1	Thursday, 2 August 2018	1	Q as radio operator?
2	(9.30 am)	2	A. I don't think I did. It is possible that someone might
3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, everyone, and welcome	3	have come over with a bit of paper, but from what
4	to today's hearing.	4	I remember, I was going on the service requests.
5	We are going to continue, first of all, with the	5	Q. Right.
6	evidence of Ms Darby; is that right?	6	If you or, more likely, I think, as you say,
7	MR MILLETT: Yes, thank you very much, Mr Chairman. If the	7	Jason Oliff received pieces of paper from the CROs, does
8	witness could please be called back.	8	that mean that what was on the piece of paper didn't get
9	SHARON DARBY (continued)	9	recorded as a service request?
10	Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY (continued)	10	A. That's correct.
11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, Ms Darby.	11	Q. I see.
12	THE WITNESS: Good morning.	12	A. Unless the control officer made a note on the log,
13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Are you all right to carry on?	13	but
14	THE WITNESS: Yes.	14	Q. All right.
15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.	15	A. But that time, we were getting so many calls, it was so
16	Yes, Mr Millett.	16	busy, I think that was the quickest way, was to write it
17	MR MILLETT: Thank you very much, Mr Chairman.	17	down on a piece of paper.
18	Ms Darby, thank you very much for coming back to us	18	Q. Okay.
19	this morning. We are very grateful.	19	Now, I would like to just try to get to this by way
20	Could I ask you to go to your witness statement,	20	of an example, if I can and it is only an example.
21	please, and go to page 5 within it, and go to the second	21	A. Okay.
22	paragraph, which starts "At certain levels of an	22	Q. Just to try to get the system in our heads.
23	incident", and then five lines down you can see, you	23	Can I ask you to look at a radio message at
24	say:	24	01.57.34, which is LFB00002719. This is for flat 205 on
25	"Eventually I think there were about three or four	25	the 23rd floor, timed at, as you can see at the top,
	Page 1		Page 3
			-
1	in the Control Room with us. When we had gone to forty	1	01.57.34, to CU8:
2	pumps they took over the communication with the Command	2	"MALE SPEAKER: Go ahead, over.
3	Unit on the ground and passed on the FSGs directly to	3	"FEMALE SPEAKER: Charlie Uniform 8, the caller in
4	them. I think they used mobile phones to do this. This	4	Flat 205 on the 23rd floor reports that the fire is
5	was then declared a major incident."	5	coming right up to their flat, over."
6	We looked at this last night, 40 pumps and the	6	As you see, that is timed at 01.57.34.
7	declaration of a major incident.	7	If we look at the short incident log, which is in
8	I just want to go back and look at what was	8	the master documents bundle at tab 23, and go to
9	happening in the control room.	9	page 20, we can't see at that time mark, or around that
10	Do you remember pieces of paper being sent by	10	time mark 01.57 any reference to that message.
11	control room officers to the head table, Jason Oliff	11	One needs also, I think, to look at page 21 as well.
12	particularly	12	A. Okay. Then it is possible that paper might have been
13	A. Yes.	13	passed to me. As I say, I don't really trying to
14	Q with FSG on them?	14	remember, but it is possible that a control officer has
15	A. Yes.	15	given me that information.
16	Q. Do you remember whether that process of sending pieces	16	Q. Right. Okay.
17	of paper started before pumps were made 40, which was	17	Just to be clearer, or to complete the picture,
18	just after 2.00 am?	18	there is a service request for flat 205 which is on the
19	A. I was still sending I don't remember when the papers	19	incident log at an earlier time, and that is at page 19,
20	started. I was still sending messages across at make	20	if I can ask the Documents Director to go back to that,
21	pumps 40 myself. So whether it overlapped or not,	21	01.40.47, where there is a service request created for
22	I don't know, but I don't know the time.	22	flat 205, "PERSONS UNABLE TO LEAVE PROPERTY", but
23	Q. All right.	23	doesn't have the detail in your radio message.
24	Did you receive pieces of paper	24	A. No.
25	A. No.	25	Q. That was created by Heather[sic] Fox, I think.
	Page 2		Page 4

A. Ves. 2 Q. And then completed by you at 01.45.10. 3 So is that an example of where Vision sends a radio message to you? 5 A. Ves. 6 Q. So Heather uses Vision to send you a radio message and then you complete in by sending that message on. 7 then you complete in by sending that message on. 8 A. (The witness node). 9 Q. Right. So looking at those two time marks, with different information, both for flat 205, the later one, as at have shown you, being on a radio message to CUS, but not being in the short incident log, does that help you rell us that in fact you were also getting messages by point of the short one proof. 5 A. I must have been. Well, yes, if it is not on a service question, then yes. 9 Q. Neglet. So looking the properties of the proof of the service of puper? 5 A. I must have been. Well, yes, if it is not on a service question, then yes. 9 Q. Ves, vey good. 10 Q. Yes, vey good. 11 A. Yes, and Adrian Fenton as well. 22 communicing directly with the incident ground. 23 Do you remember how they were communicating with the incident ground? 24 A. Mohlle phone. 25 Q. And Adrian Fenton as well. 26 Q. And Adrian Fenton as well. 27 Q. And Adrian Fenton as well. 28 Q. And Adrian Fenton as well? 29 Q. And Adrian Fenton as well? 20 Q. And Adrian Fenton as well? 21 A. Yes, and Adrian Fenton saw well. 22 Q. And Adrian Fenton saw well. 23 Q. Now, we know from Issun Oliff's evidence and his phone records that he started to pass information to the incident ground of the started to pass information to the incident ground at about 20.66, or at least during a call that starts, according to his mobile records, at each of the paper. 24 A. Mushma. 25 Q. Oakly A. Mushma. 26 Q. Ookay. 27 Now, we know from Issun Oliff's evidence and his phone records that he started to pass information to the incident ground? 28 A. Wes, and Adrian Fenton as well? 29 Q. And that is what he said in his evidence to us. 10 Q. Now, ye was proposed to the paper. 11 A. Cas, and Adrian Fenton as well? 22 Q. And de	-			
So is that an example of where Vision sends a radio nessage to you? 5	1	A. Yes.	1	A. Mm-hm.
4 A. Lon't know whose idea it was, who set it up, but 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. So Heather uses Vision to send you a radio message and 7 then you complete it by sending that message on. 8 A. (The winters node). 9 Q. Right. So looking at those two time marks, with 9 different information, both for flat 205, the later one, 11 as I have shown you, being on a radio message to CU8, 12 but not being in the short incident log, does that help 13 you tell us that in flat you were also getting messages 14 by pieces of paper? 15 A. I must have been. Well, yes, if it is not on a service 16 question, then yes. 16 Q. Yes, very good. 18 Now, going back to your statement, you say, as 19 I have shown you, that message were passed directly to 10 the serior officers who came in. They were 21 communicating directly with the incident ground? 22 Do you treamber how they were communicating with the 23 incident ground? 24 A. Mobile phone. 25 Q. Now, that was Jason Oliff, was it? 26 Q. Now, that was Jason Oliff, was it? 27 Page 5 10 A. Yes, and Adrian Fenton as well. 28 Q. Who came in later, I think? 29 Q. Wo came in later, I think? 30 Q. Who came in later, I think? 40 Q. Who came in later, I think? 41 A. Mobile house. 42 Q. Who came in later, I think? 43 A. Old That is what he said in his evidence to us. 44 Q. Who came in later, I think? 45 A. Old That is what he said in his evidence to us. 46 Q. Now, I am huppy to show you his mobile records, at 10 Q. Old Mark was that going on a white board and they relayed this to the ground revex via their phones. 46 Q. Now, I am huppy to show you his mobile records, at 10 Q. Old you in fact stop sending radio messages soon as three-quarters of the way down the page, of just beyond halfway down that second prangraph. Do you see? It has been highlighted for you there. 47 Page 6 48 A. Lore that is what he was an addresses had started going on a white board and they relayed this to the ground crews via their phones. 49 Page 6 40 Page 8	2	Q. And then completed by you at 01.45.10.	2	Q. Now, at this point that you are referring to, do you
5 A. Yes. 1	3	So is that an example of where Vision sends a radio	3	remember who set the whiteboard system up?
6 Q. So Heather uses Vision to send you a radio message and the heat you complete it by sending that message on the nyou complete it by sending that message on the different information, both for flat 205, the later one, as I have shown you, being on a radio message to CUS, but the being in the soft incident log, door start help you tell us that in fact you were also getting messages by pieces of paper? 14 A. Thust have been. Well, yes, if it is not on a service question, then yes. 15 A. I must have been. Well, yes, if it is not on a service question, then yes. 16 Q. Ver, very good. 17 A. Yes, because the radio was busy, and the volume of calls was a strunomical, and I think we just felt it was a quicker way of passing the information — the time across. Maybe it was just quicker, because the radio was busy with other setting—up of this system? 18 A. Thust have been. Well, yes, if it is not on a service question, then yes. 19 [A very good.] 10 A. Thust have been. Well, yes, if it is not on a service question, then yes. 20 [A very good.] 11 A. Yes, going back to your statement, you say, as in low the sentior officers who came in. They were communicating directly with the incident ground. 21 Deyou remember how they were communicating with the incident ground? 22 Doyou remember how they were communicating with the incident ground? 23 A. Hishi koon, yes. 24 Q. Who, that was Jasson Oliff, was it? 25 Q. Now, that was Jason Oliff, was it? 26 Q. Add Adrian Fenton as well? 27 A. Yes, ecause the radio was bate to cope with the other started to pass information to the incident ground at about 02.06, or at least during a call that sarts, according to his mobile records if you want to, but take it from me that that is what they say. 28 A. Okay. 29 A. Mah.hm. 29 (A very good.) 20 A. Molling plane. 20 (A very good.) 20 (A very good.) 21 A. Well, yes still passing good. 22 (A very good.) 23 A. I think so, yes. 24 (Q. Who came in later, I think? 25 (Q. Okay.) 26 (Q. Okay.) 27 (A very good.) 28 (A pl	4	message to you?	4	A. I don't know whose idea it was, who set it up, but
7 here you complete it by sending that message on. 8 A. (The witness nods). 9 Q. Right. So looking at those two time marks, with different information, both for flat 205, the later one, as a large send of the sending of the short neident log, does that help to but not being in the short neident log, does that help but not being in the short neident log, does that help but not being in the short neident log, does that help but not being in the short neident log, does that help but not being in the short neident log, does that help but not being in the short neident log, does that help but not being in the short neident log, does that help but not being in the short neident log, does that help but not being in the short neident log, does that help but not being in the short of large and the senting of the senting of the senting of the sention officers who came in. They were communicating dried with the neided ground. 17 A. No. 18 Now, going back to your statement, you say, as left is not on a service question, then yes. 19 I have shown you, that messages were passed directly to the sention officers who came in. They were communicating with the incident ground. 20 Do you remember how they were communicating with the incident ground. 21 A. Mohile phone. 22 Do, And Adrian Fenton as well. 23 Q. And Adrian Fenton as well. 24 Q. Who came in later, I think? 25 A. Yes. 26 Q. Okay, 27 Now, we know from Jason Oliff's evidence and his phone records that he started to pass information to the incident ground at about 20,60, or at least during a call that starts, according to his mobile records, at more proposed to the start of the way to the start of the pass information to the incident ground at about 20,60, or at least during a call that starts, according to his mobile records if you want to, but take it from me that that is what they say. 28 A. Okay. 29 Law show you way in your statement, at the same paragraph: 30 A. When. 31 Q. Now, I am happy to show you his mobile records if you want to, but take it from me that that is	5	A. Yes.	5	I believe Jason Oliff was the one writing on it.
8 A. (The winess nods). 9 Q. Right. So looking at those two time marks, with 10 different information, both for flat 205, the later one, 11 as I have shown you, being on a radio missages to CU8, 12 but not being in the short incident log does that help 13 you tell us that in fact you were also getting messages 14 by pieces of paper? 15 A. I must have been. Well, yes, if it is not on a service 16 question, then yes. 16 Q. Vers, very good. 18 Now, going back to your statement, you say, as 19 I have shown you, that messages were passed directly to 20 the senior officers who came in. They were 21 communicating directly with the incident ground. 22 Doyo remember how they were communicating with the 23 incident ground? 24 A. Mobile phone. 25 Q. Now, that was Jisson Oliff, was it? 26 Q. And Adrian Fenton as well. 27 Q. A default is fulfill from the flat that is what the sain on first control of the street of paper? 28 A. Yes. 29 Q. And Adrian Fenton as well. 30 Q. And Carrian Fenton as well. 41 Page 7 10 A. Yes, and Adrian Fenton as well. 42 Q. Wo came in later, I think? 43 A. Well, vers. 44 Q. Who came in later, I think? 55 A. Yes. 56 Q. Okay. 57 Now, we know from Jason Oliff's evidence and his 58 phone records that he started to pass information to the incident ground? 59 now that was a flavored paragraph. 50 Q. And that is what he said in his evidence to us. 51 Page 7 10 Q. And that is what he said in his evidence to us. 51 Page 6 11 Page 6 12 A. Mm-hm. 13 Q. Now, I am happy to show you his mobile records if you was started going on a white board and they relayed this to the paragraph. 51 Page 6 52 Page 7 53 A. I think so, yes. 54 A. Okay. 55 A. Ves. 56 Q. Okay defined that a fife to paper? 57 A. I don't think so. 58 Page 7 59 Page 7 50 Page 8 50 Page 8 50 Page 8 50 Page 8 51 Page 8 51 Page 8 52 Page 7 53 A. I don't think so. 54 Page 8 55 Page 7 56 Page 7 57 Page 7 58 A. Or? 59 Q. First fail the started to pass information to the incident ground? 50 Page 8 50 Page 8 51 Page 7 51 Page 7 52 Pag	6	Q. So Heather uses Vision to send you a radio message and	6	Q. Right. And do you know why it was set up?
9 Q. Right. So looking at those two time marks, with 10 different information, both for flat 205, the later one, 11 as I have shown you, being on a radio message to CU8, 12 but not being in the short incident log, does that help 13 you tell us that in fact you were also getting messages 14 by pieces of paper? 15 A. I must have been. Well, yes, if it is not on a service 16 question, then yes. 17 Q. Yes, very good. 18 Now, going back to your statement, you say, as 19 I have shown you, bett messages were passed directly to 20 the senior officers who came in. They were 21 communicating directly with the incident ground. 22 Doy ou remember how they were communicating with the 23 incident ground? 24 A. Mobile phone. 25 Q. Now, that was Jason Oliff, was it? 26 Q. Now, that was Jason Oliff, was it? 27 Q. And Adrian Fenton as well. 28 Q. Who came in later, I think? 29 A. Yes. 20 Q. Okay. 20 Okay. 21 A. Whish. 22 D. Now, we know from Jason Oliff's evidence and his 23 phone records that he started to pass information to the 24 incident ground at John College of the principle of the was to have well to prevent the other stuff a bit more. 29 Q. And that is what the said in his evidence on the incident ground? 30 A. I think so, yes. 40 Q. Who came in later, I think? 51 A. Yes. 52 Q. Now, I am happy to show you his mobile records if you was the passing from the control of the principle of the paper? 53 A. Okay. 54 A. Okay. 55 A. Okay. 56 Q. And that is what he said in his evidence to us. 57 A. Okay. 58 A. Okay. 59 A. Okay. 50 A. A. Okay. 50 A. A. Okay. 50 A. A. Okay. 51 A. Okay. 52 Lam struggling to locate it on the page. It is 53 three-quarters of the way down the second paragraph. Do you see? It has been highlighted for you three. 50 A. Exactly. 51 A. Okay. 52 C. A. Chay of	7	then you complete it by sending that message on.	7	A. Yes, because the radio was busy, and the volume of calls
infiltrent information, both for flat 205, the later one, as I have shown you, being on ratio messages to CU8, 11 but not being in the short incident flog, does that help you tell us that in fact you were also getting messages 13 by pieces of paper? A. I must have been. Well, yes, if it is not on a service question, then yes. Now, going back to your statement, you say, as 18 how shown you, that messages were passed directly to 20 the senior officers who came in. They were 21 communicating directly with the incident ground. Do you remember how they were communicating with the incident ground? A. Mobile plone. A. Yes, Q. Now, that was Jason Oliff, was it? Page 5 A. Yes, and Adrian Fenton as well. Q. Onday. Now, we known from Jason Oliff's evidence and his phone records that he started to pass information to the incident ground at about 02.06, or at least during a call that starts, according to his mobile records, at 20.0 km. Q. Now, I am happy to show you his mobile records if you want to, but take if from me that that is what they say. A. Wash. A. Okay. Now, you say in your statement, at the same paragraph: A. Althink on yes. Page 6 I am struggling to locate it on the page. It is been highlighted for you three. Page 6 I am struggling to locate it on the page. It is been highlighted for you three.	8	A. (The witness nods).	8	was astronomical, and I think we just felt it was
as I have shown you, being on a radio message to CUS, but no being in the short incident log, does that help you to be to being in the short incident log, does that help you to be to be the senior officers who came in the short of the senior officers who came in. They were 19 you go given any information about the setting-up of this system? 15 A. I must have been. Well, yes, if it is not on a service question, then yes. 16 Q. Yes, very good. 17 Q. Yes, very good. 18 Now, going back to your statement, you say, as 19 I have shown you, that messages were passed directly to the senior officers who came in. They were 20 the senior officers who came in. They were 21 communicating directly with the incident ground. 22 Do you remember how they were communicating with the 22 incident ground? 23 incident ground? 24 A. Mobile phone. 25 Q. Now, that was Jass on Oliff, was it? 26 Page 5 27 Page 7 28 Page 7 29 Page 7 20 A. Yes, and Adrian Fenton as well. 20 Q. And Adrian Fenton as well. 21 Q. Who came in later, I think? 22 A. Yes, and Adrian Fenton as well. 23 A. I think so, yes. 4 Q. Who came in later, I think? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Okay. 7 Now, we know from Jason Oliff's evidence and his phone records that he started to pass information to the incident ground? 8 A. A noverlap of the paper? 9 Q. Of radio messages and mobile messages coming from the control records that the started to pass information to the incident ground? 19 A. Mm-hm. 10 Q. Now, I am happy to show you his mobile records, at one can be a started going on a white board and they relayed this to the mobile message says on as the mobile message	9	Q. Right. So looking at those two time marks, with	9	a quicker way of passing the information the
but not being in the short incident log, does that help you tell us that in fact you were also getting messages 13	10	different information, both for flat 205, the later one,	10	importance was to get people's location and passing that
you tell us that in fact you were also getting messages by pieces of paper? A. I must have been. Well, yes, if it is not on a service question, then yes. O. Yes, very good. Now, going back to your statement, you say, as 15 A. Yes, you given any information about the setting-up of this system? I have shown you, that messages were passed directly to the serior officers who came in. They were communicating directly with the incident ground 20 the serior officers who came in. They were communicating with the incident ground 21 communicating directly with the incident ground 22 mount in the page of the serior of operations and the page of the serior of operations and the page of the serior of operation as well. 24 and Adrian Fenton as well. 25 Q. Now, that was Jason Oliff, was it? A. Yes, and Adrian Fenton as well. 26 Q. And Adrian Fenton as well. 27 Q. And Adrian Fenton as well. 29 Q. And Adrian Fenton as well. 29 Q. Who came in later, I think? 40 Q. Who came in later, I think? 41 Q. Who came in later, I think? 42 Q. Who came in later, I think? 43 Q. Who came in later, I think? 44 Q. Was there an overlap? 45 A. Ves. 46 Q. O. Okay. 47 Now, we know from Jason Oliff's evidence and his phone records that he started to pass information to the incident ground at about 02.06, or at least during a call that starts, according to his mobile records, at 16 Q. And that is what he said in his evidence to us. 46 Now, you say in your statement, at the same page, or just beyond half way down that second paragraph. Do you see? It has been highlighted for you there. 47 Page 8	11	as I have shown you, being on a radio message to CU8,	11	across. Maybe it was just quicker, because the radio
this system? A. I must have been. Well, yes, if it is not on a service question, then yes. Q. Yes, very good. Now, going back to your statement, you say, as I have shown you, that messages were passed directly to the senior officers who came in. They were communicating directly with the incident ground. Do you remember how they were communicating with the incident ground? A. Mohlie phone. Do you fan have shown from the started to pass information to the incident ground at about 02.06, or at least during a call that starts, according to his mobile records, at page now, you knaw and to, but take it from me that that is what they say. A. Mohlie phone. Q. Now, I am happy to show you his mobile records, at page now, you that they were that they were the page of the series of the way to the the page or just beyond thatfivay down that second paragraph. Do you see? It has been highlighted for you there. Page 6 His A. No. So, so what you are telling us is what you observed on the night, as it happened? A. Ves. I have shown you that messages were passed directly to the senior officers who came in Leman in terms of page of the senior officers who came in Leman in the terms of page of the senior officers who came in Leman in the were overlapped. A. Ves. Page 5 A. Ves. A. Well, I was still passing - I think we probably overlapped. I probably was still passing some, but obviously with the radio—if reed up the radio a little bit, because there was obviously the operational side, the resources that they were operational side, the resources that they were operational side, the resources that they were sufficient ground? A. Ves. Q. And Adrian Fenton as well. Q. And Carian Fenton as well. Q. And Salma Markina Fenton as well. Q. And Salma Markina Fenton as well. Q. Or and Adrian Fenton as well. Q. Or and Ad	12	but not being in the short incident log, does that help	12	was so busy with other stuff.
A. I must have been. Well, yes, if it is not on a service question, then yes. Question, then yes. Now, going back to your statement, you say, as law serious profits and the senior officers who came in. They were communicating directly with the incident ground. Law shown you, that messages were passed directly to the senior officers who came in. They were communicating directly with the incident ground. Do you remember how they were communicating with the communicating directly with the incident ground. A. Mohile phone. Do you remember how they were communicating with the case of the incident ground? A. Mohile phone. Days of the senior officers who came in. They were communicating with the radio communicating with the radio in the freed up the radio a little bit, because there was obviously the obviously with the radio—in thread in the freed up the radio as little bit, because there was obviously the operational side, the resources that they were Page 7 A. Yes, and Adrian Fenton as well. Q. And Adrian Fenton as well. Q. And Adrian Fenton as well? A. Yes, Q. Was there an overlap? A. Yes. Q. Was there an overlap? A. Yes. Q. Was there an overlap? A. An overlap of the page: A. Non-Mm. Q. Now, I am happy to show you his mobile records, at want to, but take it from me that that is what they say. A. Okay. Q. And that is what he said in his evidence to us. Now, you say in your statement, at the same paragraph: "At this point all of the names and addresses had started going on a white board and they relayed this to the ground crews via their phones." A mertage of the page of the page of just beyond halfway down that second paragraph. Do you see? It has been highlighted for you there. Page 6 Page 8 Page 8 Page 8 Page 8	13	you tell us that in fact you were also getting messages	13	Q. Were you given any information about the setting-up of
16 Q. Yes, very good. 16 Q. So what you are telling us is what you observed on the night, as it happened? 18 A. Yes. 18 A. Yes. 19 C. How did that affect your role at the time in terms of passing FSG messages to the incident ground? 21 Communicating directly with the incident ground. 22 Obyour emember how they were communicating with the incident ground? 22 Obyour emember how they were communicating with the incident ground? 23 Obyour emember how they were communicating with the incident ground? 24 A. Mobile phone. 25 Obyour emember how they were communicating with the incident ground? 26 Obyour emember how they were communicating with the incident ground? 27 Obyour emember how they were communicating with the incident ground? Obyour emember how they were communicating with the incident ground? Obyour emember how they were communicating with the incident ground? Obyour emember how they were communicating with the incident ground? Obyour emember how they were communicating with the incident ground? Obyour emember how they were communicating with the incident ground? Obyour emember how they were communicating with the incident ground? Obyour emember how they were communicating with the incident ground? Obyour emember how they were communicating with the incident ground? Obyour emember how they were communicating with the incident ground? Obyour emember how they were communicating with the incident ground? Obyour emember how they were senting members and in the control most learned of it all being fire survival guidance, the radio vas able to cope with the other staff a bit more. Obyour emember how they were communicating with the incident ground? Obyour emember how they were communicating with the incident ground? Obyour emember how they were senting members and in the control most learned of it all being fire survival guidance, the radio vas able to cope with the other staff a bit more. Obyour emember how the objourned of it all be	14	by pieces of paper?	14	this system?
17 Now, going back to your statement, you say, as 16 Now, going back to your statement, you say, as 17 Now, going back to your statement, you say, as 18 A. Yes, 20 How did that affect your role at the time in terms of passing FSG messages to the incident ground? 21 22 23 23 23 24 A. Mohile phone. 24 A. Mohile phone. 25 25 25 26 27 27 27 27 27 27 27	15	A. I must have been. Well, yes, if it is not on a service	15	A. No.
18 Now, going back to your statement, you say, as 19 I have shown you, that messages were passed directly to 20 the senior officers who came in. They were 21 communicating directly with the incident ground. 22 Do you remember how they were communicating with the 23 incident ground? 24 A. Mobile phone. 25 Q. Now, that was Jason Oliff, was it? 26 A. Yes, and Adrian Fenton as well. 27 Q. And Adrian Fenton as well. 28 Q. And Adrian Fenton as well. 29 Q. And Adrian Fenton as well? 20 Q. And Adrian Fenton as well? 21 A. Yes. 22 Page 7 1 A. Yes, and Adrian Fenton as well. 22 Q. And Adrian Fenton as well. 23 A. I think so, yes. 34 Q. Who came in later, I think? 45 A. Yes. 46 Q. Okay. 47 Now, we know from Jason Oliff's evidence and his phone records that he started to pass information to the incident ground at about 02.06, or at least during a call that starts, according to his mobile records, at want to, but take it from me that that is what they say. 48 A. Min-him. 49 Q. Now, I am happy to show you his mobile records if you want to, but take it from me that that is what they say. 40 Q. And that is what he said in his evidence to us. 41 Now, you say in your statement, at the same paragraph: 41 Page 6 42 Page 6 43 Page 8 44 Nell, I was still passing – I think we probably overlapped, I probably was still passing some, but overlapped, I probably wore statement was able to cope with the other starting in think is the operational side, the radio a little bit, because ther	16	question, then yes.	16	Q. So what you are telling us is what you observed on the
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5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Okay. 7 Now, we know from Jason Oliff's evidence and his 8 phone records that he started to pass information to the 9 incident ground at about 02.06, or at least during 10 a call that starts, according to his mobile records, at 11 02.06. 12 A. Mm-hm. 13 Q. Now, I am happy to show you his mobile records if you 14 want to, but take it from me that that is what they say. 15 A. Okay. 16 Q. And that is what he said in his evidence to us. 17 Now, you say in your statement, at the same 18 paragraph: 19 "At this point all of the names and addresses had 19 started going on a white board and they relayed this to 20 the ground crews via their phones." 21 I am struggling to locate it on the page. It is 22 three-quarters of the way down the page, or just beyond 24 halfway down that second paragraph. Do you see? It has 25 been highlighted for you there. 5 A. Of? 6 Q. Of radio messages and mobile messages coming from the control room to the incident ground? 8 A. An overlap of the paper? 9 Q. Well, let me put it differently. First of all, did anybody tell you to stop passing FSG messages to the incident ground? A. No, if they were sending me messages, I would pass them. 12 A. No, if they were sending me messages, I would pass them. 13 Q. Right. A. Yes. 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Did you in fact stop sending radio messages as soon as 16 the mobile message system started? A. I don't think so. 9 Q. Well, let me put it differently. First of all, did anybody tell you to stop passing FSG messages to the incident ground? A. No, if they were sending me messages, I would pass them. 13 Q. Right. A. Yes. 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Did you in fact stop sending radio messages as soon as 16 the mobile messages system started? A. I don't think so. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I mean, from what you are telling 19 us, I think it was really the officer who took the call 21 who would decide whether to create a service request 22 which you would then respond to. A. Exactly. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Or to put it on a piece of paper, 24 which you w	3		3	
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2 (Dagga E to 9)		1 age 0		-

1	A. Exactly.	1	log that Charlie Uniform 7 came up and said, "Can you
2	MR MILLETT: Yes, thank you.	2	now pass all of the FSG calls, fire survival calls", but
3	We can, I think, pursue that last point that you	3	Heidi wouldn't necessarily have known that, she was just
4	have just made to the chairman by looking at the short	4	putting it to Charlie Uniform 8. But it still came to
5	incident log. If we can go back to that, please, and go	5	the incident, I knew where to pass it. So even though
6	to page 21.	6	I have completed it, I have sent it to Charlie Uniform 7
7	You can see that at the top of page 21 it starts	7	as requested.
8	with a time mark of 01.56.39, with a service request,	8	Q. Thank you.
9	RT4 to CU8, and then it continues on down the page, and	9	So when we see service requests completed, RT4 to
10	just scan your eye, if you would, down the page to see	10	CU8, after the time mark of 02.23.33, we can take it,
11	various service requests on past 02.00 am, and	11	can we, that they were actually sent to CU7?
12	particularly past 02.06 am, with continued radio service	12	A. I did.
13	requests relating to FSG information.	13	Q. Yes.
14	Do you see? So at the foot of the page you can see	14	Continuing on through page 23, you can see that
15	02.10, service request, RT4 to CU8, further call	15	there is a service request at 02.40.11, just over
16	relating to flat 82 on floor 11.	16	a third of the way down that page, service request
17	Did you create that service request? It says SAD	17	created, HJF again, Heidi Fox RT4 to CU8, just on
18	next to your name there, or next to	18	creation of a service request that is Heidi Fox
19	A. Sorry, which one says created? No, that says completed.	19	there and that gets completed and this is for
20	So I passed that over to Charlie Uniform	20	flat 152 at 02.41.27. Do you see that?
21	Q. Yes, I am sorry, created. PD is created, I am so sorry,	21	Just two questions there.
22	you are quite right.	22	First of all, it looks as though Heidi Fox is
23	A. Yes.	23	completing the service request. Did there come a time
24	Q. And SAD is completed.	24	when you stopped, or perhaps shared
25	A. So I passed that over.	25	A. No.
	Page 9		Page 11
1	Q. Right.	1	Q completion?
2	A. Yes.	2	A. What Heidi has done is she has probably, possibly,
3	Q. And then over the page, one can start, I think, at	3	passed it over on paper, but she has logged it, so she
4	02.24.11:	4	has written into the log on the service request the
5	"Service Request Created: RT4 CU8 FLAT 183 21ST	5	information, but to stop me having to pass it over, she
6	FLOOR"	6	has completed it, so I haven't picked it up.
7	And you can see the details there. And that is HJF,	7	Q. Right.
8	which I think is Heather Fox.	8	A. So what she has done is made sure there is a log of it.
9	A. Heidi.	9	Q. I see.
10	Q. Heidi Fox, sorry.	10	Now, I don't think that is a pattern that we see
11	At 02.25.32, you can see that the service request is	11	emerging from this log.
12	completed by you. So it looks as if is this	12	A. No.
13	right? at 02.25, so at some time after Jason Oliff	13	Q. Why might that be?
14	had started his mobile messaging, you are still sending	14	A. Well, it is quicker to write on paper.
	radio messages to the incident ground?	15	Q. Yes.
15	A. Yes. I mean, yes, if I was sent the message, then I was	16	
16 17	7.	17	A. I don't know why Heidi has done that, but what she has
17	sending it.	18	done is correct, because she has put it on the although
18 19	Q. Right.	19	log. Q. Yes, I see. Is that a rarity or was that the norm?
	Just on that page, if you run your eye up to the	20	
20	time mark 02.23.33, SAD, it says:	1	A. No, she has just typed it into the incident and
21	"Key	21	completed it herself to stop me sending it, because she
22	"CU7 RUN ALL FSG CALLS VIA CU7."	22	has a record of it on there.
23	A. Okay.	23	Q. Is that because, on that occasion, Heidi Fox didn't send
24 25	Q. That would have come from you? A. Yes, again, when we had it earlier, I have put on the	24 25	a piece of paper A. It is possible.
23	2. 105, again, when we had it carner, I have put on the	23	11. 11 is possibile.
L	Page 10	L	Page 12

1	Q to Jason Oliff, but instead put it on the Vision log?	1	the radio log together?
2	A. No, no, she would have sent it, because I haven't passed	2	A. Yes.
3	it, so she might have put it on I see what you but	3	Q. Okay.
4	she may have put it on paper as well. She hasn't passed	4	If you can be shown, please, LFB00002636. This is
5	it on the radio, so she might well have she has just	5	a message timed at 03.14.55, which says "Control
6	made a record of it on the log.	6	out" and "FEMALE SPEAKER: FN out."
7	Q. Yes, I see, okay.	7	Can you help us with that? What does that mean in
8	Can you then go to page 24, a quarter of the way	8	radio speak?
		9	-
9	down that page, at 03.08.36, and there is a service		A. All it means is I am still listening to the channel,
10	request created there by DR, which I think is I am	10	so if they call me up, I can still hear them, it will
11	guessing Debbie Real?	11	still come through, but I have just pressed the button
12	A. Debbie Real.	12	to say I have stopped talking so they know I have
13	Q. And she creates a service request:	13	stopped.
14	" CU8 RT4 PERSONS IN FLAT 153"	14	Q. I see. What does FN mean?
15	And that is completed at 03.10.51 by you:	15	A. Sorry, it should say really M2FN. It is channel 4.
16	" CU8 RT4 PERSONS IN FLAT 153"	16	I have just said "FN" quickly, but it should be M2FN.
17	A. Mm-hm.	17	Q. Is that a mark of the fact that that was the end of your
18	Q. Does that tell us that, as late as 03.10, you were still	18	radio transmissions?
19	sending radio messages to CU8 or CU7, by that stage?	19	A. Not all, just for that moment.
20	A. Yes.	20	Q. Oh, I see, right.
21	Q. Right.	21	A. Also I was monitoring channel 2, so I had to keep
22	A. Yes.	22	pressing the button to come out of channel 4 so that
23	Q. So if Jason Oliff starts sending his mobile messages at	23	I was monitoring both channels at the same time as well.
24	02.06 on and off, and it is not a continuum	24	Q. Right. Okay.
25	A. Yes.	25	During the time up to 03.10 that you were sending
	Page 13		Page 15
	1 486 17		1 age 13
1	Q and you continued to send radio messages to CU7 until	1	radio messages to CU8 and then CU7, were you talking, do
2	03.10, does that mean we have an overlap period of about	2	you think, to the same person on the command unit or
3	an hour and a quarter?	3	different people?
4	A. Yes.	4	A. The same person on Charlie Uniform 8 and then
5	Q. Or an hour and 10 minutes, perhaps.	5	a different person on Charlie Uniform 7, but I would
6	A. Yes. I think the important thing was getting the	6	assume the same two people. I don't remember exactly,
7	information. Whether it went via Jason or me, Charlie	7	but that is how I would recall it.
8	Uniform 7 or Charlie Uniform 8 are getting the	8	Q. Do you know who you were speaking to?
9	information	9	A. No. We just use the call sign.
10	Q. Okay.	10	Q. Right.
11		11	A. We don't ask their name.
12	A of where those people are.Q. Was there a system in the control room for collating and	12	Q. Okay.
13	double checking what radio messages and mobile messages	13	Did you get any sense from your radio discussions
14	were being sent in order to make sure there was no	14	and they are not discussions in the conversational
15	inconsistency or duplication?	15	sense, as I understand of what those persons on the
16	A. No, because people were calling back and obviously	16	command units were doing with the information you were
17	speaking to different control officers. But we wouldn't	17	giving them?
18	have had time to do that.	18	A. Collating the information, passing it to whoever was in
19	Q. Did you tell Jason Oliff what FSG messages you were	19	charge.
20	passing to the incident ground so that he could record	20	Q. Did you know that?
21	it on his whiteboard?	21	A. That is what they would do.
	A. No.	22	Q. Right.
22		1	
		23	A. I would assume that that is what they would do.
22	Q. So would this be right: if we are looking for a record	23 24	A. I would assume that that is what they would do. Q. That is an assumption of yours; you didn't find out from
22 23			•

1	A. That is their job.	1	else might have been, but I don't remember.
2	Q. Yes, okay.	2	Q. Right, okay.
3	Can I then just ask you about a document which you	3	A. Because I was kind of, you know, concentrating on what
4	won't have seen before, but I will explain it to you.	4	I was supposed to be doing.
5	It is LFB00003113.	5	Q. Okay.
6	Now, these are manuscript notes made by Andy Hearn,	6	A. I wasn't really, you know that was going on in my
7	who chaired a control room debriefing on 24 July 2017 to	7	background.
8	review control room activity in the light of the	8	Q. Right, okay.
9	incident. You can see who was there at that meeting, if	9	Can I then ask you this: did you see any other
10	we can just, I think, go back to that.	10	whiteboards apart from these two?
11	You, I think, weren't present.	11	A. No, I don't think so.
12	A. I wasn't present, no.	12	Q. Okay. Let me just, if I can, finally run this to
13	Q. If you go, please, to page 4 of that note, you will see	13	ground.
14	that halfway down the page, it says:	14	Can I ask you to please be shown MET00018229.
15	"SM Oliff arrives - offers help.	15	(Pause)
16	"- opens up line with CU.	16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We have a problem, Mr Millett.
17	"- all FSGs pass this way.	17	MR MILLETT: Right, okay, that will shorten things.
18	"- mobile phone - personal mobile. * No other way."	18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Is that going to be
19	In the light of what you have been telling us this	19	MR MILLETT: No, it is not a problem at all.
20	morning about this hour or so of overlap between mobile	20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right.
21	messages and radio messages going to the incident ground	21	MR MILLETT: Standing back from the activity, were you
22	we have seen, is it right that there was no other way	22	aware, or are you aware, of any efforts being made by
23	after Station Manager Oliff arrived that FSG messages	23	anybody in the control room to identify or record or
24	were passed to the incident ground?	24	transfer to the incident ground any emerging themes that
25	A. It is quite obvious from the log that I was passing	25	were coming out of the FSG calls?
	Page 17		Page 19
1	them, and I know I passed them, so it is incorrect;	1	A. Not really. Because I wasn't taking any, I wasn't
2	there was an overlap.	2	really having that role. I was just concentrating on
3	Q. Yes.	3	the radio and the messages coming to me. So no, not
4	Can I show you the whiteboards which Mr Oliff set up	4	really.
5	and which he wrote on.	5	Q. Were you aware of any plan being implemented within the
6	These are if I can just give you the	6	control room to deal with the very high number of calls
7	references MET00018229.	7	that were coming in, apart from the whiteboard system
8	Perhaps I could start with an easier document,	8	that we have seen?
	Mr Documents Director. Scrub that request.	9	A. No.
9 10	Can I show you first of all, Ms Darby I am sorry,	10	Q. Do you remember whether any thought was given to
11	this is slightly more tricky. If you start with	11	bringing in further staff, further control room
12	MET00016912 and, at the same time, MET00016906, and just	12	officers, to man the phones?
13	have those two on the screen at the same time, if we	13	A. I don't know.
13	can, please.	14	Q. Were you aware of any plans to direct calls to I call
15	Now, these are two whiteboards which Mr Oliff told	15	them "buddy control rooms", spill-over control rooms?
16	us he was working off on the night, and Mr Fenton did	16	A. That might have happened automatically because of the
17	the same.	17	we do have a buddy control room that would take excess
18	Do they look familiar to you?	18	calls, so that may well have happened.
19	A. Yes, they were in the control room.	19	Q. Yes.
20	Q. Right.	20	A. Well, it did happen, but yes.
21	A. Yes.	21	As regards to staff, I know a couple of members of
22	Q. Did you see people writing on these boards?	22	staff from other watches did come in, obviously a lot
23	A. Well, yes, but I can't remember the detail of that.	23	later in the incident, but there was two, I think, that
24	Q. Right.	24	did come in.
25	A. Obviously Jason Oliff was writing on there. Someone	25	Q. Right. Okay.
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	Page 18		Page 20
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1	Just following up on what you just said about when	1	change in advice to the incident ground at all?
2	you were on the radio, did there come a time when you	2	A. I can't remember. I don't recall.
3	stopped sending FSG radio messages?	3	Q. Did she ask you to record it on Vision?
4	A. There would have eventually, yes. I think it was around	4	A. If she had, I would have done. So
5	03.00, just after 03.00 or something.	5	Q. Yes.
6	Q. Yes, that is what we get from the short incident log.	6	A. I don't recall.
7	A. Yes.	7	Q. Having observed Jo Smith going round telling everybody
8	Q. That is consistent	8	that the advice had changed, was there a reason why you
9	A. Yes, and after that, I wouldn't have passed any more on.	9	didn't record it on the Vision System?
	•	1	•
10	Q. We have a radio message sent at 07.51.24, which is	10	A. No. No.
11	LFB00003072, you can see that time mark from the top,	11	Q. Is it something that you would normally have recorded on
12	and that says.	12	the Vision system?
13	"FEMALE SPEAKER: Charlie Uniform 7, Charlie Uniform	13	A. Not necessarily me. Someone might have done. But at
14	7 from M2FN, over."	14	that point, you can imagine what the room was like, and
15	A. Okay.	15	then having to tell people now, "You have actually to
16	Q. Were you still on the radio in the control room talking	16	get out". So I don't remember.
17	to CU7 at 07.51 am?	17	Q. Okay.
18	A. No, I think I had gone off duty by then.	18	Do you know whether any consideration was given to
19	Q. Did anybody tell you to stop sending FSG messages by	19	calling back callers who had been told previously to
20	radio when you say you did stop at around about 03.10?	20	stay put, and now telling them that the advice has
21	A. I don't remember. It is possible, but I don't remember.	21	changed and they should now do everything they can to
22	If I had got a service request, I would, you know if	22	leave?
23	it was sent to me, I would pass it over.	23	A. So to ring I mean, I can tell you if you want me
24	Q. Right.	24	to just recall on that night, then no.
25	A. I don't recall it someone just suddenly saying,	25	Q. Right.
	Page 21		Page 23
1	"Don't send any more". I don't recall.	1	A. It wouldn't be easy to find all of the numbers to call
2	Q. Do you remember if anybody told you to stop sending	2	those people back, and there was still a big queue of
3	messages by radio?	3	999 calls waiting.
4	A. No, I don't recall that.	4	Q. Right.
5	Q. Could I ask you to go back to your statement, please,	5	When you say a big queue of 999 calls waiting, how
6	and go to page 6.	6	do control room operators see the queue?
7	Now, in your statement, in the first paragraph of	7	A. On the emergency call button that is coming in for
8	page 6, about halfway down, you say:	8	an emergency call, it will have the number of calls on
9	"I was aware that later in the night Joanne SMITH,	9	there. I don't remember taking note of them, but there
10	the Senior Operations Manager, had gone around telling	10	was emergency calls waiting.
11	everyone that the policy had changed and that they were	11	Q. Where you were sitting as a radio operator, obviously
12	to tell residents to get out by whatever means they	12	you said you had the Vision system open in front of you.
13	could and as safely as possible."	13	A. Yes.
14	A. Yes.	14	Q. Would you also be able to see for yourself a list of
15	Q. "I cannot remember what time this was, nor who actually	15	queued calls?
16	made the decision but I know from that moment the CROs	16	A. Yes, it is all on the ICS system, the ICS telephone
17	told whichever caller the updated change."	17	system, which has the radio and the telephone system all
18	Did you see for yourself or hear Jo Smith going	18	on it.
19	round telling everybody of the change in the advice?	19	Q. And so at that moment and I know it is hard to
20	A. Yes.	20	remember exactly when Jo Smith was telling the CROs
21	Q. Now, we know that it was changed in the control room	21	that the advice had changed, do you remember roughly how
22	between 02.30 and 02.50, as the outer limits of the	22	long this list of numbers was?
23	time. We have been told that by Adrian Fenton, and	23	A. I am sorry, I can't.
24	other witnesses.	24	Q. I mean, was it a handful, or was it
25	My question is: did Jo Smith ask you to relay that	25	A. No, more than that. It was a lot, but I can't remember.
23			
23	Page 22		Page 24

		1	
1	Q. Did you recognise any repeat numbers that kept coming up	1	Q. Now, given that you weren't taking calls, you may not be
2	at any time?	2	able to help me very much with this, but let me see if
3	A. No, you don't see the phone number coming in, you see	3	I can explore it.
4	just the amount.	4	Can I ask you to be shown LFB00003625.
5	Q. What does it actually say on the screen that records the	5	Now, you won't know what this document is, but it is
6	ICS system?	6	the Essex County Fire and Rescue Service log for
7	A. It is just a red button with actually you do see	7	14 June 2017. If we have a scroll down to page 4 at the
8	I am trying to imagine it.	8	time mark of 01.58, I think one has to go to the bottom
9	So you would see maybe the top number. After that	9	of the page, you can see at 01.58, "General", it says:
10	you wouldn't see the numbers. The phone number, sorry.	10	"G102 DO Dilley NILO PAGED TO INFORM."
11	Q. Right.	11	And then it runs into the next line which is:
12	A. You wouldn't see all of the phone numbers that are in	12	"HAVE TRIED RINGING LFB DIRECT BUT THERE IS NO
13	that queue, all you would see is the amount of calls	13	ANSWER.
14	waiting.	14	"WE ARE AWARE THAT THEY HAVE A MAJOR HIGH RISE FIRE
15	Q. I see. So I am just trying to get a visual picture in	15	AS BT GLASGOW ASKED IF WE COULD TAKE SOME OF THE
16	my own mind about this. It is difficult. We will get	16	OVERFLOW CALLS. AS THERE WERE TOO MANY FOR THEIR FALL
17	there.	17	BACK SERVICE BT STATED IF THIS BECAME A PROBLEM FOR
18	So you see the first number, the one that has got to	18	ECFRS [Essex] THEN TO RING THEM BACK ON THE SECURE
19	the front of the queue?	19	NUMBER AND THEY WOULD STOP THE CALLS."
20	A. Yes.	20	Do you know, or did you know, that Essex was trying
21	Q. And you see that number, do you?	21	to get through to London with overflow calls that had
22	A. I think God, I do it every day, and I should know.	22	been sent there way by BT Glasgow, or BT at all?
23	Q. I know the feeling.	23	A. I wasn't aware at the time, but I know that Essex did
24	A. Yes, you do see the first one.	24	take a lot of calls for us and they might have spoken
25	Q. Yes, okay.	25	to they might have tried to get through to one of the
	Page 25		Page 27
1	A. And then after that, it is just the amount of calls.	1	control officers, but obviously they would have got in
2		1 1	control officers, but obviously they would have got in
	() I see Does that come up as a number saying ten or	1 2	the queue
	Q. I see. Does that come up as a number, saying ten or four or	2 3	the queue.
3	four or	3	Q. Yes.
3 4	four or A. For the amount of calls, yes.	3 4	Q. Yes. A. Or they might — whether they spoke to an officer of the
3 4 5	four or A. For the amount of calls, yes. Q. For the amount of calls waiting?	3 4 5	Q. Yes.A. Or they might whether they spoke to an officer of the watch and passed them over, I am not sure.
3 4 5 6	four or A. For the amount of calls, yes. Q. For the amount of calls waiting? A. Yes.	3 4 5 6	 Q. Yes. A. Or they might whether they spoke to an officer of the watch and passed them over, I am not sure. Q. Right.
3 4 5 6 7	four or A. For the amount of calls, yes. Q. For the amount of calls waiting? A. Yes. Q. I see. So you have a number that is waiting to be taken	3 4 5 6 7	 Q. Yes. A. Or they might whether they spoke to an officer of the watch and passed them over, I am not sure. Q. Right. There is a reference there to the LFB direct line;
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3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	four or A. For the amount of calls, yes. Q. For the amount of calls waiting? A. Yes. Q. I see. So you have a number that is waiting to be taken that has come to the front of the queue, and then after that it is the number of calls that are waiting? A. Yes. Q. But not the actual telephone numbers of the calls lined up in the queue? A. Yes. Q. I follow. That is very clear, thank you. Did you know for yourself that in fact there were callbacks done during the night to some numbers? A. No, I am not aware. Q. Did you hear about or become aware of any calls that had come to the London control room at Stratford through other control rooms where they had called back? A. Yes, I mean I'd passed some of them over the radio, hadn't I? But I wasn't taking the calls, so I wasn't really Q. No, okay.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. Yes. A. Or they might whether they spoke to an officer of the watch and passed them over, I am not sure. Q. Right. There is a reference there to the LFB direct line; do you know what that is? A. We have a number that we ring direct to get through to Essex, and they probably have the same for us. On our ICS system, there is a button for Essex, and I expect but that will just go to the control operator. Q. Right. Is it a designated line? A. Yes. Q. Did you hear it ringing? A. It would get in the queue, that is the thing, it wouldn't come up as a priority over the queue, if it is that number. Q. Right. Have you any idea why there was no answer from that direct line? A. Only that it was in the queue. Q. Right. A. Only that it was in the queue. Q. Right. A. And we were taking other calls. I mean, we were really,

1	Q. Who was manning that direct line, do you know?	1	gone to the I haven't got a very good understanding.
2	A. No, it wasn't — what I am trying to say is if it is the	2	He takes a national role. So if there is a major
3	line I am thinking of, it just goes in with all of the	3	incident, he would probably have been informed of that.
4	other emergency calls.	4	Q. I follow. I see. Okay.
5	Q. Oh, I see, okay.	5	Well, we saw the major incident, of course, was
6	Now, if you can be taken on in the document, which	6	declared at 02.06.38, but there is a reference to NILO
7	means I think going up to the time mark of 02.03, it is	7	earlier than that, so there may be a time mismatch.
8	a similar question, I just want to pick it up.	8	But do you know who the NILO in the Stratford
9	We get some more information there and then I think	9	control room would have been?
10	a little bit further up the page, just to give it some	10	A. I don't we haven't got a NILO in Stratford.
11	context, it says, under the time mark of 02.04:	11	Q. You don't have a NILO?
12	"G102 DO DILLEY INFORMED AND SITUATION EXPLAINED.	12	A. No.
13	"HE WILL TRY AND MAKE CONTACT.	13	Q. Okay. How does it work?
14	"HE SUGGESTS THAT IF WE GET FURTHER CALLS FROM	14	A. Not in Stratford. There might be someone we could page
15	RESIDENTS POLICY UNTIL WE CAN CLARIFY WHAT ADVICE SHOULD	15	but I am not
16	BE GIVEN.	16	Q. Right, okay.
17	"HE ALSO ASKED THAT WE CONTINUE TO TRY TO CONTACT	17	When a major incident is declared
18	LFB REGARDING CALLER ON 22ND FLOOR.	18	A. The National Resource Centre is based Yorkshire, I
19	"NO ANSWER FROM LFB VIA DIRECT LINE."	19	think, it is Yorkshire.
20	First of all, do you happen to know who DO Dilley	20	Q. Right.
21	is?	21	A. Yes.
22	A. No.	22	Q. When a major incident is declared, does that, to your
23	Q. Again, at that time and this is an interesting time,	23	understanding, trigger or stand up NILOs in regional
24	because it is just before Jason Oliff's first mobile	24	fire rescue services?
25	call to CU8 do you remember Essex Fire and Rescue	25	A. Well, I think, as I explained yesterday, a major
	Page 29		Page 31
1	trying to get hold of the London control room?	1	incident, the supervisors would be dealing more with the
2	A. No.	2	actions and the notification of who to inform, so I am
3	Q. Okay.	3	not too familiar with that.
4	Then at 02.08, just finally on this document, just	4	Q. Right.
5	a little bit further up it says:	5	Then if we go up the document a bit further to the
6	"G102 DO DILLEY WILL TRY AND CONTACT LFB VIA HIS	6	time mark of 02.14 and again, Ms Darby, you may not
7	NILO LINE."	7	
		8	be able to help with this, so I won't take very long
8	And I should have told you NILO is national	1 0	over this a third of the way down the page it says:
Ω	inter a constituit of the constitution of the		"Compared ON THE OPENER L TOWER RECENER ATION THERE
9	inter-agency liaison officer. Do you know that?	9	"General. ON THE GRENFELL TOWER REGENERATION THERE
10	A. I have heard of that.	9 10	IS A EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH.
10 11	A. I have heard of that. Q. It says:	9 10 11	IS A EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH. "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE
10 11 12	A. I have heard of that. Q. It says: "HE HAS TAKEN ADDRESS DETAILS OF THE CALLER AT THE	9 10 11 12	IS A EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH. "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY
10 11 12 13	A. I have heard of that. Q. It says: "HE HAS TAKEN ADDRESS DETAILS OF THE CALLER AT THE LOCATION WHO HAS ASKED FOR ADVICE."	9 10 11 12 13	IS A EMERGENCY FIRE ARRANGEMENT PARAGRAPH. "THEIR POLICY STATES TO STAY PUT UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED, GRENFELL WAS DESIGNED TO RIGOROUS FIRE SAFETY STANDARDS.
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		_	
1	control room to have detailed knowledge about a building	1	A. No.
2	like this?	2	MR MILLETT: Okay.
3	A. I don't know.	3	Ms Darby, thank you very much. I have come to the
4	Q. No. Okay.	4	end of my questions, and, Mr Chairman, I think it is
5	Have you ever heard of something called a talk	5	probably now appropriate we take a short break.
6	group?	6	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
7	A. Yes, yes, the a radio-type to do with the radio.	7	MR MILLETT: And
8	Q. Okay.	8	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You may discover some more.
9	If you look at the time mark of 02.16 on the same	9	MR MILLETT: We may.
10	page, while we are on it, it says, 02.16:	10	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, all right. That is a good
11	"General. DO DILLEY HAS TRIED ALL THE TALK GROUPS	11	point to have a break.
12	AND HAS NOT GOT A RESPONSE."	12	It may be that there will be a few more questions,
13	In that context, can you help us with what a talk	13	we shan't know until afterwards.
14	group is?	14	THE WITNESS: Okay.
15	A. It might just be another radio channel that Essex would	15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, so we will stop now until
16	try and speak to sorry, I am not really, it is just	16	10.35. Please don't talk to anyone, again, about your
17	another radio channel.	17	evidence while you are out of the room.
18	Q. Radio channel, okay. It is not a group, is it, of radio	18	THE WITNESS: No.
19	operators all in different areas?	19	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And then when we come back we will
20	A. Yes, if we went on to Essex's ground, for example, to	20	see whether there are any more to ask you.
21	assist, we sent someone, we would tell them the talk	21	THE WITNESS: Okay.
22	group so they could tune into Essex's radio.	22	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right. Would you like to go
23	Q. I see, okay. So is this simply a radio channel between	23	with the usher? Thank you very much.
24	fire and rescue service control rooms?	24	(The witness withdrew)
25	A. I believe so.	25	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, 10.35, then, please.
			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	Page 33		Page 35
1	O. A modio chammal altern	,	(10.22 am)
1	Q. A radio channel, okay.	1	(10.22 am)
2	A. Yes, it is a radio.	2	(A short break)
2 3	A. Yes, it is a radio.Q. Is that part of channels 1 to 6 that we have been	2 3	(A short break) (10.35 am)
2 3 4	A. Yes, it is a radio.Q. Is that part of channels 1 to 6 that we have been talking about so far?	2 3 4	(A short break) (10.35 am) SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, did you discover some more
2 3 4 5	A. Yes, it is a radio.Q. Is that part of channels 1 to 6 that we have been talking about so far?A. It might be not necessarily. Because we have the	2 3 4 5	(A short break) (10.35 am) SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, did you discover some more questions, Mr Millett?
2 3 4 5 6	 A. Yes, it is a radio. Q. Is that part of channels 1 to 6 that we have been talking about so far? A. It might be not necessarily. Because we have the FLONS and that. 	2 3 4 5 6	(A short break) (10.35 am) SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, did you discover some more questions, Mr Millett? MR MILLETT: I was given some more questions, but just one
2 3 4 5 6 7	 A. Yes, it is a radio. Q. Is that part of channels 1 to 6 that we have been talking about so far? A. It might be — not necessarily. Because we have the FLONS and that. Q. Yes. 	2 3 4 5 6 7	(A short break) (10.35 am) SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, did you discover some more questions, Mr Millett? MR MILLETT: I was given some more questions, but just one or two short ones, and they are short. So if we could
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1	passed over calls saying that the callers are trapped on	1	Do you know what he did in order to procure, gather,
2	the 16th and 17th floors. Over."	2	EDBA equipment from around London?
3	My question is: do you know who received the police	3	A. That would be his job. I don't know.
4	calls?	4	MR MILLETT: You don't know. Okay.
5	A. They could be police calls from the police control room,	5	Yes, thank you very much, Ms Darby, I have no
6	and they would come through as emergency calls, so the	6	further questions for you. I am very grateful indeed to
7	control operators would have taken those.	7	you for coming here and assisting us with our
8	Q. Yes, right.	8	investigations, so thank you very much.
9	A. And we did have some calls from the police helicopter,	9	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
10	and that would have been the supervisors.	10	MR MILLETT: Thank you.
11	Q. Right, okay, that was my next question.	11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I would add my thanks to those of
12	Did anybody in the control room during the night	12	Mr Millett. It has been very helpful to hear how the
13	monitor the helicopter radio channel?	13	control room works, at least from the perspective of the
14	A. They monitor the emergency service radio, which is on	14	radio operator, so thank you very much for coming.
15	the supervisor's desk.	15	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
16	Q. Right.	16	MR MILLETT: Thank you.
17	A. And the police helicopter would have, I think, spoken to	17	(The witness withdrew)
18	them on that, I believe.	18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.
19	Q. I see. So it wouldn't be you?	19	MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman, we now have another witness,
20	A. No, it is not me.	20	whom Mr Kinnier is going to examine.
21	Q. Okay.	21	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
22	A. It is the supervisors and then the supervisor would pass	22	MR MILLETT: Firefighter Beale. I am going to vacate the
23	the information to me	23	lectern for a short time for him to do that.
24	Q. Okay.	24	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
25	A to pass on to the ground.	25	MR MILLETT: It may be sensible to have another very short
	Page 37		Page 39
1	O. Dicht. Thenk von	1	break now while we
1	Q. Right. Thank you.	2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Just to reorganise the furniture.
2	Finally, just a question on resourcing.	3	_
3	Do you know who in the control room on the night was responsible for resourcing, such as getting EDBA to the	4	MR MILLETT: Exactly. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, I will rise for
4 5	fire ground?	5	five minutes. Back at 10.45, please.
6	A. Well, the fire ground requested resources as part of	6	MR MILLETT: Thank you.
7	so is that what you mean?	7	(10.40 am)
8	Q. Yes.	8	(A short break)
_	A. Yes, so the fire ground, they requested EDBA. Extra	9	(10.45 am)Kinnier
9 10	EDBA.	10	MR KINNIER: Good morning, sir.
11	Q. Okay.	11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Kinnier.
12	Following on from that, then, they request that,	12	MR KINNIER: May I call Watch Manager Stuart Beale.
13	that request comes to the control room.	13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
13	A. Yes.	14	STUART BEALE (sworn)
15	Q. And then is it right that somebody in the control	15	Questions by MR KINNIER
16	room	16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Mr Beale.
17	A. Arranges that.	17	Now, I gather you would you like to sit down.
18	Q arranges that, or procures	18	THE WITNESS: Yes, please.
19	A. Yes.	19	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Do that and make yourself
20	Q. Who was it?	20	comfortable.
21	A. I think it was supervisors that sorted that out, because	21	Right. Yes, Mr Kinnier.
22	call-takers were tied up with call-taking. I believe	22	MR KINNIER: First of all, would you mind confirming your
23	that Peter May — I stand corrected, but I think it was	23	name for the record.
24	Peter May.	24	A. Stuart Kenneth Beale.
25	Q. Yes, we think so too.	25	Q. Thank you very much for coming along to give evidence
23	2 20,		Z and James J and the common and the Brita a second
i	Page 38	1	Daga 40
	1 age 30		Page 40

		_	
1	today. It is very much appreciated.	1	A. We don't have a facility within the LFB to replicate
2	Now, in front of you, you will see a blue folder.	2	an external fire on a tower or on a high-rise of any
3	Hopefully behind the first tab you will find two	3	distinct height.
4	statements. The first is dated 6 July 2017, and is	4	There are training notes to do with building
5	seven pages long, and then, if you turn further in	5	construction and building products and materials that we
6	behind that tab, hopefully you will find your second	6	will use by means of a PowerPoint presentation at
7	statement, which is three pages long, and dated	7	station, and then obviously there are other elements of
8	26 March; is that right?	8	exterior firefighting, whether that be covering jets,
9	A. Yes, sir.	9	using aerial appliances to put water curtains on the
10	Q. And if you go behind the final tab, hopefully you will	10	outside of the building, which we would practically
11	find your contemporaneous note; is that right?	11	practice at a station or other venues.
12	A. That's correct, sir.	12	Q. So have you given any particular training regarding the
13	Q. Have you read those three documents recently?	13	particular risk posed by cladding on high-rise fires?
14	A. Yes, I have.	14	A. No.
15		15	Q. And have you received any such training?
16	Q. Do you confirm that the contents are true?A. Yes, they are.	16	A. No.
	,	17	
17	Q. Are you content for those documents to stand as your		Q. Now, the first topic I would like to discuss with you
18	evidence to the inquiry?	18	relating to the incident is the handover, and if I could
19	A. Yes, I am.	19	ask you to turn to your first witness statement, page 3.
20	Q. Now, as I have said to other witnesses, I am not going	20	It is the sixth paragraph on that page, which is just
21	to go through your statements or contemporaneous notes	21	below halfway. It starts with the words:
22	line by line; there are just particular topics I would	22	"At the time we arrived the incident was just being
23	like to discuss with you.	23	handed over from a North Kensington Watch Manager to an
24	Now, if at any time my questions are unclear, please	24	incident commander."
25	say so and I will rephrase them.	25	First of all, do you know the North Kensington watch
	Page 41		Page 43
1	Finally, if you feel the need for a break at any	1	manager to be Mike Dowden?
2	time, just shout.	2	A. Yes, I do.
3	-	3	Q. Did you know that at the time?
4	A. Okay, thank you, sir.Q. Now, if we can deal, first of all, with basics.	4	A. Yes, I did.
5		5	Q. How did you know this was a handover?
	Is it right that you have been in the LFB now for		
6	more than 22 years?	6	A. I had been to the command unit previous to this, so it
7	A. Yes, I transferred from Surrey Fire and Rescue Service,	7	doesn't sit right with the statement, but from leaving
8	which I joined in 1995. I transferred into the LFB in	8	the command unit and coming to the south-east corner of
9	2000.	9	the tower, Watch Manager Dowden was in the process of
10	Q. Thank you.	10	talking to a station manager. Myself and approximately
11	In June 2017, you held the same rank as you do	11	three other watch managers were standing next to him,
12	today, namely watch manager; is that right?	12	listening to the information. I believe the information
13	A. Yes, sir.	13	that he was giving him was part of a handover.
14	Q. And in June 2017, as you are today, you were based at	14	Q. Okay, if I can stop you there, just taking each element
15	Soho and allocated to the Red Watch.	15	of that.
16	A. That's correct.	16	First of all, you went over to him with three other
17	Q. On the night in question, you were mobilised at 01.30,	17	watch managers.
18	on the road at 01.32, and arrived at the tower about	18	A. No, no, there was watch managers congregating around him
19	01.46; is that about right?	19	as he was talking to that group of people.
20	A. It is about right, sir, yes.	20	Q. Can you identify those three watch managers?
21	Q. Now, first of all, may I ask you just some brief	21	A. Obviously myself was there, Watch Manager Sadler from
22	questions about training.	22	Lambeth, and at some point it may have been Watch
23	First of all, what training have you given regarding	23	Manager Glynn Williams that had joined us, but I don't
24	fires involving external cladding on high-rise	24	know that for definite.
25	buildings?	25	Q. Do you know the identity of the station manager to whom
	Daga 42		Daga 44
	Page 42		Page 44
			11 (Pages 41 to 44)

1	Mike Dowden was handing over?	1	the words that were used in the conversation that you
2	A. I think it was Station Manager Walton.	2	had with Mr Dowden?
3	Q. You say you think; is that because do you know him,	3	A. It would be something along the lines of, "Hi, Mike,
4	first of all?	4	what have you got? What do you want me to do? What
5	A. I do know him, and since that incident I have been given	5	have you done up to now?" and just the basics. It would
6	evidence; I know now who it was.	6	have been a very brief, very short conversation. It
7	Q. Now, by the time you joined the gaggle of watch managers	7	wouldn't have been very detailed.
8	next to Mr Dowden and Mr Walton	8	Q. What did he say to you? What orders did he give you?
9	A. Yes.	9	A. He didn't give me any orders because, at that point,
10	Q first of all, can you give us the words or the gist	10	a station manager turned up into our conversation and he
11	of the words that you overheard Mr Dowden say to	11	proceeded to talk to the station manager about what had
12	Mr Walton?	12	happened up to that point.
13	A. Watch Manager Dowden was in the process of telling him	13	Q. And did the station manager presumably Walton give
14	the situation that he had been called to originally,	14	you any orders as to what to do next?
15	a fire on the 4th floor, which they believed to be	15	A. No.
16	a kitchen fire, and that his crews had come out of the	16	Q. Did anyone give you a briefing as to the strategic
17	building to find, obviously, the exterior of the	17	objectives for the firefighting plan?
18	building was alight, and the resources that he had and	18	A. No.
19	the tactics he had implemented to that point, and the	19	Q. Did anyone give you a direction there as to what you
20	resources he had ordered on and what he had in	20	were going to do and what to do once you got there?
21	attendance.	21	A. No. As they were carrying out what I believe to be
22	But I never physically saw the end of that handover,	22	a handover, I was called away by my aerial crew,
23	or him physically give the tabard to Station Manager	23	Alpha 245, who were on the east section, or the east
24	Walton.	24	side of the building, the tower.
25	Q. Did you hear any discussion of a summary of the	25	Q. Okay.
	Page 45		Page 47
		l .	
1	anditions within the tower?	1	Now before we leave the topic of the handaver if
1	conditions within the tower?	1	Now, before we leave the topic of the handover, if
2	A. No, I didn't.	2	I could ask you to turn to your second witness statement
2 3	A. No, I didn't.Q. Was there any discussion of the extent to which fire had	2 3	I could ask you to turn to your second witness statement at page 2, and it will come up on the screen, seven
2 3 4	A. No, I didn't.Q. Was there any discussion of the extent to which fire had penetrated from the exterior to the interior of the	2 3 4	I could ask you to turn to your second witness statement at page 2, and it will come up on the screen, seven lines from the bottom, you say:
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2 3 4 5 6 7	 A. No, I didn't. Q. Was there any discussion of the extent to which fire had penetrated from the exterior to the interior of the fire? A. No. Q. Was there any discussion you overheard of the system for 	2 3 4 5 6 7	I could ask you to turn to your second witness statement at page 2, and it will come up on the screen, seven lines from the bottom, you say: "When I turned up the initial incident commander was trying to carry out a handover brief" Just looking at that word "trying", it tends to give
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1	A. I can't remember, sir, sorry.	1	them.
2	Q. Can you remember whether Watch Manager Glynn Williams	2	Q. So you assumed sector command rather than being
3	contributed?	3	designated; would that be fair?
4	A. I can't remember that either.	4	A. For want of a different statement, yes, sir.
5	Q. Okay.	5	Q. Thank you.
6	The next topic I would like to discuss with you is	6	Can you give us an idea, what is the role and the
7	the question of sector command, and if I could ask you	7	principal function of the officer in command of
8	to turn back to your first witness statement at page 3,	8	a particular sector?
9	the final paragraph. You say there:	9	A. So within a larger-scale incident, as obviously Grenfell
10	"I saw both crews leave my location and make their	10	was, it is broken down into different sections, or in
11	way towards the main entrance to the tower located on	11	this case sectors, where the tower is broken down from
12	the South side. I was then designated as OIC in charge	12	each side into sections 1, 2, 3, 4. It gives the
13	of Sector 4 which was the East side of the Tower. I had	13	officer in charge much greater command of the incident,
14	attended the Command Unit set up which is in a mobile	14	for you to be able to focus on one specific task, area
15	truck stationed on Grenfell Road."	15	or location, and to feed information back to give them
16	Now, if we can take a few steps back, how long after	16	a better overall command and control position.
17	arriving at the scene did you present yourself at the	17	Q. Once you assumed command of that sector, did you radio
18	command unit?	18	either command unit or the bridgehead to say that is
19	A. We sort of entered towards Grenfell Road from Bomore	19	what you had done?
20	Road, stepped off of the truck. I had already detailed	20	A. I sent a lot of messages that night via handheld radio
21	my crews to take the BA with them en route. Because of	21	and also by runner. I can't remember physically doing
22	the traffic we had heard en route to the fire, it was	22	that, sir, no.
23	obvious they were going to need BA resources at the	23	Q. In your capacity as sector commander, to whom would you
24	tower.	24 25	report?
25	From that point, the natural protocol is to go to	23	A. The incident commander.
	Page 49		Page 51
1	a command unit or ICP or incident commander to find out	1	Q. Did you try and get a report through to Station Manager
2	what they needed you to do to assist them. As I walked	2	Walton or his successors at any stage to indicate that
3	towards the tower, I saw a command unit in Grenfell	3	you were the sector commander?
4	Road, so I proceeded to that to book in.	4	A. Yes, sir, and at one point I did have later on in the
5	Q. Can you remember at that stage whether it was CU7 or	5	incident, I had a conversation with an ops commander,
6	CU8?	6	and it had been discussed or confirmed over the radio
7	A. Crew Manager Meyrick was on that command unit. He was	7	that I was in sector 4 and running sector 4 and they
8	very busy at the time, either on the main scheme radio	8	were happy to leave that as that was.
9	or a phone, taking what I believed to be FSG and writing	9	There were a lot of radio messages backwards and
10	stuff down. So I didn't actually physically have	10	forwards, but the radio communication at times was
11	a conversation with him, which you usually would do.	11	strained, due to the traffic that was on the handheld
12	I left my nominal roll board on the desk so someone knew	12	fire ground radios.
13	we were in attendance and I left that command unit and	13	Q. Just going back a step to when you presented to the
14	proceeded on to the fire ground.	14	command unit, can you describe to us what the situation
15	Q. Thank you.	15	was like in the command unit at that stage?
16	Who designated you the officer in charge of the	16	A. Unusually, for an incident of that size, it was empty,
17	sector 4?	17	other than one officer on it, which was Watch Manager
18	A. No one; it was by default, really, more than anything	18	Meyrick. He was at the desk at the far end of the
19	else. While I was having a conversation with Watch	19	command unit, sitting down, and I don't know whether he
20	Manager Dowden, as I mentioned previously, my aerial	20	was on the main scheme radio or a handheld phone, but he
21	crew, which that night was Alpha 245, had ended up on	21	was furiously writing information down on to a notepad.
22	the east section of the building, situated on a grass	22	Q. Okay, thank you.
23	area located outside the tower. They were calling to me	23	Could I ask you apologies for jumping around.
24	saying they were having trouble getting a secure water	24	A. That is fine.
25	supply, and just by natural default, I went towards	25	Q. Could I ask you to turn to your second witness
		1	
	Page 50		Page 52

1	statement, page 2, and it is roughly halfway down the	1	incident commander generically, and I did that every
2	page, where you say:	2	time I thought there was something that had changed or
3	"I was in charge of the East side of the building	3	was relevant for me to update them on how that fire was
4	and was monitoring the North side of the tower as well."	4	progressing or manoeuvring across the building.
5	Did anybody place you in charge of monitoring the	5	Q. To give a practical example, what change would trigger
6	north side or was it you assumed that responsibility	6	a call to the command unit, just to give people
7	yourself?	7	a flavour of the threshold?
8	•	8	A. For example, we are obviously trying to send messages
9	A. That was self-appointed by location and default. Q. And you assumed that position at the same time you	9	
10	assumed command of sector 4?	10	via handheld radio, which became very difficult at
11		11	certain periods of time. I think in that evening I sent
12	A. Answer: yes.Q. Is being in charge of monitoring the same as being	12	possibly three handwritten messages by firefighter notepad and sent a runner. One of those was to say that
13	a sector commander?	13	I had noticed on the north side that the fire had then
14	A. It could be seen as that, yes, you are, but ultimately,	14	dropped down to the 4th floor. I had concerns, because
15	as the incident would progress and get larger, you would	15	I had been told, or I was aware, that the bridgehead was
16	have a monitoring officer basically sitting on your	16	on the 4th floor, and I wanted to get that information
17	shoulder and monitoring your actions, and as the	17	back to the bridgehead via the incident commander,
18	incident would increase, that would proceed through the	18	command unit or via the lobby sector, to let them know
19	different ranks.	19	that the smoke may have increased on that floor.
20	Q. In relation to your role as sector commander, did you	20	Q. Would you try and communicate directly with the
21	have a monitoring officer with you at any stage?	21	bridgehead, using that particular example, whether by
22	A. Unusually, at this incident, no, not for a very long	22	radio or by runner?
23	time.	23	A. No, that is not a usual fire ground procedure.
24	Q. And in respect of the north side of the tower, would you	24	Q. And why is that?
25	have had a monitoring officer bespoke to that side?	25	A. Because the incident commander ultimately needs to know
23	have had a momenting officer bespoke to that side:	23	A. Decause the incluent commander unumatery needs to know
	Page 53		Page 55
1	A. No, no.	1	all of the information. Now, an incident that size,
2	Q. What arrangements were put in place or did you have in	2	they put people in place, whether it is ops command or
3	place to allow you to command sector 4, the east side,	3	other officers, to be able to keep their spans of
4	to monitor what was going on on the north side? How did	4	control down to a level that they can deal with the
5	you do the two jobs, I suppose I am asking?	5	information. That one message about the fire on the
6	A. Right, so from the east side of the building, from the	6	e e
7	grass area that was on the east side of the Grenfell		north side. When it did aron down to the 4th floor.
		7	north side, when it did drop down to the 4th floor, I think the firefighter or the crew manager that
l X	Tower. I only had to take between 20 to 30 pages to see	7 8	I think the firefighter or the crew manager that
8	Tower, I only had to take between 20 to 30 paces to see the north and the south side of the tower, so from that	8	I think the firefighter or the crew manager that I designated to do that task I sent them to the
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1	fire spread?	1	location.
2	A. No.	2	Paul, could I ask you to turn up MET00016854.
3	Q. Could I ask you to stay in your second witness	3	Mr Beale, it may be more helpful looking at the
4	statement, second page, the second paragraph from the	4	screen above you.
5	bottom, and it is the final sentence which reads thus:	5	Are you able to pinpoint for us where the ALP from
6	"There was extensive external fire spread and an	6	Soho was parked?
7	unusual burn pattern."	7	A. Yes, well, rather conveniently, where the red arrow is
8	Could you explain to us what you considered to be	8	on the east side of the tower, that is the exact
9	unusual about the burn pattern?	9	location of the ALP.
10	A. Okay. So from initially turning up at Grenfell Tower,	10	Q. Can you describe for us the other sort of topographical
11	like I said before, the east side of the tower	11	features on the east side of the tower?
12	I described it as it was in three sections horizontally,	12	A. So the crew I think that night was Temporary Crew
13	section 1, 2 and 3 from left to right as I looked at it,	13	Manager Frost, and Firefighter King, who was the driver,
14	as I faced it, and the third section from level 4 to the	14	had been directed that was the only way they could get
15	23rd floor was alight, and it then progressed to the	15	access. There was no access to the north, south or west
16	second section and was burning downwards.	16	side of the tower. Paddington's TL was already in the
17	Now, obviously, fire can burn downwards. It is more	17	east south corner, directly next to the tower, so it was
18	unusual than common. And I ended up basically	18	the only location left to put a large appliance.
19	monitoring or observing a diagonal line from the top	19	They shouldn't have had it there in the first place
20	right-hand corner on the east side of Grenfell Tower,	20	because it is on grass. The aerial ladder platform
21	which was burning down towards the south-east corner.	21	weighs 23 tonnes. It is outside of policy to put it off
22	Q. Given your assessment that the fire was behaving in	22	of hardstanding. We made the decision that it was quite
23	an unusual manner, how did that inform your plan for	23	warm, the ground was quite hard, and it was a risk we
24	fighting the fire on the east side?	24	were prepared to take to set it up.
25	A. Really it was unusual, I had not seen it before, burn	25	The grass verge from where it was sitting sloped
	Page 57		Page 59
_			
1	like that. We didn't know how water would react on to	1	down towards the east side of the tower, and there was
2	the exterior of the building. We could see that the	2	a row of trees between us and the tower. Maybe three or
3	exterior cladding was involved. It was alight and	3	four trees.
4	burning, almost like a molten line diagonally across the	4	Q. Now, given those topographical features, to what extent
5	building which was slowly making its way down to the	5	could the ALP be used to rescue residents from the
6	bottom left-hand corner.	6	tower?
7	Q. We may come on to it later, but there was evidence given	7	A. We were restricted massively from how far away from the
8	by Firefighter Brown the reference is 23 June 2018,	8	tower we could get. With the perfect pitch, if you
10	page 34, line 3 and when he was directing water from	10	could get right underneath the tower, you could get the
10	flat 16 onto the cladding, he described the water as	10	cage on the ALP to the 9th and, at a push, maybe the
11	bouncing off.	11	10th floor. From where we were located, we couldn't
12	Is that a phenomenon you experienced from your	12	reach the tower with the cage.
13	sector on the east side?	13	Q. You described in the witness statement the nature and intensity of the debris falling down. Are you able to
14	A. No, the only thing you could compare it to is, like,	14	intensity of the debris falling down. Are you able to
15	a warehouse with sandwich panels that obviously has	15	amplify for us and describe for us the debris that was
16	a flammable material stuck in between two metal panels,	16	falling down from the tower?
17	and if you put water directly onto that, obviously it is	17	A. Yes, I put in place a sort of safe system of work,
18	designed are repel water. So where the exterior of the	18	because I was worried about the safety of the crews
19	building had broken down or decomposed enough, the water	19	operating the aerial. Obviously I have a firefighter in
20	would penetrate either behind the exterior facade and	20	a cage, which is in a very, you know, dangerous
21	the gap between that and the exterior of the building.	21	situation and a driver at the base of it. We sort of
22	Q. Okay.	22	designed a system amongst ourselves for safety, speaking
23	The next topic I would like to discuss with you is	23	and talking to each other.
24	the aerial ladder platform and water supply.	24	There was six-by-four-feet metal sheets falling off
25	First of all, the first topic, really, to discuss is	25	the building regularly, which would then plane and we
	Page 58		Page 60

1	couldn't predict where they were going to land. All of	1	the ALP to work.
2	us were covered at certain points throughout the	2	Q. Did they give you a summary, however expressed, of the
3	incident with molten plastic strands. The trees, for	3	efforts they had made to locate a water supply before
4	want of a better statement, looked like they had been	4	your arrival?
5	decorated with tinsel at the end of the incident. We	5	A. Yes, they had. They said they had been there we had
6	were covered in molten aluminium as well at different	6	concerns and I had concerns that there was already,
7	points that had dripped off the tower, and there was	7	obviously, a pumping appliance connected to Paddington's
8	other debris, insulation and other plastic debris that	8	aerial appliance and there was water going into the
9	had fallen off the side of the building.	9	building by means of a dry riser. In those
10	Q. Turning to a different question now, and that is the	10	circumstances, you are very aware that if you are then
11	question of pre-determined attendance.	11	going to set up an aerial appliance, you don't want to
12	Is it correct that, until recently, the attendance	12	starve that water supply because firefighters within the
13	of an aerial appliance was a pre-determined attendance	13	building need firefighting media.
14	requirement for all high-rise buildings?	14	Q. Moving from that, if you look on to the penultimate
15	A. Sorry, sir, could you repeat the question?	15	paragraph on page 4, you say you sent off two MDs to
16	Q. Yes, of course.	16	find a water supply and you said:
17	Is it correct that, until recently, attendance of	17	"The two MDs returned with A241 which just happened
18	an aerial was a pre-determined attendance at all	18	to be my appliance and they set to work getting a water
19	high-rise towers?	19	supply set up from a nearby hydrant."
20	A. Yes, the PDAs have changed recently for high-rise	20	Can you remember, after you dispatched them, how
21	buildings. They used to be on them many years ago, but	21	long it took for them to come back with Alpha 241?
22	they were taken off.	22	A. Maybe five minutes.
23	Q. Can you remember when they were taken off?	23	Q. Paul, might I ask you to turn up BLAR000000012_0011, and
24	A. Would you have to refer to the LFEPA, when they did	24	there we have figure 17.7 from Dr Lane's report.
25	that, sorry.	25	Mr Beale, I doubt you have seen this before.
	Page 61		Page 63
1	Q. Do you recall why?	1	A. No, sir.
1	Q. Do you recan why:	1 1	A. 110, 511.
2	A I wouldn't like to say A cost-cutting everyise		*
2	A. I wouldn't like to say. A cost-cutting exercise,	2	Q. You will see, marked in blue are the locations of the
3	I expect.	2 3	Q. You will see, marked in blue are the locations of the hydrants.
3 4	I expect. Q. Okay.	2 3 4	Q. You will see, marked in blue are the locations of the hydrants. Can you identify the location of the hydrant you
3 4 5	I expect. Q. Okay. Now, can I turn to the next topic, which is your	2 3 4 5	Q. You will see, marked in blue are the locations of the hydrants.Can you identify the location of the hydrant you used to supply Alpha 241, or rather the two MDs had
3 4 5 6	I expect. Q. Okay. Now, can I turn to the next topic, which is your initial observation of the ALP, and, apologies, could	2 3 4 5 6	Q. You will see, marked in blue are the locations of the hydrants.Can you identify the location of the hydrant you used to supply Alpha 241, or rather the two MDs had identified?
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1	a minute of water. That has to be supplied by	1	A. It would be very difficult to do that, but, ultimately,
2	a dedicated pump at 11.5 bars. Statistically, it states	2	like I said, with putting the appliance on hardstanding,
3	that from it is an open-ended monitor in the cage.	3	you do a dynamic risk assessment to see what the benefit
4	It has a reach, in an optimum situation, of 75 metres.	4	would be, if it outweighed the risk.
5	Q. The cage itself, how many people can it accommodate?	5	Q. What factors did you have in mind when you carried out
6	A. Four.	6	your dynamic risk assessment?
7	Q. Could it accommodate, for example, a wheelchair-bound	7	A. Well, the safety of my crews is my ultimate paramount
8	casualty as well?	8	obviously, there was residents in the building that
9	A. Depends how big the wheelchair is, I suppose,	9	needed rescuing, and we obviously had an external
10	ultimately. But we would be more concerned about	10	exterior of the building that was on fire that I wanted
11	getting the person out of their wheelchair and into the	11	to get some water onto, to try to assist, or make the
12	cage and down safely.	12	conditions better.
13	Q. Thank you.	13	Q. Just trying to get an understanding of what normal
14	Could I now ask you a few questions about the ALP	14	practice is, but would you agree that aerial appliances
15	and its use and getting it into position.	15	wouldn't normally be used for external firefighting in
16	You mentioned earlier on about the need for it to be	16	high-rise residential buildings until it had been
17	on a hardstanding	17	confirmed that there was no longer any life risk in the
18	A. Yes.	18	building?
19	Q and to avoid grass.	19	A. Yes, you have to be very careful, and even on the night
20	Assuming you find a hard place, stabilising jacks	20	of Grenfell if you set an aerial appliance up and had
21	need to be used; is that right?	21	optimum pressure and the perfect scenario, and managed
22	A. That's correct.	22	to put 2,240 litres of water a minute onto that building
23	Q. And then the ladder with the caged platform needs to be	23	and the exterior compartments of those buildings had
24	used as well?	24	fractured or decomposed, you would then change the
25	A. Correct.	25	conditions inside the building detrimentally, whether it
			g 3 ,
	Page 65		Page 67
1	Q. I recognise everything turns on particular	1	to be to firefighters or any residents in there
2	circumstances, but, as a general rule of thumb, how long	2	unrescued.
3	does it take to get the ALP in position, jacks, and then	3	Q. Is it possible that the use of either jets or sprays
4	the ladder raised?	4	from aerial appliances can make conditions worse, it
5	A. Only a few minutes. It doesn't take long at all. Under	5	seems to follow on from what you were saying, by
6	five to be set up.	6	preventing hot gases venting, et cetera?
7	Q. Do you know how long that process took at Grenfell	7	A. 100 per cent. In a situation like that, initially it
8	Tower, or had it taken place before you arrived?	8	would be used as a covering jet. So the aerial
9	A. It took a little bit longer because we had a discussion	9	operators would utilise the machine to make what is
10	about the hardstanding. We tried to put in place	10	called a water curtain. So, basically, the water
11	obviously I wasn't ideally happy that it was on grass	11	cascades down the front of the building exterior. You
12	and wasn't on tarmac or concrete, and I had spoken to	12	would be trying to avoid at all costs to put the jet
13	the driver and the firefighters to see if they were	13	straight into a window, say, at one of those flats,
14	prepared to even try and extend it and put it up,	14	because ultimately you are going to push the fire into
15	because obviously, ultimately, they are at risk.	15	the building, into the property, and then ingress into
16	We put a safe system of work in and monitored the	16	the communal areas.
17	jacks, and said we would divert any water run-off away	17	Q. Did all those factors inform the instructions you gave
18	from the grass to prevent it getting soft, and just	18	to your crew when they were operating the ALP?
19	monitored it consistently.	19	A. Yes, it did.
20	Q. Is it right that before an aerial appliance is used as	20	Q. Just understanding how that works in a practical
21	a water tower, a risk assessment should be carried out?	21	situation. Say you were aiming the jet or the spray at
22	A. That's correct.	22	a particular floor; would you co-ordinate with the
23	Q. Can you explain, how do you carry out that risk	23	command unit or the bridgehead to determine whether,
24	assessment in the situation which confronted you at	24	first of all, there were any residents to their
25	Grenfell?	25	knowledge within the flats that you were aiming at, or
	Page 66		Page 68

1	firefighters?	1	And you go on in the next paragraph to say this:
2	A. Yes, my initial plan with what I had in front of me was	2	"I did not know exactly why the pressure was that
3	to put a water curtain on the building. I could see the	3	low but it could have been for a number of reasons and
4	exterior was alight. The cladding was alight and there	4	there was nothing I could do at that time about the
5	was obviously this molten line working its way down the	5	mains water pressure."
6	building. That was my first aim.	6	Now, you refer there to a number of reasons. Could
7	Before I really put any water into an individual	7	you set out for us what those reasons were or could have
8	flat on a floor, it would have had to go through the	8	been?
9	incident commander, command unit and confirm with the	9	A. Okay, it is quite common for us to experience low water
10	bridgehead that we didn't have any firefighters in that	10	pressure in certain areas of London when we are
11	particular area.	11	firefighting. Obviously, at that situation, where we
12	Q. How is that confirmation secured, via radio, via the	12	were, there was a pumping appliance already supplying
13	runner or both?	13	a dry riser into Grenfell and there was an aerial
14	A. Ideally handheld radio. That night, it was a very busy	14	appliance from Paddington, Alpha 213, already in
15	incident and it would have been a mixture of handheld	15	operation. I didn't know I can't tell from looking
16	radio and it would have had to be runners.	16	at the surface whether the main that we plugged into was
17	Q. You say it would have been; my question is: was it	17	their main as well, and ideally you utilise the water
18	secured by	18	authority then they turn up basically with handheld
19	A. We didn't have the water supply we needed, so it never	19	tablets and they can tell us if there is a better main
20	reached that stage of having to speak to the incident	20	or a better water source near to us that we can utilise
21	commander to confirm whether he wanted to us do	21	instead of the one we plugged into, which will always be
22	aggressive firefighting into any floor of that building.	22	the nearest one to the location you are at.
23	Q. So we will come on to it later, but when you improvised	23	Q. When you were confronted with a problem such as low
24	using the hose reel, would you have informed the	24	water pressure, what are the usual work-arounds you will
25	incident commander of that improvisation and the start	25	try to get greater pressure to fight the fire more
	D (0		D 74
	Page 69		Page 71
1	of operation of that device?	1	
		1	effectively?
2	A. Ideally, yes, but on that night, no, I didn't do that.	2	effectively? A. Initially, I wasn't overly concerned. I mean,
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1	Q. We will come on to that a few stages ahead.	1	the three gentlemen, I think, with the handheld tablets.
2	But when you were confronted with this problem of	2	I spoke to them on the wall outside Kensington Leisure
3	water pressure, did you seek advice from any other	3	Centre. They said there was nothing they could do to
4	officer as to possible solutions to the problem?	4	improve the water pressure at that time. What I had,
5	A. There was no other officer in our area. I sent messages	5	383 litres a minute coming out of the ground, was the
6	via handheld radio back to the command unit to say	6	best I was going to get, and they were more concerned
7	obviously we were setting up Alpha 245 on the east	7	that within the next hour or two hours' time, the water
8	sector for external firefighting and I was having	8	pressure was going to drop due to the fact people would
9	trouble with water supplies. I did this a few times on	9	be utilising water in their surrounding premises.
10	the radio. I wasn't happy with the response that I got	10	Q. Okay.
11	via radio, and, again, sent a message via a runner.	11	Paul, I was wondering, can we go back, if possible,
12	Q. Now, to whom were the radio messages directed?	12	BLAR00000012_0011, and if we could magnify figure 17.7.
13	A. It would have been generic command unit or incident	13	The alternative hydrant you referred to there, can
14	commander.	14	you see it identified on that plan?
15	Q. And what responses did you get that you weren't content	15	A. No, sir.
16	with?	16	Q. Thank you.
17	A. Initially, I didn't get a response, and I think the	17	Going back to the search for an alternative hydrant,
18	second message I got a response to say that the water	18	would you have expected the MDT to give you locations of
19	officer, LFB water officer, was on site and was going to	19	alternative supplemental hydrants?
20	come over to the area and have a discussion with me	20	A. Yes, our usual protocol would be to go onto the MDT,
21	about what we were going to do.	21	onto the map. It is usually the driver's job, they will
22	Q. And did the water officer come over and have	22	identify the nearest location of the hydrants on the
23	a discussion as to possible solutions?	23	map. That night, the MDT was blank.
24	A. I can't remember that, sir, sorry.	24	Q. Thinking that through, how practicable would it have
25	Q. Did you try and update the bridgehead as to the problems	25	been to search for someone from the North Kensington
	Page 73		Page 75
1	you were having with water pressure	1	station to ask them whether they had any local knowledge
2	A. No.	2	of the location of any alternative hydrants?
3	Q. — or is that not an issue you had raised with the	3	A. It may have been a golden opportunity, but it is not one
4	bridgehead?	4	that we had.
5	A. It wouldn't be my remit to contact the bridgehead about	5	Q. One question that has arisen is: when you have asked the
6	that.	6	water undertaker, here Thames Water, to reduce the
7	Q. Given the difficulties you encountered with this	7	pressure, can you give us an idea of how long it takes
8	hydrant, did you take any steps to locate an alternative	8	for the water undertaker to reduce the pressure
9	hydrant?	9	A. Sorry, did you say reduce?
10	A. Yes, we did. So further up past Kensington Leisure	10	Q. Increase pressure, sorry.
11	Centre, I think the road is called Verity Close, which	11	A. It never seems to take that long. I couldn't give you
12	is the way that the appliance was taken in over the	12	an exact time.
13	block paving, the lads had found a further hydrant	13	Q. Okay.
14	further up the road. It was quite a long way up the	14	Now, given the water pressure issue, you referred in
15	road. They had run I don't know 10, 12 lengths of	15	your statement to the need for an alternative plan.
16	hose in from that hydrant. When they test the hydrant,	16	What plan did you formulate? Is it the
17	they obviously take the plate off the floor, connect	17	improvisation in which you used the hose reel?
18	a standpipe to it and ship it, or turn it on, as we	18	A. Yes, so obviously we have different jets, different
19	would call it, and they obviously see the water come	19	branches. As we said, the ideal would have been to have
20	out. So they were happy that the hydrant had a good	20	the monitor on the cage of the ALP working, but that is
21	pressure.	21	like an open-ended monitor. You can't dial it down or
22	But we never got to connect that hydrant to our	22	reduce the flow rate through it, it is set open. You
23	pumping appliance.	23	can reduce the width of the cone to a jet or widely out
24	Q. Why was that?	24	to a cone, but you can't reduce the flow rates, that is
25	A. That overlaid the time the water authority had arrived,	25	like the maximum amount.
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	Page 74		Page 76

1	So I tried different things, a ground monitor,	1	A. No.
2	different branches, and it was more luck than anything	2	Q. One point that has arisen is: are you aware that the
3	else, that Alpha 241 had been brought round by the two	3	comms system with the cage had also failed due to
4	guys that had gone off to get them. It's a brand new	4	a faulty transmitter?
5	Mercedes with this new high-pressure hose reel that we	5	A. Yes.
6	had on. It uses less water but still gave us	6	Q. Can you amplify what the particular problem was and when
7	a substantial jet. It is very similar to Rosenbauer 101	7	it started?
8	on on 230-litre setting on a 45-millimetre hose.	8	A. I don't know what the specific mechanical problem was
9	Q. How effective was that arrangement once you got it set	9	with it, but the operator of the cage is obviously in
10	up?	10	the cage at whatever height, up to 32 metres. They have
11	A. Once we got it set up and it was strapped to the cage,	11	a speaker set up on their dashboard which then
12	it was a little bit Heath Robinson, but we were	12	a secondary operator sits in a big chair at the bottom
13	desperate to do something to make some sort of stop on	13	of the ALP. Ultimately, they are in charge of the
14	the fire encroaching any further down the building. The	14	safety of the crew above, and if the crew in the cage
15	areas we worked it onto the facade on the outside, it	15	becomes overwhelmed, or something happens, they can take
16	seemed to stop it. In particular, one area we had	16	over at the bottom and override everything.
17	a gentleman trapped on I don't know, between the 11th	17	It became quite apparent quite soon, because Crew
18	and 13th floor, and we managed to stop the fire spread	18	Manager Frost was in the cage and was getting pelted
19	about a metre away from his window.	19	with debris, the same as Firefighter King who was on the
20	Q. And that was on the east side?	20	ALP at the base, and it didn't look like he was taking
21	A. On the east side.	21	any action to move himself away from the danger. We had
22	Q. Can you remember how long you used that arrangement for	22	a quick chat via the fire ground radio and managed to
23	in fighting the fire?	23	get a message through to him, and he said he was having
24	A. Five hours.	24	trouble controlling it, at which time I told him to move
25	Q. Now, turning to a new topic, again linked to the	25	it down and away from the tower.
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	- 484 11		- 40
1	operation of the ALP, and it is the slow movement you	1	Q. Did he suffer any injury?
2	referred to in your witness statement.	2	A. No.
3	If I could ask you to turn back to page 5 of your	3	Q. What effect did the problem regarding the slow movement
4	first witness statement, and it is the fifth paragraph,	4	of the ALP have on the effectiveness of the firefighting
5	which starts with the words:	5	operation?
6	"I then became aware of problem with the ALP itself.	6	A. Well, it pushed me towards having an unmanned cage, or
7	C/M Frost was still in the cage and very close to the	7	no personnel in the cage, because there wasn't the
8	burning debris still falling down. Normally the ALP has	8	facility for them to be able to manoeuvre that cage out
9	2 speeds and they would use the fast speed to manoeuvre	9	of the way should they have wished to.
10	away from danger. For some reason only the slow speed	10	Q. Again, same question in relation to the faulty comms
11	was working which meant that it took ages for them to	11	system: what effect did that have on the effectiveness
12	move out of danger and back down."	12	of the firefighting operation?
13	To the best of your knowledge, is this a problem you	13	A. Not a lot, really, because we reverted to hand signals
14	had encountered previously with this ALP?	14	and shouting at each other, basically.
15	A. Not specifically with that ALP, I can't remember a time.	15	Q. Okay.
16	We usually have a turntable ladder at Soho. The ALP was	16	Can I move to a new topic, and that is designation
17	a spare because our one was off for service.	17	as safety officer for the east side of the tower.
18	Historically, there has been an issue with them. They	18	If I could ask you to turn in your first witness
19	do break down. You would have to speak to fleet about	19	statement to page 6, nearly halfway down the page, you
20	why that happens or how often that happens, but they	20	say:
21	lock out, they go into slow mode.	21	"The Ops commander designated me as safety officer
22	I don't know if it is to do with the construction of	22	for the East Side."
23	them, being two different manufacturers strapped	23	First of all, can you remember who the ops commander
24	together, or what, but it has historically happened.	24	was at that stage?
25	Q. Were you able to solve this problem on the night?	25	A. No.
	D 70		D 00
	Page 78		Page 80
			20 (D 77 +- 90)

1	Q. Can you remember what rank he was?	1	Q. When you used the radio, were you using channel 3 or any
2	A. I don't know.	2	other channel to communicate?
3	Q. Given you were the sector commander, what additional	3	A. On the fire ground, I used my handheld radio on
4	duties would designation as safety officer bring?	4	channel 1. At some point it was in the latter parts
5	A. Ultimately, you are in charge of safety of that sector.	5	of that incident, and it may have been at the time the
6	They had concerns at that time that the building may	6	ops commander came over to give me the additional role
7	fail on the periphery, and they wanted to put in some	7	as a safety officer I believe we may have changed to
8	sort of span of control over that. It is not usual for	8	another channel, but I can't
9	a sector commander to be the safety officer as well, but	9	Q. Would you have supplemented those communications with
10	that is what happened on that evening.	10	a runner carrying a handwritten message at all?
11	Q. Okay.	11	A. Yes, the gentleman that we believe was trapped between
12	I suppose, put more bluntly, what was the point in	12	the 11th and 13th floors, we had sent messages via the
13	designating you as safety officer at that stage? Was it	13	handheld radio for that, or I had, and we had obviously
14	simply to put in arrangements should the building fail?	14	watched for numerous hours the fire spread across the
15	A. When it was designated to me, personally I didn't see	15	face of the building, and we had still managed to
16	what the point was, because we had been there for such	16	protect this one small area. So I wrote the details
17	a long time, but there are certain spans of control that	17	down of this gentleman and sent that to the command
18	the incident commander would have put in, and it	18	unit.
19	probably would have been highlighted on the command unit	19	Q. Okay.
20	that there was no safety officer in that area and they	20	I mentioned earlier we would come back to the topic
21	needed to designate someone to that role.	21	of Thames Water attendance. Looking still at page 6 of
22	Q. Would the safety officer have any functions in relation	22	your first witness statement, halfway down the page, you
23	to management/handling/responding to FSGs?	23	say:
24	A. Say that again?	24	"It must have been about 4-5 am when Thames water
25	Q. Sorry, would the safety officer have any role in the	25	turned up and they had with them all sorts of kit to
			1
	Page 81		Page 83
1	handling management or responding to ESCs?	,	tagt the pressure. I was beging that they would be able
1	handling, management or responding to FSGs?	1	test the pressure. I was hoping that they would be able
2	A. No.	2	to increase the pressure somehow but in fact they were
2 3	A. No. Q. In your witness statement, you describe seeing people	2 3	to increase the pressure somehow but in fact they were concerned that it would only reduce further once
2 3 4	A. No.Q. In your witness statement, you describe seeing people within the tower calling out for help.	2 3 4	to increase the pressure somehow but in fact they were concerned that it would only reduce further once residents in nearby towers / house started using their
2 3 4 5	A. No. Q. In your witness statement, you describe seeing people within the tower calling out for help. Were you able to pass on information regarding their	2 3 4 5	to increase the pressure somehow but in fact they were concerned that it would only reduce further once residents in nearby towers / house started using their water supplies."
2 3 4 5 6	A. No. Q. In your witness statement, you describe seeing people within the tower calling out for help. Were you able to pass on information regarding their location to the command unit or the bridgehead?	2 3 4 5 6	to increase the pressure somehow but in fact they were concerned that it would only reduce further once residents in nearby towers / house started using their water supplies." Did you speak directly with a representative of
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	A. No. Q. In your witness statement, you describe seeing people within the tower calling out for help. Were you able to pass on information regarding their location to the command unit or the bridgehead? A. When, obviously, we first took over that east side, there was numerous windows where we could see people in, on different levels, from the top all of the way down. A lot of them were signalling, either by torch, or by turning their lights on and off. You could see some of them on the lower levels were on mobile phones. Sorry, I forgot the question and went offer on a tangent. Q. Were you able to pass on information regarding the location of the people you could see signalling to you? A. No, from the outside, it was very difficult. Looking at the outside of the building, to locate a floor was hard, because obviously it didn't start from the ground floor, there was a gap. You can count from the top down, but you have to know exactly how many floors there are, and then from the outside, exterior, it is very difficult to have an exact flat location inside. We sent a message to say we have people on multiple	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	to increase the pressure somehow but in fact they were concerned that it would only reduce further once residents in nearby towers / house started using their water supplies." Did you speak directly with a representative of Thames Water? A. Yes, I did. Q. The first time you met a Thames Water representative, what did you say to them? A. I told him the experiences that I was having with the water, told him that I was having at that time — on the back of the brand new Mercedes, they have flow data information, which was, you know, very helpful that evening. I told him that I had 383 litres of water coming out of the hydrant and that obviously I needed 2,450 for the ALP, and was there anything that he could do, or was there a separate main further away that we could utilise. Q. You say he had various bits of equipment with him; did you see him carrying out any tests? A. No. Q. Station Manager Cook, were you aware, first of all, that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	A. No. Q. In your witness statement, you describe seeing people within the tower calling out for help. Were you able to pass on information regarding their location to the command unit or the bridgehead? A. When, obviously, we first took over that east side, there was numerous windows where we could see people in, on different levels, from the top all of the way down. A lot of them were signalling, either by torch, or by turning their lights on and off. You could see some of them on the lower levels were on mobile phones. Sorry, I forgot the question and went offer on a tangent. Q. Were you able to pass on information regarding the location of the people you could see signalling to you? A. No, from the outside, it was very difficult. Looking at the outside of the building, to locate a floor was hard, because obviously it didn't start from the ground floor, there was a gap. You can count from the top down, but you have to know exactly how many floors there are, and then from the outside, exterior, it is very difficult to have an exact flat location inside. We sent a message to say we have people on multiple floors that we could see, and we were told that they had	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	to increase the pressure somehow but in fact they were concerned that it would only reduce further once residents in nearby towers / house started using their water supplies." Did you speak directly with a representative of Thames Water? A. Yes, I did. Q. The first time you met a Thames Water representative, what did you say to them? A. I told him the experiences that I was having with the water, told him that I was having at that time on the back of the brand new Mercedes, they have flow data information, which was, you know, very helpful that evening. I told him that I had 383 litres of water coming out of the hydrant and that obviously I needed 2,450 for the ALP, and was there anything that he could do, or was there a separate main further away that we could utilise. Q. You say he had various bits of equipment with him; did you see him carrying out any tests? A. No. Q. Station Manager Cook, were you aware, first of all, that he was the officer in charge of the water sector?

1	Q. Did you have any discussions at any time with Station	1	(11.55 am)
2	Manager Cook regarding water pressure?	2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Kinnier.
3	A. I had a conversation with the water officer once, maybe	3	MR KINNIER: Just a few questions, but limited ones.
4	twice, throughout the evening, but I couldn't tell you	4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, thank you.
5	that it was Station Manager Cook.	5	(The witness returned)
6	Q. Turning on to use of other equipment, at one stage in	6	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you, Mr Beale. I am told
7	the evening, a lightweight portable pump was deployed.	7	a few more questions.
8	Were you aware of its deployment?	8	THE WITNESS: No worries, sir.
9	A. I was aware of its deployment and it went in to the	9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Kinnier.
10	tower.	10	MR KINNIER: Mr Beale, thank you for your patience.
11	Q. Were you able to form a view as to the effectiveness of	11	First of all, if I could ask you to turn to page 3
12	it?	12	of your first witness statement, and this really
13	A. No, not from where I was standing, sir.	13	concerns your observations on the extent of the fire
14	Q. Would it have been useful to have had a lightweight	14	when you arrived at the fire scene.
15	portable pump to fight the fire on the exterior?	15	You set out in broad terms it is the middle
16	A. I would be in no different position. So the 383 litres	16	paragraph on that page what you encountered, and you
17	of water a minute going into an LPP, it was going to	17	say, roughly halfway down the page itself:
18	give me exactly the same as putting 383 litres into	18	"From the point that I first saw the fire it was
19	a fire appliance. The fire appliance, if anything, has	19	between the 4th - 25th floor on the 3rd Section these
20	more control over it.	20	1st and 2nd sections were untouched."
21	MR KINNIER: Now, Mr Beale, thank you very much, those are	21	Now, when you say the 25th floor, by that do you
22	the questions that I have for you now.	22	mean the very top of the tower?
23	Sir, it might be appropriate to have a short break	23	A. Yes, at the time we turned up at Grenfell Tower,
24	to see whether there are any further matters that need	24	I didn't know the number of floors. That is a misprint
25	to be covered.	25	from me.
	Page 85		Page 87
1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, given the time, it might be	1	Q. By that you mean the very top?
2	appropriate to have a slightly longer break than you	2	A. From the 4th floor to the top floor, on the third
3	would otherwise have.	3	section, the right-hand section of the east face.
4	MR KINNIER: I am grateful. Thank you, sir.	4	Q. And you say there, further down:
5	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: But you can use it to see if there	5	"I would also add that between floors 4-8 the fire
6	are any other questions that you might want to ask.	6	appeared to have engulfed the inside of the flats as
7	MR KINNIER: Thank you.	7	well as the outside."
8	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Beale, we are going to have	8	And so you are absolutely clear that there had been
9	a break now. We have a break during the mid-morning.	9	internal penetration of the fire on those floors at that
10	Can we afford to take 15 minutes?	10	stage?
11	MR KINNIER: Yes, sir.	11	A. 100 per cent, yes.
12	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right. So we will stop now, and we	12	Q. When you say engulfed, previous witnesses have used
13	will resume at 11.55.	13	a percentage to describe the extent of fire engaged
14	I am going to ask you, please, not to talk about	14	within a flat.
15	your evidence to anyone while you are out of the room,	15	Using a percentage, how would you describe engulfed?
16	all right?	16	It may be an obvious question, but it may be useful to
17	THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.	17	help flesh out.
18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right. If you would like to go	18	A. It is very difficult for me to give you an accurate
19	with the usher, she will look after you.	19	percentage of the whole premise or the whole individual
20	THE WITNESS: Thank you.	20	flat because I couldn't see in all of the rooms, but the
21	(The witness withdrew)	21	right-hand set of the windows in that third section,
22	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you. 11.55.	22	that room, whatever the room was behind that window, was
23	MR KINNIER: Thank you, sir.	23	100 per cent engulfed in flames.
	(11.40 am)	24	Q. Again, this may be an obvious question: to what extent
24			
24 25		25	was it clear to you that the exterior the extent of
24 25	(A short break)	25	was it clear to you that the exterior the extent of
		25	was it clear to you that the exterior the extent of Page 88

1	the exterior flame was fully engaged by this stage?	1	the change of personnel.
2	A. Could you repeat that question, please?	2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.
3	Q. Yes, it is not a very good question, that is why.	3	MR KINNIER: Thank you.
4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Unusual candour.	4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I will rise for five minutes, thank
5	MR KINNIER: I am not saying anything!	5	you.
6	Was it visually obvious that the exterior was	6	(12.00 pm)
7	alight, is the question that I have been asked?	7	(A short break)
8	A. It was visually obvious that the internal flats were	8	(12.05 pm)
9	alight on those sections, and it was visually obvious	9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.
10	that the exterior surface, whatever that may have been	10	MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, we now have our next witness, who
11	at that time, was alight.	11	is Crew Manager Christopher Batcheldor. If he could
12	Q. And you didn't know at that stage whether that was	12	please be brought in.
13	cladding or not?	13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, thank you.
14	A. I didn't know what it was, but the exterior was alight	14	CHRISTOPHER BATCHELDOR (sworn)
15	and the byproduct of that was molten aluminium and	15	Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY
16	plastic.	16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Mr Batcheldor.
17	Q. You went on to refer in your statement to molten	17	Sit down and make yourself comfortable.
18	aluminium and plastic pouring down, causing the other	18	Yes, Mr Millett.
19	flats to catch light.	19	MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman.
20	Could you describe for us briefly that process, what	20	Mr Batcheldor, can I start by asking you, please, to
21	you saw?	21	give the inquiry your full name?
22	A. I am not 100 per cent sure I am comfortable with the	22	A. Yes, Christopher Batcheldor.
23	word "pouring" now.	23	Q. Can I begin by thanking you very much for coming to this
24	Q. You use whatever you think is accurate.	24	inquiry and assisting us with our investigations. We
25	A. You could visually see from that diagonal line that, as	25	very much appreciate it.
23	A. Tou could visually see from that diagonal line that, as	25	very mach appreciate it.
	Page 89		Page 91
1	a section of paneling caught light, there was a surface	1	I will ask you a number of questions. If you don't
2	flame a molten line across the surface that was	2	understand them, or you want me to repeat them or put
3	alight, and from that, the byproduct was aluminium and	3	the question in a different way, I am very happy to do
4	molten plastic. You could visually see it come down the	4	so, just say.
5	surface of the outside facade, or drip down in between	5	A. Thank you.
6	the gap, and then it would set light to the bit that was	6	Q. If you need breaks at any time, just say, or signal, and
7	below it.	7	we can take a break.
8	MR KINNIER: Mr Beale, those are all of the questions I have	8	A. Thank you.
9	for you.	9	Q. Can I start, then, by asking you to look at your
10	Finally, it leaves me to say thank you very much for	10	statement that you have provided, dated 29 July 2017,
11	attending today. It has been very helpful.	11	and you will find that in the first tabard of the blue
12	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I would like to add my thanks to	12	file in front of you.
13	those of Mr Kinnier. It is very helpful for us to hear	13	We also tend to look at statements and any other
14	first-hand evidence about what you saw, and also about	14	documents through the monitor, which is on the screen at
15	the water and so on. It was very helpful, and thank you	15	the back of the room or on the desk in front of you
16	very much for coming along.	16	there.
17	THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.	17	A. Okay.
18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You are free to go. If you would	18	Q. This statement is MET00007511. You have also done some
19	like to go with the usher, she will look after you.	19	contemporaneous notes, which are MET00005388.
20	(The witness was released)	20	As far as the statement is concerned, looking back
21	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Mr Kinnier.	21	at that, have you read that recently?
22	Another witness?	22	A. Yes, I have.
23	MR KINNIER: Another witness, and another counsel, I am	23	Q. Can you confirm that the contents of it are true?
24	afraid. Mr Millett will be examining Mr Batcheldor.	24	A. Yes, they are.
25	May I invite you to rise very briefly to arrange for	25	Q. Have you read your contemporaneous notes recently?
	Page 90		Page 92
			0

1 A	A. Yes, I have.	1	A. Yes, in respect of mainly if a fire comes out of
2 (Q. Can you confirm that you haven't discussed the evidence	2	a window from the compartment where the fire is.
3	in those documents or the evidence that you are going to	3	Q. Yes.
4	give to the inquiry with anybody before coming here	4	A. If it breaks out of a window, again, normally it is
5	today?	5	not normally, standardly, it is not the biggest of
6 A	A. No.	6	depending on the height that the fire breaks out, it is
7 (Q. Are you content that those documents, in addition to	7	something we look to control through outside, through
8	what you are going to tell us, stand as your evidence to	8	covering jets.
9	the inquiry?	9	Q. Have you any experience of the exterior of high-rise
10 A	A. Yes.	10	buildings igniting?
11 (Q. Okay.	11	A. No.
12	Now, can I just start, then, with a little bit of	12	Q. Have you had any training on the exterior of buildings
13	a discussion about your career so far.	13	igniting?
14	You have been with the LFB, I think, for just over	14	A. No.
15	16 years?	15	Q. Have you had any training on cladding fires in
16 A	A. 17 years, yes.	16	particular?
17 (Q. 17 now, thank you. Can you tell us exactly when you	17	A. No.
18	joined?	18	Q. Have you had any training on fire survival guidance?
	A. Yes, I joined in May 2001.	19	A. Yes, we have. That is covered in the high-rise policy.
20 (Q. Your current rank is crew manager; is that right?	20	Q. Right. Beyond that?
	A. Yes.	21	A. No.
22 (Q. Was that the rank you held on the night of the fire?	22	Q. Okay.
23 A	A. Yes, it was.	23	Did you ever do any training on the lessons learnt
	Q. 14 June 2017. You were, I think, at that date, based at	24	from a fire in south London in 2009 called Lakanal
25	Fulham?	25	House?
	Page 93		Page 95
	0		- C
1 A	. Yes, I was.	1	A. Yes, there was a case study presentation, again via
2 Q	. That is, I think, a one-appliance station, isn't it?	2	PowerPoint.
3 A	. That's right.	3	Q. Right.
4 Q	. How long had you been at Fulham on the night of the	4	A. I cannot remember the last time I covered that, though.
5	fire?	5	Q. Okay.
	. Since training school.	6	How long do you think that was before the Grenfell
	P. Right.	7	Tower fire in June 2017?
	. I got posted to Fulham straight after training, so since	8	A. It wouldn't have been that year. So, yes, longer than
9	2001.	9	a year.
10 Q	Did you ever receive any training in relation to fires	10	Q. Can I turn then to the events of the night.
11	in high-rise buildings?	11	If you go to your statement at the top of page 2,
	. Yes, we have, yes.	12	you say:
1	2. Can you just explain in very broad terms what the most	13	"We were initially deployed to a smell of burning on
14	recent training you had was on high-rise buildings, most	14	Kensington's ground. While we were on route to that
15	recent being most recent to the fire in June 2017?	15	call we could hear messages coming out over the radio
	. It would have been covered through the high-rise policy	16	from the first officers in attendance at Grenfell."
17	via a PowerPoint, and that would have been delivered by	17	Can I just be clear, the smell of burning was
18	the watch manager to the watch, and we would have gone	18	a separate and different incident, was it?
19	over high-rise procedure, high-rise policy.	19	A. Separate incident, yes.
	Do you have personal experience of high-rise	20	Q. On that night, you were I think on Fulham's pump ladder.
21	firefighting yourself?	21	A. That's correct.
	. Yes, I have attended a couple of high-rise fires.	22	Q. Is that G351?
	P. Right.	23	A. That's correct, yes.
24	In your training, did you get trained on what to	24	Q. Were you riding with Watch Manager Glynn Williams?
25	look for when compartmentation breaks down?	25	A. Yes, I was.
25	look for when compartmentation breaks down? Page 94	25	A. Yes, I was. Page 96

1	Q. And with him Firefighters Neil Saunders	1	to the incident ground?
2	A. Correct.	2	A. Not at that point.
3	Q Abdul Malik	3	Q. Did the hearing of those calls make you think about the
4	A. Correct.	4	possibility of evacuating the tower?
5	Q. — and I think also Dave Hill?	5	A. Not at that point.
6	A. And Dave Hill, yes.	6	Q. Okay.
7	Q. Right.	7	Now, staying on page 2 of your statement and looking
8	While you were en route, did you hear a persons	8	at the next paragraph, you say:
9	reported message?	9	"As we were travelling there I caught a glimpse of
10		10	Grenfell Tower from the road. It was like something out
11	A. Yes, after we got the call to after we got yeah.	11	of a movie, even early on in the incident. One side of
12	I can't remember exactly when that point was, whether we	12	
	heard it over the main scheme radio while we were still	13	the building was alight. The fire already looked like
13	in attendance at this separate incident.		it was going from the bottom to the top and was starting
14	Q. Yes.	14	to tree out a little bit."
15	A. I think that is when we first heard persons reported.	15	Just pausing there, when you say it was going from
16	Q. So was the order of events that you actually heard about	16	the bottom to the top, could you actually see the flames
17	the fire at Grenfell Tower before you were mobilised to	17	at the top of the building?
18	it?	18	A. No, we couldn't well, yes, there was a it looked
19	A. Yes.	19	like it was travelling up the building, working its way
20	Q. Now, it is a matter of record from the short incident	20	across and up, so it was going almost diagonally.
21	log we have that you were mobilised at about 01.30, were	21	Q. Right.
22	en route, so status 2, at 01.33, and at the scene at	22	A. We could see it going from the flame, obviously,
23	01.45 or so, give or take some seconds.	23	licking up. And then it was starting to when I say
24	Does that accord with your recollection?	24	"tree out", it was starting to come out, looking like it
25	A. Yes, it does.	25	was coming out across that side.
	D 05		D 00
	Page 97		Page 99
1	Q. Okay.	1	Q. I see, so horizontal spread?
2	Now, you say in your statement that while you were	2	A. Yes.
2 3	Now, you say in your statement that while you were en route, you were listening this is the second	2 3	A. Yes.
	en route, you were listening this is the second	3	A. Yes. Q. How far away were you when you saw the tower in such
3 4	en route, you were listening this is the second paragraph in your statement. You say:	3 4	A. Yes.Q. How far away were you when you saw the tower in such detail as you describe here?
3	en route, you were listening this is the second paragraph in your statement. You say: " we received a call instructing us to attend	3 4 5	A. Yes.Q. How far away were you when you saw the tower in such detail as you describe here?A. The first time, I can't say. I can't. Close enough,
3 4 5 6	en route, you were listening this is the second paragraph in your statement. You say: " we received a call instructing us to attend Grenfell Tower. As we were travelling there we were	3 4 5 6	 A. Yes. Q. How far away were you when you saw the tower in such detail as you describe here? A. The first time, I can't say. I can't. Close enough, you know, to see what I saw and the way it was on that
3 4 5 6 7	en route, you were listening this is the second paragraph in your statement. You say: " we received a call instructing us to attend Grenfell Tower. As we were travelling there we were listening to further calls coming through on the radio.	3 4 5 6 7	 A. Yes. Q. How far away were you when you saw the tower in such detail as you describe here? A. The first time, I can't say. I can't. Close enough, you know, to see what I saw and the way it was on that east side.
3 4 5 6 7 8	en route, you were listening this is the second paragraph in your statement. You say: " we received a call instructing us to attend Grenfell Tower. As we were travelling there we were listening to further calls coming through on the radio. We were aware that 'Fire Survival Guidance' were being	3 4 5 6 7 8	 A. Yes. Q. How far away were you when you saw the tower in such detail as you describe here? A. The first time, I can't say. I can't. Close enough, you know, to see what I saw and the way it was on that east side. Q. Right, so it was the east face you saw first?
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	en route, you were listening this is the second paragraph in your statement. You say: " we received a call instructing us to attend Grenfell Tower. As we were travelling there we were listening to further calls coming through on the radio. We were aware that 'Fire Survival Guidance' were being received. We knew that people were trapped in the	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 A. Yes. Q. How far away were you when you saw the tower in such detail as you describe here? A. The first time, I can't say. I can't. Close enough, you know, to see what I saw and the way it was on that east side. Q. Right, so it was the east face you saw first? A. Yes, it was.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9	en route, you were listening this is the second paragraph in your statement. You say: " we received a call instructing us to attend Grenfell Tower. As we were travelling there we were listening to further calls coming through on the radio. We were aware that 'Fire Survival Guidance' were being received. We knew that people were trapped in the building. This made us sit up a bit as it meant people	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 A. Yes. Q. How far away were you when you saw the tower in such detail as you describe here? A. The first time, I can't say. I can't. Close enough, you know, to see what I saw and the way it was on that east side. Q. Right, so it was the east face you saw first? A. Yes, it was. Q. Right. But you are not able to say how far away you
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	en route, you were listening this is the second paragraph in your statement. You say: " we received a call instructing us to attend Grenfell Tower. As we were travelling there we were listening to further calls coming through on the radio. We were aware that 'Fire Survival Guidance' were being received. We knew that people were trapped in the building. This made us sit up a bit as it meant people would need rescuing."	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 A. Yes. Q. How far away were you when you saw the tower in such detail as you describe here? A. The first time, I can't say. I can't. Close enough, you know, to see what I saw and the way it was on that east side. Q. Right, so it was the east face you saw first? A. Yes, it was. Q. Right. But you are not able to say how far away you were?
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	en route, you were listening this is the second paragraph in your statement. You say: " we received a call instructing us to attend Grenfell Tower. As we were travelling there we were listening to further calls coming through on the radio. We were aware that 'Fire Survival Guidance' were being received. We knew that people were trapped in the building. This made us sit up a bit as it meant people would need rescuing." Did you hear any specific FSG information being	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 A. Yes. Q. How far away were you when you saw the tower in such detail as you describe here? A. The first time, I can't say. I can't. Close enough, you know, to see what I saw and the way it was on that east side. Q. Right, so it was the east face you saw first? A. Yes, it was. Q. Right. But you are not able to say how far away you were? A. No.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	en route, you were listening this is the second paragraph in your statement. You say: " we received a call instructing us to attend Grenfell Tower. As we were travelling there we were listening to further calls coming through on the radio. We were aware that 'Fire Survival Guidance' were being received. We knew that people were trapped in the building. This made us sit up a bit as it meant people would need rescuing." Did you hear any specific FSG information being passed from control to the incident ground?	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 A. Yes. Q. How far away were you when you saw the tower in such detail as you describe here? A. The first time, I can't say. I can't. Close enough, you know, to see what I saw and the way it was on that east side. Q. Right, so it was the east face you saw first? A. Yes, it was. Q. Right. But you are not able to say how far away you were? A. No. Q. How long before arriving do you think that was, that you
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	en route, you were listening this is the second paragraph in your statement. You say: " we received a call instructing us to attend Grenfell Tower. As we were travelling there we were listening to further calls coming through on the radio. We were aware that 'Fire Survival Guidance' were being received. We knew that people were trapped in the building. This made us sit up a bit as it meant people would need rescuing." Did you hear any specific FSG information being passed from control to the incident ground? A. No, I didn't.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 A. Yes. Q. How far away were you when you saw the tower in such detail as you describe here? A. The first time, I can't say. I can't. Close enough, you know, to see what I saw and the way it was on that east side. Q. Right, so it was the east face you saw first? A. Yes, it was. Q. Right. But you are not able to say how far away you were? A. No. Q. How long before arriving do you think that was, that you first saw the tower?
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3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	en route, you were listening this is the second paragraph in your statement. You say: " we received a call instructing us to attend Grenfell Tower. As we were travelling there we were listening to further calls coming through on the radio. We were aware that 'Fire Survival Guidance' were being received. We knew that people were trapped in the building. This made us sit up a bit as it meant people would need rescuing." Did you hear any specific FSG information being passed from control to the incident ground? A. No, I didn't. Q. No. A. I was sat on the back of Golf 351 that evening, where the crew manager is normally sat. When we got the order in to attend Grenfell, I was discussing with my colleague about the equipment that we would take with us on arrival. So although I heard sections that were coming over the radio, I was kind of discussing equipment we would be taking. Q. Did you get any impression from the radio traffic that you could hear about FSG calls about the volume and	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. Yes. Q. How far away were you when you saw the tower in such detail as you describe here? A. The first time, I can't say. I can't. Close enough, you know, to see what I saw and the way it was on that east side. Q. Right, so it was the east face you saw first? A. Yes, it was. Q. Right. But you are not able to say how far away you were? A. No. Q. How long before arriving do you think that was, that you first saw the tower? A. A couple of minutes. Q. Did you have any thoughts at that time about how the fire might have spread like that? A. No. Q. Did it make you think about evacuation, or what advice should be given to the residents inside? A. Again, not at that time, no. Q. Did there come a time later when you had those thoughts about evacuation or advice about what the residents should be told to do?

go into the lobby and have to wait too long for Glynn to 1 Q. Now, we know that you arrived at 01.45 am or so and 1 2 2 parked and made your way to the tower. come in, we kind of went in together. 3 3 Do you know roughly where you parked the appliance? Q. But you didn't see Glynn receive his instructions? 4 A. I remember we parked -- if I had a map of the area, 4 A. No, I did not. 5 I could show you, but yes, it was opposite, I think, 5 Q. Who gave you your instructions at that point? 6 a Methodist church. 6 A. Glynn. 7 7 Q. Right. Q. And what were those instructions? 8 A. The streets were very busy with cars, so we knew we 8 A. Instructions were to make our way to the bridgehead, 9 9 couldn't get right directly below the tower. make our way to the -- in the lobby area, and it went up 10 10 the stairs, there was a short queue of firefighters 11 A. And, of course, bearing in mind other machines, aerials, 11 waiting to get their instructions for their details. 12 et cetera, would need to come on as well, so we parked 12 Q. Right. You say a short queue. 13 13 just away enough that we were close enough to the tower A. Yes. 14 but not directly below it. 14 Q. Just following that up, where was the short queue 15 15 Q. Now, looking at your statement on page 2, you say, at standing? Do you remember -the bottom of that page, four lines up from the bottom: 16 16 A. On the --17 "Outside we saw a group of approximately 15 to 20 17 Q. -- where they were? 18 firefighters. Some were wearing BA sets (Breathing 18 A. It was before they went into the actual lobby where the 19 Apparatus) which enables a firefighter to breath in 19 bridgehead was. So there was, like, a stairwell, 20 20 I think, on the 2nd floor. clean air in a smoky environment." 21 Do you remember whether the BA sets they were 21 Q. Yes. 22 22 wearing were standard or extended? A. Which was still part of the lobby, the ground-floor 23 23 A. No, I don't. lobby was made up from. 24 Q. On that subject, can you remember the first time when 24 Q. Like a balcony, going across? 25 you did see firefighters in EDBA after you arrived? 25 A. That's it, yes. Page 101 Page 103 1 1 O. Yes. A. No. I can't, no. 2 Q. On arrival, did you speak to anybody not in your crew? 2 A. So there must have been ten firefighters there in pairs 3 3 waiting to be detailed before you made your way into the A. On arrival, no. We made our way straight to the front 4 of the tower as a watch. 4 bridgehead, to the entry control boards. 5 5 Q. Did you speak to the incident commander? Q. At that stage, did the queue reach as far as the stairs 6 6 themselves or were all of the firefighters you saw on A. No, I didn't. 7 7 Q. Did anybody in your crew speak to the incident the landing or balcony? 8 A. Yes, on the balcony. It wasn't trailing down the stairs 8 commander? 9 9 A. I don't know. at that point. Q. Did you see anybody up there who was organising them or 10 10 Q. Do you have any recollection of Watch Manager Williams marshalling them in any way? 11 looking for the incident commander to speak to him? 11 12 A. Yes, I know that Glynn definitely spoke to someone in 12 A. Yes, Watch Manager Paul Watson. 13 command, because straight away he said, "I have been 13 Q. Did you know him? tasked to deal with fire survival calls, you guys carry 14 14 A. Yes, I did. 15 on into the tower". 15 Q. And you saw him there, did you? 16 Q. Do you remember --16 A. Yes, I did. 17 17 Q. Okay. A. No. 18 Q. -- or did you see Watch Manager Williams speaking to the 18 Can I ask you to look at a CCTV shot, which is at 19 INQ00000256. We have an adjusted time mark for this as 19 officer who tasked him with that? A. No, I didn't. 20 20 01.55.21. 21 Q. Where were you standing when Glynn Williams said he had 21 Do you recognise yourself in that picture? 22 A. Yes, I do. I am on the right-hand side with the crew 22 been tasked to do fire survival guidance? 23 A. We were making our way to the front door of the lobby. 23 manager rank markings on my helmet. 24 Q. Was he ahead of you? 24 Q. Who else is in that picture? 25 25 A. Watch Manager Glynn Williams on the left-hand side with A. We went in together at the same sort of time. We didn't Page 102 Page 104

1	the white helmet on, and Firefighter Neil Saunders in	1	around, got our bearings and then went straight upstairs
2	the middle.	2	to join that queue.
3	Q. And Neil Saunders is in BA as well, is he?	3	Q. The BA wearers, were they all SDBA or were there any
4	A. Yes, he is.	4	EDBA wearers?
5	Q. I think, in fact, at that stage, so is Watch Manager	5	A. I can't say.
6	Williams.	6	Q. So you say, actually, Paul Watson came up with you.
7	A. Yes, he is.	7	When Paul Watson came up with you
8	Q. Now, this is entry into the tower at 01.55.57, adjusted	8	A. Paul Watson was already there.
9	to 1.55.21.	9	Q. He was already there?
10	Can you account for the ten minutes or so between	10	A. Yes.
11	arrival at 01.45, and entry into the tower at 01.55,	11	Q. When you got there, what was Paul Watson doing?
12	10 minutes later?	12	A. He was giving crews their details regarding where to go.
13	A. Yes, that would have been getting our equipment off the	13	Q. When you say giving crews their details, was he doing
14	machine.	14	that by word of mouth?
15	Q. Right.	15	A. Verbally, yes.
16	A. We took hose, we took breaking-in gear, branches, first	16	Q. Did you see him give the crews pieces of paper?
17	aid kit, immediate response kit, all off the machine,	17	A. I didn't see what he gave or what he said to other crews
18	made sure the machine was locked up and then made our	18	in front of us.
19	way to the front of the tower.	19	Q. Okay. You didn't hear any briefings
20	Q. Right. Okay. Thank you.	20	A. No.
21	On page 3 of your statement, if we could just go to	21	Q that he was giving crews in front of you?
22	that, you say at the very top that the bridgehead was on	22	A. No. When we were close to being given our orderings,
23	the 2nd floor.	23	there was a it looks like a rough floor plan sketched
24	Did you go straight up to the bridgehead on entering	24	on the wall.
25	the tower?	25	Q. On the wall to your
	Page 105		Page 107
1	A. Yes, we did.	1	A. On the wall to our right.
2	Q. And who went up there with you, do you remember?	2	Q. To your right?
3	A. I believe I know myself, Firefighter Saunders,	3	A. Because we were standing
4	Firefighter Hill, and the other firefighter who was on	4	Q. So the back wall of the lobby on the 2nd floor?
5	standby that night.	5	A. Yes.
6	Q. Malik?	6	Q. Yes.
7	A. Yes. We went up. And I think Glynn came with us at	7	A. And we were trying to look at that to get a rough idea
8	that point, and he was in conversation with Watch	8	of what the floor layout looked like.
9	Manager Paul Watson.	9	Q. Did Paul Watson help you with that?
10	Q. I see. Okay.	10	A. When we got to him, he said, "Have you had a look at the
11	Did anybody actually instruct you to go to the	11	floor plan?" I think Paul and Glynn were together at
12	bridgehead, or did you decide that for yourselves?	12	that point, and they said, "There is a plan up on the
13	A. Yes, no, that was a natural thing to do.	13	wall, have a look at that, that is a floor layout".
14	Q. Did you know at that stage who the incident commander	14	Q. When he briefed you, did he do that face to face or did
15	was?	15	he give you a piece of paper?
16	A. No, I did not.	16	A. From what I remember, face to face.
17	Q. Right.	17	Q. Do you know where he was getting the FSG information
18	Now, in your statement on page 3 in the second line,	18	from with which to brief you?
19	you say:	19	A. No, I don't, no.
20	"There was also a queue for tasks when I got there."	20	Q. Now, in your statement in the third line you say:
21	That was a queue of BA wearers, was it?	21	"A firefighter at Fulham from Tooting was there so
22	A. Yes, it was.	22	we paired up."
23	Q. When you got there, was the queue the same size as when	23	Who was that?
24	you first entered, or had it grown?	24	A. Saunders.
25	A. Yes, we literally went into the lobby, had a look	25	Q. Firefighter Saunders? So when you say at Fulham from
I	- • • · · ·	1	• •
	Page 106		Page 108

1 2 3	Tooting, could you explain that?	1	could see that there was a list of flats on the wall
			could see that there was a list of flats on the wan
3	A. He was based at Fulham that evening. He was on standby.	2	based on the addresses from which we had fire survival
	His main station is Tooting.	3	calls."
4	Q. Yes.	4	Just to be clear, the queue, is that the queue which
5	A. And the same for Firefighter Malik as well.	5	ends with Paul Watson giving instructions?
6	Q. I see, okay.	6	A. Yes, it is.
7	You then go on to say:	7	Q. So that is not a queue at the bridgehead; it is a queue
8	"Glynn was told that he would be working from the	8	still on the balcony?
9	Bridge Head, so he removed his set and started working	9	A. Still on the balcony.
10	there."	10	Q. Okay.
11	Do you remember where he went?	11	Where, do you remember, was the list of flats that
12	A. No, I am not sure when he removed his set. It was	12	you are referring to there?
13	around that time, when we got into the lobby, we came	13	A. From the top of my head, I can't recall exactly.
14	into to the lobby, we made our way straight upstairs to	14	I can't
15	join the queue.	15	Q. Right.
16	Q. Yes.	16	Was it drawn on the same wall as the wall which had
17	A. Glynn went and spoke directly to Paul Watson, and he was	17	the map on it, the layout, or a different wall?
18	there when we went through the door to the entry control	18	A. Again, I would be guessing if I said yes, it was
19	officer.	19	definitely on the same wall as the map layout, which
20	Q. Did he come with you?	20	I can't do.
21	A. No, he was still at that door.	21	Q. Right.
22	Q. Was that the last time you saw Glynn Williams that	22	A. Sorry.
23	evening?	23	Q. Do you remember how long the list was?
24	A. It wasn't the last time I saw him that evening, I saw	24	A. No, I don't.
25	him when I came back down. But, yes, that was the last	25	Q. Do you remember whether the flat and floor number that
	Page 109		Page 111
1	time I saw him before I went up first.	1	you were given by Paul Watson was written on the wall?
	Q. Right, okay.	2	A. No, I don't.
3	So just to be clear about this, Glynn Williams	3	Q. Did you study the list at all?
4	didn't come to the entry control officer when it was on	4	A. I didn't study the list, no. I was looking at the floor
5	the 2nd floor as far as you saw?	5	plan. I was trying to look at the floor plan and get
6	A. I can't say if he did or didn't. I can't remember him	6	a bearing of where we would be going into when we went
7	coming in with us, no.	7	in through that door.
8	Q. No. Okay.	8	Q. Did you know who had done the drawing of the
9	Do you know what he then did after that, after you	9	A. No.
10	were committed and you left?	10	Q numbers on the wall?
11	A. No, just when I came back out again and I saw him on the	11	A. No.
12	ground floor, I believe. Yes, that is the last time	12	Q. Okay.
13	I saw him.	13	When you got then through to the bridgehead the
	Q. Right.	14	bridgehead was in the lobby on the 2nd floor. We have
	A. The last time when I was in the building.	15	had some evidence about that.
	Q. Right.	16	A. That's correct, yes.
17	As you went through, you said a minute ago Watch	17	Q. When you got there, who was running the bridgehead, do
18	Manager Watson had briefed you face to face.	18	you remember?
19	Did he give you a flat and floor number to go to?	19	A. I can't remember who was running the bridgehead. I went
20	A. He gave us a flat and floor number, yes.	20	directly to the entry control officer.
	Q. Okay. But no pieces of paper, as far as you recall?	21	Q. Who was that?
	A. I don't recall. I don't recall.	22	A. Watch Manager Louisa De Silvo.
	Q. Now, you say in the fourth line of your statement on	23	Q. Yes, Louisa De Silvo.
24	page 3:	24	Now, did you see a forward information board there
25	"When Neil and I got to the front of the queue we	25	at the bridgehead?
	·		-
	Page 110		Page 112

1	A. No, I did not.	1	A. But I don't remember specifics about it.
2	Q. Did you see any fire survival guidance information	2	Q. Right. Okay.
3	written down anywhere at the bridgehead?	3	Now, you were tasked, I think, as you say in the
4	A. No, I did not.	4	middle of the first paragraph on page 3, with going to
5	Q. You didn't see anything on the wall at the bridgehead?	5	the 10th floor, flat 74, as a fire survival call had
6	A. No.	6	been received from this address. You said before that
7	Q. Let me try a picture and just see if it triggers	7	you had been told that orally by Watch Manager Watson,
8	a recollection.	8	and you don't recall seeing an FIB.
9	Can I ask you, please, to be shown MET00013074.	9	Let me just show you a picture of an FIB to see if
10	This, we have been told, was written on the wall by	10	it triggers a recollection.
11	the lifts in the lift lobby on the 2nd floor. Does this	11	Can I ask you, please, to be shown maybe I will
12	look familiar to you?	12	come back to that, if I can.
13	A. I didn't notice it when I went and booked in.	13	When you were given your briefing by Watch Manager
14	Q. Right. You didn't notice it?	14	Watson, did it have any details in it apart from the
15	A. When I reported to the entry control officer and then	15	floor number and the flat number?
16	went straight up these stairs, no.	16	A. No. Not that I remember, no.
17	Q. Right.	17	Q. You weren't told anything about the conditions in the
18	Do these names mean anything to you? Floor 9, 65,	18	apartment?
19	Soho crew 4, Stanley, Saunders, Nelson, Yoman?	19	A. No.
20	A. Yes, they are firefighters names that I recognise.	20	Q. Or the floor?
21	Q. Right. Is that Saunders the the same Saunders, do you	21	A. No.
22	think?	22	Q. Were you told anything about the location of the dry
23	A. No.	23	rising main outlets?
24	Q. Not Neil Saunders?	24	A. No.
25	A. No.	25	Q. Were you told how many people were in the flat that you
	Page 113		Page 115
	1 age 113		rage 115
1	Q. What about Johnson and Roots?	1	were being sent to?
1 2	Q. What about Johnson and Roots?A. No.	1 2	were being sent to? A. No.
2	A. No.	2	A. No.
2 3	A. No. Q. Do you know them?	2 3	A. No. Q. Did you ask?
2 3 4	A. No. Q. Do you know them? A. No.	2 3 4	A. No. Q. Did you ask? A. No.
2 3 4 5	A. No.Q. Do you know them?A. No.Q. But you don't remember seeing this writing on the wall?	2 3 4 5	A. No.Q. Did you ask?A. No.Q. Do you remember whether the details of your briefing
2 3 4 5 6	 A. No. Q. Do you know them? A. No. Q. But you don't remember seeing this writing on the wall? A. No, I don't. Q. Now, you said just a few minutes ago that you had seen a drawing showing the layout of the floor. 	2 3 4 5 6	A. No.Q. Did you ask?A. No.Q. Do you remember whether the details of your briefing were written down afterwards by anybody?
2 3 4 5 6 7	 A. No. Q. Do you know them? A. No. Q. But you don't remember seeing this writing on the wall? A. No, I don't. Q. Now, you said just a few minutes ago that you had seen 	2 3 4 5 6 7	 A. No. Q. Did you ask? A. No. Q. Do you remember whether the details of your briefing were written down afterwards by anybody? A. Not that I saw. I didn't see it afterwards.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 A. No. Q. Do you know them? A. No. Q. But you don't remember seeing this writing on the wall? A. No, I don't. Q. Now, you said just a few minutes ago that you had seen a drawing showing the layout of the floor. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 A. No. Q. Did you ask? A. No. Q. Do you remember whether the details of your briefing were written down afterwards by anybody? A. Not that I saw. I didn't see it afterwards. Q. You don't remember anybody writing your deployment on
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. No. Q. Do you know them? A. No. Q. But you don't remember seeing this writing on the wall? A. No, I don't. Q. Now, you said just a few minutes ago that you had seen a drawing showing the layout of the floor. Can I just ask you to be shown MET00016948, which is actually an exhibit to Crew Manager Sephton's witness statement. Does that look familiar? A. It could be the same one I saw. It does look roughly familiar, yes. Q. Right. Now, on the left of that, very faintly, is a list of what looks like floor numbers, and there is a little bit of information next to it. I don't know if we can read it very well. My question for you is: do you remember seeing a list of floors and some information on the wall next to the floor layout diagram? A. That may have been the markings — the information that I mentioned in my statement. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. No. Q. Did you ask? A. No. Q. Do you remember whether the details of your briefing were written down afterwards by anybody? A. Not that I saw. I didn't see it afterwards. Q. You don't remember anybody writing your deployment on a wall anywhere? A. No. When we reported to the entry control board, that is where those details would have been recorded. Q. Right. You say, in your statement, that you took a hose, a branch and a thermal image camera with you. Let's just look at that. Were you instructed to take that firefighting equipment with you, or did you just do that as a matter of course? A. I can't remember whether we were instructed or whether that is just equipment that we took up that was in the bridgehead area that we thought we may need. Q. Right. Okay. Now, we have your tallying-out time as 02.17.12, which we have got from the telemetry data. I can show
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1	you, by reference to the time at which you entered the	1	way to the 10th floor from the Bridge Head on the 2nd
2	tower?	2	floor. There was just one set of stairs. I was struck
3	A. It is hard to say. It is hard to say.	3	up on how narrow the stairs were. From the 4th floor
4	Q. Right.	4	upwards it was smoky. I think I remember seeing
5	A. It felt like we were in there longer, but if that is	5	lighting in the stairwell, but I cannot be certain.
6	what it says, that is what it says.	6	Most of the doors leading on to the stairwell were
7	Q. Okay. Let me just see if I can pin these down.	7	closed otherwise it would have been much more smoky."
8	If I can ask you to go to the telemetry data and	8	How smoky was it on the way up, after the 4th floor?
9	your tallying-out time. You are in the blue, Fulham.	9	Could you describe the density of the smoke?
10	A. Yes.	10	A. Yes, we could see where we were going, but the smoke, as
11	Q. Underneath Abdul Malik and above Neil Saunders, and we	11	we got past the 4th especially, it was getting smokier.
12	have your tally-out time of 02.17.12. Do you see that?	12	As we were moving up each floor, it was getting thicker.
13	A. Yes.	13	The smoke was getting thicker with each floor, really.
14	Q. Now, on the basis that we have you entering the tower at	14	Q. What colour was the smoke?
15	01.55.21, as we have seen from the CCTV picture, you	15	A. It was getting dark, so it was a grey colour. It wasn't
16	tallied out some 22 minutes after entering the tower.	16	a thick black at that point.
17	Would that sound about right to you?	17	Q. Right.
18	A. Yes, it does, yes.	18	A. It was more of a grey colour.
19	Q. What were you doing for much of that 20 minutes?	19	Q. Okay.
20	A. We were in the queue of firefighters that were going in	20	Once you got to the 10th floor, which was your
21	and waiting to be ordered, really. So discussing with	21	destination, what was the smoke thickness and colour
22	my colleague, you know, what would we take with us. So	22	
23	we were discussing regarding there should be equipment	23	like at that point? A. It was probably the same between the 7th and 10th, and
24		24	•
25	at the bridgehead, make sure we take a hose, make sure	25	that was it was how I described it. We still had
25	we take a branch, see what else is there when we get	25	vision. We could still see.
	Page 117		Page 119
1	there, and waiting to be deployed.	1	Q. Right.
2	Q. Right. So, in essence, the time was spent queuing?	2	A. Yes.
3	A. Yes.	3	Q. And that was because, what, the electric lighting in the
4	Q. How quickly were firefighters being called off the front	4	stairwell was working?
5	of the queue to be sent up?	5	A. I can't remember if the lights were on there or not, but
6	A. I can't say now, really. Yeah, I can't really say now.	6	we had our torches with us as well.
7	I am not too sure.	7	Q. What about heat? Did you notice any change in
8	Q. Did anybody jump the queue, did you see?	8	temperature as you went up the building?
9	A. Not in front of us, no.	9	A. Not particularly. It was getting hotter. It was
10	Q. The picture of the forward information board I wanted to	10	getting a little bit hotter, but not like a massive
11	show you I can now give you a reference to, which is	11	
		11	change. Nothing really hit us until we opened the door.
12	MET00018749. Mr Documents Director, if we can just look	12	
		l .	change. Nothing really hit us until we opened the door. Q. Now, in the next paragraph of your statement, if we can just look at it, you start by saying:
12	MET00018749. Mr Documents Director, if we can just look	12	Q. Now, in the next paragraph of your statement, if we can
12 13	MET00018749. Mr Documents Director, if we can just look at that, please.	12 13	Q. Now, in the next paragraph of your statement, if we can just look at it, you start by saying:
12 13 14	MET00018749. Mr Documents Director, if we can just look at that, please. This is a photograph taken by Station Manager	12 13 14	Q. Now, in the next paragraph of your statement, if we can just look at it, you start by saying:"As we were going up other firefighters with
12 13 14 15	MET00018749. Mr Documents Director, if we can just look at that, please. This is a photograph taken by Station Manager Mulholland, which he took on the night.	12 13 14 15	Q. Now, in the next paragraph of your statement, if we can just look at it, you start by saying:"As we were going up other firefighters with casualties were coming down shouting, 'Casualty!
12 13 14 15 16	MET00018749. Mr Documents Director, if we can just look at that, please. This is a photograph taken by Station Manager Mulholland, which he took on the night. Looking at this, does this trigger a recollection of	12 13 14 15 16	Q. Now, in the next paragraph of your statement, if we can just look at it, you start by saying: "As we were going up other firefighters with casualties were coming down shouting, 'Casualty! Casualty!' as we are trained to do. This is a signal
12 13 14 15 16 17	MET00018749. Mr Documents Director, if we can just look at that, please. This is a photograph taken by Station Manager Mulholland, which he took on the night. Looking at this, does this trigger a recollection of something you saw?	12 13 14 15 16 17	Q. Now, in the next paragraph of your statement, if we can just look at it, you start by saying: "As we were going up other firefighters with casualties were coming down shouting, 'Casualty! Casualty!' as we are trained to do. This is a signal for people to move out of the way and give them
12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MET00018749. Mr Documents Director, if we can just look at that, please. This is a photograph taken by Station Manager Mulholland, which he took on the night. Looking at this, does this trigger a recollection of something you saw? A. Not that I saw, no.	12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Q. Now, in the next paragraph of your statement, if we can just look at it, you start by saying: "As we were going up other firefighters with casualties were coming down shouting, 'Casualty! Casualty!' as we are trained to do. This is a signal for people to move out of the way and give them priority. The stairwell was narrow with tight turns and
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	MET00018749. Mr Documents Director, if we can just look at that, please. This is a photograph taken by Station Manager Mulholland, which he took on the night. Looking at this, does this trigger a recollection of something you saw? A. Not that I saw, no. Q. You don't remember seeing a forward information board	12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Q. Now, in the next paragraph of your statement, if we can just look at it, you start by saying: "As we were going up other firefighters with casualties were coming down shouting, 'Casualty! Casualty!' as we are trained to do. This is a signal for people to move out of the way and give them priority. The stairwell was narrow with tight turns and it was very difficult to make space as we could not get
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MET00018749. Mr Documents Director, if we can just look at that, please. This is a photograph taken by Station Manager Mulholland, which he took on the night. Looking at this, does this trigger a recollection of something you saw? A. Not that I saw, no. Q. You don't remember seeing a forward information board like this at the 2nd-floor bridgehead?	12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Q. Now, in the next paragraph of your statement, if we can just look at it, you start by saying: "As we were going up other firefighters with casualties were coming down shouting, 'Casualty! Casualty!' as we are trained to do. This is a signal for people to move out of the way and give them priority. The stairwell was narrow with tight turns and it was very difficult to make space as we could not get our backs flat against the wall as we had the breathing
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MET00018749. Mr Documents Director, if we can just look at that, please. This is a photograph taken by Station Manager Mulholland, which he took on the night. Looking at this, does this trigger a recollection of something you saw? A. Not that I saw, no. Q. You don't remember seeing a forward information board like this at the 2nd-floor bridgehead? A. No, I don't. No, I don't.	12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Q. Now, in the next paragraph of your statement, if we can just look at it, you start by saying: "As we were going up other firefighters with casualties were coming down shouting, 'Casualty! Casualty! as we are trained to do. This is a signal for people to move out of the way and give them priority. The stairwell was narrow with tight turns and it was very difficult to make space as we could not get our backs flat against the wall as we had the breathing cylinders on our backs. People were desperate to get
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MET00018749. Mr Documents Director, if we can just look at that, please. This is a photograph taken by Station Manager Mulholland, which he took on the night. Looking at this, does this trigger a recollection of something you saw? A. Not that I saw, no. Q. You don't remember seeing a forward information board like this at the 2nd-floor bridgehead? A. No, I don't. No, I don't. Q. Okay.	12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Q. Now, in the next paragraph of your statement, if we can just look at it, you start by saying: "As we were going up other firefighters with casualties were coming down shouting, 'Casualty! Casualty! as we are trained to do. This is a signal for people to move out of the way and give them priority. The stairwell was narrow with tight turns and it was very difficult to make space as we could not get our backs flat against the wall as we had the breathing cylinders on our backs. People were desperate to get their casualties out of the building and we were
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MET00018749. Mr Documents Director, if we can just look at that, please. This is a photograph taken by Station Manager Mulholland, which he took on the night. Looking at this, does this trigger a recollection of something you saw? A. Not that I saw, no. Q. You don't remember seeing a forward information board like this at the 2nd-floor bridgehead? A. No, I don't. No, I don't. Q. Okay. Now, you then go on in your statement, same	12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Q. Now, in the next paragraph of your statement, if we can just look at it, you start by saying: "As we were going up other firefighters with casualties were coming down shouting, 'Casualty! Casualty!' as we are trained to do. This is a signal for people to move out of the way and give them priority. The stairwell was narrow with tight turns and it was very difficult to make space as we could not get our backs flat against the wall as we had the breathing cylinders on our backs. People were desperate to get their casualties out of the building and we were desperate to get up the tower to get more residents
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	MET00018749. Mr Documents Director, if we can just look at that, please. This is a photograph taken by Station Manager Mulholland, which he took on the night. Looking at this, does this trigger a recollection of something you saw? A. Not that I saw, no. Q. You don't remember seeing a forward information board like this at the 2nd-floor bridgehead? A. No, I don't. No, I don't. Q. Okay. Now, you then go on in your statement, same paragraph page 3, first paragraph to say: "We set up our BA mask and then started to make our	12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Q. Now, in the next paragraph of your statement, if we can just look at it, you start by saying: "As we were going up other firefighters with casualties were coming down shouting, 'Casualty! Casualty! as we are trained to do. This is a signal for people to move out of the way and give them priority. The stairwell was narrow with tight turns and it was very difficult to make space as we could not get our backs flat against the wall as we had the breathing cylinders on our backs. People were desperate to get their casualties out of the building and we were desperate to get up the tower to get more residents outs[sic]. It seemed to take ages for us to get up the building as we kept having to stop and try and get out
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	MET00018749. Mr Documents Director, if we can just look at that, please. This is a photograph taken by Station Manager Mulholland, which he took on the night. Looking at this, does this trigger a recollection of something you saw? A. Not that I saw, no. Q. You don't remember seeing a forward information board like this at the 2nd-floor bridgehead? A. No, I don't. No, I don't. Q. Okay. Now, you then go on in your statement, same paragraph page 3, first paragraph to say:	12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Q. Now, in the next paragraph of your statement, if we can just look at it, you start by saying: "As we were going up other firefighters with casualties were coming down shouting, 'Casualty! Casualty! as we are trained to do. This is a signal for people to move out of the way and give them priority. The stairwell was narrow with tight turns and it was very difficult to make space as we could not get our backs flat against the wall as we had the breathing cylinders on our backs. People were desperate to get their casualties out of the building and we were desperate to get up the tower to get more residents outs[sic]. It seemed to take ages for us to get up the

of the way. All the time was trying to get my head around what was happening. It was craze." Now, you describe there he scene in the stains. Specifically, do you know how many, or roughly how ramp, furfighlers you praced coming down with casualites? A. No. Leart say how many. It just felt like we would move up a floor and then we would hear the casualites? A. No. I can't say how many. It just felt like we would move up a floor and then we would hear the squeeze into the corner of a stairwell, to It the furfighters yet them casualities out as quickly as possible. Down the casualities and as quickly as possible. O Were the casualities all being carried, or were some of the manking casualities, do you think? A. It was a mixture some in an unconscious state, others were being held up by firefighters. O Right. A. No. Right was a wish you say on a say self-wacaating? A. No. O Was anybody that you save self-wacaating? A. No. O Was anybody that you save self-wacaating? A. No. O Was anybody that you save self-wacaating? A. No. Page 121 from? A. No. Page 122 Page 124 Page 124 Ill from? A. No. O Right. In was all have put the chinagraph numbers on the were bread that the chinagraph had been written over the wall which the building owners might have put the number? You say at the bottom of the third paragraph on that page that you finally reached the lifth for. You then say: My our you stop and speak to any of the firefighters who were coming down? Page 121 Page 122 Page 123 The floor you see on she were near with a rank of the building owners might have put the number? Was try you who opened the don, or was it is mink the stain and the say of the search of the paragraph, if we can just look at it: The discovered the coming was used by the search of the paragraph in the next paragraph, if we can just look at it: The floor you see and speak to any of the firefighters who were coming down? Page 123 Page 124 Page 125 Page 126 Page 127 A. No. O Now, you go not to say in the next parag				
Now, you describe there the scene in the stairs. Specifically, do you know how many, or roughly how many, firefighters you be seed coming down with casualties? A. No. Last say how many. It just felt like we would move up a floor and then we would hear the "casualty" call, have more out of the way, try to squeeze into the corner of a stairwell, to let the firefighters get them casualties out as quickly as possible. Do synch who has a misture some in an unconscious state, others were being held up by firefighters. A. It was a misture some in an unconscious state, others were being held up by firefighters. A. No. Seeps that you show self-evacuating? A. No. Seeps that you say at the bottom of the third paragraph on that page that you finally reached the 10th floor. You then say: A. No. Seeps that you say and speak to any of the firefighters who were coming down? Page 121 Infom? Infom? A. No. Seeps that you finally reached the loth floor. You then say: You say at the bottom of the third paragraph on that page that you finally reached the 10th floor. You then say: You say at the bottom of the third paragraph on that page that you finally reached the 10th floor. You then say: You say at the bottom of the third paragraph on that page that you finally reached the 10th floor. You then say: You say at the bottom of the third paragraph on that page that you finally reached the 10th floor. You then say: You say at the bottom of the third paragraph on that page that you finally reached the 10th floor. You then say: You say at the bottom of the third paragraph on that page that you finally reached the 10th floor. You then say: You say at the bottom of the third paragraph on that with a rush of bottom of the third paragraph on that with a rush of the other's and say: You say at the bottom of the third paragraph on that says at the bottom of the third paragraph on that with a rush of the fire? You say at the bottom of the third paragraph on that with a rush of the fire? You say at the bottom of the third pa	1	of the way. All the time was trying to get my head	1	floor you were on."
Now, you describe there the scene in the stains. Specifically, do you know how many, or roughly how many, firefighters you be seed coming down with casualties? A. No. I can't say how many. It just felt like we would move up a floor and then we would hear the "casualty" call, have more out of the way, try to squeeze into the corner of a stairwell, to let the firefighters get them casualties out as quickly as possible. Description of the them casualties out as quickly as possible. Were the casualties all being carried, or were some of the munitarity call, have no move unto fifthe way, try to squeeze into the corner of a stairwell, to let the fertificial their control of the munitary call, have no move out of the way, try to squeeze into the corner of a stairwell, to let the fertificial their control of the munitary call, have no move out of the way, try to squeeze into the corner of a stairwell, to let the fertificial their control of the munitary carried the feltificial through the control of the munitary carried the feltificial through the control of the munitary carried through the possible of the fertificial through the control of the firefighters. A. No. I was a misture some in an unconscious state, others were control head to save a many and the friefighters. A. No. I was a misture some in an unconscious state, others were friefighters. A. No. I was a misture some in an unconscious state, others with friefighters. A. No. I was a misture some in an unconscious state, others with friefighters. To Q. Right. I was a misture some in an unconscious state, others with friefighters. To Q. Right. I was a misture some in an unconscious state, others with friefighters. To Q. Was anybody that you save self-evacualing? A. No. I was called in the friefighters who was a some out at that point were with mist of the chief against the felt file file. The was called in the file file. The was called in the file file. The was called in the file file. The fi	2	around what was happening. It was crazy."	2	Could you see for yourself any floor numbers which
5 casualties? 7 A. No, I can't say how many. It just felt like we would move up a floor and then we would hear the "assured to move out of the way, try to "squeeze into the corner of a stairwell, to let the "fiftee get them casualties out as quickly as possible. 10 go Wore the casualties all being carried, or were some of the meaning them to the same to the stairs themselves? A. No. D. O you know who had put the chinagraph numbers on the wall? A. No, I don't, no. I remember thinking how grateful and how thankful I was that someone did, but I don't remember, or was told, who did that. The same the corner of a stairwell to let the the possible. D. O you say with the building owners might have put the number? A. No. O. Do you know who had put the chinagraph numbers on the wall? A. No. O. Do you know who had put the chinagraph numbers on the wall? A. No. O. Do you know who had put the chinagraph numbers on the wall? A. No. O. Do you know who had put the chinagraph numbers on the wall? A. No. O. Do you know who had put the chinagraph numbers on the wall? A. No. O. Do you know who had put the chinagraph had been written over the stall, who did that. The member of a stairvely the building owners might have put the number? A. No. O. Okay. You say at the bottom of the third paragraph on that paragraph the pot mumber? No say at the bottom of the third paragraph on that paragraph that pour the chinagraph number was put the number? No say at the bottom of the third paragraph on that paragraph	3	Now, you describe there the scene in the stairs.	3	
casualties? A. No, I can't say how many. It just felt like we would move up a floor and then we would hear the "casualty" call, have to move out of the way, try to squeeze into the corner of a stairvelt, to let the firefighters get them casualties out as quickly as 11 possible. A. I was a mixture some in an unconscisus state, others were heing held up by firefighters. A. I was a mixture some in an unconscisus state, others were heing held up by firefighters. A. Everyone who I saw come out at that point were with firefighters who were coming down? A. No. Q. Q. Q. Q. Was anybody that you saw self-evacuating? A. No. Q. Q. Q. Q. Was anybody that you saw self-evacuating? A. No. Q. Q. Q. Q. Was anybody that you saw self-evacuating? A. No. 120 Q. Diay ou stop and speak to any of the firefighters who were coming down? Page 121 I fixen? A. No. 121 fixen? A. No. 122 A. No. 123 Q. You go on to say in the next paragraph, if we can just look at it: 3 G. You go on to say in the next paragraph, if we can just look at it: 3 G. Were the casualties were coming down and their faces in order to help get people out of the with pieces of equipment which firefighters had shandoned in order to help get people out of the suiting the more was also a lot of discarded clothing. J. Page 123 A. No. A. Yes, it was. A. No to particularly at that point. I just remember noticing a lot of debris on the stairs and the stairs dome was also and for mother if firefighters. If it wasn't for these Chinagraph which had been weed to mark the floor numbers on these coming out of those collections and the marked wasn't for these Chinagraph which had been used to mark the floor numbers on these coming out of those lobbies into the world have been done as a team, to we followed a very, like, rough door procedures. A. Yes, it was. J. Were the casualties all been the done, or was it is procedure, floor and procedure with process of equipment which firefighters had a stire shemselves? A. No, and that it is a shell of the first door	4	Specifically, do you know how many, or roughly how	4	A. No.
A. No, I can't say how many. It just felt like we would move up a floor and then we would hear the "casualty" call, have to move out of the way, try to squeeze into the corner of a stairwell, to let the firefighters get them casualties out as quickly as possible. 12 possible. 13 Q. Were the casualties all being carried, or were some of the them say the say to the marker? 14 A. It was a mixturer some in an unconscious state, others were heing held up by firefighters. 15 A. It was a mixturer some in an unconscious state, others were heing held up by firefighters. 16 Q. Right. 17 Q. Right. 18 A. Everyone who I saw come out at that point were with firefighters. 19 Q. Was anybody that you saw self-evacuating? 20 Q. Was anybody that you saw self-evacuating? 21 A. No. 22 Q. Did you stop and speak to any of the firefighters who were coming down? 23 were coming down? 24 A. No. 25 Q. So you don't know where the casualties were coming down 26 Page 121 27 Page 123 28 A. No. 29 Page 121 29 Page 123 20 Page 123 20 Page 125 20 Page 125 20 Page 125 21 Firefighter Saudhead clothing, a label of casted clothing, a stairway was a complete mess. It was littered with pieces of equipment which firefighters had abandoned in order to help gat people out of the building. There was also a lot of discarded clothing. 20 I expect this clothing was used by people to wrap around their faces in order to protect themselves from the smoke." 25 A. No. 26 Q. Right. Olay, And do you remember whether that caused difficulty in getting up and down the staircace? 27 A. No, and the protect themselves from the stairwell, Little Lephained, clothing, phone, all sorts of things. 28 Chaptained, Little Lephained, clothing, phone, all sorts of things. 39 C. Poug so on to say: 30 C. Poug so on to say: 30 C. Poug so on to say: 31 C. Poug so on to say: 32 C. Right. Olay, And do you remember whether that caused difficulty in getting up and down the staircace? 39 C. Right. Olay, And do you remember whether that caused difficulty in getting up and down the staircac	5	many, firefighters you passed coming down with	5	Q. Do you know who had put the chinagraph numbers on the
move up a floor and then we would hear the "casualty" call, have to move out of the way, try to squeeze into the corner of a stairwell, to let the firefighters get them casualties out as quickly as possible. 3 Q. Were the casualties all being carried, or were some of them walking essualties, do you think? 4 A. Fo. Q. Right. A. Everyone who I saw come out at that point were with firefighters. Q. Q. Was as mixture's some in an unconscious state, others were being held up by firefighters. 16 A. Everyone who I saw come out at that point were with firefighters. 17 Say. A. Everyone who I saw come out at that point were with firefighters. 20 Q. Was any anybody that you saw self-evacuating? 21 A. No. 22 Q. Did you stop and speak to any of the firefighters who were coming down? 22 A. No. 23 were coming down? 24 A. No. Page 121 1 from? 2 A. No. 2 Page 122 1 from? 2 A. No. 2 Page 123 1 from? 2 A. No. 2 Page 124 1 from? 2 A. No. 2 Page 125 1 from? 2 A. No. 2 Page 125 1 from? 2 A. No. 2 Page 126 1 from abundanced in order to help get people out of the 3 building. There was also a lot of discarded clothing, 9 lespect this clothing was used by people to wrap around 10 their faces in order to protect themselves from the 10 stairs themselves? A. No, that was also A. No, that was that someone did, but I don't remember, or was the biold, who did hat. 10 Q. Okay. You say at the hottom of the third paragraph on that page that you finally reached the 10th floor. You then say. "Myself and Neil were the only people there. The lobby door was closed. We opened the lobby door to says: "Myself and Neil were the only people there. The lobby door was closed. We opened the lobby door to says: "Myself and Neil were the oloby people there. The lobby door was closed. We opened the door, or was it Firefighters Standers, do you think? A. No. 2 procedure, if you are entering a condition you don't know what is on the other side, you would have water with you, but as we didn't have an	6	casualties?	6	wall?
reasulty" call, have to move out of the way, try to squeeze into the corner of a stairwell, to let the possible. 12 possible. 13 Q. Were the casualties and a queeze into the way try to possible. 14 them walking casualties, do you think? 15 A. It was a mixture some in an unconscious state, others were being held up by firefighters. 16 A. Everyone who I saw come out at that point were with firefighters. 17 Q. Was anybody that you saw self-evacuating? 18 A. Everyone who I saw come out at that point were with firefighters. 19 G. Was anybody that you saw self-evacuating? 20 Q. Was anybody that you saw self-evacuating? 21 A. No. 22 Q. Did you stop and speak to any of the firefighters who were coming down? 23 were coming down? 24 A. No. 25 Q. So you don't know where the casualties were coming down 26 Page 121 1 from? 2 A. No. 3 Q. You go on to say in the next paragraph, if we can just look at it: 4 Is with pieces of equipment which firefighters had a bandoned in order to help get people out of the building owners might have put the number? 2 A. No. 3 Q. You go no to say in the next paragraph, if we can just look at it: 4 Is with pieces of equipment which firefighters had a bandoned in order to help get people out of the building owners might have put the number? 4 Is with pieces of equipment which firefighters had a bandoned in order to help get people out of the building owners might have put the number? 4 Is were both there to assess the conditions. 4 Q. Okay. All right 4 A. Yes, it was. 4 Is weather with a raph of the firefighters had a bandoned in order to help get people out of the building owners might have put the number? 4 Is well and the building owners might have put the number? 5 Q. Right. 6 A. H. was a mixture; some on the stairs and the stairwell, that point. I just remember that caused difficult in the properties of the paragraph of the hird paragraph of the	7	A. No, I can't say how many. It just felt like we would	7	A. No, I don't, no. I remember thinking how grateful and
squeeze into the corner of a stairwell, to let the firefighters get them casualties out as quickly as possible. Q. Were the casualties all being carried, or were some of them walking casualties, do you think? A. It was a mixture: some in an unconscious state, others were being held up by firefighters. Q. Right. A. Everyone who I saw come out at that point were with firefighters. Q. Did you stop and speak to any of the firefighters who were coming down? Page 121 I from? Q. You go on to say in the next paragraph, if we can just look at it: 1 from? A. No. Page 121 I from? Q. You go on to say in the next paragraph, if we can just look at it: 1 about a fireces in order to protect themselves from the building. There was also a lot of discarded clothing. Page 121 I expect this clothing was used by people to wrap around their fires in order to protect themselves? A. No. Q. Right. A. No. 21 A. No. 22 Q. Did you stop and speak to any of the firefighters who with a rush of thick black acrid smoke." Was it you who opened the door, or was it Firefighter Sumdox; do you think? A. It would have been done as a team, so we followed a very, like, rough door procedure. Normally with door Page 121 Page 123 procedure, if you are entering a condition you don't know what is on the other side, you would have water with you, but as we didn't have any charged water, we still used those set door procedures. Q. Right. A. So, who actually opened that door, I can't remember exactly whether it was Neil or myself. Q. Right. A. No, Was that actually on the staircase? A. No, I transched the son one one one one of the first door in the stairwell that you had opened. Q. Can't then this child paragraph in the kase well. A. No, I transched the find for door was open. Chair and the firefighters in the stairwell were closed otherwise it would have been much more smoky." Or would not be firefighters. If it wasn't for these Chinagraph which had been used to mark the first door out of the stairwell that you had opened	8	move up a floor and then we would hear the	8	how thankful I was that someone did, but I don't
firefighters get them casualties out as quickly as 10	9	"casualty" call, have to move out of the way, try to	9	remember, or was told, who did that.
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Q. You go on to say in the next paragraph, if we can just look at it: "The stairway was a complete mess. It was littered with pieces of equipment which firefighters had abandoned in order to help get people out of the building. There was also a lot of discarded clothing. I expect this clothing was used by people to wrap around their faces in order to protect themselves from the smoke." The discarded clothing, was that actually on the stairs themselves? A. Yes, it was. Q. Right. A. Yes, it was. Q. Right. Okay. And do you remember whether that caused difficulty in getting up and down the staircase? A. Not particularly at that point. I just remember noticing a lot of debris on the stairs and the stairwell. Like I explained, clothing, phone, all sorts of things. Q. Now, you go on to say: "Firefighter[s] carry a waterproof pencil called a Chinagraph mich had been used to mark the floor numbers on the wall from other firefighters. If it wasn't for these Chinagraph markings you would not have known what "The stairway was a complete mess. It was littered still used those set door procedures. Q. Right. A. So who actually opened that door, I can't remember exactly whether it was Neil or myself. A. So who actually opened that door, I can't remember exactly whether it was Neil or myself. A. So who actually opened that door, I can't remember exactly whether it was Neil or myself. A. So who actually opened that door, I can't remember exactly whether it was Neil or myself. A. So who actually opened that door, I can't remember exactly whether it was Neil or myself. A. But we were both there to assess the conditions. Q. Nay. All right. Was the door to floor 10 the first door in the stairwell that you had opened Stairwell that you had opened that door lot he first door we	2	A. No.	2	
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with pieces of equipment which firefighters had abandoned in order to help get people out of the building. There was also a lot of discarded clothing. I expect this clothing was used by people to wrap around their faces in order to protect themselves from the smoke." The discarded clothing, was that actually on the stairs themselves? A. Yes, it was. Q. Right. Was the door to floor 10 the first door in the stairwell that you had opened stairwell that you had opened A. Yes, it was. Q. a Yes, it was. A. Yes, it was. Q. a Yes, it was. A. Not particularly at that point. I just remember stairwell. Like I explained, clothing, phone, all sorts of things. Q. Now, you go on to say: "Firefighter[s] carry a waterproof pencil called a Chinagraph which had been used to mark the floor numbers on the wall from other firefighters. If it wasn't for these Chinagraph markings you would not have known what A. A A Control of the take one to floor 10 the first door in the stairwell that you had opened A. Yes, it was. A. Yes, it was. A. Yes, it was. A. No, that was the first door we opened. Q. Can I then take you back to paragraph 1 on the same page, last sentence, where you say: "Most of the doors leading on to the stairwell were closed otherwise it would have been much more smoky." On your way up, do you remember how many doors you observed were already open? A. No. I remember the 4th floor door was open. A. No. I remember the 4th floor door was open. Was there smoke coming out of those lobbies into the	4		4	
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abandoned in order to help get people out of the building. There was also a lot of discarded clothing. I expect this clothing was used by people to wrap around their faces in order to protect themselves from the smoke." The discarded clothing, was that actually on the tatairs themselves? A. Yes, it was. Q. Right. Was the door to floor 10 the first door in the stairwell that you had opened taking themselves? A. Yes, it was. Q. Okay. All right. Was the door to floor 10 the first door in the stairwell that you had opened taking themselves? A. Yes, it was. Q. or or did you open any others? A. Not, that was the first door we opened. Can I then take you back to paragraph 1 on the same page, last sentence, where you say: "Most of the doors leading on to the stairwell were closed otherwise it would have been much more smoky." On your way up, do you remember how many doors you observed were already open? A. Not I remember the 4th floor door was open. Chinagraph which had been used to mark the floor numbers on the wall from other firefighters. If it wasn't for these Chinagraph markings you would not have known what	6		6	A. So who actually opened that door, I can't remember
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10 their faces in order to protect themselves from the stairs themselves? 11	8	building. There was also a lot of discarded clothing.	8	Q. Right.
their faces in order to protect themselves from the smoke." The discarded clothing, was that actually on the stairs themselves? A. Yes, it was. Q. Right. Okay. And do you remember whether that caused difficulty in getting up and down the staircase? A. Not particularly at that point. I just remember noticing a lot of debris on the stairs and the stairwell. Like I explained, clothing, phone, all sorts Q. Now, you go on to say: "Firefighter[s] carry a waterproof pencil called a Chinagraph which had been used to mark the floor numbers check the see Chinagraph markings you would not have known what 10 Q. Okay. All right. Was the door to floor 10 the first door in the stairwell that you had opened stairwell that you had opened A. Yes, it was. 14 Q or did you open any others? A. No, that was the first door we opened. Q. Can I then take you back to paragraph 1 on the same page, last sentence, where you say: "Most of the doors leading on to the stairwell were closed otherwise it would have been much more smoky." On your way up, do you remember how many doors you observed were already open? A. No. I remember the 4th floor door was open. 22 A. No. I remember the 4th floor door was open. 23 Q. Yes. 4 A. And I think the 3rd as well. Q. Was there smoke coming out of those lobbies into the	9	I expect this clothing was used by people to wrap around	9	
11 Smoke." 12 The discarded clothing, was that actually on the stairs themselves? 13 stairs themselves? 14 A. Yes, it was. 15 Q. Right. Okay. And do you remember whether that caused difficulty in getting up and down the staircase? 16 difficulty in getting up and down the staircase? 17 A. Not particularly at that point. I just remember noticing a lot of debris on the stairs and the stairwell. Like I explained, clothing, phone, all sorts of things. 16 Q. Now, you go on to say: 17 Q. Now, you go on to say: 18 G. Now, you go on to say: 20 G. Now, you go on to say: 21 Q. Now, you go on to say: 22 "Firefighter[s] carry a waterproof pencil called a Chinagraph which had been used to mark the floor numbers on the wall from other firefighters. If it wasn't for these Chinagraph markings you would not have known what contact the stairwell door to floor 10 the first door in the stairwell that you had opened 13 A. Yes, it was. 14 Q or did you open any others? 15 A. No, that was the first door we opened. 16 Q. Can I then take you back to paragraph 1 on the same page, last sentence, where you say: 18 "Most of the doors leading on to the stairwell were closed otherwise it would have been much more smoky." 19 On your way up, do you remember how many doors you observed were already open? 20 On your way up, do you remember how many doors you observed were already open? 21 A. No. I remember the 4th floor door was open. 22 A. No. I remember the 4th floor door was open. 23 Q. Yes. 24 A. And I think the 3rd as well. 25 Q. Was there smoke coming out of those lobbies into the	10	their faces in order to protect themselves from the	10	
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20of things.20On your way up, do you remember how many doors you21Q. Now, you go on to say:21observed were already open?22"Firefighter[s] carry a waterproof pencil called a22A. No. I remember the 4th floor door was open.23Chinagraph which had been used to mark the floor numbers23Q. Yes.24on the wall from other firefighters. If it wasn't for24A. And I think the 3rd as well.25these Chinagraph markings you would not have known what25Q. Was there smoke coming out of those lobbies into the			19	
21 Q. Now, you go on to say: 22 "Firefighter[s] carry a waterproof pencil called a 23 Chinagraph which had been used to mark the floor numbers 24 on the wall from other firefighters. If it wasn't for 25 these Chinagraph markings you would not have known what 21 observed were already open? 22 A. No. I remember the 4th floor door was open. 23 Q. Yes. 24 A. And I think the 3rd as well. 25 Q. Was there smoke coming out of those lobbies into the			20	-
22 "Firefighter[s] carry a waterproof pencil called a 23 Chinagraph which had been used to mark the floor numbers 24 on the wall from other firefighters. If it wasn't for 25 these Chinagraph markings you would not have known what 22 A. No. I remember the 4th floor door was open. 23 Q. Yes. 24 A. And I think the 3rd as well. 25 Q. Was there smoke coming out of those lobbies into the		5	1	
Chinagraph which had been used to mark the floor numbers on the wall from other firefighters. If it wasn't for these Chinagraph markings you would not have known what 23 Q. Yes. 24 A. And I think the 3rd as well. 25 Q. Was there smoke coming out of those lobbies into the	22			
on the wall from other firefighters. If it wasn't for these Chinagraph markings you would not have known what these Chinagraph markings you would not have known what A. And I think the 3rd as well. Q. Was there smoke coming out of those lobbies into the			1	_
25 these Chinagraph markings you would not have known what 25 Q. Was there smoke coming out of those lobbies into the			1	~
Page 122 Page 124	25		25	
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		_	
1	stairwell?	1	On the question of smoke, was there any part of the
2	A. Yes.	2	smoke that was clear?
3	Q. Did that account for the smoke in the stairwell?	3	A. No.
4	A. I believed it to.	4	Q. So no neutral plane?
5	Q. Did you see any other doors into the stairwell from the	5	A. No.
6	lobbies open on the way up?	6	Q. So smoke all of the way down to the ground?
7	A. Not that I can remember, no.	7	
		8	A. Literally, yes.
8	Q. So no hoses propping any other doors open?		Q. The same density all of the way down, was it?
9	A. I don't remember they were.	9	A. Yes.
10	Q. When you opened the door to the 10th floor and I know	10	Q. And what colour was that smoke?
11	you said you shut it immediately did the rush of	11	A. Black.
12	smoke into the stairwell affect the amount of smoke in	12	Q. Black?
13	the stairwell? Did it make it worse?	13	A. Yes.
14	A. It did, yes.	14	Q. You go on to say:
15	Q. Much worse?	15	"I told Neil to keep hold of my leg and not to let
16	A. If we had left that door open, much worse, yes. It was	16	go. From the diagram I had seen on the Bridge Head I
17	thick black, floor to ceiling.	17	knew that we had to go diagonally from the stair door.
18	Q. All right.	18	We entered the lobby, crawling on our stomachs."
19	If you turn, please, to page 4, at the very top, you	19	A. Can I just say that that is a type error from the
20	say:	20	statement.
21	"We looked around for a rising water main, as we	21	Q. Right.
22	would normally enter a floor in the condition that we	22	A. I told Neil I would keep hold of his leg. Neil led into
23	found the 10th floor in without water as it is	23	the lobby
24	dangerous."	24	Q. Right.
25	I think you mean you would not normally enter	25	A in a diagonal position. I kept hold of his leg when
	Page 125		Page 127
1	a floor.	1	we both went in.
2	A. Yes.	2	Q. Right. Okay.
3	Q. Did you look to start with for a rising water main in	3	At this stage, are you carrying firefighting media?
4	the stairwell?	4	A. No.
5	A. Yes, quickly. It was just a quick glance around,	5	Q. Where had you put that?
6	right quick look, remember, right, there is no mains	6	A. The roll of hose that we had and the branch we left just
7	in the stairwell, it must be inside the lobby.	7	outside the door.
8	Q. Would that be something that you would normally expect	/	
0	Q. Would that be something that you would normany expect	Q	
0	to find a dry riging mains outlet in the stairwall?	8	Q. Right.
9	to find, a dry rising mains outlet in the stairwell?	9	Q. Right.A. Up against the wall, just outside the door to the 10th,
10	A. No.	9 10	Q. Right.A. Up against the wall, just outside the door to the 10th, 10th-floor door.
10 11	A. No. Q. No?	9 10 11	 Q. Right. A. Up against the wall, just outside the door to the 10th, 10th-floor door. Q. Is this right: you were entering a smoke-filled lobby
10 11 12	A. No.Q. No?A. Not particularly. It depends on how the building is	9 10 11 12	 Q. Right. A. Up against the wall, just outside the door to the 10th, 10th-floor door. Q. Is this right: you were entering a smoke-filled lobby without firefighting media?
10 11 12 13	A. No.Q. No?A. Not particularly. It depends on how the building is designed as to where that riser main outlet would be.	9 10 11 12 13	 Q. Right. A. Up against the wall, just outside the door to the 10th, 10th-floor door. Q. Is this right: you were entering a smoke-filled lobby without firefighting media? A. Yes.
10 11 12 13 14	 A. No. Q. No? A. Not particularly. It depends on how the building is designed as to where that riser main outlet would be. Q. Okay. So can we take it that on arrival at the 	9 10 11 12 13 14	 Q. Right. A. Up against the wall, just outside the door to the 10th, 10th-floor door. Q. Is this right: you were entering a smoke-filled lobby without firefighting media? A. Yes. Q. Would that be normal?
10 11 12 13 14 15	 A. No. Q. No? A. Not particularly. It depends on how the building is designed as to where that riser main outlet would be. Q. Okay. So can we take it that on arrival at the 10th floor, you didn't actually know where the DRM 	9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 Q. Right. A. Up against the wall, just outside the door to the 10th, 10th-floor door. Q. Is this right: you were entering a smoke-filled lobby without firefighting media? A. Yes. Q. Would that be normal? A. No. The night wasn't normal.
10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 A. No. Q. No? A. Not particularly. It depends on how the building is designed as to where that riser main outlet would be. Q. Okay. So can we take it that on arrival at the 10th floor, you didn't actually know where the DRM outlet was? 	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 Q. Right. A. Up against the wall, just outside the door to the 10th, 10th-floor door. Q. Is this right: you were entering a smoke-filled lobby without firefighting media? A. Yes. Q. Would that be normal? A. No. The night wasn't normal. Q. No.
10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 A. No. Q. No? A. Not particularly. It depends on how the building is designed as to where that riser main outlet would be. Q. Okay. So can we take it that on arrival at the 10th floor, you didn't actually know where the DRM outlet was? A. No. 	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 Q. Right. A. Up against the wall, just outside the door to the 10th, 10th-floor door. Q. Is this right: you were entering a smoke-filled lobby without firefighting media? A. Yes. Q. Would that be normal? A. No. The night wasn't normal. Q. No. Your task at that point is this right? was
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 A. No. Q. No? A. Not particularly. It depends on how the building is designed as to where that riser main outlet would be. Q. Okay. So can we take it that on arrival at the 10th floor, you didn't actually know where the DRM outlet was? A. No. Q. You had to look for it? 	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 Q. Right. A. Up against the wall, just outside the door to the 10th, 10th-floor door. Q. Is this right: you were entering a smoke-filled lobby without firefighting media? A. Yes. Q. Would that be normal? A. No. The night wasn't normal. Q. No. Your task at that point is this right? was actually to find the dry rising main outlet?
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 A. No. Q. No? A. Not particularly. It depends on how the building is designed as to where that riser main outlet would be. Q. Okay. So can we take it that on arrival at the 10th floor, you didn't actually know where the DRM outlet was? A. No. Q. You had to look for it? A. Yes. 	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 Q. Right. A. Up against the wall, just outside the door to the 10th, 10th-floor door. Q. Is this right: you were entering a smoke-filled lobby without firefighting media? A. Yes. Q. Would that be normal? A. No. The night wasn't normal. Q. No. Your task at that point is this right? was actually to find the dry rising main outlet? A. No, our task was to help people get out of that floor.
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 A. No. Q. No? A. Not particularly. It depends on how the building is designed as to where that riser main outlet would be. Q. Okay. So can we take it that on arrival at the 10th floor, you didn't actually know where the DRM outlet was? A. No. Q. You had to look for it? 	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 Q. Right. A. Up against the wall, just outside the door to the 10th, 10th-floor door. Q. Is this right: you were entering a smoke-filled lobby without firefighting media? A. Yes. Q. Would that be normal? A. No. The night wasn't normal. Q. No. Your task at that point is this right? was actually to find the dry rising main outlet?
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 A. No. Q. No? A. Not particularly. It depends on how the building is designed as to where that riser main outlet would be. Q. Okay. So can we take it that on arrival at the 10th floor, you didn't actually know where the DRM outlet was? A. No. Q. You had to look for it? A. Yes. 	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 Q. Right. A. Up against the wall, just outside the door to the 10th, 10th-floor door. Q. Is this right: you were entering a smoke-filled lobby without firefighting media? A. Yes. Q. Would that be normal? A. No. The night wasn't normal. Q. No. Your task at that point is this right? was actually to find the dry rising main outlet? A. No, our task was to help people get out of that floor.
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 A. No. Q. No? A. Not particularly. It depends on how the building is designed as to where that riser main outlet would be. Q. Okay. So can we take it that on arrival at the 10th floor, you didn't actually know where the DRM outlet was? A. No. Q. You had to look for it? A. Yes. Q. Okay. 	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 Q. Right. A. Up against the wall, just outside the door to the 10th, 10th-floor door. Q. Is this right: you were entering a smoke-filled lobby without firefighting media? A. Yes. Q. Would that be normal? A. No. The night wasn't normal. Q. No. Your task at that point is this right? was actually to find the dry rising main outlet? A. No, our task was to help people get out of that floor. Q. Right.
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 A. No. Q. No? A. Not particularly. It depends on how the building is designed as to where that riser main outlet would be. Q. Okay. So can we take it that on arrival at the 10th floor, you didn't actually know where the DRM outlet was? A. No. Q. You had to look for it? A. Yes. Q. Okay. You then enter the 10th floor and you say, as we can 	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 Q. Right. A. Up against the wall, just outside the door to the 10th, 10th-floor door. Q. Is this right: you were entering a smoke-filled lobby without firefighting media? A. Yes. Q. Would that be normal? A. No. The night wasn't normal. Q. No. Your task at that point is this right? was actually to find the dry rising main outlet? A. No, our task was to help people get out of that floor. Q. Right. A. And number 74.
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1	A. When we crawled into the lobby, in our head we had two	1	Did you notice, when you had been shown this by
2	objectives, which was to feel around for any casualty	2	Watch Manager Watson, that in the top left-hand corner,
3	that we could feel, or try to find an outlet if we	3	on the left-hand side of the U, there is something that
4	could.	4	says "dry riser".
5	Q. Right.	5	A. No.
6	A. But initially, if someone has tried to get out of their	6	Q. You hadn't clocked that?
7	flat and been met by those conditions, we were feeling	7	A. No.
8	around on the floor for them.	8	Q. Okay. Did anybody point it out to you?
9	Q. Right.	9	A. No.
10	So when you say:	10	Q. All right.
11	"From the diagram I had seen on the Bridge Head	11	Then if you go back to your statement, page 4, first
12	I knew that we had to go diagonally from the stair	12	paragraph, I would just like to show you something seven
13	door."	13	lines up from the bottom. You say:
14	Is that because you thought that was the direction	14	"My shoulders, everything was hot. I was really
15	of flat 74?	15	surprised how hot it was on the 10th floor before we had
16	A. We didn't know where flat 74 was, and from what	16	entered it. I had seen residents being evacuated from
17	I remember, looking at the diagram, I remember it being	17	higher up the building and they were still conscious.
18	in a U-shape. So our plan was, what we said to each	18	This would not have been possible if they had come from
19	other outside the door was, crawl in in a diagonal	19	the 10th floor"
20	position, and then try and perform a sweep.	20	Did that prompt any thoughts in your head about what
21	Q. I see, okay. I was going to ask you why were you going	21	this fire was doing at that point?
22	in a particular direction, but it is because you were	22	A. Yes, I remember thinking either someone has escaped from
23	doing a sweep, that is why?	23	that floor and somehow their flat door has been wedged
24	A. Yes.	24	open and maybe that is what has caused that heat and
25	Q. Okay. You then say:	25	smoke in the lobby, the fire coming through, through
	Page 129		Page 131
1	"We shut the door behind us to stop the smoke	1	that room, and that is what was really, you know, on our
•	We shat the door belined as to stop the smoke		that room, and that is what was really, you know, on our
2.	entering the stairwell. I didn't get more than twelve	2	head. We couldn't see what we were doing. We had
2	entering the stairwell. I didn't get more than twelve to fifteen feet when Neil said. I am hurning! It was	2 3	head. We couldn't see what we were doing. We had
2 3 4	to fifteen feet when Neil said, 'I am burning!' It was	3	absolutely zero visibility. We didn't know if we were
3	to fifteen feet when Neil said, 'I am burning!' It was very hot. We couldn't find the water outlet and we	3 4	absolutely zero visibility. We didn't know if we were crawling into a fire or not.
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1	A. It is hard to say. We did a sweep in one direction,	1 A. It was a confirmation that they had heard my call to	
2	came back to the door, turned, done the other direction.	2 them via my BARIE set, and I was to proceed with wha	at
3	It could have been a matter of minutes.	3 I had to say.	
4	Q. Right.	4 Q. I see. So go ahead and speak?	
5	A. Three, four minutes. It is hard for me to say exactly.	5 A. Yes.	
6	Q. Would it have been possible to either crawl or walk	6 Q. Okay. And what did you say?	
7	quickly round the lobby and knock on doors and shout at	7 A. I explained as quickly as I could the conditions	
8	people and alert them?	8 Q. Right.	
9	A. No.	9 A that we were met with on that 10th floor, and that w	ve
10	Q. Why is that?	10 couldn't gain access to flat number 74.	
11	A. The heat was pushing us back.	11 Q. Did you get a response to that?	
12	Q. The heat?	12 A. No, I didn't, no.	
13	A. The heat. It was really hot on that floor.	13 Q. How long do you think you were trying to get hold of the	
14	Q. And you could feel that through your PPE, could you?	entry control officer before you got a go ahead message?	
15	A. Yes, we could, yes.	15 A. I remember trying a couple of times.	
16	Q. When you came back out into the stairwell, were the	16 Q. Right. Okay.	
17	conditions the same as when you had left the stairwell,	17 Do you know whether the message that you despatched	
18	or were they different?	18 to entry control actually got through or not?	
19	A. They had got a little bit worse from where we had the	19 A. No, I don't, no.	
20	door open to go in and then come back out again.	20 Q. Can you explain, or do you know why the communication	ıs
21	Q. Right. Worse being, what, smokier?	21 were so difficult?	
22	A. Yes.	22 A. No. It was a mixture of volume of traffic	
23	Q. Was it hotter?	23 Q. Right.	
24	A. It felt very hot to us because we had just come out of	24 A. It could have been a mixture of volume of traffic, the	
25	that lobby area.	25 signal.	
23	that lobby area.	25 Signal	
	Page 133	Page 135	
1	O. Diale	1 O Did you have problems with the circus!?	
1	Q. Right.	1 Q. Did you have problems with the signal?	
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1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. 2 o'clock,	1	up."
2	then, please. Thank you.	2	And you go on to say that his buddy was Madge and
3	(1.01 pm)	3	she helped another BA down with a casualty.
4	(The short adjournment)	4	Is it out of procedure to separate from your buddy?
5	(2.00 pm)	5	A. No, that is not procedure at all, no.
6	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett, I think	6	Q. It is out of procedure?
7	Mr Batcheldor is on his way.	7	A. Yes, it is.
8	MR MILLETT: Very good.	8	Q. You say Madge had helped another BA crew down with
9	(The witness returned)	9	a casualty. How did you know that?
10	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, Mr Batcheldor, all ready to	10	A. Dave had told us.
11	carry on?	11	Q. Right.
12	THE WITNESS: Yes, I am.	12	A. Firefighter Hill, when I asked, "Where is Madge, where
13	MR MILLETT: Thank you very much, Mr Chairman.	13	is your buddy?" he explained that Madge had assisted
14	Mr Batcheldor, thank you very much for coming back	14	another crew and he had gone down with that other crew,
15	to us.	15	80
16	Can I ask you to take up your statement where we	16	Q. Was that conversation while you were standing in the
17	left off, which is on the fourth page, and in the middle	17	stairwell outside of the 10th-floor lobby door?
18	of the page, in the second paragraph, you say:	18	A. Yes, it was, yes.
19	"We then decided to make our way up to the next	19	Q. And do you know who Madge is?
20	floor."	20	A. He was a standby, I think from Richmond. He was
21	Did anybody instruct you to do that, or was that off	21	standing by at Fulham that night. So he was part of our
22	your own bat?	22	crew that evening. So he was who Dave buddled up with.
23	A. That was off our own back.	23	Q. Madge is a he, is he?
24	Q. Why did you decide to go up to the next floor?	24	A. Yes, he is.
25	A. To see if we could gain access on the 11th and see if we	25	Q. What is his full name, do you know?
	ě		, ,
	Page 137		Page 139
		,	A Table 1 of The Gold No. 191
1	could help somebody else there.	1	A. I think it is Firefighter Malik.
2	Q. Did you know of anybody needing help on the 11th at that	2	Q. Firefighter Malik?
2 3	Q. Did you know of anybody needing help on the 11th at that stage?	2 3	Q. Firefighter Malik?A. Yes.
2 3 4	Q. Did you know of anybody needing help on the 11th at that stage?A. Not that we knew of.	2 3 4	Q. Firefighter Malik?A. Yes.Q. Right. If you continue, you say:
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1	Q. We may have him down as being Firefighter Adam Johnson.	1	help to identify someone. However, by this time we had
2	Does that ring a bell, or help you?	2	gone too far to reach the phone and we couldn't stop as
3	A. It could be.	3	we had to get the unconscious woman out."
4	Q. Did that firefighter have a BA buddy with him?	4	Did you tell anybody later that there was
5	A. No, he was on his own.	5	an abandoned mobile
6	Q. Was his whistle going, do you remember?	6	A. No.
7	A. I don't remember.	7	Q at that location?
8	Q. Do you know where Firefighter Hill went?	8	A. It just rang out in my head as I was going past it.
9	A. Firefighter Hill said he was going to proceed up.	9	I don't even know if I shouted it out in a physical
10	Q. Right.	10	sense.
11	A. He is going to carry on going up the tower. When the	11	Q. Right.
12	firefighter with the casualty came when we came	12	A. Or I shouted it in my own head, "Get the phone, get the
13	across the firefighter with the casualty who needed	13	phone, that is someone's property, that is someone's
14	assistance, Dave said, "I am going to carry on going up	14	belonging", just to get it. But, yes.
15	to the next floor to see if I can assist someone there".	15	Q. You say you went down, and then you describe the descent
16	Q. Okay. And did he?	16	in the next paragraph.
17	A. As far as I know.	17	In general terms, can you describe for us the
18	Q. Right.	18	conditions on the stairs as you descended?
19	A. He didn't follow us down, so I assume he did.	19	A. Yes, it is similar to what I found when I was making our
20	Q. Now, just going on to the top of page 5, after you	20	way up. Firefighters were trying to get up the stairs
21	describe in your statement assisting with that casualty,	21	on various tasks and they were trying to make way for
22	you say:	22	us. Equipment was on the floor, which was causing us to
23	"The fire fighter from Soho took her legs. By this	23	stumble. Plus the thought of trying to get this
24	time it was proper smoky."	24	casualty out into fresh air as quick as we can to give
25	When you say it was "proper smoky", was it thicker	25	them, you know, a chance to recover you know, we were
	Page 141		Page 143
	1 agt 171		1 age 173
1	smoke now in the stairwell than you had experienced when	1	trying to move as fast as we could, get past other
2	you first came into the stairwell from the 10th-floor	2	firefighters, get past equipment, clothing, just to get
3	lobby?	3	them out the building.
4	A. Yes, it was. Yes, it was. We still had visibility. It	4	Q. Looking at the air condition, the condition of the air,
5	wasn't, obviously, as thick as we had come across in the	5	the breathability of the air as you descended, did it
6	10th-floor lobby area, so we still had some visibility,	6	change at all?
7	but the smoke had got a little bit darker and thicker.	7	A. I don't recall it changing. It was smoky, especially
8	Q. Where were you exactly at that point? Were you still on	8	around the 4th/5th, and it didn't really get clearer
9	the 10th floor?	9	until, sort of, we were reaching the bridgehead.
10	A. We were in between the 10th and 11th stairwell.	10	Q. On the way down, did you notice whether any of the lobby
11	Q. Did you have any idea of where the smoke, which was now	11	doors were open?
12	getting thicker, as you say, was coming from?	12	A. I didn't notice, no.
13	A. No.	13	Q. Okay. You didn't look in to any of the lobbies, did
14	Q. And what colour was it?	14	you?
15	A. It had got darker from when we first got up to the 10th	15	A. No, I did not, no.
16	floor. So, yes, it progressed on from, like	16	Q. Now, page 5, the third paragraph, you say:
17	I explained, a lighter grey to a darker grey smoke. But	17	"The stairwell felt very chaotic, but we managed to
18	like I said, we still had a bit of visibility. It	18	get the woman out, passed the Bridgehead to the ground
19	wasn't complete blanket.	19	floor."
20	Q. In the next paragraph in your statement on page 5 you	20	Did you know where the bridgehead was at that point?
21	say:	21	A. At that point in time, no. We didn't even stop to
22	"As the three of us were taking the woman down I saw	22	discuss or talk to anyone at the bridgehead. We just
23	a mobile phone in amongst a pile of clothes. I shouted	23	made our way straight down to the ground floor, into the
24	out to grab the phone - I knew it was somebody's	24	lobby area, and to the front entrance in desperation to
25	property and it would have their photos on and it may	25	get that casualty into some fresh air.
	D 442		F
	Page 142		Page 144
			26 (Dagga 141 to 144)

1	Q. When you went down, did you go past where the bridgehead	1	deployment to flat 74 would have been successful?
2	had been on the 2nd floor, do you remember?	2	A. Depends whether they picked up my message that I had
3	A. Yes, we would have done. That was the only stairwell to	3	sent earlier on via the BARIE set or not.
4	get out.	4	Q. Yes.
5	Q. Yes.	5	So you then say on page 5, in the sixth paragraph,
6	A. So we would have gone past it. At that point in time,	6	which is the next one down:
7	I didn't notice whether the bridgehead had moved or not.	7	"By this point I was running low on air, so I took
8	Q. Right, okay.	8	my mask off. I then returned to the Bridgehead to
9	You say that you passed the bridgehead to the ground	9	report what I had done and what I hadn't done. The
10	floor, and then you go on a little bit later, two	10	Bridgehead had now moved from the second floor to the
11	paragraphs on from that, to say that you exited the	11	third floor. Neil and I collected our BA tallies to
12	building.	12	register that we were out of the fire. I informed them
13	Do we take from that that you bypassed the	13	that we were unable to enter the 10th Floor."
14	bridgehead with the casualty when accessing the outside	14	Now, does that mean that you were still under air
15	of the building?	15	when you had come down and handed the casualty to the
16	A. That's correct, yes. We didn't actually exit the	16	firefighter at the main door?
17	building. We made our way to the lobby, to the front	17	A. That's correct, yes. We were still under air until we
18	door in the lobby, ground-floor lobby	18	passed the casualty to the firefighter to remove to LAS.
19	Q. Yes.	19	Q. Why was that? Why were you still under air?
20	A where we passed the unconscious casualty to a couple	20	A. Because we had taken that casualty from in between the
21	of firefighters that didn't have any BA on. They said	21	10th and 11th floor under air, and we carried her all
22	"We will take the casualty to paramedics".	22	the way down. We didn't stop to take our sets off, stop
23	Q. I see. It is just in the next paragraph, you say:	23	to have any communications; we just got her straight
24	"Outside the block there were fire fighters, some	24	down to the front of that building for help.
25	with BA and some without. We passed the woman to a fire	25	Q. You say, as I have just read to you, that you returned
	1		
	Page 145		Page 147
1			
	fighter without BA for him to take her to the	1	to the bridgehead to report.
2	paramedics."	2	Did you look for the bridgehead or did somebody tell
2 3	paramedics." A. Yes, we were inside the doorway, and they were just	2 3	Did you look for the bridgehead or did somebody tell you that it was now on the 3rd floor?
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	paramedics." A. Yes, we were inside the doorway, and they were just outside the doorway, literally waiting for us to pass her over to them. Q. When you got down to the ground floor, did you notice then where the bridgehead was, or whether it was on the ground floor by that stage? A. No. Q. In the process of taking the unconscious casualty to the front door of the building and handing her to the next firefighter, does that mean that you hadn't gone past the bridgehead and tallied back in? A. No. We had obviously gone past the bridgehead, because I hadn't noticed it, so I had gone past it at some point, but I had had no communication with the bridgehead as of yet. I hadn't reported what we had done or not done. Q. No. A. Hadn't collected my tally back. The priority at that point is just to get that lady to help. Q. Yes. So at that point, nobody at the bridgehead would know where you were; is that right? A. That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Did you look for the bridgehead or did somebody tell you that it was now on the 3rd floor? A. I can't remember. I can't remember that. Q. Now, we have your end of wear time as about 02.33 am. Does that sound about right to you, given that your tally-out time in other words, the time you left the bridgehead was about 02.17? A. Yes. Q. Okay. A. Yes. Q. When you got to the bridgehead on the 3rd floor, who was running it, do you remember? A. No, I don't, no. Q. Do you remember whether it was still the officers who had been operating the entry control when you deployed? A. I genuinely cannot remember who I reported to. I would have gone direct to the entry control board. Q. Right. A. I would have gone direct to them. And, again, that part of the memory has gone straight from my head. We were halfway through debriefing I was halfway through explaining conditions on the 10th, that we hadn't been able to get to flat 74, and then I was halfway through

1	came stumbling down the stairs with a 12-year-old girl	1	point was to get her outside
2	in his hands and she, like, fell on top of us, so	2	Q. Right.
3	straight away the focus was redirected again.	3	A to receive treatment.
4	Q. You say that you reported to the bridgehead, as we see	4	Q. You say, same paragraph, that there was debris falling
5	in the next sentence, you say:	5	from the building so you put your helmet on the little
6	"Neil and I collected our BA tallies to register	6	girl.
7	that we were out of the fire. I informed them that we	7	Just so that we are clear, did you take her out of
8	were unable to enter the 10th Floor."	8	the main entrance on the south side or another entrance?
9	Do you remember who you were debriefing to?	9	A. No, I believe it was the main entrance/exit, south side.
10	A. No, I don't.	10	Q. Right. And how long, roughly, after the end of wear
11	Q. And you don't remember whether it was the same entry	11	time do you think you took her out of the building?
12	control officer or bridgehead commander as was on the	12	A. It was almost immediately.
13	2nd floor?	13	Q. Right.
14	A. No, I do not.	14	A. I shut down my set in the ground-floor lobby after we
15	Q. Did you say anything to the bridgehead about the female	15	passed the adult casualty that we brought down to
16	casualty that you had assisted down the stairs?	16	waiting firefighters, so I shut my set down. Then
17	A. No. At that point, by that time, I think I had managed	17	I went straight back up to the bridgehead to collect my
18	literally just to get out that we couldn't gain access	18	tally and report what had happened, and it was at that
19	to that FSG call. I think I had just literally got that	19	point, like I explained, halfway through the debriefing,
20	out, about conditions on the 10th and that we couldn't	20	that this girl came down the stairs with a firefighter,
21	get there. Before I could get another word out, that is	21	and then I took her immediately straight out.
22	when we were involved in another situation.	22	Q. So you shut your set down before you went back to the
23	Q. So do you know whether or not the bridgehead then	23	bridgehead to collect your tally?
24	redeployed a crew to flat 74?	24	A. Yes, that's correct.
25	A. That I don't know.	25	Q. I see. Is that normal?
	Page 149		Page 151
	1 age 117		1 age 151
			<u> </u>
1	Q. In the short time, it sounds like, you were at the	1	A. Yes, it is.
1 2	Q. In the short time, it sounds like, you were at the bridgehead, did you see any fire survival guidance	1 2	A. Yes, it is. Q. You took her out of the main entrance, as you said. Was
2	bridgehead, did you see any fire survival guidance	2	Q. You took her out of the main entrance, as you said. Was
2 3	bridgehead, did you see any fire survival guidance information being recorded there?	2 3	Q. You took her out of the main entrance, as you said. Was there any system in place at that stage to protect
2 3 4	bridgehead, did you see any fire survival guidance information being recorded there? A. No.	2 3 4	Q. You took her out of the main entrance, as you said. Was there any system in place at that stage to protect casualties coming out of the building from the falling
2 3 4 5	bridgehead, did you see any fire survival guidance information being recorded there? A. No. Q. Now, you then say, as you just told us and this is in	2 3 4 5	Q. You took her out of the main entrance, as you said. Was there any system in place at that stage to protect casualties coming out of the building from the falling debris?
2 3 4 5 6	bridgehead, did you see any fire survival guidance information being recorded there? A. No. Q. Now, you then say, as you just told us and this is in the last paragraph on page 5 of your statement:	2 3 4 5 6	Q. You took her out of the main entrance, as you said. Was there any system in place at that stage to protect casualties coming out of the building from the falling debris?A. No, not at that stage, no.
2 3 4 5 6 7	bridgehead, did you see any fire survival guidance information being recorded there? A. No. Q. Now, you then say, as you just told us and this is in the last paragraph on page 5 of your statement: "As I was explaining the situation a fire fighter	2 3 4 5 6 7	 Q. You took her out of the main entrance, as you said. Was there any system in place at that stage to protect casualties coming out of the building from the falling debris? A. No, not at that stage, no. Q. And I think you say you took her to a paramedic area by
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	bridgehead, did you see any fire survival guidance information being recorded there? A. No. Q. Now, you then say, as you just told us and this is in the last paragraph on page 5 of your statement: "As I was explaining the situation a fire fighter came down with a young girl and fell on top of us.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 Q. You took her out of the main entrance, as you said. Was there any system in place at that stage to protect casualties coming out of the building from the falling debris? A. No, not at that stage, no. Q. And I think you say you took her to a paramedic area by the leisure centre; is that right?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	bridgehead, did you see any fire survival guidance information being recorded there? A. No. Q. Now, you then say, as you just told us and this is in the last paragraph on page 5 of your statement: "As I was explaining the situation a fire fighter came down with a young girl and fell on top of us. I said I would get her out, so I took her to ground	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q. You took her out of the main entrance, as you said. Was there any system in place at that stage to protect casualties coming out of the building from the falling debris? A. No, not at that stage, no. Q. And I think you say you took her to a paramedic area by the leisure centre; is that right? A. Yes. When I first come in the building, I hadn't seen
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1	mouth and eyes, and I was trying to wash that away with	1	my tally back out of the BA board
2	a bottle of water that I picked up off the floor	2	Q. Yes.
3	Q. Right.	3	A then I am guessing, like I said, it took me roughly
4	A while trying to find where the paramedics were.	4	five to ten minutes to take the young girl to the
5	Q. You go on to say that you found the family and you were	5	paramedics station, the paramedic area. From there,
6	able to reunite them?	6	I walked because I still had my set on, I walked
7	A. She was crying out, "I have left my mum, my dad", and	7	straight down to the south-east corner, so maybe
8	I think it was her brother. I think she said brother,	8	five minutes, tops. So maybe another 20 minutes or so
9	I can't 100 per cent, but "I have left them in there,	9	after my shutdown time.
10	I have left them in there, I have left them behind".	10	Q. Right, okay.
11	When we eventually come to the paramedics area, they	11	Now, I do need to put this to you. We have a 999
12	were crying on a large piece of tarpaulin, and she	12	call from a female in flat 113 with a baby timed at
13	literally just pointed at them and they just jumped up	13	03.17 who was told to leave. That is a conversation we
14	and came and grabbed her off me. Beautiful.	14	have with that time on it.
15	Q. Just take a moment. Are you okay?	15	A. Okay.
16	A. Yes.	16	Q. Does that help you, knowing what the call you had with
17	Q. We can take a break.	17	her involved, put the time on your conversation with
18	A. That's fine.	18	her, or the starting point of your call with her, more
19	Q. I am now going to turn to a different subject, which is	19	accurately?
20	a telephone conversation you had with a female in the	20	A. Not massively. But that could it sounds like that
21	tower.	21	would be around the start time.
22	A. Yes.	22	Q. Now, in your statement in the fifth paragraph on page 6
23	Q. Are you okay to continue with that?	23	you say:
24	A. Yes, yes, I am.	24	"I took the phone from Francis"
25	MR MILLETT: Okay.	25	Because that was the man's name?
	Daga 152		Dage 155
	Page 153	-	Page 155
		1	
1	I ought to just give a warning to those present that	1	A. Correct, yes.
1 2	I ought to just give a warning to those present that I am going to be discussing something that people may	1 2	A. Correct, yes. Q. " And spoke to the woman. She said 'My name is
		1	• •
2	I am going to be discussing something that people may	2	Q. " And spoke to the woman. She said 'My name is
2	I am going to be discussing something that people may find a little distressing, or very distressing. So if	2 3	Q. " And spoke to the woman. She said 'My name is Zenay. I am with my son. I am on the fourteenth
2 3 4	I am going to be discussing something that people may find a little distressing, or very distressing. So if anybody does not want to hear the evidence about the discussion between this witness and Zainab Deen, perhaps they should leave now.	2 3 4	Q. " And spoke to the woman. She said 'My name is Zenay. I am with my son. I am on the fourteenth floor - Flat 115.' I said 'Stay on the phone to me."
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1 they were aware that Zainab was in flat 113, in fact, 1 reported down, we have them already reported". 2 2 and not 115. Q. Do you remember what he looked at in order to confirm he 3 A. The number that I gave the watch manager outside, when 3 had got the flat recorded? 4 I first took the call, within 30 seconds of taking that 4 A. No, he looked over the bin where he had his sheets of 5 call, I reported it immediately to the nearest watch 5 paper spread out. What system he had in place, or how 6 manager I saw, who I believe to be Tom Furnell. 6 he had it organised, I am not 100 per cent sure of, but 7 7 I believe he was dealing with FSG calls outside of the he looked at what he had in front of him and then said 8 8 to me, "Yes, we have got that reported, we have got that building on. I think he was using a large bin, a large 9 refuse bin, that had sheets of paper all over the top of 9 already". 10 it. I went straight to that person there and explained 10 Q. Just to follow that up, you say he had sheets of paper to them, "I have got a lady and her two-year-old son in 11 spread out. Did you recognise those sheets of paper as 11 12 flat" -- whether that was 113 or 115, whatever she told 12 a particular form? 13 me at that time, I relayed that immediately. 13 A. No, I do not. 14 O. Right. 14 Q. Were they control information forms, do you think? 15 A. So whether 10 or so hours, 12 hours later, I have 15 A. I couldn't tell what they were. 16 written down -- I have remembered it as 113 or 115, but 16 Q. Do you know where he was getting his information from? 17 the flat number that she gave me, I gave that directly 17 A. No, I don't, no. 18 to that watch manager, so it would have been correct at 18 Q. Did you see who he was giving his information to? 19 19 A. No. He had a few firefighters around him. What would 20 20 normally happen is they would be used as runners. Q. Right. I am going to come back to that in just 2.1 a moment. I am sorry to explore this in a bit of 21 22 22 detail. But to be clear, did she say that she was in A. Especially on a night like that where radio comms may 23 23 flat 115 or that she lived at flat 115? not be the best form of communication. I take it he was 24 A. No, she didn't specifically say "I live here", she just 24 using them as runners. Again, I can't 100 per cent 25 said to me -- I said to her immediately, "Where are you? 25 confirm that. Page 157 Page 159 1 What floor are you on? What flat are you in?" 1 Q. Did he have any other watch managers with him, helping 2 Q. Okay. And you say in your statement, just going back to 2 him, or participating in that exercise? 3 3 A. I don't recall. it: 4 4 "Watch manager Tom FENELL was dealing with Fire Q. Okay. 5 5 Survival calls from a position outside the building so I Do you remember if the flat which Watch Manager 6 asked his advice." 6 Furnell said he had for Zainab was 113 or 115? 7 7 You say "Fenell"; in fact, we have a Watch Manager A. No, I don't recall. 8 8 Thomas Furnell? Q. You don't recall. 9 9 A. That is who it is, yeah. This has been written out A. I just remember giving him the information that Zainab 10 10 incorrectly. had given me immediately, and him immediately confirming 11 "We have got that recorded already, we know about that 11 Q. That is okay. 12 A. This is not my wording. Asked his advice is not my 12 call". 13 wording either. I reported that call to him, basically. 13 Q. When he said he had it recorded or he knew about that 14 14 call, what did you understand by that? Q. Now, you have described just a minute ago what he was 15 doing outside of the building; working on a large bin 15 A. What I took from that was that someone in that flat, with sheets of paper all over the top of it, you have 16 Zainab, or if anyone else was in there, had made a call, 16 17 17 a 999 call, and that the information given was then said to us. 18 Did you know what he was actually doing? Did you 18 given to the fire ground and that was recorded as an FSG 19 19 see what he was doing? call. So I took it as though we knew there were people 20 A. I remember asking him, I remember saying to him, "Are 20 in that flat who we needed to go and help and missions 21 you doing the FSG calls?" 21 were being carried out to do that. 22 Q. Did you gain any understanding from what he said to you 22 Q. Right. 23 A. And he said yes. And I reported that directly, I said, 23 that firefighters had already been deployed to that 24 "Have you got this floor, this flat?" And he had a look 24 flat? 25 and he said to me immediately, "We have got that 25 A. No, I didn't, no. Page 160 Page 158

1	Q. When you say you asked Watch Manager Furnell for advice,	1	and she is just following the stay-put advice.
2	what advice were you looking for?	2	Q. Stay-put advice wouldn't be given normally, would it, to
3	A. Yes, that is worded incorrectly. I never said that in	3	somebody who was trapped and had no choice?
4	my statement. That is worded incorrectly. I know it is	4	A. It would still be given, because you have to when
5	in my statement, but that is not what I said in the	5	people are stuck in a situation where they are literally
6	recording. I was reporting the situation to him.	6	petrified for their life, they would sometimes not make
7	Q. Right.	7	the best decision. So even though they can see, maybe,
8	A. It was literally it was that quick, that dynamic. It	8	the atmosphere outside that door, being told to stay put
9	was literally, "Tom, I have got this lady on the phone	9	would be a reassurance to them. Sometimes people would
10	on this floor, in this flat, she's with her two-year-old	10	panic and maybe want to make a run for it, to try and
11	son", and he had a look and said, "Yes, we have got that	11	get out
12	written down already, Chris", and that was my dealings	12	Q. I see.
13	with him at that particular time.	13	A even though that may not be the best thing to do at
14	Q. Did Watch Manager Furnell tell you anything else?	14	that particular time. So even though it may seem
15	A. No.	15	obvious to people who don't understand, wait and stay
16	Q. At that point, just standing back from the specifics of	16	put when they can't get out, you still have to reassure
17	this conversation, that moment, did you know how far	17	them by telling them that.
18	firefighters were getting up into the building?	18	Q. Right, I follow. So stay put, to a trapped person, is
19	A. At that point, no.	19	given by way of reassurance
20	Q. When you were speaking to Watch Manager Furnell, was the	20	A. Yes.
21	lady still on the telephone?	21	Q rather than by way of advice you take seriously, or
22	A. I was on the phone to her all of the time, yes. I told	22	literally?
23	her not to put the phone down, yes, stay on the phone.	23	A. Yes.
24	Q. Okay.	24	Q. I follow.
25	At this stage and, again, we can't be specific	25	Now, looking at your statement, on page 6, in the
20	in this stage with, again, we can't se specific	20	Tion, footing at your suitement, on page 9, in the
	Page 161	<u> </u>	Page 163
1	about timing did you know what the advice being given	1	last paragraph you advise her, halfway down, to go to
2	to residents generally inside the building was?	2	the least smoky room, shut the door and put clothing
3	A. She said to me — as soon as I spoke Watch Manager Tom	3	round the bottom of the door, and to lie on the floor
4	Furnell, I stepped away from his scene, and she said to	4	and put clothing round her little boy's face.
5	me, "We can't get out, we have been told to stay in the	5	Did you consider advising her, or helping her to
6	flat. We can't get out."	6	assess whether it was safe to leave?
7	Q. "We can't get out, we have been told to stay in"?	7	A. No. I took her word that
8	A. Yes. So I took it that the stay-put policy was still in	8	Q. Right.
9	place.	9	A she couldn't get out of her flat. So now my aim was
10	P		
	O. Did you get the impression from what she said to you	10	
	Q. Did you get the impression from what she said to you that she was trapped in the flat?	10	to try and keep her as safe her and her son as safe
11 12	that she was trapped in the flat?	11	to try and keep her as safe her and her son as safe as possible until what I believed we would get in and
11	that she was trapped in the flat? A. Yes, I did.	11 12	to try and keep her as safe her and her son as safe as possible until what I believed we would get in and help her out.
11 12	that she was trapped in the flat?	11	to try and keep her as safe her and her son as safe as possible until what I believed we would get in and help her out. Q. Did she tell you what the conditions were like in the
11 12 13	that she was trapped in the flat? A. Yes, I did. Q. But she also said, did she, that she was told to stay in the flat?	11 12 13 14	to try and keep her as safe her and her son as safe as possible until what I believed we would get in and help her out. Q. Did she tell you what the conditions were like in the flat?
11 12 13 14	that she was trapped in the flat? A. Yes, I did. Q. But she also said, did she, that she was told to stay in the flat? A. Yes.	11 12 13	to try and keep her as safe her and her son as safe as possible until what I believed we would get in and help her out. Q. Did she tell you what the conditions were like in the flat? A. I remember her saying it is light smoky at that time.
11 12 13 14 15	that she was trapped in the flat? A. Yes, I did. Q. But she also said, did she, that she was told to stay in the flat? A. Yes. Q. Both?	11 12 13 14 15	to try and keep her as safe her and her son as safe as possible until what I believed we would get in and help her out. Q. Did she tell you what the conditions were like in the flat? A. I remember her saying it is light smoky at that time. Q. Okay. You say "at that time"; that is at the start of
11 12 13 14 15 16	that she was trapped in the flat? A. Yes, I did. Q. But she also said, did she, that she was told to stay in the flat? A. Yes. Q. Both? A. Yes, both.	11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 to try and keep her as safe her and her son as safe as possible until what I believed we would get in and help her out. Q. Did she tell you what the conditions were like in the flat? A. I remember her saying it is light smoky at that time. Q. Okay. You say "at that time"; that is at the start of the conversation with her?
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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	that she was trapped in the flat? A. Yes, I did. Q. But she also said, did she, that she was told to stay in the flat? A. Yes. Q. Both? A. Yes, both. Q. Right. A. I had just come down from there. I had already been in the building. I saw what the conditions were like in the lobby that I was sent to. Q. Right. A. I had no other belief that it wasn't like that on any of the other floors. So if she is telling me she can't get out, I was taking it that she is trapped in that flat,	11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	to try and keep her as safe — her and her son as safe as possible until what I believed we would get in and help her out. Q. Did she tell you what the conditions were like in the flat? A. I remember her saying it is light smoky at that time. Q. Okay. You say "at that time"; that is at the start of the conversation with her? A. Yes. Q. Did she speak of fire in the flat? A. No. Q. Now, I want just to ask you about some timing questions. At the bottom of the page, page 6, you describe there what you say to her and she says to you. Then you say at the top of page 7: "I was on the phone saying this to her for 30-35
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	that she was trapped in the flat? A. Yes, I did. Q. But she also said, did she, that she was told to stay in the flat? A. Yes. Q. Both? A. Yes, both. Q. Right. A. I had just come down from there. I had already been in the building. I saw what the conditions were like in the lobby that I was sent to. Q. Right. A. I had no other belief that it wasn't like that on any of the other floors. So if she is telling me she can't get	11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	to try and keep her as safe — her and her son as safe as possible until what I believed we would get in and help her out. Q. Did she tell you what the conditions were like in the flat? A. I remember her saying it is light smoky at that time. Q. Okay. You say "at that time"; that is at the start of the conversation with her? A. Yes. Q. Did she speak of fire in the flat? A. No. Q. Now, I want just to ask you about some timing questions. At the bottom of the page, page 6, you describe there what you say to her and she says to you. Then you say at the top of page 7:

1	minutes - I was gagging to hear the door getting kicked	1	I thought just she needs to hear someone's voice,
2	in. I was just waiting to hear someone shout	2	Francis's voice, and I just said to Francis because
3	'Casualty!' to signal that they had been found."	3	he wasn't next to me, he didn't hear what I was
4	On the timing issue, 30 to 35 minutes, when, in your	4	listening to, so he didn't know what was going on. But
5	recollection, does that time period start? Is that from	5	I said to him, "Tell her you love her, tell her you love
6	the start of your conversation with her?	6	her, Francis, to carry on fighting, and you are waiting
7	A. Yes, I would say so. Yes. From then, it was just	7	for her", and I held the phone to his head, and he did,
8	a case of trying to reassure her and stay on the phone	8	he said that to her, and before she could say anything
9	to her.	9	to him, I pulled the phone back, and I explained to her,
10	Q. During that period of time, where were you physically?	10	"See, there's people waiting for you, there are people
11	A. I was around the south-east corner of the tower with	11	down here waiting for you that love you, don't give up
12	Francis Deen. One minute I was sat on the floor, the	12	on us now. Carry on the fight."
13	next minute I was pacing, but all of the time,	13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Shall we have a break? I think you
14	Francis he was around the vicinity as well. I was	14	could do with a break.
15	trying to keep my eye on him at the same time, because	15	A. I am okay, if you want to carry on. This doesn't go
16	he was obviously very upset and animated, and I was	16	anywhere. This
17	worried he was going to try and make a run for the	17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It is a very difficult thing for you
18	tower, so I was trying to make sure that I had my eye on	18	to talk about, I quite understand that. Have you nearly
19	him as well at the same time.	19	got to the end of this particular section of your
20	Q. During this period of time, the 30 to 35-minute period	20	questions.
21	you speak of, did you have any further discussion with,	21	MR MILLETT: We are quite close to the end.
22	contact with, Watch Manager Furnell?	22	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Shall we just finish this subject,
23	A. No.	23	and then we will have a break.
24	Q. Did you have any discussion with anybody else who was	24	A. Carry on, please.
25	dealing with FSGs?	25	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right.
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	- 182 - 102		
1	A. No.	1	MR MILLETT: Can you estimate, even roughly, how long
2	Q. The bridgehead?	2	Francis was on the phone to Zainab when you gave the
3	A. No.	3	phone
4	Q. Did you look for any updates as to the progress	4	A. Seconds.
5	firefighters were making to get to that flat?	5	Q. Seconds, right.
6	A. Not until, I believe, her son passed away.	6	A. Just enough time to say what I told him to say, and then
7	Q. That is, I think, something you cover in the next	7	I took it straight back.
8	paragraph of the statement; is that right?	8	Q. Right. You then say in the next paragraph:
9	A. Yes.	9	"When I took the phone back I could hear her
10	Q. In the second line you refer to 30 to 35 minutes. Is	10	coughing. I could hear other sounds like banging in the
11	that the same 30 to 35 minutes that you refer to in the	11	background and I kept thinking that the fire fighters
12	first paragraph on that page?	12	had reached her."
13	A. Yes.	13	Did you have any idea of what those sounds in the
14	Q. Then you say you passed the phone back to Francis, and	14	background were?
15	there was a conversation that you describe there, and	15	A. No.
16	then he passed the phone back to you again; is that	16	Q. Could you hear anybody else in the background, in the
17	right?	17	flat, with Zainab?
18	A. Yes. During the initial 30, 35 minutes, Jeremiah	18	A. No.
19	I could hear them both coughing and crying, and it was	19	Q. Now, you then go on to say in the next sentence:
20	about that 35-minute mark that Zainab told me her son is	20	"I spent another 35-40 minutes on the phone to her
21	dead. "He is dead, and I don't want to be here anymore,	21	in total."
22	I want to be with him". It was at that point, you know,	22	Is that another 35 to 40 minutes in addition to the
23	that I had to try and tell her not to be like you	23	initial 35 to 40 minutes we have talked about already?
24	know, "You ain't giving up on me now, don't talk like	24	A. Yes. It was at that point, after I took the phone back
	Alack areas areas and fig. 1. at 1.	2.5	
25	that, you carry on fighting". And it was then that	25	from Francis, that is when I went to Watch Manager
	that, you carry on fighting". And it was then that Page 166	25	from Francis, that is when I went to Watch Manager Page 168

1	Furnell again.	1	was quiet. She'd stopped coughing. I stayed on the
2	Q. Yes.	2	line in case she could still hear me. It wasn't until
3	A. Just to ask him, "Where are we?" you know, I was going,	3	about 10 minutes that I got confirmation, I think, that
4	"Where are we, are we nearly there? Are we nearly at	4	she had passed away, from what I could hear. And the
5	her yet?"	5	phone then went silent again completely.
6	Q. You cover that in the third line of the third paragraph	6	A few minutes after that, I put the phone
7	on page 7 of your statement.	7	I disconnected the line, told Francis that I think the
8	When you say "Where are we?", what were you asking	8	battery must have gone on Zainab's phone. We must have
9	him?	9	become disconnected.
10	A. I was asking (1) I wanted to know I wanted	10	Again, I couldn't tell him what I was listening to.
11	assurance that someone has been deployed to her, and if	11	He didn't need to know that, right there and then,
12	we had any feedback of where they were, how they were	12	I didn't feel. Rightly or wrongly.
13	getting on.	13	And then he was just asking, "Where are you, have
14	Q. What did he say to you?	14	you got her, have you got her?" and I felt like I needed
15	A. He just looked at me and shook his head and said "I am	15	to get him away from the building, really, because we
16	really sorry, Chris, we ain't getting past the 12th at	16	were both standing there watching the effects of the
17	the moment".	17	fire on the building.
18	Q. Right. Is that the first time you heard that?	18	So I took him up to the leisure centre, where I knew
19	A. Yes, it was, yes.	19	the police were, and explained to an officer who he was
20	Q. Was that the first update you had had from Watch Manager	20	and that he was waiting for somebody to come out the
21	Furnell since you had been on the phone to Zainab?	21	building, a family member to come out of the building,
22	A. Yes, it was, yes.	22	and gave him his phone back. And, yes, then the officer
23	Q. I think you remained on the line to Zainab after Watch	23	escorted him to either inside the leisure centre or
24	Manager Furnell had told you this. Do you remember how	24	somewhere else where they were waiting for news on their
25	much longer?	25	family.
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1	A. It would have been at least another 30, 35-plus minutes.	1	Before that, I got him to write down on a bit of
2	Q. Right.	2	notepaper I had Zainab and Jeremiah's name and ages,
3	In the last paragraph, you describe hearing Zainab,	3	contact details, before I yes, gave him to the
4	and then you describe some screaming, and then when you	4	police.
5	say:	5	Q. Can I show you a piece of paper to see whether that
6	"When it stopped I knew then that was it. I hung up	6	corresponds with your recollection of what he wrote
7	the phone. The whole phone call lasted about an hour	7	down. It is LFB00001968, please, Mr Documents Director.
8	and a quarter."	8	It is page 17 in it.
9	That estimate of an hour and a quarter, do you think	9	This is what looks like a firefighter's notebook
10	that is right, in the light of the	10	piece of paper?
11	A. I would say so, yes.	11	A. That is his phone number, yes, that was it.
12	Q. So 35 plus 35?	12	Q. That is the piece of paper, is it?
13	A. There was a point it was around halfway through the	13	A. That was it.
14	call, that we got disconnected.	14	Q. Can you see on it, it says, "115 [arrow] 113". Do you
15	Q. Right.	15	remember seeing that?
16	A. Literally for seconds, because I pressed recall straight	16	A. No, that was added. He wrote their names down and their
17	away again, and she answered. That must have been	17	ages, his name and phone number.
18	around the halfway stage, we became disconnected,	18	Q. I see. And you think "115 [arrow] 113" was added later,
19	I called her up again straight away, and then I remember	19	do you think?
20	it being at least another 40 plus minutes after that.	20	A. Yes.
21	Q. Right. So you were able to call her back with ease?	21	Q. You remember seeing it but without those notations?
22	A. Immediately, yes.	22	A. Yes, sorry.
23	Q. Afterwards, you I think led Francis to the paramedics	23	Q. I understand.
24	area.	24	Did he give you that piece of paper?
25	A. Yes. For about 10 minutes of that phone call, the line	25	A. I took it I ripped it from my notepad.
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	Page 170		Page 172
			43 (Pages 169 to 172)

1	Q. That is your notepad?	1	Mr Millett.
2	A. Yes, it is.	2	MR MILLETT: I do, Mr Chairman, yes.
3	Q. I see.	3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right. Well, Mr Batcheldor is
4	A. And then he wrote the details down, and after I had	4	on his way back.
5	given him his phone back and left him in charge with	5	MR MILLETT: Thank you.
6	Q. Right. Then	6	(The witness returned)
7	A. I took that bit of paper and took it to the command unit	7	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Batcheldor?
8	that I believe was dealing with the FSG calls, and	8	THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
9	I went in and explained to them who these people were,	9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think there is only one more
10	and gave that bit of paper to them.	10	question to come, but we will see anyway.
11	Q. Did you see what they did with it?	11	Yes, Mr Millett.
12	A. No.	12	MR MILLETT: Mr Batcheldor, thank you for coming back.
13	Q. Did you have any further contact with Watch Manager	13	A. Thank you.
14	Furnell?	14	Q. My question is this: when you were on the telephone to
15	A. No.	15	Zainab, and having this discussion with her, did she
16	Q. Did you have any further contact with anybody on the	16	tell you at any stage that she had been moved into the
17	ground on the night about that particular incident?	17	flat she was in from another flat?
18	A. No. Just people asking if things were okay.	18	A. No, she didn't, no.
19	Q. Can I just ask you a question, going back to the	19	MR MILLETT: No. Okay. That is my question.
20	conversation you had with her.	20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right.
21	Did Zainab tell you whether anybody else was in the	21	MR MILLETT: So I just want to say now, finally, thank you
22	flat?	22	very much, Crew Manager Batcheldor, to you, for giving
23	A. She didn't, no.	23	what cannot have been easy evidence. I am extremely
24	Q. Apart from her son.	24	grateful to you for coming here and assisting us with
25	A. No.	25	our investigations. We do really appreciate it
23	A. No.	23	our investigations. We do reany appreciate it
	Page 173		Page 175
1	Q. Did she tell you whether anybody had been evacuated	1	enormously, so thank you.
2	previously from that flat?	2	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
3	A. No, she didn't mention, no.	3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: And I would like to echo
4	MR MILLETT: Crew Manager Batcheldor, I am very grateful to	4	Mr Millett's words of thanks.
5	you. I have no further questions for you.	5	I think it must have taken a lot of courage to come
6	It may be appropriate to take a short break because	6	here and talk about those experiences in public, and
7	there may be one or two things I may have missed that	7	I am sure a lot of other people in this room are very
8	I want to cover, but would you bear with me?	8	grateful to you for having done so.
9	THE WITNESS: Thank you.	9	So thank you very much indeed.
10	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, Mr Batcheldor, we will have	10	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
11	a break now, in any event. It may be that there will be	11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right. Would you like to go
12	a few further questions for you. We will have to see	12	with the usher, then, please.
13	when you come back.	13	(The witness was released)
14	THE WITNESS: Okay.	14	Housekeeping
15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Please don't talk to anybody about	15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So, Mr Millett, no more witnesses
16	your evidence when you are out of the room.	16	for the time being.
17	THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.	17	MR MILLETT: No.
18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you like to go with the usher,	18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: But can I just
19	and we will resume at 3.05. Thank you very much.	19	MR MILLETT: Yes, there may be some housekeeping matters.
20	(The witness withdrew)	20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: There may be, we will see.
21	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, 3.05, please. Thank you.	20 21	Before we get to those I think that, as the inquiry
22		21 22	is about to adjourn for the month of August, this seems
	(2.55 pm)	22 23	
23	(A short break)		to me to be an appropriate time to take stock of the
24	(3.05 pm) SIR MARTIN MOORE PICK: Leather you have one more question	24	progress of the evidence-gathering so far, and also to
25	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I gather you have one more question,	25	outline the timetable for the remainder of phase 1.
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Grenfell Tower Public Inquiry As you all know, hearings began on 21 May with the 1 2 2 commemorations held at the Millennium Hotel in South 3 Kensington and, apart from a short break during the 3 4 second week of June, have continued without 4 5 interruption. 5 6 Normally, we have sat to hear evidence from Monday 6 7 to Thursday, between 10 o'clock and 4.15, but on many 7 8 occasions, we have in fact sat on Friday, and often 8 9 9 hearings have started at 9.30 in the morning in order to 10 keep up the momentum. 10 11 We had originally planned to complete the 11 12 firefighters' evidence, including that of the senior 12 13 officers of the London Fire Brigade, by the end of July, 13 14 and so to be in a position to start taking evidence from 14 15 the former residents of the tower and others 15 16 in September. 16 17 However, as you will realise, the process of taking 17 18 evidence from the firefighters will now need to continue 18 19 after the summer break. 19 20 20 There are a number of reasons for that. In the 21 first place, it is notoriously difficult to predict how 21 22 22 long any witness will take. More significantly, 23 23 however, it has turned out that many of the witnesses 24 from whom we have heard have had much more to tell us 24 25 than was apparent from their statements. 25 Page 177 1 1 One result of that is that it has often been 2 necessary for counsel to pursue lines of inquiry that 2 3 3 became apparent only in the course of the witness's 4 4 evidence, or from evidence given by earlier witnesses. 5 And to pursue useful lines of inquiry is, of course, the 5 6 whole purpose of the inquiry. 6 7 7 Added to that is the fact that, from time to time, 8 8 it has been necessary to take more frequent, or in some 9 9

cases rather longer, breaks in the hearings to accommodate witnesses' personal positions.

I should perhaps add to that that the number of firefighters who have been called and will have been called to give evidence in person has grown in response to requests from some of the core participants.

It is also right to mention that, since the start of the phase 1 hearings, there has been substantial further disclosure of documents and photographs to the inquiry by the LFB and through the Metropolitan Police, and the police have disclosed further firefighters' statements and exhibits. The new materials have had to be considered by the inquiry team, and disclosed to the core participants, and then put to the witnesses where necessary. All that has increased the time taken to examine the witnesses and, in some cases, has made it necessary to call further witnesses.

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All of these factors have played a part in setting the original timetable back by a few weeks. Hearing further firefighters' evidence in September will probably take up much, if not all, of that month. So we now expect to hear evidence from former residents of the tower during October, and the expert evidence in the first half of November.

We expect to complete hearing all of the evidence relevant to phase 1 before the end of the year, and then to be in a position to deliver a report early in the new

But I am pleased to say that progress of work on phase 2, which is continuing in parallel with phase 1, should not be significantly affected by the delay.

We shall continue to provide more information about the timetable for the proceedings on the inquiry website over the coming months.

In the light of the progress so far, I have come to the view that there should be a further procedural hearing at the beginning of the next session -- indeed, at 9.30 on Monday, 3 September -- before we resume taking evidence.

The hearing will have to be short -- I am going to allow a maximum of an hour and a half -- so that the evidence that is already timetabled to be heard on that

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day can be completed within the day. It would be very unfortunate if we were to start losing time on the first day of the next session. The hearing will cover four particular matters:

- 1. The nature of and the limits on the evidence to be adduced from senior LFB officers as part of phase 1.
- 2. The programme for taking evidence from BSR witnesses and the approach to any special arrangements which may be needed for them or others if it has not been possible to reach agreement on that question by
- 3. The preparation and presentation of the evidence necessary to discharge the article 2 function in relation to each of the deceased, and the programme for carrying that out.
- 4. The approach to be taken to identifying and formulating potential recommendations arising out of the phase 1 evidence.

I envisage that at that procedural hearing, counsel to the inquiry will be asked to make a brief opening statement, after which I will hear from counsel for those core participants who wish to be heard.

In order to ensure that the hearing can proceed efficiently, those who wish to be heard must file a skeleton argument in electronic form with the

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1	solicitor to the inquiry not later than 4 o'clock on	1	interim that is this break to receive examples of
2	Tuesday, 28 August.	2	what we call the obvious and manifestly obvious urgent
3	Skeleton arguments must be limited to five pages.	3	requirements for precautions in these other tower blocks
4	I know that is quite a challenge, but it seems to me	4	that we say could be taken tomorrow, but certainly very
5	important to try to do that. So skeleton arguments to	5	soon.
6	be limited to five pages, and it would help me if they	6	That is the request.
7	were drafted with one-and-a-half line spacing.	1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right.
8	Bullet-point submissions would be particularly welcome.	8	Mr Mansfield, as I have already indicated, I expect
9	Given the limited time available, I should expect	9	to hear submissions as to how we should go about
10	oral submissions to be brief and succinct, and as on	10	approaching that aspect of things when we have the
11	previous occasions, I shall expect counsel to co-operate	11	procedural hearing in September. But if you wish to
12	with each other in order to avoid repetition and make	12	formulate any suggestions, then we shall receive them
13	the best use of the limited time available, because we	13	
14	must ensure that we start with the witness promptly at		gratefully.
15	11 o'clock.	I	MR MANSFIELD: Thank you.
		I	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
16	Finally, if any of you are able to take a holiday	16	Well, Mr Millett, is there anything else that we
17	over the next month, I hope you have a very enjoyable	17	need to do?
18	time.	I	MR MILLETT: Not as far as I know, no. So that, I think,
19	Mr Millett, anything else we need to deal with?	19	does conclude the business of the day.
20	MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, no, thank you very much, and that	I	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
21	is the business of the day, I trust.	21	Well, then, I will look forward to seeing you all
22	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good. Thank you very much.	22	or at least those of you who are going to be back
23	MR MANSFIELD: I wonder if I might just ask your permission	23	here at 9.30 on 3 September.
24	for a brief moment before we all	24	As I say, if you can have a holiday, I hope you
25	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Mansfield, I can scarcely hear	25	enjoy it.
	Page 181		Page 183
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	you from here, and you ought to realise that you are not going to be caught on camera, standing where you are. So if you wish to address me, would you like to come up here? MR MANSFIELD: Yes, certainly. SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You can pretend you are a witness for a moment. MR MANSFIELD: I am much obliged. It will only take a moment. Yes, sir, it is a request from the families that I represent, and I think others as well. In a sense, it is foreshadowing what you have just said for September. There is a widespread feeling amongst the families of a sense of urgency, and that urgency relates to the possibility of helping other communities who live in tower blocks very similar to the one that they were in, all over the United Kingdom. The urgency is this: the evidence that you have heard so far gives rise to, we would contend, some urgency. Not only that, but also some obvious and we say manifestly obvious possible recommendations that obviously could wait until the interim report's publication, or just before, but the risk there is that	2 3 4 5 6 S 7 8 9 10 C 11 12 F 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	3.15 pm) (The hearing adjourned until 9.30 am on Monday, 3 September 2018) INDEX SHARON DARBY (continued)
24 25	another nine months would go by. So we would ask, would you be prepared in the	24 25	
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