1	Friday, 6 July 2018	1	Perhaps I should just leave 20 seconds or so for
2	(9.30 am)	2	people to do that.
3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to	3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, thank you.
4	today's hearing.	4	(Pause)
5	We are going to hear further from Mr O'Keeffe in	5	MR MILLETT: The video should be queued up at 1.12. Perhaps
6	a moment but, before we do, Mr Millett has something he	6	we can now go to that.
7	needs to deal with.	7	Now, Mr O'Keeffe, what I am going to show you is
8	MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman, thank you very much.	8	a short video clip, and I would like you to listen out
9	Yesterday, I put to Mr O'Keeffe the response time	9	very carefully for what is being said, as well as to
10	for his appliance, and I put to him that it appeared to	10	look very carefully at what is happening on the screen.
11	be outside the average response times which I'd taken	11	A. Okay.
12	from the London Fire Brigade's overview document which	12	Q. Right, if you could play that, please.
13	we got in May.	13	(Video played)
14	In fact, that overview document is only describing	14	Right. Now, did you hear anybody calling something
15	average response times for the first and second	15	that sounded like "Mike, Mike"?
16	responding vehicles and not any subsequent responding	16	A. Yes.
17	vehicles, even though part of the same initial response	17	Q. What was that?
18	as part of a predetermined attendance.	18	A. I don't know actually, just someone calling the watch
19	So I just wanted to make it clear that it is not	19	manager in charge, Mike Dowden.
20	suggested that, as the third arriving appliance,	20	Q. If we could just play that again and see if we can get
21	Mr O'Keeffe's appliance was outside the times for which	21	anything a bit more clearly from it. Just listen out
22	we have evidence about average response times.	22	again.
23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. Thank you very much. Well,	23	A. Okay.
24	it's important to get that clear and I am grateful to	24	Q. Also, watch what the fire is doing at the same time.
25	you for doing so.	25	(Video played)
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1	Well, then, if we could have Mr O'Keeffe in, please.	1	Okay.
2	Thank you.	2	A. It's difficult to pick it up. It's something about
2 3	Thank you. BRIEN O'KEEFFE (continued)	2 3	A. It's difficult to pick it up. It's something about possibly a number.
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1	quite loud. And there was a lot of noise in the area as	1	was put on, it was quite early on, relatively early on.
2	you will at any on the initial attendance at any	2	And when they had knocked the jet off because, as I said
3	incident, there is a lot of action and a lot of noise	3	yesterday, the BA crew had gone into the flat
4	associated with it, so officers generally and	4	Q. Yes.
5	firefighters shout instructions to each other or	5	A that's when I went to go to take over the bridgehead.
6	communicate by we use our radios, but more commonly	6	Q. I see okay, so
7	at the very beginning we shout at each other.	7	A. That would've been when it was put back on afterwards.
8	Q. Now, in the video	8	That's my understanding of it.
9	A. Yes.	9	Q. So you think that the covering jet we saw just there at
10	Q and we can play it again we saw burning material	10	about 1.15 was the second time the covering jet was
11	coming down from the window.	11	applied, or do you not know?
12	A. Yes.	12	A. I do not know.
13	Q. At that time so not very long after you'd arrived	13	Q. Okay.
14	do you remember looking up at the window and seeing	14	A. But it's close by. It's quite it's close by, so it's
15	burning material coming off?	15	difficult for me to give you an accurate answer on that
16	A. No, I remember flames coming out. There was no burning	16	time-wise.
17	material coming off at that time. The flames were just	17	Q. So you have your conversation with Mike Dowden just
18	coming out the window. There was energy behind when	18	outside the front entrance to the building where you
19	I say energy, there was when you have a compartment	19	discuss the make-up.
20	fire and it's developing and it's growing, it produces	20	We know that he tasked you with going to run the
21	energy from the heat and it will push flame out any	21	bridgehead.
22	opening and pushes it about, and that's what I saw with	22	A. He did, yes.
23	the flame; that it wasn't just wispy flames, there was	23	Q. Was it in that same conversation that he did that?
24	something burning. The kitchen was on fire, I'd	24	A. Yes.
25	imagine. And nothing burning material hanging down	25	Q. I see. What happened immediately next? What did you do
	Page 5		Page 7
			-
1	or falling	1	immediately next?
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1			
Ī	trying to get it working still. I don't know who the	1	tabard?
2	firefighter was, I just looked to my left and then	2	A. He will have the surcoat, yes, yellow and white surcoat,
3	I went to go through the door to go up the stairs to the	3	with an insert in the rear of the surcoat indicating
4	second floor, or to the glass balcony or whatever it is.	4	that he's the incident commander. So he would be the
5	Q. How did you get into the lift lobby? Did you need a fob	5	go-to guy or she would be the go-to person on the fire
6	or was it open?	6	ground wearing that as a focal point for command.
7	A. No, it was open. As far as I recall, I just walked	7	Q. Yes.
8	straight through.	8	If you go to the next photograph, number 185
9	Q. Right.	9	[INQ00000185], please, this is timed at 01.14.44 or so.
10	Can I just ask you to look at a photograph which we	10	A. Yes, that's me.
11	looked at, I think, with an earlier witness,	11	Q. That's you again. And there are BA wearers going in, it
12	Mr O'Hanlon, which is INQ00000178. I just want to see	12	seems.
13	if you can help me with the timing and the identity of	13	Do you know who they are?
14	firefighters.	14	A. No.
15	This is	15	Q. Okay.
16	A. That's Watch Manager Dowden.	16	Then the next one is timed at 01.14.49, so just
17	Q. Right. Okay. Did you see him do that? Did you see him	17	a few seconds later, and it looks like you are holding
18	come into the main entrance and	18	the door open for them. That's you, is it?
19	A. No, I didn't in the entire incident	19	A. That's me.
20	Q. Yes.	20	Q. Okay.
21	A I didn't see Watch Manager Dowden in the tower.	21	A. I can't recognise the firefighters from this angle.
22	Q. You didn't?	22	Q. Okay. No.
23	A. No.	23	Now, just to go back to what you said a minute ago
24	Q. I see. Okay.	24	about smoke in the lobby and you said it was coming out,
25	A. I believe he was in there at some stage, but I didn't	25	as it were, being forced out.
	Page 9		Page 11
1	see him.	1	A. Yes.
2	Q. Right.	2	Q. Did that give you any cause for concern at that stage?
3	Then if you go to INQ00000184, this is a picture of	3	A. Mild concern. You know, it's not entirely unusual to
4	you, I think.	4	find smoke travel in a building during fire, given the
5	Let me ask you: that is timed at 01.14.03, subject	5	proximity of the fire, which is on the fourth floor, but
6	to adjustment		
		6	it's an indicator, you know, of smoke travel. In
7	A. Yes, that's me.	7	it's an indicator, you know, of smoke travel. In a compartmentalised building with fire doors and
7 8	A. Yes, that's me. Q. That's you?		
· ·		7	a compartmentalised building with fire doors and
8	Q. That's you?	7 8	a compartmentalised building with fire doors and lobbies, you wouldn't ordinarily get smoke travel unless
8	Q. That's you? A. Yes.	7 8 9	a compartmentalised building with fire doors and lobbies, you wouldn't ordinarily get smoke travel unless a door has been opened.
8 9 10	Q. That's you?A. Yes.Q. You are wearing a white helmet.	7 8 9 10	a compartmentalised building with fire doors and lobbies, you wouldn't ordinarily get smoke travel unless a door has been opened. But I knew there was a crew who would have gone from
8 9 10 11	Q. That's you?A. Yes.Q. You are wearing a white helmet.A. That's correct. I'm a watch manager; that's my normal	7 8 9 10 11	a compartmentalised building with fire doors and lobbies, you wouldn't ordinarily get smoke travel unless a door has been opened. But I knew there was a crew who would have gone from the bridgehead on the floor below with a jet, so that
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1	smoke.	1	Q. Then you go up there.
2	Q. You say the ventilation system never appeared to work	2	Can you explain at that stage where the bridgehead
3	beforehand	3	had been set up?
4	A. Well, it was kicking in and out. I've never seen that.	4	A. So the bridgehead had been set up on the second-floor
5	That would signify to me that it was like an engine	5	level, you had this glass — how would you describe
6	trying to start up and stopping.	6	it? balcony I call it a balcony and just inside
7	Q. That was the breathing you referred to yesterday?	7	that, in the corridor in the lobby, BA had been set up,
8	A. Yes, it was like inhalation and exhalation.	8	meaning breathing apparatus entry control board, which
9	Q. You then went up to the second floor where the	9	had Firefighter De St Aubin as the operator and
10	bridgehead was, and you describe that in your witness	10	Chris Secrett, the crew manager, was in charge of the
11	statement on page 7, in the middle of the paragraph.	11	
12		12	bridgehead.
	You say:		Q. You say you spoke with Mr Secrett on the balcony; was
13	"I walked through the lobby door and up the stairs	13	that where the bridgehead was, on the balcony?
14	which sort of went around on itself; to a glass walled	14	A. Close to it.
15	balcony, which was the second floor level. I got to the	15	Q. Where was Chris Secrett going? Was he standing there or
16	balcony and I spoke to CM SECRETT asking, 'What have you	16	was he coming away
17	got?' He said it was a fire, and I think he said in a	17	A. He was standing there. He was doing his job.
18	kitchen."	18	Q. How far away from the bridgehead was he?
19	Now, you said this morning that you'd gone past	19	A. He was in the bridgehead.
20	somebody in the lift lobby still trying to work the	20	Q. Was the bridgehead on the balcony or
21	lift.	21	A. No, no, the balcony was quite close to the bridgehead,
22	A. Yes, I don't know who it was, it was somebody trying	22	it was just the way it was situated. I believe I've
23	to because that's what firefighters are: they are	23	seen some photographs of the inside
24	determined. Maybe he or she was detailed to try and get	24	Q. Yes.
25	it to work, but I was focused on going to the	25	A and if you could show me a photograph, I could
	Page 13		Page 15
	1 mgc 10		1 1,90 10
1	bridgehead.	1	explain more clearly to you.
2	Q. The person you saw on the balcony was definitely	2	Q. Yes, I can show you a plan.
3	Chris Secrett, was it?	3	A. Okay, that's fine.
4	A. I'm certain about it, yes.	4	Q. I could do that.
5	Q. You think somebody else, another firefighter, was also	5	If you could go, please, or be shown tab 5 of the
6	trying to get the lift to work?	6	master docs bundle. I'll just see if I can show you
7	A. On the ground floor.	7	a plan of the second floor. This is MET00012593.
8	Q. On the ground floor. That's your recollection, is it?	8	If we just expand it. I showed Mr Secrett this
9	A. That's correct, yes.	9	yesterday morning. This is a plan of the second floor,
10	Q. Okay. We'll need to explore that.	10	Mr O'Keeffe, and you can see the atrium or ground floor
11	Do you know who that other firefighter was?	11	in the bottom right-hand corner.
12	A. (Indicated dissent).	12	A. Yes.
13	Q. Were they wearing BA?	13	Q. The stairs go up, and then there's the walkway gallery,
14	A. No.	14	which I think you're describing as the balcony.
15	Q. Not wearing BA?	15	A. The walkway gallery is what I'm talking about. So
16	A. No.	16	inside the walkway gallery, in there, it's in the
17	Q. Were they alone or with others?	17	communal hall is where the bridgehead was set up.
18	A. Alone.	18	Q. Where do you think Mr Secrett was when you saw him and
19	Q. They were alone. Right. Any other distinguishing	19	had this conversation?
20	features about that firefighter?	20	A. He was standing in the narrow section beyond the steps
21	A. Tall. Taller than me, anyway, but I'm not that tall, so	21	up.
22	tall.	22	Q. So
23	Q. Right. Well, we need to look for a tall firefighter.	23	A. There, yes.
	Fine.	24	Q. I see. So you go out of the walkway gallery, turn right
		1 27	2. 1555. So you go out of the wantway gamery, turn right
24		25	into that corridor there
	A. Many of them.	25	into that corridor there.
24		25	into that corridor there. Page 16

1	A. He may have been in a bit further, but it was in that	1	alight?" He said he didn't really know but it wasn't
2	area. So it was either by the lifts I don't think we	2	that bad. But they were making progress.
3	were by the lifts, but in the communal hall he would've	3	I said to him, "Okay, I'm taking over", and then
4	been.	4	I detailed him I said, "What I want you to do is get
5	Q. That makes that much clearer.	5	me a second line of hose with a BA crew to deploy
6	Now, can you explain to us what the bridgehead	6	a backup jet, get me an IEC pack", and I think there was
7	looked like at that time, in terms of	7	one further crew in the lobby sorry, I forgot to
8	A. Calm. A working bridgehead, you know. There was	8	mention a further crew in the lobby at that time
9	an entry control board set up. The BA wearers there	9	which is Crew Manager Stern and Firefighter Hippel from
10	was two BA wearers. They had one line of hose working.	10	Kensington, who were standing by. So he went to do
11	Q. Right.	11	that.
12	A. And that was it.	12	Q. You say:
13	Q. That was it. Was there anything missing from that?	13	"He told me, and I realised that it wasn't enough
14	A. Yes.	14	and that back up crews were required."
15	Q. What?	15	Is that standard practice for all high-rise fires?
16	A. Well, it was an IEC pack that was missing, which	16	A. I can explain to you.
17	I mentioned to Chris. Apparently it was nearby but	17	Q. Yes, please.
18	hadn't been brought up, but I asked for it to be brought	18	A. The initial attendance to a high-rise fire could be one
19	to the bridgehead. This is when I took over as the	19	fire engine or it could be two fire engines, depending
20	bridgehead commander.	20	on the first people to get there. That's not the
21	Q. Yes.	21	initial attendance yes, the initial attendance
22	Did you test the communications between the	22	Q. That's not the same as predetermined attendance?
23	bridgehead and Mike Dowden?	23	A. No, no, no, no, it's the first people to attend, so it's
24	A. Yes, I spoke to Mike Dowden.	24	like the first police car to attend an incident.
25	Q. How were those?	25	Q. Okay.
	D 47		D 10
	Page 17		Page 19
1	A. Good. They were good.	1	A. It's essential that the first fire engine that arrives
2	Q. Good, okay.		9
		1 2	puts in the building blocks for a successful attack on
3	A. I mean, I'm sure we'll get to it, but there was quite	3	puts in the building blocks for a successful attack on a fire. And what we first have to do is we have to
3 4			puts in the building blocks for a successful attack on a fire. And what we first have to do is we have to secure water supply, so locate a hydrant, locate the
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4 5	A. I mean, I'm sure we'll get to it, but there was quite a lot of communication between the bridgehead and the incident commander Mike Dowden initially.	3 4 5	a fire. And what we first have to do is we have to secure water supply, so locate a hydrant, locate the
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	A. I mean, I'm sure we'll get to it, but there was quite a lot of communication between the bridgehead and the incident commander Mike Dowden initially. Q. We will get to it, but initially there was no problem, was there? A. Afterwards, yes. Q. Afterwards, but not at that stage. A. Significant. Q. Now, you say in the middle of page 7: "I told him I was taking over from him as Bridgehead Commander, as I was a rank senior to him." A. Correct. And I had been detailed by the incident commander, which I haven't put in there, but that's yes. Q. Right. Did Crew Manager Secrett give you a handover briefing? A. He did. Q. What did he tell you? A. Well, I asked him, "What have you got?", which is how we speak to each other. He said they had a job in the kitchen. "What are you using?" He said, "We've got one	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	a fire. And what we first have to do is we have to secure water supply, so locate a hydrant, locate the inlet, the dry riser or wet rising main. If it was a wet rising main, we locate the pump room, et cetera. We secure water to the building, which is what North Kensington did, and set up a bridgehead. The initial attack can be one line of hose. Our national operation guidance stipulates that when resources are low, a second jet should be laid out. In reality, we like to do it all at once, to have two jets up and running, but it's not always possible because of the dynamics of firefighting and life risk. If we can put in a safe system of work with one jet initially to make an attack, the other one should be, if the PDA is working correctly, have other appliances coming on, as I was, to provide additional resources and backup. Q. Okay. A. Does that make? Q. Yes, thank you for that explanation. So at that stage is this right? Crew Manager Secrett had only deployed one

1	A. That's correct.	1	Q. Okay. 5 minutes, 10 minutes?
2	Q. And you wanted a second backup pair	2	A. Relatively quick, you know.
3	A. Correct, and a third. I chose to put in another crew	3	Q. Who, do you remember, sent that message?
4	for hose management as well.	4	A. Crew Manager Batterbee.
5	Q. Why was that?	5	Q. Batterbee?
6	A. Because it's difficult to manage hose. So hose, when	6	A. Yes.
7	it's charged, is unwieldy. If you've two jets, they	7	Q. Right. Was that by BARIE radio?
8	kink around corners, they're very hard to move, and what	8	A. A BARIE radio, yes, I think. I can't remember exactly,
9	can happen, if you've only got a BA crew on a jet, say	9	but I contacted them, the BA crew, for a progress report
10	45-millimetre charged two or three lengths of hose, it	10	or an update.
11	can be difficult because the BA crew will have to	11	Q. Right.
12	separate, which we don't like. Firefighters need to	12	A. And they said the fire's out, so I thought that was
13	stay together for safety reasons and just to look out	13	a good, swift attack and that we had gotten on top of
14	for each other.	14	it.
15	So if I'm going to a compartment fire and I've only	15	Q. Okay. Then you say, four lines up from the bottom:
16	got 2 metres of hose in there and I need 5 metres of	16	"I asked Charlie BATTERBEE the Crew Manager from
17	hose in there, you know, I would have to go back as	17	North Kensington, 'Charlie, is the fire out?' He said,
18	a firefighter and pull hose around the corner. It's	18	The fire is out."
19	very labour-intensive, and if you're in a fire	19	A. Yes.
20	compartment, if you've got guys backing you up to do	20	Q. Why did you have to ask him that question?
21	that for you, it makes sense.	21	A. That's what I always ask, you know, to clarify it. When
22	Q. Right. I see.	22	you're at an incident, there's a lot going on, there's
23	Now, I think you then go on to say that you	23	a lot of noise, a lot of activity, quite action centric.
24	committed a third crew.	24	As a watch manager or an incident commander, I would
25	A. I did.	25	always double, sometimes triple check issues regarding
			, ,
	Page 21		Page 23
1	O Do you remember who they were?	1	fire spread. So it's a hit like the police: we repeat
1	Q. Do you remember who they were? A. Ldo. So Hammersmith's pair, they were on the second	1 2	fire spread. So it's a bit like the police; we repeat
2	A. I do. So Hammersmith's pair, they were on the second	2	things twice so there's clarification on radio
2 3	A. I do. So Hammersmith's pair, they were on the second jet, I believe, and one of my firefighters, who is very	2 3	things twice so there's clarification on radio transmission. So I say, "Is the fire out?" and he goes
2 3 4	A. I do. So Hammersmith's pair, they were on the second jet, I believe, and one of my firefighters, who is very experienced, Firefighter Hippel he's done 30 years,	2 3 4	things twice so there's clarification on radio transmission. So I say, "Is the fire out?" and he goes "Yeah", and I say, "Can you confirm?", is what I would
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6 (Pages 21 to 24)

1	page 7 of your statement:	1	he came straight to see me because I wanted him to come
2	"I asked the BA crews to come and see me because	2	and see me. I was standing to the right of the BA board
3	that's my manner, to make face-to-face contact."	3	and I just said to him face-to-face, "Can you confirm
4	A. Correct.	4	the fire's out?" He said "Yes". I said, "Good job".
5	Q. "I asked Charlie BATTERBEE the Crew Manager from North	5	Or something along those lines.
6	Kensington, 'Charlie, is the fire out?' He said, 'The	6	Q. When you had that face-to-face conversation had he yet
7	fire is out."	7	tallied back in?
8	We discussed that a minute ago as if that was	8	A. No.
9	a radio discussion. I'm just wondering whether in	9	Q. I see. Did he tally back in after that conversation?
10	fact	10	A. After that conversation, because I told him to go and do
11		11	
12	A. This was a face-to-face discussion. Q. That was a face-to-face discussion?	12	a fire ground A test because things had gone wrong
13		13	during the conversation. As I was speaking to him,
	A. Yes.		things started to information started coming in and
14	Q. I see. But the message that you've just been talking	14	I heard shouts and screams as we were talking.
15	about was one over the radio?	15	Q. You say that in your statement at the bottom of page 7.
16	A. On the radio, and then I said, "Come and see me" over	16	We'll come to that in just a moment.
17	the radio I said, "Come and see me", which is again,	17	Just before we do, after that conversation, before
18	it's not uncommon for an incident commander to do that	18	he tallied in, did you see him then tally in?
19	or sector commanders.	19	A. No.
20	Q. Right, okay. I probably rushed you a little bit here,	20	Q. You didn't.
21	so let me just see	21	A. I told him to go, do a fire ground A test. I had more
22	A. You have a bit, actually, I was going to explain.	22	urgent matters to attend to immediately.
23	Q. Yes.	23	Q. What about Firefighter Brown?
24	A. There was radio this is	24	A. Didn't see him.
25	Q. Let's take it slowly.	25	Q. Didn't see him?
	Page 25		Page 27
1	A. So every fire we would go to, if it's extinguished, just	1	A. No.
2	this very specific detail, I would say every experienced	2	Q. So you didn't have a debrief with him?
3	watch commander or operational officer will ask for	3	A. No, my assumption is that Danny Brown,
<i>3</i>	verification of details over the radio first and then	4	
-	face-to-face.	5	Firefighter Brown, went to the BA board. Again, it's
5		6	an assumption. I would say they had a conversation and Charlie probably said, "I'm going to talk to the watch
6	Q. Right.	7	manager" and yes.
7	A. Because it is a very important communication. If you		•
8	say the fire's out, that's a big communication. It's	8	Q. Yes.
9	an important one.	9	We have a tally in time for Firefighter Batterbee of
10	Q. Yes, I understand.	10	1.32.11, so we know that he did tally in.
11	So just to take it a bit more in stages than we	11	Just to go back and press a little bit, do you think
12	were: you have the discussion over the radio.	12	the conversation that you had with him about what he'd
13	A. Yes.	13	seen, the fire being out, was before he tallied in?
14	Q. Either he radios you or you radio him.	14	A. Yes.
15	A. Yes.	15	Q. It was. Okay.
16	Q. He tells you the fire is out, you ask him to confirm, he	16	A. When you say "tallied in", that's not the terminology we
17	says yes.	17	use; "shut down" is what we say. You shut down your
18	A. Yes.	18	set, meaning after you've had a wear, you shut it down
19	Q. We have that radio message timed at 01.21.15. He then	19	and you report to entry control and you get your tally
20	comes down to the bridgehead is this right?	20	back. You're using the terminology "tally in"; we don't
21	A. Correct.	21	use that. We say you put a tally into the entry control
22	Q. And you then have a face-to-face debrief?	22	board. I'm being pedantic here, but is that what you
23	A. He's still wearing breathing apparatus, because he's	23	mean?
24	come to see me, which is I think polite of him, he	24	Q. It is. We have a number of times on our telemetry data,
25	could've gone to the BA board and shut down first, but	25	one of which is "Tally in (to bodyguard)", another is

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1	"End of wear time", another is "Bodyguard switched off"	1	do an A test quickly because I needed more BA wearers.
2	and another one is "Logged off".	2	I knew I would because I had information that the fire
3	A. Yes. Well, logged off you should be logged off	3	was jumping.
4	immediately. Once you go back to the entry control	4	Q. I was about to ask you: when you say "it all changed",
5	board, you shut your set down and then you're logged off	5	can you just describe for us what changed?
6	by the entry control officer and you're given your tally	6	A. It went from being a calm, good job, you know, the
7	back.	7	fire's out, to people screaming and shouting. The radio
8	Q. We don't have times for logging off for that, but we	8	starts. My handheld radio started going with a message
9	have him tallying in to bodyguard at 01.32.11, end of	9	saying the fire's jumping. I don't know which
10	wear 01.29.03 and his bodyguard switched off at	10	firefighter it was, but somebody said there's fire on
11	01.29.42?	11	the fifth or the sixth, or there's fire on the fifth,
12	A. Well, that's accurate.	12	there's fire on the fifth, and he kept repeating it in
13	Q. Yes, it's accurate. It comes from established telemetry	13	an excited, or in an alarmed way.
14	data. So I've been using tally in to bodyguard	14	Q. First of all, you say there was screaming and shouting.
15	A. That's fine. That's okay.	15	Who was
16	Q. All right. Thank you.	16	A. Shouting and a couple of screams upstairs. I could hear
17	A. You're not a firefighter, so you wouldn't know.	17	it.
18	Q. No, no. Not yet!	18	Q. Right. I'm sorry
19	So that's the tally-in time.	19	A. Consternation is how I describe it.
20	A. Yes.	20	Q. So you, standing on the bridgehead, second floor
21	Q. You think the conversation you had was before that.	21	A. Yes.
22	Okay.	22	Q where you showed us, could hear screams?
23	Now, you then say well, sorry, let me just ask	23	A. Yes, a scream, shouts, and general commotion.
24	you this: you had a face-to-face discussion with him.	24	Q. Right.
25	A. Yes.	25	A. And the radio started operating.
	D		D 04
	Page 29		Page 31
1	Q. Do you remember whether Charlie Batterbee, during that	1	Q. The screaming, shouting and general commotion, was that
2	discussion, said anything to you about seeing falling,	2	coming from firefighters or from others?
3	burning material?	3	A. Probably I'd say some of the shouts were coming from
4	A. No, no, absolutely not.	4	firefighters, but from residents also.
5	Q. Right.	5	Q. Right. And did residents start coming down?
6	In his oral evidence, Charlie Batterbee said that he	6	A. Not immediately, but very soon they did.
7	did report to you that he had seen fire on the exterior.	7	Q. Right. We'll come to this shortly, but let
8	A. He didn't.	8	A. Okay. Quite a lot happened in that 5 minutes. So much
9	Q. He didn't tell you?	9	happened. Different things everybody started moving
10	A. No, he didn't tell me that, no. He told me the fire was	10	really quickly, the noise became elevated, and the level
11	out. That was it.	11	of alarm became elevated.
12	Q. That was it?	12	Q. Let's see if I can try and take this in bits.
13	A. That was it.	13	A. Okay, that's fine.
14	Q. Are you clear in your	14	Q. So fifth floor, you say and you said in your
15	A. Absolutely certain about it.	15	statement the crew transmitted that there was smoke
16	Q. Okay.	16	on the fifth floor.
17	Then at the bottom of page 7, you say:	17	A. Correct.
18	"And then, in what seemed like seconds, but was	18	Q. Did you get that information?
19	probably a minute later, it all changed. There was	19	A. I did.
20	consternation and shouting. The atmosphere changed very	20	Q. Who did you get that from?
21	quickly and everything seemed immediately different."	21	A. Don't know, a firefighter. Can't remember which one it
22	Where was Charlie Batterbee at that moment?	22	was.
23	A. Couldn't tell you. I would say well, I could tell	23	Q. Okay. From your fire ground radio?
24	you, but I don't know physically where he was, but he	24	A. Correct.
25	was on his way back to do an A test. I've asked him to	25	Q. Was the firefighter who gave you that information inside
	D 40		75
	Page 30		Page 32
			8 (Pages 20 to 32)

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1	the tower?	1	A. I can't recall, but I can recall about a minute later
2	A. Inside the tower.	2	calling him on my radio and exactly what we said to each
3	Q. Right. Did you know that a firefighter had gone up	3	other. O. What was that?
4 5	above the fire floor to A. No.	4 5	A. Well, I sent the crew that came down to me to
	Q investigate?	6	investigate. I must say, I wasn't overly concerned
6 7	A. No.	7	because you will get smoke travel. As far as I was
8	Q. Right.	8	concerned, they had extinguished the fire and, in doing
9	A. And the reason I don't know that is because we were the	9	so, some smoke had gone during the process, smoke had
10	third machine to arrive, and if firefighters from North	10	travelled up to the fifth floor. So, again, that's not
11	Kensington were inside the tower, which I would expect	11	unusual at a fire, so I sent a BA crew to investigate.
12	them to be to help their colleagues, then I but	12	Q. But you also said that you heard screaming and
13	I wouldn't know where they were exactly.	13	consternation.
14	Q. At this stage, Alex De St Aubin was running the BA entry	14	A. Yes, shouts and general consternation or yeah, noise.
15	control.	15	And I sent the BA crew there and they went there really
16	A. He was, yes.	16	quickly it seemed like seconds to me and they
17	Q. Do you know whether he said anything about knowing that	17	actually reported to me that they were on the sixth
18	a firefighter had gone up?	18	floor.
19	A. No, he didn't say anything about it.	19	Q. Okay. We're getting ahead a bit too quickly. Can
20	Q. Did Mr Secrett tell you	20	I just take it slightly more slowly.
21	A. No.	21	A. Yes.
22	Q that someone had gone up into	22	Q. Because I know there's a lot that happened and I just
23	A. No, no.	23	want to try and take it in pieces.
24	Q. Okay.	24	A. There was a lot that happened, yes.
25	To be clear, you say the crew transmitted there was	25	Q. You say you had a conversation with Mike Dowden by radio
	Page 33		Page 35
1	smoke on the fifth floor?	1	a minute later, after being told that there was smoke on
1 2	A. Mm.	2	the fifth floor. Could you just tell me
3	Q. Smoke or anything more than smoke?	3	A. No. When there was smoke reported, I would've said to
4	A. Smoke.	4	him there's smoke reported. That's the sort of thing
5	Q. So no reference to fire on the fifth floor?	5	you would say to your colleague or incident commander.
6	A. There was other information, they seemed alarmed, but	6	Q. Did he respond to that?
7	I can't remember what it was, but they said smoke and	7	A. I can't remember.
8	they said heavy smoke-logging. And then I had a BA crew	8	Q. Okay.
9	come to me, which was Crew Manager Stern and	9	A. I do not remember if there was quite a lot of radio
10	Firefighter Hippel came well, they were under air,	10	traffic then.
11	they came down to the bridgehead and they said to me,	11	Q. Then you say you committed Stern and Hippel to go to the
12	"Governor, someone said there's a fire on the fifth	12	fifth floor.
13	floor".	13	A. When I say committed, I retasked them. They were in BA
14	Q. Right. I'm going to come back to that in just a moment,	14	already.
15	but before I do, can I ask you: when you heard	15	Q. Where were they standing?
16	a firefighter tell you by your fire ground radio that	16	A. They came down to face me in the bridgehead.
17	there was smoke on the fifth floor, did you communicate	17	Q. Right. You say they came down
18	that to Mike Dowden?	18	A. The stairs. They stood at the entrance to the stairs to
19	A. I did, yes. I think I did. I think I most certainly	19	the third floor.
20	would've done, but I can't recall exactly what I said to	20	Q. Had they already been up?
21	him.	21	A. Yes. They'd been hose management.
22	Q. How did you or do you think you communicated that to	22	Q. How far up in the building had they gone to do hose
23	him?	23	management?
24	A. By radio.	24	A. On the fourth floor.
25	Q. Right. Did he respond, do you remember?	25	Q. They were on
	Page 34		Page 36

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1	A. If you're hose managing, you would be between the third	1	"I spoke to Jamal STERN via the Fire ground radio.
2	and fourth floor at that time.	2	I can't remember exactly what he said but it was
3	Q. Would they have been under air	3	something like 'It's fucked! It's going! It's completely
4	A. They were under air, yes.	4	smoked out, on this floor."
5	Q at that point?	5	A. That's what he said.
6	A. Yes.	6	Q. That's what he said?
7	Q. Do you know why they came back down to the bridgehead?	7	A. More or less. He was quite alarmed really alarmed,
8	A. Because they wanted to tell me there was a problem.	8	actually.
9	They could hear the radio just as well as I could.	9	Q. Okay. What did you tell them to do?
10	Possibly they had seen something. I don't know exactly.	10	A. Well, I immediately transmitted the message to the
11	But they're experienced people, those two guys, and they	11	incident commander.
12	came and said to me, quite clearly, there's reports	12	Q. Right.
13	they said reports of fire on the fifth floor as opposed	13	A. I said it's jumping, "The fire's jumping, Mick", as
14	to smoke. The radio transmission said smoke; they said	14	I know him as, and he said, "I know, I know, I can see
15	fire and smoke, as I recall.	15	it on the outside, I can see it on the outside", he
16	Q. I see.	16	said, and it wasn't because he wanted me to understand
17	A. On the fifth floor.	17	what he was saying; he was heightened or his senses were
18	Q. So let me see if I can get this right.	18	heightened. I said, "It's jumping, it's jumping, it's
19	You'd already tasked Hippel and Stern to go to do	19	going on the fifth and the sixth", and he said, "I know,
20	hose management on the fourth floor?	20	I can see it jumping on the outside". It was happening
21	A. On the fire floor, yes.	21	simultaneously that he could see what was happening
22	Q. On the fire floor.	22	outside, whereas I could see or hear, not see,
23	A. Well, between, you know, to help out with the hose.	23	hear what was happening on the inside.
24	Q. Yes, and they were doing that under air.	24	Q. I see.
25	A. Correct.	25	So when you had been told by Jamal Stern on the
	D 27		D 20
	Page 37		Page 39
1	Q. So they had already tallied out, as I call it.	1	sixth floor, you reported that to Mike Dowden and you
2	A. Yes.	2	had a conversation about that?
3	Q. Yes. And we have their times of tallying out at	3	A. Yes.
4	01.17 that's not to the nearest second, 01.17 or	4	Q. He said, "I know, I can see it's jumping on the
5	so and then you say they heard the message over the	5	outside"?
6	radio that there was	6	A. I told him to make pumps eight, or I advised him to make
7	A. They heard something. They saw something or they heard	7	pumps eight. I said, "Make it eight, make it eight",
8	something	8	and he said, "I'm doing it, I'm doing it", and then
9	Q. So they came down to the bridgehead.	9	I said to him okay, I'll let you
10	A that concerned them enough to come and see me	10	Q. We'll come to that.
11	personally.	11	Before we do, were you concerned at that stage?
12	Q. Then they come to the bridgehead and you then tell them	12	A. Extremely.
13	to do what?	13	Q. What were you concerned about?
14	A. Go and tell me what's happening on the fifth floor.	14	A. The fire spreading up into other apartments. I thought
15	Q. Right.	15	we'd get on top of it. We've had fire spread before,
16	A. As quickly as you can.	16	and my plan was to flood it with BA and then
17	Q. Going back to your statement, they then go up and you	17	firefighting equipment to get hold of it. That's what
18	say they went to the fifth; is this right?	18	we do.
19	A. They went past they went to the fifth and, as I found	19	Q. Now, at that stage, just summarising it, we have you at
20	out later, not that night, they went to the fifth and	20	the bridgehead knowing there's fire on the fifth and
21	they continued to the sixth.	21	sixth floor, and we've got Mike outside who can see
22	Q. Did they stop on the fifth, do you know?	22	what's happening outside.
23	A. I don't know.	23	A. Yes.
24	Q. They went to the sixth, and you say in your statement,	24	Q. Did you have a discussion with Mike Dowden about
25	two lines down from the top of page 8:	25	evacuation of the fifth floor or sixth floor?
	Page 38		Page 40
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1	A. Not at that time.	1	We'll come back at 10.30, please.
2	Q. Is there a reason why that wasn't a subject for	2	(10.21 am)
3	discussion?	3	(A short break)
4	A. The reason was, my understanding of it is that as	4	(10.30 am)
5	a bridgehead commander, I'm faced with spread and	5	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Millett, while we are waiting for
6	possibly other persons involved, and the fire's moving	6	Mr O'Keeffe, I think it would be sensible if we ran for
7	really quickly, I mean rapidly, but I thought we'd get	7	another, say, 40 minutes or thereabouts and then had
8	it, so my communication with him was to give me	8	another break for the witness's benefit.
9	everybody he had spare on the fire ground in BA now with	9	MR MILLETT: Yes, I think so. If we can now have him back.
10	firefighting kit.	10	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think he is on his way.
11	Q. You say "I thought we'd get it"; do you mean that you	11	(Pause)
12	thought you'd be able to extinguish the fire without any	12	Are you comfortable to carry on?
13	evacuation?	13	THE WITNESS: I am, certainly, yes.
14	A. Yes.	14	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think we'll all benefit from a few
15	Q. What made you think that?	15	breaks during the morning, so I've asked Mr Millett to
16	A. Experience.	16	find a convenient moment in about 40 minutes. Do you
17	Q. Had you experienced fire spread of this nature before?	17	think that's all right?
18	A. Not that quickly.	18	THE WITNESS: Yes.
19	Q. So in the light of the fact that you hadn't seen fire	19	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, we'll do that.
20	spread that quickly before, how did your experience help	20	MR MILLETT: Mr O'Keeffe, thank you.
21	you to decide that you shouldn't evacuate at that stage?	21	Now, I just want to go back to what we were looking
22	A. Because I thought it had jumped two floors. We already	22	at before the break, which is a discussion you had with
23	had two BA crews with jets in. We had one BA crew come	23	Mike Dowden about rescue.
24	out. We already had two charged jets in there. And if	24	A. Yes.
25	I was to have additional jets and crews I knew what	25	Q. Now, my question is: against the context of you having
23	1 was to have additional jets and crews - 1 knew what	23	Q. 140w, my question is: against the context of you having
	Page 41		Page 43
1	Table 1	١,	and Him alond Cham on and thereby manned to your
1	we had on the fire ground at that time I thought we	1	sent Hippel and Stern up and they've reported to you, do
2	would stop it, at least try to stop it.	2	you think the discussion you had with Mike Dowden or
3	And you're asking me about why we didn't discuss	3	Mick Dowden about rescue was after you'd heard Jamal and
4	evacuation well, we did of sorts about 30 seconds	4	Stern report to you that there was fire on the sixth
5	after that.	5	floor?
6	Q. What was that discussion?	6	A. Not immediately afterwards.
7	A. Rescues.	7	Q. How long afterwards, do you think?
8	Q. Rescues?	8	A. I can't exactly say, but not long. We started getting
9	A. It's a type of evacuation, but it's a rescue, multiple	9	calls, people in the building, because the fire was
10	rescues.	10	spreading.
11	Q. Who did you have that discussion with?	11	Q. Okay. Can you tell us what you said to Mike Dowden
12	A. Mike Dowden.	12	about rescue?
13	Q. Do you remember what you said to him?	13	A. That we were receiving — I said that we were receiving
14	A. Not exactly. We had multiple calls started coming in	14	calls from people saying that their family members were
15	immediately. I wasn't aware the fire was jumping up	15	trapped by smoke, or they were affected by smoke. And
16	through the building. And can I have a break?	16	that would indicate to him that we would need to start
17	MR MILLETT: Absolutely. Of course you can. Absolutely.	17	putting in a rescue operation. That was the
18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, you'd like to take	18	conversation.
19	a break now?	19	Q. So you said that him, that you were receiving calls?
20	THE WITNESS: Yes, I would.	20	A. Yes.
21	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Of course, we'll do that.	21	Q. What did he say to you?
22	10 minutes?	22	A. Well, they were also receiving calls outside.
23	MR MILLETT: Yes.	23	Q. Right. Just pausing there then. Where were you
24	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.	24	receiving calls from?
25	Don't discuss your evidence, please.	25	A. On the radio. I believe Firefighter De St Aubin got
	Page 42		Page 44

I can't recall exactly, there was so much activity. Right. And Crew Manager Stern and Firefighter Hippel reported to me that they had information that somebody was trapped on the 16th floor. Okay. That's Which I found very, very unusual. Okay. That jumps ahead in time a little bit far. Okay. We'll definitely come back to that because it's important. But just in terms of the discussion that you had with Mike Dowden, you were getting the information, you said, I think, through Alex De St Aubin. Do you know where he was getting that information from? I would say on his radio. Do you remember him receiving it on his radio? No. Do you remember any firefighters coming at that stage, so still early on, to the bridgehead with pieces of paper?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	A. As I said earlier on, I thought we could get it, because that's normally what happens. If the compartmentation in a building is correct and functioning as it should do, it should stop the spread of fire. Occasionally you will get adaptions to a building where services are installed or, for whatever reason, a fire door is damaged. That would undermine the integrity of the compartmentation. So if it did spread, those could be the reasons. I genuinely thought it was spreading on the inside, but Mike or Watch Manager Dowden said to me, "I can see it jumping on the outside", and then I had firefighters very quickly running in telling me what's actually happening on the outside. Q. What did you think at that moment about whether compartmentation was holding? A. I thought it had failed internally just between a couple
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. No. Do you remember any firefighters coming at that stage, so still early on, to the bridgehead with pieces of	19 20 21	•
Do you remember any firefighters coming at that stage, so still early on, to the bridgehead with pieces of	20 21	
so still early on, to the bridgehead with pieces of	21	of flats.
, ,		Q. You thought it failed
	22	A. Possibly going up, you know, the communal stairwell.
No, not with pieces of paper. It didn't happen that	23	Q. Right.
quickly.	24	A. Something unseen had broken out. That is normally what
Do you know where Mike Dowden was getting his	25	happens. You get hidden fire travel — it's quite
. Do you know where wike Dowden was getting his	23	nappens. Tou get muden me traver - it's quite
Page 45	_	Page 47
information from about people?	1	common in voids and that had broken out and just
. Main scheme radio and then from his driver, who was on	2	(Clicks) went.
the initial command pump.	3	Q. Okay, so your view, just to summarise it I hope
. Did you have a conversation with Mike Dowden about	4	I have this right is that you thought at that time
evacuation or	5	that compartmentation had failed and it had failed
. No.	6	internally?
. Was there a discussion, for example, about evacuating	7	A. Locally, locally.
everybody on the fifth floor or everybody on the sixth	8	Q. Internally?
floor?	9	A. Inside. That was my understanding, yes.
. No.	10	Q. Did that prompt any thoughts about whether there was
. Can you help, why didn't you discuss that?	11	then a risk of further failure of compartmentation
. I would say the circumstances were exceptional.	12	internally higher up the building than the sixth floor?
Something was happening well, we'd never seen this	13	A. No.
before or experienced it at the rate it was happening.	14	Q. Why is that?
I think that was to the forefront, certainly to my	15	A. Not to the extent where it went that quickly. That's my
thoughts, and I wasn't looking at the building from the	16	honest answer, or my accurate answer.
	17	Q. At that stage you think you've got internal
outside, which I would imagine was quite dramatic, for	18	compartmentation failure in the building, fire on two
	19	floors above the fire floor
outside, which I would imagine was quite dramatic, for	20	A. Yes.
outside, which I would imagine was quite dramatic, for want of a better word. It was quite severe, probably a better word.	1	Q what did you think was the correct procedure now to
outside, which I would imagine was quite dramatic, for want of a better word. It was quite severe, probably a better word. Yes.		follow in order to deal with what you have in front of
outside, which I would imagine was quite dramatic, for want of a better word. It was quite severe, probably a better word. Yes. Now, on page 8 of your statement, you say, after	,	you?
outside, which I would imagine was quite dramatic, for want of a better word. It was quite severe, probably a better word. Yes. Now, on page 8 of your statement, you say, after Jamal and Stern had reported to you what they found on	23	A. Bring in additional resources and extinguish the fire.
outside, which I would imagine was quite dramatic, for want of a better word. It was quite severe, probably a better word. Yes. Now, on page 8 of your statement, you say, after Jamal and Stern had reported to you what they found on the sixth floor, four lines down:	23	Ding in additional resources and cathiguish the life.
outside, which I would imagine was quite dramatic, for want of a better word. It was quite severe, probably a better word. Yes. Now, on page 8 of your statement, you say, after Jamal and Stern had reported to you what they found on	23 24 25	Q. So firefighting?
	better word. It was quite severe, probably better word. Yes. Now, on page 8 of your statement, you say, after	trant of a better word. It was quite severe, probably better word. 19 Yes. Now, on page 8 of your statement, you say, after amal and Stern had reported to you what they found on esixth floor, four lines down: 23

1	A. Attack the fire.	1	to be found on the higher floors?
2	Q. Attack the fire.	2	A. What it told me is that there was smoke there was two
3	You then go on to say in the fifth line down from	3	floors involved and these people were possibly from
4	the top of page 8:	4	those floors.
5	"Some of the residents started self-evacuating."	5	Q. Right.
6	A. They did.	6	How long roughly after Crew Manager Batterbee had
7	Q. "They looked frightened and had black smoke marks on	7	left the bridgehead did you see sorry, let me ask the
8	their faces."	8	question in a different way.
9	A. They did, that's correct.	9	Did you see the residents coming down past you with
10	Q. "From that moment onwards, we just started carrying out	10	smoke inhalation before or after Crew Manager Batterbee
11	rescues."	11	had left the bridgehead?
12	Just in terms of residents, were they coming past	12	A. Afterwards.
13	you at the bridgehead?	13	Q. Next question: how long afterwards, do you think?
14	A. They were being escorted past me by firefighters.	14	A. Three or four minutes.
15	Q. Okay. All of them or were some of them self-evacuating?	15	Q. Right. Thank you.
16	A. Some of them by themselves, some of them were being	16	You then say in your statement:
17	escorted by firefighters. They looked confused and	17	"From that moment onwards, we just started carrying
18	frightened.	18	out rescues."
19	Q. What did the black smoke marks tell you about how the	19	When you say "just"
20	fire was behaving?	20	A. Well, that's just the way I speak. That's what we were
21	A. That the smoke was travelling. They'd gone through	21	doing. We're firefighting and rescues.
22	smoke. They'd been in smoke or walked through smoke to	22 23	Q. I was going to ask you: you say firefighting and
23 24	exit the building.	23	rescues. A. Yes.
25	Q. Did it look as if they were suffering seriously from smoke inhalation?	25	Q. So it wasn't only rescues; it was firefighting as well.
23	SHOKE IIIIaiation:	23	Q. 30 it wasn't only rescues, it was menghing as well.
	Page 49		Page 51
1	A. Not seriously, but significant — it doesn't take much	1	A. No, it was firefighting and rescues. I was still, as
2	smoke to either well, to injure somebody.	2	a bridgehead commander, pursuing the orthodox way of
3	Q. Do you know which floors these residents had come down	3	fighting a high-rise fire. All I was doing was
4	from?	4	increasing my resources or asking for additional
5	A. No.	5	resources. I was dealing with a problem, you know.
6	Q. Did you speak to any of them?	6	It's a dynamic situation, a fire, and it can change and,
7	A. I didn't speak to the residents; I was speaking to	7	you know, we try to adapt our procedures. But by and
8	firefighters.	8	large we stick with the fundamentals of high-rise
9	Q. Right.	9	firefighting.
10	As you've told us, some of them were	10	Q. Did you prioritise firefighting over rescue or rescue
11	self-evacuating; what did that tell you about whether	11	over firefighting or both the same?
12	the building's stay-put policy was still a safe policy	12	A. It was simultaneous action. That's what it was. But
13	to pursue?	13	our prime directive or purpose is saving lives, so that
14	A. Can you repeat the question?	14	would come before anything else.
15	Q. You could see some of these residents self-evacuating.	15	Q. Absolutely.
16	A. Yes.	16	Did you give firefighters who were coming to the
17	Q. Did that tell you anything about whether the building	17	bridgehead and being committed under air instructions as
18	A. That they wanted to leave the building; there was smoke	18	to rescue?
19	and they were frightened.	19	A. Yes.
20	Q. Yes, but did that tell you anything about whether the	20	Q. What were those instructions?
21	building's stay-put policy was still a safe policy to	21	A. The floor number, flat number and number of persons and
22	pursue?	22	the conditions I mean smoke and fire conditions. So
23	A. No, I wasn't thinking about that.	23	the information is quite succinct in that it will tell
24	Q. Right.	24	you which floor the flat is on and the flat number and
25	Did that tell you anything about where the smoke was	25	the number of persons in the flat and, if available,
I	Page 50		Page 52

2 Q. Now, Ullike to try and be as precise as I can with you about the timing of when you started to receive that information. 8 Roughly how long after you started carrying out resource, that decision was made to carry out resource. I did you start getting information about flat and floor number? 9 A. Perty immediately, actually. From residents, people telling us – physically telling us – "So-and-so's in this fate or an this floor, can you go and get them?" 10 A. Not and formation on the radio. It was all happening at one very quickly, you know. 11 Q. Olay, I'm serry to – 12 A. No that's fine, I understand your questions. 13 So were their residents coming down who were story in the bridghedeal and saying to you. "So-and-so is in floor" – 13 A. No that's fine in understand your questions. 14 Q. Just in terms of that information, the BA wearers coming down who were laid to the start of the property of the start of the physically telling us – "So-and-so is in this tell and the property of the physically telling us – "So-and-so is in the property of the physically telling us – physic				
about the timing of when you started to receive that information. Roughly how long after you started carrying out rescues, that decision was made to carry out rescues, day out are getting show long after you started carrying out rescues, that decision was made to carry out rescues, day out are getting information about fland floor number? A. Prefry immediately, actually. From residents, people (elling us – physically telling us – "So-and-so's in this flat or on this floor, carry out go and get them?" And information on the radio. It was all happening at once very quickly, you know. Q. Okay, This sorty to – Joy – pick this spart a bit. So were there residents coming down who were stopping at the bridgehead and saying to you, "So-and-so is in 100". A. No, the firefighters were telling us. A. No, the firefighters were telling us. Q. Okay is the spart a bit. A. No, the firefighters were telling us. Q. Just in terms of that information, the BA weaters coming down with residents, communicating that to you, was that being recorded on the bridgehead anywhere in any way? Page 53 Page 53 Page 55 Page 55 Page 55 A. To my understanding it was on the forward information bound the radio traffic yet. Joy of the states of the other source of information to the bridgehead anywhere in any way? Page 53 Page 55 Page 56 A. To my understanding it was on the forward information to the principal parts. It's quite large—about the size of this lettera, actually—and there's information for parts, which is a piece of insometing to use, information on the grown with interest of the parts, life you will be part of the side of the parts, life yet you do—it's just like a copy book, in the life you will be principally will be provided and you do—it's just like a copy book, in the life you will be provided to the principal parts. It's you'd large, alout the side of the life you will me. I was alone. Q. Okay, So you're recording information on that. Q. When he		conditions.	1	Q with a chinagraph?
4 people, giving them information therrighters, up 16 ferences, that decision was made to carry out rescues, and the stair's full, and it was actually full, which is highly unusual. 9 A. Pretty immediately, actually. From residents, people telling us — Piss-and-so's in this flat or on this floor, can you go and get them?" 10 A. Pretty immediately, actually. From residents, people telling us — Piss-and-so's in this flat or on this floor, can you go and get them?" 11 A. And information on the radio. It was all happening at once very quickly, you know. 12 Q. Day. I'm sorry to — 14 A. Okay. 13 A. No. The strip is understand your questions. 14 Q. Okay. This strip to understand your questions. 15 Q. Pisc this spart a bit. 26 Q. Pisc this spart a bit. 27 So were there residents coming down who were stopping at the bridgehead and saying to you, "So-and-so is on floor"— 28 A. No. the firefighters were telling us. They were getting information from the residents as they were bringing down with residents, communicating that to you, was that being recorded on the bridgehead anywhere in any way? 18 A. To my understanding it was on the forward information board, which is a piece of —it's something we use, a sparate parts. It's quite large —about the size of this lettern, actually —and there's information for plans, high-rise map and locations of individuals requiring rescue or locations within the building of fire. 19 So what you do —it's just like a copy book, power recording do you remember? 20 A. A. Hans ure you will. Watch Manager Watson is a very calm information to Watch Manager watson is a very calm information to wash the was doing is running up and down the stairs, and the side of the plans, high-rise map and locations of individuals requiring rescue or locations within the building				
5 Roughly how long after you started carrying out 6 rescues, that decision was made to carry out rescues, 7 did you start getting information about that and floor 8 number? 8 A. Pretty immediately, actually. From residents, people 10 telling us—physically telling us—"So-and-so's in 11 this fat or on this floor, can you go and get them?" 12 And information on the radio. It was all happening at 13 once very quickly, you know. 14 Q. Okay. Tim sorty to— 15 A. No, that's fine, I understand your questions. 16 Q.—pick this pair a bit. 17 So were their exidents coming down who were 18 stopping at the bridgehead and saying to you, "So-and-so is on floor"— 19 A. No, the firefighters were telling us. They were getting information from the residents as they were bringing them out and they were telling us. 20 Q. Just in terms of that information, the A wearers coming down with residents, communicating that to you, was that being recorded on the bridgehead anywhere in any way? 21 A. To my understanding it was on the forward information for the series of a six of this lecter, actually—and there's information for the residents as they were bringing to pour, support the pairs, high-rice map and locations of individuals require resourced from the bringeness or locations within the building of fire. 2 So what you do—it's just like a copy book, laminated copy book. 2 Information for the residents of individuals require resourced to end the series of the later's information for the started to bring pieces of paper with information for the started to bring pieces of paper with information for the started to bring pieces of paper with information for the started to bring pieces of paper with information to Match Manager Watson is a very calm individual, very composed, good officer. He started giving me information. He became my go-to goy to pass the part of				
rescues, that decision was made to carry out rescues, did you start getting information about flat and floor telling us perfect the property of the property o				
did you start getting information about flat and floor number? A. Prefighter De St. About 1 was all happening at none very quickly, you know. And information on the radio. It was all happening at none very quickly, you know. A. No, that's fine, I understand by So were there residents coming down who were stopping at the bridgehead and saying to you, "So-and-so is on floor" - A. No, the firefighters were telling us. They were getting information from the residents as they were bringing them out and they were telling us. They were getting information from the residents as they were bringing them out and they were telling us. Just in terms of that information, the BA wearers coming down with residents, communicating that to you, was that being recorded on the bridgehead anywhere in any way? Page 53 A. A to my understanding it was on the forward information board, which is a piece of -it's something we use, it's a template, and there's -1 think it's four separate parts. It's quite large - about the size of fine. So what you do -it's just like a copy book, Inaminated copy book. A Firefighter De St Aubin was recording in on the BA board, I would imagine, I would guess, because I can't remember if we had a FIB - I knowl asked for a FIB, a forward information board, but - Q. Q. Yes. A Yes. Which is a piece of -it's something we use, it's a femplate, and there's information for plans, ligh-rise map and locations of individuals requiring rescue or locations within the building of fire. A Firefighter De St Aubin was recording it on the BA board, I would imagine, I would guess, because I can't remember if we had a FIB - I knowl asked for a FIB, a forward information board, but - Q. Q. Yes. A After that was Firefighter O'Beirne. Q. O. All was on the bead of the wall Q. O. All was all bappening at the complete of the wall Zee A. Yes.	_			
8 mumber? 9 A. Pretty immediately, actually. From residents, people to teling us – physically telling us – "No-and-so's in this flat or on this floor, can you go and get them?" 12 And information on the radio. It was all happening at once very quickly, you know. 13 Q. Okay. I'm sorry to – 14 Q. Okay. I'm sorry to – 15 A. No, that's fine, I understand your questions. 16 Q. – pick this apart a bit. 17 Sower there residents coming down who were stopping at the bridgehead and saying to you, "So-and-so is on floor" – 18 stopping at the bridgehead and saying to you, "So-and-so is on floor" – 19 is on floor" – 20 A. No, the firefighters were telling us. They were getting information from the residents as they were bringing the own at and they were telling us. They were getting information from the residents as they were bringing the own with residents, communicating that to you, was that being recorded on the bridgehead anywhere in any way? Page 53 1 A. To my understanding it was on the forward information board, which is a piece of – it's something we use, it's a template, and there's – I think it's four specified this lectern, actually – and there's information for plans, high-rise map and locations of individuals, requiring rescue or locations within the building of fire. 9 Sowhat you do – it's just like a copy book, laminated cupy book. 10 Laminated cupy book. 11 Laminated cupy book. 12 Who was doing the recording, do you remember? 13 A. At the very beginning? 14 A. The were peding information onto that requiring rescue or locations within the building of fire survival guidance calls? 15 A. Firefighter De St Aubin was recording it on the BA board, I would magine, I would guess, because I can't remember if we had a FIB. – I know I asked for a FIB, a forward information bard. 18 A. At the very beginning? 19 Q. Atter that was firefighter O'Beirne. 20 Q. When he did arrive – we can get the times perhaps another way – and the was pring his information that he was getting to you, was it? 21 Q. When was the shoard. 22				•
A. Pretty immediately, actually. From residents, people telling us – physically telling us – "So-and-so's in this flat or on this floor, can you go and get them?" And information on the radio. It was all happening at one cery quickly, you know. Q. Okay. I'm sorry to —				~ .
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1	A. To us.	1	more BA to respond to what was happening and conduct
2	Q. To you	2	rescues."
3	A. Us collectively. He would be handing that information	3	Then you say:
4	to Justin O'Beirne, or Firefighter O'Beirne, I would	4	"I told him 'Pumps 8' on the radio, to increase
5	imagine.	5	attendance and he said, 'I'm doing it. I'm doing it. I
	0		
6	Q. So the communication was Watson-O'Beirne, was it?	6	made Pumps 8'."
7	A. Pardon?	7	Now, we have a time for pumps eight, but I just want
8	Q. The communication was between Mr Watson and Firefighter	8 9	to be clear about the smoke in the stairwell.
9	O'Beirne?		Do you think that you got the information from
10	A. And me.	10	Hippel and Stern about smoke in the stairwell before the
11	Q. And you?	11	discussion about pumps eight or after?
12	A. And everybody else who was on the bridgehead at that	12	A. No, it was afterwards.
13	time.	13	Q. I see, okay.
14	Q. Okay. Was that by radio or?	14	Right.
15	A. No, verbally. Face-to-face.	15	Now, on pumps eight, doing your best to remember,
16	Q. Was he shouting?	16	when you spoke to him, had he already made pumps eight
17	A. No, speaking. He doesn't shout.	17	or was he telling you
18	Q. Right. Where was he getting that information from?	18	A. I think, you know, great minds think alike, and he's
19	A. From the fire ground.	19	an operational watch manager like myself. I can recall
20	Q. By what method of communication?	20	walking backwards while I was speaking to him onto the
21	A. I'd say face-to-face, knowing him.	21	balcony to look to try and see what was going on
22	Q. Right. We'll have to explore that a little bit later.	22	outside. I saw a big sheet of flame falling down
23	But just coming back, then, to page 8 and quite	23	outside the building, and I saw him running on the
24	early on, I think, in the incident, you then go on to	24	radio.
25	say:	25	So two things unusual: a big sheet of flame falling
	D 57		D 50
	Page 57		Page 59
1	"It became very clear that there was significant	1	down and a watch manager actually running, which we
1 2	"It became very clear that there was significant smoke in the main stairwell."	1 2	down and a watch manager actually running, which we don't see, which you shouldn't do. I don't mean that
2	smoke in the main stairwell."	2	don't see, which you shouldn't do. I don't mean that
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2 3 4	smoke in the main stairwell." A. Yes, it did. Q. How did you discover that?	2 3 4	don't see, which you shouldn't do. I don't mean that because we're lazy; you have to be calm, remain calm and composed and take in information. It's command and
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2 3 4 5 6	smoke in the main stairwell." A. Yes, it did. Q. How did you discover that? A. Crew Manager Stern and Firefighter Hippel, when they reported to me that they received a fire survival	2 3 4 5 6	don't see, which you shouldn't do. I don't mean that because we're lazy; you have to be calm, remain calm and composed and take in information. It's command and control. If a watch manager is running, there's something seriously wrong.
2 3 4 5 6 7	smoke in the main stairwell." A. Yes, it did. Q. How did you discover that? A. Crew Manager Stern and Firefighter Hippel, when they reported to me that they received a fire survival guidance call to the 16th floor — I think it was the	2 3 4 5 6 7	don't see, which you shouldn't do. I don't mean that because we're lazy; you have to be calm, remain calm and composed and take in information. It's command and control. If a watch manager is running, there's something seriously wrong. Q. Really?
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1	watch once, actually. I didn't have time to.	1	A. No, no. Before this event, I had I mean, everyone
2	Q. No, I understand.	2	knows about cladding. No, we didn't have that
3	Now, just in terms of that, though, I think you're	3	awareness; it wasn't our reality. I know new building
4	saying correct me if I'm wrong you wouldn't	4	materials are being developed constantly, but the
5	disagree with that, if I was to put those times to you	5	majority of the fires the London Fire Brigade attends
6	and say	6	are in traditional structures, or have been previously,
7	A. It seems like it's out of sequence but, you know, that's	7	but I think that's changing.
8	how I remember it: the make pumps eight went when	8	Q. While we're on that subject, can I just ask a question.
9	I found out the fire had jumped to the fifth and sixth.	9	A. Yes.
10	The make pumps 10 would have been when we started	10	Q. At any time in late 2016/early 2017, really in the
11	getting FSGs or fire survival guidance calls elsewhere	11	months leading up to Grenfell Tower, do you remember
12	in the building.	12	ever seeing or hearing about a letter that the London
13	Q. Yes.	13	Fire Brigade had written to London local authorities
14	Now, in your statement on page 8 you say in the	14	about tall buildings and the risk of fire spread on the
15	middle of the page:	15	exterior?
16	"As I was speaking to WM DOWDEN, I walked out onto	16	A. No.
17	the glass balcony. I could see flames falling down	17	Q. Okay.
18	outside the building and I thought 'that's odd'."	18	Now, you then go on in the next paragraph to say, on
19	Just pausing there, was that the first time that	19	page 8:
20	you'd seen flaming material coming off it?	20	"Seconds later, when I realised that we were losing
21	A. Yes.	21	the fire or that the fire was getting away from us,
22	Q. What were your thoughts about that?	22	I transmitted, 'Make Pumps 10, Mick. Make Pumps 10.'
23	A. That we had a problem, a big problem.	23	He said, 'I'm making Pumps 10' and sounded very
24	Q. Was it something you'd ever seen before?	24	excitable."
25	A. Because it wasn't just a particle, it was like so the	25	Now, the short incident log has us with that
	Page 61		Page 63
1	front of the desk here? It was that size and it was on	1	message, make pumps 10, at 01.24.29.
2	fire and it was falling (Indicates). And it was	2	A. Yes.
3	diagonal. I can remember it now, so yes.	3	Q. You say:
4	Q. Right. I am trying to get an idea of the size of the	4	" I realised that we were losing the fire"
5	front of the desk.	5	Did you discuss that thought with Mike Dowden?
6	A. That's quite significant	6	A. Yes.
7	Q. 5 by 3.	7	Q. What did
8	A on fire, falling from a building. Whereas when	8	A. He was frantic.
9	I walked into the building, it was a flat fire.	9	Q. What did you say to him?
10	Q. Had you ever seen anything like that before?	10	A. I can't remember the exact words. It was frantic
11	A. Yes. On a building that's been fully involved, they	11	traffic between him and I. I was I suppose it was
12	fall apart.	12	a priority message I sent from the bridgehead for
13	Q. Right.	13	everybody in BA now, is actually what I said. I said,
14	A. So, not I mean, I've seen that just to be specific	14	"Everyone you've got spare, I want them now". I wanted
15	here have I ever seen anything like that at the	15	them, you know we were out-gunned completely. It
16	beginning of an incident or where I didn't know that the	16	just happened so quickly.
17	building was on fire outside? No.	17	Q. Sure. And that message went to Mike Dowden, did it?
18	Q. Had you ever seen flaming bits falling off a building so	18	A. Yes.
19	early on in an incident?	19	Q. Did you think that pumps 10 would give you enough
20	A. No.	20	resources to cater for what you were seeing in front of
21	Q. What did that tell you about how the fire was	21	you?
22	developing?	22	A. I suppose in the 60 seconds afterwards, no.
23	A. That it was developing rapidly.	23	Q. Right. Did you think about going straight to 25?
24	Q. Did it tell you anything about what it was that was	24	A. I wasn't outside. I couldn't see what he was seeing.
25	burning?	25	He did though; he made it up really quickly. From that
	•		
	D (2	1	D (4
	Page 62		Page 64

1				
turned up. Q. Yes. A. Because I couldn't get in contact with Watch Manager Dowdon after that. It was great difficulty. A. After the pumps 10. Immediately afterwards, there couldn't transmit any more information. Q. Right So after pumps 10, funnediately afterwards, there that was — the radios just went full of traffic and I just couldn't transmit any more information. Q. Right So after pumps 10, funnediately afterwards, there that was — the radios just went full of traffic and I just that when you lost counted with Mike Dowden? A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. Watch Manager Watson appear on the scene at the bridghead? A. Pretty soon afterwards. A. Pretty soon af	1	moment onwards, from make pumps 10, that actually would	1	You then go on to say:
4 News, lost passe there 5 Dowden after that. It was great difficulty. 7 Q. After what? 8 A. After the pumps 10. Immediately afterwards, there 9 was — the radios just went full of traffic and I just 10 Q. Right. So after pumps 10, that's 12-43. you say 11 Q. Right. So after pumps 10, that's 12-43. you say 12 that's when you lost contact with Mike Dowden? 13 A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. 14 Q. Okay. 15 After that — 1.24. 29 — how soon after that did 16 Watch Manager Watson spaper on the scene at the 17 bridgehead? 18 A. Perts you on afterwards. 19 Q. Okay. 20 A. You can find out, if I can offer just one bit of 21 information, by looking at Golf 36 I booking stage 3 at 16 the incident. He was the officer in charge of that 27 appliance, and I would imagine he had a good look around 28 for himself to see what was going on and then spoke to 29 Q. Yes. Thank you. 3 We have G361 status 3 at 01.25.06, just to giv you 4 at time fix on that, so only about a minute later. 5 Is hat consistent why not recollection? 6 A. Probably consistent, yes. 7 Q. You say also you called for additional BA baards. 8 A control boards. Did those arrive? 9 A. They did. I asked for additional BA baards, additional 18 E. Packs, additional BA boards, additional 18 E. Packs, additional BA boards, additional 18 E. Packs, additional BA boards, additional 19 Q. You say also you called for additional BA boards, additional 19 G. You say also you talking about smoke spread or — 10 Q. You then go on to say at the middle of the last 17 Page A. They were, yes. 18 A. They were, yes. 19 Q. Are you talking about smoke spread or — 19 A. Yesh. 19 Q. Yes. 19 A. Yesh. 10 Q. Are you talking about smoke spread or — 10 Q. Yes. 11 A. There were recountered it in my life. It have never the countered most types of smoke in my life in the Fire Brigade. 19 A. They were, yes. 20 Q. Franciscus in the middle of the last 21 District of the proper in t	2	be a good idea of when Paul Watson, the watch manager,	2	"There was some light smoke on the second floor but
5 Now, just passe there. 6 Dowden after that. It was great difficulty. 7 Q. After what? 8 A. After the pumps 10, thursdistely afterwards, there 9 was — the radios just went full of traffic and I just 10 couldn't transmit any more information. 11 Q. Right. So after pumps 10, that's 12429, you say 12 that's when you lost contact with Mike Dowden? 13 A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. 14 Q. Olay. 15 After that — 12 429 — how soon after that did 16 Watch Manager Watson appear on the scene at the 17 bridgehead? 18 A. Pretty soon afterwards. 19 Q. Okay. 20 A. You can find out, if I can offer just one bit of 21 information, by looking aft Golf 36 hooking stage 3 at 22 the incident. He was the officer in charge of that 23 appliance, and I would imagine he had a good flook around 24 for himself to see what was going an and the spoke to 25 the incident. Commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then 26 Q. Yes. Thank you. 27 Q. You say also you called for additional BA and additional 28 BA control boards. Did beca carrive? 39 A. They did. I asked for additional BA and additional 30 BA cortor boards. Did beca carrive? 31 panagenplo to page 8: 32 Page 67 33 Power Golf states on yabout a minute later. 34 A. They were very ening it. 35 A. They were very ening it. 36 A. They were very ening it. 37 Q. Vou say also you called for additional BA and additional 38 BA control boards. Did beca carrive? 39 A. They did. I asked for additional BA and additional 39 BB A cortor boards. Did beca carrive? 30 Q. You shay and you called for additional BA and additional 30 Page 70 31 Page 70 42 A. They were, yes. 43 A. They did. I asked for additional BA and additional 44 BB A cortor boards. Did beca carrive? 45 C. You then go on to say at the middle of the last 46 Probably consistent, yes. 47 C. You then go no to say at the middle of the last 48 Probably consistent, yes. 49 A. They did. I asked for additional BA and additional 49 BB A cortor boards. Did beca carrive? 40 Q. You then go no to say at the middle of the last 41 Pro	3	turned up.	3	it was acrid which stung my eyes and throat. I have
Dowden after that. It was great difficulty. 7 Q. After what? 8 A. After the pumps 10. Immediately afterwards, there was — the radius just went full of traffic and I just condition transmit any more information. 11 Q. Right. So after pumps 10. that's 1.24.29, you say	4	Q. Yes.	4	never encountered it in my life."
A. After the pumps 10. Immediately afterwards, there was the radios just went full of traffic and I just couldn't transmit any more information. Right. So after pumps 10. that's 1.24.29, you say that's when you lost contact with Mike Dowden? Radio Couldn't transmit any more information. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. Presty soon after that did Watch Manager Wason appear on the scene at the bridgehead? A. Presty soon afterwards. B. A. Presty soon afterwards. A. Presty soon afterwards. B. A. Presty soon afterwards. B. A. Presty soon afterwards. Page 65 Page 67 A. Ves. D. Was there anything about the smoke that stands out in your memory? A. It was acrid, but smoke is often acrid. Q. Was there anything about the smoke that stands out in your memory? A. It was acrid, but smoke is often acrid. Q. Was there anything about the smoke that stands out in your memory? A. Well, I asked to come and see me. Q. Yes. Thankyou. A. Probably consistent, yes. A. They did. I asked for additional BA and additional B. A. Create	5	A. Because I couldn't get in contact with Watch Manager	5	Now, just pause there.
A. After the pumps 10. Immediately afterwards, there was — the radios just went full of traffic and I just could reasonia on proceedings. Q. Right. So after pumps 10. bacts 124.29, you say that's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. Q. O kay. After that — 1.24.29 — how soon after that did bridgehead? A. After that — 1.24.29 — how soon after that did Watch Manager Watson appear on the scene at the bridgehead? A. You can find out, if I can offer just one bit of life incident. He was the officer in charge of that population, and I would imagine he had a good look around for himself to see what was going on and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then Page 65 Page 67 being tasked to come and see me. Q. Yes. Thankyou. being tasked to come and see me. Q. Yes. Thankyou. being tasked to come and see me. Q. Yes. Thankyou. being tasked to come and see me. Q. Yes. Thankyou. being tasked to come and see me. Q. Yes. Thankyou. being tasked to come and see me. Q. Yes. Thankyou. being tasked to come and see me. Q. Yes. Thankyou. being tasked to come and see me. Q. Yes. Thankyou. being tasked to come and see me. Q. Yes. Thankyou. being tasked to come and see me. Q. Yes. Thankyou. being tasked to come and see me. Q. Yes. Thankyou. complete officers sometimes filter what you way, and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then being tasked to come and see me. Q. Yes. Thankyou. complete officers officers sometimes filter what you way. complete officers sometimes filter what you way, and then spoke to significant. complete officers sometimes filter what you say, and then spoke to significant. complete officers sometimes filter what you say, and then spoke to significant. complete officers sometimes filter what you way, and then spoke to significant. complete officers sometimes filter what you way and then spoke to significant. complete officers sometimes f	6	Dowden after that. It was great difficulty.	6	This is light smoke at the bridgehead, is it?
was — the radios just went full of traffic and I just couldn't transmit any more information. 10	7	Q. After what?	7	A. When the doors were opening, it wafted in. There wasn't
couldn't transmit any more information. 10	8	A. After the pumps 10. Immediately afterwards, there	8	a lot of it, but it was acrid. And the "I have never
that's when you lost contact with Mike Dowden? A. Arrix when what difficulty. That's when it began. A. O. Okay. Alter that 1.24.29 - how soon after that did Watch Manager Watson appear on the scene at the bridgehead? A. Pretty soon afterwards. A. You can find out, if I can offer just one bit of information, by looking at Golf 361 booking stage 3 at the incident. He was the officer in charge of that appliance, and I would imagine he had a good look around for himself to see what was going on and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then Page 65 Deing tasked to come and see me. 2 Q. Yes. Thank you. 2 A. Yes. A. Pretyting we needed to try and stop the fire. 2 A. Pretyting we needed to try and stop the fire. 3 A. They did. I asked for additional BA and additional B. BA control boards. Did those arrive; 3 A. They did. I asked for additional BA boards, additional B. A. Yesh. 3 Q. Yes. 3 A. Yesh. 3 Q. Yes. 4 A. Yesh. 4 Q. Yes. 4 A. Yesh. 4 Q. And fire spread as well? 4 A. Yesh. 4 Q. And fire spread as well?	9	was the radios just went full of traffic and I just	9	encountered it in my life" is the police interviewer
that's when you lost contact with Mike Dowden? A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. A. A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. Math Manager Watson appear on the scene at the bidde watch Manager Watson appear on the scene at the biddehead? A. Pretty soon afterwards. It iddn't pay any great attention to these – there are inaccuracies throughout the document, but they're not significant. Q. Usa to get your recollection as you stand here. A. You can find out, if I can offer just one bit of information, by looking at Golf 361 booking stage 3 at the incident. He was the officer in charge of that appliance, and I would imagine he had a good look around for himself to see what was going on and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then poke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden,	10	couldn't transmit any more information.	10	filtering what I'm saying. I didn't really say that,
13 A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began. 14 Q. Okay. 15 After that 1.24.29 - how soon after that did 16 Watch Manager Watson appear on the seene at the 17 bridgsbead? 18 A. Pretty soon afterwards. 19 Q. Okay. 20 A. You can find out, if I can offer just one hit of 21 information, by looking at Golf 361 booking stage 3 at 22 the incident. He was the officer in charge of that 23 appliance, and I would imagine he had a good look around 24 for himself to see what was going on and then spoke to 25 the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then 26 Page 65 27 Page 67 28 We have G361 status 3 at 01.25.06, just to give you 29 A. Probably consistent, yes. 20 Q. You shar go you called for additional BA and additional 29 BA control boards. Did those arrive? 20 Q. You then go on to say at the middle of the last 21 paragraph on page 8: 22 (Q. You then go on to say at the middle of the last 23 paragraph on page 8: 34 (A. Pres) 35 (A. Prevs, ex. 36 (A. Prevs, ex. 37 (A. Pyes. 38 (A. Prevs, ex. 39 (A. Prevs, ex. 40 (A. Pyes. 41 (A. Pyes. 42 (A. Pyes. 43 (Barthard you) 44 (A. Pres) 45 (Barthard you) 46 (Barthard you) 47 (Barthard you) 48 (Barthard you) 49 (Barthard you) 40 (Barthard you) 41 (Barthard you) 41 (Barthard you) 42 (Barthard you) 43 (Barthard you) 44 (Barthard you) 45 (Barthard you) 46 (Barthard you) 46 (Barthard you) 47 (Barthard you) 48 (Barthard you) 49 (Barthard you) 40 (Barthard you) 41 (Barthard you) 41 (Barthard you) 42 (Barthard you) 43 (Barthard you) 44 (Barthard you) 45 (Barthard you) 46 (Barthard you) 46 (Barthard you) 47 (Barthard you) 48 (Barthard you) 49 (Barthard you) 40 (Barthard you) 41 (Barthard you) 41 (Barthard you) 42 (Barthard you) 43 (Barthard you) 44 (Barthard you) 45 (Barthard you) 45 (Barthard you) 46 (Barthard you) 46 (Barthard you) 46 (Barthard you) 47 (Barthard you) 48 (Barthard you) 48 (Barthard you) 49 (Barthard you) 40 (Barthard you) 40 (Barthard you) 40 (Barthard you) 41 (Barthard you) 42 (Barthard you) 43 (Barthard you) 44 (Barthard you) 45 (Barthard you) 45 (11	Q. Right. So after pumps 10, that's 1.24.29, you say	11	that I've never encountered because I've encountered
14 She was a very good interviewer, I hasten to add, 15 but police officers sometimes filter what you say, and 15 but police officers sometimes filter what you say, and 15 but police officers sometimes filter what you say, and 16 Lknow I had an opportunity to review that document, but 17 I didn't pay any great attention to these — there are inaccuracies throughout the document, but they're not significant. 20 A. You can find out, if I can offer just one bit of information, by looking at Golf 361 booking stage 3 at the incident. He was the officer in charge of that 22 appliance, and I would imagine he had a good look around for himself to see what was going on and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then Page 65 Page 67 20 What did that tell you, if anything, about what was Page 65 Page 67 24 A. It was acrid, but smoke is often acrid. 25 What did that tell you, if anything, about what was Page 67 24 A. It was acrid, but smoke is often acrid. 25 What did that tell you, if anything, about what was Page 67 25 What did that tell you, if anything, about what was Page 67 26 A. Probably consistent, with your recollection? 26 A. Probably consistent, with your recollection? 27 A. Well, normally with acrid smoke it's plastic or rubber-based, which I know we'll get to, but that's what you get from plastics — you know, as you know, there are also chemicals in them, toxic chemicals, and byproducts, like hydrogen cyanides. So as soon as that gets in your throat or eyes, it will sting you because it's poison. 28 Set in your throat or eyes, it will sting you because it's poison. 38 Set in your throat or eyes, it will sting you because it's poison. 39 What was you know, there are also chemicals in them, toxic chemicals, and 39 What was you know, there are also chemicals in them, toxic chemicals, and 30 What was you know, there are also chemicals in them, toxic chemicals, and 30 What	12	that's when you lost contact with Mike Dowden?	12	most types of smoke in my 25 years in the Fire Brigade.
After that — 1.24.29 — how soon after that did Watch Manager Watson appear on the scene at the bedden and the	13	A. That's when we had difficulty. That's when it began.	13	I think that is a bit dramatic from the police officer.
16 Watch Manager Watson appear on the scene at the bridgehead? 16	14	Q. Okay.	14	She was a very good interviewer, I hasten to add,
bridgehead? 17 I didn't pay any great attention to these – there are inaccuracies throughout the document, but they're not significant. 18 A. Pretty soon afterwards. 19 Q. Okay. 20 A. You can find out, if I can offer just one bit of information, by looking at Goff 361 booking stage 3 at the incident. He was the officer in charge of that against the incident information, by looking at Goff 361 booking stage 3 at the incident. He was the officer in charge of that against the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then Page 65 10 being tasked to come and see me. 21 Design tasked to come and see me. 22 Q. Yes. Thank you. 31 We have G361 status 3 at 01.25.06, just to give you a time fix on that, so only about a minute later. 42 I will be being tasked to come and see me. 23 We have G361 status 3 at 01.25.06, just to give you a time fix on that, so only about a minute later. 44 I state consistent with your recollection? 45 Is that consistent with your recollection? 46 A. Probably consistent, yes. 47 Q. You say also you called for additional BA and additional BB A control boards. Did those arrive? 48 A. Trey did. I asked for additional BA and additional BB Control boards. Did those arrive? 49 A. They did. I asked for additional BA boards, additional BC pards, additional BA boards, additional BC pards, additional BC p	15	After that 1.24.29 how soon after that did	15	but police officers sometimes filter what you say, and
18 A. Pretty soon afterwards. 19 Q. Okay. 20 A. You can find out, if I can offer just one bit of 21 information, by looking at Golf 361 booking stage 3 at 22 the incident. He was the officer in charge of that 23 appliance, and I would imagine he had a good look around 24 for himself to see what was going on and then spoke to 25 the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then 26 Page 65 1	16	Watch Manager Watson appear on the scene at the	16	I know I had an opportunity to review that document, but
19 Q. Okay. 19 Significant. 20 Q. Just to get your recollection as you stand here. 21 information, by looking at Golf 361 booking stage 3 at 22 the incident. He was the officer in charge of that appliance, and I would imagine he had a good look around 24 for himself to see what was going on and then spoke to 25 the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then 25 Day of the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then 26 Page 67 Page 67 Page 67 Day of the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then 27 Page 67	17	bridgehead?	17	I didn't pay any great attention to these there are
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for himself to see what was going on and then spoke to the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then Page 65 Page 67 being tasked to come and see me. 1 burning? 2	22	the incident. He was the officer in charge of that	22	
the incident commander, Watch Manager Dowden, and then Page 65 Page 67 Deing tasked to come and see me. 1 burning?	23	appliance, and I would imagine he had a good look around	23	your memory?
Page 65 Page 67 Deing tasked to come and see me. 1 burning?	24	for himself to see what was going on and then spoke to	24	A. It was acrid, but smoke is often acrid.
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Q. Yes. Thank you. We have G361 status 3 at 01.25.06, just to give you a time fix on that, so only about a minute later. Is that consistent with your recollection? A. Probably consistent, yes. Q. You say also you called for additional BA and additional BA control boards. Did those arrive? A. They did. I asked for additional BA boards, additional EEC packs, additional hose, breaking-in kit— ceverything we needed to try and stop the fire. Q. You then go on to say at the middle of the last paragraph on page 8: A. They were, yes. A. They were were as many types, and rubber. They're oil-based but there are many types, and rubber. They're oil-based but there are also chemicals in them, toxic chemicals, and byproducts, like hydrogen cyanides. So as soon as that gets in your throat or eyes, it will sting you because it's poison. Q. Is that what you were experiencing? A. Briefly, yes, but I'm used to that sort of thing. The "I have never experienced this in my life" is a slight exaggeration, that one. Q. We can take that as we find it, then. Did you communicate to anybody that you could now smell even a small amount — A. No. A. Yeah. Q. Yes. A. No, it's normal in a structural fire. Q. And fire spread, actually. Q. And fire spread as well? A. Well, the FSG calls were saying there was fire on multiple floors. A. Well, the FSG calls were saying there was fire on multiple floors.	1	haing tasked to come and see me	1	burning?
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		• •	23	"Of course, what I couldn't see was that outside the
		•	24	
25 that in a moment. 25 At that stage, when you were make pumps 10, is that	25		25	
P (0		D (/		D
Page 66 Page 68		Page 00		rage os

1	right, that you couldn't see?	1	building?
2	A. That's correct.	2	A. Trying to, trying to access the building.
3	Q. But	3	Q. So when you say you were getting calls, that's not from
4	A. I couldn't see, no.	4	control, that's information from
5	Q. Okay. Did you have any clue at that stage that the	5	A. Not directly from control, no. The system we use, sir,
6	exterior of the building was on fire?	6	is the incident command pump will receive fire survival
7	A. Yes. The firefighters told me.	7	guidance from our control and transmit that to the
8	Q. So you knew it but you couldn't see it?	8	incident commander or someone helping the incident
9	A. Yes. We look out for each other, so we pass	9	commander, and that's transmitted to the fire sector.
10	information, there's a constant stream of information.	10	Q. Yes. You explain, in fact, exactly that just halfway
11	It's very important, so if something changes on the fire	11	down the first paragraph on page 9. You say:
12	ground, it is communicated.	12	"The information is then transmitted to either the
13	The textbook will say the incident commander must	13	Brigade appliance in attendance or a Command Unit,
14	communicate any changes the incident commander is	14	stating the location, flat number, floor, number of
15	busy doing other command and control. The	15	persons involved and their location within the
16	firefighters communicate with each other really well, so	16	building."
17	if they know there's a hazard within, you know, any	17	That's how it gets to the command unit, and the
18	incident, they'll tell each other so you don't get	18	command unit is either the incident command pump is
19	caught out by it and injured.	19	this right? or a full-blown CU?
20	So the firefighters coming up to me are telling me	20	A. A full-blown CU. It's the initial command pump. So as
21	that it had jumped up outside the building and it was	21	soon as control hears that we're making first of all,
22	going up towards the roof.	22	if control have multiple calls, you get a command unit
23	Q. And was going up towards the roof, right.	23	anyway. They're on a PDA of I think make pumps four,
24	At the top of page 9 you say:	24	and lots of triggers, you know. Persons involved, you
25	"At the Bridgehead we then began to receive multiple	25	will always get a command unit. So the command unit
			• 6
	Page 69		Page 71
1	requests of rescue from residents and at the same time	1	would've been there pretty quickly. I think.
1 2	requests of rescue from residents and at the same time, I began to receive Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls "	1 2	would've been there pretty quickly, I think. O. Right. You say a command unit is on a PDA for four
2	I began to receive Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls."	2	Q. Right. You say a command unit is on a PDA for four
2 3	I began to receive Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls." Just to be clear on timing again, if I can, was that		Q. Right. You say a command unit is on a PDA for four pumps
2 3 4	I began to receive Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls." Just to be clear on timing again, if I can, was that before or after the make-up to 10 pumps?	2 3	Q. Right. You say a command unit is on a PDA for four pumpsA. No, there are triggers.
2 3 4 5	I began to receive Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls." Just to be clear on timing again, if I can, was that before or after the make-up to 10 pumps? A. Before.	2 3 4 5	 Q. Right. You say a command unit is on a PDA for four pumps A. No, there are triggers. Q. Right.
2 3 4 5 6	I began to receive Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls." Just to be clear on timing again, if I can, was that before or after the make-up to 10 pumps? A. Before. Q. Before. Long before?	2 3 4 5 6	 Q. Right. You say a command unit is on a PDA for four pumps A. No, there are triggers. Q. Right. A. It depends on the level of command required and
2 3 4 5 6 7	I began to receive Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls." Just to be clear on timing again, if I can, was that before or after the make-up to 10 pumps? A. Before. Q. Before. Long before? A. I would say not very long before, but long before, yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7	 Q. Right. You say a command unit is on a PDA for four pumps A. No, there are triggers. Q. Right. A. It depends on the level of command required and communication systems required, so that's what they are.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	I began to receive Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls." Just to be clear on timing again, if I can, was that before or after the make-up to 10 pumps? A. Before. Q. Before. Long before? A. I would say not very long before, but long before, yes. That's why I — I mean, making pumps 10 at a high-rise	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 Q. Right. You say a command unit is on a PDA for four pumps A. No, there are triggers. Q. Right. A. It depends on the level of command required and communication systems required, so that's what they are. It's a mobile command centre.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	I began to receive Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls." Just to be clear on timing again, if I can, was that before or after the make-up to 10 pumps? A. Before. Q. Before. Long before? A. I would say not very long before, but long before, yes. That's why I — I mean, making pumps 10 at a high-rise fire wouldn't be that unusual if the fire is spreading,	2 3 4 5 6 7	 Q. Right. You say a command unit is on a PDA for four pumps A. No, there are triggers. Q. Right. A. It depends on the level of command required and communication systems required, so that's what they are. It's a mobile command centre. Q. Yes. So are you saying so I can place this in
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	I began to receive Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls." Just to be clear on timing again, if I can, was that before or after the make-up to 10 pumps? A. Before. Q. Before. Long before? A. I would say not very long before, but long before, yes. That's why I I mean, making pumps 10 at a high-rise fire wouldn't be that unusual if the fire is spreading, but	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 Q. Right. You say a command unit is on a PDA for four pumps A. No, there are triggers. Q. Right. A. It depends on the level of command required and communication systems required, so that's what they are. It's a mobile command centre. Q. Yes. So are you saying so I can place this in policy when multiple calls are received, a command
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	I began to receive Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls." Just to be clear on timing again, if I can, was that before or after the make-up to 10 pumps? A. Before. Q. Before. Long before? A. I would say not very long before, but long before, yes. That's why I I mean, making pumps 10 at a high-rise fire wouldn't be that unusual if the fire is spreading, but Q. Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 Q. Right. You say a command unit is on a PDA for four pumps A. No, there are triggers. Q. Right. A. It depends on the level of command required and communication systems required, so that's what they are. It's a mobile command centre. Q. Yes. So are you saying so I can place this in policy when multiple calls are received, a command unit is ordered up automatically?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	I began to receive Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls." Just to be clear on timing again, if I can, was that before or after the make-up to 10 pumps? A. Before. Q. Before. Long before? A. I would say not very long before, but long before, yes. That's why I I mean, making pumps 10 at a high-rise fire wouldn't be that unusual if the fire is spreading, but Q. Yes. A. Yes, it was before	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 Q. Right. You say a command unit is on a PDA for four pumps A. No, there are triggers. Q. Right. A. It depends on the level of command required and communication systems required, so that's what they are. It's a mobile command centre. Q. Yes. So are you saying so I can place this in policy when multiple calls are received, a command unit is ordered up automatically? A. Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	I began to receive Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls." Just to be clear on timing again, if I can, was that before or after the make-up to 10 pumps? A. Before. Q. Before. Long before? A. I would say not very long before, but long before, yes. That's why I — I mean, making pumps 10 at a high-rise fire wouldn't be that unusual if the fire is spreading, but — Q. Yes. A. Yes, it was before Q. You use the expression "fire survival guidance calls".	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 Q. Right. You say a command unit is on a PDA for four pumps A. No, there are triggers. Q. Right. A. It depends on the level of command required and communication systems required, so that's what they are. It's a mobile command centre. Q. Yes. So are you saying so I can place this in policy when multiple calls are received, a command unit is ordered up automatically? A. Yes. Q. Right. For those who are interested, that is in
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1	and that's where all the radio traffic comes through.	1	Yes, Mr Millett.
2	So it's a temporary well, mostly a temporary command	2	MR MILLETT: So we were discussing before the break,
3	post.	3	Mr O'Keeffe, the normal system of communication, and
4	Q. We're going to have a break in just a few minutes,	4	I just want to get from you the system of communication
5	Mr O'Keeffe, but before we do, can I ask you: how, when	5	of fire survival guidance information from the CU, the
6	you have multiple calls, does the FSG information	6	command unit, to the bridgehead during the various
7	normally go from the command unit to the bridgehead?	7	different stages of the incident while you were at the
8	What's the normal route of communication?	8	bridgehead.
9	A. The normal route of communication would be by radio.	9	A. Okay.
10	Q. Direct?	10	Q. Just first of all, at the very start, what was the
11	A. If it's possible.	11	method of communication of fire survival guidance
12	Q. So CU, radio channel	12	information from the CU?
13	A. They get the information from they have a dedicated	13	A. At the very start, verbally and on the radio.
14	emergency line which we use for FSG calls, and then you	14	Q. Right.
15	have it's staffed by officers, additional officers,	15	A. Thereafter it was pieces of paper.
16	and that information is recorded. But it can be brought	16	Q. Right.
17	to the bridgehead physically, which is probably better,	17	A. As I recall.
18	and it's recorded on the forward information board, and	18	Q. Okay.
19	it's used to so you'd have the information logged on	19	A. And
20	what it's an FSG poster, which is a large format.	20	Q. Who would bring the pieces of paper to the bridgehead,
21	That can be brought to the bridgehead. But it's	21	do you remember?
22	recorded in quadruple I think quadruple forms.	22	A. Various people as the incident progressed, but Watch
23	Q. Yes.	23	Manager Watson was the guy that was facilitating
24	A. So the forms can be handed out to various people, but it	24	supporting us in the bridgehead.
25	would be transmitted as well.	25	Q. What would you do with the information on the pieces of
	Page 73		Page 75
1	Q. Transmitted as well. So	1	paper?
2	A. That was happening at the very beginning of the fire at	2	A. Transcribe it onto the forward information board, and
3	Grenfell Tower.	3	when that became too full, I instructed Firefighter
4	Q. So at the very beginning it was coming by radio, was it?	4	O'Beirne the word I used was "sling it", put that
5	A. Radio and verbally.	5	information up on the wall.
6	Q. And verbally?	6	Q. In general terms, when you had information from inside
7	A. And pieces of paper.	7	the building from firefighters either coming back down
8	MR MILLETT: Right. We'll pursue that a little bit more	8	to the bridgehead or by radio, was there a way of
9	later on.	9	recording that?
10	I wonder whether now may be convenient for a break.	10	A. With the information they would bring to me, if they
11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. We'll have another break now,	11	gave me a flat number, that would go on to the
12	Mr O'Keeffe.	12	I would send them to the BA guys to give that
13	THE WITNESS: Okay, thank you, sir.	13	information. They'd have to give that information
14	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll all have a bit longer. We'll	14	anyway when they were closing down their sets. So they
15	have quarter of an hour, back at 11.25, and please don't	15	would give that information to the, I suppose, FSG
16	talk to anyone about your evidence.	16	recorder and the entry control officer.
17	Thank you very much.	17	Q. What would happen to that information after that point?
18	THE WITNESS: Thank you.	18	A. It would be recorded and the next crew to come would be
19	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Right 3.25, please.	19	given that information and assigned that if there was
20	(11.10 am)	20	a known area where somebody needed rescuing, you would
21	(A short break)	21	immediately assign a crew to it. Or that's what I was
22	(11.25 am)	22	doing.
23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, Mr O'Keeffe?	23	Q. Supposing firefighters came down just in general
24	THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.	24	terms at the moment and said to you, "Well, we've
25	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.	25	gone up to flat X and can't find anybody in there" or
	Page 74		Page 76
•	i age /T	1	i age 70

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1	"Gone up to flat X and can't get in or can't get onto	1	A. That was just after Watch Manager Dowden was making up
2	that floor" and have come down, so that it was	2	the incident as quickly as he could, but the resources
3	an unsuccessful deployment	3	hadn't arrived yet, and we had committed pretty much all
4	A. Yes, which happened throughout the night.	4	of our equipment and people. Not everybody, of course,
5	Q. Yes would that information be recorded, first of all?	5	as we had to have support on the fire ground and
6	A. It would be recorded, yes.	6	elsewhere, but as many as we could possibly commit, we
7	Q. Where would that be recorded?	7	did.
8	A. It was recorded on the wall, as far as I'm aware.	8	Q. What was he recording at this forward post, this staging
9	Q. Would that information then be fed back to ultimately	9	area?
10	Brigade control?	10	A. What was he what?
11	A. Well, I was feeding the information to Watch Manager	11	Q. What was he recording? Was he recording information?
12	Watson, because I wasn't able to use the radio any	12	A. Quite possibly, I don't know. He was listening to me
13	longer, wasn't able to transmit it, and my understanding	13	quite a lot. He is a really good guy. If you ask him
14	was he would bring any important information back to the	14	for something, he understands it readily and was trying
15	fire ground outside.	15	to get me what I or get us what we needed on the
16	Q. So to your recollection, information about successful or	16	bridgehead.
17	failed deployments would be fed back through the method	17	Q. Right.
18	of communication?	18	Was he communicating with anybody in the lobby of
19	A. Various methods of communication.	19	the building on the ground floor?
20	Q. Can you just describe those for us?	20	A. Yes.
21	A. Verbally, face-to-face, "Can you pass this information	21	Q. Who was that, do you know?
22	on", or written down. I didn't write anything down	22	A. I don't know. There was a lot of activity in the lobby.
23	myself because I was too busy, I didn't have time to	23	A lot of times I looked down the stairs or into the
24	write, but I did speak to Watch Manager Watson quite	24	lobby, there was quite a bit of activity, firefighters
25	a lot during the incident.	25	and so on.
	Page 77		Page 79
1	Q. Right, and he would go where with that information?	1	Q. Do you know where Watson was getting the information
2	A. Downstairs. He kept going back up and down. He did	2	that he was passing to you?
3	a lot of walking, running.	3	A. From the fire ground.
4	Q. To whom would he communicate the information?	4	Q. From the fire ground?
5	A. Watch Manager Watson.	5	A. He would've been getting that from we would assign as
6	Q. All right.	6	many as we can spare to manage the information coming
7	Did you have any discussions with Mike Dowden or any	7	in.
8	later incident commanders about particular failed	8	Q. He was bringing slips of paper in to you?
9	deployments that you were learning about?	9	A. Yes, just information, slips of paper.
10	A. Yes.	10	Q. Do you know where he was getting the information that he
11	Q. Who?	11	was recording on these slips of paper?
12	A. Group Manager Welch.	12	A. From the the exact location I don't know because
13	Q. We'll come to him.	13	I was inside, but he would be getting it from people who
14	Now, do you remember Watch Manager Watson setting up	14	were getting the information from Brigade control, who
15	a BA staging area on the mezzanine?	15	were manning the phones, and they were given this
16	A. Mm, I do.	16	precise information to officers on the fire ground. He
17	Q. What sort of point in the night was that? How long	17	was then getting the information and either bringing it
18	after he arrived, perhaps, was that?	18	himself or sending people with the information to us.
19	A. Pretty immediately after he arrived because I told him	19	Q. Right.
20	we had nothing left, and I was on the radio asking for	20	Did you know whether that information had been
21	resources, I wasn't getting any response. I was getting	21	prioritised so that what you were getting was
22	frustrated because I had multiple, multiple calls for	22	A. Of course.
23	rescue and I couldn't commit anybody else. I had nobody	23	Q in a priority
24	else left. And that was if I could just explain why.	24	A. That is the priority.
25	Q. Yes.	25	Q. Okay.
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1	A. FSG when you have an FSG incident, it becomes the	1	I said, "No".
2	priority.	2	Q. Right.
3	Q. Right.	3	A. And he said, "Why not?" And I said the standard
4	But I think you are saying you don't know exactly	4	duration guys were either in danger of getting killed
5	where Watson was getting the information?	5	themselves or couldn't reach the upper floors. They
6	A. No, you'd have to ask him that himself, sir.	6	were running out of air really quickly.
7	Q. Do you know whether Watson was receiving pieces of paper	7	Q. That was the problem you communicated to him?
8	from somebody else or creating the pieces of paper?	8	A. That was my big problem and he said okay, and he said
9	A. Receiving. I do know that; he was receiving.	9	"What do you need? What do we need?" I said EDBA,
10	Q. He was essentially a back and forth messenger	10	extended duration breathing apparatus. And he said,
11	a runner?	11	"How much?" And I said, "All of it." And he said, "We
12	A. He wasn't well, that would be disingenuous, to say he	12	can't do that." I said, "Governor, we need all of it,
13	was a runner, because	13	we need it now, everything." And I elaborated like
14	Q. It's a rude word, I suppose, but	14	I was trying to sell the idea to him. I said, "Get all
15	A. No, no, it's okay, he was a runner, and later on in the	15	the FRUs here, get the CBRN", I said there's loads of
16	incident, even though he was a watch manager, he was	16	guys with an EDBA ticket, as I have, which is
17	a runner, yes.	17	a qualification in London. I said, "We need them here
18	Q. Right.	18	now, otherwise we're not going to reach these people."
19	Now, page 9, you describe, five lines down, stay-put	19	That's why that was the and he thought I could
20	advice. You say:	20	see him thinking, he was listening, and he said, "Okay,
21	"In this case, the advice would have been to stay	21	we'll do that", and he ran back downstairs.
22	put. This is because high-rise buildings are generally	22	Q. Okay.
23	meant to be constructed so that fires will be contained	23	A. He also said, "I'm taking over as fire sector
24	to the fire floor"	24	commander." That was the first thing he said.
25	A. That's correct.	25	Q. In fact, we have the first deployment of EDBA wearers
	D 04		D 02
	Page 81		Page 83
1	Q. " and so it's far safer for residents of high-rise	1	there's no need to look at the telemetry data at
2	blocks to stay in their, supposedly, protected	2	around 1.56?
3	apartments until Firefighters can come and rescue them."	3	A. Paddington?
4	When you first started getting fire survival	4	Q. Yes. Paddington, a five-firefighter crew from
5	guidance calls, did you know what advice was being given	5	Paddington.
6	by the control room operators to individual residents	6	A. A line rescue crew. A line ops crew. I remember.
7	who were calling?	7	Q. Crew Manager Wigley.
8	A. No, I didn't, and on that point, I asked at one point,	8	A. Crew Manager Wigley, yes.
9	when Group Manager Welch had arrived, and one of my many	9	Q. Was that before or after Group Manager Welch arrived at
10	discussions with him that night was, "Governor, have	10	the bridgehead?
11	they lifted the policy yet? The stay-put advice." And	11	A. Before.
12	he said, "I don't know."	12	Q. So you did have some EDBA available, did you?
13	Q. Yes. You cover that in your statement.	13	A. Earlier on I said to Watch Manager Dowden, "Get some
14	When he arrived, looking ahead, did he agree with	14	EDBA here" and he said, "I'm doing it anyway." He was
15	you that the stay-put policy should be changed?	15	already thinking like I was. I think he ordered a
16	A. We didn't have that type of discussion. We had	16	couple of FRUs for line ops, as far as I understand, and
17	a different discussion when he arrived. Do you want to	17	he had a plan to use them for something.
18	know when I first saw him?	18	Q. Now, just going back to the question we'll come back
19	Q. Yes.	19	to Group Manager Welch later on about advice being
20	A. He ran up the stairs again, to see a group manager	20	given to the control room, you say you didn't know what
21	running is unusual and he said I can't remember	21	it was.
22	the exact words, he said, "B" using the initial for	22	A. No.
23	my name, he's obviously found out who I am "What are	23	Q. What assumption did you make, or did you make
24	you doing?" which is normal, you know, what	24	an assumption, about what the advice was being given
25	tactics and the gist was "Is it working?" And	25	A. I would say the assumption it is just
	D 02		D 04
	Page 82		Page 84

1	an assumption was that the advice was to stay put.	1	about the same time.
2	Q. Did you have any thoughts about whether that continued	2	A. Yes.
3	to be	3	Q. That might help you remember. How soon after that, that
4	A. I did have thoughts. I thought nobody would make it	4	deployment, do you remember Richard Welch coming to the
5	down the stairs, so that was the only advice the	5	bridgehead and you
6	stairs were smoke-logged completely, and my BA crews	6	A. Pretty soon afterwards. Not immediately, but I mean
7	were suffering and they were in BA, and I knew that it	7	he when he would've turned up, he would've had to
8	would be dangerous for anyone not in breathing apparatus	8	make his assessment of what was going on. And there was
9	to be in that stairwell, and it was the only means of	9	a lot going on. So he would've gone to the command unit
10	going up or coming down, escaping from the building.	10	to book in. He would've spoken to officers, you know,
11	And it was an assumption, and that's why I asked	11	collecting information, trying to formulate a plan. You
12	Group Manager Welch. It was an assumption that people	12	know, he's a senior officer and that's what he would do.
13	were being told to stay put.	13	Q. And you say:
14	Q. Okay.	14	" I had a conversation with Richard WELCH as
15	Was there a way in which you could communicate with	15	regards the change in advice for the Stay Put
16	the control room about what you or your BA wearers were	16	Policy"
17	seeing and experiencing in the stairs?	17	A. Yes, I can't remember the exact time that was.
18	A. All that information was fed down to the incident	18	Q. So he comes to the bridgehead, and is this conversation
19	commander through Watch Manager Watson and other	19	about stay put at that stage when he first comes to the
20	officers.	20	bridgehead to talk to you?
21	Q. That's the link you had with the control room?	21	A. As I said no, no, it wasn't. When he came first
22	A. Not just him, but other officers, and the firefighters	22	it was, "What are you doing? Is it working?" "No."
23	who were coming who had been committed, and they were	23	"What do we need? Okay, I'll do that."
24	being battered, so	24	Q. That was the EDBA discussion?
25	Q. Now, just to come back to Richard Welch, halfway down	25	A. Yes.
	Page 85		Page 87
		١.	0.7311.4
1	page 9, you say:	1	Q. Did he then go away and come back?
2	"I think it was about 0200 - 0230 hours that I had a	2	A. Yes. Throughout the night he'd run downstairs, come
3	conversation with Richard WELCH as regards the change in	3	back, yes.
4	advice for the Stay Put Policy. I can't recall the	4	Q. Then you have this conversation as regards "the change".
5	exact details of this conversation"	5	How did that conversation go? How did the subject of
6	A. It was a question.	6	changing the stay-put policy come up?
7	Q. Okay. Can I just show you your evidence up there, you	7	A. I brought it up.
8	say:	8	Q. What did you say?
10	" I can't recall the exact details of this	9	A. I asked him a question.
10	conversation but it wouldn't have changed our Search and	10	Q. What was the question?
11	Rescue tactics but would have added an element of	11	A. Is the stay put I can't remember the exact question,
12	potential unpredictability to our operations. We	12	but has the stay-put policy been lifted or is it going
13	wouldn't have known where people were."	13	to be lifted? Something like that.
14 15	Just taking this in stages.	14 15	Q. Why did you ask that question? A. Because the fire was out of control.
	Richard Welch, when he arrives, what status did he		
16	have? Was he incident commander or what?	16	Q. Just trying to get your thought processes, the fire
17	A. I was a bit confused about that because he told me he	17	being out of control, why did you think that it might be
18 19	was fire sector commander, which was my job at the time. As bridgehead commander, you're fire sector commander.	18 19	necessary to change the stay-put policy?
		1	A. It's a good question. Because the fire had
20 21	But he's quite a senior officer to me, so I was under	20	outstripped the event had outstripped our ability to
21	the impression that he had taken over the entire	21	rescue everybody, on the information I had at the time.
22	incident.	22 23	Q. So changing from stay put, what did you think at the
23	Q. Now, to put it in timing terms, we have him status 3 at		time the advice should be changed to? A. I didn't have an oninion other than if people started.
25	01.57.21. We also have your deployment of this five-person or five-firefighter Paddington EDBA crew at	24 25	A. I didn't have an opinion, other than if people started
23	nve-person of five-intengence Paddington EDDA crew at	23	to evacuate, there would become multiple casualties in
	Page 86		Page 88

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1	the stairs and we would have great difficulty in finding	1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Are you comfortable?
2	out where people were, because when you have an FSG, you	2	A. I am, just sweaty palms. That's okay; it's everybody in
3	know where someone is, and if they are protected, you	3	the room, sir.
4	know you have a destination, X or Y flat, number of	4	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I think you're right.
5	people. But if people start evacuating when the entire	5	MR MILLETT: I just want to see if I can get a time on this
6	building's on fire, or most of it's on fire and the only	6	and then we'll go back, but in the middle of page 11,
7	way down is impossible, that would have been well,	7	just after you've discussed a deployment and information
8	a huge catastrophe for well, it would've really	8	you got from Murphy and Cornelius this is floor 14
9	impeded our rescue operations.	9	you say:
10	Q. And that's the sense you get from what you say	10	"By this time the situation had deteriorated even
11	A. If my guys didn't know where people were, I couldn't	11	further. This was very early on in the incident and the
12	say, "Well, go to this floor". You just have, as we did	12	fire was developing so rapidly that BA crews were
13	afterwards, people deceased in the stairwell and various	13	finding it difficult to get beyond the twelve[sic]
14	parts of the building.	14	floor."
15	Q. At the stage you're having your conversation with	15	A. Correct.
16	Group Manager Welch, were you in favour of changing the	16	Q. Was that before or after you had this question and
17	stay-put policy or against it?	17	answer discussion with Group Manager Welch about
18	A. No, I didn't I wasn't in favour. I was wondering, it	18	changing the stay-put advice?
19	was a question. I needed to know what was going on.	19	A. Before.
20	Q. I see.	20	Q. Before. Okay.
21	A. It is very important for me to know what kind of	21	Now, I want to just look, if I can, at a number of
22	movement is happening in the building, what advice is	22	particular deployments and see if you can help me with
23	being given.	23	them.
24	Q. So do I understand your evidence to be that your	24	A. Okay.
25	conversation with him was exploratory; you just	25	Q. Is that all right?
	Page 89		Page 91
1	wanted	1	A. It's absolutely fine, yes.
2	A. Exploratory, yes.	2	Q. Okay. The first one is about a rescue well, a trip
3	Q. Did he tell you, when you had that conversation, what	3	to the 20th floor.
4	the status of the stay-put advice was?	4	A. Yes.
5	A. No, at that time it was a question and an answer. It	5	Q. Were you at the bridgehead when Crew Manager Secrett and
6	wasn't a conversation, per se. Not being disrespectful	6	Firefighters Badillo and Dorgu left the bridgehead to go
7	here, but it was just a very short exchange between he	7	to the 20th floor to perform a rescue?
8	and I, which we had many, many throughout the entire	8	A. I would have been, but I wasn't aware they went there.
9	incident.	9	Q. You weren't aware?
10	Q. I'm sure.	10	A. No.
11	A. That was the exchange. And he said, "I don't know."	11	Q. Okay.
12	Q. Do you know whether he went and discussed that question	12	Were you aware that an FSG call was in progress with
13	with anybody else?	13	a 12-year-old girl on the 23rd floor?
14	A. You'd have to ask Group Manager Welch that, sir.	14	A. Most likely, because we had multiple calls at that time,
15	Q. Right.	15	so if you asked me the number of a floor or flat,
16	At that stage, in terms of priorities, you've had	16	I wouldn't be able to tell you.
17	this question and answer with Group Manager Welch, were	17	Q. Right. So let me just see if I can get a time on this.
18	you prioritising firefighting or search and the rescue	18	If you go to the operational response report and
19	or were they the same	19	turn to page 59 and 60, 59 first of all, we see at
20	A. Search and rescue.	20	01.35.24, Operations Manager Norman she's in the
21	Q. Search and rescue.	21	control room at Stratford rings the team leader,
22	Jumping ahead a little bit, on page 11 of your	22	Watch Manager Meyryk, on CU8.
23	statement, in the middle of the page, you refer to	23	A. Yes.
24	a time I think quite early on in the incident.	24	Q. There's a conversation she has.
25	A. Yes.	25	Then over the page we have a summary here of the
			. •
	Page 90		Page 92

1	information that is passed to CU8, and the source of	1	into the building up the stairs from the bridgehead who
2	that is it's admin call and Vision.	2	weren't telling you or Alex De St Aubin where they were
3	You'll see that the floor number of the fourth entry	3	going or what they were doing?
4	down is number 23, and there are two adults and eight	4	A. That did happen.
5	children. Remarks: smoke going into the flat.	5	Q. It did happen?
6	A. Yes.	6	A. It did happen, throughout the incident.
7	Q. Now, that's at that time.	7	Q. Throughout the incident?
8	Do you remember getting information at the	8	A. On a few points where I was maintaining control, command
9	bridgehead, whilst you were in charge of it, after or	9	and control, and I remember one specific incident where
10	just after that time, about a number of people on floor	10	a crew from Hammersmith went past the entry control
11	23?	11	point with their tallies in their BA sets, which
12	A. Can you just remind me of the time?	12	I observed, and I sent a crew manager after them, Crew
13	Q. Well, that information comes in at 01.35.24.	13	Manager Tilsley from Paddington, to get them back and to
14	A. Not specifically, but there was no, is the answer.	14	book in correctly.
15	As with the BA crews that were going up, again,	15	Q. Right. How far into the incident?
16	I wouldn't be able to keep tabs on them because I wasn't	16	A. I couldn't tell you.
17	the entry control officer, although I was briefing	17	Q. Just focusing on this trio of firefighters going to the
18	people. But I didn't have I clearly can't recall any	18	20th floor, we have them leaving the bridgehead at 01.33
19	specific numbers or flats. Well, maybe one or two.	19	or so, 01.33.57.
20	Q. Do you remember having any discussion with firefighters	20	Do you remember whether after that time, when they'd
21	Secrett, Badillo and Dorgu as they went up the tower?	21	gone, any further FSG information came to the bridgehead
22	A. No.	22	about floor 23?
23	Q. Did you	23	A. It rings a bell.
24	A. Sorry, go on.	24	Q. It rings a bell?
25	Q. Did you learn from them while they were up the tower	25	A. Yes, but I can't floor 23 does ring a bell.
	Page 93		Page 95
1	about the conditions they discovered once they got to	1	Q. Any particular flat number?
2	the 20th floor?	2	A. No. I will say that numbers of flats, floors, times,
3	A. No.	3	throughout the incident, except with one exception,
4	Q. Or conditions in the stairwell?	4	where I kept FSG notes in my tunic and retrieved them
5	A. Not me personally, but they may well have briefed the	5	the following week, that's the only time stamp that
6	entry control officer on return, which I would suggest	6	I have from the entire incident, other than when I went
7	they did.	7	in and came out of the tower.
8	Q. Right.	8	Q. Right.
9	Just to pin this down, in time, we have the dispatch	9	Can you help us with when the FSG call came in about
10	time or the tally-out time for Secrett, Dorgu and	10	a flat on the 23rd floor?
11	Badillo at about 1.33. Just to be clear, for	11	A. No, sir, I can't. I can't give you the time at all.
12	Firefighter Secrett, his telemetry data shows that the	12	Q. What about a call in relation to a flat on the 20th
13	tally-out time for him was 01.33.57, and the others	13	floor, 175, do you remember
14	01.33.33 and 01.35.01. So that's the time they tally	14	A. I believe so, possibly. I don't know.
15	out, but I think you've told us that you didn't have	15	Q. Do you know when that
16	a discussion with them about what they were doing when	16	A. I remember my first BA crew but no, they went to the
17	they went up?	17	16th floor, sorry, it was a different
18	A. That's correct, I didn't. I can't recall it, but there	18	Q. I am going to some to the 16th floor in a minute, but
19	were a lot of BA crews well, everybody available at	19	just on there are two calls that are in progress
20	that time was going up, and I don't specifically	20	A. Yes.
21	remember speaking to any of that crew.	21	Q to tell you, after 1.30, and after 1.30 I'll show you
22	Q. Do you remember whether Alex De St Aubin spoke to that	22	the CU8 information about
23	crew?	23	A. Okay.
24	A. You'd have to ask Firefighter De St Aubin, sir.	24	Q the flat on the 23rd floor.
25	Q. Do you remember whether there were BA crews going up	25	The flat on the 20th floor, 175, you say that's FSG
	D 0.4		D 04
	Page 94		Page 96

1	information which rings a bell.	1	status 3, and then you would add, say, a time lapse
2	Do you remember, having received FSG information	2	of minutes while Watch Manager De Silvo was being
3	about flat 175, what you did with that information?	3	briefed, you know, on the fire ground, and then she was
4	A. I can answer by saying that all information FSG	4	escorted up to the bridgehead by or accompanied,
5	information, sorry received at the bridgehead was	5	I should say, by Watch Manager Watson, Paul Watson, and
6	acted upon was recorded and acted upon by committing	6	when she came I was very happy to see another watch
7	BA crews.	7	manager and so I detailed her to get a grip, is the word
8	Q. Do you remember whether the information about flat 175	8	I used, on the BA procedures and the FSG.
9	on the 20th floor was received by you at the bridgehead	9	Q. Right.
10	before the trio Secrett, Badillo and Dorgu had	10	Now, we have Crew Manager Secrett coming down to the
11	left the bridgehead?	11	bridgehead with an end of wear time of 01.57. We have
12	A. No, I don't remember.	12	Badillo with an end of wear time of about the same and
13	Q. Having received the information about flat 175 on the	13	also Dorgu. So just before 2 o'clock, a trio of BA
14	20th floor, did you then instruct a BA crew to go to	14	wearers come down to the bridgehead. I know you say you
15	that flat?	15	didn't have a debrief with any of them.
16	A. At that time?	16	Do you remember any firefighter at around that time
17	Q. Yes.	17	coming down to the bridgehead dangerously low on air?
18	A. If I had a BA crew, yes, they would've been committed.	18	A. Yes. They all did. Most of them.
19	Most likely, at that time, we had run out.	19	Q. Right.
20	Q. Right.	20	A. That's the way it became initially, yes.
21	Do you remember the trio of Secrett, Badillo and	21	Q. Do you remember a firefighter coming down with metabolic
22	Dorgu coming back down to the bridgehead?	22	heat stress?
23	A. No.	23	A. No.
24	Q. You don't?	24	Q. Do you remember firefighters coming down dangerously low
25	A. No.	25	on air and going out of the bridgehead without
23	A. 10.	23	on an and going out of the oridgenead without
	Page 97		Page 99
1	O. Do you remember a discussion with Crew Manager Secrett	1	debriefing you?
1 2	Q. Do you remember a discussion with Crew Manager Secrett about a trip that he'd made to	1 2	debriefing you? A. No. I wouldn't allow that to happen.
2	about a trip that he'd made to	2	A. No. I wouldn't allow that to happen.
2 3	about a trip that he'd made to A. No, definitely not.	2 3	A. No. I wouldn't allow that to happen.Q. You wouldn't allow that to happen?
2 3 4	about a trip that he'd made to A. No, definitely not. Q the 20th floor. What about Badillo?	2 3 4	A. No. I wouldn't allow that to happen.Q. You wouldn't allow that to happen?A. Not if I was aware of what was happening, I wouldn't
2 3	about a trip that he'd made to A. No, definitely not. Q the 20th floor. What about Badillo? A. No.	2 3 4 5	 A. No. I wouldn't allow that to happen. Q. You wouldn't allow that to happen? A. Not if I was aware of what was happening, I wouldn't allow it.
2 3 4 5 6	about a trip that he'd made to — A. No, definitely not. Q. — the 20th floor. What about Badillo? A. No. Q. What about Dorgu?	2 3 4 5 6	 A. No. I wouldn't allow that to happen. Q. You wouldn't allow that to happen? A. Not if I was aware of what was happening, I wouldn't allow it. Q. I was going to say, because we have this trio of
2 3 4 5 6 7	about a trip that he'd made to A. No, definitely not. Q the 20th floor. What about Badillo? A. No. Q. What about Dorgu? A. No.	2 3 4 5 6 7	 A. No. I wouldn't allow that to happen. Q. You wouldn't allow that to happen? A. Not if I was aware of what was happening, I wouldn't allow it. Q. I was going to say, because we have this trio of firefighters, they go up to the 20th floor to perform
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	about a trip that he'd made to A. No, definitely not. Q the 20th floor. What about Badillo? A. No. Q. What about Dorgu? A. No. Q. Are you clear in your recollection?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 A. No. I wouldn't allow that to happen. Q. You wouldn't allow that to happen? A. Not if I was aware of what was happening, I wouldn't allow it. Q. I was going to say, because we have this trio of firefighters, they go up to the 20th floor to perform a rescue, they don't succeed because they can't find
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	about a trip that he'd made to A. No, definitely not. Q the 20th floor. What about Badillo? A. No. Q. What about Dorgu? A. No. Q. Are you clear in your recollection? A. I'm quite clear, yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 A. No. I wouldn't allow that to happen. Q. You wouldn't allow that to happen? A. Not if I was aware of what was happening, I wouldn't allow it. Q. I was going to say, because we have this trio of firefighters, they go up to the 20th floor to perform a rescue, they don't succeed because they can't find anybody in the flat, they run out of air we've heard
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	about a trip that he'd made to A. No, definitely not. Q the 20th floor. What about Badillo? A. No. Q. What about Dorgu? A. No. Q. Are you clear in your recollection? A. I'm quite clear, yes. Q. Would	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 A. No. I wouldn't allow that to happen. Q. You wouldn't allow that to happen? A. Not if I was aware of what was happening, I wouldn't allow it. Q. I was going to say, because we have this trio of firefighters, they go up to the 20th floor to perform a rescue, they don't succeed because they can't find anybody in the flat, they run out of air we've heard evidence about this and come down a smoky stairway,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	about a trip that he'd made to A. No, definitely not. Q the 20th floor. What about Badillo? A. No. Q. What about Dorgu? A. No. Q. Are you clear in your recollection? A. I'm quite clear, yes. Q. Would A. Not that I can recall. I mean, I've got quite a good	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 A. No. I wouldn't allow that to happen. Q. You wouldn't allow that to happen? A. Not if I was aware of what was happening, I wouldn't allow it. Q. I was going to say, because we have this trio of firefighters, they go up to the 20th floor to perform a rescue, they don't succeed because they can't find anybody in the flat, they run out of air we've heard evidence about this and come down a smoky stairway, at least one of them very low on air, and then leave the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	about a trip that he'd made to A. No, definitely not. Q the 20th floor. What about Badillo? A. No. Q. What about Dorgu? A. No. Q. Are you clear in your recollection? A. I'm quite clear, yes. Q. Would A. Not that I can recall. I mean, I've got quite a good recall on events generally speaking. I don't recall	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 A. No. I wouldn't allow that to happen. Q. You wouldn't allow that to happen? A. Not if I was aware of what was happening, I wouldn't allow it. Q. I was going to say, because we have this trio of firefighters, they go up to the 20th floor to perform a rescue, they don't succeed because they can't find anybody in the flat, they run out of air we've heard evidence about this and come down a smoky stairway, at least one of them very low on air, and then leave the bridgehead and not do a debrief with you. I am trying
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	about a trip that he'd made to A. No, definitely not. Q the 20th floor. What about Badillo? A. No. Q. What about Dorgu? A. No. Q. Are you clear in your recollection? A. I'm quite clear, yes. Q. Would A. Not that I can recall. I mean, I've got quite a good recall on events generally speaking. I don't recall that.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 A. No. I wouldn't allow that to happen. Q. You wouldn't allow that to happen? A. Not if I was aware of what was happening, I wouldn't allow it. Q. I was going to say, because we have this trio of firefighters, they go up to the 20th floor to perform a rescue, they don't succeed because they can't find anybody in the flat, they run out of air we've heard evidence about this and come down a smoky stairway, at least one of them very low on air, and then leave the bridgehead and not do a debrief with you. I am trying to get a feel on whether that was something you
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1	Firefighter Murphy from my who was one of my guys at	1	Q. We have them tallying out of the bridgehead at 1.56 and
2	the time from Kensington, and Firefighter Cornelius.	2	1.57 or so. Would that be about right in terms of
3	Q. We are going to look at that deployment in some detail	3	A. That would be, yes.
4	in a moment.	4	Q your recollection?
5	A. Okay.	5	A. Yes.
6	Q. But when they did come down to you and tell you that,	6	Q. Do you remember where they were tasked to go?
7	did that indicate to you that residents in the building	7	A. They were tasked to go to the roof.
8	needed to be told by the control room about those	8	Q. Whose idea was that?
9	conditions?	9	A. Incident commander.
10	A. Certainly.	10	Q. Who was that at that stage?
11	Q. And that BA wearers going up to perform rescues and	11	A. Watch Manager Dowden, I believe.
12	evacuations needed to make sure that they could get	12	Q. What were they going to do on the roof?
13	those residents down the stairwell in some way?	13	A. Set up a line, a drencher system or set up a series of
14	A. Without a doubt, but the issue of bringing at this	14	lines with their special skills for a drencher.
15	time, I still we don't have any facilities to bring	15	Q. You say special skills, did that particular crew have
16	people through smoke without injuring them. Sorry,	16	particular drencher
17	smoke of that intensity and that degree of	17	A. Their brief was to go and set up a line a system of
18	smoke-logging.	18	lines to secure people or to secure equipment on the
19	Q. Right.	19	roof.
20	A. Otherwise my guys wouldn't be wearing breathing	20	Q. You say lines; do you mean ropes?
21	apparatus. This is a highly irrespirable atmosphere,	21	A. Ropes, yes. Sorry, we call them lines in the Fire
22	toxic, and you won't get very far.	22	Brigade. Ropes, yes. They are rope specialists.
23	Q. If the conditions on the 20th floor that Secrett, Dorgu	23	Q. Right, okay. And how would that work, or how was it
24	and Badillo had discovered thick smoke in flat 176,	24	supposed to work?
25	thick smoke in the lobby, thick smoke in the stairway	25	A. I don't know. I didn't give the it wasn't my plan.
	Page 101		Page 103
1	wight down to just hefers the huidesheed of Cross	1	I didult aire the instruction
1	right down to just before the bridgehead, as Crew	1	I didn't give the instruction.
2	Manager Secrett told us yesterday in the light of	2	Q. Do you think it was a feasible strategy?
3	those conditions that were there, as he said, before	3	A. No.
4	2 o'clock, what advice should the control room be giving	4 5	Q. Why is that?
5	to callers who are trapped in their flats? A. A description of events — a description of the		A. Why? The building from the as far as I was concerned
6	•	6 7	at that time, there were multiple seats of fire from the
7	conditions.		16th floor all the way up, and they wouldn't have made
8	Q. Right. Was it important for control room themselves to know precisely what was happening inside the building?	8	it.
9		9	Q. Right.
10	A. Of course, yes, very important. I would suggest that	10	A. I told them that. I said to them, from my perspective,
11	that crew went to the incident commander, who was their	11	inside the tower, I don't think it's a good idea.
12	officer anyway. If they didn't brief me, they would've	12	I didn't believe it was a good idea, but I can
13	spoken to the entry control board, and they would	13	understand the logic of it. But the actuality was,
14	certainly, I would say - yes, certainly - spoken to	14	I said to them, to Crew Manager Wigley, I said, "Phil,
15	their watch manager.	15	I don't think it's a good idea, I don't think you're
16	Q. Right.	16	going to make it."
17	Now, we're going to take a break in just	17	Q. Right.
18	a few minutes.	18	Did you think there might have been a better use
19	A. Okay. O. Can Livet ask you shout a particular danloyment.	19	for
20	Q. Can I just ask you about a particular deployment.	20	A. Yes.
21	Do you remember the first deployment of EDBA?	21	Q the EDBA than using it to go to the roof?
22	A. Yes.	22	A. Rescue. Rescue.
23	Q. And that was a deployment of a five-person or	23	Q. Rescue?
24 25	five-firefighter Paddington team. Do you remember that? A. That's correct, yes. Paddington's line crew, yes.	24 25	A. Yes. Q. Did you tell Phil Wigley that?
23	That o correct, year I addington a life tier, year		2. Dia jou con rain migroy unit:
	Page 102		Page 104
		-	26 (Pages 101 to 104)

1	A. Something along those lines, and he said to me, "Well,	1	You have given us a very clear picture of the
2	I've been instructed by the incident commander."	2	development of smoke in the stairwell.
3	I said, "Well, fair enough." So I knew they had a long	3	A. Yes.
4	travel distance so I told them not to start up	4	Q. So have other witnesses.
5	immediately, which goes outside policy, BA	5	Could you please be shown page 87 of the operational
6	Sorry, I need to take some water.	6	response report.
7	He had some young firefighters with him, so they	7	If we just focus on 01.58, the time there, it says
8	were less experienced. I knew it was a very hazardous	8	that between 01.39 and 01.58, which is the time when you
9	journey, so I said to them, "Look, start up when you see	9	were managing the bridgehead, the following residents
10	thick smoke, not now. So give me your tallies, and get	10	have either been rescued assisted out or self-evacuated
11	up as many floors as you can into the building, if you	11	from Grenfell Tower, and then there is a list of 20
12	are going to get to the roof, and then start up and look	12	individuals, and the source of that is various different
13	after each other."	13	notes.
14	Q. Did they start up to go to the roof?	14	I just want to ask you: given that 20 individuals
15	A. They didn't start up there. They gave me their tallies	15	come out between 1.39 and 1.58, how did they manage to
16	and then they walked as far as they could into the tower	16	get through the lobbies and down the stairs if they were
17	with their equipment.	17	so completely smoke-logged? What was the method by
18	Q. How far did they get, do you know?	18	which they
19	A. You'd have to ask them that. I don't know. I can't	19	A. Well, they were either carried or assisted.
20	recall. I know they carried out a rescue instead. They	20	Q. Right. What about their breathing?
21	never made it to the roof. They weren't going to	21	A. They would've been they would've had smoke
22	anyway; it was never going to happen.	22	inhalation.
23	Q. Were you able to stay in radio contact with them?	23	Q. Right. Was there any way of being able to assist
24	A. No.	24	residents who were being evacuated with
25	Q. Did you try?	25	A. No.
	Page 105		Page 107
	1 450 103		1 480 107
1	A. I tried. It would be good to ask the entry control	1	Q their breathing through smoke?
1 2	A. I tried. It would be good to ask the entry control officers these questions. I think Watch Manager	1 2	Q their breathing through smoke?A. The firefighters started doing that, taking off their
2	officers these questions. I think Watch Manager	2	A. The firefighters started doing that, taking off their
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1 A. With great difficulty. 1 travelling up through the conditions they were in and 2 2 O. Of course -everything else. So the brief would be -- pretty much 3 3 A. But how? Physically take the person out and hope that used up all the firefighting equipment rapidly -- would 4 you can get downstairs with them. I know from 4 be to do search and rescue, extraction or whatever you 5 5 want to call it. But find the location, locate the firefighters who were rescuing people that people were 6 6 collapsing while they were being rescued and they had to person and bring them out. 7 7 Q. When firefighters returned to the bridgehead -- we've be carried the rest of the way. So they were taken out 8 8 heard a little bit of this specifically with the into the smoke because there was no other option and 9 9 Secrett, Badillo, Dorgu trio -- in general terms, did then they would lose consciousness, and then they would 10 be carried down by the firefighters, rescued. 10 they debrief with you? 11 Q. Now, I'm going to ask you in a moment or two about some 11 A. No. 12 specific rescues. 12 Q. They didn't? 13 13 Before I do, I just have a few more general A. I cannot recollect speaking to North Kensington's crew. 14 questions about information flows at the bridgehead. 14 Q. No, but what about other crews? Did you generally 15 15 debrief with other --Q. First of all, did you brief firefighters before they 16 16 A. If I had the opportunity, but quite often, if they were 17 were committed? 17 bringing down a casualty, you won't stop to speak to 18 A. Not all the firefighters, no. I did until Watch Manager 18 somebody on the bridgehead. Every casualty that was 19 Louisa De Silvo turned up, ves. 19 brought down was brought straight out the building as 20 20 Q. What kind of information were you able to give those rapidly as possible for medical treatment. 21 firefighters you did brief? 21 Q. When they came back to the bridgehead without having 22 22 carried out a rescue, or where their deployment had not A. The number of the floor, number of the flat, number of 23 23 people requiring rescue and the conditions believed -been successful for the purpose for which they had been 24 if known, the conditions in that area, on that floor. 24 sent, did you debrief with them? 25 Q. Just to be clear, where were you getting that 25 A. They would come and seek me out ordinarily and tell Page 109 Page 111 information from? 1 me -- which happened quite a lot -- that they couldn't 1 2 A. From other firefighters. That was it, yes. And some 2 make it to the fire flats. 3 FSG -3 Q. Did they give you information about what the conditions 4 4 were like that they did encounter? O. Some FSG. 5 A. -- information, where a resident would open a door and 5 A. Yes. 6 see smoke and then that would be -- because with fire 6 Q. Did you record that information? 7 survival guidance, our operators stay on the line with 7 A. It would've been recorded on the BA board. 8 the person indefinitely, and that person will relay the Q. Okay. And --9 9 A. Or on the FIB or on the wall. information back to our controller, who will relay that 10 10 back to the command people, who will relay that back up Q. The BA board being the forward information board? 11 to the fire sector or search and rescue sector. 11 A. Yes 12 O. Right. 12 O. And on the wall. Was that information then communicated 13 In each case, whenever you briefed a crew to go up 13 back to the incident commander? 14 14 A. As I said, my point of contact was Watch Manager Watson into the tower, did you make it clear for what purpose 15 you were sending them, firefighting, rescue? 15 for quite a lot of the -- so I was feeding him 16 16 information and he would take it back. A. Absolutely, ves. 17 17 Q. Were you confident that that information about the Q. What was it in each case? 18 A. Initially, as I stated, I was committing crews with 18 conditions in the tower was --19 19 firefighting equipment, until we ran out of it, we A. Confident? didn't -- we just -- and additional to that -- it's not 20 20 Q. -- going further back up the chain? 21 a simple answer, but additional to that, firefighters 21 A. I wouldn't say confident. I would hope that was being 22 22 were becoming compromised, meaning they were running out transmitted. 23 of air, carrying a lot of equipment, which can be up to 23 Q. Did the information that you were getting from 24 50 kilograms, including a BA set and fire kit, so 24 firefighters who had gone into the tower and had come 25 an individual would be carrying that upwards, vertically 25 down, as it were, empty handed, without having carried Page 110 Page 112

1	out their mission, did that information make you	1	A. I was informed about it.
2	consider firefighting tactics and any change you needed	2	Q. When was that?
3	to make in it?	3	A. Early on in the incident.
4	A. Yes.	4	Q. Right. You say you made an inquiry; what made you make
5	Q. What?	5	the inquiry?
6	A. I told the guys to stop starting up at the bridgehead	6	A. Just what was going on outside, you know. I mean, we
7	and to travel as far as they could to extend the	7	were speaking to each other constantly, and I think
8	duration of their sets.	8	I was in the tower for about 8 hours, so in that 8-hour
9	Q. Did you discover how far up into the tower they could	9	window, there's such an amount of information that
10	get without breathing apparatus?	10	I cannot recollect individual conversations. Some
11	A. One particular crew went seven floors, but that was	11	I can, some I can't. The really important ones, that
12	later on when the fire had vented. Initially, I don't	12	I think were important, I can because they're stamped on
13	know.	13	my mind; the others, no.
14	Q. Were you monitoring what floors firefighters were able	14	Q. Okay. Did there come a time when you understood that
15	to reach and not able to reach as you went?	15	the chain of communication from the command unit to the
16	A. You had a general sense of the limitations of what they	16	bridgehead had changed?
17	were doing or how far they could travel.	17	A. Yeah, in a degree, when I started getting pieces of
18	Q. Right. And after the first of half an hour or so of	18	paper coming up, I knew that the radio transmissions
19	your being on the bridgehead, were you able to continue	19	were becoming difficult.
20	to maintain contact with the relevant incident	20	Q. Right.
21	commander?	21	A. And it was more expedient to have someone to deliver the
22	A. No.	22	information in person.
23	Q. Right. So at what point do you think you lost reliable	23	Q. Did you ever talk to Daniel Egan?
24	radio contact with the incident commander?	24	A. Never, no. Not during the incident. I know Daniel Egan
25	A. Just after pumps 10.	25	reasonably well, station manager, but, no, I didn't see
	r r		• , , , ,
	Page 113		Page 115
1	O. You said before, just after pumps 10.	1	him.
1 2	Q. You said before, just after pumps 10. Do you know why you lost reliable radio contact at	1 2	him. O At the foot of page 9 of your statement, you refer to
2	Do you know why you lost reliable radio contact at	2	Q. At the foot of page 9 of your statement, you refer to
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1	you an approximate answer to that.	1	stated that he was taking over. I briefed him and
2	Q. Right.	2	discussed the current situation with him. I told him
3	A. My concern at that very moment and it was in the	3	that SDBA crews were unable to reach persons on the
4	moment was preventing people from going back into the	4	upper floors and said that this was a job where EDBA was
5	fire, and they come up the stairs in a state of anxiety,	5	required."
6	and I had enough on my plate dealing with what was	6	That discussion, was that the first conversation you
7	dealing with unfolding, so I turned around to them and	7	had with Richard Welch?
8	said, "No, you can't come in". And we had this	8	A. Correct, it was the very first that was the very
9	discussion where one lady was trying to she was quite	9	first conversation I had with him that night.
10	upset, she wanted to go back in, and I was trying to	10	Q. So that was the question and answer
11	persuade her in the gentlist way I could that it wasn't	11	A. One of many, but that's the first.
12	possible.	12	Q. Right, I see.
13	Q. Right.	13	You then go on to say:
14	A. So I asked it came to overwhelm me a bit. Not	14	"Richard WELCH asked me how much EDBA was required
			-
15	emotionally at that time it did later, but	15	and I said, 'All of it.' And he said that wasn't
16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Are you all right dealing with this	16	possible but I said that we needed all of the EDBA in
17	now?	17	London; we had to have it. He said, 'Really?' and I
18	THE WITNESS: I'll take a break one second to take a sip of	18	replied said 'Everything'. He said 'Ok, I'll get EDBA.'
19	water.	19	He's a good Officer Richard WELCH. I've never worked
20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Have a pause.	20	with him before but he seemed like a very practical man
21	THE WITNESS: I'm okay, I'll just have a pause, yes.	21	and I communicated quite well with him. He let me carry
22	(Pause)	22	on doing what I was doing."
23	MR MILLETT: Take your time.	23	Is that the discussion you gave evidence about
24	A. So I asked some firefighters to escort the residents	24	a little earlier on this morning
25	back down the stairs. That's what happened. It	25	A. Yes.
	Page 117		Page 119
1	hannoned your quickly even how long does it take to	1	Q about the first, as it were, question and answer?
	happened very quickly, over how long does it take to	2	A. That is correct.
2	persuade someone that they can't go back into	3	
3	a building?		Q. Okay. Is it at that point, do you think, that he then
4	Q. Yes.	4	went off and summoned all the EDBA he could get his
5	Just a couple of questions about something you gave	5	hands on?
6	some evidence about earlier on about a discussion with	6	A. He wouldn't have done that personally; he would've got
7	Richard Welch about EDBA.	7	someone to do it for him.
8	A. Yes.	8	Q. I just want to get a time fix on that if we can.
9	Q. At the bottom of page 11, you say you have a discussion	9	If you could please be shown tab 23, the short
10	with the incident commander this is six lines up from	10	incident log. We think we have a time for this, but
11	the end of page 11 about EDBA. Is that the	11	I just want to see if you can help me with it.
12	discussion you are referring to that you had with	12	If you turn, please, to page 23. At 02.42.03, there
13	Group Manager Welch or is that a different discussion?	13	is an informative message which says, halfway down:
14	A. No, that's a different discussion. That was earlier on,	14	"MAJOR INCIDENT DECLARED HIGH RISE PROCEDURE
15	earlier on in the incident.	15	IMPLEMENTED"
16	Q. Right.	16	Et cetera.
17	A. That's not the discussion I had with Group	17	Then:
18	Manager Welch.	18	" TL ALP EDBA MAIN CONTROL FSG"
19	Q. Okay.	19	Now, that, I think, is the first reference we've
20	Then just pursuing this a bit more.	20	seen here to EDBA.
21	A. Okay.	21	Would that be about the time when you had your
22	Q. At the bottom of page 12 and this is just, in time,	22	discussion with Richard Welch?
23	when you say that Andy Walton had appeared you say:	23	A. No, I don't think so. That's an informative message, as
	"I continued with my team as before. At some point	24	you can see, and when you send a description of an
	1 commune with my team as before. At some point	1 27	jou can see, and when jou send a description of an
24		25	incident, you have got to include the equipment being
	Group Manager Richard WELCH arrived at Bridgehead and	25	incident, you have got to include the equipment being

1 like "all EDBA sets" is and I may be wrong about 2 Q. Right. 3 We've seen an early deployment of EDBA with the 4 Paddington five-man crew 4 reflect a general call for all EDBA. Would 5 A. That's correct. 6 Q just before 2 o'clock, so there was clearly EDBA equipment on the fire ground at that stage. 7 equipment on the fire ground at that stage. 8 Can I just ask you: would it be necessary specifically to order EDBA or would some pumps from some stations have EDBA already with them? 10 A. You have to order it. 11 Q. You have to order it? 12 Q. You have to order it? 13 A. Specifically. 14 Q. So do you know how the Paddington five-man crew came to have EDBA with them by 1.57? Was there a specific order 16 " RPE UNIT WITH EDBA APPROX I HOUR TF Pound on the pound of the pound of the pound on the pound of the pound of the pound of the pound on the pound of the pound	ee
3 We've seen an early deployment of EDBA with the 4 Paddington five-man crew 5 A. That's correct. 6 Q just before 2 o'clock, so there was clearly EDBA 7 equipment on the fire ground at that stage. 8 Can I just ask you: would it be necessary 9 specifically to order EDBA or would some pumps from some 10 stations have EDBA already with them? 11 A. You have to order it. 12 Q. You have to order it? 13 A. Specifically. 14 Q. So do you know how the Paddington five-man crew came to 15 have EDBA with them by 1.57? Was there a specific 16 order 17 A. Because the incident commander requested two FRUs. If 18 A. Turning out with message for EDBA. Would reflect a general call for all EDBA? A. Turning out with message for EDBA. Would reflect a general call for all EDBA? A. Turning out with message for EDBA. Would reflect a general call for all EDBA? A. Turning out with message for EDBA. Would reflect a general call for all EDBA? A. Turning out with message for EDBA. Would reflect a general call for all EDBA? A. Turning out with message for EDBA. Would reflect a general call for all EDBA? A. Turning out with message for EDBA? A. Turning out with seflect a general call for all EDBA? A. Turning out with seflect a general call for all EDBA? A. Turning out with seflect a general call for all EDBA? A. Turning out is a mobilisation, it's the fact they've been turned out. Q. What would that tell us about how many A. What you need to find, sir, is the assistance message for when it was requested from the fire ground to increase EDBA attendance. 10 Q. Well, let me just show you, and I'm sorry to labour this a bit. 11 A. It's okay. 12 a bit. 13 A. It's okay. 14 Q. Page 24 of the short incident log, t	ee
Paddington five-man crew A. That's correct. A. That's correct. A. Turning out is a mobilisation, it's the fact they've been turned out. Q just before 2 o'clock, so there was clearly EDBA equipment on the fire ground at that stage. Can I just ask you: would it be necessary specifically to order EDBA or would some pumps from some stations have EDBA already with them? A. You have to order it. Q. You have to order it? A. Specifically. Q. So do you know how the Paddington five-man crew came to have EDBA with them by 1.57? Was there a specific order A. Because the incident commander requested two FRUs. If Paddington five-man crew 4 reflect a general call for all EDBA? A. Turning out is a mobilisation, it's the fact they've been turned out. Q. What would that tell us about how many A. What you need to find, sir, is the assistance message for when it was requested from the fire ground to increase EDBA attendance. Q. Well, let me just show you, and I'm sorry to labour thing a bit. A. It's okay. Q. Page 24 of the short incident log, the very top of the page, at 03.05.51, that says: " RPE UNIT WITH EDBA APPROX 1 HOUR THE BEING ORDERED AS THE BA SUPPORT UNITS."	ee
5 A. That's correct. 6 Q just before 2 o'clock, so there was clearly EDBA 7 equipment on the fire ground at that stage. 8 Can I just ask you: would it be necessary 9 specifically to order EDBA or would some pumps from some 10 stations have EDBA already with them? 11 A. You have to order it. 12 Q. You have to order it? 13 A. Specifically. 14 Q. So do you know how the Paddington five-man crew came to 15 have EDBA with them by 1.57? Was there a specific 16 order 17 A. Because the incident commander requested two FRUs. If 18 Deen turned out. 19 Q. What would that tell us about how many 20 Q. What would that tell us about how many 31 A. What you need to find, sir, is the assistance message for when it was requested from the fire ground to increase EDBA attendance. 31 Q. Well, let me just show you, and I'm sorry to labour thing a bit. 32 A. It's okay. 33 A. It's okay. 44 Q. Page 24 of the short incident log, the very top of the page, at 03.05.51, that says: 45 Order 46 " RPE UNIT WITH EDBA APPROX 1 HOUR THE BEING ORDERED AS THE BA SUPPORT UNITS."	
6 Q. — just before 2 o'clock, so there was clearly EDBA 7 equipment on the fire ground at that stage. 8 Can I just ask you: would it be necessary 9 specifically to order EDBA or would some pumps from some 10 stations have EDBA already with them? 11 A. You have to order it. 12 Q. You have to order it? 13 A. Specifically. 14 Q. So do you know how the Paddington five-man crew came to 15 have EDBA with them by 1.57? Was there a specific 16 order 17 A. Because the incident commander requested two FRUs. If 18 Deen turned out. 19 Q. What would that tell us about how many 20 Q. What would that tell us about how many 21 Q. What would that tell us about how many 22 Q. What would that tell us about how many 23 A. What you need to find, sir, is the assistance message for when it was requested from the fire ground to increase EDBA attendance. 10 increase EDBA attendance. 11 Q. Well, let me just show you, and I'm sorry to labour thing a bit. 12 A. It's okay. 13 A. It's okay. 14 Q. Page 24 of the short incident log, the very top of the page, at 03.05.51, that says: 16 " RPE UNIT WITH EDBA APPROX 1 HOUR THE BEING ORDERED AS THE BA SUPPORT UNITS."	
7 Q. What would that tell us about how many 8 Can I just ask you: would it be necessary 9 specifically to order EDBA or would some pumps from some 10 stations have EDBA already with them? 11 A. You have to order it. 12 Q. You have to order it? 13 A. Specifically. 14 Q. So do you know how the Paddington five-man crew came to 15 have EDBA with them by 1.57? Was there a specific 16 order 17 A. Because the incident commander requested two FRUs. If 18 A. What you need to find, sir, is the assistance message for when it was requested from the fire ground to increase EDBA attendance. 10 just as bout how many 8 A. What you need to find, sir, is the assistance message for when it was requested from the fire ground to increase EDBA attendance. 12 Q. Well, let me just show you, and I'm sorry to labour thing a bit. 13 A. It's okay. 14 Q. Page 24 of the short incident log, the very top of the page, at 03.05.51, that says: 15 " RPE UNIT WITH EDBA APPROX 1 HOUR THE 17 BEING ORDERED AS THE BA SUPPORT UNITS."	
8 Can I just ask you: would it be necessary 9 specifically to order EDBA or would some pumps from some 10 stations have EDBA already with them? 11 A. You have to order it. 12 Q. You have to order it? 13 A. Specifically. 14 Q. So do you know how the Paddington five-man crew came to 15 have EDBA with them by 1.57? Was there a specific 16 order 17 A. Because the incident commander requested two FRUs. If 18 A. What you need to find, sir, is the assistance message for when it was requested from the fire ground to increase EDBA attendance. 10 increase EDBA attendance. 11 Q. Well, let me just show you, and I'm sorry to labour thin a bit. 12 a bit. 13 A. It's okay. 14 Q. Page 24 of the short incident log, the very top of the page, at 03.05.51, that says: 15 page, at 03.05.51, that says: 16 " RPE UNIT WITH EDBA APPROX 1 HOUR THE ITEM A. Because the incident commander requested two FRUs. If 17 BEING ORDERED AS THE BA SUPPORT UNITS."	
specifically to order EDBA or would some pumps from some stations have EDBA already with them? 10	
stations have EDBA already with them? 10 increase EDBA attendance. 11 A. You have to order it. 12 Q. You have to order it? 13 A. Specifically. 14 Q. So do you know how the Paddington five-man crew came to have EDBA with them by 1.57? Was there a specific order 15 Order 16 Order 17 A. Because the incident commander requested two FRUs. If 18 Increase EDBA attendance. 19 Q. Well, let me just show you, and I'm sorry to labour thing a bit. 10 Order 11 Q. Well, let me just show you, and I'm sorry to labour thing a bit. 12 a bit. 13 A. It's okay. 14 Q. Page 24 of the short incident log, the very top of the page, at 03.05.51, that says: 15 page, at 03.05.51, that says: 16 " RPE UNIT WITH EDBA APPROX 1 HOUR THE BASING ORDERED AS THE BASING ORDER DESCRIPTION OF THE BASI	s
A. You have to order it. Q. You have to order it? A. Specifically. Q. So do you know how the Paddington five-man crew came to have EDBA with them by 1.57? Was there a specific order A. Because the incident commander requested two FRUs. If O. Well, let me just show you, and I'm sorry to labour thing a bit. A. It's okay. Q. Page 24 of the short incident log, the very top of the page, at 03.05.51, that says: " RPE UNIT WITH EDBA APPROX 1 HOUR THE ITEM AS DEING ORDERED AS THE BA SUPPORT UNITS."	s
Q. You have to order it? A. Specifically. Q. So do you know how the Paddington five-man crew came to have EDBA with them by 1.57? Was there a specific order A. Because the incident commander requested two FRUs. If 12 a bit. A. It's okay. Q. Page 24 of the short incident log, the very top of the page, at 03.05.51, that says: " RPE UNIT WITH EDBA APPROX 1 HOUR THE PROOF OR THE PROOF OF THE PROOF OR THE PROO	s
A. Specifically. 13 A. It's okay. 14 Q. So do you know how the Paddington five-man crew came to 15 have EDBA with them by 1.57? Was there a specific 16 order 17 A. Because the incident commander requested two FRUs. If 18 A. It's okay. 19 Q. Page 24 of the short incident log, the very top of the page, at 03.05.51, that says: 10 " RPE UNIT WITH EDBA APPROX 1 HOUR THE PROPORT UNITS."	
Q. So do you know how the Paddington five-man crew came to have EDBA with them by 1.57? Was there a specific order A. Because the incident commander requested two FRUs. If Q. Page 24 of the short incident log, the very top of the page, at 03.05.51, that says: " RPE UNIT WITH EDBA APPROX 1 HOUR TF BEING ORDERED AS THE BA SUPPORT UNITS."	
have EDBA with them by 1.57? Was there a specific page, at 03.05.51, that says: order A. Because the incident commander requested two FRUs. If page, at 03.05.51, that says: " RPE UNIT WITH EDBA APPROX 1 HOUR THE PROPORT UNITS."	
order 16 " RPE UNIT WITH EDBA APPROX 1 HOUR THE 17 A. Because the incident commander requested two FRUs. If 17 BEING ORDERED AS THE BA SUPPORT UNITS."	
17 A. Because the incident commander requested two FRUs. If 17 BEING ORDERED AS THE BA SUPPORT UNITS."	
•	ESE ARE
10 Con you intermed that for you	
18 you look previously for an assistant message sent 18 Can you interpret that for us?	
earlier, you would've seen a request for two I think 19 A. That's a bulk carrier, that's not FRUs there, so	
20 it was two fire rescue units. 20 I forget the actual terminology. Or we have units in	1
21 Q. So 21 the Fire Brigade with ED BA support units which	will
22 A. That's why that the fact that they were being used 22 bring fresh BA sets to the fire ground in a pod.	
would be included in the informative. I don't know what 23 Q. What does that tell you, if anything, about whether the	è
time I spoke to Richard Welch and had that conversation 24 discussion you'd had with Mr Welch, Group Manager	Welch,
25 with him and I don't know what time the I will guess 25 about getting all EDBA sets had been actioned?	
Page 121 Page 123	
a priority message was sent for additional EDBA. 1 A. That would be I would say that would be a	iter they
2 Q. We have a message at 01.29.46: 2 were requested.	
3 " MAKE PUMPS 20 FRU X 2." 3 Q. Right.	
4 A. There you go. That's it. 4 A. So you have to go before that to find the mom	ent where
5 Q. Right, okay. 5 a priority message was sent to request make-u	FRUs so
6 A. What Watch Manager Dowden is asking for is a 20-pump 6 many, and the CBRN team, which was the che	mical,
attendance and two FRUs. We use the terminology, "Make 7 biological, radiation and nuclear team, they're	EDBA
pumps 20 and FRUs 2", that's how we speak. It's radio 8 that's where they use EDBA, in that departme	nt, they
9 discipline. 9 would've been ordered on at the same time.	-
10 Q. How many EDBA sets would there be on one FRU? 10 Q. We'll look at that over lunch.	
11 A. I think four. 11 A. Okay.	
12 Q. So two FRUs, eight? 12 Q. Can I start then by asking you about a specific	
13 A. Yes. 13 briefing, and this is Hippel and Stern to the 16th	
14 Q. Which would account for how there were five EDBA 14 floor.	
15 wearers. 15 A. Yes.	
wearers. 15 A. Yes. 16 A. There might have been five on the FRU that night. 16 Q. Now, at page 10 in paragraph 3 on that page you	ŀ
A. There might have been five on the FRU that night. 16 Q. Now, at page 10 in paragraph 3 on that page you	
A. There might have been five on the FRU that night. 16 Q. Now, at page 10 in paragraph 3 on that page you describe it's about a third of the way down the	
A. There might have been five on the FRU that night. I couldn't go into the detail of it. Q. Now, at page 10 in paragraph 3 on that page you describe it's about a third of the way down the page you committed one crew, Jamal Stern and	ł
A. There might have been five on the FRU that night. 1 Couldn't go into the detail of it. 1 Q. Now, at page 10 in paragraph 3 on that page you describe it's about a third of the way down the page you committed one crew, Jamal Stern and So when an informative message comes, "EDBA", what 19 Firefighter Hippel, to the 16th floor "because I have been five on the FRU that night. 18 page you committed one crew, Jamal Stern and Firefighter Hippel, to the 16th floor "because I have been five on the FRU that night. 18 page you committed one crew, Jamal Stern and Firefighter Hippel, to the 16th floor "because I have been five on the FRU that night. 19 So when an informative message comes, "EDBA", what	ł
A. There might have been five on the FRU that night. I couldn't go into the detail of it. Q. That's helpful. So when an informative message comes, "EDBA", what does that tell us? What does it tell us about how many 16 Q. Now, at page 10 in paragraph 3 on that page you describe it's about a third of the way down the page you committed one crew, Jamal Stern and Firefighter Hippel, to the 16th floor "because I had information that there was somebody who needed	ł
A. There might have been five on the FRU that night. I couldn't go into the detail of it. Q. That's helpful. So when an informative message comes, "EDBA", what does that tell us? What does it tell us about how many EDBAs are on order? 16 Q. Now, at page 10 in paragraph 3 on that page you describe it's about a third of the way down the page you committed one crew, Jamal Stern and Firefighter Hippel, to the 16th floor "because I have information that there was somebody who needed up there".	ł
A. There might have been five on the FRU that night. I couldn't go into the detail of it. Q. That's helpful. So when an informative message comes, "EDBA", what does that tell us? What does it tell us about how many EDBAs are on order? A. Informative message merely states that it's in use. 16 Q. Now, at page 10 in paragraph 3 on that page you describe it's about a third of the way down the page you committed one crew, Jamal Stern and Firefighter Hippel, to the 16th floor "because I have information that there was somebody who needed up there". 21 up there". 22 First of all, what was that information, do you	1 rescuing
A. There might have been five on the FRU that night. I couldn't go into the detail of it. Q. That's helpful. So when an informative message comes, "EDBA", what does that tell us? What does it tell us about how many EDBAs are on order? A. Informative message merely states that it's in use. Q. Now, at page 10 in paragraph 3 on that page you describe it's about a third of the way down the page you committed one crew, Jamal Stern and Firefighter Hippel, to the 16th floor "because I had information that there was somebody who needed up there". EDBAs are on order? A. Informative message merely states that it's in use. Q. Okay. 22 First of all, what was that information, do you remember?	f rescuing the crew
A. There might have been five on the FRU that night. I couldn't go into the detail of it. Q. That's helpful. So when an informative message comes, "EDBA", what does that tell us? What does it tell us about how many EDBAs are on order? A. Informative message merely states that it's in use. Q. Okay. A. Not how many. 16 Q. Now, at page 10 in paragraph 3 on that page you describe it's about a third of the way down the page you committed one crew, Jamal Stern and Firefighter Hippel, to the 16th floor "because I had information that there was somebody who needed up there". 21 22 A. Informative message merely states that it's in use. 23 Q. Okay. 24 A. Not how many. 25 A. A resident had told I believe had informed.	f rescuing the crew

1	that there was a resident had approached them and that	1	A. No, that was well before that. They were utilised to
2	somebody was believed trapped in that area with smoke.	2	reconnoitre that area. That was much earlier on that
3	Q. We looked at the telemetry data for Hippel and Stern	3	was before, I should say. They were detailed to go and
4	earlier, and we have them tallying out of entry control	4	check for fire spread and that had been reported to me.
5	at 01.17 or so.	5	Q. Let me see if I can get the chronology then. On page 8
6	So is it right that the information that there was	6	at the top they tell you by radio that it's completely
7	somebody on the 16th floor who needed rescuing was	7	smoked out on this floor.
8	before that?	8	A. Yes.
9	A. Yes.	9	Q. I think you said that was the sixth floor.
10	Q. When they tallied out did you give Stern and Hippel	10	A. That was the sixth floor, yes.
11	a briefing?	11	Q. So when you briefed them to go to the 16th floor, having
12	A. No, they were under air already. They were originally	12	had the FSG information, was that after Stern had come
13	committed as the hose management crew.	13	back to you and told you it was smoked out on the sixth
14	Q. In fact, you said earlier on this morning that they were	14	floor?
15	the hose management crew, and in your statement on	15	A. Yes.
16	page 8 at the top you say you had already sent them to	16	Q. How long after, do you think?
17	the fifth floor and then they went to the sixth floor.	17	A. I couldn't tell you.
18	So the information about rescue on the 16th floor	18	Q. Long, short, minutes?
19	came to you, did it, while they were under air in the	19	A. Short.
20	building?	20	Q. So we can pinpoint that a bit better.
21	A. Correct.	21	And you tell him to go to the 16th floor. Does he
22	Q. Were you then able to communicate with them?	22	respond, Jamal Stern?
23	A. Yes. I don't recall the exact communication but they	23	A. I don't recall.
24	were redeployed, because I didn't believe there was any	24	Q. You say in your statement that you had information that
25	fire on the 16th or I wasn't aware of any fire on the	25	there was someone who needed rescuing there. Sorry,
	Page 125		Page 127
1	16th floor at that time because it was so instantaneous	1	Lamback on page 10, a third of the way down you say
1	16th floor at that time because it was so instantaneous,	1 2	I am back on page 10, a third of the way down, you say,
2	what was going on.	2	"I had information".
2	what was going on. Q. I see. So they didn't come back down to the	2 3	"I had information". What form did you have that information in?
2 3 4	what was going on. Q. I see. So they didn't come back down to the bridgehead	2 3 4	"I had information". What form did you have that information in? A. I don't recall because I was getting so much information
2 3 4 5	what was going on. Q. I see. So they didn't come back down to the bridgehead A. No.	2 3 4 5	"I had information". What form did you have that information in? A. I don't recall because I was getting so much information at that time.
2 3 4 5 6	 what was going on. Q. I see. So they didn't come back down to the bridgehead A. No. Q they were in the building and you communicate 	2 3 4 5 6	"I had information". What form did you have that information in? A. I don't recall because I was getting so much information at that time. Q. Do you remember whether it was a piece of paper or a
2 3 4 5 6 7	 what was going on. Q. I see. So they didn't come back down to the bridgehead A. No. Q they were in the building and you communicate which of the firefighters did you communicate over the 	2 3 4 5 6 7	"I had information". What form did you have that information in? A. I don't recall because I was getting so much information at that time. Q. Do you remember whether it was a piece of paper or a message from
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 what was going on. Q. I see. So they didn't come back down to the bridgehead A. No. Q they were in the building and you communicate which of the firefighters did you communicate over the radio with, do you remember? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	"I had information". What form did you have that information in? A. I don't recall because I was getting so much information at that time. Q. Do you remember whether it was a piece of paper or a message from A. It wasn't a piece of paper, it would've been either
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 what was going on. Q. I see. So they didn't come back down to the bridgehead A. No. Q they were in the building and you communicate which of the firefighters did you communicate over the radio with, do you remember? A. Crew Manager Stern, I believe. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	"I had information". What form did you have that information in? A. I don't recall because I was getting so much information at that time. Q. Do you remember whether it was a piece of paper or a message from A. It wasn't a piece of paper, it would've been either verbally or a message to me on the radio.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 what was going on. Q. I see. So they didn't come back down to the bridgehead A. No. Q they were in the building and you communicate which of the firefighters did you communicate over the radio with, do you remember? A. Crew Manager Stern, I believe. Q. Stern. And 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	"I had information". What form did you have that information in? A. I don't recall because I was getting so much information at that time. Q. Do you remember whether it was a piece of paper or a message from A. It wasn't a piece of paper, it would've been either verbally or a message to me on the radio. Q. Verbally. Do you remember whether it was verbally from
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	what was going on. Q. I see. So they didn't come back down to the bridgehead A. No. Q they were in the building and you communicate which of the firefighters did you communicate over the radio with, do you remember? A. Crew Manager Stern, I believe. Q. Stern. And A. I can't remember for certain.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	"I had information". What form did you have that information in? A. I don't recall because I was getting so much information at that time. Q. Do you remember whether it was a piece of paper or a message from A. It wasn't a piece of paper, it would've been either verbally or a message to me on the radio. Q. Verbally. Do you remember whether it was verbally from somebody coming up from the lobby or a firefighter
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	what was going on. Q. I see. So they didn't come back down to the bridgehead A. No. Q they were in the building and you communicate which of the firefighters did you communicate over the radio with, do you remember? A. Crew Manager Stern, I believe. Q. Stern. And A. I can't remember for certain. Q. Which channel were you on?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	"I had information". What form did you have that information in? A. I don't recall because I was getting so much information at that time. Q. Do you remember whether it was a piece of paper or a message from A. It wasn't a piece of paper, it would've been either verbally or a message to me on the radio. Q. Verbally. Do you remember whether it was verbally from somebody coming up from the lobby or a firefighter coming down?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	what was going on. Q. I see. So they didn't come back down to the bridgehead A. No. Q. — they were in the building and you communicate — which of the firefighters did you communicate over the radio with, do you remember? A. Crew Manager Stern, I believe. Q. Stern. And A. I can't remember for certain. Q. Which channel were you on? A. That would've been 6. I was switching between 1 and 6.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	"I had information". What form did you have that information in? A. I don't recall because I was getting so much information at that time. Q. Do you remember whether it was a piece of paper or a message from A. It wasn't a piece of paper, it would've been either verbally or a message to me on the radio. Q. Verbally. Do you remember whether it was verbally from somebody coming up from the lobby or a firefighter coming down? A. I don't recall.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 what was going on. Q. I see. So they didn't come back down to the bridgehead A. No. Q they were in the building and you communicate which of the firefighters did you communicate over the radio with, do you remember? A. Crew Manager Stern, I believe. Q. Stern. And A. I can't remember for certain. Q. Which channel were you on? A. That would've been 6. I was switching between 1 and 6. Q. Did you have any difficulties getting hold of him? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	"I had information". What form did you have that information in? A. I don't recall because I was getting so much information at that time. Q. Do you remember whether it was a piece of paper or a message from A. It wasn't a piece of paper, it would've been either verbally or a message to me on the radio. Q. Verbally. Do you remember whether it was verbally from somebody coming up from the lobby or a firefighter coming down? A. I don't recall. Q. Now, what about communications with Justin O'Beirne? Is
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Q. Do you know roughly where in the building the flat that they were going to was? A. No. Q. Which side of the building? A. No. G. Q. No, you didn't. Were you aware at that stage that the fire had speed from the east faceld? Q. You had commanucations with Hippel and Stem as they went you have been the condition of the side faceld and debrief from the say faceld? Q. You had commanucations with Hippel and Stem as they went you faint he been the could feel interest heat. Q. You had commanucation with Hippel and Stem as they went you faint key used. Q. Do you that file you about he said he didn't see flather than you went up. I shink you said. A. And then when they came back down. Q. Lefore they went, se. Q. Lefore they went, se. Q. Lefore they went, se. Q. Lefore they went of the tower. A. And then when they came back down. Q. I may have misunderstood you and it's my fault, but when they were in the tower. A. Are the fifth floor one the word of the time to word. A. A. Weah, they were in the tower. A. Veah, they were in the tower, they were spill the tower. They are in the forwer, they were you in the tower. A. Veah, they were in the tower, they were was fire – there was smoke, so you will chapt do the because I had information there was fire – there was smoke, so you will chapt do the because I had information there was fire – there was smoke, so you will fall you have the left floor. Page 129 Page 129 When you gove them the instructions to go to the foll floor, where were lipped and Stem? Q. So you commanicated with them by radio, an you've said? A. No, I didn't. A. No, I didn't. A. No, I didn't. Q. Do you are member a debriefing? A. No, I didn't. Q. Do you are member stem an Hippel coming back down to he bridgeleand all fare, joing the they weren't it the hery weren't it the provention of the prople and stem were going to rescae on the felfoft floor? A. No, I didn't. Q. Do you are member a debriefing? A. No, I didn't. A. No, I didn't. Q. Do you remember stem and Hippel coming				
3 A. No. 4 Q. Which side of the building? 5 A. No. 5 Q. No, you defort. 6 Q. No, you defort. 7 Were you aware at that stage that the fire had spread from the east facade? 8 A. No. 10 Q. You had communications with Hippel and Stern as they were up, I think you said. 11 were up, I think you said. 12 A. Before they went, yes. 13 Q. Before they went, yes. 14 A. And then when they came back down. 15 Q. I may have misunderstood you and if's my fault, but when the py-were in the tower. 16 A. They were in the tower. 17 A. They were in the tower of the think of think of the think of think of the think of	1	Q. Do you know roughly where in the building the flat that	1	A. The 16th floor.
4 Q. Which side of the building? 5 A. No. 6 Q. No, you didn't. 7 Were you awar at that stage that the fire had sport of the control of the co	2	they were going to was?	2	Q. The whole of it?
5 Q. Do you know how far into the 16th floor Richard Hippel went? 7 A. No., I can't recall actually. 8 Spread from the east facade? 8 Q. You had communications with Hippel and Stem as they went; put think, you said. 10 Q. You had communications with Hippel and Stem as they went put think you said. 11 A. Before they went, yes. 12 A. Before they went, yes. 13 Q. Before they went, yes. 14 A. And then when they came back down. 15 Q. I may have misunderstood you and it's my fault, but when they were in the tower. 16 Q. I may have misunderstood you and it's my fault, but when they go to the 16th floor once they were up in the tower. 17 A. They were in the tower. 18 Q. I thought you told us earlier that you told them to go to the 16th floor once they were up in the tower. 19 go to the 16th floor once they were up in the tower. 20 A. Yealt, they were in the tower, they were still under air, they hard't closed down. I will delapt when because I had information frer was fire — there was smoke, of misorry if I have. 21 I when you gave them the instructions to go to the 16th floor, where were Hippel and Stem? 3 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. 4 Q. Let me just go back then, I may have confused you and I'm sorry if I have. 22 Page 129 23 When you gave them the instructions to go to the 16th floor, where were Hippel and Stem? 3 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. 4 Q. Dray communicated with them by radio, as you've said? 5 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. 4 A. Wet, they were with a residen? 4 A. Wet, they were with a residen? 5 Q. Drafts what I thought. When you did that, did you know that they were with the son of the man that Hippel and Stem were going to recue on the 16th floor? 4 A. Wet, that would make sense. 5 Q. Drafts what I thought. When you did that, did you know that he bridgehead after going to recue on the 16th floor? 4 A. Wet, that would make sense. 5 Q. Drafts what I thought. When you did that, did you know that he bridgehead after going to the 16th floor? 4 A	3	A. No.	3	A. It was completely smoked out, and he said he didn't see
Section of the cost facade? Section of the cost facade in the cost of the cost facade in the cost of the	4	Q. Which side of the building?	4	flame but he could feel intense heat.
Were you aware at that stage that the fire had spread from the east facade? A. No, I can't recall actually. Q. You had communications with Hippel and Stem as they were up, think you said. A. Before they went, yes. Q. Before they went, yes. Q. Han's have misunderstood you and it's my fault, but when they were in the tower. A. They were in the tower. A. They were in the tower are before they went in the tower in the tower. A. Yeah, they were in the tower, they mere still under air, they hadn't closed down. I will deploy them because 2 I had information frer was fire — there was smoke, sorry, on the 16th floor one deep were up in the tower. A. Yeah, they were in the tower they were with the one of the had information for they were in the tower. A. Yeah, they were in the tower they were sill under air, they hadn't closed down. I will deploy them because 2 I had information frer was fire — there was smoke, sorry, on the 16th floor. Begin they hadn't closed down. I will deploy them because 2 I had information there was fire — there was smoke, sorry, on the 16th floor. Begin they hadn't closed down. I will deploy them because 2 I had information its cream the tower, which could culminate in that. Begin they hadn't closed down. I will deploy them because 2 I had information its there is fire on the 16th floor which could culminate in that. Begin the process and I was trying to manage that at the bridgehead. So when firefighters would come to me and give me information, I would— it would he wouldn't be all, you know that he had experienced? Begin they hadn't closed down. I will deploy them because 2 I had information its there is fire on the 16th floor was of the rescue? Page 129 Page 131 1 When you gave them the instructions to go to the 16th floor was of the rescue? Page 129 Page 131 1 A. It was unsuccessful. I believe, and he was shocked that the 16th floor was on fire. C. Q. Did you know that they were with the son of the man that 116th floor? A. No, I didn't. A. Well, that would make sense. D. Did you remembe	5	A. No.	5	Q. Do you know how far into the 16th floor Richard Hippel
spread from the east facade? A. No. Q. Vot had communications with Hippel and Stern as they went up, I think, you said. A. Boter they went, vent up, I think, you said. A. And hen when they came back down. Q. Before they went. A. And hen when they came back down. Q. I what you could have dome? A. And hen when they came back down. B. Q. I what you could have dome? A. Twan you could have dome? A. It wasn'a calm environment at that time, it was — they were in the tower. B. Q. I who not told us earlier that you told them to go to the 16th floor once they were up in the tower. B. Q. I who hadr't closed down. I will deploy them because they were winted to the tower, they were sit they hadr't closed down. I will deploy them because they hadr't closed down. I will deploy them because they hadr't closed down. I will deploy them because they hadr't closed down. I will deploy them because they were will have a sort of the second of the second of the second down and it is my fault, but when you gave them the instructions to go to the life floor, where were Hippel and Stern? Page 129 Page 131 I When you gave them the instructions to go to the life floor, where were Hippel and Stern? A. You, were in the tower, they were will the were will the sow of the was shocked that they were with the were will the sow of the were they were will the work. I will a debrief from the was shocked that they were will the were the probable and stern were deployed and they were will the work. I would we were will the sow of the second of	6	Q. No, you didn't.	6	went?
A. No. Q. You had communications with Hippel and Stern as they were up, I think you said. A. Before they went, yes. A. Before they went, yes. A. And then when they came back down. Q. I may have misunderstood you and it's my fault, but when they were in the tower. A. And then when they came back down. A. They were in the tower. A. A. They were in the tower. A. Yeah, they were in the tower, they were sill under air, they hadn't closed down. I will deploy them because they were up in the tower, they were sill under air, they hadn't closed down. I will deploy them because they were up in the tower, as sorry, on the 16th floor once they were up in the tower, as sorry, on the 16th floor once they were with the were they were sill under air, they were in the tower, as the page 129 Page 129 When you gave them the instructions to go to the 16th floor, where were Hippel and Stern? Page 129 When you gave them the instructions to go to the 16th floor, where were Hippel and Stern? Q. They were in the tower, and the tower, but they weren't at the bridgehead? A. No, they weren't at the bridgehead, no. Q. That's what I thought. When you did that, did you know that they were with the son of the man that Hippel and Stern were going to rescue on the 16th floor? A. No, they were wrey thing the son of the man that Hippel and Stern were going to rescue on the 16th floor? A. No, they were wrey thing the son of the man that Hippel and Stern were going to rescue on the 16th floor? A. No, they were writh the son of the man that Hippel and Stern were going to rescue on the 16th floor? A. Yes, they were writh the son of the man that Hippel and Stern were going to rescue on the 16th floor? A. Yes, they were writh the son of the man that Hippel coming back down to the bridgehead after going to rescue on the 16th floor? A. Yes, C. But did you know that they were with the son of the man that Hippel and Stern were going to rescue on the 16th floor? A. Yes, C. Do you remember a debriefing? A. Yes. Q. Do you remember a d	7	Were you aware at that stage that the fire had	7	A. No, I can't recall actually.
Q. You had communications with Hippel and Stern as they went up, I think you said. 1	8	spread from the east facade?	8	Q. Do you think he told you?
Nent up, I think you said. 12 A. Refore they went, yes. 12 A. Not a full, no. 13 Q. Esfore they went. 14 A. And then when they came back down. 14 A. And then when they came back down. 14 A. They were in the tower - 16 thought you told use actifier that you told them to go to the 16th floor once they were up in the tower. 17 A. They were in the tower in the tower of the part of	9	A. No.	9	A. Probably, knowing Richard, yes, he's quite exact.
A. Refore they went, yes. 2. Before they went. 4. A. And then when they came back down. 5. Q. I may have misunderstood you and it's my fault, but when they were in the tower. 6. A. They were in the tower. 7. A. They were in the tower. 8. Q I thought you told us carlier that you told them to go be to be 16th floor once they were up in the tower. 9. A. Yeah, they were in the tower, they were still under air, they hand'r closed down. I will deploy them because 2. I had information there was Fire - there was smoke, sorry, on the 16th floor. 2. O. Let me just go back then, I may have confused you and I'm sorry if I have. 2. Page 129 1. When you gave them the instructions to go to the loth floor where were Hippel and Stern? 2. I had in Kney were in the tower, they were sind under air, they have the they were in the tower. 2. Page 129 2. I had information the the debrief that they were him the tower. 2. Before they were in the tower, they were still under air, they hadn'r closed down. I will deploy them because 2. I had information their they were sing the tower. 2. I had information their they were in the tower. 2. D. I damal Stern tell you about what he had experienced? 2. A. I don't know. They were in the tower. 2. D. Did jamal Stern the success of the rescue? 2. Page 131 2. A. I don't know. They were in the tower. 3. A. I don't know. They were in the tower. 4. O. They were in the tower, but they weren't at the bridgehead, no. 4. O. They were in the tower, but they weren't at the bridgehead, no. 4. O. Do you communicated with them by radio, as you've said? 8. A. Yes. 9. O. That's what I thought. When you did that, did you know that they were with a resident? 10. D. Did you know that they were with the son of the man that I lipped and Stern were going to rescue on the 16th floor? 11. A. No. I did you know that? 12. O. Did you know that they were with the son of the man that I lipped and Stern were going to rescue on the 16th floor? 12. O. Do you remember Stern and Hippel coming ba	10	Q. You had communications with Hippel and Stern as they	10	Q. Were you satisfied that you'd got as full a debrief from
13 Q that you could have done? 14 A. And then when they came back down. 15 Q. Imay have misunderstood you and it's my fault, but when they were in the tower. 16 they were in the tower. 17 A. They were in the tower. 18 Q I thought you told us earlier that you told them to go to the 16th floor once they were up in the tower. 20 A. Yeah, they were in the tower, they were still under air, they hadn't closed down. I will deploy them because I had information there was fire - there was smoke, sorry, on the 16th floor. 21 Q. Let me just go back then, I may have confused you and I'm sorry if I have. 22 I may be misunder air, and information there was fire - there was smoke, sorry, on the 16th floor. 23 sorry, on the 16th floor. 24 Q. Let me just go back then, I may have confused you and I'm sorry if I have. 25 Page 129 26 I when you gave them the instructions to go to the 16th floor, where were Hippel and Stern? 27 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. 28 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. 39 Q. That's what I thought. When you did that, did you know that they were with a resident? 30 Q. Did you know that they were with the son of the man that Hippel and Stern were going to rescue on the 16th floor? 30 Q. Do you remember Stern and Hippel coming back down to the bridgehead after going to the 16th floor? 31 A. Vest. 32 Q. Do you remember Stern and Hippel coming back down to the bridgehead after going to the 16th floor? 33 A. Vest. 44 A. Vest. that would make sense. 45 Q. Do you remember Stern and Hippel coming back down to the bridgehead after going to the 16th floor? 46 A. No, I didn't. 47 A. Vest. that would was been were going to rescue on the 16th floor? 48 A. Yes. 49 Q. Do you remember Stern and Hippel coming back down to the bridgehead after going to the 16th floor? 40 Q. Do you remember Stern and Hippel coming back down to the bridgehead after going to the 16th floor? 41 A. Well, that would make sense. 42 Q. Do you remember Stern and Hippel coming back down to the bridgehead after going to the 16th f	11	went up, I think you said.	11	Richard Hippel
14 A. And then when they came back down. 15 Q. I may have misunderstood you and it's my fault, but when 16 they were in the tower. 17 A. They were in the tower. 18 Q. — I thought you told us earlier that you told them to 19 go to the 16th floor once they were up in the tower. 20 A. Yeah, they were in the tower, they were still under air, 21 they hadn't closed down. I will deploy them because 22 I had information there was fire – there was smoke, 23 sorry, on the 16th floor. 24 Q. Let me just go back then, I may have confused you and 25 I'm sorry if I have. 26 Page 129 27 Page 129 28 Page 131 29 Value me in the tower, they were in the tower. 20 A. No, they were in the tower, they weren't at the bridgehead, no. 21 bridgehead? 22 O. Did you communicated with them by radio, as you've said? 23 A. Ves. 24 Q. Let me year of the tower, they weren't at the tower, they weren't at the bridgehead, no. 25 Did you communicated with them by radio, as you've said? 26 A. No, they weren't at the bridgehead, no. 27 Q. So you communicated with them by radio, as you've said? 28 A. Yes. 29 Q. That's what I thought. When you did that, did you know that they were with a resident? 29 Q. Did you know that they were with the son of the man that 11 Hippel and Stem were going to rescue on the 16th floor? 20 Q. Did you know that they were with the son of the man that 11 Hippel and Stem were going to rescue on the 16th floor? 20 Q. Did you know that they were with the son of the man that 12 I had Justico Poliem there as well and a lot of people assisting and they would've got that information and put it on the wall at this stage. 29 Q. Do you remember a debricfing? 20 Q. Do you remember a debricfing? 21 A. I remember what Dick Hippel said, or Richard, 21 information to make pumps 10. 22 Q. What was shar? 23 Q. What was shar? 24 A. It was on fire? 25 Was a failed rescue on that floor? 26 A. Do, Do you know shar blocked. 27 D. Do you know shar blocked. 28 D. Do you know shar blocked. 29 Q. Do you remember a debricfing? 20 Q. Do you remember a	12	A. Before they went, yes.	12	A. Not a full, no.
there were multiple rescue operations just commencing or in they were in the tower. A. They were in the tower they were up in the tower. B. Q. — I thought you told us earlier that you told them to go to the 16th floor once they were up in the tower. They hadn't closed down. I will deploy them because they ward to the tower they hadn't closed down. I will deploy them because they ward to the floth floor. A. The page 129 Dage 129 When you gave them the instructions to go to the 16th floor, where were Hippel and Stern? A. I don't know. They were in the tower. Dage 129 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. Dage 129 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. Dage 129 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. Dage 129 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. Dage 129 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. Dage 129 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. Dage 129 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. Dage 129 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. Dage 129 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. Dage 131 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. Dage 131 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. Dage 131 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. Dage 131 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. Dage 131 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. Dage 131 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. Dage 131 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. Dage 14 A. No, they weren't at the bridgehead, no. Day Dage 15 Day Dage 16 A. No, they weren't at the bridgehead, no. Day Dage 17 Day Dage 18 Day Dage 18 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. Day Dage 19 A. I don't recall. I don't remember. Day Dage 19 A. I don't recall. I don't remember. Day Dage 19 A. I don't were with a resident? Day Dage 19 Day Dage 19 A. I twould've been recorded, but not by me, because they would have to go then to the entry control officer. I had Justin O'Beirne there as well and a lot of people assisting and	13	Q. Before they went.	13	Q that you could have done?
they were in the tower. A. They were in the tower. Q. I thoughty tou told us carlier that you told them to give me information is there is fire on the 18th point of the 18t	14	A. And then when they came back down.	14	A. It wasn't a calm environment at that time, it was
17 A. They were in the tower. 17	15	Q. I may have misunderstood you and it's my fault, but when	15	there were multiple rescue operations just commencing or
18 Q. — Ithought you told us earlier that you told them to go to the 16th floor once they were up in the tower. 2 A. Yeah, they were in the tower, they were still under air, they hadn't closed down. I will deploy them because 1 had information there was fire — there was smoke, sorry, on the 16th floor. 2 Q. Let me just go back then, I may have confused you and 2 Page 129 Page 129 Page 129 Page 131 1 When you gave them the instructions to go to the 16th floor, where were Hippel and Stern? 3 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. 4 Q. They were in the tower, but they weren't at the bridgehead, no. 5 O. So you communicated with them by radio, as you've said? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Thafs what I thought. When you did that, did you know that they were with a resident? 1 A. No. 2 Did jou know that they were with the son of the man that Hippel and Stern were going to rescue on the 16th floor? 4 A. Well, that would make sense. 15 Q. But did you know that? 4 A. Well, that would make sense. 16 A. No, I didn't. 9 Q. Do you remember Stern and Hippel coming back down to the bridgehead after going to the 16th floor? 19 A. Yes. 10 Q. Do you remember a debriefing? 21 A. I remember what Dick Hippel said, or Richard, 22 Firefighter Hippel said to me. 23 A. I don't recall. 24 Q. What was that? 25 Bid Jamal Stern tell you about what he had experienced? 26 A. I don't recall. 27 Q. Did you about what he had experienced? 28 A. I twas on fire. 29 Q. That's what I the bridgehead, no. 30 Q. What was that? 40 A. It would've been every did be all, you know hat the deployment had been unsuccessful after it had been debriefed to you by Richard Hippel? 41 A. It would was that 42 Yes. 42 A. It was on fire? 43 A. I don't recall. 44 A. It was on fire? 45 A. It was on fire? 46 A. It was on fire? 47 A. It was on fire? 48 A. It was on fire? 49 C. What was on fire? 40 C. They were in the tower. 40 C. They were in the tower. 41 A. It would was the give me information in that. 42 C. They were in the fidth floor?	16	they were in the tower	16	in the process and I was trying to manage that at the
go to the 16th floor once they were up in the tower. A. Yesh, they were in the tower, they were still under air, they hadn't closed down. I will deploy them because 1 had information there was fire – there was smoke, sorry, on the 16th floor. Page 129 When you gave them the instructions to go to the 16th floor, where were Hippel and Stern? A. I don't know. They were in the tower. 4. Q. They were in the tower, they weren't at the bridgehead, no. 7. Q. So you communicated with them by radio, as you've said? A. Yes. Q. Did you know that they were with the son of the man that they were with a resident? A. Well, that would make sense. D. Did Jamal Stern tell you about what he had experienced? A. It was unsuccessful, I believe, and he was shocked that the 16th floor was on fire. A. It was unsuccessful, I believe, and he was shocked that the 16th floor was on fire. A. It was unsuccessful, I believe, and he was shocked that the 16th floor was on fire. A. It was unsuccessful, I believe, and he was shocked that the 16th floor was on fire. A. It was unsuccessful, I believe, and he was shocked that the 16th floor was on fire. A. It was unsuccessful, I believe, and he was shocked that the 16th floor was on fire. A. It was unsuccessful, I believe, and he was shocked that the 16th floor was on fire. A. It was unsuccessful, I believe, and he was shocked that the 16th floor was on fire. A. It was unsuccessful, I believe, and he was shocked that the 16th floor was on fire. A. It was unsuccessful, I believe, and he was shocked that the 16th floor was on fire. A. It was unsuccessful, I believe, and he was shocked that the 16th floor was on fire. A. It was unsuccessful, I believe, and he was shocked that the 16th floor was on fire. A. It was unsuccessful, I believe, and he was shocked that the 16th floor was on fire. A. It was unsuccessful, I believe, and he was shocked that the 16th floor was on fire. A. It would've been, well, I undid well was unsule to contain a depoint on the 16th floor was on fire and	17	A. They were in the tower.	17	bridgehead. So when firefighters would come to me and
A. Yeah, they were in the tower, they were still under air, they hadn't closed down. I will deploy them because 1 had information there was fire – there was smoke, 23 sorry, on the 16th floor. 24 Q. Let me just go back then, I may have confused you and 25 I'm sorry if I have. 25 Page 129 1 When you gave them the instructions to go to the 16th floor, 26 What impression did you get from the debrief that 27 Richard Hippel gave you about the success of the rescue? 28 Page 131 1 When you gave them the instructions to go to the 16th floor, 30 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. 4 Q. They were in the tower, but they weren't at the bridgehead, no. 4 Yes. 9 Q. That's what I thought. When you did that, did you know that they were with a resident? 10 A. No. 10 D. Doyou remember stem and Hippel coming back down to the 17 Q. Do you remember stem and Hippel coming back down to the bridgehead after going to the 16th floor? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. Do you remember stem and Hippel coming back down to the bridgehead after going to the 16th floor? 19 A. Yes. 10 Do you remember a debriefing? 10 Do you remember a debriefing? 11 A. Not precisely, but if would've been - well, I would've keen what Dick Hippel said, or Richard, 21 Firefighter Hippel said to me. 22 What was that? 23 What was on fire? 19 Do you indicate to the incident commander that there was a failed rescue on that floor? 19 Do you indicate to the incident commander that there was a failed rescue on that floor? 19 Do you indicate to the incident commander that there was a failed rescue on that floor? 19 Do you indicate to the incident commander that there was a failed rescue on that floor? 19 Do you indicate to the incident commander that there was a failed rescue on that floor? 19 Do you indicate to the incident commander that there was a failed rescue on that floor? 19 Do you indicate to the incident commander that there was a failed rescue on that floor? 19 Do you indicate to the incident commander that there was a failed rescue on that floor? 19 Do you indicate to t	18	Q I thought you told us earlier that you told them to	18	give me information, I would it wouldn't be all, you
they hadn't closed down. I will deploy them because I had information there was fire – there was smoke, sorry, on the 16th floor. Let me just go back then, I may have confused you and Fm sorry if I have. Page 129 Page 131 When you gave them the instructions to go to the I fish floor, where were Hippel and Stem? A. I don't know. They were in the tower. Q. They were in the tower, but they weren't at the bidgehead? A. No, they weren't at the bridgehead, no. Q. So you communicated with them by radio, as you've said? A. Yes. Q. That's what I thought. When you did that, did you know that they were with a resident? A. No. Q. Did you know that they were with the son of the man that Hippel and Stern were going to rescue on the 16th floor? A. No, I didn't. Q. Do you remember Stern and Hippel coming back down to the bridgehead after going to the 16th floor? A. No, I didn't. Q. Do you remember Stern and Hippel coming back down to the bridgehead after going to the 16th floor? A. No, I didn't. Q. Do you remember Stern and Hippel coming back down to the bridgehead after going to the 16th floor? A. No, I didn't. Q. Do you remember a debriefing? A. I remember what Dick Hippel said, or Richard, Firefighter Hippel said to me. 21	19	go to the 16th floor once they were up in the tower.	19	know, a very complex, long description, it would be
22 I had information there was fire – there was smoke, sorry, on the 16th floor. 23 A. I don't recall. 24 Q. Let me just go back then, I may have confused you and 25 Page 129 Page 129 Page 131 1 When you gave them the instructions to go to the 16th floor, where were Hippel and Stern? 2 Q. They were in the tower, but they weren't at the bridgehead? 2 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. 3 Q. They were in the tower, but they weren't at the bridgehead? 4 A. No, they weren't at the bridgehead, no. 9 Q. So you communicated with them by radio, as you've said? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. That's what I thought. When you did that, did you know that they were with a resident? 1 A. No. 11 A. No. 12 Q. Did you know that they were with the son of the man that Hippel and Stern were going to rescue on the 16th floor? 14 A. Well, that would make sense. 15 Q. But did you know that? 16 A. No, I didn't. 17 Q. Do you remember Stern and Hippel coming back down to the bridgehead after going to the 16th floor? 18 A. I remember what Dick Hippel said, or Richard, 21 Firefighter Hippel said to me. 20 Q. What was that? 21 A. I was on fire. He was shocked. 22 Did you indicate to the incident commander that there when fire? 23 A. I was a failed rescue on that floor? 24 A. It was on fire? 25 Did you indicate to the incident commander that there when fire? 26 Did you indicate to the incident commander that there when fire? 27 Did you indicate to the incident commander that there when fire? 28 Did you indicate to the incident commander that there when fire? 29 Did you indicate to the incident commander that there when fire? 30 Did you indicate to the incident commander that there when fire? 31 Did you indicate to the incident commander that there when fire? 32 Did you indicate to the incident commander that there when fire? 34 Did you indicate to the incident commander that there when fire? 35 Did you indicate to the incident commander that there when fire? 36 Did you indicate to the incident commander that there when fire? 37 Did you indicate to t	20	A. Yeah, they were in the tower, they were still under air,	20	the required information is: there is fire on the 16th
23 sorry, on the 16th floor. 24 Q. Let me just go back then, I may have confused you and 25 I'm sorry if I have. Page 129 1 When you gave them the instructions to go to the 2 16th floor, where were Hippel and Stern? 3 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. 4 Q. They were in the tower bridgehead? 5 bridgehead? 6 A. No, they weren't at the bridgehead, no. 7 Q. So you communicated with them by radio, as you've said? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. That's what I thought. When you did that, did you know that they were with a resident? 1 A. No. 10 Did you know that they were with the son of the man that Hippel and Stern were going to rescue on the 16th floor? 1 A. Well, that would make sense. 1 Q. Did you record anywhere the information about the deployment? 8 A. I'would've been recorded, but not by me, because they would have to go then to the entry control officer. 1 I had Justin O'Beirne there as well and a lot of people assisting and they would've got that information that the deployment had been unsuccessful after it had been debriefed to you by Richard Hippel? 1 A. No, I didn't. 2 Do you remember Stern and Hippel coming back down to the bridgehead after going to the 16th floor? 2 A. Yes. 2 Q. Do you remember Stern and Hippel coming back down to the bridgehead after going to the 16th floor? 3 A. I don't recall. I don't receil. I don't remember. 4 A. It would've been recorded, but not by me, because they would have to go then to the entry control officer. 1 I had Justin O'Beirne there as well and a lot of people assisting and they would've got that information and put it on the wall at this stage. 1 Q. Do you remember Stern and Hippel coming back down to the bridgehead after going to the 16th floor? 1 Room about it and the incident commander would've been informed also. But I was unable to communicate with the incident commander at that titme. I did briefly tell him the floor — the the 16th floor was on fire and that's when I urged him to make pumps 10. 2 Dod you indicate to the incident commander that there was a failed resc	21	they hadn't closed down. I will deploy them because	21	floor which could culminate in that.
24 Q. Let me just go back then, I may have confused you and I'm sorry if I have. Page 129 Page 131 1 When you gave them the instructions to go to the 2 lifth floor, where were Hippel and Stern? 3 A. I don't know. They were in the tower. 4 Q. They were in the tower, but they weren't at the bridgehead? 5 A. No, they weren't at the bridgehead, no. 7 Q. So you communicated with them by radio, as you've said? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. That's what I thought. When you did that, did you know 11 that they were with a resident? 1 A. No. 10 Q. Did you know that they were with the son of the man that 13 Hippel and Stern were going to rescue on the 16th floor? 14 A. Well, that would make sense. 15 Q. But did you know that? 16 A. No, I didn't. 17 Q. Do you remember Stern and Hippel coming back down to the bridgehead after going to the 16th floor? 18 A. I remember what Dick Hippel said, or Richard, 21 Firefighter Hippel said to me. 20 Q. What was on fire. 21 Q. What was on fire. 22 What was on fire. 23 Q. What was on fire. 24 A. It was on fire. He was shocked. 25 What impression did you get from the debrief that Richard Hippel gave you about the success of the rescue? Page 131 A. It was unsuccessful, I believe, and he was shocked that the life of floor was on fire. 2	22	I had information there was fire there was smoke,	22	Q. Did Jamal Stern tell you about what he had experienced?
Page 129 Page 131 When you gave them the instructions to go to the 16th floor, where were Hippel and Stern? A. I don't know. They were in the tower. Q. They were in the tower, but they weren't at the bridgehead, no. A. No, they weren't at the bridgehead, no. Q. So you communicated with them by radio, as you've said? A. No, they were with a resident? A. No, they were with a resident? A. No, Use were with a resident? A. Well, that would make sense. Q. Did you know that they were going to rescue on the 16th floor? A. Well, that would make sense. Q. Do you remember Stern and Hippel coming back down to the bridgehead after going to the 16th floor? A. Yes. Do you remember a debriefing? A. I remember what Dick Hippel said, or Richard, Firefighter Hippel said to me. Q. What was on fire? Page 131 A. It was unsuccessful, I believe, and he was shocked that the 16th floor was on fire? A. It was unsuccessful, I believe, and he was shocked that the 16th floor was on fire? A. It leaf floor was on fire? A. It would've been yes. Q. Or on the wall? A. It would've been recorded, but not by me, because they would have to go then to the entry control officer. I had Justin O'Beirne there as well and a lot of people assisting and they would've got that information and put it on the wall at this stage. Q. Do you know what happened to that information that the deployment had been unsuccessful after it had been debriefed to you by Richard Hippel? A. Not precisely, but it would've been – well, I would've been informed also. But I was unable to communicate with the incident commander would've been informed also. But I was unable to communicate with the incident commander would've been informed also. But I was unable to communicate with the incident commander would've been informed also. But I was unable to communicate with the incident commander would've been informed also. But I was unable to communicate with	23	sorry, on the 16th floor.	23	A. I don't recall.
Page 129 Page 131 When you gave them the instructions to go to the 16th floor, where were Hippel and Stern? 2	24	Q. Let me just go back then, I may have confused you and	24	Q. What impression did you get from the debrief that
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19	17	Q. Do you remember Stern and Hippel coming back down to the	17	debriefed to you by Richard Hippel?
20 Q. Do you remember a debriefing? 21 A. I remember what Dick Hippel said, or Richard, 22 Firefighter Hippel said to me. 23 Q. What was that? 24 A. It was on fire. He was shocked. 25 Q. What was on fire? 20 informed also. But I was unable to communicate with the incident commander at that time. I did briefly tell him 22 the floor that the 16th floor was on fire and that's 23 when I urged him to make pumps 10. 24 Q. Did you indicate to the incident commander that there 25 was a failed rescue on that floor?	18	bridgehead after going to the 16th floor?	18	A. Not precisely, but it would've been well, I would've
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	24	A. It was on fire. He was shocked.	24	Q. Did you indicate to the incident commander that there
Page 130 Page 132	25	Q. What was on fire?	25	was a failed rescue on that floor?
Page 132		D 420		D 422
		Page 130		Page 132

1	A. One of many, yes. I can't remember that one	1	Q. I can't at the moment see an Ealing crew until
2	specifically but I was indicating to Watch Manager	2	A. Well, I don't know if it was Ealing, but I remember
3	Watson, who was transporting that information outwards.	3	committing another crew to that flat.
4	Q. So your communication to the incident commander was via	4	Q. Well, perhaps we can chase that up ourselves internally
5	Watch Manager Watson?	5	and come back to you
6	A. And other officers.	6	A. Okay. All right.
7	Q. Which other officers?	7	MR MILLETT: after the break.
8	A. I don't recall.	8	Is now a convenient time for a break?
9	Q. But so far as you're concerned, you passed back up the	9	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. We'll have a break now.
10	communication chain the fact that the rescue mission to	10	Again, please don't talk to anyone about your evidence
11	the 16th floor had not succeeded?	11	and we'll resume at 2 o'clock.
12	A. Yes, because I deployed another BA team there more or	12	THE WITNESS: Okay, thank you very much.
13	less immediately.	13	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
14	Q. Well, I was about to ask you that, that was my next	14	(Pause)
15	question.	15	Thank you all very much. 2 o'clock, please.
16	Having discovered that this deployment with Hippel	16	(12.57 pm)
17	and Stern had not been successful to the 16th floor, did	17	(The short adjournment)
18	you deploy another team?	18	(2.00 pm)
19	A. I did immediately, yes, when they became available.	19	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes. I think Mr O'Keeffe is just on
20	I think it was Ealing, as far as I know.	20	his way now.
21	Q. Ealing, do you think?	21	MR MILLETT: Very good.
22	A. I believe so.	22	(Pause)
23	Q. Just before we break, I wonder if we can just identify	23	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, Mr Millett.
24	that in the	24	MR MILLETT: Mr O'Keeffe, thank you for coming back.
25	A. If you could say the name of the officer in charge,	25	A. Yes, sir.
	Page 133		Page 135
1	I could probably identify it	1	O Can Lask you first of all a question about these
1 2	I could probably identify it. O telemetry data You think it was Faling?	1 2	Q. Can I ask you, first of all, a question about these FRUs
2	Q telemetry data. You think it was Ealing?	2	FRUs.
2 3	Q telemetry data. You think it was Ealing?A. Possibly.	2 3	FRUs. A. Yes.
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1	things on the Hippel/Stern rescue or attempted rescue on	1	which was JOB/8.
2	the 16th floor.	2	(Pause)
3	First of all, from your knowledge, do you know	3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Could you give the reference again?
4	whether Hippel and Stern were at any time with the	4	MR MILLETT: Yes, MET00013074.
5	resident that they met on the stairs?	5	Yes, now, do you recognise that writing, that set of
6	A. No, I don't know that.	6	inscriptions?
7	Q. You don't know. Okay. I may have suggested to you	7	A. Not specifically. It would be what's written on the
8	inadvertently that Hippel and Stern were with him.	8	wall by our guys in the bridgehead.
9	A. I couldn't tell you.	9	Q. Do you know who was writing that up?
10	Q. About that rescue, can I ask you to look at a photograph	10	A. Again, it would be either well, not just Firefighter
11	and be shown, I think it is, tab 50 in the documents	11	O'Beirne, but other individual firefighters and
12	bundle. Mr Documents Director, it's MET00015642.	12	an officer, Watch Manager De Silvo, who came to the
13	This is a photograph we've seen before earlier this	13	bridgehead, who were working on the bridgehead, as part
14	week which was taken, I think, by Justin O'Beirne, and	14	of that team.
15	we'll just wait until it comes up.	15	Q. Can you help me with a particular inscription there. On
16	Now, this is a photograph taken by Justin O'Beirne,	16	the bottom right-hand corner you see, written at
17	as he tells us, and his evidence is that it was taken at	17	an angle from bottom-left to top-right, "113 8 people 14
18	02.17.	18	floor".
19	A. Yes.	19	A. Yes.
20	Q. So a minute or so after the FRU make-up we've just seen,	20	Q. There it is in enlarged form.
21	by coincidence.	21	First of all, whose writing was that, do you
22	Could you just look at it with me hang on, is	22	remember?
23	that the right one? I'm not sure that's the right	23	A. I don't remember.
24	one. Would you just give me a moment.	24	Q. Do you know when that was written there?
25	(Pause)	25	A. I don't.
	Page 137		Page 139
1	First of all, if you could help us with this, it	1	Q. Do you know the circumstances in which that came to be
2	says "16th" up there well, let me ask you a prior	2	written there?
3	question: do you know whose writing that is?	3	A. It would be a fire survival guidance call.
4	A. Well, I would say it's either Justin O'Beirne or Watch	4	Q. That would be a fire survival guidance
5	Manager Louisa De Silvo.	5	A. That would be the circumstances.
6	Q. And that information was coming from where, do you	6	Q. Right. It says "113 8 people"
7	think?	7	A. I remember when we had to when we eventually ended up
8	A. Okay. I don't know exactly the time that Watch Manager	8	in the lobby, having eight people in the vicinity still.
9	De Silvo came to the bridgehead. But when she came to	9	But not that specific writing. I don't know who wrote
10	the bridgehead, I detailed her to take control of BA	10	it.
11	control and FSG information.	11	Q. Okay.
12	Q. Right.	12	Can I just then go back to the photograph I was
13	A. Before she came to the bridgehead, I had detailed	13	showing you before, which is at MET00015642.
14	Firefighter O'Beirne to utilise the wall to write up the	14	If we can enlarge it halfway down, it says: "113
15	FSG information because, as he had indicated to me, the	15	14th [floor]"
16	forward information board was full, and when he did so,	16	A. Yes.
17	I instructed him to write it on the wall. So I don't	17	Q with a tick next to it, "BA". What does that tick
18	know whose writing it is.	18	mean?
19	Q. We'll come back to that photograph in a minute. I'm	19	A. That it's been searched, I would guess, but I didn't put
20	sorry, it's my fault, I've taken you to the wrong	20	the tick there, so I don't know.
21	photograph.	21	Q. All right.
22	A. Okay.	22	If we just pan out and just go back to the list,
23	Q. But the information you've just given us about that	23	a little higher up you can see 133, 16th floor. Do you
24	photograph is important. I'll come back to it shortly.	24	see that?
25	If you go, please, to the photograph at MET00013074,	25	A. Yes.
	2 00, F, to F		
	Page 138		Page 140
	1 480 130	1	1

		_	
1	Q. Do you remember the circumstances in which that came to	1	First of all, let's start with the end of wear time
2	be written there?	2	for Hippel and Stern, and we see in the blue column at
3	A. No.	3	the right-hand side of the screen that the end of Hippel
4	Q. Now, that's the 16th floor.	4	and Stern's wear time is 01.38.35 and 01.38.40.
		5	
5	Do you think that that came to be written there	1	A. Okay.
6	after Stern and Hippel had reported to you that they had	6	Q. How soon after their end of wear time do you think you
7	not been able to make a rescue on the 16th floor?	7	dispatched the next set of BA wearers to the 16th floor?
8	A. I couldn't say.	8	A. Immediately.
9	Q. Right.	9	Q. Right.
10	Then if you look at MET00015624, which is	10	A. Or as soon as one was available.
11	a different photograph, I'll see if I can just cover	11	Q. Right. So we're looking for a dispatch now at about
12	this off, this is more fire survival guidance written on	12	that time.
13	the wall. Looking again at floor 16 it looks like	13	Now, looking down on the tally-out time in the green
14	a different wall and a different set of numbers. Can	14	column, we've got a trio of BA wearers from Kensington
15	you help with that?	15	and two from Hammersmith, Broderick, Brodrick and
16	A. No. I know that the because I detailed people to	16	Sephton, tallying out at 1.38, 1.38.02 and 1.27. Do you
17	write on the walls, that they were writing on the walls,	17	think that might have been who you sent next?
18	but because I was so involved with other activities,	18	A. I don't know.
19	I that's why I delegated this work to another watch	19	Q. Okay.
20	manager, who was sent to assist me at the bridgehead.	20	What about the five from Paddington, Hammersmith and
21	Q. You see it says "16 133" there, in a ring. Do you	21	Paddington, Wolfenden, James and Felton, Benjamin,
22	remember	22	et cetera, in blue?
23	A. Can you enlarge that, please?	23	Do you think you sent five firefighters up to the
24	Q. Yes.	24	16th floor?
25	A. I can't see.	25	A. I wouldn't say I sent five up there. The again,
	Page 141		Page 143
1	Q. It will be enlarged.	1	I couldn't tell you.
2	"16", and that looks like "133" there with a ring	2	Q. Okay. Well, rather than guessing, do you remember
3	round it and a smudge next to it. Can you help with	3	whether the next set of firefighters you sent to the
4		1 -	whether the next set of intelligiters you sent to the
I -	when that was nut there'	4	16th floor was a pair or whether it was a group larger
5	when that was put there?	4 5	16th floor was a pair or whether it was a group larger
5	A. No.	5	than a pair?
6	A. No. Q. Whether that was after Hippel and Stern	5 6	than a pair? A. I don't remember.
6 7	A. No.Q. Whether that was after Hippel and SternA. I don't know.	5 6 7	than a pair? A. I don't remember. Q. Right.
6 7 8	 A. No. Q. Whether that was after Hippel and Stern A. I don't know. Q. You don't know. Okay. We may have to come back to 	5 6 7 8	than a pair? A. I don't remember. Q. Right. You said you thought it was Ealing but, having
6 7 8 9	 A. No. Q. Whether that was after Hippel and Stern A. I don't know. Q. You don't know. Okay. We may have to come back to those photographs later. 	5 6 7 8 9	than a pair? A. I don't remember. Q. Right. You said you thought it was Ealing but, having thought about it again, do you remember what station
6 7 8 9 10	 A. No. Q. Whether that was after Hippel and Stern A. I don't know. Q. You don't know. Okay. We may have to come back to those photographs later. Can I then finish off this Hippel and Stern 	5 6 7 8 9	than a pair? A. I don't remember. Q. Right. You said you thought it was Ealing but, having thought about it again, do you remember what station they were from?
6 7 8 9 10 11	 A. No. Q. Whether that was after Hippel and Stern A. I don't know. Q. You don't know. Okay. We may have to come back to those photographs later. Can I then finish off this Hippel and Stern deployment. 	5 6 7 8 9 10 11	than a pair? A. I don't remember. Q. Right. You said you thought it was Ealing but, having thought about it again, do you remember what station they were from? A. No.
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		1	
1	Cornelius tallies out at 01.51, if you look at the	1	take it they gave you a debriefing?
2	green column, and Desmond Murphy at 01.51.24. It looks	2	A. Yes. It was quite a troubled one because they were in
3	as if they've gone as a pair, but do you think the other	3	very bad shape.
4	two below them, Campbell and Mills from Paddington, also	4	Q. They were in bad shape?
5	went with them?	5	A. Yes.
6	A. I don't recall, but I do know they got split up on the	6	Q. And just in terms of their time at which they came back
7	way up.	7	to the bridgehead, if we just look at the telemetry data
8	Q. Right.	8	again at tab 1 and look at their tally-out time, we have
9	A. They were going up with two other firefighters, one	9	that in there as unrecorded, but an end of wear time, if
10	Q. Okay.	10	you look at the blue column, of 02.18.35 and 02.19.34.
11	A. Yeah.	11	Given that they tallied out at 01.51 or so, what
12	Q. Just using Cornelius and Murphy, then, we have their	12	would that tell you about how long they'd been up there
13	tally-out time at 01.51, more or less. That would be	13	and how easy it had been for them?
14	about right, would it?	14	A. It had been very difficult for them. They couldn't
15	A. I actually met them when they came down.	15	Q. We can see
16	Q. I will come to when they came down in just a minute.	16	A. Go on.
17	Let me ask you some questions about what they discover	17	Q. We can see no, continue, sorry.
18	when they go up.	18	A. No, you carry on.
19	They go up. When they go up there, are you able to	19	Q. You can see their final pressure there of 53 for Charles
20	speak to them?	20	Cornelius and 78.47 for
21	A. Not on the way up, no. Before they went up, yes, but	21	A. Yes.
22	not on the way up.	22	Q Desmond Murphy. Is that
23	Q. What brief did you give them before they went up, do you	23	A. That's quite low.
24	remember?	24	Q. That's quite low?
25	A. I told them to take firefighting equipment. They took	25	A. Yes. Your low pressure warning whistle sounds at
	The Trong them to time mongroung equipments They took		To rest four for pressure warming windste sounds at
	Page 145		Page 147
1	quite a let of finefighting equipment. I said thereis	1	84 bar.
1	quite a lot of firefighting equipment. I said there's	1 2	
2 3	a fire, reports of fire, not just smoke, and that they	3	Q. Yes.
	had one individual in — I cannot remember the number of	4	A. And you have got 12 minutes to get out, really. Q. And you say they were in quite bad shape?
4	the flat, adult male. And they were to firefighting, search and rescue.	5	
5			A. They were in bad shape, yes. Q. Could you just expand on what you mean by that?
6	Q. Right.	6	
7	A. It's an FSG call, fire survival guidance call.	7	A. I could. They had abandoned their firefighting kit
8	Q. You said you had reports of actual fire in that flat?	8	above. They didn't think they were going to make it out
9	A. Yeah, that's why I sent them with the firefighting	9	alive. That's what they said to me. That's what
10	equipment.	10	Firefighter Murphy said to me. They looked really
11	Q. Do you remember recording or having recorded on the wall	11	shaken. They said that they couldn't see any of the
12	or any of those walls by the bridgehead information that	12	door numbers, they didn't know which floor they were on,
13	there was fire in that flat?	13	and I specifically remember Firefighter Murphy telling
14	A. I not me personally, no.	14	me that he had to use his firefighter's hand lamp to go
15	Q. Okay.	15	up close to where a floor number to try and find out
16	They go up.	16	where they were.
17	A. Yes.	17	Q. Really?
18	Q. Then they come back down again, and you say at the top	18	A. That they had found the individual of the flat but,
19	of page 11 of your statement:	19	because of the density and when they went there, they
20	"The BA crew of Firefighters MURPHY and CORNELIUS	20	found another seven people from various flats who came
21	then returned to the Bridgehead, without the other two	21	to them for help. They were unable to take the eight
22	crew members. They didn't know where they had gone.	22	people out.
23	They looked exhausted and reported to me that they had	23	Q. Right.
24	reached Flat 111 and found the male occupant."	24	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Do you need a pause?
25	Pausing there, when they came back down, are we to	25	A. Just give me a moment, please.
	Page 146		Page 148

1	SID MADTIN MOODE DICK: Of course	1	Walsh shout EDDAs?
2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Of course.	2	Welch about EDBAs? A. Before.
3	(Pause) A. So I knew I had eight people now on that floor in one	3	O. It was before?
4	flat. They put the people in the flat which they deemed	4	A. Certainly was before.
5	to be the least smoky flat and they reported that to me.	5	Q. Okay. Long before?
6	As far as I recall, I deployed another BA crew	6	A. I don't know.
7	immediately to that area. I don't know I'm really	7	Q. Right.
8	sorry, but at this point I can't remember most of the	8	So based on their tally or their end of wear time
9	crews. I only know this because Firefighters Cornelius	9	that we've seen, you can't tell us, can you, who the
10	and Murphy are from my watch and they're friends of	10	incident commander was?
11	mine.	11	A. No.
12	Q. Just focusing on where they had found the other seven,	12	Q. When you say you passed it on to the incident commander,
13	was that in the same flat	13	can you tell us what you did?
14	A. Same floor.	14	A. Well, I couldn't make any comms. I was in contact with
15	Q. Same floor, but in the same flat as the male occupant,	15	various officers who were coming to the bridgehead.
16	flat 111	16	I was giving them information and I was giving
17	A. Same floor, not the same flat, the same floor. They	17	information any information I had. They would also
18	kicked the door in, I believe, and they found I won't	18	give that information Firefighters Cornelius and
19	say his name because I don't really want to say his	19	Murphy would give that information to the entry control
20	name, I don't think it's relevant at the moment,	20	board and whoever was running that system at the time.
21	I should say	21	Q. Do you think that Watch Manager De Silvo recorded the
22	Q. It's okay, take your time.	22	information that Murphy and Cornelius had given to you?
23	A. I'm okay.	23	A. If she was there, she certainly would have.
24	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Just take it at your own pace.	24	Q. Can I just ask you to look at a photograph again.
25	(Pause)	25	I think it's one we looked at a moment ago, but coming
	Page 149		Page 151
1	A. And so they placed the only thing they could do was	1	back to it. It's [MET00013074].
1 2	A. And so they placed — the only thing they could do was place people in a place which they considered to be safe	1 2	back to it. It's [MET00013074]. Again, this may not be the right one, so we may have
	A. And so they placed — the only thing they could do was place people in a place which they considered to be safe at that time and they told them that somebody would come		-
2	place people in a place which they considered to be safe	2	Again, this may not be the right one, so we may have
2	place people in a place which they considered to be safe at that time and they told them that somebody would come	2 3	Again, this may not be the right one, so we may have to look at one or two others. Are you all right with
2 3 4	place people in a place which they considered to be safe at that time and they told them that somebody would come back to get them.	2 3 4	Again, this may not be the right one, so we may have to look at one or two others. Are you all right with that, Mr O'Keeffe?
2 3 4 5	place people in a place which they considered to be safe at that time and they told them that somebody would come back to get them. MR MILLETT: Yes.	2 3 4 5	Again, this may not be the right one, so we may have to look at one or two others. Are you all right with that, Mr O'Keeffe? A. I am.
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,			
1	Q. That would be it?	1	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Just a minute, Mr Millett, are we
2	A. Yes.	2	looking at the right part?
3	Q. That would be what, De Silvo recording	3	MR MILLETT: BA Time Line (3).
4	A. That would be the recording of the information that	4	Great, thank you.
5	they'd given over.	5	If you look at the top of that now you'll see
6	Q. Right, okay. So we have it. Okay.	6	a block of five firefighters, three from Lambeth, one
7	A. Okay.	7	from Chelsea, one from Soho, all tallying out at 02.24
8	Q. Then you say you detailed another BA crew to rescue the	8	and 02.26 and then 02.27.
9	occupants of floor 14?	9	A. Yes, I recognise one there.
10	A. Yes, Yes, I did.	10	Q. Does that trigger
11	Q. Are you ready to go on or would you like a break?	11	A. A few of the names, actually.
12	A. I can go on.	12	Q. Does that trigger a recollection in whether or not that
13	Q. Okay, all right.	13	group was the group
14	A. I'm okay.	14	A. No, they weren't. They were the group that found the
15	Q. Okay. Now, just to put you back in your statement, this	15	firefighter who was lost.
16	is just before halfway down on page 11, you say:	16	Q. I see.
17	"I then detailed another BA crew to rescue the	17	A. I remember distinctly when they came they brought the
18	occupants of floor 14."	18	firefighter with them.
19	Was that an urgent matter for you?	19	Q. I don't want to fish around in this seeing if I can
20	A. Everything was urgent.	20	prompt a recollection.
21	Q. Right. I just want to try and see if I can get	21	Let me leave it this way: do you remember the size
22	an indication of who that might have been in that crew.	22	of the BA contingent that you sent in order to rescue
23	First of all, do you remember what you said when you	23	the occupants of floor 14?
24	briefed the new BA crew?	24	A. No.
25	A. No. To be as I cannot recollect briefing the new	25	Q. You don't.
	in the real section of the section o		Q
	Page 153		Page 155
1	crew, it may have been Watch Manager De Silvo or	1	Do you remember what happened when that second crew
2	somebody that briefed that crew on where on the	2	that you had briefed came back to the bridgehead?
3	location, because when Chelsea's Watch Manager De Silvo	3	A. No.
4	arrived, because of the volume of information and to	4	Q. Do you think you had a debrief with them?
5	control that information, I put watch manager her,	5	A. No. I didn't, no.
6	Louisa De Silvo, in charge of that task specifically.	6	Q. Did anybody else have a debrief with them, do you think?
7	Q. I see.	7	A. You'll have to ask Watch Manager Louisa De Silvo for
8	We have some evidence from witness statements that	8	that one.
9	a firefighter called Orchard and Herrera were briefed to	9	MR MILLETT: Right.
10	go to the 14th floor, to go to flat 111.	10	Now, jumping ahead, if I can, in your statement
11	A. Okay.	11	I am going to go on to a different document.
12	Q. Is that something that rings a bell with you?	12	Now, you've been going for 30 minutes. I think it's
13	A. No.	13	probably time for a short break.
14	Q. It doesn't.	14	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would that be a good thing?
15	What about the names Juggins and McAlonen?	15	THE WITNESS: I think it would be.
16	A. No.	16	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Yes, I thought you might.
17	Q. No?	17	We'll have a break for 10 minutes. Back here at
18	Can I just show you an entry in the telemetry data	18	2.40, no discussing your evidence.
19	again?	19	THE WITNESS: Okay, thank you.
20	A. Yes, of course.	20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Thank you very much.
21	Q. If you go to the bottom of "BA Time Line (3)" and	21	2.40, then, please.
22	there's a white box of five BA wearers, three from	22	(2.32 pm)
23	Lambeth, one from Chelsea and one from Soho, Evans,	23	(A short break)
24	Bloxham, Herrera, Ferguson and Orchard, who tally out	24	(2.40 pm)
25	at	25	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: You all right, Mr O'Keeffe?
	D 454		D 457
	Page 154		Page 156
			30 (Pages 153 to 156)

		T	
1	THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.	1	Q you were getting, when did you start getting pieces
2	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr Millett, I think I can say	2	of paper like this?
3	without too much fear of contradiction that we're all	3	A. (Nodded assent).
4	feeling the heat a bit. I'm sure Mr O'Keeffe is. I am,	4	Q. When did you start getting these pieces
5	and maybe you are and others too.	5	A. When did I start?
6	So I think what we should do is to finish this	6	Q. Yes.
7	afternoon's session by 3.15. If you reach a natural	7	A. Those pieces of paper? When I was on the ground floor,
8	point before then or a little bit before then	8	in the lobby.
9	MR MILLETT: It will be welcome.	9	Q. So when the bridgehead was on the ground floor in the
10	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: we'll take that, otherwise we'll	10	
11	finish at 3.15 and I think give you a bit of respite.	11	lobby? A. That was towards the well, that was the latter stages
12		12	
13	THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.	13	of the incident.
	MR MILLETT: Yes, Mr Chairman.		Q. Yes. So you weren't is this right? getting pieces
14	Mr O'Keeffe, thank you very much.	14	of paper like this before that?
15	Can I take you to page 15 of your witness statement.	15	A. I think I may have. I didn't have them in my tunic.
16	I am going to just ask you to look at the bottom of	16	Q. Right.
17	that page, and I want just to give you enough	17	A. I just happened to put these together because there were
18	opportunity to look at that so we can identify perhaps	18	so many coming, and I I didn't deliberately
19	when in time these things are happening.	19	I probably did at the time, I don't recall, I put them
20	You say, eight lines up from the bottom:	20	in a bundle and put them in my leggings or my tunic, my
21	"It was also apparent now that all BA crews were	21	firefighting kit.
22	EDBA crews. There was a lot of noise and shouting in	22	Q. Who was giving you these pieces of paper?
23	the lobby. I was continually handed pieces of paper by	23	A. Mainly Watch Manager Watson.
24	runners because the comms were no longer working. We	24	Q. Where were you standing when he was giving them to you?
25	had the very old-fashioned, but dependable, method of	25	A. I was standing at the end of the stairs, at the very
	D 157		D 150
	Page 157	-	Page 159
1	people physically getting numbers from the Command Unit,	1	beginning of the stairs in the lobby.
2	and then running the gauntlet of debris and other things	2	Q. In the lobby, the ground-floor lobby?
3	coming down on them to then give me pieces of paper into	3	A. Ground floor, yes.
4	my hand. All of these numbers went onto the wall and it	4	Q. Where was Watch Manager Watson getting them from?
5	grew and grew. I kept all of these pieces of paper and	5	A. He would have been getting them from the side if you
6	put them into my trouser pocket. After the incident, I	6	put a map up, I could probably the firefighters had
7	took them from my pocket and carefully unstuck them from	7	broken in a new so not the front of the building,
8	each other. They have subsequently been handed to the	8	which was the south side, it would've been the west
	LFB accident investigators."		possibly the west western side, there was a door.
10		10	
11	Now, we think we have those as just help me	11	They made an opening there which was the only safe
12	LFB00001929, if we can just have a look at that.	12	access at that time into the building, or semi-safe
	A. Yes, that's the so that was in the lobby when we had	13	access, and he was picking up I believe picking up
13 14	to evacuate the third floor bridgehead. I believe it was an emergency evacuation. And that would have been	14	the paper. So they were somebody would run to the
		15	door and hand it to him and he would run to me, give it
15	around 4 o'clock. I remember seeing the the reason		to me, or walk to me.
16	I know this is you have 04.20 on one of them and 04.05,	16	Q. Do you know who it was that was writing this information
17	which is the time of the morning it was. So at that	17	on these pieces of paper?
18	time we had well, before that, the entire bridgehead	18	A. I don't.
19	was evacuated, and these pieces of paper were being	19	Q. Is it what was happening that these pieces of paper with
20	handed to me directly and I was putting them I drew	20	writing already on them was being given to Watch Manager
21	a map on the wall of the tower, a pictogram, and I was	21	Watson
22	transcribing this information onto the wall.	22	A. Who was then giving them to me.
23	Q. Okay. Let me see if I can piece this together, then.	23	Q. Then giving them to you.
24	So these pieces of paper	24	And you don't know where or do you know where
25	A. Yes.	25	the person who gave this information to Watch Manager
	Page 158		Page 160
ı	1 age 130		1 agc 100

1	Watson got it from?	1	Now, we have some evidence that a watch manager
2	A. I will tell you that those pages are from an officer's	2	called Alan Moore ran slips from outside the tower from
3	notebook. We all carry them in our tunics for recording	3	a crew manager up to the bridgehead and gave them to
4	reasons. So they were being written on this, on these	4	a watch manager he thinks might have been you.
5	pieces of paper, and they were being handed to me	5	A. Yes.
6	individually. So I would then transcribe that	6	Q. He did the same thing when he got to the ground floor.
7	information onto the wall and then brief oncoming EDBA	7	Does that trigger a recollection? Do you remember that?
8	crews of, for example, 14th floor, 112, 14th floor, 113	8	A. Yes. Watch Manager Watson wasn't the only person giving
9	and so on.	9	the information, but towards the latter part, he was the
10	Q. The time of 04.10	10	only person coming in with information. But other
11	A. 04.10, 04.20, 04.05, around that time.	11	officers were handing me slips. If I can contextualise,
12	Q. Was that the time, to your understanding, that that	12	this was, you know, an 8-hour span.
13	information had been recorded	13	Q. No, I understand.
14	A. Yes.	14	A. It was a deluge of information.
15	Q when the person who wrote this on there wrote it?	15	Q. I understand.
16	A. Yes, without a doubt. There would be a delay of	16	To the best of your understanding, was there any
17	a couple of minutes while the information was being	17	kind of prioritisation being applied to these
18	transported to me.	18	A. They were all prioritised. Every fire survival guidance
19	Q. Right. You can see 04.30 on the right-hand side, "82",	19	call has the same level of priority. They have the same
20	it looks like "11th", "3 pers"?	20	heightened state of urgency. It's as quick as you can
21	A. Three persons, yes.	21	and as best as you can.
22	Q. Did you get much information in addition to what we see	22	Q. Right.
23	on these pieces of paper	23	Can I just ask you to look at one or two other
24	A. No.	24	documents. First of all, LFB00001951, which is
25	Q about the number of people in particular apartments?	25	a standard form control information form, 6178.
	Page 161		Page 163
1	A. Yes, so in 122 I mean, looking at the paper now, yes,	1	A. Yes.
2	we would've had number of persons or not.	2	Q. That's got "133" scribbled out and it says "left", and
3	Q. Yes.	3	then "134 + 135 16".
4	A. As the case is. But when you were given a flat number,	4	Do you recognise that handwriting?
5	you know there are people in there.	5	A. No, I don't recognise the handwriting.
6	Q. Did you understand that this meant just take for	6	Q. Do you recognise the document?
7	example 04.10 list of flats on the 14th floor there,	7	A. I do recognise the document.
8	did that mean to you that there was still residents	8	Q. Could you explain what that is?
9	A. Yes.	9	A. That document is carried in all front-line appliances,
10	Q in those flat at 04.10?	10	operational fire engines. As you can see on the top,
11	A. Yes.	11	there are four copies, and when fire crews receive
12	Q. Right. So you took that information into your hand.	12	information from our control on fire survival guidance
13	What did you do with it?	13	now in progress, meaning they have persons confirmed
14	A. So I drew a pictogram of the tower on the wall next to	14	trapped within a building, usually the driver of the
15	me and I put these numbers on the wall in an order that	15	appliance but if not, somebody available, a
16	I could understand and I could brief the crews with.	16	firefighter or officer would put the information on
17	Q. Did you brief the crews with it?	17	this form.
18	A. Yes.	18	Q. Do you remember receiving documents such as this when
19	Q. What did you tell them. Do you remember? Take for	19	you were managing the bridgehead?
20	example 04.10, flat 113, for example.	20	A. Possibly, I don't remember.
21	A. Well, okay, you're going to flat 12 sorry, flat 92 on	21	Q. Right, let's see if the next one triggers
22	the 12th floor, and that would be there would be more	22	a recollection.
23	to the briefing than that, but the specifics of life	23	LFB00001961. Same kind of form. This one says:
24	risk, that's it, and where they are.	24	"Premise number: 142 + 143 17 floor."
25	Q. Okay.	25	At the top someone has written "Priory", which I
1	D 4/2		D 474
	Page 162		Page 164
			41 (Pages 161 to 164)

		1	
1	imagine is, "Priority", 5 persons, it looks like, in	1	we've discussed, and flat 182 on the 21st floor.
2	142. The time is 04.13.	2	Do you remember anything about fire survival
3	Do you remember receiving this document?	3	guidance coming in after that time in relation to
4	A. Again, possibly. The only reason I know that the other	4	flat 182 on the 21st floor?
5	documents that I received the smaller ones is because	5	A. Not specifically, but I remember there being multiple
6	I found them a week later in my tunic. I hadn't	6	calls. So I don't know if again, I mention it again,
7	remembered getting them.	7	Watch Manager De Silvo, who was managing the FSG on the
8	Q. Right. I see. So you found these in your tunic, did	8	bridgehead, she may be able to shed more light on it, or
9	you, afterwards, this	9	firefighters O'Beirne or De St Aubin.
10	A. Yes, when we go to incidents where this was quite	10	Q. Yes.
11	an involved one, our fire gear gets contaminated by	11	A. Amongst other officers.
12	various reasons, and the correct procedure is to have it	12	Q. Yes. Just to case that one down just a little bit
13	cleaned. We keep a stock in stations, so you would put	13	further, if you could just be shown MET00015625. This
14	it in for specialist cleaning. And we keep a lot of	14	is the photograph I showed you before. It's
15	we keep a lot of personal items and notebooks in our	15	a Justin O'Beirne photograph which he took just before
16	fire gear, so I was taking all the stuff out of my	16	moving from the bridgehead at 3.08 am. That's what he
17	pockets before I submitted it for cleaning and I found	17	told us.
18	those documents, which I considered important	18	A. That's when the bridge was evacuated, and I asked my
19	Q. Yes.	19	crew to photograph the wall, which they did. We had to
20	A to any subsequent inquiry, so I gave them to our own	20	save the information, bring it with us. So we grabbed
21	senior management team, who forwarded them to the	21	the breathing apparatus boards and took photographs of
22	police.	22	what was on the wall and brought it with us to the
23	Q. Yes, I see. Okay.	23	ground floor.
24	Just going back a little bit earlier in time in the	24	Q. Yes.
25	evening, could I just ask you to be shown page 41 of the	25	In that photograph, can you just see it says, just
	Page 165		Page 167
1	ODD TILL 4 C. 1	,	Laboration of the East 1911 and the development
1	ORR. This is the operational response report at	1	below the top of the list, "21", and then there's a tick
2	01.26.54.	2	next to "204", and then "182" has a circle around it and
3	I just want to ask you one or two questions to see	3	a tick thorough it.
4	how far we can go.	4 5	Do you know what the circle around it means?
5	A. Okay. Q. With this information, it may not be that far, but let's	6	A. No, I don't, but I don't, no. I can only guess and
6	· ·	7	I don't want to do that. I can only, you know, make an experienced guess, but nevertheless a guess. So, no,
7	see. It's a call recorded by Brigade control at 01.26.54	8	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
8	from flat 186 on the 21st floor.		I don't. Q. And the tick through it, do you know what that
10		10	
10	Do you remember being on the bridgehead when that	11	represents?
11 12	fire survival guidance information came through?	12	A. Well, when I was doing similar work downstairs, a tick would mean it's searched, a cross would either mean
13	A. No. I mean, if it was 01.26, I was on the bridgehead,	13	*
13	but I don't remember that specific information.	14	deceased or rescued. Q. Right. If you continue on page 81 in the operational
15	Q. No.A. Can I just say, there were hundreds of calls coming	15	response report, it says
16	through.	16	(Pause)
17	Q. And then at 01.38.38, we have a call this is page 67	17	I'm sorry, I've given you a wrong reference and got
18	of the operational response report, I wonder if you	18	my own wrong reference, so we won't ask, but in general
19	could just be shown that being taken by Fire Brigade	19	terms, were you aware of requests coming through from
20	control which is flat 183 on the 21st floor.	20	control to prioritise calls?
21	Again, the same question, do you remember anything	21	A. In general terms, yes.
22	about that?	22	Q. Was there a message that had come through to prioritise
	A. No.	23	based on smoke density?
23		1 -5	on onione denote;
23 24		24	A. The priority would be on normally proximity to fire or
24	Q. Page 81, if we just look at that. There's a call there	24 25	A. The priority would be on normally proximity to fire, or it'd be density of the smoke, you know. If information
		24 25	A. The priority would be on normally proximity to fire, or it'd be density of the smoke, you know. If information
24	Q. Page 81, if we just look at that. There's a call there		

1	was received from the residents that there was fire	1	Q. Thank you.
2	nearby, that would be given priority, yes.	2	Now can I then ask you about how high firefighters
3	Q. I have a question about an early evacuation. Do you	3	could get into the building, starting at page 11 of your
4	remember a man coming out of a flat on the second floor	4	statement. I think we've covered this before, but
5	in the very early stages of the fire?	5	I just want to start from this point.
6	A. People did come down in the very early stages of it.	6	You say three-quarters of the way down page 11:
7	Some were okay.	7	"Our BA crews were reporting that they were unable
8	Q. Right.	8	to reach the upper floors, before reaching their
9	A. Because there wasn't anything the severity hadn't	9	turn-around time."
10	developed at that time.	10	You say you transmitted that to the incident
11	Q. Do you remember somebody coming out of a flat on the	11	commander. Do you remember which incident commander it
12	second floor and being told to go back into his flat?	12	was that you told that to?
13	A. No.	13	A. Richard Welch, Group Manager Welch.
14	Q. Do you remember somebody making a 999 call and being	14	Q. Right. Would that be at the same time as this earlier
15	told someone's coming to get you?	15	conversation about EDBA
16	A. I beg your pardon?	16	A. Yes.
17	Q. In that flat, a flat on a low floor.	17	Q. Right.
18 19	A. On the second floor? Q. Yes.	18 19	A. If I can remind you, he said, "What are you doing, what
			tactics or activity are you employing?" And I told
20	A. Well, that's where we were, on the second floor, and	20	him I can't remember the exact words of the entire
21	I don't remember that, no.	21	conversation, except that it wasn't working, we couldn't
22	Q. Right, okay.	22	successfully reach certain areas, and that to do that
23	Can I just ask you to go back to one more picture,	23	would require at the very minimum extended duration
24	which is MET00015642. We looked at it a number of times	24	breathing apparatus crews to give us more well, more
25	in relation to different flats. I'm sorry to keep	25	resources to do that.
	Page 169		Page 171
1	jumping about, but you'll see on this, if you look at	1	Q. Yes. And then over the top of the next page, you say,
2	the whole there.	2	page 12, that you made the decision to allow BA crews to
3	Three-quarters of the way down you can see "122 15th	3	go past entry control point without going under air.
4	smoke", do you see that?	4	A. Yes.
5	A. Sorry, can you repeat that?	5	Q. "This is way outside Policy but we weren't reaching and
6	Q. You can see that there it says "BA 122 15th smoke".	6	rescuing people because crews were running out of air."
7	A. Okay, that would signify that in flat 122 on the 15th	7	A. That's correct.
8	floor it was smoke, either in the vicinity or in the	8	Q. I see. So given the conditions in the stair, do you
9	flat.	9	think that actually saved much time for those
10	Q. That's what I was going to ask you: do you think it	10	firefighters?
11	refers to smoke within the flat?	11	A. Yes.
12	A. You'd have to ask the control operators about that one.	12	Q. It did? How much further do you think that enabled them
13	Q. Can you help us as to where the information about smoke	13	to get
14	would've come from?	14	A. I don't know. My information is that you could get up
15	A. That came from the occupant of the flat to our control	15	to a certain level where it became really difficult with
16	and then to us via the usual circuitous route.	16	smoke, you know, really smoke-logged. I can't remember
17	Q. From the occupant of the flat through the control	17	the actual level. So I thought if I extended the
18	room	18	duration of the standard duration BA crews, it would
19	A. Correct.	19	give them the safety margin and more air to allow them
20	Q to the command unit and then through the fire ground,	20	to either try and rescue or at least get back out
21	moving its way up to you there?	21	themselves.
22	A. Yes, that's how fire survival guidance works or calls	22	Q. Yes.
23	work.	23	You go on to say lower down in that paragraph, that
24	Q. So it was via fire survival guidance calls?	24	was a hard decision
25	A. Yes.	25	A. It was.
	Page 170		Page 172

Q and increased danger to the BA crews themselves.	1	the vicinity of our Bridgehead."
Then you say:	2	When did the light smoke appear in the vicinity of
"I also detailed the BA crews to commit without	3	the bridgehead? You described earlier
firefighting media and breaking-in kit because we didn't	4	A. Again, only when doors were opening and it wasn't
	5	permanent.
-		Q. Right. Then you say:
		"A Station Manager then arrived at the Bridgehead
~		and said to me that he was taking over and asked who was
		in charge. I didn't know who he was at the time, but I
		now know him as SM Andy WALTON. I briefed him that I
		was in charge"
		Then you say:
		" we then had a robust discussion, he stayed
		there only a very short time. Then he left and we
		didn't see him again."
		I read that all to you because there's a number of
		questions.
		First of all, you say you had a robust discussion
	l .	with him; can you explain what the discussion was about?
•	l .	
	l .	A. Not entirely, but he appeared agitated and he wasn't
	l .	calm. Q. Right.
- ·		A. I wanted to keep calm control of the bridgehead.
		I believe he said he wanted people to go down the
chanenge me and rightly so about not taking	25	stairs. We had at that time rescues going on. My
Page 173		Page 175
firefighting kit upwards. He probably didn't know the	1	judgment was that we should stay put, and I said that to
	l .	him and I said that I was in charge, even though
•	l .	I know he's a senior rank to me he wasn't it
		wasn't an argument as such, but just me firmly telling
		him we were staying there.
		Q. What did you say to him, do you remember?
		A. "I am in charge here of the bridgehead". He asked who
		was in charge of the bridgehead, I said, "I am."
		Q. Okay. Did you say anything to him about the stay-put
	l .	policy?
		A. No.
	l .	Q. Right. Did you say anything to him about what tactics
	l .	were being adopted by way of search and rescue inside
	l .	the building?
_	l .	A. No.
		Q. Do you remember what information you were able to give
	l .	to Station Manager Walton about the process you had in
	l .	
	l .	place at the bridgehead? A. I just told him multiple FSG calls.
	l .	Q. Did you give him an impression of how successful some of
	l .	
Bridgehead"	21	the deployments had been?
	22	A. No, but I assumed that he would know that we were
Well, me take a step back, you say:	2.2	
"Crews began reporting that it was zero visibility	23	carrying out rescues.
"Crews began reporting that it was zero visibility and extremely hot and that they were unable to determine	24	Q. Right.
"Crews began reporting that it was zero visibility	l .	
-	Then you say: "Talso detailed the BA crews to commit without firefighting media and breaking-in kit because we didn't have enough of it." So does that mean you're sending firefighters up into the building without water? A. Correct, yes. We ran out of firefighting equipment, specifically branches, very early on, and I remember at one point — I remember the moment very clearly, I had about eight or nine fresh BA wearers on the balcony, and I was talking to Watch Manager Watson, and I looked along and I said, "Okay, you got all the equipment, where are the branches?" He said, "We don't have any left." There were so many calls coming in for rescue that I made the decision, I said, "I can't wait any longer, we have to commit." Q. Do you remember whether any firefighters were taking BA sets up for residents to wear on the way down? A. No. Q. You don't remember that? A. No. Q. Okay. A. What I did tell the firefighters, because one did challenge me — and rightly so — about not taking Page 173 firefighting kit upwards. He probably didn't know the circumstances that we were in at that time, but I just said to him, look, there is a lot of equipment abandoned throughout the building by other crews, the initial crews dropped their kit everywhere, and to use that. Q. Right. I see. This dropped kit, was that on the stairwell? A. Yes. In the lobbies and the stairwell. Probably mainly in the lobbies. Q. Did that assist or not assist the exit route? A. I don't know. Q. Okay. Mr O'Keeffe, is it all right if I just ask you 5-minutes' more questions? A. Yes, go on. Glad you asked me, thank you! Q. I can see the clock and you can't. I just want to talk about what happened when Station Manager Andy Walton came to the bridgehead. In the middle of page 12, you say: "A Station Manager then arrived at the	Then you say: "I also detailed the BA crews to commit without firefighting media and breaking-in kit because we didn't have enough of it." So does that mean you're sending firefighters up into the building without water? A. Correct, yes. We ran out of firefighting equipment, specifically branches, very early on, and I remember at one point — I remember the moment very clearly, I had about eight or nine fresh BA wearers on the balcony, and I was talking to Watch Manager Watson, and I looked along and I said, "Okay, you got all the equipment, where are the branches?" He said, "We don't have any left." There were so many calls coming in for rescue that I made the decision, I said, "I can't wait any longer, we have to commit." Q. Do you remember whether any firefighters were taking BA sets up for residents to wear on the way down? A. No. Q. You don't remember that? A. No. Q. Okay. A. What I did tell the firefighters, because one did challenge me — and rightly so — about not taking Page 173 firefighting kit upwards. He probably didn't know the circumstances that we were in at that time, but I just said to him, look, there is a lot of equipment abandoned throughout the building by other crews, the initial crews dropped their kit everywhere, and to use that. Q. Right. I see. This dropped kit, was that on the stairwell? A. Yes. In the lobbies and the stairwell. Probably mainly in the lobbies. Q. Did that assist or not assist the exit route? A. I don't know. Q. Okay. Mr O'Keeffe, is it all right if I just ask you 5-minutes' more questions? A. Yes, go on. Glad you asked me, thank you! Q. I can see the clock and you can't. I just want to talk about what happened when Station Manager Andy Walton came to the bridgehead. In the middle of page 12, you say: "A Station Manager then arrived at the

1	appraised elsewhere.	1	after the initial conversation about EDBA
2	Q. Okay.	2	A. Yes.
3	In terms of timing, let me see if I can get the	3	Q did he just leave you to carry on with what you were
4	timing of this.	4	doing?
5	Walton, do you have this discussion with him prior	5	A. He let me carry on with what I was doing, but he kept
6	to your discussion with Group Manager Welch?	6	coming back he came back about after that. He
7	A. Yes.	7	came back to and I had the discussion about moving
8	Q. I see. And do you remember whether the discussion you	8	the bridgehead up to the third floor.
9	had with Walton was prior to pumps being made 40?	9	Q. And did he then become bridgehead commander?
10	A. What time were pumps made 40?	10	A. Well, I'm assuming if you're a fire sector commander,
11	Q. Pumps were made 40 at, I believe, 02.04.	11	you're in charge of the bridgehead, but I continued
12	A. Yes, that would've been before that.	12	doing what I was doing on the bridgehead. He would come
13	Q. Right. Before I mislead you with that, let's get	13	back occasionally.
14	absolute clarity on that.	14	Q. Was there a time when Group Manager Welch and a man
15	Yes, well, unfortunately the short incident log says	15	called Patrick Goulbourne took over at the bridgehead?
16	02.03, make pumps 25. Now, that's clearly a mistake,	16	A. No, I'll tell you what happened. I suggested to
17	but that's about the time when pumps were made 40,	17	Group Manager Welch that we can move the bridgehead up
18	according to another log we have.	18	further.
19	A. I wasn't made aware it was made pumps 40. I was far,	19	Q. Right.
20	far too involved in what we were doing in the tower.	20	A. And he said okay, you know, and I said, well, what
21	Q. Okay, all right.	21	I would do is I would reconnoitre with another Crew
22	But at any rate, it was before you say you had your	22	Manager Sephton from Hammersmith to look at the
23	discussion with Group Manager Welch	23	viability above the second floor, so we went to the
24	A. That's correct.	24	third and fourth and tried to go to the fifth, but the
25	Q about EDBA?	25	fifth was a no-goer. The fourth had well, the fourth
	Page 177		Page 179
1	A. In fact, I will tell you that the discuss with	1	was on five so we couldn't use that as a buildschool
2	Group Manager Welch, quite soon after I had a discussion	2	was on fire, so we couldn't use that as a bridgehead. The lobby had a lot of black rolling smoke in it. So we
3	with Station Manager Walton, very soon afterwards,	3	went to the third floor, and the third floor looked
4	within about 5 minutes.	4	okay, so I went back to Group Manager Welch and then
5	Q. Right.	5	he well, I said, "We can do this, we can put it
6	You say he left after a short time; do you know what	6	there", and he said okay, and then Group Manager
7	he went off to do?	7	Goulbourne and a Station Manager Cook came up to the
8	A. I don't. He was busy.	8	third floor with me, I suppose to verify my judgment,
9	Q. He was busy?	9	and they had to as senior management, and that's how
10	A. I don't know where he want.	10	that was established.
11	Q. He basically left you doing what you were doing?	11	Whilst we were there, Station Manager Cook received
12	A. Yes.	12	the fire survival guidance call on his Airwave radio,
13	Q. I see.	13	from coming from the third floor.
14	Did you know that he went off to manage the queue of	14	Q. Right. Okay.
15	BA wearers on the balcony?	15	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Would that be a good point,
16	A. No.	16	Mr Millett?
17	Q. Did you have any ongoing connection or role with Andy	17	MR MILLETT: That would be as good a point as any.
18	Walton after that?	18	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right.
19	A. Pardon?	19	MR MILLETT: Thank you very much. Yes.
20	Q. Did you have any ongoing connection or role to play with	20	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Mr O'Keeffe, we're going to stop
21	Andy Walton after he left you?	21	there for the afternoon, but before I let you go, we've
22	A. No.	22	just got to sort something out.
23	Q. Right.	23	Mr Millett, I take it you have a few more questions
24	(Pause)	24	you would like to ask Mr O'Keeffe?
25	Similarly, once Group Manager Welch had left you	25	MR MILLETT: I have a few more questions continuing on the
23	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1	
23			
23	Page 178		Page 180

1	theme we've just been on, just to try to break that up	
1 2	a bit more, but not much more after that. I think in	
	*	
3	terms of time I don't want to be more than another	
4	30 minutes with Mr O'Keeffe.	
5	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, Mr O'Keeffe, you've given us	
6	a lot of very useful evidence already, but as you've	
7	heard, Mr Millett is not quite satisfied; he'd like to	
8	ask you about a few other things. So can I trouble you	
9	to come back on Monday morning?	
10	THE WITNESS: That's fine. I'll come back on Monday.	
11	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: These are long days; I think we'll	
12	start at 10 o'clock on Monday.	
13	MR MILLETT: Yes.	
14	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: So could you be here ready to resume	
15	at 10 o'clock on Monday?	
16	THE WITNESS: Yes.	
17	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Although I'm sure a lot of people	
18	would like to talk to you about what's been going on and	
19	so on, could you remember not to talk about your	
20	evidence or the circumstances.	
21	THE WITNESS: Yes.	
22	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: If you would like to go with the	
23	usher, I will look forward to seeing you on Monday	
24	morning.	
25	THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.	
	,	
	Page 181	
1	MR MILLETT: Thank you very much.	
2	(Pause)	
3	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Now, Mr Millett, is there anything	
4	else we need to deal with?	
5	MR MILLETT: Mr Chairman, I cannot think of anything at the	
6	moment. No, there isn't.	
7	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: All right, thank you very much.	
8	MR MILLETT: Thank you very much. Thank you.	
9		
	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll stop there for the day.	
10	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: We'll stop there for the day. I'm sorry it's been a rather warm day. I've tried	
10 11		
	I'm sorry it's been a rather warm day. I've tried	
11	I'm sorry it's been a rather warm day. I've tried to improve the temperature without a great deal of	
11 12	I'm sorry it's been a rather warm day. I've tried to improve the temperature without a great deal of success, as you will have realised, but I hope perhaps	
11 12 13	I'm sorry it's been a rather warm day. I've tried to improve the temperature without a great deal of success, as you will have realised, but I hope perhaps we can do better next week.	
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