex Norman was with us or</p> <p>11 involved at that time as well, so I think between Jo and</p> <p>12 Alex -- the control operators are their staff, so they</p> <p>13 would've gone round the room and spoken to their staff.</p> <p>14 Q. Right.</p> <p>15 Do you remember calling the incident ground about</p> <p>16 whether or not to change the advice?</p> <p>17 A. So I know on the night I made absolute numerous phone</p> <p>18 calls, coming in and going out, and I do have a memory</p> <p>19 of calling the fire ground and asking the fire ground</p> <p>20 how they felt about changing the advice, and they</p> <p>21 agreed. And when I say "they", unfortunately I honestly</p> <p>22 can't remember who I called and who I spoke to, but</p> <p>23 I would suggest it would have been CU8, which is the</p> <p>24 command unit on that night.</p> <p>25 Q. CU8, not CU7?</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 151</p>
<p>1 that made all the difference?</p> <p>2 A. Yes, for me, to have that pictorial view, yes.</p> <p>3 Q. Now, Joanne Smith gave evidence and she says that it was</p> <p>4 she who made the decision to change the policy and</p> <p>5 change the stay-put advice. Do you remember that?</p> <p>6 A. So we had a discussion, and we mutually discussed the</p> <p>7 information that we both had together and we both agreed</p> <p>8 that the advice needs to be changed. I suppose you</p> <p>9 could say in her role in charge of control, that's her</p> <p>10 role and decision to be made.</p> <p>11 Q. Right.</p> <p>12 A. I helped come to that conclusion. I would suggest that</p> <p>13 my information and advice helped come to the final</p> <p>14 decision.</p> <p>15 Q. Right. What advice did you give her?</p> <p>16 A. As we've just said, about the 15th floor, about having</p> <p>17 the view of -- my overall view. So that was the</p> <p>18 information we just discussed.</p> <p>19 Q. Did you know whether Jo Smith knew or didn't know about</p> <p>20 the 15th floor?</p> <p>21 A. I can't honestly remember. I mean, I mentioned it to</p> <p>22 her. Whether she was aware of that or not aware of that</p> <p>23 at that time, I can't remember the conversation.</p> <p>24 Q. Right. Okay.</p> <p>25 You then say:</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 150</p>	<p>1 A. No. So CU7 would've been dealing with the FSGs. That</p> <p>2 information was still relayed to CU7; however, to start</p> <p>3 with, it would've been a discussion I would want to have</p> <p>4 with the incident commander.</p> <p>5 Whether I spoke to the incident commander direct --</p> <p>6 I would suggest not, but I may be told different by</p> <p>7 phone records, I'm not sure. But my memory is, and what</p> <p>8 protocol would be is for us to speak to the command</p> <p>9 unit, who the incident commander is on, so that it keeps</p> <p>10 the spans of control and the phones not ringing of the</p> <p>11 incident commander, so the command unit would pass that</p> <p>12 information straight to the incident commander.</p> <p>13 Otherwise the incident commander could be inundated with</p> <p>14 phone calls from numerous external staff asking for</p> <p>15 information.</p> <p>16 Q. Right.</p> <p>17 Now, there is some evidence that the inquiry has</p> <p>18 received which we haven't yet looked at --</p> <p>19 A. Yes.</p> <p>20 Q. -- from a Group Manager Stephen West.</p> <p>21 First of all, do you recall the involvement or any</p> <p>22 involvement of Group Manager West on the night of the</p> <p>23 fire?</p> <p>24 A. I don't remember speaking to Steve West. I do know</p> <p>25 Steve West but, as I say -- I can only apologise. The</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 152</p>

<p>1 amount of phone calls I had that night, I can't sit here 2 and recollect and go through every single conversation. 3 It must have been in the hundreds, the amount of phone 4 calls I received.</p> <p>5 Q. No, I understand, and this is not a memory test.</p> <p>6 A. Yes.</p> <p>7 Q. But let me see if I can just jog your memory a little 8 bit more.</p> <p>9 A. Okay.</p> <p>10 Q. Group Manager West recalls, or says he recalls -- we'll 11 obviously have to explore this with him when he comes to 12 give evidence, if he comes -- that he took a call from 13 you seeking permission from the commissioner -- the 14 actual commissioner, Dany Cotton -- to change the 15 stay-put advice. That's what he remembers. Do you 16 remember that?</p> <p>17 A. I don't remember that call, but I'm not saying that call 18 didn't happen, I just unfortunately can't bring that 19 back to memory.</p> <p>20 Q. Right. He says -- again, this may trigger something, or 21 maybe not -- he was in a meeting with the commissioner, 22 Assistant Commissioner Roe and some other people when he 23 took that call. Does that help you remember?</p> <p>24 A. Like I say, there's just so many numerous calls on the 25 night and I'm pretty sure that did happen, but</p> <p>Page 153</p>	<p>1 incident ground. I told Jason Oliff to ensure that that 2 went across to the CU that he was dealing with.</p> <p>3 Q. Right.</p> <p>4 A. And also I spoke to AC Richard Mills, who was in the 5 commissioner's group -- which is not on the incident 6 ground, by the way, is at headquarters -- and to make 7 sure that he was aware so he could inform the 8 commissioner's group that that is the decision that had 9 been taken.</p> <p>10 Q. Right.</p> <p>11 A. Sorry, a lot of information there, but just that's my 12 recollection of ...</p> <p>13 Q. So you had your own call, did you, with Richard Mills?</p> <p>14 A. So I spoke to Richard Mills. Richard Mills and I spoke 15 continuously throughout the night, he was ringing me, 16 I was ringing him. Whether it just happened that he 17 rang me at that time and I said, "By the way, I was 18 about to ring you, this is what's happening", or it was 19 a specific call that I rang him -- like I say, I think 20 I had over 100 phone calls coming in and out that night, 21 and to recall individual ones, unfortunately, before 22 3 o'clock, where I started to have a loggist, is 23 difficult.</p> <p>24 Q. Where was Richard Mills based throughout the night when 25 you were speaking to him?</p> <p>Page 155</p>
<p>1 unfortunately there are parts of the evening or morning 2 that I just can't remember, the amount of calls coming 3 in and going out.</p> <p>4 Q. All right.</p> <p>5 Well, let's see, we may be able to use your 6 statement for this. If you go back to page 7 of your 7 statement and look at the paragraph you were looking at 8 before, two-thirds of the way down the page this time. 9 After your reference to Joanne going around the control 10 room, you say:</p> <p>11 "At the same time, I asked a control operator to 12 speak to the incident ground via radio to inform them 13 that the advice from control and Duty DAC [that's you] 14 was that we need to change the stay put advice."</p> <p>15 Now, that's what you've put in your statement.</p> <p>16 A. Yes.</p> <p>17 Q. So you do have a recollection about that communication, 18 at least, do you?</p> <p>19 A. So, yes, when me and Joanne came to that decision, there 20 were -- I know I spoke to the incident ground, but 21 I can't confirm that it was Steve West and I can't 22 confirm who that was. I did ask a radio operator -- and 23 I think it was Peter May, but I can't be 100 per cent 24 because I was standing quite close to him at the time -- 25 to make sure that information went across to the</p> <p>Page 154</p>	<p>1 A. He was at headquarters, in the commissioner's group.</p> <p>2 Q. Okay. How did you speak to him? What mechanism?</p> <p>3 A. Mobile phone. His mobile and my mobile phone.</p> <p>4 Q. Brigade mobiles?</p> <p>5 A. Yes.</p> <p>6 Q. Those calls, would they be recorded?</p> <p>7 A. No.</p> <p>8 Q. So you spoke to him.</p> <p>9 You say, at the bottom of the page -- and I am going 10 to come back to the paragraph above it in a moment:</p> <p>11 "The information was then relayed onto Assistant 12 Commissioner Andy Roe by the Command Unit. I have found 13 out since that Andy Roe made the same decision at a 14 similar time, but that information did not come to me on 15 the night of the fire. The decision to change advice 16 between myself, Joanne and Andy must have been within 17 minutes of each other."</p> <p>18 Just on relaying it, how was the information relayed 19 to Assistant Commissioner Roe?</p> <p>20 A. So, as I mentioned before, I would suggest -- and 21 I believe it's through the -- it would've been through 22 the conversation I had with Charlie Uniform 8 and 23 through speaking to the operator. Whether it was 24 Steve West, who was a group manager and was on the 25 command unit, or whether it had been the command unit</p> <p>Page 156</p>

<p>1 operative, I couldn't confirm.</p> <p>2 Q. Apart from speaking to Richard Mills about the change in</p> <p>3 stay-put advice, is there anybody else outside the</p> <p>4 control room you spoke to about that change?</p> <p>5 A. No, apart from the control operator to send the</p> <p>6 information, I spoke to CU8, the command unit, I spoke</p> <p>7 to Jason Oliff for it to go to CU7, and Richard Mills.</p> <p>8 So I would suggest at that point they were the four.</p> <p>9 Q. So when you say, "The information was then relayed onto</p> <p>10 Assistant Commissioner Andy Roe by the Command Unit", do</p> <p>11 you have first-hand knowledge of that or is that</p> <p>12 an assumption?</p> <p>13 A. No, that's an assumption, and once you get the</p> <p>14 information to the command unit, the command unit would</p> <p>15 relay that straight on to the incident commander.</p> <p>16 Q. Right.</p> <p>17 Before the actual final decision was taken to change</p> <p>18 the stay-put advice, was there any discussion with</p> <p>19 either Assistant Commissioner Roe or the commissioner's</p> <p>20 group about whether the advice should be changed?</p> <p>21 A. Not a conversation I had, no.</p> <p>22 Q. Was there a conversation that you knew about to that</p> <p>23 effect?</p> <p>24 A. No.</p> <p>25 Q. In a similar vein, did you or anybody else, to your</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 157</p>	<p>1 advice."</p> <p>2 Now, it looks from that that in fact the decision to</p> <p>3 change the advice is one made by the incident commander,</p> <p>4 but that it should be changed through liaison with the</p> <p>5 officer in charge in control.</p> <p>6 A. So, yes, when we communicated, we said the advice from</p> <p>7 control is that we're going to -- we want to change the</p> <p>8 stay-put policy and, as I say, the conversation I had</p> <p>9 with the command unit, the OIC at the time was</p> <p>10 comfortable with us doing that.</p> <p>11 Q. Right.</p> <p>12 A. So that was part of that conversation. That may be the</p> <p>13 conversation you mention with Steve West, but, like</p> <p>14 I say, I really can't confirm who I had that</p> <p>15 conversation with.</p> <p>16 Q. Right.</p> <p>17 So in the normal course of things, if you were</p> <p>18 following policy, is this right: that actually it would</p> <p>19 be for the incident commander to decide to change the</p> <p>20 stay-put advice --</p> <p>21 A. It says in exceptional circumstances.</p> <p>22 Q. Yes, yes, in normal exceptional circumstances --</p> <p>23 A. Yes.</p> <p>24 Q. -- if you see what I mean. In other words, exceptional</p> <p>25 circumstances contemplated by the policy, it would be</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 159</p>
<p>1 knowledge, have any discussions with Assistant</p> <p>2 Commissioner Roe or anybody else on the incident ground</p> <p>3 about how the change in advice would be communicated to</p> <p>4 people still in the building?</p> <p>5 A. No, not that I'm aware of.</p> <p>6 Apart from the information came from us in control</p> <p>7 and that the advice -- I believe the message was that we</p> <p>8 will be -- the advice from control is that we will be</p> <p>9 telling residents, if they can, to leave the building.</p> <p>10 Q. Did you know as a matter of policy whose ultimate</p> <p>11 decision it would be to change advice to FSG callers?</p> <p>12 A. I believe in 790 that's control's decision; however,</p> <p>13 an incident commander can make that decision in</p> <p>14 correspondence with control.</p> <p>15 Q. If you look at 790, if we can, just for a moment, see if</p> <p>16 this assists, it's at tab 5 of the policy bundle.</p> <p>17 I just want to look at paragraph 8 with you which you'll</p> <p>18 find on page 5. Looking at 8.7 it says:</p> <p>19 "In exceptional circumstances an IC may consider</p> <p>20 informing control that their advice to FSG callers</p> <p>21 should be altered e.g. to attempt to leave their</p> <p>22 property. The IC should remember that this advice may</p> <p>23 be contrary to National Policy for control staff on FSGs</p> <p>24 and liaison with the officer in charge at control will</p> <p>25 be required for agreement to change the prescriptive</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 158</p>	<p>1 for the incident commander to tell control that the</p> <p>2 advice should change, but that would then be done in</p> <p>3 liaison with control?</p> <p>4 A. Yes.</p> <p>5 Q. Yes. It wouldn't be for control to make that decision</p> <p>6 themselves.</p> <p>7 A. No, but, like I say, we spoke to the incident commander</p> <p>8 and they were happy with the advice that we were giving,</p> <p>9 that that was the decision to be made.</p> <p>10 Q. Right.</p> <p>11 Now, just finalising this particular run of</p> <p>12 questions, if you look at the bottom of page 7, you say:</p> <p>13 "I have found out since that Andy Roe made the same</p> <p>14 decision at a similar time, but that information did not</p> <p>15 come to me on the night of the fire."</p> <p>16 Can you tell us what you're referring to about</p> <p>17 Andy Roe's separate but identical decision?</p> <p>18 A. So after the incident, so this is several weeks after,</p> <p>19 after having a discussion with Andy Roe himself, that</p> <p>20 that decision was logged on the command unit and that he</p> <p>21 had already made -- he had made that decision himself as</p> <p>22 well. So that was information that I'd received after</p> <p>23 speaking to him direct.</p> <p>24 Q. Why have you concluded that it was the same decision at</p> <p>25 a similar time as opposed to him simply logging the</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 160</p>

<p>1 decision that he made based on your input?</p> <p>2 A. I have no specific timelines, I've no specific log for</p> <p>3 that period of time, and I just looked at what</p> <p>4 Andy Roe's done, what we done in control, and they seem</p> <p>5 at similar times. I'm not saying they were done exactly</p> <p>6 at the same time; I'm saying they were done at similar</p> <p>7 times.</p> <p>8 Whether when I made that phone call to CU8 and CU8</p> <p>9 had spoken to Andy Roe, then Andy Roe's agreed with that</p> <p>10 and said, "I'm in agreement" and made the same decision</p> <p>11 and it was logged -- but like I say, on the night, at</p> <p>12 the time, that -- this is information I received at</p> <p>13 a later date.</p> <p>14 Q. Right. You.</p> <p>15 Say seven lines up from the bottom of page 7:</p> <p>16 "This change in advice [which was the change in</p> <p>17 advice that you had taken in the control room] was</p> <p>18 logged on our command unit at 0247 hours."</p> <p>19 First of all, what do you mean by "our command</p> <p>20 unit"?</p> <p>21 A. Ours as in London Fire Brigade. Not correct -- probably</p> <p>22 good terminology. So CU, I would say I mean CU8.</p> <p>23 Q. So you are saying CU8. Right.</p> <p>24 How do you know that the change in advice was logged</p> <p>25 on at CU8 at 02.47?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 161</p>	<p>1 Looking at the short incident log at page 23, we can</p> <p>2 see that at 02.44.18 there's an informative message from</p> <p>3 CU8 that Assistant Commissioner Roe is now IC, but we</p> <p>4 don't see any message at 02.47 -- or indeed at all --</p> <p>5 about changing the FSG advice and departing from stay</p> <p>6 put.</p> <p>7 Do you know why that might be?</p> <p>8 A. No, I don't.</p> <p>9 Q. Do you know why the change would be logged or might be</p> <p>10 logged on CU8 by the personal loggist of AC Roe but not</p> <p>11 make its way onto the incident log?</p> <p>12 A. No. I mean, I wouldn't have been party to that</p> <p>13 conversation, so I'm not sure whether that information</p> <p>14 came back to control or whether that was logged on the</p> <p>15 command unit or whether that was -- how that information</p> <p>16 came across.</p> <p>17 Q. Now going back to your statement --</p> <p>18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Are we going to another topic?</p> <p>19 MR MILLETT: We're finishing off this one.</p> <p>20 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right.</p> <p>21 MR MILLETT: If that's all right, Mr Chairman. Can I just</p> <p>22 finish this off and we can take a short break, if that's</p> <p>23 all right.</p> <p>24 You say in the last sentence of that paragraph we</p> <p>25 were looking at on page 7 of your statement:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 163</p>
<p>1 A. Because that was a conversation that I'd had after the</p> <p>2 incident before making my statement.</p> <p>3 Q. Where did you get the time, 02.47, from, do you know?</p> <p>4 A. No. I can't remember exactly where that --</p> <p>5 Q. Did somebody tell you that?</p> <p>6 A. Sorry?</p> <p>7 Q. Did somebody tell you?</p> <p>8 A. Yes, somebody's told me that it was logged on the</p> <p>9 command unit at 02.47. So whether -- I'm not sure where</p> <p>10 or what time -- who gave me that information.</p> <p>11 Q. Where would it be logged on the command unit?</p> <p>12 A. I would suggest by Andy Roe's personal loggist, if he</p> <p>13 had a loggist on the --</p> <p>14 Q. Did you know about a personal loggist?</p> <p>15 A. I knew he had a loggist. Obviously, speaking to</p> <p>16 officers, I know some of the roles that some of the</p> <p>17 officers played or took part in after the incident.</p> <p>18 Q. Did you see the log created by his loggist?</p> <p>19 A. No, no.</p> <p>20 Q. Did you know the name of his loggist?</p> <p>21 A. No, I don't.</p> <p>22 Q. Does the name Jackie McConochie ring any bells?</p> <p>23 A. I know a Jackie McConochie, but I wouldn't know if she</p> <p>24 was the loggist or not on the night.</p> <p>25 Q. You didn't, right, okay.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 162</p>	<p>1 "I do feel that the actual decision in control was</p> <p>2 made earlier [than 02.47] but there was a delay in</p> <p>3 recording this decision due to communications with the</p> <p>4 Command Unit (radio traffic and logging)."</p> <p>5 Do you remember there being a delay between your</p> <p>6 discussion and decision as between you and Jo Smith and</p> <p>7 speaking to the command unit about stay put and changing</p> <p>8 it?</p> <p>9 A. No. So the discussion I had with Joanne Smith I know</p> <p>10 was quite shortly after I arrived at control. So 02.47</p> <p>11 is in my memory far too late in the timings of where</p> <p>12 I came. Where I say a delay in recording this decision</p> <p>13 due to communications, it's just purely by the time me</p> <p>14 and Jo have had this conversation, then I've spoken to</p> <p>15 the control operator, then -- or spoken to the command</p> <p>16 unit, by the time the information has gone through the</p> <p>17 relevant -- that's the delay in the communications,</p> <p>18 I mean ...</p> <p>19 Q. Right.</p> <p>20 We put the conversation earlier when you and I were</p> <p>21 discussing this between 02.30 and you seeing</p> <p>22 Steve Leader and the television being on downstairs, and</p> <p>23 02.42, which was the informative message, so that</p> <p>24 12-minute period, which is then when you had the</p> <p>25 discussion.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 164</p>

<p>1 If the decision really was logged at 02.47 on CU8 as</p> <p>2 you say, then the delay would've been no more than</p> <p>3 5 minutes.</p> <p>4 A. It's possible.</p> <p>5 Q. Right. Okay.</p> <p>6 So we have the decision really down to, in terms of</p> <p>7 timing, sometime between 02.30 and 02.47?</p> <p>8 A. I would say, yes.</p> <p>9 Q. As the outer limits.</p> <p>10 A. That's the outer limits. I would say that's fairly</p> <p>11 accurate.</p> <p>12 MR MILLETT: Okay.</p> <p>13 Mr Chairman, is that a convenient moment?</p> <p>14 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, if it suits you.</p> <p>15 MR MILLETT: Yes.</p> <p>16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think we'll have a short break</p> <p>17 now, Mr Fenton. We'll return at 3.20. You have just</p> <p>18 over 10 minutes.</p> <p>19 Please don't talk to anyone about your evidence.</p> <p>20 All right?</p> <p>21 THE WITNESS: Thank you.</p> <p>22 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you would like to go with the</p> <p>23 usher.</p> <p>24 (The witness withdrew)</p> <p>25 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 165</p>	<p>1 So was your thinking that the stay-put advice needed</p> <p>2 to be changed, you needed the permission of the</p> <p>3 commissioner, but only the incident commander could seek</p> <p>4 it?</p> <p>5 A. No, I didn't say that I needed the permission of the</p> <p>6 commissioner; I said it would've been to seeked[sic] or</p> <p>7 done in conjunction with the incident commander.</p> <p>8 Q. Okay.</p> <p>9 So any decision to involve the commissioner in that</p> <p>10 decision, who would have made that decision?</p> <p>11 A. If --</p> <p>12 Q. That's a bad question, can I just rephrase the question.</p> <p>13 A. Yes.</p> <p>14 Q. Who would've been involved in any decision to involve</p> <p>15 the commissioner in the ultimate decision to change the</p> <p>16 stay-put advice?</p> <p>17 A. If it was to be escalated to the commissioner, it would</p> <p>18 have been the incident commander, who would have been</p> <p>19 AC Roe, so they would've had that discussion. But</p> <p>20 I don't remember having the conversation with the</p> <p>21 commissioner regarding the stay-put advice.</p> <p>22 Q. Do you remember any delay in being told, yes, the stay</p> <p>23 put has now changed, because of having to wait for an</p> <p>24 update from the incident ground?</p> <p>25 A. No, my recollection is that I had that conversation with</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 167</p>
<p>1 3.20, then, please</p> <p>2 (3.10 pm)</p> <p>3 (A short break)</p> <p>4 (3.20 pm)</p> <p>5 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman.</p> <p>6 (The witness returned)</p> <p>7 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Fenton?</p> <p>8 THE WITNESS: Yes.</p> <p>9 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Very good, thank you.</p> <p>10 Mr Millett, when you're ready.</p> <p>11 MR MILLETT: Yes, thank you, Mr Chairman.</p> <p>12 Mr Fenton, can I just ask you one or two little</p> <p>13 detailed questions.</p> <p>14 First of all, on the subject we were on a minute</p> <p>15 ago, do you remember seeking the commissioner's</p> <p>16 permission or agreement to change the stay-put advice?</p> <p>17 A. No, I don't.</p> <p>18 Q. You don't.</p> <p>19 Do you remember thinking that you might need to seek</p> <p>20 the commissioner's permission to change the stay-put</p> <p>21 advice?</p> <p>22 A. No, that would have gone through the incident commander.</p> <p>23 Q. Right. I see. Which was who, Andy Roe?</p> <p>24 A. Yes, if the timings are right, yes.</p> <p>25 Q. Right.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 166</p>	<p>1 CU8 and, as I say, whoever that was on there, and the</p> <p>2 conversation was that the incident ground agreed with</p> <p>3 our decision.</p> <p>4 Q. Right.</p> <p>5 Going back to your statement and about the 15th</p> <p>6 floor, on page 6 of your statement, in the middle of the</p> <p>7 page, you say:</p> <p>8 "I was advised by control or Jason OLIFF (I am not</p> <p>9 sure which) that crews were ..."</p> <p>10 Then you use the word "struggling" to get beyond the</p> <p>11 15th floor of the tower.</p> <p>12 On the next page, on page 7, you say in the middle</p> <p>13 of the page that the crews were unable to get above the</p> <p>14 15th floor.</p> <p>15 I think some people are interested in whether</p> <p>16 there's a difference: were they struggling but could or</p> <p>17 were they completely unable to?</p> <p>18 A. I think that's just the words I've used in the</p> <p>19 statement. I've used two different words for the same</p> <p>20 sentence.</p> <p>21 Q. To express what idea?</p> <p>22 A. Well, as far as I can remember, the information that</p> <p>23 I received back was that crews were struggling to get</p> <p>24 past the 15th floor. So where I've put "unable",</p> <p>25 I think that should be "struggling".</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 168</p>

<p>1 Q. So do you mean some could but most couldn't or none 2 could? What do you mean?</p> <p>3 A. I had no further information other than that statement.</p> <p>4 Q. In terms of the system for whiteboards and recording the 5 information, was there a system, do you know, that was 6 in place for what would happen if a child called seeking 7 assistance? Is that something that you recorded 8 specifically?</p> <p>9 A. No. No.</p> <p>10 Q. Was that something that you asked Jason Oliff to 11 institute, to record specifically?</p> <p>12 A. I wasn't made aware on the night that there was any 13 children actually making the calls or on the phones.</p> <p>14 Q. Right. Okay.</p> <p>15 After the decision was made to change the stay-put 16 advice, did you ask for any update or advice from the 17 incident ground as to the conditions in the lobbies and 18 the stair?</p> <p>19 A. No, not at that time. So I spoke directly to, as I say, 20 CU8, passed that information. Closely after that time, 21 I probably spent a bit -- started to go down to the BCC 22 as well, because that was starting to come up.</p> <p>23 Q. According to your statement, the effect of changing the 24 stay-put advice was that now people would be told to get 25 out of the tower. That is effectively what you say</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 169</p>	<p>1 Q. Assuming that the gist of the new advice post-change 2 was, "Get out of the tower", did you think that it would 3 be important or at least helpful to the control room 4 operators giving that new advice to know what the 5 conditions were in the building -- lobbies and stairs 6 particularly -- to be able to assist callers to get out?</p> <p>7 A. I would say they were probably getting that advice by 8 the phone call -- not advice, they were getting that 9 information from the people on the other end of the 10 phone. I mean, yes, if we could -- to be able to give 11 a control operator the information of every single 12 floor, area, flat, how dense, where the smoke is, how -- 13 I think it's a virtual impossibility. You're talking 24 14 floors, X amount of flats -- I don't think anyone's got 15 that information to pass that information back.</p> <p>16 Q. So far as you were aware, were CROs being instructed to 17 ask the callers to describe the conditions they were 18 encountering once they left their flats?</p> <p>19 A. You're asking me questions that -- I'm sorry, I can't 20 give you those answers because I'm not -- I wasn't party 21 to that part of control. I was not with the call 22 operators.</p> <p>23 Q. Right.</p> <p>24 Were you able to get information from the incident 25 ground as to how crews were going to be able to assist</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 171</p>
<p>1 three-quarters of the way down page 7.</p> <p>2 Now, I don't want to be unfair to you, that's what 3 you say in your statement, but is that right?</p> <p>4 A. That's what I put in my statement. So like I've 5 mentioned previously, Joanne Smith and Alex Norman 6 would've gone round to their control operators, spoken 7 to their control operators, given them the -- that we 8 had changed the stay put, and they would've given them 9 the advice on how to speak to the individuals on the end 10 of the phones. I wouldn't have been party to that.</p> <p>11 Q. No. To your understanding, though, the gist of the 12 advice was: get out of the tower?</p> <p>13 A. If you can get out of the tower, get out of the tower.</p> <p>14 Q. Well, if you can't get out -- well, that sounds as if 15 your understanding was that callers were being given 16 a choice.</p> <p>17 A. My understanding -- I can't give you the information 18 that was given across by control or how that was working 19 in control. So my understanding was that we had changed 20 the stay-put advice so those that could leave the tower 21 were told to leave the tower. If there was further 22 information or further discussions with the FSG 23 information, that would've taken part between the 24 control operators and the individuals. I wouldn't have 25 been party to that information.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 170</p>	<p>1 FSG callers get out of the tower pursuant to the new 2 advice?</p> <p>3 A. That information -- that would've been worked out on the 4 incident ground by the command unit and the incident 5 commander. That's the strategy that they would've done 6 on the incident ground.</p> <p>7 Q. Having arrived at the strategy on the incident ground, 8 did you get any information from the incident ground 9 about what BA wearers -- now EDDBA wearers -- were going 10 to be doing by way of assisting people to get out?</p> <p>11 A. No, no.</p> <p>12 Q. Did you not think that information was important to get 13 out from the incident ground?</p> <p>14 A. It wasn't information that was coming back to us, so it 15 wouldn't be -- as a duty DAC and the role and the 16 position I played, it's not a role that I would be 17 asking the incident ground for updates and information. 18 Like I say, my role was to run the BCC. I was working 19 additionally to assist in the position of the fire 20 survival guidance, but it's not a role that I would be 21 asking the incident ground for updates on the positions 22 and where they are. It's not a role that the duty DAC 23 would play.</p> <p>24 Q. All right.</p> <p>25 But you were there in the control room on the night</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 172</p>

<p>1 and supervising Mr Oliff's communication with the 2 incident ground. Did you not think that it would be 3 important for him, or somebody in the control room, to 4 get information from the incident ground as to what the 5 EDBA wearers were doing so that, in relation to 6 particular calls, that advice could be passed on to 7 assist people get out?</p> <p>8 A. So that information could've been coming back to 9 control, it could've been coming back, but I wasn't 10 privy to that information at the time because, like 11 I say, it's not a position I would've dealt with.</p> <p>12 Q. Right.</p> <p>13 Now, in terms of communications systems, have you 14 ever heard of a CSS, a command support system?</p> <p>15 A. Yes.</p> <p>16 Q. Did you know that on the night a command support system 17 on one of the CUs failed?</p> <p>18 A. No.</p> <p>19 Q. You didn't know that?</p> <p>20 A. No.</p> <p>21 As I've mentioned before, in my role in the BCC, 22 that information would not be coming back to me. It's 23 not protocol for that information, operational 24 information from the incident ground, to come back to 25 the duty DAC. It wouldn't flow back to me.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 173</p>	<p>1 not sure of the timing. Someone in control requested 2 that was I happy, in the role of the duty DAC and BCC, 3 for a dangerous structure engineer to be blue-lighted to 4 the incident ground, which is what I agreed to be done.</p> <p>5 Q. Right.</p> <p>6 A. So that would -- sorry to cut across -- that would -- 7 meaning either police to run them to the incident ground 8 or for us to find an officer to take them to the 9 incident ground, I'm not sure which one was finally 10 agreed, but in principle I agreed for it to be done.</p> <p>11 Q. There's another message at 03.31.04, if we could just 12 look at that, this says:</p> <p>13 "Service Request Completed: AG EMG CUB REQUEST 14 DANGEROUS STRUCTURE ENGINEER ..."</p> <p>15 Do you remember that request?</p> <p>16 A. The only request regarding the dangerous structure 17 engineer that came to me is the one via a verbal 18 conversation down in the BCC from a member of control to 19 blue light someone to the incident ground. 20 Unfortunately that is my only dealing with the dangerous 21 structure engineer.</p> <p>22 Q. I'm sorry to labour this a bit, but look at the next 23 page, page 25, it says 03.37.32:</p> <p>24 "Key 25 "EMG CU8 REFERENCE DANGEROUS STRUCTURE ENGINEER CAN</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 175</p>
<p>1 Q. Right.</p> <p>2 Would the command support system be useful in 3 assisting the fire ground to communicate with the 4 control room, if it was working?</p> <p>5 A. No, I don't think so, because communications would've 6 come across the Airwave.</p> <p>7 Q. Right.</p> <p>8 Can I then go back to a different topic but one we 9 looked at a little bit earlier, which was the dangerous 10 structure engineer.</p> <p>11 Now, we looked at the short incident log earlier, if 12 I can just ask you to go back to that. It's tab 23 of 13 the documents bundle. I would ask you to look at 14 page 23, please.</p> <p>15 Now, we looked at the message earlier I think at 16 02.38 for the dangerous structure engineer, and I think 17 you said you didn't know about that message.</p> <p>18 A. Not at that time, no.</p> <p>19 Q. No. Then there's another one at 03.15.32, which you see 20 on page 24. 03.15.32:</p> <p>21 "... CU8 REQUEST URGENT ATTENDANCE OF DANGEROUS 22 STRUCTURE ENGINEER AND STRESS THIS IS A MATTER OF 23 URGENCY AND PRIORITY."</p> <p>24 Did you see that message, do you think?</p> <p>25 A. No, I didn't see that message, but as I mentioned, I'm</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 174</p>	<p>1 WE HAVE AN ETA AND A CONTACT NUMBER TO SPEAK WITH THEM 2 DIRECTLY AND TO LET US KNOW IF THEY NEED BLUE LIGHT 3 ASSISTANCE TO GET TO THE INCIDENT AS THEY ARE A 4 PRIORITY."</p> <p>5 Did you see that message?</p> <p>6 A. No.</p> <p>7 Q. Is that the -- the time, does that help -- is that the 8 time, do you think, that you were first asked?</p> <p>9 A. Potentially. I don't know what time I've put -- is 10 that -- I think if you refer back to my statement, I had 11 a loggist at that time, and I believe -- so if my 12 loggist had put that in at that time, then that would be 13 the period or the time that I authorised it.</p> <p>14 However, once it's come to me to authorise, then 15 I wouldn't be following it up after I'd authorised it; 16 I would expect someone to action it and for it to take 17 place.</p> <p>18 Q. When you were asked to authorise the blue-lighting of 19 a dangerous structure engineer to Grenfell Tower, were 20 you made aware that the request for a dangerous 21 structure engineer had been outstanding for some time?</p> <p>22 A. No.</p> <p>23 Q. Okay. If you go to page 26, there is another message at 24 04.01.27:</p> <p>25 "LRG RESPONDED AND INFORMED TO CONTACT KENSINGTON</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 176</p>

<p>1 AND CHELSEA RE BOROUGH SURVEYOR / DANGEROUS STRUCTURE 2 ENGINEER." 3 Now, this is just after 4 am. Do you know anything 4 about that? 5 A. No. 6 Q. Did you know that someone had said that Kensington and 7 Chelsea needed to be contacted in order to get 8 a dangerous structure engineer there? 9 A. So as I previously said, you're asking me a lot of 10 information via the incident log; however, unless it 11 comes to me in my role as the Brigade co-ordinating 12 manager in the BCC, I wouldn't be aware of the 13 operational or some of the operational decisions because 14 I would be running the BCC. If that helps in -- 15 Q. Yes. 16 You say in your statement on page 8, a third of the 17 way down, that you authorised the engineer to be 18 blue-lighted to the scene. 19 A. And has that got a time? 20 Q. Well, you say it's in effect in response to the 21 informative message at 3.20. 22 So my question is, having shown you the message at 23 04.01, did you follow up what happened to the dangerous 24 structure engineer? 25 A. No, it wouldn't be a role for me -- so I'm there to help</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 177</p>	<p>1 "CU8: So you said that's Floor 22 -- what was that? 2 "OPERATOR: That's a pensioner, heavy smoke and it's 3 Flat 194." 4 Now, I put flat 194 to you based on the pieces of 5 paper. 6 A. So when you say operator, sorry, if I can ask the 7 question, do you mean a control operator? 8 Q. Yes. 9 A. Okay. 10 Q. Yes, I do. I have a couple of questions about that. 11 I just want to make sure I've put fairly to you the 12 evidence we have on flat 194, although I used it as 13 an example. 14 If you go to the whiteboard and look at what we were 15 using as the left-hand side, which I think is the second 16 one to be filled in, which is MET00016912, page 1, you 17 can see flat 194, information, "194 22nd flr -- Heavy 18 smoke. 1 adult". Nothing on the board there about 19 a pensioner, but it does look from the admin call that 20 was made to CU8 that the identification of that 21 individual as a pensioner did get through. 22 Now, having seen that, given that there doesn't seem 23 to be that information on the pieces of paper that we've 24 seen, nothing about a pensioner in 194 on a piece of 25 paper or on the whiteboard, can you help in explaining</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 179</p>
<p>1 resource the incident, and if the incident asks for 2 a resource or asks for people to be blue-lighted, I'm 3 there to help provide the resources, not to make 4 operational decisions or not to follow up decisions on 5 the incident ground. 6 Q. I see, okay. 7 A. So being, as we say, remote, the decisions and the 8 operational decisions are made by the incident commander 9 and the command chain on the incident ground. 10 Q. Now, there's one point of clarification I have been 11 asked to just put to you about a particular piece of 12 information which I asked you about earlier in relation 13 to a particular flat, which was flat 194. 14 To be fair to you, it is right that you be shown the 15 full story about it. 16 If you go to INQ00000195, this is an admin call 17 timed at 02.00.34 relating to a series of flats, one of 18 which is 194. 19 If you scroll down the pages to page 5, this is 20 an admin call recording of somebody speaking to CU8 at 21 just after 2 am, and there's flat 194: 22 "OPERATOR: Flat 194. 23 "CU8: Can you do that mate? Right. 24 "OPERATOR: And that's a pensioner with heavy smoke 25 there.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 178</p>	<p>1 how that piece of information about the occupant being 2 a pensioner got through? 3 A. I mean, that was taken before I was even in control, the 4 original information. You say it was at 2 o'clock in 5 the morning. 6 Q. Now, in terms of the system that you came to when you 7 arrived -- 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. -- we can see this particular call. It looks as if it's 10 an operator speaking to CU8 -- 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. -- over something that is recording their conversation 13 but is not a radio. Can you help with what that system 14 was? 15 A. No. Sorry, I don't know what control would use. 16 I mean, if it was over the RT which is Airwave 17 channel 4, I believe that's recordable, that's put on to 18 the system. If it wasn't that, unfortunately, no, 19 I don't know what system. 20 Q. What about the Brigade landlines? The telephone lines 21 that are used -- 22 A. Some of those may be recordable in control but 23 I wouldn't have the -- I wouldn't know. Like I say, not 24 being my environment and where I work, I wouldn't have 25 that detail.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Page 180</p>

<p>1 MR MILLETT: Right, okay.</p> <p>2 Well, thank you very much.</p> <p>3 Mr Oliff, you'll be relieved to hear that I have no</p> <p>4 further questions for you.</p> <p>5 THE WITNESS: Mr Fenton, I hope, not Mr Oliff!</p> <p>6 MR MILLETT: Yes, quite right, Mr Fenton. Of course, I'm</p> <p>7 sorry about that.</p> <p>8 Nonetheless, I'm still very grateful to you for</p> <p>9 enduring my questions and enduring getting your name</p> <p>10 wrong at the very last moment. Thank you very much for</p> <p>11 your assistance. It has been extremely helpful.</p> <p>12 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Fenton, it just remains for me to</p> <p>13 thank you very much as well for coming along. I don't</p> <p>14 suppose it's been an entirely pleasant experience.</p> <p>15 THE WITNESS: No, but I hope it's helped.</p> <p>16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It certainly has, and we're very</p> <p>17 grateful to you for coming along. So thank you very</p> <p>18 much indeed. Thank you very much.</p> <p>19 If you would like to go, you can follow the usher,</p> <p>20 she'll see you out.</p> <p>21 THE WITNESS: Thank you.</p> <p>22 (The witness was released)</p> <p>23 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Now, Mr Millett.</p> <p>24 MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman.</p> <p>25 Now, then, we did have, as people I think know,</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 181</p>	<p>1 MR MILLETT: We'll take Mr Keane first at 10 o'clock and</p> <p>2 you'll have my colleague, Mr Kinnier, taking Mr Keane</p> <p>3 through his evidence.</p> <p>4 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good. Otherwise, that's it for</p> <p>5 today?</p> <p>6 MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman, that's the business for</p> <p>7 today.</p> <p>8 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.</p> <p>9 Well, we're going to break now, then. We'll resume</p> <p>10 at 10 o'clock tomorrow when we --</p> <p>11 MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, before we do, I'm sorry, there's</p> <p>12 a signal from the floor, which, in my usual way, I will</p> <p>13 entertain. (Pause)</p> <p>14 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That's it, is it?</p> <p>15 MR MILLETT: That is now it.</p> <p>16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right.</p> <p>17 Well, as I said, then, we shall break now and we'll</p> <p>18 resume at 10 o'clock tomorrow, when we shall hear from</p> <p>19 Mr Keane.</p> <p>20 MR MILLETT: Yes, thank you.</p> <p>21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good. Thank you very much.</p> <p>22 (3.45 pm)</p> <p>23 (The hearing adjourned until Wednesday, 18 July 2018 at</p> <p>24 10.00 am)</p> <p>25</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 183</p>
<p>1 Angie Gotts, a control room operator, scheduled to give</p> <p>2 evidence tomorrow. Unfortunately we've discovered that</p> <p>3 she is unwell this week and cannot attend. We hope to</p> <p>4 be able to have her come along at some stage or to give</p> <p>5 her evidence in some way, and that will obviously have</p> <p>6 to be discussed and the schedule revised.</p> <p>7 In order to be able to use the day productively,</p> <p>8 Mr Chairman, we are going to propose that a number of</p> <p>9 statements get read into the record, five of them,</p> <p>10 namely Alexandra Norman, Debbie Real, Peter May,</p> <p>11 Peter Duddy and Sarah Russell.</p> <p>12 I should just make one point clear, and that is that</p> <p>13 by reading these statements into the record, that</p> <p>14 doesn't preclude the witness from giving evidence in due</p> <p>15 course. Indeed, the inquiry is actively considering</p> <p>16 this question at the moment. The statements are being</p> <p>17 read into the record tomorrow so as to provide the</p> <p>18 necessary context for that evidence from other control</p> <p>19 room personnel who are going to come later, and the</p> <p>20 evidence that has been heard over the last few days from</p> <p>21 Ms Smith, Mr Oliff and Mr Fenton.</p> <p>22 We are also going to hear from Mr Keane tomorrow</p> <p>23 live.</p> <p>24 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Shall we take Mr Keane first at</p> <p>25 10 o'clock?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 182</p>	<p>1 INDEX</p> <p>2 ADRIAN FENTON (sworn)1</p> <p>Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY1</p> <p>3</p> <p>4</p> <p>5</p> <p>6</p> <p>7</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10</p> <p>11</p> <p>12</p> <p>13</p> <p>14</p> <p>15</p> <p>16</p> <p>17</p> <p>18</p> <p>19</p> <p>20</p> <p>21</p> <p>22</p> <p>23</p> <p>24</p> <p>25</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Page 184</p>

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