

Module 3 - Active and passive fire safety measures within the building; the management of the building; compliance with the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005; Fire Risk Assessments; complaints by residents and the responses to them

Factsheet

Phase 1 of the Inquiry covered what happened at Grenfell Tower on the night of 14 June 2017, and the experiences of those who lived in the building and who fought the fire, and the immediate causes and effects of the fire on the night.

Phase 2 involves an investigation of the causes of the fire; it is divided into [8 modules](#).

Module 3 considers a broad range of issues relevant to the management of fire safety at Grenfell Tower in the years leading up to the fire. In particular, it will focus on whether, and to what extent, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) and the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (TMO) and others performed their duties in relation to fire safety at Grenfell Tower.

Module 3 is divided into 3 main topics:

1. Residents' Complaints

Topic 1 will be primarily concerned with examining residents' complaints about fire safety risks, fire doors and the quality of workmanship during the refurbishment and in the period leading up to the fire on 14 June 2017.

It will consider communications between local residents and the TMO drawing attention to defects in design, choice of materials or quality of workmanship which they said created or increased the risk of fire or which the evidence suggests may in the event have contributed directly or indirectly to the outbreak or development of the fire.

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It will also examine the responses of the TMO and RBKC to those complaints, both in correspondence and in their internal operations, and the degree of engagement of the residents by the TMO in relation to the refurbishment works.

In addition to residents' complaints, the Inquiry will consider the governance arrangements between RBKC and TMO, and in particular how they worked during the course of the refurbishment of the building.

The Inquiry will first hear evidence from residents whose evidence illustrates the nature and type of relevant complaints that were raised before the fire.

Their evidence will be followed by that of witnesses from the TMO and RBKC describing the systems, policies and procedures that had been implemented to deal with residents' complaints, their responses to those complaints and the management of the building in relation to fire safety.

The Inquiry will call senior representatives from the TMO and RBKC to give evidence about matters of governance and the working relationship between them.

2. Compliance with the Regulatory Reform Order 2005 and the requirement to carry out Fire Risk Assessments

The second topic will consider the obligations of the TMO and RBKC under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, and their compliance with those obligations.

The Inquiry will examine the adequacy of the TMO's management of fire safety and the effectiveness of its arrangements for carrying out fire risk assessments. One particular area of investigation will be the competence of Mr Carl Stokes, the fire risk assessor retained by the TMO, and the adequacy of his fire risk assessments (FRAs). The Inquiry will also examine the adequacy of his advice about the cladding and the TMO's consideration of that advice.

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The Inquiry will also investigate the acts and omissions of those responsible for implementing, supervising, monitoring and scrutinising the arrangements put in place by the TMO for obtaining and acting upon fire risk assessments.

Among those called to give evidence will be Carl Stokes and those officers of the London Fire Brigade (LFB) who were involved with fire safety matters concerning the tower.

3. Active and passive fire safety systems

The final topic of Module 3 will cover the history and maintenance of key active and passive fire safety systems within the tower and their compliance with legislative requirements and statutory guidance.

The following will be considered, in particular:

- Gas works at the tower, including work to replace one of the main risers;
- The smoke control system (including Building Control approval of that system);
- The TMO's maintenance regime;
- Fire doors (especially flat entrance doors); and
- Lifts.

Experts have been retained to assist the Inquiry's investigations into those matters.

Duration

Module 3 is scheduled to run from the end of March (opening statements) until summer 2021, when there will be closing oral statements on Modules 1 to 3.

Expert witnesses in Module 3

The Inquiry will hear from:

- Dr Barbara Lane, who has prepared an expert report entitled '*The Management and Maintenance of Grenfell Tower*' which focuses on matters relevant to the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 and the fire risk assessments conducted by Carl

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Stokes. Dr Lane is also preparing an expert report regarding the smoke control system in the tower

- Beryl Menzies, who is preparing an expert report regarding the smoke control system in the tower
- Colin Todd, who has prepared an expert report entitled '*The Fire Risk Assessments of Carl Stokes*'
- Roger Howkins, who has prepared an expert report entitled '*Concerning the lifts at Grenfell Tower*' regarding the lifts in Grenfell Tower
- Rodney Hancox, who has prepared an expert report entitled '*Gas engineering*' regarding the gas works in Grenfell Tower.

Expert witnesses will be called in the latter part of Module 3 and their reports will be published when they come to be examined.

In early May 2021 the Inquiry will hear evidence from Jonathan Sakula, who has prepared an expert report entitled '*Report of facade expert*' in which he considers the state of knowledge of those within the cladding industry about combustible materials during the period January 2012 to June 2017. His evidence is relevant to Module 1.

Key concepts for Module 3

A **Fire Risk Assessment** (referred to as an FRA) - is a systematic and structured assessment of the current level of fire risk affecting premises which also assesses the adequacy of existing fire precautions and the need for, and nature of, additional precautions.

Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (referred to as KCTMO or the TMO) is a company limited by guarantee, incorporated on 20 April 1995. The TMO was appointed by RBKC to manage its housing stock. It had responsibility for fire safety under the Regulatory Reform Order 2005.

A **Publicly Available Specification** (referred to as PAS) is a standardisation document produced by the British Standards Institute. It defines good practice for a product, service or process.

The **Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005** (referred to as either RRO or FSO) is a Statutory Instrument (secondary legislation) that consolidated several different pieces of legislation relating to fire safety. It applies to all non-domestic premises, which include the communal areas of residential buildings with multiple homes.

The RRO designates those in control of premises as responsible persons for the purposes of fire safety. They have a duty to undertake fire risk assessments and manage risks. The obligations of responsible persons under the RRO are to be enforced by Fire and Rescue Authorities. In the case of Grenfell Tower the authority charged with enforcement was the London Fire Brigade.

The RRO designates those in control of premises as **Responsible Persons** (sometimes referred to as RP) for the purposes of fire safety. Responsible Persons have a duty to ensure that a risk assessment is carried out to identify hazards and risks and to remove or reduce them as far as possible. In the case of Grenfell Tower the Responsible Person was the TMO.

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The **Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea** (RBKC) is an inner London Borough providing the majority of local government services. RBKC was the owner of Grenfell Tower.