

Module 5 - Firefighting

Factsheet

Phase 1 of the Inquiry covered what happened at Grenfell Tower on the night of 14 June 2017, and the immediate causes and effects of the fire on the night.

Phase 2 is the examination of the reasons why the fire happened, and is divided into [8 modules](#).

Module 5 will consider further issues relating to the adequacy of the firefighting response.

Many important elements of the assessment of the firefighting response were addressed in the Inquiry's Phase 1 investigations and report, including, for example, the question whether the "stay put" advice could and should have been withdrawn before 02.47am.

There are, however, a number of matters that require further investigation or that follow from the conclusion of the Phase 1 investigations.

The scope of **Module 5** will be to investigate the remaining matters concerning the London Fire Brigade's (LFB) response on 14 June 2017 that were not addressed in the Phase 1 report.

In addition, it will examine three other specific topics that arise out of the findings of the Phase 1 report, namely:

- section 7(2)(d) visits;
- training (including training for incident commanders generally, but particularly on evacuation); and
- alternative firefighting strategies in high-rise buildings.

Grenfell Tower Inquiry

The Inquiry will hear from further LFB witnesses in relation to the three topics identified above. As it has already heard from a large number of LFB witnesses in Phase 1, it will not hear any further evidence about the events of the night of 14 June 2017.

Duration

Module 5 is scheduled to run from September 20th 2021 to 21st October 2021.

Expert witnesses in Module 5

The Inquiry will hear from:

- Professor Chris Johnson, who has prepared an expert report entitled '*Assessment of the Design and Operation of Fireground Communications Systems available at Grenfell Tower on the Night of the Fire*' on communications
- Steve McGuirk, who has prepared an expert report entitled '*Report for the Grenfell Inquiry*' which relates to firefighting on the night of 14 June 2017
- Professor Jose Torero, who has prepared two expert reports. The first, entitled '*Phase 2 Grenfell Tower: London Fire Brigade and Complex Building Fires*', will provide his overview of the general issues arising in relation to firefighting on the night of the fire. The second, entitled '*Further Considerations on the Presumption of Technical Competency*', will draw together the strands of the Module 5 expert evidence.

The expert witnesses will be called in the latter part of Module 5 and their reports will be published when they come to be examined.

Key terms for Module 5

Fire Risk Assessment (referred to as FRA). A fire risk assessment is a systematic and structured assessment of the fire risk in a premises for the purpose of expressing the current level of fire risk, determining the adequacy of existing precautions and determining the need for, and nature of, additional fire precautions.

London Fire Commissioner. Since 1 April 2017 the London Fire Commissioner (the Commissioner) has been the fire and rescue authority for Greater London. Part 2 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 imposes certain obligations on the Commissioner as Greater London's fire and rescue authority. They include the promotion of fire safety (section 6(1)) and making provision for extinguishing fires and the protection of life and property in the event of fires within Greater London (section 7(1)).

Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (referred to either as the RRO or the FSO). The RRO is a Statutory Instrument (secondary legislation) that consolidated several different pieces of fire legislation. It applies to all non-domestic premises, as well as the communal areas of residential buildings with multiple homes.

Responsible Person (sometimes referred to as RP). The RRO designates the person in control of premises as the Responsible Person for fire safety. The Responsible Person has a duty to undertake fire risk assessments, manage the risks posed by fire and remove or reduce them as far as possible. The RRO is enforced by Fire and Rescue Authorities. In the case of Grenfell Tower it was enforced by the London Fire Brigade.

Section 7(2)(d) visits - section 7(2) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 requires the London Fire Commissioner to secure the provision of the personnel, services and equipment necessary efficiently to meet all normal requirements, to secure the provision of training for personnel, to make arrangements for dealing with calls for help and for summoning personnel, and to make arrangements for obtaining information needed for extinguishing fires and protecting life and property. This last obligation, imposed under section 7(2)(d), is of particular importance in relation to preparations for fighting fires in high-rise buildings.