1	Wednesday, 25 July 2018	1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It's all yours?
2	(9.30 am)	2	A. Yes.
3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to	3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
4	today's hearing.	4	MR MILLETT: You also have two exhibits, PAS/2 and PAS/3.
5	I'll invite Mr Millett to call the next witness.	5	PAS/2 is a map, which is MET00015641, and PAS/3 is the
6	MR MILLETT: Thank you, Mr Chairman, good morning.	6	photograph of an envelope which contains flat and floor
7	Yes, I now call Watch Manager Paul Sadler to give	7	numbers, which is MET00016967. I don't propose to show
8	evidence.	8	you those at this stage, but they are formally part of
9	PAUL SADLER (sworn)	9	your evidence.
10	Questions by COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY	10	Now, before I go further, can I just say, first of
11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much, Mr Sadler.	11	all, thank you very much for coming today to give
12	Now, I take it you want to stand up to give your	12	evidence to the inquiry. We very much appreciate it.
13	evidence.	13	My questions are supposed to be short and simple,
14	THE WITNESS: Please, sir.	14	but if they're not or you don't understand them then
15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: That's fine.	15	I'll happily rephrase the question or put it again or
16	Yes, Mr Millett.	16	not ask it at all.
17	MR MILLETT: Good morning, Mr Sadler.	17	Also, if you need any breaks at any stage, just let
18	A. Good morning.	18	us know.
19	Q. Thank you very much for coming to the inquiry.	19	A. Sure.
20	First of all, could you please give us your full	20	Q. Okay.
21	name?	21	A. Thank you.
22	A. Paul Anthony Sadler.	22	Q. Just in terms of your career, you joined the London Fire
23	Q. Thank you.	23	Brigade, I think, in August 2008; is that right?
24	Can I please ask you to go first to your two	24	A. August 2007.
25	statements, the first of which you made on	25	Q. 2007, right, my mistake.
	Page 1		Page 3
1	15 February 2018, and that is MET00012481, and the	1	Can you explain your career to date, give us
2	second you made on 12 March 2018, and that is	2	a summary of it.
3	MET00012684.	3	A. So of May 1998 I joined a retain station, Fownhope fire
4	Have you read each of these statements recently?	4	station in Hereford and Worcester Fire Brigade, which is
5	A. Yes, I have, sir.	5	now Hereford and Worcester Fire and Rescue Service,
6	Q. Can you confirm that the contents are both true?	6	where I served for 18 months. I then passed a selection
7	A. Yes, they are.	7	process to become a whole-time firefighter in November
8	Q. Have you discussed your statements or your evidence with	8	1999, where I was based on the White Watch at Hereford
9	anybody before coming here today?	9	fire station. I served there until August 2007 on the
10	A. No, I haven't.	10	White Watch at Hereford.
11	Q. Now, I think you also have a contemporaneous note which	11	I then transferred to London Fire Brigade, where
12	is MET00005565, if we can just have that on the screen,	12	I served at Heathrow fire station, Euston fire station,
13	which is a manuscript note that you made after the	13	Dowgate fire station, Soho fire station and now my base
14	incident.	14	posting on a Red Watch at Lambeth fire station as
15	Do you recognise that note as yours?	15	a watch manager.
16	A. Yes, I do.	16	Q. Right.
17	Q. It's dated 14 June 2017. Is that when you wrote that	17	Just to go back to the date you joined the London
18	note?	18	Fire Brigade, I put to you August 2008 because that's
19	A. Yes, it is.	19	what your statement says at the bottom of page 1, but is
20	Q. Okay.	20	that wrong? Is it August 2007?
21	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Sorry, Mr Millett, forgive me,	21	A. Yes, that's my error, it's August 2007.
22	I can't help noticing that the first page appears to be	22	Q. It is 2007. Okay.
23	written in two slightly different hands. Is it all	23	And you're a watch manager still, are you, at
24	yours or did somebody	24	Lambeth?
25	A. It is mine, yes.	25	A. That's correct.
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	Page 2		Page 4

1 Q. Right. 1 Q. As at the night of the fire, you were based where? 2 2 A. Lambeth. Have you had training on how to carry out a full or 3 O. Still at Lambeth? 3 partial evacuation of a high-rise --4 4 5 Q. -- domestic dwelling? 5 Q. Were you a watch manager on that night? 6 A. I was, yes. 6 A. No. 7 7 Q. Now, at page 2 of your statement, if we can just look at Q. Have you had any training on how to handle fire survival 8 it, you say in relation to your training that you focus 8 guidance calls? 9 9 a lot on high-rise buildings. You say four lines or A. I have had training. I have delivered training. Part 10 five lines down from the top: 10 of the six-pump or eight-pump exercise we take part in, 11 "The training with LFB tends to be borough specific, 11 or the four-pump exercise we take part in, we have 12 12 for instance here we have a lot of high rise buildings, simulated a role play of FSG and we have carried that 13 so we tend to focus a lot of energy on high rises and 13 out recently, yes. 14 sub surface." 14 Q. When you simulated your role play of FSG, was that as 15 In terms of high-rise training, what kind of 15 an operational officer on the incident ground? 16 16 training do you do, can you give us an idea of that? A. I developed the training on that day, so I had four fire 17 17 A. So station-based we've got a drill tower, as you're engines at Lambeth fire station and I simulated 18 aware of, and we do some role play exercises, for want 18 a high-rise fire on the upper floors above the building. 19 of a better word, where we simulate a fire on an upper 19 The upper floors of our hold headquarters are empty at 20 20 floor and our on-arrival tactics. So we do that at the moment, so we simulated FSGs, a fire on the 4th or 21 station. We also have lectures. 21 6th floor, and from that I developed fire survival 22 22 And then we have a borough-specific risk, so here at guidance coming through, and one of the fire engines 23 23 Lambeth we've got basements, we've got a lot of with us took those calls and went through the policy and 24 high-rise, so I focus more on those aspects of 24 the procedure that evolved with FSG. 25 25 firefighting than, say, one of the suburb stations does Q. Can I follow this up: you developed this training Page 5 Page 7 where they have more aspects of rural firefighting. 1 yourself on FSG, did you? 1 2 We have set dates where we have a set of fire 2 A. When I say developed, that's a bit strong; 3 3 engines that get together, four, six, eight, ten, and we I orchestrated, I put together. You know, the four fire 4 develop a training programme and we'll have 4 engines come and I chose to concentrate on FSG as the 5 a large-scale exercise, say at the Shard, where we'll 5 risk to my station ground dictates, and we did the simulate a fire on one of the upper floors and all the 6 6 high-rise firefighting, so the firefighters are gaining 7 appliances attend. It's usually a dry drill because we 7 an understanding of high-rise firefighting, and 8 don't want to destroy the building. We simulate how it 8 I evolved that to the officers, where there would be q would evolve in real time. q some FSG involved, so that aspect would come into it. 10 Q. Right. 10 Q. Now, the involvement of the FSG in the training package 11 Being a bit more specific, have you had training in 11 that you helped orchestrate -- your word, I think --12 the year or two years before the Grenfell Tower fire on 12 what was the pattern of communication or the chain of 13 fire spread in high-rise buildings? 13 communication that you trained? 14 A. In terms of specifically fire spread in high-rise 14 A. In terms of the actual drill itself? 15 buildings, no, but I would add fire spread is fire 15 Q. So, yes, just talk me through what the chain of spread with compartmentation, so we understand the communication of a fire survival guidance call was in 16 16 17 principles of compartmentation and how fire does develop 17 the training that you orchestrated. 18 through a building, be it a high-rise or a flat. 18 A. So as the policy states, we had firefighters on the 19 19 So we do train in fire spread. Obviously it is upper floors. Control -- we simulated -- one of the 20 slightly different in high-rises, different aspects. 20 firefighters pretended to be control on the handheld 2.1 But within the last year, no, but I understand some 21 radios. We'd radio up the incident pump, the ICP, and 22 principles around that, yes. 22 say we have got fire survival guidance. They would then 23 Q. Have you had specific training on what happens in 23 get the control information form out, collate that 24 a high-rise building when compartmentation is breached? 24 information, pass that information to the bridgehead and 25 25 A. No. that information would then be acted on. Page 6 Page 8

1	Q. Right.	1	search and rescue on a specific flat. So they would
2	In the training that you've just described and those	2	change their remarks column, what their brief is.
3	links in the chain, what was the chain of communication	3	Q. Did the training involve a forward information board?
4	from the control room to the ICP? Was it radio or	4	A. The forward information board would be there because
5	A. So obviously I'm simulating this, so it's station-based,	5	it's part of the equipment to go to the bridgehead on
6	so it was a handheld radio. Obviously operationally it	6	our on-arrival tactics.
7	would be a fire ground radio that would be transmitting	7	Q. On your training, would it be used to record the FSG
8	that information.	8	call information?
9	Q. Okay.	9	A. It can be. It depends on the limits of the actual FSG.
10	When you were simulating the chain of communication	10	If it's quite a straightforward FSG, there's no need for
11	in this training programme from the ICP to the	11	that, you've got the information on your control
12	bridgehead, what was the chain of communication?	12	information form and its quite straightforward that
13	A. That would be a handheld radio.	13	they've got to go to that flat, carry out that rescue.
14	Q. Directly.	14	Q. Right.
15	A. So handheld radio would communicate and a physical paper	15	Have you ever had any training or given any training
16	would follow up so there's no lost information.	16	about the risk of cladding igniting on a high-rise
17	Q. The physical paper, would that be the four-part	17	building?
18	multicoloured control information form?	18	A. No.
19	A. That's correct.	19	Q. Have you ever had any training or given any training
20	Q. Right. We'll be looking at those later on. Okay.	20	about the risks of ignition of the exterior structures
21	So what in your training programme would the	21	which wrap around a high-rise building?
22	bridgehead receive by way of FSG?	22	A. No specific training, but, as I mentioned earlier,
23	A. So for this incident, because it's a small-scale	23	firefighting tactics, when you arrive, a covering jet
24	incident, they would receive information by handheld	24	say when a fire's left the compartment, you would put
25	radio, but then they'd also receive the physical paper,	25	a covering jet above or below an opening to cool that
	D 0		D 11
	Page 9		Page 11
1	the control information form, which would be one piece	1	radiant heat from the ventilated fire from that
2	of paper from that four-ply form.	2	compartment. So that is part of on-arrival tactics and
3	Q. In that training programme, how would the bridgehead	3	just good principles of firefighting. In terms of that
4	instruct the BA wearers to proceed?	4	specific training, that is just what we do day in, day
5	A. Okay, so it's just one person trapped in this scenario,	5	out.
6	so the information obviously they're calling our fire	6	Q. Did you receive specific Lakanal House training,
7	control, we're simulating them calling our fire control.	7	training after the Lakanal House event?
8	They would give that information to the incident command	8	A. I have received training on the case study of Lakanal
9	pump. That goes up to the bridgehead. Either the	9	House through my promotion.
10	bridgehead commander or if we have a search	10	Q. What was the take-away message from that training that
11	co-ordinator we didn't then because it was	11	you recall?
12	a small-scale incident or the entry control officer	12	A. Fundamentally, for me the take-away message and this
13	would then instruct the BA crews if they're already	13	is personally was FSG and some of the
14	committed to redirect, carry out that rescue and another	14	miscommunication that might have taken place during that
15	crew would carry on the firefighting. That's how it was	15	incident. That's my personal opinion.
16	carried out.	16	Q. That was your personal learning, is it?
17	Q. Final question on this training: in that training	17	A. Yes.
18	programme, was the information about the FSG call that	18	Q. What specifically did you learn should be done by way of
19	went to the bridgehead recorded by anybody at the	19	FSG management, or by way of FSG, as you just said in
20	bridgehead?	20	your last answer, that you now would do which you
21	-	21	
22	A. So they would have the physical form, the second piece of paper from the four-ply FSG form, control information	21 22	wouldn't do before Lakanal? A. If possible collete that information in a way that it's
23		23	A. If possible, collate that information in a way that it's
23	form, so that information would be on there. Obviously	24	secure, so we have the control information form. Obviously, that isn't always possible if you're getting
25	the entry control board, they would change the brief of what the BA crew are doing; they are now carrying out a	25	Obviously, that isn't always possible if you're getting the information away from a fire engine. So a station
23	what the DA crew are doing, they are now carrying out a	23	the information away from a fire engine. So a station
	Page 10		Page 12

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1	officer carries the Airwave radio; they could get that	1	Q. Certainly. So H221, which is halfway down the screen
2	FSG there, they might not have the FSG pad, control	2	there, we have
3	information form near them. But where possible, collate	3	A. And at the top, can I see what reference is is that
4	that information in a system that is safe and that	4	mobilised and then status 2?
5	information is secure, that information gets to the	5	Q. You'll have to go back to the page before.
6	bridgehead as a priority and, when resources permit, you	6	A. Sorry.
7	get that information onto a recognised form.	7	Q. No, the first time there is the time assigned.
8	Q. Thank you. Okay.	8	A. Okay, yes.
9	Have you ever heard of the fire at Shepherds Court	9	Q. So that's 01.33.50.
10	in August 2016?	10	Then the second for H221 is 01.35.55, you see that
11	A. At Shepherd's Bush, yes.	11	there, mobile to incident or status 2.
12	Q. Yes. Were you present?	12	I'll ask you about the arrival time.
13	A. No, I was on duty that day but I think we were training.	13	But those are the times on the short incident log.
14	Q. Right, okay.	14	A. Those times will be correct, yes. So my statement
15	Did you ever receive any training or intelligence or	15	should read 01.33 we're mobilised and 01.35 we were
16	even gossip around the mess table about the lessons	16	status 2.
17	learnt from Shepherds Court?	17	Q. Now, H222 was mobilised at the same time; do you
18	A. Not that I can remember, no.	18	remember that?
19	Q. Can I now turn to the night of the fire.	19	A. That's correct, yes.
20	On the night of the fire at Grenfell Tower,	20	Q. And was riding with you?
21	14 June 2017, you mobilised, I think, once the incident	21	A. Yes, it was in front of us en route, yes.
22	had been made up to 25 pumps?	22	Q. Now, we need to try to get a fix on the time you
23	A. That's correct, sir, yes.	23	actually arrived on the incident ground.
24	Q. That's what you say in your statement.	24	Now, we know from the short incident log that pumps
25	Now, we have on record the fact that the fire was	25	were made 25 at around 01.31.48, and I'll just show you
	Page 13		Page 15
1	made up to 25 number at 01.21	1	that Thatanana 10 aftha abantinaidantina
2	made up to 25 pumps at 01.31.	1	that. That's page 18 of the short incident log.
3	In your witness statement, you say in the third paragraph, page 2, second line, that the bells went	2 3	So you can see 01.31.48 service request created,
4	down, you say I said it's the third paragraph,	4	make pumps 25, then 01.31.55, make-up, make pumps 25. So we have that in the short incident log.
5	I suppose it is, it's halfway down the page, which	5	
6	starts "The 13th June 2017 was our first night shift".	6	That being so, and looking at your mobilisation, we
7	Then the second line it says:	7	know that, as I've just shown you, you were assigned at 01.33.50 and H222, if you go back to it, at page 9,
8	"The bells went down at 12.55 am."	8	arrived just a couple of minutes after you, as I think
9	Is that the bells at Lambeth fire station?		
10		10	you say.
11	A. Yes, that's correct. Q. I just wonder whether that's a correct time.	11	Does that help you with the time that you arrived, do you think?
12	A. That might be a wrong time. Obviously my statement's	12	A. Yes, I believe I remember not booking status 3
13	given to the best of my knowledge, I haven't really	13	because there was a lot going on the radio and I was
14	revisited the reports and such like because obviously	14	briefing my crews in the back on arrival. I remember
15	post-incident I was still finding it quite tough. That	15	leaving the fire engine, I remember I hadn't booked
16	might be inaccurate. The short incident report will	16	status 3. I believe Ben McAlonen, my crew manager, he
17	give you a definitive time and I'll take that as being	17	hadn't booked status 3 either. We're busy briefing the
18	the true reflection of time.	18	crews of what to get as we approach the incident.
19	Q. So I can put to you because you were riding H221,	19	Q. Just sticking with the page of that short incident log,
20	weren't you?	20	we have your status 2, H222's status 2, as 01.37.23, and
21	A. Yes.	21	you say in your statement on page 2 that you think your
22	Q. In the short incident log at page 9, H221 is available	22	travel time was about 7 minutes.
	v. In the short including to page J, 11221 is available	1 22	
		23	A. I think that's a hit short. I believe maybe 13
23	at 01.33.50. So I think you wouldn't quarrel with that;	23 24	A. I think that's a bit short. I believe maybe 13, 14 minutes. Obviously it's hard to put a time on it.
23 24	at 01.33.50. So I think you wouldn't quarrel with that; is that right?	24	14 minutes. Obviously it's hard to put a time on it,
23	at 01.33.50. So I think you wouldn't quarrel with that;		•
23 24	at 01.33.50. So I think you wouldn't quarrel with that; is that right?	24	14 minutes. Obviously it's hard to put a time on it,

1	Q. So if it's 13 or 14 minutes, and you were mobile to	1	reflect inaccurately. I do believe I did hear and
2	incident at 01.37, that would put you on the fire ground	2	maybe the time frames might tie this up, I don't know -
3	at about 01.52, I suppose; is that right?	3	I might have heard control trying to communicate to
4	A. Just in reference to status 2, sometimes there is	4	either a CU or an ICP and they weren't getting
5	a delay, there's a lag on the MDT. It might take	5	a response. I don't know if I've thought that over the
6	a little while to take your status, depending on the	6	period of time since the fire. That's not gospel, but
7	signal. So us booking status 2 at 01.36 and 01.37 seems	7	I do believe that's what I heard to start off with.
8	quite a long time. We're usually out the doors within	8	Then that FSG did get transmitted.
9	90 seconds.	9	Q. In terms of what you were using to hear that message on,
10	Q. Were you on that night, do you thank?	10	was it a radio in the cab?
11	A. Yes, we were.	11	A. That's the main scheme radio. There's two types of
12	There was I remember looking in the watch room	12	radio I carry: a handheld personal radio, the fire
13	because it was a way off our ground, but I remember just	13	ground radio, and there's a main scheme radio which is
14	shouting that I'd use my phone, Google Maps, or the MDT	14	fixed to the cab, and obviously senior officers, station
15	to get us there.	15	officers and above, have a mobile version of that same
16	Q. On the basis that we're working from the short incident	16	radio.
17	log as accurate	17	Q. How long into the journey, which you say was 12 to
18	A. That is accurate as data's being inputted; however, it	18	15 minutes or so, did you start hearing FSG messages
19	might not be accurate when we press that button, or	19	coming over your radio?
20	we're already en route, giving that information to the	20	A. So I've referenced Earls Court at that time, so to get
21	crews in the back, then we press status 2, if that makes	21	to Earls Court, we'll just go along the embankment,
22	sense.	22	Millbank, along the embankment. So I'd say 5 minutes
23	Q. Now, on the same page in your witness statement	23	6 minutes.
24	I keep calling it the third paragraph down, it's just	24	Q. Okay.
25	below halfway down or two-thirds of the way down you	25	So trying to get a fix on that, if you look at the
	Page 17		Page 19
1	say:	1	short incident log, page 19, for example, you can see
2	"We headed towards Grenfell Tower from the South."	2	let's take 01.40.47 and it is only an example,
3	Then you say:	3	I stress a quarter of the way down page 19, you can
4	"I could tell from the chatter on the radio that	4	see it there on the screen:
5	this fire was serious and from Earls Court onwards my	5	"RT4 TO G271 [the incident pump at that stage] FYI
6	driver really put his foot down."	6	SEVEN PEOPLE IN FLAT 205 ON 23RD FLOOR PERSONS UNABLE TO
7	Now, just in terms of the chatter on the radio, what	7	LEAVE PROPERTY."
8	chatter in particular made you think the fire was	8	First of all, do you remember that message
9	serious, do you remember?	9	specifically?
10	A. The FSG.	10	A. No, it would be wrong of me to say that.
11	Q. The FSG.	11	Q. Was that the kind of message that you began to hear?
12	A. Yeah sorry.	12	A. Definitely, yes.
13	Q. Sorry, go ahead.	13	Q. Right.
14	A. So heading along Millbank and going around up to Earls	14	We have a recording of a radio transmission from
15	Court, I believe that's when I started hearing some FSG.	15	control to a specific en route appliance where there's
16	Obviously I've changed on to channel 4 we're	16	a radio transmission saying that there are lots and
17	a southern call sign, but I'll go straight to	17	I am quoting of fire survival guidance, or fire
18	channel 4 and I've picked up and intercepted	18	survival guidance calls, and people asking lots of
19	obviously this radio chatter, these communications, and	19	questions. Caller on the 18th floor, thick smoke
20	I could hear FSG taking place.	20	outside and then a list of flats.
21	So I knew I mean, this is a make pumps 25	21	Do you remember hearing that sort of thing?
22	incident, it's very large, and there is FSG evolving	22	A. I remember hearing specific FSGs. If it was a long
23	en route.	23	transcript as you just mentioned, I wouldn't like to say
24	Q. First of all, what did you hear the FSG on?	24	that, no. I just remember hearing specific FSGs.
		1 25	Q. You do?
25	A. So obviously this was a year ago and I don't want to	25	Q. Tou do:

1	A. Yes.	1	you, it's halfway down that road.
2	Q. Okay.	2	Q. So south of the three walkway blocks that we see on the
3	Were you continuing to hear them when you arrived at	3	map there?
4	the incident?	4	A. If you could just pop the cursor, I'll tell you.
5	A. On arrival, I can't recall that, but during the journey	5	So where I've written 20 metres, that's 20 metres
6	there, yes. So leading up to 2 or 3 minutes before our	6	down, there will be a junction there, and it's 20 metres
7	arrival, there were FSGs being processed, yes.	7	down that road.
8	Q. Would you say when you were hearing these en route that	8	Q. Right, okay.
9	there was well, let me try and put it in a way that	9	A. There is a high volume of fire appliances and emergency
10	doesn't suggest an answer.	10	vehicles parked there, so that's as close as we could
11	What was the volume or frequency of fire survival	11	get.
12	guidance calls messages that you were hearing en route?	12	Q. Now, you then say in your witness statement, bottom of
13	A. It's more than I've ever heard before, obviously.	13	page 2 and top of page 3:
14	Usually it's just one or two FSGs that you'll receive	14	"I then instructed my crew to put on their BA gear
15	en route, and I've experienced that once before in my	15	and I also put one on myself which in normal
16	career. This was more than one or two FSGs, maybe	16	circumstances is pretty much unheard of."
17	I wouldn't like to put a number on it, but there was	17	Why did you instruct your crew to put on their BA
18	more than one or two en route. Obviously that's why my	18	straight away?
19	driver, as I said, put his foot down. I remember that	19	A. So approaching the fire from the south, we really
20	because we nearly had an accident, such was the desire	20	couldn't see the tower until literally we were status 3
21	to get there.	21	and maybe 20 seconds before. I caught a glimpse of it
22	Q. Sticking on page 19, then, and looking at all the	22	between the trees.
23	messages we see from 01.40 down to the bottom of the	23	Obviously knowing the amount of FSGs, I'd rather my
24	page and, again, these are just a snapshot, just an	24	crews go and it was a long travel distance to the
25	example would that represent the frequency and volume	25	tower with some equipment rather than having to
	Page 21		Page 23
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1	of the fire survival guidance calls you were hearing	1	return to the fire engine and back.
1 2	of the fire survival guidance calls you were hearing over the main scheme radio in the cab en route?	1 2	return to the fire engine and back. I mean, running or walking in fire gear is quite
			_
2	over the main scheme radio in the cab en route?	2	I mean, running or walking in fire gear is quite
2 3	over the main scheme radio in the cab en route? A. I was on RT4 and I was status 2 at this time so, yes,	2 3	I mean, running or walking in fire gear is quite a strenuous task as it is. You can run 100 metres in
2 3 4	over the main scheme radio in the cab en route? A. I was on RT4 and I was status 2 at this time so, yes, I would've been hearing that.	2 3 4	I mean, running or walking in fire gear is quite a strenuous task as it is. You can run 100 metres in 15 seconds but you can't run 100 metres in even 20 or
2 3 4 5	over the main scheme radio in the cab en route? A. I was on RT4 and I was status 2 at this time so, yes, I would've been hearing that. Q. Right. Okay.	2 3 4 5	I mean, running or walking in fire gear is quite a strenuous task as it is. You can run 100 metres in 15 seconds but you can't run 100 metres in even 20 or 30 seconds in fire gear, so it is hard.
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1	an officer will carry out, so we're usually utilised for	1	Where were you physically when you were approached
2	those roles which implement some kind of command and	2	by that watch or station manager, do you remember?
3	control, so the senior officer can get rid of some of	3	A. Yes, I do. I think it was captured on one of the
4	his lines of communication to take that weight off him	4	Panorama documentaries, the actual officer speaking to
5	or her.	5	me. I was underneath the covered area at the base of
6	So I was yeah, I just made the assumption that	6	the tower, just behind Paddington's aerial, which at
7	I'll take breathing apparatus with me because the fire	7	this time was catching fire. All the firefighters were
8	was something I'd never seen before, you could see it	8	forming up there in an orderly fashion. The bridgehead
9	rapidly developing up the side of the building. I'd	9	you could see or the lobby area was saturated with
10	rather take it with me so someone else could use it or	10	firefighters going in, and this officer I was there
11	I'm needed.	11	with my breathing apparatus on with my crew behind me,
12	Sometimes in situations where its something quite	12	and this officer approached me and said that we're
13	drastic, they will send a crew manager in or watch	13	receiving a high volume of FSGs on upper floors, we
14	manager in to assess the situation, to look at what	14	needed to set up an FSG point at this location to help
15	strategies we could implement, because we know maybe	15	deal with those calls.
16	a little bit more than a firefighter. It's not	16	Q. Right.
17	necessarily always the case, but sometimes it's assumed	17	Now, before that, as you say in the first paragraph
18	that we might have an understanding of something	18	of your statement in the third line on page 3, you say
19	different.	19	you saw a command unit:
20	Q. Right.	20	" this wanting[sic] the unit for booking in,
21	Now, when you first saw the fire, were you walking	21	however I found a[sic] officer from the CU and gave him
22	up Grenfell Road or had you seen it before you parked?	22	our nominal roll boards."
23	A. Saw it maybe between the trees as we headed east across	23	The command unit, which number was that, do you
24	the junction before heading north up the road we parked	24	remember?
25	on. I think I caught a glimpse of it between the trees	25	A. I didn't know what unit it was at the time; I now know
23	on. I think I caught a grimpse of it between the trees	23	A. I than t know what time it was at the time, I now know
	Page 25		Page 27
1	there. When then we get to status 2 and not the	1	that is CU7
1	there. When then we got to status 3 and put the	1	that is CU7.
2	handbrake on, I could just see the tower behind another	2	Q. CU7?
2	handbrake on, I could just see the tower behind another block of flats. I could see the fire developing up	2 3	Q. CU7? A. Yes.
2 3 4	handbrake on, I could just see the tower behind another block of flats. I could see the fire developing up the well, the eastern side I really saw fundamentally	2 3 4	Q. CU7?A. Yes.Q. Right. You say you now know that it's CU7.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	handbrake on, I could just see the tower behind another block of flats. I could see the fire developing up the well, the eastern side I really saw fundamentally then. Q. Okay. At what point did you get a good look at the fire from the ground? A. As I entered Grenfell Road. Q. I see, okay. How much of it was alight, do you remember, at that stage? A. I think I reference it in my statement. The south-east corner or the eastern corner of the tower was alight, maybe from floors 4 up to 14, 15. Again, it's hard to reference floors when you're approaching without stopping and counting, but it was developing up that south-east corner. Q. Okay. Now, on page 3 of your statement in the second paragraph, you say: "At this time I was approached by an Officer (watch or station Manager level) who told me that lots of FSGs were coming in and that we needed to set up an FSG point	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. CU7? A. Yes. Q. Right. You say you now know that it's CU7. A. Yes. Q. What have you learnt since the time of the fire? A. Hearing your conversations here. Q. Right, okay. Again, looking at the words "I found an officer from the CU", was that from that same CU? A. I don't know. So as I briefed my crews to get the breathing apparatus, we walked it was quite a journey up, we jogged up towards the tower. Obviously I had my pumps and my nominal roll boards to book in with the CU. CU7 kind of looked in darkness on my right-hand side. When I say looked in darkness, there wasn't much activity around it. I saw someone from the CU jogging down. I asked him where the command unit was for booking in. He said it's around the other side. I said, "Well, I've got the boards". He said, "I'll take those off you". Q. As a matter of practice, do command units, as pump ladders tend to, have a number on the outside you can see?

1	Q. It would say CU7 or CU8 or CU2, would it?	1	behind us. It was quite an orderly queue of three
2	A. I believe so. Yes, it would.	2	abreast just forming up, waiting for I think Watch
3	Q. So the first one you saw that was in darkness, do you	3	Manager Brown from Battersea, Stuart, who was a safety
4	remember what CU number that was?	4	officer and there was quite a lot of falling debris.
5	A. I didn't see a number, but it's at the location that	5	Like I said, the turntable ladder was now catching fire.
6	I went back to later on as I go through my statement and	6	There were covering jets trying to put that out. He was
7	that vehicle was in the same position. So I would	7	holding people back until people filtered into the
8	assume that is the same vehicle, it's not been moved.	8	tower, and then more people would then make a dash
9	Q. Okay.	9	across into the tower.
10	Did you see a second CU on your route to the tower?	10	Q. Oh, I see. So just to see if we can get a mental
11	A. No, I didn't. Again, hearing some of your conversations	11	picture of this, there's a queue of BA wearers in the
12	here, I understand that I might have walked right past	12	tower
13	one on my right-hand side, but I didn't, no.	13	A. I looked up and there was, like, a mezzanine level and
14	Q. Okay. All right.	14	I could see firefighters in there.
15	Now, coming back to the paragraph on page 3 in your	15	Q. Okay. And the queue stretched internally how far down?
16	statement that I was on a minute ago, you say:	16	A. I wouldn't like to say. I know there's a stairwell
17	" Officer (watch or station Manager level) who	17	because I went in there later on, but I just remember
18	told me that lots of FSGs were coming in"	18	seeing firefighters in there. Someone could've been
19	Do you know who that was?	19	regulating the flow of people in from the base of the
20	A. No, I don't, no.	20	tower, or it was literally just a safety issue that
21	Q. Right.	21	Stuart, Watch Manager Brown, was just regulating the
22	Did you know or do you know a Watch Manager	22	flow of people crossing that area.
23	Kentfield?	23	Q. When you arrived at the covered area, how big was the
24	A. I might have had interactions with him, if it is a him.	24	queue of BA wearers waiting to be called down?
25	It was a him that I spoke to on the fire ground. But,	25	A. Substantial. There was over a dozen, maybe 20 of us.
	Page 29		Page 31
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		l .	
1	again, when I see we get a great deal of CUs meeting	1	Q. Was anybody marshalling you?
1 2	again, when I see we get a great deal of CUs meeting us on different fires around London, so I can't say I've	1 2	Q. Was anybody marshalling you? A. Not that I'm aware of. I was mid-queue, I was forming
2	us on different fires around London, so I can't say I've	2 3 4	A. Not that I'm aware of. I was mid-queue, I was forming up, trying to take in what was happening.Q. When you were approached by this officer who told you
2 3 4 5	us on different fires around London, so I can't say I've seen the watch manager before. Q. All right. What about let me suggest another name to you Station Manager Loft?	2 3 4 5	A. Not that I'm aware of. I was mid-queue, I was forming up, trying to take in what was happening.
2 3 4 5 6	us on different fires around London, so I can't say I've seen the watch manager before. Q. All right. What about let me suggest another name to	2 3 4 5 6	 A. Not that I'm aware of. I was mid-queue, I was forming up, trying to take in what was happening. Q. When you were approached by this officer who told you that there were lots of FSGs coming in, did he tell you anything about those calls other than that there were
2 3 4 5 6 7	us on different fires around London, so I can't say I've seen the watch manager before. Q. All right. What about let me suggest another name to you Station Manager Loft? A. No. Q. Now, do you know whether the watch or station manager	2 3 4 5 6 7	A. Not that I'm aware of. I was mid-queue, I was forming up, trying to take in what was happening.Q. When you were approached by this officer who told you that there were lots of FSGs coming in, did he tell you anything about those calls other than that there were a lot of them?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	us on different fires around London, so I can't say I've seen the watch manager before. Q. All right. What about let me suggest another name to you Station Manager Loft? A. No. Q. Now, do you know whether the watch or station manager had come from a command unit?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 A. Not that I'm aware of. I was mid-queue, I was forming up, trying to take in what was happening. Q. When you were approached by this officer who told you that there were lots of FSGs coming in, did he tell you anything about those calls other than that there were a lot of them? A. No. On reflection, maybe I could've asked a little bit
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1	these FSGs.	1	issues.
2	Q. Now, you say in your statement that he told you that you	2	Q. Right.
3	needed to set up an FSG point.	3	At the point when you were asked to set up the FSG
4	What did you understand the officer to mean by an	4	point, did you know what the system was for
5	FSG point?	5	communicating FSG calls that were already coming in that
6	A. A way of communicating and controlling at the base of	6	you've told us about to the bridgehead?
7	the tower that information into the actual building.	7	A. No. So when I was told by this watch manager or station
8	Again, I didn't have much situational awareness. I knew	8	manager I do believe it to be a watch manager of
9	that any CU would be overwhelmed at this time from what	9	this, I asked two of the firefighters from my station,
10	I'd heard. Even just half a dozen FSGs might be quite	10	Firefighter Worman and Firefighter Page, to firm up
11	an overwhelming flow of information coming in for	11	contact. I believe this watch manager told me that CU7
12	a command unit to deal with.	12	was my point of contact and channel 3 was my
13	Q. Have you ever set up an FSG point before?	13	communications channel. I got those two firefighters,
14	A. I've dealt with an FSG before, yes.	14	Steve Page and Mike Worman, to run back and firm up that
15	Q. That's not quite the same thing.	15	information that that was the correct communication for
16	Have you ever set up an FSG point before that you	16	this information.
17	were being asked to set up now?	17	Q. Okay.
18	A. So I've dealt with FSG in terms of en route to	18	Now, I'm just going to explore that a little bit
19	an incident I've taken FSG information, I've got to the	19	further in a moment. Before I do, just to go back, the
20	fire, I've informed the incident commander of FSG taking	20	answer to my question I think was no, you didn't know
21	place and asked if he or she wants me it's he in this	21	is this right? what the system was in place for
22	case to deal with that FSG, that I was given that	22	communicating FSG calls that were already coming into
23	information. Wrote that information on the control	23	the bridgehead?
24	information form, briefed the breathing apparatus to go	24	A. No, I didn't.
25	carry out that rescue. The firefighter did a 360, saw a	25	Q. Do you know whether anybody else had been taking FSG
	Page 33		Page 35
1	gentleman hanging out the back bathroom window. The	1	calls and handling them at the incident ground before
2	crews were redirected from firefighting to carry out	2	you were given this instruction by the watch manager or
3	that rescue and we rescued the individual.	3	station manager?
4	So in terms of setting up a point, it's very fluid,	4	A. I'd assume so because en route I've heard FSGs being
5	it evolves very quickly, a smaller fire, so to set up	5	transmitted and being received.
6	a point is hopefully the rescue is dealt with and	6	Q. Did you take any kind of handover from that officer?
7	over before you've really set up a point. Yes, that	7	A. No, apart from my line of communication with CU7,
8	evolves because that's part of the policy, but actually	8	channel 3.
9	the rescue was carried out before things were set up.	9	Q. Who told you to liaise with CU7 and channel 3?
10	That was communicated back to control that the FSG was	10	A. That watch manager.
11	carried out.	11	Q. Did you have any indication as to who the incident
12	Q. Let me see if I can explore that a little bit further.	12	commander was at that time?
13	What did you understand when he gave you the	13	A. No.
14	instruction that he wanted you to do?	14	Q. Did you ever speak to the incident commander, whoever it
15	A. So I think there's a piece of paper that will come up,	15	was?
16	and I don't know if he had that piece of paper then or	16	A. No. But this fire was unprecedented, and sometimes in
17	he gave me it a couple of minutes later, and he had	17	heavily involved fires you're not always going to speak
18	a lot of information. Obviously it wasn't put on	18	to the incident commander because they're quite
19	a control information form, but we will have a look at	19	overwhelmed. He's devolved spans of control and I would
20	the FSG policy soon. It was written down in a way that	20	be speaking to those people, not speaking to the
21	they could control it and deal with it, and I assumed	21	incident commander, who is maybe overwhelmed with other
22	that at that point I needed to capture that information	22	things.
23	in the correct manner and get some kind of order to the	23	Q. Now, coming back to your answer a minute ago about how
24	information going to the bridgehead. Because this one	24	you set this up, on page 3 in the fourth paragraph you
25	piece of paper could easily get lost and then we've got	25	say:
	Page 34		Page 36
			9 (Pages 33 to 36)

1	"I set myself up on a car bonnet near the foot of	1	A. Retracting.
2	the South East corner of the Tower. I was given an	2	Q. Okay.
3	envelope by the Officer that had floors and flat numbers	3	A. So there was a lot of debris coming down. Not as much
4	written on it"	4	as came down later on. So I saw that was kind of
5	Now, we'll come to the envelope in a minute, but	5	a focal point on the corner, people would see me on that
6	just looking at setting the system up, where exactly was	6	corner as well. And underneath where the little circle
7	the car bonnet in relation to the entrance to the tower?	7	with the line going off it, that's kind of where the
8	A. The south-east corner of the tower, there was	8	firefighters were forming up, if that makes sense, so
9	Paddington's turntable ladder, which was housing at this	9	that area was congested with firefighters and breathing
10	time. Just along from that there were some bollards and	10	apparatus waiting to go into the building.
11	there was a car just parked along those bollards. If	11	Q. By reference to this map, can you tell us where the
12	you get me a map, I can show you exactly.	12	turntable ladder was?
13	Q. Let's do that. Let's go back to your map at	13	A. See the end of the line?
14	MET00015641.	14	Q. Yes.
15	Now, if you enlarge the tower area, you can see the	15	A. There.
16	word "posts" there which we've seen before is where	16	Q. Right. Absolutely opposite the south-east corner?
17	there are some rising bollards or unlockable bollards.	17	A. I believe so, if my memory serves me right, yes.
18	A. Sure.	18	Q. Now, you mentioned an envelope, and in your statement
19	Q. Can you show us by reference to this map where the	19	you mention an envelope in the second line of the fourth
20	bonnet of the car was?	20	paragraph on page 3. You say you were given it by the
21	A. So where "posts" is written, if you go to the left, you	21	officer.
22	see a little rectangle. It was either there or ever so	22	Was that the same officer who had given you the
23	slightly to the left underneath the covered area.	23	instruction to set up the FSG point?
24	I believe if I've drawn it there, and that was quite	24	A. I'm not entirely sure. I want to say yes. But, again,
25	soon after the incident, that's where it was. It was on	25	there was so much information coming in at that time
	Page 37		Page 39
1	that corner there	1	that I can't hand on heart say that is the case Rut
1 2	that corner, there. O. Right. So was it actually under the covered area or in	1 2	that I can't hand on heart say that is the case. But
2	Q. Right. So was it actually under the covered area or in	2	I believe so, yes.
2 3	Q. Right. So was it actually under the covered area or in the open?	2 3	I believe so, yes. Q. Okay.
2 3 4	Q. Right. So was it actually under the covered area or in the open?A. I want to say it is maybe half and a half, because	2 3 4	I believe so, yes. Q. Okay. In the paragraph before you've referred to a watch
2 3 4 5	Q. Right. So was it actually under the covered area or in the open?A. I want to say it is maybe half and a half, because I was which we'll get to later moved from there	2 3 4 5	I believe so, yes. Q. Okay. In the paragraph before you've referred to a watch manager from the command unit giving you a jacket with
2 3 4 5 6	Q. Right. So was it actually under the covered area or in the open?A. I want to say it is maybe half and a half, because I was which we'll get to later moved from there for safety.	2 3 4 5 6	I believe so, yes. Q. Okay. In the paragraph before you've referred to a watch manager from the command unit giving you a jacket with "FSG co-ordinator" on the back. It's the second
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1	helping you, Steve Page and Mike Worman, which you	1	remember writing early 0200 hours times down, I do
2	mentioned earlier this morning and indeed in your	2	remember that. So I think they would've been dealing
3	statement in the same paragraph we're looking at there.	3	with FSGs and that would have been transmitted at
4	What did you instruct them to do first?	4	a slightly later date than it become an FSG CU.
5	A. So when I got this information, I turned to them and	5	Q. Now, Steve Page and Mike Worman were your firefighters
6	obviously it was just some faces that I knew, and I knew	6	helping you.
7	every firefighter can carry out a task, but you usually	7	Look at the fourth paragraph of your statement on
8	go for a face that you know, and I asked them to firm up	8	page 3, you say in the fourth line:
9	this information that I've been given.	9	"I took a photo of the envelope and then got one of
10	I don't know why I doubted it, but I just wanted to	10	my runners to take the envelope to the Bridgehead so
11	make sure, because this is such an important event, that	11	that they could start formulating the rescues."
12	everybody is singing from the same hymn sheet here.	12	I'm going to come to the details of that in
13	I wanted to dot the Is and cross the Ts.	13	a minute, but I just want to identify the runners.
14	Q. When you say you wanted them to firm up the information,	14	Were one of these runners Steve Page or Mike Worman
15	what did you actually ask them to do?	15	or both?
16	A. I asked them to go back to CU7.	16	A. Answer: no, they were committed to fight the fire.
17	Q. Yes.	17	Q. After they had come back to you from CU8?
18	A. Confirm that CU7 was the CU dealing with the FSGs and	18	A. That correct.
19	that channel 3 was my communications channel.	19	Q. I see. Okay.
20	Q. Did they do that?	20	Do you remember who the runners were that you had
21	A. They did, yes, and they reported back to me.	21	available for this exercise?
22	Q. How long did that take them, that trip to CU7 and then	22	A. No, I recognise faces but I know Charlie Batterbee
23	back to you?	23	was instrumental and a senior hand. Billy from
24	A. A good few minutes. I do believe that they actually	24	Hammersmith was instrumental in helping. There was
25	went to CU8. CU7 wasn't still up and running, but they	25	other people and, forgive me, I do forget their names,
	Page 41		Page 43
1	were told CII7 was the point of contact and channel 3 and	1	but there was a few of us
1	were told CU7 was the point of contact and channel 3 and	1	but there was a few of us.
2	they came back to me and told me that information.	2	Q. Okay.
2 3	they came back to me and told me that information. Q. You think they went to CU8 first and then were told to	2 3	Q. Okay. You say at the end of the third paragraph of your
2 3 4	they came back to me and told me that information. Q. You think they went to CU8 first and then were told to go to CU7?	2 3 4	Q. Okay. You say at the end of the third paragraph of your statement channel 3 and CU7 were the points of contact,
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1	Q. Right.	1	Q. So whether it's casualty report forms or control
2	Do you know who you were speaking to on CU7?	2	information forms, just to summarise your evidence
3	A. I want to say Dan Meyrick, because he's got quite	3	you've just given, you don't recall receiving those
4	a distinctive voice, but, again, this is over a year	4	pieces of paper from a driver of a pump ladder?
5	ago, so I wouldn't like to say that is gospel because	5	A. No. There was I think it might have been North
6	that would be wrong of me.	6	Kensington's pump ladder parked behind me, I believe,
7	Q. Do you know whether you did actually speak to	7	and one of the runner firefighters got me a control
8	Dan Meyrick, whether it was on CU8 or CU7?	8	information pad from that appliance, so Station Manager
9	A. No, I spoke to CU7.	9	Egan might have seen that happening and, as things were
10	Q. But you say you'd like to say Dan Meyrick; did you have	10	evolving, just thought that some communication was
11	a specific recollection?	11	coming from there.
12	A. Again, looking back, things change and I wouldn't like	12	I never received any information from any other
13	to say hand on heart that's the case.	13	appliance apart from CU7 referencing FSG on channel 3.
14	Q. Right.	14	Q. Just exploring that last answer a little bit more, do
15	Did you use another method of communicating with CU7	15	you remember seeing somebody from North Ken's pump
16	other than your radio?	16	ladder bringing you a pad of control information forms
17	A. And runners, no. And physical paper, which we'll get to	17	from that pump ladder?
18	later on, as in the control information forms. So	18	A. Yes, I asked them to go get me them.
19	methods of communication with CU7: via handheld radio,	19	Q. Do you remember who that was?
20	channel 3, firefighter runners communicating messages	20	A. No, I don't, and also I ran out of control information
21	and taking them a physical piece of paper from the	21	forms. It's a pad, quite a substantial pad, and I quite
22	control information form.	22	quickly ran out of forms because they're in
23	Q. At any point, did you take messages from a pump ladder?	23	quadruplicate, and I asked somebody to get me another
24	A. No, not at all.	24	pad. I don't know if they went back to that appliance
25	Q. Right.	25	and got a second control information pad. Usually we
	Page 45		Page 47
	Livet want to put to you the giet of what Station	1 1	only carry one because you only do one or two FSCs so
1 2	I just want to put to you the gist of what Station Manager Daniel Egan said in his evidence when he came	1 2	only carry one, because you only do one or two FSGs, so I wouldn't imagine there would be two pads on North
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Manager Daniel Egan said in his evidence when he came here on 3 July. I'll just put the gist of it to you. For our own purposes, it's page 112, lines 8 to 16 and 118, lines 20 to 25. That's so that we can pick it up later. He said he saw that there was an appliance taking FSG calls and the driver of that vehicle was getting off that machine, out of the driver's seat, walking round to you on the car bonnet with two or three casualty report forms and giving them to you but he couldn't identify you who was writing it down. Do you remember that happening? A. No. So he's saying that we had control information forms? Is that what you said? Because you said casualty report forms. Q. Yes. Well, yes, casualty report forms. A. A casualty report form is a form we do when we carry out IEC or first aid on an individual. There were no individuals at that time that needed first-aid and I wouldn't be receiving that information. I would be receiving control information forms, but I didn't receive any control information forms from any pumping appliance on that ground. I dealt with all	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	I wouldn't imagine there would be two pads on North Kensington's pump ladder, but I did run out of forms in the first 10 minutes, 20 minutes, and I asked for another pad to be got. So someone else might have gone there and it might be a coincidence that Station Manager Egan saw those two occurrences. Q. Out of interest, how many control information forms do you get in a pad? It's quadruplicate, but how many do you get? A. That's a good question. I'd say in excess of 20. Q. Right, okay. Can I also just put something to you that arose out of the evidence given by Dan Meyrick, and this is 10 July, transcript page 20, line 6 to 10. Did you ever see Watch Manager Kentfield on the radio taking fire survival guidance information details? A. Watch Manager Kentfield being the watch manager that I allegedly spoke to at the beginning? Q. I am just asking you whether you ever saw Watch Manager Kentfield on the radio on the fire ground taking fire survival guidance call information? A. I don't know who Watch Manager Kentfield is. Q. Did you see any watch manager other than yourself taking

2 A. No, but I did see a watch manager next to me taking a phone call on a mobile phone from a resident within the building who was trapped. They were not that phone from a phone from a phone for maybe two hours, actually it night even be longer than that, and I was at times concrued because the watch manager was in quite — distress, and he was off to myright, crouching down at times, on the phone to this individual. 10 Q. Okay. 11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Millest, I'm going to interrupt you for just a second to ask Mr Sadler whether you are lapton to keep going? 12 you for just a second to ask Mr Sadler whether you are lapton to keep going? 13 A. Yes, At Dunky ou very much. Mr Sadler, I'm gorden. 14 Are you content to keep going? 15 A. Yes, At Dunky ou very much. Mr Sadler, I'm gorden. 16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, I'm sorry. 17 MR MILLETT: Thank, you very much. Mr Sadler, I'm gorden. 18 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, I'm sorry. 19 MR MILLETT: Thank, you very much, Mr Sadler, I'm gorden. 20 When you starden out he FSQ point you had diese 21 count of information forms. 22 Let re just put it a different way. 23 When you starden out he FSQ point you had diese 24 and you set it que, did you have any control information forms. 25 forms already with you or did you need to get them from 26 page 49 27 A. Now when I was told about this, I had a breathing apparatus set on my back. I turned round and dropped it on the floor nearly in the purpose of the purpose	1	his radio on the fire ground?	1	parked. I can't say that for gospel but I believe
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22 Let me just put it a different way. 23 When you started at the fire survival guidance point 24 and you set it up, did you have any control information 25 forms already with you or did you need to get them from 26 Page 49 27 A. No, when I was told about this, I had a breathing 38 apparatus set on my back. I turned round and dropped it 4 on the floor next to the car, and then I started to get 5 a team together to facilitate this. 6 Q. Was one of those first actions asking the driver of the 7 North Ken pump ladder to bring you the pad of control 8 information forms? 9 A. It wasn't a driver. I think I saw a lot of firefighters 10 around me and I got Firefighter Page and 11 Firefighter Worman to go off and do that task we 12 mentioned earlier, reference CU7 and channel 3. They're 13 all fresh wearers and I could see that there were some 14 wearers that had already worn, and I was conscious this 15 was going to be quite a punishing incident for the 16 firefighters. I wanted all fresh firefighters to get in 17 there. I could see some individuals that were exhausted 18 and they were resting. I think they were the initial 19 crews that went in to fight the fire. I shouted at them 20 to come over and assist me. 21 Q. Right. 22 Q. Did that information always. There was a variation of them. So 1 fundamentally Pd say 80 per cent of thee FSGs that come 24 A. Not always. There was a variation of them. So 1 fundamentally Pd say 80 per cent of thee ms a just 1 floor only, some come in as just 1 floor only, some come in as people on the roof, some 2 come in as a flat, a don floor only. Some come in as just 1 floor only, some come in as people on the roof, some 2 come in as a flat, a don floor only, some come in as people on the roof, some 2 come in as a flat, a don floor only, some come in as just 2 floor only, some come in as just 3 come in as a flat, a don floor only, some come in as just 4 floor only, some come in as just 6 floor only, some come in as just 6 floor only, some come in as just 6 floor only, some come in as		* *	1	
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a mound with yellow to the Bridgehead and the white one to the Command Unit. The reason I changed it was that the white one was the more legible one and the one of the most importance at the time. When you say 'I armaged for the white copies to be taken to the bridgehead', idd you ask somehody to do that? A. In terms of physically do it, yes. So I was taking the FSG information from channel 3. I was writing it down. If the incident wasn't as resource-intensive, I would've stood back and facilitated crew managers doing this and super-issel, but we didn't have crough people and I would have some firefighters to my left, which one and I would have some irrefighters to my left, which are the CU. That way I can prioritise how many firefighters I had at any one time, priority being information to the tower. Page 53 A. Have you got any evidence of my control information forms, sir? Q. Vas say in your statement, at the end of the paragraph I be gibte one and of most importance at the time. What do you mean when you say the one of the most Page 55 I had at any one time, priority being information to the tower. Page 55 I had at any one time, priority being information to the forms, sir? Q. I have judged and the white one particularly important? A. I think it would speak a thousand words if you show a control information form, a white and a yellow copy. Q. Okay. Q. Okay. Q. Okay. A. I would the to show you those in a moment. A. I think it would speak a thousand words if you show a control information form, a white and a yellow copy. Q. Okay. Q. Okay. Q. When you do were the difference in the legibility. Q. Well-before I do that, let me just ask you some questions about the envisopment. Page 55 I what an anknowing you go it as early of the program, white and a yellow copy. Q. Okay. Q. Then I word. A. I may now the program in your statement about the white one where its say flow sheet which says premise number 161. If the michael with the could go to key to a country do in your statement. I would have some irrefight	1	forms actually tell you that it should be the other way	1	A. Yes.
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1	that that is an updated information.	1	Q. I see.
2	Q. Jumping ahead a little bit to something I'm going to ask	2	A. So sorry, sir. So I abandoned that numbering and
3	you later, when you did an update, did you send the	3	circling around 13, 14, I believe.
4	physically updated blue or green form up to the	4	Q. Can I ask you to turn to page 4 internally of this same
5	bridgehead?	5	document where we have a yellow version, and page 5
6	A. I can only recall one physical update and it was	6	where there's a blue version.
7	a caller recontacting control and told that smoke or	7	Looking at the yellow version, they both have 14 at
8	fire I believe smoke was entering their window via	8	the top in a ring. Just flip between one and the other.
9	I believe the kitchen. I transmitted that to the	9	If you look at the yellow one, you can see 14 in a ring,
10	bridgehead and I updated a form, and that was taken by	10	and next page the same.
11	one of the runners to the bridgehead.	11	Let's have them both up there at the same time.
12	So it definitely happened once. It might have	12	They both relate to 175, 20th floor.
13	happened a couple more times, but it would not be more	13	A. That's correct.
14	than two or three times, I believe, that process.	14	Q. If you look at the bottom part of each of the documents,
15	Q. Right.	15	somebody's added on the blue version: "5 persons 3
16	A. Does that answer your question?	16	adults 2 kids".
17	Q. Okay.	17	Do you know how that further information came to be
18	Where did you keep the blue and green forms while	18	there?
19	you were working on the car bonnet?	19	A. So I don't know how that information would've come
20	A. So I speak later on of trying to get some kind of	20	there. The white copy has gone to the bridgehead, you
21	organisation and Billy from Hammersmith was fundamental	21	can see by the dirt on it. It's been up on that floor.
22	in that.	22	The white copy would've gone to the CU and obviously
23	When we realised I think if we just go back one	23	I would be holding the two other copies.
24	of my original one of other the FSG forms, I've	24	Where that information come from, I'm not too sure.
25	written a number at the top. I might be able to help	25	I could've transmitted that by radio and not sent
	Page 57		Page 59
1	you with that. I think the very first one that come up.	1	another form up, if Louisa De Silvo or whoever was at
2	Q. Let's go to the first one.	2	the bridgehead confirmed that, because I might have been
3	A. There you go. So you can see a number at the top, maybe	3	overwhelmed. As you can see, I've taken 14. I believe
4	11?	4	I abandoned the numbering system on the car bonnet, so
5	Q. Yes.	5	I've taken 14 FSGs on the car bonnet, and I think I was
6	A. And this is the second copy of so that's the 11th FSG	6	only there for less than 10 minutes, 20 minutes maybe,
7	that I carried out. This is still on the car bonnet,	7	I don't know, but it was very limited.
8	because I abandoned that process as I went to the floor.	8	Q. So schematically, can we use the number that you put on
9	So I knew there was a lot of FSGs coming in and	9	the top in a ring to guide us as to the order in which
10	I wanted a quick process to be able to cross-reference	10	you dealt with these forms?
11	my FSGs and I thought a numbering system would help.	11	A. 100 per cent, for the early stages of the incident when
12	I remember I think I got to 13 and Billy took another	12	I was on the car bonnet, yes. I believe I abandoned it
13	FSG, because I was that overwhelmed, and he put 12 and	13	at the car bonnet. That might not have been the case, I
14	I put 14 it started to break down around 13, 14. So	14	might have abandoned it on the floor, but I'm pretty
15	that's when I abandoned that process.	15	sure I remember it going wrong not wrong, I remember
16	So that was me trying to get some control over the	16	this number sequencing going out and I couldn't trust it
17	flow of FSGs coming in so I could cross-reference them,	17	anymore on the car bonnet. I made that decision to
18	so it would be easier for me to say, rather than 161, at	18	abandon it.
19	the bridgehead they could put them in numerical order	19	Q. Okay.
20	and we could reference it that way.	20	Last question before we break. Can I just show you
21	I realised that's not going to work for updating of	21	page 33 of this bunch of documents. This is a white
22	calls, so I asked Billy to start putting them into	22	version which has got a 1 on it and your name.
23	piles, floors 1 to 10, 10 to 20, and 20 and above,	23	Is that your writing?
	p.1.00, 110010 1 to 10, 10 to 20, and 20 and above,		A. It's pretty bad so it's a good chance it will be, yes,
24	because we always had a floor number. We did not always	24	
24 25	because we always had a floor number. We did not always have a flat number.	24 25	
24 25	because we always had a floor number. We did not always have a flat number.	24 25	sir.
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1	Q. Do you remember writing that?	1	A. I don't know why he gave me the envelope or where it
2	A. I don't remember writing that, but that is yeah	2	come from. All I interpreted with this was FSGs had
3	because I tried because I understand the concept of	3	come through and that they had captured in the most
4	FSG and the CU and ICP, and I was trying to get this	4	practical manner, because of the as you can see,
5	link across that I was FSG at the base of the tower. So	5	there's in excess of a dozen FSGs there they've
6	when I refer to radio traffic between Louisa at the	6	captured in the most practical manner and they've
7	bridgehead and CU7, I would always say, "FSG at the base	7	hopefully transmitted those to the bridgehead, or
8	of the tower" so they knew which part of this process of	8	they've given them to me to document and process to the
9	trying to capture this information we're overwhelmed	9	bridgehead.
10	with I was.	10	Q. Right.
11	So I would say that is my writing. The "fire at the	11	When you were given this envelope, did you add
12	door" isn't my writing. "Fire through window" isn't my	12	anything to it in writing or is all the writing that we
13	writing either. So that might have been that	13	can see on it what you were handed?
14	would've gone up to the bridgehead straight away, so	14	A. I didn't write on there at all. I was given that
15	that writing "fire at the door" and the scribbled out	15	envelope. It's an envelope and it's written on the
16	bit I think would've been and that's the very first	16	front of it.
17	FSG I did at 02.13.	17	You can see in the background the chequered the
18	Q. That was my next question: that was your first one?	18	control the FIB, forward information board, on the
19	A. By my numbering system, yes.	19	back. So this is on the car bonnet. The chequer on the
20	MR MILLETT: That may be a convenient moment for a break.	20	top there is the top of the forward information board.
21	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We will have a break at this point,	21	You can see the shadow of my mobile phone, so I was
22	Mr Sadler. Please don't talk to anyone about your	22	conscious that this information is absolutely important
23	evidence during the break. We'll come back at	23	to get to the bridgehead. Hopefully it's been
24	11 o'clock and hopefully you'll be able to carry on	24	transmitted by fire ground radio there. So I took
25	then.	25	a photo and I said to one of the firefighters by me or
	Page 61		Page 63
1	THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.	1	actually the officer who gave it me, "Get up to the
2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you like to go with the usher.	2	bridgehead now and I'll process that information from
3	(The witness withdrew)	3	the photograph on my mobile phone", which I did process.
4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, 11 o'clock, then, please.	4	
5	(10.45 am)		O. Yes, I see.
			Q. Yes, I see. Do you know where that information had come from or
6		5	Do you know where that information had come from or
6 7	(A short break)	5 6	Do you know where that information had come from or that envelope had come from?
7 8	(A short break) (11.00 am)	5 6 7	Do you know where that information had come from or that envelope had come from? A. I believed, and he might have told me, that it had come
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		1	
1	Is that time stamp something you're able to create	1	it was it just brings back
2	into a document and hand to the inquiry?	2	Q. No, I understand.
3	A. I have printed that out for you, sir, yes.	3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You do understand that if you need
4	Q. Very good. If you could give that to us, that would be	4	a break at any stage
5	good. So 02.19?	5	A. No, I'm fine, sir. Thank you. I'm just saying why
6	A. I apologise, I did send this in as evidence, but later	6	that's inaccurate. It's something I didn't want to look
7	on I thought that might be of benefit.	7	at again.
8	Q. That's very helpful, thank you very much.	8	MR MILLETT: Yes.
9	Before you received this envelope, did you start	9	Now, can I just ask you to confirm, the envelope
10	writing fire survival guidance calls down on the white	10	that we've got I'm sorry, I do have to put it up on
11	slips of control information forms?	11	the screen
12	A. So my memory tells me that I didn't. I thought I was	12	A. That's fine, sir.
13	given this piece of information at the car bonnet by the	13	Q. Did you add anything to it at all?
14	officer from the CU. However, looking at the evidence,	14	A. The brown envelope?
15	there is time that I use my phone, I put my phone on the	15	Q. Yes, before you sent it to the bridgehead?
16	car bonnet as a reference to my iPhone, I kept having to	16	A. I took a photo it was maybe in my possession for
17	press it to light it up to tell me the time, so	17	10 seconds. I took that photo and I wanted it gone.
18	I referenced the time from my iPhone and the screenshot	18	Q. Can I put a different version of it to you: LFB00001968.
19	from this, they're both the same time. So I have done	19	I'd like you to be shown page 27 of that document.
20	FSG forms prior to receiving this.	20	This is a photocopy, I think, of the envelope, which
21	Q. You think you have?	21	you've seen. It has "18 - 6", at the bottom.
22	A. The evidence would suggest, sir, yes.	22	Do you remember whether the version you sent to the
23	Q. We'll explore that just a little bit in a moment.	23	bridgehead had those numbers on it?
24	Focusing on this document on the screen, underneath	24	A. No, I think the copy we had up just previous has
25	"CU7" and "Da Silva", it says, "Brett Loft IC". Did	25	a shadow of my iPhone over it, but I believe there's
	Page 65		Page 67
1	that mean anything to you when you received it?	1	nothing beneath that shadow. I think "152 - 18th
2	A. Not at all, sir, no.	2	pregnant", is the last piece of information that was on
3	Q. Did you ask the officer who gave you this envelope what	3	the envelope when I had it in my possession.
4	it meant?	4	Again, the blue writing at the top-left corner, that
5	A. No, sir. It was an unprecedented number of FSGs.	5	wasn't on there either.
6	I wanted to process them and get them up there as	6	Q. I was going to ask you about that. You say it's blue,
			Q. I was going to ask you about that. Tou say it's blue,
7	quickly as possible.	7	
7 8	quickly as possible. Q. Did you know anything about Brett Loft's role at the	1	just about blue. That wasn't there either? A. Answer: no.
8	Q. Did you know anything about Brett Loft's role at the	7	just about blue. That wasn't there either? A. Answer: no.
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8 9	Q. Did you know anything about Brett Loft's role at the fire ground?	7 8 9	just about blue. That wasn't there either? A. Answer: no. Q. Okay.
8 9 10	Q. Did you know anything about Brett Loft's role at the fire ground?A. No, all I knew was CU7 was my point of contact and my	7 8 9 10	just about blue. That wasn't there either? A. Answer: no. Q. Okay. Now, you got a runner well, let me ask you: how did you send the note, the envelope, to the bridgehead?
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"They were so overwhelmed at this stage flat information was being written on samps of paper, so some sort of structure was needed." A. Where are we, sir, sorry? 5. A. Where are we, sir, sorry? 6. Q. Fro sorry, Fro reading you too much. A. No, you're fine. 8. Q. Hyou go to the third line of this pangraph we have on the screen, you say: 10. "They were so overwhelmed at this stage that information was being written on scraps of apper, so some sort of structure was needed." 11. A. When I refer to "They," to contextualise it, am 12. A. When I refer to "They," to contextualise it, am 13. A. When I refer to "They," to contextualise it, am 14. I talking about the CU there? 15. Q. My question was, listed at whot tody ou the 16. information that you've recorded there in your 17. statemen? 18. A. Well, I know because I had a piece of paper given me. 19. Q. Oh, I see, So when you say "They were so reewhelmed at 11. this yell, who seed that information. So 18. A. When I was a marked to try and create that I thot. Cut there? 19. Chi, I see, So when you say "They were so reewhelmed at 19. I what yell, I know because I had a piece of paper given me. 20. They were so the served proper given me. 21. They have been given the envelope? 22. A. Well, yeah, because gridment of the tinformation. So 19. They were done their best to write it on a piece of paper, 22. which anybody would do, and then I ve come in and tried 23. the served per just proved how werewhelmed they were. Not 24. They have demonstration form. 25. So the piece of information that I had on the 26. envelope just proved how werewhelmed they were. 27. You rentioned a moment ago, I think, that the 28. So the piece of information that I had on the 29. Chair is statement of the proper given in the cut of the proper given the envelope with all these addresses on it? 29. They were so verwhelmed they were. 29. They were so that I understand 29. This paper so the provided was to the trief general that is formation form. 29. They shade the provided was the pro				
some sort of structure was needed." A. Where are we, sir, sorry? O. I'm sorry, I'm reabing you too much. A. No, you're fine. O. If you go to the third line of this puragraph we have on the secreen, you say." They were so overwhelmed at this stage that information was being written on scraps of paper, so some sort of structure was needed." A. When I refer to "they", to contextualise it, am I attached and the stage of the information was being written on scraps of paper, so some sort of structure was needed." A. When I refer to "they", to contextualise it, am I attached and I are to the secreen in once with some FSG information, he did come back to me and said there's a lot of information that you've recorded there in your statement? A. Well, I knew because I had a piece of paper given me. O. Oh, I see. So when you say "They were so overwhelmed at this stage," is that an assumption you've making from the fact hat you've been given the envelope? A. Well, yeah, because guidance states that, if possible, you should write that information form. I see that information of that information was being put up on the wall. Did the fact that you've been given the envelope? which any you've been given the envelope? they've done their best to write it on a piece of paper, when you say "They were so overwhelmed at with the control information than! I had on the exceeding like of the proper of the wall had to get a little bit more control over that information with the control information than! I had on the exceeding like of the proper of the proved how were whelmed at this stage," et even, that you were given the envelope with all these addresses on it? Think policy does state that that is a process you ever given the envelope with all these addresses on it? A. Ye, because why would you not put it on the control information there, that is one paper, even the envelope with all these addresses on it? A. Ye, because why would you not put it on the control information there, that is one paper, even the envelope with	1	"They were so overwhelmed at this stage that	1	right, sir? If my time stamp is 02.19 and one of the
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13 A. When I refer to "they", to contextualise it, am 14 I talking about the CU there? 15 Q. My question was, first of all: who told you the 16 information that you've recorded there in your 17 statement? 18 A. Well, I knew because I had a piece of paper given me. 19 Q. Oh, I see. So when you say "They were so overwhelmed at 19 this stage", is that an assumption you're making from 20 the fact that you've been given the envelope? 21 the fact that you've been given the envelope? 22 A. Well, yeah, because guidance states that, if possible, 23 you should write that information down on the control 24 information form, but no rescue should be jeopardised in 25 the actual documentation of that information. So 26 Page 69 27 They we done their best to write it on a piece of paper, 28 which anybody would do, and then I've come in and tried 29 to they've done their best to write it on a piece of paper, 29 which anybody would do, and then I've come in and tried 30 to get al title bit more control over that information 31 to get al title bit more control over that information 32 to get al title bit more control over that information 33 to get al title bit more control over that information 34 with the control information form. 35 So the piece of information that I had on the 36 envelope just proved how overwhelmed they were. Not 37 through lack of resources maybe - well, lack of 38 resources, but also the actual volume of FSGs coming in. 39 I was just unprecedented. 40 Q. So just to summarise your evidence so that I understand 41 if properly, when you say "They were so overwhelmed at 41 this stage," et ecten, that's your thinking became you 42 this stage, "et ecten, that's your thinking became you 43 the bridgehead flew your was a first that it has process you 44 A. Yes, because why would you not put it on the control 45 information interr, that's fine. 46 A. Yes, because why would you not put it on the control 47 information form? 48 the cut the Cut to capture that it information to was being put up on the wall. Did 48 the	11	information was being written on scraps of paper, so	11	in once with some FSG information, he did come back to
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			l .	
Page 70 Page 72	23	ii this evidence is right, 14 FSGs to them. Is that	25	might have other tasks that they might think are more
		Page 70		Page 72

1	pressing, they might not understand so I wanted to	1	Does that mean that that was the first one you
2	make sure a white helmet who had a functional role up	2	processed?
3	there was getting this information.	3	A. I believe so, yes, sir. So we're saying 02.13, so CU7
4	So, yeah, when they started saying it was going to	4	would most probably have transmitted that by handheld
5	the lobby, it was still going to a white helmet, it	5	radio on channel 3 to me, and they might have had that
6	didn't trouble me too much because I made the assumption	6	information, then that physical brown envelope come to
7	they were getting some kind of control on these	7	me at 02.19 if my time stamp is correct on my iPhone.
8	searches.	8	Q. Let me just ask you, looking back at the envelope, we've
9	Q. So at what point after you'd started writing out the	9	seen that it's the first one on the list, did you adopt
10	control information forms and then sending the white	10	a systematic approach going down the list and completing
11	copies into the building did you learn somebody was	11	the forms?
12	recording that information on a wall in the lobby,	12	A. Yes, I would've, sir, yes.
13	a white helmet, as you say?	13	Q. You did. This is the first one. 02.13. Does that mean
14	A. That was when I was over by the bins. Poor analogy,	14	that you didn't start processing fire survival guidance
15	I know, but that's maybe half an hour.	15	on the car bonnet before 02.13?
16	I think, sir, me sending 14 control information	16	A. If this number sequencing is what I remember, that was
17	forms up to the bridgehead Louisa might be able to	17	when the first because once I booked status 3, sir,
18	shed more light on this they would've been	18	I booked status 3
19	overwhelmed then and they would've had to start	19	Q. We don't quite know, that's the
20	a process to have a search co-ordinator put in place.	20	A. I think it was done by GPS. It is in the evidence.
21	I think that's when that was implemented. That's just	21	I think it's may be 01.53, correct me if I'm wrong.
22	my assumption.	22	I believe that has been done, Hotel 221 and Hotel 222,
23	Q. Do you recall being shown a photograph of a whiteboard	23	by GPS. I think it's 01.53 if you go into the
24	that was being used in CU7 showing what was happening	24	documents that the Fire Brigade did, the timeline the
25	with fire survival guidance calls?	25	Fire Brigade did up to 0200 hours.
	Page 73		Page 75
	1 uge 15		Tage 13
1	A. During the incident, I don't. I know they came by to	1	Q. Okay, right. You think which time?
1 2	A. During the incident, I don't. I know they came by to speak to me. I don't know if I saw that, but I did see	1 2	Q. Okay, right. You think which time? A. Maybe 01.46, sir, maybe. My memory is not great on
	•	1	
2	speak to me. I don't know if I saw that, but I did see	2	A. Maybe 01.46, sir, maybe. My memory is not great on
2 3	speak to me. I don't know if I saw that, but I did see it later on when I was tasked to go around some of the	2 3	A. Maybe 01.46, sir, maybe. My memory is not great on this.
2 3 4	speak to me. I don't know if I saw that, but I did see it later on when I was tasked to go around some of the triage areas and find out if anybody had left the	2 3 4	A. Maybe 01.46, sir, maybe. My memory is not great on this.Q. Someone behind me can find that.
2 3 4 5	speak to me. I don't know if I saw that, but I did see it later on when I was tasked to go around some of the triage areas and find out if anybody had left the building that had FSGs so we could cross-reference that	2 3 4 5	A. Maybe 01.46, sir, maybe. My memory is not great on this.Q. Someone behind me can find that.A. As I say, it's documented by GPS.
2 3 4 5 6	speak to me. I don't know if I saw that, but I did see it later on when I was tasked to go around some of the triage areas and find out if anybody had left the building that had FSGs so we could cross-reference that which was later mentioned in my evidence. I did see	2 3 4 5 6	 A. Maybe 01.46, sir, maybe. My memory is not great on this. Q. Someone behind me can find that. A. As I say, it's documented by GPS. Q. We looked at that before at the very start of your
2 3 4 5 6 7	speak to me. I don't know if I saw that, but I did see it later on when I was tasked to go around some of the triage areas and find out if anybody had left the building that had FSGs so we could cross-reference that which was later mentioned in my evidence. I did see that whiteboard then when I spoke to CU7.	2 3 4 5 6 7	 A. Maybe 01.46, sir, maybe. My memory is not great on this. Q. Someone behind me can find that. A. As I say, it's documented by GPS. Q. We looked at that before at the very start of your evidence, and on the basis of your status 2 and your
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	speak to me. I don't know if I saw that, but I did see it later on when I was tasked to go around some of the triage areas and find out if anybody had left the building that had FSGs so we could cross-reference that which was later mentioned in my evidence. I did see that whiteboard then when I spoke to CU7. Q. Can we go back, having looked at the envelope and I'm	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 A. Maybe 01.46, sir, maybe. My memory is not great on this. Q. Someone behind me can find that. A. As I say, it's documented by GPS. Q. We looked at that before at the very start of your evidence, and on the basis of your status 2 and your telling us 10 to 15 minutes, we worked it out that it
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	speak to me. I don't know if I saw that, but I did see it later on when I was tasked to go around some of the triage areas and find out if anybody had left the building that had FSGs so we could cross-reference that which was later mentioned in my evidence. I did see that whiteboard then when I spoke to CU7. Q. Can we go back, having looked at the envelope and I'm afraid I'm going to have to show you the envelope and some of the the pieces of paper. A. That's fine, sir. Q. If you need a break at any time, we can stop for a few minutes, because I know it brings things back. Can I ask you to look at the envelope, first of all, and just capture in your head the first address: flat 205. Now, I'd like you to be shown, please, page 33 of LFB 1922. Now, this is a white version which we looked at just before the break. A. Yes. Q. With the I on the top. A. Yes. Q. And I don't want to lead you through this, but let's see	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. Maybe 01.46, sir, maybe. My memory is not great on this. Q. Someone behind me can find that. A. As I say, it's documented by GPS. Q. We looked at that before at the very start of your evidence, and on the basis of your status 2 and your telling us 10 to 15 minutes, we worked it out that it was about 01.50 that you arrived. A. Yes. Q. So on the basis it's about 01.50 you arrived, which I don't think is far away from what you just said by reference to the Fire Brigade document, the ORR, what do you want to tell us about this time mark, 02.13? A. I would assume with the number sequencing I've got there, I put my name, I've said that I'm FSG outside. That would be me starting to do FSG. That would be in the very I would like to say that's the very first FSG I carried out. Q. You told us that the photograph you took of the envelope was time stamped on your phone at 02.19. A. That's correct, sir. Q. Do you think you started therefore carrying out the processing of the information on the envelope before you

1	A. Yes. But I didn't physically have that envelope then,	1	an amendment both to the yellow and to the white.
2	so the information was coming to me via channel 3,	2	Can you explain that?
3	information from the envelope was coming to me via	3	A. So "flames through window" on the yellow copy will be
4	channel 3, prior to me physically getting the envelope	4	written on the white copy in my possession. So that's
5	and then so there might be a duplication within the	5	gone up to the bridgehead. "Fire at the door" and "fire
6	control information forms I've done. There might be two	6	to door" has been written later on. So "fire at the
7	205s.	7	door" on the white has been written at the bridgehead,
8	Q. So the white piece of paper at page 33 you think came by	8	and "fire to door" on the yellow has been written on the
9	radio, and then you were handed the envelope and you	9	CU.
10	started	10	Q. Ah, at the CU, not by you?
11	A. The only evidence the way I remembered it, I was	11	A. No, I would have the blue and the green copy.
12	given that at the beginning. This time stamp is what	12	Q. Right.
13	confuses me.	13	A. So those two, white and yellow, white to bridgehead,
14	Q. I follow. Okay.	14	yellow to CU. I have no I only have the blue copy
15	Can I just ask you, then, about page 33. We can see	15	and the green copy with me at the car bonnet or the bins
16	the writing, "205 12 floor". Number of persons within	16	where I was. So that information a lot of
17	location not known. Then there's condition within	17	information come through from CU7 on channel 3 and
18	premises, something written there, something "through	18	9
19	window", which has been deleted and "fire at the door".	19	I would've radioed that up to Louisa and they would've
		20	maybe updated that information. But I would've
20 21	Do you remember on that first control information	21	endeavoured to get a blue copy or green copy up to
	form whether you took down information and then revised	21 22	there. That might not have happened because of the
22	it before sending it to Louisa at the bridgehead?	23	actual operational commitments in reference to the rest
23	A. No, unless Charlie or Billy wrote that information, but	23	of the FSGs.
24	I took ownership of these documents and I pulled them		If I've transmitted that by radio and they've
25	off and put them in the hands of the runners. So it's	25	received it, I'll take that as acceptable that they've
	Page 77		Page 79
1	the very first one. I'd like to say is there	1	got that. Belt and braces. I would send another form
1 2	the very first one. I'd like to say is there	1 2	got that. Belt and braces, I would send another form
2	a duplicate copy of that?	2	up.
2 3	a duplicate copy of that? Q. Yes.	2 3	up.Q. Okay. Just taking this in stages to see if I've
2 3 4	a duplicate copy of that?Q. Yes.A. That will answer our question.	2 3 4	up.Q. Okay. Just taking this in stages to see if I've summarised your evidence accurately.
2 3 4 5	 a duplicate copy of that? Q. Yes. A. That will answer our question. Q. Let me help you with that. That's page 34, which is the 	2 3 4 5	up.Q. Okay. Just taking this in stages to see if I've summarised your evidence accurately.A. Sure.
2 3 4 5 6	 a duplicate copy of that? Q. Yes. A. That will answer our question. Q. Let me help you with that. That's page 34, which is the yellow version of this. I just want to explore the 	2 3 4 5 6	 up. Q. Okay. Just taking this in stages to see if I've summarised your evidence accurately. A. Sure. Q. Does this mean that what you sent to the bridgehead,
2 3 4 5 6 7	 a duplicate copy of that? Q. Yes. A. That will answer our question. Q. Let me help you with that. That's page 34, which is the yellow version of this. I just want to explore the differences. Just help me through this. 	2 3 4 5 6 7	 up. Q. Okay. Just taking this in stages to see if I've summarised your evidence accurately. A. Sure. Q. Does this mean that what you sent to the bridgehead, this first FSG, was the version that said "flames
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 a duplicate copy of that? Q. Yes. A. That will answer our question. Q. Let me help you with that. That's page 34, which is the yellow version of this. I just want to explore the differences. Just help me through this. Perhaps we can have both up on the screen. Take the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 up. Q. Okay. Just taking this in stages to see if I've summarised your evidence accurately. A. Sure. Q. Does this mean that what you sent to the bridgehead, this first FSG, was the version that said "flames through window", which we can see on both the white and
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1	Q. Yes.	1	rescue someone else.
2	A. I can see on the yellow copy now that "flames through	2	So flat 205, floor 23 I don't know where floor 23
3	window" is my writing. I can't see it on the white	3	comes from though because that wasn't written on the
4	because it's been scribbled out, but that is my writing.	4	envelope, was it?
5	Q. So the sequence of events would be that the amendment to	5	Q. No, it wasn't. That's what I was going to draw to your
6	this would come by radio from the CU to you?	6	attention.
7	A. Yes, sir. Control would contact our controller on the	7	On pages 33 and 34, the first pair, the white and
8	call to the caller. They would contact the CU. They'd	8	the yellow we looked at, it said floor 12, do you
9	get the information. They'd contact me. I would update	9	remember, I drew your attention to that?
10	that information on my forms if I've got time, or I'd	10	A. Can you say that again, sorry, sir?
11	make sure that the bridgehead gets that information,	11	Q. Let's go back, page 33 and 34 of LFB00001922. If we
12	which they have.	12	just go back to that.
13	Q. And so can you help with who wrote "fire at the door" on	13	Yes, now, you see it says "205 12 floor" on both of
14	the white version?	14	those
15	A. No, that would be someone at the bridgehead.	15	A. So this would be 23 is a long way from 12 in terms of
16	Q. On the basis of information given to them by you?	16	interpreting that or we'd have to look at the short
17	A. Yes.	17	report what control information we'd been given, if
18	Q. By radio?	18	that's been lost in translation between the CU and
19	A. By channel 3 on a handheld radio, sir, yes.	19	myself or the caller, or interpreted differently, if
20	Q. So does that tell us that at this early stage there was	20	that makes sense.
21	no difficulty with radio communications from the CU to	21	Q. We will have to do that. We know it's a mistake and we
22	you, and from you to the bridgehead?	22	know that flat 205 is on
23	A. That's correct, yes.	23	A. I believe it's the very first FSG I've carried out, so,
24	Q. Can I just then pursue flat 205 a little bit. If you go	24	yes.
25	to page 35, you can see a yellow control information	25	Q. It doesn't matter, that's okay. My point is that we
	Page 81		Page 83
	form which says "flat 205 floor 23" and no other	1	know it's wrong and it is on the 23rd floor, not the
1 2	form which says "flat 205 floor 23" and no other information on it. Then if you turn to page 36, it has	1 2	know it's wrong and it is on the 23rd floor, not the
2	information on it. Then if you turn to page 36, it has	2	12th floor.
2 3	information on it. Then if you turn to page 36, it has the same in blue, which is the blue version, "flat 205	2 3	12th floor. A. Yes.
2 3 4	information on it. Then if you turn to page 36, it has the same in blue, which is the blue version, "flat 205 floor 23", but someone's added, "Additional	2 3 4	12th floor. A. Yes. Q. All I am trying to explore with you at the moment is if
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	information on it. Then if you turn to page 36, it has the same in blue, which is the blue version, "flat 205 floor 23", but someone's added, "Additional information: 2 person left building". First of all, why was a second yellow and therefore blue control information form done for flat 205? A. So this might firm up our hypothesis on what happened. I got transmitted by channel 3 FSG in flat 205, which we've alluded to, and then I've been given this envelope with flat 205 at the very top. So I can't remember what I've already transmitted. I've got the information on the blue and green, but I'm so overwhelmed, I'm just processing every bit of information I've got. Later on, Billy got a bit of control over this where I said we got it into to stop duplications, we put it into sequences of flat 1 to 10, 10 to 20 and 20 and above so we could see if there was any duplications. Because we're getting a lot of people, family members and loved ones, coming up, giving us information over the phone, which I speak about later on in my statement, and we didn't want to we wanted to update that information if possible but didn't want to create more FSGs and waste resources going to the same flat with two	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	12th floor. A. Yes. Q. All I am trying to explore with you at the moment is if you go back to 35 and 36 Mr Documents Director, if you could do that you now see flat 205 this time with the correct floor, 23, on it. My question is: do you remember how that correction or corrected floor came through to you? A. No, and that's not numbered, so that's later on. If my assumption is right with my numbering system, that's later on in the incident. Q. My next question is: when you look at page 36, someone has written on the blue copy "2 person left building". Now, given that you told us earlier you kept the blue and green copies, the yellow one went to the CU each time, do you know who wrote those words on that form? A. That's not my writing. Those forms would've been in my possession. I had Crew Manager Batterbee and Billy I forget his surname. Brodrick, maybe? Firefighter Brodrick? That might be correct, I'm not too sure. He's the senior hand at Hammersmith. Q. I think he's called Ben, actually.

1	kind of got this system together, he might have updated	1	information. Number 4 here, the yellow one, 204, 23rd
2	that, but that blue form was with us. I think this	2	floor, that's early on into the incident.
3	would've happened around the area of the bins time now,	3	Q. I was going to ask you. Looking at number 4, which
4	where we've formed up on the bins.	4	looks like the fourth one you would've processed, 204,
5	Q. How would that information have come to you or Billy?	5	23rd floor, which is correct, there's also some writing
6	A. CU7, channel 3.	6	at the top on it. Do you know how that got there or
7	Q. Channel 3, right.	7	what that is?
8	Let's see how we go with this. One more document in	8	A. We've seen that before, have we not? That could've been
9	this particular group, page 37, please, which is also	9	pushed through from another pad or could be that
10	related to flat 205.	10	would've been written on a white piece of paper, but it
11	Do you know what that document is?	11	could've been written pushed through from number 3 if
12	A. That looks like that's the same handwriting as the	12	number 3's got it written on or number 2's got it
13	envelope, is it not?	13	written on or number 1's got it written on.
14	Q. I don't know. But	14	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Millett, just help me for
15	A. I'd say it is.	15	a moment. We're looking at these two documents on the
16	Q. Right. Have you ever seen this document before?	16	screen. They're not copies of the same document, are
17	A. Answer: no. But the "1 pregnant", that refers to what	17	they?
18	was on the envelope.	18	MR MILLETT: No, they're not.
19	Q. Well, yes. So if you haven't seen this before, I don't	19	A. They're two totally different forms. I've written
20	think you can help	20	a control information form for 204 twice because I've
21	A. No, I haven't, sorry.	21	received that information twice. We were so
22	Q. You can't help me with it.	22	overwhelmed, we didn't have a system for sequencing
23	Do you know who Richard Walsh or perhaps Welch was?	23	until
24	A. Senior officer in the Fire Brigade.	24	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I wasn't for a moment criticising
25	Q. Right. And Andy Walton?	25	you. I am just trying to understand why we're looking
	Page 85		Page 87
1	A. Again, senior officer.	1	at these as if they had some sort of relevance to each
2	Q. Do you know what their involvement was at the time	2	other.
3	A. Answer: no.	3	MR MILLETT: That's a very good question, and I put the
4	Q that would relate to these floors and flats?	4	question on a false basis, which is that the yellow
5	A. (Indicated dissent).	5	version at 32 is the copy of the white version at 31.
6	Q. Right.	6	I think the answer is that is not so.
7	Let me just then pursue this a little bit more on	7	A. Answer: no. Because whatever was written on the white
8	these documents, if I can.	8	copy would be copied on the yellow.
9	We don't have numbers 2 and 3 I think with us at the	9	MR MILLETT: Right. So can you help me, then, with the
10	moment. We looked at 1. Number 4 is at page 32, and	10	relationship between page 32 and 31?
11	this is the yellow version, page 31 is the white	11	A. So I believe this time stamp of the envelope is
12	version. This is flat 204. Perhaps the best thing is	12	what's confusing me that was the fourth the one on
13	to have both on the screen.	13	the left, number 32, is the fourth FSG I carried out,
14	Let's start with the yellow version because that's	14	which is transmitted to me by handheld radio, and then
15	got the 4 at the top, which is where I started, page 32.	15	this 204 does it say flat 204 on the envelope on the
16	If this was the fourth version but is only the	16	21st floor? If so, that's when I might have processed
17	second one on the envelope which it is, take it from	17	that form at a later date.
18	me that it's the second one down what sort of order	18	Q. No, it says 204, 23rd floor. Perhaps you can be shown
19	were you doing these in?	19	that. MET00016967. Just to go back to the envelope
20	A. So obviously the white copy there is the	20	where it says flat 204, 23rd floor.
21	information's come from Watch Manager De Silvo. So I've	21	A. So I believe that information on the white copy, it's my
22	had that information maybe come back from Louisa and	22	writing, that might have come from Louisa, and I've just
23	I've captured it on that form. I think we're still	23	captured that on another form to try and capture that
24	overwhelmed at that time, so I couldn't cross-reference	24	information so it wasn't lost. Either Louisa has
25	if we had any other 204s, so I wanted to capture that	25	transmitted 21 or I've heard 21, there's been some
	D 0/		D 00
I	Page 86	1	Page 88
		1	

1	miscommunication, which is highly possible. As long as	1	MR MILLETT: Very well, Mr Chairman, we can do that.
2	we capture the flat number, that's the most important	2	Let's move on to page 22, then, which I think is the
3	thing. However, that information could've been	3	fifth version or the fifth exercise you did.
4	interpreted wrong or it could be what we were told at	4	Can you help with this? This is flat 195, which we
5	that time.	5	have on the envelope as the third address down. Flat
6	But there was some struggle with the flats and floor	6	195, 22nd floor.
7	numbers and I think the CU managed to get hold of a	7	Now, we don't, I think, have the white version of
8	Q. Looking at page 31 of 1922, given that it says 21st	8	this.
9	floor, but given that on the envelope it says 23rd floor	9	A. You see that information, my name and Hotel 22, is now
10	for flat 204, do you think that the white version on the	10	on the fifth document, so I think that's been pushed
11	right-hand side of the screen was the one you sent to	11	through from the document above.
12	the bridgehead?	12	Q. It's the fifth version or fifth exercise you did, but it
13	A. That's definitely gone to the bridgehead, sir,	13	appears third in the list on the envelope. What does
14	because	14	that tell us about the order in which you were going
15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, I'm sorry to interrupt again,	15	about filling in these control information forms?
16	but it looks to me at least as if the right-hand version	16	A. I think I would've carried these I think this form
17	is a photocopy of something. Look at the bottom of the	17	I don't know if this is the form that Charlie or someone
18	form, you can see it's been damaged.	18	was trying to help me complete the forms, that might
19	MR MILLETT: Yes.	19	be that might actually be the case now. So we're
20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Which means that it may not be	20	going methodically through this and maybe that's when
21	a white version.	21	the sequencing fell apart.
22	MR MILLETT: That may be, sir, I don't know. I'm afraid	22	It's just this time stamp of 02.19 on my phone
23	I can't help with the system.	23	really messes up how I envisaged it in my head.
24	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: No, but it may be that the questions	24	I envisaged that I got this brown envelope very early on
25	being put to the witness are being put on a basis which	25	in the incident and started processing it. It's just
23	being put to the witness are being put on a basis which	23	in the incident and started processing it. It's just
	Page 89		Page 91
1	is not actually correct.	1	that time stamp that really questions that in my head.
2	MR MILLETT: I think, Mr Chairman and we can check this		
_		2	O. Can I then try another one on you which is not on the
3		2 3	Q. Can I then try another one on you which is not on the envelope, but is flat 193 at page 20. We have a yellow
3	over the adjournment we're working on the basis of	3	envelope, but is flat 193 at page 20. We have a yellow
4	over the adjournment we're working on the basis of a colour copy. So I have assumed and I think	3 4	envelope, but is flat 193 at page 20. We have a yellow version for flat 193, 22nd floor, where someone has
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1			
	Now, where it's been updated to 11 persons from 10, they	1	that it's actually six adults, one pregnant. That's not
2	might have come back again and updated that.	2	my writing, so either Ben or Charlie or one of the other
3	Again, we were so overwhelmed, I'm literally just	3	firefighters helping me has updated that and sent that
4	capturing that on a new control information form because	4	to the bridgehead or to the CU.
5	we haven't got together with the amount of paperwork	5	Q. Right. Can I then show you pages 14 and 15. Now, these
6	we've got.	6	are also for flat 183. Can you help us with this.
7	Q. Would there be white versions for each of these?	7	The white version, as we can see, 183 and 23rd
8	A. 100 per cent, yes.	8	floor, which is in bolder type because it looks like
9	Q. Would that mean the bridgehead was getting two different	9	it's been corrected, look to the untutored eye as if the
10	white versions	10	yellow is a copy from the white cover and they are
11	A. Yes.	11	identical, premise number, floor, number of persons,
12	Q for the same flat at different times?	12	condition within premises. Then you have some details
13	A. In an ideal situation they would've got the blue and	13	under "Additional information" down to number 22.
14	green versions, but we were so overwhelmed, we couldn't	14	Then somebody has written on the yellow
15	get any control over the amount of paperwork we've got	15	version: priorities, underlined. Then somebody has
16	at that time, so it would be most and this wasn't	16	written on the white at the bottom 92, 153 and 113.
17	an FSG, this was coming from a member of the public,	17	Can you help with the differences between these two
18	I believe.	18	documents? One is a copy of the other. It looks like
19	Q. Right.	19	the white one would've gone under your system to the
20 21	Can you explain on page 21 who might have written the words "source - CU" under "Additional information"?	20	bridgehead. Who would've on the white one added 92, 153
22		21	and 113?
23	A. That would've had to be me, it looks like my scribble,	22	A. That would be well, it's definitely not been done
24	because the white copy would have to be on top. Q. Right.	23	where we're doing the FSG because it's not on the carbon
25	A. Only when it's a different colour ink on the same page,	24	copy. That has gone somewhere and that has been updated
23	A. Only when it's a uniterest colour link on the same page,	25	at a later date.
	Page 93		Page 95
1	it's been updated outside of my control.	1	Q. I see. By whom, do you know?
2	Q. Okay.	2	A. If I'd updated it, it would be pressed onto the yellow
3	Similarly, again, seeing how far we get with this,	3	copy. So that's gone inside the tower. Someone inside
4	if you go to pages 12 and 13 of the same bundle of	4	the tower.
5	documents, this is for flat 183, which also does not	5	Q. Do you know who would have written "PRIORITIES" in
6	appear on the envelope. We have the yellow version on		
7	4 1 6 1 4 11 2 4 2 1 3 3 7 1	6	
,	the left and the blue version on the right. We also	6 7	capitals on the yellow version? A. That's a different colour to the carbon copy so that has
8	have a white version for 183. I'm afraid I can't put	1	capitals on the yellow version?
	_	7	capitals on the yellow version? A. That's a different colour to the carbon copy so that has
8	have a white version for 183. I'm afraid I can't put	7 8	capitals on the yellow version? A. That's a different colour to the carbon copy so that has been added at a later date. And that yellow copy has
8	have a white version for 183. I'm afraid I can't put all three onto the screen and, again, Mr Chairman,	7 8 9	capitals on the yellow version? A. That's a different colour to the carbon copy so that has been added at a later date. And that yellow copy has gone to CU7.
8 9 10	have a white version for 183. I'm afraid I can't put all three onto the screen and, again, Mr Chairman, you may be right about this, but it seems to be	7 8 9 10	capitals on the yellow version? A. That's a different colour to the carbon copy so that has been added at a later date. And that yellow copy has gone to CU7. Q. Okay. And finally on this flat
8 9 10 11	have a white version for 183. I'm afraid I can't put all three onto the screen and, again, Mr Chairman, you may be right about this, but it seems to be a photocopy but let's look at the yellow and the blue	7 8 9 10 11	capitals on the yellow version? A. That's a different colour to the carbon copy so that has been added at a later date. And that yellow copy has gone to CU7. Q. Okay. And finally on this flat A. Sir, do we have sorry, because I did transmit a lot
8 9 10 11 12	have a white version for 183. I'm afraid I can't put all three onto the screen and, again, Mr Chairman, you may be right about this, but it seems to be a photocopy but let's look at the yellow and the blue first of all, because we know you at least kept the	7 8 9 10 11 12	capitals on the yellow version? A. That's a different colour to the carbon copy so that has been added at a later date. And that yellow copy has gone to CU7. Q. Okay. And finally on this flat A. Sir, do we have sorry, because I did transmit a lot of priorities up to Louisa. If we had 10 persons, I'd
8 9 10 11 12 13	have a white version for 183. I'm afraid I can't put all three onto the screen and, again, Mr Chairman, you may be right about this, but it seems to be a photocopy but let's look at the yellow and the blue first of all, because we know you at least kept the blue. The yellow goes to the CU.	7 8 9 10 11 12 13	capitals on the yellow version? A. That's a different colour to the carbon copy so that has been added at a later date. And that yellow copy has gone to CU7. Q. Okay. And finally on this flat A. Sir, do we have sorry, because I did transmit a lot of priorities up to Louisa. If we had 10 persons, I'd be, "Louisa, we've got 10 persons stuck in this flat,
8 9 10 11 12 13 14	have a white version for 183. I'm afraid I can't put all three onto the screen and, again, Mr Chairman, you may be right about this, but it seems to be a photocopy but let's look at the yellow and the blue first of all, because we know you at least kept the blue. The yellow goes to the CU. They look identical because the blue and the yellow	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	capitals on the yellow version? A. That's a different colour to the carbon copy so that has been added at a later date. And that yellow copy has gone to CU7. Q. Okay. And finally on this flat A. Sir, do we have sorry, because I did transmit a lot of priorities up to Louisa. If we had 10 persons, I'd be, "Louisa, we've got 10 persons stuck in this flat, the FSG form is on its way", so they might have
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	have a white version for 183. I'm afraid I can't put all three onto the screen and, again, Mr Chairman, you may be right about this, but it seems to be a photocopy but let's look at the yellow and the blue first of all, because we know you at least kept the blue. The yellow goes to the CU. They look identical because the blue and the yellow look as if they've come from the same pressing on the	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	capitals on the yellow version? A. That's a different colour to the carbon copy so that has been added at a later date. And that yellow copy has gone to CU7. Q. Okay. And finally on this flat A. Sir, do we have sorry, because I did transmit a lot of priorities up to Louisa. If we had 10 persons, I'd be, "Louisa, we've got 10 persons stuck in this flat, the FSG form is on its way", so they might have documented that information somewhere. So they might
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	have a white version for 183. I'm afraid I can't put all three onto the screen and, again, Mr Chairman, you may be right about this, but it seems to be a photocopy but let's look at the yellow and the blue first of all, because we know you at least kept the blue. The yellow goes to the CU. They look identical because the blue and the yellow look as if they've come from the same pressing on the white, but can you explain the addition under	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	capitals on the yellow version? A. That's a different colour to the carbon copy so that has been added at a later date. And that yellow copy has gone to CU7. Q. Okay. And finally on this flat A. Sir, do we have sorry, because I did transmit a lot of priorities up to Louisa. If we had 10 persons, I'd be, "Louisa, we've got 10 persons stuck in this flat, the FSG form is on its way", so they might have documented that information somewhere. So they might have updated it is there an FSG for flat 92
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	have a white version for 183. I'm afraid I can't put all three onto the screen and, again, Mr Chairman, you may be right about this, but it seems to be a photocopy but let's look at the yellow and the blue first of all, because we know you at least kept the blue. The yellow goes to the CU. They look identical because the blue and the yellow look as if they've come from the same pressing on the white, but can you explain the addition under "Additional information" of "6 adults 1 pregnant" there?	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	capitals on the yellow version? A. That's a different colour to the carbon copy so that has been added at a later date. And that yellow copy has gone to CU7. Q. Okay. And finally on this flat A. Sir, do we have sorry, because I did transmit a lot of priorities up to Louisa. If we had 10 persons, I'd be, "Louisa, we've got 10 persons stuck in this flat, the FSG form is on its way", so they might have documented that information somewhere. So they might have updated it is there an FSG for flat 92 individual, 153 individual and 113 individual? Because
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	have a white version for 183. I'm afraid I can't put all three onto the screen and, again, Mr Chairman, you may be right about this, but it seems to be a photocopy but let's look at the yellow and the blue first of all, because we know you at least kept the blue. The yellow goes to the CU. They look identical because the blue and the yellow look as if they've come from the same pressing on the white, but can you explain the addition under "Additional information" of "6 adults 1 pregnant" there? A. So we'd have got an update via CU7 on channel 3 that's	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	capitals on the yellow version? A. That's a different colour to the carbon copy so that has been added at a later date. And that yellow copy has gone to CU7. Q. Okay. And finally on this flat A. Sir, do we have sorry, because I did transmit a lot of priorities up to Louisa. If we had 10 persons, I'd be, "Louisa, we've got 10 persons stuck in this flat, the FSG form is on its way", so they might have documented that information somewhere. So they might have updated it is there an FSG for flat 92 individual, 153 individual and 113 individual? Because I might have transmitted that to her whilst we're trying
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	have a white version for 183. I'm afraid I can't put all three onto the screen and, again, Mr Chairman, you may be right about this, but it seems to be a photocopy but let's look at the yellow and the blue first of all, because we know you at least kept the blue. The yellow goes to the CU. They look identical because the blue and the yellow look as if they've come from the same pressing on the white, but can you explain the addition under "Additional information" of "6 adults 1 pregnant" there? A. So we'd have got an update via CU7 on channel 3 that's originally got this, flat 183, 21st. I believe this	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	capitals on the yellow version? A. That's a different colour to the carbon copy so that has been added at a later date. And that yellow copy has gone to CU7. Q. Okay. And finally on this flat A. Sir, do we have sorry, because I did transmit a lot of priorities up to Louisa. If we had 10 persons, I'd be, "Louisa, we've got 10 persons stuck in this flat, the FSG form is on its way", so they might have documented that information somewhere. So they might have updated it is there an FSG for flat 92 individual, 153 individual and 113 individual? Because I might have transmitted that to her whilst we're trying to get information together.
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	have a white version for 183. I'm afraid I can't put all three onto the screen and, again, Mr Chairman, you may be right about this, but it seems to be a photocopy but let's look at the yellow and the blue first of all, because we know you at least kept the blue. The yellow goes to the CU. They look identical because the blue and the yellow look as if they've come from the same pressing on the white, but can you explain the addition under "Additional information" of "6 adults 1 pregnant" there? A. So we'd have got an update via CU7 on channel 3 that's originally got this, flat 183, 21st. I believe this come from CU7 because I've not made any additional	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	capitals on the yellow version? A. That's a different colour to the carbon copy so that has been added at a later date. And that yellow copy has gone to CU7. Q. Okay. And finally on this flat A. Sir, do we have sorry, because I did transmit a lot of priorities up to Louisa. If we had 10 persons, I'd be, "Louisa, we've got 10 persons stuck in this flat, the FSG form is on its way", so they might have documented that information somewhere. So they might have updated it is there an FSG for flat 92 individual, 153 individual and 113 individual? Because I might have transmitted that to her whilst we're trying to get information together. So especially when there was 10 people trapped in a
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	have a white version for 183. I'm afraid I can't put all three onto the screen and, again, Mr Chairman, you may be right about this, but it seems to be a photocopy but let's look at the yellow and the blue first of all, because we know you at least kept the blue. The yellow goes to the CU. They look identical because the blue and the yellow look as if they've come from the same pressing on the white, but can you explain the addition under "Additional information" of "6 adults 1 pregnant" there? A. So we'd have got an update via CU7 on channel 3 that's originally got this, flat 183, 21st. I believe this come from CU7 because I've not made any additional information that's come from the fire ground, so we take	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	capitals on the yellow version? A. That's a different colour to the carbon copy so that has been added at a later date. And that yellow copy has gone to CU7. Q. Okay. And finally on this flat A. Sir, do we have sorry, because I did transmit a lot of priorities up to Louisa. If we had 10 persons, I'd be, "Louisa, we've got 10 persons stuck in this flat, the FSG form is on its way", so they might have documented that information somewhere. So they might have updated it is there an FSG for flat 92 individual, 153 individual and 113 individual? Because I might have transmitted that to her whilst we're trying to get information together. So especially when there was 10 people trapped in a flat, I'd broadcast that to her. So she might have
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	have a white version for 183. I'm afraid I can't put all three onto the screen and, again, Mr Chairman, you may be right about this, but it seems to be a photocopy but let's look at the yellow and the blue first of all, because we know you at least kept the blue. The yellow goes to the CU. They look identical because the blue and the yellow look as if they've come from the same pressing on the white, but can you explain the addition under "Additional information" of "6 adults 1 pregnant" there? A. So we'd have got an update via CU7 on channel 3 that's originally got this, flat 183, 21st. I believe this come from CU7 because I've not made any additional information that's come from the fire ground, so we take that as a FSG, and you'll be able to document that via	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	capitals on the yellow version? A. That's a different colour to the carbon copy so that has been added at a later date. And that yellow copy has gone to CU7. Q. Okay. And finally on this flat A. Sir, do we have sorry, because I did transmit a lot of priorities up to Louisa. If we had 10 persons, I'd be, "Louisa, we've got 10 persons stuck in this flat, the FSG form is on its way", so they might have documented that information somewhere. So they might have updated it is there an FSG for flat 92 individual, 153 individual and 113 individual? Because I might have transmitted that to her whilst we're trying to get information together. So especially when there was 10 people trapped in a flat, I'd broadcast that to her. So she might have written
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	have a white version for 183. I'm afraid I can't put all three onto the screen and, again, Mr Chairman, you may be right about this, but it seems to be a photocopy but let's look at the yellow and the blue first of all, because we know you at least kept the blue. The yellow goes to the CU. They look identical because the blue and the yellow look as if they've come from the same pressing on the white, but can you explain the addition under "Additional information" of "6 adults 1 pregnant" there? A. So we'd have got an update via CU7 on channel 3 that's originally got this, flat 183, 21st. I believe this come from CU7 because I've not made any additional information that's come from the fire ground, so we take that as a FSG, and you'll be able to document that via the short incident log if there is an FSG taking place	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	capitals on the yellow version? A. That's a different colour to the carbon copy so that has been added at a later date. And that yellow copy has gone to CU7. Q. Okay. And finally on this flat A. Sir, do we have sorry, because I did transmit a lot of priorities up to Louisa. If we had 10 persons, I'd be, "Louisa, we've got 10 persons stuck in this flat, the FSG form is on its way", so they might have documented that information somewhere. So they might have updated it is there an FSG for flat 92 individual, 153 individual and 113 individual? Because I might have transmitted that to her whilst we're trying to get information together. So especially when there was 10 people trapped in a flat, I'd broadcast that to her. So she might have written that down or someone with her might have written that down.

1	got 10 persons and the form's on its way.	1	on it, so I'd say that might be the later one. It looks
2	But with the people jumping and the debris falling,	2	like it has been amended. It looks like it's been
3	it was at times a minute or so to get into the tower.	3	amended this is the white copy, right? So this
4	Q. Yes, I follow. I see.	4	well, no, that could've been that could've been me
5	Maybe this is an example, I don't know, but if you	5	amending it. If have you got the yellow copy of
6	turn to page 10 we're still on flat 183 perhaps	6	evidence 14?
7	you can help with this.	7	Q. Yes, at page 15.
8	Again, because it's white, it's not necessarily	8	A. If you just check that and see if says 21 or 23 on
9	a white document, we can check, but can you help with	9	there, please.
10	this.	10	Q. Sure. If we can have page 15 up.
11	This is again about 183 on the 21st, "trapped" in	11	A. So that's amended. So I've amended that. So they've
12	different writing and then some additional information	12	transmitted me 183, 21st floor. Before I've torn it
13	underneath it.	13	off, they've said, no, correction, 23rd floor. So the
14	A. No, that looks very clean as well for it to have gone to	14	one on the left I would say was the very first,
15	the bridgehead. "183, 21st". I think I've written	15	evidence 10 is the very first one, and this is
16	that. "Trapped", "3 adults"	16	an update.
17	Q. Is that your writing?	17	Q. That's very helpful.
18	A. My writing changes quite a lot, sir, and I was yes,	18	Can I just go back to the white version of the
19	I'd say that is my writing. I've not put the yes,	19	yellow version we have there, which is page 14, which is
20	I would say that is my writing, sir.	20	all the additional information added there, which is
21	Q. Would you have sent that page, page 10, to the	21	about different flats; it's not about 183, it's about
22	bridgehead, assuming that it's a white coversheet and	22	one you can see the list.
23	not a photocopy of a yellow?	23	I don't think I did ask you this: is that your
24	A. Every single piece of paper that was white went to that	24	handwriting
25	bridgehead, because I tore it off. We had quite	25	A. Again, my handwriting is quite inconsistent. I was
	Page 97		Page 99
1	a methodical system which worked really well. There was	1	overwhelmed at the time. I ween't even putting the
2	times where I had limited runners so there would be	2	overwhelmed at the time. I wasn't even putting the time, I know how important that is. But, yes, the
3			
	a delay of maybe 2 minutes where it went back to the CII	3	
	a delay of maybe 2 minutes where it went back to the CU,	3	precedent was just to get it up there and not get my
4	which was halfway down Grenfell Road. It took about	4	precedent was just to get it up there and not get my phone back out.
4 5	which was halfway down Grenfell Road. It took about a good 30-second run away. But everything went straight	4 5	precedent was just to get it up there and not get my phone back out. If it's on the yellow form, sir, that's my
4 5 6	which was halfway down Grenfell Road. It took about a good 30-second run away. But everything went straight away and there was never really a time where there was	4 5 6	precedent was just to get it up there and not get my phone back out. If it's on the yellow form, sir, that's my handwriting.
4 5 6 7	which was halfway down Grenfell Road. It took about a good 30-second run away. But everything went straight away and there was never really a time where there was nobody to run a white form into the tower.	4 5 6 7	precedent was just to get it up there and not get my phone back out. If it's on the yellow form, sir, that's my handwriting. Q. Some of it is, not all of it.
4 5 6 7 8	which was halfway down Grenfell Road. It took about a good 30-second run away. But everything went straight away and there was never really a time where there was nobody to run a white form into the tower. Q. Okay. I don't think we've got a yellow version of that	4 5 6 7 8	precedent was just to get it up there and not get my phone back out. If it's on the yellow form, sir, that's my handwriting. Q. Some of it is, not all of it. A. So what is on that form is my handwriting.
4 5 6 7 8 9	which was halfway down Grenfell Road. It took about a good 30-second run away. But everything went straight away and there was never really a time where there was nobody to run a white form into the tower. Q. Okay. I don't think we've got a yellow version of that white control sheet.	4 5 6 7 8 9	precedent was just to get it up there and not get my phone back out. If it's on the yellow form, sir, that's my handwriting. Q. Some of it is, not all of it. A. So what is on that form is my handwriting. Q. Let's look at 14 and 15 again. I should've asked you
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1			
	A. I think this must have happened I set out my	1	Q. So on the yellow version, which would've gone to the CU,
2	structure at the very beginning, numbering at the top.	2	there's 182, which has been written over, and then 21st
3	If I can remember rightly, a mass influx come when we're	3	floor, written over.
4	back when we moved so I moved from the car because	4	That writing over doesn't appear on the blue
5	people were jumping, and I moved to the floor, and then	5	version.
6	from the floor I moved to the bins.	6	But also, the words on the yellow version 182,
7	MR MILLETT: Would you like a break, do you think?	7	21st floor appear within the tramlines for the box,
8	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, we're coming up to the time	8	"Premise number", but don't appear within the tramlines
9	when we would expect to have a short break.	9	on the blue version; they go over the line.
10	MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, we should have a break.	10	Can you help us with those differences?
11	There's one thing I would appreciate being able to	11	A. The only assumption I can make there is the number 10 on
12	check, which is what the originals look like. I have	12	the yellow form, I can't see a carbon print beneath it,
13	a message through	13	if that makes sense. So I believe the one on the right
14	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes.	14	is the original 10 and the one on the left is
15	MR MILLETT: that we may be able to do that quickly.	15	a duplicate 182, 21st floor, but maybe the CU's updated
16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It did occur to me that we might	16	it by overwriting, because you've got my carbon copy
17	want to see the originals.	17	beneath it and dark ink on top of it.
18	MR MILLETT: That's what I'm just exploring.	18	So the one on the right is the original number 10
19	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We're going to have a break now in	19	and 182 is a duplicate. I think the CU's updated or
20	any event, so we'll come back at 12.05. Don't talk to	20	corrected that information as it's come through.
21	anyone about your evidence over the break.	21	Q. How do you account for the difference in placement of
22	(The witness withdrew)	22	the words?
23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right, 12.05, please.	23	A. They're two totally different documents, sir, as in
24	(11.55 am)	24	that the blue one wasn't with the yellow one in that
25	(A short break)	25	pack of four. I've done a 182 again in repetition and
	Page 101		Page 103
1	(12.05 pm)	1	it's been updated and the 10 has been added, I believe.
2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think Mr Sadler is on his way now.	2	Q. Okay.
3	Yes, there he is.	3	Do you have any recollection of doing flat 182 more
4	(The witness returned)	4	than once?
5	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr Sadler?	5	A. I don't. And there was so much information that my best
6	THE WITNESS: Thank you. Apologies.	6	philosophy was to capture it. It was relentless, every
7	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Not at all.	7	20 seconds. I just didn't want to miss a single thing,
8	MR MILLETT: Mr Sadler, thank you for coming back to us.		
_		8	so whatever I heard, I captured, and this is the only
9	I have just one or two more questions on this run of	8 9	so whatever I heard, I captured, and this is the only way I could capture it.
9	I have just one or two more questions on this run of documents and then we will move away from them.		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	•	9	way I could capture it.
10	documents and then we will move away from them.	9 10	way I could capture it. Q. Could I just ask you to look at the blue version.
10 11	documents and then we will move away from them. A. That's fine, sir.	9 10 11	way I could capture it. Q. Could I just ask you to look at the blue version. There's some writing under "Additional information".
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10 11 12 13 14	documents and then we will move away from them. A. That's fine, sir. Q. Is that okay? A. Of course it is. Q. Can I ask you to be shown pages 8 and 9, first of all,	9 10 11 12 13 14	way I could capture it. Q. Could I just ask you to look at the blue version. There's some writing under "Additional information". I don't know whether you can read it, it's difficult to read, but can you help us with that? It looks like: "crew" something, but I can't help further. Can you?
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		_	
1	Q. That's blue.	1	or Charlie.
2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, the form looks blue and the	2	Q. Then in terms of the system you were using, you would
3	writing looks greenish, so it's all a bit confusing. It	3	then communicate that to the bridgehead directly by
4	may be if we need to pursue this, perhaps we should see	4	radio?
5	the original document.	5	A. That's correct, to Louisa fundamentally and then I think
6	MR MILLETT: I am told the originals have been asked for but	6	to some other people. Sometimes it might not be
7	will not be here before I am hoping to finish with this	7	followed up with a form because a priority FSG might
8	witness, so we'll have to manage that problem.	8	have come in, and I'll process that, but so long as
9	A. Are we saying the one on the right is a blue form?	9	I knew that information had gone to the bridgehead, to
10	MR MILLETT: I've assumed that its blue by virtue of its	10	Louisa, and she'd acknowledged it, I was happy that that
11	colour, but	11	information could be captured up there, like I say.
12	A. I think we disagree.	12	Until a couple of hours into the incident, we're
13	Q. All right, there's only so far we can pursue that. I'm	13	treading water, we're overwhelmed.
14	going to leave that I think for the time being.	14	Q. Until that time, were you able to have free contact with
15		15	Louisa De Silvo at the bridgehead?
16	A. I'm sorry I can't help you with that. O. No, you've been extremely helpful with that and my	16	A. Yes. Sometimes it would take me a couple of times to
17		17	raise her, but within 10 seconds.
18	questions have not been that easy to follow, but I'm	18	Q. Which channel were you using to do that?
19	just trying to get to the bottom of the communication	19	A. 3 as well. So Louisa would hear there was various
20	system.	20	radio channels, channel 1, channel 6 for BA and Louisa
	Just panning back from the details of these	21	would be on channel 3. So I don't know if she was
21	documents and looking at the system you were operating at this early stage, based largely on the envelope	22	hearing the CU directly, but the CU was overwhelmed and
22 23		23	it was clear they could not collate this information on
23	information you had, can I summarise your evidence in	24	control information forms, they were so overwhelmed.
25	terms of the system you were using, which was that you	25	And where we were, getting it by handheld radio and me
23	would get information from the envelope, or from the	23	and where we were, getting it by handheld radio and me
	Page 105		Page 107
1	radio, write it down on the white version with the	1	documenting it on that form, we cut down the travel time
1	radio, write it down on the white version with the	1 2	documenting it on that form, we cut down the travel time
2	yellow underneath and the blue and the green, send the	2	from CU by about a minute. It wasn't far down the road,
2 3	yellow underneath and the blue and the green, send the white to the bridgehead, the yellow to the CU, keep the	2 3	from CU by about a minute. It wasn't far down the road, but it was 30 seconds each way. We cut that minute
2 3 4	yellow underneath and the blue and the green, send the white to the bridgehead, the yellow to the CU, keep the blue and the green, number the blue version that you	2 3 4	from CU by about a minute. It wasn't far down the road, but it was 30 seconds each way. We cut that minute down. We're at the base of the tower, we're a focal
2 3 4 5	yellow underneath and the blue and the green, send the white to the bridgehead, the yellow to the CU, keep the blue and the green, number the blue version that you had	2 3 4 5	from CU by about a minute. It wasn't far down the road, but it was 30 seconds each way. We cut that minute down. We're at the base of the tower, we're a focal point for the people walking up with phone calls of
2 3 4 5 6	yellow underneath and the blue and the green, send the white to the bridgehead, the yellow to the CU, keep the blue and the green, number the blue version that you had A. Number all of them on the white version. As I'm writing	2 3 4 5 6	from CU by about a minute. It wasn't far down the road, but it was 30 seconds each way. We cut that minute down. We're at the base of the tower, we're a focal point for the people walking up with phone calls of loved ones inside. I captured that information there as
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		1	
1	what was an unprecedented and uncontrollable situation.	1	like 5/10 minutes. Debris was falling quite heavily.
2	Q. Yes, okay.	2	As I've mentioned, some people jumped from the building,
3	You mentioned prioritisation a moment ago.	3	and that was the time that we kind of moved back and
4	A. Yes, sir.	4	I lay on the floor. So say you were where the car
5	Q. Did you yourself carry out any prioritisation of FSG	5	bonnet was, I relocated to a location maybe to here, and
6	information which you then sent to the bridgehead?	6	I lay on the floor with all the information in front of
	· ·	1	•
7	A. I wasn't privy to very much information in terms of the	7	me.
8	compartment conditions, but I did send I would always	8	Q. So if you had started doing the FSG information at 02.13
9	say priority to Louisa on the radio when I had a high	9	as the first FSG form shows us, or even 02.19 when you
10	volume of FSG so the single FSGs I would try to write	10	took the photograph, would that mean that 5 to
11	out, but if I had 10 people or 3 people in	11	10 minutes after either of those times you moved back
12	a compartment, I would get that to her straight away	12	under the walkway?
13	just in case they had any crews nearby. But the ones	13	A. In my opinion, that might not be true, but in my
14	that come through single come through quite quickly and	14	Q. To the best of your recollection.
15	I could process those and get those ran in.	15	A. Yes, sir.
16	When there was a little bit of a delay, I'd	16	Q. Yes. So that would be about 02.25 or 02.30?
17	prioritise that, and the ones with the 10 people in, and	17	A. The only reason I feel this is because early on people
18	three people in, I did them as a priority to her and	18	were jumping from the tower, and I remember thinking to
19	said we've got 10 people in a compartment.	19	myself: I've only just arrived here and it's still
20	I wasn't privy to where that was in context of where	20	fundamentally early stages of this fire, what are the
21	the fire was or where the conditions were worse, that	21	conditions in that compartment that's driven this person
22	would be wrong for me to assume that. That's what	22	to do this? And I was quite shocked at this early into
23	a search co-ordinator would do, because he or she would	23	the fire. It was only developing up the corner of the
24	be privy to the information coming back from BA crews up	24	south-east corner of the block at the moment, but
25	there.	25	obviously the conditions were so bad in their
			·
	Page 109		Page 111
1	Q. When you were doing your own prioritising, what criteria	1	compartment or the lobbies to escape that either they
2	were you adopting?	2	had to jump or they were trying to transfer themselves
3	A. So I would just say priority to her to try to get her	3	to a different compartment on a lower floor and fell.
4	attention, and then I would say that there was 10	4	So I was shocked that it was at that stage, this
5	people. So if I had lots of single FSGs coming through,	5	early on.
6	I knew they could get through quite quickly, but I think	6	Q. Yes.
7	I only sent a priority to her once or twice when there	7	A. I just remember that that stuck in my mind. It was
8			•
_	was the 10 people, because I was like we've got a lot of	8	very early on into the incident. I was like: this is
9	people in one compartment she needs to be aware of this	9	already out of control.
10	she might need to send a team of 6, two teams of 3.	10	Q. At around that time, do you remember getting any
11	Q. Did you ever prioritise when you were doing it at all	11	information that crews were struggling to get above the
12	based on smoke density or conditions?	12	11th floor?
13	A. No, I had no information to make that assumption, I only	13	A. All I
14	really did that one prioritise, and all I did was	14	Q. Sorry, 15th floor.
15	vocalise there was 10 people in that compartment and	15	A. All I remember hearing I can't remember where it was,
16	that she would need to send a bigger team there.	16	I think it was when I was I can't remember if it was
17	Q. Now, going back to your witness statement, page 4, in	17	when I was at the bins or when I took over on entry
18	paragraph 2 on that page, you say that you were	18	control with my crew manager, Ben McAlonen. We were
19	instructed by Stuart Brown to get back underneath the	19	running three boards. I think it might have been later
20	covered walkway.	20	on, that the 11th floor, they had two 45s in the lobby
21	How long had you been at the car bonnet processing	21	and they were making no effect on the fire, there was a
22	FSG information there when Stuart Brown told you to move	22	ruptured gas main or something. That was either at the
23	back under the cupboard walkway?	23	bins I heard this or I do believe it was maybe when
24	A. Time travels quite quickly when you're in a situation	24	I took over on entry control in the lobby. That's the
25	where there's a lot of information coming in. It felt	25	only time I heard of difficulties making entry into fire
	· ·		
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- 1			
1	floors.	1	dangerous. I've carried on getting on top of the
2	Q. When you moved to go to work under the covered walkway,	2	control information forms for the envelope, and I've
3	were you nearer or further away from the tower?	3	relocated to the bins where another wave of FSGs come in
4	A. Nearer by 5 metres.	4	from CU7, channel 3.
5	Q. Okay.	5	Q. So when you were on the car bonnet, does that mean that
6	When you were in the new location under cover, you	6	you weren't yet working through the envelope?
7	say that you started working your way through the	7	A. That might be true.
8	envelope that you'd taken earlier.	8	Q. If that's right
9	Let me just anchor that in your statement.	9	A. The envelope might not have come to me then, sir.
10	In the third line, in the second substantive	10	I took a photo like I said to you earlier, that
11	paragraph on page 4, you say:	11	envelope was in my possession for 10 seconds. I took
12	"At my new location (about 5 meters[sic] further	12	that photo, I said, "Get that up there straight away,
13	back under substantial cover) I laid on the floor and	13	I've got it captured here". So if that envelope came to
14	started working my way through the envelope that I had	14	me at 02.18, it was gone at 02.19. And that was taken
15	taken a photo of earlier."	15	at the car bonnet. I would've relocated from the car
16	Having been through the exercise we've been through	16	bonnet and processed that information.
17	this morning of looking at the forms, looking at the	17	Does that make sense, sir?
18	envelope and talking about location, do you think that	18	Q. That being so, were you, as I think you've told us and
19	it's right that you only started working your way	19	I've certainly assumed in our discussions this morning,
20	through the envelope once you'd moved back under cover?	20	working through fire survival guidance control
21	A. I would say that's accurate, yeah. If I've said that	21	information forms on the car bonnet?
22	that's not in my contemporaneous notes though, is it?	22	A. Yes, I was. Radio FSGs from CU7, channel 3, number 1
23	Q. No, that's your statement. We can look at your	23	through to whatever, and then then I must have got
24	contemporaneous notes.	24	this piece of paper at 02.19, photographed it and
25	A. I did look at those and I didn't see that in there.	25	started processing those, sir. So there might be
	Page 113		Page 115
1	Q. No.	1	duplicates of 205, FSG from CU7, channel 3, but then
2	A. So that would figure with me starting doing FSG at	2	it's been documented on the envelope.
3	02.13, taking a photo at 02.19. I took a photo on the	3	Q. I follow.
4	car bonnet because you can see the FIB board beneath the	4	To summarise it, just so I've understood it right,
5	photo, so that was taken on the car bonnet. So I might	5	when you're on the car bonnet, you're working on control
6	have then the situation evolved that it was too	6	information forms in the order you've identified based
7	dangerous to be where we were and relocated and then	7	on radio messages. You then get the envelope at 02.19
8	worked my way through that. Those time frames seem to	8	and it goes straight up to the bridgehead. Then you
9	marry up, sir.	9	move under the covered walkway, then you start working
			move under the covered warkway, then you start working
10	Q. Right. Only we have the photograph at 02.19 of the	10	your way through the envelope.
10 11	Q. Right. Only we have the photograph at 02.19 of the envelope, and we have you starting work on the FSG forms	10 11	
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11	envelope, and we have you starting work on the FSG forms	11	your way through the envelope. A. In between priorities coming through CU7, channel 3,
11 12	envelope, and we have you starting work on the FSG forms themselves at 02.13, so a little bit earlier than that,	11 12	your way through the envelope. A. In between priorities coming through CU7, channel 3, yes.
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1	to the CU, you'd already done?	1	couldn't stand in front of me. It was like he was
2	A. No, because it was just a mass of paper at the moment.	2	drunk. He kept walking to one side. He was one of the
3	It's only when we got to the Ben, I think, the	3	initial crews that went in and fought the fire. He was
4	firefighter from Hammersmith, as I was writing, the	4	taking pieces of paper off me and falling backwards. So
5	water was starting to cascade out the tower and it was	5	I realised I needed new crews because I couldn't trust
6	moving towards us, and Ben started to relocate me, as	6	this information would get there or he wouldn't hurt
7	I was still taking FSGs, writing them, and I think at	7	himself en route, because they were so hellbent on
8	this time I've got the tabard put into the back of my	8	getting that information to the bridgehead.
9	jerkin, at this time, FSG co-ordinator, as I was laying	9	And it was an arduous task running up those four
10	on the floor. I remember them doing it. I was still	10	floors or to the mezzanine, dodging debris, and it was
11	writing.	11	starting to get congested in there. So I think I might
12	Ben started moving me to the bins where we put	12	have asked Watch Manager Brown to find me more wearers
13	a board up and made a desk there, and I when I had	13	that had already worn. I didn't want original crews
14	a gap in the FSGs, I relocated to the bins, 5 metres to	14	because they had work to do; I wanted to try and utilise
15	my left.	15	what resources I could without diminishing potential BA
16	Q. Right.	16	crews.
17	So given that you weren't at that stage being able	17	So at that time I did get more runners and they were
18	to collate white and yellow forms that you had already	18	queued up on my left and right. Again, I had the system
19	done on the bonnet with what was on the envelope that	19	
20	you received, is it possible that you then sent		left to the tower, as I was looking at them, right to
21	duplicate control information forms?	20 21	the CU, and they knew where they were going. I didn't
22	A. Definitely.	22	mix them up. I was always sometimes there was
23	Q. Right.	23	a little delay in getting the yellow form to the CU
24	A. We've seen it.	24	because priority was to get that information upstairs.
25	Q. That explains those		Q. Just in terms of links after you'd moved to the covered
23	Q. That explains those	25	walkway, links between you and the bridgehead, did you
	Page 117		Page 119
1	A Wa'va saan avidanca of that Vas Rut I was inundated	1	know that your forms, your white forms, were going into
1 2	A. We've seen evidence of that. Yes. But I was inundated.	1 2	know that your forms, your white forms, were going into
2	I had to capture everything I had, and those were every	2	the tower and then do you know how the information on
2 3	I had to capture everything I had, and those were every 20 seconds.	2 3	the tower and then do you know how the information on those forms was being communicated to the bridgehead
2 3 4	I had to capture everything I had, and those were every 20 seconds. When we got to the bins, we recognised that we were	2 3 4	the tower and then do you know how the information on those forms was being communicated to the bridgehead once inside the tower?
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1	A. So there was a couple of waves. Initially, the first,	1	I couldn't reference it.
2	those 14 that I've numbered, I feel they came in over	2	Q. So these waiting FSGs which were waiting to be
3	5 minutes. I might be wrong. Again, the whole incident	3	processed, they came to you en masse, and just so I have
4	was surreal. It felt like it was 5 minutes, 10 minutes,	4	your evidence right, are you saying they got recorded
5	those 14.	5	immediately on the FIB and were then transferred to the
6	Then there was a little lull when I moved to the	6	control information forms and processed?
7	floor and I could process the envelope details. I was	7	A. I don't think so because the only delay with writing it
8	still receiving FSGs in that time.	8	on the forward information board and putting it on
9	And then it picked up again at the bins, and I think	9	a control information form would be me just pulling four
10	that was because our control was overwhelmed with FSGs.	10	bits of paper off. And when there was little lulls,
11	BT operators, Manchester Fire and Rescue, police, they	11	I would write I would pull four bits of paper off or
12	were taking FSGs and they were getting that information	12	Ben and Charlie and some of the runners were helping me,
13	through to our control. So that was coming through in	13 14	so I would have them stacked up, left to right, and
14 15	bundles, if that makes sense, because it was coming in	15	I would write: flat, floor, flat, floor, flat, floor.
	from a different Brigade. Everybody was overwhelmed.		So then all I had to do is write the flat and floor
16 17	Q. I was going to ask you: you say "on the trot waiting to	16 17	number in and throw that away to bridgehead and CU.
	be processed". How do they wait with you?	18	Q. So when you say that they were waiting to be processed,
18	A. So when I say so CU7 would say, "We've got six FSGs	19	they weren't recorded and then rerecorded; you just
19 20	for you". So I know I had a FIB board then, I know some chinagraph was written on there. I can't tell you and	20	wrote them down as fast as you could? A. As far as I'm concerned, they were never recorded with
21	I can't remember what that chinagraph was. I don't know	20	us then we processed it. That was only on the envelope.
22	if I wrote it or if Charlie or Ben or anybody else wrote	22	They were transmitted it to me by handheld radio from
23	it. I know there was a because I remember seeing my	23	CU7 on channel 3.
24	paper and there was chinagraph between the boards, and	24	Q. Okay.
25	I can't remember what that was, but I remember just	25	Now, on the top of page 5 of your statement, you say
23	Tean tremember what that was, but fremember just	23	Now, on the top of page 3 of your statement, you say
	Page 121		Page 123
1	what I'm referring to there is CU7 will say, "Right,	1	that you had messages or FSGs that you were writing down
2	we've got six FSGs ready to process", and I'd go, "Go	2	that had come in from the public or from people on calls
3	ahead", and they'd go, "Number 1", and I'll confirm it,	3	from the tower. Can I just show you that.
4	"Number 2", I'll confirm it, and I'll pull those two off	4	A. Yes.
5	and go, "You go". Number 3, number 4, "You go".	5	Q. You say:
6	There's literally no delay. If I had six runners, every	6	" people [were] calling, who were trapped inside
7	two FSGs, I'd run it up there.	7	the building. These were relatives or friends.
8	Q. Did you receive pieces of paper from CU7 at this point?	8	I wouldn't speak with the person on the phone directly,
9	A. Not that I'm aware of. The only one was the envelope.	9	I asked for the details and wrote it down on the
10	I might have. Again, it was information overload. Not	10	FSG/Control information Form."
11	that I can recall, sir, no.	11	Is that a reference to what you told us earlier,
12	Q. All the information that came from CU7 to you, by now	12	that people were coming to you with their telephones?
13	under the safety of the covered walkway, came by radio,	13	A. Yeah, people were coming, friends and family were coming
14	did it?	14	up and saying, "This is my sister on the phone", or
15	A. Yes. I remember CU7 staff coming down and looking and	15	something to that effect. I was conscious not to take
16	the FSG co-ordinator station manager coming down and	16	the phone off them because, as we mentioned earlier, one
17	looking over my shoulder at what was going on. Again,	17	of the watch managers is already on the phone giving
18	I don't really think I even looked at them; I was	18	advice and help to a person trapped in the building.
19	processing and writing.	19	And I was so overwhelmed I couldn't stop what I was
20	The whole fire, I literally looked at a pad of	20	doing, we're under-resourced. So I wanted to capture
21	paper. I remember there was a lull. I looked up and	21	that information, I think I firmed it up by telling them
22	I saw people at the windows and I thought: can I try and	22	to go to the CU and knock on the door there so they
23	reference where they are? I think I tried one, trying	23	could maybe get more information. But I just needed to
24	to count the floors where they were. It was	24	capture it where I was. It breaks my heart that I was
25	an impossible task because the fire was just	25	a bit callous with that, but I had I had to or things
	Page 122		Page 124

1	. 11.60.	1	The first of the ESC college of the first of the
1	wouldn't have evolved.	1	were having to take FSGs calls and that's that's
2	Q. I understand.	2	a sign of what was going on.
3	You then go on to say in your statement, three lines	3	Q. Yes. Can I ask you to look at the end of the same
4	up from the bottom of that paragraph:	4	paragraph in your witness statement now, where you say:
5	"After a while the Police got on top of it and this	5	"I may be wrong with my estimation but I feel that I
6	stopped people coming up to me."	6	probably did between 60 and 80 of these Control
7	I think you said just a minute ago that the police	7	information/FSG forms."
8	would also help you with recording the details of flats	8	Now, is that in total or is that just those forms
9	and floors; is that right?	9	which recorded information coming from callers direct to
10	A. I mentioned the police here, sorry?	10	you?
11	Q. Yes.	11	A. Again, it was a surreal situation. I did 14 on that car
12	A. Where?	12	bonnet. I don't know how many in total were done. It
13	Q. Well, you said a minute ago, I think, some way back, you	13	felt like I did 60-odd. You might be able to allude me
14	thought the other services were assisting and recording	14	to the fact how many were processed, but it felt like
15	information they were getting from people stuck in the	15	that. I understand when I went to the CU that it said
16	flats.	16	they had 156 FSG calls. I don't know how accurate that
17	A. No, I haven't said, sir, that correct me if I'm wrong.	17	is, but that's what it felt like to me. It might be
18	They assisted in throwing up a cordon. The police	18	inaccurate because it was such a surreal situation.
19	would I think Charlie mentioned a police officer came	19	We know I took 14 on the car bonnet and that was the
20	over to us and said that we had some information about	20	beginning of the incident. I don't want to give you
21	someone trapped. Again, I think he referred them to the	21	inaccurate facts, that's what it felt like, it might
22	CU and we captured that information maybe. But all	22	it could even just be 40, 30. But that's just how
23	the only interaction I had with the police really was in	23	I feel.
24	terms of a cordon.	24	Q. Okay.
25	And, you know, when I say they "got on top of it",	25	In the next paragraph in your statement you say that
	Page 125		Page 127
1	that's a bit unfair to the police, they were such	1	you had to move back because of the run-off of
2	a massive cordon, and residents were coming out of local	2	firefighting water. You then say:
3	flats or friends, so they couldn't police that. But	3	"Here we put a board onto some bins and this served
4	when the cordon got tight, those those type of	4	as our desk. I also arranged for some lighting to be
5	they were not FSGs, an FSG is where it comes from fire	5	set up."
6	control and they're giving them fire advice, this was	6	I've given you that as context, but what I want to
7	just a walk up, "My sister's in that flat", and I had to	7	ask you about is two lines down from that. You say:
8	capture it somehow and I captured it on the control	8	"I tried getting the forms into some sort of order
9	information form.	9	by putting them into different piles and numbering them
10	Q. Can I ask you to be shown LFB00001922 again and page 11	10	floors 10, 10-20 and 20 and above. Billy from
11	this time, just to clarify one thing.	11	Hammersmith took this on and made good order of the
12	This is part of the sheath of documents which we	12	piles of Control Information forms."
13	looked at earlier this morning, the white, yellow and	13	Just pausing there, were those the blue and green
14	blue forms.	14	copies of control information forms that you'd already
15	Do you remember receiving a document like that from	15	processed?
16	the police?	16	A. That's right, sir, yes. So the whites would have gone
17	A. I can't, no. But I know that Charlie had an interaction	17	to the bridgehead, yellow would have gone to the CU.
18	with a police officer. I only know that from hearing	18	These were just the two copies I had left, the blue and
19	his evidence. I don't recall that, but again I was	19	the green copy. And me saying that I actually I was
20	overwhelmed and it was just a surreal situation. We	20	conscious that we had to get some kind of order because
21	would've dealt with him, we wouldn't have turned him	21	we couldn't cross-reference anything, we couldn't
22	away, if he had he or she, it was a her any	22	cross-reference an update from the CU, we couldn't
23	information. And, like I say, there was an overflow of	23	cross-reference duplicates coming up from members of the
24	FSGs coming in, that's how overwhelmed our control were	24	public. And I think it was a member of public that come
25	and what an incredible job they were doing. But police	25	to us that we actually I'm sorry, I forget his name,
	Page 126		Page 128
<u> </u>	1 agc 120		22 (Decce 125 to 129)

it must be Ben from Hammersmith -- and I said we need --1 1 around the local area to see who had left the building, 2 and we (inaudible), we go right we need to get some 2 who had called FSG and if there was -- if they were 3 structure here. And it's Ben that did that for me 3 outside safe. 4 because I was still taking FSG calls. 4 Q. Starting to day break. 5 5 Q. So the need to cross-reference -- is this right? -- was If you'd started this exercise at, say, 6 because of updates or duplicates? 6 2.00/2.15 am, do you really think that it's right that 7 7 A. Yes, sir, and it's just where the incident lent itself you were there for 5 or 6 hours under the walkway doing 8 to us being able to get on top of what we were -- I was 8 FSG? 9 9 treading water and we just got our heads above the water A. The process was working. It's irrelevant whether it's 10 and we needed to get some -- assemble some kind of 10 right or wrong, but the process was working and we're 11 order. 11 capturing what information we could and making sure 12 Q. Did that work? 12 nothing was being missed. 13 A. Massively, yeah, it was highly effective, more effective 13 Q. No, my question was simply a timing question. 14 than my numbering of 1 to 14, but it worked really well. 14 A. Sorry, sir. 15 And later when people come past to get some updates we'd 15 Q. I am asking you whether you think it is actually right 16 find that information quite quickly for them. Although 16 that you were at this location doing FSG work for 5 or the information was very limited, we didn't have very 17 17 6 hours given that you started it at around 2.00 or 18 much about conditions or such like. 18 19 O. In the same paragraph at the end you say: 19 A. It could be less than that, it could be three or 20 20 four hours, but it definitely felt like five or six "I stayed at this location for some 5 or 6 hours, 21 with FSG call in the 1st 2 hours being regular, then as 21 hours. Like I say, it's -- I don't know how I'd 22 time went on they diminished, we had time to form some 22 reference that -- reference that time at all. 23 23 order of ourselves and the paperwork." Q. Are you all right to go on for five or ten minutes? 24 What time do you think you were finally relieved of 24 25 25 Q. Is that okay? Thank you, that's very good of you. this job? Page 129 Page 131 1 A. As in FSG or actually Grenfell Tower fire? 1 Thank you. 2 Q. You're quite right. The job I am referring to is 2 You say in your statement at page 5, as you've just 3 3 told us -- this is the third paragraph down: covering FSG forms. Can you remember? 4 A. It was -- I made the decision to speak to CU7 -- it was 4 "When it eventually started to get really quiet, 5 getting virtually impossible for firefighters or too 5 I left Billy and CM BATTERBEE there to go and speak to 6 dangerous for the firefighters to get in from our CU7. I told them that it was getting harder for my 6 7 entrance. I think the main entrance had been relocated 7 runners to get in and out of the tower because of the 8 8 around to the play area side of the tower. I said that falling debris. The radio channel now was quiet ..." 9 q very little information was coming through us now, can Do you know who you spoke to there in CU7? 10 we make a direct connection between you and the 10 A. No, I don't. I spoke to -- there was one or two 11 11 bridgehead. Obviously they were now on top of what they operators in CU7. I remember seeing a whiteboard with 12 needed to do in the CU, it was an ICV CU, there was a CU 12 the numbers of people missing, the adults and children, 13 for FSG. 13 the different colours, the charts. And they kind of ran 14 14 And you've got to bear in mind of how overwhelmed me through where we were, and I was just overwhelmed 15 they were. I think when I took over the -- started 15 about how many people we thought were missing at that 16 doing the FSG at the base at 02.13 I think make -- CUs 16 time. You know, I knew there was dozens of FSGs, but, 17 17 went four, then it went six, so that showed you how yeah, it was quite overwhelming really what they'd been 18 overwhelmed they were with trying to collate and process 18 dealing with on that CU and what they were trying to 19 information, not only FSG, make-ups, messages and 19 evidence and process. 20 deploying resources. 20 Q. Who decided at that point that the link could go from 21 Q. I just want to get an idea of how long you stayed at 21 CU7 to the bridgehead direct? 22 22 your location under the walkway doing FSG calls. A. Myself and chatting to the CU operative, I can't 23 A. It was dusk, it was starting to day break, I think --23 remember who it was, it might have been the FSG 24 not dusk -- it started to day break. Because then 24 co-ordinator, a station manager, I cannot remember, but 25 25 I spoke to CU and they tasked me with the job of going it was someone in control at that. And I just said it Page 130 Page 132

1	was very little radio traffic now, it's very little for	1	you had in your hands to anybody?
2	me to update in terms of it was before 8 am because	2	A. So I went round to the CU to speak to them about,
3	I was doing the entry control board with my crew manager	3	obviously it's the radio traffic is getting less and
4	where a rescue was carried out, so it was prior to 8 am.	4	it's getting very hard for my individuals to get inside
5	Q. Do you remember Station Manager Dan Egan, or a station	5	the tower because of the structure falling down. I left
6	manager at the very least, speaking to you when you were	6	Ben from Hammersmith with the information on the corner
7	either at the car bonnet or under the covered walkway	7	there, and I went then I was tasked to go and do this
8	telling you that everything will now go through the CU?	8	job of finding the who had left the building, who had
9	A. I remember a station manager coming and tapping me on	9	called FSG in to find if we find if we could find
10	the shoulder and just saying, "This is what we're doing,	10	anybody in the surrounding area who called FSG so we
11	we're getting the forms up to the tower." And then he	11	could cross them off. When I come back to my little FSG
12	left from there.	12	corner by the bins that information had gone. I went to
13	Q. Okay.	13	CU7 to ask where it was because I wanted to start
14	Do you remember being told by a station manager that	14	photographing it to try and capture that information
15	everything could now go through the CU?	15	to and it had been gone. I had been assured that it
16	A. No.	16	had been taken either by the police or by LFB evidence
17	Q. Right.	17	collectors.
18	A. In what could you elaborate? Is that all that would	18	MR MILLETT: I see.
19	be	19	Now, I have two or three short topics left to cover,
20	Q. Let me put the evidence to you that's been given by	20	which I may be able to cover in the next 10 minutes, so
21	Station Manager Egan.	21	we can finish by 1 o'clock. I'm equally happy for you
22	A. Sure.	22	to take a break now, Mr Chairman. I'm in the witness's
23	Q. For our own reference, it is day 15 at pages 132 to 133.	23	hands and in your hands.
24	I asked him a question:	24	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: It's really a question of whether
25	"Question: What did that watch manager do in	25	• •
23	Question. What did that water manager do in	23	you would rather carry on for a bit now or have a break?
	Page 133		Page 135
1	response to your telling him that everything would now	1	A. I'm happy, sir.
2	go through the CU?	2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You are okay to carry on?
3	His answer was:	3	A. Yes, sir.
4	"Answer: They were really pleased. He gave me	4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, it won't be for more than
5	all the information that he had in his hands, we made	5	about 10 minutes.
6	sure nothing was left behind, and they went off to	6	A. That's fine.
7	I'm sure they just went off to get sets."	7	MR MILLETT: No, indeed, it won't.
8	A. That	8	At the bottom of page 5 of your statement you say
9	Q. Does that trigger a recollection?	9	this:
10	A. That's correct, sir, but that is very later on in the	10	"I was told by the Command Unit that a number of
11	incident because I put a set back on my back because	11	people had self-evacuated from the tower and at that
12	I was, as I've said in my statement, I was motivated to	12	time there was no record of them or what locations they
13	get inside that building because there was still rescues	13	came from. I was to go looking for them, so my job was
13		14	to find out who was in the building when the fire
15	to be carried out. I went round to the play area side of the Grenfell Tower, southwest corner, and I was	15	started and who had left before crews got to them."
		16	C
16 17	formed up in a queue again to try and get back into the	17	Roughly what time was that, do you remember?
17	tower to go up to the upper floors. And I was again		A. I know I was doing entry control around 8 am, 7 am,
	picked out to carry out a functional role. And myself	18	8 am, so it's got to be 6 am. So I did that for about 45 minutes. Then I went straight to put my breathing
18	and my grow managen were to relieve I evice De Ciler I	10	
18 19	and my crew manager were to relieve Louisa De Silvo and	19	
18 19 20	an another watch manager on the entry control boards.	20	apparatus on, formed up in a queue and I was then
18 19 20 21	an another watch manager on the entry control boards. Q. Okay. And at	20 21	apparatus on, formed up in a queue and I was then detailed to operate the entry control boards.
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1	Amount of the African of the Mount of the A	1	
1 2	try and get that information. Myself and	1 2	worried about capturing that information, it was people that had called FSG and had left by their own means.
3	Charlie Batterbee were detailed to go into the	3	·
	Latimer Road area to try and get that information. Is	4	I don't think I captured any of that, I think I captured
4 5	that your question? Q. No. Let me try it again.	5	a lot of the information of the people that were in the premises at the time that hadn't.
6	Do you know whether anybody had been given the job	6	Q. Do you know whether the information that you captured
7	earlier in the night of making sure those people who	7	was recorded at CU7?
8	were self-evacuating got tallied up with the flats and	8	A. I took the information back to CU7 and I left that at
9	floors they'd come from?	9	CU7. Then I was tasked to go to the leisure centre
10	A. I'm not aware of that. That would've come through	10	area, but that task had already been carried out.
11	an operation maybe through the CU.	11	I brought the crew manager back with me to clarify that
12	Q. Right, okay.	12	that was right.
13	A. Early into the incident people were coming, casualties	13	Q. On page 7 of your statement, just going on to
14	were coming past me with injuries, but that stopped	14	a different subject, in the middle paragraph you
15	pretty soon after the events I told you of us the	15	describe that you took over at the bridgehead once it
16	reason why we moved. And the casualties started going	16	was on the fourth floor.
17	out towards the play area side, Latimer Road was	17	You say:
18	a triage area there. So a lot of people started going	18	"When I took over there were 3 entry control boards
19	out casualties going out that way.	19	and crews still being committed."
20	Q. Do you know whether there was a system for matching up	20	Can you just help me roughly what time that was?
21	people who had come up out of the building by	21	A. 6.30/7.00 am. Louisa might have a better assumption of
22	themselves, in other words without the support of the	22	that because I took over from her.
23	LFB, with the flats or floors they'd come from?	23	Q. I was going to ask you, you took over from her?
24	A. No, I think that's what I was tasked, to try and capture	24	A. Yes, I believe it was Louisa that I took over from, yes.
25	some of that information later on in the incident.	25	Q. Who else was at the bridgehead at that stage running it?
	Page 137		Page 139
		1	
1	Q. Were you surprised that that system wasn't in operation	1	A. Brien O'Keeffe, I believe. I believe he was there, I
1 2	Q. Were you surprised that that system wasn't in operation earlier in the night?	1 2	A. Brien O'Keeffe, I believe. I believe he was there, I Brien is like is a station a few stations over from
2	earlier in the night?	2	Brien is like is a station a few stations over from
2 3	earlier in the night? A. Considering what we dealt with, and in an ideal world	2 3	Brien is like is a station a few stations over from me so I do recognise him, but I know Louisa more because
2 3 4	earlier in the night? A. Considering what we dealt with, and in an ideal world that would evolve, this was something unprecedented,	2 3 4	Brien is like is a station a few stations over from me so I do recognise him, but I know Louisa more because I'm quite on a daily basis we attend the same
2 3 4 5 6 7	earlier in the night? A. Considering what we dealt with, and in an ideal world that would evolve, this was something unprecedented, sir, and I wasn't shocked to that, the precedent was to get firefighters to casualties on those upper floors and lower floors, every floor, and that was fundamental we	2 3 4 5 6 7	Brien is like is a station a few stations over from me so I do recognise him, but I know Louisa more because I'm quite on a daily basis we attend the same incidents together. So I recognise her more.
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1 When I went into the lobby you could it was hard	time starting at 7.00, SDBA, at what looks like
2 to breathe and see because the smoke was so bad, and	2 Deptford. Then it runs down the column from 7 am at the
they were in the process of smashing the windows in the	top to 8.30 at the bottom. I think, on what you've told
4 lobby to try and get some cross-ventilation.	4 us, you were then running the entry control on the
5 Q. Whereabouts in the lobby were the entry control boards	5 ground floor in the lobby between those times.
6 situated at that stage when you took over the job?	6 Do you remember that information being put up on the
7 A. They are at the foot of the stairs that go up to the	wall at that time?
8 mezzanine.	8 A. Definitely the information had been put up on the wall
9 Q. Did you notice any writing on the green wall at the foot	9 to that effect, and there was a firefighter there
of the stairs when you took over?	10 crossing that off, yes.
11 A. There was extensive writing reference BA crews that had	11 Q. Do you know who that was?
been deployed. So BA crews are going up and we're to	12 A. Oh, again, there's 6,000 firefighters in this Brigade
13 rescue people we are breaking so many policies and	and they weren't neighbouring stations that I knew. I
14 procedures, and rightly so, because we'd never have got	mean, we're from all over London, I wouldn't recognise
to them. Firefighters are taking their masks off and	them if I looked at them now.
16 carrying out rescues, and a credit to them for doing	16 Q. Did you have involvement in either obtaining the
17 that.	information or recording the information that we see in
18 When they come back down they were literally pulling	that grid?
19 their tallies out the board, they didn't want to speak	19 A. No, that was just an extra span of control that we put
20 to us, they were exhausted, they could barely stand,	in place, because the firefighters were going up, and
21 people were coming down with no air left in their	the firefighters were getting a brief in the lobby from
22 cylinders.	the search co-ordinator about where to go to effect
23 So as they pulled the tallies we needed some control	rescues. When they come to myself and Ben, my crew
24 to know who they were, so firefighters, we're stopping	manager, we had three boards between us and maybe 30
25 them, asking their name and cross and then so we had	25 firefighters on and the two of us were running that,
Page 141	Page 143
1 their tallies in the board, and I did this later on as	1 that's under-resourced. And all my brief was we've got
2 well, and we'd had them written on the wall as well and	2 no water past the 11th floor, we've got no comms past
3 we'd cross their name off the wall. So we	3 the 11th floor, the telemetry drops out on the 9th
4 double-checked and double-confirmed that the right	4 floor. If you have a firefighter emergency you're
5 people were coming out and they had their right tallies.	5 trapped up there, you're on your own. And all they were
6 They were in no fit state to have much of a conversation	6 doing was looking up the stairs, they just wanted to
7 with us, they had a debrief, the search co-ordinator, so	7 chat to me, they just wanted to go up and that's a
8 we wanted to make it as easy as possible for them.	8 testament to their bravery and their courage.
9 Q. Can I ask you then to look at a photograph, which is	9 Q. Now, you say, as you just said, and it's in your
10 MET00015816.	statement in the same paragraph, three lines up from the
Do you recognise that writing on that wall?	11 bottom:
12 A. I recognise something very familiar to that because	"The comms weren't working past the 11th floor
13 is this at the mezzanine at the bottom of the stairs?	either but we were still committing teams of 3"
Q. Well, I was going to ask you. It's a green wall, and	Do you know why comms weren't working past the 11th
there is some evidence so far that it was at the foot of the stairs on the ground floor.	15 floor?
	A. No. I mean, comms, I was at a fire near the Shard the
17 A. That looks familiar, because when I was doing entry 18 control at around 8 am, we were still doing the same	other day and I heard Battersea at a shutting lift in Battersea on the handheld radio. I can be in a tower
19 principle, we were having the firefighters' names	
20 written up and then we're crossing them off as they were	 block in a lobby and my firefighters can be on the 16th, 18th, 20th floor, and I have to get them to speak to my
21 coming back out. So if there's any entries for 8 am?	driver who is outside and relay the message to me
22 Q. Yes, I am going to show you those, that is what I wanted	because it just won't work.
23 to ask you.	23 A lot of the weather conditions interfere in it, but
24 If you look at the grid on the left-hand side of the	they're so I don't know, I'm not a radio engineer,
25 picture you can see in the third column from the left a	but it happens.
1 ,	rr
Page 142	Page 144

1	Q. How long during the night were comms not working past	1	I might have done those crosses no, I don't know who
2	the 11th floor for, do you remember?	2	did the crosses, but I did the numbers. And it was
3	A. Say again, sorry, sir.	3	a way for us to cross off I believe I left before
4	Q. For how long during the night were communications not	4	this was then worked through to see what flats were
5	working beyond the 11th floor?	5	clear, what casualties or victims we had in other flats.
6	A. Louisa would be the expert in that because she was	6	Q. Right, okay.
7	the but for me, when I took over, I was I felt	7	A. The details on the right, they weren't there when
8	and I think I with have said here in my statement,	8	I left.
9	I felt quite stressed and anxious for their safety,	9	Q. They weren't there when you left?
10	because I had no control over if anything went wrong for	10	A. No. Not that I'm aware of, sir, no. To be fair, they
11	them. And I think a senior officer said to me, "We've	11	might have, to be fair, because I found it very hard
12	nearly lost one firefighter, don't lose anybody." And	12	writing on this fire door, so maybe they might of
13	I felt sick for about an hour until I just realised that	13	because the smoke is only at roof level around there.
14	they're professional firefighters, they're going to go	14	So I could've unless that's been cleaned off, maybe
15	up there and look after each other.	15	I didn't write on the wall because it was dirty and
16	MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, it's past 1 o'clock but I do have	16	someone's cleaned that. I don't remember that
17	one more question to ask.	17	information being on the right-hand side. It looks like
18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Only one?	18	the smoke the soot has been cleared.
19	MR MILLETT: Well, one, yes.	19	MR MILLETT: Right, okay. I may have to come back to you
20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think you should ask one,	20	with that.
21	certainly. You can deal with another question, Mr	21	Mr Chairman, I noticed the time. I haven't that
22	Sadler?	22	answer actually has created a number of further
23	A. I'll try my best.	23	questions which I feel I should just ask. I'm sorry
24	MR MILLETT: Thank you.	24	about that.
25	In your second witness statement, if I can just ask	25	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: No, no, that is what an inquiry is
			1 2
	Page 145		Page 147
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1	you to look at it, you say on the first page in the	1	all about, an inquiry.
2	fourth paragraph and this is six lines down in the	2	MR MILLETT: I just feel I have to follow that up. So I'm
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2 3 4	fourth paragraph and this is six lines down in the lobby on the fourth floor and this is once you've moved the bridgehead to the fourth floor:	2 3 4	MR MILLETT: I just feel I have to follow that up. So I'm not able to release the witness, I'm afraid, at the moment, or to ask you to do so.
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1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Just a few more questions, I think.	1	Now, when you say "I was relieved at 11 am", was
2	MR MILLETT: Yes.	2	that then you go on to say:
3	Mr Sadler, thank you for coming back to us.	3	"Around this time it was decided to regroup, pull
4	Can I go back to the photograph we were looking at	4	all crews out and move the Bridgehead back up to the 4th
5	just before we broke for lunch, which is MET00015813,	5	floor."
6	the picture that you took.	6	A. So this is okay, so this is a miscommunication in my
7	Now, in terms of the timing of that, can you see	7	statement again. It's been hard re-visiting this. When
8	that the photograph on the right which we've just begun	8	the police come, after a while of speaking to them, you
9	to discuss starts with the time in at 09.44 at the top.	9	just want it over.
10	Can you help us with that? Was that there, that	10	That's slightly inaccurate in terms of the
11	grid, at the time you left?	11	bridgehead was in the lobby, we relocated the bridgehead
12	A. No. So the grid on the left as we look at it with the	12	to the 4th floor, I drew the plan and I left the
13	squares or rectangles, I drew that. The yellow cross is	13	bridgehead as they started recommitting crews to the
14	a cross they weren't there. I do believe I started	14	upper floors.
15	crossing off the lower floors that weren't affected by	15	Q. Let's see if we can piece this together slightly better,
16	the fire.	16	then, by using the police statement.
17	The one on the right with the writing, I was back at	17	Can you go to your contemporaneous note and just
18	my fire engine by 09.44. I left the bridgehead when	18	look at page 3 of that. That's MET00005565.
19	I drew on that. No crews were being committed when	19	Just at the very end there, you say:
20	I left the bridgehead. They were setting back up entry	20	"Around 11:00 am I was relieved from ECO at the
21	control.	21	bridge head and left the incident."
22	Q. Just so we can be clear about the sequence of events,	22	So when you were relieved from the ECO at the
23	you go up to the 4th floor, first of all. When you get	23	bridgehead and left the incident, where was the
24		24	bridgehead at that stage?
25	to the 4th floor, you're told you have to make a plan,	25	A. I think my time frame is wrong there because I would
23	so you draw the one on the left.	23	11. I tillik lily tille I tillie is wrong tilere because I would
	Page 149		Page 151
1	A. That's correct.	1	have left the incident around that time. I can't
2	Q. Yes. Then in your statement this is what I wanted to	2	remember setting up the bridgehead and committing crews
3	pick up with you your second statement, you say in	3	from the 4th floor. We just relocated. They put fresh
4	the third paragraph:	4	entry control officers in there. Does that make sense,
5	"I carried on with Entry Control for about 2 hours	5	sir?
6	and I believe I was relieved at 11am."	6	So I was in the lobby, we were committing crews.
7	Now, first of all, is your recollection correct that	7	Smoke alleviated from the 4th floor, we relocated the
8	you were relieved at 11 am, do you think? (Pause)	8	bridgehead to the 4th floor. Whilst relocating,
9	It's on the screen if you need to look at it.		-
	it is on the sereen if you need to look at it.	1 9	carrying the boards up there, they put fresh entry
	A Thank you	10	carrying the boards up there, they put fresh entry
10	A. Thank you.	10	control operators on the boards. They asked me to draw
10 11	Q. This is your second	10 11	control operators on the boards. They asked me to draw the plan. I drew the plan and I left the 4th floor.
10 11 12	Q. This is your second A. Because obviously I totally forgot about this event and	10 11 12	control operators on the boards. They asked me to draw the plan. I drew the plan and I left the 4th floor. Q. I see, okay.
10 11 12 13	Q. This is your second A. Because obviously I totally forgot about this event and I asked the Met Police to come back and take this	10 11 12 13	control operators on the boards. They asked me to draw the plan. I drew the plan and I left the 4th floor. Q. I see, okay. When you left the 4th floor, was that the end of
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10 11 12 13 14 15	Q. This is your second A. Because obviously I totally forgot about this event and I asked the Met Police to come back and take this statement. Did I set up entry control	10 11 12 13 14 15	control operators on the boards. They asked me to draw the plan. I drew the plan and I left the 4th floor. Q. I see, okay. When you left the 4th floor, was that the end of your involvement at Grenfell? A. I left. I went to the command unit to see if because
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1	the lobby at the bottom of the mezzanine, and relocated	1	quite an emotional and sensitive situation for them and
2	to the 4th floor. So whatever time it took to relocate,	2	I haven't really gone into specifics of locations. But
3	get back up, get fresh wearers up there, 20/30 minutes,	3	my watch at Lambeth carried out multiple rescues on the
4	and then that kind of started again.	4	upper floors in the early stages of the fire.
5	Q. Now, that is at 8.45. Were you still there when the	5	Q. Right.
6	information on the right-hand side of this picture,	6	Can I ask you to be shown a section or part of
7	right next to the grid you drew, started to be filled	7	a video clip taken by a police body-worn camera at the
8	out?	8	adjusted time stamp of 02.13.03.
9	A. No, I don't remember that. Crew Manager Ben McAlonen,	9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Is this going to require any form of
10	he was with me, so his memory might be a bit better, but	10	warning?
11	unless I've totally frozen that out of my memory,	11	MR MILLETT: No.
12	which I totally forgot about this in my original	12	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right.
13	statement because of just everything that took part and	13	MR MILLETT: I hope not, no.
14	I got the police back, so	14	Now, can you identify who is in that picture?
15	Q. So looking at the first time in recorded on the grid on	15	A. That's Crew Manager Batterbee.
16	the right-hand side of the picture, which looks like	16	Q. Yes.
17	09.44 or perhaps the earliest one is earlier,	17	A. There's a watch manager there, I can see by his
18	actually, it's 09.21. That may be that there are crews	18	markings. I don't know who that is. His helmet is
19	returning. It doesn't matter.	19	there as well.
20	Do you think you had left the 4th floor by that	20	Sorry, it's hard for me to see that.
21	time?	21	Obviously you can see a police officer there.
22	A. I'm almost certain I did. You're making me question	22	This location looks like we might be back at the
23	myself now, but I'm almost certain I'd remember crews	23	I'm not too sure, actually, it's hard to see there,
24	being committed.	24	I can't reference where we are, if that's the corner of
25	Q. Okay.	25	Grenfell Tower or not.
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1	A. Yes.	1	Q. Were you wearing your helmet while doing the FSG on the
2	Q. Those times, though, look like they were time in and not	2	car bonnet?
3	time out, and we'll obviously have to ask whoever it was	3	A. I'm pretty bad at wearing my helmet, to be fair. It's
4	who drew that, but that looks like that is time back to	4	hard to hear. So unless I was forced to wear it,
5	the bridgehead and not time from the bridgehead.	5	I wouldn't be wearing my helmet.
6	A. It served a purpose that you would write time in rather	6	Q. Can I show one more to you, which is at adjusted time
7	than time out, because time in is more important to know	7	02.13.01.
8	rather than when they've left. We just cross them off,	8	Ah, that's it.
9	which it looks like they have done, the same system as	9	Now, if you look at the car and look at the bonnet,
10	we had downstairs, crossing the names off on the	10	can you help with who it is that we see there?
11	left-hand side. Time out it doesn't really serve a	11	A. That will be me. I think my helmet is on the car bonnet
12	purpose. Time in is the most imperative thing because	12	there, and that most probably will be Charlie.
13	you want to know how long they'd been in there, what the	13	Q. Okay. That adjusted by an hour, which we have to for
14	duration of their cylinders are.	14	this body-worn footage, puts you on the car bonnet at
15	Q. Okay.	15	02.13, which is the time in fact we saw for the first of
16	You mentioned Firefighter McAlonen; is he a crew	16	the white forms we looked at this morning.
17	manager at your station?	17	A. That's correct, sir.
18	A. Yes.	18	Q. That would tally with your recollection, would it?
19	Q. Was he one of the firefighters who accompanied you on	19	A. Yes, sir, and I think at 02.13, the control information
20	your pump?	20	form was numbered. If that is numbered, that would
21	A. He was in charge of the pump Hotel 222.	21	further support my number sequencing taking place on the
22	Q. Do you remember speaking to any of your watch members,	22	car bonnet.
23	either during or after the incident, about any rescues	23	Q. That's the car, is it, the bonnet of which you were
24	on floor 14?	24	working on?
25	A. Around the mess table we might have, but, again, it's	25	A. Answer: yes. It's a little bit further underneath the
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1	covered bit than I stated.	1	some further questions about them if they are absolutely
2	Q. It is. Okay.	2	necessary. I just want to make sure that everybody in
3	A. You can see Paddington's aerial on the left-hand side.	3	the room understands that. But I hope it won't be
4	Q. Oh, that's the turntable ladder?	4	necessary.
5	A. That's the turntable ladder, which is now housed and	5	THE WITNESS: Okay, thank you. Anything I can do to help.
6	they disconnected that hose and put it back underneath	6	I wouldn't really like to volunteer myself for this, but
7	this part because it was catching fire from debris.	7	if I have to, then needs must.
8	Q. Just one more question: you'll see in the middle by the	8	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much. Go with the
9	pillar or in front of the pillar an officer with a white	9	usher.
10	helmet and what looks like a white tabard. Do you	10	THE WITNESS: Thanks for your time.
11	remember seeing an officer in a white helmet and white	11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you.
12	tabard?	12	(The witness was released)
13	A. I mean, there's a lot of officers there with white	13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Now, Mr Millett the next witness
14	helmets. There's one there wearing a BA set, which	14	is?
15	could have that's not me because when I was there, it	15	MR MILLETT: Watch Manager De Silvo from Chelsea. It may be
16	was a lot more crowded, 20/30 firefighters forming up.	16	sensible to have a 5-minute break.
17	As you can see on the left-hand side, you can see them	17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Do you know if we need
18	up on the mezzanine waiting to be committed to carry out	18	reorganisation of the furniture?
19	rescues.	19	MR MILLETT: We may.
20	So I don't know who that is wearing that tabard.	20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Shall I rise for 5 minutes?
21	I will be at that car bonnet.	21	MR MILLETT: If you would, Mr chairman, that would be very
22	MR MILLETT: Okay, thank you.	22	helpful.
23	Mr Sadler, thank you very much indeed and thank you	23	(2.23 pm)
24	for your patience. You've been extremely helpful and	24	(A short break)
25	I want to say how grateful I am to you for coming to the	25	(2.50 pm)
			•
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1	inquiry today and assisting me with my questions.	1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm sorry about that rather extended
1 2	inquiry today and assisting me with my questions. I have no further questions for you.	1 2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm sorry about that rather extended interlude for reasons which I suspect were all too
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1	My questions are supposed to be short and simple;	1	going to look at most if not all of them. I am just
2	they're not always like that. If you don't understand	2	going to read the numbers into the record very quickly.
3	one or two or however many you want me to, I'm happy to	3	They are: MET00015813, MET00015824, MET00015819,
4	repeat them or ask the question in a different way.	4	MET00015814, MET00015815, MET00015816, MET00015820,
5	If you need a break at any time, just let us know	5	MET00015817, MET00015821, MET00015818, and MET00015823.
6	and we can break. Okay?	6	Now, can I now start with your career and training
7	A. Thank you.	7	with the LFB.
8	Q. Can I please start by asking you to look at your two	8	I think you tell us in your statement on page 1 that
9	statements you have done for the police. The first is	9	you joined the LFB in 2010.
10	MET00010913, dated 7 February 2018. The second	10	A. Yes, that's correct.
11	statement is dated 20 April 2018 the reference to that	11	Q. And you're now a watch manager
12	is MET00013233.	12	A. Yes.
13	Those two statements are now there. Have you read	13	Q at Chelsea fire station?
14	them recently?	14	A. Yes, that's correct.
15	A. Yes.	15	Q. You became a watch manager in 2015; is that right?
16	Q. Can you confirm for us that the contents are true?	16	A. Yes.
17	A. Yes.	17	Q. So only after 5 years with the service?
18	Q. Okay.	18	A. Yes.
19	Now, I just want to pick up something that you say	19	Q. You say on page 1 that on the night of the fire it was
20	in your supplemental statement, which is why we have it,	20	only your second tour of duty at Chelsea; is that right?
21	which is MET00013233, where you say in the second-last	21	A. Yes.
22	paragraph, you say:	22	Q. So when exactly did you join Chelsea?
23	"It seems that Alan Taylor was not at the fire on	23	A. I believe I joined Chelsea on 3 June.
24	that night. I describe the S/M as short and bald and	24	Q. 3 June?
25	Jason told me that he thought that the S/M that	25	A. Yes.
	Page 161		Page 163
	The state of the s	١,	O. Picke Ober
1	I thought was Taylor is in fact Andy WALTON."	1	Q. Right. Okay.
2		1 2	N :6
	Can you confirm that?	2	Now, if you turn to page 2 of your statement, you
3	A. Yes. Apologies for that, that was my confusion. I just	3	say in various places that you've had training on
3 4	A. Yes. Apologies for that, that was my confusion. I just associated the wrong name to the person.	3 4	say in various places that you've had training on bridgehead procedures. You say that in the second line
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1	that a standard part of high-rise training or is it	1	A. Yes. Yes, in theory. Yes information would flow along
2	specific to bridgehead management?	2	those lines, yes.
3	A. No, the bridgehead procedures are incorporated into the	3	Q. Is that because normally, in a normal case on which you
4	high-rise policy and procedure note that we will go	4	would get trained, the incident command pump is the
5	through as part of a lecture.	5	focal point of fire ground communication?
6	Q. Can you briefly summarise the key points of bridgehead	6	A. Yes.
7	procedure that you receive or give as part of the	7	Q. In your training, did you ever have any training on fire
8	high-rise training?	8	survival guidance calls and procedures?
9	A. Sure. So we would go through what equipment needs to go	9	A. Yes. So, again, there is a policy and procedure note
10	to the bridgehead, and then where the firefighters would	10	that will be given as part of a lecture, theory-based,
11	set into the dry riser, where the backup crew would set	11	station-based training. I also took part in a borough
12	into the dry riser. The procedures around the	12	exercise with Ealing borough in 2016 that was centred
13	communications between the bridgehead commander and the	13	around high-rise procedures and fire survival guidance.
14	incident commander, and letting the incident commander	14	Q. Right.
15	know when you're committing crews into a high-rise	15	Ealing borough. Which station was that run out of,
16	situation from a bridgehead.	16	do you remember?
17	Q. Right.	17	A. So I was a watch manager at Acton fire station, which is
18	On those last two features that you just referred	18	a part of the borough of Ealing. That day, that
19	to, communications between the bridgehead commander and	19	exercise took place at Acton fire station.
20	the incident commander, and letting, as you have just	20	Q. Do you remember anything specific about that training
21	said, the incident commander know about committing crews	21	day?
22	into a high-rise from the bridgehead, those	22	A. I remember the format of the day and that the theme was
23	communications, what's the standard system or method of	23	high-rise procedures and fire survival guidance. Every
24	•	24	borough have their own exercise along similar lines and
	communication that you get trained on?	25	that would be
25	A. So you would be using your handheld personal radio, and	23	that would be
	Page 165		Page 167
	that is to inform the incident commander when werely	1 1	O Did you loom on thing from that twaining day shout
1	that is to inform the incident commander when you're	1	Q. Did you learn anything from that training day about
2	going to commit crews and that they want you to do that.	2	methods of communication of fire survival guidance calls
2 3	going to commit crews and that they want you to do that. Q. So would the norm be, as per the training, that when	2 3	methods of communication of fire survival guidance calls from the control room to the fire ground?
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	going to commit crews and that they want you to do that. Q. So would the norm be, as per the training, that when you're about to commit a crew, you would use your handheld radio to communicate with the incident commander? A. Yes, to confirm that you're about to commit the crew. Q. Over which channel would you normally do that? A. Channel 1, which is the incident fire ground channel. Q. Right, okay. Would you use that channel again, as part of the trained norm, if I can use an expression to communicate back and forth between bridgehead and incident commander? A. Yes. Q. Would that normally involve also communicating back to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	methods of communication of fire survival guidance calls from the control room to the fire ground? A. Yes, so we tried to simulate a situation whereby you had the incident commander in one room, the bridgehead commander in another room with an entry control officer and then the BA crews would go off to another room, and then they would be given information to feed back. So it was very much centred around the communication of handling that sort of information from fire survival guidance calls between the three separate areas. Q. And on that training day, was there any training delivered about how you would record fire survival guidance information on its route from control room to incident ground to bridgehead and back again? A. Well, we used the forward information board, so it was
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	going to commit crews and that they want you to do that. Q. So would the norm be, as per the training, that when you're about to commit a crew, you would use your handheld radio to communicate with the incident commander? A. Yes, to confirm that you're about to commit the crew. Q. Over which channel would you normally do that? A. Channel 1, which is the incident fire ground channel. Q. Right, okay. Would you use that channel again, as part of the trained norm, if I can use an expression to communicate back and forth between bridgehead and incident commander? A. Yes. Q. Would that normally involve also communicating back to the incident commander the results of any deployment of BA wearers into a high-rise?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	methods of communication of fire survival guidance calls from the control room to the fire ground? A. Yes, so we tried to simulate a situation whereby you had the incident commander in one room, the bridgehead commander in another room with an entry control officer and then the BA crews would go off to another room, and then they would be given information to feed back. So it was very much centred around the communication of handling that sort of information from fire survival guidance calls between the three separate areas. Q. And on that training day, was there any training delivered about how you would record fire survival guidance information on its route from control room to incident ground to bridgehead and back again? A. Well, we used the forward information board, so it was an opportunity to use that piece of equipment in practice. So I remember using that, yes. Q. In terms of the standard approach on that training day, can you just give us the essential methods of recording
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	going to commit crews and that they want you to do that. Q. So would the norm be, as per the training, that when you're about to commit a crew, you would use your handheld radio to communicate with the incident commander? A. Yes, to confirm that you're about to commit the crew. Q. Over which channel would you normally do that? A. Channel 1, which is the incident fire ground channel. Q. Right, okay. Would you use that channel again, as part of the trained norm, if I can use an expression to communicate back and forth between bridgehead and incident commander? A. Yes. Q. Would that normally involve also communicating back to the incident commander the results of any deployment of BA wearers into a high-rise? A. Yes. So the training would be around the communications, yes, between bridgehead commander and the incident commander on channel 1.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	methods of communication of fire survival guidance calls from the control room to the fire ground? A. Yes, so we tried to simulate a situation whereby you had the incident commander in one room, the bridgehead commander in another room with an entry control officer and then the BA crews would go off to another room, and then they would be given information to feed back. So it was very much centred around the communication of handling that sort of information from fire survival guidance calls between the three separate areas. Q. And on that training day, was there any training delivered about how you would record fire survival guidance information on its route from control room to incident ground to bridgehead and back again? A. Well, we used the forward information board, so it was an opportunity to use that piece of equipment in practice. So I remember using that, yes. Q. In terms of the standard approach on that training day,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	going to commit crews and that they want you to do that. Q. So would the norm be, as per the training, that when you're about to commit a crew, you would use your handheld radio to communicate with the incident commander? A. Yes, to confirm that you're about to commit the crew. Q. Over which channel would you normally do that? A. Channel 1, which is the incident fire ground channel. Q. Right, okay. Would you use that channel again, as part of the trained norm, if I can use an expression to communicate back and forth between bridgehead and incident commander? A. Yes. Q. Would that normally involve also communicating back to the incident commander the results of any deployment of BA wearers into a high-rise? A. Yes. So the training would be around the communications, yes, between bridgehead commander and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	methods of communication of fire survival guidance calls from the control room to the fire ground? A. Yes, so we tried to simulate a situation whereby you had the incident commander in one room, the bridgehead commander in another room with an entry control officer and then the BA crews would go off to another room, and then they would be given information to feed back. So it was very much centred around the communication of handling that sort of information from fire survival guidance calls between the three separate areas. Q. And on that training day, was there any training delivered about how you would record fire survival guidance information on its route from control room to incident ground to bridgehead and back again? A. Well, we used the forward information board, so it was an opportunity to use that piece of equipment in practice. So I remember using that, yes. Q. In terms of the standard approach on that training day, can you just give us the essential methods of recording fire survival guidance information as it moves? A. The recording?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	going to commit crews and that they want you to do that. Q. So would the norm be, as per the training, that when you're about to commit a crew, you would use your handheld radio to communicate with the incident commander? A. Yes, to confirm that you're about to commit the crew. Q. Over which channel would you normally do that? A. Channel 1, which is the incident fire ground channel. Q. Right, okay. Would you use that channel again, as part of the trained norm, if I can use an expression to communicate back and forth between bridgehead and incident commander? A. Yes. Q. Would that normally involve also communicating back to the incident commander the results of any deployment of BA wearers into a high-rise? A. Yes. So the training would be around the communications, yes, between bridgehead commander and the incident commander on channel 1.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	methods of communication of fire survival guidance calls from the control room to the fire ground? A. Yes, so we tried to simulate a situation whereby you had the incident commander in one room, the bridgehead commander in another room with an entry control officer and then the BA crews would go off to another room, and then they would be given information to feed back. So it was very much centred around the communication of handling that sort of information from fire survival guidance calls between the three separate areas. Q. And on that training day, was there any training delivered about how you would record fire survival guidance information on its route from control room to incident ground to bridgehead and back again? A. Well, we used the forward information board, so it was an opportunity to use that piece of equipment in practice. So I remember using that, yes. Q. In terms of the standard approach on that training day, can you just give us the essential methods of recording fire survival guidance information as it moves?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	going to commit crews and that they want you to do that. Q. So would the norm be, as per the training, that when you're about to commit a crew, you would use your handheld radio to communicate with the incident commander? A. Yes, to confirm that you're about to commit the crew. Q. Over which channel would you normally do that? A. Channel 1, which is the incident fire ground channel. Q. Right, okay. Would you use that channel again, as part of the trained norm, if I can use an expression to communicate back and forth between bridgehead and incident commander? A. Yes. Q. Would that normally involve also communicating back to the incident commander the results of any deployment of BA wearers into a high-rise? A. Yes. So the training would be around the communications, yes, between bridgehead commander and the incident commander on channel 1. Q. Would you normally expect the incident commander to be	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	methods of communication of fire survival guidance calls from the control room to the fire ground? A. Yes, so we tried to simulate a situation whereby you had the incident commander in one room, the bridgehead commander in another room with an entry control officer and then the BA crews would go off to another room, and then they would be given information to feed back. So it was very much centred around the communication of handling that sort of information from fire survival guidance calls between the three separate areas. Q. And on that training day, was there any training delivered about how you would record fire survival guidance information on its route from control room to incident ground to bridgehead and back again? A. Well, we used the forward information board, so it was an opportunity to use that piece of equipment in practice. So I remember using that, yes. Q. In terms of the standard approach on that training day, can you just give us the essential methods of recording fire survival guidance information as it moves? A. The recording?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	going to commit crews and that they want you to do that. Q. So would the norm be, as per the training, that when you're about to commit a crew, you would use your handheld radio to communicate with the incident commander? A. Yes, to confirm that you're about to commit the crew. Q. Over which channel would you normally do that? A. Channel 1, which is the incident fire ground channel. Q. Right, okay. Would you use that channel again, as part of the trained norm, if I can use an expression to communicate back and forth between bridgehead and incident commander? A. Yes. Q. Would that normally involve also communicating back to the incident commander the results of any deployment of BA wearers into a high-rise? A. Yes. So the training would be around the communications, yes, between bridgehead commander and the incident commander on channel 1. Q. Would you normally expect the incident commander to be a link in the communication chain between the bridgehead	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	methods of communication of fire survival guidance calls from the control room to the fire ground? A. Yes, so we tried to simulate a situation whereby you had the incident commander in one room, the bridgehead commander in another room with an entry control officer and then the BA crews would go off to another room, and then they would be given information to feed back. So it was very much centred around the communication of handling that sort of information from fire survival guidance calls between the three separate areas. Q. And on that training day, was there any training delivered about how you would record fire survival guidance information on its route from control room to incident ground to bridgehead and back again? A. Well, we used the forward information board, so it was an opportunity to use that piece of equipment in practice. So I remember using that, yes. Q. In terms of the standard approach on that training day, can you just give us the essential methods of recording fire survival guidance information as it moves? A. The recording? Q. Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	going to commit crews and that they want you to do that. Q. So would the norm be, as per the training, that when you're about to commit a crew, you would use your handheld radio to communicate with the incident commander? A. Yes, to confirm that you're about to commit the crew. Q. Over which channel would you normally do that? A. Channel 1, which is the incident fire ground channel. Q. Right, okay. Would you use that channel again, as part of the trained norm, if I can use an expression to communicate back and forth between bridgehead and incident commander? A. Yes. Q. Would that normally involve also communicating back to the incident commander the results of any deployment of BA wearers into a high-rise? A. Yes. So the training would be around the communications, yes, between bridgehead commander and the incident commander on channel 1. Q. Would you normally expect the incident commander to be a link in the communication chain between the bridgehead and the control room about the results of a deployment	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	methods of communication of fire survival guidance calls from the control room to the fire ground? A. Yes, so we tried to simulate a situation whereby you had the incident commander in one room, the bridgehead commander in another room with an entry control officer and then the BA crews would go off to another room, and then they would be given information to feed back. So it was very much centred around the communication of handling that sort of information from fire survival guidance calls between the three separate areas. Q. And on that training day, was there any training delivered about how you would record fire survival guidance information on its route from control room to incident ground to bridgehead and back again? A. Well, we used the forward information board, so it was an opportunity to use that piece of equipment in practice. So I remember using that, yes. Q. In terms of the standard approach on that training day, can you just give us the essential methods of recording fire survival guidance information as it moves? A. The recording? Q. Yes. A. Yes, so we were informed at the bridgehead of the

1	information board as well as the entry control board	1	policy 790 at tab 5 of the policy bundle. This is on
2	that was being run by an entry control officer. So it	2	page 8 internally and it's appendix 2. That's what you
3	was centred around briefing those crews and the flow of	3	refer to?
4	information between us.	4	A. Yes.
5	Q. In terms of the source of the information that you on	5	Q. Fine. We've been looking at worked examples of those
6	that training day recorded on the FIB, what form did	6	this morning and we'll come back to them in due
7	that information come to you in?	7	course
8	A. On that day it came over the handheld radio, over	8	A. Sure.
9	channel 1.	9	Q if we need to.
10	Q. Did that training exercise look at or train you in the	10	During your career at London Fire Brigade, did you
11	use of control information forms?	11	get to hear of a fire at Lakanal House which happened in
12	A. I believe that was used, yes, the control information	12	2009?
13	sheet was used.	13	A. Yes.
14	Q. At what point in the communication chain in that	14	Q. Did you ever get any training on the lessons learnt from
15	training exercise?	15	the fire at Lakanal House?
16	A. So the information would've come to the bridgehead with	16	A. So I received the case study training in 2014 when I was
17	that control information sheet. I can't recall if it	17	a crew manager at Kentish Town. I recall receiving the
18	was it was probably a mix of radio traffic and the	18	case study, yes.
19	control information sheets.	19	Q. Right. And can you remember what you took away from
20	Q. You say "mix"; is it one or the other or one and the	20	that training in particular?
21	other?	21	A. I remember that somebody had to write the information,
22	A. Probably one and the other, but I don't recall. It was	22	the fire survival guidance information, on the wall,
23	a couple of years ago.	23	because I remember thinking about that at the time of
24	Q. Again, just focusing on this Ealing borough Acton	24	being at the Grenfell incident.
25	station-based training day, was there a command unit	25	I also remember that they had to move the bridgehead
	Page 169		Page 171
1	involvement?	1	down because, again, that was something we had to do on
2	A. No, no, the incident commander for the sake of the		
_		1 /.	the day. But that was all that I remembered around that
3		2 3	the day. But that was all that I remembered around that
3	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no	3	case study at the time, yes.
4	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no command unit on that exercise.	3 4	case study at the time, yes. Q. Okay. All right.
4 5	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no command unit on that exercise. Q. Again, within that training course, who would be	3	case study at the time, yes. Q. Okay. All right. Had you heard as at June 2017 of a fire at Shepherds
4 5 6	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no command unit on that exercise. Q. Again, within that training course, who would be recording the fire survival guidance information when it	3 4 5 6	case study at the time, yes. Q. Okay. All right. Had you heard as at June 2017 of a fire at Shepherds Court in Shepherd's Bush which happened in August 2016?
4 5 6 7	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no command unit on that exercise. Q. Again, within that training course, who would be recording the fire survival guidance information when it first came to the fire ground from the control room?	3 4 5 6 7	case study at the time, yes. Q. Okay. All right. Had you heard as at June 2017 of a fire at Shepherds Court in Shepherd's Bush which happened in August 2016? A. No.
4 5 6 7 8	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no command unit on that exercise. Q. Again, within that training course, who would be recording the fire survival guidance information when it first came to the fire ground from the control room? A. So I believe it was going to the incident commander, who	3 4 5 6 7 8	case study at the time, yes. Q. Okay. All right. Had you heard as at June 2017 of a fire at Shepherds Court in Shepherd's Bush which happened in August 2016? A. No. Q. No. Okay.
4 5 6 7 8 9	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no command unit on that exercise. Q. Again, within that training course, who would be recording the fire survival guidance information when it first came to the fire ground from the control room? A. So I believe it was going to the incident commander, who was then relaying it to us at the bridgehead.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	case study at the time, yes. Q. Okay. All right. Had you heard as at June 2017 of a fire at Shepherds Court in Shepherd's Bush which happened in August 2016? A. No. Q. No. Okay. As at June 2017, had you ever had any training on
4 5 6 7 8 9	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no command unit on that exercise. Q. Again, within that training course, who would be recording the fire survival guidance information when it first came to the fire ground from the control room? A. So I believe it was going to the incident commander, who was then relaying it to us at the bridgehead. Q. Would the incident commander be using the control	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	case study at the time, yes. Q. Okay. All right. Had you heard as at June 2017 of a fire at Shepherds Court in Shepherd's Bush which happened in August 2016? A. No. Q. No. Okay. As at June 2017, had you ever had any training on the risk of fire spread up the exterior of a high-rise
4 5 6 7 8 9 10	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no command unit on that exercise. Q. Again, within that training course, who would be recording the fire survival guidance information when it first came to the fire ground from the control room? A. So I believe it was going to the incident commander, who was then relaying it to us at the bridgehead. Q. Would the incident commander be using the control information form?	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	case study at the time, yes. Q. Okay. All right. Had you heard as at June 2017 of a fire at Shepherds Court in Shepherd's Bush which happened in August 2016? A. No. Q. No. Okay. As at June 2017, had you ever had any training on the risk of fire spread up the exterior of a high-rise building?
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no command unit on that exercise. Q. Again, within that training course, who would be recording the fire survival guidance information when it first came to the fire ground from the control room? A. So I believe it was going to the incident commander, who was then relaying it to us at the bridgehead. Q. Would the incident commander be using the control information form? A. Yes.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	case study at the time, yes. Q. Okay. All right. Had you heard as at June 2017 of a fire at Shepherds Court in Shepherd's Bush which happened in August 2016? A. No. Q. No. Okay. As at June 2017, had you ever had any training on the risk of fire spread up the exterior of a high-rise building? A. No.
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no command unit on that exercise. Q. Again, within that training course, who would be recording the fire survival guidance information when it first came to the fire ground from the control room? A. So I believe it was going to the incident commander, who was then relaying it to us at the bridgehead. Q. Would the incident commander be using the control information form? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Right. Did you get training on operations within the control room?	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	case study at the time, yes. Q. Okay. All right. Had you heard as at June 2017 of a fire at Shepherds Court in Shepherd's Bush which happened in August 2016? A. No. Q. No. Okay. As at June 2017, had you ever had any training on the risk of fire spread up the exterior of a high-rise building? A. No. Q. Did you know or had you heard of any discussion of risk of fire spread up clad buildings, buildings which have an envelope around them?
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no command unit on that exercise. Q. Again, within that training course, who would be recording the fire survival guidance information when it first came to the fire ground from the control room? A. So I believe it was going to the incident commander, who was then relaying it to us at the bridgehead. Q. Would the incident commander be using the control information form? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Right. Did you get training on operations within the control room? A. No.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	case study at the time, yes. Q. Okay. All right. Had you heard as at June 2017 of a fire at Shepherds Court in Shepherd's Bush which happened in August 2016? A. No. Q. No. Okay. As at June 2017, had you ever had any training on the risk of fire spread up the exterior of a high-rise building? A. No. Q. Did you know or had you heard of any discussion of risk of fire spread up clad buildings, buildings which have an envelope around them? A. No.
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no command unit on that exercise. Q. Again, within that training course, who would be recording the fire survival guidance information when it first came to the fire ground from the control room? A. So I believe it was going to the incident commander, who was then relaying it to us at the bridgehead. Q. Would the incident commander be using the control information form? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Right. Did you get training on operations within the control room?	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	case study at the time, yes. Q. Okay. All right. Had you heard as at June 2017 of a fire at Shepherds Court in Shepherd's Bush which happened in August 2016? A. No. Q. No. Okay. As at June 2017, had you ever had any training on the risk of fire spread up the exterior of a high-rise building? A. No. Q. Did you know or had you heard of any discussion of risk of fire spread up clad buildings, buildings which have an envelope around them?
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no command unit on that exercise. Q. Again, within that training course, who would be recording the fire survival guidance information when it first came to the fire ground from the control room? A. So I believe it was going to the incident commander, who was then relaying it to us at the bridgehead. Q. Would the incident commander be using the control information form? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Right. Did you get training on operations within the control room? A. No. Q. Okay. Are you familiar with policy note 790, fire survival guidance calls?	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	case study at the time, yes. Q. Okay. All right. Had you heard as at June 2017 of a fire at Shepherds Court in Shepherd's Bush which happened in August 2016? A. No. Q. No. Okay. As at June 2017, had you ever had any training on the risk of fire spread up the exterior of a high-rise building? A. No. Q. Did you know or had you heard of any discussion of risk of fire spread up clad buildings, buildings which have an envelope around them? A. No. Q. Can we then turn to the night of the fire. A. Sure. Q. On page 3 of your statement, you say that on the night
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no command unit on that exercise. Q. Again, within that training course, who would be recording the fire survival guidance information when it first came to the fire ground from the control room? A. So I believe it was going to the incident commander, who was then relaying it to us at the bridgehead. Q. Would the incident commander be using the control information form? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Right. Did you get training on operations within the control room? A. No. Q. Okay. Are you familiar with policy note 790, fire survival guidance calls? A. Yes.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	case study at the time, yes. Q. Okay. All right. Had you heard as at June 2017 of a fire at Shepherds Court in Shepherd's Bush which happened in August 2016? A. No. Q. No. Okay. As at June 2017, had you ever had any training on the risk of fire spread up the exterior of a high-rise building? A. No. Q. Did you know or had you heard of any discussion of risk of fire spread up clad buildings, buildings which have an envelope around them? A. No. Q. Can we then turn to the night of the fire. A. Sure. Q. On page 3 of your statement, you say that on the night of the fire this is the top of the page you
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no command unit on that exercise. Q. Again, within that training course, who would be recording the fire survival guidance information when it first came to the fire ground from the control room? A. So I believe it was going to the incident commander, who was then relaying it to us at the bridgehead. Q. Would the incident commander be using the control information form? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Right. Did you get training on operations within the control room? A. No. Q. Okay. Are you familiar with policy note 790, fire survival guidance calls?	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	case study at the time, yes. Q. Okay. All right. Had you heard as at June 2017 of a fire at Shepherds Court in Shepherd's Bush which happened in August 2016? A. No. Q. No. Okay. As at June 2017, had you ever had any training on the risk of fire spread up the exterior of a high-rise building? A. No. Q. Did you know or had you heard of any discussion of risk of fire spread up clad buildings, buildings which have an envelope around them? A. No. Q. Can we then turn to the night of the fire. A. Sure. Q. On page 3 of your statement, you say that on the night of the fire this is the top of the page you started your night shift at 20.00.
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no command unit on that exercise. Q. Again, within that training course, who would be recording the fire survival guidance information when it first came to the fire ground from the control room? A. So I believe it was going to the incident commander, who was then relaying it to us at the bridgehead. Q. Would the incident commander be using the control information form? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Right. Did you get training on operations within the control room? A. No. Q. Okay. Are you familiar with policy note 790, fire survival guidance calls? A. Yes. Q. Are you familiar with the form of control information	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	case study at the time, yes. Q. Okay. All right. Had you heard as at June 2017 of a fire at Shepherds Court in Shepherd's Bush which happened in August 2016? A. No. Q. No. Okay. As at June 2017, had you ever had any training on the risk of fire spread up the exterior of a high-rise building? A. No. Q. Did you know or had you heard of any discussion of risk of fire spread up clad buildings, buildings which have an envelope around them? A. No. Q. Can we then turn to the night of the fire. A. Sure. Q. On page 3 of your statement, you say that on the night of the fire this is the top of the page you
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no command unit on that exercise. Q. Again, within that training course, who would be recording the fire survival guidance information when it first came to the fire ground from the control room? A. So I believe it was going to the incident commander, who was then relaying it to us at the bridgehead. Q. Would the incident commander be using the control information form? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Right. Did you get training on operations within the control room? A. No. Q. Okay. Are you familiar with policy note 790, fire survival guidance calls? A. Yes. Q. Are you familiar with the form of control information form?	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	case study at the time, yes. Q. Okay. All right. Had you heard as at June 2017 of a fire at Shepherds Court in Shepherd's Bush which happened in August 2016? A. No. Q. No. Okay. As at June 2017, had you ever had any training on the risk of fire spread up the exterior of a high-rise building? A. No. Q. Did you know or had you heard of any discussion of risk of fire spread up clad buildings, buildings which have an envelope around them? A. No. Q. Can we then turn to the night of the fire. A. Sure. Q. On page 3 of your statement, you say that on the night of the fire this is the top of the page you started your night shift at 20.00. Then a few lines further down you say:
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no command unit on that exercise. Q. Again, within that training course, who would be recording the fire survival guidance information when it first came to the fire ground from the control room? A. So I believe it was going to the incident commander, who was then relaying it to us at the bridgehead. Q. Would the incident commander be using the control information form? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Right. Did you get training on operations within the control room? A. No. Q. Okay. Are you familiar with policy note 790, fire survival guidance calls? A. Yes. Q. Are you familiar with the form of control information form? A. Yes.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	case study at the time, yes. Q. Okay. All right. Had you heard as at June 2017 of a fire at Shepherds Court in Shepherd's Bush which happened in August 2016? A. No. Q. No. Okay. As at June 2017, had you ever had any training on the risk of fire spread up the exterior of a high-rise building? A. No. Q. Did you know or had you heard of any discussion of risk of fire spread up clad buildings, buildings which have an envelope around them? A. No. Q. Can we then turn to the night of the fire. A. Sure. Q. On page 3 of your statement, you say that on the night of the fire this is the top of the page you started your night shift at 20.00. Then a few lines further down you say: "When the call came in for Grenfell Tower, we had
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no command unit on that exercise. Q. Again, within that training course, who would be recording the fire survival guidance information when it first came to the fire ground from the control room? A. So I believe it was going to the incident commander, who was then relaying it to us at the bridgehead. Q. Would the incident commander be using the control information form? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Right. Did you get training on operations within the control room? A. No. Q. Okay. Are you familiar with policy note 790, fire survival guidance calls? A. Yes. Q. Are you familiar with the form of control information form? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Well, let's just make sure we're talking about the same thing. If you could just be quickly shown	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	case study at the time, yes. Q. Okay. All right. Had you heard as at June 2017 of a fire at Shepherds Court in Shepherd's Bush which happened in August 2016? A. No. Q. No. Okay. As at June 2017, had you ever had any training on the risk of fire spread up the exterior of a high-rise building? A. No. Q. Did you know or had you heard of any discussion of risk of fire spread up clad buildings, buildings which have an envelope around them? A. No. Q. Can we then turn to the night of the fire. A. Sure. Q. On page 3 of your statement, you say that on the night of the fire — this is the top of the page — you started your night shift at 20.00. Then a few lines further down you say: "When the call came in for Grenfell Tower, we had just finished up at the smell of burning at Queensgate Gardens and were mobilised to Grenfell Tower at 01:30
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	exercise was in a separate room, but there was no command unit on that exercise. Q. Again, within that training course, who would be recording the fire survival guidance information when it first came to the fire ground from the control room? A. So I believe it was going to the incident commander, who was then relaying it to us at the bridgehead. Q. Would the incident commander be using the control information form? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Right. Did you get training on operations within the control room? A. No. Q. Okay. Are you familiar with policy note 790, fire survival guidance calls? A. Yes. Q. Are you familiar with the form of control information form? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Well, let's just make sure we're talking about	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	case study at the time, yes. Q. Okay. All right. Had you heard as at June 2017 of a fire at Shepherds Court in Shepherd's Bush which happened in August 2016? A. No. Q. No. Okay. As at June 2017, had you ever had any training on the risk of fire spread up the exterior of a high-rise building? A. No. Q. Did you know or had you heard of any discussion of risk of fire spread up clad buildings, buildings which have an envelope around them? A. No. Q. Can we then turn to the night of the fire. A. Sure. Q. On page 3 of your statement, you say that on the night of the fire — this is the top of the page — you started your night shift at 20.00. Then a few lines further down you say: "When the call came in for Grenfell Tower, we had just finished up at the smell of burning at Queensgate

1 pager? 2 Was that G341? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. Now, you say you were mobilised at 01.30 and arrived at 5 01.39. 6 A. Yes. 6 Q. You were, I think, as you say, with Firefighters 7 Q. You were, I think, as you say, with Firefighters 8 Ferguson, Petty and Butler. 9 A. Yes. 9 Q. There's a fire and rescue unit, FRU, at Chelsea as well, isn't there? 10 Q. There's a fire and rescue unit, FRU, at Chelsea as well, isn't there? 11 When you go on to say: 12 A. That's correct. 13 Pager? A. So the incident will come through on the watch reach the acknowledge you've received awareness incident. 4 Can then acknowledge you've received awareness incident. 6 Q. Did you do that? Did you acknowledge? 7 A. No, so the issue I had was that there was no information on the MDT screen, but the pager did alert me to an incident. 10 Q. I see, okay. 11 When you go on to say: 12 "At that stage there was nothing on the Mobile Da Terminal (MDT), which is a Screen at the front of the appliance." 13 Do you mean there was nothing showing at all or simply no useful information? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Does that hold EDBA? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. How many cylinders does it normally hold? 18 A. So they have a set each and a spare if they're riding four, so it carries five. 19 Q. Is that normal? 20 Q. Carries five, right, Was that also mobilised with you 20 A. No. So normally the incident, the address, who's	at you of that rmation
A. Yes. Q. Now, you say you were mobilised at 01.30 and arrived at Q. Now, you say you were mobilised at 01.30 and arrived at Q. Now, you say you were mobilised at 01.30 and arrived at Q. Now, you say you were mobilised at 01.30 and arrived at G. A. Yes. Q. You were, I think, as you say, with Firefighters Ferguson, Petty and Butler. A. Yes. Q. There's a fire and rescue unit, FRU, at Chelsea as well, isn't there? Q. There's a fire and rescue unit, FRU, at Chelsea as well, isn't there? Q. Is that G346? Q. Is that G346? Q. Is that G346? Q. Does that hold EDBA? Q. Does that hold EDBA? Q. Does that hold EDBA? Q. How many cylinders does it normally hold? A. Yes. Q. How many cylinders does it normally hold? A. So they have a set each and a spare if they're riding four, so it carries five. 3 pager, but it also comes up on the MDT screen the can then acknowledge you've received awareness incident. Q. Did you do that? Did you acknowledge? A. No, so the issue I had was that there was no information? A. No, so the issue I had was that there was no information to the MDT screen, but the pager did alert me to an incident. Q. I see, okay. 11 When you go on to say: 12 "At that stage there was nothing on the Mobile Da Terminal (MDT), which is a Screen at the front of the appliance." 13 Do you mean there was nothing showing at all or simply no useful information? A. No, there was nothing showing at all. It was a ble white screen. 19 Q. Is that normal?	at you of that rmation
4 Q. Now, you say you were mobilised at 01.30 and arrived at 5 01.39. 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. You were, I think, as you say, with Firefighters 8 Ferguson, Petty and Butler. 9 A. Yes. 9 Q. There's a fire and rescue unit, FRU, at Chelsea as well, 10 isn't there? 11 When you go on to say: 12 A. That's correct. 13 Q. Is that G346? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Does that hold EDBA? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. How many cylinders does it normally hold? 18 A. So they have a set each and a spare if they're riding 19 four, so it carries five. 10 C. Did you do that? Did you acknowledge? 4 A. No, so the issue I had was that there was no informative to an incident. 16 Q. Dis go, okay. 17 A. No, there was nothing on the Mobile Date appliance. 18 Do you mean there was nothing showing at all or simply no useful information? 19 A. No, there was nothing showing at all. It was a bleach white screen. 19 Q. Is that normal?	of that mation
5 incident. 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. You were, I think, as you say, with Firefighters 8 Ferguson, Petty and Butler. 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. There's a fire and rescue unit, FRU, at Chelsea as well, 11 isn't there? 12 A. That's correct. 13 Q. Is that G346? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Does that hold EDBA? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. How many cylinders does it normally hold? 18 A. So they have a set each and a spare if they're riding 19 four, so it carries five. 10 Q. Did you do that? Did you acknowledge? 4. No, so the issue I had was that there was no information? 6 Q. Did you do that? Did you acknowledge? 7 A. No, so the issue I had was that there was no information on the MDT screen, but the pager did alert me to an incident. 10 Q. I see, okay. 11 When you go on to say: 12 "At that stage there was nothing on the Mobile Da Terminal (MDT), which is a Screen at the front of the appliance." 18 A. Yes. 19 Do you mean there was nothing showing at all. It was a black white screen. 19 Gu. Is that normal?	rmation ta
6 A. Yes. 7 Q. You were, I think, as you say, with Firefighters 8 Ferguson, Petty and Butler. 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. There's a fire and rescue unit, FRU, at Chelsea as well, 11 isn't there? 12 A. That's correct. 13 Q. Is that G346? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Does that hold EDBA? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. How many cylinders does it normally hold? 18 A. So they have a set each and a spare if they're riding 19 four, so it carries five. 10 Q. Did you do that? Did you acknowledge? 7 A. No, so the issue I had was that there was no information? 8 on the MDT screen, but the pager did alert me to an incident. 10 Q. I see, okay. 11 When you go on to say: 12 "At that stage there was nothing on the Mobile Da Terminal (MDT), which is a Screen at the front of the appliance." 15 Do you mean there was nothing showing at all or simply no useful information? 16 A. Yes. 17 A. No, there was nothing showing at all. It was a bleady white screen. 18 white screen. 19 Q. Is that normal?	ta
7 A. No, so the issue I had was that there was no informal formal forms on the MDT screen, but the pager did alert me to an incident. 8 On the MDT screen, but the pager did alert me to an incident. 9 A. Yes. 9 an incident. 10 Q. There's a fire and rescue unit, FRU, at Chelsea as well, isn't there? 11 When you go on to say: 12 A. That's correct. 13 Q. Is that G346? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Does that hold EDBA? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. How many cylinders does it normally hold? 18 A. So they have a set each and a spare if they're riding four, so it carries five. 19 (A. No, so the issue I had was that there was no information on the MDT screen, but the pager did alert me to an incident. 10 Q. I see, okay. 11 When you go on to say: 12 "At that stage there was nothing on the Mobile Day Terminal (MDT), which is a Screen at the front of the appliance." 19 Do you mean there was nothing showing at all or simply no useful information? 10 A. No, there was nothing showing at all. It was a blue white screen. 11 When you go on to say: 12 "At that stage there was nothing showing at all or simply no useful information? 13 Do you mean there was nothing showing at all. It was a blue screen. 14 A. No, there was nothing showing at all. It was a blue screen. 18 White screen. 19 Q. Is that normal?	ta
Ferguson, Petty and Butler. A. Yes. Q. There's a fire and rescue unit, FRU, at Chelsea as well, isn't there? A. That's correct. Q. Is that G346? A. Yes. Q. Does that hold EDBA? A. Yes. Q. How many cylinders does it normally hold? A. So they have a set each and a spare if they're riding four, so it carries five. 8 on the MDT screen, but the pager did alert me to an incident. 9 an incident. 10 Q. I see, okay. 11 When you go on to say: 12 "At that stage there was nothing on the Mobile Da Terminal (MDT), which is a Screen at the front of the appliance." 13 Do you mean there was nothing showing at all or simply no useful information? 14 A. No, there was nothing showing at all. It was a blue white screen. 19 Q. Is that normal?	ta
9 A. Yes. 10 Q. There's a fire and rescue unit, FRU, at Chelsea as well, 11 isn't there? 11 When you go on to say: 12 A. That's correct. 12 "At that stage there was nothing on the Mobile Da 13 Q. Is that G346? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Does that hold EDBA? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. How many cylinders does it normally hold? 18 A. So they have a set each and a spare if they're riding 19 four, so it carries five. 10 Q. I see, okay. 11 When you go on to say: 12 "At that stage there was nothing on the Mobile Da 13 Terminal (MDT), which is a Screen at the front of th 14 appliance." 15 Do you mean there was nothing showing at all or 16 simply no useful information? 17 A. No, there was nothing showing at all. It was a bl 18 white screen. 19 Q. Is that normal?	
10 Q. Tsee, okay. 11 isn't there? 11 When you go on to say: 12 A. That's correct. 13 Q. Is that G346? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Does that hold EDBA? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. How many cylinders does it normally hold? 18 A. So they have a set each and a spare if they're riding four, so it carries five. 10 Q. I see, okay. 11 When you go on to say: 12 "At that stage there was nothing on the Mobile Da Terminal (MDT), which is a Screen at the front of the appliance." 18 Do you mean there was nothing showing at all or simply no useful information? 19 A. No, there was nothing showing at all. It was a blue white screen. 19 Q. Is that normal?	
11 isn't there? 12 A. That's correct. 13 Q. Is that G346? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Does that hold EDBA? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. How many cylinders does it normally hold? 18 A. So they have a set each and a spare if they're riding four, so it carries five. 19 When you go on to say: 12 "At that stage there was nothing on the Mobile Da Terminal (MDT), which is a Screen at the front of the appliance." 18 A. Yes. 19 Do you mean there was nothing showing at all or simply no useful information? 19 A. No, there was nothing showing at all. It was a bleach white screen. 19 Q. Is that normal?	
12 A. That's correct. 13 Q. Is that G346? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Does that hold EDBA? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. How many cylinders does it normally hold? 18 A. So they have a set each and a spare if they're riding four, so it carries five. 18 Yes that stage there was nothing on the Mobile Da Terminal (MDT), which is a Screen at the front of the appliance." 18 Do you mean there was nothing showing at all or simply no useful information? 19 A. No, there was nothing showing at all. It was a bleach white screen. 19 Q. Is that normal?	
Q. Is that G346? 13 Terminal (MDT), which is a Screen at the front of the appliance." 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Does that hold EDBA? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. How many cylinders does it normally hold? 18 A. So they have a set each and a spare if they're riding four, so it carries five. 19 four, so it carries five. 10 Terminal (MDT), which is a Screen at the front of the appliance." 10 Do you mean there was nothing showing at all or simply no useful information? 11 A. No, there was nothing showing at all. It was a bleath of the appliance." 12 White screen. 13 Terminal (MDT), which is a Screen at the front of the appliance." 14 A. Yes. 15 Do you mean there was nothing showing at all or simply no useful information? 16 A. No, there was nothing showing at all. It was a bleath of the appliance." 18 White screen. 19 Q. Is that normal?	
14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Does that hold EDBA? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. How many cylinders does it normally hold? 18 A. So they have a set each and a spare if they're riding four, so it carries five. 19 four, so it carries five. 10 appliance." 10 Do you mean there was nothing showing at all or simply no useful information? 11 A. No, there was nothing showing at all. It was a black white screen. 12 white screen. 13 Q. Is that normal?	e
Q. Does that hold EDBA? 15 Do you mean there was nothing showing at all or 16 A. Yes. 16 simply no useful information? 17 Q. How many cylinders does it normally hold? 18 A. So they have a set each and a spare if they're riding 19 four, so it carries five. 19 Q. Is that normal?	
16 A. Yes. 16 simply no useful information? 17 Q. How many cylinders does it normally hold? 18 A. So they have a set each and a spare if they're riding 19 four, so it carries five. 10 simply no useful information? 11 A. No, there was nothing showing at all. It was a bleable white screen. 12 Q. Is that normal?	
Q. How many cylinders does it normally hold? A. No, there was nothing showing at all. It was a bl A. So they have a set each and a spare if they're riding four, so it carries five. 17 A. No, there was nothing showing at all. It was a bl 18 white screen. 19 Q. Is that normal?	
18 A. So they have a set each and a spare if they're riding 19 four, so it carries five. 19 Q. Is that normal?	
19 four, so it carries five. 19 Q. Is that normal?	ank
20 O Carries five right. Was that also mobilised with you	
20 Q. Carries five, right. Was that also mobilised with you 20 A. No. So normally the incident, the address, who's	ı
21 at the same time? 21 attending, who's attending with you, all that	
A. So the pump ladder was out on a separate incident. So 22 information comes up on the MDT screen en rout	e, so that
the pump ladder was out on the station ground. The FRU 23 was unusual that it was on the pager but not on the	ıe MDT.
24 was status 1 at the station. 24 Q. Was it working when you left Chelsea, left the station.	on?
25 Q. Okay. 25 A. Yes, because we'd had several shouts before the	Grenfell
Page 173 Page 175	
1 agc 175	
1 Let's just get the time for that right. If you look 1 incident came in.	
2 at the short incident log, which is tab 23 of the 2 Q. At what stage did you notice it had stopped working	ıg?
3 documents bundle at page 9 3 A. Only at that stage. So, like I say, the pager aler	ied
4 A. Sure. 4 us of the incident, and the fact that there was not	hing
5 Q you'll see that the arrival time of G346, which 5 on the MDT screen prompted me to contact cont	rol to ask
6 I think is the FRU as you said 6 them if they could send the incident to the MDT	as we
7 A. Yes. 7 hadn't received it.	
8 Q was 01.47.33. Would that sound about right to you? 8 Q. And did they?	
9 A. If that's what the log says, I assume it's correct, but 9 A. Sorry.	
10 I can't comment for the FRU as I wasn't riding the FRU. 10 Q. No, continue.	
11 Q. Do you remember when you arrived that it was there 11 A. It became apparent that obviously they had a lo	t going
before you or? 12 on and there was a lot of other radio traffic and v	we did
13 A. I didn't see them on my arrival. I don't know. 13 eventually get the information that we needed.	
14 Q. Now, on page 3 of your statement, further down, in what 14 Q. Right.	
looks like the second paragraph, it's about one-third of 15 In the same paragraph of the statement, you say:	
the way down, you're describing what happens immediately 16 "I contacted control on the main radio for more	
17 after mobilisation and you say: 17 information and proceeded to the incident."	
18 "Our initial information was limited. I was told on 18 A. Yes.	
my pager to go to Grenfell Tower but I didn't have the 19 Q. So the main radio, was that the main scheme?	
full address. At that stage there was nothing on the 20 A. Yes.	
Mobile Data Terminal (MDT), which is a Screen at the 21 Q. So the radio in the cab?	
22 front of the appliance." 22 A. Yes.	
23 Just help me with mobilisation while you're out of 23 Q. Right.	
the station. 24 You say you proceeded to the incident; did they g	ive
Would that normally be done on the watch manager's 25 you information about the incident?	
Dago 174	
Page 174 Page 176	

A. So they confirmed that the pager incident was correct. Obviously my query was is this incident for us on the pager, so that was confirmed to be so, so we proceeded to that address, and then later on the information did come up on the MDT. Q. Later on the information came up on the MDT, while you were still en route, did that MDT give you any further information over and above what you'd been told by control? A. So on the pager you just get the address. I'm not familiar with Grenfell, so I didn't know what kind of premises that would be. But when you get it to the MDT, helpful, but you also get told that it's a high-rise incident. Q. Would the MDT tell you what the make-up was at that stage? A. I twould've told me who was in attendance and who had been mobilised with me as part of an attendance. Page 177 A. So I heard Golf 261 take some FSG information fre control room staff. A. No. A. No. A. No. C. Can I show you one or two examples of fire survival guidance being broadcast at that stage. A. Sure. A. Sure. A. Sure. A. I can't remember the nature of the details of that message that was passed from control to Golf 261, 1 remember that it was an FSG call in progress. D. How many calls to G261 do you think you remember en route? A. I can't remember the nature of the details of that message that was passed from control to Golf 261, 1 remember that it was an FSG call in progress. D. Do you remember one that we've got timed at 01.36.4 saying "Lots of fire survival guidance calls and people asking lots of questions"? A. I can't remember the tatiat was as G261 do you think you remember on that we've got timed at 01.36.4 saying "Lots of fire survival guidance calls and people asking lots of questions"? A. I can't remember the that it was an FSG call in progress. D. Do you remember one that we've got timed at 01.36.4 saying "Lots of fire survival guidance calls and people asking lots of questions"? A. I can't remember the tatie was a G261 do you think you remember on that we've got intend at 01.36.	just vhile
pager, so that was confirmed to be so, so we proceeded to that address, and then later on the information did come up on the MDT. Q. Later on the information came up on the MDT, while you were still en route? A. Yes. Q. Okay. When it came up while you were still en route, did that MDT give you any further information over and above what you'd been told by control? A. Just that it was a high-rise premises. Q. Right. A. So on the pager you just get the address. I'm not familiar with Grenfell, so I didn't know what kind of premises that would be. But when you get it to the MDT, not only do you get a location on the map, which is very helpful, but you also get told that it's a high-rise incident. Q. Would the MDT tell you what the make-up was at that stage? A. It would've told me who was in attendance and who had been mobilised with me as part of an aftendance. Page 177 1 or a 25-pump fire? A. Yes. Q. Did you? A. Yes. 3 Q. Did any FSG information come to you — 4 A. No. A. No. A. No. 7 Q. Can I show you one or two examples of fire survival guidance being broadcast at that stage. A. Sure. Q. Let me ask you, did you hear specifically about a call on the 18th floor reporting thick smoke in her flat? A. I can't remember the nature of the details of that message that was passed from control to Golf 261, I remember that it was an FSG call in progress. Q. How many calls to G261 do you think you remember en route? A. I can't remember one that we've got timed at 01.36.4 saying "Lots of fire survival guidance calls and people asking lots of questions"? A. I can't remember the detail of the message, I'm aft of the progress of the detail of the message, I'm aft of the progress of the progr	just while
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stage? A. It would've told me who was in attendance and who had been mobilised with me as part of an attendance. Q. So you could work out whether at that stage it was a 20 Page 177 unable to call them up, if they're not getting any response, they will pass that information to A. Yes. Q. Did you? 1 unable to call them up, if they're not getting any response, they will pass that information to an appliance that is en route to then give to that incident command pump on arrival. So that's what on route we also heard further make-ups whilst we were en route. 2 Q. Did you understand why control was sending FSG information to G261? A. Yes. So the control room staff will try and contact ICP, which in this case was Golf 271. If they are Page 179 1 unable to call them up, if they're not getting any response, they will pass that information to an appliance that is en route to then give to that incident command pump on arrival. So that's what going on there. 6 en route. 6 Q. From your time at Acton, you would recognise, no decomposition.	
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6 en route. 6 Q. From your time at Acton, you would recognise, no de	was
7 Q. Did you get that information about the further make-ups 7 the call sign G261.	ubt,
8 once the MDT had started working? 8 A. Yes.	
9 A. Yes, I believe so. 9 Q. It's an Actonian pump ladder.	
10 Q. You say in the next paragraph of your statement that 10 A. Yes, and the officer in charge was in fact from Ch	lsea
11 there was quite a lot of radio traffic, mainly from 11 Red Watch who was standing by at Acton, so it	
12 other crews asking for more detailed information about 12 Q. Yes.	
13 the call also. 13 A was of interest.	
14 Then you say, two lines down from that: 14 Q. From that, would you have worked out that G271, be	ng
15 "On the radio, heard that the incident was being 15 the incident command pump at that stage, was otherw	e
16 made up quickly, that more and more appliances were 16 occupied?	
17 being requested." 17 A. Yes, which is normal at that stage of an incident, t	at
Do you remember what the pump status was when you 18 the driver of Golf 271 would be trying to undertake	many
19 arrived or just shortly before you arrived? 19 tasks simultaneously, one of which is to try and ma	the
20 A. So I think I heard make pumps 20 fairly close to our 20 radio. But equally he's got many things to do and	
21 arrival. 21 that's understandable that that information might	eed
22 Q. Then you say: 22 to be passed to a different appliance en route.	
23 "I heard that Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls 23 Q. Yes.	
24 were in progress." 24 Did you know that by 01.41 or so, just a minute or	
25 How did you hear that? 25 two after you arrive, some 24 fire survival guidance	
D 470	
Page 178 Page 180	

45 (Pages 177 to 180)

1	calls had been received by control?	1	Kensington's Pump Ladder, who have not responded."
2	A. I was unaware of that.	2	Then you see:
3	Q. Or at least 24 calls whether they were precisely FSG	3	"The CRO passes FSG call information to Golf 261
		4	Acton's Pump Ladder saying they have a caller on the
4	calls or not is another matter had been received by	5	18th floor with thick smoke in their flat, individuals
5	control?		•
6	A. No.	6	on the 22nd floor with smoke in their flat and a further
7	Q. Okay.	7	call to fire on the 20th floor. In flat 82 people are
8	Now, let me ask you some questions about your	8	also trapped."
9	arrival.	9	Does that trigger a recollection of the detail you
10	On page 4 of your statement, you say just at the top	10	would've heard over your main scheme radio?
11	of the page four lines down:	11	A. I don't recall that being the detail, but I recall
12	"We parked basically at the back of the queue of	12	hearing it come through and then informing the crew on
13	appliances, approx 50 meters[sic] from the tower."	13	my appliance of that information
14	Do you remember whereabouts in relation to the tower	14	Q. Right.
15	you did park?	15	A verbally, just so that they're aware of it.
16	A. So, like I say, there was already a few appliances in	16	Q. If you turn the page to 61, can I just ask you to look
17	attendance, so we parked behind those so as to still	17	at the last paragraph of this section, just first main
18	leave access for any other appliances going through, or	18	paragraph on the top of that page:
19	ambulances, for example.	19	"During the phone conversation that OM Norman had at
20	I think 50 metres from the tower is probably	20	01:35:24 with CU 8, the CRO can be heard sending the
21	an underestimation now, with hindsight, but it was	21	information to Golf 261 Acton's Pump Ladder above."
22	definitely we parked on Grenfell Road before the	22	Now, that looks like a phone conversation and not
23	junction of Bomore.	23	a radio communication. Do you know anything about
24	Q. Okay.	24	Golf 261 receiving information other than by radio?
25	A. So I passed Bomore on my way to the tower.	25	A. No, they would've only received it by the main scheme
	Page 181		Page 183
1	Q. Right.	1	radio on the appliance.
1 2	Q. Right. You say:	1 2	radio on the appliance. Q. Now, going back to your statement, on page 4 you say,
	You say:		Q. Now, going back to your statement, on page 4 you say,
2		2	
3	You say: "There was a Command Unit (CU) near to the	2 3	Q. Now, going back to your statement, on page 4 you say, six lines down from the top of the page: "I took our Nominal Roll Board (NRB) to them. The
2 3 4	You say: "There was a Command Unit (CU) near to the tower"	2 3 4	Q. Now, going back to your statement, on page 4 you say, six lines down from the top of the page: "I took our Nominal Roll Board (NRB) to them. The NRB is carried by each appliance and details who we are
2 3 4 5	You say: "There was a Command Unit (CU) near to the tower" This is just a little bit below that, fifth line down:	2 3 4 5	Q. Now, going back to your statement, on page 4 you say, six lines down from the top of the page: "I took our Nominal Roll Board (NRB) to them. The NRB is carried by each appliance and details who we are and how many crew we have and who that crew are."
2 3 4 5 6	You say: "There was a Command Unit (CU) near to the tower" This is just a little bit below that, fifth line down: " about halfway between where we parked and the	2 3 4 5 6 7	Q. Now, going back to your statement, on page 4 you say, six lines down from the top of the page: "I took our Nominal Roll Board (NRB) to them. The NRB is carried by each appliance and details who we are and how many crew we have and who that crew are." Can I just ask, what is an NRB? Is it a board or
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	You say: "There was a Command Unit (CU) near to the tower" This is just a little bit below that, fifth line down: " about halfway between where we parked and the tower."	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Q. Now, going back to your statement, on page 4 you say, six lines down from the top of the page: "I took our Nominal Roll Board (NRB) to them. The NRB is carried by each appliance and details who we are and how many crew we have and who that crew are." Can I just ask, what is an NRB? Is it a board or a piece of paper?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	You say: "There was a Command Unit (CU) near to the tower" This is just a little bit below that, fifth line down: " about halfway between where we parked and the tower." Do you remember which number the command unit was?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Q. Now, going back to your statement, on page 4 you say, six lines down from the top of the page: "I took our Nominal Roll Board (NRB) to them. The NRB is carried by each appliance and details who we are and how many crew we have and who that crew are." Can I just ask, what is an NRB? Is it a board or a piece of paper? A. It's a metal board that you can then write on with your
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	You say: "There was a Command Unit (CU) near to the tower" This is just a little bit below that, fifth line down: " about halfway between where we parked and the tower." Do you remember which number the command unit was? A. So that was Charlie Uniform 8, I believe. Q. At the point you arrived, what was the radio traffic about FSG, do you remember? A. No. So the last information I heard of FSG information was the Golf 261 message they received. Shortly after that we arrived and I made my way to the command unit. Q. Okay. Can I just go back, then, to this Acton 261 messaging. Can I ask you to be shown, please, the ORR, the operational response report, at page 61. We'll start at page 60, which is at 01.35.54. That	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 Q. Now, going back to your statement, on page 4 you say, six lines down from the top of the page: "I took our Nominal Roll Board (NRB) to them. The NRB is carried by each appliance and details who we are and how many crew we have and who that crew are." Can I just ask, what is an NRB? Is it a board or a piece of paper? /ul> A. It's a metal board that you can then write on with your chinagraph, and it will detail the officer in charge and the names of the crew that are riding on that appliance and where they're from. Q. Do you remember which command unit number this was? A. I took my nominal roll board to Charlie Uniform 8. Q. It was CU8? A. Yes. Q. Do you remember who you spoke to there when you handed your NRBs in? A. Yes, I spoke to Watch Manager Daniel Meyrick. Q. Did he tell you anything about what was happening at
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46 (Pages 181 to 184)

1	to the bridgehead?	1	a conversation around what was required.
2	A. No. I didn't stop at the command unit for too long.	2	Q. What rank do you think he was?
3	Q. No, okay.	3	A. Watch manager.
4	Did you have a discussion with him about how FSG	4	Q. He was a watch manager?
5	information was coming to the command unit?	5	A. Yes.
6	A. No.	6	Q. Okay.
7	Q. Did he tell you anything else?	7	Did he have a radio in his hand he was using?
8	A. No. Obviously at the time my priority is to get to the	8	A. I don't know if it was in his hand and it's
9	incident commander of the fire ground to see where I am	9	an assumption more than anything that he would've had
10	best needed at the time, so it was a matter of dropping	10	a handheld radio, yes.
11	off my nominal roll board so I could then go and make	11	Q. Did you know this officer?
12	myself of use somewhere else.	12	A. No.
13	Q. Did you know at that stage who the incident commander	13	Q. Let's see if I can get to it this way.
14	was?	14	Do you know or have you heard of a watch manager
15	A. I was on the assumption it was still Mike Dowden, but	15	called Kentfield?
16	I couldn't be sure.	16	A. Only since the inquiry has been unfolding.
17	Q. Did you seek to ask who the incident commander was at	17	Q. As a result of that conversation with this watch
18	that stage?	18	manager, what did you do next?
19	A. No.	19	A. So I asked him what was needed imminently. He told me
20	Q. You just assumed it was Mike Dowden, did you?	20	they needed crews with BA sets, entry control boards,
21	A. I assumed it was and obviously my intention was to go	21	hose and branches and asked me if I could get that
22	and find the incident commander, whoever that may be.	22	sorted and go to the bridgehead.
23	Q. Now, you then say that you walked towards the tower to	23	Q. Did he tell you who was operating the bridgehead at that
24	locate the OIC.	24	time?
25	When you got there, did you find the OIC?	25	A. No. I asked what floor the fire was on and where the
	Page 185		Page 187
1	A. No.	1	hyidashaad was lasatad. It was quite a short
2	Q. As a result of not finding the OIC, what did you do?	1 2	bridgehead was located. It was quite a short
3	A. So in my attempt to find the officer in charge, I went	3	conversation. The essential basis of it was that they
4	to an officer who was wearing a tabard with similar	4	needed crews and equipment to the bridgehead. Q. Right.
5	colours, who actually turned out to be a team leader	5	Now, you say in your statement, just in the next
6	from the command unit. So they also wear a tabard.	6	sentence in the paragraph we've been looking at:
7	Q. Is that a white tabard?	7	"As I looked, a significant amount of one side was
8	A. No, it's like a luminous yellow.	8	alight, with thick black smoke rising from it. A lot was
9	Q. Luminous yellow?	9	running through my mind. I knew that there would be
10	A. Parts of it is a luminous yellow.	10	people trapped in their flats and knew that I needed to
11	Q. But some of it is white, some of it is luminous yellow?	11	get water supplies going and equipment to the
12	A. The signs are white, part of it is luminous yellow. The	12	bridgehead."
13	command unit do have slightly different tabards, but	13	Did you at that stage recognise this as a cladding
14	this was my first officer that I encountered and this	14	fire?
15	was the first conversation I had with someone on the	15	A. No.
16	fire ground.	16	Q. What did you think was alight?
17	Q. Do you remember who that team leader was in the command	17	A. I didn't have many thoughts as to what was alight.
18	unit?	18	I was shocked that so much of the east side was alight,
19	A. No, I don't know his name.	19	that something external was alight. But I'd never seen
20	Q. Do you remember which command unit he was from?	20	anything like it before, so I couldn't associate it to
21	A. No.	21	anything in my mind that would be alight or cause that
22	Q. How did you know he was from a command unit?	22	kind of external fire.
23	A. We had a conversation. Obviously he wasn't the officer	23	Q. Did you have any thoughts at the time about whether
24	in charge but he obviously was from a command unit	24	compartmentation had failed?
25	because their tabard says "Team leader". Then we had	25	A. No. I had thoughts around that an external fire like
	Page 186	1	Page 188

1	that may well have spread to inside and to the flats	1	Q. Was he wearing a tabard of some kind?
2	obviously immediately on that east side, but I didn't	2	A. Yes, so this is the officer we just discussed who was
3	have any thoughts that there would be any failed	3	the team leader of a command unit, wearing that tabard.
4	compartmentation, no.	4	Q. Now, you say team leader; did it say "Team leader" on
5	Q. Did you have any thoughts at the time about whether some	5	it?
6	kind of evacuation should be carried out?	6	A. I believe so.
7	A. Obviously I think seeing an incident like that, your	7	Q. Or is it "Monitoring officer"?
8	initial thoughts are that people are going to need to	8	A. No, it wasn't "Monitoring officer".
9	leave the building, that rescues are going to be	9	Q. Not "Monitoring officer"?
10	required, and also knowing that there was fire survival	10	A. No.
11	guidance in operation already, in progress, I knew that	11	Q. Forgive what looks like pot luck, but can I try
12	there were people that were trapped.	12	a photograph on you and see how far we get?
13	Q. When you got to the entrance of the tower, could you see	13	A. Sure.
14	people coming out?	14	Q. Can I ask you to be shown INQ00000230, which is
15	A. I don't recall seeing any residents leaving; that's not	15	a photograph.
16	to say it wasn't happening, I just don't recall seeing	16	Now, this is a photograph of the lobby on the ground
17	any.	17	floor taken at 01.36.49, subject to adjustment of
18	Q. When you say in your statement, as I've just shown it to	18	36 seconds.
19	you:	19	Do you recognise the watch manager with the white
20	"I knew that there would be people trapped in their	20	helmet on the left of the pair of watch managers in the
21	flats"	21	foreground of that picture?
22	Why did you think that?	22	A. I don't recognise him. I couldn't give you a name.
23	A. Because I'd literally heard the fire survival guidance	23	Q. Was that the tabard or type of tabard that you saw on
24	information come over the radio, and I'd been informed	24	A. Yes.
25	by Watch Manager Meyrick that there was fire survival	25	Q the officer who gave you the instructions?
	Page 189		Page 191
1	guidance calls in progress.	1	A. Yes.
2	Q. It's from that.		
		2	Q. So it's a red and white chequered tabard?
3	A. Yes.	3	Q. So it's a red and white chequered tabard?A. Yes, which signifies it was someone from the command
3 4	-		Q. So it's a red and white chequered tabard?A. Yes, which signifies it was someone from the command unit.
	A. Yes.	3	A. Yes, which signifies it was someone from the command
4	A. Yes.Q. Did you think at the time that this fire could be fought?	3 4	A. Yes, which signifies it was someone from the command unit.
4 5	A. Yes.Q. Did you think at the time that this fire could be	3 4 5	A. Yes, which signifies it was someone from the command unit. Q. Unfortunately we can't see what he has on his back, but
4 5 6	A. Yes.Q. Did you think at the time that this fire could be fought?A. It was a very large external fire. I didn't have enough	3 4 5 6	A. Yes, which signifies it was someone from the command unit.Q. Unfortunately we can't see what he has on his back, but someone else may be able to do that.
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. Yes. Q. Did you think at the time that this fire could be fought? A. It was a very large external fire. I didn't have enough information as to what the spread inside was or the extent of it or how quickly it would spread, so I didn't have any thoughts around whether we could fight that fire. I just know what we would do, what we would try to do. Q. Did you see or could you see any evidence of the fire penetrating into flats from the exterior? A. I couldn't really see in any great detail whether it had penetrated in. There were certainly window-sized gaps, so the assumption was that it had, yes. Q. You say the assumption; was that your assumption? A. Yes. Q. You then say this is halfway down page 4 that you saw an officer at the front of the block: "He said that he needed crews with hoses, branches, an Entry Control Board (ECB) and BA sets to go to the bridgehead and asked me to organise them." Do you remember who the officer was? 	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 A. Yes, which signifies it was someone from the command unit. Q. Unfortunately we can't see what he has on his back, but someone else may be able to do that. Now, was it your understanding that the bridgehead had already been established? A. Yes. Q. Did you know where? A. Yes. So before I entered the building, I asked that officer where the fire was and where the bridgehead had been established. Q. He told you, did he? A. Yes, he said the fire was on the 4th floor and the bridgehead had been established on the 2nd. Q. Was that not information you had already got over the MDT en route? A. No, so you wouldn't receive that kind of information on the MDT, no. Q. Did this officer give you any information about what the plan of action was? A. No. Q. Did you understand at that point whether the task was

A. I was aware that all those tasks were going to be needed	1	A. Yes.		
to be actioned, but it's not part of the discussion we	2	Q. So let me get this right: when you went into the		
had. We had a very quick discussion.	3	building, did you know or did you not know where the		
Q. Then you say a little bit lower down page 4, that's	4	bridgehead was established?		
two-thirds of the way down:	5	A. I had been informed that the bridgehead was on the		
"I radioed my crew to meet me at the front of the	6	2nd floor.		
building"	7	Q. So when you say "to find where the bridgehead had been		
Where were they at that stage?	8	established", you're not looking for it; you knew where		
A. They were still need the appliance or also on their way	9	it was but you had to go and find it?		
down. I'd asked them to listen out for me on my radio	10	A. At this stage I don't know the layout of the building or		
so that I could go and see what was required and then	11	whereabouts on the 2nd floor they might be, so I think		
I could let them know what it is that we needed to be	12	I just mean where on the 2nd floor they were.		
doing.	13	Q. How long do you think it is an estimate I am asking		
Q. You then say, four lines down from that:	14	for after you arrived at the scene you got to the		
"At this stage whilst still outside the building,	15	bridgehead?		
I passed an EDBA crew. He told me that there were 8	16	A. Within a minute.		
people trapped on the roof and the EDBA crew, who were	17	Q. Within a minute?		
equipped with lines, were going to try to get to the	18	A. Yes.		
roof to try to rescue them."	19	Q. Right, okay.		
At that stage, were you still waiting for your crew	20	A. Sorry, from getting to the scene or from entering the		
to come with the equipment?	21	building.		
A. Yes.	22	Q. Getting to the scene.		
Q. So were you going somewhere or were you standing still?	23	A. 10 minutes.		
A. I was walking towards the entrance to the building,	24	Q. 10 minutes, okay.		
which is when I came across this EDBA crew who were	25	To get from the ground floor to the bridgehead, how		
Page 193		Page 195		
entering the building.	1	did you do that?		
		A. On foot.		
		Q. On foot.		
- ·		A. Just following the stairwell.		
		Q. At that time, can you give us an impression of how many		
		BA wearers there were on the stairs and in the lobby on		
were going to do.		the 2nd floor?		
	8	A. I don't recall an exact number. There were BA crews		
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	9	standing by ready to be committed.		
·		Q. Where were they standing when you arrived?		
		A. From the 2nd floor stairwell backwards through the		
people from the roof and that's why they were taking		lobby, that 2nd-floor balcony.		
line equipment with them.	13	Q. Right, okay. Were they queueing down the stairs?		
Q. Did Phil Wigley express an opinion to you about the	14	A. I can't recall how many crews there were standing by at		
wisdom of the trip?	15	that stage. I'm not sure.		
A. No, we didn't get into that.	16	Q. Do you remember whether there was a watch manager at		
Q. So you didn't express an opinion to him the other way	17	that stage, when you arrived on the 2nd floor on the		
about the wisdom of that trip?		balcony there, who was, as it were, holding or operating		
A. No, it was very much an in-passing kind of conversation	19	a staging post for BA wearers?		
as to what he was doing.		A. Not that I recall, but I was very focused at getting to		
Q. Okay.	21	the bridgehead.		
At the bottom of the page, three lines up, you say:	22	Q. Sure.		
"Once I had the equipment I needed I went into the	23	Now, who was in charge of the bridgehead when you		
	0.4	arrived?		
building to find where the bridgehead had been	24	anived:		
building to find where the bridgehead had been established."	25	A. Watch Manager Brien O'Keeffe.		
	to be actioned, but it's not part of the discussion we had. We had a very quick discussion. Q. Then you say a little bit lower down page 4, that's two-thirds of the way down: "I radioed my crew to meet me at the front of the building" Where were they at that stage? A. They were still need the appliance or also on their way down. I'd asked them to listen out for me on my radio so that I could go and see what was required and then I could let them know what it is that we needed to be doing. Q. You then say, four lines down from that: "At this stage whilst still outside the building, I passed an EDBA crew. He told me that there were 8 people trapped on the roof and the EDBA crew, who were equipped with lines, were going to try to get to the roof to try to rescue them." At that stage, were you still waiting for your crew to come with the equipment? A. Yes. Q. So were you going somewhere or were you standing still? A. I was walking towards the entrance to the building, which is when I came across this EDBA crew who were Page 193 entering the building. Q. Do you remember who you spoke to? A. Yes, it was Phil Wigley of Paddington. Q. And did you have a discussion about his mission? A. Yes. I know Phil, we've worked together before. We had a conversation around what it was that him and his crew were going to do. Q. And A. Which was to go to the roof to rescue eight people who were on the roof. That's my recollection of that conversation, that they were attempting to rescue eight people from the roof and that's why they were taking line equipment with them. Q. Did Phil Wigley express an opinion to you about the wisdom of the trip? A. No, we didn't express an opinion to him the other way about the wisdom of that trip? A. No, it was very much an in-passing kind of conversation as to what he was doing. Q. Okay. At the bottom of the page, three lines up, you say:	to be actioned, but it's not part of the discussion we had. We had a very quick discussion. Q. Then you say a little bit lower down page 4, that's two-thirds of the way down: "I radioed my crew to meet me at the front of the building" Where were they at that stage? A. They were still need the appliance or also on their way down. I'd asked them to listen out for me on my radio so that I could go and see what was required and then I could let them know what it is that we needed to be doing. Q. You then say, four lines down from that: "At this stage whilst still outside the building, I passed an EDBA crew. He told me that there were 8 people trapped on the roof and the EDBA crew, who were equipped with lines, were going to try to get to the roof to try to rescue them." At that stage, were you still waiting for your crew to come with the equipment? A. Yes. Q. So were you going somewhere or were you standing still? A. I was walking towards the entrance to the building, which is when I came across this EDBA crew who were Page 193 entering the building. Q. Do you remember who you spoke to? A. Yes, it was Phil Wigley of Paddington. Q. And did you have a discussion about his mission? A. Yes, I know Phil, we've worked together before. We had a conversation around what it was that him and his crew were going to do. Q. And A. Which was to go to the roof to rescue eight people who were on the roof. That's my recollection of that conversation, that they were attempting to rescue eight people from the roof and that's why they were taking line equipment with them. Q. Did Phil Wigley express an opinion to you about the wisdom of the trip? A. No, we didn't get into that. Q. So you didn't express an opinion to him the other way about the wisdom of that trip? A. No, it was very much an in-passing kind of conversation as to what he was doing. Q. Okay. At the bottom of the page, three lines up, you say:		

1	Q. Was he being assisted by anybody?	1	A. No.
2	A. Not that I was aware of at that time, no.	2	Q. Now, you say that on the bridgehead there was
3	Q. Now, on page 5 of your statement, you say, five lines	3	Firefighter O'Beirne and Firefighter De St Aubin. What
4	down from the start:	4	were they doing?
5	"Watch Manager (WM) O'KEEFE[sic] and Station Manager	5	A. They were entry control officers.
6	(SM) TAYLOR were at the bridgehead with me along with	6	Q. They were acting as ECOs, were they?
7	two entry control officers, FF O'BEIRNE and FF DE ST	7	A. Yes.
8	AUBIN of North Kensington."	8	Q. Right.
9	Now, I just want to ask you about the reference to	9	At that point, when you arrived, do you remember
10	Station Manager Taylor.	10	whether anybody at the bridgehead was receiving fire
11	I showed you your second statement earlier which	11	survival guidance call information from anywhere?
12	said that the reference to Taylor should be a reference	12	A. I don't know specifically. On my arrival to the
13	to Walton.	13	bridgehead, I was tasked with collating the FSG
14	Do you remember Station Manager Walton being there	14	information. I don't know who was doing that prior to
15	on the bridgehead when you arrived?	15	me. I was given a forward information board that had
16	A. I do remember him being there, but I felt at the time	16	information already on it.
17	that Watch Manager O'Keeffe was in charge of the	17	Q. Did you see any signs at the bridgehead of fire survival
18	bridgehead.	18	guidance information having been recorded somewhere?
19	Q. Right, okay.	19	A. Just the information that was already on that forward
20	What was Station Manager Walton doing when you	20	information board that was handed to me.
21	arrived, do you remember?	21	Q. So somebody handed you a partly completed FIB, did they?
22	A. I don't recall.	22	A. Yes.
23	Q. Do you remember how long he stayed there after you	23	Q. Who was that?
24	arrived?	24	A. I don't recall. Unfortunately I don't recall who
25	A. No, I don't know.	25	briefed me to collate the FSG information or handed me
	Page 197		Page 199
1	Q. Do you remember the arrival at the bridgehead of a watch	1	the board because I was very focused on getting to grips
2	manager called Watson?	2	with what my role was going to be. So I don't remember
3	A. I don't recall Watch Manager Watson, no. That's not to	3	who that was.
4	say it didn't happen, I just don't have any memory of	4	Q. Do you remember who had written on the FIB thus far?
5	Watch Manager Watson.	5	A. I didn't know who had written that on, no.
6	Q. Okay. Right.	6	Q. Do you know how fire survival guidance information had
7	Do you have a clear recollection of Station Manager	7	been coming to the bridgehead prior to your arrival?
8	Walton being there?	8	A. No.
9	A. Yes.	9	Q. You don't know whether it had come by radio or by pieces
10	Q. But you don't know how long he stayed there?	10	of paper?
11	A. No. I think I say a bit further on I had a discussion	11	A. I don't know. Prior to my arrival, I don't know.
12	with Station Manager Walton about removing crews from	12	Q. Now, on page 5 of your statement, just below halfway
13	that initial area that we were trying to work in, so	13	down, you say:
14	I remember that exchange with him. After that I	14	"I was asked by an officer (I'm not sure who) to
1.5		15	collate the FSG information."
15	don't recall seeing him after that.		T . 11 11 1 . 1
16	Q. Do you know who the incident commander was when you	16	Just highlight that sentence.
16 17	Q. Do you know who the incident commander was when you arrived at the bridgehead and saw him?	16 17	I've partly asked you this before but let me just
16 17 18	Q. Do you know who the incident commander was when you arrived at the bridgehead and saw him?A. The incident commander?	16 17 18	I've partly asked you this before but let me just clarify it: do you know who that officer was?
16 17 18 19	Q. Do you know who the incident commander was when you arrived at the bridgehead and saw him?A. The incident commander?Q. Yes.	16 17 18 19	I've partly asked you this before but let me just clarify it: do you know who that officer was? A. No.
16 17 18 19 20	 Q. Do you know who the incident commander was when you arrived at the bridgehead and saw him? A. The incident commander? Q. Yes. Let me ask the question this way: when you arrived 	16 17 18 19 20	I've partly asked you this before but let me just clarify it: do you know who that officer was? A. No. Q. Do you know whether it was someone who was already at
16 17 18 19 20 21	 Q. Do you know who the incident commander was when you arrived at the bridgehead and saw him? A. The incident commander? Q. Yes. Let me ask the question this way: when you arrived at the bridgehead and saw Station Manager Walton, do you 	16 17 18 19 20 21	I've partly asked you this before but let me just clarify it: do you know who that officer was? A. No. Q. Do you know whether it was someone who was already at the bridgehead or somebody from outside?
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 Q. Do you know who the incident commander was when you arrived at the bridgehead and saw him? A. The incident commander? Q. Yes. Let me ask the question this way: when you arrived at the bridgehead and saw Station Manager Walton, do you remember who the incident commander was? 	16 17 18 19 20 21 22	I've partly asked you this before but let me just clarify it: do you know who that officer was? A. No. Q. Do you know whether it was someone who was already at the bridgehead or somebody from outside? A. No, it was somebody at the bridgehead.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q. Do you know who the incident commander was when you arrived at the bridgehead and saw him? A. The incident commander? Q. Yes. Let me ask the question this way: when you arrived at the bridgehead and saw Station Manager Walton, do you remember who the incident commander was? A. No, I didn't know. 	16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	I've partly asked you this before but let me just clarify it: do you know who that officer was? A. No. Q. Do you know whether it was someone who was already at the bridgehead or somebody from outside? A. No, it was somebody at the bridgehead. Q. Now, Brien O'Keeffe has given evidence to the inquiry
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. Do you know who the incident commander was when you arrived at the bridgehead and saw him? A. The incident commander? Q. Yes. Let me ask the question this way: when you arrived at the bridgehead and saw Station Manager Walton, do you remember who the incident commander was? A. No, I didn't know. Q. When you saw Station Manager Walton at the bridgehead, 	16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	I've partly asked you this before but let me just clarify it: do you know who that officer was? A. No. Q. Do you know whether it was someone who was already at the bridgehead or somebody from outside? A. No, it was somebody at the bridgehead. Q. Now, Brien O'Keeffe has given evidence to the inquiry already, and he said when he gave evidence this was
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 Q. Do you know who the incident commander was when you arrived at the bridgehead and saw him? A. The incident commander? Q. Yes. Let me ask the question this way: when you arrived at the bridgehead and saw Station Manager Walton, do you remember who the incident commander was? A. No, I didn't know. 	16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	I've partly asked you this before but let me just clarify it: do you know who that officer was? A. No. Q. Do you know whether it was someone who was already at the bridgehead or somebody from outside? A. No, it was somebody at the bridgehead. Q. Now, Brien O'Keeffe has given evidence to the inquiry

1	and I give you the gist of it, that you were briefed and	1	So I didn't have too much time to question too much
2	then accompanied to the bridgehead by Watch Manager	2	about where it had come from; I just had to continue
3	Watson.	3	with the task as best I could.
4	Can you comment on that? Do you think he's right	4	Q. Yes.
5	about that?	5	Now, just taking that a little bit further forward,
6	A. I don't have any memory to that. That's again not to	6	in your statement on page 5, you say towards the
7	say that that wasn't the case, but that's not a memory	7	bottom and this is eight lines up I suppose we could
8	that I have.	8	start:
9	Q. Okay.	9	"When I was handed the board, some information had
10	Were you given any specific instructions as to how	10	already been written on it, maybe 3 or 4 flat numbers,
11	to go about collating the FSG information?	11	floors and number of people in each."
12	A. No.	12	Just looking at that, did you also have any
13	Q. So in order to carry out the task that you were given,	13	information about the conditions such as smoke or fire?
14	what were you drawing on?	14	A. I don't believe so, no.
15	A. The forward information board.	15	Q. Okay. You then say, two lines down:
16	Q. But in terms of a sort of how to do it guide, what were	16	"I was briefed to take the board and continue to
17	you relying on?	17	collate the FSG information. I used this board to
18	A. So previous knowledge, really. I know that the forward	18	collate a list, which already had information on."
19	information board is used for that reason and designed	19	Now, what was the purpose of the collation exercise?
20	for that reason. The information that was already on	20	A. So obviously the information comes in from the caller to
21	there, I just followed suit from there. It was very	21	control, and then obviously it's essential that we have
22	much a list, so I just followed suit with what was there	22	that information at the bridgehead. So my task
23	already and just continued with that.	23	Q. Right, so when you say
24	Q. Can you remember whether what was there already was	24	A. Sorry was to just continue making sure the bridgehead
25	detailed FSG that you would expect to see?	25	had that information or was receiving that information.
	Page 201		Page 203
1	A I don't woodl what was those avaith. It containly	1	Q. Okay.
1	A. I don't recall what was there exactly. It certainly wasn't the amount of detail that we get from a control	2	It's the word "collate" I'm interested in; do you
2 3	information sheet. That can take a lot of detail onto	3	really just mean record?
4	that piece of paper.	4	A. Yes, yes.
5	So I'd say it wasn't that amount, but it was more	5	Q. At the stage you took it over and started recording the
6	than, say, the floor and flat number, but less than the	6	FSG information, how was that information then used to
7	amount that you can get from a control information	7	brief crews?
8	sheet.	8	A. So at that stage Watch Manager O'Keeffe was briefing and
9	Q. Was the amount of FSG on the FIB voluminous, was there	9	committing BA crews and he would liaise with me as to
10	a lot of numbers of flats and floors or	10	where we needed to prioritise BA crews to go to in
11	A. No, there was a few entries, a handful of entries, just	11	regard to those FSG calls that we had at that time.
12	listed in chinagraph.	12	Q. Do you remember, once you'd started working at the
13	Q. Right.	13	bridgehead, who the first crew you saw get briefed by
14	Were you able to form a mental picture, comparing	14	Brien O'Keeffe was? Do you have a particular
15	what you saw on the FIB with what you'd heard over the	15	recollection?
16	radio coming to the incident, about whether or not	16	A. No, I don't recall.
17	sufficient FSG information had made it to the bridgehead	17	Q. Now, I just want to jump ahead in your statement to
18	by that point?	18	page 12, if I can, and just ask you something which is
19	A. I wasn't in a position to be aware of that at the time.	19	out of order in your statement but relevant here.
20	Even though I had heard the information en route,	20	At the foot of page 12, you say:
21	I didn't write it down myself, so I wasn't in a position	21	"The stay put policy is in place for certain
22	to be able to sort of cross-reference if that was on	22	residential high rise buildings. The advice is to stay
23	there. And even as soon as I was briefed and put in	23	put inside their flats. I don't know whether it was in
24	position to collate the FSG information, it immediately	24	place at Grenfell Tower and I don't know whether that
25	started to come to me in various ways.	25	advice was being given.
25	started to come to me in various ways.		
25	Page 202		Page 204

1	W	1	
1	, E		BA wears that we were getting more information as to how
2	people were trapped in their flats. In my role, I didn't	2	much of the stairwell was compromised in terms of
3	need to know whether a stay put policy was in place or	3	smoke-logging, lobbies being smoke-logged.
4	not."	4	Q. This wasn't a discussion you had with Brien O'Keeffe
5	Can I just ask you why you say you didn't need to	5	when you arrived then?
6	know whether a stay-put policy was in place or not?	6	A. Not on arrival, but soon after we did discuss conditions
7	A. Yeah, sure. What I mean is for my role of collating	7 and where the BA crews were to go to, which FSG calls to	
8	that FSG information, those people in those flats were	8	prioritise, that kind of thing.
9	trapped; they were trapped by smoke, fire or heat. They	9	Q. Do you remember the first crew debrief that you
10	didn't have an option to leave their flats, they didn't	10	experienced after arrival?
11	have an evacuation option at that stage. They're	11	A. No, I don't recall a debrief with a BA crew because
12	telling us that they are trapped and in need of rescue.	12	I was solely focused on the information coming in to me
13	So I just mean that for them an evacuation plan wasn't	13	and getting it on that forward information board.
14	a consideration; they were trapped.	14	Q. We'll come back to that in due course.
15	Q. I see.	15	A. Sure.
16	Does that mean that to you at the time, for anybody	16	MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, the witness has been going for an
17	who was the subject of what I might call a genuine FSG	17	hour, I have noticed. We are not at a particularly
18	call because they were trapped, whether or not stay put	18	natural place to break, but it may be good for the
19	was in place was irrelevant?	19	witness and for us generally to have a short break.
20	A. Not that it was irrelevant, but the information those	20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would you like to take a break now?
21	people are telling us is that they can't get down their	21	THE WITNESS: Yeah, sure.
22	escape route or their stairwell, and that if their flat	22	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We have lost quite a lot of time
23	is not compromised, that their escape route is, then in	23	today, you're probably aware of that. We kept you
24	theory and as far as we're aware, they should be safest	24	waiting to come into the hearing room.
25	in their flats. So that's where we would regard them to	25	THE WITNESS: That's okay.
	Page 205		Page 207
			GID MADTIN MOODE DIGIT IS A 1 1 10 1 1 1 1
1	be and they're in need of rescue because they can't	1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If we had a 10-minute break now,
2	escape down that stairwell because it's compromised.	2	would you feel able to go on until 4.30?
3	Q. Yes, I see.	3	THE WITNESS: Yes.
4	Now, would it have helped to know if stay-put advice	4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So we'll stop now for 10 minutes
5	was still in place, in other words hadn't been revoked	5	until 4 o'clock.
6	by control or the incident commander, or indeed anybody	6	I have to ask you, please, not to talk about your
7	else, would that not have helped you organise or	7	evidence or anything relating to it
8	prioritise rescues?	8	THE WITNESS: Sure.
9	A. I think by the time I arrived and the amount of FSG	9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: while you're out of the room.
10	calls that we had in progress, like I say, those people	10	We'll resume at 4 o'clock and see how we get on after
11	were trapped and at that stage we had no way of alarming	11	that. Is that all right?
12	residents to leave the building. The stairwell was	12	THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you.
13	fully in operation of firefighters and firefighting	13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank very much. Would you like to
14	rescues, and in fact having that one stairwell for	14	go with the usher, then, please.
15	firefighting and for evacuation was probably going to be	15	(The witness withdrew)
16	more dangerous and a higher risk at that stage of the	16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Just for the benefit of everyone
17	incident.	17	else in the room, having lost quite a lot of time
18	So the stay-put policy makes sense in that they	18	earlier on, I am minded to sit on until 4.30 or possibly
19	should be safe in their flats.	19	a little later, depending on the witness's ability to
20	Q. When you arrived and started the exercise of recording	20	cope with giving evidence. So I just mention that now
21	the FSG information, running entry control, and the FIB,	21	for your information.
22	did you observe anything about how far up the stairwell	22	We'll resume at 4 o'clock, please. Thank you.
23	was compromised with smoke?	23	(3.50 pm)
24	A. No, not at that stage. So we were waiting for it	24	(A short break)
25	wasn't until firefighters started to return from their	25	(4.00 pm)
	Page 206		Page 208
L	- "%" = "		52 (Pages 205 to 208)

		1		
1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Ms De Silvo?	1	receiving information by small pieces of paper (2" x	
2	THE WITNESS: Yes.	2	3"), runners and also by radio with just the floors and	
3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Now, can I just mention, Mr Millett	3	flat numbers."	
4	is very keen and he will go on as long as I let him, but	4	Was that so as soon as you started working at the	
5	you may start to feel a bit tired. So if you reach that	5	ECB?	
6	point, let me know and then we'll find a convenient	6	A. Not all three, no. I'd say on the 2nd floor I was	
7	point to stop.	7	receiving information by radio, certainly. And at that	
8	THE WITNESS: I will, thank you.	8	stage I was receiving some control information sheets,	
9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.	9	but the small pieces of paper and runners was more when	
10	MR MILLETT: Ms De Silvo, thank you for coming back.	10	the bridgehead had moved on.	
11	Can I just ask you whether at the early stages of	11	Q. So just focusing, then trying to keep this	
12	your involvement at the bridgehead you heard or	12	chronological.	
13	overheard a debrief given to Watch Manager O'Keeffe by	13	A. Yes.	
14	some crews who had gone up into the tower before about	14	Q. At the stage when you are on the 2nd floor, before the	
15	2 am?	15	move of the bridgehead to the 3rd floor, you say radio.	
16	Specifically, can I just ask you, did you hear	16	A. Yes.	
17	a debrief or overhear one from Crew Manager Secrett or	17	Q. Which radio was that?	
18	Firefighter Badillo or Firefighter Dorgu about a rescue	18	A. My handheld radio, my personal radio.	
19	on the 20th floor?	19	Q. Was that the fire ground radio?	
20	A. No.	20	A. Yes, my personal handheld radio.	
21	Q. You don't.	21	Q. Which channel was that on?	
22	Similar question, did you hear or overhear a debrief	22	A. Initially it would've been on channel 1. At some point	
23	given to Watch Manager O'Keeffe by two firefighters	23	I changed to channel 3.	
24	called Hippel or Stern about a trip to the 16th floor?	24	Q. Did anybody tell you to change to channel 3?	
25	A. No.	25	A. So I think this was possibly after we'd moved up to the	
	D 200		D 244	
	Page 209		Page 211	
1	Q. No.	1	2nd floor when the bridgehead had moved that a mynner	
			or of the or of the bridgeneau had moved, that a runner	
2	Did you hear or overhear any debriefs by any crews	2	3rd floor, when the bridgehead had moved, that a runner had asked me to move to channel 3 so that I could speak	
2 3			<u>-</u>	
	Did you hear or overhear any debriefs by any crews	2	had asked me to move to channel 3 so that I could speak	
3	Did you hear or overhear any debriefs by any crews coming down A. No. So	2 3	had asked me to move to channel 3 so that I could speak to Watch Manager Sadler, who was outside the tower, just	
3 4	Did you hear or overhear any debriefs by any crews coming down	2 3 4	had asked me to move to channel 3 so that I could speak to Watch Manager Sadler, who was outside the tower, just for that channel so we could communicate on that	
3 4 5	Did you hear or overhear any debriefs by any crews coming down A. No. So Q at that early stage?	2 3 4 5	had asked me to move to channel 3 so that I could speak to Watch Manager Sadler, who was outside the tower, just for that channel so we could communicate on that channel.	
3 4 5 6	Did you hear or overhear any debriefs by any crews coming down A. No. So Q at that early stage? A. I was very focused on the role that I had been given and	2 3 4 5 6	had asked me to move to channel 3 so that I could speak to Watch Manager Sadler, who was outside the tower, just for that channel so we could communicate on that channel. Q. Now, at the point you started, were you in radio	
3 4 5 6 7	Did you hear or overhear any debriefs by any crews coming down A. No. So Q at that early stage? A. I was very focused on the role that I had been given and the information that was on that board, and obviously	2 3 4 5 6 7	had asked me to move to channel 3 so that I could speak to Watch Manager Sadler, who was outside the tower, just for that channel so we could communicate on that channel. Q. Now, at the point you started, were you in radio communication with Watch Manager Sadler?	
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		1	
1	Q. Okay. Now, can I just see if no, that's misleading.	1	Paul Sadler at 02.19, he told us, of an envelope, which
2	Can I just see if you can tell us about when the	2	he says he sent via a runner to the bridgehead. Not the
3	bridgehead moved from the 2nd floor to the 3rd floor.	3	photograph, the actual paper envelope.
4	We've had some evidence, particularly from Station	4	Do you remember receiving this document?
5	Manager Cook, that it moved to the 3rd floor about 02.15	5	A. No. Not personally.
6	or 02.17 or so. That's what he remembers.	6	Q. Right.
7	What do you remember about the timing of the move?	7	A. It's possible that somebody else at the bridgehead did,
8	A. So I know that I wasn't at the 2nd-floor bridgehead for	8	but personally I don't have any memory of seeing this.
9	very long. I believe I got walked into the building at	9	Q. Right. You don't.
10	01.50.	10	A. (Indicated dissent).
11	Q. Yes.	11	Q. Do you have a memory of being given a bunch of fire
12	A. So that would probably roughly coincide with moving to	12	survival guidance details like that, some 13 addresses?
13	the 3rd floor about 02.15.	13	A. No.
14			Q. You don't.
15	3rd floor, you said earlier you remember receiving some	14	A. (Indicated dissent).
16	probably white, possibly yellow, control information	16	Q. Right.
17	forms.	17	Before the bridgehead move to the 3rd floor, do you
18	Let me see if I can show you one or two and see if	18	remember how many control information forms, roughly,
19	we can get the timing right.	19	you got?
20	Can I ask you to go to LFB00001922 and look, please,	20	A. No. I know like I say, the list on the forward
21	at page 33.	21	information board had a few entries on. I perhaps added
22	Now, I'm going to ask you to assume that this	22	a further I don't know probably less than 10. And
23	is a white copy. This is of course a photocopy but we	23	then when we moved the bridgehead, I'd say that's maybe
24	are going to find the original.	24	how many I took up with me.
25	It has a 1 on it. We heard some evidence this	25	Q. Did you have cause to write FSG information on a wall
25	Te has a 1 of it. We heard some evidence and	23	Q. Did you have cause to write 150 information on a wan
	Page 213		Page 215
1	morning from Paul Sadler that this was his document	1	while the bridgehead was still on the 2nd floor?
2	which he created at 02.13 while he was working on the	2	A. Not me personally, no.
3	bonnet of a car. He said that he sent these to the	3	Q. Did anybody write FSG information on a wall while the
4			
	4 bridgehead.		
5	5 Do you remember seeing this document as one of the		bridgehead was still on the 2nd floor?
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1	A. I'd say it was both.	1	reaching them. It was just a matter of trying to
	2 Q. Both, right.		collate it all at the same time as best I could.
3	Can I then show you an example perhaps of that. Can	$\begin{vmatrix} 2\\3 \end{vmatrix}$	Q. Still on the 2nd floor, when crews were being briefed
4	you please be shown LFB00001929.	4	while you were still on the 2nd floor, while they were
5	Now, these are pieces of paper which Watch Manager	5	being briefed to go to certain floors and flats to carry
6	O'Keeffe gave evidence about. Just so you know, the	6	out search and rescue, were you involved in the process
7	gist of his evidence was that he had received these	7	of briefing the crews?
8	during the course of the night and had put them in his	8	A. Yes.
9	tunic or his PPE trousers, and at the end of the night	9	Q. What information did you personally give the crews?
10	he had found them and handed them to the LFB.	10	A. So I had that FSG information, so between myself and
11	The third and fourth from the left are in different	11	Watch Manager O'Keeffe, who would give the briefing in
12	handwriting, and Watch Manager Watson says that he	12	terms of conditions and what he wanted them to do, he
13	thought that those two were his handwriting, and that	13	would liaise with me as to which flats needed rescues
14	those were the scraps of paper he had taken to use while	14	made from. So between the two of us, we would establish
15	the bridgehead was on the 2nd floor and had sent them to	15	where to brief each crew to, and that would be according
16	the bridgehead.	16	to the information that I had.
17	Do you recall seeing these pieces of paper or pieces	17	Q. Did you always get information in terms of conditions;
18	of paper like it?	18	in other words, about the conditions in the particular
19	A. It's entirely possible. I don't recall seeing those	19	flats where FSG calls were coming from?
20	specific pieces of paper. I probably saw 200 pieces of	20	A. Information coming to me about the flats?
21	paper throughout the time that I was at the bridgehead,	21	Q. Yes.
22	so it's quite possible, even likely. But I won't be	22	A. If I did receive any information about that, I would've
23	able to specifically remember those two pieces of paper.	23	added it to the board in order to help me prioritise
24	Q. No. But do you recall seeing pieces of paper that size	24	which flats need rescues and in what order to prioritise
25	and of that type	25	that. But quite often I wasn't getting that kind of
	••		-
	Page 217		Page 219
1	A. Yes.		
1		1 1	information because of the sheer volume of numbers that
2		1 2	information because of the sheer volume of numbers that
2	Q before you moved to the 3rd floor?	2	were coming in. Like I say, if I did get any
3	Q before you moved to the 3rd floor?A. I couldn't be certain, but I'd say yes.	2 3	were coming in. Like I say, if I did get any information like that, I would add it on and we would
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3 4 5 6	 Q before you moved to the 3rd floor? A. I couldn't be certain, but I'd say yes. Q. Okay. All right. Do you know why radio and written communications were being used to communicate FSG information to the 	2 3 4 5 6	were coming in. Like I say, if I did get any information like that, I would add it on and we would act accordingly. Q. Did you adopt any form or system of prioritisation? A. Only in that if we did have any further information
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1	Q. Is that right? When was that?	1	example?	
2	A. Well, pretty early on. It was just a matter of giving	2	A. No.	
3	the next BA crew the next number, the next flat number.	3	Q. You don't.	
4	So I'd say early on we had more numbers than we were	4	Can I just ask you, then, to go back to your	
5	able to commit crews.	5	statement and look at page 5. At the foot of the page,	
6	Q. How long did that deficit of crews last for?	6	you say:	
7	A. I mean, it was a constant stream of receiving FSG	7	"Using that information, I assisted with briefing	
8	information, so at no point could we confidently say	8	crews to go to certain floors and flats to search for	
9	that we had a BA crew going to every single number, that	9	and rescue trapped residents as per the information	
10	just wouldn't have been possible. We had availability	10	I had at the time."	
11	of BA crews but, like I say, it just takes time to get	11	Focusing on the time when the bridgehead was on the	
12	them crews briefed and in as well as crews coming out.	12	2nd floor, do you remember crews presenting themselves	
13	Q. Yes, I see. I think my question was really directed to	13	to you with pieces of paper which they'd already been	
14	whether or not you actually ran out of BA wearers; in	14	given by somebody else with FSG on it?	
15	other words, you had information but you didn't have	15	A. Not on the 2nd floor, no.	
16	anyone to give them to?	16	Q. Do you remember that happening on the 3rd floor, when	
17	A. No, we had a steady stream of available BA wearers.	17	you got there?	
18	Q. Did anybody ever ask you to prioritise based on the	18	A. Possibly, yes.	
19	information about smoke density within a flat?	19	Q. Okay. Well, we'll come back to that	
20	A. No. Again, if I had that information that an occupant	20	A. Okay.	
21	was in a heavily smoke-logged flat and in need of	21	Q in due course.	
22	rescue, we would've prioritised that. But unfortunately	22	Turning to the next sentence:	
23	we often didn't have the information because it was	23	"As crews came in and out, I attempted to update the	
24	centred around floors and flat numbers due to the number	24	board to know the progress of each FSG. If trapped by	
25	of occupants that we had coming in.	25	the effects of fire, a member of the public calls 999	
	Page 221		Page 223	
1	Q. How many firefighters would you send to each flat	1	and speaks to our control room."	
2	generally?	2	Now, I just want to focus with you on what happened	
3	A. A crew, so a BA crew of at least two. So crews were in	3	when they came out about the progress of each FSG.	
4	twos or threes and there was at least a BA crew to	4	At the start of running this task when you were on	
5	an FSG.	5	the 2nd floor, what information were you getting about	
6	Q. Did you ever get evidence of the top floors of the	6	the success or failure of crews getting to the flats and	
7	building being most severely affected and needing BA	7	floor numbers that you'd committed them to?	
8	rescues more urgently?	8	A. I don't recall specifically, but I know that any	
9	A. Not in terms of more urgently or in I didn't have any	9	information that would've come back from BA crews	
10	information regarding their smoke conditions. I had	10		
	information regarding their smoke conditions. I had		I would've used to undate the board. So if anyone was	
	information that there was FSC calls in progress on the		I would've used to update the board. So if anyone was	
11	information that there was FSG calls in progress on the	11	able to tell me where they had come from and what the	
11 12	23rd floor and I actioned that accordingly.	11 12	able to tell me where they had come from and what the conditions were like, then I would add it on.	
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1	a rescue, where it came from, so that I could make		like I say, I couldn't stop doing what I was doing or
2	a note of that on the forward information board.	2	we'd have lost information, which I just couldn't risk
3	Q. Now, where you got that information, what did you do	3	happening.
4	with it?	4	In my position, it wasn't part of my role to
5	A. I would've added it to the forward information board.	5	communicate that information back; it was just to try
6	Q. Yes, sorry, my fault.	6	and annotate the board that I had as best I could.
7	Having added it to the forward information board,	7	Q. Would it have been possible to designate a firefighter
8	did you communicate that information from the bridgehead	8	who you had on the bridgehead, or indeed to find
9	to anybody on the incident ground?	9	somebody, and task them with positively communicating
10	A. No. So given my role, I was focused on the role of the	10	the written results of a deployment you were recording
11	FSG information. Any other officers at the	11	back out to Paul Sadler or to anybody outside the
12	bridgehead so if Watch Manager O'Keeffe was aware of	12	bridgehead so that they could send that information back
13	information like that, he would've passed on information	13	to control?
14	like that as best he could as well.	14	A. With hindsight, possibly, yes. But at the time, and
15	Q. Do you remember either yourself or Watch Manager	15	especially on the 2nd floor, we didn't have the
16	O'Keeffe actively communicating with either Paul Sadler	16	resources to do that and we had to prioritise getting BA
17	or the command unit about the results of any particular	17	crews in, the rescues that were happening, and gathering
18	deployments?	18	that information that I had. So to stop and designate
19	A. I know that I did not. The information was coming to me	19	that to a firefighter when we needed all hands on deck,
20	so quickly that if I'd have taken the time to try and	20	essentially, just wasn't possible at that time.
21	update anybody so the two-way street of information,	21	Q. Thinking about the difficulties of debriefing crews that
22	obviously the information was coming to me, if I'd have	22	you referred to a moment ago, did you have difficulties
23	stop to try to relay any of that information going back,	23	actually extracting reliable information from returning
24	I would've missed something coming in. So for me, I was	24	deployments?
25	prioritising gathering information and, unfortunately,	25	A. So across the duration of that night, firefighters were
	Page 225		Page 227
1	for me personally, was unable to the update anybody for	1	certainly returning extremely exhausted, dehydrated, on
2	information going back.	2	the verge of passing out. I would say they were
3	Q. Did you have any thoughts at the time about how the	3	certainly suffering from heat stress, which affects
4	control room would learn about the conditions within the	4	their cognitive ability and their decision-making, and
5	lobbies and stair or individual flats without any	5	they were certainly in need of medical attention. The
6	information coming from the bridgehead?	6	best thing I could do for them at that time was to try
7	A. I appreciate the importance of that information and for	7	to reassure them, cool them down, get them water, get
8	them to receive the information, but due to the nature	8	them oxygen. So they were in no way able to inform us
9	of that incident and the nature of the bridgehead, and	9	as to where they'd made rescues or how many. It was
10	the firefighters in being exhausted and the difficulty	10	just a matter of trying to take care of their welfare at
11	they had in giving us any information, personally I was	11	that time.
12	unable to get any information back to control.	12	Q. Was that, looking back on it, the invariable experience
13	Q. Now, the question of getting accurate information from	13	you had or were those just exceptions or
14	the crews I understand, and that's a separate question	14	A. No, I'd say the
15	I'm going to ask you about in a moment, but where you	15	Q a minority?
16	did get clear and what you would consider to be reliable	16	A. Sorry, the majority of firefighters were suffering with
17	information about a deployment which you added to the	17	heat stress due to the circumstances, the travel
18	FIB	18	distance, the adrenaline. The efforts that they put in
19	A. Yes.	19	were 110 per cent every time. Their relief to return to
20	Q my question is really directed at why it was that	20	•
			the bridgehead when they had almost no air or sometimes
21 22	that information didn't go from the bridgehead, as	21 22	no air left, it was visible relief that they had made it
	recorded on the FIB, out to the command unit, or back to		back, and the fact that if they'd managed to bring
23 24	the control room?	23 24	a casualty with them was an amazing achievement.
25	A. It's possible that it was, but it wasn't coming from me.	25	So at that point, to either try and question the
25	So because of my role and gathering the information,	25	casualty or the firefighter, it just wasn't an option.
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1			I should just tell you this to be fair to you, where		
2	way. They needed help.	2	you say "on the wall", it looks from the statement that		
3	Q. Are you trained in how to spot metabolic heat stress in	3	you are there dealing with the written information when		
4	firefighters?	4	the bridgehead was at the 3rd floor.		
5	A. So at training school as a firefighter you are taught	5	A. Yes.		
6	about heat stress, heat exhaustion, heat stroke, so it's	6	Q. So I just wanted to get a feel for where the bridgehead		
7	something you're aware of. Certainly the elements	7	was when you experienced what you describe there, which		
8	include confusion, dizziness, passing out. Yeah,	8	was firefighters returning to the bridgehead in the		
9	definite sort of difficulties in cognitive thinking.	9	state of metabolic heat stress or other symptoms.		
10	Most firefighters needed water, needed to be sat	10	A. I would say it would have happened throughout my time at		
11	down or were collapsing, effectively.	11	the bridgehead, from when I initially got there. I'd		
12	Q. You observed that for yourself, did you?	12	say most of the crews, regardless of time through the		
13	A. Yes.	13	night, experienced that. But my main memories of being		
14	Q. Did you observe the displaying of symptoms of metabolic	14	at its most significant was when the bridgehead was on		
15	heat stress in those firefighters?	15	the ground floor.		
16	A. Absolutely, yes.	16	Q. Right. Okay.		
17	MR MILLETT: Can I ask the chairman whether another	17	Now, when we go back to page 6 of your statement, if		
18	5 minutes might take us to a suitable spot?	18	we can, you say a quarter of the way down, just after		
19	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: How do you feel about another	19	the first reference to FSG calls coming in by radio and		
20	5 minutes, or even 10, depending on what 5 means?	20	by pieces of paper, you say:		
21	A. Sure, that's fine.	21	"Another problem was the BA crews normally use		
22	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Shall we say 4.45 and no later, and	22	channel 6 to communicate with entry control. However		
23	if you reach a natural point before then, so much the	23	this channel was proving difficult throughout the		
24	better.	24	incident. There was so much feedback on the channel		
25	MR MILLETT: Fine, thank you very much.	25	that it was very difficult to use."		
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1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.	1	What were you using that channel or trying to use		
2	MR MILLETT: So continuing on this theme, just in terms of	2	that channel for?		
3	timing, on page 8 of your witness statement, if you just	3	A. So channel 6 is for the entry control officers to		
4	jump ahead a moment, a quarter of the way down, you	4	communicate with the BA crews, and that is to ensure		
5	describe there what you've just been telling us about	5	their safety as well as for information of what the BA		
6	just now.	6	crews are experiencing to give back to us.		
7	You say:	7	Q. Do you know why there was the amount of feedback that		
8	"One of the problems I had wasn't with the system on	8	you were experiencing?		
9	the wall, but with debriefing crews when they came	9	A. No. Some crews were coming back saying they just		
10	down."	10	weren't hearing anything across the radios on channel 6.		
11	Then you continue.	11	Other people did report feedback, which for a BARIE set		
12	My question there is: these conditions that you	12	goes straight in their ear and they can't remove it or		
13	observed, that you describe here in your statement and	13	get away from that. So we were having a lot of		
14	you've just told us about, identifying metabolic heat	14	difficulty with communications.		
15	stress, was that also your experience while the	15	Q. Right.		
16	bridgehead was on the 2nd floor?	16	Is feedback with a BARIE radio a common experience		
17	A. So although I think it probably did take place on the	17	in your experience?		
18	2nd floor, I wasn't aware of it. It was most certainly	18	A. It does happen. Generally the BARIE sets are very		
19	brought to my attention when the bridgehead was moved to	19	difficult to use and they're often unreliable.		
20	the ground floor.	20	Q. Why are they unreliable? In what way?		
21	Q. Right.	21	A. There's problems in that there's several parts to it, so		
22	A. Where firefighters would come down that stairwell	22	firstly, when you rig, it has to go on correctly for it		
23	immediately to us at the bridgehead and that was very	23	to work effectively. Bits can get dislodged and moved		
24	apparent at that stage.	24	around and then they can't hear you or it doesn't work.		
25	Q. I see, okay.	25	On this particular incident, I don't know if it was the		
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I	Page 230	1	Page 232		

1	sheer volume of crews that we had on channel 6 or what,	1	A. No.
2	but it wasn't working.	2	Q. Is this the first time you've seen anything like that?
3	Q. Where crews couldn't communicate with the bridgehead	3	A. Other than in the inquiry, yes, but not prior to that.
4	through channel 6, what would they do?	4	Q. You don't recognise it from the night?
5	A. So for a lot of the time we were unable to get any	5	A. No.
6	communications from them at all, which is worrying in	6	Q. Now, while you were on the 2nd floor still, do you have
7	terms of safety, because we want to monitor their air,	7	a recollection of any discussion between Watch Manager
8	we want to know their location, if they get in trouble,	8	O'Keeffe let me ask this question in a different way.
9	we need to know where to send an emergency crew, as well	9	Do you remember, while you were still on the
10	as where they are firefighting, where they think they	10	2nd floor at the bridgehead, the arrival of a group
11	are, where they are finding casualties, what rescues are	11	manager called Richard Welch?
12	taking place. We're not able to get any of that	12	A. I don't recall seeing Group Manager Welch until the
13	information back either.	13	3rd floor.
14	Q. You mention in your statement, just a little bit further	14	Q. Until the 3rd floor?
15	on, you say:	15	A. For myself personally.
16	"That left channel 1 which is used for fireground	16	Q. Right.
17	traffic"	17	Do you remember hearing or hearing about
18	Did you use channel 1 to communicate from the	18	a discussion between Watch Manager O'Keeffe and
19	bridgehead to deployed crews?	19	Group Manager Welch at about 2 am where the subject of
20	A. For BA crews?	20	EDBA came up?
21	Q. Yes.	21	A. No.
22	A. No, we use channel 6.	22	Q. Do you recall any discussion about the need to obtain as
23	Q. You say "That left channel 1", but you didn't use it?	23	many EDBA kits as possible?
24	A. So as in channel 1 was effective, but it is for the fire	24	A. I was certainly in agreement that we were going to need
25	ground. It's for the incident commander to communicate	25	EDBA. We had a building of 24 floors, and EDBA is
	D 222		D 225
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1	with his ops commanders and various other information	1	required if there is a travel distance involved. But
2	exchanges. If we'd have tried to use that for BA also,	2	I wasn't privy to that conversation or even aware that
3	it just would've been too much traffic on that channel,	3	that conversation was going on. I just focused with my
4	which is why we have a separate channel for BA crews so	4	role.
5	that the incident commander doesn't have to or the fire	5	Q. Okay.
6	ground don't have to be aware of all that information	6	When you were deciding on prioritisation of
7	that's going on, all that radio traffic.	7	deployments, whilst still on the 2nd floor, did the
8	Q. Did you experience difficulties in communicating with	8	question of availability of EDBA enter your
9	crews above a particular floor at any time? Is there	9	calculations?
10	like a cut-off floor above which you would lose	10	A. Again, it was a consideration in that if we were going
11	channel 6 communication with BA wearers?	11	to need crews to go higher up in the building, then EDBA
12	A. Not that I was aware of. I had a general understanding	12	was going to be required. That probably was
13	that we were not receiving any information back because	13	a discussion myself and Watch Manager O'Keeffe had, and
14	of the nature of channel 6.	14	that would've been a statement like "We're going to need
15	Q. Okay.	15	EDBA". But any further than that, I wasn't privy to
16	Now, you said earlier on this afternoon that you	16	anything further than that.
17	weren't aware of any information being written on the	17	MR MILLETT: Okay. All right.
18	wall on the 2nd floor at the bridgehead. Can I just	18	Mr Chairman, I think I've come to a natural break on
19	show you a photograph to see if you can help us with it.	19	topics.
20	A. Sure.	20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Perhaps it would be right to stop
21	Q. Could you please be shown MET00013074.	21	there then, I think.
22	Now, I should just tell you, Justin O'Beirne,	22	MR MILLETT: Yes. Thank you.
23	Firefighter O'Beirne, gave evidence and he said that	23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Now, you are going to need to
24	this photograph was taken at 02.17.	24	MR MILLETT: I'm afraid I am going
25	Do you recognise this wall writing?	25	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: ask Ms De Silvo to come back.
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			50 (Dagga 222 to 226)

```
MR MILLETT: I'm afraid I am going to.
2
           Ms De Silvo, I apologise, we had a timing issue this
3
         afternoon.
4
      THE WITNESS: That's okay.
5
       MR MILLETT: I am afraid I am going to have to ask you to
6
         come back tomorrow.
7
           Just for your benefit and everybody else's, and
8
         especially the chairman's, I probably have about an hour
9
         and a half's further questions, which won't affect the
10
         rest of the timetable for tomorrow because we have
11
         another witness after that who won't be terribly long,
12
13
       SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So for the witness's benefit and,
14
         indeed, for everyone else, we can start at 10 o'clock
15
         tomorrow?
       MR MILLETT: It would be prudent, Mr Chairman, to start
16
17
         earlier. I think prudence is probably better than
18
         convenience. But I am in your hands.
19
           We could say 9.45?
20
       SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Say what?
21
       MR MILLETT: We could say 9.45 as a compromise.
22
      SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: How difficult would it be for you to
23
         come at 9.30?
24
      THE WITNESS: That's fine, I can be here at 9.30.
25
      SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: The sooner you come, the sooner
                             Page 237
1
         you'll get away.
2
       THE WITNESS: That's absolutely fine.
       SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, I think we're all inclined to
3
4
         underestimate the time that it takes to give evidence,
5
         so we'll say 9.30. I'm sorry about that.
6
       THE WITNESS: No, that's fine.
7
       SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think the only other thing to say
8
         is please don't talk about your evidence overnight with
9
         anybody else, and we look forward to seeing you at 9.30
10
         tomorrow.
11
           If you would like to go with the usher, then,
12
         please.
13
                  (The witness withdrew)
14
       SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good. Well, that's it for today and
15
         we'll resume at 9.30 tomorrow, please.
16
           Thank you very much.
17
       (4.45 pm)
        (The hearing adjourned until Thursday, 26 July 2018 at
18
19
                      9.30 am)
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